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 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES
 
 Irish RaiWays 
 
 and their Nationalisation 
 
 A Criticism 
 
 of the 
 
 Report of the Vice-Regal 
 Commission 
 
 EDWIN A. PRATT 
 
 SIXPENCE NET
 
 IRISH RAILWAYS AND THEIR 
 NATIONALISATION
 
 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION 
 
 A Criticism 
 
 of the 
 
 Report of the Vice-Regal Commission 
 
 BY 
 
 EDWIN A. PRATT 
 
 Author of 
 
 "Railways and Nationalisation," 
 
 "German v. British Railways," 
 
 "Canals and Traders," etc. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 P. S. KING & SON 
 
 ORCHARD HOUSE 
 WESTMINSTER 
 
 1910
 
 / 1 i"^ 
 
 
 PREFATORY NOTE. 
 
 In the course of some remarks he made in reply 
 to a deputation from the General Council of the 
 Irish County Councils which waited upon him, on 
 October 2ist, igio, with a view to urging the necessit)^ 
 for carrying out the recommendations of the majority 
 of the Vice-Regal Commission on Irish Railways, 
 the Chief Secretary for Ireland spoke of the Com- 
 missioners' Report as *' one of the most interesting 
 documents he had ever perused. He was sure," he 
 proceeded, " when the people of England had time to 
 read it they would find it a very interesting and even 
 a remarkable paper." 
 
 It may, however, be doubted if the people of 
 England, even with Mr, Birrell's recommendation 
 before them, will so far overcome the popular pre- 
 judice against Blue Books as to devote to the Report 
 in question that close study which would alone 
 enable them to grasp the meaning, purpose and 
 possible results of the somewhat complicated and 
 certainly ill-digested scheme therein put forward by 
 the majority of the Commissioners. 
 
 All the same, it is most desirable that the main 
 issues raised by the Report should be clearly under- 
 stood, not alone by the English, but also by the 
 Irish people. Among these issues are — (i) The 
 taking, in Ireland, of the first step in the United 
 Kingdom in the way of railway nationalisation ; 
 (2) the important political considerations that might 
 
 40G065
 
 vi PREFATORY NOTE. 
 
 be involved in the transfer of the Irish railways to an 
 Irish elected authority ; (3) the unsatisfactory nature 
 — should the principle of nationalisation itself be 
 approved — of the Majority Report scheme, with its 
 absence of definite figures and estimates ; (4) the 
 improbability of Irish traders and travellers deriving 
 any appreciable advantage from that scheme, even 
 if it should be found at all practicable; (5) the 
 obvious unfairness of expecting the State to acquire 
 the Irish railways and to guarantee interest on 
 capital without retaining control over their operation ; 
 (6) the doubtful character of the proposal — which 
 Mr. Birrell frankly described as "a stumbling-block" 
 — that the general taxpayer of the United Kingdom 
 should provide not less than ;r25o,ooo a year in 
 order that the Irish trader might obtain lower railway 
 rates ; and (7) the prospect for the Irish ratepayer 
 himself of having to make up, by means of a general 
 rate in Ireland, the whole of the ultimate deficiency 
 that might arise in the operation of the railways after 
 the Irish elected authority to be put in charge of 
 them had reduced their earning power by making 
 whatever concessions in rates and charges it thought 
 either fit or expedient. 
 
 In the circum.stances, and assuming that the Man 
 in the Street may still be reluctant to go through the 
 original Blue Book, I have thought a useful purpose 
 might be served if I offered for his acceptance, in the, 
 perhaps, more inviting form of a small pamphlet, a 
 digest of the main issues involved in a problem which 
 I have myself followed up with the greater interest 
 by reason of the fact that I was among those privi- 
 leged to give evidence before the Commissioners 
 during the course of their four years' inquiry. 
 
 Edwin A. Pratt. 
 
 November, 1910.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 — ♦ — 
 
 Page 
 
 Prefatory Note v 
 
 The Vice-Regal Commission lo 
 
 Terms of Reference ......... id 
 
 Complaints Invited ......... ii 
 
 The Companies Exonerated ....... 12 
 
 Continental Conditions 13 
 
 The Colonial Example ........ 14 
 
 State Acquisition .......... 15 
 
 The Majority Report ......... 16 
 
 Number of Companies i5 
 
 Amalgamation .......... 16 
 
 The Majority Scheme 17 
 
 Terms of Purchase 18 
 
 Financial Proposals ig 
 
 The Government Grant ig 
 
 The Irish Ratepayer 20 
 
 State Purchase : Irish Control ...... 21 
 
 A Lesson from South Africa ....... 22 
 
 Disadvantages of Popular Management 23 
 
 Railway Rate Reductions 23 
 
 Economies ........... 24 
 
 Directors' Fees 25 
 
 Increased Expenditure ........ 26 
 
 Amount of Possible Savings 26 
 
 Outlook for the Traders ........ 27 
 
 Actual Effect on Railway Rates 28 
 
 Climbing Down .......... 2g 
 
 The " Helpful Fillip " Stage 29 
 
 A Vanishing Quantity 30 
 
 Majority Report Impracticable ...... 30 
 
 Irish Opinion and the Majority Report 31 
 
 The Minority Report 34 
 
 Minority View on Grievances 34 
 
 The Irish Railway Service 35 
 
 Minority Disapproval of State Purchase • • • • 35 
 
 Private Ownership Preferable 35 
 
 Australasian Railway System 36 
 
 Minority and Amalgamation 37 
 
 Self-Help for Irish Farmers 38 
 
 Economic Production 38
 
 viii CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 Railway Rates for Agricultural Produce .... 38 
 
 Views of the "Irish Homestead" 39 
 
 The Butter Industry 39 
 
 Winter Dairying 40 
 
 Railway Rates for Butter 40 
 
 Conclusions 40 
 
 APPENDIX: 
 
 State Railways in New South Wales .... 43
 
 Irish Railways 
 and their NationaHsation. 
 
 Not only has there long been in Ireland an active group of 
 advocates of some form of State ownership of the railways in 
 that country, but supporters of the nationalisation principle 
 in general have regarded Ireland as the section of the United 
 Kingdom in which a start could best be made with an 
 application of the principle they favour. They would try 
 their " 'prentice han'" on Erin, and then see what they could 
 do with England and Scotland. Lord Brassey, for instance, 
 speaking at the autumn meeting of the Association of 
 Chambers of Commerce at Liverpool, on September 19th, 
 1907, said, concerning the State ownership of railways : — 
 
 The capital value of the railways might be taken roughly at twice the 
 amount of the National Debt. To deal equitably with interests so vast 
 would be an operation which would heavily tax our financial resources. 
 Perhaps we might begin with State ownerstiip in Ireland. The financial 
 operation would be on a limited scale. 
 
 In addition to the financial consideration here suggested, 
 favouring a commencement with Ireland, it must be admitted 
 that in some respects the economic conditions of Ireland 
 are exceptional ; that the principle of State and local aid 
 towards the provision of railways, especially in necessitous 
 districts, has already been applied there to an extent unknown 
 in England and Scotland ; that there may well appear to be 
 an unduly large number of railway companies in so small a 
 country ; and that to begin with them would be a less costly 
 business than to deal with the whole of the railways in the 
 United Kingdom. 
 
 An intimation that the proposals in question were about to 
 assume a more definite shape and form than that of merely 
 academic discussion was conveyed in an article published in
 
 lo IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 the " Financial and Commercial Supplement " of The Times 
 of May 2ist, igo6, under the heading, "Irish Railways: 
 Prospects of Government Purchase." In the course of this 
 article it was said : — 
 
 For a considerable time past an agitation has been kept up in Ireland 
 in favour of the nationalisation of the railways. . . . Those who have 
 been working for the State control of the Irish railways are in a hopeful 
 frame of mind at present, owing to the action which the Irish Govern- 
 ment has recently taken. Mr. Bryce was not long in office* before a 
 scheme for the nationalisation of the Irish railways was formulated. 
 Not only is he sympathetic towards it, but the matter is receiving his 
 serious attention, and it is not improbable that one of the first important 
 Irish measures undertaken will be the purchase by the State of the rail- 
 ways. Nothing can be definitely asserted, but it is considered fairly 
 certain in well-informed quarters that the Irish Government intend to 
 deal with the matter, and that before long. 
 
 The Vice-Regal Commission. 
 
 The course actually taken differed somewhat from this 
 forecast. No measure for the State purchase of the Irish 
 railways was actually brought forward, but a Vice- Regal 
 Commission on Irish Railways was appointed by the Lord 
 Lieutenant, under date July 19th, 1906. It would appear, 
 therefore, that either the correspondent of The Times had 
 been mis-miormed by his " well-informed quarters," or the 
 fact of the Commission being appointed within two months 
 of the appearance of his article must have been not uncon- 
 nected with the " serious attention " which he said the 
 proposals in regard to railway nationalisation were then 
 receiving at the hands of the Irish Government. 
 
 Terms of Reference. 
 
 Certain it is that the terms of reference of this Com- 
 mission assumed, from the very outset, that the Irish railways 
 were in fault ; and, in view of the earlier statements by the 
 writer in The Times, as to the leaning of the Government 
 towards a nationalisation scheme, the impression may well 
 have been given that the Commission was really expected, if 
 it had not been actually designed, to collect evidence which 
 would convict the companies of various shortcomings, and 
 thus render the nationalisation idea easier of attainment. 
 
 The terms of reference, after directing the Commissioners 
 
 To inquire into the present working of the railways in Ireland, 
 including light railways, and to report how far they afford, separately or 
 
 * As Chief Secretary for Ireland.
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. ii 
 
 in conjunction with otlier means of transit, adequate facilities for the 
 cheap and rapid transport of goods and passengers within the Island 
 and to Great Britain ; 
 
 proceeded : — 
 
 zc/mi causes have retarded the expansion of traffic upon the Irish lines and 
 their full utilisation for the development of the agricultural and industrial 
 resources of the country ; and, generally, by wliat means the economic, efficient, 
 and harmonious working of the Irish railways can be best secured. 
 
 To the first part of these terms of reference no exception 
 could be taken ; but the remainder evidently regarded it as 
 an absolutely uncontrovertible fact : (i) that expansion of 
 traffic has been retarded on the Irish lines; (2) that the 
 railways have not been fully utilised for the development of 
 the agricultural and industrial resources of the country; and 
 (3) that the working of the railways has been alike un- 
 economical, in-e^c\eni, and «07i-harmonious. It was thus 
 not a matter of ascertaining by public inquiry whether or not 
 the railways really had been guilty of these faults and short- 
 comings. The Commission was, apparently, to take it for 
 granted that they had. 
 
 Complaints Invited. 
 
 This putting of the railway companies " into the dock," as 
 Mr. Balfour Browne expressed it, in his closing speech 
 (January 29th, igog) on behalf of the associated Irish railway 
 companies, was followed by the issuing of a circular in 
 regard to which Mr. Balfour Browne further alleged that 
 the Commissioners 
 
 Began to rake the country for complaints against the railway com- 
 panies, and not against anything else. . . . Perhaps it was necessitated 
 by the reference, but I am bound to say, if you look at it, it invites 
 people from all over the country to come forward and make grievances 
 against the railway companies. ... It assumes the whole thing. . . 
 Every one of these topics is suggested to these gentlemen. I would 
 have come and given evidence myself with this brief in my hand. . . . 
 It sends out from this Commission a fiery cross all over Ireland, and I 
 say no wonder you got complaints. 
 
 In effect, no fewer than 248 witnesses were examined, the 
 Commissioners held g5 public and 56 private meetings, and 
 a period of four years elapsed between their appointment and 
 the publication of their final report.
 
 12 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 The Companies Exonerated. 
 
 It cannot be suggested that there was inadequate oppor- 
 tunity for the bringing forward of any possible grievances; 
 but, although these were in no way lacking in number, a huge 
 proportion were of the most trivial kind, not able to stand 
 the test of investigation ; and, in the result, although the 
 Commissioners were divided on what became the main issues, 
 the companies were fully exonerated from the accusations 
 that had been made against them.* 
 
 Commenting on this particular outcome of the proceedings, 
 the Irish Times of July 26th, igio, said: — 
 
 The Commission began its inquiries by taking evidence against the 
 present management of the larger companies. It was suggested in 
 many quarters that this management was almost deliberately short- 
 sighted, extravagant, and unpatriotic. We maintained at the time that 
 this was an absurd and prejudiced view. . . . The Minority Report 
 states that little fault is to be found with the individual management of 
 the larger railways. The Majority Report, while condemning the 
 present system root and branch, admits that the methods which it con- 
 demns could hardly have been avoided by the companies in view of 
 their commercial obligations to their shareholders. 
 
 The chairman of the Midland Great Western Railway 
 Company of Ireland, the Hon. Richard A. Nugent, speaking 
 at the half-yearly meeting of that company on August 4th, 
 igio, said : — 
 
 Upon one aspect of the case the railway companies of Ireland have 
 ground for satisfaction. They have emerged from the long ordeal of 
 
 * The following examples, taken from the published evidence, are 
 typical of the grievances which were brought before the Commission : — 
 
 (i) A complaint that jd. was charged for the transport of 28 lbs. 
 of tobacco carried from Belfast to Monaghan, this being, the witness 
 said, at the rate of 46s. M. per ton, instead of the nominal rate 
 of i8s. 6d. per ton. (He had, of course, been charged the "small 
 parcels " scale, and not the tonnage rate for larger quantities.) 
 
 (2) A complaint by a witness that he had had a beast killed in transit. 
 Asked when it occurred, he replied, " About twenty-five years ago." 
 
 (3) A complaint that the railwaj' companies do not provide cases in 
 which dead pigs can be hung up in the vans, and so removed direct to 
 the markets. 
 
 (4) A complaint that the rate for Irish bacon from Enniskillen to 
 Liverpool was higher than that for American bacon from Liverpool to 
 Enniskillen ; though the witness admitted that if the Irish bacon were 
 packed in boxes, like the American bacon, instead of in bales, it would 
 go at the same rate. Asked why he did not adopt the system which 
 allowed of the better loading of the waggons, and thus secure the lower 
 rate, he replied, " The trade won't allow us." 
 
 For the reference in the Minority Report to the acquittal of the 
 companies, see page 34.
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. 13 
 
 this inquiry with credit, and the complaints and ill-founded charges so 
 long made against them of mismanagement and exactions and of 
 retarding the expansion of traffic have been dispelled. 
 
 Whether or not, therefore, it had really been hoped to 
 base arguments in favour of nationalisation on the alleged 
 faults and failings of the railway companies, any possibility 
 of realising such aim was clearly nullified by the investigation 
 itself. 
 
 Continental Conditions. 
 
 Another respect in which the case against the railway 
 companies broke down was as regards a comparison between 
 Irish and Continental goods rates and conditions of transit. 
 
 Such comparisons have long constituted a stock argument 
 of the railway nationalisation party. For the purposes of the 
 Irish inquiry the Department of Agriculture and Technical 
 Instruction, with the approval of the Commission, sent a 
 member of their staff, Mr. Philip MacNulty, to France, 
 Belgium, Germany, Holland, Denmark, Austria and 
 Hungary in order to collect data as to railway transport 
 conditions in those countries. Mr. MacNulty brought back 
 a large collection of official tariffs, etc., and the Statement 
 he prepared, giving a digest of facts he had gathered concern- 
 ing the railway systems of the countries in question, is a 
 mine of information, of considerable value to students of 
 railway questions in general. Such students cannot fail to 
 be grateful to the Commissioners for having published these 
 results of Mr. MacNulty's great activity in Volume IV. of 
 their report. 
 
 But the direct bearing of all this information on the 
 question of Irish transport was open to very considerable 
 doubt ; and in the evidence which I myself gave before the 
 Vice-Regal Commission, in respect to Continental conditions, 
 I sought to show (i) that there is no similarity between the 
 geographical, economic, and general transport conditions of 
 Ireland and of Continental countries ; (2) that Continental 
 railway rates may be exclusive of services which are included 
 in the Irish rates; (3) that, for these reasons, there is no 
 basis for any fair comparison between Ireland and the other 
 countries in question ; and (4) that, in effect, Irish transport 
 can only be judged rightly from an Irish standpoint.* 
 
 These views were so far adopted by the Commissioners 
 
 * The same arguments equally apply, of course, to comparisons 
 between English and Continental railway rates and conditions.
 
 14 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 that the majority say, under the head of " Information as to 
 Irish and Continental Goods Kates and Conditions of 
 Transit" :— 
 
 The considerations to be taken into account, and the differences in 
 conditions, are so great, so numerous, and so varied and involved, that 
 it would be very dilTicult to apply a common measure that could be 
 expressed in figures. We do not think any useful purpose would be 
 served by attempting to make a particular and detailed comparison 
 between Continental and Irish rates. 
 
 The Colonial Example. 
 
 It was, again, obviously hoped by the railway nationalisa- 
 tion section of the Commission that the policy to which 
 they had been more or less committed before the inquiry 
 opened would be supported by the example of Australasia, 
 where the railways are mainly owned and operated by 
 the Governments concerned. A number of witnesses having 
 personal experience of the administration and working of 
 these railways were examined. They spoke of the part 
 the lines had played in the development of the colonies; 
 they expressed their preference for State ownership over 
 company ownership, and, without necessarily having any 
 personal experience of Irish conditions, or taking into 
 account the fact that State purchase of a practically complete 
 network of railways in Ireland to-day would be a very 
 different matter from State construction of railways in 
 colonies unprovided, or inadequately provided, therewith, 
 they gave it as their opinion that the adoption in Ireland 
 of the Australasian system of State railways would be of 
 advantage to that country. 
 
 The majority of the Commissioners appear to have been 
 especially impressed by some evidence given as to the action 
 of the Victorian Government in constructing a line of railway 
 to an irrigation settlement of 3,000 people 200 miles from 
 the nearest terminus of the State railways, and they remark 
 thereon : — 
 
 Of course it is generally recognised that projects of this experimental 
 nature, with little certainty of success, and, in any event, taking years 
 to fructify, are not practicable under the system of private commercial 
 companies. 
 
 Here, however, the majority overlook the fact that, alike 
 in the United States and in Canada, private commercial 
 companies built in their pioneering days thousands of miles 
 of railways through virgin forests and across mountain ranges
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. 15 
 
 where there were then no settlements at all, or likely to be 
 until the railways afforded transport facilities, the probability 
 of such projects " taking years to fructify " in no way checking 
 developments of private enterprise which will compare 
 favourably with anything that Australia and New Zealand 
 can show in favour of State action. 
 
 Comparison between the Colonies and Ireland must, 
 however, needs be futile because of the absolute dissimilarity 
 in their circumstances and conditions ; and, after all the 
 time spent in taking the evidence of these Colonial authorities, 
 the majority find themselves compelled to admit — 
 
 In comparing the Australian with the Irish railways due consideration 
 must be given to the varying conditions of the two countries, which are 
 in many respects so different that it would be misleading to apply, 
 without such consideration, any conclusions derived from the experience 
 of the one to the circumstances of the other. 
 
 This is equivalent to saying, in effect, that the example of 
 Australia, from which so much had been hoped, is found not 
 to apply to Ireland at all. 
 
 State Acquisition. 
 
 While the case against the Irish railway companies, and in 
 support of the nationalisation scheme, thus completely broke 
 down as regards the three grounds of (i) grievances ; 
 
 (2) comparisons with Continental rates and conditions ; and 
 
 (3) the Colonial example, the majority of the Commissioners 
 have nevertheless reported in favour of State acquisition, the 
 minority in their separate Report expressing themselves 
 directly opposed thereto. The general position was thus 
 summed up in a leading article published in The Times of 
 July 26th, igio : — 
 
 There are seven Commissioners, and they are divided as equally as 
 it is possible to divide an odd number. Four of them — Sir Charles 
 Scotter (formerly general manager and now chairman of the London 
 and South-Western Railway), Lord Pirrie, Lieutenant-Colonel William 
 Hutcheson Poe (an Irish landlord), and Mr. Thomas Sexton (well 
 known in Irish pohtics) — conclude in favour of the purchase of all the 
 Irish railways by the State. Three of them— Sir Herbert Jekyll 
 (Assistant-Secretary of the Board of Trade), Mr. William Mitchell 
 Acworth (a well-known authority upon railway affairs), and Mr. John 
 A. F. Aspinall (general manager of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail- 
 way) — report in favour of amalgamation into a single commercial 
 system of all the principal Irish railways by the voluntary action of 
 the companies, assisted by permissive legislation and by limited 
 financial aid.
 
 i6 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 The Majority Report. 
 
 Failing those other reasons which, as I have shown, had 
 proved of no avail, the majority base their actual recom- 
 mendation of State purchase mainly on the ground that they 
 " consider it obvious that Irish development will not be 
 fully served by the railways until they cease to be commercial 
 undertakings," 
 
 This remark, as j\Ir, F, W. Pim observed at the half-yearly 
 meeting of the Dublin and South-Eastern Railway meeting 
 on August nth, 1910, "appears to give the keynote of the 
 whole Majority Report." Later on the report further says 
 on the same question : — 
 
 It cannot be doubted that, so long as the Irish railways continue to 
 exist as commercial undertai<ings, it will be extremely difficult, if not 
 quite impracticable, for the companies to make such reductions in rates 
 as the economic conditions of the country require, without jeopardising 
 their capital. 
 
 The majority would, in fact, abolish the Irish railway 
 companies on the ground that the commercial principle, as 
 applied to their lines, is both unsound in itself and unsatis- 
 factory in its operation. 
 
 It is desirable to see how far these conclusions are 
 warranted by the facts of the case. 
 
 Number of Companies. 
 
 There is, undeniably, one weak point in the railway situation 
 in Ireland, and it is one that seems to be frankly admitted by 
 the railway companies themselves. Although the total length 
 of the Irish railways is only a little over 3,400 miles, the lines 
 are owned by thirty-eight different companies and operated 
 by no fewer than twenty-eight. 
 
 That these conditions call for change is common ground 
 in both the Majority and the Minority Reports. Where the 
 reports differ is in the particular form of the remedy they 
 think should be applied. Each favours amalgamation under 
 the control of a single body ; but the Majority Report 
 recommends public ownership by a popularly-elected body, 
 and the Minority Report advises a continuance of the principle 
 of company ownership. 
 
 Amalgamation. 
 
 In the idea of amalgamation of the Irish railways there 
 is nothing new. The Great Northern of Ireland to-day
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. 17 
 
 comprises thirteen separate railways, which have been 
 absorbed at different times since 1875, while the seven 
 principal systems in Ireland are shown in the Majority 
 Report to comprise about sixty railways that were formerly 
 separate undertakings. Since 1888 seventy-seven railway 
 systems have been reduced to sixteen, and four of the larger 
 companies have amalgamated seventeen separate under- 
 takings embracing a total length of 503! miles. Since that 
 date the Great Southern and Western alone has absorbed 
 twelve other companies having a length of only a quarter of a 
 mile short of 400 miles. 
 
 There still remain, however, as the chairman of the Belfast 
 and County Down Railway Company (the Right Hon. Thomas 
 Andrews) said at the half-yearly meeting on August 4th, 
 1910, " a very considerable number of railways which are 
 anything but prosperous, and are giving very inadequate 
 services to the public." Thus in addition to the main issues 
 as to whether (i) the State should absorb all the companies, 
 or (2) the companies should absorb one another, there is 
 (3) the alternative issue whether the larger companies, while 
 being allowed still to maintain their separate existence, should 
 absorb the smaller companies. 
 
 The Majority Scheme. 
 
 The first of the three issues, as here stated, is, of course 
 the proposal of the majority of the Commissioners. They 
 recommend : — 
 
 I. That an Irish authority be instituted to acquire the 
 Irish railways, and work them as a single system ; 
 
 II. That this authority be a railway board of twenty 
 directors — four nominated and sixteen elected ; 
 
 III. That the general terms of purchase be those prescribed 
 by the Regulation of Railways Act, 1844, with supplementary 
 provisions as to redemption of guarantees and purchase of 
 non-dividend paying or non-profit earning lines ; 
 
 IV. That the financial medium be a railway stock, such 
 stock being charged upon (i) the Consolidated Fund ; 
 (2) the net revenues of the unified railway system ; (3) an 
 amount granted from the Imperial Exchequer ; and (4) a 
 general rate to be struck by the Irish Railway Authority if 
 and when required. 
 
 They add that the annual grant from the Exchequer, to be 
 of appreciable practical utility, should be of considerable 
 amount, and certainly not less than £250,000. 
 
 I.R.N. B
 
 i8 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 Terms of Purchase. 
 
 There is, throughout, an extraordinary vagueness about 
 the details of the scheme thus put forward. 
 
 The Majority Report makes no attempt to estimate the 
 purchase price of the Irish railways, though it clearly 
 assumes that the terms would, on the basis of the Act of 
 1844, be a sum equal to twenty-five years' purchase of the 
 average annual divisible profits for three years before such 
 purchase. But this assumption, which has been widely 
 accepted by the Press and the public, overlooks the fact 
 that the terms in question were, by a proviso in the Act, to 
 apply only to railways whose dividend equalled or exceeded 
 10 per cent, on the capital, companies paying less than 
 10 per cent, being at liberty to claim that the terms of their 
 purchase should be fixed by arbitration ; and as all the 
 railways in Ireland pay less than 10 per cent, there would 
 have to be a separate arbitration in the case of each company. 
 Hence, any calculations on the basis of twenty-five years' pur- 
 chase must needs be wholly without foundation, while no one 
 can possibly foresee what would be the result of the arbitration 
 necessary in each and every instance. No less fallacious, for 
 a like reason, must be any calculations — based on the terms 
 ot purchase — as to the savings that might be effected. 
 
 Is there not, also, something preposterous in the idea of 
 raking up an ancient Act of Parliament, passed nearly 
 seventy years ago, when railways were in their infancy 
 and expected to pay at least 10 per cent, dividends, and 
 applying it to the wholly different circumstances and con- 
 ditions of to-day ? If, for instance, it were proposed to 
 apply to the London and South-Western Railway that 
 principle of twenty-five years' purchase which the majority 
 of the Commissioners seem to think is sound (since they say 
 " the terms of purchase prescribed in the Railways Act 
 of 1844 are, in our opinion, fair and equitable ") it would 
 give the shareholders some ;;^3, 000,000 less than the present 
 market price, which price is the value the public to-day put 
 upon the line in question. 
 
 In any case, we have the fact that the majority, though 
 advising that the Irish railways should be acquired, do not 
 attempt even to estimate what would be the probable amount 
 of the purchase-money ; though without doing so they do 
 assume a saving by purchase, without siny premises for such 
 assumption.
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. 19 
 
 Financial Proposals, 
 
 No less are the financial proposals of the scheme vague, 
 ambiguous, and uncertain. 
 
 The Majority Report states that the new railway stock is 
 to be charged, first, upon the Consolidated Fund. If that 
 be so, what other fund or security is required ? If, on the 
 other hand, a general rate on the Irish ratepayers is to be 
 responsible for any deficit, what need is there for a Govern- 
 ment guarantee — unless, of course, it is assumed that the 
 Irish local rates may not be sufficient for the purpose ? It 
 is evidently anticipated that the net revenues of the unified 
 railways will be inadequate ; but is it contemplated that the 
 local rates may fail ? 
 
 Instead of offering a perfectly clear and well-defined 
 scheme, such as one may regard as especially desirable where 
 great interests and vast sums of money are involved, the 
 whole plan is hopelessly lacking in definite data and clear- 
 ness of detail. 
 
 The Government Grant. 
 
 The majority of the Commissioners evidently expect a 
 good deal from the aforesaid annual grant of ^250,000. 
 They think it " would not only secure the full utilisation 
 of the Irish railways for the development of resources, but 
 would help to mitigate the pressure of poverty by encouraging 
 employment, promoting general industries, and expanding 
 trade " ; and they further recommend that the reserve fund 
 into which is to be paid any balance left over from the grant, 
 after all these objects have been duly attained, " should be 
 applicable by the railway authority to the construction of 
 branch lines, links and extensions, and any other exceptional 
 outlay." 
 
 Is there, however, any prospect that the grant would be 
 secured ? 
 
 Mr. Birrell more than discouraged any such hope when 
 addressing the deputation from the General Council of the 
 Irish County Councilswhich waited upon him on October 21st, 
 1910. He suggested that the moment the English agricul- 
 turists heard it was proposed to subsidise the Irish railways 
 to the tune of £250,000 a year, in order that Irish railway 
 rates might be reduced, they would want to go shares and to 
 get, in proportion to the size of England, several millions 
 per annum for the reduction of railway rates in their country. 
 
 B 2
 
 20 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 He would, he said, " like to have the matter well thought 
 out whether the subsidy from the British Exchequer was, in 
 the opinion of those who advocated the Majority Report, a 
 necessary part, or whether they thought that they would be 
 able to run their railways, as a whole, under the new 
 arrangements, without imposing a charge upon the British 
 Exchequer, and without imposing any heavy liability on the 
 general taxpayer." 
 
 From the Majority Report it is clear that the said grant 
 of jr250,ooo a year really does form an essential and indis- 
 pensable part of the proposed scheme. The remarks made 
 by the Chief Secretary indicate, on the other hand, with 
 much plainness, that the Government are not in the least 
 disposed to make any such grant.* 
 
 The Irish Ratepayer. 
 
 There would, of course, still be that general rate which 
 the Irish railway authority would be empowered to impose 
 on the Irish ratepayer, "if and when required," in order to 
 make up any ultimate deficit, should the much desired, but 
 mythical, ;^250,ooo grant not suffice for that purpose. 
 
 Resort to such an expedient would mean that while the 
 trader gained a certain relief, for one pocket, in railway 
 rates, he would have to pay a larger sum out of another 
 pocket for increased local taxation. It would, alternatively, 
 mean that a merchant or manufacturer, getting lower railway 
 rates withotd any material increase in the local rates he 
 himself paid, would benefit at the expense of the agriculturist 
 who used the railway very little, but upon whom an increase 
 in local taxation would fall with especial severity ; or it 
 would mean that those who were not directly concerned 
 either in trade or in agriculture would have to pay higher 
 local rates in order that their neighbours who were in busi- 
 ness could gain bigger profits by means of subsidised 
 transport. 
 
 The majority of the Commissioners clearly anticipate that 
 there would be a heavy annual loss on the unified railways, 
 notwithstanding the predicted but wholly visionary econo- 
 mies, to which I shall allude later. Whatever, therefore, 
 may be really their idea in regard to the new railway stock, 
 
 * The Irish Times, in its issue of October 28th, 1910, remarked : — 
 " Mr. Birrell has made it perfectly clear that if we want nationalised 
 railways we shall have to pay for them ourselves."
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. 21 
 
 they could not charge it to the net revenues alone ; anj' 
 prospect of an annual grant must now be abandoned, and 
 undue dependence on the Consolidated Fund is certain to 
 be resisted by a watchful Chancellor of the Exchequer, so 
 that it is upon the Irish ratepayer the responsibility of the 
 financial obligations incurred would ultimately fall. 
 
 What amount he would be required to provide is a matter 
 for speculation ; but he could rely on having to find the 
 apparently indispensable £"250,000 which the Government 
 decline to furnish, and, in addition to this, he would have to 
 pay the whole of any further deficit. 
 
 That the Irish ratepayer will be content to run these 
 unlimited risks and accept this limitless liability, when he 
 realises all that the scheme may involve, is altogether 
 inconceivable. 
 
 In a letter to the Irish Independent of October 2gth, 1910, 
 " One Not Obsessed," writing from co. Donegal, says in 
 regard to this branch of the question : — 
 
 Under various 7i07ns de plume I have always hitherto backed Mr. Field 
 on those matters he supported ; but on the question of rate-aided State 
 railways I have no hesitation at all in going whole-heartedly against him. 
 Whatever the shortcomings of the present system, it has this advantage 
 anyway — that nobody pays except those who use the railways, and in 
 proportion to the extent that they use them. Under Mr. Field's Majority 
 Report plan those who would make most use of the railways are the 
 people who would pay little or no rates at all. . . . 
 
 Let us now turn to the other side. All our small farmers from Cork 
 to Donegal pay rates. It is within my knowledge that hundreds of these 
 have never seen a railway, and thousands have never used one. They 
 cannot afford such a luxury. The majority don't enter a train once in 
 twelve months, and very few oftener than once a month, and yet these 
 are the people who would have to bear the burden of rate-aided 
 railways 1 
 
 State Purchase : Irish Control. 
 
 The Railway Board which the Majority Report proposes 
 should be formed would consist of twenty directors, of whom 
 twelve, elected by county council and municipal corporation 
 delegates, would represent the ratepayers, two would be 
 nominated by the Treasury and two by the Lord Lieutenant, 
 one each of the remaining four being elected by the Irish 
 port and harbour authorities, the Irish Chambers of Com- 
 merce, the Irish Industrial Development Associations, and 
 the Irish cattle trade associations respectively. 
 
 ' This Board would "control and administer" the unified 
 railways, and the curious, if not altogether unique, situation
 
 22 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 would be brought about of the Imperial Government guaran- 
 teeing interest' on the railway stock, yet being in so small 
 a minority in its representation on the Railway Board that 
 the said control and administration of the railways would, 
 in regard especially to any question on which a difference of 
 opinion arose, be entirely in the hands of the Irish elected 
 members. In this respect, therefore, a " nationalisation " of 
 the Irish railways on these particular lines would go far 
 beyond any system of State railways elsewhere. It would 
 almost be the same as if the Prussian Government, after 
 acquiring the railways of that country, had appointed advisory 
 councils, not merely for consultative purposes, but to take 
 over the entire system, with full power to control and 
 administer it, to concede whatever reductions in rates they 
 thought fit, and to call on the Prussian taxpayers to make 
 good any deficiency. 
 
 It would be the purpose, if not the duty, of the Irish Board 
 to work the railways on non-commercial lines. The majority 
 of the Commissioners not only consider that Irish interests 
 cannot be served so long as the railways continue to exist as 
 commercial undertakings, but they hold that the object of 
 unification should be that of " securing special and cheap 
 transit arrangements, which are not practicable under the 
 present system of private companies," any deficits resulting 
 from a readjustment of rates being made good in the way 
 already described. 
 
 A Lesson from South Africa. 
 
 This proposed operation of the Irish railways on non-com- 
 mercial lines, at the risk and assured cost of taxpayers and 
 ratepayers, is strangely at variance with the stipulations laid 
 down in the South Africa Union Act of igog, in regard to 
 the administration of the railways belonging to the Colonies 
 included in the South African Union. It is there enacted 
 (clause 127) that " The railways, ports, and harbours of the 
 Union sJiall be adininistercd on business principles. ... So 
 far as may be, the total earnings shall be not more than are 
 sufficient " (though it is evidently designed that they shall 
 be sufficient) "to meet the necessary outlays for working, 
 maintenance, betterment, depreciation, and the payment of 
 interest due on capital not being capital contributed out of 
 railway or harbour revenue."
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISx\TION. 23 
 
 Disadvantages of Popular Management. 
 
 Disregarding the example of South Africa, and operating 
 the unified Irish railway system on other than business 
 principles, the Railway Board would carry on such operation 
 under conditions which might well lead to something like 
 financial disaster. 
 
 There would be a widespread clamour for new lines and 
 extensions, regardless altogether of any question as to the 
 prospect of remunerative traffic thereon. In fact, the 
 Majority Report itself says : — 
 
 In the course of our inquiry proposals for the construction of eighty- 
 three new railways and extensions of existing lines were brought to our 
 notice. . . . Additional railway accommodation was asked for in nearly 
 every county in Ireland, but in comparatively few cases would the 
 immediate prospects of traffic appear to be sufficient to justify com- 
 mercially the expense of constructing the lines. 
 
 How would the pressure to construct such lines be resisted 
 by a popularly-elected Board, whose policy is to be based on 
 a definite abandonment of commercial principles ? Yet the 
 fact is notorious that in France, in Australia, in Cape 
 Colony, and elsewhere, the railway systems have been 
 heavily handicapped by the construction of unremunerative 
 lines built to serve limited local, or even purely individual, 
 interests under such conditions that they were not likely 
 ever to pay ; while in Australia it has, in some instances, 
 been found cheaper to take " political " lines of this type up 
 again, and abandon their working, rather than seek to operate 
 them any longer. 
 
 Experience teaches us, also, the danger, under the influ- 
 ence of "popular control," of appointments and promotions 
 being made, or increases in pay granted, apart altogether 
 from a strict regard for business principles, with the result, 
 among other things, of unduly swelling the working expenses, 
 and adding still further to the burden the Irish ratepayer 
 would have to bear. 
 
 Railway Rate Reductions. 
 
 A no less serious risk would arise, under " popular " 
 management of the railways on non-commercial lines, of 
 reductions of rates being granted to an extent which, while, 
 perhaps, encouraging particular industries and benefiting 
 particular localities and individuals, would jeopardise the 
 financial success of the railway system, and increase the 
 prospects of a taxation of the many for the benefit of the few.
 
 24 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 Apart from the other considerations involved, the funda- 
 mental purpose of the Majority Report scheme is to bring 
 about substantial reductions in the scales of railway rates 
 and fares. 
 
 From this point of view the report makes, in effect, the fol- 
 lowing assumptions: (i) That Ireland is a backward country 
 because the railway rates are too high ; (2) that the one means 
 of ensuring her economic progress is to reduce those rates ; 
 
 (3) that this cannot be done under a " commercial " system 
 of railway ownership and operation which aims both at 
 making the railways self-supporting and at giving to share- 
 holders an adequate return on their investments ; and 
 
 (4) that the only way in which the desired reductions can be 
 assured to the Irish people is by a combination of State 
 purchase, popular control. Government subsidies, and Irish 
 taxation. 
 
 The reply to these assumptions is : (i) That the evidence 
 given before the Vice- Regal Commission failed to show that 
 any trade or industry had been hurt by the railway rates, 
 while it did show that the railways had rendered very material 
 aid to Irish industries and to Irish progress in general ; 
 (2) that there are other conditions, besides railway rates, 
 which are concerned, and may be concerned to a far greater 
 degree, in Irish economic development ; (3) that, unless 
 railways are to be regarded as a philanthropic institution, 
 they must be operated on " commercial " principles, whether 
 owned by private companies or by the State ; and (4) that 
 while rate reductions would be aimed at on the Irish lines 
 under the proposed system of popular control, the advantages 
 to be gained by the Irish traders must be very problematical, 
 while it is certain that if large reductions are made the 
 ratepayers at large will be the sufferers. 
 
 Economies. 
 
 The assurance that rate reductions could and would be 
 made on a system of unified railways under popular control 
 is based mainly on the expectation : (i) That State purchase 
 would lead to the saving of large sums in interest ; though the 
 fallacy of this assurance is shown by the fact, already men- 
 tioned in connection with the Act of 1844, that no one knows 
 what the amount to be paid for the railways would really 
 be ; and (2) that substantial economies would be effected 
 when the lines were no longer divided between so many
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. 25 
 
 companies, each with its own board of directors and separate 
 staff of officers and officials. 
 
 On the surface there would appear to be some foundation 
 for the latter argument, which, indeed, is constantly being 
 advanced by supporters of the railway nationalisation 
 principle. In the Irish Times of August loth, igio, for 
 example, "A Shareholder," in expressing approval of the 
 Majority Report scheme, wrote : — 
 
 The savings following unification . . . can it be doubted that they 
 will be enormous ? The Report mentions that there are 261 railway 
 directors in Ireland at the present time for whom a board of twenty is 
 proposed to be substituted. The directors of the Great Southern and 
 Western Company receive an average of over ;^400 each per annum in 
 fees alone, and, although the whole 261 are not remunerated as liberally 
 as the lucky twelve, yet the disappearance of so many directors must 
 mean a very handsome saving. Add to this the salaries and expenses 
 of the officials of twenty-eight railways* — managers, secretaries, 
 engineers, locomotive superintendents, accountants, audit inspectors 
 and the like — and the result will be surprising. 
 
 But when one looks into details one finds that the actual 
 savings would hardly be likely to justify the use of the word 
 "enormous." 
 
 Directors' Fees. 
 
 As shown by the witness for the associated railway com- 
 panies (Mr. Tatlow) in the evidence he gave before the 
 Vice-Regal Commission, the remuneration received in 1906 by 
 the directors of the thirty-eight companies owning the Irish 
 railways amounted to ^18,656, which gave an average of 
 £■491 per company and £y^ per director. Out of this total 
 of -£"18,656, however, ^15,250 went to the directors of the 
 six principal companies, leaving only ;£"3,4g6 for the remain- 
 ing thirty-two companies, an average of £106 per company. 
 
 Under the Majority Report scheme how much of this 
 jTiSjOOO would be saved ? Not only, according to the 
 report, are the twenty directors who are to form the pro- 
 posed Railway Board themselves to receive allowances, but 
 they are to be left to fix their own '' remuneration and scale 
 of expenses." It may reasonably be assumed that, in the 
 circumstances, they would not be unduly modest in their 
 estimates of the value of their services. 
 
 In the result, would any of the ;;^i8,ooo be saved ? How 
 far, also, would the net saving, whatever it amounted to, go 
 
 * "A Shareholder " here refers to operating, as distinct from the 
 larger number of owning companies.
 
 26 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 towards a general reduction of rates and fares on the Irish 
 railways, considering that in the year 1909 the gross receipts 
 (exclusive of those on light railways) amounted to ^1,663,832 
 from passenger fares, and ;^i, 960,701 from goods, a total of 
 ;£'3,624,533 ? 
 
 Increased Expenditure. 
 
 While, again, savings might be effected in some directions 
 on a unified system, there would necessarily be increased 
 expenditure in other directions. Apart from the demand for 
 the building of unremunerative lines, there would be a further 
 demand that small lines in the backward parts of Ireland 
 should be brought up to a higher level of equipment and 
 efficiency ; much reconstruction would be necessary ; there 
 would have to be a levelling up of wages ; traders and 
 travellers on the smaller lines would make greater demands, 
 in regard to train and other services, on a popularly-elected 
 railway authority than they would make on a railway com- 
 pany, and traders would be more ready to present ** claims " 
 on any and every possible occasion. 
 
 Against, therefore, the wholly uncertain economies would 
 have to be set alike the diminished receipts from decreased 
 rates, owing to the concessions made, and the certain increase 
 in expenditure in the various directions which I have here 
 indicated. 
 
 Amount of Possible Savings. 
 
 In the Majority Report itself no attempt is made to fore- 
 cast the amount that might actually be saved through the 
 anticipated economies. The language employed therein on 
 this branch of the subject, as well as on other matters of 
 material importance, is rich in platitudes but of the vaguest 
 character in regard to actual details. While expressing 
 generally the belief that " there is still a large held for 
 economy " through amalgamation, the majority add, " We 
 hesitate to commit ourselves to a precise figure ; " and here, 
 at any rate, they are certainly wise. They frankly admit 
 also that " the saving to be effected in directors' fees, to 
 which undue importance is apt to be attached, though 
 not inconsiderable, is much smaller than is commonly 
 supposed." 
 
 One of the witnesses examined before the Vice-Regal 
 Commission, Mr. O'Dea, of the Irish Reform Association, 
 suggested in the course of his evidence that by the conversion
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. 27 
 
 of the Irish railways into a single system a saving of a quarter 
 of a million might be effected, though he did not, of course, 
 explain how he had arrived at his figures. Thereupon one 
 of the Commissioners, Mr. J. A. F. Aspinall (General 
 Manager of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Com- 
 pany) asked him : — " Supposing your figure of a quarter of a 
 million to be right, have you ever divided the total tonnage 
 of goods carried overall the Irish railways* into that quarter 
 of a million, so as to be able to assign how much you would 
 be able to reduce the rate per ton to a particular place?" 
 The witness replied, " Well, I never made that calculation." 
 This loose and unsupported estimate of Mr. O'Dea is, I 
 might here mention, the one that has been generally accepted 
 by the railway nationalisation party. The Freeman's Journal 
 of August 30th, igio, for example, after referring to the 
 proposed grant of ^250,000, goes on to say : — 
 
 The economies following unification would, it is estimated, amount 
 to another ^250,000. Even if only ;^20o,ooo were saved there 
 would, etc. 
 
 There is, however, still no suggestion as to the way in 
 which these calculations have been arrived at, and they 
 v/ould seem to be due much more to surmise than to 
 actual data of any sort whatever. 
 
 Outlook for the Traders. 
 
 In the various circumstances here indicated, what is the 
 actual prospect of the Irish traders securing those sub- 
 stantial rate reductions and those other advantages from 
 rate-aided. State-owned, and popularly-controlled railways 
 which they had been led to expect as the result of the 
 particular policy favoured by the Majority Report ? Are 
 they not likely to find, rather, that between anticipation and 
 realisation there may be a very considerable difference ? 
 
 When giving evidence before the Vice-Regal Commission, 
 on February 23rd, 1907, the Rev. T. Z. F. Stack, who repre- 
 sented the ratepayers of Drumquin and district, was asked, 
 " Your idea is that if the State had the railways the rates in 
 force now would be considerably reduced?" He replied, 
 " Yes, sir ; they could be reduced, I believe, by at least 
 
 * In the year 1909 the goods traffic on the Irish railways (exclusive 
 of light railways) was: minerals, 2,077,112 tons; general merchandise 
 3,906,769 tons; total, 6,083,381 tons.
 
 28 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 50 per cent." Mr. P. Crumley, representing the Enniskillen 
 Urban District Council, examined November 20th, 1906, 
 expressed the view that in order to put the country in a fair 
 position for trade the present railway rates should be reduced 
 by one-third. Other witnesses declared that nothing below 
 a 25 per cent, reduction would be likely to give satisfaction. 
 
 What are the prospects of even the lowest of these three 
 figures being attained through State purchase ? 
 
 The hope that reductions of railway rates, to whatever 
 extent, would be secured through the " economies " to be 
 effected on a system of nationalised railways, popularly con- 
 trolled, and operated, in the supposed interests of the 
 "people," on lines opposed to ordinary business principles, 
 must be at once abandoned. Any economies that might be 
 effected would, as I have already shown, be counterbalanced 
 by increased expenditure in others ; and I would here add 
 to the considerations already offered that the fact has been 
 repeatedly demonstrated that State or municipal manage- 
 ment is more costly than company management. In the 
 circumstances, the Irish traders would be well advised not 
 to build their hope of rate reductions on economies. 
 
 The other source from which, under the Majority Report 
 scheme, the means for railway rate reductions were to be 
 derived was that ^^^250,000 subsidy by the British Govern- 
 ment which has now practically gone by the board ; though 
 in regard to this the Irish Independent of August 19th, 1910 
 (prior, of course, to Mr. Birrell's intimation) said : — 
 
 Considered in relation to the gross receipts of the Irish railways,* 
 /"25o,ooo is an absurdly small sum. Assuming that there would be 
 no increased cost of working, and that the present net receipts could 
 balance the interest and sinking fund, this grant would represent 
 only an average reduction of 6 per cent, on Irish fares and rates. 
 
 From an original demand for a reduction of 50 per cent, 
 the Irish trader was thus brought down to a problematical 
 6 per cent. Would a reduction such as this, assuming that 
 it could still be depended on, be likely to have on the 
 industries of Ireland an effect in any way commensurate 
 with the revolutionary financial, economic and other changes 
 that nationalisation of the Irish railway system must involve ? 
 
 Actual Effect on Railway Rates. 
 
 The chairman of the Cork and Macroom Railway, Mr. 
 Martin Flavin, has shown that the tonnage rate for butter 
 
 * See the figures already given on p. 26.
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. 29 
 
 from that district to the distributing centres of England 
 works out at three-fourths of a farthing for each pound of 
 butter, and that a reduction in rates by 10 per cent, would 
 be equal to one-fourteenth of a farthing per lb. of butter, or 
 one penny for every 56 lbs. of butter having a retail value 
 of about three guineas. 
 
 Climbing Down. 
 
 In view of such facts as these, the railway nationalisation 
 advocates have been forced to admit that the earliest anticipa- 
 tions are not likely to be realised, and they themselves have 
 discredited the idea of any general reduction of rates and 
 fares as the outcome of nationalisation. 
 
 Writing in the Irish Times of August gth, 1910, a hostile 
 critic of the Majority Report, signing himself " A Rate- 
 payer," said that if the witnesses on whom the majority 
 relied were right, nothing less than a 25 per cent, reduction 
 of rates and fares would be satisfactory ; and he proceeded 
 to argue that no possible increase in the traffic — itself 
 involving additional capital outlay and heavier working 
 expenses — would be likely to recoup the railways for their 
 loss in traffic receipts. 
 
 To this the Freeman's Journal of August loth replied that no 
 general reduction of rates was contemplated, and that the 
 principles which should, in the opinion of the Commissioners, 
 guide a national railway management in the reduction of 
 rates were : — " First, native industries that are unable to 
 compete in the home market with foreign manufacturers by 
 reason of unequal treatment from the carrying companies 
 should have the handicap removed. Second, new industries 
 should be encouraged, and get all the favour possible from 
 the railway management. Such a reduction of rates on the 
 industries indicated as would give them a helpful fillip 
 would," the Freeman's Journal added, " be well within the 
 proposed subvention of the quarter of a million, if not even 
 less than the savings to be effected by unification and 
 conversion of capital." 
 
 The "Helpful Fillip" Stage. 
 
 By this time, therefore, the original 50 per cent, all-round 
 reduction in railway rates had declined to the proportions of 
 a " helpful fillip " — not for Irish industry in general, but for 
 certain industries to be selected by the popularly -elected railway 
 authority for preferential treatment.
 
 30 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 Even this " helpful fillip," however, would seem to be 
 dependent on the quarter-of-a-million subvention which is no 
 longer to be counted on at all, and the last remaining hope 
 the majority can offer to the trader depends on the extreme 
 improbability of the Irish ratepayer being willing to submit 
 to the aforesaid general rate. 
 
 A Vanishing Quantity. 
 
 From the point of view of the Irish trader, at least, the 
 prospect first opened out to him by the scheme for the 
 nationalisation of his railways resembles (if I may adopt an old 
 analogy) that of an American thoroughfare which starts with 
 a fine broad street in a city, but dwindles and dwindles the 
 further it goes, until it is found, eventually, to lead to 
 nothing more than a squirrel track up a beech tree ! 
 
 Majority Report Impracticable. 
 
 To sum up the case against the Majority Report, I would 
 say that the scheme proposed is wrong in principle and, even 
 if it could be carried out without the £"250,000 subsidy, would 
 prove unsound in practice and unsatisfactory in results. 
 
 (i) The scheme is wrong in principle because (a) railways 
 acquired or constructed by the State should be controlled, if 
 not actually operated, by the State ; (b) taxpayers should not 
 be required to subsidise railways without being able, through 
 their representatives in Parliament, to have a voice in 
 questions of policy and management ; and (c) railways, 
 whether owned by companies or by the State, should be 
 self-supporting and worked on business lines. 
 
 (2) The scheme would be unsound in practice because 
 (a) the Railway Board would consist of members two-thirds, 
 at least, of whom would have had no previous experience of 
 railway operation or management ; (b) owing to the fact that 
 the Board was mainly an elected body, there would be the 
 risk that non-economic influences would prevail alike in the 
 choice of members, in the making of appointments on the 
 railway staff, and in the granting of promotions ; and (c) the 
 Board, by reason of its creation on a " popular " basis, 
 and because of the undue expectations raised, would 
 inevitably be led into an increaLsed expenditure which, 
 coupled with decreased traffic receipts, and the general 
 rejection of commercial principles, might speedily result in 
 financial chaos.
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. 31 
 
 (3) The scheme would lead to results which must needs 
 be unsatisfactory because {a) the management of the 
 " national " system would be less efficient than at present ; 
 
 (b) the country would be disappointed unless substantial 
 reductions in railway rates and fares were obtained ; and 
 
 (c) the ratepayers would be furious if, in order that those 
 reductions could be conceded, they themselves had to make 
 good the serious deficits that would inevitably arise. 
 
 Irish Opinion and the Majority Report. 
 
 That the recommendations of the Majority Report were 
 received, especially at first, with resolutions of approval 
 passed by County Councils, Urban Councils, Boards of 
 Guardians, and other local bodies in Ireland, is undeniable. 
 Mr. William Field, M.P., who formed one of the deputation 
 to the Chief Secretary on October 21st, igio, even stated that, 
 " so far as he knew, every representative Council, Corpora- 
 tion and public body, except certain Chambers of Commerce 
 and Agricultural Committees, had passed resolutions in 
 favour of the Majority Report." 
 
 But until Mr. Birrell, on the occasion referred to, bluntly 
 intimated that the Government were not in the least disposed 
 to make the annual grant of £250,000, it had been 
 generally assumed that such grant formed an integral part 
 of the Majority Report scheme, and the various bodies 
 which passed the resolutions in question may have been 
 influenced by their expectations in regard to the grant, the 
 withholding of which would so seriously concern the Irish 
 ratepayers if the scheme itself were carried out. Even, too, 
 before Mr. Birrell's announcement, the views of the local 
 authorities were not all in favour of the views supported by 
 Mr. Field. Thus, as reported in The Times of September 
 23rd, 1910, the Athlone Urban Council unanimously decided 
 to oppose the Majority Report, " as they believed that the 
 scheme of nationalisation outlined in it would adversely 
 affect the ratepayers." 
 
 Opinions, again, should be weighed, as well as counted, and 
 when this is done the considered judgment of bodies such as 
 Chambers of Commerce and the Irish Council of Agriculture, 
 having close and constant dealings with transport questions, 
 and possessing, therefore, a full and practical acquaintance 
 therewith, should surely be regarded as of greater worth than 
 the resolutions of Boards of Guardians and other local
 
 32 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 authorities not necessarily having anything Hke the same 
 qualifications for dealing with the questions at issue. 
 
 Although, therefore, Mr. Field seemed to dismiss the 
 views of the dissenting Chambers of Commerce and Agri- 
 cultural Committees as exceptions hardly deserving of 
 notice, it is desirable that the nature of those views should 
 be clearly understood. 
 
 The Belfast Chamber of Commerce adopted, on Septem- 
 ber 24th, 1910, a report of its Traffic Committee in which it 
 was stated that the Committee dissented " very strongly " 
 from the views and recommendations put forward in the 
 Majority Report ; that in their opinion there was little 
 ground for complaint against Irish railway administration 
 as a whole; that they were "strongly opposed to the 
 proposal to give subventions to Irish industry in the shape 
 of unremunerative rates of transit at the expense of the 
 general body of ratepayers," and regarded the scheme of 
 nationalisation by purchase and popular control as " imprac- 
 ticable and radically vicious in principle " ; that the proposal 
 to entrust the administration of the railways to a body 
 largely constituted by popular election, with a mission to 
 reduce railway rates and power to make rates to cover 
 deficits, appeared to the committee to be "monstrous"; 
 and that they endorsed the view of the minority that " the 
 remedy is not to reduce rates but to organise production and 
 distribution " ; while they further approved of an absorption 
 of the smaller lines by the principal Irish companies, and, 
 also, supported the view that there should be greater 
 facilities provided for dealing with traders' complaints. 
 
 The Council of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce passed, 
 on October 4th, 1910, a series of resolutions, as follows: — 
 
 1. Tlaat, having fully considered both the Majority and Minority 
 Reports of the Vice-Regal Commission on Irish Railways, this Council is 
 in favour of the further amalgamation of the railways, more especially 
 of the acquisition, without delay, of the smaller lines by the larger com- 
 panies, and in order to expedite this process a sufficient grant from 
 public funds to make such an operation possible should, where necessary, 
 be sanctioned. 
 
 2. That in any arrangements which may be made in pursuance of 
 the foregoing, the least possible dislocation of employment at existing 
 railway works should be aimed at. 
 
 3. That the means of dealing with complaints or applications in 
 respect of railway rates or facilities should be simplified and made easier 
 and more accessible to traders and the general public. 
 
 4. That we disapprove of the proposal in the Majority Report for the 
 acquisition of the railways at the cost and risk of the ratepayers of
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. 33 
 
 Ireland, and we observe that the Commission heard no evidence on, and 
 offer no estimate of, the probable cost or financial results of such an 
 operation. 
 
 5. That we also disapprove of the proposal that the railways should be 
 vested in and managed by a body of directors appointed in the manner 
 recommended by the Majority Report, which would constitute a system 
 of railway management not tending to efficiency or economy, and for 
 which there is no precedent elsewhere. 
 
 6. That, having regard to the small average returns paid on the 
 present railway capital, we are not satisfied that the profits would be 
 sufficient to pay the interest and sinking fund on the stock to be issued 
 as the purchase price of the railways. 
 
 7. That a system of indirectly subsidising trade or industries by 
 reducing railway charges to unremunerative figures at the expense of 
 the ratepayers, as contemplated by the Majority Report, is economically 
 unsound, and a wasteful method of endeavouring to accomplish its pro- 
 fessed object. Moreover, such a system would be open to grave abuses, 
 and would not tend to an impartial administration of the railways. 
 
 We, therefore, fail to see that any advantage would be gained by 
 involving the ratepayers of the country in an enormous debt and a most 
 serious obligation to make good deficiencies in the railway accounts. 
 
 The members of the Waterford Chamber of Commerce, 
 meeting on October 19th, igio, declared by resolution that 
 they were "not prepared to support the proposals embodied 
 in the Majority Report," their reasons for adopting this 
 course being given as follows : — 
 
 First, because we consider that the financial arrangements would be 
 unworkable, if not ruinous to the country ; and, secondly, because we 
 consider that the proposed controlling body would not be adequately- 
 representative of the general interests concerned. 
 
 The Council of Agriculture, on the same day, discussed a 
 resolution brought forward by Mr. Field, M.P., approving 
 the Majority Report, and urging the Government to take 
 immediate steps to have the recommendations thereof 
 carried into effect. In the result, and after a debate which 
 the Vice-President described as one that was worthy of a 
 very serious question, the Council rejected the motion. 
 
 Such was the position, in regard to public opinion in 
 Ireland, when Mr. Field addressed Mr. Birrell on October 
 2ist, 1910. Five days later, and subsequently, therefore, to 
 the Chief Secretary's intimation, there was held in the 
 Council Room of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce a con- 
 ference of Irish Chambers of Commerce to consider the 
 two Reports of the Vice- Regal Commission. The delegates 
 who attended represented the Chambers of Commerce of 
 Dublin, Belfast, Cork, Limerick, Waterford, Drogheda and 
 Newry. After full consideration, the conference adopted the 
 
 I.R.N. C
 
 34 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 resolutions already passed by the Dublin Chamber (see 
 page 32), the Cork Chamber alone dissenting. 
 
 In the circumstances it cannot be said that the Majority 
 Report has received, even in Ireland, such a degree of 
 influential support as would, apart from the many other 
 considerations involved, warrant the Government in carrying 
 it into effect. 
 
 The Minority Report. 
 
 The report of the three Commissioners who form the 
 minority is much more practical in its views and recom- 
 mendations than the report of the four who constitute the 
 majority. Between the two reports there are the widest, 
 and wholly irreconcilable, differences of opinion ; but whereas 
 the Majority Report is based to a very considerable extent on 
 assumptions for which it offers no definite data, and opens 
 out the prospect of an endless vista of complications, finan- 
 cial, economic, and in other ways besides, the Minority 
 Report keeps much more within the range of what may 
 be regarded as practical politics. 
 
 Minority View on Grievances. 
 
 As already indicated in the extract from the Irish Times 
 given on page 12, the minority take a more just view of the 
 past action of the railway companies, and have been in no 
 way greatly impressed by the complaints gathered in with 
 the help of the " fiery cross " spoken of by Mr. Balfour 
 Browne. " In our opinion," they say, ** the result of the 
 evidence is that, if the compatiies are considered as having 
 been on their trial, they are entitled to a verdict of acquittal." 
 They especially affirm that they do not think any argument 
 can be founded on what had been so much relied upon by 
 witnesses against the companies, viz., the alleged disparity 
 between the average cost of conveyance per ton of goods in 
 Ireland and in Great Britain, saying in this connection : — 
 
 As the railway witnesses pointed out, the comparison is vitiated 
 not only by the immense volume of mineral traffic carried at low rates 
 in Great Britain to which there is no counterpart in Ireland, but 
 also by the fact that the average length of haul is probably greater 
 in Ireland. A comparison of average passenger fares in the two 
 countries is equally delusive, on account of the enormous urban and 
 suburban passenger traffic carried at very low fares in Great Britain. 
 In such unequal conditions no conclusions of any value can be drawn 
 from comparisons of averages. The only true comparison is between
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. 35 
 
 individual rates and fares in actual operation under comparable con- 
 ditions for equal distances, and, tried by this test, the impression 
 produced on our minds by the evidence is not unfavourable to the Irish 
 railways. 
 
 The Irish Railway Service. 
 
 The minority further consider that, regarded as a whole, 
 the service given by the larger Irish railway companies does 
 not compare unfavourably with that given by railways in 
 Great Britain when allowance is made for the differences 
 alike in the volume and in the character of the traffic and in 
 the industrial circumstances of the two countries. They 
 doubt whether the expansion of traffic has been retarded. 
 They further say : — 
 
 If traffic has not expanded as much as it might, had the circumstances 
 been more favourable, the failure must, we think, be attributed to a 
 variety of causes of which railway service is only one, and not the most 
 important. On this point we have come to the conclusion that the 
 railway companies have done what they could in their own interest, 
 and so in the public interest, to stimulate traffic ; that they have 
 succeeded in augmenting its volume, and that to this extent they have 
 benefited the industries of the country. 
 
 Minority Disapproval of State Purchase. 
 
 All the same, the minority do not hold that the railway 
 system, as a whole, is incapable of improvement, and they 
 point, in this connection, to its subdivision among a number 
 of independent companies — entailing evils of divided control 
 — and other disadvantages. 
 
 Here, of course, the minority are in accord with the 
 majority ; but the two come to a parting of the ways as 
 soon as they proceed to consider the particular remedy that 
 should be applied. 
 
 Whereas the majority regard State purchase as the basis 
 of any real improvement in the Irish railway system, the 
 minority reject it in toto. The purchase of railways by the 
 State, often proposed, has, they say, as often been rejected ; 
 and they allude especially to the adverse opinions expressed 
 by the Devonshire Commission in 1867, and the Allport 
 Commission in 1888. 
 
 Private Ownership Preferable. 
 
 The minority are of opinion that *' the principle of private 
 ownership should be maintained." They express the belief 
 " not only that railways are better and more economically 
 
 c 2
 
 36 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 managed by directors responsible to their own shareholders 
 than they would be under any form of State or popular 
 control, but that their administration on commercial lines is 
 the best in the public interest." 
 They likewise say : — 
 
 We do not think that reductions of rates are more likely to occur 
 nnder public than under private ownership of railways; indeed, the 
 official statistics of the respective countries show that the fall in the 
 average rate has been much greater on the privately- owned railways 
 of France and the United States than it has been on the State-owned 
 railways of Prussia, which are universally accepted as the most 
 favourable example of State-managed railways in the world. 
 
 Australasian Railway System. 
 
 In commenting on the observations made by the Majority 
 Report in regard to the evidence given to the Commission 
 on the subject of the railway systems of Australasia (see 
 p. 14), the minority say : — 
 
 We desire to point out that : — 
 
 (i) No critic of the Australasian system appeared before us, though 
 such critics notoriously exist.* 
 
 (2) It is admitted, even by those who laud that system as it now 
 stands, that serious difficulties and drawbacks existed at the outset, 
 and were not got rid of for many years. 
 
 (3) It is shown by the official statistics that only within the last two 
 or three years has the net income of the Australasian railways sufficed 
 to cover the interest on the railway capital. 
 
 (4) Mr. Davies, late general manager of the West Australian Govern- 
 ment Railways, told us in his evidence that, "comparing Australia with 
 Ireland, the goods rates are higher in Australia, passengers' normal 
 fares are higher, and there are fewer concessions of special fares," and 
 also that the Irish railways give " a much bigger service." 
 
 Further, so far as the general effect of the evidence from Australasia 
 is to support State ownership, as opposed to private ownership, of 
 railways, we would desire to point out that, even if we admit that 
 a railway policy, which was largely forced upon Australia and New 
 Zealand by local requirements, has been justified by results, or that a 
 similar policy might have been applicable to Ireland as it was sixty 
 years ago, it does not follow that it would be applicable to Ireland now. 
 We entirely agree with the conclusion at which our colleagues finally 
 arrived in paragraph 122 of their report, that it would be misleading to 
 apply any conclusions derived from the experience of Australasia to the 
 circumstances of Ireland. These circumstances, indeed, differ funda- 
 mentally, and in most respects offer striking contrasts. To mention 
 only one : Australia — a continent with few seaports, and a sparse, 
 though growing population — required, and still requires, the opening 
 up of districts large in extent and remote from the seaboard, which 
 
 * See Appendix.
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. 37 
 
 could not be effected by private enterprise. Ireland, comparatively 
 small in area, but relatively populous, with an extended coast-line so 
 provided with ports that scarcely any interior point is more than fifty 
 miles distant from one or more of them, is already in possession of a 
 fairly complete system of internal communication by canal, river, or 
 railway, mainly provided by private enterprise. On the whole, therefore, 
 we are decidedly of opinion that no argument in favour of the intro- 
 duction of a national railway system in Ireland can be founded upon 
 the existence, however successful, of such a system in Australia. 
 
 Minority and Amalgamation. 
 
 While the minority seek to maintain the principle of 
 private ownership, they would change the application of it 
 to the Irish railways in order to remedy the defect of undue 
 subdivision among so many different companies. 
 
 As already remarked, too much seems to be expected from 
 economies to be effected through amalgamation. We have 
 seen that even the Majority Report discourages exaggerated 
 anticipations as to what might follow if the railway direc- 
 tors' fees were saved ; and I have shown that against 
 economies in some directions must be set the certain prospect 
 of increased expenditure in others. On this particular point 
 the Minority Report says : — 
 
 We cannot shut our eyes to the probability that amalgamation would 
 entail increased expenditure, which might go far to neutralise economies. 
 The general manager of the Great Northern Railway, whose familiarity 
 with the working of the Irish railways is admitted, told the Com- 
 missioners that, although the amalgamations with which he had been 
 concerned had led to increase of revenue, they had not been attended 
 with any reduction in expenditure. . . . Apart from increased expen- 
 diture on permanent way and rolling stock, a general levelling up of 
 wages would almost certainly occur, and this, in itself though good for 
 the railway servants, would go a long way to eat up any savings that 
 might be effected in other ways. 
 
 I would, however, remark, in passing, that the eating up of 
 savings under the conditions here described would be greater 
 under a system of State ownership and popular control than 
 under one of com.pany ownership and operation, since the 
 " popular " representatives, in the former case, would be 
 much more amenable to pressure from outside influences 
 than would be the directors and officers of a commercial 
 company or companies who were bound to show due regard 
 to commercial principles, and not look on their railway 
 mainly as a philanthropic institution, supported by the 
 nort-voluntary contributions of taxpayers and ratepayers. 
 
 406065
 
 38 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 Self-help for Irish Farmers. 
 
 With the further views expressed by the minority as to 
 the desirability of the Irish farmers doing more to help 
 themselves in their economic difficulties or disadvantages, 
 instead of finding so much fault with the railways, and 
 seeking to depend so much on the State, I can only express 
 my heartiest concurrence. 
 
 In my book on " The Organisation of Agriculture " I 
 have given details showing how various countries, great and 
 small, in all four quarters of the globe, have sought to adapt 
 themselves to the changing conditions of the day by effecting 
 such organisation of their agricultural industry as would allow, 
 more especially, of (i) economic production, (2) guarantee of 
 quality, and (3) combined consignment, under the best 
 conditions, in order to secure transit at the lowest available 
 rates, with the result that the foreign or colonial producers 
 have been enabled to compete far more successfully with 
 British producers on our own markets. It is still a matter 
 for serious consideration whether not only Irish but English 
 farmers might not gain more for themselves by following the 
 example of the foreigner in these directions than from any 
 practicable reduction in railway rates alone, if the railways 
 are to pay their way at all. 
 
 Economic Production. 
 
 In the matter of economic production, for instance, a 
 group of farmers in any particular district who formed them- 
 selves into an agricultural organisation society, grouped 
 their orders for seeds, fertilisers, and other necessaries, and 
 obtained these commodities through a federation of similar 
 societies, so that each individual had the advantage, not 
 only of wholesale prices for his own particular lot, but — what 
 might be of even greater importance — had an absolute 
 guarantee of purity of quality, would stand to gain there- 
 from advantages compared with which any actual benefit 
 they could hope to secure simply from a decrease in railway 
 rates would be quite small, if not actually insignificant. 
 
 Railway Rates for Agricultural Produce. 
 
 Irish farmers could, also, no doubt, secure more favourable 
 treatment on the Irish railways by means of an effective 
 organisation of transport on the same lines, more or less, as 
 
 I
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. 39 
 
 the foreign producer whose competition they have to meet. 
 On this point the Minority Report says : — 
 
 It is a matter of common knowledge that low rates and special 
 facilities are the direct and invariable accompaniment of traffic large in 
 volume, regular in transmission, and presented to the carriers in a form 
 convenient to handle. In such conditions it is notorious that railway 
 and shipping companies can afford to give rates and facilities which 
 could not otherwise be given, and this fact is, in our opinion, sufficient 
 to account for the difference in the treatment accorded to foreign and 
 Irish produce. If the latter were presented in the same conditions, we 
 cannot doubt that it would obtain the same advantages ; and this leads 
 us to conclude that the remedy is, not to reduce rates with the hope of 
 stimulating traffic, but to organise production and distribution as they 
 are organised abroad, believing as we do, that reductions in the cost of 
 transit would be certain to follow. 
 
 Views of the " Irish Homestead." 
 
 In commenting on the final Report of the Vice-Regal 
 Commission, the " Irish Homestead " — official organ of the 
 Irish Agricultural Organisation Society — said : — 
 
 It needs two classes of people to run railways economically : the 
 railway staff and the general public. The part which the public should 
 play is altogether overlooked here, while it is continually in the minds 
 of Continental experts. The railway directors and their staffs organise 
 the system. It is only the public who can organise the traffic. In 
 France, for example, there are people in almost every district whose 
 business is to bulk and organise local traffic so as to secure to the 
 merchants the advantages of low rates for consignments in bulk. . . . 
 
 On the Continent farmers have, through their co-operative societies, 
 organised their traffic so that by consigning their produce in bulk they 
 secure the low rates for large consignments. It is preposterous to 
 expect railway companies to charge low rates on a straggling lot of 
 consignments of small parcels. They must keep up large staffs of 
 porters to deal with the multifarious unorganised traffic in agricultural 
 and other goods in Ireland. The public in Ireland have not done their 
 part of the business of organising railway traffic, and the tendency is 
 to throw the whole blame on the companies, and to compare them and 
 the Irish rates with Continental countries under quite different 
 circumstances. 
 
 The Butter Industry. 
 
 Coupled with this defective organisation of actual traffic is 
 the question whether or not the industries themselves have 
 always been developed in the way they should and might be. 
 
 The butter industry is a case in point. " How large a 
 field," says the Minority Report, " is open to Ireland in this 
 single industry is shown by the fact that in 1908 butter to 
 the value of £24,080,912 was imported into the United
 
 40 IRISH RAILWAYS 
 
 Kingdom from abroad, ap:ainst only ^^4,026,023 exported 
 from Ireland"; while the Majority Report mentions that, 
 as stated in evidence, Danish butter finds its way into the 
 Limerick market, one of the principal centres of the Irish 
 butter trade. 
 
 Winter Dairying. 
 
 The real key to the situation is to be found in the far better 
 organisation of the Danish industry. This is especially the 
 case in regard to winter dairying, by means of which the 
 Danes are enabled to supplement their large and regular 
 summer supplies by similar supplies during the winter, when 
 there is practically no Irish butter on the market. In the 
 result (to quote again from the Majority Report) — 
 
 The supply of Danish butter is regular throughout the year, while that 
 of the Irish article is intermittent. Creamery butter, which forms the 
 bulk of the Irish supply, begins to arrive in the wholesale market about 
 the beginning of May, and ceases about the middle or end of November. 
 The cessation of the supply during five months of the year is said to be 
 most injurious to the Irish trade, wholesale merchants finding it 
 increasingly difficult to induce the grocers to again take the Irish 
 article in the spring, their customers who, in the meanwhile, hare been 
 dependent on the Danish butter, objecting to the change. 
 
 Railway Rates for Butter. 
 
 The view taken by the Minority Report on the subject of 
 railway rates for butter consignments is that — 
 
 To begin by reducing rates to a level unremunerative to the carrying 
 companies would be to begin at the wrong end. It would be, in effect, 
 to impose a tax upon railway receipts in order to put a premium upoa 
 faulty agricultural methods. If winter dairying were estabUshed first 
 we believe that there would be such an increase in the volume and 
 regularity of the traffic that lower rates would follow as a matter of 
 course. Moreover, though reductions in rates might help the industry, 
 the effect of such reductions would be insignificant, having regard to the 
 small proportion which existing rates bear to the value of the goods, in 
 comparison with the effect of establishing winter-dairying. This, 
 coupled with the co-operative methods which have made the industry so 
 successful in Denmark, could not fail to increase production and ensure 
 the supply of Irish butter to the British market all the year round, thus 
 enabling it to compete with Danish butter on its merits in the United 
 Kingdom, and putting a stop to the importation of the latter into Ireland. 
 
 Conclusions. 
 
 To sum up the conclusions to which I consider the 
 Majority and Minority Reports lead, I would say — 
 
 (i) That no case has been established against the Irish
 
 AND THEIR NATIONALISATION. 41 
 
 railway companies which could justify a resort to nationali- 
 sation of the railways. 
 
 (2) That railway operation has not retarded the economic 
 development of Ireland. 
 
 (3) That the Irish railway system could be improved by 
 reducing the number of separate undertakings through the 
 absorption of the smaller lines by the large companies, and 
 that this policy of absorption and amalgamation should be 
 not only continued by the companies, but encouraged and 
 facilitated by both the Imperial and the Irish authorities. 
 
 (4) That the public in Ireland — as also in England — should 
 recognise that the effect of all these commissions and com- 
 mittees of inquiry into railway operation, inspired, it may be, 
 as much by political as by economic considerations, extend- 
 ing, possibly (as in the present instance), over a considerable 
 period, and putting the companies, as has well been said, 
 " on their trial," is to create conditions of uncertainty that 
 interfere with, even if they do not discourage and check, the 
 amalgamations, developments, extensions, improvements, con- 
 cessions, or other advantages for which the companies would 
 be far better able to arrange if, in a period of less interference^ 
 they were afforded greater encouragement thereto without 
 having their time, their attention, and their energies so 
 much diverted from the steady development of rail transport 
 facilities through being required to face official investigations 
 alike into more or less groundless complaints and into more- 
 or less impracticable schemes of railway reorganisation. 
 
 (5) That the Irish traders themselves, and more especially 
 those of them who are agriculturists, should see that if they 
 are to meet foreign competition effectively, and obtain the 
 advantages their foreign competitors secure, they must, 
 instead of seeking to throw the whole responsibility on the 
 railway companies, and expecting them to carry traffic at non- 
 remunerative rates, (i.) develop their industries on the same 
 lines as the foreigner, so as to offer to the consumer con- 
 stant, rather than intermittent, supplies of commodities of 
 uniform quality ; (ii.) secure through organised effort the 
 most economical as well as the most efficient production; 
 and,(iii.) again by means of combination, put themselves in 
 a position to obtain those transport rates which can only 
 be reasonably expected for large and regular consignments, 
 despatched and carried under the most favourable conditions.
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
 STATE RAILWAYS IN NEW SOUTH WALES. 
 
 On p. 36 mention is made of the fact that the Minority 
 Report says, in regard to the State railways in Australasia : 
 ** No critic of the Australasian system appeared before us, 
 though such critics notoriously exist." 
 
 In The Times of August 27th, 1910, there was published, 
 under the heading " The Railways of New South Wales," 
 .an article from the Sydney correspondent of that journal, 
 dealing with the railway extensions and improvements pro- 
 posed to be carried out in the colony at a cost of " many 
 millions," and showing why these great operations are 
 necessary. On this last-mentioned point the correspondent 
 says : — 
 
 The need of them wants little proving to one who lives here. The 
 local Press is constantly full of complaints against the existing order ; 
 stock are injured, fruit is wasted, markets are lost, because transit is so 
 slow. If by some lucky chance the produce is carried with reasonable 
 speed, it comes to such a hopelessly congested terminus that agents and 
 shippers cannot get at it ; if it is being carried from the terminus for 
 up-country delivery, or between country stations, its fate seems no 
 better. When melons take eight days in transit between two stations 
 on a main line (the passenger train takes eleven hours) ; when trucks 
 for fat lambs cannot be had within six weeks of application ; when you 
 •can get fruit into Sydney from Hobart (650 miles away) and Brisbane 
 (500 miles away) by steamer sooner than from country stations 
 within two hundred miles of the capital (I quote statements publicly 
 made this year by known authorities), no one can feel very proud of 
 the system under which these things are possible. The Sydney Morning 
 Herald, avowedly doing its best to be as mild as possible, refers to " the 
 loss which many of our wheat producers and distributors are at present 
 experiencing through the inability of the Railway Department to lift 
 the harvest with the requisite expedition ; the loss and vexation which 
 stock-owners chronically experience at critical times through the 
 shortage of trucks ; the loss, again, which is inflicted on the mining 
 industry through the isolation of some of the best mineral areas ; the 
 arrested development of certain other admirable agricultural districts 
 for want of transport facilities " ; and in part explains it all by declaring 
 ttbat the State railways " have been the sport of local influences, instead
 
 44 APPENDIX. 
 
 of being laid down in conformity with a governing idea. We have now 
 arrived at a stage, however, when it is positively dangerous to proceed 
 further without some sort of coherent policy." 
 
 The correspondent proceeds to show how, for a long time, 
 the State railways of New South Wales have been prevented 
 from doing their proper development work owing to the veto 
 of Sydney on all lines that might take away traffic she wanted 
 to keep for herself. In the concentration of traffic on Sydney, 
 he states — 
 
 Many districts were hindered in their natural development, some 
 probably stunted altogether, by the fact that all their produce must 
 travel so far to the market ; and when railways began to spread into 
 the northern and southern lands, Sydney influence woke up to active 
 interference with the natural course of traffic. The Riverina railways 
 were deliberately left unconnected with the Murray and the one little 
 private line that jutted up from it into New South Wales; differential 
 rates were arranged to divert consignments from the river route to 
 South Australia, and the 20omile or less railway route to Melbourne, 
 over the weary four or five hundred miles to Sydney — unprofitably for 
 the railway accounts, but greatly to the profits of Sydney agents and 
 merchants. The debates of the many Federation conferences are full 
 of this differential rate question, and even long after the Common- 
 wealth had come into existence complaints about them were rife 
 between States (for Sydney, of course, was not the only offender; each 
 State capital snatched a traffic for itself, irrespective of the welfare of 
 the countryfolk). And, though differential rates are supposed to be a 
 thing of the past, delibeiate disconnections are very much alive. The 
 late Premier told the people of Murwillumbah (over 600 miles froni 
 Sydney by road and less than 100 miles from Brisbane) that they 
 should get twenty miles of railway bridging the gap to the Queensland 
 border after the 450 miles of gap towards Sydney had been bridged. And 
 a recent request for a twelve-mile junction in Riverina between Finley 
 and Tocumwal — which would give the wheat-growers of South Riverina 
 a 150-mile route to the sea instead of a 450-mile one — was met with flat 
 refusal by the present Minister for Works on the ground that " this 
 link would enable the traffic to go away from lines that were constructed 
 to enable the producers to reach the Sydney market." The Herald 
 summed up the Minister's speech thus : — " He reiterated that he was 
 going to do his best to maintain Sydney's grip on the Riverina trade."
 
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