D S -NRLF v^^ O SIMONOSEKL IKSELLERS, &c. ^ ii The Simonoseki Affair. A Chapter of Japanese History. The question of the final settlement of a certain pocuniary claim known as the "Simonoseki Indomnitj'," which was first brought against the Government of Japan in 1864 by the dii)lomatic representatives of the United States, France, Great Britain and Holland, has from time to time attracted cousiderable attention in one of the countries on whose behalf the demand was originally made, and at rare intervals, has been discussed with a languid interest in each of tlie others. To Japan, the subject has for years been one of annoyance and mortification. The justice of the exaction has never been recognized by that nation, and the integrity of the motives by which it was dictated has always been doubted. The various payments that have been' made, under tacit protest, have not only been the occasion of financial inconvenience, but have also been looked upon as an involuntary recognition of the propriety of their imposition. The full amount has nevertheless been paid, tlie last instalment liaving been delivered in July, 1874, under circumstances whicli will receive an attentive examination hereafter. It is only necessary to say at present that the feeling of the Japanese iu regard to tlie enforcement of the demand is an extremely unj)leasant one. In the case of one of the parties it is looked upon as a mere gratification of greed; in that of others as a ruthless extortion for the purpose of attempting to carry througOi a political intrigue. With r<^spect to the United States, the position is felt to be aggravated by the facts that proposals had repeatedly been made, both in Congress and iu the public journals, to relinquish the unpaid balance of the claim, and even to restore the sura already in possession of the government, and that these proposals had been responded to hy the community with a cordiality more than sutficient to warrant the expectation that they would be formally adopted. In this confident belief, the Ja- panese considered themselves amply sustained and fortified by American opinion, and the shock of their disillusion, when the Minister of the United States, at the last moment, joined his colleagues in pressing the liquidation, produced a far more unfa- vorable effect than would have resulted from a persistent and unvarying assertion of the claim throughout. The case has now passed into history, and, in a general sense, may be considered closed, unless, indeed, it should be revived by some spontaneous instinct of equity on the part of the United States or of the three European nations concerned. All discus- sion as to the actual payment is finished. As to the justice of the grounds upon which it was required, in 18G4, and pertinaciously urged for ten years, discussion has til » r' -^ c^i.^ 2 never fiiir:;; bejjun. Like most subjectsconuceted with tlie relations between Japan and foreign powers, the origin of the " Siniouoseki Indemnity " has been allowed to lie in obscurity. Tliere has never been any serious obstacle in the way of ascer- taining the real circumstances of the affair^ but the universal indifference in regard to them has discouraged all attempts to present them in their true light. The few who have given more than a moment's thought to the matter are barely aware that, at some period more or less remote, a difficulty arose iu consequence of attacks upon foreign ships which Avere passing through the Strait of Simouoseki; that a poweiful Western fleet bombarded and destroyed the fortifications that commanded tliis strait, and that a heavy pecuniary compensation was afterward imposed for the assaults upon tlie ships and the ex[)enses incurred by the avenging ex[)edition. In America, where a disposition to release the Japanese from the fulfilment of their bond has sometimes been shown, the idea has always prevailed that the surrender of tlie few liundred tliousaiul (lollart-- in question would be an act of magnanimity, to be applauded by the world and hailed with gratitude by Japan. No suspicion of the possibility that the four powers may not have been wholly right in their hostile operations and the op- pressive exactions that followed, or tliat the restitution would be notliing more thn.u an honorable acknowledgment of i>ast error, was ever entertained by the general public. The imputed fault, or crime, as it was called, of the Japanese was taken for granted. The injurious representations of the foreign Ministers residing in Japan were never scrutinized. To this day it is currently believed that the onslaught npon Si'nionoseki and its chain of consequences were devised and carried out soleh^ in ex[)iatiou of a grave national ofi'enee. In order to bring the common vague impression upon this topic, as nearly as it can be brought, in accordance with the actual events, it may be well to state briefly and clearl}-: — I- — That three foreign vessels, American, Dutch and French, were fired upon, during the summer of 18(33, from batteries erected on the shore of the Simouoseki Strait — the north western entrance to tlie Inland Sea of Japan — and from Japanese ships Ij'ing olf the port of Simouoseki. ir. — That immedatelj'' after the assault upon the American and French vessels, retaliatory attacks were made by American and French men-of-war, by which se- vere punisliment was inflicted, involving much greater destruction of life and property than had b'-cn caused by the fire of the Japanese. III. — That ii. the summer of 18G4, the diplomatic representatives of Great Bri- tian, France, the United States and Holland, chiefly influenced by the Minister of the first named Power, agreed that a combined fleet should be sent to seize and destroy the fortifications, which was accordingly done. IV. — That in a subsequent convention, the four representatives agreed to demand the sum of $3,000,000, in compensation for " damage resulting to the interests of 3 " Treaty Powers as well as tlie expenses oceasiouod by the expedition." V. — Tliat, after many delays and postponements, the last instidments of tliis amount were paid in July, 1^74. Tliese are the simple facts, which are acknowledged by all parties. They have hitlicrto been put forward in a manner calculated to fix all the error and wrong of the various transactions upon Japan ; a circumstance which need not be wondered at, iuasmucli as all the accessible reports have proceeded from parties more or less directly intei-ested in establishing this view of the case. It is the purpose of this paper, by examining tliein witli stricter impartiality, to exhibit them in a dilferout aspect, and to demonstrate : — I. That tliere is good ground f-^r disputing the right of the above mentioned tliree sliips to be where they were when fired upon. 11. — Tliat tlie attack Avas not made by tlie government, or anj' party representing the government of Japan, as it was tlien recognized b}'' foreigners, but by a local rider who was even at tliat time on liostile terms, and afterward ia violent contest with, tlie authorities of Yedo. III. — That the first acts of reprisal were undertaken by the American and French men-of-war eith'^r o7i their independent responsibility or with the hasty concurrence of the representatives of the United States and France, and were not authorized by any instructions from tlie resjiective governments. IV. — That the American ship first attacked sustained no injury Avhatever, and the French ship was but slightly damaged, while, hy the action of the men-of-war in (piestion, heav)' punishment was inflicted in the destruction of at least one ship, a native village and a batteiy, and the killing of some thirty or forty Ja]ianese. V. — That although the plan of despatching a naval expedition to Simonoseki was mainly inspired b}' the British Minister, no ship belonging to his nation had ever been assailed at that place. VI. —That the course of the British Minister was repeatedly disaj 'proved and the expedition forbidden by his Government ; and that he was justified onl}'- after his measiires had been fully carried out, when condemnation would have been of no avail. VII. — That tlie U. S. Minister formally accepted the terms of a pecuniary adjust- ment of the affair, so far as injuries to Americans were concerned, pending the settle- ment of which he authorized a vessel representing the U. S. Navy to sail and take part in the work of destruction. VIII. — That there were positive instructions against hostilities, as well as strong moral reasons for forbearance, on the part of the French Minister, to which no consi- deration was given. IX. — That at the date of the expedition a civil war was in progress, and the Yedo Government was actually engaged in the endeavor to subjugate and chastise th« offending local ruler, but was unable to promise the o^KJuing of the Strait at any positively fixed period, although pledging itself to undertake the work as soon as suf- ficient force could be withdrawn from other oj)erations. X. — That the claim was not laid, as alleged, for " damage" and " expense ;" but was purposely made exorbitant, in the hope that it could not be paid and that the Jap- anese Grovernment would be constrained to make important political concessions, as an equivalent. XI. — That until the time of the final payment, the indebtedness had been con- stantly used as a means of exerting political pressure upon the Japanese, witli the view of accomplishing ends to w lioh the governraeut lias alway been strongly opposed, and upoa the postpoaement of which the safety of the whole empire is believed to depend. The Inland Sea of Japan, as any map will show, is surrounded by the shores of the three priacipal islands of that country. It may be entered, from the open ocean, by several nai'row passages — the Strait of Simouoseki at the West, Isumi Strait and Naruto Pass at the iiist, and the Baiigo channel at the South. Its geographical features are unlike those of any other Inland Sea. Politically, it resembles the Sea of Marmora, in the circumstance of its being entirely surii'iuded by territory belonging to a single state, aud having more than one outlet to waters which are free to all na- tions. It is an axiom of luteniational Law that the maritime territory of every state extends "to the distance of a marine league along all t\w coasts." (1) Wlieaton adds that it extends " to the straits aud sounds, bounded on both sides by the territory of " the same state, so narrow as to be commanded by cannon-shot from both shores aud "communicating from one sea to another." (2) In this broad sense, tiio application to the Inland Sea of Japan is plain enough. Every one of the straits leading to it is less than six miles in width ; that of Simouoseki is at one place not more than half a mile wide. But the statement is limited by the observation, in another place, that " if the naviga- " tion of the two seas thus connected is free, the navigation of the channel by which "they are connected ought also to be free." (3) In order, therefore, to determine as to the exclusive control of the Inland Sea by Japan, it is necessary to examine the question whether the four above mentioned passages do or do not connect two seas the use of which is legally open to all nations. The Sea of Marmora furnishes exactly the desired case in point. It is entirely enclosed by Turkish Territory. It is entered at one end by the Dardanelles and at the other by the Bosphorus, both of which are, at certain points, less than six miles wide. The position held by this Inland Sea, according to the public law of European nations, is clearly set forth by the modern authorities upon International-Jurisprudence. Wlieaton explains, at some length, that Avhile the privilege of passing through these straits has bee n conceded, by speci al ( 1 ) Dana's Wheaton : p. 270. ( 2 ) Ibid. ( 3 ) Dana'a AVheaton : p. 2G2. 5 Troatj, to the merchant ships of foreign nations, tlie i-)ermission does not extend to bhips of war. "The ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, established for its own "security, by which the entry of foreign vessels of war into the canal of Constantinople, "including the Strait of the Dardanelles and that of the Black Sea, has been at all "times prohibited, was expressly recognized by the treaty concluded at Tjondon, the "i;jth July, 1811, between the five great European Powers and the Ottoman porte."(0 The Treaty of Paris, 1856, reaffirms this right, and it should be added that even mer- chant vessels, to this day, may not make the passage Avithout a permit. Not to multiply citations, most of wliich are idoutieal in meaning if not in language, it will be sufficient to quote certain paragraphs bearing upon the subject from "The Law of Nations," by Travers Twiss. This autlior's treatment of the topic is perlmps more explicit and more comprehensive in its application than that of other contemporary writers: — " If a sea is entirely enclosed by the territory of a nation, and has no otlier com- " nuuiication witli the oci-an Hum by a channel of which that nation may lake posses- " siou, it appears that such a sea is no less capable of being occupied and becoming " propcrtv than the land, and it ought to follow the fate of tlie country that surrounds " it. . . . So, likewise, straits, which serv^e as a communication between two seas, and ot •' which the shores on both sides are the territf)ry of one and the same nation, are capable " of beiu"- reduced into the possession of that nation. . . . Whenever a nati(m has an exclu- " sive riglit over an entire sea. or over a bay, or over straits, no other nation can claim a " right of navigation therein against its will. . . . The exclusive right wliich the Ottoman " Porte exercises over the straits and the intermediate sea which c(.mneet the Mediterra- " uean Avith the Black Sea, rests upon a prescription which has obtained the formal " sanction of the Oreat P.nvers of Europe. . . . The right of the Porte hnd a lawful " origin at the time wlien the shores of the Black Sea were in the exclusive possession " of the Ottomans, but after Russia had made large territorial accpiisitions on its sliores, *' the latter Power, under the common law of European Nations, had a right to navi- " gate the waters of the Black Sea, and to pass outwards with trading vessels into the " Mediterranean. But the Ottoman Porte did not at tliat time acknowledge any Public " Law in common with the Chri.-tian Powers of Europo, and the latter Powers had not " the right, if they had possessed the might, to impose tlieir system of law upon the " Ottoman nation. Accordingly as the Ottomans regarded no other law as binding " upon them than the express stipulations of Treaties, the free navigation of the straits " was secured to the merchant vessels of Christian nations by express conventions on " the part of the Porte, with Pussia in 1774, with Great Britain in 1799, witli France " in 1802, with Prussia in 180G. The Porte has meanwhile keiit the straits closed " against war ships of all nations during the time when it has itself remained at peace " with all nations, and this practice of the Porte obtained a formal sanction, as an " ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, from the Gfreat European Powers, with the ex- ( i ) Duna'8 Whcaton : p. 26^. 6 " eeption of France, in the Treaty concluded in London, Jul}- 13tli, 1841. It lias "since been more formally confirmed as part of the public law of Europe, by tlie '• Treaty of tlie Straits, annexed to tlie Treaty of Peace concluded at Paris, March 30th, " 18-j«J." ( 5 ) The similarity, often amounting to identity, of circuinstanees between the case of Turke}' and tlijit f)f Japan, and tlie direct applicability of many of ihe above cited statements to tht.^ physical properties of Jiijian and to its political relations witli foreign nations, are obvious and indisputable. The Inland Sea " is entirely enclosed by the "territory of " Japan. It " has no oth^r communication with the ocean than b}-' a ^'channel " (or channels) " of which that nation may take possession." Japan has, tliere- fore, " an exclusive right over the entire sea " and "no other nation can claim a right " of navigation therein againstits will." That the " ancient rule of the Japanese empire " was the absolute exclusion of foreign ships from all its waters — excepting, after a cer- tain period in the IGth centuiy, the harbor of Nagasaki, which was partially ojiened — and that Japan " did not at that time acknowledge any public law in common with '* the Christian I'owers of Europe " no person will venture to deny. Mr. Twiss ex- ]>lains that the free navigation of the Turkish sea had to be " secured to the merchant " vessels of Christian nations by express conventions " at diiferent periods. No simi- lar convention for the entrance and passage of the straits and Inland Sea of Japan was ever made or jn-ojiosed by any of the foreign powers. " They had not the right, if "they possessed the might, " to penetrate them. But for the various conventions with the Porte, the mercliant ships of other European nations, which now pass by special tirman in each instance, might to tliis day be subject to obstruction in the Turkish straits ; and ships of war, as has been shown, are still prohibited, and, according to the declaration of the Sultan in 185G, the right to prohibit will never be sun'endered. (G) If international precedents have any value Avhatsoever, it is sufficiently clear that neither merchant nor war vessels of foreign countries had the right, in I8()'j or at any other time, to enter tlie Strait of Simonoseki or to traverse the Inland Sea. Their exclusion was warranted in precisely the same way that any exclusion would have been warranted by Turkey, as regards merchant ships, if exjjress agreement had not been made to admit them, and is warranted, as regards war ships, at the present time. That some vague consciousness of this fact entered into the consideration of one of the Powers concerned in the Simonoseki affair, appears evident from an " Order in Council " dated January 7th, 18GI, by the British Government, " empowering Her Majesty's '• Consul-General to issue a rule, i)lacing imder restrictions, or prohibiting altogether, " the entry (jf British vessels irto such inland waters and seas " — " whenever and so " often as it shall appear that the passage may lead to acts of disturbance or acts of vio- (5) Travera Twisa's "Law of Nations" etc: Vol I— pp. 250, 251, 260, 261. (6) Lawrence's Wheaton: p. 331, note.— rhillimore, Vol. Ill, Appendix, p. 828.— Treaties and Ckjnvenliona between the U. S. and other rowers: Washington 1873.— ^p. Gol. " lence or may otlienvlse enJanger the peaceful relations and iutercourse between Her " Majesty's subjects and the subjects of tlie Tj^coon of Japan." ( 7 ) But the full right of obstruction, as demonstrated above, does not seem to have been recognized or duly estimated. Enough has now been shown to prove that the ships of war were not fairly entitled to force a passage tlu'ough the Sea. In respect to the merchantman — an American steamer — it will hereafter appear that there were additional reasons in justification of lier detention, and probably of her seizure . Tlie history of tlie assaults upon tlie three foreign craft, and of the subsequent unauthorized and partially authoriz "(l (possiblj^, also, in rare instances fully authorized) operations of foreigners, may now bi examined. A few preliminary words, only, are necessary to explain the political situation of the country at the tiine. Although the sovereiuiity of J;t] an alwa3's rested witli the Mikado, the executive control had been for man v centuries entrusted to a powerful vassal, known to foreigners, since 1854, as the Taikun or Tycoon. For two hundred and fifty years this office had been held in a single family, that of Tokugawa, the founder of wliich established a system of government wliic'i, he belip .el, was calculated to secure the virtual command of the empire to his descendants fore \er. At that remote date, the probable evils of foreign influence upon his dynasty, iu rase such influence should ever be brought to bear, were clearly foreseen. Absolute exclusion of strangers, except under such rigid restrictions as those to which the Dutch were subjected — they being the only Euro- peans admitted to any sort of intei-c >nise — was a fundam»^utal rule of the system whicli he bequeathed, and was maintain.:! unshaken until th :^ arrival of Commodore Perry. Up to that time, the sway of tlie Tokugawa family had never wavered. The oppressive rigor with which the numirius daimios, or feudal noblemen, were often treated, had created mucli discontent, but none was bold enough to venture to resist the long unbroken authority. The adv ;it of foreigners gave a sudden impulse to the disafFectod. Actuated partly by motivt >f hostility toward the government of the Taikun, and partly by the animosit}' toward all strangers which, in the course of successive 3'ears, had spread throughout the country and become a national sentiment, they strove in many ways to make the reception of representatives from abroad a source of embarrassment to the Yedo rulers. Although the Court of the Mikado, at Kioto, had been nowise concerned in the (-riginal expulsion of foreigners, it had grown to share the universal feeling, and was, during the decade succeeding the visit of Perry, ready to take a leading part in any demonstration against them. While personal rivalries prevented, for a long time, anything like perfect unanimity of action, there was always one or more of the great daimios engaged in concerting schemes with the Kioto officials for the overthrow of the Taikun and the ejection of the unwelcome visitors. Sometimes the two objects \vere united, sometimes they were separately ( 7 ) Correspondence respecting Affairs in Jap.in : Presented to Parliament. 1865 : No. 1, pp. 2, 3. 8 pursued. The result was, tliat, long Lefore 18G3, the once absolute power of tlie Taikun was almost irremediably sliattered. From a very early period, Lis government recognised tlie necessity of gradual intercourse with outside nations ; l)ut how to re- concile this course with the obstinate traditions of the people was a problem that ex- liausted the ingenuity of the Yedo councillors for a dozen years, and in the attempts to solve which they at last fell to utter ruin. At tlie b(^ginning of the year 18G3, the country was virtually iu a state of anarchy. Many of the local chiefs were in rebellion. A bloody warfare was impending in the Impori;il (•a[)ital (Kioto) between the forces of the Taikun and the daimio who, we shall fiud, was immediately responsible for the attacks upon foreign ships at Simonoseki. Tlie vital anxieties of the TokugaAva governmcut, and the difHculties, not to say perils, of its position, were apparent to everybody— to none more clearly than to the diplomatic agents of Europe and Ame- rica. But they had been accredited to tlie Taikun, and to him alone they continued to look, as maintaining the supreme authority. " AVe regard him," the British Minister, wrote, a little later, "as the Treaty-making Power; will not admit any question of his " competency, and hold him responsible for its execution." ( 8 ) During all this term of trouble, the Yedo ofHcials were unremitting in their efforts to .ti-et rid of one, and the principal, cause of their disquietude, by suggestions to the jvneign Ministers, pointing to such restrictions and limitations upon their citizens as might avert the danger of molestation by hostile daimios or their subor- dinates. These suggestions were not listened to. It was not, in the natuie of things, to be exi'octed that they should be. AVhat the members of the government would have wished, was the entire withdrawal of the disturbing element, but this they knew was out of the question. They therefore confined themselves to well-intended but futile endoaAors to prevent the actions of foreigners from becoming the cause of N-i.dtmee on the part of turbulent Japanese, and thus leading to neAv and more dangerous complications. If they had possessed greater political knowledge, or had enjoyed the advantage of foreign legal advice, these endeavors need not have been futile. They might have learned that they were entitled to close the Inland Sea uud the straits leading to it, in time to provide against disasters which they knew to be impending md which actually ensm^d. It was not the j.art of diplomatic agents to supply them with the required information, and, indeed, from the complacent confidence of their later proceedings, it is a cpiestiou whether the agents themselves possessed it. Among the most active opponents both of the Tokugawa dynasty and the policy entertained by the Taikun in regard to foreigners was the lord of Chosiu, one of whofie provinces, Nagato, borders a part of the Inland Sea and the eastern side of the Simonoseki Strait. Acting undoubtedly of his own will, but sustained and en- couraged by the Kioto Court, this daimio, in the summer of 1863, erected shoro ( 8 ) Correspondence respecting Affairs in Jiipan, No, 1, iy«.3 p. I'JG. 9 Latteries commanding the narrowest part of the channel, and phinted armed vessels where they could most advantageously co-operate in attacks upon passing ships. It does not, however, appear that his first intention was more than to prevent entrance to the Inland Sea, inasmuch as blank guns of warning were fired, in several instances, before any destructive assault was commenced. On the afternoon of June 2'jth, a small American merchant steamer, the Pembroke, on her way from Yokohama to Nagasaki, anchored near the town of Simonoseki, half way through the Strait. Guns were fired, but none were directed against the Fenihro/a' until one o'clock the next morning when two sliips belonging to Chosiu attacked her. She hastily steamed soutliward, and escaped luiiujured, and unpursued, through the Bungo channel. News of this occurrence reached Yedo on the 11th of July, and was straightway transmitted to Mr. rruyn, the U. S. Minister, then residing at Yokohama. That gentleman, on the r2th. sent for the governor of Kanagawa, made known the claim for damages that had already been presented by the owners of the Peinbrohc (!)) and stated that for the insult offered to the United States, flag ample satisfaction would be demanded. Immediately after this interview, he conferred with Commander McDougal, of the U. 8. S. Wi/oiniiaj, then in Yokohama harbor, and " was gratified " to find he had decided to proceed instantly to the Strait, for the purpose of seizing " and, if needful, destroying, the two vessels " that had made the attack. (10) The iri/oiitiixj left Yokohama on the 13th, and reached Simonoseki on the IGth. As she approached, guns were discharged, but not at her. As soon as she discovered the Chosiu sliips, of which there were three lying at anchor, she advanced iipon tliem with great vigor and boldness. An engagement ensued, in the course of which the WijomiiHj was subjected to the fire of these vessels and also of several land batteries. She succeeded, nevertheless, in sinking a brig and exploding the boilers of a steamer. The loss of life she inflicted is not known. Her own casualties were five killed and six wounded. She returned to Yokohama on the 20th. In reporting this case to the U. S. Government, on the 24tli of July, Mr. Pruyu made no fui-ther allusion to the objects of the Pembroke'' s voyage than to intimate that she was on the waj- to Nagasaki. An affidavit of the officers, forAvarded by him, stated that she was sailing " from Yokohama to Shanghai, via the Inland Sea and " Nagasaki." It may be remarked that the quickest and moot direct route from Yokohama to Nagasaki is not by the Inland Sea. It does not appe ar that Mr . ( 9 ) This neat little claim is a curiosity in its way. It ran as follows : " Statement of loss suffered in consequencf of a murderous assault made upon the steamer Pc ml role, in the Inland Sea, on the 19th June, by armed vessels Hying the flag of the government of Japan." Less of time by being obliged to go through an unknown and circuitous passage to reach the open sea; five days at S300 S 1, 500 Loss of freight and passengers, through not being able to visit Nagasaki, whither she was bound : estimated at $ C, 500 Consideration to be distributed among the officers and crew, as recompense for the deadly peril to which they were subjected S 2, 000 S 10, 000 ( 10) U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 18G3-4 : p. 1130. 10 rruyn ever found it necessary to investigate her movements more closely ; but accord- ing to iiiformation from the State Dejiartment, where the case Avas thoroughly examined, she was believed to he engaged in an attempt to communicate with the town of Simonoseki, probably for purposes of trade, and therefore not entitled to protection. Mr. Wm. Beaoli Lawrence, in his " Commentaire sur I'llistoire des Progres du droit des Gens," wliile res'iewing tlie relations between Japan and foreign nations, speaks of this matter as follows : — "Un vaisseau Americain ouvre les hosti- "lites. An mois de Juillet, 18G3, un vaisseau de guerre des Etats Uuis attaqua et "coida au fond des navires de guerre Janonais, sous pretexte qu' un navire apparten- "ant a un dairaio Japonais avait tire sur un vajteur raarchand Amc'riciiiu. D' apj-es le "compte rendu, il seniblerait que I'oflicier Americain aurait agi sans attendre des "renseignements precis, et que le vapeur marcliand que Ton croj'ait coiile, n'avait "pas souffert le moindre avarie. II parait aussi que le vapeur Americain se trouvait "dans des eaux fermees au commerce etranger." ( 11 ) On the 8th or 9th of July, a French gunboat, the KicnrJidiKj, was also fired upon while at anclior in tlie Strait, and seriously injured. The intelligence was received in Yokohama on tlie loth, and, on the 16th, tlie frigate Scmh-diniH 'M\i\i\\Q gunboat I'mi- cri'dc, under Hear- Admiral Jaures, started on a retaliatory expedition. Again, guns were fired as the vessels approached the batteries, but not upon tliem. Tlie engage- ment, on the part of the naval force, was short, and one of the batteries was speedily silenced, several gunners being killed. Two hundred and fifty men were landed, and about twenty other Japanese were bayoneted in skirmishes. The guns of the lort were spiked, the carriages burned, and the ammunition destroj'ed. A neighboring village was also burned. The entire destruction of life was larger than could be easily estima- ted. On the French side, the casualties were three men wounded. The Dutch ship-of-war J/n/n-sa sailed from Nagasaki Jvdy 9th, with the intention of passing through Straits and Sea to Yokohama. Soon after starting, she met the Kicnchdiifj, and learned the facts tliat cannon were planted at Simonoseki, and foreign vessels liable to be fired upon. The Mcdiim was not deterred by this information. She prf)ceeded on her way, and, on n(\arlng the position of danger, received the usual ad- monition of blank discharges. As she continued to advance, she was fired upon from two Choshiu ships, and from tlie fmtifications. She responded with such effect as to silence one battery and render the cannonading from the attacking vessels inefiective. What loss of life She infiicted is not known. Among her own oificers and crew, four were killed, and five wounded. The Pciiihroh,', tlie Kloiclidntj, and the Medusa were the only foreign ships in respect to which anything like wanton molestation can be alleged. The right of the first to be where she was is not recognized by the U. S. Government. Tliat of ( 11 ) " Coiiiimntairc," etc. A'ol. 1, p. l-iO. 11 tlie otlier two is opposed by the riiblic Law of European nations. But, to waive this point for a moment, it is plain that tlie injuries inflicted on two of them met with instant and ample retribution. To what extent the 3I('dtisa avenged herself has not been recorded, but it is fair to presume that the Japanese casualties were at least equal to those wliich she suffered. It is wortliy of remark tliat, in a despatch to the Taikun's Ministers of Foreign Affairs, describing tlie excursion of the Wijommfj, !Mr. Pruyu complained that that vessel was fired into " witliout the provocation of a shot on her part, and demanded " reparation to be made for the insult and injmy " to her as to well as the Pcmhrohc. (12 )In view of tlie avowed purpose of the Wijomiix/s voyage, whicli was to commit an unantliorizcd act of war, this method of dealing witli the aifair was not, to sa}^ the least, ingenuous. In the case of the French attack, the Japanese did not commence tlie engagoiuont. The Scinii-ainia fired first. Tliese events all occurred within the space of one month. It should be especially noted tliat no British ship was ever assailed, at any time. The only connection of tlie English authorities with the business was the voluntarj' despatch, by Admiral Kuper, of Her Majesty's ship Coijucifc, to comnninicato with Admiral James, and to be at " his disposal in case of need."( 1-0 That is to say, the British commander offered, and in fact sent, one of his fleet, to take part in an act of war for whi(,'h, so far as his nation was concerned, there was not the shadow of justification. Yet the British Charge d' Affaires did not hesitate to write that if the Coquette \\q.^ been fired upon, under these circumstances, it woidd have had the effect of " completing the series of "outrages and insults directed against the flags of three of the Treaty Powers." ( 1-1 ) But the British man-of-war did not arrive in time, and the anticipated, not to say desired, union of hostile interests was not at that time perfected. Nevertheless, the impression beeanie universal, and continues, in greater or less degree, to the present day, that English craft suffered eqally with those of the three other countries. This is undoubtedly due, in a great measure, to the ardor with Avhieh the British repre- seutatives in Japan took up the quarrel. To show how general the conviction was, it may be mentioned that Mr. Seward, Avriting to Mr. Bruyn Oct. 3rd, 18 03, alluded to " aggressions committed against British merchantmen," without the sllj^htest indi- cation of doubt as to whether any such had or had not been committed. (1;)) The representatives of the Foreign Bowers lost no time in calling the government to further account. On the 2-3th of July, they agreed in convention that it was " in- " dispensable for the maintenance of the rights secured by the Treaties concluded with "Japan, to proceed immediately to the re-opening of the Inland Sea, " and that it appeard " nescessary to them to establish a combined action of the naval and military ( 12) T'. S. Dip. Corrospondenco, 1863-4 : p. 11.'39. (13) Correspondence respix-tiDg Affairs in .Japan, lSr)4 : p. 84. ( 14 ) Correspondence respefting Affairs in .lapan, 1804 : p. 84. ( 15) U. S. Dip. t'orresijuudenue, 1803-4 : p. IbJl. 12 •'forces available in these seas. "(16) It is needless to say tliat this determination was arrived at without knowledge of the view that might afterward be taken by the liome authorities. It was the premonition of actions which subsequently shaped them- selves into a war declared and conducted, not by the four governments, but b}' the dip- lomatic agents thereof, on their own account. It was communicated to the Japanese with the extravagant emphasis common at that period, and which may then have seemed suitable and essential to those who employed it, but wliich does not now satisfy im- ]>avtii)l judgment as having been either necessary or politic. On the 23rd of July, at an interview between a member of the Yedo council and the foreign Envoys, the Ja- panese minister stated that the Taikun "could not of course approve of such conduct " as that of the daimio of Chosiu. (17) On the 28th, the British Charge wrote to tlie officials, accusing the Taikun of complicity in an " outrageous and lawless attempt to "cancel solemn Treaties by violent and outrageous acts," declaring that " no delay " was admissible in the destruction of the batteries " ( by the Taikun ), and asserting that " tliirty days liad now elapsed ( since the assault on the Pembroke ) during which " the governmeut might have arrested the outrages of this daimio, if enabled to do so. " ( 18) The logic of this despatch was as hazy as its tone was intemperate. It recognized the possibility that the Taikun might not have been enabled to cheek the course of Chosiu, and yet proclaimed that no delay was admissible. It stated that the oppor- tunity of restraining that daimio had existed for thirty days, when, in fact, the Pe>n- hrolo affair had been known in Yedo only seventeen daj^s. The British Charge was ^^•ell aware that the Taikuu's government was all this time in great confusion; that its head was detained in Kioto by the gravest necessities of state, and that his personal safety as well as his political authority was menaced by this same rebellious daimio. Mr. Pruyn, who knew no more and no less of the situation than his colleague did, found a ready excuse for the government's failui'e to inflict punishment themselves. " This " you doubtless omitted to do, " he wrote on the 20th of July, " as all your forces at "that time were required fur the defence of His Majesty tJie Taikun. " (10) The Yedo cabinet did not attempt to conceal the painful embarrassments of their position, and while they promised to " take measures," frankly acknowledged that it would be necessary to " wait some time for that arrangement. "(20) The communications of the foreign Ministers were curiously self-contradictory, in the fact that while they admitted the impracticability of immediate action they nevertheless veliemently insisted upon it. On the 2r)tli, Mr. Bruyn wrote thus — " Your excellencies must see that not even " the delay of a day can be justificd."(21) In common with his colleagues, ho not only assumed to instruct the Japanese in all the details of the course which, he declared, they ( K; ) TT. S. Dip. Con-cspondenco, 1863-4 : p. 1144. ( 17) U. S. Dip. Corre.sdondencc, 1803-4 : p. 1134. ( 18) Corre8])()nd(ncc ri'specling Aflkirs in J;ij)an, 18G4 : p. 89. ( 19) T'. S. Dip. ("oiT. spundence, l.S()3-l : p. 1138. (20 I IT. S. Dip. Correspondunce, 18(53-4: p. 1144. (21 ) U. y. Dip. Correspondence, 1863-4 : p. 1145. 13 were bound to take respecting foreigners, but, with tlie tone of assurance which is pre- served to this day by European and American Envoys, gave them homilies as to the con- duct of their own internal affairs. Tlie most casual glance at their published correspond- ence is sufficient to show that no similar language has ever been addressed to any other government with which the "Western Powers were at peace, or with which they desired to remain at peace. The well-known weakness of Japan, and its internecine disorders, made this an easy matter — as its comparative feebleness makes it safe and easy now. It could not then be, and it is not now, openly resented; but it never has been, never will be, and never ought to be forgotten. The declarations of the government, written and verbal, to the rejiresentatives of the four nations, were unchanging in their assurances of good faith, and in their reiterations that nothing but the anomalous political state of affairs preverted them from executing the Treaty obligations with promptness and fldelit3^ All they asked for was time. The Taikun was engaged in a desperate struggle to maintain the an- cient sway of his family — a sway that was imperilled chiefly through the presence of strangers in the land. Yet he endeavored fairly to fulfil his pledges to the strangers. As a vassal of the Mikado, he was compelled to listen to the orders of expulsion issued by the Kioto Court, aud not to ajipear to disregard them. As the medium of communication between the Mikado and the daimios, he was forced to couvey to the latter the sentiments of his sovereign, an d to publish his decrees. But his secret agents were busy in making known his real views of what was essential to the public welfare, and his chief Ministers were open and undisguised in their avowals, to the foreign representatives, that though their master was compelled to temporize at Kioto, his ultimate actions would prove that his intentions were straightforward and upright. The British Charge and the U. S. Minister reported these statements, but bhowed no disposition to credit them. At the present day, their genuineness is sel- dom questioned. Mr. F. 0. Adams, the British Charge d' Affaires in 1871, whom no person will accuse of anti-foreign tendencies, in his recently published "History "of Japan" writes thus : — "I tliink it is quite clear now that the Siogun's Ministers "were sincere when they said that the Mikado's edict of expulsion, thongh conveyed 'to the representatives as a matter of obligation, would in fact be nothing but a "dead letter. " (22) The same autlior, after showing that the Siogun's party succeeded, by a struggle in debate and in the field, which lasted many months, in bringing the contumacious Daimio of Chosiu into disgrace with the Mikado, says : — " Thus ended "18G3, and it seemed that tlie wiser counsels of the bakufu (Yedo government) were "prevailing in regard to the policy toward foreigners, and that from this time, as the "native writer complains, ' the scheme of expelling the barbarians fell to pieces like " * ice during a thaw.' '" (23) ( 22 ) Adams's " History of Japan : " Vol. T. p. 30arations for a c-ivil war, and by the exactions of the British for other indemnities. Mr. Pruyn also brought forward the case of the W>/oniiiig, again urging the point that this ship had been fired upon " before any provocation was given," and stating that he did not wish to demand any compensation for the insult to to the flag, but that " if the government " were disposed to offer a sum which would proAide annuities for the families of. the " dead, and for the wounded," he would, " for Ihe purpose of giving further proof of "friendship and moderation, take the responsibility of settling the entire case on such "basis." Let it not be forgotten that these dead and wounded were sufferers in an eno-ao-emeut which the Wi/om'nig left Yokohama with the avowed purpose of forcing upon the Japanese. The officials very naturally replied that " the government had " been disposed to regard that offence as fairly offset by the punishment inflicted," to which no response was made. ( 24 ) The subject was then allowed to rest for several months, during which, however, Mr. Pruyn was actively occupied in pressing new claims for damages sustained by American citizens. In the course of his correspond- ence he made the following remarkable statement, which, apparently, he intended to apply only to responsibilties on the part of the U. S. Government : — " There have " been very many instances where Japanese have been grossly maltreated by foreigners, " and no indemnity asked or paid. Indeed, it admits of some question whether it " would be safe, in view of the character of the floating population of the Treaty " Powers, to establish the principle of the liability of a government for the act of its "individual citizens or subjects." ( 25 ) Put no such question appears to liave entered the Minister's mind, with regard to the liability of the Taikun for Chosiu's deeds. In March, 1864, Sir Rutherford Aleock returned to Japan, relieving Colonel Neale from his duties as Charge. From this moment, the British Legation was animated by a new activity in the advocacy of violent measures against the offending daimio. Sir Rutherford was even keener than Colonel Neale had shown himself, in the desire to organize a powerful force for the reduction of the Simonoseki batteries. Their guiding motives were not, however, identical. In his last despatch, dated Mai-ch 1st, Colonel Neale wrote :— " Unless for the pin-pose of vindicating our right of " passage, I am not aware of any detriment sustained to our commerce or navigation in "this country by this temporary obstruction." ( 26 ) The grammatical obscurity of this sentence does not entirely hide the writer's meaning. He desired to say that he knew of no detriment of the kinds alluded to, and that the reopening of the Strait was ( '21 ) T'. R. Dip. Correspondence, 18C1-5 : p. 4o9. •25) U. S. Dip. Correspondence, 18G4-5: p. 485 ( 25 ) U. S. Dip. Correspont (20) Corrcspoudence respecting Attuirs in Jiipan; 1865, No. 1 : p. 12. 15 unnecessary, " unless for the purposes," etc. Sir Rutherford Alcock, on the other hand, immediately took the ground fliat the existence of the batteries would lead to the overthrow of foreign trade. Moreover, in his first communicati(Ui to his own govern- ment, he broadly accused the Japanese of •' firing indiscriminately on all flags," ( 27 ) whereas, as has been shown,- no English ship had been assailed. Perhaps it is to(j much to expect that Ministers in the East, when pursuing a cherished design, should be trammeled by mere considerations of fact. That the arrangement of the Simono- seki expedition was one of the highest objects of Sir llutherford's ambition, no person wlio reads the diplomatic papers of the time can doubt. Colonel Neale had just gained much notoriety at home — not altogether of an enviable kind — by the attack upon Kagosima and the collection of a large amount of money from Japan, and it really seems as if tlie newly -returned Minister coveted a similar distinction. That he was conspicuously enteri[)rising and alert in the matter has not escaped the notice of his countrymen. Mr. Adams says : — " Sir 11. Alcook noAv felt that the time for striking " a blow had arrived. . . The British envoy thei-efore put himself in communication "with his colleagues, witli the object of coming to a decision without loss of time." ( 28 ) The opportunities were certainly favorable. An unusually large British fleet had been gathered for the Kagosima affair, and still remained in Japanese waters. The Taikuu's Government was in as deep difficulty as ever, and could only interpose protests. And the associate representatives were not unwilling. It Avas not necessary to consult the home governments, two of which, at least, as the published records show, knew little or nothing al)Out the matter. The ignorance of Mr. Seward, as to what ships were originall}^ attacked, has been mentioned. In May, 1864, Earl Cowley, describing an interview between M. Droujni de I'lluys and the special Japanese Com- mission sent to Paris, quotes the French Secretary as saying that the Taikun " was " vv^illing to reopen some passage which had been closed to foreign ship- " ping, the name of which M. Drouyn de I'Huys could not remember." ( 29 ) Mr. Adams furthermore says that " every month deferred would render " the position more difficult." He could have added that a single week defer- red might, at the end, have rendered the expedition impossible, by bringing the im- perative injunctions of the British Foreign Office, which will presently be cited. The labor of securing tlie co-operation of the envoys, even if it had proved difficult, would doubtless have been of the kind that " physics pain." But it was not difficult. They were all ready to participate, with such force as they could command. Sir (27) Correspondence respecting Affairs in Japan; 180.5, No. 1 : p. 11. (28)History of Japan, Vol. 1, p. 376-7. Sir Eutherford, indeed, did not hesilato to avow himself the leading spirit of the enterprise. Keviewing a part of liis own course, he wrote, in August, 18(54, as follows: — " On returning to Japan, six months ago, my first ohjcct . . . was to bind together in unity of policy and " action all tlie other Treaty Powers who had diplomatic representatives, and any material force on the spot " to give effect to the resolution which might he taken " The immediate end in view was the removal "of the obstructions to the navigation of "the Inland Sea." [CoiTCspondence respecting Affairs in Japan, 1865, No. 1 : p. 86.] (29) Correspondence respecting Affairs in Japan; 1865, No. 1 : p. 13. 16 Rutherford was constrained, tlien, only to make sucli representations as should obtain, in advance, the approval of his official superiors in England. He is a skilful and vjo-orous writer, though diffuse, and he spared no ingenuity of argument or artifice of rhetoric to present his case in the light best suited to ensure the fulfilment of his plans. It is possible that the vehemence he displayed may have produced a state of feeling totally opposed to that which he desired to create. It is certain that his despatches were overburdened with a bitterness seldom found in documents of state. Pages of obloquy were piled together with an apparent dctennination to extinguish every spark of sympathy for the Japanese, as a people and as a government. Their pretensions to honour, integrity, veracity, every quality of dignity and manliness, were buried beneath the weight of his oppressive ii-ouy or ponderous scorn. For their misfortunes he had no word of commiseration. For the convulsions into which the advent of his countrymen, in common with others, had thrown an entire people, he had nothing but ridicule. From the time of his arrival until the month of September, 186-4, he rang unceasinf changes of injurious accusation and of misrepresentation which was as damag- in f as if it had been fraudulently intentional. He bore himself not as a minister of peace and goodwill to a harrassed, distressed, and tottering government, but as a messenger of wrath and venn-eance, quick to conceive and eager to execute schemes of broad destruc- tion. He held himself in the attitude of a power superior in itself alone to the humanity by wiuch it was surrounded ; endowed with the wisdom to judge, the right to condemn, and the might to inflict the direst penalties of war upon a nation. Whether the result accorded wholly with his efforts and his expectations will now be seen. On the 2Gth of July, Earl Russell, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Sir Rutherford Alcock thus: — "I have to state to you, with reference to the " despatches which I have lately received from you, tliat Her Majesty's Government "positively enjoin you not to undertake any military operation whatever in the " interior of Japan ; and they would indeed regret the adoption of any measures of " hostility against the Japanese government or princes, even though limited to naval " operations, uuless absolutely required by self-defeuce. ... It may be hoped that " the power vested in you by Her Majesty's Order in Council of the 7th of January "last, to prohibit or regulate, or restrict, the entrance or passage of British ships into t' straits or waters of Japan, when such entrance may lead to acts of disturbance or "acts of violence, or may otherwise endanger the maintenance of peaceful relations or "intercourse between Her Majesty's subjects and the subjects of the Taikun of Japan, " will enable you to prevent the occurrence of the necessity for any such measures of " hostility to obtain redress for injuries done to British vessels," (30) (30) Correspondence rcspcctiuj,' Affiiirs in Japan: lfi7=i, N". 1 : P- 4.").- -Mr. Truyn speaks of this despatch as having been " fortunately received after the sailing of the expedition." 17 Copies of tills despatch were communicated to the governments of the United States, France, and Ilolland, that there might be no misunderstanding as to the posi- tion taken hy Great Britain. On the 8th of August, Earl Russell wrote recallin"- Sir Riitheribrd Alcock, " to explain tho actual situation of affairs and confer with ** Her Majesty's Government as to the measures to be taken." He added: — " I do " not understand that the passage of the Inland Sea is at all necessary for purposes •' of foreign commerce, so long as Osaka is not open and the Mikado remains in seclu- " sion at Kioto. " (31) With regard to this latter statement it may be mentioned tliat even witli Osaka opened,, as it now is, the Inland Sea has still to be entered from the East by straits which are less than six miles in width, and none of the ports between these inner passages and Simonoseki are legally accessible to foreio-ners. On the 18th of August, Earl Russell wrote as follows : — " From your recent " despatches and from other trustworthy information, it appears that the injuries inflict- " ed by the batteries and troops of the Prince of Nagato ( Chosiu ) on ships navio-at- " ing the Inland Sea, concerned the governments of France, the United States, and '• the Netherlands ; that tlie French government have expressed themselves satisfied '' with the piiirslinient they have already inflicted on the agents and soldiers of the " Prince of Na::ato ; that the United States' Minister declined to take stops of a war- '• like nature till fresh forces of liis nation should arrive ; that the iJutch envoy and '• the Dutch government alone desire that Her Majesty's naval forces should proceed '* to measures of coercion in the Inland Sea. It appears, furtlior that the navigation '• of the Inland Sea is not necessary for purposes of European and American com- " merce so long as Kioto and Osaka are shut to foreigners : that the Taikun still " professes an intenti 'U to cha.stise the Prince of Nagato for his hostile acts. .. '• In these circumstances. Her Majesty's gfivernment are of opinion that you should not " re(|uire Admiral Kuper to act in a hostile manner against the Prince of Nagato." (32) Again, and finally, on the 20th f)f August, he said: — " As soon as you can make " ariangemenis for your return liome, you will inform the Japanese Government that '* you are to proceed to England on leave of absence, and that Mr. Consul Winchester '• will thereupon act as Her Majesty's Charge d' Affaires. On making over to Mr. " Winchester the charge of the Mission, you will caution him in the strongest terms " against having recourse to any aggressi\e proceeding."(33) Not one of these messages arrived in time to avert the catastrophe. If the first had been sent a few days sooner, the expedition would not have taken place, for the Brit- ish fleet outnuuiberod all the vessels of the other powers combined, and without its co-operation success wouhl have been doubtful, and the scheme must inevitably have Iteeu abandoned. (31 ) Correspon'leiice respocling; Affiiir? in Jap;iii ; ISfJ-'), No. 1 : p. 54 ( ;{"2 ) Correspondence re.--poctiiig AfJjiirs in Japan; IbG^}. No. 1 : p. 56. \_'i'i] L'orrespoudeiice ^■e^p( eting' Afl'airs in Japan; lb*.'>o, No. 1 : p. 07. 18 Tlic action of tho French MiulBter may be more briefly exaralaotl. M. de Bi^lle- eourt, who assisted at the earlier coiifereuces ovt^r this matter, was re'ievtHl, in May, by M. L^.>n lloehes. This gentleman was strange to Japan, and he found it ex)ie- dient to follow in the path that had been laid out by the older residents. I low far he was wan-anted in doing so is an open question. It does not snem to have been in ac- cordance with the views of his government, and, indeed, there was, in various stages of the affair, an apparent lack of understanding between the French Foreign Ofiice and the Envoy in Japan. The ignorance of M. Drouyn de Lhuys concerning tlio Strait of Simonoseki has been mentioned. It is also on record that while M. Ivochcs was actively aiding the projects of the British representative at Yokohama, the Secre- tary in Paris was assuring Earl Cowley, according to a note from the latter dated August 12th, that "his last despatches" informed him that Sii- II. Alcock "had been " promised the active support of the Dutch and United States' Ministers, and the moial "support of the Minister of France, the latter's instructions preventiiig him from cn- " gaging in hostilities except for the protection of French interests." ( .'J4 ) By this it is made sufficiently clear that the French agent was as po.sitively IVn-bidden as the English had been, to engage, of his own motion, in any aggressive movements. But there i.s another important consideration to be looked at in connection with the French share in the work. During the summer of 1864, a JapanehS enil assy visited Paris for the purpose of discussing and, if possible, settling this and other mat- ters of debate between the two governments. On the 2oth of June, a (onvention was concluded, to be considered as forming an integral part of the Treaty of 18-08, ofwliich the following were the first two articles : " En reparation de I'acte d'hostilite oommis, au mois de Juillet, 1863, contre le *' batiment de la marine imperial le ' Kienchang,' sui- lequel des coui)s de canon ont " ete tires, dans le province de Nagato, le Gouvernement Japonais s' engage a verser " entre les mains du Ministre de Sa Majeste 1' Einpereur des Francais a Yedo, trois " mois apres le retour de leurs Excellences les Ambtissadeurs du Taikun au Japon, une "iudemnite de 140,000 piastres Mexicaines, dont 100,000 piastres seront jjayeespar le " Grouvernement lui-meme, et 40,000 [)iastres par 1' Autoritie de la province de " Nagato." " Le Gouvernement Japonais s'engage ^galement a faire cesser, dans les trois "mois qui suivront le retour de leurs Excellences les Ambassadeurs du Taikun au "Japon, les empechements que rencontrcnt en ce moment les navires Francais qui " veulent passer le Detroit de Simonoseki, et a maintenii' ce pac.sage libro en tout temps, en recourant, si cela est nccessaire, a 1' emploi de la force, en agissant do •' concert avec le Commandant de la division navale Francaise." ( 35 ) This embassy returned to Japan on the 19th of August. The departure of th« (34 ) Correspond nf'e roppocting AffMirs in .Japan ; 1865, No. 1 : p. ( 35 ) CorreBpondonce re«pccting Affaiib in Japan; I8G5, No. 1 : p. UTiitoa fleet liad been fixed tor the ^Oth of that mouth. But, hearing tho nature of the couveutiou that had been agreed upon, the four envoys resolved to suspend action until it could be learned wliether the government would or would not subscribe to the various pledges. This delay was merely an empty form. Mr Pruyn distinctly stated, in a letter to Mr. Seward, that he was ''satisfied that the envoys liad entered into engage- " ments which the Taikun could not ratify, as lie would thereby immediately iuaugu- •'rate a civil war, and that if ratified they could not be carried out." (-Hi} Llis conjt o- ture was correct. As regarded the payment of the indemnities proposed, notwithstand- ing the conviction of their injustice, the government were willing to .stand by the ])romises of the ambassadors. The opening of the Strait, within the specified time, they declared to be impossible. All the Taikun's forces were occupied in a struggle with Chosiu's troops in the interior, and, evea if he had had mon and ships to devott; to the task, tlie attempt to execute it at that moment would have brought upon him the concentrated hostility of the daiiuios who sympathized with the powerful agitator. The Japanese Minister, in answering the inquiry, wrote; "Should the convention be " carried out, it is certain that civil commotion would be the result, ultimately leading " to a rupture of the friendly relations between the two countries" ( Fiance and Ja}van). (37) It was declared that the ambassadors had gone beyond their instructions, and, th aigh they had acted with good intention, their proceedings, on this single point, must be disavowed. Errors of judgment like theirs are not unprecedented '"n the history of domestic wars. The declaration of the chief Minister of State under Presi- dent Lincoln, that the conti^st which lasted more than four years would be terminated in two months, is not forgotten. It was as im[)racticable for the Taikun to take immediate possession of Simonoseki as it would have been for the United States' government to open the Southern ports within the limit of Mr. Seward's famous sixty days. The Paris convention was a blunder, that was all. But it served to reveal the disposition of the French Go\-ernment to deal with the matter on peaceful and reasonable terms — by negociation, and not by making haste to shed blood. This cir- cumstance, no less than the fact that his instructions, according to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, " prevented " M. Roches from engaging in hostilities, should have weighed effectively against the representations of his urgent colleagues. The instructions, whatever the French Foreign Office may have intended, did not in fact prevent him, and he forthwith sanctioned tho de:iarture of his three sliips-of-war with the rest of the squadron. (3(5) U. S. Dip. C.^rrcspondpDce; 1S64-5, y. .544. On this point, Sir Rulherford Alcock cxprcssfd him- Belf thus :— " If the Taikun ratified Ihe convention, it was clear he must accept a position of puWic antago- "nism to thi- Mikado and the powerful partisans of a policy hostile to foreig^ncrs, which hitherto it had heen " his 1 lain c^«re to avoid, as calculated to ensure his perdition hy an order for his deposition from Kioto, if by " no other liieaus. . . . The only alternative offering any chance of safety lay in the repudiation of this 'i'rcaty, •' and a refusal, on the ground of inability, to carry it out. This course was taken." [Correspondence respect- ing Affairs in Japan ; 1865, No. 1 : p. 88. ] (37) U. S. Dip. Correspondence, 186-1: p. 549. 20 The Minister of the United States, on or about the Lst of August, 186 1, received a writtea promise, the terms of which were dictated by himself, that on the 5th of September the sum of twelve thousand dollars, principal and interest of the Pembroke claim, should bo paid. The government handed him a document empowering him to collect public dues, at Yokohama, for that amount, in ca?e it was not otherwise tendered. Respecting the extra two thousand dollars, Mr. Pruyn wrote home : — " Some " months before, I had notified them (the government) that I should expect interest, " thinking it would hasten the payment of the principal sum. . . . The owners of " the Pembroke neither applied for nor expected interest ; nor did I ask fur it on tlieii- " behalf, but only to accelerate the payment of the principal." ('i8) The process of reasoning hy which Mr. Pru^'n justified to himself this extraordinary method of doing business would be a subject for curious speculation. But the amateur of diplomatic curiosities has only to turn the pages of the correspondence from Japan to any foreign government, at tliis period, to find a surfeit of them. However, this demand was now virtually settled, and it was the only demand, having even a siiadow of reason, that could be brought by tlie United States against the Japanese, in connection with the Simonoseki atfair. Mr. Pruyii said, on the 10th of August : — '' The owners will havf " received a very large indemnity, in view of the small loss they sustained; " (39) but he was at that moment in full co-operation with the movemeats for the combined attack, for the depai'tui'e of which the 20tli of the month hail beon designated, and Avlu'eh actually did begin before the day agreed to by the Minister for the pecuniary pctflement. The means of tracing the course of thft Dutch representative can not be easily (v»nnnanded, but it seems probable that he was not restrained by his government, ans themselves to force the "passage.'' (lU) J)uiing this conference, allusion was made to past efforts of the Yedo (38) IT R. Dip. CorrPijporilcncr. 1801 : p. .530. {a9) U. S. Dip. C'Drrasp-.Rilcnco. 18(;4 : p. iiil . ( 40) Coi T. .spoiidtucc rvBp.;cting AUairi iu Japan; 186J No. 1 : pp. 81, 8'.J. 21 authorities to effect an adjustment by negociation witli Chosiu. The United States' Minister inquired *' whether it was true that among the measures taken to bring '• about a more peaceable solution, the despatch of Envoys to the Prince of Chosiu ** had been adopted, and that they had been mui'dered in his territories." The Japanese officer replied that " it was true Envoys had been sent, and only their servants had " retiu'ned." One single attempt had been made by the foreigners, in the course of these discussions, to communicate du-ectly with the hostile daimio. Two young students who had been seat to England by Chosiu, to be educated, (41) returned to Yoko- hama with the purpose, it was understood, of endeavoring to reach their chief, and to dissuade him from combatting the power of the Western nations. Sir Rutherford Alcock supplied them with the means of regaining their own province, for the roa- 8ons, he said in a despatch to Earl Eussell, that he was " anxious to avoid, if possible, "the necessity of proceeding to extremities," and "felt the necessity of ascertaining " by observation the nature and extent of the fortifications and obstructions raised by the Prince. "(42) They, were sent with letters of complaint and warning from the four Ministers, in a Cdtish steamer, which was accompanied by a second vessel- of- war. " Twenty days," Sir liutlierford wrote, " were given to this undertaking, and the " result, so far as Chosiu's attitude was concerned, amounted to nothing." (43) Tliere is no record of what the result amouated to, so far as the opportunity of examin- ing the batteries was concerned. Perhaps a mind less bent iii>on a foregone conclusion would have taken a different view of even the political effect of the experiment. The state- ment of the young Japanese, after carrying out their design, was thus reported by Mr. Satow, one of the interpreters of the British Legation: — " They commenced the delivery " of the communication with which they were charged by saying that they had found their " prince and had given the four letters to him themselves; that he had consulted on the " subject with his chief retainers, and had come to the following conclusions: that he per- " fectly acknowledged the ti-uth of what was contained in the documents, and was " conscious of his own inability to cope with the forces of Western nations. But ho " was acting on orders which he had received, once from the Taikun and oftener from " the Mikado, and not on his own responsibility, in consequence of which he was " unable to give the desired reply to the letters without having first received their per- " mission to do so. For this purpose he intended to go up to Kioto and impress hi» " veiws on the Mikado, which he calculated would take about three months, and he '• begged that the Foreign Powers would delay operations for that period." (44) It ( 41 ) Ito Shunske and Inuye Banda, Loth of whom afterward rose to high public positions. ( 42 ) Correspondence respi'cting Affairs in Japan ; 18(i5, No. 1 : p. 87. 'I'o Admiral Kuper, Sir Rutherford wroto : — " You will no doubt deem it expedient to profit bv the opportunity of reccnnoitering Iho position," elf. [Uid. p. 71.] (43) Correspondence respecting Affairs in Japan; 18G5, No. 1 : p. 88. (44) Correspondence respecting Affairs in Japan; 18C5, No. 1 : p. 74. 22 need hardly be set down tliat, although twenty days were allowed for the delivery of the messages and the receipt of an answer (and for ubdervation of the fta-tificatious), no idea was entertained of giving tlie daimio ninety days to f^a to the cajntal, through a country disturbed by preparations for civil war, and to ])ersuade the sovereign and liis advisers to alter their whole national policy and accept the conditions which the foreign representatives were disposed to enforce. Tiie expedition was ready, and could not be delayed on such a chance. Adopting the phrase of Sir li,utherford, the result, so far as the attitude of the Envoys was concerned, amounted to nothing. The squadron sailed on its errand of destruction on the 2Sth and 29th of August, It consisted of nine British, four Dutch, and three Frencli ships-of-war. A small chartered vessel, the Takiang, " with an officer, a party of men, and a gun from the " corvette Jame.sfoini,'' was sent by the United States' Minister, to show that, although he had no force at his diq^osal, his spirit and sympathy Avere with the enterprise. The four Ministers agreed, in a joint memorandum, that the work of extiri)atiou must be wholesale and unconditional. They announced their decision, '* in the possibility '• of the Prince of Cliosiu being intimidated by the imposing nature of the force " brought against him, and not finng, to request the naval othuers, notwithstanding, " to destroy tlie batteries." " The character of this expedition," they added, "ought " to be regarded no otherwise than as a chastisement to be inflicted on an outlaw or " a pirate." (4o) By way of supplement Sir R. Alcock privately suggested the capture of the castle of llagi, belonging to Chosiu, and situated in a town remote from Simo- noseki. (46) The attack was commenced on the 5th of September, and ^^'as continued for a part of tlu-ee days. On the 8th, the batteries were all silenced, and the labor of iransferi'ing their gims to the ships was undertaken. While this was going on, a messenger from the daimio appeared, " to negotiate for a terniinatiiui of hostilities." Admiral Kuper wrote : — " Having conferred with Rear- Admiral Jaures, it was deter- " mined that, to convince us of the sincerity of the Prince's desire, it was iudispeusa- " ble that Ave shoidd receive a written requisition, under his own hand, to that elfect ; " and the Envoy having observed that an interval of tAvo da3-s would be required to *' obtain the desired communication, a suspension of hostilities for that time was " agreed upon, and the squadrons were immediately directed to hoist flags of truce. *' It was, however, stipulated that the armistice should not interfere Avith the Avork of " embarking the guns, then in progress, and it Avas accordingly proceeded Avith and " completed." (47) That is to say, the Avhite flag was displayed by the assaulting party to warn the Japanese that their operations must cease, Avhilo those of the foreigners were continued without interruption. (45 ) Correspondence respecting Affm'rs in .Tnpan; 18f),5, No. 1 : p. 80. ( 46 ) Correspondence reaj^ccting Afl'iiirn in .THjjan : 186/5, No. 1 : p. 70. (47; Corrcspondcuce respecting Affairs in Japan; 18C5, No. 1 : pp. 1012, 103. 23 As a matter of course, tlie several engagenieuts, both by sea and on tlie laud, resulted in the completo success of the allies. Admiral Kuper now found it expedi- ent to present himself in a diplomatic character. In his interviews with representa- tives of Chosin, (48) he assumed tlie usual lofty tone of foreign officials, insisting on seeing the daimio }>ersoii:illy, thougli assuz'ed that he was in strict seclusion, in conse- quence of liis disgrace hy the Mikado, and could not i)ossibly go abroad; declaring that lie and his people would visit the town of Simonoseki, and that if any of them were attacked he would destroy the place, though reminded that the excitement was great, that many " bad characters " were about, and that the native officials could not watch everybody; anriouncing that an indemnity would be required " in consideration of " sparing the town of Simonoseki, " and for the expenses of the war; threatening that if all foreign demands wore not acceded to within two dajs, he would take Simonoseki and make war as if no truce had existed; denying the right of fortification even for defence against unfri^'ndly Japanese nobles, and otherwise displaying the habitual arrogance of Europeans in the East which springs from the consciousness of superior physical force and finds its fit manifestation in striking an opponent the hardest when he is down. "W'itli regard to the indeninit}', the Japanese messengers asked what the sum would probably be, and exhibited a straightforward statement of the resources of the province. " We cannot take the amount of revenue into consideration " at all," said Admiral Kuper ; "he (Chosin) should have counted the cost before " commencing a war with Foreign Powers. He will have to pay the amount deniand- " ed now." " It is absolutely impossible," said the i^rincipal commissioner, "to give *' more mono}' than wo have. We are very anxious for peace, but at the same time " our money resources are limited, and the prompt j)ayment must in some measure " depend upon the amount." " If he has not the money himself," retorted the Admi- ral, " he can borrow it from the government." Nobody knew better than Admiral Kuper that Chosin was at open enmity with the government. His language, through- out, was that of a conqueror who is determined to tramjile his vanquished adversary into the dust. In the course of these conferences, the alleged orders of the Taikun, tliat attacks should be commenced on foreign ships, were produced. They do not justify the interpretation put upon them. They were not even original documents. The copy of the only one said to be signed by the Taikun was an answer to the Mikado's decree of expulsion, and was as follows : — " I have the honor to infomi your Majesty " that, with regard to the time when the foreigners are to be expelled, I have decided " to cease communications with them, without fail, from the 10th of the 5th month. *' I w411 also inform all the daimios of this decision." (49) No dii-eet communication ( 48 ) Corrfspondence respecting Affnirs in Japan ; 1865, No. 1 : pp. llo, et seq. ( 49 ) Correepondence respecting Affairs in Japan ; I860, No. 1 ; pp. 113. 24 of any kind, from the head of the Tedo Government to Chosiii was shown to exist. Nevertheless, in the next following interview, at Yokohama, between the four Envoys and the Japanese Ministers, the former chose to assume that the pretended instruct tions had been issued. (50) The French representative said that " it was now no " longer a matter of suspicion, but of certainty, and the documents placed in tho *' Admiral's hands proved, that the whole of these outrages and flagrant violations of " Treaties by the Prince of Nagato were really the acts of the Mikado and Taikun." The principal Japanese officer in the party promptly replied, that no order had ever been given or transmitted, by the Taikun, to fire upon foreign ships ; that the fact of the govennnent's opposition to Chosiu's action had been proved by the delegation of an aide-de-camp to cause thatdainiio to cease hostile proceedings, which messenger had been murdered while endeavoring to discharge his mission ; that the apparent ambio-uity of the Taikun had been explained and was understood by the representatives to be unavoidable, " since, had ho openly refused to carry out the orders received '• from the Mikado, he was liable to be deposed and his dynasty might have been de- " stroyed." Notwithstanding the utter want of evidence to support their broad charge of complicitv, the Envoys never retracted it, either to their own governments or that of Japan . And again, in this meeting, they undertook to advise qud direct the whole system of internal Japanese policy, according to their various judgments and caprices. Before dismissing the subject of the Taikun's alleged orders to Chosiu, it is desirable to take note of the tone held in presence of the Yedo authorities, on the one hand, and that adopted with a special messenger from the dainiio, who came to Yoko- hama on the 10th of October. To the Taikun's agent, it was emphatically declared, on the 18th of September, that his master was to be held responsible for the attacks on tho foreign ships. It may seem incredible, but it is nevertheless true, that, twenty- two days later, in a discussion with Chosiu's agent, who endeavored for his own pur- poses to fix this rei-ponsibility upon the Taikun — that is to say, precisely where the Envoys had fixed it — Sir R. Alcock and Mr. Pruyn assumed the opposite ground, and denied the truth of the very allegations they had themselves made or subscribed to. They did not even trouble themselves to put the case in a new form. They adopted, as tho expression of their original views, the arguments and almost the exact language thiit had been used by the Taikun's Ministers. (51) And to these gentlemen the world is indebted for much of the material of which the theories uf Japanese dissimulation and duplicity — the " double-faced policy " as they call it — are principally made up. (50) Corrospondcncr roHiirctiiip Affairs in Japuu ; ISGo, No. 1 : p. 12."?. { 51 ) Uorrt's))oridcn(t; rosijcctiiig; Affairs in .la j)an ; 18G5, No. 1 : p. lUl. In rofntinp; tho accusation of (■inni)licity, tho Taikuu"8 agent said, Sept. ISth, that the document " did not order the. I'rincc to lire upon '• foreif^n 8hij).s, and the ]iroof that 8uch was not its proper meaning misjht be ftpund in tho fact that although " a riimilar order was communicated to all the o.ther daimio8, he alone had j)ut that interpretation upon it. " The ?>nvoya of the T'nit*!! f>tatc« and England, addressing Cho^^u'8 me8Kcni,'er, Oct. Ktth, said that the missive " did not exj)li(itly ordrr any Daimio to tire upon foreign ^hips. . . . And the proof that such waa " uot the neco8.-ary reading of the order was to be found in the fact that no olhtr d:iinii(. hf.d bo interpreted it." 2-5 It should here be stated, to avoid any appearance of injustice to Sir Ptutherford Alcock, that, notwithstanding the former injunctions against aggressive proceedings, Earl Russell wrote to him, on the 2ud of December, after all was over, as follows : — " Your despatch of the 28th of September " ( in which the victorious results of the expedition were described ) " is a successful vindication of the policy you have pur- " sued. " Whether Earl Eussell was wholly clear in his own mind as to exactly what he was now approving, will probably always remain a question ; for, in the same communication, he alluded to his despatches of July 26th, and said :—*' Those " despatches, you will understand, remain in full force." ( 52 ) It will be remembered that, on July 2Gth, Sir liutherford was positively forbidden to undertake military operations, exce})t in self-defence. Tlie inconsistency, however, is not greater than that whicli characterized tlie judgments of the Home Governments in almost cverj' stage of these proceedings. , "We now come to the last branch of this fruitful subject — the exaction of the ludemnity, and its gradual payment by the Japanese. The designs of the Foreign Representatives, on this point, first took definite shape in a conference held Sept. 23rd, 1SG4, between the four Ministers and the Tai- kun's agents. The report of this meeting is marked " confidential, " and, though publislied in the U. S. Correspondence, does not appear in the English Blue 13ook. The British Envoy, speaking for all, said that the claims, " if pressed, would no doubt " amount to a very considerable sura," but " it was not the desire to extort money." He therefore suggested that the Taikun should " make arrangements for the opening " of the port of Simonoseki, or some other port more convenient in the vicinity, in lieu " of such payment, at the option of the Treaty Powers. " ( 53 ) At a subsequent inter- view with the Yedo cabinet, this proposition was repeated, and suppoited b}' the declaration that Chosiu himself was willing to have Simonoseki unclosed — a declara- tion sustained by no evidence whatever. ( 54 ) The ofiicials replied that " it was *' impossible for them to agree to open another port " and that " they would prefer to " assume the payment of the indemnities. " The foreign Ministers, from that time to the present moment, have never eeased to insist upon the adoi:)tion of their chosen alternative, and of late years their demand has grown from its original comparatively modest dimensions to a requirement that the whole empire shall be made free of access. The government, on the other hand, have never wavered in their resistance (52 ) Oorrespon donee respecting Affaira in Japan : 1865, No. 1 : p. 127 (53) U.S. Dip. Correspond once, 18(14-5: p. 5GG It is woilhy of note that, at this conference, M. Roches, the French Envoy, although he had been in Japan four months, showed himself so ignorant of even the geography of the country to which he was accredited as to speak of the Mikado, at Kioto, " being *' almost within hearing of the foreign artillery" at Simfaioseki. He was just as much within hearing of it 88 of the voice of M. Koches, then f-j)eakiiig. Simonoseki is farther than Yokohama from Kioto. The dis- tance is about 300 miles in a straight line :- as the crow Hies, or, as M. Uoches would perhaps prefer, as the sound of artillery travels. (54 ) U. S. Dip. Correspondence, 1864-5 : p. 568. 26 to a proposition involving peril and disaster to their country. A convention was signed on the 22nd of October, by which the amount pa^'able was fixed at tliree millions of dollars. The Japanese made no complaint respecting the magnitude of the sura, nor would it have been listened to, if they had done so. That it was exorbitant, and was deliberately intended to be exorbitant, is as complete- ly established as any fact connected with this miserable business. It was determined, by concert, that the claim should be in excess of tlie Taikun's ability to pay. A moderate demand could be promptly liquidated. An extortionate one might com- pel him to yield to the pressure for the opening of an extra port. !Mr. Pruyn makes no concealment of this piece of beautiful diplomacy, which might otherwise have remained in obscm-ity. " The British Minister and myself," he says, " prior to meet- " ing the Japanese commissioners, had agreed on two millions of dollars as the sum " to be paid." The suggestion to take advautage of the opportunity of coercion, appears to have come from M. Leon Eoches. Mr. Pruj-n readily assented to his proposition, and agreed to " fix the amount at three millions of dollars, because he thought it " more likely to lead to the substitution of a port as a material com])ensation. " ( 55 ) " The amount agreed on, " he adds, will not be regarded as unreasonable." It was just one half as large again as that which he had himself declared to be reasona- ble. ( 5G ) When the conditions of settlement were communicated to the respective govern- ments, a prolonged discussion arose upon the question as to which of the stipulated alternatives was preferable. Holland and France were emphatically in favor of the pecuniary payment. The United States appeared indifferent, and took small part in the correspondence. England, with a clearer perception of the prospects of future gain, was unusually earnest in urging the acceptance of a new port. But all these debates were rendered useless by the announcement, in April, 1865, that the Japan- ese adhered to their determination to pa}' the money and make no territorial conces- sion. At the same time, they forcibly represented their financial embarrassments, and asked to be released from the promise to make quarterly payments, at the outset. In transmitting this request, the British Charge, acting in the Minister's absence, wrote thus : — " While I felt sure that the government, rather than consent to the " opening of Simonoseki, would assume for a time the responsibility of the indemnity " even if it had been double the amount, the known state of the finances of the Taikun- " ate . . induced me to believe that the obligation to pay so large an* indemnity " as $3,000,000 would be felt as a very grievous burden. . . Enough is known ** to satisfy us that the resources of the Japanese government, so far as the power of ( 00 ) U. S. Dip. Correspondence, 1864-5 : p. .582. ( 56 ) Mr. Portman, who was attached to the U. S. Legation, and was afterward Charge d' Affairep, wroto ubeequently that the amount was "much larger than was origmally intendid, " and that in Mr. Pniyu'a own opinion, it was " too large. " [ U. S. Dip. Correspondence, 1«G5-G. Fart 111 ; p. 257. ] 27 " making large money payments is concerned, must be very limited. " ( 57 ) He did not, however, favor the appeal of the Japanese, bnt suggested that advantage might be taken of their difficulties to impose new commercial obligations upon them, such as a reduction of tlieir tariff, or the opening of Hiogo before the date agreed upon. Mr. Pruyn objected to giving tlie Japanese any time, and it appears from his desjiatch of April 2ith, upon this subject, that the other Envoys did likewise. " I " concur with my colleagues, " he said, " in the opinion that no such extension should be granted. " ( 6S ) The result was the submission of a fresh proposal by England, ojffering the remission of two-thirds of the full amount, upon these conditions, viz. : the immediate freedom of Hiogo and Osaka for pui'poses of trade ; the ratification of the Taikun's Treaties by the Mikado, and a modification of the Tariff, on the basis of a general five per cent duty. ( o9 ) The British Foreign Office took infinite pains to convince the governments of Holland and France of the expediency of this plan and at last succeeded in gaining from them a reluctant acquiescence. That of the United States, as before, show d little interest, and was ready to agree to anything. Accord- ingly, in November, l'-;65 — tlie first instalment of $500,000 having been paid in August — the representatives of tlie four Powers formall}' presented the newly-offered tenns. The conciliatory intentions of the Japanese Government were shown by an immediate assent to two of the conditions, but the abrupt opening of the ports in question they still declared to be impracticable. ( GO ) It was admitted to be so by the new British Envoy, Sir H. Parkes, who \vrote, Nov. 28th, that " those places " could not be occupied by foreign merchants without considerable risk. " ( Gl ) But the other concessions were eagerly accepted. The same Minister stated that " the " confirmation of the Treaties by the Mikado formed by far the most valuable of the " conditions we were instructed to accept in exchange for two-thirds of the indemnity. " The reduction of the Tariff, also, was obviously of far more lasting importance than the mere opening of two trading places a couple of years before the stated time. Of course, it ^^'ill be supp.)sed that, having secured the two more vital points of the three they required, a corrc-ponding abatement was made in the pecuniar}' demand. Not so. Sir H. Pai-kes' vi_ ws in this respect may be taken as representing those of all the Ministers. Having shown the preponderating advantages obtained, and acknowledged that Hiogo and Osakn, could not be safely occupied, he said : — " If, however, we have " not secui'ed the ope-ing of those places, we have, on the other hand, relinquished " no portion of that iionej^, although two of the thi-ee conditions we were willing to " receive in exchange have been secui'ed. " ( 62 ) This exemplifiq^tion of the principles (57) Correspondence nspecting Affairs in Japan ; 1866, No. 1 p. 14. ( 58 ) U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865-6. Part III. , p. 247. ( 59 ) Correspondence i jscecting Affairs in Japan, 18GG. No. 1, p. 22 ; Earl Russell to Earl Cowley. ( 60 ) U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865-6. Part III. , p. 269. ( 61 ) Correspondence resjjecting Affairs in Japan, 1866. No. 1, p. 84. ( 62 ) Correspondence reepecting Affairs in Japan, 1866. No. 1, p. 84. 28 of equity upon whicli intcrnatioual transactions in the East are conducted by Western Powers was formall}^ approved by each of the governments concerned. The above-described negotiation took pLace at Osaka, where the Taikun, with his Court, was temporarily stationed, the better to control affairs in the still pending contest between the government and the daimio of Chosiu. Sir liutherford Alcock, in his last official paper before leaving Japan, recorded the following statements and convictions : " All Treaties made with Japan have been forced upon it ; and it is in " vain to expect that Treaties so entered into can be maintained by a religious " abstinence from the use of force as a means. . . . All diplomacy in these " regions which does not rest on a solid substratum of force, must of necessity, fail in its object. ( C3 ) His successor, animated by the same faith, took with him a powerful naval force, which was strengthened by sliips-of-war of France and Holland, on his visit to the place of meeting. At the termination of the proceedings, he WTote to Lord Clarendon as follows : — " I have felt, My Lord, the grave responsibility " which attaches to the movements of a fleet, even when undertaken, as in this instance, " for the attainment of a purely peaceful object ; but I was also sensible that this '* responsibility should not deter me from the adoption of the measure that aj)peared " to me best calculated to give effect to your lordship's instruction. " ( 64 ) He had previously expressed his opinion that tlie opportunity should not be lost of showing that the means of defending " Treaty Eights " was still at hand. ( 65 ) His diplo- macy rested on a solid substratum of force. Years of anxiety and danger passed, culminating in final destruction to the Tai- kun's Government, which in 18GG and 18G7, had become utterly imimverished. Two additional instalments, of $ 500,000 each, were jiaid at the appointed times, after which there was along delay. In March, 18G7, another demand was made, to which the Ja- panese replied by confessing their straitened circumstances, stating thai the very condi- tions accceded to in 18C5 — tlio reduction of duties, etc. --had increased the difficulty of procuring money, and asking for a further postponement. This request was favored by the foreign Ministers, and was at once complied with. Mcau while, the revolution of 1868 occurred, involving the overthrow of the Ycdo rulers, the resumption of exe- cutive authority by the Kioto Com-t, and a greater exhaustion than ever of the public treasury. The new government again sought an extension of time, agreeing, in re- turn, to defer raising the expert duties on tea and silk, which they had now an ac- knowledged right to do, even imder the arbitrary conventions by which they were ham- pered. This equivalent^ was afterwa rd admitted by Sir Ilarry Farkes to be of value. (6G ) ( 63 ) Correspondence respecting Affairs in Japan, 1865. No. 1, p. 154. ( 61 ) (Jorrespdniloncu n.'Spertini^ Affairs in Jiipun, 18GG. No. 1, p. 81. (65) Conetipondence losptctinir Atlairs in Japan; 18GG, No. l,i>. G7. Mr. Portnian, U. S. Charge, with uncun.scious humor, spuke of li.o visit of the rtprescntatives to Osako, harked by a pqiiadron of nine ships, to make new demand!*, as " - > ovidLutly an act of juacc and good will tliat he did not lusitMtc in " co-operating in it. " To what cxtfi t his aclicns were guided ly these sentiments may be diseorercd in liis Bucceasivo despatches. [ U. S. Dip. Cirrespondcnco ; 1866-7, Vol. 11. , p. 180. J ( 60 ) U. IS. Dip. Correspondence ; 1S73, Vol. I. , p. 412. 29 It is not denied that the Japanese at last nsed all the Ihnited means iu their power to avoid the payment of the latter half of the Indemnity. Their conviction of the injus- tice of the claim was only strengthened by time. The embassy that visited the Treaty Powers in 1872 was welcomed in Washington with assurances that at least the balance of the share due the United States should not be exacted. A bill relinquishing this amount passed the House of Representatives, but was delayed in the Seuate. As a matter of courtesy and compliment, this demonstration may have had weight. Asa token of sound justice or liberality it was worthless. The entire loss and expense sus- tained by United States' citizens and by the government in the Sinionoseld operations was in the neighborhood of $ 50,000. The sum received from Japan, exchanged into American currency, with the accrued interest, was upwards of $700,000. (07) Lut even this partial act of grace was never carried out, as proposed. During their visit to England, the ambassadors presented a memorandum to the Foreign Office, which was understood to be an application for remission of the unpaid liability, although no such ap[)lication was made iu direct terms. They instanced th© fact that England's "desired end " was that of "developing the commercial relations " of the respective countries, " and pointed out that a "heavy pecuniary burden, " im- posed upon Japan, couM in no way assist that end. Tli'^y recalled what had been done by the governments of the Taikun and the Mikado in tlie way of granting " nia- " terial substitutes" : — the reduction of the tarilFin 1806; the Imperial saiictinu totlie Treaties; the opening of the great mercantile port of Osaka, at an earlier peri(Ml tlian that originally required, and the expenditure of more than a million of dollars iu the construction of light-houses at tlie open ports and along the coasts. (08) To Siv Harry Parkes, who was tlien in England, the task was assigned of in-eparing a reply. In regard' to the tariff, he accused the ambassadors of alleging that the revision took place " earlier than the time appointed." This is an error. They did nothing of the sort. They said: " We were required to revise our tariff before the term of tea " years fixed for a revision of treaties. " It was well understood that the import and export duties were subject to a change of some kind — not necessarily^ recbiction — five years after the opening of Kanagawa; but the Japanese had gradually come to perceive, what they did not at first see or consider, that the tariff was a7i item of the highest importance in their convention, and that the period for ititerfering with it ought properly to have been when the Treaties, as a whole, were reconsidered. It should be clearly remembered that the condition demanded in 18G5 was not revision, but reduction of the tariff. The Japanese were not to be heard on their side of the ques- tion, which is all adverse to a low rate of duties. Absolute abatement was the com- mand, and it had to be obeyed. Sir Harry Parkes remarked that " the new tariff " can be shown to be more advantageous to their interests than the old one. " This ( 67 ) Treaties and Conventions between the United States and other rowers : Washington, 1873 ; p. 1041. (08) L'. S. Dip. Correspondence : 1873, Vol. I. , p. 408 ct scq. 30 ■tt'n?, no doulit, tlie genuine conviction of the Britisli Minister ; but the question is one in dispute the world over, and the Jai)anese are ahnost unanimous in the Lelief tliat the present arrangement is rninous to tlieir national prosperity. But, in point of fact, it does not matter wliether it is or is not injurious to them. That is not tlie issue. It was a concession demanded and yielded ; and it was taken as a " material substitute " for payment at a particular time. If it had cnriclied Japan beyond all other nations, this result would not have alfectcd the obligation of the British to recognize it as a concession. Sir Harry Parkes also said that the Japanese '* should remember that the refusal "of the Mikado to ratify the Treaties wmdd have been a hostile act," and this 9^)inifin was adopted and put forth by Lord Granville in an interview Avith the Ambassailors. Here, again, a totally irrelevant point was raised. Tlie ratification was aceepterl witli exultation, in 180">, as a paramount advantage, and it could serve no purpose, legally or morally, to bring it forward, in 1872, in any other light. But the position, in itself, was not tenable. If it could be shown that the Mikado had ever authorized and empowered the Taikun to conclude these Treaties, then, indeed, the failure to subscribe to tliem miglit have been unwarranted and aii evidence of hostility', according to public usaT;e. Bat it is not pretended that such was the state of alfuirs. The Mikado was recpi'red to sanction agreements that had been made years before, without his knowledge and against his express injunctions. The only demon- stration approaching hostility in the transactions at Osaka was the bringing together by the foreign envoys, of a large seen in 18G3 ) and that a ])roiiipt payment would he impossihle ; failing which, tlie united demand for tlie opening of tlie nation eoidd not Ik; resisted. Parodies are uot always successful. The noble expedient of ten years before failed in its new ajjplication. ( 70 ) M. Drouyn de Lhuys had written, in 18G5, that the opening of Hiogo and Osaka, two years before the stipulated time, would " have been nlone of a raturo to justify the abandonment of the indemnity. " He would " feel warranted in substituting it withoat hesitation. " France was ready, in 18G.5 to surrender her riiare of the money for the privilege of two ' ^rs' trade at two ports. In 1873, she demanded as an equiva- lent for a much smaller amount, the perpetual opening, for commercial purposes, of the whole country. oo as native aiitlioritj, with having in certain instances nrgod tlieir demands with a total disre'^ard of diplomatic amenities, and a violence shocking to every sense of social pro- priety. It is publicly known that they took the unprecedented step of directly appeal- ing to the sovereign, in what was expected to have been an ordinary New Years' address of offi'nal courtesy, on behalf of their cherished design. "When this document was sub- niited to the Foreign Office, previous to its delivery, the expediency of rejecting it was seriously debated. It was determined, however, to let it pass, and to introduce a fitting phrase of rebuke in the Mikado's reply. (71) Baffled by the steady attitude of the government, the Ministers of the tliree Powers did not, naturally, relax tlieir demand for the Indemnity. The Japanese saw that it was now usele-^s to hope for any fiu-tlier consideration, and the last instalments weie delivered to the agents of England, Holland, and France in the summer of 1874. (72) The Minister of the United States had been confident that hk course would receive the a]iprobation of his government and of his countrymen at large. Tlie State iJe- partmcnt of Washington, however, held Opinions at variance with Mr. Lingham's, and, it maj'be presumed, with those of American citizens in general. He was notifi»<.l that, as Congress liad taken no final action in the matter, and as the other three nations had olanatioii is not sufficient. If it had been desired, a way of meeting the emergency could have been discovered. Mr. S^^ward, in 18(i7, found no difiicnlty in devising a legitimate e.Npodiont for ])osti)omnu'nt of payment, although the direct authority to grant delay did not reside with his Department. ( 73 ) ( 71 ) Tho accuriicy of this stateniPnt has bnen several times denied by 1hc.se vho are n^t jiroperly (on- vers.-int witli tlif> faels. ^'el■.sif>ns of tlic Mikadi's brief speteb, on t}ii8 ('ceasion, liave been jiiibht^luil. in wliich his alhisiou to the independent jiglits of Jaj an does not ajiy.ear ; but the allu.sieu was neveitheless made, and was w('ll understood to be a dc larat'on that the question of a more extensive foreipn intercouise was cue to lie d'terniincd by the sovereign will of Japan alone, and not by jressure unduly exorcised by foreign. Jlini.-tfrs. ( 72 ) It may bo supposed that the cry fer the unclosing of the Empire was now hushed. Sueh was not the case. A letter from Jajian, August 14th, 1874, relates the sequel : — "The rejirefentatives of the Euroj^'an " governintnts c(.neerued have dipjilayed singular bad faitli in tlu: adju.slnient. It will be renu'uibered that " they offered, many months ago, to reli(i(|uish Ihi ir daim if Jaj'an would throw ojieu the ei uiitry. Tho " .Ta])ane8e (fleeted to jjay the dtjmand and keejj the country closed for the prtsint. In e< mnion hcnor, tlie " foreign envoys were bound to cease their clamors for free travel and eowmereial intercourse. Tb' y forced " Japan to aceept a diiheult condition, and they now refuse to ludd to their side of tlie agreement. Tliey insist, " wiili more violcnee tlian ever, that the Emjiire sliall be urulosed. 'I'hcir action is jiointedly eomiiareil to that of •' a highwayman who cries ' Your money or your life, ' and, having extoited the money, proceeds to take the " life as wvll. " ( 73 ) U. S. Diplomatic Correspondeace : 1SC7-8, Vol. II., p. 48. 33 The history of the Siinonoseki Affair euds here, unless, as has been said, the voluntary action of some one of the four Powers should give it new vitality. This is a most unlikely contingency, and, even if such an event should haj^pen, it is by no means sure that the attempt at reparation would be followed by the happiest conse- quences. The pound of flesh has been hewn away, and many drops of blood have fallen with it. What hand could be found dexterous and gentle enough to heal the wounds ? What art could hide the ineffaceable scars left by years of humiliation and oppression? (74) In the preparation of the above narrative, the opportunities of reference to official documents have been limited. Only such diplomatic reports as were casually and accidentally at hand in Tokio cotdd be cited. The correspondence of France and Hol- land was inaccessible. But enough has been extracted to enable impartial readers to judge in what manner Japan, struggling to emerge from the darkness of centuries, and to plant itseK in a respectable rank among the civilized nations, has been encour- aged and stimulated by the Great PoAvers of the world. The record of Simonoseki stands as a type of the methods employed, during a period of nearly twenty years, for promoting friendly intercourse and reciprocal esteem through the " diplomacy " which rests on a solid substratum of force. " E. H. House. Tokio, April, 1875. ( 74 ) Since the above lines were written, intcllip^cnce has been received of an effort, sincere r n()'it;li in its way, no doubt, but totally inadeciuHte to the just requirements of the case, to ixirtially disscntanj^le t)ie government of the United States fi-om its unwholesome connection with this affair. A proposition Iihs bi en made, in Congress, to restore one half of the full amount received, and to devote the j^-reatcr jmrt of the; rest to educational purposes by which it supposed that Japan may be benetited. This movement, though insuiK- cient, must be welcomed as a step in the right direction. It is chiefly due to the energetic labors of Prof. David Murray, who has earnestly devoted himself to the task of representing the circumstances in their truR aspect to the legislators of Washington. But it need hardly Vie said that siu'h a projiosal is coldly received in Japan and it may be fairly questional whether any proposal, short of unconditional restitution, would obtain a cordial response. There are, indued, reasons fast accumulating for the apprehension that even tlua offer might not now be accepted. 1 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY BERKELEY Return to desk from which borrowed. This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. KQ 3 1947 4r^ov'57CS HiCCO _.> f ' OCT 3 1 1957 NOV 4 196? c V6-^^'*' I3Apr'50R?4 REC'D L.L> 1 S'oep^50Bct5 NOV 119S7 UBRARy uss ;20cV52^T APR 2 6 ir SEP 2 8 1952 LU REC'D L.D 18Apr'5AWC APR 2 3 mi ►«.. '«"* ]aNov»St" T.n '21-100jH-9.'47fA5702!5l6)476 U lo UNIVERSITY OF CAL,IFORNIA LIBRARY -^i^^^^i