THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW L.erioer-Moss Co. INTOXICATING LIQUORS The Law Relating to the Traffic in Intoxicating Liquors and Drunkenness BY W. W. \yOOLLEN (0£ the Indianapolis Bar) A.utkor or Indiana Trial Procedure, Etc. AND W. W. THORNTON (Of the Indianapolis Bar) A.utIior ol Oil and Gas, Girts and A.dvancement8, Etc. VOLUME 1 CINCINNATI THE W. H. ANDERSON COMPANY 1910 T Copyright THE W. H. ANDERSON COMPANY 1910 s- PREFACE The subject of Intoxicating Liquors, botli socially and legally, has greatly gained in importance in the last quarter of a century. Not since 1892 has the law relating to theui been systematically treated in a work devoted entirely to their consideration. Since then questions relating to the control of the liquor traffic have been repeatedly before the courts, and more cases have been reported since that time than had been reported previouslj' thereto in all English-speaking countries. It would seem that all questions that can possibly be raised concerning the traffic and control of intoxicating liquors have been presented to the courts for their considera- tion. It therefore seems that the time is ripe for a work covering the entire subject of Intoxicating Liquors. Not only does the present work treat of the Traffic in and Control of the Manufacture and Sale of Intoxicating Liquors, but it also treats of all questions to which they have any rela- tion, and in so doing it covers a broader field than has ever been undertaken heretofore in any legal work. Thus, the subject of Drunkenness is treated at length — its etfect upon Contracts, Wills, Divorce, as a defense for the Commis- sion of Crime, Negligence, Guardians for Drunkards, Life Insurance, and similar phases — as it has never before been treated in one work. The only subject omitted is that of the laws, rules and regulations of the United States for the taxation and licensing of intoxicating liquoi*s as a source of revenue. Copies of these rales and regulations are furnished gratuitously by the United States Treasury Department, are frequently changed by rulings of that department, and con- stitute a volume of several hundred pages. The two volumes of this work contain nearly 27,000 cita- tions. iV PREFACE. It has been the aim of th£ authors to cite all cases bearing upon the subject of iMoxieating Liq!u<»rs, and they have assiduously endeavored to* do this, and tkey belie-Ve .that very few cases, and none of real importance, feave eseapetJ them. No case, however, has been cited that has been reported since January 1, 1910, the date of goin^g to press. In their endeavors to make the' Work as complete as poseib^^ they have aimed to cite all eases re°p(Kted in Engfiand, Irelaifikl, Scotland, Quebec, Ontario, Briti^' Columbia, the British Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Mew BrunslVick, New-- t'oundland, Australia, New Zealand, asti in the British Pos- sessions of South Africa. In their exaraiiiation of the reports of these countries, and especially the Isst three, they have found many important questions discussed and decided. In an examination of the cases of Engl'a.tid the autltOfi* have been greatly aided by the last editioa' (19 Ed.) of Patterson's Licensing Acts of that country, a wofk noted fOr' its accuracy and comprehensiveness, and but little known in> this country. The authors have not hesitated, at times, to quote extensively from this most excellent work wlifire they thought the subject treated would be of value to the American practitioner. It is believed, because of the careful examination that has been made of the Canadian decisions, that this work will' be of value to the Canadian practitioner. In the citation of cases it has been the constant endeavor of the authors to give reference to the West Publishing Com-- pany's Reporters wherever a case has appeared in any of' tliem, and they have also endeavored to give duplicate refer-'- ounds 51 41. Camphor gum not an intoxicant 54 42. Cinnamon and lemon essence — Cologne 55 43. Common cordial a spirituous liquor — Godfrey's Cordial.... 56 44. Empire Tonic Bitters — Proprietary medicines 57 45. Home bitters — Medicines — Instructions — Evidence 58 46. Busby's Bitters — Judicial notice 59 47. Mead— Metheglin 60 48. Wilson's Rocky Mountiiin Herb Bitters 60 49. Intoxication — Drunkenness — Drunkard 61 50. Intemperate habit 64 51. Habitual drunkenness 84 52. Habitual drunkard 64 53. Habitual intemperance 66 54. Confirmed drunkard 68 55. Saloon defined — Limited to one room 68 56. Saloon keeper 70 57. Tippling hou>'0 71 58. Liquor shop 71 59. Tavern keeper 71 GO. Sample room 72 (Jl. Dramahop — Dramshop keeper 72 (i2. Bar defined ... 73 63. Barroom 73 64. Barroom fixtures 75 65. Barkeeper 75 66. Dram 76 67. Dealer 76 TABLE OP CONTENTS. VU SECTION. PAGE. 68. Wholesaler and retailer 76 69. Common seller 77 70. Rectifier 77 IBTICLE 11. — Judicial Notice. 71. Distiller 78 72. Judicial knowled<;;e — General rule 78 73. Spirituous, distilled or alcoholic liquors 79 74. Vinous liquors 82 75. Ale 82 76. Beer — Primary and secondary meaning 83 77. Mead or metheglin 85 78. Proof of quality of liquor 85 CHAPTER II. Constitutionality of Statutes. 79. Control of liquor traffic falls under police power 90 SO. Definition and extent of police power 92 81. Police power, continued — Legislative power 94 82. Police power not the power of eminent domain 96 83. State cannot surrender police power 97 84. Police power impairing the obligation of a contract 98 85. Police power limited by Federal Constitution 99 86. Blackstone's enumeration of police powers 100 87. Sumptuary argument insufficient to defeat liquor legislation. 101 8^8. No natural right to sell intoxicating liquors 102 89. Right to sell liqiiors at common law — Nuisance 103 90. Natural right not a judicial question 105 91. Motive for passage of law or ordinances 106 92. Prohibitory law, basis of constitutionality 107 93. Prohibiting manufacture of intoxicating liquors 110 94. Constitution prohibiting the granting of a license — Ohio Con- stitution 120 95. Eff"ect of adopting constitutional prohibitory measure on prior statute 121 96. Contracts prohibiting 122 97. Past contracts for sale of intoxicating liquors 123 98. Eff'ect of prohibition upon liquors on hand at time of its adoption 124 99. Keeping liquors 127 100. Corporate chiaters, change — Police power 12S 101. Prohibition in particular places and localities 129 Vlll TABLE OF CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 102. Confining liquor sales to certain districts 132 103. Agricultural fairs 133 104. Educational institutions 134 105. Religious assemblies 136 106. License, State may refuse 138 107. State may permit sales under a lic'fense — Biblical prohibition. 140 108. Fourteenth Amendment, effect of or power to rej^late sale of intoxicating liquors ^ . . . . ,^^, 147 109. Fourteenth Amendment — Keeping saloon...;' 151 110. Privileges and immunities of other States 152 111. "Import" defined — Statute in violation of Constitution 153 112. Discrimination against liquors of other States 155 113. Manufacture for shipment out of State 159 114. Xon-intoxicating liquors — Declaring liquors to be intoxicat- ing 1«2 115. Regulation of sales and saloons 163 116. Permitting persons to go into saloon at prohibited times. . . . 165 117. Delegation of power to license and regulate sales of liquors. . 166 118. Compelling towns to engage in liquor traffic 171 119. Monopoly of sale 172 120. Territorial power to enact liquor laws 173 121. State engaging in liquor traffic — Dispensary laws 174 122. Carolina dispensary and Wilson laws construed — Discrimina- tion 176 123. Ex post facto — Municipal legislation 179 124. No property right in license — Annulling a license 180 125. Revocation of license 185 126. Amount of license fees 186 127. Increasing amount of fee before license has expired 187 128. License for and sale by druggists 188 129. Limiting license to certain class of persons 188 130. Discrimination in granting license. . 190 131. Discretionary power to grant a license 194 132. Appeal to courts from granting, refusing or revoking license. 195 133. Taxes and fees 198 134. Fees must be uniform 201 135. Bell Punch law — Uniformity — Di.scrimination 203 136. Consent of voters to license— Validity of statutes requiring.. 204 137. Assent of neighbors may be required 206 138. Indiana statute — Remonstrance 206 139. Rales to minors, drunkards, insane persons and Indians 210 140. Limiting sales to certain purposes 211 141. Screens — Validity and enforcement of law requiring 211 142. Sunday laws — Municipal ordinance 214 143. Women as employes and visitors in saloons 217 TABLE OF CONTENTS. IX SECTION. PAGE. 1-14. Record of sules 210 145. Restitution of internal revenue — Licenses and receipts — Exposure of license 220 146. Minimum quantity that may be sold at one time 221 147. Owner of premises — Liability under statute 221 148. Civil damages 223 149. Requiring licensee to give bond 224 150. Inspection of liquors — Ingredients 224 151. "Bling Pig" or "Blind Tiger" law 225 152. Ex post facto law — Change of remedy 225 153. Local option — Its two phases 227 154. Local option not special legislation. . 227 155. Local option laws — Delegated power ., . . • 229 156. Local option laws — Constitutionality 234 157. Local option law, why not unconstitutional 235 158. Local option laws, why not unconstitutional — Continued. . . . 230 159. Local option, not in violation of Fourteenth Amendment. . . . 238 IfiO. Local option — Alabama Constitution — Notice of enactment of law 241 161. Local option law in Territories 242 162. Local option not destructive of property 242 163. Special legislation for village 243 104. Local option constitutional provisions 244 1G5. Local proliibitory laws, when con.stitutional 247 1G6. Special legislation 249 107. Proceedings in rem 251 108. Search and seizure of liquors illegally kept 253 1G9. Destruction, of intoxicating liquors 255 170. Nuisance — Abatement 256 171. Enjoining the maintenance of liquor establishments 258 172. Amount of penalty — Unusual punishment 259 173. Ex post facto law defined — Heavier subsequent punishment.. 260 174. British-North American Act 262 175. Closing saloons 263 176. Evidence, statute regulating 263 177. Jury trial, when it can be secured by appeal 269 178. Double punishment — State and municipalities 270 179. Double punishment — Conflict of jurisdiction 273 180. Imprisonment for debt 275 181. Support of penitentiary — Imitation liquor 276 182. Removal of officers for drunkenness 276 183. Drunkenness 277 184. Inebriate asylums 277 1S5. Misecllanenus decisions . . 278 186. When courts will not consider constitutional questiuu 271) 187. Title of statutes— Valid statutes 283 X TABLE OP CONTENTS. SKCTION. PAGE. 1S8. Title of statute — Invalid statute 291 189. Statute or ordinance only in part valid 293 190. Confctruction of statute 295 CHAPTER III. Interstate Commerce. 191. Statutes drawn in general terms, how construed 297 192. What constitutes interstate commerce 29s 193. Original packages 300 194. What constitutes original packages — Size of packages 307 195. Original packages — Illustrations 30S 196. Discrimination against citizens of other States 311 197. Right of consignee to sell imported liquors 313 198. Right of importer to sell in original packages 31fi U>9. "Wilson Law," origin and constitutionality 317 200. Wilson Law construed — "Arrival" defined 321 201. Liquors in transit — ^Vhen transit ceases 325 202. Wilson Law — Effect upon State laws 327 203. Importing liquors for private use 32K 204. Leaving liquor unreasonable length of time in carrier's possession 330 205. License — Tax — Regulating sale 330 206. Prohibiting solicitation of orders 333 207. Sales beyond State lines 336 208. Sales to minors and drunkards 336 209. Burden on defendant to show he is protected by the inter- state commerce law 33li 210. Liability of ofTleers sening warrant 337 211. Shipping liquor under false brand 337 212. Carrier refusing to accept liquors for transportation 337 CHAPTER IV. Regulating Liqi^ob Trafiic. 213. Extent of discussion In this chapter 340 214. Statutory requirements as to location of barroom 340 215. Arrangement of room 343 216. Screens and curtjiins 344 217. Removal of saloon 347 218. Keeping more than one bar — Barroom 347 219. More than one license 347 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XI SECTION. PAGE. 220. Beneficial interest in more than one license 347 221. Lamp burning until closing time 347 222. Keeping door locked 348 223. List of employes 348 224. Music in saloon «j48 225. Obstruction of oflicer's entrance on premises 349 226. Display of license 352 227. Signs 3o2 228. Sale in unmarked measure 352 229. Registration of sales 354 230. Sales on credit 355 231. Entering saloon in violation of orders not an offense 356 232. Permitting minors to "enter and remain" in a saloon 357 233. Minor willfully misstating his age 358 234. Permitting drunkennes on premises — Soiling to drunken man. 350 235. Found drunk on licensed premises 361 236. Power to exclude drunken man from premises 362 237. Permitting employe to drink storage liquoi-s — Premises oG'i 238. Women in saloons — Wine rooms 3G4 239. Prostitutes A'isiting premises 365 240. Permitting premises to be a brothel. 367 241. Knowingly harboring thief on premises 368 242. Gambling on premises 309 243. Suffering gambling or betting on premises — English statute. 378 244. Servant permitting gambling — Knowledge of gaming 375 245. Keeping a betting house 37t) 246. Public dispensary. . 381 247. Sales by public agents ; . . . . 382 248. Agent's liability on his bond 385 249. Transportation or conveyance of liqiiors 3S5 250. Limiting number of saloons 387 251. Saloon for negroes 388 252. Liquor sales carried on with other business 388 253. Criminal liability of owner and landlords 388 254 Police regulations, enforcement by mandamus 390 CHAPTER V. MUNICIPAT. ReGLXATION. 255. Creation of public corporations — Ordinances 393 256. Municipal power, how conferred and construed 395 257. Municipal control — Legislative power — Police power........ 397 2S8> Discretionary powers of municipal corporations ; 398 25d. Exclusive municipal power, effect 400 Xii TABLE OF CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 260. Powers delegated to and bj' municipal corporations 403 261. Municipal regulations beyond corporate limits 405 262. Keasonabhness of ordinance 408 203. Extent of power of municipality to grant licenses 410 264. Power to license — Use and grant 411 265. Power to require a license — Instances 413 266. Power to grant a license, what includes 417 267. Ordinances necessary to exaction of a license 419 268. Delegation by city of power to require a license 420 269. Number of licenses 420 270. Restricting saloons to specified parts of the city 421 271. License ordinance, when not invalid 425 272. Discriminating ordinance, when not unconstitutional 428 273. Exacting license, requirement when not discriminating 429 274. Bond of licensee 430 275. Municipal power to prohibit 430 276. Povver to prohibit includes power to license 434 277. Prohibitory ordinance, not in violation of common law rights. 435 278. Regulation and prohibition distinguished 436 279. Limitation on power of city to enact ordinance 437 280. Power to regulate sale of liquor — Valid ordinance 438 281. Power to regulate sale of liquors — Invalid ordinance 441 282. Amount of license fees or taxes 442 283. License fees, limitation 446 284. Right of different Jurisdictions to exact license 447 285. License, diflerent jurisdictions may require 449 286. United States license, effect 450 287. Keeping liquors for sale or saloon open 452 2S8. Ordinance, when not conflicting with statute — Keeping liquor for unlawful sale 453 289. Proliibiting owner to enter saloon on Sunday 454 290. Declaring sale of liquors a nuisance 455 291. Regulating da\s and hours 456 292. Sales on Sundays, election days or holidays 460 293. Sales nt prohibited hours 460 294. Picnic and social gatlierings 461 295. Physician's ])rescriptions 462 296. Rales to minors and drunkards 462 297. Prohibiting sales in State having local option laws 463 298. Women not licensing — Constitutional law 464 299. Women in saloons 464 .*iOO. Wine rooms 465 .301. Requiring a county license 466 302. Repeal of statute by implication, wlien not accomplished.... 466 303. Regulation of saloon room — Location of saloon 4G7 304. Lights burning in saloon 468 TABLE OP CONTENTS. XIU SECTIOJf. PAGE. 305. Screens— Exposure of room to viev 468 306. Proliibiting the carriage of liquors 469 307. Police visiting saloon 4C9 30S. Penalties essential — Heavier for subsequent oflense 469 309. Penalties, greater and additional — Infliction 469 310. Revocation of license — Conditional ordinance 471 31 1. Ordinance annulled by subsequent statute 473 312. Exceptions to prohibitory ordinances 473 313. Ordinance in part void 473 314. Ordinance in conflict with Constitution 474 315. City conducting a dispensary 475 316. Appointment of liquor agents 476 317. Duties and powers of liquor agents 470 CHAPTER VI. Licenses. 318. Definition , 478 319. A personal trust 480 320. Imposes no public duties — Purpose of license 481 321. Not a tax 481 322. License distinguished from a tax. . 483 323. Inherent and common law right to sell liquors without a license 485 324. License to sell not a vested right 487 325. License not property 488 326. Neither a contract nor property 489 327. Efl'ect of enactment of prohibition and a license law 491 328. Repeal of licensing laws after license issued 492 329. License by implication 492 330. Taken subject to subsequent legislation 494 331. Annulment of license by change of law 495 332. License prospective, not retrospective 497 333. Retroactive efTect of license 499 334. Impossibility to secure a license 501 .335. Neplect or improper refusal to grant a license 504 336. Performance of reqviisites to obtain a license not a license. . . 505 337. \\niat a license does and does not authorize 507 338. Agent or servant, when protected by license of his principal . . 510 339. Sale by servant when his master holds no license — illegal sales ol2 340. Servant's licen«p no protection for his master 515 341. Partnership license 516 342. Number of licenses an individual may or is required to hold. 520 343. City may require license in addition to a State license 521 Xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. ."44. City license not a defense to a State violation 622 345. United States licenne — State license 523 346. U. S. riovcrnmcnt license no defense to the State license 524 347. Duration of license 525 348. Expired license 526 349. "On"' and "oft" license 527 350. Void license — Collateral attack 528 CHAPTER VIT Pkksons Entitled to a License. 351. Eligibility 530 352. Married women — Female 536 353. Corporations 537 354. Joint and partnership licenses 538 355. Manufacturers 539 355a. Wholesalers 544 356. Hotel keeper — Innkeeper 544 357. Restaurant in capitol building 546 358. Holder of house 546 359. Boat license 547 360. Canteen — Street railway car i549 361. Who must have a license 549 362. Wholesalers 553 363. Native or domestic wines 555 CHAPTER VIII. Issuance of Licenses 364. Authority to grant 557 365. How licenFC law construed 569 366. The application, its form 560 367. Delegation of power to license 566 368. Oath of applicant 567 369. Notice of ai)plioation 567 370. Recommendation of applicant 573 371. Consent to granting of license 575 372. Consents where saloon has been abandoned or discontinued.. 579 373. Saloon near dwelling, consent of owners 581 374. What is a dwelling requiring consent of owners 583 375. Signers to consent on recommendation 584 ."76. Saloon nojir church — Distance, how measured 589 377 Saloon near schoolhousc 593 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XV SECTION. P.\GE. 378. Saloon near fair or factory 596 379. Saloon in resident part of city 596 .380. Moral qualification of applicant 598 381. Residence of applicant 600 3^2. Remonstrance 601 383. Signatures to remonstrance — Power of attorney to sign — Revocation 605 384. Who may remonstrate 607 385. Withdrawal of signatures from remonstrance 609 386. A majority remonstrance 611 387. Day for liearing application, appointing 615 388. Hearing application 617 389. Continuance of hearing — Adjourned meeting 619 390. Evidence at hearing 621 391. Licensing board acting ujwn its own information 625 392. Discretion of licensing board 627 393. Character of discretion 632 394. Discretion of municipalities in granting licenses 634 395. Review or control of discretion of licensing boards 635 396. Reasons for refusal 636 397. Unsuitable buildinos or place 640 398. Limiting number of saloons 643 399. Order granting or refusing the license 645 400. Mandamus to secure a license 647 401. Mandamus under the English Licensing Acts 653 402. Injunction to restrain issuance of license 658 403. Liability for refusing license 659 404. Appeal from order granting or refusing license 661 405. Writ of prohibition 667 406. From what orders an appeal may be taken 668 407. Persons entitled to appeal — Parties 668 408. Rights of licensee pending appeal 671 409. Sale pending appeal to Supreme Court 672 410. Certiorari 673 411. Renewal of license 677 412. Collateral attack upon a license — Qno warranto 682 413. Void license 684 414. Member of licensing board a prohibitionist — Interest 685 415. Criminal liability of licensing officer , 885 CHAPTER IX. The Form of the License. 416. The form 687 417. Conditions inserted in license 689 418. The place licensed 689 XVi TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER X. Transfer of License. section. page. 419. License to sell intoxicating liquors not transferable 693 420. Statute permitting transfer 695 42 L Assignment not a transfer 699 4L2. Death of licensee 699 423. Bankruptcy or insolvency — Receiver 701 424. Mortgage of license — Judicial sale 703 425. Transfer of license to other premises — Pennsylvania 705 426. Transfer under English statutes 706 427. Transfer under English and Colonial statutes — Cases 709 CHAPTER XL Revocation of License. 427a. State may authorize a revocation 713 428. Repeal of statute 715 429. Causes for revocation — Fraud in procuring license 716 430. License issued for a prohibition territory 717 431. Violation of the law 717 432. Violation of statute by licensee's agent or servant 721 433. Upon conviction of an offense against the liquor laws 721 434. Violation of tei ms of bond 723 435. Conducting place disorderly 723 436. House used as a brothel 724 437. Ordinance providing for a revocation 726 438. New York statute — False statements 727 439. False statements in application under New York statute.... 728 440. Erroneous statements as to place in application for a license. 732 441. License issued by mistake 732 442. The license to be revoked 733 443. Revocation after assignment for prior illegal acts 733 444. What board or court may revoke a license 733 445. Mandamus to compel a revocation 734 446. Who may commence proceedings 735 447. Who to be made defendant — Assignment of license 736 448. The petition for revocation 737 449. Joint proceedings to revoke several licenses 739 450. Notice of proceedings for revocation 740 451. The answer 742 452. Trial 743 453. Dismissal of proceeding.s — Expiration of license 746 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XVll SKCTIOX. PAGE. 454. Esfc()i)iK'l to revoke 740 455. Appeal — Certiorari 747 456. P-.Heet of revocation — Stay of proceedings 750 4'57. Costs 751 458. Rebate of fees 752 459. Liability of city for mistakenly revoking license 752 460. Action on bond when license forfeited 753 OHAPTER XII. Bond of Licensee. 46 L Power to require a bond 754 462. No statute requiring a bond 755 463. Statute unconstitutional — Local option 755 464. Giving bond a condition precedent to granting a license 75!> 465. Retroactive effect 757 466. Form 757 467. Who may be sureties thereon 761 468. Approval and filing 762 469. Void license 765 470. Cancellation nf bond 765 471. Breach of conditions of bond 760 472. Breach of conditions — Offenses as to minors 770 473. Liability of sureties 773 474. Transfer of license 776 475. Persons entitled to sue on bond 776 476. A civil action — Agent 778 477. Judgment of forfeiture on conviction, a prerequisite to suit 778 478. Effect of judgment against principal upon surety — Evidence. 779 479. Attacling validity of license and proceedings thei'efor 770 480. Pleading 780 481. Evidence 782 482. Amount of damages recoverable on bond 784 48". Compromise of liability 785 CHAPTER XIIL License Fees axd Taxes. 484. Definition of license fee 786 485. License fee — Police power — Restraint of trade 786 486. License fee, when not a tax — Police regulation 787 487. Uniformitv of taxation 790 XVlll TAbLE OF CONTENTS. srxTiox. PAGE. 488. Liability for fee or tax 793 489. Amount of fee or tax 795 490. Payable in money 798 491. Payment in advance 799 492. To what officer payable 800 493. Suit to collect 802 494. Tax lien — Landlord's property — Prosjiective statute 802 495. Disposition of fees and taxes collected 806 496. Refunding fees or taxes paid under void or illegal ordinance or statute 809 498. Refunding fees or taxes, continued — Xo statute requiring it.. 812 498. Refunding fees or taxes, continued — Cases allowing 814 499. Refunding fees or taxes, continued — PavTnent under mistake of fact 816 500. Rebate of fees or taxes under statute 817 CHAPTER XTV Dbuggist.s and Physicians. 501. Druggists' exemption from liability 821 502. No druggist or other person licensed 823 503. Statutes requiring druggists to have licenses 824 504. Sales by employe of druggist 826 505. Good faith in making sales 827 506. Druggists making unlawful sales. . , 829 507. Druggists' sales in prohibition States 830 508. Sales by druggists upon prescriptions 831 509. Prescriptions for Sunday and holiday sales 838 510. Kind of prescriptions 837 511. Registration and reports of sales 840 512. Sales by physicians 842 513. Physicians illegally giving a prescription 844 CHAPTER XV. Local Option. Abt. I. Adoption of Local Option. Art. II. Violation of Local Option Law. Art. I. Adoption of Local Option. 514. Distinctive feature of local option statutes 847 515. Sufficiency of petition for an election 849 TABLE OF CONTENTS. • XlX SECTION. PAGE. 516. Attorney in fact under Indiana statute 854 517. Separate petitions and remonstrances 856 518. Withdrawal from petition or remonstrance 85S 519. Qualitications of petitioners 860 520. Territory embraced in petition — Description of territory.... 862 521. Including "dry" territory in petition or order 864 522. To whom and the manner in which the petition must be presented — Filing 865 523. Notice of hearing 868 524. Order for election 868 525. Board of Supervisors in Michigan 876 526. Signing record 877 527. Appeal from order for election 878 528. Petition and order for re-submission 879 529. Time and place of holding an election 882 530. Notice of time and place of holding an election 884 531. Time of holding an election 891 532. Conduct of th« election 894 533. Qualifications of election olficers 896 534. Ballots 897 535. Who may vote 901 536. Canva.ss of ballots and return of result 902 537. Majority vote, what is — Wiien not defeated 904 538. Vote necessary to adopt local option 905 539. Declaration of the result of the election 907 540. The order of prohibition 911 541. Order for publication concerning prohibition order 914 542. Publishing notices of order and result of election 914 543. When local option takes effect 917 544. Contesting validity of election 919 545. Mandamus, when not a local option remedy 925 546. Prior laws, how affected by local option 927 547. Former laws, when not repealed 930 548. Changing boundary of district 932 549. Repeal of local option by vote 939 550. Local option ordinance, when not invalid 942 551. Eminent domain, power of not involved 942 552. Cost of election 943 553. Consent of local authorities 943 554. Juror's qualiiication in local option case 944 5.55. Local prohibitory or local option statutes 945 Article IT. Viot-ation of Local Option Law. 556. Sale of liquors 948 557. Shipping liquors into local option territory 940 XX TABLE OF CONTENTS. SF.CTIOX. PAGE. 558. Bringing liquors within local option territory 952 .•559. Soliciting orders in local option district 952 560. Sale under license . 954 5fil. Time for license expiring or lapsing 954 562. Transportation of intoxicating liquors 955 503. Under what statute prosecutions to be brought 957 564. Proof that local option was in force 958 CHAPTER XVI. What Liquobs Ake Prohibited. 565. Statutory provisions 960 566. Intoxicating liquors 961 567. Int^ixicating liciuors, continued 962 568. Spirituous .... 905 569. Ale and beer — Malt liquors 966 670. Wine — Vinous liquors 9G7 571. Cider . 9G7 672. Fruit preserved in intoxicating liquors 968 573. Drugs or medicines 969 574. Manufacture 972 575. Whether liquor is intoxicating a question for the jury 972 CHAPTEPt XVTI. Abatement and I^'Ju^"CTI03S■. 576. Statute necessary to secure an injunction 974 577. Grounds for ab.ntement 975 578. Statutory olFen^^e 97(j 579. t)ll<-nse which authorizes an abatement or granting of in- junction 977 580. Xo intention to violate tlie statute 980 581. Grounds for injunction 980 582. Temporary injunction 981 583. Process — Notice 982 584. Defenses 983 585. Parties plaintifi' 984 586. Parties defendant 986 587. Plen.ling — Comjdaint 98S 588. Plesuling — Answer 990 589. Evidence 991 5!?0. Trial 996 TABLE OP CONTENTS. XXI SECTION, PAGE. 591. Judgment , 997 592. Bond for continuance of use of premises 1000 593. Violation of injunction — Punishment 1000 594. Appeal — Review 1003 595. Costs— Attorney fees 1004- CHAPTER XVITI. Searches and SsjizimES. 59G. Constitutionality of searcU and seizure laws 1007 597. Federal and State jurisdictions, conflict 1011 598. Due process of \-\w, statute violating 1013 599 Seizure, power to make — Ministerial and judicial power, distinguished 1013 600. Nature of search and seizure proceedings 1015 601 Jurisdiction of inferior courts — Presumption 1017 602. Affidavit based ujxm belief 1018 603 What seizable — Justification 1020 604. Search and seizure laws of Elaine 1023 605. Municipal power 1024 606. Permit to sell, violation — Iowa statute 1023 607. Replevin of liquors after seizure 1026 608. Officers, seizure — When from, and liability 1029 609. Seizure of liquors in Indian country 1030 610. Statutes forbidding recovery of damages 1031 611. Complaint 1033 612. Complaint, statutory form sufficient 1034 613. Videlicet, use and limitations in co)nplaint 1035 614. Description of persons and liquors 1036 615. "Place" and "premises," — Meaning — Pleading 1037 616. Description of premises- -Rules of construction 1038 617. Common resort, place — x\verment 1040 618. Place, description — Pleading — Evidence — Variance 1041 619. Description of liquors, what sufficient 1042 620. Unlawful intent, averment 1044 G21. Affidavit to complaint, sufficiency 1045 622. Power to search without a warrant 1046 622a. Sufficiency of warrant 1047 623. Description in warrant of liquors and their ownership 1048 624. Description of place in warrant, sufficiency 1049 625. Place, designation of, wlien sufficient 1050 626. Adjoining properties, sudiciency of warrant to search 1052 (127. More than one building may be searched 1053 628. Complaint and warrant, when not conflicting 1054 XXll TABLE OF CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 629. Variations bfttweon warrant and complaint 1056 G30. Search warrants, when not served 1057 631. Warrant protects otficer 1060 632. False imprisonment — Evidence 1060 633. Eeturn of warrant, sufficiency 1061 634. Officers' return of warrant as evidence 1063 •635. Illegal keeping — Evidence, sufficiency 1063 636. Notice to claimants — Service and waiver 1066 637. Warehouseman and bailees, liquors in their possession 1069 638. Claims to property 1071 639. Onns probandi — Prima facie case — Evidence 1071 640. Forfeiture and fine, pleading and evidence 1073 641. Judgment— Eeview— Costs 1074 642. Disposition of property. 1076 643. Seizure and arn-st without warrant, vvhen justifiable 1076 644. Arrest without warrant, when not jiistified 1078 CHAPTEE XIX. Keeping Liquob for Unlawful Saik — Kef.ping Place foe Sale of Liquor. 646. Keeping liquor for unlawful sale 1080 647. Unlawfully keeping liquor for sale, continued 1082 648. Unlawfully keeping liquor for sale, continued 1085 649. Unlawfully keeping liquor for sale, continued 1088 650. Wife of defendant keeping liquors for sale 1090 651. Unlawful sale and unlawful keeping di.stinct ofi"enses 1091 652. Keeping liquors at place of business 1092 653. Keeping place for sale of liquors 1093 654. Keeping place for sale of liquors, continued 1097 655. Keeping liquor nuisance 1 100 656. Saloon at common law as a nuisance 1105 657. Nuisance under general statute on nuisance 1107 658. Keeping "blind tiger' 1108 059. Keeping disorderly house 1108 660. Carrying on the liquor business 1111 661. A common seller of liquors 1114 662. Exposing liquor for sale 1116 603. Keeping tippling house — Definition 11 17 CHAPTER XX. Keeping PRi';Mists Closed — Sales to Travelers. 664. Keeping open defined 1118 665. Keeping opon and selling distinguished 1120 TABLE OP CONTENTS. XXlll SECTION. PAGE. 666. Legal holidays defined 1121 667. Keeping saloon open at prohibited times 1122 668. Keeping open at prohibited times, continued 1125 669. Keeping open at prohibited times, continued 1131 670. Selling or exposing liquor for sale or opening premises dur- ing closing hours — English cases 1135 671. Closing premises 1141 672. Constable demanding visitor's address 1142 673. Stranger found on the premises 1143 674. Permitting persons to enter saloon 1 146 675. Liability of servant keeping saloon open 1148 676. Sales to travelers at prohibited times in England 1148 677. Sales to travelers at prohibited times in English colonies.. 1152 678. Sales at railway stations in England at prohibited times. . . . 1154 679. What time statute adopts 1 155 CHAPTER XXI. Sales and Oifts. 680. Illegal sale a .statutory offense 115S 681. Sale by child 1158 682. Licensee under no obligation to sell liquor 1150 683. Sales or gifts without a license 1159 684. Definition of .sales — Examples 1161 685. Executory contract of sale 1164 686. Sale wlicrc statute ^oes not forbid a barter or exchange. . . . 11G4 687. Barter or exchange 1 166 688. E.xchange of liquors — Loan 1167 689. "Otherwise dispose of" liquors 1168 690. Furnishing intoxicating liquors 1169 691. Sale of saloon business 1169 692. Sale by corporation 1170 693. Sale on credit 1171 694. Burden on defendant to show he was not the salesman 1172 095. Gifts 1173 696. A gift of liquor as an act of hospitality or in kindness 1174 697. Treating guests at a social gathering 1176 698. Sale neither a gift nor a barter 1176 699. Delivery 1178 700. 0\\Tiership of liquors 1180 701. Purchase by request of unlicensed dealer 1181 702. Sale by restaurant or hotel keeper 1182 703. Purposes for which liquor was obtained 1183 704. Motive in making sale 1183 XXIV TABLE OF CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 705. Mistake in selling intoxicating liquor — Intent 1184 706. Purchase of liquor by one person for another 1186 707. Purchase with view to prosecute seller 1187 708. In what quantities sales prohibited 1189 709. Sale at wholesale 1191 710. Sales by distillers or brewers 1194 711. Devices to avoid»charge of illegal sales — Examples 1196 712. What facts show a sale 1199 713. What facts show a sale, continued , 1202 714. What facts sho^v a sale, continued 1206 715. What evidence shows a ?,a\e. . 1210 716. What facts do not show a sale 1211 717. What facts do not show a sale, continued 1213 718. What facts do rot show a sale, continued 1216 719. Aiding and abetting a sale 1218 7?0. Purchaser not liable to prosecution 1220 721. Serving police officer on duty 1221 CHAPTER XXTl. Sales and Gifts to Minors, Dkunkaeds, Sieves, Indians and Natives. Art. I. To Minors. Art. II. To Slaves. Art. III. To Drunkards. Art. IV. To Indians and Natives Article I. — To Minors 722. Sales and gifts to minors proliibited 1222 723. Minor need not drink the liquor 1226 724. Aiding in procuring liquor 1227 725. Minor acting as purchaser or messenger for adult 1227 726. Adult acting as agent for minor 1229 727. Treating a minor 1230 728. Permitting liquor to be given to a minor 1231 729. Sale or gift with consent of parent or guardian 1231 730. Furnishing liquor io minor 1234 731. Knowledge that purchaser is a minor when essential to com- mission of offense 1235 732. Vendor's ignorance of purchaser's minoritj' no defense 1237 733. Vendor's ignorance of purchaser's minority a defense 1238 734. Sales in sealed and corked bottles or vessels 1243 735. Sales to students 1244 TABLE OP CONTENTS. XXV SECTION. PAGE. Abticle II.— To Slaves. 736. Sales or gifts to slaves 1245 Articie ITI.~To Dbunkabds. 737. Sales to intoxicated persons 1247 738. Who is an intoxe U^d person I249 739. No knowledge puichuser is intoxicated 1251 740. Civil liability l^gg 741. Sales or gifts to habitual drunkards or intemperate persons. 1252 742. Who is an habitual drunkard or intemperate person 1253 743. Knowledge purcliaser is an habitual drunkard or intemperate P«""n 1255 744. Sale to drunkard after notice not to sell him 1256 Sales to idiots and insane persons I257 Sale to convict 1253 745 746. Articie IV. — To Indians and Natives. 747. Introducing liquor into the Indian country 1258 748. What is not an introduction of liquor into Indian country. . 1260 749. Sales to Indians logj 760. State legislation 1964 761. Sale to natives under British Government 1264 CHAPITER XXIII. Sales at Prohibited Places. 752. Sales out of territory for which license is issued 1266 753. License for premises , 1267 754. Sales ofl" premises 12(J7 756. Sales off premises — English cases 1271 756. Selling in premises which have been enlarged 1276 757. Sales near church or schoolhouse 1277 758. Within prohibited dist^mce of another saloon 1279 759. Sale of liquors to be sent by common carriers 1279 760. Place of order taken deemed place of sale 1282 761. Place order taken made place of sale 1283 762. Sale by agent subject to approval by principal 1284 763. Seller taking order without but delivering liquor within prohibited district 1284 XXvi TABLE OF CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 764. Seller retaining title until purchaser actually reecives the liquor 1287 765. Seller taking order in but delivering liquor without pro- hibited territory 1287 766. Soliciting or taking orders by agent 1288 767. Liquors shipped into prohibition territory without order taken 1288 768. Sale of liquors to be drunk on premises — American decisions 1289 769. Sale of liquor to be consumed on premises — English decisions 1294 770. Sale of liquors to be drunk "about" the premises 1296 771. Refreshment saloon or restaurant 1296 772. Sale at hotel 1297 773. Sale at military canteen 1298 774. Sales at theaters 1298 775. Sales at dwelling house 1299 776. Sales on boat 1299 777. Sales of native wine in barroom 1300 778. Sales a.i public place 1300 CHAPTER XXIV. Sales and Gifts at Prohibited Times. 779. Public policy 1302 780. Sunday, election and holiday violations 1303 781. Sales or gifts on Sundays 1305 782. Facts sufficient to show a sale on Sunday 1308 783. Sunday sales or gifts— Guests 1309 784. Sales at hotels and restaurants 1312 785. Trafficking in liquors on Sunday 1313 786. Sales on prohibited hours 1314 787. Supplying liquors to private friends and lodges after clos- ing hours 1316 788. Sales on holidays 1318 789. Election days 1319 790. Under what statvite prosecution for sales at prohibited times brought 1322 CHAPTER XXV Club Sales. 791. Incorporated clubs —Cases iiolding unist have licenses 1324 792. Incorporated (iub.s — Cases holding need not have licenses — Transactions not sales 1325 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXVll SECTION. PAGE. 793. Club in existence when licensing act adopted 1331 794. Statute expressly applying to club 1332 7P5. Club required to have a license — Dramshop defined 1333 796. Club's liability for occupation tax 1338 797. Club sales in prohibition territory 1339 798. Schemes to evade the statute — Bona fides of incorporation.. 1339 799. Quasi club sales 1342 800. Sales to non-members 1344 801. Steward or servant of club liable 1345 CHAPTER XXVI. Master's Liahii.ity Fou Acts of Servant. 802. Agent directed to make sales that are unlawful 1348 803. Agent's authority 1351 804. Agent in charge of premises — Barkeeper 1353 805. Evidence must sliow authority to bind master— Sales by bartender 1350 806. Statute making master liable for illegal sale by his servant. 1357 807. Sale bv bartender to minor, intoxicated person or habitual drunkard 1359 808. Sale out of hours at prohibited times 1360 809. Evidence suflicient to show illegal sale was authorized 1361 810. Keeping saloon open 1362 811. Neglect of servant to keep records 1363 812. Permitting persons on premises 1363 813. Sales by partners 1364 814. Sale by member of defendant's family 1366 815. Sales by wife of husband's liquor.* 1367 816. Husband's liability for sale of wife's liquors 1368 817. Liability of wife 1369 818. Joint liability of husband and wife 1371 S19. Liability of agent for sales — Who is unprotected by a license 1371 820. Lial)ility of agent for ants in violation of law 1374 821. Joint or several liability of principal and agent 1S70 822. Sale by agents in local option territory 1378 823. Soliciting in interdicted territory 1379 824. Agent for purchaser participating in illegal sale 1379 XXVlll TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXVIi. Adui.tebation — Inspection. Art. I. State Decisions. Abt. II. PuBE Food and Drugs Act. Article I. — State Decisions, section. page. 825. Constitutionality of statute foihidding adulteration — In- spection 1382 826. 01T<>nse of selling adulterated liquors 1383 827. Inspection 1384 828. Filing affidavit and giving bond liquors are pure 1385 Article II. — Pure Food and Drugs Act. 829. United States Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 1386 S30. What drugs and foods covered by Act — Statute 1386 831. "Drug" and "Food" defined 1387 SS2. Adulteration and misbranding — Statute 1388 833. Adulteration of drugs defined — Statute 1389 834. Adulteration of confectionery defined — Statute 1390 S35. Adulteration of food defined — Statute 1390 836. Requisites of brand — Approval 1392 837. Name and address of manufacturer 1393 838. Mixtures or compounds with distinctive names 1394 839. Substances named in drugs or foods 1395 840. Statement of weight or measure 1397 841. Labeling wine 1398 842. Labeling whisky 1399 843. Misbranded drugs defined 1402 844. Misbranded food defined — Adulteration 1410 845. Misbr-inding 1411 846. Guaranteed goods 1414 847. Exports and imports of foods and drugs 1416 848. Original unbroken packages 1423 CHAPTER XXVIIL Indictment. 849. Certainty 850. Following ti o terms of the statute. 1441 1443 TABLE OP CONTENTS. Xxix SKCnON. PAGE. 851. Duplicity I444 852. Allegations in the disjunctive 1450 853. Joinder of counts I45I 854. Verification and source of information 1454 855. Surplusage I455 856. Referring to the statute 145g 857. Character, occupation or condition of accused 1457 858. Intent of vendor ^459 859. Knowledge — Notice j jgQ 860. Adoption and violation of local option laws 1462 861. Violation of local option laws 14gg 862. Violation of local option laws — Texas I47I 863. Violation of local statute I474 864. Unlawful nature of act , j^yg 865. Violation of nuinicipal ordinance I477 866. Place as element of the ofl'ense I478 867. Time as an element of an oJTense I483 868. Alleging a continuendo 24gg 869. Purpose or object of sale j48t 870. Description, kind and properties of liquors I49O 871. Setting out name of liquors— Averments as to properties. . . 1495 872. Charging quantity of liquor sold, when necessary 1497 873. Charging sale of "less than" a specified quantity 1498 874. Charging sale of a '-drink" or "one glass" 1500 875. When quantity sold need not be alleged 1500 876. Price paid for liquor j^qj 877. Designating purchaser necessary , I5O2 878. Designating purchaser not necessary I5O4 S79. How purchaser described — Name unknown 1508 880. Negativing defenses and exceptions I5O9 881. Negativing authority to sell 151.2 882. Negativing special authority I514 883. Negativing licenses 1515 884. Sufficiency of negation of license I517 885. Negation of legal purpose or circumstances 1520 886. Sufficiency of negation of particular licenses or licenses for particular purposes 1522 .'887, Negations as to physicians and druggists 1523 888. Negative averments as to kind of liquor or package 1527 889. Manufacturing liquor I527 890. Transportation of liquor I527 891. Keeping liquor for illegal sale 1529 892. Carrying on liquor business — Common seller 1532 8f'3. Scre<'n3 maintaining — Obstructing view I535 894. Sale without first giving bond I537 895. Keeping open at prohibited times 1538 XXX TABLE OF CONTENTS SKCnOX. PACE. 896. Keeping place for unlawful sale of liquors — Tippling house. 1541 897. Maintaining liquor nuisance 1545 898. Description of house or place constituting the nuisance as illegally kept 1550 899. Time of maintaining nuisance lo5Q 900. Sale of liquor to be drunk on premises 1552 901. Location of saloon in residence part of city 1553 902. Sales in general 1553 903. Devices or evasions to conceal sale 1559 904. Sale or gift to minor 1560 905. Sale or gift to minor without permit 1562 906. Sale to drunkard or intoxicated person 1564 907. Sale to drunkard after notice given 1564 908. Sale or gift on Sunday 1566 909. Sale or gift on election day 1568 910. Sale or gift within prohibited area 1570 911. Second oflense 1571 912. Physicians" prescription 1573 913. Music in saloon . 1573 914. Emploj'ing women in saloon 1573 915. Sale of liquors from iinstamped cask 1574 916. Failure to exhibit license or tax receipt 1574 917. Gambling in saloon 1573 918. Miscellaneous 1576 CHAPTER XXIX. EVIDENCK. 919. Competency of witness 1578 920. Spies and informers 1579 921. Admissions and declarations of accused 1581 922. "Confessions of accused — Accused intoxicated 1583 923. Prima facie evidence — Power of Legislature to declare 1584 924. Burden of proof in general 1586 925. Presumption 1590 926. Connecting accused with unlawful acts shown 1593 927. Incriminating or exculpatory circumstances 1594 928. Effort to avoid detection 1596 929. Sales 1597 930. Evidence to show sale — Incriminating evidence 1601 931. Other sales— Other crimes 1608 932. Refusal to so'.l +o others incompetent evidence 1614 933. Sale by or to agi'nt or servant — Sale l»y wife 1614 934. Sale or gift— Variance 1621 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXX L SECTION, PAGE. 935. Proof who was purchaser — Variance 1^23 936. Sales to two or more persons 1Q04 937. Joint liability ,po- J oio 938. Sale to "person un'known" 162'tj 939. Sale to minor , „27 940. Sale to intoxicated person 2t!*5() 941. Sale to habikial dr-unkird lyo, 942. Sundiay sales , g2„ 943. Sale of liquors to be drunk on premises Ig34 944. Club sales ,od- lo3o 945. Quantity of liquor sold igoa 946. Proof of license jgoy 947. Sale unauthorized! — License \Q42 948. Special authority to make the sale 1^45 949. Documentary evidence 224^ 950. Time of violation of statute ' 1649 951. Proof of time in a continuing offense I655 952. Ownership and possession of liquors I655 953. Keeping for unlawful sale 1658 954. Carrying on business of liquor selling 1665 955. Common seller Igg? 956. Exposing liquors Iggg 957. Keeping place for unlawful sale of liquors— Nuisance 1669 958. Liquor nuisance igyc 959. Local option — Proof of adoption I679 960. Local option law— Evidence to show violation 1688 961. Intoxicating quality of liquors — Proof 1694 962. Chemical analysis of liquors— Kxpert testimony 1706 963. Proof as to kind of liquor I^Iq 964. Place of otfense 1714 965. Persons jointly indicted 1^ j5 966. Prior conviction or acquittal I7I6 9G7. Second offense j-^a 968. Permitting females in saloon— Keeping a wine room 1724 969. Illegal transportation of liquors I7.75 970. "C. 0. D."— Express agent's liability 1726 971. Keeping saloon open l^.,y 972. United States license, probative effect as evidence 1728 972a. Proof of intoxication — Opinion of witness I733 973. Miscellaneous j-„^ CHA*»TER XXX. Trial and Judgment. 1738 974. Jurisdiction ....... 975. Statute of limitations 1739 XXXll TABLE OF CONTENTS. SKCTION. PAGE. 976. Repeal of statute 1740 977. Form of proceedings 1741 978. Preliminary proceedings 1742 979. Who may institute proceeding* 1743 980. Defendant's plea 1744 981. Election between offenses 1744 982. Jury trial 1747 983. Juror's competency 1749 984. Juror's qualifications in criminal prosecutions 1749 985. Question for the jurj' 1751 986. Qualifications of judge 1755 987. Verdict 1755 988. Sentence and punishment 1759 989. Excessive punishment 1762 9P0. Separate sentences — Separate counts 1764 991. Joint defendants 1765 992. Second offense — Excessive penalty 1765 993. Informer — When entitled to part of penalty 1766 994. Double liability 1767 995. Lien of tine and costs on premises used 1767 CHAPTER XXXI. Rights in and Contracts Conceening Intoxicating Liquobs. 996. At common law 1771 9S7. Property in intoxicating liquors 1771 998. Attachment of liquors — When not maintainable 1772 999. Larceny of intoxicating liquors 1773 1000. Mortgage or pledge of intoxicating liquors 1774 1001. Mortgage of license to sell liquors 1775 1002. Statutes forbidding recovery of possession or value of liquors 1776 1003. Wrongful conversion of intoxicating liquors 1776 1004. Insurance of liquors 1777 1005. Sales without license — Liquors illegally sold 1779 1006. Divisible and entire contract 1781 1007. Payment? upon amounts partly illegal 1783 1008. Contracts violating policy of liquor laws 1783 1009. Repudiation of executory contract 1785 1010. Validity of contract determined by law of place 1785 1011. Place of sale in determining its legality 1788 1012. Sale of liquors to be illegally resold 1789 1013. Sales to unlicensed dealers 1791 1014. Sale to insane person 1793 TABLE OF CONTENTS, XXXlll SECTION. PAGE. 1015. Sale of liquor to be shipped into prohibition State 1793 1016. Soliciting orders forbidden . 1798 1017. Recovery on foreign sales forbidden by statutes 1800 1018. Sale to house of prostitution 1800 1019. Recovering back money paid on illegal sales 1801 1020. Burden to show illegality of sale 1805 1021. Bills and notes 1806 1022. Contract in restraint of trade — Pleasure of damages 1808 1023. Covenants in deed not to use premises for sale of intoxi- cating liquors 1808 1024. Avoiding leases 1810 1025. Covenant not to build public house on land 1812 1026. Covenant to take all beer from landlord 1815 1027. Miscellaneous covenants as to public houses and servants. . 1819 1028. Contracts of sale of licensed premises 1830 PART II. DRUNKENNESS. CHAPTER XXXII. Civil Damages. I. Right of Action. II. Grounds of Action. III. Defenses. IV. Persons Entitled to Sue. V. Persons Liable. VI. Actions. VII. Evidence. VIII. Damages. IX. Trial and Review. Article I. — Right of Action. 1029. Remedy under common law 1S37 1030. Remedy under statute 1839 1031. Constitutionality of statute 1840 XXXIV TABLE OF CONTENTS. Article II. — Grounds of Actiox. SECTION. PAGE. 1032. Construction of statute 1843 1032a. Right of action in general 1844 1033. Illegality of sale 1847 1034. Sale contrary to notice 1850 1035. Injuries to person — Mental suflering 1853 1036. Injuries to property 185(5 1037. Injuries to means of support 1859 1038. Proximate cause of injury 1863 1039. Injuries produced bj" an intoxicated person 1863 1040. Injuries produced by reason of intoxication of any person. . 1866 1041. Sales causing death of purchaser 1869 1042. Commission of crimes by intoxicated person 1875 1043. Injury to person and property by reason of crime of drunken person 1875 1044. Injury to means of support by reason of punishment of drunken person 1879 Article III. — Defenses. 1045. In general 1881 1046. License or authority 1885 1047. Contributory act or negligence 1886 1046. Release or discharge 1891 Article IV. — Persons Entitled to Sue. 1049. In general 1892 1050. Husbands 1895 1051. Wives— Death of Husband— Divorce 1896 1052. Parents 1898 1053. Children 1904 1054. Postliumous cliild 1906 Article V. — Persons Liable. 1055. In general — Sales by s-ervants 1907 1056. Joint tortfeasors 1912 1057. Sureties on dealer's bonds 1920 1058. Owners or lessors of premises 1924 Article VI. — Actions. lO.'O. Time to sue — Statute of limitations 1931 1060. Parties 1932 1061. Pleadings 1936 1062. Issues — Proof — Variance 1942 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXXV .^RTlCLt; VII. — EVIDEKCK. SECTION. PACK. 1062a. Presumption and burden of proof 194i) 1062b. Admissibility in general 1950 1062c. Sale or particijiation therein by defendant 1955 1063. Nature and extent of injury 1962 1064. Character and habits of plaintifl" 19G9 1065. Charactor and habits of intoxicated person — Mortality tables 1970 106<3. Pecuniary condition;-; of persons or parties 1973 1067. Weight and sutlitiency of evidence 1974 1068. Nature and properties of liquors. ... 1975 Artici.k VIII. — Damages. 1069. General Rule — Cost of medical services 1977 1070. Injury to means of support 1978 1071. Mental suJlering 1982 1072. Exemplary damages 1983 1073. Excessive damages 1992 1074. Mitigation of damages 1994 Article IX. — Trial and Review. 1075. Questions for jury 1998 1076. Who made the sales 1999 1077. Proximate cause of the injury 1999 1078. Plaintifi' contributing to the injury 2001 1079. Plaintifi's injury to property or support 2002 1080. Instructions in general 2003, 1081. Instructions invading province of jury 2004 1082. Hypothetical instructions 2005 1083. Instructions on exemplary damages 2005 1084. Intoxication cause of injury 2006 10S5. Instructions on measure of damages 2006 1086. What constitutes intoxication 2007 1087. Injuiy to property 2007 1088. Unlawful sales 2008 1C89. Judgment against principal, when binding on surety 2008 1090. Lien of judgment on premises used 2010 1091. Costs . . . , 2014 XXXVl TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXXIII. Guardians and Asylums fob Drunkards. SECTION. page. 1(02. Constitutionality of statutes for the appointment of guar- dians for drunkards 2015 1093. The inquisition 2017 1094. Revocation of guardianship 201S 1095. Sale of ward's property by his guardian 2020 1096. Contracts—Statute of limitations — Suits 2020 1097. Inebriate asylums 2021 CHAPTER XXXIV. Drunkenness as a Crime. 1098. Drunk in a public place 2024 1099. Drunkenness at a private residence 2020 1100. Permitting drunkenness on licensed premises 2027 1101. Found drunk on licensed premises 2030 1102. Being a common drunkard 2030 1103. Drunkenness in office 2031 1104. What intoxication by statute is made criminal 2031 1105. Arrest for drunkenness 2032 1106. Arrest without warrant for liquor offenses 2035 1107. Miscellaneous 2036 CHAPTER XXXV. Drunkenness as a Defesse in CRiiriNAX Prosecutions. IIOR. Voluntary intoxication no excuse for the commission of crime — Reasons for rule 2045 IK'9. Voluntary drunkenness as an excuse — Continued 2045 1 1 10. Involuntary intoxication 2046 1111. Evidence of physical incapacity 2048 1112. Aggravating crime 2048 1113. Assault and battery 2049 1114. Drunkenness producing permanent disability or insanity — Delirium tremens 2049 1115. Wliat degree of insanity is a defense 2054 1110. Dipsomania — Oenomania 2058 1117. Instructions to jury — Cases of delirium tremens 2058 1118. Provocation 2059 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXXVll SKCTION. PAGE. 1119. Intoxication reducing the grade of homicide — Evidence.... 2060 1120. Intoxication reducing tl)e grade of lioniicide — Malice — Pre- meditation 2064 1121. Extent of intoxication to reduce the degree of the offense. . 206d 1122. Incapacity to deliberate, reducing homicide below second degree 2072 1123. Specific intent — Assault with intent 2073 1124. Assault with intent to commit rape 2075 1125. Conspiracy to commit murder 2076 1126. Attempt to commit suicide 2077 1127. Burglary 2077 1128. Forgery 2078 1129. Larceny and robbery 2078 1130. Self-defense 2080 1131. Willful drvmkenness — Previously formed intent 2081 1132. Burden to show the incapacity to form a criminal intent. . 2081 1133. Instructions concerning the reduction of the degree of the offense . 2083 1 134. Drunken insane person 208G 1135. Voluntary use of drugs 2086 1136. Texas statute 2087 1137. Miscellaneous 2091 CHAPTER XXXVI. Contracts of a Drunken Man. 1138. Mere drunkenness as a ground for a rescission of a con- tract 2092 1139. Voluntary intoxication 2097 1140. Intoxication produced by the other party 2099 1141. Taking advantage of intoxicated party 2101 1142. Fraud of other party 2103 ,J43. Habitual drunkards 2104 1144. Habitual drunkenness 2105 1145. Knowledge of drunken condition of party 2106 1146. Inadequacy of consideration — Unfair conti-act 2107 1147. Wluxt kind of contracts may be avoided 2108 1148. Implied contracts 2109 1149. Intoxication of maker of note 2110 1150. Marriage 2113 1151. Family settlements . 2115 1152. Replevin bail or bail bond 2115 1153. Contract void or voidable _ . . . . 2116' 1154. Rfltihcation . - - - - 2117 XXXViii TABLE OF CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 1155. Inquisition — Prior contracts — Finding a.^ evidence 2118 1156. Time of drunkenness 2121 1157. Burden to show drunkenness 2122 1158. Rescinding contract and restoring consideration 2123 1159. Who may show intoxication of party 2127 1160. Obtaining relief 2128 CHAPTER XXXVII. VVrLLS. 1161. Present intoxication 2132 1162. Habits of intoxication — Habitual drunkard 2135 1163. Drunkenness as evidence of incapacity 2137 1104. Drunkenness in connection with conduct and condition — Sufficiency of evidence 2139 1165. Drunkenness in connection with the nature of the act 2142 1166. Drunkenness in connection with undue influence 2145 1167. Point of time under investigation 2147 1168. Presumption — Burden of proof 2149 1169. Inquisition of drunkenness 2150 1170. Ratification of a previously executed will 2151 1171. Gift 2152 CHAPTER XXXVITI. Divorce. 1172. Drunkenness as a ground for divorce 2153 1173. Degree of drunkenness necessary to autliorize the granting of a divorce 2155 1174. Pleadings 2159 1175. Wasting his estate 2160 1176. Proof 2160 1177. Defenses 2161 1178. Custody of eJ;ildren 2163 1179. Drunkenness as cruelty 2164 1180. Drunkenness connected witli cruelty 21G5 1181. Drunkenness as evidence of cruelty 21fi7 1182. Drunkenness as oiTecting desertion 2167 1183. Judicial separation — English statute 2167 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXXIX CHAPTER XXXIX. Negligence. section. page. 1184. Intoxicated person may recover when negligently injured.. 2170 1185. Contributory negligence of a drunken man 2172 1186. Contrilmtory negligence of a drunkard — \Vlien rule does not apply -1"5 11S7. What is contributory negligence in a drunken man 2176 1188. Concurring negligence of both parties 2178 1189. Trespassing drunken man 2180 1190. Drunken person on railroad crossing 2185 1191. Defective highway 2186 1192. Drunken physician or surgeon 2187 1 193. Miscellaneous instances 2188 1194. Sale of poison to drunken man 2189 1195. Drunken man liable for injuries he indicts 2189 1196. Burden of proof — Presuniption 2190 1197. Intoxication only evidence of contributory negligence — Ques- tion for jury 2191 1198. Weight of evidence and its sufficiency 2195 ] 199. Question for jury 2197 1200. Master's liability to his servant for drunken servant's negligence 2198 1201. Proof of notice of servant's drunken habits 2200 1202. Drunken passengers 2201 1203. Expelling drunken passengers 2205 1204. Passenger forfeiting right to carriage by boisterous con- duct 2208 1205. Carrier leaving dnudven passenger in dangerous place.... 2208 1206. Greater care due to a drunken man in a dangerous place. . 2213 1207. Assaults by drunken passengers upon other passengers.... 2215 1208. Notice of intoxication of passenger 2217 CHAPTEH XL. Life Insurance. 1209. No representation made by insured concerning his use of intoxicating liquors 2219 1210. Statements in application not made part of policy issued thereon 2220 1211. Statements amounting to warranties concerning drinking liabiis ' 1212. Statements that applicant is "temperate" or of "temperate habits" 2222 Xl TABLE OF CONTENTS. SECTION. PAGE. 1213. Death resulting from intemperate habits 222S 1214. Promises concerning f iture habits 2229 1215. Statutes limiting legal effect of statements 2231 1216. Express clause? concerning use of intoxicating liquors 2232 1217. Cancellation of policy 2232 1218. Various clauses concerning intoxicating liquors 223'1 1219. Delirium tremens 2236 1220. Death or injury while under tlie influence of intoxicating liquors 2237 1221. Connection with liquor traffic 2240 1222. Condition against engaging in liquor traffic 2240 1223. Waiver by insurer 2241 1224. Physician of insurer to determine cause of death 2243 1225. Province of jury and court 2243 1226. Burden to show intoxication 2244 1227. Evidence to show intemperate habits 2244 CHAPTER XLI. Miscellaneous. 1228. Jurors in a criminal case using intoxicating liquors 2246 1229. Jurors in civil cases using intoxicating liquors 2252 1230. Treating jurors 2255 1231. Prohibitionist as a juror 2256 1232. Jury on trial of a liquor nuisance 2257 1233. Drunken counsel at trial 2257 1234. Defendant in criminal prosecution drunk 2257 1235. Intoxicated witness 2258 1236. Presumption a person is sober 2200 1237. Pardon 2260 1238. Drunken officer 2261 1239. Drunken pupil — Suspending from school 2262 1240. Drunken seaman 2262 1241. Bankruptcy 2262 1242. Sland<>r 2263 1243. Trade niark 2263 1244. C. 0. D. interstate shipments — U. S. statute 2263 1245. Labeling packages of liquor shipped into another State — U. S. statute 2264 1246. Agent of common carrier delivering liquor to person not consignee — U. S. statute 2265 Appendix A 2267-2275 Appendix B 2277, 2278 Index 2279 TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Aaron v. State (34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 103; 29 S. W. 267), 876, 931, 933. Abel V. State (90 Ala. 631; 8 So. 760), 513, 1372. Abbot V. Inman (35 Ind. App. 262; 72 N. E. 284), 937. Abbott V. Pike (33 Me. 204), 1039. Abbott V. Inman (35 Ind. App. 262; 72 N. E. 284), 614. Abbott V. Sartori (57 Iowa, 656; 11 N. W. 626), 354, 841. Abbott V. State (42 Tex. Cr. App. 8; 57 S. W. 97), 1687. Abel V. State (90 Ala. 631; — So. 760), 1112. Aberdeen v. Sanderson (8 S. & M. 663), 807. Ableman v. Booth (21 How. [U. S.] 506), 1012. Abrams, Ex parte ( [Tex.] 120 S. W. 883), 279, 291, 387, 634. Abrams v. Sandholm (119 Iowa, 583; 93 N. W. 563), 989. Abrams v. State ([Ala.] 46 So. 464), 1609, 1612. Acker v. Acker (22 App. D. C. 353), 2158. Acken v. Tinglehoff ([Neb.] 119 N. W. 456), 1845, 1882, 1973. Acme Brewing Co. v. Fletcher ( 109 Ga. 463; 34 S. E. 558), 333, 551. Acree v. Commonwealth ( 13 Bush, 353), 519, 1365, 1366. Adair v. Commonwealth ( [Kj'.] 56 S. W. 530), 554, 1755. Adair v. Commonwealth { [Ky.] 89 S. W. 1132; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 659), 1195. Adamek In re (82 Neb. 448; 118 N. W. 109), 622, 637, 644,663. Adams v. Albany ( 29 Ga. 56 ) , 394. Adams v. Allen (99 Me. 249; 59 Atl. 62), 1047, 1048. Adams v. Couillard (102 Mass. 467), 790, 1771, 1795, 1796, 1798, 1799. Adams v. Cox (80 Miss. 561; 32 So. 117), 785 Adams t. Cronin (29 Colo. 488; 69 Pac. 590), 219. Adams v. Gormley (69 Ga. 743), 627. Adams V. Hackett (27 N. H. 289; 59 Am. Dec. 376), 492, 495. Adams v. Kelley ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 44 S. W. 529), 881, 927. Adams v. Kelley (17 Tex. Civ. App. 479; 45 S. W. 859), 234 246, 954. Adams v. Hickett (27 N. H. 289 59 Am. Dec. 376), 183, 186. Adams v. Johnson (72 Miss. 896 17 S. E. 682), 1839. Adams v. McGlinchy (66 Me. 474), 1047. Adams v. Miller (81 Miss. 613; 33 So. 489), 774, 783. Adams v. Ryerson (4 Halst. Eq. [N. J.] 814; 1 Stockt. Eq. [N. J.] 816), 2094, 2104, 2107, 2108. Adams v. Ryerson (6 N. J. Eq. 328), 2102. xli xlii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Adams V. State ([Ark.] 41 S. W. 423), 1479. Adams v. State (25 Ohio St. 584), 1G32. Adams v. Stephens (88 Ky. 443; 11 S. W. 427), 473. Adams Exp. Co. v. Commonwealth (124 Ky. 100; 92 S. W. 932; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 224; 92 S. W. 935; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 230, 231; 92 S. W. 036; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 231), 298. 299. Adams Express Co. v. Common- wealth (124 Ky. 160; 92 S. W. 932, 935, 936; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 224, 230, 231), 307, 955. Adams Express Co. v. Common- wealth ([Ky.] 96 S. W. 593; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 904), 325, 1280. Adams Express Co. v. Common- wealth ( [Ky.] 103 S. W. 353; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 811 to 813), 320, 1558, 1G89, 1726. Adams Express Co. v. Common- wealth ( [Ky.] 103 S. W. 721 ; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 813), 1218. Adams Express Co. v. Common- wealth ([Ky.] 112 S. W. 577; 33 Ky. L. Rep. 967), 956, 1529. Adams Exp. Co. v. Iowa ( 196 U. S. 147; 25 Sup. Ct. 185; 49 L. Ed. 424 [reversing 95 N. W. 1129]), 307,324,320. Adams Exp. Co. v. Commonwealth (206 U. S. 129; 51 L. Ed. 987; 27 Sup. Ct. 006 [revers- ing 87 S. W. 1111; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1096]; 206 U. S. 138; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 608; 51 L. Ed. 992 [reversing 92 S. W. 932; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 224; 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 030] 200 U. S. 139; 51 L. 1x1. 993; 27 Sup. Ct. 609 [reversing 97 S. W. 807; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 207, and 103 S. W. 353; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 811 to 813]), 307. Adams Express Co. v. Common- wealth (206 U. S. 129; 27 Sup. Ct. 600; 51 L. Ed. 987 [reversing 87 S. W. 1111 ; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1096] ; 206 U. S. 138 ; 27 Sup. Ct. 608 ; 51 L. Ed. 992 [reversing (Ky.); 92 S. W. 932; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 224; 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 630]), 324, 326. Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky (206 U. S. 129; 27 Sup. Ct. 606; 51 L. Ed. 897; reversing [Ky.] 96 S. W. 1104; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 947), 1289. Adams Exp. Co. v. Commonwealth (200 U. S. 129; 27 Sup. Ct. 606; 51 L. Ed. 897 [Ky.] 103 S. W. 353; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 811, 813; reversing [Ky.] 87 S. W. 1111; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1096), 1726. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky (206 U. S. 129; 27 Sup. Ct. 600), 955. Adams Exp. Co. v. Commonwealtli (206 U. S. 138; 27 Sup. Ct. 008; 51 L. Ed. 992; reversing [Ky.] 92 S. W. 932; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 224; 5 L. R. A. [N. S.] 030), 1720. Adams Express Co. v. Common- wealth (214 U. S. 218; 29 Sup. Ct. 033), 330. Addis V. Campbell (4 Beav. 401), 2099. Addy V. Blake ( 19 Q. B. Div. 478 ; "Sl J. P. 599; 50 L. T. 711; 35 W. R. 719), 353. Aden v. Cruse (21 111. App. 391), 1909. Adkins v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 524; 95 S. W. 506), 1340. Adler v. State (55 Ala. 16), 28, 38. S3. 367, 966, 1233, 1240. 1030, 1755. Adler v. Whitbeck (44 Ohio St. 5.39; 9 N. E. 672), 121, 147, 199, 200, 202, 262, 479, 788, 790. TABLE OP CASES. xliii [References are to pages.] Advance, In re (59 N. Y. App. Div. 440; 69 N. Y. Supp. 314), 578. A. E. Hollcy Sl Co. v. Simmons (['J ex, Cr. App.] 85 S. W. 325), 1238, Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Davej^ (123 U. S. 739; 8 Sup. Ct. 331), 2234, 2235, 2243. Aetna Life Ins. Co v. Deming (123 Ind. 384; 24 N. E. 80, 375), 2235,2237. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hanna (81 Tex. 487; 17 S. W. 35), 2241, 2243. • Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Ward (140 U. S. 76; 11 Sup. Ct. 720), 2234, 2243. Agee V. State (25 Ala. 07). 1514. Ahlers v. Estlierville ([Iowa] 104 N. W. 453), 813, 816. Aiken v. Blaisdell (41 Vt. 655), 1791. 1797. Aiken v. Harbers (0 Rich. L. 90), 774. Aiken v. State (14 Tex. App. 142), 850, 854, 883, 1760. Ailstock V. Page (77 Va. 386), 628, 636, 400, 671. Aimo V. People (122 111. App. 398), 1320, 1540. Aitkin, Ex parte ( 1 S. E. N. S. W. 214; 18 W. N. Cas. X. S. W. 279), 670, 1170. Aken v. TinglehofT ([Neb.] 119 N. W. 456), 1968. Akerman v. Lima (7 Ohio N. P. 92; 8 Ohio S. & C. P. Doc. 430), 473. Akerman v. Lima (8 Ohio S. «t C. P. Dec. 430), 1478. Alabama Lumber Co. v. Cross (1.^2 Ala. 562; 44 So. 563), 2253. Albany Brewing Co. v. Barckley (42 N. Y. App. Div. 335; 59 N. Y. Supp. 65), 699, 703. Albertson v. Wallace (81 N. C. 479), 794. Albia V. O'Hara (64 Iowa, 297; 20 N. W. 444), 1278, 1715. Albion V. BoMt (145 ivlich. 285; 108 N, W. 703; 13 Detroit Leg. N. 430), 419. Albrecht v. People (78 111. 510), 1175, 1248, 1252. Albrecht v. State (8 Tex, App. 215; 34 Am. Rep. 737), 198, 199, 202, 203, 291, 790. Albrecht v. State (62 Miss. 516), 779. Albrecht v. Walker (73 111. 69), 1847, 1854, 1989, 1990. Albright v. Commonwealth (7 Ky. L Rep. [abstract] 762), 945. Allchorn v. Hopkins (69 J. P. 355), 1355. Alcock V. Royal, etc., Corp. (13 Q. B. 292; 18 L. J. Q. B. [N. S.] 121; 13 Jur. 445), 2191. Alder v. State (55 Ala. 16), 27. Alderson v. State ([Tex. Civ. App.] Ill S. W. 412), 1066. Alderson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] Ill S. W. 738), 1609. Aldrich v. Aldrich (49 Mass. [8 Met] 106), 1058. Aldrich v. Harvey (50 Vt, 162), 1894, Aldrich v. Purnell (147 Mass. 409; 10 N. E. 170), 1891. Aldrich v. Sager (9 Hun, 537), 1844, 1894. Alexander v. Atlanta ([Ga.] 64 S. E. 1105), 4.52. Alexander V. Humber (86 Ky. 565; 6 S. W. 453), 2191, 2192. Alexander v. O'Donnell ( 12 Kan. 608), 1780. Alexander v. State (77 Ark. 294; 91 S. W. 181), 527, 750, 752, 799, 1161. Alexander v. State (48 Ind. 394), 1509, Alexander v. State (42 Miss. 316), 400. Alexander v. State (29 Tex. 495), 1442, 1554. Alexander v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 60 S. W. 763), 1171, 1217, xliv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Alexander v. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 506; 102 S. W. 1122), 1448, 1557. Alexander v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 504; 111 S. W. 145), 922. Alexander v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 553; 110 S. W. 918), 1723. Alexander v. State ( [Tex.] 120 S. W. 998), 1463. Alford V. Hicks ([Ala.] 38 So. 752), 241. Alford V. State (37 Tex. Cr. Rep. 386; 35 S. \V. 657), 1464, 1474. Alger V. Lowell (3 Allen, 406), 2171, 2175, 2177, 2186, 2187, 2191. Alger V. Seaver (138 Mass. 331), 391. Alger V. Weston ( 14 Johns. [N. Y.] 231), 694. Allen V. Allen (31 Mo. 479), 2167. Allen V. Armstrong (16 la. 508), 508, 1585. Allen V. Carew (14 K Y. L. R. 569), 682. Allen V. Commonwealth ( 10 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 272), 109*6, 1117. Allen V. Commonwealth ( 10 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 280), 95*7, 1545. Allen V. Drew (44 Vt. 174), 791. Allen V. Houck ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 92 S. W. 993), 755, 757, 763, 765, 770. Allen V. Lamb ( 57 J. P. 377 ) , 1368. Allen V. Staples (6 Gray, 491), 253, 1008, 1021, 1027, 1029, 1046. 1048, 1049. Allen V. State (52 Ind. 486), 210. Allen V. State (14 Tex. 633), 1158, 1224, 1246. Allen V. State (17 Tex. App. 637 11888]), 2247. Allen V. State ([Tex.] 13 S. W. 998), 15.35, 1557, 1758, 1759. Allen V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 59 S. W. 264), 959, 118.5, 1683. Allen V. State ([Tex. -Cr. App.) 98 S. W. 869 ) , 958. Allen V. State (5 Wis. 329), 1488, 1500. Allen V. TinglehoflF ([Neb.] 119 N". W. 495), 1955. Allentown v. Saoger (20 Pa. St. 421), 811. Allison V. State (47 Ind. 140), 1631. Allman v. State (69 Ind. 387), 1489. Allode V. Nylin (139 111. App. 527), 408. Allor V. W'ayne Co. Auditors (43 Mich. 73; 4 N. W. 492), 1015. Allport V. Nutt (1 C. B. 975; 14 L. J. C. P. 272), 374. Allred v. State (89 Ala. 112; 8 So. 56), 12, 15, 24. 27, 28, 38, 39, 49, 59, 86, 1532, 1753. Allyn's Appeal (81 Conn. 534; 71 Atl. 794; 68 Cent. L. Jr. 449), 104, 105, 142, 480, 484, 486. Allsman v. Oklahoma City ([Okl.] 95 Pac. 468), 812. Altenburg v. Commonwealth (126 Pa. St. 602; 17 Atl. 799), 210, 1121, 1175, 1248, 1252. Altoona v. Stehle (21 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 395; 8 Pa. Dist. Rep. 25), 413. Alvon V. Pawtucket ([R. I.] 16 Atl. 1047), 593. Amador County v. Isaacs (11 Pac. 758), 170," 187, 800. Amador County v. Kennedy ( 70 Cal. 458: 'll Pac. 757)', 170, 187, 428, 800. Ambrose v. .State (6 Ind. 351), 216, 271, 448. American v. Kail (34 Hun [N. Y.] 126), 1353, 1616. American, etc., Bank v. Gueder ( 50 111. 336 : 37 N. E. 227 ) , 264. American Brewing Co., Appeal of (161 Pa. 378; 29 Atl. 22). 589, 628, 629, 632. TABLE OP CASES. xlv [Referencws are to pages.] American Express Co. v. Common- wealth ([Ky.] 97 S. W. 807; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 207 ) , 1288. American Exp. Co. v. Common- wealth (206 U. S. 139; 27 Sup. Ct. 609; 51 L. Ed. 993; reversing [Ky.] 97 S. W. 807 ; 30 Ky. 207), 326, 955, 1229, 1726. American Express Co. v. Mullins (212 U. S. 311; 29 Sup. Ct. 381; 53 L.Ed.), 326, 338. American Exp. Co. v. Schier (55 111. 140), 1727. American Exp. Co. v. State ( 190 U. S. 133; 25 Sup. Ct. 182; 49 L. Ed. 417; reversing 118 Iowa, 447; 92 S. W. 66), 298, 307, 324, 326. American Fire Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank (73 ]\Iiss. 469; 18 So. 931), 1779, 2220, 2226. American Fur Co. v. United States (2 Pet. 358), 210, 1030, 1073, 1259. Amerker v. Taylor (81 S. C. 163; 62 S. E. 7), 938. Amery v. Royal (117 Ind. 299; 20 N. E. 150), 1018. Amesbury Insurance Co. (6 Gray [Mass.], 596), 294. Amio V. People (122 111. App. 398), 1320, 1540. Amite City v. Clements (24 La. Ann. 27), 802. Ammon v. Chicago (26 111. App. 641), 414. Andery v. Smith (35 Ind. App. 94; 73 N. E. 840), 606. Amperse v. Kalamazoo (59 Mich. 78; 26 N. W. 222), 537, 763, 764, 765. Amperse v. Winslow (75 Mich. 234; 42 N. W. 123), 763. Anderson, Ex parte (51 Tex. Cr. App. 239; 102 S. W. 727), 897, 898, 900. Anderson, In re ( 14 Manitoba, 535), 938. Anderson v. Brewster (44 Ohio St. 576; 9 N. E. 683), 121, 138, 147, 199, 200, 222, 479, 484, 792, 804. Anderson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (87 Wis. 195; 58 N. W. 79; 23 L. R. A. 203), 2180, 2184, 2185. Anderson v. Commonwealth (9 Bush, 569), 11, 553. Anderson v. Commonwealth ( 13 Bush [Ky.], 485), 110, 228, 232, 234, 240. Anderson v. Commonwealth ( 105 Va. 533; 54 S. E. 305), 757. Anderson v. Galesburg (118 111. App. 525), 714, 718, 741, 813, 817. Anderson v. Kerns, etc., Co. ( 14 Ind. 199), 789. Anderson v. People (63 111. 53), 1487, 1554. Anderson v. State (82 Ark. 405; 101 S. W. 1152), 951. 1287. Anderson v. State (32 Fla. 242; 13 So. 435), 1111, 1379, 1615, 1666. Anderson v. State (39 Ind. 553), 1352, 1357, 1302. Anderson v. State (22 Ohio St. 305), 1350, 1354. Anderson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 37 S. W. 859), 1730. Anderson v. State (39 Tex. Cr. App. 34; 44 S. W. 824), 869. Anderson v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 195; 92 S. W. 39), 863. Anderson v. Van Buren Circuit Judge (130 Mich. 695; 90 N. W. 692 ; 9 Detroit Leg. N. 222), 832, 1467, 1542, 1544. Anderson v. Weber (39 Ind. App. 443; 79 N. E. 1055), 612, 668. Anderson v. Wellington ([Kan. Sup.] 19 P. 719), 461. Andler v. Whitbeck (44 Ohio St. 539), 484. Andreas v. Beaumont ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 113 S. W. 614), 158, 165, 279, 424, 429, 597. xlvi TABLE OF CASES. [rieferences are to pages.] Andress v. Weller (2 Green Eq. [N. J.] 004), 2137, 2147, 2149. Andreveno v. Mut., etc., Ass'n ( 19 Ins. L. Jr. 6G8), 2233, 2242. Andrews, Ex parte (18 Cal. 079), 215. Andrews v. Denton ([1897] 2 Q. B. 37; €0 L. J. Q. B. 520; 76 L. T. 423; 45 \Y. B. 500; 61 J. P. 326), 711. Andrews v. Fry (104 Mass. 234), 1779. Andrews v. Frye (109 Mass. 234), 1806. Andrews v. Russell (7 Blackf. llnd.] 474), 200. Androscoggin R. Co. v. Richards (41 Me. 233), 1029, 1058. Angel V. Keith (24 Vt. 371), 1027. AngerhofTer v. State ( 15 Tex. App. 613), 448. 1307. Anglea v. Commonwealth ( 10 Gratt. G96), 1767. Angelin v. State ([Miss.] 50 So. 492), 1179, 1206, 1214, 1267. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Co. v. Fullcrton (83 Iowa, 760; 50 N. VV. 56), 1028. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Co. v. Hammond (93 Iowa. 520; 61 N. VV. 1052), 1031, 1033. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Mason (44 Minn. 318; 46 N. VV. 558; 9 L. R. A. 506), 1801. Anna, The (47 Fed. 525), 2195. Annapolis v. State (30 Md. 112), 929. Anniston, Ex parte (90 Ala. 516; 7 So. 779), 431, 432. Anonymous ([1695] 3 Salk.* 25), 104. Anonymous (17 Abb. N. C. 231), 2164. Anthers, In re (58 L. ,T. M. C. 62; 22 Q. B. Div. 345; 60 L. T. 454 ; 37 W. R. 320 ; 16 Cox C. C. 588; 53 J. P. 116), 722, 1572. Anthoness v. Anderson (14 Vict. L. R. 127; 9 Austr. L. T. 175), 701. Anthony v. Krey (70 Mich. 629; 38 N. VV. 603), 778, 1921, 1941. Anthony v. State (41 Tex. Cr. App. 393; 55 S. W. 61), 1321. Applegate v. Wlnebrenner (67 Iowa, 235; 25 N. W. 148), 1960, 1908. Appling V. McWilliams (69 Ga. 840), 798, 799. Appling V. State ([Ark.] 114 S. VV. 927), 1608, 1659, 1731, 1733. Arberger v. Marrin ( 102 Mass. 70), 1787. Arbintrode v. State (67 Ind. 267; b3 Am. Rep. 86), 1498, 1500, Arbuckle Bros. v. Blackburn (113 Fed. 616), 1438. Arbuthnot v. State ([Tex. Civ. App.] 120 S. VV. 478), 52. Archer v. State (45 Mr. 33), 114, 1198, 1010, 1611, 1614, 1754. Archer v. State ( 10 Tex. App. 482), 1619. Archibold's Crim. Prac. & Plead. (8th i^M.). p. 361, 1509. Areola v. Williamson (233 111. 250; 84 N. E. 264), 260, 433, 463. Ardery v. State (35 Ind. App. 94; 73 N. E. 840), 605, 617. Arey v. Rowan Co. (138 N. C. 500; 51 S. E. 41), 797. Arfield v. Tate (7 Ired. L. 259), 1801. Arie v. Dixon ([Iowa] 123 N. W. 173), 1774. Arie v. State (1 Okla. Cr. 666; 100 Pac. 233), 121, 183. Arizona Prince Copper Co. v. Cop- per Queen Mining Co. (7 Pac. 718), 2253, 2555. Arkadclphia v. Lumber Co. (56 Ark. 370), 426. Arkell, In, re (38 Up. Can. 594), 453, 468, 1258. TABLE OP CASES. xlvii [References are to pages.] Arkenau, Appeal of (73 N. E. 1122; 18 N. Y. 527), 745. Armour, In re ([1907] 14 App. Ont. L. R. 606), 921. Armour v. Meridian ( [Miss.] 24 So. 533), 965. Armstrong, Ex parte (30 X. B. 423), 1218. Armstrong v. State (14 Ind. App. 566; 43 N. E 142), 1147. Armstrong v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 47 S. VV. 981), 958, 1181, 1182, 1186, 1187, 1684, 1690, 1696. Arm.strong v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 47 S. W. 1006), 909, 1182, 1683, 1723. Armstrong v. Taylor (11 Wheat. 271; 6 L. Ed. 472), 1777. Armstrong v. Toler (11 Wheat. 258; 6 L. Ed. 468), 1800. Army and Navy Club v. District of Columbia (8 App. Cas. [D. C] 544), 75, 1325, 1333. Arnett v. Wright (18 Okla. 337; 89 Pac. 1116), 694, 703. Arnold, In re 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 93), 718, 745, 899. Arnold v. Barkalow (72 Iowa, 183; 34 N. W. 807), 1846, 1912, 1917, 1943, 2011. Arnold v. Hickman (Munf. [Va.] 15), 2095. Arnold v. Radford ([1901] 17 T. L. R. 301), 1817. Arnold v. State (38 Tex. Cr. App. 1; 40 S. W. 734), 1607, 1636. Arnold v. State (46 Tex. Cr. App. 110; 79 S. W. 547), 1209. Arnold v. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 556; 85 S. W. 18), 1623. Arrington v. Commonwealth (87 Va. 96; 12 S. E. 224; 10 L. R. A. 242), 1121, 1314, 1322, 1478, 1483, 1554, 1557, 1720, 1721. Arroyo v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 69 S. W. 503), 229, 230, 398. Arthur v. Flanders (76 Mass. [10 Gray] 107), 1020. Arszman, In re (40 Ind. App. 218; 218; 81 N. E. 680), 594, 663. Ash V. People (11 Mich. 347), 200, 788. Ashembauch v. Carry ( [Pa.] 73 Atl. 436), 183, 481, 701. Asher v. Texas (128 U. S. 129; 9 Sup. Ct. 1), 157. Asherst v. State (79 Ala. 276), 131, 247, 938. Askew V. State ([Ala.] 46 So. 751), 1258. Askew V. State (4 Ga. App. 446; 61 S. E. 737), 1241, 1706. Askwith, In re (3 Can. Cr. Cas. 78), 1322, 1579. Ashley v. State (92 Ind. 559), 1508. Ashley v. State (46 Tex. Cr. App. 471; 80 S. \\. 1015), 1210. Ashton V. Ellsworth (48 111. 299), 419. Ashurst V. State (79 Ala. 276), 596. Aston V. State ([Tex. Civ. App.] 49 S. W. 385), 80, 1682. A.storia v. Wells (68 Kan. 787; 75 Pac. 1026), 470. Aszman v. State (123 Ind. 347; 24 N. E. 123; 8 L. R. A. 33), 2040, 2044, 2045, 2061, 2066, 2067, 2072, 2073, 2084. Atchinson v. Bartholow (4 Kan. 124), 394. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Hardy (94 Fed. 294; 37 C. C. A. 359), 2185. Atchison R. Co. v. Weber (33 Kan. 554; 6 Pac. 877; 52 Am. Rep. 543), 2202, 2203, 2212, 2215. Athens v. Atlanta ( [Ga. App.] 64 S. E. 71), 452. Atkins V. Randolph (31 Vt. 226), 476. Atkins V. State (60 Ala. 45), 1461, 1032, 1646. Atkins V. State ( [Tenn.] 105 S. W. 353; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1031), 2038, 2068, 2069, 2070. xlviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Atkins V. Town of Randolph (31 Vt. 226), 172. Atkinson v. People (46 Tex. Cr. App. 229; 7'J S. W. 31), 1232. Atkinson v. Sellers (5 C. B. [N. S.] 442; 28 L. J. M. C. 12; 23 J. P. 71), 1149. Atkinson v. State (33 Ind. App. 8; 70 N. E. 560), 1147, 1539, 1540. Attorney General v. Bailey ( 1 Welsh H. & G. 281), 23, 29, 53. Attorney General v. Ball (66 J. P. 553), 762. Attorney General v. Huebner (91 Mich. 436; 51 N. W. 1072), 763. Attorney General v. Justices (5 Ired. 315), 626, 628, 629, 686. Attorney General v. Manitoba Li- cense Holders' Ass'n ([1902] App. Cas. 73), 263. Attorney General v. Van Buren Circuit Court (143 Mich. 366; 106 N. W. 1113; 12 Detroit Leg. N. 1016), 853, 868, 869, 870, 877, 883. Atwell V. Lucas (3 K S. W. L. R. 193), 1154. Auburn v. Mayer (58 Neb. 161; 78 N. W. 462), 752. Auburn Excise Commissioners v. Merchant (34 Hun, 19; af- firmed, 103 N. Y. 143; 8 N. E. 484), 1178, 1598. Auberbach, In re (31 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 46 ; 64 N. Y. Supp. 603 ) , 729, 750, 751. AugerhofF v. State (15 Tex. App. 613), 395. Auglanier v. Governor ( 1 Tex. 653), 802. August Busch & Co. v. Webb ( 122 Fed. 655), 110, 120, 230, 233, 249, 281, 295. Aulanier v. Governor (1 Tex. 653), 788. Aultfather v. State (4 Ohio St. 467), 1241, 1461, 1551. Aurora v. Hillman (90 HI. 61), 1735, 2171, 2191, 2193, 2195 Austin V. Atlantic City (48 X. J. L. 118; 3 Atl. 65), 586, 676. Austin V. Davis (7 Ont. Rep. 478), 1352, 1354, 1362, 1907. Austin V. Murray (33 Mass. [16 Pick.] 121), 436. Austin V. State (22 Ind. App. 221; 53 N. E. 481), 1175. Austin V. State (10 Mo. 591), 110, 151, 311, 521, 627, 1459. Austin V. Tennessee (179 U. S. 343; 45 L. Ed. 224; 21 Sup. Ct. 132), 310, 1337, 1432, 1434. Austin V. Viraqua (67 Wis. 314; 30 N. W. 515), 812. Avardo v. Dance (26 J. P. 437), 375. Aj'res V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 26 S. W. 396), 2074. Ayrey v. Hill (2 Add. Eccl. Rep. 206), 2133, 2136, 2148, 2150. Azbill V. Azbill (14 Ky. L. Rep. 105), 2160. Babb V. Taylor (2 Pa. Super. Ct. 38; 30 W. N. C. 440), 534. Bach V. Smith (2 Wash. Ty. 145; 3 Pac. 831), 1780. Bachellor v. State (10 Tex. 260), 369. Baches v. Dant (55 Ind. 181), 1870. Backhaus v. People (87 111. App. 173), 799, 1184. Backman v. Charlestown (42 N. H. 125), 384. Backman v. Mussey (31 Vt. 547), 1787. Backman v. Phillipsburg (68 N. J. L. 552; 53 Atl. 620), 576, 586, 587, 676. Backman v. Wright (27 Vt. 187), 1790, 1798. TABLE OF CASES. xlix [References are to pages.] Backus V. People (87 111. App. 173), 419. Bacon v. Hunt (72 Vt. 98; 47 Atl. 394), 1787, 1788. Bacon v. Jacobs (63 Hun, 51; 17 N. Y. Supp. 323), 1864, 1877. Bacon v. New tng. Order of Prot. (123 Fed. 152), 2226, 2227. Backus V. County Supervisors (99 Mich. 221; 58 N. W. 62), 877. Badgett v. State (157 Ala. 20; 48 So. 54), 492, 559. Baecher v. State (19 Ind. App. 100; 49 N. E. 42), 296, 1849, 1869. Baehner v. State (25 Ind. App. 597; 58 N. E. 741), 1187, 1579. Baer v. Commonwealth ( 10 Bush, 8), 1238, 1458, 1764. Baer v. Commonwealth (13 Ky. Law Rep. [abstiract] 396), 1305, 1568. Baeumel v. State (26 Fla. 71; 7 So. 371), 82S. Bagby v. Commonwealth (4 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 537), 826, 1096, 1117. Bagby v. State (82 Ga. 786; 9 S. E. 721), 1280, 1285. Bage V. State (50 Ark. 20; 6 S. W. 15), 137. Bageard v. Consolidated Tr. Co. (64 X. J. U 316; 45 Atl. 620; 49 L. R. A. 424; 81 Am. St. 498), 2204, 2173, 2174. Bagley v. Mason (69 Vt. 179; 37 Atl. 287), 1736, 2049. Bagley v. Peddie (5 Sandf. [N. Y.] 192), 1808. Bagley v. State (103 Ga. 388; 29 S. E. 123), 249. Bailey, In re (64 Kan. 887; 68 Pac. 53), 416, 564, 637, 639. Bailey v. Briggs (143 Mich. 303; 105 X. W. 863; 12 Det. Leg. N. 982), 1994. Bailey v. ConinionweaUh {[Ky.] 64 S. W. 095; 23 Tly. L. Rep. 1223), 945, 957. Bailey v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 92 S. \V. 545, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 105), 1369. Bailey v. Opelika (146 Ala. 171; 48 So. 968), 417. Bailey v. Raleigh (130 X. C. 269; 41 S. E. 281), 817. Bailey v. State (26 Ind. 422), 2040, 2051, 2054. Bailey v. State (67 Miss. 333; 7 So. 348), 1608. Bailey v. State (30 Xeb. 855; 47 X. W. 208), 448. Bailey v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 66 S. W. 780), 973, 1708. Bailey Liquor Co. v. Austin (82 Fed. 785), 381, 483. Bain v. Bain (79 Xeb. 711; 113 X. W. 141), 2158. Bain v. State (61 Ala. 75), 837, 1240, 1241, 1461. Baird, Ex parte (34 X. B. 213), 1070, 1359. Baird v. Howard (51 Ohio St. 57; 36 X. E. 732; 22 L. R. A. 846), 2124. Baird v. St. Louis R. Co. (41 Fed. . Rep. 492), 156. Baird v. State (52 Ark. 326; 12 S. VV. 566), 513, 1372. Baker, In re (29 How. R. 485), 2023. Baker v. Beckwith (29 Ohio St. 314), 1848. Baker v. Boucicault (1 Daly, 23), 1283. Baker v. Branan (6 Hill [X. Y.] 47), 280. Baker v. Bucklin (43 X. Y^ App. Div. 336; 60 X. Y. Supp. 294 ; affirming 22 X. Y. Supp. 560; 50 X. Y. Supp. 739), 739, 811, 817. Baker v. Cincinnati (11 Ohio St. 534), 811, 815, TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Baker v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] €4 S. W. 657 ; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 898), 1380, 1381. Baker v. Griffith ( [N. C] 66 S. E. 565), 440, 648. Baker v. Jacobs (64 Vt. 197; 23 Atl. 588), 2256. Baker v. Panola Co. (30 Tex. &6), 426, 794. Baker v. Paris (10 Up. Can. 21), 472. Baker v. Pope (2 Hun, 556), 183, 184, 223, 1840, 1842. Baker v. Portland (58 Me. 199; 4 Am. Rep. 274), 2171. Baker v. Portland (5 Sawyer, 566), 189. Baker v. State (117 Ga. 428; 43 S. E. 744), 1112. Baker v. State (34 Ind. 104), 1714. Baker v. State (2 Ind. App. 517; 28 N. E. 735), 1621. Baker v. State (8 Ohio St. 391), 1527. Baker v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 47 S. W. 980), 963. Baker v. Summers (201 111. 52; 66 X. E. 302), 1844, 1877, 1954, 2003, 2004. Baker v. Ziegler (56 Hun, 40o), 2126. Baldwin v. Chicago (68 111. 418), 456, 1122. Baldwin v. Coburn (39 Vt. 441), 477. Baldwin v. Dover, J. J. ([1892] 2 Q. B. 421; 56 J. P. 423; 61 L. J. M. C. 215), 710. Baldwin v. Smith (82 111. 162), 474, 494, 751. Baldwin County v. Milledgeville (42 Ga. 325), 494. Ball V. Commonwealth ([Ky] 91 S. W. 1123; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 1344), 1343, 1381. Ball V. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 99 S. W. 326; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 600), 948, 959, 1741, 1762. Ball V. Kane ( 1 Pennewill [Del.] 90; 39 Atl. 77'8), 2135, 2138, 2147. Ball V. State (50 Ind. 595), 821. Ballam v. Wiltshire (44 J. P. 72), 1276. Ballentine v. State ( 48 Ark. 45 ; 2 S. W. 340), 722. Ballew V. State (84 Ga. 138; 10 vS. E. 623), 578, 585. Ballew V. State (26 Tex. App. 483; 9 S. W. 765), 1575, 1576. Ballhausen, In re (19 Vict. L. R. '66; 14 Austr. L. R. 185), 701. Balling v. Board ([X. J. L.] 74 Atl. 277), 740. Ballinger v. Griffith (23 Ohio St. 619), 2013. Ballinger v. Wilson (76 Minn. 262; 79 N. W. 109), 1788. Balogh V. Lyman (6 N. Y. App. Div. 271; 39 N. Y. Supp. 7'80), 807. Ballowe v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 44 S. W. 646; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1867), 1720, 1737. Baltimore v. Clunet (23 Md. 440), 182. Baltimore v. Keeley Institute (81 Md. 106; 31 Atl. 437; 27 L. R. A. 646), 2016, 2022. Baltimore v. Lefferman (4 Gill [Md.] 425), 811. Baltimore v. State (15 Md. 37-6), 106. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Boteler (38 Md. 568), 2171, 2191, 2192. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Cham- bers (81 Md. 371; 32 Atl. 201), 2185. Baltimore, etc., R. Go. v. Hamil- ton (16 Fed. Rep. 181), 1027. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Hen- thorne ( 73 Fed. 634 ; 43 U. S. App. 113; 19 C. C. A. 623), 2192, 2194, 2198, 2200. TABLE OF CASES. li [References are to pages.] Bamke, Ex parte ( 1 S. C. X. S. W. 177), 1359. Banchor v. Mansel (47 Me. 58), 1790, 1797, 1801. Banchor v. Warren (33 N. H. 183), 1114, 1161, 1164, 1280. Bancroft v. Duma» (21 Vt. 450), 91, 97, 228, 233, 240. Bandalow v. People (90 111. 218), 1096. Bank v. Dudley (2 Pet. [U. S.] 526), 294. Bank v. State (12 Ga. 475), 924. Banks, Ex parte ([Tex. Cr. App.] 103 S. W. 1156), 864. Banks v. State (136 Ala. 106; 34 So. 350), 1380. Banks v. Sargent (104 Ky. 843; 48 S. W. 149), 922. Bannister v. Jackson (45 N. J. Eq. 702; 17 Atl. 692; affirmed 4.8 N. J. Eq. 5'93; 21 Atl. 753), 2136, 2137, 2142. Bannon v. Adams (76 111. 331), 1846. Banty v. Barnes (40 Ohio St. 43), 1912. Barber v. Barber ([Conn.] 14 L. Rep. 375), 07, 2154, 2155, 2156. Barbee v. Reese (60 Miss. 906), 2048. Barber v. Brennan ([Iowa] 119 N. W. 142), 1002, 1003. Barber v. Griffith ([N. C] 06 S. E. 565), 162. Barber v. Savage ( 1 Sweeney, 288), 2191, 2193. Barber v. State (39 Ohio St. 660), 2067. Barber v. Sullivan (78 111. App. 298), 1133. Barbier v. Connelly (113 U. S. 27; 5 S. C. 357), 109, 116, 239. Barclay, In re (11 Up. Can. 470), 415. Barclay, In re (12 Up. Can. 86), 453, 462, 644, 849, 1225, 1249, 1258. Barckell v. State ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 106 S. W. 190), 982. Bardwell v. State (77 Ark. 161; 91 S. W. 555), 902. Barger v. State (50 Ark. 20; 6 S. W. 15), 1578. Barham v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 53 S. W. 109), 1684. Barker, Ex parte (30 N. B. 406), 1218. Barker v. Pearce (30 Pa. St. 173), 1906. Barker v. State (117 Ga. 428; 43 S. E. 744), 1114, 1557. Barker v. State (118 Ga. 35; 44 S. E. 874), 1475. Barker v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 47 S. VV. 980), 909, 958, 968. Barkley v. Cannon (4 Rich. L, [S. C] 136), 2103. Barlow v. State (127 Ga. 58; 56 S. E. 131), 1620. Barlow v. State (5 Ga. App. 21; 62 S. E. 574), 1700. Barnaby v. Wood (50 Ind. 405), 1350, 1351, 1871, 1907, 1908, 1925. Barnard v. Graham (120 Ind. 135; 22 N. E. 112), 572. Barnard v. Houghton's Estate (34 Vt. 264), 355, 1792. Barnard v. State ( [La.] 48 So. 438), 515. Barnegat, etc., Ass'n v. Busby (44 N. J. L. 627), 638. Barnes v. Commonwealth ( 2 Dana, 388), 510, 511. Barnes v. District of Columbia (91 U. S. 510), 393. Barnes v. People (113 Mich. 213; 71 N. W. 504), 1375, 1378. Barnes v. State (49 Ala. 342), 509, 691, 1267. Barnes v. State (19 Conn. 398), 1253, 1255, 1620, 1632, 1764. Barnes v. State (20 Conn. 232), 1446, 1632. Barnes v. State (20 Conn. 254), 1607, 1614. lii TABLE OF CASES, [References are to pages.] Barnes v. State ( [Tex.] 44 S. W. 491), 12, 1692, 1697, 1704, 1730, 1733. Barnes v. State (40 Tex. Cr. App. 473; 72 S. W. 177), 166G. Barnes v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 88 S. W. 805), 1167, 1168, 1372, 1621. Barnes v. Wagoner (169 Ind. 511; 82 N. E. 1037), 668. Barnes v. Wilson Co. (135 N. E, 27; 47 S. E. 737), 648. Barnesville v. Means ( [Ga.] 57 S. E. 422), 933, 1935. Barnesville v. Murphey (113 Ga. 779; 39 S. E. 413), 475. Barnhardt v. State (171 Ind. 428; 86 N. E. 481), 1100, 1532, 1545. Barnett v. Pemiscott Co. Ct. (Ill Mo. App. 693; 86 S. W. 575), 714, 733, 747, 748. Barnett v. State (36 Me. 198), 1530. Barrett, In re ( 28 Up. Can. 559 ) , 1643. Barrett v. Buxton (2 Aiken, 167; 16 Am. Dec. 691), 2094, 2097. Barrett v. Delano ( [Me.] 14 Atl. 288), 122. Barrett v. Rickard ( [Neb.] 124 X. W. 153), 387, 413. Barrier v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 103 S. W. 1196), 1473. Barron v. Arnold (16 R. I. 22; 11 Atl. 298), 1031, 1772, 1773, 1776. Barrose v. State ( 1 Clarke [Iowa] 374), 1711. Barry v. Bretlin (2 Moore, P. C. 482), 2146. Barry v. Butin (2 Moore, P. C. 482), 2146. Barry v. Little ([X. H.] 68 Atl. 40), 748, 749. Bartcl V. Hobson (107 Iowa, 644; 78 N. W. 699), 341, 343, 850, 1270. Barter v. Commonwealth (3 P. «Si W. [Pa.] 253), 270. Bartemeyer v. Iowa (18 Wall. [U. S.] 129; 21 L. Ed. 929), 91, 109, 119, 124, 148, 315, 427. Barter v. Commonwealth (3 Pa. 260), 470. Barth v. State (18 Conn. 432), 1493, 1541. Bartholomew v. People ( 104 111. 605; 44 Am. Rep. 97), 2047, 2078. Barto V. Himrod (4 Sel. ]N. Y.] 483), 231. Barton v. Gadsden (79 Ala. 495), 467. Barton v. Mahasker Co. (90 Iowa, 749; 57 N. W. 611), 1002. Barton v. State (43 Fla. 477; 31 So. 361), 924, 1682. Barton v. State (99 Ind. 89), 832, 1305, 1306. Bartman v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 43 S. W. 984), 1231. Barver v. Brenner ([Iowa] 119 N. W. 142), 842. Bascot V. State ( [Miss.] 48 So. 228), 965. Bashinski v. State (5 Ga. App. 3; 62 S. E. 577), 1092, 1093. Bass V. Nashville, Meigs ( [Tenn.] 421; 63 Am. Dec. 154), 182. Bass V. State (1 Ga. App. 728, 790; 57 S. E. 1054), 959. Bassett v. Goodchild (3 Wils. 121), 623, 657. Bassett v. Howwith (224), 1058. Batchelder v. Batchelder (14 N. H. 380), 2153, 2154, 2160. Bateman v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 44 S. W^ 290), 1474. Bates, Ex parte (37 Tex. Cr. Rep, 548; 40 S. W. 269), 259. Bates V. Davis (76 111. 222), 1994, 2094, 2096, 2103, 2116. Bates V. State (81 Ark. 336; 9P S. W. 388),950. Bath V. Wliite (3 C. P. Div. 175; 42 J. P. 375; 26 W. R. 617), 1295. TABLE OF CASES. liii [References are to pages. Batley v. Cullon (6 N. Z. L. R. 755), 1215. Baton Rouge v. Butler (118 La. 73; 42 So. (350), 107, 400, 578. Batt V. Cullcn (10 N. Y. L. R. 17), 1310. Batters v. Dunning (49 Conn. 479), 400, 035, 048. Battle V. State (51 Ark. 97; 10 S. W. 12), 844. Batty V. State (114 Ga. 79; 39 S. E. 918), 957. Bauer v. Board ([Mich.] 122 N. W. 121), 891. Bauman v. Commonwealth ( 14 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 174), 514. Baxter, In re (12 Up. Can. 139), 048. Baxter v. Ellis (57 Me. 178), 1807. Baxter v. Leche (02 J. P. 030; 79 L. T. 138; 14 T. L. R. 352), 019, 679. Baxter v. State (49 Ore. 353; 88 Pac. 677; 89 Pac. 369), 235, 934, 935. Bayless, In re (15 Ont. 13), 644. Bayles v. Newton (50 N. J. L. 549; 14 Atl. 604), 163. Bayless v. State ( [Tenn.] 113 S. W. 1039), 1733. Beach v. Stanstead (8 Quebec S. C. 178), 627. Beall V. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 105; 86 S. W. 334), 1107, 1207. Bean v. Barton Co. (33 Mo. App. 035), 650, 662, 885, 887. Bean v. Bean (11 Lane. Bar. 138), 2153, 2158. Bean v. Green (33 Ohio St. 444), 1960. Beane v. State (72 Ark. 368; 80 S. W. 573), 1130, 1132. Beard v. Indemnity Ins. Co. ([W. Va.] 64 S. E. 'll9), 239, 2245. Beard v. State ([Tex.] 115 S. W. 592), 950, 951. Beardsley v. State (49 Ind. 240), 1307. Bearley v. Morley ([1899] 2 Q. B. 121; 63 J. P. 582; 68 L. J. Q. B. 722; 47 VV. R. 474; 15 T. L. R. 392), 349. Beasley v. Beckley (28 W. Va. 81), 278. Beasley v. State (50 Ala. 149; 20 Am. Rep. 292), 2041, 2046, 2051, 2054. Beatty v. Roberts (125 Iowa 619; 101 N. W. 462), 1002, 1004. Beaty, Ex parte (21 Tex. App. 426; 1 S. W. 451), 875. Beaty v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 432; 110 S. W. 449), 80, 87, 449, 973, 1082. Beauchamp v. State (0 Blackf. [Ind.] 299), 95. Beaumel v. State (20 Fla. 71; 7 So. 371), 1524, 1525, 1703. Beauvoir Club v. State (148 Ala. 64; 40 So. 1040), 251, 285, 1133, 1333, 1338. Beavers v. Godwin ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 90 S. W. 930), 254, 1032, 1046. Bechtle v. Lewis ( 123 Mo. App. 673; 100 S. W. 1107), 780. Beck V. State (76 Ga. 452), 2041, 2045, 2054. Beck V. State (69 Miss. 217; 13 So. 835), 1181. Beck V. Vaughn (134 Iowa 331; 111 N. W. 994), 982, 983, 999, 1005. Becker v. Betten (39 Iowa 668), 1803. Becker v. Lafayette County Ct. [Mo.] 119 S". W. 985), 884. Becker v. State (32 Ind. 480), 1166. Becker v. State (8 Ohio St. 391), 1511. Becker v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 50 S. W. 949). 1380. 1603. Beckerle v. Brandon ( 133 111. App. 114; 229 111. 180; 82 N. E. 283), 1928. 1991. Beckham v. Howard (83 Ga. 89; 9 So. 784), 658, 067, 1159, 1696. Hv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Beddek v. Bowdle (2G N. Z. 884), 1134. Bedell, Ex parte (20 Mo. App. 125), 1764. Bedore v. Newton {54 N. H. 117), 223, 224, 1840, 1841. Beebe v. State (6 Ind. 501; 63 Am. Dec. 391), 104, 175. Beebee v. Wilkins ( [N. H.] 29 Atl. 693), 976. Beekhana v. State (54 Tex. Cr. App. 28; 111 S. W. 1017), 1167. Beem v. Chestnut (120 Ind. 390; 22 N. E. 315; 1849, 1864, 1938. Beer's Case (5 Gratt. 674), 1519. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts (97 U. S. 25), 91, 94, 95, 97, 99, 109, 120, 124, 129, 179, 181, 184, 211, 315, 427, 488, 489, 490, 743. Beers v. Beers (4 Conn. 535), 270, 1748. Beers v. Walhizer (43 Hun 254), 1864, 1878, 1880, 1881. Behler v. Achley ([Ind.] 88 N. E. 877), 604, 607. Behler v. State (112 Ind. 140; 13 N. E. 272), 1242, 1627, 1628. Behrens v. State (42 Tex. Cr. App. 629; 62 S. W. 568), 1568 Beigen, In re (115 Fed. 339), 335. Beine, In re (42 Fed. 545), 1433, 1434. Beine, In re (42 Fed. 545), 112, 154, 307, 308, 313, 327, 337. Beiser v. State (79 Ga. 326; 4 S. E. 257), 75, 410, 1300. Belasco v. Hannant, 3 B. & S. 13; 26 J. P. 823; 31 L. J. M. C. 225; 6 L. T. 577; 10 W. R. S(i7), 367, 726. Bclclior V. Belcher (10 Yerg. 121). 2093, 2094, 2099, 2108, 2134, 2143. Belding v. Johnson (86 Ga. 177; 12 S. E. 304; 11 L. R. A. 53), 1878. Bell, In re ([1907] 13 App. Ont. L. R. 80), 894. Bell, Ex parte ( 24 Tex. App. 428 ; 6 S. W. 197), 110, 164, 221, 755. Bell V. Cassem (158 111. 45; 41 N. E. 1089; 29 L. R. A. 571, aflhminy 56 III. App. 260), 2012. Bell V. Glaseker (82 Iowa 736; 47 N. W. 1042), 987, 993. Bell V. Hamm (127 Iowa 343; 101 N. W. 475), 342. Bell V. Lott ([1905] 9 Ont. L. R. 114), 1047. Bell V. State (140 Ala. 57; 37 So. 281), 2038, 2045. Bell V. State (91 Ga. 227; 18 S. E. 288), 8, 85, 104, 162, 931. Bell V. State (28 Tex. App. 96; 12 S. W. 410), 164, 194, 224, 1842. Bell V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 78 S. W. 933), 1612. Bell V. Thompson. ([Iowa] 106 N. W. 949), 1103. Bell V. Walters (14 W. N. [N. S. W.] 190), 1128, 1124, 1131, 1134. Bell V. Zelmer (75 Mich. 66; 42 N. W. 606), 1848, 1869. Bellamy v. Pow (60 J. P. 712; 12 T. L. R. 527), 354. Belle Center v. Welsh (11 Ohio Dee. 41; 24 Wkly. L. Bull. 176). 1095. Bellison v. Apland (115 Iowa 599; 89 N. W. 22), 1969, 1980. Belt V. Paul ([Ark.] 91 S. W. 301), 718, 723, 740. Belton V. Busby ([1899] 2 Q. B. 380; 68 L. J. Q. B. 859; 63 J. P. 709; 47 W. R. 636; 81 L. T. 196; 15 T. L. R. 458), 379. I'x'lton V. London Countj'^ Coun- cil ([18931 68 L. T. 411; 54 J. P. 1S5: 62 L. J. Q. B. 222; 41 W. R. 315; 9 T. L. 232), 1834. TABLE OF CASES. ly [References are to pages.] Benalleck v. People (31 Mich. 200), 1442, 1456. Bence v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 35 S. W. 383), 907. Bender v. Bueher (8 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 344), 2255. Benge v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 3G1; 107 S. W. 832), 1465, 1473. Bengler v. Lilly (26 Ohio St. 48), 1920. Benhoff v. Weaver (6 0. C. D. 361), 2012. Benjamin, Eos parte (65 Cal. 310; 40 Pac. 23), 802. Bennett, In re (Clark v. White [1899] 1 Ch. 316; 68 L. J. Ch. 104; 47 Vi. R. 406), 1831. Bennett v. Commonwealth (11 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 370), 888, 910, 950, 1682. Bennett v. Commissioners (125 N. C. 408; 34 S. E. 632), 1476. Bennett v. Levi ( 19 N. Y. Supp. 226), 1924, 1926, 1987, 1993. Bennett v. Otto (68 Neb. 652; 94 X. W. 807), 586, 666. Bennett v. People (16 111. 160), 1189, 1652. Bennett v. People (30 111. 389), 16, 17, 18, 81, 400, 402, 443, 522. Bennett v. Pulaski ( [Tenn. Ch. App.] 52 S. W. 913; 47 L. R. A. 278), 214, 432, 461, 469, 1129. Bennett v. State (87 Miss. 803; 40 So. 554), 1201. Bennett v. State (Mart. & Yerg. 133), 2040, 2053. Bennett v. State ( 40 Tex. Cr. App. 445; 50 S. W. 947), 1556, 1611. Bennett v. State ( 49 Tox. Cr. App. 294; 92 S. W. 415), 1323. Bennett v. Talbois (1 Ld. Raym. 149), 1455. Benning v. State (123 Ga. 546; ol S. E. 632), 249. Benninger, Ex parte (64 Cal. 291; 30 Pac. 846), 170, 187, 444. Benson v. McFadden (50 Ind. 431), 1242. Benson v. Mayor (10 Barb. 223), 98. Benson v. Moore (15 Wend. 260), 72, 508. Benson v. State ( [Ky.] 44 S. W. 168), 1720. Benson v. State (30 Tex. Cr. App. 56; 44 S. W. 167, 1091), 958, 1690. Benson v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 44 S. W. 163), 1693, 1715. Benson v. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 367; 101 S. W. 224), 1691. Benson v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 109 S. W. 168), 1473. Benson v. United States (44 Fed. 178), 1260. Benton v. Skylter ( [Xeb.] 122 N. W. 61), 2095, 2108, 2116, 2117. Benton v. State (99 Ind. 89), 836. Berchwold v. People (21 111. App. 213), 1280. Berg, In re (139 Pa. St. 354; 21 Atl. 77), 664. Berger, In re (115 Fed. 339), 323. Berger v. DeLeach (121 S. W. 591), 631, 667. Berger v State (50 Ark. 20; 6 S. W. 15), 1285. Berger v. State ([Ark.) 11 S. W. 765), 49, 50. Berger v. Williams (4 McLeiin, 377; Fed. Cas. Xo. 1341), 2008. Bergeron v. Floury ( 7 Rev. Leg. ^183), 1781. Bergman v. Cleveland (39 Ohio St. 651), 189, 218. Bergmeyer v. Commonwealth (3 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 823), 946. Bergmeyer v. Commonwealth ; 3 Ky^ L. Rep. 823), 1764. Ivi TABLB OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Bergmever v. Greenup Co. ( [Ky.] 44 S. W. 82 ) , 400. Berkemeir v. State ([Ind.], 88 X. E. t)34), 44, 1849, 1S50, 1937, 1938, 1941, 1951, 1962. Berkley v. Cannon (Rich. L. [S. C] 136), 2094, 2099, 2136. Bernard v. Feild (46 Me. 526), 1800. Bernhardt v. State (82 Wis. 23; 51 S. W. 1009), 2085. Berning v. State (51 Ark. 550; 11 S. W. 882), 513, 1372, 1644. Berry v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (41 Md. 446), 294. Berry v. Cramer (58 N. J. L. 278; 33 Atl. 201), 229, 795, 797. Berry v. DeMaris ( [X. J.] 70 Atl. 337), 125, 127. Berry v. State (67 Ind. 222), 1252, 1500, 1564. Berryman v. Berryman (59 Mich. G05; 26 X. W. 789), 68, 2155, 2157, 2162. Bert V. People (113 111. 645), 1622. Bertha, The (111 Fed. 550), 2262. Bertholf v. O'Reilly (74 X. Y. 509), 223, 312, 1303, 1840, 1841, 1859, 1863, 1864. Bertrand, In re (40 X^. Y. Misc. Rep. 536; 82 X. Y. Supp. 940), 867, 879, 903, 908, 971. Bertzel v. Court of Common Pleas ( [X. J. L.] 48 Atl. 1013) , 736. Bertzell v. District of Columbia (21 App. D. C. 49), 543. Bessemeir v. Edge ( [Al^a.] 50 So. 270), 254. Best V. Best (11 Ky. L. Rep. 215), 2134. Betting v. Hobbitt (142 111. 72; 30 X. E. 1048; affirming 42 111. App. 174), 1994. Betts V. Armstead (20 Q. R. Div. 771; 52 J. P. 471; 51 L. J. M. C. 109; 58 L. T. 811; 38 W. R. 720), 1383. Betts V. Divine (3 Conn. 107), 1014. Beverage, Ex parte (26 Tex. App. 35), 913. Beverley's Case (4 Coke, 125a), 2039, 2095. Bevery Brewing Co. v. Oliver (69 Vt. 323; 37 Atl. 1110), 1789. Bew V. Harston ( 3 Q. B. Div. 454 ; 42 J. P. 808; 47 L. J. M. C. 121; 26 W. R. 915), 374. Bew V. State (71 Miss. 1; 13 So. 868), 861. Bowen v. Clark (1 Biss. 128; Fed. Cas Xo. 1721), 2109. Beyers v. Willowmore Licensing Board (17 Juta, 254), 1264. Bhstedt V. Terefel ([Iowa] 106 X. W. 513), 991. Bickerstaff, In re (70 Cal. 35; 11 Pac. 393), 189, 200, 471, 566. Bickford v. Xew York State Life Ins. Co. (Bliss on Ins. [2d ed.] 366), 2224. Biddv v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 412; 107 S. W. 814), 1732, 1733. Biddv V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 108 S. W. 689), 914, 1580, 1584, 1602, 1731. Biederman, In re (3 Pennewill [Del.] 284; 51 AtL 602), 552. Biese v. State (79 Ga. 326; 4 S. E. 257), 1192. Bieser v. State (79 Ga. 326; 4 S. E. 257), 73, 76. Bigelow V. Crerquellochie, etc., Co. (37 Can. S. C. 55; affirm- ing 37 X. S. 482), 1281, 1284, 1792. Biggins, In re (19 X. Z. L. R. 630), 1116, 1669. Biggs V. Cunningham ([1909] Vict. L. R. 344; 29 Austr. L. T. 14), 1311. Biggs V. Lamley ([1907] Vict. L. R. 300), il31. Biggs v. McCarthy (56 Ind. 352), 1906. TABLE OF CASES. Ivii [References are to pages.] Eight, In re (12 Can. Prac. 433), 410, 420. Bilbro V. State (7 Humph. 534), 1450, 1488, 1489. Billinghurst v. Vickers ( 1 Phil- lim Eccl. Rep. 193), 2140. Eillings V. State (41 Tex. Cr. App. 253; 53 S. \V. 851), l'(J51. Billingsley v. State (96 Ala. 114; 11 So. 408), 1196. Bills V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] G4 S. W. 1047), 1204, 1543. Bills V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 86 S. W. 1012), 1380. Bilups V. State (107 Ga. 766; 33 S. E. 659), 1182. Bing V. Bank of Kingston (5 Ga. App. 578; 65 S. E. 652), 2094, 2095, 2108, 2112. Bingliam Co. v. Fidelity, etc., Co. (Idaho, 13; 88 Pac. 829, 560, 767, 793, 799, 802. Benoth, Ex parte ( 1 S. C. [X. S. VV.] 122), 1371. Bird, Ex parte (19 Cal. 130), 215. Bird V. State (104 Ind. 384; 3 N. E. 827), 1242. Bird V. United States ( 187 U. S. 118, 124 [23 Sup. Ct. 42]), 1421. Birdsong v. Birdsong ( 2 Head. 280), 2094, 2098, 2099, 2102, 2106, 2107, 2115. Birkman v. Fahrenthold ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 114 S. W. 428), 1850, 1852, 1853, 1955, 1956, 1961, 1962, 1969. Birley v. McDonald (48 C. [N. Y.] 427), 1279. Birmingham v. People ([Colo.] 90 Pac. 1121), 1128, 1134. Birmingham Breweries, Limited V. Jameson ([1898] 67 L. J. Ch. 403; 78 L. T. 512; 14 T. L. R. 396), 1817. Birr v. People (24 111. App. 380), 1254. Bishop V. Honey (34 Tex. 245), 1801. Bishop V. Tripp (15 R. I. 466; 8 Atl. 692), 792. Bissell V. fetarzinger (112 Iowa 2:66; 73 N. W. 1065), 1939. Bittix V. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 232; 87 S. VV. 348), 1214, Bivens v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 43 S. W. 1007), 1237. Bixler v. Gilleland (4 Pa. 156), 2119. Bizer v. Bizer (110 Iowa 248; 81 N. W. 4G5), 65. Black's Estate (8 Pa. Ct. Rep. 266), 2120. Black V. Ellis (3 Hill L. [S. C] 68), 2137, 2149. Black V. McGilvery (38 Me. 287), 1021. Black V. State (60 Ala. 493), 1500. Black V. State (112 Ga. 29; 37 ,S. E. 108), 1217, 1371, 1379, 1615. Black Diamond Distilling Co., In re (33 Pa. Super. Ct. 649), 664. Blackburn v. Commonwealth ( 15 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 239), 945. Blackeny v. Green (9 Ohio Dec. 570), 2008. Blackmar v. Nickerson (188 Mass. 399; 74 N. E. 932), 1022. Blackwell v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 54 S. W. 843; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 240), 909, 1467, 1680, 1683. Blackwell v. State (36 Ark. 178), 135, 136, 247, 594, 862, 1278, 1570. Blackwell v. State (42 Ark. 275), 1285. Blackwell v. State (45 Ark. 90), 1113. Blahut V. State (54 Ark. 538; 16 S. W. 582), 1233. Blain v. Bailey (25 Ind. 165), 467. Blair, Ex parte (12 Ch. Div. 522, 533), 539. Iviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Blair v. Kilpatrick (40 Ind. 312), 6G3. Blair v. Rutenfranz (40 ind. 312), 190, 662, 663. Blair v. Kilpatrick (40 Ind 312), 189, 190, 662, «71. Blair v. State (81 Ga. 628; 7 S. E. 855), 1224, 1233. Blair v. Vierling (33 Ind. 260), 662. Blake v. State (118 Ga. 333; 43 S. E. 249), 945. Blaine, Ex parte (11 Can. Cr. Cas. 193), 685. Blakeley v. State (73 Ark. 218; 83 S. W. 948), 845. Blakely v. State (57 Miss. 680), 1497, 1498. Blaney v. Blaney (126 Mass. 205), 67, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2157. Blankenship v. State (93 Ga. 814; 21 S. E. 130), 22, 1217, 1711. Blasdell v. Hewit (3 Cuines 157), 1497, 1553. Blasingame v. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 582; 85 S. W. 275), 949, 953, 1213, 1596, 1609, 1696. Blatz V. Rohrback (116 X. Y. 450; 22 N. E. 1049; 6 L. R. A. 669), 42. 43, 47, 48, 82, S3, 1753, 1873. Blaylock v. State (108 Tenn. 185; 65 N. VV. 398), 1129, 1131, 1363. Bleich V. People (227 111. 80; 81 N. E. 36), 2038, 2069, 2085. Blencome & Co. v. Hatlieiton (71 J. P. 210; 96 L. '!'. 817), C79. Blessing v. Galveston ( 42 Tex. 641), 394. Blessley v. John (Times, May 1, 1899), 1822. Blevins v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.l 2:j S. W 688), 1515 Bligh V. .Jame>» [U Allen 570), 1800. Blimm v. Commonwealth (7 Buah 320), 2041, 2061, 2062, 2081. Bliss V. Beck (80 Neb. 290; 114 N. VV. 162), 2258. Block V. Jacksonville (36 III. 301), 451, 489, 523, 525. Block V. State (66 Ala. 414), 1571. Blodgett V. State (97 Ga. 351; 23 S. E. 830), 1223. Blodgett V. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 70; 38 S. VV. 783), 1203. Bloom V. Richards (2 Ohio 387), 215, 216. Bloomer v. Glendy (70 Iowa, 757; 30 !N. VV. 486), 990, 991. Bloomfield v. State (10 Mo. 556), 1457, 1502, 1509. Bloomfield v. Trumble (54 la. 399), 216, 2026. Bloomhoff V. State (8 Blackf. 205), 1107, 1109, 1716. Bloomingdale, In re ( 72 N. Y. St. 350; 38 N. Y. Supp. 162), 636. Bloomington v. Strehl (47 111. 72), 1645. Blordel v. Zimmerman (41 Neb. 695: 60 N. VV. 6), 1904. Blough V. State (121 Ind. 355; 18 N. E. 682), 1488. Blum v. Ansley ([1900] 64 J. P. 184), 1827. Blumenthal, In re (125 Pa. St. 412; 18 Atl. 395; 23 Wkly. N. C. 493), 552, 694, 695, 700. Blunchi v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 64 S. VV. 971; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1185), 1571. Bluthentbal v. Headland ( 132 Ala. 249; 31 So. 87), 1780. Bluthentbal v. McVVborter (131 Ala. 642; 31 So. 559), 1785, 17^19, 179S, 1806. Board, Appeal of (64 Conn. 526; 30 Atl. /75), 662, 669. Board V. Barri'.- (34 N. Y. 657). 743. TABLE OF CASES. lis [References are to pages.] Board v. Buchanan (36 Tex. Civ. App. 411; 82 S. W. 194), &G3. Board v. Churchill (21 Fla. 578), 662. Board v. Forman (102 Ky. 496; 43 S. W. 682; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1553), 831. Board v. Krueger (88 Ind. 231), 672. Board v. Lease (22 Ind. 261), 662. Board v. Mayor (31 Colo. 173; 74 Pac. 458), 478, 718, 720, 733. Board v. Merchant (103 N. Y. 143; 8 N. E. 484), 264, 1585. Board v. Renfro ([Ky.J 58 S. W. 795; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 806; 51 L. R. A. 897), 191. Board v. Sackrider (35 N. Y. 154), 1743. Board v. Scott (125 Ky. 545; 101 S. W. 944; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 804), 91, 849, 942. Board v. South Carolina Ry. Co. (57 Fed. 485), 1017. Board v. Taylor (21 N. Y. 173, 177), 4, 15, 46, 1592. Board v. Watson (5 Bush [Ky.] 660), 406. Boatright v. State (77 Ga. 717), 1227, 1233, 1357. Bobier v Clay (27 Up. Can. 438), 2239. Bode V. State (7 Gill, 320), 91, 307, 316, 1457, 1511. Bodge V. Hughes (53 N. H. 4)14), 1350, 1855, 1882, 1893, 1907. Bodgett V. State ([Ala.] 48 So. 54), 945. Boericke & Runyan Co. v. U. S. (126 Fed. 1018). 18. Bogan, Ex parte (8 N. S. W. L. R. 409), 548. Bogan V. State (84 Ala. 449; 4 So. 255), 1469, 1518, 1523. Bogel V. State (42 Tex. Cr. App. 389; 55 S. W. 830). 1378, 1380. Bogg V. Jerome (7 Mich. 145), 1775. Boggess V. Boggess ( 4 Dana, 308 ) , 2166. Bohler v. Schneider ( 49 Ga. 195 ) , 198, 201, 796, 797. Bohstedt v. Shanks (136 Iowa, 686; 116 N. W. 812), 979. Bohstedt v. Tempel ([Iowa] 106 N. W. 513), 1084, 1085. Boisblanc v. Louisiana Eq. L. Ins, Co. (34 La. Ann. 1167), 2244. Bolder v. Schneider (49 Ga. 195), 787. Boldt V. State (72 Wis. 7; 38 N. W. 177), 1445, 1446, 1614, 1650, 1653, 1739. Bolduc V. Randall (107 Mass. 121), 498, 499, 501, 503. Boles V. McCarty (6 Blackf. 427), 780. Bollen V. State (26 Texas App. 483; 9 S. W. 765), 369. Bollinger v. Wilson (76 Minn. 262; 79 N. W. 109), 1780, 1787, 1803. Bolt V. State (60 Ark. 600; 31 S. W. 460), 930. Bolton V. Becker (82 Neb. 772; 119 N. W. 14), 599. Bolton V. Hegmsr (82 Neb. 772; 118 N. W. 1096), 598, 600. Bolton V. McKay ([Iowa] 102 N. W. 1131), 199, 223, 790. Boltze V. State (24 Ala. 89), 1245. Bolun V. People (73 HL 488), 1763, 1764. Bonaker v. State (42 Fla. 348; 29 So. 321), 933. Bond V. Evans (21 Q. B. Div. 249; 52 J. P. 613; 57 L. J. M. C. 105; 59 L. T. 411; 36 W. R. 767)^ 375. 376, 1152. Bond V. Plumb ([1894] 1 Q. B. 169; 58 J. P. 168), 377. Bond V. State (13 Sm. & M. 265), 1246. Bonds V. sStatc (1.30 Ala. 106; 30 So. 413). 1744. Bonds V. State (130 Ala. 117; 30 So. 427), 1379. Ix TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Boner v. Meyer (11 York Leg. Rec. [Pa.] 58), 2117, 2121. Bonesteel v. Downs (73 Iowa, 685; 35 X. W. 924), 1767. Boniface v. Scott (3 S. & R. 351), 75. Bonner v. State (2 Ga. App. 711; 58 S. E. 1123), 1172. Bonner v. Wellborn (7 Ga. 296), 72. Bonner v. State (2 Ga. App. 711; 58 N. E. 1123), 1701. Bonser v. State (Smith [Ind.] 408), 1570. Boodle V. Birmingham (J. J. 45 J. P. P. 636), 701, 709, 711. Booher v. State (156 Ind. 435; 60 N. E. 156; 54 L. R. A. 391), 2039, 2076, 2083. Book V. Commonwealth (107 Ky. 605; 55 S. W. 7; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1342), 929. Boomer shine v. Uline ( 159 Ind. 503; 65 N. E. 513), 94, 144, 189, 209, 855, 604, 611. Boon, In re (24 Up. Can. 361), 907. Boon V. State (69 Ala. 226), 1491, 1517. Boone v. State (10 Tex. App. 418; 38 S. W. 641), 833. Boone v. State (12 Tex. App. 184), 929, 933, 1740. Boos V. State (11 Ind. App. 257; 39 N. E. 197), 767, 771, 1844, 1849. 1870, 1907, 1924. Boothby v. Plaisted (51 N. H. 436), 1288, 1787. Borch V. State ([Ala.] 3» So. 580), 1311. Borches v. State ( 33 Tex. Cr. Rep. 96; 25 S. W. 423), 1569, 1737. Borck V. State ([Okla.] 30 So. 580), 289, 714, 1188, 1579. Borden v. ^lontana Club ( 10 Mont. 330; 25 Pac. 1042; 11 L. R. A. .593; 47 Am. St. 35), 1330. Bordwoll V. State (77 Ark. 161; 91 S. W. 555), 672, 859, 910, 047. Bormann, Appeal of (81 Conn; 458; 71 Atl. 502), 662, 667. Born V, Hopper (110 N. Y. App. Div. 218; 96 N. Y. Supp. 671; 48 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 177; 96 K Y. Supp. 671), 751. Borne v. Mayor, etc., of Liver- pool ([1863] 32 L. J. Q. B. 15), 1834. Bosley v. Davies (1 Q. B. Div. 84; 45 L. J. M. C. 27; 33 L. T. 528; 24 W. R. 140; 40 J. P. 550), 376. Boswell V. State (70 Miss. 395; 12 So. 446), 932, 2039, 2045, 2051, 2067. Botkins v. State (36 Ind. App. 179; 75 N. E. 298), 356, 1147, 1540. Bothwell, In re (44 Mo. App. 215), 910. Bottle V. State (51 Ark. 97; 10 S. W. 12), 835. Bottoms V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 73 .S. W. 16, 20, 963), 958, 1621. Botts V. State (26 Miss. 108), 1714. Boucher v. Capital Brewing Co. ([1905] 9 Ont. Rep. 266), 1779, 1812. Boulter v. Kent. J. J. ([1897] App. Cas. 569; 61 J. P. 532; 66 L. J. Q. B. 787; 77 L. T. 288; 46 W. R. 114; 13 T. L. R. 538). 669, 679, 681. Bound V. South Carolina Ry. Co. (57 Fed. 485), 1021, 1046. Bour John's Application (2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 33). 598, 599. Bourland v. Hildreth (26 Cal. 162), 227. Bourman v. Com. ( 14 Ky. Law Rep. 174), 1615. Boutwell V. P^oster (24 Vt. 485), 1780. Bowden v. People (12 Hun, 85), 2059. TABLE OF CASES. Ixi [References are to pages.] Bowden v. Voorhis (135 Mich. 648; 95 N. W. 406; 10 Del. Leg. N. 908), 1918, 1985, 2003. Bowen v. Clark (1 Biss. 128; Fed. Cas. No. 1721), 2093, 2104, 2106. Bowen v. Hale (4 Clarke [Iowa] 430), 990, 991, 1771. Bowen v. Lease (5 Hill [N. Y.] 221), 467. Bowen v. State (28 Tex. App. 103; 12 S. W. 413), 1486. Bower v. State ( [Ark.] 57 S. W. 800), 1201. Bowerman v. Commonwealth ( 1 4 Ky. E. Rep. [abstract] 174), 1182. Bowie V. Bowie (3 ild. Ch. 51), 2164, 2165. Bowie V. Gilmour (24 Ont. App. 254), 1792. Bowles V. State (13 Ind. 427), 1443. Bowling Green v. McMullen ([Ky.] 122 S. W. 823), 11. Bowman! In re (167 Pa. 644; 31 Atl. 932), 616, 617, 664. Bowman v. Cliicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (125 U. S. 465; 8 Sup. Ct. 689, 1062; 31 L. Ed. 700), 154, 304, 313, 315, 318, 323, 335, 1427, 1433, Bowman v. State (16 Tex. App. 513), 1575. Bowman v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 35 S. W. 382), 1615. Bowman v. State (14 Tex. Cr. App. 38; 40 S. W. 796; 41 S. W. 635), 890. Bowman v. State (38 Tex. Cr. App. 14; 40 S. W. 7«6; 41 S. W. 635). 211. 245 251, 872, 935, 1680, 1681. 1^683. Bows V. Fenwiek (L. R. 9; C. P. 339; 43 L. J. M. C. 107; 30 L. T. 524; 22 W. R. 804; 38 J. P. 440), 380. Bowyer v. Percy Supply Club ([1893] 2 Q. B. 154; 5 R. 472; 69 L. T. 447; 42 W. R. 29; 17 Cox, C. C. 669; 57 J. P. 470), 1342, 1345. Boyd V. Alabama (94 U. S. 645), 94, 95, 97, 129, 489. Boyd V. Bryant (35 Ark. 69; 37 " Am. Rep. 6), 134, 136, 232, 234, 240, 247, 248. Boyd V. Bryant (35 Kan. 69), 228. Boyd V. State (12 Lea, 687), 1300. Boyd V. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 399; 92 S. W. 845), 1212. Boyd V. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 197; 92 S. W. 845), 1202. Boyd V. State (80 Tenn. [12 Lea] 687), 247. Boyd V. Watt (27 Ohio St. 259), 1882, 1912, 1917. Boyden v. Hal)erstumpf ( 129 " Mich. 138; 88 N. W. 386), 1985. Boyer v. Barr (8 Neb. 68), 1991. Boylan, In re (15 Ont. 13), 420. Boyle, In re (190 Pa. St. 577; 42 Atl. 1025; 45 L. R. A. 399), 139. Boyle V. Commonwealth ( 14 Gratt. <374), 1497, lo57. Boyle V. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. ( Ramsey s App. Cas. [Low. Can.]), 379), 2229. Boyle V. Smith ([1906] 1 K. B. 432; 70 J. P. 115; 75 L. J. K. B. 282; 94 L. I. 30; 54 W. R. 519; 22 £. L. R. 200), 513, 1352, 1355. Braconier v. Packard (136 Mass. 50), 648. Bradford v. Boley (167 Penn. St. 506; 31 Atl. 751), 1858, 1880, 1881. Bradford v. Dawson ([1887] 1 Q. B. 307; 61 J. P. 134; 66 L. J. Q. B. 191; 76 L,. T. 54; 45 W. R. 347; 18 Cox O. C. 4^3), 377. Ixii TABLE OF CASES. fReferences are to pages.] Bradford v. Jellico (1 Tenn. Ch. App. 700), 461, 1316. Bradford v. State (5 Ga. App. 49i; 63 S. E. 530), 1583. Bradford v. Stevens ( 10 Gray, 379), 306, 307, 313, 314. Bradgett v. State ([Ala.] 48 So. 54), 1696. Bradley v. Second Ave. R. Co. (8 Daly, 289), 2177, 2195. Bradley v. State (121 Ga. 201; 40 S. E. 981), 829, 969. Bradley v. State (31 Ind. 492), 2040, 2051. Bradley v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.J 75 S. W. 32), 1377. 1396. Bradley v. Thurston (7 Hawaii, 523), 627. Bradshaw v. State (76 Ai'k. 562; 89 S. W. 1051), 970. Bradshaw v. Omaha (1 Neb. 16), 106, 394. Bradley, In re (22 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 301; 49 N. Y. Supp. 1109), 697, 743. Brady, Ex parte (70 Ark. 376; 68 S. W. 34), 2261. Brady, In re (106 X. Y. Supp. 961), 103, 594. Brag,!? v. State (126 Ga. 442; 55 S. E. 232), 1C51. Braisted v. People (38 Colo. 49; 88 Pac. 150, 151), 842, 1477. Brame v. State ( [Ala.] 38 So. 1031), 1470. Bramlette v. State (21 Tex. App. 611; 2 S. W. 765), 2075. Branch, In re (164 Pa. 427; 30 Atl. 296; 35 W. N. C. 310), 664, 763. Branch v. Sceats (20 W. X. [X. S. W.] 41), 1265. Brand v. Schenectady, etc., R. Co. (8 Barb. 368)" 2177, 2185, 2195. Brandlingor, In re (11 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 93). 639. Brandon v. Brandon (14 Kan. 342), 2163. Brandon v. Old (3 C. & P. 440), 2101. Brandt v. State (17 Ind. App. 311; 46 X. E. 682), 1849, 1908, 1910, 1921, 1941, 1964, Brannan v. Adams (76 111. 331), 1844. Brannen v. Kokonio, etc., Co. (115 Ind. 115; 17 X. E. 202), 2187. Brannon v. Silvernail (81 111. 484), 1943. 1989, 1990. Brant v. Fowler (7 Cow. 562), 2254. Brantigan v. White (73 111. 561), 1847, 1908, 1892, 1994. Brantley v. State (91 Ala. 47; 8 So. 816), 1494, 1586. 1699. Brantley v. State (42 Tex. Cr. App. 293; 59 S. W, 892), 852. Branton v. Branton (23 Ark. 580), 1906. Brashears v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 57 S. W. 475), 1380. Brass v." State (45 Fla. 1; 34 So. 307), 4, 286, 1495. BraswcU v. Commonwealth (5 Bush, 544), 72, 1542. Braun, Ex parte (141 Cal. 204; 74 Pac. 780), 789. Braunstein v. People ([Colo.] 105 Pac. 857), 413, 434. Bray v. Commerce ([Ga.] 63 S. 'e. 596), 1172, 1181. Breck v. Adams (69 Mass. [3 Gray] 569), 1031. Breconier v. Packard ( 136 Mass. 50), 572. Brecourt v. State (5 Ind. 499), 1102. Breeding v. Jordan (115 Iowa, 566: 8S X. W. 1090), 1923, 1924. Breek v. Adams ( 3 Gray, 55), 2174. Burke v. Collins (18 S. D. 190; 99 N. W. 1112), 195, 626, 650. Burke v. State ( 52 Ind. 522 ) , 1442, 1488, 1522, 1552, 1553. Burkarth v. Stephens (117 Mo. App. 425; 94 S. W. 720), 676. Burkett v. Loed ([Ind.] 88 X. E. 346), 1811. Burkhalter v. ilcConnelsville { 20 Ohio St. 309), 397, 433. Burkhard v. State (18 Tex. App. 599 ) . 2090. Burknian v. Jamieson (25 Wash. 6(>(); 66 Pac. 48), 2009. Burks V. State ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 103 S. W. 950), 924. Burnby, Ex parte ([1901] 2 K. B. 458; 70 L. J. K. B. 739 : •85 L. T, 168), 368, 725. Burner v. Commonwealth ( 13 Gratt. 778), 1182, 1544. Burnett, Ex parte (30 Ala. 461), 436, 444, 447. Burnett v. Berry ([1896] 1 Q. B. 641; 60 J. P. 375; 65 L. J. M. C. 118; 44 W. R. 512; 74 L. T. 494; 12 T. L. R. 362), 380. Burnett v. State (92 Ga. 474; 17 S. E. 858), 1235. Burnett v. State (72 Miss. 994; 18 So. 432), 1729, 1732. Burnett v. State (42 Tex. Cr. App. 600; 62 S. W. 1063), '512, 514, 1375, 1620. Burlington v. Bumgardner (42 la. 102), 412, 435. Burlington v. Insurance Co. (31 Iowa 102), 200. Burlington v. Kellar (18 la. 59), 404, 413. Burlington v. Putnam (31 la. 102), 411, 483. Burnham v. Burnham ( 1 19 Wis. 509; 97 N. W. 176), 2094. Burns, Appeal of ( 76 Conn. 395 ; 56 Atl. 611), 535, 565, '737, 748, 1297. Burns, In re ([Ind.] 87 N. E. 1028), 561, 601. Burns, In re (14 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 174; 3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 429), 696. Burns v. Burns (13 Fla. 369), 65, 67, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2159. Burns v. Elba (32 Wis. 605), 2190. Burnside, Ex parte (86 Ky. 423; 6 S. W. 276), 91, in, 125, 126, 149, 182, 243, 281, 291. Burnside v. Lincoln Co. (86 Ky. 423; 7 S. W. 276; 9 Ky. L. Rep. 635), 450, 490. Burr, In re (3 Lack. Leg. X. 162). 2017. Burrage. Ex parte (26 Tex. App. 35; 9 S. W. 72), 908, 911. Burrell, In re (X. Y. Misc. Rep. 261; 100 X. Y. Supp. 470), 902, 9n. TABLE OF CASES. Ixix; [References are to pages.] Burrell v. State (25 Neb. 581; 41 N. W. 399), 1712, 1713, 17G4. Burrell v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 65 S. VV. 914), 908, 1216. Burrit v. Silliman (16 Barb. 198), 2150. Burrouglis v. Richman (13 N. J. Law. [1 J. S. Green] 233; 23 Am. Dec. 717), 2094, 2095. Burrow's Case ( 1 Lewin C. C. 75), 2039, 2054. Bursinger v. Bank of Watertown, (67 Wis. 75; 30 N. W. 290; 58 Am. Eep. 848), 2098, 211(5, 2125, 2131. Burt V. Burt ( 1'68 Mass. 204; 46 N. E. 622), 63, 67, 08, 1735, 1736, 2154, 2158. Burton v. State (46 Tex. Cr. App. 493; '81 S. W. 742), 2084. Bush V. Breing (113 Pa. St. 310; 6 Atl. 8<5; 57 Am. Rep. 469), 2093, 2098, 2099, 2131. Bush V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 47 S. W. 585), 1703. Bush V. Indianapolis ( 120 Ind. 476; 22 X. E. 422), 144. Bush V. Lisle (89 Ky. 393; 12 S. W. 762), 2135, 2138, 2141. Bush V. Murray (&6 Me. 472), 1910. Bush V. Republic of Texas ( 1 Tex. 455), 1541. Bush V. Seabury (18 Johns. 41S), 448. Bushell V. Hammond ([1904] 2 K. B. 5ti3; 68 J. P. 370; 73 L. J. K. B. 1005; 91 L. T. 1; 52 W. R. 453; 20 T. L. R. 413), 641. Butcher's Union v. Crescent City Co. (Ill U. ,S. 746; 5 Sup. Ct. 652), 98. Butler V. Augusta (100 Ga. 370; 28 S. E. 164), 1372, 1374, 1376. Butler V. Fiscal Court ( 12'6 Ky. 146; 103 S. W. 251; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 597), 943. Butler V. Mercer (14 Ind. 479), 1989. Butler V. Merrit (113 Ga. 238; 38 S. E. 751), 175. Butler V. Mulvihill (1 Bligh. 137), 2099, 2103. Butler V. Northumberland (50 N. H. 33), 384, 1792. Butler V. State (25 Fla. 347; 6 So. 67), 86, 928, 934, 1453, 1496, 1680. Butler V. State (89 Ga. 821; 15 S. E. 763), 134, 1278, 1453, 1479. Butler V. State ([Miss.] 39 So. 1005), 2038. Butler V. Thompson (92 U. S. 412; 23 L. Ed. 684), 1162. Butman, In re (8 Greenl. [Me.] 113), 1755. Button V. Hudson River R. Co. (18 .,. Y. 248), 2185. Button V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 100 S. W. 148), 1217. Buttons V. Justice ( 16 Vict. L. R. '604; 12 Austr. L. T. 83), 351. Butzman v. Whitbeck (42 Ohio St. 223), 120, 121, 147. Buttrick v. Lowell (1 Allen 172), 1026, 1047. Byars v. Mt. Vernon (78 111. 11), 1477. Byford, In re (69 J. P. 152), 620. Bynes v. Stilwell (103 N. Y. 453), 1906. Bynum's Case (101- N. C. 412; 8 S. E. 136), 925. Byrd, Ex parte ( [Tex.] 105 S. W. 496), 127, 251, 254. Byrd v. State (76 Ark. 286; 68 S. W. 974), 2038. Byrd v. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 539; 103 S. W. 863), 1680. Byrd v. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 539; 103 S. W. 863), 940, 1218. Byrd v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 507; 111 S. VV. 149), 888,. 915, 1597. Ixs, TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages Byram v. Polk Coiintv ( 7G Iowa 73; 40 N. W. 102), 1068, 1075. Byrum v. Peterson (34 Neb. 237; 51 N. W. 829), 671. C V. C ( 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 603), 2166. Cabel V. Houston (20 Tex. 335), 457. Cabellero v. Henty ([1874] L. II. 9 Ch. 447), 1831. Cable V. State (8 Blackf. 531), 1096, 1106, 1109. Cable V. State ([Miss.] 38 So. 98), 1207. Caesar v. State (50 Fla. 1; 39 So. 470), 286, 1495, 1557. Cagle V. State (87 Ala. 38; 6 ■So. 300), 514, 1158, 1219, 1223, 1226, 1349. Cahen v, Jarrett (42 Md. 571), 787. Cahill V. Campbell (105 Mass. 40), 70. Cahill V. Millett ([1907] Vict. L. R. 605; 29 Austr. L. T. 16), 1311. Cahill V. State (36 Ind. App. 507; 76 N. E. 142), 1498, _573. Cahn V. Reid (18 Mo. App. 115), 2127. Cain, Ex parte (20 Okla. 125; 93 Pac. 974), 111, 121, 122. Cain V. Allen (168 Ind. 8; 79 N. E. 201, 896), 206, 209. 286, 606, 611. 612, 614, 618. Cairns v. Peterson (2 Vict. L. R. 143), 1209. Cairo v. Feuchter Bros. (59 111. App. 112; afTirmed 159 111. 155; 42 N. E. :!08), 190. Cakins v. State (14 Ohio St. 222), 029. Calder v. ]5nl! (.'! Dull. [U. S.J 386), 261, 267. Calder v. Kurby (5 Gray 597), 124, 182, 184, 185, 488, 489, 490, 495, 714. Calder v. Slieppard (61 Ind. 219), 531, 599. Calderwood v. Jos. Schlitz Brew- ing Co. ([Minn.] 121 N. W. 221), 820. Caldwell v. Barrett (73 Ga. 604), 232, 235. Caldwell v. Fullerton (7 Casey [Pa.] 475; 72 Am. Dec. 760)', 479. Caldwell v. Grider (88 Ala. 421; 7 So. 203), 939. Caldwell v. Grimes (7 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 601), 537, 802, 966. Caldwell v. State (55 Ala. 1.33), 276. Caldwell v. State (43 Fla. 545; 30 So. 814), 82. Caldwell v. State ( [Ga.] 29 S. E. 263), 249. Caldwell v. State (18 Ind. App. 48; 46 N. E. 697), 837, 838. Caldwell v. State (87 Miss. 420; 39 S. 896), 1761. Calhoun v. Spencer (177 Mass. 473; 59 N. E. 78), 1867. Callahan v. State (2 Ind. App. 418; 28 K E. 717), SO, 1491, 1492, 1561. Callander v. Allen (6 N. Z. L. R. 436), 536. Callaway v. Mims (5 Ga. App. 9; 62 S. E. 654), 1085, 1092, 1108. Calloway x. Laydon (47 Iowa 456"), 1854. Calloway v. Milledgeville (48 Ga. 309"), 814. Calloway v. Witherspoon (3 Ired. Eq."l2S). 2099, 2103, 2130. Cambridge Springs Co., hi re (20 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 564), 537. Camden v. Allen (2 Dutch [X. J. L.] 398), 276. Cameron, Ex parte (23 N. S. W. 24; 6 S. 11. 132), 365. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxi [References are to pages.] Cameron v. Fellows ( 109 Iowa 534; 80 N. W. 567), 944, 1104, 1270. Cameron v. Guindor (89 Iowa 298; 50 N. W. 502), 1005. Cameron v. Kepinos (89 Iowa 501; 50 N. W. 077), 1000. Cameron v. Tucker ( 104 Iowa 211; 73 N. W. 601), 999. Cameron-Barkley Co. v. Thorn- ton, etc., Co. (138 N. C. 365; 50 S. E. 695), 2093, 2116. Camp, Appeal of (80 Conn. 272; 68 Atl. 444), 643. Camp V. Camp (18 Tex. 528), 2165, 2166, 2108. Camp V. State (27 Ala. 53), 400, 1456, 1474. Campbell, Ex parte (74 Cal. 20; 15 Pac. 318; 5 Am. St. 518), 109, 149. Campbell, In re (71 Ind. 512), 355. Campbell, In re (8 Pa. Super. Ct. 524), 745. Campbell v. Amer. Popular Life Ins. Co. (1 MacArthur 471), 2243. Campbell v. Fidelity & C. Co. (109 Ky. 661; 60 S. W. 492), 1736. Campbell v. Harmon (96 :\Ie. 87; 51 A. 801), 1983, 1984. Campbell v. Jackman Bros. ([Iowa] 118 N. W. 755), 104, 142, 152, 163, 480, 486. Campbell v. Jones (2 Tev. Civ. App. 263; 21 S. W. 723), 06, 1254, 1779, 1807. ampbell v. Ketcham ( 1 Bibb, 406), 2103. Campbell v. Manderscheid (74 la. 708; 39 N. W. 92), 226, 311, 1004. Campbell v. Moran (71 Xeb. 615; 99 N. W. 498), 587. Campbell v. New Ens. Mut. L. Ins. Co. (98 Mass. oSd > , 2220. Campbell v. Schlesinger (48 Hun 428; 1 N. Y. Supp. 220), 1961. Campbell v. Schofield (29 Leg. Int. 325), 980. Campbell v. State (79 Ala. 271), 1374, 1379, 1578. Campbell v. State (171 Ind. 702; 87 N. E. 212), 1011, 1066, 1068. Campbell v. State (62 X. J. 402; 41 Atl. 717), 1547, 1552. Campbell v. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 572; 40 S. W. 282), 1225, 1379, 1694. Campbell v. State (55 Tex. Cr. App. 277; 116 S. W. 581), 1630. Campbell v. Strangways (3 S. P. Div. 105), 501. Campbell v. Thomasville ( [Ga.] 64 S. E. 815), 74, 151, 162, 168, 270, .358, 388, 425, 430, 432, 440, 441, 442, 465, 551, 560, 579, 629. Campbell v. Union Bank (6 How. [Miss.] 625), 294. Campbell v. Wing (5 Tex. Civ. App. 431; 24 S. W. 360), 2199. Candill, In re ( [Ky.] 66 S. W. 723; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2139), 534. Canfield v. Leadville (7 Colo. App. 453; 43 Pac. 910), 825. Cann, Ex parte (1 S. R. N. S. W. 262; 18 W. X. N. S. W. 180), 670. Cannon v. Merry (116 Ga. 291; 42 S. E. 274), 978. Cannon City v. Manning (43 Colo. 144; 95 Pac. 537), 1332. Canova v. Williams (41 Fla. 509; 27 So. 30), 419, 447. Cantini v. Tillman (54 Fed. 969), 110, 139, 149, 152, 174, 321. Cantrell v. Sainer (59 Iowa 26; 12 X^. W. 753), 244, 291. 436, 474. Cantvvell v. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 511; S5 S. W. 19), 1372. Ixxii TABLE OF CASES [References are to pages.] Cantwell v. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 521; 85 S. W. 18), 865, 870, 958, 1184, 1207, 1082. Canvass, In re ([Iowa] 95 N. \Y. 194), 875. Cape Girardeau v. Riley (72 ^lo. 220), 409. Capritz v. State (1 Md. oG9), 1502, 1508. Capron v. State (11 Ind. App. 95; 38 N. E. 491), 1628. Carbondale v. Wade (106 III. App. 654), 734. Cardillo v. People (26 Colo. 355; 58 Pac. 678), 69, 70, 259. Carelton v. Rugg (149 Mass. 550; 22 X. E. 55; 55 L. R. A. 193; 14 Am. St. 446), 604, 982. Carey v. State (70 Ohio St. 121; 70 N. E. 955), 864>, 883, 1765. Cargo of Aurora v. United States 7 Cranch [U. S.] 382), 252. Carico v. Wilmore (51 Fed. 196), 2035. Carrico v. Commonwealth (5 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 605), 512. Carl V. State (87 Ala. 17; 6 So. 118; 4 L. R. A. 380), 21, 52, 86, 87, 137, 822, 96'9, 1185, 1699, 1701. Carleton v. Regg (149 Mass. 550: 22 X. E. 55), 258. Carleton v. State (43 Xeb. 373; 61 X. VV. 699). 2251. Carleton v. Woods (28 X. H. 290), 1782. Carlin v. Heller (34 Iowa 256), 1804. Carlisle v. State (42 Ala. 523), 929. Carlisle v. State (91 Ala. 1; 8 So. 3'86), 131, 137, 247, 593, 1278. Carlisle v. Town of Sheldon (38 Vt. 440), 2-256. Carlson, In re (127 Pa. St. 330; 18 Atl. 8; 24 W. X. C. 184), 747, 1237. Carlton v. Kreigher ([Tex.] 115 S. W. 619), 1235, 1904, Carolina Mfg. Co. v. Anthracite Beer Co. (25 Pa. Super. Ct. 94), 1788. Carmody v. People (17 111. 158), 1505. Carmon v. State (18 Ind. 450), 12, 32, 1496, 1561. Carnes v. State ( 18 Tex. App. 375), 1680. Carnes v. State (23 Tex. App. 449; 5 S. W. 133), 1588, 1680. Carnes v. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 437; 103 S. W. 934), 958, 1465, 1473, 1611, 1689. Carnes v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 490; 110 S. W. 750), 1623, 1624. Carnes v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 509; 111 S. W. 402), 1211. Carnes v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 103 S. W. 934), 916. Carnes v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 10 S. W. 928), 913, 1682, 1684. Carney a-. United States (7 Ind. Ty. 247; 104 S. W. 606), 2038, 2091. Carpeau v. Loiseau ( 12 Rev. Leg. 1309), 352. Carpenter. In re (71 Vt. 91; 41 Atl. 1042), 2036. Carpenter v. Commonwealth (92 Ky. 452; 18 S. W. 9; 13 Ky. L." Rep. 658), 2056, 2074. Carpenter v. Commonwealth (92 Ky. 452; 18 S. W. 9), 2041, 2056. Carpenter v. Innes (16 Col. 1(55; 26 Pac. 140), 1027. Carpenter v. Rogers (61 Mich. 384; 28 X. W. 156), 2094, 2108, 2116, 2123. Carr, In re (3 Sawy. 316; Fed. Cas. Xo. 2432), 1263. Carr v. Augusta (124 Ga. 11 ; 52 S. E. 300), 472, 715, 718, 734, 740, 748, 749, 750. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxiii [References are to pages.] Carr v. Boone (108 Ind. 241; 9 N. E. 110), 610, 860. Carr v. Fowler (74 Ind. 590), 397, 313. 'Carr v. State (5 Tex. App. 153), 198, 1532. Carrier v. Bernstein ( 104 Iowa 572; 73 N. W. 1076), 1711, 1882, 1'8S5, 1939. Carrier v. Bernstein ( [Iowa] 76 N. W. 1076), 1845. Carrier v. Bernstein (78 N. W. 1076), 1848. Carrigan v. Carrigan ( 15 Gr. Eq. [N. J.] 341), 2152. Carrigan v. Lycoming F. Ins. Co. (53 Vt. 418; 48 Am. Rep. 687), 177'S. Carrington v. Commonwealth (78 Ky. 83), 837. Carroll v. State (63 Md. 551; 3 Atl. 29), 135'8. Carroll v. .State (80 Miss. 349; 31 So. 742), 1608. Carroll v. Wright (131 Ga. 728; 63 S. E. 260), 140, 276, 499, 526. Can-oil Co. v. Lee ( 127 Iowa 230 ; 103 N. W. 101), 802, 806. Carry v. State (28 Tex. Cr. App. 477; 13 S. W. 773), 1160. Carter v. Bartel (110 Iowa 211; 81 N. W. 462), 997, 1004, 1270. Carter v. Clark (28 Conn. 512), 1800, 1802. Carter v. Fischer (127 Ala. 52; 28 So. 376), 1805. Carter v. Ford, etc., Co. (85 Ind. 180), 2250, 2253. Carter v. Fred Miller Brewing Co. (Ill Iowa 457; 82 N. W. 930), 1270. Carter v. Nicol (116 Iowa 519; i90 N. W. 352), 770, 774, 778, 1269. Carter v. State (87 Ala. 113; 6 So. 356), 2042, 2049. Carter v. State (81 Ark. 37; 98 S. W. 704), 953. Carter v. State (68 Ga. 826), 1505. Carter v. State (12 Tex. 500; 62 Am. Dec. 539), 2040, 2047, 2051, 2052. Carter v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 40 S. W. 267), 1379. Carter v. State ([Tex. Civ. App.] 92 S. W. 1093), 336, 953, 1280. Carter v. Steyer (93 Iowa, 533; 61 N. W. 956), 983, 994. Carter v. Williams ([1870] L. E. 9 Eq. 678; 39 L. J. Ch. 560; 23 L. T. 183; 18 W. R. 593), 1813. Carthage v. Block ( [Mo. App.] 123 C. W. 482), 442. Carthage v. Buckner (4 111. App. 317), 462, 845. Carthage v. Carlton (99 111. App. 338), 434, 826, 844. Carthage v. Duvall (202 111. 234; 66 N. E. 1099), 1280. Carthage v. Munsell (203 111. 474; 67 N. E. 831; affirming 105 111. App. 119), 969, 1280, 1281. Cartright v. McElden ( [Ky.] 116 S. W. 297), 372. Cartwright v. State (8 Lea 376), 2060, 2067, 2069, 2072. Carson v. Devault (12 L. K [Can.] 20), 1235. Carson v. State (69 Ala. 235), 85, 86, 822, 842, 928. Carstairs v. Cochran (95 Md. 488; 52 Atl. 601), 199, 200. Carstairs v. O'Donnell ( 154 Mass. 357; 28 X. E. 271), 300, 308, 310, 313, 327, 1799. Carswell, In re ( 15 Manitoba 620), 857, 896. Carswell v. State ([Ga. App.] 66 S. E. 488), 4. 1708. Carwile v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 72 S. W. 376), 1235, 1629. Casat V. State (40 Ark. 511), 2041, 2054, 2070. Ixxiv TABLE OF CASES. fReferences are to pages.] Casey v. Painter (50 Ohio St. 527; 38 X. E. 24), 1850, 1852. Casey v. State (6 Mo. 640), 1590. Casey v. State {[Tex. Cr. App.] 59 S. W. 884), 1473, 1681, 1684. Casey v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 67 S. W. 415), 1375. Caskey v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 108 S. W. 6«o), 1717. Casou V. State (37 Fla. 332; 20 S. 547), 934. Cassady v. Magher (85 Ind. 22S), 2190. Cassedy v. Stockridge (21 Vt. 391), 2172, 2186. Cassel V. Scott (17 Ind. 514), 755. Cassens v. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 186; 88 S. W. 229), 1694. Cassiday v. Macon ( [Ga.] 64 S. E. 941), 91, 103, 162, 182. Castellano v. Marks (37 Tex. Civ. App. 273; 83 S. W. 729), 683, 761. Castle V. Bell (145 Ind. 8; 44 N. E. 2), 196, 599, 606, 854. Castle V. Fogerty (19 111. App. 619 [Bradw.] 442), 1925. Castleman v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 44 S. W. 494), 1693. Castner v. Sliker (33 N. J. L. 95), 1736. Caswell V. Hundred House [J. J.] 54 J. P. 87), 350. Caswell V. State (2 Humph. 402), 25, 26, 28, 967. Cates V. South (23 J. P. 739; 1 L. T. 365), 1136. Cathcart v. Hardy (2 M. & S. 534), 824, 1643, 1644. Catherwood v. Collins (12 Wright [Pa.] 480), 1384. Caton V. State [Tex. Cr. App.] 95 S. W. 540), 1202, 1286. Catoir v. Waterson (38 Ohio St. 319), 815. Catt V. Tourle ([1869] L. R. 4 Ch. 654; 38 L. J, Ch. 665; 21 L. T. 188; 17 W. R. 662; 32 J. P. 659), 1815. Caulkins v. Fry (35 Conn. 170), 2093, 2094,' 2110, 2111. Cavanaugh v. Iowa Beer Co. ( 136 Iowa 276; 113 N. VV. 856), 1812. Cavaness v. State (43 Ark. 331), 2041, 2051, 2054. Cavender v. Waddingham (2 Mo. App. 551), 2&94, 2098, 2116. Cavender v. Waddingham ( 5 Mo. App. 457), 64, 2093, 2094, 2099. Cawthorne v. Campbell ( 1 Austr. 212), 1027. Cayionette v. Girard (28 L. C. J. 177; 1 Mon. Sup. Ct. 182), 1257, 1853, 1942. Cayuga County v. Freeoflf (17 How. Prac." 442), 24, 46, 966. Cazet v. Field (9 Gray 329), 1807. C. B. George & Bro. v. Win- chester (118 Ky. 429; 80 S. W. 1158; 26 Ky. L. Rep. 170), 630, 649, 935. C. D. Smith Drug Co. v. First Nat. Bank (60 Kan. 184; 55 Pac. 851), 1774. Cearfoss v. State (42 Md. 403). 1175, 1304, 1306, 1321. Center Co. Licenses (9 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 376), 628, 632. Centerville v. Gayken (20 S. D. 82; 104 N. W. 910), 446, 626. Central Ry. Co. v. Maekey (103 111. App. 15), 2206. Central, etc., Co. v. Phinazee (93 Ga. 488; 21 S. E. 66), 2177, 2201. 2202, 2203. Chaba v. Burnett (34 Ala. 400), 812. Chaddick v. Haley (81 Tex. 617; 17 8. W. 233), 2152. Chailes v. Bones (22 Austr. L. T. 97; 6 Austr. L. R. 209), 536. TABLE OP CASES. Ixxv * [References are to pages.] Chalmers v. Funk (76 Va. 717), 885, 906. Chamberlain v. Tecumseh (43 Neb. 221; 61 N. W. 632), 814. Chambers, In re (18 Pa. Super. Ct. 413), 025, 664. Charabers v. Groencastle (138 Ind. 330; 35 N. E. 14), 395. Chambers v. Northwestern, etc.. Ins. Co. (64 Minn. 495; 67 N. W. 367; 58 Am. St. Rep. 540), 2222. Chambers v. Smith (12 M. & W. 2), 569. Chamlee v. Davis (115 Ga. 266; 41 S. E. 691), 175, 288, 382. 906. 910, 921. Champer v. Greencastle (138 Ind. 339), 408, 468. Champion v. Board (5 Dak. 416; 41 N,W. 379), 867, 878. Champion v. State (5 Dak. 416; 41 N. W. 739), 868. Chandler v. Ruelwlt (8l3 Ind. 139), 599, 621, 662. Chandler's Wiltshire Brewery Co., In re ([1903] 1 K. B. 569; 72 L. J. K. B. 250; 67 J. P. 119; 51 W. R. 573; 88 L. T. 271; 19 T. L. R. 268), 1834. Channey v. State (146 Ala. 136; 41 So. 172), 288. Chapleau v. Cliapleaii (1 Leg. News. 473), 2152. Chapman. In re ( [N. Y.] 110 N. Y. Supp. 352), 720. Chapman v. Erie R. Co. (55 N. Y. 579), 352, 2100, 2191, 2202. Chapman v. State (100 Ga. 311; 27 S. E. 789), 25, 969, 1711. Chapman v. State (37 Te.\. Cr. App. 137; 39 S. W. 113), 868, 912, 916. Chappel V. State ([Ala.] 47 So. 329), 1454. Charge to Grand Jury. In re (10 N. J. Law J. 116), 1108, 1109, 1110. I' Charles v. Bones (22 Austr. L. T. 97; 6 Austr. L. R. 209), 1134. Charles v. Grierson (29 Austr. L. T. 222), 1147. Charles v. State (13 Tex. App. €58), 2061. Charleston v. Ahrens (4 Strob. L. [S. C] 241), 111, 139. Charleston v. Benjamin (2 Strob. [S. C] 508), 216. 'Charleston v. Corleis (2 Bailey [S. C] 186), 499, 501. Charleston v. Feckman (3 Rich. L. 385), 498. Charleston v. Payne (2 Nott. & Mc€. 475), 2034. Charleston v. Schmidt (11 Rich. L. 343), 409, 501. Charleston v. State (4 Strobh. 241), 307. Charlton v. Donncll (100 Mass. 229), 1800. Charrington & Co., Limited, v. Camp. ([1902] 1 Ch. 386; 71 L. J. Ch. 196; 8<) L. T. 15; 18 T. L. R. 152), 1829. Chase v. Keniston (76 Me. 209), 1944, 1974. Chase v. Van Buren Circuit Judge (148 Mich. 149; 111 N. W. 750; 14 Detroit L. N. 73), S40, 841. Chason v. City of Milwaukee (30 Wis. 316), 408. Chastain v. Calhoun (29 Ga. 333), 522. Chatham v. State (92 Ala. 47; 9 So. 607), 2042, 2079. Cheadle v. State (4 Ohio St. 477), 1384, 1590. Chemlir v. Sawyer (42 Neb. 362; 60 N. W. "547), 1859, 1999, 2001. Cheney, In re (35 Misc. Rep. 598; 72 N. Y. Supp. 134), 582, 583, 592. Cheney v. Duke (10 Gill & J. 11), 1801. Ixxvi TABLE OF CASES, [References are to pages.] Chenowith, In re (56 Neb. 688; 77 N. W. 63), 1739. Chenowith v. State (50 Tex. Cr. App. 238; 96 S. W. 19), 914, 915, 916, 117'6. Cheny V. Shelbyville (18 Ind. 84), 418. Cherry v. Commonwealth ( 78 Va. 375), 715, 737, 743, 744. Cherry v. Shelbyville (19 Ind. 84), 795. Chesapeake Club v. Stale (63 Md. 446), 1325, 1339. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Sauls- berry (112 Ky. 915; 66 N. • W. 1051; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2341; 56 L. R. A. 680), 2206, 2208, 2213, 2214. Chew V. State (43 Ark. 361), 822, 834. Chicago V. Collins (175 111. 445; 51 N. E. '907; 49 L. R. A. 408; 67 Am. Rep. 224), 479. Chicago V. Enright (27 111. App. ■559), 793, 802. Chicago V. Malken (119 111. App. 542; affirmed 217 lU. 471; 75 N. W. 548), 691. Chicago V. Netcher (183 111. 104; 55 N. E. 307), 454, 469, 1337. Chicago V. O'Hara (124 111. App. 290), 578, 649, 800. Chicago V. Slack (121 111. App. 131), 409, 415. Chicago V. Stratton (162 111. 494; 45 N. E. 116), 204. Chicago City R. Co. v. Lewis (5 111. App. 242), 2174, 2177. Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Wall (93 111. App. 441), 1736. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bell (70 111. 102), 2172, 2180, 2185. Chicago, etc., Ob. v. Chicago (88 111. 221; 30 Am. Rep. 545), 167. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Doyle (18 Kan. 58), 2200. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Drake (33 111. App. 114), 2176. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Jones ( 149 111. 361; 37 N. E. 247), 264, 1585. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Randolph (199 111. 126; 65 X. E. 142), 1736, 2208. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Sullivan (63 111. 293), 2192, 2194, 2198, 2109, 2201. Child V. Hudson's Bay €0. (2 P. Williams, 207), 438. Childers v. Shepherd ([Ala.] 39 So. 235), 174, 233. Chilvers v. People (11 Mich. 43), 479, 788. Chinn v. Russell (2 Blackf. [Ind.] 172), 1027. Chipman v. People (24 Colo. 520; 52 Pac. 677), 1609, 1697. Chisholm v. Strickland ( 9 N. S. W. L. R. 391), 1325, 1343. Chittenden Co. v. Mitchell (23 Vt. 131), 1743. Chivers v. People (11 Mich. 43), 479, 788. Choate v. State (47 Tex. Cr. App, 297; S3 S. W. 377), 1380. Choice V. State (31 Cia. 424), 1735, 2041, 2058, 2086. Choran v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 301; 92 S. W. 422), 1202. Chrisman v. State (54 Ark. 283), 2041. Christ Diehl Brewing Co. v. Spen- cer (29 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep, ol2), 541. Christ Deal Brewing Co. v. Beck (30 Ohio 'Cr. Ct. Rep. 226), 544. Christian v. State (40 Ala. 376), 1290. Christian v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 39 S. W. 682), 1098, I'hristian Moer. Brewing Co. v. Hill (166 Fed. 1140), 259, 293. C hristie v. Britnell (21 Vict. L. R. 71; 17 Austr. L. T. 59; 1 Austr, L. R. 59), 1571, TABLE OF CASES. Ixxvii [References are to pages.] Christensen, In re (43 Fed. 243), 206. •Christensen, Ex parte (85 Cal. 208; 24 Pac. 747), 191, 195, 206, 208. Christensen v. Kellogg, etc., Co. (110 111. App. 61), 974. Chung Sing v. United States (36 Pac. 205), 1629. Church V. Higliam (44 Iowa, 482), 1242, 1251, 1252, 1255. Church V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (31 Fed. 529), 2197. Church V. Territory ([X. M.] 91 Pac. 720), 358. Church v. Weeks ( 38 Mo. App. om), 887. Churchill v. Alpena Ct. Judge (50 Mich. 536; 23 N. W. 211), 2255. Churchill v. Detroit (153 Mich. 93; 116 X. W. 558), 424. Churcliill V. Herrick (32 Wis. 357), 808. Chute V. Van Camp ([Wis.] 117 N. W. 1012), 441. Chuya, In re (20 Pa. Super. Ct. 410), 626, 628, 629, 635, 604. Cincinnati v. Rice (15 Ohio, 225), 216. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Com- missioners, etc. ( 1 Ohio St. 77), 240, 1014. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Com- monwealth (126 Ky. 563; 104 S. W. 394; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 954), 955, 1289. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Cooper (120 Ind. 469; 22 N. E. 340; 6 L. R. A. 241), 2191, 2193, 2202, 2209, 2210. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Marvs (119 Ky. 954; 85 S. W. l'S8; 70 L. R. A. 291), 2183, 2213, 2217. Cipperley, In re (50 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 266; 100 X. Y. Supp. 473), 852. City Council v. Ahrens (4 Strobh. 241), 189. City Council v. HoUenback (3 Strobh. 355), 529. City Council v. Talck (3 Rich. L. [S. C.J 299), 1124, 1309, 1669. City Council v. Van Roven (2 McCord [S. C] 465), 1370. City Tattersall's Club, In re (29 Vict. L. R. 257; 25 Austr. L. T. 85; '9 Austr. L. R. 165), 1345. Citizens, etc., v. Board (49 La. Ann. 641; 21 So. 742), 939. Clancy, In re (58 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 258; 109 X. Y. Supp. 044), 881. Clapton V, Commonwealth ([Va.] 63 S. E. 1022), 1650, 1652. Clare v. State (5 Clarke [Iowa] 509), 1501. Clark, Ex parte (69 Ark. 435; 64 S. W. 223), 635. Clark, Ex parte ( [Tex.] 120 S. W. 892), 279, 291, 387, 419, 635. Clark V. Adams (80 Miss. 219; 31 So. 746), 1098, 1761. Clark V. Carter (40 Ind. 190), 355. Clark V. Coldwell (6 Watts, 139), 2119, 2120. Clark V. Daniel (77 Ark. 122; 91 S. W. 9), 859. Clark V. Ellis (2 Blackf. [Ind.] 248), 294. Clark V. Pratt ([Miss.] 11 So. 631), 669. Clark V. Railroad Company (4 Allen [Mass.] 231), 1070. Clark V. Riddle (101 Iowa, 270; 70 X. W. 207), 932, 978, 1005. Clark V. Rogers (81 Ky. 43), 233. Clark V. Sheehan (22 X. Z. 707), 1153. Clark V. Skinner (20 John [N. Y.] 465; 11 Am. Dec. 302), 1027. Clark V. State ( [Ga.] 63 S. E. 606), 1602. Ixxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References aie to pages.] Clark V. (State (34 Ind. 311), 1442, 1483, 1484, 1566. Clark V. State (24 Xeb. 263; 38 N. W. 752), 6H;. Clark V. State (32 Xeb. 246; 49 N. W. 367 ) , 2056. Clark V. State (8 Humph. 671), 2040. Clark V. State (40 Tex. Cr. App. 127; 49 S. W. 85), 1612, 1613, 1691, 1732, 1733. Clark V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 107 S. W. 1198), 1465, 1473. Clark V. State (53 Tex. Civ. App. 529; 111 S. W. 659), 86, 2032. <:iark V. Tower (65 Atl. 3; 104 Md. 175), 120, 286, 864. Clark V, Tuckett (2 \'eiit. 1'82), 294. Clark V. Wilmington, etc., E. Co. (109 X. C. 430) : 14 S. E. 43; 14 L. R. A. 749), 2183, 2197. Clarke v. Blake (2 Ves. Jr. 673), 1906. Clarke v. Philadelphia, etc., Co. 92 Minn. 418; 100 X. W. 231), 1736, 218-6. Clarke v. Rochester (5 Abb. Prac. 107), 233. Clarke Co. v. Herrington (113 Ga. 234; 38 S. E. 852), 476. Class, Appeal of (6 Pa. Super. Co. 130), 697, 705. Claus V. Hardy (31 Xeb. 35; 47 X. VV. 418), 661. Claussen v. Luverne ( 103 ]\linn. 491; 115 N. W. 643), 7.52, 788. Clay, hi re (1 L. C. pi. II, 300), 491. Claydon v. Green ([1868] L. R. 3 C. P. oil; 37 L. J. C. P. 226; 18 L. T. 607; 16 W. R. 1126), 1S30. Clayton, Kx parte (03 J. P. 688), 567, 570. Clearof, In re ([1907] 14 App. Ont. L. R. 392), 921. Clears v. Stanley (34 111. App. 338), 1909, 1973. Clegg V. Hands ([1890] 44 Ch. D. 503; 55 J. P. 180), 1816. Cleghorn v. Xew York, etc., Co. (56 X. Y. 44), 2172, 2102, 2194, 2198. Clement, In re (29 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 29 ; 60 X. Y. Supp. 328 ) , 852. Clements, In re (52 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 325; 102 X. Y. Supp. 178; affirmed 118 X. Y, App. Div. 5/5; 103 X. Y. Supp. 157), 580, 730. Clement, In re 54 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 362; 105 X. Y. Supp. 1054), 103. Clement, In re (55 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 615; 105 X. Y. Supp. 1085), 706, 733, 736, 741. Clement, In re (57 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 47; 107 X. Y. Supp. 205), 731, 752. Clement, In re (58 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 257; 110 X. Y. Supp. 893), 723. Clement, In re (58 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 638; 111 X. Y. Supp. 1073), 584. Clement, In re (59 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 367; 112 X. Z. Supp. 126), 718, 742, 746, 751. Clement, In re ( 62 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 512; 116 X. Y. Supp. 1070), 742, 746, 751. Clement, In re (116 X. Y. App. Div. 148; 101 X. Y. Supp. 683; affirmed 118 X. Y. App. Div. 575; 103 X. Y. Supp. 157), 729, 739, 745. Clement, In re (1 18 X. Y. App. Div. 575; 103 X. Y. Supp. 157; affirming 103 X. Y. Supp. 447), 584, 732. Clement, In re (119 X. Y. App. Div. 622; 104 X. Y. Supp. 25; 53 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 358; 104 X. Y. Supp. »05), 730. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxix fReferences are to pages] Clement, In re (125 N. Y. App. Div. 676; 110 N. Y. ,Supp. o7, 50), 534, 54-6, 732. Clement, In re (187 N. Y. 274; 79 N. E. 1003), 745, 932. Clement, In re (190 N. Y. 523; S3 N. E. 1123; affirming 119 N. Y. App. Div. '622; 104 N. Y. Supp. 25), 370, 719. Clement v. Beers (110 N. Y. Supp. •99), 1312. Clement v. Empire State Surety Co. (110 N. Y. S. 418), li924. Clement v. Federal Union Surety Co. ( 122 N. Y. App. Div. 18 ; 106 N. Y. Supp. 1061), 769. Clement v. Harden (62 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 31; 114 X. Y. Supp. 751), 1016, 1075. Clement v. Martin ( 117 N. Y. App. Div. 5; 102 N. Y. Supp. 37), 1188, 1268, 1312. Clement v. Mattison (3 Rich. L. [S. C] 93), 2109, 2114. Clement v. Moore ( [N. Y. App. Div.] 119 N. Y. Supp. 883), 751. Clement v. Rafbech (62 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 27; 115 N. Y. Supp. 162), 1074. Clement v. Smith (60 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 395; 112 N. Y. Supp. 955), 757. Clement v. Viscosi (63 N. Y. App. Div. 514; 118 N. Y. Supp. 613), 698, 750, 818. Clemmens v. Commonwealth ( 6 Rand. 681), 540. Cleveland v. Rogers (0 Wend. [N. Y.] 438), 1018. Cleveland v. State (86 Ala. 1; 5 So. 426), 2062, 2003, 2068. Cleveland v. State (4 Ga. App. 62; 60 S. E. 801). 2024, 2035. Cleveland v. Tripp (13 R. I. 50), 792. Cleveland v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 66 S. W. 550), 1235, 1237, 1627. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Harring- ton (131 Ind. 426; 30 N. E. 37), 98. Clevenger v. Rushville (90 Ind. 258), 403. Clifford v. O'Donnell (24 N. S. W. 8), 1129, 1134. Clifford V. Smith (24 N. S. W. 192), 1255. Clifford V. State (29 Wis. 327), 12, 15, 23, 26, 29. Clifton V. Davis ( 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. 31), 2094, 2097, 2103, 2130. Clifton Cook Brewery v. Ryan (19 N. Y. 595), 1819. Cline V. State (43 Ohio St. 332; 1 N. E. 22), 2040, 2048, 2067, 2073. Cline v. Cline (10 Ore. 474), 2164. Clinton v. Gruesendorf (79 Iowa, 117; 45 N. W. 407), 69, 70, 1315. Clinton v. Laming (61 Mich. 355; 28 N. W. 125), 1899, 1900, 1978. Clinton v. Phillips (58 111. 102), 840. Clinton v. State (58 111. 102), 211, 220. Clinton v. State (33 Ohio St. 27), 1655. Clintonville v. Keating (4 Denio [N. Y.] 341), 401, 410, 414, 470. Clipperly, In re (50 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 266; 100 N. Y. Supp. 473), 880, 881, 882, 922. Clisham, In re (105 Cal. 674; 39 Pac. 37), 1532, 1533. Clohessy v. Roedelheim (99 Pa. St." 56), 1806. Clopton V. Commonwealth ([Va.] 63 S. E. 1022), 264, 1653, 1654. Clore & Berry, In re (2 B. C. 131), 627, 631. Clore V. State (26 Tex. App. 624; 10 S. W. 242), 2039, 2088, 2090. Ixxx TABLE OF CASES, [References are to pages.] "Close V. Burkholder (18 Pa. St. 48), 1782. Close V. O'Brien (135 Iowa, 305; 112 N. W. 800), 589. Cluck V. State (40 Ind. 2G3), 2040. Cloud V. State (36 Ark. 151), 513, 1357, 1358, 1372. Clutch V. Clutch (1 N. J. Eq. 474), 2167. Clyde, In re (82 Neb. 537; 118 N. W. 90), 761. Coates V. New York (7 Cow. [N. Y.] 585, 604, 606), 129. Coats V. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 553; 89 S. W. 838), 1280. Cobb V, Billings (23 Me. 470), 1191, 1780. Cobb V. Cobb ([1900] P. 294; 64 L. J. P. 125; 83 L. T. 716), 2169. Cobb V. People (84 111. 511), 784. Cobb V. Tarr (16 Gray, 597), 1775. Cobleigh v. McBride (45 Iowa, 116), 1223, 1661, 2011. Coburn v. Gill ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 60 S. W. 974), 772, 785. Cochell V. Reynolds (156 Ind. 14; 58 N. E. 1029), 855. Cockerell v. Commonwealth (115 Ky. 296 ; 24 Ky. L. Rep. 449 ; 72 S. W. 760), 1493, 1494. Cochin V. Reynolds (156 Ind. 14; 58 N. E. 1029), 606. Cochrane v. Clough (38 Me. 25), 1782. Cochran's Will, In re (1 T. B. Mon. 263; 15 Am. Dec. 116), 21;;6, 2150. Cochran v. State (26 Tex. 678), 1290, 1491, 1505, 1554, 1590. Cocker v. McMullen (64 J. P. 245; 81 L. T. 784), 690, 1271, 1285. Cockerell v. Commonwealth (115 Ky. 296; 73 S. W. 760; 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2149), 1698, 1699. Cockrill V. Cockrill (79 Fed. 143), 2019, 2117. Cockrill V. Cockrill (92 Fed. 811; 34 C. C. A. 254), 2019, 2117. Cocks V. Lady Henry Somerset ([1895] 11 T. L. R. 567), ]£30. Coe, In re (24 Up. Can. 439), 914. Coe V. Errol (116 U. S. 517; 42 L. Ed. 1088; 6 Sup. Ct. 475), 325. Coe V. State ( [Okla.] 104 Pac. 1074), 38, 83. Cofer V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 87 S. W. 264; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 934), 415, 543. Coffee V. Ruffiji (4 Cold. 487), 2126. Coffeen v. Huber (78 111. App. 455), 1280. Coffer V. Elizabethtown ( [Ky.] 99 S. W. 608; 36 Ky. L. Rep. 706), 186. Cofield V. Britton ([Tex. Civ. App.] 109 S. W. 493), 245, 865, 921, 938. Coffin, In re (41 N. Y. Misc. 131; 83 N. Y. Supp. 941), 2017. Cogdell V. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. 130 N. C. 313; 41 S. E. 541), 2189. Coggeshall v. Groves ( 16 R. I. 18; 11 Atl. 296), 123, 491, 1194. Coggeshall v. Pallett (15 R. I. 168; 1 Atl. 413), 762, 778. Coggins V. Griffith (5 Ga. App. 1; 62 S. E. 659), 441, 1089, 1090. Coghill V. State (37 Ind. Ill), 407. Cogill V. Queenstown (21 Juta, 262), 604. Cohaba v. Burnett (34 Ala. 400), 811. Cohely v. State (4 Iowa, 477), 1484. Cohen, In re (5 Pa. Super. Ct. 224), 666. Colien V. Jarrett (42 Md. 571), 101, 138, 195, 574. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxi [References are to pages.] Cohen v. King Knob Club (55 W. Va. 108; 46 S. E. 799), 977, 990. Cohen v. Rice ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 101 S. W. 1052), 167, 424. Cohen v. State ( [Ga.] 65 S. E. 1096), 1530. Cohen v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 422; 110 S. W. 66), 364. Cohens v. State ([Tex.] 116 S. W. 571), 937. Cohn, In re ([Neb.] 121 X. W. 107), 574. Cohn V. Melcher (29 Fed. 433), 152. Cohn V. State (120 Tenn. 61; 109 S. W. 1149), 254, 1602. Cohoes V. Moian (25 How. Pr. 385), 448, 449. Coker v. State (91 Ala. 92; 8 So. 874), 1166, 1223, 1224, 1754. Colchester v. Godwin (Carter, 121), 294. Colbath V. State (4 Tex. App. 76), 2039, 2067. Colburn v. Spencer ( 177 Mass. 743; 59 N. E. 78), 1974. Colby V. Fitzgerald ( [Iowa] 94 N. W. 491), 1661. Colby V. State ( [Iowa] 94 N. W. 491), 1731. Coldwell V. Guider (88 Ala. 421; 7 So. 203), 941. Cole, Appeal of ( 79 Conn. 679 ; 66 Atl. 508), 750. Cole V. Cole (5 Sneed [Tenn.] 57; 70 Am. Dec. 275), 2114. Cole V. Commonwealth (101 Ky. 151; 39 S. W. 1029; 19 Ky.. L. Eep. 324), 934. Cole V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 98 S. W. 1002; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 385), 923. Cole V. Coulton (24 J. P. 596; 2 E. & E. 695; 29 L. J. M. C. 125; 2 L. T. 216; 8 W. R. 412), 367, 726, 2026. Cole V. McClcndler (109 La. 183; 34 S. E. 384), 865. Cole V. Robbins (Bull. N. P. 172a), 2092, 2098, 2106. Cole V. State (120 Ga. 485; 48 S. E. 156), 1602, 1650. Cole V. State (9 Tex. 42), 369, 370. Colee V. State (75 Ind. oil), 2040. Coleman v. People (78 111. App. 210), 1912, 1923, 1974, 1980, Coleman v. State (145 Ala. 13; 40 So. 715), 1479. Coleman v. State (150 Ala. 64; 43 So. 715), 1443, 1484, 1505. Coleman v. State (3 Ga. App. 298; 59 S. E. 829), 2032. Coleman v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 578; 111 S. W. 1011), 916, 1168, 1181, 1339, 1343, 1692, 1694, 1696, 1729. Coleman v. State (54 Tex. Cr. App. 396; 112 S. W. 1072), 913, 1599, 1703. Colglazier v. McClary ([Neb.] 98 N. W. 670), 586, 618. Colglazier v. Salem (61 Ind. 445), 811. Collarn, In re (134 Pa. St. 551; 19 Atl. 775), 635, 648. Collender v. Densmore (55 N. Y. 206), 1727. Collian, In re (82 N. Y. App. Div. 445; 81 N. Y. Supp. 567), 186. Collier v. Early (54 Ind. 559), 1870, 1871. Collins V. Barrier (64 Miss. 21; 8 So. 164), 577, 603, 669. Collins V. Hills (77 Iowa, 181; 41 N. W. 571; 3 L. R. A. 110), 309, 310. Collins V. Noyes (66 N. H. 619; 27 Atl. 225), 1021. Collins V, State (152 Ala. 90; 44 So. 571), 1607, 1645. Collins V. State (114 Ga. 70; 39 S. E. 916), 946. Collins V. State ( 38 Ind. App. 625 ; 78 N. E. 851), 1573. Collins V. State (34 Tex. Cr. App. 95; 29 S. W. 274), 1351, 1361. bocxii TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages.] Collins T. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 497; 84 S. W. 585), 1695. Collins V. State ( 115 Wis. 596; 92 N. W. 266), 2078, 2079. Colon V. Lisk (153 N. Y. 188; 47 N. E. 302), 743. Colter V. Cooper (15 N. Z. L. R. 186), 1727. Columbus City v. Cutconip (61 Iowa, 672), 488, 490. Columbus V. Schaerr (5 Ohio S. & C. P. 100), 211, 295, 442. Columbus City v. Cutcomp (61 Iowa, 672; 17 N. W. 47), 168, 183, 184, 185. Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Wood (86 Ala. 164), 2182, 2184, 2185, 2190. Colusa County v. Seube ( [Cal.] 53 Pac. li28; affirming [Cal.] 53 Pac. 654), 412, 447. Colvin V. Finch (75 Ark. 154; 87 S. W. 443), 859. Colwell V. State (112 Ga. 75; 37 S. E. 129), 965, 969, 971. Combe v. Carthew ( [N. J. L.] 43 Atl. 1057), 2121. Combs V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 104 S. W. 270; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 822), 959, 1158, 1465, 1467, 1470. Combs V. State (81 Ga. 780; 8 S. E. 318), 1405, 1469. Commagere v. Brown (27 La. Ann. 314), 1811. Commissioners v. Backus (29 How. Prac. 33), 783, 1188. Commissioners v. Beall (98 Tex. 104; 81 S. W. 526), 863. Commissioners v. Cartman ( [ 1896] 1 Q. B. 655; 60 J. P. 357; 65 L. J. M. C. 113; 74 L. T. 726; 44 W. R. 631; 12 T. L. R. 334), 361, 1253, 1352, 1355. Commissioners v. Daugherty ( 55 Barb. 332), 513, 1372. Commissioners v. Dennis ( 1 Cheves, 229), 508. Commissioner v. Donovan ([1903] 1 K. B. 895 ; 67 J. P. 147 ; 72 L, J. K. B. 545; 52 W, R. 14; 88 L. T. 555; 19 T. L. R. 392), 744. Commissioners v. Freeoff ( 17 How. Pr. 442), 48, 82. Commissioner v. Gas Co. (2 Grant [Pa.], 291), 408. Commissioners v. Patterson (8 Jones [N. C] Law, 182), 443. Commissioner v. Roberts ([1904] 1 K. B. 369; 68 J. P. 39; 73 L. J. K. B. 231; 52 W. R. 560; 20 T. L. R. 105), 1140. Commissioners v. Taylor (21 N. Y. 173), 14, 48, 82, 85. Commissioners v. Trimble ( 150 Mass. 89; 22 K. E. 239), 62. Commonwealth v. Aaron (114 Mass. 255), 1097, 1674. Commonwealth v. Acton ( 165 Mass. 11; 42 N. E. 329 S 1596. Commonwealth v. Adair (6 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 306), 1681. Commonwealth v. Adair ( 121 Ky. 689; 89 S. W. 1130; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 657), 950. Commonwealth v. Adams ( 1 Gray, 481), 1483, 1485. Commonwealth v. Adams (6 Gray, 3o9), 1744. Commonwealth v. Ahrens ( 150 Mass. 393; 23 N. E. 53), 1166. Commonwealth v. Alexander ( 1 Va. Cas. 156; 4 Hen. & M. 522), 2031. Commonwealth v. Alger (7 Cush. 53), 92, 97, 1009. Commonwealth v. Allen ( 15 B. Mon. 1), 1516, 1517. Commonwealth v. Alpa (24 Super. Ct. 454), 1342, 1344. Commonwealth v. Anderson ( 10 Ky. L. Rep. 307), 946, 957, 1463, 1682, 1729. Commonwealth v. Andrews ( 143 Mass. 23; 8 N. E. 643), 1672. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxiii [References are to pagres.] Commonwealth v. Anthes ( 12 Gray, 29), 8, 85, 1592. Commonwealth v. Armstrong (7 Gray, 494), 16o0, 1U55. Commonwealth v. Arnold (4 Pick. 251), 369, 1575. Commonwealth v. Asbury ( 104 Ky. 320; 47 S. W. 217; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 574), 541, 1269. Commonwealth v. Atkins ( 136 Mass. 160), 1081, 1089, 1116, 1669. Commonwealth v. Auberton (133 Mass. 404), 213, "214, 344, 347. Commonwealth v. Ault ( 10 Pa. Super. Ct. 651), 2079. Commonwealth v. Austin (97 Mass. 595), 1647, 1719, 1730. Commonwealth v. Baird ( 4 S. & K. 141), 1505. Commonwealth v. Baker ( 10 Cash. 405), 1516, 1518. Commonwealth v. Baker (2 Gray, 78), 1534. Commonwealth v. Baker ( 152 Mass. 337; 25 N. E. 718), 1103. Commonwealth v. Baker ( 1 1 Phila. 631; 33 Leg. Int. 367), 2040, 2051, 2060, 2068. Commonwealth v. Barbour (121 Ky. 689; 89 S. W. 479; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 433), 057. Commonwealth v. Barker ( 14 Gray, 412), 1113, 1115, 1666, 1668. Commonwealth v. Barley (97 Mass. 597), 1614. Commonwealth v. Barlow (97 Mass. 597), 1595. Commonwealth v. Barnes (138 Mass. 511), 546, 1126, 1238, 1265. Commonwealth v. Barnes (140 Mass. 447), 213, 344. Commonwealth v. Barry (115 Mass. 146), 1090, 1368. Commonwealth v. Bartholomew ([Ky.] 33 S. W. 840), 1499. Commonwealth v. Bartley (138 Mass. 181), 1543. Commonwealth v. Bathrick (6 Cush. 247), 22, 965. Commonwealth v. Baumler (20 Pa. Super. Ct. 273), 1237. Commonwealth v. Baward^ (6 Gray, 488), 1479. Commonwealth v. Bearce (150 Mass. 380; 23 N. E. 99), 572, 730, 740, 1452. Commonwealth v. Beck ( 187 Mass. 15; 72 N. E. 357), 056. Commonwealth v. Beckum ( 153 Mass. 386; 26 N. E. 1003), 1746. Commonwealth v. Beldham ( 15 Pa. Super. Ct. 33), 972. Commonwealth v. Bell ( 14 Bush, 433), 1461, 1564. CommonwealtJi v. Below ( 1 15 Mass. 130), 1643. Commonwealth v. Benge ( 13 Ky. L. Rep. 591), 1.502. Commonwealth v. Bennett ( 108 Mass. 27 ) , 228, 232, 235, 240, 1035, 1009, 1741. Commonwealth v. Bennett ( 108 Mass. 30; 11 Am. Rep. 304), 1401, 1514. Commonwealth v. Bently (97 Mass. '551), 87, 1702, 1709. Commonwealth v. Berghman ( 129 Pa. 644; 18 Atl. 570; 25 Wkly. N. C. 151), 522. Commonwealth v. Berry ( 109 Mass. 366), 1658, 1659. Commonwealth v. Bickum (153 Mass. 3S6; 26 N. E. 1003), 1595, 1614. Commonwealth v. Bishman (138 Pa. 639; 12 Atl. 12), 1752. Commonwealth v. Blackburn ([Ky.] 122 S. W. 818), 648. Commonwealth v. Blackington ( 24 Pick. 352), 111, 139, 503, 504, 1159. Commonwealth v. Blanchard ( 105 Mass. 173), 1460. Ixxxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Commonwealth v. Blair (5 Pa. Dist. Rep. 488), 647. Commonwealth v. Blood (4 Gray, 31), 1623, 1G26, 1647, 1656. Commonwealth v. Bios (116 Mass. 56), 8, 11, 44, 46, 85, 962, 973, 1704. Commonwealth v. Bogie ( 1 S. W. 532; 8 Ky. L. Rep. 350), 931. Commonwealth v. Bogie ( 7 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 601), 946. Commonwealth v. Bolkom ( 3 Pick. 251), 369, 1575, 1640. Commonwealth v. Boon (2 Gray, 74), 2031. Commonwealth v. Boyd ( [Ky.] 32 S. W. 132), 1467, 1468. Commonwealth v. Boyden ( 14 Gray, 101), 1656, 1667, 1715, 1672. Commonwealth v. Boyden ( 183 Mass. 1; 66 N. E. 202), 1195. Commonwealth v. Boyle ( 14 Gray, 3), 1513. Commonwealth v. Boyle ( 145 Mass. 373; 14 N. E. 155), 1670. Commonwealth v. Bottoms ([Ky.] 50 S. W. 684 ; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1929), 939. Commonwealtli v. Bottoms ( [Ky.] 57 S. VV. 493; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1829 ; reversing 57 S, W. 495 ) , 940. Commonwealth v. Bottoms ([Ky.] 22 Ky. L. Rep, 410; 57 's, W. 493), 234. Commonwealtli v. Boutwell ( 162 Mass. 230; 38 N. E. 441), 1082. Commonwealth v. Boyton (2 Al- len, 160), 1112, nio. Commonwealth v. Bradley (3 Gray, 456), 1115. Commonwealth v. Brady (147 Mass, 683; 18 N. E. 568), 1375, 1675, 1676. Commonwealth v. Brelsford (161 Mass. 61; 36 N. E. 677), 709, 1698. Commonwealth v. Bi-em (5 Pa. Super. Ct. 104), 1342, 1343, Commonwealth v. Brenaman ( 8 B. Mon. 374), 511, 694. Commonwealth v. Brennan ( 103 Mass. 70), 95, 129, 182, 184, 186, 488, 489, 714, 1374, Commonwealth v. Briggs (11 Met, 573), 1655. Commonwealth v. Briant (142 Mass. 463; 8 N. E. 338; 50 Am. Rep. 707), 1591, 1615, 1629. Commonwealth v. Broker ( 151 Mass. 355; 23 N. E. 1137), 1445, 1449, 1452. Commonwealth v. Brooks ( 150 Mass. 59; 22 N, E, 436), 1615. Commonwealth v. Brothers ( 158 Mass. 200; 33 N. E. 386), 259, 345, 1536, 1595. Commonwealth v. Brown ( 10 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 407), 884, 936. Commonwealth v. Brown (2 Gray, 358), 1623. Commonwealth v. Brown ( 12 Gray, 135), 1765. Commonwealth v. Brown ( 12 Met, 522), 1500. Commonwealth v. Brown ( 124 Mass. 318), 1729, 1732. Commonwealth v. Brown ( 136 Mass. 171), 1672. Commonwealtli v. Brown ( 154 Mass. 55; 27 X. E. 776; 13 L. R. A. 195), 1374. Commonwealth v. Brusie ( 145 Mass. 117; 13 N. E. 378), 988, 1513. Commonwealth v. Bryan (9 Dana [Ky.] 310), 694, 1783. Commonwealth v. Bryan ( 148 Mass. 455; 19 N, E. 555), 1671. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxv [References are to pages.] Commonwealth v. Bryden (9 Met. 137), 1487. Commonwealth v. Buck ( 12 Met. 524), 1G37. Commonwealth v. Budser ( 14 Gray, 83), 85. Commonwealth v. Bulkley (147 Mass. 581; IS X. E. 571), 1671. Commonwealtli v. Binding ( 12 Cush. 500), 1510, 1521. Commonwealth v. Burk (11 Gray, 437), 13G0. Commonwealtli v. Burk ( 15 Gray, 404), 1651. Commonwealth v. Burke ( 14 Gray, 81), L626. Commonwealth v. Burke ( 15 Gray, 408), 23. Commonwealth a\ Burke (114 Mass. 261), 1094. 1099, 1102. Commonwealth v. Burke (121 Mass. 39), 1516. Commonwealtli v. Burke (114 Mass. 261), 1375. Commonwealth v. Burns (8 Gray, 482), 1171. Commonwealth v. Burns (9 Gray, 287), 1711. Commonwealth v. Burns ( 167 Mass. 374; 45 X. E. 755), 1101. Commonwealth v. Burns ( 38 Pa. Super. Ct. 514), 10, 14, 1697. Commonwealth v. Bushman ( 138 Pa. St. 639; 21 Atl. 12), 337. Commonwealth v. Byers ( [Ky.] 109 S. W. 895; 33 Ky. L. Rep. 252), 825, 826, '834. Commonwealth v. Byrnes ( 126 Mass. 248), 1516,*^ 1530, 1531. Commonwealth v. Bj^rne (20 Gratt. 165), 200, ""201, 7'88, '801, 802. Commonwealth v. Cagne ( 153 Mass. 205; 26 X. E. 449; 10 L. R. A. 442). 300. Commonwealth v. Calhome ( 154 Mass. 115: 27 X. E. 881), 321, 328. Commonwealth v. Callahan ( 108 Mass. 421), 1582. Commonwealth v. Callone ( 154 Mass. 115; 27 X. E. 881), 514. Commonwealth v. Campbell ( [Ky.] 107 S. W. 797; 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1131), 749. Commonwealth v. Campbell (116 Mass. 32), 1587, 1601. Commonwealth v. Cameron ( 141 Mass. 83; 63 X. E. 547), 1640. Commonwealth v. Canny (158 Mass. 210; 33 X. E. 340), 1088, 1089, 1660, 1754. Commonwealth v. Carey (151 Pa. St. 368; 25 Atl. 140), 1175. Commonwealth v. Carney (108 Mass. 417), 1670. Commonwealth v. Carney ( l.'>2 Mass. 566; 26 X. *E. 94), 1655. Commonwealth v. Carney ( 153 Mass. 444; 27 X\ E. 9), 1739. Commonwealth v. Carolina (2 Al- len, 169), 1099. Commonwealth v. Carpenter ( 100 Mass. 204), 1643. Commonwealth v. Carr ( 1 1 Gray, 463), 1738. Commonwealth v. Carroll ( 15 Gray, 809, 412), 1601, 1651. Commonwealth v. Carroll (124 Mass. 30), 1368. Commonwealth v. Casey ( 12 Allen, 214), 524.. Commonwealth v. Casey ( 134 Mass. 194), 212, 214, 344, 345. Commonwealth v. Cauley ( 150 Mass. 272; 22 X. E. 909), 687, 688, 090, 1639. Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh (2 Pa. Co. Ct. 344), 247. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors (97 Mass. 63). 1055. Ixxxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liqnois (97 Mass. 92), 10«0. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors (97 Mass. 334), 1068. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors (97 Mass. mi), 10G2. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors ( 103 Mass. 448), 1018, 1034. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors ( 105 Mass. 181), 1038. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors ( 107 Mass. 21fi), 1041. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors ( 107 Mass. 386; 107 Mass. 392, note), 1023, 1066, 1075, 1664. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors (108 Mass. 19), 1023. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors ( 1 10 Mass. 182), 1066, 1068. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors (113 Mass. 13), 1034. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors (117 Mass. 427), 1038. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors ( 1 16 Mass. 21), 1089. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors (116 Mass. 24; 116 Mass. 27), 1066. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors (116 Mass. 27), 1055, l(w9. Commonwealtli v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors ( 122 Mass. 36), 1052. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors ( 128 Mass. 72), 1034. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors ( 138 Mass. 506), 1529. Commonwealth v. Certain Intox- icating Liquors ( 142 Mass. 470; 8 N. E. 421), 1503. Commonwealth v. Chisholm ( 103 Mass. 213), 1513. Commonwealth v. Chadwick ( 142 Mass. 595; 8 N. E. 589), 1513, 1'616, 1672. Commonwealth v. Chancy ( 148 Mass. 6; 18 N. E. 572), 1578, 1677. Commonwealth v. Cheney ( 141 Mass. 102; 6 N. E. 724), 203L Commonwealth v. Chapjiel (116 Mass. 7), 8, 10, 11, 12. Commonwealth v. Churchill (2 Met. 118), L605. Commonwealth v. Churchill (136 Mass. 148, 150), 1796. Commonwealth v. Clapp (5 Gray [Mass.] 97), 110, 307, 1483, 1513. Commonwealth v. Clark ( 14 Gray, 367), 1113, 1115, 1165, 1167, 1452, 1500, 1501, 1513, 1527, 1598, 1604, L607, 1666. Commonwealth v. Clark ( 145 Mass. 251; 13 N. E. 888), I486, 1547. Commonwealth v. Clary (8 Mass. 72), 1070. Commonwealtli v. Cleary ( 105 Mass. 384), 1089, 1658, 16.59. Commonwealth v. Cleary (152 Mass. 491; 25 N. E. 834), 1590. Commonwealth v. Cleary ( 135 Pa. St. 64; 19 Atl. 1017; 8 L. R. A. 301), 2032. Commonwealth v. Cleary ( 148 Pa. St. 20; 23 Atl. 1110; 30 Wkly. Notes Cas. 1), 2040, 2247'. Commonwealth v. Clymer ( 150 Mass. 71; 22 N. E. 436), 1673, 1747. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxvii [References are to pages.] Commonwealth v. Coffee (9 Gray, 139), 1774. Commonwealth v. Cogan ( 107 Mass. 212), 1090. Commonwealth v. Collier (134 Mass. 203), 1701. Commonwealth v. Collins ( IG Gray, 29), 1581, 1602. Commonwealth v. Colter (97 Mass. 336), 1113, 1115. Commonwealth v. Colton ( 1 1 Gray, 1), 1535. Commonwealth v. Colton (138 Mass. 500), 1610. Commonwealth v. Commesky ( 13 Allen, 585), 1610, 1725. Commonwealth v. Conant (6 Gray, 482), 1500, 1513. Commonwealth v. Conley ( 1 Al- len, 6), 2027. Commonwealth v. Conlin ( 184 Mass. 195; 68 X. E. 207), 2027. Commonwealth v. Connolly ( 108 Mass. 480), 1099, 1665, 1671. Commonwealth v. Conway (112 S. W. 575; 33 Ky. L. Rep. 996), 38<). Commonwealth v. Cook ( 12 Allen, 542), 1758. Commonwealth v. CooliJge ( 138 Mass. 193), 1665. Commonwealth v. Cope ([Ky.] 53 S. W. 272; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 845), 1467. Commonwealth v. Costello ( 133 Mass. 192), 212, 213, 344, 1111, 1536, 1537, 1737. Commonwealth v. Costello ( 1 Wil- cox [Pa.] 182), 1367. Commonwealth v. Cotter (97 Mass. 336) 1667. Commonwealth v. Cotton (138 Mass. 500), 1664, 1619. Commonwealth v. Couglilin (14 Gray, 389), 1616, 1>)17. Commonwealtli v. Couohiin (123 Mass. 436), 2033/2035. Commonwealth v. Coughlin ( 182 Mass. 558; 66 N. E. 207), 1083, 1086, 1491, 1610, 1654. Commonwealth v. Crawford (9 Gray, 129), 1454. Commonwealth v. Cro.sley ( 162 Mass. 515; 39 N. E. 278), 1513. Commonwealth v. Crozier ( ] Brewster, 349), 2068, 2069, 2072. Commonwealth v. Cummings (6 Gray, 487), 1479. Commonwealth v. Cummins (121 Mass. 63), 1661, 1752. Commonwealth v. Curran (119 Mass. 206), 47, 1116, 1446, 1447, 1643. Commonwealtli v. Current (11 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 764), 950. Commonwealth v. Currier ( 164 Mass. 544; 42 N. E. 96), 1725. Commonwealth v. Cutler (9 Allen, 486), 1719. Commonwealtli v. Dady (7 Allen 531), 1115, 1667, 1668. Commonwealth v. Dady (14 Gray, 412, 531), 1113. Commonwealth v. Daily ( 133 Mass. 577), 1099, 1596. Commonwealtli v. Daly ( 148 Mass. 428; 19 X. E. 209), 1185, 1368, 1369. Commonwealth v. Davenport (2 Allen 299), 1595. Commonwealtli v. Davis (12 Bush, 240), 1162, 1165, 1166, 1173, 1233, 1235, 1238, 1561. Commonwealth v. Dav (95 Ky. 120; 23 S. W. 952; 15 Ky. L. Rep. 466), 837. Commonwealth v. Dean (21 Pick. 334), 1488, 1497, 1502. Commonwealth v. Dean (14 Gray, 99), 7, 10, 11, 49, 968. Commonwealth v. Dean ( 109 Mass, 340), 1746. Ixxxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Commonwealth v. Dean (110 Mass. 357), 232, 235, 240, 1643. Commonwealth v. Dearborn ( 109 Mass. 3t)8), 1594, 1660, 1672, 1673. Common wealtli v. Deibert ( 12 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 504; 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 446), 756. Commonwealth v. Desmond (103 Mass. 445), 1478. Commonwealth v. Dickerson [Ky.] 76 -S. W. 1084; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1043), 949, 1158, 1178. Commonwealth v. Dilbo (29 Leg. Int. 150), 1643. Commonwealth v. Dillane (1 Gray, 483), 1591, 1623, 1649. Commonwealth v. Dillane (11 Gray, 67), 1479, 1637, 1650. Commonwealth a'. Dixon ( 1 Wil- cox [Pa.] 211), 1581. Commonwealtli v. Dobbyn ( 14 Gray, 44), 1701. Commonwealth v. Doe ( 108 Mass. 418), 898, 1656, 1670. Commonwealth v. Dolan (121 Mass. 374), 1446, 1447. Commonwealth v. Donahue (149 Pa. St. 104; 24 Atl. 188; 30 Wkly. N. C. 124), 488, 495. Commonwealth v. Donnelly ( 14 Gray, 86, note), 1486. Commonwealth v. Dooly (6 Gray, 360), 1757. Commonwealth v. Dorsey ( 103 Mass. 412), 20(>7. Commonwealth v. Dovicey ( 126 Mass. 269), 165, 171. ^ Commonwealth v. Dougherty ( 1 Browne [Pa.] Appendix xviii), 2040. Commonwealth v. Vkive (2 Va. Cas. 26), 1505. Commonwealth v. Dosv ( 12 Gray, 133), 1007, 1658. Commonwealtli v. Dow (10 ^let. [Mass.] 506), 294. Commonwealth v. Dowdican (114 Mass. 257), 1587, 1701, 1735. Commonwealth v. Dowling (114- Mass. 259), 1375. Commonwealth v. Downey ( 148 Mass. 14; 18 N. E. 584), 1678. Commonwealth v. Downing (4 Gray, 29), 1188. Commonwealth v. Doyle ( 132 Mass. 244), 1647. Commonwealth v. Drew (3 Cush. 279), 514, 1219. Commonwealth v. Dudash (204 Pa. 124; 53 Atl. 756), 2038, 2044, 2047. Commonwealth v. Ducey ( 126 Mass. 269), 469. Commonwealth v. Dun ( 14 Gray, 401), 1520. Commonwealth v. Dunbar (9 Gray, 298), 1097, 1658, 1671. Commonwealth v. Duncan ( 1 1 Ky. Rep. [abstract] 402), 945. Commonwealth v. Dunn ( 14 Gray, 401), 1035, 1513. Commonwealth v. Dunn (111 Mass. 425), 1513. Commonwealth v. Duprej' ( 180 Mass. 523; 62 N. E. 726), 1649. Commonwealth v. Eagan ( 151 Mass. 45; 23 N. E. 494), 1677. Commonwealth v. Early (161 Mass. 186; 36 X. E. 794), 1508. Common w-ealth v. Eaton (9 Pick. 165), 1499. Commonwealth v. Ea.ton ( 15 Pick. 273), 144C. Commonwealth v. Edds ( 14 Gray, 406), 1513, 1544, 1615, 1619, 1675. Commonwealth v. Edinger (7 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 442), 946. Commonwealth v. Edwards (4 Gray, 1), 1527. 1533, 1534. <'ommonwealth v. Eggleston ( 128 Mass. 408), 1283, 1284. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxis: [References are to pages.] Commomvealth v. Elger (217 Pa. 512; GQ Atl. 740; 11 L. R. A. [N. S.J i)3)9), 1734. Commonwealth v. Elliott ( 1 Lack. Leg. N. 140; 16 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 122; 4 Pa. Dist. Rep. 89), 724. Commomvealth v. Elmoie ([Ky. 1 58 S. VV. 369; 22 Ky. 'l. Rep. 510), 576. Commonwealtli v. Elwell ( 1 Gray, 403), 1050, 1055, 1740. Commonwealth v. Emerson ( 140 Mass. 434; 5 X. E. 155), 130. Commonwealth v. Emmons (98 Mass. 6), 1353. Commonwealth v. Estabrook ( 10 Pick. 293), 69, 509, 691, 1207. Commonwealth v. Evei-man ( 140 Mass. 434; 5 N, E. 155), 247, 1752. Commonwealth v. Everson ( 140 Mass. 292; 2 N. E. 839), 592, 1182, 1071, 1675. Commonwealth v. Everson ( 140 Mass. 572; 5 N. E. 155), 135. Commonwealth v. Ewing ( 7 Bush, 105), 1560. Commonwealth v. Ewing ( 145 Mass. 121; 13 X. E. 365), 1341. Commonwealth v. Faher ( 126 Mass. 56), 1088. Commonwealth v. Farrand ( 12 ■Gray, 177), 1070, 1671, 1076. Commonwealth v. Farrell ( 137 Mass. 579), 1581, 1604. Commonwealth v. Farren (9 Al- len, 489), 1555. Commonwealth v. Fell ( 144 Pa. 426; 22 Atl. 915; 28 W. X. C. 429), 648. Commonwealth v. Fernden (141 Mass. 28; 6 X. E. 239), 213, 345, 1548. Commonwealth v. Finnegan ( 109 Mass. 303), 1099. Commonwealth v. Finnegan (124 Mass. 324), 1233. Commonwealth v. Finnerty ( 148 Mass. 162; 19 X. E. 215), 1594, 1595, 1657. Commonwealth v. Fischer (17 S. & R. [Pa. J 160), 210. Commonwealth v. Fisher (138 Mass. 504), 380, 1059, 1073. Commonwealth v. Fisher ( 1 Leg. Opinion, 50), 2034. Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald ( 14 Gray, 14), 1058. Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick (140 Mass. 455; 5 X. E. 272), 1612. Commonwealth v. Flaherty ( 140 Mass. 454; 5 X. E. 258), 1368. Commonwealth v. Fleckner ( 107 Mass. 13; 44 X. E. 1053), 1098. Commonwealth v. Fleece (5 Ky. Rep. 429), 1449. Commonwealth v. Fleming (130 Pa. 138; 18 AtL •622; 25 W. X. C. 122; 5 L. R. A. 470; 17 Am. St. 763), 1280. Commonwealth v. Fletcher (33 Phila. Leg. Int. 13; 8 Leg. Gaz. 13), 2068. Commonwealth v. Foley (99 Mass. 499), 2031. Commonwealth v. Fontz ( 135 Pa. St. 389; 19 Atl. 1025), 1159. Commonwealth v. Foran (110 Mass. 179), 1580. Commonwealth v. Foss ( 14 Gray, 50), 1446, 1447, 1641. Commonwealth v. Foster ( 182 Mass. 270; 05 X. E. 391), 1083. Commonwealth v. Fowler (90 Ky. 166; 28 S. W. 786; 33 L. R. A. 839), 112, 186. 221. Commonwealth v. Fowler (98 Ky. 648; 34 .S. W. 31), 186, 188, 625, 829, zc TABLE OF CASES. [Tleferences are to pages.] Commonwealth v. Fowler (145 Mass. 3{>8; 14 N. E. 457), 1226, 1560. Commonwealth v. Fralicr (126 Mass. 56), 1081, 1094. 1103, 1717. Commonwealth v. Francis ( 152 Mass. 508; 25 X. E. 836), 1121, 1310, 1318. Commonwealth v. Fredericks ( 119 Mass. 199), 139, 167, 397, 402, 1513. Commonwealth v. French (Thach- er Cr. Cas. 163), 205, 2048. Commonwealth v. Frost ( 155 Mass. 273; 34 X. E. 334), 508. Commonwealth v. Funai ( 146 Mass. 570; 16 X. E. 458), 1584. Commonwealth v. Gaffey (122 Mass. 334), 1670, 1671, 1674. Commonwealth v. Gagne ( 153 Mass. 205; 26 X. E. 449; 10 L. R. A. 442), 111, 298, 307, 327, 1527, 1664. Commonwealth v. Gallagher (124 Mass. 29), 1080, 1659. Commonwealth v. Gallagher ( 143 Mass. 104; 13 X. E. 359), 989, 1543. Commonwealth v. Galligan ( 156 Mass. 270; 30 X. E. 1142), 1605, 1650. 1651. Commonwealth v. Galligan (144 Mass. 171; 10 X. E. 788), 1375. Commonwealth v. Galligan (155 Mass. 54; 28 X. E. 1129), 1452. Commonwealth v. Garvin ( 148 Mass. 449; 19 X. E. 554), 1758. Commonwealth v. Gavin (148 Mass. 449; 19 X. E. 554), 1098, 1659. Commonwealth v. Gavin (160 Mass. 523; 3o X. E. 484), 1712. Commonwealth v. Gay ( 153 Mass. 211; 26 X. E. 852), 111, 2t^8, 300, 307, 1527, 1677. Commonwealth v. Geary ( 146 Mass. 139; 15 X. E. 363), 1663. Commonwealth v. Gedikoh ( 101 Pa. St. 354), 1304, 1307, 1308. Commonwealth v. Gibbons ( 134 Mass. 197), 213, 1447, 1480, 1537. Commonwealth v. Gilbert ( 165 Mass. 45; 72 X. E. 336), 2041, 2047, 2058, 2069, 2085. Commonwealth v. Giles ( 1 Gray, 460), 1608, 1609, 1711. Commonwealth v. Gillon (2 Al- len, 505), 1452. Commonwealth v. Gillon ( 148 Mass. 15; 18 X. E. 308), 1460, 1530, 1595, 1615. Commonwealth v. Gillaland (95 Mass. [9 Gray] 3), 1035, 152. Commonwealth v. Glennan (116 Mass. 46), 1670. Commonwealth v. Godley (11 Gray, 454), 1071. Commonwealth v. Goodman (97 Mass. 117). 1081, 1082, 1185, 1700. Commonwealth v. Gormley ( 133 Mass. 580), 1368, 1624. Commonwealth v. Gould ( 158 Mass. 499; 33 X. E. 656), 828, 832, 1629. Commonwealth v. Gourdier ( 14 Gray, 390), 43, 369, 1701. Commonwealth v. Grady (108 Mass. 412), 1035, 1513. Commonwealth v. Graves ( 18 B. Mon. 33), 528, 683. Commonwealth v. Graves (16 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 272), 1096, 1117, 1545. Commonwealth v. Gray ( 13 Gray, 26), 1541. Conimunwealtli v. Graves (97 Mass. 114), 1112, 1115, 1660. TAJJLE OF CASES. XCl [Refeifiices are to pages.] Commonwealth v. Gray (2 Gray, 501; 01 Am. Dec. 476), 1451, 1493. Commonwealth v. Gray (150 Mass. 327; 23 N. E. 47), 103. Commonwealth v. Green (80 Ky. 178; 3 Ky. L. Rep. 059), 1520. Commonwealth v. Green ('J8 Ky. 21; 32 S. W. 109), 87.5, 895, 1403, 1407. Commonwealth v. Greenfield ( 121 Mass. 40), 1285. Commonwealth v. Greenan (11 Al- len, 241), 1670. Commonwealth v. Greness (11 Al- len, 241), 1071. Commonwealth v. Greenwell (8 Ky. L. Rep. 009 [abstract]), 1500, 1510. Cominonwealth v. Grey (2 Gray, 501; 01 Am. Dec. 470), 14, 23, 26, 29. Commonwealth v. Griirin (3 Cush. 523), 1484, 1705. Commonwealth v. Griffin ( 105 Mass. 175), 1508. Commonwealth v. Guja (28 Pa. Super. Ct. 58), 1283. Commonwealth v. Guy ( 153 Mass. 211; 20 N. E. 571, 852), 1743. Commonwealth v. Iladcraft (0 Bush, 91), 1450, 1503. Commonwealth v. Hadley (11 Met. 00), 513, 514, 095, 1372, 1375. Commonwealth v. Hadley (11 Met. 71), 094. Commonwealth v. Ilaelir (113 Mass. 207), 1672. Commonwealth v. HalVner (8 Leg. Gaz. 160), IISO. Commonwealth v. Ilagan ( 140 Mass. 289; 3 N. E. 207), 1310, 1362. Commonwealth v. Hagan ( 152 Mass. 505; 26 N. E. 95), 1071. Commonwealth v. Ilagenlock (140 Mass. 125; 3 N. E. 30), 2009, 2073, 2075. Commonwealth v. Hagernian ( 10 Allen; 401), 1487. Commonwealth v. Halback (101 Ky. 166; 40 S. W. 245; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 278), 1553. Commonwealth v. Hall (8 Gratt. 588), 510. Commonwealth v. Hallett ( 103 Mass. 452), 49, 53, 1185, 1705. Commonwealth v. Ham ( 150 Mass. 22; 22 N. E. 704), 1000. Commonwealth v. Hamer ( 128 Mass. 70), 740, 1641. Commonwealth v. Hamilton ( 120 Mass. 383), 189. Commonwealth v. Hamor ( 8 Gratt. 698), 1371. Commonwealth v. Hampton (3 Gratt. 590), 1516. Commonwealth v. Hanley ( 121 Mass. 377), 1510. Commonwealth v. Hanley ( 140 Mass. 457 ; 5 N. E. 408 ) , 1722. Commonwealth v. Hardman (9 Gray, 130), 11. Commonwealth v. Hardiman (9 Gray, 136), 83. Commonwealth v. Hardin Co. (99 Ky. 188; 35 S. W. 275), 932. Commonwealth v. Hardy ( 124 Ky. 375; 99 S. W. 239; 30 Ky. Law Rep. 532), 1458. Commonwealth v. Harper ( 145 Mass. 100; 13 N. E. 459), 950. Commonwealth v. Harrington (3 Pick. 20), 1797. Commonwealth v. Harrington ( 130 Mass. 35), 1572. Commonwealth v. Harrison (11 Gray [Mass.] 308), 1121, 1600. Commonwealth v. Harris (7 Gratt. 000), 1765. Commonwealth v. Harrison (11 Gray, 310), 1306. Commonwealth v. Harrison ( 13 Allen, 559), 1323. Commonwealth v. Hart (11 Cush. 130), 1527, 1533. Commonwealth v. Hart (2 Rrewst. [Pa.] 540), 2040, 2068, 2009. sen TABLE OP CASES. [I.'eferences are to pages.] Commonwealth v. Harvey (16 B. Mon. 1), 1516, 1517. Commonwealth v. Hastings (9 Met. 259), 2034. Commonwealth v. Hatcher (0 Gratt. 667), 1556. Commonwealth v. Hatton ( 15 B. Mon. 537), 1246. Commonwealth v. Hawkins (3 Gray, 463 ) , 2043, 2060. Commonwealth v. Hayes ( 125 Mass. 209), 1516. Commonwealth v. Hayes ( 149 Mass. 32; 20 N. E. 456), 558. Commonwealth v. Hayes (114 Mass. 282), 1065, 1089, 1658, 1059. Commonwealth v. Hayes ( 145 Mass. 289; 14 N. E. 151), 1100. Commonwealth v. Hayes ( 150 Mass. 506; 23 N. E. 216), 1670. Commonwealth v. Hayes ( 167 Mass. 167; 45 N. E. 82), 1100, 1105. Commonwealth v. Haj'wood ( 105 Mass. 187), 46. Commonwealth v. Hazeltine ( 108 Mass. 479), 1064. Commonwealth v. Head (11 Gratt. 819), 1478. Commonwealth v. Heaganey ( 137 Mass. 574), 592, 595. Commonwealth v. Heasey ( [Mass.] 9 N. E. 837). 1.531. Commonwealth v. Heckler ( 168 Pa. St. 575; 32 Atl. 52; 36 W. N. C. 363; reversing 14 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 465), 1307. Commonwealth v. Heffron ( 102 Mass. 148), 1715. Commonwealth v. Helbeck (101 Ky. 166; 40 S. W. 245), 401. Commonwealth v. Helbeck (101 Ky. 166; 40 R. W. 245), 448. CJommonwealth v. Henderson (140 Mass. 303; 5 X. E. 832), 1081, 1088, 1089, 1491, 1662, 1664, 1669. Commonwealth v. Hendrie (2 Gray, 503), 1626. Commonwealth v. Heney ( [IMass.] 9 N. E. 837), 1487. Commonwealth v. Henley ( 158 Mass. 159; 33 N. E. 342), 1596. Commonwealth v. Herriek (0 Cush. 465), 12, 14, 15, 23, 1626. Commonwealth v. Hersey ( 144 Mass. 297; 11 N. E. 116), 1543, 1055, 1671, 1676. Commonwealth v. Hessey ( [Mass.] 9 N. E. 837), 1738. Commonwealth v. Hess ( 148 Pa. 98; 23 Atl. 977), 1283. Commonwealth v. Heywood ( 105 Mass. 187), 10, 1671. Commonwealth v. Hickey ( 126 Mass. 250), 1544. Commonwealth v. Higgins ( 1(> Gray, 19), 1595, 1650, 1070. Commonwealth v. Hildreth (11 Gra}% 327), 1582, 1594, 1668. Commonwealth v. Hill ( 14 Gray, 24), 1550, 1551. Commonwealth v. Hill (4 Allen, 589), 1547, 1548. Commonwealth v. Hill ( 145 Mass. 385; 14 N. E. 124), 1091, 1369. Commonwealth v. Hill (127 Pa. St. 540; 19 Atl. 141), 291, 558. Commonwealtli v. Hill (5 Gratt. 682), 1509, 1510. Commonwealth v. Hinds ( 145 Mass. 182; 13 N. E. 397), 1058. CtjmmDnwealth v. Hitchings (5 Gray f:\lass.] 482), 294, 1508, 1740. Commonwealth v. Hoar (121 IMass. 375), 1089. 1658. Commonwealtli v. Hogan (11 Gray, 315), 1673. Commonwealtli v. Hogan (97 Mass. 120), 1172, 1722. TABLE OF CASES. XClll [lleferences axe to iiages.] Commonwealth v. Hoge (9 Gray, 292), 148(i. Commonwealth v. Hoke ( 14 Bush [Ky.] 485), 234. Commonwealth v. Hoke ( 14 Bush [Ky.] mS). 23U, 882, 9U7, 929, 93G. Commonwealth v. Holbrook (92 Mass. [10 Allen] 200), 451. Commonwealth v. Holland (104 Ky. 323; 47 S. W. 21G; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 581), 541, 1268, 1269. Commonwealth v. Holland (7 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 299), 513. Commonwealth v. HoUey (69 Mass. [3 Gray] 458), 262. Commonwealth v. Holmes (119 Mass. 195), 1354. Commonwealth v. Holsapple (9 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 437), 543. Commonwealth v. Holstine ( 132 Pa. 357; 19 Atl. 273; 25 W. N. C. 423), 1186, 1267, 1285. Commonwealth v. Hornbrook ( 10 Allen, 200), 523. Commonwealth v. Houle { 147 Mass. 380; 17 N. E. 896), 1361. Commonwealth v. Howe (9 Gray, 110), 1583. Commonwealth v. Howe ( 13 Gray, 26), 110, 256, 1547, 1549. Commonwealth v. Howe ( [Ky.] 32 S. W. 133), 1463. Commonwealth v. Hoye (9 Gray, 292), 1097, 1552," 16oS. Commonwealth v. Hoye ( 1 1 Gray, 462), 1534. Commonwealth v, Hoyer ( 125 Mass. 209), 1640. Commonwealth v. Hughes (165 Mass. 7: 42 X. E. 121), 1097, 1657, 1658, 1670, 1673. Commonwealth v. Hurley (160 Mass. 10; 35 N. E. 89), 1349, 1361, 1657. Commonwealth v. Hurley ( 14 Gray, 411), 1617, 1659. Commonwealth v. Hurst ( [Ky.] 62 S. W. 1024 ; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 365), 84, 936, 1344, 1697. Commonwealth v. Hutchinson (6 Allen, 595), 1528. Commonwealth v. Hyland ( 155 Mass. 7; 28 N. E. 1055), 1091, 1368 1615, 1617. Commonwealth v. Hyneman (101 Mass. 30), 1306. Commonwealth v. lies ( 13 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 236), 554. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (79 INlass. [13 Gray] 52), 1045. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (14 Gray, 375), 1016, 1075. Commonwealth v. Stebbins (8 Gray, 492), 1063. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (88 Mass. [6 Gray] 596), 1060. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (86 ]\Iass. [4 Allen] 593), 1044, 1060, 1062, 1068, 1074. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (86 Mass. [4 Allen] 601), 1035, 1065. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (6 Allen, 596), 1040, 1057, 1060, 1061, 1067. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (6 Allen, 599), 1048, 1068. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (88 Mass. [9 Allen] 596), 1049. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (95 Mass. [13 Allen] 52), 1035, 1043, 1056, 1057. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (13 Allen, 561), 1016, 1049, 1067. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (97 Mass. 63), 1043, 1043, 1059, 1062, 1739. XCIV TABLE OF CASES. fKeferenoes are to pages.] Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (97 Mass. 332), 1018, 1041, 1054. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (97 Mass. 001), 1007. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (103 Mass. 448), 1739. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (105 Mass. 175), 1739. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (105 Mass. 178), 1018, 1048. Commonwealtli v. Intoxicating Liquors (105 Mass. 181), 1039, 1045, 1046. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors 105 Mass. 595), lOlG, 1045, 1064. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (107 Mass. 216), 1016, 1056. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (107 Mass. 390), 255, 1008, 1021, 1038. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (108 Mass. 19), 1048, 1068. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (109 Mass. 371, 373), 1039, 1054. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (110 Mass. 182), 1040, 1041. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (110 Mass. 187). 1067. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (110 Mass. 188), 1074. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (110 IMass. 416), 1043. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (110 Mass. 499), 10.39. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (110 Mass. 500), 1065. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (113 Mass. 13), 1018, 1021, 1033, 1040, 1078, 1759. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (113 Mass. 23), 1016, 1065. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (113 Mass. 208), 1040. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (113 Mass. 455), 1040. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (115 Mass. 142), 1064. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (115 Mass. 145), 1039, 1056. Commonwealth v. Certain Intoxi- cating Liquors (115 Macs. 153), 110, 129, 972. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (115 Mass. 159), 91. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (116 Mass. 21), 1037. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (116 Mass. 24), 1587, 1659. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (116 Mass. 27), 1035, 1041, 1587. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (116 Mass. 342), 1049. Commonwealtli v. Intoxicating Liquors (117 Mass. 427), 1040, 1042, 1057. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (122 Mass. 8), 1014, 1016, 1039, 1071. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (122 Mass. 14), 1041, 1056. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (122 Mass. 36), 1039, 1057, 1065. 1071, 1072. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (128 Mass. 72), 1055, 1067, 1008. TABLE OF CASES. xcv [References are to images.] Commonwealth v. Certain Intoxi- cating Liquors ( 130 Mass. 29), 1062. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors ( 135 Mass. 519 ) , 1048. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (138 Mass. 506), 1528. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (140 Mass. 287; 3 N. E. 4), 1040, 1053. Commonwealtli v. Intoxicating Liquors (142 Mass. 470; 8 >'. E. 421), 1045, 1046. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (146 Mass. 509; 16 N. E. 298), 1039, 1054, 1067, 1068. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (148 Mass. 124; 19 N. E. 23), 1756, 1757. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (150 Mass. 164; 22 N. E. 628), 1049, 1071. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (163 Mass. 42; 39 N. E. 348), 1021. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (172 Mass. 311; 52 N. E. 389), 220, 257. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (89 N. E. 918), 1059, 1062. Commonwealth v. Jacobs ( 152 Mass. 276; 25 X. E. 463), 1545, 1595, 1636. Commonwealth v. James (98 Ky. 30; 32 S. W. 219; 17 Ky. L. Rep. 588), 518, 1364. Commonwealth v. Jarrell (8 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 783), 543. Commonwealth v. Jan-ell (9 Ky. Law, 572; 5 S. W. 563), 030. Commonwealth v. Jarvis ( 120 Ky. 334; 86 S. W. 556; 27 Ky. Law Rep. 712), 1493, 1494. Commonwealth v. Jenkins ( 137 Mass. 572), 592. Commonwealth v. Jenkins (137 Mass. 572), 247. Commonwealth v. Jenks ( 1 Gray, 490), 1746. Commonwealth v. Jennings (107 Mass. 488), 1097. Commonwealth v. Jessup (63 Pa. 34), 1223, 1237. Commonwealth v. Johnson (8 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 378), 774. Commonwealth v. Johnston (5 Pa. Super. Ct. 585; 28 Pittsb. L. J. [X. S.] 141; 44 W. N. C. 92), 1371. Commonwealth v. Jones ( [Ky.] 84 y. W. 305; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 16), 870, 924. Commonwealth v. Jones ( 7 Gray, 415), 1535. Commonwealth v. Jones ( 8 Gray, 415), 1534. Commonwealth v. Jones ( 142 Mass. 573; 3 X. E. 603), 130, 134, 247, 592, 1278. Commonwealth v. Jones ( 10 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 611), 714, 715, 716. Commonwealth v. Jones (1 Leigh, 598), 2039. Commonwealtli v. Jordan ( 18 Pick. 228), 29, 43, 48, 508. Commonwealth v. Joseph Kohlne Brewing Co. ( 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 627), 720. Commonwealth v. Joslin ( 158 Mass. 482; 33 X. E. 653; 21 L. R. A. 44'9), 53, ^"28, 832, 1227, 1228, 1237, 1359, 1360, 1759. Commonwealtli v. Joyce (22 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 397; 30 Pittsb. Leg. J. [X. S.] 28), 1298. Commonwealth v. Julius ( 143 Mass. 132; 8 X. E. 898), 1251, 1255. Commonwealth v. Kahlmeyer ( 124 Mass. 322), 1065. Commonwealth v. Kane (143 Mass. 92; 8 X. E. 880), 213, 344, 345. XCVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Commonwealth v. Kane ( 150 Mass. 294: 22 N. E. 903), 995, 1754. Commonwealth v. Keefe (7 Gray, 332), 1456, 1740. Commonwealth v. Keefe (9 Gray, 290), 1487, 1513, 1552. Commonwealth v. Keefe (143 Mass. 467: 9 X. E. 840). 1528, 1537. Commonwealth v. Keefe ( 150 Mass. 272: 22 N. E. 910), 688, 690, 1639. Commonwealth v. Keenan (11 Allen, 262), 523, 525. Commonwealth V. Keenan ( 148 Mass. 470; 20 N. E. 101), loss, 1594, 1595, 1664. Commonwealth v. Keenan ( 152 Mass. 12; 25 N. E. 32), 1615, 1619. Commonwealth v. Kelley (116 Mass. 341), 1582. Commonwealth v. Kelley ( 140 Mass. 441), 214, 345, 1533. Commonwealth v. Kelley (152 Mass. 486; 25 N. E. 835), 1593, 1670, 1671. Commonwealth v. Kelly ( 10 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 721), 1559. Commonwealth v. Kelly (12 Gray, 175), 1547, 1548. Commonwealth v. Kelly (10 Cnsh. 69), 1643, 1650. Commonwealth v. Kelly (7 Gray. 332, note), 1547. Commonwealth v. Kelly (177 Mass. 221; 58 X. E. 691), 1308. Commonwealth v. Kemp (14 B. Mon. 385 1, 72, 50S. Commonwealth v. Kenan ( 148 Mass. 470; 20 X. E. 101), 1754. Commonweal til v. Kendall ( 12 Cush. 414), 110 1487, 1533, 1534. Commonwealth v. Kennan ( 10 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 723), 1490. Commonwealth v. Keimedy (97 Mass. 224), 1595. Commonwealth v. Kennedy ( 108 Mass. 292), 1754. Commonwealth v. Kennedy (119 Mass. 211), 1368. Commonwealth v. Keuner (11 B. Mon. 1), 1514. Commonwealth v. Kenney (115 Mass. 149), 1610, 1725. Commonwealth v. Kern (147 Mass. 595; 18 X. E. 566), 1531. Commonwealth v. Kerns ( 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 59), 648, 064. Commonwealth v. Kerrisey ( 141 Mass. 110; 4 X. E. 820), 1655, 1677. Commonwealth v. Kervill ( 108 Mass. 422), 932. Commonwealth v. Kevin ( 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 414), 1384. Commonwealth v. Keyes (11 Gray, 323), 1604, 1607. Commonwealth v. Kiley ( 150 Mass. 325; 23 X. E. 55), 722. Commonwealth v. Kimball (24 Pick. 359; 35 Am. Dec. 326), 53, 294, 313, 314, 316, 328, 824, 1189, 1581. Commonwef.lth v. Kimball (7 Met. 304), 1533, 1554, 1555, 1640, 1642. Commonwealth v. Kimball (7 Gray, 328), 1540, 1543. Commonwealth v. Kimball (7 Gray, 332, note), 1541. Commonwealth v. Kimball ( 105 Mass. 465), 1099, 1101, 1375. Commonwealth v. King (86 Ky. 436; 6 S. W. 124), 897, 938. Commonwealth v. King (8 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 608), 936. Commonwealth v. Kingman ( 14 Gray, 85), 1479, 1486, 1535. TABLE OF CASES. iCVU [References are to pages.] Commonwealth v. Kingsbury (5 Mass. 496), 1566. Commonwealth v. Kinsley ( 108 Mass. 24), 1671. Commonwealth v. Kirk (7 Gray, 496), 1112, 1115, 1666, 1668. Commonwealtli v. Knoerr (3 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 694), 1495, 1559. Commonwealth v. Kolilmeyer (124 Mass. 322), 1596, 1670. Commonwealth v. Lafayette (148 Mass. 130; 19 N. E. 26), 1354, 1357, 1363, 1368, 1615. Commonwealth v. Lafontaine (3 Gray, 479), 1513. Commonwealth v. Lahy ( 8 Gray, 459), 1643, 1645, 1717. Commonwealth v. Lamere ( 1 1 Gray, 319), 1112, 1655, 1656, 1666, 1667. Commonwealth v. Lattinville ( 120 Mass. 385), 1227, 1516. Commonwealth v. Lattinville ([Mass.] 25 X. E. 972), 1595, 1670. Commonwealth v. Lawrence (11 Gray, 319), 1115. Commonwealth v. Leddy ( 105 Mass. 381), 1019, 1041, 1048, 1052. Commonwealth v. Ledford ( [Ky.] 110 S. W. 889; 33 Ky. L. Rep. p. 624), 755. Commonwealth v. Leeds (9Phila. 569), 1219. Commonwealth v. Lee ( 148 Mass. G; 18 N. E. 586), 1547, 1551, 1671, 1752. Commonwealth v. Leighton ( 140 Mass. 305; 6 N. E. 221), 1123, 1660, 1728. Commonwealth v. Lemon ([Ky.] 76 S. W. 40; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 522), 932. Commonwealth v. Leo ( 12 Gray, 33), 1614. Commonwealth v. Jjeo (110 Mass. 414), 1643, 1645, 1712. Commonwealtli v. Leonard (8 Met. 529), 15.34, 1556, 1711. Commonwealth v. Levy ( 126 Mass. 240), 1089, 1659. Commonwealth v. Lillard ( 10 Ky. Law Rep. 561; 9 S. VV. 710), 917, 920. Commonwealth v. Lincoln (4 Gray, 288), 1656, 1660. Commonwealth v. Line ( 149 Mass. 65; 20 N. E. 697), 1674, 1723. Commonwealth v. Livermore (2 Allen, 292), 1586, 1587, 1668. Commonwealth v. Livermore ( 4 Gray, 18), 12, 15, 23, 29. Commonwealth v. Locke (114 Mass. 288), 386, 413, 966, 1514, 1529, 1725. Commonwealth v. Locke ( 145 Mass. 401; 14 N. E. 621), 1596, 1675. Commonwealth v. Locke ( 148 Mass. 125; 19 N. E. 24), 1095, 1679. Commonwealth v. Locke (29 Leg. Int. 172; affirmed 72 Pa. St. 491), 233. Commonwealth v. Logan ( 12 Gray, 136), 1160, 1550. Commonwealth v. Louisville, etc., Co. (117 Ky. 936; 80 S. W. 154; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2098), 1300. Commonwealth v. Lowry ( 145 Mass. 212; 13 N. E. 611), 1753. Commonwealth v. Luck (2 B. Mon. [Ky.] 296). 395, 400. Commonwealth v. Luddy ( 143 Mass. 563; 10 N. E. 448), 1026, 1027, 1035, 1289, 1459, 1488, 1516. Commonwealth v. Lufkin ( 167 Mass. 553; 46 X. E. 109), 1086, 1098, 1697. Commonwealth v. Luken ( 7 Lack. Leg. N. 4; 10 Pa. Dist. Rep. 95), 1759. XCVlll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Commonwealth v. Lynch (151 Mass. 35«; 23 N. E. 1137), 1595, 16tiO. Commonwealth v. Lynch (164 Mass. 541; 42 N. E. 95), 1090, 1660. Commonwealth v. Lynn ( 107 Mass. 214), 1035, 1513. Commonwealth v. Lyons (160 Mass. 174; 35 X. E. 312), 1057. Commonwealth v. McAnany ( 3 Brewster, 292), 2093, 2098. Commonwealth v. McArty ( 1 1 Gray, 45<3), 1671. Commonwealth v. McAtee (8 Dana, 28), 1455. Commonwealth v. McCabe ( 163 Mass. 98; 39 N. E. 777), 1596, 1679. Commonwealth v. MeCann ( [Ky.] 29 Ky. L. Rep. 707; 94 S. W. 645), 217, 263, 1128. Commonwealth v. McCarty ( [Ky.] 76 S. W. 173; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 585), 868, 871. Commonwealth v. MoCaughey (9 Gray, 296), 1670, 1722. Commonwealth v. ilcCloskey (123 Mass. 401). 1066, 1670. Commonwealth v. McClure ( 204 Pa. 196; 53 Atl. 759), GriS. Commonwealth v. McCluskey ( 116 Mass. 64), 1725. Commonwealth v. McConnell (11 Gray, 204), 1087, 1306, 1323, 1725. Commonwealth v. MeCormick ( 150 Mass. 270; 22 N. E. 911), 683, 688, 690, 1267. Commonwealth v. ^IcCne ( 121 Mass. 358), 116, 1081, 1088, 1675. Commonwealth v. McCullow ( 140 Mass. 370; 5 X. E. 165), 1657, 1<)75. Commonwealtli v. MoCurdy ( 109 Mass. 364), 1099, 1671. Commonwealth v. McDermott ([Ky.] 06 S. W. 475; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 752), 948, 1288. Commonwealth v. McDonald ( 147 Mass. 527; 18 X. E. 402), 1605. Commonwealth v. McDonald ( 187 :\[ass. 581; 73 X. E. 852), 2079. Commonwealth v. McDonough ( 13 Allen 581), 104, 105, 486, 1082, 1101, 1106, 1109. Commonwealth v. McDonough (150 Mass. 504; 23 X. E. 112), 213, 345, 346. Commonwealth v. McGrath (185 Mass. 1; 69 X. E. 340), 964, 908. Commonwealth v. 'McGregor (9 B. Mon. 3), 71. Commonwealth v. IMcGroerty 148 Pa. 606; 24 Atl. 91), 797. Commonwealth v. McGrorty ( 5 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 605), 826, 836. Commonwealth v. McGuire (11 Gray, 460), 1503, 1555. Commonwealth v. McHugh (147 Mass. 401; 18 X. E. 74), 1596, 1597. Commonwealth v. Mclvor (117 Mass. 118), 1487, 1672. Commonwealth v. McKenna ( 158 Mass. 207; 33 X. E. 389), 1089, 1060. Commonwealth v. McKiernan (128 Mass. 414), 1567. Commonwealth v. McLaughlin (108 Mass. 477), 1529. Commonwealth v. McManus (161 Mass. 04; 36 X. E. 075), 1754. Commonwealth v. McXamara (110 Mass. 340), 2031. Commonwealth v. McXamee (112 Mass. 286), 65, 1253, 2030, 2085, 2260. Commonwealth v. McXamee (113 Mass. 12), 451, 523. TABLE OF CASES. xeis. [References are to pages.] Commonwealth v. McNeese ( 156 Mass. 231; 30 N. E. 1021), 1309, l(i34, 1728. Commonwealth v. McXoir ( 145 Mass. 406; 14 X. E. G16), 1096, 1097, 1679, 1747. Commonwealth v. McSherry ( 3 Gray, 481, note), 1513. Commonwealth v. ^Madden ( 1 Gray, 486), 1668, 1674. Commonwealth v. Magee {141 Mass. Ill; 4 N. E. 819), 87, 1709, 1753. Commonwealth v. Mahony ( 14 Gray, 46), 1113, 1115, 1374, 1667, 1668. Commonwealth v. Major ( 6 Dana, 293), 1349, 1377. Commonwealth v. Malone (114 Mass. 295), 2041, 2049. Commonwealth v. Maloney ( 16 Gray, 20), 1595, 1650, 1651, 1678. Commonwealth v. Maloney (113 Mass. 211), 1084. Commonwealtli v. Maloney ( 152 Mass. 493; 25 X. E. 833), 968. Commonwealth v. Mandeville ( 142 Mass. 469; 8 N. E. 327), 608. Commonwealth v. Mann ( 1 Va. Cas. 308), 2031. Commonwealth v. Manning (164 Mass. 547; 42 X. E. 95), 1487. Commonwealth v. Marchand ( 155 Miss. 8; 29 N. E. 578), 1572. Commonwealth v. Markoe ( 17 Pick. 465), 508, 559. Commonwealth v. Maroney ( 105 Mass. 467, note), 1099, 1101, 1375. Commonwealth v. Martin ( 108 Mass. 29), 229, 1480, 1513. Commonwealth v. Martin ( 1'62 Mass. 402; 38 N. E. 708), 1090, 1791. Commonwealth v. Martin (170 Pa. St. 118; 32 Atl. 624), 807. Commonwealth v. Marzynski (149 Mass. 849; 21 XT. E. 228), 73. Commonwealth v. Maskill 165 Mass. 142; 42 X. E. 562), 1085. Commonwealth v. Mason (116 Mass. 66), 1672. Commonwealth v. Mason (135 Mass. 555 ) , 1580. Commonwealth v. Matthews (3 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 473), 833. Commonwealth v. Matthews ( 129 Mass. 487), 452, 493, 1660, 1661. Commonwealth v. Mead ( 10 Al- len, 398), 1158, 1744. Commonwealth v. Mead ( 140 Mass. 300; 3 N. E. 39), 1090, 1660, 1661. Commonwealth v. Mead ( 153 Mass. 284; 26 N. E. 855), 1672, 1673. Commonwealth v. Meaney (151 Mass. 55; 23 N. E. 730), 1632, 1677. Commonwealth v. Melling ( 14 Gray, 388), 1503. Commonwealth v. Merriam ( 136 Muss. 433), 688, 1267. Commonwealth v. Merriam (148 Mass. 425; 19 N. E. 405), 1354, 1374, 1377, 1097, 1658. Commonwealth v. Middleton (8 Ky. L. Rep. 264), 1554, 1555. Commonwealth v. Miller ( 107 Pa. St. 276), 1446. Commonwealth v. Miller ( 126 Pa. St. 137; 17 Atl. 623), 186, 796. Commonwealth v. Miller (131 Pa. St. 118), 163. Commonwealth v. Miller (4 Phila. 195; affirmed, 4 Phila. 210; 17 Leg. Int. 276, 285), 2069, 2079. TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Commonwealth 484), 262, Commonwealth 405; 32 N. Commonwealth 422; 11 S. Rep. 1008) Commonwealth Mass. 141) Commonwealth Mass. 533 1310. Commonwealth Mass. 463; 1708. Commonwealth Mass. 136; Commonwealth Mass. 244 1126, 1303, Commonwealth Mass. 324; 1663. Commonwealth Mass. 244; 1310. Commonwealth Gray 470), Commonwealth Mass. 453; 55'8. Commonwealth Mass. 314; 10. 18, 32, Commonwealth Mass. 314; 1490, 1491. Commonwealth 440; 112 S. Rep. 987), Commonwealth ]\lass. 471 ; Commonwealth Mass. 402 1660. Commonwealth Cush. 404) Commonwealth Mass. 109) V. Miller (8 Gray, 2027, 2031. V. Mills ( 157 Mass. E. 360), 1664. V. Minor (88 Ky. W. 472; 10 Ky. L. , 267, 269, 843, 844. V. Mitchell (115 , 1670, 1671. V. Molter ( 142 ; 8 N. E. 428), V. Monahan ( 140 5 N. E, 259), 86, V. Moore ( 143 9 N. E. 25). 1749. V. Moore ( 145 ), 214, 214, 345, 1655, 1670. V. Moore (157 31 N. E. 1070), V. Moore ( 145 ; 13 N. E. 893), V. Moorehouse ( 1 1451, 1452. V. Moran ( 148 19 N. E. 554), V. Morgan (149 21 N. E. 369), 6, 1708. V. Morgan ( 149 21 N. E. 369), V. Morris ( 129 Ky. W. 580; 33 Ky. L. 1810. V. Morrisey ( 157 32 N. E. 664), 277. V. Morten (162 ; 38 N. E. 708), V. Moulton { 10 , 1488, 1489. V. Moylan (119 , 1641. ' Commonwealth v. Mueller (81 Pa. «t. 127), 930, 933. Commonwealth v. Muir ( 180 Pa. St. 47 ) , 426. C'onmionwealth v. Mullen ( 166 Mass. 377; 44 N. E. 343), 1103, 1105. Commonwealth v. Munn ( 14 Gray, 361), 1112, 1115, 1666, 1667, 1758. Commonwealth v. Munsey (112 Mass. 287), 1601. Commonwealth v. Murphy (96 Ky. 38; 23 ,S. W. 655), 1319. Commonwealth v. ]\Iurphy (2 Gray, 510), 1509, 1513. Commonwealth v. ]\Iurphy (2 Gray, 560), 1369. Commonwealth v. Murphy ( 155 Mass. 284; 29 X. E. 469), 1490. Commonwealth v. Murphy (95 Ky. 38; 23 S. W. 655), 'l 125. Commonwealth v. Murphy ( 10 Gray, 1), 112, 1586, 1590. Commonwealth v. Murphy ( 1 1 Gray, 53), 1739. Commonwealth v. Murphy ( 147 Mass. 525; 18 N. E. 403), 1594. Commonwealth v. Murphy ( 147 Mass. 577; 18 N. E. 418), 1743. Commonwealth v. Murphy ( 153 Mass. 290; 26 N. E. 860), 1656. Commonwealth v. Murphy ( 155 Mass. 284; 29 N. E. 469), 1223. Commonwealth v. Murray ( 144 Mass. 170; 10 X. E. 802), 1739. Commonwealth v. Myrick (6 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 520K 1464. Commonwealth v. :^Iiiss. 554; 32 1629. Commonwealth v. Nally (151 Mass. 63; 23 N. E. 660), 1597. Nagle ( 157 N. E. 861), TABLE OP CASES. CI [References are to pages.] Commonwealth v. Naylor (34 Pa. St. 86), 215, 1304, 1309, 1310. Commonwealth v. Nazarko ([Pa.] 73 Atl. 210), 2039, 20G3, 2068. Commonwealth v. Neal ( 1 1 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 678), 844. Commonwealth v. Neason ( [Ky.] 50 S. W. 6ii; 20 Ky. L. Pvep. 1825), 233, 1409, 1470. Commonwealth v. Nefl" (9 Ky. L. Eep. [abstract] 442), 548, 1545. Commonwealth v. Nelson ( [Ky.] 57 S. W. 495; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 414), 939. Commonwealth v. Newhall ( 1(54 Mass. 338; 41 N. E. 647), 331. Commonwealth v. Newhard (3 Pa. Super. Ct. 215), 1368. Commonwealth v. Newton (123 Mass. 420), 1051, 1052. Commonwealth v. Ney ( 12 Gray, 124), 1191. Commonwealth v. Neylon ( 159 Mass. 241; 34 K E. 1078), 1657. Commonwealth v. Nichols ( 10 Met. 259; 43 Am. Dec. 432), 1349, 1353, 1361. Commonwealth v. Nichols ( 10 Al- len, 199), 1446. Commonwealth v. Nilson ( [Ky.] 50 S. W. 60; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1825), 229. Commonwealth v. Nunan ( [Ky.] 104 S. W. 731; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1090), 540, 543. Commonwealth v. O'Brien ( 134 Mass. 198), 1560, 1628. Commonwealth v. O'Connor (11 Gray, 94), 1660, 1661. Commonwealth v. O'Connor (7 Al- len, 583), 2033. Commonwealth v. Odlin (23 Pick. 275), 23, 25, 1112, 1114, 1492, 1499, 1500, 1533. Commonwealth v. O'Donnell (8 Al- len, 548), 451, 523. Commonwealth V. O'Donnell (143 Mass. 178; 9 N. E. 509), 86, 1702. Commonwealth v. O'Hanlon ( 155 Mass. 198; 29 N. E. 518), 1652, 1745. Commonwealth v. O'Hearn ( 132 Mass. 553), 1623. Commonwealth v. O'Kean ( 152 Mass. 584; 26 N. E. 97), 44, 1185, Commonwealth v. O'Leary ( 143 Mass. 95; 8 N. E. 887), 1226, 1229, 1490, 1503. Commonwealth v. O'Neal (11 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 678), 1526. Commonwealtli v. Overby ( 107 Ky. 169; 53 S. W. 36; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 843), 928. Commonwealtli v. Owens (114 Mass. 252), 1587._ Commonwealth v. Packard (5 Gray, 101), 1161, 1177, 1621. Commonwealth v. Packard ( 136 Mass. 50), 683. Commonwealth v. Page (6 Gray, 361), 1656. Commonwealth v. Park ( 1 Gray, 553), 1353, 1615. Commonwealth v. Parsons ( 195 Mass. 560; 81 N. E. 291), 2038, 2051. Commonwealth v. Pattee ( 12 Cush. [Mass.] 501), 929. Commonwealth v. Patten (151 Mass. 536; 25 N. E. 20), 1647, 1660. Commonwealth v. Patter.son ( 138 Mass. 498), 1100, 1670. Commonwealtli v. Patterson ( 153 Mass. 5; 26 N. E. 136), 1671. Commonwealth v. Paulin ( 187 Mass. 568; 73 N. E. 655), 1192, 1755. Commonwealth v. Pearson (23 Pick. 280, note), 1499. Commonwealth v. Pearson (3 Met. 449), 1459. Commonwealth v. Pease (110 Mass. 412), 1702, 1708. en TABLE OF CASES. fReferences are to poyes.] Commonwealth v. Peckham (2 Gray, 514), 11, 34, 79, 81. Commonwealth v. Petlerman ( 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 202), 1330. C-ommonwealth v. Pendeigast ( 138 Pa. St. 633; 21 Atl. 12), 337. Commonwealth v. Penniman (8 Met. 519), 1455. Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Coal Co. (66 Pa. St. 4l'), 99. Commonwealth v. People's Express Bureau ([Mass.] 88 Is. E. 420, 820), 386, 387. Commonwealth v. Peppin ( [Ky.] 40 S. W. 252), 14«7. •Commomvealth v. Perley (2 Cush. 559), 1112, 1115. Commonwealth v. Perrier ( 3 Phila. 229), 2040, 2008, 2009. Commonwealth v. Perry ( 148 Mass. 160; 19 N. E. 212), 828, 1361, 1646. Commonwealth v. Peto ( 1S6 Mass. 155), 87, 1081, 1699, 1712. Commonwealth v, Petranich ( 183 Mass. 217; 66 N. E. 807), 158, 967, 1512. Commonwealth v. Petrie Co. (90 S. W. 987; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 940), 190. Commonwealth v. Petri ( 122 Ky. 20; 90 S. W. 987; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 940), 557. Cx)mmonwealth v. PfafT (17 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 302; 5 Pa. Dist. Rep. 59; 26 Pitts. L. J. [N. -S.] 254). 1.308. Commonwealth v. Phelps (11 Gray 73). 1013, 1675. Commonwealth v. Pierce ( 107 Mass. 487), 1656, 1667. Commonwealth v. Pierce (147 Mass. 161; 10 N. E. 705), 822, 832. (.Commonwealth v. Pillsbury (12 Gray 127), 384. 47«, i008. Commonwealth v. Pine (|Ky.] 94 S. W. 32; 29 Ky. "l. Rep. 593), 218. Commonwealth v. Piatt (11 Phila. 415), 2063, 2068, 2072. Commonwealth v. Powderly ( 148 Mass. 457; 19 N. E. 781), 1093, 1113, 1667. Commonwealth v. Powell ( [Ky.] 62 S. W. 19; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1932), 824, 934. Commonwealth v. Powell ( 148 Mass. 457; 19 X. E. 781), 1115. Commonwealth v. Powers ( 123 Mass. 244). 1064, 1660. Commonwealth v. Powers (17 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 304), 1508. Commonwealth v. Pollak ( 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 600), 1608, 1611. Commonwealth v. Pomplaret ( 137 Mass. 564; 50 Am. Rep. 340), 1166. 1329. Commonwealth v. Pool ( 16 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 351), 559. Commonwealth v. Porter ( 4 Gray 426), 1116. Commonwealth v. Porter ( 10 Phila. 217), 822. Commonwealth v. Porter (31 Leg. Int. 398). 1474], 1489, 1524. Commonwealth v. Pratt ( 126 Mass. 462), 1368. Commonwealth v. Pratt ( 145 Mass. 248; 13 N. E. 886 [, 1626. Commonwealth v. Pray (13 Pick. 359), 1480, 1533. Commonwealth v. Presby ( 14 Gray 65), 2033, 2034. Commonwealth v. Price ( [Ky.] 94 S. W. 32; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 593), 219, 357. Commonwealth v. Price, etc., Co. ([Ky.] 105 S. W. 102; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1350), 949. Commonwealth v. Price (5 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 175; 4 Kulp. 289), 1447. TABLE OF CASES. cm [References are lo pages.] Commonwealth v. Purcell (154 Mass. 388; 28 N. E. 288), 978, 1103. Commonwealth v. Purdy ( 14G Mass. 138; 15 N. E. tJ64), 1655. Commonwealth v. Purdy (147 Mass. 29), 1484, 1541, 15'82, 1661. Commonwealth v. Purtlc (77 Mass. [11 Gray] 78), 1035, 1527, 1530, 1659. Commonwealth v. Putnam (4 Gray 16), 1353, 1359, 1639. Commonwealth v. Quinn ( 12 Gray 178), 1547. Commonwealth v. Quinlan ( 153 Mass. 483; 27 N. E. 8), 1547, 1550. Commonwealth v. RalTerty ( 133 Mass. 574), 1644. Commonwealth v. Ramsdell (130 Mass. 68), 20, 51, 55, 79, 822, 1088. Commonwealth v. Redman (121 Ky. 158; 88 S. W. 1073; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 117), 569. Commonwealth v. Reed! ( 162 Mass. 215; 38 N. E. 364), 1074, 1075. Commonwealth v. Regan ( 182 Mass. 22; 64 N. E. 407), 1084, 1086, 1312. Commonwealth v. Reily (9 Gray 1), 1528. Commonwealth v. Remby (2 Gray 508), 1624, 1653, 1747. Commonwealth v. Reyburg ( 122 Pa. St. 299; 16 Atl. 351; 2 L. R. A. 415), 24, 48, 49, 50, 87, 965, 1699, 1712. Commonwealth v. Reynolds (89 Ky. 147; 12 S. W. 132; 20 S. W. 167), 112, 832. 835. Commonwealth v. Reynolds (4 Ky. L. Rep. 623), 1467, 1463. Commonwealth v. Reynolds (6 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 520), 836. Commonwealth v. Reynolds (114 Mass. 306), 1367. Commonwealth v. Rhoades ( 1 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 639), 821, 1487. Commonweultli v. Rhodes ( I Pittsb. 499), 76. Commonwealth v. Riley ( 14 Bush 44), 1442, 1542, 1545. Commonwealth v. Riley ( 157 Mass. 89; 31 N. E. 708), 1752. Commonwealth v. Riley ( 196 Mass. 60; 81 X. E. 881; 10 L. R. A. [X. S.] 1122), 1726. Commonwealth v. Risner ( [Ky.] 47 S. W. 213), 1498. Commonwealth v. Roberts ( 1 Cush. 505), 1520, 1556. Commonwealth v. Robertson (5 Cush. [Mass.] 438), 408. Commonwealth v. Robinson (9 Pa. Super. Ct. 569), 796. Commonwealth v. Roby ( 12 Pick. 496), 2252. Commonwealth v. Roese ( 1 Wil- cox [Pa.] 253), 967. Commonwealth v. Rogers ( 1 Del. Cr. Rep. 517), 1125, 1319. Commonwealth v. Rogers ( 135 Mass. 536), 1095. Commonwealth v. Roland ( 12 Gray, 132), 1101, 1513. Commonwealth v. Rome ( 14 Gray [Mass.] 47), 264. Commonwealtli v. Rooks ( 150 Mass. 59; 22 N. E. 436), 1354, 1362, 1629. Commonwealth v. Rooney ( 142 Mass. 474; 8 N. E. 411), 1671. Commonwealth v. Rosenbaum (6 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 365, 575), 553. Commonwealth v. Rourke ( 10 Cush. 397). 1774. Comnionweaitli \. ILuuike (lil Mass. 321; 6 N. E. 383), 213, 345, 1679. ■ll^, . C. [Can.] 291), )i263. Harman v. Harman ( 16 111. 85 ) , 2154, 2L64, 2167. cliv TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages.] Harman v. Powell ([1892] 65 L. T. 255; 56 J. V. 150), 1821. Harmon, In re (43 Fed. 372), 308, 998, 1434, 1435. Harmon v. -Chicago ([HI.] 26 X. E. 697), 479. Harmon v. Johnston ( 1 MacAr- thur, 139), 2097. Harmon v. State (92 Ga. 455; 17 S. E. 666), 1120, 112<3. Harmony Lodge, I. 0. 0. F.'s Ap- peal (127 Pa. 209; 18 Atl. 10), 213«, 2148. Harney v. State (8 Lea, 13), 247, 1221. Harp V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 61 S. W. 467; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1792), 957, 1743. Harper, In re ( 30 X. Y. Misc. Rep. ti63; 64 X. Y. Supp. 524), 545, 720. Harper's Will, In re (4 Bibb, 244), 2136, 2139, 2149. Harper v. Archer (4 Smed. & M. [Miss.] 108), 1906. Harper v. Golden ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 39 S. W. 623), 762, 763, 767. Harper v. State ([Ark.] 127 S. W. 738), 1237. Harper v. State (85 Miss. 338; 37 So. 956), 1207. Harper v. State (7 Ohio St. 73), 1741. Harper v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 98 S. VV. 839). 1603. Harper v. State ([Ark.] 121 S. W. 738), 1161, 1205, 1226, 1280, 1282. Harrell v. Speed (113 Tenn. 224; 81 S. W. 840), 331. Harrigan, In re (Myr. Prob. 135), 2138. Harring v. State ([.\hi.] 48 So. 576), 1739. Harrington v. State (36 Ala. 236), 1188, 1219, 1223, 1578. Harrington v. State (36 Ark. 236), 1221. Harrington v. State ( 77 Ark. 480 ; 91 S. W. 747), 1568. Harrington v. State (9 Wend. [X. Y.] 525), 394. Harris v. Commonwealth (23 Pick. 280), 1760. Harris v. Jenns (9 C. B. [X. S,] 152; 30 L. J. M C 183; 9 W. R. 36; 3 L. T. [X. S.] 408; 22 J. P. 807), 27, 961, 965, 1708. Harris v. Livingston (28 Ala. 577), 77, 395, 431, 432, 1192. Harris v. People (21 Colo. 95; 39 Pac. 1084), 1125. Harris v. People ( 1 Colo. App. 289; 28 Pac. 1133), 509, 1120, 1123, 1728. Harris v. Runnels ( 12 How. 79, 83, 84; 13 L. Ed. 901, 903), 1794. Harris v. Sheffield (128 Ga. 299; 57 S. E. 305; 59 S. E. 771), 923. Harris v. State (61 Miss. 304), 2246, 2247, 2252. Harris v. State ([Miss.] 12 So. 904), 1280, 1464, 1468, 1513. Harris v. State (50 Ala. 127), 1112, 1478, 1535, 1752. Harris v. State (114 Ga. 436; 40 S. E. 315), 229. Harris v. State (4 Tex. App. 131), 198. Harris v. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 588; 85 S. W. 284, 1198), 049, 950, 1380, 1381. Harris v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 86 S. W. 763), 1697. Harris v. State ( 49 Tex. Cr. App. 233; 91 S. W. 590), 1379. Harris v. State (50 Tex. Cr. App. 411; 97 S. W. 704), 1613, 1689, 1722, 1723. Harris v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 98 S. W. 842), 1606, 1694, 1695, 1705. Harris v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 100 S. W. 'J20), 1609. TABLE OP CASES. clv fRefeieiK.'t'S are to pages.] Harris v. United States (8 App. D. a 20; 36 L. H. A. 4ti.5), 2042, 2044. Harrison v. Berkeley ( 1 Strobli. [S. C] 525; 47 Am. Dec. 578), 1838, 1893. Harrison v. Dickinson ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 113 S. W. 770), G53. Harrison v. Ely (120 111. 83; 11 N. E. 334), 60, 1254. Harrison, etc., v. Holland (3 Grat. [Va.] 247), 394. Harrison v. Lockhart (25 Ind. 112), 101, 144, 1808. Harrison v. Mayer, etc. ( 1 Ciill [Md.] 2'64), 96. Harrison v. Xicliols (31 Vt. 709), 1777. Harrison v. People (195 111. 460; 63 N. E. 191; reversing 91 111. App. 421), o^5, oil, 650. Harrison v. People (222 111. 150; 78 N. E. 52), 594, 631. Harrison v. People (124 111. App. 519), 720, 727. Harrison v. State (91 Ala. 02; 10 So. 30), 308. Harrison v. State (96 Tenn. 548; 35 S. W. 559), 1279. Harryman v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 474; 110 S. W. 926), 913, 959, 1682, 1684. Hart V. Corlett (4 Ohio Dec. 181; 1 Clev. Law Pvep. 92), 2012. Hart V. De Missisgroni (3 Quebec L. R. 170), 168. Hart V. Duddleson (20 111. App. 618), 1869. Hart V. State (87 Miss. 171; 39 So. 523), 111, 234, 953. Hart V. Thompson (15 La. 88), 2136, 2148. Harten v. State (32 Kan. G37 : 5 Pac. 212), 226. Hartford v. Palmer (16 Johns. 143), 2259. Hartgraves v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 43 S. W. 331), 1086, 1698. Hartig v. Seattle ([Wash.] 102 Pac. 408), 558. Hartley, In re (25 Up. Can. 12), 894, 914, 975. Hartsel v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 68 S. W. 285), 1471. Harvey v. Olney (42 III. 336), 811. Harvey v. Peacock (11 M. k W. 740), 1020. Harvey v. Peck (1 Munf. 518), 2102, 2126, 2130. Harvey v. State (05 Ga. 568), 1119, 1125. Harvey v. State (80 Ind. 142), 1176, 1224, 1248, 1565, 1621, 1633. Harvey v. State (8 Lea, 113), 1578. Hartwell v. Alabama, etc., Ins. Co. (33 La. Ann. 1353; 39 Am. Rep. 294), 2221, 128. Hash V. Ely (45 Tex. Civ. App. 259; 100 S. W. 980), 898, 899, 923. Haskell v. Haskell (54 Cal. 202; 17 Abb. N. C. 231), 2154, 2164. Haskell v. New Bedford (108 Mass. 208), 280. Haskill v. Commonwealth (3 B. Mon. 342), 1499. 1642, 1643. Haskins v. Spillcr (1 Dana [Ky.] 172), 1906. Haslem v. Schnarr (30 Ont. 89), 652, 715. Hastings, In re ( [Neb.] 119 N. W. 27), 558. Hasting v. People (22 X. Y. 95), 929. Hastings Brewing Co., In re ([Neb.] 119 N. W. 27), 538. Hatclier v. Commonwealth (106 Va. 827: 55 S. E. 677). 1652. Hatcher v. State (80 Tenn. [12 Lea] 368), 135. Hatfield v. Commonwealth ( 120 Pa. St. 395; 14 Atl. 151), 27, 82. 291, 967. clvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Hatfield v. State (9 Ind. App. 296; 36 N. B. 664), 1106, 1560. 1561, 1566. Hatten's Will, In re (3 N. Y. St. Rep. 213), 2136, 2138, 2142, 2147. Hatzen's League, Ex parte (5 Quebec Q. B. 160), 619, 620, 647. Hauck, In re (70 Mich. 396: 38 X. W. 269), 244, 291, 436. Haug V. Gillett (14 Kan. 140), 512, 521, 1288. Hauk V. Great Northern R. Co. (8 N. D. 23; 77 N. W. 97; 42 L. R. A. 669), 2205, 2212, 2214. Hausberg v. People (120 111. 21; 8 N. E. 857), 43, 83. Hauselman v. Kegel (60 Mich. 540; 27 X. W. 558), 1027. Haven v. State (17 Ind. 455), 1500. Haviland v. Chase (116 Mich. 214; 74 X. W. 477; 72 Am. St. Rep. 519), 1985. Hawaiian Trvist Co. v. High Sher- iff (16 Hawaii, 689), 1774. Hawesville v. Board ( 99 Ky. 292 ; 35 S. W. 1034), 808. Hawk V. People (44 Tex. Cr. App. 560; 72 S. W. 842), 844. Hawke v. Dunn ([1897] 1 Q. B. 579; 61 J. P. 292; 66 L. J. Q. B. 364: 76 L. T. 355: 45 W. R. 359; 13 T. L. R. 281), 380. Hawke v. Plymouth Breweries, Limited, ( Bodmin A.ssizes [June 27, 1906], not report- ed), 1820. Hawkins, Ex parte (61 Ark. 321; 30 L. R. A. 730; 33 S. W. 106), 2261. Hawkins, In re (165 N. Y. 168; 58 X. E. 884; reversing 28 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 383; 59 X. Y. Supp. 888 : 60 X. Y. Supp. 1141: 06 X. Y. Supp. 1132), 580, 581, 730. Hawkins v. Bone _(4 F. & F. 311), 2098. Hawkins v. Bridgewater ( [ 1900] 2 Q. B. 382; 69 L. J. Q. B. 663; 64 J. P. 631; 48 W. R. 587; 82 L. T. 847; 16 T. L. R. 404), 680. Hawkins v. Common Council ([Mich.] 79 X. W. 570), 649, 650. Hawkins v. Commonwealth (76 Pa. St. 151), 394. Hawkins v. Litchfield (120 Mich. 390; 79 X. W. 570), 759, 763. Hawkins v. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 37; 100 S. W. 956), 1181, 1206. Hawkins v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 114 S. W. 813), 836. Hawkins v. State ( [Tex.] 122 Pac. 22), 1601. Hawks v. Fellows ( 108 Iowa, 133 ; 78 X. W. 812), 992. Hawk's Xest v. Fayette Co. (55 W. Va. 689; 48 S. E. 205), 658. Haworth v. Minns (56 L. T. 316; 51 J. P. 7), 44, 85, 87, 1708. Hawthorne v. State (39 Tex. Civ, App. 122; 87 S. W. 839), 783, 784. Hay V. Parker (55 ^le. 355). 1774. Hay V. Tower Division (59 L. J. M. C. 79; 24 Q. B. Div. 561; 62 L. T. 290; 38 W. R. 414; 54 J. P. 500), 535. Hayes, Ex parte (98 Cal. 555; 33 Pac. 337; 20 L. R. A. 701), 432. Hayes v. Board (6 Cal. App. 520: " 92 Pac. 492), 566, 659, 665. Hayes v. Hyde Park ( 153 Mass. ' 514-516;^ 27 X. E. 522; 12 L. R. A. 249), 1795, 1796. Hayes v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 39 S. W. 106), 890. Hayes v. State of Missouri (120 U. S. 68; 7 Sup. Ct. 350), 238. TABLE OF CASES. clvii [References are to pages.] Hayes v. Thompson (9 B, C. Rep. 249), 432, 452. Hayes v. Waite (3G 111. App. 397), 1887. Haynes v. Cass County ( [Mo.] 115 S. W. 1084), 868, 925. Haynes v. State ( [Miss.] 23 So. 182), 1763. Haynes v. State (118 Tenn. 709; 105 S. W. 251; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 559), 1185. Haynes v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 83 S. W. 16), 1605. Haynie v. State (32 Miss. 400), 827. Hays V. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 150; 83 S. W. 201), 1211. Hays V. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 369; 91 S. W. 585), 1694. Hays V. State (13 Mo. 246), 513, 1372, 1626. Hazell V. Middleton (45 J. P. 548), 709. Hazeltine v. McGroorty (6 Kulp. 533), 815. Hazen v. Commonwealth (23 Pa. St. 355), 1220, 1305, 1311. Head v. Doehlman ( 148 Ind. 145 ; 46 N. E. 585), 663, 608, 609, 662, 671, 857. Head Money Cases (112 U. S. 580; 5 Sup. Ct. 247), 100. Headington v. Smith (113 Iowa, 107; 84 N. VV. 982), 770. Healy v. New York (3 Hun, 708), 2171, 2186, 2198. Health Department v. Trinity Church (145 N. Y. 32), 215. Hearn v. Brogan (64 Miss. 334), 488, 490, 561, 564, 928, 932. Hearsey v. Broadway (9 Mass. 95), 1058. Heart v. East Tennessee Brewing Co. ([Tenn.] 113 S. W. 364), 1811. Heath v. Intoxicating Liquors (53 Me. 172), 1059. Heath V. State (105 Ind. 342; 4 N. E. 901), 511, 514, 694. Hebert v. Winn (24 La. Ann. 385), 2136, 2137, 2148, 2149. Heblick v. Hancock Co. Ct. ( [Ky.] 10 S. W. 465), 636, 648. Heck V. State (44 Ohio St. 536; 9 N. E. 305), 119, 125, 133, 185, 247, 248, 596, 1278. Hederick v. State (101 Ind. 504; 1 N. E. 47; 51 Am. Rep. 768), 91, 96, 105, 144, 165, 217, 311, 456, 1303, 1314, 1316. Hedges v. Metcalfe Co. (116 Ky. 524; 76 S. W. 381; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 772), 666. Hedges v. Titus (47 Ind. 145), 488, 494. Hedgreen, In re ( [Neb.] HI N. W. 786), 568. Hedland v. Geyer (234 111. 589; 85 N. E. 203), 1928. Hedman, Ex parte ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 78 S. W. 349), 245. HefT, In re (197 U. S. 488; 25 Sup. Ct. 506 ; 49 L. Ed. 848 ) , 1260, 1263. Hegard v. California Ins. Co. ([Cal.] 11 Pac. 594), 75. Hegeman v. Western R. Co. ( 13 N. Y. 9), 99. Heide, Ex parte (18 Juta, 479), 695, 698. Heidelberg Garden Co. v. People (124 111. App. 331; affirming 233 111. 290; 84 N. E. 230), 537, 683. Hein v. Smith (13 W. Va. 358), 663. Heinesen v. State (14 Colo. 228; 23 Pac. 995), 1308. Heinrich Bros. Brewing Co. v. Kit- sap Co. (45 Wash. 454; 88 Pac. 838), 814. Heintz v. Le Page (100 Me. 542; 62 Atl. 605), 965, 969, 1779, 1790, 1800. Heise v. Columbia (6 Rich. [S. C. Law] 404), 244, 291, 404. Heisembrittle v. Charleston (2 Mc- Mul. 233), 413. clviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Heinz v. Stahl ([Kan.] 99 Pac. 273), 1772. Helfrick v. Commonwealth (29 Grctt. 844 [Va.]), 202, 203. Helling, In re (2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 76), 639. Helmuth v. Bell (150 III. 263; 37 N. E. 230; affirming 49 III. App. 626), 1935. Hemhall v. Ludington (33 Wi.s. 107), 1840. Heming, In re ([X. Y.] 117 X. Y. Supp. 747 ), 595. Hemmens v. Bentley (32 Mich 89), 1915, 1955, 1962. Hemmer v. Bonson ( 139 Iowa, 210; 117 X. W. 257, 260), 983, 985. Hempton v. State (111 Wis. 127; 86 X. W. 596), 2039, 2068, 2069. Henberger, License. In re {S Pa. Super. Ct. 625), 705. Hencke v. McCord (55 la. 378), 396, 1025. Hencke v. Standiford (66 Ark. 535; 52 S. A. 1), 798, 799, 802. Henderson, In re ( 14 ]Manitoba, 535), 939, 940. Henderson v. Coninionwealtli ([Ky.] 72 S. W. 781; 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1985), 2068, 2085. Henderson v. Galveston ( [Tex.] 114 S. W. '108), 132. Henderson v. Hey wood ( 109 Ga, 373; 34 S. E. 590), 452. Henderson v. Mayor (92 U. S. 259), 116, 316. Henderson v. Price ( 96 X. C. 423 ; 2 S. E. 155), 688. Henderson v. State (60 Ind. 296), 1520, 1522. Henderson v. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 79; 38 S. W. 017), 1237. Henderson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 39 S. W. 116), 1730. Henderson v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 269: 91 S. W, 569), 905, 1704, 1735. Henderson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 93 S. W. 551), 1705. Henderson v. State (50 Tex. Cr. App. 413; 98 S. W. 1055), 1167. Henderson v. State (50 Tex. Cr. App. 604; 101 S. \V. 208), 160(i. Henderson v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 514; 107 S. W. 820), 1095. Henderson v. Waggoner (2 Lea, 133), 1801. Hendersonville v. Price (9(i X. C. 423; 2 S. E. 155), 526, 780. Hendrick v. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 371; 83 S. W. 711), 972, 1703. Hendrickson v. Commonwealth ( 15 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 542), 1715. Hendrickson v. Hendrickson (51 Iowa, 68), 2126, Hendrey v. Rolleston (22 X. Y. 821), 1316. Heney v. State ([Tex.] 16 S. W. 342), 1680. Heninbvrg v. State (151 Ala. 26; 43 So. 959), 2068, 2070. Hening, In re ([X. Y.] 117 X. Y. Supp. 747), 582. Henke v. McCord (55 Iowa, 378; 7 X. W. 623), 442. Henkel v. Hoy (4 X. J. L. 56; 64 Atl. 960)', 698. Hennepin Co. v. Robinson ( 16 Minn. 381), 566, 627, 645, 807. Hennessey v. Woulfe (49 La. Ann. 1376'; 22 So. 394), 2136, 2147. Henno v. Fayetteville ([Ark.] 119 S. W. 287), 1696 Henry, In re (124 Iowa, 358; 100 X. W. 43), 69, 533. o?M, 635, 663. Henry v. Barton (107 C3I. 535; 40 Pac. 798), 627, 634. Henry v. Fulton (8 X. J. L. R. 551), 1367, 1368. TABLE OF CASES. clix [References are to pages.] Henry v. Ritenour (31 Ind. 136), 2092, 2093. Henry v. State (2G Ark. 523), 139, 787, 791. Henry v. State (04 Ark. 602; 43 S. VV. 499), 1213, 1281. Henry v. State (71 Ark. 574; 76 S. W. 1071), 1715. Henry v. State (77 Ark. 453; 92 S. W. 405), 1101, 1108, 1651. Henry v. State (33 Ga. 441), 2041. Henry v. State (113 Ind. 304; 15 N. E. 593), 1197, 1508, 1567. Henry v. State ([Tex.] 116 S. W. 1162), 514. Hensley v. Metcalfe €o. (115 Ky. 810; 74 S. W. 1054; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 204), 639, 663. Hensley v. State (6 Ark. 252), 1548, Hensley v. State (1 Eng. [Ark.] 252), 1541. Hensly v. State (52 Ala. 10), 1613. Hensiie v. State (3 Heisk. 202), 2079. Hensoldt v. Petersburg (03 111. Ill), 1702. Heny v. State (26 Ark. 523), ',.3. Hepler v. State (58 Wis. 40; 10 N. W. 42), 1645, 1764. Hepworth v. Pickles ([1900] 1 Ch, 108; 69 L. J. Ch. 55; 48 W. R. 184; 81 L. T. 818), 1814. Herald v. State (36 Me. 62), 929. Herbert, Ex parte (34 X. B. 455), 1755. Hercrow v. State (2 Tex. App. 511), 370. Herine v. Commonwealth ( 13 Bush, -295), 1457, 1542, 1545. Hering, In re ([X. Y.] 117 X. Y. Supp. 747), 103, 500. Hering v. Ervin (48 111. App. 309), 1801. Her lock v. Riser (1 McCord, 481), 1805. Herman Goepper & Co. v. Phoenix Brewing Co. (115 Ky. 708; 74 S. W. 720; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 84), 1170. Hernandez v. State ( 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 271; 22 S. W. 972), 2074. Herod v. State (41 Tex. Cr. App. 597; 56 S. W. 59), 1727. Herrick v. Morrill (37 Minn. 250; 33 X. W. 849; 5 Am. St. Rep. 841 J, 005. Herring v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (10 Ired. L. 402; 51 Am. Dec. 395), 2178, 2180. Herron v. State (51 Ark. 133; 10 S. W. 25), 137, 1281, 1288. Herron v. State (17 Ind. App. 161; 46 N. E. 540), 1444, 1502. Herschenback v. State (34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 122; 29 S. W. 470), 1233. Herschey v. Mill Creek Tp. ( [Pa.] 8 Cent. Rep. 252), 2187. Hershoff v. Beverly (45 N. J. L. [16 Vroom] 288), 410, 413. Hertel v. People (78 III. App. 109), 968. Hertzler v. Geigley (196 Pa. St. 419; 46 Atl. 360), 123, 1380, 1381. Hess V, Pegg (7 Xev. 23), 394. Hestand v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 92 S. W. 12; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 1315), 1005. Hettenbach v. If^hy ( 7 Vict. L. R. 104), 1368. Hctzer a-. People ( 4 Colo. 45 ) , 522. Hetzer v. Wheelan (21 Ga. 401), 401. Hevren v. Reed (126 Cal. 219: 58 P. 5.36), 490, 715, 716. Hewitt, Appeal of (76 Conn. 685; 58 Atl. 231), 597, 645. Hewitt's Will, In re (31 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 81; 64 X\ Y. Supp. \571), 2136, 2138, 2141. clx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Hewitt V. Invercargill (12 X. Y. L. R. 631), 644. Hewitt V. Jervis (68 J. P. 54), 6D0, 1273. Hewitt V. People (186 111. 3»6; 57 N. E. 1077; affirming 87 111. App. 367), 11, 73, 964, 968, 1195, 1196. Hexom v. Knights of Maccabees of the World ( [Iowa J 117 N. W, 19), 2240, 2242. Heyman, Ex parte (45 Tex. Cr. App. 532; 78 S. W. 349), 234, 245, 863. Heyman v. Southern Ry. Co. (203 U. S. 270; 27 Sup. Ct. 104; 51 L. Ed. 178 [reversing 122 Ga. 608; 50 S. E. 342]), 324, 328, 330, 1429. Heyman v. State (64 Ga. 437), 1515. Hibbard v. Clark (56 N. H. 155), 276. Hibbard v. People (4 Mich. 125), 254, 100-8, 1013, 1016. Hickcox V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 85 ;S. W. 1198), 298, 307, 1214, 1280. Hickey v. Hay (65 J. P. 232; 17 T. L. R. 52 ) , 380. Hickman v. Glazebrook ( 18 Ind. 210), 2124. Hicks V. State ( [Ga.] 32 S. E. 665), 1523. Hicks V. Trustees (151 Mich. 88; 114 N. W. 682; 14 Detroit L. N. 812), 762, 764. Hierholzer v. State (47 Tex. Cr. Rep. 199; 83 S. W. 836), 2090. Hiers v. .State ( [Fla.] 41 So. 881), 1379. Higbee v. Guardian Mut. L. Ins. Co. (66 Barb. 462), 2220, 2224, 2235. Higgenbotham v. State ( 19 Fla. 557), 929. Higgins V. Kavanaugh (52 Iowa, 368; 3 N. W. 409), 1966. Higgins V. People (69 111. 11), 1552. Higgins V. Rinker (47 Tex. 393), 27, 555. Higgins V. State (64 Md. 419; 1 Atl. 876), 938, 939. Higgins V. Talty (157 Mo. 280; 57 S. W. 724), 6'59. High V. State ([Okla.] 101 Pac. 115), 323, 325, 329, 3-85. Hight V. Fleming (74 Ga. 592), 800, 802. Hight V. Wilson ( 1 Dall. 94 ; 1 L. Ed. 51), 2139. Hill V. Commissioners (22 Ga. 203), 432. Hill V. Dalton (72 Ga. 314), 270, 449, 1505. Hill V. Decatur (22 Ga. 203), 432. Hill V. Dunn ([Iowa] 93 N. W. 705), 981. Hill V. Gleisner (112 Iowa, 397; 84 N. W. 511), 943. Hill V. Howth ([Tex.] Ill S. W. 649), 864. Hill V. Howth ([Tex. Civ. App.] 112 S. W^ 707), 864, 892. Hill V. Manning (12 N. Z. L. R. 153), 1597. Hill V. People (20 N. Y. 363), 2026. Hill V. Perry (82 Ind. 28), 532. Hill V. Roach (26 Tex. Civ. App. 75; 62 S. W. 959), 921, 925. Hill v. Sheridan (128 Mo. App. 415; 107 S. W. 426), 706. Hill v. Spear (50 N. H. 253; 9 Am. Rep. 205), 1785, 1786, 1795, 1796, 1798, 1799, 1801. Hill V. State (62 Ala. 168), 1223, 1240, 1241, 1253. Hill V. State (37 Ark. 395), 1233, 1598. Hill V. State (42 Xeb. 503; 60 N. W. 916), 2051, 2061, 2072. Hillard v. Fitzpatrick (27 Vict. L. R. 380; 23 Austr. L. T. 1; 7 Austr. L. R. 223), 360. TABLE OF CASES. clxi I Fieferences are to pages.] Hillard v. Giese (25 X. Y. App Div. 222; 49 N. Y. Sup. 28(5) 491, 7M. Hillard v. State ( 4S Tex. Cr. App 314; 87 S. W. 821), 915 1208. Hildreth v. Crawford (6'5 Iowa 339; 21 N. W. 667), 185, 471 '827. Hilleman, In re (11 Pa. Super. Ct. 567), 646. Hillman v. Mayher (38 Tex. Civ. App. 377;' 85 S. W. 818), 761. Hillman v, Gallagher ([Tex.] 120 S. W. 505), 1924, 1932, 1941. Hillsboro v. Smith (110 N. C. 417; 14 S, E. 972), 382, 596, 628, 629, 674. Hilterbrand v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 342; 91 S. W. 587), 1212. Hilts V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (7:>o Mich. 437; 21 N. VV. 87«), 2198, 2199, 2201. Hilverstine v. Yantes ( 88 Ky. 695 ; 21 S. W. 811), 289. Hinan v. Lett (8 Wall. 148), 316. Hinchman v. Stoepel (54 N. J. L. 486; 24 Atl. 401), 616, 617. Hinckley v. German Fire Ins. Co. (140 Mass. 38; 54 Am. Rep. 445; 1 N. E. 737), 1779. Hine v. Belden (27 Conn. 384), 1015. Hines v. Stahl ([Kan.] 93 Pac. 273), 1023. Hines v. State (26 Ga. 614), 1245. Hingle v. State (22 Ind. 462), 1307. Hingle v. State (24 Ind. 28), 237, 1304, 1307, 1308. Hinkle, Ex parte ( 104 Mo. App. 104; 78 S. A. 317), 413, 417, 796. Hinkle v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 66 S. W. 1020; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1979), 1180, 1204, 1462. Hinkle v. Smith (90 Iowa, 761; 67 N. W. 891), 1002. Hinson v. Lott (40 Ala. 123), 316. Hinson v. Lott (8 Wall. 148), 154, 156. Hintermeister v. State ( 1 Iowa, 101), 1489. Hinton v. Commonwealth (7 Dana, 216), 1096. Hinton v. State (132 Ala. 29; 31 So. 563), 1185, 1698, 1703. Hipes V. State ( 18 Ind. App. 426 ; 48 N. E. 12), 1507, 1535. Hipp V. State (5 Blackf. [Ind.] 143), 1240, 1351, 1352, 1353. Hippen v. Ford (129 Cal. 315; 01 Pac. 929), 652. Hirn v. State ( 1 Ohio St. 15 [over- ruling Curtis V. State, 5 Ohio 324]), 72, 508, 714, 716, 1510, 1521. Hirsch v. State ( 50 Tex. €r. App. 1; 96 S. W. 40), 949, 950, 1280. Hirschburg v. People (6 Colo. 145), 929. Hitchner v. Ehlers (44 Iowa, 40), 1915. Kitchens v. People ( 39 N. Y. 454 ) , 369. Hite V. Commonwealth (96 Va. 489; 31 S. E. 895), 2038. H. Koehler & Co. v. Clemont ( [N. Y.] Ill N. Y. Supp. 151), 723, 752. Hoagland v. Canficld (160 F. 146), 84, 2260. Hoard v. Peck (56 Barb. [X. Y.] 202), 1838. Hoard v. State (15 Lea, 318), 2055. Hoare & Co. Limited v. Lewisham Borough Council ( [1902] 87 L. T. 281; 17 T. L. R. 72), 1834. Hoare v. Metropolitan Board of Works ([1874] L. R. 9 Q. B. 296; 38 J. P. 535), 1834. Hobart v. Butte Co. (17 Cal. 23), 233. clxii TABLE OF CASES. [ReferencciS are to pages.] Hoboken v. Goodman (68 X. J. L. 217; 51 Atl. 1092), 148, 305, 413, 416, 464, 714. Hockett V. Wilson (12 Ore. 25; 6 Pac. 6521. 479. Hochfield v. Sutherland ( 15 Juta, 101), 567. Hochstadler v. State (73 Ala. 24), 509, 691, 1267. Hockings v. Powell (59 J. P. 358), 680. Hodge V. Commonwealth ( 3 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 822), 1466. Hodge V. Commonwealth (4 Ky. Law Rep. 341), 1467. Hodge V. State (116 Ga. 852; 43 S. E. 255), 80, 1159. Hodge V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 43 S. W. 994), 1201, 1210. Hodges V. Metcalfe Co. (116 Ky. 524; 75 S. W. 381; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 772), 627. Hodges V. Metcalfe Co. ( [Ky.] 76 S. W. 381; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 772, 1706; 78 S. W. 460), 666. Hodges V. Metcalf Co. Ct. (117 Ky. 619; 78 S. W. 177, 400; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1553, 1706), 619, 800. Hodgman v. People (4 Denio, 235), 1556, 1608. Hodgson V. New Orleans (21 La. Ann. 301), 198. Hodgson V. Temple (5 Taunt. 181), 1790, 1794, 1795. Hoefiing v. San Antonio (85 Tex. 228; 20 S. W. 85; 16 L. R. A. 608), 4«3. HofiF, In re (197 U. S. 488, 505; 25 Sup. Ct. 500; 49 L. Ed. 848), 147. HofTer, Ex parte (27 X. B. 496), 1723. Hofheintz v. State (45 Tex. €r. App. 117; 74 S. W. 310), 1130, 1451. Hofner v. State (94 Ind. 84), 1353, 1016. Hogan, In re (16 R. I. 542; 18 AtL 273), 1065. Hogan V. Dewell (24 Ark. 216), 1027. Hogg V. Davidson (3 F. [Just. Cas.] 49), 1352, 1355. Hogg V. People ( 15 111. App. 288 ) , 1343. Hogins V. Supreme Council (76 CaL 109; 9 Am. St. 173), 2231, 2232. Hoglan V. Commonwealth (3 Bush, 147), 196, 635, 664. Hoitt V. Moulton (1 Post. [X. H.] 586), 2259. Holberg v. Macon (55 Miss. 112), 202, 793. Holcomb V. People (49 111. App. 73 j, 11, 56, 968. Holden v. Brooks (68 X. H. 184; 20 Atl. 247), 1800. Holden v. State (41 Tex. Cr. App. 411; 55 S. W. 337), 1478. Holland v. Barnes (53 Ala. 83; 25 Am. Rep. 595), 2104, 2123. Holland v. Commonwealth ( 7 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 223), 11, 36. Holland v. Holland (4 Leg. Gaz. 372), 2154, 2167. Holland v. Seagreve (11 Gray, 207), 1048. Holland v. State ( [Fla.] 47 So. 903), 648, 053. Holland v. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 147, 157; 101 ,S. W. 1002, 1004), 941, 1684. Holland v. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 142; 101 S. W. 1005), 1611. Holland v. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 547; 103 S. W. 631), 957. Holland V. West End St. R. €o. (155 Mass. 387; 29 X. E. 622), 2196. Holleman v. Harward (119 X. C. 150; 25 S. E. 972), 1837, 1838. Hollenbeck v. Drake (37 Xeb. 680; 56 X. W. 296), 616, 645, 646. TABLE OF CASES. clxiii [References are to pages.] Hollender, Appeal of (11 Pa. Super. Ct. 23), 664. Hollender v. Magone (149 U. S. 586; 37 L. Ed. 860; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 932), 5. Hollender v. Magone (38 Fed. 912), 442. Holler V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 73 S. W. 901), 1472, 1689. Holley V. State (14 Tex. App. 505), 235, 289, 1176. Holley V. State (46 Tex. Cr. App. 324; 81 S. W. 957), 871, 1380, 1381, 1682, 1683. Holinquist, Ex parte (27 Pac. 1099), 195. Hollingsvvortli v. Atlanta (79 Ga. 503; 5 S. E. 37), 1089, 1658. Hollis V. Davis (56 X. H. 74), 1894. HoUoway v. State ( 45 Tex. Cr. Rep. 303; 77 S. W. 14), 2090. Holloway v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 246; 110 S. W. 745), 911, 912, 913, 1472, 1612. Holloway v. State (54 Tex. Cr. App"^. 115; HI S. W. 937, 939), 1612, 10S9. Holly & Co. V. Simmons (38 Tex. Civ. App. 124; 85 S. W. 325), 771, 1231. Holly V. Simmons ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 89 S. W. 776), 771. Holman v. Jackson (1 Cowp. 341), 1794. Holman v. Johnson (Cowper, 241), 1031. Holman v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 89 S. W. 977), 1207. Holmes, Ex parte ([1906] 32 T. L. R. 41), 18.30. Holmes v. Hunt (122 Mass. 505; 23 Am. Rep. 381), 264, 1585. Holmes v. Morgan (52 Ark. 99; 12 S. W. 201), 879. Holmes v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (5 Fed. 528), 2177, 2179, 2191, 2192, 2202, 2203. Holmes v. Robertson Co. ([Ky.] 89 S. W. 106; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 283), 666. Holmes v. State (88 Ind. 145), 1226, 1240. Holmes v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 353; 106 S. W. 1160), 1603. Holpa v. Aberdeen (34 Wash. 554; 76 Pac. 79), 745, 748. Holsky v. State ([Tex.] 36 S. W. 443), 1227. Holt v. Collyer ([1881] 16 Ch. D. 718; 45 J. P. 456; 44 L. T. 214), 1814. Holt V. Commissioners (31 Howr. Pr. 334, note), 183, 186. Holt V. O'Brien (15 Gray, 311), 1782. Holt V. State (62 Neb. 134; 86 N. W. 1073), 549, 833, 842, 1524, 1526. Holteroir v. ]\Iutual, etc., Ins. Co. (3 Am. L. Rec. 272), 2229, 2230, 2231, 2234. Holton V. Bimrod (8 Kan. App. 265 ; 55 Pac. 505 ) , 434, 954. Holton V. Haist (8 Kan. App. 856; 55 Pac. 468), 1742. Holtun V. Germania Life Ins. Co. (139 Ca!. 645; 73 Pac. 591), 2234. Holy Trinity Church v. United State (143 U. S. 457, 464), 214, 1419, 1421. Home V. Stewart (40 Vt. 145), 1031. Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta (50 Ga. 530), 483, 788, Homer v. Brown (117 La. Ann. 425; 41 So. 711), 433. Homire v. Ilalfman (156 Ind. 470; 60 X. E. 154), 1844, 1863, 1879. Honesty v. Commonwealth (81 Va. 28.3), 2071. Honey v. Guilaume ( [Ind.] 88 N. E. 937), 604, 607, 612. Hood V. Von Glahm (88 Ga. 405), 215, 271, 273, 402, 432. clxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Hooker v. Mueller ([Mich.] 123 X. W. 24), 1811. Hookset V. Amoskeag, etc., Co. (44 X. H. 105), 470. Hoop V. Affleck (162 Ind. 564; 70 N. E. 978), 197, 206, 209, 611, 835. Hooper v. Commomvealth ( 1 1 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 369), 519, 543. Hoover, In re (30 Fed. 51), 102, 110, 149, 195, 208, 239, 400. Hooper v. State (56 Ind. 153), 821, 1491, 1566. Hoover v. Thomas ( 35 Tex. Civ. App. 535; 80 S. W. 859), 233, 896, 902. Hoorman v. Climax Cycle Co. (9 App. Div. 579, 585; 41 X. Y. S. 710), 990. Hopcroft, Ex parte ([1868] 14 \V. R. 168), 1834. Hopcraft V. Flabell ([1868] 14 W. R. 168), 1817. Hope V. Warburton ([1892] 2 Q. B. 134; 56 J. P. 328; 61 L. J. M. C. 147; 66 L. T. 589; 40 W. R. 510), 359, 2058. Hopkins v. Knapp, etc., Co. (92 Iowa, 212; 60 X. W. 620). 2254. Hopkins v. Lewis (84 Iowa, 690; 51 X. W. 255; 15 L. R. A. 397), 310. Hopson, Appeal of (63 Conn. 140; 31 Atl. 5.31), 635. Hopt V. People (104 U. S. 631; 26 L. Ed. 873), 2061, 2065, 2067. Horan v. Travis Co. (27 Tex. 226), 509, 767. Ilorgan's Liquors, In re (16 R. I. 542; 18 Atl. 279), 253, 1008, 1049. Hornaday v. State (43 liul. 306), 529, 683. Hornberger v. Case (9 Ohio Dec. 434; 13 VVkly. L. BulL 437), 813. Hornberger v. State (47 Xeb. 40; 66 X. W. 23), 1505, 1507, 1558, 1641, 1643. Home V. Home ( 1 Tenn. Ch. 259 ) , 2159, 2160. Horning v. Bailey (50 Conn. 40), 1040, 1055. Homing v. Wendell (57 Ind. 171), 223, 489, 509, 1840, 1842. Hornsby v. Raggett ([1892] 1 Q. B. 20; 66 L. T. 21; 40 W. R. Ill; 55 J. P. 508), 378. Horst V. Lewis (71 Xeb. 365; 98 X. W. 1046; 103 X. VV. 460), 1912, 1922, 1973. Horton v. Carrington ( 1 How. Pr. [X. S.] 124), 1601. Horton v. Central Falls [R. I.] 35 Atl. 962), 532. Horton v. Equitable, etc., Soc. (2 Bigelow L. & Ace. Ins. Rep. 108), 2226. Horton v. Equitable, etc., Soc. (2 Abb. L. Jr. 255), 2221, 2229, 2233. Hosea v. State (47 Ind. 280), 1109, 1742. Hoskey v. State (9 Tex. App. 202), 1539, 1569. Hoskins v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 102 S. W. 276; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 309), 1173, 1176. Hotcher v. Andrews (5 Bush, 561), 1808, 1809. Hotchins v. Hindmarsh ([1891] 2 Q. B. 181; 55 J. P. 775; 65 L. T. 159), 1383. Hotchkiss V. Finan (105 Mass. 86), 1790, 1798, 1799. Hotchkiss V. Fortson (7 Yerg. 67), 2109, 2128, 2130. Hotel Cambridge License, In re (20 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 229), 705. Hotham v. Phillips (23 X. B. 126), 1790. Hotson V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 105 S. W. 955; 32 Ky. L- Rep. 392), 188. TABLE OF CASES. clxv [References are to pages.] Holtendorf v. State (89 Ind. 282), 821, 827. Houck V. Ashland (40 Ore. 117; 66 Pac. 697), 417, 463, 473. Houghton V. Austin (47 Cal. 646), 231. Houldsworth v. Fairhall (25 X. Z. 1), 1249. Houma v. Houraa, etc., Co. (121 La. 21; 46 So. 42), 403, 413, 416. Houman v. Schulster (60 X. J. L. 35; 36 Atl. 776), 675, 676. House, In re (23 Colo. 87; 46 Pac. 117; 33 L. R. A. 832), 2022. House V. State (41 Miss. 737), 673, 576. Houser v. State (18 Ind. 106), 5, 500, 505, 1586. Houster v. Leightner (42 Phila. Leg. Ind. 289), 213.5, 2136. Houston V. Gran (38 Neb. 687; 57 N. W. 403), 1862, 1959, 1994, 1997. Houston V. Graw (45 Neb. 813; 64 N. VV. 245), 1865. Houston V. Moore (5 Wheat. [U. S.] 27), 1070. Houston V. State (26 Tex. App. 657; 14 S. VV. 352), 2090. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. R'eason (61 Tex. 613), 2172, 2177. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (52 Tex. 178), 2180, 2185, 2195. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Sympkins (54 Tex. 615; 38 Am. Rep. 632), 2180, 2183, 2184, 2107. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Tierney (72 Tex. 312; 12 S. VV. 586), 2098. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Waller (56 Tex. 331), 2191. Houtsoh V. Jersey City (29 N. .J. L. [5 Dutch] 316), 215, 1135, 1303. Houtz V. People ( 123 111. App. 445), 1183, 1702. Hovey v. Harmon (49 Me. 269), 2016. Howard, Ex parte ( 25 N. B. 191), 1085, 1115, 1531. Howard v. Commonwealth ([Ky.| 33 S. VV. 1115), 1521. Howard v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 89 S. VV. 256; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 239), 1196. Howard v. Haines (25 Ind. 541), 232. Howard v. Harris (8 Allen, 297), 1165, 1166, 1783. Howard v. Moot (64 N. Y. 262), 264, 1585. Howard v. Smith (26 Sol. J. 533), 2169. Howard v. State (5 Ind. 516). 1.589, 1635, 1754. Howard v. State (6 Ind. 447), 978, 1102, 1481, 1550, 1760. Howard v. State ( [Fla.] 47 So. 963), 598. Howard v. State (Go S. E. 1076), 35. Howard v. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 494; 36 S. VV. 475), 2078. Howard v. Stenfil ([Ky.] 102 S. W. 831; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 207), 023. Howarth v. Minns (51 J. P. 7; 50 L. T. 316), 961. Howe V. Jolly (68 Miss. 323; 8 So. 513), 1771. Howe V. Plainfield (37 N. J. L. 145), 216, 271, 275. Howe V. State (10 Ind. 423), 1516. Howe V. Stewart (40 Vt. 145, 1772, 1777. Howell V. Jackson (6 C. & P. 725), 362, 2028. Howell V. State (71 Ga. 224; 51 Am. Rep. 259) 21, 52, 132, 134. Howell V. State (124 Ga. 698; 52 S. E. 649), 064, 1501. Howell V. State (4 Ind. App. 148; 30 N. E. 714), 1518. Howell V. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 536; 110 S. W. 914), 1217, 1613. clxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Howes V. Inland Revenue ( 1 Exch. Div. 385; 41 J. P. 423; 46 L. J. M. C. 15; 35 L. T. 584; 24 W. R. 897 ) , 1200. Howes V. Maxwell ( 157 Mass. 333; 32 N. E. 152), 223, 755, 762, 1840. Hoxie, hi re (15 R. 1. 241; 3 Atl. 1), 1035, 1044. Hoyniak License, In re (9 Kulp. [Pa.] 368), 500, 732. Hoyt V. State ([Tex. (Jr. App.] 89 S. W. 1082), 952. Hubbard, In re (6 J. J. Marsh, 58), 2136. Hubbard's Will, hi re (6 J. J. Marsh, 58), 2143, 2147, 2148. Hubbard v. Commonwealth ( 10 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 683), 875, 898, 910, 1704. Hubbard v. Lancaster ( 127 Ala. 157; 28 So. 796), 382. Hubbard v. Mason City (60 Iowa, 400; 14 N. W. 772), 2190, 2191, 2193, 2194. Hubbard v. State (11 Ind. 554), 1497, 1501. Hubbell V. Ebrit ( 8 Ohio Com. PI. 116), 835, 839. Hubbell V. Flint (13 Gray, 277, 279), 1796. Hubbell V. Polk Co. (106 Iowa, 618; 76 N. \V. 854), 790. Huber v. Baugh (43 la. 291), 471, 714. Huber v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 112 S. \V. 583; 33 Ky. L. Rep. 1031). .".S8, 521," 506, 1099. Iluber V. People ( S7 111. App. 120), 1230. Hubman v. State (01 Ark. 482; 33 .S. W. 843). 479. Iluby V. State (111 C.a. 842; 36 "S. E. 310), 1107. Huckless V. Chihlrey ( 135 I'. S. 622; 10 Sup. < t. 972; 34 L. Ed. 304), 149. Hudgins v. State (14.1 Abv. 499; 39 So. 717), 241. Hudson, hi re (19 Ont App. 343), 883. Hudson V. Geary (4 R. I. 485), 215, 216, 457, 1121, 1134. Hudson V. Hudson (3 Swab. & T. 314; 33 L. J. Mat. [N. S.] 5; 9 Jur. [N. S.] 1302; 9 L. T. [X. S.] 579; 12 W. R. 216), 2164. Hudson V. Lynn, etc., R. Co, (178 Mass. 64; 59 N. E. 647), 2200, 2208. Hudson V. State (73 Miss. 784; 19 So. 965), 1558. Hudson V. State (iOkla.] 101 Pac. 275), 317, 325. 327, 329. Hudspeth v. Coope-- (114 Ind. 12), 1849. Huell V. Ball (20 Iowa, 282), 107. Huff V. Aultman (69 Iowa, 71; 28 N. W. 440; 58 Am. Rep. 213), 1886, 1971, 1972, 1998, 2002. Huff V. Dyer (4 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 595), 2261. Huff V. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 441; 102 S. W. 1144), 857, 874, 909, 917, 958, 1684. Huff V. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 550; 103 S. W. 629), 1600, 1604, 1696. Huffman v. Walterhouse ( 19 Ont. Rep. 186), 1373, 1375, 1593. Huffsmith v. People (8 Colo. 175), 395. Huffstater v. Hayes (64 Barb. 573), 1779, 1783. Huffstat«r v. State (5 Hun, 23), 1638. Hugg V. People (15 111. App. 288), 1215 Hughes V. Hughes (19 Ala. 307), 2167. Hughes V. State (35 Ala. 351), 1652, 1740, 1747. Ilugill V. Merrifield (12 C. P. [Can.] 269), 1352, 1354, 1762, 1907. TABLE OF CASES. clxvii fReferPnoes are to pages ] Hugonin v. Adams ( [Miss.] 33 So. 497), 528. Hull V. Miller (4 Neb. 503), 228. Hulsman v. State (42 Ind. 500), 1516. Hulton V. Waterloo, etc., Co. ( 1 F. & F. 735), 2225. Humboldt County v. Churchill County, etc. {G Nev. 30), 106. Humphreys v. State (34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 434; 30 S. W. 1066), 369. Humphries v. Commonwt^ilth { 6 Ky. L. R. [abstract] 594), 1352. Humphries v. Johnson (20 Ind. 190), 1989. Humpler v. People (92 111. 400), 1173, 1253, 1255, 1621. Hundland v. Hardy ( 74 Mo. App. 614), 434. Hunt V. New York ( 47 X. Y. App. ■295; 62 N. Y. Supp. 184), 807. Hunter, In re ( 34 Misc. Eep. 389 ; 69 N. Y. S. 008, atfirmed 59 App. Div. 626; 69 N. Y. S. 1139), 5, 990, 994. Hunter, In re (24 Ont. 522; re- versing 24 Ont. 153), 575, 646. Hunter v. Lisso ( 35 La. Ann. 230 ) , 802. Hunter v. Senn (61 S. C. 44; 39 S. E. 235), 852, 898, 910. Hunter v. State (79 Ga. 365), 497, 550. Hunter v. State (101 Ind. 241), 1224, 1240, 1628. Hunter v. State (18 Tex. App. 444; 51 Am. Rep. 319), 1627, 2090. Hunter v. State (55 Tex. Cr. App. 269; 116 S. W. 604), 1181. Hunter v. Tolberd (47 W. Va. 258; 34 S. E. 737), 20M, 2108, 2117. Huntinguon v. Moir (20 Rev. Leg. 684), 434. Huntington v. State (36 Ala. 236), 1188. Huntington, etc., R. Co. v. Decker (84 Pa. 419), 2192, 2194, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201. Huntsville, hi re (25 Oiiio Cir. Ct. Rep. 535), 865, 867, 872. Hunzinger v. State (39 Neb. 653; 58 N. W. 194), 110, 168, 170, 407, 502. Hurber v. Baugh (43 Iowa, 514), 727. Hurdland v. Hardy (74 Mo. App. 614), 419, 824. Hurl, Ux parte (49 Cal. 557), 139, 170, 187, 191, 428, 443, 444, 791, 795. Hurlburt v. Sleeth (27 Nov. Sco. 375; 25 S. C. C. [Nov. Sco.] 620), 1076. Hurney v. State (49 Ind. 203), 1223. Huson, In re (19 Ont. App. 343), 870. Hussey, Ex parte (48 Ore. 621; 85 Pac. 332 ) , 869. Hussey v. Stiite (69 Ga. 54), 1119, 1120, 1122. Hustead v. Commonwealth (5 Leigh, 724), 1627. Huston V. Vail (51 Ind. 299). 2250. Hutcher v. State (80 Tenn. [12 Lea] 368), 134. Hutchinson v. Brown ( 1 Clarke Ch. 408 ) , 2093, 2094, 2105. Hutchinson v. Hubbard (21 Neb. 33; 31 N. VV. 245), 1864. Hutchinson v. State (62 Ind. 556), 1485. Hutchinson v. State (5 Humph. 142), 2024. Hutchinson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 90 S. W. 178), 1207. Hutchinson v. Tindall (2 Green. [N. J. Eq.] 357), 2093, 2094, 2099, 2107, 2108, 2115. Ilut.suu V. (uiuniDtus taltli ([Ky.] 105 S. W. 955 ; 32 Ky. L. Rep. 392), 839. clxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages] H. W. Metcalfe Co. v. Orange County {[Fla.] 47 So. 363), 898, 901, 902, 921, 925. Hyman v. Moore (3 Jones L. [N. C] 416), 2093, 2109. Hyman v. State (87 Tenn. 109; 9 S. W. 272 ) , 292. Hynum v. State (74 Miss. 829; 21 So. 971), 1654. Hyser v. Commonwealth ( 1 16 Ky. 410; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 608; 76 S. W. 174), 261, 262, 951, 1571. I. A. West & Co. V. Board (14 Idaho, 353; 94 Pac. 445), 635, 648. Ihenger v. State (53 Ind. 251), 1242, 1627, 1751. Ikard v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 79 S. W. 32), 1512. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Cragin (71 111. 177), 2171, 2172, 2173, 2177, 2191, 2193. Illinois R. Co. v. Hutchinson (47 111. 408), 2180. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Hutchinson (47 Minn. 357; 4 N. W. 605), 2184. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Jewell (46 111. 99; 92 Am. Dec. 240), 2199. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Proctor (122 Ky. 92; 89 S. W. 714; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 598), 2191, 2217. Imhofl" V. Witmer (31 Pa. 243), 2109, 2114, 2119. Inain v. Russell (8 Hun, 319), 1847. Independence v. Noland (21 ^lo. 394), 448, 521. Indiana County Licenses, In re (2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 358), 439. Indiana Co., In re (6 Pa. Dist. Rep. 358), 626. Indianapolis v. Bieler ( 138 Ind. 30; 36 N. E. 857), 144, 157, 187, 198, 294, 321, 332, 427, 796. Indianapolis v. Fairchild ( 1 Ind. 315), 503, 1160. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Gal- breath (63 HI. 436), 2179, 2185. Indianapolis v. Higgins ( 141 Ind. 1; 40 N. E. 671), 643. Indianapolis v. Nevin ( 151 Ind. 139; 47 N. E. 525; 50 N. B. 80), 238. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Pitzer (109 Ind. 186; 63 N. E. 310; 10 N. E. 70; 58 Am. Rep. 387), 2212. Ingalls V. State (48 Wis. 647; 4 N. W. 785), 2048, 2080. Ingersoll v. Skinner ( 1 Denio, 540), 138, 333. Ingram v. State (39 Ala. 247; 84 Am. Dec. 792), 120. Ingram v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 117; 90 S. W. 1098), 1288, 1378. Insurance Co. v. Foley ( 105 U. S. 350), 05, 1633. Intoxicating Liquors, In re ( 129 Iowa, 434; 105 N. W. 702), 670. Intoxicating Liquor Cases, In re (25 Kan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284), 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 18, 20, 33, 51, 53, 55, 56, 57, 59, 79, 86, 110, 139, 190, 557, 970. Intoxicating Liquors ( 15 R. I. 608; 10 Atl. 659), 255. Intreimer v. State ([Ala.] 41 So. 170), 1612. Iowa V. McFarland (110 U. S. 471; 4 Sup. Ct. 210; 28 L. Ed. 198), 1161. Iowa City v. Mclnnery (114 Iowa, 586 ;' 87 N. W. 498 ) , 453. Ipswitch V. Fernandez (84 Cal. 639; 24 Pac. 298), 2253, 2254. Irby V. State (91 Miss. 542; 44 So. 801), 959. TABLE OF CASES. clxix [References are to pages.] Ireland, In re (41 X. Y, Misc. Rep. 425; 84 N. Y. Supp. 1100), 580, 584. Irion V. Lewis (56 Ala. 190), 659. Irish V. State ([Tex.] 25 S. W. 633), 837, 857. Irisli V. State (34 Tex. Cr. Eep. 130; 29 S. W. 778), 908, 1588. Irwin V. Maloney (6 Can. L. Jr. 285), 2095. " Irwin V. Martinsville (9 Ohio Dec. 31; 10 Wkly. L. Bull. 76), 1096. Irwin V. Pankyty (20 Vict. L. R. 282; 16 Austr. L. T. 18), 1314, Isaacs V. Stansfield & Co., Limited ([November 1, 1907] [not re- ported]), 1829. Isan V. Griffin (98 Ga. 623; 25 S. E. 611), 715. Isbell V. New York, etc., R. Co. (27 Conn. 393; 71 Am. Dec. 78), 2212, 2214, 2215. Isitt V. Taylor (10 N. Z. L. R. 646), 685. Islett V. Quill (11 N. Z. L. R. 224), 685. Isley V. State (8 Blackf. 403), 1625. Isley V. Stubbs (5 Mass. 280), 1027. Isom V. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 610; 95 S. W. 518), 1179, 1599. Ivey V. State (112 Ga. 175; 37 S. E. 398), 426, 1702. J. B. Lyon Co. v. McDonougli (76 App. Div. 257; 78 N. Y. S. 462), 990. J. D. Her Brewing Co. v. Campbell (66 Kan. 361: 71 Pac. 825), 1022. J. I. Case, etc., Co. v. Meyers (78 Neb. 685; 111 N. W. 602; 9 L. R. A. [N. S.] 970), 2095. J. & J. Eager Co. v. Burke (74 Conn. 534; 51 Atl. 544), 1785, 1787, 1790, 1799. J. P. Bollin Liquor Co. v. Brandon- burg ( [Iowa] 106 N. W. 497), 1798. J. W. Kelly & Co. v. Conner ([Tenn.] 123 S. W. 622), 91, 153. Jack, In re (11 Australia L. R. 372; 2 C. L. Rep. 684), 695, 701. Jackson v. Boy J (53 Iowa, 536; 5 N. W. 734), 439. Jackson v. Brookline (5 Hun, 530), 1876, 1893, 1897, 1927, 1988. Jackson v. Camden (48 N. J. L. 89; 2 Atl. 668), 1643. Jackson v. Noble (54 Iowa, 641; 7 N. W. 88), 1964. Jackson v. Seeber (50 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 479; 100 N. Y. Supp. 563), 85.3. Jackson v. State (19 Ind. 312), 0, 12, 27, 82, 1714. Jackson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 24 S. W. 902), 1743. Jackson v. State ( 16 Tex. App. 373), 1575. Jackson v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 248; 91 S. VV. 574), 948, 952. Jackson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 123 S. W. 142), 1598. Jacobs, Ex parte (13 Idaho, 720; 92 Pac. 1003), 164, 193, 215, 287. Jacobs, Appeal of (73 N. E. 1122; 181 N. Y. 529), 745. Jacobs v. Hogan (73 Conn. 740; 49 Atl. 202), 776, 781. Jacobs V. Holgenson ( 70 Conn. 68 ; 38 Atl. 914), 766, 767, 779, 781. Jacobs V. Reilly (80 Conn. 275; 68 Atl. 251), 753. Jacobs V. Stokes (12 Mich. 381), 1782, 1802, 1804. Jacobs' Pharmacy Co. v. Atlanta (89 Fed. 244), 103, 434, 826. elxx TABLE OF C.VSES. [References aie to pages.] Jacobson v. Queen ( 1 Juta, 33 ) , 694. Jacoby v. Dallis (115 Ga. 272; 41 S. E. 611), 894, 906. Jacoby v. Shoemaker ( 26 Fla. 502 ; 7 So. 855), 982. Jakes V. State (43 Ind. 473), 821. Jalageas v. Winton (119 111. App. 139), 1812. James v. Commonwealth ( 102 Ky. 108; 42 S. W. 1107; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1045), 1280. James v. Commonwealth ( 16 Ky, L. Rep. [abstract] 445), 518. James v. James (58 N. H. 266), 2168. James v. Helm (129 Ky. 323; 111 S. W. 335), 1839. James v. Nervington J. J. (64 J. P. 489), 711. James v. State (133 Ala. 208; 32 So. 237), 371. James v. State (124 Ga. 72; 52 S. E. 295 ) , 287. James v. State (21 Tex. App. 189; 17 S. W. 143), 886, 888. James v. State (21 Tex. App. 353; 17 S. W. 422), 6, 20, 52, 58, 59, 885, 886, 888, 911, 971. James v. State (45 Tex. Cr. App. 592; 78 S. W. 951), 949, 950, 1209. James v. State (49 Tex. Civ. App. 334; 91 S. W. 227), 4, 10, 13, 14. James' Law Petition, In re (30 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 697), 854, 876. Jamieson v. Blaine (38 N. B. 508), 644. Jamieson v. Indiana, etc., Co. ( 128 Ind. 555; 28 N. E. 76), 106. Jamison v. Burton (43 Iowa, 282), 1237, 1461. Jamison v. People (145 111. 357; 34 N. E. 486), 2056. Jane v. Alley (64 Miss. 446; 1 So. 497), 674. Janks V. State (29 Tex. App. 233; 15 S. W. 815), 1125, 1319, 1375, 1377, 1539, 1569. Jaro V. Holstein (73 S. C. HI; 52 S. E. 870), 1021, lO'tC Jaroszewski v. Allen (117 Iowa, 632; 91 N. W. 942), 1949, 1999. Jarvis v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. 5 Ins. L. Jr. SC^, 2236. Jassey v. Speer (10. Ga. 828; 33 S. E. 718), 896. Jayes v. Harris (99 L. T. 56; 72 J. P. 364), 380. Jefferson v. People (iCl N. Y. 19; 3 X. E. 797), 1516, 1517, 1643, 1752. Jefferson v. Richardson (35 J. P. 470), 1137. Jefferson City v. Conture ('.) Mo. 083), 270. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. (112 Ind. 93; 13 N. E. 403), 467. Jeffrey v. Weaver ([1899] 2 Q. B. 449; 63 J. P. 663; 68 L. J. Q. B. 817; 81 L. T. 193; 47 W. R. 638; 15 T. L. R. 422), 1139. Jeffries v. State (9 Tex. ApiD. 598), 2039, 2074. Jelinek v. State (115 S. W. 508), 1111. Jelly V. Dils (27 W. Va. 267), 395. Jenkins v. Danville (79 111. App. 339), 753, 775. Jenkins v. jVIapes (53 Ohio St. 110; 41 N. E. 137), 1166. Jenkins v. Price ([1907] 24 T. L. R. 70), 1827. Jenkins v. State (93 Ga. 1; 18 S. E. 992), 2041, 2041, 2078, 2079. Jenkins v. State (4 Ga. App. 859), 62 S. E. 574), 1092. Jenkins v. State (82 Miss. 500; 34 So. 217), 1237, 1564, 1600. Jenkins v. Thomasville (35 Ga. 145), 270. Jenkins v. Waldron (11 Johns. 114), 660. TABLE OF CASES. clxxi [References are to pages.] Jenks V. Lima Tp. (17 Ind. 326), 811. Jenks V. Turpin (13 Q. B. Div. 505, 524; 48 J. P. 489; 49 J, P. 20; 53 L. J. M. C. IGl; 50 L. T. 808), 369, 374. Jenners v. Howard ( 6 Blackf. 240), 2092, 2103, 2116. Jennett v. Owens (63 Tex. 264), 925. Jenney, In re ( 19 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 244; 44 N. Y. Supp. 84), 704. Jennings v. Russell (92 Ala. 603; 9 So. 421), 1278. Jennings v. State (3 Head, 520), 1246. Jensen v. State (60 Wis. 577; 90 N. W. 374), 1308, 1567. Jerseyville v. Becker (117 111. App. 86), 1169. Jerue v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 123 S. W. 414), 926. Jervey v. Carolina (66 Fed. 1013), 179, 323. Jessen v. Wilhite (74 Neb. 608; 104 N. W. 1064), 1979, 1992, 1995, 2003. Jett V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 49 S. W. 786; 20 Ky. l" Rep. 1619), 935, 1742. Jewell V. Lynch (117 Mich. 65; 75 N. W. 283), 1892. Jewett V. Waiishura (43 Iowa, 574), 1888, 1914. Jockers v. Borgman (29 Kan. 109; 44 Am. Rep. 625), 1890, 1993. Joest V. Williams (42 Ind. 565; 13 Am. Rep. 377), 2093, 2116, 2123. Joffee, Ex parte (46 Mo. App. 360), 574. John, In re (55 Kan. 694; 41 Pac. 956), 221. John Hancock ]\int. L. Ins. Co. v. Daly (65 Ind. 6), 2226. Johns V. Fritchey (39 Md. 258), 2093, 2098, 2122. Johns V. State (78 Ind. 332), 215. Johns V. State (159 Ind. 413; 65 N. E. 287), 1443. Johns V. State (78 Miss. 662; 29 So. 401), 1757. Johnson, In re (57 Cal. 529), 2045, 2135, 2138, 2151. Johnson, Ex parte (6 Cal. App. 734; 93 Pac. 199), 1447, 1448. Johnson, Appeal of (73 N. E. 1122; 181 N. Y. 528), 745. Johnson, In re ( 7 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 220; 27 N. Y. Supp. 649), 2134, 2135, 2145. Johnson, In re ( 15 N. Y". Misc. Rep. 220; 27 N. Y. Supp. 649), 2136. Johnson, In re ( 18 Misc. Rep. 498; 42 N. Y. Supp. 1074), 729. Johnson, In re ( 78 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 498; 42 N. Y, Supp. 1074), 818. Johnson, In re ([Neb.] 118 N. W. 91), 761. Johnson, In re (165 Pa. 315; 31 Atl. 203), 638, 648. Johnson, In re ( 1 Dauph. Co. Rep. 40; 20 Pa. Cr. Ct. Rep. 464; 7 Pa. Dist. Rep. 248), 542. Johnson, In re ( 13 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 584), 638. Johnson, In re (40 Upp. Can. 297), 894, 907. Johnson v. Atkins (44 Fla. 185; 32 So. 879), 813. Johnson v. Atlanta (79 Ga. 507; 4 S. E. 673), 1594. Johnson v. Bessemere ( 143 Mich. 313; 106 N. W. 852; 12 De- troit Leg. N. 981), 423, 425, 470. Johnson v. Carlson ( [Neb.] 95 N. W. 788), 1844. Johnson v. Chattanooga (97 Tenn. 247; 36 S. W. 1092), 454, 1122. Johnson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 58 Iowa, 348; 12 N. W. 339), 2207, 2214. clxxii TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages.] Johnson V. Commonwealth (111 Ky. 630; 64 S. W. 467; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 856), 2262. Johnson v. Commonwealth ( 12 Gratt. 714), 1246. Johnson v. Drummond ( 16 III. App. [16 Bradw.] 641), 1866. Johnson v. Fayette (148 Ala. 497; 42 So. 621), 445. Johnson v. Gram (72 111. App. 676), 1882. Johnson v. Grimminger ( 83 Iowa, 10; 48 N. W. 1052), 1928. Johnson \. Harmon (94 U. S. 371 ; 24 L. Ed. 271), 2098. Johnson v. Higgins (3 Met. [Ky.] 566), 106. Johnson v. Johnson ( 100 Mich. 326; 58 N. W. 1115), 1918. •Johnson v. Johnson (35 Phila. Leg. Int. 70), 2153. Johnson v. Johnson ([1900] p. 19), 2169. Johnson v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (104 Ala. 246; 16 So. 70; 53 Am. St. 39), 63, 2192, 2194, 2197, 2206, 2207. Johnson v. McCann (61 111. App. 110), 1892. Johnson v. Medlicott (3 P. Wms. 131), 2103, 2129. Johnson v. People (Breese [111.] 276), 1759, 1764. Johnson v. People (83 111. 431), 1219, 1237, 1371, 1374, 1459, 1764. Johnson v. People (44 111. App. 642), 1546. Johnson v. Phifer (6 Neb. 401), 2093, 2098, 2130. Johnson v. Pliiladelphia (60 Pa. St. 491), 200, 426. Johnson v. Railroad Co. (23 111. 202), 227. Johnson v. Rich (10 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 33), 233. Johnson v. Rol>erts ([Iowa] 101 N. W. 1131), 1000, 1001, 1003, 1004. I Johnson v. Schultz (74 Mich. 75; j 41 N. W. 865), 1906. Johnson v. State (19 Ala. 527; 74 Ala. 537), 370, 371. Johnson v. State (44 Ala. 414), 1532. Johnson v. State (152 Ala. 61; 44 So. 555) , 691. Johnson v. State (37 Ark. 98), 515, 1349, 1371. Johnson v. State (40 Ark. 453), 1505. Johnson v. State (60 Ga. 634), 497, 1521. Johnson v. State (83 Ga. 553; 10 S. E. 207), 1354; 1359, 1555. Johnson v. State ( [Ga.] 66 S. E. 148), 1527. Johnson V. State (1 Ga. App. 195; 58 S. E. 265), 2025. Johnson v. Vuthrick (7 Ind. 137), 1989. Johnson v. State (74 Ind. 197), 1516, 1560. Johnson v. State ( [Iowa] 10 N. W. 1131), 1318. Johnson v. State (63 Miss. 228), 1191, 1230, 1615. Johnson v. State (23 Ohio St. 556), 10, 11. Johnson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 21 S. W. 371), 1110, 1458, 1574. Jolinson V. State (34 Tex. Cr. App. 100; 29 S. W. 472), 1743. Johnson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 44 S. W. 834), 1213, 1694. Jolmson V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 55 S. W. 968), 958. Johnson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 66 S. W. 552), 1708. Johnson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 77 S. W. 225), 1209. Johnson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 89 S. W. 834), 914. Johnson v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 554; 107 S. W. 810), 1598. TABLE OF CASES. clxxiii [References are to pages.] Johnson v. State (52 Tex. Cr. Kep. C24; 108 S. W, 683), 914, 1682, 1686. Johnson v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 339; 109 S. W. 936), 940. Johnson v. State (4 Tex. Cr. App. 419; 66 S. W. 554), 59. Johnson v. Union, etc., Ins. Co. (127 Mass. 555), 1779. Johnson v. Williams (48 Vt. 565), 1068. Johnston's License, In re (37 Pa. Super. 438), 1589. Johnston v. Brown (2 Shaw & D. 437), 2109, 2114. Johnston v. State ( 74 Ind. 197 ) , 1240. Johnston v. State (23 Ohio St. 556), 11, 47, 82, 962. Jokers v. Borgman (39 Kan. 109; 44 Am. Rep. 625), 1863, 1991, 2004. Jolie V. Cardinal (35 Wis, 118), 2187. Jolifl' V. State (50 Tex. Cr. App. 61; 109 S. W. 176), 247, 1110. Joliff V. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 61; 109 S. W'. 176), 139, 288, 1110, 1677. Jolly V. State (8 Sm. & M. 145), 1246. Jolly V. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 484; 110 S. W. 749), 949. Jones, In re (78 Ala. 419), 431. Jones, Ex parte (31 N. B. 78), 1098. Jones, Ex parte (23 N. S. W. 93; 6 S. R. [N. S. W.] 313), 1225, 1228. Jones V. Alexander (167 Ind. 395; 79 N. E. 368), 612, 614, 618. Jones V. Bates (26 Neb. 693; 42 K W. 751), 1848, 1849, 1885, 1910, 1912, 1936. Jones V. Bone ([1870] L. R. 9 Eq. 674; 39 L. J. Ch. 405; 23 L. T. 304; 18 W. R. 489; 34 J. P. 468), 1813. Jones V. Brown (54 Iowa, 74; 37 Am. Rep. 185), 660. Jones V. Chanute ( 63 Kan. 243 ; 65 Pac. 243), 986. Jones V. Byington (128. Iowa, 397; 104 N. W. 473), 341, 348, 991. Jones V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 47 S. W. 328), 1446. Jones V. Commonwealth ( 75 Pa. 403), 2040, 2067, 2070, 2072. Jones V. Commonwealth ( 106 Va. 833; 55 S. E. 697), 1652. Jones V. Fletcher (33 Me. 564), 1038. Jones V. Fletcher (41 Me. 255), 1031, 1047, 1048, 1051, 1776. Jones V. Grady (25 La. Ann. 586), 795. Jones V. Hard (32 Vt. 481), 313. Jones V. Hilliard (69 Ala. 300), 109, 574. Jones' Law Petition, In re (30 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 705), 854, 876. Jones V. McLeod, 103 Mass. 58), 1805. Jones V. Moore Co. ( 106 N. C. 436; 11 S. E. 514), 558, 635, 648. Jones V. Mould (138 Iowa, 683; 116 N. W. 733), 348, 977. I Jones V. National Mut. Ass'n ([Ky.] 2 S. W. 447; 8 Ky. L. Rep. 599), 2232. Jones V. New Orleans, etc., R. Co, (122 La. 354; 47 So. 679), 2184. Jones V. Nugent (31 Ind. App. 697; 67 N. E. 195), 605. Jones V. Paducah ( [Ky.] 115 S. W\ 801), 1363., Jones V. People ( 6 Colo. 452 ; 45 Am. Rep. 526), 2247. Jones V. People (14 IlL 196), 101, 109. Jones V. Robbins (74 Mass. [8 Gray] 329), 270, 1748. Jones V. Root (6 Gray, 435), 254, 1011, 1059, 1076, 2035. clxxiv TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages.] Jones V. Sanborn (G8 N. H. 602; 40 Atl. 393), 1799, 1807. Jones V. Shervington ([1908] 2 K. B. 539; 77 L. R. K. B. 771; 99 L. T. 57; 72 J. P. 381; 24 T. L. R. 693), 354. Jones V. State (100 Ala. 88; 14 So. 772), 1633. Jones V. State (136 x\la. 118; 34 So. 236), 1443, 1604. Jones V. State (29 Ga. 594), 2061, 2062, 2067. Jones V. State (100 Ga. 579; 28 S. E. 396), 1379. Jones V. State ( 1 Kan. 273 ) , 882. Jones V. State (67 Md. 256; 10 Atl. 216), 938, 939, 1465, 1469, 1473. Jones V. State (67 Miss. 11; 7 So. 220), 1756. Jones V. State (13 Tex. 168), 2247, 2250, 2251. Jones V. State (21 Tex. App. 353; 17 S. VV. 422), 895, 897, 908. Jones V. State (32 Tex. Cr. Rep. 110; 22 6. VV. 149), 1235, 1236, 1628, 1646. Jone.-} V. State (32 Tex. Cr. App. 533; 25 S. W. 124), 1125, 1320. Jones V. State (38 Tex. Cr. App. 533; 43 S. W. 981), 1686. Jones V. State (46 Tex. Cr. App. 517; 81 S. W. 49), 759, 760, 765, 1232, 1461. Jones V. State ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 81 S. W. 1010), 759, 760, 765. Jones V. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 519; 107 S. W. 849, 850), 1465, 1473. Jones V. Surprise (64 N. H. 243; 9 Atl. 384). 8, 13, 25, 27, 122, 334, 967, 1780, 1799, 1803. Jones V. Thro (2 Mo. App. 1303), 564. Jones V. U. S. Mut. Ace. Ass'n (92 Iowa, 652; 61 N. W. 485), 2239. Jones V. Walters (62 J. P. 374; 78 L. T. 167; 14 T. L. R. 265), 380. Jones V. Ward (77 N. Car. 337), 1027. Jones V. Yokum ( [S. D.] 123 N. W. 272), 110, 331, 1806. Jones Co. v. Sales (25 lud. 25), 780. Joplin V. Jacobs (119 Mo. App. 134; 96 S. W. 219), 219. Jorce V. Parkhurst ( 150 Mass. 243; 22 N. E. 899), 2258. Jordan, In re (49 Fed. 238), 321, 451, 523, 525. Jordan v. Bespole (8 Minn. 441; 90 N. W. 1052), 415. Jordan v. District Court ( 74 Iowa, 762; 38 N. W. 430), 110. Jordan v. Evansville ( 163 Ind. 512; 72 N. E. 544; 67 L. R. A. 613), 91, 96, 96; 99, 144, 148, 168, 191. Jordan v. Nicolin (84 Minn. 367; 87 N. W. 915), 452, 460, 1131, 1449, 1538. Jordan v. State (22 Fla. 528), 1505. Jordan v. State ( 2 Tex. App. 425 ) , 167. Jordan v. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 222; 38 S. W. 780; 39 S. W. 110), 869, 959, 1210, 1213, 1554. Jordan v. State (40 Tex. Cr. App. 189; 49 S. W. 371). 1764. Jordan v. Wappello County (69 Iowa, 177; 28 N. W. 548), 1000. Jorgcnsen, In re (75 Neb. 401; 106 X. W. 462), 626, 666. Joseph V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 86 S. W. 326), 949. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Cx). v. Superior (117 Wis. 297; 93 N. W. 1120), 415. Josephdaffer v. State (32 Ind. 402), 1586, 1649. Jossey V. Speer (107 Ga. 828; 33 S. E. 718), 921, 922. TABLE OF CASES. clxxv [References are to pages.] Josey V. State ([Ark.] 114 S. W. 216), 1643. Jovvell V. State (44 Tex. Cr. App. 328; 71 S. W. 286), 2049. Joyce, In re ([1909] 16 App. Ont. L. R. 380), 889. Joyner v. Cush. (567), 811. Joynt, Ex parte (38 J. P. 390), 1145. Judd V. Robinson (41 Colo. 222; 92 Pac. 724), 1809, 1810. •Judefind v. State (78 Md. 510; 28 A. 405; 23 L. R. A. 721), 454. Judge V. Flourney (74 Iowa, 164; 37 N. VV. 130), 1940. Judge V. Jordon (81 Iowa, 519; 46 N. W. 1077), 1845, 1950, 1960. Judge V. Kribs (71 Iowa, 183; 32 N. W. 324), 981, 985. Judge V. O'Conner (74 Iowa, 166; 37 X. W. 131), 1940. Judkins, In re (126 N. Y. App. Div. 524; 110 N. Y. Supp. 587), 741. Jugenheimer, In re (81 Neb. 836; 116 N. W. 9C6), 644. Julius Kessler & Co, v. E. F. Perilloux & Co. (127 Fed. 1011), 333. Julius Winkelmeyer Brewing Ass'n V. Nipp (6 Kan. App 730; 50 Pac. 956), 1805. Julke V. Adam (1 Redf. 454) 2139, 2145. Jul! V. Tressnor (14 N. Y. L. R 513), 1351. Junction City v. KeefTe (40 Kan 275; 19 P. 735), 258. Junction City v. Webb (44 Kan 71; 23 Pac. 1073), 1505. Jung Brewing Co. v. Common wealth (123 Ky. 507; 96 S W. 595; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 939) 979. Jung Brewing Co. v. Common wealth ( [Ky.l 98 S. W. 307 30 Ky. L.*^ Rep. 267), 159, 298, 537, 540. I Jung Brewing Co. v. Frank- fort (100 Ky. 409; 38 S. W. 710), 159, 552. Jung Brewing Co. v. Talbot (59 Ohio St. 511; 53 N. E. 51), 790, 1269. Jungenheimer v. State Journal Co. (81 Neb. 830; 116 N. W. 964), 631. Jury V. Ogden (56 111. App. 100), 1905. Justin, In re (2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 22), 602, G39, 646. Justice V. Commonwealth (81 Va. 209), 182. Justice V. Lowe (26 Ohio St. 372) 1812. Kadgihn v. Bloomington (58 111. 229), 503, 504, 503, 1159. Kadgin v. Millei (13 111. App. 474), 1983. Kaffsmith v. People (8 Colo. 175), 488. Kahlbunner v. State (67 Miss. 368; 7 So. 288), 932. Kaliski v. Gray (25 La. Ann. 576), 202, 792. Kalloch V. Newbert ([Me.] 72 Atl. 736), 337, 1023, 1062. Kammon v. People (124 111. 481; 16 N. E. 661; affirming 24 111. App. 388), 07, 1254, 1631. Kammon v. People (24 111. App. 388; affirmed 124 111. 4S1; 16 N. E. 661), 67, 1754. Kammann v. People (26 111. App. 48; affirmed 124 111. 181; 16 N. E. 661), 1631, 1711. Kamp V. State (120 Ga. 157; 47 S. E. 548), 1446. Kanamura, In re ( 10 B. C. Rep. 354), 534. Kane v. Grady (123 Iowa 260; 98 N. W.'711), 578. Kane v. Commonwealth (89 Pa. 522; 33 Am. Rep. 787), 1 125, 1319. clxxvi TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages.] Kannon v. State (10 Lea, 386), 1746. Fansas v. Bradley (26 Red. 289), 149. Kansas City v. Cork (38 Mo. App. 666), 409. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co. v. Davis (83 Ark. 217; 103 S. W. 603), 2191. Kansas City v. Grash (151 Mo. 128), 426. Kansas City v. Flanders (71 Mo. 281), 504, 1159. Kansas City v. Muhlbeck (68 Mo. 638), 1111. Kansas City v. Smith (57 Kan. 434; 46 Pac. 710), 1479. Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. State (3 Kan. 164), 271. Kappes V. State (55 Ohio Cir, Ct. Rep. 723), 1738. Karan v. Pease (45 111. App. 382), 1965. Karcher v. State ([Kan.] 104 Pac. 568), 1769. Karswich v. Atlanta ( 44 Ga. 204 ] , 215. Kaufman v. Dostal (73 Iowa 691), 119, 125, 990, 997. Kaufmann \'. Hillsboro (45 Ohio St. 700; 17 X. E. 557), 1192. Kawailani, The (128 Fed. 879; 63 C. C. A. 347), 1697. Kay V. Oves Darwen ( 52 L. J. " M. C. 90; 10 Q. B. Div. 213; 47 L. T. 411: 31 W. R. 273; 47 J. P. 388), 629. Keady v. People (32 Colo. 57; 74 Pac. 892), 2085. Kean v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (61 Md. 154), 2174, 2178, 2180, Kean v. Detroit, etc., Mills (66 Mich. 277; 33 K W. 395), 2198, 2199. Kear v. Garrison (13 Ohio Cir. a. 447), 1983, 1991. Kearly v. Tyler (56 J. P. 72; 65 L. T. 261; 60 L. J. M. C. 159), 1383. Kearns v. Commonwealth ( 15 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 332), 949. Kearny v. Fitzgerald (43 Iowa 580), 1882, 1889, 1892, 1912, 1964, 1982. Keating, In re (25 Pittsb. Leg. J. [N. S.] 454), 700. Keating's Appeal ( 19 Pitts. L. Jr. [N. S.] 283), 2139. Keaton v. State (36 Tex. Cr. App, 259; 38 S. W. 522), 1162, 1167, 1197. Kee V. McSweeney ( 15 Abb. X. G. 229), 1456. Kee V. State (28 Ark. 155), 2246, 2248. Keedy v. Howe (72 111. 133), 1350, 1847, 1907, 1908, 1987, 1994. Keefe v. Clarke (10 X. S. W. L. R. 19), 682. Keefer v. Hillsdale (70 Mich. 413; 38 X. W. 277), 650, 764. Keefer v. Hillsdale County (109 Mich. 645; 67 X. W. 981), 868, 877. Keeler, Ex parte (45 S. C. 537; 23 S. E. 865; 55 Am. St. 785; 31 L. R. A. 678), 259, 1003. Keenan v. Commonwealth (44 Pa. 66; 84 Am. Dec. 414), 2040, 2060, 2067, 2071. Keesohn v. Elgin, etc.. Co. (229 111. 533; 82 N. E. 360; affirm- ing 132 111. App. 416), 2174. Keeton v. Commonwealth (92 Ky. 522; 18 S. W. 359), 2078, 2079. Kehoe v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 89 S. W. 270), 958. Kehr v. Columbia ([Mo.] 116 S. W. 428), 920, 925. Kehr v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1234; 88*8. W. 633), 260. Kehrig v. Peters (41 IMich. 475; 2 X. W. 801), 1350, 1838, 1907, 1985. Keifer License, In re (21 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 512), 696. TABLE OF CASES. clxxvii [References are to pages.] Keiser v. Lines (57 Ind. 431), 462, 598, 599. Keiser v. State (58 Ind. 379), 510, 511, 51(5, 518, 539, 1304. Keiser v. State (78 Ind. 200), 4'97. Keiser v. State (78 Ind. 430), 498, 500, 507, 526, 672. Keiser v. State (82 Ind. 379), 1176, 1754. Keiser v. State (€4 Ind. 229), 1637. Keith, Ex parte (47 Tex. Cr. App. ■283; 83 S. W. 683), 888. Keith V. State (91 Ala. 2; 8 So. 353; 10 L, R. A. 430), 308, 309. Keith V. State (38 Tex. Cr. Rep. 678; 44 S. W. 847,849), 1320, 1321, 1486, 1538. Kellar, In re (17 Lane. Law Rev. 96; 16 Montg. Co. Law. Rep. 24; 7 North Co. Rep. 129; 23 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 251; 9 Pa. Dist. Rep. 340; 13 York Leg. Rec. 155), 705. Kellar v. Leonard ([Mo.] 116 S. W. 14), 560. Keller v. Lincoln (67 111. App. 404), 1892, 1919. Kellerman v. Arnold (71 111. 632), 1847. Keller v. State 11 Md. 525; 60 Am. Dec. 226), 138, 139, 192, 333, 540, 549, 787, 1194. Keller v. State ( 23 Tex. App. 359 ; 4 S. W. 886), 215, 1176, 1304, 1622. Keller v. State (46 Tex. Cr. App. 588; 81 S. W. 1214), 890, 1080, 1083. Keller v. State ( [Tex.] 87 S. W. 609), 245. Kelleway v. ]Macdougal (45 J. R. 207'), 1297. Kelley v. Home Ins. Co. (97 Mass. 288), 1778. Kelley v. State (3 Sm. & M. 518), 2040, 2061. Kelley v. State (31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 216; 20 S. W. 357), 2040, 2051, 2052, 2090. Kelley Drug Co. v. Truett ( [Tex.] 75 S. W. 536), 9. Kelling v. Palmer ( [Neb.] 120 N. W. 155), 1879, 1978. Kellogg V. German Amer. Ins. Co. (133 Mo. App. 391; 113 S. W. 663), 1090, 1777, 1778. Kelly, Ex parte (32 N. B. 261), 1377. Kelly V. Burke (132 Ala. 235; 31 .So. 512), 210, 1793. Kelly V. Commissioners (54 How. Pr. 327), 72. Kelly V. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 83 S. W. 99; 26 Ky. L. Rep, 1038), 1211. Kelly V. Commonwealth ( 1 Gr. Cas. [Pa.] 484), 2040, 2071. Kelly V. Dwyer (7 Lea, 180), 520. Kelly V. Earl (26 C. P. [Can.] 477), 1792, 1805. Kelly V. Faribault (83 Minn. 9; 85 N. W. 720), 446. Kelly V. State (36 Tex Cr. App. 480; 3« S. W. 779), 895, 959. Kelly V. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 220; 38 S. VV. 779; 39 S. W. Ill), 869, 873. Kelly V. Worcester, etc., Ins. Co. 97 Mass. 285), 1779. Kelminski, In re (164 Pa. 231; 30 Atl. 301; 35 W. N. C. 309), 632. Kelty V. State (61 N. J. L. 407; 39 Atl. 711), 1479. Kemp V. Bird ([1877] 5 Ch. D. 974; 46 L. J. Ch. 828; 42 J. P. 36; 25 W. R. 838), 1813. Kemp V. State (120 Ga. 157; 47 S. E. 548), 288, 945, 1503, 1512, 1555. Kemp V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 38 S. W. 987), 963. Kemper v. Commonwealtli ( 85 Ky. 219), 216. Kempf V. Kempf (34 Mo. 211), 2158, 2164. clxxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Kennedy, Ex parte (23 Tex. App. 77), 232, 243, 884, 905. Kennedy v. Favor (80 Mass. [14 Gray] 200), 1070, 1077, 10^9. Kennedy v. Garrigan ( [S. D.] 121 N. W. 183), 104, 223, 1896, 1915. Kennedy v. Saunders (142 Mass. 0; 6 N. E. 734), 1850, 1851, 1852, 1853. Kennedy v. Sullivan (34 111. App. 46; affirmed in 136 111. 94; 26 N. E. 382), 1908, 1983, 1984. Kennedy v. Sullivan ( 34 111. App. 46), 1976. Kennedy v. Warner ( 100 N. Y. Supp. 616; 51 X. Y. Misc. 362), 234, 282, 853. Kennedy v. Welsh ( 106 ilass. 692; 83 N. E. 11), 694. Kenney v. People (27 How. Pr. 202), 2040, 2071. Kenney v. Rhinelander (28 N. Y. App. Div. 246; 50 N. Y. Supp. 1088), 63. Kennon v. Blackburn ( 127 Ky. 39; 104 S. W. 968; 31 Ky. L. Eep. 1256), 932, 934). Kenny v. Harwell (42 Ga. 416), 198. Kenny v. People (31 X. Y. 330), 2040, 2070, 2071. Kent v. Willey (11 Gray 368), 1033, 1076, 1077, 1079. Kenton v. State ( 36 Tex. Cr. App. 259; 38 S. W. 522), 1166. Kentucky, etc.. Club ( 92 Kv. 309 ) , 1333. Keokuk v. Dressell ( 47 Iowa 597 ) , 402, 412, 414, 435, 443. Keough V. Foreman (33 La. Ann. 1434), 2099, 2105. Kerkow v, Bauer (15 Neb. 155; 18 N. W. 27), 43, 83, 962, 1873, 1951, 1968. Kern's Appeal, In re ( 38 Wkly. N. C. 438), 621. Kern v. State (7 Ohio St. 411), 1543. Kernon v. Blackburn (127 Ky. 39; 104 S. W. 968; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1256), 652. Kerr v. Harker (7 N. J. L. 349), 1483. Kerr v. State (63 Neb. 115; 88 N. W. 240), 963, 1698. Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (3 Ohio St. 172; 62 Am. Dec. 246), 2214. Kerwisch v. Atlanta (44 Ga. 204), 456. Kessack v. Smith (7 F. [Just. Cas.] 75 ) , 360, 2028, 2029. Kessler, hi re (163 X. Y. 205; 57 X. E. 402; reversing 60 X. Y. Supp. 1141), 731. Kessler, hi re ( 28 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 336; 59 X. Y. Supp. 888; affirmed 60 X. Y. Supp. 1141; reversed 163 X. Y. 205; 57 X. E. 402), 580, 581, 730, 736. Ketchum v. Fox (5 X. Y. Supp. 272; 52 Hun, 284), 1927, 19-88. Kettering v. Jacksonville ( 50 111. 39), 91, 109, 966. Key V. Holloway (7 Baxt. 576), 2134. Key v. State (37 Tex. Cr. App 77; 38 S. W. 773), 842, 1471, 1472. Kicker v. State (133 Ala. 193; 32 So. 253), 370. Kidd, hi re (5 Cal. App. 159; 89 Pac. 987), 172. Kidd V. Pearson (128 U. S. 1; 9 S. Ct. 8; 32 L. Ed. 346), 109, 119, 120, 125, 126, 148, 100, 161, 211, 315. Kidd V. Truett (28 Tex. Civ. App. 618; 68 S. W. 310), 921, 940. Kidder v. Knox (48 Me. 551), 383, 1792. Kidder v. Xorris (18 X. H. 532), 1805. Kiefer v. State (87 Md. 562; 40 Atl. 377), 1497, 1510. TABLE OF CASES. clxxix [References are to pages.] Kiel V. Chicago (176 111. 137; 52 N. E. 2!); reversing 69 111. App. 685), 441. Kiff V. Old Colony, etc., R. Co. (117 Mass. 591; 19 Am. Rep. 429), 1772. Kilburn v. State (9 Conn. 560), 1449, 1497. Kilburn v. Coe (48 How. Pr. 144), 1933. Kilcoyne v. Hitchens (30 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 545), 864, 865. Kilgore, In re (13 Pa. Super. Ct. 543), 664. Kilgore v. Commonwealth (94 Pa. 495), 809. Kilgore v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 447; 108 S. W. 662), 1216. Kilip V. McKay (13 X. Y. St. Rep. 5 ) , 43, 82, 84. Killick V. Graham ([1896] 2 Q. B. 196; 60 J. P. 534; 05 L. J. M. €. 180; 75 L. T. 29; 44 W R. 669; 12 T. L. R. 428), 1275 Killin V. Swatton (61 J. P. 150; 76 L. T. 55; 45 W. R. 235; 13 T. L. R. 121; 18 Cox C. C. 477), 551. Killman v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 570; 112 S. W. 92), 1187, 1474, 1611. Kilman v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 102 S. W. 404), 1465, 1473. Kimball v. Cunningham (4 Mass. 502; 3 Am. Dec. 230), 2127. Kimball v. People (20 111. 348), 1171, 1598. Kimmell, In re (41 Fed. Rep. 775), 157. Kincatid v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 303; 92 S. W. 415), 969. King, In re (23 W. N. C. 152; 16 Atl. 487), 632. King, In re ([Neb.] 10 N. W. 242), 645. King, In re ( [Pa.] 16 Atl. 487 ; 23 W. N. C. 152), 648. King, Ex parte (52 Tex. Civ. App. 383; 107 S. W. 549), 169, 245. King V. Batson (12 Can. Cr. Cas. 62), 1724. King V. Bigelow (9 Can. Cr. Cas. 322), 1285, 1723. King V. Breen (7 Can. Cr. Cas. 146), 1739. King V. Bryant (2 Hapv. [N. C] 394), 2104. King V. Cappellar (42 Ohio St. 218), 120, 121, 147. King V. Chicoyne (8 Can. Cr. Cas, 507), 842, 844. King V. Commonwealth (4 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 623), 24, 26, 43, 44. King V. Conrad (5 Can. Cr. Cas. 414), 1358. King V. Conrad (35 Nov. Sco. 79), 1367. King V. Dedham (15 Mass. 454), 1014. King V. Gardner (25 Nova Scotia 48), 255. King V. Gunn (10 Can. Cr. Cas. 148), 1202. King V. Haley (96 111. 106), 1854, 1855, 1865, 1884. King V. Ivyes ([1687] 2 Showers [K. B.] *468), 104, 4S5, 1106. King V. .Ja-cksonville (2 Scam. 305), 139; 470. King V. Laird (7 Can. Cr. Cas. 318), 369, 372, 375. King V. Law Kin (7 Hawaii 489), 220. King V. Lewis (10 Can. Cr. Cas. 104), 347. King V. Lightburne (4 Can. Cr. Cas. 358), 1331, 1342, 1636. King V. McEvoy (4 Allen 110), 310, 314, 1789. King V. McMullan (38 Nova Scotia 129), 938. King v. McNutt (11 Can. Cr. Cas. 26; 38 N. S. 339). 1085, 1662. King V. Marriot ([1693] 4 Mod. *144), 104, 485, 1106. clxxx TABLE OF CASES. fUeferencos are to pages.] King V. Niederstalt (10 Can. Cr. Cas. 292), 1194. King V. Nugent (9 Can. Cr. Cas. 1), 1084, 1659. King V. Ohio, etc., R. Co. (22 Fed. 413), 2216. King V. Orland (8 Cr. Can. Cas. 208), 352. King V. Eandall ([1695] Salk, *27), 104, 485, 1106. King V. Rogers (11 Can, Cr. Cas. 257), 1118, 1360. King V. State (81 Ala. 92; 8 So. 159), 32. King V. State (90 Ala. 612; 8 .So. 856), 2063, 2069. King V. State (77 Ga. 734), 1578. King V. State (58 Miss. 737; 38 Am. Rep. 344), 21, 51, 59, 1753. King V. State (66 Miss. 502; 6 ;So. 188), 822, 829, 1482, 1608, 1609, 1758. King V. Stata (33 Tex. Cr. Rep. 547; 28 S. W. 20] ), 893, 894. King V. State (50 Tex. Cr. App. 321; 97 S. Vr. 488), 1602. King V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 100 S. W. 024), 1464, 1472. King V. State. (52 Tex. Cr. App. 101; 109 S. W. 182), 7e2, 1692. King V. Stevens (8 Can. Cr. Cas. 76), 1449. King V. Tomlinsoii ( li8 East. Dist. Ct. Rep. 253), ^ZCA. King V. Vavisclii (8 Can. Cr. Cas. 78), 1080, 1342, 1346. King V. Verdon (8 Can. Cr. Cas. 352), 1702. King V. Vipon (1 Menz. 551), 1623. King V. Walsh (6 Can. Cr. Cas. 452), 233. King V. W. H. Townsend (No. 2 39 Nov. Sco. 189), 1059. Kingsley v. N. E. ]Mut. F. Ins. Co. (8 Cush. 573), 2230. Kingston v Ft. Wayne, etc. R. Co. (112 Mich. 40; 70 N. W. 315; 40 L. R. A. 131), 2177, 2191, 2193. Kingston v. Osterhondt (33 Hun, [N. Y.] 66), 498, 500. Kinmish v. Ball (129 U. S. 217; 9 Sup. Ct. 277), 315. Kinniundy v. Mahan (72 111. 402), 405, 420. Kinnebrew, Ex parte ( 35 Fed. 52 ) , 158, 159. Kinnebrew v. State (80 Ga. 232; 5 S. E. 56), 59, 86, 1349, 1353. Kinser v. State (9 Ind. 543), 1510, 1521. Kinze, In re (28 Misc. Rep. 622; 59 N. Y. 682), 744. Kinzell, In re ( 28 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 022; 59 N. Y. Supp. 082), 1183. Kiowa County v. Dunn (21 Colo. 185), 426. Kipp v. Patterson (2 Dutch [N. J.] 298), 4C3. Ivirby v. State (46 Tex. Cr. App. 584; FO S. W. 1007), 1216.\ Kirchner v. Myers (35 Ohio St. 85), 1918. Kirkland v. Ferry ( 45 Wash. 663 88 Pac. 1123), 990. Kirkland v. State (72 Ark. 171 78 3. W. 770), 1017, 2257. Kirkow v. Bauer (15 Neb. 561 20 ::. W. 2D), 1882, 1904. Kirkpatricl: v. Commonwealth ( 95 Ky, 326; Zj S. W. 113), 932. Kirkwood v. Autenreith ( 1 1 Mo, App. 515), ]G16. Kissam v. Kissam (21 N. Y. App. Div. ] 12 ; 47 N. Y. Supp. 270), 2158. Kissel v. Lewis (156 Ind. 233; 59 N. S. 4 78), 984, C37, 1108. Kissinger v. Tlinkhouse (27 Fed. 883), 125. Kitchens v. State (44 Tex. Cr. App. 216; 70S. W, 82), 1130. TABLE OF CASES. clxxxi [References are to pages.] Kitson V. Ann Arbor (26 Midi. 325), 69, 1C8, 278, 418, 444, 481, 908. Kittredge v. Allemenia Society (3 Ohio X. P. 312), 1811. Kittrell v. State (89 Miss. 666; 42 So. 609), 268, 13.52, 1354, 16L5, 1652. Ivizer v. Randleman (50 X. C. ' 428), 4, 5, 30, 55, 355. Klamm, In re ([Neb.] 117 X. W. 991), 575, 622, 623, 636, 663, 671. Klare v. State (43 Ind. 483), 11, 25, 26, 83, 1586, 1592. Klein v. Livingston Club (177 Pa. 224; 35 Atl. 606; 34 L. R, A. 94; 55 Am. St. Rep. 717), 1330, 1332, 1336, 1338. Klein v. State (76 Ind. 333), 1101, 1637. Kleppe V. Gard ([Minn.] 123 X. W. 665), 849. Klepper v. State (121 Ind. 491; 23 X. E. 287), 1656, 1665. Kleveshall, In i - (30 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 201; 63 X. Y. Supp. 741), 580. Klimert v. Corcoran ([Xeb.] 70 XL W. 910), 1890, 1887, 1955. Kline v. Baker (99 Mass. 253), 1280. Kline v. Kline (50 Mich. 438; 15 N. W. 581), 2162. Kling V, Fries (33 Mich. 275), 1786, 1805. Klohs V. Klolis (61 Pa. 245), 212L Xlug V. State (77 Ga. 734), 1119, 1123, 1124, 1126, ]3C2, 1728. Knapp V. r-anlin (.?1 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 756; 74 X. Y. Supp. 458), 820. Knarr, /w re (127 Pa. 554; IS Atl. 630), C:-J, 648. Knecht v. Mut. L. Ins. Co. (00 Pa. St. 118; 35 Am. Rep. 641; 8 Ins. L. Jr. 639), 2230. Knekamp v. Hidding (31 Wis. 503), 2100. Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. v. Foley (105 U. S. 350), 2223, 2224. Knight V. Goss (59 Vt. 266), 1727. Knight V. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (14 Phila. 187; 9 W. X. C. 501), 2229. Knight V. State (88 Ga. 590; 15 S. E. 457), 931, 1281, 1283, 1727. Kniper v. Louisville (7 Bush, 599), 444. Knoblauch's License, In re ( 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 323), 546, 565, 666. Knopf V. State (84 Ind. 31), 1444. Knott V. Miller (12 X. Z. L. K. 397), 1313. Knott V. Peterson (125 Iowa 404; 101 N. W. 173), 778, 876, 1883, 2004. Knott V. Tidyman (86 Wis. 164; 56 X. W.' 632), 2100, 2112. Knowles v. State (80 AIa. 9), 86, 1704. Knox V. Rainbow (111 Cal. 539; 44 Pac. 175), 674. Knox V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 77 S. VV. 13), 1130, 1727. ITnox City v. VVhiteaker (Z'; Mo. App. 468), 832. Knudson v. Great Council ( [S. D.] G3 X. VV. 611), 2221. Kohxn V. State (407 Ark. 72; 81 S. W. 235), 1195. Kob:r V. State (10 Ohio St. 44), 1197, 1754. Koblenshlag v. State (23 Tex. Cr. App. 264; 4 S. W. 888), i2;:o. Koch V. Commonwealth (119 Ky. 476; 84 S. W. 533; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 122), 449. Koch v. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 346; 88 S. W. 809), 873. Koch v. State (32 Ohio St. 353), 1653. Koohe v. Owens (23 X". S. W- 102), 1147. clxxxii TABLE OF CASES. [References ai-e to pages.] Koegel V. Egner (54 N. J. Eq. 623; 35 Atl. 394), 2141, 2146, 2149. Koehler v. Olsen (68 Hun, 62; 22 N. Y. Supp. 677), 701. Koenig v. State ( 33 Tex. Cr. Rep. 367; 26 S. W. 835; 47 Am. St. 35), 1330, 1338. Koerner v. Oberly (56 Ind. 284; 26 Am. Rep. 34), 1982, 1989. Koester v. State (36 Kan. 27; 12 Pac. 339), 190, 3S9. Kohl V. Schober (35 X. J. Eq. 461), 2136. Koliler, Ex 'parte (74 Cal. 38; 15 Pac. 436), 1382. Kohn V. Melcher 1 29 Feu 433), 109, 150, 156, 191, 208, 311, 312, 331, 335, 1792, 1797, 1799, 1803. Kojan, Appeal of (73 N. E. 1122; 181 X. Y. 528), 745. Kolling V. Bennett ( 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 425; 10 C. C. D. 81), 1850, 1852, 1974. Kolman v. State (2 Ga. App. 648; 58 S. E. 1070), 1128, 1589, 1616, 1620, 1621, 1728. Koop V. People (47 HI. 327), 71, 1117, 1127, 1634. Koopnian v. State (61 Ala. 70), 1516. Korman v. Henry (32 Kan. 49; 3 Pac. 764), 1774. Korn V. Chesapeake ( 125 Fed. £97; 63 L. R. A. 372), 2215. Ivorndorfor, /;:. re ( [N. Y.] 49 N. Y. Supp. 559), 591. Komman, In re (13 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 147; 23 Pittsb. Leg. J. [N. S.] 476), 518, 1364. Koster, Appeal of (73 X. E. 1122; 181 X. Y. 529), 745. Krach v. Heilman (53 Ind. 517), 1870. Kramer, Fx parte ( 19 Tex. App. 233), 886. Kramer v. Marks (64 Pa. St. 151), 138, 248, 592. Kramer v. State (106 Ind. 192; 6 X. E. 341), 1240, 1561. Kraut V. State (47 Ind. 519), 510, 531. Kravek v. State (38 Tex. Cr. App. 44; 41 S. W. 612), 1167. Kray, Appeal of (73 N. E. 'll22; 181 X. Y. 527-530), 745. Kreamer v. State (106 Ind. 19-2; 6 X. E. 341), 1446. Kreiss v. Seligman (8 Barb. 438), 1790, ISOl. Kreitor v. Xichols (28 Mich. 496), 223, 224, 1350, 177'.. 1840, 1907, 1908, 1984, 1985. Kress v. State (65 Ind. 106), 659, 660. Kresser v. Lyman (74 Fed. 765), 97, 183, 184, 490. Kretzmann v. Dunne (228 111. 31; 81 X. E. 790; affirming 130 III. App. 469), 594. Krick V. Dow ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 84 S. W. 245), 772, 773, 1242. Krieger, In re (59 X. Y. App. 346; 69 X. Y. Supp. 851), 879, 881. Kriel v. Commonwealth (5 Bush 363), 2061, 2062. Krigler v. Shepler ( [Kan.] 101 Pac. 619), 1784. Krnavek v. State (38 Tex. Cr. Rep. 44; 41 S. W. 612), 1339, 1342, 134G, 1567. Kroer v. People (78 IlL 294), 1118, 1122, 1125, 1127, 1134, 1538, 1567, 1761, 1764. Kroft V. Keokuk (14 Iowa 86), 811. Krueger v. Colville (49 Wash. 295; !)5 Pac. 81), 186, 259, 714. 715, 720, 752. Krug, In re (72 Xeb. 576; 101 N. W. 242), 535, 645. Kruger v. Spachek (22 Tex. App. 307; 54 S. W. 295), 1969. TABLE OF CASES. clxxxiii [References are to pages.] Krulevitz v. Eastern R. Co. ( 143 Mass. 228; 9 N. E. 613), 2033. Krumbholz, In re (60 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 534; 113 N. Y. Supp. 1060), 579, Krummel v. Kidd ([1905] Vict. L. R. 193; 26 Austr. L. T. 131; 10 Austr. L. R. 264), 1257 Kruse v. Williams (80 Pac. 648), 250, 1558. Krzykeva v. Croninger (200 Pa. 359; 49 Atl. 979), 808. Kuhlman ([.Neb.] 98 N. W. 419), 1948. Kuhlman v. Wieben ( 129 Iowa 188; 105 N. W. 445; 2 L. R. A. [N. S.] 555), 1251, 1631, 1735, 2095. Kuhn V. Bauer (15 Neb. 150; 18 N. W. 27), 1884. Kuhn V. Board, etc. (4 W. Va. 499 ) , 394. Kuhn V. Common Council (79 Mich. 534; 38 N. VV. 470), 194. Kuhn V. State (34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 85; 29 S. W. 272), 1646. Kunkel v. Abell (170 Ind. 305; 84 N. E. 503), 572. Kunkle v. Abel (167 Ind. 434; 79 N. E. 753), 612, 614, 615, 624. Kurth V. State (86 Tenn. 134; 5 S. W. 593), 198, 201, 540, 542, 790. Kurtz V. People (83 Mich. 279), 215, 1119. Kusta V. Kimberly ( 10 Oliio Dec. 789; 2 Wkly. L. Bull. 379), 797. Kurz V. State (79 Ind. 488), 11, 82, 1220, 1230, 158'6, 1592, 1«21, 1694, 1«45. Kwong Wo, In re (2 B. C. 336), 23. Kyle V. State (18 Ind. App. 136; 47 N E. 647), 832, 837, 638. Labaree v. Klosterman (33 Neb. 150; 49 N. W. 1102), 1162, 1106. Laboyleaux, Ex parte (65 Ind. 545), 530. Lacey v. Palmer (93 Va. 159; 24 S. E. 930), 324. Lackey v. Cunningham (56 Pa. 370), 2151. Lackman v. Walker (52 Fla. 297; 42 So. 461), 445. La Croix v. Fairfield Co. (49 Conn. 591), 488, 743. La Croix v. Fairfield Co. (50 Conn. 321; 47 Am. Rep. 048), 182, 183, 184, 185, 490, 715, 718, 720, 743. Lacy V. Garrard (2 Ham [Ohio] 7), 2093, 2099, 2109. Lacy V. Garrard (2 Ohio 7) 2100. Lacy V. Mann (59 Kan. 777; 53 Pac. 754), 2099, 2128. Lacy V. State (32 Tex. 227), 76, 1637. Ladd V. Dillingham (34 Me. 316), 1782. Ladd V. Moore (3 Sandf. 589), 2127. Ladson v. State ([Fla.] 47 So. 517), 4, 1495. Ladwig V. State (40 Tex. Cr. App. 585; 51 S. W. 390), 958, 1681. Lafayette, In re (45 N. Y. Misc. 141; 91 N. Y. Supp. 970; or- der affirmed, 93 N. Y. Supp. 534; 105 N. Y. App. Div. 25), 880, 881, 884, 889. Lafi'erty v. HufTman (99 Ky. 80; 35 S. W. 123; 32 L. R. A. 203), 932, 1286. Laff"ey v. Magarian (22 N. Z. 577), 1251. Lafler v. Fisher (121 Mich. 60; 79 N. W. 934), 62, 1250, 2008. La Fitte v. Ft. Collins (42 Colo. 293; 95 Pac. 927), 127. clxxxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] La France v. Krayer (42 Iowa, 143), 1915, 1927. Lagagrianmis v. Cruikshank (1 Vict. L. E. 97), 643. Lahey v. Crist (130 111. App. 152), 1862. Laid V. State (104 Ga. 72G; 30 S. E. 949), 82, 695. Laing v. State (9 Tex. Civ. App. 136; 28 S. W. 1040), 1227. Lake, In re (26 C. P. [Can.] 173), 889. Lake v. Linton (6 La. Ann. 262), 2153. Lake v. Stahl ([Kan.] 93 Pac. 275), 1023. Lake v, Stahl (79 Kan. 854; 99 Pac. 275), 1772. Lake Erie, etc. Pv. Co. v. Zoffinger (107 111. 199), 2191, 2194. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Miller (25 Mich. 274), 2179, 2180, 2182. Laliberte v. Fortin (2 Que. L. R. 573, reversing 3 Que. C. R. 385), 1441. Lally, In re (85 Iowa 49; 51 N. W. 1155; 16 L. R. A. 681), 2163. Lambe v. Jobin (12 L. N. [Can.] 407), 1372. Lambert, Ex parte (22 N. W. [N. S. W.] 130), 371. Lambert v. Rahway (58 N. J. L. 578; 34 Atl. 5), 727, 734, 740, 1760. Lambert v. State (8 Mo. 492), 509. Lambert v. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 232; 39 S. W. 299), 849, 854, 869, 916. Lambert v. Stevens (29 Neb. 283; 45 N. W. 263), 568. Lambie v. State (151 Ala. 86; 44 So. 51), 83, 967, 1349, 1556, 1643, 1701. Lammert v. Lidwell (62 Mo. 188), 240. L' Amoureux v. Crosby (2 Paige 422; 22 Am. Dec. 655), 2119, 2120. Lanahan v. Bailey ( [S. C] 31 S. E. 332; 42 L. R. A. 297), -772. Lanar v. Wiedeman (57 Mo. App. 507), 408. Lancaster v. State (2 Lea 575), 2072, 2074 Lancaster, etc. Bank v. Moore (78 Pa. St. 407), 2123. Lanckton v. United States (18 App. D. C. 348), 2038. Land v. State (5 Ga. App. 98; 62 S. E. 665), 1092. Lander & Bagley's Contract, In re ([1892] 3 Ch. 41), 1826. Landt v. Remley (130 Iowa 227; 85 N. W. 783), 1002. Lane v. Lane ([1890] p. 133; 60 J. P. 345; 65 L. J. P. 63; 74 L. T. 558), 2168. Lane v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. ( 132 Mo. 4; 33 S. W. 645; 1128), 2191, 2193. Lane v. State (37 Ark. 273), 515, 1349, 1371. Lane v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 335; 92 S. W. 839), 1212, 1611, 1666. Lane v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 82 S. W. 1034), 1651. Lane v. Tippy (52 111. App. 5.32), 1883, 1912. Lane Co. v. Oregon (7 Wall. [U. S.] 71), 276. Lanergan v. People (50 Barb. 266; 34 How. Pr. 390; 6 Park. Cr. Rep. 209), 2039, 2040, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2061. 2071, 2085. Lang's Est., In re (65 Cal. 19; 2 Pac. 491), 2136. Lang v. Ingalls Zinc Co. ( [Tenn Ch. App.] 49 S. W. 288), 2094, 2122. Langan v. People (32 Colo. 414; 76 Pac. 1048), 1505, 1523, 1738. TABLE OF CASES. clxxxv [References are to pages] Langel v. Bushnell (197 111. 20; 133 N. E. 1086, affirming 9() 111. App. (il8), 469, 967, 978, 1089, 1098, 1698. Langen v. Wood River (77 Neb, 444; 109 N. W. 748), 472. Langford, In re (57 Fed. 570), 1017, 1021. Langrish v. Archer ( 10 Q. B. Div. 44; 47 J. P. 295; 52 L. J. M, C. 47; 31 W. R. 183; 47 L. T. 548), 2025. Langswortliy v. Dubuque ( 1 Iowa 271), 393. Langton v. Hughes ( 1 Maul. & S. 593), 1796. Lanham v. Wood (167 Ind. 398; 79 N. E. 376), 663, 668, 669. Laning v. Laning (21 N. J. Eq. 248), 2156, 2166, 2168. Laning v. New York Cent. R. Co. 49 N. Y. 521; 10 Am. Rep. 417), 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201. Lanning v. Board ( [N. J. L.] 68 Atl. 1083), 591. La Norris v. State ( 13 Tex. App. 33; 44 Am. Rep. 699), 549, 1372, 1373. Lantz V. Hightstown (46 N. J. L. 102), 716, 727, 743. Laper, In re (165 N. Y. 618; 59 N. E. 1125; 53 N. Y. Div. 576; 66 N. Y. Supp. 13), 580, 581. Lapiere v. Briere ( 10 Leg. News 387), 1781. Laranger v. Jardine (56 Mich. 518; 23 N. W. 203), 1780. Laranne Co. v. New Albany Co. 92 U. S. 307), 393. Largin v. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 574; 40 S. W. 280), 1607. Larimer v. Kelly (13 Kan. 78), 2253. Larkin v. Simmons ( [Ala.] 46 So. 451), 889. Larner, In re (79 N. Y. Supp. 1039; 12 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 362), 2019. La Roche v. Brewer ( 1 Ohio C. D. 432), 2011, 2013. Larr v. State (45 Ind. 364), 660. Larson v. Chistensen ( 14 N. D. 476; 106 N. W. 51), 1768. Lartz v. Gibson (13 Bradw. [111.] 487), 1869, 1962. Larzelere v. Kerchgessner ( 73 Mich. 276; 41 N. W. 488), 1949, 1960, 1966, 1983, 1985, 2005. Lashus v. State (79 Me. 504; 11 Atl. 180), 1729. Laswell v. State (21 Tenn. [2 Humph.] 402), 31. Latham v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 72 S. W. 182), 1203. Lathrope v. State (51 Ind. 192), 1248, 1353, 1357, 1359, 1565, 1633. Lathrope v. State (50 Ind. 555), 1586, 1592. Latimer v. Birmingham, J. J. (60 J. P. 660»i.) 623. Lauer v. District of Columbia (11 App. D. L. 453), 1313, 1544. Lauer v. State (24 Ind. 131), 356, 1352, 1356, 1359, 1360, 1015, 1616, 1610. Lauk's Appeal, In re (2 Super. Cf 53; 39 W. X. C. 42). 553. Launder v. Chicago (111 111. 291), 472. Laundrum v. Flanigan (60 Kan. 436; 56 P. 753), 1895. Laundry License Case (22 Fed. 201), 411, 412, 786, 789. Lauten v. Rowan (58 N. H. 215), 1790. Lauter v. Allenstown (58 N. H. 289), 477. Lautznester v. State ( 19 Tex. App. 320), 1563. Lavette v. Sage (29 Conn. 577), 2099, 2102, 2103. clxxxvi TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages.] Law and Order Society, In re 185 Pa. 572; 40 MX. 92), G08. Lawrence, In re (69 Ala. 608; 11 Pae. 217), 521. Lawrence, In re (69 Cal. 608; 11 Pac. 217), 444, 448, 449, 800. Lawrence V. Gray (11 Johns. 179), 493, 500, 687. Lawrence v. Monroe (44 Kan. 607; 24 Pac. 1113), 439. Lawrence v. National Ins. Co. (127 Mass. 557, note.) 1779. Lawrence v. State (7 Tex. App. 192), 1125, 1319. Lawrenceburg v. Wuest ( 16 Ind. 337), 397, 413, 418. Laws V. State (144 Ala 118; 42 So. 40), 2038. Lawson, In re (109 N. Y. App. Div. 195; 96 N. Y. Supp. 33), 745. Lawson v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 66 S. W. 1010; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1983), 931. Lawson v. Edminson (78 L. J. K. B. 36 [1908]; 2 K. B. 952; 72 J. P. 79; 25 T. L. Pv. 11), 2028. Lawson v. Eggleston (59 N. E. 1124; 164 N. Y. 600; affirm- ing 52 N. Y. Supp. 181), 1873, 1954, 1975. Lawson v. State (55 Ala. 118), 1111, 1665, 1666. Lawson v. State (151 Ala. 95; 44 So. 50), 1554. Lawton v. Allentown ( 58 N. H. 289), 384. Lawton v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co. (2 Cash. 500), 2041. Layton v. Deck (63 111. App. 553), 1908. Layton v. State (49 Ind. 229), 1567. Lazare v. State (19 Ohio St. 43), 226. Lazell V. Pinnick (1 Tyler [Vt.] 247; 4 Am. Dec. 722), 2128, 2131. Lea V. State (64 Miss. 201; 1 So. 51), 1446, 1504. Lea V. State (78 Tenn. [10 Lea] 35), 247. Lea V. VVhittaker ([1872] L. R. 8 C. P. 70; 37 J. P. 183; 27 L. T. 676; 21 W. R. 230), 1832. Leach v. State (99 Tenn. 584; 42 S. W. 195), 1583. Leach v. State (35 Tex. Rep. 449; 34 S. W. 129), 1463. Leach v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 53 S. W. 630), 1182. Leader v. Yell (33 L. J. M. C. p. 233), 598. League v. Erskine ( 120 Iowa, 464; 94 X. VV. 938), 1736, 1861, 1950, 1972. Leah v. Minns (47 J. P. 198), 961. Leak v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.,] 64 S. W. 521; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 932), 1380, 1381. Leake, In re (26 C. P. [Can.] 173), 894. 907. Leake v. Linton (6 La. Ann. 262), 2166. Leaky, In re (14 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 430; 3 Pa. Dist. 472), 696. Leary v. State (39 Ind. .544), 1109, 1491. Leavenworth v. Booth ( 15 Kan. 628), 791. Leavitt v. Morris (105 Minn. 170; 117 N. VV. 393), 2017, 2023. Le Blanc, Ex parte ( 1 Can. Cr. Cas. 12; 33 N. B. 90), 1571. Lebkovitz v. State (113 Ind. 26; 14 N. E. 363), 1746. Lebolt, In re (77 Fed. 587), 331. Leckey v. Cunningham (56 Pa. 370), 2137. Ledbetter v. State (143 Ala. 52; 38 So. 836), 1181. Lederer v. State (11 Ohio Dec. 31), 1120. TABLE OF CASES. clxxxvii [References are to pages.] Lederer v. State (24 Wkly. L. Bull. 153), 1400. Lee, In re 40 N. J. Kq. 193; 18 Atl. 525), 2122, 2134, 2137, 2149. Lee V. Lee (3 Wash. 230), 2105, 2107. Lee V. Roberts (3 Oklu. lOiJ; 41 Pac. 595), 798. Lee V. SchuU ([Ind.] 88 N. E. 521), 001, 007, 012. Lee V. State (143 xila. 93; 39 So. 720), 174. Lee V. Ware (1 Hill L. [S. C] 313), 2uJ4, 201)8. Leech v. Leech (Clark [Pa.] 80; 1 Phila. 244; 4 Am. L. Jr. 174), 2135. Lee County v. Hooper ( 128 Ga. 99; 50 N. E. 997), 980. Leeds Ck)rporation v. Ryder ([1907] A. C. 420; 71 J. P. 484; 76 L. J. K. B. 1032; 87 L. T. 261), 547, 056, 059, 678. Leesburg v. Putnam (103 Ga. 110; 29 S. E. 602; 68 Am. St. 80), 69, 70, 75, 475. Leeson v. lioard ( 19 Ont. 67 ) , 648, 052, 715. Leforce v. Commonwealth (5 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 608), 1404. Leftinch v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 55 S. W. 571), 934, 1090, 1692, 1715. Leftwiche's Case (5 Rand. [Va.] 057), 929. Legal Tender Cases (12 Wall. [U. S.] 501), 100. Leger v. Rice (Fed. Cas. No. 8210), 233. Lcgeyt V. O'Brien (^Slilw. Eccl. Rep. 325), 2109, 2114. 2115. Legg V. Anderson (110 Ga. 401; 42 S. E. 720), 970, 980, 1108. Legori V. State (8 S. & M. 097), 1481. Lehman v. District of Columbia (19 App. D. C. 217), 1130, 1311, 1312, 1363, 1511, 1589. Lehman v. Porter (73 Miss. 216; 18 So. 920), 894, 897, 906. Lehritter v. State (42 Ind. 383), 495, 1516, 1034. Leibeknccht, In re ( 14 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 571; 3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 474), 090. Leigh V. Westervelt (2 Duer. 618), 636, 658. Leight V. Milton '2 N. Z. L. R. 214), 372. Leightfoot v. Heron (3 Yonge & Coll. 586), 2099. Leigh ton v. Maury (76 Va. 865), 007, 608, 627^, 631, 632, 662, 665. Leighton v. Sargent (31 N. H. 119; 64 Am. Dec. 323), 2254. Leister, Appeal of (20 W. N. C. 224), 675. Leister's Appeal ([Pa.] 11 Atl. 387), 626, 628, 664. Leister, In re (20 W. N. C. 224), 638. Leisy v. Hardin (135 U. S. 100; 10 Sup. Ct. 681; 34 L. Ed. 128), 156, 210, 299, 305, 309, 313, 315, 318, 1420, 1478, 1433, 1800. Lemerise, In re (73 Vt. 304; 50 Atl. 1002), 1800. Lemington v. Blodgett (37 Vt. 210: 37 Vt. 215), 384, 385. Lemly v. State (70 Miss. 241; 12 So. 22 ; 20 L. R. A. 045 ) , 905, 907. Lemon v. Peyton ( 64 Miss. 101; 8 So. 235), 231; 232, 235, 862, 875. Lemon v. State (50 Ala. 130), 1113, 1666, 1705. Lemon v. State (4 Ind. 603), 1521, Lemont v. Washington, etc., R. Co. (1 Mackey, 180), 2200. Lemore v. Commonwealth ( 127 Ky. 480; 105 S. W. 930; 32 Ky. L. Rep. 387), 949. Lemp V. Fullerton (83 Iowa, 192; 48 N. W\ 1034; 13 L. R. 408), 111, 327, 1828. clxxxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] licney & Sons, Limited, v. Calling- ham & Thompson ([1907] 24 T. L. R. 55), 1829. Lenthall v. Crow ( 16 N. S. W. L. R. Ill), 1183. Lenthall v. Smith ( 15 N. S. W. L. R.. 277), •1384.* Leo Ebert Brewing Co. v. State (25 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 001), 1109, 1170, 1177. Leonard v. Canton (35 Miss. 189), 412, 414. Leonard v. Saline Co. Court (32 Mo. App. 033), 883, 885, 887. Leon Mercantile Co. v. Anderson ([Tex.] 121 S. W. 808), 715, 720, 1769. Leothall v. Smith ( 15 N. S. W. L. R. 277), 1507. Leppert v. State (7 Ind. 300), 1589, Lerck v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 97 S. W. 1049), 1693. Lerderer v. State (24 Wkly. L. Bull. 153; affirmed, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 623; 3 Ohio C. D. 303), 1115, 1122, 1128. Leroy v. State ( [Ala.] 25 So. 247) , 2038, 2000. Lervery v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 34 S. W. 956), 1471. Leslie v. Clarke (22 N. Z. 907), 1313. IL,eslie V. Commonwealth ( 107 Mass. 215), 1074. Lessman v. Territory ( 3 Wash. Ter. 453), 231. Lester, Ex ' parte (77 V^a. 603), 627, 662, 663. Lester v. Miller (70 Miss. 309; 24 So. 193), 869. Lester v. Price (83 Va. 048; 3 S. E. 529), 195, 608, 662, >68, 069, 696, 706. Lester v. State (32 Ark. 727), 1583. Lester v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 80 S. W. 326), 949. I Lester v. Torrens (2 Q. B. Div. 404; 41 J. P. 821; 25 W. R. 091; 40 L. J. M. C. 280), 361, 2030. Leveille, Ex parte (Stephen's Can- adian Digest [1877-1881] p. 474, § 155), 518. Levering v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 33 S. W. 976), 1712. Levi V. Rex ([1906] East. Dist. Ct. Rep. 272), 1182, 1720. Levis' Estate (140 Pa. 179; 21 Atl. 242), 2148. Levi V. Louisville (96 Ky. 394; 30 S. W. 973; 28 L. R. A. 480), 788. Levi V. State (4 Baxt. 289), 1382. Levine v. State (35 Tex. Cr. Rep. 647; 34 S. W. 969), 1125, 1013. Levy, Ex parte (43 Ark. 42; 51 "Am. Rep. 550), 027, 028, 062. Levy V. State, (133 Ala. 190; 31 "So. 805), 953, 1600. Levy V. State (6 Ind. 281), 216. Levy V. State (101 Ind. 251; 68 N. E. 172), 789. Levy V. State (89 Miss. 394; 42 So. 875), 1098. Lewadag v. State (4 Ind. Oil), 523. Lewis, In re (20 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 532; 57 N. Y. Supp. 076), 592, 595. Lewis V. Brennan ([Iowa] 117 N. W. 279), 998, 1000, 1001. Lewis V. City Na. Bank (72 III. 543), 1843. Lewis V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 121 S. W. 643), 718, 720, 721. Lewis V. Commonwealth (90 Va. 843; 20 S. E. 777), 1111, 1452. Lewis V. Foster (1 N. H. 61), 929. Lewis V. Hogan (91 Iowa, 734; 59 N. W. 290), 988. Lewis V. Jones (50 Barb. 645), 2137. 2151. Lewis V. Lewis (75 Iowa, 200; 39 N. W. 271), 2161. TABLE OF CASES. clxxxix [References are to pages.] Lewis V. State (21 Ark. 209), 270, 1348. Lewis V. State ( [Ga.] 64 S. E. 701), 1664. Lewis V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 47 S. W. 988; 39 S. VV. .570), 1743. Lewis V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 49 S. W. 603), 1687. Lewis V. United States ( 1 Morris [la.] 199), 694. Lewis V. Welch (14 X. H. 294), 1780. Lewiston v. Fitch ( 130 111. App. 170), 463. Lexington v. Sargent (64 Miss. 621; 1 So. 903), 675. Lexington Brewing Co. v. Common- wealth ( 124 Ky. 476; 99 S. W. 618; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 758), 948. Lexper v. State ( 29 Tex. App. 63 ; 14 S. W. 398), 2056. Leyden v. State (78 Ga. 105), 1124. Leyner v. State (8 Ind. 490), 1741. Liberty v. Moran ( 121 Mo. App. 682; 97 S. W. 948), 1015, 1654. License Cases (5 How. 504; 12 L. Ed. 256), 91, 100, 105, 107, 139, 154, 181, 239, 302, 311, 313, 398, 404, 418, 525, 790, 1010. License Commissioners v. O'Con- ner (17 R. I. 40; 19 Atl. 1080), 744, 749. License Commissioners v. Norfolk (14 Ont. 749), 262. License Tax Cases (5 Wall. 462; 18 L. Ed. 497), 141, 451. Liddell v. Lofthouse ([1896] 1 Q. B. 498 ; 60 J. P. 264 ; 12 T. L. R. 204), 380. Liebler v. Carrel (155 Mich. 196; 118 N. W. 975; 15 Det. L. N. 976), 997, 1862, 1883, 1962, 1969. Liebold V. People (86 111. 33), 1303. Lienpe v. State (28 Tex. App. 179; 12 S. W. 588), 1583. Life Association v. Foster (11 Sc. Sess. Cas. [3d Ser.] 351), 2221. Liggett V. People (26 Colo. 364; 58 Pac. 144), 824, 1645. Ligonier v. Ackerman (46 lud. 552; 15 Am. Rep. 323), 811, 816. Lightfoot V. Heron (3 Younge & C. Exch. 586), 2094, 2122. Lightner v. Casey (31 Pa. 341), 774. Lightner v. Commonwealth (31 Pa. St. 341), 766. Liles V. State (88 Ala. 139; 7 So. 196), 1230. Liles V. State (43 Ark. 95), 1598. Lillenfeld v. Commonwealth (92 Va. 118; 23 S. E. 882), 740, 1613. Lillensteine v. State ( 46 Ala. 498), 1112, 1192. Lilly V. City of Indianapolis ( 149 Ind. 648; 49 N. E. 887), 100. Lincoln v. Smith (27 Vt. 328), 91, 110, 125, 253, 255, 1007, 1008, 1040, 1043, 1072, 1088, 1530, 1659. Lincoln Center v. Bailey (64 Kan. 885; 67 Pac. 455), 1614. Lincoln Center v. Linker (5 Kan. App. 242; 47 Pac. 174), 47, 1505, 1707, 1712. Lincoln Center v. Linker ( Kan. App. 369; 51 Pac. 807), 467, 1455, 1556. Lincoln Center v. Linker ( 7 Kan. App. 282; 53 Pac. 787), 39, 48, 434, 1493, 1706. Lincoln Parish v. Harper (42 La. Ann. 776; 7 So. 716), 432. Lincolnton v. McCarter ( Busb. L. [N. C] 429), 1124, 1127. Lindell v. Rokes (60 Mo. 294; 21 Am. Rep. 395), 1785. Lindenmiller v. People (3 Barb. [N. Y.] 548), 215. exc TABLE OF CASES. fReferonces are to pages.] Linder v. Prior ([1838] 8 C. & P. 518), 1820. Linder v. State (93 Ind. 254), 1560. Lindley v. State ([Ark.] 120 S. W. 987), 127, 336, 947. Lindsay v. Commonwealth ( 99 Ky. 164; 35 S. W. 269), 1692. Lindsay v. State (19 Ala. 560), 1246, 1514. Lindsey v. Stone (123 Mass. 332), 1798, 1800. Lingelbach v. Hobson ( [Iowa] 107 X. W. 168), 346, 1132. Linkenhelt v. Garrett (118 Ind. 599; 20 N. E. 708), 190, 280, 414, 430, 466. Lipari v. State ( 19 Tex. App. 431), 912. Liquor Dealers, In re (6 Pa. Dist. Rep. 723; 28 Pittsb. L. J. [N. S.] 16), 1320. Liquor Dealers, In re ( 19 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 329), 1320. Liquor License, In re (1 B. & C. [N. S.] 257), 560. Liquors, In re (15 R. I. 243; 3 Atl. 3), 1065. Liquor Locations, In re (13 R. 1. 733), 130, 247, 592. Liquor Tax Certificate In re (23 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 446; 51 N. Y. Supp. 281), 591, 592. Lissing v. Beach (99 Mich. 431; 58 N. W. 366), 1983. List V. Padget (96 Ind. 126), 431, 601, 608, 854. Litch V. People ( [Colo. App.] 75 Pac. 1079), 1178. Little, Ex parte (19 W. N. [N. S. W.] 268), 369, 372, 375. Little V. Barksdale ( [S. C] 63 S. E. 308), 381. Little V. State (123 Ga. 503; 51 S. E. 501), 452, 1082. Little V. State (42 Tex. Cr. Rep. 551; 61 S. W. 483), 2090. Little V. Thompson (24 Ind. 146), 608. Little Chute v. Van Camp (136 Wis. 520; 117 N. W. 1012), 459. Littlefield v. Peckham (1 R. I. 500), 1748. Littlejohn v. Stells (123 Ga. 427; 51 S. E. 390), 169, 216, 1761. Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Park- hurst (36 Ark. 371), 2178, 2180. Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Ilaynes (47 Ark. 297), 2178. Littleton, In re (113 X. Y. App. Div. 471; 99 X. Y. Supp. 417), 647. Littleton v. Burgess (13 Wyo. 261; 82 Pac. 864), 185. Littleton v. Fritz (65 Iowa, 488; 22 X. W. 641; 54 Am. St. 19), 256, 259, 981, 985. Littleton v. Harris (73 Iowa, 167; 34 X. W. 800), 990, 992. Lively v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 73 S. W. 1048), 914, 915, 1680, 1081. Livery Stables v. State (16 Mo. App. 131), 437. Livingston, In re (24 X. Y. App. Div. 51; 48 X. Y. Supp. 989), 491, 714, 743. Livingston, In re (62 X. Y. [Misc. Rep. 334; 115 X. Y. Supp. 269), 891. Livingston, In re (115 X. Y. Supp. 269), 853. Livingston v. Corey (33 Xeb. 366; 50 X. W. 263), 576, 600, 637, 638. Livingston v. Wolf (136 Pa. St. 519; 20 Atl. 551), 408. Livingstone, In re (6 Prac. [Can.] Rep. 17), 2024. Livingstone, Ex parte (20 Xev. 282; 21 Pac. 322), 70. Llewellyn v. Rutherford ([1875] L. R. 10 C. P. 456; 44 L. J. C. P. 281; 32 L. T. 610), 1831, 1832. TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] C2C1 Lloyd V. Albemarle, etc.. E. Co (118 N. C. 1010; 24 S. E 805), 2178, 2179. Lloyd V. Burnett (64 J. P. 708; 82 L. T. 804), 1139. Llyod V. Canon City ( [Colo.] 103 Pac. 288 [P:iks' Club]), 1325. Lloyd V, Dollison (23 Oliio Cir. Ct. Pep. 571), 148, 151, 230, 240, 554, 1683. Lloyd V. Kelly (48 III. App. 554), 1970, 1972. Loan V. Etzel (62 Iowa, 424; 17 N. W. 611), 2011. Loan V. Hiney (53 Iowa, 89; 4 N. W. 865), 1927, 1931, 2013. Lochlieim v. Gill (17 Ind. 139), 2094, 2116. Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491; 13 Am. Rep. 716), 228, 231, 235. Locke V. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 63 S. W. 795; 23 Ky. 740), 1493. Locke V. Commonwealth (113 Ky. 864; 69 S. VV. 763; 24 K. L. Rep. 654), 1357, 1358, 1467. Locke V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 74 S. W. 654; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 76), 84, 935, 963, 1697, 1699. Locke V. Garnett ([Ky.] 42 S, vV. 918; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1059), 908, 920, 922. Lockridge v. Lockridge (3 Dana, 28; 28 Am. Dec. 52), 2165. Lock wood V. Cooper ([1903] 2 K. B. 428; 72 L. J. K. B. 690; 89 L. T. 306; 52 W. R. 48 ; 67 J. P. 307 ; 20 Cox C. C 539), 372, 373, 374. Loeb, Ex parte ( 72 Fed. 657 ) , 307. Loeb V. City of Attica (82 Ind. 175), 394, 432. Loeb V. Duncan (63 Miss. 89) 574, 674. Loeb V. State (75 Ga. 258), 1357, 135«, 1460, 1560. Lodamo v. State (25 Ala 64) 109, 210, 215. Loeffler v. District of Columbia (15 App. D C. 329), 1235. Loewer v. Sedalia (77 Mo. 431) 2171, 2190. Lofland, In re ([Del.] (i6 Atl. 361), 563. Lofton V. Collins (117 Ga. 434; 43 S. E. 708; 61 L. R. A. 150), 475, 979, 985. Loftus V. Commonwealth (13 Gratt. 631), 1651. Loftus V. Hamilton ( 105 HI. App 72, 75), 1879. Loftus V. Maloney (89 Vt. 576; 16 S. E. 749), 2094. Logan, In re (22 Austr. L. T. 109; 6 Austr. L. R. 253), 626, 712. Logan V. Buck (3 Utah, 301). 216. Logan V. State (24 Ala. 18i,) 372. Long V. State (27 Ala. 32), 426 518, 539, 573, Long V. State (27 Ala. 164; 42(i. Logan V. State ([Okla.] 115 S W. 1192), 1454. Logan City v. Buck (3 Utah, 307; 5 Pac. 564), 271, 432. Loid V. State (104 Ga. 720- 30 S. E. 961), 1714. Lonchheim v. Gill (17 Ind 139) 2108. London County Council, /», r« ([1898] 1 Q. B. :m; 61 J. P. 808; 67 L. J. Q. B. 382; 77 L. T. 436; 46 \V. R. 172; 14 T. L. R. 69), 1834. London & Suburban Co. v. Field ([1881] 16 Ch. D. 645; 38 L. J. Ch. 549; 44 L. T. 444) 1814. London & Xorthwestern Rail Co. V. Garnett ([1869] L. R. 9 Eq. 26; 39 L. J. Ch. 25; 21 L. T. 352; 18 VV. R. 246), 1813. Londry, Appeal of (79 Conn. 1; 63 Atl. 293), 666, 740. CXCll TABLE OP CASES. flleferences ai'e to pages.] Long V. A. L. Green & Co. ( [Tex. Civ. App.] P5 S. W. 79), 755, 778. Long V. Commonwealth (5 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 428), 1545. Long V. Ingalls Zinc Co. ( [Tenn. 'Ch. App.] 49 S. W. 288), 2108. Long V. Joder (139 lovva, 471; 11(5 N. W. 1063), 835, 979. Long V. Lynch (38 Fed. 489; 4 L. R. A. 831), 335, 1799. Long V. State (103 Ala. 55; 15 So. 565), 127'8. Long V. iState ( 1,27 Gai. 285 ; ■56 S. E. 424), 1320. Long V. State (56 Ind. 206), 1714, 1746. Longfellow v. Quimby (29 Me. 196), 1014. Longhead v. B. F. Coombs & Co. ( 64 Mo. App. 559 ; 2 Mo. App. Rep'r, 1017), 2093, 2097. Longley v. Commonwealth ( 99 Va. 807; 37 8. E. 339; 2 Va. Sup. Ct. Rep. 660), 2039, 2056. Longville v. State (4 Tex. App. 312), 198, 199. Lonsdale Co. v. Cumberland ( 18 R. L 5; 25 Atl. 655), 603, 608, 675. Looney v. State (43 Ark. 389), 1196, 1197. Loop V. Williams (47 Vt. 407), 1029, 1068. Lord, In re (32 N. Y. Misc. 223; 66 N. Y. Supp. 252), 577. Lord V. Chadbourne (42 Me. 429; 66 Am. Dee. 290), 1028, 1031, 1776. Lord V. State (104 Ga. 726; 30 S. E. 949), 30. Lore\ V. Kelley ( [Xeb.] 90 N. W. 554), 1912. Loring v. Brackett ( 3 Pick. 403 ) , 610. Losan v. Etzel (62 Iowa, 429; 17 N. W. 611), 1931. [ Lossman v. Fidelia Knights (89 111. App. 437), 1859. Lossman v. Knights (77 111. App. 670), 1903. Lottery Cases (188 U. S. 321; 47 L. Ed. 492; 23 Sup. Ct. 321), 298. Louhridge v. State ( [Miss.] 3 So. 667), 1464, 1468, 1478. Louisiana v. Anderson ( [Mo. App.] 73 S. W. 875), 1443. Louisiana, etc., Ry. Co. v. McDon- ald ([Tex. Civ. App.] 52 S. W. 649), 2184. Louisville v. Cain ( [Ky.] 119 S. W. 763), 758, 820. Louisville v. Gagen ([Ky.] 116 S. W. 745; 118 S. W. 947), 634, 667. Louisville v. Hendricks ( [Ky.] 116 ,S. W. 747), 600, 618, 624. Louisville v. Kean (18 B. Mon. 9), 403, 627, 632, 634. Louisville v. McKean (57 Ky. [18 B. Mon.] 9), 273. Louisville v. Worden (11 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 402), 470. Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Common- wealth (126 Ky. 279; 103 S. W. 349; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 383). 1689, 1726. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Cummins (111 Ky. 3.33; 63 S. W. 594; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 681), 2177. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Davidson (1 Sneed, 637; 62 Am. Dec. 424), 232, 905. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Ellis (97 Ky. 330; 30 S. W. 979; 17 Ky. L. Rep. 259), 2211, 2212, 2214. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson 92 Ala. 204), 2203, 2210, 2214. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson (108 Ala. 62; 19 So. 51; 31 L. R. A. 372), 2174, 2191, 2197, 2203, 2206, 2217, 2218. TABLE OF CASES. CXClll [References are to pages.] Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Logan (88 Ky. 232; 3 L. R. A. 80; 10 S. W. U55;, 2206, 2208. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Lewis (14 Ky. L. Rep. 771), 2207. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. McNally ([Ky.] 105 S. VV. 124; 35 Ky. L. Rep. 1357 ) , 2202. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Sullivan (81 Ky. 624; 50 Am. Rep. 186), 2205, 2211, 2214. Love V. Porter (93 Ala. 384; 9 ,S. E. 585), 131, 135, 247, 1278. Lovejoy v. Commonwealth ( 13 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 976), 518, 802, 1096, 1117. Lovelan v. Briggs (32 Hun [N. Y.] 477, 478), 1958. Loveless v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 44 S. W. 508), 1650, 1653. Loveless v. State (40 Tex. Cr. App. 131; 49 S. W. 98), 866, 908, 1181, 1701. Loveless v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 49 S. W. 601), 1471. Loveless v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 50 ,S. W. 361), 1743. Loveless v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 49 S. W. 601), 869, 909, 911, 958, 1693, 1740, 1764, Loveless v. State (40 Tex. Civ. App. 221; 49 S. W. 892), 80, 958, 1684, 1688. Lovette v. Sage (22 Conn. 577), 2130. Loving V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 100 S. W. 154), 1464, 1472. Lovingston v. Board (99 111. 564), 198, 788. Low V. Austin ( 13 Wall. 29), 316, 1425, 1431. Low V. Hutchison ( 13 X. Z. L. R. o4), 712. Low V. Pilotage Commissioners ( 1 R. M. Charlt. 302 ) , 743. Lowell V. Oliver (8 Allen [Mass.] 247), 791. Lowell V. State (126 Ga. 105; 54 S. E. 916), 1452. Lowery v. Briggs ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 73 S. W. 1062), 903. Lowry v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 36 S. W. 1117; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 481), 232, 233. Lowry v. Grigly (30 Conn. 450), 1019, 1046, 1054. Lowery v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 34 S. W. 956), 1464, 1474. Loza V. State ( 1 Tex. App. 488 ) , 2078. Lucas, Ex parte (2 S..R. 191; 19 W. N. [N. S. W.i 98; over- ruling 18 W. X. [X. S. W.] 287), 682. Lucas V. Johnson ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 64 S. W. 823), 782, 783, 1938. Lucas V. State (92 Ga. 454; 17 S. E. 668), 1124. Lucio V. State (35 Tex. Cr. Rep. 320; 33 S. W. 358), 1638, 1643. Luck V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 97 S. W. 1049), 916, 1470, 1473. Lucker v. Commonwealth ( 4 Bush, 440), 1594. Lucker v. Liske, 111 Mich. 683; 70 X. W. 421), 1867, 1953, 1955, 1982. Ludwick v. Commonwealth ( 6 Harris [Pa.] 172), 64, 65, 2030. Ludwick V. Commonwealth ( 18 Pa. St. 172), 65, 20 L8. Ludwig V. Cory (158 Ind. 582; 64 X. E. 14), 606, 855, 859. Ludwig V. Sager (84 111. 99), 2004, 2005. Ludwig V. State ( 18 Ind. App. 518; 48 X. E. 390), 528, 668, 669, 780. Ludwig V. State (40 Tex. Cr. App. 585; 51 S. W. 390), 1182. Lueken v. People (3 111. App. [3 Bradw.] 375), 1866. Luent, In re (6 Greel. 412), 111, 139, 189. CXCIV TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pag-es.] Luff V. Leaper (36 J. P. 773), 373. Luker v. Dennis ([1877] 7 Cli. D. 227; 47 L. J. Ch. 174; 37 L. T. 827; 26 W. R. 167), 1815. Luminary, The (8 Wheat. [U. ,S.] 407), 1073. Lung V. Michigan ( 135 U. S. 161 ; 10 Sup. Ct. 725; 34 L. Ed. 128), 299. Lunenberger v. State (74 Miss. 379; 21 So. 134), 1698. Lupo V. State (118 Ga. 759; 45 S. E. 602), 1172. Lusher v. Scites ( 4 W. Va. 11), 793. Luther v. State (80 Neb. 432; 114 N. W. 411), 1706. Lutton V. Palmer (69 Mich. 610; 37 N. W. 701), 553, 806, 1445, 1534, 1555, 1556. Lutz V. Crawfordsville ( 109 Ind. 466; 10 N. E. 411), 98, 168, 402, 403, 405, 406, 411, 414, 448, 450, 457, 458. Lydick v. Korner (15 Neb. 500; 20 N. W. 26), 185, 662, 663, 672, 814, Lyle V. State (31 Tex. Cr. Pv©iJ. 103), 2053, 2087, 2090. Lyman, In re ( 163 N. Y. 536 ; 57 N. E. 745; reversing 51 N. Y. App. Div. 52; 64 N. Y. Supp. 756), 729, 818. Lyman, In re (23 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 710; 53 N. Y. Supp. 52), 730, 731. Lyman, In re ( 24 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 552; 53 N. Y. Supp. 577), 584. Lyman, In re (25 Misc. Rep. 638; 56 N. Y. S. 359: Id. 26 Misc. Rep. 300; 56 N. Y. S. 1020), 743, 1293. Lyman, In re (26 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 300; 56 N. Y. Supp. 1020), 736, 741. Lj'man, In re (26 N. Y. Supp. 568; 57 N. Y. Supp. 488), 584. Lyman, in re (27 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 327; 57 N. Y. Supp. 888), 717. Lyman, In re ( 28 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 278; 59 N. Y. Supp. 828), 752. Lyman, In re (28 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 385; 59 N. Y. Supp. 971), 741. Lyman, In re (28 Misc. Rep. 408; 59 N. Y. Supp. 968; 48 N. Y. App. Div. 275; 62 N. Y. Supp. 846), 746, 751, 1310. Lyman, In re (28 N. Y. App. Div. 209; 50 N. Y. Supp. 898), 1342, 1344. Lyman, In re (29 App. Div. 391; 49 N. Y. S. 559; 52 N. Y. S. 1145; 28 Misc. Rep. 385; 59 N. Y. S. 971; 28 Misc. Rep. 278; 59 N. Y. S. 828), 744. Lyman, In re (29 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 524; 61 N. Y. Supp. 946), 721. Lyman, In re ( 32 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 210; 67 N. Y. Supp. 502), 750, 751. Lyman, //( re ( 34 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 296; 69 N. Y. Supp. 781), 729. Lyman, / . re (34 N. Y. App. 390; 54 N. Y. Supp. 294), 580. Lyman v. Gramercy Club (39 N. Y. App. Div. 661; 57 N. Y. Supp. 376), 1344. Lyman, In re (40 N. Y. App. Div. 46), 69. Lyman, In re (44 N. Y. App. Div. 507; 60 N. Y. Supp. 805; af- firming 27 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 327; 55 N. Y. Supp. 888), 744. Lyman, In re (48 N. Y, App. Div. 275; 62 N. Y. Supp. 846), 594. TABLE OF CASES. CXCV [References are to pages.] Lyman, In re (53 X. Y. App. Div. 330; 65 N. Y. Supp. 073), 746. Lymcan, In re (59 X. Y. App. Div. 217; 69 N. Y. Supp. 309; affirming l\2 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 210; 67 I'V. Y. Supp. 48), 621, 697, '39, 745. Lyman, In re ( 62 X. Y. App. Div. 616; 70 X. Y. Supp. 822), 718. Lyman v. Bradsted (26 X. Y. Misc. Pxep. 629; 57 X. Y. Supp. 869), 796. Lyman v. Brucker ( 26 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 594; 56 X. Y. Supp. 767), 755, 768, 775. Lyman v. Cheever (168 X. Y. 43; 60 X. E. 1047; reversing 54 X. Y. App. Div. 618; 66 X. Y. Supp. 1136), 770, 817, 819. Lyman v. City Trust, etc., Co. (166 X. Y."274; 59 X. E. 903; affirming 62 X, Y. Supp. 1141), 766, 770. Lyman v. Erie Co. ( 46 X. Y. App. Div. 387; 01 X. Y. Supp. 884; affirmed 161 X. Y. 641; 57 X. E. 1115), 743. Lyman v. Fidelity, etc., Co. (39 X. Y. App. Div. 459 ; 57 X. Y. Supp. 372), 784. Lyman v. Granmercy Club (28 X. Y. App. Div. 30; 50 X, Y. Supp. 1004), 1742. I Lyman v. Gramercy Club (39 X. Y. App. Div. 459; 57 X. Y. Supp. 376), 775. Lyman v. Kane (57 X. Y. App. Div. 549; 67 X. Y. Supp. 1065), 770. Lyman v. MoGreivey (159 X. Y. 561; 54 X. E. 1093; affirming 25 X. Y. App. Div. 68; 48 X. Y. Supp. 1035), 796. Lyman v. Malcolm Brewing Co. (160 X. Y. 96; 55 X. E. 577; affirming 40 X. Y. App. Div'. 46; 57 X. Y. Supp. 634), 491, 716, 721, 744, 1270. Lyman v. :\lead (56 N. Y. App. Div. 582; 67 N. Y. Supp. 254), 783. Lyman v. :\lurpby ( 33 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 349; 68 X. Y. Supp. 490), 729. Lyman v. O'Reilly ([1898] 2 Irish Rep. 4S), 1346. Lyman v. Oussani ( 33 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 409; 68 X. Y. Supp. 450), 783, 1188. Lyman v. Periniutter (166 X. Y. 410; 00 X. E. 21; affirming 60 X. Y. App. 866), 777. Lyman v. Schenck ([X. Y.] 55 X. Y. Supp. 770), 768, 777, 778. Lyman v. Scliermerhorn (167 X. Y. 113; 00 X. E. 324; aflirm- ing 53 X. Y. App. Div. 32; 65 X. Y. Supp. 538 ) , 775. Lyman v. Siebert (31 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 285; 05 X. Y. Supp. 367), 781. Lymans v. Wedniore ([1894] 1 Q. B. 401; 58 J. P. 197; 63 L. J. il. C. 44; 69 L. T. 801; 42 W. R. 301), 678. Lyman v. Youitg Men's Cosmopoli- tan Club (28 X. Y. App. Div. 127; 50 X. Y. Supp. 979), 718, 1344. Lynch v. Bates (139 Ind. 206; 39 X. E. <)19), 534, 599, 637. Lynch v. Crosby (134 Mass. 313), 1074. Lynch v. O'Donnell (127 Mass. 311), 1281. Lynch v. Xew York, etc., R. Co. (47 Hun, 524), 2177, 2191 2192. Lynch v. PeopU- (10 Mich. 472) 1129. Lynch v. State (147 Ala. 143- 39 So. 912), 694. Lynde v. Lynde ( 64 X. J. Eq. 736, 749; 52 A. 694; 58 L. R. A.' 471), 2095. Lyng V. Michigan (135 U. S. 161; 10 Sup. Ct. 725), 157, 199. CXCVl TABLE OF CASES. fRefeiences are to pages.] Lynn, Ex parte ( 19 Tex. App. 293), 111, 120, 232, 235, 240, 243, 495, 850, 851, 860, 934. Lynn v. Allen (145 Inil. 584; 44 N. E. 640), 571. Lynn v. State ([Tex. Cr. App. J 22 S. W. 878), 1613. Lyon V. Morris (15 Ga. 480), 106. Lyon V. Phillips (106 Pa. 57), 2100. Lyon V. State (42 Tex. Cr. App. 506; 61 S. W. 125), 940. Lyons v. Xew York, etc., R. Co. (39 Hun, 385), 2198, 2199. Lyster v. Lyster (111 Mass. 327), 2154, 2168. Lytle V. May (49 Iowa, 224), 233. Lytle V. State (31 Ohio St. 196), 2067. Mc McAllen v. Rhodes (65 Tex. 348), 925. McAllister, In re' {51 Fed. 282), 1431, 1434. McAllister v. Howell (42 Ind. 15), 1808. McAllister v. State ( [Ala.] 47 So. 161), 111, 190, 192, 284, 1644. McArdle, In re (126 Fetl. 442), 702. McArthur v. State (69 Ga. 444), 247, 291. McAvoy, In re (12 Up. Can. 99), 907. McBee v. McBee (22 Ore. 329; 29 Pac. 887; 29 Am. St. 613), 65, 66, 2155, 2157, 2158, 2159. McCabe, In re (11 Pa. Super. Ct. 560), 696, 697, 705. McCabe v. Commonwealth ([Pa.] 8 Atl. 45), 1584. McCade v. State ( [Neb.] 122 Pac. 893), 1678. McCall V. California (136 U. S. 104; 10 Sup. Ct. 881), 157. McCalman v. State (96 Ala. 98; 11 So. 408), 369. ' MeCam v. Roach (81 111. 213), 1973. McCampbell v. State (116 Tenn. 98; 93 S. W. 100), 1759. McCardle, Ex parte (7 Wall. [U. S.] 514), 106. McCarl v. State (23 Ind. 127), 1499. McCarthy, Ex parte (24 N. S. W. 137), 1360. McCarthy v. McCarthy (117 Mo. App. 115; 93 S. W. 317), 2154, 2159. McCarthy v. Wells (51 Hun, 171; 4 K Y. Supp. 672), 1951. McCarty v. Atlanta (121 Ga. 365; 49 S. E. 287), 1127, 1133. MoCarty v. Commonwealth (14 Ky. L, Rep. 285), 2041, 2055. McCarty v. Gordon ( 16 Kan. 35 ) , 310, 1787, 1788. McCarty v. Justus ([Tex.] 115 .S. W. 278), 891. McCarty v. McCarty (4 Rich. L. [S. C] 594), 2256. McCarty v. State (162 Ind. 218; 70 N. E. 131), 1873. McCarty v. State (4 Tex. App. 461), 2067. McCarty v. Wells (51 Hun, 171; 4 "X. Y. Supp. 672), 1735, 1864, 1869, 1871. McClain, Ex parte (61 Cal. 436), 109, 247. McClain v. Davis (77 Ind. 419), 2116. McClanahan v. Breeding ( [Ind.] 88 X. E. 695), 125, 605, 607, 612. McClanahan v. McClanahan (104 Tenn. 217; 56 S. W. 858), 64. McClandon v. State ([Ark.] 51 S. W. 1062). 2252. McClay v. Worrell (18 Neb. 52; 24 N. W. 429), 1876, 1902. McCkary v. Barcalow ( 6 Ohio C. C. 481), 2109, 2114. MeCleave, Ex parte (35 X. B. 100), 1048. TABLE OF CASES. CXCVll [References are to pages.] McCleave v. Moncton (32 Can. S. C. 106), 1026, 1047. ilcClellan v. State {117 Ala, 140; 23 So. 653), 1181, 1741. McClelland v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (94 Ind. 276), 2180, 2205, 2207. McClendon v. State ( [Ark.] 5 1 S. W. 1062), 2249. McClure v. Braniff (75 Iowa, 38; 39 N. W. 171), 998, 1768. McClure v. Krumbliolz (9 Pa. Dist. R. 544; 31 Pittsb. L. J. [N. S.] 3; 14 York. Leg. Rec. 31), 546, McClure v. Mansell (4 Brewst. 119), 2094, 2108, 2114. McClure v. State (148 Ala. 625; 42 So, 813), 1280, 1470, 1471, 1493, 1609. McClure v. State (43 Ark, 75), 1598. McCoU V. Rally (127 Iowa, 633; 103 N. W. 972), 341, 342, 346, 583. McCollum V. State (119 Ga, 308; 46 S, W. 413), 1763, McComas v, Krug (81 Ind. 327; 42 Am. Rep. 135), 96, 277. McConihe v, McMann (27 Vt. 95), 1798, McConkie v. District Court (117 Iowa, 334; 90 N, W. 716), 944, McConkie v, Remley (119 Iowa, 512; 93 N. W. 505), 714, 722, 738, McConnell, Ex parte ( 23 N, S. W. 9; 6 Sup. Rep. 88), 1269, McConville v. Mayor, etc. (39 X, J. L. 38), 436, McCook V, State (91 Ga. 740; 17 S. E, 1019), 2041, 2047, 2048. McCool V, State (23 Ind, 127), 276, MeCord v. State ( [Okla,] 101 Pac, 280), 298, 325, 327, 1771, McCormack, Ex parte (32 N, W. 272), 1367. " McCormack v. State (133 Ala. 202; 32 So. 268), 1256, 1632. McCormick v. Jester ([Tex.] 115 S. W, 278), 902, 923, 924, 925, McCormick v. Pfeiffer (10 N. W. 31), 634, 626, 627. McCormick v. State ( 66 Neb. 337 ; 92 X, VV. 606), 2068, 2082, MeCowan v, Davidson (43 Ga, 480), 794, McCoy, In re (104 N, Y. App, Div. 215; 93 X. Y. Supp, 401), 587, 690, McCoy V, Clark (104 Iowa, 491; 73 X. VV, 1050), 490, 977, 982. McCoy V, Clark (109 Iowa, 464; 80 X. W. 538), 994, 998, McCoy V, Clark ( [Iowa] 81 N. W, 159), 1237, 1239, 1253. McCoy V. Zane (65 Mo. 1), 256. McCracken v. Markeson ( 76 Wis. 499; 45 X. W. 323), 2191, 2194, 2197. McCracken v. Miller ( 129 Iowa, 623; 106 X, W, 4), 979, 987, 994, 1084. McCracken v. State (71 Md, 150; 17 Atl, 932), 1741. McCrary, In re (31 Pa, Super. Ct. 192), 643. McCraw v. Davis (2 Ired, Eq, [N. C] 618), 2095, 2107, 2108, 2152, McCrea v, Billingslea (89 Md. 767; 43 Atl, 42), 566. McCrea v. Washington ( 10 Ohio Dec. 29; 19 Wkly. L, Bull, 66), 442, McCreary v. Commonwealth ( 8 Ky. L, Rep, [abstract] 437), 884, McCreary v, Rhodes (63 iNIiss. 308)', 561, 564, McCreary v. State (73 Ala. 480), 156, 158, 294, 1517. McCrory, In re (31 Pa. Super. Ct. 192), 664. CXCVIH TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] McCroy v. Commonwealth (8 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 437), 833, 842, 1464, 1682. McCue V. Klein (60 Tex. 168), 1939, 2180. McCuen v. State (19 Ark. 630), 1500, 1504. McCulloch V. State (11 Ind. 424), 106. McCullough, In re (51 Ark. 159; 10 S. W. 259), 6-22, 924. McCuUough's Will (35 Pitts. L. Jr. 169), 2139. McCullough V. Blaekvvell (51 Ark. 159; 10 So. 259), 859, 860. McCullough V. Brown (41 S. C. 220; 19 S. E. 458; 23 L. R. A. 410), 111, 149, 174, 307. McCullough V, Maryland (4 Wheat. 316; 4 L. Ed. 479), 331. McCurdy v. Swift (17 C. R. [Can.] 126), 1855, 1908. MeCusker, In re (47 N. Y, App. Div. Ill; 62 N. Y. Supp. 201), 591, 731. 'McCutcheon v. People (69 111. 601), 1237, 1238, 1353, 1357. McDaniel v. Commonwealth ( 18 B. Mon. 485), 369. McDaniel v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 20 S. W. 1108), 1515. McDaniel v. State (23 S. W. 989), 925. McDaniel v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 65 S. W. 1068), 963, 1186. McDermott v. Board, etc. (5 Abb. Pr. [N. Y.] 434), 404. McDermott v. Commonwealth {[Ky.] 96 .S. W. 474; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 750), 949, 951, 1286. McDiarmid v. McDiarmid (3 Bligh. N. R. 374), 2144, 2146. McDonald, Ex parte (20 N. B. 542), 954. McDonald v. Ca.sey (84 Mich. 505; 47 N. W. 1104), 1252, 1886, 1888, 1962. McDonald v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 75 Wis. 121; 43 N. W. 744), 2175, 2178. McDonald v. Commonwealth ( 173 Mass. 322; 52 N. E. 814), 259. McDonald v. Hughes ([1902] 1 K. B. 94; 66 J. P. 86; 71 L. J. K. B. 43; 50 W. R. 318; 85 L. T. 727; 18 T. L. R. 79; 20 Cox C. C. 131), 900. McDonald v. International, etc., R. Co. (86 Tex. 1; 22 S. W. 939, reversing 20 S. W. 847; 21 S. W. 774), 2182. McDonald v. State (68 Miss. 728; 10 So. 55), 1464, 1468. McDonald v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 49 S. W. 589), 1211. McDonough, In re (49 Fed. 360), 24, 25, 43, 1261. McDonough v. Cavanagh ( 22 W. N. C. [X. S. W.] 151), 1316. McDougal V. Giacomini (13 Xeb. 431; 14 X. W. 450), 69, 1956, 1974, 1975. McDowell V. Preston ( 26 Ga. 528 ) , 2258, 2259. McDuffie V. State (87 Ga. 687; 13 S. E. 596), 1492. McElroy v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 604; 95 S. W. 539), 1202, 1280, 1286. McElwee v. Ferguson (43 Md. 479), 2141. McEntee v. Spiehler (12 Daly, 435), 1846. ]VIcEvoy V. Humphrey (77 HI. 388), 1864, 1993. ' McFee v. Greenfield (62 Ind. 21), 413. McGan v. Pratley (24 Vict. L. R. 840; 5 Austr. L. R. [C. X. 1 80), 369. McGarvey, Iti re (64 How. Pr. 135), 2120. McGarvey v. Puckett (27 Ohio St. 669), 1810. MaGatrick v. Watson (3 Ohio St. 566), 216. TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] cxeix McGee v. Beal (63 Miss. 455), 601. McGee v. McCann (69 Me. 79), 1924, 1926, 1932, 1940. McGee v. State (30 Ohio St. 54), 243. McGee V. Wolfenden ([1907] Vict. L. R. 195), 1131. McGehee v. State (114 Ga. 833; 40 S. E. 1004), 715, 1161. McGill V. License Commissioners (21 Ont. Rep. 665). 453. McGill V. McGill (19 Fla. 341), 67, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2162. McGingan v. Belmount ( 89 Wis. 637; 62 N. W. 421), 797. McGinley, hi re (32 Pa. Super. Ct. 324), 739, 742, 747, 750. McGinley v. U. S. Life Ins. Co. (8 Daly, 390; 7 Ins. L. Jr. 791; affirmed 77 X. Y. 495), 2223, 2243. 3IcGinnis v. Commonwealth (102 Pa. 66), 2040, 2068, 2070. McGinnis v. Medway (170 Mass. 67; 57 N. E. 210), 416, 813. McGlasson v. Johnson (86 Iowa, 477; 53 N. W. 267), 1002. McGlasson v. Scott (112 Iowa, 289; 83 N. W. 974), 1001. McGlinchey v. Barrows (41 Me. 74), 1018, 1047, 1048, 1051. McG^jnegal v. McGonegal (46 Mich. 66; 8 N. W. 724), 2161. McGonnell's Appeal. In re (209 Pa. St. 327; 58 Atl. 615; re- versing 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 642 ) , 230, 233. McGonnell, In re (24 Pa. Super. Ct. 642), 935. McGovern v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 35; 90 S. W. 502), 872, 958, 1284, 1349, 1555, 1692. McGowan v. Brooks (16 So. 436), 2094, 2108. McGrath v. Patton (24 X. Z. 527), 1154. McGraw v. McGraw (171 Mass. 146; 50 N. E. 526), 2153. McGreivey, hi re (161 N. Y. 645; 57 N. E. 1116; 37 N. Y. App. Div. 66; 55 N. Y. Supp. 599), 796. McGrew v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 101 S. W. 1198), 1473, McGrimes v. State (30 Ind. 140), 777. McGrinley, In re (32 Pa. Super. Ct. 324), 736. McGruder v. State (83 Ga. 616; 10 S. E. 281), 289, 930, 1176. McGuinness v. Bligh (11 R. 1. 94), 310, 314, 1779, 1803. ]VIicGuire, Ex parte ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 123 S. VV. 42-5), 228, 231. McGuire v. Callahan (19 Ind. 128), 2116, 2123. McGuire v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 99 S. W. 612; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 720), 952, 955, 1742. McGuire v. Commonwealth (3 Wall. 387; 18 L. Ed. 226), 451, 523, 525. McGuire v. Glass ([Tex.] 15 S. W. 127), 194, 224, 777, 1884. McGuire v. State (37 Miss. 369), 829. McGuire v. State (42 0. St. 530), 158. McGuire v. State ([Tex. App.] 15 S. W. 917), 1236, 1241, 1627. MoGunn v. Ilanliu (29 Mich. 476), 1785. McGurk V. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (56 Conn. 52S), 2240, 2241. McHam v. Love (39 Tex. Civ. App. 512; 87 S. W. 875), 888, 915. McHenry v. Chippewa (65 Mich. 9; 31 N. W. 602), 764. McHugh V. Pollaixi (28 Vict. L. R. 581; 24 Austr. L. T. 149; 9 Au&tr. L. R. 50), 1323. ec TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] McHugh V. Schlosser (159 Pa. 480; 28 Atl. 291; 23 L. R. A. 574), 2179, 2189. Mcllveney v. Whittingham (25 X. Z. 29), 1285, 1287. llclnaney v. Hildi-eth ([1897] 1 Q. B. 600; 61 J. P. 325; 66 L. J. Q. B. 376; 76 L. T. 463; 13 T. L. R. 284), 380. Mclnerey v. Denver (17 'Col. 302; 29 Pac. 516), 727. Mclnifee v. Wheelock ( 1 Gray [Mass.] 603), 1067. Mclntire v. MeConn (28 Iowa, 480), 2130, 2138. 2140, 2141. Mcintosh V. Pueblo ( 9 Colo. App. 460; 48 Pac. 969), 1741. Mcintosh V. State (140 Ala. 137; 37 So. 223), 1105, 1611. Mclntyre v. Asheville ( 146 N. C. 475; 59 S. E. 1007), 717. Mclntyre v. Parks (3 Met. 207), 1794, 1795. Mclntyre v. People (38 111. 514). 2041, 2048, 2060, 2069, 2072. McKay v. McKay (18 B. Mon. 8), 2154, 2155, "^2160. McKee v. Ingalls (5 111. 30), 2040. McKeen, Ex parte (32 N. B. 84), 1359. McKeever v. Beacom (101 Iowa, 173; 70 X. W. 112), 1811. McKeever v. Commonwealth (98 Va. 862; 36 S. E. 995; 2 Va. Sup. Ct. 473), 1624. McKenna v. Harding (69 J. P. 354), 13.55. McKenzie v. Day (62 L. J. M. C. 49 [1893]; 1 Q. B. 289; 5 R. 161; 68 L. T. 345; 41 W. R. 384; 17 Cox C. C. 604; 57 J. P. 216), 1114. McKenzie v. Hogg (13 X. Z. L. R. 158), 644. IVIcKeown v. Lambe (20 Rev. Leg. 232), 1509. McKibbins, In re (11 Pa. Super. Ct. 421), 696, 705, 706. 3IcKillop V. Duluth St. R. Co. (53 Minn. 532; 55 N. W. 739), 1736. McKinley v. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 222; 82 S. VV. 1042), 1689. McKinley v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 182; 106 S. W. 342), 1597, 1606. McKinnell v. Robinson (3 Mees. & W. 434, 441), 1796. McKinney v. Xashville (96 Tenn. 79; 33 S. W. 724), 454, 1124, 1127, 1728. McKinney v. Town of Salem (77 Ind. 213), 91, 95, 129, 144, 182, 183, 448, 488, 489, 490, 491. McKinney v. State (3 Wyo. 719; 30 Pac. 293; 16 L. R. A. 710), 219. McKrell v. Brentford, J. J. ([1900] 2 Q. B. 387; 64 J. P. 663; 69 L. J. Q. B. 74«; 48 VV. R. 648; 83 L. T. 31; 16 T. L. R. 439), 681. McLain v. State (43 Tex. Civ. App. 213; 64 S. W. 865), 111, 249, 845, 1379. McLanahan v. Syracuse (18 Hun, 259), 798. McLane v. Granger (74 Iowa, 152; 37 X. W. 123). 25i». McLane v. Leiclit (69 Iowa, 401; 29 X. W. 327), 110, 125, 256. McLaughlin, In re 24 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 92), 718, 723. McLaughlin's Will (2 Redf. Sur. 504), 2135, 2136. McLaughlin v. Hinds (151 111. 403; 38 X. E. 136; affirming 47 HI. App. 598), 2253, 2255. McLaughlin v. McCloy (26 Ir. L. T. 131), 690, 1275. McLaughlin v. South Bend ( 126 Ind. 471; 26 X. E. 185), 157. McLaughlin v. State (45 Ind. 338), 256, 1441, 1443, 1502, 1508. TABLE OF CASES. CCl [References are to pages.] McLaughlin v. Stevens (2 Crancli, [U. S. C. C] 148), 271. McLaughlin v. Wisler (28 Ind. App. 61; (31 N. E. 73), 003, tJl2. McLaury v. VVatelsky (39 Tex. 'Civ. App. 3'J4; 87 S. W. 1045), 158, 281, 287, 7G1. McLean, In re (25 Upp. Can. 619), 894, 914. McLean v. State (43 Tex. Cr. App. 213; 64 S. W. 865), 839. McLees v. Niles (93 111. App. 442), 1843, 1977. McLellan v. Janesville (99 Wis. 544; 75 N. W. 308), 659. McLemore v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 110 S. W. 900), 163G. McLenon v. Ricliardson ( 15 Gray, 74), 2035. McLeod V. Scott (21 Or. 94; 26 Pac. 1061), 627, 783, 813. McLeod V. State (31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 331; 20 S. VV. 749), 20.58, 2090. McLeod V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 44 S. W. 1090), 1181. McLeod V. State (33 Tex. Civ. App. 170; 76 S. W. 216), 720. McMahon v. Dumas (96 Mich 467; 56 N. W. 13), 1975, 1999, 2001. McMahon v. Sankey ( 133 111. 630; 24 N. E. 1027), 1859, 1983. McManigal v. Seaton (23 Neb. 549; 37 N. W. 271), 1957, 1958. McMillan v. State (18 Tex. App. 375), 1463, 1471, 1489. McMonagle, In re (41 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 407; 84 N. Y. Supp. 1068), 545, 582, 730. McMonigal v. State ([Tex. Civ. App.] 45 S. W. 1038), 773, 775. McManus, Ex parte (32 N. B. 481), 1717. McManus v. State (65 Kan. 720; 70 Pac. 700), 25'5, 256, 257, 1076. McMaster v. Dyer (29 S. E. 1016; 44 W- Va. 644), 1900, 1901. McMillan v. State (18 Tex. App. 375), 1559. McMintay v. State (38 Tex. Cr. Rep. 521; 43 S. W. 1010), 69. McMullen v. Berean (29 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 443; 60 N. Y. Supp. 578), 866. McMullen v. Charleston (1 Bay [S. C] 46), 442. McNally, Ex parte (73 Cal. 632; 15 Pac. 368), 171, 187. McNary v. Blackburn (180 Mass. 473; 61 N. E. 885), 1867, 1868, 1900, 2006. McNaught, Ex parte (1 Okla. Cr. 260; 100 Pac. 271), 121. McXaughton v. Argyle (5 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 547; 26 K Y. Supp. 229), 634. McXeal v. Ryan (56 N. J. L. 443; 28 Atl. 552), 573, 616, 617, 624. McXeely v. Morgantown (125 N. C. 375; 34 S. E. 510), 907. McNeely v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 286; 92 S. W. 419), 1201, 1696. McNeely v. Welz (166 N. Y. 124; 59 N. E. 697; affirming 20 N. Y. App. Div. 566; 47 N. Y. Supp. 310), 703. McNeely v. Welz (20 N. Y. App. Div. 566; 47 N. Y. Supp. 310), 1170, 1776. McNeill V. Collinson (130 Mass. 167), 1224, 1901. McNeill V. State (92 Tenn. 720; 23 S. W. 52), 454. McNelton v. Herb. ( [Mich.] 123 N. W. 17), 1954. McNulty, Ex parte (73 €al. 632; 15 Pac. 368), 445. ceil TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] McNulty V. Toopf ([Ky.] 75 S. W. 258; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 430), 168, 460, 461, 409, 983. McOmber, In re (3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 431), 700. McPhee v. Sully {163 Mass. 216; 39 N. E. 1007), 2198, 2201. ilcPherson's Appeal (9 Cent. Rep. [Pa.] 408), 2138. ]McPherson v. Simmons (63 Ark. 593; 40 S. W. 78), 767, 768, 769. ilcPherson v. State (90 X. E. 610), 290, 291. McPike V. Penu (51 Mo. 63), 885, 886. McPherson v. State (90 X. E. 610), 291. MoPike V. Penn (51 Mo. 63), 886. McQuade v. Collins ( [Iowa] 61 X. W. 213), 985, 991. McQaude v. Hatch {Go Vt. 482; 27 A. 136), 1950. McQuery v. State (40 Tex. Cr. App. 571; 51 S. W. 247), 845, 1458. MacRae, In re (75 Xeb. 757; 106 X. W. 1020), 534, 624, 1228. McReynoIds v. State (26 Tex. App. 372; 9 S. W. 617), 1113. McRoberts v. State (45 Tex. Cr. App. 288; 92 S. W. 804), 58, 87, 1185, 1700, 1704. McRobie v. Bowden (24 X. Z. 10), 2030. McSorley, In re (15 R. I. 608; 10 Atl. 659), 253, 270, 1010, 1075, 1748. McSorley v. McSorley (2 Bradf. Sur. 188), 2136,"^ 2138, 2142. McSparran v. Xeely (91 Pa. St. 17), 2112. McTigue V. Commonwealth (99 Ky. 66; 35 X. W. 121), 1739. McVeigh V. Eccles (18 X. Z. 44), 1251. McVey v. Grand Lodge (53 X. J. L. 17; 20 Atl. 873), 2220, 2229. McVey v. Manatt (80 Iowa, 132; 45 X. W, 548), 1920, 1924, 1930, 1959, 2012, 2013. McVey v. William (91 111. App. 144), 1896. McVicker, In re (21 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 383; 45 N. Y. Supp. 1008), 580. McVickar v. Me Vicar (46 X. J. Eq. 490); 19 Atl. 249; 19 Am. St. Rep. 422), 2165, 2167, 2168. McWhorter v. Blumenthal ( 136 Ala. 568; 33 So. 552), 1806. McWilliams, Ex parte (1 Leg. Xews [Can.] 66), 1300. McWilliams v. Dawson (56 J. P. 182), 378. McWilliams v. Phillips (51 Miss. 196), 688, 799. McWilliams v. State ([Ga.] 34 S. E. 1016), 1720. M M. Schendler Bottling Co. v. Welch (42 Fed. 561), 154, 307, 313. Macconneliey v. State ( 5 Ohio St. 77), 2051. Maccrobie v. Accident Ins. Co. ( 13 Sc. L. Rep. 391), 2238, 2239. Mace, In re (42 Up. Can. p. 76), 870, 883, 889. Mace V. Smith (164 Ind. 152; 72 X. E. 1135), 562. Mace V. Reed ( 89 Wis. 440 ; 62 X. W. 186), 2258. Macey v. McKenzie (88 L. T. 631; 67 J. P. 251; 20 Cox C. C. 449), 1244. Machine Co. v. Gage (100 U. S. 679), 156. Mack V. Handy (39 La. Ann. 491), 65, 67, 2155, 2158, 2160, 2166. Mack V. Harding (39 La. Ann. 491; 2 So. 181), 65. Mack V. Lee (13 R. I. 293), 1787. TABLE OF CASES. CClll [References are to pages.] Mack V. State (116 Ga. 540; 42 S. E. 776), 1172. Mackall v. District of Columbia (16 App. D. C. 301), 965, 971. Macken v. State (62 Md. 224), 917. Mackenzie v. Day ([1893] 1 Q. B. at p. 291), 76. Mackenzie v. Spear ([1905] 2 K. B. p. 220; 69 J. P. p. 270), 1141. Mackenzie v. Whittingham (23 N. Z. 857; 24 N. Z. 620), 1285, 1287. Mackey v. Siddell (23 N. Z. L. R. 391), 1116. Mackie v. Erliardt (59 Fed. 771), 18. Mackinnell v. Robinson (3 M. & W. 434), 375. Mackinson v. Hannay ([1906] Vict. L. R. 604), 1130. Macleod v. Gerger (53 Iowa, 615; 6 N. W. 21), 1946. Madden v. State (1 Kan. 340), 35. Maddox v. State (118 Ga. 32; 44 S. E. 806), 1491, 1495, 1497. Maddox v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 55 S. W. 832), 1697. Maddox v. State (42 Tex. Cr. App. 509; 60 S. W. 960), 1472. Madison v. Commonwealth (17 S. W. 164; 13 Ky. L. Rep. 313), 2060, 2072. Madison, etc.. Church v. Baptist Church (46 N. Y. 131), 1162. Madison Co. v. Powell (75 Miss. 762; 23 So. 425), 875. Magahay v. Magahay (35 Mich. 210), 65, 2153, 2155, 2156. Magee v. McCan (69 Me. 79), 1838. ilagee v. State (50 Tex. Cr. App. 444; 98 S. W. 245), 1692, 1729. Magill V. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 357; 103 S. W. 397), 874, 890, 1690, 1710. Maguire, In- re (57 Cal. 604; 40 Am. Rep. 125), 218. Maguire v. Middlesex R. Co. (115 Mass. 239), 2177, 2202. Maguire v. Sheehan (117 Fed. 819; 59 L. R. A. 496), 2172, 2189. Maguire v. State (47 Md. 485), 262, 1572, 1647. Maguire v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 86 S. W. 329), 1708. Mahan v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 56 S. W. 529; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1807), 554, 852, 1470. Mahon v. Gaskell (42 J. P. 583), 1277. Mahone v. Mahone (19 Cal. 626; 81 Am. Dec. 91), 66, 67. Mahoney v. LePage (21 Austr. L. T. 200; 6 Austr. L. R. 23), 1352, 1359. Mahood v. Tealza (26 La. Ann. 108), 1801. Maier v. Mass. Ben. Ass'n ( 107 Mich. 687; 65 N. W. 552), 2243, 2245. Maier v. State (21 Tex. Civ. App. 296; 21 S. W. 974), 43, 780, 781. Main v. McCarty (15 111. 442), 2035. Mair v. Railway Passenger's Ass'n Co. (37 L. T. 356), 2238, 2239. Maize v. State (4 Ind. 342), 229, 231, 240. Makepeace v. Bronnenberg ( 146 Ind. 243; 45 N. E. 336), 2019, 2020. Malaghan, In re (184 N. Y. 253; 77 N. E. 12; affirming 108 N. Y. App. Div. 355; 95 N. Y. Supp. 1142), 582. Malken v. Chicago (217 111. 471; 75 N. E. 548; affirming 110 111. App. 542), 69, 560, 691, 714, 720, 1119. Mallet V. Stevenson (26 Conn. 428), 11, 1036, 1043. CCIV TABLE OP CASES. [Fteferences are to pages.] Mallon V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 98 S. W. 315; 30 Ky. L. Eep. 328), 1135. Malmo V. Fairfield Co. (72 Conn. 1; 43 Atl. 485), 652, 604. Malmo, Appeal of (73 Conn. 232; 47 Atl. 163), 665. jVIalone, In re (41 Up. Can. 159, 253), 889, 894, 907. Malone v. Malone (19 Cal. 627), 81 Am. Dec. 91), 2154, 2156. Malone v. State (49 Ga. 210), 2067. Malone v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 107 S. W. 927), 1029. Malone v. State ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 51 S. W. 381), 8, 958, 963, 964, 1611. Maloney v. Clifford ( 6 W. N. [N. S. W.] 124), 375. Maloney v. Dailey (67 111. App. 427), 1889, 1896, 1972, 1981, 1982. Maloney v. Traverse (87 Iowa, 306; 54 N. W. 155), 985. Malt Extract Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (73 Iowa, 98; 34 N. W. 761), 1788. Manasses Club v. Mobile (121 Ala. 501; 25 So. 628), 1338. Manchester Brewery Co. v. Coombs ([1901] 2 Ch. 608; 70 L. J. Ch. 814; 82 L. T. 347; 10 T. L. E. 299), 1816. IManchester, etc., Ins. Co. v. Feibel- man (118 Ala. 308; 23 So. 759). 1778. Mandeville v. Bard (111 La. 806; 35 So. 915), 593. Mandeville v. Baudot (40 La. Ann. 236; 21 So. 258), 5. 549. Manfian v. Auger (31 Can. S. C. 186), 1792. IMangcr v. Bhillips (139 Mich. 61; 102 N. W. 292: 11 Det. Leg. N. 748), 1981. Manheim v. State (66 Ind. 65), 358. Manis v. State (3 Heisk. 315), 1279. Mankato v. Arnold (36 Minn. 62; 30 N. W. 305), 1478. Manker v. Atlanta (78 Ga. 668; 2 S. E. 559), 1083. Mankins v. Leightner ( 18 111. 282), 2099. Manley's Estate, In re ( 12 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 472; 34 N. Y. Supp. 258), 64. Manly v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (74 N. C. 655), 2180. Manning v. Canon City ( [Colo.] 101 Pac. 978), 1338. Manning v. State (36 Tex. 670), 1158. Manor v. State ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 34 S. W. 769), 980. Mansfield v. State (17 Tex. App. 468), 1111, 1505, 1507. Mansfield v. Stonehan ( 15 Gray, 149), 477. JMansfield v. Watson (2 Clarke [la.] Ill), 2094, 2123. Manson v. London, etc., Ry. Co. (L. R. 6 Eq. 101), 691. Manvelle v. State (58 Ind. 63), 1497. Manzer v. Phillips ( 139 Mich. 61 ; 102 N. W. 292; 11 Det. Leg. N. 748), 1973. Mapes V. People (69 111. 523), 1253, 1461, 1564, 1633, 2031. Mapes V. State (69 111. 523), 1632. Maples V. State ( 130 Ala. 121 ; 30 So. 428), 1379. Marbury v. Madison ( 1 Cranch [U. S.] 137), 1014. March v. Commonwealth ( 12 B. Mon. [Ky.] 25), 271. Marcotte v. Lambe (4 Quebec S. C. 2), 798. Marcus v. State (89 Ala. 23; 8 So. 155), 1198. Mardorf v. Hemp ( [Pa.] 6 Atl. 754), 224, 1840. Marenthal v. Shafer (6 L)wa, 223), 1777. Margate Pier Co. v. Hannam (S B. & Aid. 266, 270), 1421. TABLE OF CASES. cev [References are to pages.] jMargoley v. Commonwealth (3 Met. [Ky.] 405), 779. Marianner v. Vincent (68 Ark. 244; 58 S. W. 25), 1738. Marietta v. Alexander ( [Ga.] 12 S. E, 681), 1478. Marion v. Chandler (6 Ala. 895), 436, 444, 447. Marion v. State (20 Neb. 233; 29 N. W. 918), 226. Markel v. State (3 Ind. 535), 1443. Market v. Hoffner (5 Ohio Dec. 335), 1938. Markison v. State ([Okla.] 101 Pac. 353), 83, 1698. Markle v. Akron (14 Ohio, 586), 475. Markle v. State (37 Ala. 169), 967. Markle v. Akron (14 Ohio, 586), 41, 85, 110, 962, 1171. Markle v. Newton (64 Ohio St. 493; 60 N. E. 619), 794. Marks, Ex parte (64 Cal. 29; 28 P. 109; 49 Am. Rep. 684), 2261. Marks v. State ([Ala.] 48 So. 864), 23, 24, 25, 60, 85. Marks v. Trustees, etc. (37 Ind. 163), 248. Markvis v. Thompson ( [Tex. Civ. App.] Ill S. W. 1074), 357, 1242, 1904, 1942. Marmer v. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 424; 84 S. W. 830), 1218, 12:9. Marmont v. State (48 Ind. 21), 1306, 1337, 1340. Marnaugh v. Orlando (41 Fla. 433; 27 So. 34), 432. Marous v. Marous (8G 111. App. 597), 2158. Marquardt v. State (52 Ark. 209; 12 S. W. 562), 1566. Marquett Co. v. Ishpeming (49 Mich. 244; 13 N. W. 609), 807, 809. Marquett, etc., R. Co. v. Hanford (39 Mich. 537), 2185. Marre v. State (36 Ark. 222), 1623. Marsden v. Harlocker (48 Ore. 90; 85 Pac. 328), 867, 869. Marsden v. State (54 Tex. Cr. App. 70; 111 S. W. 945), 1171. Marsh v. Clark Co. (27 Wkly. L. Bull. 56), 2256. Marsh v. Marsh (28 L. J. Mat. [N. S.] 13; 1 Swab. & T. 312; 5 Jur. [N. S.] 46), 2165, 2167. Marshall's Case ( 1 Lewin C. C. 76), 2049. Marshall, Ex parte (64 Ala. 260), 198, 790. Marshall, Ex parte (71 J. P. 501), 376. Marshall & Salt's Contract, Jn re ([1900] 2 Ch. 202; 69 L. J, Ch. 542; 48 W. R. 508; 83 L. T. 147), 1833. Marshall v. Central Ontario Ry. Co. (28 Ont. Rep. 241), 363. Marshall v. Donavan ( 10 Bush [Ky.] 681), 280. Marshall v. Fox (L. R. 6; Q. B. 370; 24 L, T. 751; 40 L. J. T. C. 142; 19 W. R. 1108; 35 J. P. 631), 369, 726. Marshall v. Creen (26 N. Y. 161), 309. Marshall v. Marksville (116 La. 746; 41 So. 57), 416. Marshall v. Riley (38 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 770; 78 N. Y. Supp. 827), 1735. Marshall v. Snediker (25 Tex. 460; 78 Am. Dec. 534), 814, 815. Marshall v. State (49 Ala. 21), 1240 1241, 1374, 1460. Marshall v. State (59 Ga. 1.54), 2041, 2068, 2071. Marshall Co. v. Knoll ([Iowa] 69 N. W. 1146), 767, 802. Marston v. Commonwealth ( 18 B. Mon. 485), 369. CCVl TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages.] Martel v. East St. Louis (94 111. 67), 185, 815. Martens v. People (186 111. 314; 37 N. E. 871; afnrming 85 111. App. 66), 415, 416, 424, 576. Martin v. Blattner (68 Iowa, 286; 25 N. W. 131), 110, 259. Martin v. Dix (52 Miss. 53), 394. Martin v. Harsh (231 111. 384; 83 N. E. 164; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1000), 2095. Martin v. People (76 111. 499), 1764. Martin v. Pycroft (2 De G. M. & G. 785; 22 L. J. Ch. [N. S.] 94; 16 Jur. 1125), 2094, 2099, 2122. Martin v. Rooks Co. (32 Kan. 146; 4 Pac. 158), 663. Martin v. State (59 Ala. 34), 1162, 1333, 1338. Martin v. State (23 Neb. 371; 36 N. W. 554), 182, 183, 185, 471, 490, 714, 740, 744. Martin v. State (30 Neb. 507; 46 N. W. 621), 1361, 1502, 1508. Martin v. State ([Tenn.] 79 S. W. 131), 1127. Martin v. State (31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 27; 19 S. W. 434), 1508, 1509. Martin v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 61 S. VV. 486), 1692, 1729. Martin v. State ([Tex.] 122 S. W. 24), 1602. Martinsville v. Frieze (33 Ind. 507), 396, 404, 413. Martz, In re ( 12 Pa. Sujjer. Ct, 521), 593. Marxhouser v. Commonwealth (29 Gratt. 853), 202, 204. Mascowitz v. State (49 Ark. 170; 4 S. W. 656), 1232. Maskew v. Highlands ([Colo.] 47 Pac. 846), 407. Mason, Ex parte (102 Cal. 171; 36 Pac. 401), 550. Mason v. Atlanta (77 Ga. 662), 942. Mason v. Gray (73 Mass. [7 Gray] 354), 1011. Mason v. Lancaster (4 Bush, 406), 139. Mason v. Lathrop (7 Gray, 354), 254, 385, 1059, 1061, 1073, 1077, 1079, 1165, 1166, 2035. Mason v. Mason (1 Edw. 278), 2164, 2165, 2167. Mason v. Mason (131 Pa. 161; 18 Atl. 1021), 2153, 2167. Mason v. Rollins (2 Diss. 99; Fed. Cas. No. 9252), 206. Masson v. Severance (2 N. H. 501), 69. Mason v. Shay (5 Ohio Dec. 194), 1848. Mason v. Shawneetown (77 111. 533), 469. Mason v. State (1 Ga. App. 534; 58 S. E. 139), 408, 964, 970. Mason v. State (170 Ind. 195; 83 N. E. 613), 343. Mason v. State ([Okla.] 103 Pac. 369), 826. Mason v. State ([Tex.] 119 S. W. 852), 7. Mason v. Trustees (4 Bush [Ky.] 406), 167, 397, 402, 449. Massey, Ex parte (49 Tex. Cr. App. 60; 92 S. W. 1083), 132, 249, 278, 335, 953, 1280. Massey v. Dunlap (146 Ind. 350; 44 N. E. 145; 46 N. E. 585), 602, 604, 611, 614. Massey v. State (74 Ind. 368), 1162, 1224. Massie v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 548; 107 S. W. 846), 1466, 1472. Matey, In re (9 Kulp. 215), 717. Matthew, In re (213 Pa. 269; 63 Atl. 837; reversing 28 Super. Ct. 384), 565. Mathews v. Baxter (L. R. 8 Exch. 132), 2116, 2117, 2118. Mathews v. Freker (68 Ark. 190; 57 S. W. 262), 1162. TABLE OF CASES. CCVll [References are to pages.! Mathews v. People (159 111. 39!); 42 N. E. 864; reversing 53 111. App. 305), 761. Mathias v. Dulpin Co. ( 122 N. C. 416; 30 S. E. 23), 635. Mathieu v. Wentworth ([1895] 4 Quebec Q. B. 343), 1681. Mature v. Devendorf (130 Iowa, 107; 106 N. W. 366), 2006. Matkins v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 58 S. W. 108), 968, 1473, 1474, 1603, 1687, 1699. Matkins v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 62 S. W. 911), 963, 968, 973, IGU, 1681, 1690. Mattair v. Card (18 Fla. 761), 2131. Matter v. Card (18 Fla. 761), 2123. Mattewan Co. v. Bentley (13 Barb. 641), 2127. Matthew, In re (213 Pa. 269; C2 Atl. 837), 759. Maupin v. Commonwealth ( 1 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 281), 836. Mausley, In re (136 Iowa, 66; 113 N. W. 548), 533. Maw V. Hindmansh ([1873] 28 L. T. 644), 1819. Maw V. King Tp. (8 Ont. 248), 2186, 2197. Maxton Co. v. Robeson (107 N. C. 335; 12 S. E. 92), 635, 636, 648. Maxwell v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (85 Mo. 95), 2198, 2199. Maxwell v. Jonesboro (11 Heisk. 257), 454, 509. Maxwell v. Pittinger (3 N. J. Eq. 156), 2100, 2102, 2103, 2122, 2129. Maxwell v. State (27 Ala. 660), 1192, 1248. Maxwell v. State ([Ala.] 25 So. 235), 1163. Maxwell v. State (140 Ala. 131; 37 So. 266), 1168, 1216, 1379. May V. New Orleans (178 U. S. 496; 44 L. Ed. 1165; 20 Sup. Ct. 976; affirming 51 La. Ann. 1064; 25 So. 959), 309, 1433, 1434. May V. People (8 Colo. 210; 6 Pac. 816), 2246. Mayer, Ex parte (39 Tex. Cr. App. 36; 44 S. W. 831), 870. Mayer v. Smith (121 111. 442; 13 X. E. 216), 1912. Mayer v. State (50 Ind. 18), 1560. Mayer v. State (83 Wis. 339; 53 N. VV. 444), 1373. Mayes, Ex parte (39 Tex. Cr. R. 36; 44 S. W. 831), 925. Mayhew v. Eugene ( [Ore.] 104 Pac. 727), 441, 936, 1696, 1723. Maynard v. Eaton (108 Mich. " 201; 65 N. W. 760), 1095. Mayne v. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 93; 86 S. W, 329), 1697, 1698, 1702. Mayor v. Allaire (14 Ala. 400), 215, 271. Mayor of Anniston, Ex parte (90 Ala. 516; 7 So. 779), 447. Mayor, etc., v. Beasley ( 1 Humph. [Tenn.] 232), 408, 428, 443, 444, 461. Mayor v. Dickerson (45 N. J. L. 38), 783, 1188. Mayor v. Dry Dock, etc., E. B. & B. R. Co. ([N. Y. App.] 28 Am. St. Rep. 614 [s. c. 30 N. E. 563]), 461. Mayor, etc., v. Guillo (3 Ala. 137), 469. Mayor v. Mason (4 E. D. Smith, 142), 504. Mayor v. Rodecke (49 Md. 217), ' 454. Mayor v. Rouse (8 Ala. 515), 215, 271. Mayor v. Shattuck (19 Colo. 104), ' 397, 424. CCVIU TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Mays V. Cincinnati ( 1 Ohio St. 268), 420, 811. Mays V. Commonwealth (3 Ky. L. Kep. [abstract] 327), 554. Mays V. Commonwealth (3 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 250), 836. Mayson v. ^-itlanta (77 Ga. 662), 439, 454, 566, 612, 1641, 1638. Meacham v. N. Y. St. Mut. Ben. Ass'n (120 N. Y. 237; 24 N. E. 283), 2223, 2229, 2243. Mead, Appeal of (161 Pa. 375; 29 Atl. 21; 34 W. N. C. 373), 628, 629, 632. Mead v. Stratton (87 N. Y. 493; 41 Am. Rep. 386), 295, 1843, 1864, 1869, 1897, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1929, 1930, 1949. Meador v. Adams (33 Tex. Civ, App. 167; 76 S. W. 238), 759. Meadows v. State (127 Ga. 283; 56 S. E. 404), 1186, 1198. Meanx v. Whitehall (8 Brad. 173), 1751. Meason, Ex parte (5 Binn. 67), 75. Meathe v. Meathe (83 Mich. 150; 47 N. W. 109), 66, 68, 2158, 2159. Medford v. State (45 Tex. Cr. App. 180; 74 S. W. 768), 938. Meehan v. Board (73 N. J. L. 382; 64 Atl. 689), 103, 110, 148, 192, 214, 295, 490. Meenan, In re (11 Pa. Super. Ct. 575), 664, 718, 739, 747, 1192. Megown v. Commonwealth (2 Met. [Ky.] 3), 215, 216, 1506, 1567, 1633, 1651. Mehan v. State (7 Wis. 670), 1645. Meidel v. Anthis (71 111. 241), 296, 1843, 1859, 1982, 1987. Meier v. State (57 Ind. 386), 1520, 1522. Meier v. State (2 Tex. Civ. App. 296; 21 S. W. 974), 83. Meinoz v. Brassel ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 108 S. W. 417), 762, 767. Meitzler's Application (2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 37), 598, 599. Melchoir v. McCarty (31 Wis. 252), 1780. Melton V. Moultrie (114 Ga. 462; 40 S. E. 302), 750, 752. Memphis v. Memphis Water Co. (8 Baxt. 590), 461. Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Womack (84 Ala. 149; 4 So. 618), 2175, 2182. Menach v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] (97 S. W. 503), 2056. Menken v. Atlanta (78 Ga. 668), 119, 125, 232, 243, 454, 492, 495, 715, 931, 943, 1087, 1372, 1377. Menkins v. Lightner (18 111. 282), 05, 2093, 2105, 2127. Mensinger v. Steiner-Medinger ([Neb.] 94 N. W. 633), 1162. Menzies, Ex parte (24 N. S. W. 179), 1129. Merced Co. v. Fleming (111 Cal. 40; 43 Pac. 392), 795. Merced Co. v. Helm (102 Cal. 159; 36 Pac. 399), 426, 793. Mercer, Ex parte (25 N. B. 517), 1683. Mercer v. State (17 Ga. 146), 2041, 2046, 2053. Mercier v. Brillan (5 L. C. J. 337), 1781. Meredith, In re (2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 82), 563, 637, 639. Meredith v. Commonwealth (116 Ky. 524; 76 S. W. 8; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 455), 660. Meriden v. Silverstein ( 30 La. Ann. 912), 216. Merkison v. State ( [Okla.] 101 Pac. 353), 38. Merkle v. State (37 Ala. 139), 80, 87, 962, 1713. Mernaugh v. Orlando (41 Fla. 433; 27 So. 34), 934. Mernaugh v. State (41 Fla. 433; 27 So. 34), 413. TABLE OF CASES. CCIX [References are to pages.] Meroney v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 337; 92 S. W. 844), 800, 1161. Merow, In re (112 N. Y. App. 562; 99 N. Y. State, 9), 887, 899. Merrifield v. Swift (103 Iowa, 167; 72 N. W. 444), 978, 981. Merrill v. Commonwealth (6 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 663), 1463. [Merrill v. Pepperdine (9 Ind. App. 416; 36 N. E. 921), 2187, 2191. Merrill v. Savage ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 109 S. W. 408), 021. Merriman, Appeal of ( 108 Mich. 454; 66 N. W. 372), 2253. Merrimane v. Miller ([Mich.] 118 N. W. 11), 1862, 1912, 1915, 1922, 1924, 1973. Merritt v. Commonwealth ( 122 Ky. 669; 92 S. W. 611; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 184), 949, 950. Merritt v. Sherburne ( 1 N. H. 199), 1014. Merriweather v. State (53 Tex. Cr- App. 410; 108 S. W. 661), 1605. Mertz, In re (12 Super. Ct. Rep. 521), 639. Meservey v. Gray (55 Me. 540), 122, 1800. Meshmeier v. State (11 Ind. 482), 229. Mesken v. Highlands (9 Colo. App. 255; 47 Pac. 846), 467. Messenger v. Parker (6 R. & G. 237; 6 C. L. T. 444), 1159. Messer v. Cross (26 Tex. Civ. App. 34; 63 S. W. 169), 923. Metcalfe, In re (17 Ont. 357), 921, 1321. Metcalf V. Hart (3 Wyo. 513; 27 Pac. 900; 31 Am. St. 122), 479. Metcalf V. State (76 Ga. 308), 573, 576. Mette V. McGuckin (18 Xeb. 323; 25 N. W. 338), 151, 148, 311. Metropolitan Board v. Barrie (34 N. Y. 657), 91, 95, 98, 101, 110, 120, 124, 129, 138, 168, 179, 182, 183, 184, 185, 488, 489, 490, 496. Metropolitan Police Commission- ers V. Roberts (73 L. J. K. B. 231 [1904]; 1 K. B. 369; 52 W. R. 560; 68 J. P. 39; 20 T. L. R. 105), 1131. Metzger v. People (14 111. 101), 1509. Metzler v. State (18 Ind. 35), 1353. Meyer v. Baker (120 111. 567; 12 N. E. 79), 136, 138, 248, 592. Meyer v. Bohlfing (44 Ind. 238), 1989. Meyer v. Bridgeton (37 N. J. L. 160), 413, 473, 1477. Meyer v. Clark (9 Jones & S. 107), 2033. Meyer v. Decatur ( 125 111. App. 556 [1908]), 559, 628, 634, 635, 172, 652. Meyer v. Hobson (116 Iowa, 349; 90 N. W. 85), 943. Meyer v. King (72 Miss. 1; 16 So. 245; 35 L. R. A. 474), 2175, 2189, 2196, Meyer v. Pacific R. Co. (40 Mo. 151), 2177, 2202, 2203, 2295. Meyer v. State (50 Ind. 8), 1623. Meyer v. State (41 N. J. L. 6; 42 N. J. L. 145), 1103, 1110, 1106. Meyer v. State ([Tex. Civ. App.] (105 S. VV. 48), 1029, 1035. Meyer v. Village of Tentopolis " (121 111. 552; 23 N. E. 651), 109. Meyer, Josen & Co. v. City of Mo- bile (147 Fed. 843), 427. Meyers, Ex -parte ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 44 S. W. 831), 883. Meyers v. Kirt (57 Iowa, 421; 10 N. W. 828), 2011. Meyers v. Smith (121 111. 442; 13 N. E. 216; affirming 25 111. App. 67), 1960, 1973. ecx TABLE OP CASEa. [References are to pages.] Mezchen v. More (54 Wis. 214; 11 N. W. 534), 605. Miazza v. State (36 Me. C12), 1650. Michael, Appeal of (63 Conn. 583), 640. Michael v. Bacon (49 Mo. 474), 1801. Michaud, Ex parte (4 Can. Cr. Cas. 509), 1755. Michaud, Ex parte (32 Can. L. Jr. 779), 1755. Michaud, Ex parte (34 N. B. 123), 1755. Michels v. State (115 Wis. 43; 90 N. W. 1090), 1161. Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Gilbert (46 Mich. 176), 2198, 2199. Middlekauff v. Adams (76 Neb. 265; 107 N. W. 232), 616, 652. Middleton v. Bobbins (54 N. J. L. 566; 25 Atl. 471), 797, 868, 879. Midland Valley R. Co. v. Hamil- ton (84 Ark. 81; 104 S. W. 540), 2191. Miles, In re (28 Up. Can. 333), 914. Miles V. Rogers (36 N. B. 345), 620. Miles V. State (53 Neb. 305; 73 N. W. 678), 720. Miles V. State (5 W. Va. 524), 1589. Mill V. Harsher (L. R. 9 Ech. 317), 1170. Miller, Ex parte (98 Ind. 451), 561, 602. Miller, In re (179 Pa. 651; 36 Atl. 139; 39 L. R. A. 220; 1 Wigmore Ev. 571), 1736. Miller, In re (8 Pa. Super. Ct. 223), 666. Miller, Appeal of (13 Pa. Super. Ct. 272; 13 York Leg. Rec. 199), 564. Miller, In re (179 Pa. 645; 36 Atl. 139; 39 L. R. A. 220), 2135, 2136, 2137, 2139, 2145, 2151. Miller, In re (171 Fed. 263), 480, 703. Miller v. Amnion (145 U. S. 421; 12 Sup. Ct. 884; 36 L. Ed. 759), 414, 448. Miller v. Belthasser (78 111. 302), 1974. Miller v. Buncombe Co. (89 N. C. 171), 629. Miller v. Camden (63 N. J. 501; 43 Atl. 1069), 1738, 1764. Miller v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.J 76 S. W. 515; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 848), 1215, 1548. Miller v. DeArmond (93 Ind. 74), 662, 671. Miller v. Drake (113 Ga. 347; 38 S. E. 747), 923. Miller v. Dudley, J. J. (46 W. R. 606), 306, 725. Miller v. Finley (2 Mich. N. P. 231), 2095, 2108, 2110. Miller v. Finley (26 Mich. 249; 12 Am. Rep. 306), 2094, 2108, 2110, 2111. Miller v: Givens (35 Ind. App. 40; 78 N. E. 1067), 669. Miller v. Givens (41 Ind. App. 401; 83 N. E. 1018), 609. Miller v. Gleason (18 Ohio Cir. €t. Rep. 374; 10 Ohio C. D. 20), 65, 1254, 1977. Miller v. Hammers ( 93 Iowa, 746 ; 61 N. W. 1087), 1987. Miller v. Hobson (17 N. Z. 225), 1153. Miller v. Hudson (114 Ind. 550; 17 N. E. 122), 1027. Miller v. Jones (80 Ala. 89), 244, 291, 431, 432, 436, 437, 447, 878, 879. Miller v. Minney (31 Kan. 522; 3 Pac. 427),' 794. Miller v. Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co. (31 Iowa, 216; 7 Am. Rep. 122; 4 Am. L. T. Rep. 218), 2221, 2234, 2235, 2244. Miller v. People (47 111. App. 472), 1765. Miller v. Reeder ([Ind.] 88 N. E. ■516), 604, 607, 609, 612. TABLE OF CASES. ecxi [References are to pages.] Miller v. State (33 Ind. App. 509; 71 N. E. 248), 1716. Miller v. State (55 Ark. 188; 17 S. W. 719), 1219, 1223. Miller v. State (5 How. [Miss.] 250), 1445. Miller v. State (68 Miss. 533; 9 So. 2h9), 1120, 1127, 1134. Miller v. State (36 Ohio St. 475), 255. 975, 998, 1241, 1461, 1543. Miller v. State (5 Ohio St. 275), 1253. Miller v. State (35 Tex. Cr. Rep. 650; 34 S. W. 959). 370, 1576. Miller v. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 35; 38 S. VV. 772), 834. Miller v. State (44 Tex. Cr. App. 99; 69 N. W. 522), 1320, 1539. Miller v. State (107 Ind. 152; 7 N. E. 898), 1257, 1565, 1631, 1633. Miller v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 72; 105 S. W. 502), 20tJ8, 2090. Miller v. Wade (58 Ind. 91), 196, 531, 532, 599, 601, 602, 627, 663. Milliman v. Xew York^ etc., R. Co. (66 N. Y. 643, affirming 4 Hun, 409; 6 T. & C. 585), 2201, 2202. Mills, In re (28 Upp. Can. 333), 894. Mills, Ex parte (46 Tex. Cr. App. 224; 79 S. W. 555), 863. Mills V, Ludington ( [Mich.] 122 N. W. 1082), 424, 429. Mills V. Perkins (120 Mass. 41), S25, 829, 831. Mills V. State (148 Ala. 633; 42 So. 816), 953. Mills V. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 220; 82 S. W. 1045), 1599. Mills V. Williams (11 Ired. [N. C] 558), 394. Minden v. Solverstein (36 La. Ann. 912), 217, 424, 1306, 1351, 1353, 1361. Minneapolis v. Olson (76 Minn. 1; 78 N. W. 877), 471, 758. Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. McGillivray (104 Fed. 258), 332. Minnehaha Co. v. Champion (5 Dak. 397; 41 N. W. 754), 930. Minnehaha County v. Champion (37 N. W. 766), 174, 233. Minot V. Doherty ( [Mass.] 89 N. E. 188), 2004. Minter v. State (33 Tex. Civ. App. 182; 76 S. W. 312), 357, 771. Mishey's Appeal (107 Pa. St. 611), 2152. Miskin v. Hughes ([1893] 1 Q. B. Div. 275; 57 J. P. 26b; 67 L. T. 680), 701, 709. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Evans (71 Tex. 361; 9 S. W. 325; 1 L. R. A. 476), 2174, 2176, 2185, 2202, 2203. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Patton ([Tex. Civ. App.] 25 S. W. 39; 26 S. W. 978), 2200. Mitchell, In re (41 N. Y. App. Div. 271; 58 N. Y. Supp. 632), 721. Mitchell, Ex parte ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 79 S. W. 558), 863. Mitchell V. Branham ( 104 Mo, App. 480; 79 S. W. 739), 694. Mitchell V. Commonwealth (106 Ky. 602; 51 S. W. 17; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 222), 964, 1697. Mitchell V. Crenshaw ([1909] 1 K. B. 701; 72 L. J. K. B. 398; 88 L. T. 463; 67 J. P. 179; 20 Cox C. C. 395), 1244. Mitchell V. Duncan (7 Fla. 13), 467. Mitchell V. Gascoigne (23 N. S. W. 239; 6 S. R. [N. S. W.] 717), 1256. CCJUl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Mitchell V. Hindman (150 111. 538; 37 N. E. 916), 1974. Mitchell V. Kingmau (5 Pick. 431), 2093. Mitchell V. Eatts (57 Ind. 259), 1849, 1936. Mitchell V. Scott (62 X. H. 596), 1812. Mitchell V. State (55 Ala. 160), 372. 3Iitchell V. State (133 Ala. 65; 32 So. 687), 170, 172, 174, 175, 170, 2SS, 295. Mitchell V. State (141 Ala. 90; 37 So. 407), 1206, 1469, 1475. Mitchell V. State (148 Ala 678; 41 So. 951), 1212. Mitchell V. State (63 Ind. 276), 1623, 1754. Mitchell V. State (146 111. 175; 33 N. E. 757; 37 Am. St- 147), 1452. Mitchell V. State (12 Neb. 538; 11 N. W. 848), 1717. Mitchell V. State ( [Okla.] 101 Pac, 1100), 1502. Mitchell V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 40 S. W. 284), 1210, Mitchell V. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 533; 89 S. W. 645), ■2026, 2091. Mitchell V. Williams (27 Ind. 62), 788. Mix V. McCoy ( 22 Mo. App. 488 ) , 61, 2040. M. Levy & Son v. Stegemann ([Iowa] 104 X. W. 372), 1798. Mobile V. Kimball (102 U. S. 691), 316. Mobile V. Phillips (146 Ala. 158; 40 So. 826), 1366. Mobile V. Richards (98 Ala. 594; 12 So. 793), 520, 553. Mobile V. Rouse (8 Ala. 515), 448. Mobile V. Yerille (3 Ala. 113), 443. Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. State (29 Ala. 586), 280, 294. Mobile, etc., R. Co. v, Davis (130 111. 146; 22 X. E. 850; revers- ing 31 111. App. 490), 2254. Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Watly (69 Miss. 145; 13 So. 825), '21 22. Modi V. Lose (13 R. L 293), 310. Modlen v. Snowball ([1831] 4 De. G. F. & J. 143; 31 L. J. Ch. 44), 1831. Mogensen, Ex parte (5 Cal. App. 596; 90 ?ac. 1063), 169, 17.']2. Mogler V. State (47 Ark. 109; 14 S. W. 473), 1357, 1358, 1515, 1563. Mohrman v. State (105 Ga. 709; 32 S. E. 143), 1086, 1133, 1148, 1337, 1338, 1347. Moise v. Weymuller (78 Neb. 266; 110 X. W. 554), 1779, 1789. Moley, Ex parte ( 7 Low. Can. Jr. 1), 1449. Molihan v. State (30 Ind. 266), 671, 1351, 1.353, 1301. Molinari, Ex parte (6 L. X. [Can.] 395), 734. Moloney v. Rogers (3 N. S. W. L. R. CjI), 712. Molyneux v. Ellison (8 Aust. L. R. [C. X.] "- 1113. Molyneux v. herson ( 23 Austr. L. R. L-3; S Austr. L, R. 120), 1314. Monaghan v. Insurance Co. (53 :,Iich. 246; 18 X. W. 797), 945. Monaghan v. Longfellow (82 Me. 419; 19 Atl. 857), 1027. Monaghau v. Reid ( 40 :Mich. 665 ) , 1786. Monaghan v. State (66 Miss. 513; <3 So. 241; 4 L. R. A. 800), 1228, 1229. Monce v. State (5 Ga. App. 229; 02 S. E. 1053), 1773. Moncla v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 70 S. W. 548), 1131. Monford v. State (35 Tex. Cr. Rep. 237; 33 S. W. 351), 1557, 1650, 1740. TABLE OF CASES. CCXlll [References are to pages.] Monigal v. State ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 45 S. W. 1038), 760. Moniteau Co. v. Lewis ( 123 Mo. App. 073; 100 S. W. 1107)> 774. Moniteau Co. v. Lewis (123 Mo. 673; 100 S. W. 1107), 782. Monk V. New Utrecht (104 N. V. 552; 11 X. E. 268), 2196. Monmouth v. Popel (183 111. 634; 56 K E. 348; affirming 81 in. App. 512), 193. Monroe v. Lawrence (44 Kan. 607; 24 P. 1113), 258. Monroe v. People (113 III. 670), 1645. Monroe v. State (8 Tex. App. 212), 492, 929. Monroe v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 120 S. W. 479), 1611. Monroe v. Thomas (61 Me. 581), 1779, 1782. Monroe Co. v. Kreuger (88 Ind. 231), 812. Mouses V. State (78 Ga. 110), 1119, 1124, 1126, 1127, 1133. Mont V. State (90 Ind. 29), 96. Montag V. People (141 III. 75; 30 N. E. 337 ) , 2038, 2056. Montclair v. State ([X. J. L.] 09 Atl. 451), 1285. Montford v. Christian ( 13 Vict. L. R. 893), 369. Montgomery v. O'Dell (67 Hun, 109; 22 X. Y. Supp. 412), 684. Montgomery v. State (86 Ala. 141; 7 So. 51), 290, 292. Montgomery v. State ( [Ala.] 49 So. 1902), 2039, 2068. Montpelier v. Mills (171 Ind. 175; 85 X. E. 0), 549, 649, 659, 1159, 1608, 1640. Montross v. Alexander (152 Mich. 513; 116 X. W. 190), 1854, 1962, 1966, 1969, 1970. Montross v. Commonwealth (8 Pa. Super. Ct. 237), 1568, 1720. Monty V. Arneson ( 25 Iowa, 383 ) , 1777. Moody V. Commonwealth (6 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 219), 543. Moody V. McKinney (73 S. C. 438; 53 S. E. 543), 1022. Moody V. Steggles ([1879] 12 Ch. D. 261), 1834. Moog V. Espalla (93 Ala. 503; 9 So. 596), 493. Moog V. Hannon (93 Ala. 500; 9 So. 596), 1780. Moog V. State ( [Ala.] 41 So. 166), 334. Moon V. Hartsuck (137 Iowa, 236; 114 X\ W. 1043), 676. Moon V. State (68 Ga. 687), 2061. Mooney v. State (33 Ala. 419), 2041, 2074. Moore, In re ([Iowa] 118 N. W. 879), 662, 666, 826. Moore v. Danville (232 111. 307; 83 N. E. 845), 132, 251. Moore v. Eubanks (60 S. C. 374; 44 S. E. 971), 1027. Moore v. Indianapolis ( 120 Ind. 483; 22 N. E. 424), 91, 96, {)8, 103, 124, 125, 120, 144, 179, 182, 184, 417, 418, 446, 488, 489, 796. Moore v. Kelley (136 Mich. 139; 98 X. W. 989; 10 Detroit Leg. X. 1002), 460. Moore v. Moore (41 Mo. App. 176), 2162. Moore v. People (109 111. 499), 497, 551, 756, 824. Moore v. People (14 How. 13), 274. Moore v. Robinson ([1879] 48 L. J. Q. B. 156; 40 L. T. 99; 28 W. R. 312), 1819. Moore v. State (16 Ala. 411), 1112. Moore v. State (126 Ga. 414; 55 ■S. E. 327), 938, 1280, 1284, 1286, 1288, 1558. Moore v. State (65 Ind. 382), 1240. Moore v. State (58 Xeb. 608; 79 X. W. 163), 651, 668 cexiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Moore v. State (G4 Neb. 557; 90 N. W. 533), 13G1, 1374, 1615. Moores v. State (69 Neb. 653; 96 N. W. 225), 604. Moore v. State ( 12 Ohio St. 387 ) , 1714. Moore v. State (9 Yerg. 353), 71, 1096. Moore v. State (96 Tenii. 544; 35 S. W. 556), 961. Moore v. Winstead (24 Ind. App. 56; 55 N. E. 777), 1781, 1789, 1790, 1791. Moran v. Atlanta ( [Ga.] 30 S. E. 298), 432, 452, 1634. Moran v. Creager (27 Ind. App. 659; 62 N. E. 61), 561, 573, 611, 615. Moran v. Goodman ( 130 Mass. 158; 39 Am. Rep. 443), 183, 184, 223, 1840, 1842, 1848, 1862, 1895. Morel V. State (89 Ind. 275), 1567. Moreland v. Durocher (121 Mich. 398; 80 N. W. 284), 1954. Moreland v. State ([Okla.] 101 Pac. 138), 325, 327. Morenus v. Crawford (51 Hun 89; 5 N. Y. Supp. 453), 1859, 1934, 1945. Morgan, Ex parte (23 L. T. 605; 35 J. P. 37), 622. Morgan v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 97 S. W. 411; 30 Ky. L. Pvep. 139), 1555. Morgan v. Commonwealth ( 7 Gi-at. 592), 1493. Morgan v. Koestner (83 Iowa, 134; 49 N. W. 80), 983, 9o7. Morgan v. Monmouth PUmk Road Co. (2 Dutch. 99), 233. Morgan v. State (81 Ala. 72; 1 So. 472), USD, 1221, 1379, 1578, 1610. Morgan v. State (117 Ind. 569; 19 N. E. 154), 264, 267, 1585. Morgan v. Tighe (12 Ohio Cir. Lt. Rep. 719; 4 Ohio C. D. 470), 1739. Morganstern v. Commonwealth (94 Va. 787; 26 S. E. 402), 403, 453, 467, 1119, 1122, 1445, 1626. Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisi- ana Board (118 U. S. 455; 6 Sup. Ct. 1114), 116. Morgan's S. S. Co. v. Board (118 U. S. 455; 6 Sup. Ct. 1114), 315. Moriarty v. Bartlett (34 Hun 272), 1838. Moriarty v. Stefl'eran (89 111. 528), 2127. Morien v. Gallagher ( 199 Mass. 486; 85 N. E. 579), 585. Morrell v. Cook (35 Me. 211), 1058. Morrill v. State (38 Wis. 428), 443. Morrill v. 'I'hurston (46 Vt. 732), 1739. Morrilton v. Comer (75 Ark. 458; 87 S. W. 1024), 475. Morris, Ex parte (34 Can. L. J. 46), 1163. Morris V. Baltimore (5 Gill [Md.] 244), 811. Morris v. Connolly (113 Iowa, 545; 85 N. W. 7S9), 984. Morris v. Lowry (113 Iowa 544; 85 N. W. 788), 984. Morris v. Mills (Tex. Civ. App. 82 S. W. 334), 759. Morris v. Nixon (7 Humph 579), 2094, 2106, 2107, 210S, 2124. Morris v. People (2 T. & C. [N. Y.] 219), 1759. Morris v. Rome (10 Ga. 532), 263, 397, 440, 443, 457, 459. Morris v. State (47 Ind. 503), 1307, 1308, 1566, 1567. Morris v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 44 S. W. 510), 1607, 1693, 1695. Morris v. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 562; 89 S. W. 832), 1365. TABLE OF CASES. ccxv [References aie to pnges.] Morris v. Territory (1 Okla. Cr. Rep. 637; 99 Pac. 760; 101 Fac. Ill), 2039. Morison v. Commonwealth (7 Dana 218), 1542. Morrison v. MoLeod (2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 221), 2103. Morrison v. Morrison ( 14 Mont. 8; 35 Pac. 1), 2166. Morrison v. State (84 Ala. 405; 4 So. 402), 2042, 2059, 2009. Morrissey v. Eastern R. Co. (126 Mass. 377; 30 Am. Rep. 686), 2182. Morrow v. State ( [Tex.] 120 S. W. 491), 1580, 1737. Morton v. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 131; 38 S. W. 1019), 1682, 1720. Moseley v. State (156 Ala. 136; 47 So. 193), 1558. Mosley v. State (23 Tex. App. 409; 4 S. W. 907). 2034. Moser v. Stebel (29 Oliio Cir. Ct. Rep. 487), 805, 1810. Moskow V. Highlands ( [Colo.] 47 Pac. 846), 401. Moss V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 44 S. W. 833), 1213. Moss V. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. . 459; 89 S. W. 833), 914. Moss V. Warren ([Tex. Civ. App.] 123 S. W. 1157), 172, 561, 563. Mouflet V. Cole ([1872] L. R. 8 Ex. 32; 42 L. J. Ex. 8; 21 W. R. 175), 1819, 1832. Moulton, In re (168 N. Y. 645; (il N. Y. 1131; affirming 59 N. Y. App. Div. 25; 69 X. Y. Supp. 14), 580, 730. Moulton, In re (59 App. Div. 27; '69 X. Y. S. 14), 544, 580, 581. Moulton V. Reid (54 Ala. 320), 925. Moundsville v. Fountain (27 W. Va. 182), 167, 272, 395, 397, 402. Mountifield v. Ward ([1897] 1 Q. B. 326; 61 J. P. 216; 66 L. J. Q. B. 246; 76 L. T. 202; 45 W. R. 288; 18 Cox C. C. 515; 13 T. L. R. 159), 1149. Mt. Carmel v. Wabash Co. (50 111. 69 j, 412, 435, 808. Mount Pleasant v. Breeze (11 Iowa 399), 469. Mt. Pleasant v. Vansice (43 Mich. 361; 5 X. W. 378; 38 Am. Rep. 193), 169, 410, 414, 474. Mt. Sterling v. King ([Ky.] 104 S. W. 322; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 919), 290. Mowery v. Camden (49 X. J. L.. 106; 6 Atl. 43«), 1454. Moyer, In re (20 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 663), 721. Moyer, Appeal of (8 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 475; 43 W. X. C. 100), 717. Moynihan, In re (75 Conn. 358; 53 Atl. 903), 197. Mueller v. People (24 Colo. 251; 48 Pac. 965), 460, 945. Mueller & Co. v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 116 S. W. 336), 1342, 1344. Mufibrd v. Clewell (21 Ohio State 191), 1864, 1868, 1980, 1854, 1856, 1857, 1982. Mugler V. Kansas (123 U. S. 623; 8 Sup. Ct. 273; 31 L. Ed. 205; affirming 29 Kan. 252; 44 Am. Rep. 634), 91, 99, 109, 119, 125, 139, 148, 149, 161, 181, 211, 256, 315, 398, 418, 450, 490. Muir V. Kcay (L. R. 10 Q. B. 599; 40 j. P. 694; 44 L. J. M. C. 143; 23 W. R. 700; 41 J. P. 423), 1296. Mulcahy v. Givens (115 Ind. 286; 17 X. E. 598), 1767, 1849, 1864, 1866. Mulherrin v. Delaware, etc., R. ■Co. (81 Pa. St. 366), 2180. ecxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages] Mulikin v. Davis (53 Ind. 206), 671. Mullen V. Peck (49 Ohio St. 447; 31 X. E. 1077), 2012. Mullen V. State (96 Ind. 304), 10, 41, 1497, 1499. Mullen V. State ( 30 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 251), 950. Muller V. Buncombe Co. (89 N. C. 171), 628. Muller V. Mayo (38 Ind. 227), 662. Mulligan v. United States (120 Fed. 98), 1261, 1263. Mullinix v. State (43 Ind. 511), 1714. Mullinix v. People (76 111. 211), 63, 1254, 1358, 1740, 1754, 1763, 1764. Mullins V. Bellemore (7 Low. Can. 228), 1365. Mullins V. Collins (L. R. 9. Q. B. 292; 43 L. J. M. C. 67; 29 L. T. 838; 27 W. R. 297), 1221, 1355. Mullins V. Lancaster ( [Ky.] 63 S. W. 475; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 436), 404, 936. Mullins V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 68 S. W. 272), 844, 845. Mulreed v. State (107 Ind. 62; 7 N. E. 884), 1240, 1241, 1242, 1628, 2200. Mumford v. Walker ([1901] 71 L. J. K. B. 19; 85 L. T. 518; 18 T. L. R. 80), 1825. Muncey v. Collins ( [Iowa] 106 N. W. 262), 567, 572. Munch V. State ( 3 Tex. App. 552 ) , 1743. Mundy, In re (59 How. [N. Y.] Pr, 359), 443. Mundy v. State (74 Pac. 378), 1*739. Municipal Suffrage to Women. In re (160 Mass. 586; 36 N. E. 488; 23 L. R. A. 113), 231. Municipality v. Morgan ( 1 La. Ann. Ill), 294. Municipality, etc. v. Wilson (5 La. Ann. 747), 270. Munn V. Illinois (94 U. S. 145), 93. Munoz V. Brassel ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 108 S. W. 417), 337, 771, 772, 773, 781, 784, 1903, 1956. Munsel v. Temple (3 Gil. [111.] 93), 799. Munson, In re (95 X. Y. App. Div. 23 ; 88 N. Y. Supp. 509 ) , 871, 873, 879. Munz V. People (90 111. App. 637), 1865, 1876. Munzebock v. State (10 Ohio Dec. 277; 19 Wkly. L. Bulk 389), 1127. Murphy v. Board (73 Ind. 483), •530, 561, 670. Murphy v. 'Curran (24 111. App. 475), 1947, 1983. Murphy v. Landrun (76 S. C. 21; 56 S. E. 850), 175, 251, 809. Murphy v. McNulty (145 Mass. 464; 14 N. E. 532), 1353. Murphy v. Montclair ( 10 Vroom, 673), 43, 47, 84. Murphy v. Monroe Co. (73 Ind. 483), 607. Murphy v. Xolan (126 Mass. 542), 68'8. Murphy v. People (90 111. 59), 65, 66, 1254, 1632, 1633. Murphy v. State ([Ala.] 45 So. 20*8), 1606. Murphy v. State (1 Ind. 366), 1179, 1190. Murphy v. State (106 Ind. 96; 5 X. E. 767), 1485. Murphy v. State (28 Miss. 637), 1245. Murphy v. State (77 Tenn. [9 Lea] 373), 134, 247, 1745. Murphy v. Union R. Co. (118 Mass. 228), 2198, 2206. Murphy v. Willow Springs Brew- ing Co. (81 Xeb. 223; 115 X. W. 763), 1838, 1896, 1897, 1904, 1933, 1973. TABLE OF CASES. ccxvu [References are to pages.] Hurray a'. Board (81 Minn. 359; 84 N. W. 103; 51 L. R. A. 828), 278. Murray v. Carlin (G7 111. 280), 2102, 2109. Murray v. Freer ([1894] App. Cas. 576; 58 J. P. 508; «3 L. J. M. C. 242; 71 L. T. 44; affirming [1893] 1 Q. B. 035; 57 J. P. 101, 583; 67 L. T. 507; 62 L. J. M. C. 33), 681, 709. Murray v. State (46 Tex. Cr. App. 128; 79 S. W. 568), 19, 964, 971, 1186. Murray v. State ( 48 Tex. Cr. App. 128; 79 S. W. 508), 1689. Murray v. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 219; 87 S. W. 349), 2025. Murray v. State ([Tex.] 120 S. W. 438), 1652. Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co. (213 U. S. 151; 29 Sup. Ct. 458), 176. Musgrove v. Graham (4 S. R. [N. S. W.] 475; 21 W. N. C. [N. S. W.l 145), 1373. Musgrave v. Hall (40 Me. 498), 1028, 1777. Musick V. State (51 Ark. 165; 10 S. W. 225), 30, 86, 968. Musselman v. Cravens (47 Intl. 1), 2093, 2122. Mutual, etc., Ass'n. v. Colter (81 Ark. 205; 99 S. W. 67), 2227. Mutual, etc., Ins. Co. v. Holter- hoff (2 Cin. Sup. Ct. Rep. 379), 2220, 2244. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Simpson ([Tex. Civ. App.] 28 S. W. 837), 2223. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Stibbe (40 Md. 302), 2234. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Thomson (94 Ky. 253; 22 S. W. 87; 14 Ky'. L. Rep. 800), 2232, 2243. Mydosh v. Bayonne (72 X. J. L. 439; 60 AtL 1111), 697. Myers v. Circuit Court ([W. Va.J 63 S. E. 201), 662, 665, 667. Myers v. Conway (55 Iowa 106; 7 N. W. 481), 1848. Myers v. Kirt (57 Iowa 421; 10 N. W. 828), 1929, 1930. Myers v. People ( 67 111. 503 ) , 294, 1502, 1506. Myers v. State (93 Ind. 251), 10, 41, 42, 84, 1592, 1711, 1712, 1976. Myers v. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 331; 39 S. W. 938), 1611. Myers v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 39 S. W. Ill), 2259. Myers v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 558; 108 S. W. 392), 1693. Myers v. State ([Tex.] 118 S. W. 1032), 1064. Myrich v. Myrich (07 Ga. 771), 2155, 2158, 2159. N Nace v. State (117 Ind. 114; 19 N. E. 729), 1110. Xacrelli, In re (S Del. Co. Eep. 20), 696, 697. Xadeau v. Lewis ( 16 Que. L. R. 210), 1441. X'^agle, Ex parte (30 X. B. 77), 938. Xagle v. Baylor (3 Dr. & War. 60), 2099. Xagle V. Keller (237 111. 431; 86 X. E. 694; affirming 141 111. App. 444), 1862. Xalder & Collyer's Brewery Co., Limited v. Ilarman ([1900] 64 J. P. 358; affirmed C. A. 83 L. T. 257), 1821. Xall V. Tinsley (107 Ky. 441; 54 S. W. 187; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1167), 852, 869, 872. Xance v. Kemper (35 Ind. App. 605; 73 X. E. 937), 2093. Xankivell v. Donovan ( 13 N. Z. L. R. 00), 1154. CCXVlll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Napier v. Hodges (31 Tex. 287), 199. Napier v. State (50 Ala. 168), 371. Nappee Valley Wine Co. v. Kas- sanave ([Wis.] 122 X. W. 812), 698. Nash V. Southern Ey. Co. ( 136 Ala. 177; 33 So. 932), 63, 2202, 2205. Nashville v. Linck (12 Lea 499), 216, 432. Nashville Hermitage Club v. Shel- ton (104 Tenn. 101; 56 S. W. 838), 794. Nast V. Eden (89 Wis. 610; 62 N. W. 409), 636. Nathan v. Louisiana (8 How. [U. S.] 73), 790. National Sporting Club v. Cope (82 L. T. 352; 48 W. R. 446; 64 J. P. 310; 19 Cox C. C. 485), 1345. National, etc., Co. v. Board (138 Iowa 11; 115 N. W. 480), 794. Naul v. McComb City (70 Miss. 699; 12 So. 903), 1608. Mazum v. State (88 Ind. 599), 85. Neal, Ex parte (47 Tex. Cr. App. 441; 83 S. W. 831), 888. Neal, etc., Co., Ex parte (58 S. C. 269; 36 S. E. 584), 123„ 1806. Neal v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 101 S. W. 11.39), 874. Neal V. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 513; 102 S. W. 1139), 857, 909, 917, 958, 1684. Neales v. State (10 Mo. 498), 1491, 1497, 1501, 1.502, 1505, 1507. Needham v. State (19 Tox. 332), 15.54. Neely v. State (60 Ark. 66; 28 S. W. 800; 46 Am. St. 148; 27 L. R. A. 503), 1227. Neideiser v. State (6 Baxt. 499), 1362, 1568, 1753. Neighbors v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 9 S. W. 718), 289, 1463, 1464, 1467, 1594, 1680, 1686. Neilly, In re (37 Up. Can. 289), 468. Neilon v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (85 Mo, 599), 2198, 2199. Neilson v. Dunsmore (3 F. [Just. Cas.] 6), 1114. Neimann v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 74 S. W. 558), 1321. Nelson v. Commonwealth (23 S. W. 350), 1609. Nelson v. Galveston, etc., R. Co. (78 Tex. 621; 14 S. W. 1021), 1900. Nelson v. State (17 Ind. App. 403; 46 N. E. 941), 163, 212, 279, 342, 344, 490, 1319. Nelson v. .State ( 32 Ind. App. 88 ; 69 N. E. 298), 1869, 1870. Nelson v. State (53 Neb. 796; 74 N. W. 279), 1662, 1703. Nelson v. State (44 Te.x. Cr. App. 595; 75 S. W. 502), 871, 890, 938, 1646, 1682, 1683, 1686. Nelson v. State (111 Wis. 394; 87 N. W. 235), 1225. Nelson v. United States (30 Fed. 112), 173, 210, 1259, 1503, 1521. Nelson v. Woodford ([1779] 2 Vesey, Jr., 319), 1907. Nepp v. Commonwealth (2 Duv. 546), 635. Netter, In re (11 Pa. Super. Ct. 566), 664. Netso V. Stat« (24 Fla. 363; 5 So. 857), 39, 83, 1711. Neuman v. State (76 Wis. 112; 45 N. W. 30), 479. Nevin v. Ladue ( 1 N. Y. Code Rep. 43; 3 Denio 43, 437), 10, 40, 42, 46, 47, 48, 82, 85, 966, 1592. Nevling v. Commonwealth (98 Pa. 323), 2054. TABLE OF CASES. ecxix [References a.re to pages.] New V. McKechnie (95 N. Y. 632; 47 Am. Rep. 89), 1864, 1876, 1880, 1984, 1985. Kewbern v. McCann ( 105 Tcnn. 159; 58 S. W. 114; 50 L. R. A. 476), 454. New Decatur v. Laude (93 Ala. 84; 9 So. 382), 1621. Newell V. Hemingway (58 L. J. M. C. 46; 60 L. T. 544; 16 Cox C. C. 604; 53 J. P. 324), 512, 1328, 1330, 1346, 1347. New Gloucester (28 Me. 60), 1500, 1583. New Hampton v. Conroy {56 la. 498; 9 N. W. 417),^ 397. New Iberia v. Erath (118 La. 305; 42 So. 945), 332. New Iberia v. Moss Hotel Co. (112 La. 525; 36 So. 552), 416, 447, 812. Newman v. Jones (17 Q. B. Div. 132; 50 J. P. 373; 55 L. J. M. C. 113; 55 L. T. 327), 1345, 1346, 1352, 1355, 1374. Newman v. State (63 Ga. 533), 1515. Newman v. State (101 Ga. 534; 28 S. E. 1005), 1486, 1505. Newman v. State ( 7 Lea 617), 1385. Newman v. State (76 Wis. 112; 45 N. W. 30), 1523. New Orleans v. Clark (42 La. Ann. 9; 7 So. 58), 186, 796, 797. New Orleans v. Guth ( 11 La. Ann. 405), 541. New Orleans v. Jane ( 34 La. Ann. 667), 508, 520, 549. New Orleans v. Kaufman (29 La. Ann. 283; 29 Am. Rep. 283), 791. New Orleans v. Macheca (112 La. 559; 36 So. 747), 206. New Orleans v. Smythe (116 La. 685; 41 So. 33), 103, 206, 649. New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana Light Co. (115 U. S. 650; 6 Sup. Ct. 252), 100, 116. New Orleans W. W. Co. v. St. Tammany W. W. Co. ( 120 U. S. 69; 6" Sup. Ct. 405; affirm- ing 14 Fed. 194), 97. New South, etc., Co. v. Common- wealth (123 Ky. 443; 96 S. W. 805 ; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 873 ) , 948. New York v. Mason (4 E. D. Smith, 142), 503, 506, 1484, 1159, 1650. New York v. Milim (11 Pet. 102), 100. New York Breweries Corp. v. Baker (68 Conn. 337; 3P Atl. 785), 552, 954. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Graham ( 2 Duv. 506), 2244. New York Life Ins. Co. v. La Boiteaux ( 4 Am. L. Rep. 1 ) , 2234, 2244. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Parent (3 Quebec L. R. 163), 233, 2225. New York, etc., L. Ins. Co. v. Simpson ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 28 S. W. 837), 2223, 2226. Newbridge Rliondda Brewing Co., Limited, v. Evans ([1902] 86 L. T. 453; 18 T. L. R. 396), 1818. Newburgh, In re ([N. Y. Misc. Rep.] 89 N. Y. Supp. 1065), 898. Newbury v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 44 'S. W. 843), 958, 1616, 1694. Newcomer v. Tucker (89 Iowa 486; 56 N. W. 499), 1001. Neudeck v. Grand Lodge (1 Mo. App. 330), 2245. Newell V. Fisher (11 Sm. & M. 431; 49 Am. Dec. 66), 2094, 2108, 2118. Newlan v. Aurora (14 111. 364), 1652. ccxx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Newman, Ex parte (9 Cal. 502), 106. Newman v, Bendysche (10 A. & E. 11; 2 P. & D. 340), 1540. Newman v. Covenant Mut. Ins. Ass'n (7G Iowa, 56; 40 N. W. 87; 14 Am. St. 196), 2233, 2239, 2241, 2244. Newman v. Des Moines County (85 Iowa, 89; 52 N. W. 105), 1004. Newman v. Lake (70 Kan. 848; 79 Pac. 675), 736. Newman v. State (88 Ala. 115; 11 So. 762), 1284, 1288. Newman v. State ([Ala.] 39 So. 648), 174. Newman v. State (63 Ga. 533), 1241. Newman v. State (101 Ga. 534; 28 N. E. 1005), 1539, 1760. Newman v. State (63 Ind. 533), 1563. Newman v. State (7 Lea, 617), 824. Newman v. State (55 Tex. Cr. App. 376; 116 S. W. 1156), 1601. Newman v. State (76 Wis. 112; 45 N. W. 30), 750, 1583. Newson v. State (1 Ga. App. 790; 58 S. E. 71), 951, 1561, Newson v. Tahigalien (30 Miss. 414), 798. Newsome v. State ( 1 Ga. App. 790; 58 S. E. 71), 951, 1234. Newton v. Central Vt. R. Co. (80 Hun, 491; 30 N. Y. Supp. 488), 2176, 2197. Newton V. Locklin (77 111. 103), 2033. Newton v. McKay ([Iowa] 102 N. W. 827 ) , ' 199, 223, 790, 816. Niagara Ins. Co. v. DeGraff ( 12 Mich. 124), 1777, 1778. Nichols, In re (43 Fed. Rep. 164), 426. Nichols V. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 87 S. W. 1072; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1176, reversing 86 S. W. 513; 27 Ky. L. Rep, 690), 958, 2067, 2069. Nichols V. Lehman ([Ind.] 85 N. E. 786), 607. Nichols V. Nichols (136 Mass. 256), 2253. Nichols V. Polk County (78 Iowa, 137; 42 N. W. 627), 1075. Nichols V. State (49 Neb. 777; 69 N. W. 99), 1761. Nichols V. State (8 Ohio St. 425), 2073, 2074. Nichols V. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 546; 40 S. W. 268), 872. Nichols V. State ( 39 Tex. Cr. App. 80; 40 S. W. 268), 832. Nichols V. Thomas (89 Iowa, 394; 56 N. W. 540), 994, 1004. Nichols V. Valentine (36 Me. 322), 552, 1031, 1773, 1776. Nicholson v. People (29 111. App. 57), 1102, 1452, 1549. Xickerson v. Boston (131 Mass. 306), 97. Nieol V. Penning ([1881] 19 Ch. D. 258; 45 L. T. 738; 51 L. J. Ch. 166), 1814. Nicolini v. Langermann ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 104 S. W. 501), 704. Nicrosi v. State (52 Ala. 336), 1182, 1189. Nieland v. McGrath (29 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 682; 62 N. Y. Supp. 760), 737. Nielson v. Lafflin (50 N. Y. St. Rep. 277; 21 N. Y. Supp. 731), 2102, 2120, 2130. Nightengale, Petitioner (11 Peck, 167), 448. Niles v. Fries (35 Iowa, 41), 1777. Niles v. Mathusa (19 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 96; 44 N. Y. Supp. 88), 699, 704, 819. tablf: of cases. cexxi [ Uef'^rences are to pages.] Ninenger v. State (25 Tex. App. 449; 8 S. \V. 480), 1464, 1471. Nipples V. Valentine (30 Me. 322), 1772. Nisliimiya v. United States (131 Fed. 650), 44. Nix V. Nottingham, J. J. ([1899 J 2 Q. B. 294; 68 L. J. Q. B. 854; 63 J. P. 628; 47 W. R. 628; 81 L. T. 41; 15 T. L. E. 463), 534, 547, 671, 681. Nixon V. State (76 Ind. 524), 821, 827, 1181. Noble V. Adams ( 7 Taunt. 59 ) , 2125. Noble V Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 105 S. W. 413; 32 Ky. L. Rep. 73), 1608. Noble V. Hart ([1897] 34 Sc L. R. 151), 1823. Noblett V. Hopkinson ([1905] 2 K. B. 214; 69 J. P. 269; 74 L. J. K. B. 544; 53 W. R. 637; 92 L. T. 462; 21 T. L. R. 448), 1136, 1140. Noecker v. People (91 111. 494), 822, 1349, 1358. Noel V. Karper (53 Pa. 97), 2121, 2122. Nolan, In re (16 Vict. L. R. 227; 11 Austr. L. T. 156), 624. Noonan v. Hudson County (22 Vroom, 454; 18 Atl. 117; 23 Vroom, 398; 23 Atl. 255), 233. Noonan v. Orton (31 Wis. 265), 610. Norcross v. Norcross (53 Me. 163), 72. Norden v. Bosman (21 Juta, 634), 695. Nordin v. Kjos (13 S. D. 497; 83 N. W. 573). 1898. Norfleet v. State (4 Sneed, 340), 2068. Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Common- wealth (93 Va. 749; 24 S. E. 837), 324. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Harman (83 Va. 553; 8 S. E. 251), 2184, 2185. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Hoover (79 Md. 253; n Atl. 994; 25 L. R. A. 710), 2201. Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Hoover (79 Md. 253; 29 Atl. 994; 25 L. R. A. 710), 2198. Norgans Liquors, In re (16 R. I. 542; 18 Atl. 279), 1043. Norman v. Commonwealtli ( [Ky.] 104 S. W. 1024; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1283), 2068. Norman v. Thompson (90 Tex. 250; 72 S. W. 62; affirming 30 Tex. Civ. App. 537; 72 S. W. 64.1, 888, 903, 920, 925. Norment v. Charlotte (85 N. C. 387), 904. Normoyle v. Latah Co. (5 Idaho, 19; 46 Pac. 831), 797. Norris, Ex parte (23 N. S. W. 27; 6 S. R. [N. S. W.] 47), 1354. Norris v. Langley (19 N. H. 423), 1807. Norris v. Oakman (138 Ala. 411; 35 So. 450), 460. North V. Barringer (147 Ind. 224; 46 N. E. 531), 534, 618, 758. Northern Ind. R. Co. v. Connelly (10 O. S. 159), 793. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Craft ( 29 U. S. App, 687; 69 Fed. 124; 16 C. C. A. 175), 2176, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. San- ders (47 Fed. 604), 1162. Northern Pac. R, Co. v. Whalen (3 Wash. T. 452; 17 Pac. 890), 675, 658, 980. Northwestern ^lut. Life Ins. Co. (122 U. S. 501; 30 L. Ed. 1100; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1221; Appeal of Miskey [107 Pa. St. 611]), 64, 65, 2233, 2243. Norton v. Alexander ( 28 Tex. Civ. App. 466; 67 S. W. 787), 921, 922, 923, 925. CCXXll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Xorton V. Salisbury (4 C. B. 32), 569. Norton V, State (65 Miss. 297; 3 So. 665), 934, 1464, 1468, 1513, 1765. Xorton V. W. H. Thomas, etc., Co. ([Tex. Civ. App.] 91 S. W. 780), 1785. Xorton V. W. H. Thomas, etc., Co. ([Tex. Civ. App.] 93 S. W. 711), 1785. Xortwick v. Bennett (62 S. J. L. 151), 646, Norwood V. Raleigh, etc., R. Co. (Ill X. C. 236; 16 S. E. 4), 2178, 2183. Xorwood V. Stuart (23 N. Z. 473, 1108), 1300. Xossman v. Rickert (18 Ind. 350), 1989. Xourse v. Pope (13 Allen), 1807. Kovich ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 86 S. W. 332), 1282. Xowotny v. Blair (32 Xeb. 175; 49 X. W. 357), 1937. Xundy, In re (59 How. Pr. 359), 627, 634. Xundy, In re (3 Pennewill, 282; 51 Atl. 005), 540. Xurnberger v. Bornwell (42 S. C. 158; 20 S. E. 14), 815. Xussbaumer v. State (54 P'la. 87; 4 So. 712), 80, 85, 87. Xussear v. Arnold (13 S. & R. 323), 2140. Nye v. Lowiy (S2 Ind. 316), 605. Oak Clifr V. State ([Tex. Civ. App.] 77 S. W. 24; affirmed 67 Tex. 391; 79 S. W. 1), 234. Oak Clitr V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 107 S. W. 1121), 1553. Oakes v. Marrificld (93 Me. 297; 45 Atl. 31), 1791, 1807. O'Banion v. Do Garmo (121 Iowa, 139; 96 X. W. 739), 774. Oberer v. State (28 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 620), 1558. Oberfell, In re (28 Pa. Super. Ct. 68), 565. O'Brien, In re (29 Mont. 530; 75 Pac. 196), 232, 234, 919, 932. O'Brien v. Mahon (126 Iowa, 539; 102 X. W. 446), 755, 759, 774, 775, 797, 801, 802. O'Brien v. People (36 X. Y. 276), 2051. O'Brien v. People (48 Barb. 274), 2054. O'Brien v. Putney (55 Iowa, 292; 7 X. W. 615), 1924, 1927. O'Brien v. State (91 Ala. 16; 8 So. 560), 1161. O'Brien v. State (109 Ga. 51; 35 S. E. 112), 230, 1600. O'Brien v. State (63 Ind. 242), 1520, 1522. O'Bryan v. Fitzpatrick (48 Ark. 487; 3 S. W. 527), 1792, 1806. O'Bryan v. State (48 Ark. 42; 2 S. W. 339), 1555, 1560. O'Bryane v. Hadley ( [Ala.] 50 So. 87), 1811. O'Connell v. Garrett ( 145 ]Nfass. 311; 14 X. E. 234), 1229. O'Connell v. Larkins (5 X. S. W. L. R. 8), 1293. O'Connell v. O'Leary (145 Mass. 311; 14 X. E. 143), 1227, 1932. O'Connell v. O'Malley (18 X. Z. 577), 1153, 1154. O'Connell v. State ( [Ga. App.] 62 S. E. 10071, 1696. O'Conner, In re (Temp. Wood [Manitoba] 293), 683. O'Connor v. Rempt (29 X. J. Eq. 156), 2095, 2099, 2108. O'Connor, In re (Temp. Wood [Manitoba] 284). 567. O'Connor v. Board ([Idaho] 105 Pac. 560), 868. O'Connor v. Congen ( 102 N. Y. 702; 7 X. E. 309), 1975. TABLE OF CASES. CCXXlll [Referfnces are to pages.] O'Connor v. Gillespie ( 17 Vict. L. R, 374), 1192. O'Connor v. Kielman ([Iowa] 121 X. W. 1088), 1784. O'Connor v. Price ( 14 Vict. L. R. 946; 10 Austr. L. T. 155), 1347. O'Connor v. State (45 Ind. 347), 1291, 1292, 1501, 1517, 1742. Odd Fellows' Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Rohkopp (94 Pa. St. 59; 9 Ins. I. Jr. 787), 2236, 2245. O'Dea V. State (57 Ind. 31), 144. Odell V. Wharton (87 Tex. 173; 27 S. W. 123), 925. O'Donnell v. Commonwealth ( 108 Va. 882; 62 S. E. 373), 1461, 1616, 1706. O'Driscoll V. Viard (2 Bay [S. C] 316), 558. Oechslein v. Passaic (2 X. J. Law J. 85), 441. O'Flaherty v. Hackett (14 Vict. L. R. 97), 1132. O'Flinn v. State (66 Miss. 7; 5 So. 390), 766, 767, 771. Ogburn v. Elmore (123 Ga. 677; 51 S. E. 641), 920, 925. Ogden V. Saunders (12 Wheat. [U. S.] 213), 261. Oglesby v. State (121 Ga. 602; 49 S. E. 706), 283, 1525. O'Grady v. People (42 Colo. 312; 95*^ Pac. 346), 1579, 1580. O'Grady v. State (36 Neb. 320; 54 'X. W. 556), 2040, 2081. O'Hagan v. Dillon ( 10 Jones & S. 456), 2171, 2186, 2195. O'Halloran v. Jackson ( 107 Mich. 138; 64 X. W. 1046), 763. O'Halloran v. Kingston (16 111. App. [16 Bradw.] 659), 1912. O'Hara, In re (63 X. Y. App. 512; 71 X. Y. Supp. 613), 884, 889. O'Hare v. Chicago (125 HI. App. 73), 167. O'Hara v. Cox (42 Miss. 496), 793. O'Herrin v. State (14 Ind. 420), 2040, 2080. Ohio V. Dollison (194 U. S. 445; 24 Sup. Ct. 703; 48 L. Ed. 1062; affirming 68 Ohio St. 688; 70 X. E. 1131), 250. Ohlrogg V. Worth County ( [Iowa] 99 X. W. 178), 1002. Ohlsson V. Kuhr (18 Juta, 205), 712, 1812. Oil City V. Oil City Trust Co. (15\ Pa. St, 454; 31 Am. St. Rep. 770), 426. Oke V. McManus ([Iowa] 121 X. W. 177, reversing 115 X. W. 580), 1271. O'Keefe v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (32 Iowa, 467), 2172. O'Keefe v. Chicago, etc, R. Co. (32 Iowa, 467), 2178, 2184. O'Keefe v. State (24 Ohio St. 175), 1095. Oldham, J. J. v. Gee (66 J. P. 341; 18 T. L. R. 34S ) , 710. Oldham v. Ramsden (44 L. J. C. P. 309; 22 L. T. 825; 39 J. P. 583), 378. Oldham v. Sheasby (60 L. J. M. C. 81; 55 J. P. 214), 1152. Oldham V. State ( 52 Tex. Cr. App. 516; 108 S. W. 657), 784, 1220, 1378, 1605, 1620. O'Leary v. Frisby ( 17 111. App. 553), 1912. O'Leary v. State (44 Ind. 91), 1353, 1357, 1359, 1615, 1629, 1633, 1655. Olivaris v. State (23 Tex. App. 305; 4 S. W. 903), 918. Oliver v. Connell (29 Vict. L. R. 329; 25 Austr. L. T. 76; 9 Austr. L. R. 177), 712. Oliver v. London (60 J. P. 248), 1317. Ollre V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 123 S. W. 1116), 1354. Olmstead v. Crook (89 Ala. 228; 7 S. E. 776), 867, 872, 918, 930. ccxxiv TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages.] Olmstead v. Noll (82 Neb. 147 117 N. W. 102), 1981. Olmstead v. State (90 Ala. 634 8 So. ',68), 1637. Olmstead v. State (89 Ala. 16 7 So. 775), 1456. Olson V. Hurley (33 Minn. 39 21 N. W. 842), 1805. Olson V. People (125 111. App. 460), 1759, 1760. Omit V. Commonwealth (9 Harris [Pa.] 426), 1310. O'Neal V. Adams ([Iowa] 122 Pac. 976), 2263. O'Neal V. Minary (101 S. W. 951; 30 Ky. L. Kep. 888; 125 Ky. 571), 859, 874, 893, 900, 904, 934, 9.35, 043. O'Neal V. Parker (83 Ark. 133; 103 S. W. 165), 1028. O'Neil V. Murray (4 Bradf. 311), 2136. O'Neil, Ex parte (9 Can. Cr. Cas. 141), 263. O'Neil V. Keokuk, etc., R. Co. (45 Iowa, 456), 2253. O'Neill V. Nolan (50 N. Y, St. Rep. 641; 21 N. Y. Supp. 222), 2106, 2122. O'Neil V. State (116 Ga. 839; 43 S. E. 248), 1538. O'Neil V. State (76 Neb. 44; 107 N. W. 119), 1022, 1084. O'Neil V. Vermont (144 U. S. 323; 12 Sup. Ct. 693; 36 L. Ed. 450), 298, 299, 307. Optumwa V. Schaub (52 la. 515; 3 N. W. 529), 471. Orange Co. v. Douglierty (55 Barb. 332), 1369. Orcutt V. Nelson (1 Gray, 536), 1786, 1796. Orcutt V. Renigardt (46 N. J. L. 337), 80, 561, 575, 577, 859. Oriatt V. Pond (29 Conn. 479), lOOS, 1031. Orke V. McManus ([Iowa] 115 N. W. 580), ,341, 364, 1782. O'Reilly -, . State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 85 S. W. 8), 1474. Orme v. Tuscumbia ( 150 Ala. 520; 43 So. 589), 453, 1122. Ormerod v. Chadwick ( 16 M, &, W. 687; 2 N. Sess. 697), 567. O'Rourke v. People (3 Hun, 225; 5 Thomp. & C. 496), 533. Osborn v. .Sargent (23 Me. 527), 1739. Osborn v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 26 S. W. 025), 2046. Osborne v. Hare (40 J. P. 759), 374, 1145. Osborne v. State (77 Ark. 439; 92 S. W. 406), 1015, 1022. Osburn v. Marietta (118 Ga. 53; 44 S. E. 807), 168, 452. Osgood V. People (39 N. Y. 449), 1493, 1504. Oshe V. State (37 Ohio St. 494), 1093, 1091, 1456. Oshkosh V. State (59 Wis. 425; 18 N. W. 324), 683, 740. O'Shannessey v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 96 S. W. 790), 1624, 1598, 1602. Ostler V. State (3 Ind. App. 122; 29 N. E. 270), 1109. Oswald V. Moran (8 N. D. Ill; 77 N. W. 281), 1804. Oswego Lake Tp. v. Kirstcn (72 Mich. 1 ; 40 N. W. 26 ) , 945. Ott, In re (95 Fed. 274), 2263. Ottawa V. La Salle (11 111. 339), 473. Otte V. State (29 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 203), 132, 853, 911, 1444, 1553, 1589, 1602. Ottman v. Young (12 Hawaii, 303), 639, 644. Otto V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 87 S. W. 698), 1214, 1282, 1289. Ottumwa V. Schaub (52 Iowa, 515; 3 N. W. 529), 714, 727, 767. Ottumwa V. Zekind (95 Iowa, 922; 64 N. W. 622; 29 L. R. A. 734; 58 Am. .St. 447), 483. Ould V. Richmond (23 Gratt. [Va.] 464), 791 TABLE OF CASES. ecxxv [References are to pages.] Ouong Woo, In re (13 Fed. 229), 189. Our V. 'Commonwealth (9 Dana, 9), 1541. Our House Xo. 2 v. State (4 Greene [Iowa] 172). 109,256, 989, 14S(], 1551. Outlaw V. State (35 Tex. 481), 2040. Outred v. Keddel (2 N. Y. 201), 1279. Ovenden v. Raymond ( 40 J. P. 727), 1145, "^1318. Overall v. Berzeau (37 Mic-li. 50G). 76, 1085, 1111, 1115, 1158, 1169. Overby v. State (18 Fla. 178), 789. Overman v. State ( 88 Ind. ) , 1109. Overseen, etc. v. Warner ( 3 Hill [N. Y.] 150), 498. Overton v. Hunter (23 J. P. S08 ; 1 L. T. 360), 1136. Overton v. Schindele (85 Iowa, 715; 50 N. W. 977), 991. Overseers v. W^oerner ( 3 Hill, 150), 72. Overstreet v. Brubaclier (98 Mo. App. 75; 71 .S. W. 1090), 1805. Oviatt v. Pond ( 29 Conn. 479 1 . 109, 125, 126, 253, 255, 1776, 1777. Owen v. Armstrong ( 13 Juta, 408), 969. Owen V. Geyer (9 Juta, [H. C] 162), 1347. Owen V. Langf ord ( 55 J. P. 484 ) , 1218. 0^ven v. McLean (3 Can. Cr. Cas. 323), 45. Owens V. People (56 111. App. •569), 532, 1752. Owens V. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 634; 85 S. W. 794), 950. Owensboro v. Ellter (3 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 255), 815. Owensboro v. Fulds ( [Ky.] 102 S. W. 1184; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 627), 794. Owing's Case (1 Bland, 371), 2093. Oxford V. Frank (30 Tex. 1 iv. App. 343 ; 70 S. W. 426 ) , 920, 939. Oxford V. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 321; 94 S. VV. 463), 1380. Oxford V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 97 S. W. 484). 948. Oxley V. Allen ([Tex. Civ. App.] 107 S. W. 945), 909, 923, 938, 939, 942. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw (120 Fed. 144), 148, 151, 162, 225, 240, 1383. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw (198 U. S. 17; 25 Sup. Ct. 552; 49 L. Ed. 925, affirming 120 Fed. 144), 147, 225, 328, 331, 332, 427. Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Terre Haute (98 Fed. 330), 427. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Common- v^ealth ([Ky.] 107 S. W. 728, 729; 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1010, 1013). 952.' Pace v. Raleigh (140 X. C. 65; 52 S. E. 277), 861. Pace v. State ([Ala.] 50 So. 353), 1581. Pacific University v. Johnson (47 Ore. 448; 84 Pac. 704), 403. Paden v. Carson (15 Okla. 399; 82 Pac. 830), 671. Padgett V. State (93 Ind. 396), 507, 673. Padgett V. Sturgis ( [Ga.] 65 S. E. 352), 1023. Paducah v. James ( [Ky.] 104 S. W. 971; 31 Ky, L. Rep. 1203), 430. CCXXVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pases.] Paducah v. Jones (126 Ky. 829; 104 S. W. 971; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1203), 1358. Page V. District of Columbia (20 App. D. C. 4(59), 546. Page V. Krekey (137 N. Y. 307; 33 N. E. 311; 21 L. R. A. 409), 2112. Page V. Krekey (63 Hun, 629; 17 N. Y. Supp. 764; 21 L. R. A. 409), 2121. Page V. Luther (51 N. C. [6 Jones] 413), 1246. Page V. Page ( [Wash ] 96 Pac. 82), 2156. Page V. Ratclifle ([No. 2] [1896] 75 L. T. 371), 1831. Page V. State (11 Ala. 849), 72, 448, 550. Page V. State (4 South, 697; 84 Ala. 446), 771, 1220, 1230, ni4, 1845. Page V. State (28 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 660), 1462. Palmer v. Doney (2 Johns. Cas. 346), 499. Pain V. Boughwood (24 Q. B. Div. 353; 55 J. P. 469), 1383. Paleher v. United States ( 1 1 Fed. 47), 1030, 1259. Palenthorpe v. Home Brewery Co., Limited ([1906] 2 K. B. 5; 75 L. J. K. B. 555; 94 L. T. 871; 54 W. R. 4-89; 22 T, L. R. 505), 1824. Palmer, In re (3 Pa. Co. Ct. 314), 603. Palmer v. Doney (2 Johns. Cas. 346), 504, 559. Palmer v. Hartford ( 73 Mich. 96 ; 40 N. VV. 850), 764. Palmer v. Sehurz ([S. D.] 117 X. W. 150), 1631, 1839, 1842, 1849, 1869, 1896, 1903, 1939, 1941. Pana v. State (51 Ark. 481; 11 S. W. 692), 1586. Pancake v. State (81 Ind. 93), 1538, 1034. Pancoast v. Graham (2 McCart. [N. J.] 294), 2137, 2142. Paola V. Williford (65 Kan. 859; 69 Pac. 331), 1191. Papworth v. Fitzgerald ( 106 Ga. 378; 32 S. E. 363), 127, 168, 452, Papworth v, Goodnow ( 104 Ga. 683; 30 S. E. 872), 639. Paquet v, Emery (87 Me. 215; , 32 Atl. 881), 1051. Paris V. Graham (33 Mo. 94), 408, 418. Paris, etc., R. Co. v. Robinson ([Tex. Civ. App.] 114 S. W. 058), 2201, 2202. Parish v. State (47 Tex, Cr. App. 148; 82 S. W, 517), 1743. Parish v. Thurston (87 Ind. 437), 2127. Park V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 98 S. W. 243), 1729. Parker v. Alder ([1899] 1 Q. B. Div. 23; 68 L. J. Q. B. 7; 62 J. P. 772; 47 W. R. 142; 79 L. T. 381; 15 T. L. R. 3; 19 Cox C. C. 191), 1383. Parker v. Barker (43 N. H. 36), 1058. Parker v. Commonwealtli ([Ky.] 12 S. W. 276), 835. Parker v. Commonwealth (6 Barr, [Penn.] 507), 231, 240. Parker v. Green (2 B. & S. 299; 26 J. P. 247; 31 L. J. M. C, 133; 10 W. R. 316), 367, 726. Parker v. Griffith ([N. C] 06 S. E. 565). 434. Parker v. Parker (52 111. App. 333), 1736. Parker v. Portland (54 Mich. 308; 20 N. W. 55), 764. Parker v. Regina ([1896] 2 Irish Rep. 404), 1152. Parker v. State (126 Ga, 443; 55 S. E. 329), 938. Parker v. State (27 Ind, 393), 1304, 1307, 1308. TABLE OP CASES. CCXXVU [References are lo pages.] Parker v. State (31 Ind. App. 1>50; 68 N. E. 912), 822, 825, 833, 971. Parker v. State (99 Md. 189; 57 Atl. 677), 111, 281, 1523, 1524. Parker v. State (62 N. J. L. 801; 45 Atl. 1092, affirming 61 N. J. L. 308; 39 Atl. 651), 1110. Parker v. State (4 Ohio St. 563), 1564, 1615. Parker v. State (12 Tex. App. 401), 883. Parker v. State (39 Tex. €r. App. 262; 45 S. W. 812), 1200, 1680. Parker v. State (45 Tex. Cr. App. 334; 77 S. W. 783), 1608. Parker v. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 69; 85 S. W. 1155), 1280. Parker v. State ( [Tex. Cr, App.] 75 S. VV. 30), 1699. Parker v. .State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 84 S. W. 822), 1225. Parker v. Wayne Co. (104 N. C. 166; 10 S. E. 137), 793, 797. Parker v. Winona, etc., R. Co. (83 Minn. 212; 86 X. W. 2), 2217. Parkinson v. State (14 Md. 184; 74 Am. Dec. 522), 289, 1173, 1223, 1515, 1563. Parks V. State (15 Ind. 9211; 64 N. E. 862), 1443. Parks V. State ([Ky.] 96 S. W. 328), 1282. Parmell v. State (29 Ga. 681), 1245. Parmenter v. United States (6 Ind. Ter. 530; 98 S. W. 3"40), 1505. Parrent v. Little (72 X. H. 566; 58 Atl. 510), 718, 719, 814, 819. Parrott v. Commonwealth (6 Ky. L. Rep. 221), 21, 52, 58, 60, 1698, 1699. Parrott v. Wilson (51 Ga. 255), 1767. Parsley v. Hutehins (47 X'. C. 159), 522. Parsons v. Alexander (24 L. J. Q. B. 277; 5 E. & B. 263), 374. Parsons v. George (17 Juta, 192), 567. Parsons v. People (32 Colo. 22; 76 Pac. 666), 170, 198, 200, 286, 789. Part of Lot 294 v. State ( 1 Clarke [Iowa] 507), 1016. Parvin v. Winberg (130 Ind. 661; 30 X. E. 790), 900. Paschal v. State (84 Ga, 326; 10 S. E. 821), 1166, 1180. Pase V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 79 S. W. 531), 1735. Pasquier v. Xeale ([1902] 2 Iv. B. 287; 67 J. P. 49; 72 L. J. K. B. 835; 51 W. R. 92; 87 L. T. 2.30; 18 T. L. R. 704), 690, 1275, 1318. Passenger Cases (7 How, 283; 12 L. Ed. 102), 100, 298. Paston V. State ( [Xeb.] 119 X. W. 520), 1708. Patchell, Ex parte ( 34 N. B. 258 ) , 549. Pate V. Jonesboro (75 Ark. 276; 87 S. W. 437), 468. Patman v. Harland ( [1881] 17 Ch. D. 353; 50 L. J. Ch. 642; 44 L. T. 728; 29 W. R. 707), 1814. Pattee v. Thompson ([X. H.] 41 Atl. 265), 1743. Patten v. Centralia (47 111. 370), 71, 1126. Patten v. Rhymer (3 El, & El. 1; 29 L. J. M. C. 189; 24 J. P. 342; 2 L. T. 352; 8 W. R. 496), 373, 374. Patterson, In re ( 4 How. Pr. $4 ) , 2151. Patterson, In re (43 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 498; 89 N. Y. Supp. 437), 584. Patterson v. Kentucky (97 U. S. 501), 95, es, 117, 315, 489. cexxvm TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages.] Patterson v. Murray (15 X. Z. L. R. 487), 1812, 1818. Patterson v. Nicol (115 Iowa, 283; 88 X. W. 323), 984. Patterson v. Society, etc., 24 N. J. L. 385), 394/ Patterson v. State (21 Ala. 571), 13(50. Patterson v. State (3(3 Ala. 297), 1293. Patterson v. State ([Tex. tr. App.] 90 S. W. 31), 1482. Patton V. McDonald (30 N. P.. 523), 1027, 1075, 1076. Patton V. People ( 1 Colo. 77 ) , 521. Patton V. State (80 Ga. 714; 6 S. E. 273), 1650, 1651, 1740. Patton V. State (31 Tex.'Cr. Rep. 20; 19 S. W. 252 J, 1568, 1569. Patton V. State (42 Tex.'Cr. 496: 61 S. W. 309), 1233, 1234. Patton V. State ([Tex.'Cr. App.] 100 S. W. 778), 1468, 1472. Patton V. Williams (35 Tex. Civ. App. 129; 79 S. W. 357), 773, 781. Patrick v. State ( 45 Tex. Cr. App. 587; 78 S. W. 947 K 1608, 1690, 1703. Patrick v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 87 S. W. 947), 1185. Patrick v. Victor Knitting Mills Co. (37 N. Y. Supp. Div. 7; 55 N. Y. Supp. 340), 2254, 2255. Paul V. Gloucester Co. (50 X. J. L. 585; 15 Atl. 272; 1 L. Pv. A. 86), 221, 228, 233, 236, 397, 888, 892. Paul V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 106 S. W. 448), 132, 169, 975, 976. Paul V. Troyor (3 Minn. 291), 402. Paul V. Washington (134 X. C. 363; 47 S. E. 793; 65 L. R. A. 902), 431, 455, 461, 472. Paulina's Cargo v. United States (7 Cranch [U. S.] 52). 252. Paulk V. Sycamore (105 Ga. 501; 31 S. E. 200), 452, 1082. Paulson V. Languess (16 S. D. 471; 83 X. W. 655), 1911. Pfiunders v. State (37 Ark. 399), 1237. Payne v. Jolinston (22 X. Z. 176), 1153. Payne v. State (66 Ark. 545; 52 S. W. 276), 2247. Payne v. State (74 Ind. 203), 1226, 1500, 1561, 1630. Payne v. State ( 5 Tex. App. 35 ) , 2067. Payne v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 19 S. W. 677), 1630. Pajne v. Thomas ( 60 L. J. M. C. 3: 53 J. P. 824; 63 L. T. 456; 17 Cox, C. C. 212: 39 W. R. 240 t, 353. Paynor v. Holzgraf (35 Tex. Civ. ' App. 233; 79 S. W. 829), 772. Peache v. Colman (L. R. 1 C. P. 324; 35 L. J. M. C. 118; 14 W. R. 439), 1151. Peacock v. Limburger (95 Tex. 258: 67 S. W. 518), 210, 219, 1239, 1245. Peacock v. Oaks (85 Mich. 578; 48 X. W. 1082), 1848, 1960, 1943. Peak V. Bidinger (133 Iowa, 127; 110 X. W. 292). 979. Pearce v. Brooks (L. R. 1 Exch. 213), 1795. Pearce v. Commonwealth ( 5 Ky. L. Rep. 407), 1545. Pearce v. State (40 Ala. 720), 1293, 1610. Pearce v. State (35 Tex. Cr. Rep. 150; 32 S. W. 697), 509. Pearce v. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 352; 88 S. W. 234), 825, 833, 972. Pearman v. Pearraan ( 1 Swab. & T. 601 ; 29 L. J. Mat. [X. S.J 54; 8 W. R. 274), 2166. TABLE OF CASES. CCXXIS [References are to pages.] Pearsall v. Supervisors (71 Mich. 438; 39 N. W. 578), 878. Pearson's Case ( 2 Lewin, C. C. 144), 2039. Pearson v. Broadbent ( 30 J. P. 485), 682, 084. Pearson v. Cass Co. (90 Iowa, 750; 57 N. W. 871), 1001. Pearson v. International Distil- lery (72 Iowa, 348; 34 N. W. 1; affirmed 128 U. S. 1 ; 9 Sup. Ct. 6; 32 L. Ed. 340), 111, 119, 126, 101, 827, 1194. Pearse v. Gill (41 J. P. 742), 1138. Pearson v. State (00 Miss. 510; So. 243; 4 L. R. A. 835), 1280, 1284. Pease v. Coats ([1806] L. Pv. 2 Eq. 688; 36 L. J. Ch. 57; 30 J. P. 819; 14 L. T. 880), 1813. Peavy v. Georgia, etc., Co. (81 Ga. 485; 8 S. E. 70), 2200. Peavy v. Goss ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 37 S. W. 317), 1895, 1897, 1903. Pecaria v. State ( 48 Tex. Cr. App. 352; 90 S. W. 42), 952. Peck, In re (107 N. Y. 391; 00 N. E. 775; 53 L. R. A. 888- reversing 57 X. Y. App. Div. 035; 68 N. Y. Supp. 1145), 738, 743, 990. Peck, In re (42 X. Y. St. Rep. 898), 2142. Peck V. Cary (27 X. Y. 9; 84 Am. Dec. 220), 2134, 2135, 2130, 2138, 2140, 2142. Peck V. Conner ( 82 Iowa, 725 ; 47 X. W. 977), 1001. Peck V. Jenness (7 How. [U. S.] 624), 1012. Peck V. Weddell (17 Ohio St. 271), 925. Peckover v. Defries ( 95 L. T. 883 ; 71 J. P. 38; 21 Cox, C. C. 323; 23 T. L. R. 20), 1220, 1350, 1373. Peddie v. Bennett (01 J. P. 680), 370. Pedigo V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 68 S. VV. 1113; 70 S. W. 659; 24 Ky. L. Rep. 535), 1084, 1097. Pedigo V. Commonwealth (24 Ky. L. Rep. 1029; 70 S. W. 059), 33, 83. Peer v. Board (70 X. J. L. 496; 57 Atl. 153), 092. Peer v. Commonwealth (5 Gratt. 074), 1452. Pegram v. Storty (31 W. Va. 220; 6 S. E. 485), 1850, 1852, 1934, 1984. Pehrson v. Ephraini ( 14 Utah, 147; 46 Pac. 657), 716. Peirce v. Xew Hampshire (40 U. S. 504), 1433. Peisch V. Linder (73 Iowa, 766; 33 X. W. 133), 991. Peitz V. State (08 Wis. 538; 32 X. W. 703), 1373. Pekin v. Smelzel (21 111. 464; 74 Am. Dec. 105), 83, 395, 398, 432, 470. Pelgreen v. State (71 Ark. 308), 1280. Polham v. Page (0 Ark. 535), 2250, 2255. Pellecat v. Angell (2 Cromp. M. & R. 311, 313), 1794. Pelly v. Wills (141 Ind. 688; 41 X. E. 354), 598, 599, 600, 622, 637, 639, 1350. Pelton v. Drummond (21 Xeb. 492; 32 X. W. 593), 507, 508. Pemberton v. State (11 Ind. App. 297; 38 X. E. 1,090), 1749, 1751. Pence v. Commonwealth (5 Ky, L. Rep. [abstract] 608; 6 Ky. L. Rep. 113), 353. Pendennis Club v. Louisville (7 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 831), 1159, 1331, 1342, 1345. Pendergast v. Peru (20 III. 51), 1640. ccxxx TABLE OF CASES. [Heferences are to pages.] Penn v. Alexander ([1893] 1 Q. B. 522; 57 J. P. 118; 68 L. T. 355; 41 VV. R. 392; 17 Cox, C. C. 615), 1150. Penn v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 68 S. W. 170), 1706. Pennell v. State ([Wi.s.] 123 N. W. 115), 19, 32, 162. Penner v. Commonwealth (111 Ky. 604; 64 S. W. 435; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 774), 1380, 1381. Penny v. VVairant (26 N. Z. 234), 689. Penney v. Warren ( 22 N. Y. 602 ) , 1297. Penniman v. Cole (8 Met. [Mass.] 496), 1067. Pennington v. Baelir ( 48 Cal. 565 ) , 605. Pennington v. Gillespie (63 \V. Va. 541; 61 S. E. 416), 1956, 1962. Pennington v. Pincock ([1908] 2 K. B. 244; 77 L. J. K. B. 537; 98 L. T. 804; 72 J. P. 199; 6 L. G. R. 830; 24 T. L. R. 509), 354. Pennington v. Streight ( 54 Ind. 376), 1014. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Books (57 Pa. 343; 98 Am. Dec. 299), 2199. Pennsylvania v. KefTer (Addison [Pa.] 290), 2031. Pennsylvania v. McFall ( 1 Addi- son [Pa.] 257), 2040. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Xewmeyer (129 Ind. 401; 28 X. E. 860), 2194. Pennsylvania Co. v. State (142 Ind. 498; 41 X. E. 942). 228. Pennybaker v. State (2 Blackf. 484), 1369. People v. Ackerman (80 Mich. 588; 45 X. W. 367), 1121, 1319, 1377. People v. Acton (48 Barb. 524), 481. People V. Adair (44 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 444; 89 X. Y. Supp. 376), 1683. People V. Adams (95 Mich. 541; 55 X. W. 461), 19, 49, 1465, 1468, 1686, 1698. People V. Adams (17 Wend. 475), 1505. People V. Adolphi Club ( 149 X. Y. 5; 43 X. E. 410; 31 L. R. A. 510; 52 Am. St. 700; affirm- ing 79 Hun. 415; 29 X. Y. Supp. 789), 1327. People V. Anderson ( [Mich.] 123 X. W. 605), 1697, 1703. People V. Andrews (115 X. Y. 427 ; 22 X. E. 358 ; 6 L. R. A. 128, reversing 50 Hun, 591; 3 X. Y. Supp. 508 ) , 1325, 1342. People V. Aldrich (104 Mich. 455; 62 X. W. 570), 1450, 1483, 1525, 1574. People V. Andrews ( 22 Jones & S. 183), 651. People V. Andrus (74 X. Y. App. Div. 542; 77 X. Y. Supp. 780), 1609. People V. Angle (74 X. Y. App. Div. 539 ; 77 X. Y. Supp. 832 ) , 2035. People v. Arensberg (103 X. Y. 388; 57 Am. Rep. 741), 163. People V. Armstrong ( [Mich.] 16 Am. St. Rep. 584 [s. c. 41 X. W. 275]), 461. People V. Aro ( 6 Cal. 607 ; 65 Am. Dec. 503), 1484. People V. Bacon (117 Mich. 187; 75 X. W. 438), 1104, 1731. People V. Bagley (41 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 97; 83*' X. Y. Supp. 766), 1738. People V. Baird (11 Hun, 289), 1748. People V. Ball (42 Barb. 324), 1566. 1633. People V. Bashford (112 X. Y. Supp. 502; affirmed [X. Y. App. Div.]; 112 X. Y. Supp. 1143), 183, 235, 936. People v. Bates (61 X. Y. App. Div. 559; 15 X. Y. Cr. Rep. 469; 71 X. Y. Supp. 123), 1557. TABLE OF CASES. CCXXXl [References are to pages.] People V. Batting (49 How. Pr. 392), 2040, 2067. People V. Bauman (52 Mich. 584; 18 N. W. 309), 13G3, 1570, 1G42. People V. Beadle (60 Mich. 22; 26 N. W. 800), 292. People V. Beach (93 Mich. 25; 52 N. W. 1035), 824. People V. Beard (33 How. Pr. 32), 481. People V. Belencia (21 Cal. 544), 2062, 2067, 2072. People V. Bell ([N. Y.] 86 X. E. 1130; affirming 125 N. Y. App. Div. 205; 109 N. Y. Supp. 90), 2261. People V. Beller (73 Mich. 640); 41 K W. 827), 1120, 1123, 1124, 1134, 1702. People V. Bellet (99 Mich. 151), 215. People V- Bemmerly (98 Cal. 299; 33 Pac. 263), 2247. People V. Bennett (14 Hun, 63), 1810. People V. Bennett (107 Mich. 430; 65 N. W. 280), 1651. People V. Bennett (4 N. Y. Misc. 10; 23 N. Y. Supp. 695), 674. People V. Berdenstein (65 Mich. 65; 31 N. W. 623), 756. People V. Bird (138 Mich. 31; 100 N. W. 103; 11 Detroit Leg. N. 461; 67 L. R. A. 424), 1225. People V. Blake (65 Cal. 275; 4 Pac. 1), 2041, 2051, 2078. People V. Blake (52 Mich. 566; 18 N. W. 360), 1119, 1132, 1353, 1674. People V. Bloom (120 Mich. 45; 78 N. VV. 1015), 424. People V. Board (24 Hun, 195), 747. People V. Board (91 Hun, 269; 39 N. Y. Supp. 158), 564, 629, 674, 675. People V. Board of Commissioners of Police and Excise (59 N. Y. 92), 743. People V. Board ([X. Y.] 16 N. Y. Supp. 798), 627, 629, 643. People V. Board (17 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 98; 40 N. Y. Supp. 741), 741. People V. Board (32 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 123; 66 X. Y. Supp. 199), 850, 852. People V. Board (110 X. Y. Supp. 745), 2033. People V. Bouchard (82 Mich. 106; 46 X. W. 232; 9 L. R. A. 106), 503, 548, 1280. People V. Bouduin ( 12 X. Y. Cr. Rep. 244), 1739. People V. Bowkus ( 109 Mich. 360), 1119, 1125, 1128. People V. Bradley (58 Hun, 601; 11 X. Y. Supp. 594; 33 X. Y. St. Rep. 562), 1508, 1509. People V. Bradt (46 Hun, 445; 10 X. Y. Supp. 157; 7 X. Y. Cr. Rep. 444), 1499, 1673. People V. Bi-aisted ( 13 Colo. App. 532; 58 Pac. 796), 1188. People V. Bray (105 Cal. 344; 38 Pac. 731; 27 L. R. A. 158), 1261, 1264. People V. Breidenstein ( 65 Mich. 65; 31 X. W. 623), 1533, 1534. People V. Bronner (145 Mich. 399; 108 X. VV. 672; 13 Detroit Leg. X. 492), 1241, 1242, 1365. People V. Brooklyn (4 X. Y. 419), 793. People V. Brooklyn Police (59 X. Y. 92), 714, 743. People V. Brown (85 Mich. 119; 48 X. W. 158), 185, 224, 1759. People V. Brown (6 Parker Cr. Rep. 666), 1305. People V. iJriunbacii (24 HI. App. 501), 1869, 1872. ccxxxu TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] People V. Brunswick (13 X. Y. Misc. Rep. oM; 35 N. Y. Supp. 6od ) , 1)34. People V. Brush (41 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 56; 83 N. Y. Supp. 607; affirmed 92 N. Y. App. Div. 611; 86 X. Y. Supp. 1144), 934, 941. People V. Buffum (27 Hun [X. Y.] 216), 510 People V. Burns (77 Hun, 92; 28 X. Y. S. 300), 2261. People V. Bush (92 X. Y. App. Div. 611; 86 X. Y. Supp. 1144; 41 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 56; 83 X. Y. Supp. 607), 934. People V. Buss (238 HI. 593; 77 X. E. 840; affirming 111 111. App. 218), 391. People V. Butler (3 Cow. [X. Y.] 347), 261, 262. People V. Camp (142 Mich. 219; 105 X. W. 155; 12 Det. L. X. 665), 2025. People V. Cannon (236 HI. 179; 86 X. E. 215), 926, 927. People V. Cannon (139 X. Y. 32; 34 X. E. 759), 264, 265, 1585. People V. Carrell (118 Mich. 79; 76 X. \V. 118), 346, 469. People V. Case (153 Mich. 98; 116 X. W. 558), 218, 219, 365, 464. People V. Cassino (30 Hun, 388), 2061. People V. Cavanag^i (62 How. Pr. 187), 2040. People V. Chandler (41 X. Y. App. Div. 178; 58 X. Y. Supp. 794), 880. People V. Charbineau (115 X. Y. 433; 22 X. E. 271), 1452, 1741. People V. Chase (41 N. Y. App. Div. 12; 58 X. Y. Supp. 292), 1314, 1739. People V. Cliipman (31 Colo. 90; 71 Pac. 1108), C96. People v. Clark, 61 X. Y. App. Div. 500; 70 X. Y. Supp. 594), 1116, 1589. People V. Claverack ( 4 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 330; 25 X. Y. Supp. 322), 634, 674. People v. Clement ( [N. Y.] 112 X. Y. Supp. 951), 818. People V. Clement (58 N. V. Misc. Rep. 631; 111 N. Y. Supp. 1033), 719. People V. Clement ([X. Y.] 116 X. Y. Supp. 1098), 818. People V. Colleton (59 Mich. 573; 26 X. \Y. 771), 197, 1739. People V. Collins (3 Mich. 343), 121, 231, 233. People V. Combs (16 Hun, 577), 1760. People V. Compagnie Gen. (107 U. S. 59; 2 Sup. Ct. 87), 100. People V. Congdon (137 Mich. 133; 100 X. W. 266; 11 Detroit L. X. 236), 1098, 1544. People V. Converse ([Mich.] 121 X^. W. 475), 385, 1675. People V. Cooper (83 111. 585), 229. People V. Copen (20 Hun, 377), 1285. People V. Corey (148 X. Y. 478; 42 X. E. 1066), 2084. People V. Corey ([X. Y.] 118 X, Y. Supp. 23), 1184, People V. Cornyn (36 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 135; 72 X. Y. Supp. 1088), 1741. People V. Cox (70 Midi. 247; 38 X. W. 235), 1119, 1123, 1127, 1128. People V. Cox (106 X. Y. Div. 299; 94 X. Y. Supp. 526; affirming 45 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 311; 92 X. Y. Supp. 125), 963, 1495. People V. Cox (45 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 311; 92 N. Y. Supp. 125), 9G3. 904, 1757. People v. Craig (112 X'. Y. Supp. 1142), 295. TABLE OF CASES. ccxxxm rUeferences are to pages.] People V. Cramer (12 N. Y. €r. Rep. 4ti9; 47 N. Y. Supp. 1039), 1482, 1742. People V. Grilley (20 Barb. 246), 2, 3, 5, 23, 48, 82, 85, 966. People V. Creiger 138 111. 401; 28 N. E. 812), 107, 474, 424, 436. People V. Clotty (93 111. 180; affirming 3 Bradw. [III.] 405), 397, 405, 419. People V. Crotty (22 N. Y. App. Div. 77 ; 47 N. Y. Supp. 845 ) , 259, 1526. People V. Crowley (90 Mich. 366; 51 N. VV. 517), 133, 1127. People V. Cullimin (173 N. Y. 604; 66 N. E. 1114; affirming 67 N. Y. App. Div. 446; 73 N. Y. Supp. 987), '817, 818, 819, 820. People V. Cullinan ( 168 N. Y. 258; 61 N. E. 243; affirmed 69 N. Y. ,Supp. 1142), 817, 818. People V. Cullinan (90 N. Y. App. Div. 006; 85 N. Y. Supp. 1142, affirming 41 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 404; 84 N. Y. Supp. 1018), 818. People V. Cullinan 95 X. Y. App. Div. 598; 88 N. Y. Supp. 1022), '818. People V. Cullinan (111 N. Y. App. Div. 32 ; 97 N. Y. Supp. 194 ) , 817. People V. Cummerford (58 Mich. 328; 25 N. W. 203), 1119. 1122, 1134, 1303. People V. Cummins (47 ^lich. 334; 11 N. W. 184), 2057, 2078, 2086. People v. Curtis (95 Mich. 212; 54 N. W. 767), 1580. People V. Curtis ( 129 Mich. 1 ; 87 N. W. 1040; 8 Detroit L. N. 832), 1237. People V. Cutler (28 Hun, 465), 369. People V. Dalton (7 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 558; 28 N. Y. Supp. 491), 627, 629, 643. People V. Davis (45 Barb. 499; affirmed 36 N. Y. 77), 509, 532, 601, 682, 684. People V. Decarie (80 Mich. 578; 45 N. W. 491), 1525. People V. Decatur Tp. (33 Miclu 335), 806. People V. Deegan (88 Cal. 602; 26 Pac. 500), 2246, 2248. People V. Decker (28 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 699; 60 N. Y. Supp. 60; order affirmed 63 N. Y. Supp. 1113), 865, 880. People V. DeGroot (111 Mich. 245; 69 N. W. 248; 3 Det. L. N. 619), 497, 952, 1286, 1372. People V. Detroit (18 Mich. 445), 270. People V. Detroit (82 Mich. 471), 216, 271. People V. Dieterich (142 Mich. 527; 105 N. W. 1112; 12 Det. L. N. 798), 1650. People V. Dillon (8 Utah, 92; 30 Pac. 150), 2060, 2061. People V. Dippold (30 N. Y. App. Div. 62; 51 N. Y. Supp. 859), 1581, 1589, 1624, 1649. People v. Douglass ( 4 Cow. 26 ; 15 Am. Dec. 332), 2247. People v. Dowell (141 Cal. 493; 75 Pac. 45), 2038, 2077, 2078. People v. Draper ( 15 N. Y. 545 ) , 106. People V. Drennan (86 Mich. 445; 49 N. W. 215), 513, 1372. People V. Drew (5 Mason 28), 2134. People V. Dunne (218 111. 346; 76 X. E. 570), 391. People V. Dwyer (4 Pac. 451), 413. People V. Eastwood (14 X". Y. 562), 1631, 1735, 2000, 2067, 2172. CCXXXIV TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages.] People V. Eckman (63 Hun, 209; 18 N. Y. Supp. 654), 755, 756, 776, 777, 1223. People V. Edwards (42 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 567; 87 N. Y. Supp. 618), 880. People V. Everts (112 Mich. 194; 70 N. W. 430), 1187. People V. Excise Commrs. (64 Hun, 632; 18 N. Y. Sup. 621), 651. People V. Excise Commissioners (12 N. Y. Misc. Eep. 296; 34 N. Y. Supp. 22), 695. People V. Fellows (122 Gal. 233; 54 Pac. 830), 2038, 2051. People V. Ferris (55 Cal. 588), 2041, 2046, 2051, 2062. People V. Finley (38 Mich. 482), 2041. People V. Fish (125 N. Y. 136; 26 K E. 319)^ 2062, 2070, 2072. People V. Flynn (110 N. Y. App. Div. 279; 96 X. Y. Supp. 655; reversing 448 N. Y. Misc. Eep. 159; 96 N. Y. Supp. 653), 185, 186, 491, 560, 741. 819. People V. Forbes (52 Hun, 30; 4 N. Y. Supp. 757; 22 X. Y. St. Rep. 278), 749. People V. Foster (64 Mich. 715; 31 N. W. 596), 19, 49, 50, 497, 967. People V. Foster (27 N. Y". Misc. Rop. 576; 58 N. Y. Supp. 574), 909, 1683. People V. Fuller (2 Park. Rep. 16), 2039, 2062. People V. Gadway (61 Mich. 285; 28 N. W. 101), 244, 291, 436. People V. Gallagher ( 4 INIich. 244 ) , 103, 110. People V. Gamer (47 111. 246), 904. People V. Ganey (8 Hun, 60), 525. People V. Gantz (41 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 452; 85 N. Y. Supp. 79), 1741. People V. Garbutt (17 Mich. 9; 97 Am. Dec. 162), 2041, 2045, 2053. People V. Garrett (68 JVIich. 487; 36 N. W. 234), 1226, 1227, 1229. People V. Gaul (233 111. 630; S4 N. E. 721), 1756, 1761. People V. Gault (104 Mich. 575; 62 N. W. 724), 551, 1525. People V. Gaynor (33 N. Y. App. Div. 98; 53 N. Y. Supp. 86), 1735, 2034. People V. Gebheard ( 151 Mich. 192; 115 N. W. 54; 14 De- troit Leg. N. 885), 1264. People V. Gilkinson (4 Parker Or. Rep. 26), 1487, 1519. People V. Gosch (82 Mich. 22; 46 N. W. 101), 2056. People V. Gray (61 Cal. 164; 44 Am. Rep. 549), 251, 2249. People V. Gregg (59 Hun, 107; 13 N. Y^ Supp. 114), 533, 1476, 1477. People V. Greiser (67 Mich. 490; 35 X. W. 87 ) , 509, 540, 542. People V. Griesbach (211 111. 35; 71 X. E. 874; reversing 112 111. App. 192), 578, 586. People V. Griffith (146 Cal. 339; 80 Pac. 08 ) , 2038, 2009, 2082. People V. Haas (79 Mich. 449; 44 X. W. 928), 1524, 1739, 1742. People V. Haag (11 X. Y. App. Div. 74; 42 X. Y. Supp. 886), 578. People V. Haley (48 Mich. 495; 12 X. W. 671), 2067. People V. Hamilton (101 Mich. 87; 59 X. W. 401), 1253, 1490. People V. Hamilton (143 Mich. 1; 106 X. W. 275; 12 Detroit Leg. X. 897), 852, 870, 873, 877, 890. People V. Hamilton (25 N, Y. App. Div. 428; 49 X^. Y. Supp. 605), 580, 581. TABLE OF CASES. ecxxxv [References are to pages.] People V. Hamilton (27 N Y. Misc. R<^p. 308; 58 J<. Y. Supp. 584), G50, 910. People V. Hamilton (27 N. Y. Misc. Kep. 360; 58 N. Y. Supp. 959), 631, 869, 1683. People V. Hamilton (29 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 405; 61 N. Y. Supp. 979), 675. People V. Hammill (2 Park. Crim. Rep. 223), 2039, 20G0, 2061, 2071. People V. Hannon (59 Hun, 617; 19 Iv. Y. Supp. 117; 35 X. Y. St. Rep. 117), 533. People V. Haren (35 N. Y. Misc. Rep.- 590; 72 N. Y. Supp. 205), 1624, 1627. People V. Harmon (49 Hun, 558; 2 N. Y. Supp. 421), 1453. People V. Harris (29 Cal. 678), 2067. People V. Harrison (191 111. 257; 61 N. E. 99; affirming 92 111. App. 643), 73, 192, 419, 652. People V. Hart (1 Mich. 467), 1741. People V. Hart ( 24 How. Pr. 289 ) , 83, 85. People V. Hartmann (10 Hun, 602), 533, 575. People V. Hartstein (49 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 336; 99 N. Y, Supp. 272), 1228. People V. Hasbrouck (21 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 188; 47 N. Y, Supp. 109), 675, 902, 921. People V. Haug (08 Mich. 549; 37 N. W. 21), 208, 254. People V. Hawley (3 Mich. 330), 9, 43, 47, 85, 9«, 119, 129, 496, 966. People V. Hayne (83 Cal. Ill; 23 Pac. 1), 1015. People V. Hazard (23 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 477; 52 N. Y. Supp. 670), 1760. People V. Hazen (35 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 590; 72 N. Y. Supp. 205), 1504, 1509. People V. Heffron (53 Mich. 527; 19 N. W. 170), 1034, 1533. People V. Henschel (12 N. Y, Supp. 46), 85, 1613, 1712, 1760. People V. Henwood (123 Mich. 317; 82 N. W. 70), 220, 849, 934. People V. Henze (149 Mich. 130; 112 N. W. 491; 19 Det. L. N. 491), 1127, 1133. People V. Hicks (79 Mich. 457; 44 N. W. 931), 1578. People V. Higgins (56 Mich. 159; 22 N. W. 309), 1119, 1127. People V. Hill (7 Cal. 97), 294. People V. Hill (123 Cal. 47; 55 Pac. 692), 2038, 2068, 2069, 2082. People V. Hilliard (176 N. Y. 604; G8 N. E. 1122), 796. People V. Hilliard (178 N. Y. 582; 70 N. E. 1106; affirming 81 N. Y. App. Div. 71; 80 N. Y. Supp. 792), 818, 819. People V. Hilliard (28 N. Y. App. Div. 140; 50 N. Y. Supp. 909), 631. People V. Hilliard (40 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 589; 83 N. Y. Supp. 21; affirmed 85 N. Y. App. Div. 507; 83 N. Y. Supp. 204), 796. People V. Hilliard (81 N. Y. App. Div. 80 N. Y. Supp. 792), 732. People V. Hinchman (75 Mich. 587; 42 N. W. 1006; 4 L. R. A. 707), 843, 844, 1490. People v. Hislop (77 N. Y. 331; affirming 16 Hun 577), 1248, 1760. People V. Hobson (48 Mich. 27: 11 N. W. 771), 929, 1319, 1538, 1539. People V. Hoenig ( [N. Y.J 86 N. Y. Supp. 673), 1741. People V. Hofl'man ( 24 N. Y. App. Div. 233; 48 N. Y. Supp. 482), 1654. CCXXXVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] People V. Houghton (41 Hun 558), 737. People V. House of Good Shepherd (32 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 453; 15 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 145; 66 N. Y. Supp. 794), 2023. People V. Hower (151 Cal. 638; 91 Pac. 507), 2038, 2060, 2062, 2084. People V. Huflman (24 N. Y. App. Div. 233; 48 N. Y. Supp. 482), 1504. People V. Hughes (86 Mich. 180; 48 N. W. 945), 1357, 1359, 2248, 2252. People V. Hughes (90 Mich. 308; 51 X. W. 531), 1119, 1122, 1127. People V. Hughes (97 Mich. 543; 56 N. W. 942). 1123. People V. Huntington (4 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 187), HI, 316. People V. Husted (52 Mich. 624; 18 X. W. 388), 1485, 1539. People V. Ingraham (100 Mich. 530; 59 N. W. 234), 1185, 1753. People V. Jackson (8 Mich. 110), 270. People V. James (100 Mich. 522; 59 N. W. 236), 1123. People V. Jarvis (19 N. Y. App. Div. 466; 46 N. Y. Supp. 596), 786. People V. Jenness ( 5 Mich. 305 ) , 1746. People V. Johnson (86 Mich. 175; 48 N. W. 870; 13 L. R. A. 163), 2035. People V. Jones (63 Cal. 168), 2067, 2070. People V. Jones (2 Edw. Sel. Cas. 88), 2039, 2071. People V. Jones (2 Mich. X. 1'. 194), 2033, 2034, 2035. People V. Jorneau (147 Mich. 520; 111 X. W. 95; 13 Uet. L. N. 1115), 1381. People V. Judson (59 X^. Y. ^Misc. Rep. 538; 112 X. Y. Supp. 408), 67 L People V. Kansas (31 How. Pr. 334, note), 183. People V. Keefer (97 Mich. 15; 56 X. W. 105), 944, 945, 1448. People V. Kemmis (153 Mich. 117; 116 X. W. 554), 233. People V. Kemmler (119 X. Y. 580; 24 X. E. 9). 2062, 2085. People V. Kennedy (105 Mich. 75; 62 X. W. 1020). 345, 1537. People V. Kestner (101 X. Y. App. Div. 265; 91 X. Y. Supp. 1004), 1700, 1709. People V. King (27 Cal. 507; 87 Am. Dec. 95), 2061. People V. Kinney (124 Mich. 486; 83 X. W. 147), 1698. People V. Klass (115 Cal. 567; 47 Pac. 459), 2039. 2081. People V. Koerner (117 X. Y. App. Div. 40; 102 X. Y. Supp. 93; affirmed 191 X. Y. 528; 84- N. E. 1117), 2038, 2039, 2068. People V. Koob (109 Mich. 358; 67 X. W. 320), 1119, 1126. People V. Krank (110 X. Y. 488; 18 X. E. 242; reversing 46 Hun 032), 1304, 1307, 1308, 1600, 1G50. People V. Kridler (80 Mich 592; 45 X. W. 374), 1125. People V. Kriesel (136 Mich. 80; 98 X. W. 850; 10 Detroit Leg. X. 972), 1132, 1319. People V. Krushaw (31 How. Pr. 344 [note]), 186. People V. Lacy (124 Mich. 180; 82 X. W. 826), 346. People V. Lanamerts (18 X*. Y. Misc. 343; 40 X. Y. Supp. 1107; affirmed 14 X. Y. App. Div. 628; 43 X. Y. Supp. 1161), 580, 590. People v. Lane (100 Cal. 379; 34 Pac. 856), 2084. People V. Langton (67 Cal. 427), 2063. TABLE OF CASES. ccxxxvn ..References are to pages.] People V. Laning (73 Mich. 284; 41 N. W. 424), 765, 774, 779. People V. Lavin (4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 547), 1634. People V. Law & Order Club (203 111. 127; 67 N. E. 855; 62 L. R. A. 884), 1325, 1338. People V. Lawrence (30 Barb. [X. Y.] 190), 294. People V. Lawtoii (30 Mich. 386), 383. People V. Leary (105 Cal. 480; 39 Pac. 24), 2247. People V. Lee Chuck (78 Cal. 317; 20 Pac. 719), 2251. People V. Leonard! ( 143 X. Y. 300; 38 N. E. 372), 2072. People V. Lester (80 Mich. 043; 45 X. W. 492), 511, 1372. People V. Lewis (30 Cal. 531), 2041, 2045, 2062. People V. Leying (74 Mich. 579; 42 X. W. 139), 1192. People V. Longwell ( 120 Mich. 311; 79 X. W. 484), 1358. People V. Longwell ( 130 Mich. 302; 99 X. W. 1; 10 Detroit L. X". 1049), 820. People V. Luders (125 Mich. 440; 85 X. W. 1981; 8 Detroit L. N. 81), 1190, 1193. People V. Ludnell (130 Mich. 303; 99 X. E. 12; 11 Detroit Leg. X. 1), 1127, 1132, 1303. People V. Luhrs (7 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 503; 28 X. Y. Supp. 498), 1325. People V. Lupton (52 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 330; 103 X. Y. Supp. 172), 1540. People V. Lyman ( 156 X. Y'. 407 ; 50 X^. E. 1112; affirming 27 X. Y". App. Div. 527; 50 X^. Y. Supp. 497), 098, 099, 705. People V. Lyman (108 X. Y. 069; 01 X. E. 1133; affirming 53 X. Y^- App. Div. 470; 65 X. Y. Supp. 1002), 752, 818, 820. People V. Lyman (25 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 217; 55 X. Y. Supp. 70), 818, 820. Pe^ re (2 Con. Sur. 403: 20 X. Y. Supp. 649), 2137, 2147. Reed, Apeai of (114 Pa. 452; 6 All. 910), 621, 622. Reed v. Adams (2 Allen, 413), 1046, 1079. Reed v. Ball (42 Miss. 472), 183. ecliv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Eeed v. Collins (5 Cal. App. 494; 90 Pac. 973), 91, 103, 627, 628, 630. Eeed v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 44 S. W. 1093), 1379, 1380, 1381. Keed v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 4; 108 S. W. 368), 1186, 1615, 1716, 1732, 1733. Reed v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 109 S. W. 182), 1729. Reed v. Territory (1 Okla. Cr. App. 481; 98 Pac. 583), 1492, 1641, 1648, 1703, 1984. Reed v. Terwilliger (42 Hmi, 310), 1927, 1988. Reed v. Terwilliger (116 N. Y. 530; 22 N. E. 1091), 1954, 1987, 1988. Reese v. Atlanta (63 Ga. 344), 497, 503, 504, 1160. Reese v. Newman (120 Ga. 198; 47 S. E. 560), 452, 1084, 1209. Reeve v. Long ( 1 Salk. 227 ) , 1906 Regadanz v. Haines (168 Ind. 140; 79 N. E. 352), 206, 209, 286, 612, 614, 618. Regadanz v. State (171 Ind. 387; 86 K E. 449), 1444, 1510, 1512. Regan, In re (213 Pa. 279; 02 Atl. 841; reversing 28 Super. Ct. 386), 565, 759. Regan v. Wooten ([Tex.] 16 S. W. 546), 1851. Regdance v. Haines (168 Ind. 140; 79 N. E. 752), 606. Regina v. Aberdare (14 Q. B. 854), 569. Regina v. Adams (5 Manitoba, 153), 1316. 1697. Regina v. Alehurst (3 Vict. L. R. R. [Aufitr.] Ill), 682. Regina v. Alexander (17 Ont. App. 458). 1.555. Regina v. Allmey (35 J. P. 534), 547. Regina v. Altrincham (11 T. L. R. 3), 680. Regina v. Andover (55 L. J. M. C. 143; 16 Q. B. Div. 711; 55 L. T. 23; 34 W. R. 456; 50 J. P. 549), 670. Regina v. Anglesey (59 J. P. 743; 65 L. J. M. C. 12; 15 R. 614), 615, 620, 679. Regina v. Anglesey J. J. ([1892] 1 Q. B. 852), 654. Regina v. Armagh (1897] 2 Irish Rep. 57), 1159. Regina v. Armstrong (65 L. J. M. C. 35), 616, 620. Regina v. Ashton ( 1 E. L. & B. L. 286; 16 J. P. 790; 22 L. J. M. C. 61; 17 Jur. 501), 374. Regina v. Aulton (30 L. J. M. C. 129; 25 J. P. 09; 3 E. & E. 568: 3 L. J. 099; 9 W. R. 278; 16 Cox C. C. 259), 352. Regina v. Austin (17 Ont. Rep. 743), 1331, 1332, 1342, 1344. Regina v. Barrett ( 1 L. & C. 263 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 36; 7 L. T. 435: 11 W. R. 124), 724. Regina v. Barton (14 J. P. 738), 657. Regina v. Beard (13 Ont. 608), 1603. Regina v. Belmont (35 Up. Can. 298), 455. 468, 469. Regina v. Bennett (1 Ont. 445), 87, 1531, 1658, 1681, 1762. Regina v. Bigelow (36 Nov. Sco. 554), 1723. Regina v. Birley (55 J. P. 88), 570. Regina v. Bishop (5 Q. B. 259), 1251. Regina v. Blackburn J. J. ( 42 J. P. 775; 43 J. P. 111). 570. Regina v. Blakely (6 P. C. [Can.] Rep. 244), 2027. Regina v. Blair (24 N. B. 74), 1651. Regina v. Bodmin ([1892] 2 Q. B. 21; 56 J. P. 504; 61 L. J. M. C. 151; 66 L. T. 562; 40 W. R. 606; 8 T. L. R. 553), 657. TABLE OF CASES. cclv [Ileferences ;ire to pages.] Regina v. Booth (3 Ont. App. 144; 9 C. P. 452), 539, 711. Regina v. Boteler (4 B. & S. 959; 33 L. J. M. C. 101; 28 J. P. 453), 632. Regina v. Bowman (07 L. J. Q. B. 463 [1898]; 1 Q. B. 663; 78 L. T. 230; 62 J. P. 374; 14 T. L. R. 303), 654, 689. Regina v. Brady (12 Ont. 358), 1762. Regina v. Breen ( 36 Up. Can. 84 ) , 1372. Regina v. Bristol J. J. (5 R. 276; 57 J. P. 486; 68 L. T. 335; 41 W. R. 379), 656. Regina v. Bristol J. J. (67 J. P. 375), 620. Regina v. Brown (1 Q. B. 119; 64 L. J. M. C. 1; 72 L. T. 22; 43 W. R. 222: 50 J. P. 485; 15 Rep. 59), 378. Regina v. Brown (10 Ont. 41), 1724. Regina v. Brown (10 Ont. 41), 1755. Regina v. Cameron (12 Ont. 524), 1681. Regina v. Campbell (2 Pac. Rep. [Can.] 55), 1370. Regina v. Cavanagh ( 27 Com. PI. [Can.] 537), 1479, 1481, 1540. Regina v. Charles (24 Ont. 432), 1332, 1346, 1347. Regina v. Chertsey J. J. (3 Q. B. D. 374; 42 J. P. 598; 47 L. J. M. C. 104; 20 W. R. 682), 655. Regina v. Clark (15 Ont. 49), 1724. Regina v. Cockshott ([1898] 1 Q. B. 582 ; 62 J. P. 326 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 467; 78 L. T. 168; 14 T. L. R. 264), 744. Regina v. Commissioners (57 L. J. M. C. 92; 21 Q. B. Div. 569; 59 L. T. 378; 36 W. R. 692; 52 J. P. 390), 1299. Regina v. Conway (46 Up. Can. 85), 539. Regina v. Collier ( 12 Prac. Rep. [Can.] 316), 1483, 1484. Regina v. Collins (14 Ont. 613), 1739, 1762. Regina v. Cothan ([1898] 1 Q. B. 802 ; 62 J. P. 435 ; 14 T. L. R. 367; 67 L. J. Q. B. 632; 78 L. T. 468; 46 W. R. 512), 654, 711. Regina v. Coulter (4 Manitoba, 309), 1445, 1478. Regina v. Crewkerne J. J. ([1888] 21 Q. B. D. 85; 52 J. P. 372; 57 L. J. M. C. 127; 58 L. T. 450; 30 W. R. 629), 658. Regina v. Crothers (11 Manitoba, 567), 747. Regina v. Cruse (8 Car. & P. 541), 2073. Regina v. Curzon (L. R. 8 Q. B. 400; 42 L. J. M. C. 155; 37 J. P. 774; 29 L. T. 32; 21 W. R. 886), 710. Regina v. Darwen J. J. (39 L. T. [N. S.] 444), 570. Regina v. Davis (30 N. B. 248), 1448. Regina v. Davis (14 Cox C. C. 563; 28 Mack. Eng. Rtep. 657), 2054, 2067, 2073. Regina v. Deane ( 2 Q. B. 96 ) , 668. Regina v. Denbigh J. J. (59 J. P. 708»), 679. Regina v. Denham (35 Up. Can. Rep. 503), 840, 1192. Regina v. Denton (16 Q. B. 832; 18 Q. B. 761; 83 E. C. L. 701), 929. Regina v. Deputies (15 Q. B. 671), 679. Regina v. DeRutzen ( 1 Q. B. Div. 55; 40 J. P. 150; 33 L. T. 726; 24 W. R. 343; 45 L. J. M. C. 57), 547, 654. Regina v. Dickson (11 Cox C. C. 341), 2039. Regina v. Dixon (11 Cox C. C. 341), 2055. Regina v. Dobbins (48 J. P. 182), 350. cclvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Eegina v. Doody (6 Cox C. C. 463), 2039, 2077. Eegina v. Doyle (12 Out. 347), 1048, 1060. Eegina v. Dublin (8 L. R. Irish Rep. 274), 1152. Regina v. Duquette (9 U. C. C. P. [Can.] 28), 1263, 1322. Regina v. Durnion (14 Ont. 172), 1739. Regina v. Eales (44 J. P. 553; 42 L. T. 735), 680. Regina v. Edgar ( 15 Ont. Rep. 142), 1442, 1724, 1762. Regina v. Elborne ( 19 Ont. App. 439; reversing 21 Ont. 504), 840. Regina v. Eli (10 Ont. 727). 1755. Regina v. Elliott (12 Ont. 524), 1681, 1762. Regina v. Essex J. J. (46 J. P. 761), 679. Regina v. Excise Commissioners (2 T. R. 381), 76. Regina v. Farquliar L. R. (9 Q. B. 258; 39 J. P. 166), 020, 656, 079, 680. Regina v. Faulkner ( 20 Up. Can. Rep. 529), 1192. Regina v. Fee (13 Ont. 590), 1579. Regina v. Flynn (20 Ont. 638), 1643. Regina v. Frances (4 Cox C. C. 57), 2074. Regina v. French (34 IT. C. 403), 1322. Regina v. Gamble (8 Up. Can. 263), 420. Regina v. Gamlen (1 Fost. & F. 90), 2039. Regina v. Gibson (11 Vict. L. R. 94), 1251. Regina v. Gilroys (4 Sc. Sess. Cas. 3d series.' 056), 513, 1272, 1,352. 1355. Regina v. Gloucestershire J. J. (54 ' J. P. 519). 055. Regina v. Grannis (5 Manitoba, 153), 1132. Regina v. Green (12 P. R. 373), 1263. Regina v. Groom ([1901 J 2 K. B. 157; 65 J. P. 452; 70 L. J. K. B. 636; 49 W. R. 484; 84 L. T. 534; 17 T. L. R. 433), 620. Regina v. Guittard (30 Ont. 283), 262. Regina v. Haggard (30 Ujjp. Can. Rep. 152), lolG, 1540. Regina v. Halliday (21 App. [Ont.] 42), 1270. Regina v. Halpin (12 Ont. 330), 919, 1579. Regina v. Hampshire (44 J. P. 72), 1270. Regina v. Harrell ( 12 ilanitoba, 198, 522), 824. Regina v. Harris (2 B. C. 177), 1152. Regina v. Harris (13 Easl. 270), 657. Regina v. Heath (13 Ont. Rep. 471), 1218. Regina v. Hefferman ( 13 Ont. 016), 1048. Regina v. Henderson { 4 Terr. L. R. 146; 2 Can. Cr. Cas. 364), il32. Regina v. Herrell ( 12 Manitoba, 198, 522), 1643, 1044. Regina v. Higgins (18 Ont. 148), i.38. Regina v. Hobbs ([1898] 2 Q. B. 047: 62 J. P. 474, 551; 67 L. J. Q. B. 928; 79 L. T. 160; 14 T. L. R. 573; 47 W. R. 79), 379. Regina v. Hodge (23 Ont. Rep. 450). 1047." Regina v. Hodgins (24 Ont. 433), 1220, 1332, 1346. Regina v. Holland J. .J. (46 J. P. 312). 724. Regina v. Holland (1 T. R. 692), 657. TABLE OF CASES. cclvii [RefereRces are to pages.] Eegina v. Howard ([1902] 2 K. B. 363; 66 J. P. 579; 71 L. J. K. B. 754; 80 L. T. 839; 51 W. R. 21; 18 T. L. R. 690), 033. Regina v. Howard (45 Up. Can. 340), 1372. Regina v. Howard, Congleton J. J. (23 Q. B. D. 502; 53 J. P. 454; 60 L. T. 960; 37 W. R. 617), 656, 657, 681. Regina v. Hughes (2 Can. Cr. Cas. 5), 1332. Regina v. Hughes (29 Ont. Rep. 179), 1340. Regina v. Hull J. J. (47 J. P. 820), 709. Regina v. Humphrey ([1897] 2 Q. B. 242; 61 J. P. 548; 66 L. J. Q. B. 601; 77 L. T. 2; 46 W. R. 9; affirmed, H. L. [1890] A. C. 143; 68 L. J. Q. B. 392; 63 J. P. 260; 47 W. R. 580; 80 L. T. 538; 15 T. L. R. 266), 380. Regina v. Irland (31 Ont. Rep. 267), 1047. Regina v. James (12 J. P. 262), 567. Regina v. Jenkins (55 J. P. 824; 61 L. J. M. C. 57; 65 L. T. 857; 40 W. R. 318), 542. Regina v. Justices (2 Pug. [N. B.] 535), 262. Regina v. Justices (46 J. P. 312), 368, 535. Regina v. Keepers of the Peace (25 Q. B. Div. 257; 39 L. J. M. C. 146; 63 L, T. 243; 39 W. R. 11), 669. Regina v. Kennedy (17 Ont. 159), 1724, Regina v. Kennedy (10 Ont. 390), 1724. Regina v. Kensington J. J. (12 Q. B. 654; 12 J. P. 743). 547. Regina v. Kent J, J. (41 J. P. 263), 679. Regina v. King (57 L. J. M. C. 20; 20 Q. B. Div. 430; 58 L. T. 607; 30 W. R. 600; 52 J. P. 164), 1158. Regina v. King (20 Q. B. D. 43; '53 J. P. 164; 57 L. J. M. C. 20; 58 L. T. 607; 36 W. R. 600), 657, 658. Regina v. Kingston J. J. (66 J. P. 547; 86 L. T. 589; 18 T. L. R. 477), 656, 679. Regina v. Kirkdale J. J. ( 1 Q. B. Div. 49 ; 40 J. P. 39 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 36; 33 L. T. 603; 24 W. R. 205), 620. Regina v. Kirkdale (50 L. J. M. C. 24; 18 Q. B. Div. 248; 15 J. P. 214), 1127. Regina v. Klemp { 10 Ont. Rep. 143), 1449, 1738, 1755. Regina v. Knopp (2 E. & B. 447; 22 L. J. M. C. 139; 17 J. P. 599), 1142. Regina v. Lancashire J. J. (L. R. 6 Q. B. 97; 35 J. P. 170; 40 ].. J. M. C. 17; 23 L. T. 461; 19 W. R. 204), 633. Regina v. Lancashire J. .J. (54 J. P. 580; 64 L. T. 562), 655. Regina v. Langridge (24 L. J. Q. B. 73; 2 C. L. R. 1657), 547. Regina v. Lawrence (11 Q. B. Div. 638; 47 J. P. 596; 52 L. J. M. C. 114; 49 L. T. 244; 32 W. R. 20), 681, 708. Regina v. Leigh ( 4 Fost. & F. 915), 2055. Regina v. Lennox (26 Up. Can. 141), 468. Regina v. Liverpool J. J. (11 Q. B. Div. 644), 678, 704. Regina v. Local Government Board (10 Q. B. Div. 231), 658. Regina v. London J. J. (55 J. P. 56), 669. Regina v. Lyon (62 J, P. 357), 570. Regina v. McAuley (14 Ont. 643), 1263, 1370. cclviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Eegina v. McCoy (23 Ont. Rep. 442), 826, 840. Regina v, JMcGarry (24 Ont. Rep. 52), 1053. Regina v. McGauley (12 P. R. 259), 1263. Regina v. ^IcGregor (20 Ont. Rep. 115), 1370. Regina v. McKenzie (0 Ont. 165), 1263. Regina v. Mabey (37 Up. Can. 248), 1723. Regina v. IManchester J. J. ( [1899] 1 Q. B. 571; 63 J. P. 360; 68 L. J. Q. B. 358; 47 W. R. 410; 80 L. T. 531), 547, 676. Regina v. Manchester J. J. (20 Q. B. D. 430; 52 J. P. 164; 57 L. J. M. C. 20; 58 L. T. 607; 36 W. R. 600), 655. Regina v. ^Market Bosworth J. J. (51 J. P. 438; 57 L. T. 56; 35 W. R. 734; 56 L. J. M. C. 96), 681. Regina v. Marsh (25 N. B. 371), 1716, 1717, 1718. Regina v. iMarthye Tydvil J. J. (14 Q. B. Div. 584; 49 J. P. 213; 54 L. J. M. C. 78), 656, 679, 680. Regina v. Martin (21 Ont. App. 145), 469. Regina v. ^Mellon (4 Terr. L. R. 301), 1262, 1263. Regina v. Middlesex (3 B. & Ad. 938), 670. Regina v. Miskin, Higher J. J. ([1893] 1 Q. B. 275; 5 R. 121; 67 ].. T. 680; 41 W. R. 252; 57 J. P 263), 604, 623. Regina v. Monkhouse (4 Cox C. C. 55), 2039, 2073. Regina v. Monteith (15 Ont. 290), 803, 938. Regina v. Monmouth (L. R. 5 Q. B. 251; 34 J. P. 566; 39 L. J. Q. B. 77; 21 L. T. 748), 654. Regina v. Moore (3 Car. & K. 319; 10 Jur. 750), 2039, 2077. Regina v. Mount (30 Ont. Rop. 303; 3 Can. Cr. Cas. 209), 1249. Regina v. Munshall (1 N. & M. 277), 683, 685. Regina v. Newcastle, J. J. (51 J. P. 244), 658, 678, 681, 710. Regina v. Nicholson ([1899] 2 Q. B. 455; 68 L. J. Q. B. 1034; 64 J. P. 388; 48 W. R. 52; 81 L. T. 257; 15 L. T. R. 509), 654, 677. Regina v. Nicolson ( 10 Vict. L. R. 255), 536. Regina v. Northumberland J. J. (43 J. P. 271), 711. Regina v. Nurse ( 2 Can. Cr. Cas. 57), 1322. Regina v. O'Meare ( 14 Viet. L. R. 516), 347. Regina v. Palmer (46 Up. Can. 262), 691. Regina v. Parlee (23 Com. PI. [Can.] 359), 1479, 1481, 1540. Regina v. Patten (20 Ont. App. 516), 1047. Regina v. Patton (35 Upp. Can. 442), 686. Regina v. Pearson (9 Juta, 261), 1316. Regina v. Peckridge (61 L. J. M. C. 132; 66 L. T. 371; 56 J. P. 87), 561. Regina v. Pelly (66 L. J. Q. B. 519 [1897] 2 Q. B. 33; 76 L. T. 467; 45 W. R. 504; 61 J. P. 373; 18 Cox C. C. 556), 2028, 2030. Regina v. Penkridge (57 J. P. 87; 66 L. T. 371; 61 L. J. M. C. 132), 573. Regina v. Pilgrim (L. R. 6 Q. B. 96; 35 J. P. 169; 40 L. J. M. C. 3; 23 L. T. 410; 19 W. R. 99), .599, 622. Regina v. Powell ([1891] 1 Q. B. 718; 2 Q. B. 693; 55 J. P. 422; 56 J. P. 52; 65 L. T. 210; 60 L. J. Q. B, 594; 39 VV. R. 630), 709. TABLE OF CASES. cclix [References are to pages.] Rcgina v. Powell (62 L. J. M. C. 174 [1803]; 2 Q. B. 158; 5 R. 486; 70 L. T. 138; 57 J. P. 24), 569. Regina v. Powell ([1891] 2 Q. B. 693; 55 J. P. 422; 60 L. J. Q. B. 594; 65 L. T. 210; 39 W. R. 630; 56 J. P. 52), 658, 710. Regina v. Prince (L. R. 2 C. C. R. 154), 1251. Regina v. Radwell (5 Ont. 186), 1132, 1322. Regina v. Raffles (1 Q. B. D. 207 ; 40 J. P. 68; 45 L. J. M. C. 61; 34 L. T. 180; 24 W. R. 536), 1276. Regina v. Ramsay (11 Ont. 210), 1739. Regina v. Raynor ( 15 C. L. T. Que. N. 403), 1225, 1230, 1231. Regina v. Redditch (50 J. P. 246), 679, 680. Regina v. Rice (L. R. 1; C. C. R. 21; 25 L. J. M. C. 93; 13 L. T. 382; 14 VV. R. 56), 368, 374, 535, 724. Regina v. Richardson (20 Ont. Rep. 514), 1198. Regina v. Riley (53 J. P. 452), 570. Regina v. Risteen (22 N. B. 51), 954. Regina v. Robson (57 J. P. 133), 657. Regina v. Roddy (41 U. C. 291), 1322. Regina v. Rodds J. J. ([1905] 2 K. B. 40; 69 J. P. 210; 74 L. J. K. B. 599; 53 W. R. 559; 93 L. T. 319; 21 T. L. R. 391), 655. Regina v. Roper (63 L. J. M. C. 68; 10 R. 598; 70 L. T. 409; 58 J. P. 512), 531. Regina v. Rymer (2 Q. B. Div. 136; 46 L. ,T. M. C. 108; 41 J. P. 199; 25 W. R. 415), 362, 1159. Regina v. Rynier (2 Q. B. Div. 136; 46 L. J. M. C. 108; 41 J. P. 199; 25 VV. R. 415) 2028. Regina v. Rymer (2 Q. B. Div. p. 140), 1159. Regina v. Sainsbury (4 T. R. 451), 657. Regin? v. Salford (18 Q. B. 687), 547. Regina v. Saner (3 B. C. Rep. 308), 1313. Regina v. Scott ([1889] 22 Q. B. D. 481; 53 J. P. 119; 58 L. J. M. C. 78; 37 W. R. 301; 60 L. T. 231), 657. Regina v. Scott (34 Up. Can. Rep. 20), 1193. Regina v. Sharp (42 Sol. J. 572), 569. Regina v. Shavelear (11 Ont. 727), 863, 938. Regina v. Sheffield J. J. (63 J. P. 595), 1276. Regina v. Sherman ([1898] 1 Q. B. 578; 62 J. P. 296; 67 L. J. Q. B. 460; 46 W. R. 367; 78 L. T. 320; 14 L. T. R. 269), 534, 623, 676. Regina v. Shropshire (8 A. & E. 173), 569. Regina v. Slattery (20 Ont. Rep. 148), 1340. Regina v. Slattery (26 Ont. Rep. 148), 1332. Regina v. Sloan (18 Ont. App, 482), 1047. Regina v. Smith (31 J. P. 259; 15 L. T. 178), 1276. Regina v. Smith (42 J. P. 295), 700, 709. Regina v. Southport J. J. (L. R. 8 Q. B. 146; 37 J. P. 214; 28 L. T. 129; 21 W. R. 382; 42 L. J. M. C. 46), 657. Regina v. Southwick (21 Ont. Rep. 670), 1311. Regina v. Spiero (4 Austr. L. R. [C. N.] 42), 1314. cclx TABLE OF CASES, [References are to pages.] Eegina v. Sproule (14 Ont. 375), 1579, 1739, 1755. Kegina v. Stafford (22 C. P. 177), 715. Regina v. Staffordshire J. J. R. (14 Q. B. D. 13; 49 J. P. 30; 54 L. J. M. C. 17; 15 L. T. [N. S.] 534; 33 W. R. 205), 655. Regina v. Stannard ( 1 L. & C. 349; 33 L.. J. Mc. 61; 9 L. T. 428; 12 W. R. 208; 28 J. P. 20), 724. Regina v. Stechlan (20 C. P. [Can.] 182), 799. Regina v. Stranahan (20 Can. Cr. Cas. 182), 1188, 1192. Regina v. Surry (52 J. P. 423), 670, 1298. Regina v. Sykes ( 1 Q. B. D. 52 ; 40 J. P. 39; 45 L. J. M. C. 39; 78 L. T. 566; 24 W. R. 141), 655. Regina v. Sylvester (31 L. J. ..i. €. 93; 26 J. P. 151; 2 B. & C. 322; 5 L. T. 794; 8 Jur. [N. S.] 484), 633. Regina v. Sylvester (50 J. P. 246), 649. Regina v. Templeton (3 Viet. L. R. 24), 711. Regina v. Thomas ([1892] 1 Q. B. 426; 56 J. P. 151; 61 L. J. M. C. 141; 66 L. T. 289; 40 W. R. 478). 649, 655, 657, 681, 709, 710. Regina v. Thornton (62 J. P. 196), 676. Regina v. Tott (25 J. P. 327; 30 L. J. M. C. 177; 4 L. T. 306; 9 W. R. 663), 350, 692, 1146. Regina v. Upper Osgoldcross (52 J. P. 823; 62 L. T. 112), 709, 710. Regina v. Vine (L. R. 10 Q. B. 195; 39 J. P. 213; 44 L. J. IVI. C. 60; 31 L. T. 842; 23 W R. 649), 529, 532, 682, 684, 1572. Regina v. Walker (13 Ont. 83), 1048, 1066. Regina v. Walsall (24 L. T. [0. S.] Ill; 18 J. P. 757; 3 W. R. 69; 3 C. L. R. 100), 633. Regina v. Walsh (2 Ont. 206), 1681, 1762. Regina v. Walsh (29 Ont. Rep. 36), 1311. Regina v. Walton (34 C. L. J. 746), 13, 14, 44. Regina v. Welby (54 J. P. 183), 709, Regina v. West Riding J. J. (L. R. 5 Q. B. 33; 34 J. P. 44; L. J. M. C. 17; 10 B. & S. 840), 619. Regina v. West Riding J. J. (11 Q. B, Div. 917; 48 J. P. 149; 92 L. J. M. C. 99), 671. Regina v. West Riding J. J. (21 Q. B. Div. 258; 52 J. P. 455; 57 L. J. M. C. 103; 36 W. R. 258), 684, 708, 709. Regina v. West Riding J. J. (59 J. P. 278), 709. Regina v. West Riding J. J. ([1898] 1 Q. B. 503; 62 J. P. 197; 67 L. J. Q. B. 279; 78 L. T. 47; 46 W. R. 334; 14 T. L, R. 89; M. & W. Dig. 74), G58, 711. Regina v. Westlake (21 Ont. Rep. 619). 1212. Regina v. Wharton ([1895] 1 Q. B. 227; 64 L. J. M. C. 74; 72 L. T. 29; 15 Rep. 102; 18 Cox C. C. 70), 378. Regina v. White (21 Can. Pr. 354), 1322, 1509. Regina v. Wigg (2 Ld. Raym. 1163), 1455. Regina v. Wilkinson (10 L. T. 370; 28 J. P. 597), 633. Regina v. Williams (42 Up. Can. 402), 1370, 1372. Regina v. Williams (8 Man. Rep. 342: 12 Can. L. T. 282), 1132, 1316, 1322. TABLE OF CASES. celxi [References are to pages.] Eegina v. Woodhouse, Ex parte Ryder ([llXXi] 2 K. B. 501; 70 J. P. 485; 75 L. J. K. B. 745; 95 L. T. 367; 22 T. L. R. 603), 656. Regina v. Worcester J. J. ([1899] 1 Q. B. 59; 62 J. P. 836; 68 L. J. Q. B. 109; 47 W. R. 134; 79 L. T. 393; 15 T. L. R. 45; 19 Cox C. C. 198), 558, 667. Regina v. Word (C. & P. 366), 1723. Regina v. Yeomans (24 J. P. 149), 2169. Regina v. Yeoveley (8 A. & E. 806), 1723. Regina v. Yorkshire J. J. ([1898] 1 Q. B. 503 ; 62 J. P. 197 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 279; 78 L. T. 47; 46 W. R. 334; 62 J. P. 197; M &. W. Dig. 74), 707. Regina v. Young ( 1 Burr. 556 ) , 657. Regina v. Young ( 5 Ont. Rep. 184a), 1478. Regina v. Young (7 Ont. 88), 1263, 1643. Regina v. Young (8 Ont. 476), 262, 1270. Regit V. Bell (77 111. 593), H87. Reich V. State (53 Ga. 73), 270. Reich V. State (63 Ga. (il6), 1240, 1241, 1515, 1563. Reichard v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. (31 Mo. 518), 2228. Reid V. Colorado (187 U. S. 146; 23 Sup. Ct. 29), 1438. Reiger v. Commissioners, etc. (70 N. C. 319), 904. Reigner, In re (11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 401), 622. Reilly's Estate, In re (0 Pa. Dist. Rep. 252), 701. Reinhard v. Mayor, etc. (2 Daly [N. Y.] 243), 470. Reinhart v. State (29 Ga. 522), 1246. Reinicker v. Smith (2 Harr. & J. 421), 2093. Rein.skopf v. Rogge ( 37 Ind. 207 ) , 2092, 2110, 2116. Reisenberg v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 84 S. W. 585), 965, 971. Reithmiller v. People (44 Mich. 280; 6 N. W. 667), 140, 185, 456, 488, 494, 790, 1121, 1304. Rencour, In re ( [N. H.] 52 Atl. 930), 995. Renfro v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 91 S. W. 576), 1198. Renfrew v. U. S. (3 Okla. 170; 41 P. 88), 1262. Reniger V. Fogossa (1 Plowd. 19), 2039. Rennie's Case (1 Lewin, C. C. 76), 2054. Rennie's Case (4 Coke, 76), 2039. Reno V. State ([Tex.] 117 S. VV. 129), 926. Reno V. State ( [Tex.] 120 iS. W. 429), 1601. Renshaw v. Lane (49 Ore. 526; 89 Pac. 147), 934. Rerchenbach v. Ruddach ( 127 Pa. 564; 16 Atl. 432; 24 Wkly. N. C. 476), 2151. Republic of Hawaii v. Warbel ( 1 1 Hawaii, 221), 953. Respublica v. Weidle (2 U. S. 2 Dall. 88; 1 L. Ed. 301), 2040. Retsbottom, In re (42 Up. Can. 358), 907. Reu's Appeal, In re ( [Pa.] 38 W. N. C. 438), 621. Reubottom, In re (42 Upp. Can. 358), 894. Reusch V. Lincoln (78 Neb. 828; 112 N. W. 377), 525, 849. Renter v. State (43 Tex. Cr. App. 572; 67 S. W. 505), 1320, 1321. Rex V. Altenkirch ( 18 Juta, 33S ) , 1264. Rex V. Athay (2 Burr. 653), 689. Rex V. Atwood (4 B. & Ad, 481), 294. cclxii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Rex V, Balme (2 Cowp. 650), 2169. Kex V. Barlow (18 Juta, 478), 1215. Rex V. Bath ([1904] 2 K. B. 570; &8 J. P. 438; 73 L. J. K. B. 845; 91 L. T. 383; 20 T. L. R. 526 ) , 642. Rex V. Bell ( 8 East. Dist. Ct. Rep. 3), 1195. Rex V. Bigelow (36 Nov. Sco. 559), 1571, 1786, 1787, 1789. Rex V. Boomer ([1908] 15 Ont. App. 321), 1377. Rex V. Brien (38 X. B. 381), 1724. Rex V. Bristol, J. J. (67 J. P. 375; 89 L. T. 474; 19 T. L. R. 596), 620, 678. Rex V. Byron (37 X. B. 383), 1724. Rex V. Carroll (7 €ar. & P. 145), 2067. Rex V. Cohen (21 Juta, 676), 695. Rex V. Davis (38 X. B. 335), 1755. Rex V. Davia (Sayer, 163), 2169. Rex V. J. Deaville ([1903] 1 K. B. 468; 72 L. J. K. B. 272; 67 J. P. 82; 51 W. R. 004; 88 L. T. 32; 19 1. L. R. 223), 379. Rex V. Dickenson ( 1 Sand. Wms. ed. 135, note), 1455. Rex V. Dixon (3 Maule & S. 11), 1353. Rex V. Downs ( 3 T. R. 560 ) , 682, 684. Rex V. Fenkner (2 Keb. 506 pi. 79), 104. Rex V. Francis ( 18 Juta, 57 ) , 1264. Rex V. Gillingham (2 Hawaii, 750), 1643. Rex V. Gontshe (6 East. Dist. Co. Rep. 280), 1169. Rex V. Groom (70 L. J. K. B. 636; [1901] 2 K. B. 157; 84 L. T. 534; 49 W. R. 484; 65 J. P. 452), 670, 677. Rex V. Hammerschlag (21 Juta, 399), 348. Rex V. Heath (Russand R. 184), 1080. Rex V. Hoffman (22 Juta, 32), 518. Rex V. Howard, J. J. ([1902] 2 K. B. 363; 66 J. P. 579; 71 L. J. K. B. 754; 51 W. R. 21; 86 L. T. 839; 18 T. L. R. 690), 679. Rex V. Huggins (2 Lord Reym. 1574), 1351. Rex V. Johnston (75 L. J. K. B. 229; [1906] 1 K. B. 228; 94- L. T. 377; 54 W. R. 347; ,30 J. P. 118; 22 T. L. R. 226), 499. Rex V. Joplin (19 Juta, 502), 1264. Rex V. Kay (38 X. B. 325), 1716, 1763. " Rex V. Kingston, J. J. (86 L. T. 589; 66 J. P. 547), 648, 679. Rex V. Laird ([1903] 6 Ont. L. R. 180), 371. Rex V. Logan (6 CoUinson, 86), 1154. Rex V. Mac Williams ( 7 East. Dist. Ct. Rep. 15), 1228. Rex V. Manchester, J. J. (08 L, J. Q. B. 358 [1899]; 1 Q. B. 571; 8 L. T. 531; 47 W. R. 410; 63 J. P. 360), 534. Rex V. Marsh (36 X. B. 186), 1571. Rex V. Mathebus (20 Juta, 403), 1176, 1178. Rex V. Meakin (7 Car. & P. 297), 2039. 2071. Rex V. Medley (6 Car. & P. 292), 1353. Rex V. Meehan ([1905] 2 Irish Rep. 577). 2018. Rex V. Meikleham ([1906] 11 Ont. App. L. R. 366; 10 Can. Cr. Cas. 382). 1300. Rex V. Xornian (19 Juta, 200), 2029. 2032. Rex V. Xortli (6 D. & Ry. 143), 1540. TABLE OP CASES. cclxiii [References are to pages.] Kex V. O'Brien (38 N. B. 381), 1571. Rex V. Parsons (20 Juta, 140), 1357. Rex V. Reese (21 Juta, 197), 1192, 1193. Rex V. Robinson (2 Burr. 799), 2169. Rex V. Rogiers ( 1 B. & C. 272; 2 D. & Ry. 431), 374. Rex V. Stern (20 Juta, 564), 1264. Rex V. Sunderland ([1901] 2 K. B. 357; 70 L. J. K. B. 946; 65 J. P. 598; 85 L. T. 183; 17 T. L. R. 551), 676. Rex V. The Company, etc. ( 8 Tenn. R. 356), 294. Rex V. Thomas (7 Car. & P. 817), 2039, 2059, 2061, 2067. Rex V. Turner (5 M. & S. 506), 1642. Rex V. Tyrone Justice ([1901] 2 Irish Rep. 497), 570. Rex V. Walker (21 Juta, 195), 1208. Rex V. Wall (7 Hawaii, 760), 549. Rex V. Ward (21 N. Z. 506), 363, 1257. Rex V. Weddell (22 Juta, 261), 1358. Rex V. West Riding, J. J. (21 Q. B. Div. 258; 52 J. P. 455; 57 L. J. M. C. 103; 36 W. R. 258), 733. Rex V. Wexford, J. J. ([1904] 2 Irish Rep. 251), 718. Rex V. Willett (19 Juta, 168), 1264. Rex V. Willowby (1 East. P. C. 288), 2028. Rex V. Woodhouse ([1906] 2 K. B. 501; 75 L. J. K. B. 745; reversed [ 1907] A\)p. Cas. 420 ; 71 J. P. 484; 76 L. J. K. B. 1032; 97 L. T. 261). 547, 676, 677. Rex V. Wynne (21 Juta, 679), 1357. Reyfelt v. State (73 Miss. 415; IS So. 925), 5, 967. Reyman Brewing Co. v. Bristor 92 Fed. 28), 543, 1270. Reyman Brewing Co. v. Brister 179 U. S. 445; 45 L. Ed. 269; 21 Sup. Ct. 201), 537. Reynolds, Ex parte (87 Ala. 138; 6 So. 335), 431, 432. Reynolds v. Commonwealth ( 106 Ky. 37; 49 S. W. 969; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1681), 1470. Reynolds v. Deary (26 Conn. 179), 1780. Reynolds v. Dechaums (24 Tex. 174; 76 Am. Dec. 101), 2094, 2098. Reyjiolds v. Geary (26 Conn. 179), 98, 109, 123, 149, 150, 153, 313, 1800. Reynolds v. Reynolds (44 Minn. 132; 46 N. W. 236), 2154. Reynolds v. State (73 Ala. 3), 1175. Reynolds v. State (52 Fla. 409; 42 So. 373), 1380, 1381, 1602. Reynolds v. State (32 Tex. Cr. App. 36; 22 S. W. 18), 1627, 1646. Reynolds v. Waller ( 1 Wash. [Va.] 164), 2094, 2098, 2130. Reynoldsville Distilling Co., In re (34 Pa. Super. Ct. 209), 664. Reznor Hotel Co., In re (34 Pa. Super. Ct. 525), 536, 546, 619, 626, 629, 630, 632, 640, 647. Rhinehart v. Long (95 Mo. 396), 426. Rhoads v. Commonwealth ( [Pa.] 6 Atl. 245; reversing i Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 639), 821, 1757. Rhode Island, etc., Co. v. Board ([R. 1.] 46 Atl. 1063), 616, 618. Rhode Island Society v. Budlong (21 R. I. 577; 25 Atl. 657), 67.3, 677. cclxiv TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages.] Hhode Island Society v. Cranston (21 R. I. 577; 44 Atl. 223), 677. Ehode Island, etc., Co. v. Dwyer (19 R. I. 643; 36 Atl. 2), 603, 604. Ehode Island, etc., Co. v. Evaston (21 R. I. 577; 44 Atl. 223), 670. Rhodes v. Bowden ( 26 X. Z. 1097 ) , 1265. Rhodes v. Iowa (170 U. S. 412: 18 S. Ct. 664; reversing 90 Iowa, 496; 58 N. W. 887; 24 L. R. A. 245), 323, 324, 327, 1433. Rhyner v. Menasche ( 107 Wis. 201; S3 N. W. 303), 2174, 2186. Rice, In re (95 X. Y. App. Div. 28; 88 X. Y. Supp. 512), 854, 867, 869, 870, 873, 890. Rice V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 61 S. W. 473; 22 Ky. L.' Rep. 1793), 945. Eice V. Foster (4 Harr. [Del.] 479), 231, 240. Rice V. Peet (16 Johns. 503), 2094. Rice V. People (38 111. 435), 1505. Rice V. Schlopp (78 Iowa, 753; 41 X. W. 603), 991. Eice V. State (3 Kan. 135), 216, 271. Eice V. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 359; 107 S. W. 833), 1606, 1701. Eichard v. Carrie ( 145 Ind. 49 ; 43 X. E. 949), 1585. Eichards v. Banks (58 L. T. 634; 52 J. P. 23), 31. Eichards v. Bayonne (61 X. J. L. 496; 39" Atl. 708), 460, 1 129. Eichards v. Columbia (55 X. H. 96), 383. Eichards v. Kirkpatrick (53 Cal. 433), 1027. Eichards v. Mobile (208 U. S. 480; 28 Sup. Ct, 372; 52 L. Ed. — ), 331. Eichards v. Moore (62 Vt. 217; 19 Atl. 390), 1959. Eichards v. Richards ( 19 111. App. 465), 65, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2161. Eichards v. Eevitt ([1877] 7 Ch. D. 224; 44 L. J. Ch. 472; 26 W. E. 166; 37 L. T. 632), 1813. Eichards v. Stogsdell (21 Ind. 74), 798. Eichards v. Swansea, etc., Co. ( 9 Ch. Div. 425), 691. Eichards v. \Voodward (113 Mass. 285), 316, 1799. Eichardson v. Commonwealth (11 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 367), 512, 1601. Eichardson v. Commonwealth ( 76 Va. 1007), 1190. Eichardson v. Foster (73 Miss. 12; 18 So. 573; 55 Am. St. 481), 2253, 2254. Eichardson v. State (3 Ga. App. 313; 59 S. E. 916), 1128. Eichardson v. Wilmington, etc., E. Co. (8 Eich. L. 120), 2180. Eichland Co. v. Eichland Center (59 Wis. 591; 18 X. W. 497), 201. Eichler, Ex parte (1 L. X. [Can.] 59), 733. Eichler v. Judah (1 L. X. [Can.] 591) 734. Richmond v. Dudley (129 Ind. 112; :iS X. E. 312; 13 L. R. A. 587), 454. Richmond v. Shickler { 57 Iowa, 486; 10 X. W. 882), 811, 1914, 1916, 1924, 1989. Eiehter v. State (156 Ala. 127; 47 So. 163), 852, 872, 878, 893, 894, 908, 918, 93.3. Eiehter v. State (63 Miss. 304), 1227. Rickert v. People (79 111. 85), 1341. TABLE OF CASES. cclxv [References are to pages.] Riddell v. Neilson (5 F. [J. C] 57), 353. Riden v. Grimm (97 Tenn. 220; 36 S. W. 1097; 35 L. R. A. 587), 1850, 1851, 1853, 189G, 1897, 1939. Rider v. State (26 Tex. App. 334; 9 S. W. 688), 2247. Ridley v. Greiner (117 Iowa, 679; 91 N. W. 1033), 984. Ridley v. Lamb ( 10 Up. Can. 354), 2186. Ridling v. State (56 Ga. 601), 1630. Riggs V. State ([Neb.] 121 N. W. 588), 1075, 1082, 1085, 1659, 1756, 1762. Riggs V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 96 S. W. 25), 1472, 1696. Riggs V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 97 S. W. 482), 915, 1472. Riley v. Bancroft (51 Neb. 864; 71 N. W. 745), 551. Riley v. Rowe (112 Ky. 817; 66 S. W. 999; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2168), 630, 646, (353. Riley v. State (43 Miss. 397), 1171, 1178, 1358, 1505, 1598. Riley v. Trenton (51 N. J. L. [22 Vroom] 498; 18 Atl. 116), 397, 420. Rindskoff v. Curran (34 Iowa, 325), 1790. Rineman v. State (24 Ind. 80), 1240, 1241, 1628. Ring V. Nichols (91 Me. 478; 40 Atl. 329), 1028, 1037. Ring V. Ring (112 Ga. 854; 38 ,S. E. 330), 63, 64, 67, 68, 2154. Rintleman v. Hahn (20 Tex. Civ. App. 244; 49 S. W. 174), 1922. Rippey v. State (44 Tex. Civ. App. 72; 73 S. W. 15), 110, 120. Rippy V. State (68 S. W. 687), 194. Ristine v. Clements (31 Ind. App. 338; 66 N. E. 924), 799. Riteliie, In re (18 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 341; 40 N. Y. Supp. 1106), 580. Ritchie v. Zalesky (98 Iowa, 589; 67 N. W. 399), 341, 344, 995. Ritter, Appeal of (59 Pa. St. 9), 2094, 2105, 2106, 2144. Ritz V. Lightson ( [Cal.] 103 Pac. 303), 424, 429. Rizer v. Topper (133 Iowa, 628; 110 N. W. 1038), 977, 980, 086. Roach V. Kelly (194 Pa. St. 24; 44 Atl. 1090), 1875. Roach V. Springer (75 S. W. 933 [Tex.]), 1889, 1951. Roach V. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 500; 84 S. W. 586), 1211, 1611. Robb V. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 101 S. W. 918; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 246 ) , 2038, 2068. Robbins v. People (95 111. 175), 271. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District (120 U. S. 489, 493; 7 Sup. Ct. 592), 156, 157, 316, 330. Roberson v. Lambertville (38 N. J. L. 69), 1189, 1454, 1478,1502, 1508, 1521. Roberson v. State (100 Ala. 123; 14 So. 869), 962, 1169, 1475. Roberson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 91 S. W. 578), 1210. Robert's Estate, In re (197 Pa. 621; 47 Atl. 987), 2019. Roberts v. Clinmire (46 Up. Can. 264), 462, 1249. Roberts v. Hopper (55 Neb. 599; 76 N. W. 21), 2008. Roberts v. Humphreys (L. R. 8 Q. B. 483; 42 L. J. M. C. 147; 38 J. P. 135; 29 L. T. 387; 21 W. R. 885), 1150. Roberts v. O'Connor (33 Me. 496), 1374. Roberts v. People (19 Mich. 401), 2051, 2052, 2067, 2070, 2074, 2075. eclxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Hoberts v. State (26 Fla. 360 7 So. 861), 505, 506, 1533. Roberts v. State (114 Ga. 541 40 S. E. 750), 230, 251. Roberts v. State (4 Ga. App. 207 60 S. E. 1082), 4, 10, 14, 17, 51, 53, 55, 295, 342. Roberts v. State (14 Mo. 138), 2035. Roberts v. State ( 52 Tex. Cr. App. 355; 107 S. W. 59), 1128, 1349, 1555, 1616, 1691. Roberts v. lay lor (19 Neb. 184; 27 N. VV.'87), 1940, 1994. Robert Porter Brewing Co. v. Southern Express Co. ( [Va.] 63 S. E. 6), 956. Robertson v. Moore ( 15 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 240), 926. Robertson v. People (20 Colo. 279), 264, 1585. Robertson v. State (5 Tex. App. 155), 930, 933. Robertson v. State ( 12 Tex. App. 541), 495, 716, 928, 933. Robinius v. State (63 Ind. 235), 1240, 1242, 1627, 1751. Robinson, Ex parte (12 Xeb. 263), 791. Robinson v. Americus (121 Ga. 180; 48 S. E. 924), 452. Robinson v. Baker (5 Cush. [Mass.] 137), 1070. Robinson v. Bank, etc., 18 Ga. 65), 294. Robinson v. Barrows (48 Me. 186), 1031, 1776. Robinson v. Bidwell (23 Cal. 379), 233. Robinson v. Charleston (2 Rich. 317), 811. Robinson v. Commonwealth ( 7 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 453), 543. Robinsfjn v. Commonwealth (6 Dana, 287), 1746. Robinson v. Ilaug (71 ^lich. 38; 46 N. E. 941), £12. Robinson v. Mayor, etc. ( 1 Humph. 156; 34 Am, Dec. 627), 461. Robinson v. Miner (68 Mich. 549; 37 X. W. 21), 189, 1016. Robinson v. Piocae (5 Cal. 460), 2171, 2172, 2187. Robinson v. Randall (82 111. 521), 1751, 1974. Robinson v. Riffey (111 Ind. 112; 12 N. E. 141), 467. Robinson v. Rockland, etc., St. E. Co. (87 Me. 387; 32 Atl. 994; 29 L. R. A. 531), 2207. Roberson v. State (99 Ala. 1S9; 13 So. 532), 1197. Robinson v. State (38 Ark. 548), 1567. Robinson v. State (38 Ark. 641), 1.365, 1366. Robinson v. State (59 Ark. 341; 27 S. W. 233), 1167. Robinson v. State (130 Ga. 361; 60 S. E. 1005), 2068. Robinson v. State (84 Ind. 452), 225, 226. Robinson v. State (113 Ind. 510; 16 X. E. 184), 2040, 2080. Robinson v. State (24 Tex. App. 4; 5 S. W. 509), 369, 389, 1575. Robinson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 75 S. W. 526), 954, 1558, 1705. Robinson v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 565; 110 S. W. 90S), 178, 1717, 1722, 1723. Robinson v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 567; 110 S. W. 905), 1202, 1558, 1654. Robinson v. Waddington (13 Q. B. 753), 569. Robinson v. Weingale (36 Tex. Civ. App. 65; 83 S. W. 182), 925. Robson V. Doyle (191 111. 506; 61 X. E. 435), 426. Robison v. Haug (71 Mich. 38; 38 X. W. 668), 110, 195. Roblin V. Roblin (28 Grant. Ch. [U. C] 439), 2109, 2114. Robv V. .State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] '37 S. W. 651), 957. TABLE OF CASES. cclxvii [References are to pages.] Roche, In re (7 N. Z. L. R. 206 ) , 536. RoclKster v. Harrington ( 10 Wend. [N. Y.] 547), 394. Rochester v. Upman ( 19 Minn. 108), 418, 549. Rock Island v. Vanlandsehoot (78 111. 485), 2171, 2187. Rock Co. V. Edgerton (90 Wis. 28«; 63 N. W. 291), 808. Rodden v. License Commissioners (IR. I.] 21 Atl. 1020), 747. Roden v. State (136 Ala. 89; 34 So. 351), 2032. Rodericks v. Jones (3 W. N. C. [N. S. W.] 116), 1313. Rogers v. Hahn (03 Miss. 5^8), 601. Rodgers v. People ( 15 How. Pr. 557; 3 Park. Cr. Rep. 632), 2084, 2068. Rodman v. Rodman (20 Grant Ch. [U. C] 428), 2167. Rodman v. Zilley (1 N. J. Eq. 320), 2099. Roesch V. Henry ( [Ore.] 103 Pac. 439), 861, 891, 892, 902. Roethke v. Phillips Best Brewing Co. (33 Mich. 340), 1786. Rogers, In re (4 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 389; 84 X. Y. Supp. 1024), 854. Rogers, In re ( 75 Vt. 329 ; 55 Atl. 601), 2033. Rogers v. Johns (42 Tex. 340), 925. Rogers v. Jones ( 1 Wend. [X. Y.] 261), 271. Rogers v. Maddocks ([1892] 3 Ch. 346), 1826. Rogers v. People (3 Park. Crim. Rep. 633), 2039, 20G0, 2084. Rogers v. State (33 Ind. 543), 2036. Rogers v. State (58 N. J. L. 220; 33 Atl. 283), 1556. Rogers v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 101 S. W. 803), 1473. Rogle V. Mattox (159 Ind. 584; 05 N. E, 743), 606. Rolilff V. Bise ( [Neb.] 120 N. W. 904), 1805. Rohr V. Gray (80 Md. 274; 30 Atl. 632), 789. Rohrbacker v. Jackson (51 Miss. 735), 138, 208, 208, 240. Roland v. State ([Ala.] 41 So. 963), 1455, Rollestone v. T. Cassireo & Co. ( :5 Ga. App. 161; 59 S. E. 442), 2176, 2217. Rollins V. Rich (27 Me. 561), 1058. Roman v. State (41 Wis. 312), 2247. Rome V. Duke (19 Ga. 93), 627, 634. Rome V. Knox (14 How. Pr. 268), 499, 504. Rome V. Lumpkin (5 Ca. 447), 495, 496. Rome V. .McWilliam (52 Ga. 251), 791. Rommel v. Schombacker (120 Pa. 579; 11 Atl. 779), 2187. Rood V. McCargar (49 Cal. 117), 294. Roouey v. Augusta (117 Ga. 709; 45 S. E. 72), 110, 127, 1083, 1129. Roose V. Perkins (9 Neb. 304; 2 N. W. 715; 31 Am. Rep. 409), 1882, 1885, 1897, 1910, 1912, 1936, 1990. Root V. Alexander (63 Hun, 557; 28 Abl). N. C. 390; 8 N. Y. Supp. 632; 142 N. Y. 063; 37 N. E. 570), 1743. Roper V. McKay (29 Tex. Civ. App. 470; 69 S. W. 459), 940. Roper V. Scurlock (29 Tex. Civ. App. 464; 69 S. W. 456), 875, 878, 890, 891. Roquemore v. State (19 Atl. 528), 371. Rose, Ex parte (2 S. R. [N. .S. W.] 268; 19 W. N. [N, S. W.] 202), 670. cclxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Rose V. Commonwealth ( 106 Va. 850; 56 S. E. 151), 21, 1763. Rose V. Commonwealth ( 106 Va. S50; 56 «. E. 151), 1491, 1505. Rose V. Frogley (57 J. P. 376; 62 L. J. M. C. 181; 5 Rep. 530; 69 L. T. 346; 9 T. L. R. 466; 17 Cox C. C. 685), 700. Rose V. Lampley ( 146 Ala. 445 ; 41 So. 521), 381. Rose V. Mitchell (6 Colo. 102), 1801. ■Rose V. Rose (9 Ark. 507), 2154. Rose V. State ( 1 Ga. App. 596 ; 58 S. E. 20), 954. Rose V. State (107 Ga. 697; 33 S. E. 439), 1320. Rose V. State (4 Ga. App. 588; 62 S. E. 117), 91, 333, 382, 953, 1170, 1378. Rose V. State (171 Ind. 662; 87 N. E. 103), 125, 255, 291. Roseerants v. Shoemaker (60 Mich. 4; 26 N. W. 794), 1886, 1981, 1991. Roseman v. Carolina Cent. R. Co. (112 N. C. 709; 16 S. E. 766; 19 L. R. A. 327), 2203, 2204, 2209, 2212, 2217. Rosenbarger v. State ( 154 Ind. 425) ; 56 N. E. 914), 1444. Rosenbaura v. State (4 Ind. 599), 1305, 1441. Rosenbaum v. State (24 Ind. App. 510; 57 N. E. 1050), 1353. Rosenbaum v. Dunston (16 Neb. Ill; 19 N. W. 610), 2014. Rosenfield Bros. Co. v. Common- wealth ([Ky.] 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1179; 96 S. W. 134), 199. Rosenham v. Commonwealth ( 7 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 602), 826. Rosenham v. Commonwealth ( 7 Ky. L. Rep. 590), 190. Rossenhamm v. Commonwealth (9 Ky, L. 519), 822. Rosenham v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 2 S. W. 230; 3 Ky. L. Rep. 519), 503. Rosenstein v. State (9 Ind. App. 290; 36 N. E. 652), 2025, 2026. Rosenthal v. Hobson ([Iowa] 77 N. W. 488), 1002, 1127. Rosewater v. Pinzenham (38 Neb. 835; 57 N. W. 563), 568. Ross, In re (14 Can. Prae. 171), 460, 1225, 1258. Ross's Case (2 Pick. [Mass.] 165), 261. Ross V. Crow (9 Baxt. 420), 1789. Ross V. People (17 Hun, 591), 1226, 1227. Ross V. State (62 Ala. 224), 2041, 2049, 2054. Ross V. Stat!e (116 Ind. 495; ir N. E. 451), 1240, 1241, 1242, 1628. Ross V. State (9 Ind. App. 35; 36 N. E. 167), 1242. Ross V. State (52 Tex. Cr. App, 295; 109 S. W. 152), 1691. Ross V. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 604; 108 S. W. 375), 14. Ross V. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 162; 109 S. W. 153), 1607, 1696. Rossell V. Garon ( 50 X. J. L. 358 ; 13 Atl. 26), 432, 433. Roth V. Eppy (80 111. 283), 1848, 1868, 1942, 1951, 1964, 1990, 2006. Rothwell, In re (44 Mo. App. 215), 907, 1687, 1688. Rottman v. State (64 Neb. 875; 88 N. W. 857), 1531. Rouse V. Catskill & N. Y. Steam- boat Co. (133 N. Y. 679; 31 N. E. 623; affirming 61 Hun, 022; 15 N. Y. Supp. 971), 1927. Rouse V. ^lelsheimer ( 82 Mich. 172; 4G N. W. 372), 1801, 1883, 1984. Rout V. Feemster (7 J. J. Marsh [Ky.] 131), 1767. TABLE OF CASES. cclxix TReferences are to pages.] Uowe V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 70 S. W. 407 ; 24 Ky. L. Rep. 974), 840, 845, 1198, 1589, 1649. Howe V. Edmunds (3 Allen, 334), 383. Howe V. State (30 Tenn. [11 Humph.] 491), 2247. Eowels V. State (39 Neb. 659; 58 N. W. 197), 110, 168, 502. Rowland v. Collingwood ([1909J 16 Ont. L. R. 272), 889. Rowland v. Greencastle ( 157 Ind. 591; 62 N. E. 474), 132, 183, 184, 186, 188, 423, 597. Rowland v. State ( 12 Tex. App. 418), 488, 490. Rowley, In re (34 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 662; 70 N. Y. Supp. 208), 891. Eowls V. American, etc., L. Ins. Co. (27 N. Y. 282; 84 Am. Dec. 280), 2220. Roy V. Paroisse de St. Paschal (9 L. N. [Can.] 275), 028. Roy V. State (91 Ind. 417), 1486, 1566. Royal V. State (78 Ala. 410), 968. Royal V. State (9 Tex. 449), 1575. Royall V. Virginia (116 U. S. 572), 426. Roy\vadosfskie v. International, etc., R. Co. ( 1 Tex. Civ. App. 487; 20 S. W. 872), 2188, 2205. Rubinstein v. Kahn (5 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 408; 25 N. Y. Supp. 760), 695, 2188. Ruble V. State (51 Ark. 170; 10 S. W. 262), 1720. Rucker v. State ( [Tex.] 24 S. W. 902), 9, 17, 1233. Rucker v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 101 S. W. 902), 1465, 1473. Ruddick v. Liverpool (42 J. P. 406), 679. Rude V. Faker (143 111. App. 456), 1878, 1991. Rude V. Nass (79 Wis. 321; 48 N. W. 555; 24 Am. St. 717), 66. Ruemmeli v. Cravens ( 13 Okla. 342; 74 Pac. 908; 76 Pac. 188), 515, 543, 1789. Ruffner v. Lather (19 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 349), 2021. Ruge V. State (62 Ind. 388), 1121, 1122, 1304, 1318, 1566. Ruhland v. Waterman ( [R. I.] 71 Atl. 1), 235, 892. Ruland, In re (21 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 504; 47 N. Y. Supp. 561), 582, 583, 584. Runde v. Commonwealth ( 108 Va. 873; 61 S. E. 792), 1505, 1584, 1730, 1731. Runyan v. State (52 Ind. 320), 510, 514, 531, 694. Rupp, In re (122 N. Y. App. Div. 891; 106 N. Y. Supp. 1163; affirming 55 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 313; 106 N. Y. Supp. 483), 583. Rupp, In re (54 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 1; 105 N. Y. Supp. 407), 582, 589, 590, 736. Rupp, hi re (55 N. Y, Misc. Rep. 313; 106 N. Y. Supp. 483; affirmed 122 N. Y. App. Div. 891; 100 N. Y. Supp. 1143), 731. Rush v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 47 S. W. 586; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 775), 935, 1108, 1678. Rushton V. Bromley J. J. (52 J. P. 760), 563. Rushworth, Ex parte (23 L. T. 120; 34 J. P. 676), 620. Russell, In re (11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 505), 639. Russell, Ex parte (20 N. B. 536). 954. Russell V. Blaekheath J. J. (61 J. P. 696), 681. Russell V. Sloan (33 Vt. 656), 79. Russell V. State (77 Ala. 89), 567, 682. cclxx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Russell V. State (53 Miss. 367), 2247. Hussell V. State (33 Vt. 656), 969. Eussell V. Tippin ( 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. 521), 1848. Russellville, Ex parte (95 Ala. 19; 11 So. 18), 431. Ruston V. Fountaine (118 La. 53; 42 So. 644), 110, 441. Ruth, hi re (32 Iowa. 250), 189. Rutherford, In re (2 Ta. Co. Ct. Rep. 78), 637. Rutherford v. Ruff (4 Desaus. Eq. [S. C] 365), 2094, 2106. Rutherford v. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 431; 88 S. W. 810), 9G4, 972, 1496, 1690. Rutherford v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 21; 90 S. W. 172), 1466, 1693. Rutland v. Cleaves { 1 Swan, 198 ) , 2149, 2150. Riitledge v. Elendorf ([Tex.] 116 S. \y. 158), 2250. Rutter V. Daniel ([1882] 46 L. T. 684; 30 VV. R. 801), 1821, 1831. Rutter V. Sullivan (25 W. Va. 427), 233. Ryall V. State (78 Ala. 410), 11, 24, 36, 1711. Ryan, Ex parte (1 W. N. C. 122), 1158, 1368, 1370, Ryan, In re (85 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 621; 83 N. Y. Supp. 123; affirming 80 X. Y. Supp. 1114), 584, 730, 1192. Ryan, In re ([Xeb.] 112 X. W. 599), 559. Ryan v. Harrow ( 27 Iowa, 494 ) , 2251. Ryan v. Ryan (9 Mo. 539), 2153, 2161. ' Ryanv. State (32 Tex. 280). 1625. Ryan v. United States (26 App. D. C. 74), 2038, 2078, 2079. Ryland v. Crawford (17 X. Y. 79), 1818. Ryland v. Foley (16 N. Z. L. R. 670), 1310. Ryon, In re (39 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 698; 80 X. Y. Supp. 1114; affirmed 85 X. Y. App. 621; 83 X. Y. Supp. 123), 545. Sachs v. Garner (111 Iowa, 424; 82 X. W. 1007), 1779, 1788, 1800. Sackett v. Rudder ( 152 Mass. 397; 25 X. E. 736; 9 L. R. A. 391), 1850, 1851, 1939, 1943, 1955, 1956. Saco V. Wentworth (37 Me. 165), 270, 1010, 1748. Sacramento v. Diliman ( 102 Cal. 107; 36 Pae. 385), 802. Sadler v. Sheahan (92 Mich. 630; 52 X. W. 1030), 1739. Sadler v. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 507; 89 S. W. 974), 1321. Saffroi v. Cobun (32 Tex. Civ. App. 79; 73 S. W. 828), 774. Safler v. Fisher (121 Mich. P. 62; 79 N. W. 934 ) , 2003. Sage V. State (127 Ind. 15; 26 X. E. 607 ) , 225. Sah Quah, In re (31 Fed. 327), 1260. St. Albans [Bishop] v. Batterxby ([1878] 3 Q. B. D. 359; 42 J. P. 581; 47 L. J. Q. B. 571; 26 W. R. 679; 38 L. T. 685), 1821. St. Amour v. St. Francis de Sales (7 Q. B. [Que.] 479), 648. St, Ames v. St. Francis de Sales ( 1 Quebec S. C. 463 ) , 628. St. Anthony v. Brandon { 10 Idaho, 205; 77 Pac. 322), 289. St. Aubin v. Laf ranee (8 Quebec L. R. [Can.] 190). 434. St. Charles v. Elener (155 Mo. 671; 56 S. W. 291), 483. St. Goddard v. Burnham (124 Mass. 578), 1228, TABLE OF CASES. celxxi I References are to pages.] St. James v. Hingtgen (47 Minn. 521; 50 N. W. 700), 758. St. Joseph V. Ernst (95 Mo. 360; 8 S. W. 558), 483. St. Joseph Tp. V. Rogers ( 16 Wall. [U. S.] 644), 904. St. Louis V. Allen (13 Mo. 414), 394. St. Louis V. Bentz (11 Mo. 62), 216, 271. St. Louis V. Cafferata (24 Mo. 94), 215, 271. St. Louis V. Gerardi (90 Mo. 640; 3 S. W. 408), 509, 691, 1267, 1268. St. Louis V. Green (7 Mo. App. 468), 791. St. Louis V. Knox (6 Mo. App. 247), 426. * St. Louis V. Shields ( 62 Mo. 247 ) , 228. St. Loui.s V. Siegrist ( 46 Mo. 593 ) , 72. St. Louis V. Smith (2 Mo. 113), 412, 418, 441. St. Louis V, Spiegel (75 Mo. 145), 789. St. Louis V. Wehring (46 111. 393), 788. St. Louis V. Weitzel (130 Mo. 600; 31 S. W. 1045), 648. St. Louis V. Western U. T. Co. (148 U. S. 92; 37 L. Ed. 380; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485), 789. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Carr (47 111. App. 353), 2204, 2213, 2218. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Gana (69 Ark. 252; 62 S. W. 738), 1022. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Wilker- son (46 Ark. 513), 2174, 2178. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Wright ([Tex. Civ. App.] 84 S. W. 270), 1735. St. Mary's Ben. Soc. v. Burford (70 Pa. St. 321), 2232. St. Paul V. Troyer (3 Minn. 291 [Gil. 200]), 167,395,397,400. St. Paul V, Upham (12 Minn. 49), 404. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. V. Kelly (43 Kan. 741; 23 Pac. 1040), 2253, 2256, Sale of Intoxicating Liquors, In re ( [Iowa] 79 N. W. 260), 623. Salford, Ex parte (16 J. P. 649), 547. Salina v. Seitz (16 Kan. 163), 402, 822, 835. Salina v. Tropper (27 Kan. 545), 2171, 2172, 2197. Salisbury, In re (19 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 340; 44 K Y. Supp. 291), 581. Salter, In re ([1902] 4 Ont. L. R. — ), 870, 883. 894. Salter v. Columbus (121 Ga. 829; 49 S. E. 734), 1179. Saltfleet, In re ([1909] 10 App. Ont. L. R. 293), 889. Sampson, In re ( 19 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 1; 5 Pa. Dist. Rep. 717), 2017, 2020. Sampson v. State (107 Ala. 76; 18 So. 207), 38, 1756. Samuel v. Agnew (80 111. 553), 1027. Samuel v. Westheimer (131 Iowa, 043; 109 N. W. 189), 298, 1280. Sanasack v. Aden (168 Ind. 559; 78 N. E. 675; 79 N. E. 457; 80 N. E. 151), 601, 013, 662, 663. Sanderfur-.Julian Co. v. State (72 Ark. 11; 77 S. W. 596), 954. Sanderlin v. State (2 Humph. 315), 1459. Sanders v. Elberton (50 Ga. 178), 691, 1267. Sanders v. State (74 Ga. 82), 215, 1303, 1594. Sanders v. State (94 Ind. 147), 2040. Sanders v. State (2 Iowa, 230), 1017. Sanders v. State ( [Tex. Cr. Rep.] 20 S. W. 360), 1463. ccixxu TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages. 1 Sanders v. Town Commissioners (30 Ga. 679), 396. Sanders v. Town Council (50 Ga. 178), 68. Sanderson, In re (34 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 375; 69 N. Y. Supp. 928), 582. Sanderson v. Goodrich (46 Barb. 616), 694, 1783. Sanderson v. Sanderson (52 N. J. Eq. 243; 30 Atl. 326), 2149. Sandford v. Court (7 Vroom, 72; 13 Am. Rep. 422), 232. Sandoval v. Meyers (8 N. M. 636; 45 Pac. 1128), 801, 809. Sandys v. Williams (46 Ore. 327; 80 Pac. 642), 250, 467, 1558. San Francisco v. Canavan (42 Cal. 541), 393. San Francisco v. Liverpool, etc., Co. (74 Cal. 113; 15 Pac. 380; 7 Am. St. 425), 479. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Cul- lerton (147 111. 385; 35 N. E. 723), 2253. San Jose v. San Jose, etc., R. Co. (53 Cal. 475), 483. San Luis Obispo Co. v. Greenberg (120 Cal. 300; 52 Pac. 797), 446. Santo v. State (2 Iowa, 165; 63 Am. Dec. 487), 98, 109, 231, 253, 204, 265, 294, 1008, 1047, 1050. Sapp v. State (116 Ga. 182; 42 S. E. 410), 62. Sappington v. Carter (67 111. 482), 1637. Sarbecker v. State (65 Wis. 171; 26 W. N. 541; 56 Am. Rep. 624), 1280, 1281. Sargeant, In re ( 13 Nat. Bank Reg. 144), 610. Sargeant v. Little (72 N. H. 555; 58 Atl. 44), 797, 813. Sarle v. Pulaski Co. (76 Ark. 336; 98 S. W. 9.53), 628, 714. Sarlo, In re (76 Ark. 336; 88 S. W. 953), 689. Sarris v Commonwealth (83 Ky. 327), 842. Sarris v. Commonwealth (83 Ky. 327; 7 Ky. L Rep. 473), 190. Sarris v. Commonwealth ( 7 Ky. L. Rep. 299), 110. Sarlls V. United States ( 152 U. S. 570; 38 L. Ed. 556; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 720), 24, 25, 39, 43, 1263. Sasser v. Martin ( [Ga.] 29 S. E. 278), 139, 249, 250. Sate V. Frost (103 Tenn. 685; 54 S. W. 986), 136. Sate V. Keen (34 Me. 500), 383. Satterfield v. State ([Tex. Or. App.] 44 S. W. 291), 1699. Saunders v. Alvido ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 113 S. W. 992), 1903. Saunders v. Saunders (Ch. D. [March 7, 1907] [not report- ed]), 1832. Saunders v. State (2 Iowa, 230), 1046. Saunders v. Thorney (60 J. P. 404; 78 L. T. 027; 14 T. L. R. 346), 1135, 1138. Saner, In re (23 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 463 ) , 647. Sauer v. Walker (2 B. C. 93), 263. Sauvage v. Trouillet (3 Mon. S. C. 276), 1839, 1981. Savage v. Commonwealth (84 Va. 582; 5 S. E. 565), 87, 125, 1469, 1483, 1491, 1699, 1713, 1714. Savage v. Commonwealth (84 Va. 619; 5 S. E. 565), 228, 233, 2.35, 248, 1465 1478, 1484, 1555, 1556. Savage v. Mallory (4 Allen, 492), 1800. Savage v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 88 S. W. 351), 1309, 1323, 1021, 1681. Savage v. Umphries ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 118 S. W. 893), 903, 924, 920. Savage v. Wolf ( 69 Ala. 569 ) , 920, 939. TABLE OF CASES. cclxxiii [References are to pages.] Savalot V. Populus (31 La. Ann. 854; 1 Bishop ilar. Div. & Sep. §§614, 624), 2114. Savannah v. Ilussey (21 Ga. 80), 270. Savannah v. Weed (84 Ga. 683; 11 S. E. 235), 793. Savier v. Chipman ( 15 Wend. 260), 72. Savill Bros., Limited, v. Langman ([1898] 79 L. T. 44; 14 T. L. 504), 1817. Sawtelle v. Jones (23 N. S. W. 165), 1270. Sawyer v. Blakely (2 Ga. App. 159; 58 S. E. 399), 1659. Sawyer v. Mould ([Iowa] 112 X. "W. 813), 1003. Sawyer v. Oliver ([Iowa] 122 X. W. 950), 1001, 1003. Sawyer v. Sanderson (113 Mo. App. 233; 88 S. W. 151), 511, 694. ^awj-er v. Sauer (10 Kan. 406), 2198, 2201. Sawyer v. State ( 52 Tex. Cr. App. 597; 108 S. W. 394), 1471. Sawyer v. Termohland ( [Iowa] 'l22 N. W. 924), 982, 984, 1000. Say v. Berwick (1 Ves. & B. 195), 2099, 2102, 2103. Sayers v. Collyer ([1884] 28 Ch. D. 103; 54 L. J. Ch. 1; 55 L. T. 723; 33 W. R. 91; 49 J. P. 244), 1814. Sayles Ann. Civ. St. (1897 Art. 5060g), 1231. Saylor v. Duel (236 111. 429; 80 N. E. 119), 249, 925. Scales v. State (47 Ark. 476; 1 S. W. 769; 58 Am. Rep. 768), 1441, 1694. Scalzo V. Sackett (30 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 543; 63 N. Y. Supp. 820), 814. Scanlan v. Childs (33 Wis. 663), 1194. Scanlon v. Denver (38 Colo. 401; 88 Pac. 156), 415. Scarritt v. Jackson (89 Mo. App. 585), 585. Scatchard v. Johnson (52 J P. 389; 57 L. J. M. C. 41), 361, 1247, 1248, 1249, 1252, 1295, 1313. Schab V. People (4 Hun, 520), 46. Schade v. Russell ([Mo. App.] 110 S. W. 667), 645, 647, 648, 649. Schafer v. State (49 Ind. 460), 1844. Schafer v. Smith (63 Ind. 226), 1989. Schafer v. Mumma (17 Md. 331), 216. Schaffner v. State (8 Ohio St. 642), 844, 1162. Schaller v. State (14 Mo. 502), 2040. Schaps V. Leliner (54 Minn. 208; 55 N. W. 911), 2106. Schaub V. Schaub (117 La. 727; 42 So. 249), 2158. Scheffler v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (32 Minn. 518; 12 N. W. 711), 2182. Schenck v. Saunders ( 13 Gray, 37), 1162. Schencker v. State (9 Neb. 241; 1 N. W. 857), 2040. Schendler Bottling Co. v. Welch (42 Fed. 561), 327. Schiek v. Sanders ([Neb.] 74 N. W. 39), 1882, 1992. Schiller v. State ( [S. C] 38 So. 706), 291, 1322, 1558. Schilling v. State (116 Ind. 200), 18 N. E. 682), 1292, 1488, 1635. Schilling, Ex parte (38 Tex. Cr. App. 287; 42 S. W. 553), 907, 912. Schlachter v. Stokes (63 N. J. L. 138; 43 Atl. 571), 410. Schlandocker v. Marshall (72 Pa. 200), 628, 629, 648. Schlencker v. State (9 Neb. 241; 1 N. W. 857), 2043, 2053. Schlesinger v. Stratton (9 R. T. 578), 310, 1787. oclxxiv TABL.E OP CASES. [References are to pages.] Schlict V. State (31 Ind. 246), 500, 1306. Schlicht V State (56 Ind. 173), 12, 32, 80, 1488, 1490, 1554. Schlosser v. Mould ( [Iowa] 121 N. W. 520), 341, 343, 1002. Schlosser v. State (55 Ind. 82), 83, 15!)2, 1871, 1976. Schmeltz v. State (8 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 82), 132. Schmidt's License, In re (37 Pa. Sup. Ct. 420), 563. Schmidt v. Cobb (119 U. S. 286; 7 Sup. Ct. 1373), 258. Schmidt v. Indianapolis ( 168 Ind. 631; 80 N. E. 632), 91, 144, 199, 425. 426, 427, 796. Schmidt v. Mitchell (84 III. 195), 1874. Schmidt v. State (14 Mo. 137), 1348, 1349, 1643. Schmidt v. State ( 53 Tex. Cr. App. 465; 110 S. W. 897), 1211. Schmitker, Ex parte (6 Neb. 108), 522. Schneider, Ex parte (11 Ore. 288; 8 Pac. 289), 73, 75, 410, 412, 414, 418, 439. Schneider v. Commonwealtli ([Ky.] Ill S. W. 303; 33 Ky. L. Rep. 770), 545. Schneider v. Hosier (21 Ohio State, 98), 296, 1843, 1859, 1864, 1897. Schober v. Rosefield ( 75 Iowa, 455; 39 N. W. 706), 1803, 1804. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania (171 U. S. 1; 43 L. Ed. 49; 18 Sup. Ct. 1), 309, 1427, 1433. Scliomaker, In re ( 15 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 048; 38 K. Y. Supp. 167), 636. Schomp V. Schenck (40 N. J. Law, 195-200; 29 Am. Rep. 219), 2095. School District v. Thompson (51 Neb. 857; 71 N. W. 728). 816. School District v. Twin Falls (13 Idaho, -i71; 90 Pac. 735), 808. Schoonmaker v. Kelly (42 Hun, 299), 2127. Schopp, In re (119 N. Y. App. Div. 192; 104 N. Y. Supp. 307), 735, 736, 738. Schramm v. O'Connor ( 98 111. 539), 2099, 2103, 2105. Schreiber, In re (22 N. Y. St. Rep. 892), 2143. Schroeder v. Charleston (2 Const. Rep. 720), 442. Schroder v. Crawford (94 HI. 357; 34 Am. Rep. 236), 1872, 1924, 1943, 2001. Schuck V. State (50 Ohio St. 493; 34 N. E. 603), 1125. Schuenke v. Pine River (84 Wis. 609; 54 N. W. 1007), 2198. Schulenberg v. State (79 Neb. 65; 112 N. W. 304), 1703. Schuler v. Bordeaux (64 Miss. u9; 8 So. 201), 138, 232, 235. Schulherr v. State (68 Miss. 227; 8 So. 328), 780, 1248. Scliulte V. Schleeper (210 111. 357; 71 N. E. 323), 1843, 1856. Schultheis v. Wilson (13 N. Y. L. R. 295), 1211. Schultz V. Mut. L. Ins. Co. (6 Fed. 672; 14 Ins. L. Jr. 171), 2229, 2230, 2231. Schultz V. State (32 Ohio St. 276), 987, 998, 1000, 1374. Schumm v. Gardener (25 111. App. 033), 520, 1189. Schuneman v. Sherman (118 Iowa, 230; 91 N. W. 1004), 944 Schurzer v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 25 S. W. 23), 1028. Schusler, Appeal of (81 Conn. 276; 70 Atl. 1029), 594. Schusler's Estate, In re (198 Pa. 81; 47 Atl. 906), 2135, 2141, 2147, 2148, 2149. Schuyler, In re (63 N. Y. App. biv. 200; 71 N. Y. Supp. 437), 742, 1297, 1312. TABLE OF CASES. cclxxv [References are to pages.] Schuyler, In re (32 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 221; 66 N. Y. Supp. 251), 742, 746. Schuylkill Co., In re (24 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 571), 762. Schwab V. People 4 Hun, 520), 24, 1480, 1489. Schwabacher v. People ( 165 111. 618; 46 N. E. 809), 2077. Schwann v. Osborn (59 Ind. 245), 1936. Schwarm v. State (82 Ind. 470), 525. Schwarting, Ex parte ( 76 Neb. 773; 108 N. W. 125), 277, 2023. Schwartz v. State (32 Tex. Cr. Rep. 387; 24 S. VY. 28), 352. Schwarz v. Dover (72 N. J. L. 311; 62 Atl. 1135; affirming 70 N. J. L. 502; 57 Atl. 394), 197. Schwedes v. State (1 Okla. Cr. 245; 99 Pac. 804), 317, 323, 327, 328, 330. Schwedes v. State ([Okla.] 104 Pac. 765), 325. Schweirman v. Highland Park ([Ky.] 113 S. W. 507), 183, 388, 479, 627. Schweitzer v. Liberty (82 Mo. 309), 439. Schwenyer v. Oberkoelter (25 111. App. 183), 1112. Schwerman v. Commonwealth (99 Ky. 296; 38 S. W. 146), 401. Schwulst V. State (52 Tex. Civ. App. 426; 108 S. W. 698), 87, 225, 1378, 1615. Schwuchow V. Chicago (68 111. 444), 69, 91, 103, 111, 138, 143, 167, 182, 185, 189, 316, 395, 398, 420, 437, 456, 471, 472, 496. Scotland Life Ass'n v. McBlane 9 Irish Eq. 176), 2243. Scott V. Chope (33 Neb. 41; 49 N. W. 940), 1873, 1876, 1911, 1952. Scott V. Donald (165 U. S. 58; 17 Sup. Ct. 265; 41 L. Ed. 632), 174, 179, 323. Scott V. Gilmore (3 Taunt. 226), Scott V. Naacke ([Iowa] 122 N. W. 824), 576, 579, 585. Scott V. Paquitt ( 17 Low. Can. Rep. 283), 2109, 2114. Scott V. Scott (29 L. J. Mat. [N. S.] 64), 2164. Scott V. State (150 Ala. 59; 43 So. 181), 1455, 1482, 1518, 1613. Scott V. State (25 Tex. Supp. 168), 1591, 1638, 1754. Scott V. State (12 Tex. App. 31), 2039, 2073, 2090. Scott V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 44 S. W. 495), 1694. Scott V. State (46 Tex. Cr. App. 176; 82 S. W. 656), 1364. Scott V. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 176; 82 S. W. 656), 1737, 1761. Scott V. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 164; 105 S. W. 796), 1174. Scottish, etc., Soc. v. Buist (4 Ct. Sess. Cas. [4th series] 1078), 2221. Scovern v. State (6 Ohio St. 288), 1743. Scoville V. Calhoun (76 Ga. 263), 927. Seaboard, etc., Ry. Co. v. Chapman (4 Ga. App. 706; 62 S. E. 488), 2188. Seaborn v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 80 S. W. 223 ; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2203), 2068. Seagar v. White (48 J. P. 436; 51 L. T. 261), 1275, 1370. Seagin v. Ehmke (120 Iowa, 464; 94 N. W. 938), 1844, 1846. Sealy v. Tandry ([1902] 1 K. B. 296; 66 J. P. 19; 71 L. J. K. B. 41; 50 W. R. 347; 85 L. T. 459; 18 T. L. R. 38; 20 Cox C. C. 57), 363, 2028. cclxxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Searcy v. Lawreneeburg (20 Ky. L. Kep. 1920; 50 S. W. 534), 798. Searcy v. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 444; 102 S. W. 1127), 917, 942. Searcy v. Turner ([Ark.] 114 S. W. 472), 441. Searle v. McArdle (15 N. Z. L. R. 613), 689. Sears v. State (35 Tex. Cr. Rep. 442; 34 S. W. 124), 1188, 1628. Seaton v. Higgins ( 50 Iowa, 305 ) , 1027. Seattle v. Clark (28 Wash. 717; 69 Pac. 407), 401, 419, 446, 689. Seattle v. Foster (47 Wash. 172; 91 Pac. 642), 188, 220, 295. Shaver v. Phelps (11 Pick. 304), 2094. Sebastian v. State (44 Tex. Civ. App. 508; 72 S. W. 849), 9, 972, 1210, 1686, 1690. Secor V. Taylor (41 Hun, 421), 1953. Seddon v. State (100 Iowa, 378; 69 N. W. 671), 999. SedgAvick v. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 627; 85 S. W. 813), 298, 307, 1214, 1280. Sefried v. Commonwealth (101 Pa. St. 200), 1456. Segars, Ex parte (32 Tex. Cr- Rep. 553; 25 S. W. 26), 852. Segars v. State (35 Tex. Cr. Rep. 45; 31 S. W. 370), 888, 1447, 1550. Segars v. State (40 Tex. Cr. App. 577; 51 S. W. 211), 958, 1443, 1456. Segur V. State (6 Ind. 451), 1501. Seibert v. State (40 Ala. 60), 1367. Seick V. State (94 Md. 71; 50 Atl. 436), 1572. Seim V. State (55 Md. 506; 39 Am. Rep. 419), 1330. Seitz, In re (32 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 108; 65 N. Y. Supp. 462), 818. Selah V. Selah (23 N. J. 185), 2103. Sellers v. Arie ( [Iowa] 38 N. W. 814), 1803, 1805. Sellers v. Foster (27 Xeb. 118; 42 X. W. 907), 1872, 1980. Selm V. State (55 Ind. 566; 39 Am. Rep. 419), 1339. Selma v. Brewer (9 Cal. App. 70; 98 Pac, 61), 439, 441, 462, 831, Sells V. State (76 Ala. 92), 1581. Semones v. Xeedles ( 137 Iowa, 177; 114 X. W. 904), 659. Semple v. Flynn ( [X. J. Eq.] 10 Atl. 177 h 694, 701, 17S3. Senate of the Happy Home Club V. Board (99 Mich. 117; 57 N. W. 1110; 23 L. R. A. 142), 2022. Sendcroft, In re (168 Pa. 45; 31 Atl. 948), 665. Senior v. Pierce (31 Fed. Rep. 625), 1013. Senior v. Ratterman (44 Ohio St. 661; 11 X. E. 321; affirming 17 Wkly. L. Bull. 115), 121, 147, 198, 202, 542, 790, 792. Sentance v. Poole (3 C. & P. 1), 2108, 2110. Seollings v. Lee (123 Ala. 464; 26 So. 211), 1780. Seranely, In re (40 X. Y. Supp. 1106; 18 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 341), 580. Sessions v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 98 S. W. 243), 1624. Seube, Ex parte (115 Cal. C29; 47 Pac. 596), 416 Seven, In re (2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 75), 622. Severance v. Kelly (86 Ky. 522; 6S. W. 386), 800. Severance v. Murphy ( 67 S. C. 409; 46 S. E. 635), 381. TABLE OF CASES. [U>3ferences are to pages.] eclxxvii Sewell V. Taylor (7 C. B. IN. S.] 160; 23 J. P. 792; 29 L. J. M. C. 50; 1 L. T. 37), 1301, 2025, 1027. Sexson v. Kelley (3 Neb. 104), 758. SexUm V. Board ([N. J. L.] 6!) Atl. 470), 138, 589, 590. Sexton V. Goodwine (33 Ind. App. 329; 68 N. E. 929; 70 N. E. 999), 601, 610, 611, 612, 613. Sexton V. Lelievere (4 Cold. 11), 2255. Seymer v. Lake (66 Wis. 651; 29 N. W. 554), 2177, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193. Sej'mour, In re (47 N. Y. App. Div. 320; 62 N. Y. Supp. 25), 751. Seymour v. De Lancey (3 Cow. 445), 2093, Sliackelford v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 22 S. W. 26), 1515. Shackleton v. Sebree (86 111. 616), 2094, 2098. 2103. Shader v. Railway Passenger's Assur. Co. (60 N. Y. 441; 23 Am. Rep. 65; 5 Ins. L. Jr. 749; affirming 3 Hun, 424; 5 T. & C. 543), 2232, 2238, 2244. Shafer v. Miamma (17 Md. 336), 271. Shafer v. Patterson (4 Ohio Dec. 157; 1 Cleve. Law. Rep. 84), 1991. Shaffer v. Stern (160 Ind. 375; 60 N. E. 1004), 666. Shaffer v. State (106 Ind. 319; 6 N. E. 818), 1500, 1562. Shaffer v. Stern (160 Ind. 375; 66 N. E. 1004), 601, 605, 606, 611, 613, 614, 856. Shatter v. State (114 Ind. 194; 16 N. E. 521), 1719. Shain v. Maxwell (115 Cal. 208; 46 Pac. 1069), 1780, 1783. Shanley v. Wells (71 111. 78), 2034. Shannahan v. Commonwealth (8 Busli, 464; 8 Am. Rep. 405), 2041, 2046, 2057, 2061, 2085. Shannon v. State (39 Neb. 658; 58 N. W. 196), 108, 110, 502. Sharpe v. Arnold (108 Iowa, 203; 78 N. W. 819), 981, 992. Sharon Borough v. Mercer Co. (20 Pa. Ct. Rep. 507), 400. Sharp V. Hughes (57 J. P. 104), 367, 535. Sharp V. State (17 Ga. 290), 1643. Sharpe v. Wakefield (22 Q. B. Div. 242), 678. Sharpless v. Mayer, etc., 21 Pa. St. 147), 105. Sharpley v. Brown (43 Hun, [N. Y.] 374), 1968. Shaw V. Carpenter (54 Vt. 155; 41 Am. Rep. 837), 9, 10, 17. Shaw V. Morley (L. R. 3 Exch. 137; 32 J. P. 391), 379. Shaw V. Pickett (26 Vt. 486), 276. Shaw V. State (3 Ga. App. 607; 60 S. E. 326), 1181, 1589. Shaw V. State ( 56 Ind. 88 ) , 39, 82, 510, 516, 517, 539, 1364, 1496. Shaw V. Thackrah (17 Jur. 1045), 2111. Shaw V. Thackray (1 Sm. & Giff. 537), 2099. Shea V. Fidelity, etc., Co. (83 N. Y. App. Div. 305; 82 N. Y. Supp. 39), 776. Shea V. Muncie (148 Ind. 14; 46 N. E. 138), 98, 138, 168, 169, 172, 183, 409, 423, 424, 488, 496, 597, 1213, 1558, 1649. Shear v. Bolinger (74 Iowa, 757; 37 N. W. 164), 125. Shear v. Brinkman (72 Iowa, 698; 34 N. W. 483), 982. Shear v. Green (73 Iowa, 688; 36 N. W. 642), 986, 990, 992, 1589. Shearer, hi re (26 Pa. Super. Ct. 34), 666. celxxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Shearer v. State (7 Blackf. 99), 1642. Sheasby v. Oldham (55 J. P. 214; 60 L. J. M. C. 812), 1149. Shedlinsky v. Budweiser Brewing Co. (17 N. Y. App. Div. 470; 45 N. Y. Supp. 174), 1811. Sheelian v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. ([Ky.] 101 S. W. 380; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 113), 935. Shelbyville v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (146 Ind. 66; 44 N. E. 929), 409. Sheldon v. Clark (1 Johns. 513), 1642. Shelling v. Commonwealth ( 1 1 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 675), 1459, 1508. Shelton v. Mayor, etc., 30 Ala. 540), 294. Shelton v. State ([Ind.] 89 Ind. 860), 554. Shepard v. New Orleans (51 La. Ann. 847; 25 So. 542), 586. Shepheard v. Walker ([1876] 34 L. T. 230), 1819. Shepler v. State (114 Ind. 194; 16 N. E. 521), 1305, 1323, 1567, 1740. Sheppard v. Bowling (127 Ala. 1; 28 So. 791), 382. Sheppelman v. People ( 134 III. App. 556), 64. Sherlock v. Stuart (96 Mich. 123; 55 X. W. 845; 21 L. R. A. 580), 94, 99, 397, 400, 424, 440, 634, 1840. Sherry, In re (25 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 361 ; 55 N. Y. Supp. 4:1 ) , 589. Sherry, In re (12 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 129), 563. Sherwood, In re (21 Fed. Cas. 1285), 71. Sherar v. State (30 Tex. App. 349; 17 S. W. 621). 2090. Sheritt, Ex parte (L. R. 5 Q. B. 174), 1572. Sherras v. De Rutzen ([1895] 1 Q. B. 918; 59 J. P. 440; 64 L. J. M. C. 218; 72 L. T. 839; 43 W. R. 526), 1221. Sheilds v. State (95 Ind. 299), 1291, 1751. Shields v. State (38 Tex. Cr. App. 252; 42 S. W. 398), 872, 894, 1686. Shiflet V. Grimsley ( 104 Va. 424 ; 51 S. E. 838), 797. Shihagen v. State (9 Tex. 430), 369, 371. Shilling, Ex parte (38 Tex. Cr. App. 287; 42 S. W. 553), 865. Shilling V. State (5 Ind. 443), 1545, 1552. Shilling v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 51 S. W. 240), 958, 1466. Shiretzki v. Julius Kessler & Co. ([Ala.] 37 So. 423), 1787, 17S8. Shonkwiler v. Stewart ( 104 Iowa, 67; 73 N. W. 479), 552. Shorb v. Webber (188 111. 126; 58 X. E. 949, afhrming 89 111. App. 474), 2007. Short v. People (96 111. App. 638), 1228. Short V. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 244; 91 S. W. 1087), 1380. Shover v. State (5 Eng. [Ark.] 529), 214. Showalter v. State (84 Ind. 562), 1618. Showyer v. Chamberlain (113 Iowa, 742; 84 N. W. 661), 1805. Shreveport v. Draiss & Co. Ill La. 511; 35 So. 727), 432, 463, 470. Shreveport v. Roos (35 La. Ann. 1010), 469. Shuch V. State (50 Ohio, 493; 34 N. E. 063), 1319. Shuck V. Shuck (7 Bush, 306), 2155, 2156, 2160. Shuler v. State (125 Ca. 778; 54 S. E. 689), 1322, 1479, 1501, 1505. TABLE OF CASES. cclxxix [References are to pages.] Shultz V. Cambridge (38 Ohio St. 659), 213, 345. Shultz V. Wall (134 Pa. 262; 19 Atl. 742; 8 L. R. A. 97), 2187. Shurman v. Ft. Wayne (127 Ind. 109; 26 N. E. 560; 11 L. R. A. 378), 479. Shuster v. State (62 X. J. L. 521; 41 Atl. 701), 1285, 1286, 1372, 1376. Shutt V. Shutt (71 Md. 193; 17 Atl. 1024), 2153, 2165, 2166. Shuttleworth v. State (35 Ala. 415), 1246. Sibila V. Bahney ( 34 Ohio State, 399), 223, 224, 1840, 1841, 1882. Sieeluff v. State (52 Ark. 56; 11 S. W. 964), 1227. Sickinger v. State (45 Kan. 414; 25 Pac. 868), 991, 1003. Siebold v. People (86 111. 33), 215. Siegel V. People (106 111. 89), 1173, 1176, 1220, 1224, 1225, 1230, 1844, 1846. Siegle V. Rush (173 111. 559; 50 N. E. 1008, affirming 72 111. App. 485), 1954. Sifred v. Commonwealth ( 104 Pa. 179), 1304, 1307, 1308. Sights V. Yarnells (12 Gratt. 292), 714. Sigmore v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 102 S. W. 277; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 310), 1173. Sikes, Ex parte \ 102 Ala. 173; 15 So. 522; 24 L. R. A. 774), 431, 432, 444, 447, 480. Sill V. McKnight (7 Watts & S. 244), 2121. Sills V. State (76 Ala. 92 > 1517, 1713. Siloam Springs v. Thompson '41 Ark. 456), 906, 1160. Silver v. State (105 Ga. 838; 32 S. E. 22), 1379, 1380, 1381. Silver v. Sparta (107 Ga. 275; 33 S. E. 31), 173, 188, 479. Silvers v. Traverse (82 Iowa, 52; 47 N. W. 888; 11 L. R. A. 804), 1001. Silvey v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 98 S. W. 1058), 1472. Silverman v. Rumbarger (4 Pa. Super. Ct. 439), 1805. Simmons, Ex parte ( 76 Neb. 639 ; 107 X. W. 863), 2017, 2018, 2020. Simmons v. Blackheath ( 17 Q. B. Div. 765; 50 J. P. 742; 55 L. J. M. C. 166; 35 W. R. 167), 701, 709. Simms, Ex parte (41 Fla. 316; 25 So. 280), 401. Simons v. State (25 Ind. 331), 1223. Simons v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 67 S. W. 502), 1646. Simonton v. Colbourne (3 Terr. L. R. 372), 750. Simpkins v. Marlatt (9 Ind. 543), 1019. Simpson v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 97 S. W. 404; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 132), 535, 610, 615. Simpson v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 104 S. W. 269; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 821; 104 S. W. 270; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 851), 747. Simpson v. Seuriss (2 Ohio C. D. 246), 797, 804. Simpson v. State (93 Ga. 196; 18 S. E. 526), 1250. Simpson v. State (17 Ind. 444), 1491. Sims V. Pottawottamie County (91 Iowa, 442; 59 X. W. "68), 1004. Sims v. State (135 Ala. 61; 33 So. 162), 1451, 1511. Sims v. State (10 Tex. App. 131), 1746. Sims V. State ([lex. Cr. App.] 87 S. W. 689), 1282. Sinclair v. State (69 X. C. 47), 152, 331. Sinclair v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 70 S. \N. 218), 1235. cclxxx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Sinclair v. State (45 Tex. Cr. App. 487; 77 S. W. 621), 914, 916, 1284, 1690. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright (33 Fed. Eep. 121), 793. Singleton v. Ellison ([1895] 1 Q. B. 607; 64 L. J. M. C. 123; 59 J. P. 119; 72 L. T. 236; 43 W. R. 426; 18 Cox, 79), 368, 724. Sinking Fund Cases (99 U. S. 700), 114. Sinnot v. Davenport (22 How. 227; 16 L. Ed. 243), 479. Sires v. State (73 Wis. 251; 41 N. W. 81), 1523. Sis V. Boarman ( 1 1 App. D. C. 116), 1771. Sisson V. Conger ( 1 T. & C. [N. Y.] 564), 2258. Sisson, Potter & Co. v. Hill (18 R. I. 212; 26 Atl. 196; 21 L. R. A. 266), 2127. Sizemore v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 102 S. W. 277; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 310), 1176. Sizer v. Syracuse, etc., R. Co. ( 7 Lans. 67), 2199. Sjoblom V. Mark (103 Minn. 193; 114 N. W. 746), 1809. Skelton v. State ([Ind.J 89 N. E. 860), 1193. Skidmore v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 57 S. W. 468; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 409), 1186, 1380, 1381. Skinner v. State (97 Ga. 690; 25 S. E. 364), 1166, 1167. Skinner v. State (120 Ind. 127; 22 N. E. 115), 1109, 1549. Skipwith V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 68 S. W. 278). 1682. Skyles v. State ([Neb.] 123 Pac. 447), 1187. Slack, Ex parte (8 Vict. L. R. 144), 626, 711, 712. Slack, Ex parte (7 Vict. L. R. 28), 539. Slack V. Jacob (8 \\. Va. 612), 106. Slater v. Fire & Police Board (43 Colo. 225; 96 Pac. 554), 560, 569, 577. Slattery, Ex parte (3 Ark. 484), 270. Slaughter v. Commonwealth (13 Gratt. [Va.] 776), 428, 793. Slaughter v. People (2 Doug. [Mich.] 334), 270. Slaughter v. State ([Tex, Cr. App.] 21 S. W. 247), 1629, 1630. Slaughter House Case ( 16 Wall. 36), 100. Slavens v. Wood (54 J. P. 742), 1220. Slavin, In re (36 Up. Can. 159), 424. Sleenburgh, In re (24 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 1; 53 N. Y. Supp. 197), 796. Slentz V. State (27 Ind. App. 700; 61 N. E. 956), 346, 1486, 1536. Sleeth V. Hurlbert ( 25 S. C. [Ont.] 620), 1050. Sleith V. Hurlbert (25 S. C. [Ont.] 620), 1059. Sliger V. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 341; 88 S. W. 243), 1207. Slinger's Will, In re (72 Wis. 22; 37 N. W. 236), 2145, 2151. Slinger v. Henneman (38 Wis. 504), 228. Sloan V. Johnson (86 Iowa 750; 53 N. \N. 268), 1002. Sloan V. State (8 Blackf. [Ind.] 35 L.), 393, 466, 521, 523. Slocum V. Mayberry ( 2 Wheat. [U. S.] 1), 1012. Sloman v. William D. Moebs Co. (139 Mich. 334; 102 X. W. 854; 11 Det. Leg. K 857), 299, 307, 333, 334. Slymer v. State (62 Md. 240), 235, 1469. Smart v. Hochelaga (4 Leg. News [Can.] 255), 648. TABLE OF CASES. eclxxxi [References are to pages.] Smart v. State (49 Tex. Cr, App, 373; 92 S. W. 810), 1202, 1380, 1381, 1613, 1758. Smeltzer, iJx parte { 17 \V. N. [N. S. W.] 190), 568. Smiser v. State ( 17 Ind. App, 519; 47 N. E. 229), 1855, 1869, 1882, 1941. Smith, In Appeal of (65 Conn. 135; 51 Atl. 529), 532. Smith, Ex parte (38 Cal. 702), 164, 218. iSmith In re (104 Iowa 199; 73 N. W. 605) 805. Smith, In re (126 Iowa, 128; 101 N. W. 875), 669, 670, 826. Smith, In re (53 N. Y. St. Rep. 658), 2141. Smith, 1)1 re (44 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 384; 89 N. Y. Supp. 1006), 880, 889. Smith, In re (48 N. Y. App. Div. 423; 63 N. Y. Supp. 255), 730, 1312. Smith, In re (2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 74), 639. Smith, Ex parte (48 Tex. Cr. App. 356; 88 S. VV. 245), 939. Smith, Ex parte ( 1 Hemstead [9 U. S. C. C] 201), 270. Smith V. Adrian (Man. [Mich.] 495), 502, 1366, 1509, 1644. Smith V. Alabama (124 U. 8. 465; 8 Sup. Ct. 564), 315. Smith V. Anderson (82 Mich. 492; 45 X. W. 729), 1952. Smith V. Benton (20 Ont. 344), 919, 1779, 1807. Smith V. Board (46 X. J. L. 312), 586. Smith V. Butler ([1900] 1 Q. B. 694; 69 L. J. Q. B. 521; 48 W. R. 583; 82 L. T. 281; 16 T. L. R. 208), 1833. Smith V. Commonwealth ( 1 Duv. [Ky.] 224), 2048, 2060, 2061, 2067, 2073, 2081. Smith V. Commonwealth (6 B. Mon. 21), 1094, 1102, 1107, 1110. Smith V. Commonwealth ( 4 Ky. L. Rep. 261), 1639. Smith V. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 48 S. W. 1081), 1370. Smith V. Grable (14 Iowa 429), 1779, 1780, 1785. Smith V. Heneman ( [Ala.] 24 So 364), 1169. Smith V. Hickman (68 III. 314), 1802. Smith V. Huntington (3 X. H. 76; 14 Am. Dec. 33), 1027. Smith V. Janesville (26 Wis. 291), 240. Smitli V. Jeffries (9 Price 257), 1642. Smith V. Joyce (12 Barb. 21), 1643, 1805. Smith V. Kibbee (9 Ohio St. 563), 1385. Smitli V. Knights of Father Mathew (36 Mo. App. 184), 2231, 2232. Smith V. Knoxville (3 Head 245), 165, 183, 184, 263, 454, 459, 461. Smith V. Land Corporation ([1884] 28 Ch. D. 7; 49 J. P. 182; 51 L. T. 718), 1832. Smith V. Lapar (67 S. C. 491; 46 S. E. 332), 1033. Smith V. McCarthy (56 Pa. St. 359), 233. Smith V. McCormick (2 Vict. L. R. 93), 1299. Smith V. City of Madison (7 Ind. 86), 396. Smith V. Xewburn (70 X. C. 14), 396. Smith V. Xew York, etc., R. Co. (38 Hun 33), 2188. Smith V. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. (114 X. C. 728; 19 S. E. 863; 25 L. R. A. 287), 2173, 2174, 2178, 2182. Smith V. Patton (103 Ky. 444; 45 S. W. 459 ; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 165), 853, 865, 872," 931, 942. Smith V. People (32 Colo. 251; 75 Pac. 914), 288, 291. celxxxii TABLE OF CASES. IRefereiices are to pages.] Smith V. People (141 111. 447; 31 N. E. 425; affirming' .*?8 111. App. 630), 62, 1809, 1972, 1976, 1998, 1999, 2005. Smith V. People ( 1 Parker Cr. Rep. 583), 111, 139. Smith V. People (9 Hun, 446), 508. Smith V. Portsmouth J. J. ([1906] 2 K. B. 229; 75 L. J. K. B. 851; 95 L. T. 5; 54 W. R. 598 ; 22 T. L. R. 650 ; revers- ing 70 J. P. 157), 642. Smith V. Reynolds (8 Hun [N. Y.] 128), 1350, 1907. Smith V. Rheimstrom (65 Fed. 989; 13 C. C. A. 201), 18. Smith V. San Antonio (7 Tex. 646), 270. Smith V. Shann ([1898] 2 Q. B. 347; 62 J. P. 354; 67 L. J. Q. B. 819; 79 L. T. 77; 14 T. L. R. 443), 623. Smith V. Skow (97 Iowa, 640; 66 N. W. 893), 2263. Smith V. Smith (11 Ky. L. Rep. 859), 2161. Smith V. Smith (67 Vt. 443), 2145. Smith V. State (23 Ala. 39), 309, 371. Smith V. State (55 Ala. 1), 64, 1632, 1754. Smith V. State (132 Ala. 38; 31 So. 552), 1232, 1234. Smith V. State ([Ala.] 46 So. 753), 1516. Smith V. State (54 Ark. 248; 15 S. W. 882), 309. Smith V. State ([Ark.] 16 S. W. 2), 1280, 1288. Smith V. State (19 Conn. 493), 1255, 1493, 1632. Smith V. State (90 Ca. 133; 15 S. E. 682), 201. Smith V. State (105 Cia. 724; 32 S. E. 127), 1083, 1722. Smith V. State (109 (5n. 227; 34 S. E. 325), 333, 551. Smith V. State (112 Ga. 291; 37 S. E. 441), 1475. Smith V. State (3 Ga. App. 326; 59 S. E. 934), 1602, 1662. Smith V. State (23 Ind. 132), 1497, 1499. Smith V. State (24 Ind. App. 688; 57 N. E. 572), 1749, 1751. Smith V. State (4 Neb. 277), 2040, 2062. Smith V. State (32 Neb. 105; 48 N. W. 823), 1445, 1446, 1449. Smith V. State (1 Humph. 396), 2024. Smith V. State (18 Tex. App. 454), 1304, 1320, 1570. Smith V. State (24 Tex. 547), 1246. Smith V. State (19 Tex. App. 444), 886, 888. Smith V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 49 S. W. 373), 1466, 1478. Smith V. State (42 Tex. Cr. App. 414; 57 S. W. 815), 225, 1212. Smith V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 66 S. W. 780), 1235, 1237, 1627. Smith V. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 509; 90 S. W. 37), 1122. Smith V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 91 S. W. 592), 1179. Smith V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 100 S. W. 953), 1473, 1611. Smith V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 103 C. VV. 953 ) , 1465. Smith V. State (52 Tex. Cr. App 357; 107 S. W. 353), 1128. Smith V. State (52 Tex. Cr. App 507; 107 S. W. 819), 1695. Smith V. State ([Tex.] 116 S W. 593), 1111. Smith V. State ( [Tex.] 120 S. W 801), 10. Smith V. State (120 N. W. 881) 33, 1697, 1702, 1708. Smith V. Toronto (16 C. P. [Ont.] 200 ) , 472. Smith V. Vaux (26 J. P. 134; 6 L. T. 46), 1141. TABLE OP CASES. celxxxiii I References are to pages.] Smith V. Warrior (99 Ala. 481; 12 So. 418), 432. Smith V. Wilcox (47 ^"t. 5i57), 1843. Smith V. Young (13 Okla. 134; 74 Pac. 104), 508, 021. Smitham v. State ( 53 Tex. Cr. App. 173; 108 S. W. 118), 917, 1685. Smithers v. Commonwealth ( 12 Ky. L. Rep. 030), 1484, 1485. Smithville v. Lee County ( 125 Ga. 559; 54 S. E. 539), 382. Smithy, Ex parte (33 Pac. 338), 432. Smothers v. Jackson ( [^liss.] 45 So. 982), 1002. Smurr v. State (88 Ind. 504), 2040. Snead v. State (40 Tex. Civ. App. 262 ; 40 S. W. 597 ) , 829, 832, ■835, 845, 896, 958. Snearly v. State ( 40 Tex. Cr. App. 507; 52 S. W. 547; 53 S. W. 696), 933. Snider v. Koehler (17 Kan. 432), 310, 1787, 1788. Snider v. State (81 Ga. 753; 7 S. E. 631; 12 Am. St. 350), 9, 11, 12, 18, 81, 1349, 1357, 1358. Snider v. State (78 Miss. 366; 29 So. 78), 1729, 1730, 1732. Snider v. Thompson (134 Iowa 725; 112 N. W. 239), 2033. Snow V. Hill (14 Q. B. Div. 588; 54 L. J. M. C. 95; 52 L. T. 859; 33 W. R. 475; 49 J. P. 440), 380. Snow V. State (50 Ark. 557; 9 S. W. 306), 69, 73. Snyder, In re (2 Pa. Dist. 785), 638, 664. Snyder's Lease, In re ( 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 785), 1808, 1809. Snyder v. Launt ( 1 App. Div. 142 ; 37 N. Y. Supp. 408), 1850, 1852. Snyder V. State (5 Ind. 194), 1501. Snyder v. State (40 Kan. 543; 20 Pac. Rep. 123), 222, 1768. Society, etc., v. Wheeler (2 Gall. [U. S.] 105), 261. Soehl V. State (39 Xeb. 695; 58 N. W. 196), 110, 168, 502. Sohn V. State (18 Ind. 389), 1304, 1714. Solomon v. Dreschler (4 Minn. 278), 1780, 1783. Somers v. Newman (31 App. D. C. 193), 2263. Somers v. Vlasney (04 Xeb. 383; 89 X. W. 1036), 565, 586, 609. Somerset v. Hart (12 Q. B. Div. 360; 48 J. P. 327; 53 L. J. M. C. 77), 375, 376. Somerset v. Wade ([1894] I Q. B. 574; 58 J. P. 231; 63 L. J. M. C. 120; 70 L. T. 452; 42 W. R. 399), 359, 306, 725, 2027, 2028. Sommer v. Gate (22 Iowa 585), 1771. Sonora v. Curtin (137 Cal. 583; 70 Pac. 674), 478. iSopher v. State (157 Ind. 360; 61 X. E. 785), 497. I Sopher v. State (169 Ind. 177; 81 X. E. 912; 14 L. R. A. I [X. S.] 172), 104, 105, 106, 144, 486, 1106, 1549, 1676. Sortwell V. Hughes ( 1 Curt. 244 ; Fed. Cas. No. 13177), 1161, 1164, 1795. Sothman v. State (66 Xeb. 302; 92 X. W. 303), 83, 253, 254, 1341, 1342, 1343, 1749. South v. Commonwealth ( 79 Ky. 493; 3 Ky. L. Rep. 276), 1220, 1487, 15i6. South v. State (86 Ala. 017; 6 So. 52), 225. Southcombe v. Merrian ( 1 C. & M. 286: 41 E. C. L. 159), 2229, 2232. South Betlilehem v. Hemingway (16 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 103), 807. cclxxxiv TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages.] Soutk Carolina v. United States (199 U S. 437; 26 Sup. Ct. 110; affirming 39 Ct. of CI. 257), 175. South Shore Country Club v. People (228 111. 74; 81 N. E. 805; 12 L. R. A. [X. S.] 519), 1325, 1338. Southern Exp. Co. v. State (107 Ga. 670; 33 S. E. 637), 956. Southern Express Co. v. State ( 1 Ga. App. 700; 58 S. E. 67), 1234, 1350, 1359, 1623, 1630, 1714. Southern Express Co. v. State (114 Ga. 226; 39 S. E. 899), 1281, 1283. Southern Ry. Co. v. Heyman (119 Ga. 616; 45 S. E. 491), 324. Southwestern R. Co. v. Hankerson (72 Ga. 182), 2197. Southwestern R. Co. v. Hankerson (61 Ga. 114), 2180, 2184. Southworth v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 532; 109 S. W. 133), 1690. Spake V. People (89 111. 617), 688, 689, 799, 827. Spann v. Lowndes Co. (141 Ala. 314; 34 So. 369), 796. Sparks v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 45 S. W. 493), 249, 1689, 1707. Sparks v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 99 S. W. 546), 1167. Sparrow, In re (138 Pa. 116; 20 Atl. 711; 27 W. N. C. 47), 400, 632, 648, 649, 651. Sparta v. Boorom (129 Mich. 555; 89 N. W. 435; 90 S. W. 681; S Det. L. N. 1100), 70, 453, 1554, 1742. Spauldingv. Nathan (21 Ind. App. 122; 51 X. E. 742), 520. Spaulding v. Nathan (21 Ind. App. 122; 51 N. E. 472), 520, 538. Spears v. State (18 Tex. App. 467), 1759. Specht V. Commonwealth (8 Penn. St. 312), 215, 216. Speckert v. Louisville (78 Ky. 287), 929. Speigle V. Meredith (22 Fed. Cas. 910), 1166. Spencer v. State (15 Lea 539), 2058. Spencer v. ^Yashington Co. ([Miss.] 45 So. 863), 879. Speogle, Ex parte (34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 465; 31 S. W. 171), 887. Sperrig, In re (7 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 131; 42 W. N. C. 37), 628. Spicer v. Martin ([1888] 14 App. •Cas. 12), 1821. Spickler, In re (43 Fed. 653; 10 L. R. A. 446), 321, 325,328. Spiegler v. 'City of Chicago (216 111. 114; 74 X'. E. 718), 428. Spira V. State (146 Ala. 177; 41 So. 465), 415. Spohn V. Missouri Pac. R. Co. ( 87 Mo. 74), 2216. Spokane v. Baiighman ([Wash.] 103 Pac. 14), 1325, 1338. Spoonheim v. Spoonheim (14 N. D. 380; 104 N. W. 845), 2095, 2108. Spratt, Ex parte (2 S. C. X. S. W. 254), 1048. Sprayberry v. Atlanta (87 Ga. 120; 13 S. E. 197), 182, 471, 472, 488, 490, 714, 740. Springfield v. Starke (93 Mo. App. 70), 408. Springfield v. State ([Tex.] 13 S. W. 752 ) , 09, 372. Springfield v. State (125 Ga. 281; 54 S. E. 172), 1380, 1381. Spring Valley v. Henning (42 111. App. 159), 1285. Squires v. State (3 Ind. App. 114; 28 X. E. 708), 1746. Staats V. Freeman (6 N. J. Eq. 490), 2098, 2131. Staats V. Washington (44 N. J. L. 605; 43 Am Rep. 402), 433, 457, 458. TABLE OF CASES. cclxxxv IReferences are to pages.] Staats V. Washington (45 N. J. L. 418), 447, 453, 457. 458, 460. Staats V. Washington (36 La. Ann. 912), 457. Stacy V. Portland Pub. Co. (US Me. 279), 1735. Stackberry v. Spencer (55 L. J. M. €. 141; 51 J. P. 181), 1275. Stahel V. Commonwealth (7 Bush, 387), 369. Stahl V. Lee ([Kan.] 80 Pac. 983), 256, 258, 931, 2257. Stahuka v. Krieth (66 Neb. 829; 92 N. W. 1042), 1979. Staley v. Columbus ( 36 Mich. 38 ) , 798. Stallings v. Lee (123 Ala. 464; 26 So. 211), 1779. Stallings v. State (33 Ala. 425), 1632. Stallworth v. State ( 16 Tex. App. 345), 231, 1489, 1560. Stambaugh, In re (31 Pa. Super. Ct. 243), 542. Stamper v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 103 S. W. 286; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 707), 936, 949, 957, 1170, 1200. Stancliffe v. Clarke ([1852] 7 Ex. 439), 1818. Standard, etc., Co. v. Attorney- General (46 N. J. Eq. 270), 791. Standard Life, etc., Ins. Co. v. Jones (94 Ala. 434: 10 So. 530), 61, 62, 2032, 2189, 2232, 2238, 2239. Standard, etc., Ins. Co. v. Laud- erdale (94 Tenn. 635; 30 S. W. 732), 2221, 2230. Standard Oil Co. v. Angevine (60 Kan. 167; 55 Pac. 879), 123. Standard Oil Co. v. Commonwealth (119 Ky. 75; 82 S. W. 1020; 26 Ky. L. Rep. 985), 479. Stanford v. State (16 Tex. App. 331), 1111. Stanley v. Monnet (34 Kan. 708; 9 Pac. 755), 627, 628, 648. Stanley v. State (26 Ala. 26), 64, 1631, 1632. Stanley v. State (89 Miss. 63; 42 So. 284), 1662. Stanley v. State (43 Tex. Cr. App. 270; 64 S. W. 1051), 1167, 1168. Stansfield v. Kunz (62 Kan. 797; 64 Pac. 614), 1785, 1792. Stanstead v. Beach ([1899] 8 Quebec Q. B. 276; overruling 8 Quebec C. S. 178), 631. Stanton v. James (19 K Z. 392), 1153. Stanton v. Simpson (48 Vt. 628), 223, 224, 1840. Stapf V. State (33 Ind. App. 255; 71 N. E. 165), 1488, 1502. Staples V. State (114 Ind. 194; 16 N. E. 521), 1524. Starace v. Rossi (69 Vt. 303; 37 Atl. 1109), 1789. Starbeck v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 192; 109 S. W. 162), 1471, 1694. Starke v. State (49 Fla. 41; 37 So. 850), 2038, 2068, 2082. Starkey v. Palm (80 Neb. 393; 114 N. W. 287), 588. Starling v. State (34 Tex. App. 295; 30 S. W. 445), 1230, 1231. Starnes v. State ( 52 Tex. Cr. App. 403; 107 S. W. 550), 1464, 1471, 1691, 1696. Starnes v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 107 S. W. 555), 1680, 1694. Starr v. State (149 Ind. 592; 49 N. E. 591), 1740. Starrett v. Douglas (2 Yeates [Pa.] 48), 2135, 2149. State Bank v. McCoy (69 Pa. St. 204; 8 Am. Rep. 246), 2106, 2108, 2110, 2112, 2116. State Board v. Aberdeen (56 Miss. 518), 807. cclxxxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.! State Brewery Co. v. Primer (59 111. App. 581; affirmed 163 111. 652; 45 N. E. 144), 1808. Ktavolo, Appeal of (81 Conn. 454; 71 Atl. 549), 667, 682. State V. (87 N. Car. 560), 448. State V. Abbey (29 Vt. 60; 67 Am. Dec. 754), 1510. State V. Abbott (31 N. H. 434), 1460, 1489, 1525. State V. Abrahams (4 la. 541; 6 la. 116), 390. State V. Aehert (95 Iowa 210; 63 N. W. 557), 577. State V. Adams (16 Ark. 497), 1541. State V. Adams ( [Del.] 65 Atl. 510), 2038, 2068, 2069. State V, Adams (20 Iowa 486), 508. State V. Adams (81 Iowa 593; 47 N. W. 770), 1548. State V. Adams (44 Kan. 135; 24 Pac. 71), 1698, 1702. State V. Adams (6 N. H. 532), 1517, 1518. State V. Adams (51 N. H, 568), 12, 15, 19, 25, 262. State V. Adams (49 S. C. 518; 27 S. E. 523), 1086, 1104. State V. Adamson (14 Ind. 296), 211, 289, 439. State V. Adler (68 Miss. 487; 9 So. 645), 426, 793, 802. State V. Agnew (10 N. J. L. Jr 165), 2060, 2063, 2067, 2068 State V. Ah Chew (16 Nev. 55) 110. State V. Ah Jum (9 Mont. 167 23 Pac. 76), 225. State V. Ah Sam (14 Ore. 347 13 Pac. 303), 1655. State V. Ahern (54 Minn. 195 55 N. W. 959), 1643. State V. Aiken (42 S. C. 222; 20 S. E. 221; 26 L. R. A. 345), 111, 149, 150, 168, 1017. .State Y. Ainsworth (11 Vt. 91), 1716. State V. Alcorn (137 Mo. 121; 38 S. W. 548), 2039, 2076. State V. Alderton (50 W. Va. 101; 40 S. E. 350), 1256. State V. Alexander (73 Mo. App. 605), 831. State V. Allen (12 Ind. App. 528; 40 N. E. 705), 1502, 1560, 1561. State V. Allen (32 Iowa 491), 1502. State V. Allen (71 Iowa 216; 32 N. W. 267), 1017. State V. Allen (63 Kan. 598; 66 Pac. 628), 1478. State V. Alliance (65 Xeb. 524; 91 X. W. 387). 662, 664. 669. State V. Allmond (2 Houst. [Del. J 612), 91, 101, 110, 126, 152, 211, 307, 313, 316. State V. Ambs (20 Mo. 24), 215, 216, 456, 1121, 1134, 1304, 1308. State V. American Express Co. 118 Iowa 447; 92 N. W. 66), 253, 256, 307, 324, 326. iState V. Amery (12 R. I. 64), 121, 294, 307, 316. State V. Amor (77 Mo. 568), 1220, 1224. State V. Anderson (81 Mo. 78), 833. State V. Anderson (3 Rich. [S. C.l 172), 1649. State V. Andre ([S. D.] 84 N. W. 783), 2251. State V. Andrews (26 Mo. 171), 185, 495, 1457, 1637. State V. Andrews (27 Mo. 267), 1716. State V. Andrews (28 Mo. 14), 183. State V. Andrews (11 Xeb. 523; 10 X. W. 410), 397, 401, 419. State V. Andrews (82 Tex. 73; 18 S. W. 554), 345. »State V. Anthony (25 Mo. App. 507 ) , 845. State V. Anthony (52 Mo. App. 507), 838. TABLE OF CASES. cclxxxvii [References are to pages.] State V. Appergcr (80 Mo. 173), 1600. State V. Arbogast (24 Mo. 363), 1499. State V. Arie (95 Iowa (375; 34 N. W. 268), 1089, 1658. State V. Arien (71 Iowa 216; 32 N. W. 267), 1739. State V. Aden (71 Iowa 216; 33 X. W. 267), 1016. State V. Aries ( [Minn.] 73 N. W. 403), 957. State V. Arnold ( 98 Iowa 253 ; •67 N. W. 252), 1610, 1650, 1673, 1674. State V. Arnold (80 S. (". 383; 61 S. E. 891), 268, 955, 959, 1465, 1528. State V. Ascher (54 Conn. 299; 7 Atl. 822), 1283, 1800. State V. Aslicraft (11 Ind. App. 406; 39 N. E. 199), 1519. State V. Ashley (45 La. Ann. 1036 ) , 2062. State V. Atkins (40 Mo. App. 344), 1556. State V. Atkinson (139 Ind. 426; 39 N. E. 51), 1121, 1122, 1304, 1318. State V. Atkinson (33 S. C. 100; 11 S. E. 93), 844, 1452. State V. Atlantic City (48 N. J. L. 118; 3 Atl. 65), 669, 677. State V. Auberry (7 Mo. 304), 1442, 1488. State V. Aulman ( 76 Iowa 624 ; 41 N. W. 379), 825, 1752, 1754. State V. Austin ( 74 Minn. 463 ; 77 N. W. 301), 1609. State V. Austin (114 N. C. 855; 19 S. E. 919; 25 L. R. A. 283), 462, 463. State V. Austin Club (89 Tex. 20; 33 S. W. 113; 30 L. R. A. 500), 1330, 1331, 133£, 1338, 1339. State V. Aydelott (7 Blackf. 157), 1443. State V. Baber (74 Mo. 292; 41 Am. Rep. 314), 2247. State V. Bach (36 Minn. 234; 30 X. W. 764), 500, 505, 1499, 1643, 1739. State V. Bach Liquor Co. (67 Ark. 163; 55 S. W. 854), 1211. State V. Back (i»9 Mo. App. 34; 72 S. W. 466), 1505, 1615. State V. Backer (3 S. Dak. 29; 51 X. W. 1088), 110. State V. Bacon (41 Vt. 526; 98 Am. Dec. 616), 1747. State V. Bacon Club (44 Mo. App. 86), 1342. State V. Baden (37 Minn. 212; 34 X. W. 24), 1188, 1218, 1221, 1308, 1578. State V. Badworth ([Minn.] 116 X. W. 486), 1499. State V. Baer (37 W. Va. 1; 16 S. E. 368), 1237. State V. Bahnenkamp (88 Mo. App. 172), 555. State V. Bailer (91 Minn. 186; 97 X. W. 670), 807. State V. Bailey (43 Ark. 150), 1504, 1505. State V. Bailey (74 Kan. 873; 87 Pac. 189), 1654. State V. Bailey ( 73 Mo. App. 576 ) , 833, 834.' State V. Bailey (57 Xeb. 204; 77 X. W. 654), 1261, 1264. State V. Bailey (100 X. C. 528; 6 S. E. 372), 2247. State V. Bailey 63 W. Va. 668; 60 S. E. 785), 1773, 1774. State V. Baker (74 Iowa 760; 38 X. W. 380), 1763. State V. Baker (71 Mo. 475), 1367. State V. Baker (36 Mo. App. 38), 885. State V. Baker (36 Mo. App. 63), 885. State V. Baker (32 Mo. App. 98), 183, 188, 495, 650. cclxxxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] State V. Baker ([Ore.] 92 Pae. 1076; 13 L. K. A. [N. «.J 1040), 219, 358, 401, 1724. State V. Baldwin (109 Mo. App. 573; 83 S. W. 261)), 870. State V. Baldwin (50 Mo. App. 423), 1499. State V. Baldy (17 Iowa 39), 2247. State V. Ball CZl Neb. 601; 43 N. W. 398), 1553, 1445. State V. Ballard (6 N. C. 186), 1476. State V. Ball ( [N. D.] 123 N. W. 826), 1169, 1708. State V. Ballingall (42 la. 87), 389. State V. Bane ( 1 Kan. App. 537 ; 42 Pac. 376), 1674. State V. Barber [(S. D.] 101 N. W. 1078), 233, 249, 283, 881. State V. Barge (82 Minn. 256; 84 N. W. 911), 342, 465. State V. Barker (3 R. 1. 280), 1513, 1533. State V. Barker (4 Sneed. 554), 1306. State V. Barnett (111 Mo. App. 552; 86 S. W. 460), 349, 723, 750, 1160, 1354, 1372, 1373, 1457, 1639, 1640, 1641, 1650. State V. Barnett (111 Mo. App. 688; 86 S. W. 572), 1374. State V. Barr (39 Conn. 40), 70, 1124. State V. Barr (78 Vt. 97; 62 Atl. 43), 281, 1491, 1652. State V. Barrels of Liquor ( 47 N. H. 369), 1015, 1016, 1029, 1071. State V. Barrett (138 N. C. 130; 50 S. E. 506), 129, 265, 1084. State V. Barringer (110 N. C. 525; 14 S. E. 781), 131, 210, 247, 249. State V. Barron (37 Vt. 57), 10, 48, 82, 1594, 1604, 1712, 1713, 1753. State V. Bartlett (47 Me. 388), 1038, 1039, 1051, 1057, 1063, 1068, 1098. State V. Bartley (92 Me. 422; 43 Atl. 19), 1532, 1572. State V. Barton (138 N. C. 575; 50 S. E. 214), 1512. State V. Baskett (52 Mo. App. 389), 1458, 1499. State V. Baskins (82 Iowa 761; 48 N. W. 800), 1670. State V. Bass (104 Me. 288; 71 Atl. 894), 336. State V. Basserman ( 54 Conn. 88 ; 6 Atl. 185), 1348, 1349. State V. Bassett (133 Mo. App. 366; 112 S. W. 764), 892. State V. Batchellor (66 N. H. 145; 20 Atl. 931), 989. State V. Bates (96 Minn. 110; 104 N. W. 709), 197. State V. Bates (62 Vt. 184; 19 Atl. Pxep. 229 ) , 389. State V. Baughnian ( 20 Iowa 497 ) , 452, 523, 525, 1447, 1531, 1589. vState V. Baughmer (5 S. D, 461; 59 N. W. 736), 1508. State V. Banm (33 La. Ann. 981), 171, 263. State V. Bauserman (54 Conn. 88; 6 Atl. 185), 1559. State V. Bayne (100 Wis. 35; 75 X. VV. 403), 694, 697. State V. Bayonne (44 N. J. L. 114), 566. State V. Bays (31 Neb. 514; 48 N. W. 270; 31 Neb. 516; 48 N. W. 271), 672. State V. Beach (147 Ind. 74; 43 N. E. 949), 166, 264, 268, 1443. State V. Beam (51 Mo. App. 360), 928, 934. State V. Bean ( [N. H.] 71 AtK 216), 1460. State V. Bearden (94 Mo. App. 134; 67 S. W. 973), 1322, 1323. TABLE OP CASES. cclxxxix [References are to pages.] State V. Beardsley (43 Kan. 641; 23 Pac. 1070), 1605. State V. Beartheol (6 Blackf. 474; 39 Am. Dec. 442), 104. State V. Beasley (21 W. Va. 777), 1712. State V. Beattie (16 Mo. App. 131), 409. State V. Beaumier (87 Me. 214; 32 Atl. 881), 1647, 1656. State V. Becker (20 Iowa 438), 1447, 1479, 1505, 1531, 1550, 1589. State V. Becker (3 S. D. 29; 51 N. W. 1018), 294, 1455, 1744. State V. Beech (147 Ind. 74; 46 N. E. 145), 1585, 1586. State V. Behrnians (Riley [S. C] 82), 1246. State V. Bell (29 Iowa 316), 2041, 2077. State V. Bell (2 Jones [N. C] 337), 1190. State V. Bellow ( 42 La. Ann. 586 ; 7 South 782), 2247. State V. Beloit (74 Wis. 267; 42 N. W. 110), 749, 1615. State V. Benadom (79 Iowa 90; 44 N. W. 218), 842, 844. State V. Beneke (9 Iowa 203), 231, 1511, 1525. State V. Benghmeu ( 20 Iowa 497 ) , 110. State V. Bengschs (170 Mo. 81; 70 S. VV. 710), 199, 224, 250, 282, 286, 294, 332, 789, 1574. State V. Benjamin (49 Vt. 101), 1462. State V. Bennett (3 Harr. [Del.] 565), 6, 24, 25, 33, 55, 57, 81. State V. Bennett (128 Iowa 713; 105 N. W. 324), 2084. State V. Bennett (95 Me. 197; 49 Atl. 867), 1050, 1059, 1481, 1531. State V. Bennett (101 Mo. App. 224; 73 S. W. 737), 676, 756, 762. State V. Bennett (19 Neb. 191; 26 N. W. 714), 201. State V. Benz (41 Minn. 30; 42 N. W. 547), 1189. State V. Bergman (0 Ore. 341), 271. State V. Berkeley (41 W. Va. 455; 23 S. E. 608), 845. State V. Berlin (21 S. C. 292; 53 Am. Rep. 677), 132, 149, 150. State V. Bernstein (129 Iowa 520; 105 S. W. 1015), 1623. State V. Berry (12 Iowa 58), 467. State V. Berry (50 La. 1309; 24 So. 329)," 1583. State V. Bertheol (6 Blackf. 474; 39 Am. Dec. 442), 485, 1106, 1109. State V. Berton (27 Xeb. 476; 43 N. W. 249), 673. State V. Bertrand (72 Miss. 516; 17 So. 235), 1468. State V. Besheer (69 Mo. App. 72), 43, 964. State V. Best (106 N. C. 747; 12 S. E. 907), 1225. State V. Best (108 N. C. 747; 12 S. E. 907), 1231, 1234, 1845. State V. Beswick (13 R. I. 211), 46, 83, 267. State V. Bevans (51 Mo. App. 368), 928, 930. State V. Beverly (45 N. J. L. 288), 439. State V. Biddle (54 X. H. 379), 10, 11, 19, 44, 48, 51, 82, 1753. State V. Bielby (21 Wis. 204), 1505, 1506, 1553. State V. Bierman (1 Strob. [S. C] 256), 1246, 1365. State V. Binder (38 Mo. 450), 904. State V. Bindle (28 Iowa 512), 8. State V. Binnard (21 Wash. 349; 58 Pac. 210), 1128, 1133. ccxc TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] State V. Binswanger (122 Mo. App. 78; 988 S. W. 103), 400. State V. Bird (108 Mo. App. 163; 83 S. W. 284), 870. State V. Bissell (67 la. 616; 25 N. W. 831), 822, 830, 835. State V. Bixman (162 Mo. 1; 62 S. W. 828), 139, 225, 331, 789, 1382, 1383, 1384. State V. Black ([Ark.] Ill S. W. 993), 1098. State V. Black (9 Ind. [N. C] 378), 370. State V. Blackman ( 134 N. C. 683 ; 47 S. E. 16), 1084, 1454. State V. Blackwell (65 Me. 556), 307, 316, 325. State V. Blair (72 Iowa 591; 34 N. W. 432), 827, 828, 1026, 1073, 1044, 1065, 1756. State V. Blaisdell (33 N. H. 388), 23, 1492, 1519, 1527. State V. Bland (121 Ind. 514), 294. State V. Blands (101 Mo. App. 618; 74 S. W. 3), 1300, 1491, 1637. State V. Blankeney (96 Md. 711; 54 Atl. 614), 1453. State V. Blodgett (50 Ore. 329; 92 Pac. 820), 2068. State V. Blount (48 Ark. 34; 2 S. W. 190), 1716. State V. Bluefield Drug Co. (43 W. Va. 144; 27 S. E. 350), 839. State V. Board (70 ,S. C. 509; 50 S. E. 203), 175. State V. Board (78 S. C. 461; 59 S. E. 145), 902. State V. Board, etc. (45 Ind. 501), 627, 675, 662, 1015. State V. Board ( [Xeb.] 108 X. W. 122), 618, 662, 665. State V. Board of Corrections (16 Utah 478; 52 P. 1090), 2261. State V. Board ([Wyo.l 105 Pac. 295), 103, 105, 158. State V. Bock (167 Ind. 559; 79 N. E. 493), 192, 293, 543, 831. State V. Bodeckar (11 Wash. 417; 39 Pac. 645), 1508. State V. Bogan (2 La. Ann. 838), 1446, 1459. State V. Boggess (36 W. Va. 713; 15 S. E. 423), 1461, 1483, 1562. State V. Bohen ( [DeL] 74 Atl. 1), 1161. State V. Boice (Cleves [S. C] 77), 1515. State V. Bollenbach ([Minn.] 108 N. W. 3), 958), '687. State V. Boncher (59 Wis. 477; 18 X. W. 35), 1492, 1561. State V. Bonnell (119 Ind. 494; 22 X. E. 301), 179, 183, 450, 490, 639, 649. State V. Bonner (2 Head 135), 1221. State V. Bonney (30 X. H. 206), 1615, State V. Bonsfield (24 Xeb. 517; 39 N. W. 427), 196, 662, 671. State V. Boston Club (45 La. Ann. 585; 12 So. 895; 20 L. R. A. 185), 139, 1333. •State V. Bott (31 La. Ann. 663; 34 Am. Rep. 224), 124, 127, 163, 104, 167, 168, 183, 184, 215, 216, 217, 263, 299, 431. State V. Bougher (3 Blackf. 307), 1443. State V. Bowden ([Kan.] 101 Pac. 654), 1742, 1744. State V. Bowen ( 1 Houst. Cr. Rep. ([Del.] 91), 2085. State V. Bowen (17 S. C. 58). 2034. State V. Bowen (4 Cranch C. C. 404), 2073. State V. Bowerman ( [Mo. App.] 124 S. W. 41), 1179. State V. Bowerman (40 ^Mo. App. 576), 886, 893. State v. Bowers ( 65 Mo. App. 639 ; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 1181), 839. TABLE OP CASES. ecxci [Referonccs are to pages.] State V. Bowman (79 Iowa 500; 44 N. W. 813), 1001. State V. Bowman ([Iowa] 82 N. W. 493), 1003. State V. Brackett (41 :\Iinn. 33; 42 N. W. 548), 549, 1189. State V. Bradford (2 Mo. App. Repr. 425; 79 Mo. App. 346), 1525. State V. Bradford (79 Mo. App. 346; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 425), 1641, 1650. State V. Bradford (13 S. D. 201; 83 N. W. 47; 80 N. W. 143), 1457. State V. Bradish ( 95 Wis. 205 ; 70 K W. 172), 734. State V. Bradley (96 Me. 121; 51 Atl. 810), 1047, 1048, 1002, 1602. State V. Bradley (132 X. €. 1060; 44 S. E. 122), 757, 1575. State V. Bradley (10 N. D. 157; 86 N. W. 354), 985. State V. Bradley (15 S. D. 148; 87 N. W. 590), 1241, 1440. State V. Bradshaw (2 Swan 627), 1240, 1457. State V. Brady (41 Conn. 588), 473, 1315, 1643. State V. Brady (6 R. I. 76), 1445. State V. Brady (14 R. I. 508), 505, 551. State V. Brady (10 R. T. 51; 12 Atl. 238), 1445, 1545, 1552. State V. Brandon (28 Ark. 410), 688. State V. Brattleboro (68 Vt. 520; 35 Atl. 472). 382, 809. State V. Braun (96 Minn. 521; 105 N. W. 975), 391, 1559. State V. Brawn ( 130 Mo. App. 214; 109 S. W. 99), 890. State V. Breaux ( [La.] 47 So. 876), 291, 844, 1526. State V. Brennen's Liquors ( 25 Conn. 278), 120, 175. 192, 2.55, 270, 319, 1008, 1010, 1036, 1043, 1047, 1058, 1059, 1068, 174S. State V. Brennan (2 S. D, 384; 50 X. W. 625), 148, 149, 240, 1455. State V. Briiinan ([Iowa] 117 N. W. 279), 999. State V. Brennan (0 Kan. App. 765; 50 Pac. 986), 1556. State V. Briggs (81 Iowa 585; A7 X. W. 865), 1176. State V. Brindle (28 Iowa 512), 965, 960, 907. State V. Brittain (89 X. C. 574), 214, 270, 273, 396, 437. State V. Broeder (90 Mo. App. 109), 1384, 1720, 1723. State V. Brooks (33 Kan. 708; 7 Pac. 591), 1491, 1739, 1743. State V. Brooks (74 Kan. 175; 85 Pac. 1013), 287, 1077. State V. Brooks ( 94 Mo. App. 57 ; 07 S. W. 933), 500. State V. Brosius (39 Mo. 534), 1189, 1037. State V. Broussard (41 La. Ann. 81; 5 So. 647), 2246, 2248. State V. Brown ([Ark.] 102 S. W. 394), 1168. State V. Brown (51 Conn. — ), 24, 1494, 1495, 1496. State V. Brown (19 Fla. 503), 208. State V. Brown (4 Iowa 349), 1016. State V. Brown (58 Iowa, 298), 1746. State V. Brown (75 Iowa 708; 39 X. W. 829), 1723. State V. Brown ([Iowa] 109 X. W. 1011), 526, 527, 688, 1512, 1095, 1741. State V. Brown (41 La. Ann. 771; So. 638), 502, 1160, 1505, 1506. State V. Brown (31 Me. 522), 53, 822, 1503, 1510, 1527, 1554, 1756. State V. Brown (107 Minn. 175; 119 X. W. 657), 1098. State V, Brown (83 Mo. 480),. 1567. CCXCll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] State V. Brown (181 Mo. 192; 79 S. W. nil), 2038, 2056. State V. Brown (18 Mo. App. 620), 831. State V. Brown (93 Mo. App. 543; 67 S. W. 711), 1372, 1373. State V. Brown ( 130 Mo. App. 214; 109 S. W. 99), 1686. State V. Brown (00 N. H. 205), 829. State V. Brown (14 N. D. 529; 104 S. W. 1112), 1103, 1481. State V. Brown ([Okla.] 103 Pac. 762), 2261. State V. Brown (30 Vt. 560), 1445; 1446. State V. Brown (49 Vt. 437), 1723. State V. Bruce (48 Iowa 530; 30 Am. Rep. 403), 2247. State V. Bruce (20 W, Va. 123), 1483, 1484, 1485. State V. Bruder (35 Mo. App. 475), 1233, 1237. State V. Brunswick (2 N. J. Law J. 240), 467. State V. Bryant (97 Minn. 8; 105 X. W. 974), 1105, 1108, State V. Bryant (14 Mo. 340), 513, 1372. State V. Bryon (74 X. C. 351), 1583, 1633. State V. Buck (78 Me. 193; 3 Atl. 573), 1484, 1552. State V. Buck (120 Mo. 479; 25 S. W. 573), 264, 1585. State V. Buckley (40 Conn. 246), 1094. State V. Buckley (5 Har. [Del.] 508), 1107, 1109. State V. Buckner (52 Ind. 278), 1518. State V. Buckner (20 Mo. App. 420), 1489. State V. Budwig (21 Minn. 202), 271. State V. Buechler (10 S. D. 156; 72 X. W. 114), 139, 201, 808, 816. State V. Buford (10 Mo. 703), 1510, 1521. State V. Bugbee (22 Vt. 32), 513, 1111, 1372. State V. Bullard (16 X. H. 139), 2247. State V. Bullock (13 Ala. 413). 2041, 2045, 2052, 2071, 2072, 2074. State V. Bundy (24 S. C. 439; 58 Am. Rep. *262), 2040, 2046. State V. Burchard (4 S. D. 548; 57 X. W. 491), 1502. State V. Burchfield (149 X. C. 537; 63 S. E. 89), 1620. State V. Burchinal (4 Harr. [Del.] 572), 1100, 1109, 1354. State V. Burgess (4 Ind. 606), 1502. State V. Burgoyne (7 Lea 173), 182. State V. Burk (66 Me. 127), 1051, 154. State V. Burkett (51 Kan. 175; 32 Pac. !25), 1476. State V. Burkhalter (118 La. 657; 43 So. 208), 1479, 1505. State V. Burks (33 Kan. 70S; 7 Pac. 591), 1505. State V. Burnett (77 Mo. 570), 1303, 1305. State V. Burns (44 Conn. 149). 1445. State V. Burns (20 X. H. 550), 1519. State V. Burr (10 Me. 438), 77. State V. Burrow ( 37 Conn. 425 ) , 1015, 1074. StaiC V. Bursaw (74 Kan. 473; 87 Pac. 183), 1558. State V. Burton (138 X. C. 575; 50 S. E. 214), 1469, 1650, 1651. State V Busby ( 44 X. J. L. 627 ) , 55f. State V. Bush ([Mo.] 118 S. VV. 670), 917, 1714. State V. Buskirk (18 Ind. App. 629; 48 X. E. 872), 1509, 1520. State V. Buskirk (20 Ind. App. 496; 48 X. E. 871), 1740. TABLE OF CASES. CCXClll [References are to pages ] State V. Bussamiis (108 Iowa 11; 78 N. \V. 700), 341, 972. State V. Butcher (40 Ark. 302), 1459. «tate V. Butler ([Me.] /3 Atl. 560), 1744. State V. Butcher (1 S. D. 401; 47 X. W. 40U), 1454. State V. Cady (47 Conn. 44), 1125, 1304, 1320. State V. Cain (78 S. C. 348; 58 N. E. 937), 424. State V. Cain (8 W. Va. 720), 1516, 1567. State V. Cain (9 W. Va. 559), 1237, 1460, 1537, 1G45. State V. Cairns (64 Kan. 782; 08 Pac. 621), 949. State V. Caldwell ( [Miss.] 17 So. 372), 1505. State V. Calloway (11 Idaho 719; 84 Pac. 27), 91, 103, 104, 184, 192, 289, 408, 415, 455, 1129, 1303. State V. Calvin (127 Iowa 632; 103 N. W. 968), 963. State V. Camden (40 N. J. L. 156), 170. State V. Camp (64 Vt. 295; 24 Atl. 1114), 1299. State V. Campbell (76 Iowa, 122; 40 N. W. 100), 386, 955, 956. State V. Campbell (214 Mo. 302; 113 S. W. 1081; 119 S. W. 494), 891, 1403, 1400, 1088. State V. Campbell (12 R. I. 147), 1530. State V. Camper (91 Md. 072; 47 Atl. 1027), 1558. State V. Capdeville (104 La. 501; 29 So. 515), 426. Stae V. Capitol Brewing & Ice Co. ([Ala.] 50 So. 312), 544. State V. Cappy (50 Ind. 291), 133, 247. State V. Cardozo (5 S. C. 297), 100. State V. Carins (64 Kan. 782; 68 Pac. 621), 1218. State V. Carl (43 Ark. 353; 51 Am. Rep. 565), 1280, 1281. State V. Carlyle (33 Kan. 716; 7 Pac. 623), 1763. State V. Carmody (50 Ore. 1; 91 Pac. 440, i081), 83, 1682, 1684. State V. Carnahan (63 Mo. App. Rep. 766), 83.3, 1650. State V. Carney (20 Iowa 82), 110, 183, 316, 523, 525. State V. Carpenter (20 Ind. 219), 1490, 1491, 1516. State V. Carron (73 N. H. 434; 02 Atl. 1044), 490, 73.3, 1359, 1742, 1707. State V. Carson (2 Ohio Dec. 81), 1461. State V. Carter (98 Mo. 176; 11 S. W. 624), 2041. State V. Carter (28 S. C. 1; 4 S. E. 790), 928. State V. Carter (7 Humph. 158), 1508. State V. Carver (12 R. I. 285), 1503. State V. Carver Co. (60 Minn. 510; 62 N. W. 1135), 635. State V. Casey (45 Me. 435), 1542. State V. Casey (54 Me. 435), 1550. State V. Cass Co. (12 Neb. 54; 10 N. W. 571), 637, 648, 600. State V. Cass Co. Ct. ([Mo.] 119 S. VV. 1010), 283. State V. Cass County Ct. ( [Mo.] 119 S. W. 1010, 1014), 648, 93 7 State V. Cassety (1 Rich. L. [S. C] 90), iTll, 1504. State V. Cassidy (22 Minn. 312; 21 Am. Rep. 765), 192, 277. State V. Cassity (49 Mo. App. 300, 302 ) , 1502. State V. Castello (62 Iowa 404; 17 X. W. 005), 22.58. State V. Caswell (2 Humph. 399), 1377. State V. Cate (58 N. H. 241), 110. CCXCIV TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] State V. Gather (121 Iowa lOG; 96 N. W. 722), 1736. State V. Cathey HI Ark. 308), 1571. State V. Cattle (15 Mo. 473), 1486. State V. Caulfield (23 La. Ann. 148 ([1887]), 2247. State V. Caiithorn (40 Mo. App. 94), 563, 564. State V. Certain Liquors ( [R. I.] 45 Atl. 552), 1074. State V. Chamberlain (74 Iowa 266; 37 N. W. 326), 220, 355, 840, 841. Stat« V. Chambers (93 N. C. 600), 1463, 1468, 1476. State V. Chambers (2 Ohio Dec. 647), 1290. State V. Chambless ( 45 Ark. 349 ) , 1498. State V. Chamblyss (1 Cleves 220; 34 Am. Dec. 593 ) , 72, 508. State V. Chandler (15 Vt. 425), 1111. State V. Chapman ( 94 Iowa 67 ; 62 N. W. 659), 1449. State V. Chapman ( 1 S. D. 414; 47 N. W. 411; 10 L. R. A. 432), 309, 336, 1101. State V. Chapman (25 W. Va. 408), 1557. State V. Charles (16 Minn 478), 271. State V. Charleston (12 Rich. L. 702), 97. State V. Charleston, etc. Co. (80 S. C. 116; 61 S. E. 209), 980. State V. Charlton ( 1 1 \V. Va. 332 ; 27 Am. Rep. 003), 1488. State V. Chartrand (86 Me. 547; 30 Atl. 10), 1057. State V. Chastain (19 Ore. 176; 26 Pac. 963), 513, 514, 1238, 1372, 1373. State V. Chastain (49 S. C. 171; 27 S. E. 2), 1086. State V. Chester (18 S. C. 464), 124. State V. Chester (39 S C. 307; 17 S. E. 752), 1, 185. State V. Cheyenne (7 Wyo. 417; 52 Pac. 975), 400, 424, 448, 627. State V. Chico ([S. C] 64 S. B. 306), 1480. State V. Chiles (64 Kan. 453; 67 Pac. 884). 1549. State V. Chilton (26 Mo. 170), 1457. State V. Chipp (121 Mo. App. 556; 97 S. W. 236), 825, 1634. State V. ChiswoU (36 W. Va. 659; 15 S. E. 412), 1505. State V. Cliristian ( [Mo. App.] 114 S. W. 549), 1077. State V. Church (199 Mo. 605), 2038. State V. Church (6 S. D. 89; 60 X. V\ 143). i2, ?3. State V. Churchill (25 Me. 306) 1447, 1534. State V. Cicault (1 Daily [X. Y.] 23), 1727. State V. Circuit Court (50 N. J. L. 585; 15 Atl. 272), 18G, 235, 237, 238, 289, 807, 868, 893. State V. City Council of Aiken ( 42 S. C. 222; 20 S. E. 221; 26 L. R. A. 345), 174, 476. State V. Clark (3 Ind. 451), 23, 1492. State V. Clark ([La.] 50 So. 811), 1700. State V. Clarke (54 Mo. 17; 14 Am. Rep. 471), 294, 437, 449, 488, 490. State V. Clark (18 Mo. App. 531), 1752. State V. Clarke (8 Post. 176; 61 Am. Dec. 611), 165, 168, 169. State V. Clark (28 N. H. 176), 432, 439, 457. State V. Clark (15 R. I. 383: 5 Atl. 635). 121. 147. 294, 491, 1194. State V. Clark (23 Vt. 293), 1519. State V. Clark (44 Vt. 636), 1445. TABLE OF CASES. CCXCV [References ate to pages.] State V. Cleary (97 Iowa 413; 66 N. W. 724), 1670. State V. Clemniensen ( 92 Minn. 191; 99 N. W. 640), 1540. State V. Clevenger (25 Mo. App. 653), 838. State V. Clevenger (156 Mo. 190; 56 S. W. 1078), 2038, 2056. State V. Clinkenbeard ([Mo.] 115 S. W. 1059), 1556. State V. Clotter (33 Ind. 409) 1233. State V. Cloud (6 Ala. 628), 72. State V. Cloughly (73 Iowa 626; 35 N. W. 652), 11, 43, 828, 843, 1587, 1589, 1643, 1701, 1712. State V. Clow (131 Mo. App. 548; 110 S. W. 632), 1211, 1376. State V. Cloyd (34 Neb. 600; 52 X. W. 579), 1088. State V. Cobaugh (78 [Nle. 401; 6 Atl. 4), 1070. State V. Cochran ( [Ore.] 104 Pac. 419), 121, 400, 936. State V. Coday (69 Mo. App. 70), 832. State V. Coffeyville (78 Kan. 599; 97 Pac. 372), 418. State V. Cofield (22 S. C. 301), 493, 498. State V. Cofran (48 Mc. 364), 1487, 1651. State V. Cohen (65 Kan. 849; 70 Pac. 600), 1203. State V. Cohen (35 Md. 236), 508. State V. Colby (92 Iowa 463; 61 N. W. 187), 1280. State V. Colby (55 N. H. 72), 1615, 1616. State V. Coleman (3 Ala. 14), 1575. State V. Coleman (27 La. Ann. 691), 2041, 2051, 205G. State V. Coleman (34 Neb. 440; 51 N. W. 1025), 610, 616, 617. State V. Collina Ul Iowa 141), 1516, 1517. State V. Collins (8 Kan. App. 398; 57 Pac. 38), 1609, 1652. State V. Collins (48 Me. 217), 1542, 1550. State V. Collins (68 N. II. 46; 36 Atl. 550), 989, 991, 993, 994, 1907. State V. Collins ([Minn.] 120 N. W. 1081), 1739. State V. Collins (28 R. I. 439; 67 Atl. 796), 171, 824, 1171, 1374, 1376, 1589, 1655, 1660, 1662, 1663. State V. Collins (74 Vt. 43; 52 Atl. 69), 976, 987, 989. State V. Colnen (48 Iowa 567), 1233. State V. Columbia (6 S. C. 8), 793. State V. Cobi.uhia (17 S. C, 80), 394, 395, 398, 400, 558, 645. State V. Colvin (127 Iowa 632; 103 N. W. 968), 1697, 1698. State V. Colwell (3 R. I. 284), 1451. State V. Combs (32 Me. 529), 1722. State V. Combs (19 Ore. 295; 24 Pac. 235), 1759. State V. Comolli (101 Me. 47; 63 Atl. 326), 1048, 1050. State V. Common Council (41 Minn. 211; 42 N. W. 1058), 746. State V. Common Pleas, etc. (36 N. J. L. 72), 240. State V. Commonwealth (28 Vt. 508), 1287. State V. Comstock (27 Vt. 553), 1444, 1748. State V. Conega (121 La. 522; 46 So. 614), 1483. State V. Conley (22 R. I. 397; 48 Atl. 200), 642. State V. Conlin (27 Vt. 318), 110, 1744, 1748. State V. Connell (38 N. H. 81), 1637. Stale V. C;mn(:iy fC3 :^,1l\ 212), 1081, 1082, 1087. CCXCVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] ?tate. V. Connolly ( 9(5 Me. 405 ; 52 Ail. 908), 1009, 1062. State V. Connor (30 Ohio St. -105), 1447. State V. Conway (38 Mont. 42; 98 Pac. 654), 1444, 1724. State V. Constantine (43 Wash. 102; 86 Pac. 384), 1236, 1357. State V. Constantino (76 Vt. 192; 56 Atl. 1101), 1520. State V. Cook (30 Kan. 82; 1 Pac. 32), 1073. State V. Cooke (24 Minn. 247; 31 Am. Rep. 344), 228, 232, 235, 236, 240, 495, 716, 928, 933. State V. Cool ( [W. Va.] 66 S. E. 740), 1700. State V. Cooler (30 S. C. 105), 226. State V. Coonan ( 82 Iowa 400 ; 48 X. W. 921), 309, 310, 327. State V. Cooper (114 Ind. 12; 10 X. E. 518), 1849. State V. Cooper (16 3Io. 551), 1637. State V. Cooper (35 Mo. App. 532), 1245. State V. Cooper (101 N. C. 684; 8 S. E. 134). 908. 920. State V. Cooper (26 W. Va. 338), 1197, 1622. State V. Cooper County (66 Mo. App. 96), 600, 60L State V. Cooster (10 Iowa 453), 369. State V. Copland (3 R. I. 33), 233, 294. State V. Copp (34 Kan. 522; 9 Pac. 233), 827. State V. Corcoran (70 Minn. 12; 72 N. W. 732), 1523. State V. Coren (35 Md. 236), 520. State V. Corn (76 Kan. 416; 91 Pac. 1067), 1679. State V. Corn76 Kan. 416; 91 Pac. 1067), 1679. State V Cornwell (12 Neb. 470; 11 N. W. 729), 799. State V. Corrick (82 Iowa 451; 48 N. W. 808), 324, 327. State V, Corrivau (93 Minn. 176; 100 N. W. 638), 2038, 2069. State V. Corron ( 73 X. H. 434 ; 62 Atl. 1044), 103, 718, 750, 768, 778. State V. Cosgrove (16 R. I. 411; 16 Atl. 900), 1749, 1751. State V. Costa (78 Vt. 198; 62 Atl. 38), 969, 970, 971, 1086, 1660, 1662. 1663, 1697, 1998, 1706, 1710. State V. Cottle (15 Me. 473), 1446, 1537. State V. Cottrill (31 W. Va. 162; 6 S. E. 428), 1483. State V. Couch (54 S. C. 256; 32 S. E. 408), 1506. State V. Coulter (40 Kan. 87; 19 Pac. 368), .53, 1610, 1626, 1701. State V. County Court, etc. (50 Mo. 317), 228*, 248. State V. Courtney (73 Iowa 019; 35 X. W. 685), 286, 756, 825, 830, 831. State V. Coval ( [W. Va.] 66 S. E. 740), 1483. State V. Cowan (29 Mo. 330), 270, 271, 394. State V. Cox (82 Me. 417; 19 Atl. 857), 1479, 1551. State V. Cox (29 Mo. 475), 1441, 1442, 1557. State V. Cox (23 W. Va. 797), 837, 839. State V. Crabtree (27 Mo. 232), 1305, 1308, 1310, 1567. State V. Cragg ([Mo. App.] Ill S. W. 856), 1566. State V. Craig (1.32 Ind. 54; 31 X. E. 352 ) . 643. State V. Crawford (9 Kan. App. 886; 61 Pac. 316), 1698. State V. Crawford (28 Kan. 726; 42 Am. Rep. 182). 256. 977. State V. Crawley (75 Miss. 919; 23 So. 625), 968. TABLE OF CASES. ccxcvu r References are to pages.] State V. Creden (78 Iowa 556; 43 N. W. 673; 7 L. R. A. 295), 111, 1021, 1070. State V. Crimmins (31 Kan. 576; 2 Pac. 574), 1740, 1746. State V. Cron (23 Minn. 140), 505, 550, 1160. State V. Cronin (39 Tex. 171), 1458. State V. Crooker (95 Mo. 389; 8 S. W. 422), li43. State V. Cross (27 Mo. 332), 2041. State V, Cross (42 W. Va. 253; 24 S. E. 996), 2056, 2063. State V. Crotean (23 Vt. 14; 54 Am. Dec. 90), 1609. State V. Crow (53 Kan. 662; 37 Pac. 170), 1643. State V. Crowell (25 Me. 171), 1643. State V. Crowell (30 Me. 115), 1492, 1527. State V. Crowley (37 Mo. 369), 1537. State V. Cucuel (24 N. J. L. 249), 2250. State V. Cucuel (31 N. J. Law [2 Vroom] 249), 2247. State V. Cummins ( 76 Iowa 333 ; 40 N. W. 124), 828, 840, 1646. State V. Cummings (17 Neb. 311; 22 N. W. 545), 541, 551. State V. Cunningham (25 Conn. 195), 264, 265, 314, 1089, 1592, 1659. State V. Curley (33 Iowa 359), 1510, 1649. State V. Currie (8 N. D. 545: 80 N. W. 475), 43, 964, 1703. State V. Currier ([N, H.] 19 All. 1000), 258. State V. Curtiss (69 Conn. 86; 90 S. W. 1014), 1349, 1555. State V. Curtis (8 Tex. Civ. App. 506; 28 S. W. 134), 768, 781. State V. Curtis (130 Wis. 357; 110 N. W. 189), 742. State V. Curtright ([Mo.] 114 S. W. 1146), 1505. State V. Cutting (3 Ore. 260), 1171, 1172, 1598, 1643. State V. Dahlquist ([N. D.] 115 N. W. 81), 1606, 1691, 1701. State V. D'Alemberte ( 30 Fla. 545 ; 11 So. 905), 429, 441, 573, 585. State V. Dalton (101 N. C. 680; 8 S. E. 154), 822. State V. Danforth (62 Vt. 188; 19 Atl. 229), 1175, 1299. State V. Dannenberg ( [N. C] 60 S. E. 301), 162, 433, 440, 796. State V. Darling (77 Vt. 67; 58 Atl. 974), 957, 1558. State V. Darlington ( 153 Ind. 1 ; 53 N. E. 925), 1443. State V. Davis (130 Ala. 148; 30 So. 344), 292, 294, 295. State V. Davis (9 Houst. [Del.] 407), 2041, 2045, 2052, 2072. State V, Davis (44 Kan. 60; 24 Pac. 73), 986. State V. Davis (119 La. 247; 44 So. 4), 652. State V. Davis (23 Me. 403), 1115. State V. Davis (108 Mo. 666; 18 S. W, 894; 32 Am. St. Rep. 640; 117 Mo. 614; 23 S. W. 759), 268. State V. Davis ( 126 Mo. App. 235 ; 102 S. W. 1103), 1525. State V. Davis (129 Mo. App. 129; 108 S. W. 127), 838. State v. Davis (76 Mo. App. 586), 831, 838, 1649. State V. Davis (69 N. H. 350; 41 Atl. 267), 993, 996, 1003. State V. Davis (109 N. C. 780; 14 S. E. 55), 1476. State v. Davis ([S. C] 66 S. E. 875), 333. State V. Davis (52 W. Va. 224; 43 S. E. 99), 2068, 2082. State V. Davis (62 W. Va. 500; 60 N. E. 584). 1598. State v. Day (37 Me. 244), 265, 1114, 1113, 1666, 1667. State v. Dean. (44 Iowa 648), 1448, 1549. CCXCVlll TABLE OP CASES [References are to pages.] State V. Bearing (65 Mo. 533), 2041, 2072. State V. Deberry (5 Iowa 371), 2024. State V. De Gress (53 Tex. 387), 925. State V. DeKruif (72 Iowa 488; 34 N. W. 007), 777. State V. Delancey (76 N. J. L. 462; 69 Atl. 958), 1504. State V. Delano (54 Me. 501), 452, 523, 525. State V. Dellaire (4 X. D. 312; 60 N. W. 988), 1505, 1507. State V. Delemater (20 S. D. 23; 104 N. W. 537), 1372, 1376, 1379, State V. Demareste (41 La. Ann. 413; 6 So. 654), 2248. State V. Dengolensky (82 Mo. 44), 32, 33, 81, 1496. State V. Dennie (51 La. Ann. 608; 25 So. 394), 129tockwell V. Brent (97 Ind. 474), 598, 599, 600, 601, 621, 623, 663. Stockwell V. State (27 Ohio St. 563), 1608, Stoddait V. Hawke (50 W. R. 93; 18 T. L. R. 22), 377. Stokes V. Sehlachter (66 N. J. L. 247; 49 Atl. 556), 413. Stokes V. Wall (112 Ga. 349; 37 S. E. 383), 677. Stolte V. State (115 Ind. 128; 17 X. E. 258), 1624. Stommel v. Timbal (84 Iowa 336; 51 N. W. 159), 523, 525. Stone V. Dana (46 Mass. [5 Met.] 98), 1062. Stone V. Mississippi (101 U. S. 814), 93, 95, 98, 126, 129, 180, 182, 450 490. Stone V. State (30 Ind. 115), 1509. Stone V. State ([Miss.] 7 So. 500), 1456, 1608. Stone V. State (3 Tex. App. 675), 369. Stone V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 39 S. W. 367), 1237, 1627. Stone V. Mississippi (101 U. S. 814), 489. Stone V. State (23 Tenn. l^ Humph.] 27 [1851]), 2247. Stoner v. State (5 Ga. App. 716; 63 S. E. 602), 4, 1491, 1697, 1702, 1708. Storey, In re (20 111. App. 183), 2U7. Stormes v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 47 S. W. 262), 824. Stormes v. Commonwealth (105 Ky. 619; 49 S. W. 451; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1434; reversing 47 S. W. 262), 549, 826, 931. Stormes v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 107 S. W. 550), 1471. Story V. Finkelstein ( 46 Neb. 577 ; 65 N. W. 195; 30 L. R. A. 644), 1781. Stountebugh v. Hennick (129 U. S. 141; 9 Sup. Ct. 256), 157. Stout V. State (43 Ark. 413), 1320. Stout V. State (93 Ind. 150), 1291, 1446, 1635, n^2. Stout V. State (96 Ind. 407), 41, 84, 1592. Stout V. Territory ( [Okla.] 103 Pac. 75), 1459. Stovall V. State ( 37 Tex. Cr. App. 337; 39 S. W. 934), 845, 1526. Stoval V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 97 S. W. 92), 948, 1376, 1611, 1612. Strahn v. Hamilton (38 Ind. 57), 694, 695, 1783. Strand v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (67 Mich. 380; 34 N. W. 712), 2174, 2177, 2203, 2217. Strange v. Prince (17 Ind. 524), 749. Strattman v. Moore ( 134 111. App. 275), 1956. Straub v. Gordon (27 Ark. 625), 198, 200, 788, 791, 793. Straus, Appeal of (73 N. E. 1122; 181 N. Y. 530), 745. Straus V. Galesburg (203 HI. 234; 67 N. E. 836; affirming 89 111. App. 504), 73, 108. 415, 424, 1193. Straus V. Pontiac (40 111. 301), 405, 432, 439. Streeter v. Peojjle (69 111. 595), 111, 138, 256. Streever v. Birch (62 Hun 298; 17 N. Y. Supp. 195), 1858. Streit V. Sanborn (47 Vt. 702), 1807. Strickland v. Knight (45 Fla. 712; 36 So. 363), 645, 658, 659, 974. Strickland v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 47 S. W. 720; rever- sing on rehearing [Tex. Cr. App.] 47 S, W. 470), 914, 1182, TABLE OF CASES. cccxli [References are to pages.] Strickland v. Whittaker (68 J. P. 235; 52 W. R. 538; 90 L. T. 445; 20 T. L. K. 224), 690, 1274. Stringfield v. Louisville Ry. Co. ([Ky.] 105 S. W. 1190; 32 Ky. L. Rep. 578), 2206. Stringer v. Huddersfield, J.J. (40 J. P. 22; 45 L. J. M. C. 39; 33 L. T. 568), 563, 1277. ■Stringer v. State (32 Fla. 239; 13 So. 450), 928. Strommert v. Johnson ( [Iowa] 123 Pac. 337), 996. Strong V. State (1 Blackf. [Ind.] 193), 261. Stroup V. State (70 Ind. 495), 749. Stroutsburg v. Shick (24 Pa. Super. Ct. 442), 809. Struble v. Nodwift (11 Ind. 64), 1838, 1989. Strydon v. Yandale ( 20 Juta 385 ) , 615. Stuart, In re (61 Cal. 374), 410, 417. Stuart V. Cullen (16 X. Z. L. R. 336), 548. Stuart V. Machias Port (48 Me. 477), 2171, 2186, 2191, 2197. Stuart V. State (1 Baxt. 178), 2051, 2057, 2058. Stuckman v. State (21 Ind. 160), 1498. Studabaker v. White (31 Ind. 211), 1808. Stukeley v. Butler (Hob. 172), 1036. Stultz V. State (96 Ind. 456), 1618, 1714. Sturgis V. State ( [Okla.] 102 Pac. 57), 1450. Stuyvesant v. Mayer, etc. (7 Cow. [N. Y.] 604), 404. Sublett, Ex parte (23 Tex. App. 309; 4 S. W. 894), 866, 871, 872, 883. Suggs V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 101 S. W. 999), 1733. Suit V. Woodhall (113 Mass. 391, 395), 1795, 1798. Sullivan, In re (30 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 682; 64 N. Y. Supp. 303), 867, 881, 882, 884. Sullivan, Ex parte ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 75 S. VV. 790), 915. Sullivan, In re (21 D. C. 139), 414. Sullivan v. Borden (163 Mass. 470; 40 N. E. 859), 722, 734. Sullivan v. Commonwealth ( 13 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 397), 1107. Sullivan v. District of Columbia 20 App. D. C. 29), 1122, 1124, 1129. Sullivan v. Kohlenberg (31 Ind. App. 215; 67 N. E. 541), 1808, 1809. Sullivan v. McCammon (51 Ind. 264), 811. Sullivan v. Old Colony R. Co. ( 148 Mass. 119; 18 N. E. 678; 1 L. R. A. 513), 2206. Sullivan v. Oneida (61 111. 242), 225, 396, 442, 1008, 1025, 1585. Sullivan v. Park (33 Me. 438), 1777. Sullivan v. Radezwirtt (82 Neb. 657; 118 N. W. 571), 1922, 1957. Sullivan v. Seattle, etc., Co. (44 Wash. 53; 86 Pac. 786), 2209, 2215, 2218. Sullivan v. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 201; 87 S. \N. 150), 1697. Summa, In re (3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 651), 701. Summa, In re ( 12 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 667), 695. Summer v. Crawford (91 Tex. 132; 41 S. W. 994). 925. Summerson, In re ([1900] 1 Cli. 112, note), 1814. Summit v. Hahr (66 N". J. L. 333; 52 Atl. 956), 1485, ceexlii TABLE OF CASES. [References a.re to pages.] Sumner v. State (4 Ind. App. 403; 30 N. E. 1105), 1219, 1223, 1224, 1226, 1227. Sun, etc., Co. v. Bennett (26 Pa. Super. Ct. 243), 571. Sun Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Sear- les (73 Miss. 62; 18 So. 544), 1779. Sunoury, etc., R. Co. v. Cooper (33 Pa. St. 278), 106. Supernant v. People (100 111. App. 121), 1232, 1560, 1562, 1564. Supervisors, etc. v. Davis (63 111. 405), 294. Supreme Council v. Curd (111 111. 284), 2231. Surber v. State (99 Ind. 71), 2040, 2071. Surrat v. State (45 Miss. 601), 1524. Susquehanna Co., In re (3 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 616), 532. Sutherland v. McKinney (146 Ind. 611; 45 N. E. 1048), 610, 612, 857, 860. Sutherland v. Standard L., etc., Ins. Co. (87 Iowa, 505; 54 N. W. 453), 2239), 2243, 2244. Sutton v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W. (84 Mo. App. 208), 65. Sutton V. Head (86 Ky. 156; 5 S. W. 410; 9 Am. St. 274), ISOS, 1809. Sutton V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 40 S. W. 996, .501), 1342, 1344, 1695. Sutton V. Washington (4 Ga. App. 30; 60 S. E. 811), 1722. Swalm V. State (49 Tex. Civ. App. 241; 91 S. W. 575), 85, 87, 1609. Swan, In re (150 U. S. 637; 14 Sup. Ct. 225 ; 37 L. Ed. 1202 ) , 1046. Swann, Ex parte (96 Mo. 44; 9 S. W. 10). 228. 232, 233, 237, 238, 928, 930. 932, 934, 1763. Swan V. State (11 Ala. 594), 1290. Swan V. State (4 Humph. 136), 2040, 2067. Swan V. Talbott (152 Cal. 142; 94 Pac. 238), 2095, 2107. Swan V. Wilderson (10 Okla. 547; 62 Pac. 422), 616, 617, 671, 672, 735. Swan River, In re (16 Manitoba, 312), 906. Swarth v. People (109 111. 621), 795. Swarthout v. State ([Mo.] 119 S. W. 1014), 283. Swartz v. Dover ([N. J. L.] 62 Atl. 1135; affirming 7 IS. J. L. 502; 57 Atl. 394), 168. Sweatt v. State (153 Ala. 70; 45 So. 588), 1612, 1652. Sweeney, In re (11 Pa. Super. Ct. 569), 664. Sweeney v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 226; 91 S. W. 575), 1357. Sweeney v. Traverse (82 Iowa 720; 47 N. W. 889), 1001. Sweeney v. Webb (97 Tex. 250), 234, 803. Sweeney v. Webb (33 Tex. Civ. App. 324; 76 S. W. 766; [Tex.] 77 S. W. 135), 188, 230, 249, 282, 295, 871. Sweeney v. Webb (45 Tex. Cr. App. 170; 76 S. W. 766), 245. Sweet V. Wabash (41 Ind. 7), 244, 291, 432, 436, 443. 444, 795. Sweetman. Ex jjarte (5 Cal. App. 577; 90 Pac. 1069), 171. Swick V. Home L. Ins. Co. (2 Dill 160), 2223, 2229. Swift V. Klein (163 111. 269; 45 X. E. 219), 279, 416, 421. Swift V. People (63 III. App. 453), 424. 652. Swift V. People (162 111. 534; 44 X. E. 528; 33 L. R. A. 470; reversing 60 111. App. 395), 208. Swift V. State (108 Tcnn. 610; 69 S. W. 326), 957. TABLE OF CASES. cccxliii [References are to pages.] Swift V. State (108 Tenn. 610; 69 S. W. 320), 1286. Swift V. Sutphiu (39 Fed. Rep. 631), 156. Swigart v. State (99 Ind. Ill), 1241, 1242, 1627, 1628. Swihart v. Hansen (76 Neb. 727; 107 N. W. 862), 588, 624. Swinfen Eady, J. ([1907] 2 Ch. 229; 72 L. J. Ch. 507), 1827. Swinford v. Lowiy (37 Minn. 345; 34 N. W. 22), 1877, 1878. Swords V. Daigle (107 La. 510; 32 So. 94), 446, 794. Swygart v. Willard (166 Ind. 25; 76 N. E. 755), 2137, 2138. Sydleman v. Beckwith (43 Conn. 9), 1736. Sylvester v. Casey (110 Iowa, 256; 81 N. W. 455), 2174, 2186. Symons v. Wedmore ([1S94] 1 Q. B. Div. 401; 58 J. P. 197; 63 L. J. M. €. 44; 69 L. T. 801; 42 W. R. 301), 081, 704. Taber v. Lander (94 Ky. 237; 21 S. W. 1056), 931. Taber v. New Bedford (177 Mass. 197; 58 N. E. 640), 559. Tacke, In re (17 N. St. Rep. 805), 2141. Tackaberry v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 71 S. W. 376), 1237. Tadcaster Tower Brewery Co. v. Wilson ([1897] 1 Ch. 705; 61 J. P. 360; 66 L. J. Ch. 402; 70 L. T. 459; 45 W. R. 428; 13 T. L. R. 295), 1831. Taffe V. State (23 Ark. .34), 2257. Taggart v. Graham ( [Tex. Civ. App. 93 S. W. 246), 762. Taggart v. Hillman (42 Tex. Civ. App. 71; 93 S. W. 245, 762. Taggart v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 85 S. W. 1155), 298, 307, 1214, 1280. Taggart v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 97 S. W. 95), 1167, 1611. Tai Kec v. Minister of Interior (12 Hawaii 164), G31. Taite v. Gosling ([1879] 11 Ch. D. 273; 48 L. J. Ch. 397; 40 L. T. 251; 27 W. R. 394), 1821. Talbott v. Dent (9 B. Mon. [Ky.] 526, 539), 904. Tallassee v. Tooms ([Ala.] 47 So. 308), 382. Tally v. Grider (00 Ala. 119), 850, 854. Tangilpahoa v. Campbell (106 La. 464; 31 So. 49), 932, 933. Tanner v. Alliance (29 Fed. 196 (111, 120, 125, 152, 475. Tanner v. Bugg (74 Mo. App. 196), 561, 576, 587. Tanner v. Louisville, etc., Co. (60 Ala. 621), 2214. Tanner v. Trustee, etc. (5 Hill [N. Y.] 121), 228. Tardiflf v. State (23 Tex. 169), 1371, 1372. Tarkington v. Bennett ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 51 S. W. 274), 1953. Tarkio v. Cook ([Mo. Supp.] 25 S. W. 202), 461. Tarr's Estate, In re ( 10 Pa. Super. Ct. 554), 2020. Tasker's Estate, In re (205 Pa. 455; 55 Atl. 24), 2135, 2138, 2141, 2147, 2148. Tasher v. Stanley (143 Mass 148; 26 N. E. 417), 1790. Tassell v. Ovenden (2 Q. B. Div. 383; 41 J. P. 710; 40 L. J. M. C. 228; 36 L. T. 696; 25 W. R. 692), 1142, 1145. Tate V. Donovan (143 Mass. 590; 10 N. E. 492) 1850, 1851. Tate V. State (91 Miss. 382; 44 So. 830), 1182. Tattersal v. Nevels (77 Neb. 843; 110 N. W. 708), 570. Tatum V. Commonwealth ( [Kv.J 59 S. W. 32; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 927), 958, 1205, 1498. cccxliv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Tatum V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 65 S. W. 449; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1533), 1469, 1470. Tatum V. State (63 Ala. 147), 64, 65, 1254, 1632, 1633, 2231. Tatum V. State (74 Ga. 176; 3 S. E. 907), 928, 932, 934. Tatum V. Trenton (85 Ca. 468; 21 S. E. 705), 812. Taul V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 61 S. W. 394), 1695. Taylor v. Becker (6 Ohio Dec. 151; 6 Wkly. L. Bull. 25), 1808. Taylor v. Board (31 Pa. St. 73), 811. Taylor v. Carroll (145 Mass 95; 13 N. E. 348), 1850, 1905. Taylor v. Chester (L. R. 4. Q. B. 309, 311), 1795. Taylor v. Carryl (20 How. [U. S.] 597), 1012. Taylor v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 40 S. W. 383), 1407, 1694. Taylor v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 59 S. W. 482; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1003), 900. Taylor v. Felsing (164 111. 331; 45 N. E. 161), 1974. Taylor v. Humphries (28 J. P. 793; 34 L. J. M. C. 1), 1149. Taylor v. Humphries (30 L. J. M. C. 242; 10 C. B. (N. S.) 429; 9 W. R. 705; 4 L. T. 514), 1149. Taylor v. Isitt (7 N. Z. L. R. 678) , 685. Taylor v. Kelly (31 Atl. 59; 68 Am. Dec. 150), 2136. Taylor v. Monnot (4 Duer. 116), 544. Taylor v. Oran ( 1 H. & C. 370; 27 J. P. 8; 31 L. J. M. C. 252; 7 L. T. 58; 10 W. R. 800), 1297. Taylor v. Patrick (1 Bibb, 168 2094, 2117. Taylor v. Pinchett (52 Iowa 467; 3 N. W. 514), 1283, 1290, 1353, 1788. Taylor v. Place (4 R. I. 324), 1014. Taylor v. Purcell (60 Ark 606; 31 S. W. 567), 2098. Taylor v. State (121 Ala. 24; 25 So. 689), 1180. Taylor v. State (121 Ala. 39; 25 So. 701), 1163, 1180. Taylor v. State (69 Ark. 468; 60 S. W. 33), 1379. Taylor v. State (5 Ga. App. 237; 62 S. E. 1048), 1602, 1662, 1722. Taylor v. State (126 Ga. 557; 55 S. E. 474), 1501, 1554. Taylor v. State (49 Ind. 555), 1643. Taylor v. State (107 Ind. 483; 8 N. E. 450), 1241. Taylor v. State (113 Ind. 471; IG N. E. 183), 1712. Taylor v. State (7 Humph. 510), 1515. Taylor v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 49 S. W. 589), 1705, 1707. Taylor v. State ([Tex.] 49 S. W. 845), 9. Taylor v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 50 S. W. 343), 1613, 1699. Taylor v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 51 S. W. 1106), 2261. Taylor v. State (44 Tex. Cr. App. 437; 72 S. W. 181), 963, 1698, 1703. Taylor v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 75 S. W. 536), 1210, 1211. Taylor v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 77 S. W. 221), 1209, 1378. Taylor v. State (54 Tex. App. 90; 111 S. W. 932), 1694. Taylor v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 112 S. W. 942), 1596. Taylor v. Strong (3 Wend. 384), 2033. Taylor v. Taylor (10 Minn. 107), 904. Taylor v. United States ( 6 Ind. T. 350; 98 S. W. 123), 953. Tavlor v. Vincent (12 I^a 282; 47 Am. Rep. 338), 76, 542. TABLE OF CASES. cccxlv IReferences are to pages.] Taylor v. Wright (126 Pa. St. 617; 170, G77), 1912, 1913. Teegarden v. State (39 Ind. App. 15; 79 N. E. 211), 342, 1536. Teague v. State (39 Miss. 516), 1740. Teague v. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 526, 529; 102 S. W. 1141, 1144), 1680, 1696. Teal V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.J 57 S. W. 464; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 350), 1285. Teasdale v. State ( [Miss.] 3 So. 245), 1358. Tefft V. Commonwealth ( 8 Leigh. 721), 1496, 1741. Tegler v. Shipman (33 Iowa 194), 1788, 1790. Tejszeaski v, Dallas ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 45 S. W. 569), 1553. Temme v. Sclmiidt (210 Pa. 507; 60 A. 158), 1999, 2000. Temmick v. Owings (70 Md. 246; 16 Atl. 719), 246, 941. Temple v. Temple ( 1 Hen. & M. 476), 2139. Temple ton. In re ( [Pa.] 4 Lancast. Law. Rev. 242), 694. Tenant v. Knlilemeier ([Iowa] 120 K W. 689), 1744. Tennant v. Belyea (24 N. B. 238), 1075. Tennant v. Cumberland ( 1 El. and El. 401; 23 J. P. 57), 1136. Tennessee Club v. Dwyer ( 1 1 Lea 452: 47 Am. Rep. 298), 1330, 1338. Tenney v. Leroy (16 Wis. 566), 184. Tenth Ward Election, In re (5 Pa. Dist. Rep. 287), 1320. Teoli V. Nardoli (23 R. I. 87; 49 Atl. 489), 690. Terre Haute '^ • -.. r<„ y Hart- man (19 Ind. App. 596; 49 N. E. 864), 1791, 1806. Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. New- land (33 Ind. App. 544; 70 N. E. 190), 1792, 1912, 1919, 1975. Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. State 169 Ind. 242; 82 N. E. 81), 1192, 1549. Terrell v. State (165 Ind. 443; 75 N. E. 884), 1485. Territory v. Burgess (8 Mont. 57; 19 Pac. 558; 1 L. R. A. 2247. Territory v. Clark (79 Pac. 708), 2257. Territory v. Coleman (1 Ore. 191; 75 Am. Dec. 554) 1264. Territory v. Connell (2 Ariz. 339; 16 Pac. 209), 174, 201, 523, 792. Territory v. Crunka ( 15 Hawaii 607 \ r58. Territory v. Dana ( [Ark.] 6 Law- son Crim. D-^* "-es 630) , 2072. Ter-' - V. Da-- (2 Ariz. 59; 10 Pac. 359), 2051, 2052. Territory v. Farnsworth (5 Mont. 303; 5 Pac. 869), 788. Territory v. Ferris ( 15 Hawaii 139) 2247. Territory v. Franklin (2 N. M. 307), 2040, 2058, 2070. Territory v. Grinnell (2 Ariz. 339; 16 Pac. 209), 138. Territory v. Guyott (9 Mont. 46; 22 Pac. 134), 1264. Territory v. Hall (17 Hawaii 536), 1231, 1241. Territory v. Hart (7 Mont. 489; 14 Pac. 768), 2246. Territory v. McPherson (6 Dak. 27; 50 N. W. 351), 648, 649, 796. Territory v. Manton (8 Mont. 95; 19 Pac. 387), 2040, 2046. Territory v. Miguel (18 Hawaii 402), 124, 174, 645. Territory v. O'Connor (5 Dak. 397; 37 N. W. 765; 41 N. W. 746; 36 L. R. A. 355), 174, 233, 235, 242, 452, 529, 931. Territory v. Pacific Club (16 Ha- waii 517), 1338. Territory v. Pratt (6 Dak. 483; 43 N. W. 711), 1466, 1698, 1713. cccxlvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Territory v. Robertson (19 Okla. 149; 92 Pac. 144), 414, ^17, 035, 974. Territory v. Webster (5 Dak. .351; 40 N. W. 535), 402. Territory v. Wong Feart (17 na- waii 353), 1293, 1612, 1">33. Territt v. Barlett (21 Vt. 184. 188, 189), 1797, 1798. Terry v. Haldiman ( 15 Upp. Can. 380), 687. Terry v. State (44 Tex. Cr. App. 411; 71 S. W. 968), 1699. Terry v. State (46 Tex. Cr. App. 75; 79 S. W. 317). 1695, 1708. Tetzner v. Naughton (12 111. App. 148), 19 J 5. Texas Banking Co. v. State (42 Tex. 636), 428, 791. Texas, etc.. R. Co. v. Robertson ( 82 Tex. 657; 17 S. W. 1041), 1906. Thackrah v. Haas (119 U. S. 499; 7 Sup. Ct. 311; 30 L. Ed. 486,, 2104, 2109. 2136. Thalheimer v. Board ( [Ariz.] 94 Pac. 1129), 230, 233, 242. Thayer v. Felt (4 Pick. [Mass.] 354), 1067. Thayer v. Boyle (30 Me. 475), 2259. Thayer v. Partridge (47 Vt. 423), 'l802, 1803. Thayer v. Turner (8 Met. 552), 2127. Thcis V. State (54 Ohio St. 245; 43 N. E. 207), 1279. Theisen, Ex parte (30 Fla. 529; 11 So. 901; 32 Am. St. 30), 429, 441. Thei.sen v. Johns (72 ]Mich| 285; 40 N. W. 727), 1952. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. v. Foss ([S. D.] 91 N. W. 584), 291, 1786, 1789. Theuer v. People 211 111. 296; 71 N. E. 997, affirming 113 111. 628), 578 580, 589, 610, 083. Thibodeaux v. State (69 Miss. 683; 13 So. 352), 794, 800, 802. Thill V. Pohlman (76 Iowa 638; 41 N. W. 385), 1987. Thirty Hhds. Sugar v. Boyle (9 Cranch 191), 252. Thixton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. ([Ky.] 96 S. W. 548; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 910), 2215. Thoma, In re (117 Iowa 275; 90 N. W. 581), 533, 535. Thomas, In re (53 Kan. 659; 37 Pac. 171), 403. Thomas, In re ( 169 Pa. Ill ; 3 Atl. 100), 627, 639. Thomas, In re (26 Ont. Rep. 448), 658. Thomas v. Abbott (105 Mich 687; 63 N. W. 984), 877, 878, 879, 887, 892, 907, 911. Thomas v. Arie (122 Iowa 538; 98 N. W. 380), 1268. Thomas v. Ashland (12 Ohio St. 127), 2035. Thomas v. Burke ([Ark] 121 S. W. 1061), 947. Thomas v. Commonwealth (90 Va. 92; 17 S. E. 788), 35, 80, 908, 929, 1465, 1493. Thomas v. Dansby (74 Mich. 398; 41 X. W. 1088), 1864, 1865, 1889, 1966, 1967, 1978, 1980. Thomas v. Ivey (12 Austr. L. T. 190), 351. Thomas v. Hayward ([1869] L. R. 4 Ex. 311; 38 L. J. Ex. 175), 1819. Thomas v. Ilinklcy (19 Xeb. 324; 27 X. W. 231), 758, 762, 1924. Thomas v. Marks (19 Xeb. 324; 27 X. W. 321), 683. Thomas v. Mount (9 Ohio 219), 294. Thomas v. Xorris (62 Ga. 538), 814. Thomas v. Powell (57 J. p. 329), 356, 1146. TABLE OF CASES. cccxlvii [References are to pages.] Thomas v, Sanders ([Fla.] 47 So. 79G), 263. Thomas v. State (97 Ala. 3; 12 So. 409), 72. Thomas v. State (117 Ala. 134; 23 So. 636), 1199. Thomas v. State ( [ Fla.] 23 So. 101), 2038. Thomas v. State (47 Fla. 99; 36 So. 161), 2068. Thomas v. State (37 Miss. 353), 1190, 1643. Thomas v. Slitters ([1900] 1 Ch. 10; 69 L. J. Ch. 27; 63 J. P. 724; 48 W. R. 133; 81 L. T. 469; 16 T. L. R. 7), .380. Thomas v. Westfield ([X. J. L.] 57 Atl. 125), 812. Thomason v. State ("0 Ahi. 20), 842, 843. Thomasson v. State (80 Ark. 304; 97 S. W. 297), 1050, 1652. Thomason v. State (92 Ga. 405; 17 S. E. 858), 1126. Thomasson v. State (15 Ind. 449), 91, 138, 139, 144, 163, 189, 198, 201, 211, 215, 289, 290, 450, 788, 790, 791, 821, 1303, 1304, 1307, 1628. Thompkins v. State (2 Ga. App. 639; 58 S. E. 1111), 1700. Thompkins v. State (65 S. E. 842), 1700. Tliompkins County v. Taylor (21 N. Y. 173), 24. Thompson, Ex parte ( Ki N. S. W. L. R. 42), 933. Thompson v. Bassett (5 Ind. 535), 773. Thompson v. Bellemore ( 7 Low. Can. Jr. 74), 098. Thompson v. Commonwealth ( 103 Ky. 035; 45 S. W. 1039). 936, 941, 1742. Thompson v. Commonwealth ( 123 Ky. 302; 94 S. W. 654; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 705), 199. Thompson v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 107 S. W. 223; 32 Ky. L. Rep. 714), 1128, Thompson v. Commonwealth (8 Gratt. 637), 2246, 2248. Thompson v. Durnford ( 12 Low. Can. Jr. 285), 1759. Thompson v. Egan (70 Neb. 169; 97 N. W. 247), 571, 585. Thompson v. Harvey (23 J. P. 150; 4 H. & N. 254; 28 L. J. M. C. 163), 529, 547, 683, 685. Thompson v. Hiatt (145 Ind. 530; 44 N. E. 486), 603. Thompson v. Koch (98 Ky. 400; 33 S. W. 96; 17 Ily. L. Rep. 941), 635, 662. Thompson v. Lessee of Carroll (22 How. 422), 396. Thom])son v. McKenzie (77 L. J. K. B. 605 [1908]; IK. B. 905; 98 L. T. 896; 72 J. P. 150; 24 T. L. R. 330), 2028. Thompson v. Mt. Vernon ( 1 1 Ohio St. 688), 395, 441. Thompson v. Peck (115 Ind. 512; 18 N. E. 16), 2127. Thompson v. Rose (16 Conn. 71; 41 Am. Dec. 121), 2125. Thompson v. State (37 Ala. 151), 510. Thompson v. State (37 Ark. 408), 1510, 1524. Thompson v. State (109 Ga. 272; 34 S. E. 579), 1200, 1701. Thompson v. State (45 Ind. 495), 356, 1352, 1357, 1359, 1615, 1616. Thompson v. State (5 Humph. 138^ 1349 1374, 1377. Thompson v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 97 S. W. 310), 13, 1602, 1693, 1701, 1704, 1705, 1731. Thomson v. Grand Gulf R. Co, (3 How. [Miss.] 240), 294. Thomson v. Greig (34 J. P. 214), 1137, 1141. Thomson v. Norris (63 Ga. 538), 812. Thomson v. Weems (L. R. 9 App. Cas. 671), 221, 223, 22S. cccxlviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Thon V. Commomvealth (31 Gratt. [Va.] 887), 215, 448, 1304, 1307. Thorn v. Atlanta (77 Ga. 661), 506, 682. Thornewall v. Johnson ([1881] 50 L. J. Ch. 641; 44 L. T. 768; 29 W. R. 707), 1814. Thornley v. Reilly (17 Ont. App. 204, affirming 26 C. L. J. 20), 1853. Thornton v. Clegg (24 Q. B. Div. 132; 53 J. P. 342; 58 L. J. M. C. 6; 61 L. T. 562; 38 W. E. 160), 709, 710. Thornton v. Territory ( 3 Wash. T. 482; 17 Pac. 896), 174, 231. Thorp V. Brookfield (36 Conn. 320), 2186, 2191, 2193. Thorpe v. Rutland (27 Vt. 149), 94, 95, 99. Threemits v. Threemits (4 Desaus. 560), 2163. Throckmorton v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 18 Ky. L. Rep. 130; 35 S. W. 635), 1464, 1468, 1521, 1524. Throckmorton v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 49 S. W. 474; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1508), 1446, 1678, Thulmeyer, Ex parte ([Tex.] 119 S. W. 1146), 925. Thurlow V. Massachusetts (5 How. 504; 12 L. Ed. 256), 147, 195. Thurman v. Adams ( [Miss.] 33 So. 944), 1370. Thurman v. State (45 Tex. Cr. App. 569; 78 S. W. 937), 1483, 1486. Thurmond v. State (46 Tex. Cr. App. 102; 79 S. W. 316), 873, 916. Thurston v. Adams (41 Me. 419), 122, 1060, 1074. Thurston v. Blanchard (22 Pick. 18; 33 Am. Dec. 700), 2125. Thweatt v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 95 S. W. 517), 1320, 1510, 1570. Tibbatts v. Boultar ([1895] 73 L. T. 534), 1833. Tibbettsv. Burster (76 Iowa, 176; 40 N. W. 707), 982, 991. Tidwell V. State (70 Ala. 33), 2041, 2060, 2085. Tiernan v. Harrison ( 109 111. 593), 202. Tiernan v. Rinker (102 U. S. 123), 199, 299. Tierney, In re (11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 406), 645, 718. Tiffany v. Driggs (13 Johns. 253), 1649. Tifft's Will, In re (55 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 81; 64 N. Y. Supp. 671), 2136. Tigler v. Shipman (33 Iowa 194), 1283. Tigner v. State (119 Ga. 114; 45 S. E. 1001), 1510, 1523. Tilford V. State (109 Ind. 3.59; 10 N. E. 107), 8.32, 837, 883, 1305, 1306. Tilleny v. State (10 Lea, 35), 131, 135, 247, 1279. Tillery v. State (10 Lea, 35), 1453. Tilton V. Tilton (16 Ky. L. Rep. 538), 2161. Tilton V. Tilton (29 S. W. 290), 2154. Tilton V. Swift (40 Iowa 78), 225. Timm v. Harrison (109 111. 593), 792. Timm v. Caledonia Station ( 142 Mich. 323; 112 N. W. 942; 14 Det. L. X. 442), 167. Tindall v. Monmouth ( [N. J. L.] 68 Atl. 799), 741. Tinkcom, In re (50 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 250; 100 N. Y. Supp. 467), 675. Tinker v. State (96 Ala. 115: 11 So. 383), 35, 38, 309, 325, 965, 960, 967, 1017, 1643. Tinkle v. Sweenev (97 Tex. 190; 77 S. W. 609), 772. TABLE OF CASES. cccxlix f References are to pages.] Tinkle v. Sweeney ([Tex. Civ. App.] 78 S. W. 248), 357, 771, 772, 1241. Tinsley v. State ( [Ga.] 35 S. E. 303), 945, 946. Tinson v. Moulton (3 Cush. 209), 1784. Tippett V. Heyman ( 19 W. N. [X. S. W.] 6), 375. Tippett V. State ( 53 Tex. Cr. App. 180; 109 S. W. 101), 1177, 1681. Tipton V. Thompson (50 S. W. 641; 21 Tex. Civ. App. 143), 1887, 1953, 1970. Tipton V. Yakey (72 Mo. 380), 470. Tivorney v. O'Brien (29 Vict. L. R. 729; 25 Austr. L. T. 255; 10 Austr. L. R. 101), 1792, 1805, 1800. Tobert v. Clough (72 Iowa 220; 33 N. W. 639), 1803. Tobin V. District of Columbia (22 App. D. C. 482), 1130. Todd, Ex parte (3 Q. B. Div. 407; 42 J. P. 662; 47 L. J. M. C. 89), 708. Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Nordyke (27 Ind. 95), 237. Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Pence ( 68 111. 524), 1509. Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Riley (47 111. 514), 2180, 2185. Tolman v. Johnson (43 Iowa 127), 1798, 1804. Toman v. Westfield (70 N. J. L. 610; 57 Atl. 125). 812, 813. Tombeaugh v. State (50 Tex. Cr. App. 286; 98 S. W. 1054), 1167. Tome v. Stump (89 Md. 264; 42 Atl. 902), 2017, 2020. Tomlinson v. Bainake (163 Ind. 112; 70 N. E. 155), 1510. Tompkins v. Oswego (40 N. Y. St. Rep. 4), 2176, 2197. Tompkins v. State (2 Ga. App. 639; 58 S. E. 1111), 80, 1161, 1598. Tompkins v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 154; 90 S. W. 1019), 934. Tompkins Co. v. Taylor (21 N. Y. 173; 19 How. Pr. 259), 43, 46, 906. Tomlinson Carriage Co. v. Kinsella 31 Conn. 208), 1783. Tonatio, In re (49 N. Y. App. Div. 84; 63 N. Y. Supp. 560), 729. Tonella v. State (4 Tex. App. 325), 139. Tony V. State (144 Ala. 87; 40 So. 388), 1229, 1233. Tooke V. State (4 Ga. App. 495; 61 S. E. 917), 1301, 1453, 1689, 1690, 1695. Toole V. State (88 Ala. 158; 7 So. 42), 885, 887, 1593, 1684. Tooth V. Laws (2 N. S. W. L. R. 154), 1784. Tooth V. Parker (17 W. N. [N. Z.] 17), 1819. Topeka v. Chesney (66 Kan. 480; 71 Pac. 843), 1679. Topeka v. Myers (34 Kan. 500; 8 P. 726), 258. Topeka v. Raynor (60 Kan. 800; 58 Pac. 557; 61 Kan. 10; 55 Pac. 509), 258, 433, 1542, 1742. Topeka v. Stevenson (79 Kan. 394; 99 Pac. 598), 1732. Topeka v. Webb (44 Kan. 71; 23 P. 1073), 258. Topeka v. Zufall (40 Kan. 47; 19 Pac. 359), 9, 51, 258, 1753. Topper V. State (118 Ind. 110; 20 N. E. 699), 771, 1219, 1220. 1223. 1220. 1230, 162l' 1845. Tousey v. De Huy ([Ky.] 62 S. W. 1118; 23ky.L.Rep.458), 858, 868. 869. Tousey v. Stites ( [Kv.] 60 S. W. 277; 23 Ky. L.'Rep. 1738). 939. Towles. Ex parte (48 Tex. 413), 925. eccl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Townley v. State ( 18 N. J. L. 311 ) , 1525. Townsend, Matter of (129 N. Y. App. Div. 909; 114 N. Y. Supp. 1149), 595. Townsend v. State (2 Blackf. 151), (588, 1751. Tozer v. Saturlee (3 Grant Cas- [Pa.] 162), 2119. Tracy, In re (11 N. Y. St. Rep. 103), 2137, 2148. Tracy, In re (1 Paige 580), 66, 2018. Tracy v. Ginzberg (189 Mass. 260; 75 N. E. 637), 480, 682, 694, 702, 819. Tracy v. Ginzberg (205 U. S. 170; 51 L. Ed. 755; 27 Sup. Ct. 461, affirming 189 Mass. 260; 75 N. E. 637), 480, 702. Tracy v. Perry (5 N. H. 504), 1365, 1625. Tracy v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 85 S. W. 1056), 1225. Tracy v. Talmage (14 N. Y. 162; 67 Am. Dec. 132), 1795, 1797, 1801. Trageser v. Gray (73 Md. 250; 20 Atl. 905; 25 Am. St. 589; 9 L. R. A. 780), 96, 149, 150, 152, 313. Trail v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 107 S. W. 545), 1598. Trainor v. Multnoma (2 Ore. 214), 808, 812, 813. Trammel] v. Bradley (37 Ark. 374), 136, 247. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg (107 U. S. 691; 2 Sup. Ct. 732), 315. Tranter v. Lancashire J. J. (51 J. P. 454), 655. Travelers' etc., Ins. Co. v. Harvey (82 Va. 949; 5 S. E. 553), 2189, 2238, 2239. 2245. Travis v. State (37 Tex. Cr. Rep. 486; 36 S. W. .589), 509, Traynor v. Jones ( [ 1894] 1 Q. B. p. 86), 701, 709, 711. Treadway v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 62 S. W. 574), 1204, 1380. Treahey v. Holliday (43 Kan. 29; 22 Pac. 1004), 1159. Treas. v. Maxwell (157 Mass. 333; 32 N. E. 152), 1840. Tredway v. Riley (32 Neb. 495; 49 X. W. 268; 29 Am. St, 447), 8, 111, 119, 1788. Treefty v. Board (73 N. J. L. 278; 62 Atl. 1004), 698. Treese v. State (14 Tex. App. 31), 929. Tremblay v. Pointe-au-Pic (13 L. N. [Can.] 386), 649. Trembly, Ex parte (7 Mon. S. C. 17), 1839. Treue v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 44 S. W. 829), 1186, 1615, 1692, 1694. Trice v. Robinson ( 16 Ont. Rep. 433), 1843. Trigg v. State (49 Tex. 645), 64. Trigally v. Memphis (6 Cold. [Tenn.] 382), 470. Triggs V. Mclntyre (215 111. 369; 74 N. E. 400; affirming 115 111. App. 257), 1999, 2000. Trinkle v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 42; 105 S. W. 201), 1094. Trinkle v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 123 S. W. 1114), 921, 926. Tripp v. Bristol Co. (2 Allen, 556), 2252. Tripp v. Flanigan (10 R. I. 128), 770, 783, 1188. Tripp v. Ilenncssy (10 R. I. 129), 1190. Tripp V. Norton (10 R. I. 125), 758. Tromans v. Hodkinson ([1903] 1 K. B. 30; 72 L. J. K. B. 21; 67J. P. 30; 51W. R.286; 87 L. T. 549; 19 T. L. R. 19), 379. Trometer v. District of Columbia (24 App. D. C. 242), 1507, 1617. TABIJ^ OF CASES. cccli [References are to pages.] Tron V. Lewis (31 Ind. App. 178; 66 N. E. 490), 975, 1108, 1268. Tross V. Board (59 X. J. L. 97; 35 Atl. 646), 682. Trost V. State (64 Miss. 188; 1 So. 49), 1556, 1744. Trott V. Irish (1 Allen, 481), 1775, 1805. Trotter, In re (24 Pa. Super. Ct. 26), 628, 638. Trout V. State (107 Ind. 578; 8 N. E. 618), 1485. Troy V. Cape Fear, etc., R. Co. (99 N. C. 298; 6 S. E. 77), 2183. Truesdell v. State (42 Tex. Cr. App. 544; 61 S. W. 935), 911, 1680. Trumbull v. Erickson (97 Fed. 891; 38 C. C. A. 536), 2191. Trustees v. Board (62 Miss. 68; 39 S. E. 793), 889. Trustees, etc., v. Board (56 N. J. L. 411; 29 Atl. 150), 616, 617. Trustees v. Keating (4 Den. [N. Y.] 341), 395. Trustees v. Lewis Co. ([Ky.] 46 S. W. 1; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 369), 807, 809. Tuchman v. Welch (42 Fed. 548), 154, 307, 313, 327. Tuck V. Waldron (31 Ark. 462), 432, 436. Tucker v. Adams (63 X. H. 361) 1771, 1772. Tucker v. Moultrie (122 Ga. 160; 50 S. E. 61), 127, 169, 1690. Tucker v. United States (151 U. S. 164; 14 Sup. Ct. 299; 38 L. Ed. 112), 2068, 2085. Tugman v. City of Chicago (78 III. 405), 408. Tuichner, Ex parte (69 Iowa, 393- 28 N. W. 655), 1760. Tulloss V. Sedan (31 Kan. 165; 1 Pac. 285), 428. Tummings v. State (32 Tex. Cr. App. 117; 22 S. W. 409), 932. Tupelo V. Beard (56 Miss. 532), 813. Turnbull v. Appleton (45 J. P, 469), 1301. Turner v. Cheesman ( 15 N, J. Eq. 243), 2135, 2137. Turner v. Clay (3 Bibb, 52), 2126. Turner v. Forsyth (78 Ga. 683; 3 S. E. 649), 473, 932. Turner v. Johnson (51 J. P. 22), 1643. Turner v. Rehm (43 Ind. 208), 662. Turner v. Saxon ([Wash. Ter.] 20 Pac. Rep. 685), 231. Turner v. State (121 Ga. 154; 48 S. E. 906), 1752, 1754. Turner v. Wilson (49 Ind. 581), 276. Turpin v. State (8f Ind. 148), 1485. Tuttle V. Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. ([Ky.] 80 S. W. 802; 26 Ky. L. Rep. 152), 2207, 2217. Tuttle V. Commonwealth (2 Gray, 505), 262, 1764. Tuttle V. Holland (43 Vt. 542), 1798. Tuttle V. Poechert ([Iowa] 121 N. W. 1057), 577, 578. Tuttle V. Russell (2 Day, 201; 2 Am. Dec. 89), 2258. Twining v. St. Louis Co. (47 Mo. App. 647), 662. Tyler v. State (69 Miss. 395; 11 So. 25), 1624. Tynemouth v. Attorney General ([1899 J App. Cas^ 293; 68 L. J. Q. B. 752; 63 J. P. 404; 15 T. L. R. 340), 671, 681. Tyra v. Commonwealth (2 Met. [Ky.] 1), 2041, 2049, 2053. Tyrrell v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 38 S. W. 1011), 1613. Tyson v. Bowden (8 Fed. 61) 1027. Tyson v. Postlethwait (13 III 728), 467. ccclii TABLE OP CASES. [J^eferences are to pages.] u Uldrich v. Gilmore (35 Neb. 288; 53 N. W. 135), 761, 773, 1981. Ulmer v. State (61 Ala. .208), 1476. Ulmer v. State (14 Ind. 52), 1485. Uloth V, State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 295; 87 S. W. 822), 972, 1185, 1731. Ulrich V. Commonwealth ( 6 Bush, 400), 1237. Ulterminova v. Zekind (95 Iowa, 622; 64 N. W. 646; 29 L. E. A. 734; 58 Am. St. 447), 786. Umholtz, Iti re (9 Pa. Super. Ct. 450; 43 W. N. €. 495), 480, 695, 696, 701, 705, 800. Underhill's Will, In re (Prob. Rep. [N. Y.] 196), 2136, 2138, 2142. Underwood v. Fairfield County ( 67 Conn. 411; 35 Atl. 274), 653, 9J9. Undtrvvood v. MeDulTee ( 15 Mich. 361), 1015. Union v. State ( [Ga.] 66 S. E. 24), 1602, 1579. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Reif (36 Ohio St. 596; 38 Am. Rep. 613, and note, pp. 615, 616; 38 Am. Rep. — ), 2222, 2223. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Diehl (33 Kan. 422; 6 Pac. 566), 2197. Uniontown v. State ( [Ala.] 39 So. 814), 241, 382. United Brethren, etc., Soc. v, O'Hara (120 Pa. 256; 13 Atl. 932), 2223, 2226, 2245. United Breweries Co. v. Colby (170 Fed. 100). 153, 165. United States v. Abigan (1 Phil- ippine, 83), 20.38, 2082. United States v. Allen (38 Fed. 736), 76. United States v. Ames Mercantile Co. (2 Alaska, 74), 538, 1114. United States v. Angell (11 Fed. 34), 81, 498, 500, 527, 1638. United States v. Anthony ( 14 Blatchf. 92), 21. United States v. Ash ( [D. C] 75 Fed. 651), 34, 80. United States v. Bede ( Fed. Cas. No. 14558), 1107, 1109. United States v. Belt (128 Fed. 168), 1262. United States v. Berner ( 5 Crancli C. C. 347; Fed. Cas. No. 14569), 1106, 1110. United States v. Binns (194 U. S. 486, 495), 1419. United States v. Bonham (31 Fed. 808), 1111, 1616, 1617. United States v. Boss (160 Fed. 132), 1259. United States v. Bowen (4 Cranch C. C. 604), 2039. United States v. Britton (107 U. S. 670; 2 Sup. Ct. 512), 1510. United States v. Buckles (6 Ind. T. 319; 97 S. VV. 1022), 1259. United States v. Burch ( 1 Cranch C. C. 36; Fed. Cas. No. 14682). 1649. United States v. Burdick ( 1 Dak. 142; 46 N. W. 571), 1261, 1262. United States v. Calhoun ( 39 Fed. Rep. 604), 821. United States v. Carr (2 Mont. 234), 1260. United States v. Celestine ( [U. S.] 30 Sup. Ct. 93), 1260. U. S. V. Clapox ([D. C] 35 F. 575), 1262. United States v. Clare (2 Fed. 55), 77, 1192. United States v. Clarke (2 Cranch. C. C. 158), 2054. United States v. Claypool (14- Fed. 127), 2039, 2048. United States v. Cline (26 Fed. Rep. 515), 1267, 1283, 1727. TABLE OF CASES. cccliii [References are to pages.] United States v. Colin ( 2 Ind. Ty. 474; 52 S. W. 38), 18, 38, 174, 963. United States v. Columbus (5 Cranch C. C. 304; Fed. Cas. No. 14841), 1106, 1109. United States v. Commissioners 17 D. C. 409), 627, 628. United States v. Cook (17 Wall. 168), 1509. United States v. The Cora ( 1 Dak. 1; 46 N. W. 503), 1030. United States v. Cornell (2 Ma- son, 91; Fed. Cas. No. 14868), 2039, 2042, 2048, 2069. United States v. Cota (17 Fed. 734), 60. United States v. Coulter (1 Cranch C. C. 203; Fed. Cas. No. 14875), 1107, 1110. United States v. Cutting (3 Wall. 441; 18 L. Ed. 241), 480. United States v. Dalasay (5 Phil- ippine, 41), 2082. United States v. Davis (37 Fed. 468), 518, 539. United States v. Devlin (Fed. Cas. No. 14955), 1643. United States v. De Witt (9 Wall. 41), 91. United States v. Distilled Spirits (5 Sawy. 421), 1775. United States v. Dodge (Deady, 186; Fed. Cas. No. 14974), 1183. United States v. Douglass ( 19 D. C. 99), 626, 632, 648. United States v. Downing ( Fed. Cas. No. 14991), 1262. United States v. Drew (5 Mason, 28; Fed. Cas. No. 14993), 2050, 2052. United States v. Ducournau (54 Fed. 138), 39, 83. United States v. Earl (17 Fed. 75), 1259, 1262. United States v. 84 Boxes Sugar (7 Pet. [U. S.] 453), 252. United States v. Elder (4 Cranch €. C. 507; Fed. Cas. No. 15039), 109, 1107. United States v. Ellis (51 Fed. 808), 24, 26, 42, 1263. United States v. 50 Cases of Dis- tilled Spirits (S3 Fed. 1000), 1030. United States v. Fiscus (42 Fed. 395), 154, 307, 313, 327. United. States v. Fitzgerald (2 Phillipiae, 419), 2082. U. S. V. Flynn (1 Dill, 451; Fed. Cas. No. 15124), 1262. United States v. Forbes (Crabbe, 558; Fed. Cas. No. 15129), 2039, 2048, 2051. United States v. Fortin (1 Phil- ippine, 299), 351. United States v. 43 Gallons of Whisky (3 Wall. 407; 18 L. Ed. 182), 1258. United States v. Forty-Three Gal- lons of Whisky (93 U. S. 188; 23 L. Ed. 846), 210, 1259. United States v. Forty-Three Gal- lons of Whisky (108 U. S. 491; 2 Sup. Ct. 906; 27 L. Ed. 803), 524, 1260. United States v. Four Bottles of Sour Mash Whisky (90 Fed 720), 1260. United States v. Fox (Fed. Cas. No. 15155), 1425, 1430, 1434. United States v. Gilbert (2 Sum. 19; Fed. Cas. No. 15204), 2247. United States v. Git (3 Philip- pine, 414), 2082. United States v. Glab ( 1 McCrary, 166), 539. United States v. Gordon ( 1 Cranch C. C. 58 ; Fed. Cas. No. 15233) , 1491, 1505. United States v. Guillermo (3 Philippine, 329), 2082. United States v. Harris (1 Abb. [U. S.] 110), 1767. cccliv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] United States v. Hey ward (2 Gall, 485), 1642. United States v. Higliliill (4 Phil- ippine, 384), 2082. United States v. Holliday (3 Wall. 407; 18 L. Ed. 182), 210, 1261, 12G2. United States v. Hull (14 Fed. 324), 1446. United States v. Hurshman (53 Fed. 543), 1261, 1262. United States v. Jackson ( 1 Hughes, 531), 1113. Uaiied States v. Johnson ( 12 U. S. App. D. C. 92), 560, 592. United States v. Johnson ( 12 App. D. C. 545), 545, 600, 618, 624, 627, 657. United States v. Kaldenbacli ( 1 Cranch C. C. 132), 396, 413. United States v. Kopp (110 Fed. 160), 1263. United States v. Lackey ( 120 Fed. 577), 1288. United States v. Le Bris (121 U. S. 278; 7 Sup. Ct. 894; 30 L. Ed. 946), 1260. United States v. Lindsay ( 1 Cranch C. C. 245; Fed. Cas. No. 15602), 1107, 1110. United States v. Luyties ( 124 Fed. 977), 23. United States v. McGlue ( 1 Curt. 1; Fed. Cas. No. 15679), 2039, 2051, 2052, 2054. United States v. Mares ( [N. M.] 88 Pac. 1128), 1263. United States v. Meagher ( 37 Fed. 875), 2061, 2062. United States v. Mickle ( 1 Cranch C. C. 268; Fed. Cas. No. 15763), 1112. United States v. Morin (4 Biss. 93), 1306, 1323. United States v. Nelson (29 Fed. Rep. 202), 109, 1043. United States v. 1,960 Bags of Coffee (8 Cranch [U. S.] 398), 253. United States v. Odita (4 Philip- pine, 309), 2082. U. S. V. Osborn ([D. C] 2 F. 58), 1262. United States v. Overton (2 Cranch C. C. 42; Fed. Cas. No. 15979), 552, 700. United States v. Paxton ( 1 Cranch C. C. 44; Fed. Cas. No. 16013), 1372. LTnited States v. Powers ( 1 Alas- ka, 180), 1268, 1741. United States v. Prout (Fed. Cas. No. 16093), 1107, 1110. United States v. Recano ( 4 Phil- ippine, 91), 2082. United States v. Renfrow (3 Okla. 161; 41 Pac. 88), 1261. United States v. Rennecke (28 Fed. 847), 76. United States v. Ronan (33 Fed. 117), 132, 400. United States v. Roudenbush (Baldw. 514), 2039. United States v. Seveloff (2 Savvy. 311; Fed. Cas. No. 10252), 1260. United States v. Shaw (Mux. 2 Sawy. 264), 210, 1259. United States v. Sheiver (23 Fed. 134), 1267, 1283, 1727. United States v. Shuck ( 1 Cranch 56; Fed. Cas. No. 16285), 1372. United States v. 6 Packages of Goods (6 Wheat. U. S. 520), 252. LTnited States v. Six Fermenting Tubs (1 Abb. [U. S.] 268), 929. United States v. Smith (45 Fed. 115), 76. United States v. Squagh ( 1 Cranch C. C. 174; Fed. Cas. No. 16370), 1190. United States v. Stafford (20 Fed. 720), 38, 60, 968. United States v. Stephens (12 Fed. 52), 173, 968, 1260. TABLE OF CASES. ccclv [References are to pages.] United States v. Stephens ( 37 Fed. 665), 76. United States v. Stofloe (76 Pac. 611), 1263. United States v. Stubblefield (40 P'ed. 454), 15, 21, 52, 58, 969. United States v. Sutton ([U. S.] 30 Sup. Ct. 116), 1260. United States v. 350 Chests of Tea (12 Wheat. [U. S.] 486; United States v. 422 Casks of Wine, 1 Pet. [U. S.] 547), 252. United States v. Tom (1 Ore. 20), 1260. United States v. 29 Gallons of Whisky (45 Fed. 847), 1030, 1260. United States v. Twenty Boxes of Corn Liquor ( 123 Fed. 135; affirmed 133 Fed. 910; 67 C. C. A. 214), 337. United States v. Voss ( 1 Cranch C. C. 101; Fed. Cas. No. 16628), 1349. United States v. Winslow ( 3 Sawy. 337; Fed. Cas. No. 16742'), 1262. United States v. Wirt (3 Sa\vj\ 161; Fed. Cas. No. 16745), 1260. United States v. Wittig (2 Low. Dec. 460), 1338. United States v. Woodward (2 Hayw. & H. 119; Fed. Cas. No. 16760a), 2051, 2052. United States v. Yape ( 10 Philip- pine, 204), 2082, United States Distilling Co. v. Chi- cago (112 111. 19; 1 N. E. 166), 169, 184, 199, 444. United States Exp. Co. v. Keefer 59 Ind. 263), 1727. University Club v. Louisville (11 Ky. L. Rep. 902), 1333. Untriner v. State ([Ala.] 41 So. 170), 1612, 1654. Upstone V. People (109 111. 169), 2041, 2045, 2053, 2055, 2062, 2067. Urhahns v. State (72 Ind. 602), 1498. Uterminova v. Zekind (95 Iowa, 622; 04 N. W. 646; 29 L. R. A. 734; 58 Am. St. 447), 789. Utsler V. Territory (10 Okla. 463; 62 Pac. 287), 372, 1123, 1481, 1650. Vaccarezza, Ex parte (52 Tex. Cr. App. 311; 106 S. W. 392), 714, 715, 716, 752. Vail, In re (38 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 392; 77 N. Y. Supp. 903), 584, 590. Vallance v. King (3 Barb. 548), 931, 933, 1009. Vanaman v. Adams ( 74 N. J. L. 125; 05 Atl. 204), 714, 727, 743. Van Alstine v. Kaniecki ( 109 Mich. 318; 67 N. W. 502), 1878, 1978. Van Buren v. Wells (53 Ark. 308), 216. Van Buskirk v. Daugherty (44 Iowa, 42), 2253. Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co. (170 U. S. 438; 18 Sup. Ct. 674; 42 L. Ed. 1100), 147, 158, 328, 1289, 1428. Vandalia v. Carracher (116 111. App. 62), 1129. Vanderbilt v. Adams (7 Cow. [N. Y.] 349), 129. Vanderlip v. Derby (19 Neb. 165; 26 N. W. 707), 601, 616. Vandewood v. State (50 Ind. 26, 295), 1442, 1488. Van Hook v. Schea (70 Ala. 361; 45 Am. Rep. 85), 167. Van Hook v. Selma (70 Ala. 361), 443. Vanliew v. Johnson (4 Hun, 415), 2127. Van Loan v. Willis ( 13 Daly, 281), 2258, 2259. ccclvi TABLE OF CASKS. [iiefeiences are to pages.] Vann v. State (140 Ala. 122; 37 So. 158), 1602. Vann v. State (83 Ga. 44; 10 S. E. 591), 2041, 2059. Vannony v. Patton (5 B. Mon. 248), 1780. Van Nortwich v. Bennett (62 N. J. L. 151; 40 Atl. 689), 576, 628. Vannoy v. State (64 Ind. 447), 498, 500, 501, 506, 526. Van Noy v. State (14 Tex. App. 09), 1760. Van Valkenburgh v. Amer. Pop. Ins. Co. (70 N. Y. 605), 2223, 2243, 2244. Van Vliet, In re (43 Fed. Rep. 761), 321. Van Wert v. Brown (47 Oliio St. 477 ; 25 N. E. 59 [reversing 4 Ohio Cir. Ct. 407]), 233. Van Wyck v. Brasher (81 N. Y. 262), 2105, 2121. Van Zant v. People (2 Parker Cr. Rep. [N. Y.] 168). 1310. Varble v. Commonwealth (3 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 694), 1290. Vardeman v. State (108 Ga. 774; 33 S. E. 643), 19, 33. Vaughan v. State (5 Chuke [la.] 369), 1529, 1531. Vaughn v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 93 S. W. 741), 1651. Vavasour v. Ormrod (6 B. & C. 530), 1509. Veasey, /?i re ( [Del.] 63 Atl. 801), 588. Veeder. In re (31 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 569; 65 N. Y. Supp. 517), 582. 584, 592. Venus, The (8 Cranch [U. S.] 253), 252. Veen V. Creaton (130 Pa. St. 48; 20 A. 865). 1899. 1901. Vernon v. State ([Ala.] 50 So. 57), 515. Ver Straeten v. T^ewis ( 77 Iowa, 130; 41 N. W. 594), 1002. Veruki v. State (127 Ga. 289; 56 S. E. 408), 1130. Ververka v. Fullmers ([Neb.] 118 N. W. 1097), 671. Victoria v. Union Club (3 B. C. 363), 1332. Vidalia v. Falkenheine ( [La.] 49 So. 217), 418. Viefhaus v. Bohenstehn (71 Ark. 419; 75 S. W. 585), 127. Viefhaus v. State (71 Ark. 419; 75 S. W. 585), 1475. Viles, Ex parte (139 Fed. 68), 1259. Vincent v. State (42 Tex. Cr. App. 413; 55 S. W. 819), 1226, 1227, 1247, 1562, 1615. Vine V. Leeds (J. J. L. R. 10 Q. B. 195; 39 J. P. 213; 44 L. J. M. C. 60; 31 L. T. 842; 23 W. R. 849), 2168. Vines v. State (67 Ala. 73), 156. Vinson v. Augusta (38 Ga. 342), 270. Vinson v. Monticello (118 Ind. 103; 19 N. E. 734), 144, 410, 415, 439. Vinton v. Middlesex R. Co. (11 Allen 304; 87 Am. Dec. 714), 2202. Violet's Will (1 Bibb, 617), 2138, 2140. Virginia v. Smith ( 1 Cranch C. C. 46), 1649. Virginia Midland R. Co. v. Boswell (82 Va. 932; 4 S. E. 689), 2180, 2184. Virginia Pocahontas Coal Co. V. McDowell Co. Ct. (58 W. Va. 86; 51 S. E. 1), 667. Viser v. State (10 Tex. App. 86), 1743. Vizacchero v. Rhode Island Co. (26 R. I. 392; 59 Atl. 105; 69 L. R. A. 188), 2174. Vliet, In re (43 Fed. 761), 328. Voetsch v. Phelps (112 Mass. 407), 1067, 1008. Vogel v. State (31 Ind. 64). 1516. Voght V. State (124 Ind. 358; 24 N. E. 680), 264, 1585. TABLE OP CASES. ceelvii [Refeiences are to pages.] Voglesong v. State (9 Ind. 113), 215. Voight V. Board (59 N. J. L. 358; 36 Atl. 686; 37 L. R. A. 292), 183, 270, 718, 738, 739. Volans V. Owen (74 N. Y. 526; 30 Am. Rep. 337), 1864, 1947. Volans V. Owen (9 Hun, 55 [N. Y.]), 1901. Volmer v. State (34 Ark. 487), 1540, 1544. Von der Leith v. State (60 N. J. L. 46; 37 Atl. 436; 60 N. J. L. 590; 40 Atl. 590), 403, 453. Vose V. Hundy (2 Mass. 322), 1039. Voss V. Haggerty (11 Ohio Dec. 408; 26 Wkly, L. Bull. 268), 541, 542. Voss V. Terrell ( 12 Tex. Civ. App. 439; 34 S. W. 170), 888. W Wabash R. Co. v. Monegan (94 Til. App. 82), 2177. Wachholz v. Wachholz (75 Wis. 377; 44 N. W. 506), 2167. Waddle v. State ([Miss.] 24 So. 311), 1182, 1604, 1615. Wade V. Colvert (2 Mill Const. 26; 12 Am. Dec. 652 [1833]), 2094, 2095, 2098. Wade V. State (22 Tex. App. 629; 3 S. W. 786), 797, 1613. Wade V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 43 S. W. 995), 1201. Wade V. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 608; 109 S. W. 191, 192), 940, 1471, 1472. Wade V. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 184; 109 S. W. 191), 873, 1471. Waddell v. Wadd*^ll (2 Swab. & T. 584), 2167. Wadsworth v. Dunnam (08 Ala. 610; 13 So. 597), 14, 21, 52, 63, 970, 1753, 2032. Wadsworth v. Dunnam (117 Ala. 661; 23 So. 699), 962, 1703, 1807. Wadsworth v. Sherman ( 14 Barb. 169), 2119. Wagner v. Breed ( [Neb.] 46 N. W. 286), 1786, 1788. Wagner v. Garrett (118 Ind. 114; 20 N. E. 706), 190, 280, 414, 430, 464, 466, 474, 530, 536. Wagner v. Hallack (3 Colo. 184), 1727. Wagner v. Holmes (88 Iowa, 728; 55 N. W. 473), 1002. Wagner v. Scherer (89 N. Y. App. Div. 202; 85 N. Y. Supp. 894), 1807. Wagner v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 306; 109 S. W. 169), 1579, 1654, 1693. Wah Yum & Co., In re (11 B. C. 154), 539. Wahl V. Walton (30 Minn. 506; 16 N. W. 397), 2033. Waits, Ex parte ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 64 S. W. 254), 873. Wakefield v. State ([Tex.] 28 S. W. 470), 1235, 1236, 1627. Wakeman, Appeal of ( 70 Conn. 733; 50 Atl. 733), 698, 747, 748. Wakeman v. Chambers (69 Iowa, 169; 28 N. W. 498), 1221, 1578. Wakeman v. Price ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 89 S. W. 1093), 772, 782, 784. Walbert v. State (17 Ind. App. 350; 46 N. E. 827), 358, 1566. Waldo V. Bell (13 La. Ann. 329), 467. Waldron v. Angieman (71 N. J. L. 166; 58 Atl. 568), 2095. Waldron v. I^uisville, etc., R. Co. (lllKy. 30; 63S.W. 580; 54 ,L. R. A. 919), 2211, 2214. Waldstien v. State (29 Tex. App. 82; 14 S. W. 394), 1228. Wales V. Belcher (3 Pick. 508), 233. ccclviii TABL£ OF CASES. [neferences are to pages.] Walker v. Cincinnati (21 Ohio [N. S.] 14), 228. Walker v. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 75 S. W. 242; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 401), 554. Walker v. Daily (101 111. App. 575), 55, 971, 1843. Walker v. Holtsclaw (57 S. C. 459; 35 S. B. 754), 755, 759. Walker's License, In re (24 Pa. Super. Ct. 90), 562. Walker v. Lovell (28 X. H. 138), 1782. Walker v. Mobley ( [Tex.] 103 S. W. 490), 894, 898. Walker v. Mobley ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 105 S, W. 61), 898, 900. Walker v. McNelly (121 Ga. 114; 48 S. E. 718)' 413, 984. Walker v. Oswald (68 Md. 146; 11 Atl. 711), 906. Walker v. Prescott (44 N. H. 511), 24, 26, 47, 48, 966. Walker v. Shook (49 Iowa, 264), 1032, 1777. Walker v. Springfield (94 111. 364), 791. Walker v. State (122 Ca. 747; 50 S. E. 994), 1207. Walker v. State (32 Teim. [2 Swan] 287), 373. Walker v. State (85 Ala. 7; 4 So. 686; 7 Am. St. Pep. 17), 2042, 2006, 2074. Walker v. State (38 Ark. 656), 85. Walker v. State (25 Tex. App. 448; 8 S. W. 644), 1236, 1028. Walker v. State ( [Tox. Cr. App.] 64 S. W. 1052 ! , 834, 837, 842, 844. Walker v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 72 S. W. 401), 1584, 1652. Walker v. State (49 Tex. Cr. App. 345; 94 S. W. 230), 1611, 1729, 1733. Walker v. State (50 Tex. Cr. App. 495: 98 S. W. 843). 1185. Walker v. State ( [Tev. Cr. App.] 98 S. W. 205), 964, 969. Walker v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 293; 106 S. W. 376), 948, 1202, 1685, 1597. Walker v. Walker (67 J. P. 452; 90 L. T. 88; 20 Cox C. C. 594), 690, 1273. Wall, Ex parte (48 Cal. 279), 231, 236, 240. Wall V. State (78 Ala. 417), 24, 53, 59, 86, 1711. Wall V. State (78 Ala. 718), 25. Wall V. State (10 Ind. App. 530; 38 N. E. 190), 1849, 1869, 1870, 1935, 1951. Wallace v. Cubanola (70 Ark. 395; 68 S. W. 485), 446, 471, 474, 934. Wallace v. Reno (27 Nev. 71; 73 Pac. 528), 714, 741. Wallace v. Salisbury ( 147 X. C. 58; 60 S. E. 713), 925. Wallace v. State (54 Ark. 542; 16 S. W. 571), 1227. Waller v. State (38 Ark. 65G), 1360, 1560, 1639, 1641. Walling V. Michigan (102 U. S. 123), 156. Walling V. Michigan (116 U. S. 440; 6 Sup. Ct. 454), 116, 154, 150, 199, 299, 315. Wallis V. Hodson (2 Atk. 115), 1906. Wallis V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 78 S. W. 231), 1311. Walser v. Kerrigan (56 Ind. 301), 1937. Walsh, In re (208 Pa. 582; 57 Atl. 983 : reversing Pa. Super. Ct. 87), 566. Walsli V. Bedfoll (16 Aust. L. T. 35 ) . 365. Walsh V. Porterfield (87 Pa. 376), 2187. Walsh V. State (126 Ind. 71; 25 X. E. 883; 9 L. R. A. 664), 190. Walter v. Columbia City (61 lud. 24), 144, 413. TABLE OF CASES. ccelix [References are to pages.] Walter v. Commonwealth (88 Pa. 137; 32 Am. Rep. 429), 217, 365, 1511. Walter v. State (38 Ark. 650), 1365. Walter v. State (105 Ind. 389; 3 N. E. 735), 1495, 1497, 1499. Walters v. State (5 Clarke [Iowa] 507), 1452, 1764. Walton, Ex parte (45 Tex. Cr. App. 74; 74 S. W. 314), 871. Walton V. Canon City (13 Colo. App. 77; 59 Pac. 840), 1188. Walton V. State (62 Ala. 197), 1248, 1252. Walton V. Walton (34 Kan. 195; 8 Pac. 110), 65, 2155, 2158, 2161. Wanack v. People (187 111. 116; 58 N. E. 242 ; affirming 87 111. App. 371), 2008, 2009. Wanganni, In re ( 10 N. Z. L. P. 583), 685. Ward, Ex parte ( 2 Sol. Cas. N. S. W. 872), 1374. Ward V. Chicago, etc., P. Co. (85 Wis. 601; 55 N. W. 771), 2176. Ward V. County Court (51 W. Va. 102; 41 S. E. 154), 169, 401, 403. Ward V. Greenville (8 Baxt. 228; 35 Am. Rep. 700), 453, 461. Ward V. Maryland (12 Wheat. [U. S.] 419;" 20 L. Ed. 449), 789, 790. Ward V. Mayor, etc. (8 Baxt. 228), 454, 459, 461. Ward V. Monaghan ([1895] 59 J. P. 392), 1823. Ward V. State (45 Ark. 351), 771, 1220, 1224, 1230. Ward V. State (51 Fla. 133; 40 So. 177), 1603. Ward V. State (48 Ind. 289), 1240, 1460, 1462. Ward V. State (48 Ind. 293) , 1460, 1496. Ward V. State (2 Cold. 605; 91 Am. Dec. 270), 684. Ward V. State (19 Tex. App. 664), 2039, 2054, 2090. Ward V. State ([Tex.] 116 S. W. 1154), 1330. Ward V. Thompson (48 Iowa, 588), 1889, 1904, 1966. Warden v. McConnell (23 Neb. 152; 36 N. W. 278), 1912, 1922, 1923. Warden v. Louisville ( 1 1 Ky. L. Rep. 179; 11 S. W. 774), 448, 521. Warden v. State ( [Tex. Cr. Rep.] 34 S. W. 125), 1463. Warden v. Tye (2 C. P. Div. 74; 41 J. P. 120; 46 L. J. M. C. Ill; 35 L. T. 852), 361, 2028, 2030. Ware v. State ( [Ga.] 65 S. E. 333), 44, 965. Ware v. State (71 Miss. 204; 13 So. 936), 1608. Waring v. The Mayor (75 U. S. 110), 1426. Warner v. Brooks (14 Gray, 107), 1665. Warner v. Hoagland (22 Vroom, 62; 16 Atl. 166), 233. Warner v. Lawrence (62 Mich. 251; 28 N. W. 844), 764. Warner v. New York, etc., R. Co. 44 N. Y. 465), 2201. Warner v. State (56 N. J. L. 686; 29 Atl. 505), 2060, 2069, 2071. Warnock v. Campbell (25 N. J. Eq. 485), 2094, 2095, 2102, 2106, 2107, 2130. Warren v. Chapman ( 105 Mass. 87), 1800, 1807. Warren v. Englehart ( 13 Neb. 283; 13 N. W. 401), 1896. Warren v. Moore ( [1897] 14 T. L. K. 138), 1831. Warrensburg v. McHugh ( 122 Mo. 649; 27 S. W. 523), 416, 442, 447, 470. Warrick v. Rounds (17 Neb. 411; 22 N. \\. 'iSo), 1SS2, 19C3, 1993. ccclx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Warwick v. State (48 Ark. 27; 2 S. W. 253), 1124, 1728. Wartelsky v. State (33 Tex. Cr. App. 629; 44 S. W. 510), 1694. Wasenhut v. State ( 18 Tex. App. 491), 929. Wash V. Lewis (5 Oliio Is. P. 391), 790. Washburn, In re (32 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 303; 66 N. Y. Supp. 732), 729, 750. Washington Co., In re (8 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 169), 622. Washington v. Eames (6 Allen, 417), 477. Washington v. Gallagher (7 Ohio N. P. 511; 5 Ohio S. & C. P. Dee. 562), 214. Washington v. Giddens ( [Ky.] a 03 S. W. 321; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 647), 936. Washington v. Lasky (5 Cranch C. C. 381; Fed. Cas. No. 17230), 463. Washington v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 85 S. W. 801), 1380. Washington v. Young (19 L. J. Exch. 348; 5 Exch. 403), 353. Wasliington Liquor Co. v. Shaw 38 Wash. 398; 80 Pac. 536), 1801. Wason V. Underhill (2 X. H. 505), 513, 1372. Wasserboehr v. Boulier (84 Me. 165; 24 Atl. 808; 30 Am. St. 344), 310, 1787. Wasserboehr v. Morgan ( 168 Mass. 291; 47 N. E. 126), 1797, 1798, 1799. Wasson v. First Nat. Bank (107 Tnd. 206, 219; 8 N. E. 97), 80, 82. 355. Wason V. Sovevanco (2 N. IT. 501), 509. (59 1. 1267. Waters v. Allen (2 Bradf. 354), 2144. Waters v. Ctinipbell (5 Sawy. 17; Fed. Cas. No. 17265), 1263. Waters v. Fitzgerald (25 Vict. L. R. 86; 21 Austr. L. T. 17; 5 Austr. L. R. 149), 363. Waters v. Leech (3 Ark. llu), 408. Waters v. McDowell (126 Ga. 807; 56 S. E. 95), 382, 476. Wathan, etc., Co. v. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 116 S. W. 239), 1342, 1344, 1755. Watkins v. Grieser (11 Okla. 302; 66 Pac. 332), 480, 534, 535, 571, 602, 609, 617, 621, 623. Watkins v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 62 S. W. 911), 891. Watson, In re (34 N. Y. St. Rep. 906), 2148. Watson V. Doyle (130 III. 415; 22 N. E. 613), 2098. Watson V. State (55 Ala. 158), 45, 83, 966. Watson V. State (140 Ala. 134; 37 So. 225), 291. Watson V. State (13 Tex. App. 160), 370. Watson V. State (42 Tex. Cr. App. 13; 57 S. W. 101), 824, 832, 1470, 1474. Watson V. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 551; 107 S. W. 544), 1473. Watt V. Glenister (40 J. P. 181; 32 L. T. 856), 1151. Watts V. Commonwealth (78 Ky. 329), 183, 435. Waugh V. Graham (47 Neb. 153; . 66 N. W. 301), 563. Wayne Co. v. Detroit (17 Mich. 390), 270. Wa\Tiell V. Reed (5 T. R. 599), ' 1790, 1794. Wear v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 29 S. W. 1082), 1321. Weathered v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 60 S. W. 876), 950, 957, 1179. Weaver, In re (20 Pa. Super. Ct. 95 ) , 664, 665. Weaver v. Mt. Vernon (6 Ohio Dec. 436), 1322. Weaver v. State (89 Ga. 639; 15 S. E. 840), 793. TABLE OF CASES. ccclxi [References are to pages.] Weaver v. State (74 Ohio St. 53; 77 N. E. 273), 1000, 1765. Weckerly v. Geyer (U S. & R. 35), 660. Webb V. Baird (11 Lea, 607), 77, 542, 1192. Webb V. Catehlove (50 J. P. 795), 368, 535, 724. Webb V. Commonwealth (7 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 453), 543. Webb V. Laird (11 Lea, 667), 1102. Webb V. Nickerson (11 Ore. 382; 4 Pac. 1126), 1030, 1263. Webb V. State ([Kan. App.] 53 Pac. 276), 1652. Webb V. State (51 N. J. L. 189; 17 Atl. 113), 2033. Webb V. State (11 Lea, 662), 541, 542, 1450. Webb V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 58 S. W. 82), 958, 1650. Webb V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 86 S. W. 331), 1214, 1726. Webb City v. Parker (103 Mo. App. 295; 77 S. W. 119), 1633. Webber v. Birkenhead (61 J. P. 664), 020, 679. Webber v. Curtis (104 III. 309) 571. Webber v. Donnelly (33 Mich. 469), 1786, 1788, 1790, 1798, 1801. Webber v. Lane (99 Mo. App. 69; 71 S. W. 1099), 045, 647. Webber v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 109 S. W. 182), 139, 247, 288, 1110. Webber v. Virginia (103 U. S. 344), 156, 315. Webber v. Williams (36 Me. 512) 518. Webbs V. State (4 Cold. 199), 779 2008. Weed V. Page (7 Wis. 512), 2127. Weed V. State (55 Ala 13), 1241, 1514, 1563. Weeks v. Milwaukee (10 Wis 242), 394. Weeks v. Xew Orleans, etc., R. Co. (32 La. Ann. 615), 2174, 2185. Weidman v. People (7 Bradw. [III.] 38), 1129. Weightman v. Weightman (462 [1906] 70 J. P. 120; 94 L. T. 621; 22 T. L. R. 362), 2169. Weikman v. City Council (2 Speers [S. C] 371), 1758. Weil V. Calhoun (25 P'ed. 865), 125, 156, 158, 232, 235. Weil V. Golden (141 Mass. 364; 6 N. E. 229), 1799, 1806. Weil V. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 603; 90 S. W. 644), 949, 1288, 1555, 1559. Weinandt v. State (80 Neb. 161; 113 N. w. 1040), 1661, 1662, 1663, 1703. Weir V. Allen (47 Iowa, 482), 1016, 1028, 1777. Weir V. Cram (37 Iowa, 649), 231. Weireter v. State (69 Ind. 269), 1253, 1637. Weis V. State (33 Ind. 204), 83. Weis V. State (22 Ohio St. 486), 2251, 2252. Weisbrodt v. State (50 Ohio St. 192; 33 N. E. 603), 12, 1496. Weischelbaum v. Hayslip (127 Ga. 417; 56 S. E. 413), 1792. Weiser v. Welch (112 Mich. 134; 70 X. W. 438), 1955, 1902, 1973, 1991. Weisnian's Estate (45 Phila. Leg. Int. 274), 2138. Weiss V. Green (26 N. Z. 942), 1184. Weitzel V. Slavin (13 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 221; 7 Ohio Dec. 155), 1771, 1810. Welch V. Jugenheimer (56 Iowa, 11; 8 N. W. 673; 41 Am. Rep. 77), 1846, 1861, 1966, 1967. Welch V. McKane (55 Conn. 25; 10 Atl. 168), 779. W^elch V. Marion (48 Ala. 291), 812. Weldon v. Colquitt (62 Ga. 449; 35 Am. Rep. 128), 2116, 2128. ecclxii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] Weldon v. State ( 36 Tex. Cr. App. 34; 35 S. W. 176), 1281. VVelker v. Potter (18 Ohio [N. S.] 85), 228. Weller v. Jersey City 11. & P. St. Ey. Co. (57 A. 730), 2095. Wellington, Petitioner (16 Pick. [Mass.] 95), 294. Wells, Ex parte (45 Tex. Cr. App. 170; 78 S. W. 928), 245. Wells V. State (118 Ga. 556; 45 S. E. 443), 957, 1475, 1490, 1505. Wells V. State (18 Tex. App. 417), 1111. Wells V. State ( 24 Tex. App. 230 ; 5 S. W. 830), 492, 883, Wells V. Torrey (144 Mich. 689; 108 N. W. 423; 13 Detroit Leg. X. 378), 282, 414, 415, 443, 472. Wells V. Wells (6 Ind. 447), 1564. Welsford v. Weidlein (23 Kan. 601), 575, 576. Welsh, In re (11 Pa. Super. Ct. 558), 665. Welsh V. State (126 Ind. 71; 25 N. E. 883; 9 L. R. A. 664), 11, 42, 84, 101, 104, 144, 150, 152, 209, 312, 313, 486, 503, 1106, 1160, 1490. Welsch V. State (19 Ind. App. 389; 46 N. E. 1050), 356. Welton V. Missouri (91 U. S. 275), 157, 199, 315. Welty V. Indianapolis, etc., Pi. Co. (105 Ind. 55; 4 N. E. 410), 2173, 2174. Wempen v. Girard (84 111. App. 130), 1779, 1791. Wendell, In re (1 Johns. Ch. 600), 2016. Wondt V. State (32 Xcl). 182; 19 N. W. 351), 1553. Wenham v. Dodge (98 ]Mass. 474), 355, 384, 385. Wenz V. State (1 Tex. App. 36), 2073. W quinton v. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 492; 102 S. W. 1124), 1698. Werdman v. People (7 III, App 8), 1124. Werneke v. State (50 Ind. 22). 1240, 1252, 1461, 1564. Werneke v. State (49 Ohio, 202), 1478. Werner v. Citizens' St. Ry. Co. (81 Mo. 368), 2178. Werner v. Edmiston (24 Kan. 147), 223, 1840, 1882, 1913. Werner v. Kelley (9 La. Ann. 60), 2153. Werner v. Washington ( 2 Hayw. & II. 175; Fed. Cas. No. 17416a), 463. Wert V. Brown (^7 Ohio St. 477; 25 N. E. 59), 281. Werth V. Roche (92 Me. 383; 42 Atl. 794), 1799. Werthheimer & Sons v. Habinck 131 Iowa, 643; 109 N. W. 189), 1779. Weser v. Welty ( 18 Ind. App. 664; 47 N. E. 639), 2035. Wesley v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 122 S. \\. 550), 926. Wesnieski v. Vanek (99 K W. 258), 1844. West V. Bishop (110 Iowa, 410; 81 N. W. 696), 488, 943, 944, 1002. West V. Columbus (20 Kan. 633), 1479. West V. Greenville (39 Ala. 69), 448. West V. State (32 Ind. App. 161; 69 N. E. 465), 1699. West V. State (70 Miss. 598; 12 So. 903), 1280, 1464, 1468, 1513. West V. State (28 Tenn. [9 Humph.] 66). 136. West V. State (40 Tex. Cr. App. 575; 51 S. W. 247), 844. TABLE OF CASES. ccclxiii [Jweferences are to pages.] West London Syndicate v. In- land Revenue Commissioners ([1898] 2 Q. B. 507; 07 L. J. Q. B. 950; 79 L. T. 289; 47 W. R. 125; 14 T. L. 11. 509), 1833. Westbrook v. Miller (90 X. Y. Supp. 558 ; 98 App. Div. 590 ) , 1838, 1843. Westbrook v. State ([Miss.] 25 So. 491), 1544. Western Express Co. v. United States (141 Fed. 28; 70 C. C. A. 510), 794. Western U. T. Co. v. Mayer (28 Ohio St. 521), 791. Western U. T. Co. v. Pendleton (122 U. S. 347; 7 Sup. Ct. 1120, reversing 95 Ind. 12; 48 Am. Rep. 092), 99, 298. Westheimer & Sons v. Habrinck 131 Iowa, 043; 109 N. W. 189), 1806. Westheimer v. Weisman (00 Kan. 753; 57 Pac. 909), 1798. Westinghausen v. People (44 Mich. 205; 6 N. W. 045), 198, 790. Westmoreland v. State (45 Ga. 225), 2247. We-ston V. Carr (71 Me. 350), 1077. Weston V. Monroe (84 Mich. 341; 46 N. W. 440), 878. Weston V. Territory (1 Okla. Cr. App. 407; 98 Pac. 300), 1502. Wetzler v. State (18 Ind. 35), 1357. Weymire v. Wolfe (52 Iowa, 533), 1890, 2171, 2179, 2180, 2189. W'halen, Ex parte (32 X. B. 274), 1717. Whalen, In re (47 X. Y. St. Rep. 313; 19 N. Y. 915), 2261. Whalen v. Macomb (70 111. 49), 1707. Whalen v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (60 Mo. 323), 2172. 2180. Whaley v. State (87 Ala. 83; 6 So. 380), 1189, 1293. Wharton v. King (09 Ala. 365), 518, 539, 1304. Whealkate Min. Co. v. Mulari (152 Mich. 007; 116 N. W. 300; 15 Det. Leg. N. 278), 1809. Wheaton v. Slattery (96 N. Y. App. Div. 102 ; 88 N. Y. Supp. 1074), 990. Wheeler v. Alder-son (Hagg. Eccl. Rep. 574), 2144, 2147. Wheeler v. Grand Trunk, etc., R. Co. (70 N. H. ■607; 50 AtL 103; 54 L. R. A. 955), 2176, 2192, 2212, 2218. Wheeler v. State ( 4 Ga. App. 325 ; 61 S. E. 409), 1504, 1050. Wheeler v. State (04 Miss. 462), 124, 488, 495, 929, 930. Wheeler v. Wheeler (53 Iowa, 511; 30 Am. Rep. 240), 67, 2107. Wheelin, Iti re (134 Pa. 554; 19 Atl. 755; 20 W. N. C. 72), 022. Wheeton v. Ilardisty (8 El. & BI. 239; 92 E. C. L. 232), 2230. Whiffin V. Mailing ([1892] 1 Q. B. 302; 50 J. P. 325; 60 L. T. 333; 40 W. R. 292; 61 L. J. M. C. 82), 080, •681. Whisenhurst v. State (18 Tex. App. 491), 938, 939. Whissen v. Furth (73 Ark. 366; 84 S. W. 500; 08 L. R. A. 161), 532, 609, 621, 669. Whitbread & Co. v. Grain ([1907] 23 T. L. R. 402), 1829. Whitcomb v. State (2 Tex. Civ. App. 301; 21 S. W. 976), 768, 781. White, Ex parte (20 X. B. 552), 1681. White v. Atlantic City (02 X. J. L. 644; 42 Atl. 170), 639, 676. White V. Beckham (26 X. S. 50), 351. White V. Bracclin (144 Mich. 332; 107 X. W. 1055; 13 Detroit Leg. X. 156), 134. ccclxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to pages.] White V. Buss (3 Cush. 448), 1796. White V. City of London Brewing Co, (58 L. J. Ch. 98; 39 Ch. D. 559; 60 L. T. 19; 36 W. R. 881; affirmed 58 L. J. €h. 855; 42 Ch. D. 237; 38 W. R. 82), 1818. W^hite V. Commonwealth ( [Ky.] 50 S. W. 678; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1942), 935. White V. Commonwealth ( 107 Va. 901; 59 S. E. 1101), 1479, 1652, 1730, 1732, 1733. White V. Coquetdale ( 7 Q. B. Div. 238; 50 L. J. M. C. 128; 44 L. T. 715; 45 J. 1\ 539), 708. White V. Cox (3 Hayw. [Tenn.] 79), 2093, 2099, 2100, 2116. White V. Creamer (175 Mass. 567; 56 N. E. 832), 722. White V. Farguson (29 App. 145; 64 N. E. 409), 606, 855. White V. Kent (11 Ohio St. 550), 2035. White V. McCullough ( [Xeb.] 123 X. W. 1034), 577. White V. Manning (46 Tex. Civ. App. 298; 102 S. W. 1160), 23. White V. Mayor, etc. (2 Swan. [Tenn.] 364), 408. White V. Morley ([1899] 2 Q. B. 34; 63 J. P. 550; 66 L. J. Q. B. 702; 47 W. R. 883; 80 L. T. 761; 15 T. L. R. 360), 380. White V. Xeilson (6 F. [Just. Cas.] 51), 1131, 1148. White V. Nestor (13 N. Z. L. R. 751), 1116, 1313, 131G. White V. Prifogle (140 Ind. 64; 44 N. E. 926), 610, 612, 859. White V. Provident, etc., Soc. ( 163 Mass. 108; 39 N. E. 771), 2232. White V. Southend Hotel Co. ([1897] 1 Ch. 767; 66 L, J. Ch. 387; 76 L. T. 273; 45 W. R. 434; 13 L. T. E. 310), 1816. White V. State (103 Ala. 72; 16 So. 63), 1736. White V. State (74 Ark. 491; 86 S. W. 296), 2056. White V. State (80 Ark. 598; 98 S. W. 377), 1017, 1065. White V. State (93 Ga. 47; 19 S. E. 49), 1180, 1650, 1651. White V. State (11 Tex. App. 476), 1500, 1759, 1763. White V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 30 S. W. 556), 2091. White V. State (24 Tex. App. 230; 5 S. W. 857), 929. White V. State (32 Tex. Cr. Rep. 625; 25 S. W. 784), 1583. White V. State (45 Tex. Cr. App. b^i; 78 S. W. 1066), 1690. White V. State (47 Tex. Cr. App. 551; 85 S. W. 9), 1213, 1283, 1284, 1286. White V. White (1 Swab. & T. 592; 6 Jur. [N. S.] 28; 1 L. T. [X. S.] 197), 2166. Whitehors€ v. State (43 Ind. 473), 929. Whiteliurst v. Fincher ( 62 L. 'i\ 433; 54 J. P. 565), 378. Whitehurst v. State (43 Ind. 473), 1740. Whiteneck v. Stryker (2 X. J. Eq. 8), 2135, 2136, 2139. Whitesides v. GJreenlee (2 Dev. Eq. [X. C] 152), 2100. Whitfield v. Bainbridge (30 ,}. P. 644), 367. Whitfield V. State (2 Ga. App. 124; 38 S. E. 385), 1600, 1607. Wliitlock's License, In re (39 Pa. Super. Ct. 34), 480, 703. Whitlock V. Bartholomew (91 Iowa, 246; 59 X. W. 76), 572. TABLE OP CASES. ccclxv [References are to pages.] Whitlow, Ex parte (59 Tex. 273), 925. VVhitlock V. Workman { 15 Iowa, 351), 1790. Whitmore v. State (72 Ark. 14; 77 S. W. 598), 1166, 1187. Whitney, In re (142 N. Y. 531; 37 N. E. 621, affirmed 3 N. Y. Supp. 838), 1123. Whitney v. State (10 Ind. 404), 1441. Whitney v. State (8 Mo. 165), 2040. Whitney v. Swensen (43 Minn. 337; 45 N. W. 609), 1027. Whitney v. Township, etc. (71 Mich. 234; 39 N. E. 40), 119, 131, 132. Whittaker, In re (03 N. Y. App. Div. 442; 71 N. Y. Supp. 497), 731. Whitten v. State (115 Ala. 72; 22 So. 483), 2039, 2076. Whitten v. Covington (43 Ga. 421), 418, 439, 471. Whittington, Ex parte (34 Ark. 394), 027, 628, 635. Whittelsey v. Acme Brewing Co. (127 Ga. 208; 56 S. E. 299), 798. Whitton V. State (37 Miss. 379), 1252, 1255, 1365, 1366. Whyte V. Williams (29 Vict. L. R. 69; 24 Austr. L. T. 222; 9 Austr. L. R. 98), 701. Wichita v. Murphy (78 Kan. 859; 99 Pac. 272), 1741, 1762. Wicker v. Siesel (80 Ga. 724; 6 S. B. 817), 799, 804. Wickwire v. State (19 Conn. 477), 1631, 1632. Widdlesfield v. Metcalfe (12 Up. Can. 247; affirmed, 8 Can. L. Jr. 74), 1321. Wiecke v. People ( 14 111. App. 447), 1621. Wiedemann (92 111. 314), 1564. Wiggenhorn v. Kountz (23 Neb. 669; 37 N. W. 600), 1856. Wiggins V. Chicago (68 111. 372), 471. Wiggins V. Ferry Co. ( 102 111. 560), 786. Wiggins V. Warner (67 Ga. 583), 558, 627, 628. Wigglesworth v. Steers ( 1 Hen. & M. 70; 3 Am. Dec. 202), 2099, 2128. Wightman v. Devere (33 Wis. 570), 1864, 1977, 1978. Wightman v. State ( 10 Ohio, 452), 448. Wiginton v. State (51 Tex. Cr. App. 492; 102 S. W. 1124), 958, 1699. Wilber v. Dwyer (69 Hun, 507; 23 N. Y. Supp. 395), 1954, 1984. Wilber v. Ress (78 Neb. 835; 1L2 N. W. 379), 849. Wilbur, Ex parte (31 N. B. 678), 1571. Wilbur V. Flood (16 Mich. 40; 93 Am. Dec. 203), 2127. Wilcox V. Bryant (156 Ind. 379; 59 N. E. 1049), 611, 635. Wilcox V. Jackson (51 Iowa, 208; 1 N. W. 51*^), 2093, 2100. Wilcox V. People ( 17, Colo. App. 109; 67 Pac. 343), 1188. Wilcox V. State (94 Tenn. 106; 28 S. W. 312), 2040. Wilcoxson V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 91 S. W. 581), 80. Wildermuth v. Cole (77 Mich. 483 ; 43 N. W. 889 ) , 552. Wilds V. Brunswick R. Co. ( 62 Ga. 667; 9 S. E. 595), 2180. Wiles V. State (33 Ind. 206), 8, 10, 47, 82, 497, 500, 1561, 1714. Wiley V. Bluffton (HI Ind. 152; 12 N. E. 165). 227. Wiley V. Ewalt (66 111. 26), 2143. Wiley V. Owens (39 Ind. 429), 144, 397, 412, 428, 429, 443, 444, 795. Wiley V. State (74 Miss. 727; 21 So. 797), 1181, 1199. ccclxvi TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages.] WUey V. Strickland (8 Ind. 453), 1018. Wilkerson v. Commonwealth (88 Ky. 29; 9 S. W. 836; 10 Ky. L. Rep. 656), 2056, 2061, 2068 Wilkins v. State (113 Ind. 514; 16 N. E. 192), 1024. Willard v. State (4 Ind. 407), 1498. Willett V. Viens (2 Que. S. C. 514), 1839. Williams, Ex parte (87 Ala. 547; 6 So. 314), 869, 2021. Williams v. Augusta (111 Ga. 849; 36 S. E. 607), 1322, 1739. Williams v. Bayonne (55 N. J. L. 60; 25 Atl. 407), 586. Williams v. Berry (8 How. 495), 1162. Williams v. Citizens (40 Ark. 290), 856, 858, 859. Williams v. Commonwealth ( 13 Bush, 304), 800, 801. Williams v. Davidson (64 Kan. 607; 68 Pac. 650), 1797. Williams v. Davidson ( [Tex. Civ. A_pp.] 70 S. W. 989), 854, 887, 934. Williams v. Edmunds ( 75 Mich. 92; 42 X. W. 534), 2188, 2191, 2193. Williams v. Foriman ( 14 Kan. 248), 1288, 1788. Williams v. Goss (43 La. Ann. 868; 9 So. 750), 07, 2155, 2157, 2158, 2166. Williams v. Iredell Co. (132 N. C. 300; 43 S. E. 896), 798. Willis v. Kalmback ( [Va.] 64 S. E. 342), 901. Williams v. Lassell & Sharman, Limited ([1906] 22 T. L. R. 443), 1822. W^illiams v. Louis (14 Kan. 605), 554, 683, 684, 688. Williams v. McDonald (58 Cal. 527), 605. Williams v. Macdonald ([1899] 2 Q. B. 308; 63 J. P. 501; 68 L.J. Q. B. 678; 47 W. R. 701; 80 L. T. 758; 15 T. L. R. 343), 1155. Williams v. Mabrecht ( 1 Bailey, 343), 2093. Williams v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (109 Mo. 475; 18 S. W. 1098), 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 219!), 2200. Williams v. Pagson ( 14 La. Ann. 7), 294. Williams v. State (81 Ala. 1; 1 So. 179; 60 Am. Rc'iJ. 133), 2041, 2063, 2068. Williams v. State (91 Ala. 14; 8 So. 668), 1176, 1621. Williams v. State (72 Ark. 19; 77 S. W. 597), 43, 964, 1697. Williams v. State (35 Ark. 430), 60, 1643, 1713. Williams v. State (47 Ark. 230; 1 S. W. 149), 1490. Williams v. State (89 Ga. 483; 15 S. E. 552), 1465, 1469. Williams v. State (100 Ga. 511; 28 S. E. 624; 39 L. R. A. 209), 1119, 1134. Williams v. State (107 Ga. 693; 33 S. E. 641), 953, 1379, 1452, 1654. Williams v. State (4 Ga. App. 853; 62 S. E. 671), 1090. Williams v. State (48 Ind. 306), 211, 439, 1253, 1256. Williams v. State (12 Lea, 211), 1583. Williams v. State (23 Tex. App. 70; 3 S. W. 661), 1235. Williams v. State (23 Tex. App. 499; 5 S. W. 136), 1111. Williams v. State (25 Tex. App. 76: 7 S. W. 601), 2039, 2059, 2090. Williams v. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 238; 39 S, W. 664), 1472, 1474. TABLE OF CASES. ccclxvii [References are to pages.] Williams v. State (38 Tex, Cr. App. 377; 43 S. VV. 115), 1472. Williams v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App. J 57 S, W. G50), 1235. Williams v. State (44 Tex. Cr. App. 235; 70 S. W. 213), 1472. Williams v. State (45 Tex. Cr. App. 477; 77 S. W. 215), 949, 1185, 1284. Williams v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 77 S. W. 783), 845. Williams v. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 81 S. W. 1209), 845, 1573. Williams v. State (48 Tex. Cr. App. 75; 85 S. W. 1144), 1214. Williams v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 107 S. W. 825), 1473. Williams v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 371; 107 S. W. 1121), 132, 245, 420, 550. Williams v. State (52 Tex. Cr. App. 430; 107 S. W. 825, 820), 1464. Williams v. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 156; 109 S. W. 189), 832, 887, 889. Williams v. Throop ( 17 Wis. 463), 552, 700. Williams v. Warsaw ( 00 Ind. 457), 210. Williams v. West Point (68 Ga. 816), 812. Williams v. Williams ([1904] P. 31; 73 L. J. P. 31; 6S J. P. 188; 90 L. T. 174; 20 T. L. R. 213), 2169. Williamson v. Lane (52 Tex. 335), 925. Williamson v. Norris ([1899] 1 Q. B. 7; 62 J. P. 790; 01 L. J. Q. B. 31; 47 W. R. 94; 79 L. T. 415; 15 T. L. R. 18; 19 Cox C. C. 203), 512, 546. Williamson v. State ( [Tox. Cr. App.] 40 S. W. 286), 1197, 1693, 1694. Williamson v. State (41 Tex. Cr. App. 461; 55 S. W. 568), 1524, 1526, 1731 Williamson v. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 43 S. W. 983), 1210. Williamsport v. Wenner (172 Pa. St. 173; 33 Atl. 544), 191. Willis V. Commonwealth (32 Cratt. 929), 2039, 2048, 2061, 2067, 2081. Willis V, State (43 Neb. 102; 61 N. W. 254), 2258. Willis V. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 82; 38 S. W. 776), 1197, 1210. W^illougiiby v. Moulton (47 N. H. 205), '2099, 2108. Wilmans v. Bordwell (73 Ark. 418; 84 S. W. 474), 854. Wilmot V. Johnson ( [Iowa] 123 N. W. 330), 980. Wilmurt v. Morgan (March 1827 [N. J. Eq.]), 2129. Wilson, In re (32 Minn. 145; 19 N. W. 723), 40o', 419, 420, 424, 437. Wilson V. Abrahams (1 Hill [N. Y.] 207), 2253. Wilson V. Bigger (7 Watts & S. Ill), 2106, 2108. Wilson V. Bohstedt ( 135 Iowa, 451; 110 N. W. 898), 861, 944. Wilson V. Booth (57 Mich. 249; 23 N. W. 799), 1854, 1975. Wilson V. Brigger ( 7 Watts & S. HI), 2095. Wilson V. Commonwealth ( 12 B. Mon. 2), 1094, 1102, 1106, 1110. Wilson V. Commonwealth ( 14 Busii 159), 1502. Wilson V. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 70 S. W. 1077; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1085), 1343. Wilson V. Crewe, J. J. ([1905] 1 K. B. 491; 74 L. J. K. B. 394; 69 J. P. Ill; 92 L. T. 164; 53 W. R. 382; 21 T. L. R. 233), 711. ccclxviii TABLE OP CASES. IReferences arc to pages.] Wilson V. Hart {[1866] L. R. 1 Lh. 463), 1813. Wilson V Herink ( 64 Kan. 607 ; 68 Pac. 72), 289. Wilson V. Hines (99 Ky. 221; 35 S. W. 627; 37 S. W. 148), 249, 866. Wilson V. Lawrence ( 70 Ark. 545 ; 69 S. W. 570), 901. Wiltshire v. Marshall (14 Wkly. Rep. 602; 14 L. T. [N. S.] 396), 2104. Wilson V. Mathis (145 Ind. 493; 44 N. E. 486), 603, 662, 663, 668. Wilson V. Peters (24 X. S. W. 9), 1147. Wilson V. Shorick (21 la. 332), 467. Wilson V. State (136 Ala. 144; 33 So. 831), 1654. Wilson V. State (35 Ark. 414), 134, 136, 157, 347, 509, 1466, 1467. Wilson V. State (64 Ark. 586; 43 S. W. 972), 375, 1356. Wilson V. State { 19 Ind. App. 389; 46 N. E. 1050), 1147, 1248, 1257, 1364, 1565, 1615, 1616, 1620, 1031, 1633. Wilson V. State (60 N. J. L. 171 ; 37 Atl. 954), 2060, 2066, 2069. Wilson V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 55 S. W. 68), 1473, 1495, 1611. Wilson V. State ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 107 S. W. 818), 923. Wilson V. State (53 Tex. Cr. App. 556; 110 S. W. 904), 1366. Wilson V. State (54 Tex. Cr. App. 13; 111 S. W. 1018), 1168, 1605, 1637. Wilson V. Stratton (47 Me. 120), 1787, 1798. Wilson V. Stuart (32 L. J. M. C. 198; 3 B. & S. 913; 27 J. P. 661; 8 L. T. 277), 512. Wilson V. Thompson (56 Ark. 110; 19 S. W. 321), 860. Wilson V. Twamley ([1904] 2 K. B. 99; 88 L. T. 803; 52 W. R. 529; 20 T. L. R. 440), 1824. ■\Yilson V. Whelan (91 Ga. 461; 17 S. E. 906), 395. Wilson V. White (29 Tex. Civ. App. 588; 69 S. W. 989), 66. Winants v. Bayonne (44 N. J. L. 114), 420, 462. Winchester, In re (8 Austr. L. K. [C. N.] 19), 644. Wind V. Her (93 Iowa 316; 61 N. W. 1001; 27 L. R. A. 219), 310, 335, 1787, 1799. Winder, In re ( 24 Pa. €o. Ct. Rep. 90), 626, 630. Windham v. State (26 Ala. 69), 371. Winerton v. State (65 Miss. 238; 3 So. 735), 931. Wing V. Benham (76 Iowa, 17; 39 X. W. 21), 1929, 2011. Wing V. Burgess (13 Me. Ill), 1039. Wing V. Commonwealth (7 Ky. L, Rep. 216), 2033. Wing V. Ford (89 Me. 140; 35 Atl. 1023), 1807. Wingo V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 108 S. W. 372), 1604, 1707. Winn V. State (43 Ark. 151), 16, 81, 961), Winneconne v. Winneconne ( 122 Wis. 348; 99 N. W. 1055), 809. Winona v. Whipple (24 Minn. 61), 139, 170, 444, 787, 807. Winoski V. Gokey (49 Vt. 282), 470, 479. Winslow V. Gallagher (27 N. B. 25), 2025. Winslow V. Newlan (45 111. 145), 610. Winslow V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 98 S. W. 241 ) , 953. 1380, 1696. Winslow V. State (50 Tex. Cr. App. 465; 98 S. W. 866), 1609. TABLE OF CASES. ccclxix [References are to pages.] Winslow V, Winslow (95 X. C. 24), 1)7. Winston v. State { 32 Tex. Cr. Rep. 59, 22 S. W. 138), 893, 894. Winter v. State (133 Ala 176; 3] So. 717), 1177, 1180, 1204, 1205, 1373, 1599, 162. Winters, v. State ( 33 Tex. Cr. Rep. 395; 26 S W. 839), 370, 373, 330, 1637. Wintermute v. Clark (5 Sandf. 242). 544. Winterton v. State (65 Miss. 238; 3 So. 735), 928, 929. Wintou V. State (77 Ark. 143; 91 S. W. 7), 1730, 1731. Wintz V. Girardy (31 La. Ann. 381), 791. Wirth V. Roche (92 Me. 383; 42 AtL 794), 1782. Wisconsin Keeley Institute Co. v. Milwaukee Co. (95 Wis. 153; 70 N. W. 68; 36 L. R. A. 55), 278, 2023. Wiseman's Estate (5 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 561), 2135, 2137. Wiseman v. Dugas (6 Mon. S. C. 138; 6 Quebec Q. B. 133), 610. Wiseman v. St. Laurent (3 Man. S. C. 108), 570. Witherspoon v. State (39 Tex. Cr. App. 65; 44 S. W. 164, 1096), 1371, 1651, 1665. Wragg V. People (94 III. 11), 216, 271. Wray v. Harrison (116 Ga. 93; 42 S. E. 351), 587. Wray v. Toke (12 Q. B. 492; 17 L. J. M. C. 183; 12 J. P. 804), 367, 726. Wreidt v. State 48 Ind. 579), 1351, 1353, 1357, 1359, 1362. Wright, Appeal of (1 Wilcox 85), 598, 638. Wright, Ex parte ([Tex.] 120 S. W. 868), 1304. Wright V. Board (75 N. J. L. 28; 66 Atl. 1061), 581. Wright V. Commonwealth ([Ky.] 72 S. W. 340; 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1838), 2038. Wright V. Defrees (S Ind. 298), 106. Wright V. Dunham ( 13 Mich. 414), 264, 1585. Wright V. Fawcett (42 Tex. 206), 925. Wright V. Fisher (65 Mich. 275; 32 N. E. 605; 8 Am. St. 886), 67, 2094, 2098. Wright V. Harris (49 J. P. 628), 1267, 1300. Wright V. Hughes (119 Ind. 324; 21 N. E. 662), 1801. Wright V. Macon ( [Gu.] 64 S. E. 807), 1333. Wright V. O'Brien (98 Me. 196; 56 Atl. 647), 990. Wright V. People (101 111. 126), 73, 549, 553, 822, 1336. Weight V. Smith 128 Ga. 432; 57 S. E. 684), 1991. Wright V. .State (129 Ala. 123; 29 So. 864), 1602. Wright V. State ( 36 Tex. Cr. App. 35; 35 S. W. 287), 1687. Wright V. State (37 Tex. Cr. Rep. 3; 35 S. W. 150; 38 S. W. 811), 959, 1682), 1686. Wright V. State (37 Tex. Cr. App. 627; 40 S. W. 491), 2079. Wright V. State ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 90 S. W. 24), 1280. Wright V. Tipton (46 S. W. 629 [Texas]), 1898. Wright V. Treat (83 Mich. 110; 47 X. W. 243) 766, 774, 781, 1855, 1866, 1884, 1937. Wright V. Waller (127 Ala. 557; 29 So. 57), 2094, 2095. Wrockledge v. State (1 Clarke [la.] 167), 1289, 1479, 1488, 1500, 1554, 1765. Wrought Iron, etc., Co. v. John- son (84 Ga. 754; 11 S. E. 233), 156. ecclxx TABLE OP CASES. [References are to pages.] Wolcott V. Burlingame (112 Mich. 311; 70 N. W. 831), 139, 761. Wolcott V. Judge (112 Mich. 311; 70 X. W. 831), 498. Wolf, Ex farte (14 Neb. 24; 14 N. W. 060), 263, 452, 457, 459. Wolf V. Johnson (152 111. 280; 38 X. E. 886), 1960, 1984. Wolfe V. Johnson (45 111. App. 122), 1255. Wolf V, Lansing (53 Mich. 367; 19 N. W. 38), 09, 397, 403, 449. Wolf V. State (59 Ark. 297; 27 S. W. 77; 43 Am. St. 34), 19, 967, 1319, 1321. Wolfe V. State (38 Tex. Cr. Rep. 537), 1374, 1378. Wolf V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 85 S. W. 8), 1623. Wolfson V. Rubicon Tp. (63 Mich. 49; 29 N. W. 486), 764. Wolters, Ex -parte (65 Cal. 269; 3 Pac. 894 ), 412, 413, 417. Wolton V. Missouri (91 U. S. 275), 156. Wong V. Astoria (13 Ore. 538), 216, 271. Wong Sing v. Independence (47 Ore. 231; 83 Pac. 387), 1490, 1498. Wood, Ex parte ( [Tex. Cr. App.] 81 S. W. 529), 915. Wood V. Andes (11 Hun, 543), 2172, 2196. Wood V. Baer (91 Iowa, 475; 59 N. W. 289), 988. Wood V. Brooklyn (14 Barb. [X. Y.] 428), 216. 441. 471. Wood V. Lentz (116 Mich. 275; 74 X. W. 462), 1939. Wood V. Pindall (Wright, 507), 2094, 2099, 2100, 2105, 2108. Wood V. Ross (11 Mass. 270), 1058. Wood V. School District (80 Xeb. 722; 115 X. W. 308), 816. Wood V. State (34 Ark. 341), 2078. Wood V. State (21 Ind. 276), 1306, 1498. Wood V. State (9 Ind. App. 42; 36 X. E. 158), 1292, 1488, 1635. Wood V. State ([Tex.] 116 S. W. 1154), 691. Wood V. Territory (1 Ore. 223), 1177, 1021. Wood V. Thomas (38 Mich. 086), 802. Woodbridge, In re (30 Mo. App. 612), 885, 886, 893. Woodford v. Hamilton (139 Ind. 481; 39 X. E. 47), 464, 536, 1780, 1789, 1791. Woodhouse, i/a; parte (3 Low. Can. Rep. 92), 1516. Woodley v. Simmonds (00 J. P. 150), 1345, 1346. Woodlief V. State (21 Tex. App. 412; 2 S. W. 812), 938, 939. Woodlock V. Dickie (6 R. & G. [X. S.] 86; 6 Can. L. T. 142), 1478. Woodring v. Jacobson ([Wash.] 103 Pac. 809), 1800. Woodruff V. Xorthern Pac. R. Co. (47 Fed. 089), 2182. Woodruff V. Parham (8 Wall 123; 19 L. Ed. 382), 154, 331, 790. Woods V. Board (128 Ind. 289; 27 X. E. Oil), 2173, 2186. Woods V. Commonwealth ( 1 B. Mon. 74), 71, 1540. Woods V. Dailey (211 111. 495; 71 X. E. 1068," 1974. Woods V. Garvey (82 Xeb. 776; 118 X. W. 1114), 600. Woods V. Kirschlavek ([Xeb.] 118 X. W. 1115), 345. Woods V. Pineville (19 Ore. 108; 23 Pac. 880), 64, 462, 1564, Woods V. Pratt (5 Blackf. 377), 603, 611. Woods V. State (36 Ark. 36; 38 Am. Rep. 22), 109, 822, 934. Woods V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.l 20 S. W. 915), 1461. TABLE OP CASES. ceclxxi [References are to pages.] Woods V. State ([Tex. Cr. App.] 75 S. W. 37), 940, 1473. Woods V. Town, etc. (19 Ore. 108), 432. Woods V. Varley ([Neb.] 118 N. W. 1114), 345. Woodson V. (jioidon (Peck [Tenn.] 180; 14 Am. Dec. 743), 2102. Woodward v. Squires (41 Iowa, 077), 1804. Woodward v. State (103 Ga. 490; 30 S. E. 522), 908. Wooldridgo, In re (30 Mo. App. 035), 885. Wooler V. Knott ([1870] 1 Ex. D. 265; 45 L. J. Ex. 884; 35 L. T. 121; 24 W. R. 1004; 40 J. P. 788), 1820. Woolheather v. Risley (38 Iowa, 480), 1850, 1857, 1861, 1882, 1912, 1971. Woolner & Co. v. Remnick ( 170 Fed. 602), 78, 1386. Woolstein v. Welch ( 42 Fed. 566 ) , 327. Woolston, In re (35 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 735; 72 N, Y. Supp. 406), 889. Wooster v. State (6 Baxt. 533), 71, 1125, 1304, 1320. Wooten V. State ( [Tex.] 121 S. W. 703), 1009. Wooton V. Commonwealth ( 15 Ky. L. Rep. [abstract] 495), 945, 957. Word V. Greenville ( 8 Baxt. 22S ) , 203. Workam v. Workam (31 Miss. 154), 2107. Worlej'^ V. tepurgeon (38 Iowa, 467), 8, 27, 28, 29, 1350, 1351, 1907, 1908. Wormley v. Hamberg (40 la. 22), 225. Worth V. Brown (40 Sol. J. 515; 62 J. P. 658), 361, 1253. Wortham v. State (80 Miss. 205; 32 So 50), 1181, 1184, 1381, 1654. Wurts V, Hoagland (114 U. S. 600; 5 Sup. Ct. 1086), 97. Wyatt V. Commonwealth (2 Ky. L. Rep. 61), 2086. Wyatt V. Ryan (113 Ky. 306; 08 N. W. 134; 24 Ky. L. Rep. 228), 850, 852. Wycott, In re (38 Up. Can. 533), 914. Wynants v. Bayonne (44 N. J. L. [15 Vroom] 114), 405. Wynehamer v. People (13 N. Y. 378; 2 Parker Cr. Rep. 421; affirming 2 Parker Cr. Rep. 377; 12 How. Pr. 238 and re- versing 20 Barb. 507), 111, 112, 125, 149, 199, 300, 316. Wynn v. Allard (5 Watts & S. 524), 2172, 2191. Wynn v. Allrod (5 W. & S. 525), 2193, 2195. Wynne v. State ([Ala.] 40 So. 459), 1652. Wynne v. Williamson (94 Ga. 603; 20 S. E. 436), 932. Yahn v. Merritt (117 Ala. 485; 23 So. 71), 291. Yakel v. State (30 Tex App. 391; 17 S. W. 943; 20 S. W. 205), 1228. Yankton v. Douglass (8 S. D. 441; 66 X. W. 923), 1543. Yarnall v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. 75 Mo. 575), 2178, 2180. Yates V. City of Milwaukee ( 1 Wall. [U. S.] 497), 408. Yates v. Nunnelly (125 Ky. 664; 102 S. W. 292; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 984), 936. Yates V. State ([Tex. -Cr. App.] 59 S. W. 275), 892. Yazel V. State (170 Ind. 535; 84 N". E. 972), 1447. Yazoo City v. State (48 Miss. 440), 169. ccclxxii TABLE OF CASES. [Ileferences are to pages.] Yeager, Ex parte (11 Gratt. 655), 035. Yearteau v. Bacon (65 Vt. 516; 27 Atl. 198), 307. Yeoman v. State (81 Xeb. 244; 115 N. W. 784), 1090, 1G24. Yerger, Ex parte (8 Wall [U. S.] 85, 105), 467. Yick Wo V. Hopkins (118 U. S. 356; 6 Sup. Ct. 1069), 116, 206, 208, 454. Yodlard v. Jacksonville ( 15 111. 588), 456. Yost V. Commonwealth (6 Ky. L. Rep. 110), 1504, 1626. Y'oun V. Lamont (56 Minn. 216; 57 N. W. 478), 2106, 2107, 2122, 2123. Young, In re (15 R. I. 243; 3 Atl. 3), 1044. Young V. Beveridge (81 Neb. 180; 115 N. W. 766), 86, 1608, 1707, 1907, 1982. Young V. Blaisdell ( 13« Mass. 344), 752, 740. Young V. Commonwealth (14 Bush 161), 559, 920, 928, 930, 934, 957, 1478, 1480, 1588, 1679, 1680, 1682. Young V. Higgin (6 M. & W. 49 ) , 569. Young V. Miller ( 145 Ind. 652 ; 44 K E. 757), 2137. Young V. State (58 Ala. 358), 1176, 1230, 1252, 1779. Young Y. State ([Ala.] 48 So. 490), 1120. Young V. State (34 Ind. 46), 671. YoHug V. .state ( [Tex. 'Cr. App.] 66 S. W. 567), 952, 1611, 1692. Young V. Stevenson ( 73 Ark. 480 ; 86 S. W. 1000), 510. Young V. Stevenson (75 Ark. 181; 86 S. W. 1000), 694. Young v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (116 N. C. 932; 21 S. E. 177), 2188. Youngs v. Youngs (130 111. 230; 22 X. E. 806; 6 L. R. A. 548; 17 Am. St. 313), 63, 66, 2154. Youngbloo»atrty of alcohol which they contain. According to ^ >Pahd's Manual of Chemistry,- spirituous liquors contain fS'toi 53 to 56 per cent, of alcohol; wines from 13 (cham- ^gne) to 26 (port) per cent.; currant and sherry wine over 10 per cent ; cider an average of about ly^ per cent. ; Metheglen about 714 per cent., and ale an average of about 614 pei' cent.^ 2 l<54o» 1646. 3 People V. Ci-illey, 20 Barb. (N. YO 24-8-. The meaning of the word '"iiqlior" must always be ascer- tained hy considering the sense in which it is used, and that sense is ascertained by considering its con- nection with the words with which it is connected. The primary meaning assigned it in the Stand- ard Dictionary is, "An alcoholic or intoxicating liquor;" and a quotation is made from Henry Ward Beecher ( Plain and Pleas- ant Talk, Warmth, p. 11 [D. & J. '59]), as follows: "He that keeps warm on liquor is like a man who pulls his house to pieces to feed the fireplace." No one can mis- take the sense in which the word is used in this quotation. "A strong or active fluid of any sort. Specifically, an alcoholic or spirituous liquid, either distilled or fermented; an intoxicating beverage; especially a spirituous or distilled drink as distinguished from fermented beverages, as wine and beer." "Spirituous liquors, liquors produced by distillation." "Vinous liquors, liquors made from grapes; wine." Century Diction- ary, the word "liquor." Where liquor was defined by a statute as "any wine, spirits, ale, beer, porter, cider, sherry, or other spiritiious or fermented liquor of an intoxicating character," it was held that "liquor" meant a liquid which is commonly knoAvn and adopted for use as a drink or Ijeverage for luiraan consumption, or which is reasonably capable of being used as a substitute for such beverages, or being converted into such beverage; and in a prosecu- tion for a sale of proprietary medicines it is not necessarily sufficient for the prosecution to prove that it contains even a large percentage of alcohol, if the alcohol is essential for its use as a medicine or is necessary for in- toxication or as a preservative, or if the other ingredients are, as compared with the contained al- cohol, of such potency or of such a disagreeable character that the use of the liquor as a beverage could ordinarily result in danger to life or health, or in nausea or sickness; and that in considering Avhether a liquid is a liquor within the meaning of the statute, re- gard should be had to the uses to which it is usually put, the pur- pose for which it is usually §2 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. Sec. 2. Liqour — Continued. "The word 'liquor,' " said the Supreme Court of Flor- ida, "may be used in either of two senses. The first is practically synonymous with 'liquid;' the second, as given in Webster's Dictionary, is, specifically, alcohol or spirituous fluid, either distilled or fermented, as brandy, wine, whisky, beer, etc.* In common parlance the word is universally understood in the hitter sense when used in speaking of a dealer in liquors. This being true, when the statute first prescribes a penalty for dealing in intoxicating liquors, and then prescribes a form of indictment to be used in prosecuting for a breach of this law, using therein the word 'liquors,' it is beyond cavil that the word is used in the special sense of intoxicating liquors, as above de- fined, and that under such an indictment the sale only of such liquors can be shown. "^ bought, and its usual effect upon the system. Gleason \. Hobson [1907] Vict. L. E. 14'8 (Aus- tralia ) . In Georgia proof that the ac- cused sold "liquor" was held suffi- cient proof that the fluid sold was intoxicating, especially where it looked like rye whisky. Carswell V. State (Ga. App.), 66 S. E. *88. * Liqueur is "an alcoholic cordial sweetened and flavored with aro- matic substances." Among the commercial liqueurs the following- are the main ones: absinthe, allasch, anisette, benedietine, casis, chartreusse, creme de menthe, crenie de rosa, creme de vanilla, curacoa, kirschwasser, kummel, mandarine, maraschino, moyan, pomeranzen, ratafia, trappistine, and vermuth." Standard Dic- tionary. r- Rrass v. State, 4.') Fhi. 1 ; 34 So. 307; State v. Ihittain, S9 N. C. 574; HoUender v. Magone, 38 Fed. 012; Kizcr v. Randleman, 5 Jones (X. C), 428; iCarswell v. State ( Ga. App. ) , 66 S. E. 488. In Texas, by one statute, in- toxicating liquors are defined; and this is held to apply to the statute relating to nuisances. State V. Frederickson, 101 Me. 37; '63 Atl. 535. Failure to use the word "intoxi- cating" before the word "liquors" in the title of an act providing for the prosecution of those sell- ing liquor in counties voting against such sale, does not render it unconstitutional. Ladson v. State (Fla.), 47 So. 517. "The term 'liquor' applies only to liquors containing a sufficient percentage of alcohol to cause in- toxication." Board v. Taylor, 21 N. Y. 173, 177; Roberts v. State 4 Ga. App. 207; 60 S. E. 1082; ,Tam(>s V. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 334; 01 S. W. 227. "Its most common a])plication is to spiritu- ous fluids, Avhetlior distilled or fermented; to decoctions, solu- DEt'INlTIONS. S<3 Sec. 3. Mixed liquors. A statute ioibade the sale of "mixed liquors" in less quantity than five gallons; and it was held that this meant a mixture of intoxicating liquors, and an indictment charg- ing a sale of mixed liquors must set forth by name the general appellation of the mixture. It was also held not to include a mixture of water and milk, or water and vine- tions, tincture.'' Houser v. State, 18 Ind. 10'6; State v. Giersch, 98 N. C. 720; 4 S. E. 193. In Arkansas it has been held that the term "liquor" does not include alcohol. State v. Martin, 34 Ark. 340; but under the Re- vised Code of North Carolina, Chap. 70, § 4, forbidding a credit of more than $10 for liquor sold, it has been lie Id to include cham- pagne. Kizer v. Randleman, 50 N. C. 428; and in New York it is said, "The word 'liquors,' as commonly used, includes all that are spirituous, vinous or fermented, including malt." People v. Crilley, 20 Barb. 248. So in Louisiana, it is held that liquors include all fer- mented liquors. Mandeville v. Bau- dot, 40 La. Ann. 236; 21 So. 258. An indictment charging a sale of liquor does not charge any of- fense under a statute prohibiting the sale of spirituous, vinous, fer- mented or malt liquors. State v. Quinlan, 40 Minn. 56; 41 N. W. 299; and proof of a sale in a saloon of liquor to deceased, where it was also shown that the defend- ant had at least on one occasion sold him seltzer, was held not to authorize the court to charoe the jury that "the sale of intoxicating liquors may be proven by circum- stantial evidence; and where it is shown that the person was sold or furnished liquor at a license' saloon, the presumption is that such liquor was intoxicating." Dolan V. McLaughlin, 43 Neb. 449; 64 N. W. 1076. Where liquor was defined by statute as meaning distilled or rectified spirits, wine, fermented or malt liquors, it was held that evidence showing the defendant sold beer was not sufficient to show a sale of liquor, as it would not be presumed that beer means fermented or malt liquor. In re Hunter, 34 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 389; eO N. Y. Supp. 908. Under the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883 (-22 U. S. Stat, at L. '505, schedule H), prohibiting any al- lowance for leakage in respect to wines, liquors, cordials, or dis- tilled spirits, it is held that beer was not embraced within any of the terms used, quoting the defini- tion given in the Century Dic- tionary. Hollender v. Magone, 149 U. S. 58'6; 37 L. Ed. 860; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 932; reversing 38 Fed. Rep. 912. In Mississippi the term "alco- holic or vinous liquors," used in a statute prohibiting the sale of such liquor, is held to include wine made from grapes and from blackberries, even though there be evidence it is not intoxicating. Reyfelt v. State, 73 Miss. 415; 18 So. 925; State v. York, 74 N. H. 125: P5 Atl. 685. § 4 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 6 gai", or tea and coffee, and that the term must be limited to a mixture of intoxicants.'^ A statute forbade the sale of wine, brandy, whisky, rum, or any spirituous liquors in a less quantity than a quart, or any punch or mixed liquor in any quantity. It was held that the term "mixed liquor" as it followed the word "punch," meant any mixture of spirituous liquor or other liquors prohibited, where Ihe basis or the substance of the liquor sold is spir- ituous and not mixed by the vendor, to come within the pre- vious prohibition of sellina: spirituous liquor.'^ A complaint charging a sale of "mixed liquor, a part, of Avhich was intoxicating," does not charge a sale of any well-knowri kind of intoxicating liquor, but is sufficient, not being in- consistent with the general words "intoxi-^ating liquor," and proof of a sale of any of the well-known forms of dis- tilled spirits which are used as a beverage, and which eon- tain alcohol mixed with water and other substances, as whisky, would be sufficient.^ Sec. 4. "Intoxicating," statute defining — Evidence — Stat- ute constitutional. A .statute which provides that the word "intoxicating" shall include any liquor or mixture of liquors which shall contain more than a certain per cent, by weight of alcohol, which prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquors, and which prescribes a form of complauit or indictment that is to be sufficient if substantially followed, is constitutional and a valid exercise of the police powers of the Sta'^e.*' Thus a statute which provides that the words "intoxicating liquors," as used therein, "shall be construed to mean al- cohol, wine, beer, spirituous, vinous and malt liquors, and all intoxicating liquors whatever" has been sustained re- gardless of the fact as to whether or not the quantity estate V. Towiiley, ", Har. {N. nutate v. Guinness, 16 R. I. J.) 311. 401; It) Atl. 910; State v. Grave- 7 State V. Bonnott, liar. (Del.) lin, 16 R. I. 407; 16 Atl. 914 565. Jackson v. State, 10 Ind. 312 8 Commonwoaltli v. :Mor<,'an, 149 James v. State, 21 Tex. App. 353 Mass. 314; 21 N. E. 309. 17 S. W. 422. 7 DEFINITIONS. § 4 drank at any time would have the effect of causing intox- ication, the court saying, "It is immaterial, in a statutory sense, what effect alcohol may have on the human system ; it is an intoxicating liquor. However much it may be di- luted, it must remain an intoxicant Avhen and however it is used as a beverage, and no ma'ter how it may bo diluted or disguised, it so remains, simply because the statute so declares."^" Such a statute is not the subject of construc- tion by the courts, the meaning of the term "intoxicating liquors" being declared by the act itself, and for this rea- son evidence to show the meaning of the term is inadmis- sible. Nor does such a statute violate a cons^itutional provision that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation."' ^^ It has been contended that a Leg- islature has no power to declare that to be intoxicating which in fact is not.^" In Massachusetts, however, it has been held that liquors not actuall}^ intoxicating, but which a statute declares "shall be considered intoxicating within the meaning of the act," may be described as "intoxi- cating" in an indictment under a statute for keeping in- toxicating liquors with intent to sell them in the Common- Avealth, without a more particular description of the liquors kept, the court holding that such an enactment "is within the discretion of the Legislature to pass.^^ And in Rhode Island it has been held that a complaint under such a statute which charged that the defendant unlawfully did "keep and suffer to be kept on his premises, in his posses- sion and under his 'charge, ale, wine, rum, and other strong 10 State V. Intoxicating Liquors, n State v. Wittmar, 12 Mo. 407; 76 la. 243; 41 N. W. fi; 2 L. R. State v. Lemp, 16 Mo. 380; State A. 418; Francis v. State (Tex.), v. Houts, 36 Mo. App. 265. 110 S. W. 97; Mason v. State instate v. McKenna, 16 R. I. (Tex.), U<9 S. W. 852. 398; 17 All. 51. A statute making it an offense is Commonwealth v. Timotliy, to sell without license malt liquors, 74 Mass. (8 Gray), 480; Com- does not apply to a non-intoxi- monwealth v. Dean, 14 Gray, 99; eating malt liquor. Jlanlwic-k v. Stato v. York, 74 X. TT. 125; 65 State, 55 Tex. Cr. App. 140; Atl. 680. 114 S. W. 832. § 5 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 8 and malt and intoxicating liquors and mixed liquors, a part of which was ale, Avine, rum and other strong and intoxicating liquors, Avith intent to sell the same in this State, against the statute," should not be quashed for un- certainty because of not stating whether it covered liquors intoxicating in fact or defined as intoxicating liquors by the statute; and under such a statutory provision and indictment, evidence of an expert is admissible on the part of the prosecution and defense to show the amount of alcohol contained in the liquor in controversy.^* The in- toxicating properties of such a liquor may also be proved by witnesses testifying to their observation of its appear- ance, taste and odor, the kind of vessels in which it was contained, the labels or marks on such vessels, the presence of men engaged in drinking, the presence of the parapher- nalia of the room in which it was sold, and other like pertinent facts.^^ Sec. 5. Intoxicating liquor used as a beverage. "Any liquor intended for use as a beverage, or capable of being so used, which contains alcohol, either obtained by fermentation or by the additional process of distillation, in such proportion that it will produce intoxication, when taken in such quantities as may be practically drank, is an intoxicant."-*' The phrase "intoxicating liquors" is a Instate V. :\IeKenna, 10 R. 1. Chappel, 116 Mass. 7; Wiles v. 3'98; 17 Atl. 51. State, 33 Ind. 200; Commonwealth 15 State V. Liquor, 38 Vt. 387. v. Bios, 116 Mass. 50; State v. For statutory definitions of "in- Hovits, 3i8 Mo. App. 205; State v. toxicating liquors," see iCommon- Rush, 13 R. I. 198; Common- wealth V. Shea, 14 Gray, 386; wealth v. Anthes, 12 Gray, 29; Worley v. Spurgeon, 38 Iowa, 467 ; Jones v. Surprise, '64 X. H. 243 ; State V. Stapp, 29 Iowa, 5i51; 9 Atl. 384; State v. Packer, 80 State V. Bindle, 28 Iowa, 512; N. C. 439. Tredway v. Riley, 32 Neb. 495; kj Decker v. State, 39 Tex. Civ. 49 N. W. 2&8; 29 Am. St. 447; App. 20; 44 S. W. 845; Pike v. Bell V. State, 91 Ga. 227; 18 S. State, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 613; 51 E. 288; State v. Volmer, 6 Kan. S. W. 3-95; Malone v. State 371; Commonwealth v. Snow, 133 (Tex.), 51 S. W. 381. (In Pike Mass. 675; Commonwealth v. v. State, supra, it was held that DEFINITIONS. §5 broad term, embracing all liquors used as a beverage, which, when so used, may or will produce intoxication.^' The term "intoxicating liquors" covers alcoJwl}^ But the courts cannot say that a certain percentage of alcohol in a beverage renders the beverage intoxicating; nor that a particular ingredient in a compound does or does not de- stroy the intoxicating influence of the alcohol, or prevent it becoming an intoxicating beverage. "Of course, the larger per cent, of alcohol, and the more potent the other in- gredients, the more probable does it fall within or without the prohibition of the statute, but in each case the question is a question of fact, and to be settled as other questions of fact.' " ^^ But under a statute defining intoxicating liquors an instruction to tlie jury was correct whicli defined intoxicating liquors as folio s: "By intoxi- cating liquors, as used herein, is meant any spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors, or medicated bitters, or medicated liquors, capable of producing intoxication wiien used in sufficient quantity." ) Frickie V. State, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 62'6; 51 S. W. 394; Sebastian v. State, 44- Tex. Civ. App. 508; 72 S. VV. 849; Taylor v. State (Tex.), 49 S. W. 845. 17 People V. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330; People v. Sweetser, 1 Dak. 308; 46 N. W. 452; State v. Oliver, 26 W. Va. 422; 53 Am. Rep. 79; In re Intoxicating Liquors, 25 Kan. 761; 37 Am. Rep. 2'84. IS Emerson v. State, 43 Ark. 372; Rucker v. State (Tex.), 24 S. W. 902; In re Intoxicating Liquors, 25 Kan. 78 1 ; 37 Am. Rep. 284; Shaw v. Carpenter, 54 Vt. 155; 41 Am. Rep. 837; Kelley Drug Co. v. Truett (Tex.), 75 S. W. 536. It has been held that wliere an indictment charges a sale of al- cohol it does not charge a sale of "intoxicating liquor." State v. Witt, 39 Ark. 216. The court says it does not judicially know alcohol is intoxicating, but this case, out- side of its own state, cannot be regarded as an authority. "iliat alcohol is an intoxicant is as well known and established as any other physical fact. There is not one man in 10,000 or 100,000 who, if asked whether alcohol is into.xicating, would not reply immediately in the affirma- tive. It is not a purely scientific fact ; it is a fact that every per- son of the commonest understand- ing knows. Indeed, it is a matter of common knowledge that alcohol is the intoxicating element of various forms of beverages known as spirituous or intoxicating liquors. In a prosecution for the sale of intoxicating liquors, wliere the proof was of the sale of pure alcohol, it was not necessary to prove that the alcohol was intoxi- cating." Snider v. State, 81 Ga. 753; 7 S. E. 031; 17 Am. St. 350. isTopeka v. Zufall, 40 Kan. 47; 19 Pac. 359; 1 L. R. A. 387. See §5 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 10 to mean "alcohol, wine, beer, spirituous, vinous and malt liquors, and all intoxicating liquors whatever," a beverage containing any alcohol is an intoxicant, regardless of the fact that the amount drank at any one time will not have that effect.-" Ale and porter are regarded in law as intox- icating liquors,^^ although they may be in a changed condi- tion ; -- and this is particularly true where the statute so 'defines or classes them.-'' Bay rum cannot be classed as an intoxicating liquor, even though it contains enough liquor to intoxicate, for it is not commonly used as a beveragy.^* Proof of a sale of heer in the usual places where beer is sold, or even when not sold in such places, raises a pre- sumption that it is intoxicating;-^ and it is sufficient to Commonwealth v. Morgan, 149 Mass. 314; 21 N. E. 369; State V. May, 52 Kan. 53; 34 Pac. 407; State V. Biddle, 54 N. H. 37G. 20 State V. Intoxicating Liquors, 76 Iowa, 243; 41 N. W. 6; 2 L. R. A. 408; Commonwealth v. Snow, 133 Mass. 575; State v. Guinness, 16 R. I. 401; 16 Atl. 910; State v. McKenna, 16 R. I. 398; 17 Atl. 51; James v. State, 4'9 Tex. Civ. App. 334; 91 S. W. 227; Roberts v. State, 4 Ga. App. 207; '60 S. E. 1082; Smith v. State (Tex.), 120 S. W. 801; Commonwealth v. Burns, 38 Pa. Super. Ct. 514. 21 State V. Barron, 37 Vt. 60 ; Kevins v. Ladue, 1 N. Y. Code Rep. 43; 3 Denio, 43, 437; Haines V. Hanrahan, 105 Mass. 480. 22 Shaw v. Carpenter, 54 Vt. 155; 41 Am. Rep. S37. 23 Commonwealth v. Chappel, 116 Mass. 7; Commonwealth v. Dean, 14 Gray, 99; State v. York, 74 N. H. 125; 65 Atl. 685; Wiles v. State, 33 Ind. 208; State v. Gravelin, IB R. I, 407; 16 Atl. 014; State v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 55. But under the Ohio Act of May 1, 1854, §4, making it an offense to keep a public resort where "in- toxicating liquors" are sold, the sale of ale is not included. John- son V. State, 23 Ohio St. 556. And in Xew Hampshire, where the indictment charged a sale of "intoxicating liquors," on proof of a sale of ale and cider it was held that the court could rule that they, after fermentation was com- pleted, were intoxicating liquors, without proof of the amount of alcohol wliich they contained ; whether or not they were intoxi- cating was a question of fact for the jury. State v. Biddle, 54 N. H. 37«. 24 In re Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284. 23 State V. Stout, 96 Ind. 407; Myers v. Stat.e, 93 Ind. 251; Douglass V. State, 21 Ind. App. 302; 52 N. E. 238; State v. Jenkins, 32 Kan. 477; 4 Pac. 809; State v. Spiers, 103 Iowa, 711; 73 Pac. 343; Mullen v. State, 96 Ind. 304. See Commonwealth v. Hey- wood, 105 Mass. 187. Contra, 11 DEFINITIONS. §5 allege in the indictment a sale of beer without alleging it is intoxicating ;-« and this is especially true where a stat- ute so shows it.-^ Brandy is an intoxicating liquor; ^s and a sale of brandy Readies and cherries is a sale of intoxicating liquors ;-« but it is not if the liquor is very weak and in- capable of producing intoxication unless drank in large quantities.'" Cider is not an intoxicating liquor unless the evidence shows the particular liquor in question was in- toxicating,^^ and that is a question of fact for the jury.^^ Cologne is not classed as an intoxicating liquor,^^ nor are drugs."^ Essence of cinnamon may be shown to be intox- icating,^^ but extract of lemon is not so classed.^" Gin is universally recognized as an intoxicant," but Jiop ah is not Kurz V. State, 79 Ind. 4'88; Plunket V. State, G9 Ind. 68; State V. Sioux Falls, etc., Co., 5 S. D. 3>9; 58 N. W. 1; 2G L. R. A. 138; Klare v. State, 43 Ind. 483; Commonwealth v. Bless, 116 Mass. 50; Johnston v. State, 23 Ohio St., 55'G; Commonwealtli v. Hardman, 9 Gray, 133. In Ken- tucky a beer having less than two per cent, of alcohol is not intoxi- cating. Bowling Green v. ;Nrc'Mul- leu (Ky.), 122 S. W. 823. 26 Welsh V. State, 12i() Ind. 71; 25 N. E. 883 ; 9 L. R. A. 6(34. 27 State V. Houts, 3'6 Mo. App. 2i65; State v. Lcmp, 10 Mo. 389; State V. Cloughly, 73 Iowa, 626; 3!5 N. W. 652. 28 State V. Lewis, 86 Minn. 174; 90 N. W. 318; Malett v. Steven- son, 26 Conn. 428; Snider v. State, 81 Ga. 753; 7 S. E. 631; 12 Am. St. 350; State v. Wads- worth, 30 Conn. 55. 29 Ryall v. State. 78 Ala. 410. See Holland v. Commonwealth, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 223. soRabe v. State, 39 Ark. 204 (six peaches to a gallon of liquor tasting like alcohol). In Ken- tucky it is held that a sale of brandy peaches is not a sale of intoxicating liquors within the statute. Holland v. Common- wealth, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 223. 31 Commonwealth v. Chappel, 116 Mass. 7; Hewitt v. People, 186 HI. 336; 57 N, E. 1077;' Johnston v. State, 23 Ohio St. 550; State v. Biddle, 54 N. H. 379. 32 State v. Page, m Me. 418, Of course, a statute may de- clare cider to be an intoxicating liquor. Commonwealth v. Dean, 14 Gray, 99; Commonwealth v. Smith, 102 Mass. 144. 33 /u re Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 2iS4. 3* Anderson v. Commonwealth, Bush, 569. 35 State v. Muncey, 28 W. Va. 494. 3G Holcomb V. People, 49 111. App. 73; In re Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284. 37 Commonwealth v. Peckham, 2 Gray, 514; Snider v. State, SI §5 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 12 unless so shown bj' eviderice.^^ Lager heer is so classed without proof of its intoxicating quality ; ^^ especially if a statute so classifies it/*^ Paregoric is not classed as an intoxicating liquor, but it may be shown that it is intox- icating/^ and so may be pop.*'- Bum has always been classed as an intoxicating liquor.*^ Spirituous liquors is not synonymous with intoxicating liquors ; ''^ and under an indict- ment charging a sale of spirituous liquor it cannot be shown the sale was of ale or beer and that ale or beer is intoxicat- ing ; *^ but under a charge of a sale of intoxicating liquor a sale of spirituous liquors may be shown ; for spirituous liquors are intoxicating/*^ Whisky is an intoxicating liquor, which "is as well known as that fire will burn or water will drown. "^'^ Wine is judicially known as an intoxicating liquor.*^ Where a statute declares that *'by the words Ga. 753; 7 S. E. ^31; 12 Am. St. 350; Dr. €. Bouvier Specialty Co. V. James (Ky.), 118 S. W. 381. 38 Barnes v. State (Tex.), 44 S. W. 491. 39 State V. Church, G S. D. 89 ; 60 X. W. 143: Rail v. People, 63 JSr. Y. 277; State v. Gravelin, 16 R. I. 407; 16 Atl. 914. Contra, People V. Schewe, 29 Hun, 122; People V. Zeiger, 6 Parker Civ. Rep. 355. 40 State V. Rush, 13 R. I. 198; People V. O'Riely (N. Y.), 8« N. E. 1128; affirming 129 N. Y. App. Div. 522; 114 N. Y. Supp. 258; Commonwealth v. Chappel, 116 Mass. 7; Commonwealtli v. An- thes, 12 Gray, 29. 41 In re Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284. 42 Godfroidson v. People, S>8 111. 284. 43 Snider v. State. 81 Ga. 753; 7 S. E. 631; 12 Am. St. 350. 44 Clifford V. State. 29 Wis. 327 ; Commonwealth v. Livermore, 4 Gray, 18; Allred v. State, -89 Ala. 112; 8 So. 5G; Weisbrodt v. State, 50 Ohio St. 192; 33 X. E. 003. 45 State V. Adams, 51 X. H. 568; Commonwealth v. Herrick, G Cush. 465. 46 State V. Pritchard, 16 S. D. 166; 91 X. W. &83; Clifford V. State, 29 Wis. 327 ; State v. York, 74 X. H. 125; 65 Atl. CSS. The term "intoxicating liquors" and "spirituous liquors" when in- serted in a license law have been held synonymous. State v. Jef- ferson County, 20 Fla. 425. 47Eagan v. State, 53 Ind. 162; In re Intoxicating Liquors, 25 Kan. 761; 37 Am. Rep. 284; Car- mon V. State, 18 Ind. 450; Edgar V. State, 37 Ark. 219: State v. Lewis. ?G l\'inn. 374: 90 X. W. 318: Schlicht v. State, 56 Ind. 173; Snider v. State. 81 Ga. 753; 7. S. E. 631: 12 Am. Pt. 350. 48 Wolf V. State 59 Ark. 297; 27 S. W. 77: 43 Am. St. 34; Jackson v. State, 19 Ind. 312. 13 DEFINITIONS. ^6 'spirit,' 'spirituous or intoxicating liquors,- shall be in- tended all spiritnous or intoxicating liqnor and all mixed liquor, any part of which is spirituous or intoxicating, unless otherwise expressly declared," another statute noting it an offense to keep or sell spirituous liquors covers the keeping or sale of intoxicating ivines:^^ But a liquor which does not contain alcohol is not an intoxicating liquor with- in the meaning of the liquor statutes; and it is therefore error to charge the jury that any liquor producing intoxi- cation is intoxicating liquor within the meaning of the statutes. ^° Sec. 6. Intoxicating liquor — Amount necessary to pro- duce intoxication. It is immaterial how much liquor is necessary to produce intoxication to render it an "intoxicating liquor," if it is 49 Jones V. Surprise, '64 N. H. 243; 9 Atl. 3S4; State v. Fred- erickson, 101 Me. 37; 63 Atl. 535. ■Statutes frequently expressly include wine under the head of in- toxicating liquors. Commonwealth V. Dean, 14 Gray, 99; Common- wealth V. Chappel, 116 Mass. 7; State V. Packer, SO N. C. 439 (port wine) ; State v. Houts, 3(i Mo. App. 265. The Ohio Act of May 1, 1854, § 4, making it an offense to keep a place where intoxicating liquors are sold,- does not cover a wine made of the pure juice of the grape cultivated in the state. Johnston v. State, 23 Ohio St. 553. 50 Thompson v. State, (Tex. Cr. App.), 97 S. W. 316. Diluted lager beer having 2.05 per cent, of alcohl has been held to be an intoxicating liquor. Queen v. McLean, 3 Can. Cr. Cas. 323. And so "blue ribbon beer." Regina v. Walton, 34 C. L. J. 746. If a liquid is intoxicating its name is immaterial. James v. State, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 334; 91 S. W. 227. Proof that a particular liquor resembles intoxicating liquor is not proof that it is intoxicating liquor. Regina v. Bennett, 1 Ont. 405. But it may be on a charge of a sale of intoxicating liquor when sold at the bar of a saloon in the quantity usually purchased for ten cents per dram. Dant v. State, 83 Ind. 60. In North Dakota intoxicating liquor is defined as "any kind of beverage whatsoever, which, re- taining the alcoholic principle or other intoxicating qualities as a distinctive force, may be used as a beverage and become a substi- tute for the ordinary intoxicating drinks." Tliis is held to include a drug having an alcoholic base that can be used for intoxication. State V. Fargo Bottling Works Co. (N. D.), 124 N. W. 387. § 7 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUOKS. 14 possible to drink enough to intoxicate a person of ordinary habits.^^ But the mere presence of alcohol in tlie article sold is not sufficient to make it an intoxicating liquor nor to bring it within the terms of a statute prohibiting ihe sale of intoxicating liquor;^- and probably the true rule is, aside from statutory definitions, that it must produce in- toxication when drank in reasonable quantities, such as the human stomach can hold. The name under which it is sold is immaterial.^^ Sec. 7. Intoxicating and spirituous liquors distinguished. The word "intoxicating"' includes a larger class of cases than "spirituous." They bear the relation to each other of genus and species ; all spirituous liquors are intoxi- 'cating, but all intoxicating liquors are not spirituous.^* The words are uot synonymous. In common parlance spir- ituous liquor means dis'illed liquor, and such is its mean- ing when used in a penal statute. Fermented liquor, though intoxicating, is not spirituous. Accordingly it has been held that an indictment for unlawfully selling "spirituous and intoxica'ing liquors" is not supported by proof of sales of liquors wh'ch are intoxicating, but not spirituous, the court saying that, "A defendant indicted for stealing a black and white horse might as well be convicted, on proof that he stole either a black horse or a white one, by hold- ing that he was properly charged with stealing a black horse and also a white one."^' 51 Wadsworth v. Dunnan, 98 v. State, 5 Ga. App. 716; 63 S. Ala. 610; 13 So. 597. See Com- E. 602 (burden), niissioners v. Taylor, 21 N. Y. Diluted lager beer having 2.05 173; Prussia v. Guenther, 6 Abb. per cent, of alcohol, has been held (N. S.) 230 ("sun smile") ; State to be an intoxicating liquor. V. Kennard, 74 N. H. 76; 65 Atl. Queen v. McLean, 3 Can. Cr. Cas. 376. 3'23. See Regina v. Walton, 34 62 Roberts v. State, 4 Ga. App. C. L. J. 746 ("blue ribbon beer") ; 207; 60 S. E. 103 James v. State, 49 Tex. Civ. Super. Ct. 514. App. 34M; 91 S. W. 227. i'>4 Commonwealth v. Herrick, 60 It is error not to so charge the Mass. (6 Cush.) 465. jury, Ross v. State, 52 Tex. Civ. sn Commonwealth v. Grey, 68 App. 604; 108 S. W, 375; Stoner Mass. (2 Gray) 501; Common- 15 DEFINITIONS. §§ 8, 9 Sec. 8. Intoxicating and non-intoxicating — How distin- guished. In determining whether liquors containing- alcohol are intoxicating or non-intoxicating, there is but one safe line of distinction to follow, and that is that those which con- tain so small a percentage of alcohol that the human stom- ach cannot contain a sufficient quantity of the liquor to produce intoxication, as is sa'd to be the case with re- spect to spruce beer, ginger beer and some others, must be regarded as non-intoxicating, and those, whether ob- tained by distillation or fermentation, of which enough can be taken to produce inebriation, must be considered as intoxicating.^'' Sec. 9. Alcohol an intoxicant — Judicial notice. Alcohol is the intoxicating principle, the basis of all in- toxicating drinks. Whatever 'contains alcohol will, if a sufficient nuantity be taken, produce intoxication.^' That it is an intoxicant is as well known and established as any other physical fact. There is not one man in ten thousand who, if asked whether alcohol is intoxicating, would not reply immediately in the affirmative. It is not a purely scientific fact ; it is a fact that every person of common wealth V. Livermore, 70 Mass. ( 4 Commonwealth v. Herrick, 6 Cush. Gray) 501; Allred v. State, 89 465. Ala. 112; 8 So. 56. In Washington a sale of liquor Under an indictment for a sale to a minor which is intoxicating of intoxicating liquor, a sale of is an offense, though not spiritu- spirituous liquors may be shown, ous. State v. McC'ormick (Wash.), for spirituous liquors are intoxi- 105 Pac. 1037. eating. Clifford v. State, 29 Wis. no Board v. Taylor, 21 N. Y. (7 327; State v. York, 74 N. H. 125; Smith) 173; People v. Zeiger, • 65 Atl. 685; State v. Pritchard, Parker's Crim. Cas. (N. Y.) 355; 16 S. Dak. 16^6; 91 N. W. 583. Bertrand v. State, 73 Miss. 51; But under a charge of a sale of 18 So. 545; United States v. spirituous liquors it cannot be Stubblefield, 40 Fed. 454; Russell shown that the liquor sold was v. Sloan, 33 Vt. 656. • ale and that aJe was intoxicating. ^^ in re Intoxicating Liquor State V. Adams, 51 N. H. 56(8; Cases, 25 Kaa. 767; 37 Am. Rep. 284. § 10 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 16 understanding knows. Indeed, it is a matter of common knowledge that alcohol is the intoxicating element of the various forms of beverages known as spirituous and intox- i'Cating liquors. It is known by the people generally as well as they know that the sun produces heat, that sum- mer is succeeded by winter, that flowers bloom in the spring, that the earth revolves, or that the blood circulates in the human system.^^ Yet notwithstanding this, it has been held that because alcohol is extensively used in the arts, employed in medicine as a solvent, in the preparation of tinctures and by painters in making varnish, a court cannot take judicial notice that it is an intoxicating bev- erage like whisky, nor that it is in common use for purposes of dissipation, nor even that it is capable of being applied to such an use.^^ Sec. 10. Alcohol — Continued. In the Century Dictionary the definition and description of ''alcohol" is given, after giving the derivation of the word: "A liquod, ethyl hydrate, C H OH, formed by the fermentation of aqueous sugar solutions, or by the de- structive distillation of organic bodies, as wood. Absolute or pure alcohol is a colorless, mobile liquid, of a pleasant spirituous smell and burning taste, of specific gravity .793 at 60 degrees Fahrenheit, and boiling at 173 degrees Fahrenheit." "Different grades of alcohol are sometimes designated in trade, according to the source from which they are derived, as grain alcohol, prepared from maize or other grain; root alcohol, from potatoes and beets; moss ■alcohol, which is made in larger quantity from reindeer moss and Iceland moss in Norway, Sweden and Russia." "Proof spirit contains 49.3 per cent, by weight of pure alcohol, or 57.1 per cent, by volume. Under-proof and over-proof are designations of weaker and stronger solu- •"'8 Snider v. State, 81 Ga. 753; so state v. Witt, 39 Ark. 21i6; 70 S. E. 631; State v. Martin, 34 Winn v. State, 43 Ark. 151. See, '^rk. 340. also, Bennett v. People, 30 111. 389. 17 DEFINITIONS. §10 tions. Distilled liquors or ardent spirits, whisky, brandy, gin, etc., contain 40 to 50 per cent, of absolute alcohol, wines from 7 or 8 to 20, ale and porter from 5 to 7 and beer from 2 to 10. "**" In common parlance, alcohol is not considered either ardent or vinous spirits, or liquor of any kind."^ It is the essmitial element in all spirituous liquors, and is a limpid, colorless liquid. To the taste it is hot and pungent, and it has a slight and not disagreeable scent. Alcohol that can be drunk has but one source — fermentation of sugar and saccharine matter. It comes through fermentation of substances that contain sugar proper, or that contain starch, w^hich may be turned into sugar. All substances that contain either sugar or starch, or both, will produce fermentation. It is a mistake to sup- pose, as many persons do, that it is really produced by distillation. It is produced only by fermentation, and the process of distillation simply serves to separate the spirit, the alcohol, from the mixture, whatever it may be, in which it exists. ^- 60 This same authority defines methyl ic or methyl alcohol, or wood alcohol, to be "alcohol ob- tained by the destruction of wood. When pure it is a colorless mobile liquid (C. H.g 0. H.) with an odor and taste like ordinary alco- hol (ethyl hydrate C, H.g O. H.), though the commercial article has a strong pyroligneous smell. It is inflammable." Century Dic- tionary, alcohol. The Vermont statute, c. 187, prohibiting the sale of intoxicat- ing liquor, is no defense to an ac- tion for the purchase price of methyl or wood alcohol; because such alcohol is a poison, which is not intended and cannot be used as a beverage. Fabor v. Green, 72 Vt. 117; 47 Atl. 391; Roberts V. State, 4 Ga. App. 207; '60 S. E. 1082. 61 State V. Martin, 34 Ark. 340; Bennett v. People, 30 111. 389. 62 State V. Giersch, 98 N. C. 720; 4 S. E. 193. A statute forbidding the sale of intoxicating liquor to a minor without the written consent of his parents, is violated by a sale of alcohol to him without such con- sent. Rucker v. State (Tex.), 24 S. W. 902; Shaw v. Car- penter, 54 Vt. 155; 41 Am. Rep. 837; Emerson v. State, 43 Ark. 372; Greiner-Kelly Drug Co. v. Truett, 97 Tex. 377; 79 S. W. 4. But it has also been held that an indictment charging merely a sale of "alcohol," does not charge a sale of intoxicating liquors, be- cause "the court does not know judicially that it is an into.xi- cating beverage like whisky, nor that it is in common use for pur- §11 TilAFPIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 18 Sec. 11. Fermented liquor — Cider. Fermented liquor is a liquor produced by fermentation and not by distillation; and a statute reg^ulating the sale poses of dissipation, nor even that gar Co. v. Gazette Printing Co., it is capable of being applied to 35 Fed. 570; United States v. such use. A bare charge of sell- ing 'alcohol' discloses no criminal olfense." State v. Witt, 39 Ark. 216. On the contrary, it is held that courts will take judicial notice that alcohol is intoxicating. Snider v. State, 81 Ga. 753; 7 S. E. 031; 12 Am. St. Rep. 350. "Pure alcohol is not in common parlance, a spirituous liquor, al- though it is a basis of all spiritu- ous liquors. But we are not prepared to say that 'selling pure alcohol' is not selling spirituous Lohn, 52 S. W. 38; 2 Ind. Ty. 474. "It is a mistake to suppose that it [alcohol] is really pro- duced by distillation. It is pro- duced by fermentation, and the process of distillation simply serves to separate the spirit from the mixture in which it exists." State V. Giersch, 9S X. C. 7-20; 4 S. E. 193. * As used in the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, par. 8, § 1, the term "alcoholic compound" in- liquors." Bennett v. People, 30 eludes a preparation of cherry 111. 389. See, also, State v. Hay- wood, 20 W. Va. 18; 43 Am. Rep. 787; and Lemly v. State, 70 Miss. 241; 12 So. 22; 20 L. R. A. 645. "Alcohol is the intoxicating principle — the basis — of all intoxi- cating drinks. Whatever contains alcohol will, if a sufficient quan- tity be taken, produce intoxica- tion." Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Ivan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284. "But it is a matter of common knowledge that alcohol is the in- toxicating element in intoxicating liquor, that pure alcohol is not used as a beverage, and that all intoxicating liquors that are so used contain alcohol mixed with other things, particularly ■with water. Whisky is alcohol mixed with water and other ele- ments, of which the alcxihol alone is intoxicatinc." 'Commonwealth V. Morgan, 149 Mass. 314; 21 N. E. 369. See, also, Eureka Vine- juice with the watery parts elim- inated and seventeen per cent, of alcohol added, tlie preparation be- ing thicker, darker, heavier and stronger than the natural juice. Smith v. Rheimstrom, 65 Fed. 989; 13 C. C. A. 261. So it in- cludes a compound composed prin- cipally of raisins and prunes crushed in water and fermented, to which, after fermentation, a mixture of alcohol is added to preserve the compound. Mackie V. Erhardt, 59 Fed. 771. The immersion of aconite and bella- donna leaves and fresh nuts of bryonia in their natural condition in alcohol for preservation, does not make the mixture an "alco- holic compound" within 30 U. S. Stat. 151. Boericke & Runyan Co. V. United States, 126 Fed. 1018. It cannot be said as a matter of law that a liquor containing only three per cent, or more of 19 DEFINITIONS. § 12 of spirituous liquors has no reference to sale of fermented liquors,^^ but one regulating the sale of fermented liquors does include the sale of malt liquors.*** And regulating the sale of malt, spirituous, brewed, fermented and vinous liquors covers a sale of fermented or hard cider.*'^ Fer- mented beer includes spruce beer, ginger beer and molasses beer,^« and the ordinarv beer of commerce." Sec. 12. Compound liquors — Mixtures. In Kansas a statute defined intoxicating liquors to be "all liquors mentioned in Section 1 of this act [e. g., spir- ituous, malt, vinous, fermented and other intoxicating liquors] and all other liquors or mixtures thereof, by what- ever name called, that will produce intoxication." Under this statute, speaking of compounds, the Supreme Court of that State said: "If the compound or preparation be such that the distinctive character and effect of intoxi- cating liquor is gone, that to use it as an intoxicating bev- erage is practically impossible by reason of the other in- gredients, it is not within the statute. The mere presence of alcohol does not necessarily bring the article within the prohibition. The influence of alcohol may be counteracted alcohol is intoxicating. State v. nell v. State (Wis.), 123 N. W. Picke, 98 Me. 34S ; 56 Atl. 1052. 115. It is not error to refuse to A statute allowing a sale ot charge the jury that a liquor is "pure alcohol" in dry territory, not intoxicating, which, if drank does not allow a sale of "whisky." in "reasonable quantities" will Vardeman v. .State, 108 Ga. 774; not intoxicate, because what is a 33 S. E. 643. reasonable quantity is left unde- ca state v. Adams, 51 N. H. SB'S, fined, it not being equivalent to c4 State v. Gill, 89 Minn. 502; such quantity as may be practi- 95 N. W. 449. cally drank. Murry v. State, 46 es People v. Foster, 64 Mich. Tex. Cr. Rep. 128; 79 S. W. 568; 715; 31 X. W. 598; People v. Decker v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. Rep. Adams, 95 Mich. 541 ; 55 N. W. 20; 44 S. W. 845. 461. See Commonwealth v. Smith, The word "liquor," associated 102 Mass. 144 (by statute), with the word "drinks" in a stat- gg State v. Biddle, 54 N. H. 379. ute forbidding the sale of intoxi- 67 state v. Watts, 101 Mo. App. eating liquor, has been held to <&58; 74 S. W. 377. mean an alcoholic beverage. Pen- § 12 TR^VFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 20 by the other elements, and the compound be strictly and fairly only a medicine. *^^ On the other hand the intoxi- cating liquor remains as a distinctive force in the com- pound, and such compound is reasonably liable to be used as an intoxicating beverage, it is within the statute, and this though it contain manj^ other ingredients and ingredients of an independent and beneficial force in counteracting dis- ease or strengthening the system. Intoxicating liquors or mixtures thereof: This, reasonably construed, means liquors which will intoxicate and which are commonly used as beverages for such purposes, and also any mixtures of such liquors as, retaining their intoxicating qualities, it may fairly be presumed, may be used as a beverage and be- come a substitute for the ordinary intoxicating drinks. "Whether any particular compound or preparation of this class is then wi'hin or without the statute is a question of fact, to be established by the testimony and determined by the jury. The courts may not say as a matter of law that the presence of a certain percentage of alcohol brings the compound within the prohibition, or that any particular ingredient does or does not destroy the intoxicating influ- ence of the alcohol or prevent it from ever becoming an intoxicating beverage. Of course, the larger the percent- age of alcohol and the more potent the other ingredients, the more probable does it fall within or wnthout the stat- ute ; but in each case the question is one of fact, and to be settled as other questions of fact.""^ 68 It is a well known fact that not be gviilty of the offense of some men are so far sunk in habit- selling intoxicating liquor to an ual drunkenness — old "topers" fre- habitual drunkard? See vState v. quently called — that they will Kezer, 74 Vt. 50; 52 Atl. 1L6. readily drink cologne and other 69 Jn re Intoxicating Liquor like substances and medicines for Cases, 25 Kan. 751; 37 Am. Eep. the purpose of brinsing on them- 284, citing State v. Laffer, 38 selves a state of intoxication. If Iowa, 426; Russell v. Sloan, 33 the vendor of these articles should Vt. 659; Commonwealth v. Rams- know that the purchaser was ad- dell, 130 Mass. 68; 24 Alb. L. dieted to their use, was an habit- Jr. 414; James v. State, 21 Tex. ual drunkard (and was buying App. 353; 17 S. W. 422; Parrott them for that purpose), would he v. Commonwealth, 6 Ky. L. Rep. .21 DEFINITIONS. § § 13, 14 Sec. 13. Distilled liquor. The term "distilled liquor" is never applied to wine, ale or beer or other fermented or malt liquors. It applies to such liquors as are obtained by distillation, as whisky, brandy, j^in, rum, the cordials. In the revenue laws of the United States it applies to all spirituous liquors whether rectified or not."^ Sec. 14, Spirit or spirits — Judicial notice. The term "spirit" or "spirits" has a general meaning, as applied to fluids, mostly of a lighter character than or- dinary water, obtained, but not produced, by distillation. But as applied particularly to liquors, they signify an in- flammable liquor produced by distillation, the essence, the extract, Ibe purest solution, the highly rectified spirit, the pure alcohol contained in them. The spirits of liquors is really the alcohol in them; it is this 'characteristic, this es- sential element, that makes them spirituous — that gives to all liquors of whatever kind, their intoxicating quality and effect. A court will take judicial notice that such a liquor is intoxicating."^ 221; United States v. Stuhblefield, and liquors (except pure apple 40 Fed. 454; Gastorf v. State, 39 cider) which will produce intoxi- Ark. 450; Wadsworth v. Dusman, cation, shall be deemed ardent 9'8 Ala. (510; 13 So. 597; State v. spirits within the meaning of its Lillard, 78 Mo. 130; State v. provisions. An indictment based Gray, Gl Conn. 39; 22 Atl. 675; upon this statute alleging a sale Howell V. State, 71 Ga. 224; 51 of "intoxicating liquors and mix- Am. Rep. 259; King v. State, 58 tures thereof," was held sufficient. Miss. 737; 3i8 Am. Rep. 344; Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 106 State V. Lat}"er, 38 Iow:i, 422; Va. 840; &6 S. E. 149; Rose v. Carl V. State, 87 Ala. 17; 6 So. Commonwealth, 106 Va. 850; 56 ll-S; 4 L. R. A. 380; State v. S. E. 151. Percj% 72 N. J. L. 37'5; 61 Atl. to United States v. Anthony, 14 148; affirmed 73 N. J. L. 554; 64 Blatchf. 92. Atl. 113. Ti state v. More, 5 Blackf. 118; A statute forbade the s\^. 251; and a'c, Ca^oiga County v. FreeoflT, 17 How. Prac. 442; Nevin v. Ladue, 3 Denio, 43; Tompkins County v. Taylor, Ifl How. Prac. 25^9; Tomp- kins County V. Taylor, 21 N. Y. 173; Schwab v. People, 4 Hun, 520; and a complaint charging a sale of "spirituous liquor, to-wit, beer," is equivalent to an allega- tion that the beer is a "spirituous liquor." State v. Brown, 51 Conn. 1. Alleging a sale of "brandy" brings an indictment within a statute forbidding a sale of spirit- uous liquors. State v. Munger, 15 Vt. 290. The term spirituous liquor does not cover "cider." State v. Oliver, 26 W. Va. 422: 53 Am. Rep. 79; Allred v. State, 89 Ala. 112; 8 So. 56. But it may be mixed with other spirituous liquor. Commonwealth v. Reyburg, 122 Pa. St. 299; 16 Atl. 351; 2 L. R. A. 415. So "spirituous liquor," mixed with water and sugar, is still a spirituous liquor. Commonwealth V. White, 10 Met. 14; Wall v. State, 78 Ala. 417; and likewise peppermint essence containing fifty per cent, of alcohol, which is pur- chased, to the vendor's knowledge, to be used as a beverage. State V. Kezer, 74 Vt. 50; 52 Atl. 116; and so a sale of peaches and cherries preserved in brandy. Ryall v. State, 78 Ala. 410. "'^ordial" is a spirituous liquor. State V. Bennett, 3 Har. (Del.) 5P5. "^his case held, however, that the sale of Godfrey's Pordial was not forbidden by a statute prohibiting a sale of spirituous liquor. "Spirituous liquors" does not 25 DEFINITIONS. §lb yet not spirituous liquors, and this is true of wine. "In ordi- nary acceptance of the term 'spirituous liquors' imports dis- include "fermented liquors." Klare V. State, 43 Ind. 483; State v. Moore, 5 Blackf. US; Caswell v. State, 2 Humph. 202; (Contra under (North Carolina 'Code, §§3110, 311G. State v. Giersch, 88 X. C. 720 ; 4 S. E. 193 ) ; State V. Adams, 51 N. H. o'GS; State v. Thompson, 20 W. Va. 674; Tinker V. State, 90 Ala. 647; 8 So. 855. A license to sell wine, beer, ale, cider, and other fermented liquors will not protect the holder of it in selling "spirituous liquors."' Commonwealth v. Thayer, 5 Met. 246. iSee also Gooch v. Com- monwealth, 8 Ky. L. Rep. (ab- stract) 437. Under a statute forbidding a sale of "spirituous liquors" with- out a license, an indictment charging a sale of "gin"' without a license is sufficient. State v. Munger, 15 Vt. 290. Under an indictment charging a sale of "spirituous liquors," a conviction may be had on proof of a sale of "rum." Common- wealth V. Odlin, 23 Pick. 275; and an indictment charging a sale of rum is good under a statute forbidding a sale of "spirituous liquors." State v. Munger, 15 Vt. 290. A statute requiring a license for sale of wine, brandy, rum, or other spirituous liquors, covers a sale of "whisky." People v. Web- ster, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 92; Frese V. State, 23 Fla. 267 ; 2 So. 1 ; Wall V. State, 78 Ala. 718; State V. Murphy, 23 N. W. 390; 48 Pac. 028: Marks v. State (Ala.), 48 Whether or not "wine" is a spirituous liquor has been held to be a question for the jury. State V. Stewart, 31 Me. 516; State v. Lowry, 74 N. C. 121; but the rule is that "spirituous liquors" do not include wines. State v. Oliver, 26 W. Va. 422; 53 Am. Rep. 79; Caswell v. State, 2 Humph. 402; State v. Moore, 5 Blackf. 118; State v. Xash, 97 N. C. 514; 2 S. E. 645. But in New Hampshire the provision in the General Laws, Chap. 109, § 13, prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquors is construed to include a sale of intoxicating wine. Jones V. Surprise, 64 X. H. 243; 9 Atl. 384. This case is in line with the cases from Maine and Xorth Caro- lina cited just above. A statute forbidding the .sale of "spirituous liquors" covers a sale of "bitters" capable of producing intoxication. Prinzel v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. Rep. 274; 33 S. W. 350; and also medicinal preparations that will produce a like result. Chapman v. State, 100 Ga. 311; 27 S. E. 789; State v. Gray, 61 Conn. 39; 22 Atl. Rep. 675; State v. Bennett, 3 Har. (Del.) 565. It has been holil that tlie term "ardent spirits" does not include alcohol. State v. Martin, 34 Ark. 340; and the Federal stntute (Rev. Stat., §2139), forbidding the introduction of ardent spirits or wines into the Indian country, has been held not to include lasrer beer. Sarlls v. United States, 152 U. S. 570; 38 L. Ed. 5&Q; 14 Sup. Ct. 720, reversing United Stntes §17 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LJQUORS. 26 tilled liquors, and such is the sense in which it is used in the statute. Spirituous liquors may be intoxicating, but the term does not include all intoxicating- liquors, beverages, or other bitters. A given liquor may be in a high degree intoxicating, and yet not be 'spirituous liquor' within the sense of the statute. Fermented or hard cider is an illus- tration. Cane beer is another.""* Sec. 17 Wine as an intoxicating liquor. The word "vinous" is derived from the Latin vmum, wine, and so named because made from the fruit of the vine. V. Ellis, 51 Fed. Rep. 808. See In re McDonougli, 41) Fed. 360. In Sarlls v. United States, 152 U. S. 570; 38 L. Ed. 556; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 720, it is held that the term is applied to liquors obtained by distillation, such as rum, gin, whisky or brandy. A statute for-* bidding the sale, without a license, of wine, gin, rum, brandy, whisky, cider spirits, and other kinds of "ardent spirits," means the kind of spirits named in the statute. Those words were construed to be a general term, the meaning of which was designated by a par- ticular naming of the spirits in- tended to be included in the words used; and in an indictment, therefore, for selling ardent spir- its, the State must prove that the defendant sold one of the samples named in the statute. State v. Townley, 3 Har. (X. J.) 311. The words "spiritiious liquors" imply that the beverage i^ com- posed, in part or wholly, of alcohol extracted by distiUation. It does not apply to a liquor whose al- coholic properties arc latent and exist substantially in the same form as in the orisrinal material from whicli t'^e liquor was made. State V. Adams, 51 N. H. 568. TiAllred v. State, 89 Ala. 112; 8 So. 56. Under a statute forbidding the sale of "spirituous liquors," a charge of a sale of "intoxicating liquors" cannot be made without alleging the liquor sold was "spir- ituous liquor." Commonwealth V. Herrick, 6 Cush. 465; Common- wealth V. Grey, 2 Gray, 501; 61 Am. Dec. 476; Commonwealth v. Livermore, 4 Gray, 18; Clifford V. State, 29 Wis. 327; and proof of a sale of ale will not authorize a conviction under a charge of selling "spirituous liquors." Flem- ing V. New Brunswick, 41 N. J. L. 231; Walker v. Prescott, 44 N. H. 511; and so as to beer. Fritz V. State, 1 Baxt. 15; Sarlls v. United States, 152 U. S. 570; 3i8 L. Ed. 556; 14 Sup. €t. Rep. 720; hi re McDonough, 49 Fed. 360; State v. Quinlan, 40 Minn. 53; 41 N. W. 299; Guadinger v. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 514; F^ing V. Commonwealth, 4 Fy. L. Rep. 623; Klare v. State, 43 Iiid. -IS3; f-tate v. '>l:«^vo. 5 Blackf. 118; iCaswell v. State, 2 Humph. 202; Commonwealth v. ^haycr, 5 Met. 246. 27 DEFINITIONS. §17 Ex vi termini. The phrase means a wine made from the fermented juice of the grape. In the second place, wine may mean a fermented juice of certain frui.s resembling in many respects the wine obtained from i^rapes, but dis- tinguished thereiVora by the source whence ii is derived, as ginger wine, gooseberry wine, currant wine, etc.'^ Wine is included in the term "intoxicating^ liquors" where a stat- ute by that phrase makes it a criminal offense to sell with- out defining what are intoxicating liquors; and the same is true under a statute against selling "spirituous and in- toxicating" liquors. Tn either of such cases it is sufficient on the part of the prosecution to prove that there was an unlawful snle of wine. If. in fact, the liquor sold w^as not intoxica'^ing, that is a matter of defense and must be estab- lished by sufficient evidence.'^*' The courts will not take judicial notice tliat wine is not an intoxicating lirpior.'^'' If a statute provides that spirituous liquors shall i.uelude "intoxicating li({uors" also, "and all mixed liquors, any part of which is * " * intoxicating," then intoxicating wines are included.'^^ "Alder v. State. 55 Ala. 10; Allred v. State, 89 Ala. 112; 8 So. 56; Feldman v. City of Morri- son, 1 111. App. 460; Harris v. Jenns, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 152; 30 L. J. M. C. 18.3; 9 W. R. 36; .3 L. T. (N. S.) 40'8; 22 J. P. 807. See definitions under Pure Food Laws, § 841. 7c Jones V. Surprise, 64 X. H. 243; 9 Atl. 384; Worley v. Spur- geon, 3i8 la. 467 ; Iliggins v. Pdnker, 47 Tex. 393. "7 Jackson v. State, 19 Tnd. 312. Wine is still wine thrmsli some water be added. Read v. Bishop of Lincoln [18921, App. Cas. at p. '656; see Scott v. Gilmore, 3 Taunt. 226; and also Harris v. Jenns, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 1.52; 22 J. P. 807 ; 30 L. J. M. €. 183 ; 9 W. R. .36; 3 L. T. (N. S.) 408, where British wine which contains a large proportion of alcohol is treated as fermented wine. ■?8 Jones V. Surprise, 64 N. H, 243 ; 9 Atl. 384. A statute prohibiting the sale of "vinous liquor" covers a sale of domestic non-intoxicating wine. Hatfield v. Commonwealth, 120 Pa. St. 395; 14 Atl. 151. For a list of names of the several kinds of wines, their classi- fication, the country of their origin and characteristics, see the word "wine" in the Standard Dic- tionary. A list of one hundred and sixty-three narres of wines are given, and yet it is said not to be complete. See, also. Wines of the World, by H. Vizetelly [W. L. & Co., 1875]. §§ 18; 19 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 28 Sec. 18. Wine — Intoxicating quality — When not a question. If it be provided that "spirituous, vinous, malt and brewed liquors" shall not be sold within a certain district, and the statute is violated, upon the (rial ol* the vendor for its violation, he may not, in support* of his plea of not guilty, show by evidence that what he sold was domestic wine, and that it was not intoxicating, it being immaterial in such case whether the liquor sold by the defendant was intoxicating or not, or how much -ileohol it contaiaed.'^^ Sec. 19. Wine as a spirituous or fermented liquor. Notwithstanding what has been elsewhere said, whether wine is a spirituous liquor, does not appear to be well established. As early as 1839 the Supreme Court of Indiana said: "Spirit is the name of an inflammabi'3 liquor pro- duced by distillation. Wine is the fermented juice of the grape or a preparation of other vegetables by fermentation. "We cannot so far confound the signification of these gen- eral terms as to call wine a spirituous liquor."^'' And to the same effect has been the i-uling of the Supreme Court of Tennessee,^^ but in North Carolina the ruling has been otherwise. In that State the court held that under a stat- ute which prohibited the sale of "spirituous liquors" that beer and Avine were included. The court said : "We know from common observation and knowledge, and it is a generally admitted fact that beer and wine contain alcohol, and gen- erally i]i such quantity and degree as to produce intoxica- tion. These liquors are, therefore, spirituous, and obvi- ously come within the meaning and are embraced by the words 'spirituous liquors' as used in the statute, for the reason that the word 'spirituous' means containing, par- taking of spirit, having the refined, strong, ardent quality of alcohol in a greater or less degree."*- In Maine it has 79 Hatfield v. Commonwealth, si Caswell v. State, 21 Tenn. 120 Pa. St. .39.5; 14 Atl. 151. 402. 80 State V. 5Toore, 5 Blnckf. 82 State v. Giersch, »8 N. C. (Ind.) 118; Adler v. Sta+e, 55 720: 4 S. E. lf).3. See. also. State Ala. 16: Worlev v. Spuro-oon, 3'S v. Sharrar, 2 Cnld. .323. The last Iowa. 4fi7; Allred v. State, 89 case is overruled in Fritz v. State, Ala. 112; 8 So. 56. 1 Baxt. 15. 29 DEFINITIONS. §^20,21 been held that whether wine is a spirituous liquor, is a question of fact, a jury matter, not a question of law.^^' The general rule is accepted by nearly all the courts, that wine is neither a spirituous nor a fermented liquor."^* Sec. 20. Wine, when a question of fact— Burden of proof. Under a statute which provides that it shall not extend to the manufacture and sale of wine made from fruit grown in the State, it has been held that the (question whether wine is an intoxicating liquor, is one of fact to be determined hy the jury and not one of law of which judicial notice is to be taken by the court. In such case the burden of showing that the wine so made from fruit grown in the State is upon the defendant or the party who would be ex- empted from liability.**'' Sec. 21. Port wine — An intoxicant. Port wine is a dark purple wine, having its origin in Portugal. It takes its name from Oporto, the chief place 83 state V. Stewart, 31 Me. 51.5. ing, first, the fermented juice of •8* Commonwealth v. Grey, 2 the grape; second, the fermented Gray, 501; 61 Am. Dec. 476; State juioe of certain fruits resembling V. Thompson, 20 W. Va. 674; in many respects the wine obtained Gommonwealtli v. Jordan, 18 Pick. from grapes, but distingaiished 228; Clifi'ord V. State, 29 Wis. 327; therefrom by naming the^'source Commonwealth v. Livermore, 4 whence it is derived, as ginger Gray, 18; Attorney General v. wine, gooseberry wine, currant Bailey, 1 Exch. 281. wine, etc. Xothing is said about 85 State V. Stewart, 3 Me. 515; apple wine or pear wine, unless ■State V. Page, 66 :SIq. 418; State they are included in the 'etc' V. Stapp, 29 la. 551; Worley v. "^ * ^- jf the statute might in- Spurgeon, 38 la. 465. elude among the 'vinous fluids' "Witliout endeavoring to trace tliose which come from the juice it any further back, we may say of fruits which groAV on vines and that it is derived from tlie Latin bushes, and are named wine, we vinum, wine, and so named be- do not think it should be con- cause made from tlie fruit of the strued so liberally as to apply the vine. Wine is defined in Wor- term 'vinous' to tlie juice of fruits cester's Dictionary, after the state- which grow on trees." Feldman ment of its derivation, and after v. Morrison, 1 Bradw. (III. App. ) reference to the word in the Ian- 460. guage of many nations, as mean- §§ 22, 23 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 30 of its manufacture. It is not a spirituous liquor.*° After proof of a sale of liqiior and that the liquor was port wine, a jury may rightfully find that the liquor was an intoxi- cating liquor. Everybody who knows what port wine is knows that it is a liquor and also that it is intoxicating. A jury may so find as to matters of common knowledge and experience without any testimony as to such matters.^'' Sec. 22. Blackberry wine as an intoxicant. It is a matter of common knowledge that when first pressed from the berries blackberry wine contains no al- cohol. After it has remained a certain time, the length of which depends upon the temperature and perhaps on other causes, it will, especially if the berries were full}" ripe, or if sugar has been added, undergo a fermentation by which alcohol is generated ; and after a certain longer time it mav undergo another fermentation in which the alcohol will be converted into vinegar. So, whether at any time alcohol is present is a question of fact to be determined 'by some tests known to scientific men or by evidence of its, effects in producing intoxication and the like, and it is not a question of law or a matter of which a court will take judicial notice.^* Sec. 23. Champagne wine, when included as a liquor. Under a statiite forbidding the sale of "liquors" in cer-. tain quantities, it has been held that under a proper con- struction of the statute, both in letter and spirit, the term "liquors" was broad enough in its meaning to embrace champagne wine.^^ s*"' But see previous sections. 89 Kizer v. Rundleman, 50 X. C. 87 State V. Packer, 80 N. C. 428. 430; state v. Moore, 5 Blackf. Champagne wine takes the name (Ind.) 118. from a district of France where, 88 State V. Lowrj', 74 N. C. 121; it was first manufactured, and Lord V. State, 104 Ga. 726; 30 S. where the best cliampagne is to E. ■949. this day made. ( ontury Diciiwa* ary, wine. ^1 DEFINITIONS. §§24-26 Sec. 24, Sherry wine. A license to sell ''sweets and made wine" in England does not cover a sale of "sherry" or "Best Sherry, Brit- ish," for sherry is ranked a foreign wine.^'^ Sec. 25. Spirits and wine distinguished— Aqua vitae. Spirits are distilled liqnors. Wine is fermented liquor This distinction exists not only in common parlance but ^is recognized by chemists and philologists. The word "spirit" is derived from the Latin word ''spiritus" one meaning of which is life. The discovery of the art of dis- tillation belongs to the alchemists, who made it in the course of their investigation after what they called elixh- vitae, a liquid the discovery of which was to render man immortal. When, by distillation, they had procured pure alcohol, ,iudging from its effects, they for a while were deluded by tne hope that the great secret had been dis- covered, and called it aqua vitae— water of life. Brandy is so called by the French eau de vie. The English adopting the name, have taken the word ''spiritus" as the root from which to form it instead of the more common word ''vitae " Therefore, the words "spirituous liquors" embrace all those which are procured by distillation, but not those procured by fermentation."! Sec. 26. Malt liquor not included in "vinous and spirit- uous." ^ A vinous liquor is a liquor made from the juicP of the grape, and the general meaning of spirituous liquor is that of a liquor which is in whole or in part composed of alcohol extracted by distillation. Any liquor in which vinous or spirituous liquor, as thus defined by our decisions, are pres- ent as a predominating element, regardless of the name 63r5'.''rp 2^. """''' '' ''■ ^- "^^ '"' "^''^^^^' "^^ "-^^-^ «^--y . ', " ■„ • wine market in the world feherry is a corruption of the ^^ Las well v. State, 21 Tenn (2 Spanish name "Jarez," a. city in Humph.) 402. Andalusia, Spain, where tliis wine § 27 TRAFFIC IX INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 32 or other ingredients of the mixture, is embraced by the words "vinous or spirituous liquors." Malt liquor has neither vinous nor spirituous liquors as an ingredient in it. It has alcohol, produced by fermentation, through which it must pass before it becomes a beverage. "Vinous liquor," or "spirituous liquor" and "malt liquor" are not synonymous terms, but each refer to a liquor separate and distinct from each other. Therefore a statute which prohibits the sale or giving away of "vinous or spirituous liquors" does not include malt liquors, and no conviction can be had there- under for a sale of such liquor, where it is not shown that vinous or spirituous liquors were mixed with it.^- Sec. 27. Whisky an intoxicant — How made^ — Judicial notice. Every person of common intelligence knows that whisky is an .ntoxicating liquor, and the courts will take judicial notice of that fact.''" Hence, an indictment which charges an unlaAvful sale of whisky is sufficient, although it does not state that it was intoxicating nor that it was a "fer- mented or distilled" liquor. The courts are presumed to be acquainted with the meaning of the words of the English language, and must take notice of the fact that whisky is a spirit distilled from grain, such as maize, wheat and rye.^* 92 King V. State, 81 Ala. 02; S For a discussion of the meaning So. 159; Pennell v. State (Wis.), of whisky, see President Taft's 123 N. W. 114. decision in the note to Sec. '842. A statute making it an offense 94 State v. Williamson. 21 Mo. to sell malt liquors without a 496; State v. Dengolensky, 82 Mo. license does not cover a sale of 44; People v. Webster, 2 Doug, non-intoxicating malt liquors. (Mich.) 92; Egan v. State, 53 Hardwick v. State, 55 Tex. Civ. Ind. 162; Schlicht v. State, 56 App. 140; 114 S. W. 832. Ind. 174; State v. Jones, 3 Ind. "Pop" has been held to be a App. 121; 29 X. E. 274; Gault malted liquor, but under evidence v. State, 34 Ga. 533; Frese v. showing tiiat it was a malt liquor State, 23 Fla. 267; 2 So. 1; Car- and intoxicating if drank in suffi- mon v. State, IS Ind. 450; Com- cient quantities. Godfriedson v. monwealth v. ^lorgan, 149 Mass. People, 88 111. 284. 314; 21 X. E. 369: Snider v. 93 Edgar v. State, 37 Ark. 219; State, 81 (Ja. 75>3; 7 S. E. 631; Carmon v. State, 18 Ind. 450. 12 Am. St. 350; State v. Lewis, 33 DEFINITIONS. §28 Whisky cannot be classed as a drug.''''' An alle- gation of a sale of whisky is sufficient to admit proof of a sale of "distilled liquors. " «« Sec. 28 Whisky cocktail— Sale— When a violation of law. A charge of a sale of whisky is sustained by proof of a sale of "whisky cocktail," where the proof also shows that what is called 'Vhisky cocktail" is only a mode of pre- paring whisky as a beverage, and that whisky is the pre- dominant ingredient. If whisky be present as the pre- dominant element in a mixture, it is immaterial that bit- ters and tonics are used to qualify or render it more pal- atable as a beverage.**^ Mr. Wharton says: "If pretexts such as these are sustained, the worst vendors of the worst liquors would be the best protected by law.""« The court 44; In re Intoxicating Liquors, 25 Kan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284. Proof of a sale of a "common cordial" is sufficient proof of a sale of whisky where it is shown to contain whisky sweetened with sugar and flavored with pepper- mint. State V. Bennett, 3 Har. (Del.) 565. A statute authorizing a sale of "pure alcohol" does not apply to a sale of "rye whisky" in a dry local option district. Vardeman V. State, 108 Ga. 774; 33 S. E. 643. Where a question is raised whether the liquor sold was in- toxicating, the court must define in its instructions the meaning of the words "intoxicating liquors;" but if the evidence sliows a sale of "whisky," it is not necessary to define those words. Smith v. State (Tex.), 120 S. W. «8L 97 Galloway v. State, 23 Tex. App. 39«; 5 S. W. 246. 98 Wharton's Criminal Law, 8th. ed., § 1507. S6 Minn. 174; 90 N. W. 318; Pedigo V. Commonwealth, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1029; 70 S. W. ftSg; Smith V. State (Tex.), 120 S. W. 881. "That whisky will intoxicate is as well known as that fire will burn or water will drown." Egan V. State, 53 Ind. 162. "An ardent spirit distilled chief- ly from grain. The term was originally applied to spirit ob- tained from malt in Ireland, Scot- land, etc., in which sense whisky is synonymous with usquebaugh. Such Irish and Scotch whiskies are still made from malt, and are known by numerous names, as poteen, mountain dew, etc. In the United States whisky is com- monly made either from Indian corn (corn whisky) or from rye (rye whisky). The name wheat whisky has, however, been applied to certain brands, and wheat is probably used in the making of many diff"erent kinds and quali- ties." Century Dictionary. 95 Gault V. State, 34 Ga. 533. restate v. Dengolensky, 82 Mo. § 29 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 34 will take judicial notice that a whisky °^ or Manhattan cocktail is intoxicating/ Sec. 29. Gin an alcoholic liquor — Judicial notice. Gin is a distilled spirit or alcoholic liquor manufactured from rye or barley, flavored with juniper berries and some- times with hops.- In a prosecution for its unlawful sale it is not necessary to allege in the indictment or prove upon the trial that it is an intoxicating liquor; it will be sufficient if it is alleged and proven that it was gin.^ Judi- cial notice will be taken of that fact, and the court may so instruct the jury.* In so deciding it was said: "Jurors are not to be presumed ignorant of what everybody else knows. And they are allowed to act upon matters within their general knowledge, wi+hout any testimony on these matters. Now, everybody w^ho knows what gin is, knows not only that it is a liquor. I)ut also that it is intoxicating. And it might as well have been objected that the jury could not find that gin is a liquor without evidence that it was not a solid substance, as that they could not find that it was intoxicating without testimony to show it to be so. No jury can be supposed to be so ignorant as not to know w^hat gin is. Proof, therefore, that the defendant sold gin is proof that he sold intoxicating liquor. "'' That the liquor sold was gin is not a subject requiring expert knowledge, but is a matter, as heretofore stated, of general knowledge, and may be proved by any witness competent to testify in any other case." "Whisky cocktail, whisky smash, * State v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn, whisky sour and whisky toddy are 55; In re Intoxicating Liquors, 25 beverages of which whisky is the Kan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284. principal ingredient." Century s Commonwealth v. Peckham, Dictionary. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 514. 99 United States v. Ash, 75 Fed. 6 Commonwealth v. Timothy, 74 651. Mass. (8 Gray ) , . "The court, 1 State V. Pigg, 78 Kan. 618; jury and accused must have known 97 Pac. 859. that gin and water i s a drink. 2 Webster's Unabridged Diction- That is the usual acceptance and ary. meaning of those words, and in 3 State V. Hunger, 15 Vt. 290. that sense they must have been 35 DEPmrTlONS. §80 Sec. 30. Brandy an intexicant — Biirden of proof. Brandy is ranked as an intoxicating liquor by writers upon the general subject, and that it is a liquor of that character is generaiiy and commonly known. The fact is, therefore, 'one of which the courts will take judicial knowl- edge J The addition to the word "brandy" of the word "black^Derry" does no more than designate it as a particu- lar 'brandy ; it does not indicate that the liquor is not 'brandy of some kind. The natural and reasonable presumption is that the basis of the liquor is brandy, and therefore intox- icating, and in a prosecution for selling it in violation of a law against the sale of intoxicating liquors, evidence that the liquor sold was "blackberry brandy" is sufficient to sustain a conviction. If, in fact, the liquor sold was not an intoxicating liquor, the burden of proof is upon the de- fendant to establish that fact.® taken." Madden v. State, 1 Kan. 340. "An aromatic spirit prepared from rye or other grain and flavored with juniper berries. The two imported varieties are Dutch gin, also called Holland and Schiedam, and English gin, known by the name of Old Tom. Holland gin is almost free from sweetness and is generally purer than Eng- lish." Century Dictionary. Cordial gin is "gin sweetened and flavored with aromatic sub- stances so as to form a sort of cordial." Century Dictionary. A statute imposing a tax on the business of compounding distilled spirits applies to the manufacture of "Buchu Gin," which is made by pouring pure "in on a bed of buchu and allowing it to perco- late through, and then addinvin V. La due, 3 Denio, 43: P-ifPn V. State, 58 Wis. 39; 16 y. W. 30- 46 An. Re'i. 621; TTnited Stntos v. Ellis. 51 Fed. 808; Hollendor v. Magone, 38 Fed. 912; Killip v. McKay. 13 N. 43 DEFINITIONS. U4 show it is an intoxicant, and whether or not it comes with- in the prohibition of the statute depends upon whether it Y. St. Rep. 5; Murphy v. Mont- clair, 10 Vroom, 673; State v. Oli- ver, 26 W. Va. 422; 53 Am. Rep. 79; Williams v. State, 72 Ark. 19; 77 S. W. 5U7. It generally con- tains 3.40 to 4.94 per cent, of al- cohol. State V. Schaefer, 44 Kan. 90; 24 Pac. 92. A statute prohibiting the manu- facture or sale of intoxicating bev- erages applies to the manufacture or sale of beer. People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330. But the mere use of the word "beer" does not conclusively show that it is intoxicating; for sev- eral kinds of beer are not intoxicat- ing, and the word as thus used does not exclude the possibility that a non-intoxicating beer is meant. Hausberg v. People, 120 111. 21; 8 N. E. 857; 60 Am. Rep. 549; Com- monwealth V. Gourdier, 14 Gray, 390; Blatz v. Rohrback, 116 N. Y. 450; 22 N. E. 1049; 6 L. R. A. 669; State v. Sioux Falls Brewing Co., 5 S. D. 39; 58 N. W. 1. "Beer," however, is within the meaning of "spirituous and strong liquors." Maier v. State, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 296; 21 S. W. 974; Tompkins County v. Taylor, 21 N. Y, 173. See Kerkow v. Bauer, 15 Neb. 150; 18 N. W. 27; State v. Cloughley, 73 Iowa, 626; 35 N. W. 652; State v. Spiers, 103 loAva, 711; 73 N. W. 343; State v. Jen- kins, 32 Kan. 477 : 4 Pac. 809. To say to the jury thnt beer is a malt liquor and is intoxieatinj? is not error. State v. Currie, 8 N. D. 545! 80 X. W. 475. When a statute defines beer as an intoxicating or spirituou.s liquor, it must be so understood and construed. State v. Dick, 47 Minn. 375; 50 N. W. 362; State v. Heinze, 45 Mo, App. 403; Murphy V. Montclair, 10 Vroom, 673; State V. York, 74 N. H. 125; 65 Atl. 685. And when so declared, the use merely of the word "beer" in an in- dictment means an intoxicating liquor. State v. Besheer, 69 Mo. App. 72; State v. Watts, 101 Mo. App. 658; 74 S. W. 377. "Strong beer" and "Dutch beer," without explanations, have been held to moan intoxicating liquors of a similar character, produced from similar materials, and in a like manner. People v. Wheelock, 3 Parker Co. Rep. 9. Beer is not a spirituous liquor. State V. Quinlan, 40 Minn. 55; 41 N. W. 299; and a statute forbid- ding the sale of spirituous liquors on Sundays does not forbid the sale of beer. Fritz v. State, 1 Baxt. 15; nor to the sale to In- dians. Sarlls V. United States, 152 U. S. 570; 38 L. Ed. 556; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 720; In re McDon- ough, 49 Fed. 3G0; Guadinger v. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 514; King V. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 514. A statute authorizing a city to grant a license to sell ale, beer, wine and other fermented liquors cannot be construed to authorize tlie licensee to sell brandy, rum or otiier spirituous liouors. Common- wealth V. Jordan, 18 Pick. 228. A statute declaring that all fer- mented drinks and wines of every §34 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 44 is intoxicating.^'' And where it is necessary to show that the liquor is intoxicating, proof that it contains a certain percentage of alcohol — as it is 15 per cent. — does not neces- sarily show that it is such a liquor as the statute forbids its sale. It must be shown to be intoxicating.^^ Belief that it is not intoxicating is no defense.^® kind should be taken as intoxicat- ing includes beer; and for that reason by force of the statute it is intoxicating. State v. Lempe, 16 Mo. 389. The term "fermented beer" in- cludes spruce beer, spring beer, ginger beer and molasses beer. State V. Biddle, 54 N. H. 379; and the use of the word "beer" in an in- dictment means a fermented beer. State V. Watts. 101 Mo. App. 658; 74 N. W. 377. A Japanese drink made from rice, having ' alcohol in it, by processes similar to those used in making beer, but resembling wine in tlie amount of its alcohol, can not be classed as l>eer under the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, Chap. 11, §1, Schedule H, par. 297 (30 U. S. Stat, at Large, 174). Nishi- miya v. United States, 131 Fed. 650. The sale of "table beer." slightly intoxicating, is prohibited by a statute forbidding the sale of in- toxicating liquors. Queen v. Mc- Donald, 24 Nova Scotia, 45. And "botanic beer," containing sugar, herbs and \vater, but no hops or malt, and having six per cent, of proof spirit, is also intoxicating liquor. Haworth v. Minns, 56 L. T. 316; 51 J. V. 7. "Blue ribbon beer" has been held to be intoxicating. Regina v. Wal- ton, 34 C. L. J. 746. "Near beer" is used to designate all malt liquors with so little al- cohol as it will not produce in- toxication, even though drank to excess. It includes all malt liquors within the purview of the general prohibiton act of Georgia. Camp- bell v. Thomasville (Ga.), 64 S. E. 815. In some cities in Georgia its sale is strictly regulated by ordi- nance. As to "Mascot beer," see State V. Wright, 68 N. H. 351; 44 Atl. 519. 17 Connolly v. Atlanta, 79 Ga. 664 ; 4 S. E. 263. IS Commonwealth v. Bios, IIG Mass. 56. (Schenk beer in this case.) IS Commonwealth v. O'Kean, 152 Mass. 584; 26 N. E. 97; Ware v. State (Ga.), 65 S. E. 333; Dead- wilier V. State (Tex. Civ. App.), 121 S. W. 864; Berkemeier v. State (Ind.), 88 N. E. 634. It has been held that a statute forbidding the sale of "ale, porter, strong beer or lager beer" does not prohibit the sale of "beer." Com- monwealth V. Bios, 116 Mass. 56. Beer is not a "spirituous liquor." King V. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L. Rep. ( abstract ) 623 ; Guadinger v. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 514. 45 DEFINITIONS. §§35,36 Sec. 35. Lager beer, a malt liquor and an intoxicant. Lager beer is and has been sin'ee its introduction into this country used as a beverage. Its constituents are enumer- ated not only in the books of science, but in the popular cyclopedias. It is a malt liquor of the lighter sort, and differs from ordinary beers or ales, not so much in its in- gredients as in its process of fermentation. In a prosecu- tion for a sale of it in violation of a statute against the sale of intoxicating liquors, it is not necessary to prove that it is an intoxicating liquor. Evidence that such is its 'character would be as useless as to prove that whisky is a distillation of grain, or wine of the fermented juice of the grape, or cider expressed juice of the apple. It is u^t necessary to prove the meaning of words in the ver- nacular language, nor the meaning of terms which, from continuous use, have acquired a definite signification, gen- erally, if not universally knowm. Courts cannot profess ignorance of the meaning of words of popular use and about the significance of which no intelligent member of the community would hesitate, and they will take judicial notice of the fact that "lager beer," commonly used as a beverage throughout the country is a malt and intoxicating liquor.^" Sec. 36. Schenk beer, intoxicating quality question of fact. Under a statute which makes the sale of liquors capable of producing intoxication unlawful and criminal, and un- der which all known spirituous liquors, without specifica- tion, form a class, and specifies that "ale, porter, strong beer, lager beer, and all wines shall be considered as intox- 20!State V. Goyette, 11 R. I. 592; Lager beer is often called "stock State V. Rush, 13 R. I. 188; Wat- beer." It is light German' beer, son V. State, 55 Ala. 158. and is so-called because, it J §. stored Diluted lager beer having 2.05 for ripening before being use4. per cent of alcohol has been held People v. O'Reilly (N. Y.), 88 N. to be an intoxicating liquor. Owen E. 1 128 ; affirming 129 N. Y. V. McLean, 3 Can. Cr. Cas. 323. App. Div. 522; 114 N. Y. Supp. See Queen v. McDonald, 24 Nova 2i5i8. Scotia 45. K 37 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 46 icating liquors as Avell as distilled spirits," a sale of beer not thus enumerated, for instance "Schenk beer," is not prohibited unless it is intoxicating, and whether it is in- toxicating is a question of fact for the jury. The fact that alcohol was discovered in it upon a chemical analysis, al- though undoubtedly competent evidence, does not neces- sarily prove that the liquor was spirituous within the meaning of the statute. The apparent purpose of such a statute is to provide that distilled spirits and all liquors with which distilled spirits are mixed, and also all the liquors included by name in the specific enumeration quoted shall be conclusively deemed intoxicating, and the question whether they are intoxicating in fact cannot be raised. But with regard to all other liquors this question is one to be determined by the jury upon the evidence like any other question of fact.-^ Sec. 37. Strong and spirituous liquors — Beer. Strong beer is within the meaning of the terms "strong and spirituous liquors" in a statute to suppress intemper- ance, and likewise is any other liquor, whether fermented or distilled, of which the human stomach can take enough to produce intoxication. The construction of such a stat- ute is not to be founded upon the percentage of alcohol ■which different kinds of beverages contain, as ascertained by chemical analysis, but rather by the effect they produce. Such a liquor must be strong enough with the inebriating principle or element, w^hether obtained by distillation or fermentation, to produce intoxication. If that be its char- acter an unlicensed vendor at retail, or one who sells in vio- lation of the terms of such a statute, incurs the penalty of the statute." 21 Commonwealth v. Bios, 116 Dillmer v. People, 4 N. Y. Wkly. Mass. 56. Dig. 251; and also ale. Cayuga 22 Board v. Taylor, 21 N. Y. 173; County v. Freeoff. 17 How. Prac. Commonwealth v. Haywood, 105 442; Nevin v. Jjadue, 3 Denio, 43; Mass. 187. Tompkins County v. Taylor, 19 "Spirituous and strong liquor" How. Pr. 250 ; Schab v. People, 4 has been held to include lager beer, Hun, 520; State v. Beswick, 13 R. if it be proved to be intoxicating. I. 211. 47 DEFINITIONS. §38 Sec. 38. Ale. Ale is a liquor very nearly related to beer, and few in America know the difference between the two liquors. In the Century Dictionary it is said that ''ale and beer were formerly synonymous terms, ale being the earlier in use; at present beer is the common name for all malt liquors, and also is used especially for a carefully made beer of a certain strength and rather light than dark; thus small beer, ginger beer and the like are not ale, nor are stout and porter. A distinclion shown by Andrew Boorde, in 1542, is that ale is made of malt and water, and should contain no other ingredients, while beer is made of malt, hops and water. "^^ 23 Century Dictionary, Beer. Nev- in V. Ladue, 3 Denio, 43, 437. "Ale, a bright-colored beer, made from malt, which is dried at low heat. Pale ale is made from the palest or lightest-colored malt, the fermenting temporature being kept below 72 degrees to prevent the formation of acetic acid." Cen- tury Dictionary, ale. Bitter ale, bitter beer. "A clear, strong, highly hopped ale, of a pleasant bitter taste." Century Dictionary. Medicated Ale. "Ale which is prepared for medical purposes by an infusion of herbs during fer- mentation." Century Dictionary. Adam's Ale, Adam's Wine. "Wa- ter, as being the only beverage in Adam's time; sometimes called Adam." Century Dictionary. Ginger Ale. "An effervescing drink similar to ginger beer. The name was probably adopted by manufacturers to differentiate their productions from the ordi- nary ginger beer." Century Dic- tionary. "Hop Ale" is a name frequently used to cover up tlie actual qual- ities of the liquor, and thus evade the liquor laws. See Lincoln Cen- ter v. Linker, 5 Kan. App. 242; 47 Pac. 174. Ale is a liquor made from the infusion of malt by fermentation, differing from beer in having a smaller proportion of hops. State v. Oliver, 26 W. Va. 422; 53 Am. Eep. 79; Nevin v. Ladue, Denio 43; Walker v. Prescott, 44 N. H. 511; and the court will take ju- dicial notice that it is a malt li- quor. Wiles v. .State, 33 Ind. 206. By statute it is sometimes declared to be an intoxicating li- quor. Commonwealth v. Curran, 119 Mass. 206; and a statute for- bidding the sale of "intoxicating liquor" without other definition, includes ale and beer. People v. Hawlev, 3 Mich. 330; Murphy v. Montclair Tp. 10 Vroom, 673; Johnston v. State, 23 Ohio St. 556; Rau v. State, 63 N. Y. 277 (dicta); Blatz v. Rohrbach, 116 N.Y. 450; 22N.E. 1049 (dicta); §39 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 48 Sec. 39. Cider. Cider is neither produced by distillation nor by fermen- tation, and although liable to fermentation and when sub- jected to distillation is capable of producing a spirituous liquor, yet the ultimate product is no more like cider than rum is like the juice of the sugar-cane from which it is manufactured; nor is it in any proper sense a mixture of any other liquor other than water, which is common to all spirituous liquors, wines, ale, porter, beer and all drinks of like nature. It is wholly unlike any fermented liquor made from malted grain or from the roots of plants or bark of trees, as spruce, ginger, sassafras, birch and sarsaparilla. Being the unadulterated juice of the apple, it is no mix- ture, and under ordinary circumstances is incapable of pro- ducing intoxication, and it cannot be classed as a spirituous liquor, nor can it with any degree of propriety be called wine.-* And although the courts have said that jurors State V. Barron, .37 Vt. 57; see State V. Biddk', 54 X. H. 379; Haines v. Hanrahan, 105 Mass. 4-80 ; and without any evidence on tlie point the jury may find that it is an intoxicating liquor. State v. Barron, .37 Vt. 57. A statute pro- liibiting the sale of any strong or spirituous liquor applies to a sale of ale. Nevin v. Laduc, 3 Denio 43; but a license to sell ale does not authorize a sale of bran- dy, rum or other spirituous liquors. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 18 Pick. 228; for ale is not a spirituous liquor. Walker v. Prescott. 44 N. H. 511; Fleming v. New Brtms- wick, 47 N. J. L. 231. Formerly a liquid called "Amer- ican Hop Ale" was sold in Kan- sas. It was an imitation of lager beer, ma.de of malted grain, hops and water, slightly fermented, and contained a very slisht percentage of alcohol. Lincoln Center v. Lin- ker, 7 Kan. App. 282; 53 Pac. 787. It has been held that ale is not a "strong liquor," as used in a statute forbidding its sale without a license. People v. Crilley, 20 Barb. 246 ; and also that it is. Nevin v. Ladue, 3 Denio 43, 437; Commissioners v. Freeoff, 17 How. Pr. 442 ; Commissioners v. Taylor, 21 ^. Y. 173; Pvau v. People, 63 X. Y. 277; Blatz v. Rohrbach, 116 X. Y. 450; 22 X. E. 1049. Of course, a statute may declare it an into.xicating liquor. State v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 55. ■-'1 State v. Biddle. 54 X. H. 379; State v. Oliver, 26 W. Va. 427; 53 Am. Rep. 79; Feldman v. Morrison, 1 111. App. 460. Contra, Commonwealth v. Reyburg, 122 Pa. St. 299; 16 Atl. 351. "We do not mean to intimate rha.t the mere imfermented juice of ap- ples is in anv circumstance to be reararded as either a vinous or spir- ituous liouor, but we do not know, and cannot say, as a matter of law, 49 DEFINITIONS. §39 might, from Iheir own knowledge alone determine that whisky, brandy and other liquors, which are always intox- icating, were so, this cannot be so as to that which may or ma.y not be an intoxicating fluid when sold. Accord- ingly, it has been held that in z prosecution for an alleged unlawful sale of cider, proof must be made that it was an intoxicating liquor w'here the statute under which the prosecution was had made it a criminal offense to sell ''spir- ituous, vinous and malt liquors,"' cider not belonging to nor being included in either of the classes thus named.-'' But if a statute prohibits by name the sale of "cider," then neither hard, fermented nor sweet cider can be sold.-'' And that its character may not be so changed by fermentation as to bring it within the meaning of the term. Of course, an admixture with spirits might render the com- pound 'spirituous.' " 25 Feldman v. City of Morrison, 1 111. App. 460. Cider is not a spirituous liquor. iState v. Oliver, 26 W. Va. 422; 53 Am. Rep. 79; Allred v. State, 89 Ala. 112; 8 So. 56; but otherwise if mixed with spirituous liquor. Commonwealth v. Reyburg, 122 Pa. St. 299; 16 Atl. 351; 2 L. R. A. 415; Common- wealth V. Hallett, 103 Mass 452. Hard cider has been held a fer- mented liquor. People v. Foster, 64 Mich. 715; 31 N. \v 595. peo- pie V. Adams, 95 Mich. 511: 55 N. W, 461; Eureka Vinegar Co. v. Gazette Printing Co., 35 Fed. 570 ; Berger v. State (Ark.), 11 S. W. 765; State v. Schaefer, 44 Kan. 90; 24 Pac. 92; State v. McLaf- ferty, 47 Kan. 140; 27 Pac. 843. Where a statute forbade the sale of cider, and the liquor sold was in imitation of cider, containing two per cent alcohol, it was held that the seller had violated the statute. Ex parte Noel, 6 Leg, News (Canada), 150. Under the English statute of 1830, 1 Will, 4 c. 64, the word cider includes "cider and periy," and this is true under the act of 1869, 32 and 33 Vict. c. 27, § 1, and under 43 and 44 Vict. c. 20. By the act of 1872 and § 74, cider and perry are declared to be in- toxicating liquor. A license is necessary to sell it either on or off the premises. 1 Will. 4 c. 64, s. 30 ; 4 and 5 Will. c. 85, s. 1 ; 3 and 4 Vict. c. 61, s. 1 ; and it is subject to excise duty, 43 and 44 Vict. c. 20, s. 41. The maximum penalty for selling cider without a license, not to be drank off the premises is £10; and to be drank on tha premises, £20. 4 and 5 Will. 4, c. 85, s. 17. 26 State V. Spaulding, 61 Vt. 505; 17 Atl. 844; Commonwealth V. Smith, 102 Mass. 144; Com- monwealth V. Dean, 14 Gray, 99 ; State V. McNamara, 69 Me. 133; State V. Roach, 75 Me. 123. See Guptill V. Richardson, 62 ]Me. 257 : State V. Frederickson, 101 Me. 37; 63 Atl. 535. §39 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 50 where a statute enumerated ale, beer, wine, alcohol "and all intoxicating liquors whatever," cider was held to be included in the phrase just vjuoted.-^ Where a statute uses the words "fermented liquor" the term will include "hard cider," but not "sweet cider." "If the witness for the State," said the Supreme Court of Kansas, "had testified that they drank cider — not hard cider — then, under the definition of Webster and some of the other lexicographers, we would not presume that the cider was fermented and intoxicating. Hard cider is excessively fermented, and therefore, presumptively, hard cider is not only fermented, but intoxicating. Under the statute all fermented liquor is presumed to be intoxicating, and if the defendant de- nies that the fermented liquor sold by him is intoxicating, it devolves upon him to remove the presumption of law by evidence."-^ Wi hin the limitations thus laid down w'hether or not "cider" is intoxicating is a question for the jury '^ under the evidence introduced to show that it is.^° 27 state V. Hutchison, 72 Iowa 561; 34 N. W. 421. Of cider it lias been judicially said: "It is common knowledge that a fermented beverage which contains from five to ten per cent of alcohol, which is freely drank by the glassful, will produce in- toxication. This is a fact of daily observation in communities where such beverages are sold." Eureka Vinegar Co. v. Gazette Printing Co., 35 Fed. 570. A statute may provide that "fer- mented cider" is intoxicating li- quor. State V. Waite, 72 Vt. 108; 47 Atl. 397. "If the statute might include among the 'vinous' fluids those which come fr'^m the juice of fruits which grow on vines and bushes, and are named wine, we do not think it could be construed so lib- erally as to apply the term 'vi- nous' to the juice of fruits which grow on trees. And in common parlance cider and beer are never called vinous liq'iors or wine." Feldman v. Morrison, 1 111. App. 460. A city may require a license to sell cider. Pikeville v. Huffman, 65 S. W. 794; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1692. 2S State V. Schaefer, 44 Kan. 90 ; 24 Pac. 92; People v. Foster, 64 Mich. 715; 31 N. W. 596; State v. McLafferty, 47 Kan. 140; 27 Pac. 843; Eureka Vinegar Co. v. Gazette Printing Co., 35 Fed. 570; Berger v. State (Ark.), 11 S. W. 765; Commonwealth v. Chapel, 116 Mass. 7. 29 Commonwealth v. Reyburg, 122 Pa. St. 299; 16 Atl. 351. 30 State V. Schaefer, 44 Kan. 90; 24 Pac. 92; Feldman v. Morrison, 1 111. App. 460. 51 DEFINITIONS. § 40 And whether eider shown to contain six per cent, of alcohol is intoxicating is a question for the jury, and the court cannot say to it that it is.^^ Sec. 40 Medicines — Compounds. The sale of medicines may or may not be an offense, ac- cording to the circumstances. "One au..horized to sell med- icines ought not to be held guilty of violating the law against retailing, because the purchaser of a mixture con- taining alcohol misuses it and becomes intoxicated: but, on the other hand, these laws cannot be evaded by selling as a beverage intoxicating liquors containing drugs, barks or seeds which have medicinal qualities. If the other in- gredients are medicinal and the alcohol is used as a neces- sary preservative or vehicle for them, if from all the facts it appears thai the sale is of the other ingredients as a med- icine and not of the liquor as a beverage, the seller is pro- tected; but if the drugs or roots are mere pretenses of medi- cine, shadows and devices under which an illegal traffic is to be conducted, they will be but shadows when interposed for protection against criminal prosecution."^- An instruc- tion to the jury, therefore, wholly ignoring the aefendant's motive in making a sale of essence of ginger, and whether when sold it was a medicine, known and recognized as such, and capable in its then state of being used as a beverage, was held erroneous; and one asked by the defendant that if they "believed from the evidence that the defendant sold tincture of Jamaica ginger as a medicine, in good faith, and believed from the evidence that the same was prepared by the directions of the United States Dispensatory, and 31 Topeka v. Zufall, 40 Kan. 47 ; Intoxicuting Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 19 Pac. 359. See also State v. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284. Toilet, Biddlo, 54 N. H. 379. culinary and medicinal prepara- 32 King V. State, 58 Miss. 737 ; tions recognized by the United 38 Am. Rep. 348; Commonwealth States Dispensatory as medicine V. Ramsdell, 130 Mass. 68; State are not to be classed as intoxica- V. Raymond, 20 W. Va. 18; 43 ting beverages. Roberts v. State, Am. Rep. 787; Bertrand v. State, 4 Ga. App. 207; 60 S. E. 1082. 73 Miss. 51; 18 So. 545. In, re § 40 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 52 that the same was recognized by the medical profession of the United States" as a medicine, was correct. It was also held error to exclude evidence that the essence was a stand- ard medicine, prepared according to a standard formula laid down in the United States Dispensatory and used by physicians throughout the United States as a medicine in their practice.^^ In a Kansas case, perhaps the leading case on this subject, Justice Brewer, then on the Supreme Court of that State, said: "If the compounds or preparations be such that the distinctive character and effect of intoxicating liquors are gone, that its use as an intoxicating beverage is practically impossible by reason of the other ingredients, it is not within the statute. The mere presence of the alcohol does not bring the article within the prohibition. The influence of the alcohol may be counteracted by the other elements, and the compound be strictly and fairly only a medicine. On the other hand, if the intoxicating liquor remains as a dis- tinctive force in the compound, and such compound is rea- sonably liable to be used as an intoxicating beverage, it is 33 Bertrand v. State, 73 Miss. A combination of numerous 51; 18 So. 545; Arbuthnot v. State drugs and elieinicals preserved in (Tex. Civ. App.), 120 S. W. 478; a dilution of alcoholic spirits con- Carl V. State, 87 Ala. 17; 6 iSo. taining 33 jier cent of alcohol has 118; 4 L. E. A. 380; State v. Laf- been held to be an intoxicating li- fer, 38 Iowa 422; Howell v. State, quor. Gostorf v. State, 39 Ark. 71 C4a. 224; 51 Am. Rep. 259; Peo- 450. pie V. Van Alstyne (Mich.), 122 Where a statute prohibits a sale N. W. 193; 16 Det. Leg. N. 392; of less quantity than' a quart at State V. Gray, 61 Conn. 39; 22 a time, without a license, of in- Atl. 675; Russell v. Sloan, 33 Vt. toxicating liquors, except such as 656; State v. Lillard, 78 Mo. 136; "shall be compounded and intend- Wadsworth v. Dunnman, 98 Ala. ed to be used as a medicine," the 610; 13 So. 597; Gostorf v. State, liquors excepted in this quotation 39 Ark. 450; United States v. are those to be used as medicine. Stubblefield, 40 Fed. 454; Parrott State v. Terry, 72 X.J. L. 375; 61 V. Commonwealth, 6 Ky. L. Rep. Atl. 148; affirmed 73 X. J. L. 554; 221; James v. State, 21 Tex. Cr. 64 Atl. 113. App. 353; 17 S. W. 422. Peruna has been held to come Lemon ginger and Empire Tonic within the prohibition of a statute Bitters have ]>een held to be a forbidding the sale of intoxicating medicine. United States v. Stub- liquor. Stells v. State, 77 Ark. blefield, 40 Fed. 454. 441 ; 92 S. W. 530. 53 DEFINITIONS. MO within the statute, aud this though it contain many other ingredients and ingredients of an independent and bene- ficial force in counteracting diseases or strengthening the system. ' " "^ 34 In re. Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284. See also .State v. Laffer, 38 Iowa, 422 ; Commonwealth v. Hal- lett, 103 Mass. 452 ; Wall v. State, 78 Ala. 417: State v. Coulter, 40 Kan. 87; 19 Pac. 368; State v. Muncey, 28 W. Va. 404; Davis v. State, 50 Ark. 17; 6 S. W. 388; Roberts v. State, 4 Ga. App. 207; 60 S. E. 1082. Sweet spirits of nitre and varnish, although con- taining a high percentage of alco- hol, are not "spirits." Attorney- General V. Bailey, 1 Exch. 281. Since paregoric, bay rum, co- logne, wood alcohol and the like cannot be used as beverages, they cannot be classed as intoxicating liquors; nor will the articles given in the United States Dispensatory which are classed as medicines be so classed. Roberts v. State, 4 Ga. App. 207; 60 S. E. 1082; Fabor v. Green, 7^ Vt. 117; 47 Atl. 391. In Australia it is held that "li- quor" means a liquid which is commonly known and is adapted for use as a drink or beverage for human consumption, or which is reasonably capable of being used as a substitute for such bever- age, or being converted into such beverage. Hence, in a prosecution for a sale of proprietary medicine, it is not necessarilj'^ sufficient for the prosecution to prove that it contains oven a large percentage of alcohol, if the alcohol is essen- tial for its use as a medicine or is necessary for extraction or as a preservative, or if the other in- gredients are, as compared with the contained alcohol, of such po- tency or of such disagreeable char- acter that the use of the liquid as a beverage would ordinarily result in danger to his health or in nau- sea or sickness. In considering whether a liquid is a liquor with- in the meaning of the statute, re- gard should be had to the use to which it is usually put, the pur- pose for which it is usuallj' bought and its usual effect upon the sys- tem. Gleason v. Hobson [1907], Vict. L. R. 148. In Maine in 1850 it was held that it was no defense that the liquor was old and used solely for medicinal purposes, if the accused had no license. State v. BroAvn, 31 Me. 522. See also Common- wealth V. Kimball, 24 Pick. 366; Commonwealth v. Sloan, 4 Cusli. 52. Statutes forbidding sale of li- quors to l>e drank on premises. People V. Van Alstyne (Mich.), 122 N. W. 193; 16 Detroit Leg. N. 392. Evidence to show members of ac- cused's family had not been ill or witness had not heard of their ill- ness, though living in the neigh- borhood. Commonwealth v. Joslin, 158 Mass. 482; 33 X. E. C.53; 21 L. R. A. 449. The object cf our statutes regu- §41 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 54 Sec. 41. Camphor gum not an intoxicant. In almost every home will be found the "camphor bot- tle," containing gum of camphor dissolved in distilled lating the sale of intoxicating li- quors is to prevent the use of such liquors as a beverage, and thus to check, and if possible, to extir- pate the evils of intemperance. Hence the statutes are intended to apply to all intoxicating liquors which can be resorted to to gratify the appetite for intoxicating drink. But there is a large class of medi- cines, bitters and tinctures, used not as a beverage, but as medici- nal remedies, to which such stat- utes are not intended to apply, al- though such articles are compound- ed in part of alcohol, and if used in sufficient quantities will pro- duce intoxication. Such articles are usually kept by druggists and are manufactured in good faith as medicine. They are not intended for and are not used as a drink. Some of them are approved of and recommended by learned and skill- ful physicians. They vary greatly in their preparation in the amount of alcohol used in them and in their qualities. Many of them are believed to be useful in the cure of diseases; many of them are prob- ably worthless or mischievous. Many mixtures of this sort pass under the title of patent or quack medicines. But the law makes no distinctions in regard to the man- ufacture, use and sale of medi- cines upon the ground that thoy are or are not the products of quackery. To prohibit the sale of these articles for their legitimate and real use as remedies for dis- ease is not within the object of our legislation in regard to intoxica- ting liquors. When, therefore, medicines, bitters and tinctures are made and sold in good faith for their true and legitimate use, to prevent or cure disease, they can- not be regarded as within the class of intoxicating liquors, whose sale is prohibited or regulated by law. But when intoxicating drinks, in- tended to be sold and used as a beverage, are by some tincture or preparation slightly disguised so as to have to some extent the taste, flavor or appearance of med- icines or bitters, when, in fact, they are really meant to be sold as intoxicating drinks, such mix- tures, however disguised, are with- in the prohibition of the law. In all such cases it is a question not of law, but of fact, whether the pretended medicine is in reality and in good faith made, sold and used as a medicine, or is only a disguise for intoxicating liquor, such questions must be determined by the evidence. Tlie composition and character of the article, the amount of alcohol in it, and whether it does readily or with difficulty produce intoxication, whether it is agreeable or nause- ous to the taste, whether it is use- ful or not as a medicine to cure diseases, whether it is generally kept and sold by druggists as med- icine, whether it is frequently re- sorted to and used as a beverage, this and similar circumstances 55 DEFINITIONS. § 42 spirits, and used exclusively as a medicine and kept ready for use when needed, but unpalatable as a beverage and not used as such. The design of our temperance statutes is to prevent the evil of tippling, and it cannot, as a rule of law or of fair statutory construction be maintained that a sale by a druggist of gum-camphor and alcohol mixed by him can in any way promote t^nnling; nor can lis convic- tion for such a sale be maintained under a statute which provides that "no person Avithout a State license therefor shall sell, offer or expose for sale spirituous liquors, wine, port, ale or beer, or any drink of a like character." In such case it cannot be said that it was the design of the Legislature to prohibit the sale of such a mixture by statute.^'' The mere presence of alcohol in an article sold to a customer by a country mercliant or his clerk, in good faith and not as a shift or device to evade the law, is not to be deemed an intoxicating liquor within the meaning of the act to provide for the licensing of, and against the evils arising from, the sale of intoxicating liquors, simply because the customer to whom it was sold drinks it and becomes intoxicated.'^** Sec. 42. Cinnamon and lemon essence — Cologne. A judgment against a defendant for selling spirituous liquors, wines, porter, ale, beer and drinks of a lilvc nature, where the evidence showed that the defendant had sold a bottle of the "essence of cinnamon" to the State's witness; that before the sale the defendant said to the \ witness if he wanted to drink it he could not get it, but if he wanted it for cooking purposes he could have it, and the witness hav- woukl be regarded as evidence Ark. 450; Davis v. State, 50 Ark. tending to determine the question. 17. Russell V. Sloan, 33 Vt. 656; 35 state v. Haymond, 20 W. Va. Commonwealth v. Ramsdell, 130 18; 43 Am. Rep. 787; Kizer v. Mass. 68: State v. Bennett, 3 Harr. Rundleman, 5 Jones (N. C), 428. (Del.) 565; Intoxicating Liquor 36 Walker v. Dailey, 101 111. App. Cases, 25 Kan. 75; State v. LafTer, 575. In re Intoxicating Liquors, 38 la. 422; Foster v. State, 36 25 Kan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284. Ark. 258; Gostorf v. State, 39 § 43 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 56 ing answered he did not want to drink it, the defendant sold it to him, and that the witness did drink part of it and it affected him so he could not see after night, was affirmed on appeal by a divided court. In this case the theory of the judges voting for affirming the judgment was that it was immaterial what were the ingredients of a prep- aration or mixture, or by what name it was known, or whether it was patented or not, if it would produce intox- ication, the sale of which was prohibited by the statute ; and that in this case the jury was justified in finding that the particular "essence of cinnamon" sold by the defend- ant did produce intoxication and that the question whether it was an intoxicating drink was one of fact purely. Those judges voting for reversal of the judgment held that there was no fact proved from which the court or jury could in- fer that essence of cinnamon was composed in whole or in part of spirituous liquor, wine, porter, ale, beer, or any other drink of like nature, or that it was any mixture or preparation known as bitters or otherwise which could pro- duce intoxication ; and in the absence of proof on this sub- ject the court could not take judicial notice of the ingre- dients entering into the composition of the ' ' essence of cinnamon. "^^ Extract of lemon, as it is usually known and used, is not classed as an intoxicating liquor, although it contains alcohol. ^^ Nor does it include cologne, and the Legislature has not the power to prohibit its sale.^** Sec. 43. Common cordial a spirituous liquor — Godfrey's Cordial. Under an act which prohibited the sale of "any wine, rum, brandy, gin, whisky or any spirituous liquor by any measure less than a quart or any punch or other mixed liquor by any measure whatever," an indictment for sell- •■57 State V. Mimeey, 28 W. Va. ^'^ In re Intoxicating Liquor 494; Roberts v. State, 4 Ga. App. Cases, supra. For essence of gin- 207; 60 S. E. 1082. ger, see Bertand v. State, 73 Miss. 38Holconibv. People, 49 111. 73; 51; IS So. 545; Roberts v. State, In re Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 4 Ga. App. 207; 60 S. E. 1082, 25 Kan. 751; 37 Am. 284. 57 DEFINITIONS. § 44 ing spirituous liquor was sustained by proof of the sale of common cordial, the proof showing that it was made of whisky sweetened and scented with peppermint and other things, and that it would intoxicate. The contention was that the proof did not sustain a charge for selling spirituous liquor, but that of a sale of mixed liquor. The court held that the mixed liquor intended by the act. fol- lowing as it did the specification of punch, was a mixture of spirituous liquors, before prohibited to be sold separately, and that where the basis of substance of the liquor sold was spirituous and not mixed by the vendor, it came with- in the prohibition of selling spirituous liquor. In answer to the contention that this construction would prohibit the sale of medicines, the basis of which was spirituous liquor, such as Godfrey's cordial, elixir of paregoric, etc., the court said, "Not so. The question will always be whether it is a sale of medicine or liquor. If an apothecary sell brandy, as such, it would be a violation of the law; if brandy made up into laudanum or other medicines, it is not a violation of a law prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquor. It will never be difficult to distinguish.. Common store cordial is sweetened whiskey sold as spirituous liquor; Godfrey's cordial is a very different thing known for, and sold as medicine, and there can be no danger from the sale of it of promoting tippling, which is the evil designed to be provided for by our Act of Assembly."*" Sec. 44. Empire tonic bitters — Proprietary medicines. A statute regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors pro-, vided that it should not apply to physicians putting up their own prescriptions nor the sale of "proprietary medi- cines." In construing it it was held that by the phrase, "proprietary medicines," as used in the statute, were meant 40 State V. Bennett, 8 Harr. cherry, and "Sherman's Prickly (Del.) 565. Under a Kansas stat- Ash Bitters" was an intoxicatin<:: ute it was held that whether "Mc- liquor, was a question of fact. In Lean's Strengthening Cordial and re Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Blood Purifier," a mixture of whis- Kan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284. ky, syrup of tulu and syrup of wild ^ 45 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 58 such proprietary medicines as were not ' ' alcoholic liquors or compounds," but medicines as distinguished from "alco- holic liquors and compounds," and that a registered drug- gist could not sell a preparation known as "Empire Tonic Bitters," which contained alcohol, without first having pro- cured the license of dram-shop- keeper. In such a case it matters not that the defendant had paid an excise tax re- quired by the Government of the United States.^^ Sec. 45. Home Bitters — Medicine — Instruction — Evidence. In a prosecution for unlawfully selling vinous and spir- ituous liquors a charge to the jury for the State which in effect said that if the compound sold, called "Home Bit- ters," was intoxicating, and was sold by the defendant as a beverage, and not as medicine, they ought to find the defendant guilty, and for the defendant, if from the evi- dence they believed he sold the compound in good faith as medicine and not as a beverage, they ought to acquit him, although the compound contained vinous or spirituous liquors sufficient to intoxicate, was held a fair statement of the law. The uses to which such a compound is ordinarily put, the purposes for which it is usually bought, and its effect upon the system are material facts from which maj' be inferred the intention of the seller. If other ingredients are medicinal and the alcohol is used as a necessary preserv- 41 State V. Wright. 20 Mo. App. pounded in part of intoxicating 412; McRoberts v. State, 45 Tex. liquor and sold for other than Cr. App. 268; 92 S. W. 804; State medicinal purposes may be pro- V. Lillard, 78 Mo. 136. In United hibited. State v. Lillard, 78 Mo. States V. Stubblefield. 40 Fed. 454. 136. Empire Tonic Bitters was held to The fact that Howe's Aromatic be a medicine. Invigorating Spirit contains 20 per Evidence tliat Hostettor's Bitters cent of alcohol does not necessarily tasted like whisky and produced show it is not a medicine. Russell intoxication is proper. Parrott v. v. Sloan, 33 Vt. 653. Commonwealth, G Ky. L. Rep. 221. Pervna has been held to be an A State may authorize a city to intoxicating liquor imder proof of suppress the sale of medicated bit- its intoxicating f(uality. Stelle v. ters. James v. State, 21 Tex. App. State, 77 Ark. 441; 02 S. W. 530. 353. 17 S. W. 422. Bitters com- 59 DEFINITIONS. § 46 ative or vehicle for them; if from all the facts and cir- cumstances it appears that the sale was made of the other ingredients as a medicine, and not of the liquor as a bever- age, the seller is protected; but if the drugs or roots are mere pretense of medicines, shadows and devices under which an illegal traffic is to be conducted, they will be but shadows when interposed for protection against a criminal prosecution/^ It matters not what name dealers or con- sumers apply to an illicit fluid so long as the arbitrary name can be translated into that of an intoxicating liquor —for instance, "rye whisky." It is the liquor and not the name which gives its character to the sale and renders it lawful or unlawful. ^^ Sec. 46. Busby's bitters— Judicial notice. A court can not judicially know that "Busby's Bitters," though shown to be intoxicating, is or contains either dis- tilled liquor or wine, or a liquor prepared for drink by the infusion of malt. Liquor of either class may be intoxi- cating, but neither class, nor all of them combined, includes all of the intoxicating liquors, beverages or bitters. A given liquor may, in other words, be in a high degree intox- icating, and yet be neither spirituous, vinous nor malt with- in the sense of a penal statute. In such case i^ is for a jury to say whether such bitters were vinous, spirituous or malt, or contain liquors of either or all of these classes in appreciable quantities.** "King V. Stato, 58 Miss. 737; « Wall v. State, 78 Ala. 417; ^State V. Wilson, 80 Mo. 303; Allred v. State, 89 Ala. 112; 8 James v. State, 21 Tex. App. 352; So. 56. For Sherman's Prickly Cxostorf V. State, 39 Ark. 450. Ash Bitters, see In re Intoxicating •»■■! Kinnebrew v. State, 80 Ga. Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 751 • 37 Am' 232. Rep. 284. A tonic containin<; four per cent "You have all heard of 'blind of alcohol, which could be drunk tigers.' One of the most common in sufficient quantities to produce of these fraudulent devices is to intoxication was held to be an in- put a few drugs, barks or extracts toxicating liquor. Johnson v. into a very common liquor and put State, 4 Tex. Cr. App. 419; M S. it on the market for sale as a pre- W. 554; State v. Stubblefield, 40 tended medicine, under the name ^^''•■*^^- of 'cordial,' 'tonic' or 'hitters- §§47,48 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 60 Sec. 47. Mead — Metheglin — Sweets. Mead is "a fermeiit liquor composed of one part of honey dissolved in three of boiling water, to which malt, yeast and spices are added. ' ' *^ Metheglin is " a fermented drink made of water and honey. " *" Sec. 48. Wilson's Rocky Mountain Herb Bitters. Medicated bitters, called "Dr. Wilson's Rocky Mountain Herb Bitters," and containing alcohol, -were 'held to be within an act which provided that "no dealer in drugs and medicines shall, directly or indirectly, sell or give away any intoxicating liquors and medicated bitters con- taining alcohol in any quantity less than one gallon, artid in no quantity to be drunk upon the premises without first having obtained, in the manner provided by law, a license as a dram-shop keeper. ' ' ^^ 'Hostetter's Bitters,' 'Fitzpatrick's Bitters,' 'Home Bitters,' 'Home Laxative Cordial,' 'Reed's Guilt Edged Tonic' and other compounds of tins character, and have all rightly been adjudged to be mere sliams as medicines, because they were sold and used as intoxicating beverages, and for the liquor, and not for the drugs and barks they contained; and dealers in them have been dealt with precisely' as if they had sold plain whisky with- out any disguise." United States V. Stafford, 20 Fed. 720, citing Williams v. State. 35 Ark. 430; Foster v. State, 36 Ark. 258; Gos- torf v. State, 39 Ark. 450: United States V. Cota, 17 Fed. 734. Hos- tetter's Bittere. Parrott v. Com- monwealt^i. fi Fv. T,. T?ep. 221. 45 Standard Dictionary. A sec- ondary definition is: "A drink. usually made of syrup of sarsapa- rilla and water impregnated with carbon dioxide." Ibid. "Odin's Mead," the mead that Odin carried away from the giant ■Septiuig, the inspiration of poetry. 46 standard Dictionary. Under the English statute the word "sweets" or made wine mean any liquor made by fermentation from fruit and sugar, or from fruit or sugra- mixed with any other material, and which has undergone a process of fermentation in its manufacture. 52 and 53 Vict. c. 42, § 28. And sweets include mead and metheglin, 33 and 34 Vict. c. 29, § 3 ; 43 and 44 Vict. c. 20, § 40. In this country the courts do not take judicial notice that mead or metheglin is intoxicating. Marks v. State (Ala.), 48 So. 864. 47 State v. Wilson, 80 Mo. 303. 61 DEFINITIONS. §49 Sec. 49. Intoxication — Drunkenness — Drunkard. There are different degrees of intoxication or drunken- ness, and the word "intoxication" is nearly synonymous with "inebriet}^" or "inebriation." The word '"intoxica- tion" is that state or condition of the person which inevi- tably follows by taking into the body excessive (juantities of intoxicating liquors.^** It is evidenced liy an undue or abnormal excitation of the feelings, oi' passions, or by rendering useless the capacity of the drinker to think and act correctly and effectually.*^ "Whenever a man is un- der the influence of liquor so as not to be entirely at him- self, he is intoxicated; although he can walk straight, al- though he may attend to his business, and may not give any outward and visible signs to the casual observer that he is drunk, yet if he is under the influence oP liquor so as not to be at himself, so as to be excited from it, and not to possess that clearness of intellect and that control of him- self that he otherwise would have, he is intoxicated." "^ In 48 Commonwealth v. Whitney, 11 Cush. 447; State v. Savage, 89 Ala. 1; 7. 'So. 183; 7 L. R. A. 426; Mix V. McCoy, 22 Mo. App. 431; State V. Kelley, 47 Vt. 2!)4; State V. Robinson, 111 Ala. 482; 20 So. 30. 49 Standard Life, etc. Ins. Co., 94 Ala. 434; 10 So. 530. soElkin v. Busehner (Pa.), 16 Atl. 102. In this case it was also said: "One man will say a person was drunk at the time of a certain oc- currence. Another will say he was not drunk; that he was sober. A great deal of testimony can be ex- plained by the different ideas those persons have as to what is meant by drunkenness or intoxication. There are degrees of intoxication or drunkenness, as every one knows. A man is said to be dead drunk when he is perfectly uncon- sciousy— powerless. He is said to be stupidly drunk wlien a kind of stupor comes over him. He is said to be staggering drunk when he staggers in walking. He is said to be foolishly drunk when he acts like the fool. All these are cases of difTerent drunkenness — of dif- ferent degrees of drunkenness. So it is a very common thing to say a man is badly intoxicated, and again that he is slightly intoxi- cated. There are degrees of drunk- enness, and therefore many persons may say that a man was not intox- icated because he could walk straight; he could get in and out a wagon. What is meant * * * by the words in the statute which makes it a penal o.'^'ense, and also the party liable in a civil action for damages, for giving to a man I 49 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING UQLORS. 62 order that a person shall be drunk it is not necessary that he be excited to a frenzy.-^^ In a ]\Iichigan case the term, "an intoxicated person," was thus defined: " Wlien it is apparent that a person is under the influence of liquor, or when his manner is unusual or abnormal, and his ine- briated condition is reflected in his walk or conversation, when his ordinary judgment and common sense are dis- turbed, or his usual will-power is temporarily suspended, when these symptoms result from the use of liquor, and are manifest, then, within the meaning of the statute, the person is intoxicated, and any one who makes a sale of liquor to such a person violates the law of the Stale. It is not necessary that the person should be called 'dead drunk' or hopelessly intoxicated; it is enough that his senses. are obviously destroyed or distracted by the use of inti)x., icating liquor. ' ' "'- The reasonable and very moderate use of intoxicating liquors, however, does not produce a legal state of intoxication. It is the unreasonable, inordinate, immoderate, or excessive use of intoxicating liquors that produces cases which the State terms intoxication or drunk- enness, forbidden by the statute ; ' ' and to say that no liquor is intoxicating, unless its moderate and reasonable use ^^' that is 'drunk or intoxicated' (be- "'S In determining what is a cause both words are used in the "moderate and reasonable use" of statute) ; and also, 'selling to a intoxicating liquor the capacity man of known intemperate hab- of the individual to withstand the its'?" Then follows the definition intoxicating effect of liquor must quoted in the text above, in an- be considered; for what would be swer to this question. a "moderate and reasonable use" 51 Smith V. People, 141 111. 447; of intoxicating liquor would pro- 31 N. E. 425. duce far less effect upon a man 52 Lafler v. Fisher, 121 Mich. who was used to it than upon a 60; 79 N. W. 934; State v. Pierce, man who was not, and even indi;- 65 Iowa, 85; 21 N. W. 195. The viduals not used to it, its use pro- word "intoxicated" is synonymous duces very radical effects. So that with "drunk." Sapp v. State, 116 it might under a statute forbid- Ga. 182; 42 S. E. 410; Standard ding a sale or gift to an intoxi- Life etc. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 94 Ala. cated person not be an of- 434; 10 So. 530; Commissioners v. fense if sold or given to one per- Trimble, 150 Mass. 89; 22 N. E. son while it would be to another, 239. thougli botii shortly previous to 63 DEFINITIONS. §49 will produce inebriety, is to declare that no liquor whatever is intoxicating."^* But a statute forbidding a sale to an intoxicated person, means a sale to a person under such a state of inebriation as attracts observation and be- comes known to others, or gives them reason to believe the person is intoxicated, and of this a bystander is generally a better judge than the person himself, whose opinion on the subject, for obvious reason, is w^orth but little.'"'' The stat- ute, however, when it refers to a person as "intoxicated" has no reference to a person intoxicated by the use of opium, haheesh, or the like, but to a person made drunk by the use of the common and usual intoxicating beverages.'^" the sale or gift, and at the same time had drunk the same quantity of the same le oross>-examined concerning his knowledge of such whisky. Beaty V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App, 432; 110 S. W. 449. Of course, the constituents con- stituting the liquor may always be shown. Regina v. Bennett, 1 Ont. 445. 65 Nussbaumer v. State, 54 Fla. 87; 44 So. 712; Regina v. Ben- nett, 1 Ont. 445; 'Commonwealth v. Magee, 14f Mass. Ill; 4 N. E. 819; Commonwealth v. Bently, 97 Mass. 551; Haworth v. Minns, 56 L. T. 316; 51 J. P. 7. 60 Commonwealth v. Timothy, 8 Gray 480. 67 Nussbaumer v. State, 54 Fla. 87; 44 So. 712; Queen v. McDon- ald, 24 Nova ,Scotia, 45 ; Merkle v. State, 37 Ala. 139; Curtis v. State, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 607; 108 S. W. 380. 68 Carl v. State, 87 Ala. 17; 6 So. 118; Savage v. Common- wealth, 84 Va. 582; 5 S. E. 563; Commonwealth v. Peto, 136 Mass. 155; Commonwealth v. White, 15 Gray, 407. 69 Haines v. Hanrahan, 105 Mass. 480. 70 Commonwealth v. Reyburg, 122 Pa. St. 299; 16 Atl. 351;' Brenl.ey v. State, 91 Ala. 47; 8 So. 816: Fairly v. State, 63 Miss. 333; McRoberts v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 92 S. W. 804. CHAPTER IL CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. SECTION. 79. Control of liquor traffic falls under police power. 80. Definition and extent of po- lice power. 81. Police power, continued — Leg- islative power. 82. Police power not the power of eminent domain. 83. State cannot surrender po- lice power. 84. Police power impairing the obligation of a contract. 85. Police power limited by Fed- eral Constitution. 86. Blackstone's enumeration of police powers. 87. Sumptuary argument insuffi- cient to defeat liquor leg- islation. 88 No natural right to sell intoxicating liquors. 89. Right to sell liquors at com- mon law — Nuisance. 90. Natural right not a judicial question. 91. Motive for passage of law or ordinances. 92. Prohibitory law, baso're<;s of its power to regulate commerce with foreign countries or among the several States and the exercise by a State of what are called its police powers. Although the members of the court did not fully agree as to the grounds upon which the decision should be placed, thev were unanimous in holding that the st-atutes under con^jid^r^tion A^'ere not inconsistent with the Constitu- tion of the United States, or with any act of Congress. In so decidino-. • Ch^'ef Justice Taney, who wrote the principal opinion, said: "If any State deems the retail and internal traffic in ardent snirits injurious to its citizens and calcu- lated to produce illness, v'ce or debauchery, I see nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent it from regulating and restraining the traffic or from prohibiting it altogether if it thinks proper." Mr. Justice McLean, among 47 1 Dillon on ]\riinie. Corp. *"!* People v. Creiger, 138 111. §311; Moyer v. Villaee of Ten- 401; 28 N. E. 812. topolis, 121 Til. .552; 23 N. E. 651; 48 License Cases, 5 How. 504; 12 Huell V. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282: Free- L. Ed. 256. port V. Mark, 50 Pa. St. 253. § 92 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 108 other things, said: "A State regulates its domestic com- merce, contracts, the transmission of estates, real and per- sonal, and acts upon all internal matters which relate to its material and political welfare. Over these subjects the Federal government has no power. * * * The acknowl- edged police power of a State extends even to the destruc- tion of property. A nuisance may be abated. Everything prejudicial to the health or morals of a State may be removed.'' Mr. Justice Woodberry observed; ''How can they [the States] be sovereign in their respective spheres, without power to regulate all their internal commerce, as well as police, and direct how, when and where it shall be conducted in articles intimately connected either with public morals, or public safety, or the public prosperity?" Mr. Justice Greer, in still more emphatic language, said: "The true question presented by these cases, and one which I am not disposed to avoid, is whether the States have a right to prohibit the sale and consumption of an article of com- merce which they believe to be pernicious in its etfects, and the cause of disease, pauperism and crime. * * * With- out attempting to define what are the peculiar subjects or limits of this power, it may be safely affirmed that every law for the restraint and effacemeut of crime, for the preservation of the public peace, health and morals, must come within the category. * * * It is not necessary, for the sake of justifying the State legislation now under consideration, to relate the appalling statistics of misery, pauperism and crime, which have their origin in the use or abuse of ardent spirits. The police power, which is exclu- sively in the States, is alone competent to the correction of these great evils, and all measures of restraint or prohibition necessary to effect the purpose are within the scope of that authority." Up to the time of the adoption of the Four- teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the right of the several States to regulate and even prohibit the traffic in intoxicating liquors was considered as falling within the police regulations of the States, and left to their judgment, subject to no other limitations than such as were 109 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §92 imposed by the State Constitutions, or by the general prin- ciples supposed to limit all legislative power. It had never been seriously contended that such laws raised any question growing out of the Constitution of the United States. This was so decided by the Supreme Court of the United States at the October term, 1873, ^« and reaffirmed at the October term, 1877."° In the case first cited it was held that the right to sell intoxicating liquors is not one of the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States which by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States were forbidden to be abridged. In accord with the foregoing decisions there are manv others of the courts of the United States and of many of the States which have held that the constitutional power of a State by a con- stitutional provision or legislative enactment to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is no longer an open question. These cases rest upon the acknowledged right of the States of the Union to control their purely "in- ternal affairs, and, in so doing, to protect the health, morals and safety of their people, provided they do not interfere with the execution of the powers of the general government or violate rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.^"* 49Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. State, 25 Ala. 64; Jones v Hil- (U. S.) 129; 21 L. Ed. 929. Hard, 69 Ala. 300; Woods v. State, 50 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 36 Ark. 38; Ex parte McClain, 61 ^- '^- ^^- Cal. 436; Ex parte Campbell, 74 50 Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. Cal. 20; 15 Pac. 318; 5 Am St S. 201; 5 S. C. 8; 28 L. Ed. 629; 518; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn" Barbier v. Connelly, 113 U. S. 27; 290; Reynolds v. Geam, 26 Conn' 5 S. C. 357; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 179; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn 479- U. S. 623; 8 S. Ct. 273; 31 L. Ed. Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586- Bell 235 affirming 29 Kan. 252; 44 Am. v. State, 91 Ga. 231; 18 S E '?89- Rep. G34; Kidd V. Pearson, 128 U. Jones v. People, 14 III. 196- Ket- S. 1; 9 S. Ct. 8; 32 L. Ed. 346; tering v. Jacksonville, 50 111 39- In re Brosnahan, 18 Fed. Rep. 62; Our House No. 2 v State 4 Greene Kansas V. Bradley, 26 Fed. Rep. (Iowa) 172; Zumhoff 'v. State 289; Kohn V. Melcher, 29 Fed. 4 Greene (Iowa) 526; Santo v Rep. 423; United States v. Nel- State. 2 Iowa 105; 63 Am Dec son, 29 Fed. Rep. 202; Lodamo v. 487; State v. Donehey, 8 'lowa' §93 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS 110 Sec. 93. Prohibiting manufacture of intoxicating liquors. The right of a State to prohibit the manufacture of in- toxicating liquor within her boundaries can be no longer 39G; State v. Stiicker, 58 Iowa 49G; 12 N. VV. 483; State v. Car- ney, 20 Iowa 82; State v. Bengli- men, 20 Iowa 497 ; ^Martin v. Blattner, 68 Iowa 286; 25 N. W. 131; McLane v. Leicht, 69 Iowa 401; 29 N. VV. 327; Jordon v. District Court, 74 Iowa 762; 38 N. W. 430; Prohibitory Amend- ment Cases, 24 Kan. 700; State v. Mugler, 29 Kan. 252; Anderson v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush (Ky.) 485; Sarrls v. Commonwealth, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 299; Preston v. Drew, 33 Me. 558; Commonwealth v. Kendall, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 414; Commonwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray ( Mass. ) 97 ; Commonwealth v. Howe, 13 Gray (Ma.ss.) 26; Peo- ple V, Hawley, 3 Mich. 330 ; People V, Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Aus- tin V. State, 10 Mo. 591; State v. Pond 93 Mo. GOG; 6 S. W. 469; Metropolitan Board etc. v. Bar- rie, 34 N. Y. 657; People v. Wu- ant, 2 Park (N. Y.) 410; State v. Gate, 58 N. H. 241; State v. Ah. Chew, 16 Nev. 55; State v. Joyner, 81 N. C. 534; State v. Frame, 39 O. St. 399; Gordon v. State, 460 St. 607; 23 N. E. 63; Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio 586; State v. Guinness, 16 R. I. 401; 16 Atl. 010; State v. Gravelin, 16 R. I. 407; 16 Atl. 914; State v. Backer, 3 S. Dak. 29; 51 N. W. 1018; State V, Rancher, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 96; Ex parte Bell, 24 Tex. App. 428; 6 S. W. 197; State v. Pres- <50tt, 27 Vt. 194; State v. Conlin, 27 Vt. 318; In re Daughter 27 Vt. 325; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328; State v. Lovell, 47 Vt. 493; Gill V. Parker, 31 Vt. 610; State V. Lowell, 47 Vt. 493; Ruston v. Fountaine, 118 La. 53; 42 So. 644; Robison v. Haug, 71 Mich. 38; 38 X. W. 068; Dupree v. State (Tex.), 119 S. W. 301; 107 .S. W. ■^m; State v. Walker (Mo.), 120 S. W. 1198, affirming 129 Mo. App. 371; 108 S. W. 615; State V. Hooker (Okla.), 98 Pac. 964; F. W. Cook Brewing Co. v. Gar- ber, 1G8 Fed. 942 ; Jones v. Yokum, (S. D.), 123 N. W. 272; Rooney V. Augusta, 117 Ga. 709; 45 S. E. 72; State v. Stoffels, 89 Minn. 205; 94 N. W. 675; August Busch & Co. V. Webb, 122 Fed. 655; Rippey v. State, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 72; 73 S. W. 15; Commonwealth V. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 115 Mass. 153; State v. Allmond, 2 Houst. (Del.) 612; In re Intoxi- cating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284; Cantini v. Till- m.an, 54 Fed. 969; In re Hoover, 30 Fed. 51; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86; 11 Sup. Ct. 13; 34 L. Ed. 620; Meehan v. Board, 73 N. J. L. 382; 64 Atl. 689: Hunzing- er V. State, 39 Neb. 653; 58 N. W. 194; Shannon v. State, 39 Neb. 658; 58 N. W. 196; Equitable Life etc. Co. v. Edwardsville, 143 Ala. 162; 38 So. 1016; Soehl v. State, 39 Neb. 695; 58 N. W. 196; Rowles v. State, 39 Neb. 659; 58 N. W. 197; State v. Skeags, 154 Ala. 249; 46 So. 268; Dor- man V. State, 34 Ala. 216; People Ill CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §93 questioned under the many decisions of the courts, even of liquor designed for transportation to and sale in another V. Huntington, 4 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 187; Wybhamer v. People, 20 Barb. 567 ; State v. Peckhara, 3 R. I. 289; State v. Fitzpatrick, 16 R. I. 54; 11 Atl. 767; Charleston V. Ahrens, 4 Strob. L. ( S. C. ) 241 ; State V. Durein, 70 Kan. 13; 80 Pac. 987; 78 Pac. 152; State V. Aiken, 42 S. C. 222; 20 S. E. 221; 26 L. R. A. 345 (overruling McCullough V. Brown, 41 S. C. 220; 19 S. E. 458; 23 L. R. A. 410); State v. Creden, 78 Iowa 556; 43 N. W. 673; 7 L. R. A. 295 ; People v. Quant. 12 How. Pr. 83; 2 Parker Cr. Rep. 410; Smith V. People, 1 Parker Cr. Rep. 583; State V. Intoxicating liquors, 5S Vt. 594 ; 4 Atl. 229 ; State v. Fitz- patrick, 16 r. I. 54; 11 Atl. 767 Pearson v. International Distill ery, 72 Iowa 348; 34 N. W. 1 affirmed 128 U. S. 1; 9 Sup. Ct, 6; 32 L. Ed. 346; Lenip v. Fuller ton, 83 Iowa 192; 48 N. W. 1034 13 L. R. 408; Commonwealth v, Gagne, 153 Mass. 205; 26 N. E 449; 10 L. R. A. 442; Common- wealth V. Gay, 153 Mass. 211; 26 N. E. 571; Commonwealth v. Gay, 153 Mass. 211; 26 N. E. 852; Tredway v. Riley, 32 Neb. 495; 49 N. W. 268; 29 Am. St. 447; State V. Walruff, 26 Fed. 178; Ex parte Cain, 20 Okla. 125; 93 Pac. 974 Tanner v. Alliance, 29 Fed. 196 Schwuchow V. Chicago, G8 111. 444 Streeter v. People, 69 III. 595 State V. Jordan, 72 Iowa 377; 34 N. W. 285; State v. Teissedre, 30 Kan. 476; 2 Pac. 650; Ex parte Burnside, 86 Ky. 423; 6 S. W. 276; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378; 2 Parker Cr. Rep. 421 affirming 2 Parker Cr. Rep. 377 State V. Porterfield, 47 S. C. 75 25 S. E. 39; Ex parte Lynn, 19 Tex. App. 293; Steele v. State, 19 Tex. App. 425; Schwulst v. State, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 426; 108 S. W. 698; Feibelman v. State. 130 Ala. 122; 30 So. 384; McLain v. State, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 213; 64 S. W. 865; State v. Fountain (Del.), 69 Atl. 926; State v. Harp, 210 Mo. 254; 109 S. W. 578; State v. Williams (X. C), 61 S. E. 61; McAllister v. State (Ala.), 47 So. 161; Plumb V. Christie, 103 Ga. 686; 30 S. E. 759; 42 L. R. A. 181; State v. Sercy, 20 Mo. 489; Powers v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 167; 13 S. W. 450; In re Luent 6 Greenl. 412; Commonwealth v. Blackington, 24 Pick. 352; Edgar V. McDonald (Tex. €iv. App.), 106 S. W. 1135; Hart v. State, 87 Miss. 171; 39 So. 523; Parker v. State, 99 Md. 189; 57 Atl. 677; In re Phillips, 82 Neb. 45; 116 N. W. 950. The principle involved in a local option prohibitory law is the same as that involved in a general prohibition law. State v. Foun- tain (Del.), 69 Atl. 926. A statute is valid which pro- hibits tlie sale of liquor, but makes the guilt of the seller to depend upon where the liquor is drunk. Raubold v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1125; 54 S. W. 17. In Kentucky the Legislature cannot prohibit the sale of liquor for medicinal purposes. Com- § 93 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 112 State where the traffic in liquor is entirely legitimate. Such a law is valid as to those engaged in the business at the time lof its passage, although the effect is to destroy their business a,nd to greatly, if not totally, impair the value of the prop- erty used in the manufacture. The most striking cases of this character arose in Kansas on the adoption in that State of the present constitutional provision forbidding the manu- facture and sale of intoxicating liquors except for medical and mechanical purposes. There the complainant owned a brewery, with all necessary appliances, which could not be devoted to any other purpose, worth, before the adoption of prohibition, fifty thousand dollars, but which was diminished in value, b}^ reason of the adoption of the prohibitory provi- sion to five thousand dollars. As to this property a lower court held the prohibitory provision unconstitutional ; ^^ but the Supreme Court of the United States held it valid. After holding that the right to manufacture and sell intoxicating liquors was not one of the privileges and immunities guar- anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the court said: "It is, however, contended that although the State may prohibit the manufacture of intoxicating liquors for sale or barter within her limits, for general use as a beverage, 'no con- vention or Legislature has the right, under our form of government, to prohibit any citizen from manufacturing for his own use, or for export or storage, any article of food or drink not endangering or affecting the rights of others.' The argument made in support of the first branch of this proposition, briefly stated, is, that in the implied compact between the State and the citizen, certain rights are reserved by the latter which are guaranteed by the constitutional pro- vision protecting persons against being deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. and with monwealth V. Fowler, 96 Ky. 166; si state v. Walruff, 26 Fed. 28 S. W. 786; 33 L. R. A. 839. 178; Wynehamer v. People, 13 The State may prohibit the sale N. Y. 378; 2 Park. Cr. Rep. 421; of whisky by driiprtrists. Common- In re Peine, 42 Fed. 545; Com' wealth V. Reynolds, 89 Ky. 147; monwealth v. Murphy, 10 Gray, 1. 12 S. W. 132; 20 S. W. 167; 11 Ky. L. Rep. 445. 113 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 93 which the State cannot interfere; that among those rights is that of manufacturing for one's use food or drink; and that while, according to the doctrines of the commune, the State may control the taste, habits, dress, food and drink of the people, our system of government, based upon the in- dividuality and taste of the citizen, does not claim to con- trol him except as to his conduct to others, leaving him the sole judge as to all that only affects himself. It will be ob- served that the proposition, and the argument made in sup- port of it, equally concede that the right to manufacture drink for one's personal use is subject to the condition that such manufacture does not undergo or affect the rights of others. If such manufacture does prejudicially affect the rights and interests of the community, it follows from the very premises stated, that society has the power to protect itself by legislation against the injurious con- sequences of that business. As was said in Munn v. Illinois,^- while power does not exist in the whole people to control rights that are purely and exclusively private, government may require 'each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another.' But by whom, or by what authority, is it to be determined whether the manufacture of particular articles of drink, either for general use or for the personal use of the maker, will injuriously affect the public ? Power to determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere ; else socie- ty will be at the mercy of the few, who, regarding only their own appetites or passions, may be willing to imperil the peace and security of the many, provided only they are per- mitted to do as they please. Under our system this power is lodged with the legislative branch of the government. It belongs to that department to exert what are known as the police power of the State, and to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, or the public safety. It does not follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of those ends is to be accepted as a legitimate ex- 52 ©4 U, S. 113, 124. § 93 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING IJQUORS. 114 ertion of the police powers of the State. There are, of neces- sity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go. While every possible presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute,^^ the courts must obey the Con- stitution rather than the lawmaking department of the gov- ernment, and must, upon their own responsi'.iility, determine whether, in any particular case, these limits have been passed. *To what purpose,' it was. said in Marbury v. Madi- son, ^* 'are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limita- tion committed to writing, if these limits may at any time be passed by those intended to be restrained ? The distinction be- tween a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation. ' The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretense. They are at liberty — indeed they are under a solemn duty — to look at tne substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the Legislature has transcended the limits cf its authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals or the public safety, has no real or substantial rela- tion to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights, se- cured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Keeping in view these principles, as governing the relations of the judicial and legislative departments of government with each other, it is difficult to perceive any ground for the judiciary to declare that the prohibition by Kansas of the manufacture or sale, within her limits, of intoxicating li- quors for general use there as a beverage, is not fairly adapted to the end of protecting the community against the evils which confessedly result from the excessive use of ar- dent spirits. There is no justification for holding that the State, under the guise merely of police regulations, is here aiming to deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights; B3 Citing Sinking Fund Cases, »* 1 Cranch 137, 176. 99 U. S. 700. 115 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 93 for one cannot shut out of view the fact, within the knowl- edge of all, that the public health, the public morals, and the public safety may be endangered by the use of intoxi- cating liquors ; nor tne fact, established by statistics? accessi- ble to every one, that the idleness, disorder, pauperism and crime existing in the country are^ in some degree at least, traceable to this evil. If, therefore, a State deems the abso- lute prohibition of the manufacture and sale within her limits of intoxicating liquors for other than medical, scien- tific and manufacturing purposes, to .be necessary to the peace and security of society, the courts cannot, without usurping legislative functions, override the will of the peo- ple as thus expressed by their chosen representatives. They have nothing to do with the mere policy of legislation. In- deed, it is a fundamental principle in our institutions, indis- pensable to the preservation of public liberty, that one of the separate departments of the government shall not usurp powers committed by the Constitution to another depart- ment. And so, if in the judgment of the Legislature, the manufacture of intoxicating liquors for the maker's own use, as a beverage, would tend to cripple, if it did not de- feat, the effort to guard the community against the evils attending the excessive use of such liquors, it is not for the courts, upon their views as to what is best and safest for the community, to disregard the legislative determina- tion of that question. So far from such a regulation having any new relation to the general end sought to be accom- plished, the entire scheme of prohibition as embodied in the Constitution and laws of Kansas might fail, if the right of each citizen to manufacture intoxicating liquors for his own use as a beverage was recognized. Such a right does not inhere in citizenship. Nor can it be said that government interferes with or impairs any one's constitutional rights of liberty or property, when it determines that the manu- facture and sale of intoxicating liquors for general or in- dividual use as a beverage, are, or may become, hurtful to society, and constitute therefor a business in which no one may lawfully engage. Those rights are best secured, in our § 93 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 116 government, by the observance, upon the part of all, of such regulations as are established by competent authority to pro- mote the common good. No one may rightfully do that which the lawmaking power, upon reasonable grounds, de- clares to be prejudicial to the general welfare. The conclu- sion is unavoidable, unless the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution takes away from the States of the Union those powers of police that were received at the time the original Constitution was adopted. But as this court has declared, upon full consideration,-^"' the Fourteenth Amend- ment had no such effect. After observing, among other things, that that amendment forbade the arbitrary depriva- tion of life and liberty, and the arbitrary spoliation of property and secured equal protection to all under the like circumstances, in respect as well to their personal and civil rights as to their acquisition and enjoyment of proper- ty, the court said: 'But neither the amendment — broad and comprehensive as it is — nor any other amendment, was de- signed to interfere with the powers of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to proscribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources, and add to the wealth and prosperity.' Undoubtedly the State, when providing by legislation for the protection of the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, is subject to the para- mount authority of the Constitution of the United States, and may not violate rights secured or guaranteed by that instrument, or interfere with the execution of the powers confided to the general government. ^"^ Upon this ground — if we do not misapprehend the position of defendants — it is /contended that, as the primary and principal use of beer 55 In Barbier v. Connolly, 113 ing v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446; 6 U, S. 27; 5 Sup. Ct. 357. Sup. Ct. 454; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 5G Citing Henderson v. Mayor, 118 U. S. C56; 6 Sup. Ct. 1064; 92 U. S. 250 ; Railroad Co. v. Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisi- Husen, 95 U. S. 465; New Orleans ana Board, 118 U. S. 455; 6 Sup. Gas Co. V. Louisiana etc. Co. 115 Ct. 1114. U. S. 650; 6 Sup. Ct. 252; Wall- 117 CONSTITUTIONAUTY OF STATUTES. S 33 is a beverage; as their respective breweries were erected when .t was lawful to engage in the manufacture of b er for every purpose; as such establishments will become of no m value, ,f not employefl in the manufacture of beer for every purpose ; the prohibition upon their being so emp Led ITatf ' ".'f' °' "■■"P"*^ '"' P»"'» use°without ': pensat.on, and depr.vmg the citizen of his property without lue process of law In other words, although the State n the exercse of her police powers, may lawfully proh b i he manufacture and sale, within her limits, of intox,™,' n g Kiuors to be used as a beverage, legislation' having tha ob annen'tT' "™"' '^ '"'"""'^ '"''"^ "«>- ->'« «t the time ation TfirT "t """"/-'--g P-P-e^, ™less compen- sation IS first made for the diminution in the value of their property resulting from such prohibitory enactments Th I be. It cannot be supposed that the States intended bv adoptmg that amendment, to impo.se restraints upon the' el r mill "oTtr"'" ""■ "" "^'^^''^ "' '"^ -^^'y. '-'". morals of the community. • • . The prineinle that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,' or prop rty C titutlr "T" "! ■'" ^'^ ^"■''°'"^^' - ™^stanee, in t^ tte f tleL r"'"'/'' '* ""' ="'' °* "X' States at the me of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and it iias never been regarded as incompatible with the principle so!;:,^trt "i^""" "^™'''^' *» "^^ p-- ^^ -^"tTof Z Ei oh ' "Zr'^ '" ""'^ ™™*^y -^ "eld under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be XT *" T »— i'y-"" "A prohibition si p^ Till • !■ '"■'"""■'■' '"'■ P"'-P°^^^ that are declared, by la et f fh '™' '' '"^■""°"' *" *'>^ '■»«'«', morals or ■ Hno. '""■""'"'y' -^xraot in any .i„st sense be deemed a taking or appropriation of property for the public benefit ''7 Here the court examines Pit tt q «(;n ^ r, W„ . Ke„t„.„ „ „. s' !:l. Sa/'C Wa r;r "• '"'"' i" ertilizinsr Co. v. HvHo T»o^i, ot Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 § 93 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 118 Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests. Nor can legislation of that character come within the Fourteenth Amendment in any case, unless it is apparent that its real object is not to protect the community or to promote the general well- being, but, under the guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of his liberty or property without due process of law. The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will be preju- dicial to the health, morals, or the safety of the public is not ■ — and consistently with the existence and safety of organized society cannot be — burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being per- mitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community. The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a person of his property without due process of law. In the one case a nui- sance only is abated ; in the other, an offending property is taken away from an innocent owner. It is true that when the defendants in these cases purchased or erected their breweries the laws of the State did not forbid the manu- facture of intoxicating liquors. But the State did not there- by give any assurance, or come under an obligation that its legislation on that subject would remain unchanged. In- deed, as was said in Stone v. Mississippi, ^'^ the supervision of the public health and the public morals is a governmen- tal power, continuing in its nature, and 'to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment may require,' and that 'for this purpose the largest legislative discretion is allowed, and the discretion cannot be parted with any more oa 101 U. S. 814. 119 CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTES. §93 than the power itself/'^" So in Beer Co. v. Massachusetts: "If the public safety or the public morals re(iuire the discon- tinuance of any manufacture or traffic, the hand of the Legis- lature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinu- ance by any incidental inconvenience which individuals or corporations may suffer."^" 5997 U. S. 32. 60 97 U. S. 25; Mugler v. Kan- sas, 123 U. S. 623 ; 8 Sup. Ct. 273 ; 31 L. Ed. 205; affirming 29 Kan. 252; 44 Am. Rep. 634. In Bartmeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; 13 Am. L. Reg. 220, the court refused to consider the question above discussed, saying it was too grave a question to be discussed unless squarely presented by the record. See also Kaufman v. Dostal, 73 Iowa, 691; Whitney v. Township Board. 7. Mich. 234; 39 N. W. 196; Menken v. Atlanta, 78 Ga. ©58; Tredway v. Riley, 32 Neb. 495; 49 N. W. 268; 29 Am. St. 447; Pearson v. International Distillery, 72 Iowa 348; 34 N. W. 1; affirmed 128 U. S. 1 ; 9 Sup. Ct. 6; 32 L. Ed. 346; Heck v. State, 44 Ohio St. 536; 9 N. E. 305 ; Stickrod v. Commonwealth, 86 Ky. 285; 5 S. W. 580; 9 Ky. L. Rep. 563; State v. Fitzpatrick, 16 R. I. 54; 11 Atl. 767. Upon this question Justice Coo- ley has well observed: "Perhaps there is no instance in which the power of the Legislature to make such '•egulations as may destroy the value of property, without compensation to the owners, ap- pears in a more striking light than in the case of these statutes. The trade in alcoholic drinks be- ing lawful, and the capital em- ployed in it being fully protected by law, the Legislature then steps in, and by an enactment based on general reasons of public utility, annihilates the traffic, destroys al- together tlio emploj'ment, and re- duces to a nominal value the property on hand. Even the keeping of that, for the purpose of sale, becomes a criminal of- fense; and, without any change whatever in his own conduct or employment, the merchant of yes- terday becomes the criminal of to-day, and the very building in which he lives and conducts the business which to that moment was lawful becomes the subject of legal proceedings, if the statute shall so declare to be proceeded against for a forfeiture. A stat- ute which can do tliis must be justified uix)n the highest reasons of public benefit; but, whether sat- isfactory or not, the reasons ad- dress themselves exclusively to the legislative wisdom." Cooley Const. Lim. (6 ed.), 719. Several decisions hold that the fact that the liquor is manufac- tured for export does not prevent the State from declaring the man- ufacture illegal or prohibiting its manufacture. Kid v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1; 9 Sup. Ct. 6; 32 L. Ed. 346; State v. Jordan, 72 Iowa, 377; 34 N. W. 285; People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330; Tanner v. § 94 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 120 Sec. 94. Constitution prohibiting the granting of license — Ohio Constitution. The Constitution of Ohio provides that " no license to traf- fic in intoxicating liquors shall hereafter be granted in this State, but the General Assembly may by law provide against evils resulting therefrom," and it was held that a statute providing for a license to sell liquor was unconstitu- tional.^^ And a statute providing that "whoever shall engage or continue in the business aforesaid of selling intoxi- cating liquors in or upon land or premises not owned by him, and without the written consent of the owner thereof, shall be held guilty of a misdemeanor," and also providing that the assessments made, by the act on the business should be a lien on the premises, occupied by the tenant was in effect a license law, and was void.*'- But the provision does not prevent the I legislature levying a tax upon the business of selling liquor, the constitutional provision merely being a declaration that the Legislature shall not countenance the Alliance, 29 Fed. 196; State v. tilling of liquors from grain, ex- Fitzpatrick, 16 S. I. 54; August cept under the direction, and with Busch & Co. V. Webb, 122 Fed. his consent, of the governor of the Thornton — Intoxicants — JFH 32 State has been held to be con- 655; Ex parte Rippey, 44 Tex. stitutional, not being a delegation Cr. App. 7'2; 73 S. W. 15; 'Com- of legislative power. Ingram v. monwealth v. Certain Intoxicating State, 39 Ala. 247; 84 Am. Dec. Liquors, 115 Mass. 153; Edgar v. 792. But it has been held that a McDonald (Tex. Civ. App.), statute prohibiting the sale of all 106 S. W. 1135; Clark v. Tower, liquors except those manufactured 65 Atl. 3; 104 Md. 175; Beer Co. under the authority of the select- v. Massachusetts; 97 U. S. 525; men of the town for sacrament, Ex parte Lynn, 19 Tex. App. 293; medicinal, chemical or mechanical Steele v. State, 19 Tex. App. 425 ; Tises, was valid. State v. Bren- Metropolitan Board v. Barrie, 34 nen, 25 Conn. 278; State v. N. Y. 657. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290. A statute declaring liquors to ei State v. Hipp, 38 Ohio St. 1)0 a nuisance is valid as to liquors 199. on hand before its enactment. Kid 62 King v. Cappellar, 42 Ohio V. Bearson, 128 U. S. 1 ; 9 Sup. St. 218; Butzman v. Whitbeck, Ct. 6; 32 L. Ed. 346. 42 Ohio St. 223. Contra, State v. A statute prohibiting the dis- Freme, 39 Ohio St. 399. 121 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 95 sale by legal sanction.*'^ The Legislature may also provide that this tax shall constitute a lien on the business." This provision applies both to wholesale and retail sales,"^ and it does not by implication prevent the enactment of prohibitory legislation.'^'^ Sec. 95. Effect of adopting constitutional prohibitory measure on prior statutes. Where a State adopts a constitutional provision prohibit- ing the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, all statutes then in force are annulled " unless the constitutional provision provides that it shall not affect ex- isting statutes or laws.*"* But a provision of the Constitu- tion prohibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors except for medical and mechanical purposes does not prevent the State licensing and regulating the sale of such liquors for medicinal and mechanical purposes, the same as if such a provision had never been adopted.**^ In Kentucky the Constitution provides for a local option election, and provides that " nothing herein shall * * * repeal any law in force, " and this was held not to prevent the repealing of a law pro- hibiting the sale of liquors before an election was held.'^'^ The adoption of a constitutional prohibitory law or provi- esAdler v. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio parte Cain, 20 Okla. 125; 93 Pac. St. 539; 9 X. E. 072; Anderson 974; Arie v. State, 1 Okla. Cr. V. Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 57G; 9 6&6; 100 Pac. 233; Ex parte Mc- N. E. 683. Xaught, 1 Okla. Cr. 260; 100 Pac. 64Adler v. \Yhitbeck, supra. 271. 65 Senior v. Rattorman, 44 Ohio 68 State v. Dorr, 82 Me. 212: 19* St. 661; 11 X. E. 321; affirming Atl. 171; State v! Walker (Mo.), 17 Wkly. L. Bull. 115. 120.S. W. 1198; affirming 129 Mo. 86 Gordon v State, 46 Ohio St. App. 371; lOS S. W. 615. 607; 23 X. E. 63 ; 6 L. R. A. 749; «" Stat« v. Kennedy, 16 R. I. State V. Amery, 12 R. I. 64. 409; 17 Atl. 5; State v. Kane, 67 State V. Touks, 15 R. I. 385; 15 R. I. 395; 6 Atl. 783; State v. 5 Atl. 036; Draper v. State (Ga.), Clark, 15 R. I. 383; 5 Atl. 635: €4 S. E. 117; King v. Cappellar, People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343. 42 Ohio St. 218; State v. ^ochran 7o Brown v. Commcawealth, 98 (Ore.), 104 Pac. 419; Butzman Ky. 652; 34 S. W. 12. V. Whitbeck, 42 Ohio St. 223; Ex § 96 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 122 sion does not prevent the Legislature enacting laws in aid thereof or in addition thereto.'^ Sec. 96. Contracts prohibiting. A State may prohibit the making of contracts in the fu- ture for the sale or purchase of intoxicating liquors; and may prohibit a recovery of the price of liquors sold.'- It may also forbid an action to recover the possession of liquor sold.^^ A State may forbid, it has been held, the mainte- nance of an action to recover the price of liquor bought outside the State with intent to sell it within the State in contravention of the laws there forbidding the sale of intoxi- cating liquors.^* But it has also been held that a State can- not forbid the enforcement of a contract entered into before the passage of the Wilson law (1890) by an agent soliciting purchases of liquor to be delivered in another State; and upon such contracts, notwithstanding the provisions of a statute declaring them void, a recovery can be had. " And a law compelling the plaintiff to prove, in an action on a contract of sale of liquor, that it was law^fully sold or lawful- ly kept and owned by him, is invalid.'*^ A statute forbidding a recovery of the possession of intoxicating liquors will be construed to mean liquor liable to seizure and forfeiture for -1 State V. Hooker (Okla.), 98 246; 61 Atl. 131; Barrett v. De- Pac. 964. See also Dupree v. lano (Me.), 14 Atl. 288; Meser- State (Tex.), 119 S. W. 301, an- vey v. Gray, 55 Me. 540; Thurston swering (Tex. Civ. App.), 107 S. v. Adams, 41 Me. 419. W. 926. "^ Thurston v. Adams, 41 Me. A person who has not complied 419. with the laws concerning the sale 74 Barrett v. Delano (Me.), 14 of liquors in force on the adop- Atl. 288; Meservey v. Gray, 55 lion of a prohibitory constitu- Me. 540; Corbin v. Houlehan, 100 tional provision cannot question Me. 246; 61 Atl. 131. the validity of such provision. F. " Durkee v. Moses, 67 N. H. W. Cook Brewing Co. v. Garber, 115; 23 Atl. 793; (overruling 168 Fed. 942. Dunbar v. Locke, 62 N. H. 442, The Oklahoma constitutional and Jones v. Surprise, 64 N. R. provisions relating to prohibition 243; 9 Atl. 384). /n re opinion of are self-executing. Ex parte Cain, Superior Court, 5 Fost. 537. 20 Okla. 125; 93 Pac. 974. to People v. Toynbee, 2 Park. 72 Corbin v. Houlehan, 100 Me. (N. Y.) 329. 123 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §97 a violation of the liquor law; for otherwise it would be void, violating the provisions of the Constitution providing that any person for an injury done him in his person or property shall have a remedy by due course of lawj^ Sec. 97. Past contracts for sale of intoxicating liquors. Contracts for the sale or purchase of intoxicating liquors that were valid at the time and place where completed, can- not be rendered invalid by any subsequent legislation con- cerning intoxicating liquors. ''^ This is particularly true of a recovery upon a breach of the condition of a bond given pursuant to the provisions of a license law, even if prohi- bition is brought about by the adoption of a prohibitory constitutional provision."" Even the repeal of the law giv- ing the right of action can not take away the cause of action arising previous to its repeal.^" "Preston v. Drew, 33 Me. 558; 54 Am. Dec. 639. Where ;i- statute forbade the sale, except for certain purposes, of in- toxicating liquors, and exempted certain property, not intoxicat- ing liquor, from sale on le- gal process for the payment of debts, the question whether such liquors can he sold on execution involves no constitutional ques- tion. Standard Oil Co. v. Ange- vine, 60 Kan. 167; C5 Pac. 879. Although a contract for the sale of liquor may be void, because un- lawful, yet the vendor may re- cover the proceeds of such sale where they have been collected by his agent, even the agent who sold the liquors. Hertzler v. Geig- ley, 196 Pa. St. 419; 46 Atl. 366. In South Carolina only the State can question the validity of a sale of liquors. Ex parte Neal, etc. Co., 58 S. C. 269; 36 S. E. 584. A statute rendering void all contracts for the sale of liquors to be delivered in any other State or county to enable the purchaser to violate the provisions of such statute by there being reshipped back into the State where sold, is constitutional. Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179. 78 State V. Williams, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 346; 30 S. W. 477; Cor- bin V. Houlehan, 100 Me. 246; 61 Atl. 131. 79 Coggeshall v. Groves, 16 Pt. I. 18; 11 Atl. 296. 80 State v. Williams, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 346; 30 S. W. 477; DeGra- zier v. Stephens (Tex.), 105 S. W. 092. § 98 TR.VFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 124 Sec. 98. Effect of prohibition upon liquors on hand at time of its adoption. It is no longer a question of doubt that a State may for- bid the future sale of intoxicating liquors within her boun- daries. The rig-ht to sell intoxicating liquors is not one of the rights of citizenship.^^ A more serious question, how- ever, is the effect upon the ownership of liquors on hand within the State at the time a prohibitory law is adopted. If the o\\Tiership of the liquor was obtained when a law was in force requiring a license to sell them, and the law providing that a license must be obtained before a sale could be made, and this law is repealed, thus leaving it impossi- ble to sell the liquors, there is no question that the repealing law is valid, and that the license immediately ends; for no one has a vested right in a license, as has been elsewhere dis- cussed.^- The effect upon liquors he has on hand is to effectually prevent the ex-licensee selling them or in any way disposing of them ; and of this fact he cannot complain, for he purchased them with the knowledge (which he was bound to have) that the law authorizing the granting of a license could at any time be repealed and the liquors left upon his hands. But the law goes still further. Although it \xaH lawful for the owner, at the time he purchased liquors or acquired property in them, to sell or otherwise dispose of them, yet a subsequent law may absolutely forbid him either selling or giving them away, and thus in a limited extent con- fiscating the liquor. A law making the keeping or sale of liquors already on hand unlawful is not an ex post facto law, and is valid, although at the time of the acquisition of ownership 81 Baremeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. Kan. 700; Calder v. Kurby, 5 129; State v. Doss, 70 Ark. 312; Gray, 597; Beer Co. v. Massachu- 67 S. W. 867. setts, 97 U. S. 25; Wheeler v. 82 See also Moore v. Indianapo- State, 64 Miss. 462; 1 So. 632; lis, 120 Ind. 483; 22 N. E. 424; Powell v. State, 69 Ala. 10; Ter- Metropolitan Board v. Barrie, 34 ritory v. Miguel, 18 Hawaii, 402; N. Y. 659; Fell v. State, 47 Md. State v. Bolt, 31 La. Ann, 663; 33 71; 20 Am. Rop. 83; Brown v. Am. Rep. 224; State v. Chester, IS State, 82 Ga. 224; 7 S. E. 915; S. C. 464. Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 24 125 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 98 in them the sale or keeping of them was not an offense.**' There are a few eases which hold that a prohibition law is unconstitutional, so far as it relates to liquors on hand at the date of the adoption, its effect being to deprive a party of his property without due process of law.^* But it may be laid down as a well-established rule at the present day that the owner of liquors which he has on hands at the time of the adoption of a prohibitory law cannot successfully com- plain of the law, although deprived of his power to sell or give them away.^' The property in liquors still remains in the owner. But a much more serious question arises when the statute attempts to make the liquors on hand "contra- band" or to confiscate them. In a recent case this exact phase was incidentally discussed. "It has been said," the court observed, "that intoxicating liquors are property, and that a law prohibiting their sale as a drink is the exercise of a despotic power, calling for an unconstitutional interference with the rights of property, and necessarily impairing and even destroying those rights, which, it is claimed, is against natural right and justice and beyond the pale of consti- S3 State V. Paul, 5 R. I. 185; Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 24 State V. Keeran, 5 R. I. 497; Rose Kan. 700; Heck v. State, 44 Ohio, V. State, 171 Ind. 662; 87 N. E. 536; 9 N. E. 305; Menken v. At- 103; Grumbauch v. Lelande, 154 lanta, 78 Ga. 668; 2 S. E. 559; Cal. 679; 98 Pae. 1059; McClana- Savage v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. ban V. Breeding (Ind.), 88 N. 582; 5 S. E. olio; Kissinger v. E. 695; Viefhaus v. Bohenstehn, Hinkhouse, 27 Fed. 883; Weil v. 71 Ark. 419; 75 S. W. 585; Stick- Calhoun, 25 Fed. 865; Tanner v. rod V. Commonwealth, 86 Ky. 285 ; Alliance, 29 Fed. 196; Shear v. 5 S. W. 580; 9 Ky. L. Rep. 563. Bolinger, 74 Iowa, 757; 37 N. W. 84VVynehamer v. Pe the sale of such liquors within the limits of an incorpor'Ated town will not deprive it of its character as a general law ; - '^ nor will it be deprived of its general character because it exempts those persons who al- ready have established places of business within the pre- scribed limits." In Massachusetts, under a statute which provided that "no license shall be granted for the sale of in- toxicating liquors in any building or place, on the same street, within 400 feet of any building occupied, in whole or in part, by a public school," it was held that the distance between the schoolhouse and building is to be determined by measuring from the nearest point of such house to the other, and that it is not necessary that the building should be sit- uated on the line of the same street ; in other words, that the measureruent is to be made, not from the nearest point of the room, but the "building or place" in which the sale is made to the school building, aud that the word "place" as used in the statute is intended to cover the case where there is no building, but where a tent, booth, excavation in the ground, or some other locality, is resorted to for the purpose of selling such liquor.^' Under that statute it was also held that if the defendant's saloon did not front on the street on which the schoolhouse was located, but had in the rear a lot, in the fence around which a gate had been put, and through which and across this lot persons were accustomed to go from the defendant's jn'omises to the street on which the school- is Boyd V. Bryant, 35 Ark. 69; Lea) 3&8; Howell v. State, 71 Ga. Wilson V. State, .".5 Ark. 414; 224; 51 Am. Rep. 259; Butler v. White V. Bracelin, 144 Mich. 332; State, 89 Ga. 821; 15 S. E. 763. 107 N. W. 1055; 13 Detroit Leg. instate v. Ranscher, G9 Tenn. N. 156; State v. Ranscher, 69 (1 Lea) 96. Tenn. (1 Lea) 90; Murphy v. i^ Commonwealth v. Jones, 142 State, 77 Tenn. (9 Lea) 373; Mass. 578; 8 X. E, 60). Hutchcr V, State, 80 Tenn. (12 1^5 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES § 104 house was situate.!, it was a question for the jury whether there was such a general use by all persons of the gate and passageway as to make th-^ premises on the same street as the sehoolhouse.^^ A local law which prohibits the sale of such liquors within a given distance of ;i sehoolhouse not only protects the school there taught from the evils of the liquor traffic, but also all persons within tho entire area of the community extending the distance named in every direction from the center of th3 house in which the school is taught, and the removal of the school to another building in the neighborhood, because of the destruction of the sehoolhouse or the taking of a vacation by the school, will not in any way change or affect the operation of the law. Its operation in the prescribed territory can not be affected by any subse- quent event, except by legislative action. The only power that can repeal or suspend such a law is the one by which it has been established — the General Assembly — in which alone is vesttd the constitutional authority to make and unmake laws.^' In Arkansas and Tennessee laws have been enacted making it unlawful to sell such liquors within a given dis- tance of any incorporated university, college, academy, or institution of learning. It has been held that these laws do not apply to the common schools provided for by the Legis- lature, even though they are taught in the building of a college or academy,'^ and that to sustain a conviction for sell- ing such liquors within the prescribed distance of such incor- porated institution of learning, the certificate of the Secre- tary of State must have previously been registered in the office of the county register.^^ A statute prohibiting sales within four miles of a sehoolhouse, except in towns of a ce>. 10 Commonwealth v. Everson, 682. Such a statute is valitl. Dor- 140 Mass. 572; 5 N. E. 155. man v. State, 34 Ala. 216. 17 Love V. Porter, 93 Ala. 384; lo Brewer v. State, 75 Tenn (7 9 So. 585; Dorman v. State, 34 Lea) 682; Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216; Tilley V. State, 78 Tenn. Ala. 216; Webster v. State, 110 (10 Lea) 35. Tenn. 491; 82 S. W. 179; State v. IS DoRois V. State. n4 Ark, 381 ; Pausohor. 09 Tonn. (1 T^a) ftfi; Blackwell v. State, 36 Ark. 178; Hatcher v. State, 80 Tenn. (12 Brewer v. State, 75 Tenn. (7 Lea) Lea) 368. § 105 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 136 tain designated population, is valid, and not open to th*' abjection that it grants unequal privileges.-" Sec. 105. Religious assemblies. An enforeible law may be enacted making it a misde- meanor for any person to sell, give, barter, or in any way dis- pose of intoxicating liquors within a given distance from the place where any religious society or assemblage of people collect together for religious worship,-^ and where the stat- ute makes an exception as to such persons as carry on their regular business at their usual places of transacting the same, a person may not rent property within the prohibited limit for the purpose of selling such liquors during the con- tinuance of a meeting of such society without violating the statute.-- Such a law has been held valid, notwithstanding a part of the territory so specified is within the limits of a town whose charter had prior to enactment of such law empow- ered the town to license liquor selling.-^ Under a local law of this character which prohibits the sale of such liquors with- in a given distance of the Methodist and Baptist Churches of a town, a conviction may be had on proof of a sale at a place which is within the district named of either one or both of such churches, the court holding that the manifest purpose of the law was to protect worshiping assemblies from annoy- ing disturbances which sometimes attend the sale of such liquors, and that protection was intended to be extended 20 Sate V. Frost, 103 Tenn. 685; Blackwell v. State, 36 Ark. 178; 54 S. W. 986. See Jung Brewing Trammell v. Bradley, 37 Ark. 374; Co. V. Frankfort, 100 Ky. 409; 38 Meyer v. Baker, 120 111. 567; 12 S. W. 710; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 855. N. E. 79; State v. Midgett, 85 N. A statute authorizing a local C. 538; State v. Partlow, 91 N. C. board to enter an order, upon pe- 550; 49 Am. Rep. 652; State v. tition of a majority of the voters Snow, 117 N. C. 774; 23 S. E. 322; in the district, to prohibit the sale West v. State, 28 Tenn. (9 of liquors within three miles of an Humph.) 66; Meyer v. Baker, 120 educational institution is consti- 111. 567; 12 N. E. 70. tutional. Trammell v. Bradley, 37 22 State v. Solomon, 33 Ind. 450. Ark. 374. 23 state v. Snow, 117 N. C. 774; 21 Boyd V. Bryant, 35 Ark. 69; 23 S. E. 322. Wilson V. State, 35 Ark. 414; 137 CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTES. § 105 equally and alike to the two churches. In other words, the legislative intent was to establish a prohibition district, which should include an area extending the distance named in every direction from the churches, and that district necessarily in- cluded every foot of ground which was less than the required distances from the churches.-* It has been held, however, that such a law was ambiguous and inoperative, where it pro- hibited the sale of such liquors within a given distance "of Mt. Zion Church in Gaston County," and it appeared on the trial of an indictment for a violation of it that there were two churches of that name in the county .-° Nor can an in- dictment, under such a statute, for selling such liquors with- in a prescribed distance of a church be sustained where the evidence shows that the sale was made within the prescribed distance of a house conveyed primarily for educational pur- poses, with permission to hold divine services therein on suit- able occasions.^" Nor can there be a conviction under such a statute unless the sale is completed within the prohibited district, so that the title to the liquor sold passes there from the vendor to the purchaser.-^ But a conviction was sus- tained where the evidence showed that the defendant was a practicing physician within the prescribed territory; that he was a member of a firm of saloon keepers in a town outside thereof; that he sent by messenger from his place of resi- dence to his partner a dollar for a quart of a particular whis- ky for medicinal purposes; that his partner at the saloon delivered to the messenger, upon receipt of the dollar, the quart of whisky, which, by the messenger, was carried and delivered to the physician. In that case it was held that the sale was not complete until the whisky had been delivered to the physician.-^ A Pennsylvania statute forbidding the sale of any kind of articles of traffic, spirituous liquors, wine, porter, beer, or any fermented, mixed or strong drink, within 24 Carlisle v. State, 91 Ala. 1; 27 Carl v. State, 43 Ark. 353; 8 So. 386. Bage v. State, 50 Ark. 20; G S. 25 State V. Partlow, 91 N. C. W. 15; Herron v. State, .51 Ark. 550; 49 Am. Rep. 652. 133; 10 S. W. 25. 2« State V. Midgett, 85 N. C. 28 Yowell v. State, 41 Ark. 355, 538. § 106 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 138 three miles of any place of religious worship during meetings held for that purpose has been construed as applying to the sale of such articles as would have a tendency to produce intoxi- cation and consequent disturbance, and not to articles of food which could not have that tendency."^ The fact that the statute permits a sale of mead with the consent of those in charge of the meeting does not render the prohibitory clause invalid.^" It cannot be objected that a statute of this kind regulates the internal affairs of a near-by city or town.^^ And a statute prohibiting within a certain distance of a church the sale of intoxicating liquors, except in licensed stores and taverns, is valid, the exception not rendering it invalid.^- Sec. 106. License state may require. As the Legislature has the power to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors, much more so has it the power to re- quire all vendors of such liquors to have a license to sell them, and punish all persons making sales without a license first obtained. "If the State has power to prohibit, it cer- tainly has the power to regulate the traffic," said the Su- preme Court of Maryland, "by determining who, and what character of persons, shall be licensed to deal in the article. * * * Having full and complete control over the sub- ject, as an article of internal commerce, the State can pre- scribe what conditions it may think proper upon which license can be obtained. It becomes simply a question of degree of prohibition." ^^ A statute requiring a license to sell and ex- 29 Fetter v. Wilt, 46 Pa. St. 457; Am. Dec. 22G; Pierce v. State, 13 Kramer v. Marks, 64 Pa. St. 151. N. H. 5.36; Ingersoll v. Skinner, 1 30 Meyers v. Baker, 120 111. 567; Denio, 540; Metropolitan Board v. 12 X. E. 79. Barrie, 34 X. Y. 657; Thomasson 31 Sexton V. Board (X\ J.), v. State, 15 Ind. 449; Territory v. 69 Atl. 470. Grinnell, 2 Ariz. 339; 16 Pac. 209; 32 State V. Muse, 4 Dev. & B. State v. Searcy, 20 Mo. 489 ; Pvohr- (N. C.) 319. backer v. Jackson, 51 Miss. 725; 33 Cohocs V. .Jarrett, 42 Md. 571 ; Streeter v. People, 69 111. 695; An- Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. derson v. Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 86; 11 Sup. Ct. 13; 34 L. Ed. 620; 576; 9 X. E. 683; Schuller v. Bor- Peoplc V. Meyers, 95 X. Y. 223; deaux, 64 Miss. 59; 8 So. 201; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 520; 69 Schwuchow v. Chicago, 68 111. 444 ; 139 CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTES. §106 acting a fee for its issuance is not in conflict with a consti- tutional provision providing that "no tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law."^* Nor does an ordinance re- quiring a fee to be paid for the license violate a provision in a Constitution providing that every person shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his property; for a license fee is not a tax.''^ So a provision in a Constitution providing tliat the Legislature may levy a license tax, but must graduate the amount thereof to be collected from the persons pursuing the several trades, professions and occupations, does not prohibit the exacting of a license from a social club that restricts its sales to its members without intending to make a profit on its sales.-'*'' A license law does not infringe a constitutional provision guaranteeing the acquiring, possessing and protec- tion of property.'-' Xor is such a law void because it ap- plies the license fees to the payment of the State's debts, '^'* Mugler V. Kansas, 123 U. S. G23; 8 Sup. €t. 273- 31 L. Ed. 205, affirming 29 Kan. 252 ; 44 Am. R p. 634; License Cases, 5 How. 504; 12 L. Ed. 256; Commonwealth v. Schowenhutt, 3 Phila. 20; Smith V. People, 1 Parker Cr, Rep. 583; Charleston v. Ahrens, 4 Strobh. 241; State v. Peckham, 3 R I. 289; Woleott v. Burlingame, 112 Mich. 311; 70 N. W. 831; In re Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284; State v. Buechler, 10 S. D. 156; 72 N. W. 114; Cantini v. Tillman, 54 Fed. 0-6^; State v. Bixman, 162 Mo. 1; 62 S. W. 828; Commonwealth v. Blackington, 24 Pick. 352; Sasser V. Martin, 101 Ga. 447; 29 S. E. 278; In re DeWalt, 186 Pa. 204; 42 W. N. C. 114; 40 Atl. 470; State V. Porterfield, 47 S. C. 75; 25 S. E. 39; State v. Mattle, 48 La. Ann. 728; 19 So. 748; Durein V. Kansas, 208 U. S. 226; 28 Sup. Ct. 567; 52 L. Ed. — , affirming 70 Kan. 1; 78 Pac. 152; 80 Pac. 987; State v. Williams, 146 N. C. 618; 61 S. E. 61; In re Boyle, 190 Pa. St. 577; 42 Atl. 1025; 45 L. R. A. 399 ; Joliff v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. -61; 109 S. W. 176; Web- ber V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 109 S. W. 182; Commonwealth v. Fred- ericks, 119 Mass. 199. 3* Henry v. State, 26 Ark. 523 ; Ex parte Hurl, 49 Cal. 557; State V. Hudson, 78 Mo. 302; Pleuler v. State, 11 Neb. 547; 10 N. W. 481. 35 King V. Jacksonville, 2 Scam. 305; Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449; Mason v. Lancaster, 4 Bush. 406. 36 State V. Boston Club, 45 La. Ann. 585; 12 So. 895; 20 L. R. A. 185. 37 In re Lunt, 6 Greenl. 412. 3s Keller v. State. 11 Md. 625; 69 Am. Dee. 226; Winona v. Whip- ple, 24 Minn. 61. § 107 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 140 and it is not an unlawful restraint of trade.^^ The enact- ment of a statute requiring a license does not exhaust the power of the Legislature; and it may enact further laws re- stricting the right to sell while licenses issued under the former law are still in force.*** So it is competent for the Legislature to fix a yearly fee for the license and require all taking out a license for that part of the year unexpired when the statute was adopted to pay a full yearly fee.*^ Nor can it be successfully claimed that the statute is invalid be- cause it requires a license of those engaged in the sale of liquors and not of those engaged in the sale of groceries, dry goods, and the like.*- The State may authorize a mu- nicipality to exact a license.*^ Sec. 107, State may permit sales under a license — Biblical prohibition. It has been contended that a State has no power to license the sale of intoxicating liquors. In one such instance the claim was made ''that the sale of intoxicating liquors to be drank as a beverage at the place of sale is so destructive to the public health and so inherently immoral that no law up- holding it can be valid either under the Constitution of this State or of the United States." In this same instance it was argued that as the people of the State, in the preamble of their Constitution, gratefully acknowledged "the good prov- idences of God, in having permitted them to enjoy a free government," that that was a recoonition of God as the source of that government; that the Bible contains the "Word of God," which condemns the use and sale of intoxicating li- quors as a beverage, and therefore that the State cannot per- mit it in any terms. To this contention the court said : "There was a time in the early history of the Common- wealth when the Bible w^as, 'in the defect of a law in any 39 Rochester V. Upman, 19 :Minn. 4i Carroll v. Wright, 131 Ga. 108; State v. Hardy, 7 Xeb. 377; 728; 63 S. E. 260. Commonwealth v. Schoenhutt, 3 42 Carroll v. Wright, 131 Ga. Phila. 20; 15 Leg. Int. 4. 728; 63 S. E. 260. 40 Reithmiller v. People, 44 Mich. 43 State v. Harper, 42 La. Ann. 280; 6 N. W. 667. 312; 7 So. 446. 141 CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTES § 107 particular case,' a rule of political government.** But even then it was never considered to contain any absolute prohibi- tion of such a business as that for which the license now in question was granted. As early as 1643 it was provided by the colonial laws that no person or persons should sell wine or 'strong water in any place within these libertyes, without license from the particular court or any two magistrates.' * * * In the face of this long history of dealing with the use and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, to be drank at the place where they are purchased, it is idle to claim that the framers of the Constitution understood or in- tended that anything contained in it should be regarded as prohibiting altogether the licensing of such a business. Our Constitution vests 'the legislative power of this State' in the General Assembly. That power covers the whole field of legitimate legislation, except so far as limitations are to be found in ether provisions of this Constitution or in that of the United States. The latter provides that the 'United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republi- can form of government.' Connecticut is therefore impli- edly bound forever to maintain such a form of government. She put her legislative power in the hands of the General Assembly. She put only, because she could put only, such power of that nature as was consistent with a republican form of government. In constitutional republics, as was observed by Chief Justice Chase in a case where arguments somewhat resembling those now made at our bar were advanced, 'there are undoubtedly, fundamental principles of morality and jus- tice which no Legislature is at liberty to disregard; but it is equally undoubted that no court, except in the clearest case, can properly impute the disregard of those principles to the Legislature.' " ^^ "However broad the scope that has been given to the guaranty of due process of law by such decisions as those to which reference has been made, that there is noth- ing unrepublican nor beyond the legitimate sphere of legis- lative power, in the maintenance of such a system as that 44 Citing 'Colonial Records of 45 License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. Connecticut, I, 509. 462; 18 L. Ed. 497. § 107 TRAPPIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 142 long established here for governmental license to sell intoxi- cating liquors, is plain from the fact, of which judicial no- tice must be taken, that most free governments have, at all periods of time, made that business a subject, not of prohibi- tion, but of regulation. Either mode of treatment is equally- legitimate. At common law it was a business lawful and open to any man. Our statutes do not enlarge, but restrict, this right." *^ In an Indiana case the same contention was made, that a licensing statute \vas unconstitutional "for the reason that the traffic in intoxicating liquors is dangerous and hurt- ful to society, and therefore wrong, and the licensing thereof cannot be upheld under the Constitution." "Counsel for the State repeatedly assert that the right to engage in the retail of intoxicating liquors is not an inherent or inalienable right. Therefore they argue that, if the right to traffic in intoxicating liquors exists in this State, it must arise out of some valid legislative grant, and that a statute granting such right is in violation of the general import or spirit of the State Constitution, and therefore must be held invalid. They assert that the object of the liquor license law of this State is to restrict a supposed common law right; but they affirm that no such right existed under the common law, and therefore there is no cause for the passage of such laws by the Leg- islature. * * * They further argue that, if the saloon business is dangerous and hurtful to the public, it must be deemed and held to be a common nuisance, and if the act of 1875 creates the right of the liquor dealer to engage in the business of retailing intoxicating liquors, to be drank as a beverage on the premises where sold, such act operates to license a wrong of the nature of a public nuisance, and there- fore should be held to be unconstitutional by the court, and the license granted thereunder to appellant in this case is no protection to him in maintaining a nuisance." After stating that it is the unrestricted, unregulated traffic in in- toxicating liquors that has been fraught with evils resulting in demoralizing influences upon private morals and the peace 40 Appeal of Allyn, 81 Conn. 534; »See also Campbell v. Jackson 71 Atl. T'W; 6« Cent. L. Jr. 449. Bros. (Iowa), 118 N. W. 755. 143 CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTES. § 107 and safety of the public/^ the court proceeds: "Such being the tendency of the traffic, the British Parliament, several centuries ago, as we have heretofore shown, ^^ and the Legisla- ture of this State, as well as the Legislatures of sister States, following the example of our ancestors, have deemed it essen- tial that the business should be permitted to exist only under such restrictions and regulations as, in their judgment, would serve to secure society or tlie public against the dangers and evils of the traffic, or, in other words, operate to mitigate or minimize as much as possible such dangers and evils. This has been the legislative policy adopted and pursued from the very beginning of our territorial existence down to the present time. Should w^e now deny the power of the Leg- islature, under our Constitution, to permit the traffic in intox- icating liquors to exist under such restrictions and regula- tions as that body may consider fit and proper to impose,- we would have no constitutional warrant for so holding. Such a decision would be nothing more than the exercise of the mere arbitrary will of the judges composing this tribunal. It would be nullification by the judiciary of a long and well- settled legislative policy. If such a revolution is desired it must be inaugurated, not by the courts, but by the peo- ple, through their representatives in the General Assembly. The legislative and judicial departments of our State govern- ment, under the Constitution, are separate and distinct from each other. Each is forbidden by our fundamental law to exercise the functions of the other. Therefore, the courts cannot make laws or regulations pertaining to the health, mor- als or safety of the public. The making of these laws, the same as others, is a question to be dealt with by the legisla- tive department and not by the courts. Neither is a court authorized to adjudge a thing to be a public nuisance which is not regarded as such by law." After reviewing the early State legislation and the action of the Constitutional Con- 4T Citing State v. Gerhardt, 145 48 By Act of 1552, 5 and 6 Edw. Ind. 439 ; 44 N. E. 469 ; 33 L. R. VI, c. 25. A. 313, and Schwuchow v. Chicago, 68 111. 444. § 107 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 144 vention of 1851 to insert a clause in the State Constitution concerning the sale of ardent spirits, the court proceeds: "By these deliberate acts of the convention which formed and molded our present Constitution, that body appears to have left the question in regard to the traffic in intoxicating liquors in the hands of the legislative department, where the conven- tion found it at the time it convened. Its action, therefore, in the matter fully serves to contradict or break down the contentions of counsel for the State, that the Legislature, in continuing its former policy to restrict and regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, by passing the act of 1875 *^ violated the general import and spirit of our present Constitution. Since the adoption of the latter, and prior and subsequently to the passage of the act of 1875, the Legislature has enacted other laws regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors, by im- posing restrictions and conditions upon the traffic. The valid- ity of these laws and of municipal ordinances of similar im- port and effect, has been repeatedly sustained by this court, and the question of the constitutional validity of such laws as the act of 1875 is no longer an open one in this juris- diction."^" "The infirmity of the argument presented by counsel for the State is that therein they assume that to be true which is not, viz., that the statute in controversy grants the right to sell intoxicating liquors, which right or privilege 49 A licensing statute. 25 N. E. 458 ; Welsh v. State, 126 50 Citing Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 71; 25 N. E 883; 9 L. R. A. Ind. 449; Harrison v. Lockhart, 25 664; Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 112; Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind, Ind. 30; 36 N. E. 857; State v. 429; O'Dea v. State, 57 Ind. 31; Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439; 44 N. E. Walter v. Columbia City, 61 Ind. 469; 33 L. R. A. 313; Flynn v. 24; McKinney v. Salem, 77 Ind. Taylor, 145 Ind. 533; 44 N. E. 213; Hedderich v. State, 101 546; Daniels v. State, 150 Ind. Ind. 564; Vinson v. Monticel- 438; 50 N. E. 74; Boomersliine v. lo, 118 Ind. 103; 19 N. E. Uline, 159 Ind. 500; 6'5 N. E. 513; 734; Emerick v. Indianapolis, Jordan v. Evansville, 163 Ind. 512; 118 Ind. 279; 20 N. E. 795; 72 N. E. 512, 544; 67 L. R. A. Bush V. Indianapolis, 120Ind. 476; 613; Schmidt v. Indianapolis, 168 22 N. E. 422; Moore v. Indianap- Ind. 631: 80 N. E. 632; Green- olis, 120 Ind. 483; 22 N. E. 424; castle v. Thompson, 168 Ind. 493; Decker v. Sargeant, 125 Ind. 404; 81 N. E. 497. 145 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 107 SO granted is in derogation of the common law. Upon this unfounded or empty assumption they base their argument. We may repeat what has been herein fully shown under the authorities cited, that, from the beginning of the common law (in force in this State by adoption) on down to the present time, the traffic in intoxicating liquors at retail or otherwise was, under the law, regarded as lawful, unless declared to be unlff^'ful by a positive act of the legislative department. Reducing counsel's argument to a simple proposition, it may be said to be more in the nature of a quarrel with the Leg- islature, because that body did not enact the law in dispute more fully and more 'completely along the lines of absolute prohibition, than it is a legal argument. "With the wisdom or policy of such laws as the act of 1875 we, as a court, have no concern. The judgment of the Legislature in respect to the expediency or wisdom of laws enacted by it is not a mat- ter subject to judicial review. "^^ "It is not the province of the judges of this court, nor of those of the lower courts, in the discharge of their official duties, to criticize the policy of the legislative department, which the latter has adopted in dealing with the liquor traffic. In the administration of jus- tice all courts must be controlled, so far as applicable, by the laws which the Legislature has constitutionally enacted, with- out regard to the individual views, in respect to the wisdom or expediency of such laws, of the persons who may preside over such courts. Neither boards of commissioners nor courts can be held responsible for granting a license under the laws to sell intoxicating liquors to an applicant therefor who is to be legally entitled to such license. In discharging this duty such boards of commissioners and courts but carry out the mandate of the law, above which no one can rise, and not the individual views of those who preside over them. It must be evident to every unprejudiced mind that a court cannot nullify an act of the Legislature on the mere assertions of persons assailing it that a license granted thereunder permits the licensee to 51 The court quotes at length 577, where similar views are ex- from Haggart v. Stehlin, 137 Ind. pressed. 43; 29 N. E. 1073; 22 L. R. A. § 107 TRAPPIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 146 maintain a public nuisance per se by merely selling intoxi- cating liquors, without violating any of the laws of the State in conducting the place in which such liquors are sold, for, as heretofore shown, whatever is authorized by an act of the Legislature, which that body is competent, under the Con- stitution to pass, is not, in the eyes of the law, a nuisance. While all citizens of this State have a perfect right to cry out, or declare upon the rostrum or before the Legislature, or other assembled bodies, that the liquor traffic cannot be legalized without committing a sin, and while their argument might be sufficiently potent to induce the Legislature to pro- hibit absolutely the traffic, they could be of no avail before a court which can neither make nor unmake laws. It is true that there is a diversit}^ of opinion among the people in re- spect to the manner in which the Legislature should deal with the question in regard to intoxicating liquors. There are very many good people who declare that the absolute pro- hibition of the traffic is the only system which the State should aaopt, while, on the other hand, very many others, equally as good, express views to the contrary, and assert that the qualified prohibition system w^hich has been adopted by the Legislature is the better plan. With this mooted legis- lative question judges of courts, in their official relations, are not concerned. The only standard which they can recognize, to measure their duty in dealing with the question of granting a license in the case before them, is the one prescribed by law," "If it could be said tkat the Legislature, under our Constitution, in dealing with the traffic, must be confined to the passage of a prohibitory measure, then the eminent men who formulated our fundamental law, members of the Legis- lature and courts, have been for many years quite ignorant and uninformed in respect to the power of the Legislature in dealing with the question. Especially may this be said in regard to the Legislature of 1881, which passed a joint reso- lution proposing to engraft a prohibitory amendment upon our present Constitution." ^^ 52 Sopher v. State, 169 Ind. 177; Tn the course of its opinion, the bi N. E. 912; 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) court, in addition to those already 172. noted, cites Thurlow v. Common- 147 CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTES. §108 Sec. 108. Fourteenth Amendment, effect on power to regu- late sale of intoxicating liquors. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;" and this provision has been re- peatedly invoked in questions arising concerning the validity of license and other laws regulating the sale and control of intoxicating liquors, but without avail. This is particularly true of that part of the amendment concerning the abridg- wealth, 5 How. 504; 12 L. Ed. 256; Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475; 18 L. Ed. 608; Crowley V. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86; 11 Sup. Ct. 13; 34 L. Ed. 620; In re Hoff., 107 U. S. 488-505; "l^c, Sup. Ct. 50G; 49 L. Ed. 848; Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U. 8. 17; 25 Sup. Ct. 552; 49 L. Ed. 925; Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438; 18 Sup. Ct. 674; 42 L. Ed. 1100; Cronin v. Adams, 192 U. S. 108; 24 Sup. Ct. 219; 48 L. Ed. 365. Under the Rhode Island consti- tution prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, a licensing statute can- not be enacted concerning sales of liquors as a beverage. State v. Tonks, 15 R. I. 385; 5 Atl. 636; but the legislature may license and regulate sales for medicinal and mechanical purposes. State v. Clark, 15 R. I. 383; 5 Atl. 635; State V. Kane, 15 R. I. 395 ; 6 Atl. 783; State v. Kennedy, 16 R. I. 409; 17 Atl. 51. The Ohio constitution provides that "no license to traffic in in- toxicating liquors shall hereafter be granted in this State." Under tliis a statute providing for a li- cense is void. State v. Hipp, 38 Ohio St. 199. And an act making it a misdemeanor to sell intoxicat- ing liquors in on upon the land or premises of another without his written consent; and providing that the assessments on the busi- ness shall be a lien on the prem- ises occupied by the tenant, is in efl'ect a license law and void. King v. Cappellar, 42 Ohio St. 218; Butzman v. Whitbeck, 42 Ohio St. 223. Contra State v. Freme, 39 Ohio St. 399. But this provision does not prohibit the levying of a tax on the traffic. Adler v. Whit- beck, 44 Ohio St. 539; 9 N. E. 672; Anderson v. Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 576; 9 N. E. 683; and making it a lien on the property in which it is conducted. Adler v. Whitbeck, supra. This provision applies both to wholesale and retail licenses Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Ohio St. 661; 11 N. E. 321; affirming 17 Wkly. L. Bull. 115. § 108 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 148 ment of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. The right to sell intoxicating liquors is not one of such privileges or immunities.^^ "The privileges and im- munities of citizens of the United States," said Chief Justice Fuller, "are privileges and immunities arising out of the nature and essential character of the national government, and granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States, and the right to sell intoxicating liquor is not one of the rights growing out of such citizenship.^* The amendment [fourteenth] does not take from the States their powers of police that were reserved at the time the original Constitution was adopted. Undoubtedly it forbids any arbitrary depriva- tion of life, liberty or property, and secures equal protection to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their rights; but it was not designed to interfere with the power of the State to protect the livps, liberty and property of its citizens, and to promote their health, morals, education and good order." ^''■' In another ease Justice Fields said: "There is no inherent right in a citizen to * * * sell intoxicating liquors by retail; it is not a privilege of a citizen of the United States * * *. The manner and extent of regula- tion rest in the discretion of the governing authority * * *. It is a matter of legislative will only. As in many other cases, 53 Jordan v. Evansville, 163 Ind. ley, 6 Fed. 289; Hoboken v. Good- 512; 72 N. E. 544; State v. Lind- man, ©S N. J. L. 217; 51Atl. 1092; grove, 1 Kan. App. 51; 41 Pac. Meelian v. Board, 73 N. J. L. 382; 688; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 64 Atl. 689; State v. Richardson, 129; 21 L. Ed. 929; Mugler v. 48 Ore. 309; 85 Pac. 225; State v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; 8 Sup. Ct. Brennan, 2 S. D. 384; 50 K W. 273; 31 L. Ed. 205; affirming 29 ©25; State v. Hodgson, 66 Vt. 134; Kan. 452; 44 Am, Rep. 634; Crow- 28 Atl. 1089; Craig v. Werth- ley V. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86; mueller, 78 Iowa, 598; 43 N. W. 11 Sup. Ct. 13; 34 L. Ed. 620; 606; Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crcn- Giozza V. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657; shaw, 120 Fed. 144; Lloyd v. Dol- 13 Sup. Ct. 721; 37 L. Ed. 599; lison, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 571; Mette V. McGuckin, 18 Neb. 323; State v. Jordan, 72 Iowa, 377; 34 25 N. W. 338 ; Farmville v. Walk- N. W. 285. er, 101 Va. 323; 43 S. E. 558; 61 R4 Citing Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 L. R. A. 125; Danville v. Hatcher, Wall. 29. 101 Va. 523; 44 S. E. 723; Kidd v. ^r. Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 ; 9 Sup. Ct. 657; 13 Sup. Ct. 721; 37 L. Ed. 6 ; 32 L. Ed. 346 ; Kansas v. Brad- 599. 149 CONSTITUTIONiVLITY OF STATUTES. §108 the officers may not always exercise the power conferred upon them with wisdom or justice to the parties affected. But that is a matter that does not affect the authority of the State, nor is it one which can be brought under the cognizance of the courts of the United States. "°° Thus, where a person had been engaged in the manufacture and sale of beer, having a large brewery, and the State adopted a constitutional provi- sion forbidding the manufacture and sale of beer in the State, and thereafter he was arrested under this law for having sold the beer that he had made in his brewery, it was held that the law was valid, and that it did not invade his rights, priv- ileges or immunities as a citizen. ^^ And a law which prohibits sales of intoxicating liquors is not in violation of any provi- sions of this amendment.^* And this is, of course, true of any law requiring a license or regulation of the sale of intoxi- cating liquors. ^^ And a law requiring a saloon keeper to 56 Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86; 11 Sup. Ct. 13; 34 L. Ed. '620; Danville v. Hatcher, 101 Va. 523, 527; 44 S. E. 723. "It has been repeatedly de- cided that the subject is wholly within the police power of the leg- islature, and that the tralBc is not one of the privileges or immunities of citizenship guaranteed and pro- tected by the United States Con- stitution or the Fourteenth Amend- ment thereto." Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. G23; 8 Sup. Ct. 273; 31 L. Ed. 205; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1; 9 Sup. Ct. 6; 32 L. Ed. 246; Huckless v. Childrey, 135 U. S. 622; 10 Sup. Ct. 972; 34 L. Ed. 304; Ex parte Campbell, 74 Cal. 20; 15 Pae. 318; 5 Am. St. Rep. 418; Cantini v. Tillman, 54 Fed. 969; Kansas v. Bradley, 26 Fed. 289; In re Hoover, 30 Fed. 51; Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179; State v. Lindgrove, 1 Kan. App. 51; 41 Pac. 688; Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250; 20 Atl. 905; 25 Am. St. 587; 9 L. R. 780; iState v. Berlin, 21 S. C. 292; 53 Am. Rep. 677; State v. Aiken, 42 S. C. 222; 20 S. E. 221 (overruling McCul- lough V. Brown, 41 S. C. 220; 19 S. E. 458; 23 L. R. A. 410) ; State V. Brennan, 2 S. D. 384; 50 K W. 625; State v. Hodgson, 66 Vt. 134; 28 Atl. 1089; Ex parte Burnside, 86 Ky. 423; 6 S. W. 276; Wyne- hamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378; 2 Parker Cr. 421; affirming 2 Parker Cr. 377; State v. Porterfield, 47 S. €. 75; 25 S. E. 39. 57 Mugler V. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; 8 Sup. Ct. 273; 31 L. Ed. 205; affirming 29 Kan. 452; 44 Am. Rep. 634. 58 Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13; 34 L. Ed. 620; Cantini v. Tillman, 54 Fed. 969; In re Hoover, "0 Fed. 51; Kansas v. Bradley, 26 Fed. 289. 59 Crowley v. Christensen, supra; Kansas v. Bradley, 26 Fed. 289; In re Hoover, 30 Fed. 51. § 108 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 150 give a bond conditioned not to sell to certain prohibited per- sons and providing a civil penalty for its infringement, and also requiring a payment of a tax in advance, is valid.''° And so is a law valid which provides that no suit shall be brought in any court of the State to recover the price of liquors sold in any other county or State with intent to enable any person to violate any provision of such law."^ Nor does this amend- ment prevent the enactment of a law forbidding a sale by any person except a druggist for medicinal or other specified purpose;*^- nor does a statute violate this amendment which creates a board of commissioners for a city and and empowers them to issue only to citizens of the United States of good moral character and temperate habits licenses to retail intoxi- cating liquors;*'^ nor does a law preventing sales within cities and towns under license and pro'hibiting them outside thereof;®* nor is one prohibiting sales by private in- dividuals and establishing State dispensaries for dispensing- liquors f^ nor does a law restricting the privilege of securing a license to certain classes of citizens of the State and restrict- ing purchases and sales by them to purchases and sales for mechanical, medicinal and sacramental purposes only, on the ground that it prevents citizens of other States selling liquors within the State f'^ nor is a statute making it discretionary with a board to issue a license f' nor is one providing that no person paying a manufacturer's tax shall pay a wholesale dealers' tax, and providing a punishment for carrying on the business without paying the tax, defining a wholesale dealer as one who sells in quantities of more than three gallons, or GoGiozza V. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 65 State v. Aiken, 42 S. C. 222; 657; 13 Sup. Ct. 721; 37 L. Ed. 20 S. E. 221; overruling McCul- 599. lough V. Brown, 41 S. C. 220; 19 61 Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. S. E. 458; 23 L. R. A. 410, and 179. State v. O'Donnell, 19 S. E. 748. 62 State V. Lindgrove, 1 Kan. eg Kohn v. :M€lcher, 29 Fed. 433. App. 51; 4 Pac. 688. 67 Gray v. Connecticut, 159 U. 63Trageser v. Gray, 72 Md. 250; S. 74; 15 Sup. Ct. 985; 40 L. Ed. 20 Atl. 905; 25 Am. St. 587; 9 L. 80; State v. Gray, 61 Conn. 39; R. A. 780. 22 Atl. G7'o; Welsh v. State, 12<> 8* State V. Berlin, 21 S. C. 292; Ind.' 71; 25 N. E. 8S3. • 53 Am. Rep. 677. 151 CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTES. § 109 more than a dozen quarts, and extending its criminal provi- sions to clerks and agents;"^ nor is one restricting the license to citizens of the State."'' Bnt a statute providing that any fruit grower may make and sell wine "on the premises where the fruit is grown and the wine made" in quantities not less than one quart, and may also sell like quantities in places where intoxicating liquors are authorized to be sold in the State, yet not in any district where the sale is prohibited, is void in so far as it authorizes a sale of wine grown on the premises where made and prohibits a sale of wine made out of the State, it being a violation of the privileges and immuni- ties of citizens of other States.'^" A statute, however, which requires of a foreign manufacturer of beer brought within the State for sale to make an affidavit showing that only cer- tain ingredients were used in its manufacture is valid, although no such an affidavit is required of a home manufac- turer, since it is practically impossible for the State to send its agents into another State there to inspect and watch the process of manufacture," So a statute is valid which permits a manufacturer to sell at wholesale to dealers outside a municipality adopting prohibition, not being a discrimination between parties living within and without the municipality, and between manufacturers and dealers/^' A statute for- bidding the shipping into a State whisky marked with the name of the consignee State, or for the purpose of so marking it, is constitutional/^* So a statute regulating the sale of a non-intoxicant beer is not in conflict with the amendment.'* Sec. 109. Fourteenth Amendment— Keeping saJoon. A municipal ordinance prohibiting the keeping of a place for the sale at retail of intoxicating liquors will not conflict G8 People V. Lyng, 74 Mich. 72 Lloyd v. Dollison, 23 Ohio Cir 579; 42 N. W. 139. Ct. Rep. 571. 69 Austin V. State, 10 Mo. 591; 73 Brown-Forman Co. v. Com- Mette V. McGurekin, 18 Neb. 323; monwealth (Ky.), 101 S W 321- 25 N. W. 338. 30 Ky. L. Rep." 793. 70 State V. Deschamp, 53 Ark. 74 Campbell v. Thomasville (Ga 490; 14 S. W: 653. App.), 64 S. E. 81. 71 Pabst Brewing Co. v. Cren- shaw, 120 Fed. 144. § 110 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 152 with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides that "no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Such an ordinance undertakes only to prevent the keeping within the corporate limits a place where intoxicating liquors are sold at retail. Under it a man may sell his stock in trade in any way he can, except in such a way as will make him a "keeper" of a place for the retail of such liquors. Such an ordinance is only a police regulation in the interest of the public morals and for the public good; and, although it may in some measure affect the value of property or inter- fere with its use in the purposes for which it was obtained, it will not thereby "deprive" the owner of such liquors of his property.'^^ Sec. 110. Privileges and immunities of citizens of other states. Section 2 of Article IV, of the Federal Constitution pro- vides that, "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." This clause is very similar to the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment providing that, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im- munities of citizens of the United States;" and a number of decisions concerning the regulation of intoxicating liquors have been based on the first quoted clause. It has been held that this clause does not restrict the State from confining the right to a license to its own citizens and prohibiting sales without such license.^*' Nor is an act void which forbids an action to be maintained in any court of the State to recover the price of liquors sold in another State with intent to enable any person to violate the provisions of the act forbidding the "Tanner v. Village of Alliance, Gray, 73 Md. 250; 20 Atl. 905; 25 29 Fed. 196. Am. St. 587; 9 L. R. A. 780; Sin- T6 Cantini v. Tillman, 54 Fed. clair v. State, 69 N. €. 47; Cohn v. 969; State v. Allmond, 2 Houst. Melcher, 29 Fed. 433; Campbell v. (Del.) 612; Welsh v. State, 126 Jackman Bros. (Iowa), 118 N. W. Ind. 71; 25 N, E. 883; Trageser v. 755. 153 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §111 retail of liquors in the enacting State.'^^ A statute which applies alike both to local and foreign agents selling intoxi- cating liquors in the State is valid." A statute providing, if a place to sell or manufacture liquors is established, that in either a criminal or civil proceeding the court shall at once enter a judgment for its abatement, and that the fixtures used in making sales or in manufacturing liquors shall be ordered sold, does not violate this provision of the Constitution.^^ In such an instance the fact that the remedy is given in chan- cery does not affect the validity of the statute.**" Sec. 111. "Import" defined — Statute in violation of Con- stitution. A statute of a State which provides that before it shall be lawful for any dealer or dealers in intoxicating liquors to offer any such liquors for sale within the limits of the State, such dealer or dealers introducing any such liciuors shall first pay a certain tax per gallon upon each and every gallon thus introduced, does not violate that clause of the Constitu- tion of the United States which says that, "No State shall levy any imposts or duties on imports or exports," if the tax is not different from that charged upon like liquors manu- factured in the State. The term "import" as used in this clause of the Constitution does not refer to articles imported from one State into another but only to articles imported from foreign countries into the United States; hence, the uniform tax imposed by a State on all sales made in it, whether they be made by the citizens of it or the citizens of some other State, and whether the goods so sold are produced in the State enacting the law, or in some other State, is valid. Such a 77 Reynolds v. Geary, 2G Conn. 79 Craig v. Werthmueller, 78 179; United Breweries Co. v. Iowa, 598 ; 43 N. W. 606. Colby, 170 Fed. 100. so state v. Jordan, 72 Iowa, 377; 78 People V. Lyng, 74 Mich. 34 N. W. 285. 579; 42 N. W. 139; Commonwealth A court of equity will not en- V. Shaffer, 128 Pa. St. 575; 18 join the enforcement of a void Atl. 390; 24 W. N. C. 539; State liquor statute. J. W. Kelly & Co. V. Hodgson, 66 Vt. 134; 28 Atl. v. Conner (Tenn.), 123 S. W. 622. 1089. § 111 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 154 statute does not discriminate against productions of sister States and is not an attempt to regulate commerce but a proper and legitimate exercise of the taxing power of the State.^^ A State statute which imposes a tax upon persons not residing or having their principal place of business within the State, w^ho engage therein in the business of selling or soliciting the sale of intoxicating liquors to be shipped into the State from places without it, but does not impose a similar .tax upon persons selling or soliciting the sale of intoxicating liquors manufactured in the State, is a regulation in restraint of commerce repugnant to the constitutional provision here referred to; and the defect cannot be justified on the ground that the statute is an exercise by the Legislature of the police power of the State for the discouragement of the use of in- toxicating liquors and the preservation of the health and morals of the people. This would be a perfect justification of the law if it did not discriminate against citizens of other States in the matter of commerce between the States and thus usurp one of the prerogatives of the national Legislature. The police power cannot be set up to control the inhibitions of the Federal Constitution or the powers of the United States government created thereby.^- And the same is true of a statute which forbids carriers to bring any intoxicating liquors into the State from any other State or territory. The police power of a State cannot obstruct foreign commerce or inter- cept commerce beyond the extent of its exercise, and, under color of it, objects not within its scope may not be secured at the expense of the protection afforded by the Federal Consti- tution.^^ 81 Woodruff V. Parkham, 8 Wall. M. Schendler Bottling Co. v. (U. S.) 123; Hinson v. Lot, 8 Welch, 42 Fed. 561; State v. In- Wall. (U. S.) 148. toxicating Liquors, 82 Me. 558; 19 82 Walling V. Michigan, 116 U. Atl. 913. S. 446; 6 Sup. Ct. 454. In the License Cases, 5 How. 83 Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. 504; 12 L. Ed. 256, it was held Co.. 125 U. S. 465; 8 Sup. Ct. 689; that a statute of Rhode Island for- United States v. Fiscus. 42 Fed. bidding a sale of liquor in less 395; In re Beine, 42 Fed. 545; quantities tlian ten gallons was Tuchman v. Welch, 42 Fed. 548; valid, even as applied to liquor in 155 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 112 Sec. 112. Discrimination against liquors of other states. Much litigation has grown out of laws enacted by many of the States discriminating against the products and manufac- tures of other States. A fruitful cause of such litigation has been the effort to i)rotect the local manufacture of intoxi- cating liquors and especially the wine industry. As a rule, when such laws have been put to the test they have been held to be in conflict with that clnrsp of Article I. Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that Con- gress shall have power to regulate commerce among the several States, and that part of Article IV, Section 2. which provides that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. The test of such a statute is "whether there is any discrimination in favor of the State or citizens of the State which enacted the law. Wherever there is such discrimination it is fatal." In sup- port of such laws the contention has been that they were within the police powers of the States. In answer to this con- tention the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the only way in which commerce between the States can be legitimately affected by State laws, is when, by virtue of its police power, and its jurisdiction over persons and property within its limits, a State provides for the security of the lives, limbs, health and comfort of persons and the protection of propertv: or Avhen it does those things which may otherwise incidentally affect commerce, such as the establishment and regulation of hisrhwavs. canals, railroads, wharves, ferries, and other commercial facilities: the passage of inspection laws to secure the due quality and measure of products and com- irndities; the passaae of laws to resrulate or restrict the sale of articles deemed injurious to health or morals of the com- munity ; the imposition of taxes upon persons residing within the State or belonging to its population and upon vocations the original packages imported particular point, is no longer an from France, not being a regula- authority. State v. Peckham, 3 tion of commerce: but in view of R. I. 289, follows, in principle, the the later decisions of the Federal License Cases. Supreme Court, this case, on this § 112 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 156 and employments pursued therein, not directly connected with foreign or interstate commerce or with some other em- ployment or business exercised under the authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States ; and the imposi- tion of taxes upon all property within the State, mingled with and forming part of the great mass of property therein. But in making such internal regulations a State cannot impose taxes upon persons passing through the State or coming into it merely for a temporary purpose, especially if connected with interstate or foreign commerce ; nor can it impose such taxes upon property imported into the State from abroad, or from another State, and not yet become part of the common mass of property therein ; and no discrimination can be made, by any such regulations adverse to the persons or property of other States; and no regulation can be made affecting inter- state commerce.^* In accordance with this statement of the law, it has been uniformly held that a State statute requiring the payment of a license tax from persons dealing in goods, wares and merchandise which are not the growth, produce or manufacture of the State, and requiring no such license tax from persons selling similar goods which are the growth, produce or manufacture of the State, is an unconstitutional regulation ; ^^ and this rule of law has been applied in relation to a tax upon non-resident sellers of intoxicating liquors to be shipped into a State from places without it.^*^ In the language 84 Robbins v. Shelby County Tax- Fed. Rep. 492; In re Rebman, 41 ing District, 120 U. S. 489, 493 ; 7 Fed. Rep. 867 ; Vines v. State, 67 Sup. Ct. 592. Ala. 73; Powell v. State, 69 Ala. 85Wolton V. Missouri, 91 U. S. 10; State v. Nash, 97 Ala. 514; 275; Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. McCreary v. State, 73 Ala. 480; S. 679; Walling v. Michigan, 102 Wrought Iron, etc., Co. v. John- U. S. 123; County of Mobile v. son, 84 Ga. 754; 11 S. E. 233: Kimball, 102 U. S. 691; Webber State v. Nash, 97 N. C. 514. V. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344; Hinson so Gray v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. V. Lott, 8 Wall. 148; Weil v. Cal- 434; Walling v. ^Michigan, 116 U. houn. 25 Fed. Rep. 865: Kohn v. S. 446; 6 Sup. Ct. 454; Robbins Melchor, 29 Fed. Rep. 433; Stock- v. Shelby Co. Taxing District, 120 ton V. Baltimore, 32 Fed. Rep. 9; U. S. 489; 7 Sup. Ct. 592; Leisy Swift V. Sutphin, 39 Fed. Rep, v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; 10 Sup. 631; Baird v. St. Louis R. Co., 41 Ct. 681; Lyng v. Michigan, 135 157 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 112 of Justice Harlan, "it must be regarded as settled that no State can, consistently with the Federal Constitution, impose upon the products of other States, brought therein, for sale or use, or upon citizens, because engaged in the sale therein, or the transportation to, of the products of other States more onerous public burdens or taxes than it imposes upon the like products of its own territory."*'' There is good reason for this conclusion, for, if the power of a State to exact a license tax of any amount is admitted, then no avithority would re- main in the United States to control its action, however un- reasonable or burdensome. Imposts operating as an absolute exclusion of the goods would be possible, and all the evils of discriminating State legislation favorable to the interests of one State and injurious to the interests of other States and countries, which existed previous to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, might follow.^^ The law as here stated is not only applicable to the States but also to the municipal corporations within them, the courts holding that an ordi- nance which requires a license fee from citizens of another State, or their agents, who offer goods within the corporate limits which have not been produced, manufactured or grown within the State, is void, because it assumes to establish a regulation affecting commerce between the States.^' In Iowa and Ohio, however, it has been held that the State, as a police regulation, may prohibit the sale of any kind of intoxicating liquors and allow the sale of another kind, and the prohibition of wines made from fruits grown in other States is no in- vasion of the privileges and immunities of the citizens of those U. S. 161; 10 Sup. Ct. 725; State 129; 9 Sup. Ct. 1; Stountebugh v. V. Marsh, 37 Ark. 356; State v. Hennick, V29 U. S. 141; 9 Sup. Ct. Deschamp, 53 Ark. 490; 14 S. W. 256; McCall v. California, 136 U. 653. S. 104; 10 Sup. Ct. 881; In re 87 Gray v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. Kimmell, 41 Fed. Rep. 775; Grafty 434; State v. Marsh, 37 Ark. 356. v. Rushville, 107 Ind. 502; 8 N. E. 8S Wclton V. Missouri, 91 U. S. 609 ; McLaughlin v. Soutli Bend, 275. 126 Ind. 471; 2-6 N. E. 1«5; In- ssRobbins v. Shelby Co. Taxing dianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30; District, 120 U. S. 489; 7 Sup. Ct. 36 N. E. 857. 592; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. §112 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 158 States, and not repugnant to Article IV, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States. In so deciding the Supreme Court of Ohio said : "If the State has the power, as a police regulation, tc prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors, it may, w it5. discretion, prohibit the sale of one kind of liquor and allow the sale of another kind. It may say that certain wines may not be sold. Because the sale of all things which may be deleterious to the public is not prohibited, is no good reason why the sale of such as are prohibited is invalid. And be- cause the sale of wines manufactured from fruit grown in this State is allowed, and the sale of wines manufactured from fruit grown in Illinois is prohibited, is no 'invasion of the privileges and immunities of the citizens of Illinois, because this State, in the exercise of its police authority, has the power to determine what kind of intoxicating liquors it will pro- hibit the sale of, and what kind it will allow."®" 00 state V. Stucker, 58 la. 496; 12 N. W. 483; McGuire v. State, 42 0. St. 530; McLaury v. Watel- sky, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 394; 87 S. W. 1045. An ordinance fixing saloon lim- its and allowing saloons outside of them to continue until their li- censes expired, is valid and not an unjust discrimination among liquor dealers outside such limits. Andreas v. Beaumont (Tex. Civ. App.), 113 S. W. 614; State v. Board (Wyo.), 105 Pac. 295. In these cases it has been held that a statute authorizing the sale of domestic wine — wine made in the State — and prohibiting the sale of wine made out of the State, was invalid. State v. Deschamp, 54 Ark. 490; 14 S. W. 653; McCreary V. State, 73 Ala. 480 (see Powell V. State, 69 Ala. 10); Ex parte Kinnebrew, 35 Fed. 52 (cider) ; Weil V. Calhoun, 25 Fed. 865; Glover v. State, 126 Ga. 594; 55 S. E. 592; Commonwealth v. Pe- tranich, L83 Mass. 217; 66 N. E. 807. (Rule extended to cider.) State V. Scampini, 77 Vt. 92; 59 Atl. 201; State v. Hazleton, 78 Vt. 567; 63 Atl. 305. So a statute limiting the sales to wine made from grapes grown on the premises is invalid. State V. Deschamp, 54 Ark. 490; 14 S. W. 6i53, though the Supreme Court of the United States held that a statute autliorizing the manufacture of wine or liquor for one's own use, and prohibiting the keeping and sale of all other liquors, is valid. Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 468; 18 Sup. Ct. 674; Douthit v. State, 98 Tex. 344; 83 S. VV. 795; modi- fying 82 S. W. 352. Where a statute excepted from its prohibitory provisions "the manufacture, sale and use of do- mestic wines or cider," it was so constrred as to except other wines, 159 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §113 Sec. 113, Manufacture for shipment out of state. A statute which provides that, "No person shall manufac- ture or sell * * * directly or indirectly, any intoxicating in order to hold it constitutional; in other words, the word "domes- tic" was stricken out by construc- tion. Ex parte Kinnebrew, 35 Fed. 52; Glover v. State, 126 Ga. 594; 55 S. E. 592. In Kenti'cky, where an ordi- nance required a license fee from all selling beer brewed out of the city, it was presumed, in the ab- sence of an averment in the plead- ings, that a like fee was required of local manufacturers, in order to uphold the ordinance. Jung Brewing Co. v. Frankfort, 100 Ky, 409; 38 S. W. 710. In Texas it was decided that liquor sellers are not denied the privileges ai d immunities of citi- zens of the United States because producers of domestic wines are given certain exemptions while such wines are in their hands, from the tax imposed and bond required by the statute regulating the sale of liquors. Cox v. State, 202 U. S. 446; 26 Sup. Ct. 71; 50 L. Ed. 1099, affirming 37 Tex. Civ. App. 607 ; 85 S. W. 34. In Vermont it is held that a statute prohibiting the sale of in- toxicating liquors, but permitting farmers to sell cider by the bar- rel, made from their own grown apples, is valid and is not class legislation. State v. Hamilton, 78 Vt. 467; 63 Atl. 7. A statute permitting a manu- facturer having his place of busi- ness in a prohibitory district to ^here sell the liquors he there manufactures, and forbidding oth- ers to sell there, does not dis- criminate against a non-resident or wholesale dealer or manufac- turer; and is therefore valid. Jung Brewing Co. v. Common- wealth (Ky.), 98 S. W. 307; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 267. If the general law of a State authorizes domestic wines to be sold, a city cannot prohibit their sale. Duren v. Stephens, 126 Ga. 496; 54 S. E. 1045; but it may require their inspection and re- quire a fee paid for the inspec- tion. It cannot require the in- spection of wines made by the owner of grapes grown on his own land, unless he opens a place of business to make sales of them. Stephens v. Henderson, 120 Ga. 218; 47 S. E. 498. A State cannot impose a license on sales of liquor in another State, to be there delivered. State V. Stilsing, 23 Vroom, 517; 20 Atl. 65. A statute declaring certain li- quors intoxicating, when they are not, does not violate this provision of the Constitution. State v. Frederickson, 101 Me. 37; 63 Atl. 535. A State may prohibit the soliciting or taking orders for sale of liquors to be delivered within its boundaries, though the solicitor is a non-resident and the liquors are without its boun- daries. State V. Miller (W. Va.), 66 S. E. 522. § 113 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 160 liquors, except as hereafter provided," and in a subsequent section further provides, ' ' that nothing contained in this law shall prevent any persons from manufacturing in this State liquors for the purpose of being sold according to the provi- sions of this chapter, to be used for mechanical, medicinal, culinary or sacramental purposes," will not authorize the manufacture of intoxicating liquors for transportation out of the State. The first clause of such a statute is a sweeping provision against the manufacture and sale; not a dealing which is composed of both steps, and consequently must in- clude manufacture as well as sale, or, c converso, sale as well as manufacture, in order to incur the denunciation of the statute, but is against either the sale or the manufacture. The conjunction is disjunctive. The sale is forbidden, the manu- facture is forbidden, and each is forbidden independently of the other. The unqualified prohibition of any and all manu- facture of such liquors by the clause is subsequently modified by four exceptions, viz. : Sale for mechanical purposes, to an extent limited by the wants of the particular locality of the seller ; sale for medicinal purposes, to the same extent ; sale for culinary purposes, to the same extent ; and sale for sacra- mental purposes, to the same extent. The effect of such a statute is simply and clearly to prohibit all manufacture of intoxicating liquors except for one or more of the four pur- poses specified. "For the purpose," says the statute. The excepted purpose is all that saves it from being ah initio, and, through each and every step of its progress, unlawful.^^ Such a statute does not conflict with Section 8, Article I, of the Constitution of the Ignited States, by undertaking to regulate commerce among the States, for it does not exercise jurisdic- tion of the State over persons or property or transactions within the limits of other States ; nor does it act upon liquors as exports, or while they are in process of exportation or im- portation. Its avowed object is to prevent not the carrying of intoxicating liquors out of the state, but to prevent their manufacture, except for specified purposes, within the state. The prohibition of the statute is directed alone to the manu- oiKidd V. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 ; 9 Sup. Ct. 6. 161 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 113 facture of intoxicating liquors for purposes other than for sale according to the provision of the statute. If the law is obeyed, no liquor will be manufactured for transportation. Its operation is to prevent the production of an article which might be lawfully transported out of the state. No distinction is more popular to the common mind, or more clearly ex- pressed in economic and political literature, than that between manufacture and commerce. Manufacture is transformation — the fashioning of raw materials into a change of form or use. The functions of commerce are different. The buying and selling and the transportation incidental thereto consti- tute commerce; and the regulation of commerce, in a consti- tutional sense, embraces the regulation at least of such transportation. Commerce consists in the interchange of com- modities or property which is the subject of trade. It does not consist in the impossible interchange of things not in ex- istence. They must be articles of trade before commerce can exist.*^- Nor does such a statute conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by de- priving the manufacturers of intoxicating liquors of their property without "due process of law." The Supreme Court of the United States has decided that a State has the right to prohibit or restrict the manufacture of intoxicating liquors within her limits; to prohibit all sale and traffic in them in the State; to inflict penalties for such manufacture and sale, and to provide regulations for the abatement as a common nuisance of the property used for such forbidden purposes; and that such legislation by a State is a clear exercise of her undisputed police power which does not abridge the liberties or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor deprive any person of property without due process of law, nor in any way contravene any of the provisions of said amend- ment."^ And a statute may require a manufacturer of liquor 92 Kidd V. Pearson, 128 U. S, 1 ; 93 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 9 Sup. Ct. 6; Pearson v. Inter- 623; 8 Sup. Ct. 273; Kidd v. national Distillery, 72 Iowa 348; Pearson, 128 U. S. 1; 9 Sup. 34 N. W. 1; State v. Fitzpatrick, Ct. 6. 16 R. I. 54; 11 Atl. 7G7. § 114 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUOES. 162 in another State, before selling it in the State enacting the law, to produce his affidavit showing the ingredients entering into the composition of the liquor, filthough no such an affi- davit is required of a home manufacturer; for a State cannot send its agents into another State to there inspect the manu- facture of liquor to be shipped into it.®* Sec. 114. Non-intoxicating liquors — Declaring a liquor to be intoxicating. The power of the State to prohibit the sale of beverages seems to be unlimited. Thus, as has been elsewhere discussed, States have prohibited the sale of cider, a liquor usually not considered intoxicating, at least in most communities, al- though, as is well known, "hard" cider if drank in excessive quantities will produce intoxication, usually of a serious char- acter. All such laws have been upheld. And so it has been held that the Legislature may prohibit the sale of malt liquor, whether intoxicating or not.'^^ As is well known, a malt liquor is made that is wholly or very nearly devoid of intoxicating effects. So the State may prohibit the sale of a non-intoxi- cating wine, such as is usually called grape juice.®'' And it would seem there is no liquor that the State may not declare shall not be sold; or that it may not declare shall be con- sidered intoxicating.®^ But in all instances where the question has been considered the liquor in question was what is usually considered intoxicating, or one that is usually considered to contain alcohol, though the alcohol is known to be a very small 9* Pabst Brewing Co. v. Cren- appearance. State v. Dannen- shaw, 120 Fed. 144. berg (N. €.), 66 S. E. 301; Bar- 95Feibelman v. State, 130 Ala. ber v. Griffith (N. C), 06 S. E. 122; 30 So. 384; Bell v. State, 91 565; Cassidy v. Mason (Ga.), 64 Ga. 227; 18 S. E. 288; Redding v. S. E. 941. State, 01 Ga. 231; 18 S. E. 289; so See State v. Frederickson, 101 Penel v. State, 123 N. W. Me. 37; 63 Atl. 535. 115; Campbell v. Thomasville, 07 The Legislature may define (Ga. App.), 64 S. E. 815 intoxicating liquors, and it usually (regulating sale). It may re- does. State v. Guinness, 16 E. quire a license for the sale of I. 401 ; 16 Atl. 910; State v. Grav- "near beer," a non-intoxicating elin, 16 R. 407; 16 Atl. 914. liquor, resembling malt beer in 163 CONSTITUTIONi\JLITY OF STATUTES. § 115 percentage of the entire bulk. Possibly, under the plea, especially snstainel by proof, that the usual soda water is detri- mental to liealth, the sale might be prohibited, for, as is well known, as a food for the sustenance of life, it possesses no nourishing (jualities. But if the liCgislature should undertake to prohibit the sale of milk, the courts would, without hesita- tion, declare the act void, although the Legislature may — or it may empower a mvmicipality to — regulate its sale in order to secure for the purchaser a pure and healthy product. That is the extent of the power of the Legislature with reference to its sale.°« Sec. 115. Regulation of sales and saloons. It has from time immemorial been thought that the business of selling intoxicating liquors was one dangerous to the public morals, and such is the experience, in northern climes at least ; and it has been the uniform practice to subject it to regula- tions, require a license from some public functionary before it is engaged in, and to punish, as a crime, the pursuit of it without a license.^^ The power of the State not only extends to the prohibition of sales or the requiring of a license, but the prohibition of sales on cer+ain davs, as election days,^ or on Sundays.- In the first instance it is deemed by the Legis- lature a necessary precaution in order to prevent disorders, secure undisturbed elections and protect electors from vio- lence; and in the second instance it cannot be seriously con- tended that the pompellinsr of thr- observance of Sunday by 98 The oleomargarine cases fur- U. S. 80; 11 Sup. Ct. 13; Camp- niah illustrations on this point, as bell v. Jackman Bros. (Iowa), well as the pure food laws. Peo- 118 N. W. 755; State v. Gibbs pie V. Arensberg, 105 N. Y. 123; (Vt.), 74 Atl. 229. People V. Arensberg, 103 N. A statute is not invalid because Y. 388; 57 Am. Rep. 741; Com- it requires a saloon to be removed monwealth v. Miller, 131 Pa. St. to the ground floor and rear- 118; Commonwealth v. Gray, 150 ranged. Nelson v. State, 17 Ind. Mass. 327; 23 N. E. 47; Bayles v. App. 403; 46 N. E. 941. Newton, 50 N. J. L. 549; 14 Atl. i Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 604; State v. Newton, 50 N. J. L. 44^; State v Roberts, 74 N. H. 534. 470; 60 Atl. 722. 89 Burch V. Savannah, 42 Ga. 2 state v. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 596; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 663; 33 Am. Rep. 224. § 115 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 164 requiring saloons closed has anything to do with the Christian religion. It is a day of almost universal rest, when men are not at their labors and have a tendency to assemble in crowds, conditions under which universal experience teaches us that men are more given to drinking and rowdyism than when employed. There are other days when the sale of liquor is frequently prohibited — as on Memorial Day, July Fourth, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas and New Year's Day. So the Legislature may prohibit the use of screens, as elsewhere noted, and require the complete exposure of the bar where liquors are dispensed. It may also require all saloons or places where liquors are sold to front on a public street and forbid them fronting on alleys or private courts. It may also prohibit the playing of musical instruments in saloons, or any kind of music ; ' and prohibit their being open certain hours of the night.* Where a statute prohibited the keeping open on Sunday for trade any store, shop, building or place of business, and exempting hotels, restaurants, livery stables and stores in making sales of medicines and supplies for the sick, news stands, engaged in the quiet sale and delivery of papers, magazines and non-intoxicating liquors, but prohibited the opening of a play house, theater, dance hall, circus, merry- go-round, pool or billiard room, bowling alley, variety hall, and any place of public amusement, and prohibited horse racing, it was held constitutional as to saloons, and not void, on the ground that it took property without due course of law.^ The State may forbid the keeper of a saloon to permit anyone entering it during prohibited hours or days, and punish him if he does.'' So it may require him to keep his license posted in a conspicuous place in the saloon or in his house.'^ And after a license has been granted the State may ^Ex parte Smith, 38 Cal. 702; estate v. Calloway, 11 Idaho State V. G«rhardt, 145 Ind. ^W; 719; 84 Pac. 27; State v. Ger- 44 N. E. 46.9; 33 L. R. A. 313. hardt, 145 Ind. 439; 44 N. E. *Ex parte Smith, 38 Cal. 702. 469; 33 L. R. A. 313. 5 State V. Dolan. 13 Idaho, 693 ; ^ Ex parte Bell, 24 Tex. App. 92 Pac. 995; Ex parte Jacobs, 13 428; 6 S. W. 197; Bell v. State, Idaho 720: 92 Pac. 1003; State v. 28 Tex. App. 96; 12 S. W. 410. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 663; 33 Am. Rep. 224. 165 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 116 pass a law prohibiting sales to minors, drunkards, intoxicated and insane persons ; ^ or sales on certain hours." A statute making the place of delivery the place of sale of whisky is eonstitutional.^o The Legislature may authorize police officers "to enter upon the premises of anyone licensed to sell, to ascertain the manner in which such person conducts his busi- ness, and to preserve order." " So the Legislature may pro- hibit the giving away or selling food to be eaten on the premises where liquor is sold; ^^ and it may authorize a city to enact an ordinance to that effect.^^ So the State mav provide that all moneys paid for liquors sold in violation of a statute shall be held under a valid promise to repay them on demand.^* So a Legislature may authorize a municipality to prescribe saloon limits.^** Sec. 116. Permitting^ persons to go into saloon at pro- hibited times. In Indiana a statute makes it unlawful for a proprietor of a saloon "to permit any person or persons other than him- self and family to go into such room [the saloon] and place where intoxicating liquors are to be so sold upon such days and hours when the sale of such licpiors is prohibited by law. The fact that any person or persons are permitted to be in or go in and out of such room upon any day or hour when the sales of such liquors are prohibited by law, shall be prima^ facie evidence of guilt upon trial of a cause charging the proprietor of such room with violating the law in the sale of such liquors upon such days or hours." This statute was 8 Commonwealth v. Sellers, 130. i-' People v. Warder, 6 N Y Pa. St. 32; 18 Atl. 541. App. Div. 520; 39 N.' Y. Supp 9 Smith V. Knoxville, 3 Head 582. 245; Hedderich v. State, 101 Ind. i a state v. Clarke, 8 Fost 176- 564; 1 N. E. 47; 51 Am. Rep. 61 Am. Dec 611. 768 n United Breweries Co. v Co' 10 State V. Herring. 145 X. C. by, 170 Fed. 100. The action io 418; 58 S. E. 1007. recover the money is a civil ^c- 11 Commonwealth v. Doucey, 126 tion of which a Federal court m-n- Mass. 260. In this case it was take jurisdiction. an ordinance that authorized the i** Andreas v. Beaumont, mayor and aldermen to enter up- (Tex. Civ App.), 113 S. W. 6.14. on the licensed premises. § 117 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 166 held to be constitutional.^^ ''As the closing features of Sec- tion 3 apply only to the prohibited days and hours, we fail to recognize how any great hardships can result from the enforcement of this law. In answer to the contention that the enforcement of the requirements of this section might inadvertently result in interfering, during such interdicted time, with other business that may be conducted by the pro- prietor in the same room where such liquors are sold, or may restrict him in the enjoyment in his own house of the society of his friends, it may be said that when he accepted his license, under the statute, and embarked in the sale of intoxi- cating liquors thereunder, he must be deemed to have con- sented to all proper conditions and restrictions which had been imposed by the Legislature, or which might in the future be imposed in the interest of public morals and safety, relative to the traffic in such liquors, or to the place wherein he was granted a permit to sell the same, notwithstanding their burdensome character." "It is true that the part rela- tive to the exclusion of persons is somewhat sweeping, making but one exception ; however, criminal statutes are not always literally construed, and possibly an emergency might arise of great necessity, to admit some one other than those mentioned in the section, and, while such admission might infringe upon the letter of the statute, it would not come within its spirit, and the court, under the particular circumstances, might make the necessary exception ; but as to this point we do not decide. We, therefore, sustain the validity of the section and adjudge that it defines a public offense."'" Sec. 117. Delegation of power to license and regulate sale of liquors. Municipalities — cities and towns — are simply smaller divi- sions of a State for its better government. They are the 15 state V. Beach, 147 Tiul. 74; 430; 40 X. E. 469; 33 L. R. A. 43 N. B. 949; Decker v. .Sargeant. 313. 1'25 Ind. 404; 25 N. E. 438; Dnv- An ordinance may prescribe is V. Fasig, 128 Ind. 271; 27 N. that the lighting up of a saloon E. 726. shall be prima facie evidence that 10 State V. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. it is open. Piqua v. Zimmerlinj 35 Ohio St. 507. 167 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 117 creatures of the Legislature — may be created or may be legally annihilated. To them the Legislature may confide its police powers for the regulation of local affairs and concerns, and when given, it may be taken away without any cause what- ever. It has always been considered that in affairs local to a small territory, a city or town is a better agency to suppress vice and disorder and to regulate matters requiring the use of local police powers than the State at large. Such has been the history and practice of the English Parliament from time immemorial, and of American Legislatures from the first set- tlements of this country. It does not require the citation of authority to gain assent to this proposition, for it is univer- sally admitted in jurisprudence.^^ "It seems to be generally conceded," said Judge Bell, of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, "that powers of local legislation may be granted to cities, towns, and other municipal corporations. And it would require strong reasons to satisfy us that it would have been the design of the framers of our Constitution to take from the Legislature a power which has been exercised in Europe by governments of all classes from the earliest history, and the exercise of which has probably done more to promote civilization than all other causes combined; which has been constantly exercised in every part of our country from its earliest settlement, and which has raised up among us many of our most valuable institutions. " ^^ Not only may the Legis- 17 Jordan v. State, 2 Tex. App. lin, 40 Kan. 410; 19 Pac. 801; 425; Moundsville v. Fountain, 27 State v. King. 37 Iowa, 4'62; Van W. Va. 182; State v. Bott, 31 La. Hook v. Schea, 70 Ala. 361; 45 Ann. 663; 33 Am. Rep, 224; Am. Rep. 8i5; O'Hare v. Chicago, St. Paul V. Troyer, 3 Minn., 291; 125 111. App. 73; Timm v. Cale- Flack V. Fry, 32 W. Va. 364; 9 donia Station, 149 Mich 323; 112 S. E. 240; Mason v. Trustees, 4 X. W. 942; 14 Det. L. N. 442; Bush 406; Board v. Watson, 5 Cohen v. Rice (Tex. Civ. App.), Bush 6G0; State v. Harper, 42 101 S. W. 1052. La. Ann. 312; 7 So. 446; Baton is State v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 279, Rouge V. Butler, 118 La. 73; 292; Cohen v. Rice (Tex. Civ. 42 So. 650; Commonwealth v. App.), 101 S. W. 1052; Gower Fredericks, 119 Mass. 199; Chi- v. A^-oo. 12R Mn. Anp. 427: 107 cage etc., Co. v. Chicago, 88 111. 221 ; S. W. 999 ; Schwuchow v. Chicago, 30 Am. Rep. 545; State v. Frank- 68 111. 444; State v. Aiken, 42 S. §117 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 168 lature delegate the power to exact a license for, or regulate, or prohibit the sales of intoxicating liquors and also regulate the place wherein liquors are sold, but it may also empower them to exact a license for, regulate, or prohibit the sales of liquors beyond its limits but in territory adjacent thereto.^^ "It is certainly within the power of the Legislature to declare that no unlicensed dramshop shall be kept within a desig- nated number of feet of the corporate limits; otherwise all that need be done to evade the law would be to keep a foot or two beyond the corporate boundaries. If the Legislature has any power at all to designate limits over which the juris- diction of municipal corporations shall extend, then, neces- sarily, the subject must be within its discretion; and, if this be so, its judgment upon the question must be conclusive."^** C. 222; 20 S. E. 221; Columbus City V. Cutcomp, 61 Iowa 672; 17 N. W. 47; Lutz v. Crawfords- ville, 109 Iml. 460; 10 N. E. 411; Metropolitan Board v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. '657; Shea v. Muncie, 148 Ind. 14; 46 N. E. 138; State v. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 663; 33 Am. Rep. 224; State v. Clarke, 8 Fost. 176; -61 Am. Dec. 611; Swartz v. Dover (X. J. L.), 62 Atl. 1135; affirming 70 X. J. L. 502; 57 Atl. 394; Hart v. De Missis- groni, 3 Quebec L. R. 170; Ex parte Covey, 21 Low. Can. Jr. 182; Kitson V. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich. 325; Campbell v. Thomasville (Ga. App.), 64 S. E. 815. 19 (Jover V. Agee, 128 Mo. App. 427; 107 S. W. 9i^9. 20 Lutz V. Crawfordsville, 109 Ind. 466; 10 X. E. 411; Jordan v. Evansville, 163 Ind. 512; 72 X. E. 544; 67 L. R. A. 613; Gower v. Agee, 128 Mo. App. 4-27; 107 S. W. 999; Falmouth v. Watson. 5 Bush 660; Emerick v. Indian- apolis, 118 Ind. 279; 120 X. E. 795; State v. Schraeder, 51 Iowa 197; 1 X. W. 431; State v. Dougli- erty, 2 Idaho, 1105; 29 Pac. 855; Hunzinger v. State, 39 Xeb. 653; 58 X. W. 194; Shannon v. State, 39 Xeb. 658; 58 X. W. 196; Soehl V. State, 39 Xeb. -659; 58 X. W. 196; Rowels v. State, 39 Xeb. 659; 59, X. W. 196. That the Legislature may em- power a city to pi'olnbit thi sale of liquor, see In re Phillips, 82 X'eb. 45; 116 X". W. 950; State v. Superior Court, 49 Wash. 268; 94 Pac. 1086; Duren v. Stepliens, 126 Ga. 496; 54 S. E. 1045; Stephens v. Henderson, 120 Ga. 218; 47 S. E. 498; Gunnerssohn v Sterling, 92 111. 569; Osburn v. Marietta, 118 Ga. 53; 44 S. E. 807; Straus v. Galesburg, 203 HI. 234;67X. E. 836, affirming 89 IlL App. 504; McXulty v. Toopf (Ky.), 75 S. W. 258; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 430; Florence v. Brown (iS. C), 26 S. E. 880; Pap- worth V. Fitzgerald, 106 Ga. 378; 32 S. E. 363; Tucker v. Moul- 169 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 117 Where a constitutional provision confers on county courts the superintendence of internal police of their counties, the Legis- lature may give a city or town the exclusive power to grant licenses to sell liquors within its boundaries.-^ The Legislature may authorize a municipality to prohibit the use or keeping of liquors in any refreshment saloon or restaurant within its boundaries.-- So an act authorizing a city to prohibit the sale of liquors within a resident portion of a municipality is valid and is not void on the ground that it authorizes the grant of special privileges.-^ A Legislature may empower a city to prohibit sales or gifts of liquors, although the general law does not prohibit them, notwithstanding a provision in the State Constitution forbids it authorizing a municipality to enact an ordinance inconsistent with the general laws of the State.^* But if the Constitution prohibits sales of liquor the Legislature cannot authorize a city to license such sales.-'^ So, where the Constitution prohibited the Legislature to pass any statute "regulating the internal affairs of cities," it was held not to prohibit the passage of a general act establishing an excise department in cities, for it was a grant of original powers to a department of a city, the creation of which was entrusted to the city itself; -" under this clause the power to act may be conferred, but the machinery for its exercise trie, 122 Ga. 160; 50 S. E. 61; If a city charter is in conflict United States Distilling Co. v. with an earlier general statute Chicago, 112 111. 19; 1 N. E. of the State on the subject of the 166; Littlejohn v. Stells, 123 Ga. sale of liquors, it will repeal pro 427; 51 S. E. 390; Ex parte Mog- tanto, as to such city, such ear- ensen, 5 Cal. App. 596; 90 Pac. lier law. State v. King, 37 Iowa 1063. 462. 21 Ward V. County Court, 51 25 Yazoo City v. State, 48 Miss. W. Va. 102; 41 S. E. 154. 440; State v. Topeka, 30 Kan. 22 State V. Clarke, 8 Fost. 176; 653; 2 Pac. 587; 31 Kan. 452; 2 61 Am. Dec. 611. Pac. 597; State v. Leavenworth, 23 Shea V. Muncie, 148 Ind. 14; 36 Kan. 314; 13 Pac. 591; see 46 N. E. 138; Ex parte King, 52 Dewar v. People, 41 Mich. 401; Tex. Civ. App. 383; 107 S. W. 29 N. W. 545; Mt. Pleasant v. 549; Paul v. State (Tex. Civ. Vansice, 43 Mich. 361; 5 N. W. App.), 106 S. W. 448. 378; 38 Am. Eep. 193. ^* Ex parte Cowert, 92 Ala. 26 State v. Trenton, 51 N. J. 94; 9 So. 225. L. 498; 18 Atl. 116. § 117 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 170 cannot be prescribed.'^ Since the Legislature may author- ize a municipality to exact licenses for sales of liquors, it may also take away the power, and may even annul those granted without making any provisions for a return of the fees paid for them, or for an amount of such fees as are proportionate to that part of the terms of such licenses re- maining unexpired at the time of their revocation.^® And the Legislature may also confer upon municipalities the exclusive and sole power to require a lieense.^^ The Con- stitution of South Carolina gives the Legislature the exclusive right to license the sale of intoxicating liquors, but this does not prevent the Legislature authorizing a city to prohibit the sale of liquors within its limits.^** The amount of a license fee may be graded according to population, as one amount for a city and another for a town.^^ Where a Con- stitution provided that any city might "make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with the general laws," it was held that an ordinance inflicting a penalty for a refusal to pay a license fee for the carrjnng on of his business as a 27 state V. Camden, 40 N. J. L. 313; 58 S. E. 715; Winona v. 156. Whipple, 24 Minn. 61. 28 Gutzweller v. People, 14 111. A city may be empowered to 142. This is upon the principle prohibit sales on Sunday. State that no one has a vested right in v. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 663; 33 Am. a license or right to sell liquors. Rep. 224. Parsons v. People, 32 Colo. 221; so Florence v. Brown (S. C), 76 Pac. 666. 26 S. E. 880. A statute authorizing a munic- A city may require a license to ipaiity to suspend a dispensary, be taken out at periods less than thereby entirely prohibiting the one year. Ex parte Hurl, 49 Cal. sale of liquors, or to permanently 557; Ex parte Benninger, 64 Cal. discontinue it, thereby putting in- 291; 30 Pac. 846. to operation the license laws both 3i Amador County v. Kennedy, of the city and State, is invalid, 70 Cal. 458; 11 Pac. 757; Amu- because it is a delegation of such dor County v. Isaacs, 11 Pac. 758; legislative power as the Legisla- State v. Dohertv, 2 Idaho 1105; ture cannot make. Mitchell v. 29 Pac. 855; Hunzinger v. State, State. 133 Ala. 65; 32 So. 687. 39 Neb. 653; 58 N. W. 194, 20 State V, Harden, 62 W. Va. 171 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 118 saloon keeper was valid.''- A city may be empowered to adopt an ordinance requiring her police to enter saloons to see if the law is being violated. ^^ Sec. 118. Compelling towns to engage in liquor traffic. A law which authorizes county commissioners to appoint an agent to purchase liquors at the expense of a town within the county Avithout the assent of the town, either expressed or implied, and without giving indemnity to the town for the faithful execution of the duties of the agent, is not consti- tutional. So far as municipal corporations are endowed with the power of contracting and of acquiring and disposing of property, it stands on the same ground of exemption from legislative control and interference as a private corporation. This being true, such a town cannot be held liable for a debt contracted in the purchase of liquors by such an agent. It cannot be claimed that the town is liable for such a debt on the ground that it arises ex contractu. This is so because it is a fundamental element in contracts that the party to be bound must have assented to. the contract, either ex- pressly or by implication. To require the town to pay such a debt would be in violation of the well established principle that the property of an individual or of a cor- poration may not be taken without compensation. If, through the artificial contrivance of a municipal corporation, of which the inhabitants of a State must be members, nolentes volentes, such consequences can be wrought out, most persons would invoke the exercise of the annihilating power of the 32 Ex parte JlcXally, 73 Cal. subject to State laws, and can- 632; 15 Pac. 36S. not contravene them. Ex parte 33 Commonwealth V. Doucey, 126 Sweetman, 5 Cal. App. 577; 90 Mass. 269. But the Legislature Pac. 1069; Ex parte Huillade, 5 cannot confer power upon a mu- Cal. App. Ill; 90 Pac. 1071; nicipality or board which itself Cooper v. Greenfield, 169 Ind. 14; must exercise. State v. Baum, 33 81 N. E. 56; State v. Robinson, La. Ann. 9F1; Feek v. Blooming- 101 Minn., 277; 112 N. W. 269. dale, 82 Mich. 393; 47 N. W. A city cannot license a sale the 37; 10 L. R. A. 69. State law forbids. Cooper v. Ordinances adopted by a city Greenfield, 169 Ind. 14; 81 N. E. under its powers to license are 56. § 119 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 172 government over such corporations rather than of the power of the police regulation, in virtue of which alone such a law, if sustainable, can be sustained.^* Sec. 119. Monopoly of sale. Monopolies are not in harmony with the genius of our laws nor of our Constitutions ; and it is a universal rule that a Legislature, aside from the sale by State dispensaries, cannot create a monopoly in the sale of liquors. Such is the case when an act attempts to create a board of commis- sioners for a certain city to sell liquors, giving them the exclusive sales therein and permitting them to take the profits of such sales for their own use.^^ But such an act authorizing a city or town to have the exclusive right to sell, and profits thereof, within its boundaries, is not objection- able, on the ground that it creates a monopoly.^® An ordi- nance prohibiting the service of liquors with meals, but pro- viding that the city council may grant permits to hotel keepers to thus serve liquors, is not unconstitutional as creating a monopoly of sales, or as an unjust discrimination among citizens of the State.^^ And a statute limiting the number of saloon licenses in a municipality is not invalid, for it is a reasonable exercise of the police power; ^^ and so is an ordinance limiting the number of saloons to a block.^^ Nor is it such a discrimination as renders the transaction void to grant a second license at a lower rate than a previous 31 Atkins V. Town of Randolph, ss Decie v. Brown, 167 Mass. 31 Vt. 226. 290; 45 N. E. 765; Moss v. War- 35 Mitchell V. State, 133 Ala. ran (Tex. Civ. App.) ; 123 S. W. 65; 32 So. 687. See Grumbauch 1157. V. Leande, 154 Cal. 679; 98 Pac. An act confining sales of liquor 1059. to the business portions of a city 36 Plumb V. Christie, 103 Ga. is not void on the ground that 686; 30 S. E. 759; 42 L. R. A. it creates a monopolj'. Shea v. 181; Deal' v. Singletory, 105 Ga. Muncie, 148 Ind. 14; 46 N. E. 466; 30 S. E. 765; Guy v. Com- 138. missioners, 122 N. C. 471; 29 39 Meyer v. Decatur, 125 111. S. E. 771: See § 112, note. App. 556 [1908J. 37 7,1 re Kidd, 5 Cal. App. 159; 89 Pac. 987. 173 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. • § 120 one ; nor can such previous licensee recover back the excess of the fee he paid over and above the amount of the fee paid by the subsequent licensee.*'' Sec. 120. Territorial power to enact liquor laws, . A territory has no powers, legislative, executive or judi- cial, except such as are conferred upon it by act. of Congress. It can have over its subjects no greater powers than Con-: gress itself has, and such powers may be as limited as Con- gress may determine. It has no powers, in fact, except such as are expressly or by implication conferred by Congress itself. The sovereignty of a territory, so called, comes from Congress, not the people. If Congress have no power under the Constitution, it can confer none upon the territory. It has been aptly said that a "territory is an outlying province of the national government," subject to its direct control through congressional supervision of territorial legislation. That it has national sovereignty over the territories has never been denied. It is expressly provided that Congress shall have power "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting a territory." From this provision it must follow that the legislative powder of a territory is limited, not only by the powers of Congress granted by the Constitution itself, but it must be confined to the powers also expressly or by necessary inference conferred by statute of Congress upon the legislative assembly. Independent of this rule, however, it has been held that it is one of the police powers of a territory to license and regulate the traffic in intoxicating liquors. In this regard the Constitution of the United States and acts of Congress, so far as applicable, are the only limitations upon the legislative powers of a territory. Such laws are looked upon as police regulations when estab- lished by the Legislature of a territory for the prevention of intemperance, pauperism and crime, and for the abate- ment of nuisances. The power to pass such laws is inherent in a State or territory.*^ ' . 40 Silver v. Sparta, 107 Ga. 275 ; ^i United States v. Stephens, 33 S. E. 31. 12 Fed. 52; Nelson v. United § 121 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 174 Sec. 121. State engaging in liquor traffic — Dispensary laws. Whether or not a State can go so far in its regulation of the use or sale of intoxicating liquors as to prohibit all sales by individuals, establish its own agencies for their sale and appoint its own agents to conduct such sales, has been vari- ously decided. The dispensary law of South Carolina, enacted in 1893, forbade any private individual to keep in- toxicating liquore in the State, vested the exclusive right in the State to sell such liquors, and designated certain officers to make such sales. In the first decisions where the validity of this law was drawn in question, the courts held it uncon- stitutional, being an invasion of that clause in the State Constitutions declaring that no person should be despoiled or deprived of his liberty or estate except by the judgment of his peers. The State was engaged in the traffic for a iprofit." It was said that the statute created a monopoly in the State, and the police power did not extend so far as to create a monopoly. But in a subsequent case the law was held valid, and the earlier cases overruled.*^ So a law empowering a city or town to establish and operate dispen- saries for the buying or selling of intoxicating liquors has been held valid.** In Georgia a law authorizing the State States, 30 Fed. 112; Territory v. 26 L. R. A. 345. These points Ck)nn€ll, 16 Pac. (Ariz.) 209; Ter- are not involved in the decision ritory v. O'Connor, 5 Dak. 307; of the United States Supreme 37 N. W. 765; 41 N. W. 740; Court which passed upon another 36 L. R. A. 355; United States v. provision of the statute. Scott v. Cohn (Ind. T.), 52 S. W. Donald, 165 U- S. 58; 17 Sup. Ct. 38; Ex parte Brown, 38 Tex. Cr. 2'85. See Cantini v. Tillman, 54 App. 29-5; Endelman v. United Fed. 069; State v. Holleyman States, 86 Fed. 456; Minnehaha (S. C), 31 S. E. 362. County v. Champion, 37 N. W. ** Childers v. Shepherd (Ala.), 766; Thornton v. Territory, 3 39 So. 235; Mitchell v. State, 133 Wash. r. 482; 17 Pac. 896; Ter- Ala. 65; 32 So. 687. ritory v. Miguel, 18 Hawaii 402. An act for a particular town 42McCullough v. Brown, 41 S. was held invalid. Newman v. C. 220; 19 S. E. 458; 23 L. R. A. State (Ala.), 39 So. 648; Lee 410; State v. O'Donnell, 41 S. C. v. State, 143 Ala. 93; 39 So. 720; 553; 19 S. E. 748. Harlan v. State, 136 Ala. 150; 33 *3 State V. City Council of Ai- So. 858; Elba v. Rhodes, 142 Ala. ken, 42 S. C. 222; 20 S. E. 221; 689; 38 So. 807. 175 CONSTITUTIONAIJTY OF STATUTES. §121 to engage in the liquor traffic, and prohibiting private citi- zens engaging therein, was held not to violate that provision of the Federal Constitution relating to interstate com- merce.*^ But in Indiana a statute of this kind, at an early- day, was held unconstitutional, on the ground that it created a monopoly in the State in a business from which its citizens were excluded.*"^ In North Carolina such a law has been held valid, not being a monopoly, since the whole community shares in the profits.*^ In Alabama, where prohibition pre- vailed in a county, a statute authorizing a town therein, in its discretion, to open a dispensary for the sale of liquors under its agency, was hela valid, the act of the town in de- ciding to open a dispensary in no sense being a delegation of legislative power and not, therefore, a repeal of the pro- hibitory provisions of the statute. The statute was also gen- erally held valid.** 45 Plumb V. Christie, 103 Ga. 686; 30 S. E. 759; 42 L. R. A. 181; Deal v. Singletory (Ga.), 30 S. E. 765; Chamlee v. Davis, 115 Ga. 266; 41 S. E. 691; Butler V. Merritt, 113 Ga. 238; 38 S. E. 751. 46Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501; 63 Am. Dec. 391. 47 Garsed v. Greensboro, 126 N. C. 159; 35 S. E. 254. It has been held that the Board of Directors of a State Dispensa- ry in South Carolina cannot close it. State V. Board, 70 S. C. 509; 50 S. E. 203. The State dispensaries in South Carolina are subject to the li- quor revenue laws of the United States. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437; 26 Sup. Ct. 110; affirming 39 Ct. of CI. 257. *» Ex parte Hall (Ala.), 47 So. 199. See Mitchell v. State, 133 Ala. 65; 37 So. 407. A statute levying a tax to en- force the dispensary law is valid under a clause in the Constitu- tion, authorizing the levying of a tax "for litigation, quarantine and court expenses." Murphy v. Landron, 76 S. C. 21; 56 S. E. 850. That the local option and dis- pensary laws of Georgia are gen- eral laws and valid. See Dispen- sary Commissioners v. Hooper, 128 Ga. 99; 56 S. E. 997. It has been held that a statute limiting sales to such liquors as should be manufactured for sac- ramental, medicinal, chemical and mechanical uses under author- ity of the selectmen of a town was valid, not being void on the ground that it established an ex- clusive privilege repugnant to the prohibition of the Constitution. State V. Brennan, 25 Conn. 27«; State V. Wheeler. 25 Conn. 290. A statute giving those agents § 122 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 176 Sec. 122. Carolina dispensary and Wilson laws construed — Discrimination. What is known as the State Dispensary Law of South Carolina did not purport to prohibit either the importation, the manufacture, the sale, or the use of intoxicating liquors. By it liquors and wines were recognized as commodities which might be lawfully made, bought and sold. While it was true that the first section of the law made it penal to manufacture, sell, barter, deliver, store or keep in possession any spirituous malt, vinous, fermented, brewed or other liquors which con- tained alcohol to be used as a beverage, and declared all such liquors to Le contraband and against the morals, good health and safety of the State, and authorized them to be seized wherever found, without warrant, and turned over to the State commissioners, yet those enactments were not absolute but were made subject to the subsequent provisions of the law. When those provisions were examined it was found that, so far from the importation, manufacture and sale of such liquors being prohibited, those operations were turned over to State functionaries, by whom alone, or under whose direction, they were to be carried on. By them liquors and wines were recog- nized as commodities which might be lawfully made, bought of a city managing a dispensary The State has power to estab- a personal interest in the sales, is lish and maintain dispensaries void. Mitchell v. State, 133 Ala. under its own agents or officials 65; 32 So. 087. created for that purpose. Plumb Power given to commissioners v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686; 30 to suspend the dispensary or S. E. 759; 42 L. R. A. 181; Deal discontinue it permanently, tnere- v. Singleton, 105 Ga. 406; 30 S. by making the sale of liquor in E. 765. the territory valid, or putting into Eflect of act of February 16, effect a license law, is unconstitu- 1907, winding up South Carolina tutional, being an unlawful delega- dispensaries on the relation of tion of legislative power, and a venUors of liquors to them. Mur- city ordinance prohibiting the ray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 sale except as allowed by such U. S. 151; 29 Sup. Ct. 458. Sale void statute, is also invalid, be- to dispensary on credit in Louisi- cause it cannot be enforced ac- ana. Cottonwood v. H. M. Avis- cording to its original intent. tin & Co. (La.), 48 So. 345. Mitchell v. State, 133 Ala. 05; 32 So. 687. 177 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES, § 122 and sold, and, therefore, the subject of foreign and interstate commerce. In February, 1895, two suits at law were instituted in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina to recover damages caused by the action of the defendants, State constables acting under the law, in seizing and carrjung away several packages of wines and liquors be- longing to the plaintiffs. One of the packages consisted of a case of domestic California wine which came by rail from Savannah, Georgia, whither it had been imported by the plain- tiff ; another was a case of whisky made in Maryland and im- ported by the plaintiff by way of a Baltimore steam packet line; and the other consisted of a barrel of beer, made at Rochester, New York, and imported into the State by way of the Old Dominion Steamship Line. The suits were tried and determined by the court with a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Writs of error from the Supreme Court of the United States were sued out and allowed. In that court the records presented the question of the validity, under the Con- stitution of the United States, of the South Carolina dispen- sary law. The court conceded that the law in question was passed in the bona fide exercise of the police power and dis- claimed any imputation to the lawmakers of South Carolina of a design, under the guise of a domestic regulation, to inter- fere with the rights and privileges of either her own citizens or those of her sister States, which w^ere secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States. The court, how- ever, held that the law was void as a hindrance to interstate commerce and an unjust preference of the products of the enacting State. It was first sought to defend the act as an inspection act within the meaning of that provision of the Constitution of the United States, which permits the States to impose excise duties as far as they may be absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws. In answering this con- tention, after a full review of the authorities upon the sub- ject, the court said: "It is not an inspection law. The prohibition of the importation of the wines and liquors of other States by citizens of South Carolina for their own use is made absolute, and does not depend on the purity or im- § 122 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 178 purity of the articles. Only the State functionaries are per- mitted to import into the State, and thus those citizens who wish to use foreign wines and liquors are deprived of the exercise of their own judgment and taste in the selection of commodities. To empower a State chemist to pass upon what the law calls the 'alcoholic purity' of such importa- tions by chemical analysis, can scarcely come within any definition of a reasonable inspection law." In the next place, it w^as sought to sustain the legislation under the pro- visions of the Wilson Law. In answering this contention the court said: "It is not a law purporting to forbid the importation, manufacture, sale and use of intoxicating liquors as articles detrimental to the welfare of the State and to the health of the inhabitants, and hence it is not within the scope and operation of the Act of Congress of August, 1890. That law was not intended to confer upon any State the power to discriminate injuriously against the products of other States in articles whose manufacture and use are not forbidden, and which are, therefore, the subjects of legitimate commerce. When that law provided that 'all fermented, distilled or intoxicating liquors transported into any State or territory, remaining therein for use, consump- tion, sale or storage therein, should, upon arrival in such State or territory, be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or terri- tory, and should not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise, evi- dently equality or uniformity of treatment under State laws was intended. The question whether a given State law is a lawful exercise of the police power is still open and must remain open to this court. Such a law may forbid entirely the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors and be valid. Or it may provide equal regulations for the inspec- tion and sale of all domestic and imported liquors and be valid. Bu<^ the State cannot, under the Congressional legis- lation referred to, establish a system which, in effect, dis- 179 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 123 criminates between interstate and domestic commerce in commodities to make and use which are admitted to be law- ful.'""* Sec. 123. Ex post facto laws — Municipal ordinance. A law is retrospective, retroactive or ex post facto, which makes acts committed prior to its enactment criminal, or, as applied to past transactions, which creates a new duty or impairs vested property rights acquired under existing law ; ^° therefore, an ordinance of a municipal corporation providing for an increased license fee and declaring that all sales of intoxicating liquors thereafter made by persons fail- ing to comply with its provisions shall be unlawful, is not an ex post facto law.^^ A license issued under a law regu- lating the sale of intoxicating liquors has neither the quali- ties of a contract nor of property, but merely forms a part of the internal police system of the State.^- No one can acquire a vested right or prevent a change of policy by the State, or by a municipal corporation acting under a charter from it, where the varying interests of society may require and where the privilege under which he is acting is merely a statutory one.-"'^ The power to grant, withhold or annul licenses to sell intoxicating liquors is an exercise of the (police power, and no limitation can be placed upon it by any statutory provision." A¥hen the premise is once estab- lished that one cannot acquire any vested or contractual interest in the police regulation, the conclusion must follow that subsequent regulations on the same subject cannot be retrospective in a technical sense. The contracts which the 40 Scott V. Donald, 165 U. S. ^i Moore v. City of Indianap- 58; 17 S. Ct. 265; 67 Fed. 854. olis, 120 Ind. 483; 22 N. E. 424; In ex parte Jervey, 66 Fed. 957, Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. the Circuit Court held that §33, S. 25; State v. Paul. 5 R. I. 185. forbidding anyone to bring liquor 02 Metropolitan Board v. Barrie, into the State was void; and so in 34 N. Y. 657. Donald v. Scott, 67 Fed. 854; and ^^ Cooley Const. Lim., 5th ed., p. so in Jervey v. The Carolina, 66 473. Fed. 1013. 54 State v. Bonnell, 119 Ind. 50 Anderson's Law Diet., p. 897. 494; 21 N. E. 1101. § 124 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 180 Constitution protects are those that relate to property rights, not governmental.^^ Sec. 124. No property right in a license — Annulling a license. There is no such property right in a license to sell intoxi- cating liquors as prevents its revocation by the authority issuing or granting it. This rule arises out of the fact that a State cannot divest itself of its right to exercise its police power — cannot bargain it away — a power "ever present and available, to be exercised by the State as emergencies may require;" and "neither the State, nor any of its agencies to whom the power has been delegated, can divest itself of the right to impose such other or additional restrictions upon the sale of intoxicating liquors, as the maintenance of good order or the preservation of the public morals may require." Again, in this same case, it is said: "If, by authorizing a license or permit for one year, the State could deprive itself of the right to impose new restrictions upon the licensee during that period, a law authorizing licenses might bind successive Legislatures for three, five, or even ten years. If the legislative discretion could be fettered or bargained away for one year, it could, upon the same principle, be bargained away for an indefinite period. It is * * * abundantly settled that a license or permit issued in pur- suance of a mere police regulation has none of the elements of a contract, and that it may be changed, or entirely re- voked, even though based upon a valuable consideration, A license issued under the law resrulating the sale of intoxi- cating liquors has neither the qualities of a contract nor of property, but merely forms a part of the internal police system of the State. No one >can acquire a vested right in a mere statutory privilege so as to bind the State, or prevent a change of policy, as the varying interests of society may require." "The enactment of a law placing restrictions upon the sale of intoxicating liquors, and requiring the pay- ment of a specified sum of money, and that a license be 55 stone V. Mississippi, 104 U. S. 814. 181 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 124 obtained before the business of selling can be lawfully entered upon, is not to be regarded as a proposition on the part of the State to contract for privileges, or to sell indul- gences, but rather as a public proclamation, announcing that the State regards the unrestricted sale of intoxicating liquors as prejudicial to the general welfare, and that in the exercise of its police power, the traffic has been placed under regulation and restraint. Those who engage in the traffic after the enactment of such a law, must be regarded as having notice from the beginning, that power of regulation is a continuing one, and that the State reserves to itself the right to deal with the subject as the special exigencies of the moment may require. They are bound to know that the license or permit has no force or vitality except as it derives it from the law under which it was issued, and that if the public good requires that the law be modified or repealed, no incidental inconvenience which they msiy suffer can stay the hand of the State. No one can acquire a vested right in the law. Even if it were conceded that a permit was possessed of some of the characteristics of property, or that it was a thing of value, in the eye of the law, it would still offer no impediment against the exertion of the police power. "^® "Even though the enforcement of an ordinance may operate to destroy a business theretofore lawful, and to seriously impair the value of property acquired under the sanction of a special law or charter, these r!onsir''°^"+''^TT;i do not render the ordinance invalid or prevent its enforcement, when the protection of the public health or the promotion of the general welfare requires it."" "T^lie licensee." said the court, in the case from which this lengthv nuotation has been made, "acquired no vested right under the previous ordinance which was taken away, nor was there anv con- tract relation existing, the obliscation of which was impaired. When the promise is once established that one can acquire 58 "The aeknowledeed police Mn^ler v. Katisas, 123 U. S. 623. Vower of the State extends often 658; 8 Snp. Ct. 273. to the destniction of property." " citing Fertilizing Co. v. Hvde License La\vs. 5 How. 504, 577; Park, P7 V. S. 659-. and Beer Co. V. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25. §124 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 182 no vested right or contractual interest in a police regulation, the conclusion follows that subsequent regulations on the same subject cannot be retrospective in a technical sense." ^* 58 Moore v. Indianapolis, 120 Ind. 483; 22 N. E. 424. Th« court concludes its opin- ion with this quotation from Stone V. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814. "The contracts which the Consti- tution pi'otects are those that re- late to propery rights, not gov- ernmental." See also Fitzgerald v. Witch- ard (Ga.), 61 S. E. 227 (where the license fee was increased af- ter the license was issued ) , Cas- sidy V. Macon (Ga.), 66 S. E. 941. This Indiana case is abundantly sustained by other cases to the same effect. Thus: "The law is now settled that the Legislature has the power to revoke licenses granted to retail liquor. Such a license is in no sense a contract by the State, county or city with the person taking out the license. It is simply a permit granted by the authorities to do business un- der the license; and the license may be revoked by the Legisla- ture at any time." Brown v. State, 82 Ga. 224; 7 S. E. 915; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray 597; Commonwealth v. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70; Martin v. State, 23 Neb. 371; 36 N. W. 554; Plenler v. State, 11 Neb. 547; Burnside v. Lincoln County Court; 80 Ky. 423; 7 S. E. 276; Metropolitan Board v. Bar- rie, 34 N. Y. 657 : State v. Holmes, 38 N. H. 225; Freleigh v. State, 8 Mo. 606: State v. Sterling, 8 Mo. 697; Baltimore v. Clunet, 23 Md. 449; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71; 20 Am. Rep. 83; McKinney v. Salem, 77 Ind. 213; State v. Bur- goyne, 7 Lea 173; Bass v. Nash- ville, Meigs (Tenn.), 421; 33 Am. Dec. 154; State v. Morris, 77 N. C. 512; Sprayberry v. Atlanta, 87 Ga. 120; 13 S. E. 197; Stone V. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814; Justice V. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 209; State v. Woodward, 89 Ind. 110. (The last five cases are cases of lottery licenses.) Frost v. State, 64 Miss. 188; 1 So. 49; Lacroix v. State, 50 Conn. 321; 47 Am. Rep. 648; Schwuchow v. Chi- cago, 68 111. 444. "The granting of a license is not the execution of a contract, and the counsel for appellants are in error in assuming, as they do, that a license issued pursuant to a general law of the State is a con- tract. The enactment of a law regulating the liquor traffic is an exercise of the police power of the State. The police power is a gov- ernmental one, and permits ob- tained under laws enacted in its exercise are not contracts. In enacting laws for the regulation of the business of retailing liquor, a sovereign power is asserted, and its exercise does not confer upon any officer authority to make a contract which will abridge this great and important attribute of sovereignty. Sovereigns may make contracts which, under our Con- stitution, will preclude them from impairing vested rights by subse- quent legislation, but this result never follows the e.xercise of a 183 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §124 As illustrating these statements, though not giving, by any means, all of the cases on the subject, it may be stated that purely police power. The right to legislate for the promotion and security of the public safety, mor- als and welfare cannot he surren- dered or bartered away by the Legislature. A license to retail liquor is nothing more than a mere permit; it is neitlier a contract nor a grant. The person who re- ceives it takes it with the tacit condition and full knowledge that the matter is at all times with- in the control of the sovereign power of the State." McKinney V. Salem, 77 Ind. 213; Shea v. Muncie, 148 Ind. 14; 4G N. E. 138; Metropolitan Board v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 659; Voight v. Board, 59 N. J. L. 358; 36 Atl. 686. "Notwithstanding his payment of large sums of money for license fees both to the county and the city, his license could be revoked without refunding his money." Haggart v. Stehlin, 137 Ind. 43; 35 N. E. 997; Shea v. Muncie, 148 Ind. 14; 46 N. E. 138; State V. Bonnell, 119 Ind. 494; 21 N. E. 1101; State v. Isabel, 40 La. Ann. 340; 4 So. 1 ; State v. Mul- lenhoff, 74 Iowa, 271; 37 N, W. 329. There is an occasional case hold- ing that a license cannot be an- nulled, because it partakes of the nature of a contract. State v. Baker, 32 Mo. App. 98; Watts V. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 329; Adams v. Hickett, 27 N. H. 289; 59 Am. Dec. 376; State v. An- drews, 28 Mo. 14; Holt v. Com- missioners, 31 How. Pr. 334, note- People V. Kansas, 31 How. Pr. 334, note; Gibbs v. State, 74 Atl. 229; State v. Doss, 70 Ark 312; 67 S. W. 867. That licenses are not contracts to sell intjo.vicating liquors be- tween the State and licensee, see Powell V. State, 69 Ala. 10; Reed V. Ball, 42 Miss. 472; Coulson v. Harris, 43 Miss. 728; People v. Bashford, 112 N. Y. Supp. 502; affirmed (X. Y. App. Div.), 112 N. Y. Supp. 1143; Schweirman V. Highland, 113 S. W. 507; State V. Louis (La.), 49 So. 167; State V. Grunald (La.), 49 So. 162; State V. Flanders (La.), 49 So. 169; Arie v. State (Okla.), 100 Pac. 23; Ashembauch v. Carry, 73 Atl. 436; Moran v. Com- monwealth, 130 Mass. 138; 39 Am. Rep. 442; Columbus City v. Cutcomp, 61 Iowa 672; 17 N. W. 47; La Croix v. Fairfield County, 49 Conn. 591; Moran v. Goodman, 130 Mass. 158; 39 Am. Rep. 443; Baker v. Pope, 2 Hun 556; Franklin v. Schermerhorn, 8 Hun 112; Kresser v. Lyman, 74 Fed. 765; La Croix v. Fairfield Co., 50 Conn. 321; 47 Am. Rep. 648; Gutzweller v. People, 14 111. 142; State v. Carney, 20 Iowa 82; Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. 700; State v. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 663; 33 Am. Rep. 224; Hadt- ner v. Williamsport, 15 W. N. C. 138; State v. Chester. 39 S. C. 307; 17 S. E. 752; Smith v. Knox- ville, 3 Head 245; Rowland v. State, 12 Tex. App. 418; Martin V. State, 23 Xeb. 371; 36 N. W. 554; Guy v. Cumberland Co. (N. €.), 29 S. E. 771. § 124 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 184 a statute allowing a recovery from a person already licensed to sell liquors, for an injury caused by a person to whom he has sold licjuor until he became intoxicated, is valid. ^'^ So is a law taking away the right to manufacaire liquors under a license not yet expired ;*'° and likewise declaring an un- expired license void and requiring of dealers to take out another license at a higher rate ;*'^ and so one authorizing a board to revoke a license without providing for a trial ;^' or to raise the fee for the unexpirpd term;**^ or to prohibit sales on Sundays.*'* So a law prohibiting sales, enacted while a license is in force, is valid :^^ as is a law authorizing a municipality to require an additional license of those already licensed hy the State,"*' or requiring saloons to be closed by a certain hour in the evening.*''^ In the considera- tion of the validity of statutes or ordinances annulling licenses in force, the question that no provision is made for a return of a proportionate amount of the license fee is not to be considered, for that fact does not render the statute or ordinance void."^ The fact that a State has enacted a statute 59 Moran v. Goodman, 130 Mass. lumbus City v. Cutcomp, 61 Iowa 138; 39 Am. Rep. 443; Baker v. 672; 17 N. W. 47. Pope, 2 Hun 556; Franklin v. es Moore v. Indianapolis, 120 Ind. Schermerhorn, 8 Hun 112. 4«3; 22 N. E. 424; Rowland v. 60 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 State, 12 Tex. App. 418; Hadtner TJ. S. 525; 24 L. Ed. 989. v. Williamsport, 15 Wkly. N. C, 01 Kresser v. Lyman, 74 Fed. 138. 765; Brown v. State, 82 Ga. 224; 64 state v. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 7 S. E. 915; Gutzweller v. People, 3G3; 33 Am. Rep. 224; State v. 14 111. 142; Fell v. State, 42 Md. Calloway, 11 Idaho 719; 84 Pac. 71; 20 Am. Rep. 83; Common- 27. wealth V. Brennan, 103 Mass 70; 65 Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597; Metropolitan Board v. Barrie, 34 State v. Chester, 39 S. C. 307; 17 N. Y. 667; Hadtner v.' Wil- S. E. 752. liamsport, 15 Wkly. N. C 138; 66 Hadtner v. Williamsport, 15 Caldner v. Kurhy, 5 Gray 597; W. N. C. 138; Moore v. Indianap- Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 24 olis, 120 Ind. 483; 22 N. E. 424. Kan. 700; Columbus Citv v. Cut- 67 Smith v. Knoxville, 3 Head comp, 61 Iowa, 672; 17 N. W. 245. 47. 68 Gutzweller v. People, 14 111. 62 La Croix v. Fairfield, 50 142; Rowland v. State, 12 Tex. Conn. 321; 47 Am. Rep. 648; Co- App. 418; Peyton v. Hot Springs 185 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §125 requiring a license to sell liquor, or regulating its sale, does not prevent it changing the law not only with respect to the regulations but also with respect to the license. '''•* Sec. 125. Revocation of license. Since a license is not a contract, the Legislature may pro- vide that on -conviction of the licensee of a violation of the liquor law — or on his conviction of a violation of any other law, especially one involving moral turpitude — his license shall, by the act of conviction, be avoided or annuUed.'^'^ So statutes under which licenses have been granted may be repealed and thereby the licenses be annulled without im- pairing the obligation of an.y contraet between the State and licensee.^i A statute authorizing a license board to revoke a license without providing for a trial has been held valid.''- Even though the money paid for a license has been appro- priated to a particular purpose and no provision is made for its return, vet the act revoking the license is valid." Co., 53 Ark. 236; 13 S. W. 764: see also Lydick v. Korner, 15 Neb. 500; 20 N. W. 26, and Martel v. East St. Louis, 94 111. 67; State V. Chester, 39 S. C. 307; 17 S. E. 752. 69 Reithmiller v. People, 44 Mich. 280; 6 N. W. 667; People V, Brown (Mich.), 48 N. W. l'o8 ; Heck V. State, 44 Ohio S. 536 ; 9 N. E. 305. Of course, law ex post facto in effect and rendering a licensee criminally liable for past offense is invalid. State v. Isabel, 40 La. Ann. 340; 4 So. 1. 70 Hildreth v. Crawford, 65 Iowa 339; 21 N. W. 667; La Croix V. Fairfield Co., 50 Conn. 321; 47 Am. Rep. 648; Martin v. State, 23 Neb. 371; 36 N. W. 554; Schwuchow V. Chicago, 68 111. 444. 71 Littleton v. Burgess, 13 Wyo. '261; 82 Pae. 864; Brown V. State, 82 Ga. 224; 7 S. S. 915; People V. Flynn, 110 N. Y. App. Div. 279; 96 N. Y. Supp. 655; reversing 48 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 159; 96 N. Y. Supp. 653 ; Fell v. Mary- land. 42 Md. 71; 20 Am. Rep. 83; Carbondale v. Wade, 106 111. App. '654. As a rule, however, a statute concerning licenses will be held to apply only to those issued thereafter, imless its explicit terms requires it to be applied to those issued before its passage. State V. Andrews, 26 Mo. 171. 72 La Croix v. Fairfield Co., 50 Conn. 321; 47 Am. Rep. 648; Co- lumbus City V. Cutcomp, 61 Iowa 672: 17 N. W. 47. 73 Gutzweller v. People, 14 111. 142; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray 597 ; Commonwealth v. Brennan, §126 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 186 Sec. 126. Amount of license fees. A larger license fee may be required in a city than in a town, or in a large city in population than in a small one A classification according to population for the determina- tion of the amount of license fee that may be charged is legitimate and a valid classification/^ Practically, there is no limit on the amount of a fee that may be exacted for a license. The amount is a matter for the Legislature and not the courts; they have nothing to do with it. The Legis- lature may prohibit altogether the sale of liquors, unless some positive clause of the Constitution forbids the prohibi- tion ; and as a method of prohibition or guasi-prohibition it may fix the amount of the license fee so high as to make it an unprofitable adventure to engage in selling liquors." 103 Mass. 70; Metropolitan Board V. Barrie, 34 N. H. 057; State v. 'Chester, 39 S. C. 307; 17 S. E. 752; Rowland v. State, 12 Tex. App. 418. A few early cases held that a license cannot be revoked, on the ground that the licensee has a vested right in it. Adams v. Hickett, 27 N. H. 289; 59 Am. Dec. 376; Holt v. Commissioners, 31 How. Pr. 334, note; People v. Krushaw, 31 How, Pr. 344, note. A statute authorizing a revoca- tion of a liquor license on convic- tion of the licensee of having vio- lated the liquor laws, is constitu- tional. Krueger v. Colville, 49 Wash. 295; 95 Pac. 81; People v. Flynn, 110 K Y. App. Div. 279; 96 N. Y. Supp. 655; reversing 48 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 159; 96 N. Y. Supp. 653. A statute requiring the licen- see, in a proceeding to revoke his license, to rleny under oath every alleged violation set out in the pe- tition and raise an issue as to any material fact, or the license issued be cancelled, is unconstitu- tional, in that it permits the tak- ijig of property without due pro- cess of law. In re Collian, 82 N. Y. App. Div. 445; 81 N. Y. Supp. 567. Where an order prohibiting sales of liquor in a particular district is set aside, and then a license issued for such district; and thereafter a prohibition order is again issued, the order annuls such license and is valid. State V. Doss, 70 Ark. 312; 67 S. W. 867. 71 State V. Circuit Court, 50 N, J. L. 585; 15 Atl. 272. See State V. Keaough, 68 Wis. 135; 31 N. W. 723 ; Commonwealth v. Smoul- ter, 126 Pa. St. 137; 17 Atl. 532; Commonwealth v. Miller, 126 Pa. St. 137; 17 Atl. 623; Foster v. Burt, 76 Ala. 229. ~^' Dennohy v. Chicago, 140 III. 627: State v. "Roberts, 74 N. H. 476; 69 Atl. 722; 12 N. E, 227; Coffer v. Elizabeth town (Ky.), 99 187 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §127 Nor can it be urged that the cost of issuing the license is out of all proportion to the amount of the fee charged, for "liquor dealers are subjected to the payment of a special tax because the object of this class of legislation is to restrict the business. * " * The theory of the legislation upon this subject is that the business is one which requires re- straint because it is harmful to society."^** And if the Legislature has empowered a city to exact a license fee, not limiting it in amount, it cannot be held that the ordinance is void because the fee is a large one.''^ Sec. 127. Increasing amount of fee before license has ex- pired. Since no one has a natural right to sell intoxicating liquors, nor a vested right in a license, a license may be revoked before it has expired; or a larger fee may be re- S. W. 608; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 700 ($1,000) ; United States Distilling Co, V. Chicago, 112 111. 19; IN. E. 166; Tenney v. Lenz, IG Wis. .566; New Orleans v. Clark, 42 La. Ann. 9; 7 So. 58; In re Guerrero, 09 Cal. 88; 10 Pac. 261; Com- monwealth V. Fowler, 96 Ky. 166; 28 S. W. 786; Commonwealth v. Fowler, 98 Ky. 648; 34 S. W. 31. 76 Emerich v. Indianapolis, 118 Ind. 279; 20 N. E. 705. 77 Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30; 36 N. E. 857 ($1,000). An ordinance requiring $25 a month has been held valid. Ex parte Benninger, 64 Cal. 291; 30 Pac. 846 ; and also one i-equiring a license to be taken nut every ninety days. In re Hurl, 49 Cal. 557; or $200 annually. Ex parte McNally, 73 Cal. 632; 15 Pac. 368. A statute requiring $500 for a license every year in cities and towns where total vote exceeds 150, $300 in all other cities and towns, and $100 for hotel and tav- ern keepers three or more miles distant from any city or town was held to be reasonable and not an unjust discrimination. State v. Doherty, 2 Idaho 1105; 29 Pac. 855. So an ordinance imposing a license fee of $1,000 is valid. State V. Hardy, 7 Neb. 377; In- dianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30; 36 N. E. 857. License fees may be graded ac- cording to the population of cit- ies, or one amount for a city and another for a town. Amador County V. Kennedy, 70 Cal. 458; 11 Pac. 757; Amador County v. Isaacs, 11 Pac. 758. A statute dividing the city li- cense fees between the city and the county is valid, although the cit.v by its original charter was entitled to the whole of the fee. Winona v. Whipple, 24 Minn. 61. §§ 128, 129 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 188 quired for the time it has j^et to run. And a city, unless expressly restrained by statute, has the power to make such an exaetion.'^^ Sec. 128. License for and sales by druggists, A State has full power to require all druggists selling in- toxicating liquors to take out a license ; and fixing the license fee at fifty dollars is not an unconstitutional abuse of its power, though in certain localities it may have the effect to absolutely prohibit a druggist selling such liquors.'^" And a statute requiring all sales by a druggist to be based upon a physician's prescription is valid. ^^ The Legislature may even prescribe the form of the prescription, and make it an offense to sell liquor upon any other form.^^ Sec. 129. Limiting licenses to a certain class of persons. Not only may a State require a license of all persons sell- ing intoxicating liquors — even in case of a single sale — ^^but it may limit the right to obtain such a license to a certain class of persons, and in doing so violate no provisions of the Constitution. "The general rule undoubtedly is, that any person is at liberty to pursue any lawful calling, and to do 78 Moore v. Indianapolis, 120 ^o Commonwealth v. Fowler, 96 Ind. 483; 22 N. E. 424; Kowland Ky. 166; 28 S. W. 786; Common- V. State, 12 Tex. App. 418. See wealth v. Fowler, 98 Ky. 648; 34 also Silver v. Sparta, 107 Ga. 275; S. W. 21; State v. .Forcier, 65 N. 33 S. E. 31. Contra, State v. H. 42; 17 Atl. 577 ; State v. Hein- Baker, 32 Mo. App. 98. emann, 80 Wis. 253 ; 49 N. W. The passage of a law increas- 818; 27 Am. St. 34; Seattle v. ing the amount of the license fee Foster, 47 Wash. 172; 91 Pac. operates as a revocation of a li- 642. cense already issued, unless the so Edgar v. State, 46 Tex. Civ. additional amount is paid. Eow- App. 171; 102 S. W. 439. Ex parte land v. State, 12 Tex. App. 418. Fedderwitz, 130 Cal. xviii; 62 A city, after a county license is Pac. 935. See Sweeney v. Webb, issued, may pass an ordinance re- 33 Tex. Civ. App. 324; 76 S. W. quiring the licensee, if he desires 766; 77 S. W. 1135. to sell, to take out a city license. si Hotsnn v. Commonwealth Hadtner v. Williamsport, 15 Wkly. (Ky.), 105 S. W. 955; 32 Ky. L, N. C. 138. Rep. 392. 189 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 129 SO in his own way, not encroaching upon the rights of others. This general I'iglit cannot be taken away. It is not com- petent, therefore, to forbid any person or class of persons, whether citizens or resident aliens, offering their services in lawful businesses, or to subject others to penalties for em- ploying thera.^^- But here, as elsewhere, it is proper to recog- nize distinctions that exist in the nature of things, and under some circumstances to inhibit employments to some one class while leaving them open to others. Some employ- ments, for example, may be admissible for males and improper for females, and regulations recognizing the im- propriety and forbidding women engaging in them would be open to no reasonable ohjection.^^ The same is true of young children, whose employment in mines and manufac- tories is commonly, and ought always, to be regulated.^* And some employments in which integrity is of vital im- portance it may be proper to treat as privileges merely, and to refuse the license to follow them to any who are not reputable."*^ This quotation illustrates the s'cope of the State acting within its police powers in the designation of what certain classes shall not be permitted to follow certain occupations, and also in limiting the right to follow other occupations to a certain class. It is with the latter that we are here concerned. A statute restricting the issuance of a license, to sell intoxicating liquors, to an inhabitant of the State who is a male twenty-one years of age, and who must be of good moral character, is constitutional, although one merely a citizen be deprived of the right to obtain a license.*® The State may even go farther than this and limit the license 82 Citing Baker v. Portland, 5 449 ; Robinson v. Miner, 68 Mich. Sawyer &66. 549; 37 N. W. 21; hi re Ruth, 32 S3 Citing Blair v. Kilpatrick, Iowa 250; In re BickerstalT, 70 40 Ind. 312. In re Oiiong Woo, Cal. 35; 11 Pac. 393; Schwuchow 13 Fed. 229, and Bergman v. v. Chicago, 68 111. 444 ; In re Lunt, Cleveland, 39 Ohio St. 651. 6 Greenl. 412; City Council v. 84 Citing Commonwealth v. Ham- Ahrens, 4 Strobh. 241 ; State v. ilton, 120 Mass. 383. Trageser, 73 Md. 250; 20 Atl. fisCooley on Const. Lim. (6 905; 25 Am. St. 587; 9 L. R. A. ed.), 744. 780; Boomershine v. Uline, 159 86Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. Ind. 500; 65 N. E. 513. §130 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 190 to such persons as qualified physicians or registered drug- gists.*' So a statute prohibiting the sale of liquor by any person not importing it, is valid.^^ A statute restricting the right to a license to males has been held valid.*" Sec. 130. Discrimination in granting licenses. Neither the Legislature nor a municipality has the power to discriminate between citizens of the same class in the granting of a license.^"* It must treat them all alike. It has, however, as has been elsewhere noted, the power to limit the granting of a license to persons of good moral ehar- 87 Koester v. State, 36 Kan. 27 ; 12 Pac. 339; Sarrls v. Common- wealth, 83 Ky. 327; 7 Ky. L. Rep. 473. In re Intoxicating Li- quor Cases, 25 Kan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284; McAllister v. State, (Ala.), 47 So. 161; State v. Lind- gron, 1 Kan. App. 51; 41 Pac. 688. A druggist cannot complain that he is put upon the same plane as a retailer of liquors as a beverage. Rosenham v. Commonwealth, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 590. 88 Wynehamer v. People, 20 Barb. 567. An ordinance of a city author- izing an exclusive contract with a particular person for the sale of liquors in a particular city park has been held valid and not to cre- ate a special privilege within the clause of a Constitution providing that no law conferring "irrevoca- ble grant of special privileges or immunities can be passed by the General Assembly," and that "the General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law granting to any corporation, association or individual anv special or exclusive right, privilege or immunity." State V. Schweickardt, 109 Mo. 496; 19 S. W. 47. 89 Blair v. Kilpatrick, 40 Ind. 312; Blair v. Rutenfram, 40 Ind. 318; Walsh v. State, 126 Ind. 71; 25 N. E. 883; 9 L. R. A. 664. A statute providing that no person except certain tavern own- ers shall sell intoxicating liquors in a named district without a li- cense is void, because it confers special rights; the exception hav- ing the eirect to protect holders of licenses then in force. Com- monwealth V. Petrie Co., 90 S, W. 987; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 940. An ordinance discriminating be- tween persons of the same class is void. Popel v. Monmouth, 81 111. App. 512. A male cannot complain of a statute that he has violated be- cause it does not permit a female to take out a license. Wagner v. Garrett, 118 Ind. 114; 20 N. E. 706; Linkenhelt v. Garrett, 118 Ind. 599; 20 N. E. 708. 80* State v. New Orleans, 113 La. 371; 30 So. 999; Cairo v. Feuchter Bros., 59 111. App. 112; affirmed 159 111. 155; 42 N. E. 308. 191 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTL^. § 130 acter; and in so doing it does not violate any constitutional provisions. For no one has an inherent right to sell intoxi- cating liquors.°° But it may not select out certain persons of those having good moral character and authorize the granting to him a license to the exclusion of others in the same class, though it may require qualifications in addition to those of a good moral character; but those in that class must be all treated alike. And, as has been elsewhere said, statutes may prohibit the granting of a license to women, or to anyone who cannot obtain the consent of those in the neighborhood of the place to be licensed;*'^ or to those not citizens or residents of the city or county wherein granted.^^ Nor is a statute void which gives a city the power to re- quire a license to sell liquors within four miles of the cor- porate limits, on the ground that it discriminates between persons ; ^^- nor is an ordinance void which imposes a larger license tax on retailers of liquor than on retailers of other articles.'** A city may classify occupations for the purpose of the imposition of license taxes according to annual sales.^'^ An ordinance, so long as it does not discriminate between persons, that imposes different rates for licenses according to the locality in which the saloon licensed is located, is valid. ^•^ A statute requiring of liquor dealers a bond, con- ditioned not to sell liquor to drunkards after notice, and imposing a State and county tax, payable a year in advance, is valid, not discriminating against citizens engaged in the liquor trade nor denying to any person the equal protection of the law.^^ Requiring of vendors of liquors a license 90 Crowley v. Christonsen. 137 s* Ex parte Bur], 49 Cn]. 557. U. S. 86; 11 Sup. Ct. 13; Ex 95 Williamsport v. Wenner, 172 parte Christensen, 85 Cal. 208; 24 Pa. St. 173; 33 Atl. 544. Pac. 747. 96 East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 91 Crowley v. Christensen, su- 46 III. 392. Contra, Board v. Ren- P^^- fro (Ky.), 58 S. W. 795; 22 Ky. 92Kohn V. Melcher, 29 Fed. 433; L. Ren. 806; 51 L. R. A. 897. DeGrazier v. Stephens (Tex.), 105 07Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. ^- W. 992. 657; 13 Sup. Ct. 721; 37 L. Ed. 93 Jordan v. Evansville. 163 Ind. 599. 512; 72 N. E. 544; 67 L. R. A. 613. § 130 TKAPFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 192 cannot be objected to on the ground that the requirement lays upon them a tax w^hich compels them to pay more toward the support of the government than others not so engaged are compelled to pay/**^ So a statute dividing liquor dealers into two classes and providing regulations ap- plicable to one and not to the other, is valid.^^ So a tax on wholesale dealers in malt liquors and not on wholesalers of spirituous and vinous liquors is valid, being merely a classi- fication of occupations, a thing not prohibited by the Con- stitution.^ So a statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of all liquors except cider and wine made in the State has been held not such a discrimination as renders it void.^ So a statute requiring all liquor dealers to pay a license fee of ten dollars for the support and maintenance of an asylum for inebriates is valid, not imposing an unequal tax.^ A statute requiring a license to sell liquors, but excepting per- sons selling at wholesale in quantities exceeding five gallons per sale is valid.* So a statute forbidding any person except the proprietor and his family being in a saloon during hours when sales are prohibited is valid.'"' A statute may prohibit sales in less quantities than four gallons in a single pack- age except in licensed saloons, and not be open to the charge of an unjust discrimination.*^ A section of a statute author- ized a city to exact a license for sales in less quantities than one gallon, another se'ction fixed the fee for a year, and a third section prescribed a penalty for sales of such quanti- ties without a license except druggists who secure a permit to sell for medicinal purposes. The city enacted an ordinance providing that any person, not a licensee or holding such a 98 Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525; 3 State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 312; 69 Am. Dec. 226. 21 Am. Rep. 765; State v. Klein, «9Meehan v. Board, 75 N. J. L. 22 Minn. 328. 557; 70 Atl. 363; affirming 73 N. * State v. Bock, 167 Ind. 559; J. L. 382; 64 Atl. 689. 79 N. E. 493. 1 Cooper V. Hot Springs, 87 Ark. 5 state v. Calloway, 11 Idaho 12; 111 S. W. 997. 719; 84 Pac. 27. 2 State V. Brennan, 25 Conn. 6 People v. Harrison, 191 HI. 278; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 257; 61 N. E. 99; affirming 92 111. 290. App, 643; McAllister v. State (Ala.), 47 So. 161. 193 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 130 permit, who should sell liquors in any quantities should be fined. This ordinance was held invalid because it unjustly discriminated between persons of the siinie chiss, by per- mitting persons having licenses to sell li(iuors in quantities of less than a gallon to sell in (juantities of a p,allon or more, and yet prohibited all others selling in quantities of a gallon or more." Where a liquor law applies to all persons alike it does not deny amy person the equal protection of the law,^ and a statute forbidding saloons to be open on Sundays and excepting certain other places from its opera- tions is valid, not being a discrimination betAveen different persons. *• A statute provided that: "The failure to carry prohibition in a county shall not prevent an election for the same from being immediately thereafter held in a justice's precin'ct or subdivision of such county as designated by the commissioners' court, or of any town or city in such county; nor shall the failure to carry prohibition in a town or city prevent an election from being immediately thereafter held for the entire justice's precinct or county in whi&6; 10 Detroit ter Bros., 54 111. App 112; af- L. News, 1004. firmed 159 111. 155; 42 N. E. 308. 195 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 132 of liquors under license a lawful transaction, and to engage in the business of selling liquors is a lawful occupation, and, therefore, the Legislature has no power to inv&et the licensing board or committee with discretionary power to grant a license to one person and refuse it to another who is equally fit to engage in the business of selling liquors. But these statutes have been almost universally, if not quite, upheld. It is said that no one has an inherent right to engage in the sale of intoxicating liquors; and the State may, therefore, empower a local board to exercise its dis- cretion in licensing or refusing a license to applicants for permits.^^ Such a law does not deny to persons the equal protection of the laws.^" A statute making it discretionarj'^ with a licensing board to accept or reject the bond tendered by the applicant, where a bond is required before the license can be granted, is constitutional.^" So one prohibiting the clerks of the circuit courts issuing licenses to anyone until the grand jury of the county recommends such one, is con- stitutional.^^ But a statute providing that the local board shall refuse to issue a license to any person whom the members of it know to be unfit to conduct the business, and authorizing the county treasurer to require a new bond in any contingency which he may think requires it, is invalid, because it submits one to the will of his neighbor.^^ Sec. 132. Appeal to courts from granting, refusing ar re- voking licenses. The granting or refusing to grant a license is purely an administrative part of the power of a government and not 14 7m re Hoover, 30 Fed. 51; af- isDuay v. Shepard, 150 Mich, firmed in United States v. Ronan, 647; 114 N. W. 238; 14 Detroit 33 Fed. 117; Gray v. Connecticut, Leg. N. 700; Burke v. Collins, 18 150 U. S. 74; 15 Sup. Ct. 9S5; S. D. 190; 99 N. VV. 1112; Ex 40 L. Ed. 80; State v. Gray 61 parte Christensen, S5 Cal. 208; 24 Conn. 39; 22 Atl. 675; Thurlow v. Pac. 747; Ex parte Holinquist, 27 Massachusetts, 5 How. 504; 12 Pac. 1090; Plenler v. State, 11 L. Ed. 256. Xeb. 547; 10 X. W. 481. Instate V. Gray, 61 Conn. 30; 1 7 Cohen v. Jarrett, 42 Md. 571. 22 Atl. 675. 18 Robison v. Mines, 68 Mich. 540; 37 N. W. 21. § 132 TR.VFFIC IN INTOXICxVTING LIQUORS, 196. a judicial part of it. But the tendency of the Legislature, largely due to the failure of administration boards to prop- erly perform their duties, owing in part to an indifference on their part to the proper execution or enforcement of the law, or because of politically corrupt influence — political cowardice, if you so please to call it — or because of the ignorance or inefficiency of those charged with the duty of granting, refusing or revoking licenses, has been to cast upon the courts the burden of hearing applications for licenses, remonstrances thereto, and petitions for their revocation. In other lines of the administration of the affairs of a State there has been a decided growth in the tendency to place the burden upon the courts in such matters in the last quarter of a century. In the early judicial history^ of this country such statutes were regarded wath jealousy by the courts, as casting upon them a burden belonging to another department of the Government ; and the courts felt that it was not within the power of the Legislature to assign them duties properly be- longing to the administrative department of the Government. In addition to this, as the judiciary is the weakest branch of the three great departments of the State, it was necessary for it to regard with jealousy all encroachments upon its domains and to refuse to take on burdens not of a judicial character. But in recent years there has been a manifest yielding on this point. More and more the Legislature has sought to cast upon the courts the administration of the affairs of the government ; and more and more the courts have yielded and sought for reasons to uphold such statutes. The action of the Legislature is a high compliment to the integrity of the courts and a signal manifestation of its con- fidence in their ability and integrity. There will be found many cases where the right to have a license has been de- termined on appeal from licensing boards to the courts.^** 19 As in Virginia, Lester v. TOS; Miller v. Wade, 58 Ind. 91; Price, 83 Va. G48; 3 S. E. 529; Goodwin v. Smith, 72 Ind. 113; in Nebraska, State v. Borsfield, Castle v. Bell, 145 Ind. 8; 44 N. 24 Neb. 517; 3D N. W. 427; in E. 2; in Kentucky, Hoglan v. Indiana, Groscap v. Rainier, 111 Commonwealth, 3 Bush 147; in Ind. 361; 12 N. E. 694; State v. Pennsylvania, In re Goldman, 138 Sopher, 157 Ind. 360; 61 N. E. Pa. St. 321; 22 Atl. 23. 197 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §132 The usual line of reasoning, in order to sustain these statutes ■allowing an appeal to the courts, is, that before a license can be issued the licensing board must find certain facts — as, the applicant is a resident of the State, or a man of good moral character, or that the necessary and qualified persons have signed his application or given their consent — and that the finding of such facts is such a judicial act or determination as authorizes the court to hear and pass upon the sufficiency of the proof to sustain them, and, therefore, in ascertaining these facts the court acts judicially and not administratively. Therefore, statutes allowing appeals in such instances have been upheld, even though there v/as in- volved the question of an abuse of discretion on the part of the licensing board in refusing the license.-*' 20 Appeal of Moynihan, 75 Conn. 358; 53 Atl. 903. The inebriate law of Minnesota was held invalid so far as it con- ferred powers on the Probate Judge in relation to the commit- ment of inebriates. Foreman v. Hennepin County, 64 Minn. 371; 67 N. W. 207. Judicial powers cannot be con- ferred upon administration offi- cers. State V. Bates, 96 Minn. 110; 104 N. W. 709; People v. ■Colleton, 59 Mich. 573; 26 N. W. 771. A statute requiring a court to appoint an Excise Board for a city does not require the exercise of judicial power. Schwarz v. Dover, 72 X. J. L. 311; 62 Atl. 1135; affirming 70 N. J. L. 502; 57 Atl. 394. In West Virginia the section of the Constitution committing to county courts the superintendence of internal police under such reg- ulations as may be prescribed by law, and that no license for sale of liquor in any municipality shall be granted without the con- sent of the authorities, is iiot self- executing, and is operative only when there is a law in force con- ferring such jurisdiction in spec- ified instances on the court. State V. Harden, 62 W. Va. 313; 58 S. E. 715; <)0 S. E. 394. Such clause will not be construed as to deny the power in the Legislature t(j withhold or take from the ..power to grant or refuse licenses; for that ren- ders the word "regulating" use- less for any purposes. State v. Harden, supra. A statute providing that no li- cense shall be issued if a majority of the voters in the township remonstrate against its issuance, does not violate the provisions of the Constitution providing that all judicial powers shall be vested in the courts. Hoop v. Affleck, 162 Ind. 564; 70 N. E. 978. (§133 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 198 Sec. 133. Taxes and fees. It is no longer a quesaon of doubt that the State may not only levy a tax against intoxicating liquors and the property used in connection with their sale, but also upon the liquor business, whether the business be one of wholesale or retail. It may even go farther and declare who are liquor dealers.-^ Not only is this true, but the legislation cannot he held unconstitutional where it levies a lump sum upon each person engaged in selling liquors, on the ground that it violates the provisions of the Constitution providing for a uniform rate of taxation, because that provision relates to the general levy alone. "An excise is a direct tax; but, in this case, taxation was not the object of imposing it, and the Legislature was not bound to appropriate its proceeds to any object for which the State is forbidden to raise money by local or special taxation. It was imposed in the exercise of the rightful police power of the State, and is an incident of a legitimate police regulation. Hence, it is not within the prohibition * * * of the Constitu- tion, prohibiting local and special taxation for State pur- poses."^- The tax may be levied upon the sales, although by that method one dealer pays more tax than another. Such was the case with the "register" or "bell punch" 21 Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Carr v. State, 5 Tex. App. 153; Ind. 40; 20 N. E. 71)5; Kiirth v. State v. Rock, 9 Tex. 309. iState, 87 Tenn. 134; 5 So. 593; That a "dispensary" law is State V. Rouch (Ohio), 25 N. not a tax law, see Farmville v. E. 59; Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Walker, 101 Va. 323; 43 S. E. Ohio St. mi; 11 N. E. 321; Port- 558. wood V. Baskett, {i4 Aliss. 213; 1 22 Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. So. 105; Emerick v. Indianapolis, 449; Parsons v. People, 32 Col. 118 Ind. 279; 20 X. K. 795; West- 221; 7G Pac. G&fi; State v. Hud- inghausen V. People, 44 Mich. 265 ; son, 78 Mo. 302; Senior v. Rat- 6 N. W. 645; Ex parte Marshall, tcrman, 44 Ohio St. 661; 11 N. 64 Ala. 266; Albrecht v. State, 8 E. 321; Lovingston v. Board, 99 Tex. App. 216; Hodgson v. New 111. 564; Brown-Foreman Co. v. Orleans, 21 La. Ann. 301; Du- Commomvealth (Ky.), 101 S. Toch's Appeal, 62 Pa. 491; Stranb W. 321; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 793; Ken- V. Gordon, 27 Ark. 625; Harris ny v. Harwell, 42 Ga. 416; Boh- V. State, 4 Tex. App. 131; Ixtng- ler v. Schneider, 49 Ga. 195; ville V. State, 4 Tex. App. 312; Brown v. State, 73 Ga. 38. J 99 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 133 law of Texas, which was held valid.-' Tha State may •constitutionally make it a penal offense lor a failure to pay the tax ;■* and may authorize its usual tax collecting officers to collect the tax.-^ The tax must not, however, discrim- inate against the citizens or products of other States.-® A tax upon the keeper of a brewery is authorized by a provi- sion of the Constitution permitting a tax to be levied and an income tax imposed on all persons, occupations, trades and callings.-^ The State may impose a tax upon distilled spirits in United States bonded warehouses.-* But a tax cannot be levied upon beer manufactured for sale within the State if beer manufa'ctured for sale without the State is exempted from it.-" And an inspection fee cannot be de- manded for inspecting liquors manufactured for sale within the State while no inspection or foe is required for those manufactured within for sale without the State.^° The State may delegate to municipalities the power to levy a tax on dealers in intoxicating liquors, such a law not in- fringing that provision of the Constitution wherein the power of taxation is given to the Legislature.^^ It may even declare the tax a lien upon the property of the dealer.'^ or lessor.^' A statute assess-ing a tax on liquors against the 23 Albrecht v. State, 8 Tex. App. 28 Thompson v. (Commonwealth, 216; Napier v. Hodges, 31 Tex. 123 Ky. 302; 94 S. W. &54; 29 Ky. 287; State v. Volkman, 20 La. L. Rep. 705; Rosenfield Bros. Co. Ann. 585. v. Commonwealth ( Ky. ) , 29 Ky. 24Tonella v. State, 4 Tex. App. L. Rep. 1179; 96 S. W. 134. 325; Longville v. State, 4 Tex. 29 State v. Bengsch, 170 IMo. 81, App. 312. 70 S. W. 710. 25Adler v. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio so state v. Eby, 170 :Mo. 497; St. 53-9; 9 N. E. 672. 71 S. W. 52. 26 Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 3i United States Distillinrr Co. v. 123; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. Chicago, 112 111. 19; IN. E. 166. 275 ; Walling v. Michigan, 1 16 U. 32 Newton v. McKay ( Iowa ) , -S. 446; 6 Sup. Ct. 454; Lyng v. 102 N. W. 827; Bolton v. Michigan, 136 U. S. 161; 10 Sup. McKay (Iowa), 102 V. W. 1131; Ct. 725 ; Schmidt v. Indianapolis, Carstairs v. Cochran, 95 Md. 4'88 ; 168 Ind. 631; 80 N. E. 632; Peo- 52 Atl. 601. pie V. Lyng, 74 Mich. 579; 42 N. 3.! Anderson v. Brawstir, 4 1 01»io W. 139. St. 576; 9 N. E. 683. 27 State V. Volkman, 20 La. Ann. &85. §133 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 200 person having them in his possession, requiring him to pay the tax, and giving him a lien on the liquor for the amount he pays, is valid under a provision of the Constitution de- claring that every person holding property in the State should contribute to a public tax according to his actual worth. It is a tax on the owners of the property and not a tax on the property itself or on the possessor of the liquors, he being merelv the agent of the State to collect the tax.^* 34 Carstairs v. Cochran, 95 Md. 488; 52 Atl. 601. See Parsons v. People, 32 Col. 221; 76 Pac. 666, where $25 li- cense fee per annum was construed to he an "annual" tax. It is no objection that the taxes are not assessed according to the business transacted. Young- blood V. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406; nor is it an objection that the statute is in conflict with the constitutional provision for a uni- form rate of taxation. Straub v. Gordon, 27 Ark. 625; Brown y. Chicago, 110 111. 186; Burlington V. Insurance Co., 31 Iowa 102; Palmouth v. Watson, 5 Bush 660; Ash V. People, 1 1 Mich. 347 ; John- son V. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 491; Commonwealth v. Byrne, 20 Gratt. 165. If the apparent scope of the li- cense law is not to prohibit the sale of liquors, but to regulate it, with a view of obtaining a reve- nue, it is not constitutional on tlie ground that it abridges the right of citizens in the pursuit of their employment. In re Bickerstafl", 70 Cal. 35; 11 Pac. 303. The Ohio "Dow" liquor law was sustained on the theory that it was a revenue measure and not a license measure, the Constitution of that State prohibiting the granting of licenses. Rayman Brewing Co. v. Brister, 179 U. S. 445; 21 Sup. Ct. 201; 45 L. Ed. 269; affirming 92 Fed. 28; Adler V. Whitbeck, 44 Oliio St. 539; 9 jST. E. '672; Anderson v. Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 576; 9 N. E. 683. Earlier statute invalid. State v. Sinks, 42 Ohio St. 345. See also to the same effect Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich.. 406; 20 Am. Rep. 0i54 ; People v. Lyng, 74 Mich. 579; 42 N. W. 131). A statute of South Dakota pro- vided for an annvial license fee of $400, the license year beginning Julj^ 1st., to be paid the county treasurer, or a pro rata sum if the license be granted after July 1st. The statute required the ap- plicant for a license to file a bond, allowed the city, town or town- ship to levy and collect an addi- tional license fee, to be paid be- fore the applicant began business. A license could be refused if the authorities deemed him an unfit person, in which event his money was returned on a warrant issued by the Board of County C-ommis- sioners. The fees paid the coun- ty treasurer were placed by him to the credit of the county's gen- eral fund, and of each license fee received he was renuird to "transmit the sum of $150 to the 201 CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTES. §134 Sec. 134. Taxes must be uniform. It is axiomatic in constitutional law that taxes must be uniform and not discriminatory.^^ A law taxing all of a class alike is valid, though it taxes those of another class at a different rate. Thus, a law taxing all liquor dealere within five miles of a town at one price and those at wayside inns at less is valid, because each forms a distinct class.^*' But where a statute levied an annual tax of $25 on all liquor dealers, and provided that no one should engage in selling liquor without obtaining the written consent of two-thirds of all the bona fide residents within three miles of the place where the sales were to be made, and then made it discretion- ary with the licensing board to issue a license, it was held that the statute was not general and of a uniform operation throughout the State, and was, therefore, unconstitutional.^^ State Treasurer," to be credited to the general fund of the State. It was held that the statute was a police regulation, and the li- cense fee a tax within the provi- sion of the Constitution requiring uniformity in taxation. State v. Buechler, 10 S. D. 156; 7'2 N. VV. 114. Under a statute authorizing a city "to raise revenue by levying and collecting a license tax on any occupation or business," and empowering it "to license, regulate and prohibit"' liquor sales and the amount to be paid for licenses, a city can both impose an occupa- tion tax upon liquor dealers and exact a license fee, but it cannot compel the payment of the occ\i- pation tax before it will issue a license. State v. Bennett, 19 Nob. 191; 26 N. W. 714. Under a power to license a city cannot levy a tax. Du Boi:^t )wn V. Rochester, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. Btp. 442. Where a Constitution provided that articles manufactured of the produce of the State should not be taxed except for inspection fees, but gave the Legislature power to tax "privileges" as it saw tit, it was held that a tax might be imposed upon a liquor dealer, though he sold liquor manufac- tured out of the products of the State. Kurth v. State, S6 Tenn. 134; 5 S. W. 593. A statute providing for the ar- rest of a liquor dealer who does not pay his tax and the sheriff can find no property to levy up- on, is valid. 'Commonwealth v. Byrne, 20 Gratt. 165. 35 Bohler v. Schneider, 49 Ga. 195; Smith v. State, 90 Ga. 133; 15 S. E. 682. See Richland Co. v. Richland Center, 59 Wis. 591; 18 N. W. 497; Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449. 36 Territory v. Connell, 2 Ariz. 339; 16 Pac. 209. 37 Smith v. State, 90 Ga. 123; 15 S. E. 682. § 134 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 202 A tax of one amount to sell generally and another amount to sell malt liquors is valid, even though the Constitution provides that taxes on "liquor dealers" shall be uniform as to the class on which they operate. ^^ So a tax on persons of one amount on those dealing in distilled liquors on land and another amount on persons following like occupations on ■steamboats is valid.'^" Still, in the same State, a tax regu- lated by the amount of business done has been held in- valid;*" while in two other States practically the same kind of tax has been held valid. *^ A statute authorizing cities to levy a tax on the occupation of liquor selling is not illegal because the State does not levy a tax on other occu- pations."*" So one tax may be levied upon breweries and dis- tillers and another on saloons.^^ So a statute imposing a tax on wholesalers but excepting manufacturers, is valid.** The fact that a statute enables one county to levy the tax in a certain amount and another county in another amount does not render the statute invalid.*^ Nor is a tax on the occu- pation of selling liquor void because it must be paid in advance and a license obtained to sell, while on other occu- pations the tax is payable only quarterly and no license required.*'^ Nor is a statute unconstitutional which requires a State officer to secure registrars of sales of liquor, and providing that he shall first supply the cities of the State, and liquor sellers therein must purchase and use them.*'^ 38 Tiernan v. Harrison, 109 111. a levy that they are not consulted ■593; Adler v. Whitbeek, 44 Ohio in their levy. Youngblood v. Sex- St. 539; 9 N. E. 672. ton, 32 Mich. 406; 20 Am. Eep. 39 Kaliski v. Grady, 25 La. Ann. 654. 576. 43 Adler v. Whitbeek, 44 Ohio 40 East Feliciana v. Gurth, 26 St. 539 ; 9 N. E. 672. La, Ann. 140; State v. Rolle, 39 44 Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Ohio La. Ann. 991; 31 Am. Rep. 234. St. 661; 11 N. E. 321; affirming 41 Marxhouser v. Oommon- 17 Wkly. L. Bull. 115; Fahey v. wealth, 29 Gratt. 863; Albrecht v. State, 27 Tex. App. 146; 11 S. W. State, 8 Tex. App. 215; 34 Am. 108; 11 Am. St. 182. Rep. 737 ; Helfrick v. Common- 45 Fahey v. State, 27 Tex. App. wealth, 29 Gratt. 844; Gaiocchio 146; 11 S. W. 108; 11 Am. St. V. State, 9 Tex. App. 387. 182. 42 Holberg v. Macon, 55 Miss. 4o Fahoy v. State, supra. 112. It is not a valid objection to 4- Helfrick v. Commonwealth, a statute requiring cities to make 29 Gratt. 844. 203 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 135 Sec. 135. Bell-pimch law — Uniformity — Discriminating practice. In some of the States there is v*-hat is known as the "Bell-punch Law," which is a device for registering- the number of sales made by a retail liquor dealer, and is much like the ordinary cash register in common use by other retail merchants. They are used for the purpose of determining the amount of tax to be paid by such liquor dealers for the privilege of conducting their business. These laws have been sustained against attacks made on the ground that they were: (1) unequal and lacked uniformity in a constitutional sense; (2) as being an unjust and partial discrimination against liquor dealers in the cities. As to the ground of inequality and want of uniformity of taxation, the court in the case first cited said : "Viewed in its twofold aspect, the law in question is free from objection on this account. It levies a specific occupa- tion tax of $250 on every dealer in the State, exempting no person or section from its operation, and requires every dealer alike to pay the tax as a prerequisite to his selling, and then it provides that after a certain arnount of sales have been made, lays an additional burden on those of the class whose prosperity in business best enables them to bear it."'*^ As to the second ground, the Virginia court said: "Absolute equality and justice are unattainable in tax pro- ceedings. The most that can be done is to approximate them as near as possible. It has been repeatedly held by this court that the provisions requiring equality and uniformity of taxation, apply onlj^ to a direct tax on property, and not to license taxes, which do not admit of a tax strictly equal and uniform in the sense contended for. But, if it be eon- ceded that the rule must apply to all subjects, yet it can only be applied as far as practicable. If a ^ven subject be only susceptible of a modified application of the principle, it must receive this and not "be rejected, because the rule cannot be applied with perfect precision to its whole extent in all its results." *^ In Texas, it was held that under such a 48 Albrecht v. State, 8 Tex. App. *^ Helfrick v. Commonwealth, 29 216; 34 Am. Rep. 737. Gratt. (Va.) S44. § 130 iKAPFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 204 law a defendant could not be convicted upon an indictment charging him Avith the sale of intoxicating liquors without turning the crank of the register if the evidence showed that the sale was made by his bartender in his absence, and that the sale was made without any complicity on the part of the defendant.^" And in Virginia it was held that a person selling such liquors at a time after the passage of the register act, which was declared to be in force from its passage, but before the registers provided for in the act were supplied, was not liable to the punishment provided for by the act, but only the punishment imposed by the former revenue law^s."^ Sec. 136. Consent of voters to license — Validity of statute requiring. It is a maxim of constitutional construction that the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other body or authority. The maxim, however, is not violated when municipal corporations are vested with cer- tain powers of legislation. This is so because it is proper that such corporations should have the right to make regu- lations for their local government, and that they are sup- posed to be better judges than the Legislature of what they need. But such powers as are conferred upon such corpora- tions must be executed by the municipality, and, so far as they are legislati\^e, cannot be delegated to any subordinate or to any other authority. The same restriction which rests upon the Leg-islature as to the legislative functions con- ferred upon it by the Constitution, rests upon a municipal corporation as to the powers granted to it by the Legis- lature.^^ Accordingly, the principle is a plain one that the public powers or trusts devolved by law or charter upon the council or governing body to be exercised by it when and in such manner as it shall .judge best, cannot be delegated to 50 Gaiocchio v. Stale, 9 Tex. 52 Chicago v. Stratton, I6'2 III. App. 387. 494; 45 N. E. 116; Swift v. Peo- 51 Marxhonsen v. Common- pie, 162 111. 534 ; 44 N. E. 28. wealth. 2D Gratt. (Va.) 853. 205 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 136 others.^^ But there can be no valid objection to an ordi- nance, which confers an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance to the ordinance itself. Upon this theory it has been held that an ordinance prohibiting the granting of license to keep dram- shops within a described portion of a city unless the appli- cant presents a petition signed by a majority of the legal voters of that portion of the city, is not invalid as delegating to such voters the power to license dramshops, and that such an ordinance is not invalid as permitting arbitrary dis- crimination between applicants because one may be able to get the petition and another cannot. Voters of the par- ticular locality may have good and just motives for signing or refusing to sign a petition ; and it will not be presumed that they were actuated by a bad rather than a good motive. They may be willing that one saloon shall be kept but, be op- posed to more. Having signed a petition for one it would not be unjust discrimination against the second applicant to refuse to sign his petition. They might be willing to have saloons in a particular part of the district but not in others. Cer- tainly it would not be discrimination to sign the petition of one for the unobjectionable locality and refuse to sign for the other.^^ So a statute prohibiting the issuance of a license to sell intoxicating liquors at any particular place if the •owners of the greater part of the land lying within two hundred feet of such place object, is not unconstitutional, not depriving the applicant for a license of his property without due process of laAV."'"^ Likewise a statute and an ordinance passed in pursuance thereof, forbidding the issuance of a license to anyone for a particular place unless upon the petition of a majority of the property or house holders within three hundred feet of such place is valid, and is not void on the ground that the statute and ordinance confer arbitrary powers upon such property or house holders ■"3 1 Dillon on Munic. 'Corp., 4tli 55 American Woolen Co. v. ed., Sec. 96. Smithfield, 2.8 R. I. 546; 68 Atl. 54 Swift V. People, 1 62 111. 534; 719; Green v. Smith, 111 Iowa • 44 N. E. 52i8; 30 L. R. A. 470; 183; 82 N. W. 448. reversing 60 111. App. 395. § 137 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 206 aud the city council to refuse to grant applications for licenses in particular neighborhoods.^" So a Federal statute prohibiting a distillery within six hundred feet of a reictify- ing establishment is valid, not being an undue interference with either the disposition or use of property.^^ In a Cali- fornia case it was said upon this question : "It is well settled that the governing power may prohibit the manufacture and traffic in liquor altogether, provided only that it does not interfere with interstate commerce. Aud if the governing power can prohibit a thing altogether, it can impose such conditions upon its existence as it pleases. "^^ In a lower Federal court the California ordinance was held unconstitu- tional,^^ but the Supreme Court of the United States held it valid.*"^ So a statute is valid which requires the applicant to first procure the consent of a majority of all male per- sons over twenty-one years of age in the city, district or town, and all female persons over eighteen years of age within such city, district or town ; and it cannot be success- fully urged that it is unconstitutional because females are not voters.*'^ Sec. 137. Assent of neighbors may be required. A statute or municipal ordinance regulating the 'carrying on of a business harmless in itself and useful to the com- munity violates the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend- ment to the Constitution of the United States if it makes 56 New Orleans v. Macheca, 112 eo Crowley v. Cliristensen, 137 La. 559; 36 So. 747; citing Crow- U. S. 86; 11 Sup. Ct. 13. ley V. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86; A statute is valid which forbids 11 Sup. Ct. 13; 34 L. Ed. 6'20; the granting of a license if a ma- New Orleans v. Smythe, 11<6 La. jority of the voters in the dis- 086; 41 So. 33. trict for which it is applied for 57 Mason v. Rollins, 2 Biss. 99 ; shall remonstrate against its is- Fed. Gas. No. 9^252. suance. Hoop v. Affleck, 162 Ind. 58 Ex parte Christensen, 85 Cal. 5f>4 ; 70 N. E. 978 ; Cain v. Allen, 208; 24 Pac. 747. 168 Ind. 8; 79 N. E. 201, 896; 50 /n re Christensen, 43 Fed. Regadanz v. Haines, 168 Ind. 140; 243. The court relied upon Yick 79 N. E. 352. Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; oi Rohrbacher v. Jackson, 51 G Sup. Ct. 1069. Miss. 73'5. 207 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 137 arbitrary and unjust discriminations against some of those who may be engaged in it. But a statute or municipal ordi- nance which requires all retail liquor dealers to procure a license, and makes it an offense to retail intoxicating liquors without such license, and at the same time forbids any such license to be issued unless the written consent of a 'certain number of persons is obtained does not violate such amend- ment. The sale of such liquors by retail and in small quan- tities may be absolutely prohibited or regulated by State and municipal legislation, without violating the Constitution or the laws of the United States, provided such legislation does not conflict with interstate commerce. This is so be- cause the business of retailing intoxicating liquors is one that is hurtful to society. "By the general concurrence of €very civilized and Christian community, there are few •sources of crime and miserj'- to society equal to the dram- shop, where intoxicating liquors in small quantities, to be dnmk at the time, are sold ind\scriminately to all parties applying. The statistics of everv State show a greater amount of crime and misery attributable to the use of ardent spirits obtained at these retail saloons than to any other source. The sale of such liquors in this way has, therefore, been at all times, by the courts of every State, considered as the proper subject of legislation. Not only may a license be exacted from the keeper of the saloon before a glass of his liquor can be disposed of. but restriction may be imposed as to the class of persons to whom they may be sold, and the hours of the day and the days of the week on which the saloons may be opened. Their sale in that form may be absolutely prohibited. It is a question of public expediency and public morality, and not of Federal law. The police power of the State is fully competent to regulate the busi- ness — to mitigate its evils or to suppress it entirely. There is no inherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicatinsr liquors by retail; it is not a privilege of a citizen of the State or of the United States. As it is a business attended with damages to the community, it may. as already stated, be entirely pro- hibited or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to § 138 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 208 the utmost its evils. The manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority. * * * It is a matter of legislative will only." Where the political power of a State for the safety of its people takes the respon- sibility of saying that a certain occupation, for instance, that of selling intoxicating liquors, is hurtful, and will not be permitted in its boundaries unless certain conditions are complied with, the occupation so stigmatized is no longer a right, privilege or immunity within the meaning of the Con- stitution.*^^ Sec. 138. Indiana statute remonstrances. In Indiana, local option was formerly secured by a remon- strance. The statute under which this is accomplished pro- vides that : "If three days before any regular session of the board of commissioners of any county, a remonstrance in writing, signed by a majority of the legal voters of any township or ward in any city situated in said county, shall be filed with the auditor of the county against the granting of a license to any applicant or against such granting to all applicants for the sale of spirituous, vinous, malt or other intoxicating liquors, under the law of the State of Indiana with the privilege of allowing the same to be drunk on the premises where sold within the limits of said town- ship, or city or ward, it shall be unlawful thereafter for such board of commissioners to grant license to any such appli- cant therefor during the period of two years from the date of filing such remonstrance ; or if such remonstrance shall be against all applicants, then it shall be unlawful for said 62Yick Wo V. H-pkins, 118 U. 528; 38 L. R. A. 470; reversing S. 356; 6 Sup. C't. 1069; Purdy v. 60 111. App. 395; In re Hoover, 30 Suiton, 56 €al. 133; Ex parte Fed. Rep. 51; States v. Ronan, 37 Christensen, 85 Cal. 2C8; 24 Pac. Fed. 117; Kohn v. Melcher, 29 Fed. 747; State v. Brown, 19 Fla. 563; 433; DeGrazier v. Stephens (Tex), Groesch v. State, 42 Ind. 547; 105 S. W. 9<)2; State v. Settles, 34 Rohrbacher v. Jackson, 51 Miss. :Mont. 448; 87 Pac. 445; see Peo- 735; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 pie v. Haug, 68 Mich. 549; 37 N. U. S. 86; 11 Sup. Ct. 13; Swift W. 21. V. People, 162 HI. 534; 44 X. E. 209 CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTES. § 138 commissioners to grant a license to any applicant therefor during a period of two years from the date of filing .-^uch remonstrance against all applicants.""'' It has been neld that this statute is not unconsiitutional because it 'confers upon the people the power to suspend the operation of the laws, and that the result of the remonstrance therein pro- vided serves as a restriction upon the jurisdiction of the board to grant a license. In so deciding the court said: "This provision was not enacted with the view of absolutely .prohibiting the sale of liquors but only as a restriction to the granting of a license, and thereby better restraining the traffic in intoxicating liquors. All laws which regulate or restrict the sale of such liquors, by imposing burdens or conditions upon the business are in their nature or character to an extent, at least, prohibitory. An absolute prohibitory law deprives all within its reach from engaging in the busi- ness; a local option [law] prohibits all within a given locality from selling within that locality; while a license law pro- hibits all within the State, who have not obtained a license, from engaging in the business of retailing intoxicating liquors. Each of these is a restriction upon the common law right of the individual citizen. Acting upon the just assumption that the restricted sale of intoxicating liquors results in much evil, and that it is detrimental to society, the lawmaking power of each State in the Union has, in the exercise of its police power, assumed to control, regulate or prohibit the business, as seemed to it best."*'* Also that it is not unconstitutional as being class legislation, since all applicants under the statute are subject to the same condi- tion, and are granted or refused license upon the same terms.**^ 63 Acts (Ind.) 1905, p. 7. Ind. 8; 79 N. E. 201, 896; Rega- 64 Welsh V. State, 126 Ind. 71; danz v. Haines, 168 Ind. 140; 79 25 N". E. 883; State v. Gerhart, N. E. 352; Boomershine v. Cline, 145 Ind. 439; 44 N. E. 469. 159 Ind. 500; 65 N. E. 513. See 65 Hoop V. Affleck, 162 Ind. 564; also Green v. Smith, 111 Iowa, 70 N. E. 978; Cain v. Allen, 168 183; 82 N. W. 448. § 139 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 210 Sec. 139. Sales to minors, dninkards, insane persons and Indians. Under the general police power a State may prohibit sales or gifts to minors;*"' or to an inmate of an orphan's home except upon written permission of the superintendent of the home f'^ or to students of institutions of learning f^ or to persons of intemperate habits f^ or to an insane person without the consent of his parent or guardian ;^° and a statute requiring a bond giving a cause of action upon it for a viola- tion of such statute is valid/^ A statute may even go so far as to make it an offense to permit a minor to visit or stay in a saloon, upon the ground that it keeps from him the tempta- tion to drink." So Congress may prohibit the sale or gift of liquor to an Indian, on the ground that it is a regulation of commerce with an Indian tribe ;" and a State statute pro- hibiting a sale to an Indian whether he has or has not severed his tribal relations, and whether he has or has not become a citizen of the United States by complying with the provisions of the United States "Land and Severalty Act" of 1887, is valid.^* 66 Allen V. State, 52 Ind. 486; to Kelly v. Burke, 132 Ala. 235; Altenburg v. Commonwealth, 126 31 So. 512. Pa. St. '602; 17 Atl. 799; Gold- 7i Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. sticker V. Ford, 69 Tex, 385 ; Leisy 657; 13 Sup. Ct. 721; 37 L. Ed. V. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; 10 Sup. 59-9. Ct. 681; 34 L. Ed. 128; Common- t2 Goldsticker v. Ford, &2 Tex. wealth V. Zelt, 138 Pa. St. 615; 385. 21 Atl. 7; 27 VVkly. X. C. 131; 11 "United States v. Holliday, 3 L. R. A. 602; Stephens v. State, Wall. 407; United States v. 4-3 47 Tex. Cr. App. 604; 85 S. W. Gallons of Whisky, 93 U. S. 188. 797 ; Lodano v. State, 25 Ala. 64. See also American Fur Co. v. 67 State V. Barringer, 110 N. C. United States, 2 Pet. 358; 525; 14 S. E. 781. United States v. Shaw Mux, 68 Peacock v. Limburger, 95 Tex. 2 Sawy. 364 ; Nelson v. United 258; 67 S. W. 518. States, 30 Fed. 112. 69 Leisy v. Hardin, supra; Com- 74 state v. Wise, 70 Minn. 99; monwealth v. Zelt, supra; Alten- 72 N. W. i843. berg V. Commonwealth, 126 Pa. St. Under a statute entitled "An act 602; 17 Atl. 799; 24 Wkly. N. C. to regulate the sale of intoxicat- 145. ing liquor" may be inserted a pro- 211 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §§ 140, 141 Sec. 140. Limiting sales to certain purposes. The State in limiting the sale of intoxicating liquor to sales made for medicinal, chemical, mechanical or sacra- mental purposes, does not exceed its powers; and a statute thus limiting sales for such purposes is contitutional, and the power thus exercised is within the scope of the legisla- tive powers.'^"' Limiting sales to pure wine for sacramental purposes does not render the statute void/'' Sec. 141. Screens — Validity and enforcement of law re- quiring. Several of the States have adopted what is known as the "Screen" Law which, like that of Indiana, provides that the room in which intoxicating liquors are to be sold at retail under a license issued for that purpose "shall be situ- ated upon the ground lioor or basement of the building where the same are sold, and in a room fronting the street or highway upon which the building is situated, and said room shall be so arranged, either with window or glass door, vision prohibiting sales to minors Sheasley (Kan.), 78 Pac. 997; and drunkards. Williams v. State, Bowman v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. 48 Ind. 306: State V. Adamson, 14 App. 14; 40 S. \V. 7»6; 41 S. Ind. 296; Thomasson v. State, 15 W. 635; Columbus v. Schaerr, 5 Ind. 449. Ohio S. & C. P. 100. 75 State V. Allmond, 2 Houst. 76 state v. Allmond, 2 Houst. (Del.) 612; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 (Del.) 612; Bowman v. State, 38 U. S. 1; 9 Sup. Ct. 6; 32 L. Ed. Tex. Cr. App. 14; 40 S. W. 796. .346; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. An ordinance limiting sales to €■23; 8 Sup. Ct. 273; 31 L. Ed. sacramental, chemical, mechani- 205; affirming 2^9 Kan. 252; 44 cal or medicinal purposes, to be Am. Rep. 634 ; Ray v. State, 47 made by druggists wlio were re- Tex. Cr. App. 407; 83 S. W. 1121; quired to furn-'-h the city clerk a Durein v. State, 208 U. S. 613; 28 written statement of the kind and Sup. Ct. 567; 50. L. Ed. — ; af- quality thereof, the purchasers' firming 70 Kan. 1 ; 78 Pac. 152 ; names and date of sale, verified 80 Pac. 987; Beer Co. v. Massa- by the oath of every servant in chusetts, 97 U. S. 25; 21 L. Ed. the employ of the druggist, was 929 ; /»i re Prohibition Amendment held to be an invasion of the Cases, 24 Kan. 700 ; State v. Bren- sanctity of private business and nen, 25 Conn. 278; State v. void. Clinton v. State, 58 111. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; State v. 102. § 141 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 212 as that the whole of said room may be in view from the street or hig-hway, and no blinds, screens or obsiructions to the view shall be arranged, erected or placed so as to pre- vent the entire view of said room from the street or high- way upon which the same is situated during such days and hours when the sales of such liquors are prohibited by law. ' ' '^ Such a statute is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State and does not conflict with a constitutional pro- vision seicuring- "the persons, houses, papers and possessions of every person from unreasonable searches and seizures," nor with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, declaring that, "No person shall be de- prived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. ' ' ''^ Nor will the fact that the law does not define what constitutes an obstruction of the view, invalidate it/" Even broader legislation than this has been sustained, for in Massachusetts, a statute which provided that no person licensed to sell spirituous and intoxicating liquors should maintain or permit to be maintained, upon premises used by him under his license during the time for which the license ■was granted, screens or blinds which would interfere with a view of the business 'conducted upon the premises, was held valid and prosecutions for its violation sustained.®*^ If one may be compelled to thus conduct the sale of intoxi- cating liquors in open view of the public without violating the provisions hereinbefore named, then no good reason can exist for holding that such provisions would be violated by a statute which compels the seller of such liquors to expose the interior of his building where sales are made at all times when by the law he is forbidden to make them. The pur- pose of such a statute is to remove the temptation to violate the statute on the forbidden days, and to make it easy for an officer or other person to determine whether a saloon is doing business contrary to law.^^ Such a statute includes 77 Burns R. S. 1908, § 8327. so Commonwealth v. Oostello, 78 Robinson v. Hang, 71 Mich. 133 Mass. 192; Commonwealth v. 38. Casey, 134 Mass. 194. 70 State Y. Doyle, 15 R. I. 325; si Robinson v. Haug, 71 Mich. 4 Atl. 764. 38; 46 N. E. 941. 213 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 141 vendors of intoxicating liquors acting under licenses granted before as well as those licensed after its passage.^- The sub- stantive part of the offense under it is the obstruction of the view vO all parts of the interior of the room, and an indict- ment for a violation of its provisions need not allege that the defendant has violated the conditions of his license or that he has sold intoxicating liquors in violation of law.^^ And where the statute provides in addition that the licensee must permanently close all entrances to the licensed prem- ises other than those on the public street upon which they are located, it will be violated if the licensee fails to close a side entrance to the licensed room.^* And it has been held that if a licensed dealer covers one of several windows to the room in which he is doing business so as materially to interfere with a view of the business conducted therein, or of the interior thereof, it is a violation of the law, although a view of the premises can at the same time be obtained through other windows. ^^ And likewise it has been held that such a dealer cannot place or maintain upon the licensed premises a curtain which interferes with a view of any part of the interior of the same, whether such part is used for the sale of liquor or not.^" The law will not be violated by maintaining a partition between a front and rear room where a license gives authority to sell in both of such rooms,^^ but in such case it will be violated if the entrance from the front to the rear room is by a door and the view of that door is hindered by screens on the windows of the front room.^^ The fact that a place is being conducted under 82 Nelson v. State, 17 Ind. App. 85 Ngig^^j y State, 17 Tnd. App. 403; 46 N. E. 941; Commonwealth 403; 48 N. E. 941; Commonwealth V. Rourke, 141 Mass. 321; 6 N. v. McDonnoush, 150 Mass. 504; E. 383; Commonwealth v. Saw- 22 N. E. 112. telle, 150 Mass. 320; 23 N. E. -54. 86 Commonwealth v. Worcester, 83 Commonwealth v. Costello, 141 Mass. 58; 6 N. E. 700. 133 Mass. 192; Commonwealth v. st Commonwealth v. Barnes, 140 Auberton, 133 Mass. 404; Com- Mass. 447; Shultz v. Cambridge, monwealth v. Gibbons, 134 Mass. 38 Ohio St. G59. 197. 88 Commonwealth v. Kane, 143 8* Commonwealth v. Fernden, Mass. 92, 141 Mass. 28; 6 N. E. 239. § 142 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 214 and by authority of a license from the United States cannot be made a defense to a prosecution for a violation of the "screen" law;"^ nor that the illegal act was done by the liquor seller's servant in his absence ;°° nor that the licensee was not in fact carrying on business at the time of the alleged violation. ^^ As has already been said the substantive part of the offense is the obstruction of a view to the interior of the licensed premises.°- Sec. 142. Sunday laws — Municipal ordinances. The law iixcs the day recognized as the Sabbath Day all over Christendom, and that day, by divine injunction, is to be kept holy — "On it thou shalt do no work." It is a civil institution, older than our State governments, and respected as a day of rest by their Constitutions, and the regulation of its observation as a civil institution has always been con- sidered to be, and is, within the power of the State Legis- lature as much as any other regulation or law which has for its object the preservation of good morals and the peace and good order of society. In this country Christianity is not the legal religion of State as established by law; but this is not inconsistent with the idea that it is in fact and ever has been the religion of the people. This fact is everyrvhere prominent in all our civil and political history, and has been from the first, recognized and acted upon by the people, as well as by constitutional conventions, by Legislatures, and by courts of justice."'' The authority to prohibit the sale of 89 state V. Mathis, IS Ind. App. tutional. Washington v. Galla- 608; 48 N. E. 645; State v. Ma- gher, 7 Oliio N. P. 511; 5 Ohio this, 20 Ind. App. 699; 48 K E. S. & C. P. Dec. 562. See late 1109; State v. Sleutz, 27 Ind. case, Bennett v. Pulaski (Tenn. App. 557; 61 N. E. 793. Ch. App.), 52 S. W. 913; 47 L. 00 Commonwealth v. Kelley, 140 R. A. 278; Meehan v. Board Mass. 441. (X. J. L.), 70 Atl. 363; 73 N.J. »i Commonwealth v. Auberton, L. 382; 64 Atl. 689. 133 Mass. 404; Commonwealth v. 93 Holy Trinity Church v. Casey, 134 Mass. 194. United States, 143 U. S. 457; 92 Commonwealth v. Moore. 145 Frolichstein v. City of Mobile, 40 Mass. 244. Ala. 725; Shover v. State, 6 Eng. A screen ordinance held consti- (Ark.) 529; Ex parte Andrews, 215 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §142 intoxicating liquors upon Sunday, or any other day, is not only constitutional but is also found in the general police power of the State. =** Since the Legislature possesses this constitutional and police power it may properly delegate the same to a municipal corporation, and an ordinance of a city passed pursuant to such power conferred upon it by its charter, requiring that every saloon and restaurant, and the bar of every tavern, inn, and other place where liquors are sold by retail shall be closed during Sunday and that no person shall sell for money or in any manner dispose of any intoxicating liquor within the limits of the city on Sunday and providing that any person guilty of violating any of the provisions of the ordinance, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by fine and imprisonment, will not be unconstitutional and may be enforced."'' Such an ordinance 18 Cal. 679; State v. McMalion, 53 Conn. 411; Hall v. State, 4 Hair. (Del.) 132; Karswich v. Atlanta, 44 Ga. 204; Sanders v. State, 74 Ga. 82; Siebold v. People, 86 111. 33 ; Voglesong v. State, 9 Ind. 113; Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449; Foltz v. State, 33 Ind. 215; Johna.s v. .State, 78 Ind. 332; State V. Hogrewer, 152 Ind. 652; Megowan v. Commonwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) 3; State v. Judge, 39 La. Ann. 132; State v. Fearson, 2 Md. 310; Commonwealth v. Moore, 145 Mass. 244; People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577; People v. Bellet, 99 Mich. 151; Brimhall v. Van Campen, 8 Minn. 13; Elken V. State, 63 Miss, 129; State v. Ambos, 20 Mo. 214; State v. Huff- schmidt, 47 Mo. 73; State v. Sin- nott, 15 Neb. 472; Houtsch v. Jersey City, 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutch.) 316; Lindenmiller v. People, 3 Barb. (N". Y.) 548; Health Department v. Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32; .State v. Wooll, SO X. C. 708; Common- wealth V. Naylor, 34 Pa. St. 86; State V. Scharrer, 2 Coldw. (Tenn.) 323; Keller v. State, 23 Tex. App. 259; Ihon v. Common- wealth, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 887; State V. Wecker, 71 Wis. 577; Ixk dano V. State, 25 Ala. 64. 9* Frolichstein v. Mobile, 40 Ala. 725; Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678; Ex parte Bird, 19 Cal. 130; Kurtz v. People, 83 Mich. 279; State v. Ludwig, 21 Minn. 202; State v. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214; ,St. Louis V. Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94; Lindenmiller v. People, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 548; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio, 387; Specht v. Common- wealth, 8 Penn. St. 312; Hudson V. Geary, 4 Pv. I. 485; State v. Dolan, 13 Idaho, 693; 92 Pac. 995; Ex parte Jacobs, 13 Idaho, 720; 92 Pac. 1003; State v. Bott. 31 La. Ann. 663; 33 Am. Rep. 224. 95 Mayor v. Rouse, 8 Ala. 515; Mayor v. Allaire, 14 Aia. 400: §142 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 216 is in no sense an attempt to enforce the observance of that day as a religious institution, and hence is not repugnant to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions for- bidding the establishment of any religion. The purpose of such an ordinance is to prevent the violation of the laws of the State as well as preserve a public respect for the Lord's Day.^® The argument that such an ordinance violates the inherent right of the Jew or any other religious denomina- tion to observe his Sabbath, which is the last instead of the first day of the week, is not tenable. He is left the absolute and unrestrained freedom of disposing of Saturday, his Sabbath, as he may deem proper, or to worship God accord- ing to the dictates of his own conscience. He is thereby re- quired to observe the Christian Sabbath, and he is not checked in his right to pursue other avocations, but is merely restrained from pursuing, on that day, a traffic which in its results may interfere with the absolute right and the undeniable privilege of others to observe that day in their Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark. 368 Hood V. Von Glahm, 88 Ga. 405 Littlejohn v. Stells, 123 Ga. 4r27 SI S. E. 390; Schwuchow v. Chi- cago, 68 111. 444; Wragg v. Penn Township, 94 111. 11; Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281; Ambrose v. State, 6 Ind. 351; Williams v. Warsaw, 60 Ind. 457; Bloomfield V. Trumble, 54 la. 399; Rice v. iState, 3 Kan. 135; Megowan v. Commonwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) 3; Kemper v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 219; Meriden v. Silverstein, 36 La. Ann. 912; Schafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331; People v. Detroit, 82 Mich. 471; State v. Ludwig, 21 Minn. 202; St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 101; Howe v. Plainfield, 37 ISr. J. L. 145; Wood V. City, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 428; Brooklyn v. Toynebee, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 282; Piqua V. Zimmerlin, 350 St. 507; Portland v. Schmidt, 13 Ore. 17; Wong V. Astoria, 13 Ore. 538; Charleston v. Benjamin, 2 Strob. (,S. C.) 508; State v. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 663; 34 Am. Rep. 224; Greenwood v. State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 409; Gabel v. Houston, 29 Te.x. 335; Ex parte Douglass, 1 Utah, 108; Logan v. Buck, 3 Utah, 301. 96 State V. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 663; State v. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214; Bloom V. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387; McGatrick v. Watson, 3 Ohio St. 566; Cincinnati v. Rice, 15 Ohio, 225; Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 S. and R. (Pa.) 50; Com- monwealth V. Fischer, 17 S. & R. (Pa.) 160; Specht v. Common- wealth, -8 Penn. St. 312; Hudson V. Greary, 4 R. I. 485; Nashville V. Luck, 80 Tenn. 499; Gabel v. Houston, 29 Tex. 335. 217 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 143 own manner, with peace and tranquillity, and without inter- ference from anyone or from any source.'-*' The Legislature may make it an offense to keep a saloon open on Sunday, without regard to the transaction of business or making of sales in it ; ^^ and it may make the keeping open of a barroom for the sale of liquors one offense, and the act of selling another offense, or each sale a separate and distinct offense.'-*'* So a statute requiring saloons to be closed during certain hours of the night is valid.^ Sec. 143. Women as employes and visitors in saloons. A statute which prohibits the employment of women as waiters or conversationalists in places where intoxicating liquors are sold is a reasonable exercise of the police powers of the State and is upheld by the courts. Under such a statute it has been held that the proprietor of such a pla)ce was liable for a violation of it, where the evidence showed that immediately after the enactment of the statute he dis- charged his female employes and then entered into a part- nership with them to continue the business at the same place, they to render the same kind of service after their dis- charge as before, the court saying that such an arrangement was an infraction of the spirit of the law. In that case it was held that the indictment Avas not subject to be quashed because of a misjoinder owing to the fa'ct that it charged the employment of several women and not severally each of them; also that the indictment need not show that neither of such employes was within the proviso as to the wife and daughter of the employer.- It has also been held that an ordinance of a municipal corporation which makes it an offense for the proprietor of a place where intoxicating liquors are sold to employ females to serve his customers 97 state V. Bott. 31 La. App. o« Commonwealth v. McCann, i6«3; 33 Am. Rep. 224; Town of (Ky.), 2D Ky. L. Rep. 707; M Minden v. >Solverstein, 36 La. S. W. 645. Ann. 912. i Heddericli v. State, 101 Ind. ssEx parte Brown (Tex. Cr. 564; 1 N. E. 47; 51 Am. Rep. 768. App.), 61 S. W. 396. 2 Walter v. Commonwealth, 88 Pa. St. 157. § 143 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 218 with such liquors was valid where the Legislature had dele- gated to such corporation the power to regulate such places within the jurisdiction of the corporation ; and that such an ordinance does not conliict with any provision of the Federal Constitution ; " and in Montana it has been held that a law prohibiting the sale of liquors in any place where women or minors are employed is constitutional, being a proper exercise of the police power of the State.* But in California, where the Constitution provides that no person shall be dis- qualified by sex from pursuing any lawful vocation, it has been held that an ordinance forbidding proprietors of drink- ing saloons to permit any female to be employed therein was unconstitutional ; ^ and in Idaho it has been held that an ordi- nance was unconstitutional which provided that it shall be unlawful for any person maintaining any saloon, barroom, or drinking shop, or any apartment thereto attached, to per- mit any female to enter therein.*' But a statute prohibiting the issuance of a license to anyone who has employed in the past females as waitresses is not unconstitutional as an ex post facto law, not being an unusual law.'^ A statute pro- hibiting the presence of women in public saloons after mid- night is not unconstitutional ; ^ and under the provisions of the California Constitution above referred to, it has been held, in a later decision, that an ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquors where female waitresses are employed is valid.^ Nor is a statute invalid that fixes the license fee at a higher figure for places where females act as bartenders, actresses, dancers, singers, and the like.^° Nor one for- 3 Bergman v. Cleveland, 39 0. 7 Foster v. San Francisco, 102 St. 651; People v. Case, 153 Mich. Cal. 483; 37 Pac. 763; 41 Am. St, 98; 116 N. W. 558. 194; Ex parte Hayes, 98 Cal. 555. 4 State V. Reynolds, 14 Mont. » Ex parte Smith, 38 Cal. 702. 383; 36 Pac. 449; Ex parte Hays, ^ Ex parte Hayes, 98 Cal. 555; »8 Cal. 555 ; 33 Pac. 337. 33 Pac. 337 ; 20 L. R. A. 701 ; s/n re Maguire, 57 Cal. 604; Ex parte Smith (Cal.), 33 Pac. 40 Am. Rep. 125. 338. estate v. Nelson (Idaho), 67 ^o Ex parte Felchin, 96 Cal, L. R. A. 808. Contra. Common- .360; 31 Pac. 224; 31 Am. St. 223. wealth V Pine (Ky.), 94 S. W. 32; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 593. 219 CONSTITLTIONALITV Of STATUTES. §144 l)idding a female under the age of twenty-one years to re- main in or about a saloon, even though it except from the provisions open and public restaurants or dining-rooms, that "being a classification which the State, in the exercise of its police power, can make; " nor can such a statute be objected to successfully pn the ground that a female attains her age at eighteen instead of twenty-one ; for the right to enter and remain in a saloon is not one of the equal privileges granted to every citizen.^- An ordinance prohibiting the keeper of a drinking place to allow infants and females to remain there over five minutes, or to drink therein, has been held valid.^^ Sec. 144. Record of sales. It has been held that a city ordinance which prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquors, except by druggists selling for chemical, sacramental, mechanical or medical purposes, and requiring them to furnish the city clerk a verified state- ment in writing showing the kind and quantity sold, when ■and to whom sold, and also requiring this statement to be verified by the oath of every servant in the druggist's em- ploy, is void, because it invades the sanctity of private busi- 11 State V. Baker, 50 Ore. 381; males. People v. Case, 153 Mich. <92 Pac. 1076; 13 L. R. A. (K S.) 08; 116 N. W. 558. 1040. 13 Commonwealth v. Price 12 State V. Baker, 50 Ore. 381; (Ky.), 94 S. W. 32; 29 Ky. L. '92 Pac. 1076; 13 L. 11. A. (N. S.) Rep. 593. But a city has not 1040. power to adopt an ordinance of A male litigant cannot object this kind. Joplin v. Jacobs, 119 to a statute because it excludes Mo. App. 134; m S. W. 219; Pea- females from tlie jury. McKin- cock v. Limburger (Tex. Civ. ney v. State, 3 Wyo. 719; 30 Pac. App.), 67 S. W. 518. 293; 16 L. R. A. 710. So one forbidding a saloon A statute prohibiting the keep- keeper to permit a female under ing a wine room, to which wo- twenty-one years of age to re- men resort, in connection with a main in or about a saloon, inde- saloon. is valid. Adams v. Cro- pendent of the purpose of her nin, 29 Colo. 48i8 ; 69 Pac. 590; visit, is valid. State v. Baker, and so is one forbidding the 50 Ore. 381; 92 Pac. lOI'Q; 13 owner of a saloon to sell to fe- L. R. A. (N. S.) 1040. §145 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 220 ness." No doubt the same court would have held the ordinance void if it had been a statute. And in Hawaii it was held that a statute requiring a saloon keeper to keep books of account of his business was unconstitutional.^^ Sec. 145. Registration of internal revenue license or re. ceipts — Exposure of license. A State may require all persons taking out United States internal revenue licenses to sell liquors to have them recorded in a public office of the State, and it is no valid objection that such a statute will tend to diminish the number of licenses that will be taken out, thereby diminishing the receipts of the Fed- eral Government of the amount of fees it would have received if no such State law had been enacted. Such a statute brings into action a legitimate exercise of the police powers and tends to aid in the enforcement of the law against unlawful traffic in intoxicating liquors.^*' So a statute requiring a 14 Clinton v. Phillips, 58 111. 102. 15 King V. Lau Kiu, 7 Hawaii, 489. In Iowa statutes requiring re- ports seem to be upheld. State V. Chamberlain, 74 Iowa, 266; 37 X. W. 326; and in Michigan it has been held that a statute re- quiring druggists in prohibition districts to report all the sales to the prosecuting attorney of the county, did not violate that pro- vision of the constitution prohib- iting unreasonable searches and seizures, nor of another provision providing that no person shall be compelled to incriminate himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. It was said to be a legiti- mate exercise of the police power respecting the sale of intoxicat- ing liquors. People v. Henwood, 123 Mich. 317; 82 N. W. 70. See Seattle v. Foster, 47 Wash. 22: m Pac. 642. A statute requiring all liquors shipped into "dry" territory to be carried by regular carriers, in pack- ages plainly marked with the con- signor's and consignee's name and address plainly marked thereon, and also with kind and amount of liquor marked in plain letters thereon; and also requiring the carriers to keep a record of all such packages carried, under a forfeiture of the liquor, is con- stitutional, being a valid exer- cise of the police power of the State. Commonwealth v. Intoxi- cating Liquors, 172 Mass. S'll; v52 N. E. 389. 16 State V. Hanson (N. D.), 113 N. W. 371. 221 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §§ 146, 147 licensee to keep his license posted np in his place of busi- ness so the public can see it, is valid. ^^ Sec. 146. Minimum quantity that may be sold at one time, A city may prohibit sales of a less quantity than a speci- fied amount, as one gallon. Where an ordinance forbade sales of "malt, hop, tea tonic, ginger ale, cider, or any other drink of like nature" in a less quantity than a gallon, the ordinance was held valid. ^^ And a statute limiting the sale to ten gallons wns held not to be a grant of an ex- clusive privilege, but the exercise of a power, the policy or expediency of which cannot be questioned by the courts ; ^' and so is a statute prohibiting druggists selling less than a quart except upon a physician's prescription.-" Interdicting sales by small measure is regulation and not prohibition.-^ Sec. 147. Owner of premises — Liability under statutes. The State of Kansas has a statute which in express terms makes the real estate of a person convicted of selling in- toxicating liquors contrary to law subject to a lien for the amount of the tines and costs adjudged against him, and it also provides that such judgment shall be a lien upon leased premises occupied by the convicted ^person, and used for the purposes of the alleged traffic, when the owner of the real estate knowingly suffers them to be used and occupied for the illegal sale of such liquors.-- Under this statute the real estate of the convicted person can be sold to satisfy 17 Ex parte Bell, 24 Tex. App. A person indicted for selling 428; 6 S, W. 197. less than five gallons without a 18 /n re John, 55 Kan. »>94; 41 license cannot question the val- Pac. 956. idity of the statute or ordinance 19'Stickrod v. Commonwealth, 5 so far as it applies to sales in S. W. 580; 9 Ky. L. Rep. 5o3. quantities of five gallons and up- 20 Commonwealth v. Fowler, 9G wards, which may be made with- Ky. 166; 28 S. W. 7i86; 53 L. E. out a license. State v. Priester, A. 839. 43 Minn. 373; 45 N. W. 712. 21 Paul V. Gloucester Co., 50 N. 22 State v. PelTerle, 33 Kan. J. L. '585; 15 Atl. 272; 1 L. R. 718; 7 Pac. Rep. 597. A. 86. § 147 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 222 the fine and costs in the usual manner of enforcing judg- ments, but the lien against the owner can only be enforced by a civil action. The lien is a statutory one which attaches to the leased premises at the time the judgment of con- viction is rendered against the lessee. -•• The statute has been held to be constitutional, and that full force and effect must be given to it,-* and that all conveyances of the leased premises made after the date of the lessee's conviction are made subject to the lien created by it.-"* In an action to enforce such a lien and establish the ownership of the prop- erty against which the lien is sought to be enforced, a deed purporting to convey the property to the defendant is ad- missible in evidence, where the description therein given of the property, taken in connection with well-known facts that are in evidence, fairly designates the property described in the petition. In such an action the landlord can only be made liable when he has knowingly permitted the occupant to use the premises for the unlawful sale of such liquors ; but knowledge sufficient to excite the suspicions of a prudent man, and to put him upon inquiry, is equivalent to knowl- edge of the ultimate fact. In such an action if the title to the real estate is in the name of the wife, it is proper to join the husband as a party defendant.-'^ In Ohio, under the "Dow Law," the State was given a lien upon the realty upon which the saloon was located for the amount of the license fees; and this act was held constitutional, even though the licensee was only a tenant of the licensed prem- ises.^^ And in Iowa, a law making a judgment secured by reason of a violation of the liquor law a lien on the property of a third person who consents to its use for the unlawful sale and manufacture of liquors, was held constitutional, not being a taking of private property for public use without compensation.-^ 23 Snyder v. State, 40 Kan. 543 ; 26 Cordes v. State, 37 Kan. 48 ; •20 Pac. Rep. 123. U Pac. Rep. 493. 2* 'State V. Snyder, 34 Kan. 425; 27 Anderson v. Brewster, 44 S Pac. Rep. 425. Ohio St. 576; 9 N. E. &83. 25 Snyder v. State, 40 Kan. 543 ; 28 Polk County v. Hierb, 37 20 Pa«. Rep. 123. Iowa 361; see also Newton v. Mc- 223 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES, § 148 Sec. 148. Civil damages. Statutes are in force perhaps in every State giving to designated persons a right of damages for sales of liquor made to habitual drunkards or intoxicated persons which result in the death of such persons, or where such persons by reason of their intoxicated state cause damages or in- juries to others. These statutes have been universally upheld as a valid exercise of the power of the State. -^ It is no defense, as these cases hold, that the person of whom com- plaint is made had a license to sell, issued by the State, for the license does not authorize anyone to transgress the laws of the State. Nor is it a valid objection to the statute which makes the defendant liable for the full damage done by the intoxicated person when the liquor he sold or gave the in- toxicated person was only a part of the liquor that made him drunk. "The business of the defendant," said the court, "as conducted by him. being in open violation of the statute, a provision that holds him responsible for an injury to which his unlawful conduct contributes, cannot be said to be in conflict with any right guaranteed by the Constitu- tion. * * * 3y causing, in conjunction with others, the injury for which the action is brought, by an act in clear violation of the statute, he becomes a joint tort feasor, and, as at common law, is liable for the entire damages resulting from such injury. "^° A statute may be drafted broad enough to make the liquor seller's lessor liable, where the liquor is sold on or in conneiction with leased premises, and when the lessor knew the purposes for which the premises were to be used, or had good reasons to know.^^ And a Kay (Iowa), 102 N. W. 827; Bol- 33 Wis. 107; Bedore v. Newton, ton V. McKay (Iowa), 102 N. W. 54 N. H. 117; Stanton v. Simp- 1131. son, 48 Vt. 628; State v. Luding- 29 Moran v. Goodman, 130 ton, 33 Wis. 107; Howes v. Max- Mass. 1&8; 39 Am. Rep. 443; Ba- well, 157 Mass. 333; 32 N. E. ker V. Pope, 2 Hun 55i6; Frank- 152; Kennedy v. Garrigan (S. lin V. Schermerhorn, 8 Hun 112; D.), 121 N. W. 783. Horning v. Wendell, 57 Ind. 171; so Sibila v. Bahney, 34 Ohio St. Sibila V. Bahney, 34 Ohio St. 399. 399; Werner v. Edmiston, 24 3i Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 x*. Kan. 147; Kreiter v. Nichols, 28 Y. 509; 30 Am. Rep. 323. Mich. 490; State v. Ludington, §§ 149, 150 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 224 statute is valid which makes the liquor dealer liable for a sale to a husband after notice by his wife given him not to sell to her husband,^^ or to a minor,""' or liable for injuries inflicted by an assault made by the person who was made drunk by his selling liquor to him in violation of law.''* The fact that the defendant may be punished criminally for the same act is immaterial.-'^ Even as applied to an agent of a town appointed to sell liquors the statute is valid, if he goes beyond his authority and makes an unlawful sale.^* Sec. 149. Requiring licjensee to give bond. A licensee may be required to give a bond with sureties to keep the law, and making him liable thereon for all penal- ties assessed against him, and providing he will not sell in any other place than the place designated in his license, or will not do so without giving notice and executing a new bond.^" So a statute making the licensee and his sureties civilly liable for damages occasioned by an illegal sale is valid.^^ Sec. 150. Inspection of liquors — Ingredients. A State has full power to require that malt liquors shall be manufactured of certain kinds of cereals and absolutely prohibit their sale if they are not, and the fact that manu- facturers, before its enactment, had the privilege to manu- facture malt liquors from other cereals, is no argument against the validity of such a statute. The State may also 32 Bell V. State, 28 Tex. App. The Pennsylvania statute em- OB; 12 S. W. 410; McGuire v. powering the judge to assess the Glass (Tex.), 15 S. W. 127. damages is valid, and not invalid 33 Cramer v. Danielson, 90 because it violates the right ol Mich. 531; 58 N. W. 476. trial by jury. Mardorf v. Hemp 34Kreiter v. Nichols, 28 Mich. (Pa.), 6 Atl. 754. 496; Sibila v. Bahney, 34 Ohio 37 People v. Brown, 85 Mich. St. 399. 119; 48 N. W. 158; Bell v. State, 35Bedore v. Newton, 54 N. H. 28 Tex. App. 96; 12 S. W. 410; 117. McGuire v. Glass (Tex.), 15 S. 36 Stanton v. Simpson, 48 Vt. W. 127. 628. 38 Bell V. State, supra. 225 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §§151,152 require all su'eh liquors to be inspected, and a charge ex- acted therefor. This is upon the ground that the manufac- ture and sale of malt liquors is detrimental to the public health and morals of the citizens of the State; and the statute is a valid exercise of the State's police power. And it is no objection that other liquors are not subject to like rules and regulations, as the State might so subject them i f it saw fit, since the State may absolutely prohibit the sale or manu- facture of liquors, and such a statute is only a regulation of their sale or manufacture.^** So a statute requiring a foreign manufacturer of beer bringing it within the State for sale to make an affidavit showing that only 'certain ingredients were used in it is valid, for the State's agents cannot go abroad to inspect such beer.^° Sec. 151. "Blind Pig" or "Blind Tiger" laws. In several instances the so-called "Blind Pig" or "Blind Tiger" laws have been held constitutional. They involve no particular constitutional questions. Usually they contain, more drastic provisions than other liquor laws.*^ Sec. 152. Ex post faxjto law — Change of remedy. The right to a particular mode of procedure is not a vested one which the State cannot change or abolish. The general rule is that a change in the remedy is not within the inhibition of the Constitution against the enactment of an ex post facto law.^- And this is true in criminal as well as 39 State V. Bixman, 162 Mo. 1; 42 South v. State, 86 Ala. 617; 62S. W.:828; Pabst Brewing Co. v. 6 So. 52; Perry v. State, 87 Ala. Cranshaw, 198 U. S. 17; 25 Sup. 30; 6 So. 4Q5; Robinson v. State, Ct. 552; 49 L. Ed. 925; affirming 84 Ind. 452; Sage v. State, 127 120 Fed. 144. See State v. Ind. 15; 26 X. E. 667; Sullivan Bengsch, 170Mo. 81; 70S. W. 710. v. City of Oneida, 61 111. 242; 40 Pabst Brewing Co. v. Cran- Worniley v. Hamberg, 40 la. 22; shaw, 120 Fed. 144. Tilton v. Swift, 40 la. 78; County 41 State V. Stoffels, 89 Minn. of Kossuth v. Wallace, 60 la. 205 ; 94 N. W. 675 ; Schwulst v. 508 ; 15 N. W. 305 ; Drake v. Jor- State, &Z Tex. Cr. App. 331; 108 dan, 73 la. 707; 36 X. W. 653; S. W. 69«; Smith v. State, 42 State v. Ah .Turn, 9 Mont. 167; Tex. Cr. App. 414; 57 S. W. 815. 23 Pac. 76; Lazare v. State, 19 § 152 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 226 in civil eases.*^ Remedies must always be under the control of the Legislature, and it would create endless confusion in legal proceedings if every case was to be conducted only in accordance with the rules of practice, and heard only by the courts, in existence when its facts arose. The Legisla- ture ma}'^ abolish courts and create new ones, and it may ■j^rescribe altogether different modes of procedure in its dis- cretion, though it cannot, in doing so, dispense with any of those substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds a person accused of crime.** Upon this theory it has been held that a statute passed after an action was in- stituted to abate a nuisance under a prohibitory liquor law, which provided for the closing for one year of the building in which a nuisance was kept and for the taxing of an attorney's fee to the defendant Avas not unconstitutional, the court holding that the statute related to the remedy only and that the attorney's fee pro^nded for was a part of the ■costs and not a part of the penalty fixed for violating the law.*^ Nor is a statute violative of such a constitutional provision which provides that a judgment rendered against anyone for the violation of an act for the suppression of in- temperance, shall be a lien upon the property of a third person, occupied and used with his knowledge and consent, for the unlawful sale or manufacture of intoxicating liquor.*^ Nor is an ordinance passed and promulgated subsequent to the issuance of a license to a retailer of intoxicating liquor which provides a penalty for its violation by a person who shall keep his saloon open after ten o'clock at night, subject to the objection that it is an ex post facto or retroactive law, unless the act sought to be punished was committed ante- cedent to the passage of the ordinance.'*^ Ohio St. 43; State v. Cooler, 30 45 Drake v. Jordan, 73 la. 707; «. C. 105; State v. Manning, 14 36 X. W. 653; Campbell v. Man- Tex. 402. dersclieid, 74 la. 708; 39 X. W. 43 Drake v. Jordan, 73 la. 707 ; 92. 3.6 X. W. 653 ; Marion v. State, 46 pdk Co. v. Hierb, 37 la. 31 ; 20 Xeb. 233; 29 X. W. 918. Harten v. State, 32 Kan. 637; 5 44Cooley'3 Const. Lim., 4th ed., Pac. 212; State v. Snyder, 34 p. 331; Robinson v. State, 84 Kan. 425; 8 Pac. 860. Ind. 452. 47 State v. Isabel, 40 La. Ann. 340. 227 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §§153,154 Sec. 153. Local option — Its two phases. The securing of a local option is brought about in two ways: the one is for the Legislature to absolutely prohibit the sale of liquor, unless, at an election duly called, the electors of a particular district — a 'city, a town, a township, a county, or a designated part of a county — shall by a majority vote declare in favor of the sale of liquor under a license law there enforced ; the other is that the sale of liquor is permitted under a license law ^** until the electors of the district, at an election duly called, by a like vote de- clare that it shall not be sold. In the decisions no distinction is drawn between these two methods when the validity of the statutes providing for a local option law is drawn in question. If the one method is valid, the other is. As the Legislature may adopt a prohibitory law, so much of the statute forbidding the sale of liquors is valid ; and only that part of the statute which permits a sale if the electors shall declare in favor of it, has been seriously contested.*" Sec. 154. Local option not special legislation. In the Constitutions of many of the States there are clauses to the effect that "in all cases where a general law can be made applicable no special law shall be enacted," and the courts of the States, as a rule, have held that it is for the Legislature alone to judge whether a law on any given subject can be made applicable to the whole State; or, in other words, that such clauses leave a discretion with the Legislature to determine in what instances a special law should be passed, and that having so determined the ques- tion cannot be reviewed by the courts."^" In harmony with 48 Xo State in the Union per- Johnson v. Railroad Co., 23 111. mits the unrestricted retail sale 202; People v. Wallace, 70 III. of intoxicating liquors. &80; Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 49 State V. Fontain (Del.), 69 499; State v. Tucker, 46 Ind. 355; Atl. 926. Wiley v. Bluffton, 111 Ind. 152; soBourland v. Hildreth, 26 €al. 12 N. E. 165; Pennsylvania Co. 162; Brooks V. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366; v. State, 142 Ind. 498; 41 § 154 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 228 this rule of statutory construction it has been held that a law, which provides that if a majority of the legal voters in a <30unty shall vote against the sale of intoxicating liquors no license shall be granted within the county for the sale thereof, does not contravene a constitutional provision that "the Legislature shall not pass private, local or special laws regulating the internal affairs of towns and counties." Such an inhibition is not intended to secure uniformity in the exercise of delegated police powers, but to forbid the passing of a law vesting in one town or county a power of local government not granted to another.'^'^ The question of license or no license, and whether the sale of particular kinds of liquors Avithin the limits of a municipal corpora- tion shall be permitted, is properly one of local police power and may be left to the municipal authorities of towns, cities, townships and counties, or the qualified voters thereof.'^- This subject, although not embraced within the power to make By-Laws and ordinances, is one that falls within the class of police regulations which may be entrusted by the Legislature to municipal authority.^* N. E. 942; Ex parte Pritiz, 9 wealth v. Bennett, 108 Mass. 27; la. 30; State v. Squires, 26 la. Commonwealth v. ilartin, 108 340; State v. Hitchcock, — Kan. Mass. 29. 178; Darling v. Rogers, 7 Kan. f-s Erlinger v. Bonean, 51 III. •592; Boyd v. Bryant, 35 Kan. ©9; 94; Commonwealth v. Turner, 1 State V. County Court, etc., 50 Cush. 493 ; .State v. Cook, 24 Minn. Mo. 317; State v. Bobbins, 51 247; State v. Simmons, 3 Mo. Mo. 82; Hall v. Bray, 51 Mo. 414; State v. Xoyes, 10 Fos. (N. 2SS; St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo. H.) 279; Tanner v. Trustees, etc., 247; State v. Pond, 93 Mo. 606; 5 Hill (N. Y.), 121; Locker's Ap- Ex parte Swann, 90 Mo. 44; Hull peal, 72 Pa. St. 491; Bancroft v. V. Miller, 4 N"eb. 503; State v. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456; Savage v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15; Welker v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 619; Potter, 18 Ohio (N. S. ), 85; Slingec v. Henneman, 3t8 Wis. 504; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio Fonts v. Hood River, 46 Ore. 492; (N. S.), 14. 81 Pac. 370; Gober v. State (Tex. '•'Paul V. (Gloucester, 50 N. J. Cr. App.), 123 S. W. 427. L. CS5; Ex parte McGuire (Tex. In a number of instances local Cr. App.), 123 S. W. 425. option laws enacted for particular 62 Anderson v. Commonwealth, districts of a State have been de- 77 Ky. (13 Bush) 485; Common- clared unconstitutional, because 229 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §155 Sec. 155. Local option laws — Delegated power. The principle is well established that the power to make laws conferred by the Constitution on a Legislature, cannot special legislation. Arroyo v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), «9 S. W. 503; Griffin v. Eaves, 114 Ga. fio; 3'9 S. E. 913; Harris v. ■State, 114 Ga. 436; 40 S. E. 315; People V. Cooper 83 111. 585; Berry v. Cramer, 5i8 N. J. L. ■278; 33 Atl. 201; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342; Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 482. A statute fixing a minimum li- cense fee in respect of population, but authorizing the fixing of a greater fee by popular vote in towns, townships, boroughs, and in cities wherein licenses are re- quired, which latter license the court of common pleas grant, is a special law and void. Berry v. Cramer, 58 N. J. L. 278; 33 Atl. 201. Where a statute authorized the electors of a certain county to determine whether the provisions of an act prohibiting the sale of liquors should be put i~ force, but also provided tliat tiie act should not interfere with certain option laws in different parts of the county then in force, it was held that the act, intending to apply only in the event there should be a vote in favor of the sale of liquors, was constitutional, the act operating uniformly throughout the county. Com- monwealth V. Nieson ( Ky. ) , 50 S. W. 66; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1825. A statute authorizing cities having a population of 2,500 to prohibit the sale of liquors does not contravene a provision of the constitution dividing cities into classes by making a new class. Ex parte Handler, 176 Mo. 383; 75 S. W. 920. The fact that in the districts adopting local option, where the electors vote "no license," dili'erent penalties for violations of the act are imposed in such districts than would be imjjosed in other dis- tricts for oft'enses of the same character in the event of the pas- sage of subsequent acts for such other districts, does not render the act invalid, where the Legis- lature has the power to provide dilTerent laws and diflferent pen- alties touching the same cliarac- ter of ofi'enses in the various sub- divisions of the State. Such a law, however, must operate uni- formly on all citizens of the sub- division to which it applies, or on tlie class of citizens to be af- fected by it, and must make a reasonable classification of those persons within the limits of its operation. State v. Fontaiu (Del.), 69 Atl. 926; Ex parte Handler, 176 Mo. 383; 75 S. W. ©20. Tlie Legislature cannot delegate the authority to a city to set aside, vacate, suspend or repeal the general laws of a State, even by a direct provision, and there- fore i provision that if any ordinance of the city adopted pursuant to the provisions of the city charter, if in conflict with a U55 TRAFFIC IX INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 230 be delegated by the Legislature to tlie people of the State, or any portion of them. When a Legislature passes a law, state law, should supersede it, is void. Arrayo v. State (Tex.), 69 S. VV. 503. Excepting from tlie provisions of a local option law sales of liquors for sacramental or medi- cinal purposes does not render the act void. Ray v. State, 47 Tex. •Cr. App. 407; 83 S. W. 1121; nor is the act void if it excepts from the operation domestic wines. Hancock v. State, 114 Ga. 439; 40 S. E. 317; Roberts v. State, 114 Ga. 541; 40 S. E. 750; Aug- ust Busch & Co. V. Webb, 122 Fed. 655. A local option statiite is not void simply because it applies only to municipalities. Lloyd v. Dollison, 23 Ohio €ir. Ct. Rep. 571. Where a general statute per- mitted the sale in any county of the State of domestic wines in quantities of one quart or more by the manufacturers, a subse- quent statute prohibiting "the sale and furnishing of spirituous, malt or intoxicating liquors" with- in a certain county was held void, because special legislation. O'Brien v. State, 100 Ga. 51; 35 S. E. 112; Embry v. State, 110 Ga. 311; 35 S. E. IIG. A statute providing for local option is not void because it de- fines what are intoxicating li- quors. People v. McBride, 234 111. 146; 84 X. E. 865; nor is it void liecause it fixes no date for hold- ing an election, nor because the board of supervisors cannot act until a petition for an election is filed with them. Thalheimer v. Board (Ariz.), 94 Pac. 1129. A clause in a statute providing that it shall not take effect in March, 1903, unless a majority vote cast on the question of local option shall be negative, when it shall go into effect in December, 1906; and other provisions as to elections shall take effect at once, is valid. State v. Scampini, 77 Vt. 92; 59 Atl. 201. A statute repealing a liquor law, but pro- viding that it should not go into effect unless a majority vote was in favor of the repeal, is valid. In re McGonnell's Appeal, 209 Pa. St. 327; 58 Atl. 615; reversing 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 642. It is no objection to a local option law on the ground that it is class legislation, that it dis- criminates in favor of those vot- ei^s who favor pfrohibition and against those who do not. Swee- ney V. Webb, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 324; 7'6 S. W. 766; 77 S. W. 1135. A statute allowing the voters of a county to determine whether local option shall prevail through- out the county is not void because certain portions of the county, under a previous statute, had al- ready determined that local op- tion should pervail in such por- tions. Gayle v. Owen County Court, 83 Ky. 61; 6 Ky. L. Rep. 789. Under a constitutional provis- ion that all license fees shall go to the school fund of the State, it cannot be insisted that a law 231 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 155 it must pass entirely upon the question of its expediency; and it cannot say that a law shall be deemed expedient pro- vided that the people afterwards, by a popular vote, or otherwise, declare it to be expedient. A statute to take effect upon a subsequent event must, when it comes from the hands of the Legislature, be a law in presenii to take effect in fiituro. On the question of the expediency of the law the Legislature must exercise its own judgment, defi- nitely and finally. This well established i)rinciple has been "the bone of contention" in the courts in many of the different States of the Union in passing upon the constitu- tionality of what are known as "local option laws." Some of the earlier decisions held that such laws were unconstitu- tional because their operation was made to depend upon the contingency of a popular vote. The leading case upon this point was decided in 1847.^* That case was followed by the courts of California, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, New York, and some others.-"'"' It Avas, however, after an able argument and examination of the course of judicial decision upon the subject, overruled.'"''' The great weight of judicial decision now is to the effect that such laws, when permitting the voters of the Meshmeier, 11 Ind. 482; Sauto county to prohibit the sale of v. State, 2 la. LC5 ; OS Am. Dec. liquor in such county is uncon- 487; Geebric v. Statc^ 5 la. 491; stit.utional. Lemon v. Peyton, 64 State v. Beneke, Iowa, 203; Miss. 161; 8 So. 235; Portwood State v. Weir, 3", la. 134; 11 Am. V. Paskett, 64 Miss. 213; 1 So. Rep. 115; Weir v. Cram, 37 Iowa, 105. 649; People v. Collins, ?, Mich. A local option statute prohibit- 343; Barto v. Himrod, 4 Sel. (N. ing the contesting of the validity Y. ) 483; Lessman v. Territory, 3 of a local option election in a Wash. Tcr. 453; Thornton v. Ter- prosecution for the violation of ritory, 3 Wash. Ter. 482 ; Stall- the law is constitutional. Ex worth v. State, 16 Tex. App. 345 ; -parte McGuire (Te.x. Cr. App.), Turner v. Saxon (Wash. Ter.), 123 S. W. 425. 20 Pac. Rep. 685. See In re Mu- s* Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 nicipal Suffrage to W^omen, 160 Barr. (Penn.) 507. Mass. 586; 36 N. E. 488; 23 L. r.5 Houghton V. Austin, 47 Cal. R. A. 113. 04G; Ex parte Wall. 48 C.il. 279; ■-■': Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. Rice V. Foster, 4 Harr. (Del.) 491. 479; Maizer v. State, 4 Ind. 342; § 155 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 232 general in their application, do not violate the constitu- tional provision that the power to make laws is vested in the Legislature. The constitutional objection to such a law is met, if the act, when it came from the Legislature, re- ceived the governor's approval, was properly published, and was, of itself, a complt.o and perfect enactment. In such case the popular will is expressed under and by virtue of a law that is in force and effect, and the people neither make nor repeal it. By this vote, petition or remonstrance, as the case may be, they onl.y determine whether a certain thing shall be done under the law, and not whether the law shall take effect. The law has full and absolute vitality when it [passes the Legislature; and the people, under the rule of •action therein given for their government, proceed to act. The same rule — the same law — is given to all the people of the State, to all parts of it; the same method for obtaining the expression of the people maintains throughout the State. As a result a different regulation, of a police nature, may, under such a law, exist in one town, city or county from that which exists in another.^^ In such case the maxim 57 Weil V. Calhoun, 25 Fed. 108 Mass. 27; Commonwealth v. Rep. 865; Ex parte Cowert, 92 Dean, 110 Mass. 3o7; State v. Ala. 94; 9 So. 225; Boyd v. Bry- Cook, 24 Minn. 247; Sehulherr v. ant, 35 Ark. 69; 37 Am. Rep. 6; Bordeaux, 64 Miss. 59; State v. State V. Wilcox, 4^2 Conn. 364; Kline, 50 Ore. 426; 93 Pac. 237; Caldwell v. Barrett, 73 Ga. 604; In re O'Brien, 29 Mont. 530; 75 Menken v. City of Atlanta, 78 Pac. 196; Lemon v. Peyton, 64 Oa. 668; Groesch v. State, 42 Ind. Miss. 161; State v. Pond, 93 Mo. 547; Ginz v. State, 42 Ind. 218; 606; 6 S. W. 469: Everse v. Hud- State V. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439; son, 36 Mont. 135; 92 Pac. 462; 44 N. E. 469; State v. Forkner, Ex parte .Swarm, »6 Miss. 44; 94 la. 1; 62 N. W. 683; Ander- State v. Gloucester, 50 N. J. L. son V. Commonwealth, 13 Bush, 585; Sandford v. Court, 7 Vroom 485; Commonwealth v. Weller, 77 72; 13 Am. Rep. 422; Glovers- Ky. (14 Bush) 218; 29 Am. Rep. ville v. Howell, 70 N. Y. 287; 407; Garrett v. Aby, 47 La. Ann. Gordon a-. State, 46 Ohio St. 607; "618; Lowry v. Commonwealth 23 N. E. 63; 6 L. R. A. 749; Ex (Ky.), 36 S. W. 1117; 18 Ky. L. parte Lynn, 19 Tex. App. 293 Rep. 481; Howard v. Haines, 2o Steele v. State, 19 Tex. App. 425 Md. 541; Fell v. State, 42 Mrl. State v. Swisher, 17 Tex. 441 71; Commonwealth v. Bennett, Ex parte Kennedy, 23 Tex. App. 233 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §155 delegata potestas non potest delegari has no applica- tion.^® 77; Evans v. State, — (Tex.), 117 S. W. 167; Bancroft v. Du- mas, 21 Vt. 456; State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 3o7. 58 People V. Collins, 3 Mich. 343; Paul v. Gloucester County, 60 N. J. L. (21 Vroom) 583; Feek v. Bloomingdale Tp., 82 Micli. 393; 47 N. W. 37; 10 L. E. A. 69; Friesner v. Common Council, 91 Mich. 504; 52 N. W. 18; State v. Pond, 93 Mo. 606; ii S. W. 469 ; Ex parte Swan, 96 Mo. 44; 9 S. W. 10; State v. Moore, 107 Mo. 78; 16 S. W. 937; iState V. Watts, 111 Mo. 553; 20 S. W. 237; State v. Dugan, 110 Mo. 138; 19 S. W. 195; State v. Rouch, 47 Ohio St. 478; 25 N. E. 59; Van Wert v. Brown, 47 Ohio St. 477; 25 N. E. 59 (reversing 4 Ohio Cir. Ct. 407); Common- wealth V. Locke, 29 Leg. Int. 172 ; affirmed 72 Pa. St. 491 ; Leger v. Eice, Fed. Cas. No. 8210; Hobart V. Butte Co., 17 Cal. 23; Robin- son V. Bidwell, 23 Cal. 37'9; Guild V. Chicago, 82 111. 472; Erlinger V. Boneau, 51 111. 94; People v. Salomon, 51 111. 87 ; Lytle v. May, 49 Iowa, 224; Clark v. Rogers, fil Ky. 43; Wales v. Belcher, 3 Pick. 508; State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 279; Morgan v. Monmouth Plank Road Co., 2 Dutch. 99; Warner v. Hoagland, 22 Vroom ©2; 16 Atl. 106; Noonan v. Hud- son County, 22 Vroom 454; 18 Atl. 117; 23 Vroom 398; 23 Atl. 255; Johnson v. "Rich, 10 K Y. Leg. Ob=^. 33; Gv^nt v. '^outer, 24 Barb. 232; Clarke v. Rochester, 5 Abb. Prac. 107; Smith v. Mc- Carthy, 56 Pa. St. 359; State v. Copland, 3 R. I. 33; Louisville, etc., R. Co. V. Davidson, 1 Sneed, 637; 162 Am. Dec. 424; Rutter v. Sullivan, 25 W. Va. 427 ; State v. O'Neill, 24 Wis. 149; Smith v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 291; King V. Walsh, 6 Can. Cr. Cas. 452; Randall v. Tillis, 43 Fla. 43; 29 So. 540; Fonts v. Hood River, 46 Ore. 492; 81 Pac. 370; State v. Handler, 178 Mo. 38; 76 S. W. 984; Hoover v. Thomas, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 535; 80 S. W. 8i59; In re McGonnell's License, 209 Pa. St. 327; 58 Atl. 615; reversing 24 Pa. Super. Ct. '642; August Busch & Co. v. Webb, 122 Fed. 655; Territory v. O'Connor, 5 Dak. 397; 41 N. W. 746; Minneha County v. Champ- tion, 5 Dak. 43; 41 N. W. 754; Thalheimer v. Board (Ariz.), 94 Pac. 1129; People v. McBride, 234 111. 146; 84 N. E. 865; State V. Peckham, 3 R. I. 289; State V. Stevens, 8 Ohio Dec. 6; 5 Ohio N. P. 354; Stevens v. State, 61 Ohio, 597 ; 56 N. E. 478 ; State v. Barber (S. D.), 101 N. W. 1078; Ray V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 176; 83 S. W. 1121; Common- wealth V. Neason (Ky.), 50 S. W. 66 ; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1825 ; Ex parte Handler, 176 Mo. 383; 75 S. W. 920; Childers v. Shepherd (Ala.), 39 So. 235; Lowry v. Common- wealth (Ky.), 36 S. W. 1117; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 481; Savage v. Com- monwealth, 84 Va. 619; 5 S. E. 565; People v. Kemmis, 153 Mich. 117; 116 N. W. 554; People V. McBride, 234 HI. § 156 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 234 Sec. 156. Local option laws, constitutionality. At the expense of a repetition it may be s'.ated that the great weight of authority now is to the etfect that a local option law, if it is a complete enactment in itself, re- quiring nothing further to give it vitality and depending upon popular vote for nothing but a determination of the territorial limits of its operation, is a valid and constitu- tional exercise of legislative power. That a statute may be conditional, and its taking effect made to depend upon sub- sec^uent events, is now well settled.^'' The question of license or no license is one properly of local police and may be constitutionally left to the decision and discretion of the lawfully created agencies representing and acting for the local public, Avhich are immediately affected by the retail liquor traffic, such as county courts, and the municipal authorities of towns and cities. Likewise, a Legislature may create other agencies to determine such local question even to the referring of it to the qualified voters of the town, city, or civil district in which the necessarj^ steps may be taken to test the sense of such voters on the subject of such retail traffic. *^° In other words, a Legislature has the constitu- tional power to confer upon the qualified voters of a local 146; 84 N. E. 865; State v. ClilT v. State (Tex. Civ. App.), Johnson, 86 Minn. 121; 90 N. W. 77 S. W. 24; affirmed 67 161; State v. Harp (Mo.), 109 Tex. 391; 79 S. W. 1; Ex parte S. W. 578; /n re O'Brien, 29 Heyman, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 532; Mont. 530; 75 Pac. 196; Sweeney 78 S. W. 349; State v. . MacEl- V. Webb, 97 Tex. 250; 76 S. W. rath, 49 Ore. 294; SQ Pac. 803; 766; 77 S. W. 1135; State v. Feek v. Township Board, 82 iSkeggs, 154 Ala. 249; 46 So. 268; Mich. 393; 47 N. W. 37; 10 L. Kennedy v. Warner, 100 N. Y. R. A. 69; Commonwealth v. Bot- Supp. 616; 51 N. Y. Misc. 362; toms (Ky.), 22 Ky. L. Rep. 410; State V. Peckham, 3 R. I. 289; 57 S. W. 493. Ray V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 59 Commonwealth v. Weller, 14 407; 83 S. W. 1121; State v. Bush (Ky.), 218; 29 Am. Rep. Fountain (Del.), 69 Atl. 926; 407. Adams V. Kelley (Tex. Civ. App.) , co Anderson v. Commonwealth. 45 S. W. 859; Stephens v. State, 13 Bush (Ky.), 485; Common- 47 Tex. Cr. App. 604; 85 S. W. wealth v. Hoke, 14 Bush (Ky.), 797; State v. Richardson, 48 485. Ore. 309; 85 Pac. 225; Oak 235 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 157 community the power to decide Mdiether the retail traffic in intoxicating- liquors shall be permitted to be licensed in such town, city or community or not.**^ Sec. 157. Local option laws, when not unconstitutional. As a rule, the Legislatures of the various States have exercised the power to prohibit the retail traffic in liquors by any other than persons specially licensed for the purpose, and have delegated to designated local agencies, such as county courts, and the authorities of incorporated towns and cities, the discretion to grant or refuse licenses, as they should deem most conducive to the well-being of the local public. A local option law, where the right to sell liquor under a license is provided for, does not differ in principle from the legislation restraining the liquor traffic by re- quiring the obtaining of a license to carry on the traffic. It merely extends the restriction by adding another agency, with power to refuse to permit a license to be granted. The voters may, by exercising the power given them in such a 61 Weil V. Calhoun, 25 Fed. J. L. 72; 13 Am. Rep. 4'22; State Rep. 805 ; Boyd v. Bryant, 3.5 v. Circuit Court, 52 N. J. L. 585 ; Ark. 69; 37 Am. Rep. 6; State v. 15 Atl. 272; Gloversville v. How- Wilcox, 42 Conn. 364; 19 Am. ell, 70 N. Y. 287; Gordon v. State, Rep. 530; Territory v. O'L'onner, 46 Ohio St. 603; 23 N. E. (il ; 6 Dak. 397; 41 N. W. 746; Cald- Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491; well V. Barrett, 73 Ga. 604; Ham- 13 Am. Rep. 71<); Holley v. State, mond V. Hanes, 25 Md. 541; 90 14 Tex. App. 505; Ex parte Lynn, Am. Dec. 77; Fell v. State, 42 19 Tex. App. 293; State v. Md. 71; 20 Am. Rep. 83; Sly- Parker, 26 Vt. 357; Savage mer V. State, 62 Md. 240; Com- v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 619; monwealth v. Bennett, 108 Mass. 5 S. E. 565; Denton v. Vann, 27; 11 Am. Rep. 304; Common- 8 Cal. App. 677; 97 Pac. 675; wealth V. Dean, 110 Mass. 357; Baxter v. State, 49 Ore. 353; 88 Peek V. Bloomingdale, 82 Mich. Pac. 677; 80 Pac. 3'69; People v. 393; 47 X. W. 37; State v. Cooke, Bashford (X. Y.), 112 N. Y. Supp. 24 Minn. 247; 31 Am. Rep. 344; 582; affirmed, 128 N. Y. App. Div. Schuler v. Bordeaux, 64 Miss. 59; 351; 112 XL Y. Supp. 1143; Hall 8 So. 201; Lemon v. Peyton, '64 v. Dunn (Ore.), 97 Pac. 811. See Miss. 161; 8 So. 235; State v. Ruhland v. Waterman (R. L), 71 Pond, 93 Mo. 606; 6 S. W. 469; Atl. L State V. jMorris County, 36 N. § 158 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 236 local option law, render the granting of licenses unlawful. But in doing so they do not make law. They do no more than county courts and municipal authorities have always done — they exercise a police power conferred upon them by Legislature. If they vote against it, the traffic is not thereby made unlawful. That was so before, unless the dealer had a license. The voters under a local option law have the power to say no license shall be issued. This is no new power. It has always existed in some agency of the law, and a local option law merely transfers the power, or a part of it, to another depository. But it leaves a residium in the county courts and municipal authorities. They may still exercise the power as formerly until the voters have exercised the power vested in them to prohibit the traffic. And when the voters refuse to exercise their power to pro- hibit, the county courts and municipal authorities, having the power to grant licenses, still have a right to refuse to grant them, just as they did before the local option law was adopted. In other words, a local option law is a permanent and continuing law in all parts of the State which adopts it. It is not adopted, suspended or repealed by the vote of the people, if any city, town or civil district vote against the sale of intoxicating liquor. The vote determines the ques- tion of local police as to whether the sale of liquors shall be licensed or not."- Sec. 158. Local option laws, when not unconstitutional — Continued. A local option law will not violate a constitutional provi- sion which vests the legislative authority of a State in a general assembly composed of a senate and house of rep- resentatives, nor a constitutional provision which vests the administrative affairs of the State in certain designated officers, by committing either of such powers to the people.*'^ csWall. Cases, 48 Cal. 279; J. L. (21 Vroom) 583; State v. Commomvealth v. Hoke, 14 Bush Fountain (Del.), m All. 926. (Ky.) f>fi8; vState v. Cooke, 24 oa Groesch v. State, 42 Ind. Minn. 247; .31 Am. Rep. 344; 547. Paul V. Gloucester County, 50 N. 237 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 158 And it makes no difference with the constitutionality of such a law whether the action of those operating under it is called an exercise of legislative or administrative power. In either case such action is had by authority of the Legis- lature, conferred by the Constitution, and when by such action an order has been made it is the law that prohibits and not the action of the authorities.*'* Nor will it violate a constitutional provision which prohibits the enactment of laws local in their nature, nor one which provides that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State.**' A special act or statute is one which at common law the courts will not notice unless it is pleaded and proved like any other fact.**"* A law which applies gen- erally to a particular class of cases is not a local or special law.**' It is only in a qualified sense that any law ican be said to be of uniform operation throughout the State. A law for the punishment of crime, the provisions of which are alike applicable to all parts of the State, must neces- sarily lack uniformity in one sense in its operation, not only as to persons but also as to localities. It operates in those places where its provisions are violated and upon those per- sons who transgress them. Under the same circumstances and ease last cited, Mr. Justice Bradley said: "No one has ever doubted that a Legislature may prohibit the vending of articles deemed injurious to the safety of society, provided it does not interfere with vested rights of property. When such rights stand in the way of public good they can be removed by awarding compensation 74 /n re Hoover, 30 Fed. Rep. 75 License Cases, 5 How. (U. 51; Barbier v. Connolly, 112 U. S.) 673. S. 27. §159 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 240 to the owner. When they are not in question the claim of a right to sell a prohibited article can never be deemed one •oi the privileges and immunities of the citizen.'' It is ap- parent from the cases cited that the extent to which the laws of a State may regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors is a matter resting almost entirely within the dis- icretion of the Legislature, that discretion being limited only by the provisions of the State Constitution. Accordingly, it has been held that where there is no express constitu- tional provision against it a Legislature may pass what is known as a local option law. It is not necessary for the sake of justifying such a law to array the appalling statistics of the misery, pauperism and crime which have their origin in the use or abuse of ardent spirits. The police power, which in this instance belongs exclusiveh^ to the States, in regard to this matter is sufficient alone and may be relied upon to correct these great evils by such measures •of restraint or prohibition as may be necessary to affect that purpose.^'' True enough, there are some cases which are against this conclusion. But the great weight of authority and the better reasons are in favor of the constitutionality of such laws.''' 16 Ex parte Wall, 48 €al. 279; Eice V. Foster, 4 Harr. (Del.) 47«; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342; State V. Weir, 33 Iowa 134; Lam- mert v. Lidwell, 62 Mo. 188; Parker v. Commonwealth. 6 Pa. St. 507; State v. Swisher, 17 Tex. 441; Ex parte Lynn, 19 Tex. App. 293; Steele v. State, 10 Tex. App. 425. "Boyd V. Bryant, 36 Ark. 69 State V. Wilcox, 42 Conn. 364 State V. Brennan, 2 S. Dak. 384 50 N. W. 625; Groesch v. State, 42 Ind. 547 ; Anderson v. Com- monwealth, 13 Bush (Ky.) 485; Commonwealth v. Waller, 14 Bush (Ky.) 218; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71; Commonwealth v. Bennett, 108 Mass. 27 ; Commonwealth v. Dean, 110 Mass. 357; State v. Cooke, 24 Minn. 247; Rohrbacker v. Jack- son, 51 Miss. 735; State v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 279; State v. Common Pleas, etc., 36 N. J. L. 72; Cin- cinnati, etc. R. Co. V. Commis- sioners, etc., 1 Ohio St. 77 ; Ban- croft V. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456; State V. Parker, 26 Vt. 357; Smith v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 291; State v. Fountain (Del.), 69 Atl. 926; Lloyd V. Dollisin, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 571; Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 120 Fed. 144. 241 CONSTITUTIONAIJTY OF STATUTES. § 160 Sec. 160. Local option — Alabama Constitution — Notice of enactment of law. The Alabama Constitution provides that no local law shall be enacted by the Legislature unless a notice thereof shall first be published in the locality affected, stating the substance of the proposed law. In pursuance of this provi- sion a notice was given wherein it was stated that an appli- cation would be made to the Legislature to enact a law preventing the sale of vinous, malt and spirituous liquors, except in cities or towns, within five miles of the insane hospitals situated at T. and M. It was held that the notice given was a sufficient compliance with this constitutional provision.'^** But a notice of an intention to introduce an act to prohibit the sale of liquor "outside of incorporated towns" in a certain county, and also providing that liquors should not be sold in an incorporated town except pursuant to an election held to determine the question of sale or no sale, is not sufficient to authorize the enactment of a law for such county to regulate the license and sale of liquor and providing for the issuance of a license in any part of the county on a petition signed by a majority of the qualified voters in the precinct.'*** Yet a notice of an in- tention to introduce a bill "to establish a dispensary in the icity of T. for the sale of spirituous liquors and other intoxi- cating liquors" is sufficient to authorize the enactment of a law establishing a liquor dispensary in the city, authorizing the city to operate it, invest money therein, select a salaried dispenser, conduct the business there under prescribed regu- lations, prohibit others from engaging in the sale of liquors in the city, and giving the city the exclusive right to sell liquors therein.'^*' Under the provision of this Constitution the Legislature cannot enact a local law where the notice of an intention to apply therefor shows that the proposed act would be unconstitutional when enacted.^" A notice that T8 state V. Williams, 143 Ala. 79 Uniontown v. State (Ala.), 501; 39 So. 276. 39 So. 814; State v. Williams 78*Hudgins v. State, 145 Ala. (Ala.). 39 So. 816. 499; 39 So. 717; Elba v. Rhodes, so Alfonl v. Hicks (Ala.), 142 Ala. 689; 38 So. 807. 38 So. 752. §§ 161, 162 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 242 an application would be made "to repeal the prohibition law of L. oeat" was held to authorize the enactment of a law repealing tne law named (which forbade the sale of liquors 'at or within eight miles oi the court house of the town of L.'"* only so far as it applied to the "corporate limits of the town of L."^^ Sec. 161. Local option law in territories. A statute providing for the proliibition of the sale of in- toxicating liquors in the several counties of a territory by local option cannot be defeated because it deprives a citizen of his property without due process of law; nor because it conflicts wi h the Organic Act of the territory; nor that it conflicts Avith the revenue laws of the United States grant- ing license to sell intoxicating liquors ; nor that it conflicts with the act of Congress prohibiting the Legislature from passing any law "impairing the rights of private property;" nor that it conflicts with the act of Congress prohibiting local or special legislation; nor that it conflicts with the act of Congress in delegating legislative power. Such a statute is of a police nature and a rightful subject of legislation within the power conferred upon a territory by its Organic Act, and being local in its character may be left to each county of the territory to determine when it shall be en- forced therein. ^- Sec. 162. Local option not destructive of property rights. A local option law does not violate the constitutional pro- vision that "no man's property shall be taken by law with- out just compensation." Such a law rests in no degree upon the power of eminent domain. It does not contemplate either the taking or the damaging of anything. It is an exercise of the police powers of a State, pure and simple. The incidental effect upon the value of property does not result from any interference with the property, but solely 81 Brenner v. State, (Ala.), 35 82 Territory v. O'Connor, 5 Da. So. 1031. Ter. 397; Thalheimer v. Board (Ariz.), 94 Pac. 1129. 243 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 163 from the owners of property to adjust their old business to the new law. These effects, if they can be called damage at all, are damnum ahsgiie injuria. The law does not take or damage the property of the owners for the public use, but only prevents them, to a certain limited extent, from taking or damaging the public for their use. This is their real grievance, and for that they have no remedy. Where busi- ness and law conflict, it is the business that must give way, not the law. The owner of property acquires and holds his property subject to the right of the Legislature, under the police power to control it whenever the public peace, the publi'C morals, or the public health is involved. Nor will such a law be invalid because of the abridgement of the rights of the dealers in intoxicating liquors. No one has a right to deal in such liquors save as a privilege from the State.«^ Sec. 163. Special legislation for villages. A statute which provides that all incorporated villages within a State, having within their limits a college or uni- versity, shall have power to provide b}'' ordinance against the evils resulting from the sale of intoxicating liquors within the limits of the corporation cannot be defeated on the ground that it is special legislation.^* A law framed in general terms, restricted to no locality and operating equally upon all of a group of objects, which, having regard to the purposes of the legislation, are distinguished by character- istics sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by themselves, is not a special or local law, but a general law.^^ Under such a law enacted under a title pro- viding that such incorporated villages may regulate the sale 83 Menken v. City of Atlanta, st Bronson v. Oberlin, 41 Ohio 78 Ga. 668 ; Burnside v. Lincoln St. 476. County Court, 86 Ky. 423 ; 6 S. ss Groesch v. State, 42 Ind. 547 ; W. 276; Ex parte Lynn, 19 Tex. Consumer's Co. v. Harles.s, 131 App. 293; Steele v. State, ID Tex. Ind. 446; 29 N. E. 1062; State App. 425; Ex parte Kennedy, 23 v. Parsons, 40 N. J. L. 123; Mc- Tex. App. 77 ; Savage v. Comnioa- gee v. State, 30 Ohio St. 54 ; State wealth, 84 Va. 619; 5 S, E. 565. v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54. § 164 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 244 of intoxicating liquors therein, a village council will exceed its power if it passes an ordinance which prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquors to all persons and for all purposes except mechanical and medicinal. Construing the words of such a statute, together with its title, the conclusion must Tbe that the pow^r conferred by the statute is that of regu- lating the sale and not of prohibiting the sale of intoxi- cating liquor. Regulation and prohibition are essentially and irreconcilably different things.^" Sec. 164. Local option constitutional provisions. In some of the States express provisions of their Consti- tutions provide for the adoption of a local option law. Such is the case in Delaware. The Constitution of that State empowers the Legislature to submit to a popular vote the question of license or no license, and requires it to provide laws to carry out and enforce such power, enact laws con- cerning the manufacture of liquors under the limitations of the Constitution, and provide necessary penalties. The Legislature adopted a law for the submission of the ques- tion, and provided therein penalties and processes for the enforcement of the act in case a popular vote in a district should adopt its provisions ; and it was held that this was a valid statute and not invalid on the ground that such penal- ties and processes would he enforceable only in the event a majority of the electors of any district voted for "no license;" for the casting of a majority vote for "no license" was only a contingency upon which the Legislature had pro- vided that the penalties should become operative. ^'^ The Constitution of Texas provides that each county shall be divided into four commissioners' precincts, and from each precinct shall be elected one commissioner. It also provides that the Legislature shall enact a law whereby the qualified R6 Miller V. Jones, 80 Ala. &9 ; W. 269; Bronson v. Oberlin, 41 Sweet V. City of Wabash, 41 Ind. Ohio St. 470; Heise v. Common 7 ; Cantrell V. Sainer, 59 Iowa 26 ; Council, 6 Rich. Law (S. C), 12 N. W. 753; People v. Gadway, 404. 61 Mich. 285; 28 N. VV. 101; In s- state v. Fountain (Del.), re Hauck, 70 Mich. 396; 38 N. 69 Atl. 926. 245 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 164 voters of any county, justice's precinct, or town, or such subdivision of a county as may be designated by the com- missioner's court, may, from time to time, determine whether the sale of liquors shall be prohibited within its limits. It was held that the statute could not be successfully attacked on the ground that it failed to vest in the commissioner's court the full measure of discretion concerning the sub- divisions in which elections might he held which the Con- stitution authorized the Legislature to grant, because the constitutional power to grant such full discretion included the lesser power to grant the limited discretion conferred by statute. It was also held that the statute was not invalid because of a failure to allow the voters of cities and towns to repeal prohibition as to them, where it had been carried as to the 'county as an entirety.^^ But an act attempting to authorize the commissioners' court to designate a portion of a county composed of seven justices' precincts for holding a local option election is void.-^ Under this provision it is held that the Legislature may provide for a vote to deter- mine whether all sales, except for sacramental and medicinal purposes, shall be prohibited.^" But an act is unconstitu- tional, under this provision, which undertakes to provide that C. 0. D. contracts of sale and shipment of liquor into local option territory shall be deemed to have been made where the goods are delivered and paid for.^^ This provi- sion of the Constitution does not prohibit the establishment of saloon limits within a city ; "^ but it prohibits the Legis- ss Sweeney v. Webb, 45 Tex. 9i Keller v. State (Tex.), 87 Cr. App. 170; 76 S. W. 766 Ex S. W. &&9. parte Ileyman (Tex. Cr. App.), 92 Williams v. State, 52 Tex. 78 S. W. 349. Cr. App. 371; 107 S. W. 1121; 89 Ex parte Wells, 45 Tex. Cr. Ex parte King, 52 Tex. Cr. App. App. 170; 78 S. W. 928; Ex parte 383; 107 S. W. 549. Hedman (Tex. Cr. App.), 78 S. Under the provisions a com- W. 349; the validity of such a missioner's precinct is a "politi- statute was conceded in argument. cal subdivision of the county" 90 Bowman v. State, 38 Tex. within the Constitution for hold- Cr. App. 14; 40 S. W. 796; 41 ing an election. Cofield v. Brit- S. W. 635. ton (Tex. Civ. App.), 109 S. W. 49'3. §164 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 246 lature empowering a commissioners' court to create new sub- divisions."^ The Constitution of Delaware provides that the Legislature, from time to time, may enact a law for submis- sion to a vote of the electors of the several districts of the State the question whether the sale of liquors shall be licensed or prohibited therein. The second sentence of the same section provides that whenever a majority of the members of each house in any district shall request the sub- mission of the question of license or no license to the electors of the district which they represent, the Legislature must provide for the submission of the question in the district at the next general election. It was held that the second sentence did not limit nor qualify the first sentence ; but under the first sentence the question of license or prohibi- tion could be submitted at a special election; and under the second sentence it must be at a general election.*** S3 Ex parte Heyman (Tex.), 78 S. W. 439. In Maryland the Constitution provides that no bill shall be come a law unless passed in the Senate and House of Represent- atives of the State by a major- ity of the members elected, and under this it is held that a sl;i1- ute relating to local option in a certain county wherein reference is made to an earlier and existing statute, providing that in a cer- tain event "said act shall apply therein as heretofore," was valid, not violating this provision of '^^be Constitution, but being merely' a recognition of the existing pol- ic}' of the county, and not hiding an attempt to re-enact the for- mer law. Temmick v. Owings, 70 Md. 24^; 16 Atl, 719. The provisions of the Tsxas Constitution are not self-execut- ing. A statute authorizing it is necessary to secure an election. Adams v. Kelley, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 479; 45 S. W. 8'59. 91 State V. Fontain (Del.), 09 Atl. 926. The local option of Texas in ex- cepting from its provisions sales of liquors for sacramental and medicinal purposes does not come in conflict witli tlie provisions of the Constitution of that State re- quiring the Legislature to enact laws whereby the electors of a district may determine whether the sale of liqviors shall be pro- hibited. Eay v. State (Tex.), Sr, S. W. 1121. The statute of South Carolina giving tlie Legislature the exclu- sive riglit to license the sale ot liquors, and prohibiting it to del- egate the power to cities, does not prevent it from authorizing c'itj(!.s to forbid the sale of liquors therein. Florence v, Brov/n, 49 S. C. 3.32; 26 S. E. '8«0; 27 S. E. 273. 247 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §165 Sec. 165. Local prohibitory laws, when constitutional. A Legislature has the power to enact local prohibitorj- laws forbidding the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors within certain described localities. This power has been exercised in the protec'ion of educational institutions,^^ churches and religious assemblies,^" fairs and places of amuse- ment,^'^ public or State buildings and institutions,^* manu- factories,"'' and railroads during construction.^ Such a law The Constitution of Kaasas for- bidding the sale of jntcixicatin^ liquors except for medicinal, sani- tary and mechanical purposes, does not prevent the Legislature enacting a law to further restrain or prohibit the liquor traffic nor prevent it imposing conditions on the conduct of its manufac- ture or sale for medical, sanitary and mechanical purposes, short of prohibition. State v. Durein (Kan.), 80 Pac. 987, amrming 70 Kan. 1; 78 Pac. 152; State v. Sheesley, 71 Kan. 857; 78 Pac. 9'97. Although a Constitution re- quires the Legislature to adopt a local option law, it may adopt a law prohibiting the keeping of a disorderly house where intoxicat- ing liqiiors are sold or kept for sale without a license. Joliff v. -State (Tex.), 109 S. W. 176; Webber v. State (Tex.), 109 .S. W. 182. 05 Love v. Porter, 93 Ala. 384; 9 So. 5&5; DeBois v. State, 34 Ark. 381; Boyd v. Bryant, 35 Ark. G9; Wilson v. State, 35 Ark. 414; Blackwell v. State, 36 Ark. 178; Trammell v. Bradley, 37 Ark. 374; Commonwealth v. Whe- lan, 134 Mass. 20<); Commonwealth V. Jenkins, 137 Mass. 572; Com- monwealth V. Everson, 140 Alass. 432; 5 X. E. 155; Commonwealth V. Jones, 142 Mass. 573; 8 N. E. 603; In re Liquor Locations, 13 R. I. 733; State v. Ranscher, 69 Tenn. (1 Leu) 96; Brewer v. State, 75 Tenn. (7 Lea) 68'2; Harney v. State, 76 Tenn. ( 8 Lea ) 113; Murphy v. State, 77 Tenn. (9 Lea) 373; Tillery v. State, 78 Tenn. (10 Lea) 35; Lea v. State, 78 Tenn. (10 Lea) 35; State v. Tarver, 79 Tenn. (11 Lea) 658: Halcher v. State, 80 Tenn. (12 Lea) 3'r>8; Boyd v. State, 80 Tenn. (12 Lea) 687. 96 Carlisle v. State, 91 Ala. 1; Boyd v. Bryant, 35 Ark. 69; Go- well V. State, 41 Ark. 355; State V. Midgett, 85 X. C. 538; Fet- ter V. Wilt, 46 Pa. St. 457. 97 State V. Cappy, 50 Ind. 291 ; Heck V. State, 44 Ohio St. 536; 9 N. E. 305; Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. 344; State V. White, 7 Baxt. 158. 98Brinson v. State, 89 Ala. 105; 8 So. 527: Ex parte McClain, 61 Cal. 436; 44 Am. Rep. 554; State V. Barringer, 110 X. C. 525; 14 S. E. 781. 99 Ashurst V. State, 79 Ala. 176: McArthur v. State, 69 Ga. 444: State V. Joyner, 81 X. €. 534. 1 State V. Hampton, 77 N. €. 52C. § 165 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 248 does not contravene a constitutional provision that the general assembly shall not pass any local or special law where a general law can be made applicable.- In such a case it is for the Legislature alone to judge whether a law on any given subject can be made applicable to the whole State.^ It has been held that an exemption from the penalties of such a statute of persons who at the time of enacting it already had established places of business within the prescribed limits would not deprive the statute of its character as a general law ; * and also, that a statute making it unlawful to sell intoxicating liquors within given distance of any in- corporated institution of learning will not deprive it of the character of a general law by a section providing that it shall not apply to the sale of such liquors within the limits of an incorporated town.'"' A law of this character which authorizes a county court to make an order prohibiting the sale or giving away of intoxicating liquors within a given distance of any ichurch or schoolhouse, upon the petition of a majority of the residents in such limits, has been held not to violate the rule that the Legislature cannot delegate the power to make laws, the court holding that a Legislature has the power in enacting a law to delegate the power to determine the facts or state of things upon which it intends to make its own action depend in enacting such a law.® It has also been held that the prohibiting of the manufacture of intoxicating liquors within three miles of an orphan's home without the written permission of the superintendent of the home was a constitutional exercise of the police powers of the State and operated on those, who, at and before the time of its enactment, were engaged in the manufacture of intoxicating liquors within the prescribed 2 Boyd V. Bryant, 35 Ark. 69; etc., 50 Mo. 415; State v. Rob- Heck V. State, 44 Ohio St. 5.36; bins, 51 Mo. S2. 9 N. E. ,305. 4 Meyer v. Baker, 120 111'. 567; 3Cooley Const. Law, 4th ed., p. 12 N. E. 79; Kramer v. Marks, 105; Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 04 Pa. St. 151. 409; Marks v. Trustees, etc., 37 s state v. Ranscher, 69 Tenn. (1 Ind. 163; State v. Tucker, 40 Lea) 96. Ind. 355; State v. County Court, e Boyd v. Bryant, 35 Ark. QQ. 24.9 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 166 territory, and the fact that upon the destruction of a portion of the buildings connected with the home the inmates were removed temporarily to another place while the buildings were reconstructed did not have the effect to suspend the operation of the statute/ Sec. 166. Special legislation. Statutes regarding the regulation or prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors must be of a general character ; they cannot be of a local character if the Constitution forbid the passage of local laws. But in many of the States the Legislature may enact a law for a single county ; and when dt may do so the only restraint upon it is that the law enacted must bear alike on all persons within the county.* And a statute authorizing the submission of the question of local option to a vote, which excepts wine used in sacra- mental and medicinal purposes, cannot .be regarded as a special law by reason of such exception.® So a statute for- bidding sales in a private room, but whieli excepts hotels from itG provisions, is not a law granting special privileges TiState V. Baninger, 110 X. C. wards v. State, 123 Ga. 542; 51 525; U S. E. 781. S. E. &30; IJenning v. State, 123 A local option statute is not Ga. 546; 51 3. E. 632; Bagley v. unconstitutional because it makes State, 103 Ga. 388; 29 S. E. 123; the election returns conclusive evi- Caldwell v. State (Ga.), 29 S. dence of the result of the elec- E. 263. tion and the regulating of the '■' Sparks v. State (Tex. Cr. proceedings, unless appealed from App.), 45 S. W. 493; Wilson and set aside. Steckard v. Reade, v. Hines, 99 Ky. 221 ; 35 S. W. (Tex.), 121 S. W. 1114; Ev- 627; 37 S. W. 148; McLain v. ans V. State (Tex.), 117 S. W. State, 43 Tex. Cr. App. 213; 64 167; Saylor v. Duel, 236 111. 429; S. W. 865; State v. Barber 86 N. E. 119. (S. D.), 101 N. W. 1078; Ray A statute regulating the stor- v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 511; age of liquors in districts adopt- '83 S. W. 1121; August Busch & ing local option is valid. Ex Co. v. Webb, 122 Fed. 655; Swee- parte Massey (Tex.), 92' S. W. ney v. Webb, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 1083. 324; 7'6 S. W. 766; Creekmore v. 8 Guy V. Commissioners, 122 N. Commonwealth (Ky.), 12 S. W. C. 471; 29 S. E. 771; Sasser v. 628; 11 Ky. L. Rep. 566. Martin (Ga.), 29 S. E. 278; Ed- § 166 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 250 which do not belong to all the citizens." Likewise a statute is not special legislation which excepts from its provisions druggists, manufacturers, persons giving away liquors in pri- vate dwelling houses and railway companies selling liquors in their dining and buffet cars under a license. ^^ Where a section of a statute pointed out a method for obtaining a license, but excepting from its provisions incorporated cities and towns having by their charters the right to issue a license, and in another section fixed the county license at a certain amount, and the Constitution prohibited the enact- ment of a special law where "provision has been made by an existing law," it was held that a special law prescribing the manner in which a license should be granted in a given county and imposing 'conditions not contained in the first section, and fixing the license fee at another amount, was valid, not being in violation of the constitutional provision quoted.^- But where a statute provided that there should be paid for the right to manufacture for sale distilled liquors and to sell distilled and vinous liquors brought into the State, "a special license tax of ten cents for every gallon," and an emergency clause declaring there was "a deficiency in the revenue of the State," and the actions of the State's officers indicated it was a revenue measure, and a section gave permission to wine growers in the State to sell their own wine on their own premises, it was held that the statute was a revenue measure and not a statute governing the liquor traffic ; and not applying to licpior manufactured for export nor to domestic wines or pure alcohol, it contra- vened a clause in the Constitution requiring taxes to be uniform on the same class of subjects within the limits of the territory in which the tax was levied." 10 Sandys v. Williams, SO Pac. is State v. Bengsch, 170 Mo. 042; Kru.se v. Williams, 80 Pac. 81; 70 S. W. 710. So far as 648. domestic and foreign liquors ship- 11 Ohio V. Dollison, 194 U. S. ped into the State were eonsid- 445; 24 Sup. Ct. 703; 48 L. Ed. ered, it was held that the stat- 1062; affirming 68 Ohio St. 688; ute was not void for want of uni- 70 X. E. 1131. formity, botji being taxed the same i2Sasser v. ^Martin (Ga.), 29 amount; it was also held that S. E. 278. as the Constitution expressly pro- 251 COXSTITl TIONALITY OF STATUTES. §167 Sec. 167. Proceedings in rem. A statute which prohibits the retail sale of intoxicating' liquors and which authorizes proceedings in rem against rum. shops is not unconstitutional. The legislative right to pass laws to protect the health, the morals, the property and the lives of the people is not onl}^ the prevailing object with all vided what property should be exempt from taxation, the attempt of the Legislature to exempt do- mestic wines rendered the whole act void. Bowman v. State, 38 Tex. 'Cr. App. 14; 40 S. W. 796; 41 S. W. 635. An ordinance excepting from its operation a particular lot in the city on which is a dramshop is void, on the ground tliat it dis- criminates in favor of the lot. Moore v. Danville, 232 111. 307; 83 N. E. 845. A State prohibition law provid- ing that it shall become opera- tive in counties where local op- tion prevails on January 1, 1908, and in all other counties on Jan- uary 1, 1909, is a general and not a local law. Stale v. Skeggs (Ala.), 46 So. 268. An act of Georgia giving local option to Douglass County, not undertaking to effect therein the domestic wine act, was not a law violating the provisions of the Constitution forbidding special legislation in a case provided for by an existing general law. Han- cock V. State, 114 Ga. 439; 40 S. E. 317; Roberts v. State, 114 Ga. 541; 40 S. E. 750. The Texas statute of April 5, 1907 (Acts 1^07, p. 156. c. 77), prohibiting the storing of liquor for sale in local option districts, nor the local option law, is neither a local or special law. Ex parte Dupree (Tex.), 105 S. W. 493; Ex parte Bj^rd (Tex.), 105 S. W. 496. A statute amending the gen- eral dispensary law of South Car- olina and levying a small tax on counties voting out the dispen- sary with the exception of two counties which never had dispen- saries, is not a special law, but is a general law with special pro- visions. Murphy v. London, 76 S. C. 21 ; 56 S. E. 850. A sale by an incorporated so- cial club without license to its members, being a violation of the genei-al State law, a subsequent statute confirming the incorpo- ration of a club under the gen- eral law and enlarging its pow- ers so as to enable it to sell to its members, without a license tlierefor, is a special law and void. Beauvoir Club v. State, 148 Ala. 643; 42 So. 1040. The Act of Minnesota. Acts 18f)5, c. 259, prohibiting sale of liquors in a town after the elec- tors had by a majority vote de- clared for prohibition, is consti- tutional. State v. Johnson, 86 ^Umi. 121: 90 N. W. 161. The Alabama prohibition law (Sp. Acts 1907. p. 71) is a gen- eral and not a local law. State v. Pitts (Ala.), 49 So. 441. § 167 TRxVFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 252 civilized institutions, but it is also the very foundation upon which our social system rests, and he who violates these laws may not only forfeit property and personal liberty, but also life itself. It is a fundamental principle of protection to society that the majesty of the law must be enforced against offending members and against offending property. If prop- erty becomes a nuisance, if prejudicial to the health or morals of the public, it may be abated or destroyed by legal sanction. This power is in harmony with self-preservation and is essential to every organized community. Under our Federal, as well as under our State Constitutions, it is not uncommon to pass laws declaring articles to be forfeited when they are used for illegal or criminal purposes. This is the case under the laws prohibiting counterfeiting, smuggling and piracy ; so also with obscene books and pictures." That proceedings in rem, against property used for. unlawful pur- poses, may be sanctioned by laws without doing violence to the Constitution, is conclusive!}^ settled by the highest judicial tribunal in our country.^ ^ In a leading case upon this point. Judge Story said: "The thing is here pri- marily considered as the offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily to the thing, and this, whether the offense be malum prohibitum or malum in se. The same principle applied to proceedings in rem, or seizures in admiralty. Many cases exist where the forfeiture for acts done attach solely in rem, and there is no accompanying penalty in personam. Many cases exist where there is both forfeiture in rem and a personal penalty. But in neither class of cases has it ever been decided that the prosecutions were dependent upon each other. But the practice has been. 1* Chir House No. 2 v. State, 4 gar v. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; Greene (Iowa) 172. United States v. 6 Packages of 15 Paulina's Cargo v. United Goods, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 520; State, 7 Cranch (U. S.) 52; Car- United States v. .350 Chests of go of Aurora v. United States, 7 Tea, 12 Wheat. (U. S. 4-86; Unit- Cranch (U. S.) 382; The Venus, ed State v. 422 Casks of Wine, 8 Cranch. (U. S.) 253; United 1 Pet. (U. S.) 547; United States V. 1,960 Bags of Coffee, 8 State v. 84 Boxes Sugar, 7 Pet. Cranch (U. S.) 398; 30 hhds. Su- (U. S.) 453. 253 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 168 and so this court understands the law to be, that a proceed- ing in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by, any criminal proceeding in 2J('''-s'f' "«"«•" ^*^ Sec. 168. Search and seizure of liquors illegally kept. The Legislature may declare that intoxicating liquors kept in violation of a statute are contraband goods and authorize their seizure and destruction under the processes of the courts. "Certain articles which are treated as prop- erty while used for lawful purposes," said the Supreme Court of Maine, "may be subjects of forfeiture and destruc- tion, under proper statutory provisions, if their use is deemed pernicious to the best interests of the community. And when such articles are attempted to be used for unlaw- ful purposes, or in an unlawful manner, and the attempts are so concealed that ordinary diligence fails to make such discovery as to enable the law to declare the forfeiture, statutes authorizing searches and seizures have been held legitimate. The exercise of this power must be properly guarded, that abuses may be prevented, and that a citizen shall not be deprived of his property without having an accusation against him setting out the nature and charge thereof, and but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land; and he shall be secure in his person, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures. It is not perceived that the statute under which the suit in this case is attempted to be defended violates any of the provisions of the Constitution which have been adverted to."^' But the law must give the owner of the 16 The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. ( U. 16 R. 154; 11 Atl. 773; State v. g ) 1 Snow, 3 R. I. 64; In re Liquors 17 Gray v. Kimball, 42 Me. 299, of Horgan, 16 R. I. 542; 18 Atl. 307; State v. Kapinsky (Me.). 279; In re Liquors of McSorley, 73 Atl. 830; Santo v. State, 2 15 R. L '608; 10 Atl. 659; State Iowa 165; 63 Am. Dec. 487; State v. Dowdell, 98 Me. 460; 57 Atl. V. Miller, 48 Me. 576; Lincoln v. 846; State v. American Express Smith, 27 Vt. 328; Gill v. Par- Co., 118 Iowa, 447; 92 N. W. 66; ker, 31 Vt. 610; State v. Wheeler, Sothman v. State, 66 Neb. 302; 25 Conn. 290; Allen v. Staples, 6 92 N. W. 303; Dupree v. State Gray 491; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 (Tex.), 119 S. W. 301 ; 107 S. W. Conn. 479; State v. Fitzpatrick, 926. §168 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 254 property an apportiinity to defend it, and give him notice of its seizure; and if it does not it is invalid/* Yet a statute may authorize the seizure without a warrant of liquors un- lawfully kept, or even in process of an unlawful sale or transportation,^^ although a statute authorizing an officer to close a saloon unlawfully kept open and to arrest the keeper without warrant has been held unconstitutional on the ground that it is an undue interference with persons or property without due process of law, and prohibits the issuance of warrants unsupported by oath.-'' A statute giving a court of chaneeiy power to abate a liquor nuisance is con- stitutional, the proceedings of a court of chancery being "due process of law" within the meaning of the constitu- tional guaranty.-^ So a statute authorizing the issuance of 18 Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gi-ay 1 ; 61 Am. Dec. 381; State v. Snow, 3 R. -I. '64; Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 125; State v. Snow, 3 K. I. M; Greene v. James, 2 Cur- tis C. C. 187; People v. Haug, 68 Mich. 549; 37 N. W. 21; Ex parte Dupree (Tex.), 105 S. W. 403; Ex parte Byrd (Tex.), 105 S. W. 496. 19 State V. O'Neil, 58 Vt. 140; 2 All. 586; Jones v. Root, 6 Gray 435; Mason v. Lothrop, 7 Gray, 354; State v. LeClair, 86 Me. 522; 30 Atl. 7. 20 People V. Haug, 68 Mich. 549; 37 N. W. 21; Bessemeir v. Edge (Ala.), 50 So. 270. The Nebraska Bill of Rights, declaring that the right to be heard in all civil cases in the court of last resort, by appeal, error or otherwise, shall not be denied, does not apply to a pros- ecution for the seizure and de- struction of contraband liquors. Sothman v. State, 66 Neb. 302; 92 N. W. 303. Where an officer secretly en- tered, on Sunday, the stairway of the defendant, removed some bricks from the wall, and through this aperture saw defendant sell liquors in violation of law, it waa held that his evidence was admis- sible and was not obtained in vi- olation of the constitutional provisions against unreasonable searches and seizures, those pro- visions not applying to unau- thorized acts of private persons or petty officers. Cohn v. State (Tenn.), 109 S. W. 1149. A statute providing for a search of premises and seizure of property under a search war- rant, but making no provisions for a disposition of the property seized, is unconstitutional, be- cause it deprives the owner of his property without due process of law. Beavers v. Godwin (Tex. Civ. App.), 90 S. W. 930. 21 State V. Jordan, 72 Iowa 377; 34 N. W, 285. 255 CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTES. § 169 a warrant to seize liquors upon an affidavit made upon in- formation and belief is valid.^- But a statute which fails to require the indictment, information, complaint or affidavit to describe the place to be searched as required by a bill of rights is invalid ; and so is one which provides for the replevin of goods seized on giving bond, but makes the value put upon the property seized uncontrovertible in an action brought on such bond to recover its value.-^ Sec. 169. Destruction of intoxicating liquors. The Legislature maj^ provide that liquors kept in violation of law may be destroyed under a judgment of the court ; and the act is not a taking of private property for public use with- out just compensation.-* The destruction of the property is a part of the punishment inflicted for a violation of the law, and is no more a taking of property without compensation than is the infliction of a fine for the same criminal act. *'So, in the case under consideration, the law imposes the forfeiture of the liquors, not for the benefit of the town, but as a punishment for keeping them for an unlawful purpose. Forfeitures have frequently been imposed by laws of Con- gress, as well as by the laws of this State, none of which have ever been adjudged unconstitutional."-^ While most 22 Rose V. state, 171 Ind. 60*2; cases in People v. Toynbee, 2 87 N. E. 103. Parker C. C. 329; 2 Park. €. C. 23Dupree v. State (Tex.), 119 490; 1 Kern. (N. Y.) 378; Peo- S. W. 301, answering (Tex.) pie v. Wynehamer, 2 Park. C. 107 S. W. 926, C. 377; 2 Park. C. C. 421; 3 Kern. 24 State V. Snow, 3 R. I. 64; (N. Y.) 378, and Miller v. State, Commonwealth v. Intoxicating 3 Ohio St. 475 ; King v. Gard- Liquors, 107 Mass. 396; Fisher ner, 25 Xova Scotia 48; McMan- V. McGirr, 1 Gray 1; 61 Am. Dec. us v. State, 65 Kan. 720; 70 381; In re Intoxicating Liquors, Pac. 700. 15 R. I. '608; 10 Atl. €59; State 25 state v. Brennan, 25 Conn. V. Brennan, 25 Conn. 278; State 278. V. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; Craig This method of inflicting pun- V. Werthmueller, 78 Iowa 598; ishment for a violation of liquor 43 N. W. 606; Oviatt v. Pond, 20 laws is very old, dating back to Conn. 479; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 the first English statute on the Vt. 328. See some doubting subject of regulating tippling §170 TBxVFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 256 of the statutes require a conviction and judgment author- izing the destruction of the liquors before tliey can be destroyed ; -'^' yet a statute may authorize their destruction upon seizure where absolute prohibition prevails and before the conviction of the owner.-^ A statute authorizing the seizure and destruction of liquors seized, under process issued and by authority of a judgment rendered by a police court, but providing no appeal from such judgment, is not for that reason unconstitutional.-* Sec. 170. Nuisance — Abatement, Not only has the State the power to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors, but it has the power to declare that the keeping of them — even though not for sale, it would seem — and the buildings wherein they are kept, shall be deemed a nuisance.-^ In Iowa, a statute provided, if Louses Stat. 12 Edw. II, c. 6, A. D. 13 IS. It may be said that by the judgment of conviction the ownership of the property vests in the State, and the State then destroys its own property. Gray V. Kimball, 42 Me. 299; McCoy V. Zane, 65 Mo. 1. In Iowa it has been held that goods shipped into the State "C O. D." may be seized while in the hands of the carrier. State v. American Express Co., 118 Iowa 447 ; 92 N. W. 66 ; while in Maine it is held that they cannot, unless intended for unlawful sale. State V. Intoxicating Liquors, 98 Me. 464; 57 Atl. 798. 26 State V. McMaster, 13 N. D. 58; 99 N. W. 58. 2TMcManus, 65 Kan. 720; 70 Pac. 700. 28Stahl V. Lee (Kan.), 80 Pac. 963. The statute involved in this decision authorized cities to seize and destroy contraband liquors. If a jury trial can be obtained by an appeal, the statute is not void because the owner of the property cannot obtain a jury trial in the lower court. State v. Fitzpatrick, 16 R. I. 54; 11 Atl. 7'67. An ordinance cannot author- ize the seizure and carrying away of liquors before the question is judicially determined. Darst v. People, 51 111. 286; 2 Am. Rep. 301. 29Mugler V. State, 123 U. S. 623; 8 Sup. Ct. 273; State v. Crawford, 28 Kan. 276; Little- ton V. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488; 22 N. W. 641; 64 Am. St. 19; McLane V. Leicht, 69 Iowa 401 ; 29 N. W. 327 ; Our House v. State, 4 Greene (Iowa) 172; McLaughlin v. State, 45 Ind. 338; Zumhoff v. State, 4 Greene (Iowa) 526; Streeter v. People, 69 111. 59i5; 257 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 170 in either a civil or criminal ease, the existence of a nuisance be established where intoxicating liquors was involved, the court should enter a judgment abating the nuisance and direct a seizure and destruction of the liquor and a removal and sale of the fixtures and furaiture used on the premises for either the manufacture or sale of the liquor. This was held to be a valid statute. "The appellees," said the court, "contend that though they did create and maintain nuisances as alleged, no decree should be entered against them for the seizure and destruction of their liquors, nor for the removal and sale of furniture and fixtures, because the law author- izing the same is in conflict with Amendments TV and XIV to the Constitution of the United States, and Sections 8 and 9, Bill of Rights, and Article III, Constitution of Iowa. Their contention is that property of an individual cannot be confiscated or forfeited by legislative enactment, but only by the judgment of a court, in accordance with due process of law, and that by said laws the Legislature forfeits the property in question and does not leave such forfeiture to the court.; that property cannot be forfeited by an action against the person, but must be by action against the thing, and that in a criminal ease for nuisance the property is not involved, and that the defendant is entitled to his day in court upon the question of forfeiture of his property. We understand the law to be that property of individuals cannot be forfeited by legislative enactment; that such forfeitures can only be by the judgment of a court of competent juris- diction, in a proper case, after due notice. This statute does not forfeit property by legislative enactment, but, as in many other instances, authorizes and requires the courts, in cases where it has been established upon judicial investiga- tion that property is such, or has been so used, as to con- stitute a nuisance, to abate the nuisance by destroying and selling the property. It is only *by the judgment of a court that any person may rightfully destroy liquors found upon Commonwealth v. Howe, 13 Gray E. 389; McMantis v. State, 05 26; Commonwealth v. Intoxicat- Kan. 720; 70 I'ac. 700. ing Liquors, 172 Mass. 311; 52 H. § 171 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 258 the defendant's premises described, or remove therefrom and sell the furniture, fixtures, etc., therein. In actions, either criminal or equitable, wherein the existence of a nuisance is established under the law in question, the action is against the thing in the place, as well as against the persons. In either case the question is whether the place was a nuisance, and, if so, then whether the person was engaged in keeping it. Such actions are against the thing, as well as the per- sons, and the person has due notice, and his day in court, in which to defend against the forfeiture of his prop- erty as well as the punishment of himself. "^° The abate- ment may be authorized by proceedings in ehancery.^^ The Legislature may even authorize a municipality to declare the keeping of liquors to be a nuisance.^- Sec, 171. Enjoining the maintenance of liquor establish- ments. Statutes have been enacted prohibiting the sale, keeping and manufacture of liquors and authorizing the courts to enforce their provisions by injunctions, and to punish those violating such injunctions for contempt of court. These statutes are held to be within the constitutional power of 30 Craig v. Werthmueller, 78 Webb, 44 Kan. 71, 23 P. 1073; Iowa 59(8; 43 N. W. 606. Monroe v. City of Lawrence, 44 31 State V. Jordan, 72 Iowa 377; Kan. 607; 24 P. 1113); Stahl v. 34 N. W. 2'8i5; Carleton v. Regg, Lee (Kan.), 80 Pac. 983. 149 Mass. 550; 22 N. E. 55. In New Hampshire, upon de- In such instance no Federal mand of the defendant, a jury question is involved. Schmidt v. must be called to determine the Cobb, 119 U. S. 286; 7 Sup. Ct. fact of the nuisance before a judg- 1373. ment of abatement can be entered. 32Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 But that is a practice peculiar 111. 588; '60 Am. Dec. 773; To- to that .State. State v. Currier peka v. Raynor, 60 Kan. 860; 58 (N. H.), 19 Atl. 1000. Pac. 557; 61 Kan. 10; 55 Pac. A private individual may de- 509 (citing Franklin v. Westfall, stroy liquors which the State 27 Kan. 614; City of Topeka v. makes a nuisance, if he can do Myers, 34 Fan. 500; 8 P. 726; so without committing a breach Same v. Zufall, 40 Kan. 47, 19 of the peace. State v. Paul, 5 R. P. 359; Junction City v. Keefle, I. 185. 40 Kan. 27'5; 19 P. 735; Same v. 259 CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTES. §172 the Legislature to enact them.^^ A statute empowering any citizen of the State, although he may not have suffered any special damage, to maintain an action to abate a liquor nui- sance is constitutional.^* Sec. 172. Amount of penalty — Unusual punishment. A statute providing a fine on second conviction of $300, or in lieu thereof three years' imprisonment, is not uncon- stitutional.^^ And a statute providing for a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $500, or imprisonment of not less than six months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, is not an excessive fine nor the in- fliction of cruel and unusual punishment.^'' A statute may authorize a revocation of his license on conviction of the de- fendant of having violated the law under which it was issued. ^^ So long as a city keeps wnthin the limitations of a statute authorizing it to regulate the sale of liquors and im- lowa 591; 22 N. W. 646; Pon- tius V. Bowman, GG Iowa 88 ; 23 K W. 277; Martin v. Blattner, 68 Iowa 286; 25 N. W. 131; Mc- Lane v. Granger, 74 Iowa 152; 37 N. VV. 123. See State v. Paul, 5 R. I. 185. 35 State V. Hodgson, 66 Vt. 134; 28 Atl. 1089. 30 Cardillo v. People, 26 Colo. 355; 58 Pac. 678. See McDonald V. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322; 5>3 X. E. 814; State v. Phillips, 73 Minn. 77; and State v. Dur- nam, 73 Minn. 150: 75 X. W. 1127; People v. Crotty, 22 N. Y. App. Div. 77; 47 N. Y. Supp. 845; Ex parte Bates, 37 Tex. Cr. Rep. 548; 40 S. W. 269. See State V. Edwards, 109 La. 236; 33 So. 209. 37 Krueger v. Colville, 49 Wash. 295; 95 Pac. 81; Commonwealth V. Brothers, 158 Mass. 200; 33 N. E. 386. 33 State V. Thomas, 74 Kan. 360; 86 Pac. 499. An action will not lie to re- strain the enforcement of a con- stitutional statute. Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. G86; 30 S. E. 759; 42 L. R. A. 181; Deal v. Singletary (Ga.), 30 S. E. 765. See Christian Moer. Brew- ing Co. V. Hill, 166 Fed. 1140. A statute imposing a heavy fine and also imprisonment for viola- tion of an injunction restrain- ing a violation of the liquor laws is not unconstitutional, and does not violate the provisions of a Constitution that excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual punisliment inflicted. Ex parte Keeler, 45 S. C. 537 ; 23 S. E. 865; McLane v. Granger, 74 Iowa 152; 37 N. W. 123. 34 Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 48«; 22 N. W. 641; 54 Am. Rep. 19; Pontius V. Winebrenner, 65 § 173 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 260 posing a fine for the violation of the ordinance regulating such sale, it cannot be held that the amount of the fine is excessive because it is high.'^^ Where the Constitution pro- vided that "no municipal ordinance shall fix a penalty for the violation thereof at less than that imposed by statute for the same off'ense, " and a statute provided a penalty for an unlawful sale of licpior at ''not less than $50 nor more than $100, or be confined in the county jail for not less than ten days nor more than forty days, or both so fined and im- prisoned in the discretion of the court or jury," it was held that an ordinance providing for the same offense a fine of "not less than $60 nor more than $100" was void, because it violated the provision of the Constitution quoted above.^^ A statute which fixes no maximum penalty, leaving the ■amount to the discretion of the court, is valid.*" Sec. 173. Ex post facto law defined — Heavier subsequent punishment. The phrase ex post facto is technical, and has relation only to criminal laws; it does not embrace statutes respect- ing private rights or civil remedies.*^ The words have a definite, technical signification. The plain and obvious meaning of a constitutional provision that no ex post facto law shall be passed is, that the licgislature shall not pass any law, after an act done by any citizen, which shall have relation to that act, so as to punish that which was inno- 38 Areola v. Wilkinson, 233 III. persons then under indictment for 250; 84 N. E. 264. violating the liquor laws shall be sft Kehr V. Commonwealth (Ky. ), released on payment of all costs 2<) Ky. L. Eep. 1234; 83 S. VV. and a fee to the prosecuting at- 633. torney directing the court to dis- A State authorizing the reduc- mis" tlie ease is unconstitutional, tion of costs does not deprive the as an intereference with the ju- party against whom they are re- dicial department of the govern- duced of the equal protection of ment. State v. Sloss, 25 Mo. the laws, it applying to all cases 291; 69 Am. Dec. 467. See also coming within the prescribed State v. Hodgson, 66 Vt. 134; 28 class. Green v. Sklara, 188 Mass. Atl. 1089. 363; 74 N. E. 595. 4 1 Andrews v. Russell, 7 Blackf. 40 State V. Kight, 103 Minn. (Ind.) 474; Poll: Co. v. Hierb, 371; 119 N. W. 56. 37 Iowa 361. A statute providing that all 261 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 173 cent when done; or add to the punishment of that which was criminal ; or to increase the malignity of a crime ; or to retrench the rules of evidence, so as to make conviction more easy.^- Accordingly it has been held that a statute, regulating the traffic in intoxicating liquors, which provides that one who has been convicted of a violation of its pro- visions, who shall again commit the same offense, is to be punished with an increased penalty, is not ex post facto, within the meaning of the Federal Constitution, even when applied to one who committed the first offense prior to the taking effect of the statute.*^ The true principle in this respect is well expressed by Judge Cooley, as follows: "And a law is not objectionable as ex post facto which, in providing for the punishment of future offenses, authorizes the offender's conduct in the past to be taken into account, and the punishment to be graduated accordingly. Heavier penalties are often provided by law for a second or any subsequent offense than for the first, and it has not been deemed objectionable that in providing for such heavier penalties the prior conviction authorized to be taken into account may have taken place before the law was passed. In such cases it is the second or subsequent offense that is punished, not the first." " In such case the offender is pun- ished, not for what he had done before the statute took effect, but for his subsequent violation of the law with the increased penalty before his eyes.*= The true construction of such a statute is, that the second offense must be com- mitted after the first in order to warrant the enhanced pen- alty. It is not enough that there be two successive of- fenses by the same person, which are severally and suc- cessively prosecuted to conviction; though the second indict- *2Calcler v. Bull, 3 Ball. (U. ^I'Cooley's Const. Lim., 4th ed., S.) 3S{3; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 p. 331 ; Ex parte Ginterrez, 45 €ranch (U. S.) 87; Ogden v. Cal. 429 ; People v. Butler, 3 Cow. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213; (N. Y. 347; Hyser v. Common- Society, etc. V. Wheeler, 2 Gall. wealth, 116 Ky. 410; 25 Ky. L. (U. S.) 105; .Strong v. State, 1 Rep. 608; 76 S. W. 174. Blackf. (Ind.) 193. 45 state v. Woods, tiS Me. 409; 43 Boss's Case, 2 Pick. (Mass.) State v. Hodgson, m Vt. 134; 28 1'65. Atl. 1089. U74 tkj\pfic in intoxicating liquors. 262 ment charge the first conviction as a part of the crime. The reasonable construction of such a statute is that "when a statute makes a second offense belong, or subject to a heavier punishment than the first, it is always implied that such second offense ought to be committed after a convic- tion for the first; for the gentler method shall first be tried, which, perhaps, may prove effectual. ' ' *'' The doctrine that when a statute imposes a greater punishment upon second and subsequent convictions of an offense, that the former con- viction must be alleged in the indictment and proved at the trial, or the same can only be punished as a first offense, is sustained by the great weight of the authorities.*^ Sec. 174. British North American Act. The British North American Act on the subject of reg- ulating intoxicating liquors overrides all provincial acts when they conflict with it.** If the local act conflicts with such statute, it is said to be unconstitutional.*" *fi People V. Butler, 3 Cow. 347. 47 Wharton's Crim. Plead, and Prac. (9th ed.), §935; 1 Bishop's Crim. Law, §§959-964; Clark's Crim. Proc., pp. 203, 204; Evans V. State, 150 Ind. 651; 50 N. E. S20; State v. Gorham, 65 Me. 270; Maguire v. State, 47 Md. 485 ; Plumbly v. Conunonwealth, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 413; Tuttle V. Commonwealth, 08 Mass. (2 Gray) 506; Commonwealth v. Holley, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 458; Garvey v. Comn'.onwealth, 74 Mass. (8 GrajO 382; Common- wealth V. Miller, 74 Mass. (3 Gray ) 484 ; Commonwealth v. Harrington, 130 Mass. 35; State V. Adams, 64 X. 11. 440; 13 Atl. 785; Ranch v. Commonwealth, 78 Pa. ,St. 490; State v. Edwards, 109 Lea 236; 37 So. 209. A statute doubling the penalty for a refusal to furnish the as- sessor information of the presence of intoxicating liquor, after de- mand made by him, for taxation, is valid. Adler v. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St. 539; 9 N. E. 672. A statute requiring the defend- ant, on a second conviction for violating the liquor law, to exe- cute a bond for his "good be- havior" for twelve months, is constitutional. Hyser v. Common- wealth, 116 Ky. 410; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 608; 76 S. W. 174. 48 Regina v. Justices, 2 Pug. (X. B.) 53'5; License Commis- sioners V. Prince Edward County, 26 Grant (Ont.), 432; License Conmiissioners v. Norfolk, 14 Ont. 749. Thus a brewer having a license under it may sell without having a local license. Regina v. Young, 8 Ont. 476; Regina v. Guittard, 30 OTit. 283. 40 QucLMi v. McDougall, 22 Nova Scotia, 442. 263 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §§175,176 Sec. 175. Closing saloons. A statute requiring saloons to be closed on Sunday (and holidays) is constitutional."'" So a statute empowering the Board of Police Commissioners of a city to order all drinking saloons to be closed ''temporarily" whenever iu their judg- ment public peace required it, and inHicting a penalty for disobedience of the order "during such period" as they shall forbid, is valid; but an order closing such places "un- til further notice" is invalid, because indefinite. The pow- er thus given is one enabling the board to only close the saloons temporarily and for a definite interval.''^ So stat- utes requiring saloons to be closed at night during such hours as are not usually devoted to business — as from 9 p. M. to 5 or 6 A. M. — ^are valid.^" So a statute forbidding anyone except the proprietor or his employes to enter his saloons between 9 o'clock p. m. and 5 o'clock a. m. or at any time on Sunday (or holidays) is valid. ^' Sec. 176o Evidence, statutes regulating Many of the States have statutes declaring wliat shall con- stitute prima facie evidence of the existence of certain facts enumerated in them. For instance, in Maine, the faet that The Nova Scotia act was held Power to close saloons on constitutional. Brown v. Moore, Sunday could not be delegated to 32 S. C. C. (jST. S.) 93; Attorney- police juries. State v. Baun, 33 General v. Manitoba License La. Ann. 081; overruling State v. Holders' Assn. [1902], App. Cas. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 603; 33 Am. 73; Queen v. Ronnan, 23 Nova Rep. 224. Scotia, 421 ; Queen v. McKenzie, 52 Decker v. Sargeant, 125 Ind. 23 Nova Svotia, 6; Queen v. King, 404; 25 N. E. 4.-)8; State v. Wash- 25 Nova Scotia, 4»8. ington, 14 N. J. L. 605; 45 N. J. For Quebec Act, see Ex parte L. 318; 43 Am. Rep. 402; Ex O'Neil, 9 Can. Cr. Cas. 141. parte Wolf, 14 Neb. 24; 14 N. 50 State v. Grossman, 214 Mo. W. 060; Morris v. Rome, 10 Ga. 233; 113 S. W. 1074; Common- 532; Smith v. Knoxville, 3 Head, wealth V. McCann (Ky.), 94 245; Word v. Greenville, 8 Baxt. S. W. 645; 29 Ky, L. Rep. 707. 228; Gilham v. Wells, 64 Ga. 192. So in British Columbia. Sauer 5:, Tlioma^ v. Sanders (Fla.), V. Walker, 2 B. C. 93. 47 So. 7»6. 51 State V. Strauss, 49 Md. 2S8. §176 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 264: a person has paid the Federal tax on liquor-sellers, and in Massachusetts the fact that he keeps posted on his prem- ises a United States tax receipt as a dealer in liquors, is made by statute prima facie evidence that such a person is en- gaged in the business of selling liquor/'* Such statutes have often been assailed as unconstitutional, on the ground that they violate the guarantee of due process of law and a trial by jury; and that they deprive an accused of the pre- sumption of innocence, but without, perhaps, an exception, they have been sustained as constitutional/^ In New York a statute provided that whenever any person was seen to drink in a shop, etc., spirituous liquors which were for- bidden to be drunk therein, it should be prima facie evi- dence that such liquors were sold by the occupant of the premises or his agent with the intent that the same should be drunk therein. A defendant was an occupant of prem- 54 Public Laws Me. [1887], c. 140; Acts Mass. [1.887], c. 414. 55 State V. Dowdy, 145 N. C. 432; 58 S. E. 1002; State v Toler (N. C), 58 S. E. 1005, Rice on Ev., §§807, 808; Whar ton on Crim. Ev., § 7I5a; Rob ertson v. People, 20 Colo. 279 State V. Cunningham, 25 'Conn 195; Clopton v. Commonwealth (Va.), 63 S. E. 1022; State v. Thomas, 47 Conn. 546; 36 Am. Rep. .98; Gage v. Cavalier, 125 111. 447; 1/ N. E. 777; Chicago, etc., R. €o. V. Jones, 149 111. 361; 37 N. E. 247; American, etc., Bank V. Gueder, 150 111. 33G; 37 N. E. 227; Morgan v. State, 117 Ind. '569; 19 N. E. 154; Voght v. State, 124 Ind. 358; 24 N. E. 680; State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439 ; 44 N. E. 46.9 ; State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74; 46 N. E. 174; Santo v. State, 2 la. 165; 63 Am. Dec. 457; Allen v. Armstrong, 16 la. 508; State v. Harley, 54 Me. 562; Fisher v. MoGirr, Gray 1 ; Commonwealth v. Williams, 6 Gray (Mass.), 1; Common- wealth V. Rome, 14 Gray (Mass.), 47; Holmes v. Hunt, 122 Mass. 505; 23 Am. Rep. 381; Wright v. Dunham, 13 Mich. 414; Ess v. Bonton, 64 Mo. 105; State v. Kingsley, 108 Mo. 135; 18 S. \\ . 994; State v. Buck, 120 Mo. 479; 25 S. W. 573; State v. Sattley, 131 Mo. 464; 33 S. W. 41; Hand v. Ballon, 12 JST. Y. 541; Howard V. Moot, 64 N. Y. 262; Board, etc., V. Merchant, 103 N. Y. 143; 8 X. E. 484; People v. Cannon, 139 X. Y. 32; 34 N. E. 759; Dun- can v. Clement, 119 IST. Y. Supp. 375 (conclusive evidence) ; State V. Higgins, 13 R. I. 330; 43 Am. Rep. 26; State v. Waldron, 16 R. I. 191; 14 Atl. 847; Delaphlame V. Cook, 7 Wis. 43; People v. Mc- Bride, 234 111. 146; 84 N. E. 865. 265 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 176 ises where liquor could not be sold to be drunk thereon, and was prosecuted for selling the same in violation of the statute. The only evidence of a sale by the accused occu- pant was the fact that a person was seen to drink upou the premises. The defendant was convicted. It was claimed for him that the act was unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the constitutional guaranties of due process of law and trial by jury. The claim was not sustained, the court holding that the general power of the Legislature to prescribe rules of evidence and methods of proof was un- doubted, and had not been illegally exercised in that ease.^^ In Massachusetts it was held in a criminal prosecution for a violation of an excise law, that a statute which provided that the delivery of any spirituous and intoxicating liquors in or from any building or place other than a dwelling house, "shall be deemed prima facie evidence of a sale," was constitutional and valid.^^ In Maine it was held that an act which provided that "whenever an unlawful sale of in- toxicating liquor is alleged and a delivery proved it shall not be necessary to prove payment, but such delivery shall be sufficient evidence of sale" was constitutional.^^ In Con- necticut a statute for the suppression of intemperance pro- vided that on the trial of a complaint for keeping spirituous liquors in violation of the statute, proof of finding of such liquor in the possession of the accused, under certain speci- fied circumstances, should be received and acted upon by the court as presumptive evidence that the liquor was kept or held for sale contrary to the provisions of the statute, was held constitutional and valid ; ^® and a like ruling has been made in Iowa ; ^° and a like one in Rhode Island." It has 50 Board, etc., v. Merchant, 103 59 .State v. Cunningham, 25 N. Y. 143; 8 N. E. 4-84; People v. Conn. 195; State v. Thomas, 47 Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32; 34 N. E. Conn, 546. So in Kansas. State 759. V. Sheppard, 64 Kan. 451; 67 5T Commonwealth v. Williams, Pac. 870. 6 Gray (Mass.) 1; Commonwealth eo Santo v. .State, 2 la. 165; 63 V. Wallace, 7 Gray (Mass.) 222; Am. Dec. 487. So in North Caro- Commonwealth v. Rowe, 14 Gray lina. State v. Jiarrett, 138 N. C. (Mass.) ■i-l. 630; 50 S. E. 506. 58 State V. Day, 37 Me. 244; ei state v. Iliggins, 13 R. I. State V. Hurley, 54 Me. 562. 330; 43 Am. Rep. 26. § 176 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING uIQUORS «266 also been held in Rhode Island tnat uncier a statute which provides that "it shall not be necessary to prove an actual sale of intoxicating liquors in any building:, place oi tene- ment, in order to establish the character of sucn premises as a common nuisance, but the notorious character of any such premises shall be evidence * * * that such premises are nuisances," that the word character is used in the statute was synonymous with "reputation," and as thus construed the statute was constitutional.^- Such a statute does not violate a constitutional provision that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him. ' ' ^^ The power of giving greater effect to evidence than it possessed at common law has been frequently exercised by Legislatures. Thus, in the case of a seizure under a law in which it was provided that, if a property be claimed by any person in any such case, the onus probandi should be upon the claimant, where proper cause was shown on the part of the prosecution, it was holden that the stat- ute might allow less evidence than would otherwise justify a condemnation, and the probable cause shown for the prose- cution was sufificient to refute the presumption of inno- cence and throw the burden of proof upon the claimant."* In another case before the Supreme Court of the United States it appeared that a district judge had instructed the jury that proof that an Indian trader had carried ardent spirits into an Indian country and had them with his other goods, was prima facie evidence of their having been carried there in violation of a law of Congress, and threw the burden of proof upon the trader, although the judge, at the same time, told the jury that he might lawfully carry them there for some purpose, as for medicinal use. And this ruling was said by Judge Washington, who delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court, to meet their entire ap- proval.*'^ If such evidence at the common law is prima 62 State V. Wilson, 15 R. I. 64 The Summary, 8 Wheat. (U. ISO; 1 Atl. 415. S.) 407. 83 State V. Waldron, 16 R. I. 65 American Fur Co. v. United 191; 14 Atl. 847. States, 2 Peters, 3&8. 267 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 176 facie evidence of an unlawful intent so as to throw the bur- den of proof upon an accused, there is no reason why the Legislature may not well say that proof of certain facts mentioned in a statute shall be deemed affirmative evidence of a like intent. In most States there are no common law offenses. In such States only such offenses as are defined by some statute are punishable as crimes or misdemeanors. As incident to the power of defining crimes and misde- meanors and of declaring what shall constitute a criminal offense a Legislature may assume to determine what shall in certain cases be deemed sufficient evidence of the commis- sion of an offense, or of some criminal act necessary to be proven in a criminal prosecution. Such bodies have assumed to determine what shall be sufficient evidence in cases of rape, seduction, receiving stolen goods, keeping places for the purpose of gaming, obstructing the highways, and in many other cases which might be enumerated.*"* The power to enact such provisions is founded upon the jurisdiction of the Legislature over rules of evidence both in civil and criminal cases. A statute of this character, however, that alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or dif- ferent testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender, is ex post facto and invalid." If a statute provided that certain facts are conclusive proof of guilt, it would be un- constitutional, as also would one which makes an act prima facie evidence of crime which has no relation to a criminal intent, and no tendency whatever to establish a criminal 'act.**^ If, however, a Legislature in prescribing rules of evidence in any class of cases, leaves a party fair opportu- nity to establish his case or defense and give in evidence to the court or jury all the facts legitimately bearing on 06 Morgan v. State, 117 Ind. 07 Caldcr v. Bull, 3 Dall. 390. 569; 19 N. E. 154; Commonwealtli «« State v. Beswick, 13 R. I. V. Minor, 88 Ky. 422; 11 S. W. 211; State v. Kantz, 13 R. I. 528. 472; 10 Ky. L. Rep. 1008; but But see Duncan v. Clement, 119 see Duncan V. Clement, 119 N. Y. N. Y. Supp. 375. Supp. 37.3. U76 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 268 the issues of the ease to be considered and weighed by the tribunal trying it, such acts of the Legislature are not un- constitutional.*'^ Such a statute must not make it obligatory on the jury to find a defendant guilty upon such evidence whether they believe him to be so or not. Properly con- strued such statutes mean that such evidence is competent and sufficient to justify a jury in finding a defendant guilty.-^" 69 state V. Beach, 147 Ind. 74; 46 N. E. 174. 70 State V. Intoxicating Liquors, 80 Me. 57 ; 12 Atl. 794. A statute declaring that the place of delivery shall be the place of sale, and that any place to which liquor is shipped for the purpose of delivering it to the purchaser shall be held to be the place of sale, is constitutional. State V. Patterson, 134 N. C. 612; 47 S. E. '808. The Legislature may provide that a licensee transgressing cer- tain restrictions shall be found guilty of selling without a license. Crabb v. State, 47 Fla. 24; 36 So. im. So a statute may provide in a prosecution for its violation, the State may give in evidence any one or more ofi'enses of the same character committed prior to the date charged in the indictment and not barred by the statute of limitations; but such a statute cannot be considered on appeal as applicable to trials occurring prior to its enactment. Kittrell V. State, 89 Miss. &&6 ; 42 So. 609. Where the court, in refusing t ) direct an acquittal, said the tes- timony showed the defendant gave another quart of whisky in lieu of one dollar promised, and that it was a circumstance to be considered by the jury as show- ing an unlawful use, but subse- quently instructed the jury that they should take nothing from him but the law, and that they were the sole judges of the facts, it was held that the constitutional provisions respecting matters of fact had not been violated. State V. Arnold, 80 S. C. 383; 61 S. E. 891. A statute making the fact that persons were m a saloon on a day when liquors could not be sold, prima facie evidence of an un- lawful sale, is constitutional. State V. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439; 44 X. E. 469; 33 L. R. A. 313. See Piqua v. Zimmerlin, 35 Ohio St. 507. A statute requiring druggists to sell only on prescriptions, and making his failure to produce them before the grand jury when required as misdemeanors, is con- stitutional. State V. Davis, 108 Mo. '666; IS S. W. 894; 32 Am. St. Pvep. 640; 117 Mo. 614; 23 S. W. 759. So a statute casting upon a physician prescribing whisky for a patient the burden to show that the whisky was used as a modi- cine, is valid; but so much of it as makes him liable where he, 269 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 177 Sec. 177. Jury trial, when it can be secured by appeal. A statute which authorizes a justice of the peace or other inferior court to try and determine whether intoxicating liquors which have been seized shall be forfeited, and pro- vides that liquors against which jud'zmont of forfeiture has been entered by such inferior tribunal shall be "forfeited" or destroyed, unless an appeal be taken, is not violative of a constitutional provision guaranteeing the right of a trial by jury to the defendant in all criminal prosecutions because it gives no time to procure sureties and perfect a recogni- zance. In such case the Legislature has a discretion which it must be left to exercise, unless it clearly exercises it in an unreasonable and oppressive manner. By the right of ap- peal the right of a jury trial is preserved if the provisions for it and the conditions imposed are reasonable. The ques- tion therefore is largely a question of reasonableness, and upon such a question it is natural, almost inevitable, for men to differ. For this reason it will not do for a court to condemn a provision for an appeal, or the conditions of a recognizance, simply because they are more stringent or more burdensome than the court would have prescribed if it had enjoyed the power and privilege of legislating. Some latitude must be allowed for differences of opinion. "Forth- with," as used in such a statute, does not imply that a reasonable time is not to be allowed, since that, like all other directions to judicial tribunals, is to be judicially carried out with due regard to individual rights. A statute, how- ever, will be unconstitutional as impairing the right to be tried by a jury, if it provides that a person claiming an ap- peal from a judgment rendered against him by a court of inferior jurisdiction for a violation of the liquor laws, be- fore his appeal is allowed, shall give a bond with sufficient sureties, conditioned that he will not, during the pendancy of the appeal, violate any of the provisions of the statute under which he has been convicted, it being held that such a condition was "foreign to the purposes for which an ap- acting in good faith, made a mis- wealth v. Minor, 88 Ky. 422; 11 take in fact, is invalid. Common- S. W. 472; 10 Ky. L. Rep. 1008. § 178 TR.^J'FIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 270 peal bond could be properly required." The right to ap- peal in such cases must not be burdened with unreason- able restrictions and conditions."^ Sec. 178. Double punishment — State and municipalities. There has been much diversity in the decisions of the courts as to whether the constitutional provision that "no person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense," and like provisions in the Constitutions of different States prohibit the enactment of a law authorizing municipal cor- porations to pass an ordinance punishing an offense w^hich, by the common law or by the State law, is a crime and pun- ishable by the State authorities as such. There are decisions in many States that a Legislature can not constitutionally confer such authority on a municipal corporation. Deci- sions to this effect may be found which either expressly hold or give great countenance to this view of the law. Such decisions may be found in Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas."- On the oth- 71 Zn re Liquors of McSoley, 15 21 Ga. 80; Jenkins v. Thomasville, R. I. 608; 10 Atl. €59; Voight v. 35 Ga. 145; Vinson v. Augusta, Board, 69 N. J. L. 358 ; 36 Atl. 38 Ga. 342 ; Reich v. State, 53 Ga. 68i6; State v. Fitzpatrick, 16 R. 73; Municipality, etc., v. Wilson, I. 54; 11 Atl. 767; Hill v. Dalton, 5 La. Ann. 747; Slaughter v. Peo- 72 Ga. 314; Saco v. Wentworth, pie, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 334; People 37 Me. 165; Saco v. Woodsum, 39 v. Jackson, 8 Mich. 110; Wayne Me. 258; Beers v. Beers, 4 Conn. Co. v. Detroit, 17 Mich. 390; Peo- 535; State v. Brennan's Liquors, pie v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 445; Jef- 25 Conn. 278; Emporia v. Volmer, ferson City v. Couture, 9 Mo. 683; 12 Kan. 622 ; Jones v. Bobbins, 74 State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330 ; State Mass. (8 Gray) 329; State v. v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 574; Barter Fitzpatrick, 16 R. I. 54; 11 Atl. v. Commonwealth, 3 P. & W. 773. Change of venue. People v. (Pa.) 253; State v. Pollard, 6 R. McBride, 234 111. 146; 84 N. E. I. 290; Zystra v. Charleston, 1 ©65. Bay. (S. C.) 387; Raleigh v. ""iEx parte Smith, 1 Hemstead Dougherty, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 11; (9 U. S. 0. C), 201; Slattery, Smith v. San Antonio, 27 Tex. Ex parte, 3 Ark. 484; Rector v. 646; Hamilton v. State, 3 Tex. State, 6 Ark. 187; Darr v. How- App. i643; see Campbell v. Thom- ard, 6 Ark. 041; Lewis v. State, asville (Oa.), 64 S. E. 815. 21 Ark. 209; Savannah v. Hussey, 271 CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTES. §178 er hand, decisions may be found in many States that a Leg- islature has the power to authorize a municipal corporation to punish either any or some offenses which, by the com- mon law or statute law, are crimes punishable by the State courts, and that a person may be twice punished, once by the State for the crime and once by the corporation for the violation of its ordiance, on the ground that each punish- ment is for a different offense. Decisions which hold thus, or which give much countenance to it are to be found in Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken- tucky, Maryland, Michigan, JMinnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Utah.'^^ And again decisions may be found in some States which countenance the position that when a State law inflicts a certain penalty for the commission of crime, and an ordinance of a municipal corporation passed by legislative authority also punishes the same crime, if com- mitted in the city, the State authorities and the municipal authorities have concurrent jurisdiction to punish the of- fender, but he can be punished only once by the State or municipal authorities, whichever first institutes proceed- ings.'^* It will be at once perceived on reading these cases that they cannot be reconciled. The one class proceeds upon 73 McLaughlin v. Stevens, 2 Cranch. (U. S. C. C.) 148; May- or, etc., V, Rouse, 8 Ala. 615 ( liquor case ) ; Mayor, etc., v. Al- lane, 14 Ala. 400; Hood v. Von Glahn, 88 Ga. 405 ; Wragg v. Peo- ple, 94 111. 11; Robbins v. People, 05 111. 175; Davenport v. Bird, 34 la. 524; Ambrose v. State, 6 Ind 351 (liquor case) ; Rice v. State 3 Kan. 135; March v. Common wealth, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 25 Shafer v. Miamma, 17 Md. 336 People v. Detroit, 82 Mich. 471 State v. Charles, 16 Minn. 478 State v. Budwig, 21 Minn. 202 State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445; St Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 62; St Louis v. Cafferetta, 24 Mo. 94 Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 101; Howe V. Plainfield, 38 N. J. L. (8 Vroom) 145; State v. Plunket, 3 Har. (N. J. ) 5; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 261; Brooklyn V. Trymble, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 2&3; State V. Bergman, 6 Ore. 341; Wong V. Astoria, 13 Ore. 538; State V. Williams, 11 S. C. 288; Greenwood v. State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn. ) 567; Hamilton v. State, 3 Tex. 647 ; Ex parte Douglass, 1 Utah, 108; Logan City v. Buck, 3 Utah. 301. 74 Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. State, 3 Kan. 164; State v. Gordon, 10 Mo. 383; State v. €owan, 29 Mo. 330; State v. Wister, 62 Mo. 593. § 178 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 272 the ground that the Constitution provides that no person shall be tried for a crime except on indictment, and that all such crimes must be tried by jury of twelve men, and that these are deemed as fundamental requirements, the ob- servation of which is necessary for the preservation of our liberties. Yet these fundamental principles are violated when a Legislature authorizes a municipal corporation by ordinance to make any or all crimes committed within a municipal corporation punishable by fine or imprisonment upon summary proceedings before a mayor or police court. If the Legislature has such power, then these fundamental and important principles of the Constitution are made to- tally inoperative in an^^ town or city in the State. The an- swer to this reasoning as found in the other class of cases is that the summary conviction before a mayor or police court is not for the crime committed in the city or for the offense against the town or city by violating one of its or- dinances, that though the offense be described in the ordi- nance in the identical words in which the offense is de- scribed in the statute, yet the violation of the ordinance is to be regarded only as an offense against the city or town, while the violation of the statute affects the punishment to be inflicted for the crime described as an offense against the State, which is something entirely different, and therefore for an offense described in the statute and in the ordinance in exactly the same words, a person may be twice punished, once by confinement in jail under the summary conviction of a mayor or police court, and once in the penitentiary or in the county jail on conviction of the crime by jury."^ As has been said, there are cases in Indiana which hold that the double punishment may be inflicted. These cases occur- red prior to 1881, when, because of the abuse of such hold- ing, it became necessary for the Legislature of the State to provide by law that "Whenever any act is made a public offense against the State by any statute and the punish- ment prescribed therefor, such act shall not be made pun- ishable by any ordinance of any incorporated city or town." '® 75 Moundsville v. Fountain, 27 76 R. S. 1881, §1640. W. Va. 182. 273 CONSTITUTION Al .IT Y OF STATUTES. § 179 In this connection it is to be observed that where an act is, in its nature, one which constitutes two offenses, one against the State and one against a municipal government, the legislative intention that a double punishment may be inflicted, "ought," as Judge Dillon says, " to be manifest and unmistakable, or the power in the corporation should be held not to exist."" Such power may not be inferred from the "general welfare clause" usual in municipal cor- porations. As was said by Judge IMerriman, of North Car- olina, ' ' It may be that the Legislature has power to author- ize a town to make an offense against the State a separate offense against the town ; but this could be done only by an express grant of authority." ^* Sec. 179. Double punishment— Conflict of jurisdiction. Can the same criminal or penal act be punished once un- der the statute of a State and again under a statute of the United States, and vice versa? Or, in other words, can an offender, as it were, be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense? Article V of the Constitution of the United States provides, among other things, that no person shall "be sub- ject for the same offense to be put twice in jeopardy of life or limb." A like provision is found in the Constitution of each of the States.' Under these provisions and governed by the dictates of humanity, the question, as it is viewed by some, ought to be answered in the negative, but such has not been the case. In the Supreme Court of the United States the question came up for consideration in 1847.^'' In the case then under consideration, Justice Daniels delivered the opinion of the court, and in it it was held that a person might be punished under the law of a State, although the same act was made punishable under a statute of Congress, and con- sequently that a conviction and punishment under a State 77 Dillon's Mimic. Corp, 3d Ed., 78 State v. Brittain, 89 N. S. §3i&8; Hood v. Von Glahn, 8S Ga. 574. 405; Foster v. Brown, 55 la. GSG; 70 Fox v. Tlie State of Ohio, 5 City of Louisville v. McKean, 57 How. 410. Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 9. § 179 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 274 law would be no bar lo a prosecution under a law of Con- gress. In so deciding, Justice Daniels said: "It is almost cer- tain that, in the benignant spirit in which the institutions, both of the State and Federal systems are administered, an offender who should have suffered the penalties denounced by the one would not be subjected a second time to the pun- ishment by the other for acts essentially the same, unless, indeed, this might occur in instances of peculiar enormity, or where the public safety demands extraordinary vigor." It occurs to the A\T:"iters that this statement can hardly be charac- terized as an argument in support of the legal proposition involved. Does it not beg the question? In that case Jus- tice ]\IcLean wrote a dissenting opinion, in which he says Justice Story concurred when the case was being con- sidered by the court, and in which he also says: "There is no principle better established by the conunon law, none more fully recognized in the Federal and State Constitu- tions than that an individual shall not be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. * * * That the State should punish for that which an act of Congress punishes is con- tradictory and repugnant. This is clearly the case whether with regard to the nature of the power or infliction of the punishment. There can be no greater mistake than to sup- pose that the Federal Government in carrying out any of its supreme functions is made dependent on State governments. The Federal is a limited government exercising enumerated powers, but the powers given are supreme and independent. If this were not the case, it could not be called a general government. Nothing can be more repugnant or contradic- tory than two punishments for the same act. It would bring our system of government into merited contempt." The question was considered by that court again, and the decision from which this quotation is taken was affirmed, Justice Mc- Lean again dissenting.'"' In an early case in Indiana, under an indictment for retailing intoxicating liquors without a li- cense, it was held by the Supreme Court, acting upon the authority of the two cases cited, "that the same act may be 80 Moore v. People of Illinois, 14 How. 13. 275 CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTES. § 180 an offense against two jurisdictions is no longer an open question." ^^ And in Dakota it has been held that a defendant who violates the laws of a State or Territory and also a municipal ordinance in sellinp' intoxicating liquors, is liable to a prosecution therefor under eitliej or both, on the theory that they are separate and distinct offenses — one against the State or Territory, the other against the municipal cor- poration.^- Notwithstanding these decisions and many oth- ers of like character that might be cited, there are some per- sons of authority who believe that the view of this question taken by Justice McLean, is the better one and that whicf ought to prevail. In this view they are sustained by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, that court having held that if a general statute covers the same ground with a municipal law authorized by a statute, both can not be enforced so as to subject a party to a double penalty.*^ Sec. 180. Imprisonment for debt. Most, if not all the Constitutions of the States provide "that there shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in case of fraud." Under this provision it has been contended that a defendant could not be imprisoned for a fine and costs assessed in a prosecution by the State or by a municipal corporation for the violation of a statute or ordinance against the sale of intoxicating liquors without having procured a license to do so; but the contention has not been sus- tained, the courts holding that the immunity from imprison- ment contemplated by such constitutional provision must be confined to debts or liabilities growing out of contracts, ex- pressed or implied, and not to liabilities from crimes or torts. In other words, that the liabilities must be a debt within the SI State V. Moore, 6 Ind. 436 ; fense to sell liquors in an anti- Howe V. Plainfield, 8 Vroom (37 saloon territory and another of- N. J. L.), 145. fense to sell in less quantity than s- City of Elk Point v. Vaughn, a gallon or in any quantity to he 1 Dak. 113; 4'6 N. W. 577. drunk on the premises. People v. 83 State V. Welch, 36 Conn. 215. McBride, 234 111. 146; 84 N. K A statute may make it an of- 865. § § 181, 182 TRAJ'PIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 276 proper and legal meaning of that word.®* "A debt," ac- cording to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, "is a sum of money due by certain and express agreement. It originates in and is founded upon contracts express or implied;"*^ and a like definition has been recognized by other courts.®'' A fine or penalty, when assessed becomes a fixed liability to pay the State or municipality a definite amount of money for the violation of a criminal statute or penal ordinance. In such cases the costs are taxed, and due to the oflSeers and witnesses, and are not within the meaning of the constitutional provision. The fact that the one is payable to the State or municipality, and the other to individuals, furnishes no ground for a distinction.®^ The distinction between tort and contract exists in the nature of things, and cannot be con- founded or abolished by law. A Constitution which abol- ishes imprisonment for debt does not prohibit a Legislature from passing a law to imprison on judgments founded on torts.®® Sec. 181. Support of penitentiary — Imitation liquor. A statute requiring a license of all persons manufacturing, selling or distributing any imitation of or substitute for beer, ale, wine, whisky, or other spirituous or malt liquors, and devoting the fee to the support of the State peniten- tiary is valid.®^ Sec. 182. Removal of officer for drunkenness. A statute may provide for the removal of any officer for voluntary drunkenness during the business hours of his of- 84 Caldwell v. State, 55 Ala. se Lane Co. v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 133; Flora v. Sachs, 64 Ind. 155; (U. S.) 71; Perry v. Washburn, Hardenbrook v. Town of Ligonier, 20 Cal. 350; Pierce v. City of &5 Ind. 70; Hibbard v. Clark, 56 Boston, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 520; N. H. 155; City of Camden v. Shaw v. Pickett, 26 Vt. 486. Allen, 26 X. J. L. 398; Dunlap v. 87 McCool v. State, 23 Ind. 127. Keith, 1 Leigh (Va.), 430, ss Turner v. Wilson, 49 Ind. 85 City of Camden v. Allen, 2 581. Dutch. (N. J. L.) 398. soCarroll v. Wright, 131 Ga. 72S; '63 S. E. 260. 277 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. §§ 183,184 fice, or for habitual intoxication. It is neither repugnant to nor in conflict with any provisions of the State or Fed- eral Constitutions, when the State Constitution provides that an officer "shall, for crime, incapacity, or negligence, be lia- ble to be removed from office"; or be "removed from office, in such manner as may be prescribed by law. ' ' "° Sec. 183. Drunkenness. The Legislature may enact a law punishing anyone appear- ing in a public place while intoxicated,®^ and the statutes may permit him to show that he has not been convicted un- der the statute within the past year, whereupon the court may discharge him without trial, this not being an interfer- ence with the power of the court.®- Sec. 184. Inebriate asylums. A statute is valid which provides for the care and cus- tody of the person and estate of habitual drunkards; and it cannot be insisted that it is void because it deprives a citizen of the right to enjoy, control and dispose of his property, and to make contracts. The court said that there was no question that the State could enact a valid law for the cus- tody and control of the person and property of infants and persons born idiots or who had become insane ; and there was no difference between a person born deficient or who had be- come after birth deficient by disease or accident.®^ And an extra license fee may be required of all persons selling liquor, to be devoted to the maintenance of an inebriate asylum, under the police powers of the State, it not being an unequ-il tnx.®* 90 McComas v. Krug, 81 Ind. 02 Commonwealth v. ^Torri^sey, 327; 42 Am. Rep. 135. The court siipi-a. considered that "incapacity" as 'J^ Devin v. Scott, 34 Ind. €7 ; used in the constitution was broad see Ex parte Schwarting, 7G Neb. enouj^h to cover a case of volun- 773; 108 N. W. 125. tary drunkenness in an officer dur- 04 State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn, ing the business hours of his 312; 21 Am. Rep. 765; State v. office. Klein, 22 Minn. 328. 81 Commonwealth v. Morrisey, 157 Mass. 471; 32 N. E. •&(y4. § 185 TR.VFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 278 But the Legislature cannot provide for the treatment of drunkards in private asylums at the public's expense, by im- posing a tax on their counties to raise the necessary funds; for such persons are not legitimate objects of public charity.""' But a drunkard cannot be confined in such an institution without a full hearing, of which due notice has been given." "'^ Sec. 185. Miscellaneous decisions. In Louisiana it would seem that a statute requiring saloomii for white and colored people to be in separate buildings is con- stitutional."^ Where local option has been adopted a statute making it a misdemeanor "to solicit an order for the sale" of intoxicating liquor in a local option district, is unconsti- tutional."* But a statute making it unlawful to solicit orders through the mail is not unconstitutional, not being an infringe- ment of the powers of Congress to establish post-offices and designate what shall be excluded from the mails."" A statute empowering a city to exact a license is constitutional.^ A hond may be required of a licensee as security against disorder.- A statute forbidding the issuance of a license for premises where a previous license has been cancelled, on the ground that the premises had become disorderly or gambling had been per- 9ij Wisconsin Keeley Institute Tlie business cannot • be con- Co. V. Milwaukee County, &5 Wis. ducted in one building. Bars sep- 153; 70 N. W. 68; 36 L. R. A. 55. arated one from another in one 96 People V. St. Saviour's Sani- building is not a compliance with tarium, 34- X. Y. App. Div. 3G3; the statute. In such an instance 50 N. Y. Supp. 431. the State cannot compel the pay- Of course such a statute must ment of two license fees. Ihid. be general, and not local or spe- ^s Ex parfc IMassey (Tex. €r. cial. Murray v. Board, 81 Minn. App.), 02 S. W. 1086; Ex parte 3.5<); 84 X. W. 103: 51 L. R. A. Hackney (lex. Cr. App.), 92 S. 828. W. 1002. The Legislature cannot requi' e i'o Zinii v. State (Ark.), 114 S. a judge of a court to manage and W. 227. control an inebriate asylum. i Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 2G Mich. Foreman v. Hennepin Co., 64 325; Beasley v. Beckley, 28 W. Minn. 371; 67 N. W. 207. Va. SI. 97 State V. Falkenheimer (La.) 2 Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 26 ^Mic' . 49 So. 214. 325. 279 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES § 186 mitted therein, is valid.^ A statute is valid which enables a city to 'prohibit the sale of liquor on Sunday.* Where a Constitution dispenses with indictments in misdemeanor pros- ecutions, the Legislature may authorize prosecutions by affi- davits for violations of liquor statutes.^ A State may pro- vide that one person shall not keep or be interested in any saloon at more than one place at the same time.*' The number of saloons in a block may be limited, as two and a half in the block. ^ A city may be empowered to prescribe saloon lim,its.^ Sec. 186. When courts will not consider constitutional question. It is a principle of constitutional law that only those who are prejudiced by an unconstitutional act can be heard to make objection to it. The courts will not listen to an objec- tion made to the constitutionality of an act by a party whose rights it does not affect, and who, therefore, has no interest in defeating it.^ Accordingly it has been held that a State law which excluded colored persons from jury service de- prived them of the equal protection of the law, but that a 3 People V. McKee, 59 N. Y. 8 Andreas v. Beaumont (Tex. Misc. Rep. 369; 112 X. Y, Supp. Civ. App.), 113 S. W. 614. 3.85. Constitutionality of ordinance 4 State V. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 'Gi63; making it the duty of the collec- 33 Am. Rep. 224. tor of revenue of a city to enforce 5 State V. Summers, 50 So. 120. the liquor ordinance. State v. c Swift V. Klein, 1G3 111. 269; Rosenblatt, 9 ]\Io. App. 587. 45 N. E. 219. A statute requiring saloons to 7 Ex parte Abrams ( Tex. ) , 120 be located on the ground floor, and S. W. 883; Ex parte Clark so arranged as to allow a view of (Tex.), 120 S. W. 892. the interior, is valid as to per- This provision was not express- sons in the liquor business when ed in the title. it is passed, and who are thereby But a statute of this kind ap- compelled to rearrange their sa- plying only to cities of over loons. Xelson v. State, 17 Ind. 50,000 was held invalid, because App. 403; 46 N. E. 941. it did not apply equally to all the 9 Cooley Const. Lim., §164; cities of the State. State v. State v. Roberts, 74 N. H. 476; Schraps, <)7 Minn. 6(2; 106. N. W. 69 Atl. 722. 106. § 186 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 280 white person could not complain of the statutory exclusions.^* Also, that a white person could not raise the question whether the exclusion of negroes from participation in the benefits of the common school system was not a violation of the State Constitution." Also, that a party who has assented to his property being taken under a statute cannot afterwards object that the statute is in violation of a provision in the Constitution designed for the protection of private property.^- Also, that a party who seeks to overthrow a statute as impairing the obligation of a contract, must af- firmatively establish that the same impairs his contractual rights and is prejudicial thereto,^^ This principle has been applied in cases prosecuted in connection with the liquor traffic. In one instance an objection was made to the validity of an ordinance providing for the issuing of licenses to retail intoxicating liquors, on the ground that it discriminated against women and non-residents. The objection was made by a resident male applicant for a license. The court said : "Since women and non-residents have so far waived any con- stitutional right they may have in respect to selling intoxi- cating liquors, we content ourselves for the present with holding that the appellants are confessedly of those who en- joy the monopoly which the ordinance secures, and they must take the privilege with the burdens which attend it. Courts will not listen to those who are not aggrieved by an invalid law,"^'* In another case where divers constitutional ques- tions as to the validity of a statute upon the subject of in- toxicating liquors were attempted to be raised, and where it was claimed that the statute was unconstitutional and void on the ground of unjust and oppressive provisions in it, the 10 Commonwealth v. Wright, 79 is Currier v. Elliott, 141 Ind. Ky. 22. 394. 11 Marshall v. Donavan, 10 Bush i* Wagner v. Town of Garrett, (Ky.), &81. 118 Ind. 114; 39 X. E. 554; 20 12 Mobile, etc., R. €o. v. State, N. E. 706; Daniels v. State, 150 29 Ala. 58(5; Haskell v. New Bed- Ind. 348; 50 N. E. 74; Linkenhelt ford, 108 Mass. 208; Embury v. v. Garrett, 118 Ind. 599; 20 N. Conner, 3 X. Y. 511; Baker v. E. 708. Branan, G Hill (N. Y.), 47. 281 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 186 court said: "It is firmly settled that a party will not be heard by a court to question the validity of a law, or any part thereof, unless he shows that some right of his is im- paired or prejudiced thereby. This fact not appearing, the contentions relative to these sections are dismissed without consideration." ^^' And a person who has given away liquors in violation of the plain provisions of a statute cannot in- sist that it is unconstitutional because it in effect prohibits him from giving liquor to a member of his family or to his guest within his house, when the gift made was not to a member of his family nor to his guest.^" So a person not hav- ing paid a tax imposed on the sale of liquors to which he was entitled to a return in part cannot insist that the law is void when he has not paid the tax.^^ Where a statute cre- ated State dispensaries and prohibited all private sales, an individual indicted for sellinqr liouor cannot assail those por- tions of the statute which are distinct from those parts de- claring the prohibition.'^ And where, by local option, sales of liquors for drinking purposes were prohibited, but sales for medicinal and religious purnoses were permitted, a per- son applying for a license to sell for drinking purposes only, it was' held he could not assail the act on the ground that it forbade sales absolutely.'^ So a vendor of liquors indicted for selling linuor cannot assail the statute because it excepts from its prohibitory provisions the sale of cider or wines. "'^ In this same State it was held that one selling without a license could rot assail the statute because it provided for the ap- I>ointment of license committees consisting of three persons 15 State V. C4erliardt, 145 Intl. tion is concerned. August Busch 439; 44 N. E. 469. & Co. v. Webb, 122 Fed. 655. iG Parker v. State, 99 Md. 189 ; is State v. Potterfield, 47 S. C. 57 Atl. 677. 75 ; 25 S. E. 39. 17 State V. Roush, 47 Ohio St. lo Ex parte Burnside, 86 Ky. 478 ; 25 X. E. 59 ; Wert v. Brown, 423 ; 6 S. W. 27<5. 47 Ohio St. 477 ; 25 X. E. 59. 20 State v. Barr, 78 Vt. 97 ; 62 Where only a Federal question Atl. 43; McLaury v. Watelsky, is involved, a Federal court will 39 Tex. Civ. App. 3f^; 87 S. W. not consider the validity of a stat- 1045. Ute so far as the State Constitu- § 186 TRAFP^IC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 282 taken from the two leading political parties.-^ So one pros- ecuted under a statute for an illegal sale cannot object to the statute because those parts relating to searches and seiz- ures are illegal, where such parts are susceptible of being disconnected from the part under which he is prosecuted.-- So, where an ordiance required a person desiring to sell li- quors to apply to the City Council for a license, and he has not done so, nor paid the license fee prescribed by it, he can- not raise the question of the validity of the ordinance.-^ But where the offense charged is a sale of liquor upon which no tax has been paid, he may assail the statute imposing a li- cense upon manufacture when the provisions of the statute are so related as to avoid it entirely.-* But when a person appeared and contested, as claimant, the seizure of liquors under a statute, it was held that he could not question the validity of the statute on the ground that it made no pro- vision for notice.-'' A licensee may contest the validity of a statute in a proceeding to revoke his license, which requires him to file an answer on oath denying the charges set forth in the petition for its revocation, even when the court offers to receive an unverified answer; because he cannot be placed in the position of either having his license revoked — his prop- erty lost — or commit perjury to prevent it before entering on the trial.-" 21 State V. Scampini, 77 Vt. 92; Civ. App. 324; 76 S. W. 7&G; 77 59 Atl. 201. S. W. 1135. 22 State V. Paige, 78 Vt. 286; Where a statute provided that 62 Atl. 1017. proof of the issuance of an inter- 23 Wells V. Torrey, 144 Mich. nal revenue special stamp should 689; 108 N. W. 423; 13 Detroit be prima facie evidence of a sale Leg. N. 378. by the person to whom it was is- 24 State V. Bengsch, 170 Mo. 81; sued, it was held that a person 70 S. W. 710; see State v. See- indicted for selling liquor within bold, 192 Mo. 720; 91 S. W^ 491. an anti-saloon territory could not 25 Quinn v. State, 82 Miss. 75; object to the validity of such pro- 33 So. 839. vision where the prosecution did 26 /ji re Cullian, 82 X. Y. App. not show that he possessed a Div. 445; 81 N. Y. Supp. 507; United States revenue stamp, see Kennedy v. Womer, 51 N. Y. People v. Mcliride, 234 111. 146; Misc. Rep. 362; 100 N. Y. Supp. 84 N. E. 865. 616; Sweeney v, Webb, 33 Tex. A person prosecuted under an 283 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 187 Sec. 187. Title of statute — Valid statutes. Many cases have been decided in which was drawn in ques- tion the sufficiency of the title of the act to sustain the va- lidity of the statute involving the usual constitutional provi- sion requiring the subject matter of a statute to be expressed in the title, and prohibiting more than one subject in a stat- ute. It is not necessary to discuss the principles underlying these provisions nor the reasons for their adoption ; it will be sufficient to cite the several instances where titles to stat- utes relating to intoxicating liquors and their regulation have been passed upon by the courts. "Where a statute provided that the question whether a license should be issued should be submitted on petition at the next municipal election to the voters of the municipality, it was held that it was not void because the title of the act recited that it was an act for licensing the sale of intoxicating liquors and not for prohib- iting, as was contended. The statute provided for an annual election on the question, and if the vote was adverse to issu- ing the license, the prohibition only lasted a year.-" And where the title of the act was "to provide for the licensing, restriction and regulation of the business of the * * * sale of * * * intoxicating liquor," it was held sufficient- ly broad to cover a provision giving a right of action to a married woman to recover damages arising from a sale of in- toxicating liquors to her husband."* So the title to an act "to provide for the creation by popular vote of anti-saloon territory in which the sale of intoxicating liquors and the licensing of such sale shall be prohibited and for the ordinance for selling less than five university. State v. Turner, 210 gallons of liquor at a time cannot Mo. 77; 107 S. W. 10G4; see also insist the ordinance is invalid be- State v. Cass Co. Ct. (Mo.), cause sales of five gallons and 119 S. VV. 1010; Swarthout over are lawful. State v. Priester, v. State (Mo.), 119 S. W. 1014. 43 Minn. 373; 45 N. W. 712. instate v. Barber (^S. D.), 101 An applicant for a license who X. W. 1078; Oglesby v. State, 121 has complied with the statute so Ga. 602 ; 49 S. E. 706. as to entitle him to a license, may ^s (Jarrigan v. Kennedy, 19 S. question the validity of an act D. 11; 101 N. W. 1081; Garrigan permitting the location of a dram- v. Thompson ( S. D.), 101 N. W. shop within five miles of a State 1135. § 187 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 284 abolition by like means of territory so created," is broad enough to include provisions creating the offense of per- jurj^ and forgery arising in connection with the filing of petitions to secure an election upon the subject.-'* The title is also broad enough to cover provisions affecting changes in the charter of municipalities and giving voters outside such municipalities the right to vote under the act, as well as reg- ulating sales by druggists. And it was also further held that the title was not deceptive nor misleading ; and an objection that it apparently provided for the abolishment of anti- saloon territory by means like that by which the territory was created, and at the same time, because of changes in the pre- cincts, voters could never again vote on the question, was not well taken, nor that no change in the boundaries of such precincts could be made so as to prevent again the sub- mission of the question to the voters of a particular terri- tory; nor was it open to the objection that the act provided that a majority of the "legal voters" voting on the question should govern, while the title used the Avords "popular vote. ""° Such a statute is not void on the ground that it provides penalties for its violation, not thereby including two subject-matters in the same aet.^^ The title of a statute "to further regulate and prohibit the sale or disposition of spirituous, vinous or malt intoxicating liquors, or the issuing of prescriptions by physicians for the sale or other disposition of such liquors," authorizes the inser- tion of a clause prohibiting the issuance of such pre- scriptions by both physicians and "other persons," as well as forbidding their issuance of them on Sunday.^- So a title to "regulate the opening, closing and operating saloons and giving away or selling" liquors "imder a license" "and to punish violators thereof," covers a provision in the statute fixing the hours for opening and closing saloons.^^ So a pro- 29 People V. McBride, 234 111. Atl. 926; Fourment v. State 146; 84 N. E. 8€5. (Ala.), 46 So. 2&6. 30 People V. McBride, 2.34 111. 32 McAllister v. State (Ala.), 146; 84 N. E. 865. 47 So. 161. 31 State V. Fountain (Del.), 60 33 Fourment v. State (Ala.), 46 So. 266. 285 CONSTITUTIONAIilTY OF STATUTES. § 187 hibitory act, so designated in its title, is not invalid, because it contains exceptions and the methods Avhereby they may be availed of so as not to violate the major part of the statute, and also contains the questions of regulation and prohibition of dealings in intoxicating liquors foreshadowed in the title. In such a case the regulation, in a sense, is accomplished by the act, but it also sets forth a method by which universal prohibition is bereft of its penalties by giving exemption to those who comply with the provisions of the statute.''* A statute of Idaho provided "for the search and seizure of liquors received, kept or used contrary to law, and the ap- pliances used in connection therewith, to define and punish as misdemeanors all violators thereof, and vesting all mag- istrates with authority who receive complaints and issue war- rants against all persons violating the provisions of" the act. This was held not to blend two subjects in one act, and the fact that the act declared the keeping or associating with others in the maintenance of a place where liquors w^ere kept or received for an unlawful purpose, and the receiving and selling them should constitute a misdemeanor; the main- tenance of a place where liquors were sold or given away, or kept for that evident purpose, or where persons were per- mitted to resort for drinking pvirposes, should constitute a common nuisance, and empowering a magistrate to issue a search w^arrant upon complaint and authorizing the officers seizing the liquors and appliances to hold them until the case was disposed of, did not render the statute of such a double aspect as to violate the provisions of the Constitution that a statute should only embrace one subject and matters prop- erly connected therewith.^'^ So in an act "to prohibit the sale of liquors on Sunday" may be included a provision making it a penalty to keep open a barroom for the sale of liquors on Sunday.^** So a title to a statute prohibiting the sale of liquors in a certain county within five miles of a cer- 34 state V. Skaggs (Ala.), 46 sg Beauvoir Club v. State, 148 So. a&8. Ala. 64; 40 So. 1040. 35 State V. Moran (Idaho), 90 Pac. 1044. § 187 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 286 tain place and forbidding the clerk of that county to issue a license, under the general law, to any person to sell liquors within this prohibited territory, does not contain two sub- jects.^^ So the title to an act "to better regulate and restrain the sale of intoxicating liquors and providing for remon- strance against the granting of licenses for its sale," is broad enough to cover a provision for a ' ' blanket remonstrance. ' ' ^^ A title fixing an annual license fee is broad enough to provide for a license fee for the sale of liquor in any quantity."^ And a title to an act requiring a license for sale in a particular county is broad enough to cover a provision forbidding sales without a license in incorporated towns of such county.^** An amendment to a statute extending its provisions is not necessarily void because it renders the act broader than when originally adopted.'*^ A statute imposing a property tax on distilled liquors made in the State, requiring vendors of liquors to have a license and, by construction, exempting pure alcohol, domestic wines and liquors made for export from taxation, is covered by a title "providing for a State license tax on distilled liquors, including whisky and distilled spir- its of all kinds, wines and all kinds of vinous liquors; to create the office of special license commissioner, and to pro- vide for" his appointment by the Governor.*- So a statute prohibiting sales of liquors in counties voting against their sale and also prohibiting sales without a license in counties where sales are permitted, may be embraced within a single statute.*^ A statute "in relation to revenue" providing for an annual tax to be paid by persons selling liquors and im- posing a penalty for its violation is valid.*"* So the title to 37 Clark V. Tower, 104 Md. 175; 4i state v. Courtney, 27 Mont. 65 Atl. 3. 378; 71 Pac. 308. 38 Cain V. Allen, 1&8 Ind. 8; 42 state v. Bengsch, 170 Mo. SI ; 79 N. E. 201; 79 N. E. 896; Re- 70 S. VV. 710. gandez v. Haines, 168 Ind. 140; 43 Brass v. State, 45 Fla. 1; 34 79 N, E. 352. So. 307; Cwsar v. State, 50 Fla. 39 Glover v. State, 120 Ga. 594; 1; 39 So. 470. 55 S. E. 592. 44 Parsons v. Peopl«, 32 Colo. 40 Glover v. State, 126 Ga. 594; 221; 76 Pac. 666, 55 S. E. 592. 287 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 187 an act "to regulate the sale of intoxicants" covers a provi- sion preventing a "gift" of such liquors ;'= or of a "barter."" So a title of an act preventing a sale of liquors on "the Island of St. Simons" is sufficient to cover a provision preventing a sale "on any river or creek within the boundary of such island.""^ An act prohibiting sales on Sunday un- der a penalty of a fine, forfeiture of the defendant's license; to sell generally on conviction of a second offense within a year, prescribing certain duties of the clerk of the court and judge if a second conviction is had and a penalty for the failure of the judge to perform such duties, is covered by "an act to prohibit the sale of liquors on Sunday. "*» The title to an act prohibiting ' ' the manufacture and sale of intoxicat- ing liquors, except for medical, scientific and mechanical pur- poses, and to regulate the manufacture thereof for such ex- cepted purposes," is sufficiently broad to cover a provision for the appointment of assistant counsel to the attorney-gen- eral of the State to prosecute violations of the statute where the local county attorney fails to do so ; ^"^ and a statute en- titled "An act relating to the sale of intoxicating liquors" may cover a provision prohibiting unlawful sale.=° So an act is valid entitled "An act to set apart Sunday as a day of public rest; to provide for closing of saloons and other places of business on Sunday; to prohibit the selling, giving away or disposing of any spirituous, malt or intoxicating liquors on Sundays; to provide for the closing of places of public amusements and prohibiting horse racing on Sundays; and to provide for the punishment of those guilty of violating the provisions of the act;" and providing for the disposal of all fines assessed for the violation of the act covers but one sul)- ject and matters properly connected therewith." So an act 45 McLaury v. Watelsky (Tex. beyond reasonable construction of Civ. App.), 87 S. VV. 104.5. the constitutional provisions. 46 James v. State, 124 Ga. 72; « state v. Brooks, 74 Kan. IT."): 52 S. E. 295. S3 Pac. 1013. 47 James v. State, supra. so state v. Kleinfield, 72 Kan. 48Borck v. State (Ala.), 39 674; 83 Pac. 831. So- 580. 51 state v. Dolan, 13 Idaho, This case does not seem to go 693; 92 Pac. 999; Ex parte Ja cobs, 13 Idaho, 720; 92 Pac. 1003. § 187 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 288 amending: a section of an act entitled "An act to regulate the license and sale of intoxicating liquors, and prescribing penalties for its violation," the amendment making any per- son keeping a place where such liquors are illegally sold guilty of a misdemeanor is germane to the original act and not void.^- An act both prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquors does not embrace two separate subjects.^^ A statute prohibiting the granting in a certain county, under a penalty, of a license to sell liquors without the applicant first filing the written consent of two-thirds of the city's freeholders, but providing that it shall not be so construed as to prevent the authorities of an incorporated village from putting additional restraints on the sale of liquors, does not contain two subject-matters, and is valid.^* A statute de- fining what shall constitute a disorderly house so as to in- clude any house in which liquors are sold without a license, and containing a section defining the oifense of procurer is valid, the latter part of the statute being separable from the former part.^^ So an act "to establish a dispensary in F, and a branch thereof in E F, and to provide for the issuance of liquor license in such city and county until this act goes into effect" clearly enough expresses the object of the act. and does not embrace two subjects ; ^® and a like act is not obnoxious because its effect is to revoke the right of such city to grant licenses.^^ The title of "an act relating to the sale of intoxicating liquors and the suppression of places where such liquors are sold, or usea, or kept tor sale, or used contrary to law" permits the insertion of provisions in the act authorizing cities to pass an ordinance to prohibit unlaAv- ful sales, define what shall be a nuisance in connection with such sales and their suppression, and to provide for the 52Donavan v. State, 170 Ind. ss Joliff v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 123; 83 N. E. 744. App. 61; 109 S. W. 176; Webber ssChanney v. State, 14^ Ala. v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 109 S. 136; 41 So. 172; State v. Thomas, W. 1S2. 74 Kan. 360; 86 Pac. 4^. 56 Mitchell v. State, 133 Ala. 54 Kemp V. State, 120 Ga. 157; 65; 33 So. 687. 47 S. E. 54S; Smith v. People, 57 .chamlee v. Davis, 115 Ga. 32 Colo. 251; 75 Pac. 914. 266; 41 S. E. 691. 289 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 187 search of all premises where such nuisances are alleged to exist, as well as the seizure of liquors, glasses, bars and bot- tles used in their maintenance.^** So a statute requiring the doors to be kept closed on Sunday, prohibiting music, danc- ing and singing in the saloon room, and also prohibiting the business of running a lunch counter and restaurant in con- nection with or in the saloon, and the payment of a fixed sum by retail dealers, is covered by a title, "A statute regulating and licensing liquor dealers" Mnthin a certain named terri- tory/'^ In the same State it was held that a title regulat- ing the hours when liquor may be sold, providing for Sunday closing and for a penalty for sales during prohibited hours, is broad enough to contain provisions requiring saloons to be closed between 12 o'clock midnight and 6 o'clock in the morning, from 12 o'clock Saturday night until 6 o'clock the following Monday morning, and prohibiting the owner from allowing any one, except his family and himself, enter- ing the saloon during the prohibited hours.**" A similar stat- ute was held valid, where the statute was entitled "Sale of intoxicating liauors."**^ So under a statute entitled "An act to regula the sale of intoxicating liquors," a sale by the glass or small measure may be prohibited,®- or the duties of police officers in relation to liquors and to liquor measures and repealing local laws may be prescribed.**^ Under a title relating to the "sale of liquors" may be included a clause pro- hibiting a gift to a minor or intoxicated person.*** Under a title "to prohibit the sale" may be inserted provisions for a local option;®^ for local option is but another way of 58 Wilson V. Herink, 64 Kan. C4 Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 607; 68 Pac. 72. 184; 74 Am. Dec. 52.2; Stickrod 59 St. Anthony v. Brandon, 10 v. Commonwealth, 8'6 Ky. 285; 5 Idaho, 205; 77 Pac. 322. S. W. 580; Thomasson v. State, 60 State V. Galloway, 11 Idaho, 15 Ind. 449; State v. Adamson, 719; 84 Pac. 27. 14 Ind. 296. Contra, Holley v. 61 Duluth V. Abrahamson State, 14 Tex. App. 505. (Minn.), 104 N. W. 082. 65 Neighbor.s v. Commonwealth 62 State V. Circuit Court, 50 N. (Ky.), 9 S. W. 718; McGruder v. J. L. 5S5; 15 Atl. 272. State, 83 Ga. 616; 10 S. E. 281; 63 Commonwealth v. Sellers, 130 Hilverstine v. Yantes, 88 Ky. 695; Pa. St. 32; IS Atl. 541. 21 S. W. 811. § 187 TRAFP^IC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 290 determining whether prohibition shall prevail in the local community. Under the title, "An act to provide a remedy against persons selling liquors to husbands and children," may be inserted provisions prohibitin;;^ sales to minors, in- toxicated persons, hab'tual drunkards, and giving a right of action against the seller who violates these provisions. '^" "Where a provision of a Constitu'ion required everv act levying a tax to distinctly specify the purpose for wh'ch the tax is levied, and another provision provided thrt the general assembly may provide for the payment of license fees on the various trades, occupations and provisions, and may delegate the power to municipalities to impose similar fees, it was held that an act imposing license taxes on com- pound, rectified and distilled spirits was not unconstitu- tional on the ground that the title failed to specify the purpose for which the tax was levied.''^ "Where a provision of a Constitution provided that no bill should be so amended on its passage through the Legislature as to change its original purpose, and a bill was introduced entitled, "To further regulate opening, closing, keeping and selling or ' giving away spirituous liquors under a license operating saloons, and to punish the violation thereof," and in its passage the title of a substitute which became a law was, "To further regulate the opening, closing and operating saloons and giving away or selling spirituous liquors under a license, and to punish violations thereof," it was held the latter title was but an extension of the title of the original bill, and it was not such a departure as violated A statute entitled, "An act to 66 Montgomery v. State, SS Ala. better regulate, restrict and con- 141; 7 So. 51; Thomasson v. trol the sale of intoxicating State, 15 Ind. 449. liquors and providing for local op- e^ Long continued usage hart tion elections" is broad enough to much to do with bringing about cover provisions for the adoption this result. Brown-Foreman Co. of local option which will totally v. Commonwealth, 126 Ky. 402; prohibit the sales of liquors in the 101 S. W. 321; 30 Ky. L. Rep. district adopting it. McPherson 793; Mt. Sterling v. King (Ky. ), T. State (Ind.), 90 N. E. 610. 104 S. W. 322; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 919. 291 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATrTE'o. U88 the provision of the Constitution to which reference has been made."^ Sec. 188. Title of statutes — Invalid statutes. Since "prohibition" is more than "regulation," therefore, under a title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors their sale cannot be prohibited, nor provision be made to submit the question of sale or no sale to a local option vote.'^'-' And it has been held that, "An act to prohibit the sale of spirituous, malt or vinous liquors near public and grading camps of canals and railroads and other kindred enter- prises," was not broad enough to include a provision for the sale of liquors and regulating their sale.^*^ So an act to "regulate" the manufacture and sale of liquor cannot con- tain a provision fixing a penaltv for being found drunk in a public place, without any reference how the liquor was Breaux, 122 La. 514; 47 So. ST^; Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. v. Foss (S. D.), 91 X. W. 584; Ex parte Abrams (Tex.), 120 S. W. 883; Ex parte Clark (Tex.), 120 S. W. 892. 69 /n re Hauck, 70 Mich. 396; 38 N. W. 2^9; Sweet v. Wabash, 41 Ind. 7; People v. Gadway, 61 Mich. 285; 28 N. W. 101; Miller V. Jones, 80 Ala. 89; Cantrill v. Sainer, 59 Iowa, 2fi; 12 N. W. 753; Bronson v. Oberlin, 41 Ohio St. 478; Watson v. State, 140 Ala. 134; 37 So. 225; State v. Richardson (Ore.), 85 Pac. 225 j Crabb v. State, 88 Ga. 584; Em- poria V. Volnier, 12 Kan. 622 1 Yahn v. Merritt, 117 Ala. 485; 23 So. 71; In Matter of Hauck, 70 Mich. 396, 404; 38 N. W. 296; Heise v. Council, 6 Rich. L. 415; State V. Mott, 61 Md. 297. Contm, McPherson v. State, 90 N. E. 610. 70 Gurding v. Board, 13 Idaho, 444; 90 Pac. 357. esFourment v. State (Ala.), 46 So. 266. Other cases on the subject aie as follows: Smith v. People, 32 Colo. 251; 75 Pac. 914; Albrecht V. State, 8 Tex. App. 216; Ex parte Burnside, 86 Ky. 423; 6 S. W. 276; McArthur v. State, 69 Ga. 444; Gandy v. State, 86 Ala. 20; 5 So. 420; Gayle v. Owen Co., 83 Ky. 61; Ramagnano v. Cook, 85 Ala. 226; 3 So. 845; In re Pollai-d, 27 Pa. St. 507; 17 Atl. 1087; Hatfield v. Common- wealth, 120 Pa. St. 395; 14 Atl. 151; Ck)mmonwealth v. Hill, 127 Pa. St. 540; 19 Atl. 141; Matter of DeVaucene, 31 How. Pr. 289, 337; State v. Braun, 96 Minn. ■521; 105 N. W'. 975; Schiller v. State (S. C), 38 So. 706; State V. Hooker (Okla.), 98 Pac. 964; Dinuzo v. State (Neb.), 123 Pac. 310; Ex parte Ellis, 76 Kan. 368; 91 Pac. 81; Rose v. State (Ind.), 87 N. E. 103; State v. § 188 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 292 obtained.'^ Under a title ''to constitute the town of B. and vicinity, in B. Count.y, a separate school district," cannot be inserted a provision prohibiting the sale of li(iuor within the town.'- So a statute prohibiting the sale of liquors cannot contain a provision for the refunding of the amount paid on licenses for the current year and appropriate money for that purpose.'"' Under an act having the title, "An act to prohibit the sale of spirituous, vinous and malt liquors in Dallas County, outside of the corporate limits and police jurisdiction of Selma," was inserted the provision that ''any person who sells, gives away, or otherwise disposes of vinous, spirituous or malt liquors, or intoxicating beverages or drinks, or fruit preserved in alcohol, or alcoholic drinks in Dallas Countl.y, outside the corporate limits and police jurisdiction of the city of Selma, shall be guilty of a mis- demeanor." It was held that the act was void so far as it prohibited the giving away of liquor or any other disposi- tion of them than by sale, and it was also void so far as it tended to prohibit the sale of liquors neither vinous, spiritu- ous nor malt,'^* Under a title to prevent the sale or gift of liquors to minors cannot be inserted a provision prohibiting a sale or gift to an adult."'^ An act was entitled, "An act to establish an excise department in cities of this State." It also provided that a board of excise commissioners should be elected at the next charter elections on the general ticket. A supplementary statute to this act provided that the governing board of any city or town, except cities of the first class, might provide for a board of excise commis- sioners to be appointed by a court of the county. It was held that the supplementary act was not covered by the title to the original act .because its object was to regulate the excise and to divide municipalities embraced in such scheme into two classes.^^ So, "An act to regulate and 71 People V. Beadle, GO Mich. 74 state v. Davis, 130 Ala. 148; 22; 26 N. W. 800. 30 So. 344. 72 Montgomery v. State, 88 Ala. 7n Hyman v. State, 87 Tenn. 141; 7 So. 51. 109; 9 S. W. 272. 73 State V. Davis, 130 Ala. 148; 76 Hann v. Bedell, 61 N. J. L. 30 So. 344. 148; 50 Atl. 664. 293 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 189 license the sale of spirituous, vinous, malt, and other intoxi- cating liquors, ' ' cannot be so amended as to apply to whole- salers or persons selling less than five gallons at any one time, for the original act only applies to retailers. '^^ Under a title concerning the "sale" of intoxicating liquor cannot be inserted a provision forbidding a "gift" of liquor by a private person as a mere act of courtesy or hospitality, dis- connected with any business transaction J* Under "An act to prohibit the sale of spirituous, malt or vinous liquors near public works and grading camps of canals and rail- roads and other kindred enterprises," a provision providing for a regulation of the sale, of liquors is unconstitutional/'* Sec. 189. Statute or ordinance only in part valid. It is a well settled principle of constitutional law that when a part of a statute is unconstitutional, if by striking from the act all that part, which is void, that which is left is complete in itself, sensible, capable of being executed and wholly independent of that which is rejected, the courts will reject that which is unconstitutional and enforce the re- mainder. It is equally well settled that where a part of a statute is unconstitutional, if such part is so connected with the other parts as that they mutually depend upon each other as conditions, considerations or compensations for each other, so as to warrant the belief that the Legislature in- tended them as a whole, and if they could not be carried into effect the Legislature would not have passed the residue independently of that which is void, then the whole act must fail. Such constitutional and unconstitutional provi- sions may even be contained in the same section and yet be perfectly distinct and separable, so that the first may stand though the last fall. The point is not whether they are contained in the same section — for the distribution into sec- tions is purely artificial — but whellier they are essentially 7T state V. Bod:, 1C7 Ind. 559; 444; 99 Pac. 82G. For other cases 79 N. E. 493. see Brumbaugh v. vState (Tex.), 78 State V. Fulks, 207 Mo. 26; 120 S. W. 423; ChriHtian 105 S. W. 733. Moline Brewing Co. v. Hill, 166 79Gerding v. Board, 15 Idaho, Fed. 140. §189 TKAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 294 and inseparably connected in substance.^" The same rule of construction applies to a B3'-Law or an ordinance of a municipal corporation, and if it has distinct and independent parts, alihough one or more of them may be void, the rest are equally valid, as though the void clauses had been omitted; but if it be entire, each part having a general in- fluence over the rest, and one part of it be void, the entire By-Law or ordinance is void.^^ This rule of construction has been applied to statutes and ordinances relating to in- toxicating liquors.^- soiCooley's Const. Lim. (6tli Ed.) 211; State v. Bengsch, 170 Mo. 81; 70 S. W. 710; Bank v, Dudley, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 5'26; Mo bile, etc., R. Co. v. State, 29 Ala 507; People v. Hill, 7 Cal. 97 Rood V. McCargar, 49 Cal. 117 State V. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290 Robinson v. Bank, etc., 18 Ga 65 ; Supervisors, etc., v. Davis, '63 111. 405; Myers v. People, 67 111. 503; Clark v. Ellis, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 248; State v. Blend, 121 Ind. 514 ; iSanto v. State, 1C5 ; Town of Eldora v. Barlingame, 62 la. 3^2 ; 17 N. W. 148; Eli V. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 70; Williams v. Pagson, 14 La. Ann. 7; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151; Berry v. Balti- more, etc., R. €o., 41 Md. 446; Commonwealth v. Hitcliings, 5 Gray (Mass.), 482; Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 95; Commonwealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick. (Mass.) ."-j'.); Thomson v. Grand Gulf R. Co., 3 How. (Miss.) 240; 'Campbell v. Union Bank, 6 How. (Miss.) 625; State v. Clark, 54 Mo. 17; People v. Lawrence, ,S« Barb. (N. V.) 190; PZxchan^e Bank v. Hinos, .'! Ohio, 1 -. State V. Copeland, 3 R. I. 33; State v. Snow, 3 R. I. 04; State v. Amery, 12 R. I. 64; State v. Clark, 15 R. I. 383; 5 Atl. 635. 81 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 3i54; Rex v. The Company, etc., 8 Tcnn. R. 356; Colchester v. Godwin, Carter, 121; Elwood v. Bullock, 6 Q. B. 386; Clark v. Tuckett, 2 \'ent. 1&2; Rex v. Atwood, 4 B. and Ad. 481; Shelton v. Mayor, etc., 30 Ala. 540; Municipality v. Morgan, 1 La. Ann. Ill; Common- wealth v. Dow, 10 Met. (Mass.) 506; Amesbury Insurance Co., 6 Gray (Mass.), 596; State v. Clark, 54 Mo. 17; Thomas v. Mount, 9 Ohio, 219. 82 MeCreary v. State, 73 Ala. 480; Indianapolis, 138 Ind. 30; 36 N. E. 857; Piqua v. Zimmc-lin, 35 Ohio Ft. 507; State v. Becker, 3 S. D. 29; 51 N. W. 1018; State v. Amery, 12 R. I. 64; State v. Clark, 15 R. I. 383; 6 Atl. 635; State V. Bengsch, 170 Mo. 81; 70 S. W. 710; State v. Davis, 130 Ala. 148; 30 So. 344. If the part of the statute under which the defendant is prosecuted is separable from the part he claims is unconstitutional, tlie validity of the latter pa'-t wHl not be considered by the court, and he la not entitled to raise any ques- 295 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. § 190 Sec. 190. Construction of statutes. In accompjishing the purposes of their enactment liquor laws should be liberally construed.^" This is true of all those statutes, or parts of statutes, relating to the control of the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors — to regulations concerning their sale and manufacture — to local option laws. But concerning penal sta'^utes, or those por- tions of the liquor laws inflicting penalties, they are strictly construed under the well-known rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed. In a New York case, however, it was said that "while a statute of this character should not be enlarged, it should be interpreted, where the language is clear and explicit, according to its true intent and mean- ing, having in view the evil to be remedied and the object to be obtained. The evident object was to suppress the sale and use of intoxicating liquors, and to punish those who, in any form, furnished means of intoxicaHon, by making them liable for damages which might arise, which were caused by the parties who furnished such means.^* With relation to tion concerning its validity. State sales on Sunday is void where a V. Paige, 78 Vt. 2»6; 62 Atl. 1017. statute permits sales for medici- See Ferguson v. Josey, 70 Ark. nal and mechanical purposes. Co- 04; 66 S. W. 345; State v. Davis, lumbus v. Schaerr, 5 Ohio S. & C. 130 Ala. 148; 30 So. 344; Meehan P. 100. v. Board, 75 N. J. L. 5i57 ; 70 Atl. In Vermont it was held that so 3'63; affirming 73 N. J. L. 382; 64 much of a statute as related to Atl. 689; Ex parte Dupree ( Tex. ) , sales in the original packages was 105 S. W. 493. void; but that fact did not in- 6o much of tlio statute as is validate the remaining portions, not covered by the title may be State v. Kibling, 63 Vt. 036; 22 rejected and the remainder stand. Atl. 613. Hancock v. State, 114 Ga. 439; 40 83 /« re Finley, 58 N. Y. Misc. So. 317. But an act depending 639; 110 X. Y. Supp. 71; Roberts upon another act that is invalid v. State, 4 Ga. App. 207; 60 iS. E. cannot be euiorced. Mitchell v. 1082; see Seattle v. Foster, 47 State. 133 Ala. 65; 32 So. e87: Wash. 172; 91 Pac. 642; Cox v. Sweney v. Webb, 33 Tex. '^'■. Anp. Buriiham, 120 Iowa. 43; 94 N. 324; 76 S. W. 766; 77 S. W. 113o; W. 265; People v. Craio^. 112 X. .August Pu9ch ct Co. V. Wobb. 192 y. Supn. 1142. Fed. 655; Brumbausrh v. State, 84 Mead v. Station, 87 N. Y. (Tex.), 120 S. W. 423. 493; 41 Am. Rep. 386. An ordinance forbidding ftll § 190 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 296 those provisions giving a civil remedy to persons sustaining damages occasioned by sales to drunkards and the like, the statutes are strictly construed in so far as giving a cause of action ; and one must come clearly within their provi- sions,^^ for the cause of action is purely a statutory one. But if the person seeking to recover damages is clearly designated by the statute, and the wrong of which he com- plains is clearly denounced by the statute and provision made for the recovery of damages, there is no reason for a strict construction in enforcing the remedy given by the statute.^*' 85 Schneider v. Hosier, 21 Ohio 71 111. 241; Feese v. Tripp, 70 111. St. 98. 4fl6; Fentz v. Meadows, 72 111. 86 Tliat such statutes are strict- 540 ; Baecher v. State, 19 Ind. ly construed, see Meidel v. Anthis, App. 100; 40 N. E. 42. CHAPTER III. INTERSTATE COMMERCE. SECTION. 191. btatutes drawn in general terms, how construed. 1&2. What constitutes interstate commerce. 193. Original packages. 194. What constitutes original packages — ^Size of pack- ages. 195. Original packages — Illus- trations. 196. Discrimination against citi- zens of other States. 197. Right of consignee to sell imported liquors. 198. Right of importer to sell in original packages. 199. "Wilson Law," origin and constitutionality. 200. Wilson Law construed — "Arrival" defined. 201. Liquors in transit — When transit ceases. 202. Wilson Law — Effect upon State laws. SECTION. 203. Importing liquors for pri- vate use. Leaving liquor unreasonable length of time in carrier's possession. License — Tax — Regulating sale. Prohibiting solicitation of orders. Sales beyond State lines. Sales to minors and drunk- ards. Burden on 'defendant to show he is protected by the interstate commerce law. Liability of officers serving warrant. Shipping liquor under false brand. Carrier refusing to accept liquors for transporta- tion. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. Sec. 191. Statutes drawn in general terms, how construed. It is a general rule of interpretation, as has been else- where noted, that statutes drawn in general terms and which are, therefore, in terms, applicable to intoxicating liquors imported and while in the original packages, will not be held void for that reason, but will simply be held to apply to liquors not imported or not in the oridual packages, and, therefore, valid, unless the terms of the statute are such that 297 § 192 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 298 they cannot be made applicable to non-imported liquors or liquors not in the original package.^ Sec. 192. V/hat constitutes interstate ccmmerce. "What does and a' hat d^e.s not constitute interstate com- merce is often a delicate question. J-S a general rule, com- merce is not traffic alone — it is interccursa. Speak'ng of the interstate commerce laws of the Federal Constitution the Supreme Court of the United States said: "It describes the commercial intercourse between na'^'ons, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and i^ regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse."- As distinguished from domestic or State commerce, interstate commerce includes traffic between points in different States as well as between points in the same State, but which in transit is carried through another State.' Goods shipped C. 0. D. from one State to another constitutes interstate commerce, and such goods cannot be controlled by State laws.* So a wholesale dealer in liquors in one State, having no place of business in another State except one where he keeps a few samples, enter- ing into a contract in the latter to ship whisky into it from the former State in the original package is engaged in inter- 1 Commonwealth v. Gague, 153 3 Hanley v. Kentucky Cent. R. Mass. 205; 26 N. E. 449; 10 L. Co., 187 U. S. 617; 47 L. Ed. R. A. 44'2; Commonwealth v. Gay, 333; 23 Sup. Ct. 1214. 153 Mass. 211; 26 N. E. 571, 852; 4 Sedgwick v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. see Jung Brewing Co. v. Com- App. 627; 85 JS. W. 813; Taggart monwealth (Ky.), 98 S. W. 307; v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 85 S. 30 Ky. L. Rep. 267; State v. W. 1155; Hickcox v. State (Tex. Kibling, 63 Vt. 636; 22 Atl. 613; Cr. App.), 85 S. W. ll'gS; Amer- State V. Fitzpatrick, 16 R. I. 54; ican Exp. Co. v. State, 198 U. S. 11 Atl. 7'67; McCord v. State 133; 25 Sup. Ct. 1«2; 49 L. Ed. (Okla.), 101 Pac. 2«0. 417 (reversing 118 Iowa, 447; 92 2 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. S. W. 66); O'Xeil v. Ver- 1; followed in Passenger Cases, mont, 144 U. S. 323; 12 Sup. Ct. 7 How. 283; 12 L. Ed. 102; West- 693; 36 L. Ed. 450; Adams Ex- ern U. T. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 press Co. v. Commonwealth, 124 TJ. S. 347; 30 L. Ed. 1187; Lot- Ky. 100; 98 S. W. 593; 29 Ky. tery Cases, 188 U. S. 321; 47 L. L. Rep. 904; Samuel Westheimer, Ed. 492; 23 Sup. Ct. 321. 131 Iowa, 643; 109 N. W. 189. 299 INTERSTATE COMMEuCi:.. ^ xy2 State commerce." And it has been held that if a liquor dealer ship whisky C. 0. D. into a prohibition State, consigned to a person not ordering it, and then notifies him of the ship- ment, and such consignee then pays for and receives the liquor, it is not an interstate transaction, for there was no previcm crntract for 'N r^nrphase, and the contract of sale took place in the prohibition State." Bnt ordering goods by letter or telegram sent from ano+her State to be shipped C. 0. D. does not deprive the goods of their interstate char- acter/ A statute impos^'ng an annual tax on the business of selling only malt linuors and another tax on t'le business of manufacturing such liquors, and also providing that the manufacturer may sell, without paving anything beyond the latter tax, is a regulation of interstate commerce as to non- resident manufacturers in so far as it prevents their sending their liquors into the State, and there selling them in the original packages through an agent located there.* So a statute imposing a certain tax on wholesalers selling liquors to be shipped into the State from wUhout, who do not have their principal place of business in such State, and which does not impose a I'ke tax upon resident wholesalers of liquors manufactured in the Sta^e. is voVl, because it is a regulation of commerce between the States." So a statute taxing imported liquors without taxing liouors manufachired within the State is such a discriminat^'on asrainst imported liquors as renders it vo:d.'° Where a dealer had an agent located in another Sloman v. William D. Moebs 135 U. S. 100; 10 Sup. Ct. 681; Co., 139 Mich. 334; 102 N. W. 34 L. Ed. 128) ; and reversing Peo- 854; 11 Detroit Leg. N. 857. pie v. Lyng, 74 Mich. 579; 42 N. 6 Adams Exp. Co. v. Common- W. 139. wealth, 124 Ky. 100; 92 S. W. 9 Walling v. People, IIG U. S. 932; 29 Fy. L. Rep. 224; 92 8. 446; 6 Sup. Ct. 454;' 29 L. Ed. W. 935; 29 Fy. L. Rep. 230, 231; 691 (reversing People v. Walling, 92 S. W. 936; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 231. 53 Mich. 2€4; 18 N. W. 807). 7 O'Neil V. Vermont, 144 U. S. lo Tierman v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 323; 12 Sup. Ct. C93; 30 L. Ed. 123; 26 L. Ed. 103. 450. A statute vi^ill always be con- 8 Lun61; 10 Sup. Ct. 725; 34 L. Ed. be reasonably done. Under this 128 (following Leisy v. Hardin, rule a statute forbidding the sale § 193 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 300 State to look after his business, and the agent sold liquor to a resident of the State in which he (the agent) resided and conducted his principal's business, and to fulfill the contract the dealer shipped liquor to his agent who delivered it to the purchaser in the original packages, it was held that the sale was legal and the purchaser liable for the price of the liquor, though neither the dealer nor his agent had a license to sell in the State to which the goods were consigned.^^ Sec. 193. Original packages. Section 8, Article I, of the Constitution of the Unitea States, provides, among other things, that Congress shall have the power, "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." It has been said that this clause "presents the remarkable in- stance of a national power which was comparatively un- important for eighty years, and which in the last thirty years has been so developed that it is now in its nationalizing tendency, perhaps the most important and conspicuous power possessed by the Federal Government." This is all the more evident when we study the decisions of the Federal courts. It was thirty-seven j-ears after the adoption of the Constitu- tion before the first case was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, placing a construction upon it. In 1840, there had been five cases ; in 1860, twenty cases ; in 1870, thirty cases ; in 1880, seventy-seven cases ; in 1890, one hundred and forty-eight cases; while at the present time there are more than two hundred and twenty-five which have been decided upon questions raised under it. The same increase of late years may be noted in the lower Federal courts, where at of intoxicating liquors, but mak- 442; Commonwealth v. Gay, 153 ing no express exception in favor Mass. 211; 26 N. E. 571, 852. of imported liquors in the orig- A statute prohibiting the im- inal packages, is not void, be- portation of liquors under an as- cause it will be construed to apply sumed nan^e is not a regulation only to domestic liquors. Com- of interstate commerce. State v. monwealth v. Cagne, 153 Mass. Moody, 70 S. C. 56; 45 S. E. 8. 205; 26 N. E. 449; 10 L. R. A. n Carstairs v. O'Donnell, 154 Mass. 3'57; 28 N. E. 271 301 INTERSTATE COMMERCE. § 193 \ the present time there have been probably fifteen hundred cases tried and determined which involved its construction. The first case in the Supreme Court of the United States construing it was decided in 1824.^- In that ease Chief eTus- tiee ]\Iar.shall, who WTote the principal opinion, said: "To what commerce does this power extend ? The Constitution in- forms us, to commerce 'with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes. ' It has, we believe, been universally admitted that the words comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on be- tween this country and any other to which this power does not extend. It has been truly said that commerce, as the word is used in the Constitution, is a unit, every part of which is indicated by the term. If this be the admitted mean- ing of the word in its application to foreign nations, it must carry the same meaning throughout the sentence, and remain a unit unless there be some plain, intelligible clause which alters it. The subject to which the power is next ap- plied is to commerce 'among the several States.' The word 'among' means intermingled wnth. A thing which is among others — intermingled with them. Commerce among the States cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State but may be introduced into the interior. * * * The genus and character of the whole government seem to be that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to these internal concerns which affect the State generally, but not to those which are com- pletely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the Government. The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself." In 1827 a case reached that court which depended entirely upon the question whether the Lecrislature of a State could consti- tutionally^ require the importer of foreign articles (in this case intoxicating liquors) to take out a license from the State 12 See §848; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1. § 193 TRAI'FIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 302 before he could oe permitted to sell a bale or package so imported.^^ This may be said to be the first "original pack- age" case, for in it the court held that the right to import necessarily involved the right to sell and that until the goods had been sold or in some other way made a part of the prop- erty of the State they were not subject to its taxing juris- diction. In so deciding, Chief Justice ^Marshall, said: "Com- merce is intercourse — one of its most ordinary ingredients is traffic. It is inconceivable that the power to authorize this traffic, when given in the most comprehensive terms, with in- tent that its efficacy should be complete, should cease at the point when its continuance is indispensable to its value. To what purpose should the power to allow importation be given, unaccompanied with the power to authorize a sale of the thing imported? Sale is the object of importation, and is an essentia] ingredient of that intercourse, of which importation constitutes a part. It is as essential an ingredient, as indis- pensable to the existence of the entire thing, then, as importa- tion itself. It must be considered as a competent part of the power to regulate commerce." In 1847, twenty years after the decision was rendered in Brown v. Maryland, what is generally known as the "license cases" was decided by that court, wherein laws passed by IMassachusetts, Rhode Island and New Hampshire in reference to the sale of intoxi- cating liquors, came under review and were sustained.^* In the case from New Hampshire the defendants had been fined for selling a barrel of gin which they had bought in Boston and brought coastwise to Portsmouth, and there sold in the .same barrel and in the same condition in which it was pur- chased in Massachusetts, but contrary to the law of New Hampshire in that behalf. In it Chief Justice Taney said the case in hand "differs from Brown v. Maryland, in that the latter was a case arising out of commerce with foreign nations which Congress had regulated by law, whereas the case in hand was one of commerce between the two States, in relation to which Congress had not exercised its power." In 13 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat, i* The License Cases, 5 How. (U. S.) 419. (U. S.) 504; 12 L. Ed. 256. 303 INTERSTATE COMMERCE. § 193 other words, "The question brought up for our decision is whether a State is prohibited by the Constitution of the United States from making any regulation of foreign com- merce with another State, although such regulation is confined to its own territory, and made for its own convenience or interest, and does not come in confl'ct with any law of Con- gress." In answering this question he sa:d: "The controlling and supreme power over commerce with fnreijrn iTi+i';>'i- and the several States is undoubtedly conferred upon Conorress. Yet, in my judgment, the State may, nevertheless, for the safety or convenience of trade, or for the protection of its citizens, make regulations of commerce for its own r»orts and harbors and for its own territory; and such regulations are valid unless they come in conflict with the law of ron^-ress. Such, I think, was the construction universallv rpc^n^^rl ot the time of its adoption, as appears from the legislation of Con- gress and of the several States, and a careful examination of the decisions of th's court will show thnt so far from sanction- ing the opposite they recognized and r^'^int'^i'^od the nowpr of the States." His conclusion was that, "Upon the whole, therefore, the law of New Hampshire is, in my judgment, a valid one, for, although the gin sold was imported from another State and Consrress has clearlv the power to regulate such importations, under the grant of power to resrulate com- merce among the several Stages, yet as Congress has made 710 rrgnlafinv on the snhieet the traffic in the article niay be lawfully regulated by the State as soon as it is landed in its territory and a tax imnosed unon it. or license reou'red. or the sale altogether prohibited, according to the policy which the State may suppose to be its interest or duty to pursue." In that case the several justices wrote separate oninions. Mr. Justice Woodbury, in his opinion, for the first time formulated the modern rule; that is, that the commercial power in its nature is not more exclusive than other powers granted to Congress. In 1851 the suerorestion made bv him was adopted by the Supreme Court as the rule of decision in the case of Cooley v. Port "Wardens.' ' "nd the distinction be- i5Cooley V. Port Wardens, 12 How. (U. S.) 298. § 193 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 304 tween cases in which Congress has exerted its power over com- merce and those in which it has abstained from its exercise, as bearing upon State legislation touching the subject, was first plainly pointed out by Mr. Justice Curtis. For many years after that the rule as to exclusiveness therein laid down was followed in the Supreme Court and that rule may be thus stated : The States may establish port regulations, regula- tions of pilotage, may improve their harbors and erect bridges and exercise many other local powers. In the exercise of this proper authority a State may enact laws providing for the inspection of goods, to determine whether they are fit for commerce and to protect the citizens and the market from fraud. But in all instances where the States may exercise powers, which may be said to partake of the nature of the power granted to the genprfl government, they are strictly not such, but are merely local powers, which have full pro- tection until circumscribed bv the action of Congress in the general power. In matters admitting of uniform regulation throughout the country and affecting all the States, the action of Congress is to be taken as a declaration of its will that commerce "shall be free and unrestricted" so far only as concerns any general rep-idation of the States. This phrase does not mean mere freedom from such regulations as admit of uniformity, but it is onlv to this extent that the jurisdic- tion of Concress over interstate commerce is exclusive of State regulation. In 1887 the question again came before the Supreme Court of the United States in a case prosecuted for the purpose of construing a statute of the State of Iowa which was enacted to rcQiTlate the traffic in intoxicating liquors in that State and in which it was held that the State could not, for the purpose of protecting its people against the evils of intemperance, enact laws which regulate commerce between its people and those of other States of the Union unless the consent of Congress, expressed or imnlied, was first obtained. ^^ Two years later the question as to whether intoxicating liquors Two years later arose the question as to whether intoxicating liquors imported into a State, where a statute of the State r»ro- i«Bo\\Tnan v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 4G5; 8 Sup. Ct. 689. 1002. 805 INTERSTATE COMMERCE. § 193 hibits their sale except for certain purposes, could be sold by the importer in the "original package," Congress having not made provision for such sales.^^ In the case of Pearce v. New Hampshire the court held that, "as Congress has made no regulation on the subject, the traffic in the article may be law- fully regulated by the State as soon as it is landed in its territory." The rule thus enunciated was overruled in the case now under consideration. In his opinion, Chief Justice Fuller, quoting from Bo^^^nan v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., said: "The doctrine now firmly established is that where the sub- ject upon which Congress can act under its commercial power is local in its nature or sphere of operation, such as harbor pilotage, the improvement of harbors, the establishment of beacons and buoys to guide vessels in and out of port, the construction of bridges over navigable rivers, the erection of wharves, piers and docks, and the like, which can be properly regulated only by special provisions adapted to their localities, the State can act until Congress interferes and supersedes its authority; but where the subject is national in its character and admits and requires uniformity of regulation, affecting alike all the States, such as transportations between the States, including the importation of goods from one State into an- other, Congress can alone act upon it and provide the needed regulations. The absence of any law of Congress upon the subject is equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that matter shall be free. Thus, the absence of regulations as to interstate commerce with reference to any particular subject is taken as a declaration that the importation of that article into the States shall be unrestricted. It is only after the im- portation is completed and the property imported has mingled with and become a part of the general property of the State that its regulations can act upon it, except so far as may be neces- sary to insure safety in the disposition of the import until thus mingled." From this statement of the law the conclu- sion follows that, as the grant of the power to regulate com- merce among the States, so far as one system is required, is exclusive, the States cannot exercise that power without the T^LcisY V. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; 10 Sup. Ct. 681. § 193 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 306 assent of Congress, and, in the absence of legislation, it is left for the courts to determine when State action does or does not amount to such exercise ; or, in other words, what is or is not a regulation of such comineree. When that is determined controversy is at an end. "^hose decisions rest upon the un- doubted right of the States of the TTnion to control their purely internal affairs, in doing wWh th^^y exercise Bowers not surrendered to the national Government; but whenever the law of the State amounts essentially to a regulation of commerce with foreVn rations or among the States, as it does when it inhibits, directly or indirectly, the receipt of an imported commodity or its disposition before it has ceased to become an article of trade between one State and another, or another country and this, it comes in conflict with a power which, in this particular, has been exclusively vested in the general government, and is, therefore, void. It may be added that in the decisions cited and others that might be cited, the rule prior to August, 1890, the date of the enactment of the Wilson Law, was that the right to sell imported liquor, given by the laws of the United States. Avas subject to two important limitations: 1. That it remahied in the hands of the im- porter; and 2, That it should be sold in the condition in which its importation was authorized, and that all sales by other persons, or in any other quantity or condition than that in which it was imported, were subject, like sales of other prop- erty, to such regulations as might be prescribed by State laws. The right was neither general as to persons nor in its applica- tion to the property to which the laws of the United States related. The right, on the contrary, was limited to certain persons and qualified by the status of the property. While it was in the hands of the importer and in the condition in which it was imported, the laws under which he had imported it gave him the right to sell it in that cond'tion. This was the extent of that right. When he parted wHh the property and changed its condition his right, and all right to sell it, derived from these laws, ceased. It was no longer the right to sell which was given by the laws of the United States.^' 18 State V. Robinson, 49 Me. Barb. (N. Y.) 567; Bradford v. 286; Wynehamer v. People, 20 Stevens, 10 Gray, 379; Doorea 307 INTERSTATE COMMERCE §194 Sec. 194. What constitutes an original package — Size of packaga In another section we have seen that bottles of whisky may be original packages. It would thus seem, and that is V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 109 S. W. 302; 33 Ky. L. Rep. G9; Yearteau v. Bacon, 65 Vt. 516; 27 Atl. 1'9'8; State v. Robinson, 49 Me. 285; State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 82 Me. 558; 19 Atl. 913 (see State v. Rlackwell, -05 Me. 556); Bode v. State, 7 Gill, 326; State V. Amery, 12 R. I. 64 ; State V. Pfleajor, 81 Iowa, 759; 4-6 N. W. 106.3; United States v. Fiscus, 42 Fed. 395; In re Beine, 42 Fed 545; Tuckman v. Welch, 42 Fed 54S; M. Schandler Bottling Co. v Welch, 42 Fed. 561; State v. In toxicating Liquors, 82 Me. 558; 19 Atl. 913; Donald v. Scott, 74 Fed. 859; State v. Allmond, 2 Houst. (Del.) 612; Common- wealth V. Clapp, 5 Gray, 97 ; Com- monwealth V. Gagne, 153 Mass. 205; 26 N. E. 449; 10 L. R. 442; Commonwealth v. Gay, 153 Mass. 211; 26 N. E. 571, 852; McCul- lough, 41 S. C. 220; 19 S. E. 458; 23 L. R. A. 410; Bradford V. Stevens, 76 Mass. 379; O'Neil V. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323; 12 Sup. Ct. 693; 36 L. Ed. 450; Ex parte Loeb, 72 Fed. 657; State V. Stilsing, 52 N. J. L. 517; 20 Atl. C5; Charleston v. State, 4 Strobh. 241; State v. Allmond, 2 Houst. (Del.) 612; Adams Exp. Co. V. Commonwealth, 124 Ky. 160; 92 S. W. 932, 935, 936; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 224, 230, 231; Com- monwealth V. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. (Ky.), 101 S. W. 894; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 99; Adams Exp. Co. v, L. Ed. 987; 27 Sup. Ct. 606 (re- versing 87 S. W. nil; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1096); 206 U. S. 138; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 608; 51 L. Ed. 992 (reversing 92 S. W. 932; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 224; 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 630); 206 U. S. 139; 51 L. Ed. 993; 27 Sup. Ct. 609 (reversing 97 S. W. 807 ; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 207, and 103 S. W. 353; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 811 to 813); Commonwealth V. Southern Exp. Co., 103 S. W. 339; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 813; State V. Intoxicating Liquors, 102 Me. 206; 66 Atl. 393; State v. Ken- ney, 62 W. Va. 284; 57 S. E. 823; State V. Moody, 70 S. C. 52 ; 49 S. E. 8; American Exp. Co. v. State, 19-6 U. S. 133; 25 Sup. Ct. 182; 49 L. Ed. 417 (reversing State V. American Exp. Co., 118 Iowa, 447; 92 N. W. 98) ; Adams Exp. Co. V. State, 196 U. S. 147; 25 Sup. Ct. 185; 49 L. Ed. 424 (reversing 95 iV. W. 1129) ; Sedg- wick v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 627; 85 S. W. 813; Tag'jart v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 85 S. W. 1155; Hickcox v. State (Tex. Or. App.), 85 S. W. 1198; Sloman v. William D. Moebs Co., 139 Mich. 334; 102 N. W. 854; 11 Det. Leg. N. 857; Crescent Liquor Co. v. Piatt, 148 Fed. 894; State v. In- toxicating Liquors, 101 Me. 430; 64 Atl. 812. The fact that a foreign com- pany had an agent in a prohibi- tion State to there sell its liquors does not make such company Commonwealth, 206 U. S. 129; 51 amenable to its laws nor prohibit § 195 TRAI'FIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 308 the fact, that the mere size of the package has nothing to do with the question. "It is not perceived why," said a Federal court judge, "in the absence of a regulation by Congress to the contrary, the importer may not determine for himself the form and size of the packages he puts up for export. The idea that small packages of liquor cannot be treated as original packages because they are small, springs from the con- struction back of it that liquor in any form, or in any sized package is not a legitimate subject of commerce. That ques- tion is put at rest by the decision of the United States Supreme Court until Congress shall act. As long as packages of liquor in any form or size may lawfully be sold by the importer or his agent in a prohibition State, the size of the package is not of much consequence."^® Sec. 195. Ori^al packages — Illustrations. In this section, in order to avoid possible error, the cases cited are those only in which the right to receive from another State liquors and sell them was involved; and these cases do not involve a construction of the Wilson Law elsewhere dis- cussed. Necessarily there arises the question what is and what is not an original package; for if the packages sold are the "original packages," then the State to which they are shipped cannot exact a license from the vendor; but if they are not then the State may. Thus, where each bottle of whisky was wrapped in paper and sealed and then a number of them were closely packed in uncovered wooden boxes fur- nished by an express company, and these boxes were marked "to be returned," and in that condition were shipped from one State to another, it was held that the boxes and not the bottles were the "original packages," and, therefore, a sale of a single bottle subjected the person receiving the box subject to the State law ; -° and it made no difference that each bottle it shipping liquors into such -oin re Harmon, 43 Fed. 372; State. Doores v. Commonwealth Keith v. State, 91 Ala. 2; 8 So. (Ky.), 109 S. W. 302; 33 Ky. L. 353; 10 L. R. A. 430; Harrison Rep. 69; Carstairs v. O'Donnell, v. State, 91 Ala. 62; 10 So. 30; 154 Mass. 357; 28 X. E. 271. Haley v. State, 42 Neb. 556; 60 19 /m re Beine, 42 Fed. 545. N. W. 962; 47 Am. St. 718; State 309 INTERSTATE COMMERCE. § 195 was labeled 'original package." -^ But where bottles were so labeled and delivered singly to the carrier, and the carrier, without the shipper's knowledge, put the bottles into a box and then shipped them, it was held that each bottle was an original package and not the box.-- The vendee of liquors shipped from one State to another was held not to be within the interstate clause of the Constitution where he imports bottles of liquor in boxes with closed tops which were broken open.-' But the Arkansas case was overturned by a decision of the United States Supreme Court, which is the final arbiter in questions of this kind. In that decision it was held that where beer and whisky were put up in sealed bottles in one State and shipped in boxes and barrels for convenience by the owner to its agent in another State to sell, and he removed the bottles and sold them singly, without breaking the seals, to customers who were not allowed to open them and drink their contents on the premises, that neither the agent nor principal was liable to the license laws of the State where the liquors were sold.^"* This decision was distinguished by a State court in a case where a saloon keeper thus im- ported liquors in bottles, sold the bottles over his bar to his customers who destroyed the seals, drew the corks, poured the contents into glasses on the bar furnished by the saloon keeper, drank the contents of the glass and left -the bottles on the bar. In such an instance it was held that the saloon keeper must have a license, and, of course, if a statute forbade V. Chapman, 1 S. D. 414; 47 N. Hills, 77 Iowa, LSI; 41 N. W. W. 411; 10 L. R. A. 432; State 571; 3 L. R. A. 110; State v. V. Parsons, 124 Mo. 436; 27 S. Winters, 44 Kan. 723; 25 Pac. W. 1162; 42 Am. St. 457. 235; 10 L. R. A. 616. (This case 21 Keith V. State, 91 Ala. 2; overrules State v. Fulker, 43 Kan. 8 So. 353; 10 L. R. A. 430. 237; 22 Pac. 1020; 7 L. R. A. 22 Tinker V. State, 96 Ala. 115; 183); May v. New Orleans, 178 11 So. 383. U.S. 496; 44 L.Ed. 1165; 20 Sup. 23 Smith V. State, 54 Ark. 248 ; Ct. 976; affirming 51 La. Ann. 15 S. W. 882. 1064; 25 So. 959; .Se\iollenber- 24Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. ger v. Pennsylvania, 171 XT. S. 1; 100; 10 Sup. Ct. 681; 34 L. Fd. 43 L. Ed. 49; 18 Sup. Ct. 1; State 128; State v. Coonan, 82 low i v. Miller, 86 Iowa 638; 53 N. W. 400; 48 N. W. 921; Collins v. 330. § 195 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 310 the sale of intoxicating liquors he had Tiolated its provisions.-'' But in a subsequent case in the same State it was held that where the person receiving the bottles was the asrent of the shipper, and he removed the bottles frrm the boxes, delivered them with a corkscrew a""d plas'-es ^'^ the i^nrchasers. and al- lowed tl^em to open the bottles and d^^^^k their contents on the premisfs, the transaction was not w'th^-n the prohibitory law of the State. ^^ But where the sale is cop'l'tionprl unon the right of the vendee to o^^^n or nn^pa^ the bottles and sample the liquor to see if it corre'snonds wi+h the r'^'^»'e81. 53 Leisy v. Hardin, 78 la. 286; 43 N. W. 188. 319 INTERSTATE COMMERCE. § 199 the opening up in the States, which prohibited the traffic in liquor, or imposed a high license on the traffic, of what were properly called "original package houses." Liquor imported in packages of all forms and sizes, but in original packages, was sold in these houses. In this way the retail traffic in liquor was practically established, and in many cases by the most irresponsible and unsuitable persons who were not citi- zens of the State and were indifferent to its welfare. Peaceful and quiet communities, from which the sale of liquor had been banished for years, were instantly afflicted with all the evils of the liquor traffic. The seats of learning were invaded by the "original package" vendor, and the youth of the State who gathered there for instruction were corrupted and de- moralized, and disorder, violence and crime reigned, where only peace and order had been known before. The invaded communities were powerless to protect themselves. They could neither regulate, tax, restrain nor prohibit the traffic. The courts held, and rightly so, that the importer and vendor of original packages was not sub.ject to State laws and that any application of such laws to him would be a violation of his rights under the Constitution of the United States, until Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce, should withdraw the protect'ng power of that instrument from original packages that had reached the State where they were designed for consumption or sale. Congress was applied to for relief. Petitions flowed in upon it, praying for imme- diate action. It acted promptly and with more celerity than ordinarily characterizes the action of so large a deliberative body and the Pres'dent approved its action. This in brief is the origin of the "Wilson Law" which was approved August 8, 1890, and which provides, "That all fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any State or territory or remaining for use, consumption, sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such State or territory be subject to the protection and effect of the laws of such State or territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers to the same extent and in the same manner as that if such liouids or linuors had been produced in such State or territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason § 199 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 320 of being introduced therein in original packages or other- wise.'"^^ The first case under this law was on appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, being an application for a writ of haheas corpus made to that court, the petitioner having been arrested by the State authorities for selling imported liquor on the 9th day of August, 1890. The trial court discharged the prisoner, holding that the Wilson Law was unconstitu- tional. From this decision an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States and there it was held that the law was constitutional, and after it took effect such liquors or liquids introduced into a State or territory from another State or territory, whether in the original packages or otherwise, became subject to such existing laws of the State as had been properly enacted by the State in the exercise of its police powers.^*^ In thus deciding the court said: "The power to regulate commerce is solely in the general Government and it is essentially a part of that regulation to prescribe the means for governing the introduction and incorporation of articles into and with the mass of property in the country or State. No reason is perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide that certain distinct subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by the rule which divests them of that character at an earlier period of time than would otherwise be the case, it is not within its competency to do so." As to the effect of the Wilson Law the conclusion of the court was that, "Con- gress did not use terms of permission to the State to act, but merely removed an impediment to the enforcement of the State laws in respect to imported packages in their original condition, created by the absence of a specific utterance on its part. It imparted no power to the State not then pos.sessed, but allowed imported property to fall at once upon arrival within the local jurisdiction.""" In other words, the Wilson Law declares that intoxicating liquors shall, on arrival in a State, be subject to the operation of the police powers of the 55 Act of 51st Congress, 1st Ses., ".o /„ re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545; c. 728, p. 313; 2« U. S. Stat, at US. Ct. 9,^; 35 L. Ed. 572; L. 313, c. 728; U. S. Comp. St. reversing 43 Fed. 556. 1901, p. 3177. 321 INTERSTATE COMMERCE. § 200 State and merely defines the time when imported intoxicating liquors shall become subject to State control, and is, therefore, not unconstitutional as being a delegation to the States of the power to regulate interstate commerce. Tt does not de- clare that the States shall, in general or in any particular, have the poAver to regulate interstate commerce. It confers no power upon the States to legislate upon that subject. The States are not authorized to declare when such importations shall become subject to State control. Nor can the States in any manner change or affect the enactment made by Con- gress on that subject. Congress can, at any time, abrogate or change the enactment in question and it is clearly a con- stitutional exei-cise of the power conferred on Congress."^'" Sec. 200. Wilson Law construed — "Arrival" defined. The words ''shall upon arrival in such State or territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or territory," as used in the Wilson Law, in one sense might be held to mean arrival at the State line; but to so interpret them would necessitate isolating these words from the entire context of the act and would compel construction distinctive of other provisions contained therein. This would violate the fundamental rule requiring the construction of a statute as a whole and not by magnifying a particular word found in it. It is clear that the word "arrival" as used in this statute means that the goods shall actually come into the State, since it is further provided that "all fermented, dis- tilled or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into a State or territory-," or "remaining therein for use, consump- tion, sale or storage therein," shall "be subject to the opera- tion and effect of the laws of such State or territory." This "/w re Spicklcr. 43 Fed. Rep. 6. 296; 15 Sup. Ct. 367; hi re 053; 10 L. R. A. 451; In re Van Jordon, 49 Fed. 23«; Cantini v. Vliet, 43 Fed. Rep. 761; State Tillman, 54 Fed. f)69; Ex parte V. Fraser, 1 X. Dak. 425; 48 N. Edgerton, 5fl Fed. 115; Indian- W. 343. apolis v. Bielor, 138 Ind. 30; 36 See also Plumley v. Massachus- ,N. E. 857 ; Commonwealth v. C^l- etts, 155 U. S. 461; 15 Sup. Ct. home, 154 Mass. 115; 27 N. E. 154; Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. 881. § 200 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. . 322 language makes it impossible in reason to hold that the law intended "arrival" should mean at the State line, since it prescribes the coming of the goods into the St^te for "use, consumption, sale or storage." The fair interence from enumeration of these conditions, which are all embracing, is that the time when they arrive at the place to which thej^ were consigned was made the test by which to determine the period when the operation of the State law shall attach to goods brought into the State. To construe the word "arrival" to mean arrival at the State line would be to hold that each State might compel every interstate commerce train to stop before crossing its borders and discharge its freight, lest by crossing the line it might carry within the State merchandise of the character named covered by the inhibitions of a State statute. In other words, that the statute of a State might attach and operate beyond the State, and thus become extra territorrial in its operation. Such is not the construction which is to be placed upon the Wilson Law. If it had been the intention of the law to provide for the stoppage at the State line of every interstate commerce contract relating to the merchandise named in the act, such purpose would have been easy of expression. The fact that such power was not conveyed, and that, on the contrary, the language of the statute relates to the receipt of the goods "into any State or territory for use, consumption, sale or storage therein" nega- tives the correctness of an interpretation holding that the receipt into a State or territory for the purpose named could never take place. In the language of the Supreme Court of the United States: "We think that interpreting the statute by the light of all of its provisions, it was not intended to and did not cause the power of the State to attach to an interstate commerce shipment, whilst the merchandise was in transit under such shipment and until its arrival at the point of destination and delivery there to the consignee. ' ' In other words, the statute must be interpreted and enforced by the light of the fundamental rule of carrying out its purpose and object, of affording the remedy which it was intended to create, and of defeating the wrong which it was its purpos'^ to frustrate. Undoubtedly the purpose of the act was to enable 323 INTERSTATE COMMERCE. § 200 the law of the several States to control the character of the merchandise therein enumerated at an earlier date than would have been otherwise the case, but it is equally unquestionable th^t tl e Wilson Law manifests no purpose to confer upon the States the power to give their statutes extra-territorial opera- tion so as to subject persons and property beyond their borders to the restraints of their laws."^ The fundamental right to be protected from the operation of State laws by the Con- stitution of the United States is the continuity of shipment of goods coming from one State into another from the point of transmission to the point of consignment and the accom- plishment there of the delivery covered by the contract.^'' So where a State court held that the Wilson act did not protect a carrier carrying liquors from one State to another, and that it was liable under a State law requiring such a carrier to first obtain a certificate from the State authorities allowing it to carry liquors,'=° it was held on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States that the decision was erroneous.*'' This act did not empower the State of South Carolina to enact a law prohibiting anyone, except the designated officers, import- ing liquors into the State, in accordance with the Dispensary Law of that State.«- Where the defendant purchased in North Carolina liquor for his own use, loaded it in his buggy and started home, and as soon as he crossed the State line, and before his arrival at home, he was arrested, it was held that he had not "arrived" at his destination, and that the liquor was not liable to seizure nor he amenable to the State laws.''^' 58 Rhodes V. Iowa, 170 U. S. eo State v. Rhodes, 90 Iowa 496; 412; 18 S. Ct. 664; reversing 90 58 N. W. 887; 24 L. R. A. 245; Iowa 49-6; 58 N. W. 887; 24 L. Ex parte Jervey, m Fed. 957; R A 245. Jervey v. Carolina, 66 Fed. 1013. 59 Bowman v. Chicago, etc. Ry. ai Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. Co., 125 U. S. 465: 8 S. Ct. 869. 412; 18 Snp. -C t. m4. The Wilson law extends no 62 Scott v. Donakl, 165 U. S. farther than to allow the police 58; 17 Snp. Ct. 205; 41 L. Ed. laws of the State to be applied to 632. intoxicants shipped into the State 63 state v. Holleyman (S. C), after they have reached the end 33 S. E. 3C6; 45 L. R. A. of the shipment, and have been 567; High v. State (Okla.), delivered to the consignee. In 101 Pac. 115; Scliwedes v. State re Berger, 115 Fed. 339. (Okla.), 99 Pac. 804. See State § 200 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 324 Yet where an agent of a brewing company took an order as its agent in a foreign State to deliver a keg of beer at the residence of the purchaser situated in the latter State, and the beer was shipped to and received by another agent of the company, who conveyed it to and delivered at his house before his arrival home, it was held that the trans- action amounted to a sale in the foreign State or place of delivery, and that the beer had "arrived" when it reached the station and was there delivered by the carrier to such agent and that it was then subject to the State law ; and so far as the question of interstate commerce was con- cerned it was immaterial whether the sale was made before or after the arrival of the beer.*^* To constitute an "arrival" in the State of destination, within the meaning of the Wilson Law, delivery to the consignee is essential, and merely' placing the liquors shipped in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of their destination is not such an "arrival" as Avill subject them to the State laws within the meaning of the Wilson act."^ While the AVilson Law enables a State to regulate or prohibit the sale of liquors in the original packages after it has been actually delivered to the consignee, yet it does not empower it to enact a law prohibiting the carrier delivering the package to such consignee.'^'' Delivery of the liquors to the consignee V. Moody, 70 S. C. 56; 49 S. L. Rep. 1090); State v. Intoxi- E. 8. ' eating Liquors, 102 Me. 206; 66 64 Stevens v. State, 93 Fed. 7^3. Atl. 393; Rliodes v. Iowa, 170 U. «5Heyman v. .Southern Ry. Co., S. 412; 42 L. Ed. 1088; 18 Sup. 203 U. S. 270; 27 Sup. €t. 104; Ct. 664; Stat U. 8. 147; 25 Sup. Ct. 185; 148 Fed. 894. See Norfolk & W. 49 L. Ed. 424 (reversing 95 N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 93 Va. W. 1129); Adams Exp. Co. ^. 749; 24 S. E. 83 i ; Lacey v. Commonwealth. 206 U. S. 129; Palmer, 93 Va. 159; 24 S. E. 930. 27 Sup. Ct. 006; 51 L. Ed. 987 Liquors imported before the (reversing 87 S. W. 1111; 27 Ky. Wilson law was passed, and which. 325 INTERSTATE COMMERCE. § 201 by the carrier is necessary to constitute an "arrival," whether the consignee was or was not known to the carrier, and whether or not the name used for the consignee was real or fictitious."^ In the passage of the liquor from the express office, in charge of the express company's agent, they still are in transit and have not yet "arrived" at their ultimate destination, and cannot then be seized."^ The more recent decisions hold that the word "arrival" has reference to the time when the liquors reach their destination, which is the home of the consignee, by continuous conveyance from the station to his house or place of business.*''-' Sec. 201. Liquors in transit — When transit ceases. Where liquors are subject to interstate commerce they cannot be seized while in transit, and on this point all the authorities agree ; "^ but when they have reached their destina- tion, then the aiithorities differ concerning whether they can be seized on arrival. Thus, it has been held that they may be seized while the importer retains possession of them, if he has the intent to break the original package and sell them in quantities less than a paekage.^^ But an agreement of the was then free of State control, to bring into it liquors and keep became subject to State control them for his own uses. See Crig- immediately upon passage of that Jer v. Commonwealth, 120 Ky. act. Tinker V. State, 90 Ala. '638; 512; 87 S. W. 276; 27 Ky. L. 8 So. 814; State v. Fraser, 1 N. D. Eep. 918; 87 S. W. 280; 27 Ky. 425; 48 N. W. 343. In re Spick- L. Rep. 920, 927, 281; Schwedes ler, 43 Fed. 653; 10 L. R. A. v. State, supra. 441). '*> State v. Intoxicating Liquors, G7 State V. Intoxicating Liquors, 10' Me. 206; 67 All. 312; Cres- 102 Me. 206; '67 Atl. 312. cent Liquor Co. v. Piatt, US Fed. 68 State V. Intoxicating Liquors, iS94. 101 Me. 430; 64 Atl. 812. To be in transit the goods must t59 Hudson V. State (Okla.), 101 be actually delivered to the car- Pac. 275; Moreland v. State rier. Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517; (Okla.), 101 Pac. 138; Mc- 42 L. Ed. 1088; 6 Sup. Ct. 475; Cord V. State (Okla.). 101 Adams Express Co. v. Common- Pac. 280; High v. State (Okla.), wealth (Ky.), 96 S. W. 593; 29 101 Pac. 115; Schwedes v. Ky. L. Rep. 904. State (Okla.), 104 Pac. 765. 7 1 State v. Blackwell, 65 Me. The cases hold a resident of a 656. prohibition State has the right § 201 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 326 local agent of an express company carrying liquors into a State to hold them a few days, that were shipped C. 0. D., to suit the convenience of the consignee in making the payment required, does not so change the character of the interstate commerce shipment as to render the express company liable to the State's laws, for the liquors are still in transit." Nor can they be seized in the hands of the express company."^ So where by a continuous waybill liquors were shipped from Massachusetts to Maine through Canadc, and on arrival at its destination was left on a "team track" twenty rods from the claimant's freight house, and on its arrival the claimant's serv- ants broke the car door seals and removed other merchandise, leaving the liquors in the car, and the usual practice was, in cases of shipments, to leave goods in the car two or three days on the team track, and if not claimed to take them to the freight house, it was held that they could not be seized in the car under the State law making liquors contraband, for the transportation had not ceased and could not at least until deposited in the freight house of the claimant railroad com- ])any.'^* And generally, it may be stated that notwithstanding the Wilson Law, liquors are not the subject of State pro- 's This case was decided after "3 American Express Co. v. the Wilson law went into force. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133; 4 L. Ed. Adams Express Co. v. Common- 417; 25 Sup. Ct. 182; reversing wealth, 206 U. S. 129; 27 Sup. State v. American Express Co., Ct. -eoe; 51 L. Ed. 987 (revers- 118 Iowa 447; 92 K W. 66; ing 87 S. W. 1111; 27 Ky. L. Adams Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 Hep. 1096) ; 206 U. S. 138; 27 U. S. 147; 49 L. Ed. 424; 25 Sup. Sup. Ct. «08; 51 L. Ed. 992 (re- Ct. 185 (reversing 95 N. \V. versing (Ky.); 92 S. W. 932; 1129); Crescent Liquor Co. v. •29 Ky. L. Rep. 224; 5 L. E. A. Piatt, 148 Fed. 894; American (N. S.) 630); American Express Express Co. v. Mullins, 212 U. S. Co. V. Commonwealth, 206 U. S. 311; 29 Sup. Ct. 381; 53 L. Ed. 130; 27 Sup. Ct. 609; 51 L. Ed. — . 993 (reversing (Ky.); 97 S. ^i state v. Intoxicating Liquors, W. 807; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 207; 102 Me. 206; 66 Atl. 393. Adams Express Co. v. Common- It is to be observed that under wealth (Ky.), 103 S. W. 553: the decisions of the United States 31 Ky. L. Rep. Sll to 813; Supreme Court, cited above, the American Express Co. v. Mul- transportation would not cease lins, 212 U. S. 311; 29 Sup, Ct. even if deposited in the freight 381; 63 L. Ed. house. 327 INTERSTATE COMMERCE. §202 hibition laws until delivered to the consignee, and arc subject to them on their arrival.^" Thus, it has been held that a resident of a prohibition State may there order liquors to be shipped him from another State, and may convey the same in the original package from the railroad station to his house or home/*^ The conveyance from the station to his house is a part of the interstate transportation, and is not a violation of the prohibition law there in force. ^^ The act of a drayman in taking the goods in the original package and placing it on his dray for delivery to the consignee is a part of the inter- state transportation/* Liquors thus received for family use may be kept and so used by the consignee, notwithstanding prohibition statutes/'* Sec. 202. Wilson Law's effect upon State laws. There are decisions which hold, prior to the enactment of the Wilson Law, that a State statute might be void as against -5 Rhodes V. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412; 42 L. Ed. 1088; 18 Sup. Ct. •&64. The following ca-s^-s follow this decision: State v. Winters, 44 Kan. 723; 25 Pac. 235; State v. Pfleagor, 81 Iowa, 759; 4^ N. VV. 1063; State v. Coonan, 82 Iowa, 400; 48 N. W. 921; Carstairs v. O'Donnell, 154 Mass, 357; 28 N. E. 271; State v. Corrick, 82 Iowa 451; 48 N. VV. «08 (goods on de- pot platform) ; Lemp v. Fuller- ton, S3 Iowa 192; 48 N. VV. 1034; Schendler Bottling Co. v. Welch, 42 Fed. 561; Tuchman v. Welch, 42 Fed. 548; Woolstein v. Welch, 42 Fed. &&6 ; United States v. Fis- cus, 42 Fed. 3»5; In re Beine, 42 Fed. 545. Because a statute in general terms applies to salas of liquors generally, it will not necessarily be- held void; because it may be in- valid as to imported and valid as to domestic liquors. State v. Kib- ling, 63 Vt. 636; 22 Atl. 613; Commonwealth v. Gagne, 153 Mass. 205; 26 N. E. 449. It has been held that a statute making it an ofl'ense to handle "contraband liquors in the night time" or to deliver them "in the night time" was valid, not being an interference with interstate commerce. State v. Ilolleyman (S. C), 31 S. E. 362. 76 Hudson V. Stat« ( Okla. ) , 101 Pac. 275; Moreland v. State (Okla.), 101 Pac. 138. 77McCord V. State (Okla.), 101 Pac. 280; High v. State (Okla.), 101 Pac. 115. 7sMcCord V. State (Okla.), 101 Pac. 280; Hudson v. State (Okla.), 101 Pac. 275; More- land V. State (Okla.), 101 Pac. 138. ToSchwedes v. State, 1 Okla. Cr. 245; 9Q Pac. 804. § 203 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 328 an importer of liquor in the original packages but still be valid as to domestic liquors, although in terms it applied to both liquors.^" The question, therefore, necessarily arose whether or not these laws, even though they had been declared void, were or were not to apply to imported liquors in the orig- inal packages, and were in force after the passage of the Wilson Law. At first there was some fluctuation in decisions, but the Supreme Court of the United States put the question at rest by holding that the laws were still in force and became effective as soon as the Wilson Law was enacted.^^ Sec. 203. Importing liquors for private use. It is of importance whether or not a man may import or bring into his State liquors for his own private use and for the use of his family. The authorities are practically one that he can do so, and that a State cannot prevent him doing so. "A resident of one State has the right to have shipped to him from another State alcoholic liquors when ordered by him for his and his family use, and to keep the same for such use; and the State cannot, under its police power, enact laws so as to substantially hamper or burden such constitutional right to have such shipment made and to receive and retain the same for personal use."^- The Wilson Law does not change the rule; that law simply forbids his selling the liquor brought into the State.'*'^ And the Supreme Court of the United States 80 State V. Fuller, 33 X. H. arrival are subject to the State 259; Commonwealth v. Kimball, laws; and cannot be sold if pro- 24 Pick. 359; 35 Am. Dec. 32t). hibition is there in force. State 8i/«. re Raher, 140 U. S. v. Fulker, 43 Kan. 237; 22 Pac. 545; 11 Sup. Ct. 865 (re- 1020; 7 L. A. 183. versing 43 Fed. '556 ) . To same 82 Schwedes v. State, 1 Okla. eflFect. In re Spickler, 43 Fed. Cr. 245 ; 99 Pac. 804 ; citing Vance 653; In re Vliet, 43 Fed. 761; v. Vondercook Co., 170 U. S. 438; Commonwealth v. Calhame, 154 18 Sup. Ct. 674; 42 L. Ed. 1100; Mass. 115; 27 N. E. 881; State and Heyman v. Southern Ry. Co. V. Fraser, 1 X. D. 425; 48 N. W. 203 U. S. 270; 27 Sup. Ct. 104; 343. 51 L. Ed. 178. This question now, however, is ss Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crcii- practically academic. shaw, 198 U. S. 17; 25 Sup. Ct. Liquors imported upon actual 552; 49 L. Ed. 925. 329 INTERSTATE COMMERCE. § 203 has declared that every resident of a prohibition State "is free to receive for his own use liquor from other States, and that the inhibitions of a State statute do not operate to pre- vent liquors from other States from being shipped into such State on the order of a resident for his use." ^* But this rule will not permit a brewery in one State to establish an agency in another State to sell liquors on orders given him for the purchasers' own private use, to be shipped from the State in which the liquor is manufactured, by a common carrier, directly to the purchaser.^^ Nor does it permit the bringing in of liquors for sale ; and if brought in for sale they may be seized as soon as they pass into the exclusive possession of the consignee, even though that be upon the station grounds of the carrier.*^" And although a person may import liquors for his own private use, yet if after their arrival he changes his purpose and keeps them for sale, they may be seized as contra- band goods. "After the liquors are removed to one's home on the theory that [the] same was ordered by the consignee from another State and received by him at the depot of the carrier, and also by him transported for the purpose and intention of being for his personal use, but afterwards he should change his intention and have them in his possession in his home for sale, contrary to law, the burden would be upon the Govern- ment, however, and the presumption would be in favor of the claimant, subject to be rebutted by proof. When the liquors are received at the depot by the consignee, if he then and there has the same in his possession with the intention of bartering or selling the same contrary to law, the same would, under such circumstances, be subject to forfeiture, the burden rest- si Vance v. Vandercook Co., su- ss Delameter v. South Dakota, pra; Heyman v. Southern Ry. 205 U. S. 93; 27 Sup. Ct. 447; Co., supra; Dehimetei- v. South 51 L. Ed. 724. Dakota, 205 U. S. 93; 27 Sup. S6 State v. Eighteen Casks Ct. 447; '51 L. Ed. 724; Pligh v. (Okla.), 104 Pae. 1092; Foppi- State (Okla. Cr.), 101 Pac. 115: ano v. Speed, 199 U. S. 501; 26 McCord V. State (Okla. Cr.), 101 Sup. Ct. 138; 50 L. Ed. 288. A Pac. 280; State v. Eighteen Casks sale on the carrier's premises of Beer (Okla.), 104 Pac. 1093: would he illegal. State v. Eighteen Hudson V. State (Okla. Cr.), 101 Casks, supra. Pac. 275. §§ 204, 205 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 330 ing upon the State, with the presumption likewise in favor of the claimant, subject to be rebutted by proof." " Sec. 204. Leaving liquors unreasonable length of time in carrier's possession. As is well known, if goods be left in the hands of the carrier at the place of their destination after notice by it to the con- signee of their arrival, and a sufficient length of time has elapsed after the receipt of the notice to enable him to take them from its possession, the relation of the carrier to such goods is that of warehouseman and not that of a carrier. And while the relationship between the consignee and the carrier is that of carrier, the liquors he has brought into the State is protected by the interstate commerce clause, and even after their storage. But if the consignee, after notice and full opportunity to receive them, designedly leaves them in the hands of the carrier for an unreasonable time, the conduct of the consignee, if affirmatively alleged and proven, will justify the court in holding that liquors so dealt with have come under the operation of the Wilson Law, because constructively de- li vered.^*" Sec. 205. License — Tax — Regulating sale. "The business of interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, and as the right to bring goods from another State includes the right to sell them and to solicit sales therefor, as well as to deliver the property sold, the State cannot tax the right to sell or deliver, or to solicit sales, Avhether in the form of license tax or otherwise. It is immaterial that the tax is without discrimination, as between domestic and foreign drummers, as interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all. ' ' ^^ But when 87 state V. Eighteen Casks the leaning of the court. See also (Okla.), 104 Pac. 1093; Schwedes State v. Eighteen Casks (Okla.), V. State, 1 Okla. Cr. 245; 99 Pac. 104 Pac. 1092. 804. 83 Judson on Inter. Com. ( 1st 88 This point is left undecided in ed.), § 18; citing Robbins v. Shel- Heyman v. Southern Ry. Co., 203 by County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 270; 27 Sup. Ct. 104; 51 J. S. 489; 7 Sup. Ct. 592; 30 L. L. Ed. 178; but evidently that is Ed. 604; McCullough v. Mary- 331 INTERSTATE COMMERCE. § 205 liquors have reached their destination in the State, they may be taxed as property in common with other property in the State, if the tax be levied without d'scriminution between domestic and non-domestic goodsj^" whethorthey are in original packages or not ; and this was true before the day of' the Wilson act.^^ But the Wilson Law, so far as intoxicating liquors are concerned, has relaxed the rules in a measure on this subject. Thus, where the State of Tennessee exacted a license fee from a person engaged in selling licjuors within the State on a ferry boat employed between th-it State and Arkansas in interstate commerce, it Avas held that the Federal statute authorized the enactment of the State law, and that the license fee could be exacted.^- And a license tax imposed upon those engaged in selling beer by the barrel is valid, even though the barrels sold are original packages, a statute or ordi- nance exacting the license being merely an exercise of the police law, although the State or city derives more or less revenue thereby."" So a law requiring all liquors received from without the State to be inspected, and all sold within the State to be also inspected, is a valid exercise of the police power and is permitted under the Wilson act."^ But a State land, 4 Wheat. 310; 4 L. Ed. 479; So. 826; Richard v. Mobile, 20S and Brown v. Maryland, 12 U. S. 480; 28 Sup. Ct. 372; 52 Wheat. 419; 6 L. Ed. 678; Sin- L. Ed. — ; Jones v. Yokum Clair V. State, 69 N. C. 47. (S. D.), 123 N. W. 272; Corn- so American Steel & Wire Co. monwealth v. Newhall, 164 Mass. V. Speed, 192 U. S. 500; 24 Sup. 338; 41 N. E. 647; Kohn v. Melch- Ct. 365; 48 L. Ed. 538. er, 29 Fed. 433; State v. Wheel- 91 Woodrutr V. Parham, 8 Wall. ock, 95 Iowa, 577; 64 N. W. (>20; 123; 19 L. Ed. 382; Brown v. 30 L. R. A. 429. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; 29 L. Ed. Contra. In re Lebolt, 77 Fed. 257; Pittsburg, etc. Coal Co. v. 587. Bates, 156 U. S. 577; 30 L. Ed. o< Pabst Brewing Co. v. Cren- 538. shaw, 198 U. S. 17; 25 Sup. Ct. 92 Foppiano v. Speed, 199 U. S. 552; 49 L. Ed. 925; affirming 501; 26 Sup. Ct. 138; 50 L. Ed. 120 Fed. 144; State v. Bixman, — (affirming 113 Tenn. 167; 82 162 Mo. 1; 62 S. W. 828. S. W. 222); Harrell v. Speed, 113 This statute was held not to Tenn. 224; 81 S. W. 840. app'V' '" 'ts construction to beer 03 Phillips V. Mobile, 208 U. S. shipped through the State to an- -^72; 28 Sup. Ct. 370: 52 L. Ed. other State. Pabst Brewing Co. — ; affirming 146 Ala. 138; 40 v. Crenaliaw. 120 Fed. 144. § 205 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 332 cannot require lifjiiors temporarily stored in a State, on their transit for convenience in distributing them in other States, to be inspected and exact a fee for such inspection. ^'^ A statute of Michigan provided for an annual tax of five hundred dollars on wholesalers and another annual tax of sixty-five dollars on the brewing of liquor, and that no person paying the brewing tax should pay a wholesaler's 'tax on the liquor brewed under the brewer's tax. It defined wholesalers to be those who sell liquors in quantities of more than three gallons, or more than one dozen quart bottles at a time to any person. It was held that this statute was not in restraint of interstate commerce on the ground that wholesalers of brewed liquors were required to pay an annual tax while brewers were only required to pay sixty-five dollars and not to pay the whole- saler's tax, because in the sale of liquor at a brewery the sale was not at wholesale, the statute forbidding a brewer to establish a warehouse or place of sale elsewhere than at his brewery without the payment of a wholesaler's tax. The statute was held to apply to a foreign brewery sending liquors into the State for storage and sale therein by its agent.^*^ A provision of the Constitution of Louisiana provides that no domestic or foreign corporation shall do any business within the State without having at least ono known place of business therein and an authorized agent within the State on whom service of process can be made. A foreign corporation sold liquors within tlie State, to be shipped from Kentucky to New 95Pabst Brewing Co. v. Cren- 398; 91 N. W. G'24; 9 Detroit shaw, 120 Fed. 144. In this case Leg. N. 377; Indianajjolis v. Biel- it was held that the provision er, 138 Ind. 30; 36 N. E. 857. in the statute that beer made in (In this Indiana case it was held the State and exported for sale that a city could pass an ordi- outside of it should be inspected nance requiring a license of all free of charge, was one of which wliolesalers, but not merely of a foreign manufacturer could not foreign brewers.) Minneapolis complain, and was not an illegal Brewing Co. v. McGillivray, 104 discrimination, since the inspec- Fed. 25'8 ; New Iberia v. Erath, tion fee was charged alike on all 118 La. 305; 42 So. 945; State v. beer sold within the State, re- Bengsch, 170 Mo. 81; 70 S. VV. gardless of whore it was made. 710. 90 People V. Voorhis, 131 Mich. 333 INTERSTATE COMMERCE. § 206 Orleans, and took notes for the purchase price. These notes were payable in New Orleans. It was held that the trans- action was valid— an act of interstate commerce — and was, therefore, not within the provision of the State Constitution.^'^ Sec. 206. Prohibiting solicitation of orders. Unable to prohibit the shipment of intoxicating liquors into the State, several States have enacted laws prohibiting the soliciting of orders for liquors by agents of liquor dealers of other States, and several of these statutes come under the consideration of the courts. Thus, in Georgia, a State statute prohibited the solicitation of orders for liquors in a prohibition county, and it was held that the law was not void on the ground that it conflicts with the power of Congress to regulate and control interstate commerce, even though the seller and liquor sold be in another State.**^ So a statute making it an offense to act as an agent of either a vendor or purchaser of liquor in any territory of the State in which a sale is prohibited is not in contravention of the Federal Con- 97 Julius Kessler & Co. v. E. F. An ordinance requiring dealers Perilloux & Co., 127 Fed. 1011. in liquors to procure a license A statute requiring all persons from a city applies to a non-res- soliciting orders for liquors in a ident manufacturer who maintains State, the liquors thereafter to be a depot in a city from which sales shipped into the State to pay a are made by an agent, whether specified tax is void. Slgman v. such sales are made to 'licensed Williams D. C. Moebs Co., 139 dealers or consumers. Duluth Mich. 334; 102 N. W. 854; 11 Brewing Co. v. Superior, 123 Fed. Detroit Leg. X. 857. (Contra, 353. People V. Walling, 53 Mich. 204; Construction of Georgia Act, 18 N. W. 807.) 1896, p. 26. Smith v. State, 101) Several cases have held that a Ga. 227; 34 S. E. 325; Acme statute requiring all dealers sell- Brewing Co. v. Fletcher, 109 Ga. ing liquors in the State to take 463; 34 S. E. 558. out a license is valid. Keller v. 98 Rose v. State, 4 Ga. App. State, 11 Md. 525; 09 Am. Dec. 588; 62 S. E. 117. 226; IncrersoU v. Skinner, 1 Denio This decision took iiifo consid- 640; Fincannon v. State, 93 Ga. eration the Wilson law. State 418; 21 S. E. 53; but of those v. Davis (». C), 66 S. E. 875; cases it cannot be said that they State v. Miller (W. Va.), 66 S, are sound. E. 522. § 206 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 334 stitution.^* And in Ohio it is held that a sale of an original package of liquor by an agent of a manufacturer located in another State is a violation of the local law ar>d the agent cannot claim protection on the ground of an interstate trans- action.^ On the other hand, it has been decided that the Wilson Law providing that liquors carried into a State shall be subject to local police regulations has no application to a sale of liquors by a traveling salesman where the liquors sold are to be transported into the State.- And where it was shown that a defendant had solicited orders for liquors, that he received an order which he filled out on a house in another State, that afterwards the Mquor came C. 0. D. by express and the consignee paid the express company the charges but he paid the defendant nothing for the liquor, it was held that the sale was protected by the interstate clause, although the defendent received a commission on all orders for liquors taken by him if the liquor was accepted by the consignees, but if not accepted it was shipped back at defendant's expense.^ So a Michigan statute was held void which provided that anyone who comes into or brings into the State liquor or sells liquor to citizens of the State at wholesale, or solicits or takes orders for liquors to be shipped into the Stat€ or furnished at wholesale to any person within the State by any person not a resident of the State nor having his principal place of business therein, shall pay a tax specified, is invalid.* So a statute making it an offense to solicit orders in a State for liquors to be shipped into another State, with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the liquors were to be brought back into the State in violation of its laws, was held to be a regulation of commerce and void.* And a like decision was also made that the law was not valid »9Hart V. state, 87 Miaa. 171; ^Sloman v. William D. U. 39 So. 523. Moebs Co., 139 Mich. 334; 102 N. 1 Stevens v. State. Gl Ohio St. W. 854; 11 Del. Leg. N. 857. h597 ; 5<5 N. E. 478. n Durkee v. Moses, 67 N. H. 2Moog V. State (Ala.), 41 So. 115; 23 Atl. 793. (Overruling 166. Dunbar v. Locke, 62 N. H. 442, 3 Donley v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. and Jones v. Surprise, 64 N. H. App. 567; 89 S. W. 553. 243; 9 AU. 384.) 335 INTERSTATE COMMERCE. § 206 by reason of the Wilson act having been enacted.^ And a like decision has been rendered by the Supreme Court of Iowa, where it was sought to punish under the Iowa statute a travel- ing salesman soliciting orders for liquors to be shipped C. 0. D. by his principal in Illinois, the liquor being shipped from the latter State. The order, however, was subject to the acceptance or rejection by his principal.^ And a like decision was rendered by a United States Circuit Court of Appeals, where the liquors purchased w^ere for the private use of the purchaser.* The salesman had solicited orders in Kansas. About the same time the Supreme Court of Kansas held the statute of that State on the subject unconstitutional.® But it has been held by a Federal Court of Appeals that the laws of New Hampshire making it unlawful to solicit or take orders in the State for liquor to be delivered without the State, when the solicitor had reason to believe that it was the in- tention of the purchaser to sell the liquor illegally, was constitutional ; '^° and a similar statute, without a clause con- cerning the evasion of the law, has been held valid recently in Illinois.^ ^ It has been held in Texas that a statute making it a misdemeanor "to solicit an order for the sale" of intoxi- cating liquors in prohibition territory was void, because in violation of the interstate commerce law.^- And it has also oCorbin v. McC'onnell, 71 N. 125 U. S. 465; 8 Sup. Ct. 689, H. 350; 52 Atl. 447. 1062; 31 L. Ed. 700. 7 State V. Hanaphy, 117 Iowa n People v. McBride, 234 III. 15; 90 N. W. 601; Wind v. Her, 146; 84 N. E. «65. 93 Iowa, 316; 61 N. W. 1001; 27 A statute attempting to make L. R. A. 219. the agent of a common carrier the 8 /n re Beigen, 115 Fed. 339. vendor of liquors he delivers to 9 State V. Hickox, 64 Kan. persons in the State, except to 650; 68 Pac. 35. Recently such persons having State licenses to a statute has been held valid in sell or to the bona f.de consignee that State. State v. Wm. J. thereof who has in good faith Lemp Brewing Co. (Kan.), 102 ordered the liquors for his own Pac. 504. use, is unconstitutional. Crescent See Kohn v. Melcher, 29 Fed. Liquors Co. v. Piatt, 148 Fed. 433. 894. 10 Long V. Linch, 38 Fed. 489; 4 ^^ Ex parte Massey (Tex. Civ. L. R. 831, distinguishing Bow- App.); 92 S. W. 1086; Ex parte man v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., Hackney (Tex. Civ. App.), 92 S. §§ 207-209 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 336 been held that a statute making it an offense to solicit orders for liquor in such territory through agents, circulars, posters, or newspaper advertisements, was valid/^ Sec. 207. Sales beyond State lines. A State has no power bej^ond its own territorial limits. It, therefore, cannot make it an offense for one of its own citizens where he goes into another State and there sells liquors he has manufactured in his own State in violation of its own laws.^* Sec. 208. Sales to minors and drunkards. The interstate laws, however, cannot be stretched so far as to enable an importer to sell liquors to a minor or drunkard in violation of a State statute.^^ Yet a statute making it an oft'ense to knowingly furnish liquor to an inebriate is, as applied to the transportation of liquors by a common carrier from one State to another, unconstitutional, because a regula- tion of interstate commerce.^® Sec. 209. Burden on defendant to show he is protected by the interstate commerce law. The burden is upon a defendant who is charged with violating the State's liquor laws, if his defense is that he is an importer, to show: (1) that he is either an importer or agent of an importer; (2) that in such capacity he received the liquor in question from a State or foreign country; (3) that in such capacity he sold or held this importation by the original unbroken packages; and (4) that he was not making his house or place of business a saloon or tippling place for the rendezvous of persons, thus bringing it within the police power of the State to declare it a nuisance.^" The tona fides W. 1092; Carter v. State (Tex. A. (502; Commonwealth v. Silver- Civ. App.), 92 S. W. 1093. man, 138 Pa. St. 642; 22 Atl. "Zinn V. State (Ark.), 114 S. 13. W. 227; State v. J Bass Co., 104 le Adams Express Co. v. Com- Me. 288; 71 Atl. '894. monwealth, 214 U. S. 218; 29 i*Lindley v. State (Ark.), Sup. Ct. 633. 120 S. W. 9«?. 17 State v. Chapman, 1 S. D. 15 Commonwealth V. Zelt, 138 414; 47 N. W. 411. Pa. St. 615; 21 All. 7; 11 L. R. 337 INTERSTATE COMMERCE, §§ 210-212 of his agency is a question for the jury.'*' The size of the package, however, is not a criterion of the lawfulness of the sale.^^ Sec. 210. Liability of officer serving warrant. If an officer is directed by a warrant to seize liquors that are not liable to seizure because of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution, he is justified in making the seizure, and the warrant is a protection to him. Whether or not the liquor is a commodity within the protection of that clause is a question for the court issuing the warrant and not one to be determined by the officer as a condition precedent to the ex- ecution of his warrant.-** Sec. 211. Shipping liquor under false brand. A statute of the United States-^ makes it an offense for any person to ship liquors under any other than their proper brand, and inflicts as a penalty the forfeiture of the liquors, and renders him subject to a fine of $500. This statute is regarded as highly penal in its character and is strictly eon- strued.-- Sec. 212. Carrier refusing to accept liquors for transpor- tation. "While it is the duty of a common carrier to accept all goods, in a safe or reasonable condition, for transportation, without discrimination, yet it may adopt a rule by which it can decline to receive shipments of liquors C. 0. D., if the rule applies to all shippers and all locations alike, where the acceptance of such business has resulted in a loss to the company and detri- ment to its business throuiih unclaimed packages, and has 18 Commonwealth v. Bushman, 20 Kalloch v. Newbort (Me.^ 72 138 Pa. St. 639; 21 Atl. 12; Com- Atl. 736. monwealth v. Pendergast, 138 Pa. =1 U. S. Rev. St. §3449; U. S. St. 633; 21 Atl. 12. See Austin Camp. St. [1901] p. 2277. V. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343; 45 22 United States v. Twenty L. Ed. 224; 21 Sup. Ct. 132. Boxes of Corn Liquor, 123 Fed. 19 In re Beine, 42 Fed. 545. 135, affirmed 133 Fed. 910; 67 C. €. A. 214. § 212 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 338 had a tendency to annoy or drive its patrons away from it.^' And if liquors in its possession be seized by the officers of the State to which it is consigned as contraband goods, the carrier may notify the consignor or consignee of the seizure, and request him to defend, and he will then be bound by whatever judgment be rendered, even though the judgment was rendered on default.'* 23Burk V. Piatt, 172 Fed. 777; 2* American Express Co. v. Mul- Davis Hotel Co. v. Piatt, 172 lins, 212 U. S. 311; 29 Sup. Ct Fed. 175. 381; 53 L. Ed. — . CHAPTER IV. EEGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. SECTION. 213. Extent of discussion in this chapter. 214. Statoitory requirements as to location of barroom. 215. Arrangement of room. 21fi. Screens and curtains. 217. Removal of saloon. 218. Keeping more than one bar — Barroom. 219. More than one license. 220. Beneficial interest in more than one license. 221. Lamp burning until closing time. 222. Keeping door locked. 223. List of employes. 224. Music in saloon. 225. Obstruction of officer's en- trance on premises. 226. Display of license. 227. Signs. 228. Salo in unmarked measure. 229. Registration of sales. 230. Sales on credit. 231. Entering saloon in viola- tion of orders not an of- fense. 232. Permitting minors to "en- ter and remain" in a sa- loon. 233. Minor willfully misstating his age. 234. Permitting drunkenness on premises — iSelling to drunken man. SECTION. 235. Found drunk on licensed premises. 236. Power to exclude drunken man from premises. 237. Permitting employe to drink storage liquors — Premises. 238. Women in saloons — Wine rooms. 239. Prostitutes visiting premises. 240. Permitting premises to be a brothel. 241. Knowingly harboring thief on premises. 242. Gambling on premises. 243. Suflering gambling or bet- ting on premises — English statute. 244. iServant permitting gam- bling — Knowledge of Gam- ing. 245. Keeping a betting house. 246. Public dispensarj'. 247. Sales by public agents. 248. Agent's liability on hia bond. 249. Transportation or convey- ance of liquors. 250. Limiting number of saloons. 251. Saloon for negroes. 252. Liquor sales carried on with other business. 253. Criminal Liability of own- er and landlords. 254. Police regulations, enforce- ment by mandamus. 339 §§213,214 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 340 Sec. 213. Extent of discussion in this chapter. In many of the other chapters have heeu discussed ques- tions relating to the regulation of the liquor traffic and the sales of intoxicating liquors. This is particularly true of the concerning the constitutionality of statutes and the powers of municipalities to control and regulate the traffic. Necessarily these discussions are not to be repeated. In this chapter is discussed not so much the power to regulate as the extent to which the power in particular instances has been carried — a construction of statutes upon the subject ; and in addition thereto have been added some instances not easy to classify under any head. Sec. 214. Statutory requirements as to location of bar- room. The opposition to the retail sale of intoxicating liquors has at times taken on almost fantastic rules and regulations. Thus, in some instances, statutes have required the removal of all tables and chairs from where liquors are sold for con- sumption, while other States require all liquors to be served at tables where the consumer can be seated thereat while drinking the liquor he has purchased. In the history of the temperance movement statutes have required all evidence of drinking to be screened from the public, so there would ^e as little allurement or enticement held out to the youth as pos- sible, and where the evidence of drinking would not be flaunted in the face of the public. Then statutes have been enacted forbidding sales of liquor to be consumed on the premises where sold. All these statutes are simply expressions of opinions concerning what measures tend to suppress intem- perance and are evidences of efforts in that direction. By com- pelling the sale of liquors in the open view it is the belief of many that, owing to the public obloquy cast upon the use of intoxicating liquors, men would refrain from drinking in- toxicating liquors in view of the public, and not being able to procure it elsewhere by the drink would, in a large measure, at least, refrain from its use. AVith this end in view statutes have been enacted compelling the location of saloons on the 341 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. § 214 public streets with the entrance opening thereon, and even forbidding, in a few States, any other entrance, And they often require the view of the saloon to be unobstructed, at least during the time liquors may not be sold. In the latter instance the object is to prevent violations of the law, and if such violations do occur, then to render them easy of detection. Thus, a statute of Iowa required liquors to be sold in "a single room having but one entrance or exit, and that opening upon a public business street." While it was in force a saloon had one entrance opening into the street and another opening into an office, and this office had an exit upon another street. It was held that this was not a compliance with its provisions.^ In that same State the "mulct" law required the liquor traffic to be conducted in a single room opening into the street and the bar to be established ' ' in plain view of the street," unobstructed in any way; and it was held that a saloon located in a basement, with the bar thirty-five feet from the sidewalk, having the tops of its windows but four feet above such walk, was a violation of that law.^ So sales in a small room, cut off from the barroom by a partition, in which is kept food from which to supply lunches to customers of the barroom, is not permitted by this statute ; "" and so is the use of a cellar, though having an entrance from the street, in which to store beer, when used in connection with the bar- room.* But the statute has no relation to a brewery which operates a saloon in connection therewith, though the saloon be a nuisance in law.^ This Iowa law forbids all connection of the saloon with other rooms in the building, and a con- nection with a cellar below it is prohibited." In that State, where the saloon was located in a basement, reached by a 1 Ritchie v. Zalesky, 98 Iowa * Garrett v. Bishop, supra ; 689; 67 N. W. 399; Schlosser v. State v. Bussannis, 108 Iowa 11; Mould (Iowa), 121 N. W. 520. 78 N. W. 700; Bartel v. Hobson, 2 McColl V. Rally, 127 Iowa 633; 107 Iowa €44; 78 N. W. 689. 103 K W. 972. -I Orke v. McManiis (Iowa), 115 3 Garrett v. Bishop, 113 Iowa N. \V. 580. 23; '84 N. W. 923; State v. Bus- "Jones v. Byiujrtou, 128 Iowa samus, 108 Iowa 11; 78 N. W. 397; 104 N. W. 473. 700; State v. Kline, 107 Minn. 1S4; 119 N.W. 656 (wine stalls). § 214 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 342 long passage way from the street, it was held not to comply with the statute.'^ Even where beer was kept in a cold storage warehouse several blocks away and removed to the saloon as needed, it was held to be a violation of the statute, the traffic not being conducted "in a single room."'* But where a statute made it unlawful to keep liquor at one's place of business, the keeping of liquor in a room used solely for storage, which is locked and only opened when, liquors are to be taken out, to which the public is not invited and where no business is transacted, is not a violation of its provisions, for a place of business within the meaning of such statute is a public place of business in contradistinction to a private place of business. In such an instance the w-ord "business" is not synonymous with the employment, vocation, or even occupa- tion, but is used in the sense of trade, commerce or traffic.** So where saloon keepers were forbidden to construct any booth, stall or enclosure of any kind in connection with their saloons, enclosures used for secret lounging, drinking and immoral practices were illegal, though others connected therewith were innocently maintained and necessary.^" A statute requiring a saloon to be located on the irround floor, and front on a public street, provided with windows or glass doors, does not apply to a cold storage warehouse from which liquors are sold in wholesale nuantities and not for consumption there." A statute of this kind applies to persons who obtained their licenses before it was adopted.^- Thoush the statute requires the applicant to distinctly give a description where the saloon is to be located for which he applies for a license, and the licensing board can orlv issue a license for the place described 7 McColl V. Rally, 127 Iowa, 633; v. Slentz, 27 Ind. App. 557; 61 103 N. W. 972. N. E. 793; Slentz v. State, 27 8 Bell V. Hamm, 127 Iowa 343; Ind. App. 956; <51 N. E. 956. 101 N. W. 475. (These last two cases are on the 9 Roberts v. State, 4 Ga. App. sufliciency of an indictment un- 207; CO S. E. 1082. der the statute referred to.) 10 State V. Barge, 82 Minn. 256; 12 Nelson v. State, 17 Ind. App. 84 N. W. 911; State v. Kline, 403; 46 N. E. 941. See also Peo- 107 Minn. 184; 119 N. W. 656. pie v. White, 127 Mich. 428; 86 iiTeegarden v. State, 39 Ind. N. W. 992; 8 Detroit Leg. N. 397. App. 15; 79 N. E. 211. See State 343 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. § 215 in such application, yet their action in granting the license is not an adjudication that the room licensed complies with the statute; and if it does not, and the licensee conducts a liquor business therein, he may be prosecuted. '=* Under such a statute a room situated in a hotel back of the cloak room is a violation of its provisions, though it had long been maintained there.'^ Where a statute required a retailer of liquors to pro- vide a room for their sale separate and apart from any other business of any kind, and it was shown that the accused leased two rooms, in one of which he had his bar, the other one he sub- let to his barkeeper for a card and pool room, in which the barkeeper served liquors from the bar, that the accused paid the light and water bills for the back room, owned all the furniture in it, honored checks with his initials on them given to customers of the pool room by giving liquor in exchange for them at his bar, and received a share of the profits arising from the operation of the pool room, it was held that he was interested in the pool room and had violated the provisions of the statute above referred to.^^ Sec. 215. Arrangement of room. The use of chairs and tables in a barroom or saloon may be forbidden, and a municipality may adopt an ordinance to this effect. ^° So the State may forbid lounging places or wine rooms connected with the saloon or barroom.^"* So the Legis- lature may provide that liquor shall be sold only in a single 13 State V. Harrison, 162 Ind. fill them from another room where 64*2; 70 N. E. 877. See Gray v. it is stored is not a sale "in a 'Commonwealth, 9 Dana 300; 35 single room having but one en- Am. Dec. 136. trance or exit, and that opening 1* People V. White, 127 Mich. on a business street," the orders 428; 816 N. W. 992; S Detroit being delivered in the saloons Leg. N. 397; Schlosser v. Mould and there paid for. Battel v. (Iowa), 121 N. W. 520. Hobson, 107 Iowa 644; 78 N. W. In Nova Scotia a statute of this 689. kind has been upheld. Queen v. is Brown v. Lutz, 36 Neb. 527; McDonald, 26 N. S. 402. 54 N. W. 860. 15 Mason V. State, 170 Ind. 195; lo* State v. Kline (Iowa), 83 N. K. 613. 119 N. W. 656. To solicit orders in saloons and § 216 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 344 room, having only one entrance or exit; and a room having a front entrance and also a back door unlocked, three feet above the ground, with no steps leading up to it, is a violation of its provisions.^^ Sec. 216. Screens or curtains. A statute requiring all screens and blinds to be removed so that there may be an unobstructed view of the bar and bar- room does not apply to wholesalers but only to retailers.^* Where the interior of the room can only be seen by stooping down and peering through a slot blind, the statute is violated, for the statute requires a clear view of the entire interior of the room without making unusual efforts to obtain it." The statute applies to Sundays as well as to week days; -" and to common vietualer's licensed to sell liquor.^^ But if a liquor dealer has a room which fronts upon two streets, and he puts a partition through its center crosswise so as to make two rooms, one fronting on each street, and then obtains a license for each room, he is not required to remove such partition on the theory that the view of both places must be from both streets.-" The entire premises must be kept open to view, not merely the place where sales are made.^^ If screens be up the offense is committed, though no police officer has Instate V. Roney, 133 Iowa Smith, 145 Mich. 530; 108 N. W. 416; 110 X. W. 604. 1072; 13 Det. L. X. 651. isRitcliie v. Zalesky, 98 Iowa 21 Commonwealth v. Salmon, 589; 67 X. W. 399; Queen v. 136 Mass. 431. Power, -28 Xov. Sco. 373 (stat- 22 Commonwealth v. Barnes, ute valid). 140 Mass. 447; 5 N. E. 252; Com- 19 Commonwealth v. Costello, monwealth v. Sansville, 140 133 Mass. 192. Mass. 450; 5 X. E. 254. An employe does not violate the 23 .Commonwealth v. Worcester, statute where he has nothing 141 Mass. 58; 6 N. E. 700; Com- whatever to do with placing or monwealth v. Kane, 143 Mass. maintaining the screens. In re 92; 8 X. E. 880; Xelson v. State, Adamek (Xeb.), 118 X. W. 109. 17 Ind. App. 403; 46 X. E. 941; 20 Commonwealth v. Auberton Componovo v. .State, (Tex. Cr. 133 Mass. 404; Commonwealth v. App.); 39 S. W. 1114; X^elson Casey, 134 Mass. 194; People v. v. State, 17 Ind. App. 403; 46 N. E. 941. 345 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. § 216 ordered them taken down or notified the saloon keeper they were so kept up as to violate the hiw.-* Curtains that so obscure the room that it cannot be seen from the outside how the business is conducted, is a violation of the statute, although other parts of the room can be plainly seen ; and it is im- material for what purpose the curtains are maintained.-"' The maintenance of a painted glass window is a screen if it ob- scures the view of the interior ; -" but the closing of one shutter to a window, if another window affords a view of the entire room, is not an offense.-^ In Massachusetts it is held that the statute applies to a druggist selling liquors."** The running of a partition through the licensed room and using the part cut off for another purpose, is not a violation of the law if the part in which liquor is sold is open to the view of the public.-^ In proving the offense, where tlie statute re- quires the barroom to be open to the public from the street or alley, it is not necessary to show that the street or alley had been dedicated to the public ; it is sufficient to show that it was open to the use of the public."" If the licensee's servant place a screen so as to hide the barroom, the licensee will be liable for his act.^^ It is immaterial to the commission of the offense that the licensee is not, in fact, carrying on the liquor traffic when the screens are up ; ^- and one not licensed may commit the offense/''^ It is a question of fact for the jury 2* Commonwealtli V. Roiislio, 141 tk)uo Febur Sterlin4; 12 Austr. L. T. States v. Fortin, 1 Phillipine 299. 83. In New York when the outer 60 Ellis V. Dempster, 12 Austr. door of a hotel is open a police L. T. 216. officer maj^ go into every part of 61 Buttons V. Justices, 16 Vict. the hotel to search for violators L. R. 604; 12 Austr. L. T. 83. of the law, and forcible exclusion 62 Devine v. O. Sullivan, 23 from any room in it constitutes Vict. L. R. 75; 19 Austr. L. T. 3; resistance to an officer. People v. 3 Austr. L. R. (C. N.) 33. Miller, 79 N. Y. St. 1122. One who throw^s to the ground §§ 226-228 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 352 Sec. 226. Display of license. If a statute requires a dealer to post up in a conspicuous place in his saloon his license, a failure to do so will render him liable; ana there must be a substantial compliance with its provisions and not a posting up where it will be difficult to see it. The object of such a statute is twofold: one, that the officers of the law ma3^ easily ascertain whether or not the liquor dealer is selling liquor in violation of the law; and the other, that his would-be customers may ascertain if they are assisting him in its violation by purchasing liquors from him.®^ "Where a statute required a license to be displayed in a window facing the street from which a door was opened into a room in which liquors were sold, it was held that it was violated by placing it on a wall in the room, though it could be plainly seen thereon through a portion of the window not covered by the window curtain.®* Sec. 227. Signs. A statute forbade the use of a sign for a saloon where none was situated, and a licensed dealer on the expiration of his license took out a license for a temperance hotel, but left his saloon sign up, reading, "North California Hotel, Joseph Loiseau, " taking away that part of the sign indicating that he had a license to sell intoxicating liquors. It was held that he had not violated the statute by maintaining an improper sign.**^ Sec. 228. Sale in unmarked measure. In England liquor sold at retail and not in a cask or bottle in a quantity of a half pint or over must be sold "in measures marked according to the imperial standards," and if the sale be made in an unmarked measure a penalty is in- curred and the measure liable to forfeiture. "*'• In construing this statute it is said by an acknowledged authority : ®^ " The penalty in this section is incurred only by the person who sells es Schwartz v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. Leg. 139. See King v. Orland, 8 Rep. 387; 24 S. W. 28. Cr. Can. Cas. 208. 84 /n re Chapman (N. Y.), 0035 and 36 Vict. c. 94, §8. 119 N. Y. Snpp. 352. C7 Patterson's Licensing Acts esCarpeau v. Loiseau, 12 Rev. (19 ed.), p. 355. 353 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. § 228 or suffers his servants to sell and act in contravention of the section. There may be cases where the keeper of the house shows successfully that he did not suffer his servants to sell in measures not marked, as where the servant has, in disregard of his order, so sold. This penalty will apply to unlicensed as well as licensed persons selling, and is a cumulative pen- alty. A publican who uses earthen mugs, and serves cus- tomers with them, impliedly represents them to be of imperial measure, and if they are unstamped they will be liable to seizure.*"* It has been held that if a customer asks for a quan- tity of liquor, not under any usual denomination of imperial capacity, but by some local name, and the quantity supplied equals or exceeds half a pint, as, for example, a 'blue of beer,' which is about one-third of a quart, the seller is liable under this section." "^ "A man asked for a 'schooner' of beer at a public house, a schooner being a glass tumbler capable of hold- ing about a third of a quart. He was supplied with one filled from the counter pump, and paid 2 d. It was held by the Court of Justiciary in Scotland that he [the seller] had contravened an enactment corresponding to Section 8. ™ But where the customer asks for a glass of beer or other quantity which is not a known legal measure of capacity, and which does not exceed or equal half a pint, then no offense will be committed by the seller, whatever may be the capacity of the glass."'' "In Addy v. Blake," B went into a licensed 68 Citing Regina v. Aulton, 30 than half a pint, in measures L. J. M. C. 129; 25 J. P. 69; 3 marked according to imperial E. & E. 508; 3 L. T. 699; 9 standards. That is general and W. R. 278; 16 Cox C. C. 259; imperative." /6jd., per Hawkins, J. Washington v. Young, 19 L. J. ^o Set forth at the beginning of Exch. 348; 5 Exch. 403. this section. Citing Riddell v. 69 "Notwithstanding the Weights Neilson, 5 F. (J. C.) 57. and Measures Act [1878] (41 and 7i Citing Craig v. MePhee, 10 42 Vict. c. 49), §22." Citing €t. Sess. Cas. (4th series) 51; 48 Payne v. Thomas, 60 L. J. M. C. J. P. 115. "It is under this sec- 3; '53 J. P. 824; 63 L. T. 456; tion a person may be convicted 17 Cox €. C. 212; 39 W. R. 240. for selling by the 'long pull.'* "The language of §8 [above Patterson's Licensing Act (19th quoted in part] is that every per- Ed.), p. 356. son shall sell all liquors, if not "19 Q. B. Div. 478; 51 J. P. in cask or bottle, or if not less 599; 56 L. T. 711; 35 W. R. 710. § 229 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 354 house of A and asked for a pint of beer. A went into the back parlors, poured the liquor into a stamped measure not seen by B, and then into a jug, and delivered the jug to B, and the court held that this was not a selling by imperial measure, as the measure was not seen by B, and, therefore, A had committed the offense under this section. Smith, J., said : ' What was done did not amount to a sale in a stamped measure, which is the obvious requirement of Section 8.' Wills, J., said: 'The beer was sold when it was placed before the customer and not till then.' " ^^ Where a pint was asked for, and a marked vessel filled with beer and then poured into the customer's jug, and then one gill more was pumped into it as a "long pull," and then the jug handed to the purchaser, it was held that the seller was not guilty of selling in an un- marked measure."^ Sec. 229. Registration of sales. In a very few States statutes have been enacted requiring the registration of sales and also requiring reports to be made at certain times to designated officers. In Iowa, the statute required those reports to be made "on the last Saturday of every month" to the auditor of the county, "showing the kind and quantity of liquors sold and purchased;" but the court held that the statute was not mandatory concerning the exact time of making the report and that it was sufficient to make it at any time before a suit was begun to recover the penalty inflicted for a neglect to report ; "^ but afterwards the statute was amended so as to make it mandatory to report at 73 For a decision under the livered, and not such as are com- Weights and Measures Act, see monly so sold or delivered." Fern- Bellamy V. Pow. CO J. P. 712; 1 , dale v. Dillon [1907], 2 K. B. T. L. R. 527. 513; 76 L. J. K. B. 922; 97 L. T. 74 Pennington V. Pincock [1908], 284; 71 J. P. 374; 21 €ox C. C. 2 K. B. 244; 77 L. J. K. B. 537; 500; but this decision has been 98 L. T. 804; 72 J. P. 199; 6 L. disapproved in Jones v. Sherving- G. R. 830; 24 T. L. R. 509. ton [1908], 2 K. B. 539; 77 L. R. The plirase "such intoxicating K. B. 771; 99 L. T. 57; 72 J. P. liquors as are sold or delivered 381; 24 T. L. R. 693. in corked or sealed vessels" means 75 Abbott v. Sartori, i57 Iowa, such as are in fact so sold or de- &5^; 11 N. W. 626. 355 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. § 230 the time fixed by it ; '" and it was held also that all sales or prescriptions must be reported." In Vermont, the statute gave a form to be used, and in it was a requirement not required by the statute itself; and it was held that the form in this respect need not be complied with.'''^ In this instance the statute prescribed the form in which the liquor seller should keep an account of his sales, but it was held that if he kept the form in a different manner, yet had the same entries as the statute required, there was a sufficient compliance with its provisions.'^" A failure to keep the record as the statute requires renders a town agent for the sale of liquors liable; '^'* but a statute requiring him to keep a "book and enter therein the date of every sale made by him, the person to whom sold, the kind, quantity, and price thereof, and the purpose for which sold, substantially in the following form [setting out a tabulated form]," does not require the book to be in tabular form.*^ Sec. 230. Sales on credit. Sales on credit may be forbidden ; *- but such a statute is construed strictly and not extended to persons not clearly within its provisions, as one prohibiting an innkeeper giving credit will not be extended to a retail grocer selling liquor. "^-^ 78 state V. McEntee, m Iowa, Campbell, 71 Ind. 512; Evansville 381; 27 N. W. 265. Bank v. Button, 105 U. S. 322. 77 State V. Chamberlin, 74 Iowa 79 Barnard v. Houghton's Es- 266; 37 N. W. 326. tate, 34 Vt. 264. 7s Barnard v. Houghton's Es- As to druggicts' report of sales, tate, 34 Vt. 2<64. see index. It may be added that in Indi- so Wenham v. Dodge, 9i8 Mass. ana, where the statutory tax 474. schedules, that the owner of prop- siWenham v. Dodge, 9S Mass. erty was required to use, differed 474. from the pixivisions of the stat- ^- Kizer v. Randleman, 50 N. €. ute, the schedule controlled. Was- 428. son V. First National Bank, 107 83 Brittain v. Bethany, 31 Miss. Ind. 212; 8 N. E. 97; Clark v. 331. Carter; 40 Ind. 190; In Matter of § 231 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 356 Sec. 231, Entering saloon in violation of orders not an offense. A conviction of a violation of a statute declaring it un- lawful for the proprietor of a saloon to permit any person to go into the saloon room at times when the sale of liquor is prohibited by law, cannot be sustained where a person who entered the saloon at the prohibited time did so in violation of orders of the saloon keeper, given in good faith, with the intention and expectation that they should be obeyed ; but whether such orders were given in good faith or not is a ques- tion of fact for the jury.** It cannot be said that putting it within the power of another to do an act means a permission to do such a«t. The defendant, to be guilty under such a statute, must have known of the illegal use to which his prem- ises were being put. Justice Blatchford, in construing the words ' ' suffer ' ' and ' ' permit ' ' has said : ' ' Every definition of 'suffer' and 'permit' includes knowledge of what is to be done under the sufferance and permission and intention, that what is done is what is to be done." ^■' The word "permit" is derived from the Latin " per mitt ere," which means "to concede, to give leave, to grant." **' It is one of the underlying principles of our criminal law that a man shall not be deemed guilty of a crime in the absence of a wrongful intent. Nowhere have we been able to find where the courts compelled a man invol- untarily and against his will to be guilty of a crime, against the commission of which he protested, was not present when it was committed, and the evidence shoM^ed he tried to prevent it." ^^ Where a defendant went upon the premises and in three minutes came off with a bottle of gin, it was held that he had violated the statute.^* s^Botkins v. State. 36 Ind. 87 Lauer v. State, 24 Ind. 131 App. 179; 75 N. E. 208. Hanson v. State, 43 Ind. 550 85 Gregory v. United States, 17 O'Leary v. State, 44 Ind. 91 Rlatchf. 325. Thompson v. State, 45 Ind. 495. 80 Welsch V. State. 19 Ind. App. **« Thomas v. Powell, 57 J. P. 389; 46 N. E. 1050. 329. 357 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. § 232 Sec. 232. Permitting minors to "enter and remain" in a saloon. A statute in Texas requires a licensed dealer's bond to be conditioned that he will not jjermit a minor to "enter and remain" in his saloon.^'' Under this statute it is held that it is no defense that the saloon keeper in good faith believed that the minor entering and remaining was an adult.'"' To constitute a violation of the bond these must be both an entry and remaining, or, in other words, the entry must be followed by a remaining, and if there be a mere entry and no remain- ing, no offense is committed.^''* And where it was shown that the minor entered on three occasions and remained in the sa- loon only long enough to purchase, drink and pay for beer, it was held that there was no breach of his bond.**^ The com- plaint in a civil action is sufficient if it charges that the minor was permitted to enter and remain "on or about" specified dates; and the court may instruct the jury that the plaintiff may recover if the minor was permitted to enter at any time on or about the date given. It is not error to refuse to con- fine the plaintiff's right to recover to violations on the exact date alleged.^- Where an ordinance forbids a saloon keeper to suffer a minor or female to drink in his saloon or remain in it over five minutes, and declaring that it shall be a defense to show that the minor or female was in good repute, proof that the accused suffered a minor or female to drink in his saloon or to remain in it over five minutes is sufficient to jus- tify a conviction; for if he wishes to escape a conviction he must show that the persons so obtaining the liquor or remain- ing therein was in good repute."^' A statute prohibiting 89 Rev. Stat. [1895], Art. 5060.^7, Stephens (Tex. Civ. App.), 78 S. as amended by Act April 27, 1901 W. 1084. (Laws, 1901, p. 314, c. 136). 9^ Mimoz v. Brassel (Tex. Civ. soMinter v. State (Tex. Civ. App.), 108 S. W. 417. As to suf- App), 76 S. W. 312; State fieiency of a complaint under this V. Dittforth (Tex. Civ. App.), 79 statute, see Markus v. Thompson S. W. '52. See State v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.), Ill S. W. 1074. (S. D.), 121 N. W. 7'85. 93 Commonwealth v. Price 9o*Minter v. State, supra. (Ky.), 94 S. W. 32; 29 Ky. L. 91 Tinkle v. Sweeney (Tex. Civ. Rep. 593. App.), 78 S. W. 248; Ghio v. An instruction that the (jues- §233 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 358 a minor visiting a saloon is constitutional.^* Where it was made an offense for the owner of public billiard tables to permit minors to congregate at a place where billiards were played, it was held that a congregation or assemblage of min- ors must be shown to sustain a conviction, the statute implying the joint action or co-operation of two or more persons, it be- ing applicable to the coming together of a considerable num- ber of persons.^^* Sec. 233. Minor willfully misstating his age. AVhere a statute made it an offense in a minor, for the pur- pose of inducing any person to give or sell him intoxicating liquor, to represent that he is twenty-one years of age or over, it was held that the seller could not escape punishment on a tion for the jury to determine whether the accused was the owner of a saloon, and whether he per- mitted the person, who was, in fact, under the age of twenty-one years, to remain in his saloon, does not assume that the person was under such age. State v. Baker (Ore.), 92 Pac. 1076; 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1040. Where a statute made it an offense to permit a minor to gamble in a saloon, it is no de- fense that the proprietor in- structed his servants not to per- mit it, where they permitted it. Church V. Territory (N. M.), 91 Pac. 720. 9* Territory v. Crunka, 15 Hawaii, 607. 04* Powell V. State, 62 Ind. 531 ; "Manheim v. State, GO Ind. 65; Hanralian v. State, 57 Ind. 527; Walbert v. State, 17 Ind. App. 350; 4G X. E. 827. In a trial for a violation of a statute forbidding a minor to be on the premises, it is not a ques- tion of fact for the jury to de- termine as to the peculiar evils tliat might surround a particular visit. State v. Johnson (S. D. ), 121 S. W. 7S'5. Where a saloon keeper employed an adult to furnish music for his saloon, and the adult brought a minor who played in the com- pany of other musicians, and the saloon keeper, as soon as he dis- covered he was a minor, ordered him to leave, it was held that he was not guilty of employing a minor in a saloon. State v. Haugh, 123 N. W. 251. An ordinance providing that minors shall not be permitted to enter a place where "near beer" is sold is valid. Campbell v. Thomasville (Ga.), 64 S. E. 815. A statute forbidding the em- ployment of a minor in a place where intoxicating liquors are sold applies to a beer garden. State V. Hough ( Wis. ) , 123 N. W. 251. 359 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. § 234 charge of selling to a minor, on the ground that the minor stated he was of age, where such seller knew the statement was false.^^ Sec. 234. Permitting dmnkeimess on premises — Selling to drunken man. Statutes sometimes forbid a licensee to permit drunkenness or a drunkard to come on the licensed premises. To violate such a statute it is not necessary for the licensee to sell the liquor that creates the drunkenness, nor any part of it.®^ A licensee cannot be convicted of permitting drunkenness in the absence of knowledge, or connivance, or carelessness on his part. Thus Avhere the evidence showed that a person who was on the premises was in fact drunk, and it also showed that the licensed person did not know that such person was drunk, it was held that the licensed person could not be convicted."^ Where the only evidence was that a person had been drinking in a licensed house, and three-quarters of an hour later was found drunk in a d'tch about one hundred yards distant, and the court convicted the keeper of the licensed house, its judg- ment was sustained.^^* So to supply liquor to one already drunk is to permit drunkenness on the licensed premises.^^ And where a person is found on licensed premises, and is known to be so by the licensee, the latter is liable, though no drink may have been given him by the licensee."" At the same time it must be recollected, to permit drunkenness on the licensed premises implies that there was power to prevent it; and if a customer becomes drunk, but is not allowed to remain on such premises, the licensee cannot be deemed to permit it.^°^ A sim- 95 state V. GuUey, 41 Ore. 318; as Edmunds v. James [1892], 1 70 Pac. 385. Q. B. 18; 56 J. P. 40; 61 L. J. 96 Edmunds v. James [1892], 1 M. C. 56; 40 W. R. 140; 65 L. T. Q. B. 18; 56 J. P. 40; 61 L. J. 675. M. C. 56; 40 W. Pv. 140; 65 L. T. 09 Hope v. Warburton [18921, 2 C75. Q. B. 1.34; 56 J. P. 3-28; 61 L. J. 97 Somerset v. Wade [1894L 1 M. C. 147; 66 L. T. 589; 40 W. Q. B. 574; 58 J. P. 231; 63 L. J. E. 510. M. C. 126; 70 L. T. 452; 42 \V. Pv. n-i Where a shihifc (Scottivli 399. Licensing Act, 1903, § 9S) pro- 97* Ex parte Ethelstane, 40 J. P. vided that when a licensed per- 39; 33 L. T. 339. son was charged with permitting §234 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 360 ilar statute lias been adopted in certain English colonies. Thus, in Australia, under a statute where it was proved that there was a drunken person upon the premises, but it was also shown that both the licensee, who was absent, and the person left by him in charge of the premises, had in fact no knowledge of the presence of the drunken man, it was held that the prima facie conclusion to be drawn from the presence of such drunk- en man, to the effect that the licensee permitted a drunken person to be on his premises, was rebutted, and the accused was discharged."- This English statute also prohibits sales to a drunken person ; and the prohibition is absolute. Where, therefore, the customer is really drunk, the licensee cannot set up the defense that he and his partner considered the custo- mer not to be drunk, for the risk of discovering the facts rests drunkenness on his premises, and it was proved that any person was drunk on his premises, it should "be on the licensed person to prove that he and those era- ployed by him took all reasonable steps for preventing drunkenness on the premises," it was held that on a showing that the li- censed defendant and one X were friends and were both found in the licensed premises at 3 a. ji. asleep and intoxicated, the de- fendant must be convicted of hav- ing permitted X to remain on the premises while in a state of in- toxication, he not having dis- charged the onus imposed on him by the statute. Kessack v. Smith, 7 F. (Just. Cas.) 75. There is a similar English statute (2 Edw. VII, c. 28, § 4; and Patterson (Licensing Acts [19th Ed.], p. 583) construes it in this wise: "The effect of this section appears to be that, where any person is drunk on licensed premises, this will he prima facie evidence of permitting drunkenness, and, to rebut this, the licensed person must prove that he and his serv- ants took all reasonable steps for preventing drunkenness on the I^remises. If a licensed person, or his servant, as soon as he found that the person was drunk, turned him oif the premises, he would rebvit tlie prima facie presump- tion. If, on the other hand, he supplied tlie person with drink, so that the latter became drunk on the premises, the licensee would be liable to be convicted, for, by supplying the drink which caused the drunkenness, he has not taken all reasonable steps to prevent drunkenness on the premises. A lisensee would be similarly liable if he neglected to notice the con- dition of the drunken person en- tering or being on the premises." io2Hillard v. Fitzpatrick, 27 Vict. L. R. 380; 23 Austr. L. T. 1; 7 Austr. L. E. 223. See Con- nolly V. Stenniker, 22 Vict. L, R. 2'57; 18 Austr. L. T. GO; 2 Austr. L. R. (C. N.) 322. 361 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. § 235 with the licensee.^°-'' The licensee is also liable where his man- ager, contrary to express general instructions, supplies liquor to a drunken person.^"'* Moreover, if a drunken man and a sober man enter together, and the latter orders liquor for both, this will be deemed a selling to a drunken man/ A licensee cannot be convicted under this statute for being drunk on his own premises.^ Sec. 235. Found drunk on licensed premises. Where a statute provides that it shall be an offense "to be found drunk on licensed premises," if found drunk on un- licensed premises, no offense is committed. If he is drunk in licensed premises, but is not "found" in the state of drunken- ness, he escapes the penalty of the statute. But to incur the penalty it is not necessary that a police officer find him on the premises in a state of intoxication. If the drunken per- son, before beinu' found has staggered out of the licensed prem- ises into an adjoining field he escapes the penalty. And if the licensed premises are his own house, the drunken person would obviouslj' not be liable, except to be found drunk during open hours and in the public part of the premises.^ But a person who enters a house to use it as licensed premises, and not as a lodger or inmate, and is found drunk in the house after the closing hours, may be convicted.* losiCundy v. LeCocq, 13 Q. B. think, looking at the collection of Div. 207; 48 J. P. .599; 53 L. J. words, that 'licensed premises,' M. €. 125; 51 L. T. 2G5; 32 for the purpose of the section W. R. 760. ['Every person found drunk in 104 Commissioners of Police v. any highway, or other public Cartman [189G], 1 Q. B. 655; 00 place, whether a building or not, J. P. 357; 65 L. J. M. C. 113; 74 on any licensed premises, shall be L. T. 726; 44 W. R. '637; 12 T. liable,' etc.], must mean open to L. R. 334; Worth v. Brown, 40 the public during licensed hours, Sol. J. 515; 62 J. P. 658. or during the time when the prem- 1 Scatchard v. Johnson, 52 J. P. ises are a quasi public place." 380; 57 L. J. M. C. 41. 4 Eegina v. Relly [1897], 2 Q. 2 Warden v. Tye, 2 C. P. Div. B. 33; fil J. P. 373; 66 L. J. Q. 74; 41 J. P. 120; 40 L. J. M. C. B. 519; 45 W. R. 504; Warden 111; 35 L. T. 852. v. Tye, 2 C. P. Div. 74; 41 J. P. 3 Lester v. Torrens, 2 Q. B. Div. 120; 46 L. J. M. C. Ill; 35 L. T. 404; 41 J. P. 821; 25 W. R. 691; 852. 46 L. J. M. C. 280. Lush, J.: "i § 236 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 362 Sec. 236. Power to exclude drunken man from licensed premises. An English statute expressly authorizes any licensed person to "refuse to admit to and may turn out of the premises in respect of which his license is granted any person who is drunken, violent, quari-elsome, or disorderly, and any person who would subject him to a penalty" under the law.^ This sec- tion also authorizes all constables® on demand of any licensed person, agent, or servant to expel or assist in expelling a drunken, violent, quarrelsome or disorderly person from the licensed premises, ' ' and may use such force as may be required for that purpose. ' ' In turning out a drunken, violent, quarrel- some or disorderly person, no more force can be lawfully used than is necessary to overcome the resistance of the person to be turned out. Of this statute it is said that "a request to leave peaceably should always be first made to such person and proved on the hearing of the charge. The constable acts usually as the agent of the licensed person, unless he has witnessed some violation of the act. " "If the licensed person turns out a per- son who is not drunken, violent, quarrelsome or disorderly, or whose presence would not subject him to a penalty, then such person when turned out cannot be convicted under this sec- tion. Where a chimney sweep in his working dress came to the public house bar amongst the company and refused to leave, it was held that he could be excluded by force, even though the premises were an inn.^ And the same where a per- son had a large dog accompanying him, which caused reason- able alarm.^ The respondent, who was not a traveler, en- tered the appellant's licensed premises — not being an inn — he having been on several previous occasions ejected by the appel- lant from the premises for using offensive language and be- having in a disorderly manner, and he was known to be one of a disorderly gang. The respondent was half drunk when he entered, and threatened to fight the appellant, but the magis- 5 35 and 36 Vict. e. 94, § 18. « Citing Regina v. Rymer, 2 Q. «The English term for police- B. Div. 13G; 46 L. J. M. C. 108; men. 41 J. P. 199; 25 W. R. 415; see 7 Citing Pidgeon v. Legge, 21 J. also Howell v. Jackson, 6 C. & P. P. 743. 725. 363 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. § 237 trate found as a fact that he was neither drunken nor quarrel- some nor disorderly. The appellant requested the respondent to leave, but he refused. The appellant went to eject him, and the respondent kicked him in the face. The magistrate refused to convict the respondent of an assault on the ground that the appellant had no right to eject the respondent for refusing to leave when requested. The court held that the appellant had the right to request the respondent to leave if he did not wish him to remain on the premises, and remitted the case to the magistrate to hear the charge of assault." ° A landlord of a saloon may eject customers from his premises, though they are not drunken, violent, quarrelsome, or disorderly ; ^'^ but a person not drunken, nor violent, nor quarrelsome, nor disorderly cannot be convicted for not leaving the premises when requested to leave by the landlord or licensee.^^ Sec. 237. Permitting employes to drink storage liquors — Premises. A statute of Texas'- makes it an offense for anyone engaged in the "business or occupation" of keeping or storing intox- icating liquors in a county which has adopted locai option, to 9 Patterson's Licensing Acts hibited person may demand en- (ISth Ed.), p. 387; citing Sealy trance. Waters v. Fitzgerald, 25 V. Tandy [1902], 1 K. B. 296; 66 Vict. L. R. 86; 21 Austr. L. T. J. P. 19; 71 L. J. K. B. 41; 50 17; 5 Austr. L. R. 149. W. R. 347; 85 L. T. 459; 18 T. In Canada, a railway employe L. R. 38; 20 Cox C. C. 57. may be discharged summarily for 10 Sealy v. Tandy, supra. being drunk while on duty witn 11 Dallimore v. Tulton, 78 L. T. other employes; and although 409; G2 J. P. 423; 19 Cox. C. C. only a recipient of the intoxicat- 31. ing liquor, such conduct consti- In New Zealand it is an of- tutes a participation in a crim- fense for an habitual drunkard to inal offense under § 259 of the enter on licensed premises during Railway Act, 51 Vict. c. 29 C. D. the time an order is in force pro- which prohibits anyone selling, hibiting him entering thereon. To giving or bartering spirits or in- commit the offense, he need not toxicating liquors while on duty, buy liquor. Rex v. Ward, 21 N. Marshall v. Central Ontario Ry. Z. 506. In Australia the prohib- Co., 28 Ont. Rep. 241. iting order must name the house 12 Gen. Laws [1906], p. 91, c. and give the time at which a pro- 64. § 238 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 364 permit another to drink any of such liquor within such place of business. It was held that the terms "business" or "occu- pation," so used in a statute, means the trade, the calling, or the vocation in which one engages to make a living or obtain wealth. Consequently, it was held error to define "business or occupation" in an instruction to a jury to be that which engages one 's time and labor or attention, or that about which one is engaged or employed, where it was shown that the in- toxicants drank on the premises were not kept for profit, nor as a business, or calling; but they were kept casually or incidentally to another business.^^ So an Iowa statute^* provides that any person operating a brewery who permits its products to be drunk or sells them at retail ' ' upon the prem- ises of any such manufacturing establishment" shall be sub- ject to a forfeiture. It was held that the word "premises" was limited to the buildings occupied by and the grounds used in connection with the brewery. Consequently it was held where a brewery had an entrance into the general manager's office and an entrance from that office to a saloon in the same building, upon which saloon the liquor taxes were paid, the operation of the saloon was not a violation of the statute, the entrance from the brewery being used by no one to obtain liquor, and the employes, when they desired liquor, entering only from the outside. ^^ Sec. 238. Women in saloons — Wine rooms. Statutes are common forbidding the furnishing of liquor to women in saloons or the keeping of wine rooms in connection with saloons into which women are permitted to enter and he supplied with liquor. Where wine rooms are forbidden, a room to come within the prohibition of the statute must be kept as a part of the saloon. The statute refers to a place where patrons of the saloon are supplied with liquor privately instead of drinking at the bar.^" Where such rooms are f or- is Cohen V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. ic Ellis v. People, 38 Colo. 516; App. 422; 110 S. W. 66. 88 Pae. 401; Denver v. Domedian, !■» Iowa Code, § 2460. 15 Colo. App. 3(3; 00 Pac, 1107. 15 Orke V. .McMamis (Iowa), 115 N. W. 580. 365 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. ' ^ 239 bicfden balls or like entertainments cannot be given in them.^^ But to supply liquor to a female in a restaurant with her meal, the restaurant being located in the same building, owned by the saloon keeper, but separated by a hall, is not a serving of liquor in the saloon, and the act is not a violation of the statute.^^ A statute which forbids the employment of females in a saloon cannot be evaded under the subterfuge of tak- ing them in as partners in the business.-® Where a female servant went into a bar and obtained liquor which she took out of the bar and went to a customer in a parlor of the hotel in which the bar was kept, it was held that she had not served liquors in a bar within the meaning of a statute forbidding a female to serve liquor in a bar.-^ Sec. 239. Prostitutes visiting premises. An English statute forbids any licensed person to knowingly permit his premises "to be the habitual resort of or a place of meeting of reputed prostitutes, whether the object of their so resorting or meeting is or is not prostitution" "longer than is necessary for the purpose of obtaining reasonable refresh- ment." '^ The word "knowingly," as used in this statute, ap- plies to the character of the persons who are permitted to re- sort to the premises; and it is said that "this expression is necessary, because if that or some similar word were not used it might be contended that if women were knowingly permit- ted to resort to the premises it would be no defense that it was not known that they were reputed prostitutes." "^ "In or- 1- Cunningham v. Porchet, 23 A "dancing saloon" means a Tex. Civ. App. 80; 56 S. W. 574. place to which persons are ad- 18 Denver v. Domedian, 15 Colo. mitted on payment of money, or App. 36; GO Pac. 1107. on the understanding that they Such a statute is considered a will purchase liquor. But a stat- fair one. Greiner v. Hoboken, ute prohibiting the keeping,. of (N. J. L.) ; 53 Atl. 693; People such a place does not prohibit the V. Case, 153 Mich. 98; 116 N. W. licensee admitting his friends to 558; Hoboken v. Goodman, 68 N. dance as his guests. Walsh v. J. L. 217; 51 Atl. 1092. Bedfell, 16 Aust. L. .T,_.35. 26 Walter v. Commonwealth, &8 2835 and 36 Vict. c. 94, •§ 14. Pa. St. 137 -^ Patterson's Licensing Acts 2- Ex parte Cameron, 23 N. S. (19th Ed.), p. 368, citing Mathew, W. 24- 6 S. R. 132. J-j and Collins, J., in Somerset v. § 239 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 366 der to prove the offense," says the author just cited, "it must be shown: (1) That the licensed porson, or at least Lis man- ager, knew the women were reputed prostitutes, and the jus- tices will inquire into the grounds of belief of witnesses as to this evil reputation; (2) That he allowed them to remain longer than necessary for reasonable refreshment, which is partly a matter of arithmetic, the nature of the meal or re- freshment being generally the best materials for showing whether they remained longer than was necessary for its con- sumption. Accordingly, where a woman of the unfortunate class was found on licensed premises by a police constable, and the woman immediately left upon being spoken to by the publican as soon as the constable entered, it was held that this was not enough to sustain a conviction under this section. ^'^ In this case there was no evidence as to whether the woman had gone to the house for the purpose of obtaining refreshment or not, nor how long she had been upon the premises, but the constable stated that at the time when he saw the woman she was not partaking of any refreshment. The evidence was thus consistent with the Avoman having finished her refreshment and being on the point of leaving when the constable entered, and was therefore insufficient to sustain a conviction. " " Un- less the woman," continues the same writer, "remains longer on the premises than is necessary for the purpose of refresh- ment, it seems that, though her object may be prostitution, yet the penalty will not be incurred by the licensed person till the time for her refreshment has ceased. It is only after that time that her remaining on the premises can be in- quired into; but for whatever purpose she is there after that time is immaterial. And if she do not resort for refreshment at all, then if the landlord allow her to remain for any length of time, however short, he will be liable for the penalty. The licensed person has the powder to turn her out,^^ and if he fails to do 60 he will run the risk of the penalty. An objection, founded on the conduct of licensed houses as to serving pros- Wadc [18941, 1 Q. B. 674; 68 3o Citing Miller v. Dudley, J. J. P. 231; •SS L. J. M. C. 126; 70 J., 46 W. R. 606. L. T. 452; 42 W. R. 399. 3 1 Section 18 of the same act gives the power. 367 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. §240 titutes, being often raised to the renewal of a license, in one case there was evidence given that several times seventeen prostitutes were found in the house at one time, and this was known to the license holder, and he produced no evidence that they were there for the purpose of refreshment, the licensing justices were held justified, after due notice of opposition, in refusing to renew the license.^- It is not essential that the prostitutes who 'meet' should be the same persons; it is enough that persons of their class frequently come to the house, and that one is there, though for the first time, if known as to character. And in any summons or conviction it is not necessary to name the disorderly persons or allege that they are unknown." "^ Sec. 240. Permitting premises to be a brothel. An English statute provides that "if any licensed person is convicted of permitting his premises to be a brothel he shall 32 Citing Sharpe v. Hughes, 57 J. P. 104. sselting Wray v. Take, 12 Q. B. 492; 17 L. J. M. C. 183; 12 J. P. 804. Cases under previous English statutes are Greig v. Bendeno, E. B. & E., 133; 27 L. J. M. C. 294; Purkis V. Huxtable, 1 E. & E., 780; 28 L. J. M. C. 221; 5 Jur. 790; 23 J. P. 197, and Whitfield V. Bainbridge, 30 J. P. 644. "The constable having seen prostitutes previously in the house is some evidence of the keeper's knowledge of their char- acter." Patterson's Licensing Acts (19th Ed.), p. 3e'9, citing Belasco v. Hannant, 3 B. & S. 13; 26 J. P. 823; 31 L. J. M. C. 225; 6 L. T. 577; 10 W. R. 8<57; Parker v. Green, 2 B. & S. 299; 26 J. P. 247; 31 L. J. M. C. 133; 10 \V. R. 316; Cole v. Coulton, 24 J. P. 596; 2 E. & E. 695; 29 L. J. M. C. 125; 2 L. T. 216; 8 VV. R. 412. "The cases decided," says Patter- son, "under the previous statutes, show that prostitutes are entitled, like other people, to refreshment, and that it cannot be reasonably implied from the fact of the li- censed person supplying them with refreshment that he permits them to assemble in an unlawful man- ner." In Australia it is held that, al- though the presence of reputed prostitutes on licensed premises is made by statute prima facie evidence that the licensee know- ingly permitted them to be pres- ent with the knowledge they were prostitutes, the presumption may be rebutted. Cullen v. Ware, 3 Austr. L. R. (C. N.) 65. Using a room at a hotel for the purpose of illicit sexual inter- course is using it "for the pur- pose of prostitution. § 241 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 368 be liable to a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds, and shall forfeit his license, and he shall be disqualified forever from holding any license for the sale of intoxicating liquors."^* In order to prove the offense it is not material that there was no outward sign of indecency,^^ or that there was no actual dis- orderly conduct. ^"^ A brothel is the same thing as a "bawdy house, ' ' and the term applies to a place resorted to by persons of both sexes for the purpose of prostitution."'^ If a licensee or his manager permits people to use the premises for purposes of prostitution once, this is some evidence to support the charge of permitting the premises to be used as a brothel.-''^ A charge under the statute that the licensee permitted his prem- ises to be used as a brothel on the 26th, 28th, 29th and 31st of January, and 1st, 4th, 5th and 6th of February, was held to charge him with but one offense, the charge being a continuing offense, notwithstanding the days were not consecutive.^'' Sec. 241. Knowingly harboring thief on premises. An English statute makes it an offense for the keeper of a saloon to knowingly lodge or knowingly harbor thieves or re- puted thieves, or "knowingly suffer them to meet or assem- ble therein. "^*' Under this statute where a meeting was held in a saloon, pursuant to a circular, to get up a subscription for the wife and children of a convicted thief, several thieves being in the company, it was held that there was such an as- sembly of thieves as the statute forbade, notwithstanding their. 34 35 and 36 Vict. e. 94, § 15. officer refused to say where he 35 Regina v. Rice, L. R. 1 ; C. was standing wlien he discovered C. E. 21; 35 L. J. M. C. 93; 13 that the place was used as a L. T. 382; 14 W. R. 56. brothel, and the court held that 36 Greig v. Bendeno, E. B. & E. he was bound to answer on cvosp- 133; 27 L. J. M. C. 294. examination as to this, as it had 37 Singleton v. Ellison [1895], an important bearing on his credi- 1 Q. B. 607; 64 L. J. M. C. 123; bility. «59 J. P. 119; 72 L. T. 236; 43 ^^ Ex parte Burnby [1901], 2 W. R. 426; 18 Cox, 79. K. B. 458; 70 L. J.K. B. 739; 38 Regina v. Justices, 46 J. P. 85 L. T. 1&8. 312; Webb v. Catchlove, 50 J. P. *o 34 and 35, c. 112, § 10. 705. In this last case the police 369 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. §242 good intentions." But permittin This statute creates two separate and distinct offenses, the one keep- ing the places referred to, first, for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto ; and, secondly, for the purpose of receiving deposits on bets. A person may be rightly con- victed for one or the other of these offenses.^ It is not neces- sary to a conviction for keeping a house for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto to prove an actual resort- ing, and it is enough to show that the house was opened and •'■• m and 17 Vict. c. 119, § 1. Stoddart v. Hawko, .50 W. R. 93; « Bradford v. Dawson [1897], 1 18 T. L. R. 22. Q. B. 307; 61 J. P. 134; 66 L. J. ^ Bond v. Plumb [1894], 1 y. Q. B. 191; 76 L. T. 54; 4.5 W. R. B. 169; 58 J. P. 168. 347; 18 €ox C. C. 473. See also § 245 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 378 advertised as a betting house. But if evidence of resorting is relied upon it must be physical "resorting" as that term is used in its ordinary sense.* If two separate acts of betting with strangers are proved and betting books kept, this is some evidence of keeping a betting house.^ But if the betting takes place between members of a bona fide club this is not an of- fense within this statute.'** A person who goes into a bar of a public house, and not casually, but for several days, habi- tually bets with people he meets there on horse-racing, though he has no interest in the room or house, may be convicted of using the house for betting." "Where it was proved that on each of three different days the defendant was in the bar of a beer house and a number of persons came in, took slips of paper which were hanging on the wall, wrote on the slips the names of the horses they wished to back for the races, .wrapped up in the slips the money they staked and handed the slips with the money enclosed to the defendant; and it was also proved that usually the defendant went outside and received the slips and the money on the doorstep of the house, but on one of the three days he received two slips with money enclosed in the bar, it was held that there was evidence to go to the jury that the defendant had used the bar for the pur- pose of betting with persons resorting thereto on each of the three days, and that he was rightly convicted.'- The license holder Avho knows of a bookmaker using the bar of his house for the purpose of betting with the customers may also be con- victed of suffering betting upon his premises.'^ "Where a stran- ger stood on a piece of waste ground near but not belonging to a public house and received bets in sealed packets, and these sRegina v. Brown, 1 Q. B. 119; n MacWilliam v. Dawson, 58 J. 64 L. J. M. C. 1; 72 L. T. 22; 43 P. 182; Whitehurst v. Fincher, W. R. 222 ; 59 J. P. 485 ; 15 Rep. 62 L. T. 433 ; 5* J. P. 565. 59. i2Regina v. Warton [1895], 1 9Foote V. Butler, 41 J. P. 7&2. Q. B. 227; 64 L. J. M. C. 74; 72 10 Downs V. Jackson [1895], 2 L. T. 29; 15 Rep. 102; 18 Cox Q. B. 203; 59 J. P. 487; 64 L. J. C. C. 70. M. C. 238; 72 L. T. 728; 43 \V. is Hornsby v. Raggett [1892], 1 R. 5G6; 15 Rep. 466; Oldham v. Q. B. 20; 66 L. T. 21; 40 W. R. Ramsden, 44 L. J. C. P. 309; 22 111; 55 J. P. 508. L. T. 825 ; 39 J. P. 583. 379 REGin.ATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. § 245 packets were fetched at intervals by a servant of the house, who kept them in the house till the stranger entered and opened them, but the stranger had no interest in the house, it was held that the license holder could not be convicted of suf- fering the stranger to use the house as a betting house.^* Where a professional betting man went for three hours every- day to a beer house and conducted the business of ready- money betting in the saloon to the knowledge of the license holder, it was held that the betting man was guilty of the offense of using a place for betting and the license holder of permitting his licensed premises to be used as a place of betting.^^ If a betting man carries on his betting without the knowledge or consent of the license holder, he [the licensee] cannot be convicted.^*' The sale and receipt of the pur- chase money for tickets in an ordinary Derby sweepstakes by a licensed victualler in England in the bar of his house is not an offense against the betting act of that country, although it may be a lottery." Where the grounds of a public house are used for races or matches much depends on the kind of uses and the relation between the owner of the place and those who bet there to constitute the user an offense. Thus, where the owner of the ground allowed a betting man to receive bets in a palisade forty-four yards long and two yards wide, the latter was held to keep a "place." ^* So where a betting man stood on a stool on which there was a large umbrella, on a race ground, it was held he 14 Davis V. Stephenson, 24 Q. B. 8^; 51 W. R. 604; 88 L. T. 32; Div. 529; 54 J. P. 565; 59 L. J. 19 T. L. R. 223. M. C. 73; 62 L. T. 436; 38 W. H. is Rex v. A. Deavillc, Rex v. 492. Simpson [1903], 1 K. IJ. 468; 72 i&Belton V. Busby [1899], 2 Q. L. J. K. B. 272; 67 J. P. 82; 51 B. 3«0; '68 L. J. Q. B. 859; 63 W. R. -604; 88 L. T. 32; 19 T. J. P. 709; 47 W. R. 636; 81 L. T. L. R. 223. 196; 15 T. L. R. 45i8. Consult i^ Regina v. Hobbs [1898], 2 Q. also Tromans V. Hodkinson [1903], B. 647; 62 J. P. 474, 561; 67 L. 1 K. B. 30; 72 L. J. K. B. 21; J. Q. B. 928; 79 L. T. 160; 14 67 J. P. 30; 51 W. R. 286; 87 T. L. R. 573; 47 W. R. 79. L. T. 549; 19 T. L. R. 19; Rex is Shaw v. Morley, L. R. 3 V, J. Dea'ville [1903], 1 K. B. Exch. 137; S2 J. P. 391. 468 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 272 ; 67 J. P. §245 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 380 kept a "place." ^'^ Likewise, where the place was a field of three acres, in which was a pigeon-shooting match for ten pounds a side, and afterwards a foot race took place, to which persons were admitted who betted with each other, it was held he kept a "place."-" The same ruling was made where an occupier of enclosed land permitted bookmakers to bet on a foot race in the enclosed land,-^ and also where the book- maker stood in the ring at a grand stand during the race.-^ But where one S went into a field where dog races were held, but only walked up and down, and stood in no one spot mak- ing bets, it was held that he did not keep a ' ' place ' ' for bet- tinsr.--* 10 Bows V. Fenwick, L. R. 9 ; C. P. 339; 43 L. J. M. C. 107; 30 L. T. 524; 22 W. R. 804; 38 J. P. 440. 20 Eastwood v. Miller, L. R. 9; Q. B. 440; 43 L. J. M. C. 139; 30 L. T. 71G; 22 W. R. 7C0; 38 J. P. <347. 2iHaigli V. Sheffield, L. R., 10 Q. B. 102; 44 L. J. M. C. 17; 31 L. T. 536; 23 W. R. 547; .0 J. P. 230. 22 Galloway v. Morris, 8 Q. B. Div. 275; 46 J. P. 326. 23 Snow V. Hill, 14 Q. B. Div. 588; 54 L. J. M. C. 95; 52 L. T. 839; 33 W. R. 475; a J. P. 440. Under this English statute there must be evidence of rnore than one act of betting. Jayes v. Harris, 99 L. T. 56; 72 J. P. ZM. Further illustrations as to tho meaning of a "place" will bo found in Liddell v. Loftliouse [1896], 1 Q. B. 498; CO J. P. 264; 12 T. L. R. 204; Mclnaney V. llildreth [1897], 1 Q. B. 600 61 J. P. 325; GO L. J. Q. B. 376 76 L. T. 463; 13 T. L. R. 284 Regina v. Humphrey [1897], 2 Q. 3. 242; Gl J. P. 548; 66 L. J. Q. B. 601; 77 L. T. 2; 46 W. R. 0; affirmed H. L. [18<)9] A. C. 143; 68 L. J. Q. B. 392; G3 J. P. 260; 47 W. R. 580; SO L. T. 538; 15 T. L. R. 2GG ; overruling Hawke v. Dunn [1897], 1 Q. B. 379; 61 J. P. 2D2; 66 L. J. Q. B. 364; 76 L. T. 355; 45 W. R. 359; 13 T. L. R. 281; and Bro\\Ti v. Patch [ICDO], I Q. B. 892; 68 L. J. Q. B. 588; 63 J. P. 421; 47 w. v.. c.::; 80 l. t. 716. An ordinance prohibiting per- sons from frequenting and using any street or public place for the purposes of bookmaking or betting is valid. Burnett w Berry [1896], 1 Q. \l. 641; 60 J. P. 375; G5 L. J. M. C. US; 44 W. R. 512; 74 L. T. 494; 12 T. L,. R. 362; Jones V. Walters, 62 J. P. 374; 78 L. T. 167; 14 T. L. R. 265; White v. Morley [1899], 2 Q. B. 34; 63 J. P. ::0; C6 L. J. Q. B. 702; 47 W. R. 883; 80 L. T. 761; 15 T. L. R. 360; Thomas v. Suffers [1900], 1 Ch. 10; 69 L. J. Ch. 27; 63 J. P. 724; 48 W. R. 133; 81 L. T. 469; 16 T. L. R. 7; Hickey v. Hay, 65 J. P. 232; 17 T. L. R. '52. For a casp of a penny-in-a-slot machine held to be kept in vio- 381 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. § 246 Sec, 246. Public dispensary. In several States liquor is only sold at public dispensaries owned and managed by the State or by one of its subdivi- r;ions. This Avas particularly true of South Carolina. Usually the person or officer in charge of the dispensary was selected by the county wherein it was located, but he was a State offi- cer, and all books, documents and letters therein prima facie related to the public business, subject to examination by the Legislature.-* The County Board of Control in that State des- ignated the location of a dispensary, notice thereof being'duly given, and thereupon the voters of the township wherein it was to be located could remonstrate by petition against its location in the township, and it was not necessary for this remonstrance to specifically specify the exact place where the dispensary was to be located."' The officer in charge of a dis- pensary was required to deposit all monies received for sales of liquors with the County Treasurer, and to give bond for a faithful accounting.^^ Any one purchasing liquors outside the State and bringing them within it was required to comply with the regulations of the dispensary law on their arrival or the liquor would become "contraband."-'' This dispensary law did not repeal by implication prior statutes forbidding the sale of intoxicating liquors in various counties of the State, and in such counties dispensaries could not be established.-^^ This is also true in Alabama, w^here a dispensary law had been enacted;-^ nor could one be located within the distance of a lation of the law, see Fielding v the State Dispensary, all its funds Turner [1903], 1 K. B. 867; 67 was held to be a trust fund for J. P. 252; 72 L. J. K. B. 542; 51 the payment of claims of dispen- W. R. 543; 89 L. T. 273; 19 T. sary creditors. Fleischman Co. L. R. 404. V. Murray, 161 Fed. 152 (officers 24 State V. Farnum, 73 S. C. not officers of State ) . 165 ; 53 S. E. 83. 27 Dispensary Act, March 6, 25 Severance v. Murphy, 67 S. 1896, § 37 ; State v. Holleyman €. 409; 46 S. E. 35. See also (S. C), 31 S. E; 362. Little V. Barksdale (S. C), 63 28 Bailey Liquor Co. v. Austin, S. E. 308. S2 Fed. 785; See also State v. 26 Guy V. McDaniel, 51 &. C. Loftis, 49 S. €. 443; 27 S. E. 451. 436; 29 S. K. 196 (sufficiency of 29 Rose v. Lampley, 146 Ala. complaint to recover funds). 445; 41 So. 521; Gilmore v. On winding up the afTairs of State, 126 Ala. 20; 28 So. 382; §247 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 382 church or schoolhouse wherein the Legislature had provided by a prior act that liquors should not be sold.^° A like rule pre- vails in Georgia.^^ The right to operate a dispensary is the exercise of a franchise which must be given by the State.^- In North Carolina the dispensary law does not repeal the general statute forbidding the retail of liquors without a li- cense, although the County Commissioners are forbidden to issue a license, and if issued it would be no protection to the holder of it.^^ The Georgia statute authorizing the city of Rome to maintain a dispensary and to borrow money and make purchases of liquors on credit is constitutional.^* Sec. 247. Sales by public agents. In some of the New England States for more than half a century sales of liquors have been in the hands of public agents. see iSheppard v. Dowling, 127 Ala. 1; 28 So. 791; Hubbard v. Lan- caster, 127 Ala. 157; '28 So. 79'6; Davis V. State, 145 Ala. 247; 40 So. 663. 30 Tallassee v. Toombs (Ala.), 47 So. 308. 31 Rose V. State, 4 Ga. App. 588 ; 62 S. E. 117; see also Ex parte Hall (Ala.), 47 So. 199; Fowler V. Rome Dispensary (Ga. App.), 62 S. E. 660. 32 Union Town v. State ( Ala. ) , 39 So. 814; State v. Wilburn (Ala.), 39 So. 816. The Alabama act is constitutional. Sheppard V. Dowling, 127 Ala. 1 ; 28 So. 791. 33 State V. Smith, 126 N. C. 1057; 35 S. E. 615. Citing Hills- boro V. Smith, 110 X. C. 417; 14 S. E. 972; State v. Smiley, 101 N. C. 709; 7 S. E. 904; State v. Stevens, 114 N. C. 873; 19 S. E. 861; State v. Reid, 115 N. €. 741; 20 S. E. 4&8; State v. Robinson, 116 N. €. 1046; 21 S. E. 701; State v. Downs, IIG N. C. 1064; 21 S. E. G89; State v. Weathers, 9« N. C. 685; 4 S. E. 512; State v. Haynie, 118 N. C. 1270; 24 S. E. 536; State v. Hicks, 101 N. C. 747 ; 7 S. E. 707 ; State v. Hamby (N. C), 35 S. E. 614. As to disposal of profits of sale of liquors in North Carolina, see Crocker v. Moore, 140 N. C. 429; 53 S. E. 229. 34 Chamlee v. Davis, 115 Ga. 266; 41 S. E. 691. As to what officers shall have control of these dispensaries, see Dallis V. Griffin, 117 Ga. 408; 43 S. E. 758; and as to what towns and cities under the Lee County Act (Acts 1902, p. 222) may es- tablish a dispensary, see Smith- ville V. Lee County, 125 Ga. 559; 54 S. E. 539; Waters v. McDow- ell, 126 Ga. 807 ; 56 S. E. 95. As to the funds coming into the hands of the public town liquor agent in Vermont, see State V. Brattleboro, 68 Vt. 520; 35 Atl. 472. After a dispensary has been abolished, sales by its officers are illetral. Dispensary Commissioners V. Hooper, 128 Ga. 99; 56 S. E. 997. 383 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAP^FIC. § 247 These were the forerunners of the dispensaries of the South — of South Carolina, of Ahibama, of Georgia. These agents are not officers of the political division of the State selecting them, their positions are not offices, and they do not hold over until their successors have been selected and qualified, as is the case of officers generall3^•^^ Where selectraen were liable to a penalty for failure to select an agent, and the selectmen of a town appointed one of their own number, making the ap- pointment a matter of record, and he accepted, it was held that they were not guilty under the statute on the ground that they fixed no salary for him, made no regulations concerning sales, the town clerk made no entry on the town records of the appointment, and the agent gave no bond, as required by statute, nor entered upon his duties.^'^ But as a rule the select- men of a New England State cannot appoint one of their own number as agent, nor can they purchase liquors and bind their town by the purchase. ^^ If a duly appointed agent sell liquors in violation of law he becomes liable to its penalty the same as any other person so selling liquors.^® As, for instance, if he sells to a minor.^" A statute authorizing a town to sell liquor for a specific purpose is sufficient to authorize them to make a purchase of the liquor in order to sell it.*° Irregu- larity in making the appointment of the agent will not render him liable if he make a sale thereunder, on the theory that the sale is illeg-al ; *^ but if he must give a bond, then a sale before 35 state V. Weeks, 67 Me. -60; Dispensary Board was inefTectual, S Atl. 754. the act in that respect being un- 3G Rowe V. Edmunds, 3 Allen, constitutional. State v. Porter- 334 ; see State v. Woodbury, 35 field, 47 S. C. 75 ; 25 S. E. 39. N, H. 230. 38 Sate v. Keen, 34 Me. 500; Where the statute was in its State v. Putnam, 38 Me. 296; main purpose ineffectual, man- State v. Parks, 29 Vt. 70; State damns was refused to compel an v. Fisher, 35 Vt. 584. appointment. People v. Lawton, 39 State v. Fairfield, 37 Me. 517. 30 Mich. 386. 4o Kidder v. Knox, 48 Me. 551; 37 Richards v. Columbia, 55 N. Great Falls Bank v. Farmington, H. 96. 41 N. H. 32. In South Carolina it was held 4 People v. Converse, (Mich); 59. 121 N. W. 475. 52 Wenham v. Dodge, 98 Mass. As to what does not sliow the 474. agent of an express company was 53 State V. Kaplicsky, 73 Atl. guilty of delivering liquors in a 830. local option district, see this case. Incidentally it may be stated See also Mason v. Lathrop, 7 that the interstate law has no ref- Gray, 384. § 249 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 386 town to another plact- in the same town is a violation of a statute forbidding the conveyance or transportation of liquors.^^ This covers an instance of a wholesaler delivering goods sold to his customers.'"'" A common carrier cannot screen itself from prosecution under its common law duty to accept and convey goods tendered it for carriage.^^ A statute which forbids express companies, common carriers, or their employes, "or any other person," to convey liquors applies to the driver of a team who undertakes with his team to de- liver liquors in his own wagon. ''^ "Where a statute makes it an offense to "receive for conveyance liquors unlawfully sold or intended for unlawful sale, " it is the receipt of the liquors for the purpose of conveyance that creates the offense, for that act completes their sale. In such an instance the pur- chaser's intention with regard to the sale is immaterial; and he need not be named in the indictment, nor need it be shown he had no authority to sell."° In order to show that the carrier had reasonable cause to believe the liquors conveyed were in- tended to be unlawfully sold, the general reputation of the consignee as a liquor dealer, and of discoveries made on a search warrant of his premises, may be shoAMi.'''*' In a statute forbidding any person or corporation not "regularly" con- ducting a "general" express business, except a railroad or street railway company authorized to carry freight or express, to receive for transportation, for hire, for delivery of liquor in a place where licenses are not granted, the word general imports something more than a casual, infrequent and in- cidental carriage of goods other than liquors, and means that the major part of its business is the carriage of a variety of goods commonly carried by express companies. The word 55 Commonwealth v. Waters, 11 so Commonwealth v. Harper, Gray, 81. 145 Mass. 100; 13 N. E. 459; see 5« State V. Campbell, 7G Iowa, Commonwealth v. Fisher, 138 122; 40 N. W. 100. Mass. 504. 57 State V. Goss, 59 Vt. 2&6 ; 9 Evidence which showed defend- Atl. 829. ant was conducting a general ex- 58 State V. Campbell, 76 Iowa, press business. Commonwealth v. 122; 40 N. W. 100. People's Express Bureau (Mass.), 59 Commonwealth v. Tx)cke, 114 88 N. E. 420. Mass. 2S8. 387 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAPPIC. § 250 regularly means fixedness and permanency in the character of the business, and indicates stated times and established routes of conveyance." Upon a charge of a violation of such a statute brought against an express company, no presumption arises from its name thaj; it is engaged in carrying on a general express business. That fact must be proven.*^- It was held that the statute just alluded to included those who carried liquors in their own vehicles as well as those who go on trains or steamers, but it involves the idea of route and time, or both.^" Such a statute is constitutional.*'* Where a statute requires expressmen to keep open for inspection of police officers a book, in which must be plainly entered the date of reception of each package of liquor received for carriage into a no-licensing towTi, with a correct transcript of the marks as well as date of delivery, it is violated if the ex- pressman carries the liquor into such town before he makes the entries, although he may have made them correctly afte^' their arrival.""' In South Carolina, a statute forbidding the ''trans- port" of liquors "from place to place" within the State, applies to the carriage or conveyance of liquor on the person.*^"' Sec. 250. Limiting number of saloons. The Legislature may limit the number of saloons within a city or within a block of a city, and such limitation is not a prohibitory law but a mere regulation of the sale of liquor.*"' And where a city council or town board has a discretion to issue a license or refuse the application without assigning any 61 Commonwealth v. Peoples A city may require a common Express Co. (Mass.), 88 N. E. carrier to deliver all liquor 820. brought within such city by it 62 Commonwealth v. Peoples Ex- from without the State at a press 'Co. (Mass.), 88 N. E. 420. particular depot and nowhere 63 Commonwealth v. Peoples else. Barrett v. Richard (Neb.), Express Co., supra. 124 N. W. 153. 64 Commonwealth v. Peoples <^'' Ex parte Abrams (Tex. €r. Express Co., supra. App.), 120 S. W. 883; Ex parte 65 Commonwealth v. Shea, 185 Clark (Tex. Cr. App.), 120 S. Mass. 89 ; m N. E. 1060. W, 892. 60 State V. Pope, 79 S. C. 87; €0 S. E. 234. §§ 251-253 TR.VFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS.^ 388 cause, or without any cause for its refusal to its issuance, a refusal of a license for a town where others are in force will not be reviewed, and the licensing authorities are justified in doing so."* But an ordinance limiting the number of licenses ®* to one in a space of nine hundred yards on a single street, including the parks on intersecting streets, is unreasonable, amounting to substantial prohibition, especially when taken in connection with a clause in it requiring the consent of all owners and occupants of stores, residences and other buildings within a radius of one hundred miles from the place where the business is to be conducted.'^" Sec. 251. Saloon for negroes. In Louisiana separate saloons are provided for negroes and whites ; and the requirements of the statute that they can be used only by the race for which they are provided seems to be regarded as valid. ^^ Sec. 252. Liquor sales carried on with other business. An ordinance providing that the sale of "near" beer shall not be carried on in connection with any other business is a reasonable regulation.'^- Sec. 253. Criminal liability of owner and landlord. In some States, by statute, it is made a misdemeanor for the owner of real estate to lease it for the illegal sale of in- toxicating liquors, or to suffer premises under his control to 68 Schweirman v. Highland Park In Rhode Island one license (Ky. ), 113 S. W. 507. only can be issued for each 500 69 In this case limiting the sale inhabitants according to the last of "near beer." United States or the State census "0 Campbell v. Thomasville (Acts 1908, p. 206, c. 1783). (Ga.), '64 S. E. 15. Greenougli v. Xarragansett (R. A licensee who opens two bars I.), 71 Atl. 594. in different buildings cannot in- 7 1 State v. Falkenheimer (La.), sist that he cannot be punished 49 So. 214. for maintaining either, as one or 72. Campbell v. Thomasville the other is lawful. Huber v. (Ga.), 04 S. E. 15. Commonwealth (Ky.), 112 S. W. 583; 33 Ky. L. Rep. 1031. 389 REGULATING LIQUOK TRAFFIC. § 253 be used for that purpose. Under such a statute, if a building is leased to a tenant for a lawful purpose, and the tenant enters into possession under the lease, the building is under the control of the tenant while he continues in possession under the lease, unless there are special provisions in the lease which give the control to the landlord." The gist of the offense is in the landlord allowing his premises lo be used for purposes violative of the liquor law, when he might have pre- vented it. xVccordingly, it is held that the owner of premises upon which intoxicating liquors are kept for sale contrary to law, is not guilty of an offense if he leased them for a lawful purpose, and does not affirmatively assent to such unlawful use; the mere failure to prevent or attempt to prevent the illegal use or sale of the liquors will not subject him to the penalties of the statute.^* Under such a statute, a landlord who lets a house, knowing at the time of letting it that it is to be used for the clandestine sale of intoxicating liquors, or who afterwards advises, encourages, or aids oUch sales, is guilty of a misdemeanor; but when he leases the house for a lawful purpose, his mere non-interference with the subsequent illegal traffic of his tenant, after he becomes aware of it, does not involve him in his tenant's guilt. The enforcement of a law is a duty which rests primarily upon the officers and the courts. The law is not so unreasonable as to require a private citizen to embroil himself in personal difaculties, contentions and law suits for the public good.^^ And in a prosecution for a violation of the statute the State must show such acts or circumstances as will satisfy the jury that the landlord, having knowledge that the house was being used for such illegal purpose not only remained inactive, but he assented or 73 state V. Pearsell, 43 la. 630; 74 state v. Ballingall, 42 Ta. 87; Commonwealth v. VVentwortli, 14G State v. Bates, (i'2 Vt. 184; 19 Atl. Mass. 36; 13 N. E. 138; Koester Rep. 229. V. State, 36 Kan. 27; 12 Pac. Rep. 75 Crocker v. State, 49 Ark. 60; 339; State v. Shanahan, 54 N. H. 4 S. W. Rep. 197; State v. Pot- 497 ; Crofton v. State, 25 Ohio St. ter, 30 la. 587 ; Koester v. State, 249; Robinson v. State, 24 Tex. 36 Kan. 27; 12 Pac. Rep. 339; 152; Commonwealth v. Conway, State v. Williams, 30 N. J. L« 112 S. W. 575; 33 Ky. L. Rep. 102. 996. § 254 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 390 consented to such use, the burden of proof being upon the State.'" In such case, as we have already said, an affirmative assent on the part of the landlord is necessary, but in establish- ing such affirmative assent it is not necessary to show that the defendant told the lessee that he assented to the building being used for an illegal purpose. Such assent is the result of the landlord's mind and need not be coupled with any other pur- pose. In order, however, to ascertain such assent, the jury must find that the defendant did some affirmative act, or made some declaration in connection therewith, or in relation thereto, from which they can find that the defendant did so assent.'^^ Sec. 254. Police regulations — Enforcement by mandamus. The remedy by mandamus is one which is allowed to compel the performance of some duty owing to an individual or to the public. The duty must be specific in its nature and of such character that the court can prescribe a definite act or series of acts w^hich will constitute a performance of the duty, so that the respondent may know what he is obliged to do and may do the act required, and the court may know that the act has been performed and may enforce its performance. It is not necessary, in all cases, that the performance of the duty should consist of a single act. It may be a succession of acts if this duty is specific and the acts are of such a nature that the court can supervise the performance of the duty and the execution of the mandate. But the \^Tit has never been made use of and does not lie for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties generally. It will not lie where the court would have to control and regulate a general course of official conduct and enforce the performance of official duties generally. In such a case the court could not prescribe the particular act to be performed and enforce its performance. Accordingly, it has been held that mandamus will not lie to compel the mayor of a city to enforce Sunday restate V. Ahraliains, 4 la. 541. Cordes v. State, 37 Kan. 48; 14- TTiSUitc V. Abrahams, 6 la. Pac. Rep, 493. 11-6; State v. PuarscU, 43 la. 630; 391 REGULATING LIQUOR TRAFFIC. § 254 closing laws and ordinances against the saloons of such city. In such a case the court could not prescribe the particular act to be performed and enforce its performance. To do so it would be necessary for the court to supervise generally the official conduct of the mayor and to determine in numerous instances whether he had persistently, and to the extent of his power and the force in his hands, carried out the mandate of the court and performed his official duty. For a court to assume the management of municipal affairs of a city w'ould be to depart from its proper sphere and assume governmental functions, which are outside of the jurisdiction of the courts and not within the remedy by writ of mandamus.'^ And in Massachusetts, it has been held that mandamus will not lie to compel the marshal of a city to station a police officer at a certain place in accordance with an order of the board of aldermen of the city.'^ 78 People V. Dunne, 21S 111. 346; 79 Alger v. Seaver, 138 Mass. 76 N. E. 570; People v. Buss, 238 331. 111. 593; 77 N. E. 840; affirming 111 111. App. 218. CHAPTER V. MUNICIPAL REGULATION. SECTION. 255. Creation of public corpora- tions — Ordinances. 25'6. Municipal power, how con- ferred and construed. 257. Municipal control — Legis- lative power — Police power. 258. Discretionary powers of mu- nicipal corporations. 259. Exclusive municipal power, efl'ect. 260. Powers delegated to and by municipal corporations. 261. Municipal regulations be- yond corporate limits. 262. Reasonableness of ordinance. 263. Extent of power of munic- ipality to grant licenses. 264. Power to license — Use and grant. 265. Power to require a license — Instances. 266. Power to grant a license, what includes. 267. Ordinances necessary to ex- action of a license. 268. Delegation by city of power to require a license. 269. Number of licenses. 270. Restricting saloons to spec- ified parts of a city. 271. License ordinance, when not invalid. 272. Discriminating ordinance, when not unconstitutional. SECTION. 273. Exacting license, require- mient when not discrim- inating. 274. Bond of licensee. 275. Municipal power to prohibit. 276. Power to prohibit includes power to license. 277. Prohibitory ordinance, not in violation of common law rights. 278. Regulation and prohibition distinguished. 279. Limitation on power of city to enact ordinance. 280. Power to regulate sale of liquor — Valid ordinance. 281. Power to regulate sale of liquors — Invalid ordi- nance. 282. Amount of license fees or taxes. 283. License fees, limitation. 284. Right of different jurisdic- tions to exact license. 285. License, different jurisdic- tions may require. 286. United States license, effect. 2'87. Keeping liquors for sale or saloon open. 288. Ordinance, when not con- flicting with statute — Keeping liquor for un- lawful sale. 280. Prohibiting owner to enter saloon on Sunday. 393 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. §255 SECTION. 2)90. Declaring sale of liquors a nuisance. Regulating days and hours. Sales on Sundays, election days or holidays. Sales at prohibited hours. Picnic and social gatherings. Physician's prescriptions. Sales to minors and drunk- ards. Prohibiting sales in State having local option laws. Women not licensing — Con- stitutional law. Women in saloons. Wine rooms. Requiring a county license. Repeal of statute bj impli- cation, when not accom- plished. Regulation of saloon room — Location of saloon. 304. Lights burning in saloon. 291. 2D2. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 29S. 299. 300. 301. •302. 303. SECTIOX. 305. Screens — Exposure of room to view. 306. Prohibiting the carriage of liquors. 307. Police visiting saloon. 308. Penalties essential — Heavier for subsequent offense. 309. Penalties, greater and ad- ditional — Infliction. 310. Revocation of license — Con- ditional ordinance. 311. Ordinance annulled by sub- sequent statute, 312. Exceptions to prohibitory ordinances. 313. Ordinance in part void. 314. Ordinance in conflict with Constitution. 315. City conducting a dispen- sary. 316. Appointment of liquor agents. 317. Duties and powers of liquor agents. Sec. 255. Creation of public corporations — Ordinances. Public or municipal corporations are established for the local government of towns, cities or particular districts. The special powers conferred upon them are not vested rights a.s against the State, being wholly political rights existing only during the will of the Legislature of the State ; for otherwise there would be numberless petty governments existing within the State forming a part of it, yet independent of the control of the sovereign power. Such powers may at any time be re- pealed or abrogated by the Legislature, either by a general law operating upon the whole State, or by a special act alter- ing the powers of the corporation.^ If the legislative action 1 Barnes v. District of Colum- bia, 91 U. S. 510; Laranne Co. v. ^^ew Albany Co., 92 U. S. 307; iState V. Jennings. 27 Ark. 419; San Francisco v. Canaran, 42 Cal. 541 ; Granbury v. Tliurston, 23 Conn. 416; People v. Power, 24 111. 187; Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 35L; Langsworthy v. Du- buque, 16 la. 271; Atchinson v. § 255 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 394 in such cases operates injuriously to the municipalities or to individuals, the remedy is not with the courts. The courts have no power to interfere and the people must be looked to, to right through the ballot box all such wrongs.^ Being created by the Legislature, ordinances of such corporations must not conflict with the general laws of the State, and powers conferred upon them in reference to the traffic in intoxicating liquors must be exercised in conformity to such laws unless exclusive control over the subject is granted to them. The granting authority of such a corporation to pass ordinances in relation to such traffic, in and of itself, will not by implication repeal the general laws of the State upon the same subject ; ^ nor will a clause in the charter of such a corporation in general terms to pass By-Laws not consistent with the Constitution and laws of the State confer power upon the municipal authorities to pass an ordinance making it a penal offense to sell intoxicating liquors in quantities of a quart or more to be drank on the premises, where there is a statute of the State w'hich, in effect, declares that every citizen may sell such liquors in quantities of a quart or more ; * nor to punish a person for selling such liquors, the sale of which is already prohibited by the statute of the State, unless specially authorized to do so.^ In other words, where author- ity is conferred upon a municipal corporation to regulate the traffic in intoxicating liquors such power does not enable the corporation to nullify or abrogate the general laws of the Bartholow, 4 Kan. 124 ; Goff v. v. Haines, 35 Ore. 379 ; ^S Pac. 39. Frederick, 44 Md. 67; Martin v. 2 City of St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Dix, 52 Miss. 53; State v. Cowan, Mo. 414; Bronson v. Oberlin, 41 29 Mo. 330; Bradshaw v. Omaha, Ohio St. 476; 52 Am. Rep. 90; 1 Neb. 16; Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. State v. Columbia, 17 S. C. 80. 23 ; Patterson v. Society, etc., 24 3 Gardner v. Morris, 20 111. N. J. L. 385; People v. Tweed, 63 431; Harrington v. State, 9 K Y. 202; Mills v. Williams, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 525; Rochester v. Ired. (N. C.) 55>8; Hawkins v. Harrington, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) Commonwealth, 76 Pa. St. 151; 547; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex. (N. Y.) 325; State v. Witter, 107 641; Kuhn V. Board, etc., 4 W. N. C. 792. Va. 499; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 < Adams v. Albany, 29 Ga. 66. Wis. 242 ; Harrison, etc., v. Hnl- 5 Loeb v. City of Attica, 82 Ind. Ifind, 3 Grat. (Va.) 247; State 175. 395 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 256 State.® Where, however, the exclusive power to license, pro- hibit, or to regulate the traffic in intoxicating liquors is given to a municipal corporation by the Legislature, such corpora- tion may license, regulate or partially or entirely prohibit the traffic as it may see proper to do without regard to the general laws of the State.'^ A city may be given the exclusive power to grant licenses to sell liquors within its boundaries; ^ and it may be authorized to require licenses from all who eugage in the sale of liquors within its boundaries.'' A city may be empowered to inflict a greater penalty for the same act than the State inflicts.^'' Sec. 256. Municipal power, how conferred and construed. Municipal corporations have such powers only as are con- ferred upon them by the act of Legislature creating them, and such incidental powers as are implied by their creation and for their continued existence.^^ "It is a general and undis- puted proposition of law," says Judge Dillon, "that a munic- ipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted in express words; 6 Harris v. Town of Livingston, fied, and a city of one class be 28 Ala. 577; Huffsmith v. People, given greater powers than those 8 Colo. 175; Foster v. Brown, 55 given to another class. Bronson la. ■686; Commonwealth v. Luck, v. Oberlin, 41 Ohio St. 476; 52 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 296; State v. Am. Rep. 90; Burckholter v. Mc- Langdon, 31 Minn. 316; State v. Connellsville, 20 Ohio St. 308. Nolan, 37 Minn. 16; Thompson v. s state v. Dwyer, 21 Minn. 512; City of Mt. Vernon, 11 Ohio St. Wilson v. Whelan, 91 Ga. 461; 17 688; Aug-erhoff v. State, 15 Tex. S. E. 906; Coulterville v. Gillam, App. .613; Craddock v. State, 18 72 111. 599. Tex. App. 567; Corbett v. Terri- » Bronson v. Oberlin, 41 Ohio tory, 1 Wash. Tr. 431; St. 476; 52 Am. Rep. 90; State v. 7 Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586; Columbus, 17 S. C. 80; Mounds- Schwuchow V. Chicago, 68 111. 444; ville v. Fountain, 27 W. Va. 182; Harbaugli v. Munough, 74 111. Jelly v. Dils, 27 W. Va. 267; 371; Gunnarsson v. Sterling, 92 Glantz v. State, 38 Wis. 649. 111. 5P9; Phillip V. Tecumseh, 5 lo Pekin v. Smelzel, 21 III. 464; Neb. 30'5; Trustees v. Keating, 4 74 Am. Dec. 105. Den. (N. Y.) 341; St. Paul v. n Chambers v. Greeneastle, 138 Troyer, 3 Minn. 291 (Gil. 200). Ind. 330; 35 N. K 14. Cities and towns may be classi- § 256 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 396 second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essentially to the declared purpose of the corporation — not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied. Of everj^ municipal corporation the charter or statute hy which it is created is its organic act. "^- It has been held that the ordinances of the corporation of the city of Washington cannot increase or vary the power given by the acts of Congress, or impose any terms or conditions not authorized by the act of Congress ; ^^ also, that the corporation of Washington cannot grant a license to retail intoxicating liquors where the general law is that such licenses are granted by the county courts exclusively.^* In other words, the actions of such corporations are to be held strictly within the limits prescribed by their charters, these being their Constitutions. The courts will not infer that a Legislature intends to authorize a local departure from a general policy of the State unless the local exception is ex- pressed in specific terms ; and a general law of the State regu- lating its municipal corporations will give no authority to them to pass ordinances to license and regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors within their corporate limits. Within such limits such corporations are favored by the courts, and powers expressly granted to them or necessarily implied from their charters cannot be defeated by a strict construction ; but acts authorized by them must be done in a manner provided by such statutes.^^ 12 Dillon's Munic. Cor., §S0; City of Madison, 7 Ind. S6; Town Cook County v. McCrea, 93 111. of Martinsville, 33 Ind. 507 ; Com- 2.3'6; Hencke v. McCord, 55 la. monwealth v. Voories, 51 Ky. (12 378; Smith v. Xewburn, 70 N. C. B. Mon.) 3C1; State v. Brittuin, 14. 89 N. C. 574. i-'^ Thompson v. Lessee of Car- A statute specifically naming in roll, 22 How. 422. what instances and for what pur- 1* United States v. Kladenbach, poses a city may exact a license 1 C. C. 132. and regulate the sale of liquors !•"' Sanders v. Town Commission- followed by a general clause that ers, 30 Ga. 679; Sullivan v. City it "may make any other by-laws of Oneida, Gl 111. 242; Smith v. and regulations which may seem 397 MUNICIPAL REGULATION, § 257 Sec. 257. Municipal control — Legislative power — Police power. The municipal authorities of incorporated towns and cities may, in the absence of constitutional restrictions, be invested by the Legislature of the State with the power to license, regulate, prohibit or suppress the traffic in intoxicating liquors subject to the general laws of the State, and such traffic may be prohibited in one part of a town or city, and licensed in another part, as the public welfare may require. This is so because the to^vns and cities of a State are a part of the governmental frame work of the State, and such power may be delegated to them as a rightful legislative power, to be carried out by the enactment of proper By-Laws or ordi- nances.^*' And without the grant of such power, a municipal corporation may not legislate upon the subject, and it will not of itself authorize its authorities to issue a license. Such power in a municipal corporation is a dormant one and affords no authority to issue a license until called into life and put into operation by appropriate legislation by the proper municipal authorities.^^ When such power has been conferred upon a municipality, it is wholly discretionary with for the well-being of the city, pro- Mich. 367; 19 N. W. 38; Sherlock vided they be not repugnant to v. .Stuart, 96 Mich. 193; 55 N. VV. the Constitution or laws of the 845; St. Paul v. Troyer, 3 Minn. State" only empowers it to pass 291 ; State v. Dwyer, 21 Minn. 512; an ordinance upon the cases de- State v. Andrews, 11 Neb. 523; scribed in the specific provisions. State v. Fay, 44 N. J. L. ( 15 State V. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424. Vroom) 474; Paul v. Gloucester, 16 Mayor v. Shattuck, 19 Colo. 21 Vroom (N. J. L.), 585; 15 104; Morris v. Rome, 10 Ga. 532; Atl. 272; Riley v. Trenton, 51 N. Denehy v. Chicago, 120 111. 627; J. L. (22 Vroom) 49'8;18 Atl. 116; City of Lawrenceburg v. Wuest, Burkhalter v. McConnellsville, 20 1'6 Ind. 337; Wiley v. Owens, .39 Ohio St. 309; Bronson v. Oberlin, Ind. 429; Crawfordsville v. Lutz, 41 Ohio St. 47<); Davis v. State, 109 Ind. 466; 10 N. E. 411; Ma- 2 Tex. App. 425; Moundsville v. son V. Trustees, 4 Bush (Ky.), Fountain, 27 W. Va. 1S2; Glentz 40'6 ; State v. Harper, 42 La. Ann. v. State, 28 Wis. 549. 312; 7 So. 446; New Hampton v. i7 People v. Crothy, 93 111. 180; Conroy, 56 la. 498; 9 N. W. 417; Conley v. Rushville. 60 Ind. 327; Commonwealth v. Fredericks, 119 Carr v. Fowler, 74 Ind. 590. Mass. 199; Wolf v. Lansing, 53 § 258 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 398 its authorities to license and regulate or partially or wholly prohibit the liquor traffic, provided such municipal legislation is not in contravention of the Constitution, statutes and police power of the State.'^ Under the police power of the State, such municipal authorities may enact ordinances of wider scope and affixing greater penalties than are provided by the laws of the State for the violation of the laws, provided they are not prohibited from doing so by a statute of the State ; and the enactment of laws by the State regulating the liquor traffic will not have that effect, nor prevent such municipal authorities from acting/^ The acknowledged police power of the State extends even to the destruction of property. For this reason, even though the enforcement of an ordinance may operate to destroy a business theretofore lawful, and to seri- ously impair the value of property acquired under the sanction of a special law or charter, these considerations will not render the ordinance invalid or prevent its enforcement when the pro- tection of the public health or promotion of the general wel- fare requires it."° Sec. 258. Discretionary powers of municipal corporations. "Where there is no constitutional inhibition, a Legislature has the right to confer upon the municipalities of the State the power of regulating any business which may act preju- dicially upon the health, morals, and peace of the inhabitants. This regulation may be extended to the exercise of the dis- 18 Schwiichow V, 'Chicago, 68 111. Where a Constitution prohibits 444 ; Yunnarsaohn v. Sterling, 92 the Legislatm-e delegating the 111. 5-69; State v. Columbia, 17 power to suspend the laws, it can- 6. C. 80. not delegate such power to a mu- 19 Pekin v. Smclzel, 21 111, 464; nicipality to suspend a law; and 74 Am. Dec. 105. a city charter providing that its 20 License Case, 5 How. 504; provisions nd an ordinance en- Brewing Co. V. Mass, 97 U. S. 26; acted in oursuance thereof shall Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 supersede a State statute when- U. S. 659; Muglcr v. Kan. 123 U. ever there is conflict between 6. 623; 8 Sup. C't. 273;— L. Ed. them is void. Arroyo v. State An ordinance in conflict with a (Tex. Cr. App.), 69 S. W. 503. State law is void. State v. Lang- ston, S8 N. €. 682. 399 MUNICIPAL liEGULATION. § 258 cretionary power by the municipal authorities, as to the person who is to be licensed and the place where the business is to be transacted; and a reasonable tax may be imposed for the privilege of embarking in, and carrying on, any such business. The right to regulate such matters is found in the first prin- ciples of good government and self-protection and the compre- hensive police power of the State. The right to impose a tax upon a licensed business is largely supported by legislative and judicial sanction and recognition. That a very large dis- cretion must be vested in the officers who are to grant or refuse the licenses in such cases is manifest from the nature of the subject to be regulated. In the matter of licensing tippling shops and saloons they must of necessity be the best, and generally the only, judges whether the establishment of such a place in any particular locality will affect or disturb the peace of the community, as each particular ease must depend in a great measure upon its own circumstances and bearings. In such case there is no presumption that the persons charged with the duty of granting such licenses will not perform it or that they will abuse the discretion given them. Other con- siderations than the mere locality must often enter into the determination of the suitableness of the place for the saloon. If the building be so arranged as to render violations of the law easy, or if it is to be kept in connection with a house of prostitution, or if it be not situated upon a street or an alley, or if it be one of the upper stories of a building, or in a part of the city kept for residence only, or near a school, these would certainly afford good reasons for rejecting an applica- tion for such a license. The power to regulate and grant such a license necessarily involves the power to refuse to grant one, when, in the judgment of the municipal authorities, there are features connected with any particular application which would render the compliance unsafe or improper. Unless this poAver to refuse is admitted there could be no regulation, because if the authorities were obliged to license every applicant who has complied with a prescribed set of conditions, or who will pay a certain sum of money, the power would be changed from one of regulation into one of simple taxation, from a power, the judicious exercise of which § 259 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 400 is essential to the very life of a municipal corporation, into one entirely at the mercy of individual citizens, and of no possible value to the municipal corporation, save in the paltry sums it might put into the treasury. When we speak of the discretion in municipal authorities, in the exercise of the power, we mean, of course, a legal discretion and not an arbi- trary and uncontrollable sway. From the peculiarly demo- cratic character of our municipal institutions such powers cannot become dangerous in the hands of our rulers except, perhaps, in the granting of such licenses with too much liberality.-^ Sec. 259. Exclusive municipal power — Effect. If the Legislature of a State, having the power to do so, provides that the incorporated towns and cities of the State shall have the exclusive privilege of granting licenses to retail intoxicating liquors within their corporate limits, this will deprive the State and county officials of all authority to inter- fere in any manner whatever with the granting of such licenses.-- A grant of such exclusive power and authority to 2i7ji re Hoover, 30 Fed. ol; 389; Baton Rouge v. Butler, IIS United States v. Ronan, 33 Fed. La. 73 ; 42 So. 650 ; State v. Lind- 117; Batters V. Dunning, 49 Conn. quist, 77 Minn. 540; 80 N. W. 479; Sherlock v. Stuart, 96 Mich. 701; Coulterville v. Gillen, 72 193; 55 N. W. 845; St. Paul v. 111. 599; State v. Binswanger, 122 Froyer, 3 Minn. 200; State v. Mo. App. 78; 98 S. W. 103; Ed- Ludwig, 21 Minn. 202; Perkins monson v. Commonwealth, 110 V. Ledvetter, 68 Miss. 327; 8 So. Ky. 510; 62 S. W. 1018; 22 Ky. 507; Sparrow's Petition, 138 L. Rep. 1902; Commonwealth v. Penn. St. 116; 20 A. 711; Ail- Luck, '2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 296; State stock V. Page, 77 Va. 386; State v. Wheeler, 27 Minn. 76; Berg- V. Columbus, 17 S. C. 80. meyer v. Greenup Co. (Ky. ), Under a power to regulate the 44 S. W. 82; Sharon Borough v. sale, an ordinance may vest dis- Mercer Co., 20 Pa. Ct. Rep. 507; cretionary power in the city as to State v. Nolan, 37 Minn. 16; Alex- the place or places where sales ander v. State, 42 Miss. 316; Phil- may be made. State v. Cheyenne, lips v. Tecumseh, 5 Nob. 312; 7 Wyo. 417; 52 Pac. 975. Cook v. Mercer Co., 51 N. J. L. 22 Camp V. State, 27 Ala. 53; 85; 16 Atl. 176; Raubold v. Corn- State V. Cochran (Ore.), 104 Pac. monwealth (Ky.), 54 S. W. 419; Bennett v. People, 30 111. 17; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1125; Feather- 401 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 259 one jurisdiction, for instance, to a municipal corporation, to restrain or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors upon every day in the week, is irreconcilable with the existence of an antecedent power, for instance, in the State, to prohibit the exercise of the same upon a special day of the week ; -^ and a general statute which empowers the county authorities of a State to grant licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors at retail, but provides that it shall not apply to any toA\'n or city, which, by its charter has power to grant licenses for the sale of such liquors, provided the fees charged therefor are at least as much as those required by the county, will deprive the county authorities of jurisdiction to act in the premises and grant a license under the provisions of such general statute.^* The fact that an incorporated town or city which has been granted the exclusive power to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors within its corporate limits, sees proper not to grant an applicant a license for the sale of in- toxicating liquors within its limits, will not confer upon the State and county authorities power to act in the premises, and if they do and issue a license to such applicant it will be void and afford him no protection. The effect of the granting of such exclusive power to a municipal corporation is to super- sede or suspend the general law of the State upon the subject; and if a person in such case brings himself within the rules and regulations adopted by a municipal corporation to whom such exclusive privilege has been granted, he is not amenable to the general law, nor punishable for acts which, without the protection afforded by the license of such corporation, would be violations of the general laws of the State. But a statute which confers upon the municipal corporations within a State stone V. Lambertville, 50 N. J. L. Moskow v. Highlands (Colo.), 47 (21 Vroom) 507; 14 Atl. 599; Pac. 846; Schwerman v. Common- Clintonville v. Keating, 4 Denio wealth, 99 Ky. 296 ; 38 S. W. 146 ; (N. Y.), 341; State V. Baker, 381 I'ommonwealth v. Helbeck, 101 Ore. 50; 92 Pac. 1076; 13 L. R. Ky. 16G; 40 S. W. 245. A. (N. S.) 1040; Ward V. County -'s Hetzer v. Wheelan, 21 Ga. Court, 51 W. Va. 102; 41 S. K. 461. 154; Seattle v. Clark, 28 Wash. 24 State v. Andrews, 11 Neb. 717; 69 Pac. 407; Ex parte 6'23; Clintonville v. Keating, 4 Simms, 41 Fla. 31'6; 25 So. 280; Denio, 341. §259 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 402 the power to license or regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors within their corporate limits does not thereby confer the ex- elusive right to do so, but a right concurrent with that of the State and county authorities in regard to the same matter or subject. The exclusive right of municipal corporations to license and control the sale of intoxicating liquors within their corporate limits is unusual and not in harmony with the system of State legislation. Hence, the legislative intention of con- ferring such a power must be clear to that effect and sus- ceptible of no other reasonable construction. The usual power conferred upon such a corporation to collect a license for the sale of such liquors within its limits will not be sufficient to confer the right of such exclusive control.-^ When a municipal corporation has the exclusive privilege of granting licenses to sell intoxicating liquors, and to prescribe the terms on which they may be sold within the limits of incorporation, it has the power to declare the sale of such liquors within its limits a nuisance and to punish it as such.-" 25 Territory v. Webster, 5 Dak. 3-51; 40 N. W. 535; Corbett v. Territory, 1 Wash. T. 431; Lutz V. Crawfordsville, 109 Ind. 466; 10 N. E. 411; State v. Gurlock, 14 Iowa, 444; Keokuk v. Dressell, 47 Iowa, 597; Ginnochio v. State, 30 Tex. App. 584; 18 S. W. 82. 26 Bennett v. The People, 30 111. 394; Village of Coulterville v. Gillen, 72 III. 599. There is no constitutional ob- jection to a statute which turns over to cities the complete con- trol over the liquor trallic within them. Davis v. State, 2 Tex. App. 425; ^loundsville v. Fountain, 27 W. Va. 182; Taul v. Troyer, 3 Minn. 291; Commonwealth v. Fredericks, 119 Mass. 119; Mason V. Trustees, 4 Bush, 40i6 ; State v. Harper, 42 La. Ann. 312; 7 So. 446 ; Ex parte Cowert, 92 Ala. 94 ; So. 225; State v. King, 37 Ala. 462. Power once given to license may be taken away, even though the license fees had been used and the city would not return them to the licensees. Gutzweller v. People, 14 111. 142. A general statute prohibiting the opening of a saloon on Sunday does not prevent the Legislature authorizing a city "to pass all or- dinances in relation to keeping open saloons on the Sabbath day in" the city. Hood v. Van Glahn, S8 Ga. 405; 14 S. E. 564. Power given a city to enact ordinances regulating the liquor traffic within its boundaries does not repeal the general State liquor law so far as it relates to such city. Gardner v. People, 20 111. 430; State v. Langdon, 29 Minn. 393; 13 N. W. 187; and vice versa. Salina v. Seitz, 16 Kan. 143; Drysdale v. Pradot, 45 Miss. 44'5. 403 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. §260 Sec. 260. Powers delegated to and by municipal corpora- tions. A license is a privilege granted by the State usually on the payment of a valuable consideration, though this is not essen- A statute prohibiting a city from punishing by ordinance an act for wliich a State law prose- cutes a penalty does not prohibit a city passing an ordinance re- quiring a license to sell liquor and prescribing a penalty for a sale without it, although the same act of sale is a violation of a statute prohibiting such sale with- out a State license, and the ac- cused has no such State license. ■Clevenger v. Rushvillc, 90 Ind. 258; Zeller v. Crawfordsville, 90 Ind. 2<52; Lutz v. Crawfordsville, 109 Ind. 4G6; 10 N. E. 411; Ex parte Stephen, 114 Cal. 27'8; 41) Pac. 86; Von Der Leith v. State, •60 N. J. L. 46; 37 Atl. 436; 60 N. J. L. 590; 40 Atl. 590; Mor- ganstern v. Commonwealth, 94 Va. 787; 26 S. E. 402. Contra, Foster v. Brown, 55 Iowa, 686; 8 N. VV. «54. The fact that the State at large has adopted prohibition does not prevent a city adopting an ordi- nance regulating the liquor traffic within its boundaries. In re Thomas, 53 Kan. C59; 37 Pac. 171. Although a State levies a tax upon the liquor traffic, it may au- thorize a city to levy an addi- tional tax. Wolf v. Lansing, 53 Mich. 367; 19 N. W. 38; Louis- ville V. Kean, 18 B. Mon. 9. In West Virginia a city has the exclusive power to determine whether a license shall be grant- ed; and if it grant one, then the county must and may be com- pelled to grant one. Ward v. ■County Court, 51 W. Va. 102; 41 S. E. 154. In Kansas, cities of the second class have been held authorized to regulate the sale of liquors not intoxicating but which contain al- cohol. Eureka v. Jackson, 8 Kan. A pp. 49; 54 Pac. 5. A prohibitory statute may be repealed by the enactment of a city charter. PursifuU v. Com- monwealth (Ky.), 47 S. W. 772; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 863; Douglass v. Commonwealth (Ky. ), 4*7 S. W. 329; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 653. A statute of Georgia incorpo- rating the city of Swainsboro, empowering it to grant licenses to sell liquors, has been held not to repeal a special act proliibit- ing the sale of liquors within three miles of a particularly spe- cified place in the city. Pughsley V. State, 4 Ga. App. 494; 61 S. E. 886; see also Pacific Univer- sity V. Johnson, 47 Ore. 448; 84 Pac. 704. As to power of Atlantic City, N. J., see Conover v. Atlantic City, 73 N. J. L. 596; 64 Atl. 146; reversing (N. J. L.) 60 Atl. 31. As to the town of Houma ( La. ) , see Houma v. Houma, etc., Co., 121 La. 21; 46 So. 42. See generally. State v. Kesells, 120 Mo. App. 233; 98 S. W. 494; Peo- ple v. Thornton, 186 111. 162; 57 X. E. <841. As to effect of granting a new § 260 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 404 tial.-^ The grant of a license may be made by the State directly or it may be made indirectly through one of the municipal corporations of the State. Of the direct grant it is to be observed that a municipal corporation as such has no inherent power to grant licenses or exact license fees ; it must derive all its authority in this regard from the State, and the power must come by direct grant and cannot be taken by implication.-^ A municipal corporation can no more exercise powers not conferred upon it than any other corporation. They are all creatures of the law and can exercise such powers only as are conferred upon them by it.-^ Where, how- ever, such power has been conferred upon a municipal corpora- tion, it may provide by ordinance duly passed, for a license system of its own, and enact penalties for its violation, and this it may do notwithstanding that the State has provided for a license system of its own and enacted penalties for its viola- tion. The powers exercised by a municipal corporation in such case are superadded to those exercised by the State.^^ And likewise it may do so even though the State has not enacted any laws upon the sale of intoxicating liquors. This is so because the authority to pass By-Laws and to regulate the internal affairs of a municipal corporation is incident to its existence.^^ An ordinance hy a municipal corporation for such purpose, although to some extent in restraint of trade, is not arbitrary, is incident to the exercise of a police power, and if authorized by a valid law of the State will not be unlawful or void.^^ Where power has been conferred upon a municifjal charter to a city, see Brinkley v. so City of Elk Point v. Vaughn, State, 108 Tenn. 475; 67 S. W. 1 Dak. 11.3. 796. 31 Burlington v. Kellar, 18 la. Local option and general local 59. option and city charter construed. 32 License Cases, 5 How. (U, Mullins V. Lancaster (Ky.), 63 S.) 504; City of St. Paul v. Up S. W. 475; 23 Ky. L. Hep. 436. ham, 12 Minn. 49; City of Ko 27 Cooley on Taxation, p. 40'6 ; Chester v. Upham, 19 Minn. 78 Heise v. Columbia, 6 Rich. (S. C. Presbyterian Church v. City of Law) 404. Xew York, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 540 28 Cooley on Taxation, p. 408 ; Stuyvesant v. Mayer, etc., 7 Cow 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., §89. (X. Y.) 604; McDermott v 29 Martinsville v. Frieze, 33 Board, etc., 5 Abb. Pr, (N. Y. Ind. 507. 434. 405 MUNICIPAL, REGULATION. § 261 corporation to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, it is so done with the intention that such power shall be exercised by such corporation, and in the mode prescribed, and it cannot delegate it to others or to an individual. ^^ Until it by proper ordinance has either prohibited the sale of such liquors or provided for the regulation of their sale, and fixed a penalty for its violation, no prosecution can be maintained by the corporation against a person for selling such liquors. The power delegated to the corporation remains dormant until called into exercise in the mode provided for in its charters and by the laws of the State.^* Sec. 261. Municipal regulation beyond corporate limits. If there be no constitutional provision to the con- trary, the power of the Legislature over the municipal corporations of the State is supreme and transcendent; it may direct, change, divide and abolish them at pleasure, as it deems the public good to require.''^ Having this power, it can designate the limits over which the jurisdiction of such corporations shall extend, and its judgment upon the question will be conclusive. It may declare that they may provide by ordinance that no unlicensed dramshop shall be kept within a designated distance of their corporate limits; for otherwise all that need be done to evade the law would be to keep a foot or two beyond the cor- porate boundaries.^'' AVhere a Legislature has done this, an ordinance passed by such a corporation with proper penalties affixed providing that the retail dealers in intoxi- cating liquors outside of and within the designated limits, shall obtain a license from the corporate authorities is a valid 33 East St. Louis v. Wehring, 34 City of East St. Louis v. 60 111. 28; Kinmundy v. Mahan, Wehring, 50 111. 28; People v. 72 111. 462; Darling v. .St. Paul, Village of Crotty, 93 III. 180. 19 Minn. 389 ; lyi re Wilson, 32 33 Dillon Munic. Corp., § -54. Minn. 145; 19 X. W. 723; State 3o Lutz v. City of Crawfords- V. Kantler, 33 Minn. 69; 21 N. ville, 109 Ind. 446; 10 N. E. 411; W. '856 ; Wynants v. Bayonne, 44 Falmouth v. Watson, 5 Bush, 060. N. J. L. (15 Vroom) 114. § 261 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 406 exercise of the power granted to it, and may bo enforced.'^ The object of this clause of legislation is to restrict the busi- ness of selling, and not to secure to the vendor the protection of the municipal government. The liquor seller is compelled to pay a special tax in the form of a license fee in order that the business may be restricted to fewer persons, and not be open, like other pursuits, to every one without the payment of any special tax. The theory of such legislation is that the business requires restrictions because it is harmful to society. There is, therefore, no just reason for affirming that a person who could secure no benefit from the municipal government, because his place of business is outside of corpo- rate limits, should be exempt from the special tax imposed up- on those engaged in the business of selling liquor within the corporate limits.^* In the Supreme Court of Nebraska it was contended that such a statute was within the interdiction of a clause of the State Constitution which provided that no man's property should "be taken or applied to public use without the consent of his representatives, and without just compensation being previously made to him. ' ' In answering this contention the court said : ' ' Had the exercise of the power complained of been the imposition of an ordinary tax merely on the property of the appellee, situated without the limits of the town, for municipal purpose, we should not doubt the correctness of the objection ; or even if the exclusion of the same in controversy in consideration of the trade license, had been made for local revenue purposes alone, though not in the usual form of tax- ation, we should regard it as within the constitutional prohi- bition ; for the Legislature could not delegate to the corpora- tion the right to either license for a compensation or tax, a privilege to be enjoyed beyond its limits, except as a police regulation, having reference to the comfort, safety and wel- fare of society within its local jurisdiction. But in our opin- ion the exaction of a fee of one hundred dollars for the priv- 37 Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 111. N. E. 729; Board v. Watson", 5 301; Lutz V. Crawfordsville, 109 Bush (Ky.), GGO. Mo. 466; 10 N. E. 411; Emerich :^s Emerich v. City of Indian- V. Indianaiwlis, 118 Mo. 279; 20 apolis, 118 Mo. 279; 20 N. E. 729. 407 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 261 ilege of vending ardent spirits, in such proximity to the towTi as to render its exercise liable to effect the good order or peace of the local community did not infringe any constitutional right of the appellee." ^9 Subsequently in approving this state- ment of the bnv. the court said: "This provision violates no command of the Constitution. It is general in its application to all territory of the State falling within such description, and it is but an exercise of the police power intrusted to the Legislature. It is referrable to that principle which enables the Legislature to prohibit liquor selling on Sundays and on days of election, or within the vicinity of fairs, camp-meet- ings, and other gatherings of the people."^" Likewise it has been held that a law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors within two miles of the corporate limits of any municipality is not obnoxious to the constitutional provision requiring all laws to be uniform in their operation ; nor does it violate the constitutional requirement that every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith,*^ While it is true that the enacting of necessary by-laws for the regu- lation of municipal corporations is an incidental power essen- tial to their continued existence, it is also true that such by- laws must not be inconsistent with their charters. These are the fundamental laws of their creation; and, in effect, are the Constitutions to such petty legislative bodies to whom the power to enact by-laws is delegated. Such corporations there- fore cannot give to their ordinances extra territorial effect ex- cept so far as they may be clearly authorized so to do by their charters, and an ordinance passed without such authority is void." 39Pleuler v. State, 11 Neb. 547; its limits. Ex parte Stephen, 114 10 N. W. 481. Cal. 278; 46 Pac. 86. 40 Hunzinger v. State, 39 Neb. In Colorado it is held that a per- 653; 58 N. W. 194. son selling liquor within a mile 41 State V. Shroeder, 51 la. 197; of a town may be punished, 1 N. W. 431. though the place where he made 42 Gabel v. Houston, 29 Tex. 335. the sale is within a mile of an- It would seem that one amount other town or towns. Meckew v. may be chai-ged for a license Highland,s, 9 Colo. App. 255; 47 within a city and another beyond Pac. 846. If the limitation distance runs ;§262 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 408 Sec. 262. Reasonableness of ordinances. In the United States the courts have often affirmed general incidental power of municipal corporations to make ordi- nances, but have always declared that ordinances passed by virtue of an implied power must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. *^ It has al- ways been held that the courts will review the question as to reasonableness of ordinances passed under a grant of power, general in its nature or under incidental or implied municipal powers, and if any given ordinance is found unreasonable will declare it void as a matter of law.** The grounds on which an ordinance may be declared void for unreasonableness have been said to be two: First, where it is oppressive, unequal and unjiLst ; and second, where it is altogether unreason- able.*'' But the question whether an ordinance is rea- sonable cannot be raised to affect its validity, where the power into another county in which the city is not located, the city may as to such of its territory as lies in such other county exact a li- cense. Gower v. Agee (Mo. App.), 107 S. W. '999. See also Mason v. State, 1 Ga. App. 534; 68 S. E. 139. The question of the jurisdiction of a city over the place where the illegal sale took place cannot be raised in a prosecution because of such sale, where it is admitted that the city had assumed to ex- ercise jurisdiction with respect to the place. Allode v. Nylin, 139 111. App. 527. 43 Dillon's Munic. Corp., § 253 ; Waters v. Leech, 3 Ark. 110; In re Frank, 52 Cal. 606; Tugman v. iCity of Chicago, T8 111. 405; Chaniper v. City of Greencastle, 138 Ind. 339; Commonwealth v. Steffee, 7 Bush (Ky.), L61; Com- monwealth V. Robertson, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 438; Paris v. Graham, 33 Mo. 94; Kipp v. Patterson, 2 Dutch. {N. J.) 298; Dayton v, Quigley, 29 N. J. Eg. 77; State v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426; People V. Throop, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 183; Commissioner v. Gas Co., 2 Grant (Pa.), 291; Mayor, etc., v. Beas- ley, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 232; White V. Mayor, etc., 2 Swan (Tenn.), 364; Chason v. City of Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 31'6; State v. McCannon, 111 Mo, App. 626; 86 S. W. 510. « McQuillin Munic. Corp., § 182; Yates V. City of Milwaukee, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 497; Lanar v. Weidman, 57 Mo. App. 507; Springfield v. Starke, 93 Mo. App. 70; Livingston v. Wolf, 136 Pa. Ft. 519; 20 Atl. 551; State v. Cal- " "-iv, 11 Idaho, 719; 84 Pac. 27. "Mcyuillin Munic. Corp., § 182; 409 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 262 to enact the particular ordinance is specifically conferred upon the municipal corporation. When the legislative power has been thus extended, its exercise necessarily involves the author- ity to determine whether the results are reasonable or unrea- sonable, and, if the judiciary assumes to pass upon the reason- ableness of the results which follow from the exercise of that power, it departs from its function as one of the independent, co-ordinate branches of the government. It would result in the greatest confusion of decisions to permit, in any case, the introduction of evidence as to the effect of an ordinance upon a business, trade or occupation. The jury would, in the one case, hold that under the facts proven, the ordinance was in- valid, while in another ease, with more or less evidence of its hurtful consequences, the ordinance would be held valid; nor would it be more just to permit the reasonableness of an or- dinance to be determined by the court as a question of law arising upon the face of the ordinance and from the general knowledge of its harmful effects. To do so would be to deny the right of the legislative branch of the government, whether local or general, to judge of the wisdom and prudence of its own enactments, or it would result in the coexis.tence of power in the legislative and judicial departments to judge of that wisdom or prudence which would invite endless conflict of decision between the departments.'*''' Where the authority has ijeen conferred upon a municipal corporation to suppress and prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors as well as to license the sale, an ordinance which imposes a penalty for selling such drinks without a license, where the penalty exceeds that im- posed by general lav/ of the State, is reasonable. ■*" State V. Beattie, IG Mo. App. 131 ; *' Deitz v. Central, 1 Colo. Kansas City v. Cork, 38 Mo. App. 323. 6'6'6; Plattsburg v. Kiley, 42 Mo. In determining whether an or- App. 18; Cape Girardeau v. Riley, dinance is reasonable, the court 72 Mo. 220. may consider its provisions in 40 Steffy V. Monroe City, 135 connection Avith the legislative Ind. 4GG; 35 N. E. 121; Shelby- policy as disclosed in its enact- ville V. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., ments on the subject-matter of 146 Ind. G'6; 44 N. E. 929; Shea the ordinance. Chicago v. Slack, V. Muncie, 148 Ind. 14; 46 N. E. 121 III. App. 131. 138. § 263 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 410 Sec. 263. Extent of power of mitnicipality to grant licenses. The power to license places for the sale of intoxicating li- quors granted to a municipal corporation where such places are unrestrained by the general law of the State, coupled with the general power to pass ordinances for promoting the peace and good order of such corporation, will justify an ordinance which forbids sale of such liquors in unlicensed places.** In such case the power to license implies the power of such a cor- poration to determine the amount to be exacted as a license fee, subject only to a restriction that it shall not be so large as to show an evident intention to prohibit altogether acts to be licensed, the rule being that the power to regulate, license and tax the traffic does not include the power to pass ordi- nances prohibiting it.*® Authority given to such a corporation "to license saloons, taverns and eating houses" will not au- thorize the granting of the right to sell intoxicating liquors.^" The words used in conferring such authority will not war- rant such construction. It is not possible to contend that "sa- loons, taverns and eating houses" are, in contemplation of law, inseparable from the sale of intoxicating liquors. The power, however, ' ' to license, tax, regulate and restrain bar- rooms and drinking shops" does confer the power to license the business of keeping or conducting a place in which to sell intoxicating liquors. In so deciding it was said that a "bar- room and a dramshop" signify a place where intoxicating li- quors can be had.^* In a measure a general State law may 48 Vinson v. Town of Monti- 43 Mich. 361; 5 N. W. 378; 38 cello, 118 Ind. 103; Clintonville Are. Rep. 193. V. Keating, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 341; si Beiser v. State, 79 Ga. 326; HershofT v. Beverly, 43 N. J. L. 43 S. E. 257; In re Schneider, 11 (16 Vroom) 288; Schlachter v. Ore. 288; 8 Pac. 289. Stokes, 6.; X. J. L. 138; 43 Atl. Power to pass an ordinance re- ."571; State v. Kaines, 35 Ore. 379; quiring a dealer to take out a 58 Pac. 39. license cannot be delegated by a 49 /n re Stuart, Gl Cal. 374; Ex city. State v. Milwaukee, 129 parte Wolters, 65 Cal. 269; City Wis. 562; 109 N. W. 421; but it of Portland v. Schmidt. 13 Ore. mny be if the statute expressly 17; Provo, City of SchurtlefT. 4 authorizes it. In re Bight, 12 Utah, 15. Can. Prac. 433. 80 Mount Pleasant v. Vansice, 411 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 264 come to the aid of powers illy conferred upon a town, or in- distinctly given. Thus, where a general statute prohibited the sale of liqaors throughout a county except in a certain to\\Ti therein, and that town had the power to pass an ordinance "for the preservation of good order, decency and decorum within its limits," it was held that this special charter should be construed in the light of the passage of the general law in order to ascertain the intent of the Lecislature in the use of the words quoted ; and as thus considered the town could prohibit the sales of liquors within her boundaries.^^ And where a general city law authorized the city to enact an ordinance re- quiring all persons selling liquors within its boundaries under a county license to take out a city license, it was held that a defendant who had sold liquor in the city without having a city license could not escape the penalty of the ordinance by showing that he had no county license, admitting at the same time that iP he had a county license he would be amenable to the city ordinance.^^ Sec. 264. Power to license, use and grant. When an express authority to license is given, it may be a question whether it is intended for the purpose of revenue or regulation, ^mce a municipal corporation has no authority to impose a tax otherwise than in pursuance of an express grant of power to that effect, or a clear and necessary impli- cation from an express grant, a power to license should be used only for regulation, unless there is something in the language of the grant, or the circumstances of the case, clearly indi- cating that it was also intended to be used for the purpose of revenue. When the power to license is not especially given, but only implied as a means of regulating the subject, it can- not be used for anything else ; in other words, while the power to license may be inferred from the power to regulate, the power to tax cannot.^* As a means of regulating the business 52Fortner v. Duncan, 91 Ky. Fed. Rep. 701 ; State v. Herod, 29 171; 15 S. W. 55. la. 123; City of Burlinjrton v. 33Lutz V. €rawfordsville, 109 Putnam, 31 la. 102; Copeland v. Ind. 466; 10 N. E. 411. Sheridan, 152 Ind. 107; 51 N. E. »4 Laxindry License Case, 22 474. § 264 TRAl^PIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 412 it implies the power to charge a fee therefor sufficient to de- fray the expense of issuing the license ; and to compensate the corporation for any expense incurred in maintaining such regulation. °^ The terms in which a municipality is empowered to grant licenses will be expected to indicate with sufficient precision whether the grant is conferred for the purpose of revenue, or whether on the other hand, it is given for regu- lation merely. It is perhaps impossible to lay down any rule for the construction of such grants that shall be general and at the same time safe.^'^ The appropriate word to confer the power to regulate a vocation is "license," but the use of it is not absolutely essential. For instance, in California it was held that the provision, "Any county, city, town or township may nriake and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with the general laws, ' ' conferred the power to regulate the sale of in- toxicating liquors within either of such corporations, by impos- ing a license tax.^^ In other States it has been held that the power to "restrain and prohibit," "regulate and prohibit" and to prohibit the sale of such liquor included the power to license the traffic and to fix a penalty for pursuing the business without such license.^* And in others it has been held that the power to "tax" or to "restrain" carries with it the power to license the traffic.^® On the other hand it has been held that the power to tax does not confer the authority to license,®" and that the right granted to a city "to tax or entirely sup- press all petty groceries" does not confer upon the corpora- tion the power to grant licenses for retailing."^ 55 Laundry Case, 22 Fed. Rep. bash Co., 50 111. 09 ; In re Schnei- 701; Colusa County v. Seube der, 11 Ore. 288. (Cal.), 53 Pac. 1128; affirming so City of Burlington v. Bum- (Cal.) 53 Pac. 654. gardner, 42 la. 102. 56 Cooley on Taxation, p. 408. si Leonard v. City of Canton, 35 57 Ex parte Wolters, 65 Cal. 269. Miss. 189. 58 Wiley V. Owens, 39 Ind. 429 ; If there be neither express nor City of Keokuk v. Dressell, 47 la. implied power given to a city to 697; City of Emporia v. Volmer, require a license, it cannot exact 12 Kan. 623; City of St. Louis v. one. Deutschman v. Charlestown, Smith, 2 Uo. 113. 40 Ind. 449; Steinmetz v. Ver- ■'•» Town of Mt. Carmel v. Wa- sallies, 40 Ind. 249 ; Martinsville 413 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. §265 Sec. 265. Power to require a license — Instances. Unless expressly or impliedly empowered by the Legislature a city has no power to require a license to sell intoxicating li- quors."^ A provision of a Constitution that a city "may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with the general laws," empowers it to adopt an ordinance requiring a license ; '" ' and V. Frieze, 33 Ind. 507; Walker v. McNelly, 121 Ga. 114; 48 S. E. 718. Where a statute empowers a city to issue a liquor license and exact a fee therefor, and a subse- quent statute gives it a part of the county license fee, the prior statute will be held repealed. Al- toona V. Stehle, 21 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 395; 8 Pa. Dist. Rep. 25. An ordinance is not void be- cause it discriminates in favor of spirituous and vinous and against malt liquors. Grabbs v. Danville, 63 111. App. 590. A statute authorizing a "town" to issue a license means an incor- porated town and not a township organization, although townships are called "towns." People v. Thornton, 186 111. 162; 57 N. E. •841. A city may exact a license of one who has a county license to sell in its limits. Ex parte Hin- kle, 104 Mo. App. 104; 78 S. W. 317. So a city may classify licenses and fix one rate for one kind and another rate for another; and a dealer falling in the class of the lower rate cannot complain of it because there is a class of a higher rate provided for in it. Petitfils V. Jcanerette, 52 La. Ann. 1005; 27 So. 35S. A city may require a common carrier to deliver liquor at a par- ticular depot and nowhere else. Barrett v. Kickard (Neb.), 124 N. W. 153. Under a power to regulate or prohibit, a city may prohibit so- liciting of orders. Bravmstein v. People (Colo.), 105 Pae. 857. 62 United States v. Kaldenbach, 1 Cranch C. C. 132; Fed. Cas. No. 15504; Cowley v. Rushville, 60 Ind. 327; Walter v. Columbia, 61 Ind. 24; McFee v. Greenfield, 62 Ind. 21; Carr v. Fowler, 74 Ind. 590; Burlington v. Kellar, 18 Iowa, 59; Commonwealth v. Voor- hies, 12 B. Mon. 361 ; Common- wealth V. Locke, 114 Mass. 288; Hamel v. St. Jean Deschaillons, Rap. Jud. Que. 20 Can. Sup. 301; Houma v. Houma, etc., Co., 121 La. 21; 46 So. 42; Mernaugh v. State, 41 Fia. 433; 27 So. 34. 63 Ex parte Wolters, 65 Cal. 200 ; 3 Pac. 894 ; People v. Dwyer, 4 Pac. 451; Perdue v. Ellis, IS Ga. 586; Douglassville v. Johns, 62 Ga. 423; Lawrenceburg v. Wuest, 16 Ind. 337; Meyer v. Bridgeton, 37 N. J. L. 160; Her- shoff V. Beverly, 45 N. J. L. 288; Heisembrittle v. Charleston, 2 McMul. 233 ; Portland v. Schmidt, 13 Ore. 17; 6 Pac. 221; Stokes v. Schlachter, 66 N. J. L. 247; 49 Atl. 556; Hoboken v. Goodman, 68 N. J. L. 217; 51 Atl. 1092. § 265 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 414 such ordinance may provide for certain reqiiisities before the license i^; granted."* Power to license, regulate and prohibit sales or gifts of liquors authorizes the adoption of an ordi- nance requiring a license for sales in quantities of one gallon or over."^ Under such a power a city may prohibit sales in one part of a city and require a license in the other part.*^" Under a power to exact a license from persons licensed by State or county authority, it may punish those selling liquor with- out a city license, even though he has no State or county li- cense.®^ As a prerequisite to obtaining a license a city may require an applicant to first obtain a county license."® Under a power to "regulate or prohibit" the sale of liquors a city may require a license for their sale ; "^ but it has been held that under a power to license "saloons, taverns and eating houses," a license could not be imposed for the sale of liquor; "° and one "to tax or entirely suppress all petty groceries" not to license retail liquor dealers. '^^ A resolution of Congress authorizing the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to enforce police regulations for the safety of the "lives, health,- comfort and quiet" of the inhabitants of such District, was held not to authorize them to punish a person for selling li- quor without a license.'^ And power authorizing a city to 64 Foster v. San Francisco, 102 cs Wagner v. Garrett, 118 Ind. Cal. 483; 37 Pac. 763; 41 Am. St. 114; 20 N. E. 706; Linkenhelt v. 194; Wells v. Torrey, 144 Mich. Garrett, 118 Ind. 599; 20 N. E. 689; 108 N. W. 423; 13 Detroit 708; see also Territory v. Robert- Leg. N. 378. son, 19 Okla. 149; 92 Pac. 144; esDennehy v. Chicago, 120 111. Gale v. Moscow, 15 Idaho, 332; 97 627; 12 N. E. 227; Ammon v. Pac. 828. Chicago, 26 111. App. 641 ; Miller so Keokuk v. Dressell, 47 Iowa, V. Ammon, 145 U. S. 421; 12 Sup. 597; State v. Stevens, 114 N. C. Ct. S84; 36 L. Ed. 759; Common- 873; 19 S. E. 861; In re Schnei- wealth V. Turner, 1 €ush. 493; der, 11 Ore. 288; 8 Pac. 2S9. Clintonville v. Keating, 4 Denio, "o Mt. Pleasant v. Vanice, 43 341. Mich. 361; 5 N. W. 37'8; 38 Am. 60 People V. Cregier, 13S 111. Rep. 193. 401; 28 N. E. 812. ■?! Leonard v. Canton, 35 Miss. STLutz V. Crawfordsville, 109 189. Ind. 46<5; 10 N. E. 411; Frankfort 72 /„ re Sullivan, 21 D. C. V. Aughe, 114 Ind. 77, 600; 15 N. 139. E. S02, 804. 415 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. §265 license, regulate and restrain the sale of liquor is broad enough to authorize the adoption of an ordinance requiring a license for selling, bartering or giving it away." Under its general power to exact a license a city may provide that no one shall receive a license except his application be accompanied by a recommendation signed by a specified number of respectable citizens who state that the applicant has a good reputation ; '* and it may require a grocer selling liquor to take out a li- license," and, under a proper power conferred, may require a wholesaler to take out a license.'^^ An ordinance which pro- vides that "no person" shall sell or give away any intox- icating or malt liquors to be drunk on the premises applies to the keeper of a restaurant ; ^^ but power to exact a license from houses of public entertainment only will not authorize the enactment of a license from the keeper of an inn.^^ An 73 Vinson v. Monticello, 118 Ind. 103; 19 N. E. 734; Gertz v. Monticello, US Ind. 600; It) N. E. 735. 74 Wells V, Torrey, 144 Mich. 6&9; 108 N. VV. 423; 13 Detroit Leg. N. 378; People v. Mount, 186 111. 560; 58 N. E. 360; affirming 87 111. App. 194; State v. Kes- sells, 120 Mo. App. 233; 96 S. W. 494. Held otherwise under a con- stitutional provision. State v. McCammon, 111 Mo. App. 626; 86 S. W. 510. An ordinance requiring two- thirds of a majority of the voters to annually sign the petition for a license is void, because unrea- sonable. State V. McCammon, HI Mo. App. 626; 86 S. W. 510; but not one requiring two-thirds of the voters in the block where the saloon is to be located. Martens V. People, 186 111. 314; 37 N. E. 871; affirming 85 111. App. 66. 75 Chicago V. Slack, 121 111. App. 131. 70 Confer v. Elizabcthtown 8 Ind. dianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30; 031; 60 N. E. 632; State ex rel. 36 N. E. 587; Schmidt v. Indian- v. Hudson, 78 Mo. 302. apolis, 168 Ind. 631; 80 N. E. is Schmidt v. Indianapolis, 168 g32 Ind. 631; 80 N. E. 632; Portland 12 Gray on Limitations of Tax- v. Schmidt, 13 Ore. 18; 6 Pac. ing Power, § 1452; Tiedeman on 221. Limitations of Police Power, pp. lOIatter of Guerrero, 69 €al. 273, 277. 278; Cooley on Taxa- 95; 10 Pac. 261; Schmidt v. In- tion (3d Ed.), pp. 1142, 1143; dianapolis, 168 Ind. tiSl; 80 N. § 272 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 428 Sec. 272. Discriminating ordinance, when not unconstitu- tional. The power granted to the common council of a municipal corporation to fix the rates for the privilege of transacting business is a branch of the taxing power which is not affected by a constitutional requirement that taxes shall be uniform. The council, therefore, in fixing such rates, may discrimi- nate and impose a larger license tax upon one class of busi- ness, such as retailing intoxicating liquors, than on another. ^^ Accordingly, it has been held that a county ordinance fixing a less rate for selling intoxicating liquors at a wayside tavern than in a village or city was not invalid ; ^^ that a city ordi- nance dividing liquor dealers into different classes, according to the amount of their sales and imposing a license tax vary- ing in amount according to the class was constitutional ; ^'' that the fact that the same license fee, as a tax, is not required by all cities in the State, is no valid objection to a law confer- ring power on the common council to pass such an ordinance or to the ordinance itself ; ^^ and that within the same city an ordinance may properly impose different rates according to the locality in which such liquors are to be sold, provided it does not discriminate between persons. ^^ In other words, such an ordinance may be differential in its character if it does not discriminate between persons having equal facilities for profit.^" "Where the law of the State or the charter of the mu- E. 632; Dennehy v. Chicago, 120 le Amador Co. v. Kennedy, 70 111. G27; 13 N. E. 227; Spiegler Cal. 458; 11 i'ac. 757. V. City of Chicago, 216 III. 114; it Gross v. Allentown, 132 Pa. 74 N. E. 71'8. St. 319; 19 Atl. 269. If an ordinance be regular on is Wiley -/. Owens, 39 Ind. 429. its face, purporting to have been lo East St. Louis v. Wehrung, adopted by the common council 46 111. 392. and duly published, a license is- 20 People v. Thurber, 13 111. sued thereunder and paid for is a 554; Tulloss v. Sedan, 31 Kan. defense to a prosecution for sell- 165; 1 Pac. 2'8'5; State v. Rolle, ing without a license, although it 30 La. Ann. 991; Mayor, etc., v. was not legally passed. Hanks Beasley, I Humph. 232; 34 Am. V. People, 39 111. App. 223. Dec. 646; Texas B. and Ins. €0., i^Ex parte Hurl, 49 Cal. &57. 42 Tex. 636; Slaughter v. Com- monwealth, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 767. 429 Ml]NICIPAl> REGULATION. ■ . § 273 nicipal corporation does not limit the amount that may be charged for a license to carry on such business, the amount to be charged must be determined by the circumstances, and can be changed bj^ the common council of the corporation where the business is to be carried on much better than author- ity remote therefrom, and if the ordinance is not prohibitory in its character it will be sustained by the courts.-' But an ordi- nance which makes the granting of a license to rest upon the arbitrary will of the council or city officer, is void.^^ And so is an ordinance which discriminates in favor of two classes of persons, each of whom are exempted from its operation.-^ Under the usual powers given a city it may charge one amount for a license for a saloon and another amount for a tavern license ; -* but it cannot charge one amount for one locality and another amount for another.-^ An ordinance providing that liquor in certain parts of a city can be sold only at a bar in a hotel is valid, being based upon a proper classification.-" So an ordinance limiting saloons to certain portions of a city, but providing that those outside the limits may continue in business until their licenses expire, is likewise valid.-'^ Sec. 273. Existing license requirement, when not discrim- inating. As it is competent for a State to confer upon its municipal corporations the power to regulate and restrain the traffic in intoxicating liquors, then when this has been done such corpo- rations may by duly enacted ordinances determine what shall be required of an applicant for a license to sell such liquors within the corporate limits. Under such authority such a corporation may require an applicant to hold an unexpired license issued by the Board of Commissioners of the county 21 Wiley V. Owens, 39 Ind. 429. 2^- In re Donnelly, 38 Up. Can. 22 Ex parte Theisen, 30 Fla. 599. 529; 11 So. 901; 32 Am. St. 36; 2g Ritz v. Liorhtson (Cal.), iState V. D'Alemberte, 30 Fla. 103 Pac. 303. . '545; 11 So. 905. 27 Andreas v. Beaumont (Tex. 23Popel V. Monmouth, 81 III. Civ. App.), 113 S. W. 614; Mills App. 512. V. Ludington (Mich.), 122 N. W. 24 In re Grand, 27 Up. Can. 46. 1082. §§ 274, 275 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 430 in which the municipality is located. Such a requirement is not an arbitrary one nor is it subject to the objection that it discriminates against women and non-residents where, under the laws of the State, male inhabitants only can obtain a license from the Board of County Commissioners of the State. Per- sons who have obtained licenses from such county boards will be presumed to have shown their fitness to be trusted with the sale of such liquors before a tribunal where the right of remon- strance is secured. As a rule such corporations are not pro- vided with the machinery for prosecuting inquiries into the character and fitness of such applicants. Hence, such a re- quirement is a reasonable exercise of the power to regulate and restrain the traffic.-* Sec. 274. Bond of licensee. It is not necessary that a city be expressly empowered to require a bond from a licensee to retail intoxicating liquors in order to enable it to require the giving of a bond as a prerequi- site to the issuance of a license. Thus, under a power to license, tax and regulate the liquor traffic within the limits, it has been held that a city may require a bond in a specified sum, with good and approved sureties, conditioned that the licensee will conduct his liquor business according to law. Such a require- ment has a tendency to compel an observation of the law, and is reasonable and proper.^'' Sec. 275. Power to prohibit. In the absence of constitutional provisions to the contrary, it is competent for a Legislature to delegate to the munici- palities of a State the power to prohibit the traffic in intoxi- cating liquors.^" Accordingly it has been held that a general power in a city or town charter to prohibit the sale of such 28 Wagner v. Garrett, 118 Ind. so Harris v. Livingston. 28 Ala. 114; 20 N. E. 706; Likenhelt, 118 — ; Ex parte Sikes, 102 Ala. 173; Ind. 699; 20 N. E. 145. 15 So. 522; Paul v. Washington, 29Paducah v. James (Ky.), 104 134 N. C. 363; 47 S. E. 793; 65 S. W. 971; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1203; L. R. A. 902; Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Campbell v. Thomasville (Ga. Ga. 586. App.), 64 S. E. 815. 431 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 275 liquors is sufficient to authorize the adoption of an ordinance for a total or partial prohibition of their sale; and that where such power is conferred it is wholly discretionary with the municipality to license, regulate, partially or entirely prohibit the traffic, and that if a municipality adopts an ordinance prohibiting the sale of any such liquors within its limits, if sales are made within the corporate limits of the municipality for a lawful purpose, the burden is upon the seller to prove such fact.-''^ And the same is true where the power conferred upon the corporation is "to license and regu- late the retailing of intoxicating liquors within their corporate limits, to revoke licenses by them issued for good cause shown, to close up retail establishments for such time as they may deem necessary, and to prevent the selling of such liquors within their corporate limits whenever they may deem it expedient;" and the same will be true if such a corporation is authorized "to license, regulate and prohibit" the sale of such liquors, or if a like prohibitory clause be included in the grant of authority.^- But power to entirely prohibit such sales is not conferred if the grant is to "license, regulate and re- strain" the traffic. The intention to prohibit the traffic must be expressly granted to it, or the terms used in the charter must be such as plainly to indicate that the Legislature intend- ed to confer the power. Such an intention cannot be inferred when the controlling words used in the grant are "license," "regulate" and "restrain." These words are not synonymous with the word "prohibit." In such a connection, to license a business is to grant a formal permission from the proper au- thorit'es to perform or carry it on when, without such permis- sion, it would be illegal ; to regulate it is to adjust it by rules or method ; to direct it, to put it into good order, to govern it ; and to restrain it is to hold it back or keep it in check.^^ Such 31 Giinnarsohn v. City of Sterl- see State v. Gill, 89 Minn. 502; ing, 92 111. 569; Ex parte Russell- 95 N. W. 449. ville, 95 Ala. 19; 11 So. 18; State 33 Miller v. Jones, SO Ala. S9; V. Bolt, 31 La. Ann. 663; 33 Am. Ex parte Reynolds, 87 Ala. Rep. 224; Litch v. People, 19 138; 6 So, 335; Ex parte Colo. App. 435; 75 Pac. 1079. Anniston, 90 Ala. 516; 7 So. 2-/n.-e Jones, 78 Ala. 419; and 779; Ex parte Florence, 78 §275 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 432 terms, however, -will warrant the adoption of an ordinance pro- viding for a partial prohibition; that is, to encumber such sales wath such conditions and limitations as will hinder and prevent in some degree the sale of such liquors.^* The power to prohibit is not included in the power to license.'"' It may prohibit the keeping of liquor in a restaurant. ^"^ But a stat- ute authorizing a town to prohibit saloons does not empower it to prohibit sales in any quantity or for any purpose.^^ Un- Ala. 419; Ex parte Sikes, 102 Ala. 173; Harris v. Livingston, 28 Ala. 577; Tuck v. Waldron, 31 Ark. 462; Hill V. Commissioners, 22 Ga. 203; Pekin v. Smelzel, 21 111. 464; 74 Am. Dec. 105; Sweet v. City of Wabash, 41 Ind. 7; Loeb v. City of Attica, 82 Ind. 175; Em- poria V. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622; State V. Harper, 42 La. Ann. 312; 7 So. 446; Lincoln Parish v. Har- per, 42 La. Ann. 776; 7 So. 716; Portland v. Schmidt, 13 Ore. 17; Woods V. Town, etc., 19 Ore. 108; Logan City v. Buck, 3 Utah, 307 ; 5 Pac. 564; Hayes v. Thompson, 9 B. C. Rep. 249; In re- Frawley [1907], 14 Ont. App. L. R. 99; Marnaugh v. Orlando, 41 Fla. 433; 27 So. 34; Moran v. Atlanta (Ga.), 30 S. E. 298; Duran v. Stephens, 12C Ga. 496; 54 S. E. 1045; State v. McCammon, 111 Mo. App. 626; 86 S. W. 510; Shreveport v. P. Draiss & Co., Ill La. 511; 35 So. 727; Bennett V. Pulaski (Tenn. Ch.), 52 S. W. 913; 47 L. R. A. 278; .State v. Franklin Co., 49 Wash. 268; 94 Pac. 1086; Concord v. Patterson, 53 X. C. 182; State v. Hudson, 11 Mo. App. 590; Campbell v. Thom- asville (Ga.), «4 S. E. 815. 34 Provo City v. Shurtlilf, 4 Utah, 15; 4 Pac. 302. 30 Miller v. Jones, 80 Ala. 89; Ex parte Reynolds, 87 Ala. 138; 6 So. 335; Ex parte Anniston, 90 Ala. 516; 77 So. 779; Hood v. Von Glahn, 88 Ala. 405 ; 14 S. E. 564; Tuck V. Waldron, 51 Ark. 462; Hill v. Decatur, 22 Ga. 203; Sweet V. City of Wabash, 41 Ind. >8; Rossell v. Garm, 50 N. J. L. 358; 13 X. E. 26; Portland v. Schmidt, 13 Ore. 17. But it is under the power to "restrain." Smith V. Warrior, 99 Ala. 481; 12 So. 418. Contra, Portland v. Schmidt, 13 Ore. 17; 6 Pac. 221. Under a power to make all local police, sanitary and other regu- lations, not inconsistent with the State laws, a city may prevent sales of liquor without a license, prohibit sales in dance houses, places where musical and theat- rical entertainments are given, and where females attend as waitresses. Ex parte Hayes, 98 Cal. 555; 33 Pac. 337; 20 L. R. A. 701; Ex parte Smithy, 33 Pac. 338. 38 State V. Clark, 28 X. H. 176; 61 Am. Dec. 611; Xashville v. Linck, 12 Lea, 499; Gabel v. Houston, 29 Tex. 335. 37 Straus v. Pontiac, 40 111. 301 ; State v. Harper, 42 La. Ann. 312; 7 So. 446; Lincoln Parish V. Harper, 42 La. Ann. 776; 7 So. 716; Rossell v. Garon, 50 N. J. L. 433 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 275 der a statute empowering a city to regulate, restrain and pro- hibit ale, beer and porter houses or shops and places of resort for intemperance, it may adopt an ordinance making it unlaw- ful to keep in the city a house, shop, booth or place where ale or beer is habitually sold.'* Power "to provide by ordi- nance against the evils resulting from the sales of intoxicating liquors" does not authorize an ordinance prohibiting all sales except for medicinal and mechanical purposes. ^^ One em- powered to prohibit saloons and dramshops and abate nui- sances does not authorize it to adopt an ordinance prohibiting persons from soliciting, receiving or transmitting orders for liquors.*" Under a power to suppress saloons for the sale of liquors, a city may suppress a room at a hotel set apart for their sale at retail ; *^ and so under a power to prevent and re- move nuisances, to suppress and prohibit saloons, a. city may declare any place to which people are permitted to resort to drink liquors shall be deemed a nuisance.*- If a city be em- powered to pass all by-laws respecting its police as it shall deem necessary for its security, welfare, good government and for the preservation of its health, peace and good order, it may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors.*^ An ordinance in- flicting a penalty on anyone selling liquor is not invalid on the ground that it does not expressly prohibit the sale of li- quor.** A city cannot, however, prevent the sale of liquor which is not intoxicating, or which contains so little alcohol that if drunk in ordinary quantities it will not intoxicate.*'^ If 35'8; 13 Atl. 26; State v. Brit- 4i Rattenbury v. Xorthville, 122 tain, S^ N. C. 574; iStaats v. Mich. 158; 80 N. W. 1012. Washington, 44 N. J. L. 605; 43 42 Topeka v. Raynor, 8 Kan. Am. Rep. 402; Piqua v. Zimmer- App. 279; 55 Pac. 509. lin, 35 Ohio St. 507. « Bailey Liquor Co. v. Austin, 38 Burkholter v. McConnells- 82 Fed. 785. ville, 20 Ohio St. 308. 44 Areola v. Wilkinson, 233 III. 39Bronson v. Oberlin, 41 Ohio 250; 84 N. E. 264. St. 476 ; 52 Am. St. 90 ; Piqua v. 45 Fontana v. Grant, 6 Kan. Zimmerlin, 35 Ohio St. 507; State App. 462; 50 Pac. 104; State v. V. Roush, 47 Ohio St. 478; 25 N. Dannanburer (N. €.), 63 S. E. E. 59. '946. But see Eureka v. Jackson, 40 Homer V. Brown, 117 La. Ann. 8 Kan. App. 49; 54 Pac. 5. 425; 41 iSo. 711, See Lincoln Center v. Linker, §276 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 434 the general statutes permit sales for medicinal and mechanical purposes a town cannot restrict the sales to medicinal pur- poses only/" But a city may prohibit sales of liquors "in connection with drugs or in drug stores" under an authority to regulate the sale of them.'^ If a statute forbid the sale of liquors, an ordinance cannot authorize their sale.''^ But if it is the policy of a general State laAV that liquors may be sold under a license, a municipality cannot prohibit their sale within its limits.*' Sec. 276. Power to prohibit includes power to license. It has been said that under the police power, license fees may be imposed : 1. For regulation. 2. For revenue. 3. To give monopolies. 4. For prohibition. The fourth pur- pose is entirely admissible in the case of pursuits or indul- 7 Kan. App. 282; 51 Pac. 807, holding that a city could require the removal of obstructions to the view of a room where non- intoxicating liquors were sold. An ordinance "to prohibit the keeping and selling of intoxicat- ing liquors, except for medicinal, scientific and mechanical pur- poses," applies to saloons. Hol- ton V. Bimrod, 8 Kan. App. 2G5; 55 Pac. 505. Where a statute defines sales at retail, an ordinance prohibit- ing sales at retail need not de- fine a retail sale. Brunker v. Tp. of Mariposa, 22 Ont. Rep. 120. A city which attempts to li- cense the sale of liquors in viola- tion of a prohibitory clause in the State Constitution, may be ousted of its powers by an action in the nature of a quo warranto. State V. Topeka, 31 Kan. 586; 3 Pac. 320; State v. Topeka, 31 Kan. 452; 2 Pac. 593; State v. Leavenworth, 36 Kan. 314; 13 Pac. 591. Under a power to prohibit the sales of liquor, a city may ex- empt from the provisions of an ordinance forbidding sales phy- sicians who use liquors in good faith in their practice as medi- cine. Carthage v. Carlton, 99 111. App. 338. 46 Hundland v. Hardy, 74 Mo. App. 614. *7 Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. At- lanta, 89 Fed. 244. As to power in the Province of Quebec to authorize a city to pro- hibit the sales of liquor, see St. Aubin V. Lafrance, 8 Quebec L. R. (Can.) 190. Contra, Huntingdon V. Moir, 20 Rev. Leg. 6'84, and Compton V. Simoneau, 21 Rev. Leg. 265. 48 Shelton v. State. 89 N. E. 860. 49 Parker v. Griffith (N. C), 66 S. E. 565. Under a power to regulate and prohibit, a city may prohibit the solicitation or receiving of orders for liquors. Braunstein v. People (Colo.), 105 Pac. 857. 435 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 277 gences which in their general effect are believed to be more harmful than beneficial to society, and that it is often found that prohibition of an occupation which excites or gratifies the vices or passions of large numbers of people, is met by a resistance so steady and powerful as to render the law wholly ineffectual, when a heavy tax might lessen the evils and pos- sibly in the end make the occupation unprofitable.^" Accord- ingly it has been held that under a power given to a munici- pal corporation to "regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicat- ing liquors," the corporation may, by a duly enacted ordi- nance, authorize the granting of licenses to dealers in such liquors. Authority to prohibit, as we have seen, implies the power to interdict, hinder and prevent. Whatever will h'nder or prevent the full exercise of a pursuit has the effect of pro- hibition in a degree. There may be the exercises of power un- der authority to probibit which results only in partial prohi- bition ; or it may be more wisely and effectively exerted in a manner that will result in total prohibition. Whether the prohibition be partial or total, it is exercised under the same authority. The licensing of intoxicating liquors hinders and prevents in a degree the traffic in those liquors. So far as a license restricts the free sale of such liquors, it that far oper- ates to hinder and prevent the traffic. Therefore, as we have already said, a license may be imposed under the authority to prohibit.^^ Sec. 277. Prohibitory ordinance, not in violation of com- mon law rights. The Legislature of a State where there is no constitutional provision inhibiting it from doing so may prohibit the traffic in intoxicating liquors, and having such power the Legislature may, by proper legislation, empower the municipal corpora- tions within the State with a like power. In a case where the 50 Cooley on Taxation, p. 403. however, under a power to "pro- si Keokuk v. Dressell, 47 la. hibit" the sale of liquors, it is 595; Mt. Carmel v. Wabash Co., held that a power to regulate is 50 111. 69; see Burlington v. Bum- not given. State v. Fay, 44 N. J. gardner, 12 Iowa, 673. L- 474. In the State of New Jersey, § 278 TRAiPIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 436 power has been conferred upon such corporation to license, regulate, or prohibit the traffic in such liquors, it is in the dis- cretion of the corporation to do either of such things; and therefore an ordinance which provides for the prohibition of the sale by retail of such liquors within the corporate limits will be valid and not subject to the objection that it is con- trary to the common law. The right to engage in such a busi- ness and to be protected by law in its prosecution can no longer be claimed as a common law right, but is a right which can be exercised only in the manner and on the terms which the stat- ute prescribes. The refusal to license a man to conduct the business does not deprive him of any personal or property right, but merely deprives him of a privilege Avhich it is in the discretion of the municipal authorities to grant or with- hold." Sec. 278, Regulation and prohibition distinguished. "To regulate" is the expression most frequently used to define the power delegated to municipal corporations in refer- ence to the traffic in intoxicating liquors, and the meaning of the phrase has been fully determined by many well-adjudicat- ed cases. In these cases, the phrase, "to regulate," is distin- guished from "to prohibit," it being held that they have dif- ferent and distinct meanings, whether understood in their or- dinary and common signification or as defined by the courts in construing them. Power granted to a municipal corporation to grant licenses to retailers of intoxicating liquors, and to regulate them, does not confer power to prohibit, either di- rectly or by a prohibitory charge for a license fee. Regulate and prohibit are not synonymous.^^ To regulate the sale of 52 People V. €regier, 138 111. CI Md. 297; Austin v. Murray, 33 401; 28 N. E. 812. Mass. (16 Pick.) 121; People v. 53 Marion v. Chandler, 6 Ala. Gadway, 61 Mich. 2So; 28 N. W. 695; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 101; In re Hauck, 70 Mich. 396; 461; Miller v. Jones, 80 Ala. 89; McConville v. Mayor, etc., 39 N. Tuck V. Waldron, 31 Ark. 462; J. L. 38; State v. Fay, 44 N. J. Duckwall V. New Albany, 25 Ind. L. 474; State v. Garm, 50 N. J. 283; Sweet V. City of Wabash, 41 L. 358; 13 Atl. 26; Bronson v. Tnd. 7; Cantrill v. Sainer, 59 la. Oberlin, 41 Ohio St. 478. 26; 12 X. W. 753; State v. Mott, 437 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 279 liquor implies ex vi termini, that the business may be engaged in or carried on, subject to established rules or methods. Pro- hibition is to prevent the business being engaged in, or car- ried on, entirely or partially. The two purposes are incon- gruous.'''* To regulate does not mean to annihilate or suppress, or to prohibit under all circumstances. No regulation or rules are necessary concerning an evil absolutely prohibited.'^''' The power to license, tax, regulate and restrain barrooms and drinking shops carries with it, without any express provision, authority to provide by ordinance the terms and conditions upon which such license shall be issued, the amount of tax to be imposed (if it be reasonable and not prohibitovv). and the mode of conducting the business, and implies the power to inhibit the carrying on that kind of business without such li- cense.""' While the power "to rearulate" does not authorize prohibition in a general sense, because the very essence of reg- ulation is the existence of something to be regulated, yet the Aveight of authority, is to the effect that this power does con- fer the authority to confine the business hours of the day, to certain localities or buildings in a city, and to the manner of its prosecution within those hours, localities and buildings, pro- viding such regulations do not conflict with the statutes of the State." Sec. 279. Limitation of power of city to enact ordinance. If, by the provisions of a city charter, power is conferred upon a city council to make and establish ordinances and by- laws for numerous purposes, specifically set forth in the char- ter, among which are ordinances and by-laws "to prohibit the selling or giving away any ardent spirits by any store- keeper, trader or grocer, to be drunk, except by innkeepers duly licensed," and "to forbid the selling or giving away of 54 Miller v. Jones, 80 Ala. 89; " /n re Wilson, 32 Minn. 145; Schwuchow V. City of Chicago, 08 Livery Stables v. State, 10 Mo. 111. 444. App. 131; Cronin v. People, 82 N. 55 State V. Clark, 54 Mo. 1, 34; Y. 318; Piqua v, Zimmerlin, 35 State V. Vic. De Bar, 18 Mo. 395. Ohio St. 17. 06 Portland, 13 Ore. 1; Provo City V. Shurtlifl", 4 Utah, 15. § 280 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 438 ardent spirits or other intoxicating liquors to any child, ap- prentice or servant without the consent of his parent, master or guardian;" and such specific enumerations are followed by a provision in the charter that the city council "may make any other by-laws and regulations which may seem for the well-being of the city, provided they be not repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the State," the power of such city council to pass ordinances on the subject of the sale of ardent spirits or other intoxicating liquors is limited to the cases described in the specific provisions. In such cases the general provision is to be construed as referring to other matters, more properly the subjects of police reorulation than those specifically enumerated. Consenuently an ordinance prohibiting the sale of intoxicatinsi: liouors to any person without a license from the mayor and aldermen will be unauthorized by such char- ter and void.^^ The rule in pueh cases is that the nower to make by-laws, when not expressly given, is imnlied as inci- dent to the very existence of a cornoration ; but mi the case of the express grant of the power to enact by-laws limited to certain specified cases and for certain purposes, t^e cnrnorate power of the legislation is confinpd to the objects specified, all others being excluded by impr'catinn. To hold in such case that such a general clause confers the power to pass an ordi- nance prohibiting the sale of intoxicating linuoT"s to any per- son without a license would in effect be to expuTi""e t^e special provisions from the charter; and not these onlv but nil the numerous clauses which go to limit and define thp pre^^i^e boun- daries of a power to be exercised by the city in the various cases specified for the enacting of by-laws and ordinances.^'' Sec. 280, Power to regulate sale of liquors — Valid ordi- nance. Under a power to require a license for the sale of liquors, a municipality has the right to provide that no license shall be granted an applicant unless he "produce the written recom- 58 state V. Ferguson, 33 X. H. and Ames on Corp., 177; Child v. 424. Hudson's Bay Co., 2 P. Willliams, 68Kyd on Corp., 102; Angel 207. 439 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 280 mendation of four of his nearest neighbors." ^^ And although the statute conferring the power to require a license says noth- ing about the right to require the licensee to furnish a bond conditioned that he will obey the ordinance of the municipal- ity, yet as incident to the licensing power it may require him to furnish such a bond with surety to be approved by it." Under such a power it may provide thnt a sale of liquor with- out a license shall render the seller liable to a prescribed pen- alty.«2 XTnder its power to licence, reo-ulate and restrain the traffic it may prohibit the criving av^^ay or bartering of li- quors.*'^ A statute prohibiting the sale of unfermented cider in less quantities than a gallon, or forbidding its being drunk on the premises where sold, is not so unreasonable as to be void.*'* Under a power to license a particular place a city may impose a penaltv for a sale made at an unlicensed place."'' A city may declare that linuors shall not be kept in restaurants or like places ; *"* or that druggists shall only sell for medicinal purposes.^^ But under such a power it may not prohibit sales at saloons in any quantities or for any purpose unless they be for medicinal purposes.*'® Punishment for a sale of liquors without 60 Whitten v. Covington, 43 Ga. tion all that is necessary to make 421; In re Indiana County Li- the power granted effectual. The censes, 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 358. ordinance is, therefore, valid as a ^^ Ex parte Schneider, 11 Ore. whole." Citing State v. Adam- 288; 8 Pac. 289. son, 14 Ind. 296; Williams v. 62 Schweitzer v. Liberty, 82 Mo. State, 48 Ind. 306. 309; Mayson v. Atlanta, 77 Ga. C4 Lawrence v. Monroe, 44 Kan. 662. C07; 24 Pac. 1113. G3 Vinson v. Monticello, 118 es State v. Beverly, 45 X. J. L. Ind. 103; 19 N. E. 734. "The 288. substantive grant contained in the C6 State v. Clark, 28 N. H. 176. statute is the power to license, e- Provo City v. Shurtliff, 4 regulate and restrain the sale of Utah, 15; 5 Pac. 302; Selnia v. intoxicating liquor, but as a nee- Brewer, 9 Cal. App. 70; 98 Pac- essary incident to the power to 61. restrain and regulate the sale, and 68 Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 111. 301. to prevent the evasion of any or- Municipalities have some lati- dinance against selling without tude in cases of violations of its license, is included the power to ordinances, so long as they do not prohibit the bartering or giving run counter to State statutes on away of any intoxicating liquor. the came subject. Jackson v. This is upon the principle that a Boyd, 53 Iowa, 536; o N. W. 734. grant carries with it by implica- § 280 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 440 a license may be had, although the State inflicts a punishment for the same sale.*^'' After issuing a license a city may adopt an ordinance regulating the sale under it, not essentially im- pairing the right to retail liquors authorized by it to be sold.'''* So a city may regulate the sale of liquors in greater quantities than the State regulates it.'^ Under its general power to enact ordinances for the i-egulation of the sale of liquors, such as it deems desirable, a city may require an applicant for a license to state in his application such facts as will show the suitableness of the place for the saloon as where it is to be lo- cated.'^ The selling of "near beer" is a business which from its nature admits of strict regulations. It stands in a different class from selling drugs, soda water and similar liquids. Therefore regulations may be upheld which w^ould be arbitrary and unreasonable if applied to other business.''^ So that an ordinance forbidding the sale of it in a less quantity than a pint at a time is valid ; but one forbidding a sale of more than one quart to one person in a day is unreasonable. But an or- dinance requiring a dealer to furnish samples to be tested to- ascertain the amount of alcohol in the liquor he is selling or offering for sale is valid. So an ordinance requiring bottles and barrels containing it to be plainly stamped, so as to show their contents with the names of the manufacturers is reason- able. But in the absence of an express provision in its charter a city may not prohibit its sale.''- It has been held that a city under its general power to regulate the sale of liquors may prohibit screens, blinds and stained windows, or any other de- vice to obscure the view of the interior of the room where li- quors are sold, even though non-intoxicating, in ordei* to pre- 60 State V. Harris, 50 Minn. 128 ; State v. Dannenberg (N. C), && 52 N. W. 387. S. E. 301. TO Morris v. Rome, 10 Ga. 532. This is a malt liquor which 71 Dennehy v. Chicago, 120 111. contains so little alcohol that it 627; 12 N. E. 227. will not produce intoxication, 72 Sherlock v. Stuart, 96 Mich. though drunk to excess. In Geor- 193; 55 N. W. 485; 21 L. R. A. gia it includes all malt liquors 580. not within the purview of the gen- 73 Campbell v. Thomasville eral prohibition law. (Ga.), 64 S. E. 815; Baker v. 74 Campbell v. Thomasville Griffith (N. C), '66 S. E. 565; (Ga.), 64 S. E. 815. 441 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 281 vent a surreptitious sale of intoxicating liquors." Under a power to exact a license of retailers a city may impose a fine upon all persons keeping tippling houses without a license.^® So under a power given a city to declare by ordinance what shall constitute a nuisance, a city may declare the maintenance of a house for unlawful sale of liquors or the carrying on of such business shall be a nuisance." If especially authorized by statute, a city may prohibit the sale of intoxicating li- quors. ^"^ Under the general welfare clause a city may provide that it shall be unlawful to keep a "blind tiger" or keep for illegal sale intoxicating liquors.''^ The exemption of Weiss beer from a prohibitory ordinance does not render the ordi- nance void.'*" Sec. 281. Power to regulate sale of liquor — Invalid ordi- nance. An ordinance which makes the granting of a license to rest upon the arbitrary will of the common council or municipal officers is void.^' So is an ordinance authorizing any person to bring an action in the name of a city to recover damages for its violation and giving him a reward if he be suceessfui.^- And an ordinance prohibiting sales to a certain class of per- sons on Sunday is void when the State law permits them; «=^ or prohibiting sales in certain quantities when a State law per- mits such sales.^* An ordinance if not authorized by 75 Campbell v. Thomasville so Kiel v. Cliica/io, 176 111. 137; (Ga.), '64 S. E. 815. 52 N. E. 29; reversing «9 111. 76 St. Louis V. Smith, 2 Mo. 113. App. 685. TTMayhew v. Eugene (Ore.), si fia? parte Theisen, 30 Fla. 104 Pac. 727; Ruston v. Fountain, 529; 11 So. 901; 32 Am. St. 36; 118 La. 53; 42 So. 644. State v. D'Alemberte, 30 Fla. 545; 78 Ruston V. Fountain, 118 La. 11 So. 905; Chute v. Van Camp 53; 42 So. 644; Gale v. Moscow, (Wis.), 117 N. W. 1012. 15 Idaho, 332 ; 97 Pac. 828 ; Searcy s^ Oechslein v. Passaic, 2 N. J. V. Turner (Ark.), 114 S. W. 472; Law J. 85. Selma v. Brewer, 9 Cal. App. 70; 83 Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 98 Pac. 61; Campbell v. Thomas- 425. ville (Ga.), 64 S. E. 815. 84 Thompson v. Mt. Vernon, 11 7S Coggins V. Griffin, 5 Ga. App. Ohio St. 688. 1; 62 S. E. 659. § 282 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 442 some statute is void.^^ Under a power authorizing a city to pass an ordinance making a sale or gift of liquor a nuisance, it cannot enact an ordinance making the keeping of it a nui- sance.®^ Under a power "to regulate or prohibit" the sale of liquor a town cannot provide that liquors kept for sale in violation of an ordinance shall be destroyed.**^ Under a power "to make such by-laws, rules and regulations for the better government of the town, as they may deem necessary," an. ordinance cannot be passed making it "unlawful for any bar- keeper, clerk or agent or any person whatever to keep open, or be or remain in, a barroom or other place Avhere spirituous or intoxicating liquors are sold, between the hours of 10 o'clock p. M. and 4 o 'clack a. m."^'* And under a somewhat similar principle, sales of liquors by wholesale cannot be interdicted nor druggists be compelled to keep a list of all persons to whom they sell li([uors on prescriptions.®^ Under a general power to make by-laws and punish those violating them, a city cannot enact a by-law regulating the sale of liquors.^" An ordinance forbidding the sale of more than one quart a day of "near beer"-'^ to one person is void.°- Sec. 282. Amount of license fees or taxes. A State may, for revenue purposes and as a police regula- tion, impose a license for the carrj'ing on of particular branches s"") Columbus V. Schaerr, 5 Ohio "i A non-intoxicating malt S. & C. P. Dec. 100; State v. To- liquor, peka, 31 Kan. 452; 2 Pac. 593. 92 Campbell v. Thomasville se Sullivan v. Oneida, 61 III, (Ga.), 64 S. E. 815. 242. A city cannot adopt an ordi- 87 Henke v. McCord. 55 Iowa, nance prohibiting the drinking of 378; 7 N. W. 623. liquor "in any quantity in any 88 State V. Thomas, 118 N. C. stairway, areaway, street or al- 1221 ; 24 S. E. 535. ley, or on any sidewalk," because 89 McCrea v Washington, 10 it is unreasonable, depriving a Ohio Dec. 29; 19 Wkiy. L. Bull. person of his personal liberty; 66. tliough it would seem that it can 90 McMullen v. Charleston, 1 j)rohibit the drinking of liquor in Bay (S. C), 46; Zylstra v. the street or on the sidewalk. Charleston, 1 Bay ( S. C.), 382; Carthage v. Block (Mo. App.), Schroeder v. Charleston, 2 Const. 123 S. W. 482. Rep. 726. 443 MUNICIPAL REGUIiATION. § 282 of business, including that of retailing intoxicating liquors, and may confer the right upon a municipal corporation with- in its jurisdiction, though the payment of the license fee op- erates incidentally as a tax upon the dealer or consumer.^^ A law conferring such a power and an ordinance passed under it M'ill not be unconstitutional^ nor can it be objected to on the ground that the same license fee is not required by all of the cities and towns of the State; for though taxes must be uniform throughout the city or town levying them, they need not be the same throughout the different cities and towns.^* It has also been held that a municipal corporation cannot be re- quired to tax all vocations or pursuits alike, but may discrim- inate against such as are hurtful or dangerous to the com- munity. °^ If the law authorizing such a municipal corpora- tion to require a license from a retail dealer does not limit the amount to be paid therefor, such corporation in the exercise of a reasonable discretion may determine the amount, provided it will not be prohibition in effect.""-' AVhat will amount to a prohibiting tax is a question of fact, and not one of which the courts will take judicial notiee.^^ As to what would be a pro- hibitory tax, reference must be had to the population, char- acter and peculiar circumstances of the municipality, and the 93 2 Dillon Munic. Corp., §793; Minn. 175; In re Mundj', 59 How. Cooley's Const. Lim., §201; Mo- (N. Y.) Pr. 359; Commissioners bile V. Yerille, 3 Ala. 113; City of v. Patterson, 8 Jones (N. Car.), Elk Point V. Vaughn, 1 Dak. 113; Law, 182; Portland v. Schmidt, Morris v. City of Pvome, 10 Ga. 13 Ore. 17; Morrill v. State, 38 532; Douglasville v. .Johns, 62 Ga. Wis. 428; State v. Plainfield, 44 423; Brown v. State, 79 Ga. 473; N. J. L. 118. Bennett v. People, 30 III. 389; 94 Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind. 429; Coulterville v. Gillon, 72 111. 599; Wells v. Torrey, 144 Mich. 689; Denneberg v. Chicago, 120 111. 108 N. W. 423; 13 Det. L. N. 627; 12 N. E. 227; Sweet v. City 378. of Wabash, 41 Ind. 71; City of o5 Ex parte Hurl, 49 Cal. 557; Frankfort v. Aughe, 114 Ind. 77; Mayor, etc., v. Beasley, 1 Humph. Emerich v. Indianapolis, 118 Ind. (Tenn.) 232. 279; 20 N. E. 795; Shea v. City so Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind. 429 of Muncie, 148 Ind. 14; 46 N. E. Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala. 361 138; Keokuk v. Dresscll, 47 la. 97 Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind. 429 597 ; State v. City of Leavenworth, Sweet v. City of Wabash, 41 36 Kan. 314; State v. Pfeifer, 26 Ind. 7. §282 TK^VrFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 444 general policy of the State with reference to its liquor legis- lation.^® The amount that may be exacted in such ease for a license is not to be confined to the mere expense of issuing the license, but may be for a sum which will in some measure realize a reasonable compensation for the additional expense of police supervision of the business."^ In Indiana it is held that a city ordinance fixing the fee for a retail liquor deal- er's license at $500 is not unreasonable nor objectionable; ^ but in other States it has been held that a fee of $1,000 is too great and amounts in effect to prohibition.- In California it has been adjudged that it cannot be assmned judicially that city ordinances requiring the payment of $50 every ninety days for the privilege of retailing intoxicating liquors in quanti- ties less than one quart is virtually a prohibition of the sale of such liquors; nor is an ordinance providing for a license tax of $25 per month,^ nor is one providing for a tax 9sElk Point v. Vaughn, 1 Dak. 113; Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586; Wiley V. Owens, 39 Ind. 429; Sweet V. City of Wabash, 41 Ind. 7. nn Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala. 361. 1 Wiley V. Owens, 39 Ind. 429; Sweet V. City of Wabash, 41 Ind. 7. 2 Ex parte Hurl, 49 Cal. 557 : Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. 5'86; Elk Point V. Vaughn, 1 Dak. 113; 46 N. W. 577; Marion v. Chandler, 6 Ala. 899; United States Dis- tilling Co. V. Chicago, 112 111. 19; Mayor, etc., v. Beasley, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 232. Contra, Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728. A $2,000 license fee has been upheld. Ex parte Sikes, 102 Ala. 173; 15 So. 522; 24 L. R. A. 774; see Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich. 325. A power given to exact a license fee from brewers of "not less than $50, nor more tlian $500," and to "grade, class and fix the rate of license within the minimum and maximum amounts designated," will not authorize the passage of an ordinance requiring brewers to pay "one-tenth of one per cent, on the amount of liquor manufac- tured," but requiring them to pay at least $15 a year regardless of the amount manufactured. Kniper V. Louisville. 7 Bush, 599. The city may provide to whom the license fees shall be paid, un- der its power to license. Ex parte Lawrence, 69 Cal. 608; 11 Pac. 217. Tlie Legislature may divert part of the charges into the coun- ty treasury, by amending the citj^'s charter or the general law. Winona v. Whipple, 24 Minn. 61. 3 Ex parte Benninger, 64 Cal. 201; 30 Pac. 846; In re Guerrero, 69 Cal. 88; 10 Pac. 361. 445 MUNICIPAL KEGULATION. §282 of $50 per quarter or $200 per year void because unreasonable and oppressive and in restraint of trade.* In fixing such fees a classification of population has been recognized as valid ' and in Wisconsin where a statute thus fixing the license fees and providing that the population of any city or village shall be determined by the last preceding enumeration by the State or general government, it was held that the method of ascer- taining the population thus pointed out w^as exclusive of any other, and could not be proved by parol or by application for a new census.'^ In other words, that the method prescribed by statute must be followed. The Legislature may authorize a city to exact a higher license fee than the State exacts for its license for the same locality.^ The presumption is that the ordi- nance is valid and the amount of the fee not prohibitive until its invalidity or prohibitive character is established by proper evidence.* The fact that a liquor license fee is higher than the tax on dealers on other commodities cannot be construed as a discrimination.^ *Ex parte McNulty, 73 Cal 632; 15 Pac. 368. 5 Foster v. Burt, 76 Ala. 229 ; Commonwealth v. Miller, 126 Pa. St. 137; 17 Atl. 623; Common- wealth V. Smoulter, 126 Pa. St. — ; 137 Atl. 532. 6 State V. Keaough, 68 Wis. 135; 31 N. W. 723. 7Petitfills V. Jeanerette, 52 La. Ann. 1005; 27 So. 358. An ordinance prescribing what steps must be taken to secure a license, and providing that the licensee should pay for it at a rate that might from time to time be established, though ex- pressly repealing an ordinance in relation to its subject-matter or inconsistent with its terms, does not repeal a prior ordinance fixing the amount of tlie fee to be paid yearly for the license. People v. Mount, 186 111. 560; 58 N. E. 360; affirming 87 111. App. 194. s Johnson v. Fayette, 148 Ala. 497; 42 So. 621. In this case, in a town of 700 people, there were four saloons operating under li- censes of $500 each. Three of these saloons made a net profit from $460 to $800 yearly; while the remaining one was closed be- cause the profit was not satisfac- tory. The license fee was raised to $750, as the statute authorized. It was held that this was not prohibitory. Recovery by city of fees from county in Pennsylvania. Com- monwealth V. Schadt, 214 Pa. 592; 64 Atl. 320; Commonwealth V. Scranton, 214 Pa. 505; 64 Atl. 321. 9 Lackman v. Walker, 52 Fla. 297; 42 So. 461. A city can not adopt an ordi- nance providing that if there be a dispute as to the amount of fees to be paid, it shall be re- §283 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 446 Sec. 283. License fee, limitation. Where, by an act of the Legislature, a municipal corpora- tion has the power and authority lo license and regulate the f erred to the nearest justice of the peace. Baker v. Paris, 10 Up. Can. 26. An ordinance relating to the granting of licenses does not re- peal one fixing the rate for a li- cense. People V. Mount, 186 III. 560; 58 N. E. 360; affirming 87 111. App. 194. Where a statute forbids the is- suance of a license until $500 has been paid into the city treasury and as much more as the city may exact, the city cannot au- thorize the issuance of a li- cense on the payment of less than $500; and it may exact a sum in excess of $500. Kelly v. Fari- bault, 83 Minn. 9; 85 K W. 720. A tax on the general business conducted in a store maj' be levied, and an additional tax if liquor be sold therein. San Luis Obispo Co. V. Greenberg, 120 Cal. 300; '52 Pac. 797. Under a power to regulate the sale of liquors, a city may raise the amount of the license fee after it has granted a license and require the licensee to ppy the increase. Wallace v. Cubanola, 70 Ark. 395 ; 68 S. W. 485 ; Moore V. Indianapolis, 120 Ind, 483; 22 N. E. 424. In Louisiana, the statute re- quiring the publication of the es- timates of expenditures by the police jury applies to liquor li- cense fees. Swords v. Daigle, 107 La. 510; 32 So. 94. A failure of an ordinance to prohibit a licensee from "engag- ing in the business of selling in- toxicating liquors to be drunk in or about the premises where sold," but requiring him to pay a certain license fee per annum for each place where he retails liquors, is valid; and a person selling without such a license may be fined. Centerville v. Gayken, 20 S. D. 82; 104 N. W. 910. Where a statute requires a liquor license fee to be fixed by ordinance, an ordinance whicli provides that in case an amend- ment to the city charter shall carry at an election, the fees shall be as therein so fixed is a compli- ance with such statute. Seattle V. Clark, 28 Wash. 717; 69 Pac. 407. Under a power to exact a li- cense for the business of retailing liquor, either as a police regula- tion or for revenue, or even for both, an ordinance exacting it as a revenue will be construed as a police regulation in order to up- hold it, where if It was held to be a revenue measure, it would be void for want of notice. Swords V. Daigle, 107 La. 510; 32 So. 94. The imposition of a tax of $50 for peddling beer is not author- ized where a statute limits the license fee for the sale of beer to $20. Hamel v. St. Jean Deschail- lons, Rap. Jud. Que. 20 C. S. 301. A city, by its charter, was em- powered to levy taxes on prop- erty and exact a license fee from saloon keepers; a general statute provided for taxes on property 447 MUNICIPAL REGULATION, § 284 traffic in intoxicating liquors within the corporate limits and "to fix the price or tax on all licenses," the only limitation on the power and discretion of the municipality in fixing the price of the licenses is that the price fixed shall not be so excessive as to be prohibitory; and whether the price fixed by an ordinance of the municipality is so excessive as to be pro- hibitory must be determined by the facts and particular cir- cumstances of each ease. In so determining the populousness of the municinality, the profitableness of the business, the character of the business proposf'd to be licensed and its effect upon the community, the additional expense necessarily entailed by a police supervision of the business, are all proper subjects of inquiry in arriving at a legal and just conclusion in fixing a nriee vhieh will vA be prohibitory. In such case the price of a corporation license need not be limited to the sum fixed by the law of the State on a license to retail. As one of the incidental powers of a municipal corporation the council may transcend that limit, provided the ordinance is not in its nature prohibitory. ^° Sec. 284. Right of different jurisdictions to exact licenses. Under a general power to license, regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors, a municipal corporation may regu- and authorized towns to \exy lo To\yn of Marion v. Chandler, taxes on business carried on with- 6 Ala. 899; Ex parte Burnett, 30 in their limits, not in excess of Ala. 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 fifty per cent, of the State tax, Ala. 728; Miller v. Jones, 80 Ala. but provided that its provisions 89; Ex parte Mayor of Anniston. should not abridge their privilege 90 Ala. 516; 7 So. 779; Ex parte to exact licenses that had been or Cowert, 92 Ala. 94; 9 So. 225; might have been granted them by Ex parte Sikes, 102 Ala. 173; 15 charter or special act. It was S. E. 522; Staats v. Washington, held that their powers to tax 45 N. J. L. 318. liquor dealers was not limited to Amount of fee allowable in Mis- 50 per cent, of the State tax. souri. Warrensburg v. MoHugh, Canova v. Williams, 41 Fla. 509; 122 Mo. 649; 27 S. W. 523. 27 So. 30. An ordinance in case of a de- Difference between exacting a linquency to pay a fee may pro- license for selling and for carry- vide that interest and an attorney ing on the liquor business. Co- fee for collection shall be added, lusa County v. Seube (Cal.), 53 New Iberia v. Moss Hotel Co., Pac. 654. 113 La. 1022; 37 So. 913. § 284 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 448 late such sales in quantities larger than those for which pro- vision is made by the general law of the State; ^^ and such a corporation, with the necessary power in its charter, may regulate to the extent of prohibiting such sales by persons who are not licensed therefor, though the sale of such liquors be not prohibited by the laws of the State.^^ Such corpora- tions, unless debarred by statute from doing so, have the power to exact licenses from persons who have State and county licenses, as well as other persons who keep shops for the sale of such liquors.^^ The obtaining of a license from a city or town does not relieve a liquor dealer of the necessity of obtaining a State and county license where the city or town charter contains nothing w^hich excludes the right of the State or county to demand a license to make such sales ; ^* on the other hand, the grant of a license by a State or county does not interfere with the powers of another jurisdiction, such as that of an incorporated city or tow^n, to exact a license, the enactment being in the nature of a restraint upon the traffic. The powers exercised by municipal corporations in such eases are superadded to those exercised by a State or county. ^^ 11 Denneby v. Chicago, 120 111. i^ Elk Point v. Vaughn, 1 Dak. 627; 12 N. E. 227; Miller v. 108; Cuthbert v. Conley, 32 Ga. Amnion, 145 U. S. 421; 12 Sup. 211; McKinney v. Town of Salem, Ct. 884; 36 L. Ed. 759. 77 Ind. 213; Warden v. Louis- 12 City of Davenport v. Kelly, 7 ville, 11 Ky. L. Kep. 179; Com- la. 103 City of Burlington v. Kel- monwealth v. Helbeck, 101 Ky. lar, 18 la. 59; Nightengale, Pe- 166; 40 S. W. 245; Independence titioner, 11 Peck, 167; Bush v. v. Noland, 21 Mo. 394; Bailey v. Seabury, 18 Johns, 418; Elk Point State, .30 Neb. 855; 47 N. W. 208; V. Vaughn, 1 Dak. 113; 46 N. W. State v. Frances, 95 Mo. 44; 8 577. S. W. 1; State v. Langdon, 31 isLutz V. Crawfordsville, 109 Minn. 316; 17 N. W. 859; Am- Ind. 466; 10 N. E. 411; State v. brose v. State, 6 Ind. 351; Wight- Cheyenne, 7 Wyo. 417; 52 Pac. man v. State, 10 Ohio, 452; Co- 975. hoes V. Moran, 25 How. Pr. 385; 1* State V. Eastbrook, 6 Ala. Thon v. Commonwealth, 31 Gratt. 653; Page v. State, 11 Ala. 849; '887; Angerhoffer v. State, 15 Tex. Matter of Lawrence, 69 Cal. 608; App. 613; Craddock v. State, 18 State V. Sherman, 50 Mo. 265 ; Tex. App. 567 ; West v. Green- State V. Harper, 58 Mo. App. 26; ville, 39 Ala. 69; Eppenheimer v. Stat« v. Propst, 87 N. Car. Commonwealth, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 660; State v. Cheyenne, 7 Wyo. (abstract) 223. 417; Mobile v. Rouse, 8 Ala. 515. 449 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 285 Though a statute prohibit the sale of liquor without a license, yet a city may adopt an ordinance prohibiting the sale of the same liquor as a beverage.^" So a statute forbidding sales on certain hours of a day creates one offense, while an ordinance preventing the keeping open of a saloon on another hour of the same day creates a distinct offense.^^ A State may impose one tax on the liquor trade and a city another if it be empowered by the Legislature to do so.^* An ordinance pre- venting sales from 10:30 p. m. to 5 a. m. is valid, notwith- standing a general statute forbids the keeping of liquor for sale or the keeping open any place on Sunday where liquors are kept or sold.^® Sec. 285. Licenses by different jurisdictions may be re- quired. A municipal corporation, if authorized by its charter or by law so to do, may require a dealer in intoxicating liquors to obtain a license from the municipal authorities and pay a fee therefor, notwithstanding he may have paid for and obtained licenses from the United States and the State. And in the event that such a license is not procured, or for valid and legal cause is refused to an applicant, he will not be authorized to sell such liquors, and may be prosecuted for violating an ordinance providing for the issuing of the license.-" The contrary of this might be true if a license were a contract and conferred a vested right to continue the trade without further hindrance or imposition ; but such is not the case. A license 10 Hill V. Dalton. 72 Ga. 314; 20 state v. Eastbrook, 6 Ala. State V. Langdon, 31 Minn. 316; 653; Ex parte Lawrence, 69 Cal. 17 N. W. 859. 608; Elk Point v. Vaughn, 1 Dak. 1- Cohoes V. Moran, 25 How. Pr. 113; Ciithbert v. Conly, 32 Ga. 385. 211; McKinney v. Town of Salem, 18 Wolf V. Lansing, 53 Mich. 77 Ind. 213; Mason v. Trustees, 367; 19 N. W. »8. etc., 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 406; State 19 State V. Welch, 36 Conn. 215. v. Clark, 54 Mo. 17; State v. Effect in Kentucky where a Harper, 58 Mo. 17; Furnan v. toA\Ti grants a license and the Knapp, 19 Johns. 24'8: State V. county refuses one. Koch v. Probst. 87 N. Car. 560; Common- Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 47'6; 84 wealth v. Sweitzer, 129 Pa. St. S. W. 533 ; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 122. 644 ; State v. Mancke, 18 S. C. 81. § 286 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 450 is not a contract; it is a restrictive special tax, imposed for the public good and in the exercise of the police power of the State. As the power to grant, withhold or annul licenses to sell intoxicating liquors is an exercise of the police power, it follows that no limitation can be placed upon its exercise by any statutory provision. It is a power incapable of surrender or annihilation.^^ Such a license is a restriction upon the traffic, and the grant of a license by one jurisdiction will not authorize the person to whom it is granted to violate the laws of another jurisdiction. In imposing one restriction there is neither an express nor an implied undertaking that no other jurisdiction shall refra^'n from imposing a restriction, in the form of a license, upon those who are engaged in selling intoxicating liquors. One who accepts such a license from the United States does it with the understanding and implied consent that an additional license maj'^ be required by the State; and the same is true in reference to the municipal cor- porations within the State if he holds licenses from the United States and the State. Not only may such corporations exact licenses from persons who have such government and State licenses, but also of "all other persons who keep shops for the sale of intoxicating liquors to be used on the premises." ^- Sec. 286. United States license, effect. A receipt of a United States internal revenue collector for a tax on the business of a retail or wholesale dealer of intoxi- cating liquors or a license issued thereunder is no authority to sell intoxicating liquors in violation of the laws of a State or the ordinances of a municipal corporation. The granting of such a license is regarded as nothing more than a mere form of imposing a tax, and of implying nothing except that the licensee shall be subject to no penalties under the laws of the siMugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 39 N. W. 394; Burnside v. Lin- 623; 8 Sup. Ct. 273; Emrich v. coin County Court, SB Ky. 423. City of Indianapolis, 118 Ind. 22 stone v. Mississippi, 10 U. S. 279; 20 N. E. 79,5; State v. Bon- 814; Lutz v. Crawfordsville, 109 nell, 119 Ind. 494; 22 N. E. 301; Ind. 466; 10 N. E. 411; Frank- State V. Mullenhoff, 74 la. 271; fort v. Aughe, 114 Ind. 77; 15 K E. 802. 451 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 286 United States provided he pays the tax.-^ Such a license gives no authority. It is a mere receipt for taxes. In such cases the general Government very properly recognizes the power of State governments to regulate their internal police, but when a State has conferred the authority to sell intoxi- cating liquors, then the general Government claims the right to tax the exercise of the business thvis authorized. When a State in the exercise of an undoubted power has, however, prohibited a business, Congress disclaims all intention to confer the right to authorize the exercise of such prohibited business in opposition to the State laws. But when the sale of intoxicating liquors is not prohibited by State authority, the general Government then claims the right to impose this revenue tax upon the exercise of the occupation. Otherwise there would be necessarily a conflict in the jurisdiction of the two governments that would lead to confusion, if not to conflict of jurisdiction. Such power has never, since the organization of the Government, been claimed or exercised. It has been admitted in the past by statesmen of every class, as well as of eminent jurists, that each State has the sole power to regulate its own internal police; to defend and punish crime ; to declare and enforce the rights of its citizens ; and to establish the relations and prescribe the duties of its citizens. It has never been suggested that Congress could interfere with or exercise such a power. And to hold that Congress could license citizens of a State to violate its laws would be an invasion of the constitutional power of the State that would be subversive of our republican form of govern- ment.-' Accordingly, it has been held that a United States license to sell intoxicating liquors is no defense to an indict- ment for unlawfully selling such liquors in a State where the 23 McGuire v. Commonwealth, 7 Holbrook, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) U. S. (3 Wall.) 387; License Tax 200; Commonwealth v. McNamee, Cases, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 462; 113 Mass. 12; Commonwealth v. In re Jordan (D. C), 49 Fed. Sanbourn; 116 Mass. 61; State v. 23«; Commonwealth v. Thornley, Funk, 27 Minn. 318; 7 N. W. 359. 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 445; Com- 2< Block v. Town of Jackson- monwealth v. O'Donnell, 90 Mass. ville, 36 III. 301. (8 Allen) 548; Commonwealth v. § 287 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 452 sale of such liquors is entirely prohibited by law;-^ nor in a State governed by a local option ; ^^ nor in a State where such sales are unlawful without first having obtained a State or municipal license to sell them.-^ In a criminal prosecution under the laws of a State or the ordinances of a municipal corporation for unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors, the holding of a United States license by the offender does not raise a presumption of guilt.-* Sec. 287. Keeping liquor for sale or saloon open. The usual general welfare clause of a city charter has been held sufficient to authorize the city to adopt an ordinance prohibiting the keeping of liquors for unlawful sales within its corporate limits.^" But it cannot prohibit the keeping of liquor whose sale it cannot prohibit.'"' A city may require saloons to be closed certain hours of the night, notwith- standing a statute provides "that, in granting licenses, cor- poration authorities shall comply wth whatever general law of the State may be in force relative to granting licenses," and that no State statute prescribes hours for closing.''^ But 25 state V. McCleary, 17 la. 44; derson v. Heywood, 109 Ga. 373; State V. Stutz, 20 la. 488; State 34 S. E. 590; Papworth, lOG Ga. V. Baughman, 20 la. 497; State 378; 32 S. E. 363; Little v. State, V. Stommel, 84 la. 751; 52 N. W. 123 Ga. 503; 51 S. E.501; Reese v. 557; State v. Delano, 54 Me. 501. Newnan, 120 Ga. 198; 47 S. E. 26 Territory v. O'Connor, 5 Dak. 500 ; Alexander v. Atlanta ( Ga. ) , 397; 41 N. W. 746. 64 S. E. 1105; Athens v. At.lan- 27Pierson v. State, 3D Ark. 219; ta (Ga. App.), 64 S. E. 71. Commonwealth v. Scheckles, 78 so Duren v. Stephens, 126 Ga. Va. 36. 496; 54 S. E. 1045; Fontana v. 28 State V. Stutz, 20 la. 488. Grant, 6 Kan. App. 462-, 50 Pac. 29 Brown v. Social Circle, 105 104. Ga. 834; 32 S. E. 141; Papworth 31/,,, re Wolf, 14 Neb. 24; 14 V. Fitzgerald, 105 Ga. 491; 32 S. N. W. i660; Commonwealth v. E. 363; Moran v. Atlanta, 102 Matthews, 129 Mass. 485; Platle- Ga. 840; 30 S. E. 298; Cunning- ville v. Bell, 47 Wis. 488; Jordan ham V. Griffin, 107 Ga. 690; 33 v. Xicolin, 84 Minn. 367; 87 -V. W. S. E. 664; Robinson v. Americus, 915. In re GreystocK, 12 Up. 121 Ga. 180; 48 S. E. 924; Paulk Can. 4.>8; In re Bright, 12 C. P V. Sycamore, 105 Ga. 501; 31 S. (Ont.) 433; Croker v. Board (N. E. 200. Tlie ordinance is consti- J. Ch.), 63 Atl. 901. Contra, tutional. Osburn v. Marietta, Hayes v. Thompson, 6 Can. Cr. 118 Ga. 53; 44 S. E. 807; Hen- Cas. 227. 453 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. §288 an ordinance prohibiting sales between 6 p. m. and 6 a. m. has been held void, on the ground that it was unreasonable ; •''- and so was one prohibiting sales during the hours on the first three days court was in session in the town.^^ Yet an ordi- nance closing saloons from 10 p, m. to 4 a. m. is valid.^* Under a power to regulate and control the liquor traffic for the preservation of peace, good order, public safety, improve the morals, order^ comfort and convenience of a city, it may pass an ordinance compelling saloons to close on election days.^^ But an ordinance cannot be adopted compelling saloons to be closed at times the State statutes permit them to be kept open for sales of liquors."*' Sec. 288. Ordinance, when not conflicting with statute — Keeping liquor for unlawful sale. As long as the owner of intoxicating liquors retains posses- sion of them, intending to deliver them on an unlawful con- 32 Ward V. Greenville, 8 Baxt. ■228; 35 Am. Rep. 700. 33 Grills V. Jonesboro, 8 Baxt. 247. 34 Staats V. Washington, 45 N. J. L. 418; Morganstern v. Com- monwealth, 94 Va. 7'87; 26 S. E. 402; Von Der Leith v. State, 60 N. J. L. 46; 37 Atl. 436; Ex parte Stephen, 114 Cal. 27'8; 46 Pac. 86. 35 Iowa City v. Mclnnery, 114 Iowa 586; 87 N. W. 498. 36 h> re Brodie, 38 Up. Can. 580 Baker v. Paris, 10 Up. Can. 621 In re Arkell, 38 Up. Can. 594 In re Barclay, 12 Up. Can. 86 Daniels v. Burforc 10 Up. Can 478; McGill V. License Commis sioners, 21 Ont. Rep. 665. In Illinois a city cannot re- cover botli the penalty pre- .scribed by the ordinance requir- ing saloons closed on Sundays and maintain an action on the saloon keeper's bond for same violation. Jenkins v. Danville, 79 111. App. 339. In order to uphold an ordi- nance forbidding a liquor dealer to keep any part of liis house open on Sunday, it was held that it should be construed so as to pre- vent the keeping open any part of the division, apartments or connected section of the houst; used for the liquor business. Orme v. Tuscumbia, 150 Ala. 520; 43 So. 584. Under a power to suppress a saloon a city cannot pass an or- dinance declaring that every sale of liquor made in the city shall be deemed to have been made in a saloon. Sparta v. Booroni, 129 Mich. 555; 89 N. W. 435; 8 Det. L. K 1100. Under its usual powers, a city may even forbid a saloon to be kept open at prohibited times for the sale of cigars and non-intox- icating liquors. Croker v. Board (N. J. Ch.), 63 Atl. 901. § 289 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 454 tract of sale, such possession is within a municipal ordinance which prohibits the keeping of such liquors for unlawful sale. Such an ordinance will not conflict with a statute of the State making it an offense to sell such liquors. While it hovers on the margin of such a statute, it does not overlap it. If there is a keeping for unlawful sale the ordinance is violated, whether any sale is made or not. In ease such a sale ensued, the statute is violated ; but this does not cancel the relation of the ordinance. An offense against one jurisdiction cannot be wiped out by committing another against another jurisdiction. The only effect of such an ordinance is to prevent preparation for violating the statute. That an offender will be liable to prosecution under the statute for unlawful selling when a sale is consummated, Avill not hinder his being punished under ordinance against keeping for unlawful sale. The two offenses are distinct and independent.^'^ Sec. 289. Prohibiting owner to enter saloon on Sunday. An ordinance is unreasonable and void which undertakes to prevent the owner of a saloon and his agents, clerks or employes entering his saloon on Sunday without first obtaining a written permission from the city authorities wherein is stated the length of time he or they may remain therein.^* In North Carolina a similar ordinance, with many additional restrictions, was held valid. This ordinance required a view of the interior of the saloon from the exterior to be given; 37 Mayson V. City of Atlanta, 77 1092; Smith v. Mayor, etc., 3 Ga. 662; Menkin v. City of At- Head 24.5; Maxwell v. Jonesboro lanta, 78 Ga. f)68; 2 S. E. 559. Corp.. 11 Heisk, 257; Ward v. ssNewbern v. :McCann, 105 Mayor, etc., 8 Baxt. 22S; Rich- Tenn. 159; 58 8. W. 114; 50 L. mond v. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112; 28 R. A. 47'6. [Citing Breyer v. X. E. 312; 13 L. R. A. 587; Yick State, 102 Tenn. 110; 50 S. VV. Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. .S. 356; 6 769; Judefind v. State, 78 Md. S. €t. 10G4; 30 L. Ed. 220; Mayor 510; 2S A. 405; 23 L. R. A. 721; v. Rodecke, 40 Md. 217.1 See also McNeill V. State, 92 Tenn. 720; State v. Thomas, 118 N. C. 1221; 23 S. W. 52; McKinney v. Xash- 24 S. E. 535; Chicago v. Netch- ville, 96 Tenn. 79, 81; 33 S. W. er, 183 HI. 104 55 N. E. 307; 724; Johnson v. City of Chatta- Eureka v. Jackson, 8 Kan. App. nooga, 97 Tenn. 24-8; 36 S. W. 49; 54 Pac. 5. 455 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 290 required all liquors to be served at a counter ; forbade chairs and tables; forbade the use of side, rear or trap doors, elevators or stairways, or the keeping open the saloon from 8 p. M. to 6 A. M. ; prohibited pool and billiard tables, tenpin alleys, gaming, or other devices; forbade the maintenance of a restaurant or other room connected with the barroom, or in the same building, unless separated by solid perpendicular walls in which were no oneninsrs; and authorized a revocation of a license for the violation of its provisions.^^ In Idaho it was held to be a reasonable ordinance which forbade the pro- prietor of a saloon to permit anyone, himself and family ex- cepted, to enter it on hours during which sales could not be made.*" Sec. 290. Ordinance declaring sale of liquor a nuisance. A town ordinance which declares the selling of intoxicating liquors a nuisance and imposes a fine for the offense is valid if the corporate powers conferred upon the town are broad enough to authorize the ordinance. Such an ordinance may not be defeated upon the ground that intoxicating liquors are property, that the right of acquiring, holding, using and dis- posing of them is both a natural and constitutional right, and that such right cannot be invaded by declaring it to be an offense; that the rVht mav be recrulated but not destroyed. Some of our natural riM^ts we must and do surrender or modify in entering into the social state, and in like manner a part of both our natural and social riphts in enter'ng into the political state. The surrender and modification of these are such as become indispensable to the good government, the due regulation, and well-beintr of society, and so paramount to the individual good, and are comprehended under the police powers of government so far as criminal justice is administered. In such case the act and the thing with its use must be judged and characterized by its effect ; and when these bring it wdthin the reason and mischiefs of the law, 39 Paul V. Was] :n£;tnn, 1^4 N. i" Slnto v. Cnlloway, 11 Idaho C. 363; 47 S. E. 793; 65 L, R. 719; 84 Pac. 27. Cntra, Regina A, 902. V. Belmont, 35 Up. €an. 298. § 291 traffic; in intoxicating liquors. 456 though it be of a new class of acts or things, or uses, it must fall under the power of government to regulate or suppress, as the public good may require the one or the other; and of these lawgivers must be the judge. It will not do to say, as we may, that under the police power we may carefully protect the public morals and the profligate from the evils of gaming, horse racing, cock fighting; from obscenity of prints and pictures; from horses and exhibitions of mountebanks and rope dancers; from the offensive smells of useful trades and hog pens; from the manufacture and exhibition of fireworks and squibs ; from rogues, idlers, vagabonds and vagrants ; and from the dangers of pestilence, contagion and gunpowder; and yet that the right to sell a slow and sure poison, as a common beverage, must remain intact and not amenable to police regu- lations for its suppression, although all the other evils to- gether will not destroy a tithe of the human lives, nor produce more moral degradation, or suffering, wretchedness, and misery in the social relation of society; or pauperism, va- grancy and crime in the political community, or pecuniary destitution of individuals and families, than will the constitu- tionally protected right of destroying our neighbors and fellows, for the selfish end of our individual private gains.*^ Sec. 291. Regulating days and hours. It is now well established by the authorities that in the interest of public safety and of good morals, the Legislature of a State, as a police regulation, has the power to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors during certain prescribed days*- and hours,*^ and by the exercise of such power may require the proprietor of a saloon or place where intoxicating liquors are sold as a beverage to securely close the same during 41 Yodlard v. Jacksonville, 15 Welch. 36 Conn. 21 5; Kerwisch v. 111. 588. Atlanta, 44 Ga. 204; Schwuchow 42 Quintard v. Corcoran, 50 v. Chicago, 68 111. 444. Conn. 34; Thomasson v. State, 15 43 Baldwin v. Chicago, 68 111. Ind. 449; Decker v. Sargent, 125 418; Hedderich v. State, 101 Ind. Ind. 404; Reithmiller v. People, .5'64; State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 44 Mich. 280; 6. N. W. 667; State 439; 44 N. E. 469. y. Anabs, 20 Mo. 214; State v. 457 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 291 such prescribed days or hours, and permit no one to enter therein during the times when the sale of such liquors is thus forbidden, and that it may delegate such power to the munic- ipal corporations within the State.** Independently of such legislative authorization, such corporations may, in the exer- cise of their police power, provide by ordinance that all places in which intoxicating liquors are sold as a beverage be closed at a certain hour in the evening and not opened until a certain hour the next morning; that during such time the doors shall be securely locked, all screens removed from them and the windows, and that no person shall be permitted to enter or remain therein except those living and employed therein ; and the same rules and regulations may be extended to Sundays, legal holidays and election days.*^ Such police power, however, cannot be exercised in an arbitrary way by such corporations, but must be in every case reasonable in the restraints put upon those who are acting by legislative or legal authority in the business of selling such liquors. They may not make police regulations that will, in effect, prohibit such sales, or unreasonably interfere with them, but they may impose reasonable regulations for the peace and good order of the community. The reasonableness of such an ordinance or regulation must depend on the fact of each case. An ordi- nance closing all bars for the sale of such liquors at an early hour might be reasonable in a small retired town where the public travel and convenience would not require accommoda- tion, and the only purpose in keeping them open after that time would be to encouraoe tippling, drunkenness, disorder, and other vices ; while such an ordinance would be unreason- ably restricted in cities or thoroughfares where public travel demands that places be kept open for refreshment at later 44Statev. Welch, 36 Conn. 215; I5asig, 128 Ind. 271; Staats v. Morris V. Rome, 10 Ga. 532; State Washington, 36 La. Ann. 912; V. Clark, 28 X. H. 176; State v. Ex parte Wolfe, 14 Neb. 24; Freeman, 38 X. H. 426; Hudson Staates v. Washington, 44 N. J.. V. Geary, 4 R. T. 485; Plattville L. 605; Staates v. Washington, V. Bell. 43 Wis. 488. 45 X. J. L. 318; Cabel v. Houston, 45Lutz V. Crawfordsville, 10!) 29 Tex. 335. Ind. 466; 10 N. E. 41; Davis v. § 291 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 458 hours. In every case a large discretion must be given to the governing body who are charged with the responsibility of maintaining the peace and good order of the community ; but in no case will it be free from the supervision of the courts, which must conserve individual rights, while those of the public are carefully guarded. Both are effected by keeping all municipal bodies within the terms of their charters.*^ Such an ordinance will in no way infringe upon the business of one who holds a license from the State and county authorities to sell intoxicating liquors at retail, even though there may not be a like statute enacted by the State. A license to sell intoxi- cating liquors is a restriction upon the traffic, and the grant of a license by one jurisdiction does not authorize the person to whom it is granted to violate the law of another jurisdic- tion. In imposing one restriction there is neither an express nor implied undertaking that no other jurisdiction shall re- frain from imposing a reasonable restriction, in the form of a license or otherwise, upon those engaged in selling intoxicating liquors. Thus, it is well settled that a grant of a license by the United States does not interfere with the right of the traffic by exacting a license fee or imposing other restraints.*^ There is no constitutional right, where a license is granted, to sell every day and every hour in the day.*^ The Supreme Court of Tennessee, however, has held that an ordinance of a municipal corporation forbidding licensed retailers of spiritu- ous liquors to sell between the hours of 6 p. m. and 6 a. m. is invalid, because it is an unreasonable exercise of the police powers of the municipal corporation. The court said: "The State recognized the retail trade in liquors as legal on condi- tion that the retailer pays for the privilege and procures a license. This license confers upon him the right to sell for one year, subject, of course, to the general laws of the State, declaring it unlawful to sell on specified days and at specified places. With these two exceptions the retailer has the author- ity of the State to follow his trade, day or night, for a year. <6 Staates v. Washington, 44 N. ^7 Lutz v. Crawfordsville, 109 J. L. 605; Decker v. Sargent, 125 Ind. 466; 10 N. E. 411. Ind. 404; 25 N. E. 458. <» staates v. Washington, 44 N. J. L. m5. 459 MUNICIPAL REGUL^VTION. § 291 * * * It must be borne in mind that the municipal cor- poration had no power, under the pretext of public regula- tion, to prohibit the exercise of a right conferred by the State. Whenever this is done, and whatever the extent, the prohibi- tion merely is a prohibition, is unreasonable, oppressive and invalid. The only reason which we can see for restraining the trade for two hours before dark and for two hours after daylight is simply for the purpose of prohibition to that extent. The reason may be a sound one when viewed simply as a prohibitory measure; it might be equally sound if the prohibition was total and absolute. But the State has virtually forbidden a municipal corporation to exercise its police powers for purposes of prohibition merely. To be legitimate the pro- hibition must be so restricted as not to interfere unreasonably or oppressively. ' ' *" There has been some diversity of deci- sions as to what will constitute a reasonable hour. Ordinances have been held valid which require saloons to be closed at 9 o'clock,-'" or at 10 o'clock,'^ or at 11 o'clock at night; '- also at 10 o'clock at night until 5 o'clock in the morning." But an ordinance requiring all saloons to be closed between certain hours, "unless by special leave of the president" of the town is void, because it is an attempt to confer arbitrary power on an executive officer to direct the enforcement of the ordinance or not, at his discretion.^* 49 Ward V. Mayor, etc. 67 Tenn. ton, 44 N. J. L. 318; 43 Am. Rep. 228; Grille v. Mayor, etc., 67 402; Platteville v. Bell, 43 Wis. Tenn. 247. "^88. Under a power to close saloons 52 Decker v. Sargent, 125 Ind. "temporarily," the police cannot 404; 25 N. E. 458. order tliat "be so temporarily na iiorris v. City of Rome, 10 closed until further notice," al- Ga. 532. Sec §293. though the Legislature might have 54 Little Chute v. Van Camp, authorized the city to adopt an or- 136 Wis. 526; 117 N. W. 1012. dinance conferring such power. A statute requiring saloons to State V. Strauss, 49 ^Id. 288. close wherever "any denomina- 50 Smith V. KnoxviUe, 3 Head tion of Christian people are hold- 245 ing divine service" in the town is 51 Ex parte Wolfe, 14 Xebr. 24; void. Gilhous v. Wells, 64 Ga. 14 N. W. 660; State v. Washing- 192. §§292,293 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 460 Sec. 292. Sales on Sunday, election day or holidays. Under the general power to regulate the liquor traffic a city may prohibit sales on Sundays, election days or holidays.^^ But a statute empowering a city to regulate the "selling or giving away" of liquor on Sunday will not authorize the adoption of an ordinance forbidding anyone to "sell, give away, furnish, or cause to be furnished or delivered," any in- toxicating liquor so far as it relates to one procuring liquor for one at his request, for the ordinance so far as it forbids a delivery is invalid except in connection with a sale or gift.^*^ Under its power to restrain the sale a city cannot require a saloon to be closed or forbid sales when the State laws permit it to be open or sales to be made.^^ An ordinance is not void for uncertainty w^hich provides that "no person or persons licensed to keep a restaurant or beer saloon, or either, within the limits of the city, shall keep open on the Sabbath;" for the meaning of the ordinance is that their proprietors shall temporarily cease to entertain the public, or cease to entertain the public on that day.^® Sec. 293. Sales at prohibited hours. Under its general powers a city may prohibit sales after certain hours of the night ; as from 10 p. m. to 4 a. m. ; "^ or 55 state V. Ludwig, 21 Minn. Minn. 355; 105 N. W. 965; In re 202; Cranor v. Albany, 44 Ore. Barclay, 12 Up. Can. 86; In re 144; 71 Pac. 1042; Jordan v. Nic- Ross, 14 Can. Pac. 171. olin, 84 Minn. 307; 87 N. W. 915; 5s Richards v. Bayonne, 61 N. State V. Maciniak, 97 Minn. 355; J. L. 496; 39 At). 708. 105 N. W. 965; Edis v. Butler, 8 A city may authorize sales be Ohio N. P. 183; 11 Ohio St. & v. made on Sunday; and a State P. Dec. 245 ; Richards v. Bay- may empower it to pass an ordi- onne, 61 X. J. L. 496; 39 Atl. nance permitting such sales with- 708. in its boundaries, though if it liad 56 Xorris v. Oakman, 138 Ala not passed, it the sales would have 411; 35 So. 450. violated a State law. State v. 57 Moore v. Kelley, 136 Mich. Kessels, 120 Mo. App. 233; 96 139; 98 N. W. 989; 10 Detroit S. W. 494. Leg. N. 1002; Mueller v. People, 59 staats v. Washington, 45 N. 24 Colo. 251; 48 Pac. 965; Peo- J. L. 418; McNulty v. Toopf, 116 pie V. Rush, 113 Mich. 539; 71 X. Ky. 202; 75 N. W. 258; 25 Ky. W. 863; State v. Marciniak, 97 L. Rep. 430; Bennett v. Pulaski 461 MUNICIPAI- REGULATION. § 294 between 8 p. m. and 6 a. m. ; '^° but one prohibiting druggists selling at night, they, under a general law, not being per- mitted to dispense liquors at any time as drink, is invalid."^ In Tennessee it has been held that an ordinance requiring saloons to close during the night time was valid, and that notwithstanding the town was situated on the State line and immediately across that line Avere saloons which were monop- olizing the entire liquor traffic, both day and night, by reason of the fact that the saloon of plaintiff was closed at night.®" Sec. 294. Picnic and social gatherings. Where the charter of a city gives the common council power to pass ordinances to license and regulate or pi-ohibit inns or taverns, restaurants and beer saloons to retail intoxicating liquors, the power thus granted to the common. council cannot be delegated by ordinance to the mayor or anyone else. In such case the power of the common council is limited to licensing places occupied by the applicants in which the business of selling intoxicating liquors is to be carried on as a regular business; and the common council has no power, by a license or permit, to authorize the sale of such liquors at any other place than one regularly licensed. Hence, an ordinance au- (Tenn. Ch. App.), 52 S. W. 913; pie v. Armstrong (Mich.), 16 Am. 47 L. R. A. 278. [Citing Robinson St. Rep. 584, note (s. c. 41 N. W. V. Mayor, etc., 1 Humph. 156; 34 275).] But not from 6 p. m. to Am. Dec. 627; City of Memphis A. ii. Ward v. Greeneville, 8 Baxt. V. Memphis Water Co., 8 Baxt. 228 ; 35 Am. Rep. 700 ; nor during 590; Ward v. Mayor, etc., Id. 229; the first three days court is held in Smith V. Mayor, etc., 3 Head, 245; the town. Grills v. Jonesboro, 8 Railroad Co. v. Berry (Ky.), 40 Baxt. 247. See § 291. Am. St. Rep. 161, 10 S. W. 1026; go Raul v. Washington, 134 N. Phillips V. City vf Denver (Colo. C. 363; 47 S. E. 793; 65 L. R. Sup.), 41 Am. St. Rep. 230; 34 P. A. 902. 902; City of Tarkio v. Cook (Mo. ei McNulty v. Toopf, 116 Ky. Supp. ), 25 S. W. 202 ; Mayor, etc., 202; 75 S. W. 258; 25 Ky. L. V. Beasly, 1 Humph. 241; Ander- Rep. 430. In this case it was son V. City of Wellington (Kan. held that sales at wholesale could Sup.), 19 P. 719; Mayor v. Dry not be confined to certain hours of Dock, etc., E. B. & B. R. Co. (N. the day. Y. App.), 28 Am. St. Rep. 614; 02 Bradford v. Jellico, 1 Tcnn. note (s. c. 30 K E. 563); Peo- Ch. App. 700 §§ 295, 296 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 462 thorizing the mayor, upon recommendation of a common council, to issue a permit for the sale of ale, beer, and other malt beverages, at picnics or social gatherings, for a license fee will be illegal and void."^ Sec. 295. Physician's prescription. Under a charter authorizinsr a town to license, regulate and suppress the sale of intoxicating liquors, an ordinance which provides, under penalty, that it shall be unlawful for any physician to give a prescription to f^vy well person, or who is apparently in good health, to enable him to get any intoxi- cating liquor to be used as a beverage, is not unauthorized, unreasonable nor oppressive: neither does it discriminate against any class of persons. Tbp oVijeet of such an ordinance is to suppress the evils of intemnerance. but not to prohibit the use of intoxieatino- liquors for medical purposes. No physician is bound to act under the ordinance, but if he sees proper to avail himself of the privilege given by it he is bound by its terms, and can only give a prescription for the purpose named in the ordinance and for no other. Such a restriction is necessary to prevent fraud upon the law, and he who adopts the profession of a physician must conform to the reasonable requirements of the law in the discharge of his professional duties.®* Sec. 296. Sales to minors and drunkards. Under its general powers a city may adopt an ordinance prohibiting sales or gifts to habitual drunkards.*'' And so it may prohibit sales to minors."" Under its general powers to make such by-laws as it deem necessary, it may prohibit minors entering saloons without the consent of their parents 63 Winants v. Bayonne, 44 N. Contra, Roberts v. Clinmire, 46 J. L. 114. Up. Can. 264; In re Barclay, 12 8* Carthage v. Buckner, 4 111. Up. Can. SG (after notice given App. 317. vSec also Selma v. not to sell). Brewer (Cal. App.), 98 Pac. 61. "estate v. Austin, 114 N. C. 65 Woods V. Pineville, 19 Ore. ®55; 19 S. E. 919; 25 L. R. A. 108; 23 Pac. 880; /n re Grey- 283; In re Brodie, 38 Up. Can. stock, 12 Up. Can. 458. 580. 463 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 297 or guardians.^^ Under a power to regulate ordinaries and taverns it has been held that a town could prevent sales to free colored persons.*^^ So under the general welfare clause a city may prohibit minors frequenting or loitering in saloons or procuring liquors.*'^ An ordinance is not invalid which forbids sales to minors not having their parents' written per- mission, but permits sales to such as have." Sec. 297. Prohibiting sales in States having local option laws. In those States where local option laws are in force, whereby a city or town may prohibit sales of liquors within its boun- daries, courts seem to be inclined to limit the power of a city to adopt a prohibition ordinance, or rather to deny the power unless it be clearly given in its charter or in the general law, leaving the question of prohibition to be decided by popular vote. Thus, where no election had been taken upon the ques- tion of local option it was held that a city had no authority to prohibit the sale of liquors.'^' But this statement must be received with caution, and its soundness cannot be assured. Thus, where a city charter required the question annually to be voted on whether a license should be issued for the sale of liquor during the ensuing year, and after the time the first vote had been taken an ordinance was adopted making it a misdemeanor to sell liquor without a license, it was held that the ordinance making it an offense to sell without a license, coupled with the failure to provide for the issuance of a license, effectually prohibited the sale of liquors and no pro- hibitory ordinance was necessary to prevent their sales." 67 state V. Austin, 114 N. C. an ordinance making him liable 855; 19 S. E. 919; 25 L. R. A. if his servant sells liquor to a mi- 283. nor when the prosecution is for a 68 Washington v. Lasky, 5 sale he himself has made. Areola Cranch C. C. 3S1; Fed. Cas. No. v. Wilkinson, 233 111. 250; 84 17230. T^ut not for selling to N. E. 264. guests at the bar of a tavern. ^o Fitch v. Lewiston, 137 111. Werner v. Washington, 2 Hayw. & App. '570. H. 17o; Fed. Cas. No. 17416a. • i Shreveport v. P. Draiss & Co., 69Lewistown v. Fitch, 130 111. Ill La. 511; 35 So. 727. App. 170. '^2 Honck v. Ashland, 40 Ore. A saloon keeper cannot attack 117; 66 Pac. 697. §§298,299 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 464 Sec. 298. Women not licensing — Constitutional law. A statute providing that any male inhabitant having other specific qualifications may obtain a license by proceeding in the manner therein described, by implication prohibits women from obtaining a license." It is a maxim of the law that the express mention of one person or thing is "the exclusion of another;" ''■* or, as stated by another eminent author, "What is expressed makes what is silent to cease." "^ And a person answering the description required by such a statute, being prosecuted for selling without a license, cannot complain that an unjust discrimination is made by the statute against women and non-residents, for it is a well established principle that only those who are prejudiced by an unconstitutional act will be heard to make an objection to it. Courts will not listen to those who are not aggrieved by an invalid law.^'' Sec. 299. Women in saloons. An ordinance is valid which prohibits the assembling or employment of women in saloons.'^ Power to pass such an ordinance is given by an authority to prevent vice and im- morality, to preserve public peace and good order, and to license and regulate saloons.'^ So a city may prohibit the employment of women in saloons, even though women may be licensed to sell liquors at retail, or that the wife of a licensed dealer may sell drinks in his saloon. ^'^ But under an ordi- nance preventing women being entertained in saloons, the proprietor of a saloon w^ho serves women in his restaurant, located across a hall from his saloon, with food and wine does not violate its provisions.^*' An ordinance may even go so far "Woodford v. Hamilton, 139 S. 108; 48 L. Ed. 365; 24 Sup. Ind. 481; 39 X. E. 47. Ct. 219; affirming 29 Colo. 488, -4 Wharton's Legal Maxims, p. 503; 69 Pac. 590, 1125; Cronin 11. V. Denver, 192 U. S. 115; 48 L. 73 Coke Litt., 210a. Ed. 368; 24 Sup. Ct. 220. "8 Wagner v. Town of Garrett, "« People v. Case (Mich.), 16 118 Ind. 114; 20 X. E. 706. X. W. 558. 7" GreJHier v. Hoboken (X. J. 'o Hoboken v. Goodman, 68 X. J. L.), 53 Atl. 693; Denver v. Dome- L. 217; 51 Atl. 1092. dian, 15 Colo. App. 36; 60 Pac. so Denver v. Domedian, 15 Colo. 1107; Cronin v. Adams, 192 U. App. 76; 00 Pac. 1107. 465 MUNICIPAL. REGULATION. § 300 as to prevent females entering saloons or wine rooms,^' or a sale of liquor to them.^- Sec. 300. Wine rooms. The meaning of the words "wine rooms," as used in conunon parlance, is a room to which females resort to obtain intoxicating liquors. Usually they are resorts of lewd women who there seek opportunities to make the acquaintances of men. They are also frequently places into which young women are lured, not infrequently to their ruin, by designing men and women. In all instances they have direct connection with a saloon and are under the control of the saloon keeper. It has been found necessary to suppress them in many States, and cities have been empowered to do so.^^ It is often diffi- cult to determine whether a particular room falls within the prohibitory provisions of a statute or ordinance. Sometnnes these rooms are mere stalls opening off a larger room. Thus, where an ordinance prohibited the construction or mainte- nance of booths, stalls or other inelosures, with curtains, screens or partitions in or connected with a barroom, and the barroom w^as seventy-five feet long by nineteen feet wide, at the rear of which was cut off by partition a square division, nineteen feet square, in which were kept a table and chairs, a doorway being in the partition but having neither door nor curtain nor screens, it was held that such division fell within the prohibition of the ordinance, being an inclosure within the meaning of that word as used therein.^* Such an ordinance is a reasonable regulation of the liquor traffic and is author- ized by a grant of power to license and regulate all persons dealing in intoxicating liquors. The words "other inclosure" include only such inelosures as are of the same kind as stalls and booths. ^^ 81 state V. Nelson, 10 Idaho s* State v. McGregor, 88 Minn. 522; 79 Pac. 79; 67 L. K. A. 74; 92 N. W. 509. g(^g 85 state V. Barge, 82 Minn. 256; 82 (Campbell v Tliomasville 84 N. W. 911; C^ronin v. Adams, (Ga) 64 S E 815 1^2 U. S. 108; 24 Sup. Ct. 219; 83 Denver v. Domedian, 15 Colo. 48 L. Ed. 365; affirming 29 Colo. App. 36; 60 Pac. 1107. 488, 503; 69 Pac. 590, 1125; Cro- §§301,302 TRiVFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 466 Sec. 301. Requiring a county license. A town has the right by an ordinance to limit the licenses issued by it for the sale of intoxicating liquors to such persons as have procured and hold a license from the board of county commissioners. Such an ordinance is a reasonable one. A person who obtains a license from such a board may be pre- sumed to have sho\ATi his fitness to be trusted with the sale of such linuors. before a tribunal whore +he ri?bt of remon- strance is secured. Towns are not provided with the ample machinery for prosecuting innuiries into the character and fitness of applicants as are such boards, and so it is a reason- able exercise of the power to reirulate and restrain to require that an applicant for a town license shall have complied with the law of the State by securing a license from the board of commissioners of the county iu which the town is located.*^ Sec. 302. Repeal of statute by implication, when not ac- complished. The fact that a municipal corporation is authorized by the Legislature to 'pass ordinances regulating the traffic in intoxi- cating liquors, and declaring the sale thereof without a municipal license a nuisance does not thereby repeal by im- plication a general law of the State upon the same subject. While a license from such corporation will protect the holder of it, yet if the corporation authorities fail or refuse to grant a license, the general law of the State would be violated by a sale within the corporate limits and the aggressor might be punished under it. The fixing the rates and granting a license by a municipal corporation excuses from liability to the municipal ordinances, but cannot excuse from liability to the penal ordinances of the State.^^ It is a maxim in the construction of statutes that the law does not favor a repeal by implication, and it has accordingly been held that where nin V. Denver, 192 U. S. 115; 24 114; 20 N. E. 706; Linkenhelt v. Sup. Ct. 220; 48 L. Ed. 368; Garrett, 118 Ind. 599; 20 N. E. State V. Nelson, 10 Idaho 522; 79 708. Pac. 79; 67 L. R. A. 868; Ends- 87 Gardner v. People, 20 111. ley V. vState (Ind.), 88 N. E. 62. 431; Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. 80 Wagner v. Garrett, 118 Ind. (Ind.), 361. 467 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. §303 two acts are seemingly repugnant, they must, if possible, be so construed that the latter may not operate as a repeal of the former; the repeal must be specific. ^^ Nor will mere in- convenience, marked by the similarity of two statutes, justify the courts in declaring that the earlier is repealed by the latter.^^ It has also been held, in pursuance of this rule, that an act is not repealed by implication when the Legislature had no intention to repeal it.^** Sec. 303. Regulation of saloon room — Location of saloon. Under a power to regulate and license a city may require a licensee to carry on the business personally, and that the rooms in which he conducts his liquor traffic shall not be adjacent to any theater or place where variety show entertainments are conducted."^ So it may require the saloon to be open to the public gaze.®^ So it may prevent all sales in any side, back or upper room, or in any alcove, booth or box connected with the saloon f^ and may prohibit all communicating pass- age ways between a place where liquors are sold and billiard 88 Dwarris on Statutes and their Construction, ■674 ; Ledgvvick's Stat, and Const. Law, p. 127; Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 85, 105; Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilm. (III.), 221; Blain v. Bailey, 25 Ind. 165; Jeffersonville, etc. R. Co., 112 Ind. 93; 13 N. E. 403 State V. Oarlock, 14 Iowa 444 State V. Langden, 29 Minn. 393 Bowen v. Lease, 5 Hill. (N. Y.), 221. 89 Mitchell V. Duncan, 7 Fla. 13; Robinson v. Riffey, 111 Ind. 112; 12 N. L. 141; State v. Ber- ry, 12 Iowa 58; Wilson v. Shor- ick, 21 la. 332; Waldo v. Bell, 13 La. Ann. 329. 90 Tyson v. Posttethwait, 13 111. 728; Coghill V. State, 37 Ind. 111. An ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquors, under a penalty, is repealed by a later ordinance permitting a sale under an ordi- nance. Barton v. Gadsden, 79 Ala. 495. An ordinance covering the en- tire subject matter of a prior or- dinance repeals it. State v. Brunswick, 2 N. J. Law J. 240. 91 State V. Scatena, 84 Minn. 281; 87 N. W. 764. 92 Lincoln Center v. Linker, 360 Kan. App. 6; 51 Pac. 807; Croker V. Board (N. J. Ch.), 63 Atl. 901. See Mesken v. High- lands, 9 Colo. App. 255; 47 Pac. 846; Morganstern v. Common- wealth, 94 Va. 787 ; 26 S. E. 402 ; but see section on "Screens" and "Wine Rooms." 93 Sandys v. Williams, 46 Ore. 327; 80 Pac. 642. §§ 304, 305 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 468 tables kept ; "* or forbid gambling, profane swearing, blas- phemous or insulting language, or any indecency or disorderly conduct therein."^ But an ordinance that "every person receiving a shop license shall confine the business of his shop solely and exclusively to the keeping and selling of liquor, ' ' is void, because in restraint of trade.^*^ And a city cannot compel persons not selling liquors to remove the saloon signs from over their doors; ^^ but it may require a saloon to have a saloon sign over its entrance.'*^ Under a power to regulate a city may forbid the use of tables and chairs in a saloon, ex- cepting one for the bartender or proprietor to use.®^ Sec. 304. Lights burning in saloon. In Canada an ordinance prohibiting a light in a saloon from 12 o'clock midnight until 5 a. m., and requiring a saloon to be then closed and unoccupied except by the keeper and his family, has been held void ; ^ but in New Jersey it has been held that an ordinance forbidding a light burning in the saloon between 7 a. m. and midnight on Sunday was valid.^ Sec. 305. Screens — Exposure of room to view. Unless especially empowered a city cannot adopt an ordi- nance requiring the removal, from the doors or windows of a saloon, of all screens and other obstructions to the view of the interior of and business transacted in the saloon. Such an ordinance is prohibition of a lawful business and not a mere regulation of it.^ So an ordinance prohibiting the exposure of liquors for sale where dry goods are kept or exposed for sale is void, not being an exercise of the police powers for the 9* In re Neilly, 37 Up. Can. 289 ; 99 Pate v. Jonesboro, 75 Ark. In re Arkell, 38 Up. Can. 594. 276; 87 S. W. 437. 95 In re Brodie, 38 Up. Can. i Regina v. Belmont, 35 Up. 580 (a licensediinn). Can. 298. 96 /jj, re Croonie, 6 Ont. Bep. 2 Croker v. Board (N. J. Ch.), 188. 63 Atl. flOl. ^- In re Bright, 12 Can. Pac. 3 Steffy v. Monroe City, 135 433. Ind. 466; 35 N. E. 121; 41 Am. 98 Regina v. Lennox, 26 Up. St. 436 ; Champer v. Greencastle, Can. 141. 138 Ind. 339; 35 N. E. 14; 24 L. R. A. 768; 46 Am. St. 390. 469 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. §§ 306-308 protection of the public,* But an ordinance, enacted under a provision authorizing a city to regulate sales of liquore, re- quiring the removal of obstructions from the interior view of the room during the times sale may not be made, has been held valid.^ Sec. 306. Prohibiting the carriage of liquors. A city or town may not prohibit a carrier or its agent de- livering liquors shipped to the consignee from another State, and collecting the purchase price and remitting it to the con- signor. Such an ordinance is void.^ Sec. 307. Police visiting saloon. Under a power to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, a municipality may provide that the police or excise inspector shall have at all times access to all licensed saloons except during the time the law or ordinances require them to be closed.'^ Sec. 308. Penalties essential. The power conferred by a Legislature upon the municipal corporations of a State to enact ordinances authorizes or of necessity implies the power of such corporations to impose penalties for the violation of such ordinances; and without provision for such a penalty a penal ordinance is non- enforcible.^ The power to suppress, regulate and restrain the 4 Chicago V. Netcher, 183 111. e Carthage v. Muniiell, 203 III, 104; 55 N. E. 707; 48 L. R. A. 474; 67 N. E. 831; affirming 105 201. 111. App. 119, citing Langel v, 5McNulty V. Toopf, 1L6 Ky, Bushnell, 197 111. 20; 63 N. E. 202; 75 S. W. 258; 25 Ky. L. 1086; 58 L. R. A. 266. Eep. 430; Regina v. Martin, 21 T^Croker v. Board (N. -J. Ch.), Ont. App. 145; Regina v. Belmont, 63 Atl. 901; Commonwealth v. Du- 35 Up. Can. 298; Bennett v. Pu- cey, 126 Mass. 269. laski (Tenn. Ch.), 52 S. W. 913; « Mayor, etc. v. Guillo, 3 Ala. 47 L. R. A. 278. See People v. 137; Mason v. Shawneetown, 77 Carrel, 118 Mich. 79; 76 N. W. 111. 533; Mount Pleasant v. 118; Endsley v. State (Ind.), 88 Breeze, 11 Iowa 399; Shreveport N. E. '62. V. Rocs, 35 La. Ann. 1010; Grover § 309 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 470 use of intoxicating liquors embraces the authority to adopt the usual means employed for such purpose. The merely adopting an ordinance which declares that liquor shall not be sold, without imposing any penalty for its non-observance, would not tend in the slightest degree to accomplish the end sought. The imposition of a fine fnr the breach of such ordi- nance is the means usually authorized by the Legislature, and none are more proper; occasionally provision is made for imprisonment, and this is legitimate.^ Under a power to re- quire a license a city may inflict a penalty for a sale with- out such license.^" Sec. 309. Penalties, greater and additional — Infliction. Municipal corporations may exercise powers by ordinances regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors beyond those au- thorized by the general laws of the State, provided they are not inhibited from doing so by a statute of the State, and in such cases may provide for greater penalties than are pro- vided for by the laws of the State. ^^ Likewise they may impose additional penalties to those inflicted by the State, and there are undoubtedly good reasons why this may be done. Particular acts may be far more injurious and the temptation to commit much greater in a crowded town or city than in the State generally. They consequently require more severe V. Huckins, 26 Mich. 4?6; Town penalty for outside such limits. of Tipton V. Yakey, 72 Mo. 380; Johnson v. Bessemer, 143 Mich. Hookset V. Amoskeag, etc. Co., 44 313; 106 N. W. 852; 12 Detroit N. H. 105; Reinhard v. Mayor, Leg. N. 081. etc., 2 Daly (N. Y.) 243; Barter A failure to provide a pehalty V. Commonwealth, 3 Pa. 260; renders the ordinance void. As- Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Cold. toria v. Wells, 68 Kan. 787; 75 (Tenn.) 382; Winooski v. Yokey, Pac. 1026. 49 Vt. 292. See Louisville v. io Ex parte Guerrero, €9 Cal. Worden, 11 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 88; 10 Pac. 261; Deitz v. City 402. of Central, 1 Colo. 323; King v. »City of Pekin v. Smelzell, 21 Jacksonville, 2 Scam. (111.) 305; 111. 464. Warrensburg v. McHugh, 122 Mo. An ordinance inflicting a pen- 649; 27 S. W. 523; Meyer v. alty for operating a saloon with- Bridgeton, 37 N. J. L. 160; Clin- in certain limits of the city is not tonville v. Keating, 4 Denio, 341. void, for St. t^ilure to provide a " Pekin v. Smelzel, 21 111. 464, 471 MUNICIPAL REGULATION. § 310 measures for prevention. State laws are, of course, for the general good and cannot always answer the peculiar wants of particular localities. The power of making general laws be- longs exclusively to the State, but local legislation may be delegated to the municipal corporations. Their acts under the power thus delegated are valid when there is no conflict, and superadded penalties are not inconsistent with those previously imposed.^- Sec. 310. Revocation of license — Conditional ordinance, AYhere power is rightfully conferred on a city to entirely prohobit the sale of intoxicating liquors, or to regulate and license the same, at discretion, the city may grant the privilege of selling such liquors on such terms and conditions as it may see fit to impose, and has ample power to impose, as a condition, that a license granted shall be subject to revoca- tion on the violation of any of the statutes of the State or of the ordinances regulating the traffic. In such a case, where absolute control over the whole subject of granting licenses is conferred, the city may impose any other conditions calculated to protect the community, preserve the order and suppress vice, such as closing the licensed place on election days, holi- days or Sundays, or the closing of the same at a particular hour each evening; and for a violation of any of these conditions provide for a forfeiture of the license. Such power grows out of the fact that it is discretionary with the city to prohibit the sale of such liquor or to grant a license for thfiir sale on such terms as it may choose.'- A person who takes out a license to engage in a business he otherwise would 12 Wood V. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. etc., 43 Ga. 421; Sprayberry v. (N. Y.) 425; Wallace v. Cu- Atlanta, 87 Ga. 124; 13 S. E. banola, 70 Ark. 395; {>8 S. W. 485. 197; Wiggins v. Oiicago, -68 111. A city cannot inflict a greater 372; Schwuchow v. Chicago, GS penalty than the limitations 111. 444; Huber v. Baugh, 43 la. placed upon it by the statute. 291; Optumwa v. Schaub, 52 la. Minneapolis v. Olson, 76 Minn. 1; 515; 3 N. W. 529; Hildreth v. 78 N. W. 877. Crawford, 65 la. 359; 21 N. W. 13/nre Bickerstaff, 70 Cal. 35; 677; Martin v. State, 23 Neb. 11 Pac. 393; Whitten v. Mayor, 371. § 310 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 472 have no right to carry on, takes the privilege subject to the restrictions and burdens imposed by the ordinance under which alone it can issue, and his act in accepting the license is a recognition of the ordinance and estops him from denying its validity.^'' In such case the burden is cast upon the licensee in order to protect himself in the enjoyment of his license, to see to it that no violation of the law or ordinance be committed upon the licensed premises; and he cannot claim that an offense committed thereon was committed without his knowledge or consent. ^^ Under ' ' full power and authority to regulate the retail of ardent spirits." and "at their discretion to issue a license to retail or to withhold" it, a city may enact an ordinance providing that upon a conviction of a licensee of a violation of the State liquor law it shall revoke his city license.^" So it may provide that a violation of its liquor license ordinance shall work a revocation of the license issued thereunder,^'^ or require the applicant to consent to a revoca- tion at the will of the city council.^* A city may provide by ordinance for the trial of a licensee for a violation of the liquor license law and for the revocation of his license ;^*' but it cannot delegate its power to revoke a license to a court try- ing the offender.-^ A statute may authorize a city to revoke a license, in its discretion, without cause, on refunding the value of the unexpired term.-^ 14 Launder v. Chicago, 111 III. R. A. 902; Carr v. Augusta, 124 291. Ga. 116; 52 S. E. 300. Contra, 15 People V. Meyers, 95 N. Y. In re Bright, 12 Ont. Rep. 433; 223. Shreveport v. Draiss & Co., Ill Although a statute forbids a La. 511 ; 35 So. 727 ; Smith v. To- city issuing a license for less than ronto, 16 C. P. (Ont.) 200. one year, it does not prevent the is Wells v. Torrey, 144 Mich, city from adopting an ordinance 689; 108 N. W. 423; 13 Detroit providing for its revocation on Leg. N. 37'8. the licensee committing certain i9 Langen v. Wood River, 77 offenses. State v. Dwyer, 21 Minn. Xeb. 444; 109 N. W. 748. 512. 20 state v. Milwavikee, 129 Wis. 16 Sprayberry V. Atlanta, 87 Ga. 562; 109 N. W. 421. See also 120; 13 S. E. 197. Baker v. Paris, 10 Up. Can. 21. !■ Schwuchow v. Chicago, 68 21 State v. Pierce County, 50 111. 444; Paul v. Washington, 134 Wash. 650; 97 Pac. 77S. N. C. 363; 47 S. E. 793; 65 L. 473 ' MUNICIPAL BEGULATION, §§ 311-313 Sec. 311. Ordinance annulled by subsequent statute. The Legislature has full power to enact a statute in general terms which will annul previous ordinances of a city; as, for instance, taking away the power of a city to enact such ordi- nances. And so if a State adopts general prohibition that will annul all license ordinances without an express provision to that effect."- And so, under a power to adopt special legis- lation, if the Legislature adopt a prohibition law for a county, the effect would be to annul all city or town liquor licensing ordinances of cities or towns situated in such county. Such is the case when a county adopts local option, except that the ordinances are not annulled but temporarily suspended.-^ Sec. 312. Exceptions to prohibitory ordinances. Where a State law permits sales for certain special pur- poses, or where a statute authorizes a city to adopt an ordi- nance prohibiting sales of liquor except for such purposes — as medicinal, mechanical or sacramental purposes — an ordinance which does not except or permit sales for such purposes has been held voicl.^* On the contrary, such an ordinance has been held valid ; -^ and in the same State from which the first case is cited another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction has held such an ordinance valid.-" Sec. 313. Ordinance in part void. If an ordinance be in excess of the power of a city to pass it, of course the entire ordinance is void ; but not infrequently only a part of it is in excess of such power, and then it is always a question whether the valid part can remain and be 22 Platteville v. McKernan, 54 ing under an ordinance and un- Wis. 4i87; 11 N. W. 798; Adams der a subsequent statute, see State V. Stephens, 88 Ky. 443; 11 S. v. Brady, 41 Conn. 588. W. 427; Ottawa v. La Salle, 11 24 Akerman v. Lima, 7 Ohio N. 111. 339. P. 92; 8 Ohio S. & €. P. Dec. 23 Turner v. Forsyth, 78 Ga. 430. 683; 3 S. E. 649; Ex parte 25 Houck v. Asliland, 40 Ore. Brown, 38 Tex. Cr. App. 2D5; 42 117; 66 Pac. 697. S. W. 554. 2oEdis v. Butler. 8 Ohio N. P. As to difference in time of clos- 183; 11 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 245. § 314 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 474 enforced. In this respect in determining this question the same rules apply as apply in determining the validity of a statute which in part infringes upon some provision of the Constitution. -''* Thus, if a city can only require a license for sales, and it requires a license for one class of sales and pro- hibits sales of another class, as to the latter class the ordi- nance is void, yet as to the other class it remains in force, and a license as to that class may be enforced."^ And this was held true where a city could prohibit the sale of malt and vinous liquors and could not spirituous, but undertook to prohibit the sale of any of them.-^ And where a city could not prevent the sale of li(|uors in quantities of five gallons or over, and it passed an ordinance preventing the sale of any quantity, it was held to prohibit sales of less than five gallons, though void as to sales of five gallons or over."^ And the same rule applies to one prohibiting sales by anyone when the city has no power to prohibit sales by a drug'gist.^*' An attempt to permit a transfer of a license does not avoid the other provisions of the ordinance forbidding sales without a license.^^ Sec. 314. Ordinance in conflict with Constitution. It does not require the citation of a decision of a court to establish the proposition that an ordinance in conflict with a provision of the State or Federal Constitution is absolutely void.-''- If it is in conflict when enacted with a provision of the Const'tution, a subsequent amendment of that provision so as to remove the conflict will not render the ordinance valid ; ^^ nor does such an amendment so amend the city's charter as to give it power it did not possess before.^* But a constitu- te* 77ar parte Stephen, 114 Cal. so Ex parte Cowert, 92 Ala. 94; 278; 46 Pac »6. 9 So. 225. 2T Ilarbaugh v. Monmouth, 74 3i Wallace v. Cubanola, 70 Ark. 111. 3G7; Wagner v. Garrett, 118 305; 08 S. W. 485. Ind. 114; 20 N. E. 706. a2 Baldwin v. Smith, 82 111. 28Eldora v. Burlingame, 62 la. 162. 32; 17 N. W. 148; €an trill v. 33 Mt. Pleasant v. Vansice, 43 Sainer, 59 Iowa, 26; 12 N. W. Miph. 361; 5 X. W. 378; 38 Am. 753. Rep. 193. 29 State V. Priester, 43 Minn. "-* Dewar v. People, 40 Mich. 373; 45 N. W. 712. 401; 29 Am. Rep. 545. 475 5IUN1CIPAL BEGUIx.\TION. § 315 tional provision giving the inhabitants of a State religious freedom does not prohibit the enactment of an ordinance for- bidding the sale of liquors or the keeping open of saloons on Sunday ; ^° nor does an ordinance imposing a reasonable regu- lation upon the sale of liquors, or even prohibiting trafficking in them, violate the provisions of a Constitution prohibiting the deprivation of a person of his liberty or property.^® Where a citj^ openly and defiantly enacted an ordinance authorizing the sale of liquors in the face of a provision of the Constitution prohibiting such sale, it was held that pro- ceedings in the nature of a quo icarranto lay to annul the authority attempted to be thus given. "^ Likewise a city charter in conflict Avith the Constitution is void to the extent of the conflict."'' Sec. 315. City conducting a dispensary. A power to control and direct the sales of liquor within its limits will not authorize a city to enter upon the sale of liquors by organizing a dispensary and appointing officers to sell the liquors, although done in the interest of temperance.^* Nor does the general welfare clause of a city's charter empower it to do so.*^ Under the North Carolina statute" the State established a dispensary board in certain cities and authorized the board of aldermen to name the members of the board and to approve the bonds of the treasurer and manager; but the city simply acted as the agent of the State to name the meml)ers of the dispensary board and it was not engaged in the liquor traffic in violation of its charter provi- sions forbidding it.^- In South Carolina an ordinance de- ssGabe! v. Houston, 29 Tex. 39 Lofton v. Collins, 117 Ga. 434; 335. 43 S. E. 708; 61 L. R. A. 150; 36 Tanner v. Alliance, 29 Fed. Barnesville v. Murphey, 113 Ga. 196; Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio 779; 39 S. E. 413. 5S^ 40 Leesburg v. Putnam, 103 Ga. 3T State V. Topeka, 30 Kan. 110; 29 S. E. 602; State v. Rusli- 653; 2 Pac. 387; 31 Kan. 452; ing, 140 Ala. 187; 36 So. 1007. 2 Pac. 597; State v. Leavenworth, 4i Laws 1890, c. 254. 36 Kan. 314; 13 Pac. 591. 42 Garsed v. Greensboro (N.C.), 3s Morrilton v. Gomer, 75 Ark. 35 S. E. 254. 45-8; 87 S. W. 1024. §§316,317 TR^^FFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 476 daring all liquors contraband except those sold by the State's agent was held not inconsistent with the State dispensary law Avhich declared all liquors, except domestic wines, not labeled and certified to as having been bought from a State dispensary should be contraband. *^^ Sec. 316. Appointment of liquor agents. Under laws providing for it, cities, towns or counties may appoint agents for the sale of liquors within their boundaries, under proper conditions.^* These agents are not considered as officers of the cities holding over as officers do, and, there- fore, their employment ceases at the end of the time for which they were appointed or employed.^^ If the liquor statute requires him to be appointed and give a bond, until he is duly appointed and gives his bond he has no authority to act ; *^ and until then he cannot bind the city by purchasing liquor on its account, when that may be done.*'^ An agent duly selected may usually appoint such sub-agents as will enable him to carry out the provisions of the law.*^ Sec. 317. Duties and powers of public liquor agents. If an agent make illegal sales he is liable the same as if he were not an agent. *^ Any agreement on his part for a profit 43 Easley v. Pegg, '63 S. C. 98 ; of tlie community. Waters v. 41 S. E. IS. McDowell, 126 Ga. 807; 56 S. E. 44 State V. City Council, 42 S. J>5 ; and in South Carolina the lo- C. 222; 20 S. E. 221; 26 L. R. A. cation of one may be enjoined un- 345; Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt. der certain circumstances. Crox- 226. ton V. Truesdale. 75 S. C. 418; 5fi estate V. Weeks, 67 :\Ie. 60. S. E. 45. 46 Commonwealth v. Pillsbury, Controlling a division of the 12 Gray 127. profits between the city and coun- 47 Atkins V. Randolph, 31 Vt. ty, Clarke Co. v. Herrington, 113 226; Foxcroft v. Croker, 40 Me. Ga. 234; 38 S. E. 852. 308. Under the Georgia dispensary 48 State V. Marley, 78 Conn. law the persons appointed to sell 330; 62 Atl. 85. See as to law liquors are governmental officials in New Hampshire. Opinion of and not liquor dealers subject to justices, 72 N. H. 605; 55 Atl. a tax. Dispensary Corars. v. 043. Thornton (Ga.), 31 S. E. 733. In Georgia the question of the 49 State v. Keen, 34 Me. 300; continuance of a public dispen- State v. Putnam, 38 Me. 296. eary may be submitted to a vote 477 MUNICIPAL BEGULATION. § 317 to himself in the sale of the city's liquor is void, being con- trary to public policy/'*^ He must sell for cash and not on credit, whatever the customs may be in the vicinity/*^ If the law requires him to purchase from a State agent, he cannot purchase from another and bind his city.'^- At the end of his term he must account for all monies received and liquors on hand/'^ 50 Baldwin v. Coburn, 39 Vt. 52 Laiiter v. Allenstown, 58 N. 441. H. 289. 51 Mansfield v. Stonehan, 15 53 Washington v. Eames, 6 Al- Gray 149. len 417. CHAPTER VI. LICENSES. SECTION. 318. Definition. 319. A personal trust. 320. Imposes no public duties — Purpose of license. 321. Not a tax. 322. License distinguished from a tax. 323. Inlierent and common law right to sell liquors with- out a license. 324. License to sell not a vested right. 325. License not property. 326. Neither a contract nor prop- erty. 327. Effect of enactment of pro- hibition and a license law. 328. Repeal of licensing laws af- ter license issued. 329. License by implication. 330. Taken subject to subsequent legislation. 331. Annullment of license by change of law. 332. License prospective, not ret- rospective. 333. Retroactive effect of license. 334. Impossibility to secure a li- cense. 335. Neglect or improper refusal to grant a license. SECTION. 336. Performance of requisites to obtain a license not a li- cense. 337. What a license does and does not authorize. 338. Agent or servant, when protected by license of his principal. 339. Sale by servant when his master holds no license — Illegal sales. 340. Servant's license no protec- tion for his master. 341. Partnership license. 342. Number of licenses an indi- vidual may or is required to hold. 343. City may require license in addition to a State license. 344. 'City license not a defense to a State violation. 345. United States license — State license. 346. U. S. Government license no defense to State license. 347. Duration of license. 348. Expired license. 349. "On" and "off" license. 350. Void license — Collateral at- tack. Sec. 318. Definition. In its proper sense, a licen.se is a permit to do business that cannot be done Avithout it.^ It is synonymous with "author- iSonora v. Curtin, 137 Cal. or, 31 Colo. 173; 74 Pac. 458; 683; 70 Pae. 074; Board v. May- People v. Rains, 20 Colo. 489; 39 478 479 LICENSES. §318 ity" or "permission." = "The popular understanding of the word license undoubtedly is. a permission to do something which without the license would not be allowable. This we are to suppose was the sense in which it was made use of in the Constitution. But this is also the legal meaning."^ It is essentially a grant to those to whom it is given or extended, not enjoyed by persons generally.* It is "granted by some competent authority to do an act which without such authority would be illegal.""'' "The object of a license is to confer a right that does not exist without a license."" "A common right is not the creation of a license." ' As used in the liquor laws of a State, "a license is a privilege granted by the court, or other competent authority, to sell liquor."^ Where a Pac. 341; Standard Oil Co. v. Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 75; 82 S. W. 1020; 26 Ky. L. Rep. 985; Ft. Smith V. Hunt, 72 Ark. 556; 82 S. W. 163; 6C L. R. A. 238; Schweirman v. Highland Park (Ky.), 113 S. W. 507. It is not a privilege that any citizen may demand. It is in the nature of a favor. Schweirman v. Highland Park (Ky.), 113 S. W. 507. 2 Harmon v. Chicago (III.), 26 N. E. 697; Neuman v. State, 76 Wis. 112; +5 N. W. 30; Win- oski V. Gokey, 49 Vt. 282; Sin- not v. Davenport, 22 How. 227 ; 16 L. Ed. 243; San Francisco v. Liverpool, etc. Co., 74 Cal. 113; 15 Pac. 380; 7 Am. St. 425. a Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406; 20 Am. Rep. '654; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43; Adler v. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St. 439; 9 N. E. 672. estate V. Frame, 39 Ohio St. 399; Adler v. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St. 439; 9 N. E. 672. fi Pullman Southern Car Co. v. Nolan, 22 Fed. 276; Metcalf v. Hart, 3 Wyo. 513; 27 Pac. 900; 31 Am. St. 122; Caldwell v. Ful- ton, 7 Casey (Pa.) 475; 72 Am. Dec. 760; Shurman v. Ft. Wayne, 127 Ind. 109; 26 N. E. 560; 11 L. R. A. 378; Hockett v. Wilson, 12 Ore. 25; 6 Pac. 652; Ander- son V. Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 576; 9 N. E. 683; State v. Hipp, 38 Ohio St. 199; State v. Hardy, 7 Xeb. 377. 8 Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43; Adler v. Whitbeck, 44 Oiiio St. 539; 9 N. E. 672. - State V. Frame, 39 Ohio St. 399 ; State v. Peel, etc., Co.. 36 W. Va. 802; 15 S. E. 1000; 17 L. R. A. 385. 8 Hubman v. State, 61 Ark. 482; 33 S. W. 843; Silver v. Sparta, 107 Ga. 275; 33 S. E. 31; Chi- cago V. Collins, 175 111. 445; 51 N. E. 907; 49 L. R. A. 408; 67 Am. Rep. 224. The term "liquor license" may mean the paper writing which usually, though not necessarily, is the evidence of the license; or it may be used to designate the permission to sell liquors. Fie- §319 TR-VFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 480 statute prohibited the taking of liquor into a certain territory without a permit issued by the lieutenant-governor, and an- other statute authorized a municipality in this territory to require a license, it was held that the permit was not the license and did not dispense with the obtaining of a license from the municipality." The license must be a written one, it has been held, or it is not a license.^** Sec. 319. A personal trust. A license to sell intoxicating liquor is granted to the recipient of it because of his personal fitness to receive it and act thereunder. It is a personal trust, not tranferable, and not, because of its non-transferability, an asset of his estate on his decease or assignment in bankruptcy.^^ genston v. Mulligan, 63 X. J. Eq. 179; 51 Atl. 191; United States V. Cutting, 3 Wall. 441; 18 L. Ed. 241; Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548; 4 X. E. 197; 54 Am. Rep. 343, or it may mean both, as where a statute authorizes the at- tachment and sale of liquor li- censes and all rights and interests therein. Quinnipac Brewing Co. V. Hackbarth, 74 Conn. 392; 50 Atl. 1023. Under authority to license a city cannot stretch its powers so as to prohibit. Ex parte Sikes, 102 Ala. 173; 15 So. 522; 24 L. R. A. 774. In Pennsylvania a statute pro- vided that if a "party licensed" should die or remove his license might be transferred by tlie au- thority granting it, or a license be granted liis successor for the remaining part of the year; and it was lield that a person remov- ing from tlic State between the time of granting the license and payment of the fee was a "party licensed." In re Umholtz, 191 Pa. St. 177; 43 Atl. 75. 9 Queen v. Salterio, 1 Ter. L. R. .301. 10 Connecticut Breweries Co. v. Murphy, 81 Conn. 145; 70 Atl. 450. The requiring of a license is a proper exercise of the police pow- er. Campbell v. Jackman Bros. (Iowa), IIS X. W. 755; Appeal of Allyn, 81 Conn. 534; 71 Atl. 794. Usually a license is necessary to sell intoxicating liquors. Pra- ter v. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 344. 11 //I re Buck's Estate, 185 Pa. St. 57; 39 Atl. 821; 64 Am. St. 816; Watkins v. Grieser, 11 Okla. 302; 66 Pac. 332; Furman, etc. Co. V. Long. 113 Ala. 203; 21 So. 339; In re Whitlock's License, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 34; In re Miller, 171 Fed. 263; In re Conner & Co., 171 Fed. 201; Tracy v. Ginzberg. 189 Mass. 260; 75 X. E. 637. Although a license is no part 481 LICENSES, §§ 320, 321 Sec. 320. Imposes no public duties — Purpose of license. "License to a person to follow any particular trade or business, ' ' it was said in a New York case, ' ' is not an appoint- ment to office, nor does it confer any of the powers or priv- ileges of a public officer. It is a mere license to follow his calling, whatever it may be. The duties to be performed are not public duties, and the public have no interest in their per- formance or omission. The ob.ject of the license is for the purpose of controlling the business and preventing its being conducted in a manner injurious to the public welfare. Be- yond that the public interest is not affected, and, if the licensee neglects to act under his license, the public cannot com- plain."^- Sec. 321. Not a tax. A tax is not a license ; it does not come within the definition of a license. "Within this definition,!^ a mere tax upon the traffic cannot be a license of the traffic, unless the tax confers some right to carry on the traffic which otherwise would not have existed. We do not understand that such is the case here. The very act which imposed this tax repealed the pre- vious law, which forbade the traffic and declared it illegal. The trade then became lawful, whether taxed or not ; and this law, in imposing the tax, did not declare the trade illegal in case the tax was not paid. So far as we can perceive, a failure to pay the tax no more renders the trade illegal than would a like failure of a farmer to pay his tax on his farm render its cultivation illegal. The State has imposed the tax in each of an estate's assets, yet if the warranto. State v. Gibbs (X. H.), administrator make a personal 74 Pac. 229. profit out of it, and if he 12 People v. Beard, 33 How. Pr. treat it as a part of the estate, 32; People v. Acton, 48 Barb. his personal creditors cannot reach 524. the profits he derives from its i3 "The object of a license is to uses. Asherbach v. Carey (Pa.), confer a right that does not ex- 73 Atl. 435. ist without a license." Chilvers A licensee is not an officer of v. People, 11 Mich. 43, 49; Kitson the State, and his right to sell v. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich. 325; Do- under it cannot be tested by quo ran v. Phillips, 47 Mich. 228; 10 N. W. 350. § 321 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 482 ease, and made such provision as has been deemed needful to insure its payment ; but it has not seen fit to make the failure to pay a forfeiture of the right to pursue the calling. If the tax is paid, the traffic is lawful ; but if it is not paid, the traffic is equally lawful. There is consequently nothing in the case that appears to be in the nature of a license. The State has provided for the taxation of a business which was found in existence, and the carrying on of which it no longer prohibits ; and that is all. But it is urcred that by taxing the business the State recognizes its lawful character, sanctions its exist- ence, and participates in the profits — all of which is within the real intent of the prohibition of license. The lawfulness of the business, if by that we understand merely that it is no longer punishable, and is capable of constituting the basis of contracts, was undoubtedly recognized when the prohibitory law was repealed ; but as the illegality of the traffic depended on that law, so its lawfulness now depends upon its repeal; the tax has nothing to do with it whatever. Now, it is not claimed, so far as we are aware, that the repeal of the pro- hibitory law was incompetent; and if not, the mere recogni- tion of the lawfulness of the traffic cannot make the tax levy or any other law invalid. It is only the recognition of an existing and conceded fact, and the courts cannot, if they would, refuse to recognize it. The idea that a State lends its countenance to any particular traffic by taxing it, seems to us to rest upon a very transparent fallacy It certainly over- looks or disregards some ideas that must always underlie taxa- tion. Taxes are not favors ; they are burdens ; they are necessary, it is true, to the existence of government, but they are not the less burdens, and are only submitted to because of the necessity. It is deemed advisable to make careful provi- sions to preclude these burdens becoming needlessly oppres- sive ; but it is conceded by all the authorities that under some circumstances they may be carried to an extent that will be ruinous to individuals. It would be a remarkable proposition, under such circumstances, that a thing is sanctioned and countenanced by the Government Avhen this burden, which may prove disastrous, is imposed upon it ; while, on the other hand, it is pounced upon and condemned when the burden is 483 LICENSES. § 322 withheld. It is safe to predict that if such was the legal doe- trine any citizen would prefer to be visited with the untaxed forms of government rather than with those testimonials of approval which are represented by the demands of the tax gatherer." "Taxes upon business are usually collected in the form of license fees; and this may possibly have led to the idea that seems to have prevailed in some quarters, that a tax implied a license. But there is no necessary connection what- ever between them. A business may be licensed and yet not taxed, or it may be taxed and yet not licensed. And so far as the tax being necessarily a license, that position is frequently made by law for the taxation of a business that is carried on under a license existing independent of the tax." ^* Sec. 322. License distinguished from a tax. There seems to be a little difference of opinion as to the definition of a license. It is defined, in its general sense, as a "permission granted by some competent authority to do an act which, without such permission, would be illegal." ^•' This agrees in substance with the definition as given in a number of cases.'" A license is essentially the granting of a special 1* Youngblood v. Sexton, *2 does not aiitliorize a tax, though Mich. 402 ; 20 Am. Rep. 654. a fee for it sufficient to cover the A license "is a part of the po- cost of issuance and its enforce- lice regulations of the country, ment may be exacted ; but if the and the fee is rather intended to fee is so high as . to amount to a prevent the indiscriminate open- prohibitory tax, it cannot be ex- ing of such establishments than to acted. Ottumwa v. Zekind, 95 raise revenue by taxation. It is Iowa 922; C4 N. W. 622; 29 L. in no proper sense a tax." Burch R. A. 734; 58 Am. St. 447; Hoef- v. Savannah, 42 Ga. 596 ling v. San Antonio, 85 Tex. 228; Power given a city "to license" 20 S. W. S5; 16 L. R. A. 608; gives implied power to tax when Burlington v. Putman Ins. Co., such is tlie manifest intention. St. 31 Iowa 102; State v. Ilerod, 29 Joseph V. Ernst, 95 Mo. 360; 8 Iowa 123. S. W. 558; St. Charles v. Elener, i^ Bouvier's Law Die, art. "Li- 155 Mo. 671; 56 S. W. 291. So cense"; State v. Hipp, 38 Ohio does a power "to license and reg- St. 206. ulate." San Jose v. San Jose, m Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 50 etc. R. Co., 53 Cal. 475. But as Ga. 530; Chilvers v. People, 11 a rule the mere power to license Mich. 43; Youngblood v. Sexton, § 322 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 484 privilege to one or more persons, not enjoyed by citizens generally, or, at least, not enjoyed by a class of citizens to which the licensee belongs. A common right is not the crea- ture of a license.'^ The result of the definitions M'hich have been given of a license as implied in its etymology, is in con- formity to the sense in which the word is ordinarily used, and may be regarded as strictly accurate. That is permitted which cannot be done without permission ; and to say that a person is permitted, licensed, to do what he may lawfully do without permission, is a misuse of the words. The distinction between a tax upon a business and what might be termed a license, is, that the former is exacted by reason of the fact that the busi- ness is carried on, and the latter is exacted as a condition precedent to the right to carry it on. In the one case the in- dividual may rightfully engage in and carry on the business M'ithout paying the tax ; in the other, he cannot. Hence, unless it can be shown that a simple tax on the liquor traffic enlarges the privileges of those engaged in it, or confers a right that did not previously exist, there is no ground for saying the tax is a license of the business.'* A license being of the nature of a privilege, it would be a strange incongruity to grant one the privilege of bearing the burden of a tax. A tax which may be resorted to for the purpose of restraining what is opposed to the public interests, would hardly be called a license to do that which is sought to be restrained. The two things are entirely distinct in their characteristics. A license may exist without the imposition of a tax, and a tax may be imposed without the granting of a license.^" 32 Mich. 406; Plenler v. State, 11 v. Bartley, 4 S. R. (N. S. W.), ]S^eb. 547;.Andler v. Whitbeck, 44 290; 21 W. X. C. (N. S. W.), 81; Ohio St. 539; Anderson v. Brews- State v. Miller, 114 Iowa 396; 87 ter, 44 Ohio St. 576; 9 N. E. 683. N. W. 287; Doran v. Phillips, 47 "State V. Frame, 39 Ohio St. Mich. 228; 10 N. W. 350; Allyan, 399. Appeal of, 81 Conn. 534; 71 Atl. isAdler v. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio 794; Brown v. State (Tenn.), 114 St. 539. 8. W. 198; State v. Plainfield, 19 Anderson V. Brewster, 44 Ohio 44 X. J. L. 118; Courtwright v. «t. 576; 9 X. E. 683. For cases Xewaygo, 96 Mich. 290; 55 X. W. on this generally, see Peterawold 808. 485 LICENSES. § 323 Sec. 323. Inherent and common law right to sell liquors without license. A law or uuiiiicipal ordinance authorizing the licensing of the sale of intoxicating liquors cannot be defeated as uncon- stitutional on the ground that the traffic in such liquor is dangerous and hurtful to society; that the right to engage in the retail traffic of such licfnors is not an inherent or in- alienable riglit. and that no such right existed at common law. It is true that brothels and gaming houses were at common law under all circumstances held to be nuisances, but ale houses and other places in which intoxicating liquors were sold to be drunk were not so held or regarded unless they became disorderly, and in, such cases it was not the mere sale of the liquors Avhich constituted them nuisances but it was the dis- orderly conduct therein; or, in other words, the disorderly manner in which they were conducted or kept, and in such cases it was immaterial whether the keepers thereof were licensed or unlicensed. The first general statute restricting and regulating the keeping of ale houses and tippling houses was passed by the British Parliament in 1552, and was the act of the Fifth and Sixth Parliament of Edward VI. This statute constitutes Chapter 25, page 391, of the English Statutes at Large, 1540 to 1552. The preamble to this statute declares: "For as much as intolerable hurts and troubles to the commonwealth of this realm doth daily grow and increase through such abuses and disorders as are had and used in common ale houses and other houses called tippling houses, it is therefore enacted by the King, our Sovereign Lord, ' ' etc. At common law prior to the passage of this statute, any person had the right, without a license, to keep and maintain ale houses and tippling houses. Such business was not re- garded as a public offense, but was considered and held to be a means of livelihood which one was free to follow.-'^ In 20 2 Cooley's Blackstone {4th dall, 3 Salk. 27; Anonymous, .3 ed.), p. 714; 1 Hawkins P. €. Salk. 24, 25; King v. Marriot, (Cum. Ed.), p. 714; 1 Bishop on 4 Mod. 144 and notes; Faulkner Crim. Law (7th ed.), Sec. 505; case, 1 Saund. 240; King v. 1 Bisliop on Statutory Crimes ( 3(1 Ivyes, 2 Showers, 357 ; State v. ed.), Sees. 984, 98'5; Stevens v. Bertheol, 6 Blackf. 474; 39 Am. Watson, 1 Salk. 45; King v. Ran- Dec. 442; State v. Milliken, 8 § 323 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 486 Bishop on Statutory Crimes, it is said: "It is at common law lawful to keep a properly regulated inn, ale house or tippling house, which severally are indictable only when dis- orderly. Hence, a fortiori, the simple selling of intoxicating drinks is not a common law crime; but from an early period in English legislation during ante-colonial times, and thence downward to the present day with us, statutes, in various forms of provisions, have been enacted as aids to the sup- pression of erroneous evils which the use or abuse of inebri- ating liquors have wrought. Indeed, the old English enact- ments of this sort are numerous, and they have largely been the models for legislation in our States."-^ The dicta or ex- pressions of the higher courts, both State and Federal, that the right to engage in the retail traffic of intoxicating liquor is not an inherent or inalienable right invariably occur in con- nection with the restricted and unregulated traffic in such liquors and not as an argument to defeat laws and ordinances regularly adopted for the purpose of licensing and regulating the sale of such liquors.-^ In the language of Mr. Justice Greer : "It is not necessary, for sake of justifying the State legislation now under consideration, to array the appalling statistics of misery, pauperism and crime which have their origin in the abuse of ardent spirits. The police power, which is exclusive- ly in the States, is alone competent to the correction of these great evils, and all measures of restraint or prohibition neces- sary to effect the purpose are within the scope of that author- ity.-^ As has been aptly said by another learned judge : "The power is signally exercised in legislation designed to diminish and prevent the demoralization and impoverishment and the nvimberless vices and miseries, which as the mere concomitants and consequences of a free traffic in intoxicating liquors, by restraining or prohibiting them." ~* Blackf. 260; Welsh v. State, 126 23 License Cases, 5 How. 504; Tnd. 71; 25 N. E. 883; Sopher v. People v. Walling, 53 Mich. 264; State, 169 Ind. 177; 81 X. E. 913; 18 N. W. 807. Commonwealth v. McDonough, 13 24 State v. Fitzpatrick, 16 R. I. Allen (Mass.) 581. 54; 11 Atl. 767 ; Appeal of Allyan, 211 Bishop on dim. Law (7th 81 Conn. 5.34; 71 Atl. 794; Camp- ed.), See. 505. bell v. .Tackman Bros. (Iowa), 22Sopher v. State, 1(>9 Ind. 177; 118 N. W. 755. 81 N. E. 913. 487 LICENSES. § 324 Sec. 324. License to sell not a vested rig-lit. The enactment of a law regulating the liquor traffic is an exercise of the police power of the State. The police power is a governmental one, and permits obtained under laws enacted in its exercise are not contracts. In enacting laws for the reg- ulation of the business of retailing liquors, a sovereign power is asserted, and its exercise does not confer upon any officer authority to make a contract which will abridge or limit the great and important attribute of sovereignty. Sovereigns may make contracts, which, under the Constitution, will preclude them from impairing vested rights by subsequent legislation, but this result never follows the exercise of a purely police power. The right to legislate for the promotion and security of the public safety, morals and welfare can not be surren- dered or bartered away by the Legislature. Accordingly, the uniform decisions of the courts have been to the effect that a license to retail intoxicating liquors is nothing more than a permit ; it is neither a contract nor a grant. It is a restrictive special tax, imposed for the public good, in the exercise of the police power of the State. It may be changed or even annulled by the supreme legislative power of the State when- ever the public welfare demands. Under a license the licensee acquires no vested right or contractual interest. lie takes the license with the tacit condition and the full knowledge that the matter is at all times within the control of the sovereign power of the State, and is deemed to have consented to all proper conditions and restrictions which have been imposed by the Legislature, or may in the future be imposed by it in the interest of the public morals and safety relative to the traffic in such liquors, or to the place wherein he was granted such permit to sell the same, notwithstanding their burden- some character. And a law regulating or authorizing munici- pal corporations to regulate and impose restrictions upon the sale of intoxicating liquors is an exercise of the police power of the State, and neither the State nor the municipality can, by any sort of contract, license or permit, abdicate, embarrass or bargain away its right to exercise the pov/er in such a § 325 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 488 measure as it may thereafter deem the public welfare re- quires.^^ Sec. 325. License not property. A license to sell intoxicating liquors is not a contract be- tween the State or a municipal corporation and the person licensed, giving the latter vested rights, protected on general principles and by the Constitution of the United States against subsequent legislation ; nor is it property in any legal consti- tutional sense. It has neither the qualities of a contract nor of property, but is simply a temporary permit to do what would otherwise be an offense against a general law or an ordinance. It forms a portion of the internal police powers of the State or municipal corporation, is issued in the exer- cise of the police power, and is subject to the direction of the State or municipal government, which may modify, revoke or continue it as the State or corporation may deem fit, even though l)ased upon a valuable consideration. For this reason the holder of such a license cannot complain that the obliga- tion of a contract has been impaired or that he has been unduly 25 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 ]\Iiss. 462 ; State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. U. S. 25; Powell v. State, 69 Ala. 17; Metropolitan Board v. Bar- 10; Kaffsmith v. People, 8 Colo. rie, 34 N. Y. 659; Rowland v. 175; La CroLx v. Fairfield Co., 49 State, 12 Tex. App. 418; Hedges Conn. 591; Elk Point v. Vaughan, v. Titus, 47 Ind. 145; State v. 1 Dak. 113; Brown v. State, Mullenhoff, 74 Iowa, 271; 37 N. 82 Ga. 224; Sprayberry v. At- Vv. 329; State v. Isabel, 40 La. lanta, 87 Ga. 120; 13 S. E. 197; Ann. 340; 4 So. 1 ; Reithmiller v. McKinney v. Salem, 77 Ind. 213; People, 44 Mich. 280; 6 K W. Moore v. City of Indianapolis, 120 667; People v. Warden, 17 N. Y. Ind. 483; State v. Gerhardt, 145 Misc. Rep. 1; 38 N. Y. Supp. 837; Ind. 439; Shea v. City of Mun- affirmed 6 N. l". App. Div. 520; cie, 148 Ind. 14; Columbus City 39 N. Y. iSup. 582; Common- V. Cutcomp, 61 Iowa 672; Pro- wealth v. Sellers, 130 Pa. St. 32; hibitory Cases, 24 Kan. 700; Fell 18 Atl. 541; 15 Atl. 891; 25 V. State, 42 Md. 71; Calder v. Wkly. .X. C. 154; Commonwealth Kurby, 5 Gray (Mass.), 597; v. Donahue, 149 Pa. St. 104; 24 Commonwealth v. Brennan, 103 Atl. 188; 30 Wkly. N. C. 134; Mass. 70; Hearn v. Brogan, 64 West v. Bishop, 110 Iowa 410; 81 Miss. 334; Wheeler v. State, 64 N. W. 696. 489 LICENSES. § 326 deprived of his property.-" Those powers which are inherent in all governments, and the exertion of which, as emergen- cies may demand, is essential to the well-being of organized society, cannot be abridged or weakened or their vigor im- paired by contract or bargain.-^ The right to legislate for the promotion and security of the public safety, morals and wel- fare cannot be surrendered or bartered away by the Legis- lature.-^ Sec. 326. Neither a contract nor property. A license to sell intoxicating liquors is not a contract be- tween the State or municipality issuing it and the licensee. This question has been discussed in the chapter on constitu- tional law, but it Avill bear a short review here. "These licenses to sell liquor," said the Court of Appeals of New York, "are not contracts between the State and the persons licensed, giving the latter vested rights, protected on general principles and by the United States Constitution against sub- sequent legislation, nor are they property in any legal or con- stitutional sense. They have neither the qualities of a con- tract or of property, but are merely temporary permits to do what otherwise would be an offense against a general law. They form a portion of the internal police system of the State, are issued in the exercise of its police powers, and are subject to the direction of the State government, which may modify, revoke or continue them, as it may deem fit. If the act of 1857 had declared that licenses under it should be irrevocable (which it did not. but by its very terms they are revocable), the Legislature of subsequent years would not have been bound 26 Brown v. State, 82 Ga. 224; 645; Moore v Indianapolis, 120 Block V. Jacksonville, 36 111. 301; Ind. 483; 22 N. E. 424. Moore v. City of Indianapolis, 120 2S Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 Ind. 483; Prohibitory Amendment U. S. 25; Patterson v. Kentucky, Cases, 24 Kan. 700; Fell v. State, 97 U. S. 501; Stone v. Mississip- 42 Md. 71; Calder v. Kurby, 5 pi, 101 U. S. 814; McKinney v. Gray (Mass.) 597; Commonwealth Town of Salem, 77 Ind. 213; Fre- V. Brennan, 103 :\rass. 70; Met- lei^h v. State. 8 Mo. 606; State v. ropolitan Board, etc., v. Barrie, Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439; 44 N. 34 N. Y. '659. E. 469; 33 L. R. A. 3l3; Horn- 2TBoyd V. Alabama, 94 U. S. ing v. Wendell, 57 Ind. 171. §326 TR.VFFIC IN IXTOXICATIKG LIQUORS. 490 by the declaration. The necessary powers of the Legislature were all subjects of internal police, being a part of the general grant of legislative power given by the Constitution, and cannot be sold, given away or relinquished." "^ The legal qualities of a license are strikingly brought into light when it is borne in mind that the power authorizing their issuance may revoke them at any time without either a liability to compensate the holders for the losses the holders sustain by the revocation or even to return the fees or any part of them paid for them, or may even increase the unpaid fees before the license has expired and make the continuance of the life of the license to depend upon the payment of the increased amount.^" And likewise it is strikingly illustrated by the rule that if a licensee holds a license from the State, the latter may, while it is in force, authorize a municipality to exact another license before it shall be lawful to sell under the first, although the statute authorizing a municipality to require the license is enacted 29 Metropolitan Board v. Barrie, 34 X. Y. 959; Moore v. Indian- apolis, 120 Ind. 483; 22 N. E. 424; Brown v. State, 82 Ga. 224; 7 S. E. '915; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71; 20 Am. Rep. 83; Cald- er V. Kurby, 5 Gray 597 ; Com- monwealth V. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70; State v. New Orleans, 113 La. 371; 3'6 So. 999; Meehan V. Board, 73 N. J. L. 382; 64 Atl. 689 ; Martin v. State, 23 Neb. 371; Plenler v. State, 11 Md. 547; .State v. Carron, 73 N. H. 434; 62 Atl. 1044; Powell v. State, 69 Ala. 10; Hearn v. Bro- gan, 64 Miss. 334; 1 So. 246; Rowland v. State, 12 Tex. App. 418; Columbus v. Cutcomp, 61 Iowa 672; 17 N. W. 47; State v. Clarke. 54 Mo. 17; 14 Am. Rep. 471 ; 'SlcCny v. Clark. 104 Iowa. 491 ; 73 N. W. 1050; Nelson v. State, 17 Ind. App. 403; 46 N. E. 941; People V. Schmitz, 7 Cal. App. 330 ; 94 Pac. 407 ; State v. Lichta, 130 Mo. App. 284; 109 S. W. 825; State V. Roberts (N. H.), C9 Atl 722 ; Kresser v. Lyman, 74 F. 765 ; Hevren v. Reed, 126 Cal. 219; 58 P. 530 ; La Croix v. Commission- ers, 50 Conn. 321; 47 Am. Rep. 648; Sprayberry v. City of At- lanta, 87 Ga. 120; 13 S. E. 197; McCoy V. Clark, 104 Iowa 491; 73 N. W. 1050. 30 Moore v. Indianapolis, 120 Ind. 493; 22 N. E. 424; McKin- ney v. Salem, 77 Ind. 213; State V. Bonnell, 119 Ind. 494; 21 N. E. 1101; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814; Beer Co. v. Massachu- setts, 97 U. S. 25; Burnside v. Lincoln Co., m Ky. 423; 7 S. W. 276; i) Ky. L. Rep. 63^5; Mugler V. Kansas. 123 U. S. 623; 8 Sup. Ct. 273 ; Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. 700. 49] LICENSES. §327 after the State's license has been issued, and while it is in force.^^ Sec. 327. Effect of enactment of prohibition and a license law. The effect of the adoption of a constitutional provision in favor of total prohibition is to annul all statutes on the sub- ject of licenses then in foree.^- And a sale after such pro- vision goes into force, under a license previously issued and which by the terms had not expired, is illegal.^^ So where a 31 Elk Point V. Vaughn, 1 Dak. 113; 46 N. W. 577; McKinney v. Salem, 77 Ind. 213; Decker v. Mc- Gowan, '59 Ga. 805. In New York liquor tax certifi- cates are property only in a qual- ified and restricted sense. Peo- ple V. Flynn, 18 N. Y. 597; 77 N. E. 1194; affirming 110 N. Y. App. Div. 279; 9-6 N. Y. St. 655; and reversing 48 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 159; 96 N Y. Sup. 653; Lyman V. Malcom Brewing Co., 160 N. Y. 96; 54 N. E. 577; 55 N. E. 408; affirming 40 N. Y. App. Div. 46; 57 N. Y. Supp. 634; Frank V. Forgotston, 61 N. Y. Supp. 1118; Duncan v. Clement (X. Y. ), 119 N. Y. Supp. 374. In Brit- ish Columbia a license, "like other contracts, carries the elements of mutuality," subject to forfeiture for its violation, /n re Clay, 1 B. C, pt. II, 300. The owner of a liquor license or a liquor tax certificate may in- voke the general rules of law to protect it in any proceedings in- tended for the forfeiture of his rights therein. Lyman v. .ilal- com Brewing Co., 160 N. Y. 96; 54 N. E. 577 ; affirming 40 N. Y. App. Div 46; 57 N. Y. Supp. 634; Frank v. Forgotston, 61 N. Y. Supp. 1118; llillard v. Giese, 25 N. Y. App. Div. 222; 49 N. Y. Sup. 286; In re Livingston, 24 N. Y. App. Div. 51; 48 N. Y. Supp. 989. In Washington it is held that where the right to transfer a li- quor license is recognized by a statute, it becomes valuable prop- erty, subject to barter and sale. Deggender v. Seattle, etc. Co., 41 Wash. 385; 83 Pac. 898. So long as the State recognizes the right to make and sell liquor, the occupation is under the pro- tection of the law, but the license may be revoked. F. W. Cook Brewing Co. v. Garber, 168 Fed. 942. 32 State v. Tonks, 15 P. I. 385; 5 Atl. 636; State v. Dorr, 82 Me. 212; 19 Atl. 171; State v. Swan, 14 N. W. 492. 33 Prohibitory Amendment Cas. 24 Kan. 700. Other phases under such a pro- vision can be seen in the follow- ing cases: Coggeshall v. Groves, 16 R. I. 18; 11 Atl. 296; Frank- lin v. Wostfall, 27 Kan. 614; State V. Clark, 15 R. I. 383; 5 .Atl. 6.35; State v. Kane, !5 R. I. 395; 6 Atl. 783. §§ 328, 329 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 492 statute for licensing the sale of liquors is adopted, and which, prohibits all sales except under license is of so general a char- acter that it repeals a previous prohibitory law ; ^* but a stat- ute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquors "to be used as a beverage" is not affected by a general statute of subsequent data prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquors for "other purposes.""^ Of course, a general licens- ing statute which repeals all previous laws concerning the sale of intoxicating liquors will remit all penalties incurred under such laws, unless there be a saving clause.^^ Sec. 328. Repeal of licensing law after license issued. As a license is not a contract, and the holder of it has no vested right therein within the meaning of that phrase in the Constitution, it follows that there is no limitations on the right of the Legislature or on the city when it has issued the license to repeal the statute or ordinance under which it has been issued, although the repeal may result in absolute prohibi- tion by the annulment of the license. ^^ Saving clauses may, however, preserve or keep in force licenses then issued until they expire by the limitations prescribed by the law repealed.^* Sec. 329, License by implication. The complying with all the requirements to secure a license is not the equivalent of a license actually granted or issued. 34 Culler V. state, 42 Conn. 55; State, 14 Tex. App. 31; Monroe State V. Spokane Falls, 2 Wash. v. State, 8 Texas App. 343; 1-rath- 40; 25 Pac. 903. er v. State, 14 Tex. App. 453; sn State v. Kane, ^5 l\. 1. 3:>5; Dawson v. State, 25 Tex. App. 670; 6 Atl. 783. In this case a pro- 8 S. W. 820; Wells v. State, 24 hibitory clause in the Constitu- Tex. App. 230; 5 S. W. 830. tion forbade the manufacture and 37 pieuler v. State, 11 Neb. 547; sale of liquors "to be used as a 10 N. W. 481; State v. Holmes, beverage," and it was held that 38 N. H. 225 (Adams v. Ilack- the Legislature could enact a law ett, 27 N. H. 289; 59 Am. Dec. forbidding their manufacture and 376, is not the law on this point) ; sale for "other purposes." Badgett v. State (Ala.), 48 So. 30 State V. Sutton, 100 N. C. 54. 476 ; 6 S. E. 687. 38 Menken v. Atlanta, 78 Ga. Such is the case by the adop- 668; 3 So. 414; Griffin v. Atlanta, tion of local option. Freese v. 7'8 Ga. 679; 4 So. 154. 493 LICENSES. § 329 If it were, then the license would practically be one bj'^ impli- cation, or a quasi parol license, things or conditions the stat- utes do not recognize.^'' And statutes or ordinances cannot be construed as impliedly granting licenses or permits to sell in- toxicating liquors. This rule is very well illustrated in a num- ber of cases. Thus, where the selectmen of a town in Massa- chusetts, having full authority so to do, ordered an officer of the town to cause all saloons to be closed on an hour named, and intimating an intention to prosecute all offenders in a cer- tain contingency, a defendant claimed the result of such action was that he w^as entitled to sell liquor at times and under circumstances not covered by this order and intimation, but the court refused to uphold his claim, because to do so would be in effect to hold that a license had been granted by impli- cation.^*^ A statute provided that any person who, after the fifteenth of January, in any year, engaged in or carried on any business for which a license is required should be amenable to the law, and it was held that no one was justified in sell- ing liquors before that date without first procuring a license.*^ And a law providing that a license shall not be granted out- side of cities and towns, and making it unlawful to sell with- out a license, does not authorize a sale within these munici- palities without a license first obtained.^- Under no pretense of legitimate construction of a statute, where a yearly license is granted can it be claimed that the infliction of a fine for conducting the business of selling intoxicating liquors during any year shall be an implied permission to continue to conduct the business without a license for the remainder of such year.^^ 3» state V. Moore, 14 X. H. 451; even to the knowledge of the Lawrence v. Gracey, 11 John 179. courts. ^0 iCommonwealth v. Mathews, Where a city was empowered 129 Mass. 485. to license the sale of liquors, and *i Moog V. Espalla, 93 Ala. a statute provided that such a '303 ; 9 So. 596. license should not authorize a ■12 State V. Cofield, 22 S. C. 301. sale "unless the .State license be 43 State V. ilcBride, 4 MeCord obtained and the State tax be 332. paid before the grant thereof," In one State, and perhaps more, it was held that the. county court this practice is secretly pursued had no power to refuse a license, by connivance of the police force, because the purpose of the law § 330 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 494 Sec. 330. Taken subject to subsequent legislation. From what has already been said, the conclusion is readily reached that a licensee accepts his license, not only subject to all laws then in force having a bearing upon and regulating the liquor traffic, but also subject to all reasonable (indeed, they may be unreasonable if reasonable in the estimation of the Legislature") regulations and restraints that may be adopt- ed in the future; and conditions to that effect need not be inserted in the license itself.** Thus a law enacted after a license is issued may forbid sales of intoxicating liquors to a drunkard or minor; for no one has or can acquire a vested right to ruin the health and morals of his fellow beings.*^ And so a licensee may be forbidden to sell on holidays, although it was lawful to do so when he received his license;*^ or he may be forbidden after the license goes into force to give away or sell food upon the licensed premises, even though the stat- ute under which it is issued permitted selling or giving away of food, and provided that every license issued under its pro- visions shall })e valid for the term for which it was granted, and that "the rights and liabilities of the holder thereof dur- ing such term shall be governed by the laws in force imme- diately prior to the taking effect of this act," and the subsequent law provided that those provisions of the earlier law "relating to the transfer, cancellation or revocation of a license, the collection of penalties, or prosecution for the violation of law, shall continue in force as to any license which has not expired at the time this act takes effect until the expiration thereof. " ^'^ So a licensee may be required by a was fully met by the payment *^ Hedges v. Titus, 47 Ind. 145 ; of the State tax. Griffith v. Com- Commonwealth v. Sellers, 130 Pa. momvealth, 14 Ky. L. Rep. (ab St. 32; 18 Atl. 541; 25 Wkly. stract) 303. N. C. 154; 15 Atl. 891 (sales to If a city have no power to ex- minors forbidden). act a license, the State license ^e Reithmiller v. People, 44 will authorize sales within such Mich. 280; 6 N. W. {567. city. Baldwin County v. Mil- 4^ In this instance the subse- lidgcville, 4"2 Ga. 325. quent statute was an entirely new 4* Baldwin v. Smith, 82 111. 162; statute, repealing the old stat- State V. Isabel, 40 La. Ann. 340; ute, under which the license had 4 So. 1 ; y. VV. Cook Brewing Co. been issued, but continuing such V. Garber, I'GS Feb. 942. old license in force under the 495 LICENSES. §331 subsequent statute to sell in certain increased quantities and be forbidden to sell liquors to be drunk upon the premises.*^ And so the State may require a licensee to take out a city license before he can continue his sales under his State license/^ So the fee for the license then in force may be increased for the remainder of the term.^'' Sec. 331. Annulment of license by change of law. Th? passage anrl adoption of a constitutional or statutory provision by which the sale of intoxicating liquors is prohib- ited will have the effect of repealing by implication all laws authorizing the issuance of licenses and of annulling those which may have been issued previously under laws authoriz- ing them to be issued, unless their continuance for the time they were issued is saved by a proviso ;^^ and the same will be true of the passage and adoption of a local option law.^- It cannot be said in either of these events that th-e con- clause above quoted. People v. Warden, 6 N. Y. App. Div. 520; 39 N. Y. Supp. &82, affirming 17 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 1 ; 3S N. Y. Supp. 837. 48 Commonwealth v. Donahue, 149 Pa. St. 104; 24 Atl. 188; 30 Wkly. N. C. 124. The following decisions cannot be said to be in accord with the later and better considered cases Rome V. Lumpkin, 5 Ga. 447 Hannibal v. Guyott, 1« Mo. 515 Adams v. Hackett, 7 Post. 289 59 Am. Dec. 376; State v. Baker, 32 Mo. App. 9«. The case of State V. Andrews, 26 Mo. 171, was an instance of statutory con- struction; and the cases of Leh- ritter v. State, 42 Ind. 482; State V. MullenhofT, 74 Iowa 271; 37 N. W. 329; and Watts v. Com- monwealth, 7'8 Ky. 329, involved a saving clause in subsequent statute. In Gilhon v. Wells, 04 Ga. 192, was involved an ordinance requir- ing all persons then or thereaf- ter holding licenses to close their drinking places when "any de- nomination of Christian people" were holding church in the town. It was held void, but it was void as to future licensees. 49 Elk Point V. Vaughn, 1 Dak. 113; 46 N. W. 577. 50 Moore v. Indianapolis, 120 Ind. 483; 22 N. E. 424. 51 Brown v. State, 82 Ga. 224; 7 S. E. 915; Prohibitory Amend- ment Cases, 24 Kan. 700; Calder v. Kurby, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 597; Wheeler v. State, 64 Miss. 462; State v. Tonks, 15 R. I. 385; 5 Atl. 636. 52 Menken v. Atlanta, 78 Ga. 668; 2 S. E. 559; State v. Cook, 24 Minn. 247; Wheeler v. State, 64 Miss. 462; Robertson v. State, 12 Tex. App. 541; Ex parte Lynn, 19 Tex. App. 293. § 331 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 496 stitutional provisions that no law "impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed," and that "no man's property shall be taken by law without just compensation" have been violated. This is so because a license to sell intoxicating liquor is not a contract, nor a property right, nor a vested interest of any sort. It is merely a permission to engage in a business which is hurtful to society, which the law regards with dis- favor, and which may be withdrawn at any time.^^ In accept- ing such a license the licensee does it with the knowledge that it is at all times within the control of the Legislature, and he will be deemed to have consented to all proper conditions and restrictions which have been or may be imposed in the fu- ture, relative to the traffic in such liquors, notwithstanding their burdensome character and that he may have paid a val- uable consideration for the license.'^* It is the peculiar prov- ince of the State, either by constitutional or legislative enact- ment, or through authority delegated to its municipalities, to exercise its police power for the protection of the lives, health, and property of its citizens, as well as to maintain good order and preserve public morals. It is everywhere conceded that the traffic in intoxicating liquors affects all these subjects, and that it is, hence, a proper subject for police regulation. It is essential, therefore, that the power to regulate shall be a continuing one, ever present and available, to be exercised by the State as the emergency may require. Hence, the rule that neither the State nor any of its agencies to whom the power has been delegated, can divest themselves of the right to impose such other additional restrictions upon the sale of intoxicating liquors tjs the maintenance of good order or the preservation of public morals may seem to require. ^'^ K3 People V. Hawley, 3 Mich. Brewing Co. v. Garber, 168 Fed. 330; Schwuchow v. Chicago, ('-S 942. 111. 444; Fell v. State, 42 Md 71; 55 Moore v. Indianapolis, 120 Metropolitan Board v. Barrie, 34 Ind. 483; 22 X. E. 424. N. Y. 659. Tims the Legislature may au- ^* Haggart v. Stehlin, 137 Ind. thorize a city by ordinance to an- 43; 35 N. E. 997; State v. Ger- mil a State license then in force, hardt, 145 Ind. 439; 44 N. E. 469; Cuthbert v. Conly, 32 Ga. 211. Shea V. City of Muncie, 148 Ind. The case of Rome v. Lumpkin, 5 14; 43 X. E. 138; F. W. Cook Ga. 447, is no longer an author- ity. 497 LICENSES. § 332 Sec. 332. License prospective, not retrospective. A license to sell intoxicating liquors should bear date of the day upon which it is issued ; it takes effect from that day. It does not relate back to the order or judgment granting it, unless there is a statute providing that it shall do so. Dating it back so as to legalize sales made between the date of the order or judgment and the issuing of the license will not have that effect.^** It cannot act retrospectively so as to condone offenses against the statute prior to its issue. It is the license properly dated and issued, and not the order or judgment granting it, that authorizes an applicant to sell at retail. The order or judgment is not the license ; and when the license is obtained and dated, it looks forward, and not backward. It cannot have relation so as to cover an intermediate space. The order or judgment granting a license is but one of the pre- liminary steps in procuring it. Such an order or judgment may have been made or rendered, and the applicant then re- fuse to pay the license fee or execute the bond required by the statute. The statutes in such cases, almost invariably, provide for the payment of the fines and costs assessed against the licensee for violations of the law and all civil damages occa- sioned by unlawful sales made by him. The sureties on such a bond can not be held liable to pay fine and costs or civil damages which have been or may be adjudged against the licensee on account of anything done before the execution of the bond, though done after the making of the order or rendering of the judgment granting the license. An appli- cant in such case cannot be under license unless at the same time he is under bond, nor can he obtain a license until he has paid the license fee." The principle here involved is the same 56Zecrlin V. Carver Co., 72 pher v. State, 157 Ind. 360; 61 Minn. 17; 74 N. W. 901. ^^- K. 785; State v. Pittman, 10 57 Edwards v. State, 22 Ark ■2'53; Johnson v. State, 60 Ga 634 ; Reese v. Atlanta, 63 Ga. 344 Hunter v. State, 79 Ga. 365 Moore v. People, 109 111. 499 Wiles V. State, 33 Ind. 293 Kan. o93 ; Commonwealth Welsh, 144 Mass. 356; 11 N. E 423; State v. Shaw, 32 Me. 570 People V. Foster, 64 Mich. 715 People V. DeGroot, 111 Mich. 245 State V. Hughes, 24 Mo. 147 Keiser v.' State, 78 Ind. 206; So- State v. O'Connor, 65 Mo. App. § 332 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 498 under the United States internal revenue laws.^^ A receipt for a license fee in such case is not retroactive, and cannot be admitted in evidence on a charge for retailing liquor during a period of time prior to its issuance. And this principle has been applied where a sale was made after an application for a license had been made, but the license could not be obtained until afterwards, because of the fact that there was no officer authorized to issue it ; ''^ also, where the licensee had given a bond, which was defective because one of the sureties was disqualified, although the bond was given in good faith and w^as sufficient in form and had been approved by the mu- nicipal authorities.''^ Where an ordinance provided all licenses should be taken out during the first week in April and the first week in October, to continue one year from those weeks, but permitted the granting of licenses at other times if the applicant paid for a full year, it was held that a licensee tak- ing out his license in December, which would expire during the first week of the following October, could not justify a sale made in November immediately preceding the Decem- ber he took it out, although he received a receipt for a license beginning the previous October.^^ In the same State it was held that the penalty was not remitted by the issuance of the license, although the ordinance under which it was issued pro- vided that after suit commenced for a penalty no person should be permitted to take out a license without the payment of 325; Overseen, etc., v. Warner, 3 overruled in Keiser v. State, 78 Hill (N. Y.), 150; Kingston ^ Osterhondt, 23 Hun (N. Y.), 66 State V. Cofield, 22 S. C. 301 State V. Luddington, 33 Wis. 107 State V. Fisher, 33 Wis. 155; Ind. 430. See State v. Strath- mann, 4 Mo. App. (abstract), 633. In Missouri a license takes ef- fect from the date of its delivery; and antedating it does not affect Brown v. State, 27 Tex. 335. its validity. State v. Leonard 68 United States v. Angel, 11 (Mo.), 116 S. W^ 14. Fed. Rep. 155. When a license bears two dates, 59 Bolduc V. Randall, 107 Mass. evidence is admissible to show the 121; State V. McNary, 88 Mo. 143. true date of its issuance. Fagan soWolcott v. Judge, 112 Mich. v. State (Del.), 74 Atl. 692. 311; 70 N. W. 831. The cases of ei Charleston v. Feckman, 3 Vannoy v. State, 64 Ind. 447, and Rich. L. 385. State V. Wilcox, 66 Ind. 557, are 499 LICENSES. § 333 the penalty.®- On the day an applicant applied for a city license and paid one-half the license fee, a statute was passed prohibiting the issuance of a license to a person who should not have paid the county fee as well as the city fee. City licenses expired December 31st, and the application was made during the following- January. In the following July he ob- tained his license, in which it was recited that it was good until the following December 31st. Two days before he had paid this half of the license fee he made a sale of liquor. It was held that his license did not have such a retroactive effect as to enable him to escape the penalty of selling without a license.'^' The fact that no board had been created to issue the license at the time of the application will not excuse a sale thereafter made and before the license was issued.®* If a license be pro- duced covering the period of sale, the prosecution may show that it had been antedated.®^ Sec. 333. Retroactive effect of license. Whether or not a license can have such a retroactive effect as legalizes past illegal sales has been a divided [question in 62 Charleston v. Schmidt, 11 cases are recognized as sound de- Rich. L. 343. cisions. But see Charleston v. Corleis, A statute providing for a license 2 Bailey (S. €.), 186. during a "calendar year" means 63 State V. Mancke, 18 S. C. 81. the year from January 1st to De- 64Bolduc V. Randall, 107 Mass. cember 31st, inclusive, and not a 221 period of twelve months commenc- es Commonwealth V. Welch, 144 ing at any fixed or designated Mass. 356; 11 N. E. 423; State v. month, and terminating with the Leonard (Mo.), 116 S. W. 14. day of the corresponding month in In the case of Rome v. Knox, 14 the next succeeding year. Carroll How. Pr. 268, a new law made it v. Wright, 131 Ga. 728; 63 S. W. impossible to renew a license that 260. See also Crothers v. Mon- had expired April first until July teith, 11 Manitoba, 373. first, when the renewal was dated When license may become efTec- back, and sales in the interval five in England. Rex v. John- made legal; and a like ruling was ston, 75 L. J. K. B. 22«; [1906] made in Pahner v. Doney, 2 1 K. B. 228; 94 L. T. 377; 54 W. Johns. Cas. 346. But at the pres- R. 347; 30 J. P. 118; 22 T. L. R. ent day (these were early cases) 226. it is exceedingly doubtful if these § 333 TRAFFIC IX INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 500 the past; but it may now be regarded as settled that it can- not. Where a license was granted, thereafter a sale made at the place for which it was granted, a prosecution then insti- tuted, and the next day the requisite bond was filed and the license issued, dated back to the date of the grant, it was held that it could have no such retroactive effect as to relieve the licensee from the penalty he had incurred by making the sale, although the license, being only for one year, began to run on the day it was granted.*"^ "The order of the board is not the license," said the Supreme Court of Indiana, "nor does it alone confer the power to retail. It is but one of the preliminary steps in procuring the license. The order may be made, but the applicant may refuse to pay the fee or exe- cute the bond, without which he is not entitled to the license. It is the license itself, properly procured, that confers the right to retail under the statute, and until it is issued no such right is conferred. It is made a penal offense to sell intoxi- cating liquors by a less quantity than a quart at a time, or to sell any quantity to be drunk or suffered to be drunk in the vendor's house without such license, and it is not in the power of the county board or the auditor to grant a license extending back to a prior date, so as to cover offenses already committed. The license can only take effect from the date it is issued."®^ In another line of cases, however, it is held that the subsequent issuance of the license so far legalizes the sale as to enable the vendor of the liquor to escape the penalty 66 Keiser v. State, 78 Ind. 430 State, 78 Ind. 430, and Dudley v. (overruling Vannoy v. State, 64 State, 91 Ind. 312, are made to Ind. 447, and State v. Wilcox, 60 turn upon the fact that the Ind. 557); Houser v. State, 18 grantee had not filed his bond, Ind. 106; Schlict v. State, 31 Ind. which he must have done before 246; Wiles v. State, 33 Ind. 206; getting his license, when the sale Fagan V. State (Del.), 74 Atl. 692. was made; but even though the «7 Wiles V. State, 33 Ind. 206. bond had been filed, and no license To same effect are many cases. taken out, the sale would now be Edwards v. State, 22 Ark. 253; held illegal by the great majority Lawrence v. Gray, 11 Johns. 179; of cases.) State v. Bach, 36 Minn. State V. Hughes, 24 Mo. 147; 234; 30 N. W. 764; Kingston v. State V. Brooks, 94 Mo. App. 57; Osterhaudt, 23 Hun, 66; United 67 S. W. 933: Dudley v. State, 91 States v. Angell, 11 Fed. 34. Ind, 312. (The case of Keiser v. 501 LICENSES. § 334 of the statute. The overruled cases of the Indiana court very well express the view of the courts upon this point: "If he had been prosecuted for this sale, before he obtained his license, he would have been liable perhaps, upon conviction, to the penalty imposed by statute. But it seems to us that, after he had paid his license fee and had obtained a license, in due course of law, which covered the day on which the sale was made, the sale which had been illegal for the want of such license, was thereby legalized, and the offense was thereby pardoned, if the expression may be allowed, at least to the extent that he could not and ought not to be thereafter pros- ecuted or convicted. The proper officers under the law hav- ing received his money, and having thereupon issued him a license which in terms authorized him to make the sale for which he was afterward indicted, we are clearly of the opinion that these facts operated as a complete bar to this prosecu- tion. ' ' ^'^ And where a city ordinance, by statute, was required to "relate back to the regular semi-annual periods of April and October," it was held that a license would relate back to one or the other of those dates, as the case might be, so as to cover a sale thereafter and before the license was issued.*^® It is error to admit evidence of a sale before the statute prohibiting it took effect."" A license issued in the after- noon does not cover a sale in the forenoon of the same day.'^^ Of course, where a license begins to run from the date of its issuance and not from the date of the grant, the result is the same.''- Sec. 334. Impossibility to secure license. It is no excuse, when a charge is preferred for a sale without a license, that none could be procured, under any circum- 68 Vannoy v. State, 64 Ind. 447 ; issued, the subsequent issue of State V. Wilcox, 06 Ind. 557; 9 tlie license is no defense. Chailes- Cei;^;. L. Jr. 408. (These cases ton v. Schmidt, 11 Rich. (S. C.) overrule the earlier Indiana cases 343. cited above.) But see Keiser v. to State v. Dunning, 14 S. D. State, 78 Ind. 430. 316; 85 K W. 589. 69 Charleston v. Corleis, 2 "i Campbell v. Strangways, 3 C Bailey (S. C), 186. P. Div. 105. Yet if suit had been brought for 72 Brown v. State, 27 Tex. 335; the penalty before the license was Bolduc v. Randall, 107 Mass. 121;' § 334 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 502 stances.^-^ This statement is very well illustrated by an Indi- ana case. The Ohio River constitutes the boundary between that State and Kentucky, low-water mark on the north side of the river being the southern boundary of the State of Indi- ana, but Indiana has concurrent jurisdiction in civil and crim- inal cases with the State of Kentucky on the river. If a vio- lation of the criminal law occurs on the river the offense may be charged as having been committed in the county opposite the place where the act was committed constituting the crime. Where, therefore, intoxicating liquors were sold without license in a boat anchored in the river opposite an Indiana county, south of low-water mark, on the Indiana side, it was held proper to charge and try the offense as having been committed in that county, and the fact that no provision had been made by law for granting a license to sell intoxicating liquors upon the Ohio River did not authorize their sale without a license. "It will thus be seen," said the court, "that the criminal laws of the State extend to and are in force on the Ohio River where such river constitutes the southern boundary of the State. The contention of the appellant, that because no pro- vision is made by law for granting a license to sell intoxi- cating liquors upon the Ohio River, he has a right to sell without a license, is not tenable. As it is made unlawful to retail intoxicating liquors within the jurisdiction of the State without a license so to do, and as there is no law authorizing the granting of a license to sell upon the waters of the stream, it may be that as to the space between low-water mark on the Kentucky side, we have absolute prohibition in so far as the right to sell liquors by retail is involved. The difficulty at- tending the detection, arrest and punishment of violators of the law engaged in the retail liquor business on the water would seem to furnish a sufficient reason to the Legislature Commonwealth v. Welch, 144 6 So. i638; Smith v. Adrian, ^^lan. Mass. 35fi; 11 N. E. 423. (Mich.) 4&5; Hunzinger v. State, In Missouri it begins to run 39 Neb. 653; 58 N. W. 194; Shan- from date of delivery. State v. non v. State, 39 Neb. 65«; 68 N. Leonard (Mo.), 116 S. W. 14. W. 196; Sochi v. State, 39 Neb. 73 State V. iuckcr, 45 Ark. 55; 659; 58 N. W. 19«; Rowels v. State V. Brown, 41 La. Ann. 771; State, 39 Neb. 059; 58 N. W. 197. 503 LICENSES. § 334 for withholding a license to sell upon the Ohio and Wabash Rivers, when such rivers constitute the boundary of the State. It is to be observed that we are not dealing with a person nav- igating the Ohio River, engaged in interstate commerce, but the case before us is one where the offender, not engaged in navigation, anchors his boat near the Indiana line and engages in the business of retailing intoxicating liquor without a license. Such a case, in our opinion, falls both within the letter and the spirit of our statute, and it is no defense to say that the law makes no provision for granting a license to sell at that place. "^* Nor is it an excuse that no one is em- powered to issue the license; for if a person cannot obtain a license he has no right to sell.^^ Nor is it any excuse that the licensing board or court absolutely refuses to grant one a license, however much he may be entitled to it, for its re- fusal to grant the license does not repeal the statute.'^ It is not a defense, in a prosecution by a municipality, for a vio- lation of the ordinance that a license could not be issued by it for that portion of the city where the sale was made ; '^^ nor is it a defense that the city clerk was so ill that none could be issued, and after the sale one was issued and dated back to the time when the old license should have been renewed.''* And it is not a defense when the limit has been reached in the number of licenses that can be issued for the locality, as shown by the official record, for the accused to produce an unrecorded license and prove thereunder he made the sale charged to have been an illegal oue.^** Practically, in diametrical opposition to this line of cases is another line which, under proper con- 74 Welsh V. state, 126 Ind. 71; ton, 24 Pick. 352. Xew York v. 25 N. E. &S3; 9 L. R. A. 664. Mason, 1 Abb. Pr. 344; 4 E. D. As to sale in Michigan on one of Smith, 142; State v. Downer, 21 the great lakes, see People v. Wis. 274; State v. Kantler, 33 Bouchard, 82 Mich. 156; 46 N. W. Minn. 69; 21 N. W. 85G; State v. 232; 9 L. R. A. 106. Funk, 27 Minn. 318; 7 N. W. 359; 75 Rosenham v. Commonwealth, Brock v. State, 65 Ga. 437 ; Kad- (Ky.); 2 'S. W. 230; 3 Ky. gihn v. Bloomington, 58 111. 229. L. Rep. 519; Bolduc v. Randall, 77 Indianapolis v. Fairchild, 1 107 Mass. 121; State v. McNearj', Ind. 315. 88 Mo. 143. 78 Reese v. Atlanta, 63 Ga. 344. 76 Commonwealth v. Blacking- 79 State v. Shaw, 32 Me. 570. § 335 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 504 ditions, excuse the person making the alleged illegal sale, as where a licensed dealer, after his license expired, and before the next possible meeting of the licensing board for the issu- ing of licenses, continued to sell until its next meeting, and then took out a license/"** And where the system of licensing took effect July first and a new license law took effect April first, it was held that no offense was committed by an old license holder making sales during the interval, although his license, by reason of the new law, was not in force during that interval.^^ Sec. 335. Neglect or improper refusal to grant a license. Licenses to sell intoxicating liquors are not matters of right. This has been repeatedly decided. Therefore, the neglect or the improper refusal or the intentionally wrongful refusal of the licensing board or court or officers to grant or issue a license to an applicant, although he has clearly shown him- self entitled to it, will not justify him in engaging in the sale of intoxicating liquors without a license ; and when pros- ecuted for a violation of the statute by making sales without a license covering the period of such sales, he cannot show that he had taken all the necessary steps to secure one, but was wrongfully refused, or that the board or court officer had negli- genth' failed to issue it.*- So a refusal of the licensing board to grant any licenses whatever, even though they had no discretion in the matter of their issuance, however arbitrarily made, will not justify an applicant (or anyone else) in engaging in the liquor traffic.*^ In such an instance the applicant must pur- sue his remedy by appeal or mandamus ; ^* and, of course, if the board has a discretion in the granting of a license, he is without relief. The fact that the attempted adoption of 80 Palmer v. Doney, 2 Johns. Wis. 274; Commonwealth v. Cas. 340. Blackington, 24 Pick. 352. 81 Rome V. Knox, 14 How. Pr. s* Brock v. State, 65 Ga. 437; 268. State v. Jamison, 23 Mo. 330; 82 State V. Huntley, 29 Mo. App. Kansas City v. Flanders, 71 Mo. 278; Reese v. Atlanta, 63 Ga. 344. 281; Kadgihn v. Bloomington, 58 83 Mayor v. Mason, 4 E. D. 111. 229. Smith, 142; State v. Downer, 21 505 LICENSES. § 336 local option is void, but the licensing board has erroneously held it valid, and consequently refused the application for a license, will not justify the applicant in engaging in liquor traffic.^^ Nor can he justify his action in selling without a license on the ground that the district in which prohibition prevailed has voted in favor of license, when he has not se- cured one.*'' And if his license has expired and he has made application for its renewal, he cannot excuse himself upon the plea that it was the practice that between the date of the expiration of the license and the granting of a renewal, where proceedings for a renewal were pending, it was customary to continue in the traffic, and that police officers assured him he would not be prosecuted or was immune from prosecution.^^ Where^ however, the license issued was only evidence of the permit granted, and an ordinance authorizing the town clerk to issue it upon compliance with its provisions, the court held the mere clerkly failure of that office to issue the formal per- mit would not subject the applicant to a prosecution for hav- ing violated its provisions in making a sale M'ithout its issuance. ^^ Sec. 336. Performance of requisites to obtain a license not a license. The performance*of all the requisites to obtain a license — the filing of the application, the obtaining and filing of the written consent of the adjoining property owners, the order for the issuance of the license, any or all of these is not or are not the equivalent of the issuance of a license.^'' This is espe- cially true if the applicant bas not paid the license fee;^" or the licensing board have a discretion in granting the license 85 Curry v. State, 28 Tex. App. so Roberts v. State, 26 Fla. 360; 477; 13 S. W. 773. 7 So. 861; State v. White, 23 86 State V. Cron, 23 Minn. 140. Ark. 275; Brook v. State, 65 Ga. 87 State V. ^rady, 14 R. I. 508. 437; State v. Racli, 36 Minn. 234; ssprather v. People, 85 III. 36. 30 IST. W. 764; State v. Huntley, Of this case it may be observed 29 Mo. App. 278; Curry v. State, that the clerk was reaUv an au- 28 Tex. App. 477; 13 S. W. 773. tomatic machine for issuinsr the flo Dudley v. State, 91 Tnd. 312; license when a certain condition Houser v. State, 18 Ind. 106. had been brought about. § 336 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 506 and have made no order for it.''^ In one ease it was said : "It is argued that the defendant tendered the money and de- manded a permit to sell liquor, and that the officer whose duty- it was to grant the permit refused to grant it, and for this reason the defendant, in selling without a license, was not legally liable for such selling. But this is not correct, because it makes no difference whether the defendant offered to pay the money or not, as his authority for selling could only be shown by the proper license. If the defendant was entitled to the permit and license, he could have compelled ®^ the proper officers to grant them. This he did not do, but proceeded to sell without authority, and hence laid himself liable to the penalties of the law. "''^ But where an applicant had taken all the steps that were required of him to secure a license, in- eluding the payment of the license fee, it was held that the jury were warranted in acquitting his bartender who had made a sale for his employer.^* So w^here an applicant had com- plied with all the requirements of an ordinance to secure a license and had paid his fee, it was held that he was not to be convicted merely because of the failure of the clerk of the town to issue the license ; "'' and in the same State it was held that a refusal of the authorities to issue the license, where they had no discretion, would justify the applicant to pro- ceed upon the retail of liquor.^*^ But where the president of the town board refused to approve the applicant's bond or to sign the license, it was held that sales could not be made upon the application.'"' Yet where a licensing board refused to grant a license, but on appeal to the court a judgment was entered that he was entitled to one, and thereupon he paid the license fee and tendered a sufficient bond which the county auditor refused to approve and also refused to issue the license; and the remonstrators then appealed from this judg- "1 New York v. INIason, 4 E. D. Welsh, 144 Mass. 356; 11 X. E. Smith, 142. 423; Vannoy v. State, «4 Ind. 447. 92 See Brock v. State, 65 Ga. 04 state v. White, 23 Ark. 275. 437; Kadgihn v. Bloomington, 58 03 prather v. People, 85 111. 36. Til. 229. oG Zanone v. Mound €ity, 11 03 Roberts v. State, 20 Fla. 360; r.radw. 334. 7 So. 861; Commonwealth v. "t Franklin v. Stringam, 56 111. App. 104. 507 LICENSES. § 337 raent to the Supreme Court, and after the appeal to the Su- preme Court had been taken, and after the fee had been paid, and after the auditor, by command of the court, had approved the bond, the applicant sold liquor, it was held he could not be prosecuted for selling liquor AV'thout a license, the court say- ing: "An applicant for a license, who has obtained a proper judgment declariiip- his ri-^ht to a license, and has properly tendered the requisite fee and bond, cannot be successfully prosecuted for violating the l^w. for he has done all that it was in his power to do, and all that the law renuired of him. The violation of law is on the part of the ministerial officer who withholds the license. The case is utterly unlike that of one who sells without having tendered either fee or bond, and after sale makes tender of both bond and fee. In the one case there is wrong on the part of the applicant; in the other there is none; in the one case there is the possibility of an evasion of the law, in the other there is an earnest effort to obey the law before undertaking to sell. The applicant can- not be in the wrong where he has done all that it was in his power to do. A man cannot be denied a statutory right because a public officer has made it impossible to fully com- ply with the statute; to hold otherwise would be equivalent to declaring that a man may be denied the benefit of a stat- ute for not doing what was legally impossible. If the proper officer should demand the fee and bond and offer a license relating back to the .iudgment and the appellant should refuse to execute the bond or pay the fee, and should thereafter retail liquor, he would, doubtless, be subject to prosecution, but as long as he honestly keens Inmself in the position of doing all that he can do to comply with the law, he cannot be pros- ecuted for a criminal offense." °^ Sec. 337. What a license does and does not authorize. What a license does authorize depends upon the law under which it is issued and the purpose for which it was issued. Thus, under an early statute of Ohio it was held that a license to keep a tavern was, according to the true meaning of the act, 98 Padgett V. state, 93 Ind. 3&6. ,§337 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 508 a license to sell intoxicating liquors at retail ; "^ and a like decision was rendered in South Carolina/ although a decision otherwise was also rendered in that State,- and a decision similar to the latter was rendered in New York."* So that it has been held that a license to Jceep a saloon does not necessa- rily authorize the licensee to engage in the sale or to sell in- toxicating liquors.* And a licensed restaurant keeper cannot supply his customers with intoxicating liquors under his license; "' nor can they be sold under a confectioner's license.^ So a statute authorizing sales in small quantities cannot be construed to authorize sales of liquors to be drunk on the prem- ises, even though the licensee is an innkeeper, where a statute forbids sales of liquors to be drunk at the place of sale.'^ So a license to sell from a quart to five gallons is not a license to retail liquors.^ A license to sell for one purpose will not authorize a sale for another purpose.^ Nor can a licensee 99Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio St. 15. «, State v. Xewcomb^ 107 N. C. So in KentucKy. Commonwealth 900; 12 S. E. 53. In this case V. Kemp, 14 B. Mon. 385. the charter of the city of Greens- 1 State V. Chamblyss, 1 C'heves, 220; 34 Am. Dec. 593. So in Maine. State v. Woodward, 34 Me. 293. 2 Commissioners v. Dennis, 1 Cheves, 229. 3 Benson v. Moore, lo Wend. 260; Commonwealth v. Jordan, 18 Pick. 228; Hannibal v. Guyott, 18 Mo. 515. * Kitson V. Ann Arbor, 26 ]\Iich. 325. 5 Commonwealth v. Markoe, 17 Pick. 465 ; Commonwealth v. Jor- dan, 18 Pick. 228 ; State v. Cohen 35 Md. 236. 6 Xew Orleans v. Jane, 34 La. Ann. 667. 7 People V. Smith, 69 N. Y. 175; reversing Smith v. People, 9 Hun, 446; Commonwealth v. Mandeville, 142 Mass. 469 ; 8 N. E. 327 ; Com- monwealth V. Frost, 155 Mass. 273; 34 N. E. 334. boro prohibited the county com- missioners granting a license to retail liquors in the city without the consent of the city, but per- mitted them granting licenses to sell in quantities of five gallons or less. The defendant cannot give evi- dence that he thought he was sell- ing five gallons when the liquor sold Avas less than that quantity. People V. Nylin, 236 111. 19; 86 N. E. 156; affirming 139 111. App. 500 In this case it was also held that there must be five gallons of quiet liquor after it had been re- leased from confinement and the gas, froth or foam arising when the liquor is released from the vessel in which it is contained can- not be considered in determining the quantity of liquor sold. 9 State V. Adams, 20 Iowa, 486; Curd V. Commonwealth, 14 B. Mon. 386. 509 LICENSES. § 337 justify sales under his license in violation of the criminal laws of the State, though no reference be made in his license or in the licensing statutes to such laws.^** So where a board of county commissioners had the power to make an order pro- hibiting sales within three miles of any college, after they had made such an order it was held that a license granted by them for sale of liquors at a place within the limits thus prescribed would not be a justification to the licensee in mak- ing sales thereunder ; for the reason that when the board had entered the prohibition order its powers were exhausted, and it could neither revoke nor modify its action/^ So if a statute prohibit the sale of liquor within a certain distance of a factory, a license for the county will not authorize a sale within the prohibited area.'^ A license to sell "bottled beer" by the quart will not authorize a sale by the quart when the liquor is drawn from casks.^" A license to sell at a particular place will not justify a sale at another place, or on certain premises a sale off the premises,^* nor to conduct the business in more than one place.^^ A licensee under a wholesale license cannot sell at retail/" Nor is a licensee authorized to sell in violation of law simply because he holds a license,^^ as on Sun- day^^ or out of hours.^** i» Lambert v. State, 8 Mo. 492. i'- Zinner v. Commonwealth (Pa. 11 Wilson V. State, 35 Ark. 414. St.), 14 Atl. 431; State v. 1--J Barnes v. State, 49 Ala. 342. Walker, 4 Shep. (Me.) 241; State 13 Harris v. People, 1 Colo. App. v. Fredericks, 16 Mo. 382 State v. 289; 2'8 Pac. 1133. Hnghes, 24 Mo. 147. Keeping 1+ State V, Prettyman, 3 Har. three bars at one place is permis- (Del.) 570; Hochstadler v. State, sible. St. Louis v. Gerardi, 90 73 Ala. 24; Commonwealth v. Mo. 640; 3 S. W. 408. Estabrook, 10 Pick. 293; Wason is People v. Greiser, 67 Mich. V. Severance, 2 N. H. 501; People 490; 35 N. W. 87. V. Davis, 45 Barb. 494; State v. it Lambert v. State, 8 Mo. 492; Moody, 95 X. C. '656; Horan v. Horning v. Wendell, 57 Ind. 171; Travis Co., 27 Tex. 226; Pearce Gouin v. State, 8 Mo. 493; Brua v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. Rep. 150; 32 v. State, 8 Mo. 496. S, W, '697; Travis v. State, 37 is State v. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214. Tex. Cr. Rep. 4'86; 3'6 S. W. 589. 1 9 Maxwell v. Jonesboro, 11 Heisk. 257. § 338 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 510 Sec. 338. Agent or servant when protected by license of his principal. A license to sell intoxicating liquors is not transferable, but a licensee who has not forfeited his license may cai|ry on the business by an agent at the place designated in the license, and the agent will not be responsible, criminally, for selling with- out a license. If, however, under a statute Avhich requires the applicant for a license to be a resident vrhere the application is made, the licensee moves from the county or State, he can not continue the business under his license by an agent. This is so because the license in such case is a personal privilege, not transferable, and the personal fitness of the licensee is a mat- ter of legislative concern ; the fitness not merelv when an applicant, but also at all times while in the enjoyment of the privilege. The purpose of a Legislature in providing for the granting of such a license is to regulate the traffic, in part, through the particular persons found by the proper authori- ties to be qualified to have charge and control of the business.^*' Yet, however, in Alabama and Kentucky it has been held that a license having been granted to one man to keep a tavern in a particular house, and he having removed from it, another man, being indicted for retailing linuor in the same house, may prove in defense that he did it as the aeent of the licensee under the latter's license.^^ The weight of author- ity, however, we think is affainssf i'hp AUiliqmq an^l TToritncky decisions, and there is reason for thinking so. A review of the statutes upon this subject forces the conclusion that there has been a manifest purpose shown by the Lesrislaturp to place about tbe retail traffic a safegruard by way of presf^ribinsr for licensees oualifications tendiner to minimize the inevitable evils of the business. The object of such statutes is not to encour- 2oPickons V. State, 20 Tnd. 116; 152; People v. Buffum, 27 Hun Krant v. State, 47 Ind. 519; Run- (N. Y.), 216; State v. McNeeley, yon V. State, 52 Ind. 320; Reiser 60 N. C. 232; Younir v. Stevenson. V. State, 58 Ind. 379; Shaw v. 73 Ark. 4S0; 86 S. W. 1000. State, 56 Ind. 188; Pierce v. 2t Thompson v. State, 37 Ala. Pierce, 17 Ind. App. 107; 46 N. E. 151; Barnes v. Commonwealth, 2 480; Duncan v. Commonwealth, 2 Dana (Ky.), 38e. B. Mon. (Ky.) 281; 38 Am. Dec. 511 LICENSES. § 338 age the traffic, but rather to narrow its dangers, the extent of which is largely dependent upon the qualifications of the particular persons to whom the control of the business is entrusted. It is plain that very much of such contemplated restraining influences would be less likely to be exercised by proprietors continuously away from the neighborhood of the business, and unaccjuaintod, therefore, with the persons of their customers and their habits, and unable to personally supervise the conduct of the business. Such statutes contem- plate, not merely that the licensee shall remain within limits where he ma\^ be reached by legal process, but also that he shall remain where he will have the ability to see personally that the business is carried on within the restrictions placed upon it by law.-- And for like reasons the placing of such a business in the hands of an agent must be real and not for the purpose of evading the law, and therefore the appointing a vendee by the vendor of a saloon or other place where intox- icating liquors are retailed, as his agent, will afford such vendee no protection under the vendor's license.-^ This state- ment is well illustrated in a case where B agreed to pay A for his license to keep a saloon and sold liquors in an adjoining room, renting the room from C, the saloon not being at all under the control of A. It was held that A's license was no protection to B.^* Of course, if the principal cannot make sales at any other place than the one licensed, his agent in making them at another place is not protected by the license."^ But a license for a place does not necessarily confine the agents in the performance of his duties to the licensed premises ; for his principal may send him out to solicit and take orders, and 22 state V. Dudley, 33 Ind. App. same as if his principal had made 640; 71 N. E. 976; Sawyer v. it. State v. Hunt, 29 Kan. 762; Sanderson, 113 Mo. App. 233; 88 Barnes v. Commonwealth, 2 Dana, S. W. 151. 388; Duncan v. Commonwealth, 2 23 Heath v. State, 105 Ind. 342; B. Mon. 281; 38 Am. Dec. 152; 4 N. E. 901; Commonwealth v. People BufTum, 27 Am. 216. Branaman, 8 B. Mon. (Ky. ) 374. 24 Commonwealth v. Branamon, See Keiser v. State, 58 Ind. 379. 8 B. Mon. 374. If the principal has a license, 2n People v. Lester, 80 Mich, the ag-ent, in making a sale for 643; 45 N. W. 492. his master, will be protected the § 339 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 512 he will not be liable if he do not deliver the goods sold, the place of delivery being confined to the licensed premises.-'' Sec. 339. Sale by servant when his master holds no license — Illegal sales. The usual statute prohibiting sales without a license or per- mit has been held not to apply to an agent or servant merely selling his principal's or master's liquors, he not otherwise violating the law. Thus in England a statute provides that "no person shall sell or expose for sale by retail any intox- icating liquors without being duly licensed to sell the same, or at any place where he is not authorized by his license to sell the same. Any person selling or exposing for sale by retail any intoxicating liquor which he is not licensed to sell by retail, or selling or exposing for sale any intoxicating liquor at any place where he is not authorized by his license to sell the same" is liable to certain penalties. It was held that this statute did not apply to a sale of his master's property by a servant under orders. "The sale which is prohibited," said Chief Justice Russell, "must be a sale by the pei*son who ought to be licensed. The sale struck at is a sale by the master or the principal."-^ But if he acted knowingly he can be con- victed under the Act of 1848,-^ making it an offense to aid and abet in the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor.-^ In the case just cited it was held that an unlicensed sale at a bar within the precincts of the House of Commons by a servant of the House of the liquors of the House, by the direction of the committee, did not render him liable under the provision of the statute above quoted. But "if a servant having no authority to sell at all. chooses to make a sale, he not being a licensed person, is liable to penalties under" the statute 2GlTang V. Gillett, 14 Kan. 140. 2s n and 12 Vict. c. 43. 2T Williamson v. Norris [1899], -"'Williamson v. Norris, supra; 1 Q. B. 7; '62 J. P. 790; 68 L. J. Wilson v. Stuart, 32 L. J. M. C. Q. B. 31; 47 W. R, 94; 79 L. T. 198; 3 B. & R. 913; 27 J. P. 661; 415; 15 T. L. R. 18; 19 €ox. C. C. 8 L. T. 277; Burnett t. State, 42 203; Newell v. HemingAvay, 53 J. Tex. Cr. App. 600; .62 S. W. 1063; P. 324; €arrico v. Commonwealtli, Richardson v. Commonwealth, 11 5 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 605; Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 174. State V. Sterns, 28 Kan. 154. 513 LICENSES. § 339 quoted,''" In the case just cited the defendant, who was licensed to sell by retail, at his brewery, beer for consump- tion off the premises, employed a drayman to deliver beer to customers onlj^ who had previously given orders for it. He had been expressly ordered not to sell or deliver beer to other persons, and to bring back to the brewery any beer which he was unable to deliver. The drayman sold and delivered some bottled beer from his van to persons in a street who had not previously ordered it. It was held that the defendant was not liable, not having violated the statute, the drayman not having had any delegated authority to sell, and what the drayman did was outside the scope of his authority.^^ The decision of the English courts would seem to be reason- able, but their doctrine has not always been accepted in this country. In Vermont it was said of an agent who illegally sold liquors: "The agent who does the act can stand in no better situation than his principal. He justifies under him, and if the principal had no authority to sell the agent would have none."-''- The rule announced in this quotation has been adopted in many cases, and they hold that the fact the servant made the sale for his master is no defense if the latter was unlicensed.^^ Indeed, the decisions have gone so far as to hold that the good faith of the agent or servant is immaterial; for at his peril he must ascertain whether his principal holds 30 Boyle v. Smith [1906], 1 K. 215; Commissioners v. Dougherty, B. 432; 70 J. P. 115; 75 L. J. 65 Barb. 332; State v. Bryant, 14 K. B. 2'82; 94 L. T. 30; 54 W. R. Mo. 340; Abel v. State, 90 Ala. 519; 22 T. L. R. 200. 631; 8 So. 760; Hays v. State, 13 •'1 See also Regina v. Gilroys, 4 Mo. 246; Davidson v. State, 27 Se. Sess. Cas. 3(1 Series, 656. Tex. App. 262; 11 S. W. 371; 32|State V. Bugbee, 22 Vt. 32. State v. Kriechbaum, 81 Iowa, This was said, however, in a case 633; 47 N. W. 872; Baird v. where the defendant was not in State, 52 Ark. 326; 12 S. \V. 566; the employ of the liquor owner, Cloud v. State, 36 Ark. 151; Rana and where he voluntarily sold the v. State, 51 Ark. 481; 11 S. W. liquors. 692; State v. Deevers, 38 Ark. 33Wason V. Underbill, 2 N. H. 517; Berning v. State, 51 Ark. 505; Commonwealth v. Hadley, 11 550; 11 S. W. 882. Contra, Corn- Met. 66; State v. Chastain, 19 monwealth v. Holland, 7 Ky. L. Ore. 176; 23 Pac. 963; People v. Rep. (abstract) 299. Drennan, 86 Mich. 445; 49 N. W. § 339 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 514 a valid license. "As statutes of this character bind the party to know the facts and to keep them at his peril, neither the motive nor the intent of the defendant can relieve him, when a sale is made without a license. The intent is immaterial M'hen the statute makes the act indictable irrespective of guilty knowledge ; and in such case ignorance of fact, no matter how insincere, can be no defense. It is enough that under the stat- ute the commission of the act prohibited constitutes the offense, irrespective of the motives or knowledge of the de- fendant, and as his principal had no license to sell, the defendant must stand for him, so far as appertains to this prosecution."^* But a servant may carry on his master's business at a place and have sole charge thereof, and will not be guilty of selling Avithout a license if his master hold a license for that place. ^^ One selling in violation of a prohi- bition law cannot justify his conduct on the ground that he was in fact acting for his principal.^" So an agent or bar- tender carrying on for his principal the business of a common seller is liable unless his principal has a license.^^ So if he keeps liquors for illegal sale for a non-resident principal, he is guilty of maintaining a nuisance.^^ And if he makes a sale his master could not make under his license, he is liable.^" Thus where a servant engaged to clean up a saloon on Sun- day carried whisky from the barkeeper to a purchaser, who stood outside the door, it was held that he was guilty of assist- ing in an illegal sale.'**' But a purchase of liquor for another without the State is not an offense in him within a statute 3* state V. Chastain, 19 Ore. Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 174; Henry 176; 23 Pac. 9G3. v. State, (Tex.), 116 S. W. ir62. 3'' Runyan v. State, o2 Ind. 320; 37 Commonwealth v. Hadley, 11 State V. Dudley, 33 Ind. App. 640; Met. 66; Commonwealth v. Drew, 71 N. E. 975. 3 'Cush. 279. It would be otherwise if the 38 Commonwealth v. Callone, 154 agency was a mere subterfuge to Mass. 115; 27 N. E. 8S1. . avoid the law, the servant being so People v. Metzger, 95 ilicli. an unfit person to hold a license 121; 54 N. W. {539; Cagle v. State, and could not obtain one for tliat S7 Ala. 93; >G So. 300. reason. Heath v. State, 105 Ind. -Jo Burnett v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. 342; 4 N. E. 901. App. 600; 62 S. W. 1063. 38 Bauman v. Commonwealth, 14 515 LICENSES. § 340 making it an offense to aid or procure an unlawful sale or purchase or other disposition of liquor, nor within the pro- vision of a statute making it an offense to act as agent for a purchaser in procuring an unlawful purchase.*^ Sec. 340. Servant's license no protection for his master. If the master have no license, he cannot shield himself under his servant's license. If the servant sells his master's liquors the sale is by the master and not by the servant. Thus a defendant entered into a contract to supply liquor at an exhibition, and arranged with one Jenkins, a licensed person, that he (Jenkins) should obtain what was known as an occa- sional license for the sale of liquors at the exhibition. The defendant, who was not a licensed person, anplied on behalf of Jenkins for an occasional license, and it was granted to Jenkins. I inuors were sold at the exhibition by bar maids who were ordinarily employed by Jenkins in his business at his licensed premises, but who for the time thev were at the exhibition were paid by the defendant. The liquors so sold were sent to the exhibition by the order of the defend- ant, who subsequently paid for them. The proceeds of the sale were put into the till at the bar and then taken away by Jenkins's son. w^ho was in the employment of the defend- ant. The defendant was occasionally in the room where the liquors were sold, but did not with his own hands sell any liquors. Jenkins attended at the bar and personally sold liquors, and was in control of the bar and serving staff, but 41 Vernon v. State (Ala.), 50 ing the business, it was held that So. 57. he was an employe of the licensee Where tlie defendant purchased and was protected by his license, a bankrupt licensee's stock of Earnard v. ,btate (La.), 48 So. liquor and sold it back to him, 438. taking a mortgage on it, but re- A servant cannot sell his own taining possession of the goods liquors under his master's license, himself to secure the purchase Ruemmeli v. Cravens, 13 CHcla. price; and they agreed that the 342; 74 Pac. 908; 7^ Pac. 188. defendant should conduct the But see State v. Keith, 37 Ark. business as manager until the pur- 1)6; Johnson v. State, 37 Ark. 98, chase price was paid, and then re- and Lane v. State, 37 Ark. 273. ceive a stated salary for conduct- § 341 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 51G was not paid for such services, nor did he receive a share of the profits of the sale. It was held that the defendant was guilty of an illegal sale.*^ Sec. 341. Partnership license. Under a statute providing that any male inhabitant of the State, of good moral character, is entitled to a license to sell intoxicating liquors, and that it should "be unlawful for any person or persons to directly or indirectly sell" intoxicating liquors without a license, the license may be granted to two persons jointly, as to partners; but if granted to one person and he then forms a partnership with another, the unlicensed person is not protected by the license in sales he may make ; *^ though if the arrangements between them did not constitute them as partners, and the one selling was in law the agent of the other, he would not be guilty of a violation of a statute prohibiting unlicensed persons making sales.'** In passing upon a question of this kind the Supreme Court of Indiana, after referring to the statute making it "unlawful for any person or persons to directly or indirectly sell" intoxicating liquors Anthout first procuring a license, and after deciding that a license might be granted to two persons jointly, said: "We think, as a corollary * * * that a joint sale by, or a sale for the joint benefit of, two or more persons, of said arti- cles jointly owned by such persons, if the sale be made by one of said persons, who has no separate license, will be unlawful, unless the whole number of persons, by or for whom such joint sale is made, have first procured the required license, and that a license to one of two or more persons will not legalize a sale made by the other or others of said persons, who have no license, even though it be a sale of articles which the licensed person might lawfully sell, and in which, and the sale whereof he was equally interested with the other or others making such sale. Such, in our opinion, is a fair interpreta- *2 Dunning v. Owen [1907], 2 4?, Shaw v. State, 56 Ind. 88; K. B. 237; 71 J. P. 3'83; 76 L. J. Commonwealth v. Hall, 8 Gratt. K. B. 796. &88. ^^Kelser v. State, 58 Ind. 379. 517 LICENSES. § 341 tion of the present liquor law of this" State. It recognizes the fact that two or more persons, as partners or joint owners, may engage in the sale of intoxicating liquors, in quantities less than a quart at a time, and it provides that it shall be unlawful for such persons to make such sales, without having first procured, from the proper board of commissioners, the proper lieonsf'." The court then refers to the statute pro- viding that the applicant for a license must ''be a fit person to be entrusted with the sale of intoxicating liquor, and if he be not in the habit of becoming intoxicated, but in no case shall a license be granted to a person in the habit of becom- ing intoxicated," and adds: "From the last clause of this proviso it will be observed that it contains a positive pro- hibition against the granting of a license, in any case, to any person who is in the habit of becoming intoxicated. Ordina- rily, anyone can form a copartnership in business with anyone else, without regard to his personal habits and without let or hindrance from the law. If we should hold that a license granted to one person would inure to the benefit and protec- tion of his partners, the effect of such a decision might well be to virtually license persons who were all the time drunk or intoxicated, and wholly unfit for the peculiar trust conferred by the license. The law recognizes the fact that some persons are fit and others are not fit for this particular business, but the construction of the law advocated by appellant's counsel, if carried out. would necessarily abolish this distinction and render nugatory the provisions of this proviso. Such a con- struction this court will not give." "The license to Besselman was certainly not a license to appellant; nor can it be con- strued to be a license to both Besselman and the appellant. Appellant's counsel insists that, in making the sale in question, appellant was the agent of Besselman, and would, therefore, be protected by the latter 's license. A partner is the agent of his copartner in partnership matters; but where, as in this case, a partner sells copartnership property, in which each partner has an equal interest, he is rather the agent of the firm than of the individual partner, in making of such sale." " 45 Shaw V. State, 56 Ind. 188. § 341 TKAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 518 In an Alabama ease the question was more tersely put in this way: "A license to retail affords protection only for those acts which, in law, are merely the acts of the person to whom it was granted. If granted to an individual, it affords protection only for those acts which, in law, are merely his acts as an individual. If granted to a partnership, it affords protectioTi only for those acts which, in law, are acts of the firm. A license to an individual cannot be a license to a part- nership. ' ' *^ In consonance with this reasoning, a license to a firm, one member of which is a member of another firm, confers no right upon the latter firm to sell liquor; " although if one member of a licensed firm purchase out his partners he may continue the business under the license issued to the partnership; *^ and so may the remaining partner, if for any reason the others retire, and the question of his fitness to hold the license cannot be raised, for that was settled when the license was issued to the firm.''^ Of course, in a case of this kind the question of partnership or no partnership is always to the front. Thus, where a defendant in a prosecution for selling without a license was the owner of the premises where the sale was made, and he made the sale pursuant to and in com- pliance with the terms of a written contract between him and another who had a license, whereby he, the defendant, leased the premises to the licensee for a saloon, upon the condition that such licensee should furnish the stock necessary to carry 46 Long V. State, 27 Ala. 32; Rex v. Hoffman, 22 Juta, 32. Ex parte Leveille, Stephens' Can- Contra, State v. Zermmehler, 110 adian Digest [1877-1'8'81], p. 474, Iowa, 1; 81 N. W. 154. §155; Lovejoy v. •Commonwealth, 49 State v. Gebhardt, 3 Jones 13 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract), 976. (N. €.), 178; In re Kornman, 13 47 Wharton v. Kino, 69 Ala. Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 147; 23 Pittb. 365. Log. J. (N. S.) 476. 48 United States v. Denis, 37 If an action be brought by a Fed. 46^; United States v. Glab, firm to recover back the price of 1 McCrary, lOB; Commonwealth liquor sold in violation of law, V. James, 98 Ky. 30; 32 S. W. the presumption is that it was 219; 17 Ky. L. Rep. 588; James v. made by the partner who had au- Commonwealth, 16 Ky. L. Rep. thority to sell; and if that be not (abstract) AA5. So held in South true, the defense must show it. Africa. Queen v. Ware, 12 Juta. Webber v. Williams, 36 Me. 512. 4; but later the contrary was held. 519 LICENSES. § 341 on the business, that the defendant in the name of the licensee should make all purchases and sales of the stock, pay all debts and expenses incurred in carrying on the business out of the proceeds of the sale, and for his services and the rent of his building should receive all the profits of the business, except a certain sum per diem, which was to be paid the licensee, it was held that the defendant and licensee were not partners, but principal and agent, and that the sale by the defendant was protected by the license/'" Whore a partnership may hold a license, if one of the partners sell liquors illegally, prima facie, all are liable;"^ but if the accused was not present or dissented from or protested airainst the sale, he is not liable; for the fact they were partners did not imply an agreement by them as part of their partnership undertaking: to violate the laws of the State by illegal sales of liquors." The question of guilty or not guilty turns upon the question of agency, and the same rules applicable to an illegal sale by a servant, where it is sought to hold his master liable for his illegal act, applies Avhen it is sought to hold one partner guilty for his partners' illegal act; and the same presumptions prevail, though per- haps more strongly. In a more recent case in Indiana, the one from which a quotation has been made above, it was held that a partnership could not hold a license. The statute con- strued by the court provided that "no license shall be granted to any other than a male person over the age of twenty-one years," and that "no more than one license shall be granted or issued to any one person, and in no case to any person other than the actual owner and proprietor of such business, who must apply in his own name." "It is evident," said the Appellate Court of that State, "that it was the intention of the Legislature that the license to sell intoxicating liquors at retail should only be issued to one person, and guided by the established principles of construction [that the express men- tion of one person or thing is the exclusion of another] , it is clear that two or more persons are inhibited by the statute from obtaining a license jointly or as partners, and hence soKeiser v. State, 58 Ind. 379. " Acree v. Commonwealth, 13 81 Hooper v. Commonwealth, 11 Bush, 353. Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 369. § 342 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 520 cannot engage as partners in retailing intoxicating liquors under the law." '"'^ Sec. 342. Number of licenses an individual may or is re- quired to hold. Aside from the question of holding a license under differ- ent jurisdictions, it may be said that it is altogether a matter of statute whether a person may hold more than one license. If the license is a permit to retail liquor within a certain political division of the State, and is not confined to a partic- ular place, then, of course, only one license is required to retail at one or any number of places within that division, the statute not forbidding the maintenance of more than one single place of business ; but if the statute requires the license to be issued for a particular place within the political division, then it is clear that if the licensee desires to carry on business at another place therein he must have a license for that place. Whether he can obtain it will depend upon the words of the statute. So under a license issued for one political division of the State it is clear that sales and the business must be confined to that division, unless in making such sales they are made through the medium of an agent taking orders. But it is clear that under a license to either manufacture or sell at wholesale a licensee cannot sell at retail,^* though there would be no objection to a retailer selling at wholesale, unless he was expressly forbidden by the statute to do so. And, of course, as we have elsewhere seen, a license for one thing cannot be used for another, as a license to keep a confection- ery cannot confer the right to sell liquors; and if the con- fectioner desires to sell liquors he must also obtain a license for that purpose. ^^ And so of a licensed retail grocer.-"'" 53 Spaulding v. Nathan, 21 Ind. App. 6.33; Burcli v. Savannah, 42 App. 122; 51 N. E. 742. Ga. 590. But in a subsequent case, where 55 Xew Orleans v. Jane, 34 La. a license was issued to two per- Ann. 667. sons, the same court held that the ^6 State v. Sies, 30 La. Ann. bond they gave was valid, fetate 918; Mobile v. Ricliards, 9S Ala. V. Gelding, 28 Ind. App. 233; 62 594; 12 So. 793; Police Jury v. iN". E. 502. Marrero, 38 La. Ann. '896; State 84 See State v. C'nren, 35 Md. v. Sheriff, 38 La. Ann. 975; Kelly 230; Schumm v. Gardener, 25 111. v. Dwyer, 7 Lea, 180. 521 LICENSES. § 343 Usually a person engaged in selling liquors must have as many- licenses as he has different and distinct bars or places to sell liquor.^^ Sec. 343. City may require license in addition to State license. There is nothing to prevent a State authorizing a munici- pality to exact a license, notwithstanding a person holds a license issued by the State. This is a common practice.'^* And a city license issued to a person will not excuse him from taking out a State license.'^'' Even a statute providing that retailers procuring a license from a city shall not be required to pay anything to the county for the privilege of selling liquor will not excuse them from taking out a State license under a statute requiring a license.*"' A city may enact an ordinance, after the State has is^jued a license, requiring all persons selling liquor within her boundaries to take out a license under the ordinance; and the fact that the licensee under the State law held a license issued prior to the adoption of the ordinance will not excuse him from a compliance with the provisions."^ The fact that a city's charter gave it ex- clusive power to license liquor dealers does not even raise a presumption that such dealers are exempt from a general 57 In re Lyman, 59 N. Y. App. N. E. 795 ; Freeman v. Common- Div. 217; 69 N. Y. Supp. 309; wealth, 8 Bush, 139; Independence affirming (N. Y. Misc. Rep.) v. Noland, 21 Mo. 394; Furman 67 N. Y. Supp. 48; Huber v. Com- v. Knapp, 19 Johns. 248; Warden monwealth (Ky.), 112 S. W. 583: v. Louisville, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 179; 33 Ky. L. Rep. 1031; State v. 11 S. W. 774. Falkenheimer (La.), 49 So. 214. 59 Davis v. State, 4 Stew. & P. ssHaug V. Gillett, 14 Kan. 140; (Ala.) 83; Stevenson v. Hunter, Gillen v. Riley, 27 Xeb. 158; 42 2 Ohio K P. 300; 5 Ohio S. & C. N. W. 1054; In re Lawrence, 69 P. Dec. 27; Austin v. State, 10 Ala. 608; 11 Pac. 217; Paton v. Mo. 591; Broomfield v. State, 10 People, 1 Colo. 77; People "". Mo. 556; Gritiith v. Common- Raines, 20 Colo. 48^; 39 Pac. wealth, 14 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 341 ; Elk Point v. Vaughn, 1 Oak. 303. 113; 46 N. W. 577; Sloan v. co State v. Esterbrook, 6 Ala. State, 8 Blackf. 361; Emerick v. fi53. Indianapolis, 118 Ind. 279; 20 oi Cuthbert v. Conly, 32 Ga. 211. § 344 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 522 law of the State taxing liquor dealers ; ®- although statutes may be, and have been, so worded as to exclude the right of the State to exact a license within a city or town, the whole authority of the State having been delegated to the munici- pality ; "^ or the statute may be so drafted as to prohibit the exacting by the city of a license from any one holding a State license,*'* or the State exacting one when the city has done so."^ Where a statute permitted a city to exact a license from any person retailing liquors within a certain distance beyond its boundaries, that was held not to prohibit the State also requir- ing a license of him.^^ Sec. 344. City license not a defense to a State violation. The grant of a right to the common council of a city by the Legislature of a State to fix the rate of all licenses for the retailing of intoxicating liquors should be construed to mean for a city purpose only ; and, the fact that a sale of such liquors is made within the city by a licensee of the city, but in violation of a general statute of the State upon the same subject, cannot in a prosecution by the State be defeated because of the existence of such ordinance. Corporate pow- ers are granted for the benefit of the corporators. They afford additional privileges and impose additional obligations, but do not exempt such corporations from any of their obligations as citizens of the county and State in which the corporation is situated. As inhabitants of incorporated cities or towns they may be taxed for city and town purposes, but 62 Decker v. McGowan, 59 Ga. 151; State v. Williams, 143 Ala. 805; State v. Sherman, 50 Mo. 501 ; 39 So. 276. 265 ; State v. Harper, 58 Mo. 530 ; 63 Hetzer v. People, 4 Colo. 45 ; Parsley v. Hutchins, 47 N. C. Bennett v. People, 30 111. 389; 159; State v. Propst, 87 N. C. State v. Schmail, 25 Minn. 370; 660; Commonwealth v. Sweitzer, Phillips v. Tecumseh, 5 Neb. 312; 129 Pa. St. 644; 18 Atl. 569; 25 Ex parte Schmitker, 6 Neb. 108. Wkly. N. C. 151; Commonwealth 64 Chastain v. Calhoun, 29 Ga. V. Berghman, 129 Pa. 644; 18 333. Atl. 570; 25 Wkly. N. C. 151; osstate v. White, 115 La. 779; Commonwealth v. .Shultz, 129 Pa. 40 .So. 44. 644; 18 Atl. 571; 25 Wkly. N. C. ee Emerick v. Indianapolis, 118 Ind. 279; 20 N. E. 795. 523 LICENSES. § 345 they are not thereby relieved from the necessity of contrib- uting their proportion of the public charges in their capac- ity as citizens of the State at large."'' Sec. 345. United States license — State license. Inasmuch as any resident or inhabitant of a State is a resi- dent or inhabitant of the United States, it follows that if the United States requires a license that fact cannot excuse the licensee from taking out a license under the State if the State requires a license to sell liquors.'"'' A distiller holding a license from the United States to distill or manufacture whisky does not authorize him to manufacture or sell his man- ufactured product without a State license where a State stat- ute requires him to take out a State license to manufacture whisky or to sell it."" This is true even if he sell through an agency in a town where his distillery is not located.''** Under a Federal license the licensee cannot even sell his domestic or own manufactured wine, if a State statute requires a State license.''^ This applies also to a Federal licensee selling liquors on board a steamer plying on waters within a State's juris- diction.'- This question has also been put at rest by a special provision of Congress providing that "the payment of any 07 Davis V. State, 4 Stevens & 10 Allen, 200; Commonwealth v. Porter (Ala.), 83; Sloan v. State, Keenan, 11 Allen, 262; Conmion- 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 361; Lewadag v. wealth v. McNamee, 113 Mass, State, 4 Ind. ClI. 12; 'Commonwealth v. Sanborn, osMcGuire v. Commonwealth, 116 Mass. 61; State v. Funk, 27 3 Wall. 387; 18 L. Ed. 226; In Minn. 318; 7 N. W. 359; State v. re Jordan, 49 Fed. 238; Pierson Downs, 116 N. C. 1064; 21 N. E. V. State, 39 Ark. 219; Black v. 689; Territory v. O'Connor, 5 Jacksojpville, 3G 111. 301; State v. Dak. 597; 41 N. W. 746; 3 L. R. McCleary, 17 Iowa, 44; State v. A. 355; Territory v. Gonnell, 2 Carney, 20 Iowa, 82; Boyd v. Ariz. 339; 16 Pac. 209. State, 12 Lea (Tenn.), 687; C9 State v. Hazell, 100 N. €. State V. Stulz, 20 Iowa, 488; 471; 6 S. E. 404. State V. Baughman, 20 Iowa, 497; ^o pietz v. State, 68 Wis. 538; Stommel v. Timbal, 84 Iowa, 336; 32 N. W. 763. 51 N. W. 159; Commonwealth v. 7i State v. Delano, 54 Me. 501. Thorniley, G Allen, 445; Com- 72 Commonwealth v. Sheckler, monwealth v. O'Donnell. 8 Allen, 78 Va. 36. 548; Commonwealth v. Hornbrook, §346 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 524 tax imposed by the internal revenue laws for carrying on any trade or business shall not be held to exempt any person from any penalty or punishment provided by the laws of any State for carrying on the same within such State, or in any manner to authorize the commencement or continuance of such trade or business contrary to the laws of such State or in places prohibited by municipal law; nor shall the payment of any such tax be held to prohibit any State from placing a duty or tax on the same trade or business, for State or other purposes." "^ Sec. 346. United States Govemment license no defense to State violation. The payment of a tax imposed by the United States upon retail liquor dealers is not a protection against the violation of a State statute prohibiting or regulating the sale of intox- icating liquors. When a State, in the exercise of an undoubted power, has prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors within the State, Congress disclaims all intention to confer the right to authorize the exercise of such prohibited business in oppo- sition to the State laws. But when a State has conferred the authority to sell such liquors, then the general government may claim the right to tax the exercise of the business thus 73 Rev. St. U. S. 187S, §3243. Another statute expressly pro- vides that the word "State" shall include a "territory." Rev. St. U. S. 1878, § 3140. Construed, Territory v. O'Connor, 5 Dak. 397; 41 X. W. 746: 3 L. R. A. 35.5. A licensee under the Federal Government, when indicted for selling liquors in violation of a State statute, is not entitled to remove the suit into the Federal court for that district under the Federal statute for the removal of suits, providing that "a suit or prosecution against any offi- cer of the United States or other person, for or on account of any act done under the revenue laws of the United States, or under color thereof, or for or on ac- count of any right, authority or title set up or claimed by such officer or other person under any such law of the United States." Rev. Stat. U. S. 1878, § 643; Com- monwealth V. Casej-, 12 Allen, 214; State v. Elder, 54 Me. 381. A licensee under the Federal stat- ute cannot take into or sell liquor in an Indian country, even if such country be a part of his dis- trict. United States v. Forty- three Gallons of Whisky, 108 U. S. 491; 2 Sup. Ct. 906. 525 LICENSES. § 347 authorized and to impose a revenue tax upon the exercise of the occupation. In other words, the general government rec- ognizes the power of the State governments to regulate their internal police. Any other rule would necessarily result in confusion and lead to a conflict in the jurisdiction of the two governments. Such power has never, since the organization of the Government, been claimed or exercised. Indeed, to hold that Congress can license citizens of a State to violate its laws, would be an invasion of the constitutional power of the State, which would be subversive of our republican form of government.^* Sec. 347. Duration of license. As a rule a license begins to run from the date of its issu- ance, and usually expires within a year from that date. And if the limitation is a year it cannot be construed as extending over a period of a year and a day.'^^ In many States all licenses are granted for a fixed period, and all expire on the same date, and the fact that a license is granted after that date does not continue it in force beyond the succeeding date, although if granted on the first date it would have continued a full year.^" If a State authorize the granting of a license for a year the licensing board cannot grant it for a part of a year ''"' unless the statute expressly authorizes it.^" A licensing board may grant a license which will begin to run 74 License Case, 46 U. S. (5 wealth v. Sanburn, 116 Mass. 01; How.) 574; McGuire v. Common- State v. Funk, 27 Minn. 318; wealth, 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 387; State v. Hazel, 100 X. C. 471; In re Jordan, 49 Fed. Rep. 23«; State v. Downs, 116 N. C. 1064; Pierson v. State, 39 Ark. 219; 21 S. E. 689; Commonwealth v. Black V. Town of Jacksonville, 36 Sheckels, 78 Va. 36. 111. 301; State v. McCleary, 17 Tsgchwarm v. State, 82 Ind. la. 44; State v. Carney, 20 la. 470; see State v. Sumter Co., 22 i82; State v. Bausrhman, 20 la. Fla. 1, and Reiisch v. Lincoln, 78 497; Stommel v. Timbrel, 84 Li. Neb. 828; 112 N. W. 377. 336; 51 N. W. 159; State v. De- 76 Disbrow v. Sanders, 1 Denio, lano, 54 Me. 501; Commonwealth 149. V. Thornley, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) v- Gnrley v. State, -65 Ga. 157. 445 ; Comnionwealtli v. Keenan, 93 78 People v. Ganey, 8 Hun, GO. Mass (11 Allen) 262; Common- § 348 TBAFP^IC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 526 after the terms of the commissioners have expired; and the fact that their terms expired before the date the license was to take effect cannot be used to shorten its lifeJ® The term of a license, by statute, may, however, begin to run from the date of the payment of the license fee and not from the date it is issued, that depending upon the statute ; ^ but in Indiana the license begins to run from the date it is granted, and not from the date of its issuance.^^ In England "occasional" licenses are issued to licensed keepers of public houses to carry on the traffic in liquors at some other designated place for a period of time ''not exceeding three consecutive days at any one time. "^- When these licenses (or rather permits to sell off the licensed premises) are granted, they are, for the time being, a complete protection to the holder if he in other respects obey the law.^^" In fact, they are permits to sell liquors for a period not over three days at a designated place, but subject to all the regulations and requirements pertain- ing to sales under a regular license. A license for a "calendar year" means from January 1st to December 31st, inclusive, and not for a period of twelve months commencing at any fixed date and terminating with the corresponding date next year.®* Sec. 348. Expired license. An expired license is no better than no license at all. The licensee selling under it is in no better position than if he had 79 Hendersonville v. Price, 90 59 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 533; 112 N. N. C. 423; 2 8. E. 155. Y. Siipp. 475. 80 Brown v. State, 27 Tex. 335. When a license expires. Green- si Keiser V. State, 78 Ind. 430 ough v. Narragansett (R. I.), 71 (overruling Vannoy v. State, 64 Atl. 574. In Manitoba. Crothers Ind, 447; State v. Wilcox, 66 Ind. v. Monteith, 11 Manitoba, 373. 557 ) . The issuing officer cannot, by 82 25 and 20 Vict. c. 22, §13; insisting that the license was to Patterson's Licensing Act, p, 288. continue until it was revoked, 83 Stevens v. Emson, 1 Exch. prolong a license beyond the date Div. 100; 40 J. P. 484; 45 L. J. fixed by law for its expiration. M. C. 63; 33 L. T. 821. State v. Brown (Iowa), 109 S. W. 84 Carroll v. Wright (Ga.), 63 1011. S. E, 260; see People v. Moore, 527 LICENSES. § 349 never held a license. He may not even sell the stock he held on hand when it expired.^'^ In certain instances, however, as has elsewhere been stated, sales after the expiration of a license and before it could be renewed or another obtained have been excused where a renewal or license was thereafter secured as soon as the law permitted its issuance.*® Sec. 349. "On" and "off" licenses. In England licenses are divided into two classes, "on" and "off" licenses. How this distinction arose is thus stated by Pattei*son: "In 1830 it was deemed 'expedient for the better supplying of the public with beer in England to give greater facilities for the sale thereof than are at present afforded by licenses to keepers of inns, ale houses and victual- ing houses. ' ^^ The Beer House Act, 1830, was accordingly passed, authorizing any person being a householder assessed to the poor rate except sheriffs' officers, etc., to obtain from the excise, on payment of two guineas a year, a license to sell beer by retail. This license authorized the holder to sell beer by retail in his dwelling house, whether for consumption on the premises or not, but was issued subject to certain condi- tions expressed on the face of it, for the breach of which he was subject to heavy penalties. These conditions were sub- stantially the same as in the case of the innkeeper's license, but the closing hours were more strictly defined. In 1834 it was found that much evil had arisen from the management and conduct of these beer houses. The Beer Plouse Act of 1834 ®* was accordingly passed, by which a distinction was made between retail licenses for consumption on the prem- ises and off retail beer licenses. The former were to cost tliree 85 United States v. Angell, 11 should expire on a certain date, Fed. 34; State v. McNett, 5 Pen. this was held not to protect the (Del.), 334; 61 Atl. 689; Tracy licensee on a prosecution for a V. Ginzberg, 189 Mass. 260; 75 sale after such date. State v. N. E. 637. Brown (Iowa), 109 S. W. 1011. 88 Where the issuing officer in- st Beer House Act of 1830, U serted a clause that the license Geo. IV and I Will 4, c. 64. was to continue until revoked, and ss 4 and 5 Will 4, c. 85. a statute provided that all sales |§ 350 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 528 guineas a year and the latter one guinea. The latter were to be granted practically in the same way as under the produc- tion to the excise, by the applicant, of a certificate that he was of good character, signed by six rated inhabitants of the parish. The licenses, Avhether on or off, were held subject to the same conditions as under the previous act, with the same penalties, a slight change being made in the closing regula- tions."^^ Subsequently on and off licenses for selling wine and also licenses for selling spirits were permitted.^*' Sec. 350. Void license — Collateral attack. A sale under a void license is the same as a sale without any license whatever. A void license is no protection, how- ever bona fide may have been the intention of the licensee not to violate the law.**^ Such was held to be the case where a town board was composed of a mayor and three aldermen, to which an application was made for a license. One of the aldermen moved that a license be granted the applicant, but the mayor refused to put the question, and, therefore, one of the two remaining aldermen put the question and he and the alderman moving the question voted. for it. The clerk of the board re- fused to enter the action upon the minutes, but the two aldermen voting for it signed an order granting the license, approved the applicant's bond, and a license otherwise was duly issued. It was held that the license was void and no protection for sales under it.®- But if a license be duly granted by a board or court having jurisdiction of the application for it, its validity cannot be collaterally attacked in order to secure a conviction of the licensee under a charge of a sale withoTit authority to make it."^ But notwithstanding the 89 Patterson's Licensing Acts, p. 410; 44 So. 156; State v. Raj', 4. 119 La. 417; 44 So. 417. 90 32 and 33 "Vict. e. 27; 33 92 Hugonin v. Adams (Miss.), and 34 Vict. c. 29. 33 So. 497. 91 Alexander v. State, 77 Ark. 93 Ludwig v. State, 18 Ind. App. 294; 91 S. W. 181; State v. 518; 48 N. E. 390; Common- Moore, 1 Jones (N, C), 276; Ex wealth v. Graves, 18 B. Mon. 33; parte Dimond, 2 N. S. W. L. R. Goff v. Fowler, 3 Pick. 300; City 207; State v, Laborde, IIQ La. Oouncil v. Hollenback, 3 Strobh. 529 LICENSES. § 350 general rule that a license cannot be collaterally attacked, it has been held that an inquiry may be instituted, as to whether it had been properly obtained, in an action for a sale without a license.^* And so it has been held in England that if the licensee was a person to whom a license could not be issued, his license was no protection upon a charge of a sale without one ; ^^ and this is also true if it was issued for a local option district, or where local option had become effective.®^ 355; Hornaday v. State, 43 Ind. 649; Thompson v. Harvey, 4 H. 306. & N. 254; 28 L. J. M. C. 163; 23 s*Ex parte Dimond, 2 N. S. J. P. 150. W. L. R. 207. 9c state v. Laborde, 1 19 La. 95Regina v. Vine, L. R. 10 Q. 410; 44 So. 156; State v. Ray. B. 195; 35 J. P. 213; 44 L. J. M. 119 La. 417; 44 So. 159. C. 60; 31 L. T. 842; 23 W. R. CHAPTER VII. PERSONS ENTITLED TO A LICENSE. SECTION. SECTION. 351. Eligibility. 357. Restaurant in capitol build- 352. Married women — Female. ing. 353. Corporations. 358. Holder of house. 354. Joint and partnership li- 359. Boat license. censes. 360. Canteen — Street railway car. 355. Manufacturers. 361. Who must have a license. 355a. Wholesalers. 362. Wholesalers. 356. Hotel keeper — Innkeeper. 363. Native or domestic winea. Sec. 351. Eligibility. The right to a license to sell liquors at retail is usually restricted to a certain class of persons; but, as a rule, no such restrictions are placed upon a license to sell at wholesale. The:"e is no question of the right and power of a State to restrict a license to retail to a certain class, as has been shown in the chapter on constitutional law. It is not necessary to further discuss that phase of the subject. Usually the statutes restrict the right to a license to an inhabitant of the State. The object of this is to enable the State to secure a better control over the traffic. If the licensee is required to be an inhabitant of the State, however, he need not be an inhabitant of the town, or city or county wherein he seeks a permit tc carry on the business of retailing linuors; it is sufficient if he be an inhabitant of the State. ^ Of course, the distinction between an inhabitant and a citizen must be borne in mind, for while an inhabitant must reside in a State a citizen does 1 Ex parte Laboyleaux, 65 Ind. A male innabitant cannot in- 545; Murphy v. Board, 73 Ind. sist an ordinance is invalid be- 483 ; State v. Dudley, 33 Ind. App. cause women cannot obtain a li- 640; 71 N. E. 975; Welsh v. State, cense under it. Wagner v. Gar- 126 Ind. 71; 25 N. E. 883; 9 L. rett. 118 Ind. 114; 20 N. E. 706. II. A. 664. 530 531 PERSONS ENTITLED TO A LICENSE, § 351 not necessarily do so.- Statutes often restrict the license to an inhabitant of a county, or a city, or a town, or even a township; and when such is the case the applicant must be an inhabitant of the political subdivision for which he seeks the license; and not only that, but he must remain an in- habitant during the life of the license, for if he do not and move out of it he will forfeit his license, and his servant retailing liquors over this bar after his master has removed will not be protected by his master's license.^ This is par- ticularly true if the licensee remove from the State.* As a rule, statutes require licensees to be persons of good moral character, and when such was the ease it was held that a refusal of a license to the keeper of a house of prostitution was proper.^ Not infrequently statutes provide that an applicant who has been convicted of a violation of the liquor laws shall not be entitled to a license, but unless the statute expressly so provides, that is no ground for refusing him a license.^ But a statute providing that "any person having a license as a dramshop keeper" who sells on Sunday shall be subject to a fine, forfeit his license, and not be entitled to another license for two years, applies only to a licensed dealer M^ho has violated the statute and not to an unlicensed person selling on Sunday, though he may be liable to a penalty.'^ In New York it was held that an application will not be refused solely on the ground that the applicant eighteen years before had been convicted of a felony and then pardoned.^ The fact that an applicant may have once been intoxicated does not disqualify him under a statute requiring the licensee to be "a fit person to be intrusted with the sale of intoxicating liquors" and "not in the habit of becoming intoxicated."^ Other species of 2 Welsh V. State, 126 Ind. 71; t state v. Hambright. 33 Mo. 25 N. E. 8'83; 9 L. R. A. «64. 394; see also Eegina v. Eoper, 63 3 State V. Dudley, 33 Ind. App. L. J. M. C. 68; 10 R. 598; 70 r.40; 71 N. E. 975; Runyan v. L. T. 409; 58 J. P. 512. State, 52 Ind. 320. 8 People v. Sackett, 17 N. Y. 4 Kraut V. State, 47 Ind. 519. Misc. Rep. 406; 40 N. Y. Supp. sQuachita Co. v. Rolland, 60 413. The pardon wiped out the Ark. 5\Q- 31 S. W. 144. oflense and made the person re- e Golden v. Bingham, 61 Ind. ceiving it a new man in law. l,9g_ 9 Calder v. Sheppard, 61 Ind. 219; Miller v. Wade, 58 Ind. 91. § 351 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING l.IQUORS, 532 immorality besides intoxication may lie made an effectual objection to an applicant ; ^" for one may be an immoral man Adthin the sense that term is used in the statutes without being addicted to intoxication.^^ Such would be the case of one who frequents gambling places, though the statute makes no reference by that name to the unfitness of an applicant/- If the statute prohibits the issuance of a license to any person convicted of a certain crime, the fact that an applicant had been so convicted but on appeal the judgment was reversed or set aside will not be a bar to his application.^^ An ordinance prohibiting the issuance of a license to any person who has either carried on or is carrying on his business in a certain manner applies to an applicant who so carried on his business before the ordinance was adopted.^* A statute providing for the issuance of a license to druggists, to sell for medicinal and other purposes, does not require the applicant to be a pharmacist.^' A statute requiring the application to be for a designated place or house does not require the applicant to reside on such place or in such house, though it may require 10 Grumman v. Holmes, 7G Ind. A plea of guilty, followed bv a 585. suspension of sentence, is a con- 11 Hill V. Perry, 82 Ind. 28. viction, and prevents the issuing i2Groscap v. Rainer, 111 Ind. of a license where the statute pro- 361; 39 N. E. 47; Whissen v. Aides no license shall issue to a Furth, 36'6 Ark. ; 84 S. W. 500 ; person convicted of a felony. Peo- 68 L. R. A. 161. pie v. Lyman, 33 N. Y. Misc. Eep. 13 Appeal of Smith, 65 Conn. 243; 68 N. Y. Supp. 331. 135; 31 Atl. 529; Horton v. Cen- Under a discretionary power to tral Falls (R. I.), 35 Atl. 962. grant licenses to sell liquors in 14 Foster v. Board, 102 Cal. quantities not less than a quart, 483; 37 ^ '. 7'63; 41 Am. St. a licensing board may grant a li- 194; ai,. see Regina v. Vine, L. cense to a druggist. In re Sus- R. 10 Q. B. 195; 39 J. P. 213; quehanna Co., 3 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 44 L. J. M. C. 60; 31 L. T. 842; 616. 23 W. R. 649, where a conviction That the applicant must be an of a felony previous to the en- inhabitant of the political sub- actment of tlie statute prevented division of the State for which a transfer of the license, it evad- he applies for a license, see Mil- ing the license. ler v. Made, 58 Ind. 91; People 15 Owens v. People, 56 111. App. v. Davis, 36 N. Y. 77; affirming 569; see In re Gillham (Iowa), 45 Barb. 494; State v. County 99 N. W. 179. Ct. GG Mo. App. 96. 533 PERSONS ENTITLED TO A LICENSE. § 351 him to reside in the political subdivision for which such license is to be granted, as where an innkeeper may take out a license.^*^ A statute prohibiting a "police official " from taking out a license does not apply to the mayor of the city, though ex officio he is a member of the police force ; ^^ nor does it apply to an alderman, though the board of aldermen has power to appoint and remove members of the police force.^* Where a statute provided that a license should not issue to a person of "bad fame," proof of the fact that he was living in adultery, but coupled with no evidence as to his reputation in the neighborhood, was held not to show he was a man of "bad fame" within the sense it was used in the statute; '^ for a man to be of "bad repute" must be generally known as such, and merely living with another man's wife does not bring him within the statutory meaning of the word.-" Where a statute provided that a permit to sell liquor should not be granted to a pharmacist, and no other person was entitled to a license, and a pharmacist should not be granted a permit if six months prior to the application he had been unlawfully con- ducting a pharmacy, it was held that if an applicant within that period, without a permit, sold alcohol to be used in "pre- serving a specimen," though he himself assisted in putting the liquor to its intended use, he was not entitled to a license.-'- Where an applicant for a second license was shown to have so screened his place of business as to amount to a violation 16 state V. Hill, 52 N. J. L. lo /« re Pool, 14 Vict. L. K. 326; 19 Atl. 789; The People v. 519. Hartmann, 10 Hun. 602; O'Roiirke 20 Potter v. Bowling, 5 W. N. V. People, 3 Hun. 225; 5 Thomp. (N. S. W.) 143. & C. 496. -^ In re Heery, 124 Iowa, 358; 17 People V. Gregg, 59 Hun, 100 N. W. 43; In re Willielm, 124 107; 13 N. Y. Supp. 114; 35 N. Iowa 380; 100 N. W. 44. Effect Y. Supp. 757. of judgment of conviction by con- is People V. Hannon, 59 Hun, sent. In re Thomas, 117 Iowa 617; 19 N. Y. Supp. 117; 35 N. 275; 90 N. W. 581. But an un- Y. St. Rep. 117. lawful sale of soda waters or ci- As to producing certificate of gars does not disqualify him as a good moral character, see In re licensee. In re Mausley, 136 Hunter, 24 Ont. 522 (reversing Iowa 66; 113 N. W. 548. 24 Ont. 153) ; In re Greystock, 12 Up. Can. 458. ,ys5i TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 534 of the law, a license was refused." But in Pennsylvania it was held that a single sale in violation of law would not justify a refusal of the application for a license.^^ And where an applicant had been granted a license, executed his bond in good faith, but the bond was void because of a technical defect, it was held that he was not guilty of a criminal offense in making sales and was entitled to another license.-* A statute of Kentucky provided that a license should not be granted "to any person of bad character, or who does not keep an orderly, law-abiding house;" and it was held that the county court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a license to an applicant who had sold liquor without a license and also to minors.-" So liquors sold at a place forbidden by law is suffi- cient to authorize not only the refusal of a new license but a revocation of one in existence.^" A statute provided that no 22 In re MacRae (Neb.), 106 N. W. 1020. 23Babb V. Taylor, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 38; 38 W. N. C. 440. 24 North V. Barringer, 147 Ind. 224; 46 N. E. 531. In Indiana even a conviction of the applicant for a violation of the law in the sale of li(iUors does not necessarily show him to be unfit to receive a license. Golden v. Bingham, 61 Ind. 198; Lynch v. Bates, 139 Ind. 206; 39 K E. 919. 25 Appeal of Candill (Ky.), t>6 S. W. 723; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2139; Watkins v. Grieser, 11 Okla. 302; 66 Pac. 332. 26 /,i re Clement, 125 N. Y. App. Div. 676; 110 N. Y. Supp. 57, 59. In England "The real resident holder and occupier" of the house in which he seeks a license must be sleetping upon the premises. Rex v. Manchester JJ., ^8 L. J. Q. B. 358 [1899]; 1 Q. B. 571; 8 L. T. 531; 47 W. R. 410 63 J. P. 360; Regina v. Sherman, 67 L. J. Q. B. 460 [1898]; 1 Q. B. 578; Nix V. Nottingham JJ., 63 L. J. Q. B. 854 [1899]; 2 Q. B. 294; 81 L. T. 41; 47 W. R. 628; 63 J. B. 628. ( In this case it was held that the mere fact that a person receives a salary as a man- ager of a brewery company and pays over to it the profits made out of the sale of its beer, did not prevent him being the "real resi- dent holder and occupier." In British Columbia a Japanese is entitled to a license. In re Kanamiira, 10 B. C. Rep. 354. A statute prohibited the grant- ing of a second application during a license year where the appli- cant's previous license had been denied because he was an unsuit- able person, or where a previous application during the year had been refused on the ground that the place was not a suitable one. It was held that the prohibition within the year applied where the person or the place had become a suitable person or place. Ap- peal of D'Amato, 80 Conn. 357; 68 Atl. 445. 535 PERSONS ENTITLED TO A LICENSE. § 351 one ever convicted of a felony should hold a license ; but one who had been convicted and then pardoned was held eligible for a license, the pardon removing all his disability."^ In England a statute prohibits the issuance of a license, or the renewal of a license, to anyone "convicted of permitting his premises to be a brothel." In construing this statute it is held that it is not necessary to prove the offense; it is not material there was no outward sign of its indecency,-^ or there was no disorderly conduct.-" Proof that the licensee per- mitted the place to be used for the purposes of prostitution once is some evidence to support the charge of permitting the premises to be used as a brothel.^" The fact that the licensee had permitted prostitutes to frequent his place of business was held sufficient to warrant the justices refusing him a license.^* A license to sell liquors is in the nature of a personal trust, and whoever applies for a license must not only be able and competent to carry out that trust, but he must be willing to do so.'^ If an applicant meets the requirements of the statute, the licensing board must grant him a license, except where it has a discretion in the matter.^^ But it cannot dispense with the necessary qualifications in the applicant.^* An application cannot be refused solely on the ground that no man of good moral character would engage in the liquor traffic, and, there- 27 Hay V. Tower Division, 59 J^. Grieser, 60 Pac. 332 ; 1 1 Okla. J. M. C. 79; 24 Q. B. Div. 561; 302; see Simpson v. Comnion- 62 L. T. 290; 38 W. R. 414; 54 wealth (Ky.), 9/ S. W. 404; 30 J. P. 500. See also People v. Ky. L. Pvep. 132. Sackett, 17 N. Y. Mis. 407; 40 33 Harrison v. People, 195 III. N. Y. Supp. 413. 406; -63 N. E. 191; reversing 91 28Regina v. Rice. L. R. 1 C. C. 111. App. 421. R. 21; 35 L. J. M. C. 93; 13 L. 34 Appeal of Hums, 76 Conn. T. 382; 14 W. xi. 56. 395; 56 Atl. 611. 29 Greig v. Bendeno, E. B. & E. If a licensee consent to the en- 133; 27 L. J. M. C. 294. tering of a decree of conviction. soRegina v. Justices, 46 J. P. "in a spirit of compromise," but 312; Webb v. Catchlove, 50 J. P. under an agreement that it shall 795. not bar his riglit to a second li- 31 Sharp V. Hughes, 57 J. P. cense, yet the judgment will have 104. that effect. In re Thoma, 117 32 /m. re Krug, 72 Neb. 676; Iowa, 275; 90 N. W. 581. 101 N. W. 242; Watkins v. § 352 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 536 fore, the application shows the applicant is not a man of good moral character, for such a rule would invalidate the law itself.^^ Sec. 352. Married Women — Female. The usual statute restricts a license to a "male inhabitant" or a "resident male" or a "voter;" and, therefore, prohibits licenses being granted to females. So many of the statutes require the licensee to give a bond with sureties for his good behavior or to pay damages under certain conditions. This has been claimed to prevent a married woman from taking out a license, because she could not bind herself by her bond. But here the argument largely fails because of the many recently enacted married women enabling acts. Under a statute pro- viding that any male inhabitant over twenty-one years of age, and giving proper notice, may obtain a retail license, it was held that it impliedly forbade the granting of a license to a female."''® In New Zealand it is held that "The Married Woman's Property Act" does not authorize the issuance of a license to a married woman, the prohibition being an implied one.^^ In Australia a married woman cannot obtain a license ; ^^ but in Ncav South Wales, a part of that country, 3" In re Phillips, 82 Neb. 45 ; the application. Appeal of 116 N. W. 950. D'Amato, SO Conn. 357; &8 Atl. In Pennsylvania, stockholders in 445. As to place, see In re Rez- a brewing company cannot take nor Hotel Co., 34 Pa. Super. Ct. out a license to retail liquor. In 525. re Consumers' lirewing Co., 4 s^ Woodford v. Hamilton, 139 Lack. Leg. N. 165; 20 Pa. Co. Ct. Ind. 4'81; 39 N. E. 47. Rep. 597; 7 Pa. Dist. Rep. 193. A male cannot object to the A statute prohibiting the licen- validity of a statute or ordinance sing of the keeper of an eating because a female cannot obtain a house or of a restaurant or of a license. Wagner v. Garrett, 118 saloon will not prevent the is- Ind. 114; 20 N. E. 706. suance of a license to the keeper 37 in re Roche, 7 N. Z. L. R. of a drug store who sells soda 206; Callander v. Allen, 6 N. Z. water and ice cream. In re Henry, L. R. 436. 124 Iowa, 35'8; 100 N. W. 43. 38 Regina v. Nicolson, 10 Vict. In some States a person de- L. R. 255. But a married woman nied a license cannot make a sec- has held a license in that coun- ond application within a year try. Chailes v. Bones, 22 Austr. from the first application; they L. T. 97; 6 Austr. L. R. 209. are incapacitated thereby to make 537 PERSONS ENTITLED TO A LICENSE § 353 it would seem she can when not living with her husband ; ^'' while in Michigan, the traffic being legal, a married woman, living with her husband, may execute the proper bond and carry on the business of retailing liquors.*" Sec. 353. Corporations. Where a general statute was in force providing that the words "person or persons" might extend to and be applied to corporations as well as individuals, it was held that a statute for licensing persons to sell intoxicating liquors author- ized the licensing of a corporation/^ But it cannot be said that this decision could be accepted in many of the States under the provisions of their liquor laws, for how can it be said that a corporation is a "male inhabitant," or "twenty- one years of age," or "of good moral character?" And it has been held that a statute requiring the "person" applying for a license to be twenty-one years of age, of good moral char- acter, a law-abiding, an assessed, and tax-paying citizen could not be applied to a corporation or an incorporated club.*' Where a corporation is entitled to a license, a license issued to one of its stockholders for the place it owais, to retail liquors, with the intention on the part of the licensing board 39 J5/a? parte Day, 15 X. S. W. A foreign corporation was held L. R. 420. ,o be a trafficker in liquors and 40 Amperre v. Kalamazoo, 59 subject to tax where it main- Mich. 78; 26 X. W. 222. So held tained a store in Ohio and sold in Kentucky. Caldwell v. Grimes, liquors and collected payment 7 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) (501. therefor. Reyman Brewing Co. v. 41 Heidelberg Garden Co. v. Brister, 179 U. S. 445; 45 L. Ed. People, 124 111. App. 331; affirm- 269; 21 ,Sup. Ct. 201; see Jung ed 233 III. 290; 84 X. E. 230; In Brewing Co. v. Commonwealth, re Gulf Brewing Co., 11 Pa. Co. (Ky.); 30 Ky. L. Rep. 267; 98 Ct. Rep. 346; Connecticut Brew- S. \V. 307. eries Co. v. Murphy, 81 Conn. In Pennsylvania a license will 145; 70 Atl. 450; Enterprise not be granted an insolvent liotel Brewing Co. v. Grimes, 173 Mass. company. In re Cambridge iSprings 252; 53 X. E. 855. Co., 20 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 564; see 42 State V. St. Louis Club, 125 In re Pittsburg Brewing Co., 12 Mo. 30'8; 28 S. W. 604; 26 L. R. Pa. Super. Ct. 176; 30 Pittsb. A. 573; see State v. Moniteau Co. Leg. J. (N. S.) 179. Ct. 45 Mo. App. 387. § 35-1 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 538 that the corporation may sell liquors thereunder, will not pre- vent sales of its liquors by it being illegal and subjecting it to a criminal prosecution for making a sale without a license so to do." Sec. 354. Joint and partnership licenses. "Where a statute authorized the issuance of "licenses to persons to keep inns" this was construed to authorize the issuance of a license to two persons jointly, though other parts of the statute referred to the licenses in the singular number.** But where a statute provided "that no license shall be granted to any other person than a male person over the age of twenty- one years," and "no more than one license shall be granted or issued to any one person, and in no case to any person other than the actual owner and proprietor of said business, who must apply in his own name," it was said that it was "evident that it was the intention of the Legislature that the license to sell intoxicating liquor at retail should only be issued to one person, and * * * jt is clear that two or more per- sons are inhibited by the statute from obtaining a license jointly or as partners, and hence cannot engage as partners in retailing intoxicating liquors under the law. "'*^ But in the same State, and by the same judge w^o wrote the opinion from which the above quotation has been made, it was held that *3 Connecticut Brewei'ies Co. v. for a sale in violation of law. Murphy, 81 Conn. 145; 70 Atl. United States v. Ames Mercantile 450. Co., 2 Alaska, 74; Enterprise In Pennsylvania even a regis- Brewing Co. v. Grimes, 173 Mass. tered corporation cannot secure a 252; 53 N. E. 855. license. In re Peter Schoenhofen In Rhode Island a domestic /brewing Co., 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 141 ; corporation is a "citizen resident 42 VV. N. C. 402. of the State, and entitled to a 11- As a rule. States requiring li- cense." Greenough v. Board (R. censes of wholesalers or distiller- I.), 74 Atl. 785. ies or breweries permit the issu- 44 state v. Hill, 52 N. J. L. iince of licenses to them, though 32G; 19 Atl. 789; State v. Moni- not to retail liquor. In re Hast- teau Co. Ct. 45 Mo. App. 387. ings Brewing Co. (Xoh.). 119 X. "tr, Spat,l(^J^^'' State v. Cummings, 17 Neb. erty, 11 Ohio Dec. 408; 26 Wkly. 311; 22 N. \V. 545; State v. L. Bull. 268; Christ Diehl Brew- Turner, 18 S. C. 103. ing Co. V. Spencer, 29 Ohio Cir. ss state v. Schroeder, 43 Minn. Ct. Rep. 512. 231; 45 S. W. 149; 45 Minn. 44; r.3New Orleans v. Guth, 11 La. 47 N. W. 308 (State v. Orth, 38 Ann. 405. Minn. 150; 36 N. W. 103, is no 56 Commonwealth v. Holland, longer an authority). § 355a TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 542 statute requiring retailers to pay a tax for the privilege of selling at retail.^^ Where a statute defined "trafficking" in liquors as buying and selling, not including "the manufac- turing and sale thereof by the manufacturer, ' ' it was held that wholesale dealers not manufacturers were liable to a tax under a statue taxing "the business of trafficking in intoxi- cating liquors;"®** but this same statute does not apply to a broker selling whisky stored in another State, by trans- ferring warehouse receipts ; *^^ nor does it impose a tax on one making a single sale, for he is not a person engaged in "buying or procuring and selling of intoxicating liquors.""^ Under a Tennessee decision one who sells wine made from grapes raised on his own farm in quantities less than a quart is not a wholesale but a retail dealer; *^^ and a manufacturer, in that State, selling in unbroken packages at his place of manufacture, is not a wholesale dealer liable to taxation "as other merchants."®^ A wholesaler does not lose his standing 59 People V. Greiser, 67 Mich. 490; 35 N. W. 87; People v. New- man, 99 Mich. 148; 57 N. W. 1073. In Pennsylvania a bottler may sell by the keg without a whole- sale license. In re Johnson, 1 Daiiph Co. Rep. 40; 20 Pa. Cr. Ct. Rep. 464; 7 Pa. Dist. Rep. 248. 60 Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Ohio St. 661; 11 N. E. 321; affirming 17 VVkly. L. Bull. 115. 61 Voss V. Hagerty, 21 Ohio Dec. 408; 26 Wkly. L. Bull. 268. 62 Voss V. Hagerty, supra. 63Kurth V. State, 86 Tenn. 134; 5 S. W. 593; see Webb v. Baird, 11 Lea, 667. 64 Taylor v. Vincent, 12 Lea, 282; 47 Am. Rep. 338; State v. Lowenhaught, 11 Lea, 13; State V. Tarver, 11 Lea, 658; Webb v. State, 11 Lea, 662; Webb v. Baird, 11 Lea, 667. For a definition of a wholesale dealer, see Flournoy v. Grady, 25 La. Ann. 591. A wholesaler cannot purchase beer by the barrel, then bottle it and sell it by the bottle. In re Stambaugh, 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 243. But in England, where a dealer in beer must sell it in casks containing not less than four and a half gallons, or in not less than two dozen reputed quart bottles at one time to be drunk or consumed elsewhere, he can- not be treated as selling without a license because he sells in pint instead of quart bottles, if the quantity sold at one time is the same. Fairclough v. Roberts, 24 Q. B. Div. 350; 54 J. P. 421; 59 L. J. M. C. 54; 62 L. T. 700; 38 W. R. 330. A statute restricting the times of sale at retail has no ap- plication to a sale by wholesale. Regina v. Jenkins, 55 J. P. 824; 543 PERSONS ENTITLED TO A LICENSE. §355a as such merely because he sells to a consumer and not to a retail dealer, so long as he sells in wholesale quantities.^^' Sales by a distiller at his distillery or at his residence are "sales in the usual course of trade" within the meaning of a statute exempting from its provisions sales made by manufac- turers "in the usual course of trade."*"' A statute which provides that "distillers have the privilege of selling at their residence any spirits of their own manufacture," docs not authorize each member of a distillery firm to sell the procfuct of the distillery at his residence ; and if each member of such firm does sell at his residence all are lial)le, even though if the distillery was owned by one person he could lawfully sell at his residence.'*^ A statute permitting sales by a distiller at his residence does not permit a sale at his store room.®^ 61 L. J. M. C. 57; 65 L. T. 857; principal under his own license is 40 W. R. 318. When a manufacturer storing liquor must pay a wholesaler's tax under the Ohio Dow Act. Reyman Brewing Co. v. Bristor, 92 Fed. 28. An ordinance providing that anyone selling liquors without a license may be fined, applies to a sale at wholesale. Cofer v. Com- monwealth (Ky.), 87 S. W. 2G4; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 934; Common- wealth V. Nunan (Ky.), 104 S. W. 731; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1090. One who solicits orders in Washington for a brewery in New York is not a brewer's agent un- der the Act of Congress, 32 U. S. Stat, at L. €27, requiring brew- ers' agents to pay a tax. Bert- zell V. District of Columbia, 21 App. D. C. 49. In Oklahoma, under the liquor law ( Wilson's Rev. & Ann. Stat. 1903, pp. 841, 843, §§1 and 8) exacting a license of persons sell- ing liquor at wholesale, an agent selling liquors of his non-resident not protected if his principal has no license. Ruemmeli v. Cra- vens, 13 Okla. 342; 74 Pac. 908; 13 Okla. 342; 76 Pac. 188. 65 State v. Bock, 167 Ind. 559; 79 N. E. 493 (five gallovs under the statute). 66 Commonwealth v. Jarrell, 8 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 783; Webb v. Commonwealth, 7 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 299; Robinson v. Com- monwealth, 7 Ky. L. Rep. (ab- Commonwealth v. Ky. L. Rep. (ab- stract) 453; Holsapple, 9 stract) 437. 6" Hooper v Ky. L. Rop. ( 68 Moody v Ky. L. Rep. . Commonwealth, 11 abstract) 369. , Commonwealth, 6 (abstract) 219. In West Virginia, under §§ 54, 55 and 62 of the Code of 1899, a brewery must pay a license tax to carry on its business and also take out a license to sell its man- ufactured product. State v. Schmulbach Brewing Co., 56 W. Va. 333 ; 49 S. E. 249. In Ohio, a statute imposed a § 356 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 544 Sec. 356. Hotel keeper — Innkeeper. In certain States licenses are restricted to keepers of hotels, and what shall be necessary to constitute a hotel is defined or declared. Thus, in New York the statute •*" provided that a license might be granted to the keeper of a hotel which had ten furnished rooms for guests. It was held that the fact that two of the rooms were connected with doors did not make it a hotel of only eight rooms, and that the objection on that ground to the license being granted was frivolous. '^° Under this statute a hotel is defined to be a house kept open for the entertainment of all who come to it without having any previous agreement concerning the duration of the stay or terms of the entertainment.'^^ The fact that a building has upon it a sign as a "boarding house," or does not keep a safe for valuables, or have a register or private stable accommoda- tions, does not necessarily prevent it from being a hotel. Nor does the fact Avhere it has been used exclusively as a hotel at a certain time deprive it of the privilege of being licensed as a hotel, because after that date the barroom has been removed to another part of the hotel. "^ But if portions of it be rented at times to tenants it cannot be said that it had been continuously occupied as a hotel within the meaning of the liquor law of that State requiring a building for which a license is applied to have been continuously occupied as a tax on a trafficker in liquors. A could sell its own products at brewery company maintained a wholesale in another county with- storage house at some distance, out taking out a wholesale deal- and in another part of the town, er's license there. State v. Capi- f rom its brewery, took orders and tol Brewing & Ice Co. ( Ala. ) , 50 delivered beer from this house. It So. 312. was held it was subject to the eo Laws 1896, c. 112, §31. tax imposed on traffickers. Christ ^o In re Purdy, 40 N. Y. App. Deal Brewing Co. v. Beck, 30 Ohio Div. 133; 57 N. Y. Supp. 629. Cir. Ct. Rep. 226. ^i in re Brewster, 39 N. Y. In Alabama, a statute imposed Misc. Rep. 689; 80 N. Y. Supp, a license tax on wholesale deal- 066, citing Cromwell v. Stephens, ers in beer exclusively, but pro- 3 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 26; Matter vided that any brewery could of Moulton, 59 App. Div. 27 : 69 sell its own manufactured prod- N. Y. S. 14; Taylor v. Monnot, 4- ucts at wholesale without taking Duer, 116; Wint€rmute v. Clark, out a license. It was held that 5 Sandf. 242. a licensed brewery in one county ^- In re Brewster, supra. 545 PERSONS ENTITLED TO A LICENSE, § 356 hotel.^^ A New York statute required a hotel for which a license was applied to have at least six bedrooms, each having an independent access by doors from the hall, in addition to the rooms occupied by the servants and the keeper's family. In order to comply with the law the keeper's family vacated one of the six bedrooms, after the tax certificate had been applied for, and lodged in the hall, into which the other five bedrooms opened, the vacated room being upon another floor. It was held that the hotel was not constructed in compliance with the ]aw.^* Where some of the bedrooms of the hotel did not comply with the statute as to floor area and cubic feet of space when the application was made, it was held that a license could not be granted.'^'* Under this statute a boarding house cannot be construed to be a hotel/'' Under the Act of Con- gress of March 3, 1S93, it is the duty of the commissioners for Washington in licensing an applicant for a hotel who claims to be the proprietor or lessee thereof, to determine whether he is such proprietor or lessee, and whether the building is an established hotel ; and their decision, they having a dis- cretion in the matter, will not be reviewed by a writ of certiorari in the matter, nor will it be reviewed upon a writ of mandamus.''^ In Kentucky it is held that one may be a "tavern keeper" though his receipts from the bar exceed those from the tavern proper; and whether there be a necessity for a tavern at the place depends upon whether there are persons who naturally desire or seek accommodations at the one in ques- tion, and not whether accommodations can be secured at other places.^^ -3 In re Brewster, supra. ''^ In re Ryon, 39 N. Y. Misc. 74 /n re McMonagle, 41 N. Y. Rep. 698; 80 N. Y. Supp. 1114; Misc. Rep. 407; 84 N. Y. Supp. affirmed 85 N. Y. App. 621; 83 1068. N. Y. Supp. 123. A building with six rooms, two 76 /n re Harper, 30 N. Y. Misc. of which are well furnished and Rep. 663; 64 N. Y. Supp. 524. two containing single beds and 77 United States v. Johnson, 12 mattresses only, the remaining U. S. App. D. C. 545. two being unfurnished ; between 78 Schneider v. Commonwealth the rooms being only thin parti- (Ky.), Ill S. W. 303; 33 Ky. L. tions, and only part lighted, is Rep. 770. not a hotel. In re Place, 27 N. Where the liquor law defines Y. App. Div. 561; 50 N. Y. Supp. what shall constitute an hotel en- g40. titled to a license, a building code §§357,358 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 546 Sec. 357. Restaurant in capitol building. It has been held that the congressional restaurants located and conducted in the capitol building at Washington, D. C, under congressional committees need not take out licenses ; ^^ but in England it would seem that restaurants in the House of Parliament are subject to the licensing acts.^'' Sec. 358. Holder of house. In England a license to sell beer or cider by retail could formerly be granted only to a person who was a "real resident householder and occupier of the dwelling-house in which he" should apply to be licensed. The house had to be rated for taxation at not less than fifteen pounds per annum if situated in certain places; or, in certain other places, rated at a rent or annual value of eleven pounds per annum; or, in still certain other places, at a rent or annual value of eight pounds.'^' Under this act a house used partly as a grocer's shop and partly as a beer house is deemed qualified for a enlarging that definition of an ho- tel is not controlling. In re Clem- ent, 129 N. Y. App. Div. 229; 113 N. Y. Supp. 392. Under the Pennsylvania Act, 1887, p. 108, a hotel, to be li- censed, must have for the "exclu- sive use of travelers at least four bedrooms and eight beds." In re Knoblauch's License, 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 323. As to keeper of European hotel and the tax he must pay. Mc- Clure V. Krumbholz, 9 Pa. Dist. R. 544; 31 Pittsb. L. J. (N. S.) 3; 14 York Leg. Rec. 31. Persons who go into a hotel for the purpose of procuring and drinking liquor are not "guests." Commonwealth v. Moore, 145 Mass. 244; 13 N. E. 893; Com- monwealth V. Barnes, 138 Mass. 511. Where a statute provided that the privilege to sell liquor should not be enjoyed by any licensee to keep a tavern, cofi'ee house, board- ing house or restaurant, it was held that a license to keep a cof- fee house was not a license to sell spirituous liquors. Common- wealth V. Woods, 4 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 2-62. As to the necessity for a hotel license in the neighborhood, see In re Reznor Hotel Co.'s License, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 525. 79 Page v. District of Colum- bia, 20 App. D. C. 469. 80 Williamson v. Norris [1899], 1 Q. B. 7; 62 J. P. 790; fil L. J. Q. B. 31; 47 W. R. {>4; 79 L. T. 415; 15 T. L. R. 18; 19 Cox. C. C. 203. 81 Beer House Act [L840], 3 and 4 Vict. c. 01; Patterson's Licens- ing Acts (19th Ed.), p. 245. 547 PERSONS ENTITLED TO A LICENSE. §359 license.-^- To be a real resident holder and occupier, the applicant must at least sleep on the premises. Hence, a rail- way arch used as a beer house was held not qualified because no one slept in it, and it was not a dwelling-house.*^ So a person who is upon the premises of a restaurant twelve hours each day, and has his meals there, is not a real resid;>nt holder and occupier."* The fact that the applicant is paid a salary by brewers, and has to pay over to them the profits made upon the sale of the beer, does not of itself in law prevent him from being the "real resident holder and occupier."*"' Unless an applicant for a justice's license or certificate is a "real resi- dent holder or occupier," his application must be denied.*" Sec. 359. Boat licenses. Not infrequently boats are required to take out licenses, whether they make sales when in port or on their voyages. A 82Garrety v. Potts, L. R. 6 Q. B. 86; 35 J. P. l&S; 40 L. J. M. €. 1; 23 L. T. 554; 19 W. R. 127. 83 Regina v. Allmey, 35 J. P. 534. 8* Regina v. Manchester, J. J. [1899], 1 Q. B. 571; 63 J. P. 360; 68 L. J. Q. B. 358; 47 W. R. 410; 80 L. T. 531. This is now chansed by statute. Licensing Act, 1902, 2 Edw. 7, c. 28, § 22 ; Patterson's Licensing Act (19th Ed.), p. 624. 85 Xix V. Nottingham, J. J. [1899], 2 Q. B. 294; 68 L. J. Q. B. 854; 63 J. P. 628; 47 W. R. 628; 81 L. T. 41; 15 T. L. R. 463. 86 Rex V. Woodhouse, J. J. [1906], 2 K. B. 501; 70 J. P. 485; 75 L. J. K. B. 745; s. c. Leeds v. Ryder [1907], App. Cas. 420; 71 J. P. 484; 76 L. J. K. B. 1032; 97 L. T. 261. This qualification for a license does not apply to a license to sell off the premises, or wliat is term- ed an "off" license. Regina v. DeRutzen, 1 Q. B. Div. 55; 40 J. P. 150; 33 L. T. 726; 24 VV. R. 343; 45 L. J. M. C. 57. The overseers or justices could not be compelled to certify that an applicant was a real resident occupier. Regina v. Kensington, J. J. 12 Q. B. 654; 12 J. P. 743; Regina v. Langridge, 24 L. J. Q. B. 73; 2 C. L. R. 1657; but they could be ordered by mandamus to inquire and determine that fact. Ex parte Piddlesden, IS J. P. 391. .1 certiorari to quash tlie excise license on tlie ground that the licensee is not a real resident holder of the premises does not lie. Regina v. Salford, 18 Q. B. 687; s. c. Eic parte Salford, 16 J. P. 649. A license issued to a real resident holder without the justice's certificate, is valid, though it would not be if he were not. Thompson v. Harvey, 4 H. & N. 254 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 163 ; 23 J. P. 150. §359 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 548 statute of Tennessee provided that any person selling liquors on steamboats must pay a privilege tax, in lieu of other taxes, of $250 per annum; and it was held that the boat making a trip from one port to another port in the State Avas subject to this tax,-^ In New South Wales the statute authorizing the exacting of a license from vessels is not restricted to sea- going vessels, but applies to a vessel on inland waters.^* A packet license issued in that country authorizes the master of the packet, being a vessel by which pasengers are carried "from" any place to any "other place," to sell liquor "during his passage between such places." A steamer was placed on a river between W and P, going from W to P on one day, stopping there for the night, and returning the next day. A passenger to P, who was returning the next day, was allowed to stop on board the steamer on the night that she lay at P. Liquor was sold to this passenger on board the steamer while she lay at P. It was held that the sale was not made during the passage of the steamer and the sale was illegal. If the sale had been at a stopping place between W and P it Avould have been a sale during passage and would have been valid. The sales on board the steamer were restricted to passengers, and it was immaterial that a passenger did not pay for his passage.^** s^ Foppiauo V. Speed, 113 Tenn. lice District during the time pro- 167; 82, S. W. 222. liibited in public laws. 5 and 6 88 Ex parte Bogan, 8 N. S. W. Vict. c. 44, § 5 ; Patterson's Li- L. R. 409. censing Acts, p. 256. 80 Stuart V. CuUen, 1-6 X. Z. 1^. A sale on a river steamboat R. 336. while stopping in a town, without In Gi'eat Britain, commanders a license from the town, is a vio- of vessels carrying passengers lation of a statute requiring ven- from one part of the United King- dors in such town to have a 11- dom to another, must have a 11- cense; and the boat is a "house" cense. Licensing Acts [1828], 9 within the meaning of the stat- Geo. 4, c. 47; 4 and 5 Will 4, c. ute against keeping a tippling 75, § 10; 5 and 6 Vict. c. 44, § 5; house. Commonwealth v. Neff, 9 43 and 44 Vict. c. 20, § 45; 53 and Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 442. Sale •54 Vict. CQ. 21, 28; Patterson's as on a boat in Lake Huron. Peo- Licensing Acts, pp. 176, 256, 544. pie v. Bouchard, 82 Mich. 156; 46 Liquors cannot be sold on boats N. VV. 232; 9 L. R. A. 106. at anchor in the Metropolitan Po- 549 PERSONS ENTITLED TO A LICENSE. §§360,361 Sec. 360. Canteen — Street railway car. Under the New Brunswick statute the militia may maintain a canteen in that country, under the king's regulations, with- out a license.^" And by statute this is the case in England.^^ A statute requiring a "vehicle" plying for hire to procure a license does not apph^ to a street railway car."^ Sec. 361. Who must have a license. The usual statute is directed against sales of liquors as beverages, but many of them are broader than that. It is a general rule that all persons carrying on a traffic in intoxi- cating liquors must have a license so to do of the character required by the statute. Indeed, most of the statutes go farther and prevent all sales and gifts by unlicensed persons. Thus, in Nebraska, a statute prohibited even so much as the keeping of intoxicating liquors for sale, but excepted therefrom, in a precautionary clause, liquors kept for home consumption; and it was held that the fact a person kept liquors for home consumption did not authorize him to sell or keep for sale liquors without a license or permit."^ So a wine vinter, making wine from ^apes grown on his own land, who retails the liquor over his own bar must have a license."* So a con- fectioner must have a license,®^ and a grocer,^*^ and a Pullman car conductor selling on his ear when passing through a State requiring a license to sell liquors,"^ and a druggist, unless the statute especially excepts his sales from its provisions,"® and 00 Ex parte Patchell, 34 N. B. »+ Mandeville v. Baudot, 49 La. 258. Ann. 236; 21 So. 2rrS. 91 Licensing Act [1872], 35 and 85 New Orleans v. Jane, 34 La. 36 Vict. c. 94, § 72 ; Licensing Act Ann. 667. [1902], 2 Edw. 7, c. 28, §23; 96 State v. Brackett, 41 Minn. Patterson's Licensing Acts, pp. 33 ; 42 N. W. 548. 475, 478, 625. "^ La Xorris v. State, 13 Tex. 92 Rex V. Wall, 7 Hawaii, 760. App. 33; 44 Am. Rep. 699. 93 Holt V. State, 62 Neb. 134; 86 98 Brown v. State; 9 Neb. 189; N. VV. 1073; Montpelier v. Mills, 2 N. W. 214; Wright v. People, 171 Ind. 175; 85 N. E. 6; Keller v. 101 111. 126; Rochester v. Upnian, State, 11 Md. 525; '69 Am. Dec. 19 Minn. 108; Stormus v. Com- 226; State v. Stiefel, 74 Md. 546; monwealth, 105 Ky. 619'; 49 S. 22 Atl. 1; State v. White, 115 La. W. 451; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1434; re- 779; 40 So. 44. versing 47 S. W. 262; Eastman § 361 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 550 a tavern keeper.-''-' But where a license is required for sales not exceeding a certain quantity at a time, a license for a sale exceeding that amount is not necessary.^ A statute requiring all persons who "sell" liquors to pay a license tax, does not require a person carrying on the "business" of selling liquors to take out a license." A statute requiring a dramshop keeper in a city or town to procure a license from such city or town does not require him to have a county or State license.^ A licensing statute excepting from its provisions sales "by the maker, brewer, or distiller thereof, not to be drunk on the premises," and declaring that brewers and distillers shall not sell liquors "in less quantities than unbroken packages, or less than packages of one gallon each, and they shall pay" a certain license fee per annum "for the privilege of selling liquors as aforesaid," requires a license for all sales in un- broken packages of not less than one gallon, but only when the liquor is sold to be consumed on the premises.^ The fact that a municipality has voted in favor of licensing the sale of liquors does not release a vendor of liquors from his duty to take out a license."' And where a State law requires a vendor of liquore to have a State license, a subsequent statute empowering a certain town to exact a license of a vendor of liquors within its limits and to restrain, regulate and control "to the entire exclusion of any control or right to regulate or restrain, in said matters, by any board, officer, person, or municipality of this county," the liquor traffic, does not dis- pense with a State license for a vendor of liquors selling within the limits of such town.*' Under the phrase that "all V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 20 Ky. i Hunter v. State, 79 Ga. 365; L. Rep. 1639; 40 S. W. 795. Con- 5 S. E. 134. tra in Texas. Gil)~()n v. State, 34 -Ex parte Mason, 102 Cal. 171; Tex. Cr. App. 218; 29 S. W. 1085; 36 Pac. 401. Prinzel v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. "• State v. Pittman, 10 Kan. 593, 274; 33 S. W. 350. * State v. Stiefel, 74 Md. 546; »9Page V. State, 11 Ala. 849; 22 Atl. 1. Crown Point v. Warner. 3 Hill, s State v. Cron, 23 Minn. 140. 150; Commonwealth v. Woods, 4 estate v. Nolan, 37 Minn. 10; Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 2G2. 33 N. Yi. 36; Williams v. State, Contra, State v, Pittman, 10 Kan. 52 Tex. Cr, App, 371; 107 S. VV. 593, 1121. 551 PERSONS ENTITLED TO A LICENSE. §361 persons who shall sell" intoxicating liquors must take out a license, a wholesaler must have one.'^ So a person whose license has expired must have a license, even though the police authorities induce him to believe none was necessary if he had his old license renewed and dated back.* A statute which makes it an offense, without a license, to offer or expose for sale "or solicit or receive orders" requires an agent soliciting orders in a county adopting such law at a local option election to have a license even though he solicits orders for a principal who lives in another county, has his place of business there, and in which no license is required.^ A person selling liquors by sample, as the agent of a non-resident, the goods being shipped to the purchaser by the principal from another State, or from the place of business of the non-resident, need not have a license.^" So where an ordinance makes no mention of a written permit in ordti to sell liquors, none is required." So a general statute levying a tax upon the occupation of a estate V. Cummings, 17 Neb. 311; 22 N. W. 545. 8 State V. Brady, 14 R. I. 508; People V. Gault, 104 Mich. 575; 62 N. W. 724. estate v. Swift, 35 W. V^a. 542; 14 S. E. 135. See Smith v. State, 109 Ga. 227; 34 S. E. 325; Acme Brewing Co. v. Fletcher, 109 Ga. 463; 34 S. E. 558. In Texas the statute is broad enough to require a person sell- ing medicated bitters to have a license. Prinzel v. State, 35 Tex. €r. App. 274; 33 S. W. 350. In England a statute permitted the children of officers in the Pen- insular War to set up and exer- cise a trade in any city without let, suit or molestation, notwith- standing any statute, law, evi- dence, custom, or provision to the contrary. It was held that such a person must have a license to sell liquors, the statute having reference only to customs, char- ters, by-laws and the like ex- isting in particular localities; and that the general statutes re- lating to liquor licenses and sales were not affected by the special statute. Killin v. Swatton, 61 J. P. 150; 76 L. T. 55; 45 VV. K. 235; 13 T. L. R. 121; IS Cox C. C. 477. In Georgia an indigent Confed- erate soldier is exempt from a li- cense for sale of "near beer," but not from reasonable municipal regulations for its sale. Camp- bell V. Thomasville (Ga.), 64 S. E. '815. 10 McCarthy v. Gordon, 16 Kan. 35; Riley v. Bancroft, 51 Neb. 864; 71 N. W. 745. A gift of a drink to a prospec- tive purchaser by a traveling agent is a violation of law. State v. Jones, 88 Minn. 27: 92 N. W. 468. 11 Moore v. People, 109 111. 499. 5 361 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 552 liquor dealer, and providing that druggists selling liquors on a physician's prescription shall not be exempted from its provisions, does not require druggists selling liquors on prescriptions in local option prohibition counties to have a license.^- So a statute requiring "all persons" selling in- toxicating liquors to have license so to do has no application to an officer levying upon, with an execution, and selling a stock of liquors by virtue thereof at public auction. ^^ Nor need an administrator of a deceased liquor dealer have a license to sell the liquors belonging to the estate, though he may not sell them at retail." And so may an assignee in in- solvent proceedings under a State statute providing for such insolvent proceedings.^^ 12 Gibson v. Stat^-, .34 Tex. Cr. App. 218; 29 S. W. 1085; see Prin- zel V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. Rep. 274; 33 S. W. 350. 13 Wildermuth v. G)le, 77 Mich. 483 ; 43 N. W. 889 ; State v. John- son, 33 X. H. 441 ; Nichols v. Val- entine, 36 Me. 322; see United States V. Overton, 2 Cranch. C. C. 42, and In re Blumenthal, 125 Pa. St. 412; 18 Atl. 395. 1* Williams v. Throop, 17 Wis. 463. 13 Gignonx v. P.ilbrnck, 63 X. 1' 22. In Kentucky it has been held that a person who is not a mer- chant, without a license may sell whisky in small quantities to be consumed oflF the premises. Com- monwealth V. Wheeler, 79 Ky. 284. A brewer, having his business in another State, may make an exclusive business arrangement with a person residing in a li- censing iState for the purchase and sale of his beers, though he is not a licensed dealer in such licensing State. New York Brew- feries Co. v. Baker, C8 Conn. 337; 26 Atl. 785. W'here an ordinance requires a license from any person engaged in the business of selling beer brewed out of the city, to dealers therein, foreign brewers keeping beers in storage in the city, and delivering it from time to time to local dealers buying it, must take out a license. Jung Brew- ing Co. V. Frankfort, 100 Ky. 409; .38 S. W. 710; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 855. A general statute requiring a license to sell beer does not apply to a manufacturer wlio has taken out a license under another stat- ute and providing that a licensee thereunder shall not be liable to pay any tax or license fee for sell- ing his manufactured product. In re Biederman, 3 Pennewill (Del.). 284; 51 Atl. 602. A statute assessing a tax against persons selling liquoi'S, but excepting "registered phar- macists holding permits," does not render a pharmacist liable for tlie tax who sells in violation of his permit. Shonkwiler v. Stewart, 104 Iowa, 67; 73 N. W. 479. Although a distiller may be re- quired to hold a license and not 553 PERSONS ENTITLED TO A LICENSE. §362 Sec. 362. Wholesalers. Under various heads and in various sections has been dis- cussed in a limited extent the question of licenses for whole- sale dealers. In this connection we note a few other cases. A statute forbidding a sale without a license applies not only to retail sales, but also to sales at wholesale.^*' And a license to sell at wholesale will not cover a retail sale," however dis- guised it may be.^* Unless a statute fix what shall constitute a wholesale or a retail transaction, or fixes the amount that may be sold without a license, it is a question of fact whether a transaction is a sale at wholesale or retail.'" If a charge be made of a sale at retail, and the evidence shows one at wholesale, which is lawful, there can be, of course, no convic- tion.-'' The classification made by dealers themselves, where no statute defines a sale at wholesale, in their trade are con- trolling, and if it be shown that the transaction is a sale at wholesale according to such classification, a peremptory charge even then sell in less quantities than a gallon, yet that will not limit his sales to dealers alone. In re Lauk's Appeal, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 53; 39 W. N. C. 42. In Illinois a statute required all persons selling intoxicating liquors to take out a license; and this was held to include a drug- gist. Wright V. People, 101 111. 126. But a Kentucky statute pro- hibiting a "merchant" from sell- ing liquors was held not to apply to an apothecary combining mer- chandise with his stock of drugs. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 9 Bush, 569. A statute forbidding a tax levied on a wholesale grocer will not prevent his prosecution for selling intoxicating liquors from his establishment by retail. Mo- bile V. Richards, 98 Ala. 594; 12 So. 793; Burch v. Savannah, 42 Ga. 596; Dearen v. Taylor County Court, 9'8 Ky. 135; 32 S. W. 402; Flournoy v. Grady, 25 La. Ann. 591. Under the Mississippi Act of 1896, p. 39, c. 35, a license to sell hoppenweis, hop tea and white hops, though malt liquors, is not required. Harland v. Adams, 76 Miss. 308; 24 So. 262. 10 Dolson V. Hope, 7 Kan. 161. See § 359a on Manufacturers. Contra, Commonwealth v. Rosen- baum, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 575. 17 Commonwealth v. Rosenbaum, 6 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 365, 575; State v. Quinn, 170 Mo. 176; 70 S. W. 1117. 18 Pence v. ■Commonwealth, 5 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 608. 10 Pence v. Commonwealth, 5 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 608; En- gle V. Commonwealth, 7 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 830; Pence v. Commonwealth, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 113. 20 Luton V. Palmer, 69 Mich. 610; 37 N. W. 701. § 362 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 554 to find for the defendant, who has been charged with retailing, is proper."' But where a statute permitted sales of five gal- lons and over without a license, a sale of five gallons or more of beer, which was placed on ice for the buyer by the seller at the latter 's place of business and then delivered in quan- tities of less than five gallons was held to be a sale at retail.-- "Where a statute permitted sales "at wholesale" without a license, but did not define what constituted a sale at wholesale, yet another statute provided that a manufacturer might sell one gallon or more without license, it was considered that all sales of a gallon or more was a sale at wholesale.-^ Where a stat- ute for a county prohibits the sale and use of intoxicating liquors, and provides for the repeal of all laws authorizing the county "to grant license to retail liquors," this will not prohibit sales in the county at wholesale.^* A statate which permits sales by wholesale dealers and defines a wholesale dealer as "a person, firm or corporation whose sole business in connection with the liquor traffic is to sell ax, wholesale to retail dealers licensed by the laws of the State or to whole- sale liquor dealers or to druggists or pharmacists who are licensed as such by the State Board of Pharmacy," a sale at wholesale to an unlicensed person who himself is not a whole- saler, is a violation of the statute.-^ A license issued for sale only at M'holesale is not invalid as a wholesale license, simply because it does not authorize sales at both wholesale and re- fail as it might have done.-° 2iEngle V. Commonwealth, 7 Nylin, 236 III. 19; 86 N. E. 150; Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 830. affirming 139 111. App. 500. 22 Mahan v. Commonwealth, 21 23 Lloyd v. Dollison, 23 Ohio Ky. L. Rep, 1807; 56 S. W. 529; Cir. Ct. Rep. 571. Adair v. Commonwealth, 21 Ky. 24 Commonwealth v. Ties, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 1818; 56 S. W. 530; L. Rep. (abstract) 230. Mays V. Commonwealth, 3 Ky. L. 25 Shelton v. State (Ind. ), 89 Rep. (abstract) 327; see Walker Ind. 800. V. "Commonwealth, (Ky.) ; 75 As to manufacturers in South S. W. 242; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 401. Carolina and the Dispensary law, A statute permitting sales of see State v. Ross, 58 S. C. 444; five gallons of beer at a time 36 S. E. 659. means five gallons of still liquor, 26 Williams v. Louis, 14 Kan. and not five gallons of froth and 605. solid liquor combined. People v. 555 PERSONS ENTITLED TO A LICENSE. § 363 Sec. 363. Native or domestic wines. Elsewhere -"* has been discussed to some extent the manu- facture and sale of native wines, or Avines manufactured from grapes grown in the State or on the premises of the manu- facturer. These statutes are so different in their details that a discussion of the cases is hardly practicable. As an illus- tration, thus in Texas, as late as 1877, a sale of wine without a license was lawful only when made in a separate establish- ment, and not where other liquors were sold.-^ And where a person who manufactures wine from grapes grown on his own premises may sell it without a license, he cannot sell wine made from grapes grown on his own premises to which have been added other grapes.-^ But the grapes may be grown by him on leased premises."^ Where a statute permitted one holding a manufacturer's license to sell licjuors in quantities not less than a gallon at the place where made, but not to be drunk there; and another statute provided that every person holding or purchasing personal property for the purpose of adding to it by any process of manufacturing, refining, or by combina- tion of different materials, should be a manufacturer, it was held that a person who takes new wine and puts it through a process which clarifies and refines it, by adding an ingredient thereto, was a manufacturer, and must have a license.^" 26* Pee Index for references. 29 Stephens v. Henderson, 120 STHiggins V. Rinker, 47 Tex. Ga. 2LS; 47 S. E. 498. 393. 30 State v. Bahnenkamp, 188 Mo. 28 State V. Miller, 104 Mo. App. App. 172. 297 ; 78 S. W. 643. CHAPTER VIII. ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. SECTION. sect: 3'64. Authority to grant. 386. How license law construed. 387. The application, its form. Delegation of power to 3BS. license. 389. Oath of applicant. Notice of application. 390. Recommendation of appli- SDL cant. Consent to granting of 392. license. 393. Consents where saloon has 394. been abandoned or discon- tinued. 395. Saloon near dwelling, con- sent of owners. 396. What is a dwelling requir- 397. ing consent of owners. (Signers to consent on recom- 398. mendation. 399. Saloon near church — Dis- tance, how measured. 400. Saloon near schoolhouse. Saloon near fair or factory. 401. Saloon in resident part of city. 402. Moral qualification of appli- cant. 403. Residence of applicant. Remonstrance. 404. Signatures to remonstrance — Power of attorney to 405. sign — Revocation. 406. Who may remonstrate. Withdrawal of signatures 407. from remonstrance. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 985. A majority remonstrance. Day for hearing application, appointing. Hearing application. Continuance of hearing — Adjourned meeting. Evidence at hearing. Licensing board acting upon its own information. Discretion of licensing board. Character of discretion. Discretion of municipalities in granting licenses. Review or control of discre- tion of licensing board. Reasons for refusal. Unsuitable buildings or place. Limiting number of saloons. Order granting or refusing the license. Mandamus to secure a license. Mandamus under the Eng- lish Licensing Acts. Injunction to restrain issu- ance of license. Liability for refusing li- cense. Appeal from order granting or refusing license. W^rit of prohibition. From what orders an ap- peal may be taken. Persons entitled to appeal — Parties. 556 557 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES, § 364 SECTION. SECTIOX. 408. Rights of licensee pending 412. <:ollateral attack upon appeal. license — Quo warranto. 409. Sale pending appeal to !Su- 413. Void license. preme Court. 414. Member of licensing board 410. Certiorari a prohibitionist — Interest. 411. Renewal of license. 415. Criminal liability of licens- ing oHicer. Sec. 364. Authority to grant. In discussing the application to obtain a license or the grant- ing of one, the first thing in the natural order of the discus- sion is the power to grant a license ; for if there be no power to grant one none can be obtained. This statement is very well illustrated by the Indiana case, holding that no power or authority had been conferred upon the licensing board to issue a license for sales to be made below low-water mark on the Ohio River, and yet a sale made there was illegal and sub- jected the salesman to punishment.^ Statutes confer the power upon local boards or courts to grant licenses under certain con- ditions ; and unless such power is conferred, no board or court can grant the prayer of an applicant for a license ; and if it attempt to do so its action will be void and confer no rights or protection." There is no constitutional objection to granting such powers to the courts, where the courts must find certain facts to exist before it orders the license issued ; for the find- ing of these facts is the exercise of judicial powers.^ It might be otherwise if the duty imposed on the court was merely clerical, requiring it to issue a license to all applicants regard- less of fitness and without discretion. In England justices of the peace for the local municipal division, when assembled for that purpose grant or refuse the application for a. license,* 1 Welsh V. State, 126 Ind. 71; 940; Bryan v. DeMoss, 34 Ind. 25 N. E. 8'83; 9 L. R. A. 664; see App. 473; 73 N. E. 156; Bryan v. State V. Hall, 2 Bailey (S. C), Jones, 34 Ind. App. /OS; 73 \'.i E-. 151. 1135; State v. Gorman, 171 Ind. 2. State V. Fort (Mo. App.), 81 58; 85 N. E. 763. S. W. 476. *6 Edw. 7, c. 42 [190(5]; 9 Geo. 3 Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 4, c. 61, §§ I and 9 [1828]; Pat- Kan. 751; 37 Am. Rep. 284; Com- terson's Licensing Act, pp. 179; nionwealth v. Petri, 122 Ky. 20; 195, 761. 90 S. W. 987 ; 25 Ky. L. Rep. In that country a transfer of an § 364 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 558 The power to grant and issue a license may be conferred upon the clerk of a court,^ or upon the city council.® The authority to grant the license, however, is never divided, and a grant of power to one court or local body, or officer, cannot be exer- cised by another court, or local body or officer. The grant is an exclusive one." Whatever court, local body or officer is des- ignated to grant the license it or he cannot exceed the limi- tions conferred by the statute ; for if he do, its or his act will be void. Thus a license cannot be issued by it for a place where prohibition prevails, either by positive statute or by the adoption of local option.* And if a city council has adopted a rule that no license shall issue unless the applica- tion receives the favorable vote of six, a license, so long as this rule stands, cannot be issued upon the vote of four or five.^ So if only one license can be issued per thousand inhab- itants, licenses in excess of this limitation are void.^° But pri- vate arrangements or contracts place no restraints upon a court or licensing board ; as where there is a clause in the licensee's deed for the place to be licensed x^roviding that no intoxicating liquor shall be sold thereon. A license for such a place is valid.^^ Although a court may have a superintend- ing general control over county courts authorized to issue a license, yet that will not authorize it to restrain a county court outlying parish of a county to an- App. 194; Hartig v. Seattle other county, or other area within (Wash.), 102 Pac. 408. it, under the County Police Act The mayor may give a casting of 1840, does not also transfer vote on an application for a li- the licensing jurisdiction. Regina cense. In re Hastings (Xeb. ), 119 V. Worcestershire [1891)], 1 Q. B. N. W. 27. 59; eS L. J. Q. B. 109; 62 J. P. 7 See Wiggins v. Varner, 67 Ga. S»6; 47 W. Pv. 134; 79 L. T. 393; 583; Cooke v. Common Pleas, 51 15 T. L. R. 45; 19 Cox C. C. 198. N. J. L. 85; 16 Atl. 176; Broom- 5 0'Driscoll V. Viard, 2 Bay (S. field v. State, 10 Mo. 556. ■C), 316; see also Commonwealth s Jones v. Moore Co., 106 X. C. V. Hill, 127 Pa. 540; 19 Atl. 141; 436; 11 S. E. 514. State V. Rosenblatt, 9 ]\Io. App. » Commonwealth v. Moran, 148 587. Mass. 453; 19 N. E. 554. estate v. Columbia, 17 S. C. lo Commonwealth v. Hayes, 149 80; People v. Mount, 186 111. 560; Mass. 32; 20 N. E. 456. 58 N. B. 360; affirming 87 111. n State v. Busby, 44 N. J, L. 627. 559 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES, §365 from granting one.'- A statute empowering a city to enact ordinances to license saloons and taverns requires it to enact an ordinance for that purpose before it can exact or grant one.'^' A State may abdicate its right to issue licenses and con- fer it upon cities and towns to its own exclusion/* If a county or district has adopted local option, forbidding the sale of liquors therein, then no board or council can thereafter issue a license to sell liquors in such county.^^ And a license granted contrary to law is no protection.^^ A license granted by two of three licensing commissioners without the presence or consent of the third, and when they are not legally assembled for that purpose, is void.'^ In granting a license a board of coun- ty eonunissioners is not the agent of the State.^* Sec. 365. How lioeinse law construed. Licenses or permits to sell intoxicating liquors at retail or as beverages are regarded rather as grants of privileges on the part of the State than as confirming rights to persons to 12 State V. Fort, 75 Mo. App. 214; 81 S. W. 470. A mayor and alderman do not jlisqualify themselves to act by signing the applicant's petition. Ferguson v. Brown, 75 Miss. 214; 21 So. 603. 13 Ellis V. Board, 59 N. J. L. 151; 35 Atl. 795; Meyer v. De- catur, 125 111. App. 556; In re Ryan (Neb.), 112 N. W. 599; Greunbauch v. Lelande, 154 Cal. 679; 98 Pac. 1059. Members of a board appointed in an unconstitutional manner cannot issue a license when a de jure board is in existence. Dien- stag V. Fagan, 74 N. J. L. 418; 65 Atl. 1011. A license issued by a de facto board is valid. Taber V. New Bedford, 177 Mass. 197; 58 N. E. 640. A city may adopt an ordinance authorizing one of its committees to issue a license, with the right of appeal to tho council. Cooke v. Loper. 151 Ala. 546; 44 So. 78. Or confer the power on a police board. Greun- bauch V. Lelande, 154 Cal. 679; 98 Pac. 1059. Instate V. Harden, 62 W. Va. 313; 58 S. E. 715; 60 N. E. 394. 15 Commonwealth v. Pool, 16 Ky. L. Rep (abstract) 351; Young V. Commonwealth, 14 Bush, 101 ; Padgett v. State, 157 Ala. 20; 48 So. 54. 16 Commonwealth v. Markoe, 17 Pick. 465. 17 Palmer v. Doney, 2 Johns. Cas. 346. Unless power is given to board to grant a license, it cannot grant one. Stat« v. Police Jury, 116 La. 767; 41 So. 85. 18 State V. Gorman, 171 Ind. 58; 85 N. E. 763. § 366 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 560 traffic in intoxicating liqiTors. This is unquestionably the view taken by the courts and the Legislatures during the last three-quarters of a century. And while a licensee has the right to pursue his trade under his license and be protected therein, if he infringes no law regulating his business, yet he is liable to meet with regulations, even prohibitory legislation, that he would meet with in no other legitimate trade or profession. And while an applicant is entitled to a license of he brings himself within the provisions of the law, yet he must squarely do so before he can bring proceedings to coerce the issuance to him of a license. For these, and perhaps other reasons stat- utes regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors, especially as beverages, and the process for procuring of a license are strictly construed ; and the applicant for a license must com- ply strictly with their provisions if he would be successful in his application.^^ Sec. 366. The application, its form. It is scarcely necessary to say that the application for a license must be made to the court, board or officer author- ized to issue it ; for a license issued by any other would be a nullity.^° The applicant for a license must in all things com- ply with the requirements of the statute,-^ in order to secure 19 In re Hoyniak License, 9 -o Bingham Co. v. Fidelity & Kulp. (Pa.) 368; United States Deposit Co., 13 Idaho, 34; 88 Pac. V. Johnson, 12 U. S. App. D. C. 829; State v. Moniteau Co. Ct. ©2. Tax certificates in New York 45 Mo. App. 387; Slater v. Fire stand upon a little different & Police Board, 43 Colo. 225; 96 ground from licenses. People v. Pac. 554; In re Liquor License, 1 Flynn, 110 N. Y. App. Div. 279; B. & C. (N. S.) 257; State v. ■96 N. Y. Supp. 655; reversing 48 Young, 17 Kan. 414. To be filed N. Y. Misc. Rep. 159; 96 N. Y. an application need not be Supp. 653. Construed strictly marked "filed." Keller v. Leon- against applicants and liberally to ard (Mo.), 116 S. W. 14. A city carry out their provisions. In re may require a written applica- Hering (X. Y.), 117 X. Y. Supp. tion. Campbell v. Thomasville 747; In re Place, 27 X. Y. App. (Ga.), 64 S. ii.. 815. Div. 561; 50 X. Y. Supp. 640; -^ In re Hoyniak License. 9 Malken vi Chicago, 217 111. 471; Kulp. (Pa.) 368; Cxreen v. South- 75 N. E. 54'8; affirming 119 111. ard, 94 Tex. 470; 61 S. W. 705; App, 542. reversing 59 S. W. 839. 561 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. § 366 it; which means that he must present a sufficient written petition, for all statutes, we believe, require a written appli- cation.-- Petitions, however, lacking in some formalities are not necessarily so defective as to justify the denial of their prayers for licenses. Thus, where the statute provided that applications for licenses should be for the right to retail "liquors, wines or beer," a petition to sell "spirituous or in- toxicating liquors, or wine and beer," is sufficient.-^ If the applicant need not be an inhabitant of the political division for which he seeks a license, of course he need not state that he is such an inhabitant in his petition.-* If the license is to be issued for a particular place, then the petition must contain a reasonably certain description of the place for which the license is sought; but it is sufficient if so reasonably full and certain that it points out the exact location,-^ as the one- story frame building, situated on the east sixty-six feet in length and twenty-five feet in width" of a designated town lot;^'' or "No. 1005 Elizabeth Avenue, the corner of Spring Street, in said city. "-^ Upon a petition for a license at one place, a license cannot be granted for another place.-** The fact that the building to be licensed is not yet built when the application is made is immaterial, if the place be otherwise properly described.^^ A statute required the ap- plicant to designate in his petition the place in which he pro- posed to retail liquors, the particular place ailid house to be designated in the license, and it was held in a suit on his bond that a license for sale of liquors in a town where the streets 22Corbett v. Duncan, 63 Miss. J. M. C. 132; 66 L. T. 371; 56 '84; McCreary v. Rhodes, 63 Miss. J. P. 87; Green v. Southard, 94 308; In re Donmoyer, 9 Pa. €r. Tex. 470; 61 S. W. 705, revers- Ct. Rep. 303. ing 59 S. W. 839. 23 State V. Jefferson Co., 20 26 ^a, pario circulation among the parties in inter- est, and wholly failed of the purpose for which notice by publication is intended. The notice not only did not comply with the plain meaning of the statute,^' but was fraudulent in its purpose and design."*'' If additional names be added to the petition after notice has been published, a new notice is not necessary.^'" When the statute requires the applicant to give the notice, the county clerk with whom his application must be filed cannot give the notice.^*^ In a number of States a description of the place for which a license i i sought must S3 The applicant "shall give no- avoid giving actual notice to the tice to the citizens of the town- party in interest, the proceedings ship, town, city, or ward in which based upon such notice may be he desires to sell, by publishing, held voidable, even though the let- in a weekly newsjiaper in the ter of the statute has been ob- county, a notice, stating the pre- served." Lynn v. Allen, 145 Ind. cise location" of the place for 584; 44 N. E. 646; see Webber v. which the license is desired. Curtis, 104 111. 309. Burns R. S. 1901, §7278. ss Thompson v. Egan, 70 Xcb. 84Goodwine v. Flint, 28 Ind. 169; 97 N. W. 247. App. 36; 60 N. E. 1102. so Watkins v. Grieser, U Okla. "The purpose of the statute, 302; 66 Pac. 332. namely, that notice may reach the As a rule, the liquor licensing party interested, should be kept acts control the manner of giving in view. So it has been held that notice and not the general stat- whore the publication has been utes on legal notices. Sun, etc., made by design in an obscure pa- Co. v. IJennett, 26 Pa. Super. €t. per, with the obvious intent to 243. § 369 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 572 be inserted in the notice. In this respect there is no differ- ence between the description that must be inserted in the application than that inserted in the notice ; bnt we note a few cases. Thus a notice for a license in a building on lot 23, Main Street, in the town of B is insufficient if there is a "Lot East 23" and a "Lot AVest 23," both on Michigan Street, and there is no ^Main Street.**^ "A certain building on lot 1, block 14," is sufficient, where the particular location of the place where the business is carried on must be given. ^^ Where a statute required the name of the applicant to be published in full, the class of a license he desired and a description of the premises, giving street and number, if practicable, and designating the building or the part of the building to be used, it was held that a notice giving the first and surname of the applicant, with his middle initial, the class of license desired, and describing his place of business as "in a building known as 'Kenwood's Block,' ou the east side of Marced Street, at the corner of South Street," was sufficient, the applicant occupy- ing a room in the block, the third from the corner of the two streets, with a druggist's sign in front of the room, neither the block nor the street being numbered, and wrote his name as it was used in the notice. ^^ But describing the premises as "the first floor of a builclins: situntc-d on the easterly side of South Main Street, owned by Catharine Bearce," is not suf- ficient under the same statute.^" Nor is a notice under this statute to secure a license for "J. F. Bearce & Son" suffi- cient."^ A notice describing the place as a room fronting on Main Street in a building situated on part of a lot described by the ordinarj^ description, giving the part of the lot where the building is situated, is sufficient.®^ A statute requiring a description of the place to be licensed to be published must be complied with to give the licensing board jurisdiction."^ In 87 Barnard v. Graham, 120 Tnd. Cumberland, 17 R. T. 222; 21 Atl. 13'5; 22 N. E. 112. 347. 88 Whitlock V. Bartholomew, 91 oi Commonwealth v. Bearce, Iowa, 246; 59 N. W. 76. supra. 8»Breconier v. Packard, 13« 92 Kunkel v. Abell, 170 Ind. 305; Mass. 50. 84 x. e. 503. 80 Commonwealth v. Bearce, 150 93 Muncey v. Collins (Iowa), 106 Mass. 389 ; 23 N. E. 99 ; Dexter v. N. W. 262. 573 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. § 370 England it is held that the situation of the premises need not be described as strictly as in a conveyance; thus a notice for a license for "house or shop at the market place in C" was held sufficient, although there were seventeen houses not uumljered in the market place."'* The fact that the building- is not in existence when the notice is given is immat»'rial, if it is in existence when the license is issued.""' In Iowa, upon filing a general denial to the petition containing the consents of elec- tors, the county attorney must "cause notice thereof to be served on the person or persons filing said statement of con- sent." This is held not to refpiire notice to the persons who filed the consent of the city council nor to the resident free- holders within fifty feet of the site of the proposed saloon; nor to the county auditor, the statute containing no such requirement.-'" Sec. 370. Recommendation of applicant. In some States the applicant must present to the licensing board a recommendation of his fitness to hold a license. This recommendation differs from an assent or consent to the granting of the license, for in the latter instance a recom- mendation is not necessarily involved, though it may be if this statute is broad enough to make it so. If a recommendation is required, it must be furnished, for its existence is a juris- dictional fact. The recommendation must comply with the terms of the statute ; it must be a full statutory recommenda- tion." And the fact that the statute requiring the produc- tion of a recommendation from a majority of the householders oi Regina v. Penkridge, 56 J. V. nullc.l. :McXeal v. Ryun. 56 N. 87; 66 L. T. ,371; 61 L. J. M. C. ,1. L. 443; 28 Atl. 552. 132 «7 Ixjng V. State, 27 Ala. 32 ; osMoran v. Creagan, 27 Iml. Ex parte Cox, l^ Ark. &SS; Vnrdy App. 659; 62 N. E. 61. v. Sinton, 50 Cal. 133; State v. 96Fitzgibbon V. Macy, 118 loua, D'Alemberto, 30 Fla. 545: H So. 440; 92 N. W. 78. '905; Metcalfe v. State, 76 Ga. Alicense granted by a citv council 308; Darling v. Boesch. -67 Iowa, at a special meeting on a few hours' 702 ; 25 N. W. 887 ; House v. Sta^e, notice, without notice of the ob- 41 Miss. 737; Eureka v. Davis, 21 ject of the meeting, will be an- Kan. 578; Read v. Board (N. J. L.), 71 Atl. 120. § 370 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 574r of a district does not provide any means or method of obtaiu- inj^ such recommendation or of ascertaining such majority does not render it void.^^ A statute requiring the production of a recommendation of a certain percentage of the house- holders and freeholders residing within the corporate limit.s of the town for which the license is to be issued is not com- plied with by producing a petition containing the requisite percentage of householders and freeholders of the "town and district," and mandamus proceedings based thereon to compel the issuance of a license must fail because of this variance.'''' Where a license could issue only upon the recommendation of the grand jury, it is the duty of the grand jury to discriminate be- tween proper and improper persons ; and they cannot refuse to recommend anyone because they did not want to discriminate between the applicants.^ A statute requiring an applicant to produce a petition recommending him as a person "of good reputation and a sober and suitable person to receive" a license ; the application is insufficient, if it omit the statement that the petitioner is "of good reputation. " - Under this same statute a petition which contains an averment that a partnership is of good reputation, but contains no averment that such are the re- putations of the individual members of the firm, is insufficient.^ A statute requiring a city auditor to issue a license to an applicant producing an endorsement on his application of the board of police commissioners that he has proven him- self to be a person of good moral character, repeals a prior ordinance of such city that the applicant should obtain the written consent of the majority of the adjacent property hold- ers before obtaining his license, although the statute provided that all ordinances in force at the time the statute was adopted, and not inconsistent with its provisions, should remain in force.* Signing a recommendation for one kind of license 08 Jones V. Hilliard, 69 Ala. 300. * Ex parte Jofleo, 40 Mo. App. 09 Glenn v. Lynn, «9 Ala. COS; 300. 7 So. 924 ; /» re Cohn (Xeb.),r21 A statute authorizing a board N. W. 107. of excise to grant a license to any 1 Cohen v. Jarrett, 42 Md. 571. person of good moral character 2 Corbet v. Duncan, 03 Miss. 84. approved by it, on a written ap- 3Loeb V. Duncan, tiS Miss. 89. plication signed by him, repeals 575 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. §371 does not disqualify a person from signing a recommendation for another kind.^ Petitioners cannot withdraw their names after license is refused in order to defeat mandamus proceed- ings.'' Under its general powers a city may require an appli- cant to present a certificate of four municipal electors as to his good moral character and honesty, and also a certificate from the proper officers that he has paid the license fee and signed a bond conditioned to abide by the by-laws of the city council for the regulation of the sale of liquors.' If a license be granted without the requisite number of signatures, the licens- ing officer may refuse to sign the license, notwithstanding the licensing board or municipal council has granted it.* Sec. 371. Consent to granting of license. In some of the States statutes are in force requiring the applicant for a license to secure the assent of a certain num- ber, or a certain percentage, of the voters, residents or inhab- itants of the district in which he desires to retail liquors. Occasionally a statute requires him to secure the consent of a certain number of those residing within a designated distance of the place where he proposes to open his establishment for their sale. In whatever form thev are drawn, this consent is a a prior statute requiring a peti- tion of twenty freeholders to be presented before the license ■-•an be granted. People v. ILirtnian, 10 Hun, 602. •'' Orcutt V. Reingardt, 40 N. J. L. 337. 6 Harlan v. State, 13G Ala. 150; 33 So. 858. A blank form of petition, not addressed to any court, nor desig- nating any town where tlie sign- ers reside, not asking for tlie granting of a license to any per- son, the signers named being ap- pended to blank books indepen- dent of any petition, is insuffi- cient. -State V. Tulloch, lOS Mo App. 32; 82 S. VY. 645. ' III re GrcA'stock, 12 Up. Can. 458; In re Hunter, 24 Ont. 5J2; reversing 24 Ont. 153. s Welsford v. Weidlein, 23 K.m. 601. Affidavits arc incompetent to prove the qualifications of t!ie pe- titioners. //( re Klamni (Neb.), 117 N. W. 991. The wife of an applicant, though a freeholder, cannot sign his ap- plication. In re Powell (Neb.), 119 N. W. 0. A statute requiring "freehold- ers" to sign the application re- quires bona fide freeholders, and not such as aie made freeholders merely to enable them to sign tlie application. In re Powell, supra. §371 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 576 jurisdictional factor, and without it the licensing board can- not proceed and cannot grant the license. If it do, the license will be void." But if the petition have liot a sufficient number of signatures when filed, others may be added before the license is granted, and then when it is granted it will be valid.^" A statute which requires the signature to be written in the pres- ence of two witnesses does not require them to attest the signature.^ ^ Statutes sometimes require the applicant to file his affidavit that he of his own knowledge knows that the persons whose names are attached to his petition did actually sign it; and when that is the case he cannot base his affidavit upon the information of others.^' A petition and consent entitled "Petition and consent, under section 17, known as the 'Mulct' " law, and stating: "The undersigned residents and voters of 0, respectively petition and consent that said city of shall be put under the operation of the provisions of said law," is sufficient under a statute, requiring that a "writ- ten statement of consent signed by a majority of the voters" '•> Ex parte Cox, 19 Ark. 688; Purdy V. Sinton, 56 Cal. 133; Metcalf V. State, 76 Ga. 308; Darling v. Boescli, 67 Iowa, 702; 25 X. W. 887: House v. State, 41 Miss. 737; State v. Weber, 20 Xeb. 467; 30 X. W. 531; State v. Moore, 46 X. C. 276; Hillsboro v. Smith, 110 X. C. 417; 14 S. E. 972; State v. Seibert, 98 Mo. App. 212; 71 S. ^Y. 95; Cooper v. Hunt, 103 Mo. App. 9; 77 S. W. 483; Martens v. People, 85 111. App. -66; affirmed 186 111. 314; 57 X. E. 871; Wiseman v. St. Laurent, 3 Man. S. C. 108; In re Forest, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 600; Backman V. Phillipsburg, 68 X. J. L. 552; 53 Atl. 620; Tanner v. Bugg, 74 Mo. App. 190; State v. Higgins, 71 Mo. App. 180; Van Xortwich V. Bennett, 62 X. J. L. 151; 40 Atl. 689 ; Davanney v. Hanson, 60 W. Va. 3; 53 S. E. 603; Tattersal V. Xevels, 77 Xeb. 843; 110 X. W. 708; State v. Xew Orleans, 117 La. 715; 42 So. 245; Common- wealth V. Elmore (Ky. ), 58 S. VV. 369; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 510; Wels- ford V. Weidlein, 23 Kan. 601; State V. Wooten (Mo. App.), 122 S. W. 1101. 10 State V. Jefl'erson Co., 20 Fla. 425; Livingston v. Corey, 33 Xeb. 366; 50 X. W. 263; Back- man V. Phillipsburg, 68 X. J. L. 552; 53 Atl. 620. Contra, In re Bridge, 36 X. Y. App. Div. 533; 25 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 213; 55 X. Y. Supp. 54; 56 X. Y. Supp. 1105; In re Forst, 208 Pa. St. 578; 57 Atl. 991; affirming 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 600. 11 State V. Sumter Co., 22 Fla. 1. Instate V. Sumter Co., 22 Fla. 364; Scott v. Xaacke (Iowa), 122 X. W. 824. 577 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. § 371 be filed with the county auditor/" If an applicant circulate several petitions, having materially different captions, he can- not combine the several names under one caption in order to secure the requisite number.'* A person who has signed both the petition and counter-petition may withdraw his name from the latter by signing a second petition for the granting of the license.'^' A name cannot be withdrawn from a petition if it would defeat the board's jurisdiction, unless the board consent thereto.'" Consents to the issuance of the order can- not be filed after the petition is filed even under an order of the court.'" Consent of at least a majority of the property owners and tenants in the block where the saloon will be located, means the entire block from street to street and not from the street to an alley.'^ A "block" within the meaning of a statute requiring the consent of a majority of the owners of real estate "within the frontage of the block in which such liquors are to be sold" means more than a square made up of two platted subdivisions, one-half of which is designated as a block in one of these subdivisions.'" In such a case con- sent therefor must be signed by the owners of a majority of the frontage of the block on all the streets enclosing it; and it is not sufficient if signed only by a majority on the side of the block where the saloon is to be located.-" The c/)unty treas- urer receiving the fee and issuing the tax certificate in New York may determine the fact whether the applicant is entitled to a license without regard to the statements made in his 13 state V. Meteer, 94 Iowa, 42; icQrcutt v. Reingardt, 46 N. J. 02 N. W. 684; Wliite v. McCul- L. 337; see Scott v. Naacke lough (Neb.), 123 N. W. 1034. (Iowa), 122 N, W. 824. In Iowa the sufficiency of thi^; '^'^ In re Lord, 32 N". Y. Misc. petition may be determined on 223; 66 N. Y. Supp. 252. collateral attack; for it is a mere is Perkins v. Loux, 14 Idaho, ministerial act. State v. Aohert, 607 ; 95 Pac. 694. 95 Iowa, 210; 63 N. VV. 557. i9 Slater v. Fire and Police 1* Collins V. Barrier, 64 Miss. Board, 43 Colo. 225; 96 Pac. 554. 21; 8 So. 164; State v. Scott, 96 20 Slater v. Fire and Police Mo. App. 620; 70 S. W. 736. Board, supra; Harrison v. Peo- 13 Perkins v. Henderson, 68 gile, 195 III. 466; 63 X. E. 191; Miss. 631; 9 So. 897; see Tuttle reversing 97 111. App. 421; People V. Poechert (Iowa), 121 N. W. v. Griesbach, 211 111. 35; 71 N. 1057. E. 874; reversing 112 111. App, §371 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 578 petition.^^ A consent signed by the husband without author- ity and without her knowledge, is not invalid when he owns the building.-- Parol evidence is not admissible to change the effect of a written petition.-" If a freeholder sign a permit and then sell his freehold, at the beginning of the next tax year, the licensee must file a new statement of consent by the purchaser, although if there had been no sale another state- ment would be unnecessary.-* Under a statute requiring the written consent of the nearest hona fide residents, at least five of whom must be freeholders, irrespective of county lines, means nearest the proposed place of sale; those who reside nearest the place are those who must give their consent, whether they reside in the county next where the application is made or in a city or town, even though the act specifically provides that it shall not apply to incorporated towns or cities.-^ Where a statute required a consent to contain the proper names of two-thirds of the assessed tax-paying citizens in the block where the saloon is to be located "as shown by the last previous annual assessment and vote of the cit}^" un- 192; Chicago v. O'Hare, 124 111. App. 290; Theuer v. People, 211 111. 296; 71 N. E. 997; affirming 113 111. 628. (In this ease it was held that the park commissioners had fHJwer to sign for park front- age.) 21 People V. Haag, 11 N. Y. App. Div. 74; 42 N. Y. Supp. 886. In New Vork the assent may be revoked at any time before the county treasurer acts upon the petition and issues his tax cer- tificate. In re Advance, 59 N. Y. App. Div. 440; 69 X. Y. Supp. 314. As to in Iowa, see Kane v. Grady, 123 Iowa, 260; 98 N. W. 711. ' 22 /« re BuUard, 113 N. Y. App. Div. 1.59; 98 N. Y. Supp. 1011. 23 Griesbach v. People, 226 111. 65; 80 N. E. 734; affirming 127 111. App. 462. In Montana Ji petition for a sec- ond license on the expiration of the old. one is necessary. State V. Settles, 34 Mont. 448; 87 Pac. 445. A city, under its general pow- ers, may require an applicant to present a petition having therein the written assent of property owners in the vicinity. Baton Rouge V. Butler, 118 La. 73; 42 So. '640. 24 Conway v. Fayett* Co., 132 Iowa, 510; 109 N. W. 1074; State V. New Orleans, 117 La. 715; 42 So. 245. 2r. Ballew v. State, 84 Ga. 138; 10 S. E. 623; but see State v. Greenway, 92 Iowa, 472; 61 N. W. 239; Tuttle v. Poechert, 121 N. W. 1057. 579 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. § 372 less such a consent is presented showing the qualifications of the subscribers the licensing board must refuse to issue a license.-'' Wliere a certain percentage of the voters at the last preceding election, as shown by the poll lists, nnist sign the consent, the names on such consent paper must appear on the poll books of such election, and names appearing on the writ- ten consent not identical with the corresponding names on the poll list cannot be counted.'" Sec. 372 Consents where saloon ha^ been abandoned or discontinued. In New York "when the nearest entrance to the premises described in" the petitioner's "statement as those in which traffic in liquor is to be carried on is within two hundred feet, measured in a straight line, of the nearest entrance to a build- ing or buildings occupied exclusively for a dwelling," it is necessary to fde the written consents of at least two-thirds of the owners of such building or buildings; but it is provided that "such consent shall not be required in cases where such traffic in liquor was actually lawfully carried on in said prem- ises so described in said statement on March 23, 1896, nor shall such consent be required for any place described in said statement which was occupied as a hotel on said last men- tioned date, notwithstanding such traffic in liquors was not 26 state V. Packett (Mo.), Ill) the place selected for its sale, it S. W. 25. was held void, because prohibit- Under the Iowa statute a sig- ory and not a regulation of the nature by a mark must be wit- sale. Campbell v. Thomasville nessed to be counted. Scott v. (Ga. ), 64 S. E. 15. Naacke (Iowa), 122 N. W. 824. In New York, if the application , 27 Scott V. Naacke (Iowa), 122 is correct in form, the county X. W. 824. treasurer must issue the certifi- Whei'e an ordinance limited a cate unless it appears by the cer- license to sell "near beer" to a tilled statement of the result of space of 900 yards on a single an election that such certificate street, including the parks and in- cannot be issued; but this certi- tersecting streets, and requiring fied statement need not be filed the consent of all owners and oc- with the county treasurer. In re cupants of stores and residences Krumbliolz, GO X. Y. Misc. Rep. within a radius of ten miles from 534; 113 N. Y. Supp. 1060. §372 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS 580 then carried on thereat." The privileges thus conferred to maintain a sak)On without the consent of property owners does "not attach to the property in perpetuity and is not a thing that necessarily runs with the land. It may be lost by abandonment or non-use, when the facts or circumstances are such as to justify the conclusion that the owner intended to discontinue the liquor traffic at the place. When that inten- tion is clearly established the period of time during which the place is vacant or used for other purposes is immaterial."-* Accordingly it was held that the fact that a tenant prior to the application, whose lease expired May 6, 1899, moved out sixteen days before his lease expired, was not such a dis- continuance of the liquor traffic as amounted to an abandon- ment of the premises, and that consents of owiiers of dwell- ing houses within two hundred feet were not necessary.'^ And a like holding was made where the tenant was ejected for non-payment of his rent.'^° This statute, in its exception, does not extend or apply to buildings afterwards purchased and annexed to the liotel.^^ And while the statute requires a 28 7n re Hawkins, 165 N. Y. 1G8; S'S N. E. 884; reversing 28 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 383; 59 N. Y. Supp. 888; 60 N. Y. Supp. 1141; 66 N. Y. Supp. 1132; In re Kleve- shall, 30 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 361; 63 N. Y^ Supp. 741 ;/h re Ritchie, 18 N. Y'. Misc. Rep. 341; 40 N. Y. Supp. 1106; People v. Lanmerti, 18 N. Y. Misc. 341; 40 N. Y. iSupp. 1107; affirmed 14 N. Y. App. Div. 628; 43 X. Y. Supp. 1161; 18 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 343; In re Bridges, 25 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 213; 55 N. Y. Supp. 54; affirmed 36 N. Y. App. Div. 533; 55 N. Y. Supp. 54; People v. Hamilton, 25 N. Y. App. Div. 428; 49 N. Y. Supp. 605; In re Lyman, 34 N. Y. App. 390; 54 X. Y. Supp. 294; In re Kessler, 28 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 336; 59 N. Y. Supp. 888; 163 N. Y. 205; 57 X. E. 402; In re McVicker, 21 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 383; 45 X. Y. Supp. 1008; In re Seranely, 40 X. Y. Supp. 1106; 18 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 341; In re Laper, 165 X. Y. 618; 59 X. K. 1125; In re Moulton, 168 X. Y. C45; 61 X. E. 1135; In re Clem- ents, 52 X. Y. Misc. 325; 102 X. Y. Supp. 178; affirmed 118 X. Y. App. Div. 575; 103 X. Y. Supp. 157. •-«/h re Hawkins, 165 X. Y. 188; 58 X. E. 884. (In Kessler's case, 163 X. Y. 205; 57 X. E. 402 ; reversing 28 X. Y. :Misc. Rep. 383 ; 59 X. Y. Supp. 888, the ques- tion was not raised.) 30 /j,, re Moulton, 59 X. Y. App. Div. 25; 69 X. Y. Supp. 14. ■••1 In re Haight, 33 X. Y. Misc. 544; 68 X. Y. Supp. 920; In re Ireland, 41 X. Y. :\Iise. Rep. 425; 84 X. Y. Supp. 1100, 581 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. §373 particular statement of the dwellings, churclies and school- houses within two hundred feet, yet if it be shown that the place was a licensed place on March 23, 1896, and had been continuously used since, it is not necessary to insert any alle- gations with reference to such buildings; and if a willfully false allegation in reference thereto be inserted, it being im- material, will not prevent the issuance of a license.^- Sec. 373. Saloon near dwelling- — Consent of owners. Statutes frequently require the consent of the o^siiers of a dwelling house within a certain distance of the proposed site of a saloon, and others forbid the location of a saloon within a certain distance of a church or sehoolhouse. These statutes are enacted chiefly concerning saloons in cities and towTis. A statute of this kind has been frequently before the courts in New York. This statute of that State requires the consent of owners of a chvelling, the "nearest entrance" of which is within two hundred feet, measured in a straight line, Under the Xew York statutes, if a saloon burn down, and two months are taken to rebuild it, it is not a building in continuous use as a saloon, and new consents are required. In re Kesler, 28 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 336; 59 X. Y. Supp. 888. See where tenant va- cated a saloon without his land- lord's consent, and new consents were held, not necessary. In re Laper, 53 X. Y. Div. 576; 66 N. Y. Supp. 13; affirmed 105 N. Y. filS; 59 N. E. 1131. For instances where a licensee, by discontinuance of his business, did or did not lose his right to continue such business, see In re Zinzow, 18 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 653; 43 X. Y. Supp. 714; People v. Hamilton, 25 X. Y. App. Div. 428; 49 X. Y. Supp. 605; People V. Hamilton, 21 Misc. Rep. 375; 47 N. Y. Supp. 190; In re Hawk- ins, 165 X. Y. 188; 58 X. E. 884; reversing 54 X. Y. App. 617; 66 X. Y. Supp. 1132; In re Place, 27 X. Y. App. Div. 561; 50 X. Y. Supp. 640; In re Place, 34 X. Y. App. Div. 389; 54 X. Y. Supp. 294; In re Salisbury, 19 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 340; 44 X. Y. Supp. 291. 32 In re Hawkins, 165 X. Y. 168; 58 X. E. 8'84; reversing 66 X. Y. Supp. 1132; In re Kess- ler, 163 X. Y. 205; 57 X. E. 402; In re Moulton, 59 X. Y. App. Div. 25; 69 X. Y. Supp. 14. What is a "new place" for a liquor license under the Xew Jer- sey statute. Wright v. Board, 75 X. J. L. 28; 66 Atl. 1061. What is an abandonment, see Quigley v. Monsees, 56 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 110; 106 X. Y. Supp. 167; and In re Cowles, 34 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 447; 69 X. Y. Supp. 756. § 373 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 582 of the ''nearest entrance * * " to the premises described in said statement [or application for a tax certificate or per- mit] as those in which liquor is to be carried on." ^" Another provision of the statute requires the applicant to describe "the premises where such business is to be carried on, stating the street and number if the premises have a street and number, and otherwise such apt description as will reasonably indicate the locality thereof, and also the specific location on the prem- ises of the bar or place at which liquors are to be sold." Under the construction given this act in determining the dis- tance the saloon must be located from a dwelling house the nearest entrance of such house must be the one taken into account, though there be several other entrances to it, and it makes no difference that this nearest entrance is a side or rear entrance and not the front entrance.^* So in determining the "nearest entrance" of the saloon to the dwelling house, that one must be taken which is nearest, though it be a rear or side door or front door, no difference being made between a front entrance or any other entrance. ^^ In ascertaining the distances between the two entrances a straight line must be used, ''disregarding all other obstructions." "" If a rear door or any other door l)e permanently closed it cannot be consid- ered an "entrance.""" Where an owner of a dwelling cut a 33 Laws 1897, p. 220, c. 312, 95 N. Y. Supp. 1142; In re Kupp, §17, subdiv. 8. 54 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 1; 105 N. Y. This statute is strictly con- Supp. 467. strued against applicants and lib- 3r, /,[, re McMonagle, 41 N. Y. orally construed to carry out its Misc. Kep. 407; 84 N. Y. vSupp. provisions. In re Hening (N. Y. ), liMi. 117 N. Y. Supp. 747; In re -«/» re McMonagle, 84 N.Y. Supp. Place, 27 N. Y. Ap].. Div. 5G1; lOG; In re Ruland, 21 N. Y. Misc. 50 N. Y. Supp. (Ml). Rep. 504; 47 N. Y. Supp. 561; .".4 lyi re Sanderson, ;)4 N. Y. In re Bridge, 36 N. Y. App. Div. Misc. Rep. 375; (19 N. Y. Supp. 533; 55 N. Y. Supp. 54; 25 N. Y. 028; In re Veeder, 31 N. Y. Misc. Misc. Rep. 54; 56 N. Y. Supp. Rep. 569; 65 N. Y. Supp. 517; In 1105. re Cheney, 3-5 Misc. Rep. 598; 72 37 /n re Malaghan, 184 N. Y. N. Y. Sui>p. 134; In re McMon- 253; 77 N. E. 12; affirming 103 agle, 41 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 407; 84 N. Y. Supp. 355; 95 N. Y. Supp. N. V. Supp. 1068; In re Mala- 1142; In re Purdy. 40 N. Y. Div. ghan, 184 N. Y. 253; 77 N. E. 12; 133; 57 N. Y. Supp. 629. affirming 108 N. Y. App. Div. 355 ; 583 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. • § 374 new door in his dwelling, after an application had been made and on the day the license was granted, with the evident intent to prevent the issuance of a license, it was held that his action did not prevent the issuance of the license nor call for its cancellation upon his petition therefor.^^ Where a liquor dealer was unable to secure the consent of the necessary number of property owners within two hundred feet for a saloon in his basement, erected a partition therein of ceiling lumber, leaving a dead space between the partition and the basement wall, useless and unoccupied; and his new room was a few inches beyond the two hundred foot limit, it was held that this was a mere subterfuge to evade the statute, and that he must have the consent of the owner whose property lay within two hundred feet of the room as it was before it was changed.^^ An applicant f )r a license cannot evade the law requiring him to procure the consents of owners of dwellings within a certain distance of his saloon by putting upon them small business signs, in order to create the impression that they were business houses.'" Where there is an entrance to the saloon from a rear yard, but there is no entrance to the yard except through the rear entrance of the house, the nearest "entrance" as designated in the New York statute is not this rear entrance.*^ Sec. 374. What is a dwelling requiring consent of owners. In New York the statute requires the owners of a building used exclusively as a dwelling or church to give their consent to the location of a saloon within a certain distance of it, and if it is not exclusively used as a dwelling or church no consent is required. Under this statute it was held that the fact that a dressmaker used a house, working therein, but having out no sign, did not deprive it of its exclusive character as a dwell- ing house ; *- and of course, this statute does not require the 38 7n re Cheney, 35 N. Y. Misc. 4i /« re Rupp, 122 N. Y. App. Rep. 598; 72 N. Y. Supp. 134. Div. 891; 106 N. Y. Sup.i. 116b; 39McColl V. Rally, 127 Iowa, affirming 55 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 313; f)33; 103 N. W. 972. 106 N. Y. Snpp. 193. *o In re Rasquin, 37 N. Y. Misc. *- In re Ruland, 21 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 693; 76 N. Y. Supp. 404. Rep. 504; 47 N. Y. Supp. 561. § 375 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 584 consent of the owners of a business building.*^ Woodsheds of rough boards, loosely joined and unplastered and never used for living purposes until the evening before the application was tiled are not dwelling houses.*^ But owners of vacant dwellings must be counted, and all vacant houses intended for dwellings.^"' Under this statute a house may be a dwelling though used occasionally for Avashing.*" The fact that the dwelling is an addition to a business block, having no inside communication, but used exclusively for a dwelling, having its own street number, does not deprive it of its character as a dwelling/^ Unfinished dwellings cannot be counted as dwell- ings.^^ If the house be double, it may be treated as two houses in ascertaining the requisite number of consents ; *" though the building ma,y be so constructed as to prevent that.''" Thus, a frame building (this one was on the rear end of the lot), costing about twelve hundred dollars, divided into seven equal parts by wooden partitions, each part about eight feet wide, was held to be only a single building.^^ A small house, costing only thirty-five dollars, of one room and moved within two hundred feet of the site of the proposed saloon, is not a building "occupied exclusively as a dwelling." ^- But it may be otherwise if occupied permanently.^^ And letting rooms by the week or month does not deprive the house of its char- acter as a dwelling."'^ Sec. 375. Signers to consent or recommendation. The statute prescribes V\"ho shall sign the consent or recom- 43 7n re Ireland, 41 N. Y. Misc. so 7,^ re Clement, US X. Y. Eep. 42.5; 84 N. Y. Supp. 1100. App. Div. 575; 10.3 X. Y. Supp. 44 /n re Lyman, 24 N. Y. Aluc. 157; affirming 103 X. f. bapp. Eep. 552; 53 X. Y. Supp. 577. 447. 45 In re Rnland, 21 X. Y. Misc. si /„ ,-e Patterson, 43 Miic. Rii>. Eep. 504; 17 X. Y. Supo. 561. 498; 89 X. Y. Supp. 437; see a^so 46 In re Lyman, 26 X. Y. Supp. In re Clement, 18 X. Y. App. Di"\ . S68; 57 X. Y. Supp. 48S. 575; 103 X. Y. Supp. 157. 4T/n re Lyman, 20 X. Y. Supp. ^^ Jn re Vail, 38 X. Y. Misc. 568; 57 X. Y. Supp. 488. Rep. 392; 77 X. Y. Supp. 903. 53 In re Ryan, 85 X. Y. App. Div. 621; 83 X. \'. Supp. 123; af- firming 39 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 698; 80 X. Y. Supp. 1114. 54 /n re Veeder, 31 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 560; 65 X. Y. Supp. 517. 48 In re ■Clements, 58 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 638; 111 X. Y. Supp. 1073. 49 In re Patterson, 43 X. V. Misc. Rep. 498; 89 X. Y. Supp. 437. 585 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES, § 375 mendation ; and only such can be counted as have the proper qualifications in determining whether a sufficient number have signed it, although if others sign it that would not avoid the consent or recommendation. Where a statute required that the application should "be signed by a majority of the regis- tered voters of the election district, as shown by the registra- tion list at the date of the application," this list must be considered in determining whether a majority had signed the application ; and if they had not, the issuance of a license cannot be coerced.^^ If the applicant be a registered voter he must be considered the same as any other registered voter, and may sign his own petition.-^*^ Where a statute requires "resi- dent householders" within fifty feet of the place of business to give their consent, only persons residing in the city by which the license is granted are included.^'' But a statute requiring the consent of the nearest bona fide residents, five of A^hom snould be freeholders, irrespective of county lines, nearest the place of busniess, includes persons residing nearest the place of business although in the adjoining county.'^^ Unless the statute requires it, the freeholders nearest the place of business, to be qualified to sign the petition or give their consent, need not reside upon their freeholds.^'^ A statute requiring the assent of a majority of the "assessed tax-paying citizens" of a town, includes married and single women assessed for taxes, and minors owning property who have guardians, but not citizens residing outside the town though owning property in and assessed therein."'' Under this statute mere taxpayers are not qualified; the signers must be "as- 55 state V. D'Alemberte, 30 Fla. withstanding the easement of the 545; 11 So. 905; Scott v. Naacke public to use the street for travel, (Iowa), 122 N. W. 824. tlie "owner of real estate" with- 50 State V. Sumter Co., 22 Fla. 1. in twenty-five feet of the premises, 57 State V. Greenway, 92 Iowa, and so may object to the granting 472; 61 N. W. 239. of the license. Morian v. Gallag- 58BaIlew V. State, 84 Ga. 138; lier, 199 Mass. 486; 85 N. E. 579. 10 S. E. 623. 00 state v. Howard Co. Ct., 90 59 State V. Meteer, 94 Iowa, 42; Mo. 593; 2 S. W. 788; see State 62 N. W. 684. V. Meyers, 80 Mo. 601; Scarritt A person who owns the fee of a v. Jackson, 89 Mo. App. 585; street in front of premises for Thompson v. Egan (Neb.), 97 N. which a license is sought, is, not- W. 247. §375 TRAi^FIC IN INTOXICATINQ LIQUORV?, 586 sessed, tax-paying citizens." *" A conveying of valueless land, without consideration, cannot make the grantees respectable citizens and freeholders to be counted with others giving their consent when the statute requires those consenting to have those qualifications.^- A person occupying a house as a resi- dent is a house holder under a statute requiring the consent of hona fide householders."^ A statute requiring the consent of a majority of bona fide householders "or" property owners is satisfied by the consent of either.*** Where a statute re- qnired the signatures of thirty freeholders to a petition before a license could be granted, it was held that if there was less than sixty freeholders in the district, a majority of those therein was sufficient.''^ A minor's consent to a saloon, if he be a property owner, may be given by his guardian, but he personally cannot give it."** One joint tenant may give the consent of all his co-tenants.*'^ An owner of a lot whose con- sent has been purchased cannot be counted."^ A property 61 state V. Heege, 37 Mo. App. 338; State v. Kingsburg, 105 Mo. App. 22; 78 S. W. 641; see State V. Moniteau Co. Ct., 45 Mo. App. 387. 62 Smith V. Board, 46 X. J. L. 312; Austin v. Atlantic City, 48 N. J. L. 118; 3 Atl. 65; Colglazier V. McClary (Neb.), 98 N. W. 670; Bennett v. Otto, 68 Neb. 652; 94 N. W. 807; Backman v. Phillips- burg, 68 N. J. L, 552; 53 Atl. 620; Dye v. Posen, 79 Neb. 149; 112 N. W. 332. A statute disqualifying free- holders who have signed a peti- tion from signing a second peti- tion within a year therefrom, has no application to freeholders who signed a petition before its pas- sage. Williams v. Bayonne, 55 N. J. L. GO; 25 Atl. 407. Under a Pennsylvania statute, persons so illiterate that they can- not write their own names can- not sign the petition; signing by mark is not sufficient, hi re Grant, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 87; In re Faulkner, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 86. 63 Shephard v. New Orleans, 51 La. Ann. 847; 25 So. 542. 64 Shephard v. New Orleans, supra. 65 Somers v. Vlasney, 64 Neb. 383; 89 N. W. 1036. 66 People V. Griesbach, 211 111. 35; 71 N. E. 874; reversing 112 111. App. 192. 67 People V. Griesbach, supra. But in the case of joint owners it has been held that he must have their consent. In re Cowles, 34 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 447; 59 N. Y. Supp. 756. esTheurer v. People. 211 111. 296; 71 N. E. 997; affirming 113 111. App. 628. In this case before Tiearing a signer withdrew his signature, and it was held that he could not be counted. The ^87 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. § 375 o\\Tier may sign by an authorized agent if no statute expressly forbids it-/^ and so may an executor with power to sell.'" In determining whether a petition has a sufficient number of signers, signatures of partnerships cannot be counted. ^^ A statute requiring a majority of assessed, tax-paying citizens and guardians in the block to sign the petition does not require a majority of the male taxpayers, a majority of the female taxpayers, and a majority of the guardians to sign it, but only a majority of all these three classes of persons.^- The petition need not recite that it is sio-ned by a maioritv of the assessed taxpayers; it is sufficient that the order of the board recite fhat fact." In Nebraska the homestead, the title to which is in the husband and on which his wife lives, and also when the title to it is hers, and they live on it jointly together, is not a freehold withih the meaning of the linuor law.''* A widower entitled to the use of his deceased wife's real estate during his life is such a freeholder as may sign a recommenda- tion for a license.'^ In Georgia, a statute requiring a certain number of citizens to sign the petition, only voters are re- garded as citizens.^*^ A city may adopt an ordinance sT)ecify- ing the number of persons and their qualifications who must sign a petition for a license, and it will be bound thereby so long as the ordinance is not repealed; and the granting of a license by the common council is not a repeal of the ordi- nance." In South Africa the majority of voters must be purcliase in this case was where Ct. 600; afiirmed 208 Pa. St. 578; an owner of property filed a pro- 57 Atl. 991. test, and then the applicant leased 72 state v. Fort, 107 IMo. App. of him his premises, the payment 328; 81 S. W. 476. of rent being upon the condition ^3 State v. Fort, supra. Contra, that a license be issued; and it Tanner v. Bugg, 74 Mo. App. 19G. was held that the rent was paid 74.Cobbey's Ann. St., § 717'5; to the owner for his signature. Campbell v. Moran, 71 Neb. 615; cnTheurer v. People, supra; In 99 N. W. 498. re McCov, 104 N. Y. App. Div. 7r. Harlan v. State, 136 Ala. 215; 93 N. Y. Supp. 401. 150; 33 So. 858. 10 In re McCoy, 104 N. Y. App. to Wray v. Harrison, 116 Ga. Div. 215; 93 N.' Y. Supp. 401. 93; 42 S. E. 351. 71 /» re Forest, 23 Pa. Super. 77Bachman v. Phillipsburg, 68 N. J. L. 552; 53 Atl. 620. § 375 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 588 determined b3' the voters' official roll, and evidence aliunde is inadmissible.'** In Mississippi, voters signing a petition must be voters under the constitutional provision regarding the payment of their taxes, but payment of such taxes by the pro- posed licensee, with their consent, does not disqualify them.'" A statute provided that any freeholder M-ho had recommended a person for a license could not within that year recommend any other person, was held to prevent him recommending any other person during any part of the year covered by the first application.^" Mere possession of real estate does not make a person such a freeholder that he may sign a petition.*^ Where a statute requires a signer of a petition to read it or have it read to him, a person signing it who does not read it, nor to whom it is read, cannot be counted as a signer ; ^- anfl if a license be issued upon a petition containing an insufficient number of competent signers, it may be revoked. ^^ The hus- band owning land may consent, though his wife does not join him.^* Under the statute proof that the signer is a freeholder need not be as conclusive as in an ejectment proceeding.^^ A husband is not the agent of his wife to such an extent that he may give her consent where he and she hold an estate by entireties.*^^ Partners in real estate must consent as indi- viduals and not as partners, so that all must sign the written '■s Gibson v. Manley, 11 Juta, ho. filed "simultaneously" witli the 191. application; and a consent filed 79 Ferguson v. Brown, 75 Miss. with an application by one pei-son 214; 21 So. 603. cannot be used twenty days later 80 Cope V. Soniers Point, 73 N. for an application filed by another J. L. 376; 64 Atl. 15G. person. In re Griffin, 56 N. Y. siSwihart v. Hansen, 76 Neb. Misc. Eep. 21; 106 N. Y. Supp. 24. 727 ; 107 N. W. &62. Signatures preceding the con- s- In re Veasey (Del.), 63 Atl. senting clause cannot be counted SOI. under a statute requiring the s:! 7n re Bullard, 113 N. Y. App. written consent to be "executed" Div. 159; 98 N. Y. Supp. 1011. and acknowledged as a deed. In ^* In re Bullard, 113 N. Y. App. re Griffin, supra. Div. 159; 98 N. Y. Supp. 1011. so Quigley v. Monsees, 56 N. Y. 85 Starkey V. Palm, 80 Neb. 393 ; Misc. Eep. 110; 106 N. Y. Supp. 114 N. W. 287. 167. In New York the consent must 589 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. § 376 consent." A lessee cannot give consent though he represents the owner as a general real estate agent, and though he may also be interested in the profits on a sale of such real estate.^** A lessee cannot sign the consent petition.*" Where a statute provided that if objections be filed by the occupants or owners of the greater part of the land within two hundred feet of the proposed site of the saloon no license should be granted, account must be taken of a park owned by the city, for the city is its owner or occupant within the meaning of the statute ; ''^ but the park board could give its assent thereto on behalf of the city.°^ Sec. 376. Saloon near schoolhouse— Distance, how measured. Statutes in several States forbid the maintenance of a saloon within a certain distance of a church or place of worship; and other statutes have a like prohibition with relation to colleges and schoolhouses. Likewise a few statutes may be found with similar prohibitory clauses with reference to other public buildings, as an orphan asylum or a soldiers' home. All such statutes are constitutional, and within the circle thus prescribed no license can be granted; and all licenses attempted to be granted are void.**- The chief questions in 87 Close V. O'Brien, 135 Iowa, Such a law is not a tax. In re 305; 112 N. W. SOO. Place, 27 N. Y. App. Div 561; 88 7n re Rupp, 54 X. Y. Misc. 50 N. Y. Supp. 640. Rep. 1; 105 N. Y. Supp. 407. A law prohibiting a saloon 89 American Woolen Co. v. North within 200 feet of a church or Smithfield, 28 R. I. 546; 69 Atl. schoolhouse, except in a place oc- 203; In re Sherry, 25 N. Y. Misc. cupied by a hotel, was amended Rep. 361; 55 N. Y. Supp. 421. by providing that the prohibition 90 Dexter v. Sprague, 22 R. 1. should not apply to a place oc- 324- 47 Atl. 889. cupied as a hotel when the former oiTheuer v. People, 211 111. 296; act took effect. This was held to 71 N. E. 997; affirming 113 111. be a legislative interpretation of App. 628. the first statute, which, therefore. Paying tax so voters could be- related to a place occupied for a come qualified to sign petition. hotel when it took effect. In re Ferguson v. Brown, 75 Miss. 214; Place, supra. 21 So. 603. A license granted within the 92 Sexton v. Board (X. J. L.), prohibited area is void. €ommon- 09 Atl. 470; State v. Pawtucket wealth v. Whelan, 134 Mass. 206. (R. I.), 46 Atl. 1047. § 376 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 590 this connection to be considered are what buildings come within the definitions of the statute and by what rule of measurement shall the prohibited distance be ascertained. As a rule, in the case of a church, little difficulty can arise. However, a few cases of contest have arisen on this point. Thus, where "Faith Curists, " an organized body of men and women, held meetings for Bible study and also for secular and religious instruction of the young, in a building occupied on the first floor in the rear for storage purposes, the upper part as a dwelling, and the front room downstairs for their meetings, it was held that such building was not a church nor did such persons constitute a church organization within the meaning of a liquor statute forbidding a saloon within two hundred feet of a church.''' Some of these statutes apply to camp- meetings or "incorporated camp-meetings." °* Under a statute prohibiting a saloon within a certain distance of "a building occupied exclusively as a church," a building ten by sixteen feet, located on an alley and occasionally used by an unincor- porated association for religious purposes, and which was built and used in order to defeat the grant of a license, the society having headquarters elsewhere in the town, is not such a building as the statute describes.^^ Under a statute pro- hibiting a saloon within a certain distance "of a building occupied exclusively as a church," a lot owmed by a religious society on which a building has been commenced but not com- pleted does not come within its prohibition.^^ But if the main floor of a building is occupied exclusively as a church it is a church, notwithstanding its basement may be used by other 93 Geo V. Board (N. J. L. ), 6.3 also Foster v. Speed (Tenn.), Ill Ati. 870. S. W. 925. 9* Sexton V. Board (N. J. L. ), A camp-meeting is "a place set G9 Atl. 470. apart for the worship of Almiglity In this case a special city char- God." State v. Hall, 2 Bailey (S. ter empowering the city to license C), 151. saloons was held to he subject to ss /n re Vail, 38 N. Y. Misc. a previous general statute pro- Rep. 392; 77 N. Y. Supp. 903. hibiting saloons within one mile 06 People v. Lammerts, 18 N. Y. of an "incorporated camp-meet- Misc. Rep. 343; 40 N. Y. Supp. ing." The camp-meeting in this 1107; In re Rupp, 54 N. Y. Misc. case was Asbury Park, N. J. See Rep. 1 ; 105 N. Y. Supp. 467. 591 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. § 376 relig-ious and charitable organizations."^ A dwelling house was bought by a society and used, without alteration, for religious purposes. The pastor occupied the second story as a dwelling. Church services and Sunday-school were held on the parlor floor. A woman with her children occupied the third floor, and to some extent superintended the work on the premises. It was held that this was not a building used "exclusively as a church" within the meaning of the statute.''^ But in the case of a Jewish synagogue, where the upper floor was used exclusively for church purposes, the lower floor for Sunday-school services and as a meeting place of three lodges of a benevolent and fraternal character, each of which paid rent to the synagogue, the membership in the lodges being limited to Jews by birth, though not to members of the con- gregation, it was held that the building was "exclusively occu- pied as a church. ' ' ^^ The occupation of the basement of a church by societies of a charitable, literary and patriotic char- acter, at various fixed times, their membership being prin- cipally composed of members of the congregation, and the object being to raise money for the church, will not deprive the building of its characteristics as a church.^ Upon the question of a cancellation of a license because issued within too close a distance of a church, it is immaterial how long it has been or will be used as a church, if it was so used before the application for a license was made.- In all these instances the question of distance is usually the chief one discussed. Where a statute forbade the issuance of a license within two hundred feet of the curtilage of a church edifice, it was held that the measurement must be made from its nearest point to the nearest point of the premises to be licensed, although the entrance to the latter building was more than two hundred feet from the church's curtilage.^ Where the limit was two 97 In re Zinow, 18 N. Y. Misc. i hi re Liquor Tax Certificate, Rep. 653; 43 N. Y. Supp. 714. 23 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 446; 51 N. Y. 98 7n re Finley, 58 N. Y. Misc. Supp. 281. Rep. 639; 110 N. Y. Supp. 71. -In re Korndorfer (N. Y.), 49 99 /n re McCusker, 47 N. Y. JST. Y. Supp. 559. App. Div. Ill; 62 N. Y. Supp. 201. 3 Lanning v. Board (N. J. L.), 68 Atl. 1083. § 376 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 592 hundred feet from a church, it Avas held that closing the entrance to the saloon and making anotlier next the street and more than that distance from the church did not make it lawful to maintain the saloon.* "Where the entrance to the church must be two hundred feet from a saloon, then any saloon within a circle having such entrance as its center and a radius of two hundred feet will forbid its maintenance.''^ In determining the distance between the nearest entrance of the church and the saloon the shortest and most direct dis- tance between the two points must be taken, without regard to the way the streets run between them.^ Such is the case under an act of Congress '^ forbidding the sale of liquor within one mile of the soldiers' home property located in the District of Columbia — the measurement to be made in a level plane from the outside walls of the enclosure in a straight line, and not by the shortest avenue of travel between the nearest entrance and the place to be licensed.^ In the case of a church it was held from the nearest point of the church edifice.'' If there is any serious doubt which of two places is the actual entrance, the courts will usually hold that the one within the prohibited distance is the one and prohibit the maintenance of the saloon.^'' Where a special statute forbade the sale of liquor within three miles of a specially named church, and after its enactment a new church building was erected, it was held that the new building must be accepted as the point */n re Zinzow, 18 N. Y. Misc. 137 Mass. 572; Commonwealth v. Eep. 653; 43 N. Y. Supp. 714. Heaganey, 137 Mass. 574; In re 5 In re Cheney, 35 N. Y. Misc. Lewis, 26 X. Y. Misc. Eep. 532; Eep. 598; 72 N. Y. Supp. 134; 57 N. Y. Supp. 676. Meyer v. Baker, 120 111. 567; 12 7 26 U. S. Stat, at Large, 797. K. E. 79 ; Kramer v. Marks, 64 s United States v. Johnson, 12 Pa. St. 151. App. D. C. 92; In re Veeder, 31 6 7m re Liquor Tax Certificate, N. Y. Misc. Eep. 569; 65 N. Y. 23 N. Y. Misc. Eep. 446; 51 N. Y. Supp. 517. Supp. 281; Commonwealth v. o Geo v. Board (X. J. L.), 63 Jones, 143 Mas^. 573; 8 X. E. Atl. 870. 603; In re Liquor Locations, 13 lo/n re Finley, 58 X. Y. Misc. E. I. 733; Commonwealth v. Ev- Eep. 639; 110 X. Y. Supp. 71. tr.son, 140 Mass. 434; 5 X. E. See Commonwealth v. Whelan, 134 155; Commonwealth v. Jenkins, Mass. 206. 593 ISSUANCE 01'\ LI'JENSES. §377 from which to begin the measurement of the three mile limit.'' If the statute prohibits sales within three miles of two churches, then a sale within the limit of one of them though more than three miles from the other is prohibited.'^ Where the statute forbids sales within three miles of a named rail- road during its construction, the zone covered by this three miles was construed to be a moving one and to apply only to that part of the road under construction for the time being.''' Subterfuges to evade the statute are usually unsuccessful. Thus, where a person licensed to sell liquor just beyond the prescribed limits, cut an opening between it and his adjoining building and rented the latter for saloon purposes, it was held that this was a clear invasion of the terms of the statute.'* Sec. 377. Saloon near schoolhouse. Where a statute forbade sales within a certain distance of any academy, university or institution of learning, it was held that it did not apply to a public school supported by the instate V. Eaves, 106 N. C. 752 11 S. E. 370. 12 Carlisle v. State, 91 Ala. 1; 8 So. 386. 13 State V. Hampton, 77 N. C. 52G. While a number of the cases cited are instances of illegal sales, yet they are applicable to the granting of licenses; for as the sales were prohibited by statute, no license could make them legal. Alvon V. Pawtucket (R. I.), 16 Atl. 1047. i*7n re Place, 27 N. Y. App. Div. 561; 50 N. Y. Supp. 640. A statute forbidding the grant- ing of a license to sell liquors in a place of amusement, does not forbid the granting of a license for a part of the premises not having any communication be- tween it and the other part. In re Martz, 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 521. In Rhode Island a statute for- bade the granting of a license for a saloon where the owners of the greater part of the land within 200 feet of the site objected. This was held to include land in an- other State within the two hun- dred feet limit; and objections filed by those residing in the granting State owning the greater part of the land within 200 feet was not sufficient. American Woolen Co. v. North Smithfield, 28 R. I. 546; 6'8 Atl. 719. An ordinance which provides that no new saloon should be lo- cated within 500 feet of a church, hut leaves the old saloons free to carry on the business, is void. Mandeville v. Bard, 111 La. 806; 35 So. 915. §377 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 594 State, even though taught in a building formerly used as a college.^^ A school building having a library room in which charitable, temperance and religious societies meet, paying a nominal rent, is still a building occupied "exclusively" as a schoolhouse.^" In some States, even though no statute cover the subject, the licensing board may refuse a license for a saloon to be located near a public school/' Where a statute forbids the location of a saloon within two hundred feet of a parochial or public school, nor "in such proximity to a char- itable institution as may be detrimental to the same," a parochial school supported by private funds is such an institu- tion as the statute covers/** Under such a statute the licensing board have a discretion to renew a license where the statute permits a renewal ; but it is held that no place is suitable for a saloon which is so near a charitable institution building that isBlackwell v. State, 36 Ark. 178. 16 7n re Lyman, 48 N. Y. App. Div. 275 ; 62 N. Y. Supp. 846. 17 7n re Curtin, 19 Vict. L. R. 12; 14 Austr. L. T. 228; Eslinger V. East, 100 Ind. 434. "In de- termining the fitness or unfitness of an applicant, it was proper for the board of commissioners to take into account the place where he desired to sell intoxicating liquors, its proximity to the court house, schoolhouse, churches and all other surroundings, for the reason that it might be that only a man possessed of an extraordi- nary degree of circumspection and caution could fitly conduct the business at that place on account of the situation and surround- iiigs." State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439; 44 N. E. 469; Haggart v. Stethlin, 137 Ind. 43; 35 N. E. 997; 22 L. R. A. 577; Harrison V. People, 222 111. 150; 78 N. E. 52; Queen v. McPheraon, 24 Nov. Sco. 378; In re Quinn, 32 Nov. Sco. 542. The same rule was applied to a reformatory for girls, though there was a wall ten feet high between the saloon site and the reformatory grounds. Kretzmann V. Dunne, 228 111. 31; 81 N. E. 790; affirming 130 111. App. 469. Under a power enabling a park board to forbid any ofTensive busi- ness within a certain distance of a park, it may forbid a saloon. In re Arszman, 40 Ind. App. 218; 81 N. E. 680. A statute prohibiting sales of liquor within half a mile of any "building premises or land," oc- cupied by a State hospital, in- cludes a garden kept by the State hospital on contiguous premises owned by it. Such a statute is liberally construed. In re Brady (N. Y.), 106 N. Y. Supp. 921. 18 Appeal of Schusler, 81 Conn. 276; 70 Atl. 1029. 595 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. § 377 it will be detrimental to the interests of the institution; and the fact that the site for the parochial school was bought after the saloon had been located did not deprive the licensing board of its power to refuse to renew the license. ^^ A saloon and a sehoolhouse were situated within a triangle formed by three streets, A, B and C. and within four hundred feet of each other. The saloon stood on a lot on C street, and this lot ran through to A street, the latter having a lower grade than C street, so that there was a cellar basement in the building with doors opening into the lot on A street side, where the building was thirty feet distant from the street. The barroom in the building opened into a common hallway, from which stairs led into the basement. The sehoolhouse faced an angle made by the junction of A and B streets, and had entrances from both, the lot being inclosed by a fence with a gate at the entrance from each street. It was held that it was competent for the .jury to find that the saloon and sehoolhouse were on the same street, and that being true they were within less than four hundred feet of each other.-** Where a statute forbade the location of a saloon within two hundred feet of a sehoolhouse, but provided that it should not apply to buildings then in existence and used respectively for school and saloon purposes, and the business of saloon keeping in the building having been abandoned, after the passage of the statute, by the proprietor, who was a lessee of the building and who removed therefrom leaving such build- ing vacant, it was held that thereafter a new saloon could not be established in such building, not coming within its ex- ception.-' Such a statute does not apply to a nurse training school.-- 19 Appeal of Schusler, supra. 21 /,} re Lewis, 26 N. Y. Misc. Evidence of a renewal of an- Rep. 532; 57 N. Y. Supp. 676. other license for a place near the See also In re Heming (N. Y.), school was held in this case im- 117 N. Y. Supp. 747. material; for the board was un- What evidence is sufficient to fettered by what had been done show a school is a public school, in dealing with any other appli- see Commonwealth v. Whelan, 134 cant for a renewal. Mass. 206. 20 Commonwealth v. Heaganey, -- flatter of Townsend, 129 N. 137 Mass. 574. Y. App. Div. 909; 114 N. Y. Supp. 1149. §§ 378, 379 TRiVFFic in intoxicating liquors. 596 Sec. 378. Saloon near fair or factory. Where a statute forbade sales within a certain distance of an agricultural fair, it was said that a place where manu- factured and agricultural products were received and placed on exhibition for the purpose of awarding premiums for their excellence was an agricultural fair, although conducted for a profit.-^ Inasmuch, however, as an agricultural fair is of a temporary character, the question whether a license shall be granted within a certain distance of it is not covered by statutes ; it is usually a sale of lic^uor within a certain distance that is prohibited; and when that is the case even a licensed saloon keeper may not sell liquor when the fair is being held.-* Where a statute forbade sales within a prescribed distance of a factory, and a mortgage on it was foreclosed and the factory sold to others, the prohibition was held to still continue, not being personal to the original ownership.-^ Sec. 379. Saloon in resident part of city. Statutes occasionally are enacted forbidding the location of a saloon in a residence part of a city or town. Thus, a statute authorized a municipality to exclude sales of liquors from "the suburban or residence portion of such city, and confine the places where such sales may be made to the business por- tion of such city," and an ordinance adopted in pursuance of this power thus given declared that it should "be unlawful for any person or persons to sell any intoxicating liquors to be used in or upon the premises in the residence portion of said city of Muncie, but all such sales shall be excluded from such portions of such city, and all places where such sales may be made shall be confined to the business portion thereof." The statute was not questioned, but the ordinance, it was con- tended, was invalid because vague, and because it did not define the residence and business portions of the city. The court, however, did not agree with the contention, holding the ordinance valid, and also holding that what was a resi- 23 state V. Long, 48 Ohio St. 24 Heck v. State, 44 Ohio St. 609; 28 N. E. 1038. 536; 9 N. E. 305. 26 Ashurst V. State, 79 Ala, 276. 597 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. § 379 dence portion of a city was a question of fact for the court ; and the same was true of the business portion.-*' In a subsequent case the ordinance defined the resident and busi- ness portions of the city by specific boundaries; and it was held that the city could do this, but it was also held that the ordinance was only prima facie evidence of what territory within the resident boundaries was a resident territory, and that evidence was admissible to show that it was not, the coun- cil not being- able to define conclusively what was and what was not the resident portion of a city. The court took occasion to say that the words "residence" and "suburban" did not mean the same thing, saying: "The suburban portion of a city is the outlying part, that portion which is remote from the center of trade and population, where the houses are, generally, more or less scattered, and where many of the im- provements and advantages enjoyed by the central and more densely populated parts of the city are wanting. The suburban part of a city may be used for business, or it may be occupied by residences, or it may be used for both resi- dence and business purposes. But in either case, police sur- veillance and protection are usually less thorough and efficient than in the central parts of the city, and, however occupied, the same reasons exist for excluding from such portions of the city places of resort and offensive occupations which may breed disorder and threaten the quiet and safety of the neigh- borhood.""^ Where a statute foi-bade the granting of a license for a saloon to be located in a "purely residential part of a town," it was held a portion of a street, eleven hundred feet long, having- thereon fifty-eight buildings, such portion of the street being very thickly settled, the houses small and for the most part occupied by Italians and negroes, this por- tion of the street containing four small groceries in buildings occupied also as dwellings, and also containing two licensed saloons, was not such a portion of the city as the statute defined.-^ 26 Shea V. Muncie, W^ Ind. 14: 27 Rowland v. Greencastle, 157 4G N. E. 13S. Tiid. 591; 62 N. ¥.. 474. Such a statute is constitutional. 2s Appeal of Hewitt, 70 Conn. Andreas v. Beaumont (Tex. Civ. 085; 58 Atl. 231. App.), 113 S. W. 614. As to discrimination in the § 380 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 598 Sec. 380. Moral qualification of applicant. Statutes not infrequently require the licensee to be a man of good moral character,-^ or forbid the granting of a license to a person not fit to be entrusted with the sale of intoxicating liquors, or to a person in the habit of becoming intoxicated. Such is the case in Indiana.'*' Under the Indiana statute the fitness of the applicant is a question of fact,"^ and a witness cannot usurp the right of the court or board or jury hearing the application by stating that the applicant is or is not a fit person.-''^ The applicant's unfitness may be proven by specific acts of immorality and by the kind of saloon he formerly kept or is then keeping.^^ It may be shown that he has violated the criminal laws of the State.^* But a single con- viction of an applicant of having violated the liquor laws does not necessarily show that he is an unfit person to be licensed."'^ Immoral conduct covers other kinds of immorality than the habit of becoming intoxicated and may be made the grounds of a remonstrance.^'^ Thus, as bearing on this ques- tion, it may be shown that the saloon will be located near a school or college, as evidence from which the court or jury may determine of his fitness to there sell liquors. ^'^ But the court cannot say to a jury trying the question that a single amount of licenses between places 34 Groscup v. Rainier, 111 Ind. being void, see Howard v. State 361; 12 X. E. 694; Bronson v. (Fla.), 47 So. 963. Dunn, 124 Ind. 252; 24 N. E. 749; 29 Character means the estima- Hardestj' v. Hine, 135 Ind. 72; 34 tion in which a man is held by N. E. 701; Bourjohn's Applica- those who are acquainted with tion, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 33; Meitz- him. Leader v. Yell, 33 L. J. M. ler's Application, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. C, p. 233. Rep. 37 ; Appeal of Wright, 1 Wil- 30 Burns R. S. 1008, §§8319, cox, 85. 8324. 35 Golden v. Bingham, 61 Ind. 31 Reiser v. Lines, 57 Ind. 431; 198. But frequent violations are Ilardesty v. Hine, 135 Ind. 72; 34 sufficient. In re Quirck, 17 Pa. K E. 701; Pelley v. White, 14] Co. Ct. Rep. 327. Ind. 688; 41 Ind. 354. 36 Grummon v. Holmes, 76 Ind. 32 Stockwell v. Brent, 97 Ind. 58o; Groscup v. Rainier, 111 Ind. 474. 361; 12 N. E. 694. 33 Stockwell v. Brent, 97 Ind. 37 Eslinger v. East, 100 Ind. 434, 474; Bolton v. Hegner, 82 Neb. 772; 118 N. W. 1096. 599 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES, § 380 act of intoxication shows such immoral conduct as renders the applicant unfit ; nor does it, in fact, show him to be a person in the habit of becoming intoxicated.^*' Occasional drinking does not show the applicant is an unfit person to be licensed.^" If trial of the applicant's fitness is had bj'^ a jury, then the court must not instruct the jury what is necessary to show him to be a fit man to be licensed, for that is a question for the jury.*" The burden is upon the applicant to show that he is not an immoral man and that he is not in the habit of becoming intoxicated, though that involves proof of a nega- tive; and he must produce evidence of those facts if he desires to secure a license unless it is waived or the facts are admitted.*^ And if he shows himself to be such a man he is entitled to his license;*- and it cannot be denied him upon the gTound that anj- man who will engage in the sale of in- toxicating liquors is an immoral man.*^ A common gambler or a man who frequents gambling houses may be denied a license, although not specified under the statute referred to as one of the causes for refusing him a license; but such con- duct may be regarded as acts of immorality." If two petition for a license, the fact that one absconds does not necessarily defeat the application of the other.*^ Habitual violations of the liquor law are sufficient to defeat the applieation,**^ as are repeated violations of the criminal laws of the State. *^ In Nebraska the statute makes an applicant unfit to receive a 38 Lynch v. Bates, 139 Ind. 206; 43 A juror so thinking is in- 38 N. E. 806. competent to sit on the trial of "9 Calder v. Sheppard, 61 Ind. the application. Chandler v. Rue- 219. belt, 83 Ind. 139. 40 Reiser v. Lines, 57 Ind. 431; ■" Groscap v. Rainier, 111 Ind. Hardesty v. Hine, 135 Ind. 72; 361; 12 N. E. 694; Stockwell v. 34 N. E. 701; Pelly v. Willis, 141 Brent, 97 Ind. 474. Ind. 688; 41 N. E. 354. 45 Polk Co. v. Johnson, 21 Fla. 41 Goodwin v. Smith, 72 Ind. 578. 113; Castle v. Bell, 145 Ind. 8; 4g Brunson v. Dunn, 124 Ind. 44 N. E. 2; Chandler v. Ruebelt, 252; 24 K E. 740. 63 Ind. 139; Regina v. Pilgrim, 47 Bourjohn's Application, 2 Pa. L. R. 6 Q. B. 96; 35 J. P. 169; Co. Ct. Rep. 33; Meitzler's Appli- 40 L. J. M. V.'. 3; 23 L. T. 410; cation, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 37; 19 W. R. 99. Bolton v. Becker, 82 Neb. 772; 42 Miller v. Wade. 58 Ind. 91. 119 N. W. 14. §381 TRAI'FIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 600 license if within a year before his application he has violated the liquor law in a single instance ; and under it a single sale to an habitual drunkard is sufficient to defeat the applica- tion ; *^ and other things tending to show the applicant 's unfit- ness may be shown, though not enumerated in the statute.*^ It may be shown that the applicant jDermitted gambling to be carried on in his premises, or gamblers and dissolute persons to frequent there/** or kept gambling instruments.'^ It is not a sufficient reason, however, for refusing a license, that a former proprietor had violated the law.'- If a corporation can be licensed, the moral character of the applicant is not a question to be considered.'^^ If the licensing board improperly grant a license where the applicant has violated the law that does not prevent it denying a second application because of such violation.'* Sec. 381. Residence of applicant. Statutes require, often, that the applicant be a resident or inhabitant of the State, or even of the licensing district; and that is a jurisdictional fact which either gives or withholds 48 state V. Kaso, 2.5 Xeb. 607 : 41 X. W. 558; State v. Cass Co., 12 Xeb. 54; 10 X. W. 571; Liv- ingston V. Corey, 33 Xeb. 366 ; 50 X. W. 363; In re Phillips, 82 Xeb. 45; 118 X. W. 1098. 40 State V. Hanlon, 24 Xeb. 608 ; .•59 X. W. 780. soStockwell V. Brent, 97 Incl. 474; Bolton v. Hegner, 82 Neb. 772; 118 X. W. 1096; Hardesty ■V. Hine, 135 Ind. 72; 34 X. E. 701 ; Woods V. Garvey, 82 Xeb. 776; 118 X. W. 1114. siPelley v. Wills, 141 Ind. 688: 41 X. E. 354. ^- Appeal of Dorbemeck, 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 99; 38 WTcly. X. C. 90. 53 In re Prospect Brewing Co., 127 Pa. 523; 17 Atl. 1090; 24 W. N. C. 177. 54 Louisville v. Hendricks (Ky.), 116 S. W. 747. In this ease it was held that a board was not justified in rejecting an applica- tion because the applicant had kejit a disorderly house on one day by permitting disorderly per- sons engaged in election frauds to assemble on election day in his saloon; for the keeping of a dis- orderly house on one day was not evidence that a disorderly house was kept within the statute; see also United States v. Johnson, 12 App. D. C. 545. Where the applicant must be a taxpaying male citizen, that fact he must show to get a license. State V. Cooper County, 66 Mo. App. 96, 601 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES § 382 jurisdiction to or from the licensing board. A license granted in violation of the statute in this respect is void, not voidable, although if granted the presumption is that the licensee was a proper person to receive it.^^ Sec. 382. Remonstrance. The form and substance of a remonstrance is seldom regu- lated by statute ; but the terms of the statute not infrequently require certain specifications to be made in order to defeat a license. Of course, the remonstrance must be presented to the licensing board, and not infrequently it must be filed a certain length of time before the date of hearing. This is eminently fair; for, as the remonstrance usually brings forward new matter — matter not stated in the application, or only inci- dentally stated— the applicant ought to be given time to meet the charges made in it against him. Where a statute required that an application for a license should lie over for a month "for consideration and the reception of counter petitions," it was held that after the month thus rcciuired a counter petition may be presented, but it must be done before the license is granted."'" Nor can a remonstrance be filed on appeal ; " but it may be amended by making the objections more specific and by adding new specifications under the original objections, where no new parties are introduced.^** If there be only a 55McGee v. Beal, 03 Miss. 455; fnd. App. 329; (v8 N. E. 929; 70 People V. Davis, 45 Barb. 494; N. E. 999. Sunday must be 36 N. Y. 77. iSee State v. Cooper counted as a day. Shaffer v. County, 66 Mo. App. 96; and In Stern, 160 Ind. 375; 66 N. E. re Burns (Ind.), 87 N. E. 1028. 1004; Lee v. Scliull (Ind.), 88 N. 56 Rogers v. Hahn, '63 Miss. E. 521. '578; Flynn v. Taylor, 145 Ind. "'7 Miller v. Wade, 58 Ind. 91; 633- 44 N. E. 540; Conwell v. List v. Padgett, !)6 Ind. 120; Sana- Overmeyer, 145 Ind. 698; 44 N. sack v. Aden. 108 Ind. 5.59; 78 N. E. 548; Vanderlip v. Derby, 19 E. 675; 79 N. E. 457; 80 N. E. Neb. 165; 26 N. W. 707. 151 ; State v. Gorman, 171 Ind. 58; Where a statute allows a re- 85 N. E. 763. monstrance to be filed on a cer- ss Stockwell v. Brent, 97 Ind. tain day, a remonstrator has the 474; Hardesty v. Hine, 135 Ind. whole of such day to file his re- 72; 34 N. E. 701; Bryan v. Jones, monstrance, up to twelve o'clock, 34 Ind. App. 701; 73 N. E. 113*5. midnight. Sexton v. Goodwine, 33 § 382 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 602 single remonstrator and he dismiss his remonstrance on appeal, a new party cannot then appear and file a new remonstrance,^'' nor, in fact, sign the old remonstrance and thus make it his oAvn. Resistance against the granting of a license can only be made by a remonstrance ; "^ and a remonstrance can only be filed for the causes specified in the statute.®^ Its sufficiency may be tested by a demurrer for want of necessary allegations of facts sufficient to constitute a remonstrance, but not by a motion to strike it from the files.*^- The allegations of a remonstrance should be specific, not general. They must set forth the particulars wherein the applicant is not entitled to a license. Thus, to remonstrate simply "on account of im- morality" is not a sufficient allegation. "This may mean the immorality of the applicant or the immorality of the traffic. A remonstrance on the immorality of the applicant, or of his unfitness otherwise to be entrusted with the sale of intoxi- cating liquors, ought to set forth the particulars of the immorality imputed to him, of his unfitness otherwise, with such reasonable degree of certainty as will advise him of the nature of the charge against him, so that he may be able to meet it."^" This ruling was made, it should be observed, where the applicant for a license must have been "a fit person to be entrusted with the sale of intoxicating liquor," and "not in the habit of becoming intoxicated."*^* The remon- strance must be directed against the granting of a license to a particular person, and it cannot be made against the granting of any license ; '^'^ but a remonstrance against the granting of a license to "J W or any applicant" is good as against 59 Miller v. Wade, 58 Ind. 91. 121; 38 N. E. 472; Ehrenfied v. GO Ex parte Miller, 98 Ind. 451; Kenncy, 14 N. Z. L. R. 19. State V. Moniteau, 45 Mo. App. 63 Grummon v. Holmes, 76 Ind. 387. 585. ci Gates v. Hern, 150 Ind. 370; 64 Groscup v. Rainier, 111 Ind. 50 N. E. 299; State v. Moniteau, 301; 12 N. E. ■694; Watkins v. 45 Mo. App. 387; In re Justin, 2 Grieser, 11 Okla. 302; m Pac. 332. Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 22. Contra, 63 State v. Gerharat, 145 Ind. Watkins v. Grieser, 11 Okla. 302; 439; 44 N. E. 469; Massey v. 66 Pac. 332. Dunlap. 146 Ind. 350; 44 N. E. 62 Fletcher v. Crist, 139 Ind. 641; Pize v. Eraser, 17 Ont. Rep. 635. 603 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. § 382 "J. W."®^ But where the statute provided that ''no license shall be granted to any person residing within any town or township where a majority of the freeholders in such town or township shall remonstrate against granting the same," it was held that a general remonstrance against the granting of a license to any one, not naming any person whatsoever, was suffi- cient.^^ But this was a local option law under the right of re- monstrance. Separate remonstrances, identical or not identical, may be filed against the same applicant by different remon- strators.'^^ If a statute reouires the remonstrance to be veri- filed by affidavit, a remonstrance filed without an affidavit will not be considered."'' Where a statute provided "that no license should be granted to authorize the sale of liquors at any building or place where the owners or occupants of the greater part of the land within two hundred feet of such building or place shall file with the board their ob.iection," it was held that it was sufficient to allege "that the undersigned were [are] the owners of the greater part of the property" within that distance. '^° If a remonstrance be filed in time but at the session of the licensing board at which notice was given that it would be heard and the applicant does not bring it on for a hearing, but gives a new notice that it will come up at the next session, the remonstrance remains on file and must be passed upon at such second session. '^^ A single remonstrance against two or more applicants cannot be con- es Thompson v. Hiatt, 145 Ind. Upon a mandamus to compel 530; 44 N. E. 486. (These In- the licensing board to hear a re- diana decisions were under a stat- monstrance, it is no defense to ute providing that on the filing the issuing of the writ that the of a remonstrance, it sliould be remonstrance is untrue; for that unlawful "to grant such license question can only be heard upon to such applicant therefor.") the hearing on the remonstrance. Collins V. Barrier, G4 Miss. 21; State v. Reynolds, 18 Neb. 431; 8 So. 164. 25 N. W. 610; State v. Pearse, 31 C7 Woods V. Pratt, 5 Blackf. Neb. 562; 48 N. W. 391. 377. 70 Lonsdale Co. v. Cumberland, OS Wilson V. Mathias, 145 Ind. 18 R. T. 5; 25 Atl. 655. 493; 44 N. E. 486; Flynn v. Tay- 7i McLaughlin v. Wisler. 28 lor, 145 Ind. 533; 44 N. E. 546. Ind. App. 61; 62 X. E. 73; Rhode «9/n re Palmer, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. Island Perkins, etc., Co. v. Dwyer, 314. 19 R. I. 643; 36 Atl. 2. § 382 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 604 sidered ; a remonstrance must be filed against each applicant.' - In England it may be shown that the applicant had kept a disorderly house."^ The remonstrance need not state the political division for which the application has been made; it is sufficient if it identify the application.'* A remonstrance must be filed with the licensing board; but if sent to the board, and they order it preserved in its files, that is a suffi- cient filing.'^^ AVhere a statute provides that if a majority of the voters of the district remonstrate against the granting of a license to an applicant, no license shall be granted, no grounds or cause of remonstrance need be stated.^'* A remon- strance remains on file after the petition for a license is with- drawn, and on renewal of an application it is applicable thereto and must be considered."^ Where a statute provided that a remonstrance shall be prima facie evidence that the names upon it have been properly and lawfully signed and that their owners qualified to sign the remonstrance unless the right to sign shall be denied by a pleading under the oath of the applicant ; upon filing such a pleading the burden is upon the remonstrators to establish their qualifications as well as the authority of the persons by whom their names were signed and attached to the remonstrance.^^ The use of the initials of the Christian name is sufficient ; ^® and a signa- ture may be corrected, even if signed by an attorney in fact.®" 72Massey v. Dunlap, 146 Ind Eesler (Ind.), 88 N. E. 516; 350; 44 N. E. 641. Beliler v. Adiley (Ind.), 88 N. E. 73Regina v. Miskin Higher, J. 877. J. [1893] 1 Q. B. 275; 5 R. 121; "Rhode Island, etc., Co. v. 67 L. T. 680; 41 W. R. 252; 57 Ovvyer, 19 R. I. 643; 36 Atl. 2. J. P. 263; Cogill v. Queenstown "s Miller v. Reeder (Ind.), 88 21 Juta, 262. X. E. 516; Honey v. Guilaimie 74 Bryan V. DeMoss, 34 Ind. App. (Ind.). 88 X. E. 937. 473; 73 N. E. 156; Bryan v. Jones. to Miller v. Reed, supra; Carel- 34 Ind. App. 473; 73 N. E. 1135. ton v. Rug, 149 Mass. 550; 22 75Moores v. State, 69 Xeb. 653; X. E. 55; 5 L. R. A. 19; 14 Am. 96 N. W. 225. St. Rep. 446. 76 Boomer shine v. Uline, 159 so Miller v. Reed, supra. Ind. 500; 65 X. E. 513; Miller v. 605 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. §383 Sec. 383. Signatures to remonstrance — Power of attorney to sign — Revocation. The remonstrance must be in writing and duly signed by the remonstrator. His signature is essential. But the signa- ture may be written with a pen or pencil or a typewriter, unless a statute prevents the use of the latter. A printed signature is sufficient.*^ An attorney duly authorized by those entitled to remonstrate may execute a remonstrance for them against the granting of a license; and this he may do ])y having his agent or clerk or typewriter sign the remon- strance.**- Under powers of attorney one person may be author- ized to sign the names of remonstrants not only to one remon- strance but to any number of remonstrances. It is not necessary that the power of attorney should be to sign a remonstrance against a particular application, but it may be against any the implement which the signer may use? — a polygraph, for ex- ample or types, or a stamp. * * * The law requires sign- ing merely as an indication and proof of the parties' assent." 1 Opinions of Attorney General, 670. "The typewriter is a modern convenience. The signature made by it was in this case the signa- ture of the attorney, the operator being in fact his agent, exactly as the keys and the types were his agent. It has the same validity as if written by his own hand — indeed, within the meaning of the law, it becomes his proper hand- writing." Ardery v. Smith, 35 Tnd. App. 94; 73 X. E. 840 (cit- ing Nye V. Lowry, 82 Ind. 316; Croy V. Busenbark. 72 Tnd. 48). 82 Ardery v. Smith, 35 Ind. App. 94; 73 N. E. 840; Shaffer v. Stern, 160 Ind. 375; 66 N. E. 1004; Jones v. Nugent, 31 Tnd. App. '697; 67 N. E. 195; McClan- ahan v. Breeding (Ind.), 88 N. E. 69'5. 81 Ardery v. State, 35 Ind. App. 94; 73 N. E. 840; Hamilton v. State, 103 Ind. 96; 53 Am. Rep. 491; Williams v. McDonald, 58 Cal. 527 ; Hancock v. Bowman, 49 Cal. 413; Pennington v. Baehr, 48 Cal. 565; Herrick v. Morrill, 37 Minn. 250; 33 N. W. 849; 5 Am. St. Rep. 841; Mezchen v. More, 54 Wis. 214; 11 N. W. 534. Where a statute required the .Secretary of State to sign war- rants, the Attorney General gave an opinion tliat a warrant printed from a chopper plate with his sig- nature engraved thereon was suf- ficient, saying: "There would be great difficulty in maintaining the proposition as a legal one, that when the law required signing, it means that it must be done with pen and ink. No book has laid down the proposition, or even given color to it. I believe that a signature made with straw dipped in blood would be equally valid and obligatory; and if so, where is the legal restriction on §383 TIL^ITIC IN INIOXICATING LIQUORS. 606 and all applications then pending before the licensing board or at any time thereafter presented without any designation ol the applicants against whom the remonstrances are to be presented. Such a power of attorney continues in force until revoked.^'' In some States, however, the statutes make cer- tain requirements concerning signatures, as where a signature by mark must be attested; and when that is true, unattested signatures cannot be considered.^* A power of attorney ex- ecuted by several persons is several as to each one; and the death of one or more of them does not work its revocation. ^^ A power of attorney to sign the name of the person executing it "to any and all remonstrances against persons who may give notice of an intention to apply for a license and also to sign his name to remonstrance or remonstrances against the granting of a license to any person to sell intoxicating liquors in the township" is an unlimited remonstrance in time, being in the nature of a trust after its acceptance, and is not dis- ss Ludwig V. Cory, 158 Ind. 582; 64 N. E. 14. In this case the power of at- torney was as follows: "Know all men by these presents, that we, the undersigned legal voters of Lawrence Township, Marion Coun- ty, Indiana, have constituted and appointed, and do herebj' constitute and appoint, Perry C. Apple, of Lawrence Township, Indiana, our true and lawful attorney for us, and in our names, place and stead, to sign any and all necessary pa- pers and remonstrances against the granting by the board of com- missioners of Marion County, In- diana, to any applicant therefor, any license to sell spirituous, vinous, malt or other intoxicating liquors under the laws of thei, State of Indiana, with the privi- lege of allowing the same to be drunk on the promises, at any and all places or locations within said Lawrence Township." Sea also Castle v. Bell, 145 Ind. 8; 44 N. E. 2; Coehill v. Reynolds, 156 Ind. 14; 58 N. E. 1029; White v. Ferguson, 29 Ind. App. 144; 64 N. E. 49; Rogle v. Mattox, 159 Ind. 584; 65 N. E. 743; Fried v. Nelson, 30 Ind. App. 1; 65 N. E. 216; Andery v. Smith, 35 Ind. App. 94; 73 N. E. 840; ShalTer V. Stern, 160 Ind. 375; 66 N. ¥. 1004; Cain v. Allen, 168 Ind. 8; 79 N. E. 201, 896; Regdance v. Haines, 168 Ind. 140; 79 N. E. 752. 84 Faber v. Wilder, 70 Ark. 449 ; 69 Ark. 260. A power of attorney to sign a remonstrance may be revoked as 'd past and future signing by filing a revocation with the licens- ing board. Davis v. Affleck, 34 Tnd. App. 572; 73 N. E. 283. sr. Shaffer v. Stern, 160 Ind. 375; 66 N. lii. 1004. 607 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. § 384 cretionary as to its execution. "" But, as a rule, a power of attorney to sign a remonstrance is at an end when the remon- strance, duly signed, is filed with the licensing board or its clerk.*^ Names appended to a remonstrance under a power of attorney may be withdrawn by those executing the power of attorney who authorized their signatures attached thereto, at any time before the licensing board have acted upon the remonstrance.^'^ This may be done by filing with the board a revocation of their signatures. ^^ Such a power is not one coupled with an interest ; and it may be revoked at any time ; ^^ and this may be done by signing another power of attorney authorizing a person to withdraw the signature from the remonstrance."^ But until the power to withdraw the signa- ture has been executed, it is no objection to a person who has remonstrated that he cannot sign the remonstrance be- cause of his having executed a power of attorney authorizing the withdrawal of his name.-'- The revocation of a power of attorney takes place from the time the agent has actual notice of it.^^ Persons who in no way signed a remonstrance cannot withdraw therefrom.*^* Sec. 384. Who may remonstrate. The statutes usually designate who may remonstrate against the granting of a license, and when they do no other person can remonstrate. In Iowa, any citizen may appear and remonstrate or oppose the granting of a license ; ^'^ and in Indiana the board of county commissioners who have refused to grant the license may appear on appeal and oppose its granting.^*^ The remonstrance need not set forth the quali- 86 McClanahoun v. Breeding ^- Miller v. Tlessler, supra. (Ind.), 88 N. E. 695. 93 Honey v. Guilaume (Ind.), 87 Miller v. Resler (Ind.), 88 88 N. E. 937; Behler v. Achley N. E. 516. See Nichols v. Lehman, (Ind.), 89 N. E. 877. 42 Ind. App. 384; 85 N. E. 786. 9* Behler v. Achley (Ind.), 89 88 Lee V. Schull (Ind.), 88 N. N. E. 877. E. 521. 95 Darling v. Boesch, 67 Iowa, 87 Miller v. Ressler (Ind.), 88 702; 25 N. W. 887; Leighton v. N. E. 516. Maury, 76 Va. 865. 90 Miller v. Ressler, supra 96 Murphy v. Monroe Co., 73 91 Miller v. Ressler, supra; Lee Ind. 483. V. Schull (Ind.), 8S N. E. '521. § 384 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 608 fications of the remonstrators ; it need not show that they are voters, or that they constitute a majority of the voters in the licensing district where a majority is necessary to be effective, for a remonstrator cannot know when he signs the remon- strance that the requisite majority will sign it.^^ It need not show the residences of those remonstrating."'* If, pending the proceedings, a remonstrator ceases to possess the qualifications enabling him to sign the remonstrance, his name must be stricken out, although that defeat the whole remonstrance pro- ceedings.-'" If more than one remonstrance be filed, and those signing one of them are not qualified to remonstrate, that one may be stricken out, but it is not error to refuse to do so unless their names are essential to make up the requisite number of remonstrators in order to defeat the application.^ In Rhode Island a railroad company may remonstrate in its corporate name by its superintendent on direction of its general manager who has the right to so direct ; and no formal vote of the board of directors is necessary to authorize him to give such direction.- In Virginia any citizen may remon- strate and appeal, and by so doing he will render himself liable for costs ; ^ and a still later statute allows any person who may feel himself aggrieved the right to object.* It is no objection to a remonstrator that he is personally interested in the result, as where a newspaper proprietor objects that the notice should have been printed in his newspaper, because it had the largest circulation, and not in that of a rival proprietor.' AVhere no statute prescribed the qualifications of the remonstrators it was held that any resident of the territory, or a non-resident who was a taxpayer therein, might »7 Head v. Doelileman, 148 Ind. i Fletcher v. Crist, 1.39 Ind. 145; 46 N. K. 585; Bryan v. 121 ; 38 N. E. 472. Jones, 34 Ind. App. 701; 73 N. 2 Lonsdale Co. v. Cumberland, E. 1135; Little v. Thompson, 24 18 R. I. 5; 25 Atl. 655. Ind. 146; Bryan v. DeMoss, 34 a Leighton v. Maury, 76 Va. 865. Ind. App. 473; 73 N. E. 156. * Lester v. Price, 83 Va. 648; Contra, In re Law and Order So- 3 S. E. 529. ciety, 185 Pa. 572; 40 Atl. 92. s Fell v. Kitchen Bros. Hotel, 08 Bryan V. DeMoss, 34 Ind. App. 57 Xeb. 204; 77 N. W. 344. See 473; 73 N. E. 150. In re Law and Order Society, 185 »9List V. Padgett, 96 Ind. 126. Pa. 572; 40 Atl. 92. 609 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. § 385 remonstrate.'' A statement that the remonstrators are "resi- dents and voters" snfficiently states that they are "legal voters."'^ A statute provided that if a remonstrance signed by a majority of the voters of any township, or ward in any city, shou]d be filed, no license shall be granted, was re- enacted after the Supreme Court had held that remonstrators must be voters of the ward of a city wherein the applicant desired to locate his saloon ; and it was held that it would be presumed the statute was re-enacted with that construction, nothing to the contrary being contained in the amendment.* Sec. 385. Withdrawal of signatures from remonstrance. A remonstrator is not at liberty to withdraw his name from the remonstrance at any time he may see fit. Thus, where the statute provided that, "If, three days before any regular session of the board of commissioners of any county, a remon- strance in writing, signed by a majority of the legal voters of any township or ward in any city, situated in said county, shall be filed with the auditor of the county, against the granting of a license to any applicant for the sale of spiritu- ous, vinous, malt, or other intoxicating liquors, under the law of the State of Indiana, with the privilege of allowing the same to be drunk on the premises where sold, within the limits of said township, or city ward, it shall be unlawful thereafter to grant such license to such applicant," it was held that within this three days period a remonstrant could not withdraw his name; but "until the beginning of this three day period, whether the remonstrance has been placed on file or not, any remonstrator must be deemed to have the absolute right by some affirmative act of his own to fiWatkins V. Grieser, 11 Okla. Furth, 73 Ark. 366; 84 S. W. 302; 66 Pac. 332; Somers v. Vlas- 500; 6'8 L. R. A. 161. ney, 04 Neb. 383; 89 N. W. 1036. Where a remonstrator did not 7 Head v. Doehleman, 148 Ind. testify fully as to his qualifica- 145; 46 N. E. 585. tions, it was held that his dis- 8 Miller v. Givens, 41 Ind. App. qualification might be shown on 401; 83 N. E, 1018. cross-examination. Miller v. Ress- In Arkansas any private citizen ler (Ind.), 88 N. E. 51'6. may remonstrate. Whissen v. § 385 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 610 withdraw his name from such remonstrance. But," added the court, "if this right is not exercised prior to the be- ginning of the first day of this three days' period, it no longer exists."" And the court makes this quotation from a similar case showing the reasons why a remonstrator should not be then allowed to withdraw his name: "This motion came too late. Rights had been acquired and money expended on the faith of the order made upon the first report [in the ditch proceedings], and justice requires that a petitioner should not be allowed to destroy rights which his own act had been the means of creating. The case is not at all like that of an ordinar}' civil action, for, in such a proceeding as this, the public and many persons have a common interest, and he who sets on foot the proceedings cannot be permitted to end it to the injury of the public and others by dismissing the petition." ^" In Arkansas, after petition has been filed for a revocation of an order entered to prohibit the sale of liquors, the petitioners may not withdraw their names, even for good cause shown ; but they may protest against the granting of the praj'er of their own petition on the ground that it does not contain the names of a sufficient number of qualified in- habitants within the territory.^^ If remonstrators have signed the remonstrance by an attorney in fact, they may file a statement with the licensing board, after the remonstrance is filed, revoking the powers of attorney, as to past and future 9 State V. Gerhardt. 145 Ind. v. Godwine, 33 Ind. App. 329; 68 J39 ; 44 N. E. 469 ; Davis v. Affleck, N. E. 929 ; 70 N. E. 99<) ; Wiseman 34 Ind. App. 572; 73 N. E. 283. v. Dugas, 6 Mon. S. C. 133; 6 loCarr v. Boone, 108 Ind. 241; Quebec Q. B. 133; Simpson v. 9 N. E. 110; State v. Reingardt, Commonwealth (Ky.), 97 S. W. 46 N. J. L. 337; In re Sargeant, 404; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 132. 13 Nat. Bank Reg. 144; Noonan n Phillips v. Goe, 85 Ark. 304; V, Orton, 31 Wis. 265; Loving v. 108 S. W. 207. Brackett, 3 Pick. 403; Winslow In Illinois any person consent- V. Newlan, 45 111. 145; White v. ing to the issuance of a license Prifogle, 146 Ind. 64; 44 N. E. may witlidraw his name at any fl26; Sutherland v. McKinney, 146 time before the application is Ind. Ill; 45 N. E. 1048; Conwell finally passed upon. Theurer v. V. Overmeyer, 145 Ind. 698; 44 People, 211 111. '2»6; 71 N. £. !N. E. o4'8; State v. Coleman, 34 997; 113 111. App. 628. Neb. 440; 51 N. W. 1025; Se.xton 611 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES, § 386 acts of such attorney, and withdraw their names from the remonstrance.^- Where a statute gives a remonstrator, until three days before the day set for hearing the application for a license, the right to withdraw his name from the remon- strance, he must exercise his right prior to the beginning of the first day of this three day period." Sec. 386. A majority remonstrance. Statutes sometimes provide that if a majority of the voters or inhabitants of the political district for which a license is sought shall file a remonstrance before it is issued, no license shall be granted ; and in Indiana the statute goes so far as to prevent not only a license issued to the applicant, but one issued to any person for a period of two yeare thereafter, when what is called a "blanket" remonstrance is filed. This is local option under another form, and such a law is consti- tutional.^* Under the Indiana statute the remonstrance must be "signed by a majority of the legal voters of any township, or any ward, in any city situated in" the county wherein the application is made.^"' Under this statute no one but a legal voter of the ward of a city, or of the township, can sign the remonstrance ; ^"^ and the remonstrator need not assign any objection to the applicant nor assign any reason for the objec- tion.'^ A majority of the votei*s of the licensing district must sign the remonstrance ; '^ and when that is done no license can be issued. ^^ This remonstrance need not be filed at the 12 Davis V. Affleck, 34 Ind. App. la Massey v. Dunlap, 14G Inch 572; 73 N. E. 283, 350; 44 N, E. 641, i3iSexton V, Goodwine, 33 Ind, i7 Boomershine v. Uline, 159 App. 329; 68 X. E. 929; 70 X, E. Ind. 500; 65 X. E. 513. See also 999, Davis v. Board, 7 Cal, App, 571; Instate V, Gerhardt. 145 Ind. 95 Pac. 170, 439; 44 X. E. 469; Cain v. Allen, is Moran v. Cregan, 27 Ind. 168 Ind. 8; 79 X. E. 201; Wilcox App. 659; 62 X, E, 61. V. Bryant, 159 Ind, 379; 59 X. E. i9 Wilcox v, Bryant, 156 Ind. 1049; Boomershine v. Uline, 159 379; 59 X, E, 1049; Shaffer v. Ind. 500; 65 Ind, 513; Hoop v. Stern, 160 Ind. 375; 66 N, E. Affleck, 162 Ind, 564; 70 X, E. 1004, See also In re Connors, 978, Temp Wood (Manitoba), 284, 993; 15 Burns K. S. 1908, §8332; Woods v. Pratt, 5 Blackf. 377. Acts 1895, p. 248, §9. § 386 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING L.IQUORS. 612 same session of the licensing board at which the application is made ; but if it is on file when the application is made, no license can be granted."" Under this Indiana statute voters may remonstrate against the grant of a license to any appli- cant or against all applicants; and if a proper number has signed the remonstrance the board of county commissioners — - the licensing board — have no power to proceed any farther, but must refuse a license; and no license can be issued for two years if the remonstrance is a "blanket" remonstrance. Upon filing this "blanket" remonstrance the remonstrators become adverse parties to all subsequent applicants, and each side is entitled to a hearing thereon, the burden being upon the remonstrators to show that a majority of the voters had signed the remonstrance. If an applicant has been denied a license he cannot apply until two years thereafter has expired ; but a new applicant may, and he may contest the validity of a prior remonstrance which the board has held sufficient, for he has not had his day in court. The "blanket" remonstrance cannot be filed until an application for a license has been made, and until the application is made the board has no jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of a remonstrance. Under this statute voters may authorize an agent or attorney to sign for them a special or "blanket" remonstrance. Voters have no right to withdraw from the general or "blanket" remonstrance after the beginning of the three d?rv^ period prior to the commencement of the sessions of the board before which the remonstrance must be filed.^^ 20 McLaughlin v. Wisler, 28 Ind. McKinney, 14G Ind. 611; 45 N. E. App. 61; 61 N. E. 73. 1048; Sexton v. Goodwine. 33 21 Cain V. Allen, 168 Ind. 8; 79 Ind. App, 329; 68 N. E. 929; JV. E. 201; Jones v. Alexander, Davis v. Affleck, 34 Ind. App. 167 Ind. 395; 79 N. E. 368; Ra- 572; 73 N. E. 283; Ragle v. Mat- gadanz v. Haines, 168 Ind. 140; tox, 159 Ind. 584; 65 N. E. 743; 79 N. E. 359, 1085; Anderson v. Lee v. Shnll (Ind.), 88 N. E. Webber, 39 Ind. 443; 79 N. E. 521; Miller v. Resler (Ind.), 88 1055; Kunkle v. Abel. 167 Ind. N. E. 516; Honey v. Guilaiime 434; 79 N. E. 753; State v. Ger- (Ind.), 88 N. E. 937; McClana- hardt, 145 Ind. 439; 44 N. E. han v. 13reedi«g (Ind.), 88. N. E. 469; White v. Prifoglc, 146 Ind. 695. 64; 44 N. E. 926; Sutherland V. 613 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. § 386 If because a majority of legal voters remonstrate against granting a license to an applicant to sell liquors a license is refused, and the applicant appeals, and before the cause is tried in the court to which an appeal was taken a majority of the legal voters file with the county board, as provided by law, a remonstrance against granting licenses to all persons, and that fact is duly presented to the Appellate Court, the appeal of the applicant will be dismissed, thus leaving him Avithout a license.-- Filing a remonstrance on Friday next before the meeting of the county board on the next Monday is soon enough, under the provision requiring the remonstrance to be filed three days before the board meets.-^ This statute provides that ''the number to constitute a majority of voters shall be determined by the aggregate vote east in said to\ATiship or ward for candidates for the highest office at the last election preceding the filing of such re- monstrance, ' ' -* and it is construed to re(iuire the remonstrance to be signed by a majority of the aggregate vote east in the township for candidates at the general election last preceding the filing of the remonstrance where an application is made to conduct a saloon at some place in the township outside of the limits of an incorporated city; but where the applicant desires to obtain a license to operate a saloon in a ward of an incorporated city, then the majority of voters is determined by an aggregate of the vote of that particular w^ard as cast at the general city election preceding the filing of the remon- strance, for the highest municipal office to be filled at such election. The phrase "candidates for the highest office at the last election" means the governor, if a governor was elected at the last State election preceding the filing of the remon- strance, if the applicant desired to obtain a license to sell in a township beyond the limits of an incorporated city; in the event a governor w^as not elected at that election, then the votes cast for Secretary of State become the standard. "When the application is for a license to conduct a saloon in an in- 22 Sanasack v. Ader, 108 Ind. 160 Ind. 375; 66 X. E. 1004; Sex- 659; 7'8 N. E. 675; 79 N. E. 457. ton v. Goodwine, 33 Ind. App. 23 Flynn v. Taylor, 145 Ind. 533 ; 329 ; 68 N. E. 929. 44 N. E, 546 ; Shaffer v. Stern, 24 Acts 1905, p. 248, § 9. §386 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 614 eorporated city, a majority of the legal voters of the ward is determined by the aggregate vote cast therein for mayor at the last preceding election, and in the event no mayor was elected at that election, then the majority is determined in like manner by the vote cast in the ward for councilman.-" The change of the boundaries of a city ward does not pro- hibit the voters therein from remonstrating against an appli- cation, but the voters taken from the ward cannot be counted on the remonstrance, and they should be deducted from the vote of the ward in estimating the total number of voters. The number to be deducted must be ascertained by parol evidence of witnesses who are able to testify who the voters cut off from the ward are.-° If a remonstrator die before a 25 Massey v. Dunlap, 14G Ind. 350; 44 N. E. 145; 46 N. E. 585; Shatler v. Stern, 100 Irul. 375; 66 N. E. 1004; Kunkle v. Abell, 167 liid. 434; 79 N. E. 753. The "last election preceding the tiling of the remonstrance" means a general and not a special election. Kun- kle V. Abell, supra. 26 Abbott V. Inman, 35 Ind. App. 262; 72 N. E. 284. The statute prescribes the form, and all that is necessary is to use the form thus given. (Jain v. Al- len, 167 Ind. 8; 79 N. E. 201, 896; Kagadanz v. Haines, 168 Ind. 140; 79 N. E. 352. An ex parte determination ot the validity of a remonstrance is a nullity. Jones \. Alexander, 167 Ind. 395; 79 X. E. 368. After the decision in Massey v. Dunlap, svpra, the statute was amended so as to read: "The num- ber to constitute a majority of the voters herein referred to shall be determined by the greatest ag- gregate vote Citst in said town- ship or ward for candidates for any office at the last election pre- ceding the filing of such remon- strance." The word "greatest" was inserted before aggregate and "any" substituted for "highest." This was held to require the stand- ard to be that by which the number of voters required to sign the remonstrance in a township must be tested or measured is a majority of the greatest aggre- gate vote cast for all candidates for any particular office at the last preceding election. Where an application is made for a license to sell in a township outside of an incorporated city therein, the test under the section as amended is not now confined alone to the aggregate vote cast at said gen- eral election for all the candi- dates for governor or Secretary ol State, as the case might be, but t!ie test must be the greatest ag- gregate vote cast for all candi- dates for any office, regardless of the rank of such office. The vote cast for candidates upon the State ticket is not alone to be the test; but if the greatest aggregate vote cast at the election is for candi- 615 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. §387 remonstrance is considered, his name cannot be considered in order to make up the requisite number.-' Where a voter may sign an applicant's petition, if he thereafter sign a remon- strance, his name cannot be counted on either side.-* Sec. 387. Day for hearing application, appointing. Statutes prescribe the time, usually, when the application for a license will be heard, as at the next term of the licensing board, or its next sitting as fixed by the statute. Under the English statute notice is given of the place, day and hour when the licensing justices will sit to hear applications; and when they meet they may adjourn over to a time and place, of which notice must be given. -° In some States on filing of dates upon either the State, county or township ticket, such vote, under tlie circumstances, must be the test or standard by which the required number of votes must be measured. In case a general remonstrance is filed a^rainst granting a license in a ward of a city, then the number of remonstrators "must at least constitute a majority of the great- est aggregate or combined vote cast in such ward for all candi- dates for any city oilice, regard- less of the rank of such office, at the last election held preceding the tiling of the remonstrance." Kunkle v. Abell, 1G7 Ind. 434; 79 N. E. 753. When the remonstrance is against granting the license in the township, voters in the towns and cities in the township must be counted in determining the ag- gregate number of voters in the township. Moran v. Creagan, 27 Ind. App. 659; 62 N. E. 61. -' Strydon v. Yiiiidak', 20 Juta, 385. 28 Fotheringham v. George, 19 Juta, 532, Under a Kentucky statute, when a remonstrance is made against the grant of a license, tiie c". People v. Murray, 2 N. Y. App. viding that no license should be Div. 607; 37 N. Y. Supp, 1096. granted unless the board "shall 6 Attorney-General v. Justices, l>e satisfied upon examination 27 N. C. 315. * * * that a license may prop- 7 Miller v. Buncombe Co., 89 N. erly be granted for such sale in C. 171; Hillsboro v. Smith, 110 the place proposed." People v. X. C. 417; 14 N. E. 972; Perkins Dalton, 7 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 558; v. Loux (Idaho), 95 Pac. 694. 28 N. Y. Supp. 491; People v. s Schlandecker v. Marshall, 72 Murray, 38 N. Y. Supp. 177. Pa. 200; In re Reznor Hotel Co., 3 People V. Board, 91 Hun, 269; 34 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 525; Appeal 39 N. Y. Supp. 158. of Mead, 161 Pa. 375; 29 Atl. 21: 4 People V. Mills, 91 Hun, 142; 34 W. N. C. 373; Appeal of Amer- 36 N. Y. Supp. 273; Sharpe v. ican Brewing Co.,' 161 Pa. 378; Wakefield, 60 L. J. M. C. 73; 29 Atl. 22; In re Chuya, 20 Pa. [1891], App. Cas. 173; 64 L. T. Super. Ct. 410; Campbell v. 180; 39 W. R. 551; 55 J. P. 197; Thomasville (CJa.), 64 S. E. 815. Kay V, Oves Darwen, 52 L. J. M. This does not apply to a distil- § 392 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 630 necessity of a wholesale license, the court having no personal knoAvledge of the matter, and there was no objection either to the applicant or his place, it was held that the court had no discretion in the matter and must grant the license.' "Where an ordinance provided that *'if, after due consideration of the same by the board of supervisors," they might act favor- ably upon the petition of the applicant, the phrase "due consideration" was held to mean a consideration of the appli- cation upon its merits, based upon the evidence, and the board held no power to arbitrarily refuse a license without a suffi- cient hearing of the evidence.'" Where a statute provides that no license shall be granted if a majority of the voters remonstrate, when such a remonstrance is filed, with a suffi- cient number of legal names thereto, the board has no dis- cretion, and must refuse the license.'^ But if at an election for license or no license the election results in favor of licenses, then the licensing board or city council have no power to arbitrarily refuse to grant a license.'- But this vote does not take away from the board its discretion to refuse to license an improper person or to license a saloon at an improper place. '^ Discretion to issue a license is a thing that a licensing board — not even a city — can bargain away.'* It is not an ler's license. Appeal of Doyles- 439; 44 N. E. 469; 33 L. R. A. town Distillery €o., 41 VV. N. C. 313. 313. 12 c. B. George & Bro. v. Win- It may be remarked that the Chester, 118 Ky. 429; 80 S. W. cases of In re Pollard, 127 Pa. 1158; 26 Ky. L. Rep. 170. 507; 17 Atl. 1087; and In re Pros- i3 Riley v. Rowe, 112 Ky. 817; pect Brewing Co., 127 Pa. St. 523; 66 S. W. 999; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2168. 17 Atl. 1090, differ from the other i4 State v. Stiff, 104 Mo. App. Pennsylvania cases; but these two 685; 78 S. W. 675. decisions are based upon local stat- In England the discretion of the utes wherein the licensing board justices is limited to four grounds was given no discretion. named in the statute. Ex parte 9 In re Winder, 24 Pa. Co. Ct. Flinn, 68 L. J. Q. B. 1025 [1899]; Rep. 90. 2 Q. B. 607; 81 L. T. 221; 48 W. 10 Reed V. Collins, 5 Cal. App. R. 29; 63 J. P. 740. 494 ; 90 Pac. 973 ; In re Reznor In New York county treasury Hotel Co., 34 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. officials cannot refuce to issue 525. tax certificates where a vote in 11 State V. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. favor of licenses has been taken, 631 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. §392 abuse of discretion to refuse to license a saloon situated neat a church,^'* nor near a post-office and United States court house, or in any locality where children and women visit for proper purposes.'" But where a Hawaiian statute provides "that no license shall be issued for any lodging or tenant house, hotel, boarding house or restaurant to be established or maintained in any location which in the opinion of the executive council is unsuited for the purposes, or which the executive council believes to be objectionable," it was held that it was void, for the reason that it subjected the contractual rights of persons to the arbitrary discretion of the council and contained nothing to guide or control the exercise of its discretion.^^ "Where a city was empowered to issue only two licenses in every half block, and if there were more than two applica- tions for any half block the council should determine which should be accepted on the question of priority of applications ; and there were three applications, the first and third of which were granted; it was held that this fact did not show an abuse of discretion, though the council in acting on the applications did not discuss the priority of filing nor the qualifications of the applicants.^* on the ground that the statement of the town clerk a3 to such vote is legally insufficient. People v. Hamilton, 27 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 360; 58 N. Y. Supp. 959; People V. Hilliard, 28 N. Y. App. Div. 140; 50 N. Y. Supp. 909. 15 Dunne v. Kretzman, 130 ill. App. 469; 228 111. 31; 81 N. E. 790. 16 Jungenheimer v. State Jour- nal Co., 81 Neb. «30; 116 N. W. •964; In re Close & Berry, 2 B. C. 131; Harrison v. People, 222 111. 150; 7'8 N. E. 52, 222. 17 Tai Kee v. Minister of In- terior, 12 Hawaii, 1^64. A city (or officer) having a dis- cretion to grant a license, is not liable for refusing to grant it. Stanstead v. Reach [1899], 8 Quebec Q. B. 276; overruling 8 Quebec C. S. 178. isEergeer v. DcLoach, 121 S. E. 591. Where the statute provided that the county court "shall grant" a liquor license on the applicant bringing hiinself within certain re- quirements; and then declared that on appeal the circuit court "may grant the license," it was held that the latter words meant that the circuit court must grant the license if the applicant, brought himself within the re- quirements, and the statute did not confer upon it arbitrary power. Leighton v. Maury, 76 Va. 865. § 393 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 632 Sec. 393. Character of discretion. A licensing board, however broad a discretion it may pos- sess, cannot act arbitrarily and deny a license. ^'^ The dis- cretion that will justify the refusal of a license must be a legal discretion and exercised in a judicial manner.-" An abuse of discretion may consist in arbitrarily refusing the license where the applicant has decided that the facts exist entitling the applicant to a license.-^ The fact that the number of remonstrants exceeded the number of petitioners for a hotel and a license therein is not conclusive that the license is not a matter of public necessity, its refusal to grant the license does not show an arbitrary use of its discretion.-- The discretion must be a judicial one and not a mere capricious act, regardless of the special circumstances of each applicant.-^ ''Discretion is a science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between right and wrong," it has been said, "between shadows and substance, between equity and color- less glasses and pretense, and not to do according to the will and private affections."-^ "Discretion means," said Lord Halsbury, "something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities, that something is to be done within the rules of reason and justice, and not according to private opinions; according to law and not humor. It is to be not arbitrarily vague and fanciful, but legal and regular."-^ No 19 Appeal of Kelminski, 164 Pa. Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 525; Ensley v. 231; 30 Atl. 301; 35 W. N. C. State (Ind.), 88 N. E. 62; Leigh- 309; Centre Co. License, 9 Pa. ton v. Maury, 76 Va. 865. Co. Ct. Rep. 376; Appeal of Mead, 21 United States v. Douglass, 19 161 Pa. 375; 29 Atl. 21; 34 W. D. C. 99. JSI. C. 373; Appeal of American 22 7^ re Sparrow, 138 Pa. St. Brewing Co., 161 Pa. 378; 29 116; 20 Atl. 711; In re King, 23 Atl. 22. VV. N. C. 152; 16 Atl. 487. 20 Appeal of Doberneck, 1 Pa. 23 Regina v. Boteler, 4 B. & S. Super. Ct. 99; 38 W. N. C. 90; 959; 33 L. J. M. C. 101; 28 J. P. Louisville v. Kean, 18 B. Mon. 9; 453. State V. Durein, 70 Kan. 13; 80 24 Rooke's Case (40 Eliz.), 5 Pac. 987; affirming 78 Pac. 152; Co. Rep. 503; Keighley's Case (7 70 Kan. 1; State v. Sheasley, 71 Jac. 1), 10 Co. Rep. 501. Kan. 857; 80 Pac. 997; State v. 25 sharp v, Wakefield [1891], New Orleans, 113 La. 371; 36 So. App. Cas. 179. 999; In re Reznor Hotel Co., 34 633 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. §393 action lies against a licensing: board for a refusal to exercise its discretion and grant a license.-'' Under the English Act of 1828 ^^ the justices may rightly refuse a new license, on the ground that there are already too many ale houses,-® or that the house is too far removed from police supervision.-^ They do wrong, however, to lay down a rule before hearing the applications, such as they will refuse all licenses, except the party will promise to take out an excise license to sell spirits.^" Nor can they lay down any general rule beforehand to fetter their discretion, for they ought to consider the circumstances of each case independently.^^ They may refuse a license to a person who does not intend to sell under it."- But neither an officer nor a licensing board, though they are endowed with discretionary powers, may refuse a license on the ground of his personal views that the scope of the license law is against public policy.^' 26 Bassett v. Goodchild, 3 Wils. 121. 27 9 Geo. 4, c. Gl. 28 Regina v. Lancashire J. J., L. R. 6 Q. B. 97; 35 J. P. 170; 40 L. J. M. C. 17; 23 L. T. 401; 19 W. R. 204; Regina v. Howard [190::], 2 K. B. 3G3; 66 J. P. 579; 71 L. J. K. B. 754; 86 L. T. 839; 51 W. R. 21; 18 T. L. R. 090. 29 Sharp V. VVakelield [1891], App. Cas. 173; 55 J. P. 197; 60 L. J. Q. B. 209; 64 L. T. 180; 39 W. R. 561; 7 T. L. R. 389. 30 Regina v. Sylvester, 31 L. J. M. C. 93; 26 J. P. 151; 2 B. & C. 322; 5 L. T. 794; 8 Jur. (N. S.) 484. 31 Regina v. Walsall, 24 L. T. (O. S.) Ill; 18 J. P. 757; 3 VV. R. '69; 3 C. L. R. 100. 32 Regina v. Wilkinson, 10 L. T. 370; 28 J. P. 597. 33 In re Indiana Co., 6 Pa. Dist. Hep. 35'8. In New York are some conflict- ing decisions upon the right of licensing commissioners to refuse a license in their discretion. If the highest Appellate Court has settled the question, the decision has not come to our notice. Un- der the law of 1902, c. 401, § 41, no license can be issued if a ma- jority of the voters have voted for prohibition when the question was submitted to them. Without such a vote having been taken, licensing boards refused licenses on the ground that they were elected as "no license" commis- sioners — no statute providing for such an issue — and it was held in a number of cases that they might so refuse. People v. Turner, 4 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 247; 23 N. Y. Supp. 913; judgment affirmed 71 Hun, 614; 24 N. Y. Supp. 1148; People v. Warsaw, 4 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 547; 24 N. Y. Supp. 739; People v. Randolph, 76 Hun, 224; 27 N. Y. Supp. 41. § 394 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 634 Sec. 394. Discretion of municipalities in granting licenses. In the absence of a constitutional inhibition a Legislature may confer upon the municipalities of a State the right to determine the places where saloons may be kept and to deter- mine that question upon each application. In determining such question other considerations than mere locality must often enter into the consideration of the suitableness of the place for a saloon, and if the building be so arranged as to render violation of the law easy, or if the saloon is to be kept in connection with a house of prostitution, or if it be not situated upon a street or alley, or if it be one of the upper stories of a building, or in a part of the city occupied for residence purposes only, or near a school, such conditions would certainly afford good reasons for the rejection of an application for a license.^^ But the rule is that a common council, empowered to issue licenses, has no discretion if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the statute and ordinance.^'"' Yet, in Kentucky it is held that the city authorities have a judicial, though not an arbitrary discretion in refusing a license/'" and so in Mississippi,^" and New York.^^ But a number of decisions are and they had been so occupied to the contrary, holding such a for fifty years, it was hali an decision "arbitrary" and "without abuse of discretion to refuse him good or valid reasons." People v. a license. Louisville v. Gagen •Claverack, 4 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 330; (Ky.), 116 S. W. 745; 118 S. W. 25 N. Y. Supp. 322; People v. 947. iSymonds, 4 N. Y. Misc. Rep. G; s* Sherlock v. Stuart, &6 Mich. 23 N. Y. Supp. 6-89; McXaughton 193; Dunne v. Kretzmami, 130 V. Argyle, 5 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 547; 111. App. 469; affirmed 228 111. 31; 26 N. Y. Supp. "29; People v. 81 N. E. 790 •. Perry v. Salt Lake Brunswick, 13 N. Y. Misc. Rep. City, 7 Utah, 143; 25 Pac. 739, 537; 35 N. Y. Supp. 6.59. 998; 11 L. R. A. 446; McCormick It is no abuse of discretion to v. Pfeifler, 10 N. W. 31. refuse a license for an unsuitab'e 33 Henry v. Barton, 107 Cal. place, though the applicant has 535; 40 Pac. 798; Rome v. Duke, complied fully with all thu stat- 19 Ga. 93; Meyer v. Decatur, 125 utes and possesses the requisite 111. App. 556. moral and other qualifications. -"s Louisville v. Kean, 18 B. Ex parte Abrams (Tex.), 120 S. Mon. 9. W. 883; Ex -parte Clark (Tex.), •" Perkins v. Ledbettor. 68 :Miss. 120 S. W. 892. But where the 327; 8 So. 507. petitioner had occupied the prem- ss In re Nundy, 59 How. Pr. 359. ises with a saloon for ten years, 635 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES §395 A city cannot by ordinance, reserve the power to arbitrarily rpfnsf^ to issue a license.^" refuse to issue a license.^" Sec. 395. Review or control of discretion of licensing board. Where the licensing board or court may exercise a dis- cretion whether it will grant a license, unless arbitrarily ex- ercised, it is not subject to control by a writ of mandamus.*" And this is true, although its reasons for its decisions may be erroneous.*^ And even where an appeal lies from refusal to grant a license, the discretion of the board in refusing the license is not reviewable.^- But if there has been a manifest and arbitrary abuse of the discretion, a court of review will intervene upon that fact appearing of record and set aside the order of refusal;*' and may control their action when 39 Meyer v. Decatur, 125 111. App. 556. In Oklahoma a statute pro- vided that a licensee of a county, on presentation of his license to a city of the first class, should be entitled to a city license; and it was held that a city of that class within the county could not refuse him a city license. Terri- tory V. Robertson (Okla.), 92 Pac. 144. 40 Dunbar v. Frazer, 78 Ala. 538; Ex parte Whittington, 34 Ark. 394; Batters v. Dunning. 49 €onn. 479; State v. Board, 45 Ind. 501; Devin v. Belt, 70 Md. 352; 17 Atl. 375; State v. Carver Co., 60 Minn. 510; 02 N. W. 1135; State V. Hudson, 13 Mo. App. 61; Hamilton Co. v. Bailey, 12 Neb. 56; 10 N. W. 539; People v. Nor- ton, 7 Barb. 477 ; Attorney General V. Guilford Co., 27 N. C. 315; Jones V. Moore Co., 106 N. C. 436; 11 S. E. 514; Maxton v. Robeson, 107 N. C. 335; 12 S. E. 92; In re Knarr, 127 Pa. 554; 18 Atl. 639; In re Collarn, 134 Pa. 551; 19 Atl. 755; 26 W. N. C. 73; Ex parte Yeager, 11 Graft. 655; In re Cramer, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 596; In re Chuya, 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 410; Mathias v. Dulpin Co., 122 N. C. 416; 30 S. E. 23; I. A. West & Co. V. Board, 14 Idaho, 353; 94 Pac. 445; hi re Henry, 124 Iowa, 358; 100 N. W. 43. •11 Ramagnano v. Crook, 85 Ala. 226; 3 So. 845; Wilcox v. Bryant, 156 Ind. 379; 59 N. E. 1049. 42 Appeal of Hopson, 65 Conn. 140; 31 Atl. 531; Nepp v. Com- monwealth, 2 Duv. 546; Raleigh V. Kane, 47 N. C. 288 ; In re Con- way (Pa.), 1 Atl. 727; Appeal of Reed, 144 Pa. 459; 6 Atl. 910; In re Randenbusch, 120 Pa. 328; 14 Atl. 148; French v. Noel, 22 Graft. 454; Ex parte Clark, 69 Ark. 435; 64 S. W. 223; In re Friedman, 7 Pa. Super. Ct. 639. 43 Nepp V. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. 546; Hoglan v. Common- wealth, 3 Bush, 147; Thompson v. Koch, 98 Ky. 400; 33 S. W. 96; 17 Ky. L. Rep. 941; In re Excise License (N. Y.), 38 N. Y. Supp. 425. § 396 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 636 there has been a refusal, by a Avrit of mandamus.*^ If the board or court has a discretion in the issuance of a license, it cannot be prevented from issuing it by an injunction.'*^ And where a writ of certiorari lay to reverse a board's action where the license had been "arbitrarily or unreasonably re- fused, ' ' it was held that the hearing must be on the writ, the return, and the papers on which the writ was granted, and the commissioners having stated in their return that they had determined by a majority vote not to grant any license to the applicant, their action could not be reversed because the ques- tion of issuance rested in their discretion.*® It is immaterial that the voters of the licensing district have expressed them- selves favorably to the issuance of the license; if the board has a discretion in issuing it, their action will not be reviewed.*^ If a superior court undertakes to interfere with the discretion of the licensing board or court, a writ of prohibition will lie from the Supreme Court to restrain the interference by supersedeas and ^vrit of error.*^ Sec. 396. Reasons for refusal. The licensing board should refuse to grant an application where it is not signed by a sufficient number of voters, and if there Be any serious questions whether some of those sign- ing are not legal voters, and by deducting their names from other signers the application would not be signed by a suffi- cient number of legal voters, their action will not be con- trolled by a writ of mandamus.*® An habitual drunkard who had kept a saloon as a disorderly house and is incapable of keeping a saloon, should be refused a license. °'* A single act 44 Zanone v. Mound City, 103 Schomaker, 15 >J. Y. Misc. Rep. 111. 552; Heblick v. Hancock Co. 048; 38 N. Y. Supp. 167. Ct. (Ky.), 10 S. W. 465. *' Maxton v. Robeson Co., 107 45 Leigh V. Westervelt, 2 Duer. N. C. 335; 12 S. E. 92. 618; Ailstock v. Page, 77 Va. 386; 48 Ailstock v. Page, 77 Va. 386. Nasi V. Eden, 89 Wis. 610; 62 49 state v. Sumter Co., 22 Fla. X. W. 409. 364. 46 People V. Montgomery (N. ^o Bronson v. Dunn, 124 Ind. Y.), 25 X. Y. Supp. S73; see) 252; 24 N. E. 749; Perkins v. In re Bloomingdale, 72 N. Y. St, Loux, 14 Idaho, 607; 95 Pac. 694; S50; 38 X. Y. Supp. 162; In re In re Klamm (Neb.), 117 N. W. 991. 637 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. § 396 of intoxication in a public place, tliongh a misdemeanor, will not justify a refusal of a license, if there be no other objec- tions to the applicant."^ Where, on appeal, a trial of the application is had by a jury, the question of the applicant's fitness is one for the jury and not for the court.'- If the ap- plication be for a druggist's license to sell liquors it should be denied if it appear that the applicant merely assumed the vocation of a druggist in order to secure a license to retail liquors. •'^' In such an instance the application must be made in good faith or it will be denied. So the license may be denied if it be shown that the applicant had sold liquors to minors, knowing them to be such, or on Sundays, or kept a gambling and disorderly house within a year or less before the date of the application, or did all those unlawful acts, and an answer to that effect in an application for a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of the license is sufficient.^* It ha.s been held that although by statute it was made the duty of the board to refuse an application for a license if such illegal acts were shown, yet that did not limit the board in making a refusal, for it might refuse it on other sufficient grounds.^"' In the same State from which these cases are cited it was made a misdeameanor to sell adulterated liquor. On an application a chemist testified that he had analyzed a glass of whisky applicant had sold within a year before (the stat- utory limitation), and found that it contained common sugar, charcoal (which might have come from the barrel), fusel oil, and tannate of iron; that the iron was an extraneous mat- ter, the fusel oil resulted from the process of distilling; 51 Lynch v. Bates, 1.39 Ind. 206; Neb. 607; 41 N. W. 558; Living- 38 N. E. '806. ston v. Corey, 33 Xeb. 366; 50 N. 52Groscup V. Rainier, 111 Ind. W. 263; In re Quirk, 17 Pa. Co. 361; 12 N. E. 694; Hardesty v. Ct. Rep. 327; In re Bailey, 5 Pa. Hine, 135 Ind. 72; 34 N. E. 701; Dist. Rep. 172; In re Rutherford, Lynch v. Bates, 139 Ind. 206; 38 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 78; In re N. E. 806; Pelley v. Wills, 141 Meredith, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 82; Ind. 688; 41 N. E. 354. In re Adamek, 82 Neb. 448; 118 53 Evans v. Commonwealth, 95 N. \V. 109. Ky. 231; 24 S. W. 632. ^^ State v. Hanlan, 24 Xeb. 608; 54 State V. Cass Co., 12 Neb. 54; 39 N. W. 780. 10 N. W. 571 ; State v. Koso, 25 § 396 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 638 that the whisky had been thinned with water, and sugar was not a part of pure whisky. It was held that, although only a single sale was shown, the license must be denied.'"'" It has been held, where the application and license had to specify the place where the saloon would be located, that a covenant in the deed of conveyance prohibiting the sale of liquors on the premises was good ground for refusing the license ; ■''' and it has also been held that it was not."'^ Where the application was for a license to sell liquors in an amusement building which was used for amusements only a part of the time, during which it was illegal to sell liquors therein, it was held improper to refuse a license merely because it was an amusement building.'" And although a hotel may be needed at the place for which a license is applied (which in- cluded the right to sell liquors at retail), „ which must be shown before the license could be granted, yet if it be shown that the applicant has violated the law his application must be re-; fused."'' Where a license had been refused a year before, and the situation was not changed, that was held a sufficient reason for refusing it a second time."^ The fact that the applicant is not a resident of the licensing district is no reason for refusing him a license unless the statute requires him to have his residence there.*'- A distiller's license to sell at whole- sale in a certain city has been refused on the ground that his distillery was not there located, the distillery was not nec- essary, the applicant Avas not doing a legitimate business, and a former occupant had violated the liquor laws."^ The fact 56 Livingston v. Corey, 33 Neb. Rep. 584;' Appeal of D'Amato, 80 3m; 50 N. W. 2(53. Conn. 357; &8 Atl. 445. 57 In re Snyder, 2 Pa. Dist. ^- Appeal of Dorbeneek, 1 Pa. 785; In re Fanning, 23 Pa. Super. Super. Ct. 99; 38 W. N. C 90. Ct. 622; Jn re Trotter, 24 Pa. ^^In re Johnson, 165 Pa. 315; Super. Ct. 26. 31 Atl. 203. 58 Barnegat, etc., Ass'n v. Busby, Subsequently it was held that 44 N. J. L. 627. the requirements that the place 50 People V. Woodman, 5 N. Y. licensed must be necessary for the; St. Rep. 318. accommodation of the public had 60 Appeal of Wright, 1 Wilcox no application to a distiller's li- (Pa. ), 85; Apjx-al of Leister, 20 cense. Appeal of Gemas, 169 Pa. W. N. C. 224. 43; 32 Atl. 88; 36 W. N. C. 367. 81 in re Johnson, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 639 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. §396 that an applicant's bartender has violated the liquor laws without the applicant's consent or knowledge is not sufficient ground upon which to deny him a license.*^* If the evidence shows that the applicant is seeking a license for two places of business — as where he has two adjoining houses with a passageway between them, with separate front entrances — a license may be refused."^ So if he already has a license.*^^ If a statute forbids a second application within a year, when a refusal of a license has been made, if a second application be made there must be an absolute refusal.''" But it is not a suffi- c4Pelley v. Wills, 141 Ind. 688; 41 N. E. 354. In Pennsylvania, in the absence of the absolute necessity for a hotel being licensed, the prevail- ing sentiment against a license being granted must prevail. In re Smith, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 74; In re Justin, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 22; In re Bailey, 5 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 172. If the evidence be evenly divided, it must be granted; and it cannot be refused on evidence of general disorder in the neigh- borhood, unless the applicant be connected with the disorder. In re Helling, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 76; In re Meredith, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 82. In this State, if two apply for licenses, at the same place, and there be many remonstrants against one house and only a few against the other, that is evidence of the necessity for a house there and of the good character of the latter applicant. In re Meredith, 2 Pa. Cr. Ct. Rep. 82. If two ap- ply for a license to sell liquor in the same hotel, and one is grant- ed and the other continued, on failure of the one securing the li- cense to take it out, the other may be gi-antod it for the remainder of the licensing year on payment of the necessary part of the fee. In re Russell, 1 1 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 505. If there be a general request for licensing a house, a license will be granted; and that request may be shown by the signature to a pe- tion for it. In re Brandlinger, 11 ]Montg. Co. L. Rep. 93. The word "necessary," refusing a license to be granted for a hotel when "necessary" is not construed in the strict sense of the word. In re Erie Licenses, 4 Pa. Dist. Rep. 167. See In re Philadelphia Licenses, 4 Pa. Dist. Rep. 201. But the judges may deny it on his individual opinion that it is not necessary. In re Thomas, 169 Pa. HI; 3 Atl. 100. In re Gerstlauer, 5 Pa. Dist. Rep. 97. 65 Papworth v. Goodnow, 104 Ga. 653 ; 30 S. E. 872 ; In re Mertz, 12 Super. Ct. Rep. 521. 66 State V. Bonnell, 119 Ind. 494; 21 X. E. 1101. See Ott- man v. Young, 12 Hawaii, 303. 87 White V. Atlantic City (N. J. L.), 42 Atl. 710; Hensley v. Met- calfe Co., 115 Ky. 810; 74 S. W. 1054; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 204; Ap- peal of D'Amato, 80 Conn. 357; 68 Atl. 445. A license caonot be refused be- § 397 TRAFFIC ]N INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 640 cient ground for a refusal that the applicant "made a promise last year not to apply for a license this year."®^ In his dis- cretion a mayor of a city may refuse to license a saloon situated near a church.''-' Where a statute provided that "due regard" must be had in granting a license as to the character of the persons petitioning for a license and their number, this was held to include the personal knowledge possessed by the mem- bers of the board, the testimony of witnesses, and the oppor- tunities the rcmonstrators and petitioners had to know the things about which they made representations or state- ments.'" If the applicant is the owner of a building for which he seeks a license, and he has permitted the law to be there violated by his tenants in the conduct of the liquor business, when he had the legal right and power to prevent it, he may be denied a license; for he is not a fit person to hold a license.''^ Sec. 397. Unsuitable buildings or plaxies. In almost every State and country statutes specify in what kind of houses liquors shall not be sold, and prescribe the kind of houses in which they may be sold. And these statutes ex- tend so far, often, as to provide that before a license will be granted for a place a house must be in existence, of a certain kind and structure. In England, in addition to these require- ments, houses, to be licensed, must be of a certain annual rental value, according to the population.^- In addition to that no one can obtain a license unless he submit a plan of his premises to the licensing justice.'" In addition to this cause a requisite affidavit attached '^o In re Reznor Hotel Co., 34 to a petition is not made before an Super. Ct. 525. officer of the county, unless there ^i Appeal of ^Michael, 63 Conn. be an order of court previously 583. adopted requiring it. In re Brew- 72 Licensing Act 1872, 35 and 36 ing Co., 14 Pa. Super. Ct. 188. Vict. 94, §§45 to 47; Patterson's 68 /» re Donoghue, 5 Pa. Super. Licensing Acts (10 ed. ), pp. 428 to Ct. 1 ; 40 W. N. C. 440. 433. «9 Dunne v. Kretzman, 130 111. 73 Licensing Acts [1902] 2 Edw. App. 469; affirmed, 228 lU. 31; 81 7 c. 28, § 11; Patterson's Licensing N. E. 790. Acts, p. 601. 641 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. § 397 certain alterations in the premises cannot be made without their consent, and all applications for renewals must also be accompanied by a plan of the licensed premises. Before this act of 1902 "the power of justices to require structural alter- ation in licensed premises was not in a satisfactory state. Where the discretion to e,rant or refuse either new licenses or renewals was unlimited, some benches took advantage of this power to enforce structural alterations An applicant was informed that unless he made certain alterations his appli- cation for renewal would probably be refused on the next occa>:!ion. But the legality of this course was open to ques- tion ; for the power to grant or refuse an order does not imply a power to make a conditional order. " ^* Under the Eng- lish law now justices have full control over the structure of licensed premises.'^ The statute specifically provides that on renewal of a license the justice "may by order direct that within a time fixed by the order such alterations as they may think reasonably necessary to secure the proper conduct of the business shall be made in that part of the premises where intoxicating liquor is sold or consumed." A failure to make the alterations subjects the licensee to a fine each day he neg- lected to comply with the order. In one instance on applica- tion for a renewal, the licensing justice ordered that a back entrance to one of the passages in the licensed premises be closed by a substantial gate, with a lock, the key to be kept by the licensee or the owners of the premises, the gate not to be opened except for the purpose of delivering beer, casks, or other goods when necessary, or for private use by the tenant or his household only; and that all lamps, notices, or boards describing this entrance as a backway or entrance to the licensed house should be removed. No liquor was in fact sold at or near the back entrance or in the passageway to it, nor was it shown, in a prosecution for failure to comply with the order, that any liquor was consumed at the back entrance or in the passageway; but there was nothing to prevent the consumption, the back entrance being used by customers for 74 Patterson's Licensing Acts 2 K. B. 563; 68 J. P. 370; 73 L. (19 ed.), p. 602. J. K. B. 1005; 91 L. T. 1; 52 W. "Bushell V. Hammond [1904], R. 453; 20 T. L. Pv. 413. § 397 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 642 entering or leaving the premises. It was held that the power of the justice under the statute quoted was not confined to that part of the premises where liquor was actually sold or consumed, but included the means of access thereto.''^ So where the licensed premises had doors giving access respective- ly from different streets to a part of the premises where liquor was sold, the justice made an order that one of the doors be kept locked and not used except on the previous order stated above; but here it was held that they had exceeded their au- thority, because the statute referred only to structural alterations." In the first of these cases undoubtedly the justice could have refused to renew the license, or even grant a new one, if the premises had not been altered to comply with his wishes; while in the other they could not do so. In Rhode Island a statute provided that no license should be granted for the sale o^ liquors in any place except licensed taverns, to which an entrance should not be allowed other than directly from a public traveled way, and it was held that this meant a straight and immediate entrance, and one to a barroom requiring a circuitous or crooked route of travel from the street thereto Avas such an entrance as the statute for- bade.'^^ But when a statute provided that a barroom should be so arranged that all parts of it could be seen from the street or highway; and it also provided that an applicant should in his application "specifically describe the room" and its "exact location,' it was held no objection to the granting of the license that it was not shown to be such a room as all parts of it could be seen from the street or highway, for the applicant was not required to state that fact in his application, and there was therefore no way to try the question ; but if the licensee did not so arrange his room before he sold liquor there- in, he would be liable to fine and punishment. '*' Where a stat- 7oBushelI V. Hammond, supra. P. 438; 73 L. J. K. B. 848; 91 7T Smith V. Port.smoutli, J. J. L. T. 383; 20 T. L. R. 526 [1906), 2 K. B. 229; 75 L. J. K. 7S State v. Conley, 22 R. I. 397; B. 851; 95 L. T. 5; 54 W. R. 598; 48 Atl. 200. 22 T. L. R. 650, rcviTsing 70 J. P. ^o Gates v. Haw, 150 Ind. 370; 157. A3 to appeal, see Rex v. 50 N. E. 299. Bath [1904], 2 K. B. 570; 68 J. In Australia if a licensee make 643 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. § 398 lite required a saloon to be so arranged either with a window or glass door or otherwise that the whole barroom could be seen from the street, it was held that a paved alley sixteen feet wide passing through the middle of the block was not a street, and therefore a saloon could not be located upon it.*° A grant to an applicant to conduct a saloon in a "lower room" of a desig- nated building does not give him the right to conduct a saloon upon the lower floor of that building.*^ A statute of Connecticut, forbidding sales of liquor in any building con- trolled by the State or any "county or town" has no appli- cation to a building controlled by a "city." ^- Sec. 398. Limiting number of saloons. Not infrequently statutes limit the number of saloons that may be located in the licensing districts or within the neigh- borhood. And even that is not the case, if a licensing board has a discretion to grant the licenses, it may refuse one if the neighborhood is already sufficiently supplied. An instance of this is reported in a New York case, where a licensing board refused, in its discretion, to license a saloon on the fourth corner of a street crossing, the other three corners being sa- loons, on the ground that the neighborhood was sufficiently supplied. ^^ And we have seen that under the Pennsylvania statute it must be shown that the hotel for which a license is sought is necessary to the vicinity. These cases need not be a substantial addition to his ute would be so construed in any- building so as to alter its orig- Western State wliere the word inal design, he must take out a "town" is construed as a generic new license. Lagagnanmis v. term. See State v. Craig, 132 Cruikshank, 1 Vict. L. R. 97. Ind. 54; 31 N. E. 352; Indian- 80 State V. Harrison, 1G2 Ind. apolis v. Higgins, 141 Ind. 1; 40 542; 70 N. E. 877. N. E. 671. 81 Price V. Lincoln, 130 Til. sa Poople v. Board (N. Y.), 16 App. 254. N. Y. Supp. 798. See People v. ssApi^eal of Camp, 80 Conn. Dalton, 7 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 558; 272; 68 Atl. 444. 28 N. Y. Supp. 491; People v. This construction put upon the Murray, 38 N. Y. Supp. 177; In word "town" is because of the re McCrary, 31 Pa. Super. Ct. character of towns in Connecti- 192. cut. It is doubtful if the stat- § 398 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 644 cited again. Occasionally a licensing board is empowered to arbitrarily reduce the number of saloons in a neighborhood, by refusing to renew licenses.^^ Statutes limiting the number of licenses that may be granted in a neighborhood are held to apply to retail and not to wholesale licenses ; ^^ and they also refer to the number applied for and not the number when the act went into force.^° If the limit has been reached and a license lapses a new license may be issued in its place.*' Where a statute limited the number in a city, and declared they were to be apportioned among the wards, it was held that no particular number need be granted in a particular ward.''^ Of course, a licensing board, cannot arbitrarily refuse to grant licenses and thereby give those already licensed a monopoly of the retail business,^^* but that question comes un- der the arbitrary use of a discretion. Under a discretion in the granting of a license the city may adopt an ordinance limit- ing the number of licenses it will grant within its limits ; and this power is given it when it is charged with policing and maintaining good order within its boundaries with a specified number of police officers which it may appoint ; for in such an instance it has unusual ground for exercising its discre- tion.^^ So a city may limit the number under a power ex- pressly given by statute.^" In this same State no license must be granted if there be enough for the neighborhood, and no second application can be made for that place during the licensing year, nor by any person who has been denied a license during the year on the ground that he is an unsuit- able person. It was held that a denial of a license on the ground that no license was needed in the neighborhood was a denial on the ground that the place was an unsuitable one.®^ 8* Hewitt V. Invercargill, 12 N. ss Jamieson v. Blaine, 38 X. B. Z. L. R. 631. 508. 85 McKenzie v. Hogg, 13 N. Z. ss* Nor can a city. In re Bro- L. R. 158. die, 38 Up. Can. 580; In re Bar- 86 Bull V. Licensing Justices, 12 clay, 12 Up. Can. 80. Austr. L. T. 82. See Ottman v. 89 /n re Jugenheimer, 81 Neb. Young, 12 Hawaii 303. 83G; 116 N. W. 966. 87 In re Winchester, 8 Austr. L. so In re Bayless, 15 Ont. 13. R. (C. N.), 19. 91 De Amato, 80 Conn. 357; 68 Atl. 445. 645 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. § 399 Sec. 399. Order granting or refusing the license. Perhaps no general rule can be laid down concerning what the order granting or refusing the license should contain. That is a matter almost wholly statutory, if not entirely so, depending upon the particular statutory provisions of the locality in each case. So caution must be used in the examina- tion of the cases to see whether the licensing body is a board, incorporated or not, or a court, for there seems to be a line of distinction drawn between the order of a mere board and that of a court granting the license, althougk it is often diffi- cult to discern it. Where a court grants a license its act is a judicial one and the sufficiency of the order must be con- sidered from that point of view.**- The board or court, or whatever body or person grants or refuses the license cannot delegate its powers to do so to another; it must itself act in the matter.®" In the ease of a common council granting the license iit does not act as a court.*'* The licensing body is without power to grant the license to any other person than the applicant, as where the applicant has no interest in the license, and it is for the exclusive use of another who is the proprietor of the business."' It cannot grant it for a district w^here prohibition has been adopted.''*' If there be several members of the licensing body, then the license cannot issue unless a majority vote in favor of its issuance; ^^ but it is not illegal because one of their number was not present at a prior hearing.®^ The grant of the license is an 92Holl€nback v. Drake, 37 Neb. 576; 101 N. W. 242; In re Tier- 680; 56 N. W. 296; Webber v. ney, 70 Neb. 704; 99 S. W. 518. Lane, 99 Mo. App. 69; 71 S. W. a* State v. Columbia, 17 S. C. 1099; Ck)oper v. Hunt, 103 Mo. 80. App. 9; 77 S. W. 483; Schade 9r, /„. re King (Neb.), 10 N. W. V. Russell (Mo. App.), 110 S. 242. W. 667; Territory v. Miguel, se Strickland v. Knight, 45 Fla. 18 Hawaii 402; State v. Fort, 712; 36 So. 363. i07 Mo. App. 328; 81 S. W. 97 Appeal of Hewitt, 76 Conn. 476; Appeal of Hewitt, 76 Conn. 685; 58 Atl. 231. 685; 58 Atl. 231. 98 Appeal of Hewitt, supra. 93 Hennepin Co. v. Robinson, 16 Where a special meeting was Minn. 381; In re Krug, 72 Neb. called for another purpose, it was § 399 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 64fe adjudication of all the questions essential to be considered.^^ But it is not res judicata nor conclusive when a renewal or second license is applied for, because it is the duty of the board or court to ascertain if the applicant is a fit man as of the date of the renewal or of the second application.^ If the order contains a finding that the requisite number of persons have signed the application or petition, its decision cannot be reviewed in a proceeding for an injunction to enjoin the granting of the license on the ground of fraud.- In some States the order granting the license must be drawn up with strictness or the license will be void. Thus, in Missouri it was held that an order to be sufficient must show affirmatively that the petition purported to be signed by the requisite number of citizens, or embraced a statement that the court found as a fact a majority of such citizens had signed the petition and that the applicant had the statutory qualifica- tions ; ^ that is, that all the jurisdictional facts necessary to authorize the granting of a license must affirmatively appear on the face of the proceedings.* On refusing a license, how- ever, the matter is different, and the court is not even required to state its reasons.'" Where the licensing board acts judicially, as the common council of a city,'' the officer whose duty it is lield that the board rightly re- cessity. In re Hunter, 24 Ont. fused to grant a liconse, in the 522; reversing 24 Ont. 153. absence of some of its members. s State v. Page (Mo. App. ), 80 Riley v. Rowe, 112 Ky. 817; 66 S. W. 912. S. W. 999; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2168. * State v. Seibert, 97 Mo. App. 99 /w. re Justices, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. 212; 71 S. W. 95. In this case Rep. 22; Connecticut Breweries the petition had not been on file Co. V. Murphy, 81 Conn. 145; 70 ten days as the statute required Atl. 450. before the hearing of the appli- 1 State V. Higgiii.s, 84 Mo. App. cation; and it was held that the 531; In re Pittsburg Brewing Co., board of commissioners were with- 16 Pa. Sujjer. Ct. 215. out Jurisdiction to hear tlie aj)- 2 Cooper V. Himt. 103 Mo. App. plication. 9 ; 77 S. W. 483. ^ /„, re Hilleman, 1 1 Pa. Super. Where a statute required the Ct. 567 ; see Nortwick v. Bennett, applicant to file a certificate of 62 N. J. L. 151. character with the inspectors be- 6 Hollenbeck v. Drake, 37 Xeb. fore a license was granted, this 680; 56 X. W. 296; Webber v. was held to be an imperative ne- Lane, 90 Mo. App. 69; 71 S. W. 647 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. §400 to issue the license — as the mayor who has the power of veto — cannot refuse to do so on the ground that the board or council ordered the license granted on an insufficient petition.^ The order granting the license is one thing and the license another, and to complete the transaction the license must be duly issued. A license issued without the granting of it is invalid, even if issued and signed by all the members of the licensing board who are required to sign the order granting it.^ Where the statute does not require the averment in the petition that the applicant is a man of good character, there need be no finding as to that effect inserted in the order.** If the license has once been granted it cannot be recalled or the grant set aside.'" In granting or refusing a license the licensing board is not the agent of the State.' ^ Sec. 400. Mandamus to secure a license. It scarcely needs authorities to sustain the statement that where the licensing board, court or officer has a discretion lOnO; Schade v. Eussell (Mo. App.), 110 S. W. G67. T Schade v. Rus.sell (Mo. App), 110 S. W. 667. Cojitra, In re Qiiinn, 32 N. S. 542. 8 Connecticut Breweries Co. v. :\Iurphy, 81 Conn. 14'5; 70 Atl. 450. 3 In re Sauer, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 463. ^0 Ex parte Fearn, 00 J. P. 177. Contra, Ex parte Hatjen's License, 5 Q. B. 160 (Quebec). Any citizen has the right to in- spect reports and papers in tlie custody of an officer used in hear- ing an application for a license; and to be furnished copies thereof on payment of the fees prescribed by statute. Commonwealth v. Blair, 5 Pa. Dist. Rep. 488. Amending liquor tax certificate, wlien cannot be done. In re Lit- tleton, 113 N. Y. App. Div. 471; 99 N. Y. Supp. 417 A recital in an order requiring a license that evidence submitted on tlie application was considered and due regard had to the number and character of the witnesses is conclusive upon the petitioner that he had a hearing. In re Doyles- town Distilling Co.. 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 90. A refusal to grant a license for a hotel on the ground that a hotel at that place is not necessary for the public is not res judicata as to the same place and the same per- son on a subsequent year. Usu- ally tl'e refusal of the license, or even its granting, ought not to have any or but little weight on a subsequent year. In re Reznor Hotel Co., 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 525. 11 State v. Gormon, 171 Ind. 58; 85 N. E. 763. \iinc pro tunc entries cannot be contradicted by parol evidence to show that they are void. State V. Leonard (Mo.), 116 S. W. 14. §400 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 64!^ whether it will grant or refuse a license, mandamus does not lie to control its discretion nor compel it to issue the license.^^ But where the issuance of a license is merely a ministerial act, and a proper application in form has been refused, a writ of mandamus will be granted to compel the issuance of a license.^^ The court will not upon mere moral grounds deny the writ/* The writ will not be granted before the day of hearing the application and where the publication of notice has not yet been completed. ^^ If a city has not 12 United States v. Douglas, 10 D. C. 99; Maxton Co. v. Robeson Co., 107 N. C. 335; 12 S. E. 92; Eve Simson, 78 Ga. 120; Dunbar V. Frazer, 78 Ala. 538; In re Johnson, 165 Pa. 315; 31 Atl. 203; State v. Cass Co., 12 Neb. 54; 10 N. W. 571; Commonwealth V. Fell, 144 Pa. 426; 22 Atl. 915; 28 W. N. C. 429; State v. Stiff, 104 Mo. App. 685 ; 78 S. W. 675 ; In re Sparrow, 138 Pa. 116; 20 Atl. 711; 27 W. N. C. 47; In re King (Pa.), 16 Atl. 487; 23 W. N. C. 152; Schlandeeker v. Mar- shall, 72 Pa. St. 200; In re Col- larn, 134 Pa. St. 551; 19 Atl. 775; Batters v. Dunning, 49 Conn. 479 ; Jones v. Moore Co. 106 N. C. 436; 11 S. E. 514; Devin v. Belt, 70 Md. 352; 17 Atl. 375; In re Knarr, 127 Pa. St. 554; IS Atl. 639; Stanley v. Monnett, 34 Kan. 708; 9 Pac. 755; Heblich V. Hancock Co. (Ky.), 10 S. W. 405; State v. Hudson, 13 Mo. App. 61 ; In re Baxter, 12 Up. Can. 139; Leeson v. Board, 19 Ont. 67 ; Barnes v. Wilson Co., 135 N. E. 27; 47 S. E. 737; S.tate v. Northfield, 94 Minn. 81; 101 N. W. 1063; St. Amour v. St. Fran- cis de Sales, 7 Q. B. (Que.) 479; Privet V. Sexton, 16 C. L. J. 192; Smart v. Hochelaga, 4 Leg. News (Can.), 255; State v. Langan, 149 Ala. 647; 43 So. 187; I. A. West & Co. V. Board, 14 Idaho 353; 94 Pac. 445; State v. Williams, 143 Ala. 501; 39 So. 270; Commo»- wealth v. Kerns, 2 Pa. Super. Ot. 59; State v. Higgins, 84 Mo. App. 531. 13 Braconier v. Packard, 136 Mass. 50; Territory v. McPherson, 6 Dak. 27; 50 N. W. 351; Schade v. Russell (Mo. App.), 110 S. W. 667 ; State v. Wooten ( Mo. App. ) , 122 S. W\ 1101; Ex parte Gibson, 2 N. S. W. L. R. 203; Harlan v. State, 136 Ala. 150; 33 So. 858; Baker v. Griffith (N. C), 66 S. E. 565; State v. McCammon (Mo. App.), 86 S. W. 510; Common- wealth V. Blackburn (Ky.), 122 S. W. 818: Rex v. Kingston, J. J. 86; L. T. 589; 66 J. P. 547; Cox v. Common Council, 152 Mich. 630; 116 N. W. 456; State v. Turner, 210 Mo. 77; 107 S. W. 1064; St. Louis V. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600; 31 S. W. 1045; State v. Packett (Mo.), 119 S. W. 25; Holland v. State (Fla.), 47 So. 963; State v. Cass County Ct. (Mo.), 119 S. W. 1010, 1014. 14 State V. Jefferson County, 20 Fla. 425. 15 Eamagnano v. Crook, 88 Ala. 450; 7 So. 247. 649 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. §400 conferred upon its tax collector power to issue a license he cannot be compelled to issue one as a tender of fees though it might have given him the power.^« If the applicant has a license unexpired, and he is entitled to only one, he must fail in his application.!^ If the license be refused m a capricious manner without any cause, but arbitrarily, a writ of mandamus will be issued to require its grant, though the licensing board is endowed with discretion to grant or refuse a license ;!« and that is true if it places its refusal on untenable grounds, or on grounds that the statute does not specify as reasons for a refusal/'' But in Massachusetts the courts have gone so far as to hold that a mayor may refuse to sign a license granted by the city council if he in good faith believes the applicant has not complied with all the provi- sions of the law; and he cannot be compelled to sign it.^' Mandamus lies to compel a licensing board to grant a hear- ing;-^ but not to meet and hear an application if its term 16 Puckett V. State, 33 Fla. 385 ; 14 So. 834. A retail liquor dealer desiring a license is a person "beneficially interested" under a statute award- ing the writ of mandamus to any- one beneficially interested in a controversy. Territory v. Mc- pherson, 6 Dak. 27; 50 N. W. 351. Instate V. Bonnell, 119 Ind. 494; 21 N. E. 1101; State v. Mil- ler, 'l29 Mo. App. 390; 108 S. W. 603. 18 Zanone v. jNlound City, 103 Ind. 552; New Orleans v. Smythe, 116 La. 685; 41 So. 33; In re Spar- row, 138 Pa. St. 116; 20 Atl. 692; C. B. George & Bro. v. Winchester, 118 Ky. 429; 80 S. W. 1158; 26 Ky. L. Rep. 170; State v. New Orleans (La.), 36 So. 999; Trem- blay V. Pointe-au-Pic, 13 L. N. (Can.), 386; Edson v. Hatley, 27 L. C. J. 312; Godfrey v. St. Fe- lix, 14 L. N. (Can.), 297; Mont- pelier v. Mills, 171 Ind. 175; 85 N. E. 6; Chicago v. O'Hara, 124 111. App. 290. 19 7)1 re Prospect Brewing Co., 127 Pa. St. 537; 17 Atl. 1090. 20 Deehan v. Johnson, 141 Mass. 23; 6 N. E. 240. But see Schade V. Russell (Mo. App.), 110 S. W. 667. In such an instance the appli- cant is not justified in selling without a license because his ap- plication has been unjustly re- fused. Brock V. State, 65 Ga. 437. 21 Regina v. Sylvester, 50 J. P. 246; Regina v. Thomas, 61 L. J. M. C. ul [1892], 1 Q. B. 426; 66 L. T. 289; 40 W. R. 478; 56 J. P. 151; Ex parte Foley, 29 N. B. 113; Falconer v. Williams, 14 N. Z. L. R. 502; Hawkins v. Common Council (Mich.), 79 N. W. 570; Ex parte Donaher, 27 K B. 554; 17 N. B. 44. § 400 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 65^ has expired.^- In determining whether or not an applicant is entitled to a license under an ordinance the court will not follow the construction put upon it by the common council when it refused a license, but will put its own construction vipon it.-^ Whether or not a licensing board has the authority to grant a license may be raised in an application for a writ of mandamus ; '* and so may the validity of a local option elec- tion.'^ The writ may be issued against a common council of a city in a proper case, but not where the council have a dis- cretion in the matter.-*^ Unless there be an ordinance for the granting of a license a city cannot be compelled to issue one, and the fixing of the amount to be paid for a license to keep a saloon is not such an ordinance.-" If it appear that the petitioner for the writ is under indictment for a violation of the liquor laws his application will be delayed until he is brought to trial and acquitted upon the charges, or they be dismissed.-^ A city cannot repeal its license order after an application for a writ of mandamus, and thus escape being com- pelled to issue a license, where it has in force another ordinance providing that the repeal of an ordinance shall not affect pend- ing suits.-" If an officer only has discretion as to the sufficiency of the bond tendered he may be compelled to issue a license if a sufficient bond has been first tendered.^" The writ of mandamus cannot be resorted to to test the reasonableness or 22 People V. Saratoga Co., 7 Abb. v. Common Council, 152 Mich. Prac. 34. 630; 116 N. W. 456; Hawkins v. If there be a cause of doubt it Common Council (Mich.), 79 N. is resolved against the petitioner W. 570; Keefer v. Hillsdale, 70 for the writ. State v. Miller, 129 Mich. 413; 38 N. W. 277. Mo. App. 390; 108 S. W. 603. 27 Crotty v. People, 3 Bradw. 23 Harrison v. People, 195 111. 465; Ex parte Persons, 1 Hill 655. 466; 63 N. E. 191, reversing 97 111. 28 State v. Weeks, 93 Mo. 499; App. 421. 6 S. W. 266. 24 Evans v. Police Jury, 114 La. 29 State v. Baker, 32 Mo. App. 771; 38 So. 555. 98. 25 People v. Hamilton, 27 N. Y. 3o state v. Ruark, 34 Mo. App. Misc. Rep. 308 ; 58 N. Y. Supp. 325 ; Bean v. County Court, 33 Mo. 584. App. 635; Burke v. Collins, 18 8. 28 State v Northfield (S. D.), D. 190; 99 N. W. 1112. But see 101 N. W. 1063; Hippen v. Ford, Devine v. Board, 121 Mich. 433; 129 Cal. 315; 61 Pac. 929; Cox 80 N. W. 109. 651 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. §400 unreasonableness of a license fee fixed by a city.^^ Where a return alleged that the application was denied on the sole "ground that there is a decided preponderance against the granting of the license in favor of the remonstrances that have been filed against it," and denied none of the averments of the petition for the writ, mandamus was awarded.''- In New York, however, by reason of the express provisions of a statute, a court will review the action of commissioners of excise in re- fusing a license. The statute requires them to send up all the evidence upon which they acted ; ^^ but it will not award the applicant a jury trial.^* But if there be evidence from which the commissioners were justified in refusing the license, their decision will not be disturbed.^^ "Where the answer to the peti- tion for the writ was that the relators claimed to be hotel pro- prietors (to which only a license could be granted), but they had no established hotel, only having a cheap lodging house which they used for immoral purposes, it was held that this an- swer must ])e taken as true, and the application for the writ de- nied.^" Where an application was refused on the ground that a former license held by the applicant had been revoked accord- ing to an agreement with him to the effect that it should be if he was convicted during the year of having violated both an or- dinance and a statute, it was held that a conviction of a viola- tion of the statute and not of the ordinance was not sufficient cause for the refusal. ^^ In Nebraska the writ does not lie to compel the license board to reduce the testimony to writing and place it on file, on behalf of a remonstrant, where it does not appear that the license was granted over his protest.^* 3 J 'State V. Hardy, 7 Neb. 377. 3* People v. Excise Comnirs., 64 Contra, State v. Police Jury, 120 Hun 632; 18 N. Y. Sup. 621. See, La. 163; 45 So. 47. however, People v. Woodman, su- S2ln re Sparrow, 20 Atl. 692. pra. See also In re Prospect Brewing 35 People v. Andrews, 22 Jones Co., 127 Pa. 523; 17 Atl. 1090; & S. 183. 24 W. N. C. 177, where a long re- 3o United States v. Johnson, 12 turn to the petition was held in- App. D. C. 545. sufficient, l)ecause it set out con- 37 Cox v. Common Council, 152 elusions and not facts. Mich. 630; 116 N. W. 456. 33 People V. Woodman, 15 Daly 3s Moore v. State, 58 Neb. 608; 20; IN. Y. Supp. 335. 79 N. W. 163. § 400 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUOR.S. 652 The validity of a city annexation may be tested on application for a writ of mandamus."-^ Where the result of a local option election has been properly certified to, the regularity of such election cannot be tested in a mandamus proceedings.*" Nor will the court compel a board or mayor of a city to issue a license for a place where the saloon would be a nuisance ; *'■ nor compel the issuance of a license in violation of a statute, or where a license was granted but not issued, then revoked in order to give the license to another, and mandamus was sought to compel the issuance to the latter.*- Mandamus may issue if the fee fixed by a city council is so high as to abso- lutely prohibit the sale of liquor, as w^here it had been fixed at $5,000, which the testimony all showed absolutely barred the maintenance of a saloon in the district. The court granted the writ on condition the applicant pay one-half that amount.*^ If a remedy be given by appeal that must be resorted to for relief, and not a resort to a w^rit of mandamus be made.** The burden is always upon the applicant for a writ of manda- mus to show he had complied with the statutes or the ordi- nance, as the case may be, concerning the issuance of a license before he applied for the writ ; *^ and the fact that he alleges in his petition for the writ that the board will not grant any license whatsoever will not be an excuse on his part for not 39 People V. Harrison, 191 111. ceeding to procure the issuance of 257; 61 N. E. 99, affirming 92 111. a city license, the applicant must App. 643. show the city council's consent to 40 State V. Martin, 55 Fla. 538; its issuance. Devanney v. Han- 46 So. 424; Kermon v. Blackburn, son. 60 W. Va. 3; 53 S. E. 603. 127 Ky. 39 ; 104 S. W. 968 ; 31 Ky. If remonstrators be present when L. Rep. 1256; State v. Davis, 119 a city council grants the license La. 247; 44 So. 4. and do not object, they cannot se- 41 Swift V. People, 63 111. App. cure a writ of mandamus to re- 453. voke it. Middlekauff v. Adams, 42Haslem v. Schnarr, 30 Ont. 76 Xeb. 265; 107 N. W. 232. 89. See Leeson v. Board, 19 Ont. 44 Malmo v. Fairfield Co., 72 67. Conn. 1; 43 Atl. 485. 43 State V. Police Jury, 120 La. 45 Hippen v. Ford, 129 Cal. 315; 163; 45 So. 47. 61 Pac. 929; Harlan v. State, 136 This certainly smacks of judi- Ala. 150; 33 So. 858; Meyer v. cial legislation. Decatur, 125 111. App. 556. In the case of a mandamus pro- 653 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. § 401 »?omplying with the statute.^*' If the case be submitted upon the pleadings, and the answer denies the allegations contained in the petition, the writ must be denied.*" The petitioner has the burden not only to show that he has complied with the law, but also that he is a fit person, such as the statute requires, to be entrusted with a license.*^ A licensing board, not having the duty or power to determine the validity of an election in a town on the question of license or no license, cannot be re- quired by mandamus to issue a license in a town where its records show that a majority had voted against a license.'*" Sec. 401. Mandamus under the English Licensing Acts. We take the following extract from Paterson's Licensing Acts,^° which sets forth succinctly the English Practice: "As justices derive all their authority to grant licenses from the Alehouse Act, 1828, as amended by later statutes, they are bound to hear and determine all applications on the merits, aad if they fail to do so, and thereby some applicant has not been duly heard, the only remedy usually is for the high court to grant a mandamus directing the justices to hear the application over again. The fact that the justices made a mistake in law sometimes is a ground for a mandamus, but usually is treated as a misfortune which cannot be remedied. *It is obvious that the distinction between an erroneous decision and a failure to hear and determine according to law may be very fine, and the eases on the subject show that it is so. I take the governing principle to be that if the justices have applied themselves to the consideration of a section of an act of Parliament, and have, no matter how erroneously, deter- mined the question which arises upon it, before them, their 46 Riley V. Rowe (Ky.), 66 S. 49 Underwood v. P'airfield Coun- W. 999; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2168; ty, 67 Conn. 411; 35 Atl. 274. Commonwealth v. McClure, 204 Pa. Mandamus lies to compel the 196; 53 Atl. 759. financial officer of a city to issue 47 Conlee v. Clay City (Ky. ), a receipt to an applicant where 102 S. W. 862; 31 Ky. L. Rep. such a receipt is a necessary step 533. to secure a license. Holland v. 48Conlee v. Clay City, supra. State .( Fla. ) , 47 So. 963. Harrison v. Dickinson (Tex. Civ. 5° 19 ed. p. 101. App.), 113 S. W. 776. § 401 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 654 decision cannot be reviewed by process of mandamus. That is so, whether there is an appeal from their decision or not. If there is an appeal mandamus will not lie ; if there is not, their decision is final. But when it appears that they have taken into consideration matters which are absolutely outside the ambit of their jurisdiction, and absolutely apart from the matters which by law ought to be taken into consideration, then they have not heard and determined according to law." ^^ Instances of mandamus issuing where justices have not heard and determined according to law are to be found in R. v. De Rutzen,^^ where justices took into consideration matters out- side the statutes under which they are purported to act ; R. v. Bowman,^^ where they granted a license on the payment of a sum of money for a public purpose, and R. v. Catham, supra, where they purported to grant the transfer of a license from a person who had not theretofore kept the premises as an inn. The question is also discussed by a divisional court (Darling and Channell, JJ.), in R. v. Nicholson,^* from whose decision there was an appeal which turned upon another point. A mandamus will lie to command the justices to hear an ap- plication for a new license, if they refuse to entertain it ; but when once the justices hear and adjudicate, there is often no remedy, if they refuse to grant a license of any kind, though in some cases there may be a remedy by mandamus, owing to the neglect of some preliminary condition.^" "When justices refuse the renewal of a license and are required by statute to state the grounds of refusal, as under the "Wine and Beer- house Act, 1869, sec. 8, and the Licensing Act, 1904, sees. 1 (1), 9 (3), and they do not state them, a mandamus will be granted commanding them to hear and determine the appli- si Wills, J., in R. V. Gotham T. 230; 46 W. R. 512; 14 T. L. 11898], 1 Q. B. 802; 62 J. P. 435; R. 303. 67 L. J. Q. 632; 78 L. T. 468; ^4 [1899] 2 Q. B. 455; 63 J. P. 46 W. R. 512; 14 T. L. R. 307. 564; 68 L. J. Q. B. 715; 15 T. L. 52 [1875] 1 Q. B. D. 55; 40 J. R. 358. P. 150; 33 L. T. 726; 24 W. R. f^^ R. v. Monmouth, L. R. 5 Q. 343; 45 L. J. M. C. 67. B. 251; 34 J. P. 566; 39 L. J. Q. " [1898] 1 Q. B. 663; 62 J. P. B. 77; 21 L. T. 748; R. v. Angle- 374; 67 L. J. Q. B. 463; 78 L. sey, J. J. [1892], 1 Q. B. 852. 655 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. §401 cation."® If the quarter sessions refuse to hear an appeal owing to some mistake in law, a mandamus may be applied for, but care must be taken to do so within two calendar months after the refusal by the sessions.^^ Should a mandamus be granted, and the justices seek to evade it, the prosecutor may traverse the return which they make in answer to the writ of man- damus.'^* Thus, in one case a mandamus issued to the justices and they heard the case over again and came to the same con- clusion, and the applicant, by pleading, raised an issue for trial as to whether the justices really heard the case or merely pretended to hear it over again.^'* And this course of travers- ing the return is always open to the applicant.*'*' When a man- damus is issued to justices it is not generally framed so as to compel them to grant the license, but merely to hear and de- termine"^ and the justices on hearing the case again have in most cases the same jurisdiction to entertain all objections to 56 R. V. Thomas [1892], 1 Q. B. 426; 56 J. P. 151; 66 L. T. 289; 61 L. J. M. C. 141; 40 W. R. 478; Ex parte Smith, R. v. Sur- rey or Chertsey, J. J., 3 Q. B. D. 374; 42 J. P. 598; 47 L. J. M. C. 104; 26 W. R. 682; R. v. Sykes, 1 Q. B. D. 52; 40 J. P. 39; 45 L. J. LI. C. 39; 78 L. T. 566; 24 W. R. 141; Tranter v. Lancashire, J. J., 51 J. P. 454; R. V. Lancashire, J. J., 54 J. P. 580; 64 L. T. 562. 57 Crown Office Rules [1906], r. 68 ; R. V. Gloucestershire, J. J., 54 J. P. 519. 58 R. V. Staffordshire, J. J.; R. V. Pirehill, 14 Q. B. D. 13; 49 J. P. 36; 54 L. J. M. C. 17; 51 L. T. (n. 8.) 534; 33 W. R. 205 59 R. V. Pirehill, J. J., 49 J. P. 453. R. V. King, or Manchester, J, J., 20 Q. B. D. 430; 52 J. P. 164; 57 L. J. -• 20; 58 L. T. 607; 36 W. R. i>00. 61 In R. V. Denbigh, J. J., Ex parte Fisher, 59 J. P., 708 n., tlie divisional court on making the rule absolute for a mandamus to hear and determine, expressed an opinion that the applicant ought to have his license without the ne- cessity for further notices. In R. V. Rodds and Others, Birkenhead licensing J. J. [1905], 2 K. B. 40; 69 J. P. 210; 74 L. J. K. B. 599; 53 W. R. 559; 93 L. T. 319; 21 T. T. L. R. 391, where the licensing justices had attached certain con- ditions to the renewal which they had no power to attach, and had intimated that the renewal license would remain in the hands of their clerk, to be delivered over to the licensee on his giving an un- dertaking to carry out the condi- tions, the Court of Appeals di- rected a mandamus to go to com pel them to deliver a renewal li- cense without suoh conditions. § 401 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 656 the license, and to hear parties on the merits, as if they had acted regularly on the first occasion."- The general rule is that the court will not by mandamus order a judicial tribunal to act in a particular way unless it is quite plain that what it has to do is purely ministerial and not judicial According- ly, in R. V. Kingston, JJ., ex parte Davey,*'^ the court refused a mandamus to justices to hold a further adjournment of the general annual licensing meeting, and at such further adjourn- ment grant a renewal of a license, but merely ordered the justices to hear and determine according to law. Where a per- son applies for the renewal of a license that is refused, and he appeal to quarter sessions, but gives an invalid notice of ap- peal, he is not entitled to a mandamus to the licensing jus- tices to rehear the application."* At the general annual licens- ing meeting the hearing of an application for a renewal was appointed for 10 a. m. Notice of opposition had been duly served, but on the case being called neither the opponent nor his solicitor was present. Justices, after sending for both, and they not attending, waited five minutes, and then decided by a majority of five to four to renew the license. The oppo- nent and his solicitor then arrived and asked to be heard, but the justices refused to reopen the matter. The court held that it was entirely a matter of discretion for the justices to treat the case as determined or to reopen it. The court held, also, that as no application for a mandamus had been made until three months after the refusal the order nisi should be dis- ss R. V. Howard, Congleton, J. J., house and others, Leeds, J. J., Ex 23 Q. B. D. 502; 5.3 J. P. 454; parte Ryder [190G], 2 K. B. 501; 60 L. T. 960; 37 W. R. 617; R. v. 70 J. P. 485; 75 L. J. K. B. 745; Farquhar, L. R. 9 Q. B. 258; 39 95 L. T. 367; 22 T. L. R. 603; J. P. 166. reversed on appeal, the House of G3 [1902] 66 J. P. 547; 86 L. T. Lords holding, on the facts, that 589; R. V. Farquhar, supra; R. v. no mandamus should issue. (Leeds HoAvard, supra; R. v. Merthyr Corporation v. Ryder [1907], A. Tydvil, J. J., 14 Q. B. D. 584; 49 C. 420; 71 J. P. 484; 76 L. J. J. P. 213; 54 L. J. M. C. 78, as K. B. 1032; 87 L. T. 261). explained in K. v. Kingston, J. J., ^4 R. v. Gloucestershire, J. J. ; Ex parte Da-wej, supra. A rule in E. v. Bristol, J. J., 5 R. 276; 57 similar terms was granted by the J. P. 486; 68 L. T. 335; 41 W. R court of appeal in R. v. Wood- 379. 65 < ISSUANCE t>F LICENSES. § 40i charged.*"' The justices, likes other judges, are not personally liable for making a mistake in exercising their jurisdiction.*'*' If they act corruptly, or abuse their power, or misbehave themselves in the execution of their office, they are answerable criminally by way of information.''^ Thus^ refusing a license hecause the applicant would not vote for a particular candi- date for Parliament was a ground of criminal information. *''' And it would be the same whether they granted or refused the license on such ground.*''' If one set of justices were to grant a license (not at an adjourned session) which another set of justices had refused, this would be indictable.'^*' The writ of mandamus will be issued to justices who decide or assume that they have an absolute discretion when they have only a limited discretion."^ It is sometimes refused if there was a better remedy by appeal to quarter sessions.'^- Where a mo- tion for an order nisi for mandamus has been once heard and refused, the court will not allow a second motion for the same thing to be made on amended affidavits." When the justices make their return to the writ, this is treated like the state- ment of defense to an action, and the prosecutor may traverse the fact in the return that they have heard the case, and allege in effect that they merely pretended to hear it, and all the time intended to repeat their judgment."* Or the prosecutor may plead to the return that it is bad in point of law.'"' Should the 65 R. V. Robson, 57 J. P. 133. ^2 R. v. Smith; R. v. Soutli- 66 R. V. Barton, 14 J. P. 738; port, J. J., L. R. 8 Q. B. 146; Bassett v. Goodchild, 3 Wils. 121; 37 J. P. 214; 28 L. T. 129; 21 W. R. V. Holland, 1 T. R. 692. R. 382; 42 L. J. M. C. 46; R. V. 67 R. V. Holland, 1 T. R. 692; R. Thomas [1892] 1 Q. B. 426; 56 J. V. Young, 1 Burr. 556; R. v. Har- P. 151; 66 L. T. 289; 61 L. J. M. ries, 13 East. 270; R. v. Williams; C. 141; 40 W. R. 478. R. V. Davis, 3 Burr. 1317; Bassett " R. v. Bodmin [1892], 2 Q. B. V. Goodchild, 3 WiJj 121. 21; 56 J. P. 504; 61 L. J. M. 68 R. V. Williams, 3 Burr. 1317. C. 151; 66 L. T. 562; 40 W. R. 69 R. V. Holland, ] T. R. 692. 006; 8 T. L. R. 553. 70 R. V. Sainsburn 4 T. R. 451. "•* R. v. Staffordsshire, J. J.; R. -1 R. V. King, 2? Q. B. D. 43; v. Pireliill, J. J., 49 J. P. 453, 52 J. P. 164; 57 L. J. M. C. 20: ante, p. 103. 58 L. T. 607 ; 36 W. R. 600 ; R. v. '- R. v. Howard ; Congleton, J. Scott [1889], 22 Q. B. D. 481; J., 23 Q. B. D. 502; 53 J. P. 454; 53 J. P. 119; 58 L. J. M. C. 78; 60 L. T. 960; 37 W. K. 617. 37 W. R. 301; 00 L. T. 231. § 402 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 658 divisional court refuse to grant a rule for a mandamus, or a judge give judgment in favor of the prosecutor on a manda- mus, there is an appeal to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords."' Where a person, who has successfully opposed the granting of a license subsequently successfully shows cause against the making absolute of a rule nisi for a mandamus to the licensing justices or to quarter sessions, the court has a discretion to grant him the costs of showing cause against the rule, although licensing justices are not a court of summary jurisdiction." '^ Sec. 402. Injunction to restrain issuance of license. Since relief is afforded those opposing the issuance of a license, by appeal or writ of certiorari, a court of equity can- not be invoked to restrain the issuance of a license, those ap- plying for it having another remedy.'^^ This is true even though the license be void; for if it be void it will not pro- tect those selling under it, nor authorize sales under its pro- tection." And the fact that the applicant falsely stated to a signer of his petition that some other person intended to sign it, or that the applicant promised the signer to withdraw the petition, is no ground for restraining the issuance of the li- cense.*" Under an application for an injunction, proceedings for the issuance of a license cannot be reviewed.*^ Nor will an 76 R. V. King, 20 Q. B. D. 43; 890; Cooper v. Hunt, 103 Mo. 52 J. P. 164, supra; R. v. Crewk- App. 9; 77 S. W. 483; Regina v. erne, J. J. [1888], 21 Q. B. D. Local Government Board, 10 Q. 85; 52 J. P. 372; 57 L. J. M. C. B. Div. 231; In re Godson, 16 Onl. 127; 58 L. T. 450; 36 W. R. 629; App. 452; In re Thomas, 26 Ont. R. V. Newcastle, J. J., 51 J. P. Rep. 448; Hawk's Nest v. Fayette 244; R. V. Powell [1891], 2 Q. B. Co., 55 W. Va. 689; 48 S. E. 205; 693; 50 J. P. 52; 60 L. J. Q. B. Strickland v. Knight, 47 Fla. 327; 594; 65 L. T. 210; 39 W. R. 630. 36 So. 363. 77 R. V. West Riding, J. J. : Ex 79 Beckham v. Howard, 83 Ga. parte Shaw [1898], 1 Q. B. 503; 89; 9 So. 784; Cooper v. Hunt, 62 J. P. 197; 67 L. J. Q. B. 279; 103 Mo. App. 9; 77 S. W. 483. 78 L. T. 47; 46 W. R. 334; 14 T. so Cooper v. Hunt, 103 Mo. App. L. R. 89; M. and W. Dig. 74. 9; 77 S. VV. 483. 78 Leigh V. Westervelt, 2 Duer si Cooper v. Hunt, supra; Fooks 618; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. v. Purnell, 101 Md. 321; 61 Atl. Whalen, 3 Wash. T. 452; 17 Pac. 582. 659 ISSUANCE OP LICENSES. § 403 injunction be granted to restrain the enforcement of an act where the effect would be to prevent the complainants obtain- ing a license ; for that is not an interference with either his personal or property rights.«^ Nor has the court the power to grant a stay of proceedings to revoke a license where an appeal has been taken from an order refusing a temporary injunc- tion.^2 But an injunction will be issued against the retention of illegal voters' names on a census roll where an applicant must obtain the consent of a certain percentage of such voters thus enrolled, and that percentage must be determined by the census roll before he can obtain a license.** A license to sell liquor be- ing neither property nor a contract and subject to revocation, an officer having authority to do so cannot be restrained from revoking it.*'^ If the aggrieved party has a remedy by a review of void proceedings granting a license, he cannot secure an in- junction to prevent its issuance.*® The fact that the license if issued will be void, because for a prohibition locality under the local option law, is not a sufficient reason for granting an in- junction ; nor the fact that the sales under it would become a nuisance, if it be not shown that the applicant for the injunc- tion would suffer special injury.*" Sec. 403. Liability for refusing license. Where the granting or refusal of a license is a judicial pro- ceeding, the commissioners or judges refusing it are not liable in damages because of such refusal;** but where a license is wrongfully and arbitrarily refused the applicant may recover compensation for any damages he may have sustained.*® In 82 Plumb V. Christie, 103 Ga. 87 Strickland v. Knight, 47 Fla. 686; 30 S. E. 759; 42 L. R. A. 327; 36 So. 363. 181; Deal v. Singletory, 103 Ga. ss Halloran v. McCullougli, 68 466; 30 S. E. 765. Ind. 479; Irion v. Lewis, 56 Ala. 83McLellan v. Janesville, 99 190; Kress v. State, 65 Ind. 106. Wis. 544; 75 N. W. 308. See Leeds v. Ryder [1907], App. 84Semones v. Needles, 137 Iowa Gas. 420; 71 J. P. 484; 76 L. J. K. 177; 114 N. W. 904. B. 1032; 97 L. T. 261, reversing ssHiggins v. Talty, 157 Mo. [1906] 2 K. B. 501. 280; 57 S. W. 724. «» Montjjelier v. Mills, 171 Ind. 86 Hayes v. Board, 6 Cal. App. 175; 85 N. B. 6. 520; 92 Pac. 492. § 403 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 660 this respect the granting or refusing of a license does not dif- fer from any other official act. Thus in an Indiana case, speak- ing of a refusal of a school officer to issue a teacher's license, the court said : " It is well settled, and hence conceded, that a judicial officer is not civilly liable for an erroneous decision, however gross the error may have been, or however bad the motive was which inspired it. Such liability would be incon- sistent with the proper exercise of judicial functions."®" Af- ter deciding that a county school superintendent is not and cannot be endowed with judicial powers, the court continues: "But we regard the discretion conferred upon the county superintendent on the subject of licensing teachers as being so far analogous to a judicial discretion that he is protected from any claim for damages on account of any mere mistake in his discretion, or error in judgment, whether in granting or withholding a license to persons desirous of becoming qual- ified teachers in the common schools. In that respect, we think, a county superintendent of schools occupies a similar, and gen- erally analogous, position to that of an inspector of an elec- tion, who cannot be made responsible for a mere error of judg- ment in rejecting a ballot offered by a qualified voter, but who may be required to answer in damages for maliciously re- jecting such ballot. "^^ The court then makes the following extract from Cooley on Torts i**^ ''But it is an interesting and very important question whether, in the case of that class of officers who do not hold courts, but exercise what may be and often is called power quasi judicial like assessors of land for taxation, the immunity is not, after all, only partial and lim- ited by good faith and honest purpose. There are certainly 90 Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 74; 37 Am. Rep. 185; Cooley on 548; 54 Am. Rep. 343; citing Torts, pp. 379, 403. Larr v. State, 45 Ind. 364; Kress 9i Citing Gates v. Neal, 23 Pick. V. State, 65 Ind. 106; State v. 308; Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 John. Jackson, 68 Ind. 58; Halloran v. 114; Goetcheus v. Matthewson, 61 McCullough, 68 Ind. 179; Stewart N. Y. 420; Weckerly v. Geyer, 11 V. Cooley, 23 Minn. 347; 23 Am. S. & R. 35; Rail v. Potts, 8 Rep. C90; Bristust v. Parsons, 54 Humph. 225; State v. McDonald, Ala. 393; 25 Am. Rep. 688; Rains 4 Harr. 55.5. V. Sampson, 50 Tex. 495; 32 Am. 02 Page 411. Rep. 609 ; Jones v. Brown, 54 Iowa 661 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. §404 many cases which hold, and more which assume, that the law will hold such officers liable if they act maliciously to the prejudice of individuals. Thus, it is said that the mem- bers of a school board may be held responsible for the dis- missal of a school-teacher, if they act maliciously and with- out cause; and a county clerk, for willfully and maliciously approving an insufficient appeal bond; and a wharfmaster, for the removal of a ship from a certain dock, where it can be shown that the order was given maliciously and with the pur- pose to cause injury." And then the court adds: "In this connection it may be stated that where a public officer acts either from a wilful and wicked, or from corrupt motives, he is held to act maliciously. While, therefore, the non-liabil- ity of a county superintendent for a mere error in judg- ment in refusing to grant a license to an applicant who de- sires to become a teacher is fulh^ conceded, we are of the opin- ion that he ought to be held liable for maliciously withhold- ing a license from an applicant lawfully entitled to receive such a testimonial to his qualifications as a teacher in the com- mon schools. ' ' ^" Sec. 404. Appeal from order granting or refusing license. Perhaps there is nothing distinctive concerning an appeal from an order granting or refusing a license. When the li- censing board is a court the right of appeal is geaerally held to 93 Elmore v. Overton, supra. "In eral paragraphs of the complaint, coming to this conclusion," says now before us, cannot be sus- the court, "we feel that we are tained." supportied by the Very decisive Where the clerk wrongfully re- weight of authority in analogous fused to issue a license, as the cases, and are in harmony with council had directed, the appli- the general scope and spirit of cant having tendered his fee, it Article III of the Constitution, was held that there was no cause which divides our State govern- of action, because the tender of ment into three separate and dis- the fee, without actual payment, tinct departments, Gregory V. State, was not enough to entitle him 94 Ind. 384; 48 Am. Rep. 162. to the license. Claus v. Hardy, Consequently, the objections urged 31 Neb. 35; 47 X. W. 418. against the sufficiency of the sev- §404 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 662 be given by a statute authorizing appeals on matters coming before the court.^* A provision of the Constitution forbidding the Legislature to create any courts other than those named in that instrument does not prohibit the enactment of a statute authorizing an appeal from a licensing board to a trial court or court of review.^^ In nearly all instances the case on appeal is tried de 7iovo,^° and from the decision of that court an appeal 94 State V. Vierling, 33 Ind. 99 ; Ex parte Levy, 43 Ark. 42; Blair V. Kilpatrick, 40 Ind. 312; Ap- peal of Board, 64 Conn. 526; 30 Atl. 775; Blair v. Rutenfranz, 40 Ind. 318; Board v. Lease, 22 Ind. 261; Ex parte Dimn, 14 Ind. 122 Blair v. Vierling, 33 Ind. 2G9 State V. Board, 45 Ind. 501 Brown v. Porter, 37 Ind. 206 Groscap v. Rainier, 111 Ind. 361 12 N. E. 694; Muller v. Mayo, 38 Ind. 227 ; Ex parte Lester, 77 Va. 663; Wilson v. Mathis, 145 Ind. 493; 44 N. E. 486; Lester v. Price, 83 Va. 648; 3 S. E. 529; Lydick v. Korner, 13 Neb. 10; 12 N. W. 838; Chandler v. Ruebelt, 83 Ind. 139; Miller v. DeArmond, 93 Ind. 74; State v. Alliance, 65 Xeb. 524; 91 N. W. 387; State v. Board (Neb.), 108 X. W. 122. That no appeal lies, see Bean V. Barton, 33 Mo. App. 635 ; Twin- ing V. St. Louis Co., 47 Mo. App. 647. That no appeal lies to the Supreme Court, see Board v. Lease, 22 Ind. 261; Blair v. Vier- ling, 33 Ind. 269; Brown v. Por- ter, 37 Ind. 206; Mueller v. Mayo, 38 Ind. 227; Turner v. Rehm, 43 Ind. 208; State v. Gorman, 171 Ind. 58; 85 N. E. 763; Appeal of Borman, 81 Conn. 458; 71 Atl. 502; Ex parte Lester, 77 Va. 663. Appeal and mandamus is the proper course for relief. State v. Durein, 70 Kan. 13; 78 Pac. 152, affirming 80 Pac. 987; State v. Sheasley, 71 Kan. 857; 78 Pac. 997. Contra, Bean v. Barton Co., 33 Mo. App. 635; Myers v. Circuit Court (W. Va.), 63 S. E. 201; Creekmore v. Commonwealtli, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 813; Board v. Church- ill, 21 Fla. 578. 95 Thompson v. Koch, 98 Ky. 400; 33 S. W. 96. 96 State V. Vierling, 33 Ind. 99; In re Moore (Iowa), 118 X. W. 879 (tried in equity); Blair v. Kilpatrick, 40 Ind. 312; Blair v. Rutenfranz, 40 Ind. 318; Sansack V. Ader, 168 Ind. 559; 80 N. E. 151; 78 X. E. 675; 79 X. E. 457; Keiser v. Lewis, 57 Ind. 431; Had- dox V. Clarke County, 79 Va. 677 ; Hardesty v. Hine, 135 Ind. 72; 34 X. E. 701; Leighton v. Maury, 76 Va. 865; State v. Bonsfield, 24 Xeb. 517; 39 X. W. 427; Lester V. Price, 83 Va. 648; 3 S. E. 529; Head v. Doehlman, 148 Ind. 145; 46 X. E. 585; Fer- guson V. Brown, 75 Miss. 214; 21 So. 603. Xo appeal lies from a board exercising legislative func- tions in granting a license. State V. Franklin Co., 49 Wash. 268; 94 Pac. 1086; or where it is said the license may be issued "in the discretion" of the court or judge, Martin v. Rooks Co., 32 Kan. 146; 663 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. §404 may lie to the Supreme Court.^"* Unless a statute especially specifies how the appeal must be takenj then the general law must be complied with, especially with respect to the giving of a bond.^^ Change of venue may be taken as in ordinary civil cases."^ The trial, when de novo, must be upon the original papers, and new papers or remonstrances cannot be filed,^'^ though they may be amended/ If a petition for a license be dismissed the applicant may appeal ; - so he may do so even if a remonstrance shows that the number of remonstrants absolutely prevents the granting of a license, for in that instance the trial is upon the question whether a sufficient number of legal re- monstrants who are entitled to remonstrate have signed the remonstrance as an issue of fact.^ Local statutes fix the time when an appeal must be taken, and these be followed.* In a number of the States the court to which the appeal is taken is merely a court of review, though a nisi prius court, and from its decision an appeal may lie to the highest court of appeals for the State. Where such is the case the court will examine the record to see if there be error in it ; and if it be not shown there was error or an abuse of discretion the finding of the licensing court or board will be either affirmed or the appeal 4 Pac. 158; Hein v. Smith, 13 W. Ind. 145; 4(5 N. E. 585; Groscap Va. 358. Sometimes the trial is v. Rainier, 111 Ind. 361; 12 N. E. heard npon the evidence given be- 694; In re Arszman, 40 Ind. App. low. Hensley v. Metcalfe Co., 115 218; 81 N. E. 680; In re Per- Ky. 810; 74 S. W. 1054; 25 Ky. singer (Neb.), 90 N. W. 242. L. Rep. 204. See /n re Henry, 124 i Stockwell v. Brent, 97 Ind. Iowa 358; 100 N. W. 43; In re 474; Hardesty v. Hine, 135 Ind. Foylton (Neb.), 118 N. W. 119. 72; 34 N. E. 701. sti* In re Adamek, 82 Neb. 448; 2 Lanham v. Woods, 167 Ind. 118 N. W. 109. 398; 79 N. E. 376; Wilson v. 97 Blair v. Kilpatrick, 40 Ind. Mathis, 145 Ind. 493; 44 N. E. 312; Blair v. Rutenfranz, 40 Ind. 486. 318; Ex parte Lester, 77 Va. 663. s Lanham v. Woods, 167 Ind. 98 State v: Vierling, 33 Ind. 99; 398; 79 N. E. 376. Blair v. Kilpatrick, 40 Ind. 312; But a city cannot apjjeal from Blair v. Rutenfranz, 40 Ind. 318. an order of its. own excise board. 99 Miller v. Wade, 58 Ind. 91; In re Klamm (Neb.), 117 N. W. Sansack v. Ader, 168 Ind. 559; 991. 80 N. E. 151; 79 N. E. 457; 78 * Lydick v. Koruer, 13 Neb. lOj N. E. 675 ; Head v. Doehlman, 148 12 N. W. 838. §404 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 664 dismissed.' Sucli is the case in Pennsylvania where the appeal is regarded as a substitute for a certiorari; *' and as the rea- sons assigned, in case of a refusal, form no part of the record, they will not be considered.^ Of course, if the applicant does not possess the requisite qualifications the refusal of the licens- ing board because he did not possess the necessary qualifica- tions will not be disturbed.* In Pennsylvania the Supreme Court will not review the facts of the case ; ^ and if the order recites that the application was refused "after hearing," it will not hold that the refusal was arbitrarily done.^° The fact that more petitioners favor the granting of the license than those remonstrating is no reason why the refusal of the appli- cation should be reversed ; ^^ nor the fact that there are na remonstrants nor any evidence given against the applicant, 5 French v. Noel, 22 Gratt. 454 ; Toole's Appeal, 00 Pa. St. 376. 6 Appeal of Brown, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 63. In re Donovan, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 647; 44 W. N. C. 34. 7/>i re Berg, 139 Pa. St. 854: 21 Atl. 77; Leister's Appeal (Pa.), 11 Atl. 387; In re Frae, 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 348; In re Netter, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 566; In re Kilgore, 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 543; In re Brown, 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 409; In re Weaver, 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 95; In re Donaghue, 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 1 ; 40 W. N. C. 440. 8 7m, re Goldman, 138 Pa. St. 321; 22 Atl. 23; Hoglan v. Com- monwealth, 3 Bush 147; In re Chaml)ers, 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 412; State V. Alliance, 65 Neb. 524; 91 N. W. 387; Ferguson v. Brown, 75 Miss. 214; 21 So. 603; Malmo V. Fairfield Co., 72 Conn. 1; 43 Atl. 485. 9 Leister's Appeal, 11 Atl. 387; 20 W. N. C. 224; In re Branch, 164 Pa. 427; 30 Atl. 296; 35 W. N. C. 310; In re Frae, 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 348; In re Chambers, 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 412; Common- wealth V. Kerns, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 59 ; In re Snyder, 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 648; In re Cohen, 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 224. 10 //t re Gross, 161 Pa. 344; 29 Atl. 25; 34 W. N. C. 404; In re Quinton, 169 Pa. 115; 32 AtL 101 : Appeal of Doberneck, 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 637; In re Black Dia- mond Distilling Co., 33 Pa. Super. Co. 649 ; In re Reynoldsville Dis- tilling Co., 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 269; Appeal of Hollender, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 23; In re Quinn, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 554; In re Sweeney, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 569; In re Chuya, 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 410; In re Di Nubile, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 571; In re Meenan, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 575; In re Foreman, 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 98 ; In re Kilgore, 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 543; In re McCi-ory, 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 192; hi re De Haven, 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 335. 11 /w. re Bowman, 167 Pa. 644; 31 Atl. 932. 665 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES, § 40-4 for the board may have acted upon its own knowledge of his fitness.^" Tf the license be refused because nnnecessary to the neighborhood, the presumption will be indulged in that the court acted from its own knowledge and had due regard to the number and character of the petitioners.'^ Where the license could be issued by a city board of trustees only upon certain facts which must ])e shown before it was issued, acting upon the rule that where the jurisdiction of an inferior court depends on the existence of certain facts, its adjudication of their existence will be conclusive, unless there be a provision for its review, the Appellate Court of California refused to re- view the proceedings of such board.^* If the record recites that a hearing on the application was heard, that is conclusive upon the parties and the}" cannot show there was no hearing in faet/^ Where in Connecticut the licensing board have no dis- cretion in granting a license if certain facts be proven, its action in refusing a license will be reversed if such facts be shown : but if the board had to choose an applicant out of several, the number of licenses in the district being limited, the Appellate Court will not make the choice.^" A statute which gives a licensee a right of appeal when his license shall 12 /?i re Sendcroft, 1G8 Pa. 45; Ct. 558; In re tjuinn. 11 Pa. 31 Atl. 948; Appeal of Dober- Super. Ct. 554. neck, 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 637; Ap- In Pennsylvania an appeal does peal of Gross, 1 Pa. Super. Ct. not bring up tlie evidence nor the 640; In re Curtus, 173 Pa. 27: rulings of the court on the ques- 34 Atl. 214; T^igton v. Maiiry, 7G tions of evidence. The investi- Va. 865. gation of the appellate court is 13 7n re Dunhip, 171 Pa. 454- confined to tlie record. In re 32 Atl. 1128; 37 W. N. C. 245. Weaver, 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 95. 1* Hayes v. Board, 6 Cal. App. In Nebraska if all the pro- 520; 92 Pac. 492. ceedings have not been sent up In Kentucky the statute, at one to the appellate court, cither in a time, made the decision of the Cir- bill of exceptions or the tran- cuit Court final, and no appeal script, the court may order that lay from its decision. Hainer v. to be done. Persinger v. Miller Burton, 75 Kan. 281; 89 Pac. 697. (Xeb.), 90 X. W. 242; State v. So in West Virginia, Myers v. Board (Neb.). 108 N. W. 122. Circuit Ct. (W. Va.), 63 S. E. ic Appeal of Malmo, 73 Conn. 201. "32: 47 Atl. 163. 15 Zn. re Welsh, 11 Pa. Super. §404 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 666 be revoked does not apply to an instance M'here it is part of the penalty inflicted for a violation of the liquor law that the violator of the law shall be fined and have his license revoked.^'' "When the evidence goes up to the appellate tribunal, the court must act upon its own view of it, and, as a rule, not be in- fluenced by the action of the lower court.^* A refusal to grant a license because there Avere enough saloons in the neighbor- hood is not error of which the applicant can complain.^" If 1" Appeal of Londry, 79 Conn. 1; 63 Atl. 293; Hedges v. Met- calfe Co., 116 Ky. 524; 76 S. W. 381; 25 Ky. L. Eep. 772. That the applicant has the bur- den to show a right to a license, see In re Foreman, 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 98. The presumption is that there Avere sufficient reasons for refusing a license when one is refused. In re Miller, 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 223; In re Cohen, 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 224 ; Ferguson v. Brown. 75 Miss. 214; 21 So. 603; In re Donovan, 44 W. N. C. 34; 9 Pa. Sujier. Ct. 647. If there be evidence tending to sustain the finding of the licens- ing board, its action in granting a license will not be reviewed by the Supreme Court. In re Mac- Pvae, 75 Neb. 757; 106 N. W. 1020; In re Moore (Iowa), 118 X. W. 879. Where the requisite number of remonstrants have filed a remon- strance the qualifications of the applicant is no longer an issue, and evidence concerning them cannot be received. Shaflfer v. Stern, 160 Ind. 375; 66 N. E. 1004. 18 Bennett v. Otto, 68 Neb. 652; 94 N. W. 807. 15 7m re .Torgensen, 75 Neb. 401; 106 N. W. AO-2. In Kentucky the trial is upon the evidence contained in the bill of exceptions; and if the evidence therein shows the court had no discretion, the Circuit Court should remand the case with di- rections to grant the license. Mer- edith V. Commonwealth, 116 Ky. 524; 76 S. W. 8; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 455; Hodges v. Metcalfe Co. Ky.), 76 S. W. 381; 25 Ky. L. Pvep. 772, 1706; 78 S. W. 460; Holmes v. Robertson Co. (Ky.), 89 S. W. 106; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 283. In Nebraska it is sufficient to file a certified transcript of the proceedings of the license board. State V. McGuire, 74 Neb. 769; 105 N.W. 471. The judgment of the district court in that State is not reviewable by the Supremo Court. Halverstadt v. Berger, 72 Neb. 462; 100 N. W. 934. In Pennsylvania the judgment of the appellate court will not be reversed because the names of the remonstrants are duplicated, the presumption being that the court had due regard for the number and character of the petitioners for the license. In re Shearer, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 34. If the record shows the court refused the license for a reason the law does not recngni7e as valid, its action will be reversed. In re Knoblauch, 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 323. 667 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. § 405 the discretion of the licensing boai-'l has been unreasonably or arbitrarily used in refusing a license, the action will be reviewed.-" If a statute requires the appellant to give a bond when he takes an appeal, then a copy of his bond must appear in the record, under the Kentucky practice.-^ Sec. 405. Writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibitnon may be issued where a licensing board undertakes to grant a license for a territory over which it has no jurisdiction. Such was held to be the case in England where the justices of Warwickshire purported to act as licens- ing justices for an outlying district of the county of Worcester which had been transferred to the county of Warwick for po- lice purposes only, and to hear and determine applications for licensing such district, over which tliey had no jurisdiction.-- And in Missouri it was held that the holder of a license was entitled to a writ of prohibition on refusal of the court to give him a change of venue in certiorari to review the proceedings in the county court granting him a license; because he had no adequate remedy by appeal from a judgment refusing him a license.-^ But where the act of issuing a license is non-judi- cial and of an administrative regulation, the writ will not be is- sued.-* If the license will be void if issued, a writ of prohi- bition will not be granted.-^ 20 Louisville V. Gagen (Ky.),llG Appeal of Stavolo, SI Conn. 454; S. W. 745; 118 S. W. 947; Berger 71 Atl. 549. V. DeLoach, 121 S. W. 591. 22 Regina v. Worcester, J. J. In this last case the detenni- [1899], 1 Q. B. 59; 62 J. P. 836; nation of the city council which 68 L. J. Q. B. 109; 47 W. R. 134; of two applicants should receive 79 L. T. 393; 15 T. L. R. 45; 19 the license, when only one could Cox C. C. 198. See also IMyers v. be issued, was held not reviewable. Circuit Court (W. Va. ), 63 S. E. 21 Hamilton v. McKinney (Ky.), 201. 65 S. W. 2; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1341. 23 State v. Denton, 128 Mo. App. In Connecticut tlie questions on 304; 107 S. W. 446. appeal are whether the county 24 Virginia Pocahontas Coal Co. commissioners acted legally, and v. McDt-well Co. Ct., 58 W. V:\. whether they exceeded or abused 86; 51 S. E. 1. their powers. Appeal of Bor- 20 Beckham v. Howard, 83 Ga. mann, 81 Conn. 458; 71 Atl. 502; 89; 9 S. E. 784. §§406,407 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 668 Sec, 406. From what orders an appeal may be taken. Appeals lie only from judgments granting or refusing li- censes, or from a "final judgment." Thus where a remon- strance was filed and to it a paper was filed called a "demur- rer," and this demurrer was sustained, and the record then recited that "thereupon the remonstrators failed and refused to plead further and the court rendered judgment on the de- murrer ; and it is therefore considered and adjudged by the court that the remonstrants take nothing by this action and that defendant recover from the remonstrants his costs and charges in this case laid out and expended," followed by the usual prayer for an appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that there was no final judgment from which to appeal.-" So a remonstrant cannot appeal from an order merely overruling his protest; -• and in Alabama it has been held that an order merely refusing the license Avas not a "final decree of the probate court" nor a "final judgment order or decree of the judge of probate. ' ' ~^ But where there were two judges of the court and they disagreed, the order reciting, "The court dis- agrees to granting this license, and therefore there is no license granted," it was held that this was a final judgment from which an appeal lay.-^ Sec. 407. Persons entitled to appeal — Parties. Of course, an applicant denied a license has a right to ap- peal where appeals lie generally ; ^** and if the license be grant- so Barnes v. Wagener, 169 Ind. 2s Eamagnano v. Crook, 88 Ala. 511; 82 N. E. 1037. It should be 450; 7 So. 247. noted that although this case had 29 in re Foreman, 20 Super. Ct. been appealed from the board of Rep. 98. county oommissioners to the C'ir- so Ex parte Dumi, 14 Ind. 122; cuit Court, the latter court tried Lester v. Price, S3 Va. 648; 3 S. the case de novo, and granted or E. 529 (by statute) ; Wilson v. refused the license as the facts Mathis, 145 Ind. 493; 44 N. E. proven showed should be done. 486; Lanham v. Woods, 167 Ind. Anderson v. Weber, 39 Ind. App. 398; 79 N. E. 376; Ludvvig v. 443; 79 N. E. 1055; State v. State, 18 Ind. App. 518; 48 N. E. Schneider, 47 Mo. App. 669. 390; Regina v. Deane, 2 Q. B. 27 Moores v. State, 58 Neb. 608 ; 96. 79 N. W. 163. 669 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. §407 ed, the remonstrants may appeal.^^ And where a nearby land- owner may object to the granting of a license, he may appeal.''- But a person who has no interest in the granting or refusal of the license, Avho is not a party to the record, cannot ap- peal.^^ Thus the attorney of the remonstrants cannot appeal in his own name nor without their consent. ^^ But where a statute gave an appeal to ' ' any taxpayer * * * who shall be aggrieved, ' ' it was held not necessary for an appellant tax- payer to show an aggrievance special to himself."^ In New York the county treasurer to whom the license tax must be paid is a "party aggrieved" within the meaning of a statute giving "aggrieved" persons a right of appeal.-^" A per.son who intervenes in the quarter sessions of Pennsylvania after the license is granted, for the purpose of appealing, cannot main- tain an appeal.^^ And where an appellant to the Appellate Court appeared in the Circuit Court fi-om which an appeal had been taken and filed an answer setting up a remonstrance by a majority of the legal voters, to which a demurrer was sustained, he not having the right to file a new remonstrance at that stage of the case, it was held that he had no standing to appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court.^'* In England a trade 31 Collins V. Barrier, 64 Miss. 21; 8 So. 164; Ludwig v. State, 18 Ind. App. 518; 48 N. E. 390; Les- ter V. Price, 83 Va. 648; 3 S. E. 29 (by statute) ; State v. Atlantic City, 48 N. J. L. 118; 3 Atl. 65; Lanham v. Woods, 167 Ind. 398; 79 N. E. 376; Whissen v. Furth, 73 Ark. 366; 84 S. W. 500; 68 L. R. A. 161; In re Smith, 126 Iowa 128; 101 N. W. 875. Con- tra, Drapert v. State, 14 Ind. 123 ; Boulter v. Kent [1897], App. Cas. 569; 61 J. P. 532; 66 L. J. Q. B. 787; 77 L. T. 288; 46 W. R. 114; 13 T. L. R. 538. 32 Dexter v. Cumberland, 17 R. I. 222; 21 Atl. 347; Appeal of Gib- boney, 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 26. 33 State V. Lamberton, 37 Minn. 362; 34 N. W. 336. 31 Clark V. Pratt (Miss.), 11 So. 631; Regina v. Keepers of the Peace, 25 Q. B. Div. 257; 39 L. J. M. C. 146; 63 L. T. 243; 39 W. R. 11; Regina v. London, J. J., 55 J. P. 56; Miller v. Givens, 35 Ind. App. 40; 78 N. E. 1067. 35 Appeal of Board, 64 Conn. 526; 30 Atl. 775; State v. Alli- ance, 65 Neb. 524; 91 N. W. 387. 36 People V. Sackett, 15 N. Y. App. Div. 290; 44 N. Y. Supp. 593, reversing 17 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 405; 40 N. Y. Supp. 413. 37 Appeal of Gibboney, 6 Pa- Super. Ct. 26. 38 Miller v. Givens, 39 Ind. App. 40; 79 N. E. 1067. § 407 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 670 rival has sufficient interest to entitle him to appeal under a statute giving a "person aggrieved" an appeal,-''^ but the owner of the premises licensed, who is not the licensee, is the "person aggrieved," and cannot appeal from a decree for- feiting the license, although it may mean much to him.*'' In New South Wales any person residing within the prohibited district is a person "aggrieved," and may appeal from a grant of a license.*^ But where, in Arkansas, the record re- cited "Coner K ct al,^^ when K filed an answer, and the un- known parties styled "et al," are not expressly made parties to the proceedings, only K being treated as a party, another than K cannot appeal.'*- In loAva "any citizen of the county" may file with the clerk of the court a general denial to the application for a license; and on an adverse decision may ap- peal, and although it is made the duty of the county attorney to appear to such application, yet the person so filing a general denial has also the right to appear and prosecute an appeal.*^ The licensing board is not a proper party to the appeal.** An appeal will not be dismissed on the ground that persons not entitled to appeal have agreed to pay a part of the expenses of an appeal taken by others entitled to take appeal.*^ In England where the question is one of renewal of a license the landlord may join with his licensee tenant who has applied for a renewal of his license and been refused ; *'"' and the licensee 39 Rex V. Groom, 70 L. J. K. B. W. N. (X. S. W.) 202; Ex parte 636; [1901] 2 K. B. 157; 84 L. Aitkin [1901], 1 N. S. W. 214. T. 534; 49 W. R. 484; 65 J. P. See Rhode Island, etc. Co. v. 452. Evasion, 21 R. I. 577; 44 Ail. 223. So in New South Wales. Ex 42 Halford v. Kirkland (Ark.), parte Cann, 1 S. R. N. S. W. 262; 71 S. W. 264. 18 W. N. N. S. W. 186. Contra, *^ In re Intoxicating Liquors, Regina v. Middlesex, 3 B. & Ad. 129 Iowa, 434: 105 N. W. 702; 938; Regina v. Surry, 52 J. P. In re Smith, 126 Iowa, 128; 101 423. N. W. 875. 40 Regina v. Andover, 55 L. J. 44 Murphy v. Board, 73 Ind. 483. M. C. 143; 16 Q. B. Div. 711; 55 Contra, Guinn v. Cumberland Co., L. T. 23; 34 W. R. 456; 50 J. P. (Ky.), 90 S. W. 274; 28 Ky. 549. L. Rep. 759. 41 7n. re Gleason, 7 W. N. C. 45 Ferguson v. Brown, 75 Miss. (N. S. W.) 140. Contra, Ex parte 214; 21 So. 603. Rose, 2 S. R. (N. S. W.) 268; 19 40 Feist v. Tower, J. J., 68 J. P. 264. 671 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. § 408 may authorize a mortgagee of the premises to appeal, though he himself declines to do so.^^ And where the owner of the premises is expressly authorized b}^ statute to apply for a trans- fer from one tenant to another of the licensed premises, he may appeal on refusal of the court to make the transfer/'' Remonstrants cannot appeal after the license against which they remonstrated has expired/" A statute which gives an applicant a right of appeal does not thereby give the remon- strators the right of appeal.''" Sec. 408. Rights of licensee pending appeal. Where a case is tried de novo on appeal m the Appellate Court, the effect of the appeal is to vacate or suspend the or- der or judgment granting a license, and any license isvSued thereon before the appeal is taken is vacated, and if issued thereafter it is void.^^ In Nebraska it is held that the licensing body must recall the license when an appeal is taken ; and if it do not mandamus lies to compel it to do so; ^- and the right 47 Garrett V. Middlesex, J. J., 12 In re Klamni (Neb.), 117 N. W. Q. B. Div. 620; 48 J. P. 358; 53 991. L. J. M. C. 81; 32 W. R. G4C. 49 Ververka v. Fullmers (Neb.), 48Regina v. West Riding, J. J., 118 N. W. 1097. 11 Q. B. Div. 917; 48 J. P. 149; 92 soAilstock v. Page, 77 Va. 386. L. J. M. C. 99; Stevens v. Shern- si Molihan v. State, 30 Ind. 266; brook, J. J., 23 Q. B. Div. 142; 53 Young v. State, 34 Ind. 46; Blair J. P. 423; 58 L. J. M. C. 167. v. Kilpatrick, 40 Ind. 312; Mul- In England the licensing justices ikin v. Davis, 53 Ind. 206; State are the only proper respondents, v. Sopher, 157 Ind. 360; 61 N. S. and no other person can oppose the 785; Head v. Doehleman, 148 Ind. license without leave of court. 145; 46 N. E. 585; People v. Jud- Tynemouth v. Attorney General son, 59 N. Y. IVIisc. Rep. 538; 112 [1899] App. Gas. 293; 68 L. N. Y. Supp. 408. J. Q. B. 752; 63 J. P. 404; 15 T. 52 State v. Bonsfield, 24 Neb. L. R. 340; Nix v. Nottingham, 517; 39 N. W. 427; Byrum v. J. J. [1899], 2 Q. B. 300. n. Peterson, 34 Neb. 237; 51 N. W. If the remonstrants be success- 829; Swan v. Wilderson, 10 Okla. ful, they cannot be taxed with 547; 62 Pac. 422; Watkins v. costs. IVIiller v. DeArmond, 93 Grieser. 11 Okla. 302; 66 Pac. Ind. 74. 332; Paden v. Carson, 15 Okla. A citf cannot appeal from the 399; 82 Pac. 830. action of its own excise board. Jure Foltyn (Neb.), 118 N. W. § 409 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 672 to the -writ is not necessarily lost by delaj","^ though it may be.'''* Wliere the trial is de novo the appellate court in which such trial is had awards the license, and the applicant's right de- pends upon the license issued by that court, and not upon the license issued by the court or board from which the appeal was taken.^^ Occasionally a statute provides that the license issued by the licensing court or board may continue in force until the c[uestion is determined in the appellate court which tries the case de novo; but usually there is a limit to the time it may continue, as for instance, until the close of the first term of the court to which the appeal is taken.^® Mere notice of an intention to appeal does not prevent the issuance of the license,^^ though it should be withheld during the time an ap- peal can be taken, if notice of appeal has been given.^^ If a license has been granted and it remains in force pending the appeal, a reversal of the order granting the license has the effect to revoke the license.^^ Sec. 409. Sale pending appeal to Supreme Court. In Indiana it has been held in a well-considered case, that an appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of the Circuit Court granting a license to sell intoxicating liquors does not suspend the right of the applicant to sell pending the appeal if he has tendered to the proper officers the license fee and 119; State v. Rathsack, 82 Neb. diction over the case, it being nec- 386; 117 N. W. 949. essary to reconcile several stat- es State V. Bays, 31 Neb. 514; utes relating to appeals. 48 N. W. 270; 31 Neb. 516; 48 N. r,7 Lydick v. Korner, 13 Neb. 10; W. 271. 12 N. W. 838. 54 State V. Elwood, 37 Neb. 473; If a licensee pay the license fee, 55 N. W. 1074. take out his license, and then an 55 State v. Sopher, 157 Ind. appeal be taken and his license be 360; 61 N. E. 785; Keiser v. State, denied, he cannot recover back the 78 Ind. 430; Board v. Krenger, 88 fee. Board v. Kreuger, 88 Ind. Ind. 231. 231. 56 State V. Sopher, 157 Ind. 360; ss Swan v. Wilderson 10 Okla. 61 N. E. 785. In this case it was 547; 62 Pac. 422. held until the close of the next 59 Bordwell v. State, 77 Ark. term of the court at which the 161; 91 S. W. 555. ut this Regina v. Minshall, 1 N. & M. 277 ; statement must be received with Williams v. Louis, 14 Kan. 005; caution; for, as we have seen, a Commonwealth v. Graves, 18 B. license issued in a proliibition Men. 33 district is absolutely void. 3T Heidelberg Garden Co. v. Peo- Contra, Raleigh v. Cane, 47 N. pie, 124 111. App. 331; affirmed 233 C. 293. 111. 290; 84 N. E. 230; Theurer V. 4 1 Hornaday v. State, 43 Ind. People, 211 111. 290; 71 N. E. 306. 997; affirming 113 111. App. 028; « State v. Evans, 83 Mo. 319. Handy v. People, 29 111. App. 99; -13 Commonwealth v. Whelan, 134 /n re OTonner, Temp. Wood (^lai Mass. 200; Commonwealth v. Mc- itoba), 293. Cormick, 150 Mass. 270; 22 N. 38 State V. Lewis, 110 1a\. 762; E. 911. § 413 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 684. where granted is void.** A license issued by the wrong officer is void and not voidable,*^ but the licensee may show that the officer issuing the license was in fact duly elected, even though such officer has received no certificate of election.**^ If a license could only be issued by a board when in actual session, one issued out of session, or when it had no power to sit, is void.*'^ A license paper in proper form is prima facie valid, and he who asserts it is not has the burden to show his assertion is true.** Sec. 413. Void license. A void license is no protection to the person holding it.** Thus, in case of a license granted to a person who had pre- viously been convicted of a felony, a statute forbidding the licensing of such a person, though no one but himself was aware of the felony, and a formal transfer had been obtained regu- larly by a third person, it was held that the license was void even in the hands of such third person.^ And of course a for- feited license is void from the moment of the judgment of for- feiture, or from the moment of conviction where the statute provides that a conviction for a violation of the license law shall work a forfeiture of the license.^^ So a statute issued under a repealed statute is void, though everybody believed it was in force and acted in good faith.-'- So where justices were required to grant licenses at public sittings, the grant of one at a private sitting was held void.^^ So where a statute required a cer- 44 People V. Davis, 45 Barb. 494; 48 State v. Kuhuke, 26 Kan. affirmed 36 N. Y. 77. 405: Williams v. Louis, 14 Kan. 4s Cronin v. Stoddard, 97 N. Y. 605. 271. 4f) state v. Moore, 1 Jones (N. 4« Montgomery V. O'Dell, 07 Hun C), 276; State v. Moore, 84 Mo. 169; 22 N. Y. Supp. 412. App. 11. 47 Raleigh v. Kane, 47 N. C. 293. so Regina v. Vine, L. R. 10 Q. B. As to presumption board was in 195; 39 J. P. 213; 44 L. J. M. C. session, see Montgomery v. O'Dell, 60; 31 L. T. 842; 23 W. K. 649. 67 Hun 169; 22 N. Y. Supp. 412. si Regina v. West Riding, J. J., A license issued by the author 21 Q. B. 258; 52 J. P. 455; 57 L. ities of a Confederate State dur- J. M. C. 103 ; 36 W. R. 855. ing the War of the Rebellion was 52 Pearson v. Broadbent, 36 J. P. held valid. Ward v. (State, 2 €old 485. 605; 91 Am. Dec. 270. es Rex v. Downes, 3 T. R. 560. 685 ISSUANCE OF LICENSES. ' §§ 414; 415 tain written recommendation, and a license was issued with- out this recommendation, it was held the license was' void.'** But a license granted without the overseer's certificate, as a statute required, was held not void, although it would have been if the licensee had not possessed the requisite qualifications.'*^ And where a license was produced, but one of the signatures of the justices was suggested to be forged, though not by the license holder, the justices refused to receive evidence of the forgery, and this was held a proper decision.^*' Where a license could only be issued for six months, the grant of a license for a year was held void.^^ Sec. 414. Members of licensing board prohibitionists — Interest. In New Zealand prohibitionist officers are not competent to pass upon the question whether a license shall be granted,'*^ but they may b^ compelled by proper proceedings to do their duty.-^^ A licensing officer who is so indiscreet as to sign a petition for a license does not thereby disqualify himself from acting although a constitutional provision disqualifies judges having an interest in a cause.**" Sec. 415. Criminal liability of licensing officer. A licensing officer who knowingly and willfully issues a license in violation of law lays himself liable to indictment if he be not a judicial officer, though not liable for error of judgment.*'' So if an officer perversely, without cause, refuse 54 State V. Moore, 1 Jones (N. L. R. 583; Quill v. Isitt, 10 N. C ) 276. Z. L. E. 636; Taylor v. Isitt, 9 N. 55 Thompson v. Harvey, 23 J. P. Z. L. R. 678. 150; 4 H. & N. 254; 28 L. J. M. go Ferguson v. Brown, 75 Miss. C. 163. 214; 21 So. 603. 56 Regina v. Munshall, 1 N. & M. "i People v. Norton, 7 Barb. 477 ; 277. People v. Worsley, 1 N. Y. Supp. 57 State V. Moore, 84 Mo. App. 748; 17 N. Y. St. Rep. 610; Com- jl monwealth v. Wood, 116 Ky. 748; "58lslett V. Quill, 11 N. Z. L. 76 S. W. 842; 25 Ky. L. Rep. lOlt). j^ 224. ^^ parte Blaine, 11 Can. Cr. Cas. 59 Isitt V. Taylor, 10 N. Z. L. 193. R. 646; In re Wanganni, 10 N. Z. § 415 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 686 a license he likewise lays himself liable to a criminal prosecu- tion.^^ A statute provided that no certificate for a license should issue to any applicant until the inspector should have reported that there were proper accommodations prepared for a public house, and a fine was imposed for issuing a license contrary to its provisions. An application was m.ade to a city council for a license, but the inspector reported that his premises were insuf- ficient, the defect being the lack of a step in the stairs. A minute was entered that the license should issue as soon as the applicant produced the inspector's certificate, and the issuing officer signed a certificate and gave it to the clerk, telling him not to hand it over until he had received the in- spector's certificate. This certificate was handed over two days after the application had been made to the council, when the license was given by the clerk to the applicant. It was held that the licensing officer had committed no offense under the statute prohibiting the illegal issuance of .licenses.^^ «2 Attorney General v. Justices, ing. Commonwealth v. Wood, su- 3 Ired. 315; State v. Kite, 81 Mo. pra. 97. G3 Regina v. Patton, 35 Upp. Indictment for unlawfully us- Can. 442. CHAPTER IX. THE FORM OF THE LICENSE. SECTION. SECTION. 416. The form. 418. The place licensed. 417. Conditions inserted in li- cense. Sec. 416. The form. Statutes require licenses to be put in writing. A parol license from the officer whose duty it is to issue it is no pro- tection from a prosecution for selling without a license.^ And a certificate of the county commissioners' clerk that a certain person had been licensed was held not a license, nor even con- clusive evidence that a license had been granted.- The license, to be a protection, must be signed by the proper officer, law- fully authorized to do so.^ The order directing the issuance of a license is not the license itself, and hence an order of the licensing board correcting an error in a license already issued is not admissible to protect the licensee from a crim- inal prosecution for having violated the liquor laws.* Just what should be the contents of a license must depend upon 1 Laurence v. Gray, 11 Johns. An ordinance cannot take the 179; State v. Moore, 14 N. H. 451; place of a license, though so in- Connecticut Breweries Co. v. tended. In re Coyne, 9 Upp. Can. Murphy, 81 Conn. 145; 70 Atl. 448. But see Terry v. Haldi- 450. mand, 15 Upp. Can. 380. 2 Commonwealth v. Spring, 19 * Commonwealth v. Cauley, 150 Pick. 396. Mass. 272; 22 N. E. 909. 3Cronin v. Stoddard, 97 N. Y. 271, 687 § 416 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 688 the requirements of the statute, and what might not be suffi- cient in one State would be in another. Usually the license must designate the place where the liquors are to be sold, what liquors the licensee can sell, and the authority granting it, duly signed. "When such a paper is produced it raises the presumption that its issuance was lawfully authorized.^ A license, however, may show on its face it is void, as wdiere it shows all the fee for it had not been paid, when that was a pre- requisite.^ If a statute authorizes a change of place, then the authorization must be as formally signed as the license itself.'^ If the license is granted for a particularly designated place, then such place must be set forth in the license. Thus where the statute required "the building in which the business is to be carried on" to be set forth, it w^as held not sufficient to merely name the street, and sales made under it were held to render the licensee liable to a fine.^ But if no statute re- quires it, the house in which the liquors will be sold need not be specified.^ The license need not specify, that it will ter- minate with the term of the officers who authorized its issu- ance.^" If the one issued exceed the conditions in the order granting it, to the extent of the excess, it will be void, as where it is on its face to run longer than the granting order allowed.'^ Usually, however, the licensee will be protected even if the license is informal. '- 5 state V. Brandon, 28 Ark. 410; monwealth v. Kepp, 150 ^li&ss. Murphy v. Nolan, 126 Mass. 542; 272; 22 N. E. 910. State V. Kuhuke, 26 Kan. 405. 9 Goforth v. State, 60 Miss. 756; 6 Townsend v. State, 2 Blackf. State v. Gerhardt, 48 N. C. 178. 151; Commonwealth v. MeCor- lo Henderson v. Price, 96 N. C. mick, 150 Mass. 270; 22 N. E. 423; 2 S. E. 155. 911; Spake v. People, S9 111. 617; In Tennessee, under the Act of Handy v. People, 29 111. App. 99; 1846 the license was void unless McWilliams v. Phillips, 51 Miss. the oath of the licensee was en- 196; Zielke v. Stathe, 42 Neb. 750; dorsed upon it. Pope v. Swan, 2 60 N. W. 1010. Swan 611. 7 Commonwealth V. Merriam, 136 n State v. Brown, (Iowa); 109 Mnss. 433. N. W. 1011. *< Comnionwealth v. Merriam, su- 12 Dubois v. Boivin, 14 L. C. J. pra. 203; Williams v. Louis, 14 Kan. Commonwealth v. Cauley, 150 605. Mass. 272; 22 N. E. 909; Com- g89 THE FORM OP THE LICENSE. §§417,418 Sec. 417. Conditions inserted in license. The licensing board or conrt has no power to insert any conditions in the license beyond what the statute authorizes it to do.^^ Thus in England it is held that the licensing justices cannot annex a condition to a license that the licensee shall pay a sum of money into their hands, to be applied by them to- wards reduction o£ notes or similar public purposes;^* or to pay the debt he owes another.^'' So, unless the statute expressly authorizes it, a condition cannot be inserted m a license that sales shall not be made on a day named, when the statute permits W^ But where a statute made a difference in the amount of the fee charged for a druggist's license and a saloon keeper's, it was held that the licensing board could in- sert a condition in the druggist's license, who paid a less fee than the saloon keeper, that neither he nor his agents should sell liquor to be consumed on the premises.^^ That a Legislature may authorize the licensing board to impose and insert con- ditions in a license will not be seriously controverted.^^ Thus, a city license conditioned that the licensee will pay an in- creased license fee if the fee thereafter be increased is valid.^^ So a condition as to the granting of a license that the board may revoke it if the license violate the liquor law is valid.^<> Sec. 418. The place licensed. Almost invariably, under recent statutes, the license must not only be issued for a certain political division of the State, but it must be issued for a designated point in that political divi- 13 Penney v. Weirau, 26 N. Z. the licenses they grant. Patter- 234- Queen v. Van Zyle, 16 Juta son's Licensing Acts (19 ed.), p. 278' 674; 4 Edw. 7 C. 23, §4. i4Regina v. Bowman, 67 L. J. ^« /« re Breslin, 45 Hun 210. Q. B. 463 [1898] ; 1 Q. B. 663; 78- i^ Spake v. People, 89 111. 617. L. T. 230; 62 J. P. 374; 14 T. L. isSearle v. McArdle, 15 N. Z. R 303 ^- ^" ^^^' ■i5Rexv. Athay, 2Burr. 653. i« Seattle v. Clark, 28 Wash. The English statutes confer 717; 69 Pac. 407. great powers upon the licensing ^o /^ re Sarlo, 76 Ark. 33G; 88 justices to insert conditions in S. W. 953. § 418 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 690 sion. "When sueli is the ease a sale can be made at no other place than at the one licensed. Thus a license issued for the sale of liquors in a room situated in the basement of a hotel — not being a hotel license — will not authorize a sale in any- other room of the hotel than that room.^^ And a license to sell at a particular building will not permit the peddling of liquors with teams from house to house.-- In some of the States it is sufficient if the petition for and the grant of the license specify the place where the liquors are to be sold ; -^ while in others, to be valid, the place must be specifically and particularly set forth in the license.^* Just what terri- tory is covered by the license is sometimes a difficult ques- tion. Thus a license was to sell "in and upon the premises known as the Palmer House." This house stood upon the front part of a deep lot owned by the licensee, the rear part of which had been for many years enclosed and used as a fair ground, immediately within which enclosure the licensee made a sale of liquor. It was held that as the fair ground, though part of the lot upon wiiich the hotel stood, was not used in connection with or for the enjoyment of the hotel, 21 /n re McCoy, 104 N. Y. App. Hewitt v. Jervis, 68 J. P. 54; Div. 215; 93 N. Y. Supp. 401; Strickland v. Whittaker, 68 J. P. State V. Prettyman, 3 Harr. 235 ; 52 W. R. 538 ; 90 L. T. 445 ; (Del.) 570; Commonwealth v. 20 T. L. R. 224; Pasquier v. Cauley, 150 Mass. 272; 22 N. E. Xeale [1902], 2 K. B. 287; 67 J. 909; Commonwealth v. Keefe, 150 P. 49; 71 L. J. K. B. 835; 51 W. Mass. 272; 22 N. E. 910. R. 92; 87 L. T. 230; 18 T. L. R. 22Teoli V. Nardoli, 23 R. I. 87; 704; McLaughlin v. McCloy, 26 Ir. 49 All. 489; Pletts v. Campbell L. T. 131. [1895], 2 Q. B. 229;. 59 J. P. 502; See Davis v. Burnett, 71 L. J. K. 64 L. J. M. C. 225; 73 L. T. 344; B. 355 [1902], 1 K. B. 666; 86 43 W. R. 634; 15 R. 493; Cocker L. T. 565; 50 W. R. 391; 66 J. V. McMullen, 64 J. P. 245; 81 L. P. 406. T. 7S4; Pletts V. Beattie [19:], 23 Goforth v. State, 60 Miss. 756. 1 Q. B. 519; 60 J. P. 185; 65 L. 24 Commonwealth v. Stratton, J. M. C. 86; 74 L. T. 148; Steph- 150 Mass. 188; 22 N. E. 893; Com- enson v. Rogers, 63 J. P. 230; 80 monwealth v. McCormick, 150 L. T. 195; 15 T. L. R. 748 Walker v. Walker, 67 J. P. 452 90 L. T. 88; 20 Cox C. C, 694 Mass. 270; 22 N. E. 910; Com- monwealth V. Cauley, 150 Mass. 272: 22 N. E. 909. 691 THE I'^ORM OF THE LICENSE. §4]'' it was not covered by the license.-"' Where the license is for a particular place, by no process of reasoning can it be con- strued to authorize sales at two places.^® Under a license to sell liquors in a dwelling house "and the apartments and dependencies thereof," a sale cannot be made at a small house forty-five rods away from the dwelling, on the same lot, and having a passageway between them.-^ But a license for a single place will not prevent the use of two or more bars thereon, although screened off but connected by doors or passageways.-^ And M'here a licensee had two rooms, con- nected by an archway, and a bar in each room, one for whites and the other for negroes, it was held that his license, though issued for a place, covered sales at both bars.-^ Yet where a licensee had a stand at a corner of a certain street, and also another stand adjoining, with an inside passageway between them, it was held that his license covered sales only at the first stand."" Where a license is granted to a house, without defining the metes and bounds, the house includes the curtilage and a piece of ground in front of it.^'^ A bench placed out- side the door of the licensed premises and used by customers 25 Regina v. Palmer, 46 Up. Can. a house require only one license 262; Watson v. Severance, 2 N. H. or requires two licenses, will be 501; State v. Moody, 95 N. C. upheld; for it is a question of 656. fact for it to decide. Sanders v. 26 State V. Walker, 16 Me, 241; Elberton, 50 Ga. 178, State V. Hughes, 24 Mo. 147; Zin- so State v. Fredericks, 16 Mo. ner v. Commonwealth (Pa.), 14 382; Malken v. Chicago, 119 111. Atl. 431; Chicago v. Malken, 119 App. 542; affirming 217 111. 471; 111. App. 542; affirmed 217 111. 75 N. E. 548. 471; 75 N. E. 548; Wood v. State Under a general license to re- (Tex.), 116 S. W. 1154. tail, the designation of a place be- 27 Commonwealth v. Estabrook, ing unnecessary, the license can- 10 Pick. 293; Johnson v. State, not sell in districts of the coun- 152 Ala. 61 ; 44 So. 555. ty which has adopted local prohi- 28 St. Louis V. Gerardi. 90 Mo. bition. Barnes v. State, 49 Ala. 640; 3 S. W. 408. 342. 29 Hochstandler v. State, 73 Ala. ^i Manson v. London, etc. Ry. 24. Co., L. R. (5 Eq. 101; Richards Usually the judgment of the li- v. Swansea, etc. Co., 9 Ch. Div, censing board, when it is a ques- 425; Commonwealth v. Esta- tion of fact whether two rooms in brook, 10 Pick. 293. §418 TR-VFFIC IX INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 692 to sit and drink beer on has been held to be a part of the licensed premises ; ^- and so has an outhouse, in England, al- though used only as a cellar.^^ 32 Cross V. Watts, 32 L. J. M. C. 73. 33 Regina v. Tott, 30 L. ,J. M. C. 177; 4L. T. 306; 25 W. R. 327; 9 W. R. 663. In New Jersey, under the act of 1889, p. 83, § 112, a license can- not be granted for a place in which a grocery or other mer- cantile business is carried on. Peer V. Board, 70 N. J. L. 490; 57 Atl. 153. To make a place used for sale of liquors a "new place" within the meaning of a statute forbid- ding the granting of a license for a "new place," there must be a Bubstantial abandonment of the business there. Eckersly v. Ab- bott (N. J. L.), 74 Atl. 314. CHAPTER X. TRANSFER OF LICENSE. SECTION. SECTION. 419. License to sell intoxicating 424. Mortgage of license — ^adi- liquors not transferable. cial sale. 420. Statute permitting transfer. 425. Transfer of license to otiier 421. Assignment not a transfer. premises — Pennsylvania. 422. Death of licensee. 426. Transfer under English stat- 423. Bankruptcy or insolvency — utes. Receiver. 427. Transfer under English and Colonial statutes — Cases. Sec. 419. License to sell intoxicating liquors not transfer- Laws regulating the granting and issuing of licenses to vend intoxicating liquors to be drunk as a beverage, as a rule, clothe those who grant them with the authority to determine who are fit persons to be intrusted with such business, and this rule is based upon sound principle. The purpose of such laws is to regulate the traffic in intoxicating liquors, and to lessen the evils resulting from the unrestrained sale and use thereof. Observation and experience have dem- onstrated that there is a marked difference in the capacity of men to restrain and control others. A proper person to be entrusted with a permit would not knowingly sell to minors, or men intoxicated, or to those in the habit of being intoxi- cated, or permit gambling, fighting, or other disorderly con- duct in or about his place. In requiring these qualifications, much reliance is placed in the personal fitness and capacity of the persons who are to be entrusted with licenses to sell intoxicating liquors to be drunk where sold, and the law con- templates that persons thus licensed will give their personal attention to such business, and if a licensee had the power 693 §419 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS 694 to transfer such a license he could transfer it to whom he pleased, regardless of the fitness of the transferee to engage in such perilous and hazardous business, and thus the very object of the law Avould be defeated. Accordingly it has been uniformly held that a license to sell or traffic in intoxi- cating liquors, is personal to the holder and cannot be dele- gated or assigned to another or committed by a court to the care of a receiver.^ And in Nebraska it has been held that a license was no defense to an indictment for a violation of the statute against the vending of intoxicating liquors where it M^as shown by the evidence that a person who held a liquor license issued under the authority of a mayor and council of a city, sold out his saloon and assigned his license to the defendant, who petitioned the mayor and council to transfer the license to him, and the council thereupon ordered the license to be so transferred, and the clerk issued an original license, in form, to the defendant, who proceeded to sell in- toxicating liquors under it.- In Indiana it has been held that iStat« V. Sumter Co., 22 Fla. Flynn (X. J. L.), 10 Atl. 177; 8; Godfrey v. State, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 151; Pickens v. State, 20 Ind. IIC; Strahn v. Hamilton, 3S Ind. 57 ; Riinyon v. State, 52 Ind. 320; Heath v. State, 105 Ind. 342; 4 K E. 901; Pierce v. Pierce, 17 Ind. App. 107; 46 N. E. 480; Lewis V. United States, 1 Morris, (la.) 190; Commonwealth v. Bryan, 9 Dana (Ky.) 310; Alger V. Weston, 14 Johns. (X. Y.) 231; State V. McXeeley, 1 Winst. (N. C. L.) 234; In re Templeton (Pa.), 4 Lancast. Law Rev. 242 ; In re Blumenthal, 125 Pa. St. 412; 18 Atl. 395; 23 Wkly. X. C. 493; Gilday v. Warren, 69 Conn. 237; 37 Atl. 494; State v. Prettyman, 3 Harr. (Del.) 570; Common- wealth V. Brenaman, 8 B. Mon. 374; Commonwealth v. Hadley, 11 Met. 71; Tracy v. Cxinberg, 189 Mass. 260; 73 N. E. 637; Semple v. Sanderson v. Goodrich, 46 Barb. 616; Matter of Place, 27 X. Y. App. Div. 561; 50 X. Y. Supp. 640; In re Grim, 181 Pa. St. 233; Young V. Stevenson, 75 Ark. 181; 86 S. W. 1000; Saw- yer V. Sanderson, 113 Mo. App. 233; 88 S. W. 151; State v. Bayne, 100 Wis. 35; 75 X. W. 403; Kennedy v. Welsh, 196 Mass. 592; 83 X. E. 11; Arnett v. Wright, 18 Okla. 337; 89 Pac. 1116 (note given for transfer is void) ; Jacobson v. Queen, 1 Juta 33; Mitchell v. Branham, 104 Mo. App. 480; 79 S. W. 739 (a con- tract to transfer a license is void). If one of two licensed partners die, the other may continue the business. Lynch v. State, 147 Ala. 143; 39 So. 912. 2 State v. Lydick, 11 Xeb. 3G0; 9 X". W. 560. 695 TRANSFER OF LICENSE. § 420 a promissory note given for the transfer of a liquor license was without valid consideration.^ Sec. 420. Statute permitting transfer. In some States licenses may be transferred bj^ the licensee, but always under restrictions. This is pursuant to some statute expressly permitting it. Usually the licensing- board must approve of the transfer; and this is in order to pre- vent the liberty of the license being used by an improper person. When such is the case the licensee may sell the license and recover the price agreed to be paid.* When the board has acted upon the application for a transfer, and has granted it, nothing remaining to be done except the issuance of the certificate of transfer by its clerk, it has fully acted in the premises and cannot rescind its action.^ If the appli- cation be arbitrarily denied, the action of the board may be revised by a writ of certiorari.^ But if the transfer is a matter of discretion with the board, then mandamus does not lie to revise their action in refusing to approve the transfer.'^ A statute authorizing the transfer of a retail license will not authorize the transfer of a wholesale license.* In Pennsyl- vania it was held that if a licensee abandons licensed prem- ises the court might transfer it to a new party, refunding to the original licensee the proper portion of the fee,® even with- out the consent of the licensee.^" Under a statute allowing sStrahn v. Hamilton. .38 Ind. ers, 12 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 29G; 34 57. N. Y. Siipp. 22. But a licensee may authorize "^ In re Blumenthal, 125 Pa. St. others to act with and under him 412; 18 Atl. .395; 23 Wkly. N. in executing the powers granted C. 493. to him by the license. Common- ^ In re Rahn, 14 Pa. Co. Ct wealth V. Hadley, 11 Met. 66. Rep. 202; In re Gerke Brewing 4 Rubenstein v. Kahn, 5 N. Y. Co., 23 Pittsb. L. Jr. 420. Misc. Rep. 408 ; 25 N. Y. Supp. » In re Doyle, 6 Kulp, 356. 760; In re Jack, 11 Australia L. io/„ re Summa, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 372; 2 €. L. Rep. 684; Rex v. Rep. 6G7. Cohen, 21 Juta 676; Norden v. The right of transfer was dis- Bosman, 21 Juta 634; Ex parte cretionary under an early stat- Heide, 18 Juta 479. ute. In re Breen, 2 Pa. Dist. 5 People V. Wells, 11 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 652; but now it is not. Laib Rep. 239; 32 N. Y. Rep. !)73. v. Hare, 1C3 Pa. St. 481- 30 Atl. <5 People V. Excise Commission- 163. § 420 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 696 a transfer the license cannot be transferred to another house.^'- In that State if the licensee become insolvent, on application of the owner of the premises the license may be transferred without his consent/- especially if he has violated the stat- ute/^ Any one aggrieved by a transfer may have himself made a party and contest its validity." The owner of prem- ises, when his licensed tenant has vacated the premises, is not entitled to have the license transferred as a matter of right, under the Pennsylvania statute. The right to a trans- fer is in the sound discretion of the court; and if the court to which the application is made decides there is no longer any necessity for the maintenance of a saloon at the place licensed, and for that reason refuse the transfer, its action is not reviewable.^^ The jurisdiction of the court to order a transfer rests upon the fact that a valid license is in exist- ence at the time the application is made; and if there is not, its action is void.^^ A petition for a transfer must set forth the same facts as were necessary in the original application for a license, and in addition thereto give the licensee's name, its date, the place for which it was granted, the reasons for the transfer, and that the licensee is willing for the transfer or give the reason why he is not willing.^^ If the applicant for a transfer, pending the hearing, transfers all his rights^ the transferee may file a petition for a transfer to him, but he must give notice of his application for the transfer in order to give the court jurisdiction. ^^ The transfer is not a transfer of the license, nor is the application or the amend- 11 7n re Burns, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. Super. Ct. 538; In re McKibbins, Rep. 174; 3 Pa. Dist. Eep. 429. 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 421. 12 In re Leibeknecht, 14 Pa. Co. i6 in re Umholtz's License, 9 Pa. Ct. Rep. 571; 3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 474; Super. Ct. 450; 43 W. N. C. 405; In re Leaky, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. In re Danrel, 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 430; 3 Pa. Dist. 472. 15G. 13 /n re Quirk, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. i^ /n re Nacrelli, 8 Del. Co. Rep. Rep. 327. 20; In re McKibbons, 11 Pa. 14 Lester v. Price, 83 Va. 648; Super. Ct. 421. 3 S. E. 529; In re McCabe, 11 Pa. is /n re Keifer License, 21 Pa-. Super. Ct. 560. Co. Ct. Rep. 512. 15 In re Stern's License, 27 Pa. 697 TRANSFER OF LICENSE. § 420 ment of the original petition for a transfer." An application for a transfer of a. license applies to an existing license and not to a subsequent one.^*' A license may be revoked after its assignment by reason of acts of forfeiture committed before the date of the assignment.-^ If an assignee of a license dis- cover that the licensee is an unfit person for a license he may and should refuse to further proceed in the matter of se- curing a transfer to himself.-- An agreement, however, to pay a licensee for the ''use" of a license is void, being against public policy; and a license is not transferred until it has been sanctioned by the State.^^ Where a county treasurer was the officer deputed to allow the transfer, it was held that he could not refuse to do so on the ground that complaint had been made that the licensee had carried on the liquor traffic in a forbidden place, that not impairing the right to a transfer.-* Howsoever an assignee may act in good faith, even to the extent of filing the bond required by stat- ute when a transfer is to be made, yet if he sells before the transfer is officially made he is guilty of selling without a license.-^"^ Where a statute permitted a transfer of a license, 19 /m. re Keifer License, sxipra. ing 32 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 210; 07 Tlie owner of tlie premises has N. Y. Supp. 48. sufficient interest to appeal from -^ Cronin v. Sharp, IG Pa. Super, the transfer. In re McCabe, 11 Ct. 70. Pa. Super. Ct. 560. 23 David Mayer Brewing Co. v. A remonstrance, to aid in the Mack, 59 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 202; collection of a debt by delaying 110 N. Y. Supp. 245; Gilday v. the transfer will be ignored, hire Warren, C9 Conn. 237; 37 Atl. Nacrelli, 8 Del. Co. Rep. 20. 494. The court has no jurisdiction 24 people v. jManzer, IS X. Y. to order the payment of the pro- Misc. Rep. 292; 41 N. Y. Supp. ceeds of a sale of a hotel as a 1075. condition to the approval of the 25 state v. Baync, 100 Wis. 35; transfer. Appeal of Class, 6 Pa. 75 N. W. 403. Super. Co. 130. In New York the commissioner 20 Mj'dosli v. Bayonne, 72 N. J. of excise may pay the original li- L. 439; 60 Atl. 1111. censee a rebate of the portion of 21 In re Bradley 22 N. Y. Misc. the fee covered by the unexpired Rep. 301; 49 N. Y. Supp. 1100; term, unless tlie licensee has vio- In re Lyman, 59 X. Y. App. Div. lated the liquor law before the 217; 69 N. Y. Supp. 309; affirm- transfer is actually made. People §420 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 698 a resolution of a board of excise transferring a license to one of its members, he being- present and voting for the resolu- tion, was held voidable on a writ of certiorari. -^ The recogni- tion of the right of a transfer of a license converts it into property, and makes it the subject of barter and sale.^^ V. Lyman, 156 N. Y. 407: 50 N. E. 1112; affirming 27 N. Y. App. Div. 527; 50 N. Y. Supp. 497. One transfer does not exhaust the power of court to grant an- other. Ex parte Heide, 18 Juta 47!). Tn New York, although the tax certificate has been assigned and is in the possession of the assignee who has violated the law, the principal and surety in the bond of the assignor or licensee are lia- ble thereon until tlic tax certifi- cate is presented to the proper board for cancellation, or the as- signment is approved. Cullinan V. Kuch, 177 N. Y. 303; 60 N. E. 597; affirming 84 N. Y. App. Div. 642; 82 N. Y. Supp. 1098; People v. Lyman, 156 N. Y. 407; 50 N. E. 1112; affirming 27 N. Y. App. Div. 527; 50 N. Y. Supp. 497. Under a statute permitting a transfer where a party applies for a license, but removes from the State, with no intent to return, be- fore it is granted and the fee for it paid, he is "a party licensed" un- der the statute permitting a trans- fer where "a party licensed" dies or removes from the State. In re Umholtz, 191 Pa. St. 177: 43 Atl. 75; 29 Pittsb. Leg. J. (X. S.) 387 ; 44 W. N. C. 98. In New Jersey a license may be transferred not only from one per- son to another, but from one place to another. Hcnkel v. Hoy, 74 N. J. L., 56; 64 Atl. 960. No appeal lies from an order granting a transfer unless a stat- ute permits it; and a statute au- thorizing an appeal on granting or revoking a license does not apply to a transfer. Appeal of Wake- man, 70 Conn. 7.33; 50 Atl. 733. 26Treeftz v. Board, 73 N. J. L. 278; 62 Atl. 1004 27 Deggender v. Seattle, etc. Co., 41 Wash. 385; 83 Pac. 898. Where a saloon was sold under an agreement that the business was to be run by the vendee in the vendor's name until paid for, and the vendee should not buy goods in the vendor's name for use in the saloon, this was held not to protect the vendor against one selling goods to be used in the saloon without notice of the agree- ment. Nappee Valley Wine Co. v Kassanave ( Wis. ) , 122 N. W. 812. In a proceeding to cancel a li- cense for a violation of the law by the person to whom it was is- sued, his assignee is not entitled to be made a party thereto. Clem- ent v. Viscosi (N. Y.), 118 N. Y. Supn. 613. An applicant for a transfer must comply with all the formalities re- quired by the statute. Thompson V. Ecllemore, 7 Low Can. .Tr. 74. 699 TRANSFER OF LICENSE. §§421,422 Sec. 421. Assignment not a transfer. An assio-nment of a liquor liceDse is not a transfer of it where the statute requires the court or licensing board to make a transfer upon a proper application. The right to a liquor license, or a transfer of one already issued, is not as- signable. It is nothing more than the expression of a consent that the license may be transferred to the person named therein ; and all the rights it gives to such person is a privilege to apply to have it transferred to him. An assignment has no market value.-^ In New York, however, it has been held that the assignment of a license tax certificate is valid, even when made to secure the payment of money borrowed to enable the applicant to pay for the certificate, as against judgment creditors of the licensee.-'' The assignee takes the assigned license subject to its forfeiture for misconduct of the licensee committed after its assignment.^*^ An agreement to assign and an assignment made pursuant thereto, includ- ing stock and fixtures, in case of a failure to make payments on his debt, has been held an agreement to consent to a transfer of the license, and therefore valid.^^ Sec. 422. Death of licensee. The rule is a general one that on the death of the licensee neither the Hcense nor any rights thereunder pass to his per- sonal representatives or to his heirs. This is upon the ground that the license is peculiarly personal to the person to whom 28 Cronin v. Sharp, 16 P». Super. Supp. 407. See People v. Manzer, Ct. 76. See Gilday v. Warren, 69 18 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 292; 41 N. Y. Conn. 237; 37 Atl. 494. Supp. 1075. 29 Niles V. Mathusa, 19 N. Y. si Germantown Brewing Co. v. Misc. Rep. 96; 44 N. Y. Supp. 88. Booth, 162 Pa. St. 100; 29 Atl. A more recent case holds the as- 386; 34 W. N. C. 340; reversing signment under such instances 14 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 189; 3 Pa. void. David Mayor Brewing Co. Dist. 142. See Albany Brewing V. Mack, 59 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 202 ; Co. v. Barckley, 42 N. Y. App. Div. no N. Y. Supp. 245. 335; 59 N. Y. Supp. 65, and Deg- 30 People v. Lyman, 156 X. Y. gender v. Seattle, etc^ Co., 41 407; 50 N. E. 1112; affirming 27 Wash. 385; 85 Pac. 898. N. Y. App. Div. 527; 50 N. Y. § 422 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 700 it is granted — the privilege to sell liquors is a personal one — because of his ascertained fitness to engage in the liquor traffic after a hearing had and a determination of that fact by the licensing board. The license is not in the nature of property.'- There are statutes, however, which permit the transfer with the consent of the licensing board.^^ Such is the case in England where a licensee dies while the license is still in force. There the justices may "grant to the heirs, executors, or administrators of the person so dying," "a license to sell excisable liquors by retail, t-o be drunk or con- sumed in such [licensed] house or the premises thereto be- longing. " '* So the heirs, executors, or administrators may continue to carry on the business until the next special trans- fer session of the justices without incurring a penalty for sales without a license.'^ Under this statute where the licensee dies intestate during the licensing year, the person who has a prima facie right to apply for letters of administration does not commit the offense of selling without a license for con- tinuing the sales of liquors until the next special transfer session.^** The person acting under this statute is himself a "licensed person" for the purpose of the licensing acts, and is therefore liable in the same way as the ordinary licensed person for any offense committed by him."^ 32 United states v. Overton, 2 62 L. J. M. C. 181; 5 Rep. 530: Craneh C. C. 42; Fed. Cas. Xu 69 L. T. 346; !) T. L. R. 466; 17 15979; People v. Sykes, 96 Mich. Cox C. C. 685. 452; 56 N. W. 12; In re Keating, 37 McDonald v. Hughes [1902], 25 Pittsb. Leg. J. (N. S.) 454; 1 K. B. 94; 66 J. P. 86; 71 L. J. /n reBlumenthal, 125 Pa. St. 412; K. B. 43; 50 W. R. 318; 85 L. 18 Atl. 395. See Williams v. T. 727; 18 T. L. R. 79; 20 Cox Troop, 17 Wis. 463 on sale of C. C. 131. saloon stock and fixtures and the The license cannot be renewed right of the purchaser. in the name of the deceased, for 33 In re McOmber, 3 Pa. Dist. "a license to a dead man is a Rep. 431. mere nullity." Cowles v. Gale, L. 34 Patterson's Licensing Acts R. 7 Ch. 12; 41 L. J. Ch. 14; 25 (19 ed.), 197, 198. See also pp. L. T. 524; 20 W. R. 70. 167, 196, 249, 267, 325. The granting of the transfer is 35 Patterson's Licensing Acts ( 19 discretionary with the justices, ed. ), 334. the same as in granting licenses. 30 Rose V. Frogley, 57 J. P. 376 ; Regina v. Smith, 42 J. P. 295 ; 701 TRANSFER OF LICENSE. §423 Sec. 423. Bankruptcy or insolvency — Receiver. Unless some statute authorizes it, a license cannot be trans- ferred to a receiver of a court, and he cannot continue the business thereunder; ^^ and it cannot be vacated in a creditor's action.^^ A creditor of the licensee has no interest in the license.*" In New South Wales by statute the license of a bankrupt passes to his legal representative;"*^ and the assignee may carry on the business, but cannot secure a renewal of it.*- In other parts of Australia the license does not pass to the licensee's assignee in insolvency.*^ The English statute ex- pressly makes provision for a transfer of a license of a licensee who "shall become a bankrupt" to his assignee in bank- ruptcy.** The assignee can continue the business until the next Boodle V. Birminoham, J. J., 45 Vict. L. R. 6G; 14 Austr. L. R. 185. ssSemple v. Flynn (N. J. Eq.), 10 Atl. 177. 39Koehler v. Olseii, 68 Hun 63; 22 N. Y. Supp. 677. 40 /n re Breen, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 141. See In re Summa, 3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 651. 41 Ex parte Empson, 3 N. S. W. L. R. 206. 42Dunlop V. Ulir, 14 N. S. W. L. R. 430. 43 Anthoness v. Anderson, 14 Vict. L. R. 127; 9 Austr. L. T. 175; In re Jack, 11 Austr. L. T. 372; 2 C. L. R. 684. See Whyt« V. Williams, 29 Vict. L. R. 69; 24 Austr. L. T. 222; 9 Austr. L. R. 98. 44 Patterson's Licensing Acts ( 19 ed. ), p. 197. Formerly the license could be assigned when tlie licensee took "the benefit of any act for the relief of insolvent debtors," but the part of the statute quoted was repealed by tlie statute law Revision (No. 2), Act 1888 (51 and 52 Vict., c. 57), schedule. J. P. p. 636 ; Traynor v. Jones [1894], 1 Q. B. p. 86; Simmons v. Blackheath, 17 Q. B. Div. 765; 30 J. P. 742; 55 L. J. M. C. 166; 35 W. R. 167; Miskin v. Hughes [1893], 1 Q. B. Div. 275; 57 J. P. 263; 67 L. T. 680. Under the Pennsylvania statute a "party licensed" is not one who dies aft«r application for a license and before it is granted and pay- ment of the license fee. In re Um- holtz, 191 Pa. St. 177; 43 Atl. 75; 29 Pittsb. Leg. J. (N. S.) 387; 44 W. N. C. 98. In Pennsylvania a license of a deceased licensee has been held to be an asset of his estate; the ex- ecutor cannot use it for his own l)enefit. Ashenbach v. Carey (Pa.), 73 Atl. 4,35. And if he succeeds in securing a transfer he becomes liable as trustee to all persons interested. In re Reilly's Estate, 6 Pa. Dist. Rep. 252. An administrator may hold and join in the application for a trans- fer, but not the agent of the ad- ministrator. In re Ballhausen, 19 § 423 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 702 Special session of the justices, when he must secure a transfer to himself as assignee.^^ But where a licensee became a bank- rupt, and by the covenant of his lease he was bound on its de- termination to assign the license to the lessor, it was held that the license was not "property" of the lessee, and did not pass to the trustee, but ought to be assigned to the lessor.**^ In Kentucky where the license is granted to an applicant be- cause of his fitness to conduct the liquor traffic, to sell at a definite place, the licensing board or court, in case of the death or transfer by the licensee of his business to his personal representative or to the purchaser, may trans- fer his license; and it was held that the attempt of an in- solvent licensee to transfer his license to a creditor did not render him liable to pay the licensee's trustee in bankruptcy an>i;hing for the license.'' AMiere the police commissioner of Boston had uniformly permitted sales of licenses by trustees in bankruptcy, for the benefit of the licensee's cred- itor, but also uniformly refused to recognize mortgages of licenses, by allowing the trustee to name the licensee's suc- cessor, it was held that a court of bankruptcy would not recognize the claim of a mortgagee of the licensee, because contrary to the policy of such commissioners, without whose consent and co-operation it would be impossible to realize anything from the sale of the license for the benefit of the bankrupt's creditors.*^ And in a case of a licensee in this same city it was held that the commissioners by issuing a license, on a vacancy created by bankruptcy, to the nominee of his trustee in bankruptcy, did not deprive a co-licensee of his property without due process of law, where he held the original license as security, for his rights were subject to the police commissioner's rules. '*^ « Patterson's Licensing Acts, p. 117 Ky. 459; 78 S. W. 208; 25 334, 348. Ky. L. Rep. 1560. 46 In re Britnor, 4G L. J. Bk. 48 in re McArdle, 126 Fed. 442. 85; 25 W. R. 500. Such would 49 Tracy v. Giiizberg, 205 U. S. not be the cas« where the law does 170; 51 L. Ed. 755; 27 Sup. Ct. not recognize contracts to assign 461: affirming 189 Mass. 200; 75 a license. N. E. 637. 47 E. S. Bonnie & Co. v. Perry, In New Yorlc the receiver of a 703 TRANSFER OF LICENSE. § 424 Sec. 424. Mortgage of license— Judicial sale. As a general rule a license to sell intoxicating liquors can- not be mortgaged or pledged to secure an indebtedness, and in that way be transferred to the purchaser under the mort- gage or the pledge.-'" But where a party executed a chattel mortgage covering certain furniture and bar fixtures, and all his interest in a license to sell intoxicating liquors, or a renewal of it, although the court held the mortgagee acquired no title to the license, both because it could not be mort- gaged and because it was not then in existence, yet it was good as a contract to assign the license whenever obtained.^^ And in another case where a saloon owner gave a bill of sale of all his stock and saloon fixtures, and also all "right, title, and interest in and to a license to sell licjuor," it was held that he was not required under his contract of sale to pay for the license for which he had made an application at the time he executed the bill of sale, and which was granted afterwards." And where a statute treated a license as assign- able property, but subject to be sold on legal process,' it was held that it could be mortgaged, and where the plaintiflP advanced money to a party to enable him to secure a license, and took a chattel mortgage upon it, and the licensee sold it to a third person who secured its transfer upon the proper records of the city to his firm instead of to himself, it was held not to affect the mortgagee's right to sue him alone; licensee may surrender the license bankruptcy, and the latter can- and receive the rebate of the un- not sell it for the benefit of the earned fee. Albany Brewing Co. v. bankrupt's estate. In re Whit- Barckley, 42 N. Y. App. Div. 335; lock's Estate, 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 34. 59 N. Y. Supp. 65. so McNeeley v. Welz, 16(i N. Y. If a purchaser of a license from 124; 59 N. E. 697, affirming 20 a trustee in bankruptcy is not N. Y. App. Div. 566; 47 N. Y. able to secure its transfer to him- Supp. 310; Arnett v. Wright, 18 self, he is entitled to a return of Okla. 337; 89 Pac. 1116 (note his money. In re Miller, 171 Fed. given for transfer is void) ; David 263; In re Conner & Co., 171 Fed. Meyer Brewing Co. v. Mack, 110 261. N. Y. Supp. 245. If a license be granted to a per- ci McNeeley v. Welz, supra. son after he has been adjudged a ^2 Costello v. Keeler, 20 R. I. bankrupt, it belongs to him per- 298; 38 Atl. 927. sonally and not to his trustee in § 424 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 704 and the debt secured by the mortgage being less than the market value of the license, the mortgagee was not entitled to recover its market value, but only the amount due him.^* In England the rights of mortgagees are somewhat regulated by statute. There a mortgagee of licensed premises given by the owner, not the lessee, may, on payment of a fee of one shilling, be registered as an owner of the premises ; ■"'* and as such owner he may, under certain conditions, apply for a renewal of the license granted his tenant, a renewal, for in- stance, of a license for the premises licensed, to be operated by himself or his tenant."''' As a consequence of those statutes the mortgagee of licensed premises, or of the saloon fixtures and stock of goods, has an interest in them that enables him to maintain an appeal, where the mortgage deed makes him attorney for the license holder in that respect, on refusal of the licensing board to renew the license where the licensee has applied for it.^^ In New York the tax certificate may be assigned as collateral security,^'^ and if surrendered the as- signee is entitled to the amount of the fee rebated.^^ An in- strument reciting "I hereby agree to assign to" A liquor license number 328, "taken in my name," for one hundred dollars "loaned to me for the purpose of purchasing said license," to be the property of A, and until the sum be paid in full "the license is the property of the said A" is not a chattel mortgage and need not be recorded as against attach- ing creditors.^" The assignee or mortgagee takes the license subject to the right of the State to cancel it for misconduct ssNicolini v. Langermann (Tex. Misc. Rep. 90; 44 N. Y. Supp. Civ. App.), 104 S. W. 501. 88. 54 Patterson's Licensing Acts ss /,i ye Jenney, 19 X. Y. Misc. (19tli ed.) 535, §29. Rep. 244; 44 N. Y. Supp. 84. He 55 Regina v. Liverpool, J. J., 11 may carry on the business under Q. B. Div. 644; Symons v. Wed- it, or may surrender it if a re- more [1894], 1 Q. B. Div. 401; 58 ceiver or assignee for the holder J. P. 197; 63 L. J. M. C. 44; 69 be appointed. In re Jenney, su- L. T. 801; 42 W. R. 301. pra. 56 Garrett v. Middlesex, J. J.. 59 Njies v. Mathusa, 20 N. Y. 12 Q. B. Div. 620; 53 L. J. M. C. App. Div. 483; 47 N. Y. Supp. 81 ; 48 J. P. 357; 32 W. R. 646. 38. 57Niles V. Mathusa, 19 N. Y. 705 TRANSFER OF LICENSE. § 425 of the licensee committed either before or after the assign- ment or pledgement.*'" Sec. 425. Transfer of license to other premises- Pennsylvania. Statutes also go so far occasionally as to allow a transfer of the license from one premise to another, although a statute requires the license to be issued for a particular site. Such is the case in Pennsylvania, where the landlord refuses to renew the licensee's lease,**^ or where the buildings or prem- ises are destroyed or become a nuisance and unfit for occu- pancy."- If the license has been revoked or abandoned by failure to complete the application, there can be no transfer, for there is nothing to transfer.^'' There can be no transfer from one house to another where the license is sold at sheriff's sale or the licensed premises were sold at such sale, at the request of the vendee, the sale not being a destruction of the premises, within the meaning of the statute." Where an applicant applied for a license for one place and afterwards filed his application for a different place, and marked it "change of location," it was held not a transfer from one place to another.*'''* In Connecticut one who is not a licensee cannot apply for a removal permit.*'*' In this same State a statute forbade a second application for a license for the same place during the license year where the first application had been refused on the ground that the place was an un- suitable one. It was held that when a license had been re- 60 People V. Lyman, loG N. Y. 63 /n re Daniels, 31 Pa. Super. 407; 50 N. E. 1112; affirming 27 Ct. 156; In re Umholtz's License, N. Y. App. Div. 527; 50 N. Y. 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 450; 43 W. N. Supp. 497. C. 495. 61/nre McKibbin, 11 Pa. Super. 64 /„ re Hotel Cambridge Li- Ct. 421; In re Kellar, 17 Lane. cense, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 229; Law Rev. 96; 16 Montg. Co. Law Appeal of Class, 6 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 24; 7 North Co. Rep. 129; 23 130. Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 251; 9 Pa. Dist. e^ /«■ re Heubergcr License, 8 Rep. 340; 13 York Leg. Rec. 155. Pa. Super. Ct. 625. 02 Cellar filled with water. In 66 Appeal of D'Araato, 80 Conn. re McCabe, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 500; 357; 68 Atl. 445. In re Keller, supra. § 426 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 706 fused because in that locality there were enough saloons, an application for a transfer of a license, held by another per- son, to the same place could not be granted during the same license year.^'^ If the lawfulness of a sale of liquor be chal- lenged, the transferee has the burden to show a lawful trans- fer of the license to himself, in order to protect himself from the penalty inflicted for a violation of the law.®^ This cannot be done by oral evidence; it must be proven by the record of the transfer.*''' The transferee cannot deny the authority of the person making the transfer, even though he was only an agent of the licensee, when he executed the statutory bond and by authority of the license pursued the occupation of a liquor dealer."" Sec. 426. Transfer under English statute. The English statutes provide for transfers of license under certain contingencies, and the cases under them are worthy of consideration. Under Section 14 of the English Ale House Act of lvS28'^ it is provided that if a licensee, before the expiration of his license, "die, or shall be by sickness or other infirmity rendered incapable of keeping an inn, or shall become a bankrupt;"- or if any person so licensed, or the heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns of any person 67 Appeal of D'Amato, 80 Conn. McKibbins, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 421. 357 ; 68 Atl. 445. An application to have a license 68 Hill V. Sheridan, 12S Mo. changed from one place to another App. 415; 107 S. W. 426. is in effect an original application 69 Hill V. Sheridan, supra. for a license. Lester v. Price, 83 Where there is no statute author- Va. 648; 3 S. E. 529. izing a record, see In re Clement, ^i 9 Geo. IV, c. 61, § 14; Pat- 55 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 615; 105 N. terson's Licensing Acts, pp. 17J) Y. Supp. 1085. to 197. 70 Faulkner v. Cassidy, 39 Tex 72 The act originally had these Civ. App. 415; 87 S. W. 904. words: "Or shall take the ben- If the licensee refuse to consent efit of any act for the relief of to the transfer from one place to insolvent debtors;" but this pro- another, where the buildings on vision was repealed by the Stat- the licensxid premises are de- ute Law Pvcvision (No. 2), Act stroyed, the transfer may be made 1881 (51 and 52 Vict. c. 57). anyway, in Pennsylvania. In re 707 TRANSFER OP LICENSE. § 426 licensed, shall remove from or yield up the possession of the house specified in such license; or if the occupier of any such house, being about to cjuit the same, shall have wilfully com- mitted or shall have neglected to apply at the general annual licensing meeting, or at any adjournment thereof, for a license to continue to sell excisable liquors by retail, to be drank or consumed in such house; or if any house, being kept as an inn by any person duly licensed as aforesaid, shall be or be about to be pulled down or occupied under the provision of any Act for the improvement of highways or for any other public purpose ; or shall be, by fire, tempest, or other unfore- seen and unavoidable calamity, rendered unfit for the recep- tion of travelers, and for the other legal purpose of an inn," it shall be lawful for the justice at a special session in such case, * ' and in such case only, to grant to the heirs, executors, or assigns of the person so dying; or to the assigns of such person becoming incapable of keeping an inn ; or to the as- signee or assignees of such bankrupt; or to any new tenant or occupier of any house having so become unoccupied; or to any person to whom snch heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns or otherwise have bona fide conveyed or otherwise made over his or their interest in the occupation and keeping of such house, a license to sell excisable liquors by retail to be drank or consumed in such house or the premises thereto belonging; or to grant to the person whose house shall, as aforesaid, have been or shall be about to be pulled down or occupied for the improvement of the highways or for any other public purpose, or have become unfit for the reception of travelers or for the other legal purpose of an inn, and who shall open and keep as an inn some other fit and con- venient house, a license to sell excisable liquors by retail, to be drank or consumed therein." "This section," said Justice Mathew, "provides for the transfer of a license to a different person in respect of the same premises, and for the transfer to the same person in respect of different premises."" TJn- TsRegina v. Yorkshire, J. J. 47; 40 W. R. .334; 62 J. P. 197; [1898], 1 Q. B. 503; 62 J. P. M. & W. Dig. 74. 197; 07 L. J. Q. B. 279; 78 L. T. § 426 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 708 der this statute a number of cases have been decided. Thus where a new tenant has come into the premises and has failed to obtain a transfer, there is nothing to prevent a second new incoming tenant making a second application during the li- censing year, for the justices may accept one person though they may have rejected another, and the license once granted continues in existence until the end ^* of the licensing year.'* But if the license has been forfeited no application can be made.^** While the application is usually made before the expiration of the license, the object being to provide for some contingency happening between the general annual li- censing meetings, at which alone a license or a renewal can be obtained, and which license positively lapses on a definite day in the year;^^ yet if the events mentioned in this statute have all happened during the current year, as the death or removal of one tenant or the entry of another into the li- censed premises, then the application may be made at any time after the expiration of the current license, the juris- diction of the court depending on the happening of events, and not on the date at which the remedy is requested."* Under this statute if a tenant has been refused a renewal he may surrender the premises at any time before the end of the licensing year, and then a new tenant may enter and apply for a transfer, and the justices cannot refuse to hear his ap- plication on the ground that they had already refused a re- newal to the outgoing tenant, as that is not a case of res 74 April 5th. 77 Namely, April 5tli. 75j5a; parte Todd, 3 Q. B. Div. 78 Regina v. Lawrence, 11 Q. B. 407; 42 J. P. G62; 47 L. J. M. C. Div. G38; 47 J. P. 596; 52 L. J. 89. M. €. 114; 49 L. T. 244; 32 W. 70 Regina V. West Riding, J. J., R. 20 (overruling Ex parte Todd, 21 Q. B. Div. 258; 52 J. P. 455; 57 3 Q. B. Div. 407; 47 L. J. M. C. L. J. M. C. 103; 30 W. R. 258. 89; 42 J. P. 662, and Wliite v. It is, however, doubtful, if a Coquetdale, 7 Q. B. Div. 238; 50 succession of new incoming ten- L. J. M. C. 128; 44 L. T. 715; 45 ants can apply one after the oth- J. P. 539, where it was held the er. See Stevens v. Shornbrook, J. application must be made before J., 23 Q. B. Div. 143; 58 L. J. M. the license expired). C. 107; 61 L. T. 240; 37 W. R. 605; 53 J. P. 423. 709 TRANSFER OF LICENSE. §427 judicata.''^ The general rule is under this statute that the justices have the same discretion, but not more, concerning the grants of transfers from one person to another as they have concerning renewals.^" A husband may obtain a trans- fer of his wife's license, where she held it before their mar- riage.^^ On an application for a transfer, evidence of the bad character of previous tenants may be showTi.^" Sec. 427. Transfer under English and Colonial statute — Cases. The following are illustrative cases under the English stat- utes, followed by a few Colonial cases under statutes very similar to the English statutes. If a license has been for- feited, there can be no application successfully made there- after for a transfer.*^ And the same is true if it has been 79 Eegina v. Upper Osgoldcross, 53 J. P. 823; 62 L. T. 112; Ee- gina V. Thomas [1892], 1 Q. B. 426; 56 J. P. 151; 66 L. T. 289; 66 L. J. M. C. 141; 40 W. R. 472. Where a tenant lost his right to a renewal by neglect, see Re- gina V. Powell [1891], 1 Q. B. 718; 2 Q. B. 693; 55 J. P. 422; 56 J. P. 52; 65 L. T. 210; 60 L. J. Q. B. 594; 39 W. R. 630. See also Eegina v. West Riding, J. J., 59 J. P. 278. soRegina v. Smith, 42 J. P. 295; Traynor v. Jones [1894], 1 Q. B. p. 86; Boodle v. Birming- ham, J. J., 45 J. P. p. 636; Sim- mons V. Blackheath, 17 Q. B. Div. 765; .50 J. P. 742; 55 L: J. M. C. 166; 35 W. R. 107. 81 Hazell V. Middleton, 45 J. P. 548. 82Misken v. Higher [1893], 1 Q. B. 275; 57 J. P. 263; 67 L. T. 680. See Regina v. Hull, J. J., 47 J. P. 820. Where the current license had come to an end before any applica- tion had been made for a trans- fer or grant under the section quoted, to a special sessions transfer, the court held tliat the justices were no longer re- stricted to the four ground men- tioned in the section for a trans- fer. This was upon the ground that it was really an application for a new license. Murray v. Freer [1893], 1 Q. B. 635; 57 J. P. 101, 583; 67 L. T. 507; 62 L. J. M. C. 100; affirmed [1894] App. Cass. 570; 63 L. J. M. C. 242; 71 L. T. 444; 58 J. P. 508. Appeals lie from a refusal to transfer. Thornton v. Clegg, 24 Q. B. Div. 132; 53 J. P. 342; 58 L. J. M. C. 6; 61 L. T. 562; 38 W. R. 100; Regina v. \\'elby, 54 J. P. 183. 83 Regina v. West Riding, J. J., 21 Q. B. Div. 258; 52 J. P. 455; 57 L. J. M. C. 103; 36 W. R. 258; Stevens v. Green, 23 Q. B. Div. 142; 53 J. P. 423; 58 L. J. M. C. 167; 61 L. T. 240; 37 W. E. 606. § 427 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 710 discontinued. In that event the application must be for a new license.^* Where K, a licensed holder, abandoned posses- sion, and at the next general meeting of the justices his land- lord asked for a renewal in K's name or his own, which was refused; it was held that P, a new tenant, who entered after the general meeting, could not apply for a transfer so long as the refusal formerly entered as to the landlord remained unappealed from and unreversed. '''^ But where the first ap- plication was made by a new tenant, and was refused, it was held that a second new tenant could successfully apply and was not barred by the refusal of a renewal to the first.^^** An off beer license (a license to sell beer to be consumed off the premises) was granted in 1S94 to the occupier of a grocer's shop upon condition that the license should be given up on his leaving or letting the shop to carry on the grocery business there. The occupier being about to give up the shop and to cease to carry on the grocery business, G applied to the li- censing justices for the transfer of the license to him. It was held that the condition did not prevent the licensing jus- tices from entertaining the application for the transfer. "Al- though," said Lord Alverstone. "the condition was a circum- stance which could be taken into consideration by the jus- tices, it did not prevent them from entertaining the matter of the transfer; it was not a bar preventing the licensing jus- tices from granting the transfer, but only a matter to be taken into consideration."^*' Where a house is pulled down 84Regina v. Curzon, L. R. 8 Q. Davis v. Evans, 62 J. P. 120; 77 B. 400; 42 L. J. M. C. 155; 37 J. L. T. 688; 14 T. L. R. 163; Thorn- P. 774; 29 L. T. 32; 21 W. Pv. ton v. Clegg, 24 Q. B. Div. 132; 886. 53 J. P. 742; 59 L. J. M. C. 6;, 61 ssRegina v. Xowcastle, J. J., 51 L. T. 562; 38 W. R. 160; Regina J. P. 244. v. Powell [1891], 2 Q. B. 693; 85* Baldwin v. Dover, J. J. 55 J. P. 422; 00 L. J. Q. B. 594; [1892), 2 Q. B. 421; 56 J. P. 05 L. T. 210; 39 W. R. 630; 56 423; 61 L. J. M. C. 215; Regina J. P. 52; Regina v. Thomas V. Upper Osgoldcross, 53 J. P. [1892], 1 Q. B. 426; 56 J. P. 151; 823; 62 L. T. 112. 66 L. T. 289; 61 L. J. M. C. 141; The following eases involve 40 W. R. 478. questions of practice peculiar to 86 Oldham, J. J. v. Gee, 66 J. P. the P^nglish practice in obtaining 341; 18 T. L. R. 348, a renewal or transfer of licenses. 711 TRANSFER OF LICENSE. § 427 for the purpose of public improvement, and an application is made for a grant to the person whose house has been pulled down of a license in respect of other fit and convenient prem- ises, the application must be made by a licensed person who M'as keeping the old premises as an inn at the time of their demolition ; ^^ and the house to which it is proposed to make the transfer must be in existence at the time.^^ If there are sufficient public houses in the vicinity to which the transfer is requested, the justices, in their discretion, may refuse to grant the transfer.'*^ In granting a transfer of a license to another place the justices are not bound by the same condi- tions that they would be if the application was for an original license. In such an instance they have unlimited jurisdic- tion."" A grant to a proposed transferee of a license of a temporary authority to sell does not cancel the existing li- cense, and while the license holder remains in possession of the premises he cannot be convicted of selling without a li- cense.''^ No transfer can be made in instances not covered by the statute.^^ In Australia it is held that it is no ground for a refusal to make a transfer that the proposed transferee is bound by his lease to buy all his beer and spirituous liquor from his landlord."'^ A license cannot be split and transfered in part, as where a tenant of two adjoining persons was evicted and the two separate owners sought each one-half the license.^* The magistrate in determining whether a trans- srRegina v. West Riding, J. J. C32; 78 L. T. 468: 46 W. R. 512, [1898], 1 Q. B. 503; 62 J. P. 197; and Wilson v. Crewe, J. J. [1905], 67 L. J. Q. B. 279; 78 L. T. 47; 1 K. B. 491; 74 L. J. K. B. 394; 69 46 W. R. 334; 14 T. L. R. 89; M. J. P. HI; 92 L. T. 104; 53 W. & W. Dig. 74. R. 382; 21 T. L. R. 233. 88 James v. Nervington. J. J., 64 oi Andrews v. Denton [1897], 2 J. p. 489. Q. B. 37; 66 L. J. Q. B. 520; 76 89 Boodle V. Birmingham, J. J., L. T. 423; 45 W. R. 500: Gl J. P. 45 J. P. 635. See Regina v. North- 326. umberland, J. J., 43 J. P. 271. "2 Regina v. Booth, 3 Ont. 144; soTraynor v. Jonos [1894]. 1 Q. 9 C. P. 452. (A Canadian stat- B. 83; 58 J. P. 182: 63 L. J. M. ute involved.) C. 31: o9 L. T. 862: 42 W. R. ^^ Rpo-ipn v. Tomploton. 3 Vict. 201. See also Regina v. Oothan L. R. 24. [1898], 1 Q. B. 802: 62 J. P. 435; ^^ Ex parte Slack, 8 Vict. L. R. 14 T. L. R. 367; 67 L. J. O. B. 144. § 427 TR.VFFIG IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 712 feree is a proper person may proceed upon his own knowledge of his character and fitness.^"^ Permission to have more than one bar on the premises does not pass with a transfer of the license; and to maintain more than one the transferee must obtain permission of the licensing board. ^"^ In New Zealand a statute requires a conviction to be recorded on the defend- ant's license. A transferred all of a license; and afterwards the first holder was convicted of an offense occurring while he held the license ; but the court held that his conviction could not be noted on the license transferred.''^ In South Africa one K, who had a licensed hotel in Q, covenanted to hand over to on the expiration of his tenancy the liquor license for the premises. Thereafter K entered into an agreement with P by which he purported to sell him the good "W'ill of the hotel, and O agreed to accept P as a tenant in place of K, but was not a party to the sale by K to P. Afterward K became insolvent and his trustee claimed the right to retain the li- cense until P had paid the purchase price, and refused to hand it over to 0. It was held that he was bound to hand the license over to O.**^ 95 Eoc parte Slack, 8 Vict. L. R. transfer of the license before su- 144; In re Logan, 22 Austr. L. T. ing for the purchase money. It is 109; 6 Austr. L. R. 253. sufficient if he is ready and will- 98 Oliver v. Connell, 29 Vict. L. ing to transfer it. Moloney v. R. 329; 25 Austr. L. T. 76; 9 Rogers, 3 X. S. W. L. R. 351. Austr. L. R. 177. 97 Low v. Hutchison, 13 N. Z. On a sale of a hotel and the L. R. 54. license to retail liquors, the ven- 98 Ohlsson v. Kuhi-, 18 Juta 205. dor is not bound to procure a CHAPTER XL REVOCATION OF LICENSE. SECTION. 427 a. State may authorize a re- vocation. 428. Repeal of statute. 429. Causes for revocation — Fraud in procuring li- cense. 430. License issued for a pro- hibition territory. 431. Violation of the law. 432. Violation of statute by li- censee's agent or servant. 433. Upon conviction of an of- fense against the liquor laws. 434. Violation of terms of bond. 435. Conducting place disorderly. 436. House used as a brothel. 437. Ordinance providing for a revocation. 438. New York statute— False statements. 439. False statements in applica- tion under New York statute. 440. Erroneous statements as to place in application for a license. 441. License issued by mistake. 442. The license to be revoked. SECTION. 443. Revocation after assignment for prior illegal acts. 444. What board or court may revoke a license. 445. Mandamus to compel a revo- cation. 446. Who may commence proceed- ings. 447. Who to be made defendant — Assignment of license. 448. The petition for revocation. 449. Joint proceeding to revoke several licenses. 450. Notice of proceedings for re- vocation. 451. The answer. 452. Trial. 453. Dismissal of proceedings — Expiration of license. 454. Estoppel to revoke. 455. Appeal — Certiorari. 456. Effect of revocation — Stay of proceedings. 457. Costs. 458. Rebate of fees. 459. Liability of city for mis- takingly revoking license. 460. Action on bond when license forfeited. Sec. 427a. State may authorize a revocation. Licenses, as we have seen, are not contracts; they are only permits. Hence the State may authorize their revocation, with 713 §427a TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 714 or without cause assigned/ And a city, under the general licensing power, may provide by ordinance that if the licensee violate the ordinances, or even the State law, with reference to the sale of intoxicating liquors, and perhaps any other law, the license shall be forfeited.- And so a city may insert in a license certain conditions the violation of which will work its forfeiture.^ If a city may revoke a license, of course it may revoke an order g-rant^'^^ it before the license is issued.* It cannot be argued that thc^ lir-p^-^pp has a v^nr^p^^v^ in his license, and if it be revoked he w^'ll be deprived of his prop- erty and not be able to use p-^<\ cannot put his bar fixtures to other use.-"* A city may adont an ordinance requiring a licensee before receiving his license to enter into an agree- ment that if he be convicted of a violation of either the ordi- nance of the city or of a State law he shall forfeit his license ; •* and it may by ordinance revoke a license, although thereby it creates a system by special enactment contrary to the local 1 In re Livingston, 24 N. Y. App. Div. 51; 48 N. Y. Supp. 989; Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio St. 15; Bar- nett V. Pemiscot Co. Ct., Ill Mo. App. (393; 86 S. W. 575; Pleuler V. State, 11 Neb. 547; 10 N. W. 481; People v. McBride, 234 111. 146; 84 N. E. 865; Commonwealth V. Jones, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 611; Spraberry v. Atlanta, 87 Ga. 120; 13 S. E. 197; Brown v. State, 82 Ga. 224; 7 S. E. 915; Martin v. State, 23 Neb. 371; 36 N. W. 554; Fell V. State, 42 Md. 71; Com- monwealth V. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray 597; People V. Brooklyn Police. 59 N. Y. 92; Borck v. State (Ala.), 39 So. 580; Sarin v. Pulaski Co., 76 Ark. 336; 88 S. W. 953; McCorkie V. Remley. 119 Iowa 512; 93 N. W. 505: CroiK v. Fairfield Co., 50 Conn. 321; 47 Am. Rep. 648; Krueger v. Colville, 49 Wash. 295 ; 95 Pac. 81. 2 Ottumwa V. Schaub, 52 Iowa 515; 3 N. W. 529; Hoboken v. Goodman, 68 N. J. L. 217; 51 Atl. 1092; Carbondale v. Wade, 106 111. App. 654; Wallace v. Reno, 27 Nev. 71; 73 Pac. 528; Anderson v. Galesburg, 118 III. App. i525; Campbell v. Thoms- ville (Ga.), 64 'S. E. 815. 3 Huber v. Baugh, 43 Iowa 514; Cox V. Jackson, 152 Mich. 630; 116 N. W. 456; Malken v. Chi- cago, 217 111. 471; 75 N. E. 548; affirming 119 111. App. 542. 4 Sights V. Yarnells, 12 Gratt. 292; Hagan v. Boonton, 62 N. J. L. 150; 40 Atl. 688; Ex parte Vaccarezza, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 311; 106 S. W. 392. See Varnaman v. Adams, 74 N. J. L. 125; 65 Atl. 204. ^ Graziano v. New Orleans, 121 La. 440; 46 So. 566. 6 Cox V. Jackson, 152 Mich. 630; 116 N. W. 456. 715 REVOCATION OF LICENSE. § -128 option law.'' In the absence of charter or statutory restric- tions, a city may revoke a license at any time without in- curring a liability for damages, even though there be no cause for the revocation;^ and an authority to issue a license is a grant of power, for good cause, to revoke it.^ In Ontario it is held that if a license has been granted, though not issued, the grant cannot be revoked in order to give it to another.^" A statute may provide that a license may be annulled upon the petition of a certain specified number of hou^e holders living near the licensed premises." A statute is not invalid because it provides for a revocation without a return of the license fee or any part of it.^- If a city may revoke a license at its pleasure, yet if the resolution for a revocation shows it was not passed in pursuance of that power, but under an ordinance declaring a given act to be a sufficient cause for a revocation, its action will be erroneous.^^^ A license may be revoked because of an offense the licensee had committed be- fore it was issued ; '^ and the fact that a criminal proceeding is pending against a licensee for a violation of the liquor laws is no bar to a proceeding to revoke his license.^"^ Sec. 428. Repeal of statute. A repeal of the law authorizing the grant of a license has the effect to at once annul all licenses issued under it, unless it have a saving clause.^" While the repeal of the existing 7 McGehee . State, 114 Ga. 833; i3 Carr v. Augusta, 124 Ga. 116; 40 S. E. 1004. 52 S. E. 300. sisan V. Griffin, 98 Ga. 623; 25 i* Cherry v. Commonwealth, 78 S. E. 611. Va. 375. sHevren v. Reed, 120 Cal. 210; is Lacroix v. Fairfield County, 58 Pac. 536. 50 Conn. 321; 47 Am. Rep. 648. 10 Haslem v. Schnarr, 30 Out. An individual in his private ca- 89, not following Leeson v. Board. pacity cannot insist on a forfeit- 19 Ont. 67. "i'^- I>«f>" Mercantile Co. v. An- iiCrothers V. Monteith, 11 Man- derson (Tex.), 121 S. W. 868. itoba 373; Young v. Bhxisdell, 138 i6 Pleuler v. State, 11 Neb. 547; Mass. 344. '^^ ^- W. 481; Commonwealth v. i2Krue,?er v. Colville, 49 Wash. Jones, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 611: 295; 95 Pac. 81; Ex parte Vac- Menken v. Atlanta, 78 Ga. 60S; 2 care'zza, 52 Tex. Cr." App. 105; 105 R. E. 559. See Regina v. Stafford, S. W. 1119. 22 C. P. 177. § 429 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 716 law may be by implication/'^ yet the courts will not hold that a repeal was effected unless it clearly so appears in the en- actment of the later actJ^ On the adoption of a constitu- tional provision prohibiting the sale of liquor, all existing licenses are at once revoked/^ And the same is true on the adoption of local option prohibition.-" Sec. 429. Causes for revocation — Fraud in procuring' license. The right to revoke a license can only be done for the cause and in the manner prescribed by statute.^^ But if a license has been obtained by fraud, or the consent of certain neighbors had been procured by fraud, then a statute author- izing its revocation is not necessary; and it is not necessary to proceed in accordance with a statute providing for the revocation of a license.-- Where a statute provided that ap- plication for a license might be refused only for good cause, in the discretion of the city council, a subsequent statute providing that the council may revoke a license "whenever in the judgment of the city council such action may be nec- essary" to good order does not authorize an arbitrary revo- cation.^^ If it is sought to enjoin a city council from revoking a license issued under an ordinance, it must be shown that the council had no power to revoke it, as otherwise it will be presumed it had.^"* i'' Commonwealth v. Jones, 10 affirming 40 N. Y. App. Div. 46; Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. Gil. 57 N. Y. Supp. 634; People v. isHirn v. State, 1 Ohio St. 15. Woodman, 15 Daly 136; 3 N. Y. 19 Prohibitory Amendment Supp. 926. Cases, 24 Kan. 700; State v. 22 State v. Schroflf, 123 Wis. 98; Tonks, 15 R. I. 385; 5 Atl. 636. 100 N. W. 1030. See Lantz v. 20 Robertson v. State, 12 Tex. Hightstown, 46 N. J. L. 102; App. 541; State v. Cooke, 24 Decker v. Board, 57 N. J. L. 003 ; Minn. 247; 31 Am. Rep. 344; Ex 31 Atl. 235. parte Lynn, 19 Tex. App. 293; Ex 23 Pehrson v. Ephraim, 14 Utah parte Vaccarezza, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 147: 46 Pac. 657. 3,'}2; 100 S. W. 392. See §430. 24 Hevren v. Reed, 126 Cal. 219; 21 Lvman v. Malcom Brewing 58 Pac. 536. Co., 160 N. Y. 96; 55 N. E. 577, 717 REVOCATION OF LICENSE. §§430,431 Sec. 430. License issued for a prohibition territory. A license issued, in the district for which it is granted, when by local option the sale of liquors has been prohibited may be revoked.-^ Sec. 431. Violation of the law. Statutes are sometimes so broad as to call for a cancellation of a license if the holder shall have violated any criminal law of the State during the period for which it was issued; but this is rare, the right to cancel being limited to certain offenses. But usually the right to cancel a license is limited, under this head, to a violation of the liquor laws ; and the cancellation may take effect, unless the statute otherwise pro- vides, whether the licensee has been convicted or not. The offence authorizing a cancellation must, however, be one of those for which the statute authorizes a cancellation, and not one against the liquor law generally, unless the statute is broad enough to cover the instance. This is very well illus- trated by a New York case. In that State a liquor tax cer- tificate could be issued for the sale of liquors to be con- sumed on the premises, and another for sales not to be there consumed under subdivisions one and two of section II of the liquor laws. To sell liquors without a certificate was illegal under section 31 Subdivision 2 of section 34, provided that anyone selling liquor in violation of sections 11 or 31 should be punished and forfeit his license, but also provided that its provisions should not apply to violations of section 31, which prescribed a punishment for its violation in its first subdivision. The first subdivision of section 34 inflicted a fine and im- prisonment on anyone selling without first procuring a proper tax certificate. Under these several provisions it was held that a tax certificate could not be revoked for a sale of liquors to be consumed on the premises.^*' Unless the evidence be clear that the licensee has violated the law, a revocation of his li- cense for that cause will not be ordered." Sales to minors 25McIntyre v. Asheville (S. C), 27 /n re Matey, Kulp 215; Ap- 59 S. E. 1007. See cases in note peal of Moyer, 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 20. Rep. 475; 43 W. N. C. 100. 26 /n re Lyman, 27 N. Y. Misc. Eep. 327 ; 57 N. Y. Supp. 888. §431 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 718 may be sufficient to authorize a revocation of the license,-^ or other illegal sales.-^ If the applicant was not entitled to receive a tax certificate, sales by him are illegal; but a pre- vious conviction of a violation of the statute is not necessary to a revocation of his certificate.'" A statute may provide for a revocation of a city license for a failure of the licensee to obey an ordinance of the city.^^ A statute requiring a license to be revoked upon three convictions for offenses com- mitted, does not require the offenses to have been committed within the licensing year."- Provisions in one section of a statute providing that a licensee violating the liquor law may be punished by having his license forfeited are not inconsis- 28 Appeal of Mover, svpra; In re Gordon, 16 Montg. Co. Law Rep. 25; In re Tieriiey, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 406; Lewis v. Common- wealth, (Ky.). 121 S. W. 643. 29Voight V. Board, 59 N. J. L. 358; 36 Atl. 686; In re Lyman, 62 N. Y. App. Div. 616; 70 N. Y. Supp. 822; Clement v. Martin, 117 N. Y. App. Div. 5; 102 N. Y. Supp. 37; In re McLaughlin, 24 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 92 ; hi re Arnold. 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 93; In re Cul- linan, 45 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 497; 92 N. Y. Sup. 802; 90 N. Y. App. Div. 607; 86 N. Y. Supp. 1046; Parrent v. Little, 72 N. H. 506; 58 Atl. 510; Lyman v. Young Men's, etc. Club, 28 N. Y. App. Div. 127; 50 N. Y. Supp. 977; Board V, Mayr, 31 Colo. 173; 74 Pac. 458; State v. Corron, 73 N. H. 434; 62 Atl. 1094; Carr v. Au- gusta, 124 Ga. 116; 52 S. E. 300; State V. Seebokl, 192 Mo. 720; 91 S. W. 491; Belt v. Paul, 77 Ark. 211; 91 S. W. 301; State v. Os- kosh (Wis.), 70 N. W. 300; Ap- peal of Meenan, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 579; Anderson v. Galesburg, 118 111. App. 525. A sale on Sunday is cause suf- ficient for the revocation of the license, /n re Clement, 59 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 367; 112 N. Y. Supp. r2{3. so In re Halbran, 30 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 515; 63 N. Y. Supp. 1024; Lacroix v. Fairfield County, 50 Conn. 321; 47 Am. Rep. 048. 31 State v. Curtis, 136 Wis. 357; 110 N. W. 189. In this case sec- tion one of a statute authorized any member of the city to give an order forbidding the sale of liquor to spendthrifts; section two pro- vided for a revocation of a license for failure to observe "any order" of tlie aldermen made pursuant to law; section three required a bond of a licensee conditioned that he would "obey all orders of such al- dermen or any of them made pur- suant to law." It was held that an ordinance requiring saloons to be closed during certain hours of the day was an order within the meaning of section two. State v. Curtis, 136 Wis. 357; 110 N. W. 189. ?.2Rex V. Wexford, J. J. [1904], 2 Irish Rep. 251. 719 REVOCATION OF LICENSE. § 431 tent with a provision in another section authorizing the li- censing board to revoke the license for the same violation of the statute, since the licensee may be brought before the court and punished where no revocation of the license has been made.^^ But a license issued after a conviction of a sale of liquors without a license cannot be revoked because of such conviction.^* A failure to keep the bar of a saloon exposed, as a statute requires, is sufficient to authorize a revocation of the proprietor's license.-''^ Under the New York statute a licensed hotel proprietor may serve his guests with drinks at their meals ; and if he does so in good faith his license cannot be revoked ; for he has committed no offense.^" Permitting gambling on the premises is a sufficient cause for a revocation of a license,^^ but the gambling must take place with the permission or connivance of the licensee. Thus, a licensee as tenant occupied a room adjacent to a billiard hall, with a door between them, usually open; and at times billiard players ordered drinks from his bar. The proprietor of the billiard hall installed a slot machine in his room, concerning which the licensee protested, and there was no evidence of fraud. It was held that the evidence was not sufficient to authorize a revocation of his license, on the charge that he permitted gambling to be carried on upon his premises.^* When a statute requires a saloon door to be closed on Sun- day, and no one shall be permitted to pass through the door except the proprietor, members of his family or his servants, the licensee cannot justify his conduct in keeping the door open so that customers may pass through the door and reach his restaurant situated in the barroom ; and for such con- duct his license may be revoked. '"^^ Where a license could be revoked because of a sale or gift of liquor "to a person of 33 Parrent v. Little, 72 N. H. 37 Brockway v. State, 36 Ark. 566; 58 Atl. 510. 629. 34 People V. Clement, 58 N. Y. 38 /„ re Clement, 190 N. Y. 523; Misc. Rep. 631; 111 N. Y. Supp. 83 N. E. 1123; affirming 119 N. 1033. Y. Div. 622; 104 N. Y. Supp. 25. 35 Cuirczak v. Keron (N. J. L.), ss in re Cullinan, 68 N. Y. App. 70 Atl. 366. Div. 119; 74 N. Y. Supp. 182. 36 In re Cullinan, 75 N. Y. App. Div. 301; 78 N. Y. Supp. 118. § 431 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING IJQUORS. 720 known intemperate habits," it was held that it was not nec- essary to show that the licensee knew of the intemperate habits of the person to whom he furnished the liquor.'*" And the same was held true of a sale to a minor.'*^ So under a pro- vision authorizing a revocation if certain "disreputable per- sons" visit the premises, it is no defense that they behaved decently when they made their visit.'*- A license may be re- voked for a sale off the premises, in violation of the law."*^ "Where a statute provides for a revocation in case the licensee violates its provisions, a previous conviction of such violation is not necessary to authorize a revocation.^* If a licensee runs two places of business under a license w^hich is for only one of them, his license may be revoked.*^ But the temporary closing of the place licensed and the running of it at another place without transfer of the license, has been held in Texas not to furnish sufficient grounds for revocation of the license.*® A license may be revoked for a violation of the law even though an appeal has been taken from the judgment of con- viction.*^ If one of two licensed partners sell liquors to a minor, the license may be revoked as to both of them.'*^ A violation of the screen law is sufficient to justify a revocation of a license.*® An agreement between a non-resident and a resident that the latter should get the license in his name but the former should conduct the business, is sufficient cause for revoking the license because it is an evasion of the statute requiring licensees to be residents.*"* 40 7n re Garey, 11 Pa. Co. Rep. Fairfield County, 50 Conn. 321; 4-68. 47 Am. Rep. 648. 41 7n re Eick, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. « Malkan v. Chicago, 217 111. Rep. 50; 4 Pa. Dist. R. 461. 471; 75 N. E. 548; affirming 119 42 Commonwealth v. Simmons. 4 III. App. 542. Pa. Dist. Rep. 35. 46 Mcleod v. State, 33 Tex. Civ. 43 Commonwealth v. Joseph App. 170; 76 S. W. 216. Kohlne Brewing Co., 1 Pa. Super. 47 Harrison v. People, 124 111. Ct. 627. App. 519. 44 Miles V. State, 53 Neb. 305; 48 Lewis v. Commonwealth 73 N. W. 678; Krueger v. Col- (Ky.), 121 S. W. 643. ville, 49 Wash. 295; 95 Pac. 81; 49 /n re Chapman (N. Y.), 119 State V. Seebold, 192 Mo. 720; 91 N. Y. Supp. 352. S. W. 491; Board v. Mayr, 31 49* J^on ^Mercantile Co. v. An- C!olo. 173; 74 Pac. 458; Lacroix v. derson (Tex.), 121 S. W. 868. 721 REVOCATION OF LICENSE. §§ 432, 433 Sec. 432. Violation of statute by licensee 's agent or servant. A statute requiring a revocation of a license for a violation of the liquor law by the licensee applies to a violation by his agent or servant. Thus a holder of a tax certificate assigned it as security to a brewing company, which the law permit- ted, to secure a. debt ; and the company removed it from the saloon licensed. A statute required its exposure to the public view in the place licensed. Thereafter the brother of the licensee, who was his general manager, sold liquors in his absence. It was held that the liquor tax certificate must be cancelled.'^*' It is no defense that the licensee's bartender made illegal sales contrary to his orders w^hen the statute pro- vides that he must see that his bartender or agent committed no violations of its provisions. ^^ And so where a licensee per- mitted a boy, having charge of a lunch room, free access to his bar from which he obtains liquors to serve customers of the lunch room ; and he serves minors with liquors, his license may be revoked.^- But where a licensee's agent, or one whom a licensee permits to do businees under his license at the place designated therein, engages in unlawful sales of his own elsewhere, the license cannot be revoked; for his act is not the act of the licensee.^^ If one of two partners violates the liquor laws, the license may be revoked as to both of them." Sec. 433. Upon conviction of an offense against the liquor laws. It is a common provision of the statutes relating to the sale of intoxicating liquors that a conviction of the licensee 50 In re Mitchell, 41 N. Y. App. Montg. Co. Law Rep. 25; People Div. 271; 58 N. Y. Supp. 632; In v. Woodman, 15 Daly 136; 3 N. Y. re CuUinan, 88 N. Y. App. Div. Supp. 926. 6; 84 N. Y. Supp. 492; In re Ly- ^^ In re Moyer, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. man, 29 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 524; 61 Rep. 663. N. Y. Supp. 946 ; People v. Mey- ss Lyman v. Malcom Brewing Co. ers, 95 N. Y. 223. 160 N. Y. 96; 54 N. E. 577; 55 51 /» re Cullinan, 85 N. Y. App. N. E. 408; affirming 40 N. Y. App. Div. 620, 621; 83 N. Y. App. Div. Div. 46; 57 N. Y. Supp. 634. 643; 82 N. Y. Sup. 1098, affirming 54 Lewis v. Commonwealth 39 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 636; 80 N. (Ky.), 121 S. W. 643. Y. Supp. 607; In re Gordon, 16 § 433 TR.VFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 722 of having violated their provisions, or the provisions of any other similar statute, shall work a revocation of the defend- ant's license. Where under a statute providing that a conviction" of a "violation" of the liquor laws should "of itself, make the license of said person void," it was held that a final judgment, conclusively establishing the guilt of the offender, was necessary to satisfy the provisions of the statute, and that a verdict of a jury, unsupported by a judgment was not a "eonvir'tion" within the meaning of the statute.^" A statute providiTT^ th-^t upon a conviction of having violated the liquor laAvs the license of the defendant shall ipso facto be revoked and annulled does not supersede another statute providing for the revocation and annulling of a license when a conviction has beeu obtained for a pen- alty or upon a bond under another statute.^® A statute pro- viding that on conviction of a licensee his license shall be forfeited applies to a city license in a prosecution for having violated a State tax liquor law.^'^ In some instances statutes are in force wdiich provide ipso facto for a revocation of a license upon conviction of the liquor laws, and when that is the case a conviction of such a violation works a forfeiture of the license at once.^^ In cases of a conviction for a second offense the offenses must be against the liquor laws, and usually a second offense against the act providing for the forfeiture, and not an offense against another liquor law.^^ 55 Commonwealth v. Kiley, 150 quired number of persons with the Mass. 325; 23 N. E. 55; Sullivan county auditor of a verified peti- V. Borden, 163 Mass. 470; 40 N. tion for the removal of the saloon E. 859. See White v. Creamer, id a bar to prosecution^;, for viola- 175 Mass. 567 ; 56 N. E. 832. tion of the liquor law ipso facto re- 56 People v. Tighe, 5 Hun 25. moved the bar. McConkie v. Rem- 57 State V. Horton, 21 Ore. 83; ley (Iowa), 93 N. VV. 505. 27 Pac. 165. In Missouri under a statute pre- ss People V. Meyers, 95 X. Y. viding that on a second conviction 223; Ballentine v. State, 48 Ark. a judgment must be entered can- 45; 2 S. W. 340. oellincr t^^e defendant's license, the 69 In re Anthers, 22 Q. B. Div. first conviction must be charged in 345; 53 J. P. 116; 58 L. J. M. the indictment. Stn[. v. Watts, C. 62; 37 W. R. 320; 60 L. T. 454. 101 Mo. App. f?fifir 74 S. W. 376. In Iowa (in 1903) under §2451 A finding of guilty, not fol- of the Code the filing by the re- lowed by a judgment, but by a 723 REVOCATION OF LICENSE. §§434,435 Sec. 434. Violation of terms of bond. Wliere a license court may require conditions to be inserted in the bond the licensee must give, his license may be revoked if he violates any of the conditions/'*' But a statute author- izing a licensing board to revoke a license whenever it shall appear to its s?itit;fap+ion thot any conditions of the bond have been violated" does not give it arbitrary power to re- voke the license, but only for good cause sho\^^^.®^ If the li- censee agree that his license may be revoked for sales on Sunday, and he sells liquor on that day in violation of the agreement, he cannot complain if it be revoked for that reason. *'- Sec. 435. Conducting place disorderly. Statutes are in force providing that if the licensee conduct his business at the licensed place in a disorderly manner his license may be revoked. Under such a statute where a licensed hotel keeper (who could sell linuors) maintained a concert garden in connection with his hotel in a disorderly manner by permitting drunken and disorderlv persons to there congregate and disturb the neighborhood, his license may be revoked, be- cause his business was illegally conducted.®^ Such is the case where a proprietor permits women of bad repute to visit his place of business.®* A single sale to two minors cannot be construed to constitute the house a disorderly one;*^ but per- mitting soldiers to sing and dance at the licensed place, thus suspension of sentence, is a con- C2 Belt v. Paul, 77 Ark. 211; 91 viction within the meaning of the S. W. 301. law that a license shall not be 63 in re Gordon, 10 Montg. Co. issued to a person convicted of a Law Rep. 25; In re Mcljaughlin, violation of the liquor law, and 24 Co. Ct. Rep. 92; State v. Kirk, such a person is a person not "au- 112 Mo. App. 447; 86 S. W. Rep. thorized to sell liquors under the 1099. provisions" of the statute. H. 64 Jn re Gerver, 7 North Co. R. Koehler & Co. V. Clement (N. Y.), (Pa.) 382; State v. Barnett, 111 111 N. Y. Supp. 151. Mo. App. 552; 86 S. W. 460; In re ^0 In re Gerstlauer, 5 Pa. Dist. •Clement, 58 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 257; Rep. 97. 110 N. Y. Supp. 893. 81 State v. Dwyer, 21 Minn. 512. cr, state v. Lichta, 130 Mo. App. 284; 109 S. W. 825. § 436 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 724 attracting a crowd which fills the room and obstructs the sidewalk, resulting in sales to minors and intoxicated per- sons, renders a place a disorderly house.''" Sec. 436. House used as a brothel. Some statutes require a forfeiture of a license where the licensee permits or uses the licensed premises as a brothel, either with or without a conviction for that offense. Thus, the English statute of 1872 provides that "if any licensed per- son is convicted of permitting his premises to be a brothel, he shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds, and shall forfeit his license, and he shall be disqualified for- ever from holding any license for the sale of intoxicating liquors. " ^'^ To convict a licensee of keeping a brothel it is not material there was no outward sign of indecency,"^ or that there was no actual disorderly conduct.^^ A brothel is the same thing as a "bawdy house;" and is a house or place resorted to by persons of both sexes for the purpose of pros- titution. But where a woman kept a house to which men resorted for the purposes of fornication with her, it was held that she could not be convicted of having kept a brothel, no other woman coming there for the purpose of prostitution.'^'' Permitting the licensed premises to be used once for the purposes of prostitution is some evidence to support the charge of permitting the premises to be used as a brothel ;^^ but per- mitting them to be used on the 26th, 28th, 29th and 31st of 66 Commonwealth v. Elliott, 1 J. P. 119; 72 L. T. 236; 43 W. R. Xack. Leg. N. 140; 16 Pa. Co. Ct. 426; 18 Cox C. C. 79. Rep. 122; 4 Pa. Dist. Rep. 89. The landlord of the tenant li- 67 35 and 36 Vict. c. 94 § 15; censee cannot be convicted of keep- Patterson's Licensing Acts ( 19th ing a brothel when the licensee so Ed. ) , p. 372. kept the place rented. Regina v. 68Regina v. Rice, L. R. 1 C. C. Stannard, 1 L. & C. 349; 33 L. J, R. 21; 35 L. J. M. C. 93; 13 L. T. M. C. 61; 9 L. T. 428; 12 W. R. 382; 14 W. R. 56. 208; 28 J. P. 20; Regina v. Bar- 69 Greig v. Bendeno, E. B. & E. rett, 1 L. & C. 263 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 133; 27 L. J. M. C. 294. 36; 7 L. T. 435; 11 W. R. 124. 70 Singleton v. Ellison [1895], 1 ^i Regina v. Holland J. J., 46 Q. B. 607; 64 L. J, M. C. 123; 59 J. P. 312. See Webb v. Catch- love, 50 J. P. 795. 725 REVOCATION OP LICENSE. § 436 one month and on the 1st, 4th, 5th and 6th of the fol- lowing month is only one continuing offense, notwithstanding the days are not consecutive." It is sometimes made an offense to permit prostitutes to visit a saloon and a cause for a revocation of the keeper's license. The element of knowl- edge of the character of such persons is essential, as a rule, to render the licensee guilty of an offense and consequently of a liability to have his license revoked. Thus, where it was made an offense for ' ' any licensed person knowingly ' ' to per- mit his premises "to be the habitual resort or place of meeting of reputed prostitutes," and he should, on conviction, be fined, it was held that the word "knowingly" applied to the char- acter of the persons who were permitted to resort to the prem- ises; and it was said that this word was necessary, because if that, or some similar word, were not used it mieht be con- tended that if women were knowingly permitted to resort to the premises, it would be no defense that it was not knoA\Ti they were reputed prostitutes.'^-^ Under the statute just re- ferred to, "in order to prove the offense it must be shown: (1) That the licensed person, or at least his manager, knew the women were reputed prostitutes, and the court inquires into the grounds of belief of witnesses as to the evil reputation; (2) that he allowed them to remain longer than necessary for reasonable refreshment, which is partly a mat- ter of arithmetic, the nature of the meal or refroshment being generally the best materials for showing whether they re- mained longer than was necessary for its consumption. Ac- cordingly, where a woman of this unfortunate class was found on licensed premises by a police constable, and the woman immediately left on being spoken to bv the publican as soon as the constable entered, it M^as held that this was not enough to sustain a conviction. '^^ Tn this case there was no evidence as to whether the woman had gone to the house for the pur- ■r^ Ex parte Burnhy [1901], 2 K. M. C. 126; 70 L. T. 452: 42 W. B. 458; 70 L. J. K. B. 730; S.') K. .309. L. T. 16S. 74 Citing Miller v. Dudley J. J., 73 Somerset v. Wade [1894], 1 46 W. R. 606. Q. B. 574; 58 J. P. 231; 63 L. J, § 437 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 726 pose of obtaining refreshment or not, nor how long she had been upon the premises, but the constable stated that at the time when he saw the woman she was not partaking of any refreshments. The evidence was thus consistent with the woman having finished her refreshment and being on the point of leaving when the constable entered, and w^as there- fore insufficient to sustain a conviction. '^^ It may be shown that prostitutes had been seen previously in the licensed prem- ises, that being some evidence of the keeper's knowledge of their character.''® Under this statute it is not essential that the prostitutes who "meet" on the premises should be the same persons; it is enough that persons of their class frequently come to the house, and that one is there, though for the first time, if known as to her character.'^ Sec. 437. Ordinance providing for a revocation. A city may provide by ordinance that au applicant for a license must agree that if he violate the liquor ordinances of the city or of the State it shall be a sufficient cause for a revocation of his license ; and such an ordinance in the provision which says a licensee shall agree that his license may be revoked if he violates a "State law" will be con- ^5 Patterson's Licensing Acts Where a statute provided that (19th Ed.), p. 368. if any keeper of a beer or public 76 Belasco v. Hannant, 3 B. & S 13; 26 J. P. 823; 31 L. J. M. C 225; 6 L. T. 577; 10 W. R. 867 Parker v. Green, 2 B. & S. 299 26 J. P. 247; 31 L. J. M. C. 133; house "knowingly lodges or know- ingly harbors thieves or reputed thieves, or knowingly permits or knowingly suffers them to meet or assemble tlierein" shall be liable 10 W. R. 316; Cole v. Coulton, 24 to a fine, a meeting called at an J. P. 596; 2 E. & E. 695; 29 L. J. ale house by a circular to get up M. C. 125; 2 L. T. 216; 8 W. R. a subscription for the wife and 412. children of a convicted thief, sev- 77 Wray v. Toke, 12 Q. B. 492; eral thieves being in the company, 17 L. J. M. C. 183; 12 J. P. 804. was held to render the keeper In a charge of allowing prosti- liable to punishment. Marshall v. tutes to meet on the premises, it is Fox, L. R. 6 Q. B. 370; 24 L. T. not necessary to name them nor 751; 40 L. J. M. C. 142; 19 W. allege they were unknown. R. 1108; 35 J. J. 631. 727 REVOCATION OF LICENSE. § 438 strued to mean a "State liquor law.""** Under a power to license and regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors a city may provide that upon violation of its provisions the mayor may revoke the license ; for in doing so he acts as the agent or arm of the council."" But an ordinance providing that upon a second conviction of the licensee for having violated the liquor laws he shall forfeit his license and the fee paid for it, notwithstanding he maj'- appeal and secure an acquittal of the offense charged against him, is so oppressive as to be void and cannot be enforced. ^° And a statute authorizing a city to require a bond of the licensee, and empowering it to revoke his license "whenever it shall appear to its * * * satisfaction * * * that any conditions of the bond have been violated" does not empower it to arbitrarily revoke the license, but only upon a showing that a condition of the bond has been violated.^' Having once granted a license, the coun- cil of a city after the session at which it was granted cannot revoke it, except oursuant to the statute or ordinance em- powering it to revoke it upon grounds therein provided for its revocation.®- ^-^nd if a council is authorized to revoke a license upon certain conditions found to exist, it cannot by ordinance delegate the power to the police justice or city judge, but must itself act in the matter.®^ Sec. 438. New York statute — False statements. A New York statute provides that "at any time after a liquor tax certificate has been issued" it "may be revoked and cancelled if material statements in the application of the holder of such certificate were false," or if the proper con- sents of property owners to the granting of the certificate 78 Ck)x V. Jackson, 152 Mich. si State v. Dwyer, 21 Minn. 512. 630; 116 N. W. 450; Hurber v. 82 Lantz v. Hightstown, 46 K Baugli, 43 Iowa, 514; Ottumwa v. J. L. 102; Decker v. Board, 57 N. Schaub, 52 Iowa, 515; 3 N. W. J. L. G03; 31 Atl. 235; Vanaman 529. V. Adams, 74 X. J. L. 125; 05 Atl. 79 Harrison v. People, 124 III. 204. App. 519. 83 Lambert v. Railway, 58 N. J. soMcInerey v. Denver, 17 Col. L. 578; 34 Atl. 5. 302; 29 Pac. 516. § 439 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 728 to sell liquors at the place designated in the application were "not properly filed," "or if the holder of said certificate was not for anj- reason entitled to receive or hold the same, or to traffic in liquors, or if any provision" of the liquor "act is violated at the place designated in said certificate as the place where such traffic is to be carried on by the Iiolder of said certificate, or by his agent, servant, bartender or any person whomsoever in charge of said premises, or if the holder of said certificate shall violate any of the provisions" of the liquor act "at any place." The State commissioner of excise, the deputy State commissioner of excise, "or any taxpayer of the city, village or town for which such liquor tax certificate was issued may present a verified petition" to the judge of the court "of the county in Avhich such traffic in liquor is designated to be carried on, or in which the holder of such certificate resides" "for an order revoking or cancelling such certificate upon either or all of the grounds" above stated. This "petition must state the facts upon which such application is based;" and when the application is by a taxpayer the State commissioner of excise must be "made a party to the proceeding, and is entitled to due notice thereof. Upon the presentation of the petition the "justice, judge or court" must grant an order requiring the holder of the certificate to show cause before him, on a day specified therein, not more than ten days after the granting thereof, "why an order revoking and cancelling" his tax certificate should not be granted, and the order must also contain an injunction restraining the certificate holder from transferring or surrendering his certificate for rebate, as the statute al- lows.®* Sec. .439. False statements in application under Nev^r York statute. As we have seen a liquor tax certificate may be revoked and cancelled in New York "if material statements in the application of the holder of such certificate were false." One of the statements required of an applicant under the statute 84 Laws 1906, ch. 272, subdiv. 2. 729 REVOCATION OP LICENSE. § 439 of that State is that there are no buildings exclusively oc- cupied as dwellings within two hundred feet of the place where liquor is to be sold under the certificate to be issued to the applicant; and if the statement in this respect be false, it is sufficient to call for a revocation and cancellation of the certificate issued thereon, although the statement Avas made in good faith.^"^ An application which refers to and relies upon material statements made in a previous appli- cation which are false, requires the tax certificate to be can- celled.^*^ A saloon may be located within the two hundred feet limit, if the owners of dwellings therein consent; and a false statement that they had so consented is sufficient to authorize a cancellation and revocation of the tax certificate, though it is made in good faith, in reliance upon statements of persons expert in such matters employed to obtain the necessary consents ; " and the necessary consents given after the issuance of the certificate is not sufficient to prevent its revocation.^^ An entire failure to answer a question pro- pounded in the application is not a false statement."'' A false statement that the applicant had complied with the statute S3 /u re Harper, 30 N. Y. Misc. costs against the holder of the Eep. 663; 64 N. Y. Supp. 524; In certificate, regarding the cancel- re Clement, 116 N. Y. App. Div. lation of the certificate as a 148; 101 N. Y. Supp. 683; af- sufficient punishment. In re Eas- firmed 118 N. Y. App. Div. 57.5; quin. 37 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 693; 76 103 N. Y. Supp. 157 ; In re Haiglit, X. Y. Supp. 404 ; In re Derrel, 55 33 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 544; 68 N. N. Y. Misc. Rep. 618; 106 N. Y. Y. iSupp. 920; In re Halbran, 30 Supp. 1030. N. Y. App. 515; 63 N. Y. Supp. ss Lyman v. IVlurphy, supra; In 1024; In re Auerbach, 31 N. Y. re Haight, 33 N. Y. Misc. Rep. Misc. Rep. 44 ; 64 N. Y. Supp. 602 ; 544 ; 68 N. Y. Supp. 920 ; In re In re Lyman, 34 N. Y. Misc. Rep. Halbran, 30 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 515; 296; 69 N. Y. Supp. 781; People 63 N. Y. Supp. 1024; In re Wash- V. Pettit (X. Y.), 113 N. Y. Supp. burn, 32 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 303; 66 243. N. Y. Supp. 732; In re Johnson, 86 /n re Tonatio, 49 N. Y. App. 18 Misc. Rep. 498; 42 N. Y. Supp. Div. 84; 63 N. Y. Supp. 560. 1074, the revocation was held to 87 Lyman v. Murphy, 33 X. Y. lie discretionary with the court. Misc. Rep. 349; 68 X. Y. Supp. 89 /,j re Lyman, 163 X. Y. 536; 490. In this case the court re- 57 X. E. 745; reversing 51 X. Y. fused to render judgment for App. Div. 52; 64 X. Y. Supp. 756. § 439 TRAi^PIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 730 authorizing the issuance of a liquor tax eertij&cate to a hotel keeper will authorize its cancellation ; and a compliance after its issuance will not prevent the cancellation, for in determ- ining the truth of such statements the court is restricted to the time when the application was made.®" But a statement that the building had been used as a hotel, followed by a false statement that it had ever since been so used, is no ground for the cancellation of the certificate.®^ Where the consent of property owners within the two hundred feet limit is not necessary, a false statement that they had given their consent is not a false material statement, and not a suflS- cient cause for a revocation of the liquor certificate.®- The fact that a protest against the issuance of a tax certificate was filed with the treasurer, whose duty it was to issue the certificate, will not prevent its revocation, where he had no discretion as to its issTiance, the statute authorizing proceed- ings for its cancellation to be brought "at any time" after its issuance.^^ At a date prior to the enactment of the stat- ute, cited at the beginning of this section, the consent of only two-thirds of the owners of buildings used exclusively for dwellings was required; and when that was the case it was held that the application need not contain a statement how many such dwellings there were. Consequently a false state- so /«, re Smith, 48 N. Y. App. ^"^ In re Moulton, 168 N. Y. 423; 63 K Y. Supp. 255; In re 645; 61 N. Y. 1131; affirming 59 Cullinan, 39 N. Y. Misc. Eep. 646; N. Y. App. Div. 25; 69 N. Y. Supp. 80 N. Y. Supp. 626; In re Ryon, 14; In re Hawkins, 165 N. Y. 188; 85 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 621; 83 N. Y. 58 X. E. 884; reversing 66 N. Y. Supp. 123; affirming 80 N. Y. Supp. 1132; In re Pierson, 32 N, Supp. 1114; In re Brewster, 85 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 293; 66 N. Y. Supp. Y. App. Div. 235 ; 83 N. Y. Supp. 546 ; In re Kessler, 28 N. Y. Misc. 235; 13 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 250; re- Rep. 336; 59 N. Y. Supp. 888; versing 80 N. Y. Supp. 666; In re affirmed 60 N. Y. Supp. 1141; re- McMonagle, 41 N. Y. Misc. Rep. versed 163 N. Y. 205; 57 N. E. 407; 84 N. Y. Supp. 1068. 402. But see In re Clement, 119 oi/ji re Brewster, 39 N. Y. N. Y. App. Div. 622; 104 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 689 ; 80 N. Y. Supp. Supp. 25 ; 53 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 358 ; 666; In re Clement. 52 N. Y. 104 N. Y. Sn])p. 905. Misc. Rep. 325; 102 N. Y. Supp. ^^ In re Lyman, 23 N. Y. Misc. 178. ■ Rep. 710; 53 N. Y. Supp. 52. 731 REVOCATION OF LICENSE. § 439 ment of the number of dwellings is an immaterial statement when it is alleged two-thirds thereof had given their con- sent.®* A false material statement made unintentionally re- quires a caneellation of the certificate issued thereon.^^ But ■when, according to the statute, a hotel must have ten rooms, and the hotel did not have that number when the application was made, but did have when the certificate was issued, a revocation was refused.^" A denial of a petition to cancel a certificate issued for a certain place, because within two hundred feet of a church, is no bar to the cancellation of another certificate issued for the same place to a different person.®^ The fact that a church was built within the two hundred feet limit after the tax certificate was issued is no reason for its cancellation ; ^** but it is on an application for a second or renewal of the certificate.''^ A statement that "the traffic in liquors had been lawfully carried on upon the premises on and since" a certain date, "and that since that date the premises had been occupied continuously for such traffic" is not false where the premises were occupied on that date with a saloon which was accidentally destroyed by fire three years later, compelling the occupant to suspend traffic therein for three months, when he resumed business, he not having abandoned his intention to continue his occupancy of the premises. Such an interruption was held not to consti- tute an abandonment.^ The forging of a property owner's signature to a paper purporting to give his consent to a lo- cation of the saloon within two hundred feet of his dwelling is sufficient ground for a revocation of the tax certificate issued pursuant thereto; but the burden is upon the party alleging the forgery to prove it.- Where a statute forbade Q*In re Lyman, 23 X. Y. Misc. affirmed 122 N. Y. App. Div. 801; Rep. 710; 53 N. Y. Supp. 52. 106 N. Y. Supp. 1143. 95 /n re Fall, 26 Misc. Rep. 611; ^^ In re Clement, 57 N. Y. Al)se. 57 N". Y. Supp. 858. Rep. 47; 107 N. Y. Supp. 205. 96 /n re Purdy, 40 N. Y. App. ^ In re Kessler, 163 N. Y. 205: Div. 133; 57 N. Y. Supp. C29. 57 N. E. 402; reversing 60 N. Y. 97 In re McCusker, 47 N. Y. App. Supp. 1141. Div. Ill; 62 N. Y. Supp. 201. 2 /« re Whittaker, 63 N. Y. App. 98 /n re Rupp, 55 N. Y. Misc. Div. 442; 71 N. Y. Supp. 497. Rep. 313; 106 N. Y. Supp. 483; § § 440, 441 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 732 the location of a saloon within one-half mile of any State hospital or lands occupied by such a hospital, it was held that a saloon located within seventy-five feet of an eight hun- dred acre-tract of land on which was located a State hospital more than one-half mile from it was a violation of law, and a liquor tax certificate therefor must be revoked.^ A false repre- sentation that one of two applicants was a citizen of the State and that he and other applicants were equal partners, as the statute required, is sufficient to revoke the license granted on such representation.* Sec. 440. Erroneous statements as to place in application for a license. If a license be issued upon an application containing such an error in the description of the place to be licensed that there is no such place as that described, it may be cancelled.^ Sec. 441. License issued by mistake. A license issued under a mistake of facts necessary to authorize its issuance may be revoked; and the officer issuing it is not estopped by his conduct in issuing it to revoke or cancel it." And where the issuance of a license has been pro- cured by fraud, the court or licensing board, on notice given, may proceed to investigate the fraud, and if found true, with- draw the license. Such a proceeding does not come under the statute authorizing a revocation of a license because of misconduct of the holder, and a writ of certiorari does not lie to review the court or board's action, for its action will be entirely ignored in a subsequent proceeding to determine the validity of the license.^ 3 7n re Clement, 110 N. Y. Sii])?. affirming (N. Y.), 101 K y. 57, 59; 125 N. Y. App. Div. 670. Supp. 447; In re Cullinan, 87 N. 4 People V. Hilliard, 81 N. Y. Y. App. Div. 47; 8.3 N Y. Supp. App. Div. 71; 80 N. Y. Supp. 792. ^025. 5/w- re Hoyniak, 9 Kulp. 368. ^ state v. SchrofT, 123 Wis. 98; 6/n re Clement, 118 N. Y. App. 109 N. W. 1030. Div. 575; 103 N. Y. Supp. 157; 7;>:') uEvocATioN OF LICENSE §§ 442-444 Sec. 442 The license to be revoked. Where a statute provides that a license may be revoked for a violation of the liquor laws it is usually understood that the violation must take place when the license is in force ; but that is not always the case. Thus where the liquor law was violated by the licensee's bartender, and thereafter the license expired and at the date of the expiration another li- cense w'as issued to him, and he was thirteen days afterward convicted of the offense committed while the first license W'as in force, it was held that his second license could be revoked because of such conviction.^ Sec. 443. Revocation after assignment for prior illegal acts. A license may be revoked after its assignment and while in the assignee's lawful possession and ownership for illegal acts of the licensee committed before the date of assignment,' although the assignee knew nothing of such illegal acts.^** Sec. 444. What board or court may revoke a license. As a rule statutes expressly empower certain courts or boards to revoke licenses, which is not always the licensing board or court. In Pennsylvania it is the quarter sessions that are thus empowered;'^ in New Hampshire, the board of commissioners;'- in Colorado, the board of county com- missioners ; '" in Missouri, the county court ; ^* and in Canada, the recorder.'^ An officer may be empowered to revoke a 8 People V. Woodman (X. Y.), 423; 58 L. J. M. C. 1G7; 61 L. T. 4 N. Y. Supp. 532. 240; 37 W. R. 605. 9/n re Clement, 55 N. Y. Misc. n Dolan's Appeal, 108 Pa. St. Rep. 615; 105 N. Y. Supp. 1085. 564. 10 /n re Cullinan, 185 N. Y. 546; 12 State v. Carron, 73 N. H. 434; 77 N. B. 1184; affirming 104 N. Y. 62 Atl. 1044. App. Div. 205; 93 N. Y. Supp. 492. is Board v. Mayr, 31 Colo. 173; If a license has been forfeited, 74 Pac. 458. it cannot be transferred. Rex v. 1* Barnett v. Pemiscott Co. Ct. West Riding J. J., 21 Q. B. Div. Ill Mo. App. 693; 86 S. W. 575. 258; 52 J. P. 455; 57 L. J. M. C. i'^ Ex parte Ricbler, 1 L. N. 103; 36 W. R. 258; Stevens v. (Can.) 59. Green, 23 Q. B. Div. 142; 53 J. P. § 445 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 734 license/® or a city council/^ or a police board,^^ But where a city was given exclusive authority "to license, tax, regulate, restrain, suppress and prohibit barrooms, groceries and tipi^ling houses" and also to "impose forfeitures" it was held that did not supersede a general law of the State providing that upon conviction of a licensee for certain offenses against the liquor law the court must revoke his license. ^'^ If the power to revoke a license be vested in the city council it cannot by ordinance delegate its power, as to a police justice of the eity,-° nor can it revoke the license by rescinding the order granting it after it has been issued, at least.-^ Where one of the three members of a town board hired minors to purchase liquor from a licensee, in order to secure evidence against him of selling to minors, it was held that he was incompetent to sit in a proceeding for the revocation of such license be- cause of such sales, and his sitting on the board at the tvial avoided the proceedings.-- Sec. 445. Mandamus to compel a revocation. If there be no other adequate remedy, mandamus lies to compel a revocation after the proceedings for a revocation has been instituted. Thus where a statute required a city council to revoke a license if it found "the complaint to be true," and it was admitted that the testimony concerning illegal sales Avas uncontradicted, and the licensee admitted them, a refusal of the council to find the charge true was held to be an abuse of discretion on its part, and accordingly mandamus lay to compel a revocation, there being no other adequate remedy.-'^ But mandamus does not lie to compel iG Richler v. Judah, 1 . L. N. 20 Lambert v. Rahway, 58 N. J. (Can.) 591; Ex parte Molinari, 6 L. 578; 34 Atl. 5. L. N. (Can.) 395. 21 Dziok v. Board, 28 R. I. 526; 17 Carbondale v. Wade, lOG 111. 68 Atl. 479. App. 654; Carr v. Augusta, 124 22 State v. Bradish, 95 Wis. 205; Ga. 116; 52 S. E. 300. 70 N. W. 172. 18 Sullivan v. Borden, 163 Mass. 23 State v. Oslikosh (Wis.), 70 470; 40 N. E. 859. N. W. 300. See also Cox v. Jack- in State V. Horton, 21 Ore. 83; son. 152 Micli. 630; 116 N. W. 456; 27 Pac. 165. See People v. Tighe, People v. Meakin. 133 N. Y, 214; 5 Hun, 25. 30 X. E. S2S ; affirming 15 N. Y. 735 KEVOCATION OF LICENSE. § 446 the revocation of a void license ; because the granting of it is a mere idle act, fruitless in its effect."* If a license be issued after an appeal has been taken, or during the time when an appeal may be taken, mandamus lies to compel the licensing board or court to withdraw or revoke the license.^'^ Sec. 446. Who may commence proceedings. The statute almost invariably provides who may institute proceedings for a cancellation of a license or liquor tax cer- tificate. Not infrequently some officer is authorized to in- stitute the proceedings. A citizen or taxpayer of the vicinity or district for which the license is granted may usually insti- tute the proceedings, regardless of the fact that some officer is also authorized to bring them. In New York the State Commissioner of Excise, the Deputy State Commissioner of Excise, "or any taxpayer of the city, village or town for which" the liquor tax certificate was issued may present a verified petition to the .judge of the court of the county "for an order revoking or cancelling" the tax certificate.^" Under this statute if it be alleged in the answer that the action for a revocation was unauthori/edly brought, evidence may be taken to prove the allegation.^^ The petition for a revocation must show the ri^ht of the petitioner to institute the pro- ceedings.-** The licensee who has transferred the license can- not bring an action to revoke it because the transferee has failed, or has become unable, to pay him for it.-^ Where a statute provided that any taxpayer of the district for whir-h the license was granted might institute proceedings for its revocation, an allegation in the petition that the petitioner was the owner of certain described property in the district Supp. 917; State v. Johnson, 37 2c Laws 1906, ch. 272, subdiv. 2. Neb. 362 ; 55 N. W. 874. 27 In re Halbian, 30 N. Y. Misc. 24 State V. Hammel, 13+ Wis. Rep. 515; 63 N. Y. Supp. 1024. 61; 114 N. W. 97. 2S People v. IMcGowan, 44 N. Y. 25 Swan V. Wilderson, 10 Okla. App. Div. 30; 60 N. Y. Supp. 407; 547; 62 Pac. 422. In such a case In re Schopp, 119 N. Y. App. Div. the holder is neither a necessary 192; 104 N. Y. Supp. 307. or proper party defendant. 29 /n re Flosser, 8 Kulp. 343. § 447 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 736 was held to presumptively allege he was a taxpayer/" Trus- tees under a will, in whom the legal title to the testator's real estate is vested, are taxpayers, and under the statue referred to may institute the proceedings.^^ A statute author- izing "any citizen" to institute the proceedings does not re- quire him to be a taxpayer.''- Where a statute required that no saloon should be located within 200 feet of a dwelling house, it was held that a citizen not within that distance might apply for the revocation of its license.^" Sec. 447. Who to be made defendant — Assignment of license. The rule is invariable that the holder* of the license at the time the proceedings are instituted must be made the de- fendant or respondent. If the license be assigned (when that is permissible) the assignee should be made a party de- fendant or the respondent, and not the assignor; and if he be not the proceedings will be void.^* But where the statute provides that the proceedings might be brought against "the holder of record," they may be brought against "the holder of record," though he has no connection with the place desig- nated in the license or with the violation of the law at that place which authorizes its revocation.^" But if the license or tax certificate be assigned (as may be sometimes done) as collateral security, the assignee need not be made a party; for he is not a holder of record.^" Nor can the wife of the 307,1 re Schopp. lin App. Div. Rep. 336; 59 X. Y. Siipp. 888. 119; 104 N. Y. Supp. 307. . Sometimes the judge of the li- 31 hi re Rupp, 54 N. Y. Misc. censing court is emi^wered to in- Rep. 1 ; 105 N. Y. Supp. 407. stitute proceedings. Newman v. Under the Pennsylvania Act, Lake, 70 Kan. 848; 79 Pac. 675. May 13, 1887 (P. L. 108), it is S4 Bertzel v. Court of Common not necessary that the petitioner Pleas (N. J. L. ), 48 Atl. 101?. be a resident of the ward for 35 Cullinan v. Kuch, 39 N. Y. which the license was issued. In Misc. Rep. 641; 80 X. Y. Supp. re McGrinley, 32 Pa. Super. Ct. 186. 324. 36 7n re Lyman, 20 N. Y. Misc. 32 Zn re Halbron, 30 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 300; 56 N. Y. Supp. 1020; Rep. 515; 63 N. Y. Supp. 1024. In re Clement, 55 N. Y. Misc. 615; 33 Zn re Kessler, 28 N. Y. Misc. 105 N. Y. Supp. 1085. 737 REVOCATION OP LICENSE. § 448 licensee, to whom it has been assigned by consent of the excise commissioner, be brought in as a defendant.^^ When A loaned S the necessary amount to obtain a license, who obtained it and assigned it to A as collateral security, together with the right to receive all rebates on its surrender ; and S then discon- tinued the business, and A surrendered the license and re- ceived a certificate for the amount of rebate; and thereafter B took up the traffic of liquor at the place licensed, without authority, and a proceeding was brought to cancel S's li- cense because of illegal sales by B (which could be done), it was held that A had a right to intervene and show that B had not violated the law, in order to protect the license and secure the rebate.^'' Sec. 448. The pyetition for revocation. As a basis for the proceedings, it is necessary to aver that the defendant or respondent holds a license at the time of beginning of the proceedings."® But the proceedings usu- ally being of a summary character, the same strictness in the petition is not required as in ordinary proceedings in the court in civil actions.*" "Where a statute provides that an application shall be founded or a complaint made to the licensing board, it is not sufficient for the board to issue a w^arrant reciting that information calling for its revoca- tion has come to its knowledge. There must be a formal written complaint placed on file for the licensee's in- formation.*^ Merely alleging that the licensee had vio- lated the liquor ordinance or statute without stating in what respect, is not sufficient.*- The petition for a revocation must show that the petitioner is one authorized to bring the pro- 37Nieland v. McGrath, 20 X. Y. Burns, 76 Conn. 395; 56 Atl. 611; Misc. Rep. 682; 62 N. Y. Supp. 760, Cherry v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 38 In re Cullinan, 94 N. Y. App. 375. Div. 445; 88 N. Y. Supp. 164. 41 State v. Lamos, 26 Me. 258. 39Breubaker v. State, 89 Ind. 42 State v. Tomah, 80 Wis. 198; 577. 49 X. W. 753; In re Halbran, 30 40 People V. Houghton, 41 Hun, N". Y. Misc. Eep. 515; 63 K Y. 558; People v. Wright, 3 Hun, Supp. 1024. 506; 5 T. & C. 518; Appeal of § 448 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 738 ceedings; as for instance, that he is a taxpayer where a stat- ute authorizes a taxpayer to institute the proceedings.'*" If the petition must be verified it is not necessary to give the petitioner's grounds of belief that the facts alleged are true when he states them on information and belief;** but where the statute requires him to state "the facts on which said application is based," it is not sufficient for him to state that he believes that certain facts exist, or that the licensee has committed an act in violation of law, without stating the grounds of his information.*^ An insufficient petition gives the court jurisdiction when a proper notice is served.*" In New York deficient allegations in a petition may be sup- plemented by affidavits accompanying it, as where the peti- tion stated the facts on information and belief — which was an insufficient statement — and the accompanying affidavits stated the facts on personal knowledge of the affiant.*' If the petition proceeds upon the theory that the licensee has violated a particular provision of the law, but fails to state facts sufficient to show a violation, it is deficient ; thus charg- ing a sale after the hour of 12 o'clock midnight does not charge a violation of a statute or ordinance providing that saloons shall be closed between the hours of 12 o'clock mid- night and 5 o'clock a. m.*^ But if a petition be defective, and no objection be taken to it; and the proof shows that 43 People V. McGowan, 44 N. Y. 47 Jn ,-e Cullinan, 7G N. Y. App. App. Div. 30; 60 N. Y. Supp. 407; Div. 362; 78 N. Y. Supp. 466; 12 In re Schopp, 119 N. Y. App. Div. N. Y. Ann. Cas. 68; affirmed 173 192; 104 N. Y. Supp. 307. N". Y. 610; 66 N. E. 1106; In re 44 People V. McGowan, supra. In Cullinan, 89 N. Y. App. Div. 613; such an instance the provisions of 85 N. Y. Supp. 1129; affirming 41 the Civil Code may be followed. N. Y. Misc. Eep. 392; 84 N. Y. 45 /n re Peck, 167 X. Y. 391; 60 Supp. 1075; In re Cullinan, 40 N. N. E. 775; 53 L. R. A. 888; re- Y. Misc. Rep. 423; 82 N. Y. Supp. versing 68 N. Y. Supp. 114o; 337. Voight V. Board, 59 N. J. L. 358 ; 4S state v. Curtis, 130 Wis. 3,17 ; 36 Atl. 686; 37 L. R. A. 292. 110 N. W. 189. 40 In re Cullinan, 39 N. Y. Misc. But in this case it was held that Rep. 354; 79 N. Y. Supp. 840; the city council was not justified McConkie v. Remley, 119 Iowa, in dismissing the petition. It 512; 93 N. W. 505. should have been amended. 739 REVOCATION OF LICENSE. § 449 the license ought to be revoked, it may be amended to corre- spond to the proof.*" In New York the State Excise Com- missioner is not required to state the facts of his own knowl- edge which justify a revocation, but he may allege such facts upon his information and belief, based upon the public rec- ords and statements of his deputy commissioner or subordi- nates.^" Reasonable certainty is required in the petition."^ But where the illeiial sales are charged to have been made by the respondent, "the holder of said license," it will be presumed they were made after the license was issued." If it is sought to revoke a license issued for a hotel because it does not comply with the statute in its structure and number of spare rooms and beds required by the statute for the accommo- dation of travelers, the petition must sufficiently set forth that such hotel did not have such accommodations to bring it with- in the exemptions of the statute.^^ Sec. 449. Joint proceeding to revoke several licenses. A petition to revoke two or more licenses held by the re- spondent, even if they be of different classes, is not fatally defective because the allegations charge the commission of the acts of forfeiture to have been committed at the same time.^* If a statute do not forbid it, no objection can be made to a joinder of licenses for several places granted to the same person. '^^ 40 /n re Stedler, 52 X. Y. Misc. 59 N. J. L. 358; 36 Atl. 686; Rep. 322; 102 N. Y. Supp. 147; Cuirczak v. Keron (N. J. L.), 70 Plass V. Clark, 71 N. Y. App. Div. Atl. 366. 488; 76 N. Y. Supp. 2. See Croth- 62 /n re McCinley, 32 Pa. Super, ers V. Monteith, 11 Manitoba, 373. Ct. 324. 50 7n re Cullinan, 89 N. Y. App. 53 Cuirczak v. Keron (N. J. L.), Div. 613; 85 N. Y. Supp. 1129; 70 Atl. 366. affirming 41 N. Y. Misc. 392; 84 54 Commonwealth v. Bearce, 150 N. Y. Supp. 1075; In re Clement, Mass. 389; 23 N. E. 99. 116 N. Y. App. Div. 148; 101 X. 55 /n re Lyman, 59 N. Y. Supp. Y. Supp. 683. Div. 217; 69 N. Y. Supp. 309; af- 51 Appeal of Mecnan, 11 Pa. firming 32 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 309; Super. Ct. 579 ; Voight v. Board, 67 N. Y. Supp. 48. § 450 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 740 Sec. 450. Notice of proceeding's for revocation. As a general rule a license cannot be revoked without notice of the proceedings to revoke it being first given to the licensee or holder and an opportunity given him to show cause why it should not be rev^oked. The proceedings without notice are void and the revocation a nullity.^*' A statute, however, is not void because it does not provide for a notice; it being implied that the licensee is to be notified." If the license be issued to two or to a partnership, notice to one of the two or to one member of the partnership, is a sufficient notice.^* Where a statute provided that "after ten days' notice to any person * * * the court maye revoke" his license, it was held that an order served on the licensee to show cause why his license should not be revoked "for selling and causing to be sold to minors whisky" was sufficiently definite to render the proceedings valid.''-' But where a statute provides that for a conviction of an offense against the liquor laws the li- cense of the defendant may be revoked, notice of the proposed revocation is not necessary ; *'" and this is especially so where the license itself contains the conditions of forfeiture as pre- scribed by the statute or ordinance under which it is issued.®^ Where notice is required to be given to a licensee that his li- cense has been revoked, it is held sufficient to give him a verbal notice.*'- An order to show cause why the license should not be cancelled, directed to be personally served on the part- ners who hold the license, or by leaving it at their place of business as designated in the license with a person in charge, 56 Plunimer v. Commonwealth, 1 •'"'S ■Commonwealth v. Bearce, 150 Bush, 26; Lambert v. Rahway, 58 Mass. 389; 23 N. E. 99. IST. J. L. 578; 34 Atl. 5; Common- so Lillenfeld v. Commonwealth, wealth V. Wall, 145 Mass. 216; 92 Va. 118; 23 S. E. 882. 13 N. E. 486; Crothers v. Mon- co Martin v. State, 23 Neb. 371; teith, 11 Manitoba, 373; Balling 36 N. W. 554; Carr v. Augusta, V. Board (N. J. L.), 74 Atl. 277. 124 Ga. IIG; 52 S. E. 300; Appeal 57 Young V. Blaisdell, 138 Mass. of Londry, 79 Conn. 1 ; 63 Atl. 293. 344; Oshkosh v. State, 59 Wis. ci Sprayborry v. Atlanta, 87 Ga. 425; 18 N. W. 324; Gaertner v. 120; 13 S. E. 197. Fond du Lac, 34 Wis. 497. ^- Commonwealth v. Hamer, 128 Mass. 76. 741 REVOCATION OF LICENSE. § 450 is sufficient if served in either of the specified ways.®^ The notice should specify definitely Avhen and where the pro- ceedings for a revocation will be heard; but an irregularity or indefiniteness that does not mislead the respondent is not sufficient to avoid the proceedings or call for a reversal on appeal.''* The notice should be served on the holder of the license at the time the proceedings are commenced ; and if the licensee has assigned the license (as may sometimes be done), notice to him is not necessary."'^ If a statute or ordinance under which the license is issued provides that it may be re- voked for a violation of its terms without notice, a revocation without notice is valid.*"* But the general rule is that a stat- ute authorizing a revocation of a license without notice and a hearing is unconstitutional."^ If on the return day the notice be not served on all interested, a new order for a notice may be entered in New York on the original papers, and a second notice be issued and served on those not served."* Notice in this State need not be served on one who holds the liquor tax certificate as collateral for a loan."^ 63 In re Cullinan, 68 N. Y. App. «» In re Lyman, 20 N. Y. Misc. Div. 119; 74 N. Y. Supp. 182. Rep. 300; 56 N. Y. Supp. 1020: 6* In re Judkins, 126 N. Y. App. In re Clement, 55 N. Y. Misc. Rep. Div. 524; 110 N. Y. Supp. 587. 615; 105 N. Y. Supp. 1085. «5 In re Lyman, 53 N. Y. App. Under the New York statute Div. 330; 65 N. Y. Supp. 673. authorizing the Board of Excise 6G Anderson V. Galesburg, 118 III. to "summon before it" a person App. 525. charged with violating the excise 67 People V. Flynn, 110 N. Y. law and revoke his license if App. Div. 279; 96 N. Y. Supp. guilty, a summons signed "The 655; reversing 48 N. Y. Misc. Rep. Board of Excise of the City of 159; 96 N. Y. Supp. 653. Utica. by Benjamin Brady, Corn- Lender the Nevada Act, May 16. missioner of Excise and Chairman 1903, incorporating the town of of said Board," is sufficient. Peo- Eeno, a license may be revoked pie v. Board, 17 N. Y. Misc. Rep. without notice for a sufficient 98; 40 N. Y. Supp. 741. cause. Wallace v. Reno, 27 Nev. In New Jersey a conviction nf 71; 73 Pac. 528. tlie o/Tcupe for which a revocation 68 In re Lyman, 28 N. Y. Misc. is sought does not dispense with Rep. 385; 59 N. Y. Supp. 971. the right to a notice. Tindall v. Monmouth (N. J. L.), 68 Atl. 799. § 451 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 742 Sec. 451. The answer. An answer positively denying the charges in the petition requires a hearing and trial on the merits ; ''° but a failure to controvert a fact if true requires a revocation without a hearing or reference."^ An answer that the respondent had been tried and acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the same facts alleged in the petition for a revocation does not state a defense.'^- Nor is an answer sufficient which avers that the license sought to be revoked has exj^ired since the pro- ceedings began by its own limitations.^^ Where the charge is that the licensee kept his saloon open on certain prohibited hours, and in his answer he admits it was open during those hours, the burden is on him to .show a valid excuse for hav- ing it open at that time;'^* and the snme is true because of sales on Sunday when the answer alleges the sales were made to guests on Sunday by the licensee, as the occupant of a hotel, at their meals.'^^ An answer in such a case admitting the issuance of the license but not averring it was issued to respondent as a hotel keeper, or that he was a hotel keeper, will not entitle him to show he conducted a hotel and that the sales were within the exception of the statute permitting him to furnish liquors to his guests at their meals."" If the answer denies only a part of the charges, the evidence will not be limited to the denials, for the defend- ant may succeed on the charges denied and yet forfeit his To/„, re McGinley. 32 Pa. Super. ^i state v. Curtis, 130 Wis. 357; Ct. 324. 110 N. W. 189. "1 In re Bridge, 50 N. Y. Supp. "«• In re Cullinan, 45 N. Y. Misc. 1105; 36 N. Y. Ajip. Div. 533; 55 Rep. 497; 92 N. Y. Supp. 802. But N. Y. Supp. 54; ai'iiriT.ing 25 N. Y. it sliould be noted that this is Misc. Rep. 213. because tlie right to furnish 72 /n re Schuyler, 32 N. Y. Misc. liquors by a hotel keeper to his Rep. 221; 66 N. Y. Supp. 251. guests is given by an exceotion in '^ In re Schuyler, supra; In re the statiitc. Clement, 62 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 512; '« /n re Schuyler, 63 N. Y. App. 116 N. Y. Supp. 1070; In re Clem- Div. 200; 71 N. Y. Supp. 437. ent, 59 N. Y. Misc. Supp. 367; 112 N. Y. Supp. 337. 743 REVOCATION OF LICENSE, §452 license on those charges undenied." But the Legislature can- not provide that if the defendant fails to deny under oath a material allegation in the petition his license shall be revoked ; for it cannot raise a presumption of guilt from an omission of the accused to testify, by a provision that proof shall not be necessary if the defendant does not deny the charges under oath." Sec. 452. Trial. If a license has been once granted, it cannot be revoked, even by the court granting it, without a hearing or trial.^' The trial may be, and usually is, without a jury ; and a stat- ute providing for a trial without a jury is constitutional.^" " In re Cullinan, 39 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 354; 79 N. Y. Supp. 840; In re Cullinan, 39 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 046; 80 N. Y. Supp. 62(5. 16 In re Peck, 107 N. Y. 391; CO N. E. 775; 53 L. R. A. 888; re- versing 57 N. Y. App. Div. 635 68 N. Y. Supp. 1145; In re Cul linan, 40 N. Y. Misc. 583; 83 N. Y. Supp. 9; In re Cullinan, 41 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 392; 84 N. Y. Supp. 1075; affirmed 89 N. Y. App. Div. 613; 85 N. Y. Supp. 1129. "9Vanaman v. Adams, 74 N. J. L. 125; 65 Atl. 204; Lantz v. Hightstown, 46 N. J. L. 102; Decker v. Board, 57 N. J. L. 603; 31 Atl. 235; Dziok v. Board, 28 R. I. 526; 68 Atl. 479; Ferron v. Board, 28 R. I. 529; 68 Atl. 480. 80 state V. Schmidtz, 65 Iowa, 556; 22 N. W. 673; LaCroix v. Fairfield Co., 49 Conn. 591; Peo- ple V. Brooklyn Police, 59 Conn. 92; LaCroix v. Fairfield Co., 50 Conn. 321; 47 Am. Rep. 648; riiorry v. Commonwoa''tli. 78 Va. 375; Low v. Pilotage Commission- ers, 1 R. M. Charlt. 302; In re Livingston, 24 N. Y. Div. 51; 48 X. Y. Supp. 989; Lyman v. Erie Co., 46 N. Y. App. Div. 387; 61 N. Y. Supp. 884; affirmed 161 N. Y. 641; 57 N. E. 1115. [Citing Board v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; People v. Wright, 3 Hun 306; People v. Meakim, 56 Hun 631; 10 N. Y. S. 163; People v. Board of Commissioners of Police and Excise, 59 N. Y. 92; People V. Murray, 149 N. Y. 367; 44 N. E. 146; 32 L. R. A. 344; Colon v. Lisk, 153 N. Y. 188; 47 N. E. 302; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; 24 L. Ed. 989; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814; 25 L. Ed. 1079; In re Bradley, 22 Misc. Rep. 301; 49 N. Y. S. 1100; In re Livington, 24 App. Div. 51 ; 48 N. Y. 989; In re Lyman, 25 Misc. Rep. 638; 56 N. Y. S. 359; Id. 26 Misc. Rep. 300; 56 N. Y. S. 1020; In re Bridge, 36 Apn. Div. 533; 25 Misc. Rep. 213; 55 N. Y. S. 54; In re Place, 27 App. Div. 561; 50 X. ^'. S'. '''0: Tn rr. Lymiin. 20 App. Div. 391; 49 N. Y. S. 559; 52 N. Y. S. 1145; Id. 28 Misc. § 452 TRAPFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 744 But where the forfeiture takes place upon a conviction of the licensee of having violated the law — the judgment of forfeiture is a part of the judgment of conviction — the de- fendant is entitled to a jury upon the question of his guilt.*^ Under the New York statute, where the charge is that the licensee has violated the liquor law% the proof must show that he has been regularly convicted of the offense before the proceedings for a revocation were begun.''- Of course, showing a prior conviction of the offense charged in the peti- tion is no bar to the proceedings for a revocation.^^ "When witnesses are called, they must be sworn;** and usually wit- nesses must be called to prove the facts alleged in the peti- tion ; *^ unless the petition alleges as the basis of the pro- ceeding a prior conviction, then a proper certificate of such conviction is all the e\adence necessary, unless evidence of identification be necessary.^'' If the conviction was in the same court it may be proved by the judgment docket or reg- ister of conviction. ^'^ If the proceedings for a revocation is based upon the fact that the licensee had failed to answer a material question in his application, he cannot defeat the proceedings by asking leave to amend his application in that particular.*^ If the petition be sufficient, the petitioner is entitled to a hearing and to introduce proof; and it is error Rep. 385; 59 X. Y. S. 971; Id. s-t License Comrs. v. O'Comier, 17 28 Misc. Rep. 278; 59 X. Y. S. 828; R. I. 40; 19 Atl. 1080. In re Kinze, 28 Misc. Rep. 622; 59 ss Deignan v. License Comrs., 10 N. Y. 682.] R. L 727; 19 Atl. 332. siRegina v. Cockshott [1898], se Martin v. State, 23 Xeb. 371 ; 1 Q. B. 582; 62 J. P. 325; 67 L. 36 X. W. 554. Usually this cei- J. Q. B. 407; 78 L. T, 168; 14 T. L. tificate is conclusive. People v. R. 264. Lyman, 53 X. Y. App. Div. 470; 82 7,1 re Lj'man, 44 X. Y. App. 65 X. Y. Supp. 1062. Div. 507; 60 X. Y. Supp. 805, 87 Commissioner of Police v. affirming 27 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 327; Donovan [1903], 1 K. B. 895; 67 65 X. Y. Supp. 888; Lyman v. J. P. 147; 72 L. J. K. B. 545; 52 Malcom Brewing Co., 160 X. Y. W. R. 14; 88 L. T. 555; 19 T. L. 96; 54 X. E. 577; 55 X. E. 408, R. 392. affirming 40 X. Y. App. Div. 46; 88 7,^ re Deuel, 55 X. Y. Misc. 57 X. Y. Supp. 634. Rep. 618; 106 X. Y. Supp. 1030. 83 Cherry v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 375. 745 REVOCATION OF LICENSE. § 452 to deny him that right. '^^ Under the former New York stat- ute the case could be referred to a referee to take and report the evidence and his conclusions thereon ; ^^ but not under the present statute.^"* The trial must be upon the facts alleged ; and there can be no revocation upon facts not alleged,^^ even though the respondent avers he is entitled to hold his li- cense.^- But where the application was for the revocation of five liquor tax certificates for five different places, and the evidence showed a violation at only four of the places, it was held that there must be a judgment of forfeiture for the fifth place."^ "Where an order was issued for the licensee to show cause why his license should not be revoked, and he appeared before the city council by attorney as ordered and confessed that such council had authority to revoke the license, and a warrant for the rebate of the unexpired part of the license fee was ordered drawn, it was held that it sufficiently appeared that he consented to the revocation."* If the licensee agreed in writing when the license was granted that he would not sell liquors on Sunday, he cannot complain of a judgment revoking his license because of his violation of the agree- 89 7n re Clement, IIG N. Y. App. 96 N. Y. Supp. 751; order [1904], Div. 148; 101 N. Y. Supp. 683; 89 N. Y. S. 683; 97 App. Div. 122, In re Campbell, 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 630, affirmed; In re Cullinan, 73 524; In re Arnold, 30 Pa. Super N. E. 1122, 181 N. Y. 527-530; Ap- Ct. 93. peal of Kray, Id. ; Appeal of Jacobs, 90 /n re Bridge, 56 N. Y. Supp. 73 N. E. 1122; 181 N. Y. 529; 1105; 36 N. Y. App. Div. 533; 55 Appeal of Johnson, 73 N. E. 1122; N. Y. Supp. 54, affirming 25 N. 181 N. Y. 528; Appeal of Kojan, Y. Misc. Rep. 213; Plass v. Clark, Id.; Appeal of Koster, 73 N. E. 71 N. Y. App. Div. 488; 76 1122; 181 N. Y. 529; Appeal of N. Y. iSupp. 2; In re Halbraii, 30 Arkenau, 73 N. E. 1122; 181 K N. Y. Misc. Rep. 515; 63 N. Y. Y. 527; Appeal of Straus, 73 N. Supp. 1024; Cullinan v. Babating, E. 1122; 181 N. Y. 530. '^ 49 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 442; 99 KY. ^i pjass v. Clark, 71 N. Y. App, Supp. 977. Div. 488; 76 N. Y. Supp. 2. 90* /ii re Clement, 187 N". Y. 92 piass v. Clark, supra. 274; 79 N. E. 1003; (see In os in re Lyman, 59 N. Y. App. re Lawson, 109 N. Y. App. Div. Div. 217; 69 N. Y. Supp. 309; 67 195; 98 N. Y. Supp. 33) ; In re N. Y. Supp. 48. Cullinan, 109 N. Y. App. Div. 816; 94 Hoi pa v. Aberdeen, 34 Wash. 554; 76 Pac. 79. §§453,454 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 746 ment.^^ The board, council or court may grant continuances of the trial, as in other matters.^*' Sec. 453. Dismissal of proceedings — Expiration of license. A proceeding to revoke a license cannot be dismissed merely because the license to be revoked has expired by its own lim- itation, unless the petitioner consent thereto; for the peti- tioner has a right to have the question involved determined upon its merits, in order to recover his eosts.^^ But the petitioner may apply for a discontinuance of the proceed- ings.''^ Under the New York statute proceedings may be maintained after an abatement of prior proceedings hy rea- son of the petitioner's death.®" Sec. 454. Estoppel to revoke. As a rule a licensing officer or board cannot estop itself so as to prevent a revocation of a license for a proper cause, even where an innocent person may suffer by the revocation. Thus, where a statute forbade a transfer of a license after the holder had violated any provision of the liquor law, an approval of a transfer by a deputy excise commissioner without any know'ledge of a violation of the law by the holder, was held not to estop or preclude the excise commissioner from pro- ceeding against the assignee for the revocation of the license, 95 Belt V. Paul, (Ark.), 91 S. 408; 59 N. Y. Supp. 968; 48 N. W. 301. Y. App. Div. 275; 62 N. Y. Supp. 96 State V. JCommon Council, 41 846; In re Schuyler, 32 Misc. Rep. Minn. 211; 42 N. W. 1058; In re 221; 66 N. Y. Supp. 251; In re Lyman, 53 N. Y. App. Div. 330; Faber, 115 N. Y. App. Div. 451; 65 N. Y. Supp. 673. 101 N. Y. Supp. 429; In re Clem- It is no defense that the license ent, 59 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 367; was surrendered before the pro- 112 N. Y. Supp. 337; In re Clem- ceedings were begun. In re Clem- ent, 62 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 512; 116 ent, 62 N Y. Misc. Rep. 512; 116 N. Y. Sup. 1076. N. Y. Supp. 1070; In re Clement, ^» In re Cullinan. 39 N. Y. Misc. 59 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 307; 112 N. Rep. 558; 79 X. Y. Supp. 582. Y. STipp. 337. 99 In re Halbran, 30 N. Y. Misc. 97 In re Lyman, 28 Misc. Rep. Rep. 517; 63 N. Y. Supp. 1026. 747 REVOCATION OP LICENSE, § 455 although he knew of the violation of tlu; law at the time of the transfer.^ Sec. 455. Appeal — Certiorari. Unless some statute provides for an appeal from an order or judgment of the licensing board or court revoking a license, none can be taken.- But where no appeal can be taken, a writ of certiorari lies to review the legality of the proceed- ings ; * yet not to review the sufficiency of the evidence,* unless it be to determine whether or not the board or court were authorized to draw the inference it did and not that they rightly found the facts.'^ Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal ; but may be used to determine whether the court or board revoking the license acted without juris- diction or in excess of its jurisdiction." In Pennsylvania where the affidavit filed with the petition specifically alleges the ground for the revocation and the order of revocation specifies no other ground, the Appellate Court will examine the petition in order to determine whether the alleged act was a violation of the law.'^ In determining the qualifica- tions of the applicant and the suitableness of his place for the liquor traffic, a court acts judicially; and an objection cannot be made that the order granting or refusing the li- cense cannot be appealed from because it is not a judicial 1 In re Cullinan, 87 N. Y. App. ^ Gaertner v. Fond du Lac, 34 Div. 47; 83 N. Y. Supp. 102.5. Wis. 497; State v. Lichta, 130 Simpson v. Commonwealth (Ky), Mo. App. 204; 109 S. W. S25. 104 S. W. 269; 31 Ky. L. Rep. •* /u re Carlson, 127 Pa. St. 330; 821; 104 S. W. 270; 31 Ky. L. 18 Atl. 8; 24 W. N. C. 184; Ap- Eep. 851. peal of Meenan, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 2 Appeal of Wakenian, 70 Conn. 579; People v. Board, 24 Him 195; 313; 50 Atl. 733; Regina v. Croth- In re McGinley, 32 Pa. Super. Ct. ers, 11 :\lanitoba 567; State v. 324. Superior Court (Wash.), 87 Pac. s Rodden v. License Commis- 818; Barnett v. Pemiscot Co. Ct., sioners (R. I.), 21 Atl. 1020. Ill Mo. Ann. GO: 86 S. W. .575; estate v. Lichta, 130 Mo. App. State V. Kivk. 112 Mo. App. 447; 294; 109 S. W. 825; People v. 86 S. W. 1099; Dolan's Appeal, Board, 24 Hun 195. 108 Pa. St. 564. '^ Appeal of Meenan, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 579. § 455 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 748 aet.^ But it has also been held that in such a ease the court acts in an administrative and ministerial capacity, and there- fore no appeal lies from its order of revocation.'' A writ of certiorari does not lie to review the resolution of a city council revoking a license on the ground that the applicant was not qualified to receive it and was guilty of a fraud in securing it ; because the resolution will be entirely disregarded in a subsequent proceeding to determine the validity of the license.^" But where an ordinance of a city provided for a revocation of a license issued under its provision on the holder's conviction of a violation of its provisions, and that the council's clerk should submit to the council each convic- tion; it was held that the ordinance contemplated that the clerk should submit the evidence of the conviction before any action Avas taken revoking the license, and if a revoca- tion was made without the evidence being so submitted, the action of the council might be reviewed by certiorari}'^ A statute giving an appeal in instances of granting and revok- ing licenses does not give one from the decision of a licensing board approving a transfer of a license previously granted.^' So one cannot appeal from a revocation of a license after the time has expired for which it was granted ; because he has no beneficial interest in its revocation after that time.^^ On appeal matter not presented in the petition for revocation of the license cannot be considered.^* For acts of a court done after the revocation — as the criminal prosecution and conviction of the licensee for the violation of law for which his license had 8 Appeal of Burns, 7G Conn. n Carr v. Augusta, 124 Ga. 116; 395; 50 Atl. 611; Carr v. Augus- 52 S. E. 300; People v. McGlyn, ta, 124 Ga. 116; 52 S. E. 300 131 X. Y. 602; 30 N. E. 804, af- ( action of city council reviewed on firming 62 Hun 237; 16 N. Y. certiorari) ; Barry v. Little (X. Supp. 736. H.), 68 Atl. 40 (State Board of 12 Appeal of Wakeman, 70 Conn. License Commissioners). 313; 50 Atl. 733. estate v. Kirk, 112 Mo. App. is Holpa v. Alx'rdeen, 34 Wash. 447; 86 S. W. 1099; Barnett v. 554: 76 Pac. 79. Pemiscot Co. Ct., Ill Mo. App. 1^ /» re Purdy, 40 X. Y. App. 693; 86 S. W. 575. Div. 133; 57 N. Y. Supp. 629. 10 State V. SchrofT, 123 Wis. 98; 100 X. W. 1030. 749 REVOCATION OP LICENSE. § 455 been previously revoked — a review does not lie in reviewing its action in revoking the license.^'"' In order to appeal from the action of a court or board revoking a license, the order or resolution of revocation need not be delivered to the li- censee.^® If the revocation has been made on the ground that the licensee had been convicted of a violation of the liquor laws, then a review of the proceedings for the con- viction cannot be had in a review of the proceedings for a revocation ; as, for instance, the sufficiency of the indictment on which he was convicted.' '^ Where the petition for a writ of certiorari alleges that the licensing board revoked his li- cense without informing the petitioner for the writ of the nature of the accusation against him, or hearing any wit- nesses, the writ will be granted.'^ A failure to swear the wit- nesses is sufficient to quash the proceedings under a statute providing that "witnesses for and against" the licensee "may be heard. "'^ A resolution of a city council that "in view of the evidence presented, the license of the respondent be, and the same is hereby revoked," is not subject to be set aside on a writ of certiorari because there are no express findings that the allegations of the petition are true.^° A statute pro- viding for an appeal from an order of court revoking a city license entitles the city to a notice of the appeal, and in the absence of such a notice, an order restoring the license revoked is irregular.-' But until set aside, an order of re- vocation is valid, if notice of the proceedings has been given. -^ 15 Commonwealth v. Wall, 145 of an unsworn witness is a waiver Mass. 216; 13 N. E. 486. of the right to have him sworn. 16 People V. Forbes, 52 Hun 30; Stroup v. State, 70 Iml. 495; 4 N. Y. Supp. 757; 22 N. Y. St. Strange v. Prince, 17 Ind. 524. Rep. 278; State v. Schmidtz, 65 20 State v. Beloit, 74 Wis. 267; Iowa 556; 22 N. W. 673. 42 N. W. 110. 1" Conner v. Commonwealth 21 Commonwealth v. Campbell (Ky.), 16 S. W. 454; 13 Ky. (Ky.), 107 S. W. 797; 32 Ky. L. L. Rep. 403. Rep. 1131. See also Common- is Deignan v. Providence License wealth v. Wall, 145 Mass. 216; 13 Comrs., 16 R. I. 727; 19 Atl. 332. N. E. 486, and Carr v. Augusta, 19 License Comrs. v. O'Conner, 124 Ga. 116; 52 N. E. 300. 17 R. L 40; 10 Atl. 1080. But a 22 Barry v. Little (N. H.), 68 failure to object to the testimony Atl. 40. In this case the State §456 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 750 Statutes sometimes give to any person — as a taxpayer or citizen of the community — feeling aggrieved by the decision of the licensing board or court, the right to appeal.-"' If the record or appeal show that the court acted wholly upon the evidence given in a criminal prosecution wherein the licensee was acquitted, the judgment of revocation will be reversed.^* On a certiorari to review the action of a city council, the court should reciuire the council to file an answer.-^ Sec. 456. Effect of revocation — Stay of proceedings. The act of revocation avoids the license, and renders all sales thereunder thereafter illegal, even though a writ of certiorate has been sued out.-" The order of revocation is not a bar to a criminal proceeding because of sales made by the licensee on Sundiiy.-'' A judgment or order of revocation is valid until reversed or set askle; -^ and binds the servants and agents of the licensee.-^ AVhere a prohibition order was set aside, and then an order entered setting aside the order of revocation of such prohibition order, wherebv a licensee's license was revoked, and thereafter the prohibition order was revoked, it was held that a second license could not be issued without the payment of a new license fee.^" A stat- Board of License Commissioners Lyman, 32 N". Y. Misc. Rep. 210; heard ex parte evidence prior to 07 N. Y. Supp. 502; hi re Auer- the regular hearing, and it did not beck, 31 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 46; 64 appear that at the subsequent N. Y. Supp. 003; Clement v. Vis- hearing the licensee was ignorant cosi, 63 N. Y. App. Div. 514; 118 of the board's act, or that an ob- N. Y. Supp. 613. In some juris- jection was made to the act of dictions the appeal keeps the the board. license in force. Simonton v. Col- 23 Appeal of Cole, 79 Conn. 679 ; bourne, 3 Terr. L. R. 372. See 66 Atl. 508. Cullinan v. Devito (N. Y.), 99 24 /n re McGinlcy, 32 Pa. Super. N. Y. Supp. 976. Ct. 324. 27 State v. O'Connor, 58 Minn. 25 0arr v. Augusta, 124 Ga. 1.16; 193; 59 N. W. 999. 52 N. E. 300. 28 State v. Corron, 73 N. H. 434; 26Neumanv. State, 76 Wis. 112; 62 Atl. 1044; State v. Barnett, 45 N. W. 30; Melton v. Moultrie, 111 Mo. App. 552; 86 S. W. 460. 114 Ga. 462; 40 S. E. 302 {In re 29 state v. Barnett, supra. Washburn, 32 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 3o Alexander v. State, 77 Ark. 303; 66 N. Y. Supp. 732; In re 294; 91 S. W. 181. 751 REVOCATION OF LICENSE. § 457 nte requiring the licensed premises to be closed by a police officer when the license is revoked will not justify the officer in forcibly ousting the licensee from the premises and thereby depriving him of the use of his property.^^ A statute empowering a board to enter and take possession of a license and cancel it, where necessary, requires no formal revocation, and it is sufficient to write the licensee his license is revoked and they will call on him for it. On the dav such a notice is given the license may be taken away.^- An appeal from a judgment or order cancelling a license does not re- instate such judgment or order, and no stay of proceedings will be granted."^ Sec. 457. Costs. If the license be cancelled upon the charges set forth in the petition, the petitioner recovers his costs; and although the license expires by efflux of time before the proceedings are carried to a final determination, the petitioner is entitled to have the charges set forth in his petition tried in order to recover h^!s costs.-"** But a judgment cannot be rendered against an officer personally whose duty it is to institute and prosecute the proceedings for cancellation.^^ Where an appli- cant acted in good faith and was awarded a license when he was not entitled to it, on application of the commissioner 31 Baldwin v. Smith, 82 111. 1G2; a violation of law, a judgment for See also Born v. Hopper, 110 N. the defendant is a bar to an action Y. App. Div. 218; 96 N. Y. Supp. for a penalty based on the same 671; 48 N. Y. Mies. Rep. 177; violation, the issue being the same 96 N. Y. Supp. 671. in both actions. Clement v. Moore 32 People V. Woodman, 4 N. Y. (N. Y. App. Div.), 119 N. Y. Supp. Supp. 532; 22 N. Y. St. Rep. 883. 435. 34 In re Lyman, 28 N. Y. Misc. 33 /» re Auberbach, 31 N. Y. Rep. 408; 59 N. Y. Supp. 968; Misc. Rep. 46 ; 64 N. Y. Supp. In re Clement, 59 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 603; In re Lyman, 32 N. Y. Misc. 367; 112 N. Y. Sunp. 337; In re Rep. 210; 67 N. Y. Supp. 502; Clement, 62 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 512; Goldman v. Goodrum, 77 Ark. 116 N. Y. Supp. 1070. 580; 92 S. W. 865. In an action 35 /n re Seymour, 47 N. Y. App. to revoke his license because of Div. 320; 62 N. Y. Supp. 25. § § 458, 459 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 752 of excise to cancel it, judgment for costs in his favor was refused.^® Sec. 458. Rebate of fees. As a holder of a license has only a permit and not a prop- erty or vested right therein,^'' a statute providing for a revoca- tion of a license need not provide for a return of the unearned part of the fee f^ and the authorities cannot be enjoined from ordering a revocation on that ground.^® The public authori- ties may retain so much of the license fee as covers that por- tion of the period for which the license is revoked.*" "Where a license was granted and the license fee paid, an appeal taken and the license suspended, but an appeal was finally deter- mined in favor of the grant of the license, it was held that the licensee was entitled to a repayment of .such proportion of the fee as the time when the license was suspended bore to the period for which the license should have run.*^ Sec. 459. Liability of city for mistakenly revoking license. A municipality cannot be held liable for the mistaken action of its council in attempting to revoke or in revoking a license.*^ sa /n re Clement, 57 N. Y. Misc. 295; 95 Pac. 81; Alexander v. Kep. 47; 107 N. Y. Supp. 205. State, 77 Ark. 294; 91 S. W. 181; In Massachusetts, under Pub. In re Lyman, 28 X. Y. Misc. Rep. St. c. 100, sec. 7, the court cannot 278; 59 N. Y. Supp. 828; In re render a judgment against the li- CuUinan, 87 N. Y. App. Div. 47; censee for costs on revocation of 83 N. Y. Supp. 1025; H. Koehler his license. Young v. Blaisdell, & Co. v. Clement, 111 X. Y. Supp. 138 Mass. 344. 151; In re Falx-r, 115 X. Y. App. 37 People V. Wright, 3 Hun 306; Div. 451; 101 X. Y. Supp. 429; 5 T. & C. 518; People v. McBride, People v. Lyman, 168 X. Y. 669; 234 111. 146; 84 X. E. 865. 61 X. E. 1133, affirming 53 N. Y. 38 Melton v. Moultrie, 114 Ga, App. Div. 470; 65 X. Y. Supp. 462; 40 S. E. 302; Ex parte Vac- 1062. carezza, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 105; ^i Auburn v. Mayer, 58 Xeb. 105 S. W. 1119. 101; 7« X. W. 462. 39 Melton V. Moultrie, supra 42 Claussen v. Luverne, 103 Minn. 40Kreuger v. Colville, 49 Wash. 491; 115 X. W. 643. 753 REVOCATION OF LICENSE. § 460 Sec. 460. Action on bond when license forfeited. Statutes sometimes provide for an action on the licensee's bond when his license is forfeited. Where the court could certify that in its opinion, on conviction, the bond ought not to be forfeited and no action could then be maintained, bvit upon a forfeiture the clerk of the court should mail a copy of the .iudsrment to the county treasurer who should bring suit thereon, and on the conviction of a licensee no forfeiture was decreed, the court postponing its determination of that question for its final determination, yet the clerk by mistake issued a copy of the judgment of forfeiture, and suit was brought upon the bond, and subseouent to this the court issued, upon the licensee complying with the provisions of the statute with reference to the arrangement of his premises, a certificate that the bond should not be forfeited, it was held that the action of the court was a good defense to the action on the bond.** « Jacobs V. Reilly, 80 Conn. 275; 68 Ail. 251. CHAPTER XIL BOND OF LICENSEE. SECTION. 461. Power to require a bond. No statute requiring a bond. Statute unconstitutional — Local option. Giving bond a condition precedent to granting a license. Retroactive efTect. Form. Who may be sureties there- on. Approving and filing — Man- damus. Void license. Cancellation of bond. Breach of conditions of bond. Breach of conditions — Of- fenses as to minors. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. SECTION. 473. Liability of sureties. Transfer of license. Persons entitled to sue on bond. A civil action — Agent. Judgment of forfeiture on conviction, a prerequisite to suit. Effect of judgment against principal upon surety — Evidence. Attacking validity of license and proceedings therefor. Pleading. Evidence. Amount of damages recov- erable on bond. Compromise of liability. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. Sec. 461. Power to require a bond. As a condition precedent to engaging in the liquor traffic, and as one of the conditions on which a license can be claimed, the Legislature has full power to require that a bond be given by the licensee with sureties obligating himself to pay penal- ties and liabilities incurred by his violation of the liquor laws. Such statutes are constitutional.^ 1 Cullinan v. Burkhard, 93 N. Y. App. Div. 31; 86 N. Y. Supp. 1003, reversing 41 N. Y. Misc. Rep. .321; 84 N. Y. Supp. 825. There is nothing unreasonable in an ordinance requiring a licensee to sell "near beer" to give a bond conditioned to keep an orderly house, to comply with the regula- tions governing it, not to violate the State law, and to pay all fines assessed against him for violation of its provisions. Campbell v. Thomasville (Ga.), 64 S. E. 815. 754 755 BOND OF LICENSEE. § § 462, 463 Sec. 462. No statute requiring a bond. In order to render a bond valid some statute must require it. If no statute require it, then the licensing board cannot, and if one pursuant to a demand of an officer be executed and filed, it will be void. Even as a voluntary bond it is not valid." A subsequent law making the law under which the bond was supposed to be required applicable to the principal in the bond will not render it valid.' Until filed and approved there is no liability on a bond.* A bond imposing res'^raints upon a licensee in addition to those required by statute has been held void,'"* but the better rule is that it is not.'' A second bond given under the belief that the first was invalid, on request of the licensing officer, when it was not, is invalid.'' But where the licensing board, as a condition precedent to the issuance of a license, demanded the execution of a boud running to the State, it was held to be a good common law bond.^ Sec. 463. Statute unconstitutional — Local option. If a statute under which a bond is given be unconstitutional the bond is void ; ^ but one who has never executed a bond when a license was granted, and has been arrested for sales without a license, is not in a position, on an application for his release from arrest, to be heard upon the validity of the conditions of the bond as required by the statute.^" If local option be adopted a right of action to recover a penalty ceases.^ ^ 2 Commonwealth v. Ledford 7 Howes v. Maxwell 157 Mass. (Ky.), 110 S. W. &S9; 33 Ky. L. 333; 32 N. E. 152. Eep. p 624 ® People v. Eckman, 63 Hun 209 ; 3 Gorman v. Williams, 117 Iowa 18 N. Y. Supp. 654. See also 560; 91 N. W. 819. O'Brien Co. v. Mahon, 126 Iowa 4 Allen V. Houck (Tex. Civ. 539; 102 N. W. 446. App.), 92 S. W. 993. 9 Cassel v. Scott, 17 Ind. 514; 5 Crosby v. Snow, 16 Me. 121. Dunham v. Hough, 80 Mich. 648; 6 Lyman v. Brucker, 26 N. Y. 45 N. W. 497. Misc. Rep. 594; 56 N. Y. Supp. ^o Ex parte Bell, 24 Tex. App, 767; Walker v. Holtsclaw, 57 S. 428; 6 S. W. 197. C. 459; 35 S. E. 754: Dowiat v. n Long v. A. L. Green & Co. People, 92 111. App. 433; affirmed (Te.x. Civ. App.), 95 S. W. 79. 193 111. 264; 61 N. E. 1059, § 464 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 756 Sec. 464. Giving bond a condition precedent to granting a license. In many of the States, if not all, applicants are required to give a bond before the license is issued. The conditions of these bonds vary, but usually they are conditioned to pay all fines and penalties assessed against the principal or licensee and to pay all civil damages occasioned by illegal sales of liquors. It is an invariable rule that a license is^ed — not granted — without a bond being filed with the proper officer is invalid.^" A statute requiring a licensed saloon keeper to give a bond does not require a druggist to give one, though selling liquors for medical or mechanical purposes ; ^^ nor does it apply to physicians; ^^ nor to a city or town license unless specifically designated.''^ But a statute requiring "whole- salers" to take out licenses "in such manner as is provided by existing laws" requires them to give a bond.'*^ If a bond after its approval be withdrawn, no license can be issued though the application has been granted.^^ The State has the right to require a bond to be given before a license be granted, conditioned for the observance of the liquor law ; '* and so has a municipality."* Statutes sometimes authorize a court to require a bond of a person whom it has reasonable cause to suspect has sold liquor without a license. In such a case 12 State V. Fisher, 33 Wis. 154; i* State v. Ferguson, 72 Mo. State V. Bennett, 101 Mo. App. 297. 224; 73 S. W. 737; State v. Shaw, is State v. Willard, 39 Mo. App, 32 Me. 570; State v. Schreiner, 86 251. Minn, 253; 90 N. W. 401; People le Commonwealth v. Deibert, 12 V, Berdenstein, 65 Mich, 65; 31 N. Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 504; 2 Pa. Dist. W. 623. See People v. Utley, 129 Rep. 446; People v. Eckman, 63 Mich. 628 ; 89 N. W. 349 ; 8 De- Hun 209 ; 18 N. Y. Supp. 654. troit L. N, 1077. i7 State v. Schreiner, 86 Minn. 13 Moore v. People, 109 111. 499; 253; 90 N. W. 401. State V. Courtney, 73 Iowa 619; is Cullinan v. Burkhard, 93 N. 35 N. W. 685; State v. Ferguson, Y. App. Div. 31; 86 N. Y. Supp. 72 Mo, 297, 1003; reversing 41 N, Y, Misc, But a statute may require a Rep. 321; 84 N. Y. Supp. 825. druggist to give a bond. People i8*//i re Greystock, 12 U. C. V. Utley, 129 Mich. 628; 89 N. 458. W. 349; 8 Det. Leg. N. 1077. 757 BOND OF LICENSEE. §§465,466 an mdictment found, of a sale without a license, is a suffi- cient cause for the requiring of the bond/'' While the general rule is that a license issued before the license fee is paid is void, yet a bond given in such an instance cannot be avoided if it was subsequently paid.-" It is no excuse for a failure to give a bond that the licensing officer would not issue a license until he received certain blanks from* the State excise commis- sioners.-^ Sec. 465. Retroactive effect. A bond does not have a retroactive effect so as to render the sureties liable for past acts of the principal. Thus, where the sureties at first only signed the bond, and the principal did not sign it until after it had been filed and approved and the acts complained of committed, it was held that the bond was invalid and an action could not be maintained thereon by reason of the commission of such acts." But it has been held that where, pursuant to a statute, a bond must be executed every year, the execution relates back to the date it bears and covers the period of time between that date and the date of filing it.-^ Sec. 466. Form. A bond should comply with the requirements of the statute, and if it adds restraints in addition to those required by the statute, it is void in that respect.-* One condition that the li- censee shall "duly observe all laws relating to intoxicating liquors" is valid and not void for uncertainty.-^ Where a stat- ute required the bond to be given to the county treasurer and 19 Anderson v. Commonwealth, Houck & Dieter Co. (Tex. Civ. 105 Va. 533; 54 S. E. 305. App.), 92 S. W. 993. 20 State V. Harper, (Tex. Civ. 23 Brockway v. Petted, 79 Mich. App.) 87 S. W. 878. G20; 45 N. W. Gl. 21 Clement v. Smith, 60 N. Y. 24 Crosby v. Snow, 10 ISIe. 121. Misc. Rep. 595; 112 N. Y. Supp. 25 Quinterd v. Corcoran, 50 Conn. 955. 34; Plucknett v. Tippey, 45 Neb. 22 State V. Teague (Tex. Civ. 343; 63 N. W. 845; Providence v. App.), Ill S. W. 234; Allen v. Bligh, 10 E. I. 208. § 466 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 75S his successors in office, one made payable to the county treas- urer without giving his name and without the words "and his successors in office" was held valid, because it was considered payable to whomsoever was treasurer when the suit was brought thereon.^^ The bond should usually be made payable to the State and not to the county, nor to a municipality when it is a State bond.^^ But the statute may require it to be made pay- able to the county, even though a city therein grant the license.-* A bond payable to the "city treasurer" of a city is valid without inserting the name of the person holding the office of treasurer when it was executed.-" Failure to insert the name of the county in which the liquor traffic is to be carried on Mnll not invalidate the bond.^*' Where a statute required the bond to be conditioned to "pay all fines and forfeitures," one conditioned to "pay all damages, fines, costs and penalties" is a sufficient one.'^ Where it required a dealer to give a general bond in a named amount and a second bond in a named amount not to sell adulterated liquors, a single bond in an amount equal to both such amounts was held valid.^- And where the amount of the penalty was left blank, and the sureties justified in the lowest penalty allowed by statute, the bond was held valid for that amount.^^ If signed by one of the sureties only and yet be approved by the proper officer, it will be valid, and sales thereunder will be lawful.^* A resolution of a city council fixing the amount of liquor bonds remains in force until repealed, and all bonds 26 Redpath v. Nottingham, 5 si Crowley v. Commonwealth, Blackf. 267. 123 Pa. 275; 16 Atl. 416; 23 W. 27 St. James v. Hingtgen, 47 N. C. 148. Minn. 521; SON. W. 700; Thomas 32 Green Covmty v. Wilhite, 29 V. Hinkley, 19 Neb. 324; 27 N. W. Mo. App. 459. 231 (bond valid); Minneapolis v. 33 Garrison v. Steele, 46 Mich. Olson, 76 Minn. 1; 78 N. W. 877. 98; 8 N. W. 696. Held valid in 28 Sexson v. Kelley, 3 Neb. 104. the lowest statutory amount. 20 Tripp V. Norton, 10 R. I. Conira, Louisville v. Cain 125; Redpath v. Nottingham, 5 (Ky.), 119 S. \V. 763. Blackf. 267. ^* North v. Barringer, 147 Ind. 30 State V. Sitterle (Tex. Civ. 224; 46 N. E. 531. But see State App.), 26 S. W. 764. v. Teague (Tex. Civ. App.), Ill S. W. 234. 759 BOND OP LICENSEE. §466 until then should comply therewith.''' AVhere a statute con- cerning State dispensaries required the dispenser to give a bond conditioned to obey the laws of the State in relation to the sale of liquors and not to sell at a price other than that fixed by the board of control, and a liquor dispenser gave a bond conditioned to obey the laws in relation to the sale of liquors and not to sell liquors at a charge exceeding fifty per cent, above their cost to him, it was held that it was valid as to the first provision but not as to the latter.^^ Mere clerical errors will not avoid a bond, even though the error be the in- sertion of an unauthorized condition.''^ A bond conditioned to comply with a certain designated act of the Legislature — the liquor statute of the State— is valid though superseded by a later act.'^ The bond need not contain a description of the principal 's place of business.^^ A city cannot exact a greater number of sureties than the statute requires."*" If a bond must accompany the application for a license, the fact that the space for the names of the proposed sureties is not filled in will not defeat the application, for it is not a substantial de- fect."^ A bond signed after a liability under the liquor law h,as been incurred does not cover such liability.*- Giving a bond in a penalty in a greater amount than the statute requires does not avoid it, and it is valid to the extent of the statutory penalty.*^ Where a bond on its face showed that two persons desired to engage in the liquor traffic, and were the principals therein, and was conditioned one of them should perform the 35 Hawkins v. Litchfield, 120 -lo Power v. Litchfield, 141 Mich. Mich. 390; 79 N. W. 570. 350; 104 N. W. 664; 12 Detroit 3G Walker v. Holtzclaw, 57 S. €. Leg. N. 484. 459; 35 S. E. 754. ^^ In re Matthew, 213 Pa. 269; 37Dowiat V. People, 92 111. App. 62 Atl. 837; In re Regan, 213 Pa. 433; affirmed 193 111. 264; 01 N. 279; 62 Atl. 841. E 1059. *- Cullinan v. Bowker, 88 N. Y. 88 O'Brien Co. v. Mahon, 13G App. Div. 170; 84 N. Y. Supp. Iowa, 539 ; 102 N. W. 446. 696, reversing 40 Misc. Rep. 439 ; S9 O'Brien Co. v. Mahon, 126 82 N. Y. Supp. 707. Iowa 539; 102 N. W. 440; Douthit 43 Meador v. Adams, 33 Tex. V. State, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 396; Civ. App. 167; 76 S. W. 238. Nor 82 S. W. 352; 83 S. W. 795; Mor- does it if made in a less amount, ris V Mills (Tex. Civ. App.), 82 Jones v. State (Tex. Civ. App.), S. W. 334. 81 S. W. 1010. § 466 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 700 things required of them by the statute, it was held insufficient, though signed by both ; and as the conditions were limited to one of them only by the repeated use of the pronouns "he" and "his" following their names, it was held that the omission of the other persons must be deemed intentional and could not be treated as a mere clerical error.** After receiving the benefits of a bond the principal is estopped to question its validity;**"' and a principal and his sureties cannot object to its validity that it was his intention before and at the time he received his license to permit another to conduct the business who was incompetent to receive a license.*^ A statute re- quiring a bond to be conditioned that the licensee would not sell intoxicating liquors in any quantity except upon the pre- scription is not rendered invalid by a failure to recite that the thing not to be sold was intoxicating liquor.*^ Where liquors could be sold only on the premises licensed, a failure to insert in the bond a clause that the liquors were to be drunk on the premises was held not to render the bond void, although bonds were only required when the liquors were sold on the premises.*^ A statute required the licensee to give a bond containing a provision that he would not use any screen which would obstruct the view "through" doors opening into the saloon from the street. The bond given provided that no screen should be used which would obstruct the view "to" such doors, and it was held not invalid as imposing a more onerous condition than the statute required.*^ A statute re- quired saloon keepers to give a bond that he or they would not permit gambling on the premises. Under it a bond was given wherein the words "or they" were used after "he," and it was held that this did not invalidate the bond.^" •Instate V. Harper, 99 Tex. 19: 47 Edgar v. State (Tex. Civ. 86 S. W. 920, reversing 85 S. W. App.), 102 S. W. 439. 294. 48Monigal v. State (Tex. Civ. « Point Pleasant v. Greenlee, r■^ App.). 45 S. W. 1038. W. Va. 207; 60 S. E. 6C1: State 49 State v. Whorton. 22 Tex. v. Golding, 28 Ind. App. 233; 02 Civ. App. 202; 63 S. W. 915. N. E. 502. no State v. Whorton, 26 Tex. Civ. restate v. English, 74 N. H. App. 262; 63 S. W. 915. 328; 68 Atl. 129; Jones v. State (Tex. Civ. App.), 81 S. W. 1010. 761 BOND OF LICENSEE. § 467 A wrong description of the place to be licensed inserted in the application will not avoid the bond.'^^ A bond conditioned that H will conform to the provisions of a liquor statute is valid though it recite that H and G desire to engage in the liquor tratBc and that they are principals.^- A bond purport- ing to bind the heirs and legal representatives of the obligors is not void.^'^ But a bond with only one surety when two are required is not a valid statutory bond.^* Where a statute required a bond to be given conditioned that the licensee "will not violate any of the provisions of this act, and that he will pay all damages, fines, penalties and forfeitures" adjudged against him, a bond conditioned that he would "comply with chapter 50 of the Compiled Statutes" of the State, entitled "Liquors, * * * and, moreover, pay promptl}^ all fines, penalties and forFeitures" adjudged against him, was held not to bind the sureties, though it did the principal.^^ If a bond be not properly conditioned, and it be accepted, on appeal from the proceedings an amended bond cannot be filed in the court to which the appeal has been taken.^** It is error for a licensing board to approve an improper or defective bond."'^ Sec. 467. Who may be sureties thereon. A bond requiring sureties to be freeholdei's of a county Joes not require them to be residents of the county.''^ Where 51 Cullinan v. Fidelity, etc. Co. R^' Uldrich v. Gilmore, 35 Neb. 41 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 119; 83 N. 288; 53 N. W. 135. Y. Supp. 969; Castellano v. Marks, A statute of Michigan required 37 Tex. Civ. App. 273; 83 S. W. a description of the place where 729. tlie I)usiness was to be carried on 52 State V. Harper, 99 Tex. 19; to be inserted. Courtwright v. 86 S. W. 920; reversing 85 S. W. Newaygo, 96 Mich. 290; 55 N. W. 294. 808. ssMcLaury v. Watelsky, 39 Tex. so 7,^ re Clyde, 82 Neb. 537; 118 Civ. App. 394; 87 S. W. 1045. N. W. 90. 54Hillman v. Mayher, 38 Tex. s- /n re Clyde, 82 Neb. 537 ; 118 Civ. App. 377; 85 S. W. 818. But N. W. 90; In. re Johnson (Neb.), if one of the sureties be disquali- 118 N. W. 91. fied, it is sufficient. Wolcott v. 58 Mathews v. People, 159 111. Burlingame 112 Mich. 311; 70 N. 399; 42 N. E. 864; reversing 53 W. 831. III. App. 305. § 468 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 762 a statute required bonds to have two freehold sureties, and a subsequent statute provided that all bonds required by law might be executed by surety companies, and still later the first statute was re-enacted, still containing the provisions con- cerning two freehold sureties, it was held that a bond executed by a surety company was valid.^^ A statute required the applicant for a license to give the names of tw^o freeholders as sureties and state that they were such bona fide owners of real estate, and that "he is not engaged in the manufacture of spirituous, vinous, or brewed liquors." It was held that this did not prohiliit a brewer becoming surety on a bond because the clause quoted applied only to the applicant. "" If a person can only be accepted on one bond, yet if he became surety on a second one, he cannot for that reason defend against an action on the second bond.*'^ Sec. 468. Approval and filing — Mandamus. Approval of the bond is essential to the validity of the license for that is its acceptance, and until accepted it is not in force.'"'- But the approval of the bond may be implied, as the issuance or receipt for the license money on presentation of a bond are a direction to the licensing clerk to issue the license ;^^ and the filing of it is presumptive evidence of its approval.*'* But a report by a committee of a council to which 59Taggart v. Hillman, 42 Tex. 6= Curtz v. State, 4 Ind. 385; Civ. App. 71; 93 S. W. 245; Tag- State v. Bennett, 101 Mo. App. gart V. Graham (Te.x. Civ. App.), 224; 73 S. W. 737. 93 S. W. 246; Hicks v. Trustees, Contra, Harper v. Calder (Tex. 151 Mich. 88; 114 N. W. 682; 14 Civ. App.), 39 S. W. 623. Detroit L. N. 812. 63 Prather v. People, 85 HI. 36; An ordinance requiring the sure- Thomas v. Hinkley, 19 Neb. 324; ty to be a guaranty or surety com- 27 N. W. 231; Meinoz v. Brassel pany is void. Campbell v. Thom- (Tex. Civ. App.), 108 S. W. 417; asville (Ga.), 64 S. E. 815. Deckard v. Drewrey, 64 Ark. 599; 60 7n re Schuylkill Co., 24 Pa. 44 S. W. 351; Coggeshall v. Pal- Co. Ct. Rep. 571. See Attorney lett, 15 E. I. 168; 1 Atl. 413. Ceneml v. Pall, 66 J. P. 553. g4 Howes v. Maxwell, 157 Mass. 61 Thomas v. Hinkley, 19 Neb. 333; 32 N. E. 152. See Graves 324; 27 N. W. 231. v. McHugh, 58 Mo. 499. 763 BOND OF LICENSEE. § 468 it has been referred for examination, in favor of its accept- ance and approval, is not an approval by the council.®^ Approval by a majority vote of a council is all that is neces- sary, and the resolution of approval need not be approved by the mayor."" For a refusal to approve a bond a member of a city council is not liable, even though he assigns no reason for his refusal."' If one of the sureties of a bond has ap- parently been erased since it was executed, an officer or court need not approve it, but may decline to do so ; "^ but he cannot arbitrarily refuse to approve a bond in proper form where the evidence shows the sureties are sufficient,"" nor because he thinks the principal will conduct his place of business illegally.^'' If a married woman take out a license, her bond cannot be rejected because of her coverture.'^^ If no statute requires it, a bond need not be recorded ; ''" but it has been held that the filing- of it is essential to its validity.^^ By refusing to approve a bond, a common council cannot exercise its power, when it has that power by adopting an ordinance, to suppress saloons.'* If a bond is insufficient a new one may be presented for approval and the license granted." If a proper bond be presented to the board or officer who is to approve it for approval and he refuses, he may be compelled 6.-- Garrison v. Steele, 46 Mich. 26 Pac. 1061; Post v. Sparta, 83 S>8; 8 N. W. 696; Contra, Drewrey Mich. 323; 29 N. W. 721. V. Drewrey, 64 Ark. 599 ; 44 S. W. ''o Courtright v. Newaygo, 96 351. Mich. 290; 55 N. W. 808. Occasionally the license fee or '^i Amperse v. Kalamazoo, 59 ta.x cannot be received until the Midi. 78; 26 N. W. 222. bond is approved. Attorney Gen- '-Harper v. Golden (Tex. Civ. eral v. Huebner, 91 Mich. 436; 51 App.), 39 S. W. 623. N. W. 1072. 73 Allen v. Houck & Dieter Co. ooO'Halloran v. Jackson, 107 (Tex. Civ. App.), 92 S. W. 993. Mich. 138; 64 N. W. 1046. Contra, Brockway v. Petted, 79 6i Amperse v. Winslow, 75 Mich. Mich. 620; 45 X. W. 61; 7 L. R. 234; 42 N. W. 823. A. 740. 68 Commonwealth v. Wilson, 127 •?* Hawkins v. Litchfield, 120 Pa. 542; 18 Atl. 601 ; 25 W. N. C. Mich. 390; 79 N. W. 570. 148. 75 /„ re Branch, 164 Pa. 427; fioMcLeod v. Scott, 21 Or. 94; 30 Atl. 296; 35 W. N. C. 310. § 468 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 764 to approve it by a writ of mandamus; "*' but if the refusal was based upon the insuffieienc}^ of the sureties, and there is evi- dence from which that conclusion may be drawn, mandamus will not issue to compel its approval.'^^ A return by the officer or board that in his judgment the sureties on the bond are in- sufficient, is sufficient under a statute providing that "if, in the judgment" of the officer or board the sureties were in- sufficient they might reject the bond/^ In a petition for a writ of mandamus the reasons given by the officer or the board for the refusal should be given or stated/*^ If the officer or board has a discretion in the matter it must be shown he ex- ercised it unreasonably or arbitrarily, or that he was actuated by illegal or improper motives.**'' Whether or not a board acted in good faith or arbitrarily in refusing to approve a bond may be reviewed by the court. ^^ A bond approved before an application for a license is filed is not void if an application was filed thereafter ; *- nor is it if no application be filed.^^ A failure of a transferee to have the transfer of the license re- corded, as the statute requires, will not avoid the bond he is required to give when the transfer is made.*'* Whether or not a bond was filed on the date of its execution is one of fact 76 Potter V. Homer, 59 ]Mi<:'li. "o Goss v. Vermontville, 44 Mich. 8; 26 N. W. 208; Amperse v. 319; G X. W. 684. Kalamazoo, 59 Mich. 78; 20 X. so McHenry v. Chippewa. 65 W. 222; Warner v. Lawrence, 62 Mich. 9; 31 N. W. 602; Com- Mich. 251; 28 N. W. 844; Court- monwealtli v. Wilson, 127 Pa. 542 right V. Newaygo, 96 Mich. 290; 18 Atl. 601; 25 W. N. C. 148 55 N. W. 808; Keefer v. Hillsdale, Post v. Sparta Tp., 64 Mich. 597 70 Mich. 413; 38 N. W. 277. 31 N. W. 535. Contra, Parker v. Portland, 54 si Farr v. Anderson, 135 Mich. Mich. 308; 20 X. W. 55. 485; 98 N. W. 6; 10 Detroit Leg. See Hicks V. Trustees, 151 Midi. X. 843; Power v. Litchfield, 141 88; 114 X. W. 682; 14 Detroit Mich. 350; 104 X. W. 664; 12 L. X. 812. Detroit Leg. X. 484; Briggs v. Mc- VTWolfson V. Rubicon Tp., 63 Kinley, 131 ilich. 154; 91 X. W. Mich. 49; 29 X. W. 486; Post v. 156; 9 Detroit Leg. N. 273. Sparta Tp., 63 :\Iicli. 323; 29 X. s^ State v. Harper (Tex. Civ. W. 721; Briggs v. McKinley, 131 App.), 87 S. W. 878. Mich. 154; 91 X. W. 156; 9 De- 83 Faulkner v. Cassidy, 39 Tex. troit T^g. X. 273. Civ. Ann. 415 1 87 S. W. 904. 78 Palmer v. Hartford, 73 Mich. 84 Faulkner v. Cassidv. 39 Tex. 96; 40 X. W. 850. Civ. App. 415; 87 S. W. 904. 765 BOND OF LICENSEE. §§469,470 and not a presumption of law.**' A failure of a city council to require the statutory affidavits of the sureties to accom- pany the bond does not avoid it, even though it may render the members of the council liable for a neglect of duty.^** A liquor dealer is entitled to prompt approval of his bond when presented;"" and until acceptance and approval there is no liabilit}^ upon it.®^ The licensing officer or board should act fairly with the licensee in refusing to approve his bond and distinctly inform him of the reasons for its refusal ; and in case of a city council its reasons should be entered on record."'' The sureties must have the requisite qualifications.^** Sec. 469. Void license. If the license be void, the bond is void. Such was held to be the case where the license was void because it did not suffi- ciently designate the place where the liquor might be sold.^^ But where a license could not be legally issued to two persons, yet one was so issued which was for that reason void, it was held that the bond given on its issuance was valid.**- An in- tention to engage in an illegal traffic in liquors will not avoid the bond.^^ Sureties cannot urge for the first time on appeal that the bond was void because of false statements made in the application for a license.^* Sec. 470. Cancellation of bond. Statutes sometimes provide for a cancellation of a bond and the substitution of another, and give sureties the right to 85 Allen V. Houck (Tex. Civ. m Green v. Southard (Tex. Civ. App.), 92 S. W. 993. App.), 61 S. W. 705, reversing 59 S6 People V. Laning, 73 Mich. S. W. 839. 284; 41 N. W. 424. 92 state v. Golding, 28 Ind. App. 87 Amperse v. Kalamazoo, 59 233 ; 62 N. E. 502. See also State Mieh. 78; 26 X. W. 222. v. Harper (Tex. Civ. App.), 87 88 Garrison v. Steele, 46 Mich. S. W. 878. 98;8N. W. 606. P3 Jones v. State (Tex. Civ. 89 Amperse v. Kalamazoo, su- App.), 81 S. W. 1010. pra. 94Cullinan v. O'Connor, 100 N. »o Camp bell v. Thomasville Y. App. Div, 142; 91 N. Y. Supp. (Ga.), 64 N. E. 815; Post v. Spar- 628. ta, 63 Mich. 323; 29 N. W. 721. § 471 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 766 apply for the cancellation and be relieved of their liability on the bond for future conduct of the principal. The mere giving of the requisite notice to the licensing board or officer may have the effect to cancel the bond at the end of the time for which the notice is to run.^"' But a notice to the principal that he must give a new bond does not release the sureties until a new bond be given.^*^ A statute providing that a surety on the bond of a public officer may apply for its can- cellation and his release from future liability thereon has no application to the bond of a licensed liquor dealer.^^ Sec. 471. Breach of conditions of bond. Usually clauses are inserted in bonds of this character pro- viding that if the liquor laws of the State be violated the principal in the bond and his sureties shall be liable thereon, and occasionally the bond is broad enough to cover the viola- tion of other laws committed in connection with the liquor traffic authorized by the license to be conducted by the licen- see. Thus where a bond was conditioned to "duly observe all laws relating to intoxicating liquors," a sale on Sunday, though not forbidden in the general liquor licensing statute, was held to be a violation of the obligation of the bond.®* And so where bond was given to observe "all the provisions of the Revised Code of 1880," it covered an amendment of the code made before the bond was executed.®" But the provisions of this character will not be extended by construction so as to apply to violations of other statutes, unless they plainly re- 05 Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Jenness, Schenek (X. Y), 55 X. Y. Supp. 138 Iowa, 725; 116 N. W. 709. 770. 96 Wright V. Treat, 83 ^lich. The bond is given as an indem- 110; 47 X. W. 243. nity to protect the State as well 97 Fidelity, etc. Co. v. Jenness, as private parties autliorized to 138 Iowa 725; 116 X. W. 709. maintain actions thereon. State osQuintard v. Corcoran, 50 v. Larson, 83 Minn. 124; 8G X\ W. Conn. 34; O'Flinn v. State, 6G 3; 54 L. H. A. 487. Miss. 7; 5 So. 390; Lyman v. City ^ O'Flinn v. State, 66 Miss. 7; Trust, etc., Co., 166 X. Y. 274; 59 5 So. 390. But not separate and N. E. 903 ; affirming 62 X^. Y. distinct statutes. Jacobs v. Hol- Supp. 1141; Lightner v. Common- genson. 70 Conn. 68; 38 Atl. wealth, 31 Pa. St. 341; Lyman v. 767 BOND OF LICENSEE. § 471 quire it.^ A bond given not to "permit any game or games to be played in his house, whether licensed or not," known as ' ' lioran 's groeerj', situated on Congress Avenue in the City of Austin, on lot No. 3," is broken by the principal letting games be played in a house in the rear of but connected with the grocery, and opening from it, as a billiard saloon.- If the principal permit another to do business under his name on the premises, and that other permits gambling there, the principal is liable on his bond.^ Sales of liquor made by the principal's agent or barkeeper to a minor, or by one behind the bar not shown to be an interloper, renders the principal liable under a condition not to sell to minors.* A condition not to sell to a stndent is broken, even though he does not drink the liquor sold him.^ A bond "conditioned upon the faithful observance of all the provisions" of an act covers a tax assessed under the act which it is the principal's duty to pay ; ^ but not to obligations created by a city ordinance.' Where an application for a license to sell in quantities over a gallon at a time was followed by a tax receipt to the same effect and a like recital in the preamble of the bond, and the ond contained the usual statutory conditions not to sell to minors, it was held that the sureties were liable for a sale of less than a gallon to a minor. ^ Under a statute providing 1 Crawley v. Commonwealth, 123 N. E. 041; Boos v. State, 11 Ind. Pa. 275; IC Atl. 416; 23 W. N. C. App. 257; 39 N. E. 197; State v. 148; Jacobs V. Holgenson, 70 Conn. Terheide, 166 Ind. 689; 78 N. E. 68; 38 Atl. 914; Crouse v. Com- 195; Meinoz v. Brassel (Tex. Civ. nionwealtli, 87 Pa. 168. App.), 108 S. W. 417. See Pa- 2Horan v. Travis Co., 27 Tex. ducah v. Jones, 126 Ky. 809; 104 226; McPherson v. Simmons, 63 S. W. 971; 31 Ky. Law Rep. 1203. Ark. 593 ; 40 S. W. 78. e Daniels v. Grayson College, 20 3 Grady v. Ragan, 2 Willson Civ. Tex. Civ. App. 562 ; 50 S. W. 205. Cas. Ct. App., §259; Cullinan v. 6 Marshall Co. v. Knoll (Iowa), Burkhard, 93 N. Y. App. Div. 31; 69 N. W. 1146; Bingham Co. v. 86 N. Y. Supp. 1003; reversing 41 Fidelity, etc., Co., 34 Idaho, 13; N. Y. Misc. Rep. 321; 84 N. Y. 88 Pac. 829. Supp. 825. 7 Ottumwa v. Hodge, 112 Iowa, 4 0'Flinn v. State, 66 Miss. 7; 430; 84 N. W. 533. 5 So. 390; Edgar v. State (Tex. » Harper v. Golden (Tex. Civ. Civ. App.), 102 S. W. 439; State App.), 39 S. W. 623. v. EJiotts, 24 Ind. App. 477; 50 § 471 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 768 that a bond shall stand good for ' ' fines and costs recovered for any offense," a bond conditioned that the principal "shall pay all damages and costs recovered against him by any person under the Code, ' ' covers a liability for fines assessed for unlaw- ful sales.^ A condition not to sell on any prescription having the same number of another prescription given by the same person and dated during the year is violated by a sale on a prescription having the same number of another prescription given by the same person, and dated during the same year whether the prescription was given to the same or different persons.^" A condition not to exhibit "vulgar" pictures on the premises is broken by an exhibition of "obscene" pic- tures.^ ^ So one not to permit gambling is violated by keeping a slot machine wherein one ma.y drop a coin and press a trig- ger and either lose his coin or obtain a certain number of like coins as the machine may turn.^- A condition not to keep a disorderly house, or to keep a "quiet house" is broken by per- mitting music in the saloon licensed where a statute defines a quiet house as one in which "no music, loud and boisterous talking" "or any other noise calculated to disturb or annoy persons residing in the vicinity" is allowed.^^ A condition to keep an orderly "house or place of business" includes an arbor across an alley where customers are served with liquors from the house licensed ; and if boisterous talking, music and indecent and vulgar language be permitted therein, the con- dition is broken.^* So a condition not to permit disorderly conduct on the premises is broken by such conduct on the premises carried on without the knowledge or consent of the 9 State V. Xutter, 44 W. Va. is State v. Curtis, 8 Tex. Civ. 385; 30 S. E. 67; State v. Corran, App. 506; 28 S. W. 134. 73 K H. 434; 62 Atl. 1044. i* Whitcomb v. State, 2 Tex. 10 Edgar v. State (Tex. Civ. Civ. App. 301 ; 21 S. W. 976; Cun- App.), 102 S. W. 439. ningham v. Porchet, 23 Tex. Civ. iiRaley v. State (Tex. Civ. App. 80; 56 S. W. 574 (in an- App. ), 105 S. W. 342. other room separated by a board 12 Lyman v. Brucker, 26 N. Y. partition not reaching the ceil- Misc. Rep. 594; 56 N. Y. Supp. ing) ; McPherson v. Simmons, 63 767. Ark. 593; 40 S. W. 78 (question for jury). 769 BOND OP LICENSEE. § 471 principal.^" A bond issued for a hotel conditioned not to per- mit the premises to become disorderly includes the rooms of the hotel in which the liquor business is carried on.^'' The licen- see's bond does not cover illegal sales made by his agent, though in the general scope of his duty, made in direct violation of the licensee's orders.^ ^ Nor does it cover sales made by his agent for his own benefit.^* Under a bond conditioned for the payment of any money lost at gambling in a saloon, "or any room or building attached thereto, under the [licensee's] control" it is essential to his.l'iability that the money was lost by gambling in the saloon or in a room or building attached thereto under his control ; and if there be doubt as to whether the room or building where i-t was lost was under his control, the jury must be instructed that the room or building must have been under his control at the time the money was lost by gambling therein to render him liable. There may be a lia- bility, however, if he collusively rented out the room to persons who conducted therein gambling games for the purpose of escaping a liability.^^ A condition that the licensee would not "suffer or permit" any gambling on the premises covers gamb- ling by persons other than the licensee ; and is not limited by another clause to the effect that he wall not violate the liquor tax law himself.-*' But under a bond that the principal will pay all fines and costs that may be assessed against him for violation of the liquor laws, he is not liable thereon for fines and costs assessed against his bartender for an unlawful sale made by such bartender without his knowledge or consent.-^ A bond conditioned to pay all damages by reason of the licensee ob- is Clement v. Federal Union is Paducah v. Jones, 126 Ky. Surety Co., 122 N. Y. App. Div. 809; 104 S. W. 971; 31 Ky. Law 18; 106 N. Y. Supp. 1061. Eep. 1203. 16 Cullinan v. Fidelity, etc., Co., is McPherson v. Simmons, 63 84 N. Y. App. Div. 292; 82 N. Y. Ark. 593; 40 S. W. 78. Supp. 695; affirmed 177 N. Y. 574; 20 Cullinan v. Burkhard, 93 N. 69 N. E. 1122. Y. App. Div. 31; 86 N. Y. Supp. 17 Cullinan v. Burkhard, 93 N. 1003; reversing 41 N. Y. Misc. Y. App. Div. 31; 86 N. Y. Supp. Eep. 321; 84 N. Y. Supp. 825. 1003; reversing 41 N. Y. Misc. 21 State v. Leach, 17 Ind. App. Rep. 321; 84 N. Y. Supp. 825. 174; 46 N, E. 549. § 472 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 770 taining a license, under a statute requiring him to give a bond to pay all damages occasioned by his selling liquors, covers damages for the selling of liquors, and is not merely an in- demnity for damages occasioned by the issuance of the license.^^ A surety on a bond, however, given where a license has been issued upon a false statement made in the application is not liable thereon by reason of such false statement. Such was held to be the case where the applicant falsely stated he had obtained the consent of certain resident householders neces- sary for him to obtain before the license could be issued, and this notwithstanding the fact that the entire traffic of the licensee was a violation of the law; for the bond was intended to protect the public against violations of the law under a license lawfully issued, and had no application to an instance of fraud in securing a license.-^ A bond conditioned to pay all "civil damages" does not render the sureties liable to pay a fine assessed against the principal for a sale to a minor.^* Sureties are not liable for sales off the licensed premises.-^ A covenant in a bond not to ' * rent or let ' ' any part of the licensed premises to any person for the purpose of run ni nor any game prohibited by law does not cover the independent acts of a vendee of the principal committed after a sale of the premises.'^ A sale to a police officer of a city is not a waiver of the right of the city to bring an action for a breach of the bond, unless, possibly, the sale was induced by what the officer said or did.-" Sec. 472. Breach of conditions — Offenses as to minors. Intoxicating liquor sold by an agent or barkeeper of the licensee, in his line of duty, renders such licensee liable on his bond conditioned not to sell to minors; and proof of a sale by a person behind defendant's bar, not shown to be an inter- 22 Dowiat V. People, 193 111. 264 ; 23 Carter v. Nicol, 116 Iowa, 61 N. E. 1059; affirming 92 111. 519; 90 N. W. 352. App. 433. 20 Allen v. Houck & Dieter Co. 23 Lyman v. Kane, 57 N. Y. App. (Tex. Civ. App.) , 92 S. W. 993. Div. 549; 67 N. Y. Supp. 1065. 27 Tripp v. Flanigan, 10 R. I. 24Headingtfln v. Smith, 113 128. Iowa, 107; 84 N. W. 982. 'J'71 BOND OP LICENSEE. § 472 loper, is sufficient proof of a sale by Hk^ licensee.-^ But if a sale is made to a minor in good faith, the salesman believing that he is of age, he is not liable on his bond. '•' Statutes sometimes provide that in such instances the licensee shall not be liable if he or his salesman acted in good faith, believing the minor to be of age; in which event the burden is on him to plead and prove that fact."" A sale of liquor to an adult who "treats" a minor with it is not a sale to such minor nor a gift by the salesman to him/''^ But a statute providing that a liquor dealer shall neither "give nor permit to be given" any liquor to a minor obligates him not to knowingly permit the gift to be made to a minor on his premises, but goes further and requires him to prevent the gift there.^- Where a bond is conditioned that the licensee will not permit a minor to "enter and remain" in his saloon, there can be no recovery for an entry "or" for remaining there; but both the entry and remaining must concur to create a liability. ^^ If the licensee permitted the minor to enter and remain, believing in good faith he was of age, he is still liable; anl a statute relieving him from liability where he sold liquor to a minor, believing in good faith he was of age, has no application and 28 0'Flinn v. State, G6 Miss. 7; 3o Farr v. Waterman (Tex. Civ. 5 So. 390; State v. Terheide, 166 App.), 95 S. W. 65; Tinkle v. Ind. 689; 78 N. E. 195; Brooks v. Sweeney (Tex. Civ. App.), 78 S. Ellis (Tex. Civ. App.), 98 S. W. W. 248; Holly v. Simmons (Tex. 936; George Scalfi & Co. v. State, Civ. App.), 89 S. W. 776; State 31 Tex. Civ. App. 671; 73 S. W. v. Dittfurt (Tex. Civ. App.), 79 441; 74 S. W. 754; State v. S. W. 52; Holly & Co. v. Simmons, Knotts, 24 Ind. App. 477; 56 N. 38 Tex. Civ. App. 124; 85 S. W. E. 941 ; Boos v. State, 11 Ind. App. 325. 257; 39 N. E. 197; State v. Ter- si Holly & Co. v. Simmons, 38 heide, 166 Ind. 689; 78 N. E. 417; Tex. Civ. App. 124; 85 S. W. 325; Munoz V. Brassel (Tex. Civ. App.), Page v. State, 84 Ala. 446; 4 So. 108 S. W. 417. 697; Ward v. State, 45 Ark. 351; 29Gilbreath v. State (Tex. Civ. Topper v. State, 118 Ind. 110; 20 App.), 82 S. W. 807; Cox v. N. E. 699; People v. Neumann, 85 Thompson (Tex. Civ. App.), 73 S. Mich. 98; 48 N. W. 290. W. 950; Holly & Co. v. Simmons, 32 Holly & Co. v. Simmons, 38 38 Tex. Civ. App. 124; 85 S. W. Tex. Civ. App. 124; 85 S. W. 325. 325. 33 Minter v. State, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 182; 76 S. W. 312. § 472 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 772 affords no defense.'^ Permitting a minor to enter and re- main long enough to purchase, pay for and drink a glass of beer, though several times repeated, is not a breach of a con- dition against permitting him to "enter and remain. "^^ But in such an instance the condition is broken if, after he has drunk his liquor, the licensee permit him to remain in the saloon ten or fifteen minutes, merely "loitering and hanging around." ^" It is error for the court to charge the jury that the length of time the minor remained is immaterial; for it is a question for the jurj^ whether he "remained" in the defendant 's place of business.^' It is error in such an instance in the charge to the jury to use the word "knowingly" in connection Avith the word "permit," ^^ for it is not necessary to create a liability that the licensee knew the minor had entered the saloon.^^ The emancipation of the minor by the parent is no defense.*" The parent may recover damages for such infraction of the statute — for a sale to his minor son and also for permitting him t« "enter and remain" in the sa- loon.*^ Evidence that the minor was a gambler is inadmissi- ble.'*' Evidence that signs were up in the saloon stating that minors were not allowed therein is immaterial.*^ If the parent consent to the minor entering and remaining in the saloon he waives his cause of action ; but his non-consent may siMinter v. State, supra; Cox Holt, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 297; 70 V. Thompson (Tex. Civ. App.), 73 S. W. 342. S. W. 950 ; State v. Dittfurth 3- Cox v. Thompson, 32 Tex. Civ. (Tex. Civ. App.), 79 S. W. 52; App. 572; 75 S. W. 819. Krick V. Dow ( Tex. Civ. App. ) , 84 ss Wakeman v. Price ( Tex. Civ. S. W. 245. App.), 89 S. W. 1093. 35 Tinkle v. Sweeney ( Tex. Civ. 39 Munoz v. Brassel ( Tex. Civ. App.), 78 S. W. 248; Ghio v. App.), 108 S. W. 417. Stephens (Tex. Civ. App.), 78 S. 40 Cok v. Thompson (Tex. Civ. VV. 1084; Tinkle v. Sweeney, 97 App.), 73 S. W. 950. Tex. 190; 77 S. W. 609; Cox v. 4i Coburn v. Gill (Tex. Civ. Thompson, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 572; App.), 60 S. W. 974. 75 S. W. 819. 42Paynor v. Holzgraf, 35 Tex. 3c White V. Manning, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 233 ; 79 S. W. 829. Civ. App. 29'8; 102 S. W. 1160; 43 Krick v. Dow (Tex. Civ. Quails V. Sayler, 18 Tex. Civ. App. App.), 84 S. W. 245. 400; 45 S. W. 839; Dickson v. 773 BOND OF LICENSEE, § 473 be inferred by evidence showing that he was absent in a distant State and that the minor had been in the city where the saloon was but a few days.** A complaint is not defective nor subject to a special exception which alleges that the vio- lations of the law took place "on or about" a certain date, "and on divers days before and after said date during" the same month.*^ In such an instance the evidence need not be confined to the exact date given, but a recovery may be had on any of the "divers days before and after" the date.*« A statute giving a cause of action to the parents of the minor authorizes the father and mother to join in one action; and if either die the other may file an amended complaint and prosecute the cause .of action in his name alone.*^ Proof that the plaintiff minor "entered and remained" in the defend- ant's saloon is sufficient to show that the plaintiff was "ag- grieved" thereby, and entitles him to recover.*^ The taking effect of local option prohibition is no defense.*" Under the Texas statute the State may recover on the bond, although the father hired out his son to work in the saloon.^** Sec. 473. Liability of sureties. A repeal of the statute under which the bond was given is a cancellation of the bond as to all future liability thereun- der." The liability of the surety is coextensive with that of his principal's liability thereon.^^ Liability incurred under an old act is not cancelled by a repeal of the act and the sub- stitution of another.^' Mere irregularities in the justification 44Krick V. Dow (Tex. Civ. 48 Wliite v. Manning 46 Tex. App.), 84 S. W. 245. But per- Civ. App. 298; 102 S. W. 1160. mitting him to occasionally enter 49 White v. Manning, supra. and drink beer is not a consent to so McMonigal v. State ( Tex. Civ. all sales made to him. White v. App.), 45 S. W. 1038. Manning, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 298 ; si Thompson v. Bassett, 5 Ind. 102 S. W. 1160. 535. 45 Patton V. Williams, 35 Tex. S2 Qran v. Houston, 45 Neb. 813; Civ. App. 129; 79 S. W. 357. 64 N. W. 245. But see Uldrich v. 46 Munoz V. Brassel ( Tex. "Civ. Gilmore, 35 Neb. 288 ; 53 N. W. Ato-), 108 S. W. 417. 135. 47 Munoz V. Brassel, supra. 53 GuHickson v. Gjorud, 89 Mich. 8; 50 N. W. 751. § 473 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 774 of the sureties attached to the bond or the entire omission of such justification will not render a bond void which is correct in form ; ^* and if the bond is complete, a mere failure to file it with the proper officers after it has been delivered to the board, accepted and approved, is no defense.^^ If a law be re-enacted the liability on the bond continues under the act as re-enacted ; for the provisions of the act as it stood before its re-enactment is not repealed by the re-enactment, but simply continued in force.'" A surety cannot defend on. the ground that he has removed from the county or State where the stat- ute, in that event, required the principal to give a new bond, but no new bond was given, although he was properly noti- fied by the proper officer to give one/'*' A law enacted reduc- ing the liability of the sureties has no application to a liabil- ity incurred thereon before its enactment. ^^ Notice of the approval and acceptance of the bond need not be given the sureties; for they are bound to take notice of that fact.^" If a bond be conditioned to pay whatever fine may be assessed against the principal, and in default of its payment he shall serve a day in prison for each dollar of the amount of the fine; his service in a prison because of his failure to pay does not release the sureties.^" Where the license is for a partic- ular place, the bond only applies to sales on the premises, though sales by the licensee oft' the premises be illegal.*'^ Where the place could be changed on application to the proper officer, 5-1 people V. Laning, 73 I\Tich. •'o People v. Laning, 73 Mich. 284; 41 N. W. 424. 284; 41 N. W. 424; Stehle v. Com- 55 Brockway v. Petted, 79 Mich, monwealth, ( Pa. ) , 7 Atl. 1-69 ; 620; 45 N. VV. 61; 7 L, R. A. 740. Brown v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. so Gullickson v. Gjorud, 89 Mich. 335; 6 Atl. 152. Otherwise if the 8; 50 N. W. 751. See O'Brien Co. principal has paid the fine. Aiken V. Mahon (Iowa). 102 N. W. 446. v. Harbers, 6 Pvich. L. 96. 57 Wright V. Trost, 83 Mich. ci Saffroi v. Cobun, 32 Tex. Civ. 110; 47 N. W. 243. App. 79; 73 S. VV, 828; O'Banion ssLightner v, Ca.sey, 31 Pa, v. DeGarmo, 121 Iowa, 139; 96 341; Commonwealth v, Johnson, 8 N, W, 739; Adams v. Miller, 81 Pa. Co. Ct, Rep, 378. Miss. 613; 33 So. 489; Carter v. 59 People V. Inning, 73 Mich. Nicol, 116 Iowa, 519; 90 N. W. 284; 41 X. W. 424. 352; :Moniteau Co. v. Lewis, 123 Mo, App, 073; 100 S. W, 1107. 775 BOND OF LICENSEE. § 473 and a licensee by false statements induced the officer to change the place named in the license, and he engaged in business on the new location, his sales then being illegal by reason of such false statements, it was held that his sureties were not liable for the penalties he incurred by reason of makmg them.*'- If the bond covers the licensee's taxes, the sureties cannot escape paying them, if the principal fail to pay, on the ground that after his failure he is no longer operating under the liquor law, where the failure to pay has that effecf^ A surety is not liable for a false statement unknown to him made by the licensee in his application for a license, although the license issued thereon is void ah initio at the election of the State."* The death of a surety does not avoid the bond.''' If the bond be irregul*ar, yet under it the principal enjoy all the rights of a licensee, the sureties are estopped to deny its legality;"" and if the licensee is a club or a corporation they are estopped to deny its incorporation."" As a rule the liabil- ity of the surety is secondary and that of the principal pri- mary; and usually if the surety is compelled to pay a judg- ment rendered against them jointly it remains in force against the principal for his, the surety's benefit."^ In some States the principal need not be first exhausted."^ Where a surety was given a sum of money by his principal as an indemnity, to be held during the term of the bond and until his liability Ibereon ceased, it was held that the principal could recover back the amount so paid the surety without waiting to have the bond cancelled, there being no statute providing for its cancellation, and also without waiting until the statute of Jim- 02 Saffroi v. Cobun, supra. 66 Lyman v. Brucker, 26 N. Y. 03 O'Brien Co. V. Mahon (Iowa), Misc. Rep. 594; 56 N. Y. Supp. 102 N. W.^46. 767. 04 Lyman v. Schermcrhorn, 167 gt Lyman v. Gramercy Club, 39 N. Y. 113; 60 N. E. 324; affirm- N. Y. App. Div. 459; 57 N. Y. ing 53 N. Y. App. Div. 32; 65 N. Supp. 376. Y. Supp. 538. 68 Jenkins v. Danville, 79 111. osMcMonigal v. State (Tex. Civ. App. 339. App.), 45 S. W. 1038. «« O'Brion ro. v. Mahon (Iowa), 102 N. VV. 446. §§474,475 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 776 itations had run against the bond.^° The recovery and pay- ment of a penalty given under an independent statute against and by the principal is no defense for the surety to an action on the bond.'^ Occasionally statutes provide in addition to the fine a penalty may be recovered on the bond When that is the case a payment of the fine is no defense for the surety in an action on the bond to recover the penalty.'^- A bond complete in form, but not to be delivered until another surety be added to it is binding if delivered and approved, though in violation of the surety's instructions and understanding.'^^ "Where the bond is a several one, the surety may be sued alone.'^* Sec. 474. Transfer of license. If a license may be transferred, the licensee is liable for the acts of the transferee until the assignment has been pre- sented to the proper authorities and consent to the transfer obtained.'^'' But it has been held that if the transfer of the license has not been approved by the licensing board or officer, the sureties on the bond are not liable for the illegal conduct of the transferee. ■^^ Sec. 475. Eersons entitled to sue on bond. As the action on the bond is purely statutory, only a per- son or officer designated in the statute as the one who may 70 Shea v. Fidelity, etc., Co., 83 X. Y. App. Div. 296; 82 N. Y. N. Y. App. Div. 305; 82 N. Y. Supp. 827; affirming 39 K Y. Supp. 39. Misc. Rep. 446; 80 N. Y. 187; 71 People V. Eckman, 63 Hun, Lyman v. City Trust Co., 166 K 209; 18 N. Y. Supp. 654. Y. 274; 59 N. E. 903; affirming 72Paducah v. Jones, 126 Ky. 02 N. Y. Supp. 1141. 809; 104 S. W. 971; 31 Ky. L. 7 o Lyman v. Cheever, 168 N. Y. Eep. 1203. 43; 60 N. E. 1047; reversing 54 73 Jacobs V. Hogan, 73 Conn. N. Y. App. Div. 618; 66 N. Y. 740; 49 Atl. 202. Supp. 1136. 7* Knott V. Peterson, 125 Iowa, As to what is sufficient allega- 404; 101 N. W. 173. tion to show that a transfer had 75 Cullinan v. Kuch, 177 N. Y. been made, in a suit on the trans- 303; 69 N. E. 597; 84 N. Y. App. feree's bond, see Faulkner v. Cas- Div. 642; 82 N. Y. Supp. 1098; sidy, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 415; 87 Cullinan v. Parker, 177 N. Y. S. W. 904. 573; 69 N. E. 1122; affirming 84 777 BOND OF LICENSEE. §§474,475 sue thereon can bring the suit. No other person or officer can sue. But a bond given to an officer in his official char- acter can be sued upon by his successor in office.'^'' To col- lect fines and forfeitures the right of action is usually given to the State, and the State must bring it.'* A general provi- sion of a code providing that "where any bond shall be exe- cuted in a legal proceeding, it shall inure to the person to whom it is designed by law as a security, and be subject to judgment in his favor, no matter how it is conditioned," ap- plies to a bond given by a liquor licensee.^® Under a pro- vision of the statute giving a right of action to any person "aggrieved by the violation of" the liquor statute, a father may maintain an action thereon where the principal has given liquor to his minor son, even with the father's consent, it being a question for the jurv^ to determine whether the father had been "aggrieved" by the action of the principal.*" In such an instance the father may bring the action in his own name, though the bond is payable to the State.*^ Where a statute provides that any person "aggrieved" by a sale of liquor to a student of any college, the college is the person "aggrieved," and may bring the suit.*- A statute may change the right of action from one officer to another; and the lat- ter may recover for a breach of the bond before such statute was enacted. ^^ '7 Granger v. Hayden, 17 R. I. laid down. For cases in different 179; 20 Atl. 833. States, see People v. Eckman, 63 78 State V. Whitener, 23 Ind. Hun, 209; 18 N. Y. Supp. 654; 124; State v. Pierce, 26 Kan. 777; State v. Mortland, 71 Iowa, 543; McGrimes v. State, 30 Ind. 140; 32 N. W. 485; State v. DeKruif, State V. Estabrook, 29 Kan. 739. 72 Iowa, 488; 34 N. W. 607; State 79 State V. Depeder, 65 Miss. 26 ; v. Humber, 73 Iowa, 707 ; 34 N. 3 So. 80. W. 829; Lyman v. Perimutter, 166 soEdgett V. Finn (Tex. Civ. N. Y. 410; 60 N. E. 21; affirming App.), 36 S. W. 830. 66 N. Y. App. 866. siMcGuire v. Glass, (Tex. Civ. 82 Daniels v. College (Tex. Civ. App.); 15 S. W. 127. This is a App.), 50 S. W. 205. question of local practice, how- 83 Lyman v. Schenck ( N. Y. ) , 55 ever, upon which no rule appli- N". Y. Supp. 770. cable to all jurisdictions can be §§476,477 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 778 Sec. 476. A civil action — Agent. An action to recover on a bond is a civil action on a con- tract ^^* and not a criminal one. Thus, while it might possibly be a defense in a criminal action if an agent of the principal sold liquor to a minor against the direct orders of his prin- cipal, yet it is not in an action on his bond, for the liability being a civil one the principal is bound by the act of his agent within the scope of his employment, though in direct violation of his express orders.^* An action of debt is a proper form of action on a licensee's bond to recover dam- ages.*^ But if the statute provide a specific remedy, that remedy must be follow^ed.** In an action on the bond the State may appeal, though if it were to criminally prosecute the principal for the same act it could not.*^ A right of action on the bond to recover a penalty terminates with the taking effect of a local option law.**^ Sec. 477. Judgment of forfeiture or conviction as a pre- requisite to suit. The general rule is that neither a judgment of forfeiture nor a conviction of the principal, where the action is for the benefit of the State or municipality, need be had or entered before an action can be brought on the bond.**° And this is true where the action is by a private individual to recover damages the statute awards him.^'' If the principal be sued on his bond and defeat the action, that is a bar to an action against him individually."^ 83* Cullinan v. Burkhard, 93 N. 88 Long v. A. L. Gren & Co. Y. App. Div. 31; 86 N. Y. Supp. (Tex. Civ. App.), 95 S. W. 79. 1003; reversing 41 N. Y. Misc. 89 Coggeshall v. Pollitt, 15 R. I. Rep. 321; 84 X. Y. Supp. 825. 168; 1 Atl. 413; Granger v. Hay- 84 Greene Co. v. Wilhite, 29 Mo. den, 17 R. I. 179; 20 Atl. 833; App. 459; State v. Terheide, 166 State v. Corron, 73 N. H. 434; 62 Ind. 689; 78 N. E. 195. Atl. 1044; Knott v. Peterson, 125 85 State v. Walker, 56 N. H. 176. Iowa, 404; 101 N. W. 173; Ly- 86 Commonwealth v. Thompson, man v. Schenck (N. Y.), 55 N. Y. 2 Gray, 82. See also Anthony v. Supp. 770. Krey, 70 Mich. 629 ; 38 N. W. 603. so Quintard v. Knocdler, 53 87 State v. Nutter, 44 W. Va. Conn. 485; 2 Atl. 762. 385; 30 S. E. 67. »i Carter v. Nicol, 116 Iowa, 519; 90 N. W. 352. 779 BOND OP LICENSEE. §§478,479 Sec. 478. Effect of judgment against principal upon his surety — Evidence. If judgment is to be given both against a principal and his surety, then the surety is not bound thereby unless he has regular notice of the proceedings."" But where a statute pro- vides that upon conviction of having violated the liquor law the bond of the licensee shall become forfeited, the record of the conviction may be put in evklence, and is sufficient evi- dence of the breach of the bond."^ If the condition is that there shall be a liability upon the bond if the licensee vio- lates the liquor law, then a judgment of conviction for the same offense charged in the complaint is prima facie evidence of such violation, but not conclusive.^* But if the statute provides that the sureties shall be liable for the amount of any judgment recovered against the licensee for having vio- lated the liquor law, then a judut in evidence. In such an instance while the license is the best evidence of its issuance and existence, yet it is not error to admit proof of the license by the records of the board or court issuing it.-^ Where it is a matter of identification of prescriptions for liquors that have been issued, the affidavit of the druggist made pursuant to a liquor statute is admissible for that purpose.-- The affidavit stating that no other liquors were sold except those stated in the pre- scriptions is prima facie evidence of that fact.-'^ Putting the license in evidence raises a presumption that an application 10 State V. Terheide, 166 Ind. have concluded the plaintiff was 689; 78 N. E. 195. required to prove all the breaches i'^ Lucas V. Johnson ( Tex. Civ. alleged in his complaint. App.), 64 S. W. 823. -'« Cullinan v. Fidelity, etc., Co., isQuist V. American Bonding, 41 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 119; 83 N. Y. etc., Co., 74 Neb. 692; 105 N. W. Supp. 969. 255. But see Earl v. State, 33 -'i Moniteau Co. v. Lewis, 123 Tex. Civ. App. 161; 76 S. W. 207. Mo. 673; 100 S. W. 1107; Lucas i^Wakeham v. Price (Tex. Civ. v. Johnson (Tex. Cr. App.), 64 S. App.), 89 S. W. 1093. In this case W. 823. Proof of license by the court instructed the jury that copy produced by witness. King if they failed to find there was any v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 101 ; 109 violation of the conditions of the S. W. 182. bond "on said dates," they should "- Edgar v. State, 46 Tex. Civ. find for the defendant, and this App. 171; 102 S. W. 439. was held error, because they might ^s Edgar v. State, supra. 783 BOND OP LICENSEE. §§481 for it had been duly made.-'* If the charge is illegal sales on Sunday, and the evidence shows the sale was made by a clerk of the defendant, evidence is also admissible to show that such clerk made sales on other Sundays, to show he acted with the consent of his employer in making the sale charged.-^ If the alleged breach is the keeping of a disorderly house, evidence that the plaintiff rented his adjoin'ng house to obiectionable characters is inadmissible as a defense, such proof showing neither consent nor contributory neerl^ence on the plaintiff's part.-*' If the complaint allege illegal sales off the licensed premises it is demurrable.-'' The breach need not be proven of the exact time laid, and evidence, therefore, of a breach at another time is admissible.-^ Evidence of the exhibition of the license in the place licensed is admissible, and with this may be coupled the testimony of the licensing officer that the licensee obtained no other 'license covering any of the period the license was in force.-^ In a suit on the bond the applica- tion for a license is admissible in evidence.^" Unless the proof show a violation of the law as alleged the plaintiff must fail in his action.'' Evidence that the law was violated by a sale to an officer of the State who purchased for the purpose of entrapping the defendant is admissible, especially if it was the duty of the officer to investigate to ascertain if breaches of the liquor laws were being committed.'" Proof of the issuance 24 White V. Manning, 46 Tex. Div. 582; 67 N. Y. Supp. 254; Cul- Civ, App. 298; 102 S. W. 1160. linan v. Parker, 177 N. Y. 573; zsPaducah v. Jones, 126 Ky. 69 N. E. 1122; affirming 84 N. Y. 809; 104 S. W. 971; 31 Ky, L. App. Div. 296; 82 N. Y. Supp. 827 ; Rep. 1203. 39 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 446; 80 N. Y. 26 Cunningham v. Porchet, 23 Supp. 187; Quist v. American Tex. Civ. App. 80; 56 S. W. 574. Bonding, etc., Co., 74 Neb. 692; 27 Adams v. Miller, 81 Miss. 613; 105 N. W. 255; Cullinan v. Quinn, 33 So. 489. 95 N. Y. App. Div. 429; 88 N. Y. 28 Hawthorne v. State, 39 Tex. Supp. 963. Civ. App. 122 ; 87 S. W. 839. 3^ Lyman v. Oussani, 33 N. Y. 29 Cullinan v. Horan, 116 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 409; 68 N. Y. Supp. App. Div. 711; 102 N. Y. Supp. 450; citing Commissioners v. 132. Backus, 29 How. Prac. 33; People 3» Lucas V. Johnson (Tex. Civ. v. Smith, 28 Hun, 626; Tripp v. App.), 64 S. W. 823. Flanigan, 10 R. I. 128; Mayor v. 31 Lyman v. Mead, 56 N. Y. App. Dickerson, 45 N. J. L. 38. § 482 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 784 of the license need not be expressly made where the testimony affords strong presumptive evidence of the issuance. ^^ If the accused be notified to produce his license at the trial and does not do so, parol evidence of its contents may be given.^* Sec. 482. Amount of damages recoverable on bond. If the bond be given in a certain named amount — as the statute requires — the surety is not bound beyond that amount though the principal may be personally liable for a much greater sum.^^ He is liable, as a rule, for actual and not for exemplary damages."*^ In Kansas, at an early day, if the licensee forfeited his bond and paid the judgment and costs rendered because of such forfeiture, though it was less than the penalty named, the bond was extinguished.-'*^ Occasionlly statutes provide the giving of bonds with no limit as to the amount of the liability.'*^ If the bond provide for the recovery of a certain penalty, the amount of damages occasioned by the violation of the law has no place in the case.^^ If the State sue on more than one breach of the bond, it may recover more than one penalty,*" up to the limit of the bond.'*^ The sum named in the bond, where it is the amount of recovery for any breach of its conditions is treated as liquidated damages.*" Under a stat- ute giving a parent an action for a sale to his minor child and 33Munoz V. Brassel (Tex. Civ. 39 Paducah v. Jones, 126 Ky. App.), 108 S. W. 417 (license stub 809; 104 S. W. 971; 31 Ky. L. ' put in evidence). Rep. 1203; State v. Lawson, 83 34 State V. Walker, 129 Mo. App. Minn. 124; 86 N. W. 3: 54 L. R. 371; 108 S. W. 615; Oldham v. A. 487. State (Mo. App.), 108 S. W. 667. ^" Douthitt v. State (Tex. Civ. 35 People v. United Surety Co., App.), 87 S. W. 190; Wakeman v. 120 N. Y. App. Div. 655; 105 N. Price (Tex. Civ. App.), 89 S. W. Y. Supp. 72; Lyman v. Fidelity, 1093; Douthitt v. State, 36 Tex. etc., Co., 39 N. Y. App. Div. 459; Civ. App. 396; 82 S. W. 352; 83 57 X. Y. Supp. 372; Douthit v. S. W. 795. State, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 396; 82 4i Hawthorne v. State, 39 Tex. S. W. 352; 83 S. W. 795. Civ. App. 122; 87 S. W. 839. 36 Cobb V. People, 84 111. 511. 42 Cullinan v. Burkhard, 93 N. 37 State V. Estabrook, 29 Kan. Y. App. Div. 31; 86 N. Y. Supp. 739, 1003; reversing 41 K Y. Misc. 38 Day V. Frank, 127 Mass. 497. Rep. 321; 84 N, Y, Supp, 825. 785 BOND OP LICENSEE. § § 483 also for allowing him "to enter and remain" in a saloon, and the child enters the saloon and purchases liquor and then remains there, the parent may recover one penalty for the sale and another for the entry and remaining in the saloon.*^ If the bond be exhausted a new one may usually be required." Sec. 483. Compromise of liability. While the liability is due an individual, there may be a compromise of the claim or amount due. Such is not the case when the amount is due the public. Thus, where a State revenue agent had power to bring suit to recover damages growing out of the violation of any contract with the State, county or municipality where he might sue, it was held that the county supervisors could not relinquish a judgment on a liquor bond due the county.*'^ «Cbburn V. Gill (Tex. jCiv. Civ. App. 396; 82 S. W. 352; 83 App.), 60 S. W. 974. S. W. 795. «4Douthitt V. State, 36 Tex. 45 Adams v. Cox, 80 Miss. 561; 32 So. 117. CHAPTER XIII. LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. 484. Definition of license fee. 495. Disposition of fees and taxes 485. License fee — Police power — collected. Restraint of trade. 496. Refunding fees or taxes paid 486. License fee, wlien not a tax under void or illegal ordi- — Police regulation. nance or statute. 487. Uniformity of taxation. 497. Refunding fees or ti.xes, con- 488. Liability for fee or tax. tinned — No statute requir- 489. Amount of fee or tax. ing it. 490. Payable in money. 498. Refunding fees or taxes, 49 L Payment in advance. continued — Cases allowing. 492. To what officer payable. 499. Refunding fees or taxes, con- 493. Suit to collect. tinued — Payment under 494. Tax lien — Landlord's prop- mistake of fact. erty — Prospective statute. 500. Rebate of fees or taxes un- der statute. Sec. 484. Definition of license fee. A license fee is the price paid for the license. It is usually such a sum as will compensate those issuing it for the expense of such issuance and the recording of it ; and when it is issued for the purpose of securing public control over the business licensed, then such further sum as will probably be expended in the regulating and inspecting the business and enforcing the law regulating such business. If the license may be issued the fee may be exacted.^ Sec. 485. License fee — Police power — Restraint of trade. A Legislature may pass any law not inhibited by the Con- stitution, and a law requiring an amount or sum of money to 1 People v. Jarvis, 19 N. Y. 22 Fed. 201; Ulterminova v. Ze- App. Div. 466; 46 N. Y. Supp. kind, 95 Iowa, 622; 64 N. W. 596; Wiggins v. Ferry Co., 102 646; 29 L. R. A. 734; 58 Am. St. 111. 5'60; Laundry License Case, 447. 7&6 787 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. § 486 be paid for a license to sell intoxicating liquors, is not a tax in the sense of the constitutional provision that "no tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law," etc.- A State law, taxing by way of a license fee, those who sell, in small quan- tities intoxicating liquors manufactured by themselves within the State, is constitutional ; it is a law which the State has the power to pass, in the exercise of the right to regulate its in- ternal police, and everything that relates to the morals and health of the community is within that power. Pursuits that are pernicious and detrimental to the public morals may be prohibited altogether, or licensed for a compensation to the public.^ Nor is such a law void as being in restraint of trade.* Sec. 486. License fee, when not a tax — Police regulation. A license fee for retailing intoxicating liquors is in no proper sense a tax for revenue. Its object is not to raise revenue. From time almost immemorial it has been thought that the traffic in intoxicating liquors was dangerous to the public peace and morals, and it has been the uniform practice in this country to subject it to regulation, to require a license from some public officer before it is engaged in, and to pre- scribe as a crime the pursuit of it without a license. Such a license is a part of the police regulation of a State, and the fee is intended rather to prevent the indiscriminate opening of such establishments than to raise revenue by taxation. Tax- ation is not the object of imposing such a license fee and the Legislature is not bound to appropriate the proceeds for any object for which the State may raise money by local or special taxation. It is imposed in the exercise of the rightful police power of the State, and is an incident of legitimate police regulation. Such being the nature of the business, under the law, it is the province of the Legislature 2 Henry v. State, 26 Ark. 523. Md. 571; Culver v. People, 11 3Bureh v. May, etc., 42 Ga. Mich. 43; City of Winona v. 598; Bolder v. Schneider, 49 Ga. Whipple, 24 Minn. 61; State v. 195; People v. Thurber, 13 111. Hudson, 78 Mo. 302. 554; East St. Louis v. Trustees, •* City of Rochester v. Upham, etc., 102 111. 489; Keller v. State, 19 Minn. 78. 11 Md. 525; Cahen v. Jarrett, 42 § 486 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 788 to regntate it and to fix the price of the license fee at such sum as that body may deem best calculated to restrain the dangerous consequences of the traffic to the public peace and morals.^ In determining what such a fee shall be, it is proper and reasonable for the Legislature to consider, not only the expense merely of direct regulation, but of the incidental con- sequences that may be likely to subject the public to cost in consequence of the business licensed. The business is one that affects the public interest in manj^ ways and leads to many disorders. It has a powerful tendency to increase pauperism and crime. It renders a large force of officers essential and it adds to the expense of the courts and nearly all of the branches of civil administration. It cannot be questioned, therefore, if it is to be licensed by the public authorities, that it is legitimate and proper to take into consideration the question of the probable consequences, or that the payment to be exacted should be sufficient to cover all the incidental expenses to which the public are likely to be put on account of the business being carried on. All reasonable intendments must favor the fairness and justice of the fee thus fixed. It will not be held excessive unless it is manifestly something more than a mere fee for regulation.® We have already said that such a fee was not in anj* sense a tax for revenue. It is, however, an indirect tax which may be made effectual as a police regula- tion. A license upon the traffic in intoxicating liquors is an GStraub v. Gordon, 27 Ark. son, 78 Mo. 302; State v. Hardy, 625; Burch v. Savannah, 42 Ga. 7 Neb. 377; Pleuler v. State, 11 596; Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, Neb. 547; 11 N. W. 481; Adler 50 Ga. 530; People v. Thurber, v. Whitbeck, 44 0. St. 539; 9 N. 13 111. 554; St. Louis v. Wehring, E. 672; Aulanier v. Governor, 1 46 111. 393; Lovingston v. Board, Tex. 653; 'Commonwealth v. etc., 99 111. 564; Thomasson v. Byrnne, 20 Grat. (Va.) 165; State, 15 Ind. 449; Mitchell v. State v. French, 17 Mont. 54; 14 Williams, 27 Ind. 62; State v. Pac. 1078; 30 L. R. A. 415; Ter- Doe, 79 Ind. 9; Falmouth v. Wat- ritory v. Farnsworth, 5 Mont, son, 5 Bush. (Ky.) 560; Levi v. 303; 5 Pac. 869. Louisville, 97 Ky. 394; 30 S. W. e Cooley on Taxation, p. 409; 973; 28 L. R. A. 480; Ash v. Peo- Claussen v. Luverne, 103 Minn, pie, 11 Mich. 347; Chivers v. Peo- 491; 115 N. W. 643. pie, 11 Mich. 43; State v. Hud- 789 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. § 486 excise, and an excise is an indirect tax. Indirect taxation by way of tariffs, etc., has ever been regarded as a legitimate exercise of the taxing power. Such a fee or tax is imposed in the exercise of the rightful police power of the State and is an incident of legitimate police regulation." Hence, it is not within a constitutional prohibition against "local and special taxation for State purposes." Such a constitutional provision refers mainly to the general tax levied by the State. It is a restraint upon the otherwise discretionarj^ powers of the Legislature and prescribes a rule for its enforcement in authorizing the levy of taxes. It must be governed by that rule whether the levy is for the State at large or for a munic- ipal subdivision. Indirect taxation imposed not merely for the purpose of revenue but in the restraint of a particular business or calling, or as a license upon particular pursuits, or as mere police regulations, does not come within the spirit and meaning of such constitutional provisions.^ A license fee does not lose its character as such because it is called a "tax" in the statute authorizing its exaction." But if it be imposed merely for revenue then it becomes a tax.^^ 7 Anderson v. Kenns, etc., Co., "The power to license, as the 14 Ind. 199. means of regulating business, 8 Bright V. MeCullough, 27 Ind. means the power to charge a fee 223; Pleuler v. State, 11 Neb. therefor sufficient to defray the i547; 11 N. W. 481. expense of issuing the license." 9 Levy \. State, 161 Ind. 251; Laundry License Case, 22 Fed. 68 N. E. 172. 201; Uterminova v. Zekind, 95 10 Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. Iowa, 622; 64 N. W. 646; 29 418; 20 L. Ed. 449; Glasgow v. L. R. A. 734; 58 Am. St. 447. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479; St. Louis v. The Missouri law exacting a Spiegel, 75 Mo. 145; iState v. fee for inspection of beer imposes Bengschs, 170 Mo. 81; 70 S. W. a tax, no right of sale being given 710; Hancock v. Singer Mg. Co., under it. State v. Bixman, 162 62 N. J. L. 289; 41 Atl. 846; 42 Mo. 1 ; 62 S. W. 828; Parsons v. L. R. A. 852; Rohr v. Gray, 80 People, 32 Colo. 221; 76 Pac. 666; Md. 274; 30 Atl. 632; see Over- Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204; 74 by v. State, 18 Fla. 178; Ex parte Pac. 780. Pfirrmann, 134 Cal. 143; 66 Pac. The "mulct" tax of Iowa is a 205; St. Louis v. Western U. T. tax, and not a license; and it is Co., 148 U. S. 92; 37 L. Ed. 380; collectible by summary proceed- 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485. ings. Newton v. McKay (Iowa), § 48 / TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 790 Sec. 487. Uniformity of taxation. It is within the power of a State Legislature to tax the liquor traffic,'^ wholesale as well as retail;^- and a law pro- viding for the taxing of such traffic is not one to raise revenue, but simply one enacted in the exercise of the police power.^-' The power to impose such a tax exists independently and concurrently in the State and Federal Government, subject to constitutional restrictions; in the State government, subject to the exclusive right conferred on Congress to regulate inter- state comerce;''* and in the Federal Government, subject to the prohibition of any interference with the internal regula- tions of the States.^'' Such a tax is not a tax upon property 102 N. W. 827; Bolton v. McKay (Iowa), 102 N.W. 1131. It is presumed a liquor tax was properly levied, and levied at the time the law requires it to be lev- ied. Hubbell V. Polk Co., lOG Iowa, 618; 76 N. W. 854. Whisky refined by age into drinkable and marketable whisky is not "raw material" within the meaning of the Dow Liquor Law of Ohio exempting "raw mate- rial" of a distiller from taxation thereunder. Wash v. Lewis, 5 Ohio N. P. 391. Under the Bates Law of Ohio a brewing company selling liquors away from its brewery is engaged in trafficking in liquor, and liable to the tax imposed by that law, the law defining trafficking as "buying or procuring and selling of intoxicating liquors." Jung Brewing Co. v. Talbot, 59 Ohio St. 511; 53 N. E. 51. In Georgia State dispensary agents are not taxable; for they are governmental agents. Dispen- sary Com'rs v. Thornton, 106 Ga. 106; 31 S. E. 733. 11 Ex parte Marshall, 64 Ala. 266; Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449 ; Westinghausen v. People, 44 Mich. 265; 6 N. W. 641; Pveith- miller v. People, 4 Mich. 280; 6 N. W. 667; Portwood v. Ba-skett, 64 Miss. 213; 1 South. 105; Ad- ler v. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St. 539; 9 N. E. '59; Durach's Appeal, «2 Pa. St. 491; Kurth v. State, 86 Tenn. 134; 5 S. W. 593; Albrecht V. State, S Tex. App. 216. 1- Senior v. Rattcman, 44 Ohio St. 661; 11 N. E. 321. 13 Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449; State v. Wright, 14 Ore. 365; 12 Pac. 708. 14 Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 514; Dobbins v. Erie County, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 435; License Tax Cases, 5 How. (U. S.) 504; Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. (U. 'S.) 73; Pervear v. Massachusetts, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 475; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 4 IS. ij Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 419; Nathan v. Ix)uisiana, 8 How. (U. S.) 182; Woodruir v. Parham, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 123. 791 LICENSE PEES AND T.SJXES, § 487 but an indirect or excise tax, imposed not merely for the pur- pose of revenue, but in restraint of a particular business or calling, or as a license on a particular pursuit, or as a mere police regulation, and, consequently, is not subject to constitu- tional restrictions upon the power to tax property; such, for example, as that taxes shall be uniform and equal.^*' Ac- cordingly, it has been held that a statute imposing a special tax on a dealer in intoxicating liquors was not in violation of a constitutional provision that "taxation on property shall be ad valorem only, and uniform in all species of property taxed," the court holding that the tax was on the business of selling such liquor and not on the liquors sold.^^ It has also been held that a tax upon an occupation is not a tax upon property, although the amount and value of the stock in trade of the dealer is adopted as a standard ; ^^ or upon the value of the property;" or in any case when the tax is measured by the amount of the net earnings or income.-" Such taxes, how- ever, must be uniform and not discriminating in their opera- tion. "While this is true, it must be remembered that perfect accuracy cannot be had in apportioning such taxes. It has been said, and rightfully, that "perfectly equal and uniform taxation will remain an unattainable good as long as laws and governments and men are imperfect." Approximation to uniformity is all that can be had and this must be left to the judgment of the lawmaking power.-^ Whether such a tax is iG Henry v. State, 26 Ark. 523 ; ern U. T. Co. v. Mayer, 28 Ohio Straub v. Oordon, 27 Ark. 625; St. 521; Texas Banking Co. v. Ex parte Hurl, 49 Cal. 557; State, 42 Tex. fia6. Rome V. McWilliam, 52 Ga. 251; i7 Burch v. Savannah, 42 Ga. Walker v. Springfield, 94 111. 596. 364; Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. is Corson v. State, 57 Md. 251. 449; Leavenworth v. Booth, 15 i« Stat« v. Western U. T. Co., Kan. 628; New Orleans v. Kauf- 73 Me. 518. man, 29 La. Ann. 283; 29 Am. 20 Philadelphia Contributorship Rep. 283; Wintz v. Girardy, 31 v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. St. 48. La. Ann. 381; St. Louis v. Grwn, 21 Cooley on Taxation, p. 127; 7 Mo. App. 468; Ex parte Robin Commonwealth v. Savings Bank, son, 12 Neb. 263; State v. U. S., 5 Allen (Mass.) 428; Lowell v. etc., Ex. Co., 60 N. H. 219; Oliver, 8 Allen (Mass.) 247; Al- Standard, etc., Co. v. Attorney len v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174; Ould v. General, 46 N. J. Eq. 270; West- Richmond, 23 Gratt. (Va.) 464. § 487 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 792 just and equal or not is not a question of law for the eourts.-- If it were, the courts, by adopting a standard of rigid con- struction, might altogether put a stop to such taxation. The uniformity required in the operation of such a law is that which simply requires that the law shall bear equally in its burdens upon all persons standing in the same category. A law is uniform in its operation where every person who is brought within the regulation provided for is alike affected by the law. It must have uniform oneration upon all of those included within the class upon which it purports to operate.^' Therefore, a law which declares that all who sell liquors within five miles of a town or city shall pay one tax, and the keeper of a wayside inn or station another, is a uniform law within this meaning. Such a law is uniform as to each class and the classification is a reasonable one and within the power of a Legislature to make.-* Nor is a statute unconstitutional be- cause it levies a tax of eighty-five dollars on persons dealing in intoxicating liquors on lands, while fifty dollars is levied on persons following a like occupation on steamboats, although they may ply within the limits oF the same jurisdiction ; ^^ nor a law which makes a distinction between breweries and distilleries on the one hand, and saloons on the other; -® nor a law that distinguishes between malt liquors and those which, in their effect, are more intoxicating ; -^ nor a law which re- quires retail liquor dealers to pay a tax a year in advance, but permits the tax on other occupations to be paid quarterly and requires a license to pursue such occupations but permits others to be pursued without license : ^® nor is such a law un- constitutional because of the fact that other subjects or occu- 22 Cooley on Taxation, p. 126. 23 Kaliska v. Grady, 25 La. 23 Territory v. Connell, 2 Ariz. Ann. 576 ; State v. Rolle, 30 La. 339; Hack v. State, 44 Ohio St. Ann. 99 L 536; 9 N. E. 305; Senior v. Rat- 2g Anderson v. Brewster, 44 0, termann, 44 Ohio St. 661; 11 X. St. 576; 9 X. E. 682. E. 321; Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 27 Timm v. Harrison, 109 111. R. I. 50; Bishop v. Tripp, 15 R. 593. L 466 ; 8 Atl. C92. 28 Faher v. State, 27 Tex. App. 24 Territory v. Connell, 2 Ariz. 146; 11 S. W. 108. 339; 16 Pac. 209. 793 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. § 488 pations are not taxed.-'' "An excise tax on one kind of busi- ness only is not illegal for the discrimination; it is always to be conclusively presumed that the Legislature found good and controlling reasons impelling the action it has taken and that in view of all the circumstances which were known to its members, the tax which has been provided for is reasonable. ' ' ^^ Sec. 488. Liability for fee or tax. A license fee or tax cannot be collected from a person engaging in the liquor traffic without a license, where a license is necessary in order to engage in such traffic or sell intoxi- cating liquors, although he may be liable to punishment be- cause of having violated the statute.^^ A statute authorizing a city to collect a tax on all kinds of ' ' business ' ' not prohibited by law, followed by an ordinance levying a tax on all persons who "sell" intoxicating liquors and declaring the tax a debt payable from anyone who may engage in any "business" on which the tax is imposed, does not require the payment of a tax merely for the sale of liquor, but does require it for a person engaging in the "business" of selling liquors.^- In -9 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, so Cooley on Taxation, p. 125; 33 Fed. Rep. 121; Heny v. State, Northern Ind. R. Co. v. Connelly, 26 Ark. 523; Straub v. Gordon, 10 0. S. 159; People v. Brook- 27 Ark. 625; Goodwin v. Savan- lyn, 4 X. Y. 410; Decamp v. Eve- nah, 53 Ga. 414; Savannah v. land, 19 Barn. 81; Lusher v. Weed, 84 Ga. 683; 11 S. E. 235; Scites, 4 W. Va. 11. Weaver v. State, 89 Ga. G39; 15 si Chicago v. Enright, 27 111. S. E. 840; Bright v. McCullough, App. 559; O'Harra v. Cox, 42 27 Ind. 223; Fretvi^ell v. Troy, Miss. 496; State v. Adler, ©8 18 Kan. 271; State v. Valkmar, Miss. 487; 9 So. 645; State v. 20 La. Ann. 585; Yoiingblood v. Piezzo, 66 Miss. 426; 6 So. 316; Sexton, 37 Mich. 406; Holberg v. Druggist Cases, 89 Tenn. 449; 3 Macon, 55 Miss. 112; Pleuler v. S. W. 490; Cominonwealth v. Tay- iState, 11 Neb. 547; 10 N. W. lor (Ky.) ; 116 S. W'. 682. 481; Gattin v. Tarboro, 78 X. But in Idaho a sale of liquors Car. 119; Darrach's Appeal, 62 renders the vendor liable to the Pa. St. 491; State v. Columbia, county for the tax. Bingham <3 S. C. 8; Pullman, etc., Co. v. County v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., State, 64 Tex. 274; Slaughter v. 13 Idaho, 34; 88 Pac. 829. Commonwealth, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 32 Merced €o. v. Helm, 102 Cal. 776. 159; 36 Pac. 39D. §488 TRAFB^IC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 794 order to exact a liquor tax some law must be in force author- izing its exaction/'^ A statute may levy a tax for the State and authorize a county to levy a tax on the same business or person for the county."* The license fee or tax cannot be exacted for a period of time before the statute providing for it went into force.^'' A social club, selling only to its members, that takes out a United States revenue license, is liable to a liquor tax under a law imposing a privilege tax on a social club, incorporated or otherwise, selling intoxicating liquors and making the procurement of such revenue license prima facie evidence of liabilitv to the tax.^" "3 McCowan v. Davidson, 43 Ga. 480; Miller v. Minney, 31 Kan. 522; 3 Pac. 427; Parker v. Wayne Co., 104 N. C. 166; 10 S. E. 137. 34 Baker v. Panola Co., 30 Tex. 86; Parker v. Wayne Co., 104 X. C. 166; 10 S. E. 137. In Texas it has been held that a person selling liquor under the local option law is not liable for an occupation tax imposed by the statute on liquor dealers. Rath- burn V. State, 88 Tex. 281; 31 S. W. 189 (Texas Civ. App.); 32 S. W. 45. Exemption in North Carolina under Acts 1877, c. 156, § 12. Al- bertson v. Wallace, 81 K C. 479. 35 Tliibodeaux v. State, 69 Miss. 683; 13 So. 352. But it is permissible for a stat- ute to provide that licenses shall be annual ones and all bear a certain date, and require an ap- plicant to pay a full yearly li- cense fee; thereby requiring him to pay for a period of time ante- dating the actual issuance of his license. 3c Nashville Hermitage Club v. Shelton, 104 Tenn. 101; 56 S. W. 838. A solicitor of sales for the per- son owning the liquors is not lia- ble for license fees or taxes, though he might be fined for sell- ing liquor without his employer being licensed. Swords v. Le Blanc, 111 La. 416; 35 So. 622; Owensboro v. Fulds ( Ky. ) ; 102 S. W. 1184; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 627. Under U. S. Rev. St. § 3244 ( U. S. Comp., 1901, p. 2098), any per- son who "sells or offers for sale" malt liquors is subject to the spe- cial tax imposed on dealers, re- gardless of the fact of ownership. Western Express Co. v. United States, 141 Fed. 28; 76 C. C. A. 516. Under Ohio Rev. St., §§4364-9, the assessment of the tax should be made on the traffic, although carried on in violation of a city ordinance. Conwell v. Sears, 65 Ohio St. 49; 61 N. E. 155; and omitted taxes may be put on the tax duplicate. Markle v. New- ton, 64 Ohio St. 493; 60 N. E. 619. So in Iowa under Code § 1374. hi re Des Moines Union Ry. Co.. 137 Iowa, 730; 115 N. W. 740, 743; National, etc., Co. V. Board, 138 Iowa. 11; 115 N. W. 480; National, etc., Co. v. Board, 134 Iowa, 527; 111 N. W. 1009. 795 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. § 489 Sec. 489. Amount of fee or tax. Usually the statute fixes the amount of the fee or tax, and when that is clone a city cannot by ordinance increase the amount ; ^' but where a statute provided that after a certain date in the future the amount of the fee should not be less than a certain amount, it was held that the city might by ordi- nance provide for the issuance of a license before that date for less amount, and that it could not be successfully con- tended that it was the intent of the city to ev^de the law, and for that reason the ordinance was void.^^ If the amount be not fixed which a city may charere, it is said that it must be reasonable ; ^^ and whether the rate fixed amounts to pro- hibition is a question of fact ■*" to be determined by the court upon the face of the ordinance, and evidence on the question is not admissible/^ In one instance it was said that the court could not, as a matter of law, adjudge it prohibitive or unreasonable, for the common council is the better judge of that fact, and the court will not revise its action by a mere examination of the ordinance.*- If the amoimt is within the limits allowed by the statute no question can be raised as to its validity on that point." AVhere statutes did not restrict the amount of fees or taxes a city might impose or exact it has been held that the court would not assume that $50 per month was oppressive or unreasonable;*^ nor $30, but if a female be employed in the saloon $150 ; ■''' nor $500 per year ; *^ Assessing a cold storage com- 4 1 Merced Co. v. Fleming, 111 pany storing beer. In re Des Cal. 46; 43 Pac. 392; Berry v. Moines Union Ry., 137 Iowa, 730; Cramer, 58 N. J. L. 278; 39 Atl. 115 N. W. 740, 743. 201. 37 Drew Co. v. Bennett, 43 Ark. 42 Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind. 429; 364; In re Pittston, 7 Kulp. 527; Ex parte Hurl, 49 Cal. 557. Crestin v. Viroqua, 67 Wis. 314; 43 Dennehy v. Chicago, 120 111. 30 N. W. 515; see Jones v. Cxrady, 627; 12 N. W. 227. 25 La. Ann. 586. ** E-"' parte Guerrero, 69 Cal. ssSwarth v. People, 109 111. 88; 10 Pac. 261; Queen v. Sa- 621. terio, 1 Terr. L. R. 301 ($100 per 33 Cherry v. Shelbyville, 19 Ind. annum). 84. A fee of $1,000 to sell "near- 45 ^;c parte Felchin, 96 Cal. beer" was held reasonable. State 360; 31 Pac. 224; 31 Am. St. 223. V. Donnenberg (N. C), 66 S. E. Nor $700. Gaml)ill v. Erdrieli, 301. 143 Ala. 506; 39 So. 297. 40 Sweet V. Wabash, 41 Ind. 7. 4g Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind. 429. §489 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 796 nor $2,500 per anuum where theatrical performances are at- tached;*^ nor $1,000 per annum i'or a brewery's agency ;*** nor $1,000 per annum for a small city ; *^ nor $20,000 when the amount was fixed by statute.'^" The amount may be graded by statute according to the population of the city wherein the license is issued.'"' A city charter fixing the amount that may be exacted within its boundaries is not changed by a general law fixing another amount for the State generally.^- The addition of a small fee for the actual manual issuance of the license does not render the ordinance providing for it void.^' Wholesalers ot brewers cannot be charged retail license fees; "'* but whether or not the individual or corporation sought to be 47 Goldsmith v. New Orleans, 31 La. Ann. 646. 48 Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30; 36 N. E. 857; Schmidt V. Indianapolis, 168 Ind. 631; 80 N. E. 632. 49 Ex parte Hinkle, 104 Mo. App. 104; 78 S. A. 317; State v. Dannenberg (N. C), 66 S. E. 301 (for near-beer). 50 Glover v. State, 126 Ga. 594; 55 S. E. 592. 51 Foster v. Burt, 76 Ala. 229; People V. Medberrj', 17 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 8 ; 39 N. Y. Supp. 207 : Commonwealth v. 'Smoulter, 120 Pa. 137; 17 Atl. 532; 24 W. N. C. 48; Commonwealth v. Miller, 126 Pa. 157; 17 Atl. 623; Com- monwealth V. Shoup, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 289; State v. Keaough, 68 Wis. 135; 31 N. W. 723; People V. Hilliard, 40 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 589; 83 N. Y. Supp. 21; af- firmed 85 N. Y. App. Div. 507; 83 N. Y. Supp. 204; Hilliard v. Giese, 25 N. Y. App. Div. 222; 49 N. Y. Supp. 286; Lyman v. McGreivey, 159 N. Y. 561; 54 N. E. 1093; affirming 25 N. Y. App. Div. 68; 48 N. Y. Supp. 1035; People v. Lyman, 48 N. Y. App. Div. 484; 62 N. Y. Supp. 902; People V. Hilliard, 176 N. Y. 604; 68 N. E. 1122; Lyman v. McGrei- vey, 25 N. Y. App. Div. 68; 48 N. Y. Supp. 1035; 37 N. Y. App. Div. 66; 55 N. Y. Supp. 599; In re McGreivey, 161 N. Y. 645; 57 N. E. 1116; 37 N. Y. App. Div. '66; 55 N. Y. Supp. 599; Baker V. Bucklin, 22 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 560; 50 N. Y. Supp. 739; In re Sleenburgh, 24 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 1; 53 N. Y. Supp. 197; Lyman v. Bradsted, 20 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 629; 57 N. Y. Supp. 869; Com- monwealth V. Robinson, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 569; Petitfils v. Jean- erette, 52 La. Ann. 1005; 27 So. 358. 52 State V. Howe, 95 Wis. 530; 70 N. W. 670; Territory v. Mc- Pherson, 6 Dak. 27; 50 N. W. 351; In re Pittson, 7 Kulp. 527; Spann v. Lowndes Co., 141 Ala, 314; 34 So. 369. But see Fulton V. Blythe (Ky.), 30 S. W. 1018. 53 Moore v. Indianapolis, 120 Ind. 483; 22 N. E. 424. 54 Boliler V. Schneider, 49 Ga. 195; State v. Wecklering, 38 La. Ann. 36; New Orleans v. Clark, 42 La. Ann. 9; 7 So. 58. 797 LICENSE B'EES AND TAXES, §489 subjected to the fee or tax is a wholesale or retail dealer is a question of fact/"' A statute may provide a certain fee for a license to sell malt liquors, and provide that if the licensee sell alcoholic liquors he must pay a larger fee, and where such is the case "a single sale" of alcoholic liquor renders him liable to pay the larger fee/" The annual license may be reduced for a part of a year, if a statute so provides; but if not it is the same for a part of a year as for the entire year where all licenses expire on a fixed date." If other business be combined with the sale of liquors, a larger fee may be charged.''^ One amount may be charged by a town and another by a city/° A tax may be imposed upon distillers operating a rectifying plant in addition to the tax on distillers generally not operating such a plant/" Statutes sometimes permit the amount of the fee to be fixed by a popular vote ; " but under them the fee cannot be fixed so high as to prohibit the issuance of a license/- In case of a brewery, the amount of the tax may be made to depend upon the amount of beer brewed/^ V. Janesville, 90 Wis. 157; 62 N. W. 933; State v. Robbins, 54 N. J. L. 566; 25 Atl. 471; reversing Middleton v. Robbins, 53 N. J. L. 555; 22 Atl. 481; Sargent v. Lit- tle, 72«N. H. 555; 58 Atl. 44; Xormoyle v. Latah Co., 5 Idaho, 19; 46 Pac. 831. 62 Berry v. Cramer, 58 N. J. L. 278; 33 Atl. 201. A levy of "a tax of one-half of the State occupation tax, as lev- ied by the hiws of the State^" is a sufficiently definite levy by a board authorized to make the levy. Wade v. State, 22 Tex. App. 629; 3 S. W. 786; Parker V. Wayne Co., 104 N. C. 106; 10 S. E. 137. fis In re Pittsburg Brewing Co., 16 Pa. Super. Ct. 215. As to rental value of a house as fixing the amount of the liquor fee, see Foster v. Lambe, 3 Que- 55Bohler v. Schneider, 49 Ga. 195. 56 Simpson v. Seuriss, 2 Ohio C. D. 246; Gambill v. Erdrich, 143 Ala. 506; 39 So. 297. 57 Foster v. Burt, 76 Ala. 229; Kusta V. Kimberly, 10 Ohio Dec. 789; 2 Wkly. L. Bull., 379; Shif- lett V. Grimsley, 104 Va. 424; 51 S. E. 838; Engelthaler v. Linn Co., 104 Iowa, 293; 73 X. W. 578; O'Brien Co. v. Mahon, 120 Iowa, 539; 102 N. W. 446; David V. Hardin Co., 104 Iowa, 204; 73 N. W. 576. 58 New Orleans v. Clark, 42 La. Ann. 9; 7 So. 58; Goldsmith V. New Orleans, 31 La. Ann. 646. 59 Commonwealth v. McGroerty, 148 Pa. 600; 24 Atl. 91. 60 Arey v. Rowan Co., 138 N. C. 500; 51 S. E. 41. 61 McGingan v. Belmount, 89 Wis. 637; 62 N. W. 421; State §490 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 798 Sec. 490. Payable in money. A license fee or tax is payable in money; it cannot be otherwise paid, as by taking the note of the licensee ; '^* but a city may provide that the note of the applicant may be taken instead of money."' Unless payment by note be authorized by statute, one taken for the fee is void;"" and the officer bee, S. C. 328, and Marcotte v. Lambe, 4 Quebec, S. C. 2. A tax may be based upon the total amount of the dealer's pur- chase; and for that amount there cannot be deducted the United States Internal Revenue tax. Williams v. Iredell Co., 132 N. C. 300; 43 S. E. 8D6. In Georgia under Laws 1905, p. 30, sec. 2, par. 28, a brewery company paying the special tax imposed by that statute is not liable to pay an additional tax for an agency for storing beer located in another county. Whit- tlesey V. Acme Brewing Co., 127 Ga. 208; 5G S. E. 299. Where a statute provides that the amount of tax shall be ascer- tained by the amount of liquors sold, the amount of sales of other articles at the same time cannot be considered. State v. New Or- leans, etc.. Club, 116 La. 46; 40 So. 526. A statute fixing a State license at one-half of the yearly amount for six months or less does not require a municipality to pursue the same rule in fixing the amount to be paid for a city li- cense. Fuselier v. St. Laundry Parish, 107 La. 221: 31 So. 678. The amount of licensee fees does not have to be fixed annually by a municipality, although only one annual license can be issued. People V. Mount, 186 111. 560; 58 X. E. 300; afiirming 87 111. App. 194. The South Carolina Dispensary Law of 1907 imposed a license fee on a manufacturer or bottler of beer of $3,000 where he made or bottled from twenty to forty barrels per day; if he made over fort}' barrels a day, then $5,000. A biewery paid a fee of $3,000, but one day in the year it exceeded forty barrels. It was held liable for $5,000, though its daily aver- age was less than forty barrels. German Bre\\ ing Co. v. Rutledge (S. C), 65 S. E. 230. 6-iZielke v. State, 42 Neb. 750; 60 X. W. 1010; Richards v. Stogs- dell, 21 Ind. 74; Doran v. Phill- ips, 47 Mich. 228; 10 N. W. 350; Dickson v. Gamble, 16 Fla. 687; Lee v. Roberts, 3 Okla. 106; 41 Pac. 595; McLanahan v. Syra- cuse, 18 Hun, 259. Contra, App- ling V. McWilliams, 69 Ga. 840; Staley v. Columbus, 36 Mich. 38; Hencke v. Standiford, 66 Ark. 535 ; 52 S. A. 1 ; Newson v. Tahi- gahen, 30 Miss, 414. 65 Powers V. Decatur, 54 Ala. 214; Fulton v. Blythe, 17 Ky. 341; 30 S. W. 1018; Searcy v. Lawrenceburg, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1920; 50 S. W. 534. ii« Doran v. Phillips, 47 Mich. 228; 10 X. W. 350; Ristine v. Clements, 31 Ind. App. 338; 66 799 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. §491 taking it and issuing the license is liable for the fee."' But in Alabama and Georgia such a note has been held valid and collectible."^ A statute providing that taxes may be paid with city orders does not authorize their use in payment of license fees, for license fees are not taxes.'''* Sec. 491. Pajrment in advance. Where a statute requires the fee for a license to be paid before it is issued, it must be paid for the entire period of the license and be paid in advance, or the license will be void.^** No officer can waive such a provision of the statute.''^ Pay- ment in part is not sufficient, even pro tanto.''- Not infre- quently statutes require a license fee to be tendered with the application, and when that is the ease a license may be denied unless the fee for it accompanies the application." If, for reason of defects in the proceedings, a license be not issued, but the money retained by the State, on perfecting the pro- ceedings the applicant is entitled to a license for the remainder of the term without further payment.^* The mere fact that ^^. E. 924; McWilliams v. Phill- ips, 51 Miss. 1S>6; Craig v. Smith, 31 Mo. App. 286. 6" McWilliams v. Phillips, 51 Miss. 196. 68 Appling V. McWilliams, 09 Ga. 840; Powers v. Decatur, 54 Ala. 214. 69 East St. Louis v. Wehring, 46 III. 392. 70 Handy v. People, 29 111. App. 99; Binghan Co. v. Fidelity, etc., Co., 13 Idaho, 34; 88 Pac. 829; Fry V. Kaessner, 48 Neb. 133; 66 N. W. 1126; Backhaus v. Penple, 87 111. App. 173; Munsel v. Tem- ple, 3 Gil. (111.) 93; Hencke v. iStandiford, 66 Ark. 535; 52 S. W. 1 ; Regina v. Stechan, 20 C. P. (Can.) 182; In re Phillips, 82 Neb. 45; 116 N. W. 681; Doran V. Phillips, 47 Mich. 228; 10 N. W. 350; Alexander v. State, 77 Ark. 294; 91 S. W. 181; State v. Lincoln, 6 Neb. 12. ■71 McWilliams v. Phillips, 51 Miss. 196; Zielke v. State, 42 Neb. 750; 60 N. W. 1010; Ristine V. Clements, 31 Ind. App. 338; 66 N. E. 924. "Spake V. People, 89 111. 017. In a case of a city violating its own ordinance by its officers issuing the license when a part only of the fee was paid, it was held estopped to seize the stock of the licensee in the hands of a pur- chaser for the remainder due. Wicker v. Siesel, 80 Ga. 724; 6 S. E. 817. "3 Evans v. Commonwealth, 95 Ky. 231; 24 S. W. 632. 74 State V. Cornwell, 12 Neb. 470; 11 N. W. 72D. H92 TRAP^PIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 800 a license fee is paid does not authorize the issuance of a license where the law forbids its issuance, nor does the license issued protect the holder.'^^ Where a statute provided that the fee should be paid wathin fifteen days after the license was granted, a failure to pay it within that time was held to be a revocation of the grant.'^" If a statute does not prohibit the granting of a license before the fee is paid, the licensing board may grant it and provide that it shall not be issued until such fee be paid.'^ It is no excuse in the licensee that he had arranged with another to pay, when he is on trial for a sale without a license or having made a sale "without having first paid the fee/^ Sec. 492. To what officer payable. Fees and taxes must be paid to the officer designated by law to receive them.''^ A municipality may provide, in the absence of a statute on the subject, to whom the fee shall be paid.^° Where a statute expressly authorized the sheriff of 75 Hodges V. Metcalfe Co., 117 Ky. 619; 78 S. W. 177, 460; 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1706. 76 In re Umholtz, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 450; 43 W. N. C. 495. 77 /» re Phelps, 82 Neb. 45; 116 N. W. 681. If an officer by mistake accepts a license fee he may notify the person paying it of that fact ; and the payment confers no right to a license. Chicago v. O'Hare, 124 111. App. 290. 78 Meroney v. State (Tex. Civ. App.), 92 S. W. 844. A community cannot determine for itself wlietlier a liquor tax shall be collected. Doran v. Phill- ips, 47 Mich. 228; 10 X. W. 350. Where a license fee must be paid within fifteen days after the application has been granted or the grant will be revoked and no license issued, the court has no power to relieve him from his de- fault to pay by extending the time beyond that fixed by the statute. In re Umholtz's License, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 450; 43 W. N. C. 495. 79 Williams v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush. 304; Youngblood v. Sex- ton, 32 Mich. 406; 20 Am. Rep. 654; Hight v. Fleming, 74 Ga. 592; Severance v. Kelly, 86 Ky. 522; 6 S. W. 386; Thibodeaux v. State, 69 Miss. 683; 13 So. 352; Doran v. Phillips, 47 Mich. 228; 10 N. W. 350; Stevenson v. Deal, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 212. 80 Amador Co. v. Kennedy, 70 Cal. 458; 11 Pac. 757; Amador Co. v. Isaacs, 11 Pac. 758; In re Lawrence, 69 Cal. 608; 11 Pac. 217. 801 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. §492 the county to collect the tax, and another one provided for a revenue agent to collect delinquent revenues of the State, it was held that the latter could not, in the first instance, collect the tax and could not proceed against the tax debtor for viola- tion of the law until the sheriff negligently failed or refused to collect it.^^ A statute requiring a saloon keeper to procure a license "from the county treasurer of the proper city or county" and to pay a tax "to the treasurer of the proper county for the use of the Commonwealth" requires the pay- ment to be made to the county treasurer and not to the city treasurer, and he must also issue the license.*- 81 State V. Thibodeaux, C9 Miss. 92; 10 So. 58. 82 Stevenson v. Deal, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 212. Under an authprity given a court of chancery to enjoin the collector of an illegal tax, it may ei.join the collection of an illegal license tax. Portwood; v. Basket, 64 Miss. 213; 1 So. 105. Mere failure of an officer to col- lect the license fee does not re- lease the surety on the licensee's bond of his liability to pay the fee. O'Brien Co. v. Mahon, 12G Iowa, 539; 102 X. W. 440. The officer collecting the fee is liable on his bond for it. Bing- ham Co. V. Fidelity, etc., Co., 13 Idaho, 34; 88 Pac. 829. Liability of city for fees of coun- ty treasurer under Iowa "mulct" law. Waverly Bremer Co. ( Iowa ) , 101 N. W. 874. Unless the law provides that the collecting officer shall receive fees for collecting liquor license fees, he is entitled to none. Pitts- burgh V. Anderson, 7 Pa. Dist. Rep. 714; Sandoval v. Meyers, 8 N. M. 636; 45 Pac. 1128. The court cannot impose upon a collecting officer the duty of holding a fee pending litigation over it. Davis v. Patterson, 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 479. If a collecting officer have the poAver to arrest a licensee for fail- ure to pay his license tax; and he levy on property to satisfy such tax, but a United States rev- enue officer likewise seizes such property for taxes due the United States, the collecting officer may then arrest the licensee for his failure to pay the tax, if he can find no other property. Com- monwealth V. Byrne, 20 Gratt. 165. A community cannot direct the tax officer not to collect the tax. Doran v. Phillips, 47 Mich. 228; 10 X. W. 350. Some times there is no penalty for sales without a license, but merely one for sales without hav- ing paid the ta.x. Gorman v. State, 38 Tex. 165. A power given to trustees to is- sue a license by implication gives them power to receive the tax, and it may be paid to the clerk of the board. Williams v. Com- monwealth, 13 Bush. 304; Love- §§493,494 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 802 Sec. 493. Suit to collect. In the case of a city a suit may be maintained by it to collect a license fee due it according to the provisions of an ordinance.^^ But it cannot impose by ordinance an attorney's fee for its collection unless expressly authorized so to do by statute.** If it is made the duty of au officer to collect a license tax, he cannot maintain an action to recover the amount due unless some statute authorizes it.*^ If the fee is due the State it is said that the State may sue for it.*® In all in- stances if the tax impose a personal liability, suit may be maintained to collect it.*^ Sec. 494. Tax lien — Landlord's property — Prospective statute. What was known as the "Dow Law" provided for the assessment of an annual tax upon the liquor traffic, and that the assessment, together with any increase thereof, should attach as a lien upon the real property on which the business was conducted and should be paid at the times for the pay- joy V. Commonwealth, 13 Ky. L. v. Xutt, 118 Ga. 257; 45 S. E. Rep. (abstract) 976; Caldwell v. 269. Grimes, 7 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) So in Michigan, Wood v. Thom- 601. as, 38 Mich. 680; and in Virginia 83 Hall V. Bastrop, 11 La. Ann. Commonwealth v. Byrne, 20 603; Sacramento v. Dillman, 102 Gratt. 165. Cal. 107; 36 Pac. 385. (How- 84 Hunter v. Lisso, 35 La. Ann. ever, in this case the statute ex- 230. pressly avithorized the suit.) Ex ss state v. Fragiercomo, 70 parte Benjamin, 65 Cal. 310; 40 Miss. 799; 14 So. 21; O'Brien Co. Pac. 23; Amite City v. Clements, v. Mahon, 126 Iowa, 539; 102 N. 24 La. Ann. 27; State v. Flem- W. 446; Hencke v. Standiford, 66 ing, 112 Ala. 179; 20 So. 840. Ark. 535; 52 S. W. 1; Bingham Contra, Chicago v. Enright, 27 Co. v. Fidelity, etc., Co., 13 Idaho, 111. App. 559; State v. Adler, 68 34; 88 Pac. 829; see Thibodeaux Miss. 487; 9 So. 645; State v. v. State, 69 Miss. 683; 13 So. 352. Piazza, 66 Miss. 426; 6 So. 316. 86 Auglanier v. Governor, 1 Tex. Under the Georgia Code (in 653; Carroll Co. v. Lee, 127 Iowa, 1885), §886, a tax collector 230; 103 X. W. 101; State v. could issue an execution for a liq- White, 115 La. 779; 40 So. 44. uor tax that was unpaid. Hight s7 Marshall Co. v. Knoll v. Fleming, 74 Ga. 592; Brewer (Iowa), 69 X. W. 1146. 803 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. § 494 meiit of other taxes. The act made no provision as to when it should become operative. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the statute was prospective. In so deciding the court said : " It is presumed that the Legislature designed these sections to be prospective in their operation so as not to impair existing rights. The settled rule is that whenever an act of the Legislature can be so construed and applied as to avoid conflict with the Constitution, and give it the force of law, such construction will bo adopted by the courts. In deter- mining whether the assessment in question would operate as a valid lien upon the owner's premises, it is material to inquire as to the conditions under which the tenant is in possession. If the real property on or in which the business is conducted is held by the tenant under a lease for a term made prior to the passage of the statute, the provisions for a lien in the second section would not operate. It might well be considered an unauthorized interference with private property, and con- trary to the legislative intent, to subject the freehold of a lessor for assessments against the business of a lessee, over which the lessor could exercise no control, during the term granted under a pre-existing lease. But, in the case at bar, the occupant had no written lease and occupied the premises only as a monthly tenant. After the passage of the statute and before the commencement of the original action, his term had expired, and he had become a tenant at sufferance. At common law he had only a naked possession, and no estate which he could transfer or transmit, or which was capable of enlargement by release, nor was he entitled to notice to quit. He held by the laches of the landlord, who miffht enter and put an end to the tenancy when he pleased. Holding over, as the tenant did, after the month of May, the plaintiff in error could have resorted, at her option, to the statutory remedy of forcible entry and detainer. She was not, therefore, in the position of a lessor whose premises are placed beyond his control by a lease executed before the passage of the statute, but she had it in her power to terminate the tenancy and thus prevent the assessment from becoming a charge upon her property. If she elected to allow her tenant to hold over after § 494 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING IJQUORS. 804 his interest was determined, and to permit the relation of landlord and tenant to be renewed, and the premises were thereafter used by the tenant in the business of trafficking in. intoxicating liquors, it w^ould be presumed that she so acted in full view of the statutory lien that would thereby be fastened upon the premises."*^ A like construction was placed by the Supreme Court of Michigan upon an act of the Legislature postponing all liens, mortgages, conveyances and incumbrances to the lien of a liquor tax, created by the act, and in so deciding the court said: "It is true the language is general, but it is still subject to the rule of interpretation which imputes an intention against retrospective action unless the terms clearly indicate an intention in favor of it. And surely, before venturing to assume the existence of any such purpose, it would be necessary to find the will of the Legis- lature very distinctly expressed in favor of making new tax levies have preference over law'ful securities given before the statute. The provision, then, giving superiority to the tax process over 'liens, mortgages, conveyances and incumbrances' cannot be held to apply to 'liens, mortgages, conveyances or incumbrances' created before the act was passed."**^ Under the Ohio Dow Law if the lessee sell any other intoxicating liquor than malt liquor he is liable to an increased amount of taxes, and these increased taxes become a lien on the prem- ises ; "° and this is true of sales made in violation of the terms of the lease forbidding all sales, even though the sales be made without the knowledge of the lessor or owner of the premises.®^ Where an ordinance provided payment of the fee in advance, but the mayor and council issued the license on part payment in advance, it was held that the city could not subject the licensee's stock in trade to the payment of the remainder of the fee after it had passed into the hands of a hona fide pur- chaser without notice of such unpaid remainder.^- Liens 8s Anderson v. Brewster, 44 0. '-'i Simpson v. Serviss, 2 Ohio C. St. 576; 9 N. E. 683. D. 240. 80 Finn v. Haynes, 37 :Micli. 03. "2 Wicker v. Siesel, 80 Ga. 724; !'(' Simpson v. Serviss, 2 Ohio i\ G S. E. 817. D. 246. 805 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. § 494 created by a sale of liquor by a lessee does not affect the rights of a prior lessee."'^ If the premises are liable to a tax lien and by an unlawful sale the lessee has forfeited his lease, and he is insolvent, the lessor may bring an action to enjoin him from continuing the saloon and to have the lease declared forfeited."^ A statute may make a liquor tax a prior lien, though subsequent in date, to the lien of a mortgage previously executed thereon, and it Avill be so even though the premises, at the time the mortgage was executed, had never been used for the sale of liquor, were not adapted to that end, and the mortgagee did not know it was the intention of the owner to use or lease them for that purpose."^ But it has been held that a law cannot provide for a tax lien superior to a lien on the premises placed there before its enactment."" The amount x)f the tax is not determined by the value of the prop- erty, and no rebate of it can be had because of its small valua- tion."' If a surety on the licensee's bond in Iowa cause the premises to be sold under the supposed lien, and he become the purchaser, he cannot recover back the payment when it is dis- covered afterwards that the lien is void, because his obliga- tion to pay the tax is a personal one and he is liable regardless of the validity of the lien. In such an instance a statute pro- viding that when by the wrongful act of the county treasurer 93Moser v. .Stebel, 29 Ohio Cir. premises leased before its enact- Ct. Eep. 487. ment, where sales were made af- 04Moser v. Stebel, 29 Ohio Cir. ter such enactment.) Ct. Rep. 487. yo Peoples, etc., Ass'n v. Ilaii- 93 Pioneer Trust Co. v. Stich, son, 7 Ohio Dec. 179; 5 Ohio N. 71 Ohio St. 459; 73 N. E. 520. P. 162. See Burfiend v. Hamil- Kee David v. Hardin Co., 104 ton, 20 Mont. 343; 51 Pac. 161, Iowa, 204; 73 N. W. 576. and Ferry v. Deneen, 110 Iowa, What is sufficient "notice to 290; 82 N. W. 424. the owner" that his lessee is 97 Ferry v. Deneen, 110 Iowa, selling liquor thereon, so as to 290; 82 X. W. 424. render the leased premises liable Under the Iowa Code, §§ 2432, to the liquor tax because of such 2448, the liquor tax is a personal unlawful sale, see David v. Hardin obligation of the licensee and the Co., 104 Iowa, 204; 73 X. W. 576; lien operates merely as an aid to /« re Smith, 104 Iowa, 199; 73 X. collection. Guedort v. Emmet W. 605. (Statute applies to Co., 116 Iowa, 40 j 89 X. W. 85. § 495 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 806 land is sold on wliich no tax is due the county shall hold the purchaser harmless has no application."* But the lessee's tax is not the personal obligation of the lessor, though his leased property is liable to the lien."" The lien may not be foreclosed by a proceeding in equity/ unless such a remedy is given by statute. - Sec. 495. Disposition of fees and taxes collected. The disposition of the money paid as fees or taxes for licenses is entirely controlled by local statutes, and no general principles of much value can be deduced from the cases on the subject. Sometimes statutes divide the monies received between two overlapping municipalities — as between a county and a city or town within it — or as between a city, town or county and the State. Whenever that is the case the munic- ipality collecting the money is liable to the other municipality, or to the State, as the case may be, for its proportion of it, and suit may be maintained therefor.'' Mandamus lies where there is no dispute as to the amount to compel the officer or municipality receiving money to pay over the proper share to the municipality entitled to it.* If by mistake more be paid over than should have been, the municipality thus overpaying may reimburse itself out of the next monies received which is payable over to the payee municipality."' But if a county treasurer is the agent of a city within the county to collect its license fees, and he fails to account to the city for all he collects, the city cannot withhold funds of the county coming into its hands in an amount equal to the fees it has not received. It must look to the county treasurer and his sureties for the ssGuedert v. llnimet Co., 116 "Brown v. Aberdeen, 4 Dak. Iowa, 40; 89 X. W. 85. 402; 31 X. W. 735; Fox Lake v. 99 Carroll Co. v. Ley, 127 Iowa, Village of Fox Lake, 62 Wis. 486; 230; 103 X. W. 101. 22 X. W. 584. 1 Crawford Co. v. Laub, 110 4 People v. Decatur Tp., 33 Iowa, 355; 81 X. W. 500. Mich. 335; East Saginaw v. Sagi- 2 People, etc., Ass'n v. Hanson, naw Co., 44 Mich. 273 ; 6 X. W. 7 Ohio Dec. 179; 5 Ohio X. P. 684. 162. 5 Gros.se v. Wayne Co., 85 Mich. 44; 48 X. W. 153. 807 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. §495 delinquent amount.*' A city is not compelled to pay over license fees it has received under void licenses, and if an officer having no authority so to do has issued the license and received the fees he cannot be compelled to account for them.'^ An order of the council is not necessary to authorize the city treasurer to pay over to the county or State the amount due it where a statute provides he shall pay it to the county.^ Under a constitutional provision that all license monies shall be paid over to the county and be by it appro- priated to the support of the schools of its respective school districts, the monies belong to the county and not to the school districts.'' When it is made the duty of a county treasurer to collect all fees for licenses issued by a city or in a city, and pay over a certain portion or all of them to such city, the county has no interest in the proportion to be paid over.^° sMarquett Co. v. Ishpeming, 49 Mich. 244; 13 N. W. 009. 7 Hennepin Co. v. Robinson, 16 Minn. 381. 8 Winona v. Whipple, 24 Minn. Gl; Commonwealth v. Martin, 170 Pa. St. 118; 32 Atl. 624. A general law directing that all license fees collected by cities he paid over to the county has no application to a city acting under a special charter and pro- viding that the fees it shall col- lect sliall be devoted by it to a particular purpose. Aberdeen v. Sanderson, 8 S. & M. 663; unless the express language of the gen- eral law requires it, or unless the tenor of the act is such as to show that was the intent of the Legis- lature. State Board v. Aberdeen, 56 Miss. 518; Deposit v. Deve- reux, 8 Hun, 317; State v. Spo- kane, 2 Wash. St. 40; 25 Pac. 903: People V. Williams, 29 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 463; 61 N. Y. Supp. 983; Hunt v. New York, 47 N. Y. App. 295; 62 N. Y. Supp. 184; People v. Williams, 162 N. Y. 240; 56 N. E. 625, reversing 47 N. Y. App. Div. 88; 62 N. Y. Supp. 130; Trustees v. Lewis Co. (Ky.), 46 S. W. 1; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 369; State v. Bailer, 91 Minn. 186; 97 N. W. 670; State V. Seattle (Wash.), 71 Pac. 712. a State v. Fonton, 29 Neb. 348; 45 N. W. 464. 10 Commonwealth v. Martin, 170 Pa. St. 118; 32 Atl. 624; South Bethlehem v. Hemingway, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 103. Usually the payment over of the fees by the collecting officer will not be enjoined, being a revenue law. Balogh v. Lyman, 6 N. Y. App. Div. 271; 3^ N. Y. Supp. 780. As between town and township occupying the same territory, see State V. Slack, .-)2 N. J. L. 113; 18 Atl. 687. § 495 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 808 Whether or not the officer receiving the fee should at once pay it over to the treasurer or officer entitled to receive it depends upon the statute. Thus, if the fee is payable when the application is made for a license, then it should be paid into the treasury ; ^^ but if the money remains the property of the applicant until the license is issued, then the money cannot be used until that event. ^-^ If an officer receiving the fees paj' it to the wrong officer of a municipality — as to the township road supervisor when he should have paid it to the township treasurer — he may be compelled to pay it over, even though it has been applied by the officer receiving it to the actual purposes of the municipality as required by statute.' ' A statute requiring a division of fees collected by a county be- tween it and the State is not invalid on the ground that the latter is at no expense incident to the enforcement of the liquor statute." Unless some statute devotes the license fees and taxes to a particular object they fall into the general fund of the municipality or State, as the case may be, and may be used to pay its obligations generally ; '^ and the State Legis- lature has absolute control over it in the absence of a consti- tutional prohibitive provision.' ° But if the Constitution devotes the fees to a particular purpose the Legislature cannot 11 Trainor v. Multuoma, 2 Or. able to a school district therein 214. whose territory extends beyond 12 State V. Lincoln, 6 Xeb. 12. the city limits. School District 13 Krzykeva v. Croninger, 200 v. Twin Falls, 13 Idaho, 471; 90 Pa. 359; 49 Atl. 979. Pac. 735. Instate V. Buechler (S. D.), 72 i^Hawesville v. Board, 99 Ky. X. W. 114. 292; 35 S. W. 1034; Mt. Carmel In Iowa, under Laws 1894, c. v. Wabash Co., 50 111. 69; Trainor 62, § 14, license fees are payable v. Multnomah, 2 Or. 214; State to the municipality in which the v. Seattle (Wash.), 71 Pac. 712. saloon is located, but a school- i6 Rock Co. v. Edgerton, 90 district township is not such a Wis. 288; 63 N. W. 291; Church- municipality. District Tp. v. ill v. Herrick, 32 Wis. 357 (used Frahm, 102 Iowa, 5; 70 N. W. to pay expense of keeping pau- 721. pers) ; Flannigan v. Wilkesbarre, Money collected in a city pay- 10 Kulp. 100 (keeping roads of able to the trustees of a school township in repair), district within its limits is pay- 809 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. § 496 divert them from it; '" nor can a city divert the fund from an object designated by a statute/^ Sec. 496. Refunding fees or taxes paid under void or illegal ordinance or statute. Every person is chargeable with a knowledge of what is the law and he cannot plead his ignorance of it in order to escape an engagement into which he has entered or the liability for an act he has performed. Money paid in pursuance to a void ordinance or statute is money voluntarily paid, and it cannot be recovered back. This is true of money paid under such a statute or ordinance to secure a license, and the licensee does not pay it involuntarily. "It cannot be maintained," said the Supreme Court of Indiana, ' * either on reason or authority, that an individual who pays a demand, with a full knowledge of all the facts, in the belief that it is a legal duty for him to do so, pays it involuntarily. Nor will an individual be heard to say that he was coerced to do that which he believed the law required of him. The law Avill presume that every citizen freely and voluntarily does every duty which he be- 17 Murphy v. Landron, 7G S. C. ers, 8 N. M. 573; 45 Pac. 1128. 21- 56 S. E. 850. See also Stroutsburg v. Sliick, 24 18 Eminence v. Wilson, 103 Ky. Pa. Super. Ct. 442. 326; 45 S. W. 81; 20 Ky. L. Other cases construing local Rep. 29 ; Trustees v. Lewis Co. statutes are Frame v. State, 53 (Ky. ), 40 N. W. 1; 20 Ky. L. Ohio St. 311; 45 N. E. 5; Mar- Rep. 369; Winnecone v. Winne- quett County v. Ishpeming, 49 conne, 122 Wis. 348; 99 N. W. Mich. 244; 13 N. W. 609; Essex 1055. County v. Barber, 2 Halst. (N. Under a general statute provid- J. ) G4 ; Kilgore v. Commonwealth, ing that the county treasurer 94 Pa. 495; State v. Brattlelx)ro, "shall collect all taxes and li- 68 Vt. 520; 35 Atl. 472; Plain- censes, and shall receive four per field v. Plainfield, 67 Wis. 526; centum of the amount collected" 30 N. W. 672. "remaining unpaid," it was held If a county treasurer illegally that he could not retain four per- deduct fees for collecting a tax centum on license fees that had due a city, the county is not lia- to be paid before the license was ble to such city. Zoo City v. issued, because they did not "re- Woodbury County (Iowa), 122 main unpaid." Sandoval v. Mey- Pac. 940. §496 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 810 lieves it imposes upon him, and, when it is admitted that there was no fraud, no personal exaction, nothing but the passage and publication of the ordinance — which was done in good faith, and which both parties recognized as valid — then it follows, au a conclusion of law, that the payment was volun- tary." *'If the appellee [the licensee] believed the ordinance valid," continued the court, "he recognized it as imposing on him a just obligation, and concurring in the wholesome doc- trine of the law, that everyone is under a moral obliga- tion to comply with the law of the community in w^hich he lives, he made his application, received his license, paid the price stipulated, under a conviction of legal duty, freely, and with an unconstrained will. When, therefore, the premise is admitted that the appellee believed the ordinance to be a valid enactment, the conclusion unavoidably follows that he did not pay under an apprehension of legal proceed- ings, but from a con\action of legal duty. " " It is well settled, ' ' the court still continuing, "that the mere existence of the ordinance would not render the payment compulsory. The money must have been exacted by the appellee under a threat of prosecution, and the money must have been unwillingly paid, under protest. It is well settled that a mere apprehen- sion of legal proceedings is not sufficient to make a payment compulsor\% and that where there is a threatened prosecution the payment must be made under protest." "If, then, after the passage of the ordinance, the parties had arrived at dif- ferent conclusions as to its validity, neither one could have reached or affected the other without first appealing to the court, and whenever persons are in that situation they are on an equal footing." "If the ordinance in question had been valid, as both the parties believed, then the money would have been la^^'fully paid upon a legal demand. If, however, the ordinance was invalid, as it was held to be, then the appellee, when sued for failure to comply with the provisions, could have defeated the action by showing the invalidity of the ordi- nance. There was no pressing and controlling necessity for prompt and immediate payment on the part of the appellee, for he could have waited the decisions of the court without 811 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. §496 sustaining loss or suffering inconvenience."^^ In a subse- quent case, in the same State, it was alleged in the complaint to recover back the money paid for a license that it was paid "for the purpose of avoiding the fines, penalties and for- feitures provided in the [license] ordinance for the violation of its provisions, and to save" the plaintiff from "arrest and imprisonment for the violation of the ordinance, as provided by the statute laws of the State of Indiana [he] was com- pelled to pay and did pay to the treasurer of" the town, "as provided for in the ordinance, the sum of fifty dollars for a license to sell intoxicating liquors." This allegation was held not to show an involuntary payment, and that the fee could not be recovered back.-° 19 Ligonier v. Ackerman, 46 Ind. 652; 15 Am. Rep. 323. This case has a very .thorough discus- sion of tlie affect of a voluntary payment of money and the riglit to recover it back; and many cases are reviewed and cited, among which are the following of the many: Cohaba v. Burnett, 34 Ala. 400; Riclimoud v. Judali, 5 Leigh. 305; Harvey v. Olney, 42 111. 336; Elston v. Cliicago, 40 111. 514; Baltimore v. Leffer- man, 4 Gill. (Md.), 425; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268 ; Baker V. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 534; Taylor v. Board, 31 Pa. St. 73; Allentown v. Saeger, 20 Pa. St. 421; Cook V. Boston, 9 Allen, 393; Jenks v. Lima Tp., 17 Ind. 326; Morris v. Baltimore, 5 Gill. (Md.), 244; Robinson v. Charles- ton, 2 Rich. 317; Phillips v. Jef- ferson Co., 5 Kan. 412; Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick. 7; Joyner v. Cush, 567. The court distinguishes the case from a payment to secure a release of property: "Where one person has in his own hands the property of another, wliich he re- fuses to surrender, except upon the condition of the payment of an illegal or exorbitant demand, it can be well said that he has an undue advantage. The pos- session of the property may be a matter of such moment to him that to await the law's delay would be ruinous; but where an individual is in the possession of his projjerty, and asserts the right to control his use of it, if that claim can only be enforced by legal proceedings, no case can be found whicli holds that the party may tamely surrender his right, with a full knowledge of all the facts, and without fraud or impo- sition, and then say that he was not on an 'unequal footing' with the other." 20 Sullivan v. MeCammon, 51 Ind. 264; Edinburg v. Hackney, 64 Ind 83; Colglazier v. Salem, 61 Ind. 445; Kroft v. Keokuk, 14 Iowa, 86; Baker v. Bucklin, 43 N. Y. App. Div. 336; 60 N. Y. Supp. 294; affirming 22 N. Y. Supp. 560; 50 N. Y. .Supp. 739: Eslow v. Albion, 153 Mich. 729; 117 N. W. 328; 15 Detroit Leg. N. 008. ^ 497 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 812 Sec. 497. Refunding fees or taxes, continued — No statute requiring it. Money paid under protest to obtain a license which it is claimed is void cannot be recovered back, though paid under a threat that if not taken out the applicant would be prosecuted if he sold liquor.-' If local option be adopted shortly after a license goes into force, thus at once annulling it, no part of the fee can be recovered back, if no statute authorizes a re- covery ; -- and a licensee voluntarily paying more for his license than the law requires cannot recover back the excess ; '^ nor can he recover back any part of the amount paid on the ground that the amount required for his license was a day or so after his application and its issuance reduced.^* And money voluntaril}^ paid to a board bavin sf no authority to issue the license cannot be recovered back."' And where a licensing board granted a license, the fee was pa^d and the license issued, and then an appeal was taken and the license refused because the statute was void, it was held that there could be no re- covery back of the fee paid.-" Where the license was granted, the fee tendered but the license not issued because not ready, and on the same day the council increased the amount of the fee, which the licensee afterwards paid under protest in order to secure his license, it was held that he could not recover back the amount of the increase.-^ Anyone applying for a license, paying his fee, securing its grant, and then abandoning it be- 21 Welch T. Marion, 48 Ala. 25 Tatum v. Trenton, 85 Ga. 291; Chaba v. Burnett, 34 Ala. 468; 11 S. E. 705. 400; Trainor v. Multnomah Co., 20 Monroe Co. v. Kreuger, 88 •2 Or. 214; Custin v. Viragua, 1)7 Ind. 2.31; Toman v. Westfield, 70 Wis. 314; 30 N. W. 515; see New N. J. L. 610; 57 Atl. 125. Cow- Iberia V. Moss Hotel Co., 112 La. tra. Where order granting license 525; 36 So. 552. is reversed. People v. Sackett, 15 22 Peyton v. Hot Springs Co., N. Y. App. Div. 290; 44 X. Y. 53 Ark. 236; 13 S. W. 764. Con- Supp. 593; reversing 40 N. Y. tra, Allsman v." Oklahoma City Supp. 414. But see Thomas v. (Okl.), 95 Pac. 468. Westfield (K J. L.) ; 57 Atl. 125. 23 Thomson v. Norris. 63 Ga. 27 Emery v. Lowell, 127 Mass. 638. 138. 24 Williams v. West Point, 68 Ga. 816. 813 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. § 497 cause unwilling to furnish the bond, cannot recover back the amount paid.-'* If by mistake of law a licensee receives a license for a less fee than the law requires, he cannot recover back the fee on the theory that his license is void, because a proper fee had not been paid.-'' A fee paid under a statute which had been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the State, though paid under protest and to avoid litigation, cannot be recovered back.^° A statute providing for a refund- ing tax generally has no application to a liquor fee or tax.-''^ If the money paid as a fee immediately goes into the public treasury, and is not a deposit, it cannot be recovered back.^^ So much so is this true that if the court refuse the license the fee cannot be recovered back.^"' Where the money paid is a liquor tax, and the money is voluntarily paid under a mistake of law, it cannot be recovered back.'* If a license fee can be recovered back, yet it cannot be recovered from the officer receiving it ; it can only be recovered from the municipality receiving it; and if the State receives it, of course there must be a statute authorizing a suit for its recovery."^' If the fee be paid and then on appeal the license be refused, the amount of the fee cannot be recovered back ; "*' nor is he entitled to a refund if for any cause his license be revoked;"^ nor can he recover back the fee he has paid even though his license be revoked because of his failure to give the proper notice of his application for a license ; ^^ or even where his application is 2S Curry v. Tarvas Tp., 81 33 McLeod v. Seott, 21 Or. 94; Mich. 365; 45 N. W. 831; John- 26 Pac. 1061; Hague v. Ashland, son V. Atkins, 44 Fla. 185; 32 91 Wis. 629; 65 N. W. 508. So. 879. 34 Ahlers v. Estherville (Iowa),, 23 Tupelo V. Beard, '56 Miss. 104 N. W. 453. 532. 35 Sargent v. Little, 72 N. H. soHornberger v. Case, 9 Ohio 555; 58 Atl. 44. Dec. 434; 13 Wkly. L. Bull. 437. 38 Toman v. Westfield, -70 -'X. J. V. Wilson, 9 Ohio L. 610; 57 Atl. 125. But see Peo- Dec. 432; 13 Wkly. L. Bull. 437. pie v. Sackett, supra. 31 State V. Rauch, 47 Ohio 478; 37 Anderson v. Galesburg, 118 25 N. E. 59. Ill- App. 525. 32Trainor v. Multnomah, 2 Or. 38 McGinnis v. Medway, 170 214. Mass, 67; 57 N. E. 210. § 498 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 814 refased because of a failure to file a proper application.^'* An attempt on the part of a city to illegally refund a license fee may be enjoined on the suit of a taxpayer or citizen of the city.^° Where a fee was paid and a license granted by a city for the remainder of the year, and during- such remainder the Legislature enacted a law requiring a higher license fee for the county in which the city was situated, it was held that the licensee could not discontinue his business and recover back a proportionate amount of the fee paid.*^ If a license be revoked because of the alleged illegal act of the holder, and then he be indicted upon the same alleged violation of the statute and acquitted, he cannot recover back the unearned part of his license fee.*- Sec. 498. Refunding fees or taxes, continued — Cases allow- ing. It has been held, notwithstanding the almost universal rule, that if a municipality without authority collect a license fee the person paying it may recover it baek,*^ especially if paid under threats of municipal officers of fines and imprisonment if sales be made without the license.** So it has been held if the license be granted, the fee paid, the license taken out. and then on appeal thereafter the license be canceled, the licensee is entitled to have his fee returned ; *^' at least a ratable portion of it.*^ So it has been held that a tax paid under protest in 39ScaIzo V. Sackett, 30 N. Y. Ga. 309. Modified in Thomas v. Misc. Rep. 543; 63 N. Y. Supp. Norris, 62 Ga. 538; Marshall v. 820. The officer receiving the Snediker, 25 Tex. 460; 7'8 Am. money cannot make a valid con- Dec. 534; see Douglassville V. tract to return it if the license Johns, 62 Ga. 423. be refused. Heinrich Bros. Brew- ** Princeton v. Vierling, 40 Ind. ing Co. V. Kitsap Co., 45 Wash. 340. (This decision is hardly in 454; >88 Pac. 833. line with the Indiana cases pre- 40 Fitzgerald v. Witchard, 130 viously cited.) Ga. 552; 61 S. E. 227. 45 Chamberlain v. Tecumseh, 43 41 Fitzgerald v. Witchard, 130 Neb. 221; 61 N. W. 632. Ga. 552; 61 S. E. 227. 4g Lydick v. Korner, 15 Neb. 42Parrent v. Little, 72 N. H. 600; 20 X. W. 26. But it was 566; 58 Atl. 510. held that the treasurer could not 43 Calloway v. Milledgeville, 48 be compelled to refund it. 815 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. § 498 accordance \Wth an unconstitutional statute may be recovered back.*^ Where the applicant contended the fee should be $150 and the treasurer contended it should be $350 because letters patent had been issued for the incorporation as a city of the locality where the premises were located, and he paid the fee of $350 under protest, because if he did not pay within fifteen days his license, already issued, would be revoked, and after- wards it was judicially determined that the fee should have been $150, it was held that he was entitled to recover back the excess.^® Money paid under a void license ordinance, it has been held, could be recovered back, on the ground that the applicant did not stand on an equal footing with the officers of the municipality, and for that reason was entitled to recover back his money thus involuntarily paid.*^ Where an applicant paid a fee for a year's license, when it should only have been one-half that amount and six month's fee, and the city council promised to return one-half the amount paid if they could only issue a six month's license, it was held that one-half of the fee could be recovered back.^° So it has been held that if a municipal officer takes a fee for a license the city cannot repudiate his action, retain the money and not grant the license.'^^ And if an application be made and the fee be paid with it, as the law requires, and a license be not granted for the time specified in the application — and the same would be true if not granted for the place specified in the application— but is post dated the application, the appli- cant can refuse to accept the license, even though tendered *7 Catoir v. Waterson, 38 Ohio prima facie evidence of every fact St. 319; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 necessary to make the assess- Ohio St. 534. ment; and also includes the fact 48Doolittle V. Lucerne Co., 6 that the plaintiff was engaged in Kulp. 495; Hazeltine v. McGroor- selling liquors. Stevenson v. ty, 6 Kulp. 533. Hunter, 2 Ohio N. P. 300; 5 Ohio '49 Marshall v. Suediker, 25 Tex. S. & C. P. Dec. 27. 460 ; 7S Am. Dec. 534. ^i Martel v. East St. Louis, 94 soNurnberger v. Bornwell, 42 111. 67; Owensboro v. EUter, 3 S. C. 158; 20 S. E. 14. Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 255; In an action to recover back State v, Lincoln, 6 Neb. 12. taxes paid, the tax duplicate is § 499 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 816 to him, and recover back the fee paid.^- Statutes sometimes provide for a return of the money if the application for a license be denied.^" Sec. 499. Refunding fees or taxes, continued — Payment under mistake of fact. Money paid under a mistake of fact may usually be re- covered back, especially if there was no negligence in an attempt to ascertain the facts.^^ But where a person engaged in selling liquor in which all the requirements of a prior law had been complied with by him except securing the general consent of the property owners to the location of the saloon, or a finding of its sufficiency by the licensing board, as required by a subsequent law, and without resorting to the public records for information as to whether the law then in force had been complied with, he paid the tax, relying upon the fact that other saloons were being operated in the city, but his saloon Avas soon after closed, it was held that he had not paid the tax under a mistake of fact, and was without a remedy.^"* So where by an examination of the records the plaintiff could have ascertained that liquors were being illegally sold on his premises, the fact that he did not have actual knowledge until after the time when he might have applied under a statute for a remission of the tax, it was held that he could not recover them back.^** And where the State commissioners of excise certified without authority that the population of a certain city was so much and that the license fee, based on the population was a certain amount, increased over the amount it was previously, and a 52 Zeglin V. Carver Co., 72 to recover where the licensee has Minn. 17; 74 N. W. 901. died and the term of the license 53 State V. Buechler, 10 S. D. has not expired. Wood v. School 156; 72 N. W. 114; School Dis- District, SO Neb. 722; 115 N. W. trict V. Thompson, 51 Xeb. 857; 308. 71 X. W. 728. In this case the 54 Ligonier v. Ackerman, 46 money was paid to the village Ind. 552; 15 Am. Rep. 323. treasurer, who paid it to the 55 Ahlers v. Estherville (Iowa), school district; and it was held 104 X. W. 453. that the school district was liable 56 Xewton v. McKay ( Iowa ) , to return it. 102 X. W. 827. Right of legal representatives 817 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. § 500 licensee paid the excess over protest, it was held that he had not paid it under a mistake of fact, and could not recover back the excess." Where a fee was paid to a city of the fifth class, and the fee was less for a city of the sixth class, it was held that the applicant for the license could not maintain an action for the difference between the amounts of the two fees on the ground that the act for the formation of the cities of the fifth class was invalid. Only the State could raise that question,'^® Money paid because of mistake of the requirements of the law cannot be treated as a payment under a mistake of fact.^'* Sec. 500. Rebate of fees or taxes under statute. Statutes at times provide for rebate of part of the amount of fees or taxes where the license or permit is cancelled or surrendered before the end of the term for which it was issued; but unless some statute provides for the rebate none can be made.*'" Usually the statutes provide that if the licensee has obtained his license illegally or has been guilty of a violation of the liquor law he shall not be entitled to a rebate. And where a statute provided that the certificate should have one month to run after the surrender of the license it was held that if the licensee continued to do business during the month he was not entitled to have the rebate, although he held a certificate for its rebate."^ If a statute 57 People V. Cullinan, 111 N. Y. a license will be ordered returned App. Div. 32; 97 N. Y. Supp. 194. where the order directing the li- es Providence V. Shackelford, censing officer to issue a license 106 Ky. 378; 50 S. W. 542; 20 is reversed. People v. Sackett, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 1921. N. Y. App. Div. 290; 44 K Y. 59 Baker v. Bucklin, 43 N. Y. Supp. 593; reversing 17 N. Y. App. Div. 336; 60 N. Y. Supp. Misc. Rep. 406; 40 N. Y. Supp. 294; affirming 22 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 414. 560; 50 N". Y. Supp. 739. oi Lyman v. Cheever. 31 N. Y. 60 Anderson v. Galesburg, 118 Misc. Rep. 100; 63 N. Y. Supp. 111. App. 525; Bailey v. Raleigh, 809; People v. Cullinan, 168 N. 130 N. C. 269; 41 S. E. 281. Y. 258; 61 N. Y. 243; affirming (Legislature without power to 69 N. Y. Supp. 1142; People v. enact a statute requiring a re- Cullinan, 173 N. Y. 604; 66 N. E. l>ate.) 111-t; affirming 67 N. Y. App. Div. Under the Xew York statute 446; 73 N. Y. Supp. 987. money paid on an application for §500 TRiVPFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 818 provide that no rebate shall be made where the licensee ob- tained his license on an application containing a material false statement, such a false statement will defeat his right to a rebate.*'- If the licensee be indicted for a violation of the liquor law, under the New York statute no rebate can be awarded him so long as the indictment remains pending, even if indicted after the surrender.'''^ If a licensee be arrested for a violation of the statute and be acquitted on the ''merits," he is entitled to the rebate.*'* The New York statute provides that if the licensee be twice convicted of having violated its provisions, he shall not be entitled to any rebate of the tax paid if he cease the liquor business. Under it a rebate cannot be denied where only one conviction has been had.®^ Under this statute a conviction is not necessary to defeat the application for a rebate; it is sufficient that the applicant has merely violated its provisions.*'*' But the statute does not apply to violations of the law committed before the license certificate was issued."^ 62 /n re Lyman, 163 N. Y. 536; 57 N. E. 745; reversing 51 N. Y. App. Div. 52; 64 N. Y. Supp. 756; People v. Lyman, 33 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 243; 68 N. Y. Supp. 331; People v. Hilliard, 178 N. Y. 582; 70 N. E. 1106; affirming 81 N. Y. App. Div. 71; 80 N. Y. Supp. 792. 63 In re Johnson, 78 N. Y. Misc. Pvep. 498; 42 N. Y. Supp. 1074; People V. Cullinan, 168 N. Y. 258; 61 N. E. 243; affirmed 69 N. Y. Supp. 1142; People v. Layman, 59 N. Y. App. Div. 172; 69 N. Y. Supp. Ill; af- firming 65 N. Y. Supp. 462; In re Seitz, 32 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 108; 65 N. Y. Supp. 462; People V, Clement (N. Y.), 112 N. Y. Supp. 951 ; People v. Clemcit (N. Y.), 116 N. Y. Supp. 1098; Clement v. Viscosi (X. Y.), 118 N. Y. Supp. 613. 64 People V. Lyman, 168 N. Y. 669; 61 N. E. 113, affirming 53 N. Y. App. Div. 470; 65 N. Y. Supp. 1062; People v. Lyman, 69 N. Y. App. Div. 406; 74 N. Y. Supp. 1104; People v. Cullinan, 173 N. Y. 604; 66 N. E. 1114; 69 N. Y. App. Div. 406; 74 N. Y. Supp. 1104. 65 People V Cullinan, 90 N. Y. App. Div. 606; 85 N. Y. Supp. 1142, affirming 41 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 404; 84 N. Y. Supp. 1018. 66 People v. Cullinan, 95 N. Y. App. Div. 598; 88 N. Y. Supp. 1022. But see People v. Cullinan, 90 N. Y. App. Div. 606; 85 N. Y. Supp. 1142, affirming 41 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 404; 84 N. Y. Supp. 1018. 67 People V. Leyman. 25 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 217; 55 N. Y. Supp. 76. In New Hampshire where the State excise board revoked a li- cense because its holder had vio- 819 LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. §500 The assignee of the license or liquor tax certificate, where that is allowed, takes it subject to all the illegalities it carried in the hands of the licensee; and if the latter cannot secure a rebate, neither can the assignee ; ''^ and if proceedings be pend- ing against the licensee for a violation of the law he is not entitled to the rebate until they are determined favorably to the assignor.*'" If the licensee has obtained his license on false statements, the assignee takes the assignment of the license affected by these statements.''*' Mandamus lies in New York against the excise commissioner to compel the payment of the rebate, but the applicant must show that he has ceased selling liquor, and he is not relieved from so doing by showing that the deputy excise commissioner had issued him receipts for the unearned portion of his license when his cessation of sales is denied, the determination of that fact by the deputy not being an adjudication of the truth of the fact of cessation.^^ It is no defense to such proceedings that charges had been preferred against the licensee, when he is tried and discharged bv the magistrate for want of sufficient evidence to believe lated the law, and subsequently he was indicted on the charge and acquitted, it was held that he was not entitled to a retuin of any of the license fee. Parent v. Little, 72 N. H. 566; 58 Atl. 510. A surrender in New York of the license does not release the sure- ties on the licensee's bond for the licensee'^ illegal acts committed within a month after the sur- render and before the rebate money is paid. Lyman v. Cheever, 31 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 100; 63 N. Y. Supp. 809. As to surrender and grant of new licenses in Massachusetts, see Tracy v. Ginzberg, 189 Mass. 260; 75 N. E. 637. The right to surrender a liquor tax certificate and have its sur- render value returned is in the nature of a chose in actio*. Niles V. Mathusa, 20 N. Y. App. Div. 483; 47 N. Y. Supp. 38. 6« People v. Lyman, 33 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 243; 68 N. Y. Supp. 331; People v. Lyman, 27 N. Y. App. Div. 527 ; 50 N. Y. Supp. 527. C9 People V. Lyman, 59 N. Y. App. Div. 172; 09 N. Y. Supp. Ill, affirming 05 N. Y. Supp. 462. TO People v. Hilliard, 178 N. Y. 582; 70 N. E. 1106, affirming 81 N. Y. App. Div. 71; 80 N. Y. Supp. 792. See, generally, People v. Flynn, 110 N. Y. App. Div. 279; 96 N. Y. Supp. 655, reversing 48 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 159; 96 N. Y. Supp. 653. 71 People V. Cullinan, 173 N. Y. 604; 66 N. E. 1114, affirming 67 X. Y. App. Div. 446; 73 N. Y, Supp. 987; People v. Lyman, ■67 N. Y. App. Div. 446; 73 N, Y. Supp. 987. §500 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 820 him ^ilty.'- The petition must show the issuance of the rebate certificate and that it is still in force, but it need not recite any of the facts necessary to obtain the certificate when application for it had been made/^ Under the New York statute, if the petitioner for a writ of mandamus has been arrested or indicted for a violation of the liquor law, he must show he had been acquitted on the merits/* The judgment should be that the State excise commissioner issue an order for the rebate and not that he pay it, for only the State treasurer can pay it.'^^' In order to secure a writ of mandamus all the necessary steps entitling the licensee to a rebate cer- tificate must first be taken."'' If the answer to a petition for a mandamus allege that the petitioner had not voluntarily ceased to traffic in liquor, the petitioner is entitled to a trial of the issue of fact so raised, and a peremptory \\Tit should be refused, even though no prosecution against him has been commenced on account of the violations charged in the answer." 72 People V. Cullinan, 173 N. Y. 604; 66 N. E. 1114, affirming 69 N. Y. App. Div. 406; 74 N. Y. Supp. 1104. 73 People V. Lyman, 168 X. Y. 669; 61 N. E. 1133, affirming 53 N. Y. Supp. 470; 05 N. Y. Supp. 1062. '. Lyman, 168 X. Y. E. 1133, affirmed 53 Div. 470; 66 X. Y. V. Scanlin, 36 X. Y. 756; 74 X. Y. Supp. 74 People 669; 61 X, N. Y. App Supp. 1002 75 Knapp Misc. Rep. 458. 76 People V. Lyman, 25 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 217; 55 X. Y. Supp. 76. The law in force at the time a rebate is applied for governs, and not the law as it was when the license was issued. Ging v. Sherry, 32 X. Y. App. Div. 354; 52 X. Y. Supp. 1003. 77 People V. Cullinan, 173 X. Y. 604; 66 X. E. 1114, affirming 69 X. Y. App. Div. 406; 74 X. Y. Supp. 1104. If the agents and servants of the petitioner has violated the liquor laws in the conducting of his business, he cannot secure the rebate, for he is responsible for their acts. Duncan v. Clement (X. Y.), 119 X. Y. Supp. 375. In Kentucky if the license be revoked for a violation of law, the unearned part of the fee cannot be recovered back. Louisville v. Cain (Ky.), 119 S. W. 763. Where a statute validates any refunding made by officers of a city theretofore made out of public funds in good faitli, it is the good faith of the officers alone who paid out the money and not of the city council which appropriated the money or ordered it paid out. Calderwood v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. (Minn.), 121 X. W. 221, CHAPTER XIV. DRUGGISTS AND PHYSICIANS. SEC. SEC. 501. Druggists' exemption from liability. 507. 502. No druggist or other person licensed. 508. 503. Statutes requiring drug- gists to have licenses. 509. 504. iSales by employe of drug- 510. gist. 511. 505. Gk»od faith in making sales. 506. Druggists making unlawful 512. sales. 513. Druggists' sales in prohibi- tion States. Sales by druggists upon prescriptions. Prescriptions for Sunday and holiday sales. Kind of prescriptions. Registration and reports of sales. Sales by physicians. Physicians illegally giving a prescription. Sec. 501. Druggist's exemption from liability. There are some cases which hold that a druggist who sells .spirituous and vinous liqours upon a proper occasion hona fide, and with due caution, to be used for medical purposes only, is not to be regarded as having violated the laws, although he has no license to sell and although the law does not except him from its terms.^ In arriving at this conclusion, the court, in one of the earliest cases said: ''In construing a statute it is proper to look to its effect. Statutes certainly are not always, nor ought they to be, construed literally. The Bolog- 1 United States v. Calhoun, 39 Fed. Rep. 604; Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449; Jakes v. State, 43 Ind. 473; Ball v. State, 50 Ind. 595; Hooper v. State, 56 Ind. 153; Nixon v. State, 76 Ind. 524; Hottendorf v. State, 89 Ind. 282; State v. Wray, 72 N. C. 821 253; Hamline v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush (Ky.), 350; State v. Larrimore, 19 Mo. 391; State v. Mitchell, 28 Mo. 562; State v. Wells, 28 Mo. 565; Rhoades v. Commonwealth, 6 Atl. 245; Com- monwealth V. Rhoades, 1 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 639. §501. TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 822 nian Law which enacted 'that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,' was held after long debate, not to extend to a surgeon who opened the vein of a person who fell down in the street with a fit.' "^ It will be noticed that the Bolognian Law was not decided in favor of the surgeon until "after long debate." Confessedly, then, this was not a strong precedent uj)on which to hang the Indiana decision from which we have quoted. The North Carolina case upon this point has been limited if not over- ruled, by the Supreme Court of that State.'' In the last case cited, it was said, "this court will not go, by construction or interpretation, beyond the ruling in State v. AVray. To do so would tend to impair the face of the statute, weaken its re- straining power, and often to defeat the legislative will by rendering evasions and violations of the law easy." In accord with the thought last expressed are many well considered cases which hold that such a sale is a violation of the law, even though it is made upon the prescription of a physician,* and there was no one authorized to issue a druggist's license,' and this we regard as the better holding.*' A leading case 2Donncll v. State, 2 Ind. 658; IGl; IG X. E. 705; King v. State. Elrod V. State, 72 Ind. 292; Park- 66 Miss. 502; 6 So. 188; Brown er V. State, 31 Ind. App. 650; 68 v. State, 9 Neb. 189; 2 N. W. X. E. 912. 214; People v. Saflord, 5 Denio 3 State V. McBryer, 98 X. C. (X. Y. ) , 112; Commonwealth v. 619; State v. Dalton, 101 X. C. Porter, 10 Phila. 217; State v. 680; 8 S. E. 154. Cox, 23 W. Va. 797; Gault v. * Carson v. State, 69 Ala. 235; State, 34 Ga. 533; State v. Dal- Carl V. State, 89 Ala. 93; Woods ton, 101 X. C. 680; 8 S. E. 154; V. State, 36 Ark. 36; 38 Am. Rep. Druggists' Cases, 85 Tenn. 449; 22; Flower v. State, 39 Ark. 209; 3 S. W. 490; State v. Thompson, Chew V. State, 43 Ark. 361; State 20 W. Va. 674. V. Gray, 61 Conn. 39; 22 Atl. s Rossenhamm v. Common- 675; Noecker v. People, 91 111. wealth, 9 Ky. L. 519. 494; State v. Knowles, 57 la. c Wright v. People, 101 111. 126. 669; State v. Bissell, 67 la. 616; Under a statute authorizing 25 X\ W. 831; City of Salina v. druggists to keep all medicines Seitz, 16 Kan. 143; State v. authorized by the United States Brown, 31 Me. 522; State v. Hall, Dispensary as of recognized mc- 39 Mo. 107; Commonwealth v. dicinal utility, they may keep in- Ramsdell, 130 Mass. 68; Com- toxicating liquors. Pollard v. Al- monwealth v. Pierce, 147 Mass. len, 96 Me. 455; 52 Atl. 524. 823 DRUGGISTS AND PHYSICIANS. § 502 upon this point, to our mind, gives a good and sufficient reason for so holding. "But let it be once understood," the court said, "that the druggist or other tradesman, merely because his chief business is confined to traffic in other classes of mer- chandise, may retail intoxicating liquors ad libitum, so long as he in good faith sells for some legitimate purpose other than as a mere beverage, the chief safeguards which the law, as now understood, throws around the subject, will soon be frittered away and the doors will be thrown wide open to all manner of frauds and evasions of law which would bid defi- ance to the highest degree of watchfulness and diligence the officers of the law could possibly bring to the official discharge of their duties in endeavoring to enforce the law on the sub- ject. If the druggist may sell for sickness, the family grocer may, on the same principle, sell for culinarj^ purposes, and there is no telling where the thing would stop. The only safe course is to enforce the law as the Legislature has made it and not defeat its execution upon some hypothetical theory of public policy that finds no place or recognition in the act itself. If the legitimate business of druggists or other tradesmen necessarily involves the retail of liquors in small quantities; we see no reasons, founded upon public policies or otherwise, why they should not like other dealers pay for the privilege of doing so. This construction, moreover, compels all persons who engage in the traffic to equally contribute to the support of local municipal government. The contrary construction would be discriminating between individuals engaged in the same business, with respect to the burdens of local government, without any sufficient reason for doing so." Sec. 502. No druggist or other person licensed. To an indictment for selling intoxicating liquors without a license and in contravention of a statute upon that subject, it is no defense that, at the time of making such a sale there was no druggist or other person licensed to sell such liquors within the county, that the sale was made upon the order or prescription of a physician, and that the liquor thus obtained was necessary for the buyer's use, either as a medicine or for § 503 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 824 the preservation of his health. If it were sufficient in such a case to avoid the prohibition of a statute, for the purchaser to say that the liquor was intended for medicine, it would, in effect, repeal the statute.^ Sec. 503. Statute requiring druggists to have license. In many of the statutes druggists are required to take out a license or permit and even to execute a licensee 's bond ; but a statute merely regulating their liquor traffic does not require of them a license, although dealers in general must have licenses.^ "Whether or not a druggist must give a liquor dealer's usual bond, of course depends upon each particular statute, and no general rr.le can be stated on that question.^ But a statute requiring all liquor dealers not to adulterate their liquor applies not only to liquor dealers strictly so, but also to druggists or pharmacists." In some States only regis- tered pharmacists can sell liquors." A statute permitting druggists to sell liquors does not require that he must manu- 7 Commonwealth v. Sloan, .58 316; 85 N. W. 589; Stormes v. Mass. (4 Cush.) 52; Common- Commonwealth (Ky.), 47 S. W. wealth V. Kimball, 24 Pick. 366. 262; State v. Randall, 73 Mo. 8 Moore v. People, 109 111. 499 ; App. 463, 465 ; Watson v. State, State V. Witty, 74 Mo. App. 550; 42 Tex. Cr. App. 13; 57 S. W. Hurdland v. Hardy, 74 Mo. App. 101, 614. This is so in Nova Scotia. In lennessee a druggist hold- Gardner v. Parr, 2 R. & G. 255; ing a merchant's license must S. C. 1 Can. L. T. 710; and in also pay liquor dealer's occupa- Manitoba. Cathcart v. Hardy, 2 tion tax. Druggists' Cases, 85 M. & S. 534; Regina v. Harrell. Tenn. 449; 3 S. W. 490. 12 Manitoba, 198, 522; Common- Moore v. People, 109 111. 499 wealth v. Powell (Ky.), 62 S. W. (no bond required); State v. 19; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1932; State Ferguson, 72 Mo. 297 (a bond re- v. Collins, 28 R. I. 439; 67 Atl. quired); S+^te v. Pierce, 26 Kan. 796; Liggett v. People, 26 Colo. 777 (bond required); People v. 364; 58 Pac. 144. Beach, D3 Mich. 25; 52 X. W. TIh; license is a defense. State 1035. V. Morgan, 96 Mo. App. 343; 70 10 Newman v. State, 7 Lea. 617. S. W. 267. "State V. Dunning, 14 S. D. 825 DRUGGISTS AND PHYSICIANS. §503 faetnre or compound medicines to be such a person, or to be an apothecary ; '- and a statute requiring druggists to have a license to sell intoxicating liquor does not require him to have a license to compound and sell a medicine containing alcohol on a physician's prescription, or even on his own formula.^'' But under a right to sell proprietary medicines he cannot sell alcoholic bitters that are composed chiefly of alcohol/* If only a druggist can malVe a sale of liquor, then on proper proof that he holds a druggist's license the burden is cast upon the prosecution to show that in fact he is not a druggist, 12 Haimline v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush, 350. The Iowa statute of 1&86, c. 83, on permits for druggists to sell liquors was complete within it- self so far as druggists were con- cerned. State V. Courtney, 73 Iowa, 010; 35 N. W. 685; see also State V. Mercer, 58 Iowa, 182; 12 N. W. 269; State v. Aulman, 76 Iowa, 624; 41 N. W. 379. The act of Colorado Laws 1889, p. 228, regulating the licensing of "tippling houses" did not repeal the statute -f +l,at State. (Mills Ann. St., §4403, subdiv. 18), em- powering cities and towns to grant permits to drujTfrists to sell liquors for "medicinal, mechani- cal, sacramental and chemical purposes only." Canfield v. Lead- ville, 7 Colo. Apn. 453: 43 Pac. 910. The meaning of the word "drug- gist" cannot be so strp+ci^ed as to cover sales by commi^si'>n me^-- chants dealing prinr^innTlv in al- cohol. VUls V. PerVins, 120 Mass. 41. 13 Commonwealth v. Fowler, 98 Ky. 648; 34 S. W. 21: Parker v. State, 31 Ind. App. 650; 68 K E. 912; DeTarr v. State, 37 Ind. App. 323; 76 N. E. 897; Pearce V. State (Tex. Civ. App.), 88 S. W. 234; State v. Roller, 77 Mo. 120; Haimline v. Common- wealth, 13 Bush, 350. 14 State V. Wright, 20 Mo. App. 412. In Missouri it was held that the proprietor of a drug store could not escape liability by the employment of a non-resident pharmacist who was present only two or three times a week. State V. Jordan, 87 Mo. App. 420; State V. Workman, 75 Mo. App. 454; State V. Chipp, 121 Mo. App. 556: 97 S. W. 230. Although he have a permit, yet a druo-ffist may be convicted of maintaining a liquor nuisance. State V. Engborg, 63 Kan. 853: 66 P. 1007. It is not error to allow a de- fendant to testify that he is a drujrgist before producing his li- cense. His license is prima facie evidence that he is in fact a li- censee. Commonwealth v. By- ers (Ky.), 109 S. W. 895; 33 Ky. L. Rep. 252. §504 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 826 and, therefore, does not come within the provisions of the statute allowing druggists to sell liquors.^^ Sec. 504. Sales by employe of druggist. As in all other instances of sales by an agent, the employe or clerk of a druggist or pharmacist is not subject to prosecu- 15 Commonwealth v. Byers (Ky.), 109 S. W. 895; Ky. L. Rep. See State v. Shanke, 98 Mo. App. 138; 71 S. VV. 1065. Under a Canadian statute for- bidding a licensed chemist to sell liquors to be drunk on the prem- ises, a sale by an unlicensed chem- ist for that purpose is also an offense. Regina v. McCoy, 23 Ont. Rep. 442. It has been held that if a drug- gist has in good faith olfered to pay for his license, which offer was declined, he cannot be con- victed of selling without a li- cense. Storms V. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 619; 49 S. W. 451; re- versing 47 S. W. 262. See also Commonwealth v. McGrorty, 5 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract), 605. Indictment of merchant selling in drugs and compounding pre- scriptions occasionally. State v. Shanks, 98 Mo. App. 138; 71 S. VV. 1065. Sales at wholesale by druggists when allowed. People v. Long- well, 136 Mich. 302; 99 X. W. 1; 10 Detroit L. N. 1049. Under a power to license, regu- late and prohibit the sale of in- toxicating liquors, a city may adopt a licensing ordinance and exempt a druggist from its pro- visions. Carthage v. Carlton, 99 111. App. 33S. So it may prohibit the sale. Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Atlanta, 89 Fed. 244. If a druggist desires to sell liq- uor in any other way than that prescribed for druggists, he must take out a license to sell liquors; and if he sells liquors without he is liable tlie same as any other person. Luton v. Palmer, 69 Mich. 610; 37 N. W. 701; In re Moore (Iowa), 118 N. W. 879; Rosenham v. Commonwealth, 7 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 602; Bag- by V. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 53 (not a mer- chant, within the moaning of the Kentucky statute) ; Mason v. State (Okla.), 103 Pac. 369; Stewart v. Calhoun Co. (Mich.), 121 N. W. 279; State v. Moore, 107 Mo. 78; 16 S. W. 937. In Missouri, if a druggist be properly registered, he cannot be indicted under dramshop law for a sale he has made. State v. McAnally, 6'6 Mo. App. 329; and in that same State he must file an affidavit and give a bond not to adulterate his liquors. State V. Summers, 142 Mo. 586; 44 S. W. 797; State v. Goff, 66 Mo. App. 491. In Michigan a druggist cannot sell liquors to be drunk on the premises as a beverage. Stewart V. Calhoun Co. (Mich), 124 N. W. 39. Qualifications for license in Iowa. /;;, re Sniitli, ]-G Iowa, 128; 101 N. W. 875. 827 DRl'GGISTS AND PHYSICIANS. § 505 tion if his employer could have legally made the sale.^'' If the druggist was not licensed or registered, when that is neces- sary, then his clerk in making a sale for him violates the law/'^ If he sells off the licensed premises he becomes thereby liable to the penalty of the statute. ^^ If the statute authorizes a druggist to sell for medical, mechanical or sacramental pur- poses only, then a sale by the clerk for some other purpose renders him liable. ^^ If the license or permit of the druggist be revoked, as it may,-" of course, a sale by his clerk there- after is an unlawful act in such clerk. Sec. 505. Good faith in making sales. The element of "good faith" in making sales is always in- volved in sales by a druggist if he desires to escape the pen- alty of the statute. This is especially true where no statute provides that he may sell, but by construction of the statutes by the courts he is permitted to sell for medicinal and like purposes. If, under his right to sell, he uses his right, or even statutory permit, as a cloak to sell liquor unlawfully, he will be liable to the statute forbidding- sales without license or permits, or to the .statutes permitting him to sell for only certain purposes upon certain conditions.-^ "Whether or not he acted in good faith is a question for the jury; but if the jury disregard the uncontradicted evidence showing good faith a conviction will be set aside on appeal.-- This rule ex- iG State V. MullenliofT, 74 Iowa, tillery, 72 Iowa, 348; 34 N. W. 1. 271; 37 N. W. 329; State v. Copp, 22 Kixoii v. State, 76 Ind. 524; 34 Kan. 522; 9 Pac. 233. Hottendorf v. State, 89 Ind. 282; Instate V. Gibson, Gl Mo. App. State v. Oeder, 80 Iowa, 72; 45 768; 1 Mo. App. Rep. 656; Gault N. W. 543; State v. Shank, 79 V. State, 34 Ga. 533. Iowa, 47; 44 N. W. 241; State 18 State V. Copp, 34 Kan. 522; v. Blair, 72 Iowa, 591; Haynie v. 9 Pac. 233; Spake v. People, 89 State, 32 Miss. 400; State v. 111. 617. Thompson, 74 Iowa, 118; 37 N. laProvo City v. Shurtlid, 4 W. 104; Brooks v. State, 65 Miss. Utah, 15; 5 Pac. 302. 445; 4 So. 343; State v. Hoag- 2oHildreth v. Crawford, 65 land, 77 Iowa, 135; 41 N. W. Iowa, 33fl; 21 N. W. 667. 595; State v. Flusehe, 79 Iowa, 21 Pearson v. International Dis- 765; 44 X.. W. 698. § 505 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 828 tends to sales upon physician 's prescriptions ; for if the drug- gist knows that the prescription is a mere subterfuge to evade the law he will be as liable as if he sold without it.^^ The defendant has the burden to show a justification for the sale; for when the prosecution has showTi a sale the presump- tion is raised that it was an illegal transaction.-* "The fact that the defendant's place of business was a drug store does not raise any presumptions in his favor, and if the State has proven to satisfaction of the jury that any single sale of spirit- uous liquors was made by the defendant, and the defendant has not then shown that such sale was justified under the privileges of a druggist, which he claims, they should convict. Such w^as an instruction given by the trial court in one case, and it was approved on appeal.-"' It is admissible to show, on the part of the prosecution, in rebuttal of the claim of good faith sales, that the drug store was a rendezvous for men who drank, and their personal appearances may be inquired into, as to whether they were men who apparently needed intoxicating liquors for medicinal purposes and the like.-^ Thus in one ease the reports of the defendant, made in pursuance to a statute, showing over three thousand sales, but not in all in- stances specifying to whom the sale was made nor what kind of liquors had been sold, was admitted in evidence; and notwithstanding the accused bnd tpst'^pd the sales were legal, he was convicted.-'' It is not a sufficient justification in the de- fendant that he sold the liouor unon the purchaser's statement that he desired it for medicine; for that is not that degree of caution and circumspection which the law requires.^^ It is not 23 Commonwealth -. Joslin, 158 25 Baeumel v. State, 26 Fla. 71; Mass. 482; 33 N. E. 653; 21 L. 7 So. 371. K.- A. 449; Commonwealth v. 26 State v. Huff, 76 Iowa, 200; Gould, 158 Mass. 499; 33 X. E. 40 N. W. 720; State v. Thomp- 656; State v. Wray, 72 N. C. 253 Thornton Intoxicants WEK 173 (sales in good faith on prescrip- son, 74 Iowa, 119; 37 N. W. 104. tions are protected). 27 State v. Cummins, 76 Iowa, 24 Commonwealth v. Perry. 148 333; 40 N. W. 124. Mass. 160; 19 N. E. 212; State 28 State v. Knowles, 57 Iowa, V. Cloughly, 73 Iowa, 626; 35 N. 669; 11 N. W. 620; State v. W. 652. " Blair, 72 Iowa, 591; 34 N. W. 432. 829 DRUGGISTS AND PHYSICIANS. § 506 a, sufficient showing that the liquors were purchased for medic- inal purposes, by proof that they were sold at wholesale.-" The reports of sales made by a druggist, under the statute, may be put in evidence by the State in a prosecution against him; and he cannot claim that the statute, by allowing their use in evidence, compelled him to incriminate himself .•"■" It is no defense that the defendant had no intention to violate the statute, and that the sale was made in the belief that the liquor sold was not intoxicating/'^ Sec. 506. Druggists making unlawful sales. Druggists can sell only for the purposes designated in their permits or in the statutes where permits are required or stat- utes regulate their sales. Under the guise of selling for a purpose permitted by a statute, they cannot sell for another purpose.^- If he may sell for medical, mechanical or culinary purposes, he may not sell by the keg or barrel for the pur- pose of manufacturing other liquors to be consumed as beverages.'''^ If he knows that the purchaser does not buy it for one of the purposes for which he may sell it, he cannot shut his eyes to the intention of the purchaser, whatever he may say, and thus escape punishment, if in fact it be used for another purpose.^'* These permits do not extend, as a rule, so far as to enable the holders of them to sell to others to be used in compounding medicines ; " nor may he compound medicine with them and sell them except as he may sell liquors in accordance with the provisions of the statute.^** 20 Mills V. Perkins, 120 Mass. 41. «3 State v. Yager. 72 Iowa, 30 State V. Elliott (Kan.), 20 421 ; 34 N. W. 188. (In this case ■pg^Q 55 to make a kind of soda water.) 31 King V. State, 06 Miss. 502; 34 McGuire v. 'State, 37 Miss. 6 So. 188; Snead v. State, 40 369. Tex. Civ. App. 202 ; 40 iS. W. 35 State v. Brown, 60 N. H. 205. 597; Bradley v. State, 121 Ga. 30 State v. Gray, 61 Conn. 39; 201; 40 S. E. 981. 22 Atl. 675. 32 State V. Salts, 77 Iowa, 193; But the contrary of this propo- 39 N. W. 167; State v. Cox, 23 sition has been held in Kentucky, W. Va. 797; State v. Hamil, 127 Commonwealth v. Fowler, 98 Ky. Mo. App. 661; 106 S. W. 1103. 648; 34 S. W. 21. § 507 TR.VFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 830 A statute permitting di'Uggists to "keep spirituous liquors for compounding their medicines ' ' does not authorize them to sell them uncompounded.-'"" If his violation of the liquor law has the effect to revoke or cancel his certificate or per- mit to sell, he may then be indicted for unlawfully keeping such liquors; and it is no defense for him that when the liquor was seized he did not have actual possession of it.^^ An occasional statute requires druggists to report all sales made, but his failure to make such reports does not render the sales illegal ; it is his failure to make the reports that is the offense and not the sale. -'^ Sec. 507. Druggists' sales in prohibition States. "When prohibition was first agitated in several States the question was at once presented whether or not liquors should not be sold for certain specified purposes, as for medical, sci- entific and mechanical purposes. To prevent the absolute use of alcohol in all instances would be so disastrous to the inhab- itants of a State that it was not to be contemplated for an instant. So that, in all .such States, whether the prohibition enactment is statutory or constitutional, exceptions are made as to alcohol, or other like liquids for these purposes as well as wine for sacramental use. Invariably sales of alcohol and wine for these purposes are regulated by statute, and drug- gists or pharmacists are the persons designated as those who may sell such liquors, and heavy penalties are provided if they violate the statutes permitting them to sell. They must, in all such States, have a "permit" to sell,^** and without this they cannot sell liquor under any circumstances.^^ Whether he must STiState V. Shaw, 58 N. H. 72. so state v. Von Haltzschuber, 72 Upon a charge of unlawfully Iowa, 541; 34 N. VV. 323. keeping liquors he may show that ^o The term "license" seems to he had applied for a druggists' be obnoxious to Legislatures in license; and that shortly after the this connection, time laid as to the keeping he -ii State v. Bissell, 67 Iowa, may also show that he received 616; 25 X. W. 831; State v. a license upon such application. Courtney, 73 Iowa, <)19; 35 X. W. Commonwealtli v. Wellington, 140 6S5 ; State v. Douglass, 73 Iowa, Mass. 5G0; IG X. E. 446. 270: 34 X. \V. 856. 38 State V. \Vard, 75 Iowa, 637; 36 X. W. 7<35. 831 DRUGGISTS AND PHYSICIANS. §508 give a bond of course depends upon the requirements of each particular statute.*- Of course, these permits do not author- ize a pharmacist to sell or give away liquor for an unlawful purpose." The amount of liquor he may keep on hand is usually regulated by statute;" but if not, then he can exer- cise his own desires in that respect. Usually he must be pun- ished under the pharmacist's act, but it may be so drawn as to subject him to a penalty not only inflicted by that statute, but also under one inflicting a penalty upon any one making sales of liquor. Such a statute is constitutional.'*^ Sec. 508. Sales by druggists upon prescriptions. Sales by druggists are permitted in a number of States upon physicians' prescriptions. Not infrequently these druggists must have a permit or license even to fill such prescrip- tions or make sales thereon.^" These statutes have a twofold 42 state V. Courtney, 73 Iowa, 619; 35 N. W. 685. 43 State V. Harris, 64 Iowa, 287; 20 K W. 439. 44 State V. Shank, 79 Iowa, 47; 44 N. W. 241. 45 State V. Duggan, 15 R. I. 403; 6 Atl. 787. See State v. Hoagland, 77 Iowa, 135; 41 N. W. 595. If a druggist may sell liquors, it is not unlawful for him to keep them for sale. Sal ma v. Brewer (Col. App.), 98 Pac. 61. Under Kentucky local option law, see Board v. Forman, 102 Ky. 496; 43 S. W. 682; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1553. If there be no evidence the de- fendant was a registered pharma- cist, he cannot escape on the plea that he should have been indicted as a pharmacist; but may be pun- ished under the general statute for illegal sales. State v. Paul. 87 Mo. App. 47. See also State V. Bock, 99 Mo. App. 34; 72 S. W. 466. 40 As to who are and who are not druggists under these acts is a matter of purely local import- ance. In Massachusetts a mer- chant dealing principally in alco- hol was not a druggist, or did not come within the druggist statute of 1869, c. 415. Mills v. Perkins, 120 Mass. 41. The Act of Missouri of May 19, 1879, was repealed by the Act of March 26, 1881. State v. Roller, 77 Mo. 120; State v. Johnson, 17 Mo. App. 156; State v. Brown, 18 Mo. App. 620. As to what statute a druggist making an illegal sale must be prosecuted under in Missouri, see State V. Randall, 73 Mo. App. 463; State v. Alexander, 73 Mo. App. 605; State v. Witty, 74 Mo. App. 550; State v. Davis, 76 Mo. App. 586; State v. Steele, 84 Mo. App. 316; State v. Goff, 66 Mo. §508 TKAPFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 832 object in view: The one is to prevent the indiscriminate sale of intoxicating li(iuors by druggists, especially for improper purposes, and the other is to enable honest druggists to I)rotect themselves from prosecutions where they have made honest sales.*' As these statutes are for the protection of the druggist, and the statute specifically declares that he must have a prescription in order to make the sale, a sale without it cannot be in any way justified on the ground of necessity ; *^ but if the sale is made upon the prescription in good faith, and not as a subterfuge to enable one to obtain the liquor as a bev- erage,*" the prescription is a full protection to him and a com- plete justification in making it/° "There is a reason, and a solid one, for requiring a 'written prescription,' for it is evi- App. 491 ; State v. Coday. 00 Mo. App. 70; State v. Williams, G!) Mo. App. 284, 286; State v. Mc- Anally, 66 Mo. App. 329; State V. GolT, 70 Mo. App. 295. These Missouri cases hold that a li- censed druggist cannot be prose- cuted under the dramshop act. Knox City v. Whiteaker, 87 Mo. App. 468. As to prosecutions in ^Michigan, see Anderson v. Van Buren Cir- cuit Judge, 130 Mich. 695; 90 N. W. 692; 9 Detroit Leg. N. 222. Only druggists are protected by these prescriptions. State v. Shanks, 98 Mo. App. 138; 71 S. W. 1065. 4T Kyle V. State, 18 Ind. App. 136; 47 N. E. 647. 48 Barton v. State, 99 Ind. 89; State V. Searcy, 4-6 Mo. 421; State V. Hendrix, 98 Mo. 374; 11 S. W. 728; Tilford v. State, 109 Ind. 359; 10 N. E. 107; Snead v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 262; 49 S. W. 597; Powell v. Common- wealth (Ky.), 66 S. W. 818: 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2167; State v. Hens- ley, 94 Mo. App. 151; 67 S. W. ■964 ; Commonwealth v. Pierce, 147 Mass. 161; 16 X. E. 705; State V. Wright, 20 Mo. App. 412; Nichols v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 80; 40 S. W. 268; Williams V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 156; 109 S. W. 189; Watson v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. App. 13; 57 S. W. 101. 4'-> Commonwealth v. Joslin, 158 Mass. 482; 33 X. E. 653; 21 L. R. A. 449; Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 89 Ky. 147; 12 S. W. 132; 20 S. W. 167; Common- wealth V. Gould, 158 Mass. 499; 33 X. E. 656; Snead v. State. 40 Tex. 'Cr. App. 262; 49 S. W. 595; State V. Terry, 72 X. J. L. 375; 61 Atl. 148; State v. May, 33 S. C. 39; 11 S. E. 440 (one .sale and three deliveries i . 50 De Tarr v. State. 37 Ind. App. 323; 76 X. E. 897; Kyle v. State, 18 Ind. App. 136; 47 X. E. 647; Snead v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 262 ; 49 S. W. 595 ; State V. Gregory, 110 Iowa, 624; 82 X. W. 335. 833 DRUGGISTS AND PHYSICIANS. § 508 denee of a tangible and lasting form, and it puts a profes- sional man upon record as having deliberately advised a patient to buy and a druggist to sell liquor on Sunday.^^ It is an effective means of preventing abuse, and is quite as important in a case where the druggist is himself a physician as any other. But we need not pursue the discussion further, for the statute says there must be a ' written prescription, ' and it is the duly of everybody, physicians as well as any one else, to obey the law.'"'- It was therefore held that a physician cannot sell without a prescription, although he was a drug- gist."^' In other States it is held that a physician cannot give a prescription for the sale of his own liquors ; ^* while in others it is held that he may.^'"' But a prescription is not required for the sale of medicine containing whisky, or a compound consist- ing of whisky and herbs so that it cannot be consumed as a beverage, and which the purchaser intends to use as a medicine, as the druggist is informed or knows.^'*' The statute some- times designates what physicians may give the prescription. Where it is said that it should be given by "a reputable prac- ticing physician," the court refused to say that a physician 51 The statute under review for- 418; 38 S. W. 641; State v. Pol- bade sales on Sunday without a lard, 72 Mo. App. 230; State v. physician's prescription. Manning, 107 Mo. App. 51; 81 52 "It is possible that there iS. W. 223; State v. Furney, 178 may be cases of urgent necessity Mo. 385; 77 S. W. 992; see State demanding immediate action where v. Bailey, 73 Mo. App. 576. a druggist would be held excused 5g Parker v. State, 31 Ind. App. from selling without a 'written 650; 68 N. E. 912; Good v. State, prescription,'" says the court. '87 Miss. 495; 40 So. 12; De Tarr 53Tilford V. State, 109 Ind. v. State, 37 Ind. App. 323; 76 N. 359; 10 N. E. 107. E. 897; State v. Williams, (S. 54 State V. 'Carnahan, 63 Mo. D.), 104 N. W. 546; State v. App. 244; 1 Mo. App. Rep. 766; Costa, 78 Vt. 198; 62 Atl. 38; State V. Anderson, 81 Mo. 78; Queen v. Armstrong, 13 Junta, Holt V. State, 62 Neb. 134; 86 408; Pearce v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. N. W. 1073; Commonwealth v. App. 352; 88 S. W. 234; State Matthews, 3 Ky. L. Rep. (ab- v. Roller, 77 Mo. 120; Common- stract) 473; McCroy v. Common- wealth v. Fowler, 98 Ky. 648; 34 wealth, 8 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) S. W. 21. A dentist is not a 437_ physician. State v. McNinn, 118 55 Boone v. State, 10 Tex. App. X. C. 1259 ; 24 iS. E. 523. §508 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 834 without a license to practice could give one.^' But where the statute required the prescription to be given by a "regularly registered and practicing physician," to be admitted in evi- dence, it was held that it must be sho^vn that the physician was such a physician as the statute required should give a prescription.^^ In Missouri druggists residing in local option counties may make sales upon a physician 's prescription ; ^^ and so they may in a local option county in Texas ^'^ and in Kentucky.*^ The prescription must be issued at the request of the purchaser of the liquor or some one acting for him ; and a prescription issued'for a person not the purchaser is no defense for the druggist.*'- So the prescription must be in actual existence when the sale is made ; and it cannot be issued thereafter so as to protect the seller.''^ Only such drug- gists can sell under a prescription as the statute specifies. If it specifies "registered pharmacist," then only a registered phar- macist can sell under it.®* But where a statute prohibited any 57 DeTarr v. State, 37 Ind. App. 323; 78 N. E. &97. 58 State V. Millikan, 24 Mo. App. 462. A statute requiring the pre- scription to be given by a licensed physician "or other person" pre- vents an unlicensed person prac- ticing medicine to give it. Mc- Allister V. State (Ala.), 47 So. 161. The fact that the applicant ob- tained the prescription by an im- position upon the physician will not make the pharmacist liable to the penalty of the statute. Walk- er V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 64 S. W. 1052. 59 state V. Eussell, 99 Mo. App. 373; 73 S. W. 297. 80 Gordon v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 73 S. W. 398; Greiner- Kelley Drug Co. v. Truett (Tex Civ. App.), 75 S. W. 536. ci Powell V. 'Commonwealth (Ky.), 66 S. W. 818; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2167. 62 State V. Hensley, 94 Mo. App. 151; 67 S. W. 964; State v. Bail- ey, 73 Mo. App. 576; Miller v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 35; 38 S. W. 772. But this rule does not apply where the sale is to a husband for his wife (and perhaps for his child). Commonwealth v. Byers (Ky.), 109 S. W. 895; 33 Ky. L. Eep. 252. 63 State V. Hensley, 94 Mo. App. 151; 67 S. W. 9'64; State v. Hale, 72 Mo. App. 78. 64 State V. Kampman, 81 Mo. App. 205; State v. Feagan, 70 Mo. App. 406; State v. Dunning, 14 6. D. 316; 85 N. W. 589; Woods V. State, 36 Ark. 36; 38 Am. Rep. 22; Chew v. State, 43 Ark. 361; State v. Gray, 61 Conn. 39; 22 Atl. 675; Gault v. State, 835 DRUGGISTS AND PHYSICIANS. §508 person selling liquor in any quantity, except upon a physician prescribing it in good faith for his patients, it was held lawful for any druggist to fill the prescription and sell the liquor therein called for/'^ The fact that the statute requires the prescription to be cancelled, and provides a penalty for the druggist if he do not do so, does not render the sale invalid or an offense.^® Where a druggist can sell liquors to an applicant upon his written request, which must contain cer- tain statements, a sale upon an application not having such statements is illegal.''^ If the statute requires the purchaser to make an affidavit concerning the object of the purchase, a sale without the affidavit is illegal.*'^ A statute prohibitng a druggist from allowing the liquor he sells to be consumed on his premises is valid, even as to a physician also running the drug store and prescribing for his own patients.*^ 34 Ga. 533; State v. Bissell, 67 Iowa, 616; 25 N. W. 831; Salina V. Seitz, IG Kan. 163. An ordinance requiring a li- cense but providing that it shall not apply to sales by druggists "upon the prescription of a re- putable physician and for medi- cal purposes," does not require the druggist to have a prescrip- tion in order to sell liquor. Prowitt V. Denver (Colo. App.), 52 Pac. 286. 65 Parker v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 12 S. W. 276; Common- wealth v. Reynolds, 89 Ky. 147; 12 S. W. 132; 20 S. W. 167. Contra, Bottle v. State, 51 Ark. 07; 10 S. VV. 12. 6«Snead v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 262; 49 S. W. 595. In New York it has been held that it must be shown that the sale was for medical purposes, even when made upon a prescrip- tion; but that was when no stat- ute had been enacted concerning prescriptions. People v. SaflFord, 5 Denio, 112. 67 Long V. Joder, 139 Iowa, 471; 116 N. VV. 1063; State v. Gregory, 110 Iowa, 624; 82 N, W. 335. See State v. Huff, 76 Iowa, 200; 46 N. W. 720. 68 State V. Gregory, 74 Kan. 467; 87 Pac. 370. sa State v. Finney, 178 Mo. 385; 77 S. W. 992. Where a druggist sought to re- strain the collection of a liquor tax, claiming that all sales of liquors he had made were on pre- scriptions issued by reputable physicians, such as the statute re- quired, it was lield that he had the burden to show that fact. Hubbell v. Ebrit, 8 Ohio Com. PL 116. A compound in half-pint bottle of rock candy, ginger, glycerine, and whisky in equal parts with- out a prescription is an offense under a statute requiring a pre- scription for a sale of intoxicat- § 509 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 836 Sec. 509. Prescription for Sunday and holiday sales. In Indiana a statute requires a prescription from a reputable practicing jjliysician to protect the seller selling on Sundays and holidays. The purpose of this statute "is to protect the Sabbath, and the other days therein named, from the evils that might result from the sale of intoxicating liquors. The section is an absolute inhibition upon the sale of such liquors on the days named, to he drunk as a beverage. It seems to recognize the right of druggists to sell such liquors for medicinal purposes, but imposes a condition on such sales on Sunday * * * that is, that the sale shall be made only to those who have procured a written prescription there- for. The intention is to prohibit the sale on those days except in case of sickness. And in order that this intention may not be thwarted by feigned sickness the prescription is re- quired." '^ "There is a reason, and a solid one, for requiring a 'written prescription,' for it is evidence of a tangible and lasting form, and it puts a professional man upon record as having deliberately advised a patient to buy, and a druggist to sell, liquor on Sunday. It is an effective means of pre- venting abuses and is quite as important in a case where the ing liquors. State v. Sharpe, 119 without one. State v. Hendrix, Mo. App. 386; 95 S. W. 298. 98 Mo. 374; 11 S. W. 728; Mays A statute autliorizing a drug- v. Commonwealth, 3 Ky. L. Kep. gist to sell upon a physician's (abstract) 250; State v. Moore, prescription does not authorize a 107 Mo. 78; 16 S. W. 937; Mau- distiller or grocer to sell upon it. pin v. Commonwealth, 1 Ky. L. •Commonwealth v. Day, 95 Ky. Rep. (abstract) 281. 120; 23 S. W. 952; 15 Ky. L. Where a person secured of a Rep. 466. doctor a prescription for whisky Unless the statute requires it, for his own use, but procured the the druggist need not have a li- whisky thereon for another, with cense. Commonwealth v. Mc- such other's money, it was held Grorty, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 674; Com- that he sold the liquor to such monwealth v. Reynolds, 6 Ky. L. other, and had made an illegal Rep. (abstract) 520. sale. Hawkins v. State (Tex. Cr. Where a statute ' requires a pre- App.), 114 S. W. 813. scription to sell liquors, it is an 7o Benton v. State, 99 Ind. 89. offense to sell it as a medicine 837 DRUGGISTS AND PHYSICIANS. § 510 druggist is himself a physician as in any other. " " ' ' It may be remarked, prima facie, every sale of intoxicating liquor on Sunday, and the other days named in the statute, is unlawful. The burden of showing such sale to be lawful rests upon the person making the sale, and the statute contemplates that such proof shall be in writing. To permit it to be made in any other way would throw open the door to evasions of the plain provisions of the statute. It will be observed that the prescription offered in evidence was given six days before the sale for which appellant was prosecuted. If this were a prosecution for selling without a license, on a week day, and the question involved was one of a sale in good faith for medicinal purposes, this prescription would, perhaps, be strong evidence in the appellant's favor; but, in our opinion, it was no justification of a sale made on Sunday, six days after its date." ^- Sec. 510. Kind of prescriptions. Unless a statute requires it the prescription need not be a written one, at least where the words "requisition of a physician for medical purposes" are used in the statute.'^'' But where the statutes used the words "written prescription" nothing else will do. The^-e must be a separate prescription for each sale, and there cannot be a general or "continuing" prescription.^* Thus, where a prescription was as follows, "John W. Edwards: Let Benj. Howard have one-half pint of whisky and glycerine for medicinal purposes. Repeat as 71 Tilford V. State, 109 Ind. written instrument. Caldwell v. 759; 10 N. E. 107; Edwards v. State, 18 Ind. App. 48; 46 N. E. State, 121 Ind. 450; 23 N. E. 697. 277. 74 Carrington v. Commonwealth, 72 The prescription was itseli 78 Ky. 83; Kyle v. State, 18 Ind. Tery defective in form. Edwards App. 136; 47 N. E. 647; Common- V. State, 121 Ind. 450; 23 N. E. wealth v. Day, 95 Ky. 120; 23 S. 277; Caldwell v. State, 18 Ind. W. 952; 15 Ky. L. Pvep. 466; State App. 48; 46 N. E. 697; Walker v. Cox, 23 W. Va. 797. See also V, State (Tex. Cr. App), 64 S. Edwards v. State, 121 Ind. 450; W. 1052. 23 N. E. 277; Irish v. State (Tex. 73 Bain v. State. 61 Ala. 75. Cr. App.), 25 S. W. 634, The word prescription means a § 510 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 838 needed," and duly signed by a physician, it was held that it was not sufficient in form. "The prescription offered in evi- dence is somewhat vague and uncertain in its terms," said the court. "It prescribes whisky and glycerine, but gives no directions as to the proportions in which they are to be mixed. * * * There is no direction as to how frequently or in what quantities it shall be taken, but all is left to the judg-ment of the patient. But whatever else may be said of this pre- scription, it cannot be said that it advises the patient to buy, or the druggist to sell, on Sunday. " "^ So a writing purport- ing to be signed by a physician, which read, "R, whisky, one quart, for medical use," not addressed to anyone, and not containing the name of the patient to whom the liquor was to be sold, nor the manner of its use, nor a request that the sale be made on Sundaj^^" was held not to be such a pre- scription as a statute which required one from a regularly practicing physician to render the sale a legal transaction." So a prescription addressed to no one, and made for a "sufficient quantity" is not a compliance with the statute.'^* Where a statute re(piired that the prescription should contain a statement that the liquor was "absolutely" necessary as a medicine, the omission of the word "absolutely" was held to render the prescription insufficient."^ Where a statute requires the prescription to be dated, a dating with numerals only is sufficient.*" A signing with the initials alone is a sufficient signature.*' Where a statute requires the physician to certify 75 Edwards v. State, 121 lud. 7S Kyle v. State, 18 Ind. App. 450; 23 N. E. 277; Kyle v. State, 136; 47 N. E. 647. 1« Ind. App. 136; 47 N. E. -647. 79 State v. Titrieh, 34 W. Va. 76 The sale was made on Sun- 137; 11 S. E. 1002; State v. Nix- day in both of the last two cases ford, 46 Mo. App. 494; State v. above, but the statute requiring a Davis, 76 Mo. App. 586; Prowitt prescription tor sales on Sunday v. Denver, 11 Colo. App. 70; 52 had no provision in it that the Pac. 286; State v. Manning, 107 prescription should contain a re- Mo. App. 51; 81 S. W. 223. quest for sales on that day. so In this case as follows: "12, 77 Caldwell v. State, 18 Ind. 16, 84." State v. Clevenger, 25 App. 48; 46 N. E. 697. See Mo. App. 653. State V. Anthony. 52 ]\Io. App. si state v. Clevenger, 25 Mo. ■507; State v. Davis. 129 Mo. App. App. 653. 129; 108 S. W. 127. 839 DRUGGISTS AND PHYSICIANS. § 510 upon the honor of a physician that he has personally examined the person to whom the prescription is given, an omission of that statement avoids the prescription so far as it is a de- fense.^' Where a statute required a prescription to name the person for whom it was issued and that the liquor prescribed is a necessary remedy, a prescription is a sufficient compliance with its provisions which states that it is prepared for a cer- tain person, is a necessary remedy, and is for medical pur- poses.^^ But where a statute required the prescription to be dated, state the quantity of liquor to be sold, as well as the quantity prescribed, and the name of the person to whom it is prescribed, a prescription is not sufficient and is no protection to the druggist that has no date, nor the name of the person to whom it is prescribed, and on which eight ounces of whisky is sold instead of two, as prescribed, although otherwise suffi- cient.^* The eases cited in this section show that unless the prescription is such as the statute requires, it is no protection to the druggist filling it.-'" "S\Tiere the statute required the pre- scription to be a "written" one, it was held that it need not be in the form of an order on the druggist requesting him to furnish the liquor, but it was sufficient if the liquor was prescribed for the patient.^" If the statute requires that the name of the person to whom the prescription is given be speci- fied, a designation as "Mr. Gibson" is sufficient if the Gibson referred to obtained the liquor." Designating the liquor to be sold by Latin abbreviations, as " E. Spts. Frumenti ojj.," which means two pints of spirits frumenti, is a compliance with a statute requiring "the kind and quantity of liquor" to be furnished.'^ It is a question for the court to determine whether the paper in evidence is a prescription within the meaning of the statute.^^ In Iowa, if the applicant for the S2 McLean v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. se state v. Blufield Drug Co., App. 213; 64 S. W. S6o. 43 W. Va. 144; 27 S. E. 350. 83 State V. Hammack, 93 Mo. 87 State v. Blufield Drug Co., App. 521. 43 W. Va. 144; 27 S. E. 350. s4Hutson V. Commonwealth 88 state v. Blufield Drug Co., (Ky.). 105 S. W. 055; 32 Ky. L. 43 \V. Va. 144; 27 S. E. 350. Rep. 392. soHubbell v. Ebrite, 8 Ohio 85 State V. Bowers, 65 Mo. App. Com. PI. 116. G39; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 1181. § 511 trjvpfic in intoxicating liquors. 840 liquor lives in a city or town where the streets are named and the residences numbered, the prescription must contain the residence number of the person for whom the prescription was prepared, and if not for a person residing in such a city or town, then it must contain his address; and a prescription short of this is no protection to the druggist filling it.''" Where the prescription was one-half pint of whisky with a little "gadine" cordial and about ten drops of creosote in it, given to an applicant who said he had a deep cold and wanted "some whisky or something for it," it was held to be a ques- tion for the jury whether the sale upon such a prescription (the druggist himself having written it) was made in good faith."^ Sec. 511. Registration and reports of sales. In Illinois, an ordinance requiring druggists to keep a registry of sales made, showing when and to whom made, and the amount sold, and also requiring a report of them to the clerk of the city, was held void as being unduly oppressive.^- But statutes of a like import have not met such a fate. A stat- ute requiring reports of all sales made covers a sale by pre- scription.''^ The reports are public records when made and filed with the proper official and may be used in a prosecution against the person making them, and the statute is not uncon- stitutional on the ground that the accused is thereby made to incriminate himself.''* A statute requiring the reports to be made on a particular day of each month is satisfied if made 90 State V. Harris, 122 Iowa, borne, 19 Ont. App. 439; revers- 78; 97 N. W. 1093. ing 21 Ont. 504; Regina v 91 Rowe V. Commonwealth Denham, 35 Up. Can. Rep. 503 (Ky.), 70 S. W. 407; 24 Ky. L. Regina v. McCoy, 23 Ont. Rep Rep. 974. 442. 92 Clinton v. Phillips, 58 111. 94 state v. Smith, 74 Iowa, 580 102. 38 N. W. 492; State v. Cum 93 State V. Chamberlin, 74 mins, 76 Iowa, 133; 40 N. W Iowa, 266; 37 N. W. 326; Chase 124; People v. Shuler, 136 Mich V. Van Buren Circuit Judge, 148 161; 98 N. W. 986; 10 Detroit Mich. 149; 111 N. W. 750; 14 L. N. 1004. Detroit L. N. 73; Regina v. El- 841 DRUGGISTS AND PHYSICIANS. § 511 on any day of that month, the statute not being mandatory ; ®' but one requiring the report to be made on a certain day of each month, "or within five days thereafter," requires the report to be made within that time, and if not so made sub- jects the druggist to the penalty of the statute for not having complied with its terms.^^ As these reports are official docu- ments their execution need not be proven before admitting them in evidence, the question of identification being all that is necessary.^^ Statutes inflicting penalties for false reports cover false reports made through mistakes or inadvertence.®^ Of course, these statutes have no retrospective effect.'^® Where a statute requires the purchaser to sign a registry of the sale, if there be a conflJct whether the sale was actually made, the registry may be put in evidence.^ An indictment which charges that the defendant neither made a record of his sales nor a report to the proper authority, charges two separate offenses, and is bad for duplicity.- Statutes requiring regis- tration and weekly reports of sales are constitutional.^ A failure to report a sale does not make the sale illegal, but simply lays the delinquent liable for a failure to report.* The use of ditto marks indicating dates of sales and residences of purchasers does not render the reports an insufficient com- pliance with a statute requiring the dates of sales and resi- st Abbott V. Sartori, 57 Iowa, quired by statute incurs a liabil- 656; 11 N. W. 626. ity to a penalty even though the 96 State V. McEntee, 6S Iowa, prescriptions were properly filed. 381; 27 N. W. 265. Holland v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 97 State V. Thompson, 74 Iowa, 103 S. W. 631. 119; 37 N. W. 104. 1 State v. Shelton, 16 Wash. 98 .State V. Chamberlin, 74 590; 48 Pac. 258. Iowa, 266; 37 N. W. 320. This 2 Chase v. Van Buren Circuit seems to be a very harsh rule. Judge, 148 Mich. 149; 111 N. W. and probably owes its origin to 750; 14 Detroit Leg. IST. 73. the fact of actual necessity in or- ■" People v. Shuler, 136 Mich, der to prevent evasion of the pen- 101; 98 N. W. 986; 10 Detroit alty of the statute. Leg. X. 1004. 99 State V. Haltzschullerr, 72 4 People v. Thompson, 147 Iowa, 541; 34 N. W. 323. Mich. 444; 111 N. W. »6; 13 De- In Texas a druggist not mak- troit Leg. N. 1122. ing report within tlie time re- § 512 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 842 dences of purchasers to be given. ^ In stating the object of the purchaser it is sufficient to use the word ' ' medical. ' ' ^ But an affidavit containing nothing but the signature of the officer is not a compliance with a statute requiring the drug- gist making the sales to "make and swear to" his report of liquor sold.^ Sec. 512. Sales by physicians. The law permits a physician to administer intoxicating liquors to his patients,, and the numerous statutes on the subject of intoxicating liquors have seldom attempted to pre- vent him from doing so, even in prohibition States.^ If the physician buys the liquor for his patient and turns it over to him, in pursuance of a prescription he has given him, he commits no offense.^ Yet in Kansas and Iowa it has been held that he cannot sell liquor to his patient nor put it up in pre- scriptions unless he has a permit to sell liquor, such as is required of druggists, the statute forbidding druggists and all other persons to sell liquor without a permit.^" And in Alabama, where the statute made no exception as to physicians, it was held that a physician could not furnish liquor to his patient as a medicine, though he acted in the utmost good faith." Where a physician may administer liquor to a patient 5 People V. Henner, 135 Mich. » Key v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 629; 9S N. W. 397; 101 X. W. 77; 38 S. W. 773. For cases 403; 10 Det. L. N. 907. where the seller is both physician 6 People V. Renner, supra. and druggist, see previous section. " People V. Renner, supra. lo State v. I*reming, 32 Kan. Where the purpose of the sale 588; 5 Pac. 19; State v. Bena- must be given, a failure to do so done, 79 Iowa, 90; 44 N. W. 218. is an offense. Barver v. Brenner So in Colorado. Braisted v. Peo- (lowa), 119 N. W. 142. pie, 3S Colo. 49; 88 Pac. 150, 8 State v. Wilson, 71 Kan. 263; 151; and in Nebraska, Holt v. 80 Pac. 565; Walker v. State State, 62 Neb. 134; «6 N. W. (Tex. Cr. App.), 64 S. W. 1052; 1073. McCrory v. Commonwealth, 8 Ky. n Carson v. State, 69 Ala. 235; L. Rep. (abstract) 437; Sarris v. Thomason v. State, 70 Ala. 20; Commonwealth, 83 Ky. 3'27 ; tState v. Benadom, 79 Iowa, 90; State V. Larimore, 19 Mo. 391; 44 N. W. 218. King V. Chicoyne, 8 Can. Cr. Cas. 507. 843 DRUGGISTS AND PHYSICIANS. § 512 lie must act in the utmost good faith. He cannot use his professional power as a means of furnishing liquors as a beverage, or to one who does not need it. In one case where a physician gave a prescription for a quart of whisky, which was filled at a drug store owned by a partnership of which he w^as a member, the sale was held illegal. "The statute con- templates," said the court, "the bona fide administering of such liquors as a medicine in cases of necessity, not otherwise. We are all of opinion that the giving by a physician of an order for a quart of whisky, on a drug store in which he himself was a partner, without more, is not the administering of medicine within the meaning of the law, but an illegal sale of spirituous liquors, contrary to the terms of the statute."^- A statute is valid that casts upon the physician the burden to show that the condition of the patient reasonably demanded the use of intoxicating liquors.^^ He must make the sale as a physician, and reasonably believe that the patient needs it, and not upon the suggestion of the patient that he needs it,^* or that his wife or a member of his family needs it.^^ But where a statute permitted a druggist to sell liquor for sacramental, medicinal and mechanical pur- poses, and required him to keep a registry of the sale, stating the time it was made, the amount and kind of liquor sold, and the name of the purchaser, it was held that if the pur- chaser stated to him that the liquor was for one of the three objects named, and he believed him and acted in good faith in making the sale, he was not required to investigate the truthfulness of the purchaser's statement; but if that state- ment was a mere pretense and the druggist knew it, or did not act in good faith in making the sale, he violated the statute.^*^ 12 Brinson v. State, 89 Ala ^^ People v. Hinchman, 75 105; 8 So. 527. Mich. 587; 42 N. W. 1006; 4 L. 13 Commonweal til v. ;Minor, 88 R. A. 707. Ky. 422; 11 S. \s'. 472. In Iowa it has been held that a 14 State V. C'louglily, 73 Iowa, physician must have a permit or 626; 35 N. W. G52. license to furnish liquor to his 15 Thomason v. State, 70 Ala. patients upon prescriptions. State 20. V. Benadom, 79 Iowa, 90; 44 N. §513 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 844 Sec. 513. Physicians illegally giving a prescription. In an occasional State statutes forbid a physician giving a prescription for liquor when the person to whom it is given does not actually need the liquor. If the physician believes in good faith that the patient needs the liquor he may pre- scribe it for him,'^ though it turn out he was purposely deceived by the patient in order to obtain the liquor.^^ To show that he did not act in good faith, evidence of the number of prescriptions he has given to other persons within a reason- ably limited period of time when the particular prescription was illegally given may be introduced for the purpose of showing an intent on his part to violate the law.^^ A statute casting upon the physician the burden to show that the patient actually needed the liquor is constitutional.^" A statute prohibiting a physician giving a prescription in a prohibition county to one not actually ill has no reference to a physician writing a prescription for himself.-^ It has been W. 218. So in Arkansas. Battle V. State, 51 Ark. 97; 10 'S. W. 12. But in Canada if he acts in good faith he need not have it. King V. 'Chicoyne, 8 Can. Cr. Cas. 507. Under a power to license, regu- late and prohibit the sale of in- toxicating liquors, a city may adopt an ordinance requiring all persons selling them to have a license, and may exempt physi- cians from its provisions. Carth- age V. Carlton, 99 111. App. 338. The administering of medicine by a physician to his patient is not a sale. Schaffner v. State, 8 Ohio St. 642. Where accused sold straight whisky and a physician thereaf- ter put medicine in it for the prosecuting witness, it was held that an offense had been commit- ted. Cotton v. State (Tex.), 120 S. W. 432. 17 Commonwealth v. Minor, 88 Ky. 422; 11 S. W. 472. As to indictment, see West v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 575; 51 S. W, 247. See also State v. Drug Co., 43 W. Va. 144; 27 S. E. 350; Mullins v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 68 S. W. 272; State v. Breaux (La.), 47 So. 876. Tliere is no such an offense at common law as that of "unlaw- fully prescribing." Common- wealth v. Neal, 11 Ky. L. Eep. (abstract) 678. IS Walker v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 64 S. W. 1052; People v. Hinehman, 75 Mich. 587; 42 N. W. 1006; 4 L. R. A. 707; Com- monwealth v. Williams, 120 Ky. 314: 86 S. W. 553; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 695. m State v. Atkinson, 33 S. C. 100; 11 S. E. 93. 20 Commonwealth v. Minor, 88 Ky. 422: 11 S. W. 472. 21 Hawk V. People, 44 Tex. Cr. App. 560; 72 S. W. 842. 845 DRUGGISTS AND PHYSICIANS, § 513 held that an ordinance forbidding a physician to give a patient a prescription for liquor when he really did not need it was authorized, and neither unreasonable, oppressive nor an unjust discrimination against the physicians as a class.'^ Of course, a sale is not illegal merely because the druggist does not keep a record of nor report it.-^ A physician illegally giving a prescription need not be licensed or registered in order to commit an offense against a statute prohibiting the giving of a prescription contrary to its terms.-* A physician who gives a prescription to a person so he can obtain the liquor for another violates the statute,-'^ and may be con- victed of making an illegal sale, for he is an accomplice of or assistant to the seller ; -^ but it must be shown that he knew^ when he gave the prescription that the patient was not sick, or gave it without making a personal examination of him, where the statute requires a personal examination before giving it.-^ The mere giving of the prescription in an improper instance is no offense unless there is a sale upon it.'^ "Where a statute required a physician to file an affidavit to enable him to prescribe, it was held that this did not prevent the State from showing that the sale, to the knowledge of the physician, was an improper one.-^ Whether or not a pre- scription was given in good faith is a question for the jury.^° 22 Carthage v. Buckner, 4 III. State, 7 Tex. Cr. Eep. 970; 73 S. App. 317. W. 1056. 23Snead v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. 23 Blakeley v. State, 73 Ark. App. 262; 49 S. W. 595. 218; 83 S. W. 948. Sufficiency 2-t State V. Anthony, 52 Mo. of affidavit, People v. Renner, 135 App. S07. Mich. €29; 98 N. W. 397; 100 25 State V. Berkeley, 41 W. Va. N. W. 403; 10 Detroit L. N. 907. 455 ; 23 S. E. 608. 3o Rowe v. Commonwealth 26McLain v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. (Ky.), 70 S. W. 407; 24 Ky. L. App. 213; 64 S. W. 865. Rep. 974. 27 Williams v. State (Tex. Cr. Statutes go so far as to re- App.), 81 S. W. 1209; Stovall v. quire a physician giving a pre- State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 337; 39 scription to personally examine S. W. 934; McQuerry v. State the applicant for it before giving (Tex. Cr. App.), 40 S. W. 990. it; and makes him liable if it is 28 Williams v. State (Tex. Cr. not given in good faith. Mullina App.), 77 S. W. 783; Stephens v. v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 68 S. VV. 272. CHAPTER XV. LOCAL OPTION. Art. I. Adoption of IjOcal Option. Art. II. Violation of Local Option Law. SECTION. ol4. Distinctive feature of local option statutes. 515. Sufficiency of petition for 82 N. W. 70. A city cannot adopt by indirec- tion a measure required to be submitted to the electors. In re Barclay, 12 Up. Can. 86. When a sale actually took place, the fact that it was made to test the validity of the local option law is immaterial; for the suit is not a fictitious one. Lam- bert V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 232; 39 S. W. 299. A statute giving the right of local option to "towns and incor- porated villages" has no applica- tion to cities. Kleppe v. Gard (Minn.), 123 N. W. 665. § 515 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 850 aver that in the opinion of the petitioners the public good will be promoted by a prohibition of the sale or giving away of intoxicating liquors within the limits described, a failure to make such averment in the petition will render the entire proceedings void ; - and if a statute requires that a certain number of qualified voters shall sign it, it will not be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a court, where the order of the court issued under it shows that a designated person and "many other citizens of the county" signed it,^ or that the "election was ordered upon the petition of C and twenty-nine others. ' ' * But in later cases by the same court it was held that where the petition stated that "the undersigned citizens of said county" prayed for the holding of such an election, it was sufficient, the court holding that the commonly accepted meaning of the word "citizen" conveys the idea of a qualified voter, and that, therefore, the petition was sufficient.^ And in other cases it has been held that it is not essential to the sufficiency of such a petition that it should show the qualifica- tion of the petitioners by direct or indirect averment. Such holding was upon the reasonable theory that the qualification of such petitioners was a jurisdictional fact to be ascertained by the court independent of any allegation in the petition.* In other words, such a petition will not be defective for want of an allegation in it that it is signed by the requisite number of qualified petitioners, if in fact it was signed by such number, and the official body with whom it was filed ascer- tains that fact.^ If the statute providing for such a petition does not stipulate what particular allegations or statements shall be made in it, it will be sufficient if it expresses in an 2 Tally V. Grider, 66 Ala. 119; 4 Aiken v. State, 14 Tex. App. Aiken v. State, 14 Tex. App. 142. 142; Bartel v. Hobson, 107 Iowa, ^ Ex parte Lynn, 19 Tex. App. 644; 78 N. W. 689; People v. 293; Steele v. State, 19 Tex. App. Board, 32 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 123; 425. 66 N. Y. Supp. 199; Wyatt v. e Steele v. State, 19 Tex. App. Ryan, 113 Ky. 306; 68 S. W. 425. 134; 24 Ky. L. Rep. 228. 7 state v. Weeks, 38 Mo. App. 3 Prather v. State, 12 Tex. 566 ; State v. Smith, 38 Mo. App. App. 401. 618. 851 LOCAL OPTION. § 515 intelligible manner the desire of the petitioners that an elec- tion under the provisions of the statute shall be held within the limits defined in the petition.* While it is better that such a petition should, at least, substantially follow the words of the statute, if it, nevertheless, appears from its face that it could mean and have for its object but one thing, that of voting on the question whether an order for such an election should be made — for instance, an order of "elections to take the sense of the voters upon what is known as the Wood's Local Option Law" — the petition will be regarded as suffi- cient.^ It is not essential, however, that a petition should refer to and designate the statute under which the election must be ordered, and if it does so incorrectly the erroneous reference may be disregarded as surplusage.^" And the same construction has been placed upon a petition under a statute Avhich made no mention of wine or beer, but where it appeared from other provisions of the statute that the words ''intoxi- cating liquors" were used therein as including wine and beer and the petition prayed for an election *'to determine whether or not spirituous and intoxicating liquors, including wine and beer, should be sold."" Statutes sometimes require the petition to be accompanied by written proof concerning the signatures of the petitioners being genuine. Thus, in Mich- igan, a statute required the petition to be accompanied by a copy of the poll list of the last preceding general election, and by an affidavit of one of the resident electors to the effect that he personally knew the petitioners and that they resided within the district; or, if the poll list could not be procured, then that the petitioners were qualified electors, and accompany the affidavit by the returns or canvass of the last election. 8 State V. Weeks, 38 Mo. App. » State v. Smith, 38 Mo. App. 566; State v. Smith, 38 Mo. App. 618. 618; Ex parte Lynn, 19 Tex. lo State v. Schmitz, 36 Mo. App. 293; Dillard v. State, 31 App. 550; Steele v. State, 19 Tex, Tex. Cr. Rep. 470; 20 S. VV. App. 426. 1106; State v. McCord, 207 Mo. n State v. iSchmitz, 36 Mo- 519; 106 S. W. 27; Ezzell v. App. 550. State, 29 Tex. App. 521; 16 S. W. 782. § 515 TR.VFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 852 Under such a statute it was only necessary to allege tbe resi- dence of the petitioners when a copy of the poll list was filed.'- If the petition purports to be signed by the requisite number of petitioners, and the order is based thereon, the election cannot be regarded as void if in fact it did not have sufficient genuine signatures.'^ The metes and bounds of the district need not be set out in the petition, it being sufficient to designate a political division of the State, unless the district is a subdivision of some political division.'* Where a statute requires a petition to be signed by a certain per cent, of the voters of a city, it is not necessary that that per cent, of the voters in each ward should sign it.'^ Where a statute re- quired ten per cent, of the voters casting a ballot at the last preceding election to sign the petition, and their acknowledg- ments of signing the petition to be taken by a notary public, and fifty-five electors signed it, but only seventeen acknowl- edged their signatures, and there was no proof that such signers constituted ten per cent, of those who had so voted, the proceedings based thereon were held void.'® Where a statute required four questions to be submitted to the voters it was held that all of them must be submitted and not a 12 Friesner v. Common Council, is People v. Board, 32 N. Y. 91 Mich. 504; 52 N. W. 18. Misc. Rep. 123; 66 N. Y. Supp. isEzzell V. State, 29 Tex. App. 199; Wyatt v. Ryan, 113 Ky. 521; 16 S. W. 782; Ex parte 306; 68 N. W. 134; 24 Ky. L. Segars, 32 Tex. Cr. Rep. 553; 25 Rep. 228. lis. W. 26; People v. Hamilton, Members of the board ordering 143 Mich. 1; 106 N. W. 275; 12 the electors who sign the petition Detroit Leg. N. 897. may be counted. Hunter v. Senn, ^*Ex parte Perkins, 34 Tex. Cr. 61 S. C. 44; 39 S. E. 235. Rep. 429; 31 S. W. 175. If there be a full expression of Those who sign both petitions the will of the voters, an irregu- for and remonstrances against an larity in the petition will not election cannot be counted on avoid the election. In re Clem- either petition. Raubenheimer v. ent, 29 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 29; 60 Parsons, 12 Juta, 326. N. Y. Supp. 328. 15 Mahan v. Commonwealth The signatures may be on sev- (Ky.), 56 S. W. 529; 21 Ky. L. eral pages or papers. In re Cip- Rep. 1807; Brantly v. State, 42 perley, 50 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 266; Tex. Cr. App. 293; 59 S. W. S92; 100 N. Y. Supp. 473; Richter v. Nail V. Tinslej', 107 Ky. 441; 54 State (Ala.), 47 So. 163. 6. W. 187; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1167. 853 LOCAL OPTION. § 515 part of them, and that a petition attempting to submit less than four was insufficient." "Where a statute requires the signers of the petition to acknowledge theii* signatures before a notary public, the certificate of the officer that "the above named persons" appeared before him and signed the petition in his presence is not a sufficient compliance with the statute;^* nor is it sufficient for the officer to certify that they subscribed and were sworn to the petition before him.^® If several political petitions be combined, then the requisite percentage of voters in each division must sign the petition, and it is not sufficient that the requisite percentage of voters of the combined districts signed it.-" A statute which requires a majority of the voters at the last general election to sign it does not require a majority of the voters to sign it in the district at the time it is presented, even if there then be many more voters than there were at the last general election.-^ In Michigan, if the court accepts the petition, regular in form and having a sufficient number of signatures to it, its action; is conclusive so far as the genuineness of such signatures is concerned.-- 17 Kennedy v. Warner, 51 N. Y. record in the proceedings for an Misc. Rep. 362; 100 N. Y. Supp. election. State v. McCord, 207 616; In re Getman, 28 N. Y. Mo. 519; 106 S. W. 27. Misc. Rep. 451; 59 N. S. Supp. The term last "general elec- 1013. tion" means the last general elec- is Jackson v. Seeber, 50 N. Y. tion at whicli State or county Misc. Rep. 479; 100 N. Y. Supp. officers were elected, and not the 563; In re Livingston, 115 N. Y. last Congressional election. Davis Supp. 269. V. Henderson, 127 Ky. 13; 104 19 Kennedy v. Warner, 51 N. Y. N. W. 1009; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1252. Misc. Rep. 362; 100 N. Y. Supp. The petition need not fix a date 616. Under this statute there for the election. Puckett v. Sni- must be both a signing and ac- der, 110 Ky. 261; 61 S. W. 277; knowledgment to constitute the 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1718. petition valid. 22 Attorney General v. Van Bu- 20 Davis V. Henderson, 127 Ky. ren Circuit Court, 143 Mich. 13; 104 S. W 1009; 31 Ky. L. 366; 106 N. W^ 1113; 12 Detroit Rep. 1252; Smith v. Patton, 103 Leg. N. 1016. Ky. 444; 45 S. W. 459; 20 Ky. L. In New York a statute pro- Rep. 165. vided that, except for a failure 21 Otte v. State, 29 Cir. Ct. Rep. to file a petition, if certain ques- 203. tions concerning the sale of liq- The petition is a part of tlie uors had been improperly submit- §516 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 854 Sec. 516. Attorney in fact under Indiana statute. Under the Indiana statute regulating the sale of intoxi- cating liquors it has been held that the proceeding before the board of commissioners of the county, that being the desig- nated body to grant licenses for that purpose, is a judicial One,^^ in the nature of a civil action, and that the proceeding may be prosecuted or defended by a party in person or by an agent, an attorney, or an attorney in fact.^* The fact that the statute permits a remonstrance to be signed by an attorney in fact does not render it obnoxious to the Constitution of ted to a vote at a regular town meeting, they should be submit- ted at a special town meeting. A petition for an election was not signed and acknowledged by tlie requisite number of electors; and it was held that there was no au- thority for a resubmission, the statute not providing for it in that contingency. In re Rogers, 4 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 3«9; 84 X. Y. Supp. 1024. In this State a petition praying for the submis- sion to vote "the several ques- tions relating to the sale of liq- uors, as provided by section 16 of the liquor tax law," sufficiently states the questions for submis- sion. In re Rice, 95 X. Y. App. Div. 28; 88 N. Y. Supp. 512. Where the board has the power to order an election independent of a petition, it is immaterial that the petition is insufficient. Lambert v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 232; 39 S. W. 299; Wil- liams v. Davidson (Tex. Civ. App.), 70 S. W. 987. In Alabama a failure of the pe tition to state that "in the opiu ion of the petitioner the public good will be promoted by a pro- hibition of the sale or giving away of vinous or spirituous liq- uor within" the limits of the ter- ritory described therein was held so limited as to confer no juris- diction on the board. Tally v. Grider, 60 Ala. 119. Unless a board or court has the inherent power to order an elec- tion without a petition, an order without it is void. Aikin v. State, 14 Tex. App. 142. In Ohio the petition is not prima facie evidence of its suffi- ciency, except upon failure of the electors to contest it. The bur- den of proof lies upon the peti- tioner to prove the facts stated in it. But if an elector seeks to withdraw his signature he must show it was procured by fraud or misrepresentation. In re James Law Petition, 30 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 697. When can be filed in Arkansas. Wilmans v. Bordwell, 73 Ark. 418; 84 S. W. 474. 23Halloran v. McCullough, 68 Ind. 179; List v. Padget, 96 Ind. 126. 24 Castle V. Bell, 145 Ind. 8; 14 N. E. 2; Fried v. Xelson. 30 App. 1; 65 X. E. 216. 855 LOCAL OPTION. § 516 Indiana on the ground that an applicant for a license who is confronted by a remonstrance signed by an omnibus power of attorney has not an equal chance with an applicant eon- fronted by a personally signed remonstrance."^ Under such statute, however, the leg:al voters of a township or city have no authority, by a power of attorney, to authorize an at- torney in fact to sign their names to "any remonstrance against the granting of a license to any person he may see fit to remonstrate against." This is so because the regulation and restraint of the sale of intoxicating liquors is an exercise of the police power of the State, and that power, as an orig- inal power, is lodged in the Legislature. The Legislature having delegated a portion of the power to the voters of the townships and city wards, and having made no provision by which they may redelegate it to an agent or attorney in fact, they are without power to do so. It is an elementary prin- ciple that a delegated right cannot be redelegated in the absence of express authority to that end from the principal.-'' But a power of attorney to remonstrate against the granting of a license to "any applicant" is not invalid as conferring a discretion on the attorney as to what applicants to remon- strate against. In such case the word "any" is the equivalent of the word "all" or "every."" The word "any" is frequently and appropriately used to express the same mean- ing as "all" or "every. ""^ Such a power of attorney is not invalid because it does not contain any applicant, but is general and directed against all applicants.-^ If it is executed by a majority of the voters of the township or of a ward in a city, it will not be revoked by the death of one or more persons executing it, provided it still contains a majority of 25 Hoop V. Affleck, 162 Ind. 513; White v. Fargeson, 29 App. 564; 70 N. E. 978. 145; 64 X. E. 409. 26 Cochell V. Reynolds, 156 Ind. 2s 2 Am. and En5 State V. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439; 44 N. E. 469; White v. Pri- fogle, 146 Ind. 64; 44 N. E. 926; Ludwig V. Cory, 158 Ind. 594; 64 N. E. 14. Those signing the petition for a local option election may with- draw their names before it is act- ed iipon. jDavia v. Henderson, 127 Ky. 13; 104 S. W. 1009; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1252; O'Neal v. Mi- nary, 101 S. W. 951; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 888; 125 Ky. 571; Green v. Smith, 111 Iowa, 183; 82 N. W. 448. Signers of a petition to have a district declared "dry" cannot withdraw their names on the ground that boys and old men would buy whisky in the adjoin- ing State. Clark v. Daniel, 77 Ark. 122; 91 S. W. 9. But ap- plications to withdraw filed two days after the petition was filed and five days before the date of hearing was held to be in time. In this case the reasons assigned for withdrawing was that "after mature deliberation" they desired to take their names off the peti- tion; that they had been "mis- led," that "unjust means were used to secure signers," and that they were "inclined to the belief that the matter was not fairly presented" to them. It was held that these were not sufficient rea- sons for a withdrawal, no spe- cific reasons nor proof of facts be- ing presented. Colvin v. Finch, 75 Ark. 154; 87 S. W. 443. In Arkansas it is held that a petitioner cannot withdraw his name witliout the consent of the court. Bordwell v. Dills, 70 Ark. 175; 66 S. W. 646; (citing Wil- liams V. Citizens, 40 Ark. 290; McCullough V. Blackwell, 51 Ark. § 519 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 860 Sec. 519. Qualifications of petitioners. With respect to a petition for an election under a local option law it is only necessary that the requisite number of qualified persons shall, by a petition in writing, indicate to the proper court or board their desire that such an election shall be held in a particular locality for the purpose of deter- mining whether or not the sale of intoxicating liquors shall be prohibited in that locality.'^ In such case the qualification of the petitioner is a fact to be inquired into and determined by the court or board before acting upon the petition. It is an in(iuiry as to a jurisdictional fact which is not dependent upon or atlected by any allegation, or the absence of any allegation, in the petition. ^^ And a petition which states that, "the undersigned, citizens of said county," sufficiently shows that the petitioners are qualified voters of the county, where the local option law under which it is filed provides that they shall be such. One of the meanings of the word "citizen" as given by Webster, is "a person, native or naturalized, who has the privilege of voting for public officers, and who is qualified to fill offices in the gift of the people." ^^ But in the determining whether a petition for a local option election is signed by the requisite qualified electors in the county, the registration book of the county is not conclusive or even prima facie evidence that the persons registered are qualified 164; 10 iS. W. 261; Wilson v. The petitioners may .dismiss Thompson, 56 Ark. 110; 19 S. W. their petition and combine it with 321 ; State v. Gerhardt ( Ind. a new petition. State v. Kellogg. Kup.), 44 N. E. 469; 33 L. R. A. 133 Mo. App. 431; 113 S. W. 660. 325; Can- v. Boone, 108 Ind. 241; If an elector seeks to withdraw '9 N. E. 110; Sutherland v. Mc- his name from a petition he has Kinney, 146 Ind. 611; 15 N. E. the burden to show a sufficient 1048; Orcutt v. Reingardt, 46 N. cause for the withdrawal. In re J. L. 337; Grinnell v. Adams, 34 Jones Law Petition, 30 Ohio Cir. Ohio St. 44). Ct. Rep. 697. In Iowa the written withdraw- 37 Steele v. State, 19 Tex. 425. al of a consent for sale of liquors ss Eoo parte Lynn, 19 Tex. App. need not show the voting precinct 294. of the signer, as in case of signa- 39 Ex parte Lynn, 19 Tex. App. tures to the statement. Dyer v. 294; Steele v. State, 19 Tex. Augur (Iowa), 110 N. W. 323. App. 425. 861 LOCAL OPTION. §519 voters. Such a registration is evidence of nothing except of the list of persons registered and who have complied with that requisite to vote. It is that without which one cannot be a qualified elector, an essential prerequisite, and yet not con- ferring the right. In such case there cannot be any qualified elector not registered, but there may be many registered and not qualified electors. It may be determined from the regis- tration boolv that the number of qualified electors does not exceed those shown by it. It may be seen by an inspection of it that certain persons are not qualified electors because not registered; but it cannot be determined from a registra- tion book that there is a single qualified elector in the county. The right to register, and being registered, and the right to vote are distinct and different things. One may be registered and not be entitled to vote.*" A statute which authorizes an 4oBew V. State, 71 Miss. 1; 13 So. SGS; Fergason v. State, 71 Miss. 524; 14 So. 81; Roesch v. Henry (Or.), 103 Pac. 439. Where a statute provided that a statement of general consent to the sale of liquors should be signed by sixty-five per cent, of the legal voters who voted at the last preceding election as shown by the poll lists, parol evidence was held inadmissible to identify those signing the consent with persons who voted at the election as shown by the poll lists. Wil- son V. Bohstedt, 135 Iowa, 451; 110 N. W. 898. In this case the court refused to hold that "G. H. Meyer" was the same person as "George Meyer;" or "Henry Wag- ner" as "H. C. Wagner;" or "Wil- liam Wall" as "W. M. Wall," or "William Border" as "W. H. Border." A recital of the order of sub- mission that the required num- ber of voters had signed the pe- tition shows that the requisite number of qualified voters had signed it. State v. Foreman, 121 Mo. App. 502 ; 97 S. W. 269. In Mississippi it is held that the supervisors should not regard the registration book of the coun- ty as even prima facie evidence as to who are qualified electors, because persons may be regis- tered who are not entitled to vote, registration not conferring the right. Ferguson v. Monroe County, 71 Miss. 524; 14 So. 81. Where a statute required "one- tenth of the total vote cast for governor at the last general elec- tion" in the town or city, all qualified voters residing in the town or city who voted at the last general election for governor are qualified to sign the petition. Ex parte Perkins. 34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 429; 31 S. W. 175. "Registered" voters in North Carolina, Pace v. Raleigli, 140 N. C. 65; 52 S. E. 277. jMembers of the board may sign § 520 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 862 order for an election to be made upon the petition of a majority of the "adult residents" of a township, does not require the petitioners to be males or electors. Acting under the police; power of the State, a Legislature can pass an act to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors, in specially designated terri- tories, as, for instance, within three miles of an institution of learning, without an}' provision for a petition from any number of inhabitants, or order of a county court. This being so there is no good reason why women and girls, if adults, should not join in such petitions;. Thov are as deeply inter- ested in removing temptation to dissipation and vice and preserving good morals in communities as men are.*^ And where a statute provides "thfif unon application, signed by one-tenth of the voters," it shall be the dutv of the board of supervisors to order an election to determine whether or not spirituous liquors shall be sold within the limits of a county, members of such board mav sicn such application and canvass for signers to it without disqualifying them to act upon the petition as members of the board. One does not cease to be a citizen by becoming a judge and he may vote as his judgment dictates or petition for an opportunity to vote, and does not thereby disqualify himself as a judge in the matter which may come before him. The interest which disqualifies a judge is pecuniary and not political.^- Sec. 520. Territory embraced in petition — Description of territory. Usually there is little trouble or doubt in the ascertainment of the district in M-hich the election is to be held, for the statutes almost invariablj' so name the districts that there is no room for construction. But one thing must always be borne in mind, and that is that the statute in this regard must be explicitly followed. Two or more political units, as desig- nated by the statute, cannot be combined unless the statute the petition, and are not thereby 4i Blackwoll v. State, 36 Ark. disqualified to act. Lemon v. Pey- 178. ton, 64 Miss. 161; 8 So. 235. 42 Lemon v. Peyton, 64 Miss. 161: 8 South 235. 863 LOCAL OPTION. § 520 clearly provides for a combination. Thus, if the election is to be by townships, it must be by townships and not by counties, and each township must vote separately, unless the statute authorizes two or more to combine and hold a single joint election for their combined territory.^^ Where a Con- stitution provided that the Legislature should enact a law by which the electors in any county, justice precinct, t■o\^^l. city, or such subdivision of the county as may be designated by the commissioners' court may determine from "time to time" whether the sale of liquors shall be prohibited, it was held that the Legislature could not authorize the commissioners' court to combine two or more justices' precincts, but an election must be ordered separately for each precinct.** And it was further held that as election precincts were subject to annual changes they were not such political subdivisions of a county as was contemplated by the provisions of the Constitution, and, therefore, the commissioners' court could not be author- ized to order an election in such precincts.*^ The Legislature in Canada has the power to authorize a township in another county to be included within the district voting on the ques- tion of local option. *° Somewhat at variance with the Texas decisions is one in Kentucky. There the Constitution author- ized the General Assembly to provide for local option elections 43 Commissioners v. Beall, 98 4.-, Efird v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. Tex. 104; 81 S. W. 520; Ex parte App. 582; 80 S. W. 529; Ex parte Mitchell (Tex. Cr. App.), 79 S. Pollard, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 488; W. 558; Sweeney v. Webb, 97 103 S. W. 878. Tex. 250; Ex parte YL&ymiin (Tex. *« Regina v. Sbavelear, 11 Ont. Cr. App.), 78 S. W. 349. 727; Regina v. Monteth, 15 Ont. **Ex parte Heyman (Tex. Cr. 290. App.), 78 S. W. 349; Ex parte In Texas it is held that if the Elliott, 44 Tex. Cr. App. 57-5; 72 field notes contained in the peti- S. W. 837; Ex parte Mills, 46 Tex. tion for an election are sufficient Cr. App. 224; 79 S. W. 555; to enable one to accurately trace Board v. Buchanan, 36 Tex. Civ. the boundaries of the district, it App. 411; 82 S. W. 194; Ander- is sufficient, variance in the call son V. .State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. being immaterial. Goble v. State, 195; 92 S. W. 39. See Griffin v. 42 Te.x. Cr. App. 501; 60 S. W. Tucker (Tex. Civ. App.), 119 S. 966. W. 338. §521 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 864 in "any county, city, town, district, or precinct;" but this was held not to prevent the enactment of a statute providing for such an election in a magisterial district of a county.'*'" Where part of the district was detached aiter the election was ordered it was held that those electors residing in the detached portion were still entitled to vote, and the result being for prohibition, liquors could not be sold in such de- tached portion.*** Sec. 521. Including "dry" territory in petition or order. The cases are not of one result whether territory that i« "dry" can be included with territory that is "wet" in the petition and order for an election. This is due largely to the provisions of the various statutes. Thus, in Louisiana wards that are already "dry" may be included in the petition with 47 Eggen V. Offutt, 128 Ky. 314; 108 S. W. 333; 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1350. 48 Hill V. Howth (Tex.), Ill S. W. 649. In Texas the fact that the Leg- islature has autliorized a city to issue a license to sell liquor does not prevent the county at large prohibiting by election the issu- ance of such license. Ex parte Elliott, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 108; 91 S. W. 570. In Ohio it was held that a "hamlet" was one of the politi- cal divisions for holding a local option election. Carey v. State, 70 Ohio St. 121; 70 N. E. 955. In Texas an election cannot be ordered in a "school distriat.'" Ex parte Banks (Tex. Cr. App.), 103 S. W. 1156; Ex parte Haney, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 634; 103 S. W. 1155. The fact that part of the ter- ritory described lies in another State will not make the proceed- ing invalid as to so much as lies in the State where the proceedings are had. Clark v. Tower, 104 Md. 178; 65 Atl. 3. The court declaring the result of the election and declaring the law to be in force, cannot be compelled to except from the or- der a certain city within the ter- ritory which is not affected by the election, unless the statute makes it its duty to do so. State V. Mahneler County (Ore.), 103 Pac. 446. A second petition overlapping a part of the territory described in the first petition is erroneous and void. Kilcoyne v. Hitchins, 30 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 545. See where the change of the description of the territory after petition filed and election ordered did not avoid the proceedings. Hill V. Howth (Tex. Civ. App.), 112 S. W. 707. 865 LOCAL OPTION. § 522 those that are "wet." *^ So where the Constitution authorized a commissioners' court to order an election in a justice's pre- cinct and also in a commissioners' precinct, and a commis- sioners' precinct, by a previous order of such court, embraced two justices' precincts, one of which was then dry, it was held that this did not prevent the ordering of an election for the entire commissioners' precinct, which, of course, would cover the "dry" precinct.'"'" And where the statute on local option provided for an election by a county, and also provided that the result of the election should not affect any city or town in the county where by law the sale of liquors was prohibited, either by high license or local option, or other legislation, so long as such local laws remain in force, it was held that the electors in such city or town had the right to vote at a county local option election, and necessarily the territory of such city or town must be included in the petition for an election. ^^ "Where, in Texas, a justice's precinct voted "dry," and no election could be held therein on the question until two years had expired, and within the two years an election was ordered for a commissioners' precinct, which included this justice's pre- cinct and another justice's precinct that was "wet," it was held that the election was void.^'^ Sec. 522. To whom and the manner in which the petition must be presented — Filing. The petition must be presented to the person, court, tri- bunal or board designated by law for its reception, and in the manner therein prescribed.^^ Thus, under a statute providing 49 Hagens v. Police Jury (La.), Kilcoyne v. Kitchens, 30 Ohio 46 So. 676. Cir. €t. Rep. 545. 50'Cofield V. Britton (Tex. Civ. An election is not void because App.), 109 S. W. 493. one of the precincts of the district A like decision was made in refused or omitted to vote. Ex Kentucky. Smith v. Patton, 103 parte Shilling, 38 Tex. Cr. App. Ky. 444; 45 S. W. 459; 20 Ky. 287; 42 S. VV. 553. L. Rep. 165 ; Cantwell v. State, 47 53 /«, re Huntsville, 25 Ohio Cir. Tex. Cr. App. 521; 85 S. W. 18. Ct. Rep. 535; People v. Decker, 28 5iCk)le V. McClendler, 109 La. X. Y. Misc. Rep. 699; 60 N. Y. 183; 34 S. E. 384. Supp. 60; order affirmed, 03 N. Y. ^2 Ex parte Randall, 50 Tex. Cr. Supp. 1113. App. 519; 98 S. W. 870. See also § 522 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUOKS. 866 that the county jud'ge, at the "next regular term" of a count}' court, after receiving a petition for an election, must make an order therefor on some day not earlier than sixty days after the petition is lodged with him, it was held that the petition must be received in court and a record made of it, and that an election held on a petition received by the county judge out of court on one day, and the election ordered the next, which was the first day of the term, was void.^* Where the statute required the judge to direct an election "at the next regular term" of his court "after receiving" the petition, an order entered on the same day the petition was noted as filed on the records of the court was held void, though such day was the first day of the term, the petition under the law not being "received" until filed.^'^ In Texas the petition need not be filed prior to the convening of court.-'" Where a statute re- quired the petition to be filed with the town clerk at least twenty days before the town election, and another statute declared the proposition relating to sales should again be sub- mitted at the annual elections held every second year after their first submission, upon written petition of ten per cent, of the electors at the next preceding general election, "duly filed" with the officer charged with furnishing ballots for the election, it was held that the last petition must be filed at least twenty days before the town election/" In New York a statute required the county clerk to furnish the ballots for the election, and also required a certified copy of the petition to be filed within five days of its receipt by the town clerk if the question was to be submitted at a general election. The law was changed making it the duty of the town clerk to furnish the ballots. A certified copy of a petition was not filed with the county clerk within five days after its receipt by the tovra clerk, but was filed more than twenty days prior 54 Wilson V. Hine?, 99 Ky. 221; ss Loveless v. State (Tex. Cr. 33 S. W. 627. App.), 49 S. W. 98. 55 C r e s 8 V. Commonwealth 57 People v. Town Clerk, 26 N. (Ky.), 37 S. W. 493; Ex parte Y. Misc. Rep. 220; 56 N. Y. Supp. Sublett, 23 Tex. App. 309; 4 S. 64; McMullen v. Berean, 29 N. W. 894. Y. Mis. Rep. 443; 60 N. Y. Supp. 578. 867 LOCAL OPTION. § 522 to the date of the election, and it was held that the delay in filing the certified copy did not require a resubmission.^^ If the petition is filed by the electors of a town lying in two counties, it must be filed in the court of that county in which the greater part of the town lies.'"" The clerk of the court cannot order the election where it is the duty of the court to do SO; and if he do, the election will be invalid.''*' A peti- tion once filed cannot be withdrawn in order to include other territory in it and then refile it.**^ As the court must deter- mine whether the petition is sufficient, whether it has the requisite number of signatures and whether such signatures are genuine, this calls for the exercise of judicial power, and the statute, therefore, cannot be held unconstitutional on the ground that it imposes upon the court administrative duties."^- In Ohio where the petition had to be presented to the city council, it Avas held that the presentation was a necessity, and could not be dispensed with — a jurisdictional fact — and its presentation could not be presumed from the fact that an election was ordered; but if it appears in the record the pre- sumption is that the election was properly ordered unless the proceedings are so irregular as to invalidate the order. ''^ r-s/n re Rice, 95 N. Y. App. 407. See State v. Kellogg (Mo. Div. 28; 88 N. Y. Supp. 512; App.), 113 S. W. &60. Eggleston v. Board, 51 N. Y. App, 82 state v. 'Circuit Court, 50 X. Div. 38; 64 N. Y. Supp. 471; In J. L. 585; 15 Atl. 272; State v. re Sullivan, 30 N. Y. Misc. Rep. McElrath, 49 Ore. 294; 89 Pac. 682; 64 N. Y. Supp. 303. A pe- 803; Champion v. Board, 5 Dak. tion for a resubmission need not 416; 41 N. W. 379. be filed in New York. In re Ber- 63 in re Huntsville, 25 Ohio Cir. trand, 40 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 536; Ct. Rep. 535. 82 N. Y. Supp. 940. A petition once presented can- For computing tlie five days, see not be withdrawn and presented In re Sullivan, 30 N. Y. Misc. again. State v. Webb, 49 Mo. Rep. 682; 64 N. Y. Supp. 303. App. 407. But State v. Kellogg 50 Early v. Rains (Ky.), 89 S. (Mo. App.), 113 S. W. 600. W. 289; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 415. No board or court can order 60 Marsden v. Harlocker, 48 the election except the board Ore. 90; 85 Pac. 328; Ex parte or court to wliich the petition Haney, 48 Ore. 621; 85 Pac. 332. must be addressed or with which ai State v. Webb, 48 Mo. App. it must be filed. Olmstead v. §§523,524 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 868 Sec. 523. Notice of hearing. If the statute requires a hearing on the petition and that notice be given of such hearing, then such notice of the hearing must be given as the statute requires; and if the notice fails to make mention of the subject matter of the petition or proceedings, an order for the election will be in- valid."* Sec. 524. Order for an election. If a proper petition be presented to the local board or court having jurisdiction over its subject matter it must act and grant the praj'er of the petition by ordering an election."^ If the court or board refuses to act, or to act within time, it may be compelled to do so by mandamiLs:"" So if the court fails to make the order at the first term after receipt of the petition, it may do so at the next term; and if it makes a mistake in its order it may enter a new order, even at the next term."^ If several petitions be presented at the same time for separate precincts, or before the order is made, each sufficient in itself, and the court combine them and order one election for the entire district covered by them, the election will be valid if it be carried with the requisite vote in each €roacli, 89 Ala. 228; 7 So. 776; The ordering of an election is State V. Circuit Court, 50 N. J. L. county business. Chapman v. 585; 15 Atl. 272. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 137; 39 A petition for local option may S. W. 113; Champion v. Board, 5 be marked "filed" at any time of Dak. 416; 41 X. W. 739. the proceedings, and need not be oe Attorney General v. Van so marked when presented for fll- Buren Circuit Judge, 143 Mich, ing. O'Connor v. Board (Idaho), 366; 106 N. W. 1113; 12 Detroit 105 Pac. 560. Leg. N. 1006; State v. Richardson, «* Middleton v. Kobbins, 54 ( Ore. ) , 85 Pac. 225 ; Keefer v. ]Sr. J. L. see; 25 Atl. 471. Hlllsdale County, 109 Mich. 645; 65 State V. Richardson (Ore.), 67 N. W. 981. 85 Pac. 22i5; Attorney General v. «7 Tousey v. De Huy (Ky.), Van Buren Circuit Judge, 143 62 S. W. 1118; 23 Ky. L. Rep. Mich. 366; 106 N. W. 1113; 12 458. See Commonwealth v. Mc- Detroit Leg. N. 1006. Carty (Ky.), 76 S.. W. 173; 25 It is a preliminary and not a Ky. L. Rep. 585. final order. Haynos v. Cass Coun- ty (Mo.), 115 S. VV. 1084. 869 LOCAL OPTION. §524 precinct."'^ The order should fix the day for the election,*'* unless the law fixes the date *'^* and designate the district within which it is to be held.'" If the board have the power to order an election whenever it deems it expedient, then it is immaterial that the petition is not sufficient.^' The petition must be recorded in the records of the court or board ; " but if the statute does not specify when it shall be recorded, the recording- may be made at any time after the order is made, and it will be presumed in the absence of a contrary showing that it was duly recorded.'^^ In some States it is held that the order must show affirmatively that the requisite number of persons signed the petition,'^* and in others it need not,^^ while in some of the States it is held that, in a prosecution for the violation of the local option law, the pro- ceedings cannot be collaterally attacked.^** In Canada it is held not necessary for the order to name the polling places 68Tousey v. De Hiiy (Ky.), 62 S. W. 1118; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 458; Nail v. Tinsley, 107 Ky. 441; 54 S. W. 187; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1167. 69 Puckett V. Snider, 22 Ky. 1718; 61 S. W. 277; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1718. 69* Attornej^ General v. Van Buren Circuit Judge, 143 Midi. 366; 106 N. W. 1113; 12 Detroit Leg. N. 1000. 70 Kelly V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 220; 38 S. W. 779; 39 S. VV. Ill; Jordan v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 224; 38 S. W. 780; 39 S. W. 110. In two of these cases the dis- trict was definitely described, but referred to as school districts for which no election could be held; yet the description was held valid. An election held without an order for it is void. Marsden v. Harlocker, 48 Ore. 90; 85 Pae. 328 ; Ex parte Hussey, 48 Ore. 621; 85 Pac. 332. 71 Lamliert v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 232; 39 S. VV. 299. 72 Covert v. Munson, 93 Mich. 603; 53 N. W. 733. 73Pitner v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 268; 39 S. W. 662. But see Ex parte Williams, 35 Tex. Cr. Rep. 75; 31 S. W. 653. If the order bears a date the court will take judicial knowledge wlietlier it was made at a reg- ular term. Loveless v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 49 S. W. 601. 74 Lester v. Miller, 76 Miss. 309; 24 So. 193. 75 In re Rice, 95 X. Y. App. Div. 28; 88 N. Y. Supp. 512; Dalrym- ple V. State, 26 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 562. 76 People V. Hamilton, 27 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 360; 58 N. Y. Supp. 959; Anderson v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 34; 44 S. W. 824; State V. Mackin, 51 Mo. App. 299. § 524 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 870 in small villages."' Where a statute required the question of local option to be submitted whenever it "has been prayed for by the requisite number of electors" ''by resolution" declaring that fact, an order is suflficient in which it is recited that the petition was signed by a certain number of electors, the number stated being suificient to require the holding of an election, without a distinct previous resolution determining that the submission had been requested by the requisite number of electors.'*^ And where there were several petitions for elections in as many election precincts, but which con- stituted one masiistorial district, an order on all these peti- tions reciting that a sufficient number of voters of the district had signed the petitions and directing an election be called, was held sufficient without a recital that a sufficient number in each precinct had signed the petitions.'^ The order may be amended by a nunc pro tunc entry if there be sufficient data from which to amend it, as where the clerk wrongly copied the order into the records and the original order was still in existence.^" But where it was the duty of the court to designate the newspapers in which notice of the election should be published, it was held that the omission in this respect could not be -^ -applied, even though notices had actually been published in the requisite number of newspapers.^^ Where a statute provided for calling an election to determine -T In re Salter [1902], 4 Ont. L. Contra, State v. Bird, 108 Mo. R. — ; In re Mace, 42 Up. Can, p. App. 163; 83 S. W. 284. 76; In re Huson, 19 Ont. App. ''o Commonwealth v. Jones 343. So also held in Texas, (Ky.), 84 S. W. 305; 27 Ky. L. wliere electors not misled. Ex Rep. 16; In re Rice, 95 X. Y. App. parte Mayer, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 36; Div. 28; 88 N. Y. Supp. 512. 44 S. W. 831. so state v. Bird, 108 Mo. App. -s People V. Hamilton, 143 Mich. 163; 82 S. \V. 284. See later 1; 106 N. W. 275; 12 Detroit Missouri decisions cited below. Leg. N. 897 ; Attorney General v. Where tlie clerk used the word Van Buren 'Circuit Judge, 143 "same" instead of "sale," in a Mich. 366; 106 N. W. 1113; 12 criminal prosecution he was al- Detroit Leg. N". 1006; Common- lowed to correct the record. Cant- wealth V. Jones (Ky.), 84 S. W. well v. 'State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 305; 27 Ky. L. Rep. Ifi; In re 521; 85 S. W. 19. Rice, 95 K Y. App. Div. 28; 88 si state v. Baldwin, 109 Mo. N. Y. Supp. 512. App. 573; 83 S. W. 266. 871 LOCAL OPTION. §524 whether sales of liquor should be prohibited "except for medicinal and sacramental purposes," and the order calling an election concluded with the words "except for the pur- poses and under the regulations prescribed by law," and pro- vided that those who favored prohibition should vote a printed ticket with the words "for prohibition" on it, and those who opposed it one with the words "against prohibition" on it, it was held that the order was not defective because of the words quoted, it being apparent from the remainder of the order that these words referred to the local option law.^- It is not necessary that the order show who were appointed to hold the election where the presiding officers of the general election theretofore acted in the premises.^^ The order may be recorded at a subsequent term of the court ordering the election.^* The order for an election need not contain the statutory exceptions in favor of wines for medicinal and 82 Sweeney v. Webb, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 324; 76 S. W. ('66 (Tex.), 77 S. W. 135. See also Racer v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 73 S. W. 968. 83 Nelson v. State, 44 Xex. Cr. App. 595; 75 S. W. 502. »* Ex parte Walton, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 74; 74 S. W. 314. In Texas it is held that a local option election is not invalid be- cause the county judge was not present at the opening day of the term, there being a quorum of the judges present. Racer v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 73 S. W. 968. If a statute or the Consti- tution provide that if the judge of the county be not present, the judge of an adjoining county shall have jurisdiction, and on the open- ing of the court the judge of a county be not present, whereupon tlic petitioners pri'sent it tu the judge of an adjoining county, they waive their right to present to the judge of their own county. In re Munson, 95 N. Y. App. Div. 23; 88 N. Y. Supp. 509. The original minutes of tlie court containing the order of sub- mission may be used to prove the law is in force. Holley v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 324; 81 S. VV. 957. In Kentucky a statute authoriz- ing the entrance of the order at the next term after a petition is filed, one entered at the same term it was filed is invalid. Common- wealth v. McCarty (Ky. ), 76 S. W. 173; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 5»5; Ex parte Sublett, 23 Tex. App. 309; 4 S. W. 894. Where the order for an elec- tion was made, to be held on a cer- tain day, and nothing more was en- tered, the president of the board, it was held, could not provide the inaehim-yy (f r.iv flection I'V a proclamation for he had no more authority in the premises than an §524 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 872 sacramtntal purposes, ^^ but it must provide for the submis- sion of the propositions prayed for in the petition. Thus, individual. The election was void. Police jury v. Ponchatoula, 1 18 La. 138; 42 So. 725. If the board of its own accord can order an election, it need not record the petition. McGovern v. State (Tex, Civ. App.), 90 S. W. 502. A recital in an order that a "petition had been signed" sliows that it was a "written petition." Nail V. Tinsley, 107 Ky. 441; 64 S. W. 1«7; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1167; In re Huntsville, 25 Ohio <]r. Ct. Rep. 535. A petition was addressed to "Robert I. Burke, judge of the probate court," etc. The order for the election was headed "State of Alabama, Cullman County, Pro- bate Court." It recited the filing of the petition, and that it was therefore "ordered, adjudged and decreed by his court that the 9th day of December, 1907, be set as the day for holding said elec- tion." The order was signed by "Robert I. Burke, judge of pro- bate." This was held to be an order of the probate court and not of the probate judge, and was valid. Richter v. State ( Ala. ) , 47 So. 163; Olmstead v. Crook, 89 Ala. 228; 7 S. E. 776. To render an election void be- cause there is a variance in the description of the territory in the order for the election and the one declaring its result, it must be a material variance, and mere dis- crepancfes in tTie field notes in the petition ancT two orders is imma- terial, if the exact boundaries at- tempted to be designated can be ascertained with legal certainty. (Joble V. State, 42 Tex. Cr. App. 501; (50 S. VV. 966. If the election covers the whole of a political division of a State, it need not be described by metes and bounds. Nicliols v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 546; 40 S. W. 268; Fitze v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 85 S. VV. 1156. See Bowman v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. App. 14; 40 S. W. 796; 41 S. W. 635. A statute requiring an order to be made at the "next regular term" after a petition is filed, does not prevent the filing at a special term of the court called for tlie reception and filing of such petitions; and the election may be ordered at the next regular term. Smith v. Patton, 103 Ky. 444 ; 45 S. W. 459 ; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 165; on the ordering of an election at a special session, see Ex parte Snblett, 23 Tex. App. 309; 4 S. W. 894. 85 Shields v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. App. 252; 42 S. W. 398; Frickie V. State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 254; 45 S. W. 810. An order for an election car- ries a presumption tliat a proper petition was filed, and that it was signed by the requisite number of electors. Dalrymple v. State, 2'6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 562. The order need not show the name of the presiding officer. Fitze v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), •85 S. W. 1156. The order may be made at a special term of the board of com- 873 LOCAL OPTION. §524 where the petition prayed that the question whether druggists should be allowed to sell liquors should be submitted to a vote in addition to the submission of the general question of sales, it was held that the order must submit both ques- tions for the consideration of the electors; the petition must be submitted as a whole, and so adopted or rejected.^^ Unless missioners. Hanna v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 269; 87 S. W. 702; Koch V. Stat<>, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 346; 88 S. W. 809. Where a board of its own mo- tion may order an election, after ordering one on petition, it may on its own motion order one. Ilan- na V. State, supra. An order for resubmission con- taining a recital that it was made at a special term of court shows it is the order of the court and not of the judge. In re Munson, 95 N. Y. App. Div. 23; 88 N. Y. Supp. 509. If the statute requires four propositions to be submitted to the voters, and one is omitted, the or- der of submission is improper. In re Munson, 95 N. Y. App. Div. 23 ; 88 N. Y. Supp. 509. When the statute required the question to be submitted "wheth- er" local option should be adopted, an order submitting the qviestion "whether or not" it should be adopted, is valid. Thurmond v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 162; 79 S. W. 316; Wade v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 184; 109 S. W. 191; nor is it necessary to recite tha*' it is submitted at an election t be held by the "qualified voters' of the district. Thurmond v. State, svpra. Xor is it objec- tionable that it designate a day different from that named in the petition. Thurmond v. State, su- pra. 86 Erwin v. Benton, 120 Ky. 536; 87 S. W. 291; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 909. In this case the submis- sion was "whether or not spiritu- ous," etc., "liquors shall be sold," etc., "within the town of," etc., "and that the provisions of this law and prohibition shall apply to druggists," and it was held properly worded, neither mislead- ing nor contradictory. See In re Rice, 95 N. Y. App. Div. 28; 88 N. Y. Supp. 512. Where a statute requires the local board to determine that a petition was signed by the requi- site number of voters, it will be presumed, in a prosecution for selling liquor illegally that the law was complied with in that re- spect. People V. Hamilton, 143 Mich. 1; 106 N. W. 275; 12 De- troit Leg. N. 897. If the description of the boun- daries of the district be uncer- tain as set out in the order, the election is invalid. Ex parte Waits (Te.x. Cr. App.). 64 S. W. 254. In Texas the commissioners' court may name any person to hold the election. Kelly v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 220; 38 S. W. 779; 39 S. W 111. So in Ken- tucky. Puckett V. Snider, 110 Ky. 261; 61 S. W, 277; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1718. §524 TRiVFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 874 a statute provide for it, no appeal lies from an order for an election.^" Where the statute required the local board to order notice of the election to be published for four ' ' consecu- tive" weeks, and the order was for four ''successive" weeks, it was held that the variance was not fatal.^^^ The fact that the board ordered notices not provided for in the statute to be given does not vitiate the election.^® A provision that the election be held at "boxes" instead of "places" as the statute provides is net so misleading as to prevent a fair vote, and the election is not void for that reason.***^ Where a statute re- quires notices to be posted at five public places in a county, an order requiring them to be posted in five places, not saying these places should be public places, and not designating how long they should be posted, is a sufficient compliance with its provisions."^ If the statute provides for an election to deter- mine whether liquor shall be "sold," the court cannot 87 O'Neal V. Minary, 125 Ky. 571; 101 S. W. 951; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 888. In Missouri the statute requires the local board to specifically set forth that the requisite petition had been filed, and this is juris- dictional. State V. McCord. 124 Mo. App. €3; 100 S. W. 1129. (In this case the order recited that one-tenth of tlie voters and taxpayers of the district signed the petition, when the statute re- quired one-tenth of the voters, and the election was held void. State V. McCord, 207 :\ro. 519; 106 S. W. 27. But if the proper recitals are in the order, it is con- clusive on the question of juris- diction. State V. Hitchcock, 124 Mo. App. 101; 101 S. W. 117. See State V. McCord, supra. 88 State V. Hitchcocii, 124 Mo. App. 101; 101 S. W. 117. 89Neal V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 101 S. W. 1139; Huff V. iState (Tex. Cr. App.), 101 S. W" . 1144. ooXeal V. State, supra; Huff v. State, supra. oiMagill V. State. 51 Tex. Cr. App. 357; 103 S. W. 397. Where new territory was added to the voting district on election day, and it appeared that the re- sult would have been the same if it had not been added, the elec- tion was held valid as to the pre- vious district. Ex parte Curlee, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 614; 103 S. W. 896. In Michigan it is held that where tlie law fixes the time wlien the different proceedings under it shall be made matter of record, and signed by the proper official, it is mandatory, and a •failure to comply with the law will vitiate the proceedings. Covert v. Mun- son, 93 Mich. 603; 53 N. W. 783. 875 LOCAL OPTION §524 extend the terms of the statute by enlarging the question .vhether it should be "bartered or exchanged." ^- The order of election must be addressed to the officer authorized to hold elections. Where the local option law provided that the order for election should be addressed "to the sheriff or other officer of said county who may be appointed to hold said election," and another section of the same act provided that all elections should "be held by such officers as would be qual- ified to hold elections for county officers," it was held that an order for a city local option election was properly addressed to the sheriff of the county, and not to the city officers.**^ Where the order recited that the election "should be con- ducted, the returns thereof made, and the result ascertained and determined, in accordance in all respects with the laws and ordinances governing municipalities in the city," and that was a literal copy of the words of the statute, it was held sufficient. *** If the statute makes it the duty of the clerk 92 Ex parte Beaty, 21 Tex. App. 426; 1 S. W. 451; Hubbard v. CommonAvealth, 10 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 683. A statute required an airidavit of some reputable person show- ing that he personally witnessed the signing of each name appear- ing on the petition. On a trial of the contest of an election it was stipulated that a sufficient num- ber of signatures was attached to the petition, and that they were genuine signatures of qualified persons. It was held that evi- dence that the persons making the affidavits were not reputable per- sons was inadmissible. In re Can- vass (Iowa), 95 N. W. 194. If objections be made that the signatures to a petition are not genuine, the board hearing the application or contest must give opportunity, by adjournment if necessary, for the production of evidence concerning them. Mad- ison Co. V. Powell. 75 Miss. 7G2; 23 So. 425. Number of signatures for coun- ty petition when a city within the county is excluded. Roper v. Scurlock, 29 Tex. €iv. App. 464; 69 S. W. 456. Members of the board signing the petition are not disqualified thereby to act thereon. Lemon v. Peyton, 64 Miss. 161; 8 So. 235. 03 Commonwealth v. Green. 98 Ky. 21; 32 S. W. 169. 0^ State V. Dugan, 110 Mo. 138; 19 S. W. 195. A statute required the ques- tion submitted to be whether or not the sale of "intoxicat- ing liquors and medicated liquors producing intoxication" should be prohibited, and the statute was changed so the question was whether the sale only of "intox- icating liquors" should be pro- § 525 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 876 to post elet'tion notices, the order need not direct him to do so.^' Sec. 525. Board of supervisors in Michigan — Conclusive- ness of orders. The Legislature of Michigan in 1889 enacted a "local-option law," which among other things provided that a board of supervisors might by resolution determine and declare whether the necessary preliminaries had been taken to warrant them in issuing an order directing that an election should be held for the purpose of ascertaining whether the local option law should be applied and enforced in a given locality. The Su- preme Court of that State held that where a board of super- visors had obtained jurisdiction of the subject matter in such case by the call of the county clerk, and by petitions the validity of which appeared signed by a sufficient number to authorize the county clerk to act, the determination of the board was final, and that the statute wisely made it so, and that the power of the Legislature to confer upon the boards of supervisors to so determine was amply provided for by the Constitution of the State which declares that the Legislature may confer upon organized townships, incorporated cities and villages, and upon the board of supervisors of the several counties such powers of a local legislative and administrative hibited; but the order was for ess. Gilbert v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. an election to determine whether Rep. 596; 25 S. W. 632. or not the sale of "intoxicating ^^ Aaron v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. liquors and medicated liquors pro- Rep. 103; 29 S. W. 267. ducing intoxication" shovild be It is the duty of the court hear- prohibited. It was held that the ing the petition to compel the at- order was not so misleading as to tendance of witnesses. In re Jones invalidate the election. Dillard v. LaAV Petition. 30 Ohio Cir. Ct. State, 31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 470; 20 S. Rep. 705. W. 1106. The board hearing the petition If the statute requires a copy may collect and collate the re- ef the order to be posted as a no- quired statutory facts, to enable tice, the seal of the court need it to order tlie election, through not be attached; for it is not a committee appointed for that "process" within the meaning of purpose. Giddings v. Wells, 99 a statute on the subject of proc- Mich. 221; 58 N. W. 64. 877 LOCAL OPTION. §526 character as they maj' deem proper."*' Under that statute it was also held that it was competent for the board of su- pervisors, when convened for the purpose of determining whether or not under an election under the local option law had been prayed for by the requisite number of electors, to appoint a committee to collect and collate the required statutory facts, and that the adoption of the report of such a committee, and of a resolution enacted thereunder declaring and determining that such election had been prayed for by the requisite number of electors was, in legal effect, a declaration and determination of the board of supervisors of that fact, and it could not be presumed that the fact that the report was made excluded from their inquiry as to the requisite number of signers or that the members of the board did not verify the facts set forth in the report, or did not avail them- selves of any other means of information."^ It has also been held in that State that it was not within the discretion of a board of supervisors to refuse to call an election for a resub- mission of the question upon the presentation of a petition answering the requirements of the statutes,'''* Sec. 526. Signing record. Under a local option law which provides that the board of supervisors of a county shall determine whether a sufficient number of electors have petitioned for an election, the board shall so declare and make an order calling the election and fixing the date when it shall be held, and that "such order shall be entered in full upon the journal of the proceedings of the board for that day, and the same shall be signed by the acting chairman and clerk of the board before the final ad- journment,'' the unsigned and unauthenticated proceedings 90 Friesner v. Common Council, visors, 109 Mich. G+S; 67 N. VV. '91 Mich. 504; 52 N. W. 18; 981. See also People v. Hamil- Tliomas v. Abbott, 105 Mich. 687; ton, 143 Mich. 1; 106 N. W. 275; 63 N. W. 984; Michigan Const. 12 Detroit Leg. N. 897; Attor- art. iv, sec. 38. ney General v. Van Buren Cir- 97 Backus V. County Supervisors, cuit Judge, 143 Mich. 366; 106 99 Mich. 221; 58 N. W. 62. X. W. 1113; 12 Detroit Leg. N. 98 Keefer v. Hillsdale Co. Super- 1006. § 527 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 878 of such board of supervisors cannot be said to be such a record as the law requires to be made in order to give effect to its provisions. The statute in such cases is mandatory."" It requires a record duly authenticated, noi: only that the result may be evidenced in an enduring form, but that it may be seen and known whether the board has acted within the limits of the power conferred or not/ It is sufficient, however, in such eases if the proceedings are signed after the close of the session of the board. This accords with the usual practice of such boards in the signing of records, the journal of each daily session being signed after its close. In many instances such records are signed after final adjourn- ment.- And where, in the record of a day's proceedings of such board, other matters appear besides the resolution or order of the board directing the holding of a local election, it is proper to omit such irrelevant matter from the notices served and posted and to append thereto the signatures of the clerk and chairman found at the close of the day's proceed- ings as recorded.^ But a statute may dispense with a sign- ing, and none is required unless the statute specifically so provides.* Sec. 527. Appeal from order for election. Unless a statute provides for it, no appeal lies from an order providing for an election ; but in some jurisdictions a writ of certiorari may be issued to revise the action of the board or lower court making the order.'"' But a statute providing 99 Covert V. Munson, 9.3 Mich. ■* Davidson v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. 603; 53 N. W. 733. See Richter App. 586; 73 S. W. 808; Roper V. State (Ala.), 47 So. 163. v. Scurlock, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 1 Pearsall v. Supervisors, 71 464; 69 S. W. 456, interlineations Mich. 438; 39 N. W. 578; Wes- before the signin<( does not ren- ton V. Monroe, 84 Mich. 341 ; 4t> der the order void. Bruce v. N. W. 446. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 35 S. W. 2 Covert V. Munson, 93 Mich. 383. 603; 53 N. W. 733; Thomas v. 5 Champion v. Board, 5 Dak. Abbott, 105 Mich. 687; 63 N. W. 416; 41 X. W. 739; Miller v. 084. Jones, 80 Ala. 89; State v. Rob- 3 Thomas v. Abbott, 105 Mich. bins, 54 N. J. L. 568; 25 Atl. 687; 63 X. W. 984. 471. 879 LOCAL OPTION. § 528 generally for appeals from orders of a board of super- visors authorizes an appeal from their order upon a petition for a local option election.*' In the case just cited the stat- ute gave the right of appeal to any citizen of the county. In New Jersey it was held that a citizen who appears before the board of supervisors, in pursuance of a notice published of the hearing on the petition, and objects to the ordering of an election, gains such a standing as entitles him to sue out a writ of certiorari to test the proceedings, and that an inn- keeper who held a license to sell liquors was entitled to the writ.^ If the order of the board for the election is con- clusive that all necessary steps have been taken, then no ap- peal lies from it.* Sec. 528. Petition and order for resubmission. Statutes in some States provide for a resubmission of local option questions, usually after a certain period of time has expired. This may be done, where the statute authorizes it, without an additional petition.'* In New York an order for resubmission will not be granted for errors of the town clerk 6 Ferguson v. Monroe Co., 71 lips v. Goe, 85 Ark. 304; 108 S. Miss. 524; 14 So. 81; Spencer v. W. 207. Washington Co. (Miss.), 45 So. A licensee has sufficient interest 863. to entitle him to appeal from an 7 State V. Robbins, 54 N. J. L. order of prohibition. Miller v. 566; 25 Atl. 471, reversing Mid- Jones, 80 Ala. 89. dleton V. Robbins, 53 N. J. L. 555 ; Where an appeal lies certiorari 22 Atl. 481. will not lie. State v. Schmitz, 65 8 Thomas v. Abbott, 105 Mich. Iowa 556; 22 N. W. 673. 687; 63 N. W. 984. ^ In re Bertrand, 40 N. Y. Misc. In Arkansas a person, four Rep. 536; 82 N. Y. Supp. 940. months after granting an order for See In re Krieger, 59 N. Y. App. prohibition, who files an affidavit 346; 69 N. Y. Supp. 851. for an appeal does not make him- Objectors to tlie ordering of a self a party to tlie proceedings, resubmission must make a formal and cannot appeal Holmes v. application therefor, and usually Morgan, 52 Ark. 99; 12 S. W. give notice; at least this is so 201. And persons not signing in New York. In re Munson, 95 to a petition for revocation of an N. Y. App. Div. 23; S>8 N. Y. order of prohibition are not "ag- Supp. 509. grieved" and cannot appeal. Phil- § 528 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 880 in printing in his notice of the election the caption of the questions only once, and in printing them on the ballot with- out printing the caption, the notice and ballots being in other respects sufficient.^'* But where the clerk added, imauthor- izedly, a question to the four statutory questions, this was held to call for a resubmission.^^ So in that State an application for resubmission was denied where, through the laches of the applicant the result of the order would be to authorize hotel keepers to sell liquor, regardless of the result of the vote on resubmission, from the date of the order until the date the result of the election would take effect.^- If the first pro- ceedings Avere void, then there can be no resubmission.^^ Where a statute enacted in 1896 provided for a resubmission on petition of the question of prohibition every two years, and an election was held the next year, resulting in a prohi- bition majority, and the next year (1897) and after the an- nual election at which the question had been submitted, the laws were changed so as to make the annual election in No- vember, 1898, instead of March, 1899, and in 1898, a statute was enacted providing that the questions of sale or no sale should be voted upon at the general election of that year, but might be resubmitted (without saying anything about the necessity of a petition) at the general election of 1901, and biennially thereafter, it was held that there could be no re- submission without a petition ; and if there was, the election was void,^* Statutes occasionally, however, require an an- nual submission of the local option question. Usually it is in those States where prohibition prevails throughout the 10 People V. Edwards, 42 X. Y. n In re Smith, 44 X. Y. Misc. Misc. Rep. 567; 87 X. Y. Supp. Eep. 384; 89 X. Y. Supp. 1006. 618; In re Merow, 112 X. Y. App. ^^ In re Town of Lafayette, 45 Div. 562; 99 X. Y. State 9; In re X. Y. Misc. 141; 91 X. Y. Supp. Clipperly, 50 X. Y. Misc. Rep. 970 ; order affirmed 93 X. Y. Supp. 266; 100 X. Y. Supp. 473; People 534; 105 X'. Y. App. Div. 25. V. Chandler, 41 X. Y. App. Div. is/,,, re Getmar, 28 X. Y. Misc. 178; 58 X. Y. Supp. 794. See Rep. 451; 59 X. Y. Supp. 1013. Raymond v. Clement, 118 X. Y. i4 People v. Decker, 28 X. Y. App. Div. 528; 102 X. Y. iSupp. Misc. Rep. 699; 60 X. Y. Supp. 1070. GO; order affirmed 63 X. Y. Supp. 1113. 881 LOCAL OPTION. §528 State unless a vote of a district permits sales. Such was the case in South Dakota. There the question of granting permits to sell at retail was submitted on petition at the annual municipal elections held in townships, towns and cities, and if in favor of sales, the corporate authorities were required to issue permits to sell "for the ensuing year," it was held that there must be an annual submission of the question of granting permits, and the power to grant such permits was limited to the ensuing year after an election favoring the granting of them, unless the granting was authorized by an election^ of the following year.^-' If a statute provides that an election may be held two years after prohibition be adopted, it cannot be held before that period has expired.^" 15 state V. Barber (S. D.), 101 N. W. 1078. 10 Adams v. Kelley {Tex. Civ. App.), 44 S. W. 529. In New York the board of su- pervisors may exercise a reason- able discretion in calling a meet- ing, and should not call a second election if the true result of the election has been ascertained and there be no reasonable gi-ound for believing that any irregularity af- fected the result. A failure to give a voter an opportunity to vote, or error in counting the votes or in reading the returns, is no ground for resubmission, if the irregularities did not affect the result. In re Clancy, 58 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 258; 109 N. Y. Supp. 644. But in Texas, where the stat- ute provides for a resubmission where the question shall "not have been properly submitted," resub- mission must be made where the counting and certifying of the vote and the declaration of the result are insufficient to ascertain the result or show a fair elec- tion; and it is held that a sub- mission is not completed until the vote is canvassed and the result ascertained. In re Clancy, 58 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 258; 109 N. Y. Supp. 644. If the first election is void for want of notice, there can be no resubmission on the old petition. In re Sullivan, 34 K Y. Misc. Rep. 598; 70 N. Y. Supp. 374; In re Town of Lafayette, 45 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 141; 91 N. Y. Supp. 970; affirmed 105 N. Y. App. Div. 25; 93 N. Y. Supp. 534; In re Clipperley, 50 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 266; 100 N. Y. Supp. 473; In re Krieger, 59 N. Y. App. Div. 346; 09 N. Y. Supp. 851. In New York a statute provided that an election could be held on each even numbered year, if that year be the second succeeding the year when tlie question of local option was lost or might have been lawfully submitted to a vote. In 1899 an election was held on the question which was judicially declared void for irregulari- ties. It was held that the hold- § 529 TRAPPIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 882 Sec. 529. Time and place of holding an election. The general rule is that the time and place of holding an election and the legal qualifications of the electors, are of the substance of an election, and a failure to observe the law, in respect to such matter, will invalidate an election, and that statutes governing' those matters must be construed as manda- tory and not directory. The intention of a legislature to make such provisions essential may appear as well by the general scope and policy of the statute as by direct averment. In or- der that a ballot in any election shall have force, it must be east at an election held at a time and place either fixed by law or by the order of some one having authority.^^ Accordingly, if a local option law requires that a local option election shall be ordered at a particular time, for instance at the first ses- sion of a court after the filing of the petition asking for such election, the law must be strictly complied with, and an order for the holding of such election made at any other time will be void. While the law clothes the acts of public officers with every presumption of verity and fairness, such presumption ing of this invalid election did Where a statute provided that not preclude the holding of a spe- the local option "election herein cial election within two years provided for shall not be held of- thereafter. In re Sullivan, 30 N. tener than every two years," the Y. Misc. Rep. 682 ; 64 N. Y. Supp. question whether liquor shall be 303. See People v. Mosso, 30 N. permitted sold may be submit- Y. Misc. Rep. 164; (53 N. Y. Supp. ted every two years. Common- 588. wealth v. Hoke & Yocum, 14 Busli The fact that the interests of 668. the town will be injured if the A void election cannot be count- question is not submitted is no ed in determining whether an ground for ordering a resub- election has been held within two mission. In re Clipperly, 50 X. years. State v. Rinke (Mo.), Y. Misc. Rep. 266; 100 N. Y. 121 S. W. 159. Supp. 473; nor that voters were i7 McCreary on Elections (3 misled as shown by affidavits by ed.), sees. 192, 193; Dickey v. the defects in the ballots used, Hurlburt, 5 Cal. 343; Jones v. when an examination of the re- iState, 1 Kan. 273; Pradat v. turns shows that no considerable Ramsay, 47 Miss. 29; Fullwood number were misled. In re Clip- v. State, 67 Miss. 554; State v. perley, 50 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 266; Webb, 49 Mo. App. 407. 99 N. Y. Stat. 473. 883 LOCAL OPTION. § 529 will not authorize an officer to defeat the popular will or to postpone to an indefinite future its expression.'^ And if the law provides an election shall be held after a petition therefor has been filed, the statiite is mandatory and must be complied with, and an election held beyond the period fixed by the statute will be unauthorized and void.^** It has also been de- cided that if a statute does not fix the time for holding an election, but leaves it to be determined by an officer, who is disqualified under the Constitution from acting, that an elec- tion held, under the direction and authority of the person named, will be null and void.-" It has also been held that an election held under a local option law is a special election, and only to be held at the time to be fixed by the authority designated by the statute, after the happening of the condi- tions precedent prescribed.-' The order should fix the day for the election -- unless the law fixes the date.-^ Whether or not the order must designate the polling places depends upon the wording of the statute ; if the statute be silent, then it will be sufficient to designate them in the election notice.^* 18 J5a; parfe Sublett, 23 Tex. App. 106 N. W. 1113; 12 Detroit Leg. 309; 4 S. W. 894; Wells v. State, N. 1006. 24 Tex. App. 230; 5 S. W. -830. 24 in Canada it is held not nec- 19 State V. Ruark, 34 Mo. App. essary to designate in the order 325; State v. Webb, 49 Mo. App. the polling places if the village 407; Boone v. State, 10 Tex. be small. In re Salter [1902], 4 App. 418; Parker v. State, 12 Ont. L. R. — ; In re Mace, 42 Up. Tex. App. 401; Aiken v. State, Can. p. 76; /» re Hudson, 19 Ont. 14 Tex. App. 142; Ex parte Sub- App. 343. In Texas the omission lett, 23 Tex. App. 309; 4 S. W. to designate the place is not fa- 894; Carey v. State, 28 Tex. App. tal, if the electors be not misled. 475; 13 S. W. 752; State v. Kel- Ex parte Meyers (Tex. Cr. App.), logg, 133 Mo. App. 431; 113 S. 44 S. W. 831. W. &60. A statute required the question 20 Dickey v. Hurlburt, 5 Cal. of local option to be submitted 343. at "every towrn meeting to be held 2iiState V. Tucker, 32 Mo. App. on the first Tuesday of March, 620; Leonard v. Saline Co. Court, 1903, and annually thereafter;" a 32 Mo. App. 633. subsequent statute provided that 22 Prichett v. Snider (Ky.), 61 the words "annual meeting" mean S. W. 277; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1718. the annual town meeting in 23 Attorney General v. Van Bu- March, or an adjournment there- ren Circuit Judge, 143 Mich. 396; of. Another section designated §530 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 884 Sec. 530. Notice of time and place of holding an election. Local option laws generally provide that notice of the time and place for holding a local option election shall be given either by posting notices thereof or publishing the same in a newspaper, and the manner of doing it, and in such cases if the provisions of the statute are not complied with no valid election can be held.-^ If the statute provides that the notice must be made by publishing it for a given number of weeks in a newspaper, prior to a given number of days before the election, the notice must be published a number of days equal to seven days to each week, the computation to be made by excluding the first day and including the last day prior to the number of days named preceding the day of the same date for holding the an- nual meeting, provided for ad- journments, but a failure to hold the meeting should not prevent the election of officers at a sub- sequent meeting, and another sec- tion required the town officers to warn the voters as to the business to be transacted, and still an- other section said one of these warnings should contain the lo- cal option question. The town officers failed to warn the annual town meeting at the proper time, and a special town meeting was given for a later date which con- tained an article on the question of license. It was held that a vote on the question at the spe- cial meeting was not authorized, for the reason that a vote on the question could be held only at the annual meeting. State v. Sargent (Vt.), m Atl. 825. See also Peo- ple V. Sackett, 15 N. Y. App. Div. 290; 44 X. Y. Supp. 593; reversing 40 N. Y. Supp. 414. Where a statute provided that a local option election should not be held within sixty days of any municipal election within the city, a local option election held on February 7th in a city whose gen- eral election must occur on April 7th following, was held in time. Becker v. Lafayette County Ct. (Mo.), 119 S. W. 985. A statute providing that a local option election may be held "at any regular town, city or coun- ty election" does not refer alone to elections fixed by the Con- stiution, but includes statutory elections. McCreary v. Common- wealth, 8 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract), 437 ; Commonwealth v. Brown, 10 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 407. 25 Ex parte Kennedy, 23 Tex. App. 77; 3 S. W. 114; Haddox V. Clarke Co., 79 Va. 677; In re Sullivan, 34 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 598 ; 70 N. Y. Supp. 374 ; In re Powers, 334 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 636; 70 N. Y. Supp. 590; In re O'Hara, 63 N. Y. App. 512; 71 N. Y. Supp. 613; In re Town of Lafayette, 45 Misc. Rep. 141; 91 N. Y. Supp. 070; affirmed 105 N. Y. App, Div. 25; 93 N. Y. Supp. 534. 885 LOCAL OPTION. §530 holding the election,-*' And if a statute provides that the clerk shall post, or cause the notices to be posted, and it ap- pears that he did not post them, but issued them and placed them in the hands of men to be posted, the law will not be com- plied with, since it will not be presumed that the men did in fact post the notices.-^ A notice in such case need not state that the petition for the election was signed by the requisite number of voters.-** The omission of a local option law to provide for giving notice of an election thereunder within an election district will not vitiate the law. In such case it will be assumed either that the obligation to direct a proper notice is implied in the authority to order an election, or that notice must be given as required in the general elec- tion law.-** And if the law fails to prescribe the manner in which the giving of such notice shall be proved, oral testimony is admissible to prove that fact, or that any other plain and express provision of the statute providing for such an elec- tion, has or has not been complied with.-"* The notice provided 26 III re Wooldridge, 30 Mo. App. 635 ; State v. Tucker, 32 Mo. App. 620; Leonard v. Saline Co. Court, 32 Mo. App. 633; Bean v. County Court, 33 Mo. App. 635; State V. Kaufman, 45 Mo. App. 656. 27 James v. State, 21 Tex. App. 17 S. W. 422. 28 State V. Weeks, 38 Mo. App. 566; State v. Smith, 32 Mo. App. 618. 29McPike V. Penn, 51 Mo. 63; State V. Dugan, 110 Mo. 138; 19 S. W. 195. 30 State V. Baker, 36 Mo. App. «3; State v. Hutton, 39 Mo. App. 417; State v. Dugan, 110 Mo. 139; 19 S. W. 196; Chalmers v. Fak, 7'6 V.i. 717; Haddox v. County of Clark, 79 Va. 677. If the statute make no provi- sions for recording the notice of an election or the order of pub- lication, tlie record of such no- tice and order is not admissible in evidence where it is necessary to prove them. Toole v. State, 8S Ala. 158; 7 So. 42; State v. Ru- ark, 34 Mo. App. 325; State v. Tucker, 32 Mo. App. 628; Leon- ard v. Saline Co. Court, 32 Mo. App. 633; In re Woodbridge, 30 Mo. App. 612; State v. Baker, 30 Mo. App. 38. Proof that a less number than those provided for by law were posted within the proposed terri- tory to be embraced in the or- der of prohibition will make the election and all proceedings under it invalid. But if a statute pi'O- vides that an officer shall post such notices, in tlie absence of ])roof to the contrarj^ tlie pre- siunption will obtain that such of- ficer completely discharged the duty imposed upon him. Such § 530 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 886 for by such a law is absolutely essential to the validity of sueli an election.^^ If a statute provides that notice of such an election shall be by publication in some newspaper published in the county for a given length of time, and such "other notice" may be given as the county court or municipal body ordering the election may think proper in order to give gen- eral publicity of the election, if the notice complies with the requirements of newspaper publication, it will be sufficient, even though the county court or municipal body ordering the election fail to give other notice, as "other notice" is by the statute in such case discretionary.^- If a local option law provides that an election under it shall be held on a day with- in a given number of days of any municipal or State elec- tion, the word "within" must be construed as referring to elections held before and after the time of holding an election under such local option law.^^ Such an election, however, will not be declared null and void because of the fact that it was held within the number of days prescribed by the stat- ute previous to a special municipal election Avhich could not have been anticipated until after the date of the local option election. If the statute in such case provides that "notice of such election shall be given by publication in some newspaper for four consecutive weeks, and the last insertion shall be within ten days next before such election," it must be con- strued as meaning that there must be four weeks' notice (twenty-eight days) of the election, the computation being made by excluding the first day of the notice and including presumption, however, will be 253; James v. State, 21 Tex. App. overcome by proof that he placed 189; James v. State, 21 Tex. App. the notices "in the hands of good 353. men to be posted." Delivery of si Stephens v. People, iSO 111. the notices to "good men" is not 337; George v. Township, 16 Kan. a posting of the same within the 72; McPike v. Penn, 51 Mo. 63; meaning of the law, nor will the State v. Tucker, 32 Mo. App. 620. courts presume that "good men" 32 State v. Weeks, 38 Mo. App. posted notices when they were un- 566. der no legal obligation to do so. ss in re Woodbridge, 30 Mo. Ex parte Kramer, 19 Tex. App. App. 612; State v. Bowerman, 40 233; Smith v. State, 19" Tex. App. Mo. App. 576. 444; James v. State, 21 Tex. App. 887 LOCAL OPTION. § 530 the day of election, and that the last insertion shall be one or more days, not exceeding ten, next before such election. Such a notice is satisfied if twenty-eight days intervenes be- tween the first one of consecutive weekly publications and the day of election without a daily insertion of the whole.^* If the statute does not provide the manner of making proof of such publication, it may be made by the oral testimony of a witness Mdio has personal knowledge of the fact that it was made. In the absence of such a statutory requirement, it must be held that it is the fact of publication in the mode prescribed by the statute, and not any particular method of provmg the fact is what puts the statute in force."^ When the notice to be given consists of a copy of the order, and other matters of the board ordering the election is inserted between the order and the signatures of its members appended to the day's proceedings, such other matters need not be inserted in the notice.='*^ It is not necessary for the notice to contain a statement that the petition had appended to it the required number of signatures."' Where the district for the election was described by metes and bounds, but in the notice it was described as a certain justice's precinct, yet the two descrip- tions were identical, the supposed variance was held imma- terial. ^« So where the notice had to be published in a news- paper selected by the governor and comptroller of the State, but they had made no selection, yet it was published in all the newspapers, one of which these officials would have been com- pelled, under the law, to select, it was held immaterial that 34 state V. Tucker, 32 Mo. App. tration of the extent to which 620; Leonard V. Saline Co., 32 Mo. contests of tlie validity of local App. 633; Bean v. Barton Co., 33 option elections have been pushed Mo. App. 635; State v. Kaufman, — every straw has been seized up- 45 Mo. App. 656; State v. Dob- on in order to overturn their re- bins, 116 Mo. App. 29; 92 S. VV. suits. 13^- 37 Church V. Weeks, 38 Mo. App. 35 Toole V. State, 88 Ala. 158; 566; State v. Smith, 38 Mo. App. 7 So. 42; Williams v. State (Tex. 618. Or. App.), 109 S. W. 189. zs Ex parte Speogle, 34 Tex. Cr. 36 Thomas v. Abbott, 105 Mich. Rep. 465; 31 S. W. 171; Williams 687; 63 N. W. 984. The decision v. Davidson (Tex. Civ. App.), 70 of this point is a very fair illus- S. W. 987. § 530 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 888 they had failed to make the selection.^" If the statute requires five notices of the election to be given and only three be posted, the election will be void, it has been held.*" Where the statute required all elections to be held according to its provisions, and provided that where "any election" is ordered, at least twenty days ' notice of it should be given ; but the statute also provided that its provisions should apply to all elections "when not otherwise provided by law;'' and the local option law required the clerk to post five notices of the election for at least twelve days prior to the day of election, and provided that an election under such law should be held in comform- ity with the general election law ; it was held, inasmuch as the local option law was a special law and the local option elec- tion a special election, twelve days' notice was all that was required.*^ In Texas it is presumed, in prosecutions for viola- tion of the local option law, that notices were posted the re- quisite time ; *- but the evidence and inference to be drawm therefrom may overcome this presumption. Thus where the evidence showed that the clerk whose duty it was to post the notices did not do so, but placed them in the hands of "good men" to be posted, there was no presumption that they were posted.*^ In New York Avhere four propositions could be 39 Paiil V. Gloucester Co., 50 N. 42 Segars v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. J. L. 585; 15 Atl. 272; 1 L. R. Rep. 45; 31 S. W. 370. See also A. 86. in Kentucky, Bennett v. Coni- 40 Smith V. State, 19 Tex. App. monwealth, 11 Ky. L. Rep. (ab- 444. Contra, Xornian v. Thomp- stract) 370. son, 96 Tex. 250; 72 S. W. 62; 43 James v. State, 21 Tex. App. affirming 30 Tex. Civ. App. 537 ; 72 189; 17 S. W. 143; 21 Tex. App. S. W. 64. 353; 17 S. W. 422. But see 41 Voss V. Terrell, 12 Tex. Civ. Frickie v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. App. 439; 34 S. W. 170; Ex parte 254; 45 S. W. 810. Keith, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 283; 83 In this State a failure to post S. W. 683; Ex parte Xeal, 47 Tex. all the notices is not a subject of Cr. App.. 441; 83 S. W. 831; Eg- contest of the election. Norman gleston V. Board, 51 N. Y. App. v. Thompson, 96 Tex. 250; 72 S. Div. 38; 64 X. Y. Supp. 471; W. 62; affirming 30 Tex. Civ. App. McHam v. Love, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 537; 72 S. W. 64. (In this case 512; 87 S. W. 875; Byrd v. State, one of the notices was not posted 63 Tex. Cr. App. 507; 111 S. \V. the full time, but the voters had 149. actual notice. The election was 889 LOCAL OPTION. §530 voted upon at once, and the clerk's notice of election was under the heading, ''Local option to determine whether liquors shall be sold under the provisions of section 16, c. 367, laws of 1900, known as the 'Liquor Tax Law,' " and that a vote would be taken at the next election "on said proposed questions," it was held that the notice was sufficient in its statements of the questions to be voted upon ; that the notice need not state that all of the four questions would then be voted upon, nor need they be set out in full." If the question of local option •lield valid.) Contra, Ex parte Conley (Tex. Cr. App. ), 75 S. VV. 301. Other cases that notice of tlie election must be given or the elec- tion will be void are In re Mace, 42 Up. Can. 70; In re Malone, 41 Up. Can. 159, 253; In re Hamil- ton, 41 Up. Can. 253; In re Lake, 26 C. P. (Can.) 173; In re Brophy, 26 C. P. (Can.) 290; In re Pickey [1907], 14 App. Ont. L. E. 587; In re Duncan [1909], 16 App. Ont. L. R. 132; Rowland V. CoUingwood [1909], 16 Out. L. R. 272; In re Saltfleet [1909], 16 App. Ont. L. R. 293 ; In re Joyce [1909], 16 App. Ont. L. R. 380; Brooks v. Ellis (Tex. Civ. App.), 98 S. W. 936; Ex -parte Conley (Tex. Cr. App.), 75 S. W. 301. ** In re Woolston, 35 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 735; 72 N. Y. Supp. 406. See In re Foster, 57 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 676; 108 K Y. Supp. 788. In this State, where the elec- tion is held at a "town meeting," the election is held valid, though no notice of it be given, where the electors knew the propositions to be voted upon at the meeting, and there was a full vote. In re France, 36 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 693; 74 N. Y. iSupp. 379; In re Town of La- fayette, 45 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 141; 01 N. Y. Supp. 970; order af- firmed, 105 N. Y. App. Div. 25; 93 N. Y. Supp. 534; In re Smith, 44 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 384; 89 N. Y. Supp. 1006; In re O'Hara, 40 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 355 : 82 X. Y. Supp. 293. In South Carolina a law re- quired twenty days' notice to be given for the location of a dis- pensary, and a designation of the locality where it was to be lo- cated. A failure to designate the particular locality was held fatal. Trustees v. Board, 62 Miss. 68; 39 S. E. 793. In Alabama every local law passed by the Legislature without notice is void under a Constitu- tion requiring it. Larkin v. Sim- mons (Ala), 46 So. 451. If a judge's certificate be oth- erwise regular, the fact that he states that the notice was pub- lished four weeks on the date of the fourth issue of the newspaper containing the notice, where four consecutive weeks or twenty-eight days from the day of its publi- cation was required, will not viti- ate such certificate, although the four weeks did not expire until the end of the M'eek in which the last publication was made. Wil- liams V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 156; 109 S. W. 189. ^530 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 890 can only be voted on at the annual "town meeting," then a notice that the question would be submitted at a special "town meeting" cannot empower it to pass upon the ques- tion.*^ Slight variations in the notice, stating the statutory propositions to be voted on will not vitiate it.'*^ Where the statute requires notices to be posted it means an actual post- ing of the requisite number; but if they be posted and then be torn or blown down, the election, in that respect, will be valid."*^ If the statute requires the elerjc of the board to give the notice of election, it is not necessary that such board order him to give it.*^ •3- State V. Sargent (Vt.), 09 Atl. 825. In Missouri if notice for the full time be not given the elec- tion is void. State v. Kemp- man, 75 Mo. App. 188. Contra in Louisiana, Hagens \. Police Jury (La.), 46 So. 676. In Texas no- tices given in each precinct by posting is sufficient. Keller v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 588; 81 iS. W. 1214. 46/,!. re Rice, 95 X. Y. App. Div. 28; 88 N. Y. Supp. 512. 47 Nelson v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. App. 595; 75 S. W. 502; Bow- man V. State, 14 Tex. Cr. App. 38; 40 S. W. 796; 41 S. W. 635. Where the clerk is required to record the affidavit of publica- tion of the order of the adoption of local option, it need not im- mediately follow the order, it not being nullified by the insertion of several pages of other matters. People V. Hamilton, 143 Mich. 1 ; 106 N. W. 275; 12 Detroit Leg. N. 897. Notices posted December 29th for ;ni election January 17th are posted twelve days jjrior to the date of the election. Hayes v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 39 S. W. 106. For Texas statute, see Roper V. Scurlock, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 464; 69 S. W. 456. 48 Hayes v. State (Tex. Cr. App.,), 39 S. W. 10'6; Eggleston v. Board, 51 N. Y. App. Div. 38; 04 X. Y. Supp. 471. Publication of the notice may be shown by oral evidence, even to the contradiction of the printer's affidavit. State v. Swear- ingen, 128 Mo. App. 005; 107 S. W. 1. The certificate of publication made by the judge need not show the particular issues of tlie pa- per in which the publication was made. Magill v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 357; 103 S. W. 397. Where the court selected the newspaper for the notice, and pub- lication was required for four consecutive weeks, the last inser- tion to be within ten days before the date of the election, insertions for four consecutive weeks in a weekly newspaper the last eight days before the election was held sufficient. State v. Brawn, 130 Mo. App. 214; 109 S. W. 99. Sample ballots of an election 891 LOCAL OPTION. §531 Sec. 531. Time of holding an election. The election must be held at the time the law requires it to be held. If the statute requires the court or board hearing were mailed to every voter in the town, stating the questions to be submitted. Several general public meetings were held, at which these questions were discussed, of which accounts were given in the news- papers, and these newspapers dis- cussed the questions from time to time at length. More votes were cast on these questions than for any office voted for at the same time. The town clerk failed to post four notices in public places and to give notice of the election in a newspaper. Tlie court re- fused to declare tlie election void. In re Rowley, 34 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 662; 70 X. Y. Supp. 208. Any one posting the notices may testify to that fact. Watkins v. State (Tex. €r. App.), 62 S. W. 911. The notice, where it consists of a copy of the order of election, need not have the seal of the court attached to it. Roper v. Scurlock, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 4G4; 09 S. W. 456. Where a statute provides that the clerk of the court shall post or provide to be posted the elec- tion notice, it is sufficient that they were posted with his con- sent. McCarty v. Justus ( Tex. ) , 115 S. W. 278. The notice must be published as the court orders it, or the election will be void; partial com- pliance with the order is not sufficient. State v. Reid, 134 Mo. App. 5-82; 114 S. W. 1116. An affidavit of publication may be substituted for a lost one. State v. Campbell, 214 Mo. 362; 113 S. W. 1081; 119 S. W. 494. A notice that a petition has been filed with the clerk for the sub- mission of local option questions under the liquor statute (desig- nating the particular section of the statute), and that all local option questions provided for therein will be submitted to the freeholders on a specified day, is sufficient, and it is not necessary to state the questions will be voted on the day named for tlie elec- tion. In re Livingston, 62 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 334; 115 N. Y. Supp. 269. Where a statute requires no- tice to be published for four con- secutive weeks, the last insertion to be ten days before the election, a publication of the first notice on February 8th, the fourth on March 1st, and a fifth within ten days prior to the date of the election on March 13th, is suffi- cient. State V. Campbell, 214 Mo. 362; 113 S. W. 1081; 110 S. W. 494. Where the first notice was pub- lished four days short of the pe- riod prescribed by the statute, and few if any of the electors did not vote, it was held that the election was valid. Bauer v. Board (Mich.), 122 N". W. 121. A statute requiring the sherifl" to post up notices is complied with by a posting of such notices by private persons. Roesch v. Henry (Ore.), 103 Pac. 439. §531 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 892 the application to fix the date of the election, it must do so and the election must be hehl on that daj' ; but if the law fixes the date, then on the daj^ thus fixed/" If the law requires the petitioners to fix the date in their petition, then the elec- The printing of the clerk's name to the notice is a sufficient subscription thereto of his signa- ture, and the seal of the court need not be attached. Roesch v. Henry (Ore.), 103 Pac. 439. Where the court's order for sub- mission found tliat the county contained no city or town of 2,500 inhabitants, and directed the clerk to give notice of the election, and he gave a notice reciting that it was ordered by the judge of tlie county court that '"the qualified voters" of the county are notified that an election would be held on a specified date to determine whether liquors would be sold within the city limits of the coun- ty and the "outside limits of all cities and towns having 2,5(t0 inhabitants or more," it was held that the notice was void, because it attempted to limit the sale of liquors to the countj^ outside tlie limits of any town or 2,500 in- habitants or more, thereby being a departure from the order for an election. State v. Rinke (Mo.), 121 N. W. 159. In Michigan it is sufficient to embody the order of the court for an election in the notice, without posting a certified copy of such order. Thomas v. Abbott, 105 Mich. 687; 63 N. W. 984. Where five notices had to be posted in each precinct of tlie county twelve days before the elec- tion, and in one nrecinct none were posted, in another for only eleven days, in another for only ten days and in another three for only eight days, tlie election was held void, and tlie commissioners were enjoined from entering an order prohibiting the sale of liquors in the county. Guesnsey v. McHaley (Ore.), 98 Pac. 158; Hill V. Hawth (Tex. Civ. App.), 112 S. W. 707; Roesch v. Henry (Ore.), 103 Pac. 439. Where the provisions for notice inserted in the liquor statute were void, it was held that notice could be given under the general elec- tion law. Ruhland v. Water- man (R. I.), 71 Atl. 450. Failure of the court to desig- nate the paper is not fatal, if the clerk cause the notice to be published in another proper paper. State v. Kellogg (Tex.), 113 S. W. 660. A failure to state when tlie polls would be open is not fatal, when the statute specifies the hours. State v. Bassett, 133 Mo. App. 366; 112 S. W. 764. A notice that an election had been "ordered to be holden" on a certain date is not insufficient be- cause of a failure to state specifi- cally that on that day an election "would be held." State v. Bassett, 133 Mo. App. 366; 112 S. W. 764. ■tsYates v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 59 S. W. 275; Paul v. Gloucester Co., 50 N. J. L. 585 ; 15 Atl. 275; 1 L. R. A. 86. 893 LOCAL OPTION. § 531 tion must be held on the date thus selected ; but if the law does not require them to fix the date, and yet they do, the court may disregard the prayer of the petition in this re- spect and select another date/'" The election must be held upon the date stated in the election notice/^ Some of the statutes require the election to be held within a certain time after the date of the reception of the petition, and others with- in a similar date of the entry of an order for an election. When such is the case its provisions must be observed or the election will be invalid.^'- And where the statute pro- hibited the holding of a local option election "within" sixty days of a State or municipal election held in the district, it was held that this meant both before and after such State or municipal election ; and if its provisions were violated the election would be void;^^ but not so if the election was a "special" municipal election where the date of the local op- tion election was firet set.^* A statute concerning elections in general, requiring special elections to be held on "Tuesday" has no reference to a local option election ; ^'^ nor has it any reference to a general school election, the term "general elec- tion" meaning the biennial State election. ="'" Where the elec- tion is held within the prohibited zone of time, the fact that the prior election was irregular for want of a sufficient notice will not render the local option election valid." Where a statute provides that a local option election shall be held on a day not less than fifteen nor more than thirty days from the date of the order, an election ordered on the fifteenth of a 50 O'JSTeal v. Minary, 1-25 Ky. 53 Jn re Woodridge, 30 Mo. App. 571; 101 S. \V. 951; 30 Ky. L. Q\2. Eep. 888. 54 state v. Ruark, 34 Mo. App. 5iRichter v. State (Ala.), 47 325. So. 163; Winston v. State, 32 Tex. ss state v. Circuit Court, 50 N. Cr. Rep. 59; 22 S. W. 138; King J. L. 585; 15 Atl. 272; 1 L. R. A. V. State, 33 Tex. Cr. Rep. 547; 28 m. S. W. 201. 56 state v. Searcy, 39 Mo. App. 52 State V. Ruark, 34 Mo. App. 393; State v. Watts, 39 Mo. App. 325; Curry v. State, 28 Tex. App. 409. 475; 13 S. W. 752. 57 State v. Bowerman, 40 Mo. App. 57'6. § 532 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 894 month and held on the twenty-fifth is valid ; "* but one or- dered November 16th and held December 17th is void.^* Sec. 532, Conduct of the election. If the local option statute provides how the election shall be held, then its provisions must be followed, to the exclusion of the general election law^; but if its provisions are wanting in detail the general election law will supply them. Not infre- quently it is provided that the election shall be held in pur- suance to the general election law,"^* omitting all details, in which event no question can arise on the subject; and even though there was no declaration how the election should be conducted, the provisions of the general election law would be held to control, rather than there should be an entire fail- ure to carry out the will of the Legislature as expressed in the local option law.*^" So the election must be held at the place fixed in the order, or substantially at the place so fixed ; ^^ but if the order does not designate the polling place, then sub- stantially at the places designated in the notice. But a fail- ure to fix the polling place in a small village or hamlet has been held in Canada not fatal to the election.*'- If the election is conducted under the general election law, and an order is 5S Winston v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 80; In re Hartley, 25 Upp. Can. Rep. 59; 22 S. W. 138. 12; In re McLean, 25 Upp. Can. salving v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 619; In re Mills, 28 Up. Can. 333; Rep. 547; 28 S. W. 201. In re Malonne, 41 Upp. Can. 159; 59* The election is valid, even In re Leake, 20 C. P. (Can.) 173; if it does not so provide. Jacoby In re Reubottom, 42 Upp. Can. V. Dallis, 115 Ga. 272; 41 S. E. 358; In re Johnson, 40 Upp. Can. 611. But see Lehman v. Porter. 297; Walker v. Mobley (Tex.), 73 Miss. 216; 18 So. 920. 103 S. W. 490; Richter v. State 6"> On these statements, see gen- (Ala.), 47 So. 163; Winston v. erally People v. Pierson, 35 N. Y. State, 32 Tex. Cr. Rep. 59; 22 S. Misc. Rep. 40C; 71 N. Y. Supp. W. 138; King v. State, 33 Tex. 093; order affirmed, '64 X. Y. App. Cr. Rep. 547; 28 S. W. 201. Div. 624; 72 X. Y. Supp. 1123; ei Farrington v. Turner, 53 Hagens v. Police Jury (La.), 46 Mich. 27; Dale v. Irvin, 78 111. So. 676; Shields v. State, 38 Tex. 170; Preston v. Culbertson, 58 Cr. App. 252; 42 S. W. 398; In re Cal. 198. Bell [1907], 13 App. Ont. L. R. 62/,; re Salter [1902], 4 Ont. L. R. — . 895 LOCAL OPTION. § 532 of record in the county, or city, or town fixing a polling place under that law for holding elections, then the election should be held there. The court or board ordering the election may or may not direct who shall conduct the election, that de- pending on the terms of the statute. Where a general stat- ute provided that the county board of elections should annu- ally appoint election officers for precincts who should "hold their offices for one year, and until their successors were ap- pointed and qualified," and the local option law provided that elections under it should be held "by such officer as would be qualified to hold elections for county officers, and they shall be selected in the same way," and all elections thereunder should ' ' be held in accordance within the provisions of the gen- eral election laAvs, * * * except that they shall not be held on the same day with any regular political election," but it did not require the officers appointed to hold other elec- tions in those precincts, it was held that special election offi- cers must be appointed to hold the local option election.*''' In Texas it is held that the commissioner's court may name any person to hold the local option election."* Where the spirit of the statute requires a division of the election officers between the contesting parties, it is proper for the court or board to appoint special officers."^ In Texas the election officers need not be appointed when the election is ordered, it being sufficient to appoint them afterwards.''" The polls must be opened at the time the law requires them to be opened and kept open for the full time required by stat- ute, whether the election is controlled by the local option law or the general election law. Thus, where the statute re- quired the polls to be opened at 9 a. m. and kept open until B3Er\vin V. Benton, 120 Ky. 536; der, 110 Ky. 263; «1 S. W. 277; 87 S. W. 291; 27 Ky. L. Rep 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1718; Common' ^^^- wealth V. Green, 98 Kv. 21; 32 ei Kelly v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. S. W. 169; 17 Ky. L. Rep. 579. App. 480; 38 S. W. 779. g5 Puckett v. Snider, 110 Ky. In Kentucky it is proper to di- 263; 01 S. W. 277; 22 Ky, L. rect the order of election to the Rep. 1718. sherifl" Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Dav- for or against prohibition, there idson Co., 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 637, is no election, and a party is not 692. entitled to have certified any facta 10 Giddings v. Wells, 99 Mich. concerning the same. Erwin v. 221; 58 N. W. 64. Benton, 120 Ky. 536; 87 S. W. 11 ^a? parte Kennedy, 23 Tex. 291; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 909. App. 77; 3S. W. 114. 12 Fennick v. Ovvings, 70 Md. If the canvassing board certify 246; 16 Atl. 719. it is unable to find a majority § 538 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 90G liquors are sold within the limits of the city until after a general election has been held at which the electors have voted upon the question ^vithin the city.^^ And in Alabama it has been held that, where a statute provided that licenses should not be issued unless a majority of the voters voted in favor of the granting of such licenses, that, although a majority of the votes Avere not cast "against license," yet that licenses could not be granted unless a majority of the votes were east "for license." Tt was also held, where the re- turns showed that 252 votes were cast at an election and that 121 of them were "for license," one for "no license" and the remainder of them were so informal that they could not be counted, that there was no such majority as would authorize the issuing such licenses.^* Whether a majority of votes had been cast in favor of granting a license, must neces- sarily depend upon the wording of the statute under which an election is held." Informality in the wording of ballots cast at such an election will not make the result of the elec- tion void, if by the ballots used the voters are informed that they are voting at such election either "for the sale" or "against the sale" of intoxicating liquors.^*^ i3Erb V. State, 35 Ark. 638; 272; 41 S. E. 611; Chamlee v. Siloam 'Springs v. Thompson, 41 Davis, 115 Ga. 266; 41 S. E. 691. A.rk. 456. So in Maryland. Walker v. Os- 14 Prestwood v. Borland, 92 Ala. wald, 68 Md. 11 Atl. 711. 599; 9 South 223. A deposited but rejected bailot 15 Chalmers v. Funk, 76 Va. 717. cannot be counted in determining 16 Lehman v. Porter, 73 Miss. whether the requisite nuniber of 216; 18 So. 920. votes were cast at the election. In Where a statute provides that re Swan River, 16 Manitoba 312. a license may be issued if there In South Dakota the majority be a majority vote for it, but n j for license must be, not on that election is held, a license cannot question alone, but a majority of be granted. Siloam Springs v. the liighest vote cast at the elec- Thompson, 41 Ark. 456. tion on another proposition sub- In Georgia providing that a lis- mitted or for candidates for oi- pensary may be established if i* fice. State v. Stakke (S. D.), 117 majority of the votes be in favor N. W. 129. of it, means a majority of those In Canada it was held that lo- actually cast at that election and cal option must be adopted by a counted. Jacoby v. Dallis, 115 Ga. majority of all the electors on the 907 LOCAL OPTION. § 539 Sec. 539. Declaration of the result of the election. The determination and declaration of the board or court concerning the result of the election is final until set aside in a legally instituted contest proceedings.^^ Where a statute requires the board of commissioners of election to canvass the return of the inspectors of election, determine the result and make a verified report of it, they need not certify that they had canvassed the returns and the result was derived from such returns.^® Nor is it necessary for them to show the election was held at the places designated by the order of election or by law; for that is presumed. '° Nor is it neces- sary in such certificate that the officer making the canvass— a clerk in this case- -called in assistants, as the law required him to do.-" It is sufficient if a majority of the board certify to the result.-' If the law requires the election board to spread upon their records the reports of the election supervis- ors, its provisions may be complied with either at a general or special meeting.-- The order of the board declaring the assessment rolls, not by a major- that notices were given; Bence v. ity of those voting. In re Mc- State (Tex. Cr. App.), 35 S. W. Avoy, 12 Up. Can. 99; In re Rets- 383. bottom, 42 Up. Can. 358; In re so/,;, ,c Rothwell, 44 Mo. App. Johnson, 40 Up. Can. 297; In re 215. Malone, 41 Up. Can. 159; In r-? In Kentucky it is held the board Leake, 2« C. P. (Can.) 173; /;; re need not certify that it had ex- Boon, 24 Up. Can. 361. amined the poll books unless the The first election may be re- vote be adverse to granting li- pealed by a majority vote. Mi> censes. Commonwealth v. Hoke, Neely v. Morganton, 125 N. C. 14 Bush, GG8, 375; 34 iS. E. 510. 21 Fullwood v. State, C7 Miss. An election is not void because 554; 7 So. 432. ,See State v. one of the precincts of the dis- Searcy, 40 Mo. App. 421. trict neglected or refused to vote. A failure of the cleric of th- Ex parte Schilling, 38 Tex. Cr. board to certify the result to tlie App. 287; 42 S. W. 553. Secretary of State, as the statute 17 Thomas v. Abbott, 105 Mich. requires, will not invalid.ite the 687; 63 N. W. 984. election. Ciddings ^. Wells, 99 isPuckett V. State, 71 Miss. Mich. 221 ; 58 N. W. 64. 192; 14 So. 452. 22 Puckett v. State, 71 Miss. i9?uckett V. State, supra; nor 192; 14 So. 452. §539 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 908 result need not be in the words of the statute.-' A mere clerical error in making the record is immaterial.^* Thus where a part of the entry declared that less than a majority cast their votes for no license, but other parts of it showed that a majority did cast their vote for prohibition, the error was held immaterial.-^ It will be presumed that before entering the order the court or board passed upon all preliminary matters relating to its legality.-*^ The order declaring the result of the election need not follow up the petition by inserting a description of the territory described in the petition, if words sufficient be used to indicate that the order is based upon such petition.-" The declaration of the result of the election is not open to a collateral attack.-^ Nor can one pros- ecuted for selling liquor in violation of the local option law attack the validity of the election.--" In Texas the commis- sioners' court may count the votes regardless of the result reached by the election officers, and so declare the result.^" It 2.t state V. Cooper, 101 N. €. €84; 8 S. E. 134; clones v. State, 21 Tex. App. 353; 17 S. VV. 422. 2i Thomas v. Commonweal rb, 90 Va. 92; 17 S. E. 788. 25 Ex parte Burrage, 26 Tex. App. 35; 9 S. W. 72. 20 Irish V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 130; 29 S. W. 778; Cooper V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 65 S. \V. 916. 2T Bruce v. State ( Tex. Cr. App.), 35 S. W. 383; Fit^e v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 85 S. W. 1156; Loveless v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App., 131; 49 S. W. 98. In Missouri those called in to assist in the canvass need not sign the declaration of the re- sult of the canvass. State v. Searcy, 46 Mo. App. 421. 28 State V. Emery, 98 N. C. 768; 3 S. E. 810. See Ex parte Dou thitt (Tex. Cr. App.), 63 S. W. 131. 29 State V. Cooper, 101 N. C. 684; '8 S. E. 134; Woodward v. State, 103 Ga. 490; 30 S. E. 522. If by error the election l)oard has certified a wrong lesul.t the contesting board may correct the certificate. Lrocke v. Garnett (Ky.), 42 S. W. 918; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1059. In Alabama it is not necessary to the validity of the election that a report of the result of th-j election be posted at the door of the court house, as the statute di- rects. Richter v. State fAla.), 47 So. 163. soBurrell v. State (Tex. f>. App.), 65 S. W. 914. In a proceeding to set aside a canvass of the vote, it is held in New York that the town board and its members are proper par- ties, they being the canvassing board. In re Bertrand, 40 N, Y. Misc. 536; 82 N. Y. Supp. 940. 909 LOCAL OPTION. ^539 is not necessary that the order declaring the result should set out the vote by precincts, it being- sufficient to declare the total vote cast in the voting district,-'^ nor need it show the election was held in each precinct.''" This declaration is not vitiated by an erroneous reference to the year in which the local option law was passed.^^ A failure to enter the order declaring the result within the time fixed by statute is not fatal to the election.^* In the order or certificate of the proper court declaring the result of a local option election it is only siBarker v. State (Tex. C'r. App.), 47 S. W. '980; Armstr.ng V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 47 S. W. lOOG. 32 Barker v. State, supra. 33 Barker v. State, supra. In Connecticut the county com- missioners cannot be 'compelled to issue a license if the records of the county show a majority voted against the license, it not being their duty, and they have not the power to determine the validity of the vote. Underwood V. Fairchild Co., 67 Conn. 411; 35 Atl. 274. See also People v. Fos- ter, 27 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 576; 58 N. Y. Supp. 574. 34 Loveless v. .State (Tex. Cr. App.), 49 S. W. 601; Blackwell V. Commonwealth (Ky. ), 54 S. W. 843; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 240; Rawls v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 622; 89 S. W. 1071; Oxley v. Allen (Tex. Civ. App.), 107 S. W. 945. In Mississippi the failure to re- turn the result of tlie vote under oath was held to avoid the elec- tion. Grubbs v. Griflin ( Miss. ) , 25 So. 663. In South Carolina the board of commissioners for the election of State and county officers, and not the board of commissioners for the election of Federal officers, de- clare the result of the election. State V. Jennings, 79 iS. C. 246; 60 S. E. 699. In Michigan the board of coun- ty supervisors have only admin- istrative and not judicial powers in local option election matters. Feek v. Bloomingdale, 82 Mich. 393; 47 N. W. 37; 10 L. R. A. 69. Where a statute required the board of commissioners to meet in special session to canvass the votes and declare the result, it was held that the published order need not show it was made at a special session, for that would be presumed. Neal v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 513; 102 S. W. 1139; Huff V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 102 S. W. 1144 See also State v. Edmunds, (Ore.), 104 Pac. 430. A recital in the order that on a certain day the vote was can- vassed "to determine whether or not the sale of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors shall be prohib- ited," is not fatal because it have the words "intoxicating liquors" are used instead of those of the statute. Neal v. State, supra; Huff V. State, supra. §539 TRAI<^FIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 010 necessary to state the result as the canvassers found it, and such certificate will be 'prima facie evidence of the result thus shown. In the absence of impeaching facts, it will be pre- sumed that the officer making the certificate was justified by a legal and proper canvass of the votes in issuing the certifi- cate as to the result of such election. The well-settled pre- sumptions of the regularity of official action, and that things required to be done have been rightly done, apply as in other cases. The presumption is, therefore, that the election has been properly conducted, and that the officers charged with the duties of ascertaining and declaring the result have dis- charged their duty faithfully, and the failure of the proper officer to make such certificate within the time provided for will not affect the election. ^^ 35 In re Bothwell, 41 Mo. App. 215; State v. Meekin, 51 Mo. App. 299; Prather v. State, 12 Tex. App. 401 ; Coleman v. State, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 396; 112 S. W. 1072. In South Carolina the .statute concerning the adoption of the dis- pensary law is sufficiently com- plied with if the managers, the in- tendant and the wardens cf the town certify in writing to the re- sult of the balloting. Hunter v. Senn, «1 S. C. 44; 39 S. E. 235. The finding cannot be over- turned by an abstract of the vote made by the election commission- ers, when the certificate does not cover the question cf license, al- though it does civer the votes cast for a candidate for office. State V. Sanger (Ark.), SS S. W. 903. In Arkansas the failure cf the election commissioners to lay be- fore the county court the returns of the election does not deprive that court of its power to grant licenses, if the actual vote was in fav(ir of the granting. Bord- well V. State, 77 Ark. 161; 91 S. VV. 555. An order passed by the court certifying that the returns showed 1,459 "for dispensary" and 1,190 "against dispensary" is sufficient, and puts the act into force. Cham- lee V. Davis, 115 Ga. 266; 41 S. E. 691; Hubbard v. Common- wealth, 10 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 683 ; Bennett v. Commonwealth, 1 1 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 370. In Kentucky the certificate of the result must be filed with the county clerk before the act goes into force. Cress v. Common- wealth (Ky.), 37 S. W. 493; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 633. Where the declaration of the result of the election must be signed by the canvassing board, tlie signing of such a result by the town clerk only is not suffi- cient. People V. Hamilton, 27 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 308 ; 58 N. Y. Supp. 584. In New York the certificate of the canvassing board as to the 911 LOCAL OPTION. §540 Sec. 540. The order of prohibition. In some of the States the statute not only provides that the court or board of commissioners shall declare the result of the election, but they shaJl enter an order, if that be the result of the election, prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors in the voting territory. This order need not be in the words and form required by the statute, but a substantial compliance with its provisions is sufficient.^** Thus an entry declaring a sale, gift or barter "is absolutely prohibited, ex- cept for the purposes and under the regulations prescribed result is conclusive. In re Brown, 38 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 157; 77 N. Y. Supp. 261, and the clerk cannot overturn it by a statement snow- ing a diflerent result when he came into office long after the election. Ibid. An omission in the order de- claring the result without refer- ence to the voting box is not fatal and a reference to it is un- necessary. Efird V. State, 44 Tex. Cr. App. 447; 71 S. W. 957. Until the votes have been can- vassed the election has not been "properly submitted," as a stat- ute requires it to be. In re Bur- rell, 50 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 261; 100 N. Y. Supp. 470. The failure to file a certificate of the result with the municipal clerk in Ohio does not prevent local option going into force. Otte V. State, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 203. If the persons who canvass the returns are candidates for elec- tion at the same election, the can- vass is void. Commonwealth v. Shuck, 10 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 874. If the local option act do not provide who shall canvass the vote, then the general election officers — the local option election being held at the time of the general elec- tion — can canvass it. Common- wealth V. Shuck, 10 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 874. Where the action of the can- vassing board is final, mandamus does not lie to control its action. Haehlne Brewing Co. v. Board (Mich.), 121 N. W. 202; 16 De- troit L. N. 184. If all the members of the board assemble and canvass the result, it is immaterial how or when it was called together. State v. Ed- munds (Ore.), 104 Pac. 430. The board of supervisors or court may require the election can- vassers to execute a new certificate where the certificate returned is defective, but it can be corrected by its own statements. Thomas v. Abbott, 105 Mich. 687; 63 N. W. 984. 36 James v. State. 21 Tex. App. 353; 17 S. W. 422; Holloway v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 246; 110 S. W. 745 ; Doss V. Commonwealth, 14 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 334. § 540 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 912 by law" is sufficient ; ^' and such order need not give the date the election was ordered.^* Delay on the part of the court in making the order will not invalidate the election.^" It is not necessary that the order except the statutory exceptions of sales for medicinal and sacramental purposes.*" It is not necessary for the order to state that proper notices of the election were given/^ nor need it describe the territorj^ by metes and bounds, if it constitutes a political district of the State.*^ Thus describing the territory as "Precinct Number Two" where the order was for an election in "Justice Pre- cinct Number Two, " of a named county, was held sufficient.*^ It is not necessary for the order to declare that prohibition w'ill continue in the district until it is invalidated by a vote of the electors.** Until the order of prohibition is made there is no prohibition in force, when such order is required.*^ The entering of the order is prima facie evidence that all the pre- liminary steps had been taken.*® It is not necessary for the court or board to state they "opened" the polls and counted the votes, especially where it appears from the record that it will not affect the election.*^ The failure of the judge of the court to make an entry of the publication, as required by statute, will not invalidate the election,*** nor will his failure ST Ex parte Burrage, 26 Tex. 4 1 Bruce v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 35; 9 S. W. 72; Daniel v. App), 35 S. W. 383. State, 32 Tex. Cr. App. 16; 21 S. « Bruce v. State, swpra. W. 68; Zollicoffer v. State (Tex. 43 Loveless v. State (Tex. Cr. €r. App.), 38 S. W. 775. App.), 49 S. W. 601; Efird v. 38 Daniel v. State, supra. State, 44 Tex. Cr. App. 447; 71 39 Ex parte Burger, 32 Tex. Cr. S. W. 957. Eep. 459; 24 S. W. 289. 44 Lipari v. State, 19 Tex. App. 40 Gilbert v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 431. Rep. 596 ; 25 S. W. 632 ; Ex parte 45 Holloway v. State, 53 Tex. Perkins, 34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 429; 31 Cr. App. 246; 110 S. W. 745. S. W. 175; Bruce v. State (Tex. 46 £-0; parte Schilling, 38 Tex. Cr. App.), 35 S. W. 383; Love- Cr. App. 287; 42 S. W. 553; Chap- less V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 49 man v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. S. W. 601; Truesdell v. State, 42 167; 39 S. W. 113 Tex. Cr. App. 544; 61 S. W. 935; 47 Beaty v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. People V. Whitney 105 Mich. 622; App. 432; 110 S. W. 449. 63 X. W . 765. 48 Beaty v. State, supra , 913 IjOCal option §540 to give the dates of the publication, where he certifies that the publication was made "for the time and in the manner re- quired by law" render the certificate ineffective as evidence of the publication.'*'' If an election under such a statute results in favor of prohibition, it is sufficient for an order declaring the result to state that fact and to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors within the locality for which the elec- tion was petitioned. It is not essential to the sufficiency of the order that it shall declare that the prohibition shall con- tinue until such time as the qualified voters of the locality, by a majority vote, at an election held therefor, shall decide otherwise. Such limitation is fixed by law and cannot be affected by the order of a court.^'*^ 49 Harrjnnan v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 474; 110 S. W. -J20; Carnes v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 110 S. W. 928. 50 Ex parte Beeverage, 26 Tex. App. 35 ; Coleman v. State, 54 Tex. €iv. App. 396; 112 S. W. 1072. In the discharge of their duty 'declaring the result of the elec- tion and entering an order of pro- hibition the court exercises neither judgment nor discretion, and man- damus lies to compel it to com- ply with the law. State v. Rich- ardson (Ore.), 85 Pac. 225. Until the order be made there can be no prohibition. Holloway V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 246; 110 ,S. W. 745. Where it is the duty of the judge of the court to make an entiy declaring the result of the election, it is not necessary for him to write it in person, its transcription by another being suf- ficient. Coleman v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. App. 396; 112 S. W. 1072. In this case the county clerk en- tered an order declaring the re- sult of the election. On the suc- ceeding page was an order signed by the countj^ clerk declaring that the six previous pages had been read over in open court and were correct. It was held that this was an adoption of the entry of the clerk as the official act of the judge. An order of prohibition entered in violation of an injunction or- der is void. Doss v. Common- wealth 14 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 334. Where a statute required, on a second election resulting against prohibition, the court to enter an order setting aside the previous order enforcing prohibition, it was held not necessary to enter an or- der of any kind where the second election resulted in favor of pro- hibition. State V. Edmunds (Ore.), 104 Pac, 430. Where the order of prohibition could not affect sales by druggists and pharmacists selling wine for sacramental purposes it was held that a saloon keeper could not ob- ject to an order that did not ex- cept such sales. People v. Whit- ney, 105 Mich. 622; 63 N. W. 765. §§ 541, 542 TR.Vl'PIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 914 Sec. 541. Order for publication concerning prohibition order. In some of the States the board or court declaring the re- sult of the election or entering the order of prohibition must order that publication be made of the result of the election or the fact that an order prohibiting sales had been made. This order for publication may be made at any time after the result of the election is declared or the order of prohibition made, unless the language of the statute imperatively requires it to be made within a time stated.^^ If the statute requires the court or board to designate or select the paper in which the notice of prohibition shall be inserted it must make the selection, but where the county judge was required to make the selection, it was held not nec- essary to provide in the order that he should make such selec- tion.^^ Sec. 542. Publishing notices of order and result of elec- tion. In some of the States the order is not in force until the fact of adoption of prohibition or "no license" has been published for a certain length of time or so many publications of the result of the election has been made in a newspaper, usually so many weekly publications. When this is the case the requisite number of publications must be made before the prohibition of the order becomes effective. '^^ Where three 51 Biddy v. State (Tex. Cr. land v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), App.), 108 S. W. 689; Rawls v. 47 S. W. 720; on rehearing revers- State, 4'8 Tex. €r. App. 622; 89 ing judgment. (Tex. Cr. App.) S. W. 1071 (eleven months' de- 47 S. W. 470; Lively v. State lay). (Tex. Cr. App.), 72 S. W. 393; 52 Johnson v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. Chenowith v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 624; 108 S. W. 683; Sin- App. 238; 96 S. W. 19; In re Coe, Clair V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 24 Up. Can. 439; In re Miles, 28 4'87; 77 S. W. 621. Up. C^i. 333; In re Day, 38 Up. 53 Moss V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. Can. 528; In re Wycott, 38 Up. App. 459; 89 S. W. 833; John- Can. 533; In re Hartley, 25 Up. son V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 89 Can. 12; State v. Weeks, 38 Mo. S. W. 834; Ellis v. State (Tex. App. 566; Ezzell v. State, 29 Tex. Cr. App.), 89 S. W. 974; Strick- App. 521; In re McLpan, 25 Up. Can. 619. 915 LOCAL OPTION. § 542 weekly publications were made, when four were required, and the fourth was enjoined, and an appeal from an order dis- missing the action taken, a supersedeas bond having been giv- en, the appeal was dismissed by agreement, and the fourth publication was then made in the first issue of the paper there- after, although more than thirty days after the third publica- tion had been made, it was held that the publications were continuous, the county judge havinir no authority to proceed with the publication while the proceedinsfs on anoeal were in fieri/'* Where the statute requires a minute of the publication to be made of record by the judge of the court, an entry in his minutes, that the result of the election was published "for the time and in the manner required by law" is suffi- cient, although it does not show whether the publication was made by posting or by insertion of a notice in the news- paper.'^^ Where a statute required the order to be published four successive weeks, a publication November 21st, 28th, De- cember 5th and 12th was a compliance with its requirements, where the minute of the publication M'^as entered December 19th.^" Where a statute required publication for four succes- sive weeks, but an injunction, after two publications had been made, for sixteen months prevented further publications ; but on its dissolution two more publications were made, it was held that the publication was not sufficient." A statute re- quiring the order declaring that prohibition had carried does not require the names of the judges signing it to be pub- lished.^* Where a statute requires the judge of the court to 54 Gill V. State, 48 Tex. Or. App. 157; Chenowith v. State, 50 Tex. 517; 89 S. W. 27-2; Ex parte Cr. App. 238; 96 S. \V. 19. But Wood (Tex. Cr. App.), 81 S. W. see Riggs v. State (Tex. Cr. 529. App.), 97 S. W. 482. 55Byrd v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. "-s Hillard v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. Rep. 507; 111 S. W. 149; Lively App. 314; 87 S. W. 821. V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 72 S. A restraining order of a Fed- W. 393. eral court prohibiting the publi- ^^ Ex parte Sullivan (Tex. Cr. cation of the order was held not App.), 75 S. W. 790. to annul the election. McHam v. 57 Griffin v. State (Tex. Cr. Love, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 512; 87 App.), 87 S. W. 155; Stephens v. S. W. 875. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 87 S. W. ,§542 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 916 select a newspaper, and he forbids the proprietor of a paper to publish the order, but he does publish it, such judge can- not ratify his act by adopting and certifying to the publi- cation. "''' If the order misstates the date of the election, that will not invalidate it.'^'^ Where the order declared that the order was published "for four successive weeks ending on" a certain Saturdaj^ it will be presumed, in order to avoid the presumption that the first publication was made on Sun- day, that the time of publication had already expired on such Saturday.^^ The fact that the order was published an unnecessary number of times will not vitiate the election.^- While a statute may require the judoe to make the order for publication, yet that does not mean that he shall write it, it being sufficient if he sign an order written by another."' An order suspending the operation of the law until publication has been made and certified to by the judge, and requiring such publication to be for four weeks, is not void on the ground that it renders uncertain the time when the law takes effect, though the publication be made for five weeks.** The court itself need not draft the notice for publication nor re- cite it in the order for publication."^ The fact that the notice was published in other newspapers than the one selected will not affect the election if it be published the requisite num- ber of times in the one selected, but the full number of pub- lications cannot be made up by several publications of the notice in different newspapers."'' Unless a statute requires 59 Chenowith v. State, 50 Tex. Tlie fact tliat the commission- er. App. 23'8 ; 96 S. W. 19. ers' court in Texas unauthorizedly 60 Luck V. State (Tex. Cr. signed the order with the county App.), 97 S. W. 1049. ,i"dge does not invalidate it. 61 Lambert v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. Hanna v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. App. 232; 39 S. W. 299. 269; 87 S. W. 702. 62 Sinclair v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 65 state v. Hitchcock, 124 Mo. App. 487; 77 S. W. 62; Chapman App. 101; 101 S. W. 117. V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 167 ; 39 ee state v. O'Brien, 35 Mont. S. W. 113. 441; 90 Pac. 514. 63 Coleman v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. A skip of one week in the pul)- App. 578; 111 S. W. 1011. lication was held not to invali- 61 Tlmrmond v. State, 46 Tex. date the election. Carnes v. State, Cr. App. 162; 79 S. W. 316. (Tex. Cr. App.), 103 S. W. 934. 917 LOCAL OPTION. § 543 the publication of the order to be made within a certain des- ignated time after the order is entered, it may be published within a reasonable time thereafter.'*^ If a statute provides that a designated officer of the court shall make proclamation of the result of an election without providing in what man- ner such proclamation shall be made, a verbal proclamation made by him at the court house door that "the local option law had carried, and that the majority of the votes were against the sale of intoxicating liquore," will be sufficient. Such a statute, in the absence of further explanatory words, simply requires an announcement in some form of the result certified by the judges of the election, as a conclusion of the whole matter, and fixing the period from which the law be- comes assertive. It requires the officer to make proclamation without directing him how to do it. One of Webster's defini- tions of proclamation is "the act of proclaiming; a declara- tion or notice by public outcry, such as is given by criers at the opening and adjourning of covirts.""- Sec. 543. When local option takes effect. When a local option law goes into effect depends very much upon the provisions of the statute upon that subject. In one State at least, the statute provides that it shall go into oper- ation .immediately after an election has been held at which a majority vote was cast in favor of the adoption of the law.*"* The fact that the commission- made. 'Covington v. State, 51 ers' court ordered the publication, Tex. Cr. App. 48; 100 S. W. 368. when the order should have been «7 Ezzell v. State, 29 Tex. App. made by the county judge, will 521. not vitiate the election. Neal v. ss Macken v. State, 62 Md. 224. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 513; 102 Allegations in indictment as to S. W. 1139; Huff v. State, 51 publication. Smitham v. State, Tex. Cr. App. 441; 102 S. W. 53 Tex. Cr. App. 173; 108 S. W. 1144. 1183. Nor will a suggestion by the Unless some statute requires ity district judge who tried the con- there need be no return or proof test affect the election. Searcy to the court of tlie publication. V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 444; State v. Bush, 118 S. W. 670. 102 S. W. 1127. 69 Commonwealth v. Lillard, 10 An order for the publication Ky. Law Rep. 561 ; 9 S. W. 710. does not show the publication was § 543 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 918 But in Texas it has been held that a local option law, when adopted by a majority vote of the electors does not become operative until the result of the election has been declared by a proper order to that effect, and if publication of the order is required, that must be made, and the time provided for have fully elapsed. For instance, if the statute requires that the order must be published four successive weeks, the publication must be for four full consecutive weeks, or twen- ty-eight days from the day of its first publication, and until that time has elapsed, the sale of intoxicating liquors in the community to be affected, will not be a violation of the law ; and where, as in Alabama, it is provided that no penal stat- ute shall go into effect until thirty days after the adjourn- ment of the Legislature, such limitation is to be taken into account in determining when a local option law will become effective.''^ It has been held, however, that the operation of a local option law in a given district does not depend upon the forwarding, without delay, by the county clerk to the secretary of the State, when the statute requires it to be done, of a certified transcript of the resolution of prohibition, and of so much of the journal of the proceedings of the board of supervisors as pertains to the election, including the tabular statement of votes, together with a copy of the affidavit of publication or the notice of the adoption of the resolution, and that a failure of the clerk to comply with the statute in this regard will not defeat the proceeding. In such case mandamus will lie to compel him to forward such tran- script, but the operation of the law will not be made to de- pend upon that fact. If so, the act of the individual might be corruptly used to defeat the will of the people." 70 Phillips V. State, 23 Tex. App. In Kentucky before the statute 304; 4 S. \V. 893; Olivaris v. goes into force the certificate of State, 23 Tex. App. 305 ; 4 S. \Y. the canvassing board must be filed 903. with the clerk of the county court. 71 Olmstead v. Cook, 89 Ala. Cress v. Commonwealth (Kj'. ), 37 228; 7 So. 776. See Richter v. S, W, 493; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 633. State, 156 Ala. 127 ; 47 So. 163. Contra in Ohio, Otte v. State, 29 72 Giddings v. Wells, 99 Mich. Ohio Cir. €t. Rep. 203. 221; 58 N, W. 64. In Canada it was held that lo- 919 LOCAL OPTION, § 544 Sec. 544. Contesting validity of election. The general rule is that the ascertainment and declaration of the result of a local option election is prima facie correct, and is conclusive until in a proper action brought for that purpose the true result is ascertained and determined by a d'rect judicial proceeding instituted for that purpose. It would lead to confusion and ridiculous absurdity to allow the result of such an election to be contested every time the result of it, as determined by the election officers, became materially collateral in a litigation. In one case a defendant might be able to prove facts showing that such an election was void for one cause or another; in another a defendant, charged with a like offense, might be less fortunate, and the State might show that it was regular and valid; and so on indefinitely. The law does not make provision for such con- tinual and repeated contests in every case that may arise. It intends that one contest, properly instituted for the purpose, shall establish the validity or invalidity of the election ques- tioned. If there are those who are dissatisfied with the con- duct of the election, or the result of it as declared, they must promptly bring their action to contest its validity and the cal option goes into force on elec- tra, Ex jjorlc Farrell, 23 N. B. tion day, and of this fact all must 467. take notice. Smith v. Benton, 20 Under the Texas statute a sale Ont. 344; Regina v. Halpin, 12 after the fourth week by publi- Ont. 330. cation of the order of prohibition, A statute of Xova Scotia pro- but witliin twenty-eight days of Added that if a vote be given the first publication is not a vio- against licensing, then the stat- lation of the law. Green v. State, ute should be in force "upon, from 53 Tex. Cr. App. 466; 110 S. W. and after the day on which the 919. license for the sale of spirituous Date set by Statute, State v. liquors then in force in such coun- Fulkerson ( Ark. ) , 83 S. VV. 934 ; ty" should expire. No license was 86 S. W. 817; or by order of Po- in force in the county at the time lice Jury in Louisiana. Police of the election, and none had been Jury v. Descant, 105 La. 512; 29 in force for years. It was held So. 976. Date when the vote may that the statute never went into be taken. State v. Wenzel, 72 N. force, and there could be no con- H. 396; 56 Atl. 918. Takes ef- viction for a sale. Queen v. Ly- feet only on favorable vote. In ens, 5 R. & G. (N. S.) 201. Con- re O'Brien, 29 Mont. 530; 75 Pac. 19'6. § 544 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 920 correctness of the ascertained result.'" But in some States it is held that if a statute provides for the contest of a local option election within a given time after it is held, and such contest is not made, this will not abridge the right of a person to show the law to be void, at any time when it is sought to hold him amenable for its violation. This is upon the theory that punishment cannot be inflicted for the vio- lation of a void law.'^* Such a law may be contested for fraud, and a finding that the judges of such an election had been guilty of fraud invalidating the election, has been sustained, where the uncontradicted evidence showed that the judges electioneered with the voters in the booths and urged them to allow such judges to prepare their ballots, that a large number of ballots were prepared by one of the judges, and that they were prepared directly contrary to the expressed wish of the voters ; and in such instances the voters were permitted to contradict their ballots."'* Unless some stat- ute specifically authorizes a contest of a local option election there can be none; and the question of its conduct is not "a civil or political right" within the meaning of that phrase as used in a constitution."*' If a statute provides a complete reme- dy in equit}^ for testing its validity, then that method must be pursued ; '''^ but if a statute does not authorize a court of 73 Commonwealth v. Lillard. 10 osho (Mo. App.), 123 S. W. 473; Ky. Law Rep. 561; 9 S. W. 710; Darboume v. Oberlin, 121 La. 641; State V. Emerg, 98 K C. 7&8; 3 46 So. 679; Savage v. Wolfe, 69 S. E. 810; State v. Cooper, 101 Ala. 569. N. C. 684; 8 S. E. 134. The contest must be instituted 74 Young V. Commonwealth, 14 in the court having jurisdiction Bush (Ky.), 161; Curry v. State, thereof. Oxford v. Frank, 30 Tex. 28 Tex. App. 475; 13 S. W. 752. Civ. App. 343; 70 S. W. 426; Nor- 75 Freeman v. Lazarus, 61 Ark. man v. Thompson, 30 Tex. Civ. 247; 32 S. W. 680; 31 So. 361. App. 537; 72 S. W. 62, 64; Og- A statute authorizing the oon- burn v. Elmore, 123 Ga. 677; 51 testees to state grounds "to sus- S. E. 641; Kehr v. Columbia tain" the election does authorize ( Mo. ) , 116 S. W. 428. them to state grounds to avoid it. 77 State v. Martin ( Fla. ) , 46 Locke v. Garnett (Ky.), 42 S. W. So. 424; Puckett v. Snider, 110 918; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1059. Ky. 261; 61 S. W. 277; 22 Ky. 76Hagens v. Police Jury, 121 L. Rep. 1718; Ogburn v. Elmore, La. 634; 46 So. 676; Haas v. Ne- 123 Ga. 677: 51 S. E. 641; Hard- 921 LOCAL OPTION. § 544 equity to proceed in sueli a matter it cannot interfere, even to enjoin the publication of the result, on the ground that the enforcement of the statute will destroy the petitioner's prop- erty.^* Tf a statute provides for a contest, then the method thus provided must be followed." The action under the stat- ute is a special proceeding, and the courts are limited to such subjects as are specified by the statute.^^ The presumption is that the election officers did their duty, that the election was regular and lawfully conducted, that a correct result was attained, and he who asserts the contrary has the burden to overcome this presumption.*^ The contestee may go behind the election returns and show that illegal votes were cast,*^ and that legal votes were improperly refused.*^ But the acceptance of illegal votes or the refusal of legal votes must have been in sufficient numbers to have changed what the result would otherwise have been.** Where the registrar's books were not kept open for the election the full length of time, it was held that before the result of the election would be set aside, it must be shown that the result would have been different if they had been properly kept open.*^ The petition for a contest must definitely and with certainty point out the irregularities, and merely alleg- ing V. McLennan Co.,. 27 Tex. Tiinkle v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), Civ. App. 2g; 65 S. W. 56; Kidd 23 S. W. 1114. V. Truett, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 618; ^-' /n re Clearof [1907], 14 App. 68 S. W. 310. Ont. L. R. 392; In re Armour 78 Merrill v. Savage (Tex. Civ. [1907], 14 App. Ont. L. R. 606; App.), 109 S. W. 408; Hill v. In re Metcalfe, 17 Ont. 357. Roach, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 75; 62 »s Jn re Pounder, 19 App. Ont. S. W. 959; Norton v. Alexander, 684. 28 Te.v Civ App. 466 ; 67 S. VV. «* In re Pounder, supra. People 787. V. Hasbrouck, 21 N. Y. Misc. Rep. '9 Merrill V. Savage, supra; Fike 188; 47 N. Y. Supp. 109; H. W. V. State, 25 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. Metcalf Co. v. Orange County 554. (Fla.), 47 So. 363. soCofield V. Button (Tex. Civ. s^ Chamlee v. Davis, 115 Ga. App.), 109 S. W. 493. 266; 41 S. E. 691; Jossey v. Speer, siPuckett V. Snider, 110 Ky. 107 Ga. 828; 33 S. E. 718; Hardy 261; 61 S. W. 277; 22 Ky. L. v. State, 52 Tex. Cr, App. 420; Rep. 1718; Kidd v. Truett Co., 28 107 S. W. 547. Tex. Civ. App. 618; 68 S. W. 310; § 544 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 922 ing the grounds of the contest in the words of the statute is not sufficient.^'' An allegation that the anti-prohibitionist paid the poll tax of five hundred voters in order to have them vote against the question submitted presents no question for ■contest, unless it be averred that they or some of them voted against prohibition.^' But the fact that those in favor of pro- hibition — in this case ladies — furnished coffee and eatables at the election for the purpose of influencing voters is not sufficient to overturn the election, even though it might sub- ject them to prosecution for a violation of the law."^ But the use by the election officers of whisky in the voting room, in many instances accompanying the elector into the booth and marking or seeing him mark his ballot, permitting those not electors to be in the room during the election and canvass, are such irregularities as require the precinct vote to be re- jected.*® So holding the election at a time not authorized by law is fatal to it.®" In order to set aside an election it is not necessary to find that the election officers acted corruptly; it is sufficient that their acts, however innocent, improperly produced an incorrect result.®^ A continuance of the trial may be granted, as where exceptions to depositions are sus- tained, necessitating the taking of new ones.®- The contest is triable by the court and not by jury.®" The usual statute allowing contest is broad enough to permit a citizen of the election district to contest the result, without a showing of special interest.®* The contest must be brought within the time the statute prescribes.®^ Persons not originally parties 86 Stinson v. Gardner, 97 Tex. 32 Locke v. Garnett (Ky.), 42 287; 78 S. vV. 492; Jossey v. S. W. 918; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1059. Speer, 107 Ga. 828; 33 S. E. 718. 93 Dye v. Angus (Iowa), 110 87,Stinson v. Gardner, supra. X. W. 323. 88 In re Clipperly, 50 X. Y. Misc. s* Norton v. Alexander, 28 Tex. Rep. 266; 100 N. V. Supp. 473. Civ. App. 466; 67 S. W. 787. 89 Banks v. Sargent. 104 Ky. 95 Desroches v. Cote, 11 Rev. 843; 48 S. W. 149. Leg. 386: Alexander v. State, 53 90 Early v. Rains, 121 Ky. 439; Tex. Cr. App. 504; 111 S. W. 89 S. W. 289; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 145. (In this Texas case it was 415. held that a defendant indicted for 91 Drake v. Drewry, 112 Ga. a violation of the liquor laws 308; 37 S. E. 432. could not, after the time for a 923 LOCAL OPTION. § 544 to the contest proceedings cannot come in at the hearing and file a counter protest."" If the contestor must first give notice to the contestee of his intention to contest, such notice is a prerequisite to his standing in court ; ^~ and by answering the contestee does not waive his right to the notice.*^^ Wliere the grounds of contest w'ere that the polls were unlawfully closed for an hour and thereby a large number of electors were deprived of the right to vote, it was held that the names of these electoi-s must be given, or a valid excuse alleged for not giving them.^" The validity of the election law as a whole cannot be raised on a contest under its provisions.^ Failure to produce evidence on the presentation of the petition for an order for election that the requisite number of voters had signed it is not such an error as will reverse the result of the election, w^here the judge to whom it was presented said he knew most of the signers and also knew enough electors had signed it.- AVhere a voter presenting his ballot is also required to exhibit his tax receipt showing his right to vote, a failure of the election officers to require its presentation will not avoid the election unless it be shown that its presenta- tion would have produced a different result, by showing that those so voting were not entitled to vote.-^ Where the result contest had expired, raise the 99 Oxley v. Allen (Tex. Civ. question of the validity of the App.), 107 S. VV. 945. election proceedings.) Cole v. Illegal proceedings at a previous •Commxjnwealth (Ky.), 98 S. W. illegal election are immaterial. 1002; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 3'85; Hardy Oxley v. Allen, supra. V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 488 ; 107 i Harris v. Sheffield, 12« Ga. S. W. 547; Wilson v. State (Tex. 299; 57 S. E. 305; 59 S. E. 771. Civ. App.), 107 S. W. 818. Ihe court cannot try matters 9c Miller V. Drake, 113 Ga. 347; beyond the scope prescribed by 38 S. E. 747; Douglass v. Hamil- the statute. Harris v. Sheffield, ton (Ark.), 120 S. W., 387; Mc- supra. Cormick v. Jester (Tex.), 115 S. 2 Howard v. Stenfil (Ky.), 102 W. 278. S. W. 831; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 207. 97 Norton v. Alexander, 28 Tex. s Hash v. Ely (Tex. Civ. App.), Civ. App. 466; 67 S. VV. 787; 100 S. W. 980. Drake v. Drewry, 112 Ga. 308; A court or board cannot refuse 37 S. E. 432; Messer v. Cross, 26 to count the vote on the ground Tex. Civ. App. 34; 63 S. W. 169. that the election was not held in 9s Norton v. Alexander, supra. accordance with the law and that §544 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. :^24 of the election was in favor of issuing licenses, a contest was begun which was dismissed by the court, a license was then issued, afterwards an appeal taken to the circuit court and the election declared void, and then on appeal taken to a court of appeals and a supersedeas issued; it was held that the license was valid and that the licensee could sell under it during its life or until the disposal of the appeal.* on contest a court would decree that the election was void. T5urks V. State (Tex. Civ. App. ) , 10:5 S. W. Hot). 4 Commonwealth v. Weisen- burgh, 126 Ky. «; 102 S. W. 84li; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 449. A collateral attack cannot be made on an election in a criminal prosecution. ('(mimonwealth v. Jones (Ky.), 84 S. W. 305; 27 Ky. L. Rej). Ut; Barton v. State, 43 Fla. 477; 31 So. 361; State v. Rinke (Mo.), 121 S. W. 159, unless the proceedings are A'oid for want of jurisdiction. State v. Mitchell (Mo.), 115 S. W. 1098. As to appeal see In re McCul- lough, 51 Ark. 159; 10 S. W. 259. Where a statute required tlie contest to be begun within thirty days after the return day of elec- tion, and the result was declared June 22d, but the contest was be- gun July 22d, it was held that it was begun in time. McCormick V. Jester (Tex.), 115 S. W. 278. Where a statute provided that objections to the capacity of the contestors must be raised by a sworn plea in abatement, the al- legation in the petition that the contestors are resident citizens and property owners of the county, as the statutes required them to be, cannot be controverted. McCor- mick V. Jester, supra. A jury trial cannot be dcnuuul- (■(1. McCormick v. Jester, supra. By bringing an action to secure an injunction restraining the pub- lication of the result, one does not bar himself from contesting sucli proceedings, after the restraining order is dissolved. Savage v. Umphries (Tex. Civ. App.), 118 S. W. 893. Upon a proceeding to enjoin the publication of the result of an election, it is not enough to aver that the petition for calling an election did not have a suiRcient number of signatures where the statute required it to be signed by not less than ten per cent, of the registered, voters of the coun- ty, but in no event should it be necessary to obtain more than five hundred petitioners who are legal voters. Roesch v. Henry (Ore.), 103 Pac. 439. An injunction to restrain the board from promulgating the re- sult of the election cannot be se- cured before the result of the election as been ascertained. Ponchatoula v. Tangipahoa, 120 La. 292; 46 So. 16. A temporary restraining order will be dissolved on the coming in of the answer squarely denying the allegations of illegality in the election proceedings, the presumj)- tion being in favor of the regular- ity of the election. Wallace v. 925 LOCAIi OPTION. ^545 Sec. 545. Mandamus, when not a proper remedy. If, by a local option law, authority is vested in an officer, for 'instance, an ordinary, to consolidate the returns and decide all questions and contests arising under elections held Salisbury, 147 X. K. .")H; GO S. E. 713. Injunction will not lie where proceedings by contest will afford the relief prayed, even upon an allegation of irreparable injury to plaintiir's property if publication be made. Robin>on v. Weingale. 3(i Tex. Civ. App. ()■}; 83 S. W. 182. [Citing Ed- parte Towles, 48 Tex. 413; Williamson v. Lane, 52 Tex. 33.5; Ex parte Whitlow, 59 Tex. 273; State v. De Gress, 53 Tex. 387; City of Fort Worth v. Davis, 57 Tex. 225; Gibson v. Tem- pleton, 62 Tex. 55G; Jennett v. Owens, 63 Tex. 264; Odell v. Wharton, 87 Tex. 173; 27 S. W. 123; Norman v. Thompson (Tex. Sup.), 72 S. W. 62; Wright v. Fawcett, 42 Tex. 206; Rogers v. Johns, 42 Tex. 340; McAllen v. Rhodes, 65 Tex. 348; Buckler v. Turbeville, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 120; 43 S. W. 810; Peck v. Weddell, 17 Ohio St. 271; Bynum's Case, 101 N. C. 412; 8 S. E. 136; Garrigue's Case, 28 Pa. 9; 70 Am. Dec. 103; Moulton V. Reid, 54 Ala. 320; Harding v. Commissioners, 65 S. W. 56; 3 Tex. Ct. Rep. 162; Sum- mer V. Crawford, 91 Tex. 132; 41 S. W. 994; Hill v. Roach (Tex. Civ. App.), 62 S. W. 959; Mc- Daniel v. State, 23 S. W. 989; Ex parte Mayes, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 36; 44 S. W. 831; Norton v. Alexan- der, 67 S. W. 787; 4 Tex. Ct. Rep. 723,] See also Ogburn v. Elmore, 121 Ga. 72 ; 48 S. E. 702. Contra H. W. Motcalf Co. v. Orange (Fla.), 47 So. 363 (by statute 1 . A statute providing that the court in which the contest is brought shall have "final juris- diction" to hear and determine the contest, cuts off an appeal from its decision. Saylor v. Duel, 236 111. 429; 86 N. E. 119. (The statute is constitutional.) If no statue gives an appeal, none lies. Haynes v. Cass Coun- ty (Mo.), 115 S. W. 1084. A mere taxpayer cannot make himself a party, nor appeal. Haynes v. Cass County, supra; Kehr v. Columbus (Mo.). 116 S. W. 428. The validity of an election can- not be raised on habea,s corpus pro- ceedings. Ex parte Thulmeyer (Tex.), 119 S. W. 1146. Facts not pleaded cannot be proven, as that unnumbered bal- lots had been cast and counted for prohibition. McCormick v. Jester (Tex.), 115 S. W. 278. As to service of notice of con- test on deputy instead of on his principal, see McCormick v. Jes- ter, supra. If a statute does not require a security to be given by the con- testors, none can be required. Mc- Cormick V. Jester, sitpra. Upon an order to a board to purge the poll books of illegal §545 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 926 by virtue of the law, and the law further provides a remedy if such officer fails to do so, or acts unfairly, the remedy thus provided must be pursued, and the constitutionality of the law cannot be tested by mandamus, for the reason that such an election and the supervision thereof by such an officei- is an exercise of the political and police power, and it is not at all or in any sense judicial, unless where the act itself con- fers judicial jurisdiction. When such a law operates upon the private property of an individual and it is seized, destroyed or confiscated, or an individual is indicted for a violation of it, he may assail the portion thereof affecting his private property or personal liberty as unconstitutional, and the courts will make such adjudication as will maintain the in- tegrity of the law as a whole, if possible, and, at the same time, protect the citizen against any unconstitutional or illegal portion of the law, if there be such. The courts will never blot out the existence of a great police and moral enactment votes, the contestors cannot com- plain that it met within seven days after the order was entered. Robertson v. Moore, 15 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 240. A writ of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal for the correction of mere irreg- ularities, as to quash an order of the court for an election, on the ground that the majority of adult inhabitants had petitioned for an election. Douglass v. Ham- ilton (Ark.), 120 S. W. 387. See State V. Sundquist (Wis.), 118 N. VV. 836. Xor can a lower court, where it acts judicially, be compelled to omit a certain city from the oper- ation of 'ts order. State v. Mal- heur County, 46 Ore. 519; 101 Pac. 907. The court in a contest is not lx)und to have certain cliallenged ballots removed from the boxes and then direct the clerk to count the remaining ballots and an- nounce the result. Savage v. Umpliries (Tex. Civ. App.), 118 S. \V. 893. If no appeal lies, the action of the lower court, wliere its judg- ment is final, cannot be controlled by mandamus. People v. Can- non, 236 111. 179: 86 N. E. 215. The statute must be strictly fol- lowed in order to put the law in force. GrifRn v. Tucker (Tex. App.), 119 S. W. 338. In a prosecution for a viola- tion of the local option statute, the proceedings for its adoption cannot be attacked, for this is a collateral attack. Reno v. State (Tex.), 117 S. W. 129; Jerue v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 123 S. W. 414; Wesley v. State (Tex. Cr. App.). 122 S. W. 550; Trinkle v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 123 S. W. 1114. 927 LOCAL OPTION. § 546 of this character, on the ground that parts of it are attacked as unconstitutional, in a general onslaught upon it all. On the contrary, they will preserve it all, if possible, giving the benefit of doubts to the co-ordinate branches of Government, even when a legitimate case of individual suffering in person or property is brought before them, and will never decide laws unconstitutional if cases can be otherwise adjudicated. They will always wait until the law is attempted to be put in operation, and then act against the officer who executes or attempts to execute it, and not against the lawmaking branch in the general scope of its power."' If it he sought to compel the lower court to make an entry putting the prohibition or licensing vote into force, the petition for the writ must show each necessary step for the election was duly taken, and that it was legal when taken." ^Mandamus will not lie to secure a new election for a part of a county whereby the publication of the result of a previous election for the entire county would produce the desired result for that part.'^ The duties of the court to be coerced by the writ of mandamus must be ministerial and not discretionary or the writ will not be granted.* Sec. 546. Prior laws, how affected by local option. A local option law enacted under a mandatory provision of the Constitution of a State, while in one sense it may be said to be a general statute, still in its operation it is confined to the localities which may adopt it, and in this sense it is a special statute and will be given the effect as such, and be held to set aside, and, during its operation, suspend all laws SiScoville V. Calhoun, 7G Ga. lie to control its action. People 263. V. Cannon, 23G 111. 179; 86 N. E. Mandamus will not lie to com- 215. pel a recount of the A'otes when 6 State v. Jlolheur Co., 46 Ore. another election can be called to 519; 81 Pac. 368. determine the result. People v. 7 Adams v. Kelley { Tex. Civ. Mosso, 30 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 164; App.), 44 S. W. 529. 63 N. Y. Supp. 588. s state v. Richardson, 48 Ore. If the action of the lower 309; 85 Pac. 225. court is final, mandamus will not § 546 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 928 and regulations in conflict with it, and will have effect, when adopted in a particular locality, to prohibit the sale of intoxi- cating liquors in that locality by any person, without regard to whether any such person has been licensed by the State, county, city or town to sell. By its adoption all such licenses are abrogated.-' As a rule, the suspension of such general laws docs not tliereaftor prevent the prosecution and punish- ment under them of anyone who may have previously violated them;^'* but when a local oi)ti()n law takes effect in a given locality it becomes operative as a whole and one violating its provisions mu.st be prosecuted and punished under its pro- sions and not under the general law.^^ The rule is different, however, where the effect of adoption of a local option law is to repeal all former laws regulating the traffic in such liquor. The proposition is an old one and a plain one that after the repeal of a law no penalty can be enforced for a violation of its provisions committed while it was in operation, unless provision be made for that purpose. The repeal of a statute is a remission of penalties inflicted by it because of the absence of authority to punish when the law has ceased to exist. But where a law is not repealed but is merely sus- pended, it still has vitality to authorize punishment for its violation before its suspension. A repeal makes the law as if it had never been. Suspending its operation for a time leaves it operative as to the past, and in all respects wherein it is not abrogated by the new. A repealed statute is dead and 9 Butler V. Stato. 25 Fla. 347; 6 Lynn, 19 Tex. App. 293; State v. So. 67; Stringer v. State, 32 Fla. Smith, 26 Fla. 427; 7 So. 848. 239; 13 So. 450; Carson v. State, lo People v. Wade, 101 Mich. 37 Fla, 331; 20 So. 547; Tatum 69; 59 X, W. 438; Hearn v. Bro- V. State, 79 Ga, 17'6; 3 S. E. 907; gan, 64 Miss. 334; 1 So, 246; Win- Garner V. State, 8 Blackf . ( Ind. ) . terton v. State, 65 Miss. 238 ; 3 So, 368; State v. Cook, 24 Minn. 247; 735; Ex parte Swann, 96 Mo. 44; 31 Am. Rep. 344; State v. Emery. 9 S. W. 10; State v. Beam, 51 98 N. C. 768; 3 S. E. 810; State Mo. App. 360; Commonwealth v. V, Smiley, 101 X. €. 709; 7 S. E. CK-erby, 107 Ky. 169; 53 S. W. 904; State v. Carter, 28 S. C. 1; 36; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 843. 4 S. E. 790; Robertson v. State, n Young v. Commonwealth, 14 12 Tex. App. 541; Donaldson v. Bush (Kj-.) 161; State v. Bev- State, 15 Tex. App. 25; Ex parte ans, 51 Mo, App. 368. 929 liOCAL OPTION. 546 no sting can be inflicted by it; but one which still lives, although displaced for a time as to its full effect, is not without power to vindicate its suspension. Being still a law there is no want of authority to punish under it for such violation of it.^- In harmony with this general statement of the law, it has been held that if a county or a minor division thereof adopts a local option law and afterwards rescinds it, there is no legal authority for the punishment of a person Avho sold liquor in the county, or in such minor division while such local option law was in force,^^ and that the same rule maintains if the law is rescinded during an appeal. By such repeal a conviction under the repealed law is annulled.^* 12 Regina v. Denton, 16 Q. B. 832; 18 Q. B. 761; 83 E. C. L. 761 ; United States v. 6 Fermenting Tubs, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 268; Car- lisle V. State, 42 Ala. 523 ; People V. Tisdale, 57 Cal. 104; Hirsch- biirg V. People, 6 Colo. 145; Hig- genbotham v. State, 19 Fla. 557; Bank v. State, 12 Ga. 475; White- horse V. State, 43 Ind. 473 ; State V. Mason, 108 Ind. 48; 8 N. E. 716; Speckert v. Louisville, 78 Ky. 287; State v. O'Connor, 13 La. Ann. 486; Herald t. State, 36 Me. 62; Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 112; Commonwealth v. Pat- tee, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 501; Peo- ple V. Hobson, 48 Mich. 27; Wheeler v. State, 64 Miss. 462; 1 So. 246; Winterton v. State, 65 Miss. 238; 3 So. 735; State v. Patrick, 2 Mo. App. Rep'r 1149; Lewis V. Foster, 1 N. H. 61; Den V. DuBois, 16 N. J. L. 285; Hast- ing V. People, 22 N. Y. 95; State V. Wise, 66 N. C. 120; Cakins v. State, 14 Ohio St. 222; Genkin- ker V. Commonwealth, 32 Pa. 99; State v. Fletcher, 1 R. I. 193; State V. McCord (S. C), 1; Brother v. State, 2 Cold. (Tenn.) 201; Greer v. State, 22 Tex. 588; State V. Meader, 62 Vt. 458; 20 Atl. 730; Lecftwiche's Case, 5 Rand. (Va.) 657; State v. Inger- soll, 17 Wis. 631; Book v. Com- monwealth, 107 Ky. 605; 55 S. W. 7; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1342; Dean V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 249; 92 S. W. 38. isHalfin V. State, 5 Tex. App. 212; Monroe v. State, 8 Tex. App. 212; Boone v. State, 12 Tex. App. 184; Fitze v. State, 13 Tex. App. 372; Treese v. State, 14 Tex. App. 31; Pinchard v. State, 13 Tex. App. 373. 14 Prather v. State, 14 Tex. App. 453; Wasenhut v. State, 18 Tex. App. 491; White v. State, 24 Tex. App. 230; 5 S. W. 857; Dawson V. State, 25 Tex. App. 670; 8 S. W. 820. The Legislature may provide that the repeal of local option shall not release penalties incurred thereunder while in force. Ezzell V. State, 29 Tex. App. 521. See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 92; 17 S. E. 788; Commonwealth V. Hoke, 14 Bush 668. § 547 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 930 Sec. 547. Former laws, when not repealed. The general rule is, that when the provisions of a local option have been adopted and put in force in a given locality, it then becomes the exclusive regulation for the sale of in- toxicating liquors in that locality, and has the effect to suspend during its continuance all other laws which are in- consistent with its terms.^^ And it has been held that a local option law was operative in a city which had adopted it, notwithstanding the city by its charter had the exclusive power to license and regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors. In this instance the local option law was passed subsequently to the city charter which provided that, "All other acts, whether special or general, so far as they conflict with the provisions of this act, are hereby repealed."^** It also has been held that a special local option law is not repealed by a local general option law, where the general repealing clause of the latter act applies only to laws in conflict with it and pro- vides for exemption from its operation of localities governed by other prohibitory laws, for the reason that a later general afifirmative law does not abrogate an earlier special one by implication.^" In ]\Iissouri, however, it has been held that the adoption of a local option law by a city or county did not have the effect to repeal the druggist's and pharmacist's law of that State, and that the latter might be invoked by a drag- gist as a defense to a criminal prosecution under the local option law.^^ But if a local option election results in favor 15 Bolt V. State, 60 Ark. 600; wealth, 78 Pa. 490; Minnehaha Co. 31 S. W. 460; Young v. Common- v. Champion, 5 Dak. 397; 41 N. wealth, 14 Bush (Ky.) 161; Com- W. 754. monwealth v. Jarrell, 9 Ky. Law i" McGruder v. State, 83 Ga. 572; 5 S. W. 563; State V. Yewell, 616; 10 S. E. 281; Zarresseller 63 Md. 120; Wheeler v. State, 64 v. People, 17 111. 101. Miss. 462; 1 So. 632; State v. ^» Ex parte Swain, «6 Mo. 44; Weeks, 38 Mo. App. 566; Raneh 9 S. W. 10; State v. Moore. 107 V. Commonwealth, 78 Pa. St. 493; Mo. 78; 16 S. W. 937; State v. Commonwealth v. Mueller, SI Pa. Williams, 38 Mo. App. 37; State St. 127; Robertson V. State, 5 Tex. v. Kaufman, 45 Mo. App. 656:- App. 155. State v. Bevans, 52 Mo. App. 130; 16 Olmstead v. Crook, 89 Ala. Fitzgerald v. Hurley, 180 Mass. 228; 7 So. 776; Ranch v. Common- 151; 61 N. E. 815; Smith v. Pat- 931 LOCAL OPTION. §517 of licensing the sale of intoxicating liquors it will have no effect on any prior law, for a general liquor law of the State cannot be abrogated by merely holding a local option elec- tion.^'' And if a local option law when adopted makes no provision for inflicting penalties for its violation, such viola- tions, if repugnant to the general laws of the State governing the sale of such liquors, may be punished under such general laws."" So where a local option law provides that ' ' in addition to the penalties now prescribed by law" unlawful sales may be enjoined, this has the effect, by implication, to continue in force and incorporate the penalties referred to.-^ In other words, it may be stated as true that a special local option law does not vary a prior general law touching the granting of a license to retail intoxicating liquors; for the reason that the one relates to the prohibition of sales altogether, and the other to regulations of sales, or making them unlawful under certain conditions." ton, 103 Ky. 444; 45 S. VV. 459; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 165; Storms v. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 619; 49 S. W. 451; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1369; Lawson v. Commonwealth ( Ky. ) , 66 S. W. 1010; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1983 (requiring druggists to reg- ister sales, still in force). 19 State V. HoUingsworth, 100 N. C. 535; 6 S. E. 417. 20 Winerton v. State, 65 Miss. 238 ; 3 So. 735 ; Territory v. O'Con- nor, 5 Dak. 397; 41 N. W. 746; 3 L. R. A. 355 ; Grantham v. State, 89 Ga. 121 ; 14 S. E. 892. 21 Territory v. O'Connor, 5 Dak. 397; 41 N. W. 746; Aaron v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 103; 29 S. W. 267. 22 Bell V, State, 91 Ga. 227; 16 S. E. 207; Redding v. State, 91 Ga. 231; 18 S. E. 289; Vallance V. King, Barb. (N. Y.) 548; Grantham v. State, 89 Ga. 121; 14 S. E. 892. Statutes not infrequently pro- vide that the adoption of local op- tion shall not affect licenses then in force. Menken v. State, 78 Ga. 6(5i8; 2 S. E. 559; Griffin v. State, 78 Ga. 679; 4 S. E. 154; State v. Smith, 26 Fla. 427; 7 So. 843. When special local option laws are in force. Crabb v. State, 88 Ga. 584; 15 S. E. 455; Knight v. State, 88 Ga. 590; 15 S. E. 457; Stahl V. Lee, 71 Kan. 511; 80 Pac. 983; Farris v. Commonwealth, 111 Ky. 236; 63 S. W. 615; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 580. When license law does not ap- peal general law prohibiting sales. State V. Van Vliet, 92 Iowa 476; 61 N. W. 241; Commonwealth v, Weller, 14 Bush 218; 29 Am. Rep. 407 ; when it does, Commonwealth V. Bogie, 1 S. W. 532; 8 Ky. L. Rep. 350; Engle v. Commonwealth, 1 S. W. 593; Taber v. Lander, 94 Ky. 237; 21 S. W. 1056; Laffarty 548 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 932 Sec. 548. Changing- boundary of district. The adoption or rejection of a loeal option law, as a rule, is effected by the majority vote of a county, city, town, or other political division in favor of or against the granting of V. Huffman, 9!) Ky. 80; 3.5 S. W. 123; 32 L. R. A. 203; Common- wealth V. Hardin Co., 99 Ky. L88 ; 35 S. W. 27.5; Yunger v. State, 7« Md. 574; 28 Atl. 404; Boswell V. State, 70 Miss. 395; 12 So. 446; In re Clement, 187 N. Y. 274; 79 X. E. 1003; Common- wealth V. Lemon ( Ky. ) , 76 S. W. 40; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 522. A local option law declaring that it shall not be so construed as to prevent the sale of wine for medicinal or sacramental pur- poses, nor to prohibit a pharma- cist furnishing alcohol for mechan- ical, scientific, art or medical pur- poses, does not repeal the usual druggists' and pharmacists' law. Ex parte Swann, 96 Mo. 44 ; 9 S. W. 10. When general local option law repeals special city or town char- ter. State V. Hutton, 39 Mo. App. 410, and when general law does not repeal local law. Crigler v. Commonwealth, 120 Ky. 612; 87 S. W. 276; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 918; 87 S. W. 280; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 925, 926, 927; 87 S. W. 281; Clark v. Riddle, 101 Iowa 270; 70 N. W. 207; Kennon v. Blafckburn, 127 Ky. 39; 104 S. W. 968; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1256. When local option adoption an- nuls licenses. Ranch v. Common- wealth, 78 Pa. 490. When local option statute re- fers only to incorporated towns. Tummings v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. App. 117; 22 S. W. 409. When an act subsequent to local option law repeals the latter so far as to sales of nnti\e wines. Kahlbunner v. State, 67 :\liss. 368 ; 7 So. 288 ; Hearn v. Brogan, 64 Miss. 334; 1 So. 246. When the period of prohibition is limited by a subsequent stat- ute. Commonwealth v. Kervill, 108 Mass. 422. When statute is for a resub- mission of question of local op- tion and does repeal act for local option. Kirkpatrick v. Common- wealth, 95 Ky. 326; 25 S. W. 113. An amendment to a statute pro- hibiting the holding of local op- tion election within four years ot another local option election ap- plies to a local option election witliin the four-year period held before its adoption. Wynne v. Wil- liamson, 94 Ga. 603; 20 S. E. 436. Where a county local option statute deprives a city therein of its power under the special char- ter to regulate sales of liquors. Turner v. Forsyth, 78 Ga. 683; 3 S. E. 649; Cooper v. Shelton, 97 Ky. 282; 30 S. W. 623; In re O'Brien, 29 Mont. 530; 75 Pac. 196. Where a city having power to adopt local option is precluded by the county's adopting it. Tatum V. State, 79 Ga. 176; 3 S. E. 907; Tangilpahoa v. Campbell, 106 La. 464; 31 So. 49. A vote for no licensing taken 933 LOCAL OPTION. §548 a license to sell intoxicating li(iuors in such political division for a period of time fixed by law. Sometimes the majority is ascertained by ballot and sometimes by petition or remon- after an application for a license is made precludes the granting of the license thereafter. Dearen V. Taylor Co., 98 Ky. 135; 32 S. W. 402; Bonacker v. State, 42 Fla. 348; 29 So. 32 L If a part of a city lies in a county, adoption of local option prohibition by the county pro- hibits sales in such portion of the city. Garrett v. Aby, 47 La. Ann. 618; 17 So. 238. The adoption of a no-license pro- vision revokes licenses then in force. State v. Cooke, 24 Minn. 247; 31 Am. Rep. 344; Robert- son V. State, 12 Tex. App. 541. Voting for a license will not authorize a license in that part of the district voting for it that is within a distance of two miles of a church when another statute absolutely forbids a license with- in such distance. State v. Hol- lingsworth, 100 X. C. 535; 6 S. E. 417; Barnesville v. Means (Ga.), 57 S. E. 422. Laws regulating taverns not re- pealed by adoption of local option. Vallance v. King, 3 Barb. 548. License law not repealed by lo- cal option, and a sale in violation of it is punishable. State v. Smi- ley, 101 X. C. 709; 7 S. E. 904. A sale under a license after lo- cal option is adopted cannot be justified. Commonwealth v. Muel- ler,* 81 Pa. St. 127; Robertson V. State, 12 Tex. App. 541; Bon- aker v. State, 42 Fla. 348; 29 So. 321; Richter v. State, 156 Ala. 127; 47 So. 163. Ex parte Pratt, 17 N. S. VV. L. R. 295; Ex parte Thompson, 16 N. S. VV. L. R. 42. Those two last cases relate to renewals. Nor can a liquor tax be col- lected. Robertson v. State, 5 Tex. App. 155 ; Rathburn v. State (Tex. Civ. App.), 32 S. W. 45; Tangipahoa v. Campbell, 106 La. 404; 31 So. 49; Snearly v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 507; 52 S. W. 547; 53 S. W. 696. Nor penalties inflicted for of- fenses incurred under prior li- cense laws. Boone v. State, 12 Tex. App. 1'84. Prohibition in a justices's pre- cinct in a county is not repealed by the failure of a county to sub- sequently vote for prohibition. Ex parte Cox, 28 Tex. App. 537; 13 S. W. 8'62; Aaron v. State, 34 Tex. €r. Rep. 103; 29 S. W. 267. If prohibition carry, the old law is abrogated without an express provision to that eiTect inserted in the court's order. State v. Harvey, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 691; 33 S. VV. 885. A statute prohibiting the hold- ing of a second election "within the same prescribed limits, in less than two years after" such elec- tion is held does not prevent the holding of an election in a sub- division carved out of the terri- tory previously voting within that time. Ex parte Brown, 35 Tex. Cr. Rep. 443; 34 S. V^. 131. When the county adopting lo- cal option does not prevent a city therein issuing a license. Ken- §548 TKAFTIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 934 strance. In Indiana the statute provides that no license shall be granted for a period of two years, if three days before the time when an application therefor must be filed, a remonstrance non V. Blackburn, 127 Ky. 39; 104 S. W. 9&8; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1256; see Rensliaw v. Lane, 49 Ore. 526; 89 Pac. 117; Cole v. •Commonwealth, 101 Ky. 151; 39 S. W. 1029; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 324, and where it does. O'Neal v. Min- ary, 125 Ky. 571; 101 S. W. 951; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 8S8. Ex parte Fields, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 50; 46 S. W. 1127; Williams V. Davidson (Tex. Civ. App.), 70 S. W. 987; Evans v. Police Jury, 114 La. 771; 38 So. 555; Ex parte Douthitt (Tex. Cr. App.), 63 S. W. 131; Police Jury v. Mansura, 107 La. 201; 31 So. 650; Wal- lace v. Cubanola, 70 Ark. 395; 63 S. W. 485; State v. Iliekerson (Mo. App.), 109 S. W. 108; Adams v. Kelley (Tex. Civ. App.), 45 S. W. 859; Doss v. Moore, 69 Ark. 258 ; 63 S. W. 66. When the question of local op- tion is submitted to a justice's precinct and at the same time to the entire county, anu the pre- cinct adopts and the county does not, or vice versa, efTect. Baxter v. State, 49 Ore. 353; 88 Pac. 677; 89 Pac. 369. That the right to license is only suspended by local option and not repealed. Mernaugh v. Orlando, 41 Fla. 433; 27 So. 34; People v. Brush, 41 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 56; 83 N. Y. Supp. 607; Eastham v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 49 S. W. 795; Tompkins v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 154; 90 S. W. 1019; Commonwealth v. Powell (Ky.), 62 S. W. 19; 22 Ky. L. R. 1932. Adoption of local option law suspends all inconsistent laws — see Butler v. State, 25 Fla. 347; 6 So. 07 ; Cason v. State, 37 Fla. 331; 20 So. 547; Mernaugh v. Orlando, 41 Fla. 433; 27 So. 34; Tatum V. Staie, 79 Ga. 176; 3 S. E. 907; Young v. Com., 14 Bush 161; Stat« V. Hauley, 25 Minn. 429; Norton v. State, 65 Miss. 297 ; iState v. Vandenburg (Miss.), 28 So. 835; Ex parte Swann, 96 Mo. 44; 9 S. W. 10; State V. Beam, 51 Mo. App. 368; Ranch v. Com., 78 Pa. 490; Rath- burn V. State, 88 Tex. 281; 31 S. \^■. 189; Ex parte Lynn, 19 Tex. App. 293; Gibson v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 218; 29 S. W. 1085; People V. Bush, 92 N. Y. App. Div. 611; '86 N. Y. Supp. 1144; 41 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 56; 83 N. Y. Supp. 607. Where a prohibition territory again adopts prohibition while the first adoption is in force, the first remains in force and not the lat- ter. Leftwich v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 55 S. W. 571. A vote by covmty is a vote as a unit, and a majority vote car- ries it, although some of the pre- cincts vote the other way. Ex parte Fields, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 50; 46 S. W. 1127. Druggist not entitled to a li- cense. Eastham v. Common- wealth (Ky.), 49 S. W. 795; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1639; People v. Hen- wood, 123 Mich. 317; 82 S. W. 70. A city cannot so amend its charter as to avoid the prohibi- 935 LOCAL OPTION. §548 in writing, signed by a majority of the legal voters of the township or ward for which such license is asked shall be filed with the auditor, against the granting of such license, tion voted for in the county. Bax- ter V. State (Ore.), 88 Pac. 677; 89 Pac. 369; and in Texas, owing to the prohibition clauses in the Constitution, the Legislature can not grant a city a charter exempt- ing it from the local <^tion law. Fox V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 150; 109 S. W. 370. General statute prohibiting li- cense repealing statute prohibit- ing issuing license in a particular city. In re McGonneii, 24 Pa. Super. Ct. 642. Local option in force remains in force on adoption of a consti- tutional prohibitory provision. White V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 50 S. W. 678; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1942. A second adoption of local op- tion by a county annuls a license vote taken by a city therein to begin when the first county local option had expired. Police Jury v. Mansura, 107 La. 201; 31 So. 650. When city not voting is bound by result in county. Bowman v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. App. 14; 40 S. W. 796; 41 S. W. 635. Where prohibition is in force in a city in a local option coun- ty, a vote of tne city that the local option law should become inoperative in a certain precinct of it is equivalent to a vote that liquors therein might be sold. C. B. George & Bro. v. Winchester, lis Ky. 429; 80 S. W . lloS; 2ti Ky. L. Rep. 170. A local option statute prohib- iting sales of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors does not conflict with a later statute prohibiting the sale of any '"intoxicating bev- erage, liquid mixture or decoc- tion." Rush V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 47 S. W. 586; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 775. Where subsequent city govern- ment act repeals county local op- tion act within a city. Jett v. Commonwealth (Ky. ), 49 S. W. 786; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1619. Where amendment of local op- tion laws will not afl'ect terri- tory in Avhicli the law is then in force. Ex jiarte Elliott, 44 Tex. Cr. App. 575; 72 S. W. 837. When both local and general prohibition law in force in a city. Locke V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 74 S. W. 654; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 76. Brewery license cannot be is- sued. Hager v. Jung Brewing Co. (Ky.), 92 S. W. 573; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 176. A local option law making it an ofi'ense to bring liquors into the district adopting prohibition does not apply to those whose license has not expired. Sheehan V. Louisville, etc. R. Co. (Ky.), 101 S. W. 380; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 113. Effect of adoption of county lo- cal prohibition on city dispensary. Bamesville v. Means, 128 Ga. 197 ; 57 S. E. 422. When county and not city the local unit. O'Nual v. Miuary, 125 Ky. 571; 101 S. W. 951; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 886; Yates v. Nun- §548 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 936 and that the majority of the voters shall be determined by the aggregate vote cast in the township or ward where the business is to be conducted for candidates for the highest nelly, 125 Ky. 664; 102 S. W. 292; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 984. When cHy and county not en- titled to separate elections on same day. Washington v. Gid- dens (Ky.), 103 S. W. 321; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 647. In Kentucky the adoption of constitutional provisions on local option did not repeal local laws then in force. Commonwealth v. Hurst (Ky.), 62 «. W. 1024; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 365; Mullins v. Lan- caster (Ky.), 63 ,S. W. 475; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 436; Farris v. C!om- monwealth, 111 Ky. 2.36; 63 S. W. 615; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 580; Stamper v. Commonwealth, 102 Ky. 33; 42 S. W. 915; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1014; Thompson v. Com- monwealth, 103 Ky. 68IS; 45 S. W. 1039; 46 S. W. 492. The adoption of local option by a city suspends all its licens- ing ordinances. Mayhew v. Eu- gene (Ore.), 104 Pac. 727; but not an ordinance declaring a place in the city maintained for the sale of liquor to be a nuisance. May- hew V. Eugene, supra. A statute of April 21, 1-908, changed the beginning of the li- cense year from May 1st to October 1st, and provided that the statute at the time the local op- tion was taken should not be changed until October 1st fol- lowing. In November, 1907, a license town voted for no li- cense. It was held that the right to a license existed un- til October 1, 1908. People v. Bashford (N. Y. Misc. Rep.), 112 N. Y. Supp. 1143; affirmed 128 N. Y. App. Div. 351; 112 N. Y. Supp. 502. County's right to take away from city under special charter its right to' grant a license. Evans v. Commonwealth, 10 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract; 681; Commonwealth v. Brown, 10 Ky. L. Rep. (ab- stract), 407. Druggists are not exempted from operation of statute. State v. Moore, 107 Mo. 78; 16 S. W. 937. The adoption of local option merely suspends and does not re- peal the liquor licensing laws. Brewer v. Commonwealtli, 14 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 270. When the Legislature prohibits the sale in a district, but per- mits the citizens by vote to per- mit sales of liquors, the vote does not repeal the prohibitory stat- ute, but simply permits sales un- til the citizens shall vote that they may not be made. Commonwealth V. Hoke & Yokum, 14 Bush 66S. Part of a town cannot permit sales when the town as a whole has prohibited them. Common- wealth V. King, 8 Ky. L. Rep. ( abstract ) 608. Where the Legislature may adopt local laws, it may take a city's territory out of a local op- tion law. Hall V. Dunn ( Ore. ) , 97 Pac. 811; State v. Cochran, (Ore.), 104 Pac. 420; State v. Malheur -County (Ore.), 101 Pac. 907. 937 LOCAL OPTION. § 548 office at the last election preceding the filing of such remon- strance. In construing this statute it was said that its mani- fest purpose was to permit the legal voters of the particular district at the time of filing of the remonstrance to say whether such license should be issued, and that it was not contemplated by the Legislature that between an election and the filing of an application for a license, a ward should be re- districted, nor would it be a reasonable interpretation of the statute to hold that such action by a common council would deprive the resident voters of the ward of the right to express their will in the premises. Accordingly, where such a re- districting had occurred, remonstrants no longer residents of the new ward were not entitled to be considered; but, on the other hand, if they were not permitted to remonstrate they were not to be counted in the aggregate of legal voters when it affirmatively appeared that they were no longer voters of the ward affected.-^ The general rule is that whenever an election has been held under and in conformity with the pro- visions of a local option law in a parish or county, and the vote cast is against granting licenses for the sale of intoxi- cating liquors, such vote will preclude a minor subdivision of such parish or county from subsequently holding another election for such minor portions upon such question. The former vote will control the entire parish or county, including its minor subdivisions, for the period of time for which the election was held; and if a new district is carved out and created with a new name from a district which has already adopted a local option law, such law will be enforced in the new district upon the theory that all qualified voters of such new district have had a right, and were called upon, to vote at the election held in the old district for or against the adoption of the law, and the result of that election subjects Census to show status of city. Where a vote is essential to a State V. Cass County (Mo.), 119 grant of a license. State v. S. W. 1010, 1014. ' Stakke (S. D.), 117 S. W. 129; Violation of license law may 118 S. W. 703. be prosecuted after adoption of 23 Abbot v. Inman, 35 Ind. App. local option. Cohens v. State 262; 72 N. E. 284. (Tex.), 116 S. W. 571. §548 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 938 the entire population of the new district to the provisions of the law for the period of time covered by such election.-' At the expiration of the time for which such election was held a minor or new division may hold such an election, and if the majority vote is not for the adoption of local option such determination will be binding for a like term and cannot be defeated by a general election of the parish or county upon the same subject for the time designated in the statute.-^ 24 Ashurst V. State, 79 Ala. 276; Prestwood v. State, 88 Ala. 235; 7 So. 259; Commonwealth v. King, 86 Ky. 436; 6 S. VV. 124; Cooper V. Shelton, 97 Ky. 282; 30 S. W. 623; Garrett v. Mayor, et al, 47 La. Ann. 618; 17 So. 238; Higgins v. State, 64 Md. 419; 1 Atl. 876; Whisenhurst v. State, 18 Tex. App. 491; Wood- lief V. State, 21 Tex. App. 412; 2 S. W. 812. 25 Whisenhurst v. State, 18 lex. App. 491; Woodlief v. State, 21 Tex. App. 412; 2 S. W. 812; Par- ker V. State, 126 Ga. 443; 55 S. E. 329; Medford v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 180; 74 S. W. 7C8; Nelson v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 75 S. W. 502; Jones v. State, 67 Md. 256; 10 Atl. 216. If a local option county be di- vided and an entirely new one be created local option continues in force in the new county. Par- ker V. State, 126 Ga. 443; 55 S. E. 329; Moore v. State, 126 Ga. 414; 55 S. E. 327; Amerker v. Taylor, 81 S. C. 163; 62 S. E. 7. The addition of new territory to the local option district does not annul the former result nor authorize a new vote for the whole new territory before the expiration of the statutory time for a new vote. Ex parte Fields (Tex. Cr. App.), 86 S. W. 1022. As to presumption that boartl in ordering election did not include territory where an election was unauthorized. Cofield v. Brittou (Tex. Civ. App.), 109 6. VV. 493 (town charter lapsed or forfeit- ed). "Dry" territory taken into "wet" territory remains "dry." In re Cunningham, 21 Can. Prac. 459; Ex parte ]S;agle, 30 N. B. 77; King V. McMuUian, 9 Can. Cr. Cas. 531; Ex parte McCleaver, 21 N. B. 315; Regina v. Monteith, 15 Ont. 290; Regina v. Shovelear, 11 Ont. 727; Ex parte Pollard, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 488; 103 S. W. 878; Regina v. Higgins, 18 Ont. 148; Oxley v. Allen (Tex. Civ. App.), 107 S. W. 945; Ex parte Dalton, 27 N. B. 426; Ex parte Brennan, 30 N. B. 91; King v. MoMullan, 38 Nova Scotia 129; In re Anderson, 14 Manitoba 535; Prestwood v. State, 88 Ala. 235; 7 So. 259. So if a portion of a "wet" dis- trict "be taken into a "dry" mu- nicipality, that portion continues "wet," and licenses issued there- for are in force. Ex parte Mc- Cleaver, 21 N. B. 315; but if the portion thus taken be created into an entirely new municipal- ity, it may repeal the by-law granting local option prohibition, although the old municipality 939 LOCAL OPTION. §549 Sec. 549. Repeal of local option by vote — Second election in subdivisions. Not infrequently statutes require the question of local option — whether for prohibition or license — to be submitted periodically to the voters, and other statutes provide for an election on the question when a petition is presented for that purpose. But nearly all of them provide that a certain period of time must elapse before the question can again be submitted for a vote; and when that is true an election held before that period has elapsed will result in a nullity or void election.-® And the statute cannot be evaded in part by sub- mitting the question to a subdivision of the district voting on the question ^^ unless the statute provides for it.-^ Nor can the voting district be combined with a larger district and a vote thus taken within the prohibited time.-^ In determining whether the requisite time has elapsed the time is reckoned from the date of the election and not from the date of the publication of the result.^" It is the duty of the coiTrt or could, not if such territory had remained tlierein. Doyle v. Duf- ferien, S Manitoba 280; In re Henderson, 14 Manitoba, 535; yet prohibition continues in force un- til set aside by a vote of the new municipality. Higgins v. State, 64 Md. 419; 1 Atl. 876; Jones v. State, '67 Md. 256; 10 Atl. 216. Additional territory added on election day will not affect the election. Ex parte Curlee, 51 Tex. €r. App. 614; 103 S. W. 896. 26Tousey v. Stites (Ky.), 66 S. W. 277; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1738; Commonwealth v. Nelson (Ky.), 57 S. W. 495; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 414; Savage v. Wolfe, 69 Ala. 569 (pe- tition showed election had been held within prohibition time, pro- ceedings void ) ; Hancock v. Bing- ham (Ky.), 102 S. W. 341; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 427; Oxley v. Allen, (Ky.), 107 S. W. 945. 27 Tousey v. Stites, supra; State v. Hickerson (Mo. App.), 109 S. W. 10'8; Caldwell v. Grider, 88 Ala. 421; 7 So. 203. 28Eggen v. Offutt, 128 Ky. 314; 108 S. VV. 333; 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1350; Citizens, etc. v. Board, 49 La. Ann. 641; 21 So. 742; Police Jury v. Mansfield, 49 La. Ann. 796; 21 So. 598; Commonwealtli v. Bottoms (Ky.), 50 S. W. 084; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1929; Oxford v. Frank, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 343; 70 S. W. 426; Whisenhunt v. State, 18 Tex. App. 491; Wood- lief V. State, 21 Tex. App. 412; 2 S. W. 812. 29 Ex parte Randall, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 519; 98 S. W. 870. ^oEx parte Smith, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 350; 88 S. W. 245. § 549 TRAPTIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 940 board to refuse to order an election on the question of repeal where a sufficient length of time has not elapsed.^^ The fact that a city decided for a license when the county decided for prohibition will not authorize the city to vote before the requisite period has expired.''- "Where a city lying over cer- tain population and lying within a county voting for pro- hibition was authorized, within less than the period that the second election could be submitted to the county, to hold its own separate election on the question, it was held that if the city did not have the requisite population at the time of the county election it could not claim the right to vote before the county period had elapsed on the ground that its population had increased to the requisite amount."^ If the second elec- tion in a city is held too soon, but results in prohibition which was the result of the prior county election, a conviction for the violation of the local option law as adopted in such city will not be reversed, for local option on the county election was in force when the offense was committed.^* If ''dry" territory be added to a "wet" political division of the State, an election cannot be ordered or held within such division until the requisite time has elapsed for holding an election in the political division from which such "drj'" territory was taken.^^ If the time for the county second election has ex- siKidd V. Truett, 28 Tex. Civ. 53 Tex. Cr. App. 339; 109 S. VV. App. 618; 68 S. \V. 310; Roper v. 936; Wade v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. McKay, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 470; App. 608; 109 S. W. 191, 192; 69 S. W. 459. Woods v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 32 Commonwealth v. Bottoms 75 S. W. 37. Contra, Byrd v. (Ky.), 57 S. W. 493; 20 Ky. L. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 539; 103 Rep. 1929, reversing 57 S. W. 495. S. W. 863. Mandamus will not lie to com- 33 State v. Robinson, 129 Mo. pel a recount of the vote when App. 147; 108 S. W. 619. another town election can be 34 Lyon v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. called. People v. Mosso, 30 N. App. 506; 61 S. W. 125. Y. Misc. Rep. 164; 63 N. Y. Supp. ^^^ Ex parte Fiekls (Tex. Cr. 588. App.), 86 S. W. 1022. Contra, If a second prohibition be Doyle v. Dufferien, 8 ^Manitoba "dopted, a conviction for a viola- 286; In, re Henderson, 14 Mani- i,ion during the first prohibition toba 535. may be had. Johnson v. State, 941 LOCAL OPTION. §549 pired, and a city is authorized to hold its own election, it can then do so, although the county has not called a second election.^** A territory after adopting prohibition cannot be subdivided and then an election be called within the pro- hibited period for one of the smaller territorial districts.^'^ Where a statute provided that if there was a majority vote for license a second election might be called, it was held that if the result of the election for license was a tie vote there could be no second election called.^^ If a county has voted upon the question of prohibition, no subdivision voting upon it thereafter — although it might lawfully so vote — can deprive the county, at the end of the prohibition period, or at any time thereafter, from voting on the question a second time,^^ for the statute with reference to a second election has 36 state V. Jackson, 105 La. 436; 29 So. 870. 37^/0? parte Elliott, 44 Tex. Cr. App. 575; 72 S. W. 837. On the reversal of a phohib- itory vote the privilege granted under a license to sell is revived, unless the holder has by some act abandoned it, or it by limitation has expired. People v. Bnish, 41 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 56; 83 N. Y. Supp. 607 ; affirmed 92 N. Y. App. Div. 611; 86 X. Y. Sunp. 1144. See Price v. Board, 98 Md. 346; 57 Atl. 215. Where prohibition continues in force until repealed, and the re- sult of a second election is not in force until published, the State may rely upon the first election where the ofl'ense is committed af- ter the second election and be- fore the result is published, (liv- ens V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 267; 91 S. W. 1090, 1091. See Thompson v. Commonwealth, 103 Ky. 635; 45 S. W. 1039; Decker V. State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 20; 44 S. W. S45; State v. Foreman, 121 Mo. App. 502; 97 S. W. 269. A freeholder held to have a light to intervene and insist a second election would be void. Coldwell V. Guider, 88 Ala. 421; 7 So. 203. 38Temmick v. Owings, 70 Md. 246; 16 Atl. 719. Where statute shortening the prohibition period does not apply to previous elections. Dawson v. State, 25 Tex. App. 670; 8 S. W. 820. In Kentucky, until the certifi- cate of the result of the second election is recorded, there is no change in the status of the liquor question. Commonwealth v. Weisenburgh (Ky.), 102 S. W. 846; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 449. If the accused claims the sec- ond election was void because brought on too soon, he must show that as a fact. Holland v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 147; 101 S. W. 1002. 39 Hancock v. Bingham (Ky. ), 102 S. W. 341; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 427; Police Jury v. Mansura, 119 La. 300; 44 So. 23; 119 La. 306; 44 So. 25; Smith v. Patton, 103 §§ 550, 551 TEAPFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 942 referouLC to llic identical territory covered by the former election/'' If the first election be void, not voidable, then the prohibitive period does not apply to the second election.*^ Sec. 550. Local option ordinance, when not invalid. An ordinance duly passed by the authorities of a municipal corporation prohibiting the keeping of intoxicating liquors for the purpose of a local sale will not conflict with the statute of the State which provides that if a majority of the votes cast at any election held under a general local option law shall be against the sale, it shall not be lawful for any person, within the limits, of a municipal corporation where an election is held, to sell or barter for a valuable consideration, either directly or indirectly, or to give away to induce trade at any place of business, or to furnish at other places of business, any intoxicating liquors or intoxicating beverages, or other drinks, which if drunk to excess, will produce intoxication. Such an ordinance and statute are not inconsistent with each other.*- And it has been held that when a city by ordinance has adopted the local option law of a State, a penalty affixed to the ordinance of not less than $300 and not more than $1,000 for the violation of its terms is not unreasonable and may be enforced.*^ Sec. 551. Eminent domain, power of not involved. A local option law rests in no degree upon the power of eminent domain. It does not contemplate either the taking Ky. 444 ; 45 S. W. 459 ; 20 Ky. first election went into force, and L. Rep. 165. not from the date of the elec- 40 Board v, Soott, 125 Ky. 545; tion. (Seary v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 101 S. VV. 944; 30 Ky. L. Rep. App. 444; 102 ,S. W. 1127. §94; Oxley v. Allen (Tex. Civ. If the second election be in- App.), 107 S. W. 945. valid because held too soon, its In Louisiana an election result validity may be tested coUater- continues in force until a second ally. Oxley v. Allen (Tex. Civ. one is called and the result re- App.), 107 S. W. 945. versed or changed. Police Jury ^i Oxley v. Allen, supra. V. Mansura, 119 La. 300; 44 So. 42 Mason v. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 23; 119 La. 306; 44 So. 25. 662. In Texas the prohibitive period 43 Warrensburg v. McHugh, 122 begins to run from the date the Mo. 649. 943 LOCAL OPTION. §§ 552, 553 or damaging of anything. It is the exercise of the police power of a State or Connnonwealth, pure and simple. The incidental effects upon the value of property that has been used for the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors result not from any interference with the property, but solely from the inability of the owners of the property to adjust their old business to the new law. The effect, if they can be a damage at all, is damnum ahsqim injuria. The law does not take or damage the property of such owners for the public use, but only prevents them, to a certain limited extent, from taking or damaging the public for their use. Such is their real grievance, and for that they have no remedy. Where business and law conflict, it is the business that must give Avay and not the law.*^ Sec. 552. Cost of election. Unless the statute imposes the cost upon them, those peti- tioning for the election are not liable for the costs of the election, nor anyone else, nor can they be required to make a deposit to cover the costs.'*^ But a statute m^y require them to do so, especially the expenses up to the calling of the election.*" Sec. 553. Consent of local authorities. In Iowa a statute required as a condition to the issuance of a license that a written statement of general consent of a certain percentage of the voters at the last general election be presented to the board of supervisors, who should canvass it and enter its finding as to the results in its records. But under this law if the consent was given by the voters of a township that would not authorize the granting of a license to sell in a town within the township,*^ and where a town was « Menken v. City of A-tlanta, Ky. 146; 103 S. W. 251; 31 Ky. 78 Ga. 668; 3 S. E. 414. L. Rep. 597. *5 O'Neal V. Minary, 125 Ky. 47 Hill v. Gleisner, 112 Iowa 571; 101 S. W. 951; 30 Ky. L. 397; 84 N. W. 511; West v. Eep. 888. Bishop, 110 Iowa 410; 81 N. W. 46 Butler V. Fiscal Court, 126 (596; Meyer v. Hobson, 116 Iowa 349; 90 N. W. 85. § 554 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 944 incorporated after the canvass was made and the record signed, a canvass must then be as to the town before a license to sell in the town could be granted.*^ The canvass is made from the poll books of the last previous election ; but if they be destroyed, then the board must ascertain the facts as well a-s it can.*^ Sec. 554. Juror's qualifications in local option cases. Upon the trial of a person charged with an offense against a local option law, a juror is not disti-ualified who, upon his voir dire, states that he voted for the local option law, or that he is in favor of the law and its enforcement, or that he is opposed to the saloon business, or believes in prohibition, or that he has conscientious scruples against the saloon busi- ness. It would be a strange rule that would disqualify a juror because he is in favor of an existing law, believe in its enforcement, and is opposed to a business w^hich, if carried on at all, is carried on in direct violation of a statutory pro- hibition. The question to be tried in such case is not the policy of the law, but whether or not the party charged has b'een guilty of its violation. Nor is a juror dis([ualified in such case who states that he understands the local option law to be in force, or that he knows that a local option election ■was held, and knows the result of the election was to super- sede and suspend the general jaws of the State respecting the sale of intoxicating liquors. Although the existence of the law is a fact to be proven, the question of the sufficiency of the proof is a matter for the court and not for the jury.^** In such case, however, it would be error to refuse to permit a juror to be asked which way he would give a verdict if the 4S Schimeman v. Sherman, 118 Certiorari to review proceed- lowa 230; 91 N. W. 1064. i igs. Darling v. Boesch, 67 Iowa 49 West V. Bishop, 110 Iowa 702; 25 N. W. 887. 410; 81 IST. W. 696; Wilson v. How requisite percentage of Bohstedt, 135 Iowa 457; 110 N. voters ascertained. Cameron v. W. 898. Fellows, 109 Iowa 534; 80 N. W. Proof of filing of contest. Mc- 567. Conkie V. District Court, 117 Iowa so People v. Keefer, 97 Mich. 334; 90 N. W. 716. 15; o6 N. W. 105. 945 LOCAL OPTION. §555 evidence, as between the people and defendant, should be equally balanced.'^^ Sec. 555. Local prohibitory or local option statutes. In the past — and even in a few States at the i^resent day — liquor statutes have been frequently adopted for particular localities, and the question frequently arises what is the effect of a subsequent general statute for the entire State covering the same subject. Where no provision of the Constitution of the State forbids local letrislation such statutes are valid, being enacted under the State's general police power to regu- late the traffic in intoxicating liquors.^^ Necessarily the ques- tion whether a local law was repealed by a general law on the same subject must depend upon the intent of the Legis- lature as expressed in the latter act. There are many cases where it is held that the local act is not repealed, and con- sequently prosecutions must be based upon its provisions ; ^^ while on the contrary it has often been held that the gen- eral law repeals the local statute.^* In matters of this kind, however, the general rule that repeals by implication are not favored prevails.^^ But if a local law is enacted for a par- si Monaghan v. Insurance Co., 53 Mich. 246; 18 X. VV. 797; Ot- sego Lake Tp. v. Kirston, 72 Mich. 1 ; 40 N. VV. 26 ; Theisen v. Johns, 72 Mich. 285 ; 40 N. W. 727 ; Peo- ple V. Keefer, 97 Mich. 15; 56 X. W. 105. 52 Stickrod v. Commonwealth, S6 Ky. 285; 5 S. W. 580; 9 Ky. L. Rep. 563. C3 Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 15 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 239; Wooton V. Commonwealth, 15 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 495; Common- wealth V. Weller, 14 Bush 218; 29 Am. Rep. 407; Bodgett v. State (Ala.), 48 'So. 54; Rice v. Com- monwealth (Ky.), 61 S. W. 473; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1793; Bailey v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 64 S. W. 995; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1223; Cranor V. Albany, 43 Ore. 144; 71 Pac. 1042; State v. Piner, 141 N. C. 760; 53 S. E. 305; Hail v. State, 48 Tex. 'Cr. App. 514; 90 S. W. 503; People v. Mulkins, 25 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 599 ; 54 N. Y. Supp. 599. 54 Albright v. Commonwealth, 7 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract), 762; Kemp V. State, 120 Ga. 157; 47 S. E. 548; Tinsley v. State (Ga.), 35 S. E. 303; Blake v. State, 118 Ga. 333; 45 S. E. 249; Common- wealth V. Duncan, 11 Ky. L. Rep. ( abstract ) 402 ; Commonwealth v. Warren, 10 Ky. L. Rep. (ab- stract) 490; Mueller v. People, 24 Colo. 251; 48 Pac. 965. 55 Commonwealth v. Weller, 14 Bush 218; 29 Am. Rep. 407. § 555 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 946 ticular district, then it supersedes the general statute as to such district. ^° Such a statute containing a provision that the violation of its provisions shall be punished according to existing laws for the illegal sale of whisky is valid and capable of enforcement." If a local act be unconstitutional that will leave the general statute on the same subject in force.^* "Where sales within four miles of any schoolhouse were pro- hibited, and the statute was so amended as to extend its pro- visions to towns not having over two thousand inhabitants, but several s'llpsj made bv persons having licenses "at the date of the passage of that act during the time for which such licenses were granted," which was for a year, and four years subsequently this amendment was so amended as to require the number to be five thousand, it was held that the latter act did not re-enact the first amending statute or revitalize its provisions so as to except from its operations sales made under licenses in force at the time the act was passed, and licenses which had expired before the last amendment was made were no protection for sales thereafter made, not being saved by the later act.^° A few eases may be noted in this con- nection concerning those statutes prohibiting sales within certain distances of schools and the like, for they are strictly local prohibition statutes. A statute of this character pro- hibited sales within three miles of any schoolhouse if the proper steps were taken to put it in force. A schoolhouse was located within less than three miles of a State line, but it was held that the statute was not for that reason void or inapplicable, and that the inhabitants living in such other State but within the three mile limit were not to be counted nor their consent required in determining if the requisite numher in the county had voted for local 58'Commomvealth v. Anderson, s7 Commonwealth v. Edinger, 7 10 Ky. L. Rep. 307; Gifford v. Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 442; Berg- Commonwealth, 2 Ky. L. Rep. meyer v. Commonwealth, 3 Ky. (abstract) 437; Commonwealth v. L. Rep. (abstract) 823. Bogie, 7 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) ss Tinsley v. State (Ga.), 35 S. 601; Collins V. State, 114 Ga. 70; E. 303. 39 S. E. 916; Cotton v. State, 62 59 Webster v. State (Tenn.), 75 Ark, 585; 37 'S. W. 4S. S. W. 1020. 947 LOCAL OPTION. § 555 option.®" Under such a statute where the num- ber required by statute petitions for a prohibitory order, it is the imperative duty of the board or court petitioned to make the order.''^ The sole question before the court is to determine if the requisite number of persons have signed the petition.*'- Where local prohibition within three miles of a schoolhouse was established, and three years afterwards a new schoolhouse, a quarter of a mile from the first school- house, was built, and a new prohibition order was entered, and thereafter at a general county election a majority of the votes were cast for licenses and the court revoked the first order prohibiting the sale of liquors within the prohibitory district, it was held that the overlapping of the areas of the prohibitory orders did not make the second one invalid, and that the revoking of the first order did not have any effect upon the second oneand,therefore,thedefendant was not pro- tected after such county had voted for licenses.*'^ A recital in the order which locates the schoolhouse at a wrong place does not invalidate the order, it not being necessary to locate it.®* Parol evidence is admissible to show which schoolhouse was in question where there were two buildings used for school purposes within the district.""' An order revoking a prohibitory order is self-executing, and remains in force until set aside or superseded. An appeal from the order of revoca- tion does not suspend it.®® A petitioner for prohibition has such an interest in the matter that he may appeal from a denial to enter an order as prayed for in the petition,®^ soLindley v. State (Ark.), 120 64 Lindley v. State, supra. S. W. 987; Thomas v. Burke es Thomas v. Burke (Ark.) , 121 (Ark.), 121 S. W. 1061. S. W. lOGO. 61 Bridewell v. Ward, 72 Ark. ea Bordwell v. State, 77 Ark. 187; 79 S. W. 762. 161; 91 S. W. 555. 62 Douglass V. Hamilton (Ark.), st Thomas v. Burke (Ark.), 121 120 S. W. 387. S. W. 1060. 63i^indley v. State (Ark.), 120 S. W. 9S7. §556 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 948 ARTICLE II. VIOLATION OF LOCAL OPTION LAW. SECTION. 556. Sale of liquors. 557. Shipping liquors into local option territory. 558. Bringing liquors within local option territory. 559. Soliciting orders in local option district. SCO. Sale under license. SECTION. 561. Time for license expiring or lapsing. 562. Transportation of intoxi- cating liquors. 563. Under wliat statute pros- ecutions to be brought. 564. Proof that local option was in force. Sec. 556. Sale of Liquor. "When local option has been adopted and has gone into force sales or gifts of liquors thereafter in the territory adopting it are unlawful. What is and what is not a sale has been elsewhere discussed, and what is there said need not be re- peated in this connection. Whatever transaction amounts to a sale or gift is forbidden by these statutes, and all such transactions are punishable by fine or imprisonment.''* Thus, where a defendant kept liquor at his house in a prohibition county, and on being solicited to sell he and the solicitor took the desired amount of liquor, rowed across a river into another county where the liquor was delivered and the money therefor received, and they then returned, it was held that the sale was brought about by a subterfuge within the meaning of a ssstoval V. state (Tex. Cr. App. ) , 97 S. W. 92 ; Brookman v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 277; 96 S. W. 928; Ball v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 99 S. W. 326; 30 Ky. L. Eep. 600; Oxford v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 97 S. W. 484; Polk V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 97 S. W. 467; Commonwealth v. Mc- Dermott (Ky.), 96 S. W. 475; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 752; Jackson v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 248; 91 S. W. 574; Pike v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 613; 51 S. Vv^. 395; Walker V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 293; 106 S. W. 376. In Kentucky, under the stat- utes, it is held a brewer may sell his beer in the local option county where his brewery is located. Lexington Brewing Co. v. Com- monwealth, 124 Ky. 476; 99 S. W. 618; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 758; New South, etc. Co. V. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 443; 96 S. W. 805; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 873; but not in another local option county. F. W. Cook Brewing Co. (Ky.), 99 S. W. 354, 355; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 598, 600. 949 LOCAL OPTION. §557 statute making all sales by trick or device illegal."^ An intent not to violate the local option law is not material."*^ But an express agent of a carrier delivering the liquors and collect- ing the amount due on them cannot be charged with having sold them.'^ Sales by wholesale are prohibited by local option laws as well as by retail."- But these statutes do not prevent a distiller selling out to his partner his interest in the dis- tillery or its manufactured product. '^^ Sec. 557. Shipping liquors into local option territory. Sales, with some very restricted exceptions, are universally made illega-l in local option territory. It is difficult at times to say with exactness just where the sale takes place. In an instance of shipping liquors into a local option county by common carrier, under a contract of sale, the point of ship- ment is the place where the sale is consummated, even though the liquor is sent C. 0. D.^* In such an instance it matters 69 Merritt v. Commonwealth, 122 Ky. 669; 92 S. W. 611; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 184; Lemore v. Common- wealth, 127 Ky. 4-80; 105 S. W. 930; 32 Ky. L. Rep. 387. See where 'a gift of liquor is not a violation of a local option stat- ute preventing a sale. Common- wealth V. Dieker.son (Ky. ), 76 S. W. 1084; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 104'3. 70 Williams v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. App. 477; 77 S. W. 215; Jolly v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 484; 110 S. W. 749. 71 State V. Cairns, 64 Kan. 782; 68 Pac. 621. 72 Greiner v. Kelley Drug Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 75 «. W. 536. 73 Stamper v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 103 S. W. "386; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 707. 74 Freshman v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 126; 38 S. W. 1007: Joseph V. State ( Tex. Cr. App. ) , 86 S. W. 320; Lester v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 86 S. W. 326; Green v. State ( Tex. Cr. App. ) , 87 S. W. 1043; Weil v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 603; 90 S. W. 644; McDermott v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 96 S. W. 474; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 750; Doores v. Common- wealth, 121 Ky. 226; 89 S. W. 161; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 1*92; 89 S. W, 104; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 196; Kearns v. Commonwealth, 15 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract), 332; Blasin- game v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 582; 85 S. W. 275; Harris v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 588; 85 S. W. 284, 1198; Queen v. Cahill, 6 Can. Cr. Cas. 204; 35 K B. 240; Hirsch v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App, 1; 96 S. W. 40; James v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 592; 78 S. W. 951 ; State v. Cairns, 64 Kan. 782; 68 Pac. 621 ; Commonwealth v. Price, etc. Co. (Ky.), 105 S. W. 102; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1350; Weath- ered V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), §557 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 950 not that the order for the liquor was taken in the local option county.^'* And one to whom the liquor is shipped to deliver to the purchaser, in turning it over to him does not violate the law.^" But where a person telephoned to a liquor dealer outside the prohibition territory to send him some liquor, which the dealer did by his wagon, and in order to evade the statute the driver refused to accept pay for the liquor unless the purchaser would go with him across the line of the prohibited territory, it was held there was a clear violation of the statute."^ And where the liquor is to remain the property of the seller until taken out of the express office by the pur- chaser, then the seller is guilty of shipping liquor into the county under a statute prohibiting it/^ Where the order was 60 S. W. 876; Commonwealth v. Current, 11 Ky. L. Rep. (ab- stract) 764; Commonwealth v. Russell, 11 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 576 ; Mullen v. State, 30 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 251; Beard v. State (Tex.), 115 S. W. 592; Jones v. Dermott v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 96 S. W. 474; 20 Ky. L. Rep. 750. 75 Joseph V. State, sujpra ; Lus- ter V. State, supra; Fosliee v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 87 S. \V. 820; Owens v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. '634; 85 S. W. 794; Com- monwealth V. Current, 11 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 7'64; Bennett v. Commonwealth, 11 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 370. 76 Harris v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 588; 85 S. W. 284, 1198; Glass V. State, ^8 Ark. 266 ; 57 S. W. 793; James v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 592; 78 N .W. 951 ; Queen V. Cahill, 35 N. B. 240; 6 Can. Cr. Cas. 204. 77 Commonwealth v. Adair, 121 Ky. 689; 89 S. W. 1130; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 657 ; Merritt v. Common- wealth, 122 Ky. €69; 92 S. VV. 611 ; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 184. See also Hall V. Commonwealth, 13 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 399. In Kentucky it would seem that if the liquor is sent C. 0. D. t'.ie law fixes the place of sale at the place where the carrier delivered the goods to the purchaser, but if not sent C. 0. D., then the stat- ute does not apply. Doores v. Commonwealth, 121 Ky. 226; 89 S. W. 162, 1J34; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 192, 196. Soliciting orders within a local option county and afterward ship- ping the liquor pursuant to the orders received cannot be regarded a trick or device to evade the stat- ute, within the prohibition of a statute making all sales by trick or device unlawful. Doores v. Commonwealth, 121 Ky. 226; 89 S. W. 162, 164; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 192, 196. When sales of native wine are prohibited and when not in local option counties. Bates v. State, 81 Ark. 336; 99 S. W. 388. 78Hirsch v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 1 ; 96 S. W. 40. Statutes sometimes make the place where the money is paid for 951 LOCAL OPTION. § 557 solicited in a prohibition territory by an agent of a foreign dealer, the order taken and the money for the liquor then and there paid, it was considered that the method adopted was a mere trick to evade the statute and the transaction was an illegal sale." Where A received in a local option county from B money, and agreed to send him whisky, which he did, it w^as held that he was more than an agent, that he sold the liquor to B, and had violated the law.^*' But a right to return the liquors if they do not correspond with the sample does not change the place of sale from the place of shipment to the place of consignment.*' Where A received money from B in a local option county to buy him whisky in a non- local option county, which he did and sent it to B by the hand of a person not under his control nor acting as his agent, it was held that he had not violated such local option law,**^ So a filling of a telephone order in a non-prohibition county to ship liquor by carrier into a local option county, is not a violation of the law in the latter county.^^ When the evidence showed that the accused shipped two packages of liquors by express "C. 0. D." to E in a local option county to be delivered by the express agent to anyone who had an order signed by E, upon payment of the charges, and upon some one telling G if he wanted liquor the liquors the place of sale. Hy- State, 82 Ark. 405 ; 101 S, W. ser V. Commonwealth, 1L6 Ky. 410; 1152; l^iord v. State, 82 Ark. 603; 76 S. VV. 174; 25 Ky. L. Rep. 60S; 102 S. VV. 1196. Buckman v. Commonwealth, 11 si Gill v. Kaufman, 16 Kan. Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 526. 571. 79 (State V. Small (S. €.), 60 S. In Georgia a sale by mail order E. 676. to minor, shipped to him in an- Some States by statute have other county, can be prosec»ited in made the place of delivering in the either the county of shipment or local option county the place of of -the consignment. 'Newsome v. sale. State v. Herring, 145 K C. State, 1 Ga. App. 7'GO.; 5^ S. E. 418; 58 S. E. 1007; Newson v. 71. State, 1 Ga. App. 790; 5'8 S. E. 82 Beard v. State (Tex.), 115 S. 71; State v. Patterson, 134 N. C. W. 592. 612; 47 S. E. 808. ss McDermott v. Commonwealth soMcDermott v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 96 S. W. 474; 29 Ky. L. (Ky.), 100 S. W. 830; 30 Ky. L. Rep. 750. Rep. 1227. But see Anderson v. §§ 558, 559 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 952 F would give an order upon the express agent, which F did. and received an order upon which he got the liquor, paying its cost and the amount of the transportation charges, and the agent said F had ordered him to deliver "any and every package" received by him, it was held that there was suffi- cient evidence to send the case to the jury on the question M^hether E and F were acting merely as the accused's agents.®* Sec. 558. Bringing liquors within local option territory. Under the usual local option statutes it is an offense to bring intoxicating liquor within the local option territory, even for one's own use, where it is shipped by express C. 0. D.^^ Where a foreign dealer solicited an order for liquors in a local option county, shipped those ordered to an adjoining county that was not a local option county, and they were then transported into the local option county by wagon, it was held that the presumption was the wagon was the buyer's, and that the sale was consummated in the non-local option county.*'' Sec. 559. Soliciting orders in local option district. In most of the States it is made a penal offense to solicit orders for intoxicating liquors in local option territory. It was found essential to the integrity of the local option law that statutes forbidding the solicitation of orders for liquors should be adopted. Thus, where a dealer having his place of business in Louisiana solicited orders in Mississippi, to be delivered in the former State to an express company for the purchaser, it was held that he had violated a statute of the latter State making it a misdemeanor to act as the agent of 84 Current v. Commonwealth, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 720; Jackson v. State, Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 764. 49 Tex. Cr. App, 24-8; 91 S. W. 85 Young V. State {Tex. Cr. 574. App.), 66 S. W. 567; Hoyt v. se Pabst Brewing Co. v. Com- State (Tex. Cr. App.), 89 S. W. monwealth, (Ky.), 107 S. W. 728, 1082 ; Pecaria V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 729; 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1010, 1013. App. 352; 90 S. W. 42; Randall So where he sends it to his agent V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. a61; 90 to deliver them. People v. De S. VV. 1012; McGuire v. Common- Groot, 111 Mich. 245; 69 N. W. wealth (Ky.), 99 6. W. 612; 30 248; 3 Det. L. N. 619. 953 LOCAL OPTION. § 559 either the seller or purchaser in making a sale in local option territory.'*^ An advertisement of liquors for sale and soliciting orders for them is not a violation of a statute forbidding the solicitation of orders in a local option district ; ^^ nor is mail- ing printed circulars.^" Under a statute making an offense to sell or furnish intoxicating liquors in the Indian Territory, one who sends his agent into that territory and solicits orders for liquors and then fills the order by shipping the liquor ordered into the territory is guilty of violating the statute."'^ A statute prohibiting the solicitation of purchases of liquors applies to a single solicitation and by one not engaged in the sale of liquors or in the liquor business."^ To constitute the offense of soliciting orders for liquors to be shipped into a prohibition district it is not necessary that the liquors be shipped,"- nor an order be received.**" Where a statute pro- hibits personal solicitation of orders for liquor, a solicitation by mail is a violation of its provisions.^^ "Where a statute made it an offense to solicit orders "by an agent" in a pro- hibition territory, and a person solicited and obtained an 8T Hart V. state, 87 Miss. 171; In Texas it was held that a stat- 39 So. 523; Blasingame v. Sta+e, ute making it an offense "to solicit 47 Tex. Cr. App. 582 ; 85 ,S. W. an order for the sale" of liquor in 275; Winslow v. 'State (Tex. Cr. a local option district was uncon- App.), 98 S. W. 241; Mills v. stitutional, as to interstate ship- State, 148 Ala. 633; 42 So. 816; ments, being a violation of the Williams v. State, 107 Ga. 693; interstate commerce act. Ex parte 33 S. E. 641. iMassey, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 60; 92 88 Carter v. State, SI Ark. 37; S. VV. 1086; Ex parte Hackney 08 S. W. 704. (Tex. Civ. App.), 92 S. W. 1092; 80 State V. Wheat, 48 W. Va. Carter v. State (Tex. Civ. App.), 259; 37 S. E. 544. 92 S. W. 10D3. 90 Taylor v. United States, 6 92 Levy v. State, 133 Ala. 190; Ind. T. 350; 98 S. W. 123. 31 So. 805. 91 Mills V. State, 148 Ala. 633 ; 93 State v. Wheat, 48 W. Va. 42 So. 816. 259; 37 S. E. 544. The phrase "solicit or order" has 9t Rose v. State, 4 Ga. App. 588; been construed to mean "solicit 62 S. E. 117; State v. Wheat, 48 order for," the statute using the W. Va. 259; 37 S. E. 544. language "to solicit or order or The offense is not committed un- sell goods, wares," etc. Republic til the message is received, and of Hawaii v. Warbel, 11 Hawaii then it may be prosecuted in the 221. county in which it is received. §§ 560, 561 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 954 order, and then went to the defendant, a deaJer, not revealing that he had solicited an order, but bought of him liquor to fill the order, it was held that the defendant was not liable, for he did not solicit the order "by agent" or otherwise.®^ Sec. 560. Sale under license. If liquor may be sold in such territory uinder a license, then the fact of a sale under a license is one of defense, and the State need not prove that the accused had no license ; ^'^ but if the statute is so worded as to require the State to prove that the accused had no license, then the custodian of records of the licensing board or court may testify that he has ex- amined the records and found no license had been issued."^ Sec. 561. Time for license expiring or elapsing. Where licenses in a district adopting local option have a certain time to run after its adoption, during which time sales thereunder may be made, and it appears that the defendant held a license at the time of the sale, then the prosecution must show, if it does not otherwise appear in evidence, that a sufficient time had expired between the date of the adoption of local option and the date of the sale for the license to have expired, in order to secure a conviction-^** 95 State V. Earles, 84 Ark. 479 ; in another State making an ex- 106 S. W. 941. elusive business arrangement with These statutes apply only to pro- a person in the State for the pur- hibition territory. Rose v. State, chase and sale of his beers, with- 1 Ga. App. 596; 58 S. E. 20. out taking out a license. New A statute making it an offense York Breweries Corp. v. Baker, 68 to "solicit orders" has no appli- Conn. 337; 36 Atl. 785. cation where one "takes or accepts oo Robinson v. State (Tex. Cr. orders," there being no solicitation. App. ) , 75 S. W. 526. Kanderfur-Julian Co. v. State, 72 97 Holton v. Bimrod, 8 KaiL. Ark. 11; 77 S. W. 596. App. 265; 55 Pac. 505. A statute forbidding sales "by 98 Ex parte McDonald, 20 N. B. samples, by soliciting or procur- 542; Ex parte Russell, 20 N. B. ing orders or otherwise, within 536; Regina v, Risteen, 22 N. B. the State, without taking out a 51. license" does not prevent a brewer 955 LOCAL OPTION. § 562 Sec. 562. Transportation of intoxicating liquors. In some of the States statutes have been enacted forbidding common carriers or any person carrying liquors into local option territory, and inflicting penalties if they do. These statutes are often made applicable by their terms to instances where the liquors are received by a carrier in another State and deliverd in the State enacting them ; "^ but in this respect they are invalid.' A statute providing that "no person * * * shall bring into this State, or transport from place to place within this State, by wns-on, cart, or other vehicle, or by any other means or mode of carriae;e, any liquors," applies to one carrying liquors on his person from place to place, that being a "means or mode of carriage," and the finding of liquors in the possession of a person who is selling them in a prohibition territory raises the presumption that he carried them there.- But the general rule is that such statutes apply only to common carriers or carriers for hire.' A statute which makes it unlawful to carry liquors for unlawful use to any "place or county," makes it an offense to carry them for an unlawful use from place to place within a connty; and whether or not the transportation was for an unlawful use is a question for the jury." The carrier cannot escape on the ground that it believes the acts of the consignor are legitimate acts of interstate commerce.^ If there be no statute for- bidding the transportation into prohibition territory, then the carrier cannot be convicted of a sale who merely carries the 09 Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. Com- portation in a wagon by a person monwealth, 126 Ky. 563; 104 S. not a common carrier. State v. W. 394; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 9'54. Campbell, 76 Iowa 122; 40 N. W. 1 American Exp. Co. v. Common- 100. wealth, 206 U. S. 139; 27 Sup. 3 McGuire v. Commonwealth Ct. 609; 51 L. Ed. 993. reversing (Ky.), 99 S. W. 612; 30 Ky. L. (Kv.), 97 S. W. 807: 30 Ky. 207; Rep. 720. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 200 4 state v. Arnold, 80 S. C. 383; U. S. 12«; 27 Sup. Ct. <306. 61 S. E. &91. 2 State V. Pope. 79 S. C. 87; = Adams Express CJo. v. Com- 60 S E 2M; State v. Reillv, 108 monwealth (Ky.), 92 S. VV. 932, Iowa 735; 78 N. W. 680. ' 935, 936; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 224, Such a statute applies to trans- 230, 231. §562 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 956 property of the consignee and delivers it to him." Where a statute prohibits the transportation of intoxicating liquors, the mere carrying from a wholesale house to a retail dealer in the same town or city is a violation of its provisions.'' If the transportation is within the State, and it is made by a common carrier, it is no defense that the law required the carrier to carry the goods, for the law does not require the performance of an illegal act." If a statute is against the "receiving for convej-ance liquors unlawfully sold or in- tended for unlawful sale," it is an offense to merely receive the liquors for conveyance, in case a sale has been made, this completing such sale, regardless of the intention of the carrier." Where it is ncessary to show that the carrier re- ceived the liquor to carry it to a certain place under a reason- able belief that it was intended to be sold in violation of law, the general reputation of the consignee as a liquor seller may be put in evidence, as M'ell as the discoveries made on a search warrant for liquors at the place of the consignee.^'' But a carriage of boxes without a knowledge they contain liquors does not render the carrier liable." The carrier must act in good faith, and if it know the liquor is contraband it will be liable, though the shipper inform it the box does not contain liquors.^- Southern Exp. Co. v. State 107 Ga. 670; 33 S. E. 637. A statute torbidding "any com- mon carrier or person" carrying liquor into local option territory applies to an individual taking it there. iState v. Reilly, 108 Iowa 735; 78 X. W. 680. But a stat- ute forbidding a railroad corpora- tion or a person or corporation reg- ularly and lawfully conducting a general express business to carry liquors except in vessels with cer- tain marks vipon them, does not apply to a person not conducting a. general express business. Com- monwealth V. Beck, 187 Mass, 15; 72 N. E. 357. 7 State V. Campbell, 76 Iowa 122; 40 N. W. 100; Common- wealth V. Walters, 11 Gray 81. 8 State V. Goss, 59 Vt. 266; 9 Atl. 829. 9 Commonwealth v. Locke, 114 Mass. 288. 10 Commonwealth v. Harper, 145 Mass. 100; 13 X. E. 459. 11 Adams Express Co. v. Com- monwealth (Ky.), 112 S. W. 577; 33 Ky. L. Rep. 967. 12 Adams Express Co. v. Com- monwealth, supra. See Robert Porter Brewing Co. V. Southern Express Co. (Va.), 63 S. E. 6. 957 LOCAL OPTION. § 363 Sec. 563. Under what statutes prosecutions to be brought. Under what statutes prosecutions for violation of local option laws are to be brought the cases are not at one with each other. In some States it is held that the prosecution may be for selling liquor without a license, since the general licensing laws still remain in force notwithstanding they have no application to the territory adopting local option, or the prosecution may be brought for a violation of the specific pro- visions of the local option law, at the election of the prosecu- tion.^^ But in other States it has been held that the local option law supersedes the general law, and prosecutions must be under it.^* As a rule, a general local option takes the place of a special local option law.^^ If two local option elections have been held, a prosecution may be maintained under either, if both resulted in favor of prohibitioin.^° But where the local option law provides no penalty, then prosecu- tions under the general liquor statute for a sale without a license may be maintained.^' *3 Commonwealth v. Barbour, 121 Ky. 689; 89 S. W. 479; 28 Ky. L. Rep. 433; Commonwealth v. VVeller, 14 Bush 218; 29 Am. Rep. 407; State v. Swanson, 85 Minn. 112; 88 N. W. 410; State v. Darl- ing, 77 Vt. 67; 58 Atl. 974; State V. Scampini, 77 Vt. 92; 59 Atl. 201; State v. Arbes (Minn), 73 N. N. W. 403 ; State v. Holt, 05 Minn. 423 ; 72 N. Y. 700 ; Swift v. State, 108 Tenn. 610; 69 S. W. 326; Wooten V. Commonwealth, 15 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 495; Wells v. State, 119 Ga. 556; 45 S. E. 443; State V. Ely (S. D.), 118 X. W. 687. Instate V. Vandenburg (Miss.). 28 So. 825; Edwards v. State, 123 Ga. 542; 51 S. E. 630; Stamper V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 103 S. W. 286; 31 Ky. L. Rep. 707; Holland V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 547; 103 S. W. 631; Commonwealth v. Anderson, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 307; Harp V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 61 S. W. 467; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1792; Allen V. Commonwealth, 10 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 280; Young v. Commonwealth, 14 Bush, 161; Batty V. State, 114 Ga. 79; 39 S. E. 918; State v. Graves, 135 Mo. App. 171; 115 S. \Y. 1054. 15 Bailey v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 64 S. W. 995; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1223. 10 Weathered v. State (Te.K. Cr. App.), 60 S. W. 876. But see where the precinct local option was held merged in the county lo- cal option. Roby v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 57 S. W. 651. IT Green v. Commonwealth, 15 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 297. It is sometimes expressly so provid- ed. Pitner v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 268 ; 39 S. W. 662. §564 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 958 Sec. 564. Proof that local option was in force. Where courts do not take notice whether or not local option has been adopted in the territory where it has been charged the offense was committed, there can be no conviction unless the fact of adoption be shown.'* And mere proof by parol is not sufficient. '° The proof should be made by record, and when this is done the court may charge the jury that the law in the particular locality is in force.-** If the d<>fendant claims that the local option law has been repealed by vote, he has the burden to show that fact if he desires to avail himself of it as a defense.-^ But where a statute provides that it shall be presumed the law was in force, unless that fact is denied by a plea filed, then no question is presented in the absence of a plea.-- In the absence of such a statute the State must prove 18 Bottoms V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 73 S. W. 16, 20, 903; Crad- dick V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 385; 88 S. W. 347; Allen v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 98 S. W. 869; Armstrong v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 47 S. VV. 981; Loveless v. State, 40 Texas Cr. App. 221 ; 49 S. W. 892; Nichols v. Common- wealth (Ky.), 87 S. W. 1072; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1176, reversing 86 S. W. 513; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 690; Bar- ker V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 47 S. W. 980; McGovern v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 35; 90 S. W. 502; Ladwig V. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. '585; 51 S. W. 390; State v. Bol- lencbeck, 98 Minn. 480; 108 N. W. 3; Shilling v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 51 S. W. 240; Tatum V. Commonwealth ( Ky. ) , 59 S. W. 32; 22 Ky. L. Rep. 927; Davis v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 107 S. W. 632, 839. laMalone v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 51 S. W. 381. 20 Johnson v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 55 S. W. 968; Webb v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 58 S. W. 82; Segars v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 577; 51 S. W. 238; Shilling V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 51 S. W. 240; Carnes v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 437; 103 S. W. 934; New- bury V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 44 S. W. 843; Benson v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 56; 44 S. W. 167, 1091; State v. O'Brien, 35 Mont. 482; 90 Pac. 514; Wiginton v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 492; 102 S. W. 1124; Neal v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 513; 102 S. W. 1139; Huff V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 441; 102 S. W. 1144. 21 Loveless v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 49 S. W. 601. 22 Kehoe v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 89 S. W. 270; Cantwell v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 511; 85 S. W. 19; Powell v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 592; 99 S. W. 1002; 6nead v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 262 ; 49 S. VV. 597 ; Piper v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 485; 110 S. W. 898; Bruce v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 53; 39 S, W. 683; Harryman 959 LOCAL OPTION. §564 the adoption of local option beyond a reasonable doubt.-^ In some States, however, the courts take judicial notice in what counties local option ?r prohibition prevails, and, of course, in such instances proof of its adoption is not neces- sary.-* And it also will, when it is proven to have been adopted, take judicial notice how long it will continue in foree.-^ V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 474; 110 S. W. 926; Jordan v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 222; 38 S. W. 780; 39 S. W. 110; Wright v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 3; 35 S. W. 150; 38 S. W. 811; Kelly v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 480; 38 S. W. 779. 23 Stick V. State, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 392. Contra, Allen v. State (Tex. Cr. .vpp.), '59 S. W. 264. 24 State V. Arnold, 80 S. C. 383 ; 61 S. E. 891 ; Crigler v. Common- wealth, 120 Ky. 512; 87 S. W. 276, ^'BO, 281; 27 Ky. L. Rep. 918, 925, 926; Ball v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 99 S. VV. 326; 30 Ky. L. Rep. State V. Hall, 130 Mo. App. 170; 108 S. W. 1077. CHAPTER XVL WHAT LIQUORS ARE PROHIBITED. 565. Statutory provisions. 566. Intoxicating liquors. 567. Intoxicating liquors, con- tinued. 568. Spirituous. 569. Ale and beer — Malt liquors. 670. Wine — Vinous liquors. SECTION. 571. Cider. 572. Fruit preserved in intoxi- cating liquors. 573. Drugs or medicines. 574. Manufacture. 575. Whether liquor is intoxi- cating a question for tho jury. Sec. ,565. Statutory provisions. It is altogether a matter of statutory provision what liquors it is illegal to sell, either without a license or under a prohibitory clause. In the earlier statutes on the subject of licenses and sales without them the term "intoxicating liquors'" was frequently used, but there soon came into use the words "spirituous," "vinous" and "malt" liquors. But as new devices were used to evade those statutes, the Legis- latures descended into details, specifying each particular liquor that was prohibited and concluding with a general term intended to cover any liquor that had been omitted in the enumeration. The English statute declares that the term intoxicating liquor "means spirits, wine, beer, porter, cider, perry and sweets,'^ and any fermented, distilled or spirituous liquor which cannot, according to any law for the time in 1 By statute "sweets" include any liquor made by fermentation from fruit and sugar, or from fruit and sugar mixed with another ma- terial, and which has undergone a process of fermentation in its man- ufacture. 52 and 53 Vict. c. 42, sec. 28. It includes made wines, mead and metheglin. 33 and 34 Vict. c. 29, sec. 3 ; 43 and 44 Vict, c. 20, sec. 40. Cider includes perry, beer includes cider, and wine in- cludes sweets. 43 and 44 Vict. c. 20, see. 40 960 961 WHAT LIQUORS ARE PROHIBITED. § 566 force, be legally sold without a license from the Commissioners of Inland Revenue."- By statute it is also provided that "any fermented liquor containing a greater proportion than forty per cent, of proof spirits shall be deemed and taken to be spirits. ' ' ^' By another statute the word beer ' ' shall in all cases be deemed to include beer, ale and porter ; and the word cider shall in all cases be deemed to include cider and perry."* By the statute of 1880 beer "includes ale, porter, spruce beer and black beer, and any other description of beer. ' ' " These quotations in a measure will show to what extent legislation has gone. Sec. 566. Intoxicating liquors. Alcohol when used as a beverage is an intoxicating liquor within the provisions of a statute forbidding the sale of in- toxicating liquor without a license." It includes all liquids, under whatever name, kind or quality, which are capable of producing drunkenness when drank as a beverage.^ In Rhode Island, by statute, intoxicating liquor is defined to be any liquor containing two per cent, of alcohol.^ In the Massachu- setts statute of 1885, "ale, porter, strong beer, lager beer, cider, and all wines" are considered intoxicating.® In Iowa a statute defining intoxicating liquor as a liquor containing alcohol includes a liquor containing alcohol, however small 2 35 and 36 Vict. c. 94, § 74. it. Leah v. Minns, 47 J. P. 198; 3 23 and 24 Vict. c. 27, §21. but since then the act above quo- British wine which contains a ted was enacted, a license is re- large proportion of alcohol is treat- quired for its sale. Howarth v. ed as fermented liquors. Harris Minns, 51 J. P. 7; 56 L. T. 316. V. Jenns, 22 J. P. 807; 9 C. B. 6 Winn v. State, 43 Ark. 151. (N. iS.) 152; 30 L. J. M. C. 183; See State v. Witt, 39 Ark. 216. 3 L. T. 408; 9 W. R. 36. 7 Moore v. State, 96 Tenn. 544; 4 1 Will. 4, c. 64, sec. 32; 32 35 S. W\ 556. and 33 Vict., c. 27, sec. 2. 8 state v. Hughes, 16 R. I. 403 ; 5 43 and 44 Vict. c. 20, §2; 16 Atl. 911. and 48 and 49 Vict. c. 51, § 4. In It was held that that statute an early decision it was held that could not be given a retroactive ef- botanic beer or liquor brewed from feet so as to make a liquor intox- sugar and water, though it con- icating which was not so formerly, tained two per cent, of spirit, 9 Commonwealth v. Sliea, 14- did not require a license to sell Gray, 386. § 567 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 962 may be the amonnt.'" In Alabama it is held that "intoxi- cating drinks" are not necessarily "spirituous, vinous or malt" liquors.'^ The mere fact that a gallon of beer may contain as much as a pint of alcohol is not conclusive that it is intoxicating.'- If beer be classed by statute among intoxi- cating liquors, then it is error to permit a witness to answer the question that if a person would drink enough of it, it would intoxicate him, though the error is harmless.^^ Strong beer is an intoxicating liquor." Lager beer has been classed by statute as an intoxicating liquor.^' A statute forbidding a sale of a particular kind of liquor as a beverage, does not require the liffuor to be intoxicating.^** Sec. 567. Intoxicating liquors, continued. Statutes requiring licenses usually specifically designate what liquors re(iuire a license to sell them, such as "spiritu- ous, vinous or malt liquors." When such is the case there is little trouble on the question whether the liquor sold is one that a license is necessary to sell it. But many statutes in the past have simply used the term "intoxicating liquor," and this has afforded scope for a large number of decisions as to what was included therein by its use. If the liquor is intoxicating, then the extent of its intoxicating effect is not a subject of inquiry except as incidental to a deter- mination whether or not it is an intoxicating liquor within the terms of the statute.'" Evidence which loiState V. Intoxicating Liquors, from the provisions of a statute 76 Iowa 243; 41 X. W. 6; 2 L. forbidding a sale of strong beer. R. A. 408. See also Merkle v. m State v. Rush, 13 R. I. 198. State, 37 Ala. 139. le Merkle v. State, 37 Ala. 139. 11 Roberson v. State, 100 Ala. It has been held in Arkansas 123- 14 So. 869. that alcohol is neither ardent nor 12 Commonwealtli v. Bios, 116 vinous liquor. State v. Martin, Mass. 56. 34 Ark. 340. See also State v. 13 Kerkow v. Bruer, 15 Neb. 150; Witt, 39 Ark. 216. 18 N. W. 27. 17 Wadsvvorth v. Dunam, 117 i4Rau V. People, 63 X. Y. 277; Ala. 661; 23 So. 699; Frickie v. Markle v. Akron, 14 Oliio 586. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 626; 51 See Johnston v. State, 23 Ohio S. W. 394; Pike v. State, 40 Tex. St. 556, where ale was excepted Cr. App. 613; 51 S. W. 395; Peo- 963 WHAT LIQUORS ARE PROHIBITED. § 567 shows that the liquor actually drank produced intoxication is sufifieient to support the charge that it was intoxicating ; ^* but evidence that other liquor procured at another place and sold by the same name produced intoxication is not sufficient to show that the specific liquor sold was intoxicating, when the name given it does not import an intoxicating liquor/^ So a sale of peppermint essence containing fifty per cent, of alcohol, although generally used as a carminative, but which may be and is used as a beverage to the vendor's knowledge, is an offense.-" Under a statute requiring a license for sale of all distilled or rectified spirits or fermented or malt liquors, sales of a liquor containing between .74 per cent, and 1.18 per cent, in volume of alcohol requires a license, especially w'here it is intended as an evasion and to defeat the statute.'^ But liquor sold as a beverage cannot be classed as intoxi- cating where a statute declares that the term "intoxicating liquor" shall include liquors that will produce intoxication, regardless of the percentage of alcohol it contains, for the percentage may be so small as to not produce intoxication.-^ Where intoxicating liquors are declared by statute to include any malt liquor, then proof of a sale of beer shows a violation pie V. Cox, 45 N. Y. Misc. Rep. i9 Kemp v. State (Tex. Cr. 311; 92 N. Y. Supp. 125; Goode App,), 38 S. W. 937 (Hughes' V. State, 87 Miss. 618; 40 So. 12; Lemon Ginger) ; Malone v. State Greiner-Kelly Drug Co. v. Tru- (Tex. Cr. App.), 51 S. W. 381. €tt (Tex. Cr. App.), 75 S. W. 536. 20 state v. Kezer, 74 Vt. 50; 52 isFricke v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. Atl. 116. App. 626; 51 S. W. 394; Pike v. 21 People v. Cox, 106 N. Y. App. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 613; 51 Div. 299; 94 N. Y. Supp. 526; S. W. 395; Baker v. State (Tex. affirming 45 N". Y. Misc. Rep. 311; 'Cr. App.), 47 S. W. 980; State v. 92 N. Y. Supp. 125; State v. Cal- Good, 56 W. Va. 215; 49 S. E. vin, 127 Iowa 632; 103 N. W. 121; State V. Reynolds (Kan.), 47 068; Locke v. Commonwealth Pac. 573; Taylor v. State, 44 Tex. (Ky.), 74 S. W. 654; 25 Ky. L. Cr. App. 437; 72 S. W. 181; Mat- Rep. 76; United 'States v. Cohn, kin& V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 62 52 S. VV. 38; State v. Morehead, 22 S. W. 911; McDaniel v. State R. I. 272; 47 Atl. 545; State v. (Tex. Cr. App.), 65 S. W. 1068; Gillispie, 63 W. Va. 152; 59 S. kerr v. 'State, 63 Neb. 115; 88 E. 957. JSr. W. 240. 22 state v. Virgo, 14 N. D. 293; 103 N. W. 610. §567 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 964 of the statute.^' Blackberry cordial, if intoxicating, is pro- hibited,-* and so is Jamaica ginger.-'^ Whether or not "hop- ale" or "hop- jack" is intoxicating is a question for the jury.-*' If a statute provides that the sale of liquor contain- ing a certain per cent, of alcohol shall not be made without a license, it is immaterial whether or not it is intoxicating.-" Peach brandy is an intoxicating li()uor, and the jury may be so told.-^ If a li(iu()r may be drank in such quantities as prac- tically not to produce intoxication, then it cannot be classed as an intoxicating liquor; but it is not error to refuse to say to the jury that "if drank in reasonable quantities" it would not produce intoxication it cannot be classed as an intoxi- cating liquor.-" Under a statute prohibiting the sale of alcohol it is immaterial that it is not intoxicating.^" Liquor which requires the drinking of excessive quantities in order to produce intoxication is not usually classed as intoxicating liquors.''^ If a statute provides for the licensed sale of a 23 Douglass V. State. 21 Ind. App. 302; 52 N. E. 238; State v. Besheer, 69 Mo. App 72; State v. Currie, 8 N. D. 545; 80 N. W. 475; 'Cullinan v. McGovern, 94 N. Y. Supp. 525; Williams v. 'State, 72 Ark. 19; 77 S. W. 597. 2* Pike V. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 613; '51 S. W. 395. 25 Mitchell V. Commonwealth, 100 Ky. 002; 51 S. W. 17; 21 Ky. L. Rep. 222. -6 Daniel v. State, 149 Ala. 44; 43 So. 22; Rutherford v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 431; 88 S. W. 810; Costello V. State, 130 Ala. 143; 30 So. 376. 27 State V. York, 74 N. H. 125; 65 Atl. 685. It includes cider. Common- wealth V. McGrath, 185 Mass. 1 ; 69 X. E. 340; Commonwealth v. Wenzel, 24 Pa. Super. Ct. 467; Eaves v. State, 113 Ga. 749; 39 S. E. 318. See also People v. Cox, 45 N. \. Misc. Rep. 311; 92 N. Y. Supp. 125. 2'* Howell V. State, 124 Ga. 698; 52 S. E. 649; fereiner- Kelly Drug Co. V. Truett (Tex. Cr. App.), 75 8. W. 536. 29 Murray v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 128; 79 S. W. 568; Fawcett V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 73 S. W. 807 ; Racer v. State ( Tex. Cr. App.), 73 ,S. W. 807. 30 Commonwealth v. Wenzel, 24 Pa. Super. €t. 467. 31 State V. Reynolds (Kan. App.), 47 Pac. 573; Mason v. State, 1 Ga. App. 534; 58 S. E. 139; Davis v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 393; 37 S. W. 435; Hewitt V. People (111.), 57 X. E. 1077, affirming 87 111. App. 367; Malone V. State (Tex.), 51 S. W. 381; State v. Parker, 139 X. C. 586; 51 S. E. 1028; Walker v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 98 S. W. 265; Heint^s 965 WHAT LIQUORS ARE PROHIBITED. §568 particular liquor, its sale is legal though intoxicating, and although a statute forbids the sale of intoxicating liquors.^- A sale of liquor that contains a mere "trace" of alcohol is not an intoxicating liquor.^'' If the liquor be intoxicating, it is immaterial that the vendor sold it as a medicine ; ^* but if it be doubtful whether the liquor sold can be used as a bev- erage, and it has never been so used, its sale is not a violation of the statute.^^ The fact that the seller believed the liquor he sold was not intoxicating, and that he purchased it as such, is no defense.^'' Sec. 568. Spirituous. Spirituous liquors mean distilled and fermented liquors under the Tennessee code,^' and wine and ale ; ^^ and in Pennsylvania it need not be intoxicating.^" In North Carolina it includes wine and beer.*° Under the Mississippi Act of 1842 neither alcohol nor wine was a spirituous liquor." "Spiritu- ous liquors" does not include beer,*^ but if beer be mixed with V. LcPage, 100 Me. 542; 62 Atl. 605; Henderson v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 269; 91 S. W. 569. 32 Armour v. Mpridian ('Miss.), 24 So. 533. In Georgia in 1901 native wine could not be sold. Hancock v. State, 114 Ga. 439; 40 S. E. 317. 33 State V. Parker, 139 N. C. 686; 51 S. E. 1028. Othei-wise if slightly intoxicat- ing. Queen v. McDonald, 24 Nov. Sco. 45. 34Colwell V. State, 112 Ga. 75; 37 S. E. 129. 35 Mackall v. District of Colum- bia, 16 App. D. C. 301. A malt tonic, not intoxicating, may be sold in a prohibition dis- trict. Reisenberg v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 84 S. W. 585. Where a liquid was shown to contain one ounce of alcohol in every four ounces it was treated as a wine, though there was no statutory definition of wine. Har- ris V. Jenns, 9 C. B. (N S.), 152; 30 L. J. M. C. 183; 3 L. T. 408; 9 W. L. 36. 36 Bascot V. State ( Miss. ) , 48 So. 228; Cotton v. State (Tex.), 120 S. W. 432; Ware v. State (Ga.), 65 S. E. 333, But see Dead- wilier V. State (Tex.), 121 S. W. 864. 37 Fritz V. State, 1 Baxt. 15. 38 State V. Sharrer, 2 Coldvv. 323. 39 Commonwealth v. Reyburg, 122 Pa. 299; 16 Atl. 351; 23 W. X. C. 151; 2 L. R. A. 415. 40 State v. Gierseh, 98 N. C. 720; 4 S. E. 193. 41 Lemly v. State, 70 Miss. 241 ; 12 So. 22; 20 L. R. A. 645. 4.: Tinker v. State, 90 Ala. 647 ; 8 So. 855; State v. Brindle, 28 Iowa 512. §500 aRAI-'FIC fiV INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 960 spirituous liquors, and sold as beer, a sale of the mixture is a violation of the statute forbidding the sale of spirituous liquors,*^ Sec. 569. Ale and beer — Malt liquors. Under a statute forbidding the sale of malt liquors there may be a conviction on proof of a sale of beer.** Beer is neither a spirituous nor a vinous liquor ; *^ but a sale of spirituous liquor with which beer has been mixed is covered by a charge of a sale of spirituous liciuors.**"' Strong liquor covers a sale of strong beer,'^ but not ale.*** Where a statute, without defining beer gave a city power to prohibit its sale, and the city adopted an ordinance in the terms of the statute, it was held that the beer sold need not be intoxicating to constitute a sale a violation of the ordinance.*" But in this same State it has been held not sufficient to merely charge a sale of beer without alleging it was intoxicating. '^^ If a ^"' Commonwealth v. Bathwick, a Cush. 247. A city charter provided for an election to determine the question of license or no license for the re- tailing of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors. That section of the •charter making it the duty of the town trustees to grant licenses in the event of a majority of the votes was cast in favor of a li- cense omitted the word "spiritu- ous." It was held that the omis- sion of this word was evidently a mistake, and that the trustees were not confined merely to the licensing of vinous or malt liquors. Caldwell v. Grimes, 7 Ky. L. Rep. (abstract) 601. 44Adler v. State, 55 Ala. 16; Watson V. State, 55 Ala. 158; State V. Lemp, 16 Mo. 380; State V. Rush, 13 R. T. 108. 45 Tinker v. State, 00 Ala. 647; 8 So. 855; State v. Brindle, 28 Iowa 512. 46 Commonwealth v. Bathrick, 6 Cush. 247; Walker v. Prescott, 44 X. H. 511. 47 Nevin v. Ladue, 3 Denio 43, 437; 1 Code Rep. 43; People v. Wheelock, 3 Park. Cr. Rep. 9; Tompkins Co. v. Taylor, 21 N. Y. 173; 19 Plow. Pr. 2-59; People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330. 48 People V. Crilley, 20 Barb. 246; Cayuga Co. v. Freoff, 17 How. Pr. 442; Contra, Tompkins Co. V. Taylor, 21 N. Y. 173; 19 How. Pr. 259. 49 Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50 111. 39. As to "near" beer, see Campbell V. Thomasville (Ga.), 64 S. E. 815. 50 Hansberg v. People, 120 111. 1; 8 N. E. 857; 60 Am. Rep. 549. 967 WHAT LIQUORS ARE PROHIBITED. §§ 570, 571 statute prohibits the sale of malt liquors it is immaterial that they are not intoxicating.^^ Sec. 570. Wine — Vinous liquors. A statute forbidding the sale of vinous liquor means a liquor made from the juice of the grape.^- It is an intoxi- cating ^^ or spirituous liquor.^* Blackberry wine is an alcoholic liquor.^^ Under a statute prohibiting the sale of vinous liquors the wine sold need not be intoxicating to violate its provi- sions."^ Beer is not a vinous liquor, and a statute forbidding the sale of vinous liquors does not include beer,*^^ nor alcohol.^^ Sec. 571. Cider. Under a statute prohibiting the sale of "alcohol, or any spirituous, ardent, vinous, malt or fermented liquor," fer- mented cider, being an alcoholic beverage, cannot be sold.^® But cider does not come under the terms of a statute pre- venting the sale of spirituous, malt or vinous liquor,®" but it does under one preventing a sale of "all intoxicating liquors 51 State V. O'Connell, 99 Me. 120 Pa. 395; 14 Atl. 151. Gl; 58 Atl. 59; Dinkins v. State, "Tinker v. State, 90 Ala. 647; 149 Ala. 49; 43 So. 114; Langel 8 So. 855; State v. Brindle, 28 V. Bushnell, 197 111. 20; 63 N. Iowa 512. E. 1086, affirming 96 111. App. bs Lemly v. State, 70 Miss. 241 ; 618; Lambie v. State, 151 Ala. 12 So. 22; 20 L. R. A. 645. 86; 44 So. 51; Markle v. State, 37 A statute permitting a sale of Ala. 169. native wine made in the State 52 Adler v. State, 55 Ala. 16. means wine made in the State 53 Wolf V. State, 59 Ark. 297 ; and not wine made in any other 27 S. W. 77; 43 Am. St. 34; State State or country. Commonwealth V. Page, 66 Me. 418. v. Petranich, 183 Mass. 217; 66 5* State V. Moore, 5 Blackf. N. E. 807. 1 IS ; Jones v. Surprise, 64 N. H. 59 Eureka Vinegar Co. v. Ga- 243; 9 Atl. 384. zette Printing -Co., 35 Fed. 570; Contra, Caswell v. State, 2 People v. Foster, 64 Mich. 715; Humph. 402. 31 N. W. 596; Commonwealth v. 55 Reyfelt v. State, 73 Mi.^s. llue.^e, 1 Wilcox (Pa.,!, 253. 415; 18 So. 925. eo Feldman v. Morrison, 1 58 Hatfield v. Commonwealth, Bradw. (111.), 460. §572 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 968 whatevpr,""^ and especially "hard cider," which the court takes judicial notice that it is intoxicating.'- Under a statute prohibiting a sale of "cider or fermented liquor" is included any cider, whether fermented or not ; "" l)ut one prohibiting the sale of "spirituous liquors, wine, porter, ale, or beer, or any drink of like nature," has been held not to cover crab eider or cider."* Cider made from grapes is a fermented liquor.*'' Sec. 572. Fruit preserved in intoxicating liquors. The sale of a bottle containing six peaches and one gill of brandy to preserve the peaches does not come within the pro- visions of a statute forbidding the sale of intoxicating liquors ; ••" nor does extract of lemon though it may produce intoxication."^ But whether or not brandied cherries was a sale of intoxicating liquors was deemed a question of fact, and if sold in a bottle containing liquor that could be drunk and would intoxicate, then an offense against the statute was committed."^ 61 state V. Hutchinson, 72 Iowa 561; 34 N. W. 421; State v. Mc- Namara, 69 Me. 1.33; State v. Roach, 75 Me. 123; Common- wealth V. Dean, 14 Gray 99; Her- tel V. People, 78 111. App. 109; State V. Robinson, 61 S. C. lOG; 39 S. E. 247; Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 152 Mass. 493; 25 N. E. 833; State v. Crawley, 75 Miss. 919; 23 So. '625; State v. White, 72 Vt. 108; 47 Atl. 397; State v. Thornburn, 75 Vt. 18; 52 Atl. 1039; Matkins v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 58 S. W. 108; Common- wealth V. McGrath, 185 Mass. 1; ■69 N. E. 340; Hewitt v. People (111.), 57 X. E. 1077, affirming 87 111. App. 367; Matkins v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) ; 62 S. W. 911. Contra, Guptill v. Richardson, 62 Me. 257. 62 State V. bchaefer, 44 Kan. 90 ; 24 Pac. 92. 63 State V. Spanieling, 61 Vt. 505; 17 Atl. 844. 64 State V. Oliver, 2G W. Va. 422; 53 Am. Rep. 79. rown v. Per- v. Robertson, 19 Okla. 149; 92 kins, 12 Gray 89; Christensen v. Pac. 144; Depree v. State (Tex.), Kellogg, etc. Co., 110 111. App. 119 S. W. 301. 61; Strickland v. Knight, 45 974 975 ABATEMENT AND INJUNCTION. § f)?? damages. Such was the case where the owner of a lot adjoin- ing a private residence, in a part of a city devoted entirely to residences, located a saloon thereon within ten feet of the door of plaintiff's residence.- Sec. 577. Grounds for Abatement. Under an Ohio statute '• on conviction of the proprietor of having illegally sold liquor, the premises will be abated as a matter of course unless it appears that he has voluntarily and permanently stopped the sale.* Under this statute it was the business and not the place where it was carried on that constituted the offense, and hence if the business had ceased no decree of abatement could be entered, for the decree had to be directed against the business and not against the place where it had been carried on.^ A single sale did not make the place, or the seller a "keeper" of a nuisance.*' The discharge of a clerk who made illegal sales is not such a cessation of the business as will be a sufficient defense, espe- cially if subsequent sales be shown. ^ Under the West Virginia Code ** there could be no abatement until the o-wner or keeper had been convicted of an illegal sale, and then a bill in equity filed wherein the conviction was set up as a reason for the abatement.^ zHaggart v. Stehlin, 137 Ind. Hargett v. Bell, 134 N. C. 394; 43; 35 N. E. 997. 46 S. E. 749. (The opinion in 29 N. E. 1073 As to conflict between a city- was set aside.) State v. Uhrig, charter and the general law on 14 Mo. App. 413 Tron v. Lewis, the question of local option, see 31 Ind. App. 178; 66 N. E. 490; Paul v. State (Tex. Civ. App.), Gowan v. Smith (Mich.), 122 106 S. W. 448. N. W. 286; 12 Det. L. N. 365; 3 Act May 1, 1854. Detroit Realty Co. v. Barnett, 156 * State v. Sundry Persons, 2 Mich. 385; 120 N. W. 804; 16 Det. Ohio Dec. 435. L. N. 107. 5 Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475. In North Carolina it is held 6 Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475. that the question whether a liquor ^ Elwood v. Price, 75 low^a 228 ; dealer has violated the loo-l op- 39 N. VV. 281. tion law, wherein is involved the « Code, c. 32, § 18. validity of a license he holds, he ^ Hartley v. Henrietta, 35 VV. cannot be tried in equity, but re- Va. 222; 13 S. E. 375. Contra, sort must be had to a court of Cowdery v. State, 71 Kan. 450; law where a jury can be secured. 80 Pac. 953. § 578 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS DIG Sec. 578. Statutory offense. In recent years, in order to cope adequately with the liquor traffic in a number of States, public opinion has demanded the adoption of statutes giving to courts of equity power to suppress it under certain circumstances, or equity powers in this particular have been given to courts of law for a like purpose. This is particularly true of the statutes of Maine, New Hampshire, "West Virginia, Ohio,^° Florida, Georgia, Iowa and Kansas. The remedy, as a rule, is to enjoin an act declared to be a nuisance; it is not to punish for past criminal acts, nor to enjoin the commission of them in the future. Its scope is to prevent the continuance of a nuisance already in existence." It is a cumulative remedy, and is available even though other remedies be within themselves adequate and complete.^- In Maine, upon petition of a cer- tain number of legal voters the Supreme Court has been given power to abate a liquor nuisance.^ ^ Where a statute made a place where intoxicating liquors are sold in violation of law, or where kept in violation of law, or M'here persons are allowed to resort for the purpose of drinking,^* it was held the keep- ing of the place where these things were done was the nuisance and not the selling or resorting to the place for the purpose of drinking.'^ And where a boarder in a hotel, with- 10 At least at one time. the difficulty of enforcing prohibi- 11 Davis V. Auld, 96 Mo. 559; tion laws by the use of juries 53 Atl. 118; State v. Roberts (N. and even by the use of local H.), 69 Atl. 722; Devanney v. courts. The death of one of the Hanson, 60 W. Va. 3; 53 S. E. petitioners is no abatement of ■603. the cause of action, because in its i-Legg V. Anderson, 116 Ga. nature is is criminal. Beebee v. 401; 42 S. E. 720; State v. Col- Wilkins (N. H.), 29 Atl. 693. lins, 74 Vt. 43; 52 Atl. 69; Paul i* N. D. Rev. Codes 1899, V. State (Tex. Civ. App.), 106 §7605. S. W. 448; In re Rancour, 66 N. i5 state v. Nelson, 13 N. D. 122; H. 172; 20 Atl. 930 (a civil pro- 99 X. W. 1077. ceeding.) Hammer v. Dunla\'y The word "place" was held to (Iowa), 121 N. W. 1024. mean the particular room, tene- 13 Davis v. Auld, 96 Me. 559 : ment or apartment where the 63 Atl. 118. liqv.or is kept or sold, or the un- This Maine statute illustrates lawful business done. 977 ABATEMENT AND INJUNCTION, § 579 out the knowledge or consent of the proprietor kept liquor in his room, and on three or four occasions sold it, it was held that the court could not adjudge the entire hotel a nuisance but only the particular room, and that it could not do so unless the particular room was definitely ascertained.^" A social club, formed and conducted in clear evasion of the law, may have its club rooms abated.^^ Actual sales are not always necessary to the commission of the offense, it being sufficient to show that liquors were kept in violation of the statute.^^ As the action is quasi criminal in its character, the facts claimed to constitute a nuisance must clearly fall within the provisions of the statute, even though the action is brought and maintained by an individual/'' Sec. 579. Offenses which authorize an abatement or grant- ing of injunction. Before an abatement of a place as a nuisance can be decreed or an injunction be issued, some violation of the law must be shown. But although a person may be authorized to sell liquor, yet if he persistently sell it in a manner which is a violation of the law, his act will render his business or place a liquor nuisance. Thus, if a druggist has a permit to sell liquors, yet if he sells them in a manner which is illegal or to persons to whom he is prohibited at the time from selling — as sales without a physician's prescription when prescriptions are required — his place may be abated as a liquor nuisance.^" Such a place need not be kept in a disorderly manner to Instate V. Nelson, supra. criminal proceedings, and the 17 Cohen v. King Knob Club, 55 maintenance of a saloon would W. Va. 108; 46 S. E. 799. not be enjoined. State v. Craw- 18 State V. Dominisse (Iowa), ford, 28 Kan. 726; 42 Am. Rep. m N. VV. 561. 182. 19 Jones V. Mould, 138 Iowa 683; 20 state v. Donovan, 10 X. D. 116 N. W. 733. 203; 86 N. W. 709; McCoy v. Under former Iowa statutes the Clark, 104 Iowa, 491; 73 N. W. proceedings partook of a criminal 1050; State v. McGrier, 9 X. D. character. State v. Greenway, 92 566; 84 N. W. 363; Rizer v. Top- Iowa 472; 61 N. W. 239; State v. per, 133 Iowa 628; 110 N. W. Van Vliet, 92 Iowa 476; 61 X. 1038. W. 241, In Kansas they were § 579 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 978 constitute it a nuisance.-^ Although the liquors be not drunk upon the premises where illegally sold, yet the penalty of the statute will be incurred as effectually as if they were drunk there.-- A city may be empowered to declare that a place where ale containing alcohol in sufficient amount to produce intoxication is sold shall be a nuisance.-^ And it has been held that it is not necessary to show that the liquor .sold was intoxicating in order to decree an abatement of the place.-* But in Georgia where a dispensary was operated in good faith, and liquors likewise sold in violation of the law, it was held that it was not a "blind tiger," Rubject to be abated or enjoined.-'^ In Iowa the statute r^^nlies not only to places of retail but also to places of wholesale and manufacture.-'' Irregularities in the grantincr of a license to sell will not authorize the abatement of the place where the liquor is sold, nor will the fact that the defendant has sold or is selling liquor illegally in another place justify the granting of an injunction, where the statute provides that the place where the illegal sale takes place and not the place itself shall con- stitute the nuisance.-^ Under a statute declaring that "all buildings, places or tenements used for the illegal keeping or sale of intoxicating liquor .shall be deemed common nuisances," a hotel is a "place" and may be abated.-^ Where a landlord incurs the penalty of the statute, if he leases his premises for the liquor traffic or permits his tenant to carry on the traffic in violation of the statute, if the tenant, without his knowl- edge carries on an illegal traffic, a judgment abating such premises will not be given -" especially if the illegal traffic has ceased before the action is brought.^" Where a licensee 21 Howard v. State, 6 Ind. 444. Iowa, 598; 43 N. W. 606. 22 State V. Fraser, 1 N. D. 425; 27 Clark v. Riddle, 101 Iowa 48 N. W. 343. 270; 70 N. W. 207. 23Langel v. Buslinell, 197 111. 28 Commonwealth v. Purcell, 154 20; 63 N. E. 1086, affirming 96 Mass. 388; 28 N. E. 288. See 111. App. 618. State v. Nelson, 13 N. D. 122; 99 24 State V. Hughes, 16 R. I. 403; N. W. 1077. 16 Atl. 911. 29 state v. Stafford, 67 Me. 125. 25 Cannon v. Merry, 116 Ga. 3o Merrifield v. Swift, 103 Iowa 291; 42 S. E. 274. 167; 72 N. W. 444. 28 Craig V. Werthmueller, 78 979 ABATEMENT AND INJUNCTION, § 579 just before the expiration of his license entered into an arrangement with a person to add to his [the licensee's] stock large quantities of liquors, and then executed to him a mort- gage thereon, and permitted this mortgage to be foreclosed, and under an execution issued on such decree was proceeding to sell and continue the sale of such liquors in retail quan- tities, from day to day, the purpose of the mortgagor and mortgagee being to evade the statute concerning the liquor traffic, the court enjoined the sale, holding that the sale was an abuse of the process issued on the decree.^^ If a party is openly violating the law he cannot avoid an injunction by bringing his business into conformity with the law before a hearing is had but after the suit is begun. ^- And although the defendant may have ceased to violate the statute before suit brought, yet if he be still in the liquor business, and there is a fair presumption that the violation of the statute will be resumed in the future, an injunction will be awarded,^' So where a saloon keeper habitually sells liquor by the keg, and those purchasing it take it into the street in front of the saloon and there treat the crowd, or, when several purchasers drink the liquor and repeatedly become intoxicated and con- duct themselves in sn disordprlv a manner that people avoid passing along the street, a nuisance is maintained upon the saloon premises which will be abated.^* And if a statute re- quires sales to be made upon M-ritten requests and a sworn report of such sales made to an officer, and the sales are made upon insufficient or blank requests, which are afterwards filled out by the salesman, and no reports of sales are made, the maintenance of the saloon will be enjoined."^' A dispensary 31 Fears v. State, 102 Ga. 274 ; injunction or an abatement of the 29 iS. E, 463. nuisance. Long v. Joder, 129 Iowa 32 Donnelly v. Smith, 128 Iowa 471; 116 N. W. 1063. 257; 103 N. W. 776; McCracken 3* Jung Brewing Co. v. Com- V. Miller, 129 Iowa 623; 106 X, momvealth, 123 Ky. 507; 96 S. W. W. 4. 595; 29 Ky. L. Rep. 939. 33 McCracken V. Miller, 129 Iowa ss Peak v. Bidinger, 133 Iowa '623; 106 N. W. 4; Bohstedt v, 127; 110 N. W. 292; Lofton v. Shanks, 136 Iowa 686; 116 N. Collins, 117 Ga. 434; 43 S. E, \V. S12. A promise not to vio- 708; 61 L. R. A. 150; State v. late the statute in the future will Estop, 66 Kan. 416; 71 Pac. 857. not prevent the granting of an §§ 580, 581 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 980 authorized by a State law, but operated illegally may be abated.^" So au arrangement of the saloou which is a viola- tion of a statute providing liow it shall be arranged is a sufficient cause for its abatement.''^ Sales of liciuor on an election day authorizes a decree abating the saloon, although the sales took place only on one of such days.^* A pharmacist in Iowa cannot escape on the ground that the illegal sales were not made by him personally but by his brothers and sisters in the store without his authority.^^ Upon the accused's claim that he distributed the liquors among members of a club and that the transactions were not sales, it was held that he could not complain of an instruction authorizing a conviction if he used rooms for the sale of liquors therein, or kept such rooms for the unlawful purpose of distributing the liquors to the members of such elub.*° Sec. 580. No intention to violate the statute. If a person has in fact violated the statute, the fact that he had no corrupt intention to do so is no defense.*^ Sec. 581. Grounds for injunction. An injunction cannot be maintained to prevent a liquor dealer selling liquor to the plaintiff's employes;*- nor will it lie to prevent a violation of the law unless, as previously stated, the plaintiff has suffered a peculiar damage.*^ This is true, even though the illegal act is a public nuisance.** 36 state V. Riddock (S. C), 61 ^ogtate v. Johns (Iowa), 118 S. E. 207; State v. German Rifle X. W. 295. Club, 80 S. C. 126; 61 S. E. 208; 4i Rizer v. Tapper, 133 Iowa State V. Charleston, etc. Co., 80 628; 110 N. W. 1038. S. C. 116; 61 S. E. 209; State v. 42 Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Wha- Riddock, 80 S. C. 118; 61 S. E. len, 3 Wash. T. 452; 17 Pac. 890. 210. -13 Manor v.* State (Tex. Civ. 37 State V. Gifford, 111 Iowa App.), 34 S. W. 769; Campbell 648; 82 N. W. 1034. v. Schofield, 29 Leg. Int. 325; 38 Hammond v. King, 137 Iowa State v. Schweickerdt, 109 Mo. 548; 114 N. W. 1062. 496; 19 S. W. 47. 39 Wilmot V. Johnson (Iowa), ** State v. Uhrig, 14 Mo. App. 123 N. W. 336. 413; State v. Wood, 155 Mo. 425; 66 S. W. 474; 48 L. R. A. 596. 981 ABATEMENT AND INJUNCTION. § 582 And even thongli a statute provide for an injunction to- restrain an illegal act or maintenance of a series of acts, yet if the act has been fully performed or the series of acts have been discontinued, an injunction will not issue ; *'' nor will it if the illegal acts have been performed on the premises without the accused's knowledge or consent.*** But if the illegal maintenance of the nuisance has been discontinued after suit brought, then a decree enjoining it will be entered.*'^ To justify the issuance of an injunction restraining the carry- ing on of the liquor traffic a statute authorizing its issuance is necessary ; but such a statute does not cover an instance of a probabilit}' that there will be a violation of the law if an injunction be not issued.^^ Where defendant was enjoined maintaining a liquor nuisance on his premises, and after- Avards another was enjoined maintaining a like liquor nuisance on another lot in the same block, and then the defendant purchased the house condemned and moved it onto his own lot, in which he sold liquor, it was held a new injunction would issue abating the building in its new location/'* Sec. 582. Temporary injunction. A conviction of unlawful sales is not necessary to the securing of an injunction ; even a temporary injunction may be granted without such a conviction.^'" But where the lessee 45 state V. Saunders, &6 X. H. 48 pike County Dispensary v. 39; 25 Ati. 588; 18 L. R. A. 64{); Brundige, 130 Ala. 193; 30 So. Eckhert v. David, 75 Iowa 302; 451. 39 N. W. 513; State v. Strick- The running of a saloon is not ford, 70 N. H. 297; 47 Atl. 262; a nuisance per se, and municipal Sharpe v. Arnold, 108 Iowa 203; authorities cannot single out a 78 N. W. 819; Merrifield v. Swift, particular saloon and arbitrarily 103 Iowa 107; 72 N. W. 444. declare its nuisance and close its 48 State V. Severson, 88 Iowa doors. De Blanc v. New Iberia, 714; 54 N. W. 347; Drake v. 100 La. 680; 31 So. 311. Kingsbaker, 72 Iowa 441; 34 X. 49 Hill v. Dunn- (Iowa), :^3 X. W. 199. W. 705. *- Halfman v. Spreen, 75 Iowa so Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 309; 39 N. W. 517; Judge v. 488; 22 N. A. 641; 54 Am. Rep. Kribs, 71 Iowa, 1-83; 32 N. W. 19; Pontius v. Winebrenner, 65 324; Donner v. Hotz, 7A Iowa Iowa =591; 22 X. W. 646; Don- 389; 27 N. W. 969. uelly v. Smith, 128 Iowa 257; 103 § 583 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 982 has created the nuisance, and the lessor in good faith has sought to abate it, a temporary injunction will not be granted.°^ If the plaintift' is entitled to a temporary in- junction it is error to refuse it. Such is the case where the complaint and affidavit in support of it makes out a primo facie case. In such an instance it is error to grant the de- fendant's application for a continuance without granting a temporary injunction.^- On appeal from a temporary in- junction a supersedeas will not be granted even though a bond for it be filed, for the reason that if it be granted the nuisance will be continued, to the detriment of the community when the temporary injunction bond affords ample protection to the defendant if the case be reversed. ^"^ Sec. 583. Process — Notice. Notice to the person whose property it is sought to abate is absolutely necessary, just as it is when it is sought to enjoin the maintenance of a nuisance. But a statute may provide for notice to a non-resident of the State by publica- tion, and such a statute will apply even to a non-resident trustee in bankruptcy.^* The notice of a hearing for a tem- porary injunction, three days' notice being required, must have the formalities of a notice required in any other form of action to give the court jurisdiction.^^ Thus, where the plain- tiff was required to give three days' notice that at a particular X. W. 776; Pontius v. Brumen, 66 5?, Jacoby v. Shoemaker, 26 Fla. Iowa 88; 23 X. W. 277; State v. 502; 7 So. 855. Patterson, 13 X. D. 70; 99 X. \Y. If the accused admitted that the 67 Powers v. Winters, 106 Iowa allegations of the petition were 751; 77 X. W. 509; McCoy v. true, it was held that the grant- Clark, 104 Iowa 491; 73 X. W. ing of a preliminary injunction 1050; Barckell v. State (Tex. Civ. was within the discretion of the App.), 106 S. W. 190. court. Carelton v. Rugg, 149 51 Shear v. Brinkman, 72 Iowa Mass. 550 ; 22 X. E. 55 ; 55 L. R. 698; 34 X. W. 483. A. 193; 14 Am. St. 446. 52 Tibbetts v. Burster, 76 Iowa 54 Radford v. Thoruell, 81 Iowa 176; 40 X. W. 707; Sawyer v. 709; 45 X. W. 890. Termohlen (Iowa), Ml X. W. 55 Beck v. Vaughn, 134 Iowa 921. 331; 111 X. W. 994. See Powers v. Winters, 106 Iowa 751; 77 X. W. oi^ 983 ABATEMENT AND INJUNCTION. § 584 time he would file his petition in the office of the clerk of the court for a temporary injunction, a notice that at a particular time he would make application to the judge of the court on a petition for a temporary injunction, was held to give the court no jurisdiction of the matter. Such a notice must state the name of the judge to whom the application will be made and the place where he may be found. So such a notice is insufficient if it state that the action is brought by the county attorney when it should have been brought by the State.^** Sec. 584. Defenses. An injunction to restrain a defendant from maintaining a nuisance throughout the judicial district does not prevent the bringing of a second action when a second nuisance is main- tained ; " but such a judgment is a bar to a second action brought by another party seeking the same relief.^^ The motive with which the action is brought is no defense."^ Where the owner of premises leased them for a lawful purpose with the privilege of erecting a building thereon for use, but the lessee, without his knowledge opened a saloon in such building, and after a preliminary hearing had been heard and a temporary injunction been granted, the owner served notice on the lessee to vacate the premises and brought an unsuc- cessful action to oust him, a refusal to restrain him and a dis- missal of the action as to him was held not error.*"' The validity of an ordinance requiring the closing of saloons may be raised by the defendant."^ It is no excuse for him that he violated the law by mistake.*^- Where it hax^pened that the 56 Beck V. Vaughn, 134 Iowa •'"'S Dickinson v. Eicliorn, 78 Iowa 331; 111 N. W. 994. 710; 43 X. VV. 620; 6 L. R. A. In Kansas it has been held that 721. a notice of an application for a ^^ Hemmer v. Bonson, 139 Iowa preliminary injunction need not 210; 117 N. W. 257, 260. be given, as none is required. ^^ Morgan v. Koestner, 83 Iowa State V. Jepson, 76 Kan. 644; 134; 49 X. W. 80. 92 Pac. 600; State v. Hunter ei McNulty v. Toopf, 116 Ky. (Kan.), 92 Pac. 603. 202; 7o S. W. 258; 25 Ky. L. 57 Carter v. Steyer, 93 Iowa Rep. 430. 533; m N. W. 956. 62 state v. Gifford, 111 Iowa 648; 82 N. VV. 1034. § 585 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 984 defendant had sold out his business, was not then engaged in the business, and did not intend to engage in such business, the injunction was refused.*'^ But a discontinuance of the business after the granting of a preliminary injunction is not sufficient to secure the dismissal of the proceedings."* If there has been sales in violation of law a license to sell is no protection, and that is true where there has been such dis- orderly conduct permitted on the premises as to injuriously affect adjacent property when the proprietor of such adjacent property brings the suit for an injunction on the ground that he is suffering an irreparable injury because of the continua- tion of such conduct.**'' Where a statute provides that the suit might abate if the property owner paid the costs and gave a bond conditioned for the abatement of the nuisance, it was held not applicable to a defendant who had maintained the nuisance, but had abated it, who was not the ovMier of the premises.*"* But on the property owner complying with such statute the action abates.**^ Sec. 585. Parties plaintiff. Usually the statute points out who shall bring the action for an abatement or an enjoining of the nuisance, and that statute must be followed. Thus, in Georgia the action is brought on behalf of the public by the solicitor general of the judicial district where the violations of the statute have taken place."^ But there are statutes which authorize ' ' any citizen ' ' of a county to institute and maintain an action to enjoin a liquor nuisance. Under these statutes the person prosecuting the action must have the necessary qualifications, for if he 63 Eidley v. Greiner, 117 Iowa st Morris v. Lowry, 113 Iowa 679; 91 N. W. 1033. '544; 8.5 N. W. 788; Morris v. Con- 64Drummond v. Richland City nolly, 113 Iowa, 544; 85 N. W. Drug Co., 133 Iowa 266; 110 N. 789. W. 471; State v. Donovan, 10 es Walker v. MeXelly, 121 Ga. N. D. 610; 88 N. W. 717. 114; 48 S. E. 718. 65 Kissel V. Lewis, 156 Ind. 233 ; Substitution on revenal. Saw- 59 N. S. 478. yer v. Termohlen (Iowa), 122 N. 66 Patterson v. Nicol, 115 Iowa W. 924. 283; 88 N. W. 323. 985 ABATEMENT AND INJUNCTION. § 585 have not, he has not such an interest as enables him to main- tain the action. If he has such qualifications he may prose- cute the action both as a citizen and as an attorney for the State.*"' He acts in a representative capacity and cannot assent to any action of the court which will operate either as a license or permit to the maintenance of a liquor nuisance ; and if he does so assent any other citizen may have a review of the decree, on certiorari, especially if such other citizen's consent to the location of the saloon constituting the nuisance was necessary before it could be located at the place it occu- pies.^'' By the prosecutor removing from the county, the case cannot be dismissed."' But after suit brought by a citizen of the county, no other citizen, so long at least as he is prose- cuting it, has a right to intervene and thereby in any way control the action.'- "While the word citizen is usually con- strued to mean a ' ' citizen of the county, ' ' ^" yet this has been held to cover an instance of a Methodist clergyman residing in the county until removed by his conference to another loca- tion.^* In Iowa the qualifications of the plaintiff to maintain the action is not raised by the general denial, nor by an answer denying knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether he is a citizen of the county.'"' A statute authorizing any citizen of the county to maintain the action in the name of the State does not require him to obtain the consent of the State's attorney or attorney general to bring it.^^ But in Kansas the proper officer must institute the 89 State V. Sioux Falls, et*. Co., ''^•i Fuller v. McDonnell, 75 Iowa 2 S. D. 363; 50 N. W. 629; De- 220; 39 N. W. 277. vanney v. Hanson, 60 W. Va. 3 ; ''^ Craig v. Hasselman, 74 Iowa 53 S. E. 603; Lofton v. Collins, 538; 38 N. W. 402. 117 Ga. 434; 43 S. E. 708; 61 restate v. Bradley, 10 N. D. L. R. A. 150. 157; 86 N. W. 354. 70 Hemmer v. Bonson, 139 Iowa [Citing Littleton v. Fritz, 65 210; 117 N. W. 257, 260. Iowa 488; 22 N. W. 641; 54 Am. 71 Judge V. Kahl, 74 Iowa 486; Rep. 19; Conley v. Zerber, 74 Iowa »8 N. W. 173. 699; 29 N. W. 113; Maloney v. T^ Conley v. Zerber, 74 Iowa Traverse, 87 Iowa 306 ; 54 N. W. 699; 39 N. W. 113. 155; McQuade v. Collins (Iowa), 73Devanney v. Hanson, 60 W. 61 N. W. 213; State v. Sioux Falls Va. 3 ; 53 S. E. 603. Brewing Co. ('S. D.), 50 N. W. § 586 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 986 action in behalf of the public, and the fact that the statute declares the place to be a public nuisance will not justify a citizen abating it without process of law/^ Where the statute authorized public officers to maintain a civil action to abate a liquor nuisance, it was held that a municipal corporation coidd maintain an action to enjoin the illegal sale of liquors in such a place, although no vote had yet been taken to deter- mine whether a local option law should be put in force for- bidding the sale of liquors." When citizens bring the action and describe themselves as the "mayor and councilmen" of the city, this dosci-iption is mere surplusage and may be stricken outJ" Sec. 586. Parties defendant. The person who violates the liquor law is the person who is to be enjoined or whose premises or liquor is to be abated. If he hold a license, and yet sell in violation of the law, the statute applies to him and to his property.*** If the nuisance to be abated is the house vi^here the liquors were unlawfully sold, and the house is owned in partnership, then all the partners must be made defendants; for if only one be, then no decree ordering it be abated can be entered, for an effort to abate the interest of the partner made a party would lead to vexatious and unnecessary litigation.**' Any person who is Testate V. Stark, 03 Kan. 52!); plaintifT for the superintendent of 66 Pac. 243; 54 L. K. A. 910, cit- police of a city, who has brought ing Jones v. Chanute, 63 Kan. the action and asks leave to with- 243; 65 Pac. 243; Brown v. Per- draw the petition. State v. Lynch, kins, 12 Gray 89; Corthell v. 72 N. H. 185; 55 Atl. 553. Holmes, 87 Me. 24; 32 Atl. 715. The fact that another employed iSee also Lee Comity v. Hooper, the attorney conducting the case 128 Ga. 99; 56 N. E. 997. for plaintiff does not warrant a 'I's Britton v. Guy (8. U. ) , 97 dismissal of the action, where such N. W. 1045. plaintiff fully ratified the em- 79 Legg V. Anderson, 116 Ga. ployment and took active part in 401; 42 S. E. 720. the trial. Eizer v. Tapper, 133 In North Dakota the action is Iowa, 628; 110 N. W. 1038. brought by the State on the rela- so State v. Webber, 76 Iowa tion of the attorney general. 686 ; 39 N. W. 286 ; State v. Davis, State V. Donovan, 10 X. D. 203; 44 Kan. 60; 24 Pac. 73. 86 N. W. 709. SI Shear v. Green, 73 Iowa 688 ; In New Hampshire the State 36 N. VV. 642; State v. Douglass, solicitor may be substituted as 75 Iowa 432; 39 N. W. 686. OS- ABATEMENT AND INJUNCTION. § 586 in possession and control of the premises and liquor, if he manage them unlawfully may be made a defendant, even though he be not the owner; **'- but, of course, this would not be the case with om- who is a mere servant of the owner or keeper.^^ All concerned in the keeping of the premises may be joined, except mere servants.^* But the action cannot be maintained against parties where the nuisance has been created by mere trespassers, by erecting a building or tent on the premises and illegally selling liquors therein without the knowledge of the owner of such premises.^^ If the premises are occupied by a tenant, then both he and his landlord may be made parties, for the landlord has the power to eject his tenant from the premises as soon as he creates a nuisance thereon ; and whether he leased the premises for a lawful or an unlawful purpose, as soon as the nuisance is created the premises are subject to abatement.'^*' But unless the owner be made a party, and an opportunity be given him to be heard, no decree will be entered against him." If the party in pos- session be a tenant for life, he has absolute control of the premises, and only his interest therein can be abated.'" Where a statute provided that the owner and all persons interested in the premises, including the keepers of them, might be made parties, and they, their servants, agents, lessees, tenants and assigns enjoined from maintaining a nuisance thereon, it was held that an owner who was a resident in another State, but who maintained the place by an agent, could be joined, if he had reason to know his agent kept a liquor nuisance thereon.'^ s2Schultz V. State, 32 Ohio St. Iowa 432; 39 N. W. 686; iState v. 276. Riddock (S. €.), '61 S. E. 207; 83 State V. Gravelin, 16 R. I. McCracken v. Miller, 129 Iowa 407; le Atl. 914. 623; 106 N. W. 4; Morgan v. 84 Martin v. Blatter, 68 Iowa Koestner, 83 Iowa 134; 49 N. W. 286; 25 N. W. 131: 27 N. W. 80. 244. 8' State v. Marston, 64 N. H. 85 State V. Lawler, 85 Iowa 564; 603; 15 Atl. 222; Banner v. Hotz, 52 N. W. 490. 74 Iowa 389; 37 N. W. 969. 86 Martin v. Blatter, 68 Iowa ss Danner v. Hotz, 74 Iowa 389; 286; 25 N. W. 131; 27 N. W. 244; 37 N. W. 969. Bell'v. Glaseker, 82 Iowa 736; 47 §9 State v. Collins, 74 Vt. 43; N. W. 1042; State v. Douglass, 75 52 Atl. 69. § 587 TR^VFPIG IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 988 If the premises to be abated be in the control of a bankrupt court, they may still be abated, for the jurisdiction of the bankrupt court is not such as to prevent the entering of a decree against them.'"' Where a statute provided that "per- sons interested" might be made defendants, it was held that a mortgagee could not be made a party unless he had possession, or some right to the possession or control of the property."^ Sec. 587. Pleading — Complaint. The complaint or petition must show that the place sought to be enjoined or abated is within the State,^- and likewise show it lies within the terrtory over whch the court wherein the proceedings are brought has jurisdiction. Where a private person may bring the action it need not be alleged that notice had been given to the prosecuting officer before suit was brought, unless the statute specifically requires it.^^ Where it is sought to hold the owner of the premises because he permitted a nuisance to be maintained thereon, it must be alleged he had notice of its maintenance; but an allegation that it was maintained with his permission is equivalent to an allegation that he knew of its maintenance.''* If it is made an offense to use any building for the illegal sale or keeping of liquor, a petition is fatally defective which merely alleges that the building is occupied by its owner for the purpose of selling and keeping therein liquors for sale," be- cause it does not state that the building was actually used for that purpose."'' The petition must allege that the liquors were kept and sold by the defendants, and not that the build- so Radford V. Thorncll, 81 Iowa 394; 51 N. W. 22; 15 L. R. A. 709; 45 N. W. 890. 187. 91 State V. Massey, 72 Vt. 210; 93 Wood v. Baer, 91 Iowa 475; 47 Atl. 834. 59 N. W. 289; Lewis v. Hogan, In this case it was held that if 91 Iowa 734; 59 N. W. 290. the tenant created the nuisance, o* Gray v. Stienes, 69 Iowa 124; it must be alleged that the land- 28 N. VV. 475 ; Commonwealth v. lord, if made party, knew of the Brusie, 145 Mass. 117; 13 N. E. nuisance. 378. 92 Buck V. Ellenbolt, 84 Iowa 95 State v. Martin, C4 N. H. 603; 15 Atl. 2z2. 980 ABATEMENT AND INJUNCTION. § '"'^T ing occupied by the defendant ''is a place where spirituous liquors are unlawfully kept and sold, and is a common nuisance.""*' An allegation that the defendant "is guilty of keeping and maintaining a certain tenement" is equivalent to the charge that he "did keep and maintain a certain tene- ment," and is in that respect sufficient." Where the pro- ceedings were required to be made upon the petition of twenty legal voters, it was held that the signature of the twentieth man might be added after the petition was filed.''^ The peti- tion must allege specifically wherein the law has been violated which will justify an abatement of the places as a nuisance, and if it does not, the defendant may move that it be made more specific in that respect.^'" A petition which in one respect gives an inaccurate description of the place, yet such in- accuracy does not mislead the accused, is not bad because of such inaccuracy.^ Where the statute provided that an in- formation must be filed in a court of equity for the abatement of the nuisance upon a conviction of the keeper in a court of law of having illegally kept or maintained it, it is not neces- sary to aver that at the time of filing the information in the court of equity it had been maintained from the time of such conviction until the time of such filing.^ Under an allegation that the owner knew a nuisance was kept on the premises, proof is admissible that his agent knew or had reason to know it was so maintained, and it is not a variance.^ Where the statute required the petition for an injunction to "state the facts on which" the allegations of a violation of the law "are based," it was held that it could not be based no state v. Batcliellor, GG N. H. case in the Supreme Court of the 145- 20 Ail. 931. See Our House State. V State, 4 Greene (Iowa) 172. 99 Abrams v. Sandholm, 119 9T Commomvealth v. Gallagher. Iowa, 583; 93 N. W. 563. 145 Mass. 104; 13 X. E. 359. ^ State v. Reno, 41 Kan. 674; osiState V. Collins, 68 N. H. 46; 21 Pac. 803. 36 Atl. 550. estate v. Massey, 72 Vt. 210; This was where the proceed- 47 Atl. 834. inss were begun as an original 3 state v. Collins, 74 Vt. 43; 52 ^ Atl. 69. §588 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 990 on information and belief.* So an information charging that the defendant sold liquors at a certain place contrary to law is deficient in not alleging in what manner they were sold contrary to law.'' In pleading the nuisajiice facts must be alleged showing that the nuisance existed, and mere conclu- sions to the effect tliat a nuisance had been created is not sufficient.** Sec. 588. Pleading — Answer. If the place where the liquor was sold was a drug store, and liquor can be there lawfully sold, then that fact is a matter of defense.^ Where a statute was in force which pro- vided that if one sue in a representative capacity and if his capacity to so bring the suit be not controverted, it will be taken as true ; and to question the i-ight it must be specifically controverted; a general denial was hold not to raise the question that the plaintiff was not a citizen of the county when he had alleged that fact." So an answer denying knowl- 4 Wheaton v. Slattery, 96 X. Y. App. Div. 102; 88 X. Y. Supp. 1074. [Citing Matter of Peck, 107 N. Y. 391; GO N. E. 775; 58 L. R. A. 888; Hoorman v. Climax Cycle Co., 9 App. Div. 579.585, 41 K Y. S. 710; People ex rel. J. B. Lyon Co. V. McDonough, 7G App. Div. 257; 78 N. Y. S. 462; Matter of Hunter, 34 Misc. Rep. 389; 69 N. Y. S. 908, affirmed 59 App. Div. 620; €9 N. Y. S. 1137; People v. Windholz, 68 App. Div. 552; 74 N. Y. S. 241.] ^ Cohen v. King Knob Club, 55 W. Va. 108; 46 S. E. 799. In Kansas it is not necessary to aver that the place where the liquors were kept was not a dwell- ing house, that apparently being a defense. Ft. Scott v. Dunker- ton, 78 Kan. 189; 90 Pac. 50. See also as to a drug store in Wash- ington. Kirkland v. Ferry, 45 Wash. 003; 88 Pac. 1123. In Elaine the proceedings in equitj- are not governed by the strict rules of ecpiity procedure, and it is not necessary to allege that the defendant intends to con- tinue the illegal use of the prem- ises. Wright v. O'Brien, 98 Me. 196; 50 Atl. 647. «Bowen v. Hale, 4 Clarke (la.) 430. As to what is not a sufficient showing of information and belief, see State v. Union Social Club, 82 S. C. 142; 63 S. E. 545. 7 Kirkland v. Ferry, 45 Wash. 663; 88 Pac. 1123. 8 Shear v. Green, 73 Iowa 688; 36 N. W. 642; Kaufman v. Dos- tal, 73 Iowa 091; 36 X. W. 643; Littleton v. Harris, 73 Iowa 167; 34 X. W. '800; Bloomer v. Glen- dy, 70 Iowa 757; 30 X. W. 486. 991 ABATEMENT AND INJUNCTION. § 589 edge or information sufficient to form a belief that the plain- tiff has the requisite qualifications to bring the action is equivalent to a general denial and raises no issue on that question.'' If the defendant does not deny the maintenance of the nuisance, the allegations of the petition or complaint will be taken as true/" So if the action is against the owner of the premises, where it is charged his tenant maintained the nuisance with his knowledge, if lack of knowledge be not alleged in the answer, the allegation in the complaint will be taken as if it were proven.'^ If the answer does not deny the nuisance, and the nuisance consists of sales without a license, an answer alleging that after the suit was brought the defendant obtained a license for the place where the sales had been made is demurrable.^- To an answer alleging that the action was brought in bad faith and to annoy the defend- ant, no reply is necessary.^^ Sec. 589. Evidence. The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove a sufficient amount of the allegations in the complaint to constitute a cause of action.^^ A mere preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to sustain the complaint. ^^ Where the action was against the owner for permitting a nuisance to be kept on the premises by his tenant, proof that on several searches liquors were found on the premises in an ordinary saloon with places for concealing them, and that such owner had been subpoenaed as 9 Craig V. Hasselman, 74 Iowa i* Bowen v. Hale, 4 Clarke 538; 38 N. W. 402. (Iowa) 430; Jones v. Byington, 10 Bloomer v. Glendj', 70 Iowa 128 Iowa 397; 104 N. W. 473; 7'57; 30 N. W. 486; Peisch v. Lin- Sickinger v. State, 45 Kan. 414; der, 73 Iowa 766; 33 N. W. 133. 25 Pac. 868; State v. Reymann, 48 11 Overton v. Schindele, 85 Iowa W. Va. 307; 37 S. E. 591; State 715; 50 K W. 977. v. Jepson, 76 Kan. 644; 92 Pac. 12 Halfman v. Spreen, 75 Iowa 600, 603. Evidence showing aban- 309; 39 N. W. 512; Tibbetts v. donnient of liquor business. Bhs- Burster, 76 Iowa 17'6; 40 N. W. tedt v. Terefel (Iowa), 106 N. 707; Rice v. iSchlopp, 78 Iowa W. 513. 753; 41 N. W. 603. i- Davis v. Auld, 98 Me. 559; i3McQuade v. Collins, 93 Iowa 53 Atl. 118; -State v. Collins, 68 22; 61 N. W. 43. N. H. 299; 44 Atl. 495. § 589 TRAFFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 992 a witness in a former prosecution, was held sufficient to justify a decree abating the nuisance, although the tenant's lease provided he should sell no liquors on the premises, and the owner denied all knowledge of the unlawful use of them.'" Statutes often make the finding of liquors on the premises prima facie evidence of a nuisance, but these statutes are usually strictly construed. Thns, under the North Dakota statute the finding must be by an officer acting under the power of a search warrant, and not other^v^se, to raise the pre- sumption of illegality, and the proceedings must be instituted by an indictment. ^^ But where the statute raises the pre- sumption of illegality or of a nuisance on proof of sales, then the burden is on the defendant to show they were legal. ^'^ The accused may show that ho had ceased selling liquor before the action was brought.^^ Where husband and wife were jointly indicted for maintaining a nuisance, and the evidence showed that a customer applied to the husband for liquors and he said he had none but his wife did, which she kept for private use; and thereupon the husband got the liquor from his wife and handed it to the customer, it was held that she could not be convicted of an illegal transaction. -° Where the action was brought by an individual, and the plaintiff put in evidence an affidavit that he was an employe of the defend- ant's saloon and that the defendant was conducting such saloon in compliance with the law, it was held that he was bound thereby, except where the evidence showed statements in the affidavit were untrue.-^ Statutes are sometimes in force permitting the giving in evidence the reputation of the saloon,-- but usually such evidence is not admissible without 16 Littleton v. Harris, 73 Iowa as to wliat is sufficient evidence 167; 34 N. W. 800. lo justify a decree of abatement. 17 State V. Nelson, 13 N. D. 21 Hawks v. Fellows, 108 Iowa 122; 99 N. W. 1077. 133; 78 N. W. 812. 18 Shear v. Green, 73 Iowa G8S; 22 Farley v. O'Malley, 77 Iowa. 36 N. W. 642. 531; 42 N. W. 435; State v. 19 Sharp V. Arnold, 108 Iowa Mathieson, 77 Iowa 485; 42 K W. 203; 78 N. W. 819. 377; Hall v. Coffin, 108 Iowa 466; 20 State V. Mathieson, 77 Iowa 79 X. W. 274. 486; 42 N. W. 377. See the case 993 ABATEMENT AND INJUNCTION, § 589 the aid of a statute. Keputation that the business at the place was conducted lawfully is overcome by evidence showing actual violations.-^ Where a statute makes the possession of a United States license to sell intoxicating liquors prima facie evidence of illegal sales, and the accused claims the liquor actually sold was non-intoxicating, he has the burden to show it was not, and the fact that he took out the license to sell the particular liquor, because the United States Government claimed it was necessary on account of its alleged intoxicating qualities, is to be considered as an admission on the part of the accused that it was intoxicating, though not conclusive.-* If the proceeding is against the landlord to abate a nuisance on his premises maintained by his tenant with his knowl- edge, statements that he made to tenants before he rented them if they should take them they w^ould have to sell liquor, was held admissible to show a knowledge of sales made at subsequent tiraes.-^ The evidence need not show any par- ticular number of sales ;^" nor that they covered any par- ticular period of time; sales for half an hour will make the premises a nuisance.^^ Where a landlord made no effort to stop sales, except to serve upon his tenant notice to vacate the premises, but permitted him to remain several days during which sales were made, it was held that the evidence showed he acquiesced in their being made.-^ Evidence is admissible that one of several defendants, on the day the defendant was on trial for having sold the liquors, claimed the seized liquors, is admissible as an admission of his ownership of the place. -^ Of course, it must be shown that the liquors kept or sold were 23 Hall V. Coffin, 108 Iowa 466; 28, state v. Grime, S5 Iowa 415; 79 N. W. 274. 52 N. W. 351. 24 State V. Schultz, 79 Iowa 29 state v. Collins, 68 N. H. 478; 44 N. W. 713. 299; 44 Atl. 495. 25 State V. Davis, 69 N. H. 350 ; Effect of passage of Act of Con- 41 Atl. 267; Bell v. Glaseker, 82 gress known as the Wilson Iowa 736; 47 N. VV. 1042. Bill upon liquors as evidence 26 Craig V. Plunkett, 82 Iowa when found on the premises which 474; 48 N. W. 984; Pottenger v. were brought there before its pas- State, 54 Kan. 312; 38 Pac. 278. sage. State v. Severson, 88 Iowa 27 State v. Lord, 8 Kan. App. 714; 54 N. W. 347. 257; 55 Pac. 503. § 589 TR.\FFIC IN INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 994 intoxicating liquors,-''" and ille53; 43 N. W. 279; 6 L. R. A. 533; Campbell v. Manderscheid, 74 Iowa 708 ; 39 N. W. 92 ; Drum- mond V. Richland, etc. Co., 133 Iowa 266; 110 N. W. 471; Plank V. Hertha, 132 Iowa 213; 109 N. W, 732; Carter v. Bartel, 110 Iowa 211; 81 N. W. 462; State v. Gif- ford, HI Iowa 648; 82 N. W. 1034. 12 Craig V. Werthmueller, 78 Iowa 598; 43 N. W. 606; State V. Plamondon, 75 Kan. 269; 89 Pac. 23. 13 Newman v. Des Moines Coun- ty, So Iowa 89; 52 N. W. 105. As to amounts in various cases, see Farley v. O'Malley, 77 Iowa 531; 42 N. W. 435 ($350); Nich- ols V. Thomas, 89 Iowa 394; 56 N. W. 540 ($100); Hamilton v. Baker, 91 Iowa 100; 58 N. W. 1080 ($40); State v. Plamondon, 75 Kan. 269; 89 Pac. 23. 14 Sims V. Pottawottamie Coun- ty, 91 Iowa 442; 59 N. W. 68. Ten per cent, must be taxed for the county attorney in such an instance. Brennan v. Roberts, 125 Iowa 615; 101 N. W 460; John- son V. Roberts (Iowa), 101 N. W. 1131. 1005 ABATEMENT AND INJUNCTION. § 595 liquors were stored there,^^ In an action to enjoin the enforce- ment of a decree abating a nuisance, and the injunction is awarded, judgment for costs will be rendered against the person who was the active party in obtaining the injunction to abate the nuisanee.^^ But in the action to abate the nuisance the costs of the proceedings cannot be taxed to the plaintiff unless the action was brought maliciously.^^ 15 Cameron v. Guinder, 89 Iowa it Clark v. Riddle, 101 Iowa 298; 56 N. W. 502. 270; 70 N. W. 207. 16 Beck V. Vaughn, 134 Iowa 331; HI N. W. 994. / UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. REC'D LO-UKt UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY AA 000 838 251