>^i«^S^»J^J^J^i**^; iaf^i% . ^ n.' V m REESE LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Received^ Accessiofis No. j^^Mt. ^, ^/^ Shelf J^ ^^^u-^^5^^ -3v> Ebua '( t =,^^ wmi ^^^ r>^ :.^. l^-—. M ^^fer, :l^ M /s. I jC .\ ^ s 1 ELEMENTS xHENTAIi AND mORAIi SCIENCE DESIGNED TO EXHIBIT THE SUSCEPTIBILITIES OF THE MIND, AlTD THE RULE BY WHICH THB RECTITUDE OF ANY OF ITS STATE8 OR FEELINGS SHOULD BE JUDGED. \ f BY GEORGE pklPNK, A. M. ' OF THB PUBLISHED BY J. LEAVITT, 1 8a BKOADWAY. BOSTON : CROCKER & BREWSTER, 47 Washington Strc«t. 1829. P3 PsrcH. IBMRV ar3i/ Vanderpool & Cole, Printers, 104 Beekman Street. The subsequent pages owe their origin to the professional en- gagements of the writer. Expected to impart instruction to the students committed to his care, in the philosophy of the human mind» as well as on subjects strictly theological, he devoted all the time he could command to the task of drawing up a course of lectures on the Elements of Mental and Moral Science, which should be made to combine, as far as he found it practicable, comprehension with brevity, and might be used as a text book in his future prelections. His object in the preparation of his lectures was not originality, but usefulness. His sole desire was to guide the minds of his pupils to what he regarded as the right decision upon the multi- farious topics of inquiry which his plan embraced ; and whether he attained that end by presenting to them the statements of others, or what might be more properly denominated his own, was to him a matter of no importance whatever. In the prosecution of this object, the quotations made from the works both of living and departed genius were of course nume- rous. In short, it appeared to him that to present to his young friends a statement of the sentiments of our most approved wri- ters in relation to the important subjects to which he directed their attention, combined with an effort to guide them to the truth amidst this conflict of opinions, wouid prove one of the best modes he could adopt for securing a competent acquaintance with IV PREPACK. those subjects ; nor when he afterward proceeded to prepare his' manuscript for the press, did he see reason to adopt a different course of proceeding. , The preceding statement will account for the free use which he has made, in the following pages, of the writings of those illus- trious men to whom the friends of mental science are under such deep obligations. He ventures to state, however, that the pre- sent work is not a mere compilation. He has endeavoured at least to think for himself; and though he has mainly adopted the views and the system of the late Dr. T. Brown, the attentive rea- der will perceive that he differs from that writer on several im- portant points — whether justly so or not, must of course be left for the public to decide ; the difference will at any rate show that he does not slavishly follow any leader, nor consent to hold his mind in bondage to any man. Unless the reader should be familiarly acquainted with the wri- tings of Locke, Reid, Stewart, Brown, Welsh, &c., it is presumed that he will deem it a great advantage to be presented with an account of the views of these illustrious men ; he will thus be put in possession of better and more ample means for forming an enlightened judgment for himself, than if the sentiments of the writer had been singly exhibited. And even many who are tole- rably conversant with the subjects on which this volume treats, may be glad to have their memories refreshed, and to be spared the labour of making references — a trouble which they must other- wise have undergone : while all who may honour this Work, by taking it as their guide in the commencement of their studies, will, it is hoped, be better prepared, in consequence of the plan which it adopts, for an extensive course of reading, to which it is designed ti invite and allure them. The Author wishes to add a few words in reference to the sys- tem which, as it has been already intimated, is mainly followed in ' PREFACE. V the present Work, viz. that of Dr. Thomas Brown, late Profes- sor of Moral Pliilosophy in the University of Edinburgh ; a sys- tem which differs very considerably from the one which is still advocated with so much ability by his predecessor, Mr. Dugald Stewart. The sentiments of this latter gentleman are avowedly formed upon those of his preceptor, Dr. Reid ; yet he has pre- sented the same radical principles in so much more elegant a dress — has adorned his pages with such varied and beautiful illus- tration — and maintained so high a tone of moral eloquence, that his writings, although it should be admitted that they have not perhaps very greatly enlarged the boundaries of Mental Science, have gained for their Author a larger measure of public applause, than has been bestowed upon those even of his more original predecessor. The works of these distinguished men formed an epoch in the history of Mental Science, second only in importance and splen- dour to that which had been introduced by the labours of our im- mortal Locke. Yet, without intending to detract from their great merits, the present Writer ventures to predict that the time is not far distant, when the publication of Dr. Brown's Lectures will be regarded as constituting an era not less brilliant than any of the preceding ones. The public have not as yet been just to the great merits of the latter gentleman. Many circumstances, which it is unnecessary to specify, have operated to prevent his attainment of that unrivalled distinction as a metaphysician, to which "his transcendent genius, blending together," as it did, ** all that is most gracefiil in fancy, with all that is most arduous and recondite in original speculation," most justly entitles him. There is one point only to which the Author of these pages Would refer. He was a poet, and, therefore, as it has been too hastily inferred, he cannot have been a solid anc/judicious philosopher. Now if it were admitted that a brilliant imagi- nation is not, generally speaking, found in union with those powers which qualify an individual for abstract speculation and "patient thouffht," it misrht still be maintained that Dr. Brown VI PREFACE. was an exception. In his writings " the lighter graces of poetry are interspersed amongst the demonstrations of a profound and original metaphysics. Never was philosophy so abstruse, yet never was it seasoned so exquisitely, or spread over a page so rich in all those attic delicacies of the imagination and the style, which could make the study of it attractive."* It ought also to be further observed, that the poetry, which is doubtless to be found in Dr. Brown's philosophical works, is not only exqui- site in itself, but invariably subordinated to the reasoning. His imagination is yoked to his argument, and it is only for the purpose of carrying it forward with greater rapidity and power that he ever gives to the former the reins. In short, that splen- dour of fancy which sometimes, it must be confessed, eclipses thought, serves, in Dr. Brown, as it always should do, to set it in the clearness of noon-day before the view of the reader. Were it as certain, that the man who is not a poet must be a metaphysician, as that Dr. Brown possessed, in an eminent de- gree, the higher qualities of both, the writer of the present work might venture, on that ground, to prefer some claim to the charac- ter of a Mental Philosopher. No one can be more fully aware, than he is himself, how impossible it is for him to shed over his work those graces of style which give to the pages of Dr. Brown so irresistible an attraction. He has not, accordingly, been guilty of the folly of attempting it. His sole effort has been to render the principles he advocates as intelligible as the abstract nature of the subjects would allow. He has aimed only at correctness and perspicuity — to think with accuracy and clearness himself, and to convey to his readers a distinct conception of his meaning. He ventures not to say, nor even to imagine, that he has been uniformly successful. In a volume comprehending so wide a variety of topics, each of them requiring for its full elucidation considerable power of abstract thought, it were presumption to * Fide Prospectus for a Monument to the memory of Dr. Brown, by one of the most eloquent writers of the present day. PflEfACE. Vll conceive that there are no mistakes of doctrine as well as of phraseology ; and he expects to derive much instruction from the friendly remarks (for he will not anticipate any of a different description) of the various critics who may honour his work with their notice. He trusts, however, that it will not be entirely use- less. He can with truth say, that his object in thus venturing to appear at the bar of the public, has been to advance the interests of what he acknowledges is to him a favourite science. He re- gards that science as being even yet in a state of infancy ; and when succeeding writers shall have carried it, as they doubtless will, to a higher point of advancement than that to which it has at present attained, he trusts that, though he may be constrained by their labours to relinquish some of his present sentiments, he shall not be the last to offer them his thanks. ' In committing this volume to the press, the Author has had more immediately in view the benefit of his junior brethren in the ministry ; and of that large body of British youths whom the ad- vancing spirit of the age will compel to devote some attention to the subjects on which it treats, and who may feel their need of some such assistance as the present Work attempts to supply. At the same time it has not received any such pecuhar adaptation to either of these classes as to render it, on that account, less fit for circulation beyond the boundary of the circle just referred to. The connexion between some of the doctrines of Mental Science, and various parts of Theological Truth, has indeed been exhi- bited ; and it is hoped that this circumstance will not render the volume less acceptable to those whose religious opinions are in harmony with the sentiments of the Writer. Yet he is not aware that his Theology has influenced his philosophical opinions. He rests the views he entertains concerning the nature and properties of the human mind, upon the ground on which he believes in the ductility, &c. &c. of gold — on the ground, that is, of observation alone. He has endeavoured to examine the substance mind, as we examine the substance gold ; and he has ascribed no proper- ties to it but such as in this manner he found, or, at least, fancied VIU PREFACJt:. he found it to possess. He has certainly rejoiced to see that what he regards as the true principles of Mental Science, are in union with those views of revealed truth, which appear to him of great ? and paramount importance ; his faith in both has been confirmed by the discovery of the alliance. Yet it would be to do injustice to the Work to suppose that it attempts to found a system of Men- tal Philosophy on any peculiar religious opinions. It is conducted on philosophical principles ; and it respectfully invites the candid attention of the man of science, as well as of the friend of religion. A regard to brevity has prevented the Author's enlarging on some points upon which he wished to enter more fully. He deemed it, on various accounts, inexpedient that the work should extend beyond one volume. Should it happen to obtain so much favour from the public as to render a second edition necessary, he has it in contemplation to expand considerably that part which treats on Moral Science, or rather to introduce additional topics and discussions ; and either to abridge the former part, or to add another volume, as circumstances and the advice of friends may seem to direct. In its present form he solicits for it the kind con- sideration of his friends, and the candid attention of an enlight- ened public. Blackburn Academy, 1828. CONTENTS. CHAP. I. TAQX IMTRODUCTIOir. All philosophical inquiries relate to Matter or Mind — ^importance of a knowledge of the latter — its influence upon physical science, in Education, Poetry, Eloquence, Criticism^ Moral Science, Theology, &c. — its tendency to strengthen the faculties, &c. &c 17 CHAP U. THS OBJSCT OF IlfTXULECTUAI. SCIENCE; AUTD THE MODE IN WHICH OUR INQXHRIES SHOULD BE CONDUCTED. Inquiries limited to the phaenomena of Mind — its essence unknown, but not material — its properties to be ascertained by observation alone — the only questions are, What are the elements of our Thoughts, &c. and the order of their occurrence— the nature of Causation, Mental Analysis, &c CHAP. m. THE TRUE NATURE OP THE POWERS AND SUSCEPTIBILITIES OF THE MIND EXPLAINED. Thoughts, Ideas, Sensations, &c. are the Mind itself in particular states — Mental Powers, &c. are capabilities of existing in these states — The nature of Physical Qualities, &c 46 CHAP. I?. THE MANNER IN WHICH OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE MENTAL PH2EN0» MENA IS OBTAINED. The nature of Consciousness— statements of Reid, Stewart, Welsh, Brown, &Cr— not a distinct power, &c 65 2 CONTENTS. CHAP. V. THE ORIGIN OF THE NOTION OF SELF, AND THE IDENTITY OF THE THINKING PRINCIPLE, &C. &C. Difference between Stewart and Brown — The notion of Self, and the notion of Identity, not the same — the former intuitive, &c 63 CHAP. VI. ANALYSIS AND ARRANGEMENT OF THE MENTAL PHJBNOMENA. The power of recognizing Resemblances the basis of classification — different principles on which it may be conducted — modes adopted by Reid, Stewart, and Brown — reasons for following the latter : • 68 DIVISIOJSri. External Aflfections ....'.. ; 80 Order I. — Less definite External Affections. . . 81 Order II. — Sensations. . 90 GENERAL REMARKS CONCERNING SENSATION: Ptrs<— All Sensation is in the Mind 91 Second — The term denotes those states of mind which directly result from a change in the state of the Organ QQ Third — It is not confined to those which are decidedly pleasurable or painful 98 Fourth — The nature of the previous change in the state of the organ is unknown 99 Fifth— Th& connexion between Matter and Mind is unknown— attempts to account for it — the theories of Des Cartes, Dr. Briggs — Hartley — fallacy — no especial mystery here 100 Sixth — External objects are known only relatively 108 Important difference between Reid and Brown on this subject — mistakes of Reid and Stewart in reference to Primary and Secondary Qualities and Perception — its true nature explained — Ancient theory of Perception by Images — Examined. Seventh— To Sensation all our knowledge may be traced 131 Statements of Locke, Leibnitz, Shaftesbury, Stewart, &c. — Examined. CLASSIFICATION OF OUR SENSATIONS. Class I. — Sensations of Smell, Considered in the following Order:— The Organ — the Sensations — the Properties which produce them— the Knowledge derived from them 140 CONTENTS. 3U PAGE ' CX«A8S II. — I^EM^SATIOirs OF TASTE. The same order 146 Class III. — Sehtsations of Hsaring. The same order 149 Class IV.— Sensations of Touch. The same order — Our knowledge of things external is not derived from the sense of Touch, but from Muscular Sensations — by Intuition — Statements of Reid, Brown, Welsh, &c 152 Class V.—Sknsations of Sight. The same order — The knowledge of Distance, Magnitude, &c. not gained by this Sense — Extension involved perhaps in our original percep- tions— Opinions of Reid, Brown, &c .165 DmSIOJ>r JL INTERNAL AFFECTIONS. Proof of their existence — tlieir nature — importance — Phrenology — must be analyzed and classified — caution necessary here — mistakes of Condillac, Reid, &c 176 Order I. — Intblllectual States of Mind 189 CI.ASS I. — Simple Suggestions. Explained— the power by which they arise— the phrase, * association of ideas,' improper — importance of the difference between Reid and Brown here— value of the faculty of Suggestion— Laws of Suggestion stated by Hume, Stewart, &c. — may be resolved into three - - - 191 First Law of Suggestion. Resemblance. Analagous as well as resembling objects are suggested — tendency to such suggestions gives existence to the Metaphor, Simile — enlarges the boundaries of the arts and sciences, &c 200 Second Law of Suggestion. Contrast .... ...... 204 Xll CONTENTS. PAGE Third Law of Suggestion. CONTIGUITY. Objects contiguous in Place and in Time are suggested — influence of this law in the study of Chronology, History, &c. — circumstances which modify the influence of these laws — especially constitutional differences — original tendencies to different species of Suggestions, give birth to genius— its nature— the faculty of Suggestion powerfully stimulated by objects of Perception — Conceptions may co-exist - - 206 ATTENTIOWr, Not an original power — ^but Desire co-existing with some other mental affection - - 215 CONCEPTION, MEMORY, IMAGINATION. Statements of preceding writers — are not distinct powers — may be resolved into Suggestion — why they have been considered distinct — Reminiscence — mistakes in reference to Imagination — the separate parts of complex conceptions arise neither directly nor indirectly by Volition — what takes place in the mind when Arguments and Images are said to be selected ----- 222 HABIT -- 240 Class II. — Conceptions of Relation. Their nature explained — different from Simple Conceptions — and from Perceptions — imply the existence of a distinct Power - - - - -244 Species I. — Relations of Co-Existence. Position, Resemblance or Difference, Proportion, Degree, Comprehen- sion — the faculty of recognizing Resemblances the source of classifi- cation and of general terms — their nature explained — Nominalists and Realists — mistakes of both — proof that we have general Ideas — explanation of their nature . ------------- 248 JUDGING, REASONING, &C. General statements of Reid and Stewart — the power of recognizing relations accounts for the phaenomena of Judging, &c. &c. — a mental Judgment is the recognition of a relation — when expressed in words is a Proposition — Reasoning consists of a series of Propositions, each expressing a relation of Comprehension — explanations and illustra- tions — all series of such propositions do not constitute Reasoning — the particular connexion between each which is necessary — the manner in which they arise mentally in the required order — not by Sagacity, but Suggestion --- 256 CONTENTS. XUl ABSTRACTION-. Obscurity of some preceding writers — may be resolved into Suggestion — Abstract Notions— their nature— how formed 269 Species II. — Relations of Succession. Conceptions of the ordei of Events — supply the place of Histoiy — Prophecy 274 Order II. — Emotions. Differ from Intellectual States — must be analyzed and classified— do not admit of generic distinctions — examination of Cogan's state- ments — indefinite — self-contradictoiy— different modes of classifying them stated — Dr. Brown's arrangement — why adopted 276 Class I. — Immediate Emotions. ----- 288 Cheerfitlness ..-- 289 Melancholy 290 surprise, wonder, and astonishment. Called by Cogan Introductory Emotions — his obscurity — are distinct and original feelings — mistake of Adam Smith — their moral use - - 293 Languor 299 An Emotion, not a Sensation— of a pleasing kind — transferred to the object which excites it — which is hence called Beautiful — is an affection of Mind only — not an external Essence — inquiry whether any material objects originally awaken the Emotion — opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Payne Knight on one side, and of Messrs. Alison and Jeffrey on the other — Reasons for considering Beauty as the result of association 300 SUBLIMITY. The Emotion is transferred to the object — Beauty and Sublimity probably different Emotions — Sublimity in material objects the result of Association — apparent inconsistency of Dr. Brown. ----- 316 Deformity and Ludicrousness 322 MORAL approbation AND DISAPPROBATION. The Mind formed to approve what is right, &c., the moral Emotion follows the moral judgment — conceived mistake of Dr. Brown — importance of these Emotions 323 xiv CONTENl^^ PAGE 1,0VE AND HATRED. Analysis of each — importance of both SYMPATHY Is felt with Pleasure as well as Pain — perhaps with the latter more power- fully — why so — may perhaps be resolved into Suggestion — displays the Divine goodness - 332 PRIDE AND HUMILITY Explained — are Emotions — their moral aspect -----.-. 333 Class II. — Retrospective Emotions . . - - 341 Its nature explained — modifications — not evil per se, but in danger of becoming so --_-----_.- md gratitude, A modification of Love — ^kindled by a conception of the amiableness of the benefactor 344 regret and gladness Contain the Emotion, and a conception of its cause — most events awaken both Emotions — importance of a desire to trace their favourable consequences - --. 346 remorse and self-approbation. Explained — distinct from Moral Approbation and Disapprobation — con- stitute the power of Conscience — statements of different writers - - 347 Class III. — Prospective Emotions. Desire and Fear explained and distinguished — the origin of Desire — statements of Drs. Price and Brown— Reasons for dissenting from them — different gradations of Desire expressed by the terms Wish, Hope, Expectation, Confidence, &c.— these not distinct Emotions— the nature of the Will— accounts of Mr. Locke, Dr. Reid, &c. mistakes — statements of Dr. Brown — Volition is Desire, arising in particular circumstances — cannot, therefore, be opposite to each other — application of the foregoing doctrine to Rom. vii. 15. — to the question of Liberty and Necessity— to the notion of the Self-deter- mining Power of the Will, &c.— particular Desires 351 CONTENTS. Xy PAGE THE DESIRE OF CONTINUED EXISTENCE, One of the most universal of our Desires— existence a good per se — chiefly valuable as that which may be rendered happy — the Desire of Life not improper in itself—- a principle of great practical importance, 372 THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY. Whether original — in what sense it is so----- 373 THE DESIRE OF KNOWLEDGE. Universality of the principle — manner in which it operates — Knowledge in itself deUghtful— Klesired consequently on its own account — chiefly for the sake of its consequences -___.. 375 THE DESIRE OF POWER. Its origin— progress— may lead to the Desire of Knowledge- Elo- quence — Rank, Station, &c. — its moral character— the Desire of Wealth— how it arises— statements of Brown 378 THE DESIRE OF THE SSTEKIC AND L.0VX OF OTHERS, A distinct and original £motion-4t8 moral character 364 THE DESIRE OF 8ITPERI0RITT Is an original principle— Emulation not to be confounded with Envy- not evil in itself— whether lawful to appeal to it— afl&rmed - - - 386 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE. The difference between Cc^pabilities of Thinking, Feeling, &c. and the Rectitude of particular Thoughts, &c.— Mental Science inquires con- cerning the former, — Moral Science, the latter. — Inquiries concerning the Rectitude of actions suppose a moral rule, &c.— important to ascertain what that i»— first Inquiry ---- -- 389^ WHAT 18 RECTITUDES A quality in actions— an essential distinction between Right and Wrong— examination of various systems concerning the nature of Virtue Z9^ First— The Sceptical System — on what grounded— the foundation in- secure—the theory of Hobbes, that Law gives actions a moral cha- racter, shown to be fiadse .«.. Qnd XVI CONTENTS, PAG£ Secondly— The system of those who place the foundation of virtue in the Will of God— distinction to be observed— actions are not right because commanded, but commanded because they are right - - - 396 Thirdly—The systems of those who represent Virtue as depending upon the constitution of the Mind— Theories of Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Brown — each has common and peculiar difficulties to encounter- considered separately— Dr. Brown's at length— statement of his opinions on the subject of Morals— shown to be contrary to his own principles of Philosophy— Objections ------- _-- 399 Fourthly—The system of those who maintain that the consequences of actions impart to them their moral character— differences among the advocates of the general system — arguments in support of it— what may be conceded— arguments against it— the systems of Private and Public Utility opposed— at variance with the manner in which moral emotions arise— contrary to Scripture -_- 422 JF^feZy— Rectitude is the conformity of affections and actions with Relations— an account of the relations in which we stand to God and to each other — some of the relations arbitrary — others not— the obli- gations which grow out of them never so— the systems of Clarke, Price— obscurity and mistakes of the latter— neither our Perceptions nor our Emotions a perfect criterion of virtue— that criterion the perfect intellect of God guided in its decisions by his infinitely holy nature— the nature of God the ultimate foundation and criterion of Rectitude 436 WHAT IS THE STANDARD OF RECTITUDE ? This question resolves itself into an inquiry, what Revelation God has made of himself— the material Creation contains a Revelation of him — improper language sometimes used here— the Scriptures the most Perfect Revelation— the office of Reason— the only question is, What readest thou ?-------------- — -- 446 OF THJ 'UiriVEESITT, &LI .^MENTS OF MENTAIi AND mORAIi SCIENCE. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. " The whole system of bodies in the universe,'* as it has been very justly stated, " may be called the Material world; the whole system of minds, from the infinite Creator, to the meanest creature endowed with thought, may be called the Intellectual world." Such being the case, the subject of all philosophical in- quiries must be either Matter or Mind, To investigate the properties of the former, is the object of Physical Sci- ence ; to develope the nature and operations of the latter, belongs to the department of Metaphysics, or Mental Phi- losophy. It is true that, as the mind is not thought or feeling, but THAT which thinks and feels, all our speculations with re- gard to mind belong to the general department of Physics* We do not, however, regret this arbitrary separation of the philosophy of Mind from that of Matter. It leads to a divi- sion of literary labour, favourable to the advancement of both. Confining our observation to this world, the mind of man must be allowed to be the noblest production of Almighty power : it deserves, therefore, our closest study. It must. 3 18 Ii\TRODUCTION. however, be admitted, that an investigation of the nature imd properties of Mind, is not unattended with difficulty ; and that it may be conducted in a manner httle calculated to yield much valuable fruit. To these two causes we may, perhaps, chiefly trace that absurd prejudice against all inquiries of this nature, which prevails — we lament the necessity of admitting — to a considerable extent, even in the present day. The prejudice is properly designated absurd, for Mr. Hume long ago observed, that " all the sciences have a relation to human nature." It is mani- fest, indeed, that the mind is the instrument which is employed in every disquisition into which we enter ; the measure of success which attends our application of this instrument must, accordingly, depend, in some de- gree at any rate, upon the perfection of our know- ledge of its nature. The importance, however, of Mental Science is not a subject to be thus cursorily dismissed ; the subsequent part of this chapter will, therefore, be devoted to a more full development of that importance. A writer of powerful talents,* has endeavoured to depre- ciate all investigations of this kind by statements of which the following is the substance. Matter and Mind present distinct pha^nomena, of which the former may be the sub- ject of actual experiment, the latter only of observation. By experiments in physics, the nature of any substance may be so ascertained, as to enable us to manage it at pleasure. With regard to mind, the case, it is alleged, is different. Here we can do no more than observe the phoeno- mena ; their order and succession are beyond our control. We may examine them minutely ;. we may describe them accurately ; but, as we cannot subject them to experiment, we obtain no more power over them. " In metaphysics certainly," he adds, " knowledge is not power ; instead of producing new phoenomena to elucidate the old, by well- contrived and well-conducted experiments, the most dili- gent inquirer can do no more than register and arrange the appearances, which he can neither account for, nor control." '■^ Vide Edinburg^h Review, Vol. III. p. 269- INTRODUCTION. 19 Mr. Stewart admits the premises of this writer, without acquiescing in his conclusion ; because, as he states, "the difference between experiment and observation consists merely in the comparative rapidity with which they accom- plish their discoveries ; or rather," he adds, " in the com- parative command we possess over them, as instruments for the investigation of truth. The discoveries of both, when actually effected, are so precisely of the same kind, that it may safely be affirmed, there is Jiot a single proposi- tion true of the one, which will not be found to hold equally with respect to the other."* A little consideration may, perhaps, serve to convince us, that Mr. Stewart has admitted more than he needed to have done, — that the distinction of the objector is a dis- tinction without a difference : for the business of the philo- sopher is observation, and observation alone. He is to watch how the processes of nature (the term nature is used here to prevent circumlocution) are carried on in the de- partments both of matter, and of mind. It is possible, indeed, to secure, by a little effort on our part, a more fre- quent recurrence of some of these processes than would otherwise take place. Instead of watching, for instance, for the accidental fall of a stone from a certain eminence, in order to ascertain at what rate the velocity of falling bodies is accelerated, we may cause it to be frequently thrown from that eminence, and thus gain, in considerable less time, tlie desired information; but still there is nothing more than observation here. The stone is brought to the ground, in each case, by the laws of nature (to adopt popu- lar phraseology ;) its motion is accelerated, in each case, by the same laws ; and we watch the process of descent, that we may ascertain the law of acceleration. Should it be said that the essence of the experiment con- sists in giving the motion to the stone, and not in the no- tice we take of the manner and velocity of its descent, it will be easy to reply, that we may, in a similar manner, make experiments upon mind. We may set Mind in ac- * Philesophical Essays, pp. 33, 34. 20 INTRODUCTION. tion as well as Matter ; and to every attempt to discover the laws of Mind, by originating any mental process, either in our own bosoms, or in the bosoms of others, the name of experiment may be given with as much propriety as to any trial in the department of physics. And if mind can be thus subjected to trial, or even to observation only, in the sense of the objector, so that the general laws which guide its operations may be ascer- tained, why should it be said that knowledge, in the philo- sophy of mind, is not power ? Why may not a knowledge of general laws be turned to a good practical account, in the one case, as well as in the other ? The assertions of the Reviewer are at direct variance with the facts of the case. " What," says Mr. Stewart, " is the whole business of edu- cation, when systematically and judiciously conducted, but a practical application of rules, deduced from our own experiments, or from those of others, on the most effectual modes of developing and of cultivating the intellectual fa- culties and the moral principles ?" He adds, with great truth, '^ that education would be more systematic and en- lightened, if the powers and faculties on which it operates were more scientifically examined, and better understood." These remarks may be sufficient to show that the objec- tion to which reference has been made, ought not to pre- vent our entrance into the temple of Mental Science. To this entrance many considerations invite us. 1. The important influence of Mind, and a knowledge of Mind, upon physical science in general. Science is the comparison of phcenomena^ and the discovery of their agreement^ or disagreement^ — or the- order of their succes- sion. All science is, then, as Dr. Brown very justly states, in the mind ; for it is the mind which perceives, arranges, judges, reasons, &c. ; and these perceptions, classifica- tions, and reasonings, which are purely mental phsenomena, constitute science. There might, accordingly, be objects of science without mind, but not science itself; and, since all science is in the mind, and must, consequently, derive its character from the nature and susceptibilities of the mind, it is manifest, that the constitution of the latter INTRODUCTION. 21 could undergo no material change, without effecting an entire alteration in the aspect of all physical science.* But though this should be conceded, it might still be objected, that the admission does not prove the necessity of possessing any knowledge of the mind ; that men may make great progress in physical science, who pay no at- tention to intellectual philosophy. We reply, that unless they conduct their investigations according to rules which nothing but a knowledge of mind can supply, the hope of a satisfactory result must be groundless. The history of the world establishes, beyond all question, the truth of the above statement. To what is it to be ascribed, that phy- sical science, previous to the time of Bacon, presented so meagre and dwarfish an appearance ? Were there, amongst its votaries, no men of ardour and genius ? This will not be pretended. The truth is, that some of them possessed transcendent talent ; but their profound ignorance of the human mind, impelled them to a blind activity more mis- chievous than idleness itself. " It is not," says Dr. Brown, " the waste of intellect, as it lies torpid in the great multi- tude of our race, that is alone to be regretted in relation to science, which, in better circumstances, it might improve and adorn. It is, in many cases, the very industry of in- tellect, busily exerted, but exerted in labours that must be profitless, because the objects, to which the labour is di- rected, are beyond the reach of man."t " It is of great use to the sailor," says Mr. Locke, " to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean." The Anti-Baconian philosophers did not know the length of their line. They had not properly surveyed the powers of their minds ; and the misdirected "industry of intellect" carried them into fields of investigation, from whence nothing which pro- mised any benefit to mankind, could possibly be gathered. Nor was it till Bacon had introduced juster principles of physical inquiry — principles which were the result of more * Fide Brown's Lectures, Vol. I. p. 17—26. t Vol. I. p. 43. 22 INTRODUCTION. correct views of the nature, faculties, and laws of the mind — that physical science commenced that splendid career of improvement which has equally astonished and delighted mankind. In looking " to those rules of physical investigation, which he has given us, we are too apt" says Dr. Brown, " to think of the erroneous physical opinions which preceded them, without paying sufficient attention to the false theories of intellect which had led to those very physical absurdities." — " We must not forget that the temple which he purified, was not the temple of external nature, but the temple of the mind, — that in its inmost sanctuaries, were all the idols which he overthrew, — and that it was not till these were removed, and the intellect prepared for the presence of a nobler divinity, that Truth would deign to unveil herself to adoration : — as in the mysteries of those eastern religions, in which the first ce- remony for admission to the worship of the God, is the purification of the worshipper,"* 2. Consider the important aid which an intimate ac- quaintance with the nature and powers of the mind, may be made to afford to those arts in which mind is the subject of direct operation. Such are the arts of Education, Poetry, Eloquence, Criticism, &c. &c. The object at which they aim, is to originate certain habits, or trains of thought, and to awaken various feelings of pleasure, tran- sport, enthusiasm, anger, fear, sympathy, &c. ; to kindle them into momentary, or permanent existence, as the cir- cumstances of the case may require. Now if it be the fact, that our thoughts and feelings are united in the rela- tion of cause and effect, and, consequently, follow one another in a certain train, how can it be doubted that the teacher, the poet, the orator, &c., must be acquainted with the order of their succession, before he can cherish any rational hope of effecting the object he has in view? Ignorant of this, he might strengthen propensities and habits (as is too frequently done by empyrics, in education) which he desired to subdue ; and rouse, into fearful and * Vol. I. pp. 28, 29. INTRODUCTION. ^3 resistless energy, passions which, as he imagined, he was taking the most prudent measures to allay. Should it be said, that the order of the successions of human thought and feeling is as perfectly known to the peasant as to the most profound philosopher, so that the study of Mental Philosophy is unnecessary, it may be re- plied, firsts that the assertion is not true ; the more obvi- ous, and ordinary, and every-day successions, being all that are known to .the great body of mankind ;* and, secondly, that if it were true, it would not detract from the value of intellectual philosophy, but prove merely that the very men who urge the objection, possess more of this philoso- phy, and are more deeply indebted to it, than they have the good sense and gratitude to acknowledge. 3. Consider the important bearing of the Philosophy of Mind upon moral science and theological investigations. It is the assertion of a very judicious writer, that " a man might as reasonably entitle himself a learned physician, though he had never studied anatomy, as esteem himself an adept in moral science, without having obtained an intimate acquaintance with the affections, passions, and sentiments of the human heart." Mental Philosophy is the anatomy of human nature : is it possible, then, to ex- hibit the rationale of Morals, if we are ignorant of this species of anatomy? The rectitude of moral precepts depends upon the powers and susceptibilities of those to whom they are addressed. There must be a harmony and correspondence between what is required from moral agents, and what is given to them ; and without an inti- mate acquaintance with the latter, this correspondence must be, in a considerable degree at least, veiled from our view. One branch of mental philosophy relates to those states of mind which constitute, when they exist in certain cir- cumstances, our moral affections ; such as — Hatred, Love, Gratitude, Anger, Desire, &,c. . To possess an intimate acquaintance with the nature, causes, and results of these * Vidt Stewart, Vol. I, pp. 282, 283. :24 INTRODUCTION. emotions, must be of incalculable importance to the Chris- tian moralist. They are the springs of human conduct. To be able to touch them requires obviously a know- ledge of the manner in which they arise ; and one of the main causes to which is to be ascribed the power which one mind frequently exercises over others, bending and directing them at its will, is the superior acquaintance of its possessor with the order of succession of human thought and feeling, and his consequent higher capability of ori- ginating that train, which will ultimately lead to the accomplishment of his own purposes. " It is principally on this account," says an excellent writer, " that almost all the best practical writers on religion have been mental philosophers. They are not satisfied to show what is the meaning, or what the extent, of any precept ; but they endeavour to trace the avenues by which it may be con- ducted to the recesses of the heart, and to detect the principles of our own nature to which it has the nearest alliance, or from which the most obstinate hostility may be expected. And, on the other hand, it is, in part at least, from ignorance of the mental constitution, that many per- sons deceive themselves in many things of great practical importance ; are insensible to the growth of the most daiv gerous associations ; mistake the real sources of their errors in conduct ; confound the more amiable natural dispositions with the evidences and fruits of sanctifica- tion ; or remain insensible to dormant principles of sin, which they might have discovered and mortified, till a powerful temptation draws them forth to a terrible and fatal activity." And who can doubt 'the important aid which an accu- rate acquaitance with the nature and faculties of the mind will afford to the theological student ? The refer- ence here is not so much to the precision of thought and statement which the study of intellectual science cannot fail to produce, though its value even in this point of view can scarcely be too highly appreciated ; but to many inte- resting and important questions in theology, in reference to which it is not too much to affirm, that no man who INTRODUCTIOxV. '25 has not paid considerable attefition to intellectual science, can form an enlightened judgment. The subjects of Free Agency, Predestination, &c. will immediately occur to the mind of the reader. Their intimate connexion with mental science must be obvious to all ; a necessary regard to brevity forbids any thing more than this bare reference to them. 4. Reflect upon the powerful tendency of intellectual philosophy to discipline and strengthen the mind. The design of education is not so much to impart information, as to give tone and vigour to the mental powers — to form the understanding to habits of thought at once " bold and cautious, patient and discursive," comprehensive and profound. To effect this purpose, "those sciences in which the evidence is only probable, possess manifest advantages over those in which it is demonstrative." The evidence which the mathematician requires, and without which he will not, in his department of science, admit the truth of any proposition, cannot be obtained as the / 1 I i guide of our conduct, even in cases of great moment, and » requiring prompt decision. It is on moral evidence that we must act in all the relations we sustain both to God and to each other. Now, if the constant habit of requiring and obtaining demonstrative evidence should not produce a sceptical bias in the mind of the mathematician, which Mr. Stewart denies, it must, we should think, infallibly render him less competent to judge in cases when the only evidence to direct him is that with which he is less con- versant and familiar — it must, in a measure, unfit him to decide on probable evidence, and where probability, as is sometimes the case, opposes probability. The studies to which the attention of the reader is directed, in this work, are the best guides here. They tend more eminently than any others " to form reflective habits of mind ; for reflec- tion is necessary for observing the phaenomena on which we are to reason ; it is requisite for comparing, combining, and separating them ; it is requisite ultimately for ascer- taining the laws to which they are subjected." 4 20 THE OBJECT OF 5. To all this it may be added, that while other sciences require a considerable apparatus of books, &c. and oppor- tunities of general information, the mental philosopher carries the materials of his art constantly about with him. They are perpetually present, and ready for use ; ''^ pemoc- tant nobiscum, peregrinantur^ rusticantur ; — and the most vulgar incidents in life, which only distract the thoughts of other speculators, furnish to him not unfrequently occa- sions for examining anew the principles he has established, and supply hints for their enlargement, illustration, or correction." CHAPTER II. THE OBJECT OF INTELLECTUAL SCIENCE ; AND THE MODE IN WHICH OUR INQUIRIES SHOULD BE CONDUCTED. We give the name of Mind to that mysterious principle within us, which constitutes " the permanent subject" of various phsenomena, or properties, differing essentially from those which matter exhibits. Matter is that which is extended, divisible, impenetrable, &c. ; Mind is that which perceives, remembers, compares, judges, &c. Now the reader is especially requested to observe, that the object of the present inquiry is to ascertain what are the phaenoraena, or properties, or qualities of mind, and not what is the essence of mind. Indeed, of the essence both of matter and of mind, we are profoundly ignorant. We know that matter is extended, &c. &c. ; — that mind perceives, &c. &c. — L e, we know the properties of each. We know, at least, some of the various ways in which matter affects us — some of the various states in which mind may exist. But this is not to know the essence of either ; it is to know them both, not absolutely, but rela- tively only. INTELLECTUAL SCIENCE •27 There is no difference of opinion among our best phi- losophers on this point. " The essence both of body, and of mind," says Dr. Reid, " is unknown to us. We know certain properties of the first, and certain operations of the last, and by those only we can define or describe them."* " If 1 am asked," adds Mr. Stewart, " what I mean by Matter ? I can only explain myself by saying, it is that which is extended, figured, coloured, &c. &c.; i. e, I can define it in no other way than by enumerating its sensible qualities. It is not matter, or body, which I per- ceive by my senses; but only extension, figure, colour, and certain other qualities, which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to something which is extended, figured and coloured. The case is precisely similar with respect to Mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition; operations which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills."! " In this re- spect," states Dr. Brown, " the philosophy of matter and of mind completely agree — that in both equally our knowledge is confined to the phaenomena which they exhibit." — " What matter is independent of our percep- tion we know not." — " If our knowledge of matter be relative only, our knowledge of mind is equally so. We know it only as susceptible of feelings that have already existed, &c."| " That we know nothing more of the mind," says the Rev. Mr. Welsh, " than that, from the time of our birth till the present moment, it has existed in certain states of thought and feeling, is a position so very obvious, that I can scarcely conceive it to be disputed."§ Our inquiries are then to be limited to the phaenomena, or properties of mind. To prevent the possibility of mis- take, on the part of those who have not made mental science the subject of their inquiries, it may be well to state distinctly — First, that it is by no means intended to intimate a doubt with reference to the existence of mind. The * Reid's Essays, Vol. I. p. 26. t Elements, Vol. I. p. 3. 8vo. t Vol. I. p. 193—195, & 206. 5 Memoirs of Brown, p. 214. ^8 THE OBJECT OF sceptical philosopher maintains, that our successive thoughts and feelings constitute mind itself; and that the qualities of hardness, colour, form, weight, divisibility, &c. consti- tute matter. With the single exception of seriously at- tempting to refute a dogma so extravagant as this, it is scarcely possible to conceive of a greater absurdity. The preceding statements, while they abandon all intention of inquiring into the essence of mind, take for granted its existence, by exhibiting it as the permanent subject of certain varying phaenomena of which we are conscious. Nor, secondly, is it intended to intimate that there may be no essential difference between the essence of matter and of mind ; for all the speculations of intellectual science take it for granted that such a difference exists, and, on the supposition of there being none, would be perfectly absurd. We inquire, at one time, into the qualities of the substance matter ; we inquire, at another time, into the qualities of the substance mind^ (the term substance, in reference to the mind, is used to avoid cir- cumlocution) as contrary distinguished from those of matter : but if the essence of matter and mind be not essentially different, the subject of our inquiries is, in both cases, the same. Though it must, accordingly, be con- fessed to be unphilosophical to speculate concerning the positive essence of the mind, it is not unphilosophical to attempt to show that that essence is not material. The importance, not to say necessity, of doing this, is greater, we conceive, than Mr. Stewart, or even Dr. Brown, seems disposed to allow. The former indeed says, that " the conclusions to which we are led, by a careful examination of the phaenomena which mind exhibits, have no neces- sary connexion with our opinions concerning its nature."* This statement is surely not correct. Are we not in the constant habit of contending that the complexity, which we cannot but ascribe to the mental phaenomena, cannot be similar to that which is produced by the union of two or more substances, so as to form one physical whole, * Vol. I. p. 7. INTELLECTUAL SCIENCE. ^ because the mind is a simple indivisible essence ? Do we not assume the indivisibility of the mind, in many of our speculations ? And have we any right to do this, without previously proving the immateriality of mind, L e. that its essence, though unknown, is different from that of matter? ^.^.^ ^ Into an extended argument on this subject my limits will not permit me to go : it must be sufficient to glance at the proof which may be adduced. Two distinct classes of phaenomena, viz. extension, divisibility, gravity, form, colour, attraction, repulsion, &c. ; and perception, memory, reasoning, joy, grief, &c., become known to us, in radically different ways ; the one, through the medium of the ex- ternal senses — the other, by consciousness. Are these phaenomena the qualities of the same substance? Is it " reasonable to suppose that properties so opposite to each other, the knowledge of which is obtained in so different //• . a manner, inhere in the same permanent subject ? If the qualities are thus essentially different, must not the essence * be essentially different ? The argument is, however, yet but partially developed. Some of these qualities are in- compatible with each other, so that like length and short- ^^'^^ ness, when the comparison is with the same objects, theyto ^^Vj cannot possibly be the qualities of the same substance, p f^ Sensation and thought belong to one of the classes of ^ f properties which have been specified ; divisibility is in- ?, — ^^ eluded in the other. If sensation and thought were pro- C*^ ^'^ perties of matter, they must be divisible, because matter * ^^^ is divisible ; every separate particle of the thinking and feeling whole, must possess a separate portion of sensa- tion and thought ; as every separate particle possesses the power of attraction. But sensation and thought are not .Owciu>i*. divisible, consciousness being judge ; the permanent sub- '-'A^ '♦^^ ^ ject, therefore, of these qualities, whatever be its positive * ^<-^j^Ji (^ nature, is certainly not material. ^'*^ '■^^ *^^ The Mind then is to be regarded as a substance endowed ^s^^^^^"^ ^ with certain properties, susceptible of various affections or J^ ^^i modifications, which, existing successively as momentary ^*^ states of the mind, constitute all the phaenomena of thought and feeling : our object is to ascertain what these proper- 30 THE OBJECT OF ties, powers, and susceptibilities of the mind are. How- then is this to be done ? The answer shall be given in the following admirable statement by Dr. Brown: — "We must inquire into the properties of the substance Mind, in the same way as we ascertain the properties of the sub- stance Matter. As we say of gold, that it is that which is of a certain specific weight, yellow, ductile, fusible at a certain temperature, and capable of certain combinations, because all these properties have been observed by our- selves or others ; so we say of the Mind, that it is that which perceives, remembers, compares, and is susceptible of va- rious emotions, or other feelings ; because of all those we have been conscious, or have observed them indirectly in others. We are not entitled to state with confidence any quality as a property of gold, which we do not remember to have observed ourselves, or to have received on the faith ^ ^ of the observation of others, whose authority we have rea- son to consider as indubitable ; and as little are we enti- tled to assert any quality, or general susceptibility, as be- longing to the human mind, of which we have not been ^- conscious ourselves in the feelings resulting from it, or for rfr which we have not the authority of the indubitable con- sciousness of others."* And again : " Let it then never be forgotten, that the powers and operations of the mind can only be ascertained by a careful observation of the mind itself; and that we might as well attempt to discover by logic, unaided by observation and experiment, the various coloured rays that enter into the composition of a sun- beam, as to discover, by dialectic subtilties, a priori^ the various feelings that enter into a single thought or passion."? The preceding statements exhibit the Baconian method of investigation, in its application to Mind. It is truly wonderful as well as melancholy, that so many centuries should have rolled away before it was distinctly perceived, that the properties and laws of Mind can be ascertained by observation and induction alone. In the employment of * Vol. I. p. 85. t P. 7. INTELLECTUAL SCIENCE. 31 this method, it is however necesary to remember, that it affords us no light with reference to the rectitude of our particular affections and conduct. We discover by it, how we are capable, by the constitution of the mind, of feeling and acting ; but not whether thus feeling and thus acting in any particular case, we should feel and act rightly. In one respect, indeed, the knowledge of what is, is identical with the knowledge of what ought to be in man. The physical constitution of the mind is what it should be, be- cause it is what God made it. When therefore, we have ascertained, by the inductive process, what are the natural susceptibilities of the human mind, its various capabilities of feeling, we know what man should be in this point of view. But susceptibilities, or capabilities of feeling, &c. are to be distinguished from actual feelings. A being who is susceptible of the angry emotions, unless he be a perfect moral agent, may be improperly angry. "When, there- fore," says Dr. Brown, " we know that man has certain affections and passions, there still remains the great inqui- ry, as to the propriety or impropriety of those passions, and of the conduct to which they lead. We have to consider, not merely how he is capable of acting, but also whether, acting in the manner supposed, he would be fulfilling a duty or perpetrating a crime."* Our inquiry, then, regards the phajnomena of Mind only ; and we are to depend, not upon hypothesis, but observa- tion, for all the knowledge that is to be obtained upon the subject. With reference then to the phaenomena of Mind, "What are the particular points to be examin- ed ?" This is an inquiry of great practical importance. Had more attention been paid to it by preceding philoso- phers, the science of mind would have made more rapid progress. Dr. Brown brings it prominently into view ; and it is to be ascribed, partly at least, to the circumstance of his having kept this definite and proper object of inquiry so steadily before him, that his investigations have been attended with such splendid success. The phaenomena of * Vol. I. p. 9. Introduction. 32 THE OBJECT OF mind consist of certain thoughts and feehngs, or, to use a single word, comprehending both, of certain states. Now the only questions which can be instituted here are the two following : — " What is the order in which they arise ?" and, " What are the elements of which they consist?" Leaving out of our consideration, for the present, the moral character of our various states of mind, (an inquiry which will be entered upon at the proper time and place.) it is imagined that the questions just mentioned comprise every topic of investigation in relation to Mind. Dr. Brown illustrates this two-fold object of intellectual science by its analogy to the objects of natural science. All physical inquiry is directed to ascertain either the com- position of bodies, or their powers and susceptibilities ; in other words the elementary hoAies which are to be found in any aggregate before us ; or the manner in which these aggregates affect other substances, and are affected by them in return, i. e. the changes which they produce or suffer* All the phsenomena of the material world consist of changes. Take, for example, the phgenomenon of the solution of glass in the fluoric acid. What is this but a change in the state of the glass — a change from solidity to fluidity? These changes can only be ascertained by ob- servation ; and the changes which one body produces upon all others, indicate its powers — the changes which it suf- fers from the action of others, its susceptibilities. The ingenious and excellent biographer of Dr. Brown, has made some very just remarks upon his statement in re- ference to the composition of bodies. They evidently pro- ceed, he thinks, upon the admission of the corpuscular hypothesis of Boscovich; which, however ingenious and beautiful, is, as yet, only an hypothesis. He says, in sub- stance at least, that it is impossible for us to discover the constituent elements of bodies, if such elements exist; and that, even if we could, our knowledge of them would be only relative ; we could learn nothing more concerning them, than the changes they would produce or suffer ; so that the two inquiries of Dr. Brown " may, in chemical science; be resolved into one : our sole object being, not to INTELLECTUAL SCIENCE. 33 cuscertain the original atoms that compose any body, but the changes which the body will undergo, or occasion, in new circumstances."* Taking the term element, however, not in the technical sense of Boscovich, but in the manner in which it is ordi- narily used by chemists, viz. to denote those substances which appear to be simple, or uncompounded, (and it is not certain to nie that Dr. Brown did not intend it to be understood in this sense,) it is manifestly tlie object of physical science to ascertain the elements, as well as the powers and susceptibilities of bodies. But how then can the objects of Physical, illustrate those of Intellectual, Science ? Do our thoughts and feelings, or states of mind, stand in need of analysis, like manifestly compound physical substances ? or do they even admit of any such analysis ? Do they stand in the relation of cause and effect to each other, — one thought introducing another thought, and one feeling another feeling, as certain effects always result from certain causes in the world of nature? If this be the case, it is manife^st that the preceding re- marks concerning the object of physical science, may be transferred to our inquiries relative to Mind. Of this, then, there can be no doubt. s. The phcenomena of mind, like the phcenomena of mat- ter, follow each other in a regular order of succession, and are, consequently, capable of arrangement as causes and effects. One great object of intellectual science is, then, to ascertain the laws of succession, without which such an arrangement cannot be effected. We need not say any thing in support of the alleged fact, that a certain order is preserved in the succession of human thought and feeling ; no one will deny it. It is, however, necessary for the reader particularly to observe, that all our know- ledge of the laws of succession is derived from experience. This, if he has not been accustomed to speculations of this kind, he may find it a little difficult to conceive. There are some thoughts and feelings which seem so na- * Welsh's Memoirs, p. 206. 34 THE OBJECT OF turally, and even necessarily, to result from other thoughts and feelings, that we are apt to imagine we should have been able to predict their sequence, independently of expe- rience. Their apparent inseparable union is, however, the mere consequence of our having invariably found them together. The mind was doubtless so formed by its Maker, as that the present order of succession of thought and feeling should take place ; and, perhaps, we are war- ranted in saying, that while the present constitution of the mind remains, a different order of succession is impossible. But that constitution was an arbitrary one. The mind might have been formed with other and different suscepti- bilities ; and its states might have followed each other in a radically different order. Nothing, then, can manifestly be known of mind — of its phaenomena — of their relation to each other, as cause and effect, but as the result of actual observation. To suppose the contrary, is as absurd as that we might have predicted the properties of gold without examination ; or that we might have described the nature of a machine, which depended entirely upon the arbitrary will of its inventor for its form, size, &c. with- out an actual inspection of it. " There is nothing," says Dr. Brown, " in any one state of mind, considered in itself, which necessarily involves the succession of any other state of mind. That particular state, for example, which constitutes the mere feeling of pain, instead of being attended by that different state which constitutes the desire of being freed from pain, might have continued as one uniform feeling, or might have ceased, and been succeeded by some other state, though, in the original adaptation of our mental powers, by that Creator's wis- dom which planned the sequences of its phaenomena, the particular affection that constitutes desire had not been one of the innumerable varieties of affection of which the mind was for ever to be susceptible." — " We are always too much inclined to believe that we know what must have been, because we know what is." — " In the rarer successions of feeling, we allow that there are phaeno- mena of th^ mind, which we could not have foreknown ; INTEX.LECTUAL SCIENCE. -^O but we find it difficult to imagine, in the recurrence of the common mental phaenomena, that, even originally, it could have required any peculiar foresight to predict what we are now conscious of predicting with a readiness, that seems to us almost like the instant glance of intuition."* If a doubt, with reference to the preceding statements, should remain on the minds of any, I would refer them to the case of brutes. That brutes possess mind, i. e. some- thing which is not matter, all but avowed materialists must allow. Yet the succession of states of feeling in the minds of brutes, is not the same with that which is observed in men — a decided proof that the properties of the substance Mind, and, a fortiori, the successions of its phaenomena, being to us arbitrary, can only be ascer- tained by actual observation. This is not the case in the department of Mind alone. The statement holds good with reference to the succes- sions of all phaenomena, whether they be material or men- tal. Whether it be true or not that " better eyes" would enable us to discover the composition of bodies, it is unde- niable that no increased power or delicacy of sensual organization could apprize us of their powers and sus- ceptibilities. The changes which result from them, and in which, as we have seen, all the phaenomena of the natural world consist, can manifestly be known only by ex- perience. Independently of experience, who could have predicted that spring would invariably precede summer, and summer as invariably follow spring — that the ascent of the sun above the horizon would be succeeded by day, and his descent by night ? " Who, by considering sepa- rately the mere sensible qualities of bodies, could ascertain the changes which, in new circumstances of union, they might reciprocally suffer or produce? Who could infer, from the similar appearance of a lump of sugar and a lump of cal- careous spar, that the one would be soluble in water, and the other remain unmelted; or, from the different aspect of gunpowder and snow, that a spark would be extinguished, * P. 212—215. 36 THE OBJECT OF if it fell upon the one, and, if it fell upon the other, would excite an explosion that would be almost irresistible?: But for experience, we should be altogether incapable of pre- dicting any such effects from either of the objects com- psired ; or if we did know that the peculiar susceptibility belonged to one of the two, and not to the other, we might as readily suppose that calcareous spar would melt in water as sugar, and as readily, that snow as that gunpow- der would detonate by the contact of a spark. It is expe- rience alone which teaches us that these eifects ever take place, and that they take place not in all substances, but only in some particular substances. ""^ There have, indeed, been philosophers who held the opinion, that " if we were acquainted with the intimate structure of bodies, we should then see, not merely what corpuscular changes take place in them, but why these changes take place, and should thus be able to predict, before experience, the effects which they would recipro- cally produce." Mr. Locke, for instance, imagined, that if we knew the mechanical affections of a particle of rhubarb, hemlock, opium, and a man, we should be able to tell beforehand, that rhubarb will purge, hemlock kill, and opium make a man sleep. This opinion of Mr. Locke is obviously grounded upon the assumption, that all the changes which take place in the material universe, as well as in the cases he refers to, are the effects of contact and impulse, and of a kind, therefore, which may be termed, strictly, mechanical. On this sentiment, we observe, in the first place, that it is not supported by evidence ; and, secondly, that if it were as well as it is ill-founded, it would leave the difficulty where it found it; since the conse- quences which result from mechanical influence, from even contact itself, are known only by experience or testi- mony. We must see, in order to ascertain the reciprocal influence of bodies, i. e. their susceptibilities and powers, " That a ball in motion, when it meets another at rest, should force this to quit its place, appears now to be some- * Vol. I. p. 114. INTELLECTUAL SCHENGE. lit thing which it required no skill or experience to predict ; and yet, though our faculties were, in every respect, as vigorous as now ; if we could imagine this most common of all phaenomena, to be wholly unknown to us ; what reason should we be able to discover in the circumstances that immediately precede the shock, for inferring the effect that truly results, rather than any other effect whatever ? Were the laws of motion previously unknown, it would be in itself as presumable, that the moving ball should simply stop when it reached the other, or that it should merely rebound from it, as that the quiescent ball should be forced by it to quit its state of rest, and move forward in the same direction. We know, indeed, that the effect is different, but it is because we have witnessed it that we know it ; not because the laws of motion, or any of the mechanical affections of matter whatever, are qualities that might be inferred independently of observation."* Mr. Locke's statements, however, suppose that we do not know the mechanical affections of matter. Whatever, then, might have been the case with us, had we possessed this knowledge, it is manifest, since we are destitute of it, that our acquaintance with the sequences of phajnomena in the material world, i, e, with the powers and susceptibi- lities of bodies, must be derived from experience alone. But here a difficulty suggests itself. Experience teaches us the past only, not the future. But to affirm of any body that it possesses certain powers and susceptibilities, is to state the changes which it will occasion and undergo to the end of time. If, then, there is nothing in the structure of bodies to enable us to predict these changes, from what source does our confidence that they will happen arise ? The only satisfactory reply, we apprehend, is, that it springs from an original principle of our nature. The great Former of the mind has so constituted it, that, on the sight of a certain operation of one body upon another, or of a certain change, effected by the former, in the state or appearance of the latter, we are irresistibly led to * Brown, pp. 120, 12t. 38 THE OBJECT OF \ believe that, in similar circumstances, the same change will take place in all time to come. There is nothing wonderful in this ; at any rate it is not more wonderful than that any thought, or feeling, or state of mind, should exist in any circumstances whatever. Here, as Dr. Brown justly observes, "nothing is wonderful, or all is wonderful." The Creator of the universe ordained a certain order of sequence in the phaenomena of the natural world ; and by giving to us an original or instinctive belief in the regu- larity of this sequence, he has enabled us to foresee, and provide for, the physical events that are to arise, without which foresight the creatures for whom he has so bounti- fully provided, must have been left to perish, " ignorant and irresolute, amid elements that seemed waiting to obey them, and victims of confusion in the very midst of all the harmonies of the universe." To know the order in which the phoenomena of the ma- terial universe present themselves to our view, is to know them in the relation of cause and effect. If, then, there is nothing in the structure of bodies which can enable us to predict this relation, — if our knowledge of it is the result of experience alone, it follows that all we know in reference to a cause is, that it is the immediate and invariable ante- cedent of a certain change, to which we give the name of an effect. It is not said that there is nothing more in a cause than immediate and invariable antecedence; for if there were not aptitude in a cause to precede, and in an effect to follow, i, e. if there were not something in the very constitution of the cause, to adapt it to stand in the relation of precedence, it would follow, in that case, that the cause and effect are only united like two nouns by a conjunction, and so might exchange places ; and, further, that there is nothing to tie them together but the direct energy of the great first cause ; so that, in fact, God is the only agent in the universe — a sentiment which, by annihilating all the indications of skill, and contrivance, of adaptation of means to ends, with which the universe abounds, would overturn the foundation of morals as well as religion — the doctrine of the divine existence itself. INTELLECTUAL SCIENCE. 39 Oil this subject I am constrained to dissent from the doctrine of Dr. Brown. Admitting, as he does, that there is aptitude in a cause to precede, he yet denies that a cause is any thing more than an immediate and invariable ante- cedent; statements which appear to me irreconcilably opposed to each other. Had Dr. Brown contented himself with affirming that no third substance intervenes between the cause and the effect, by which their junction is effected; had he even merely denied that we can form any concep- tion of the nature of this aptitude, 1 could have gone along with him. But to maintain that there is nothing in a cause but immediate and invariable antecedence, is, in my judg- ment, only a different mode of affirming that there is no aptitude in a cause to precede ; since aptitude to prece de differs as much from actual precedence, as aptitude to produce sensation differs from the production of sensation, or from the sensation produced. It strikes me that this admirable writer has not sufficiently distinguished between the cause itself, and our notion of that cause. There may be nothing more in our conception of a cause, than that it immediately and invariably precedes a certain effect ; but there may be something more in the cause itself. Our conception of the fragrance of a rose is, that it produces a certain sensation ; but the fragrance itself is something different from this. In like manner, our conception of a cause is that of immediate and invariable antecedence ; of its adaptation to be an antecedent, we know nothing, we can form no distinct conception ; yet it necessarily differs from the antecedence itself, u e, a cause is something more than an immediate and invariable antecedent. The same general principles apply to the philosophy of Mind, as well as to the philosophy of Matter. The phai- nomena of mind present themselves successively. The order of their sequence is ascertained by experience, and experi- ence alone ; there being nothing in one state of mind from which it would have been possible for us to predict the oc- currence of any other, by which the Creator determined that it should be followed. Those thoughts and feelings which immediately precede, we denominate causes ; those 40 THE OBJECT OP which immediately succeed, we call effects. God has so formed the human mind that there is an aptitude in certain feelings, or states of mind, to precede and follow one another ; but of that aptitude we can form, as we have said, no conception. All we know of the human mind» in this point of view, is confined to the bare fact, that there are certain laws, by which, or according to which, the order in the sequences of its phsenomena are regu- lated ; and it is one great object of intellectual science to ascertain what these laws are. But the phcBnomena of mind may he further regarded as complex^ and susceptible of analysis. The term analysis is of Greek origin, and signifies to untie or un- loose. Its possible application to the different substances in nature, takes it for granted that they are not simple, but compound substances. It would seem, therefore, to follow as a necessary consequence, that no simple, uncom- pounded substance, can be analyzed ; that unless a body consists of parts, like a mechanical compound, where the parts are in juxta position, or in a state of aggregation, — or a chemical compound, where they are in a state of in- timate incorporation, it must be manifestly impossible to resolve it into parts. A difficulty occurs here then in the science of Mind ; for as the mind is a simple indivisible essence, and as all its thoughts and feelings, however complex they may ap- pear, must be, in reality, as simple and indivisible as the mind itself, it would appear as if there could be no analysis of any of the mental phaenomena. With respect to matter, the case is essentially' different. Here, with seeming simplicity there is real complexity. A piece of glass, which appears really simple, is, in truth, not so. It is composed of a vast number of particles of alkaline and silicious matter bound together, which the art of the chemist can untie, and exhibit in a state of disunion. In this case, the simplicity and oneness is not in the body, but in our conceptions. Analysis is, accordingly, prac-. ticable here. But the most complex thought, or feel- ing, whatever number of others have had influence in INTELLECTUAL SCIENCE. 41 modifying it, is still only one feeling ; " for we cannot divide the states or affections of our minds into separate self-existing fractions, as we can divide a compound mass of matter into masses which are separate and self-existing, nor distinguish half a joy or sorrow from a whole joy or sorrow." And- yet we cannot but regard some of our ideas and feelings as complex. In what sense then can complexity be ascribed to any of the mental phasnomena ? How can they be analyzed ? What is the meaning of the term analysis in its application to them ? To these ques- tions, I am not aware of any statements which deserve a moment's regard, but those which are furnished us by Dr. Brown, (and his ingenious biographer, the Rev. Mr. Welsh. I shall endeavour to give the reader the substance of the remarks which are made by both these writers, accompany- ing them, as yve proceed, with any observations which may occur to my own mind.) Dr. Brown tells us that our original simple states of mind become so altered and modified, through the influ- ence of the associating principle, combining others with them, that they may never afterward be found in their original state, — that these modified states of mind, which result from the association of many thoughts and feelings, though they are, and in the very nature of the case must be, as simple as the mind itself, necessarily appear to us as if they were actually composed of the sentiments and feelings from which they have resulted, or by which they have been modified. A complex state of mind, is, then, one which is the result of certain previous feelings, " to which, as if existing together, it is felt to have the virtual relation of equality, or the relation which a whole bears to the parts that are comprehended in it. But the con- ception of a golden mountain is still as much one state or feeling of one simple mind, as either of the separate conceptions of gold, and of a mountain which preceded it." The process of analysis, then, in reference to mind, is the act of distinguishing the separate sensations, or thoughts, or emotions, which appear to be comprehended in these complex feelings, or from which they have ro» 6 42 THE OBJECT OP suited. It is hot the resolution of a substance actually compound into the elements of which it consists, but of .one which appears to be compound, into what appear to be its elements. It is a mental or virtual untying of a certain feeling of mind, " which being considered by us as equivalent to the separate ideas from which it results, or as comprehensive of them, is truly to our conception — though to our conception only — and therefore only virtually or relatively to us the inquirers, the same as if it were composed of the separate feelings co-existing, as the elements of a body co-exist in space." The Rev. Mr. Welsh thinks, on the contrary, that com- plexness, with reference to the mental phaenomena, is actual, or real ; and, consequently, that the analyses of the intellectual chemist are more than virtual. It is, how- ever, not a complexness of substances as in the material world, but of relations only ; and so analogous to the vast diversity of aspects, and complexity of states under w^hich bodies, perfectly simple in themselves, exhibit themselves according to their relation to other objects. Analysis, then, in reference to mind, does not resemble the decom- pounding processes of chemistry, because such a separa- tion of parts is felt to be impossible ; but it bears, he adds, " a very striking analogy to that species of philosophy which is occupied with the general qualities of matter, and which, if it observes particular substances at all, observes them only with the design of resolving the phse- nomena they exhibit into their simplest and most general laws. Thus, we may resolve the particular properties of gold into the general qualities of matter, and show that its weight, its colour, its form, its cohesion, its motion, are but particular instances of the great laws of repulsion and attraction. In a manner analogous to this, we resolve the diversified phoenomena of mind into a few simple and primitive laws, by which term we denote the most general circumstances in which the phaenomena are felt by us to P. 210. INTELLECTUAL SCIENCE. 43 In a subsequent part of his book, where the views of this excellent writer are more fully developed, he supposes us to experience the sensation excited by the fragrance of a rose. In this case, the mind exists in one simple rela- tion, to one quality of an external object. The substance mind is simple ; its relation is also simple. But the sen- sation of fragrance may co-exist with the remembrance of the fragrance, or with other feelings. Here we have the mind existing in one simple state, in so far as it relates to its essential nature ; — the consciousness, which is the result of the simultaneous influence of different objects upon the organs of sense, is also simple ; it is one state of one indivisible subject, but it is one state formed of a variety of relations.* 1 have endeavoured to collect the substance of this writer's statements, though I have not been able to pre- sent them always in his own well-selected words. I have been the more anxious to do justice to the sentiments of my reverend friend, if he will allow me thus to designate him, because I cannot exactly agree with him, or rather, perhaps, because I do not fully comprehend him. At first view, I acknowledge, his explanation of the complexness, which we cannot but ascribe to many of our mental states, appears to be recommended by greater simplicity than that of Dr. Brown ; but I find myself unable to attach any very definite meaning to the term relation, as used by him, in this connexion. On the whole, I prefer the ex- planation of Dr. Brown, the substance of which is so admirably given in the following passage, that the reader will readily pardon me for quoting it. " It is this feeling of the relation of certain states of mind, to certain other states of mind, which solves the whole mystery of mental analysis, that seemed at first so inexplicable ; the virtual decomposition, in our thought, of what is by its very nature indivisible. The mind, in- deed, it must be allowed, is absolutely simple in all its states ; every separate state or aflfection of it must there- * Pp. 234, 5. 44 THE OBJECT ©F fore be absolutely simple ; but in certain cases, in which a feeling is the result of other feelings preceding it, it is its very nature to appear to involve the union of those preceding feelings ; and to distinguish the separate sensa- tions, or thoughts, or emotions, of which, on reflection, it thus seems to be comprehensive, is to perform an intellec- tual process, Avhich, though not a real analysis, is an ana- lysis at least relatively to our conception."''^ And again, "What the chemist does in matter, the intellectual analysist does in mind ; the one distinguishing by a purely mental process of reflection the elements of his complex feelings, as the other operates on his material compounds, by processes that are themselves material. Though the term analysis may be used in reference to both processes, the mental as well as the material, since the result of the process is virtually the same in both, it has been univer- sally employed by philosophers in the laws of the mind without any accurate definition of the process ; and I was careful, therefore, to explain to you the peculiar meaning in which it is strictly to be understood in our science ; that you might not extend to the mind and its affections, that essential divisibility which is inconsistent with its very nature ; and suppose that, when we speak of com- plex notions, and of thoughts and feelings that are united by association with other thoughts and feelings, we speak of a plurality of separable things. The complex mental phsenomena, as I explained to you, are complex only in relation to our mode of conceiving them. They are, strictly and truly, as simple and indivisible states of a substance, which is necessarily, in -all its states, simple and indivisible, — the results, rather than the compounds of former feelings, — to which, however, they seem to us, and from the very nature of the feelings themselves, cannot but seem to us, to bear the same species of relation, which a whole bears to the parts that compose it. The office of intellectual analysis, accordingly, in the mode in which I have explained it to you, has regard to this relation only. INTELLECTUAL SCIE.NCE. 45 It is to trace the various affections or states of mind that have successively contributed to form or to modify any pecuHar sentiment or emotion, and to develope the elements, to which, after tracing this succession, the re- sulting sentiment or emotion is felt by us to bear virtually that relation of seeming comprehensiveness of which I spoke."* In the scientific] examination of mind, analysis must be employed, as well as in that of matter. It is less, perhaps, a subject of wonder than of regret, to those who are ac- quainted with the literary productions of Mr. Dugald Stew- art, that he should interpose the high authority of his name to prevent an entrance even into a field of investigation so important. How can it be doubted that in education, ora- tory and poetry, there would exist more power in guiding the thoughts and feelings of men in general, if we possess- ed a more intimate knowledge of the elements of our com- plex sentiments and affections; i,e. a knowledge of the varied simpler thoughts and feedings, which the power of association has bound indissolubly together ? From the in- fluence of how many circumstances, adapted to modify in- juriously our subsequent states of mind, — to pervert the judgment, and to corrupt the heart, — might we be pre- served, were intellectual science more generally studied and understood ! No man, whose sentiments are guided by Divine Revelation, can expect that any attempted pro- cess of moral reformation, without higher concurring energy, will subvert the empire of evil in the world. But every possible corrective of a moral nature wc ought to employ; while we look to higher instrumentality, and higher agency, for more glorious triumphs than any which education alone can achieve. * Vol. I. pp. 234, 5. 46 POWERS AND SUSCEPTIBILITIES CHAPTER III. THE TRUE NATURE OF THE POWERS AND SUSCEPTIBILITIES OF THE MIND EXPLAINED. The phaenomena of mind, or its varied thoughts and feelings, comprise, as we have seen, every thing, in rela- tion to it, of which we can obtain any knowledge. It mil be desirable, therefore, to endeavour to ascertain what is the notion we ought to form of these phaenomena. The body possesses various members, distinct from each other, though they form unitedly one beautiful and perfect whole. And hence it is possible to lose one of the bodily members while the others remain, or to put one in motion, while the others continue at rest. From our proneness to reason analogically, we are apt to transfer the same mode of thinking to the mind— to con- ceive that it consists of various powers, asjtfeebody is com- posed of different members, each of which is distinct from the others, and also from the mind itself-— capable of ex- isting apart from the rest, or of perishing while its asso- ciate powers remain in being, and in vigour. A little reflection will, however, convince us that some at least of these notions are utterly inconsistent with our conceptions of mind as a simple indivisible essence. It will remind us that, as the mind does not, like the body, consist of parts, no analogy borrowed from the latter will apply here ; that the powers of perceiving, feeling, judging, &c. are not to be considered as separate portions or mem- bers, so to speak, of the mind ; but as capabilities, im- parted to it by its Creator, of existing in various states of thought, and feeling, which constitute the whole phaeno- mena of the mind, and, as far at least as the physiology of the mind is concerned, the exclusive subject of inquiry and examination. or THE MIND EXPLAINED. 47 With reference then to these phaenomena, let it be ob- served, that they are not to be regarded as constituting something distinct from the mind, but as being the mind itself in different states. This is one of the fundamental principles of Dr. Brown's philosophy ; and its importance is so great as to render it deserving of a little fuller eluci- dation. I shall view ii^ first, in its bearing upon the actual phaenomena of the mind; and, secondly, in reference to what we denominate its powers and susceptibilities. , According to the doctrine of the Peripatetics, ideas are not merely distinct from the mind, but actual images of objects which are contemplated by the mind, as it was sup- posed, in perception, and which rise again to view in every act of memory. This doctrine is now, however, univer- sally discarded ; and, indeed, so manifest is its absurdity, that it is impossible to avoid expressing astonishment at the length of time during which it held dominion over the public mind. In many instances the existence of such an image is altogether incredible, or rather impossible. " That there should be an image of an individual object in the mind, as of a rose, is conceivable. But what image can there be of honesty, of justice, or of any other similar quality ?" It is now, accordingly, generally admitted, thit an idea is nothing more than the conception which the mind forms of an object. It is not, however, to be doubted that this word, together with the similar terms, notion, thought, &c., is still apt to be regarded as denoting some- thing i7i the mind, distinct from the mind itself, and capable of being actually separated from it. We talk of a notion, a thought, or an idea, as though it constituted a real independent entity, like gold, silver, &c. " There seems," says Mr. Welsh, "to be a natural tendency in all men, when they first reflect upon the subjects of their consciousness, to conceive that ideas and feelings arc something different from the mind itself. We ascribe to them a real existence, shadowy and undefined it may be, but still real, as if they were separate entities over which we exercise a mysterious power, calling them into exist- ence, and allowing them again to fade into nothing at our 48 POWERS AND SUSCEPTIBILITIES will."* All this is delusion. There is no notion or idea in the mind, and distinguishable from it. A thought, in the concrete state, i. e, " a particular thought, as it really exists in the mind of an individual, is the mind thinking" — an idea is the mind conceiving. " A cause of thought we can easily conceive separate from the mind, in an outward object," — ^'' or an object we can conceive separate from the mind about which our thoughts are employed ; but what notion is it possible to form of a thought distinguishable from the mind thinking,"! or of an idea from the mind conceiving ? Our notions, thoughts, and ideas, then, are nothing more than the mind itself in difterent states : and a similar asser- tion may be made with reference to our endlessly diversified sensations. They are not distinct and separable from the mind. There is not the mind, and its sensation, as we say there is the body, and the limbs ; for the sensation is the mind affected in a particular way. When the leg, or arm, has received some injury, we do not say there is the arm and its wound ; for the wound is, not indeed the arm itself, but the arm in a particular state. In like manner a sensation is not actually the mind itself, as Mr. Welsh pro- perly observes ; for we employ the word Mind to signify the unknown substance of which the qualities only can be ascertained, — but the mind, i. e, this unknown substance, in a particular state. The same thing may be said of the varied affections of the mind. We are not to conceive of the emotions of joy. sorrow, hope, fear, &c., which there is reason to think many do, as so many feelings laid up, so to speak, in the mind — feelings distinct from the mind, and capable of being deve- loped by appropriate circumstances. They are the mind itself in different states, or affected in various ways. They only exist, accordingly, when they are felt. There is no joy, or sorrow, &,c. in the mind when these emotions are not experienced. Doubtless the mind possesses a capability of being made to exist in those particular states to which n\2l5 tP221. OF THE .Ml.\'i> ILXl'LAlNtU. 49 we give the name of hope, fear, &c. ; and, for ordinary purposes, it may be sufficiently accurate to call this capa- bility the affection of hope, fear, &c. But, in reality, hope, or fear, is the mind affected in a particular manner, or existing in a particular state. The capability of experi- encing these emotions, stands in a similar relation to the emotions themselves, with the power of perceiving exten- sion, solidity, (fee, to the perception of extension, &c. itself. It is not difficult to show the application of these principles to what are called the powers and susceptibilities of the mind. They are not to be regarded as distinct from the mind itself, or as separate from each other. Of this the great Mr. Locke was well aware. " These powers of the mind, viz. of perceiving and preferring," says this writer, " are usually called by another name, and the ordi- nary way of speaking is, that the understanding, and the will, are two faculties of tlie mind ; a word proper enough if it be used, as all words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in men's thoughts by being supposed, as I suspect it has been, to stand for some real beings in the soul, that performed those actions of understanding and volition. For when we say the will is the commanding or superior faculty of the soul ; that it is, or is not free ; that it determines the inferior faculties ; that it follows the dic- tates of the understanding, &c. ; though these, and the like expressions, by those that carefully attend to their own ideas, and conduct their thoughts more by the evidence of things than the sound of words, may be understood in a clear and distinct sense ; yet I suspect, I say, that this way of speaking of faculties has misled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us, which had their several provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings, which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty, in questions relating to them."* The faculties of the mind, or its powers and susceptibi- lities, let it then be remembered, are not to be distinguished from the mind itself. The words denote the constitution * Book 11. Chap. xxi. § 0. 7 50 POWERS AND SUSCEPTIBILITIES it has received from its Creator, by which it is capable of existing in all those* different states, which form the con- sciousness of life. Our actual feelings depend upon the na- ture of the mind, and the nature of the objects by which the mind is affected. Were a change in either to take place, the pha^nomena, which it is the business of intellectual science to contemplate, would undergo a corresponding change|. " It is the object, indeed, which affects the mind when sentiment ; but it is the original susceptibility of the mind itself, which determines and modifies the parti- cular affection, very nearly, if I may illustrate what is mental by so coarse an image, as the impression which a seal leaves on melted wax depends, not on the qualities of the wax alone, or of the seal alone, but on the softness of the one, and the form of the other."* Thus the powers and susceptibilities of the mind are not to be identified with the actual phsenomena of mind, though they constitute nothing different from the mind itself. They are, in fact, the nature of the mind ; — its capabilities of feeling, thinking, conceiving, judging, &c. ; an actual feeling, or conception, or judgment, as it exists in the mind, is the mind itself in a particular state. There is not a very broad line of distinction between the powers and the susceptibilities of the mind. Both of the terms denote a certain constitution of the mind. The latter exhibits what Locke called its passive powers, that is, its capacities of undergoing certain changes ; the latter intimates its faculties of producing certain changes. The odour of a rose comes in contact with the olfactory nerves, and a certain mental feeling, or a sensation, is the result ; 2. e. a change is produced in the state of the mind ; this change indicates the existence of a mental susceptibility. We will to move our limbs -y the limbs are instantly obe- dient to volition ; and the change in the state of the body, produced by volition, indicates a mental power. To the above distinction, though correct, no great prac- tical importance is to be attached. It is of far greater con- sequence to remember, that neither the term susceptibility * Brown, vol. I. p. 22. OF THE MIND EXPLAIXKT). 51 nor power denotes any thing distinct from the constitution of the mind. The susceptibility to which we have referred, is a certain constitution of mind, in consequence of which, a change in its state takes place on the approach of a cer- tain material object. The power to which we have re- ferred, is also a certain constitution of mind, in conse- quence of which a change takes place in the state of the body, subsequent to a certain feeling of mind. What is a sensation but a certain state of mind? What is a volition but a certain state of mind? They both imply a certain constitution of mind by which it is rendered capable of existing in these different states ; but whether we give to this constitution the name of susceptibility, or power, or capacity, is of no material importance. When the state of mind of which we at any time speak, is regarded as a con- sequent of something else, it may be convenient to say that it indicates a corresponding mental susceptibility; and when it is regarded as the antecedent of something else, that it proves the existence of a mental power. But the susceptibility, and the power, a^re not different from the mind. Both may be included under the general term ca- pacity of existing in certain states, — a capacity of which we can know nothing, but by the states of thought, and feeling, which grow out of it, and which is to be ascribed to the sovereign pleasure of the Creator of the mind. Nor are the states of mind which are thus indicative of what are called mental powers, and mental susceptibilities, > so radically different as it is sometimes imagined. The mind has the power of volition; it has also the susceptibi- lity of sensation. Now between an actual sensation, and an actual volition, what essential distinction, of the kind, that is, which the words susceptibility and power might lead us to expect, is found to exist ? They are both states of mind. They are both caused by something else ; for volition can no more exist without a cause than sensation. Each of them may be the cause of something else. The sensation of hunger nrny produce the desire of food ; a voli- tion may produce a bodily movement. Why then should the latter be said to indicate a mental power, and the ^ POWERS AND SUSCEPTIBILITIES former a mental susceptibility? In fact there is not a single state of mind which may not sustain the double relation of cause and effect — which may not be itself a change from a former state, and lead to a change. So that, according to the foregoing distinction between susceptibilities and powers, all our mental faculties may be regarded as constituting both ; and if an attempt be made to establish any other distinction, it will, we think, be found to prove abortive. In the subsequent part of this volume, the term suscep- tibilities, or powers, will be used to denote the nature or capacity, or constitution of the mind, by which it is capa- ble of existing in those varied states of thought, and feeK ing, which form the consciousness of life. The whole of the preceding statement may be illustrated by a reference to the properties or qualities of physical substances. These properties cannot be separated from the body in which they inhere. There is no such thing in nature, as a quality apart from its substance. The truth of this will further appear from another statement which we now proceed to make, viz. that these properties consti- tute nothing distinct from the substance itself. They are the substance formed capable of undergoing and of origi- nating certain changes; its capacities of producing changes, we term its powers ; its capacities of tindergoing- changes, we denominate its susceptibilities. It has been too common to conceive of the powers, pro- perties or qualities of a substance, as something super- added to it, and capable of being withdrawn from it. This is a great mistake. Dr. Brown has shown, with resistless force of argument, that " the substances which exist in nature, are every thing that has a real existence in nature." The statement, however, of this writer, and of his able and excellent biographer, the Rev. Dr. Welsh, that the powers, or qualities of a substance, are the substance itself consi- dered in relation to certain changes which it undergoes or occasions, seems to me liable to exception. It is in har- mony with their doctrine with regard to causation, and must stand or fall with it. If the powers, &c. of bodies. OF THE MIND EXPLAINED. tt*^ "^ ^ ^^ *^ *^ * ^ ' are those bodies considered in different relation^|j^^^?Q^^3^^ that if we, who observe the relations, did not exis!^' powers of which we speak would not exist. Besides, as it is not the direct energy of the Deity, which, according to their system, binds the cause and the effect together, it leaves the important fact, how it comes to pass that the particular relations which we actually witness exist, and not apposite relations, altogether unaccounted for. I pre- fer, therefore, the statement given above, viz. that the powers or qualities of a substance, are not indeed to be regarded as any thing different from the substance, but the particular nature, or constitution, which the Creator has given to it, in consequence of which it is capable of existing in the various relations it sustains toother bodies. A similar exception must, we think, be taken against the statement, that the powers or susceptibilities of the mind are the mind itself, considered in relation to certain changes which it occasions, or undergoes. They rather denote, as it has been already stated, that particular na- ture or constitution which has been given to it by its Cre- ator ; in consequence of which it is capable of existing in these various relations. Power, or susceptibility, in short, denotes not the relations themselves, nor the consideration of tl^em, but a physical capacity of sustaining them. Before we leave this subject, there is one source of mis- conception, against which the reader should be especially cautioned. The states of thought and feeling, in whicli the mind is capable of existing, which constitute the pha*- nomena of the mind — all, indeed, which can be known of the mind — are incalculable in point of number. Now as each state of mind supposes a previous susceptibility of existing in that state, we are in danger of imagining that there must be a number of separate susceptibilities in the mind, corresponding with its individual states. The error involved in this conception will be perceived, when the previous statements with reference to the meaning of the term susceptibility are recollected. A mental susceptibi- lity is nothing different from the mind itself. It is the sim- ple indivisible essence, formed capable of producing or 54 POWERS AND SUSCEFTlBILiTlES undergoing certain changes, in which the whole phaeno- mena of mind consist. The mind is not made up of parts; it cannot therefore consist of a number of separate suscep- tibihties. But though simple and indivisible, it may be capable of producing and undergoing changes which are not in their nature less different from each other than are the circumstances in which they arise. This is finely illus- trated by Mr. Welsh, in regard to the properties of physi- cal substances. An object possesses colour and gravity, i, e. it excites a certain feeling in our mind to which we give the name of the sensation of colour ; and it attracts the earth and other substanc.es. Now the question is, are there two distinct powers in the object to produce these differ- ent effects ? In reply, Mr. Welsh says, " Now, without any minute analysis of what we mean by colour, gravitation, &c., it may be observed that the colour, not being in the object, is merely an effect of the object on our minds ; and the approach of the earth is not in the object, it is an effect produced on the earth. And, as the objects operated upon are essentially different, there is no occasion for supposing two different powers for the two different results. It might be demonstrated that, if the substance were one, and nothing more than one, it would, when placed in relation to objects so essentially different as a mass of matter, and a spiritual substance, produce essentially different effects. To suppose then that there must be two powers, when one is sufficient to account for all that we see produced, is an unwarrantable violation of Newton's simplest axiom. How different is the sensa- tion of heat upon approaching the finger to a lighted can- dle, and the melting of wax when it is placed in a similar situation. But no one surely will maintain, that heat has the power of melting wax, and a different power for exci- ting a peculiar sensation — there is nothing but the heat simply in relation to two different substances. Why, then, should we any more suppose different powers inherent in the gold, or indeed, in any other simple substance ?"* And, again, in a passage which 1 trust he will excuse me for thus *Fid€ Memoirs of Brown, pp. Ill, 112. OF THE MIND EXPLAINED. 55 introducing, " a piece of wax is susceptible of a thousand different impressions, but there are not a thousand differ- ent qualities in the wax ; there is the one quality of taking impressions, conceived in relation to a thousand impressive forms. Thus it is with the mind. Millions of figures may be placed before our eyes, one after another, and the mind is in a different state upon every new figure being presented. But this is surely one simple mind, considered in relation to a million objects. So with colours, sounds, &,c." In harmony with previous remarks, I should be disposed to make a slight change in the phraseology, or little more than in the phraseology, of these admirable passages* CHAPTER IV, THE MANNEB IN WHICH OUR KNOWLEDGE OP THE MENTAL PHENOMENA IS OBTAINED. Op the essence both of Matter and of Mind, we are, as we have seen, profoundly ignorant. All that can be known, with reference to both, is comprehended in the varying phoenomena which they exhibit An important question then occurs here, " In what way do we gain our acquaintance with these phaenomena ? How do the worlds of matter and of mind become known to us? Is it neces- sary that we should be endowed with special and separate powers to obtain that little information, with reference to each, to which it is possible for us, in the present state to attain?" To the latter question an answer has usually been given in the affirmative. Sensation, or perception, it is gene- rally said, is the link which unites us to the material uni- verse, — that high, and in many respects, mysterious power, which reveals to us the phoenomena of nature, or the world tvithout us; while consciousness makes us acquainted with 56 ON THE NATURE the feelings and changeful appearances of the world within. Now concerning the way in which phgenomena of mat- ter become known to us, there is, and can be, no doubt. External objects affect our organs of sense, or, as we are accustomed to say, (though the words convey no distinct meaning, being little better than a cloak for ignorance,) make some impression upon them. This impression upon the organ is instantly followed by a certain feeling, or state of mind, — a feeling or state which necessarily supposes that the mind must have been so constituted by its Cre- ator as to be capable of being made to exist in that parti- cular state; or, in other words, that a certain power — the power of sensation or perception, has been conferred upon it by the Deity. Thus the phaenomena of matter become known to us, and can only become known to us, through the medium of a certain physical or bodily conformation, in union with a certain mental susceptibility or power. The same mode of thinking we have been in the habit, as it appears to me, of transferring improperly to the phae- nomena of mind. Since the properties of matter can only be discovered by means of the power of perception, — to which power the various bodies by which we are sur- rounded, together with their various properties, stand in the relation of objects, — we are apt to imagine, that the phaenomena of mind require for their recognition a pecu- liar power, to which a definite name must be attached. But in suffering ourselves to be seduced by this analogy, we forget that the phaenomena of the mind are its varied thoughts and feelings ; and that it may not, accordingly, require what we call a distinct power of mind, to give us the knowledge of our feelings, though a particular faculty is necessary to secure to us an acquaintance with bodies which are out of the mind, whose existence can, accord- ingly, only become known by some operation upon the mind, or by the production of some change in its state, the very production of which necessarily supposes, as we have seen, that the mind is possessed of a corresponding susceptibility of undergoing that change. OF (JUNSClOUSNESs. 57 To this supposed power, which has thus for its objects, as it is conceived, the phaenomena of mind, philosophers have given the name of Consciousness, We shall first examine their statements with regard to its nature — state- ments in which there are some things to commend, though the general doctrine they advocate must, it is conceived, be abandoned. " Consciousness," says Dr. Reid, " is a word used by philosophers to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of all the present operations of the mind."* Within the compass of a few lines, he speaks of it as " a power by which we have a knowledge of the operations of our own minds." Again, in another part of his generally excellent writings, he tell us that " Consciousness is an operation of the understanding of its own kind, and cannot be logically defined." "The objects of it," he adds, are our present pains, our pleasures, our hopes, our fears, our desires, our doubts, our thoughts of every kind, &c." It is scarcely possible to conceive that the general views of this writer were very distinct, when he could permit phraseology so loose and contradictory to escape from his pen. Conscious- ness is, first, the immediate knowledge we have of our thoughts, &c. ; then a power by which we know them ; then, again, an operation of the understandings (i. e. accord- ing to the philosophy of this writer, a power of a power,) which cannot be logically defined. It is surely needless to remark, that the first and second statements are self-contra- dictory, and the third, contrary to both. If consciousness be knowledge^ it cannot be a power to know. If it be an operation of the understanding, it can, on his system, be neither the one nor the other. Passing by this inaccuracy, some of the subsequent statements of Dr. Reid deserve our attention. He tells us, in substance at least, and that very justly, that con- sciousness has relation only to things in the mind, such as our thoughts, sensations, emotions, &c. — that these are the ♦ Vol. I. p. 32. 8 58 ON THE NATURE only proper objects of consciousness — that it cannot be said correctly that we are conscious of the beings and things that surround us — that they are objects of percep- tion, not of consciousness — that it is improper to say we are conscious of things past, even of the past feelings, &,c. — that they are objects of memory, not consciousness. Dr. Reid might have added, that though we cannot be conscious of any thing out of the mind, we may be said to be conscious of the perceptions and emotions they awaken, because they are really things in the mind, or the mind in particular states of thought and feeling. This power of consciousness, Dr. Reid affirms to be a different power from that by which we perceive external objects ; and a philosopher, he says, ought carefully to preserve this dis- tinction. Regarding consciousness thus as an original power of the mind, distinct from all others, by which we gain the, knowledge of things in the mind, our author proceeds to show, why we put confidence in its testimony. The mind experiences a sensation : consciousness assures us that such is the case. " But if I am asked to prove that I cannot be deceived by consciousness, I can find," he says, " no proof" " I cannot find any antecedent truth from which it is deduced, or upon which its evidence may depend." He tells us further, that the irresistible convic- tion we have of the operations of our minds, is not the effect of reasoning, but is immediate and intuitive. " The existence, therefore," he adds, " of those passions and operations of our minds, of which we are conscious, is a first principle, which nature requires us to believe upon her authority." A simpler view of the nature of consciousness would have shown this excellent writer, how completely unneces- sary are all such statements. They accord with, and are indeed required by his system, which regards consciousness as an original power of the mind, and whose testimony, like that of perception, it might be supposed necessary to con- firm and establish. But if consciousness be not an original power — if the consciousness of the moment be nothing more than the feeling of the moment — if the consciousness dp CONSCIOUSNESS. 59 of pain, for instance, be the sensation itself, it is manifestly absurd to attempt even to prove that we experience it. All that can be desired or said is, that we actually suffer pain. No one in a sound state of mind, will ask for proof that the feeling really exists. Mr. Stewart agrees in the general doctrine of his prede- cessor. " It is," says he, " by the immediate evidence of consciousness, that we arc assured of the present existence of our various sensations, of all our affections, passions, hopes, fears, thoughts, (fee." He states, very justly, that consciousness is confined to what we call states of mind — that it does not inform us of the existence of mind itself; and, he adds, " it would not be possible to arrive at the knowledge of its existence, even supposing us to be created in the full possession of all the intellectual capacities whicli belong to human nature, if no impression were ever to be made on an external sense." He proceeds to observe, " that the moment in which a sensation is produced, we learn two facts at once — the existence of the sensation, and our own existence as sentient beings ; in other words, the very first exercise of consciousness necessarily implies a belief, not only of the present existence of what is felt, but of the present existence of that which thinks and feels, or of that being which I denote, I, and myself." It is, however, of the former of these facts only that we are conscious.* At present we say nothing with reference to the origin of the belief of our own existence ; but we would just ask, en passant, what is meant by the assertion " that the mo- ment in which a sensation is produced, we learn the exist- ence of the sensation?'''' Is not this an identical proposi- tion, amounting to the statement, — " the instant we feel, we feel r'' Mr. Stewart is not free from that vagueness of state- ment, of which it was found necessary to complain in the case of Dr. Reid. In his " Outlines," he enumerates con- sciousness among the poivers of the mind. And yet, in * Fide Outlines, pp. 18, 19. Philosophical Esiays, Essay I. Chap. I. Elements, Vol. 11. p. 52—54. 60 ON THE NATURE his formal definition of the term, he says, " the word de- notes the immediate knowledge which the mind has of its thoughts, &c." He then immediately adds, " the belief with which it (consciousness) is attended," {i, e. according to his own definition, with which our immediate know- ledge of our thoughts, &c. is attended,) " has been consi- dered as the most irresistible of any, &c."* Thus, con- sciousness is first a power of the mind ; then the immedi- ate knowledge we have of our thoughts ; and, finally, this immediate knowledge of our thoughts is attended with an irresistible belief that we have them ! Statements thus confused and self-contradictory, pro- ceeding from such men as Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart, go very far to induce us to suspect, that there must be some radical defect in the opinions which have been held on this important subject; and the mistakes of others, who agree with them in their general doctrine, are calculated to strengthen this suspicion. Thus it has been said, that "consciousness is awakened by two different classes of ob- jects, — that we are conscious of the effects produced by external objects upon the organs of sense, — and of the mind's attention to them." Ey the word "effects," in the first member of the sentence, the writer meant, not effects upon the organ, as the language would seem to imply, but upon tlie mind ; for he immediately adds, " these effects are sensations." Of the attention of the mind to these sensa- tions, we are said to be conscious ; and it is by means of it, (viz. this attention) that we gain, as it is further said, the knowledge of external objects. This latter assertion, however, unless understood with great modifications, is untrue. We might attend for ever to the sensation pro- duced by the fragrance of a rose, for instance, without per- ceiving the rose ; yea, without the idea once arising in the mind, that the feeling resulted from the influence of any thing ad extra. We should believe, indeed, that it had a cause ; but we might imagine that the cause was in the mind. It is not every sensation that gives us the notion of * Outlines, p. 18. or CONSCIOUSNESS. 01 oxteinal objects; and when that notion does arise, it springs, by a law of the mind, as we shall afterward see, out of the sensation itself; it is not gained by attention to it, nor by any process of reflection upon it. It was left for Dr. Brown to give us more correct, and therefore intelligible, views of the nature of consciousness. His perspicacious mind could not repose upon the vague- ness of preceding writers. Indeed, their representations are at direct variance with those fundamental parts of his system which have come under our review. The old sys- tem, built upon a falsely admitted analogy between matter and mind, regards individual sensations, 8 ANALYSIS AND ARRANGEMENT CHAPTER VI. ANALYSIS AND ARRANGEMENT OF THE MENTAL PHiENOMENA. The susceptibilities or powers of the mind are, as we have seen, the mind itself, formed capable of existing in various states of thought and feeling. These susceptibili- ties can only be ascertained by actual observation, (as is the case with regard to the properties of physical substan- ces) — by a careful examination of the actual sensations, thoughts, emotions, &c. of which we ourselves are con- scious, or of whose existence in the minds of others, we have indubitable proof. These infinitely diversified states of mind, constituting the whole of the mental phaenomena, are the sole objects of regard in this part, at least, of intel- lectual science. They are to the mental philosopher, what the various substances in the material universe are to the inquirer in natural science. They present themselves, also, for examination, in an analogous state of complexity and disarrangement ; and they require, like them, to be reduced to their elementary parts, and arranged in classes, on prin- ciples both obvious and unexceptionable. To this difficult and important work we now proceed. I have avoided the common phraseology, viz. division of the powers of the mind, because though I admit there is an obvious distinction between the susceptibilities and pow- ers of the mind, and the actual phcpmomena of the mind, — /. e, its varied states of thought and feeling, — it is not less manifest, as we have intimated, that the only method of classifying these powers, &c. is to classify the phaenomena. The process to be instituted has a direct reference to the actual states of mind. These are to be analyzed, and ar- ranged in classes, as referrible to different corresponding OP THE MENTAL PHiCNOMEKA. 09 susceptibilities, or powers ; so that, in fact, a classification of the mental phaenomena, is a classification of the mental susceptibilities, &c. In entering upon this subject, it should not be forgotten that the phaenomena, concerning which we now inquire, arc not only complex in their nature, in the sense in which this can be aflirmeci of any of the states of a simple indivisible essence, but incalculable in point of number. And since every state of mind indicates a corresponding susceptibility, we may adopt the statement of Dr. Brown, that "the suscep- tibilities of the mind, by which, in different circumstances, it may exist in these different states, are certainly as truly infinite as the space which surrounds us, or as that eternity which in its progress measures the successions of our feel- ings, and all the other changes in the universe." In conse- quence of that generalizing process, to which the phocno- mena of mind have been subjected, we are, indeed, exceed- ingly apt to conceive of those which we have arranged in the same class, as if the individuals, of which it consists, had no distinctive characters -, yet it ought never to be forgot- ten that all our thoughts, and sensations, &c., how minute soever may be the shades of diflference which exist amongst them, constitute so many distinct and separate states, or affections, of mind. There are no classes of sensations, and thoughts, in the mind, — nothing is to be found there but individual thoughts, and sensations, as every object in the material world, is an individual object. We cannot alter the nature or condition of the phaenomena themselves; but, possessing the faculty of perceiving resemblances, we can, after reducing those which are complex to the utmost degree of simplicity, arrange and group, our individual thoughts and sensations. We can thus accomplish (in effect) what has been done, with so much benefit, in natural science, a very considerable part of which consists in classification. What is Natural History, but a science of arrangement? What is Chemistry, but a science of analy- sis, and arrangement? — sciences which have their founda- tion in the constitution of the mind ; to which, it is as im- possible to avoid comparing things together, and observing their agreement, or the contrary, as to remain ignorant of 70 ANALYSIS AND ARaANGEMENX the form and colour, &c. of surrounding objects, when we have a distinct vision of them. The science of Mental Philosophy, then, in as far at least as it relates to the classification of the mental phaenomena, is built upon one of its own powers — that power by which we discover resemblance, or relation in general. Two, or more objects meet our view, and we not only perceive their individual properties but become immediately sensi- ble of their resemblance to each other, in a variety of respects. It is possible to conceive that the human mind might have been so constituted as not to be capable of recognizing this resemblance. In this case all science (if indeed any thing worthy of the name of science^could have existed) must have assumed a character differing essentially from that which it bears at present — every thing like arrangement being entirely out of the question. En- dowed, however, with this noble power, the resemblances, and relations in general, which it discovers to us, constitute so many directors in classification, by the practical gui- dance of which, assemblages of objects blended together apparently in the most hopeless confusion, are easily made to separate, and assume the utmost degree of order and regularity. Referring to this admirable power, and its in- fluence in the classification of the mental phoenomena, Dr. Brown says, " It begins by converting thousands, and more than thousands, into one, and reducing, in the same man- ner, the numbers thus formed, arrives at last at the few dis- tinctive characters of those great comprehensive tribes, on which it ceases to operate, because there is nothing left to oppress the memory, or the understanding.^ Still it must be carefully borne in mind, that " classifica- tion has reference only to our mode of considering objects." It effects no alteration (as we have already said) in the phaenomena of mind themselves. It places those together in our conceptions^ which are felt to resemble each other. These we regard as distinct classes of affections, by an enumeration of which we define the mind. " It is that, wo say, which perceives, remembers, compares, grieves, * Vol. I. p. 353. OF THE MENTAL PHJENOME^'A. 71 rejoices, loves, hates, &.c." The terms, however, it must not be forgotten, are mere inventions of our own, and each of them "comprehends a variety of feelings, that are as truly different from each other, as the classes themselves are different." The process of classification may be con- ducted on different principles, and carried to a greater length by some, than by others ; but those states of mind in which even no general circumstances of agreement can be discovered, must be arranged in different classes ; and to these ultimate divisions, if we may so call them, or ra- ther to the constitution of mind which they indicate, we give the name of Powers, or Susceptibilities of the mind. It has been just stated that the process of classification may be conducted on different principles. This circum- stance results from the variety of relations which objects bear to each other ; relations, which strike various minds differently, in consequence of which they are led to adopt even opposite modes of arrangement. And it is an impor- tant remark of Dr. Brown, that the classification which ac- tually approaches nearest to perfection,_may not be that which seems, at first sight, most obvious ; and he very ad- mirably illustrates this observation, in its application to the phajnomena of the mind, by the obvious principle of ar- rangement which would seem to be supplied by the three- fold natural division of our sensations, into those which arc agreeable, painful, and indifferent. To a common observer this might appear a division as unexceptionable as it is obvious: it is far, however, from being such in reality. " For to take the pleasures and pains of sense," says the Doctor, " for instance ; to what intelligible division could we reduce those which are not merely fugitive in them- selves, but vary, from pain to pleasure, and from pleasure to pain, with a change of their external objects so slight often, as to be scarcely appreciable, and in many cases even when the external objects have continued exactly the same ? How small and how variable a boundary sepa- rates the warmth that is pleasing from the heat which pains ! A certain quantity of light is grateful to the eye ; — increase it, it becomes not indifferent, — though that would be a less change, — but absolutely painful : and if the i'Z ANALYSIS AND ARRANGEMENT eye be inflamed, even this small quantity of light, which was agreeable before, and which seemed, therefore, to admit of being very safely classed among the sources of pleasure, is now converted into a source of agony. Since it is impossible, therefore, to fix the limits of pain and plea- sure ; and every affection, or state of mind, agreeable, dis- agreeable, or indifferent, may, by a very trifling change of circumstances, be converted into an opposite state ; it is evident that any classification, founded on this vague and transient distinction, must perplex and mislead us in our attempts to systematize the almost infinite diversities of thought and feeling, rather than give us any aid in the arrangement.''* Bearing some of the preceding remarks in memory, we shall not be surprised that different classifieations of the mental phaenomena have been suggested. Dr. Reid fol- lows the mode which was regarded by him, at that time, as the most common ; and traces all the mental phaeno- mena to the powers of the understanding and the will, " Under the will," he adds, "we comprehend our active powers, and all that lead to action, or influence the mind to act ; such as appetites, passions, affections, &C. The understanding comprehends our contemplative powers ; by which we perceive objects ; by which we conceive or re- member them ; by which we analyze or compound them ; and by which we judge and reason concerning them."t He afterward enumerates the following as constituting the only ones, which he thinks it necessary to explain : 1. The powers we have by means of our external senses. 2. Memory. 3. Conception. 4. The powers of resolving and analyzing complex ob- jects, and compounding those that are more simple. 5. Judging. G. Reasoning. 7. Taste. 8. Moral Perception. 9. Consciousness. . * Vol. I. pp. 356, T. t \ol. I. p. ifo, OF THE MENTAL PH-ENOMENA. 73 The foregoing enumeration, were it objectionable on no other grounds, appears defective in point of precision. What is meant, for instance, by the powers we have by means of our external senses ? The phraseology is cer- tainly very exceptionable. A mental power, in the sense in which the words have been explained, and in which they were used by Dr. Reid, may be dependent for its deve- lopement upon an organ of sense; but the power resides in the mind ; or rather it is the mind, — it is the constitu- tion which its Creator has given to it. It is not received by means of the senses ; and since the dissolution of the material part of our frame is not necessarily connected with the extinction of the mind, (unless indeed the doctrines of the Materialists and the Phrenologists should prove to be true.) it might remain after the body has crumbled into dust. Mr. Stewart follows the division of Dr. Reid, varying his phraseology, and adding a third class : — of these, the 1st, Comprehends the intellectual powers ; the 2d, The active and moral powers ; and the 3d, Those which belong to man as the member of a political body. It would seem as if Dr. Reid himself was not satisfied with that division of the powers of the mind, to which re- ference has just been made ; though forgetting, partly at least, that the great business of the mental philosopher is to analyze and classify, he did not deem it necessary even to think of replacing it by another. He says, " it may be of use in order to a more methodical procedure;" — but cold approbation to bestow upon a division of such anti- quity, and adopted also by himself! To the perfection of any arrangement of the mental phsenomena, it is necessary that there be a strongly marked line of demarcation between the respective classes under which they are arranged ; and that all the phaenomena be fairly included under one or another of them. When we apply these rules to the division of the powers of the mind, followed by Dr. Reid, we find that both are transgressed. There is no broad line of distinction, he 10 74 ' ANALYSIS AND ARRANGEMENT himself being judge, between the powers of the under- standing and those of the will. He expressly guards us, indeed, against supposing, that in those operations which are ascribed to the understanding, there is no exertion of will or activity ; or that the understanding is not em- ployed in the operations ascribed to the will. He tells us, that so far is this from being the case, that there is no operation of the understanding, wherein the mind is not active in some degree ; and no act of will which is not accompanied with some act of understanding.* Why then, it may be asked, is not the old distinction between the powers of the understanding, and those of the will, abandoned, as a distinction without a difference ? The fact is, that Dr. Reid is less self-inconsistent here than his own words would seem to imply. Though the under- standing is involved, in his opinion, in an act of will, and the will involved in an operation of the understanding, they are still, according to his doctrine, separately^ though jointly exercised. The will which is active, directs the understanding which is not active ; so that the mind, in consequence of this direction, may be said to be active in every such operation of the understanding. In cases in which the understanding is not directed by the will, the mind, on his principles, is not active in an operation of the understanding. Now if in involuntary thinking and com- paring, (and that we do involuntarily think and compare is manifest,) the mind is not active, how can it be imagined to be so, when the thinking is induced by the will ? Surely the act of thinking must in this respect be the same, whe- ther it be voluntary or involuntary ; the mind cannot well be conceived to be active in the former, and passive in the latter case. The activity of the mind must cease, accord- ing to Dr. Reid's doctrine, even in cases where an opera- tion of the understanding is directed by the will — cease with the volition which impelled it ; so that in an opera- tion of the understanding, the mind is, in all cases, passive. In this way only, as it appears to me, can the consistency of those who adopt Dr. Reid's classification be defended. * Vol. I. pp. 98, 99. OF THE MENTAL PHiENOMENA. 75 In thus vindicating their consistency, we however in- volve them, perhaps, in greater difficulties. For if the ac- tivity of the mind ceases with the volition, by which the subsequent operation of the understanding was directed, (and if it does not cease, the propriety of their division of the mental phaenomena must be abandoned,) it follows that the mind is inactive in perceiving, comparing, judging, &c. ; and active, when it exists in any of the states de- nominated appetites, passions, affections, &c. which are said to belong to the active powers ; i. e. (for such is the strange doctrine which seems to be necessarily involved in this statement,) the mind is passive when it thinks, and active when it feels ! And, if this be the case, why does Dr. Reid talk of an act of the understanding — operations of the understanding ? Might he not with equal propriety talk of an act of sensation, on the ground that an indi- vidual had resorted to voluntary and active means to se- cure its existence ? This doctrine of Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart, of the passivity of the mind in its intellectual states and exercises, in contradistinction from its other states, is proved by Dr. Brown, with resistless power of argument, to be un- founded. " In whatever manner we define the term ac- tive, is the mind," he asks, " more active when it merely desires good and fears evil, — when it looks with esteem on virtue, and with indignation, or disgust, or contempt on vice, than when it pursues a continued train of reason- ing, or fancy, or historical investigation V " Surely," he adds, " when it records the warning lessons of the past, or expatiates in fields which itself creates, of fairy beauty or sublimity, or comprehends .whole moving worlds within its glance, and calculates and measures infinitude; — the mind is active, or there are no moments in which it is so !"* In further support of this general statement, the same writer adds, " It is only when some intellectual energy co-exists with desire, that the mind is said to be active, even by those who are unaccustomed to metaphysical * Vol. I. p. 359. 76 ANALYSIS AND ARRANGEMENT nomenclature. Passion is active only when, with intellec- tual action, it compares means with ends, and deliberates, resolves, and executes. Ambition acts by prompting to the devising of means for gratifying its insatiable ap- petite. As a passion, it is the mere desire of power or glory. It is in the intellectual part of the process that the mind is active ; for it is only intellectually, with the exception of the production of muscular motion, that the mind can act. To class the active powers, therefore, as distinct from the intellectual, he adds, is to class them as opposed to that without which, as active powers, they cannot even exist."* It must not be forgotten that the language of Dr. Brown here regards the mental phaenomena, as they are in themselves ; it does not consider them in relation to the faculties which they may call into action. Whatever sense be attached to the term active, the mind must be as active in an operation of the understanding (to employ the language commonly used on this subject) as in an operation of the will. In fact, however, it will be found difficult, if not impossible, to attach any definite ideas to the terms activity and passivity, when employed in refer- ence to different states of mind, as they are in themselves. Much false conception, it is believed, or rather want of conception, prevails upon this subject. The mind is usually said to be passive in sensation, (though this is at variance with Dr. Reid's classification,) and active in ad- miring, loving, &G. We ask, what is meant by passivity and activity here ? If it be replied, that we are passive in sensation, because sensation is hot the result of volition — that the mind cannot but feel, &c. ; we reply, that ad- miring, loving, &c. are not invariably even indirectly the result of volition, and that they are never directly so ; that, in many cases at least, we might perhaps say in all cases, the mind cannot but admire, love, &c. Where then is the difference ? If it be alleged that admiring, loving, &c. prompt to action, &c. ; we answer, so does sensation. It is admitted that love to an object will pro- f- Vol. I. pp. 359. 360. OF THE MENTAL PHiENOMENA. 7 4 duce desire and exertion to secure it ; but, in the same manner, the sensation of pain will awaken desire of reliei, and lead to the adoption of measures to obtain it. Where then is the difference ? If it be alleged that there is an essential difference in the states of mind themselves, — that the state, or affection designated by the word sensa- tion, is in itself essentially passive, while the state or af- fection designated by the term love, admiration, &c. is essentially active ; — we answer, it may be so, for any thing we know to the contrary, but that we do not understand the assertion. It will be found impossible, we believe, to attach any definite signification to the terms activity and passivity, in their application to states or affections of the mind, except this, that the passive states are produced, and that the active states are the producers of others, or of some change upon the body. And, if this be true, there is not a single mental affection in which the mind may not be both active and passive ; i. e. there is not a single state which may not be both a cause and an effect. Sensation is produced ; it does not arise spontaneously ; it produces, also, some other state. Admiration, belief, love, volition, &c. are produced ; they can no more arise spontaneously, i, e, exist without a cause, than sensation, and like it they produce some other state. The term activity, then, has no meaning when applied to any state of mind, but in reference to its results. But though it should be admitted that all the mental phaeno- mena may be active, inasmuch as they may become the antecedents of certain changes, are not some of them, it may be asked, more especially entitled to the name of active powers, on the ground that to them must be ulti- mately traced all the bustle, and vigour, and animation, which we see around us ? This is denied by Dr. Brown. *'In what sense," says he, " can it be said that joy and grief lead to action, even indirectly, more than any other feel- ings, or states, in which the mind is capable of existing ? We may^ indeed, act when we are joyful or sorrowful, as we may act when we perceive a present object, or remem- ber the past ; but we may also remain at rest, and remain 78 ANALYSIS AND ARRANGEMENT equally at rest, in the one case as in the other. Our intel- lectual energies, indeed, even in this sense, as indirectly leading to action, are, in most cases, far more active than sorrow, even in its very excesses of agony and despair ; and in those cases in which sorrow does truly lead to action, as when we strive to remedy the past, the mere regret that constitutes the sorrow is not so closely connected with the conduct which we pursue, as the intellectual states of mind that intervened — the successive judgments by which we have compared projects with projects, and chosen at last the plan which, in relation to the object in view, has seemed to us, upon the whole, the most expedient."* It may, perhaps, be doubted whether Dr. Brown's rea- soning does full justice to this argument in support of Dr. Reid's classification. Conceding to Dr. Brown, that our intellectual states of mind are the more immediate, or the proximate cause of action, it might be contended, that those affections which belong to the order of feeling, con- stitute the radical and ultimate cause. Is it not apparent, indeed, that what Dr. Reid classes with our active powers — our appetites, passions, desires, &c., are the springs, so to speak, which keep the whole machinery of the mind in motion? There would be no intellectual activity were there no curiosity, no desire, no susceptibility of pleasure, or of pain. It may be true, that sorrow was not so directly connected with the conduct which w^e pursued, as the intellectual states that intervened ; but then, without this sorrow, these intellectual states themselves would not have intervened. There would have been no comparison of pro- ject with project — no prosecution of the plan of which he speaks. Were we possessed of nothing but intellect, life would be a dull, monotonous, insipid, and wearisome calm. In fact, it is the best argument in defence of this old divi- sion of the mental powers, that those states of mind which are classed with the active powers, are, in cases in which action is the result, generally speaking, the radical and ultimate cause of it. •^ Vol. I. p. 361. OP THE MENTAL PHENOMENA. 79 Still, however, this division is imperfect, because some of the phaenomena which are classed with the active pow- ers, and which must be classed with them, do not always lead to action. They are accordingly destitute, in this case, of the essential characteristic of their class. The classification of Dr. Reid transgresses also the other canon with reference to arrangement : it does not include all the mental phaenomena. There are some states of mind which cannot well be said to belong either to the under- standing, or the will — to the intellectual, or active powers. To which department shall we assign the feelings of acqui- escence, satisfaction, and a variety of others of a similar kind? It may, also, be further objected against any such division of the powers of the mind, that it is adapted to perpetuate those false views of the nature of those powers, to which such frequent reference has been made. "No sooner," says Dr. Brown, "were certain affections of the mind classed together, as belonging to the will, and certain others as belonging to the understanding, than the understanding and the will ceased to be considered as the same indivi- dual substance, and became immediately, as it were, two opposite and contending powers in the empire of mind, as distinct as any two sovereigns with their separate nations under their control ; and it became an object of as fierce contention to determine, whether certain affections of the mind belonged to the understanding or the will, as in the management of political affairs, to determine whether a disputed province belonged to one potentate or to another. Every new diversity of the faculties of the mind, indeed, converted each faculty into a little independent mind."* Dissatisfied with all previous arrangements. Dr. Brown presents us with one entirely original. The reader will observe that it is in harmony with the leading principles of his system, viz. that the business of the intellectual philo- sopher is to analyze, and classify, the phaenomena of mind ; * Vol. I. pp. 365, 366. 80 ANAfiVSIS AND ARRANGEMENT which phaenomena are to be no otherwise regarded than as the mind itself in various states of thought and feeling. The following statement of the classes, and orders, in which he arranges the mental phaenomena, is taken from his Physiology : " Of these states or affections of mind, when we consi- der them in all their variety, there is one physical distinc- tion that cannot fail to strike us. Some of them arise in consequence of the operation of external things — the others in consequence of mere previous feelings of the mind itself. In this difference, then, of their antecedents {i, e, as being external or internal,) we have a ground of primary division. The phaenomena may be arranged as of two classes, — The External affections of the mind ; The Internal af- fections OF THE MIND. " The former of these classes admits of very easy subdi- vision, according to the bodily organs affected. " The latter may be divided into two orders ; Intellectual states of mind, and Emotions. These orders, which are sufficiently distinct of themselves, exhaust, as it appears to me, the whole phaenomena of the class."* The following is a more full and methodical statement of this arrangement : DIVISION I. THE EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS OF THE MIND. ORDER I. THE LESS DEFINITE EXTERNAL AF' FECTIONS. Class I. Appetites : such as Hunger, &c. Class IL Muscular Pains. Class III. Muscular Pleasures. ORDER II. THE MORE DEFINITE EXTERNAL AF- FECTIONS, Class I. Sensations of Smell. Class II. Sensations of Taste. Class III. Sensations of Hearing. Class IV. Sensations of Touch. Class V, Sensations of Sight. • P. 41—43. OF THE MENTAL PH51N0MENA. 81 DIVISION II. THE INTERNAL AFFECTIONS OF THE MIND. ORDER I. IKTELLICTUAL STATES OF UIKD. Class I. Simple Suggestions, Suggestions of Resemblance, Contrast, Contiguity. Class II. Relative Saggestions, or Feelings of Relation. Speciet 1. Relations of Co-existence, Position, Resemblance, Degree, Proportion, Comprehensiveness. Species 2. Relations of Succession. ORDER II. EMOTIONS ; SUCH AS LOVE, &C. Class I. Immediate Emotions. Class II. Retrospective Emotions. Species I. Retrospective Emotions, having re la- tion to others. Species 2. Retrospective Emotions, having refer- ence to ourselves. Class UI. Prospective Emotions. With 'reference to this classification of the mental phae- nomena, I perfectly concur in opinion with the biographer of Dr. Brown, that it is " original, simple, distinct, and complete. The division into external and internal affec- tions is natural and obvious. Not less so is the distinction he makes with reference to the internal affections ; for intellectual states and emotions are felt by us as .gene- rically different, and must always thus be felt by us." The arrangement is also, in its leading particulars, complete ; for to know all our sensitive states or affections — all our intellectual states — and all our emotions, is " to know all the states of phaenomena of the mind." In the minor sub- divisions Dr. Brown's classification may be susceptible of improvement ; but the leading divisions seem so much in accordance to nature, that with the Rev. Mr. Welsh, I cannot anticipate the time when another shall be suggested so worthy of adoption. n 82 ANALYSIS AND ARRANGEMENT I would not, however, be understood as expressing lull . approbation of the phraseology of the first general division, viZi "the external affections of the mind." I am well aware that the concluding words will sufficiently indicate, to those who are accustomed to think on such subjects, that the adjective " external," is merely intended to sug- gest, that the cause of these affections is out of the mind. It may, however, be misunderstood. It may lead some to imagine, that there are affections which are not in the mind — that sensation is in the organ, &c. ; and on that account, I am disposed to regret that some other mode of designation was not employed by this writer ; yet as the matter is of subordinate importance — and as an uniform nomenclature, in intellectual science, as well as in physical, is very desirable, it is not my intention to deviate from it in the subsequent discussions. DIVISION I. INCLUDING THE EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS OF THE MIND. This division of the mental phaenomena comprehends, it must be recollected, all those affections of mind which are immediately subsequent upon certain states of the body, and particularly of what are called the organs of sense, and which are never found but in connexion with those states of the body to which we have referred. Such is the constitution of the mind, that when certain states of the material fabric, with which it is connected, exist, cer- tain affections of mind are experienced ; and to these states of mind we give the name of external affections, because the cause of their existence is something ad extra. Of external affections there are, according to Dr. Brown's arrangement, which we propose to follow, two orders ; viz. Order I. INCLUDING THE LESS DEFINITE EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS. This order of the external affections comprehends all those mental affections which result from certain states of OP THE MENTAL PHjENOMENA. O.^ any part of the material fabric, with the exception of tfie organs of sense. By the aid of this exception, we are enabled to distinguish them from sensations, properly so called, which as we shall shortly See, are states or mind ori- ginated by impressions upon the organs of sense. Dr. Brown, indeed, says, that tlie less definite external affec- tions are sensations^ as well as the more definite affections gf this division, because they arise from a certain state of the body. In using this language, however, he speaks in- cautiously. It is at variance with his own statements. An organ of sense is the external termination of a nerve which proceeds fi-om the brain, and is, indeed, an elongation of it. A sensation, as the word imports, is a mental affection arising from an affection of an organ of sense. A state of mind originated by an affection of any part of the body, which does not constitute an organ of sense, cannot then be a sensation ; though, as its cause is ad extra, it must be an external affection of mind. In this ojder of our feelings are to be classed, 1. Our various appetites, such as hijinger, thirst, (fcc. ; or rather, that '< elementary uneasiness,'* which constitutes a part of them ; for it must surely be apparent that these appetites are complex feelings ; that the appetite of hunger, for instance, consists of an uneasy feeling, and a desire to obtain relief from it. The elementary uneasiness is, doubt- less, the result of a certain state of the body ; and the accompanying desire of relief arises, by a law of the mind, which would certainly originate a similar feeling in any other case of want or suffering. There is nothing pecu- liar in the pain which constitutes one element of our appetites ; there is nothing peculiar in the desire which con- stitutes the other. Why then, should the pain and desire co-existing, be thought to require a particular designation, and to constitute what is called a power of mind in .this case, and not in others ? A man falls into a pit ; his situ- ation is painful ; it originates the desire of relief. Why should we not say he has the appetite of ascending, as well as that we have the appetite of hunger ? It will be replied, perhaps, that the complex feeling, denominated hunger, 84 ORDER I. recurs at regular intervals, and that, on this account, it ought to be regarded as being specifically distinct from any accidental case, in which there is an union of pain and desire. But what is the reason of this regular recurrence of the appetite ? Is it not that God has so formed the body* that it is, at these intervals, in that state which is necessary to the existence of the elementary uneasiness involved in appetite ? This we suppose will be admitted. And should it be so,. how can it be thought that that circumstance can impress a peculiar character upon the mental feeling itself? Suppose the individual, referred to a short time ago, should fall into the pit at regular intervals ; that the result should invariably be bodily pain, and desire of relief; would the circumstance of the accident happening habitually, and regularly, convert this complex mental feeling into an appetite ? This will not be pretended. And yet the reply of our opponents ought to be in the affirmative. Dr. Reid has admitted the correctness of the preceding analysis of appetite. " Every appetite," he says, " is ac- companied with an uneasy sensation proper to it ; in the appetite of hunger, for instance, there are two ingredients — an uneasy sensation, and a desire to eat, which arise and perish together." Surely, then, as there is nothing peculiar either in the pain or the desire, the former should be classed with our other sensations^ (L e, on his princi- ples,) and the latter with our other desires. Their habi- tual union produces no change in their nature, and cannot entitle the complex feeling to be considered as the result of a distinct and original power of the mind — the light in which it is represented by Dr. Reid. The circumstance which has operated, more than any other, to prevent the reception of the foregoing state- ments, is, that the desire is invariably and immediately successive to the uneasiness. We are apj, accordingly, to conceive of them as constituting but one feeling, or affec- tion of mind ; and this tendency is strengthened by the fact of their having received but one name. " In themselves they are, however, as different," says Dr. Brown, " as if no such succession took place ; as different as the pleasure of OF THE EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS. 85 music is from the mere desire of hearing it again ; or as the p^in of excessive heat, in burning, from the subse- quent desire of coolness. There is, therefore, no reason that we should consider the elementary pain itself as dif- ferent in kind from all our other pains ; it is evidently a sensation, as much as any other internal bodily pain that we feel ; a state or affection of the mind, arising immedi- ately and solely from a state or affection of thfe body, which is the only definition that can be given of a sensa- tion."* . It is not wished to discontinue the use of the word appetite. As the feelings which the term denotes recur at regular intervals, and are distinguished by that circum- stance from other co-existing pains and desires, it is con- venient to have a distinct name by which to designate them ; but we must guard against supposing that the term denotes an original power of. mind. I must not pass from this subject without noticiing the vague statements of Dr. Rjeid with regard to our appe- tites. " Every appetite," he says, " is accompanied with an uneasy sensation proper to it," i, e. the uneasy sensa- tion is not ' the appetite ; for the companion of a thing Cannot be the thing itself. He immediately adds, how- ever, " If we attend to the appetite of hunger, we shall find in it two ingredients, an uneasy sensation, and a de- sire to eat;" i. e. the uneasy sensation is the appetite, or a constituent part of it, and not its companion merely. An appetite then consists of two parts. And yet, he im- mediately adds, " that appetite in an infant is only one of these parts ;" for in them, he says, " there is no desire." And he concludes the whole with the words, " That the appetite of hunger includes the two ingredients I have menUoned, will not, I apprehend, be questioned!'''' though he had himself denied it but the moment before !t Mr. Stewart, in treating of appetites, says, " they take their rise from the body ; they are occasional ; they are accompanied with an uneasy sensation, &c." He does * Vidt p. 83. t Vol. III. pp. 145, 146. 86 .ORDER I. not directly state what they are ; but his language necessa- rily implies, that the uneasy sensation is not one of their ingredients. It would seem as if he considered the desire, of which Dr. Reid speaks, as constituting exclusively the appetite, — a sentiment which involves, unless there be a difference of judgment between him and Dr. Reid on the case of infants, the opinion, that infants are destitute of appetite altogether.* I have no doubt that the want of precision, which the statements of these writers occasionally display, results from their opinion of the comparative unimportance of mental analysis. Having specified several benevolent affections, Mr. Stewart says, " he does not state them as ultimate facts in our constitution — that several may be analyzed into the same general principles — but that this (notwithstanding the stress which has been sometimes laid upon it) is chiefly a.question of arrangement,'^''] This language argues, it is humbly conceived, an erroneous conception of the object of intellectual science. In phy- sical science " we endeavour to resolve the particular properties of bodies into the general qualities of matter." In like manner, we should aim, in intellectual science, to resolve particular states or affections of mind, into those '' simple and primitive laws, by which term we denote the most general circumstances in which the phaenomena are felt by us to agree." In other words, we should endea- vour to discover what are " ultimate facts," as Mr. Stew- wart calls them, in the mental constitution ; what are the " ingredients," if we may use that language, of indivi- dual states of mind ; what portions of these ingredients are common to other states, and what are peculiar to the individuals ; that we may thus arrive at the knowledge of the elements of Mind, as the chemist aims to discover the elements of the bodies by which he is surrounded in the world of matter. Mental science will remain compara- tively uninteresting and profitless, till more is attempted generally in the way of analysis, — a field of investigation, * r«Vf« Outlines, pp. 82, 83. t Ibid. p. 99. OF THE EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS. 87 into which, k is hoped, the splendid success of Dr. Brown will induce many to enter. What can be more barren than the statements of Mr. Stewart himself on the subject of appetite ? — a barrenness which is solely to be ascribed to the absence of all attempt to analyze. Appetites, he tells us, rise from the body — are occasional — are accom- panied with an uneasy sensation — are three in number, &c. — are not selfish — are both natural and acquired ! This is actually the amount of Mr. Stewart's section on this subject. It comprises all that can be said upon it, by any one who writes upon Mr. Stewart's principles, t. e, it tells us what we, and all men, most perfectly know. How different the statements even of Dr. Reid, and especially of Dr. Brown ! What we call an appetite is a complex feeling ; but its particular " ingredients," or parts, resolve themselves into the general properties of Mind, as the weight of gold resolves itself into the general quality of gravity. An appetite may be analyzed mto an uneasy feeling, and a desire to be delivered from it ; but there is nothing peculiar either in the pain or the desire. An ap- petite is not then an element — not a simple and original power of the mind — and has no title to be ranked amongst the number of its distinct susceptibilities. The wisdom and goodness of the Great Author of our frame, are especially apparent in the provision he has made for*the regular recurrence of that complex state of mind 10 which we give the name of appetite. We can illus- trate this statement in reference to one of them only. The waste of strength, to which the animal frame is ne- cessarily exposed, can only be repaired by a regular supply of nourishment adapted to its state and wants. Some means must, accordingly, be resorted to by the Creator, to secure the taking of this nourishment. Now, if the appe- tites of hunger and of thirst did not exist, what security could we possess that the fruits of his bounty would not be neglected ? What rule should we have to direct us what quantity of food to take, and how frequently ? '•Though a man knew," says Dr. Reid, "that his life must be supported by eating, reason could not direct 88 ORDER 1. • him when to eat^ or what ; how much, or- how ot'teri. In all these things, appetite is a much better guide than reason." Or, if it be admitted that experience might, in process of time, furnish a rule, would it not, in all probabi- lity, without the spur and impulse of appetite, be in dan- ger of constant violation? " Were reason only to direct us in this matter, its calmer voice would often be drowned in the hurry of business, or the charms of amusement. But the voice of appetite rises gradually, and at last becomes loud enough to call off our attention from any other employ- ment."* "If indeed," adds Dr. Brown, "the necessary supply were long neglected, the morbid state of the body which would ensue, though no pain of actual hunger were to be felt, would convince, at last, the sufferer of his folly. But the providence of our gracious Creator has not trusted the existence of man to the dangerous admonition of so rough a monitor, which might, perhaps, bring his folly be- fore him, only when it was too late to he wise. The pain of hunger — that short disease, which it is in our power so speedily to cure, prevents diseases that more truly deserve the name."t But eating is not the mere removal of pain or " disease ;" it is the source of pleasure : a circumstance which has been most properly referred to by Arch-deacon Paley, as an unequivocal manifestation of the goodness of God. "Assuming," says this luminous writer, "the necessity of food for the support of animal life, it is necessary that the animal be provided with the organs fitted for the procuring, receiving, and digesting of its prey. It may be necessary also that the animal be impelled by its sensations to exert its. organs. But the pain of hunger would do all this. Why add pleasure to the act of eating, sweetness and relish to food ? Why a new and appropriate sense for the perception of pleasure ? Why should the juice of a peach, applied to the palate, affect the part so differently from what it does when rubbed upon the palm of the hand ? This is a constitution which, as it appears to me. . ^ Ftrfe Vol. III. p. 147. Vol.1, p. 394. OP THE EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS. 89 call be resolved into nothing but the pure benevolence of the Creator. Eating is necessary ; but the pleasure at- tending it is not necessary ; it is superadded to what is strictly essential, and can only have flowed from the good- ness of God."* Should it be objected that this accomp anying pleasure exposes us to the danger of excess, it may be replied, that the Creator has provided against this, by rendering it painful to continue the supply of food, in any great pro- portion, after the demands of nature have been adequately satisfied. No better barrier of a moral nature (and moral agents must be ruled by moral means) could have been set up ; and, in most cases, it is sufficiently strong :so that to adopt the beautiful illustration of Dr. Brown, " Between satiety on the one hand, and want on the other, the stream of health flows tranquilly along, which, but for these boundaries, would speedily waste itself and disap- pear : as the most magnificent river, which, if dispersed over a boundless plain, would flow almost into nothing, owes its abundance and majestic beauty to the very banks which seem to confine its waters within too narrow a channel."! In the order of less definite external aflections, Dr. Brown classes, 2dly, Those affections of mind which result from certain conditions of any of the muscles of the body : for though we find it difliicult to ascribe them to any local organ ( on which account they ought not to be called sensations,)| yet they require for their immediate antecedents certain states of some part or parts of the animal frame, and there- fore are external affections, ?*. e. states of mind pro- duced by certain states of the body. To this class belong Muscular pleasures. In early life^ the constant and ra- pid action of the muscles is a source of high gratification ; it forms, indeed, a chief part of the delight which is experi- enced by the young of all species of living beings. "They seem to me," says Paley, " to receive pleasure simply from 'P Vide Nat. Theol. pp.518, 519. t Page 394. % Vide p. a3. 12 90 ORDER II. the exercise of tlieir limbs, and bodily faculties, without reference to any end to be attained, or any me to be answered by the exertion."* In middle age, it is from less violent muscular action that pleasure can be derived ; and in advanced life, repose becomes to us, bending under the weight of years, what alacrity and action are to us in child, hood. Muscular pains ^ also, belong to this class. The motion of any limb, to which the action of many muscles is neces- sary, cannot be continued for a considerable length of time without great uneasiness : and few feelings are more distressing than that which is occasioned by muscular re- laxation, after the parts had been long kept in a s tate of tension. The acute pain, accompanying our return to an upright position, after long-continued stooping, has been experienced by all. To the same class, also. Dr. Brown refers the various organic feelings which constitute the animal pleasure of good health, when every corporeal function is exercised in just degree. " This pleasure," he justly observes, " is cer- tainly more, even at all times, than mere freedom from pain, though it is experienced with the greatest zest, after the habit of enjoyment has been long broken by disease." Order II. OP THE EXTERNAL AFPECTIONS, COMPRISING OUR SENSATIONS. It is impossible to suggest a better definition of the word Sensations, than that which is given us by Dr. Brown. " Sensations," says he, " are those states of mind, however various they may be, which immediately succeed the changes of state produced in any of our organs of sense, by the presence of external objects." The definition takes it for granted, it will be observed, that we have a body, and bodily organs, and that there are external objects to act upon thom ; i, e. it takes for granted the existence of an external world. In what manner our knowledge and belief of something external to our own minds arise, will ■■■ Nat. TheoL pp. 492, 3. ALL SENSATION IN THE MIND. 91 be shown afterward. It. is merely necessary now to observe that the term sensation includes only that class of our feelings which are conceived by us to result from the influence of something ad extra. Assuming, then, as we do for the present, the existence of the body, and the organs of sense, the best mode of classifying our sensations is, to arrange those together which are received through the medium of the same or- gan ; for though there may, perhaps, be sensations of the same sense, which differ from each other as widely as others which are received through different channels, " if we quit," as Dr. Brown says, " that obvious line of dis- tinction, which the difference of organs affords, we shall not find it easy to define them by other lines as precise." It will, therefore, be necessary to consider separately the sensations of Smell, Taste, Hearing, Touch, and Sight : before we proceed to do this, however, it will be expedient to lay before the reader some general remarks with reference to the nature and process of Sensation. I. Our first observation then is, that all sensation is in the mind. Were not this the case, it would not be the object of intellectual science ; it is, accordingly, affirmed in the definition adopted from Dr. Brown, that sensations are those states of mind^ :f- PERCEPTION EXPLAINED. 119 I answer, that this perception of the rose, of which they imagine themselves the subjects, is either the particular sensation of sight which the rose produces ; or the refer- ence of this sensation to something external as its cause, which is known to be present by the existence of the sensa- tion, and which is onhj known as the cause of the sensation. The child, it is admitted, before he has gained more knowledge than can be derived from the sense of sight, does not see the rose in the sense which we now attach to to the words. Were it not for the sense of touch, it is fur- ther admitted, we should never see the rose in our present sense of the terms. The result of the presence of a rose would be a mere sensation, the cause of which would never be imagined to be any thing external. Such is not the perception of a rose now ; because the sense of touch, or muscular sensation, has given us the knowledge of some- thing without us ; and experience has taught us that when certain sensations exist, certain external bodies are pre- sent to the organs, and, therefore, we refer the sensations to these bodies as their causes. With the sensations of touch, however, or with the mus- cular sensations, which for the present I do not distinguish from each other, I admit that there is connected an intui- tive belief in the existence of things external. It will, ac- cordingly, be perhaps contended, that we have here per- ception in the sense which Dr. Reid attached to the term. Let us examine this subject a little more fully. An external body is brought, we shall suppose for the first time, into contact with the organ of touch. It pro- duces its appropriate sensation. That sensation suggests the notion of something out of the mind. It is not only believed to have a cause, but it is referred intuitively to something external as its cause. What can perception, in this case, be more than this intuitive reference ? It will be replied, perhaps, that, along with this intuitive reference, there arises, by a law of the mind, the notion of extension, figure, hardness, &c. ; — that this notion is the perception of these qualities, and pre-supposes an original power of mind, to which the same name (perception) is 120 THE NATURE OF given, by which it is rendered capable of forming the notion. Now if it be granted that such notions do arise, (though it may be doubted whether our conceptions of hardness, roundness, &c. &c. include any thing more than a notion, in each case, that there is something external which produces the sensations we experience when we touch a hard and a round body : so that our conceptions of the primary qualities may not be essentially different from the notions we have of the secondary qualities of mat- ter,) it is maintained, that they arise in the same way with our belief that the whole is greater than its part — or that the order of nature will remain the same ; and that we might with as much propriety ascribe our belief, in the cases just mentioned, to the power of perception, as our notions of extension, figure, &c. It may be further ob- served, also, that if the term Perception be regarded as denoting these notions, there can be no perception by the other senses ; for, according to Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart's own account of the matter, we have no notion, in this sense, of the secondary qualities ; we only know them as causes of peculiar sensations ; L e. we have no notion of them, but of their relations,''^ Let it be also recollected, in addition to what has been said, that, whatever be the nature of our notions of hardness, extension, form, &c., they are not the qualities themselves — that there can be nothing in the mind but conceptions or notions of the qualities — that the qualities cannot in the nature of things, bear any resemblance whatever to the notions, &c. ; from all which it follows, that the primary qualities are only known as the antecedents or causes of certain -sensations and notions; i, e. they are not known absolutely, but relatively only. In thus stating the opinion, however, that perception is not a simple and original power of the mind — that the word denotes merely the reference we make of our sensa- tions to something external as their cause, I agree with Dr. Brown, to whom we are indebted for the most enlight- cned views upon this subject, in thinking, that it is not desirable to erase the word from our metaphysical vocabu- lary. " On the contrary," he adds, " I conceive it to be a TERCEPTION EXPLAINED. 121 very convenient one, if the meaning attached'to it be suffi- ciently explained, by an analysis of the complex state of mind which it denotes ; and the Ose of it confined rigidly to cases in which it has this meaning. Sensation may exist without any reference to an external cause, in the same manner as we may look at a book without thinking of the author; — or it may exist with reference to an external cause ; and it is convenient, then, to confine the term sen- sation to the former of these cases, and perception to the latter.'"** There is, accordingly, no object in sensation, in this sense of the word ; i. e, no reference is made to the cause of the feeling. In Perception there is an object ; f. c. in perception such a reference is made, and by this, and this alone, it is distinguished from sensation. Before proceeding to the last general remark concern- ing sensation, it may be proper to give an account of some of the difliculties in which the more ancient writers on the subject of perception were involved — difficulties with which they could not have been perplexed, had they entertained juster and simpler views of its nature. It is not easy, in- deed, to state what were the precise ideas they entertained in reference to perception ; the probability is, that there was nothing very definite in their conceptions. The lan- guage they employ is analogical, and grossly material. One thing, however, is tolerably certain, viz. that they imagined that, in perception, matter acts in some way upon mind, or mind upon matter, or that there is a mutual and reciprocal operation of matter and mind. Out of this opinion arose, as it appears to me, the absurd doctrine of perception by images. Of this doctrine, I shall^rs^ give a brief account ; secondly^ exhibit its connexion with the •assumed axiom on which it was made to rest ; and thirdly^ present the reader with a few of those remarks upon it, which the present advanced state of the science of mental philosophy enables us to make. The doctrine itself may be stated in a very few words. The objects by which we are surrounded, are continually » Vide Vol. TT. p. 47. 16 122 THE SUPPOSED AXlOxVf throwing ofi' certain shadowy films, or resemblances of themselves, called anciently species, forms, phantasms, ttc, and, in more modera times, ideas, or by Mr. Hume, impressions. These species of phantasms, coming in contact with the organs of sense, are by them transmit- ted to the brain, on which, as it seems to have been ima- gined, they impress an image of themselves, or of external objects. I have said, it seems to have been imagined, because it is in some measure doubtful whether they con- ceived the image to be impressed upon the mind, or the brain, or upon both. It is certain however, that these species, or the impressions made by them, were regarded by ancient writers as the immediate, i. e, real objects in perception ; and that, when they talked of perceiving exter- nal objects, they intended their language to be understood metaphorically, as we may be said to perceive an absent friend when we look on his picture. " Plato," says Dr. Reid, " illustrates our manner of perceiving the objects of sense in this manner. He supposes a dark subterraneous cave, in which men lie bound in such a manner, that they can direct their eyes only to one part of the cave. Far behind them is a light, some rays of which come over a wall to that part of the cave which is before the eyes of our prisoners. A number of persons, variously employed, pass between them and the light, whose shadows are seen by the prisoners, but not the prisoners themselves." This statement abundantly confirms the assertion made a short time ago, that the language of the ancient philoso- phers on this subject is analogical, and grossly material. It is impossible to reflect upon it without feeling that they must have conceived of the mind as possessing eyes like the body ; and, further, that the mind perceives an object by looking at it. And there is strong ground to think that some modern philosophers, of great name, opposed, as they imagine themselves to be, to the old Peripatetics, have not entirely delivered themselves from the influence of this false analogy. The connexion of this view of perception with the as- sumed axiom, that nothing can act where it is not, i& manifest. The invention of these phantasms was a con- ON WHICH THEY WERE BUILT. Iii3 trivance to destroy, not so much the distance between the senses and the object, which Dr. Brown alleges, as the distance between the object and the percipient mind ; that there might be that mutual action of matter and mind which they deemed essential to perception. The following statements will show this. " I suppose," says Malebranche, " that every one will grant, that we per- ceive not the objects that are without us immediately and of themselves. We see the sun, the stars, and an infinity of objects without us ; and it is not at all likely that the soul sallies out of the body, and, as it were, takes a walk through the heavens, to contemplate all those objects. She sees them not, therefore, by themselves ; and the im- mediate object of the mind, when it sees the sun, for ex- ample, is not the sun, but something which is intimately united to the soul ; and it is that which 1 call an idea. So that, by the word idea, I understand nothing else here but that which is the immediate object, or nearest to the mind, when we perceive any object. It ought to be care- fully observed, that, in order to the mind's perceiving any object, it is absolutely necessary that the idea of that object be actually present to it. Of this it is not possible to doubt. The things which the soul perceives are of two kinds. They are either in the soul, or without the soul. Those that are in the soul are its own thoughts ; that is to say, all its different modifications. The soul has no need of ideas for perceiving them. But with regard to things without the mind, we cannot perceive them but by means of ideas." " How body acts upon mind, or mind upon body," says Dr. Porterfield, " I know not ; but this 1 am very certain of, that nothing can act, or be acted upon, where it is not ; and, therefore, our mind can never perceive any thing but its own proper modifications, and the various states of the sensorium to which it is present. So that it is not the external sun and moon which are in the heavens, which our mind perceives ; but only their images or repre- sentations impressed upon the sensorium. How the soul of a seeing man sees these images, or how it receives those 1*24 THE SUPPOSED AXIOM ideas from such agitations in the sensorium, I know not ; but 1 am sure it can never perceive the external bodies themselves, to vi^hich it is not present."* These extracts sufficiently explain the notions concern- ing perception, which were formerly entertained by philosophers, and the reasons which led to their adop- tion. " Whatever difficulties the hypothesis of species involved," says Dr. Brown, " it at least seemed to remove the supposed difficulty of perception at a distance, and by the half spiritual tenuity of the sensible images, seemed also to affi)rd a sort of intermediate link for the connexion of matter with mind."t This theory of perception by images, together with all its connected absurdities, it ought to be observed, had partly given place to more rational conceptions before the time of Dr. Reid, whose writings demolished the crazy fabric altogether. Dr. Brown indeed affirms, that, from the time of the decay of the Peripatetic philosophy, the opinions of the very men whom Dr. Reid considered him- self opposing, were precisely the same with his own ; that he has been misled, by understanding in a literal sense what they understood in a figurative sense, and so has maintained a sort of "windmill contest" with metaphors only •, and, beyond all question, he does produce passages from the writings of Des Cartes, Locke, and others, which seem to bear him out in his assertions. It is necessary, however, to put one statement in the balance against another ; and any one who does this carefully, will be dis- posed, I apprehend, to think that sufficient justice has scarcely been done to Dr. Reid ; ^hat more darkness hung over the minds of men, on this subject, than Dr. Brown is disposed to allow. Mr. Welsh conceives it quite indis- putable, " that the language of Locke is merely meta- phorical ;" the statements, however, of the former, seem only to prove that they were occasionally so ; and the fol- lowing extract from Dr. Price's Review proves, beyond all question, that the old theory of images had by no means * Vide Reid's Essays, Vol. I. pp. 289, 290. t ^«^« Vol. II. p. 107. OF PECEPTION BY IMAGES. I5i5 entirely disappeared. " External objects themselves not being present, if perceived, they must be perceived by ideas of them. Nor will it follow from hence, that we can have no assurance of the existence of external ob- jects. All ideas imply the possibility of the existence of correspondent objects ; and our belief of the actual ex- istence of the objects of sense, we may resolve (as Dr. Reid does) into impressions on our senses, forcing belief at the moment of the impression in a manner we cannot explain. And this may be done to more advantage on the supposition of ideas, than without it. For scepticism seems to be less favoured by supposing, that in perception by our senses there is something distinct from the mind, and independent of it, really perceived,- than by supposing that there is nothing then perceived."* Upon the whole doctrine of perception by images, the following remarks are submitted : — First, that, in relation to many objects of perception, it implies a manifest absurdity. " If vision," says Dr. Brown, " had been our only sense, we might, perhaps, have under- stood, at least, what was meant by the species that directly produce our visual images. But what is the phantasm of a sound or an odour ?" We perceive, according to this doctrine, by means of all the senses ; and yet by none of the senses is it possible to perceive, but by the sense of sight. Secondly, that, in relation to visual objects, it is a mere hypothesis. What proof have we that an image of such objects even as will admit of an image, is formed in the brain ? " The brain," says Dr. Reid, " has been dis- sected, times innumerable, by the nicest anatomists — every part of it examined by the naked eye, and with the help of microscopes ; but no vestige of an image of any external object was ever found. The brain seems to be the most improper subject that can well be imagined for receiving or retaining images, being a soft, moist, medul- lary substance."! * Vide Price, Note C. pp. 481, 482. t Vol. I. p. 149. I'M REMARKS UPON THE DOCTRINE And further, it may be asked, What proof have we even of the existence of the species themselves^ by which the images in the brain are supposed to be formed ? Has any man ever seen them ? Has any one ever been conscious of them ? This is not pretended. The only thing like argument in the support of their existence is derived from the assumption, that nothing can act where it is not ; and that this assumption is a false one, will, it is hoped, speedily appear. The whole doctrine of perception by images is, therefore, nothing but a fiction, or an hypothesis ; " and men," says Dr. Reid, "then only begin to have a true taste in philosophy, when they have learned to hold hypo- theses in just contempt, and to consider them as the reve- ries of speculative men, which will never have any simili- tude to the works of God." Thirdly^ that, as an hypothesis, it is useless in relation to the great purpose for which it was invented. It leaves any supposed difficulty on the subject of perception just where it found it. For supposing the monstrous absurdity, that there are images of sounds, smells, &c. as well as of colour and form, could be disposed of; and that we were to allow that, by some mysterious process (a process which, on their own principles, must be as mysterious as percep- tion itself,) they niiake their way to the brain, and impress the likeness of themselves upon that member ; what real progress should we have made in explaining the phgeno- mena of perception ? It was to destroy the distance be- tween the object of perception and the mind, that the ex- pedient of species, or images, was resorted to. But if the brain, on which the image is supposed to be formed, and the mind, are not in contact with each other, it is manifest that the distance is not destroyed after all. The image is not where the mind is : and, therefore, Malebranche and others have still the main difficulty to solve, how the image in the brain acts upon the mind (or the mind upon the image, for it is difficult to say which was regarded as the agent in perception) where it is not. We cannot wonder that Dr. Porterfield should say, " How the soul of a seeing OF PERCEPTION BY IMAGES. 1*27 man sees these images I know not ;" for, if it be true that nothing can act where it is not, — and if it be fur- ther true, that in perception there is an action of matter upon mind, or of mind upon matter, — it is obviously as impossible for the soul of a seeing inan to see an image of the sun in the brain, as to perceive the sun itself, at the distance of nearly a hundred millions of miles. Should it be said, with a view to obviate this difficulty, that the soul resides in the brain, so that the image of an external object in the brain is present to the soul ; I would ask what is meant by this language. We know what we are to understand by the assertion, that one portion of matter is present to another ; the phrase imports that the two are, according to ordinary conception, in contact ; but how can these ideas be applied to such opposite existences as the soul and the body ? How can a material substance be present to, or in contact with, an immaterial one ? Besides, if any notion could be formed of the con- tact of mind and matter, how would this diminish the sup- posed difficulty of perception ? " Two things may be in contact without feeling or perception." " This power of perceiving ideas," says Dr. Reid, " is as inexplicable as any of the powers explained by it. And the contiguity of the object contributes nothing at all to make it better under- stood ; because there appears no connexion between conti- guity and perception, but what is grounded on prejudices drawn from some imagined similitude between mind and body."* The only way of apparent escape from the pressure of this difficulty, is to contend that these phantasms, or spe- cies, produce directly upon the mind, and not upon the brain, images of themselves. But to do this is to plunge still deeper into the regions of mystery and nonsense. For how can an image of that which has parts exist in an indi- visible essence like the mind ? Surely the notion of an image, in the mind, must have appeared to the Peripate- tics themselves as great an absurdity, as that any thing * Vol. I. pp. 305, 6. ■ 1128 THE DOCTRINE BUILT UPON should act where it is not, had their attention been fairly directed towards it. Fourthly^ that the assertion just referred to, viz. " nothing can act where it is not," so far from deserving to be re- garded as an axiom, is a mere assumption, for which there is no proof whatever. It has been too long the custom of philosophers to regard it as a self-evident proposition. Dr. Reid himself declares his conviction that its truth must be admitted ; and, for a reason which does not appear to pos- sess much weight, even on his own notions of power, " That nothing," says he, " can act where it is not, must I think be admitted ; for J agree with Sir Isaac Newton, that power without substance is inconceivable."* But power residing in a substance, though it should operate beyond the boundaries of that substance, is not, it is obvi- ous to reply, power without substance. Conceding, however, what he does to the old philoso- phers. Dr. Reid is constrained to deny that in perception there is any action of matter upon mind, or of mind upon matter, — a denial on which some very powerful animad- versions are made by a writer in the Encyclopcedia Bri- tannica^ though they do not appear to be grounded on the most enlightened principles ; for the action of one body upon another, can mean no more than that it is the imme- diate antecedent of some change in that other body ; and that there is, in this sense, a mutual action of matter and mind, is undoubted. A certain change, for instance, in the external organ, or the central brain, is immediately fol- lowed by a change in the state of the mind ; i, e. in the only intelligible sense of the words, matter acts upon mind. Again a certain volition of the mind, is instantly followed by an action of some part of the muscular frame ; L e, mind acts upon matter. Dr. Reid, however, is driven to the necessity of denying either that the mind, in perception, acts upon the object, or the object upon the mind, as the only way of escape from all the absurdities of the ideal philosophy. He is ♦ Vol. I. p. 290. AN ASSUMED AXIOMS 129 driven to it, as we have seen, by hi& unnecessary admis- sion of the truth of the pretended axiom to which we now refer. And I call it an unnecessary admission, since it is as impossible to conceive how two bodies, in a state of junction, act upon each other, (whatever sense we attach to the term action — even if we use it in Dr. Rcid's sense, which seems to include something more than immediate antecedence,) as to explain the fact when they are in a state of separation 5 and, therefore, we have no more right to pronounce the latter to be impossible than the former. In fact, all the evidence of experience goes to prove that, in order to action, it is not necessary that two bodies be in a state of junction or contact. The sun attracts the earth — the earth the sun ; the moon raises the tides, and alters the relative position of every atom upon the face of our globe ; and yet the sun is not where the earth is — the earth is not where the moon is. In fact there is not, as we have good reason to think, one single atom of matter in the whole universe in contact with another atom ; and yet the principle of attraction pervades all, 1. e. matter acts where it is not. There is no possible way, then, of supporting the credit of this pretended axiom, but to deny that any portion of matter can be properly said to act upon another, — to main- tain that all the motions and changes in the material world are, in fact, effected by spirit, not body, — that God, in other words, is the only agent in the physical universe. Nor is it certain that even this will answer the purpose; for it is as difficult, as we have seen, to say the least of it, to conceive how spirit can be present with matter, as how one particle of matter can be present to another. That the great Being who formed the universe is so far present every where, as that his knowledge and power pervade all times, and all places, is a truth of which we can form a tolerably clear conception ; but to talk of his being present in the sense of the metaphysicians, when they say that matter can neither act, nor be acted upon, where it is not, is to get far beyond our depth, and to utter words which, while they reach the ear, convey no idea to the understanding. 17 130 THE DOCTRINE BUILT UfOS The preceding reasoning is valid, whatever sense vi^e at* tach to the term action ; but if, when we employ the phrase " one body acts upon another," the meaning is merely that it produces a change in the state of that other body, I can see, for my part 1 acknowledge, no plausible reason for supposing that the junction of the two bodies is necessary for the production of such an effect. It is just as easy to Divine power so to constitute the sun and the earth, as that a change should take place in the latter, when brought into a certain relative position with reference to the former, though at the distance from it of 95,000,000 of miles, as if the two were in actual contact. Our feelings are apt to deceive us on this subject, in consequence of the circumstance that most of the changes which we witness are produced among bodies in seeming contact with eacli other. We should remember, however, that this contact is only a seeming contact, (in fact, if it were real, the change would be equally unaccountable) ; and that there are cases of influence in which even apparent contact does not exist, — such, for instance, as the mutual attraction of the earth, and the heavenly bodies ; — a fact which nonplusses the fol- lowers of the old philosophy, (the supposition of any thing intervening between the earth and moon does not destroy the difficulty, for still there is no contact,) and fairly com- pels them to acknowledge their ignorance, or draws from them a more than ordinary portion of nonsense and absur- dity. The time is not far distant, let us hope, when this nostrum of the dark ages will descend to the grave of all the Capulets, whither it should have gone long ago. Fifthly, that the whole doctrine of perception by images is built on a radically mistaken conception of the nature of perception, giving existence to difficulties, as we have seen, Vi'hich could not have been fancied even to exist, with more correct views of its nature. For if perception be neither more nor less than the reference, either instinctive or otherwise, which we make of our sensations to some- thing external, as the causes to which they owe their exist- ence, it is manifestly attended with no more difficulty to refer them to something distant, than to something near. A GRATUITOUS AXIOM. 131 When the finger approaches a candle, and we feel its heat, we refer the sensation of warmth to the candle. In like manner, when basking in the heat of the sun, we refer the sensation we feel to the solar rays as its cause. There is as much difficulty in the one case as in the other, and no more ; i, e. there is, in neither case, no difficulty at all. VII. The Seventh and last general observation with re- ference to sensation is, that it is that power which connects us with the external world ; and that to it may be ulti- mately traced all the knowledge of which we are pos- sessed. " The philosophers," says Mr. Stewart, " who endea- voured to explain the operations of the human mind by the theory of ideas, and who took for granted, that in every exertion of thought there exists in the mind some object distinct from the thinking substance, were naturally led to inquire whence these ideas derive their origin ; in particu- lar, whether they are conveyed to the mind from without, by means of the senses, or from part of its original fur- niture."* While ideas continued to be regarded as little images in the mind, distinct both from the mind and the object, it is not wonderful that, with regard to 7nany of them at least, the latter opinion was generally held. It must have been so difficult to show in what manner a very considerable number could have entered by the senses, or been produced by reflection, that it was at any rate the easiest mode to say, with Des Cartes, that they are innate. Mr. Locke raised hi^ voice against the doctrine of innate ideas, maintaining that all may be traced to sensation, or reflection. He insists that the mind has no original furni- ture of this description, — that all our ideas of external objects enter by means of the senses ; and that the rest are obtained from what he calls the perception of the opera- tions of our own minds, employed about the ideas it has got. These ideas, thus acquired, " the understanding," he says, " has the power to compare, unite, &c, so as to make '^ Vol. I. p. 94. 132 THK ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS. at pleasure new complex ideas ; but it has not the power to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the way before mentioned."* These notions of Locke, after prevailing for a time, were assailed by Leibnitz and Shaftesbury, who insist that many things are innate to the mind, particularly the intellectual powers themselves, and the simple ideas which are neces- sarily unfolded by their exercise. On this statement it has been well observed, that " a part of it is doubtless true, though the truth is so obvious that it may perhaps be safely affirmed that Mr. Locke never dreamed of denying it. That our faculties, as conception, memory, and the like, are not ideas acquired by sensation or reflection, is just as plain as that the powers of perceiving and reflecting are not so acquired. It is mere trifling to say that Mr. Locke has not marked the distinction. Pie was not bound to mark it. It is involved of necessity in the statement of his theory. For the rest, by what sort of logic is it that ideas, unfolded by the exercise of the faculties, can be shown to be innate ?" The views of Mr. Stewart differ materially from those of Locke. He supposes that sensation and conscious- ness, or reflection, furnish what he calls the occasions on which the mind is first led to form those simple notions into which our thoughts may be analyzed, and which may be considered as the principles or elements of human knowledge — that the sensations, received by means of the external senses, furnish the occasions for instance, on which the intellectual faculty forms the notion of sounds, smells, flavours, colours, &c. ; since the -notions are confined to those who are possessed of these senses — thatthe exer- cise of the mental faculties furnishes the occasions, in like manner, on which the ideas of reflection (according to Locke's classification) — such, for example, as those of- time, motion, personal identity, &c. are formed; to the existence of which notions, or ideas, the exercise of the respective faculty is indispensable — and that since sensa- * Fide Bool? II. Chap, i, ii. DOCTRINE OF LOCKE, STEWART, &C. 133 tion originates this exercise of the mental faculties, all our ideas may, in the sense explained above, be referred to it. In answering the question, whether all our knowledge may be ultimately traced from our sensations, he replies in the affirmative; but says it implies nothing more " than that the impressions made upon our senses, by external ob- jects, furnish the occasions on which the mind, by the laws of its constitution, is led to perceive the qualities of the external world, and to exert all its intellectual faculties." " Agreeably to this explanation of the doctrine," he adds, "it may undoubtedly be said with plausibility (and I am inclined to believe with truth) that the occasions on which all our notions are formed, are furnished either immedi- ately, or ultimately, by sense." The amount of Mr. Stewart's statements seems to be, that the exercise of the mental faculties, — as for instance, memory, abstraction, reason,