BRITISH POLICY AND OPINION DURING THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR DORA NEILL RAYMOND, A. M. Sometime University Fellow at the University of lex'x* and Schiff Fellow in Political Seiche at Columbia University ;... . SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THF. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE Faculty of Political Science Columbia University NEW YORK 1921 BRITISH POLICY AND OPINION DURING THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR DORA NEILL RAYMOND, A. M. Sometime University Fellow at the University of Texas and Schiff Fellow in Political Science at Columbia University SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE Faculty of Political Science Columbia University NEW YORK 1921 Copyright, 1921 BY DORA NEILL RAYMOND gXGW*^ G,E K (La MY FATHER WHOM IT USED TO PLEASE TO SAY, " TOGETHER SOME DAY WE WILL WHITE A HISTORY," I DEDICATE, WITH DEEP AFFECTION, THIS DISSERTATION ON A SINGLE PHASE OF A GREAT WAR HENRY HART NEILL, B. A., LL.D. 1848-1911 4C CONTENTS PAGE Introduction: Great Britain, 1870 11 CHAPTER I British Relations with France and Germany, 1860-1870 .... 17 CHAPTER II France under Parliamentary Government 37 CHAPTER III British Negotiations preceding the Declaration of War 51 CHAPTER IV The Responsibility for the Declaration of War 67 CHAPTER V Publication of the Draft Treaty 87 CHAPTER VI Formation of the League of Neutrals 107 CHAPTER VII The Downfall of the Empire 127 CHAPTER VIII The Reception of the Republic 153 CHAPTER IX Abortive Peace Negotiations . ........ 172 CHAPTER X War a Outrance 194 7] 7 g CONTENTS [8 PAGE CHAPTER XI A Moon of Treaties and an Eclipse 215 CHAPTER XII A Stroke from the Bear 2 3i CHAPTER XIII Anarchic December. . 2 5° CHAPTER XIV " Peace at any Price" 28 4 CHAPTER XV The Armistice 3"> CHAPTER XVI The Negotiation of the Preliminaries 333 CHAPTER XVII Lenten Meditations. 358 CHAPTER XVIII The Treaty of Frankfort. . 383 Bibliography 406 Index 413 FOREWORD This study is the development of a master's thesis written at the University of Texas under Professor Thad Weed Riker. The author takes this opportunity of thanking him for his help at that time and for his suggestion of a sub- ject that has afforded her sustained interest and enjoy- ment. She wishes to acknowledge very gratefully the as- sistance of Professor Charles Downer Hazen, under whose guidance the research was conducted for two years at Columbia. Through his introduction she was enabled to use the very excellent collection of British periodicals and newspapers in the Boston Athenaeum and was incidentally given the pleasure of working in the most delightful library it has been her privilege to enter. The burden of proof reading has fallen to Professor Carlton Hayes, whose skill- ful care in this particular the author much appreciates. Though examination has been made of the files of the New York and the Boston Public Libraries, the Library of Congress, and the Libraries of Columbia, Harvard, and the University of Texas, the author is aware that much in- teresting material on the subject remains untouched across the Atlantic. That valuable collection of extracts from the British Press which is entitled Public Opinion has been extensively drawn upon to supply the lack of papers not available in this country. Biographies and memoirs of the period are constantly making their appearance and, barring the adoption of the loose-leaf system of certain encyclo- paedias, it would not be possible, even in England, to make the work definitive. 91 9 IO FOREWORD [ IO Finally, the author wishes very sincerely to thank Pro- fessor William Archibald Dunning for having permitted her to write the dissertation under his supervision after Professor Hazen had been called to Strasburg. Professor Dunning' s marginal comments and annotations have been so interesting, and, at times, so humorous that she regrets that it is not permissible to retain them with the text. The unconscious criticism that has been supplied by the super- iority of his own work cannot be so erased and the author hopes she may still profit by it. INTRODUCTION England, 1870 England, in the summer of 1870, may be described not inaptly by phrases which at that time might have described her Queen, — a lady who had attained to that age when com- fort is more to be esteemed than glory, and the quiet of Balmoral to any royal progress, even though it emulate the French Eugenie's journeyings in Egypt. A lady, however, not to be pitied or ignored, — one who caused her physician small anxiety and was herself undismayed by any vaporous fears of age or death. There was, too, a dignity about her that commanded respect, — the respect accorded to power which has been used greatly in times past and may again be used on provocation. The Queen, it was said, might sometimes be unmindful of the talk about her, but she was found to be alert always to whatever had to do with her brother, the Duke of Coburg ; her cousin, King of Hanover ; her uncle, Leopold of Belgium; her daughter, the Crown Princess of Prussia, her daughter-in-law, the* erstwhile Princess of Denmark; and most of all, her son, who was to rule dominions on the Seven Seas. Victoria, then, might choose to ride behind plump ponies in the low-swung car- riage that bears her name, but diplomatists and their masters could not forget that the drowsy widow tmder the tilted little sunshade was a queen and that the sunshade could be discarded for a sceptre. England, be it said, was like her Queen, — plump, and pacific, yet powerful withal. In this summer of 1870, her policy was controlled by disciples of the Manchester School : gentlemen who preferred congresses to wars, and rejoiced 11] 11 I2 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ I2 more at the conclusion of a commercial treaty or a guaran- tee of free trade than the acquisition of new territory. The days of " bluster and blunder " were believed to be well passed. Palmerston had died five years before, and Russell was in retirement. Reduction in armament was operating very favorably on the budget. A cotton market gone astray had come to be as much a matter of concern as a stray Britisher, clamorous of his citizenship. That echo of the Government, the Times, once called the " Thunderer," had donned slippers and dressing jacket and become querulous and homiletic. First of her public men was Gladstone, who for two years had been prime minister. Very much interested in the difficulties of Ireland was Gladstone. One of his greatest qualities, the only one in which he claimed to excel his rivals, was concentration. When it is considered that his interest was already deeply engaged elsewhere and that in character and manner he was wholly antithetic to his French neighbours, it may be understood how it happens that in his excellent biography in the Encyclopedia Britannica no men- tion is made of the war which during his premiership was waged beyond the " streak of silver sea," — a great war whose issue was of vast importance to> England. His Foreign Secretary was the patient, and polite, and very pliant, Lord Granville. This Lord Granville spoke French like a Parisian. He could appreciate French wit and treasure a bon mot so carefully that it would lose noth- ing of its gallic sparkle when it reappeared in an after-din- ner speech. But the French of that radical young advocate, Gambetta, left him cold. Nor can one fancy that the splen- did verve of the Song of Roland would have been to him a compensation for its gory fright fulness. He has been called the great pacificator of politics. Men said, in the winter of 1870, that he led England through the valley of humiliation that he might gain that title. I3 ] INTRODUCTION 1 3 Perhaps the most powerful personality in the Cabinet was that of the Quaker, John Bright. He was in ill-health at this time and absented himself from most of the meetings, but he wielded, none the less, a strong influence over his 1 associates. For many years he had been consistently favor- able towards France, believing as he did that Napoleon's friendship for England was the one "fixed point in his otherwise erratic schemes." He rejoiced at the renewal of the Commercial Treaty between the two countries; wrote an occasional strong letter to Gladstone or Granville when he feared they might swerve from neutrality; disregarded the critical press that urged his retirement; took his medi- cines regularly; and when the war was over and done with could boast, as did the Abbe Sieyes after a more turbulent epoch, that he had lived. Robert Lowe was 'Chancellor of the Exchequer. In a " Cabinet of Reform and Retrenchment " his business was to see that hostility to the former was balanced by gratitude for the latter. Reductions in the Navy had greatly assisted him in the preparation of a popular budget. It needed only peace to justify a continuation of his work. Messrs. Card- well and Childers were respectively War Secretary and First Lord of the Admiralty. At this time these positions were regarded as secondary and no extensive inquiry had been made as to these gentlemen's ability to fill them. Disraeli was the leader of the Opposition. He had not yet found himself, and was regarded as a weather cock by those Conservatives who could not understand how he had followed Bright in his desire for reduced naval armaments and, for the sake of office, embraced the Reform Bill of the Liberals. He, himself, was somewhat sceptical of the wis- dom of his course in those proceedings and yet reluctant to be completely out of gear with the well- jointed times. He did not wish to be classed with the brilliant Sir Henry Bulwer. I4 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR fl4 Good European that Sir Henry was, and servant of Great Britain in the days of Palmerston and Russell, it was believed that he did not know a hawk from a handsaw where commercial interests were involved. The young men even of his own party looked upon him as a superannuated diplomat. Of his pattern, too, was Sir Robert Morier whose finest days were yet to come. He was ripe now for his high destiny, but he found himself a charge d'affaires at Darmstadt while his country was served in the Continental capitals by men, who, though his inferiors in diplomacy, were regarded by the home Government as of sterling safety. In Paris there was that punctilious bachelor, Lord Lyons; in Madrid. Mr. Layard, the envoy extraordinary, dreamed of Babylon and Nineveh, while Prim and the agents of Bismarck conspired to place a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne; Lord Augustus Loftus showed himself more alert at Berlin; but in St. Petersburg, Sir Andrew Buchanan could be disregarded with impunity. Quite outside the pale of officialdom, and yet still vividly associated in the memory of his contemporaries with British foreign policy, was that old attache of Stratford Canning's, and most picturesque of diplomats, David Urquhart. He was still thundering against Russia and urging the sedulous study of international law. Absolutely and proudly op- posed to the current of his time, he sought to redirect it in the Diplomatic Review, a periodical so scholarly and of a bias so vigorous and pronounced as to make it a thing unique of its kind. But " Urquhartism " was dying. The talents of the editor, reinforced by contributions from Karl Marx and a small group of followers, could not save the slim review from dropping from a monthy to a quarterly, sup- ported by a steadily dwindling list of subscribers. Those who could understand its style were those most certain to poohpooh its ideas. Urquhart, they said, was a good sort 1$] INTRODUCTION 1 5 to have introduced the Turkish bath into England, but Jove, man, the fellow had gone to seed utterly with his eternal drivel against Russia and his harpings on the courtesies of nations. He was " touched." Much more intelligible, though also somewhat unBritish in its viewpoint, was that group of Oxford men that had followed the teachings of Auguste Comte. The Positi- vists had a disconcerting way of analyzing governmental! policies not on the basis of their effect on the industry of Manchester, and Leeds, and Birmingham, but of their effect on the populace as a whole. They were felt to be danger- ous. Professor Beesly, with his reputation for scholarly attainment, could not be denied a hearing. The eloquent young Frederic Harrison made an opponent even more alarming. The whole school showed a disconcerting tend- ency to affiliate with the working men, and to dignify by their approbation the speeches of George Odger and others whom the press was in the habit of deriding. It was believed that they might even have some ideas in common with that atheistical young republican, Charles Bradlaugh. Others there were in the cast, — " lords, ladies, and atten- dants," — to say nothing of the mob, which though it be kept off stage ever so successfully for most of the evening has a way, when once it gains the boards, of diverting either tragedy or comedy from its own proper ending. To speak severally of the supernumeraries would be to name many who in other dramas have a higher place. But here they can be grouped together as having exercised no very ap- preciable influence on a formation of policy or opinion at the time we are to describe. Certainly, that doughty Scotchman, Thomas, Carlyle, would cavil at seeing his name in pica. But so it deserves to be, if only as retribution for his own faults of classifica- tion. For he ranged all humankind into two columns. Man lf> BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [^ was either exalted as a hero or impaled as a knave, — a method not so convincing as it was simple. The public tired of Carlylogiums on Prussia, Bismarck, and the brave and pious German soldier. Other more worthy historians, somewhat too busy writ- ing history to help to make it, were the gentle, humorous John Richard Green; that staunch admirer of things Ger- man, Freeman; the stately Lord Acton; and Sir Alexander Malet, late Minister Plenipotentiary at Frankfort, whose recently published history, had it been widely and imme- diately read, would have well prepared the British for what was to come. Ruskin philosophized on the enchained se- quence of events; John Stuart Mill set forth his ideas on the worth and durability of treaties ; the poets, Browning and Buchanan, tested their powers at analyzing the character of the third Napoleon ; Swinburne celebrated the new Republic in an ode of " a thousand lines and not a single idea." A host of eager young war correspondents sent back reports all hot from camp and field. And John Morley and other cf the reviewers strove to boil all down to a potable draught of wisdom for the quarterlies. The shifting, multicolored mob nocked to the Alhambra to hear the Marseillaise; and to the wax works of Madame Tussaud, where Bismarck frowned in effigy ; it lit its torches under Nelson's monument and gathered in Hyde Park, and all the sainted halls of London, to resolve and demonstrate. We must not linger so long in Downing Street and at the news stalls and print shops, that we miss the flare of torches through the fog, the sight of bobbing Phrygian caps and upflung arms, the raucous sound of voices hoarsened by night shouting. Nothing must be lost if we are to know of that public opinion, which Huxley called the chaos of popular prejudice. CHAPTER I British Relations with France and Prussia, i 860- i 870 anglo-french relations from i860 to 187o To appreciate the viewpoint the Islanders had of the events of the War of 1870, it is necessary to see them against the background of the past relationships of Great Britain with the two belligerents. For past events as well as future have the character of contributing to the chiaros- curo of the present. It was no single act of the French Emperor, be sure, that caused the calm Poet Laureate to shake his long ambrosial locks and exclaim as pettishly as any young subaltern : 1 " True that we have got such a faithful ally, That only the devil can tell what he means." And that made his apprehensions to be so generally shared by his fellows. Although, during the decade preceding the Franco-Prus- sion War, England often acted in conjunction with her old ally of the Crimea, her attitude toward the foreign policy of France was always distrustful. This was not unnatural when it is remembered that the period opens on the Emper- or's acquisition of Nice and Savoy, — an aggravating coda to a treaty which even the moderate friends of Italy had ad- judged unsatisfactory, almost treacherous. Though Napo- leon III had acquiesced in Lord John Russell's famous 1 Alfred Tennyson, The Works of (Hallam edition, N. Y., 1916) ; Riflemen Form, p. 866. 17] 17 j8 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [t8 dispatch of January 17, i860, thereby giving pledge not to intervene in Italian affairs by force of arms nor to lengthen unduly the occupation of Rome by his soldiery, 1 dissatisfac- tion in England was still keen. The London Times des- cribed the Emperor as " universally declared to be a man without loyalty or good faith." 2 It cautioned the neigh- bors of France to extreme watchfulness. On the occasion of his meeting with the German rulers at Baden Baden, it described his arrival as the entrance of a sportsman into a well stocked preserve. The " bustling birds " were warned that he came, probably, to bag the Palatinate, which he desired for the " rectification " of his boundary. 3 His proposed occupation of Chablis and Faucigny, the Swiss districts of Savoy, was declared to be inspired not so much by a wish for territory as for the securing of a passageway for his armies into neutralized Switzerland. 4 Prussia was urged to assume leadership : to compose her internal differences, to put money in her purse, and to increase her army. 5 More, the Times suggested that that sense of security felt by France from her gain of two provinces separated from her by the highest mountains, might well dispose Prussia to attempt to gain two provinces separated from German territory by one of the widest rivers in Europe. 6 Small wonder that the Moniteur protested at the nervous shiverings of the neighbours of France, — among whom she included England. 1 It was matter for rejoicing to Gladstone that the Com- 1 Fitzmaurice, Edmond George Petty, Life of Lord Granville (Lon- don, 1005), vol. i, pp. 368-369. ' The Times, London, Apr. 3, i860. 1 Ibid., June 16, i860. * Ibid., Apr. 17, i860. 5 Ibid., Apr. 4, 6, 13, May 5, i860. 6 Ibid., June 2, i860. 7 Ibid., June 2, i860. I9 ] RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND PRUSSIA jg mercial treaty, concluded with France that year, served as a check to " needless alarms and fancies," to " tendencies towards convulsion and confusion." 1 John Bright and certain other members of the House of Commons burned for a further application of the principles of the Manchester School. They urged a concert with the French Government for the mutual reduction of the British and French navies But against this the opposition of Palmerston was insur- mountable. In 1861 Great Britain associated herself with France and Spain in a joint invasion of Mexico for the collection of debts due their subjects. But in the next year she with- drew from the expedition and further showed her diver- gence from the Emperor's American policy by refusing to support his offer of mediation between the Federals and Confederates. 2 Her decision was justified by the future. Not so sound was the rejection of cooperation in the mat- ter of intervening in Polish affairs. In 1863, the conscrip- tion by the Russian viceroy of two thousand young Poles was believed by Napoleon III to justify the calling of a congress for a consideration of the entire question. The British government chose to content itself, and to discontent Russia, by giving platonic and ineffectual advice to that Government, the while Prussia won the Tsar by an attitude of cordial sympathy. 3 Queen Victoria's fear that Napoleon intended, through an alliance with Austria and the aid of Italian armies, to resuscitate Poland by dissecting Prussia, quite overwhelmed her discretion. 4 Not only was Russian 1 John Morley, Life of Wm. Ewart Gladstone (N. Y., 191 1), vol. i, p. 638. 2 Annual Register, 1863, vol. cv, pp. 4, 7, 9, 125, 308-309. 8 J. A. R. Marriott, England Since Waterloo (London, 1911), p. 321; Fitzmaurice, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 446-447. 4 Disraeli to Mrs. Bridges Williams, W. F. Monypenny and G. E. Buckle, Life of Benjamin Disraeli (N. Y., 1910-1920), vol. iv, p. 34a 20 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ 2 o hostility incurred but the good understanding with France was diminished. It would still further have dwindled, had the French Emperor known that those English statesmen, who had dissociated themselves from his disastrous Mexican policy, were gloating at difficulties which they believed would save Belgium and the Palatinate from his rapacity. The Manchester group, however, still showed themselves friendly and arranged to cooperate with him in measures concerning the cotton question. 1 In 1864 the tables were turned. The matter of the dis- posal of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein was a nearer concern of England than of France, though the latter was? equally associated with her and the other five Powers that had guaranteed the King of Denmark in their possession by the London Protocol. Palmerston and Russell, — always proponents of the " strong policy," — were willing to go any lengths to preserve the. strategically important duchies from falling under the dominance of Austria or Prussia. Napo- leon, still embroiled in Mexico, would resort to nothing more drastic than a congress, — which it was found impos- sible to assemble. 2 The Conference, convened in London, after the fortune of the war was already decided, had no positive effect on the fate of the duchies. But the admission during its sessions that England was without allies and unable to act alone had the negative effect of lowering British prestige abroad and the influence of the Ministry at home. 3 The creation by France of a friendly ally in Mexico for the Confederacy, thought Lord John Russell, might so strengthen the South as to make a Federal invasion of 1 Sir Thos. Newton, Lord Lyons, A Record of British Diplomacy (N. Y., 1913), vol. i, pp. 115-116. 1 Fitzmaurice, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 450-472 ; Monypenny and Buckle, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 343-345. 1 Monypenny and Buckle, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 346. 2i ] RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND PRUSSIA 2 I Canada impracticable. 1 But this was but a shred of com- fort for the loss of the strong European ally then so greatly- needed. In 1866 France was allowed the empty honor of assisting in negotiating a truce that led to the treaty ending the war of Austria and Prussia, — a treaty which gave notice to the world that France had lost in Mexico the hegemony of Europe. Impotence to direct on the Continent was more galling than the undisguised defeat abroad. The many British who looked on the French Emperor as a theatrical manager, holding his place only through his ability to stage a striking success at more or less regular intervals, were a- tiptoe to see with what new piece his people were to be re- galed, and very sure that the performance would be one to merit censure. Belgium, Luxemburg, and Rhenish Bavaria were each rumored to be the intended victims of the tragedy, and not without reason. Some one of these, it was be- lieved, had surely been held out as bait to ensure French neutrality during the recent war. The bristling questions were which, and how and when France was to make the acquisition. Publicly, her policy was blameless. In August of 1866, Napoleon declared, in a letter meant not alone for the recipient, that the true interest of France was not the acquisition of territory but rather the giving of such assist- ance to Germany as would enable her to constitute herself after a fashion favorable to French and European interests. 2 The letter failed of its purpose. Disquieting rumours of intrigue continued, and on the last day of the year we find Disraeli uneasy over a proposition, said to have emanated from Bismarck and found favor in the French ministry, that France acquire Belgium as the quid pro quo of allowing Prussia to absorb the states of south Germany. 8 1 Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 133. 1 Benedetti, Ma Mission en Prusse (London, 1913), p. 182. 1 Monypenny and Buckle, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 69. 22 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ 2 2 England, however, kept the distrust of the French fore- ign policy well localized and, while keeping a crowded eye on her possible intrigue in Central Europe, cooperated with her in the East to secure Turkey's recognition of a Hohen- zollern prince as hereditary ruler of the new Rumania. L She was temperate, too, in her remonstrance at the new French garrison which occupied Rome after the attack of the Italian volunteers. 2 Prussia, who was not so, would have laid the onus of discontent on England but Napoleon was not deceived and showed no ill will toward his old ally. 3 It was something of a relief to the turbid situation when a plan for French compensation came to the surface and could be officially discussed. In April of 1867, the King of the Netherlands was found to have given a contingent consent to Napoleon's purchase from him of the Grand Duchy of Lux- emburg. His consent was qualified because the possession of the duchy had been guaranteed to him in 1839 by the Great Powers and their acquiescence was necessary for its dis- posal. 4 Russia expressed her willingness to the transfer, — bought, England believed, by the French proposal to hasten the dissolution of Turkey by a cession of Crete to Greece. 6 The matter in its entirety was displeasing to England. She had no wish to see Belgium become a French enclave nor to see Russia advance even indirectly to- ward Constantinople. Prussia also expressed emphatic disapproval of the proposed purchase by France of Luxem- burg. She made her disapproval more noteworthy by re- 1 Newton, op. cit., vol. i, pp. i53- T 56. 'Lyons to Stanley, Paris, Jan. 16, 1868, ibid., vol. i, p. 186. * Ibid., vol. i, pp. 183-184. * Stanley to Lyons, London, Apr. 4, 1867, ibid., vol. i, p. 168; Mony- penny and Buckle, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 469-471 ; Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 168. * Newton, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 163-170, 180, 209. 23] RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND PRUSSIA 23 vealing at the same time the defensive military treaties she had made with the South German States at the close of the late war. The matter was settled at a conference of the great Powers in London. France, though absolutely denied the acquisition of Luxemburg, seems to have left the Conference with greater satisfaction than either Prussia or England, — a fact which would make it appear that it was not so much territory as a preservation of prestige and a guarantee against further Prussian encroachments that she desired. To Victoria and certain of the English diplomats the collective guarantee accorded the neutrality of Luxem- burg seemed not so strong as circumstance might demand. It was believed France would be aggressive and disposed to •violate international agreements and an unequivocal attitude of Great Britain in such a contingency was needed as a deterrent. 1 Prussia was unhappy at being obliged to re- move her garrisons and at having to sign a treaty with France instead of against her. A solution by war might have proven more favorable. She was well prepared and she knew that her rival was not. 2 It was something, how- ever, for Prussian satisfaction to have drawn from France in the early stage of the negotiations, the admission that the question of possessing Luxemburg involved the existence of the Napoleonic dynasty. The London Conference and its deference to French amour propre had modified the failure of the Emperor's project. But a state whose dynasty could survive a rebuff only by the assistance of a European congress, was temptingly vulnerable. England, too, was apprized of the weakness of the nation which she had been regarding as a bogey. The French Ambassador told his British confrere in Berlin that the reason France could not permit the formation of a German 1 Monypenny and Buckle, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 472. 2 Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 169. 24 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [24 Empire was that it would make the position of the Emperor untenable. 1 The British Ambassador in Paris was assured by the Foreign Minister, who spoke with even more author- ity, that it was not aggrandizement France wished but se- curity for the future. 2 France, it would appear, would mis- behave only if she were frightened, and the task of England was either to preserve the status quo or to convince France that a united Germany would oppose no real danger to her freedom and prestige. The compliance of the present at- titude of France was encouraging. She had accepted the decision of the London Conference with real happiness, and according to the Emperor, who had been looked on as the chief offender in the matter, was eager to settle the Roman question also by conference. 31 When in the next year, 1868, France was alarmed at the rumour that Prussia was on the point of annexing the Grand Duchy of Baden, she turned again to England. She would have had her advise Prussia of the disfavor with which such a step would be regarded in Paris. The attitude of France was that any annexation of territory south of the Main would be as much an act of aggression and conquest on the part of Prussia as on her own part. England refused to give the desired advice to Prussia, but France on this special point received reassurance from Prince Napoleon after his visit to Berlin in the spring. The Prince reported that there was no present intention of increasing the area of the North German Confederacy by annexation but that the principle was one Prussia was prepared to maintain. He reported, also, that nowhere else, save in the United States, were foreign governments held in such indifference. Prussia, he 1 Morley, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 319. * Ibid., vol. ii, p. 320. * Newton, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 178-180. * Ibid., vol. i, pp. 194-196. 25 ] RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND PRUSSIA 25 said, was fast carrying out her plans and war, were it to be made, should be declared this year or not at all. 1 Lord Lyons, however, informed his Government that he believed the Emperor was sincerely anxious to preserve peace. 2 His opinion seems to have been justified, for the critical period was allowed to elapse. With the New Year, there came a recrudescence of alarm in England. In January the King of Belgium, in a letter to Victoria, expressed a fear that France, by a customs con- vention or by purchase through a French company of the Luxemburg railway, would attempt to gain a footing in Bel- gium. He was at once assured by the Queen that any proceedings which seemed to threaten the independence or integrity of Belgium would bring England at once into the field. 3 At this time the Prussian ambassador in London (von Bernstorff) thought it opportune to inform Gladstone and Clarendon that, though his Government was not willing to defend Belgium single-handed, it would willingly make terms with England to join in her defense. 4 At a later time Bismarck reverted to this episode and assured Claren- don that it was only this offer of support and the disapproval of a single French minister that had prevented an occupa- tion of Belgium from taking place. 1 However real the danger may have been, England, it seems, did not think it necessary to contract the alliance. In view of the existing guarantee of neutrality to which France was signatory and the officially correct attitude of her Government, such an effort at reinsurance on England's part would certainly have been regarded as a slap in the face. Belgium was more affected by the Prussian warning, and passed an act to for- 1 Newton, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 192-193. 2 Lyons to Stanley, Paris, March 27, 1868, ibid., vol. i, p. 192. 'Ibid., vol. i, pp. 211-213. * Clarendon to Lyons, Apr. 19, 1868, Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 218. 26 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ 2 6 bid the granting of concessions to railroads without govern- mental consent. 1 The act was regarded in France as hav- ing been instigated by Bismarck. M. de Lavalette declared that after this it would be impossible for the French Govern- ment to have any friendship for the Belgian Ministry. 2 No hostility was shown toward the attitude of England in the matter, since the Queen's declaration had been merely a reassertion of her already avowed policy, and was made not to the Emperor but to the uneasy king of the neutral country. It remains to speak of another railway which was the sub- ject of debate in the French Chamber a month before the war's outbreak. This road, which the Swiss designed to traverse their republic and pierce the Alps by the St. Gothard Pass, had been promised subsidies by Prussia, Baden, and Italy, to whom it would afford communication. 3 The Op- position, led by Jules Ferry, made an attempt to discredit the Ministry by declaring the project a menace to France. The Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that the Govern- ment was perfectly at ease in the matter: Switzerland had given repeated assurance that she would maintain her neutrality, and by the convention of Berne foreign troops were barred from transport. 4 It was an attitude that must have delighted the British Ministry, — adhering as they did to the Manchester tenets and regarding railways from the standpoint rather of commerce than of strategy. The debate was satisfactory, also, in having given the Ministry an opportunity to allay any suspicion that France was medi- tating revenge on Prussia. M. Jules Ferry had been called 1 Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 211. * Lyons to Clarendon, Paris, Feb. 16, 1869, Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 214. 3 Times, June 15th and 16th, 1870; Spectator, June 18, 1870. 4 Times, June 21, 1870; Manchester Guardian, June 22, 1870. 2 j] RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND PRUSSIA 27 to order when he attacked the Government for having per- mitted Sadowa. The Due de Gramont, with the explicit approval of Napoleon, had embraced the opportunity to declare that the peace of Europe was never more assured. 1 Surely, when the leader of the constitutional majority in France showed himself to be pacific and received the con- gratulations of the Emperor for so doing, the danger of a coup in foreign affairs could 'be pronounced illusory. ANGLO PRUSSIAN RELATIONS FROM i860 TO 187O In strong contrast to the distrust meted out to France by Great Britain in i860 was the encouraging and almost maternal regard she showed toward the evolution of Ger- many. She was eager for its speedy unification. The belief was, as the Times phrased it, that such a un- ification was very much to British interest, an object of great and immediate importance. Germany was regarded as " the natural friend of all who wish to hold in peace what they honestly possess and prudently use .... the natural impediment of all who would convulse the world for the hope of gaining by confusion." England, said the Times, was in the position of a stout gentleman who knows that there are pickpockets near, and who sees the police quarrelling among themselves. 2 A great Central Power would do much to preserve that balance in the Continental system which was the anxious care of Great Britain. It would check the aggressions of both France and Russia and prevent the necessity of England's doing police duty to pro- tect the smaller states. It was a matter of concern, of course, which of the Germanies should determine the character of the future Germany. In this regard British statesmen natur- ally looked to Prussia to assume the leadership. The mem- 1 Times, June 22, 1870. 2 Ibid., Apr. 13, i860. 28 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ 2 g ory of her part in the final defeat of Napoleon was still green. The beginning of the decade found her with a well filled exchequer, a military system of great potentiality and a government possessed, seemingly, of liberal tenden- cies. Baden, like Austria, had sacrificed the love of her people for the protection of the Ultramontane. Prussia had not made such a mistake and she had matched her tolerance in religious matters with a regard for constitutional forms well pleasing to the English. When, in i860, the Bund sought to uphold the elector of Hesse Cassel in replacing the liberal constitution of 1831 with a more reactionary one, it was Prussia that had dissented. 1 Her minister declared that the question of the constitution of Electoral Hesse was the question of the constitution of Germany. Prussia, therefore, reserved the right to adhere to her point of view and pursue such a policy as her honor and power might demand. 2 England rejoiced at this manifestation of ten- dencies so like her own. The Prussian state, over which some day would reign a British princess, promised to be a congenial and valuable ally for the future. Already she was associating herself with England to prevent French aggression in the neutralized districts of Savoy. In 1 86 1 William was crowned King of Prussia, thereby bringing Victoria's daughter, the wife of Prince Frederick, within a step of the throne. The next year Bismarck was called to undertake the conduct of the Prussian Government. The importance of the latter event far outweighed that of the former. The liberal Germany of which Victoria and the Prince Consort had dreamed and which all England had been eager to welcome as an ally was not soon to come into being. British statesmen remembered that it was Bismarck, 1 Times, Apr. 2nd and 3rd, i860. 2 Ibid., Apr. 21, i860. 2 g] RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND PRUSSIA 29 who at the time of the Crimean War had successfully used his influence in preventing Prussia from associating her- self with the Western Powers. He had made no secret of his hostility toward them nor of his wish for an alliance with Russia. M. de Moustier, the French Ambassador, had threatened that his conduct of Prussian policy would bring him to Jena. The retort was prompt and disconcerting. " Why not to Waterloo? " had said Bismarck. 1 Here was a diplomat to be reckoned with, — one who played the game with a boldness that seemed to scorn the finesse that really it concealed. He had been in London shortly before the King called him to power and had outlined his plans to Disraeli : " I shall soon be compelled to undertake the con- duct of the Prussian Government. My first care will be to reorganize the army, with or without the help of the Land- tag .... As soon as the army shall have been brought into such a condition as to inspire respect, I shall seize the first best pretext to declare war against Austria, dissolve the German Diet, subdue the minor states, and give national unity to Germany with Prussian leadership. I have come here to say this to the Queen's Ministers." 2 Only strength of power or innocence of purpose could justify such an orgy of candor. The British, though they might approve the end in view, could not have been expected to approve the means Bismarck detailed for its accomplish- ment. It appeared, then, that this Prussian quite disre- garded the matter of their opinion. " Take care of that man! " warned Disraeli, " He means what he says! " " The first best pretext to declare war on Austria " being overlong in making its appearance, Bismarck, himself, set about creating it by a war, which with Austria as an ally, should result in a peace which would make Austria an op- 1 George Hooper, The Campaign of Sedan (London, 1914). * Monypenny and Buckle, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 341. 30 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [30 ponent in the division of the spoils. The more or less in- nocent victim of the tortuous proceeding was Denmark, whose duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were marked out as the spoils. It could not be expected that the quar- rel would remain wholly a neighbourhood affair. Among the signatories that had confirmed, though not guaranteed, the King of Denmark in his administration of the Elbe duchiesl were France, Russia, and Great Britain. France, as we have seen, was at this time too deeply embroiled in Mexico to do more than try to assemble a congress. Russia was exper- iencing difficulties with the Poles and had been fortified by sympathy and even offers of assistance from Prussia. It was from Great Britain that Denmark expected assistance, not only because that country was more able to give it but because her interests were more nearly involved. Lord Palmerston believed it undeniable that at the base of the German design was the wish for a fleet, and a harbor for that fleet at Kiel. 1 The prospect of a naval rival in the Baltic, and perhaps elsewhere, was one to cause reflection. The Queen was interested in the matter more because it involved the principle of legitimacy, and because the Prin- cess of Wales was the daughter of the King of Denmark. Victoria would have had the duchies awarded to their legi- timate ruler and the King of Denmark compensated by a Swedish marriage, which, by uniting his kingdom with Norway and Sweden, would form a strong northern barrier against Russia. 3 At first Great Britain took a high tone in the matter. Denmark, however, showed herself as stubborn to her friend as to her foes. Prussia was recalcitrant. Nothing could be done without her, said Lord Granville, " and she will never consent to anything which does not give her more 1 Marriott, op. cit., p. 327. 1 Memorandum to Granville, Fitzmaurictf, op. cit., vol. i, p. 456. 3 i ] RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND PRUSSIA 3I preponderance than the Southern States will admit." l It became apparent that British bluster would not suffice and it was not possible to bring more than that to bear. The warlike policy of Palmerston and Russell was not popular even in the Cabinet and was strongly opposed by the Queen. Nor were the British people eager to embark in a war with- out allies. But the Prime Minister had made a statement before Parliament that made retreat difficult. He had threatened that, were Denmark attacked, it would not be that country only with whom the aggressors would have to contend. 2 It was hard to sink from such an octave to the querulous half-tone of a conference. The nation was jar- red with consciousness of the humiliating position into which she had been led by what Derby called Palmerston' si policy of " muddle and meddle." Only the Lords saved the Ministry from going under. A more important consequence was the distrust of Prus- sia caused by her secession from the London Protocol, and her acquisition of Lauenburg and the command of Kiel by the Gastein Convention. The Queen spoke for the nation when she informed Lord Granville of her wish that Prussia should at least be made aware of what she and her Govern- ment, and every honest man in Europe, must think of the unblushing violation of every assurance and pledge that had been given. 3 In the ensuing quarrel between victorious Prussia and Austria that culminated in the Seven Week's War of 1866, the Queen offered her mediation. Bismarck refused it brusquely.* He had not manufactured his " pretext " for 1 Fitzmaurice, op. cit., vol. i, p. 450. 1 Ibid., vol. i, p. 452. s General Gray to Granville, Aug. 24, 1864, Fitzmaurice, op. cit., voL i, p. 476. 4 Marriott, op. cit., p. 327. 32 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [32 the purpose of seeing it dissolved. And so another war was waged without benefit of England. The provisions of the Peace of Prague greatly augmented the Queen's chagrin. She saw the extinction of the kingdom of her cousin of Hanover, the diminution of the powers of her son-in-law of Hesse, and the humiliation of her son's father-in-law of Denmark. For these visitations on her kin and her next to kin, the Queen blamed the lordly Bismarck. This peace, regarded unfavorably in England and with hostility in France, was followed by a nervous period in which the British watched with narrowed eyes for some coup on the part of Napoleon to recompense him for Prussia's accessions. The air was somewhat clarified, as we have seen, when Great Britain by the sessions of the London Con- ference of 1867 contrived to send France away at once satisfied and empty-handed. After the fiasco of the Confer- ence of 1864, she had been astonished at her own success. At Paris the feeling of gratitude to England was reported to be both general and strong. 1 The time seemed propitious for efforts which might result in something more than the elimination of a present difficulty. No one was better fitted for this delicate task of mediation than Lord Clarendon. More often than any other diplomat, he had represented his country in important negotiations and ceremonies abroad. He was familiar with the whole field of European diplo- macy, and was regarded as a personal friend by the royal families of France, Spain, and Prussia. His devotion tof pacific principles was sincere, but so discreet that he could be trusted to urge his viewsi earnestly and even persistently but never fanatically nor obtrusively. He held no brief for either of the rival courts. Both were aware that his friend- ship for the one was matched by his friendship for the other. 1 Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 169. 33] RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND PRUSSIA 33 The interviews of 1868 with the King and Queen of Prus- sia, and General Moltke, were satisfactory in the assurance given Clarendon that Prussia would be careful not to give offence and very slow to take it. Even so, however, King William was not sure how long peace could be maintained. But he promised that, should war be precipitated, Prussia would so act as to make it manifest that France was the un- provoked aggressor. 1 No one could foresee when dynastic interests might induce Napoleon to resort to war in order to smother internal discontent. It was this uncertainty that kept the nations armed to the teeth. Napoleon listened to Clarendon's report of the interviews " with evident satis- faction." At its conclusion, he suggested a collective con- firmation by Europe of the treaty of Prague. This would assure Prussia of her gains and do much to restore public confidence. A diminution of armaments would be a logical sequence. He would have had England take the initiative in summoning a congress for this purpose. 2 It was apparent that the rulers of France and Prussia were not like-minded as to the cause of European unrest, — the one believing it a consequence of the distrust engen- dered by the latter's gains in her war with Austria, the other believing it a consequence of the uncertainty of the means the French Emperor might take to preserve his dynasty. But the divergence of their analysis was not alarming if both were sincere in the desire they expressed for peace. A subsequent interview with the Prussian Crown Prince afforded Clarendon even more encouragement. Frederick William was eager to see his country's army reduced to something more like a peace footing. He believed that in a year or so his father would be forced to such a reduction by discontent at the burden of taxation. 3 1 Lyons to Stanley, Oct. 13, 1868, ibid., vol. i, pp. 202, 203. ' Lyons to Stanley, Oct. 20, 1868, ibid., vol. i, pp. 204-205. 8 Ibid., vol. i, pp. 208-209. 34 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [34 In France the need to placate the voters by disarmament was very strong by 1870. Three years before, Napoleon had told Bismarck, according to the latter's account, that there were but two courses open to him : war or the granting of more internal liberty. 1 In January of 1870, Napoleon called Ollivier to power and from that time on the drift was toward a parliamentary form of government. It was a necessary corollary that an effort should be made toward disarmament. To prevent power from falling into the hands of the urban socialists, the agricultural population had to be won over by a diminished call for recruits. Be- fore the expiration of the first month of its existence, the Ollivier Ministry, with the Emperor's consent, approached England in the hope of gaining through her a confidential agreement with Prussia on disarmament. It was necessary that the negotiations be conducted secretly, for France, hav- ing lately suffered a loss of prestige, could not brave a re- buff. 2 Lord Clarendon accepted the task and in a letter laid the proposition informally before Bismarck. The Chancellor gave it no encouragement. He reminded the Englishman of his country's position between the great military powers, — > any two of which might ally themselves against her; he reverted to French aggression in times past; hinted at her present hunger for rectifications, and the aid that an armed Prussia might be to England were those desires to lead to sins against Belgium. It would be impossible, said Bismarck, to modify a military system so deeply rooted in the tradi- tions of his country. He dared not even mention the mat- ter to the King, who would regard the proposal, were it made by France, as a ruse, and, were it made by England, as the act of a poor friend. He begged, also, that Clarendon 1 Loftus to Garendon, Feb. 5, 1870, Newton, op. tit., vol. i, p. 255. * Ibid., vol. i, p. 245. 35] RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND PRUSSIA 35 say nothing of the matter at Paris since the refusal if known there would make things dangerous. 1 The negotiations, so inauspiciously begun in February, were continued into March, but at no time did the Chancel- lor swerve from his attitude of negation. His arguments made an unpleasant impression on the British statesmen. They believed the danger he alleged from France to be il- lusory. Gladstone was vexed that he so ignored the Ministry's reduction in the naval estimates as to point his finger at Great Britain as a fellow believer in large arma- ments. 2 Clarendon thought him hypocritical in his pre- tence that the King would be seriously offended at the pro- posal. For he knew that the King had actually said only a little while since that he would disarm if other Powers would do so. 3 Lord Loftus, who was in personal communication with Bismarck at Berlin, advised that the negotiations be discontinued. Nothing more had been achieved than a promise that the question would be referred to Parliament in a year or so. 4 The decision of the French Foreign Minister to persevere in his plan after having been apprized that he could hope for nothing similar from Prussia, made Bismarck's conduct ap- pear yet more sinister. 5 Clarendon, knowing of the re- duction that had been planned and the disappointment that it must now, perforce, be limited, expressed his opinion of the failure of the negotiations very clearly. Some day that which he knew would be known by all, and then, he 1 Loftus to Clarendon, Berlin, Feb. 5, 1870, Newton, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 254-256. 1 Gladstone to Clarendon, Feb. 7th and Apr. 9th, 1870, Morley, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 332. J Clarendon to Lyons, March 12, 1870, Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 26d. * Ibid., vol. i, p. 275. s Lyons to Clarendon, Feb. 11, 1870, Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 258. 36 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [36 said, upon Prussia would rest the responsibility not only of maintaining so large a force herself, but of compelling other countries reluctantly to do the same. 1 On the 26th of May, the King, in closing the German Parliament, announced that the military organization of the Confederacy was at last complete, and " of an im- portance in harmony with the just demands of the German nation." One of the British papers suggested that this should have been spoken to the accompaniment of the softly played air, " Our freeborn German Rhine." Those diplomats who had been negotiating with Bis- marck must have read the comment with something of approval. In the second week of June, Lord Clarendon wrote to the British Ambassador at Paris of a meeting of the Tsar and the King of Prussia at Ems. He suspected that they occupied themselves with a discussion of a more somplete uni- fication of Germany, — beginning with the incorparation of Baden. 8 It was one of his last acts of service to the British Foreign Office. His death occurred in this same month, — a time when of all others his ministrations were most needed. It may have been only a brusque way of paying a com- pliment ; it may have been a real admission of the superior- ity of the Englishman's diplomacy to his own strategy, that caused Bismarck to say to Clarendon's daughter, on a later visit to London : " Madam, nothing ever gave me so much pleasure as your father's death." 4 1 Clarendon to Loftus, March 9, 1870, Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 270. * Spectator, May 28, 1870. ■ Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 293. *Lord Algernon Freeman-Mitford Redesdale, Memories (London, 1915), vol. ii, pp. 525-526. CHAPTER II France under Parliamentary Government In addressing the assembled Diplomatic Body on New Year's day of 1870, Napoleon III expressed his satisfaction at the " good relations existing between France and for- eign powers," and announced his happiness at having arrived at that point where, like a tired traveller after a long journey, he could relieve himself of a portion of his burden and so gain fresh strength to continue his course. 1 Two days later he officially received his new premier, M. Ollivier, who was to conduct France from an autocratic to a constitutional regime. The new Minister, it was believed in England, had been wisely chosen as one who would work with equal honesty to the people and devotion to the Empire. Vanity Fair, ac- cording him a place in its gallery of notables, depicted him as a black-garbed, pigeon-toed gentleman with an amiable expression, hands clasped in front of him. The serio-com'ic portrait ludicrously represented the British idea of his diffi- culties. He was to tend with equal care the business of his master, the Emperor, and his master, the Corps Legislatif, the while he kept his own hands locked; one foot was to in- cline toward the imperial pathway and the other towards the broad highway of parliamentary responsibility. " The most useful and necessary qualities a politician can have," M. Ollivier was quoted as saying, " is a readiness to be consid- ered foolish or vulgarly ambitious when that is calculated 1 Spectator, Jan. 8, 1870. 37] 37 38 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [38 to promote the success of a long meditated plan." The wish was expressed that, since the gentleman had already been adjudged both foolish and ambitious*., he might now be suc- cessful. 1 Lord Lyons, though foreseeing difficulties with the extremists, wrote hopefully of the outlook, and reported that already the Empress, who had long been antagonistic, professed to see great good in parliamentary government. 2 In the first two weeks of its existence, the new Ministry reaped golden opinions. Almost immediately, it had dis- missed the extravagant but competent Baron Haussmann, who for seventeen years had labored at the rebuilding of Paris, and was a favorite with the Emperor; it had dis- missed, also, some twenty " devoted " prefects, and served warning on the others not to interfere in elections. It had shown its liberal tendencies by passing measures to ensure the greater freedom of the press and by frankly and promptly answering its interpellators. 3 England rejoiced at the re- newal of the Commercial Treaty of i860, 4 and it might be hoped that Prussia felt satisfaction at the expressed wish of the French for a one-fourth reduction of the conscription. But on the very day that the Corps Legislatif had met to inaugurate the new Ministry, an event occurred which was provocative of great difficulty in the founding of a liberal and pacific empire. Prince Pierre Bonaparte shot to death the unarmed Victor Noir who brought to him a duelling challenge of M. Rochefort. It cannot be thought that so slight a thing, — the killing of an obscure journalist by a dis- inherited cousin of the Emperor, — was more than the spark that fired already smouldering embers. But the inciting 1 Vanity Fair, Jan. 15, 1870. The serio-comic portrait of Ollivier is by " Ape " (Pellegrini). 1 Newton, Lord Lyons, vol. i, pp. 244-245. 'Spectator, Jan. 8th and 15th, 1870. 4 Annual Register, 1870, vol. cxii, p. 3. 39] FRANCE UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 39 brutality of the murder; the fervid eloquence of M. Roche- fort (which he exerted in his paper, before the Belleville mob, and in the House of Deputies) ; and the bungling of the frightened police and the judiciary, all served to provoke to extremity the hatred of Paris for the existing regime. The fifty thousand, who accompanied the funeral cortege, would have taken the corpse to the City had not M. Roche- fort, — himself alarmed at the tempest his eloquence had helped to raise, — dissuaded them from the attempt. On the arrest of M. Rochefort, the excitement was greatly height- ened. There was rioting for three nights in Paris : erection of barricades, the proclamation of a republic, cries of death and destruction to the Bonapartes, — all the well known harbingers of a change of government in France. On this occasion, however, the Empire had no difficulty in main- taining itself. But it had glimpsed the awful hatred of those to whom it was extending liberty and some degree of power, and drew back, frightened. It had been made to resort to the old paraphernalia of imperialism : seizure of papers, arrest of their editors, the ranging of the military against the populace. And once the pendulum had swung back, there came a retarding in its next swing forward. 1 In the latter part of February, a notable interpellation was introduced by Jules Favre. He claimed that the Ministry had not yet given due assurance that the country governed. It had caused bloodshed in Paris ; it had arrested four hun- dred and fifty citizens, who were, for the most part, in- offensive; it had not reorganized the National Guard; and, in short, had made no substantial change from the old system of personal government. Furthermore, he declared that the Opposition would not be satisfied until the Chamber, which had been elected under the old system of governmental inter- 1 Annual Register, 1870, vol. cxii, pp. 128, 131 ; Redesdale, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 527; Spectator, Jan. 15, 1870; Saturday Review, Jan. 15, 1870. 4 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ 4 q ference, had been superseded by one more honestly repre- sentative. He was answered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Daru, in whom of all the Cabinet, the Left had the greatest confidence. His refutation of the leading charges was so convincing that the Government received a gratifying vote of confidence, in which it was supported by many of the Opposition. 1 It was unfortunate that the accord among the Ministers, of which Count Daru had boasted at this time, was so soon shaken. The trouble came from) beyond the mountains, — a disagreement as to the course the French should pursue in view of the Ecumenical Council's desire to proclaim the doc- trine of papal infallibility. Count Daru's advice that France send an envoy to protest against such proceedings was opposed by the head of the Ministry. It cannot be doubted that this matter, the culmination of which was over- shadowed by the outbreak of the war, was sufficiently grave to have justified Count Daru's recommendation. He argued that the new Catholic pretensions would give fresh armis to the revolutionary party and vastly weaken the Con- servative influence of the Church by introducing a schism among its members. 2 Overruled in this, and sure that the forces of socialism and revolution would now receive new impetus, he showed no inclination to try by foreign war to turn the hootings of the Belleville mob into a shout of patriotism. Late in March, he gave out a significant interview on French foreign policy which was published in the leading German papers. He declared his policy toward Germany to be above all a policy of peace, and, as an earnest of his sincerity, gave news of the contemplated reduction of the army, and of the Ministry's 1 Spectator, Feb. 26, 1870. The vote was 236 to 18. * Ibid., March 5, 1870. 4 i ] FRANCE UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 4I resolution never to declare war except with the consent of the Corps Legislatif. 1 It is matter for regret that this astute and pacific Minister was destined, like Clarendon,, not to be on the political stage when the last efforts were made to< thwart Bismarck's in- trigue for war. The rift, which had appeared between him- self and Ollivier in the conduct of French policy toward the question of papal infallibility, was hopelessly widened by his refusal to follow the Premier in upholding Napoleon's use of the plebiscite. M. Rouher's obstructionist tactics to- wards the Government's reforming bills were answered by the Emperor's decision to adopt at once all the reforms re- quired by constitutional government, and, by submitting to the people a scnatus cotisidtum embodying them, to gain for France through popular support of imperial reform 1 , those benefits which the extreme Left seemed eager to bring about by a revolution precipitated by the socialists. 2 To Count Daru, but lately won over to the support of the Emperor, this reversion to the plebiscite, — even though it were used to inaugurate liberal reforms, — seemed a reversion to a policy which he could not support. In April, the Government ac- cepted his resignation. 3 The momentous plebiscite was submitted at a time of great industrial unrest. The ten thousand workmen at the iron and steel foundries and factories at Creuzot, of which M. Schneider, President of the Corps Legislatif, was owner, had abandoned work for a time in January, again in March, and now once more were in a state of ferment; the iron workers of Fourchambualt in the Department of the Loire had stopped work; and placards posted in Paris and other industrial cen- 1 News of the World, March 27, 1870. 1 Spectator, March 26, 1870. * Ibid., Apr. 16, 1870. 42 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [42 tres called for a general strike of workmen throughout the Empire. This intense unrest was connected in some way, which the authorities could not trace, with foreign agencies. 1 In view of the fact that Bismarck, at a later time, boasted that he had so ordered matters in Italy that, had that country chosen to aid France in the coming war, she would have been incapacitated by the outbreak of serious disorders, 2 it would seem that an interesting topic of investigation might be the question of Bismarck's connection with the strikes in the French munition plants, — strikes which not only embar- rassed France in her new domestic policy, but retarded the manufacture of implements of war, and, perhaps, played a part in inclining the President of the Corps Legislatif, to a declaration of war, which would not only be profitable to his industry but could be counted upon to still disaffection into a quiet concentration on the patriotic manufacture of arms " pour la patrie." However this may have been, the industrial unrest preva- lent at the time of the plebiscite went far towards giving the Emperor that great majority which would enable him to boast of popular approval in support of his future actions. The peasants were alarmed by the fear of civil war or the enforcement on the Government of the strange doctrines preached by the artisans of the cities. They believed those who told them that to vote "yes" to the plebiscite, — to support the Emperor — was to vote for peace. The Government was able to press its arguments the more effectively by the dis- covery of a vicious plot against the Emperor's life. It had been concocted by one Beaury, a young deserter from the army, who had affiliations with some of the prominent agi- tators of Paris. The official press, on the exposure of the 'Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 280; Spectator, Apr. 16, 1870; Annual Register, vol. cxii, p. 134. 1 Malet to Lyons, Sept. 17, 1870, Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 321. 43 ] FRANCE UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 43 plot, claimed that every " no" to the plebiscite meant approval of assassination and anarchy, and on this ground those who subscribed funds for agitation against it were arrested. 1 France, therefore, when it was asked to reckon the cost of a Napoleon, found that it was still not too dear to pay. Even though Napoleon might not be sincere in all his promises, he was old, and ill, and the Prince Imperial was very young. Neither could be expected to hinder the de- velopment of that constitutionalism which was to give se- curity for the future. The Emperor was supported by rather more than the expected majority. But in analysis the vote appeared not so reassuring as in toto. Not only Paris, but all of the larger cities had strikingly availed themselves of this opportunity to show their disaffection. More serious still, the army unexpectedly marred its record of loyalty by the returning of fifty-thousand noes. 2 There are two distinct versions of the effect this adverse minority from the military had on Napoleon. The first comes from Lord Redesdale's report of a conversation he had with a Frenchman, — friend of the Emperor and his former Minister, but of a somewhat dubious reputation as to honesty. The other comes directly from another friend of the Emperor, and former ambassador to France from England. The Due de Persigny says that Napoleon told him in the late spring that it was apparent that there remained for him but two alternatives : the sternest repression at home, or war abroad. Thereupon, Persigny, on the Emperor's suggestion, undertook to see whether it were possible to form a ministry on the programme of the absolute suppression of political agitation. Two days later, when he returned to 1 Spectator, May 7, 1870; Annual Register, vol. cxii, p. 143. 1 As Punch expressed it, " The Army turned up its noes." Vide, Saturday Review, June 4, 1870; Spectator, May 14, 1870; Annual Reg- ister, 1870, vol. cxii, p. 143. 44 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [44 render his report to the Emperor, he was kept waiting in the antechamber while Napoleon gave audience to Marshal Le- boeuf, and on his admittance, he says that he saved the Emperor embarrassment by assuming that it was useless to revert to the matter of their former conversation. Where- upon, he was politely dismissed with the Emperor's admis- sion that he had, indeed, changed his mind. In accordance with the new attitude, the Ministry was reformed with " devoted " adherents of the Emperor, so that M. Ollivier was left the only Liberal in his own cabinet, and the real direction of policy fell to the Minister of War, Marshal Leboeuf, and the new Foreign Secretary, the Due de Gramont. 1 The other report comes from the Earl of Malmesbury, who had an intimate conversation with the Emperor on May the nineteenth, two days before the news of the formation of the new Ministry appeared in the British papers. To him, Napoleon admitted his disappointment at the returns from the army, but explained that the adverse votes had been cast in certain special barracks), where the officers were unpopular and the recruits numerous. He was gratified that the min- ority was overweighted by the three hundred thousand sol- diers, who had voted for him. The numbers surprised the Englishman. He told Napoleon that he had supposed the army to number nearer six hundred thousand. To quote directly : the Emperor " gave no reply, but looked suddenly very grave and absent. He observed later that Europe ap- peared to be tranquil, and it was evident to me that at that moment he had no idea of the coming hurricane. ... I feel sure that not a thought of the impending idea of a Hohen- zollern being a candidate for the Spanish throne had crossed his mind, . . . He was no longer the same man of sanguine 1 Redesdale, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 528. 45 ] FRANCE UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 45 energy and self reliance, and had grown prematurely old and broken." 1 Surely, this is not the picture of a monarch who has but lately closeted himself with a Marshal of France to conspire for the making of a foreign war. It would seem, rather, that the Emperor intended to re- gain approval by gentler means. In a letter addressed to Marshal Canrobert, Napoleon requested him to assure the generals, officers, and privates under his command that the Emperor's confidence in them had never been shaken, and to congratulate General Lebrun on the admirable firmness that he and his troops had shown in the suppression of the riots following the plebiscite. 2 As to the character and intentions of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, it is true that M. de Gramont was reported as hostile to Prussia and overfriendly to Austria, at whose capital he had lately represented France. But, certainly, at first he showed himself inclined to continue the pacific policy of his predecessor. He completed the arrangements for the reduction of the army which were to be presented to the Legislative Body late in June; he satisfied the Ambassador of Prussia, Baron Werther, as to his pacific intentions toward that country ; s and so late as the last day of June, it was reported in the British press that the Government had agreed to the sale of a number of the horses belonging to the French army because the drought had made exorbitant the cost of their upkeep. 4 It is prob- able that Bismarck's manipulations would still have been suc- 1 James Howard Harris, Third Earl of Malmesbury, Memoirs of an ex-Minister (London, 1884), vol. ii, pp. 414-415. * Annual Register, 1870, vol. cxii, p. 18. 3 Ibid., 1870, vol. cxii, p. 148. 4 Illustrated London News, June 30, 1870. A third of the French regular Army was absent on leave, says Thos. W. Evans, The Second French Empire (N. Y., 1905), p. 200. 46 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [46 cess ful in exacting the forthcoming declaration of war from France had Daru continued in office. But, assuredly, he would have had to contend against a Minister more tactful and more highly regarded abroad than was de Gramont. And it is probable that the policy of France in the negoti- ations preliminary to the War's outbreak would have been so managed as to have won for her from the Neutrals a cordial sympathy rather than distrust and indifference. The drought, which occasioned the sale of the army horses, was, in June, having more serious consequences. It brought suffering and discontent not only to the rural popu- lation that saw their crops a failure, but to the cities where there was a great advance in the price of food. Paris, es- pecially, suffered. The heat intensified the ravages of the prevalent smallpox epidemic, and the abandonment by the Government of the building programme of Baron Hauss- mann threw great numbers of men out of work. Moreover, the city authorities added fuel to the flame by refusing to pay the sums already due the builders. 1 Another disturbing factor was the Government's prosecution of the Interna- tional Society of Workmen, thirty-eight of whose members had been brought to trial. It was accused of fomenting strikes, agitating for a democratic and social republic, caus- ing the riots that followed the taking of the plebiscite, and abetting those who planned the assassination of the Emperor. 2 If there was gloom in the cities and the country, there was gloom also at the Tuileries. Late investigations in the conspiracy of Beaury disclosed a widespread plot that, initiated in a conclave in London, had been carried further by seditious letters and pamphlets in Paris, and whose pur- 1 Manchester Guardian, June 7, 1870; News of the World, June 12, 1870. * Spectator, July 2, 1870. 47 ] FRANCE UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 47 pose was fully revealed by the discovery of a great number of explosive bombs, many of which were still ready to function. 1 An attack of rheumatic gout, from which the Emperor was suffering, was certainly in no manner alleviated by such news as this from his police. He was being con- tinually hectored by former political friends who were eager to regain their former places and scornful of the present Government. He was irritated, too, by the critical attitude of doubt with which his efforts at liberalism were discussed in English editorials. Lord Lyons expressed the wish that his countrymen would somewhat modify their tone in view of the recently renewed Commercial Treaty and the un- happy effect that constant criticism might have upon the Emperor. 2 It was this prickly time that the exiled princes of the House of Orleans selected to petition for a return to France. Their request presented the Government with a disagreeable dilemma. To accede meant to admit to discontented France four popular princes around each of whom there might centre plots against the existing Government. To refuse meant to acknowledge weakness, and to receive the oppro- brium not only of enemies, but of those who believed in the new pretensions to liberalism. These new adherents of Napoleon would look for an act of justice from a ruler, who, himself long an exile, had but recently been confirmed in his tenure of power by a large vote of confidence. The Government decided to oppose the return on the ground that, no matter how innocent the princes might be of intrigue, their presence in France would breed sedition, and that the plebiscite had been a direct appeal to the Emperor to main- tain domestic peace. The correspondent of the Tunes reported that, irrespec- 1 Times, June 25, 1870; Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 285. * Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 200. 4 8 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [48 tive of the Government's desire to base its refusal on the late vote of the people, public opinion was strongly in favor of permitting the return. 1 The Ministry, however, was up- held by a large majority in the Corps Legislatif, though the honors of the debate went to the Opposition. M. Estancelin, gave them warning that their action would justify the taunt that if they did not dare to be just it was because they felt they were net strong. 2 It is never a happy day for a Min- istry when its adversaries can launch against it an accusa- tion so quotable. This affair, which extended into July, was followed by a libellous attack on the Emperor by the editor of the Figaro, who, hitherto, had been his staunch supporter. The charge was that Lord Clarendon had lent to Louis Napoleon, before his accession to power, some twenty thousand pounds and, postponing the payment of interest at the time when the principal was returned, had later demanded, and been granted, the Treaty of Commerce in full payment. 3 The story showed itself false at once to those who' had any knowledge of the character of Clarendon or of the negotiat- ing of the treaty. But free trade had become unpopular, due more to conditions brought about by the drought and inter- mittent strikes than to any defect proper to itself, and many seized on this gossip the better to declaim against the treaty. The effort to punish the editor further aggravated the of- fense by causing him to publish, in the most widely circulated journal of France, a lurid description of various episodes of Napoleon's pre-imperial career. On the ninth of July the Paris correspondent of the London Graphic reported that editors of the Reveil, the Marseillaise, the Avenir National, the Rappel, the Steele, and the Parlement had also incurred 1 Times, June 25, 1870. ' Ibid., July 4, 1870; Illustrated London News, July 7, 1870. * Times, July 6, 1870; Spectator, July 9, 1870. 49 ] FRANCE UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 49 the disfavour of the Government, and were under sentences of fine and imprisonment for various sins of omission and commission. It was in these early July days, made hectic, as we have seen, by drought, and heat, and pestilence ; the unrest of the cities ; and the doubt and distrust of the country ; by overt and covert attacks on the jaded Emperor at home; and intrigue and criticism abroad, — it was in these days that the Minister for Foreign Affairs launched his bill for the re- duction by ten thousand of the army contingent for 1870. 1 The bill was the outcome of that plan of Count Daru's which had enlisted Clarendon's efforts to obtain some similar action on the part of Prussia. It was the first step in a reduction which it was hoped could be made more drastic year by year, so that in the final period of the life of the third Napoleon, he might justify his assertion: " L' Empire c'est la paix." The bill was opposed by those radicals who professed themselves eager to do away with the whole existing army system, which they dubbed irksome, and costly, and provo- cative of war. To have followed them in their opposition to this reduction, on the ground that it was not sufficiently drastic, would have been to make an advance that France was no more willing than her neighbours to make. The radicals, themselves, had they been in power, might have been willing to postpone disarmament until there was a greater degree of amity and understanding between nations. It was opposed, also, by such men as the deputy, Latour, late Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, during his career had represented France both at Vienna and Berlin, — men who saw in modern diplomacy reason rather for the enlargement than the aboli- tion of armies. He based his argument on the growing military power of Prussia and the necessity that France 1 Times, July I, 1870. 5 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [g maintain her position, and insist upon the observance of the Treaty of Prague. The Government was fortunate in the debate in having the support of M. Thiers, usually its opponent. This able statesman contended that the bill would give an assurance of the Government's pacific tendencies and, at the same time, so far maintain its strength as to dissuade foreign Powers from disregarding its wishes. He was con- tent to wish for peace, and to adopt that course which would manifest his desire, and help to realize it. The Premier went further. During the debate on the St. Gothard rail- way late in June, the Foreign Minister had asserted that the Government had no uneasiness and that peace was assured. 1 M. Ollivier reaffirmed this confidence in a statement that the grim war, declared within a fortnight, mocked to the echo: " The Government has no uneasiness whatever," said M. Ollivier. "At no epoch was the peace of Europe more assured. Irritating questions nowhere exist." 2 1 Times, June 21, 1870. 1 Manchester Guardian, July 2, 1870; Times, July 1, 1870. Two days after the debate, the Emperor expressed to Prince Metternich his confidence that the peace of Europe was secure and that he would be able to transmit his crown to his son. Vide, Reginald Lucas, Lord Glenesk and the Morning Post (London, 1910), p. 237. CHAPTER III British Negotiations Preceding the Declaration of War During the doldrums of the first week in July of 1870, it seemed peace brooded over all the capitals of Europe. M. Ollivier, as we have seen, inaugurated the month with a grave assurance to the French Chamber that the time was one of peculiar serenity, and that there was apparent no difficulty of disturbing imminence. Diplomatists were glad to make his words a summer text and gratefully close their portfolios and go vacationing. A calm almost sabbatical enwrapped the darkened embassies. In Paris, the Cham- bers were still sitting, but it was supposed the most im- portant business was well finished with the disposal of the St. Gothard affair and the passing of the bill to reduce con- scription. The Emperor was preparing to go to Vichy for the waters. 1 Mr. Washburne, the United States'Minister to France, was leaving for Carlsbad with the happy reflec- tion that he availed himself of a time unusually propitious. 1 In Berlin Herr von Thile was left in charge, while his King sought recreation at Ems and the Chancellor buried himself on his estates. The great houses of London, in- cluding the French embassy, were dark, though Parliament was still in languid session. Lord Granville had but lately acceded to the office of Secretary of Foreign Affairs, left 1 Gentleman's Annual, 1830, " The Story of the War," pp. 1 et seq. 1 E. B. Washburne, The Franco-German War and Insurrection of the Commune (Exec. Doc. no. 24, Washington, D. C, 1878), p. I. 5i] 51 5 2 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [52 vacant by Clarendon's death. On the fifth of July, the veteran Under Secretary, Mr. Hammond, congratulated him on his having assumed his duties during the greatest lull in the Foreign Office he remembered. 1 Tempo lente e suave, truly, but already, pianissimo, could be heard the strain that was to swell to the crescendo of war ! From the time that the Bourbon, Isabella, had been forced to leave her castles in Spain, the provisional government had hawked her throne from England to Italy, and saw it still unoccupied. Most persistently it had been offered to young Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, brother of the new ruler of Rumania, a member of the reigning house of Prussia, and an officer in the Prussian army. He had twice declined its acceptance, but, in July, it became known to the French Minister at Madrid that Marshal Prim was in receipt of a third response that was favorable. 2 The news was received in Paris with the dis- pleasure that is felt at the reopening of a disagreeable ques- tion that was supposed to have been settled. When rumours of the candidacy had reached the French Ministry a year before, Count Benedetti had been instructed to inform the Prussian Government of the dissatisfaction with which such a choice would be regarded in France. He had at that time been assured by Herr von Thile on his honour that the Prince was not, and could not seriously become, a can- didate for the Spanish crown. 3 The recrudescence of the question persuaded the Emperor that it was a matter which, considering the uneasy rela- 1 Granville to Russell, July 7, 1870, Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Gran- ville, vol. ii, p. 33. 2 Comte Maurice Fleury, Memoirs of the Empress Eugenie (N. Y., 1920), vol. ii, chap, vii, passim. 3 Quotation from Due de Gramont's Circular to the Diplomatic Agents of the Empire in a dispatch of Layard's, Madrid 1 , July 25, 1870, British State Papers for 1870, Foreign Office Series, vol. lxx, p. 42. 53 ] BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS 53 tions existing between France and Prussia since Sadowa, must be handled with firmness and circumspection. In the absence of his Ambassador from London, he commissioned Baron Rothschild to transmit the disquieting news of the candidacy to Gladstone, and to represent to him the displeas- ure felt in France and urge the British Government to do what it could to prevent its aggravation. 1 On the next day, July the sixth, France was again ^re- presented in England, and M. de Lavalette called on Lord Granville to give official repetition to the informal message. 2 The British Government, until this time, professedly had been in ignorance of the project. Earl Granville expressed himself as not surprised at the unfavorable reception it had received in France, though he could not share the French estimate of its importance, and regretted that Gramont had spoken in strong terms to Baron Werther, the Prussian Am- bassador. He readily promised to use what influence he could, both with Spain and Prussia, to persuade them to the abandonment of the project. 3 The despatches which he forthwith sent to the British re- presentatives in Berlin and Madrid are models of diploma- tic correspondence. Lord Loftus is informed that the British Government cannot believe that an offer so secretly conducted can have received the sanction of King William. The British Ambassador to Prussia is to remind that Power of the present sensitiveness of opinion in France to Prus- sian aggrandisement and the occasion this opportunity of- fers to exhibit a friendliness and forbearance that would in- 1 Morley, Life of Gladstone (N. Y., 1911), vol. ii, p. 325; Hunt and Poole, Political History of England (N. Y., 1 905-1915), vol. xii, p. 261 ; Sir Spencer Walpole, History of Twenty-five Years (N. Y., 1904- 1908), vol. ii, p. 482. 1 Newton, Lord Lyons, vol. i, p. 295. •Granville to Lyons, July 6, 1870, Brit. State Papers for 1870, For- eign Office, vol lxx, p. 2. 54 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [54 volve no sacrifice. He is to urge as his main argument, however, the interest of Spain in the matter — the difficulties that she might encounter should she select a dynasty so hateful to the neighboring French. 1 The despatch sent to Mr. Layard at Madrid after the Spanish Minister had called to announce the choice of his Government, embodies a sigh for Lord Clarendon, who had understood Spain so well and been so highly regarded there. It makes no pretence to dictate to Spain her choice of king, but for " prudential reasons " urges that she look further. 2 On the day that Lord Granville despatched his propitia- tory message to Prussia, M. de Gramont, having received no reply to his representations at Berlin and Madrid, complica- ted the task of mediation by declaring in the Corps Legislatif that the advancement of the Hohenzollern prince could have no end but war. 3 The vehemence of the speech surprised the British Ambassador who had discussed the matter only the day before with M. Ollivier and found him firm but not bel- licose. The speech was complained of to Lord Lyons by the Prussian Charge a" Affaires, who was acting in Baron Werther's absence. Though making no defence for the precipitateness of Gramont's declaration, the British Ambas- sador, nevertheless, expressed the opinion that it had the entire approval of the French nation and that it was, ac- cordingly, the King of Prussia, rather than the Emperor, who could with dignity and honor put an end to the affair.* 1 Granville to Lyons, July 6, 1870, Brit. State Papers for 1870, vol. lxx, p. 3. 2 Despatches of Granville to Layard, July 7th and 8th, 1870, Brit. State Papers for 1870, vol. lxx, pp. 5-10. s " L'avenemcnt du Prince de Hohenzollern c'est la guerre" Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 296; Gentleman's Annual for 1870, "Story of the War," pp. 1 et seq. * Lyons to Granville, Paris, July 7, 1870, Brit. State Papers, vol. lxx, pp. 7-8. 55] BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS 55 To his chief, he wrote even more frankly of the inflamed state of French opinion. He believed the Ministry was no more than making an attempt to gain popularity by ener- getically voicing the feeling of the nation, but that they were really desirous of settling the affair by diplomacy. 1 One must remember the lean years France had recently been through and the dubious position of her Emperor and his Ministry to understand those " faults and follies," which Gladstone with the overemphasis of oratory accused of being " without parallel in the history of nations." 2 To French insistence, Prussia opposed an attitude of obdurate resistance. Her Ambassador at London, Count Bernstorff, maintained to Lord Granville that the matter was not one which concerned North Germany, but that if France chose to make war his country was prepared to de- fend itself. 3 The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg re- presented Russia's attitude to be identic in attaching no responsibility to Prussia for the election of a Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne. 4 It is lamentable that Gladstone's) Cabinet was not better informed of the extent and ramifica- tions of the negotiations preceding the election. 5 Had Downing Street even known that the candidature had been the subject of discussion between the Prussian King, his Chancellor, and von Moltke, Lord Granville might have 1 Lyons to Granville, Paris, July 7, 1870, ibid., vol. lxx, pp. 5-7. 2 Morley, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 327. 1 Hunt and Poole, op. cit., p. 261. * Sir A. Buchanan to Granville, July 9, 1870; Brit. State Papers for 1870, vol. lxx, p. 49. 5 On Feb. 27, 1870, Bismarck drew up a confidential report in which he strongly favoured the candidature. On March 15, a council was held to discuss the matter at which there were present Moltke, Roon, Thile. Bismarck, Prince Anthony, and Leopold. Moltke on this occa- sion let it be known that Prussia was in a condition to combat Napo- leon's disapproval. Prince Leopold, however, refused to become a 56 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [56 succeeded in puncturing the cool armor of unconcern which so aggravated France and so persistently repelled the con- ciliating efforts of the British. It would seem, too, that the information that Lord Lyons supplied was not so complete as it should have been. He was deceived by the belliger- ent tone of certain press articles and by the warlike attitude of the Parisians into thinking that there existed a burning, national desire for revenge on Prussia. 1 At a time when the French Emperor was heartily wishing that the perturbed deputies and ministers " would fellow the sage practice of the American Indians and keep their mouths shut," when the Empress was urging Isabella to use her influence to pre- vent the accession of so unwelcome a successor, and Bis- marck was rinding it necessary to keep Dr. Busch constantly employed in writing anonymous articles that would incite the French, it was believed in Downing Street that impetus to the quarrel came from France rather than from Prussia. On the tenth of the month, matters were somewhat bet- tered by Gramont's interview with Lord Lyons, in which he gave the British a basis for mediation. The French demand for the withdrawal of the Prince's candidature, which Rothschild had earlier communicated to Gladstone as the sine qua non of the negotiations, remained the same, but it appeared now that the French advanced the demand with more of reason. Benedetti, — the Minister sent to ascertain candidate. In April, Bismarck sent agents to Spain on a secret mis- sion. At the end of May Leopold was won over to the project, largely through the efforts of the Crown Prince. The next month Salazar, at Bismarck's suggestion, came to Sigmaringen to negotiate with Leo- pold's father in order to come to a final agreement. The young Prince had only yielded a consent contingent on the Royal approval. " After a hard struggle," King William agreed to the project on June 21. Fleury, op. cit., vol. ii, chap, vii ; Grant Robertson, Bismarck (Lon- don, 1018), pp. 265-267. 1 Newton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 297. 57] BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS 57 the attitude of Prussia in the matter, — had been unable to in- terview Bismarck, and disliking in an affair of such gravity to negotiate solely with an Under Secretary, who could only offer to his objections the parrot-like repetition that the af- fair was not germane to the Government, had gone directly to the King at Ems. The result was, Gramont told Lyons, that the King had admitted having given his consent. He now promised to confer with Prince Leopold and give a definitive answer to France when he had done so. This admission and agreement, M. Gramont believed, removed the ambiguity of the affair, making it distinctly one between France and the King of Prussia. Gramont assured Lord Lyons that if the Prince of Hohenzollern should now, on the advice of the King, withdraw his acceptance, the whole affair would be at an end. The British Ministers decided to ask the Queen to write confidentially advising the Prince's withdrawal. France, meanwhile, deferred any ostensible preparations for war. 1 On the morning of the eleventh, Gramont informed Lord Lyons that, as yet, no answer had been received from King William, but that his Government would wait another day, although the Corps Legislatif was restive under the delay and the Ministry was becoming most unpopular. 2 At two p. m. the following day, Lord Lyons telegraphed that an answer had been received from the King of Prussia. It was a demand for time made on the surprising admission that that most important princeling, Leopold of Hohen- zollern-Sigmaringen, was not to be found. 3 Later in the day, a more extended answer was received. In it His 1 Morley, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 327; Lyons to Granville, Paris, July 10, 1870, Brit. State Papers for 1870, vol. lxx, pp. 16-17. 1 Lyons to Granville, Paris, July 12, ibid., vol. lxx, pp. 18-19. 1 Ernest Hartley Coleridge, Life and Correspondence of John Duke, Lord Coleridge, Lord Chief Justice of England (London, 1904), vol. ii, p. 172. The telegram does not appear in the British State Papers. 5 8 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [58 Majesty disclaimed all connection with the offer of the Spanish crown to his kinsman and declined to advise him to withdraw his acceptance. However, the father of the elusive Prince sent a copy of the telegram which he had despatched to Marshal Prim, declaring that his son's candidature w r as at an end. 1 M. de Gramont regretted that the King had not only not given the definitive answer he had promised but had now distinctly refused to advise the Prince in the mat- ter and had reverted to his attitude that a distinction should be drawn between himself as King of Prussia and as head of the family of Hohenzollern. The Prince himself was of age and it was not known that he entertained such regard for his father's wishes as to induce him to prefer filial obedience to submission to any future prompting of the Prussian King or his Chancellor. Lord Lyons seems to have had no patience with these French misgivings. He believed, and said so, that the demand of France had been fulfilled and that it was her duty now to fulfil her own promise to the British Government and consider the matter ended. He warned France that insistence on a matter of form would be regarded as cul- pable, by all of Europe, whereas Prussia, were she pushed to war, would gain sympathy as fighting in self-defence and could expect to rally all Germany to her support. 2 Granville approved Lord Lyons' despatch, and himself used the same arguments to the French Ambassador. On the following 1 On the morning of July 12, when Napoleon had received news of Prince Anthony's telegram to Prim, he said to the Italian Ambassador, Count Nigra : " This dispatch . . . means peace. I have requested you to come here for the purpose of having you tell the news to your Gov- ernment. ... I know very well that public opinion is so excited that it would have preferred war. But this renunciation is a satisfactory solu- tion and disposes, at least for the present, of every pretext for hostil- ities." Thos. W. Evans, The Second French Empire. 1 Lyons to Granville, Paris, July 12, Brit. State Papers, vol. lxx, pp. 20-21. 59 j BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS 59 day he telegraphed that Lord Lyons should make represen- tations, before the French Council assembled, of the im- mense responsibility that the British Government would charge to France if she sought to enlarge the grounds of the quarrel by declining to accept the Prince's withdrawal. 1 It may be that the severity of Granville's telegram was due not only to the exigency of the situation but to irritation be- cause M. de Gramont, in his speech to the Deputies on the eleventh, had declared that up to that time all the European Cabinets appeared to admit the legitimacy of French com- plaints, 2 a point that was made the subject of a despatch to Lord Lyons the same day 3 and of subsequent objections from Parliament. 4 Certainly this day, the thirteenth, was one of distinct ill omen for France. In Paris, M. de Gramont was in receipt of a telegram from the French Minister to Russia which advised him that when the Emperor Alexander had begged King William to order the Prince's withdrawal, the Prussian monarch had refused and accompanied his refusal with no single word of explanation. 5 He was also in re- ceipt of a most extraordinary telegram from Stuttgart which stated that the Wurttemberg Government had been informed that Lord Granville had said France would at- tack Prussia immediately by sea and by land without a declaration of war were her demands refused. The Wurt- temberg Government had received the information via 1 Substance of telegram from Granville to Lyons, July 14, 1870, Brit. State Papers, vol. lxx, p. 37. 2 Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville, vol. ii, p. 35 ; Morley, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 328; Brit. State Papers for 1870, vol. lxx, p. 26. . 3 Brit. State Papers for 1870, vol. lxx, p. 22. * Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, July 14th and July 18th, 1870, pp. 225 and 370. Russell and Horsman were the interpolators. * Lyons to Granville, July 13, 1870, Brit. State Papers, vol. lxx, p. 26. 60 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [60 Berlin and, as well as Lord Lyons could remember, from the Prussian Government. 1 From Vienna, the French agent transmitted Count Beust's warning against pushing matters to extremities. The state of feeling in the South German states, which he believed himself peculiarly able to gage, was not one of sympathy to France in the present matter. 2 In view of these developments, France was eager for such a definitive termination of the affair as could come only if his Prussian Majesty would forbid Prince Leopold from altering at any future time his present decision. Gramont assured Lyons that if England could succeed in obtain- ing this agreement from the King, he would give a written assurance that for his Government the incident would be terminated. 3 Lord Lyons forwarded the re- quest, 4 and reported that the impression prevailed on the night of the thirteenth that it was yet possible to preserve peace. The language of the Cabinet was more pacific. It was understood that the renunciation of the prince had come to confirm that received from his father, and the Spanish Government had formally declared to the Government of France that the candidature was at an end. 5 It would seem from an interview of Lord Loftus with Bismarck on this fateful thirteenth that the tempest clouds blew now from the north. 1 The day before, the Prussian Chancellor had left Varzin to go to the King at Ems, but, 1 Lyons to Granville, July 18, 1870, ibid., he. cit. a Bloomfield to Granville, Vienna, July 13, 1870, ibid., vol. lxx, pp. 50-51. 'Morley, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 330. 4 Lyons to Granville, Paris, July 13, 1870, Brit. State Papers, vol. lxx, 26. • Lyons to Granville, Paris, July 14, ibid., vol. lxx, p. 35. 6 At a Cabinet Council, held on the 13th, the Emperor gained the Ministry's consent to his proposal to submit the subject of the contro- versy to arbitration. Evans, op. cit., p. 164. 6l] BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS 6l stopping at Berlin, he was met by telegrams from his royal master that so displeased him that he sent Marshal Eulen- burg to the King instead, and himself remained in the capital, half resolved to resign his post. He was disposed now to admit a mighty concern in a matter which, hitherto, he had permitted the King to deal with in the capacity of head of the House of Hohenzollern. When, then, the British Ambassador congratulated him on the solution which apparently was reached, Count Bismarck demurred. He told Lord Loftus that the " extreme moderation evinced by the King of Prussia under the menacing tone of the French Government and the courteous reception by His Majesty of Count Benedetti at Ems, after the severe lang- uage held to Prussia both officially and in the French press " was producing general indignation. He mentioned various telegrams which he had received that morning confirmative of such dissatisfaction. He, then, expressed a wish that the British Government would officially declare its satisfaction at the solution of the question by the " spontaneous act of Prince Leopold," and bear public testimony to the calm and moderation of the King of Prussia, and his Govern- ment, and the German Press. 1 May it be observed that this request to Great Britain was rather extraordinary in that it asked official commendation for an act which the Prussian King and his Government had repeatedly declared to be wholly unofficial and committed by the King only in his personality as head of the House of Hohenzollern? However, the distinction is one so subtle that, were it not that the offender was the clear-headed Bismarck, it is not surprising to find it occasioning confusion to the very Government that avowed it. The Count went further and demanded that the solution of this purely family affair 1 Loftus to Granville, Berlin, July 13, 1870, Brit. State Papers, vol. lxx, pp. 32-33 ; Hunt and Poole, op. cit., p. 262. 62 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [62 should be publicly acknowledged by France to the European Powers and that France should promise to raise no further claims in the matter and disavow, or satisfactorily explain, the menacing language of the Due de Gramont. Under the existing circumstances, it was impossible, the Chancellor said, for him to receive the French Ambassador, and were the conditions he had just outlined not fulfilled, " Prussia would be obliged to seek explanations from France." The British Ambassador, who had begun the interview with con- gratulations, hastened off to write his chief that, were the French Government not induced to appease enraged Prus- sia, war would be inevitable. His despatch did not reach Granville until the fifteenth. Had it come a day earlier, Her Majesty's Government would have been saved from the rebuff it encountered by so far acceding to Gramont's request of the thirteenth as to ask that the dually constituted William of Hohenzollern would confirm the Prince's withdrawal by an expression of approval. 1 Before the deferential British request reached Prussia and Count Bismarck had time to express regret at receiving a proposal of so impossible a nature as to preclude him from presenting it to King William, 2 an episode took place which totally changed the state of feeling in the French capital. On the morning of the fourteenth, the hopes of Ollivier were dispelled by a startling telegram from the Charge d'Aif aires at Berlin. It stated that an article had appeared in the Prussian Ministerial organ, the North German Gazette, to the effect that the " French Ambassador had requested the King to promise never to allow a Hohen- zollern to be a candidate for the throne of Spain, that His 1 Granville to Lyons. July 14, Brit. State Papers, vol. lxx, p. 28. 2 Granville to Loftus, July 15, 1870, ibid., vol. lxx, p. 30. 63] BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS 63 Majesty had, thereupon, refused to receive the Ambassador and sent him word by an Aide-de-Camp that he had nothing more to say to him." The French Government, alarmed at news so much more disquieting than that sent by Count Benedetti, himself, 1 nevertheless, prevented it from becoming generally known and made no communica- tion on the subject to the Corps Legislatif and the Senate in their sessions of that day. Lord Lyons, however, who was still dutifully urging moderation and caution, expressed great fear that when the evening papers copied the article of the North German Gazette, the anger of the populace might precipitate the Government into declaring war. 2 The solu- tion of this family affair had, in a way, been withdrawn from the competency of the Ministry and laid before the high tribunal of the people. a By evening, it was known at the Quai d'Orsay that the Prussian Government had given endorsement and further publicity to the article by telegraphing it to all its embassies throughout the Continent. Its communication to Baron Werther, the conciliatory ambassador to Paris, was ac- companied by instructions to leave his post at once. The 1 Lyon's report of interview with Gramont, ibid., vol. lxx, p. 40. * Lyons to Granville, Paris, July 14, 1870, ibid., vol. lxx, pp. 35-36. A special supplement of the Nord Deutsche Zeitung, containing the famous Ems telegram that had been edited by Bismarck, was distrib- uted gratis on the streets of Berlin on July 13, 1870, according to a letter of the Berlin correspondent of the Times. * It can be a matter of interest more to the metaphysician or to the psychologist than th historian, that two or three days after the pub- lication of the inflammatory account of the first interview of King William with Benedetti, the aide-de-camp reported that his master, who as the Prussian King was a Dr. Jekyll, who really knew nothing of the nefarious Spanish business, and as head of the House of Hohenzollern was a Mr. Hyde, who persisted in consenting to the project, had agreed at Ems to withdraw his consent " in the same sense and to the same extent it had been given." Granville to Loftus, July 19, 1870; ibid., vol. 70, p. 60. 64 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [64 Emperor returned from St. Cloud and held a council at the Tuileries. The indefatigable Lord Lyons for the first time found it impossible to communicate directly with the Due de Gramont, and could extract no comforting 1 reassurance from the head of his Cabinet. 1 The next day, July the fifteenth, the reserves were called out and the Government, after reviewing the negotiations, de- clared before the Chambers that further attempts at con- ciliation were impossible. It laid especial emphasis on the fact that the King of Prussia had announced to the French Ambassador that he would not receive him, and that the Prussian Government had communicated this decision to the Cabinets of Europe, and instructed Baron Werther to demand his passports. 2 These points were stressed again in an interview which the Due de Gramont had with Lord Lyons later in the day. Prussia, said the French Minister, had deliberately insulted France by declaring to the public that the King had affronted Count Benedetti. She had shown herself eager to take credit with the people of Ger- many for having acted with haughtiness and discourtesy, and had seen fit to telegraph the news of the affront to the Prussian agents throughout Europe. The matter was the more provocative, said the Duke, since the French Govern- ment was aware that its Minister had not been treated with such rough discourtesy as Prussia had boasted. It was the boast and not the episode itself which was the " gravamen of the offense." It constituted an insult which had made it impossible for France further to avail herself of the good offices of Great Britain. He expressed the hope that that Government might not be so wedded to the doctrine of peace as to refuse sympathy to an old ally, who was about to commence hostilities, and he assured Lord Lyons that, in 1 Ibid., vol. lxx, p. 39. 2 Lyons to Granville, Paris, July 15, 1870, ibid., vol. lxx, pp. 36-37. 65] BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS 65 regard to Belgium (ever "England's funny-bone"), the French Government had already spontaneously given it as- surance that its neutrality would be regarded as a funda- mental principle. 1 The British Ambassador believed that no diminution of friendly feeling would take place but that, at the same time, chagrin would be felt that France had not contented herself with the simple withdrawal of the pretensions of Prince Leopold. One further effort was made by Lord Granville even at this eleventh hour. In identic notes to France and Prussia he urged those countries to avail themselves of the Twenty-third Protocol of the Conference of Paris of 1856. 2 Its provisions were recognized as offering a dignified man- ner in which aggrieved nations might submit to mediation those questions which, otherwise, would lead to war. 3 The Government of France declined to resort to the Protocol on the ground that the difficulty between herself and Prussia was one involving national dignity and so had been re- served from its provisions.* The Prussian Government based its refusal on the fact that since France had taken the initiative in the direction of war, it would be unbecoming, and even impossible because of the national excitement, for Prussia to take the initiative in negotiating for peace. 6 The appeal to the Protocol had been, indeed, but formal. The events of the thirteenth of July had success- 1 Lyons to Granville, Paris, July 15, 1870, ibid., vol. lxx, pp. 39-40. ' Granville to Lyons, July 15, 1870, ibid., vol. lxx, p. 35. On July 17th Loftus, in compliance with instructions, was still urging the Protocol at Berlin. 1 Lyons to Granville, Paris, July 18, 1870, ibid., vol. lxx, p. 64. * Lyons to Granville, Paris, July 19, 1870, ibid., vol. lxx, pp. 58. 4 Bismarck to Loftus, July 18, 1870, ibid., vol. lxx, p. 68; Loftus, in a despatch of the same date, states that addresses were pouring in from all parts of the country expressing loyalty to the King and a readiness to incur any sacrifice for the honor and protection of the country. 66 BRITISH POUCY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [66 fully nullified any efforts at mediation. The article in the North Gentian Gazette and the publicity given it by Prussia had convinced France that it was the intention of Bismarck to make the " family matter" a pretext for belligerency. On the nineteenth of July, the French Charge d' Affaires at Berlin delivered the declaration that his Government was sure the Prussian Chancellor had angled for. CHAPTER IV Responsibility for the Declaration of War Diplomacy is somewhat like the American game of stud poker where one card is always held back. Even for those who sit in at the green table there is an element of uncer- tainty, but for those who watch from afar there i& ev«« greater certainty of uncertainty. It is often ludicrous to hear them expending their efforts at wit or wisdom in pro- nouncing judgments on situations which they totally misap- prehend. The candidature of Prince Leopold for the Span- ish throne, made known by Madrid despatches of July the third, was a complete surprise in London. Both Conservative and Liberal papers condemned the secrecy and the quixotic audacity of the Spanish negotiations that had led to his selection by the Cortes, and there was no thought of blam- ing France for her disinclination to see herself thorned on either side by a Hohenzollern. Berlin despatches in an- nouncing the Prince's acceptance of the offer, made bold to report the nomination as being regarded favorably in England. 1 This the Times at once denied. 2 It criticized, however, the imperious tone with which France interposed in the petty intrigue of princes. It was an American-cousin way of demanding the mustard at the point of a revolver. 8 For the most part, even those journals that thought French interests would be endangered by the " Jack-in-the- 1 Quoted in Correspondence du Nord-Est. * Times, July 7, 1870. 8 Ibid., July 12, 1870. 6;] 5 7 68 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [68 Box " affair believed no war would result. " Louis Napo- leon," said the Daily News, discounting the " fantastic and passionate lucubrations " of the independent French jour- nals, " Louis Napoleon, no doubt, will think it best to bow to the fait accompli and make the best of it 1 ... . Even if it should cause a civil war in Spain, it will not be per- mitted to disturb the peace of Europe." 3 Said the Man- chester Guardian, France will accept the election and Prussia will disclaim any hostility or disrespect. The Emperor would prefer a Hohenzol- lern to the Duke of Montpensier, who might be expected to aid Orleanist intrigue, and as for the French people, they have already endured, with a bad grace indeed, aggrandizements of Prussia upon a great scale, and they will not be very seriously embittered by the thought that a younger branch of the house of Hohenzol- lern has obtained royalty in Spain. 8 The London Graphic declared French interests in no way threatened, and, contenting itself with a brief mention of the affair, expended much space in describing the camp being held at Wimbledon, and discussing Disraeli's recently published Lotlvair." When, however, the candidacy received no check from the clearly expressed disapproval of France, it began to be thought that Spain must have had some assurance of Prus- sian support to show herself persistent. The Times de-> clared the crux of the question to be the share Count Bis- marck had had in the nomination and noted that, though the Prussian papers were in tone very temperate, they forbore to advise their Government to extinguish the affair by dis- 1 Daily News, July 15, 1870. 1 Ibid., July 6, 1870. * Manchester Guardian, July 6, 1870. * London Graphic, July 9, 1870. 69] RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECLARATION OF WAR 69 suading Prince Leopold. 1 The Telegraph, very early in the controversy, described him as the " nominee of the Count and probably his obedient servant." 2 The Globe and Traveller urged the Prussian Government to take immediate steps to procure the rejection of the Spanish offer. 3 And the Spectator avowed that since General Prim was no fool he must have known how his project would be regarded in Paris and Berlin, and been ready to resort to arms if neces- sary. 4 It was an Irish paper that most luxuriated in im- plicating and imprecating Prussia : " Prim and Bismarck have tricked, deceived, and outwitted Napoleon," says the Nation, " have menaced, defied, and humiliated France." 8 On July 12, a week after the affair had begun to arouse general comment, telegrams reached London giving news of an imperious ultimatum just sent by France to Prussia. A serious panic took place on the Stock Exchange. Some relief was felt when, that afternoon, news was received of the Prince's withdrawal. But as the reports from France continued to be discouraging, fresh excitement set in.' This pocket-book disaster and the receipt of the circular sent out by Spain disclaiming any responsibility of Prussia in her action, induced a more nervous attitude toward the affair. Its base was seen to have widened and, in this, France was believed to be the offender. From then on the tone of the press became less sympathetic. The Times urged the Em- peror to consult the wishes of his eight million subjects be- fore he allowed himself to be carried away by the clamorous 1 Times, July 12, 1870. * Daily Telegraph, July 7, 1870. 1 Globe and Traveller, July 8, 1870. * Spectator, July 9, 1870. 5 Nation (Belfast), July 9, 1870. 6 Telegraph, July 12, 1870. j BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [y politicians of the boulevards, 1 The Standard, heretofore very sensitive to the French view of the matter, suspected that the rumoured ultimatum concerned itself with even more than the immediate question. 2 And the Telegraph, also reckoned as a partisan of France, chronicled the gossip as to the Prince's withdrawal on the fourteenth with the fear that, were it true, only a temporary suspension of the convulsion would be effected. Small wonder that the Siecle took alarm at the uneasy tone of the British press and urged the French Government to moderation. 5 While the London papers thus expressed alarm, their Paris correspondents were preparing despatches that would have gone far to steady confidence. Rumours of the episode at Ems — the " garden scene," as some one later dub- bed it, — followed so hot upon the news of the Prince's renun- ciation that, in some cases, the pacific despatches were never sent. In instances where they were transmitted and given credence by London editors, there occurred the pheno- menon of British papers appearing with tidings of peace after the French Chambers had already given their decision for war. It was like a rainbow seen dimly through a blind- ing storm. The correspondent of the London Graphic wrote, on the thirteenth, that in Paris funds had gone up, and the general opinion was in favour of peace. In the same envelope he enfolded another dispatch saying that even as he wrote thus hopefully there was taking place in the Kursaal that famous interview, the report of which roused the Parisians to fury. The laconic telegram from Ems (which England was not to know for years had been maliciously edited by Bismarck) appeared in the North 1 Times, July 13, 1870. 8 Standard, July 13, 1870. * Times, July 15, 1870 (letter from Paris Correspondent, dated July 14). 7I ] RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECLARATION OF WAR yi German Gazette on the morning of the fourteenth, and was at once sent by the Reuter Agency to London. At the same time there came from Berlin correspondents news of the massed crowds that assembled in front of the palace to cheer their ruler and beg that he lead them to the Rhine. 1 Editorial comment fully approved the indignation of the Prussians. The Times declared that it could no longer be doubted that it was the fault of the French that further nego- tiations were almost impossible, that nothing could justify the deliberate provocation with which the discourtesy of Spain had been fastened upon Prussia. 2 The Daily Tele- graph blamed France for having spoken " the fatal last word that precedes a conflict of which none can estimate the results." It believed that the Envoy's intrusion on the royal promenade had not been without malice prepense. However, consideration was given to the singular prompt- ness with which the King resented the rudeness, and the immediate publicity his Government had given the incident. Conviction that France was wholly to blame for the unfor- tunate termination of the quarrel was weakened by reports from French sources that a circular had been sent to Prus- sian representatives abroad, which confirmed the affront of- fered to M. Benedetti, and declared the King to have re- stored to Prince Leopold the liberty of accepting the Spanish crown. The issuing of such statements after M. Ollivier's organ, the Constitutionnel, had recorded the accep- tance of the withdrawal, the Telegraph believed, made Prus- sia culpable with France. 3 The rumoured circular, however, received no general comment in the English press. Another of the papers, that, like the Telegraph, condemned France with manifest reluctance was the Tory Globe. For while 1 Times, July 15, 1870. * Ibid., July 15, 1870. 8 Telegraph, July 16, 1870. 72 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [y 2 admitting that, " if the accounts have not been exaggerated, it is impossible in the interests of truth and justice to say that war has not been provoked by the French Govern- ment," it warned its readers that Prussian conduct in times past had been equally precipitate and extravagant. The morning that chronicled the momentous breach of etiquette at Ems heralded a day rife with rumours of the mounting excitement at Paris and Berlin. The later papers carried the news of the French Government's declaration to the Chambers which practically removed all hope of peace. That afternoon, Disraeli, rising in a hushed and breathless House of Commons, inquired of the Prime Minister whether or not the news the members had just been so anxiously reading were true, whether war had been made inevitable. Gladstone could give no further reassurance than that negotiations were not yet broken off. It must have been an uncomfortable session for the Prime Minister. No one more than he enjoyed the attitude of righteous con- demnation and could so revel in the prolix splendour of in- dignation. It must have been galling to sit fettered by the chains of office and hear the Disraelian thunder against the French monarch who so wantonly disturbed the peace of Europe because he believed his own armament to be in better condition than his neighbour's, the description of the virtu- ous, enlightened age, which such impious levity flouted, and the sonorous prophecy that this sovereign would be punished by a more powerful force than any military army, — " the outraged opinion of an enlightened world." Gladstone could only assume an attitude of f orebearance and give brief assurance that the Government had made efforts at media- tion and in this last extremity had appealed to the Protocol of 1856. 1 'Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, vol. cciii, pp. 346-347; Morley, Life of Gladstone, vol. ii, p. 335 ; Hunt and Poole, Political History of England, p. 262. 7 3 ] RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECLARATION OF WAR 73 When the Prime Minister and his doughty opponent had seated themselves, the impression prevailed that both were of the opinion that Napoleon should be, in some way, casti- gated, but that, whereas the one had done no more than try to reason with him and finally urge that he submit his quar- rel to more temperate heads, the other was crtain that, had he been in office, something — no one knew exactly what — but something much more effective would have been done about it. In justice to France and the attitude of neutrality the Government had decided on, it would seem that Glad- stone should have given some brief account of the progress of the negotiations that had been so assiduously and even so hopefully continued up to this time by the French and the British. It may have been that his extreme reticence was due to the impression made on him by the German ac- counts of the bearding of the aged King at Ems. Cer- tainly, his appreciation of French claims appears to have been dulled to extinction. Granville, in his reply to in- terrogations in the House of Lords on the same subject, was no more communicative. 1 So late as the twenty-first, when the Government was still withholding information as to the negotiations, the Globe commented on its action as " a mystery most profound," and urged that the facts be laid before the public without further delay. But irrespective of paucity or authenticity of inform- ation, the Fourth Estate adjured the restraint of the Lords and Commons and was clamorous in its criticism of France and profuse in its speculations as to the causes of her in- iquity. It was a finer thing to read the papers than to at- tend the sessions. For a few days it seemed the Times was reviving its old title of the "Thunderer." Vide the leader of the sixteenth : " The greatest national crime that we have had the pain of recording in these columns since the 1 Hansard, op. cit., vol. cciii, p. 35. 74 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [74 days of the First French Empire has been consummated. War is declared — an unjust but premeditated war. This dire calamity, which overwhelms Europe with dismay, is, it is now too clear, the act of one man in France. It is the ultimate result of personal rule." The Times itself, how- ever, was not so dismayed that it could not see the ultimate end of the war to be the conquest by France of the left bank of the Rhine, or the acquisition by Prussia of Alsace and Lorraine, and that the failure of Napoleon's dynastic ambi- tions would result should the latter take place. The Economist, immensely perturbed at the heavy fall in all description of securities, characterized the French decla- ration of war as " one of those awful events which brings comment to a stand," and, then, straightway disproved its own judgment by a lengthy description of the French greed for prestige and the Emperor's ambition that had directed Count Benedetti " to ask for more." l The Spectator, showing the same vehement detestation of Napoleon which distinguished the Times, bewailed the fact that " Europe must pass through a year, perhaps years of misery, in order that one single man may secure the career and position of one single child." It believed it to have been the recent adverse vote of a minority of the soldiery that induced Napoleon, " by a series of insults almost without precedent in diplomacy," to force Germany to war. 2 The Pall Mall Gazette and the Manchester Guardian 3 both ironically con- gratulated Napoleon for the modus operandi with which he had brought Prussia to agree to a foregone decision. The Daily News with a sententiousness equal to the Times, de- clared that in the court of history the action of France would be rated as a crime — a crime against civilization, against 1 Economist, July 16, 1870. * Spectator, July 16, 1870. 'Issues of July 16, 1870. 7 e] RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECLARATION OF WAR 75 humanity, as well as against the peace and good order of the world. 1 The Weekly Scotsman, not to be outdone in indignation by its English contemporaries, but somewhat muddled as to the facts, delivered a scathing sermon on this " war for the sake of war " brought on after " the pro- posal of a proposal was withdrawn by those having national authority over the proposed to be proposed Prince." : The amount of violent abuse in both the Liberal and Con- servative journals of the British press, and more especially that in the Times, which was regarded as, in some manner, inspired by the Government, greatly irritated the French. Had they wished, they could have pointed to the fact that even on the sixteenth when British condemnation was at its hottest, the reports of correspondents writing from Paris had induced several papers to discount later tidings and believe the war cloud to have passed. The Illustrated London News of the sixteenth dared to rejoice, though timorously, at the " unexpectedly pacific tone which the affair of the week has happily taken." The Examiner recorded the fact that Prussia had thought it prudent to give way and hoped things would stay as they were and the King of three hundred legions not change his mind, nor the heir of the conqueror of Jena take a fancy to avenge Leipsic. 3 The slow-moving Queen, on the same date, expressed belief that the resigna- tion of the Prince's candidature would be the means of averting war — " at least on the present issue ; " and the priestly Tablet, with like reservations as to the future lengths to which France might be driven by her desire to see Prussia eat humble pie, hoped that " the danger of war, which overhung Europe for the last week, is for a time dis- pelled." 1 Daily News, July 16, 1870. * Weekly Scotsman and Caledonian Mercury, July 22, 1870. * Examiner and London Review, July 16, 1870. 76 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [76 Between the extremes of denunciation against France for having occasioned the war and these misinformed pratings of the difficulty's pacific solution, were those papers that, acknowledging war's advent, still forbore to lay its blame on France, and in some case showed a willingness wholly to exonerate her. M. de Lesseps, at this time visiting Eng- land on the invitation of the Liverpool merchants, may have found congenial reading in the Court Journal, that, basing 1 its argument on Berlin accounts of the King's affront to M. Benedetti and the restoration to Leopold of freedom of action in the Spanish affair, asserted that the declaration of war came from the ruler of Prussia and thei offense was his. 1 The Northern Whig may have rejoiced the distinguished visitor with its appreciation of Napoleon's friendship for England and its doubts as to British comfort, should Europe fall under the domination of Bismarck-ruled Prussia. 2 But for truly soul-satisfying endorsement M. de Lesseps should have shipped himself to John Bull's other island. Certainly nowhere could there have been found on July the sixteenth anyone more French than an Irishman. The Weekly Freeman commended the bold Minister, who looked facts squarely in the eye and delivered his ultimatum to a King, who with his Chancellor, was " privy to every step of the negotiations with Prim." The Nation flouted the British papers for their mischievous abuse of France and urged, with a logic that only an Irishman could follow, that this was preeminently a time for the " repeal of the Union." Only Saunders', a Protestant parjer largely without honour in its own country, blamed Napoleon for this fresh proof of his country's enslavement to military glory and his own will- ingness to upset the balance of power to give ambition scope.* 1 Court Journal and Fashionable Gazette, July 16, 1870. 1 Northern Whig, July 19, 1870. 3 Saunders's News-letter and Daily Advertiser, Dublin, July 16, 1870. 77] RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECLARATION OF WAR jj The hearty approval with which the Irish press greeted the decision for war gathered momentum from each groan of censure from the Times and News. Did the British papers denounce M. Rouher's indiscreet avowal that Napoleon had occupied four waiting years in the perfecting of armament and the organization of his country, the Irish papers re- joiced that he must, then, be in excellent fighting trim. Did the British express amazement at M. Ollivier's announce- ment that he entered upon the war with a light heart, the Irish applauded a blithe spirit so like their own. As the Spectator put it, in commenting on this ebullient sympathy which other journals were deriding: "What with his Catholicism, his Celtic blood, and history, the genuine Irishman feels himself a younger brother of the Frenchman and intrinsically detests the sceptical, rigid, and unsympa- thetic Teuton." 1 It must be confessed that, for the most part, there was little demand for analysis of diplomatic documents or circumstantial details by the men of the sham- rock. But there was a sincerity and abandon about their sympathy that was infectious. As John Mitchel put it, " Everybody is taking part in the general struggle : We take part instantly, frankly, and zealously — for France." 2 On the evening of the nineteenth, partly as a demonstra- tion against the alleged false representations of British opinion issuing hourly from the London press, the Irish of Dublin, to the number of twelve or fifteen thousand, as- sembled in front of the French Consulate. The police were competent to testify that there was nothing laboured or arti- ficial about this demonstration. There were some ten or a dozen bands which alternated the Marseillaise with Irish melodies. There was a fight with the police over a French 1 Spectator, July 23, 1870. 'John Mitchel, Ireland, France, and Prussia (Dublin, 1918), editorial from the Irish Citizen. 7 8 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [78 tricolour that had been wreathed with strips of green and orange; there were speeches that recalled the glorious ex- ploits of the Sarsfield Brigade and the deeds of German hire- lings in Ireland in '98, and ended by assuring France that if she gave the word thousands of Irish would come to her aid, — each very eager to kill his Hessian. The crowds, then, peacefully dispersed with the pleasant confidence that they had heartened all of France and had displeased the Protestant editor of Saunders' } It made scant difference to them that in London that night the printers were setting up the Queen's proclamation of neutrality. Its publication was the signal for the Times dutifully to moderate its tone. The Thunderer declared with virtuous rectitude, that war being now inevitable and the primary dispute a matter of history, its editorial policy so far as duty allowed would be neutral. In an effort at retrospective justice, its editorials for the twentieth mentioned the existence of a plot between Bismarck and Prim simultaneously to attack France north and south, which, it hazarded, might have been the cause of Benedetti's insistence. A new version of the Ems episode stated that the envoy " happened " to meet the King in the Kursaal Gar- dens, and that the King, himself, began the interview by placing in Benedetti's hands a newspaper account of Leo- pold's renunciation. On another page its Paris correspon- dent reported that Ollivier was actually drawing up a pacific statement to the Chambers when he received the Prussian account of the famous interview. But an impression intensely condemnatory of France could not materially be modified by these tardy addenda. The press, for the most part, refused to wriggle into the 'Alfred Duquet, Ireland and France (Dublin, 1916), intro., pp. xi- xiii; Nation, July 23, 1870; Tablet, July 23, 1870; Saunders's, July 25, 1870. 79 ] RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECLARATION OF WAR 79 strait jacket of neutrality and its tone continued to sicken men like George Meredith, who laid small stress on the princely peccadillo that initiated a struggle which was now to be regarded as one between two nations. 1 The German residents of London in public meeting assembled did no more than an act of justice when, a day after the proclama- tion of neutrality, they thanked the English press for the almost unanimous sympathy it was affording Prussia. 2 It miffht be that Mr. Brooks would deliver no more sermons in St. James' Chapel praising King William and his nation, 3 and that the Archbishop of Canterbury had set about com- posing a "strictly neutral and heartily pacific" prayer; 4 but, as the Spectator frankly acknowledged, the English middle class was dead against the Emperor, and the only true neutral was the working man, who branded Napoleon a fiend, and William of Prussia, a fool. 5 It was because England was essentially not neutral in her feelings that officials made such a grandiose parade of her neutrality, with something of the notion, perhaps, that a double negative would obscure an affirmative. Chambers of Commerce in large cities hastened to pass resolutions commending a rig- orous silence as to the merits of the quarrel, and a member of Parliament rose in his place to warn journalists against making excursions outside the neutral pale. 6 The British Government consented to take over the care of French in- 1 George Meredith, Letters of (N. Y., 1912), vol. i, pp. 208-211, cor- respondence with his son and John Morley. 1 Times, July 21. 1 This sermon of the Rev. Stopford Brooks was criticized by Saun- ders's, July 25, 1870. * Doubt of the puissance of Prussian amis made it difficult for the British to use this prayer, since it asked the Almighty to inspire the vanquished with submission. Spectator, Aug. 13, 1870. 5 Ibid., July 23, 1870. * Fortnightly Review, " France and Germany," vol. xiv, pp. 36-37. 80 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [80 terests in Germany and received appropriate thanks, 1 but the French were aware of the British attitude and impatient of it. A caricature map of Europe, very popular in Paris, figured England as a fussy, nervous old lady, turning her back on Europe in a nutter of alarm, shocked and grieved at her neghbours having fallen to blows. A breeze from across the Channel blows the poor dame's petticoats through her legs, and almost lifts her off her feet, while she struggles with her bonnet and an enormous umbrella. 2 France was desirous to attract dame England's attention to other difficulties than these of her own. To fill, in some manner, the gap occasioned by the Government's withhold- ing of the official documents, the Comte de Gramont sent to neutral England on the twenty-first a circular explanatory of the French course of action. The circular referred to assurances given a year before by the Prussian Under Secre- tary, von Thile, that Leopold would never seriously become a candidate for the Spanish throne, and to the Emperor's impression that, irrespective of this, negotiations to that end had for some time been carried on under Bismarck's direction. In discussing the much mooted encounter on the Kursaal promenade, it declared that the King was ad- dressed only because Bismarck had made himself inacces- sible. The Prussian answer to the circular evaded de- tails, confining itself to a dignified denial that the candidacy had been discussed by Prussian officials and Benedetti after they had become aware of the Spanish offer. This, as the Standard and the Morning Post pointed out, was in no way a refutation of Benedetti's statement as to what had happened in 1869. At that time, the papers" said, the crown had not been formally offered but assurances 1 Granville to Lyons, July 21, 1870, Brit. State Papers, vol. lxx, pp. 68-60. 1 Described in Saturday Reinetv of May 27, 1871. 8!] RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECLARATION OF WAR 8 1 had been given that would preclude such an eventuality. These had not been observed, since by the King's admission, the candidacy had received royal consent after consultation with Bismarck. 1 The circular had no very apparent influence on British opinion. The Kinglake Napoleon, which to most Islanders was the true one, was not a man to have been outplayed in diplomacy by a rough Prussian, who, it was thought, knew little but the berserker methods of blood and iron. As the Globe complained, 2 the press continued its onesided policy in regard to the war, printing much nonsense in support thereof. Napoleon, it was declared, like Alexander, had been jealous that there might appear two suns in the heavens. 3 The fifty thousand " noes " of the army in the re- cent plebiscite had set him on the quest for Prussian blood, and with a fe, fi, fo, fum he had smelled it in this affair of the Hohenzollern princeling. The impression remained that, as the Saturday Review phrased it. Napoleon, on the slenderest provocation, had committed one of the greatest of crimes,* and that France had disgraced herself by sub- mitting to the will of this " wretched man." Papers like the Morning Advertiser and the canny Scotsman, that reviewed Prussia's conduct toward Denmark and Austria unfavorably, regretted that, were she punished for past of- fenses, it must be at the hands of an impious adversary. 5 A respectable minority, comprising the Standard, the Globe, the widely read Telegraph, the Tablet, Lloyd's Weekly, and News of the World, could only buffet hopelessly against the tide. 1 Issues of July 25, 1870. 1 Globe of July 25, 1870. 3 Illustrated London News, July 23, 1870. * Saturday Reviezv, July 23, 1870. * Issues of July 23, 1870. 82 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [82 It has been said with reason that if a lie be allowed twenty-four hours start nothing can catch it. It is not surprising, then, that when the official correspondence was laid before Parliament, almost a fortnight after the Ems episode, it had scarcely more influence than the Gramont circular, and, indeed, by many of the journals was com- pletely ignored. Events of the week before last could not compete in interest with other very startling news, which we shall see was astutely laid before the public on the day before the documents were made available. It is doubtful, even, whether members of Parliament occupied themselves very much with despatches that ten days before would have had a very vivid interest. Earl Russell was certainly drawing his information from other sources when he laid himself open to the Earb of Malmesbury's correction by asserting that Benedetti had declined discussion with Bis- marck and insisted on dealing directly with the King. 1 Lord Granville, in acknowledging that much turned on the misreading of the Ems incident, rigorously forebore to in- timate by which side the misreading had been contrived. 2 Documents that in a court of law could not but have proven valuable to French interests received substantially no analysis by the leaders of Parliament. Nor was the public more discriminating. It was equally pleased with Charles Lever, who described Napoleon as a second Sir Lucien O'Trigger, 3 and with Mrs. Malaprop, who misquoted Lever and called the Emperor Sir Lucien In- triguer. Lord Lyons complained to Granville of a dis- position on the part of the public to " attribute everything to deep laid plots and schemes," which induced them to 1 Session of July 28, 1870, Hansard, op. cit., vol. cciii, p. 1061. * Session of July 28, 1870, ibid., vol. cciii, p. 1054. 8 Lever, O'Dozvd Papers, Blacktuood's, Sept., 1870, vol. cviii, p. 360. 83] RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECLARATION OF WAR 83 suppose the war a foregone conclusion. This, he was sure, was not true in the case of France. Even at the last moment, he claimed, she would have left the door open to the mediation of a congress, had it not been for the appearance of the momentous article in the North German Gazette. 1 The press verdict on the Official Correspondence was that Granville had played a role eminently dignified but some- what useless. French partisans blamed his severity, when after the dubious withdrawal of the Prince, he had charged the French Government with the " tremendous respon- sibility of insisting on a mere point of form." 2 They pointed to Bismarck's unrebuked refusal to submit to the King, Granville's memorandum to Bernstroff, which had aimed at effecting a settlement injurious to the dignity of neither country. 3 The French Journal Ofhciel of July the thirty-first gave the close analysis of the British Blue Book that the London papers omitted, and urged that, should its interpretation be considered biased, the doubter should resort to the docu- ments themselves. 4 It cannot be believed that this advice caused the pages to be ruffled very considerably. Even the leisurely contributors to the magazines were offenders on the score of heedlessness. There occurs no newspaper article so absolutely contemptuous of the facts set forth in the Blue Book as a discussion appearing in Fraser's for August, which denied that the war was preceded by " any correspondence, demands, or ultimatum," whatsoever. 5 In 1 Lyons to Granville, July 31, 1870. 1 Daily Telegraph, July 28, 1870. * Pall Mall Gazette, July 28, 1870; Manchester Guardian, July 28, 1870. 4 Translation of extracts from Journal Ofhciel, Brit. State Papers for 1870, vol. lxx, pp. 59-61. * Fraser's New Series, vol. ii, pp. 266 et seq., "The Causes of the War." 84 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [84 Blackwood's Magazine for the next month, Charles Lever hits off ludicrously the persistent belief in French intrigue by a dialogue between Napoleon and his Foreign Minister. " Better than all that," whispered M. de Gramont. " There's a forty-ninth cousin of the King wishes to be King of Spain. Prim told it to a lady who knows the Prince Carlo de Bourbon, who told it to the Duke of Lucca, who told it to me." " Admirable, nothing could be better," muttered his Majesty, and between his teeth, went on, " honour of France, integrity of our Empire, inordinate ambition, and throne of Charles V ! I'd like to see an English dispatch reply to that !" * It was not until the war was well lost by the Emperor, and Paris was besieged, that it began to be believed that the whispering and muttering might have been on the Prussian side. The Times, on the last day of December, speaks of the candidature as a pretext which had been for some time kept in reserve, perhaps with the malicious connivance of the North German Chancellor. The annual supplement to the Gentleman's Magazine, published also in December, gives a fairly comprehensive history of the affair on the Spanish side, mentioning Seiior Ranees' visit to Berlin in March of 1869 and his interview with Bismarck; the subse- quent assurance given by von Thile to Benedetti in the same month; the Dusseldorf negotiations of Sefior Salazar with Prince Leopold in February of 1870, and the Spaniard's dis- creet admission that Prussia had not interfered with the affair. The reviewer hazards the conjecture that, though history was not explicit on the spring and summer negotia- tions of 1870, "hardly anything less than the consciousness that the army of the North German Confederation was on his side, could have sustained General Prim in the daring posi- tion he persisted in when he maintained his advocacy of Prince Leopold, in spite of French objections." He be- 1 O'Dowd Papers, Blackwood's, vol. cviii, p. 353. 85] RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECLARATION OF WAR 85 lieved that Bismarck knew both of the offer and its accep- tance, though the King was wilfully left in ignorance. 1 Even to this day the affair wears still its cloak of mystery. Bernhardi's memoirs significantly omit the in- teresting chapter that should have dealt with the secret mis- sion he undertook to Spain at Bismarck's behest, and the memoirs of Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon are no more com- municative on the subject. Lord Acton, who, it is said, knew the banker through whom the transaction was effected, is authority for the statement that a large sum of Prussian bonds were transferred to Madrid while the Cortes was dis- cussing the question of the Spanish succession. 2 As to the " gravamen of the offence," — the inflammatory version of the telegram from Ems and its immediate pub- lication, — Bismarck, himself, has long since admitted — even boasted — that by clever excisions of the King's des- patch he had converted, as Moltke put it, a summons to a parley into a fanfare, and by the personally conducted and widespread publicity given the edited telegram had waved a "red flag before the Gallic bull." But his admission was reserved for the nineties. Nor did the French Minister publish his version of the affair in time to influence British opinion during the conduct of the war. a Something of direct connivance, however, was sus- pected in England after Prussia's victories had proven her preparedness. David Urquhart and more than one of his followers, writing in pamphlets, and in the Diplomatic Re- view, and the Anglo-American Times, noted with mistrust the justification Bismarck gave when, on second thought, he 1 " Story of the War," Gentleman's Annual for 1870, pp. 1 et seq. 'Acton, Historical Essays and Studies (London, 1907), p. 204; Lady John Russell, A Memoir, pp. 228-229; Marriott, England Since Water- loo, p. 423- 'Comte Vincent Benedetti, Ma mission en Prusse, Paris, Oct., 1871. 86 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [86 accepted a modicum of the applause and congratulations of the Prussian soldiery. " Gentlemen," he said, " I have done nothing to obtain the success .... but wait for a moment — I have done one thing. I have so acted that the Southern States of Germany have aided us with all their power." 1 Urquhart and his disciples beclouded their analyses and conjectures with much ado about Russia's share in the negotiations. Many thought that they did but bespatter Prussia in their efforts to paint Russia with a more lavish blackness. It resulted that their revelations were glossed over by the British public. Only when they reappeared so late as March, 1871, (all too late to be of practical advantage to France) and were strengthened by a searching analysis of the Official Correspondence, did they receive due weight. The discussion of " Scrutator," in a pamphlet entitled, Who is Responsible for the War, 2 aroused widespread attention. By the Germans, he was believed to have been either Gladstone, himself, or someone speaking for him. 3 British reviewers described him as a well known advocate of Gladstone's ecclesiastical policy. 4 The semi- official quality and the brilliance of the writer's argument caused credence to be given to his account of the war's con- triving. " The Chancellor published in his own organ," says " Scrutator," " and communicated to the Governments of Europe, an incident which never took place, but which had the immediate effect of precipitating war." 1 Issues respectively of Jan. 2, 1871. and Nov. 19, 1870. 'The pamphlet was the outcome of a controversy waged between " Scrutator " and Prof. Max Muller in the Times. * North German Correspondent, quoted in John Bull, March 25, 1871. 4 He was believed by some to have been Count Gasparin. CHAPTER V Publication of the Draft Treaty That much of British sympathy was diverted from France at the war's inception was due not to any evaluation of the merits of her case, nor to the connection existing be- tween the Prussian and English Royal families, nor to a revival of the traditional hatred of France nor indiscri- minate fear of her aggrandizement, but to a very tender regard for the little country of Belgium, whose great port of Antwerp, were it possessed by any but a neutral Power, would sorely menace the safety of John Bull's tight little island. 1 It was feared that during the course of the war the security guaranteed Belgium by the Treaties of 183 1, 1839 would be endangered by French aggression, and that, in the event of Prussian defeat, it would become neces- sary for England to form a second line of European de- fence against an unscrupulous France. On July the fifteenth, M. de Gramont had made the spontaneous declaration to Belgium that, should war take place, the Government would continue to respect her neutrality. 2 News of this had been duly communicated to the British Ministry by Lord Lyons, but before it was received Gladstone, already, had sent enquiries to his Min- ister of War as to the readiness with which England could send twenty thousand men to Antwerp. 3 It was only a far 1 Spectator, July 23, 1870. 2 British State Papers for 1870, Foreign Series, vol. lxx, pp. 40-41. 1 Morley, Life of Gladstone, vol. ii, p. 339- Sir Robert Morier claims that England went so far as to discuss with other Governments the feasibility of her sending troops to Antwerp. 87] 87 88 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [88 outlook, however, he told Cardwell in a later communica- tion, which brought into view the possibility of having to send such an expedition. 1 Be that as it may, the French Ambassador became so much alarmed at rumours of these military considerations as to report to his Government that they had been the subject of discussion in the Cabinet, and to remark, in passing, that a British occupation of Antwerp would be a strange way of showing respect for Belgian neutrality. 2 One can imagine, then, what discomfort was felt by Gladstone and Granville when, shortly after the declara- tion of war, the Prussian Ambassador, von Bernstorff, in- formed them of a treaty drafted in the handwriting of M. Benedetti which provided for the absorption of Belgium by France. 3 While the British Ministers had the matter under advisement, the Ambassador entrusted the treaty to Baron Krause, who on the night of July the twenty- fourth carried it to the rooms of the editor of the Times at Ser- jeant's Inn. 4 Mr. Delane was selected by Count Bismarck to be the bearer of its ill-tidings not only because he con- trolled the most influential of London journals but because he was believed to have an intense dislike of the French Emperor. This aversion, which, the Standard claimed, grew out of Napoleon's refusal to aid the Times in a trade 1 Morley, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 'Lyons to Granville, Paris, July 19, 1870, Newton, Lord Lyons, vol. i, pp. 301-302. * Morley, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 340. *Cook, Delane of the Times (London, 1915), pp. 226-227; Count Andreas Bernstorff, Second Secretary to the Prussian Embassay, claims that it was he who carried the Draft Treaty to Delane at the Times office, The Bernstorff Papers, Dr. Karl Ringhoffer, Life of Count Al- brecht von Bernstorff (London, 1008), vol. ii, pp. 275-276; in Hunt and Poole, op. cit., it is said that Bismarck gave the Draft Treaty to the Berlin correspondent of the Times, vol. ii, p. 263. 8 9 ] PUBLICATION OF THE DRAFT TREATY 89 speculation, 1 had lately been intensified by the decision of the French that no newspaper correspondents might ac- company their armies, 2 and by their recent arrest of one of the Times' men who had made a soldier drunk at Metz to worm from him forbidden information. 3 Baron Krause knew that he would unfold his tale to willing ears. The document he had to show was undated. He supplied the information that its date was 1866. It was unsigned, but he assured the editor that the handwriting was that of the nefarious envoy who had conducted himself so shabbily at Ems. Delane read, copied, and published at once. 4 Not only did he stand sponsor for the anonymous treaty which had been left on his doorstep but he accepted in toto all that the bearer told him of its origin and history. His editorial of the twenty-fifth succeeded in exciting almost more of alarm than did the treaty itself : " We might easily deduce from internal evidence," says this astute editor, " if we were not otherwise assured of the truth, that the proposed Treaty was submitted to Prussia by France as a basis for 1 Standard, July 26, 1870; Anglo-American Times, Aug. 6, 1870. 'Globe and Traveller, July 28, 1870. Felix Whitehurst, when he attempted to gain the Emperor's permission for Dr. Russell to go to the front, met with a courteous but positive refusal. Napoleon re- marked that Gortchakoff had told him that during the war in the Crimea, the War Office at St. Petersburg was always perfectly au courant with what was going on at British headquarters through the brilliant communications forwarded to the Times by this same Dr. Russell. Life and Adventures of George Augustus Sola (N. Y., 1895), vol. ii, p. 154. The French refusal caused the British Government tem- porarily to deny permission to Capt. Hozier, another of the Times' correspondents, to start for the Prussian Army. Delane, indignant at such careful neutrality, wrote to Dasent that the Ministry were mean- spirited and white-livered. Dasent, John Delane (N. Y., 1908), vol. ii, pp. 266-268. 1 Tablet, July 28, 1870. * Times, July 25, 1870. Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville, vol. ii, pp. 39-40. 9 q BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [go the removal of all difficulties that threatened to interrupt peace between them ... It was rejected, but unless we are misinformed, and speaking with all reserve on a sub- ject of such importance we are satisfied that our informa- tion is correct, — the Treaty has been again offered as a con- dition of peace. The suggestion has not been favourably- received." The editorial of the accommodating Delane gave more eclat to the Treaty's publication in London than it enjoyed in its own country. It appeared in Berlin on the same day with no such addition of authoritative assurances. But even without the sauce of editorial comment, it was sure to prove a provoking tidbit. 1 Its terms provided that the North German Confederation and all acquisitions by Prussia be recognized by the Emperor; that the King of Prussia con- sent to the acquisition of Luxemburg by France; that the Emperor agree to a more intimate union of the govern- ments of North and South Germany; that the King of Prussia consent to a French invasion of Belgium, and join with the Emperor in an offensive and defensive alliance, and in giving a reciprocal guarantee of his dominions. One can imagine that Paterfamilias in reading the news of this Monday morning saw trouble ahead and did not linger for a second cup of coffee before setting out for the City. If it so happened that he met on the way one of his neighbours who was a reader of the Daily Telegraph an interesting dialogue must have taken place. The neighbour would have been keen on discussing an interview that his paper carried between the Emperor and two Englishmen in Paris. 2 Napoleon had spoken very frankly in his effort to get his case before the British. He told them he had been sure he could so handle the controversy as to make 1 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, vol. cciii, col. 955. 1 Daily Telegraph, July 25, 1870. Oi] PUBLICATION OF THE DRAFT TREATY 91 peace certain, but " France had slipped out of his hand." He had thought that to present his position clearly as to the Hohenzollern candidature was the best means of avert- ing the war that he knew himself not prepared for. He reverted to the difficulties he had been facing ever since Bismarck, in 1866, had refused to reward his friendly neutrality by permitting him to acquire Luxemburg and certain small towns which menaced his frontier. And then he amazed his interviewers by saying that Bismarck had qualified his refusal by enquiring of M. Benedetti what quid pro quo would satisfy France were Prussia to annex Holland, — an enquiry that brought a threat of war from the French envoy and terminated the interview. If the neighbour chanced to be a person of importance and knew some of the secrets of the British Foreign Office, he may have remembered that, in 1865, the Danish Minister told the British Ambassador to his country that Bismarck had communicated to him this same wish to acquire Hol- land, — a country which, he said, attracted Prussia not only because of her coast-line but because of her colonies. France, Bismarck had said, could then take Belgium,— " since a guarantee was in these days of little value." l It cannot be supposed that Paterfamilias, whose digestion was still disturbed by the news in his own paper, allowed his neigh- bour to unburden himself of many of his fears and surmises before he quite astonished him by pointing out the more startling revelations in the Times. Napoleon had reported a conversation, which had admittedly been terminated. Prussia had communicated a treaty, which she claimed had been urged on her very recently with the effect of precipitat- ing the present war. Small wonder that, as the Scotsman complained, the British almost wholly disregarded the state- ment of Napoleon. 1 Morley, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 320. c 9 2 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [g 2 It is our business to heed the voice of the pack, so, like Paterfamilias, we will clutch the Times closer and plunge down into the City. The stock market, a ready barometer of public opinion, was in dire confusion. Consols were especially unsteady. At least six members of the Exchange faced positive ruin. The day's parliamentary session was barren of relief. News came that Gladstone had said noth- ing to clarify the situation, — had contented himself with the climactic declaration that the document was of a nature to excite attention and even astonishment,: — one whosd character was such that it might be deemed incredible. 1 Lord Granville, on the day following, laid before the Lords the official correspondence that preceded the war. Prussia's astutely timed publication of the Treaty made these documents about as interesting as the dusty papers of a neglected wastebasket. The Honorable Members were immensely more interested in the report he gave of a con- versation he had just had with the French Ambassador. M. de Lavalette admitted that the document all were dis- cussing had, indeed, been written by Benedetti, but claimed it had originated with Bismarck. So far as France was concerned the Treaty was only a souvenir of an incident long closed. He reminded Granville that his country had assured Belgium before the war's outbreak that her neutral- ity would be respected, and had communicated this decla- ration to Lord Lyons. 2 That Ambassador, on the day Lord Granville was making this report in Parliament, re- ceived renewed assurances from Gramont, who told him Bismarck had not only prepared the Treaty but had offered that, in case France feared the odium of occupying Belgium, Prussia would undertake the occupation and then retire in apparent deference to her remonstrances. Lord Lyons! 1 Session of July 25, Hansard, op. cit., vol. cciii, p. 885. * Ibid., vol. cciii, pp. 925-926. 93] PUBLICATION OF THE DRAFT TREATY 93 was of the opinion that the Times was misinformed when it claimed the Treaty had been the basis of recent discus- sion. 1 The statement of the Foreign Secretary to Parliament greatly pleased the Standard, which had warned its Con- servative readers that very morning against giving credit to what seemed " a poor squib — the work of some English- man unaccustomed to the employment of the French lang- uage " — a something its rival had published to add fuel to a flame already blazing and to lure England into hostilities against France. 2 Somewhat to cool this flame it reprinted a series of gossipy sketches that had appeared in its columns in August of 1866, detailing such schemes as we heard our friend of the Telegraph striving to communicate to Pater- familias on the day the Treaty was published. 3 The Morn- ing Post joined the Standard in denouncing its powerful contemporary's attempt to damage France by such dubious means. It pointed out that the King of Prussia was set forth in the Treaty as the first contracting party, and that according to diplomatic usage this alone was proof of its Prussian origin. 4 But it must be admitted that the Record was just when it characterized the Morning Post as " not- oriously French." The Pall Mall Gazette, guileless of such favouritism, more nearly expressed the popular opinion when it com- plained that "during the entire period within which this proposal must have been made, England has been on terms of cordial friendship with the French nation. It is start- ling to find that all this time the French Government was contemplating an enterprise which England could not have 1 Newton, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 303-304. 2 Issue of July 26, 1870. 3 Issue of July 27, 1870. * Record, July 26, 1870. 94 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [94 suffered to go unopposed without sacrificing her dignity and putting her future independence in peril." * Saunders', trying hard to transplant this British attitude on the stub- born soil of Ireland, declared that the document precluded any further trust in France, and, whereas the editor of Pall Mall had advocated armed neutrality, Saunders' im- proved upon his ardour by advocating " positive hostility." : The Daily News, however, which had been as zealously critical of France as these two of its contemporaries, was not so sure that the revelation reacted solely to her dis- credit. It observed that a rogue does not go straight to an honest man and propose that he become his accomplice. 9 This was the view, too, of the Evening Mail* and of the Record, that modified the metaphor by describing the intri- guers as two burglars sitting down beforehand to arrange how a profitable robbery might be committed with impunity. 5 The Manchester Examiner, likewise, concluded that the in- dex fingers of two hands would be needed to point the guilty man. It believed Count Bismarck had done his cause no good by showing himself to be more versed in the wiles and guile of diplomacy than had been thought. 6 Its rival the Manchester Guardian pointed both fingers, too, and wagged its head at the British Foreign Office that had been deceived into confidence while Napoleon and Count Bismarck quietly discussed how best to make Holland, a Prussian, and Bel- gium, a French, province. 7 It was the morning after the Treaty appeared that John Stuart Mill expressed his com- 1 Issue of July 25, 1870. 1 Issue of July 27, 1870. * Issue of July 26, 1870. 4 Issue of July 26, 1870. 1 Issue of July 27, 1870. 8 Issue of July 27, 1870. 7 Issue of July 26, 1870. gt] PUBLICATION OF THE DRAFT TREATY 95 plete approval of a demonstration Sir Charles Dilke and others of the Liberals were sponsoring. He hoped they would take this opportunity of assuring Prussia that Great Britain considered her as defending her own and the liberty of Europe, and that she, herself, recognized her obligations to Belgium, and was convinced that, were France victori- ous, she would, in her turn, be attacked as the " fourth of the Great Powers that fought at Waterloo." * On the morning of the twenty-seventh, the Times pub- lished a letter of M. Emile Ollivier's which categorically denied the portentous claim that any recent negotiations had taken place on the basis of the notorious Treaty. 2 Some- what later, the Foreign Office published a slender sheaf of documents dealing with the matter. 3 For scandal mongers in diplomacy this second Blue Book was most interesting. The musty acorn of a rejected treaty had produced a whole forest of phantom, but very shady, negotiations for the parcelling out of those smaller European states that were Great Britain's particular care. Not to enter too deeply into its bosky recesses, it will suffice to say that Prussia and France were equally voluble and recriminatory. Each claimed to have valiantly withstood the assiduous tempta- tions of the other — Bismarck keeping the guilty secrets " for the sake of peace," 4 — even though he saw England beguiled by the French into proposing a disarmament which was intended to make possible these nefarious schemes. Though accommodatingly vocative, the Chancellor was not always consistent. For instance, after instructing his agent, Baron Krause, to give the Treaty's date as 1866, 5 he 1 Mill to Henry Fawcett, July 26, 1870, Letters of John Stuart Mill (London, 1010), vol. ii, pp. 266-267. ' Vide also. Standard, July 28, 1870. s Brit. State Papers of 1870, vol. lxx, pp. 47-71. * Bismarck's telegram to Bernstorff, July 28, 1870, ibid., vol. lxx, p. 40.. •'• Supra, p. 89. 9 6 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [96 instructed Bernstorff to give the date to Granville as 1867; 1 and though writing his Ambassador that Benedetti, " of his own accord," amended Article II, 2 he himself told Lord Loftus that the amendment to this article was directly due to his own suggestion. 3 What really interested the British was his claim that if the publication of the Treaty had not taken place, France would have proposed to Prussia after the completion of their preparations for war that they unite their armies against unarmed Europe for the carrying out of the Benedetti programme. 4 The Treaty had been shown to Lord Loftus. It was soon to be photographed and published in the Graphic 5 so that all who wished might read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest. But were it only one of those dead drafts, — ghosts of dark plans that died aborning, which Morier claimed haunted the cupboards of all the Foreign Offices, it was not worth inspection. Only Count Bismarck's statement gave it interest and vitality. The veracity of the Prussian Minister became a matter of eager interest. Gramont's circular to the French agents abroad gave the same absolute denial to his claims that Ollivier had sent the Times.* The press advanced its judgment for 1 Brit. State Papers, vol. lxx, p. 41. * Bismarck to Bernstorff, July 29, 1870, ibid., vol. lxx, pp. 67-69. 1 Loftus to Granville, July 30, 1870, ibid., lxx, p. 70. * Bismarck to Bernstorff, July 29, 1870, ibid., vol. lxx, p. 69. 5 Supplement to issue of Aug. 20, 1870. * Dated, Aug. 4, 1870, Brit. State Papers, vol. lxx, pp. 88-90 ; for Bene- detti's account of the affair, vide Ma mission en Prusse. The French instructions to Benedetti in regard to the negotiations of 1866-1867, it is claimed, were discovered and acquired by the Germans in Cercay, M. Rouher's chateau, during the War of 1870. The collection is said to have included the original of the famous Draft Treaty, annotated by the Emperor himself. To provide against the intervention of England, Antwerp was to have been declared a free city. Vide George Hooper, Campaign of Sedan. The recent Treaty of Versailles provides that the papers be returned to France. 97 ] PUBLICATION OF THE DRAFT TREATY 97 the guidance of the public. The Daily Telegraph thought from the evidence in the case one might assign the role of Satan, with equal propriety, to either of the dark actors in the late drama; 1 Once a Week saw the Treaty as the work of two armed pickpockets; 2 the Quarterly Review with more circumspection observed, none the less, that Bis- marck's past record did not exclude him from the Rogues' fraternity; 3 while Judy, in biblical vein, suggested that these plots to gobble up the little nations reminded her of Aaron's rod that swallowed up all the other rods. She warned the author of the scheme to take care that his little essay in the rod business did not turn out badly for his own back. 4 The Manchester Guardian commended Bis- marck for having so wisely followed the advice of a lawyer to an inconstant lover and made most violent promises but communicated them only to the air. 5 The Northern Whig contrasted his loquacity with the reticence of the Duke of Marlborough on the occasion of an unworthy offer that had been made to him. The example of the great Duke should have been followed. If the proposals were so dishonorable as Bismarck and his Government now claimed, how came they for four years to be repeated ? 6 The Court Journal believed the French version of the affair and frankly hoped the previous kindly feelings for Prussia would be changed to cynical distrust. 7 To the Spectator, 6 it seemed that, although Bismarck was 1 Issue of July 30, 1870. * Issue of Aug. 6, 1870. 1 Issue of Oct., 1870. *Aug. 3, 1870. 5 Issue of Aug. 2, 1870. •Issue of July 30, 1870. 'Issue of July 30, 1870. 8 Issue of July 30, 1870. 9 8 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [q8 blameable for secrecy, it was France that had been guilty of " an almost matchless perfidy." The Economist, like- wise ignoring French denials, believed that the rejection of the Treaty and not the Hohenzollern candidature was the true cause of the war. 1 Judy had proclaimed Prince Leo- pold the " lion of the season." He had sunk to a puppet, and now was only a makeshift. The London Graphic saw an argument for Prussian righteousness in the fact that the Treaty was so clearly favourable to France. 2 The Telegraph thought the flaw of secrecy should be overlooked since Prussia was too weakened after the Austrian war to have opposed France with decision. 3 The Illustrated London News stands out with equal clearness from the critics of both France and Prussia. It took the unique position that neither had yielded to tempta- tion to any greater extent than would have " England or any other European Power in the same circumstances." It was the foe of excessive armaments. They produced an assurance of strength that induced nations to gratify their desires, — no matter how savage such desires might be. What a nation could do, it would readily find justification for doing.* Its opinion was unique not only in that it pointed to its own country as capable of similar dark traffickings, but that it raised its voice at this time against national arma- ments. Its contemporaries were vociferous in urging Britan- nia into armor. The Manchester Guardian represents John Bull as saying to a protesting Bismarck : " Well, I'm sure I don't know. Nap says he wrote that letter at your dicta- 1 Issue of July 30, 1870. 'Issue of July 30, 1870. 8 Issue of Aug. 20, 1870. * Issue of Aug. 18, 1870. 99] PUBLICATION OF THE DRAFT TREATY 99 tion. I'll tell you there's been queer dealings between you two fellows of which I don't half know yet. It seems to me you're two big thieving blackguards ; not a pin to choose between you, and that the best thing for me to do is to look after my own goods and chattels." l Punch won an approving smile when he turned the matter into verse : " Bismarck against Napoleon ! Who the odds will give or take, Which of the two more lightly his faith will bind or break? ' Arcades ambo — blackguards both !' says John Bull's low'ring eye As he puts his trust in Providence — and keeps his powder dry." 2 Those who enjoyed the ramifications into iniquity with which Fraser's Magazine* occupied itself to the disparage- ment of France, and the long-winded accusatory letters that found space in the Times, regretted that the journals briefly agreed to disagree on the apportionment of guilt and set about congratulating themselves on the unanimity of their agreement to force dame England to discard her coal- scuttle bonnet and crinolines for a suit of shining armour. When energy can be expended in action words become few. The Annual Register marvelled at the " rapidity with which the story of the secret treaty was assigned to oblivion." * Perhaps its demise was hastened by the keen shafts of wit of the jokesters. Charles Lever in his O'Dowd papers satirizes the Billingsgate attitude of the disputants in this fashion : I'll show the Belgians what you did by them, says Bismarck; and I'll show the Dutch what a pleasant destiny was to have been theirs, replied the Duke de Gramont. Will you have the face to deny that you did not mean to annex part of Piedmont and 1 Issue of Aug. 3, 1870. * Aug. 6, 1870. 8 Cf. The War, appearing in the Sept. issue. * Annual Register for 1S70, vol. cxii, p. 95. IO o BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [iqo the Maritime Alps? asks Bismarck. Will you kindly furnish the Florentine Government with the military report from the staff officers of the Italian army when they were your allies? Did you, or did you not offer us 300,000 men in the war against Austria? x Judy provoked merriment by stating the revelations of the week in an amusing chronology : Aug., 1870. Monday — Count Bismarck publishes a draft treaty, in Count Benedetti's handwriting, proposing the annexation of Belgium by France. (N. B. Benedetti's pen wiper and pocket handkerchief marked with the Imperial arms, and left behind him, can be seen at the Berlin Foreign Office, as evidence that Bismarck was the lamb and Count Benedetti the wolf in this transaction.) Tuesday — Bismarck publishes another secret treaty, in which France proposes to annex Austria, Russia, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and a few other countries, and allows Prussia to take the coast of Greenland as an equivalent. (Refused with virtuous indig- nation.) Wednesday — A third document published at Berlin showing a proposal of France to annex the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the Gulf Stream, and the Papal States; offering the Pope a kiosque and the privilege of selling newspapers in the Paris boulevards. Thursday — Bismarck prints another secret proposal that France should seize Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia, and Bismarck, Great Britain (if he could persuade the people there to let him have it). Rejected with dignity. Friday — The German Official Gazette contains a further secret treaty, under which the French agree to take Paris, and the Prus- sians to march on Berlin. (Temporized with.) Saturday — Further revelations. French prepared to annex the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, allowing Prussia to take the North and South Poles. (Rejected immediately.) Sunday — Spent by Bismarck at the Berlin Foreign Office, rum- maging up a lot more revelations for next week. 2 1 Blackwood's, Sept., 1870. ' Bismarck's Diplomatic Revelations, in issue of Aug. 31, 1870. IOI ] PUBLICATION OF THE DRAFT TREATY IO i It is not surprising that the cotton-wool Government that had been conducting its retrenchments largely at the ex- pense of the army and navy felt themselves forced to a right-about-face. Gladstone had been striving for a secure neutrality, — one which would manifest " unequivocal friend- liness " to each belligerent. 1 The Draft Treaty and its rev- elations made it apparent that the only secure neutrality was an armed one, and that the attitude of the mutual friend had better be exchanged for that of a potential disciplinarian. John Bright was ill, but his brother, Jacob, spoke for him in opposition to the idea that England should arm herself for the defence of another, — even though that other was a nation whose neutrality she had guaranteed. 2 He, himself, wrote to Gladstone, censur- ing his backsliding from Manchester principles, and even intimating that such dereliction might induce his resigna- tion. 3 But the Quaker brothers were in a hopeless minor- ity. Only seven members in the House of Commons voted against furnishing the means for additional land forces. The Government was strengthened by a vote of credit to the amount of £ 2,000,000 for the supporting of British neutrality and the discharging of any obli- gation that might devolve on it. It cannot be claimed that the Government had shown any enthusiasm in the alacrity with which it had to respond to the popular demand. Mr. Gladstone was described as lukewarm, and almost hor- rified at the term " armed neutrality." 4 The honours of the debate went to Mr. Bernal Osborne and to Disraeli. The first sneered at a Foreign Office that had allowed " the most material event that ever happened 1 Annual Register, vol. cxii, p. 100. * Spectator, Aug. 13. 3 Macaulay Trevelyan, Life of John Bright (London, 1913), p. 417. * Annual Register, cxii, pp. 100-102. I02 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [102 in the history of diplomacy " to be learned from the columns of the Times. He was impatient of the position of entire nullity which her powerful neighbours had assigned to England and welcomed Disraeli's advocacy of armed neu- trality. 1 " There are vast ambitions abroad in Europe," Disraeli warned the uneasy Prime Minister. "This is no time to be weak." British neutrality should be " assured," — dowered with such strength that it could make itself respected. A cordial understanding with Russia, he be- lieved, would do much to strengthen England against that time when it might be necessary to counsel the belligerents and bring them to peace. 2 Disraeli's words and those of other speakers in the House suggested the belief that it was France who needed chiding and would later need counselling. 3 This attitude was re- gretted by Sir Henry Bulwer, who counted the years of his friendship for France with the same tally that he counted the years of his life. He made no effort to exculpate her for having provoked the present conflict, but he expressed fear that she might be the victim of her own rash enterprise. And, reminding her critics that she had been the firm ally of Great Britain on the field of battle and at the great councils of Europe, expressed his hope that when occasion came for friendly mediation, they would "arrest the hor- rors of war in a country so eminent in the arts of peace, and save from the still greater horrors of tumult and revolution a capital that is the pride and ornament of the whole world." 4 1 Annual Register, vol. cxii, p. 103. * Ibid., vol. cxii, pp. 98-100; Weekly Freeman's Journal Aug. 6, 1870 ; Daily News, Aug. 3, 1870 ; Buckle, Life of Benjamin Disraeli, vol. v. pp. 126 et seq. 3 Speeches of Messrs. Taylor, White and Beaumont, session of Aug. 10, 1870, Hansard, op. cit., vol. cciii, col'ns 1741, 1782, 1784, respectively. * Ibid., vol. cciii, col'ns 1780-1781. I03 ] PUBLICATION OF THE DRAFT TREATY 103 In the House of Lords, the debates were not so vivid, partly because Lord Granville had proven more amenable to public opinion than had the Prime Minister. When Earl Russell urged that the Government should declare openly and explicitly the intention to be true to their treaties and faithful to their engagements, he was assured that nothing would prevent a scrupulous adherence to the Government's intentions whenever they had been clearly intimated. 1 So aroused was public opinion that had the Ministry not shown itself determined to ensure respect for Belgium, it was be- lieved, it could not have lasted till the end of the session. 2 Gladstone had given his endorsement to a new treaty of guarantee with much greater willingness than he had shown in the matter of increasing British armaments. On the thirtieth of July, the Cabinet met and decided to propose for the signature of France and Prussia identic treaties pro- viding that in the event of the violation of Belgian neutra- lity by either of the two, Great Britain would cooperate with the other for its defence, with the stipulation that such action should not involve her in the general war. The British Government, in proposing these engagements, carefully refrained from any mention of the Draft Treaty or of subsequent revelations, and based its proposal on the fact that both Emperor and King, in the assurances they had recently given in regard to Belgium, had made reserva- tions in the event of one or the other failing to respect the neutrality both had guaranteed. These conditional assur- ances, wrote Lord Granville, seemed to indicate that the declaration of each was incomplete. The new treaty was recommended as a means of removing the general anxiety " which at present not unnaturally disturbs the minds of 1 Annual Register, vol. cxii, p. 105. 1 St. Paul's Magazine, Sept., 1870, The English Aspect of the War, pp. 562 et seq.; Hunt and Poole, op. cit., vol. xii, p. 263. IQ 4 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [104 neutral Powers." 1 Prussia gave her signature on the ninth and that of France was obtained two days later. The latter acquiesced with something of reluctance. She regarded the request for new assurances as impugning the honesty of the spontaneous declaration she had given Belgium shortly before the declaration of war. It seemed to her at least a partial triumph for Bismarck. 2 Austria and Russia, sig- natories of the Treaties of 1831, and '39, declined England's request to sign the present one, due to an objection to its provision for coercive measures. They thought it would be impossible to embark on a war to protect Belgium that would not widen out into a participation in the general hos- tilities. 3 The treaty had its critics at home who' made the same objection. Lord Cairns was one of these. 4 Their view was stated in the press by the Globe and Traveller. 6 Other of its critics were Bernal Osborne, who dubbed it a " child- ish perpetuation of diplomatic folly," and Sir Robert Morier, who called it a document " monstrously absurd in which, with an ingenuity worthy of a better cause, England endeavours to make each belligerent believe that she ia really only distrustful of the other, and in which she en- gages not to use her fleet, which is the only help any one cares about, and to employ her army only, which frightens Continentals about as much as an old horse pistol of the last century." 6 In Ireland, the jealous care of Belgium, to which the new* 1 Granville to Lyons, July 30, 1870, Brit. State Papers, vol. lxx, p. 55. *Ibid., vol. lxxx, pp. 56 et seq.; Fitzmaurice, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 41. * Ibid., vol. lxxi, pp. 14-15. * Annual Register, vol. cxii, p. 107. 1 Issue of Aug. 9, 1870. ^Memoirs and Letters of the Hon. Sir Robert Morier (London, 1911), vol. ii, pp. 206-208. I0 e] PUBLICATION OF THE DRAFT TREATY 105 treaty bore witness, was matter for derision. The Nation criticized the inconsistence of a Power that enslaved Ire- land, but fostered Belgium, and while guaranteeing the freedom of one nationality, perpetuated the subjection of another. 1 The pictures in Fun, representing England as coming to the rescue of those Babes in the Woods, Holland and Belgium, whom the two wicked uncles were fighting over ; or in the guise of a benevolent bull-dog that slept with one eye open the better to guard little dog, Belgium, while France and Prussia fought behind the kennel, 2 gained only a wry smile from Patrick. On the whole, however, the treaty received a hearty wel- come. The Peers showed their content by almost im-i mediately dropping the debate on foreign affairs. It wasi believed necessary by careful diplomatists who remembered the terms of the two previous arrangements for Belgian neutrality. The Treaty of 1839 specifically based itself on the first twenty-four articles of the Treaty of 1831. But the guarantee of the execution of the latter was contained in its twenty-fifth Article. Therefore the later treaty, which supplanted its predecessor, though containing a state- ment of Belgian neutrality in the Seventh Article of its Annex, had no specific guarantee for its execution. 5 The Spectator found cause for rejoicing, not that a faulty treaty had been supplanted by a more distinct pronouncement but because it believed the newer an engagement was the more forceful was it. " '39 is a long while ago," it argued, " and we have guaranteed many things in our history which from effluxion of time or change of circumstances, or modifica- tions in opinion, we certainly should make no effort to se- 1 The Nation, Aug. 6, 1870. 1 Issue of Aug. 13, 1870. 1 Daily News, issue of Aug. 6, 1870; Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii, pp. 881 et seq., 996 et seq. io 6 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [106 cure." x It was suggesting a dangerous doctrine, and one which was to be turned against England herself by Russia in only a few months. Paterfamilias had more the at- titude of the Daily Telegraph, and regarded the new treaty not as replacing engagements worn thin by time, but as reaf- firming them, and giving recognition to a bond which Eng- land's neighbours had considered she regarded but lightly. 2 As Sir Robert Morier said, he cherished " old fashioned ideas about England's honour and such like fancies " 3 and delighted in a treaty which made them manifest to the world. And so John Bull was all aglow with virtue at having foiled the plots of that "crowned swindler, Napo- leon " and the " terrible German Chancellor " by a simple affirmation of his own honourable intentions, — a renewal of engagements which accorded, by happy chance, so splen- didly with his own proper interests. 4 1 Issue of Aug. 6, 1870. 1 Issue of Aug. 6, 1870. 1 Letter to Dr. Faucher, Sept. 19, 1870, Morier, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 180-181. i Ten days after the new treaty of guarantee was signed, the British Government advised the French to permit Prussia to transport the wounded through Belgium. On Aug. 24, 1870, Borthwick, the editor of the Morning Post, published an editorial in regard to this " Prus- sian intrigue." He claimed that his exposure of the motives behind the project convinced Gladstone and Granville of their error in having yielded to the Prussian proposals and caused them to withdraw their sanction immediately. The British State Papers ignore this " triumph " of the Post. Vide, Reginald Lucas. Lord Glenesk and the Morning Post (London, 1010), pp. 230-240. CHAPTER VI Formation of the League of Neutrals While English tourists were scurrying home from the war zone, and Gladstone, in eloquent letters to his friends and a long speech at the Cobden Commemoration, was ex- ercising all that skill at mingling philosophy with denuncia- tion which the bonds of office had restrained in Parliament, those of the Tories and the old soldiers of the Crimea, who cherished for France such love as Bulwer had, busied themselves with maps, and speculations as to what course the war would take and what allies France might win for Prussia's undoing. The papers, full as they were of French and Prussian despatches, were, in George Meredith's phrasing, " mere chips of dry biscuit to the devouring ap- petite " of these partisans. 1 The time that the sheets would leave the press could not be stated, but telegraphic news was supplied by various agencies to clubs, and reading rooms, and even to "private addresses;" lectures on the geography of the war were given to workmen ; maps at sixpence each found eager buyers. London was full of parlour strategists. It is related that one hostess was greatly perturbed at having a guest who had just seated himself at her dinner table exclaim emphatically to his neighbour, "I shall fall on the right wing and the left flank!" "Oh," said the lady, "then you will want at least half a fowl!" 1 Letter to John Morley; Meredith had half-decided to start for French headquarters as a correspondent for the Post. Letters of George Meredith (N. Y„ 1900-1912), vol. i, p. 209. 107] io 7 io 8 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [108 One of the papers said that a great Prussian squadron lay in the Mediterranean, 1 and would act as a deterrent to Italy, should she wish to join an old ally who had gained much for her and might under pressure be induced to cap his work by granting her her ancient capital. 2 However, should Count Beust swing Austria to the French side, Italy would think it better to fight with Austria and France than to stand by and watch them grow so strong from victory that they could punish her for her abstention. Austria, all knew, was smarting still under the terms of the Treaty of Prague, and only recently had shown the hurt in speaking of the " reckless selfishness " of Bismarck, and the " bad conscience" which his insistence on the railway across St. Gothard's Pass exhibited. The rumour was reported by Lord Lyons that Count Beust, though quite aware that nothing could be hoped for from South Germany, still trusted so much in French strength that on the day after War's declaration he concluded an informal alliance with France, promising her active aid by the middle of Sep- tember, or somewhat later when the advent of winter should make it impossible for Russia to concentrate her forces for active intervention. 3 Some said it was stipulated that France 1 Spectator, July g, 1870. The paper was in error as to the location of the fleet. In the Bernstorff Papers it is described as having been on its way from Plymouth to Madeira. It was saved from capture by a warning from the Ambassador himself. Bernstorff Papers, vol. ii, p. 275. When Prince Napoleon was sent to Italy in August, 1870, he, it is claimed, gained Victor Emmanuel's consent to ally himself with the Emperor on the condition that Italy be allowed to do as she pleased in regard to Rome. The Emperor refused to be a party to such an agreement. His defeats and the withdrawal of his forces from Italy made it possible for that country to occupy Rome without his consent. Fleury, Memoirs of Empress Eugenie, vol. ii, p. 275. 1 Times, June 20, 1870, extract from Neue Frcie Presse. 3 Lyons to Granville, Dec. 31, 1872, Newton, Lord Lyons, vol. ii, pp. 35-36. 109] FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NEUTRALS too, should have a force at that time in Baden. These plans materializing, the advance on Berlin would be made after armies marching from the south and west had made a junc- tion. There were others who regarded the Baltic with more of interest, and believed Prussia would be invaded by France from the north. 1 Four days before war was declared and when the British had just made their appeal to the Protocol of 1856, Lord Granville told the Minister of the Netherlands that in the event of war's outbreak, Great Britain would be neutral, and if she offered advice to other Powers it would be that they follow her example. 2 Queen Sophia of the Nether- lands was German by birth but strongly French in sympathy, and, on the day that her Minister was interviewing Granville, was, herself, lamenting the death of Granville's predeces- sor, the Lord Clarendon, whom so many believed might have succeeded in preventing the war. She found it dif- ficult even to show herself civil to the Prussian Minister and his British wife. 3 It was not probable that a country ruled by a Queen so friendly to the French Court would in- terfere were Denmark to respond to French solicitations. The Duke of Cadore was at Copenhagen, urging the Danes to join their fleet with that of France and protect the land- ing of troops that might then march on Berlin from the north. 4 There was much speculation in England as to whether Denmark would take a step so bold. The Man- chester Guardian was of the opinion that, if she did, Eng- 1 Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville, vol. ii, p. 42. 'Granville to Vice Admiral Harris, July 15, 1870. 3 Baroness de Bunsen, In Three Legations (London, 1909), pp. 335- 336. For the untimeliness of Clarendon's death, see Sir Spencer Wal- pole, History of Tiuenty-Hve Years, vol. ii, p. 481 ; Lucas, Lord Glenesk ■and the Morning Post, p. 240; Redesdale, Memoirs, vol. ii, pp. 525-526. * Fitzmaurice, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 42. j IO BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ i ia land, at least, could not blame her: "Europe looked on with apathy while the spoliation of Denmark was accom- plished in 1864, and by a righteous retribution it is now involved in a conflict which would probably never have arisen if the neutral Powers had interfered to withstand the first onset of Prussian ambition. King Christian, ob- served the Guardian, " owes no gratitude to any of his al- lies." J But whether assistance was to come for France from the north or south, none but a few of the British doubted that Prussia would be the country invaded. The editor of the Times was ready to lay his shilling upon Casquette against Pumpernickel, 2 and the ears of von Bernstorff were assailed in the " most aristocratic and influential English clubs " by praise of the superior French valour. 3 The state- ment of M. Rouher that credited the Emperor with four years of careful preparation was accepted at par value. Not without cause, it was thought, M. Ollivier had said that he embarked on this enterprise with a " light heart."" A Minister of War, whose confidence was such that he could vouch for the last button on the last gaiter of his soldier's accoutrement, surely, was not to be caught nap- ping. Guizot, in his retirement at Val Richer, assured Bishop Wilberforce that he knew the enemy's campaign would be to retreat and fight on the defensive. He thought Denmark would join France after her first victory and create a diversion from the north that would bring disaster to Prussian arms. 4 It is true that Guizot's rival, the veteran Thiers, had de- 1 Issue of Aug. 5, 1870; see also Spectator, Feb. 4, 1871. 1 Cook, Delane of the Times, p. 280. 3 Bernstorff, Im Kampfe fin Prussens Ehre, p. 618. 4 R. G. Wilberforce, Life of Bishop Wilberforce (London, 1878),. vol. iii, p. 355. UX] FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NEUTRALS 1 1 1 clared before casting his vote against the war, that France was not yet ready; and that the Emperor, even more re- cently, had admitted as much in the interview the Telegraph had published on the day of the Draft Treaty's appearance. 1 Also the Prince Napoleon, who was listened to and dis- regarded by everyone, had shown himself much agitated by his country's conduct. He was cruising in the Baltic when he learned of the imminence of war and determined at once to return "to Charenton [the French Bedlam] ; to that city of madmen which is shouting, to Berlin! and which is called Paris." There was the case, too, of the Jewish banker, who had grown rich in the French capital but left it for London, saying that it would be surrounded in a month. No one believed him. He committed suicide before he could forget the loss of his ducats in satisfaction at his foresight. Among the military, the doubters were General Ducrot, who had kept himself informed of what was going on across the Rhine, and Baron Stoffel, the French military attache at Berlin in 1869, who knew more, and had made a remarkable report of his observations the preceding August. 2 On Marshal MacMahon's authority it can be said that Baron Stoffel's superiors had given no credence to revelations that, when reprinted in '71, read almost as though they were a series of reflections on what had happened. 3 The British were avid for reports from their own countrymen and newspapers were more than eager to in- dulge them. At first, it had seemed the French would al- low reporters to accompany them on their " promenade to Berlin," and many set out for Metz. But soon official re- 1 Supra, chap, v, pp. 90, 91. 1 Capt. the Hon. D. Bingham, Recollections of Paris (London, 1896) r vol. i, p. 158. 8 Newton, op. cit., vol. it, p. 50. II2 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ t i 2 cognition was denied and some fared badly, — which in no wise increased their sympathy for the French cause. 1 However, by August the twelfth the Emperor so far modi- fied his rules as to permit the presence of those correspon- dents on whom he thought he could rely. Prussia, on the other hand, had extended a really royal welcome to the gentlemen of the Fourth Estate. In Berlin, Dr. Russell of the Times was invited to the christening of the baby daughter of the Crown Princess and, on being presented to the King by the British Ambassador, was welcomed as the minister of a very important power — that of public opin- ion. 2 The continual favours showered on this famous cor- respondent, known to his admirers as " Billy Russell of the Crimea," and to those who disliked him as " Bull Run," provided good material for the fun makers, who claimed that when the gray-coated Doctor mounted his horse, it was customary for the gorgeously uniformed Crown Prince to hold his stirrup. He travelled de luxe, with secretaries and couriers, as befitted the representative of a journal that counted for more abroad than all the British press together. Special facilities were afforded him for getting his re- ports to the Times and the Army and Navy Gazette. 3 ' The former paper was served, also, by Captain Hozier, who had ably reported the Sadowa campaign, and after delay again received his Government's permission to accompany the Prussian armies. Others of the foreign staff were Alex- ander Inness Shand, whose subsequent volume on the war 1 E. A. Vizetelly, My Days of Adventure (N. Y., 1914), pp. 56-57. i W. H. Russell, My Diary During the Last Great War (London, 1874), p. 30. 3 Julian Kune, Reminiscences of an Octogenarian Hungarian Exile (Chicago, 1911), pp. 205-206; Archibald Forbes, Memories and Studies of War and Peace (Leipzig, 1871), pp. 225-226; Vizetelly, op. cit., pp. 183-184. j I3 ] FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NEUTRALS i 13 became popular; Charles Austin, who wrote from Paris; Frank Lawley, who contributed also to the Telegraph, and Mr. Dallas, whom the Times shared with the News. The paper's motto, John Bright complained in i860, was Omnia pro tempore, scd nihil pro veritate — which he rendered, " Everything for the Times, but nothing for Truth." 1 These men reported events fully and accurately, but their chief prevented them from effecting any change in the paper's policy. It was the Daily News that plucked the highest laurels during the war, and is said to have doubled its circula- tion. The brightest star in its constellation was Henry Labouchere, whose ironic wit gave him a vogue surpassing any of his competitors. It had the only woman reporter, Jessie White Mario, the widow of Garibaldi's companion in arms in the Liberation days ; and Hilary Skinner, one of the few who were allowed special means of communication by the Prussian Staff ; Crawford, who for long had written his newsletters at a little cafe fronting the Bourse, was another, as was the amusing Archibald Forbes. For the Standard, there was the elderly but jaunty Bower, whose glossy top hat and buff waistcoat were more appro- priate on the boulevards than in the camp, and who fortun- ately found matter for his pen without going afield. 2 In Paris, also, was J. Augustus O'Shea, a good fellow of an Irishman, not to be confused with the gay and eccentric G. Augustus Sala, who was not a Bohemian and went to law to prove it. The Telegraph was popular also, — so much so that since it was always delivered late, newsdealers in Rus- sell Square complained that they lost the sale of other 1 Speeches of Right Hon. John Bright, M. P. (edited by Thorold Rogers, London, 1868), p. 500. ' Vizetelly, op. cit., p. 37. 1 14 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [114 papers because many preferred to wait and scramble over its quickly exhausted edition. It had a larger circulation in London than any of its competitors and proudly flaunted the number of its subscribers in every copy. The men who helped to give it popularity were Felix Whitehurst, who saw everything through French glasses and made his diary speak with a Gallic accent; Beatty Kingston, "the best man in the world for German news;" 1 and Lord Adare, — later Earl of Dunraven, who had with him, perhaps as guard agains mistakes in reporting a war in which always the unexpected happened, the famous mystic, Douglas Home, Browning's model for Mr. Sludge, the Medium. Another titled correspondent was Sir Henry Havelock, whose scrupulosity in paying for what he needed did some- thing to dispel the peasant's belief that England was at war with France. 2 The Morning Post was sierved by Thomas Gibson Bowles, whose precisely parted hair and trim moustache were the envy of the younger correspon- dents. There were, too, the three Vizetellys, father and sons, who reported for a number of papers; George T. Robinson, who got himself shut up in Metz to his advan- tage and that of the Manchester Guardian; Blanchard Jerrold, whose knowledge of the French spy system kept him in terror for the indiscretions of his brethren of the press; 3 Captain Walker, former military attache at the British Legation in Berlin; the irresponsible Lewis Wing- field, a free lance, who contributed to all and sundry ; Jules Pilcoq, who imperturbably sketched battle scenes for the Illustrated', and Henry Mayhew, more fitted to write on economics than to follow a campaign. 1 Bismarck at times accorded him very special privileges. See Forbes, op. cit., p. 226. * Kune, op. cit., p. 205. * Vizetelly, op. cit., p. 57. j I5 ] FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NEUTRALS ne These were some of the many to whose omnipresence it was due, as Sir Robert Morier complained, that the horrors of war were microscopically laid out to jostle the toast and muffins on every British breakfast table. With a similarity to that jolly character of Dickens', who was always draw- ing skeletons, these gay gentlemen contributed no jam for John Bull's muffins, and Punch and Judy, lest he should sup full of horrors, tempered their dolour by creating a " very special cockalorum," who gave himself all the airs of Dr. Russell, and a certain Ally Sloper, who consulted the can- non for accurate information, and got himself into all sorts of escapades in his efforts to serve the British public. At one time he ridiculed the practice of the other papers by sending back instructions that Judy stick up a paper outside the shop with scareheads chronicling the loss of his famous umbrella, and later his own disappearance, together with his belongings, "inclusive of umbrella and white hat." " The umbrella and hat are right as ninepence, you'll be pleased to hear," wrote Ally privately ; " but that don't mat- ter, stick it up outside the shop, and it'll have 'em beautiful. Contradict everything next day, and pot 'em again the day after." x A certain suspicion that the Power that would be found first ready for war was the Power that had meant war all along, invested with unusual interest the reports that were sent back as to the mobilization of the belligerents. On the twenty-second of July, the correspondent for Temple Bar wrote from Coblentz that, though France had about 150,000 men at Chalons, they were not ready to take the field and were backed by no reserves. He estimated that it would require at least a fortnight or three weeks before they could undertake a campaign. Whereas, the Prussians, he be- lieved, could assemble all their forces in eleven days. John 1 Judy, Aug. 3, 1870. ! !6 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [i 16 Scott Russell had been assured it would be a matter of only ten days. 1 Shand, who wrote for the Times, relates that Moltke lay smoking a cigar when his aide-de-camp brought him news of the declaration of war. " I had hardly looked for it for a day or two," he said without rising — " Just have the goodness to open that drawer." Within an hour the necessary orders were flying to his subordinates in all parts of Germany. 2 On July the twenty-third, English reporters sent news that some twenty of the actors of the Passion Play at Ammergau had been called to the colours. Joseph Mair was the name of the peasant who played the part of Christ. He was a wood-carver, well over six feet in height, "gentle, modest, and deeply devoted." With the German regard for efficiency he was permitted to wear his long hair unshorn so that when he was mustered out of the artillery he might resume his role, if von Moltke's calcula- tions went not awry and the work of battle was completed before the year expired. 3 France, through the lamentable disorganization of her own system, could not but give her enemy an excess of the time required for mobilization. With what clock-like precision it was accomplished is apparent from the single statement that nineteen days after it was known war would be waged, Germany commenced on French soil her march to Paris. 4 It was not until several months later that the detailed work which had made possible such speed and surety became known to the English. The Graphic, then, recounted the visit of General von Moltke to France in April of 1868, 1 John Scott Russell, Into Versailles and Out, Macmillan's Mag- azine, Feb., 1871, pp. 3 10 et se Q- 'A. I. Shand, On the Trail of the War (London, 1870), pp. 87-88. 3 Notes and Queries, Fourth Series, vol. vi, p. 176; Spectator and Daily Telegraph, issues of July 23, 1870. 1 Spectator, Aug. 6, 1870. 1 17 ] FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NEUTRALS ny at which time he had visited her frontiers and had made notes on the condition of her defences. 1 John Scott Russell told the readers of Macmillan's that for several years he had noticed the organization of the railroads throughout Germany into one military system. Each train, he said, carried two numbers and marks, — one of which gave its capacity in peace time and the other the use to which it was to be put in the event of war, and how many soldiers or how much ammunition it was to carry. For four years previous to the war, he claimed, each man, and every weapon was exactly placed on paper for the march to France. 2 The fact that the Emperor at first forbade the presence of correspondents with the armies served to prevent the British temporarily from discovering that their belief in French military preparedness was a delusion. However, the length of time elapsing between the Emperor's procla- mation to his people on the twenty-second of July and the beginning of his campaign gave the more thoughtful mat- ter for reflection. They wondered if the delay were not caused through some lack of generalship. It had been thought France was all eagerness to put to the test those two machines that Disraeli named as the cause of the war, — the so much discussed chassepot and the mitrailleuse. 3. Superiority of equipment would be necessary to counter- balance the presence of von Moltke on the Prussian side. That the Emperor accompanied his army was regarded as rather a detriment to France. It was believed he belonged to that second class of rulers described by Machiavelli, those who were able to accomplish great things — by their 1 Issue of Oct. 22, 1870. * J. S. Russell, op. cit., pp. 310 et seq. 8 Lord Carlingford to Lear, Bath, Oct. 19, 1870. Later Letters of Edward Lear (edited by Lady Strachey, London, 191 1). 1 18 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ 1 x g councillors. It was remembered how fearful British states- men had been during the Crimea that he would seek glory in that campaign to the embarrassment of the allied generals. 1 " There he goes," said Sala, when at last the Imperial forces got under way, " There he goes, and he has forgotten to get himself a return ticket." His lack of it, perhaps, was due not so much to want of foresight as to inability to pay its price. Before he became Emperor he had advised France to borrow from Germany her system of military organization. 2 In 1867 he had formulated an elaborate report to aid the military commission. Only re- cently he had urged the abolition of exemptions, and the adoption of the Remington breech-loader that Metternich had told him was proving efficient in Austria. 8 He was no more able as Emperor to accomplish these last innovations than he had been to accomplish the greater one when he was pretender. He was a sight to 'rouse the laughter of the gods, a Napoleon, feeble and old before his time, who had not the power to command his generals nor the ability to inspire his soldiers. In the vanguard of his army went the Turcos, — auxiliaries unfortunately accepted from the Arab chiefs. They were stationed in Baden, and whatever sympathy had been felt for France in that province rapidly disappeared. Of all the inconceivable follies committed by the Emperor, Sir Robert Morier thought this employment of African savages to fight the Germans was the greatest. 4 But 1 Fitzmaurice, op. cit., vol. i, p. 103. 2 CEuvres de Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (edited by C. E. Temblaire, Paris, 1848), vol. iii, pp. 49 et seq.; chap, vi, pp. 268 et scq. * Wickham Hoffman, Camp, Court, and Siege, pp. 142-144. 4 Morier to his father, Aug. 3, 1870, Memoirs of Sir Robert Morier, vol. ii, p. 163. Cf. also London Graphic, Aug. 27, 1870; Fraser's Mag- azine, Oct., 1870. A Month with the Belligerents, N. S., vol. ii, pp. 483 et scq. j IQ ] FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NEUTRALS i 19 Morier was overfond of superlatives. There were yet other follies to match this. On the second of August, Napoleon attacked Saarebriick, a town of six thousand inhabitants that the British journals were quick to inform their readers was unfortified. 1 More- over, he had the misfortune to be successful, — which con- firmed the existing opinion of French power, — and to misuse his success by a needless destruction of the remains of the little town. The message to the regent Empress that the young Prince Imperial, whom he had with him, had stood his baptism of fire very bravely, was another blunder. The British would not applaud the boy's pluck nor the temerity of a father that made such test of it. Punch and the Spectator made wry faces at the whole performance, — a baptism of blood, and tears, and fire, they called it. 2 There was a rumour in England, despite French protests to the contrary, that the fourteen-year-old boy, who was taken out in a special train that morning to direct the first mitrail- leuse fired by the Army of the Rhine, was carried back hopelessly shattered and afflicted with an hysterical malady which made it impossible any longer to exhibit him in public. 3 Paterfamilias read of this strange Caesar chrism with ris- ing indignation, and with a sigh of relief, turned the page to read the simple address of the Prussian ruler to his soldiers. King William had told them at Saarebriick that he assumed command of his forces to repel attack. As for his people, he assured the French that they had desired, and still desired, to live at peace with them. As for himself, 1 Record, Aug. 8, 1870. 'Aug. 13, 1870. 1 Chamber's Journal, March 18, 1871, A Good Correspondent, pp. 169 et seq. Cf. Edward Legge, The Empress Eugenie and her Son (Lon- don, 1916), pp. 59-6o; Augustin Filon, Le Prince Imperial (London, I9I3). I2 o BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [120 he warred against soldiers, not against citizens, whose se- curity he would respect. 1 What a contrast the British thought him to the cruel Emperor with his painted cheeks and trained mustachios! What a contrast was the Land- wehr to the barbarous Turcos ! On the morning of the fifth of August, six or eight hours before the event was known in Paris, 2 the London Times 1 printed the news of the battle of Weissembourg, where some thousand Frenchmen with their complement of officers had surrendered. It was " really a great success," Charles Lever boasted in a letter to Blackwood, " I don't care a rush that the Prussians were in overwhelming numbers. May they always be so, and may those rascally French get so palpably, unmistakably licked that all their lying press will be unable to gloss over their disgrace." Not only were numbers unequal, but according to Sir Charles Dilke, who was at this time with the Crown Prince and as staunch an admirer of his forces as was the famous creator of O'Dowd, the battle was won really by some Poles who fought in the centre against the Turcos, while hardly a German or Frenchman was in sight. The Poles had cartridges and hymnbooks. The savages were almost as innocent of the one as the other. 3 This defeat and the twin disasters of Worth and Spich- eren, which occurred on the same day, foreshadowed the fate of the Empire. The Standard, in its editorial of the eighth, spoke of them as proof of the genuineness of the love of peace and economy that had been professed by the Ollivier Cabinet on its coming into power, — a testimony 1 Times, Aug. 4, 1870. * Washburne to Fish, Aug. 8, 1870, Washburne, Correspondence of the Franco-German War, pp. 19-20. s Stephen Gwynn and Gertrude Tuckwell, Life of Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Dilke (N. Y., 1917), vol. i, p. 105. I2 i] FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NEUTRALS I2 i that was at the same time a sort of swan song to Imperial prestige. It did not believe the battles presaged disaster to France itself. Nor did the Morning Post of that date, nor the Guardian, nor Spectator. But the Times was lugubrious, and the News croaked " Nevermore." x In Ireland, where demonstrations at Cork, Kantuck, and Castlebar 2 had followed the great night at Dublin, it was freely hinted that these British papers were in Prussian pay. Their evil tidings were disbelieved. There were cheers for General MacMahon, descendant of one of the " wild geese," who had contrived to elude the penal laws and emigrate to France. It was calculated that 600,000 Irish had died in the French service in the past century. 3 They promised an Irish brigade to MacMahon now if he should ask it. 4 In Limerick, 10,000 gathered at the Treaty Stone on the day of the battle of Worth to vaunt their sympathy for France. Katharine Tynan, who was a little girl at the time, remembered how on her way from school she saw the Irish school boys fighting the battles over again, and seeing to it that the French had the victory, in spite of all the lying British press. No one would take the part of the Prus- sians, so the boys had to combat unoccupied houses, — of which there were no few in Ireland, and riddle their win- dows with stones, the while they shouted battle cries. 5 Young Quixotes tilting at windmills, perhaps. Perhaps, torch bearers, cherishing the fire some day to melt their 1 Issues of Aug. 8 and Aug. 9, respectively. 1 Northern Star and Ulster Observer, Spectator, Weekly Freeman's Journal, issues of July 30, 1870. * Spectator, July 30. Estimate based on Records of French War Office. * Weekly Freeman's Journal, July 30, 1870. 5 Katharine Tynan, Twenty-five Years' Reminiscences (London, 1013), pp. 43-44. I22 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [122 chains. Their mothers and sisters were busy collecting old linen to make charpie for the French wounded. 1 "It is always safe to predict that if one section of Irish- men take to asseverating that anything is white, another section will therefore and forthwith take to asseverating furiously, that it is black," said the Scotsman. True to tradition, across the Boyne there was a fanfare of rejoic- ing. For Protestant Ireland favoured the Prussians, and al- ready in Londonderry many had been wounded in a demon- stration that for an Orangeman neutrality was as much an anomaly as it was for his Catholic fellow. 2 It was thought by the British that these Protestants did well to rejoice, for Dublin, and Cork, and Galway were cherishing the hope that France, that had often drawn the sword for others, might help her to attain nationality and the enjoyment of free institutions. 3 It was a wild hope, the Times said, but it was discussed, none the less, by British papers. They re- minded their readers that Monseigneur Dupanloup had encouraged Irish aspirations and accused Napoleon of hav- ing shown more sympathy for them than was correct for an ally of Great Britain. 4 The Evening Mail inveighed against the Nationalist press for seditiously hoping Eng- land would be embroiled in the Continental quarrel to its undoing. 5 This could not but increase the British efforts' to isolate the belligerents. The little Island that embraced the world had the weakness of its strength. It roused the jealousy of others, who had similar anacondic desires. England had need of caution. l C. E. Ryan, With an Ambulance during the Franco-German War (N. Y., 1896), p. 1. 2 Daily News, Aug. 4, 15, 1870; Saunders', Aug. 1, 1870. 3 Times, Aug. 13, 1870. * Daily News, July 25, 1870. 5 Issue of Aug. 9, 1870. I2 3J FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NEUTRALS 123 Lord Granville, in advocating the new treaty guarantee- ing Belgium, had been actuated not only by a desire to se- cure the engagements to which England was a signatory, but by a desire to localize the war. Thus the Government, though renewing an entangling alliance, believed itself still acting in accordance with the tenets of the Manchester School, — as Gladstone urged on Bright, who was im- patient of the sensitiveness for Belgium's safety. Indeed, this desire to localize the conflict seems to have been the guiding principle of Granville's policy. A free field for France and Prussia and a packed grandstand was hi9 motto. France, he believed, would prove the stronger, and he wished to prevent any further increase of the odds that she might gain by assistance from the side lines. Not content with bolstering his own country into an attitude of rectilinear correctness by such means as pro- claiming her neutrality on the very day of the declaration of war; adjusting her armament to that nice point which would ensure respect and yet not rouse suspicion; and by promptly passing an act to restrain the inordinate partisan- ship of the Irish, he set about the formation of a league of neutrals. In this he was assisted by the victories of the sixth of August. They prepared the public for the news that Strasbourg was besieged, Fort Lichtenburg captured, that the war, in short, was to be fought on French, not Prussian, soil. The French fleet had blockaded the north- ern ports of Germany, but the events of early August caused the prudent Danes to give support, now, to their Government's adoption of neutrality. They caused, too, the resignation of the Ollivier Ministry and the appointment of another, which an English paper said even flattery would be puzzled to salute with a tribute of admiration. Where Austria before had been inclined to pledge al- liance, the present rumour was that she would content her- I2 4 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [124 self with joining Italy in an agreement to urge a peace that would involve no territorial cession. A Berlin despatch, printed in the Times, claimed England had declined to be- come a third party to such a compact. 1 Press comment says nothing of the London visit of the Italian statesman, Marco Minghetti, nor do the biographers of the Ministers record it. But Count Beust asserts in his memoirs that it was this Italian, — an economist well pleasing, it may be supposed, to Bright and Gladstone, — whose mission resulted in England's decision to refrain from intervention and in- itiate the formation of a neutral league. 2 On the tenth of August, the day after General Montaubon, Count de Palikao, was appointed premier of France, Lord Granville wrote Lyons that he had informed the Prussian Ambas- sador of " engagements " exchanged between Italy, Austria and his own Government, by which they bound themselves not to depart from neutrality "without an interchange of ideas and an announcement to one another of any change of policy." 3 Austria, be it noticed, before entering into this agreement had declared herself free from any conflicting engagements. Within the week, Granville informed the French Ambassador of the success of these negotiations and his hope to extend them, 4 — the outcome not of a formal compact of nation with nation, but a sort of " gentleman's agreement," formed by means of letters between Ministers. It was designed, he said, to take the place of a more formal project for combined neutrality that several Powers had advanced since the beginning of the war. Though the British proposals were received favourably, the note send- 1 Times, Aug. 13, 1870. * Memoirs of Count Beust (London, 1887), vol. ii, p. 206. 3 British State Papers for 1870, Foreign Series, vol. lxx, p. 96. 4 Granville to Lyons, Aug. 6, 1870, ibid., vol. lxxi, pp. 11-16; Fitz- maurice, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 42-43. 125] FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NEUTRALS I2 e ing was not completed until the middle of the succeeding month, 1 which makes it appear that there might yet have lingered some chance for France to gain allies, had she been able to retrieve the August disasters. Rumours of the project created the impression in Ger- many, Morier reported early in September, that England had taken the initiative in organizing the Powers for a re- sistance to her exaction of territorial indemnity when the time of peace should come. He was reassured by Gran- ville, 2 and Prussia made no remonstrance. But the French regarded this " Ligue dcs Neutres" as especially inimical to their interests, — an effort to rob them of intended allies. 3 There were two reasons why France was justified in her complaints. In the first place, the fight was not to be one between evenly matched combatants. Lord Granville's estimate of the military strength of France was incorrect. Furthermore, it affected her more harshly than it did Prus- sia, since her chances for alliance were the better, not only in August when it was believed she might rally from defeat, and other nations with grievances against Prussia might have combined to strengthen her, but later when her weak- ness was discovered and the severity of Prussian demands wakened the wish of Neutrals to spare her from further humiliation, and themselves from future disaster. The League resulted, too, in giving Prussia assurance that no concerted pressure would be used against her should she exact an increase of territory. The strength of a neutral lies in the restraining influence exerted on the belligerents by the uncertainty of his future policy. The communica- tion to France and Prussia of the perfecting of this laissez 1 Denmark was one of the last to enter the agreement. * Morier to Granville, Sept. 2, 1870, Brit. State Papers, vol. lxxi, pp. 65-66. 3 Fitzmaurice, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 43. I2 6 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [126 faire project ensured them in the indulgence of a do-as-you- please policy, the results of which would be dependent wholly on their own character. The League has a sinister appearance, also, in that it was concluded in secret, with- out debate of Parliament or the press. If it meant noth- ing, it was unnecessary. If it meant anything, it should not have been formed by Great Britain without the know- ledge and consent of Parliament and people. CHAPTER VII The Downfall of the Empire Soon after his accession Napoleon had declared, " L' Em- pire c'est la paix." In the middle of August, 1870, the French turned the mot against themselves and with a shrug and a gay attempt at raillery in the midst of disaster, ex- claimed, " Certainement ce n'est pas la guerre! " 1 With no single French soldier left in Germany, — except as prisoner * with the enemy well across the boundaries; with the reali- zation that General Le Boeuf was right when he had boasted not a button lacking from a gaiter for a single French soldier, — for the very good reason that not a gaiter was in the French equipment, nor a military map of France, nor many another necessary thing; 2 with their Government definitely apprised by the British success at league-making that they were to continue without allies, 5 the French stub- bornly refrained from crying a peccavimus. If the war had been furthered by Napoleon, or Gramont, or by Ollivier, or some black-garbed confessor of the Empress, it was conceded now that it had been adopted by the nation, — that it had attained legitimacy. Napoleon, submitting to the advice of his generals, the perturbed Regent, accepting an enforced change of ministry, were become only the sceptered puppets of their country. 1 Spectator, Sept. 3, 1870, Letter of Paris correspondent * Weekly Scotsman, Aug. 20, 1870. 3 Supra, chap, vi, p. 125. 127] 127 I2 8 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ I2 g In July the Council of the Workingmen's Association had addressed a manifesto to the Workers of the World pro- testing against the war as a criminal absurdity and declar- ing themselves to be the spokesmen in this opinion of all the working people of France. 1 They claimed that those men who had performed the contortions of war in the streets of Paris were only the "band of the ioth of De- cember" in a masquerade of workmen's blouses, — that proof of this was afforded by the fact that Pietri, the prefect of police, thought it prudent to stop the " patriots " because the real workmen of the Faubourg came forward in such force to refute them that cries of " Vive la guerre!" were drowned in cries of " Vive la paix!" The correspon- dent of the Standard had written, on the sixteenth of July, that he was convinced there was even in Paris a strong minority against the war; and the representative of the Evening Mail went so far as to deny that it was ever popu- lar. On the very day that war was formally declared, the Times published the report that Thiers was receiving two hundred letters a day stating approval of his efforts to preserve the peace. It believed that those peasant proprie- tors who had supported the Emperor in the plebiscite three months before, had yielded their adherence because they thought Napoleon stood for peace. 2 Guizot, in retirement at Val Richer, had said to Bishop Wilberforce that France had such misgivings as to the right of the war that the Government would not dare exact an increase of territory. 3 A merchant of Havre wrote to John Richard Green that there was not one of his trade in that city but hated the 1 General Council of the International JVorking Men's Association on the War, a manifesto issued to the members of the International Working Men's Association in Europe and the United States. * Times, Aug. 30, 1870. 3 Wilberforce, Life of Bishop Wilberforce, vol. ii, p. 360. ' 12 g] THE DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE 12 g war as iniquitous; and another correspondent in northern France reported to Green that there it was equally con- demned by the workmen. 1 But the conscripts had answered the call to the colors. In the barracks the long proscribed Marseillaise had been distributed by the Government ; 2 it was sung in all the theatres of Paris by women draped in the tricolour. A favourite tenor of the Opera Comique was forced to chant it from the top of an omnibus, halted in front of the Bourse. 3 Le Rhin of Alfred de Musset and the Chant du Depart of Queen Hortense, shared in its honors. Through the cities the soldiers had gone marching, marching, in long lines of splendid rhythm to a battle-scarred frontier where waited an ancient foe. The tirades of Edmond About and of the hot-blooded Emile Girardin were read and quoted on the boulevard at the hour of absinthe, and next morning in the provinces. 4 The ironic speeches of Thiers; the writings of Prevost Parodol that in days gone 'by had lashed the Emperor for having tolerated Sadowa; the tradition of the great Napoleon, cherished in every peasant's cottage throughout France, were bearing their bitter fruit. News came of the condemnation of the British press. The French Ambassador had asked that it be counteracted by some word of sympathy from the Queen's Ministers, but he had found Granville " cold, very cold." ! News came of defeats and German exultation, 1 Letters of J. R. Green (edited by Leslie Stephens, N. Y., 1901), pp. 257-258. ' Manchester Guardian, July 21, 1870. 1 Mrs. George Cornwallis West, The Reminiscences of Lady Randolph Churchill (London, 1908), pp. 10-20. 4 Daily Telegraph, Sept. 2, 1870; Manchester Guardian, Aug. 18, 1870. 5 Granville to Lyons, July 21, 1870, British State Papers, Foreign Series, vol. lxx; Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville, vol. ii, p. 39. ^o BRITISH POUCY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [130 of the smug rejoicing of the British. " Tell those travel- ing Englishmen who so loudly express their pleasure at German victories that they make the position of their countrymen in France most difficult," wrote an expatriate at Boulogne. 1 France felt that she was alone, misunder- stood, threatened with great danger. The bird of France is the coque de la gloire, says an old ballad, it sings in victory, but it sings yet more loudly in defeat. " The French rabble," wrote a visiting Englishman from the capital, " cannot endure that Albion should see them humiliated. They want to have it out on someone." 2 Somewhere some- thing had gone wrong. It remained only to fight, and that with all the strength they had, to make the sun to smile again. The peasants whispered of Bismarck. They be- lieved his power supernal, and when an early winter came with excess of cold and sleet, they said that, too, was the work of the Herr Chancellor. Mothers frightened their children with stories of the blond-haired Uhlans from across the Rhine, and told them of the glory of France in ancient wars. The war loan of £30,000,000, asked by the Government, was supplied not by a few Parisian capitalists but by a vast number of creditors throughout the Empire, who showed by their eager investment a strong resolution to support the war to a favorable conclusion. M. Thiers was praised now as the man who had thrown round Paris a splendid girdle of barricades. After all, he had resisted war only because he knew his country was not ready. It was felt, vaguely, that fate had its hand in this, — that war had been inevitable. Across the Channel a strangely assorted trinity specu- 1 Letter to Times, Aug. 15, 1870. 3 Times, July 29, Aug. 31, 1870. Cf. Gabriel Honotaux, Contempo- rary France (N. ¥., 1903-1009), vol. i, p. 9. 131] THE DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE I3 i lated on the chance of solving future difficulties by some better means than war. They were a leader of the labor party, 1 the editor of the Banker's Magazine, and a great lady, — the wife of Lord John Russell. 2 Their chirpings seemed irrelevant. The point to be discussed was the ef- fect this war would have on England. Sir Robert Morier believed it would establish the preponderance of Germany over Europe for centuries to come. He did not wish France to be annihilated. It could furnish an element that Germany could not, — " lightness, grace, form," but it should be induced by defeat into a more pacific temper. 3 George Eliot recognized the war as one between two different civilizations. She, too, believed the world had entered on that better period, which would be " marked in future histories and charts as the ' period of German as- cendancy.'" 4 The Earl of Lytton saw the Teutons asl glorious, juvenescent; France, rotted by lies in every fibre till there remained to her nothing but native ferocity. 5 The letter of Dr. Friedrich Strauss to M. Ernest Renan was much discussed in August as affording an authorita- tive intimation of what could be expected of the great nation new in its ascendancy. The writer was a German Liberal, — one of the Illuminati, who could fairly be heard on the subject. His country waged a war of ideas, he 1 Edmund Beales, Times, Aug. 29, 1870. 2 Letter to Lady Dunfermline, Aug. 24, 1870, Lady John Russell, a Memoir (edited by Desmond McCarthy, N. Y., ion), pp. 220-230; Banker's Magazine, Sept., 1870, Arbitration of the Sword, vol. xxx, pp. 57 et seq. 8 Letters to Stockmar and Malet, Aug., 1870, Memoirs of Sir Robert Morier, pp. 165-177. 4 Complete Works of George Eliot (Edinburgh, 1878-1885), vol. xi (Life and Letters), p. 551. 5 Letter to Miss Farrar, Personal and Literary Letters of Robert, First Earl of Lytton (edited by Lady Betty Balfour, N. Y., 1006), vol. i, p. 258. I3 2 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [132 said, — ideas that were shared by University professors, statesmen, generals, privates, and the populace alike. Not through fault of hers was Germany driven to prove her right to unity by ordeal of battle. Once made a united nation she would speedily assert and establish a well ordered freedom. In the course of attaining her aspirations, she would have to discipline France out of her love of glory, but would leave her free, prosperous, and contented, a pledge for Europe's safety. This was a gilding with philosophy of Bismarck's simple statement that a victorious Germany would stabilize the equilibrium of Europe. 1 Strangely enough, it was this very solicitude for the safety of Europe that France advised as its most stimulat- ing motive in the war. Its Government claimed specifically that it fought to preserve the balance of power. It was hoped that Gladstone would express some opinion of these rival claims instead of distributing in a thoroughly neutral manner equal condemnation to both sides. Saunders' re- marked that in the midst of the Prime Minister's statesman- ship, one called to mind the valiant conduct of such leaders as Canning and Palmerston. 2 The Manchester Guardian warned that the time was past for an English Minister to exhaust his vocabulary of epithets in praise of a condition of neutrality. 3 " What a master of rigamarole he is," said Green, " nobody else could make one wish Palmerston alive again as Gladdie is making everybody wish him just now."* That the wish was strong and prevalent was due not so much to the belief that any especial value would inhere in 1 Times, Aug., passim; Daily News, Sept. 1, 1870; Saunders', Sept. 3. 1870. * Aug. 9, 1870. * Aug. 2, 1870. 4 Letter to E. A. Freeman, Aug., 1870, Letters of John Richard Green, p. 257. ! 3 3] THE DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE ^3 his opinion of the relative merits of the two belligerents; not that it was thought he could infallibly determine to which nation the sensitive balance of power could best be trusted, but because the Belgian controversy had created distrust of German rectitude, and because the press and public men of Germany were showing contempt and hostility for Eng- land. Palmerston, it was felt, would have rescued his country from the negative role Gladstone had trained her to. If she blundered and blustered, or meddled and mud- dled, as Disraeli said she had under Palmerston, she could be no more abused than she was now. At home, John Stuart Mill blamed Gladstone for not having used the navy as a police force to prevent the aggression of either Power. 1 Bismarck scolded that England had not stopped the war at the outset by telling Napoleon that if he broke the peace he would find her ranged with Germany as ally. 2 He pro- fessed to find it mortifying that the British had so readily undertaken the representation of France in North Ger- many, and surprised Lord Lyons by forthwith entrusting German interests in Paris to the care of the American Minister. These complaints, which seem to have had their beginning at the apex of the German state, became wide- spread throughout the nation when the official papers pub- lished news that England was exporting horses, coal, and munitions of war to Havre. The press contrasted the outspoken judgment on the " greatest crime the country had witnessed" with the "aside" utterances that booked orders from France and calculated the amount of a ten percent profit. 3 It affirmed that while England served Ger- 1 Mill to Sir Chas. Dilke, Sept. 30, 1870, Letters of John Stuart Mill. 2 Bismarck the Man and the Statesman (N. Y., 1899), vol. ii, p. 60; W. H. Russell, My Diary during the Last Great War (London, 1874), p. 494; Augustus Loftus to Granville, July 18, 1870, Fitzmaurice, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 37-38. s Times, Sept. 2; also in issue of Aug. 30, 1870. I3 4 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [134 many with a syllabub of praise, the solid pudding went to France. Complaints of this "merchantlike conduct" of her subjects were sent the Queen by her daughter, by the Crown Prince, and even the King of Prussia, until she became deeply distressed. After a letter from the Duke of Coburg which pointed out the dangers that would threaten England were she deprived of German friendship, the Queen asked Granville if it would not be possible to make some public demonstration to convince the German people of the endeavour to preserve neutrality. 2 The Crown Prin- cess, grieved that accusations of gross unfairness were con- tinually leveled against Granville, sent for Bismarck to say her say in his defence. He would not believe her, and said with a smile, " But his acts prove it." " It will be long," she wrote the Queen, " before people believe England means kindly and well by Germany." * In the British press, small effort was made to defend an international practice admittedly bad, but which England had certainly not inaugurated. Prussia was reminded that she had shown herself quite as bourgeois in the Crimean War when she had sold arms to Russia. It was asked why now she addressed no complaints to America, who was ex- ercising the same prerogative. 4 Judged by the logic of common sense, British conduct was wrong but by the ethics of jurists and statesmen, as the Economist pointed out, it was well within the bounds of neutrality ; 5 and the author- 1 The Empress Frederick, a Memoir (London, 1918), p. 232. * Col. Ponsonby to Granville, Aug. 3, 1870, Fitzmaurice, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 38-39. 3 Crown Princess to Queen Victoria, Aug. 9, 1870, ibid., vol. ii, p. 38. * Annual Register for 1870, vol. cxii, p. 108. The British Ambassador at Washington informed Granville later that America's export of arms was expressly secured by a treaty with Prussia. * Aug. 6, 13, 1870. 135] THE DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE 1 ^ ity of the latter certainly had precedent in international law. Correspondents of the Times quoted Germany's own jurists, Bluntschli and Heffter, to show that it was not a nation's duty to prohibit the export of contraband. 1 The Spectator warned that a check of the export of coal to France would be a violation of treaty provisions. The most that could be' done, — and some such course 1 was advocated by the News, the Echo, and the Economist, 2 — would be for the Government to avail itself of the Customs Consolidation Act (an Act never resorted to ex- cept when England was on the point of becoming a belli- gerent) for the prohibition of export of munitions; or to extend the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act to " everything which sufficient authority shall decide to be contraband of war." It was pointed out by the Pall Mall Gazette that preventive action, truly to accord with neu- trality, should have been taken before the war's inception, and not now, when circumstances would make such a course tell heavily in Prussia's favour. 3 Lord Granville's cir- cular in answer to Bernstorff was criticised because it stres- sed the difficulty of preventing contraband from reaching the ports of belligerents, rather than the immunity of muni- cipal regulations from foreign interference, where no special treaty or generally accepted rule of conduct pro- vided for the contrary. 4 The tone of Count Bismarck, even more than his com- plaint, was considered extraordinary. " What does Count Bismarck think to gain," said the Spectator, by calling Englishmen old women and taunting us with cowardice 1 E. C. Clark, Cambridge, to Times, Nov. 4, 1870. 1 Issues of Aug. 1, 6, 1, respectively. 'Aug. 1, 1870. * Globe and Traveller, Aug. 24, 1870. 136 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [^6 and prophesying our subjection? . . . Does he think Englishmen are Continentals to be driven into a duel by a few hard words? ... or is he preparing a state of feeling in Germany which will enable him, when war is over, to set England at defiance? 1 The Pall Mall Gazette expressed misgivings, too, as to what the pother was about. " If it had been a popular out- cry in the first instance there would have been no great cause for surprise, but the impulse was given from above. It was the inspired papers that started the agitation ; and it was not only started with singular promptitude, but with exceeding energy." 2 Later in the month, with the contro- versy still unsettled, Pall Mall was alarmed by an article in the Hamburg Borsenhalle into believing that the object of Prussia was to convince its people that for the future England could be left out of the account, — that she would never act vigorously except when her business interests were concerned. 5 On the twenty-seventh of August, the announcement of the Count de Palikao to the French Chambers that the Im- perial Government had purchased forty thousand rifles abroad, gave fresh impetus to Prussian protests, 4 and aroused a number of leading papers to denounce a policy so contradictory to Lord Granville's earlier statement that the bystander who furnishes fresh weapons to a disarmed combatant should not be considered as a neutral. Already, in August of 1870, England was finding her position so prickly that the wish for war's early conclu- sion expressed in many of her journals cannot be thought to have been wholly unselfish. On the fall of the Ollivier Ministry, which followed within a few days the defeats of 1 Spectator, Aug. 6, 1870. 2 Pall Mall, Aug. 1, 1870. * Ibid., Aug. 25, 1870. 4 Daily News, Aug. 30, 1870. 137] THE DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE ^ Worth and Forbach, many editorials expressed the hope that this might be the prelude to the fall of the dynasty. An enforced abdication, it was urged, would be considered by Prussia such an acknowledgment of wrong-doing, — ■ such a repudiation of the system represented by Gramont and Benedetti, — that any further desire to inflict punishment would be extinguished. The day of Ollivier's resignation, it was said in the Telegraph that if the Imperial policy should be condemned and confounded be- fore the incensed national feeling of Germany, she, also, France, be it remembered, is a great and united nation, and she will abide- when dynasties have passed away and are done with. This calam- ity is the Sovereign's rather than hers, ... we foresee for her a better fortune than the one of mere military fame and personal glories. 1 The Times, adding the weight of its influence to the popu- larity of the Telegraph to hasten the fall of the tottering dynasty, advised that the Emperor return to Paris and as- sist his country by an abdication. On August the tenth, with the smug assumption that its diagnosis of the disease of France was correct and its remedy the one that would be adopted, it proffered advice to England : There is a duty incumbent upon us in such a contingency (a change of Government in France) from which, difficult as it would be in execution, no Ministry ought to shrink. Germany has never made war upon France. The Emperor threw down the challenge. . . . With the retirement of the challenger the battle ought to close. The editorials of succeeding days were in the same key. France was told that she should not expect to escape the consequences of the acts of her rulers, and Germany that she might reasonably require some indemnity " for the 1 Aug. 9, 1870. !38 BRITISH POUCY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [138 expenses of a war she was challenged to fight." And the Morning Advertiser wailed that Napoleonism had broken down, and that the Emperor stayed with his army only be- cause he was too ill to travel and too timorous to present himself to the people of Paris. 1 It is not surprising that the readiness with which the by no means, decisive defeats of the French were seized upon in a neutral country by the main organ of the Government and the most popular London daily, aroused the criticism of their contemporaries. " On the Continent," said the Manchester Guardian, a declaration by the Times is regarded as hardly less important than if it were made by the Ministers of the Crown, and there is no saying what mischief may not already have been done by the reckless and scandalous suggestion that England now expects the downfall of the Napoleonic dynasty. ... If malcontents in Paris were only waiting for some one bold enough to speak of " abdication," an English journal should not have pronounced the word. 2 The Conservative Standard expressed regret that news- papers "professing to speak for the party which the Gov- ernment represents — known to receive occasional inspira- tion from the Government, come forward to assure France that her safety lies in getting rid of her sovereign." Eng- land's assurance, it believed, that the only way to salvation led through revolution would be interpreted as a piece of outrageous impertinence. It congratulated Count Berns- torff on having won the Liberal press to such a " scandal- ous partisanship." 3 The Sun begged that the French be left to their own counsels, — " to urge upon them any in- centive to a revolutionary outbreak is, at a moment like 1 Issue of Aug. 10, 1870. 1 Ibid. s Ibid. I3 q] THE DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE 139 this, nothing less than criminal." 1 The organ of the Church of England, the Record, remonstrated that there was neither wisdom nor good feeling in seizing on the moment of the Emperor's calamity ... to call for his " abdication ". . . . He has ever been to England a loyal and steadfast ally . . . much more friendly, both in his avowals and his public acts, than either the old Bourbons or the Orleanists. 2 " Tout pent se retablir," the Emperor had said after the defeat of Worth. But the victory that he needed to re- establish the confidence of his soldiers and his people and to refute the croakings of the Times and News, was not to be won. The siege of Strasburg was begun on the tenth of August ; on the next day the Germans captured Fort Lichten- burg. On the eighteenth, the French suffered another de- feat at Gravelotte, and the following day Strasburg was 1 under bombardment. On the twenty-ninth, Marshall Mac- Mahon was defeated at Beaumont, and two days later Bazaine failed to make his way through the forces investing Metz. All this to a running accompaniment of verbal shell fire from the Liberal press of neutral England. The Daily News, in joining its sonorous voice to the Io Victis, assured France that she was without a ruler, — that in Paris men screamed out their conviction that no good could be done until the country rid itself of the Bonapartes. Napoleon's mind, said the News, had lost its grip, — He is like an enchanter deserted by his familiar ... a pitiable sight striking vainly with his broken sword at his dreadful antag- onist. All the Liberal feeling of England and Europe regards the Emperor as the real cause of the disasters of France, and be- lieves that the very calamities which attend his fall may regen- erate the nation. 3 1 Aug. 11, 1870. * Aug. 10, 1870. • Issues of Aug. 17, 20, 1870. I4 q BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [140 Judy added her shrill piping to the chorus, and in thin verse exclaimed : " If vict'ry crowns his aims, then shout Hurrah ! If conquered? then Napoleon a bas.'' 1 Throughout the cheap news and tobacco shops of London there were distributed in enormous quantities caricatures showing his Imperial Majesty hobbling on crutches, with a hump on his back in the fashion of Mr. Punch, and little Louis carried pick-a-back. 2 When Napoleon's detractors ranged from the Lord Chief Justice, who rejoiced at the collapse of a " militaristic villain," to the cockney cabbies, who bought these prints, those who professed still to see health in his cause were hard put to it to defend him. Con- sidering the importance of the Times, the News, and the Telegraph, and the comparatively small circulation of the aristocratic Court Journal, this paper showed some audacity in naming as " small spiteful little birds " those who had " pounced upon the wounded eagle," and had suggested his abdication as a means of escape from further humiliation. On behalf of the gentlemen of England it apologized for the language of a fraction of the English press and assured the world that it was " unindorsed by the best classes of society." 3 The Liverpool Albion* from a lower rung in the social ladder, showed by its criticism of the larger dail- ies, that Napoleon could still count friends among other than the denizens of Mayfair. From beyond the English boundaries, the Weekly Freeman and the Irish Nation echoed their rebukes. The papers of Ireland thought the 1 Judy, Aug. 17, 1870. 'Daily News, Aug. 18, 1870. * Court Journal, Aug. 20, 1870. 4 Quoted in Evening Mail, Dublin, Aug. 12, 1870. 1 The paper's policy won the commendation of the Irish Nation. I4I ] THE DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE 141 abuse of Napoleon had been so prolonged that, were it really not representative of English feeling, it should receive public repudiation. 1 It can hardly be supposed that discontent from a quarter so little influential could have done much to temper the tone of the British press. But some moderation was noted late in the month, and Judy, at least, believed the change was due to Ireland. In her edition of the thirty-^first she says: Circumstances have made our wise rulers aware that there is danger in these incitements to revolution, and the lesson sought to he taught to the French may be learnt nearer home — in Ireland. So the word has gone forth that the revolution game must now be abandoned and accordingly the Ministerial papers are now en- deavoring to make their readers believe they have never done any- thing so naughty as to advise the subjects of a sovereign with whom we are on terms of amity to dethrone him. 2 This change for which Judy's intuition found a reason, was remarked on, also, by the Manchester Guardian in its issue of the twenty-fifth, but without speculation as to its cause. Perhaps it was due not so much to fear of upheavals in Ireland as to the reception that was given to the Times and the News when they attempted to garb themselves in the white robes of peacemakers. On the seventeenth of the month the greatest of London dailies advanced the claim of England to a peculiar fitness to the role of mediator, and urged the Government not to shirk from the difficulties and responsibilities of such a posi- tion. M. Benedetti was in England at this time. Accord- ing to the Times, he left Calais two days before and visited Granville at Walmer Castle where Bernstorff went to meet 1 Weekly Freeman, Aug. 27, 1870; Nation, Aug. 20, 1870. 1 Judy, Aug. 31, 1870. The tendency to circle that was displayed in this and other instances by London's best known journal was called " curvature of the Times." I4 2 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [142 him. The Manchester Guardian reported that Prince Murat was a visitor at the Castle on the eighteenth. 1 The day that the Times chose for its advocacy of British media- tion, the Birmingham Daily Post stated that already the Government's attempts had failed and the Queen's mes- sengers had returned from Berlin. The Prussian King and his Minister had balked proceedings by declaring that if Napoleon wished for peace he must ask for an armistice in the usual way. The accuracy of the Birmingham paper seems somewhat doubtful since, surely, if such a decisive answer had been determined on, Bernstorff would not have been permitted to meet Benedetti, and had it been com- municated to England, the Times, as Ministerial organ, would have been deterred from urging mediation. The Standard of the eighteenth denied that any foundation whatever existed for the story that the English Govern- ment had tendered its good offices. Whether the Birming- ham paper had really achieved a " scoop " in chronicling the failure of negotiations that the Governmental papers were not allowed to notice, and the Times had been " inspired " to urge mediation in an effort to frighten a nation that showed itself recalcitrant, rumours were so rife that, on the old proverb of fire and smoke, it may be hazarded that the Standard was overly confident in its absolute denial. Biographers of the English Ministers could have done much to clear the mystery, but they are alike silent on the mes- sages sent to Berlin and on what passed when the lights burned long in Granville's castle, overlooking the Straits of Dover. The papers favorable to France were those most un- favorable to any attempt at mediation in the midst of de- feats which they believed could be redeemed. The Pall Mall Gazette of the seventeenth thought it improbable that Napo- 1 l Manchester Guardian, Aug. 20, 1870. 143] THE DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE I43 leon would, at this time, find it acceptable, and doubtful whether England, if she intervened, could do so only for such a period and for such a purpose as she might desire. From north of the Tweed, the Scotsman with his native caution, was wary of the violent efforts of the Times to share in the blessings of the peace maker. It remarked that its power- ful contemporary had systematically fallen foul of France from the first, — had blamed her for vaingloriously forcing war on an unready enemy and now that France, herself, was seen to have been ill prepared, had told her she was beaten and should sue to Germany not to punish her longer. It believed the present judgment of the Times might prove as fallible as had been her estimate of the military situation the month before. 1 In its disparagement of the French chance for success the Morning Post believed the Times was jumping at conclusions which the German commanders would be glad to arrive at, and found it " unbecoming of gentlemen sitting at their desks in London to put forth statements so unpleasant and so unfounded with regard to the military position of our quondam ally." 2 The Dublin Evening Mail may be considered as largely repre- sentative of Irish opinion when it expressed confidence that the Times would not be permitted to drag England into the quarrel by precipitating an impertinent and uncalled-for in- tervention. 3 She was not. The mysterious interviews came to noth- ing. Judy might urge grandiloquently that England " Step forth with stern but friendly mediation And earn the gratitude of every nation !" 1 Weekly Scotsman, Aug. 20, 1870. * Morning Post, Aug. 18, 1870. 3 Evening Mail, Aug. 17, 1870. The opposite opinion was expressed in its issue of Aug. 12. I44 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [144 But the painful rhyme remained unproductive. There wa3 no stepping forth, — only whispers so low and so discreet that at this far-off time one cannot give their import but only say that they existed. Already there was shadowed the dark reason that was to make mediation a thing so difficult no nation would aspire to press it openly, and peace a thing so dear that France might be expected to fight unto exhaustion. On the fifteenth of August, the day Benedetti set sail for Dover, an Irish paper commented on the proclamation of the Prussian King abolishing conscription in Alsace as fore- boding an intention to reannex that province. On succeed- ing days, British papers found matter for reflection in his ap- pointment of Prussian governors for Alsace and Lorraine. It was remarked by the Telegraph on the twentieth, that in the King's reply to a papal offer of mediation he had expressed a willingness for peace at whatever time guaran- tees would be given him against future attack from France. Even those papers that had most consistently supported Prussia showed alarm. " A province cannot nowadays be transferred when its inhabitants protest against the trans- fer," said the Times, and even if we could suppose the change formally made, it would undo all the benefits of peace. . . . The transfer of Alsace from France to Germany, were it possible, would violate the essential principle of respect for national sovereignty now universally acknowledged, and would be incompatible with the permanent maintenance of peace. 1 And the News expressed fear that if Alsace were granted Germany, that country, whose praise she had so lustily been singing, might grant a sop to French jealousy and pride at the expense of neutral territory. 2 If the principle of nation- 1 Times, Aug. 18, 1870. * Daily News, Aug. 18, 1870. j 45] THE DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE 145 ality launched by Napoleon was proving a boomerang for his undoing, the Draft Treaty, also, was showing remark- able dexterity in curving back to the detriment of Prussia. Britain speculated on devices that would provide security without too deeply wounding France. The Economist re- cords that a rumor was current at the beginning of the week to the effect that the Government favored the creation of Alsace and Lorraine into a neutral state, 1 — a sort of apple of discord to be equidistantly poised between the two com- petitors. Only fear was at the basis of the rumor, — fear of the thing even " Jupiter " named briefly and hesitatingly as being too dreadful for discussion. Sir Robert Morier, in a letter of the twenty-first, wrote that this contingency which was alarming England was one that he had long fore- seen. He proclaimed himself " heart and soul " with Ger- many, " but he was not blind to the danger of her taking over two provinces the inhabitants of which were more Gallic than the Gauls, because, being Germans, they could add a peculiarly Teutonic blatancy to their French character." 2 John Richard Green, though rejoicing at Prus- sian success as the victories of truth, right, and intelligence, was as vehement as Morier against any snatching at pro- vinces in the old style of Louis XIV. "The people of Alsace," he said, are French to the core. "Men are not cattle — even if they have the ill-luck to be Frenchmen." 3 Another historian, W. E. H. Lecky, while dutifully chorus- sing pleasure at victories that would " raise the moral level of civilization," expressed deep compassion for France, and especially for the peasants in the districts under invasion. 1 Economist, Aug. 27, 1870. * Morier to Stockmar, Darmstadt, Aug. 21, 1870, Memoirs of Sir Robert Morier, vol. ii, pp. 165-166. 3 Green to E. A. Freeman, Aug. 31, 1870, Letters of J. R. Green, pp. .259-261. I4 6 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [146 " I do not like Bismarck," he declared. " I think the bom- bardment of Strasburg was very bad, and that of Paris would be much worse. I am very anxious to see whether the Germans will prove moderate and magnanimous in peace." x From the editorial office of the Fortnightly, John Morley joined his voice in protesting against " anything like revindication of territory in Alsace or elsewhere in consolidated France," which, he believed, ought " to en- counter the most energetic protests from the entire public opinion of Europe." 2 So it was that the last of August found England watch- ing Prussian movements with more of interest, but some- thing less of sympathy than she had felt at the month's beginning. She could not so wholeheartedly applaud a war for the unification of Germany, were that war to re- sult, also, in a partial disintegration of France. There were, too, raisons de coeur for a change of sentiment. Statesmen, who had served a gay apprenticeship as care- less attaches in brilliant Paris; green grocers, who had stolen across the Channel for one blithe holiday; women, who cherished bits of gauze and lace, instinct with the beauty that is French, had pity for the bel royaume so grievously invaded. Undoubtedly, there existed in Eng- land strong sentiment against that territorial aggrandize^ ment which Granville, during his league making, had assured Prussia his Government was not concerned with. England knew nothing of the strictures that had been laid on her by that "gentlemen's agreement." Her Parliament had been prorogued on the eleventh without its mention, and the press was uninformed. The shift in opinion is the more creditable since it had 1 Elizabeth Lecky, Memoirs of IV. H. Lecky (N. Y., 1909), p. 86. 1 Fortnightly Revietv, Sept. 1, 1870, France and Germany, vol. xiv,. pp. 367-376. I47 ] THE DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE 147 nothing to do with the immediate value of the pound sterl- ing. By the second week in August, the unsteadiness fol- lowing the first great panic on war's declaration was well past. An unhealthy mania for speculation had diminished. Prices on the Stock Exchange were steady. The change implied that French success had been more dreaded than Prussian by the monied interests. Trade in coal and iron had received a direct impetus, and that in textiles was in- directly benefited because of the handicap imposed on rival manufacturers. Before the middle of the month the Bank of France suspended specie payment and the Bank of Eng- land was relieved of the strain of competition for the pre- cious metals. Both France and Prussia contracted great war loans to British advantage. 1 Only the tailors and certain clerks in City offices, who were suffering from an influx of German competitors had reasons economic for wishing well to France. 2 Temporary disturbances were, of course, to be looked for the week before Sedan. The stock markets were in a state of depression pending the result of the great battle, which it was believed would soon be fought. The stage was set for the last act of the " circus manager," and Eng- land watched in a tense hush of expectation. Even so, the disaster of September the second was so complete that the expectant were astounded. The news, published in the papers of the next morning, was that not only had the Em- peror surrendered, but an entire army of almost a hundred thousand men had been made prisoners of war. The capitulation was not confirmed for some days, and in Ire- land the newspaper offices were surrounded each night at dusk by crowds that waited for hours to read the hateful 1 Illustrated London News, Aug. 20, 1870; Spectator and Economist, Aug. 13, 1870; Annual Review, 1870, vol. cxii, p. 79. * Daily News, Aug. 31, 1870. I4 8 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [148 bulletins and tear them down, because their news con- tinued stubbornly unpleasant. Windows were smashed and the matter was made the subject of an editorial by Saun- ders'. 1 In London, wise and prudent Englishmen were either sympathetic or silent on the great victory ; but in more than one instance, notably at the entrance to the Alhambra be- fore the curtain went up for the evening's performance, a too freely declared admiration of the Prussians led to something like a melee. The Queen, always slow in her royal progress, had had no news, on the third, of the great battle, but presented her readers with full-page portraits of the King of Prussia and his defeated rival. The former wore his mustache curling up, like optimistic steers' horns ; the latter wore his with pointed ends down-drooping as badge of mourning for the calamity of the day before. As England gazed on Napoleon's enigmatic face with its theat- rical hirsute adornments, she saw that it was old and very weary. She believed the whirligig of time would never bring to him revenge. The papers were filled with pseudo mortuary notices that were read to the accompaniment of German bands that blared Die Wacht am Rhem trium- phantly. They chronicled his life's events; praised him for a friendliness to England that she had sometimes dis- regarded; recalled his endeavours to extend French trade, to increase her industry, and develop her agriculture, his efforts to promote international goodwill. Soon the poets were busy with him, — first the penny-a-liners who wrote on order for the press, and later the greater ones, Browning and Buchanan, who wrote more ably and for longer time. 2 Surely when the poets weave sonnets of a man's life the fates cease to find its thread of interest. 1 Sounders', Sept. 7, 1870. 2 Robert Browning, Prince Hohenstiel Schwangau, Saviour of Society, 149] THE DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE I4 q Scattered through the obituaries were some that were not complimentary. Once a Week described the Emperor as retiring to his sarcophagus, undismayed by the ruin he had brought on France, comforted by his eternal cigarette, his belief in fatalism, and the possession of a large fortune in English funds. It quoted the witty verse now popular with the Parisians: " Les deux Napoleons les gloires sont egales, Quoiqu' ayant pris les chemins inegaux ; L'un de l'Europe pris les capitales, L'autre au pays a prix les capitaux." 1 His personal wealth was denied by the Times, which did him the tardy justice to admit that, though for so long a period he had distributed the favors of the most splendid state in Europe, he had suffered little of her gold to cleave to his hands. 2 The ignominious end of this Caesar who as Fun had said, " ' cried Havoc, and let slip the dogs of war ' ' 3 was an excellent theme for the moralists, — some- thing to rattle the bones of all the old quotations gathering dust in editorial closets. The A r ews sermonized on vaulting ambition that o'erleaps itself and falls on the other side, and had a goodly following of imitators. 4 But the utterances of Polonius soon pall. If it may be permitted to turn the clock of public opinion slightly forward, more interest will Complete Poetical Works (N. Y., 1917), p. 907; Mrs. S. Orr, Robert Browning, Life and Letters (N. Y., 1891), pp. 425-426; W. Hall Griffin and H. C. Minchin, Life of Robert Browning (London, 1911), p. 244; Robert Buchanan, Complete Poetical Works (London, 1901), vol. i, Political Mystics, Songs of the Terrible Year, pp. 295-347, also a drama, Napoleon Fallen. 1 Once a Week, Sept. 17, 1870. * Times, Sept. 21, 1870; Economist, Oct. 22, 1870. 3 Fun, July 30, 1870. 4 Daily News, Sept. 3, 5, 1870. ! 5 q BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ 1 50 be found in the details of Napoleon's last days as Emperor that reached England somewhat later. Green was fortunate in having an account from the French historian, Gabriel Monod, who was serving with a French Protestant Ambulance at Roncourt, near Beaumont, when the French soldiers came pouring in, " weary, starved, mutinous." They had had no rations for two days, and plundered the fields for potatoes, and then flung them- selves down to sleep as best they might. The Imperial Staff came clattering down the street, with Napoleon, old, way-worn, covered with dust, pasty-pale, his moustache gray-white. All night long thousands came straggling in. At early morning the Emperor's horse was called for, and Monod saw the suite appear all spick and span in the midst of the mob of soldiery. Napoleon was painted to the eyes, his hair and moustache dyed and waxed again. Only one or two peasants cried out a viva for him, and they were answered by the grim looks and the curses of the soldiers. Some shouted " a bas l' assassin! " On his way to his horse, he passed a group of officers and made a low salute, but none responded. 1 Another vignette came from Archibald Forbes, who wrote for the Advertiser and the News. He describes Napoleon in front of the weaver's hut, where he had his interview with Bismarck and arranged for his surrender. A half troop of the Slesvig regiment of Life Guards formed a semicircle around the house, while the lieutenant and two of his dismounted men marched up to the cottage wall behind the Emperor's chair to halt and draw their swords. The Emperor flushed and glanced backward, as though he did not half like these German tactics. His barber told Forbes, — and the fact was confirmed by reports of the 1 Green to E. A. Freeman, Letters of J. R. Green, pp. 263 et seq. I S i] THE DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE j$i enemy, — that Napoleon had conducted himself worthily at Sedan, had directed guns with his own hand, and kept continually under fire. But he had found his army honey- combed with socialism, and desirous of a republic. Many regiments would not follow their officers. It was Wimp- ffen, not MacMahon, who had to make the surrender, for the latter had been wounded in an attempt to rally some of the disaffected. In Paris, there had been such vivas for the war and for himself, that he had chosen to avoid the main thoroughfares on his journeyings from St. Cloud to the Tuileries, the day before he had set forth. He thought he moved in the popular direction, that he would lead an army well equipped, eager for glory. 1 Count Bis- marck reported that Napoleon told him at the weaver's cot- tage that he never desired the war, that he was forced into it by his people. Again, and again, he repeated, " On ma trompc, on m'a trompc." 2 It is hard not to give him some dole of sympathy. Mixed warp and woof, Punch called him, 3 and it might seem from his early writings that fine ideas and good intentions might have won for him lasting honour, had not the old Napoleonic legend warped them hopelessly. " No one O'f the ex-royal- ties now scattered about the country is a less deserving sub- ject of sympathy and regret," said Froude in Fraser's.* But Froude's epitaphs have a way of getting themselves re- written by posterity. As the Spectator said, the Emperor had spent two- thirds of his life in dreaming of power and the remainder in exercising it to such poor purpose that he 1 Archibald Forbes, My Experience of the War between France and Germany, vol. i, pp. 253-254. 2 Blanchard Jerrold, At Home in Paris, vol. ii, p. 13. 3 Punch, Sept. 17, 1870. * Fraser's Magazine, Jan., 1870, Personal History of Imperialism in 1870. 1 52 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ i $ 2 had made all the mistakes he had inveighed against be- fore his succession. 1 Had the gods loved him and taken him away while he was yet Louis Napoleon, he would have been looked back upon as the most promising of prince pre- tenders. Circumstances alter personalities, and the British were, perhaps, saner in their judgment when they con- demned a system that made the fate of a nation depend on one man only, than when they croaked abuse of the " in- valid adventurer," the " Emperor of the despot brood." a and the " crowned colossal thing that crawls." 3 The best of epitaphs was spoken across the Channel by one of the officers of the army that was, in the appropri- ately inaccurate French of King William's note to Napo- leon, "si bravcment battue sur vous ordres." * It was the single sentence of an old officer, who flinging his head far back to inhale the fine air of the morning, exclaimed grate- fully, " One breathes better." 5 1 Spectator, Sept. io, 1870. 2 W. C. Bennett in Literary World, Sept. 16, 1870. * Rodien Noel, Sedan, St. Paul's Magazine, vol. viii, p. 162. * Graphic, Sept. 24, 1870. ' Spectator, Sept. 10, 1870. CHAPTER VIII The Reception of the Republic After the great victory of September, royal headquar- ters were established in the old cathedral city of Rheims, and for a week a pause was made while men asked them- selves whether the war was at an end. When the German soldiery had learned the Emperor was caught in the mouse trap of Sedan, there had broken out among them the wild- est exhibition of delight; for they believed his capture would end hostilities and make possible a return to their homes. It was remembered that the King had proclaimed that he did not war with the peace-loving people of France but their ruler, and their own anger had been stirred not against France but against the odious Minister of the Em- peror, M. Benedetti, who had insulted their aged King. They believed that France, too, was eager for the war to end. There remained the matter of an indemnity to be arranged, a treaty to be signed with the Empress Regent, or whomever the French might appoint their representative, the attaching of red seals and ribbons, and a gay return to their homes. 1 The spotlight must be shifted from an army that marked time and waited to a capital where civilians were about to take into their hands the command the Emperor had let slip. The officer whom he had appointed Adjutant General of 1 Archibald Forbes. My Experience of the War between France and Germany, vol. i, pp. 260-261 ; C. E. Ryan, With an Ambulance during the Franco-Prussian War, p. 362. 153] 153 ! 54 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ 1 54 the Palace before setting out on his campaign, had been impatient for more active service. Napoleon comforted him with the intimation that he would, perhaps, find greater danger at his post in Paris than on the field of battle. 1 On the morning of the fourth of September this General must have given the Emperor credit for his prescience. Sir Charles Dilke stood that day with Labouchere in front of the Grand Hotel on the Boulevard and watched the fall of Empire. He describes it for his grandmother. A battalion of fat National Guards from the centre of Paris, shop keepers all, marched firmly past, quietly grunting, " L' abdi- cation ! L'abdication !" They were soon followed by a battalion from the outskirts marching faster, and gaining on them to the cry of " Pas d'abdication ! La decheance! La decheance!" . . . We stood just in front of the cavalry, that was partly composed of mounted Gendarmerie of the Seine . . . and kept watching their faces to see whether they were likely to fire or charge, but at last the men began, one by one, to sheathe their swords, and to cry, " Vive la Republique!" and the Captain in command at last cried "Vive la Republique!" too, and withdrew his men, letting the crowd swarm over the bridge. The Revolution was accomplished. The Englishman joined those who went sweeping over the bridge and sing- ing the Marseillaise in such a chorus as had never been heard before. " They halted in front of the Chambers, and after ten minutes parley inside, the leaders returned, and chalked upon one of its great columns the names of the representatives of Paris declared to constitute the Pro- visional Government .... The crowd demanded the ad- dition of Rochefort's name, and it was added." After that he followed on to the statue of Strasburg that was decor- ated with flowers, in recognition of the gallant defence the city was still making, and then to the Tuileries. A Turco 1 Capt. the Hon. D. Bingham, Recollections of Paris, p. 164. I 5 5] THE RECEPTION OF THE REPUBLIC ^5 detained them at the gates by dancing in front of the crowd, but finally they grew impatient and insisted on entering the private gardens, so the gates were thrown open, and the crowd swept in, and up into the palace, and through each grand apartment. Nothing was touched, for guards had been stationed everywhere, and the people respected the power of the new Republic. It was all most satisfactory. "I would not have missed yesterday for the world," Sir Charles wrote to his grandmother. 1 In London the news of this rose-water revolution was received with equanimity and in many quarters with posi- tive rejoicing. It had been accomplished so pacifically that Fun seemed only bent on making a poor joke when she exclaimed, " Le roi est mort. Vive le row\" It was re- cognized that the word, republic, had a sort of talismanic charm for Frenchmen, — that only under this old-new gov- ernment could there be expected those prodigies of valour that must be performed if the Prussians were to be driven across the border. Whether or not the metaphysical meta- phor of the Observer was correct, in describing a dynasty in France as cut flowers that could be kept fresh only for a brief time by tender care, or whether, as the Tories believed, the change was only a transient one, men accepted it as a means to a welcome end. Gambetta and Jules Favre, said the Standard, naming two of those whose names Sir Charles Dilke had seen chalked up for the crowd to see, had heretofore done all they could to embarrass the Govern- ment in its moment of supreme emergency, but they had acceded to power under a pledge to carry out the national will and could be expected to accomplish all that was pos- 1 Gwynn and Tuckwell, Life of the Right Hon. Sir Chas. Dilke, vol. ii, pp. 109-110. Cf. Fleury, Memoirs of Empress Eugenie, vol. ii, pp. 427-428. 1 Observer, Sept. 17, 1870. I5 6 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [156 sible to expel the enemy from French territory. It ac- cepted, therefore, a Government that even the staunchest Imperialists supported as the best, "if only a provisional substitute" for the Empire. It was noted, too-, by admirers of the exiled prince pretenders, that General Trochu, the President, was an Orleanist and, though patriotically em- bracing every means at hand to free France from her dif- ficulties, might be expected, in time, to revert to his former principles. 1 The Globe, indeed, believed it impossible for a Republic to last in France, since the theory of equal dis- tribution of citizenship and distinction was impracticable in a country where the individual appetite for honours was peculiarly keen. 2 In Ireland the Nation, disgruntled at the overthrow of Empire, denied that the de facto Government was representative of the wishes of the French people, though it could expect their support so long as it devoted itself to repelling invasion. 3 The Cosmopolitan, taking the unique position of denying efficacy as well as longevity to the new Government, prophesied that Jules Favre would shortly have to yield to Prussia the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine and a hundred millions sterling for indemnitv. "Then," it gloated, "his little mushroom Paris Republic will collapse like a bubble of fetid gas, and the red ring of Jacobites, by which M. Favre is surrounded will ' make themselves air' like Macbeth's fiends and vanish into en- veloping night — into the contempt of history." 4 But the Times held that Favre and his fellows had sub- stantial claims for respect in view of their past services, and hoped their way might be made easy. 5 The Telegraph 1 Standard, Sept. 6, 1870. * Globe, Sept. 9, 1870. 3 Issue of Sept. 19, 1870. 4 Ibid. * Times, Sept. 5, 1870. 157] T HE RECEPTION OF THE REPUBLIC icy lauded them for "high mental gifts, rich culture, and spot- less reputation," — excepting only Rochefort as a represen- tative of " rowdyism," and justifying even his election be- cause of the suffering entailed by his high courage. 1 That the members of the Government were almost all representatives of Paris was considered not inappropriate since the defence of the capital was the great military prob- lem they would be called to solve. The fact that they described themselves as a Government of National De- fence, rather than as a Committee of Safety, was believed an indication that they would use their powers moderately and in the interest of all France. Jules Favre, Gambetta, and Rochefort were a guarantee for the great towns. The large military command which the Emperor had, perforce, kept in the south to ensure its loyalty could now be directed against the enemy. 2 Trochu, it was said, in four days had been able to assemble an army from the remotest corners of France and place them in Paris, drilled, armed, equip- ped, and ready for the fray. 3 " King William has yet a good deal of fighting before him," observed the Globe. 41 Sir Edmund Blount wrote that the Garde Nationale and the Garde Mobile were admirable — far superior in appear- ance to the regular troops that had gone to meet the Prus- sians — well behaved, quiet, without drunkenness, and pos- sessed of that spirit of obedience the other army had utterly lacked. 5 But those who gave the new Government the sincerest welcome were those who believed its value was inherent in itself and not simply contingent on its efficacy in expelling 1 Daily Telegraph, Sept. 6, 1870. ' Manchester Guardian, Sept. 7, 1870 ; Pall Mall Gazette, Sept. 7, 1870. * Vanity Fair, Sept. 17, 1870. * Globe and Traveller, Sept. 5, 1870. * Memoirs of Sir Edmund Blount, diary entry of Sept. 13, 1870. j 58 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ 1 58 the invading Prussians. They were men to whom a re- public, no matter by whom, or of whom constituted, was the symbol of a glorious freedom — men like Swinburne, who set himself the task of writing a lengthy ode in praise of its nativity — and that larger class to whom an abstrac- tion was moonshine, but who suffered under the realities of an imperialistic "queendom" and looked across the waters for a beacon to guide them to a safer mooring. Louis Blanc had told them what great things the Republic oi '48 had planned to accomplish. He was gone back to his own country now and many letters followed him to tell of the change of feeling taking place for France. To Charles Bradlaugh the new Republic was a young giant from whom could be expected not only the salvation of France but such social reforms as would benefit the world. With a florid fervor equalling Gambetta's he begged that the people of all nations stretch out the hand of fellowship to the " thrice-risen child of Freedom." 1 Henceforth his journal, the National Reformer, that had used its lash against a dynastic war waged by the Empire, was pledged to aid the French Republic in defence of its territories. Much interest was felt in the first steps of a new Gov- ernment of which such diverse things were said. It was believed it might win for itself allies where the Empire had failed. A pronouncement was waited for on Italy. The men risen to present power were those who had con- sistently protested against the French occupation. Would they now repudiate the annexation of Nice and Savoy and promise to leave Rome in the unmolested possession of the Italians? M. Jules Favre and his colleagues did nothing to gain an alliance that the Telegraph thought was the only one they might secure. 2 It was suggested by wide-spread- 1 National Reformer, Sept. 11, 1870. 2 Daily Telegraph, Sept. 16, 1870. I59 ] THE RECEPTION OF THE REPUBLIC I gn ing England that the new Government might signify its change of characer by abandoning Algiers, an extravagant piece of folly that France must see diverted from her as- sistance many soldiers that she sorely needed. But General Trochu and his colleagues recognized their powers as provisional and outside of an indiscreet flourish addressed to Spain about the fine things in store for the Latin race, were content to take account solely of the business in hand. 1 They were no innovators but the delegates of a hard-pressed nation. On the sixth of September, M. Jules Favre, in his capac- ity as Minister of Foreign Affairs, issued a circular which clearly defined the war, the great pivot on which the fortune and future career of France must turn. It attempted to throw the onus of its disastrous declaration on the defunct Empire, and for itself utterly disavowed any intention of conquest. At the same time it startled England and Ger- many by expressing a rigid determination not to cede an inch of territory nor yield a stone of fortress to hasten the making of peace. Its vehemence in this regard was disap- proved by the Globe, 2 which wished the Provisional Govern- ment rather to take the lead toward preparing France for sacrifices than to nerve her to firm resistance. It was con- demned also by the Times and Nezus, 3, that still antagonistic to French policies, derided this simultaneous proclamation of a desire for peace and a resolution not to budge a step to get it. They believed, as did also the Post, 4 that France was so confident that the changed character of the war would bring intervention that she thought she could be careless as to whether or not her stubbornness might complicate the 1 Daily Nezcs, Sept. 13, 1870. 2 Issue of Sept. 8, 1870. •Ibid. 4 Morning Post, Guardian, issues of Sept. 10, 1870. 160 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [^o efforts of the neutrals. In spite of the sympathy felt for her, such a ne plus ultra, the Guardian believed, would deter France from gaining any ally, save only that of a wide- spread, engulfing social disorder. It feared the Radical leaders were willing to invoke international revolution. Favre, himself, it acquitted of conscious complicity in such malicious endeavors, though it deprecated the pos- sible effect of his circular. 1 He was believed to be, as Lord Lyons said, really patriotic, but too much the slave of sentiment to be a good diplomatist or a skilful negotiator. However, the Guardian's suggestion is interesting and worth looking into. - On September the fifth the Central Committee of the Socialist Democratic Party issued a manifesto protesting against the annexation of Alsace Lorraine. It declared that " in the interest of peace and liberty, in the interest of Western Civilization, the German workmen would not patiently tolerate the annexation of these two provinces, but would faithfully stand by their fellow workmen in all countries for the common international cause of the Pro- letariat." 3 As a demonstration of counter opinion, large meetings of the most influential men of Prussia had been held to urge the King to exact such guarantees as would give security for the future conduct of France and the unity of the entire German people. 4 The Manifesto, taking note of these activities, said they were stage-managed to create the impression that the pious King was coerced by the ir- resistible behest of the German nation to abandon his pledge 1 Morning Post, Guardian, issues of Sept. 10, 1870. 2 Lyons to Granville, Sept. 12, 1870, Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Gran- ville, vol. ii, p. 55. 1 The General Council of the International Working Men's Associa- tion on the War (London, 1870), p. 96; London Graphic, Sept. 10, 1870. i Manchester Guardian, Sept. 1, 1870. ;[6i] THE RECEPTION OF THE REPUBLIC t6i to war only on the soldiers of the Empire. Bismarck well knew there were social and political malcontents in Ger- many as there were in France. His policy was to silence them by repression rather than coddle them by concessions. In Frankfort the war had not been received with enthus- iasm, for many of its inhabitants hated Prussia and be- lieved victory would make her doubly autocratic. Business there was at a standstill. Many great houses had failed and there was no work for the artisans. 1 The army had shown an alarming willingness to cry quits at the down- fall of the Empire. Early in September the Volkes Zeitung won friends by its plea for peace. A republic in France had precedent for liberating and synthesizing all the dis- content within the boundaries of its neighbors. " What I most fear," it was reported Bismarck told a British attache, " is the effect of a republic in France upon Ger- many itself. That is what the King and I most fear, for no one knows so well as we do what has been the influence of American republicanism in Germany." 2 Bismarck was prepared to fight an enemy in front and resolved to pre- vent the appearance of an enemy in the rear. The men who had signed the Manifesto, and even those who had printed it, were arrested very promptly and sent to Liitzen in East Germany. Their detention roused no great pro- test in England. The Reformer had printed the appeal in letters half an inch thick, and this of itself had been enough to invest it with frightfulness in the mind of the average Britisher. a Of the widely read journals only the 1 Corvin, Germany under War; Temple Bar, vol. xxx, p. 277. 2 Manchester Guardian, Sept. 26, 1870. The interview with Mr. Malet was reported first by the Daily Nezcs. Later Bismarck denied that he had made the statements ascribed to him. Cf. Manchester Guardian, Oct. 8, 1870. s Cf. London Graphic, Sept. 24, 1870. l6 2 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [162 Spectator dared to praise the German workmen for their advocacy of " honorable and reasonable political meas- ures." 1 But when in continuation of the policy of repres- sion, Dr. Jacoby was arrested at Konigsberg for speaking against the territorial annexations, the British roused them- selves. They protested against the imprisonment of an elderly "philosopher-democrat," who, it was felt, was the very honorable representative of opinions that, though they lost caste when espoused by certain of the German workmen, were, none the less, shared by the majority of Europe. Said the Telegraph, " The admission that he (Bismarck) fears the spirit which he has gagged in the person of Dr. Jacoby justifies the warning that in trampling on the honor of France and violating the right of the conquered provin- ces to be consulted, he may be setting a brand upon his own success and making democracy strong by identifying it with morality, restitution, and lasting peace." 2 The Manchester Guardian condemned not only the deed but the method of its execution which it called the exercise of an instrument substantially equivalent to the lettres de cachet of the agents of divine right. 3 The Court Journal re^ ported the rumour that many more were marked men on the Chancellor's list. For the British to advise Count Otho von Bismarck Schoenhausen at this time in the interest of free speech would have been, as was recognized, something like advising a Nasmyth steam-hammer while it was fall- ing. But when other refractory papers showed themselves uninfluenced by the punishment meted out to the Frank- fort Journal for its protest in favor of the sturdy old Radical, and especially when the Cologne Gazette, influen- tial in its own Rhineland provinces and in Prussia and 1 Spectator, Sept. 17, 1870. * Telegraph, Sept. 24, 1870. s Manchester Guardian, Sept. 26, 1870. 363] THE RECEPTION OF THE REPUBLIC 163 South Germany as well, offered opposition, the Chancellor realized that attempts to muzzle the press were impractic- able. His failure caused him to lose something af his ex- cellent sang froid, and to express strong opinions on this lack of support. 1 After a month of punishment he re- leased Professor Jacoby and all others accused of like offense, with the exception of some Socialists. The) British hoped their criticism had influenced him in this, but the Globe and the Spectator believed it was due rather to the dissatisfaction expressed by the Liberals, especially in South Germany. 2 Orders were given that no more political arrests be made and that political meetings be per- mitted. Bismarck had no sympathy with the German ad- mirers of the Government of the "gentlemen of the pavement," but he believed he could afford generosity since the object of their praise would be short-lived. In Metz there was a great army under the staunch Imperialist, Bazaine, who had made no intimation that he had accepted a change of masters. The Republic had gained no allies. It had not even received recognition from the great monar- chical nations of Europe. Even in France its legality was dubious for it had had no popular confirmation. The ple- biscite, so signally demonstrating the confidence of France in its Emperor, remained the last recorded expression of public opinion. Furthermore, previous republican govern- ments had been of short duration, and had occasioned such disturbance in Europe that they had left a legacy of dread. This one's defiance, certainly, had done nothing to ingratiate it with its enemy, and Bismarck knew it had small chance of making good its boast. When the time should come for a humiliating peace to be signed, could it be expected that France, France of the provinces, would tamely accept this! 1 Court Journal, Oct. 8, 1870; Daily News, Oct. 14, 1870. 1 Issues of Oct. 2j and Oct. 29, 1870, respectively. !64 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [164 Paris-born Republic and give to it, and to its treaty, the ratification of a silent consent? However helpful the Gov- ernment might be to Prussia, temporarily, by its repellant influence on the neutrals, and by the potentialities it might have of dividing France against itself, it was expedient that when the time for peace should come, there should be men at the helm of a different character from Favre and Roche- fort. Prussia once before, conjointly with the other Powers, had reimposed a dynasty on France to give security to a hard treaty. Bismarck now held as his prisoner an Emperor, who cherished great ambitions for his son. Per- haps this new eaglet could be taught to fly as Prussia listed and be tethered so strictly by strong obligations that his flight would be always within the zone of Prussian influ- ence. The father, then, was treated with Imperial honors. On his surrender, Count Bismarck's phrase, " Sire, I re- ceive you as I would my own Royal Master," was quoted, and not with favour, among the Prussian soldiery. He was assigned the magnificent castle of Wilhelmshohe as resid- ence, and Queen Augusta was deprived of one of her finest chefs that his kitchen might be under proper governance. A member of the North German Parliament drew atten- tion to the gilded captivity of the third Napoleon and com- plained that it foreboded his reinstatement as sovereign of France. He was prosecuted and sentenced to a two months' imprisonment. 1 The Empress and the Prince Im- perial were fugitives in England. There began to be cir- culated, soon after their arrival, a penny sheet called " La Situation " that strongly urged a restoration. 2 It could not 1 The article was written by Dr. Hirsch, the editor of Gewerkverein, in which journal it appeared. Daily News, Nov. 7, 1870. Cf. Sept. letters of Berlin correspondent of Daily Telegraph; Manchester Guar- dian, Sept. 14, 1870; Newcastle Daily Chronicle, Sept. 14, 1870; Graphic, Sept. 17, 1870. 2 Literary World, Sept. 30, 1870. 165] THE RECEPTION OF THE REPUBLIC 165 be established that it drew its inspiration from Eugenie's quiet residence at Chislehurst. She did not make it the organ o>f her communications to the British, and at least on one occasion, its statements so displeased her that she made use of space in the Times to refute them. The Duke of Cambridge, who called on her, found her low and sub- dued — looking sixty years old. He believed it would be the Orleanists who would have the next turn on the throne of France. 1 The British were lavish in her praise. They recalled her courtesy to English visitors to her capital, the profusion of her charities, her bravery in visiting the sick and dying during the days of the cholera. But they regarded her, none the less, as the butterfly ruler of a holiday France, now broken on the wheel of fortune, 2 — not as the regent of a dynasty that had not yet signed away its claims, an Em- press regent, who might plot dangerously for the elevation of her son. Huxley praised her for her nobility and dignity. But she was no> Roland, no Corday, he said, — 1 " only a second-rate Marie Antoinette." 3 British journals might still describe the lightest bow and frailest ruffle of her costumes with ponderous minutiae, but it was only the Queen of Fashion that they meant to honor. Let King 1 William shout " Vive V Etnpereur ! " as much as he pleased, no one but Bismarck would echo the cry, said the British papers. No Englishman would test his accent with the phrase. That class in England most hostile to a restoration and the territorial cession which it was felt would surely ac- company it, was the same that opposed Count Bismarck' si 1 Lord Carlingford to Lear, Oct. 19, 1870, Later Letters of Edward Lear, p. 126. 2 Daily Telegraph, Sept. 12, Oct. 29, 1870; London Society, Nov., 1870. 3 Life and Letters of Thos. H. Huxley (edited by J. W. Harding, N. Y., 1896), vol. i, p. 361. j66 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [166 plans in Germany. The Spectator called it with courteous deference, "the operative class." 1 The first meeting of republican working men, called together after the establish- ment of the Provisional Government, was held in Arundel Hall, in the Strand, on the seventh of September. Its pur- pose was nonpartisan : the organization of a movement in favor of " reestablishing peace in the present crisis, and of procuring arbitration in place of war generally." But, in spite of remonstrances from the presiding officer, George Odger and others made it the occasion for declaring their sympathies with France. 2 Two nights later, after the cir- cular of Jules Favre had been read and considered, a meet- ing at St. James's Hall, held under the same presidency, was permitted to pass resolutions expressing a welcome to the French Republic and the hope that, since the cause of hostilities had been removed, the German army would discontinue its march on Paris, and England would exert herself to smooth the way for peace. 3 The resolutions and the speeches urging them were cri- ticized by the press as indiscreet and unnecessary. The News contended that wars are made between nations, not between their governments, — on which false assumption the resolutions had seemed to base themselves. On the other hand, it pointed out that there was not in France any power with which a foreign Government could safely negotiate a treaty. 4 A strange doctrine, truly, for if the power of a nation extends to the making of war, when the desire of war ceases, should it not be able to make peace, even though in giving expression to its desire it find it necessary to over- turn the existing Government? It would seem to be a way 1 Spectator, Sept. 10, 1870. 3 Pall Mall Gazette, Sept. 8, 1870. * Times, Sept. 10, 1870. * Daily News, Sept. 12, 1870. 167] THE RECEPTION OF THE REPUBLIC rfy of saying. "You may do what you want if you want to make war, and you will be held accountable for it; but if you want to make peace you must do what your Govern- ment wants, and you must bear the burden of its decision." The Morning Post expressed regret that the democracy of London seemed incapable of understanding the events that were passing before their eyes. 1 Surely, the writers of the leaders in London's greatest dailies did little to help them. On the day following the meeting in St. James's Hall the London Democracy held a demonstration in Hyde Park at which it was resolved that the address of Mr. Odger be sent to Jules Favre, and the British Government was urged to recognize the French Republic and to insist on an armistice for the arranging of peace by impartial arbitra- tion. 2 Sixty thousand addresses condemning the continu- ance of war had been sent throughout the country to the centres of the working classes, and when Odger sailed from Dover, personally to deliver his resolutions to Favre, 3 sim- ilar resolutions were already on the way from Birmingham and other districts where the " operatives " abounded. The succeeding meetings of September are too numerous to chronicle, but characteristic of all of them was sympathy for France ; the wish that England intervene, either through mediation or a defensive alliance; and a grandiose desire to put an end to war for all time by some system of in- ternational arbitration. The vehemence with which the resolutions were proposed, and the willingness that was shown in many instances to plunge England into present war to ensure a stable peace suggest, somewhat, the amaz- ing antics of a child that is overjoyed with a new toy but 1 Morning Post, Sept. 12, 1870. * Times, Sept. 12, 1870; Spectator, Sept. 12, 1870; Illustrated London News, Sept. 17, 1870. 8 Times, Sept. 22, 1870; Punch, Sept. 24, 1870. j68 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [168 plays with it after the old manner — sticks its rattle in its mouth, so to speak. May it be observed that these meet- ings, even though they numbered among the audience not only workingmen, but Liberals and Comtists of the white- shirted upper class as well, were regarded as of about as much consequence as the above mentioned performance? There was, albeit, less of tolerance in England's attitude. The Manchester Guardian said of the Democrats that they were utterly without influence except in the negative sense, — t that the majority of the nation generally began to feel afraid it had been misled if, by chance, it found its opinion in any political question agreeing with that of the Demo- crats. 1 And when the Irish Nationalists, who shared their unpopularity, began to hold simultaneous demonstrations with them in Hyde Park, sympathy for France in some quarters, at least, received a considerable check. There crept in a fear that these meetings, where the Marseillaise was sung, and republicanism extolled, where international amity was discussed by men of many races, were un- English, — that Jules Favre, in receiving the resolutions and welcoming George Odger was trafficking with hostile forces. A great bond of friendship between nations, as between men, is a mutual enemy. And so, Bismarck, op- posing a bulwark of blood and iron to strange new forces, which the Republic seemed to foster, appeared hallowed in a benevolent nimbus. It is hope-inspiring that the derisive press reports of the working men's meetings and the diverse theories bodied into resolutions did not blind many eminent men to the value and sincerity of their expressions of sympathy for France. If Mr. Bradlaugh offended by his abuse of the "God protected William of Prussia" there were Professor Beesly and Sir Henry Hoare to give the 1 Manchester Guardian, Sept. 20, 1870. !69] THE RECEPTION OF THE REPUBLIC 169 meetings dignity. Best of all there was honest John Mor- ley to use the Fortnightly for their defense. In September he was writing : The attitude of the workingmen toward the fallen country in the bitter hour of expiation attests a large and compassionate human- ity that contrasts instructively with the crawling prudence of that organ of the English press, which after having played pander to the Empire of stock jobbers for eighteen years, at the first moment of reverse swiftly turns about, asks who is going to call for abdi- cation, and then by a crowning stroke eagerly anticipates demands which the German Government had not made, waits for no ulti- matum, prays for no moderation in the conqueror, and in the overflowing of its officious baseness urges France to come to terms with her adversary as speedily as she can, " even though these terms include the loss of Alsace, Metz and a strip of Lorraine." Once more the generosity and spirit of a nation, not inferior to any other in either, are hidden behind the ignoble words and grovelling ideas of a little clique of journalistic shadows. 1 It was the leaven of men of known worth and ability that won some consideration for the many who coupled sage de- sires capable of present fulfillment with fantasic hopes doomed to long disappointment. For one thing, the work- men wanted official recognition of the French Republic. The densely crowded meeting held on the twenty-fourth in St. James's Great Hall had petitioned the Government for this. 2 It was demanded next day by a more radical meet- ing in Hyde Park. 3 On September the twenty-seventh the representatives of the Trade Societies of London waited on the Premier to address him on the matter. The Man- chester Guardian thought the attitude illogical because the French, themselves, by deferring the conclusion of a settle- ment with Prussia until their position had been ratified, 1 Fortnightly Review, vol. xiv, pp. 479-488. 2 Manchester Guardian, Sept. 27, 1870. s Times, Sept. 27, 1870. j j BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ 1 70 acknowledged the Republic's provisional character. The de- facto Government already was given practical recognition. Until such time as it should become formal, anyhing further would be inappropriate. 1 John Richard Green was very doubtful if that day would come. If the Republic showed itself favorable to the alienation of French territory, it could not stand a day, if it did not, it made way, in his opinion, for the "most frightful jacquerie the world has ever seen." John Stuart Mill believed a Government which had the obedience 1 of all the country not occupied by foreign troops should be accorded an official recognition "as de facto." 3 The Daily News, which early in the month had struck out boldly for a recognition that would make amends for England's condonation of a former coup d'etat, now showed repentance for its rashness. 4 It was not to be expected that the Times, regarding with equanimity, as it did, the possibility of a Prussian entrance into Paris as preferable to an excess of republicanism, should join in the petitions for recognition addressed to the Prime Minister. 5 It was a matter for wonder that Glad- stone received the delegates of the Trades Societies at all. He was believed to have shown himself both gracious and sagacious when, after hearing them, he explained that Eng- land could not recognize a Government not yet officially sanc- tioned in France, but would lose no time in following that country's example when she did accept it. He went further. He intimated the representations the deputation 1 Manchester Guardian, Sept. 27, 1870. * Green to E. A. Freeman, Sept. 5, 1870, Letters of John Richard Green, pp. 261-262. 3 Mill and Helen Taylor to Sir Chas. Dilke, Sept. 30, 1870, Letters of John Stuart Mill, vol. ii, p. 273. * Cf. editorials in News for Sept. 6 and Sept. 12, 1870, on this subject. * Times, Sept. 27, 1870. 171 ] THE RECEPTION OF THE REPUBLIC iyi made in regard to the cession of Alsace and Lorraine were not antithetic to his own feelings in the matter. 1 The work- men were but little better satisfied with the conduct of the Government after Gladstone's explanation. Their protests and demonstrations continued. They could not know what had been done already in the interest of peace. Ourselves live later to the advantage of our knowledge. For fifty years make even the walls of Chancelleries grow thin. We shall listen as best we may, and perhaps we shall find that the Government had done something more to overcome the difficulties of peacemaking than the orators of Trafalgar Square believed. And if France had to content herself with the mild endeavours we are about to study instead of the one ally of social revolution that the creation of the Republic made possible to her, it is fair to assume that her own conduct together with Bismarck's belated wisdom in releasing political prisoners and restoring comparative free- dom to the press, and the British practice of permitting freedom of speech to all and sundry, prevented a precipi- tation of that bouleversement whose end none can foresee. 1 Morning Post, Daily News, and Manchester Examiner of Sept. 28, 1870, endorse Gladstone's attitude; Globe of same date describes it as ambiguous. Illustrated London News is most captious toward the personnel and purpose of committee. CHAPTER IX Abortive Peace Negotiations HOME AND FOREIGN NEWS Thursday — Mr. Gladstone bought a pair of slippers. Friday — Immense slaughter of French and Germans before Sedan. Saturday — Mr. Cardwell went out shooting. Sunday — The Emperor of France abdicated and surrendered to the King of Prussia. Monday — The President of the Board of Trade passed a good night. Tuesday — The Empress having quitted Paris, a Republic was inaugurated. Wednesday — The Home Secretary had a tea-party, and the Prus- sians are still marching on Paris. 1 Judy's chronicle for the week epitomizes the September attitude toward a Manchester Ministry off on a holiday while the Continent flamed with war. A correspondent of the Times thought the matter was more reprehensible if it were true, as reported, that the Cabinet had made an ar- rangement with other Powers not to join in the struggle without mutual explanation. 2 Was it to be expected, asked Pall Mall, that for the convenience of the upper classes, the whole world of nations would be good enough to fall into a state of suspended animation until the Upper Ten Thous- and had spent their holidays and were disposed to return to work? 3 The members of the Government were vari- 1 Judy, Sept. 21, 1870. 2 " Spectator " to Tivt-es, Sept. 7, 1870. 3 Pall Mall Gazette, Sept. 7, 1870. 172 [172 I73 ] ABORTIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 173 ously described as striding after grouse over the breezy Scottish moors and picking up shells upon the beach at Walmer. The Queen herself was not immune from criti- cism. She was at the furthest extremity of her kingdom so that every despatch coming to London had to travel an additional three days before it could gain her considera- tion. The Economist was for permitting the Premier to sign documents in the Sovereign's name whenever the flag was not flying over the royal residences at Windsor or Lon- don. 1 But it was the activities of the Prime Minister that were held up for special derision. " Napoleon III," said the Globe, declares war against Prussia, and as a counter demonstration Mr. Gladstone commends to the amusement of the British Senate the astonishing capabilities of his favorite ballot toy. The cannon began to boom — the box began to rattle. Since then a dynasty has been wrecked ; the keel of a Republic laid ; a huge fast-rolling wave is threatening to suck into its vortex the ruins of an invaded capital. But the sublime equilibrium of the Premier's nature is not even now disturbed. . . . He brings his equable frame of mind to the undivided study of the Workingmen's International Exhibition, and discriminatingly analyzes its curious subtilties, its dainty refinements, its airy monuments of artistic triumph, its deli- cate guarantees of a continuance of industry — promoting peace, which of course we shall always enjoy." 2 The English in Paris were extremely excited by the inac- tivity oif their Government. " What is Lord Granville doing?" wrote Sir Edmund Blount to a friend at home. " Does he think that the majority of the English nation will ever pardon a Government which shows culpable apathy at such a time? " 3 The Globe believed his lordship was setting 1 Economist, Aug. 27, 1870. 2 Globe, Sept. 9, 1870. ' Memoirs of Sir Edmund Blount, p. 173. 174 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [174 an example in his own person of the role of neutrality and nullity he wished his country to adopt. 1 The shades of Palmerston and Canning were invoked to point the way to action. 2 The more taciturn and preoccupied the Minister appeared, the greater were the efforts to rouse him with warnings. It was urged that the downfall of the Empire was the psychological moment for the tendering of good offices. The sins of Napoleon should not be visited on the young Republic, the struggle should not be allowed to be- come a people's war. In all contention, said the News, there comes a time when events unmistakably indicate the road to peace. At such a time a Neutral may interpose with such deliberate but decided use of her moral authority as may prepare the way for peace. It hoped Lord Gran- ville might now find his opportunity. 3 But the Govern- ment was admitted to be at a striking disadvantage because it could not give force to a remonstrance by that reserve of strength which in times past had heartened British courage. It would take more than the generous subsidy that Parlia- ment could be relied upon to grant to render efficient those defences, which the Globe thought had been criminally neglected in the interests of a false economy.* The great claims intimated before Sedan in the pourparlers carried on with the Bishop of Strasburg and now widely bruited in the Prussian press gave little hope that any mere note carry- ing would prove beneficent. 5 Morier believed from infor- mation gained in Germany, that, if the Neutrals opposed the cession of Alsace and Lorraine, Prussia was prepared to 1 Sept. 7, 1870. * Examiner and London Review, Sept. 3, 1870. 3 Daily News, Sept. 10, 1870; Standard, Sept. 5 and 12, 1870; Oxford Graduate, Inside Paris during the Siege (London, 1871), pp. 75"76. 4 Globe, Sept. 7, 1870 ; Punch, Sept. 10, 1870. * Daily Telegraph, Sept. 27, 1870. !75] ABORTIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 175 disregard the neutrality of Belgium and offer part of it to France to win her to complaisance. 1 But it is nowhere intimated that such a possibility proved a bogey to Lord Granville. It was rather the absolute divergence of the views of the belligerents than the fear of a further unscrupu- lous agreement that retarded his efforts at peace-making. 3 On September the tenth, the day after France was forced to surrender Laon, Tissot, who had succeeded Lavalette as the French representative in London, informed Granville that several Powers (probably Austria, Italy and Spain) sympathized with the French desire for an honorable peace and asked that the English join with them to arrange for the signature of an armistice. He reiterated the determina- tion, already expressed in the Favre circular, to maintain the integrity of France even if such a resolution led to a war a outrance. 3 Notice of the endeavours of these Neutrals was already on the way to Bismarck in a letter from his good friend and former school-fellow, John Loth- rop Motley, then Ambassador to England from the United States. The letter was a very amiable and quite ex officio communication which informed Count Bismarck that from frequent, confidential, and earnest conversations with those most interested and influential in British affairs, the writer was aware that great pressure was being put upon the Government by the other considerable Powers in favor of some kind of intervention, mediation, or joint expression of opinion as to the terms of peace. Hitherto, England had resisted these invitations and suggestions, but in doing so she had laid herself open to the charge of being an obstruc- 1 Memoirs of Hon. Sir Robert Morier, vol. ii, pp. 179-180. 2 Morley, Life of Gladstone, vol. ii, p. 357 ; Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville, vol. ii, p. 48; Pall Mall Gazette, Sept. 12, 1870; Times, Sept. 12, 1870. 3 British State Papers, Foreign Office, vol. lxxi, p. 58. I7 6 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [176 tive and a laggard. In view of these matters, he believed it his duty, as a sincere friend of Prussia, to suggest that the "more moderate the terms on the part of the conqueror at this supreme moment, the greater would be the confidence inspired for the future, and the more sincere the founda- tion of a durable peace." The Prussian Chancellor an- notated this " sacredly confidential communication " with the words, " damn confidence," and filed it away. 1 Neither he nor his Sovereign was perturbed at the suggestion that England was to be budged from her neutrality by Powers that were too timid themselves to take the lead. King Wil- liam, at the time of the confiscation of the property of the Queen's cousin of Hanover, had said that England had forgotten the days of Pitt and become the very humble servant of the economists of Manchester, of Gladstone, and of Cobden and his disciples. 2 There was no reason to believe that she was minded to change her policies. Prussia, too, was resolved to continue on in her course, and rejoiced that the anomalous position of the French Govern- ment made it appear less devious. Von Bernstorff was instructed to inform Lord Gran- ville that, though Prussia held herself in readiness to meet every overture of the Queen, she could not regard the pro- posals of the existing Government in France with such consideration as she would give to one that had been ac- cepted by the French people. 3 The captive Emperor was still to Foreign Powers the bearer of the sovereignty. Prussia asked what guarantee would be given for the re- 1 Motley to Bismarck, Sept. 9, 1870, John Lothrop Motley and his Family (edited by his daughter and H. St. John Mild-may, London, igio), pp. 288 et seq. - King of Prussia in conversation with Comte de Boeswerk, A. Dumas, La Terreur Prussienne (Paris, 1872), p. 54. 3 Telegram of Bismarck to Bernstorff, Sept. 12, 1870, Brit. State Papers, vol. lxxi, p. 83. I7 7] ABORTIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 177 cognition of possible peace terms by the present Government of France, or any that might follow it. Diplomatically speaking, this statement was masterly. It offered in a most courteous way an assurance to the Provisional Government that it would be accorded recognition at a proper price. It apprized England that she would be violating the bounds of propriety if she too closely pressed on Prussia the soli- citations of a Government from which she herself withheld formal recognition. If England unduly urged Bismarck to negotiate with a de facto Government, — the durability of which he avowedly doubted, would she not, in a way, be undertaking to underwrite for Prussia's security the forth- coming treaty? The dual character of a sovereign, a vexatious matter that had appeared in the dispute over the Hohenzollern candidature, now reappeared in the prob- lem of the status of the captive Napoleon. He had sur- rendered, not abdicated. Moreover, the surrender was one of his person and involved neither his imperial power, which he had delegated to the Empress, nor his military command, which he had resigned to MacMahon. But the restoration of the Imperial family under German protection would be bitterly resented by public opinion in England, as Granville well knew. He wrote to his chief that he did not think the Cabinet could with propriety receive the com- munication of such an idea from Prussia without record- ing its objections. 1 Since nothing but the realization of a contretemps had been gained by dispatches, the French welcomed the sug- gestion of the veteran diplomatist, M. Thiers, that he go to England and then to other countries to plead the cause of the last of the many Governments to which he had given allegiance. And so while the Conservative journals were 1 Granville to Gladstone, Sept. 16, 1870, Fitzmaurice, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 49-51 ; Fleury, Memoirs of Empress Eugenic, vol. ii, pp. 525-526. I7 8 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ijg urging on England mediation, even to the point of forcing consideration for her pacific intentions by dint of arms, and their Liberal opponents were representing that her part was rather to soothe French susceptibilities on the matter of an inevitable loss of territory, a new attack on the policy of passivity was launched from across the Channel. M. Thiers was preceded by an agent sent to pave the way for him. This precursor reported on his return that for Glad- stone and Granville France as a nation no longer existed. " They were polite," he said sadly, " but seemed to think we were blotted from the map of Europe." x He seems not to have been made aware that Thiers, in spite of his long practice in diplomacy, was, perhaps, not the most appro- priate man for France to send on an important mission. His part in doing to death a former republic certainly would not make him persona grata with the eager friends of France that met in St. James' Hall. Thirty years ago he had fallen from power because he could not win support for a policy which was on the point of precipitating his country into war with England. Even by those whose minds were not disturbed by memories, it was recognized that he was totally out of sympathy with the economic theories of Bright and Gladstone ; and that he had done what he could to make his opposition felt. In regard to the present war, he was regarded by the Evening Mail as its ultimate cause, — the man, who above all others, had developed " that bale- ful idea of French dictatorship in Europe which was at once the secret of the power of the Emperor Napoleon and the immediate occasion of his downfall." 2 The Daily News saw a certain poetic and dramatic justice in the spectacle of this historian and statesman, who thirty years ago was meditating a sudden attack upon the British fleet in 'Felix Whitehurst, My Private Diary (London, 1875), vol. i, p. 91. 2 Evening Mail, Oct. 7, 1870. 179] ABORTIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 179 the Mediterranean, making a diplomatic tour in his old age as a suppliant for the moral intervention of the neutral Powers to save his country from the consequences of that vainglorious and aggressive spirit and policy, of which he had ever been the most eloquent and powerful advocate. He was likened now in his old age to that intrusive old peace-maker, Touchwood, in one of Scott's romances. "Don't be afraid of me," says Touchwood, though I come thus suddenly upon you, I acknowledge that my talents and experience have sometimes made me play the busy- body, because I find I can do things better than other people, and I love to see fellows stare. But after all, I am«n bon diable, and I have come four or five hundred miles to put all your little matters to rights just when you think they are most desperate. 1 But M. Thiers had swallowed, too much of criticism to be greatly perturbed by these bitter spoonfuls administered by the British press. He was encouraged, too, by the kindly reception and good hopes extended him by papers representing so many and so diverse interests as the Times, the Telegraph, the Record, the Examiner, and Saunders'. 2 If the News refused to dignify his visit by calling it a mis- sion, he could take comfort that in the Standard he was dubbed an Ambassador Extraordinary. 3 He did not wait upon Lord Granville when he arrived in London until he had talked with an old friend about his chances of success. He spoke to him of England's duty to support France in the interest of the balance of power. But his friend broke in abruptly to tell him to put such notions out of his head, for England now had no interest in them. 4 Perhaps it was this warning that deterred Thiers 1 Daily News, Sept. 14, 1870. 2 Issues of Sept. 14, 16, 17 and 1 15, respectively. 3 Standard, Sept. 14, 1870. * Robt. Wilson, Life and Tunes of Queen Victoria (London, 1887- 88), vol. ii, p. 871; Fortnightly Review, March, 1884, vol. xxxv, p. 418. lg BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ 180 from asking for active intervention. Perhaps it was the cold courtesy of the British Foreign Minister who refused to concede the envoy's argument that the war had been due entirely to the Empire, and that the downfall of Napoleon removed any justification of its continuance. It is doubtful whether the French diplomatist's endeavour to cast a sombre pall of responsibility over the defunct Empire was as for- tunate a choice of argument as would have been an effort to dress forth with his keen wit some quite live arguments for Prussian responsibility that slumbered in the record of the negotiations preceding war's outbreak. Instead of the active intervention, which Granville was certainly prepared to refuse, Thiers urged immediate recognition of the Re- public, and the exertion by England of that moral influence which, when supported by the Neutral Powers that only waited on her leadership, would surely oppose an irresist- ible barrier to Prussian aggression. Both were refused him. On the petitioner's own argument Lord Granville had good reason for the first denial. For Thiers had urged nothing more in favor of the de facto Government than its present expediency, — a republic represented everybody at a time of crisis. His second request he urged with better logic and far greater eloquence. Even by reading Gran- ville's report of the interview one can see that Thiers's heart was in that plea. But he found the Foreign Minister guided by a policy of inertia. " In other days," Thiers wrote Jules Favre, " England would have shuddered with indignation at the idea of allowing so great a revolution as was accomplishing itself to be fulfilled without taking the part in it proper to a great Power. Today, while recogniz- ing that Prussia is becoming formidable, e : he prefers to shut her eyes and ears rather than to see it or hear it said .... The idea of a great war dismays her, and the thought of taking a step that might meet with a rebuff .... dismays !8i] ABORTIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS iSl her almost as much as war itself." a The net result of his interviews in England was Granville's promise to deliver a message from the French Government requesting an in- terview with Bismarck, and to accompany it with words of satisfaction at thus aiding a meeting which would afford the best means of making each party acquainted with the other's demands and so arriving at an honorable peace. 2 With this sop, M. Thiers set out on his circular visit to the Continental capitals, — an " old Orleanist premier," the Dublin Review described him, " starting on his hopeless cruise from court to court in search of an ally, at the bid- ding of two boisterous barristers, who have been suddenly flung from the gutter into the Louvre." 3 At St. Peters- burg he was even less successful than in London, and Pall Mall published a squib about his visit there that must have annoyed Lord Tennyson : " Thiers, idle Thiers, I know not what you mean — Thiers, claiming pity from the ruthless bear! Thiers, idle Thiers, you gather in my eyes A fatal likeness to the autumn fields Where chaff is found, but golden grain no more." 4 At Vienna he found himself at table with the Prussian his- torian, von Ranke, and made bold to remonstrate with him on the inconsistency of his country in pursuing hostilities when the author of the war and the Government he headed had become things of the past. " On whom, pray, do you then make war? " he ended. " On Louis XIV," was the grim answer. 5 The story was told with gusto by the 1 Memoirs of Louis Adolphe Thiers, 1870-1873 (London, 1915), pp. 11-12. 3 Fitzmaurice, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 53-57. 8 Dublin Review, Oct., 1870, vol. xv, pp. 479-496. * Pall Mall Gazette, Oct. 7, 1870. 5 Edinburgh Review, April, 1871, The German Empire, vol. cxxxiii, pp. 459 et seq. lg 2 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [182 friends of Prussia in England. Not only these men, but many who argued against them for the merits of the French case, approved the outcome of the London mission. The claims of the belligerents differed so widely that, as Glad- stone said, it could not be considered an offense that Eng- land did not interfere and unreservedly second pretensions of which she could not approve. 1 Much was hoped from the personal interviews so soon to be arranged. The Prus- sian King disclaimed ambition, the Republic was intense in its eagerness for peace. If both were honest, peace must come speedily. Edward Malet, Second Secretary of the British Lega- tion in Paris, was chosen to bear the message sent from Granville through Lord Lyons, and the French despatch from Favre. Sir Edmund Blount was glad to see him go, for Paris was almost invested and he hoped that Prussia would ask moderate concessions and not insist on terms to which the French populace would not allow their Gov- ernment to accede. He believed that Malet carried des- patches not only from England and France, but from Rus- sia also. However that may have been, the courier arrived in due time with his weightly documents at the Prus- sian outposts. The camp was in an excellent temper. Dr. Russell had come back only recently from a visit to London bringing with him " congratulations and reassuring news." * There was current a rumor that the defence of Paris had been abandoned, and though this had been contradicted, it was still believed. So it came about that on the morning of the sixth when Archibald Forbes, while riding on the 1 Gladstone to Chevalier, Sept., 1870, Morley, Life of Gladstone, vol. ", PP- 343, 344- * Memoirs of Sir Edmund Blount, p. 175. 8 Journals of Field Marshal, Count von Blumenthal (translated by Maj. Gillespie Addison, London, 1903), p. 122. 183] ABORTIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 183 outskirts of the camp with a hussar officer, saw a little posse of French lancers following a civilian who bore a white flag, he believed the emissary had come in confirma- tion of the soldiers' gossip. But Mr. Malet, before leav- ing the next morning, told him the true reason of his visit. 1 He, perhaps, reported something more of success than might be implied from that day's entry in the journal of Field Marshal, Count Blumenthal : " An English Attache was with Bismarck this morning. He had brought some communications, regarding an armistice, but he was soon warned off." 3 Bismarck had really consented to the personal interview that Granville recommended. Three days later a very dif- ferent sort of messenger arrived in Paris. It was Captain Johnson with despatches that probably gave instructions to Lord Lyons as to the British attitude toward the negotia- tions. As he was driven down the Faubourg St. Honore in an open caleche he attracted the vociferous attention of French pedestrians. A postilion bestrode one of his horses, wearing his hair a la Catogan, and tricked out in a jacket with scarlet facings, a gold-banded hat, huge boots, and all the appurtenances that were now seen only behind the footlights or at a masquerade. Vizetelly, who watched his approach to the Embassy, was all for singing a snatch from a comic opera, " Oh, oh, oh, qu'il etait beau" — but the Parisians were looking on the semi-military gentleman in the caleche with suspicion. By some illogic of wartime psychology, they believed him a Prussian spy and wanted to stop his carriage and march him off to prison. But Cap- tain Johnson flourished his cane in a very menacing man- ner and the German porter of the Embassy came to his 1 Archibald Forbes, My Experience of the War between France and Germany, vol. i, pp. 280-282. * Journals of Count von Blumenthal, p. 127. 1 84 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [^4 assistance, so that he finally drove in triumph into the court- yard that was under the protection of the Queen of Eng- land. 1 The bold captain seems to have become impatient of his threatrical trappings, that not only roused the sus- picion of the French but the laughter of his own country- men. " Why," wondered Felix Whitehurst, " do they dress the Queen's messenger like King George the Third, or the old two penny postmen in the Windsor uniform, and stick V. R. in their caps ? " Captain Johnson was given the re- fusal of a washerwoman's cart and donkey for his return journey, and seriously considered accepting it. But we must not linger over his picturesque difficulties, for the day of his arrival in Paris (September the nineteenth) Jules Favre and Count Bismarck were discussing things of grave importance at Ferrieres, the county-seat of Baron Alphonse de Rothschild. Jules Favre was eager for a peace, but failing that he would have welcomed an armistice for the convoking of a Constituent Assembly that would give to his Government the national approval which England had de- clared essential for her recognition. Count Bismarck was eager, also, that France be ruled by something more than a Provisional Government when the time came for treaty making. But he demanded that it give promise of being of a character to his liking. He could afford to show some indif- ference, since as he cynically protested, already he had two Governments — one at Wilhelmshohe and one at Paris. Bismarck demanded Strasburg, the two departments of the Bas and Haut Rhin, and a part of Moselle, including Metz, Chateau Salins, and Soissons. As a guarantee while his terms were under discussion, he asked the occupation of Strasburg, — the garrison of which should surrender, — Toul, 1 E. A. Vizetelly, My Days of Adventure, pp. 106-107 ; Julian Kune, Reminiscences of an Octogenarian Hungarian Exile, pp. 200-207. * Felix Whitehurst, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 151, 178. lS^] ABORTIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 185 Phalsburg, and a fortress dominating Paris. 1 On the nineteenth there was published in the Standard an interview that the great Chancellor had granted its correspondent in which he had declared that Metz and Strasburg would be de- manded of France to ensure Prussia from future attack. This much the public was allowed for guessing what might pass at Ferrieres. Lord Lyons wrote on this day that he believed a loss of territory and a French humiliation would be great evils and sources of danger, but he did not wish to aggravate difficulties by holding out hopes that British mediation could overcome them. 2 This was a clear endorse- ment of the opinion Bismarck had stated in a manifesto on the mission of Thiers, 3 and it seems to have been shared also by the Government in London. For no representa- tion on the rigorous Prussian conditions was made by the Ministry. The day after the interview's conclusion, it is true, the Queen sent a belated telegram to King William, ex- pressing the hope that he might be able to shape such con- ditions as the vanquished might accept. The King replied courteously but insisted that he must place in the first line the protection of Germany against the next attack of France, which he believed no generosity would be able to deter. 4 Jules Favre announced the results of the Ferrieres in- terview at the same time that he announced the more or less negative results of the mission of Thiers. He had not been able to accept the terms either for a peace or for a truce, and though he claimed that four of the members 1 Fitzmaurice, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 62; Times, Sept. 26, 1870. 2 Lyons to Granville, Sept. 19, 1870, Newton, Life of Lord Lyons, vol. i, p. 323. s Annual Register for 1870, vol. cxii, p. 127. 4 Fitzmaurice, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 45-47. !86 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [186 of the League of Neutrals showed a willingness to inter- vene directly on the basis of conditions he had proposed, two had refused the cooperation that was needed to make the agreement of the others available. He believed, how- ever, that the interview was not barren of result if it had had the effect of removing the misconceptions of Prus- sia's intentions which had prevailed among the Neutrals. 1 In the Prussian camp, there existed some fear, apparently, of how the news of the Ferrieres meeting might be received. Dr. Russell noted in his diary a slight apprehension and great iritation lest the European Powers should make an effort at intervention. 2 But in the gaining of allies, surely, nothing succeeds like success, and, in spite of the opti- mistic declarations of her press, French affairs were at low* ebb. The surrender of Toul was imminent, Strasburg was in flames, Paris completely invested, and Marseilles in re- volt. Things being in this desperate plight, a great many British agreed with Mr. Lowe, the Chancellor of the Ex- chequer, that it was not opportune for Ministers to sit all day round a table covered with green cloth, with wax tapers burning, perpetually receiving and sending forth telegrams. There were three courses open to England as a Neutral, he said. She might become an arbitrator at the request of both belligerents; she might herself assume authority and intervene; or she might mediate by means of good offices proffered in the interests of both sides. It was this last course she had chosen to pursue, and there was no necessity for expenditure of candle power to light her on her way. 8 Who could help France, said the Times, when disregarding her own danger and the advantage of an armistice, she re- 1 Favre to Members of Government of National Defense, Sept. 21, 1870; Brit. State Papers, lxxi, pp. 105-110. 2 W. H. Russell, My Diary during the Last Great War, pp. 326-327. 3 Times, Sept. 22, 1870. jg;] ABORTIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 187 jected Count Bismarck's terms. 1 The Guardian rejoiced that the Ministers refused to be hustled or dragged into un- welcome efforts at mediation or the greater perils of for- cible intervention. 2 But there were other papers which found Mr. Lowe's exposition of the attitude of his Govern- ment far from satisfying. He had done no more, said the Globe, than say that mediation was an uncommonly perilous business. What the public really wished to know was at what point England could be expected to allow her energy to take a more substantial form than fear. 3 The Spectator complained of the wish for a neutrality so punctilious that it feared to trench on silence, lest some clue be given which might encourage one of the belligerents. The Spectator believed it would be better that Germany should know clearly, and in the most authoritative way, how fast she was losing England's sympathy. 4 As for the cheese-paring economy secured through the light-saving of the present diplomacy, Pall Mall and other journals thought that the moderate expenditure on candles which a weekly meeting at the green table involved would not be held amiss. In Vienna, Florence, and St. Petersburg cabinets were in daily session. 5 By far the strongest answer to the much discussed speech Mr. Lowe had made at Elgin appeared in a carefully worded letter to the Times from Sir Henry Bulwer. He regretted the absence of the Ministers from the capital, but made no reference to their inconsequential activities in partridge shooting and seashore studies. He regretted, also, that Parliament was not in session. "I have great confidence 1 Times, Sept. 26, 1870. * Manchester Guardian, Sept. 19, 1870. 1 Globe, Sept. 19, 1870. 4 Spectator, Sept. 24, 1870. 6 Pall Mall Gazette, Sept. 19, 1870; Once a Week, Sept. 24, 1870. r 88 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [i8g in Mr. Gladstone," he said, " and great confidence in Lord Granville; but their fault in Foreign Affairs, if they have any, is not presumption." He doubted if they would have full confidence in themselves without being in legitimate communication with the nation. He believed the rights of Europe paramount to those of France and Prussia, and urged that national interests were so intermingled that in- tervention, if ever it could be justifiable, had now become so. Albeit, the letter closed with a plea only for media- tion. 1 Its readers were rather dubious as to just what Sir Henry Bulwer wished. The Evening Mail thought he de- manded too much of England in expecting her to ascer- tain the least that Prussia would accept and the most that France could surrender. If she should fare badly in her self-imposed task, would she not have to resort to force to save herself from humiliation? 2 The News attempted to dismiss Sir Henry as an ancient disciple of Talleyrand, who dearly loved his Paris and could not endure that " the capital of civilization and petit soupers" should be de- sieged, but who dared not plainly state his wish for an armed intervention. 5 Saunders', though believing his sug- gestions unsound, appraised him as being rather more than an Epicurean follower of adhorred French diplomacy, — a man instead, who was " rich in experience and loaded with all the distinctions of a long diplomatic life." 4 The letter was described by the Scotsman as an excellent piece of writing but a very indefinite guide to action. Ministers and people in general were called upon to do something but no intimation was given of just what they ought to do or what would happen to them if they did it. 5 1 Sept. 21, 1870. 1 Evening Mail, Sept. 23, 1870. * Daily Telegraph, Sept. 28, 1870. 4 Saunders's, Sept. 29, 1870. * Weekly Scotsman, Oct. 1, 1870. !8q] ABORTIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 189 A letter printed a few days later attempted to clear away the alleged ambiguity of its predecessor. Sir Henry, it seemed, wished England to discard her neutrality, and be- come the " friend of both belligerents," to substitute a more difficult role for one already overtaxing her. In the media- tion, which he urged that she attempt, he wished her neither to proclaim that she meant only to talk, nor to bully and swagger and employ a town crier to go about saying that she did not mean to fight. He was impatient of supinely waiting for a time suitable for good offices. He had never known a timid rider to find a good opportunity for trying his horse at a stiff fence, and, it was said, the more the rider looked at it, the less he liked it. 1 The paper warfare waged by the advocates of the albino-like policy of the albino Min- ister, Mr. Lowe, and the more decided and more dangerous course suggested by the picturesque Sir Henry, roused the echoes in many journals. That the latter's eloquence did not win more to his ranks from his own class was due, in part, as the Saturday Review well pointed out, to French impropriety in exchanging polite communications with the English Republican malcontents and the Irish Fenians. They especially disliked the recognition accorded Mr. Odger as the bearer of a " semi diplomatic message from a fraction of the London rabble." 2 It was on the twenty-seventh of the month, while the controversy was at its height, that the public was amazed at the impudence of the London Trades Societies in sending a deputation to advise the Prime Minister on his foreign policy. It was on this day, too, that the English papers published the circular of von Thile, who, presiding at Berlin in Bismarck's absence, gave out the Prussian account of 1 Times, Oct. 1, 1870. A second letter had appeared in the issue of Sept. 27, 1870. 'Saturday Review, Oct. i, 1870. I9 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [190 the Ferrieres interview. The circular, of course, threw the blame for the continuance of the war on the unreasoned stubbornness of the Government of National Defence. The Standard and the Daily Telegraph believed it would have no other effect than to create enthusiasm in the " beer houses in which stay-at-home warriors formulate the policy and screw up the purpose of the German armies," 1 To others it seemed to confirm the opinion that M. Jules Favre had more of heart than head, — that his lachrymal ductsi were in a higher state of development than his cerebrum. On the day the Prussian circular was first discussed in London, Lyons was engaged in sending to Granville a com- munication from this same emotional Jules Favre. France, he said, had been encouraged by the Foreign Powers to ad- dress herself directly to Count Bismarck. The result had been a painful humiliation. " The ambition of Prussia and her desire to destroy France were now patent to the world and entitled his country to appeal to Europe for sup- port. The Powers should speak to Prussia with unmis- takable firmness and take measures to ensure that they be heeded. 2 Her willingness to make every reasonable sacri- fice exculpated France from blame for future disasters. It was a strong letter, and the fact that Strasburg was for- ced to capitulate on the day it was written did its part in further strengthening it. The Cabinet was summoned to meet on the thirtieth, — a date so unusually early that the News feared the public might conclude that intervention was contemplated. 3 In spite of the denial of the Liberal papers, many did think so, and certainly there was more reason for their belief than there had been at any previous time. M. Favre had the support of the Austrian Minister 1 Issues of Sept. 27, 1870. * Brit. State Papers, vol. lxxi, p. 99. 3 Daily News, Oct. i, 1870. !m] "ABORTIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 191 of Foreign Affairs, who had already suggested the oppor- tuneness of collective mediation at St. Petersburg and London. 1 In Russia there was a strong current in favor of France, as Sir Horace Rumbold, the secretary to the British embassy, noted. But it is safe to assume that she could not have been won to action unless the efforts of the other Neutrals so strengthened this current as to have swept away the barriers of official opposition. In England, Gladstone, himself, strongly opposed the transfer of territory or inhabi- tants by mere force. Such a policy called for the reprobation of Europe, he wrote John Bright, and Europe was entitled to utter it, and could utter it with good effect. 2 His views on the territorial cession had the support of the majority of the British press. The Standard, the Globe, and the Econ- omist being especially notable for their denunciation of the Prussian claims, 3 while Pall Mall, in its zeal to refute them, crossed the Rhine to cite arguments from such authorities as Grotius and Puffendorf.* The Times looked on the transfer as a necessary evil. 5 The News, alone, pre- tended to see justice in it, claiming France was protected by no favoured-nation clause that made inviolate her territory. 8 But Gladstone failed to carry his Cabinet with him in his wish to join with other Neutral Powers in remonstance of Prussia's avowed intentions. It was Lord Granville, ac- cording to that gentlemen's biographer, who persuaded him 'Sir Horace Rumibold, Recollections of a Diplomatist (London, 1902), vol. ii, p. 292. 1 Gladstone to Bright, Sept. 30, 1870, Morley, Life of Gladstone, vol. ii, p. 346 ; see also ibid., pp. 346-348. 3 See especially editorials in issues of Sept. 8, 6 and 24, 1870, respec- tively. * Pall Mall Gazette, Sept. 20, 1870. 6 Times, Sept. 23, 1870. For expressions of different views in the same paper, see the editorials of July 11, Sept. 16 and 21, 1870. 6 Daily News, Sept. 15, 1870. I9 2 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [192 to refrain from any official expression of his abhorrence of the cession of provinces against the wishes of their inhabit- ants. 1 And so there was necessity for only a single meeting of the Cabinet. The Ministers separated, said the Times, with the conviction that the time had not yet come for the abandonment of their policy of " observant neutrality." : Sir Henry Bulwer and others thought differently, and the Times continued to give space to their ideas, but it was very impatient of them. They reminded its editor of the woman who confused her husband when his affairs were greatly embarrassed by repeating with nervous energy, " Do something, my dear! Do something! " In its semi- official capacity it declared with hearty approval that Eng- land had discarded the so long and so meticulously guarded principle of the European balance and was resolved to rejoice in the free and healthy growth of her neighbors. If Cinderella's sisters, making heroic and bloody preparations for trying on the crystal slipper, had heard the Prince's courier extol the beauty of " free and healthy growth" they would, perhaps, have experienced the same feelings that France had when she read these tidings. England had elected to do nothing at all, but the Times and the News, it would seem, were determined that she assume a posy atti- tude in doing it. The reason for this vain posturing was that the Conservative leaders had become very active. The Earls of Carnarvon and Derby had gone to London to confer with Disraeli. 3 The leaders of the Standard and the letters of Sir Henry Bulwer were increasingly annoying. There was such a swell of public sympathy for France that fear was felt that Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli might ride the tide to office. But Parliament was not in session, the 1 Fitzmaurice, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 63. * Times, Oct. 1, 1870. s N. Y. Herald, London correspondent, Oct. 3, 1870. 193] ABORTIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS ^3 by elections were carefully postponed, and for the time being France and the British public had to be content with Granville's decision to offer mediation only when it was plainly apparent that both belligerents would welcome it. " The object of the Provisional Government," he wrote to Lyons, "appears to be that Neutral Powers should, if needful, support by force any representations that they might make to Prussia. Her Majesty's Government are bound to state explicitly that they themselves are not pre- pared to adopt any such means, or to propose it to other Neutral Powers." 1 As for according formal recogni- tion to the hard-pressed Government of France, Great Brit- ain must postpone that until such a time as France, having recognized it herself by a duly elected Assembly, could justly urge its claims upon the Neutrals. 2 Until such a time England would continue to date her passports the second of September. His country, said Sir Robert Morier, had become a bit of wet blotting paper amongst the nations, and it upset his serenity, and made him wish to be a Maori or a Turco, both of whom were possessed of some kind of individuality and self-assertion. 3 1 Granville to Lyons, Oct. 4, 1870, Brit. State Papers, vol. lxxi, pp. 116-117. * Granville to Lyons, Oct. 1, 1870, ibid., vol. lxxi, p. in. 1 Memoirs of Sir Robert Morier, vol. ii, p. 206. CHAPTER X War A Outran ce In October London Society reported that the war news, which had lately held its own against the grouse, was now opposing a sturdy resistance to the partridge. More people were in town than was usual in such an unfashionably early month. Mrs. Lloyd-Lindsay wrote that it was possible to assemble at a dinner at the German Embassy, Gladstone, Granville, two or three ambassadors, Delane, Hayward, and other notables. Except for a lack of dinner part- ners for these eminent guests, it was quite as though it had been the middle of the season. 1 The city was agog with the war. Excitement reached its height when the evening papers began to appear. In the leading thorough- fares — east and west — nearly every man had a broad or a narrow sheet in his hand, perusing it on the pavement. There were letters to be read from special correspondents, " our own' correspondents ; " leading articles devoted to different branches of the war; discussions of England's own military system ; financial articles, — very dull these, because uncertainty kept trade slack; lists of subscriptions in aid of the sick and wounded; advertisements of French refu- gees who wished to dispose of their jewelry or find em- ployment as chefs, governesses, or in " any honorable capacity whatever." 1 Harriet S. Wantage, Lord Wantage, a Memoir (London, 1907), pp. 188-189. 194 t x 94 195] WAR A OUTRAN CE I95 John Bull read them all. He knew more of the war's hap- penings than was known in Germany and infinitely more than was known in France. He was being hurried through mighty pages of history at express-rate speed and was doing his best to keep his grip on things. 1 Perhaps he should have been devoting all his attention, these mid- autumn days, to the Imperial Manifesto and the Bismarck Circular, but he was very human and his interest was not always in constant attendance on the things that had most claim on it. The Evening Mail 2 and the Weekly Free-* man acknowledged early in October that they were bored by the war. Its epic interest had expired at Sedan. At times Paterfamilias was wearied also. He had no mind to go home and change the pins in his wall map to accord with the latest telegrams. It was fatiguing to note the progress all in one way and the superabundance of the Prussian colours. The month was to see the defeat of the French at Arthenay and at Soissons, Orleans occupied, the surrender of Chateaudon and Schelstadt, and at the last, the capitulation of Metz, with its garrison of six thousand officers and a hundred and sixty-seven thousand men. The whole thing seemed an outrage on the sporting instincts of our honest Englishman. He was tired, too, of having Herr Bismarck's face stare at him from the window of every printshop. On each account of a fresh Prussian victory the visage of the Chan- cellor made its reappearance and seemed, alas, to have gained nothing of beauty during its retirement. Some shops, said the News, had whole strings of Bismarck's, like 1 London Society, Oct., 1870, England during the War, vol. xviii, pp. 384 et seq.; All the Year Round, Oct. 15, 1870, p. 473. * Evening Mail, Oct. 4, 1870. s Weekly Freeman's Journal, Oct. 8, 1870. I9 6 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ I9 6 ropes of onions. 1 There were always enough others who were not tired and would buy them for their table albums. Enough others, too, to buy the patriotic songs that were printed in sheets and sold at a penny apiece. Paterfamilias was especially disgruntled at the omnipre- sent Marseillaise. It was rendered on barrel-organs before his front door in the time of a dirge, or by a clarinet af- flicted as with yelping spasms in the high register and with sudden mournful eructations in the lower notes, and its effect was distinctly depressing. He was glad when the News protested against this conversion of a splendid anthem into a clamorous invocation for coppers. 2 Gustave Dore was exhibiting what purported to be an idealization of the song — an idealization described by the Art Journal as a masculine, disreputable, undressed harridan with a large sword and banner, and a painfully distended mouth. 9 Paterfamilias was inclined to believe it a very realistic pre- sentment of the Marseillaise as he knew it. At Agricul- tural Hall the war was illustrated by a morning panorama of its principal scenes, and at North Woolwich there wa9 an al-fresco painting of Weissenbourg and a representa- tion of the battle with real fire and real British volunteers to take the part of the combatants. 4 At Mme. Tussaud's they were consantly adding new figures to the military contingent of the wax works. 5 In the comic journals the gods of battle took on a more fantastic turn, and the awful Bismarck and his royal master brought a disrespectful chuckle from some who at 1 Daily News, Oct. 18, 1870. 'Ibid., Oct. 17, 1870. 3 Art Journal, Oct., 1870. * London Society, Oct. 1, 1870, England during the War, pp. ^S^etseq. 5 Daily Telegraph, Dec. xg, 1870; John T. Tussaud, Romance of Mme. Tussaud's (London, 1920), chap, xxii, passim. jgy] WAR A OUTRANCE 1 97 first had accorded them only awed admiration. 1 If idols can be kept in darkened recesses or exhibited only behind a cloud of incense when men's heads are lowered, a coat of gilding may be sufficient to cover feet of clay. But an idol brought to the market place to furnish forth copy for every paper of the United Kingdom has need to be one hundred percent fine gold from top to toe. When King William had prostrated himself in prayer and humiliation, and heralded his entrance into war with a pious proclamation of his honorable intentions, he had been exalted by many sincere Britishers to a position only a little lower than the angels. They experienced now a feeling of annoyance at the profuse thanks he rendered Providence for each of his various vic- tories. It was esteemed an unmannerly presumption that Prussia, having the services of Bismarck and von Moltke, should lay claim also to a monopoly of the Divine guardian- ship. The fact that Bazeilles was burned on the day of Sedan, with a horrible thoroughness which made its name soon known throughout the world, 2 encouraged the British to deride the king's devotion. " Providence be thanked," he had telegraphed to his Queen on the great day, whereupon Punch misquoted him in this wise: " Thanks be to God, My dear Augusta, We've had another awful bluster; Ten thousand Frenchmen sent below, Praise God from whom all blessings flow !" 3 It was related that a wounded prisoner, writhing in agony, 1 The cartoons of Sir Arthur Tenniel in Punch are especially clever. * C. E. Ryan, With an Ambulance in the Franco-German War, pp. 88-89; Graphic, Sept. 10, 1870; Athenaeum, Dec. 24, 1870; Spectator, Sept. 17, 1870; Pall Mall Gazette, Sept. 21, 1870; Saunders', Sept. 24, 1870; Annual Register for 1870, vol. xvii, p. 189. 3 Punch, Sept. 3, 1870. I9 8 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [198 called out on God to aid him : " Why do you call on God? " said his next neighbor, " Don't you know He has forsaken us and gone over to the Prussians?" r England could not think so. She disliked the orders to fire villages as a means of making peasants hunt out the franc tireurs. She did not like requisitions enforced by terror. A Protestant pastor vouched for the truth of the horrors suffered by the hundreds of homeless after the burning of the village of Cherizy. 2 Strasburg had been bombarded in spite of the appeals of its Bishop to General Werder. Its starving citizens had been denied the privilege of seeking a place of safety be- fore the guns were fired. 3 The Art Gallery and the Cathed- ral had not been able to resist the bombs of the pious King William. An estimate of the damage done to them was given in the Athenaeum. 4 But the loss of the Library was considered irreparable. Its wonderful collection of in- cunabula and manuscripts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could never be replaced. The Alsatians, them- selves, claimed that it, with the Cathedral, had been made the special targets for artillery fired under General Werder's orders. The Bookworm inveighed against the conscious destruction of a priceless collection by a lieutenant of the "God-fearing, God-mouthed King of Prussia." 5 Ruskin published his opinion of the Prussian commander who had succumbed to the tempting target which the famous build- ings made in the glare of the naming city. He found no ' The Monthly Packet of Evening Readings, March, 1871. * Spectator, Oct. 29, 1870; see also Times, Oct. 28, 1870, Jan. 11, 1871. * Manchester Guardian and Daily Telegraph of Sept. 2, 1870. 4 Athenaeum, Nov. 19, 1870, vol. xliv, p. 662. 5 Bookworm, Sept., 1870, The Burning of the Strasburg Library, pp. 138-139; Daily Telegraph, Oct. 7. 1870. 199] WAR A OUTRANCE I99 consolation in the news that the Parisians would attempt to repair the losses by casting a great bronze Strasburg. 1 The Times made it an opportunity for sententiously re- minding the Prussians that the gratification of military honour should not be accompanied by the debasement of their moral qualities. 2 Vanity Fair, in adding the portrait of the Crown Prince to its gallery of notables, remarked that the English might have wished another husband for the Princess Royal than the fighting heir of a despotic and ag- gressive monarch. 3 It was hoped he would not send her battle loot. Stories came back that showed the invaders found it particularly difficult to resist the acquisition of impedimenta. Where professional soldiers had stolen for self alone, the home-loving German requisitioned with a loving memory of wife and children that induced a more painstaking thoroughness.* The most telling expression of the changed estimate of the Prussian military that was taking place between July and October appears in the statements of two young Eng- lishmen who had been so fired with enthusiasm for King William's cause at the war's beginning that they had at- tached themselves to the Prussian armies. One was Sir Charles Dilke, who had hoped for fine things from future alliance with " our brothers in America," and " our kins- 1 men in Germany and Scandinavia," but became disgusted at the arrogance and aggressiveness of the Prussians after their first victories. There was in the Prince's suite, he wrote, a celebrated German Liberal, the writer and politi- cian, Gustav Freytag, who had the bad taste to wear the 1 Academy, Oct. i, 1870, pp. 431 ct seq.; Temple Bar, Nov., 1870, vol. xxx, p. 548; All the Year Round, Sept. io, 1870. 'Oct. 18, 1870. 3 Vanity Fair, Sept. 24, 1870. * Pall Mall Gazette, Sept. 21, 1870. 200 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [200 Legion of Honour in the invaded country, and made him- self further obnoxious by his constant patriotic exultation. Dilke and Auberon Herbert, who was with him, soon de- serted their ambulance corps, and the former was in Paris in time to witness the September revolution. 1 There was, also, Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, who returned to England in October and made public acknowledgment of the shift of his sympathy to France. He believed that if German opinion had not been tampered with by governmental in- fluences, it would have shown a strong dislike for territor- ial spoil, but that the scheme, originated in the King' si Cabinet, had been advanced so cunningly that the acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine was now considered a national necessity. He testified to the Prussian demoralization in victory as being so great as to justify the loss of sympathy he, and many other Englishmen, had felt. 2 A great deal was being said just then of French degener- acy, of which Lord Fitzmaurice professed himself incompe- tent to judge. The English proved as adept as the Gaul in seeking out a woman on whom to put the blame for the dis- aster. Lord Granville and many others named the Emp- ress as the cause of war, and linked with her as entrigants: the names of various high dignitaries of the Roman Church, or that of Marshal Leboeuf, as inclination led them. 3. All made much of the luxury Eugenie had sponsored and that had so conspicuously flaunted itself on the Parisian boule- 1 Gwynn and' Tuckwell, Life of Rt. Hon. Sir Chas. Dilke, vol. i, pp. 104-108. 'Letter to Pall Mall Gazette, Oct. 18, 1870; for criticisms of letter, see Lord Carlingford to Lear, Oct. 19, 1870, Later Letters of Edward Lear, p. 126 ; Examiner and London Review, Oct. 22, 1870. 3 Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville, vol. ii, pp. 51, 388; Earl of Malmesbury, G. C. B., Memoirs of an ex-Minister, vol. ii, pp. 415-416. Cf. Dr. Evans, Second Empire, pp. 167-168; see also Spencer Walpole, History of Twenty-five Years, vol. ii, pp. 492-493. 201] WAR A OUTRANCE 201 vards. 1 There were those who said the loose morals that went unrebuked at Court were emulated by the soldiers, who marched away wreathed and fettered by the garlands that had been flung round them by their women, who ran beside them, singing, to the station. A number of pro- fessional dancers had come over from Paris and were astounding London audiences by a certain set of contor- tions which were at first described as the French national dance. In October, after a good deal of editorial preach- ing, the magistrates were induced to revoke the licenses of the Alhambra and Highbury Barn, that had housed the chief offenders. 2 But it is safe to say that these irrespon- sible refugees had already done not a little to strengthen the disapprobation of the British who crowded the stalls to see them. Lady Churchill wrote that a more exclusive audience was equally entertained and shocked by the doings and sayings of two pretty and lively refugees, who with their husbands, preferred shooting birds in England to being shot at in France. They had taken a place in the country and the ladies astonished the sober yokels by hunt- ing in kilts and puffing away at little cigarettes. They were of a very sprightly humour and the practical jokes that they played in exile were not over-nice in their regard for British propriety. 3 The English marvelled at the antics of these exponents of a civilization that was on trial for its very life. There were those who pointed out that it had produced and applauded that frail heroine of romance, Mile, de Maupin. 4 The arch-moralist, Rossetti, was very 1 Lady John Russell, a Memoir, p. 230; Mrs. El. Lecky, Memoir of W. E. H. Lecky, p. 85. * Daily News, Sept. 20, 1870; Examiner and London Review, Oct. 15, 1870. 5 Mrs. George Cornwallis West, Reminiscences of Lady Randolph Churchill, p. 28. * Andrew Lang, Theophilc Gautier, Dark Blue, March, 1871, pp. 27 et seq. 202 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [202 sure that Mme Bovary 1 was somehow culpable for the deep sorrow of poor France. The impotence of Favre's tears before Bismarck, the amusing spectacle of Thiers, — ' drumming the merits of the new Republic before the rulers of Europe and finding little interest in his sample case, — were believed by many, even of those who wished it other- wise, to indicate that France must speedily succumb to the aggressive virility of her neighbour. Delane was specu- lating on just what day in October Paris would give the signal for surrender. 2 England was abruptly startled from her melancholy musings by the aerial flight of Gambetta from Paris to Tours. There was a whistling of hostile bullets when his balloon cleared St. Denis, and at Creil the Prussians suc- ceeded in piercing it, and in grazing Gambetta's hand, but finally, early in the afternoon of October the seventh, it descended near Montdidier to catch in an oak tree and leave the Minister hanging head downwards with his legs clutched round the ropes of the car. The peasants, who believed him a Prussian, were reassured by the sight of the tricolour and the sound of a hearty Vive la Republique. They assisted him to the ground and cheered him that even- ing when he was driven away to his destination. " Honour to the brave!" exclaimed the London Illustrated News, and forthwith dubbed the new deliverer the " Minister of the Balloon." 3 It was natural that so theatrical a descent of the Minister of the Interior should arouse the good- natured raillery of the British. Gambetta was called a political athlete, a winged messenger, and was congratulated on having experienced no more serious " reverse " on his 1 Ford Madox Huefer, Ancient Lights and Certain New Reflections (London, 1911), p. 182. 1 Dasent, lohn Delane, vol. ii, p. 270. $ Illustrated London Nezvs, Oct. 15, 1870. 203] WAR A OU TRANCE 203 journey than the awkward episode of the inhospitable oak tree. 1 It was soon recognized, however, that Gambetta must be taken seriously, — that he had accumulated all the authority from Tours to Marseilles into his hands, and that his suc- cess in using it would determine the fate of the Republic. 3 His proclamations began to be read and criticized as care- fully as those of the great Chancellor himself. They of- fered a striking contrast to the Chancellor's. As the Ex- aminer said, if Count Bismarck revelled in the inexorable, M. Gambetta outdistanced all competitors in the field of official boast. The one appealed to horror, the other to hope. 3 The Record found Bismarck's pronunciamentos hard, exultant, and arrogant. 4 The Spectator said that the famous iron and blood not only backed his diplomacy but seemed to enter into it. 5 In October he issued a sort of dis- claimer of German responsibility for the dreadful suffer- ing that he foresaw for Paris. She would be reduced to starvation, he said, and the besiegers would not be able to afford help to her famished populace. 6 Gambetta' s pro- clamation showed another picture. Paris was, indeed, somewhat bored at not having its letters daily, and its fresh vegetables so plenteously. It missdd its rides into the country. But with a garrison of six hundred thousand and a ring of impregnable fortifications, it stood at ease and calmly defied its foes. 7 All of this was said in a style that 1 Judy, Oct. 26, 1870; see also Chamber's Journal, March 4, 1871, pp. 129 et seq. 2 Spectator, Oct. 22, 1870. 1 Examiner and London Review, Oct. 15, 1870. * Record, Sept 30, 1870. 5 Spectator, Oct. 8, 1870. 'Illustrated London News, Oct. 15, 1870. 1 Examiner and London Review, Oct. 15, 1870. 204 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [204 seemed to many of the English bombastic, — even " menda- ciously rhapsodic." 1 "If he (Gambetta) carried the newly published document in the car of his balloon," said the Telegraph, " he could have wanted little other ballast. It is heavy with doom, loaded with forthcoming miseries and madness — a burden of passionate pride and national impenitence." 2 The Court Journal, though somewhat sarcastic, was more tolerant. " We ought," it said, " to proclaim all honor to inflation, at the moment when the Government itself is borne through the air, and drops from the clouds, carpet bag in hand, laden with its own mes- sages, and transporting its own decrees." : And the Man- chester Examiner conceded that brave words and great deeds might sometimes go together and that for the French, at least, fine phrases were one of the necessaries of life. 4 Almost at the same time that the news of Gambetta's sen- sational flight reached England, it was learned that Gari- baldi had come to France. Indeed, the Dublin Review needed to juggle its dates only a little to declare that the one had descended from his balloon to embrace the other. 5 There was practical unanimity in England in declaring 1 that the presence of the valiant old Italian was not of ad- vantage. By the majority, his appearance was regarded as distinctly unfortunate. It would deepen the tint of the Republic that already seemed alarmingly red to many who wished to be its friends. The Guardian spoke of his 1 The Interests of Europe in the Conditions of Peace (pamphlet, London, 1870) ; see also Quarterly Review, Oct., 1870; Terms of Peace, pp. 540 et seq. 1 Daily Telegraph, Oct. 11, 1870. 1 Court Journal, Oct. 29, 1870. 4 Manchester Guardian, Oct. 12, 1870. 5 Dublin Review, Oct. 1, 1870, The Fall of the Empire, vol. xv, pp. 479 ct seq. 205] WAR A OUTRANCE 205 utter lack of political stability, and of the ease with which he might be used by men of extreme opinions. 1 The News believed his championship of the new government would cause dissension in those classes from which it needed financial and military support. 2 His desire to secure Alsace and Lorraine for the one-time enemy, who had wrested from Italy Nice, and Savoy was declared by the sober- minded Saunders' as utterly quixotic or, what was the same, Garibaldian. 3 From the standpoint of the influential class in England, it would have been better had the French thanked the noble old chieftain for his goodwill and then conducted him civilly to the frontier and seen him safely aboard a ship bound for Caprera. He brought a great heart, said the Times, but what France needed was a head, — the ability to organize her shattered resources, the saga- city that would win confidence in her good intentions for the future, — not only among her own people but abroad. 4 The old Commander, with the magic of his fame, the mag- netism that reduced his followers almost to the frenzy of idolaters, disturbed pacific England. He was an idealist, and idealists could do such shocking things. But if the perfervid tone of Gambetta's eloquence 3 and the colour of the shirt that covered the brawny shoulders! of Garibaldi alienated some Britons who had sympathies with the French, they further inflamed the zeal of those workingmen who had already espoused the cause of the Republic. Already these were demanding that Parliament be assembled that it might teach the Ministry its duty in recognizing the new Government, and in rebuking Prussia 1 Manchester Guardian, Oct. 11, Nov. 7, 1870. * Daily News, Oct. 14, 1870. 3 Saunders', Oct. 13, 1870. 4 Times, Oct. II, 1870. * His General Order was called in England "Garibaldi's Hymn'". 206 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [206 for the greed she wished to gratify in Alsace and Lor- raine. 1 The conservative Standard regretted that many of all classes of English society were deterred from taking part in the agitation for mediation, because if they did take part they would be expected, too, to shout for the French Republic and do such undignified things as carry torches and wait on the Prime Minister with representations as to his foreign policy. 2 The Tories, who, to some extent, had sympathized with France before the fall of the Imperial Government, had small sympathy with their new associates, the Comtists. They resented the attempt to identify her cause with republicanism, solidarity, and the brotherhood of man. They believed the French themselves were not very proud of the kinship the Leather Lane republicans claimed for them with their " cousins — German." 3 There was a torch-light demonstration of about six hundred of these Democrats in Palace Yard, a few days after Garibaldi had been invested with his French command. Their reso- lutions were more than usually ardent, and found little re- sponse among the absent Conservatives. Gladstone was to be instructed to recognize Republican France and to pro- test against its dismemberment; he was urged to call a special meeting of Parliament, so that if Germany persisted in her harsh demands, Great Britain could be empowered to take up arms in opposition. 4 The Economist was sure that, had the working class attributed any practical im- portance to this or the other meetings, it would have seen to it that the minority that opposed the resolutions would have been swelled to a majority. The stay-at-homes had 1 Times, Oct. 5, 1870. * Standard, Oct. 13, 1870. 1 Judy, Oct. 26, 1870; Times, Oct. 24, 1870. 1 Times, Oct. 20, 1870; Illustrated London News, Oct. 22, 1870. 207] WAR A OUTRAN CE 207 felt assured that the middle class was, for the most part, in favour of caution and could be trusted to counter-balance the turbulent wishes of their brothers. 1 England possessed a very fine navy, but it was believed that the men whose taxes supported it were too practical to attempt to send it to the relief of Paris. Among the Irish, of course, it was not expected that considerations of common sense would prevail. The Tablet thundered that the new Government was composed of the disciples of Voltaire ; 2 but in October, Lecky wrote that Irish- men were still as passionately French as they had been in the days of the Catholic Empire. The country people, he said, stopped him in the road to ask for news of the war, and carmen and guides overwhelmed the hapless tourist with political discussion. 3 The Corporation of Dublin exceeded its functions by call- ing for Her Majesty's Government and those of the other Neutral Powers to intervene for peace. 4 A dealer in the Strand made much money from a caricature map which showed England quaking with fear and rage, and holding by a string Ireland, who, as a little dog, was very eager to get loose and fight. 5 No one was surprised when in the middle of October, an Irish Ambulance Corps left Dublin to sail to Havre. The Times was fearful that these strong, young Irishmen had left for a more dangerous purpose than they avowed, and urged the Home Secretary to take meas- ures against the violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act* 1 Economist, Oct. 22, 1870, The Middle and the Working Classes in th-e War, vol. xxviii, pp. 1283 et seq. * Nov. 26, 1870. ! El. Lecky, Memoirs of W. E. H. Lecky, p. 87. * Saunders', Oct. 25, 1870. 6 Art Journal, Oct., 1870, pp. 322-323. 6 Issues of Oct. 11, 15, 1870. 20S BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [208 Von Bernstorff was still showing an amazing facility at peppering the Government with remonstrances on the ex- portation of coal and munitions of war. According to an English M. P., in Havre when the contingent arrived, the seventy Irishmen were told that they were expected to join the French Army. Fifty, he said, went on to do so, and the rest applied to the English consulate to be sent home. 1 The Irish Nations account of the expedition was very dif- ferent. Two hundred and fifty, instead of seventy, went to Havre, it recorded, and since only forty could be used as hospital attendants, a hundred and fifty of the number de- cided to join the Foreign Legion. The others returned to Dover. 2 The Compagnie Irlandaise was allowed to fight as a unit under its own flag, that had been quartered with the tricolour. It gave a good account of itself and re- mained to hear the last shot fired by the Foreign Legion. But the admonition of the Times was heeded, and the For- eign Enlistment Act thereafter so carefully enforced that no further such companies of men on mercy bent were al- lowed to leave the Empire. 3 The ill luck of the Irish in attaching themselves to a lost cause was signally emphasized by the astounding news of the surrender of Metz that followed hard on their arrival. It g-ave the month its climax. Marshal Bazaine. after a siege of only seventy days, gave up the fortress that France had proudly called, " La Pucellc." It was only very gradually the English came to know the story that lay behind the Marshal's surrender. Until they did, the denunciations of Gambetta seemed bombastic rhodomontade to be as utterly discredited as the usual accusations of unfairness shrilled 1 Letter to Times, Oct. 15, 1870. 2 Irish Nation, Oct. 22, 1870. "Duquet, Ireland and France, passim; see also Report of Irish Am- bulance Corps for 1870 (Dublin, 1871). 209] WAR A OUTRAN CE 209 out by a poor loser. 1 It was realized that the surrender was most timely for the Germans. For, if the six corps of the army surrounding the city could have been detained some weeks longer, great things might have been expected of General Aurelles de Paradin, who had taken command of the Army of the Loire, — much to its advantage, — and of General Keratry, who was forming an army in Brittany. 2 ' We must take some liberty with the sequence of disclo- sures, if we are to follow the sequence of the events that made up the ugly episode. Early in the month, the news- papers noticed as relatively unimportant the Emperor's pub- lication of a manifesto from Wilhelmshohe. It was an attempt to free himself from the charge of having precipi- tated the disastrous war. The English saw its chief signi- ficance in the fact that Bismarck had permitted its appear- ance. 3 It was a straw worth noting, especially since the semi-official journals were claiming that he had not wholly given up the Bonapartist dynasty. 1 The Spectator believed that the superfluous discourtesy with which he had branded as " totally without foundation " a report made by Dr. Russell of the ex-Emperor's Sedan interview with the King, was due to an attempt to screen the Imperial captive from the hostile criticism to be expected from an exposition of his ignorance of the military situation at that battle. 5 If these straws showed the way the wind blew, it was thought Prussia was eager to checkmate the Republic and reestablish the dynasty. 1 Daily News, Oct. 31, 1870; see also Memoir of Edward Blount, diary entry for Nov. 17, 1870; Manchester Guardian, Oct. 31, 1870; Pall Mall Gazette, Nov. 2, 1870. 2 Saturday Review, Dec. 17, 1870. 3 Daily News, Oct. 4, 1870. *W. H. D. Adams, The Franco -Prussian War (London, 1872), vol. ii, p. 37. 5 Spectator, Oct. 8, 1870. 2io BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [ 2 io On October the eighth, the London papers commented on the visit to Chislehurst of General Bourbaki, brother of Mme. Le Breton, the Empress' friend and attendant. They very naturally drew the conclusion that General Bazaine, who had permitted his subaltern to make the journey from Metz, must still consider himself to be fighting for the Regent, and that Bismarck, in granting passports to the visitor, showed that he hoped, for good things from the interview. 1 A little later the go-between in the negotiations came in for much editorial comment. He was a certain M. Regnier, an obscure Frenchman, who baffled attempts at deciding whether he was a clever but inconsiderable busy-body or a very shrewd agent of the Prussian government. Whatever his character, he had certainly done his part in serving Prus- sia's purpose. On a visit to Hastings he had obtained an in- terview with the Empress, and by a bit of strategy, an autographed message from the Prince Imperial to* his father. By means of a passport from the Prussian Em- bassy he carried this to Ferrieres, while Bismarck was negotiating with Favre. Needless to say, he greatly em- barrassed the attempts of the Provisional government by affording the Prussian a threat in the form of an alterna- tive Imperial negotiation. On the termination of the Ferrieres interviews, he carried his autograph to Metz as proof of his claim that he was a messenger from the Em- press, who wished to communicate with its commander. Bazaine forthwith sent General Bourbaki to Chislehurst, and M. Regnier returned to Bismarck to tell him that Bazaine had declared his willingness to capitulate, on con- dition that he be allowed to march to France and there proclaim the Regency. For this he was willing to sign a peace ceding Alsace and Lorraine. Bourbaki, however, 1 Graphic; Daily Telegraph. 2 1 1 ] WAR A OUTRAN CE 211 on his arrival before Eugenie, found that she did not ap- prove the intrigue and was absolutely opposed to signing away French territory. There was nothing for the General to do but return and admit to his superior that the mission was founded on a deception. The Spectator believed that, had the Empress acceded to the terms offered through Bour- baki, her son would have been carried to Metz and pro- claimed Emperor. But though letters passed between Eugenie and King William, and she granted von Bernstorff an interview, and even availed herself of permission briefly to visit Napoleon at Wilhelmshohe, it must be said to her credit that not even the future of her son tempted her to become Count Bismarck's puppet. 1 On October the nineteenth, the editor of the Times wrote in a private letter that there were rumours of peace that the Belgians swore were well founded. No one could find reason for them, but the Belgian Minister went so far as to maintain that a treaty was practically signed. 2 On this day, too, Lord Granville telegraphed to Lyons news of intelli- gence sent him from Brussels that a treaty had been signed between the Prussians and Marshal Bazaine. Lord Lyons replied that the Provisional Government had no knowledge of such a treaty, but that it had known for some time that the Marshal was communicating with the enemy and sus- pected that he negotiated on the basis of a Bonapartist re- storation. The last telegram received by them, however, in- dicated that Bazaine had changed his aim and was dicker- ing for his own establishment as dictator. 3 The day that Lyons sent this information to his chief, the Times published a story by a correspondent at Wilhelmshohe, who had been 1 Spectator, Oct. 15, Nov. 12, 1870; Pall Mall Gazette, Nov. 11, 1870. 2 Dasent, John Delane, vol. ii, pp. 271-272. 3 Lyons to Granville, Oct 20, 1870, Brit. State Papers, vol. lxxi 00 168-169. ' 212 BRITISH POLICY IN FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR [212 told by a commissioner from Alsace that the Prussians had offered the Marshal permission to leave Metz with his army and go wherever he pleased, while they held Alsace and Lorraine. On the twenty-second it was reported by the Graphic that Bazaine already had sent his aide-de-camp to Prussian headquarters at Versailles to negotiate directly. According to the Court Journal, Bazaine' s wife herself went with the company on the express condition that she be allowed an interview with the King. She was described as a lady with eyes " black as night " — " eyes that could look behind her." But the all-seeing emissary and her es- corts, it appears, did not arrive until after her husband had surrendered. 1 Meantime, General Boyer had come to Chislehurst from Metz on the twenty-second, and had departed empty- handed, as had others before him. 2 On the twenty-sixth the Empress authorized a statement that she was further- ing no intrigues for peace or for an armistice. 3 Bazaine'si capitulation, the day after, went even further to make the British regard the Empress' residence as a retreat rather than a centre for political intrigue. It was found that the Marshal had surrendered without stipulating for any conditions favorable to the dynasty ; but that he had, nevertheless, worked traitorously against the Republic was not believed until the narrative of G. T. Rob- 1 Court Journal, Nov. 5, 1870. 2 Daily News, Oct. 26, 1870. Revue Historique (March- April, 1918) prints the text of a letter which the Empress addressed to King Wil- liam in Oct., 1870. The reply was received on the 26th and proved unacceptable. See also Fleury, Memoirs of Empress Eugenie, vol. ii, pp. 540-560, for an account of the fruitless mission for the Empress undertaken by the son of Theophile Gautier. Young Gautier arrived at Versailles, Oct. 23. Bismarck refused the terms the Empress offered, declaring he must have Alsace and Lorraine ; see also Bemstorff Papers, vol. iii, chap, xx; Dr. Evans, The Second Empire, pp. 31 et seq. 'Daily News, Oct. 26, 1870. 213] WAR A 0UTRAN CE 213 inson appeared some time later. This correspondent of the Guardian, due to his presence within the fortress, had en- joyed exceptional advantages for observation, and his re- velations were not to Bazaine's credit. The Marshal's own report, published in England in December, was disappoint- ing even to those inclined to think him honest. It was described as eminently dry, official, and unsatisfactory, 1 — • minus a single word that might have revealed heroism. The men, said Robinson, had fought splendidly in the sortie of August the thirty-first, and might have followed up their success and raised the siege under another commander. 2 Even at later times, they could have cut their way through the besiegers, but they were weakened by the fear that they would be sold for a price, that the Empress, or her son, was to be brought to Metz to make peace. They knew Bour- baki had gone to her, and Boyer. They were told the Germans occupied Normandy and Picardy; that Brittany was in revolt for a restoration ; that the Reds were murder- ing and plundering in all the great cities of France; that Italy was on the point of declaring war to recover Savoy and Nice. It was said, the garrison had been won to a sur- render, believing food was exhausted, when, in reality, there remained enough to provision it for months. 3 Robin- son drew a horrible picture of the French Commander dawdling over his late breakfasts in the villa he dared not leave for fear of assassination. There he took time from his pleasures to suppress the city's papers and replace them by official sheets that painted all things black. There he 1 Saturday Review, Dec. 31, 1870. 2 Cf.