^•Til^DNVSOl^ ■^Ail3AINn-3WV^ ^OF-CAIIFO% ^OF-CAIIFO/?^ ^ ... ^WtUNIVERy//, o '^Aa3AiNn-3WV^ ^lOSANCEtfj> o ^^^ ■ %avaan-# ^^Aavaan-# ^j:?i3dnysoi^ %a3AiNn-3WV .^WEUNIVER% I %a3AINa-3WV^ ^ILIBRARYOc. ^^lllBRARY^/- ^&Aavaan# ^(?Aavaan-i^ .viT.IIDDAOV/). vit.llRDADV/l^ .jnc.Aurrifp 3| %\^^g ^j:^13dnvsoi^ ?^. ^4.0FCA[IF0% .^WE•UNIVER5•//i ;lOSANCElfx^ -^l-LIBRARYQ/r ■^AagAiNrt-avw^ ^> "^aBAINH-aWV' ^OFCAL1FO%. ^OFCAilFO% ^> %Qi\mi^'^ ^WEllNIVERy/A o ;,OFCALIF0% AWEUNIVERi//i ^lOSAVCElfj^ o ^ ^OF-CAL!FO«i^ # "^^Aavjianx^ %313dnvsoi=<^ '^/saaAiNnawv^ '^^Aavaaiii'^ ^vlOSANCElfj-^ "^AaaAiNa-awv^ .^ ^lOSANCElfj;> ^tUBRARYQ^ ^ILIBRARYQ^^ "^aaAiNaawv^ >&Aavaaii# ^^Aavaani^ .5i\EUNIVER% oe ^^ ^ - ^J^3DNVS01^ AWEUNIVER5'/a ^^il30NVSQl^ ^tir iuii«frnr>. inc iitrti r. .r iinnAnvM. THE RISINGS ON THE North-West Frontier. Being a complete narrative, with specially prepared maps, of the various risings of the Frontier Tribes in the Tochi Valley, the Swat Valley, the Country of the Mohmands and Mamunds, and the Country of the Afridis and Orakzai ; and of the several punitive cam- paigns undertaken against these tribes, as well as the two minor expeditions sent against the Utman Khels and the BunervA/als: the whole covering a period ex- tending from the niiddle of June 1897 to the end of January, 1898. (Compiled from the Special War Correspondence of the "Pioneer") a 1 1 a b a b a D j^r^INTED AND J^UBLISHED AT THR j^lONEER j^P.ESS 18&8 CONTENTS. stack Annex s INTRODUCTION. The Area of Disturbanxe. PART I. The Rising in the Tochi Valley. Chapter. I. — The Maizar Outrage II. — The Official Account III.— The Pimitive Expedition I V. — The Work of Destruction Page. 1-9 10- 17 18 — 22 23—27 PART II. The Rising in the Swat Valley, I.— The Attack on the Malakand II. — The Situation in the Swat Country III. — Renewed Attacks on the Malakand IV.— The Malakand Field Force V, — The Relief of Chakdara ... — VI. — Further events in the Swat Country VII. — The Action at Landaki VIII. — Concluding Operations in the Swat Valley 29-33 34-37 38-44 45—47 48-51 52-54 55-58 59-63 2017207 11 PART III. The Rising of the Mohmands and the Mamunds. Chapter. I. — The Raid on Shabkadr Fort ... II.— Prompt Reprisals III. — The Mohmand Expedition IV. — With General Jeffreys's Brigade ,,, V. — With General Wodehouse's Brigade VI. — With General Elles's Division VII. — Further Operations against the Mamunds Page. 65-68 69—74 75-79 80 — 90 91—94 95-98 99 — 106 PART IV. The Rising of the Afridis and the Orakzai. I. — The Brewing of the Storm ... ... • ... 107 — 112 II. — The Capture of the Khyber Forts by the Afridis ... 113 — 116 III. — The Rising of the Orakzai ... ... ... 117 — 123 IV. — The Relief of the Kurram Valley Forts ... ... 224 — 131 v.— The Attack on our Samana Forts — Saragheri and Gulistan, 132— 142 VI. — The Tirah Punative Expedition ,„ ... ... 143 — 149 VII.— The Attitude of the Amir ... ... ... 150—157 VIII. — Crossing the Samana — The Capture and Abandonment of Dargai ... ... ... .. ... 15S— 166 IX. — The Re-capture of Dargai— Gallantry of the Gordons ... 167 — 173 X. — Lifting the Purdah from Tirah ... ..^ ... 174 — 1S4 XI. — Guerilla Warfare — a Heavy Casualty List ... ... 185 — 199 XII. — The Plan of Campaign further developed ... ... 200-210 XIII.— The Plan of Campaign completed ... ... ... 211—227 X.IV.— The Re-occupation of the Khyber and the Expedition into the Bazar Valley ... ... ... ... 22S— 238 Ill TART V. Two Minor Expeditions. Chapter. I.— The Utman Khel Expedition II. The Expedition against the Bunerwals Page. ... 239—244 ... 245-250 APPENDICES. I.— The Rewards for Maizar 11.— The Tochi Field Force III.— The Tochi Valley Despatches ... IV.— The Malakand and Swat Valley Despatches v.— The Mohmand and Mamund Despatches ... VI.— The Tirah Field Force VII.— The Samana and Kurram Valley Despatches VIII.— The Tirah Despatches ..„ ...■ IX. — Casualty List ... ... Page. i & ii iii — V vi — vii viii — xvi xvii — xxvi xxvii — XXXV xxxvi — xliii xliv — Ixii Ixiii ><- /^ Scale— English Mil 1 Punjab proper and tribal lerritor/. ODo o a t a Proposed Halliffay tines, -x-x-x-/" rarious tracts of country inhsbiisd by tfie different tribes. —Indicates tlie boundary between the -x-x- X- roughly demarcates tha INTRODUCTION. THE AREA OF DISTURBANCE. I N the extent of the area aftected, more obviously than in any other respect, the Indian Frontier disturbances of 1897-98 differ from all previous border troubles. From Waziristan on the left to Bimer on the right a stretch of more than 400 miles of our border- land, inhabited, as Sir George White said in a speech at the United Service Club in Simla, by 200,000 first-rate fighting men, has been involved in the outbreak, and the dates of the various risings indicate an identity of design and a unity of purpose never before discernible in the history of frontier disturbances. " The disturbed area on the true frontier, namely, the one which we guard and protect," wrote Sir Robert Low in an article in the National Review, "commences with the mountains on the right bank of the Indus near Dirbund, where the river emerges from the hills into the plains. From this point the frontier line follows the line of mountains: it takes a long sweep to the north and then bends round to the west and south, enclosing the Peshawar Valley, and it completes a rough semicircle at Kohat. From Kohat our frontier goes west to Thull and then north-west up to the head of the Kurram Valley. The tribes which immediately face us on this frontier line, commencing at the top of the semicircle at Dirbund, on the Indus, are, taking them in their order, the Bunerwals, the Swats, the Utman Khels, and the Mohmunds; then come the Khyber Pass and the Afridis, and lastly, on the northern flank of the road from Kohat to Thull, the Orakzai. There are many other minor tribes and sections of the larger ones with different names, but to mention them is only confusing. The above are our immediate neighbours, and are the ( vi ) prinoijml tribes, and they led the others with tliem to a great extent in such risings as we are dealing with. " Our positions for the defence of this line, — (prior to the outbreak) — taking them from the top of the semicircle, have been ' Hoti Mardan,' the head-quarters of the Corps of Guides ; in advance of it in the hills the Malakand position with its outpost at Chakdara; then, further round the semicircle, the forts of Abazai, Shabkudhr and Michni, and then Peshawar with its outpost of Jamrood guarding the entrance of the Khyber Pass ; then, crossing the spur of the hills which run down towai'ds the river Indus, we come to the station of Kohat with its out- posts on the road to the Kurram "Valley at Hangu and ThuU, and the flanking position of Fort Lockhart and minor posts on the Samana Eange. These posts were all occupied by troops or police, while beyond them, the road to Chitral, the Khyber Pass, and the Kurram Valley were held by tribal levies." The map facing the first page aflFords a comprehensive view of the whole affected area. The actual tribal outbreaks and their dates were as follows: — The Maizar outrage on the 10th of June ; the attack on the Mala- kand and Chakdara positions on the 27th July; the attack on Shab- kudhr on the 9th August : the threatening attitude of the Af ridis and Orakzai on the 18th August, and the attack on the Khyber Pass on the 23rd August. Thereafter the narrative of events turns from tribal aggression, and follows the punitive operations of the Goverumeut of India's forces. ><■ PART I. THE TOCHI VALLEY AFFAIR. PART I. THE TOCHI VALLEY AFFAIR. CII AFTER I. THE MAIZAR OUTRAGE. The Fi'ontier disturbances of 1897 began, as has been briefly shown, on the 10th of June, when a startling outrage was committed on a British party in the Tochi Valley. Naturally enough the first account of the affair which reached head-quarters in India from the Tochi gave but scanty details, but it was unfortunately certain that the casualty list was a heavy one ; tliree British Officers, twenty-two men of the native ranks and two followers being killed, while three other British Officers and twenty-four men were wounded. The three Officers killed were Colonel A. C. Bunny, 1st Sikhs, Captain J. F. Browne, R.A., and Lieutenant H. A. Cruickshank, E,A,, both of No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery ^ while the wounded were Lieutenant A. J. M. Higgiusou and Surgeon-Captain C. C. Cassidy of the 1st Sikhs, and Lieutenant C. L. Seton-Browne, 1st Punjab Infantry. It appeared that Mr. Gee, Political Officer in the Tochi Valley, left Datta Khel on the morning of the 10th June, with an escort of 300 men from the 1st Sikhs and 1st Punjab Infantry, two guns of No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery, and twelve sowars of the 1st Punjab Cavalry. Colonel Bunny, commanding the Tochi Column, v/as in charge of the escort. The object in view was to fix a site for a new outpost beyond Sheranni, nine miles beyond Datta Khel, and also to realise a fine which had been imposed upon the local tribesmen some months back. The party got as far as Maizar, which is somewhat to the south of Sheranni, and halted. What exactly occurred there was not explained in the first hasty despatches, but Mr. Gee, in a short preliminary report, stated that a cowardly and treacherous attack was made at 2 p.m., when the troops were at rest, and the little force was suddenly rushed by a large body of tribesmen. A desperate fight followed, the escort had to beat a retreat, ( 2 ) and they were followed for four miles along the road to Datta Kliel. Captain H. A. Cooper, 1st Sikhs, was in command at that post, and the first news he received was at 5 o'clock, when a sowar arrived, who stated that the troops had been attacked, their British Officers killed or wound- ed, and that their ammunition was running short. Captain Cooper ordered out two companies of infantry with a fresh supply of ammuni- tion, and sent with them the only two British Officers who, with himself, had been left at Datta Khel. These reinforcements enabled the retire- ment to be completed, the tribesmen desisting from the pursuit and not venturing near the post. Until more complete information arrived it was not possible to judge how it came about that an escort of such a size was surprised. The Political Officer's reference to the cowardly and treacherous manner in which the original attack was made, pointed to a species of tribal tac- tics not uncommon on the border, namely, the appearance of headmen professing friendliness, the gathering of tribesmen about the camp, and then the sudden rush of others lying hidden near at hand. Judging from the casualties, the British Officers seemed to have been the first to be attacked, for all six were killed or wounded. The losses among the native rank were distributed as follows : — 1st Punjab Cavalry, 2 sowars wounded ; No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery, 2 killed, 3 wounded ; 1st Sikhs, 12 killed, 13 wounded ; 1st Punjab Infantry, 8 killed, 6 wounded. Two followers were also killed, and one other was wounded. The moun- tain battery had four mules killed and five wounded, but the guns were brought safely into Uatta Khel, Nineteen commissariat mules were lost, while the cavalry detachment had three horses killed. Tlie tribesmen concerned in the affair belonged entirely to the Madda Khel sub-section of the Darwesh Khel Waziris. They hold the country at the western end of the Da war Valley, through which the Tochi River runs. The Darwesh Khel Waziris had hitherto behaved extremely well, and as portions of the tribe dwelt in British territory, it was not expect- ed that they would give trouble. During Sir William Lockhart's expedi- tion against the Mahsud Waziris, they showed no disposition to join with their fellow-tribesmen. Conjecture was therefore I'ife as to why the men of the Madda Khel should so suddenly have committed them- selves. Meanwhile it was clear that their punishment would have to be an exemplary one. True, the season was not very favourable for the movcmeut of a large force, but it seemed quite possible to carry ( 3 ) out punitive measures with a small column. For the moment it was decided to immediately reinforce the garrison of Tochi with one battalion of native infantry, and to move an additional regiment to Bannu. The following moves were therefore ordered : — 33rd Punjab Infantry, from Bannu to Tochi Valley ; 3rd Sikhs, from Kohat and the 14th Sikhs from Ferozepore to Bannu ; 2nd Punjab Infantry, from Abbotta- bad to Kohat. Within twenty-four hours of the receipt of the first intelligence the following further particulars arrived regarding the disaster : — Mr. Gee, the Political Officer, with his escort, arrived at Maizar, as al- ready stated, on the morning of the 10th June, nothing having occurred on the road from Datta Khel to excite suspicion regarding the attitude of the tribesmen. He was met at Maizar by Sadda Khan, Malik of Sheranni, and other local headmen, whose bearing was quite friendly. The troops were halted near the village, and Mr. Gee, with only the cavalry detachment (12 sabres), proceeded to Datoi, a few miles away, accompanied by some of the maliks. The visit was an uneventful one^ and the party returned to Maizar. Sadda Khan had meanwhile provided food for all the British Officers and also for the Mussalman sepoys in the escort. This was partaken of, and such a show of hospitality' threw the party off their guard, as even among the Pathans the lives of guests are usually held sacred for the time being. At 2 o'clock, just as the Officers had finished their lunch, fire was opened upon them from the village towers, and all six were shot down, almost at once. At the same time a continuous fire from all sides was directed against the sepoys, some five hundred tribesmen joining in the attack. The position was apparently unsuitable for defence, and the troops began to retire over the hills in the direction of Sheranni. The number of their assailants rapidly increased, and it was calculated that a thousand men were engaged in the pursuit before the river bank was reached opposite Sheranni. It was clearly established that the tribesmen had planned the attack beforehand, as fresh parties appeared from the hills between Sheranni and Datta Khel. The troops did not reach the latter post until 11 o'clock at night. Their march was necessarily a slow one, as a running fight had to be maintained for four miles, and they were en- cumbered with their dead and wounded. Nine rifles only were lost, which spoke well for the sepoys. The Waziris were said to have lost ninety killed and a considerable number wounded. Among the former were four mullahs and a malik. It was satisfactory to learn that the ( 4 ) ■woundetl Officers and men were on the whole doing well. Lieutenant Higeinson was severely wounded in the left arm ; Lieutenant Seton- Browne had a flesh wound in the thigh ; Surgeon-Captain Cassidy was hit in the knee. Later information received at Army Head-Quarters from the Tochi fully confirmed the first estimate of the behaviour of the troops in the affair at Maizar. It appeared that Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny, though mortally wounded, almost immediately the tribesmen opened fire, man- aged to issue orders under which the retirement from the neighbour- hood of the towers and walls of the village was effected. The men had to fall back two miles, as no defensive position offered, but thereafter they quite held their own against the attack. Shortness of ammuni- tion alone compelled further retirement, but this was made without disorder. Not on-ly so, but when reinforced by the two companies from Datta Khel, bringing up more ammunition, the troops faced about and shelled Sheranni village. Thus, from a number of separate reports, a fairly complete idea of the circumstances of the disaster was now obtainable, but the following simple, straightforward account of the affair from one of the few sur- vivors of the little party of Officers presented the events in a more con- nected form and in a clearer light : — "The recent attack on the military escort which accompanied Mr. Gee, Political Officer, Tochi, to Sheranni and Maizar was the work of the Madda Khel section of the Utmanzai Darwesh Khels. The Madda Khels occupy the Tochi Valley from Sheranni, nine miles above Datta Khel, up to the Amir's boundary, and a portion of them who were not, as a tribe, concerned in the attack live in the Kazha, which is a northern tributary of the Tochi. Sheranni and Maizar are on the main Tochi route from Birmal or Glia.zni to Bannu, and the tribe is under agree- ment to keep this road open. Maizar, which is the name given to a col- lection of villages at the mouth of the Shawal Algad, eleven miles from Datta Khel Camp, had already been fixed on as the site of the most westerly levy post in the Tochi, and it was mainly for the purpose of finally selecting the site for this post that the Political Officer pro- ceeded there on this occasion. He had also arranged to meet all the Madda Khel Maliks of the Tochi there, to discuss the question of the distribution of a fine which was outstanding against the tribe. "The escort consisted of 200 rifles 1st Sikhs, Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny in command, with Lieutenant Higginson, 100 rifles 1st Punjab ( 5 ) Infantn- uncTor Liontenant Seton-Browne, fotir gnns No. G Bombay Mountain Battery undex' Captain Browne, E.A., with Lieutenant Cruick- shauk, and 12 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry, and Surgeon-Captain Cassidy, Medical Officer. The escort marched from camp Datta Kliel at 5 a.m., and after halting twice on the road reached Maizar at 9-30. Maizar consists of a number of cultivated terraces gradually sloping down to the Shawal Algad, and the men were halted on the highest terrace at an open space under some trees not far from a hot belonging to the Drepilari section of the Madda Khels. This spot was jiointed out by the maliks themselves as the best place to camp, as there was plenty of room, and water was available near. The guns were jjlaced close to a o-arden wall in a field clear of the trees. The approach to this camping ground is over a small kotal and down a narrow laue through fields bounded by low stone walls. The lane runs straight from the kotal to the camping ground, which is close to a threshing-floor and then curves round to the north to the hot. The men were ordered to keep their arras with them and not to pile them. All necessary precautions were taken — cruards, pickets and sentries placed were considered necessary.. As soon as this was settled Mr. Gee and Captain Browne, R.A., taking the sowars, 1st Punjab Cavalry, and accompanied by some of the maliks, visited Datoi, which lies a few miles further on in the Tochi, while those left behind made themselves comfortable under the trees. "The Political Ofiicer returned about 12 o'clock ; the question of the fine was said by the maliks to have been settled amicably ; food was provided bv the leading maliks for all the Mussalman sepoys, and there was not the slightest suspicion of unfriendliness on the part of the tribes- men. After lunch, about 2 p.m., Colonel Bunny ordered the pipers to play for the villagers to listen to, and they played one tune. Just as they began another, a man was seen waving a drawn sword on a tower in the Drepilari kot, and the villagers suddenly cleared off towards the village. A single shot was fired, apparently as a signal, and a fusillade at once commenced, directed at the British Officers, who wei'e together under a tree, and the Sikhs. Tliis was taken up on all sides, the sepoys in the meantime falling in at once and taking up positions. Lieutenant Seton-Browne was hit in the leg at the second or third shot, and Colonel Bunny was mortally wounded almost immediately after. The guns then opened fire and did great execution among a party of men who attempted to rush them, but as they were in an exposed position the two British Officers afforded an easy mark for the men in the bagh. ( G ) Captain Browne was hit at about the fifth shot and Lieutenant Cruickshank shot dead almost directly after. This was all within five minutes of the first shot, and as the enemy's fire did not slacken, and the guns had expended their ammunition, a movement was made back towards the kotal, the guns limbei'ing up and going first up the lane. "As the Infantry retired, the Waziris came out in great numbers from all sides, but a stand was made round the corner of the bagh to allow the wounded men to retire. In the meantime Lieutenant Higgin- son was shot through the arm and Surgeon-Captain Cassidy in the knee. The Waziris were, however, successfully held in check by a mixed party of 1st Sikhs and 1st Punjab Infantry, and the latter retired up the kotal when every one was over. Successive positions were taken up on the six ridges which stretch from Maizar to the plain above Shei'anni, a distance of about two miles, and though the Waziris ft)llowed up in a most deter- mined fashion and occupied all available positions on the hills round, the retirement was orderly and time was given for all the wounded to get safely out on to the plain. Lieutenant Higginson was shot in the ariu a second time while crossing the hills. The force eventually took up a good position about a mile from the last ridge about 5-30 p.m., and waited there until reinforcements (two companies of the 1st Sikhs) with more ammunition under Lieutenant deBrett, E. A., arrived from Datta Khel. These reinforcements covered nine miles in IJ hours and arrived at 6-15 P.M. " The tribesmen had been in the meanwhile kept thoroughly in check, and the guns were now got to work again, and the heights and the village of Sheranni were shelled. This put an end to the business and no farther opposition was met with. The Khiddar Khels, who live on the Tochi below Sheranni, behaved well, bringing out w^ater for the sepoys and supplying charpoys for the wounded. The rear-guard reach- ed camp at 12-30 p.m. Colonel Bunny and Captain Browne died on the road. One Subadar (1st P. I.) and 22 men were killed and 25 wounded. Nearly all these were Sikhs and not Mussalmans. The enemy are re- ported to have lost 00 killed and many wounded. " The causes of this treacherous attack are not at present clear, but all the circumstances point to its being premeditated. It is known that some of the maliks were implicated, and one or two of them were killed. Once the aifair commenced it no doubt became a matter of ' ghaza ' but it does not appear that the nmllahs had previously worked ( 7 ) up the tribesmen. The fact that they attacked a party who had just eaten food with them— contrary to all Patlian codes of honour — renders the matter additionally hard to explain." To complete the story the following roughly written notes of the action at Maizar were received privately from Datta Khel :— " The enemy held a nullah in front in great strength and had lined the village walls and a 10-foot high wall on the right, the latter with picked marksmen. They also held the rising ground and some huts on the left, and a tower in the rear. Our troops were rested on the ground between. The 1st Sikhs and the 1st P. I. and all the Officers were under the trees to the left front near the nullah, and 60 to 70 yards from the walls on the right. Pickets were out at the front and reai^, and the guns were unlimbered at the right rear 10 yards from the 10-foot wall. The mules were unsaddled. At the set-off Captain Browne and Lieutenant Higginson were hit by the first volley and Colonel Bunny was struck shortly afterwards while talking to Mr. Gee. Captain Browne and Lieutenant Cruickshank doubled to the guns and Captain Browne was hit immediately by a marksman on the wall. The guns opened fire with case shot on the nullah. Lieutenant Cruick- shank was hit by a marksman on the wall, but raised himself up on one knee and continued directing the fire on the nullah till hit a second time and killed. The guns fired reversed shrapnel when the case shot was exhausted, and were commencing common having exhausted shrap- nel, when orders were received to retire. In limbering up a -wheel a mule was shot, but Havildar Amardin ran back under fire and picked up both wheels, 72ibs. each, and started to rejoin the Battery. He was shot dead and the wheels were not recovered. Cruickshank's orderly picked up a gun weighing 200ft>s. single-handed and carried it to the gun mule. The mule was shot dead, so he carried it to the relief mule. Then he went back and brought in Lieutenant Cruickshank's body. One N.-C. O. of the battery was hit by a '450 express bullet. Surgeon- Captain Cassidy was hit by a man in the tower. The ammunition and hospital mules stampeded, so 4,000 rounds of M.-H. ammunition, the neld hospital, and the Veterinary stores fell into the enemy's hands. The enemy also captured a helio which they now flash from the top of a hill. Subadar Narain Singh, 1st Sikhs, conducted the retirement till the arrival of Lieutenant deBrett who tlu'ew 28 shells into Sheranni. One shell struck a mosque, blowing up the mullah, who was waving a green flag, into the air. All the bodies were brought in by fiieudiies. C s ) Sikhs and Patluins were alike mutilated. Mr. Gee i-endered great assistance throughout and conveyed the order to the guns for the retii'e- ment, but escaped being hit. He has it that over 100 of the enemy were killed, and their wounded are reported to be dying daily." All was now known tliat could be known of the main incidents of the outrage, but as tlie details emerged there was much to say of the gallantry shown by the troops. Colonel Bunny, though mortally wounded at the outset, directed the retirement. Captain Browne, R.A., thouo-li fair.t from loss of blood, owing to a severed artery, looked carefully after the withdrawal of his guns. Lieutenant Cruickshank, E.A. after being shot down, staggered to his feet and fought his cruas until hit by a second bullet which killed him. As to the men with the section of the battery, they were Sikhs and Punjabis, and their conduct was beyond praise. There were only sixteen shells for each of the two guns, and these were quickly expended as the tribes- men were within a hundred yards. In order to prevent a rush while the mules were being got ready the native gunners tired powder charf^es. It has already been related how the gunners carried a gun and limber when the mules were wounded. Havildar-Major Mahomed Ismail and Havildar Nehal Singh particularly distinguished them- selves. The native drivers vied with the gunners in their gallantry. They assisted in carrying ofi" the wounded, and .some of them even began coolly loading up spare mules with the over-coats of the detach- ment in spite of the heavy fire, but Captain Browne ordered them to lead the mules away as the risk of casualties was too great. One of the Salutris of the battery, named Kevval, did his best to dress Captain Browne's wound, regardless of the enemy's approach. As to the in- fantry, Subadar Narain Singh, 1st Sikhs, must come fii'st on the list not merely for personal gallantry, but for the military qualities he dis- played. No sooner had the attack begun than he recognized the im- mense importance of saving the reserve ammunition (ten boxes, each containing 600 rounds), as he knew the sepoys had only twenty-two rounds in their pouches. He told oil" seven men to fetch the boxes, and they succeeded in carrying six back to the firing line. These were opened and the packets at once distributed among the two companies of the regiment. Sepoy Shiv Singh made two journeys for this am- munition and was twice wounded. Narain Singh, as senior Native Officer, had the burden of carrying out the details of the retirement, under orders issued by Lieutenants Higginsou and Seton-Browne who r 9 ) \veie both suffeiing severely from tlieir wounds. He did his work adinirablj. Siibadar Sundar Singli, 1st P. I., must be bracketed with Narain Singh. He, with his bi'other Sundar and Jamadar Sherzad, ]st Sikhs, formed up a party of sepoys to cover the retirement, and not a man budged until the order was given that they might fall back. The enemy closed with them, hand-to-hand fighting taking place, but the tribesmen could not force their way through this small body of de- termined meji. It was here that the great majority of the casualties occurred. Sundar Singh was killed, sacrificing himself in order to give more time for the retirement to be eflfected. He was a young Officer, having entered the service in 1883. Jamadar Sherzad surely earned the Victoi'ia Cross if such a decoration were given to the Native Army, He first of all carried Lieutenant Higginson away, then possessing him- self of a rifle he covered by his fire a party of three men carrying Surgeon-Captain Cassidy to a place of comparative safety, and finally he shared in the desperate rear-guard fight. Subadar Nawab Khan, 1st Sikhs, was among the last to leave the ground. He was twice shot in the leg, but his wounds did not interfere with his cool discharge of duty on the way to Datta Khel. Coming now to the rank and file the gallantry shown was so universal that it is difficult to single men out. Chief among those who distinguished themselves were Lance-Naik Ishar Singh, 1st P. I., who killed several of the enemy with the bayonet, him- self escaping untouched ; Bugler Bala Singh, who first assisted in sav- ing the reserve ammunition, then with a rifle taken from a dead man doing some fighting, and afterwards distributing packets of cartridges among the sepoys whose supply was running out; Sepoy Allayar Khan, 1st P. I., who carried Lieutenant Seton-Browne to the first defensive position taken up ; Lance-Naik Assa Singh, 1st P. I., who assisted the same Officer when the enemy were pressing closely upon the troops during the retirement ; and last, but not least, Sepoy Nurdah, 1st P. I., who drove ofl" a party of tribesmen by shooting two of them at close quarters and then with a few comrades charging them with the bayonet. He was severely wounded in the affray. > ( 10 ) C II APT Eli II. THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT. Finally there was the official version of the affair, contained in the report of Mr. Gee, the Political Officer in Tochi, which may be given in full :— Maizar is the name given to a group of Madda Khel villages situated above the junction of the Shawal Algad and the Tochi, and not the name of one single village. It consists of a number of broad culti- vated terraces sloping down to the stream, and is occupied by Drepilari, Khoji Khel, Ali Khan Khel and Macha sections of the Ger portion of the Madda Khel tribe. It lies two miles beyond the village of Sheranni, and is about eleven miles distant from Datta Khel Camp. The main road to Birmal and Ghazni, which the tribe is under agreement to keep open, runs through it, and it forms part of that tract of the Upper Tochi in which a more extended influence was contemplat- ed as compared with the hill tracts of Darwesh Khel country. As long ago as September 1896, I had visited Sheranni and Maizar with the view of examining possible sites for the Sheranni levy post, and you had concurred generally with me that the post should be somewhere between Sheranni and Maizar. My chief object in making the present visit was to select a final site for this post, as the building season was already far advanced and the sanctioned plan and estimate were expected back from the Public Works Department, and, if possible, to establish a temporary post there for the Sheranni levies, who since our occupation of Datta Khel have been kept close to camp. I had asked Colonel Bunny to accompany me in order that he might give me his advice in the final selection of the site. In my letter, dated 15th June 1897, 1 have explained the circumstance con- nected with the realisation of the fine in Honda Kam's case, and my intention of discussing the details of distribution with all the maliks concerned on my visit to Maizar. This was an additional leason for going up the valley, though the fact that I asked the jiryah to meet me at Maizar was merely due to my intention to halt there as being the most convenient place. Under ordinary circumstances, with the valley quite peaceful, as we believed it to be an escort of sowars and maliks would have sufficed to ( 11 ) visit Maizar, as the road lies through open country, and the kotal above Maizar is visible from Datta Khel Camp. I asked Colonel Bunny if he ■would mind taking out the same number of men aa were employed on my recent visit to the Kazha. That visit had an excellent effect on the Kazhawals, and aa 1 had not visited Maizar foi- some time, I was of opinion that the sight of a large escort would have a good effect there too, especially in view of the early commencement there of the levy post. Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny agreed to my proposal. The following is the detail of the escort that accompanied me : — 200 riiies 1st Sikhs with Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny and Lieutenant Higginson. 100 rifles 1st Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Seton-Browne. 2 guns. No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery under Captain Browne, R.A., and Lieutenant Cruickshank, E.A. 12 sabres 1st (P. A. V. O.) Punjab Cavalry. Surgeon-Captain Cassidy, 1st Sikhs. The 9th was originally fixed for the visit, but owing to rain it was postponed till the 10th. Sadda Khan and Alambe had been sent on one day in advance to make what preparations were required and col- lect the local maliks for the purpose of discussing the distribution of the fine in Honda Eam's case. A start was made from Datta Khel at 5 a.m. and Maizar was reached at 9-30. I was accompanied from Datta Khel by Khan Baha- dur Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Assistant Political Officer, Maliks Nabbi Khan, Sabil and his son Dande and Khanadin of the Kazha ; Shadam Khan, brother of Malik Sadda Khan, Mozammil Khan, his nephew, at present officiating as Levy Jamadar, and Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel. At Ziarat village I was joined by the Khiddar Khel Maliks, Salehdin, Gul Samid, Syad Khan and Khan Wazir, and at Sheranni by the Madda Khel Maliks, Khan Habib and Zer Makhmad. Sadda Khan and Alambe were already at Maizar, and met me there. Sadda Khan showed me the place where he wanted the troops to camp and where a number of charpoys had been placed in readi- ness. This was under some ti-ees on the topmost terrace, close to a threshing floor and not far from the Drepilari kot of Modai, a small malik. I showed the place to Colonel Bunny and the troops were halted there. ( 12 ) I wont on at once with most of the maliks wlio had come with nie and the cavahy ho a3 to inspect Datoi, and came back before it was very liot. Before going, however, I and the Assistant Political Officer saw some of the Maizar Maliks, and they were told with reference to the line in Honda Ram's case that I would have them all up and dis- cuss the matter on my return. Sadda Khan and Alambe stayed in camp by my order. Captain Browne, KA., and Lieutenant Higginson accompanied me towards Datoi and we returned to camp at 11-30, when we all had breakfast. The people of the villages round at that time appeared perfectly friendly, and talked freely to the Pathan sepoys. Everything required in the way of grass and wood had been supplied ; and about midday food which had been cooked in one of the Maizar kots was brought down for the sepoys, and a special point was made of the British Officers partaking of some of it. I then made enquiries as to whether the local J irg a fi, which had been sitting under some trees near for some time, were ready to come and see me, and I was told by the Assistant Political Officer that they had come to an amicable agreement by themselves and that all that was necessary was that they should come up later and make a formal statement before me. This was what Malik Sadda Khan had led Ghulam Muhammad Khan to believe ; but if the evidence available is to be trusted, Sadda Khan's statement was a deliberate lie, for at that very time the Maizar- wals had refused, as they had the day before, to be bound by Sadda Khan's proposals and must have been preparing for the outbreak. Had Sadda Khan given us the slightest information of this attitude on the part of the Maizarwals, which he, as well as the other Madda Khel Maliks, who had been there all day, must have been perfectly well aware of, there would have been plenty of time to prepare for an attack. The attack actually did not take place till a little while after this, about 2 P.M., when we had just finished lunch. I was pi-eparing to go round with Captain Browne and look at sites for the post. The pipes had begun to play at the request of the maliks, for the villagers to listen to, and the sepoys and ourselves were seated under the trees. Tiie pipes played one tune and had just commenced a second, when suddenly all the villagers cleared off towards the Drepilari kof. It was seen that something was wrong and the order to fall in was given, but at the same moment a signal shot was fired which was followed by an irregular .volley a])parently aimed at the Officers under the tree. Lieutenant Seton-Biowne was hit in the thigh at the second or third shot, and ( 13 ) Surgeon-Captain Cassidy carried liini tn a place of comparative safety by a small bhusa stack and tied up his wound. Colonel Bunny and myself had meanwhile gone towards the trees where the men were, but the Colonel was mortally wounded in the stomach just as he got there, and Lieutenant Higginson was shot in the left arm almost at the same minute. The firing had now become general from all the kots round. The guns then opened fire with case and did great execution among a body of men who had come out of the Drepilari hot and attempted to charge them. As they were not protected b an v cover, the two Eoyal Artillery Officers afforded an easy mark for the men who were shooting from towers around, and Captain Browne was hit in the arm at about the fifth round from the battery, and Lieutenant Cruiekshank was shot very soon afterwards, first in the arm and then in the chest, the second wound being fatal. It is much to be regretted that no medical aid was available for Captain Browne. The bullet had severed the artery, and had a proper tourniquet been applied, his life would have been saved, but Surgeon-Captain Cassidy was shot in the knee while going towards the kotal and could give no assistance. After about five minutes from the commencement of the attack, the guns having expended all their ammunition limbered up, and Colonel Bunny gave orders for a general retirement towards the kotal. This was efltected along the lane which had low walls on either side of it. As far as the kotal we were exposed to fire on both sides, and practically all the casualties occurred before the kotal was reached. A fine stand was made at the corner of the garden by the lane, with the result that the battery and the wounded men were all safely over the kotal before the position was evacuated. It was here that the greatest loss in men occurred, including Subadar Sundar Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, and many individual acts of gallantry were performed which will be duly brought to the notice of Government by the Officer Commanding Tochi Valley. The retirement was then continued across the six ridges which extend from the kotal above Maizar to the sloping- plain above Sheranni, \shich is a part of the Tsirai plain. A position was taken up on each ridge in succession, and the retirement wascon- . ducted in an orderly manner, time being given for all the wounded to get safely out on the plain, a distance of about two miles. Directly Maizar .itself was evacuated, the tribesmen came on in large numbers, which were ( 14 ) constantly being increased by reinforcements from every village round including Sheraiini. They followed up the force closely and persistently and also occupied all the heights they could along the line of retirement. They were unable to do much damage owing to the steady behaviour of the rear-guard, and they must have lost a good many men themselves. Lieutenant Higginson had the misfortune to be shot again in the left arm while crossing the hills. The force eventually took up a good position about a mile from the last ridge at 5-30 p.m., and waited there for reinforcements from Datta Khel, which arrived at 6-15 p.m., under Lieutenant deBrett, E.A. Some sowars of the 1st Punjab Cavalry had been despatched as soon as possible to fetch them and warn the camp. These reinforcements cover- ed a distance of nine miles in one-and-half hours. They consisted of two companies of the 1st Sikhs and extra gun and rifle ammunition. The tribesmen meanwhile, whose numbers had probably increased to well over 1,000, had been kept thoroughly in check, and as soon as the gun was got to work (the second gun had lost its wheels) the gather- ing began to disperse. The heights all round, which had been crowded -with men, were shelled, and then Sheranni village, from which I had myself seen large parties issuing to intercept our retirement. This was continued until I received a message from Khan Bahadur Ghulam Mu- hammad Khan who had escaped via the Tochi with a few maliks, to the effect that he had arrived close to the village and was in danger of being hit. No further opposition was met with. The Khiddar Khels of Ziarat village gave us great assistance in bringing out water for the men and charpoys for the wounded, and though a few of them undoubtedly join- ed the Madda Khels, the maliks, who had gone straight back from Maizar when the attack began, were entirely successful in preventing the tribe from joining. Captain Browne, E.A,, had by this time died from loss of blood, and Colonel Bunny did not live to reach camp. The rear-guard reached camp at 12-30 p.m. Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan also came in the same night. It appears that when the outbreak occurred, Sadda Khan had just come over to him from the jirgah with Kotan Khan and stated that the fine had been arranged for and would be paid up in five days, and ( 1.5 ) almost directly afterwards the firing began. Ghulam Muhammad Khan had just gone down to a lower terrace to perform his ablutions, and he was at once joined by Nabbi Khan, Khangai Macha, Alimad Madda Khel, Wadin Saidgi and the Khiddar Khel levies and Border Police. His munshi and clerk were also with him. This party was afterwards joined at different times by Sadda Khan, Shadam Khan, Dande, his brother, Khan Habib, Zerin and Mozammil Khan and they went down the Shawal Algad to the Tochi and took refuge on the other side of the Tochi in Tarraori Kila, the inhabitants of which were just preparing to join the fight. From thei'e Sadda Khan was despatch- ed to Sheranni to keep the people quiet, and he returned after two hours, saying he had dispersed the lashkar and the road was clear. Nothing could have been further from the truth. In consequence of what he stated, Ghulam Muhammad Khan started down the Tochi, and, as already stated, arrived at Sheranni when it was being shelled. Mozam- mil Khan and Alam Shah, the Madda Khel Daffadar of Kazha, were the only Ger Madda Khels who came on with the Assistant Political Officer to camp. The next day I called the Khiddar Khel Maliks in and asked them to arrange to bring in the dead, and this they eventually did with the assistance of Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel, and 1 think great ci^edit is due to them for the performance of this service, especially as the bodies were much mutilated, Mussalmans and Sikhs alike. The following is the list of casualties on our side : — Three British Officers killed. Three British Officers wounded. Native ranks killed — One Subadar and seven men of the 1st Punjab Infantry. Twelve men and a Kahar of 1st Sikhs. One Havildar and one driver, No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery. It is a significant fact that of the above total 17 were Sikhs, though the force was composed of nearly an equal number of Sikhs and Mussal- mans. Wounded — 1st Punjab Infantry — Two men severely, two men slightly. 1st Punjab Cavalry — One man slightly. 1st Sikhs — Twelve men severely, one mule-driver dangerously, eight men slightly. ( 10 ) No. Bombay Momitain Battery— Two men severely, one man slightly, one Kahar slightly. The Waziri loss in killed has been put at 100 by the maliks, from whom enquiries have been made, and as it is probable that a good many have died since of their wounds probably a total of 100 is not very wide of the mark. This is also the opinion of Native Officers who had the best means of judging. A large number (some 30 or 40) are said to have been killed outside theDrepilari hut by the case shot, and very nearly as many were killed at the corner of the garden where the stand was made. All alon"- the line of retirement the ti'ibesmen pressed close, and a number of them were shot down. • • • Here ends the Political Officer's report. The narrative of the Maizar outrage however cannot properly be closed without mention of the rewards granted to those who had taken part in the action connected with the outbreak. The military reports received from Lieutenant-Colonel Gray regard- ing the Maizar affair were published as despatches. The Commander- in-Chief placed on record his appreciation of the heroic conduct of Officers and men, and declared that " the action was a deed of arms second to none in the annals of the British Army." The Government of India " most heartily endorsed this view." The two surviving British Officers who were present at Maizar, Lieutenant A. J. M. Higginson, 1st Sikhs, and Lieutenant C. L. S. Seton- Browne, 1st Punjab Infantry, both of whom were severely wounded, were recommended for the Distinguished Service Order.* With regard to Mr. Gee, Colonel Gray, in his report on the Maizar affair, thus referred to the Political Officer whose escort was attacked : " Though it is not my business to report on Civil Officers, it would be unjust to omit mentioning that Mr. Gee's exertions and presence of mind were of great value in the help he rendered during the retire- ment and in sending to call up the reinforcements." On the recommendation of General Corrie Bird, supported by the Commander-in-Chief, the three principal Native Officers with the troops engaged in the Maizar atfair were given the Order of Merit at once as a reward for their gallantry. Subadar Sund ar Singh, 1st Punja b * Lieutunani Hiusinson did not live to receive this award, and Surgeon-Captain Casisidy liaii alreaily succumbed to his wuuud. ( 17 ) Infantry, who was killed, was also gazetted to the Order of Merit, so as to enable his widow to draw a larger pension. Subadar Narayan Singh, 1st Sikhs, whose coolness and gallantry were so noticeable, was admitted to the Order of British India, with the title of Bahadur ; 23 Non- commissioned Officers and men were given the Order of Merit ; Jhanda Singh, cook of the 1st Sikhs, was also admitted to the Order of Merit, though a non-combatant, for having carried off a box of ammunition under heavy fire. The widows of eight men killed were admitted to a pension of the 3rd class of the Order of Merit. Later on there was published in the Gazette of /nrfea a full list of rewards for the Non- commissioned Officers and men. This list will be found among the appendices. There is only one more fact to chronicle. An impression gained ground, when the news of the outrage was first published, that the Madda Khel had singled out the Sikhs for attack and that the Maho- medan sepoys escaped lightly. This was altogether erroneous. No- such distinction was made, and indeed in the melee it would have been impossible. It is sufficient to mention that of five sepoys killed in the splendid defence at the garden wall three were Mahomedans and that both Sikh and Mahomedan bodies were afterwards found mutilated in the horrible manner peculiar to the frontier tribes. A special Gazette was subsequently issued, containing a despatch in which the gallantry of Lieutenant de Brett, E.A., on June 10th, near Sheranni, was warmly acknowledged. This Officer, it appeared, in his keenness to keep his battery in continuous play, rammed the charges home in a mountain gun with a sepoy's rifle without sponging out be- tween the rounds— a most dangerous thing to do. CHAPTER HI. THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION. As it appeared imperative to punish without delay the villages of Maizar and Sheranni, which were immediately concerned in the treacherous attack on the Political Officer's escort, the Government of India arranged within the next two or three weeks for a punitive column to move into the offending country from Datta Khel. The expeditionary force consisted of two Brigades. Major-General G. Corrie Bird, then commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, was given the chief command, and the principal members of his staff were as fol- lows : — Assistant Adjutant-General, Major J. Wilcocks, D.A.A.G. at Nagpore ; Assistant Quartermaster-General, Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. 'Nixon, 18th Bengal Lancers ; Ordnance Officer, Major C. H. Wilson, E.A.; Intelligence Officers, Major G. V. Kemball and Lieutenant G. K. Cockerill of the Intelligence Branch at Army Head-Quarters ; Superin- tendent, Army Signalling, Captain G. W. Rawlins, 12th B.C.; Field Engineer, Major I. Digby, Madras ; Assistant Field Engineers, Captain A. L. Schreiber and Lieutenant W. I). Waghorn ; Principal Commissariat Officer, Major G. Wingate, Peshawar ; Transport Officers, Veterinary- Major G. J. R. Rayment and Captain H. James, Mian Mir ; Provost Marshal, Captain P. Malcolm, 4th Gurkhas ; Principal Medical Officer, Surgeon-Colonel R. H. Carew. The two Brigades were composed as follows : — \st Brigade: Colonel C. C. Egefton, Corps of Guides, Commanding ; D. A. A.-G., Captain H. B. B. Watkis, then at Army Head-Quarters ; D. A. Q.-M.-G., Major F. Wintour, Allahabad; Commissariat Officer, Lieutenant E. A. R. Howell, Sialkot. Troops -.—The Peshawar Mountain Battery, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the 1st Sikhs, the 1st Punjab Infantry, and the 33rd Punjab Infantry. 2n£f Brigade : Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, Sirhind District, Commanding ; D. A. A.-G., Captain J. MacN. Walter, Devonshire Regiment, then on the Staff at Lucknow ; D. A. Q.-M.-G., Major M. H. S. Grover, then D. A. Q.-M.-G., Punjab Command. Troops :— No. . 6 (Bombay) Mountain Battery (4 guns), the 3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade, the 14th Sikhs, and the 25th Punjab Infantry, The two squadrons of th© ( 19 ) Ist Punjab Cavalry already in the Toclii Yalley and No. 2 Companr Bengal Sappers and Miners were also ordered to form part of the expe-{ ditionary force. Fuller details of General Corrie Bird's staff and of the staffs of the two Brigades, as well as of the composition of the force, are added in an appendix. Full political power was vested in Major-General G. Corrie Bird during the operations in the Tochi Valley. Mr. Gee was appointed Chief Political Officer attached to the General, while Mr. Lorimer and Mr. Kettlewell were Assistant Political Officers, each attached to a^. Brigade. A proclamation was at once issued notifying to the tribes-' men in and about the Tochi Valley the reason for the expedition. While the concentration of the Tochi Field Force Avas yet in pro- gress, speculation was rife as to the nature and strength of the opposi- tion which our troops would be likely to encounter at and beyond Datta Khel. News received from native sources mentioned that a gathering of tribesmen in strength was contemplated at Sheranni and Maizar. The Mahsud Waziris, who were then lying to the south, were said to be send- ing a contingent to join the Madda Khel, while another tribal force was reported to be moving from Birmal in Afghan territory. As against this, the Darwesh Khel in the Upper Tochi Valley were certainly not unani- mous at that time in the matter of further hostilities : the Khiddar Khel sub-section had brought in the bodies of some sepoys killed in the retirement from Maizar, and their headmen were holding aloof from the Madda Khel. It seemed improbable also that the tribesmen of Birmal, who are subjects of the Amir of Kabul, would cross into British terri- tory. It was quite likely, however, that restless spirits among the. Mahsud Waziris would join their kinsmen in Tochi. Later news from the Waziristan direction stated that the Khiddar Khel and the Sadgis from Birmal were helping the Maizarwals to remove their goods into Afghan territory, thus giving the tribesmen a free hand for fighting. The latter, however, showed no desire meanwhile to assume the offensive, against the Datta Khel post. At this early period there appeared upon the scene a figure of some note — an old acquaintance, the Mullah Powindah — whose movements thenceforth became a matter of considerable interest to our Intelligence Department in Tochi. The tactics of the Mullah up to the time of the preliminary concentration of our troops at Banna were however of a kind ( 20 ) which showed that his influence over the Mahsud Waziris as a body was not as great as three yeai's previously. He at first tried to induce the tribesmen to send a contingent to help the Madda Khel, but there was such a faint response to his appeal that he promptly changed his ground and wrote into our Political Officers in the Tochi offering to mediate be- tween the Government and the people of Maizar and Sheianni. This step was, of course, taken by him in order to increase his prestige in Waziristan and the adjacent country : it was a clever move, but the Government could not recognise his position in any way. The Madda Khel are a section of the Darwesh Khel Waziris, and with the latter the Mullah had nothing whatever to do. He had, in fact, no status, and it would have been most unwise to have any dealings with him. As a possible enemy he had to be watched : as a friendly mediator he was put aside. Mediation moreover was not called for. The Madda Khel had deliberately planned the attack on Colonel Bunny's detachment and had carried it out in the most treacherous way. Their offence was clearly de- fined and their punishment would need to be exemplary. A tribal rising of the ordinary local kind, or a raid upon an outpost, is not of material consequence in the borderland. Such disturbances are more or less ex- pected whenever our troops occupy positions beyond the old frontier line. But the Maizar affair was of an entirely different complexion, for it in- volved a breach of hospitality and could only have been successful by cunningly contrived treachery. The Mullah Powindah himself was said to have denounced its treacherous character, but probably if he did so at all he only did it when he found that the Mahsuds would not obey his summons to raise a force to help the Madda Khel. From all that could be learnt it seemed that the great majority of the Darwesh Khel, many of whom held lands in British territory, were as little disposed as the Mahsuds to commit themselves to hostilities. Lest, however, in view of these facts and in the light of subsequent events it should be thought that the Field Force was too large for the work before it, it may be at once said that the Government of India were anxious not to set the whole frontier from Kurram to the Gumal in a blaze by sending up a small force which would invite attack, and it was expected that large military preparations would have the effect of check- ing the fanaticism of any clans who might be hesitating whether they should join the malcontents in the Upper Tochi Valley. It was known that the Madda Khel against whom the Tochi Valley Force were about to move, could muster only 1,200 fighting men, but it was impossible to say with certainty that no other section of the Uarwesh ( 21 ) and Mahsud Waziris would join them, and hence the necessity for being prepared for more than a mere promenade to Maizar, Sheranni and Datoi. The Dawaris also, who hold the greater part of the Tochi Valley, were known to be an ill-conditioned and fanatical lot, who might give trouble along the line of communications in case of any check to our troops beyond Datta Khel. The Kabul Khel of Birmal who were said to have made common cause with the Madda Khel are a section of a big clan of the Utmanzai, and they were in a position to fight with the comfortable assurance of being able to get away whenever they had had enough, for Birmal is in Afghan territory and is only a day's journey from Sheranni. It was therefore impossible to fore- see that General Corrie Bird's force would find no enemy when the advance was made from Datta Khel. As had been proved at Wano, 5,000 or 6,000 tribesmen can assemble so quickly, and their movements are made so secretly, that their presence is first announced by a rush of swordsmen on our pickets. Waziri tactics are, as a rule, based on surprise, and valleys which may have been empty of men in the morn- ing may swarm with thousands after nightfall. If opportunity offers for striking a sudden blow the tribesmen do not generally hesitate to deliver an attack. The affair at Wano itself was but a repetition of that at Palosin in 1860, when our losses were 63 killed and 166 wounded, in addition to 60 casualties among the levies. Any force which moved up the Tochi Valley had to be prepared for attack, not only from the south but from the north also, for there was no guarantee that the tribesmen from the Kurram border to the Gumal would not suddenly be infected with a spirit of hostility. And now to follow the actual course of events. The concentration of the troops was carried out as rapidly as possible consistent with the collection of supplies and transport. Bannu being the base, Datta Khel was fixed upon as the advanced base from which the force would only have to advance about 13 miles to reach Maizar and Sheranni, and 6 miles further to reach Datoi (some tribesmen of which partici- pated in the Maizar outrage). To ensure the safety of Bannu itself and to keep the peace on the border the following additional moves were ordered : — 200 sabres of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry and the whole of the 3rd Sikhs from Kohat to Bannu ; the 2nd Punjab Infantry from Abbottabad to Kohat, and 250 of the 4th Sikhs from Dera Ismail Khan to Jandoula, Sarwakai and Haidari Kach on the Mahsud frontier. As a special precaution against the effects of the heat the British soldiers ( 22 ) in the Toclii Field Force were j^rovided witli sola topees in lieu of helmets and with sun glasses. It is probable that this thoughtful measure saved many casualties that would otherwise liave occurred from sunstroke and fever. The concentration at Bannu was of course uneventful, but the ad- vance to Datta Khel via Saidgai, Idak and Boya was not made quite so serenely, as shots were repeatedly fired into camp, a sentry being killed in this way at Datta Khel. The Engineers en route from Bannu had rendered valuable service in cutting a good road, partly through solid rock, all the way to Boya, and in constructing (in twelve days) a crib and trestle bridge, 600 feet wide, over the Tochi Eiver at Boya. As a result the march to Datta Khel was accomplished with the minimum of difficulty, and the Field Force was then within striking distance of the doomed villages. ( 23 ) CHAPTER IV. THE WORK OF DESTRUCTION. WiTHOTTT a blow being struck or a shot being fired, Sherannl was Occupied by General Egerton's Brigade of the Tochi Field Force on July 20th. General Bird and his Staff accompanied the Brigade. The rear-guard saw a body estimated at about 500 men some 2 miles from the road who disappeared into the further hills. On arrival at Sheranni the cavalry reconnoitred the scene of the action at Maizar and found one man who was brought in prisoner. The carcases of five mules and two ponies were seen lying where they had been shot down, and about five yards from the wall of one of the kothis an ordnance pack saddle and one or two other articles of Government property were found and. brought in. Sheranni itself was quite deserted. Its wood wall was torn down to serve for firewood for the troops, as the hills in the vicinity were barren of vegetation. There was a certain quantity of bhusa, barley and clover about in the village, and the fields around were fairly advanced in cultivation. After the bhusa had been gathered and sufficient wood accumulated the destruction of the village was begun. A few shots were fired into camp that night by a band of about 10 to 20 men, but no large body of the enemy was anywhere discernible. This absence of opposition was variously explained. The Madda Khel tribesmen in a body, with their families, were reported to have crossed the Afghan frontier into Birmal, leaving only scouts to watch the approach of General Corrie Bird's force. As Birmal is a tract which usually yields only sufficient supplies for its ordinary population, the position of the Madda Khel, if this report were true, threatened to be- come a very awkward one. In another direction it was reported that the Mullah Powindah had assembled 7,000 Mahsud Waziris near Razani in the adjoining Khaisora Valley to the south, and that his intention was to attack Boya or Datta Khel after the advance from the latter post to Sheranni had been made. As a precautionary measure two companies were ordered from Miran Shah to Boya. Boya is the post on the line most exposed to Waziri raids, as a fair road is said to exist .to it from Khaisora, but it had been strongly entrenched by the Sap- pers and was believed to be impregnable against any tribal attack. ( 24 ) When all defensive arrangements had been completed news was received that the Mullah Powindah had abandoned his intention of attacking our troops in the Tochi Valley, and that his gathering of Mahsuds had dispersed. Every precaution, however, was still taken at Datta Khel, Boya, Idak, and Miran Shah to guard against possible surprises, while all convoys were strongly guarded. Reports from Wano showed that southern Waziristan was quiet, and no demonstration seemed likely to be made in that quarter ; in fact the Mahsuds as a body had apparently shrunk from committing themselves to helping the Madda Khel. Later news made it almost certain that the Mullah Powindah had returned to his own village in Waziristan, and it was further ascertained that there was no large gathering of Mahsuds at Razmak. The Tochi Field Force had therefore little prospect of getting any fighting worthy of the name, unless some totally unexpected tribal combination occurred. The night of the 25th of July witnessed the successful destruction of the towers and fortified houses of Sheranni. The next day parties from each corps went out to Maizar to destroy the fortified houses and towers of the villages. The defences of Drepilari hot were destroyed by the Highlanders and Sappers. The towers were blown up, and after the troops had left, smoke was seen rising from the direction of Drepi- lari, the result probably of some woodwork catching tire after the explosions necessary to demolish the towers. As a high wind was blowing, and the kot contained a large quantity of bhusa, most of it was probably burnt. The troops were again occupied on the 27th of July in destroying the kots in the Maizar settlement to the north of the village of Drepilari. The village itself, which caught fire, was already pretty well destroyed. On the 28th July the kots to the south of it were destroyed, as also were those in the village of Tormor, which lay some two miles up the stream of Sheranni on the left bank of the Tochi. With the exception of intermittent and ineffectual sniping, varied by small seizures of straggling camels and donkeys, there was nothing all this time to suggest the presence of an enemy in the neighbourhood, and the position eventually became very tiresome. Finally, on the 5th of August, letters were sent to all the leaders of the Madda Khels, inviting them to come in under safe conduct and hear what the terms demanded by the Government were. It was, of course, well understood beforehand that nothing less than the surrender of the ring-leaders and the payment of heavy fines could well be exacted by General Bird. When first sum- moned the maliks huug back and apparently placed no reliance on the ( 25 ) safe conduct promised them. General Bird, however, utilized the services of some of the headmen of the neighbouring tribes, and on the 16th of August three Madda Khel Maliks came in. The following afternoon General Bird held a Darbar at which some Kazha Khel and Tori Khel Maliks were also present. It was announced that Government demanded the return in good condition of the property which had been lost at Maizar, the surrender of some 18 headmen, the payment of a fine still outstanding for the murder of a Hindu writer there, and a further fine of Rs.10,000 for the outrage. Ten days was given them in which to take the terms to the tribe and discuss them and to give an answer. The Darbar did not last more than half-an-hour, and the people were told that no discussion was to be permitted ; they had been sent for merely to receive the orders of Government. On the 22nd of August the tribes were reported to be still discuss- ing the terms imposed on them, and thereafter news from the Tochi Valley became very scant and infrequent. On the 2nd of September there was said to be a probability that the sons of the Madda Khel Maliks would come in that day and give their answer to the terma imposed by the Government, but the expectation was not realised. The same day a column, under the Hon'ble Montagu Curzon, consisting of the Eifle Brigade, the 1st Punjab Infantry, two guns, and a company of Sappers, marched to Landi Khel to make a road along the right bank of the Tochi River to Datoi, and was fired at on arrival and also at night when in camp. The next evening a belated reconnoitring party under Major R. M. Maxwell, while returning to Miran Shah from towards the Khaisora Valley, was also fired at in the dark by parties from both sides of the river near the village of Argun ; but no mischief was done. In this uneventful manner the Tochi Valley punitive operations, for want of an enemy to punish, came to be generally regarded as at an end. The aspect of affairs was not enlivened when, on the 14th of September, the Madda Khel definitely refused to accept the terms offered them, for as they still carefully avoided a collision with our troops by remaining in Afghan territory their contumacy only converted a position of perplexity into an absolute deadlock. It was perhaps rather sanguine to expect that at this stage any frontier tribe would agree to give up leaders whose execution was admittedly a foregone conclusion. Our troops meanwhile could do nothing. There was no enemy to fight and it did not seem in the least likely that there ever would be one. Nevertheless, the Gov- ernment of India decided to leave the Tochi Force in occupation for a time with the general idea of their continuing to o verawe the Waziris. ( 26 ) At the end of J-'eptember the political situation was much the same. The Madda Khel showed no .signs of submitting to our terms, and were still over the border. It was stated that the Amir had offered them land and water, but in Tuikistan, and that they could not make up their mind whether or not to accept the offer. No doubt they hoped by staying out to wear down the patience of Government, and so be re- admitted to their own land on terms less severe than those already deliberately imposed on them for their conduct. A month later — October the 29th to be exact — five headmen belong- ing to the villages of Tormor, situated about two miles above Sheranni, came in and surrendered themselves to General Bird. On the 31st of the month Khan Saheb and three other Sheranni Maliks came in, followed shortly afterwards by Sadda Khan and his brother Shadam, the headmen of the Madda Khel tribe. It was decided to try them by a tribunal to be specially assembled for that purpose. On the 14th November General Bird received the submission of the whole of the Madda Khel tribe unconditionally, and among those who surrendered were four more of the seventeen men who were demanded by name for their share in the affair at Maizar. A good many of the proscribed headmen, whose families took refuge in Afghan territory, were said to be experiencing a difficulty in getting away from their asylum and in removing their families. Five of the proscribed men for instance were ready to come in and surrender unconditionally on the 13th November, but during the night received news that their families had been detained beyond the border, and they naturally went off to obtain their release before surrendering to General Bird, which they had sworn on the Koran before their whole jiiyuk to do. General Corrie Bird proceeded to Datta Khel on the 15th November, taking with him his prisoners and the jirffa/i of friendly tribes, for the purpose of finally deciding the question of assessment and distribution of fines among those concerned, and of obtaining proper security for payment. These points were duly settled, and it was understood that the tribe as a whole would be admitted back to its territory at once. The work assigned to the Tochi Field Force was accomplished, and the Tochi Valley no longer formed part of the " disturbed area." It is but fair to add here that though the force only experienced de- sultory opposition on the part of the enemy, it had to fight against an unhealthy season in the hottest time of the year, and against difficulties ( 27 ) which only those who are actually acquainted with the Tochi Valley can properly appreciate. Moreover, the expedition has been productive of at least one permanently useful result outside the scope of its strictly militai-y purpose : a very large extent of country, the whole of it in fact that lies between the Tochi Valley and the Kurram River at Thai, has been accurately surveyed and mapped by Lieutenant Pirrie, the Survey Officer with the Tochi Force. The gazetteering and recon- naissance work was done by Major Kemball, who on one day reached the village of Biland Khel which is only some three miles from Thai. * * * . In order to preserve the continuity of what is to some extent a separate narrative, we have carried events in the Tochi Valley unin- terruptedly from the Maizar outrage in June to the submission of the castigated tribesmen in November ; and have made no mention of the graver occurrences which were being enacted the greater part of this time in other territories on our North-West frontier. Thus, while General Corrie Bird's punitive force was engaged towards the end of July in destroying Sheranni and Maizar, the Malakand position was being fiercely assailed by thousands of Swatis ; and to this stirring period the story now reverts. -^^ PART II. THE RISING IN THE SWAT VALLEY. ( 29 ) PART II. THE RISING IN THE SWAT VALLEY. CHAPTER I. THE ATTACK ON THE MALAKAND. An outbreak no less sudden than that in the Tochi Valley, and in- finitely more serious in its extent and sustained ferocity, began at the Malakand on the 26th of July when our strategical position at the head of the Pass was attacked by about 2,000 tribesmen, mostly belong- ing to the Swat country. The assailants were for the moment driven back with great losses, but also not without a severe loss to the garrison, one British Officer being killed and four others wounded, in addition to several casualties in the native rank and file. From all the information ultimately available it appeared that on the morning of the day in question, which was a Monday, news reached Malakand that a disturbance had taken place at Thana, a village a few miles to the north-east, opposite Chakdara (the outpost of our Malakand position) where the suspension bridge crosses the Swat River. It did not then seem that anything very serious had occurred, but later in the day further reports were received to the effect that the " Mad Fakir," a mullah who had gained much notoriety locally, had gathered some hundreds of tribesmen about him and was bent upon mischief. In the evening the levies employed on the road to Chakdara came flying into camp, their report being that the Swatis had risen en masse, and that the "Mad Fakir" was marching down the valley with the intention of attacking Malakand. Colonel Meiklejohn, Commanding the Malakand Brigade, decided, after consultation with Major Deane, the Political Officer, to send out a column at 3 a.m. in order to disperse the tribal gathering. But the mullah and his following anticipated this action by attacking the camp at half-past ten o'clock at night, a most unusual hour for Pathans, who usually wait until just before dawn. At 9-45 P.M., while the troops were engaged preparing for the march at daybreak, a levy jamadar arrived with the news that the ( 30 ) " Mad Fakir " and his force had passed Khar- and were advancing up the Buddhist and graded roads, and that the hillsides east of the camp were covered with Pathans. The alarm was at once sounded, all the pickets were doubled, and the regiments fell in on their alarm posts. Lieute- nant-Colonel McRae, who was commanding the 45th Sikhs, taking as many men as he could get together, at once doubled up to the point where the old Buddhist road reaches the top of the hill, and arrived at the narrow gorge through which the Buddhist road passes just in time to meet a mass of several hundred Pathans creeping silently up the road. In another few minutes they would have been in the camp. He gave them a very hot reception, holding this gorge for about 20 minutes, and finally falling back, as the enemy took possession of ground commanding the gorge, to a very strong position completely barring the road, which he held the whole remaining time. Colonel McRae's prompt action and the stubborn resistance which he, aided by Major Taylor and his small party, offered to vastly superior num- bers, undoubtedly saved the camp from being rushed on that side. As Colonel McRae fell back to the more easily defensible position he ■was reinforced by Lieutenant Barff, and thenceforth that night they held in check immense odds, fighting unremittingly till daybreak. Major Taylor was wounded in the side by a bullet early in the fight, and was carried away to hospital, knowing that he could not recover. In the centre and left of the camp, on the alarm sounding. Lieute- nant Climo, with a company of the 24th Punjab Infantry, had manned the walls of the bazar commanding the approaches from the graded road and the gorge below it. Another company of 24th Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Costello had manned the walls of the commissariat and hospital enclosures facing the gorge from the North Camp, and a third company of the same regiment supported the pickets on the left. The remainder of the regiment was held in reserve in their camp. No. 5 Company Sappers and Miners had fallen iu at the walls and abattia surrounding their own camp. It was a^pitch dark night, and at about 10-15 the first shot was fired. The eaemy made a vigorous rush at the Abbott Road picket and overpowered it. Dashing through the opening thus made they gamed • There are two places, quite (listinct liom each "ther, so named. .'""^.'^''J^^ °'''f,V' mcutiou in different parts of the nan-ativo. Tlie Khar now referred to is «''"'''■")"'; J" road between Malakai.d (aud Cha> ( 34 ) CHAPTER II. THE SITUATION IN THE SWAT COUXTRY, The rising in the Malakand was totally unexpected. Since the time when the Chitral Campaign came to an end the Lower Swat Valley had been singularly peaceful, and the people seemed well content with the new order of things. Trade had expanded, the Chitral road had been kept open without any ditficulty, and splendid crops were ex- pected in the valley. Everything in fact seemed to make for peace. Suddenly the "Mad Fakir" appeared on the scene and quickly gathered about him a large fighting force, whose boldness in attack- ing a stronghold like Malakand showed with what desperate courage they were inspired. He chiefly had with him men from Upper Swat, Mian Guls as they are called, from their adherence to the prin^^iples inculcated by their great Akhund who died some years ago. These tribesmen are noted for their fanaticism, but another motive for their action was the resentment excited by the Khan of Dir-'s attempts to extend his authority over them. Once the " Mad Fakir " had succeeded in making a disturbance at Thana, he was joined by the Lower Swatis, carried away by the rising tide of enthusiasm, and as the news of the movement spread the lawless Utman Khels from the west and a section of the Bunerwals from the south-east also sent contingents. The suddenness of the attack on the 26th July illustrates the marvellous rapidity with which the tribesmen on our borders can be mustered for warlike projects. The few hundreds who assembled in the first instance at Landaki had their numbers swollen by men from Thana, Aladand and Khar, as the " Mad Fakir" made his way down the valley ; and by nightfall the gathering was so large that the mullah was able to attack the Malakand at once. But for the news brought by the levy jamadar the pickets might have been rushed before they had been doubled, and the regiments would not have had ti>ue to reach their posts. The tribesmen apparently waited until after sunset before beginning their stealthy movement along the hills, and this further accounts for theii' sudden and unexpected appearance. Their numbers on this first night were fortunately smaller than on subsequent nights ; otherwise, with the troops broken n\) into two parties— in the North ( 35 ) Camp and on the Malakancl Ridge— the losses of the garrison nmst have been very great. Fanaticism did not entirely account for this determined rising in a country which liad been singularly peaceful for two years. The " Mad Fakir " was, undoubtedly, a power in the country at that cime, but his fiery preaching was not the sole incentive which made the villagers of Swat leave their rice-fields at a moment's notice, swarm about the Malakand, fighting with a heroic disregard for their lives, and when repulsed turning with savage fury (as will afterwards appear) upon the isolated garrison at Chakdara. "When the purdah was lifted from Swat in April 1895, the people of the valley fought one action on the Malakand and then quietly made their submission. At the close of the campaign they accepted will- ingly enough, as it appeared at the time, the new conditions which were established. They were formally brought within the sphere of British political influence, though permitted to manage their own tribal concerns ; their headmen were subsidised in return for the levies which they provided ; they benefited materially by the demand for supplies required by the troops left in occupation of the Malakand and Chak- dara ; the trade of the valley developed rapidly, owing to the im- proved load to Bajour and Chitral and the bridging of the Swat and Panjkora Rivers ; and, to add to all this, some of the material benefits of civilisation were placed within their reach. Major Deane, the Poli- tical Officer to whom their interests were entrusted, was acceptable to them, and they showed marked anxiety to refer their disputes to him for decision. No resentment was openly mainfested at the pi'e- sence of our troops in the country ; the relations between the sepoys and villagers were of the most friendly kind ; and not a single disturb- ance occurred. The annual relief of the Chitral garrison was carried out in 1896 and again in 1897 without a shot being fired in Swat, and the Government of India might fairly have congratulated itself on the peaceful outlook beyond the Malakand. We have spoken so far only of Lower Swat, through which the Chitral road runs. In Upper Swat the same contentment did not altogether prevail, though no danger was anticipated from that quarter. The reason for unrest in the upper country was the growing power of the Khan of Dir, the man whom Umra Khan had driven into exile among ( 36 ) the Swatia, but who rose as the Chief of Jhandoul fell. Mahomed Sharif Khan, after the campaign of 1895, had all the prestige which attaches to a border chief directly supported by the British Government, and he began to extend his authority over that portion of Upper Swat which adjoins Dir. Further, the people in the Talash Valley beyond Chakdara were made to feel that he might possibly claim to exercise control over them. Exactly how far he pursued a forward policy is not for the present purpose worth inquiring into, but it is certain that the Upper Swatis grew alarmed at his pretensions. The Mian Guls, the four grandsons of the old Akhund, began to fear that such power as they had might disappear, and it was difficult to reassure them. A man calling himself Mohamed Ibrahim appeared in Simla at the beginning of July bringing a letter addressed to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab from one of the grandsons of the late Akhund of Swat. It was an attempt to play a trick which is common enough in the East. Those who employed him had addressed Major Deane direct regarding their grievances and had simultaneously sent the emissary to make a separate representation at head-quarters. They hoped to obtain con- flicting orders and thus to weaken the authority of the Political Officer on the spot. Their scheming was so transparent that it was seen through at once, and their emissary was referred back to Major Deane. This was the situation in the Swat country when the " Mad Fakir " appeared on the scene. According to tribal reports this man is a native of Swat, who, in his earlier years, travelled to Central Asia and eventually settled in Mazar-i-Sharif, the Amir's chief cantonment in Afghan Turkistan. He lived there for ten yeai's and then moved to Kabul. During the sum- mer of 1897, he visited Bajour, the Utman Khel* country and Buner, preaching the necessity of waging war against all enemies of the Faith. He was in league with Hajab-ud-din, the notorious Mullah of Hadda, whose fanatical hostility to the British Government was already notori- ous and who was destined to play an active part in subsequent frontier troubles. When the " Mad Fakir " appeared in Upper Swat in July, the fame of his preaching spread far and wide. He gradually worked his way down the valley, with a huge rabble of men and boys at his heels, and on July 26th was at Landaki within hail of Chakdara. It was not * This name is also borne by several unimportant sub-sections of other and quite distinct t>ibes. In this part of the book it refers only to the clan dwelling between Swat and Bajour. ( 37 ) till then that he took the final step -which brought about the rising. He claimed to be inspired to work miracles ; the Heavenly Host were, he said, on his side ; and he announced that with or without help from his listeners he would sweep our troops from Chakdara and the Mala- kand in eight days. His excited appeals to the fanaticism dormant in every Pathan were responded to in a manner little short of marvellous : his progress from Landaki to Thana and thence to Aladand, both villages in view of the Chakdara post, must have been a triumphal one ; the villagers flew to arms ; our levies hastily retired, except such as joined his standard ; all the headmen, with one solitary exception, were carried away by the popular enthusiasm, and by nightfall a reso- lute body of tribesmen were on the move to attack the Malakand, while another party turned their attention to Chakdara, The mullah had roused the whole valley, and his standard afterwards became the rally- ing point for thousands of fighting men from Upper Swat, Buner, the Utman Khel country, and even more distant parts. >^- ( 38 ) CHAPTER III. RENEWED ATTACKS ON THE MALAKAND. Soon after daybreak on the 27th of July, in fact immediately the enemy had withdrawn after the repulse of their initial attack on the Malakand, Colonel Meiklejohn, in accordance with his original idea, sent out a column consisting of four guns of No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, one squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, and the 31st Punjab Infantry. These troops were ordered to pursue and break up any gathering in the Swat Valley and open up communication with Chakdara. They found themselves opposed to large bodies of tribesmen, but the cavalry pushed on towards Chakdara. The guns and infantry, however, had to return to Malakand. It then became clear that the rising was serious and Colonel Meiklejohn wired down south to Mardan oi'dering the Corps of Guides up with all possible speed. He withdrew the troops from the North Malakand Camp, concentrating his brigade in and about the entrenched position on the Kotal, Avhere they could best be utilised in repelling any attack in strength. At the same time he telegraphed to the head-quarters of the Punjab Command at Murree asking that rein- forcements might be sent. During this same day (July 27th) bodies of tribesmen appeared on the hills about the Malakand position, but did not venture upon any determined advance. They were fired upon when within range. The Guides arrived in the evening, though they had received the order to proceed to Malakand only at 9 p.m. the night before. They thus completed the march of 32 miles, with a long climb of seven miles at the end of itj in most oppressive heat, in something like 16 hours. It was a march to be proud of. They dropped a detachment of infantry at Dargai* at the foot of the hills so as to keep the road open. The garrison in the Malakand at that time consisted of one squad- ron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, No. 8 Mountain Battery, No. 5 Company Madras Sappers, the 24th and 31st Punjab Infantry, and the 45th Sikhs, or something under 3,000 men. Of these, 25 cavalry and 200 infantry were ordinarily detached to hold the outpost at Chakdara and the * Tliis place will not be confused with the now famous heights of the same name on the Bamaua liange, ( 39 ) bridge-head on the Swat River. The Chakdara post was considered to be impregnable, and was armed with Maxim guns which could sweep the bridge. As ample supplies and reserve ammunition are always stored there, not the least fear was entertained regarding the safety of the post itself. In response to Colonel Meiklejohn's demand for re- inforcements the following movements of troops were promptly ordered from Murree : — No. 7 British Mountain Battery from the Murree Gullies, the 3r)th Sikhs from Peshawar, the 18th Dogras from Now- shera, to Malakand ; three squadrons 11th Bengal Lancers from Now- shera, and the 22nd Punjab Infantry from Jhelum, to Mardan ; the 37th Dogras fi'om Sialkote to Peshawar ; and one Native Infantry regi- ment from the Bengal Command to Nowshera, where there was only a small detachment of British troops, as the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were absent on service in the Tochi Valley. When Colonel Meiklejohn evacuated the North Camp on Tuesday afternoon, July 27th, the tents in the camp had to be left standing, as no camel transport was available to move them and they were too heavy for the mules, being of the pattern known as " European pri- vate's." The enemy burnt them, and as the conflagration must have been visible for miles, the tribesmen from a distance flocked in to see how far successful the Swatis had been. The numbers of the enemy were thus greatly increased, and at 8-30 p.m. they again attacked Malakand on all sides. The Malakand force had by this time been redistributed, the 24th Punjab Infantry with two guns holding a conical hill on the north side of the camp commanding the approaches from the North Camp direc- tion, and the 31st Punjab Infantry with two guns and the main body of the Guides occupying the central enclosure ; two guns and 100 of the Guides wei'e sent to strengthen the 4.5th Sikhs on the right, while a party of 50 men were sent from the Fort to Maxim Point to close that side of the camp and command the water-supply. The attack commenced at 8-30 P.M. and was carried on with the same determination as on the night before, but this time the enemy did not penetrate. They, how- ever, succeeded in capturing the Serai, which was outside the line of de- fence, and in which 25 men of the 31st Punjab Infantry had been placed. The enemy attacked it with great vigour, and eventually mined it and set fire to the door. The picket held on manfully as long as they could, but ultimately had to let themselves down by the back wall and retire to the enclosure, in doing which they lost ten men. The 45th Sikhs and ( 40 ) 24tli Punjab Infantry were equally vigorously attacked, but tliey drove off the enemy with great loss. As day dawned the enemy began pressing the 24th Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant Climo, who was in command of the regiment, decided to deliver a counter-attack. Accord- ingly with 100 men he advanced up the spur to the east to meet them and delivered a tremendous fire. The enemy drew off, but were pursued and driven from crest to crest in grand style, losing about 90 killed. Lieutenant Costello was wounded in this brilliant little counter-attack, and our losses altogether on the second night were : — Lieutenant Costello slightly wounded ; native ranks, 10 killed, 45 wounded. All day during Wednesday, the 28th July, desultory fighting was going on in every direction round the camp, and large bodies of the enemy could be seen collecting from all directions and joining our foes on the hills. At 10 o'clock in the evening they attacked f\gain from all sides and with the same vigour as they had shown both nights before. The distribution of the troops remained the same as on the 27th. The attack commenced on the enclosure in which were the Sappers and Miners, the 31st Punjab Infantry and the Guides — and the brunt of the fi rush the 45th Sikhs. Thoy were met, however, with the same perfectly cool and steady resistance which this jrallant regiment had opposed to them night after night since the figlit began, and were Iwyoneted in considerable numbers. The enemy withdrew at about 3 a.m.; our casualties being only 2 sepoys wounded. The next day, Saturday, July 31st, the 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras arrived in camp after a most trying march, the heat on the road being intense, and they were a most welcome reinforcement to the garrison. All was quiet during the day and nothing but sniping into camp occur- red that night, so the troops had comparative rest. On Sunday, the 1st of August, Colonel Meiklejohn decided to take with him 1,000 infantry, one squadron of cavalry and 2 guns, and also 50 Sappers and try to relieve Chakdara. At 11 a.m. the cavalry went down to the plain by the short road to the North Camp. This move was at once discovered by the enemy, who turned up in swai^ms from every direction. The cavalry, comjoosed of the Guides Cavalry under Colonel Adams and one squadron 11th Bengal Lancers under Major Beatson, chai'ged them in grand style, and got well into them once, but the difficult nature of the ground and the skill with which the enemy availed themselves of it prevented their going far, and they had to fall back, having accounted for nearly 100 of the enemy. They returned into camp under cover of the fire from the _ infantry and guns, their casualties being : British Officers:— Captain Baldwin, Guides, severely wounded, and Lieutenant Keyes, Guides, slightly wounded. Native ranks : — 1 killed, 12 wounded. Colonel Adams had his horse shot under him. It was now so late in the day and the enemy were evidently in such numbers, that it was thought impossible to get to Chakdara that night, Avith the probability of having to fight three fights on the way, one in getting out of the kotal, another at Butkela and the third at Amandara Pass. The attempt was accordingly put off till the next day. At Chakdara itself, the attacks upon the fort had been almost con- tinuous, and it looked as if the assailants intended to wear out the garrison, and, if possible, cause them to exhaust their ammunition. Practically, it was impossible for the enemy to capture the fort until the troops holding it had no cartridges left, and even then storming parties might be beaten back with the bayonet, as the fort stands on a scarped, rocky eminence of great natural strength. A heliograph message had however been received at Malakand from Chakdaiu with the two ( 44 ) ■words "Help us" and great anxiety was consequently felt for the little force. A heliograph had been sent in reply " Expect us to- morrow morning. Is the bridge standing ? " But no reply to the ques- tion had come back. It was imperative therefoi-e to relieve the post at all costs. How this relief was carried out at a critical moment will presently be related. X ( 45 ) chaptfh IV. THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE. Owing to the serious aspect of affairs in the Swat Valley orders were issued from Army Head-Quarters for the troops at Malakand, together with those moving up, to be formed into a Division for field service, the command of which was given to Brigadier-General Sir Bindon Blood (then commanding the Bundelkhand District), with a complete staff. The 1st Brigade, under Colonel Meiklejohn, was to be composed of the Royal West Kent Regiment, the 24th Punjab Infantry, the 31st Punjab Infantry and the 45th Sikhs. The 2nd Brigade, under Colonel Jeffreys, then officiating in command of the Sirhind District, was to be composed of the Buffs, the 35th Sikhs, the 38th Dogras and the Guides Infantry. The Divisional corps were to be No. 1 and No. 7 British and No. 8 Bengal Mountain Batteries, No. 5 Company Madras, and No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, the Guides Cavalry and one squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers. Colonel Aitkin was given the command of the Royal Artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel Schalch, 11th Bengal Infantry, was made Base Commandant at Nowshera. The following was the full staff of the new Malakand Field Force : — Commanding, Brigadier-General Sir B. Blood ; Assistant Adjutant- General, Major H. H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders ; Assistant Quarter- master-General, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Masters, Central India Horse ; Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Department, Cap- tain H. E. Stanton, R.A. ; Field Intelligence Officer, Captain H. F. Walters, 24th Bombay Infantry ; Signalling Officer, Captain E. W. M. Norie, Middlesex Regiment ; Principal Medical Officer, Surgeon-Colonel G. Thomson ; Commanding Royal Artillery, Colonel W. Aitkin ; Ad- jutant, Royal Artillery, Captain H. D. Grier ; Field Engineer, Major £. Blunt ; Assistant Field Engineers, Lieutenants C. M. F. Watkins and H. O. Lathbury ; Ordnance Officer, Captain W. W. Cookson, R.A. ; Chief Commissariat Officer, Major H. Wharry ; Assistant Com- missariat Officer, Lieutenant A. S. Cobbe, 32nd Pioneers ; Divisional Transport Officer, Captain C. G. R. Thackwell ; Assistant Transport Officer, Captain F. H. Hancock, 26t.h Punjab Infantry ; Veterinary ( 40 ) Officer, Captain tt. T. W. Mann ; Provost Mar.'shal, Captain C. fi. V. Edwards, nth Punjab Cavalry. 1st Brigade St off : — Commanding, Colonel W. H. Meiklejohn ; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Major E. A. P. Hobday, R.A. ; Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, Captain G. F. H. Dillon, 40tl) Patbans; Commissariat Officer, Captain C. H. Beville ; Brigade Transport Officer^ Captain J. M. Camillery ; Regimental Transport Officer, Lieutenant R. Hariuan, 4th Sikhs ; Veterinary Officer, Captain W. R. Walker. 2nd Brigade Staff : — Commanding, Colonel P. D. Jeffreys ; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Major E. O. F. Hamilton, Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment ; Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, Major C. H. Powell, Ist Gurkhas ; Commissariat Officer, Captain G. A. Hawkins ; Brigade Transport Officer, Captain D. Baker, Bombay Grenadiers ; Regimental Transport Officer, Lieutenant G. C. Brooke, Border Regiment ; Veterinary Officer, Lieutenant T. W. Rudd. Bane and Line of Comirinnicadon ." — Base Commandant, Colonel V. A. Schalch, 11th Bengal Infantry ; Staff Officer at Base, Captain H. Scott, Royal Sussex Regiment ; Section Commandant, Captain O. B. S. F. Shore, 18Lh Bengal Lancers ; Commissariat Officer, Captain S. W, Lincoln ; Assistant Commissariat Officer, Lieutenant E. G. Vaughan ; Transport Officers, Lieutenants R. S. Weston, Manchester Regiment, and E. F. Macnaghten, 16tli (Queen's) Lancers. Brigadier-General Sir Bindon Blood was given the temporary rank of Major-General while commanding the Malakand Field Force, and Colonel W. H. Meiklejohn and Colonel P. D. Jeffreys were given the temporary rank of Brigadier-General while commanding the 1st and 2nd Brigades respectively under Sir Bindon Blood. Orders were also issued for the immediate formation of a Reserve Brigade for the Malakand Field Force. This was composed as fol- lows:— Commanding, Brigadier-General J. Wodehouse, R.A. Troops: — The Highland Light Infantry from Cawnpore, the Gordon High- landers from Rawalpindi, the 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas from Dharm- sala, the 10th Field Battery from Rawalpindi, and No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers from Kirkee. The formation of this Reserve Brigade was due to further inform- ation received as to the attitude of the tribesmen in the Swat Valley. It was by this time clear that four sections of the BuUfi wals were in the ( 47 ) field, and thnnoh the Malakand position was no longer in danger there were ten or twelve thousand of the enemy on the hills to the north, the north-east and the south-west, as well as in the Swat Valley itself. Sir Bindon Blood arrived at Malakand in advance of some of his troops on Sunday, August 1st (the day when Colonel Meiklejohn made his ineffectual attempt to relieve Chakdara% and at once assumed command. After inspecting the Malakand defences and the garrison, he reported to Army Head-Quarters that all the arrangements made by Colonel Meiklejohn were admirable in every way, and the position absolutely secure. He described the spirit of the troops as excellent, all showing eagerness to be led against the enemy. He warmly praised " their soldierly bearing and keenness after the almost continuous fighting of the Week, with little rest at night and exposure to sun during the day." With such troops there could no longer be any lack of confidence in assuming the offensive and in relieving Chakdara, as the Malakand garrison now comprised more than four thousand infantry, five or six hundred cavalry, one company of Sappers and a mountain battery. The heliograph, it will be remembered, had already told the Mala- kand garrison that help was urgently needed at Chakdara. On the evening of Monday, .July 26th, almost simultaneously with the first assault on the Malakand, Chakdara had been invested by a large force of Pathans, who attacked from all sides. The garrison of four British Officers, two companies of the 45th Sikhs, and 25 sowars of the lltli Bengal Lancers, was augmented on the Tuesday, under circumstances already described, by two Officers and 40 sowars of the] 1th Bengal 'Lancers from Malakand. Communications in the fort were commanded ■from nearly all sides by the enemy, who sniped from cover at from 100 to 200 yards distance. Frequent attacks were made on the Tuesday and Wednesday, the enemy bringing ladders and bundles of grass to get over the wire entanglement. All this time the garrison could get no rest, not being able to tell when or where the enemy's attack would next take place. On the Thursday night a desperate assault was made on the isolated signal tower, garrisoned by 16 men, but was repulsed with great loss. On the Friday, the strength of the enemy in men and Martini-Henry rifles was very much increased, and they so closely sur- rounded the fort that no one could leave cover. This critical condition of affairs continued till the Sunday night when the tribesmen made an- other fierce onslaught, which was still in progress the following morning when the relieving force from the Malakand dashed victoriously upon the scene, ' ■ ( 48 ) CHAPTER V. THE RELIEF OF CITAKDARA. The relief of Chakdara was carried out by Colonel Meiklejolin in bril- liant style on Monday morning, August 2nd. In order to clear the way for the relieving column, it was necessary at the outset to disperse the enemy on the hills to the east and north-east, as they commanded the road leadinf into the Swat Valley. This task was assigned to Colonel Gold- ney, who took with him two mountain guns, the 35th Sikhs and the 38th Dogras, these two regiments being quite fresh, as they had had two days' rest after arrival at Malakand. At the very first streak of dawn Colonel Goldney silently advanced from the position his troops had held at night to within rushing distance of the enemy's position without firing a shot. He charged the position with the bayonet, taking the enemy completely by surprise. They fired a few wild shots and then fled in every direction, disappearing like rabbits among the huge rocks and boulders with which the whole side of the hill down to the foot of the oi-aded road is covered. Their exact casualties were never ascertained, but seven dead bodies were found and one prisoner was taken. At the same time that Colonel Goldney started. Colonel Meiklejohn also moved off with his force, and he got three-fourths of the way down the graded road before a shot was fired at him. Those of the enemy, however, who bad fled from Colonel Goldney's attack had carried the alarm down to the villages and encampments at the foot of the hill, and Colonel Meikle- john soon saw swarms of men with many banners running out of the villages and down the hillsides to prepare to oppose him. They took up a position across the road ; their right being strongly posted on a conical hill west of the graded road, their left resting on a high spur running from the main mountain and completely commanding the road. Colonel Meiklejohn immediately deployed to his left, sending a party to seize the levy post, which was about 600 yards in advance of the enemy's position. It was grand to see the way the troops advanced. They had longed for this opportunity, and they went at it with a determination that the enemy doubtless appreciated. The fire was brisk on both sides, but there was no delaying our troops. They rushed the hill occupied by the enemy's right and drovs ( 49 ) them from it. The enemy fled up the- hills to the east, and in the dix'ec- tions of Khar and Butkela, where they were met by a friendly stream drawn from Butkela by the noise of the firins^. Thefleeing and advancing portions of the enemy met where the road crosses the saddle of the Dogras Hill, and here they re-formed, taking up a position on Dogra Hill. Colonel Meiklejohn, without wasting a moment, advanced on this se- cond position, covered by the fire of his guns, sending his cavalry round the north point of the hill, so as to be in a position to cut off the enemy from Khar and Butkela. The enemy, however, would not wait to be attacked. Many of them probably had a remembrance of the Guides' charge over the same plain in 1895, and they fled. They were too late, however, for in a few minutes the cavalry were on them, through them, and beyond them to the villages of Khar and Butkela, leaving our polo ground and the whole plain dotted over with what appeared to the garrison left behind in Malakand Fort only little black heaps, but were in reality Swatis, Bunerwals, and others who would fight no more. The cavalry scoured the whole plain, and only those escaped from them who took to the broad stretch of rice-fields on the banks of the river. This sudden dart from the Malakand spread terror in the valley and people could be seen hurrying in every direction from the village to the river bank, carrying away what they could. Colonel Meiklejohn's force, however, had another and more pressing object in view than in cutting these men off, and so the cavalry resumed their direction straight for Chakdara, having first dismounted a third of a squadron, and given the gathering on the banks a few rousing volleys. Colonel Meiklejohn, having taken Dogras Hill, resumed his march, and disappeared from the view of those who had watched with admiration the brilliant and dashing manner in which the previous week's score was being wiped out. Covered by the cavalry, Colonel Meiklejohn's force advanced on Butkela, which was occupied by the enemy. The cavalry got beyond the village without a shot being fired at them, and galloped on to the Amandara Pass, holding it with dismounted men, and then cut off the enemy's retreat. The infantry came up rapidly and attacked Butkela. The enemy made next to no resistance and fled across the rice -fields to the river, where the cavalry could not pursue them. As soon as the infantry came up to the Anmndara Pass, the cavalry dashed ( 50 ) on towards Cliakdara, where, from the noise and smoke, rt was evident that severe fighting was going on. The cavahy reached Cliakdara at 9 a.m. Tlic Ivridge was intact, but the enemy were occupying the Civil Hospital and the terraces of the hill on which the signalling tower is and also innumerable sunffars all over the level ground and rice-fields round the north and east sides of the fort, from which they kept up a lieavy fire. The cavalry at once crossed the bridge, part of the garrison moving out to cover their crossing, and on reaching the north bank they at once moved out against the enemy in the open, getting among those on the hard ground and attacking those in the smit/ara in the rice-fields with dismounted fire, while the fort supported them with fire from their 9-pounder guns and Maxims* They killed a great many of the enemy, who began to retire at once, some towards Uch, others up the valley to Upper Swat. In many of the sungars light scaling-ladders were found, with which the enemy had evidently intended to get over the walls of the fort. The Chakdara gari'ison were in good spirits and holding their own magnificently. The party in the mgimlling tower were suffering most, not having had any water for two days. The only casualty that morning among Officers was Lieutenant Rattray, severely wounded in the neck, who was hit in coming oat to cover the passage of the cavalry to cross the bridge. Other casualties among the garrison were very slight. The fort had proved itself practically impregnable and the garrison had behaved gallantly. Tliey had been fighting with hardly any sleep for seven days. Colonel Meiklejohn arrived with the infantry at 10, by which time the fighting had ceased. It may be added here that in addition to the troops already spoken of the Chakdara Relieving Column included No. 5 Queen's Own Sappers and Miners. The casualties in Colonel Meiklejohn's force in the morning's operations were : — Native ranks, 4 killed and 26 wounded. No British Officers were hit. As for the enemy, their losses had all along been enormous. The following were sent in as reliable estimates for the week's fighting at Malakand and Chakdara :— At Malakand, 700 ; at the fighting with Colonel Meiklejohn's force on its way to Chakdara, over .lOO ; at Chakdara, 2,000. The Maxims and 9-pounder guns at Chakdara did great execution. One discharge of grape from the 9-pounder smooth- bore is supposed to have accounted for 80 men. Another shot, which ( 51 ) happened to land in the mosque at Chakdara while the enemy were at prayer, killed a considerable number. Several stories are told of the individual courage of the Pathans, and the ff r sneral Klles lifted the jMrdah of the Bohai Valley ( I'iilc Chapter VI). ( 67 ) operate in any direction, while a reserve brigade liad been formed at Mardan which could move at a few hours' notice into the Peshawar Valley. As for the Mohmand tribes, a few woi'ds will suffice to tell all that needs to be stated here about them. They hold the country bounded on the south by the Kabul River from Jellalabad to its entrance into British territory, and on the north by Bajour. They extend west- wards to the hill country above the Kunar River, and in the east they touch the Peshawar border and the Utman Khel country lying about the junction of the Swat and Panjkora Rivers. Under the Durand Treaty they came partly under the political influence of the Indian Government and partly under that of the Amir of Kabul. The actual demarcation of the zones of influence has never been carried out, the attempt to form a Boundary Commission having come to nought a few months previously. The following is an official description of the Mohmand territory : "The country of the Mohmands is divided naturally into two parts, the rich alluvial lands along the bank of the Kabul River from Jellalabad to Lalpura, and the country to the east of Lalpura, consisting of a network of hills and valleys. The principal of the latter are the valleys of Shilman, Gandab and Pandiali. They are, as a rule, dry and arid water-courses, raging torrents in heavy rain, but usually presenting a stony and shingly bed, from which slopes of barren ground lead to the rocky spurs and ranges that flank them." As the Durand boundary runs from Landi Kotal eastwards of Lalpura and then along the watershed separating the basins of the Kunar and Panjkora Rivers, the most considerable portions of the country are within the British zone. The fijihting strength of the whole tribe is put at between 17,000 and 18,000, the Baizai accounting for one-half of the total. These hold the eastern part of the country adjacent to Bajour and the Utman Khel border. The Mohmands had never been accounted an enemy of much importance in previous conflicts with our troops. In 1880 they made but a poor resistance, when some 5,000 of them, who had crossed the Kabul River near Dakka, were attacked by a column 850 strong under Colonel Boisragon. On an earlier occasion, in 1879, a small detach- ment of 170 men of the Merwara Battalion, under Captain O'Moore Creagh, successfully held a position near Kane Dakka against several thousand Mohmands who attacked for six hours. As a tribe, the Mohmands are split up into six clans : the Baizai, already mentioned, good fighting men ; the Tarakzai, (including the Is Khel and Barhan Khel), 2,800 ; the Halimzai, 2,600 ; the Khwaizai, 1,800 ; the Dawezai, ( 68 ) 800 ; and the Utmahzai, 400. There is a conipavatively easy route into their country from Matta, a few miles north of Shabkadr, over the Inzari Pass.* This is known as the Alikandi route, and it might have been used by the Chitral Relief Force in 1895 in preference to that over the Malakand, but it was thought desirable not to enter the Mohmand country at that time. * Another pass bearing this name, situate in the Afridi country, comes into the xiaxrative later. ><- ( G9 ) CHAPTER II. PROMPT REPRISALS. The report regarding the retirement of the Mohmand raiders after the arrival at Shabkadr of strong reinforcements from Peshawar was true only in part. They withdrew to the low hills which run from the main ranges to within a mile of the Fort, which is three miles from the border line. Here they remained out of gunshot range. Their numbers increased on Sunday night, August 8th, the presence of the Hadda Mullah serving to attract contingents from all the Mohmand clans, with the exception of the Tarakzai. On Monday morning, August 9th, at daybreak, Lieutenant-Colonel Woon, 20th Punjab Infantry, who had been left in command at Shab- kadr by Brigadier-General Elles, moved out his troops to the attack. He had at his disposal four guns of the 51st Field Battery, two squad- rons of the 13th Bengal Lancers, two companies of the Somersetshire Light Infantry, and the whole of the 20th Punjab Infantry 600 strong, or a total of between 1,100 and 1,200 men. The enemy's line was about two miles in length, some 6,000 men, at least, being assembled. Their right rested on the high hills, their centre extended across the low hills, while their left stretched* into the cultivated ground in the plain itself. Colonel Woon began his attack with the infantry, shortly after 6 o'clock, but could make no impression on the position, and his small force was outflanked by the Mohmands, who streamed out into the plain on either hand. To guard against the infantry being completely enveloped. Colonel Woon began to withdraw towards the Fort. At this period of the action Brigadier-General Elles arrived on the scene and took command. He had had to return to Peshawar on the previous day to arrange the disposition of the garrison thex'e (weakened by the sudden call upon it) and to report by telegraph to Army Head- Quarters the state of affairs on the border. He left Peshawar again early that morning, taking with him two companies of the 30th Punjab Infantry. On arrival at the ferry over the Kabul River, he heard the sound of heavy firing at Shabkadr and at once pushed on, leaving the infantry to follow. ( 70 ) General Elles reached the scene of action at 8-40 a.m., by whidi time most of the enemy had swarmed down from the low hills and were en- gaged with our infantry in the open, and he at once saw the favourable opportunity offered for using his cavalry. He first concentrated the fire of the four guns upon the enemy's left, and then directed the two squad- rons of the 13th Bengal Lancers to charge from right to left along the whole line of tribesmen. This charge was brilliantly carried out under the leadership of Major Atkinson, commanding. The two squad- rons of Lancers swept right along from end to end of the line, rallying and re-forming on the left of the infantry. Their losses were few, but Major Atkinson and Lieutenant Cheyne had their horses shot. By this time the two companies of the 30th Punjab Infantry had come up, and an infantry attack was ordered against the enemy before they could re- cover from the effects of the cavalry charge. The Mohmands were driven back, and pursued to the foot of the high hills, on which they took re- fuge. Had an additional cavalry regiment been present they would, in General Elles's opinion, have been almost completely cut off, but as it was, their losses were very heavy, as the dead they left on the ground showed. The action was over by 10-30 a.m. ; General Elles not con- sidering it desirable, with the small infantry force at his command, to push further into the hills, particularly as his men had been hotly engaged for four hours. The Mohmands, however, had received a sufficiently sharp lesson, and they began to retire over the hills when the troops returned to Shabkadr, and by two o'clock not a man was to be seen. The Hadda Mullah, who was present during the fight, had evidently seen that liis defeat could not be retrieved. Our casualties in this affair were 12 killed and 52 wounded; not heavy losses considering how sharp was the fighting, and the number of the enemy. Severely wounded : Major Lumb, Somersetshire Light In- fantry, bullet wound in the neck ; Captain Blacker, 51st Field Battery, bullet wound in the leg. Slightly wounded •' Lieutenant Cheyne, 13th Bengal Lancers, The details of the casualties were as follows :— Somer- setshire Light Infantry : 4 men killed, 8 wounded severely, 1 slightly ; 20th Punjab Infantry, 7 killed, 20 wounded severely, 1 slightly ; 13th Bengal Lancers, 1 killed, 8 wounded severely, 6 slightly. Another account of the fight gave the following additional details :— " Our infantry attacked in front, the cavalry and artillery on the right being thrown forward for the advantage of the ground, and to threaten ( 71 ) the enemy's line of retreat. The enemy changed front to meet this, and swarmed on both flanks under heavy rifle fire from our left, and they pressed hard to cut us off from the Fort, distant about 2 miles. Most of our casualties occurred at this time, but the artillery kept the enemy off on our right. General EUes with his Staff arrived at this moment, about 9 a.m., and took over command. He lengthened and threw back our left and ordered the cavalry out to the right front. Captain Blacker of the Artillery here received his wound. The cavalry charged down the enemy's line, rolling it up, and in spite of the heavy ground and bad going, the charge was brilliantly executed by Major F. G. Atkinson, Lieutenant A. G. B. Turner, and Lieutenant Cheyne and two squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers, supported by the artillery fire directed ahead of the cavalry line. The enemy immediately fled to the tops of the foot hills, and remained watching in groups. Shells dispersed the groups, but our force was too small to enter the hills in pursuit. On our side the total number engaged was just 800, and with these were only 15 British Officers, including General EUes and Staff, and four of these were wounded in addition to the Medical Officer. The latter was struck by a stone knocked up by a bullet, and incapacitated for a short while, but he insisted on returning to duty. Cei'tainly first aid to the wounded was efliciently performed, and in this case saved many lives. None of the wounded have yet died, and none apparently are in bad case. Seventy-seven were killed or wounded, a loss of about 10 per cent." A curious fact worth mentioning is that the ground on which the action was fought was practically the same as that on which Sir Colin Campbell in 1852 with 600 men met and defeated 6,000 Mohmands, and where again in January 1864 Colonel A. Macdonnel, of the Rifle Brigade, with 1,750 men, defeated a body of 5,000, who held the low hills facing Shabkadr. The success of the latter, like that of General Elles, was due to the cavalry, the Mohmands being tempted into the plain and then charged. A squadron of the 7th Hussars on that occasion made three successive charges which enabled the infantry to act with decisive effect against the enemy's broken line. Having withdrawn the troops to the neighbourhood of the Fort, General Elles returned to Peshawar, and immediately ordered up to Shabkadr the remainder of the Somersetshire Light Infantry and 250 of the 37th Dogras, so as to be ready to assume the offensive if the Mohmands should reappear. At 3 o'clock, however, a heliographic message was received from Shabkadr stating that no enemy could be seen even on the distant hills. ( 72 ) As it was impossible to say how far the excitement extended along the border, General Elles called up tluee companies of the 8th Bengal Infantry from Nowshera, and at the same time asked for one battery of artillery, a regiment of native cavalry and one of native infantry, it being important to have a garrison at Peshawar. The Gordon Highlanders, under orders from Army Head-Quarters, had been despatched from Rawalpindi by train at midnight on Sunday, August 8th, and reached Peshawar on the Monday afternoon ; the 2nd Queen's from JuUundur replacing them at Rawalpindi as part of the Re- serve Brigade of the Malakand Division. The arrival of the Gordon Highlanders filled the gap at Peshawar caused by sending the Somer- setshire Light Infantry to Shabkadr. The troops now watching the Mohmand Frontier were the 51st Field Battery (four guns), two squadrons 13th Bengal Lancers, the Somersatshire Light Infantry (740 strong), the 20th Punjab Infantry (600 strong), the 30th Punjab Infantry (300), and the 37th Dogras (250); a handy force of about 2,200 men. A reconnaissance was made on Tuesday, August lOth, five miles into the hills from Shabkadr without any enemy being seen. The Mohmands, however, were reported as intending to return to the attack after i-eplenishing their ammunition and food supplies. They were said to have lost between three and fuur hundred killed and several hundred wounded in the action on the 9th August, The reinforcement of the Peshawar garrison was most promptly carried out. In addition to the Gordon Highlandez's from Rawalpindi and the three companies of the 8th Bengal Infantry, the 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas arrived on the scene. The Gurkhas had been intended for the Reserve Brigade at Mardan, but on arrival by train at Nowshex-a they were sent straight on. The 9th Bengal Lancers and the 57th Field Battery from Carapbellpore were also ordered up. These reinforce- ments enabled General Elles to send the whole of the 13th Bengal Lancers to Shabkadr, thus raising the strength of the force there to about 2,500 men. Apart from this detached column General Elles eventually had the following troops in Peshawar itself : one section of the 51st Field Battery and the whole of No. 57 Field Battery, No. 5 Company Bengal Sappers, 9th Bengal Lancers, the Devonshire Regiment, the Gordon Highlanders, the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Gurkhas, five companies of the 30th Punjab Infantry, six companies of the 37th Dogras, and three companiea of the 8th Bengal Infantry { r.\ ) As the i^oneral sitiiaLioii <»ii the North- W^cst Froiitior now presented itself, however, it was obviously wise to still t'urthei- strengthen the gairison of Feshawai' so as to have a seeond eolunin ready to take the field in case the tribal excitement should spi'ead. The Government of India therefore ordered up the following troops :— 4tli Dragoon Guards and " K " Battery Royal Horse Artillery, from Rawalpindi; the 26th Punjab Infantry from Jullundur, and No. 3 (British) Mountain Battery from Jutogh, Simla Hills. For the next five days or so phenomenally heavy rains came down and made matters extremely uncomfortable for the Peshawar and Shab- kadr garrisons. The fair vale of Peshawar almost disappeared under watei-, and the roads were turned into bogs, the one to Shabkadr being a veritable slough of despond to Transport Officers. The new bridge over the Kabul River, which runs midway between Peshawar and Shabkadr, was a triumph of engineering skill. The current at that time was coming down with a roar at a speed of from ten to twelve knots an hour, and was generally level with and sometimes overflowing the banks ; but the bridge, which was held by wire hawsers, splendidly withstood the flood : it consisted of country boats, pontoon system, and its length was about two hundred yards. Fortunately the floods did not interfere with any urgent military operations, for the reason that no immediate operations were possible without an enemy ; and the Mohmand warriors, imitating the beaten Swatis at Chakdara, had completely disappeared. The Mullah of Hadda was so discredited that he had retired temporarily to his haunt in the Bohai Valley. The " Mad Fakir " in Swat, in replying to a mess- age from the Hadda Mullah asking for congratulations, was reported to have sent the answer—" Dog, you have done nothing ! " which indeed was the plain truth. On August the 22nd, however, about a fortnight after the action at Shabkadr, it was reported at Peshawar that the Hadda Mullah had again worked up the Mohmands, and that he in- tended to attack both Shabkadr and Michni, one tribal column coming down the Gandab Valley and another by the more northerly Alikandi route. This demonstration was announced as arranged for Monday, August 23rd. If it had actually taken place the Mohmands would have had a warm i^eception, as more cavalry were now on the scene with General Elles than were available on the 9th of the month ; but the still smarting tribesmen were apparently not to be thus easily inflamed a second time. As a matter of fact many of them were attending ( 74 ) peacefully to their fields, the recent heavy rains havin? rendered agri- cultural work a necessity ; added to which the war council of the tribe was for the moment hopelessly torn by internal dissensions. * * * "While General Elles was awaiting permission from head-quarters to press home retaliation upon the Mohmands, signs of restlessness were being reported day by day from the Afridi and Orakzai country, and at length on Tuesday, August 24th, the smouldering embers of fanaticism in this new direction burst suddenly into flames, and a fierce attack was made upon our Forts in the Khyber Pass. This new rising, however, and the grave events which succeeded it, require separate narration, and are only mentioned here for the sake of chronology, and because they influenced the Government of India in deciding upon the further exemplary operations against the Mohmands now to be described. X- ( 75 ) CHAPTER III. THE MOHMAND EXPEDITION, During the .first week in September the welcome announcement was received in Peshawar that the Government of India had sanctioned extensive punitive measures against the various tribes on the Peshawar border, and that the Mohraands would be the first tribe to be taken in hand. Definite orders followed for the immediate concentration at Shab- kadr of two brigades under the command of General Elles, the troops to be drawn from the force already in and about Peshawar. The Peshawar force at that time numbered something like 9,000 men, although it had just been depleted by the despatch to the disturbed Afridi and Orakzai frontier of the 6th Bengal Cavalry, the 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas, and the 30th Bengal Infantry. The proposed movement against the Mohmands was well timed, as the Hadda Mullah was once again reported to be on the war-path, this time with 4,000 Baizai Mohmands, his intention being to re-visit Shab- kadr. His other ambitious plan (already described) for attacking Dir and cutting round to Chitral had come to nought, owin» to the rapid move- ment across the Panjkora Eiver of the Uch force under Brigadier-General Wodehouse, a'nd owing also to Sir Bindon Blood's promptness in recall- ing Briyadier-General Jeffreys' Brigade from the Utman Khel Expedi- tion. Everything pointed to the operations of our troops being short and decisive, as two powerful forces were about to move upon the con- demned country from opposite directions. Sir Bindon Blood, with the two brigades of the Malakand Field Force under Brigadier-General Wodehouse and Brigadier-General Jefi'reys, was acting from the north and east, while General Elles, with two brigades (commanded by Bri- gadier-General Westmacott and Brigadier-General Macgregor), would move forward from Shabkadr on the southern side. The composition and staff of the Mohmand expeditionary force fi'om Peshawar were as follows : — Commanding : Brigadier-General Elles with the rank of Major- General; A.-D.-C, Lieutenant E. Elles ; A. Q.-M.-G., Major P. Sulivan, RE.; Commanding Royal Artillery, Colonel A. E. Duthy ; Adjutant, R. A., Captain W.K. McLeod ; D. A. Q.-M.G, for Intelligence, Captain ( 7G ) r. A. Jloghton, Iflt Bombay Gronadiors ; Field Intelligence OfTicor, liieutenant C!. E. E. F. K. Maoqnoid, Hyderabad Contingent ; Principal INIedical OlHecr, Surgeon-Colonel E. Townsend ; Field Engineer, Major Kelly ; Assistant Field Engineers, Lieutenants VV. A. Stokes and C. B. L. Greenstreet; Ordnance Officer, Major F. E. Rowan ; Chief Commis- sariat Officer, Captain G. R. C. Westropp; Divisional Transport Officer, (!aptain F.C. W. liideout; (^munissariat Officer for the Base at Shabkadr, Lieutenant E. G. Vauglian ; Veterinary Officer, Veterinary -Captain F. W. Forsdyke ; Provost Marshal, Major II. S. Massy, 19th Bengal I>ancers. I'lf. Brigaile : — 0>mnianding, Brigadier-General Westmacott. Troops: Somerset Light Infantry, 20th Punjab Infantry, 2ik1 Battalion 1st Gurkhas. <2nd Brigade .•— ODmmandingr, Brigadier-General C^. R. Macgregor. Troops : Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 9th Gurkhas, six companies 37th ] )ogras. Divisional Troopn .—13th Bengal Lancers, No. 3 British and No 5 Bombay Mountain Batteries 28th Bombay Pioneers, and one regiment of Imperial Service Infantry. The Maharaja of Patiala and Sir Partab Singh of Jodhpur joined General Elles's personal staff as extra Aides-de-Camp ; Major W. J. Bythell, R.E., accompanied the Mohmand Expedition in charge of the survey. It will be noticed that certain Imperial Service Troops were includ- ed in the expeditionary force, and the following notification on the sub- ject, which was issued from the Foreign Department on September 5th, affords all the explanation that is necessary : — "The tiibal disturbances on the frontier have prompted the ruling Chiefs in all parts of India to come forward with their wonted loy alty to press upon the Governor- General in Council the services of their Imperial Service Troops. The Governor-General in Council has resolved that the time has come when the assistance of the troops so loyally prepared and maintained may be accepted from the Chiefs of the Punjab, and when they may be allowed to co-operate in punishing those who have made and are making per- sistent efforts to disturb the peace of that Province. It is impossible to employ cavalry to any great extent in the expeditions which have now to be undertaken ; the Governor-General in Council has therefore ( 77 ) tlocidcd to aceopt from the States in the ruiijab the service of four bat- talions of infantry and of two companies of Sappers and Miners. These troops will immediately proceed to the front. It has also been deter- mined to utilise the services of the Gwalior and Jaipur transport trains which did such good work in the Chitral Expedition, and which the pat- riotic action of His Highness the Maharaja Sindhia and His Highness the Maharaja of Jaipur places again at the disposal of the Government of India. Orders have been given tliat the thanks of the Government of India should be conveyed to all the Chiefs from whom otfers of troops have been received. The urgency and unanimity, which charac- terise the action in this respect of rulers of States in India emphatical- ly testify to the spirit of loyalty which animates them." The plan of campaign, already outlined, may now be more fully unfolded. During previous border wars the custom in attacking hostile tribes had been to march straight into their country on one line of advance. This had always enabled the tribesmen to gather at a single point, generally a pass, offering a good defensive position, thus compel- ling our troops to storm breastworks before making good their entrance into the country. In some instances heavy losses had been incurred by our troops in this way, and progress had necessarily been slow. The present expedition was being conducted on very different lines. Our possession of Lower Swat and the opening out of the road to Chitral through Dir permitted of a strong flank movement being made against the Mohmands, pending the development of which General Elles would not move out from Shabkadr. Sir Bindon Blood had crossed the Panjkora Eiver at Sado, and was marching rapidly due west up the Ushiri Valley to Mandia, the route followed by Sir Robert Low in the Chitral Campaign. From Mandia a road leads south-west up the Khaluzi Valley to the high range which separates Bajour proper from the Mohmand country. This range Sir Bindon Blood intended to cross by a pass overlooking Nawagai, the head-quarters of the Khan of that name, who had assumed a particularly friendly attitude towards the British Raj. This Chief is an old rival of Umra Khan's and his territory in the south touches the Mittai Valley, a tract about which there had been a dispute between the Government and the Amir of Kabul. From Sado to Nawagai is about 50 miles. When our troops reached Nawagai, they would be in rear of the Mohmands and could march to any point in their country. A caravan route leads due south to the Peshawar border and this would perhaps be the best to follow as it ( 78 ) passes throngli Lokerai in tlio Bnliai Valley, where the Mohmands have many villages. The Mohmands, on the appearance of Sir Bindon Blood's Division at Nawagai, would be obliged to gather their fighting- men to oppose his advance southwards. They had never been attacked from the north before, and would clearly be taken at a disadvantage. But at the very time at which their attention would be turned to Nawagai, their scouts would bring in news that another big force had entered the country from Shabkadr and was pressing forward through the Gandab defile upon Lokerai. This place is 30 miles from Nawagai and about 50 from Shabkadr. As each division was 5,000 strong, and as the total strength of the Mohmands was only 17,000, of which one-half had to be furnished by the Baizai clans to the extreme west, the tribe was not likely to make much of a fight against the two forces. The Mohmands are a poverty-stricken race, and, unlike the Afridis, were badly armed, as they had never been able to purchase breech- loading rifles. In the raid on Shabkadr they were assisted by the clans which owe allegiance to the Amir, but help could not, it was believed, reach them from this direction now, as Abdur Rahman * had shown that he would not permit his subjects to join in the fighting on the border. As our two divisions moved to meet each other in the Boliai Valley, the tribesmen would probably flee to the hills, though they might make some show of resistance at the outset. Their villages would lie open to the troops, and columns could be sent out in various directions. Jarobi, the head-quarters of the Hadda Mullah, would doubtless be visited, as it lies at the head of the valley and could readily be reached. This then was the plan of operations, and predictions were not wanting that within a week the Mohmand operations would be over, the four brigades being then free to move against the Afridi and Orakzai combination. As a matter of fact, the expedition (as will be shown) occupied more than a month, and to at least a portion of the troops engaged afibrded quite as much fighting as even a keen soldier could desire. No proclamation was issued to the Mohmands before our troops moved into their country. Our Political Officers, however, made known that the visit was not made in order to deprive any tribe of its independ- ence, but because the British Government were determined to "take such measures as would insure its border against being attacked in the future.'' Further, the Mohmands were informed that if any opposition * The attitude of the Amir towards the various tribes breakiug the peace ou our fron- tier is alluded to more fully in a later chapter. ( 79 ) was offered, those who engaged in hostilities would be followed up and punished. On Saturday, the 11th of September, Major-General Elles and the Divisional Staff moved out from Peshawar to Shabkadr, and Colonel A. Gaselee, then commanding Cawn^Dore station, took over the command of the Peshawar District with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General. On Monday, the 13th September, the whole force was concentrated on the Shabkadr-Michini road, and after a delay of two days man^hed off. This short delay, it is worth explaining, was due to causes affecting General Blood's further advance upon Nawagai. Major Deane, before leaving General Blood and returning to Swat, desired to secure the complete submission of the Utman Khels, who had apparently been wholesomely alarmed by the march of our troops. All their jirghas were anxious to come in, and General Blood at Major Deane's request halted his division for two days for that purpose. Hence the date of General EUes's advance was changed from the 13th to the 15th September, as it was most important that the combined advance of the two divisions should be so timed that the enemy could be caught between the two armies ap- proaching simultaneously from north and south. It was now expected that General Blood and General Elles would join hands at Lokerai on the 18th September : whereupon Sir Bindon Blood would assume supreme command of both divisions with full political power. The advance from the Shabkadr side was uneventful enouo-h. On Wednesday, September 15th, General Westmacott's Bzigade marched through the Khorappa* defile into the Gandab Valley. Half of General Macgregor's Brigade followed in support. The Hadda Mullah was reported to be in the Gandab Valley just ahead with a gathering of tribesman belonging to the Khwazai and Utman Khel sections, the numbers being unknown. No enemy, however, was seen on the march, which proved to be a difficult one. The remaining troops of the divi- sion followed in due course, and General Elles soon found himself in an advanced position in the enemy's country, practically unchallenged, ♦ * * Leaving the Shabkadr Division thus marching on unopposed, the narrative has now to follow the more chequered fortunes of the two brigades under Sir Bindon Blood on the opposite borders of the Moh- mand country. * Another place bearing this name is mentioned in later pages dealing with tlie Orakzai rising. ( so ) CU AFTER IV. WITH GENERAL JEFFREYS' BRIGADE. Geseral Wodeiiouse's Brigade, accompanied by Sir IJindoii lilood, reached Nawagai on Monday, September 13tli, the camp having been sniped at the previous night at a place called Lhamshak. No jirgahs had come in, and evidently the natives were hostile, as small parties armed with Martinis had fired the previous day on two squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers reconnoitring the Mohmand Valley. But the Khan of Nawagai was friendly, and while the troops remained in his territory, collected grain and supplies for them. No large body of the enemy beinf in sioht, instructions were issued to the Survey Officers with the force to examine the Mittai Valley closely, with a view to the settle- ment of its boundaries. This was an imjjortant step to take, as the Amir of Kabul, when he claimed the valley the year before, had sent troops to occupy it. The country could now be surveyed without interruption (as it seemed), up to the Durand Boi'der, after which the brigade could swing round and march due south via Lokerai upon Yakhdand, in order to unite with General Jeffreys' Brigade entering the Mohmand country by the route east of Nawagai which leads direct upon Yakhdand. But neither General Wodehouse nor General Jeffreys was able to adhere strictly to these plans, owing to the difficult position of the one and the resolute opposition encountered by the other. While in the neighbourhood of Inayat Kill on the 14th September a determined attack was made at night on General Jeffreys' camp and the firing lasted for nearly six hours, two British Officers being killed, and one dangerously wounded, while nine men in the rank-and-file were hit, and about 80 horses and transport animals lost. The tribesmen attack- ing were Mamunds* and Salarzai, who inhabit the valleys of south Bajour west of Munda. It has just been mentioned that a day or two previously a cavalry reconnaissance in the Mohmand Valley was fired upon by tribesmen, but Sir Bindon Blood did not stop to punish them as there was no large gathering to be found. These tribesmen were Mamunds, and seeing one brigade thus pass on harmlessly to Nawagai * A clau of tlif Biijouii tribes, uut to bu cuuf used with tLic Mohmauils. ( 81 ) they seem to have thought they could hai-ass the troops which still re- mained south of the rauge of hills separating Bajour from the Mohmand country. General Jeffreys had intended crossing this range the follow- ing day, September 15th, and had sent the Buffs and Sappers to hold the crest for the night. His camp, with the transport animals, was in the best position available, and it was guarded by shelter trenches, which the 35th Sikhs and the 38th Dogras lined when the enemy opened fire. The tribesmen must have got the range accurately, judging by the results of their tire, but they made no attempt to rush the entrenchments. Firing began at 8-15 p.m. on the face of the camp occupied by the Guides Infantry. At 10 o'clock there was a lull, but at 10-30 heavy firing recommenced on the face occupied by the 38th Dogras and the 35th Sikhs, and Brigadier-General Jeffreys proceeded thither to direct the fire. The attack was continued until 2-15 a.m., when the enemy retired carrying their dead with them. The disproportionate loss among the British Officers was due to the fact that they walked about without cover, conducting the defence, while the men were protected by shelter trenches. The enemy were extremely well armed, and creeping along various nullahs, gained positions whence a most galling fire was delivered. The troops were directed to avail themselves of cover, but the necessity of sending messages involved exposure, principally of Officers, resulting in the losses already mentioned. All lights were extinguished, yet such tents as stood were pierced by bullets. The enemy were everywhere repulsed. Our casualties in detail were : — British OSicers— killed : Captain "W. E. Tomkins and Lieutenant A. W. Bailey, 38th Dogras; dangerously wounded : Lieu- tenant H. A. Harrington,* 26tli Punjab Infantry, attached to the 38th Dogras. Natives — killed: one havildar, No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, one sepoy, 38th Dogras, and two followers ; wounded, 5. Seventy-six horses and mules were hit. Captain Tomkins and Lieutenant Bailey were buried the next morning with military honours. Lieutenant Harrington's condition was hopeless from the first, the bullet having penetrated the brain. That same morning, as soon as light allowed, a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, under Captain E. H. Cole, went out and overtook the Mamunds at the foot of the hill, killing 21, with the loss of one horse killed and one wounded. ** Died of his wounds a fortnight later. ( 82 ; TliP onomy, howovor, did not appear to be disheartenpcl, and thoufrh tlioy were quiet the next night, they had boldly declared their intention of returning after resting. Clearly they had not been punished suffi- ciently. General Jeffreys accordingly recalled the Buffs and Sappers from the crest of the Eambat Pass, and proceeded to visit the valleys whence the enemy had come. The idea of joining General Wodehouse's Brigade at Yakhdand was given up in favour of punitive operations in the Maraund (or Watelai) Valley. How far these operations would delay the movement of the brigade into the Mohmand country was not yet plain ; but in any case Sir Bindon Blood with General Wodehouse could carry out the plan of joining hands with General Elles. The incident showed the wisdom of having sent large forces forward from the Swat Valley. If there had been only one brigade on the northern Mohmand borders, the plan of the Mohmand Campaign would have fallen through. Now, however, General Jeffreys could comfortably devote his attention to the two sections of the Bajouris which had thus unexpectedly assumed a hostile attitude, and in the event of this task occupying a considerable time he could return to the Swat Valley via Sado, as the troops already in the Mohmand coun- try would be sufficient to deal with any possible Mohmand combination. Sir Bindon Blood, on hearing what had happened, ordered another squadron of the 11th Lancers at Nawagai to join General Jeffreys, seeing that the cavalry already in the Watelai Valley had been used against the Mamunds to such good purpose. The Mamunds and Salarzai were plainly in a sullen temper, but whether they would be able to gather in any great strength seemed doubtful, as the Bajour clans as a whole had not made common cause with them. In order, however, to be prepared for possible compli- cations, the Ist Brigade under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, which since its return from subjugating the Swat Valley had been awaiting develojjraents, was moved from Sarai to the Paujkora River, a depot being established at Sado on the river bank. On Thursday, September 16th, General Jeffreys' Brigade fought the important and in some respects memorable action of the Mamund Val- ley, which began at 7-30 in the morning, continued throughout the day, and did not finally cease till after midnight. In this severe engage- ment nine Officers, includinp- the Brigadier himself, and 140 men were either killed or wounded. This was the gi-eatest loss that had occurred in frontier warfare in a single dav since the Ambela Campaign. The ( 83 ) facts are these : After the night attack on General Jeffreys' camp on the 14th September the brigade moved from Inayat Kili to the head of the Watelai Valley, to punish the Mamunds by burning several of their vil- lages near at hand. To expedite the work of destruction General Jeffreys divided his attacking force into three columns, each of which was to operate independently of the other two. The right column under Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Vivian consisted of the 38th Dogras, a section of Sappers and two guns. The centre column under Colonel P. H. Golduey consisted of one squadron 11th Bengal Lancers, four guns, the 35th Sikhs and the Buffs. The left column under Major F. Campbell included the Guides and was instructed to operate in the ueighboui'hood of the camp. At 7-30 the cavalry with the centre column came in con- tact with the enemy, and firing began. The tribesmen retired slowly, taking advantage of cover, and shooting accurately. Five companies of the 35th Sikhs belonging to the same column now arrived and cleared the enemy from the hillside, reaching a village, which they partially burned, the tribesmen ascending the hills. At 12 o'clock only a few snipers were visible, and the retirement of the column was ordered. As soon as this had begun, large numbers of the enemy ajopeared showing great courage, and being armed generally with Martinis they pressed the retreat severely. The ground favoured the tribesmen, who succeeded in out-flanking the 35th Sikhs. Their swordsmen and snipers frequently came to within 40 yards, and the Officers had to use their revolvers freely. There was also stone-throwing. The rear company was encumbered with the wounded. Here Lieutenant Hughes was killed and Lieutenant Cassels wounded. The enemy showed the greatest daring, and firing was maintained at under 100 yards for 15 minutes. As soon as the ground admitted, the charge was sounded, and the men responded well. Fixing bayonets they drove the tribesmen back up the hills. Some of the Buffs forming part of the same column under Lieutenant J. Hasler came up, and the enemy in retiring across the open suffered considerable loss from their fire. All this fighting was confined to Colonel Goldney's column. Colonel Vivian had found the villages allotted to him too strongly held to be attacked by so small a force and had returned to camp. Major Campbell's column had also avoided an action for the same reason, and after destroying some small hamlets had retired. As soon as the enemy's resistance to Colonel Goldney's column was found to be vigorous, orders had been sent to the two other columns to concentrate, and reiuforcemeuts were ordered from the ( 84 ) camp. Brigadier-General Jeffreys, who now arrived from the camp, ordex^ed the Buffs again to occupy the village, to complete its destruction, and recover the bodies of the killed. Covered by the fire of the 8th Bengal Mountain Battery, the Buffs and the 35th Sikhs re-occupied the hill again, the tribesmen retiring and inflicting slight loss by sniping. At 2-30 the village was completely destroyed, and the force began marching back to camp again. The enemy once more attacked the columns, and the Buffs and Guides covered the retirement with great steadiness, but still the enemy, displaying a standard, advanced recklessly, and though suffering severe loss from carefully-aimed volleys, followed the troops to the camp, frequently firing at close range. Night had now come on, and the darkness was intensified by rain, but vivid lightning enabled the enemy to continue firing at the marching columns. The steadiness and endurance of the troops were admirable, and the camp was reached by the main body of the troops in perfect order at 8 o'clock. Meanwhile, in addition to the main attack, the hills to the right of the enemy's position had been crowned by one strong company of the 35th Sikhs under Captain Ryder. This company was at 5 o'clock attacked by large numbers of Mamunds, and desperate fighting ensued. It was here that Captain Ryder and Lieutenant Gunning were wounded. To extricate these troops two companies of the Guides were detached from the main body, and in spite of severe fighting, darkness and rain, they were relieved and reached the camp safely. Their losses were, however, severe. In the darkness and the pelting rain, which made it impossible at times for one company to hear or see anything of its nearest neighbour, four guns of No. 8 Mountain Battery and a half company of Sappers who had been covering the Guides's retreat found themselves separated from the main body, together with a few men of the Buffs. Brigadier- General Jeffreys, himself belated, and literally in the dark as to the exact whereabouts of the remainder of his brigade, joined these stragglers and assumed command. On reaching the village of Thana he decided to give up the idea of reaching camp that night, and halted the foz'ce, and they took up an entrenched position. The enemy, however, occuj^ied half the village, and severe fighting at close quarters ensued. The guns fired case-shot through the walls, and eventually the enenjy were expelled with the bayonet. Here Lieutenants Wynter and Watson were severely wounded, and the Brigadier himself had his head cut open by a fragment ( So ) of rock. Captain Birch, R.A,, had his left side cut by a bullet, and other Officers had bullets through their helmets. As soon as moonlight allowed, the cavalry, the 38th Dogras, and four companies of the 35th Sikhs proceeded from the camp and relieved the place. Our casualties for the day were: — British Officers— 4»7Zed .• Lieutenant V. Hughes, 35th Sikhs, and Lieutenant A. T. Crawford, Eoyal Artillery. Wounded : Lieutenant G. E. Cassels and Lieutenant O. G. Gunning, 35th Sikhs ; Captain W. I. Ryder, Ist Gurkhas (attached to the 35th Sikhs) ; Lieute- nant F. A. Wynter, Royal Artillery ; Lieutenant T. C Watson, Royal Engineers. Slightly wounded : Brigadier-General Jeffreys and Captain A. H. C. Birch, Royal Artillery. British soldiers — killed, 'i\\danijerously wounded, 1 ; severely toouiided, 3 ; slightly ivounded, 5 ; (all of the Buffs). Native soldiers — No. 8 Mountain Battery — killed, 6 ; tvounded, 22. Guides— Ai/Zerf, 2 ; wounded, 1 Subadar, 2 Havildars, and 7 men. 35th Sikhs— AiVZerf, 22 ; ivounded, 44. llth Beugal Lancers— ivounded, 2. Sap- pers and Miners — killed, 4 ; wounded, 1 5. Another account of this action, which gave rise to much criticism, was published some time later. The following extract from it is worth adding : — " The idea of the punitive operations in the early morning was it let loose nearly the whole brigade in the valley, to punish every village of importance in a single day, and then march back again to Inayat Kili. The brigade was already due in the Mohmand countxy to co-operate with "General Elles's Division : its Coiumander and the troojjs composing it had the further prospect of Tirah before them ; and there was every inducement therefore to ' polish off ' quickly the Mamunds who had been bold enough to fire into the camp below the Rambat Pass. To each Commandant was allotted a village, or group of villages, and he was directed to deal with it independently. Thus the Buffs, the 35th Sikhs, the 38th Dogras and the Guides Infantry, each six companies strong, moved off to accomplish their respective tasks : a detachment of the llth Bengal Lancers, the Mountain guns and the Sappers being held ready for emergencies in case of any particularly strong oj^position. The 38th Dogras on the right found the village of Damodolah far too strong to attack without artilleiy, and Colonel Vivian very sensibly returned to camp, instead of knocking the heads of his men against mud walls. On the left the Guides were successful in sweeping through some small hamlets, but had they pushed on to Agrah ■and Gat, they would probably have had to withdraw, as the 38th Dogras ( SG ) had dune. FiuLliei' up the valley the BulFs luid disjXKsed of one villaf^e also. It was in the centre that matters went wion<,'. The 35th Sikhs pushed on well into the hills at the far end of the valley, and as the fur- ther mistake was made of splitting the six companies into three parties, the Mamunds saw their chance and got to close quarters. Three com- panies which had begun to burn the village of Shahi Tangi were forced back, and they had to abandon the body of Lieutenant Hughes, who had been killed. Word was sent back for the Buffs and Guides to come up with all speed, and the 11th Bengal Lancers made a charge which, though it could not be driven home owing to broken ground, prevented the Sikhs from being surrounded. When the reinforcements arrived the Mamunds were driven back, and Lieutenant Hughes's body was recovered. Then came a long halt of some three hours, which enabled the enemy to col- lect in full strength ; and when the retirement was eventually ordered, the tribesmen pursued their usual tactics with considerable success. Two companies of Sikhs, holding a hill over 2,000 feet high, were left to fifi-ht their way down alone : an order, it is said, was sent to them to retire, but it never reached Captain Ryder. There was some desperate fighting, and the Guides Infantry had to double back to save the Sikhs ■who were attacked by overwhelming numbers. It was here that the heavy losses occurred. The retirement down the Watelai Valley was weary work for the troops, for a thunderstorm came on, and as the enemy closed in, it became pitch dark. The guns, with a half company of Sappers and 15 men of the Buffs, got separated from their escort of four companies of the Sikhs, and in the thick darkness General Jeffreys found himself belat- ed with this small party. The valley is intersected with ravines, and marching at night was no easy matter, as the Guides, who formed the rear-guard, discovered. The General eventually decided to take up a position under the walls of a village, and here for four or five hours the handful of British soldiers, gunners, and Sappers had to defend them- selves against the enemy at very close quarters indeed. There were no means of sending off to camp for assistance, and it was not until the moon rose that the party were extricated, about an hour after midnight. The details of the fight under the village walls go to show that Officers and men behaved with the finest courage. Lieutenant Wynter fought his guns after he was wounded, until through faintness from loss of blood he could no longer give orders. Then a sepoy took him in his arms, and sat for hours shielding him with his own body against the enemy's fire. It was an heroic action, and the sepoy was severely wounded, while thus protecting his Officer. Another man coolly beat out with his coat the ( 87 ) bundles of bnrnin.Q- straw which the Mamnnds threw from the house- tops to light up the ground and enable them to aim. The work was perilous in the extreme, but the sepoy went about it calmly, and re- peatedly extinguished the flaming straw. A Sapper was sent out into the open to watch a door in the walls from which it was feared the enemy might rush : his figure was outlined clearly with every flash of lightning and he was repeatedly shot at, but he stuck to his post, calling out from time to time to show that all was well. Again, Major Worlledge, with the relief party from the camp, finding that he could not reach the spot whence the noise of firing came, sent out a sowar to open communication with General Jeffi-eys. This man passed safely through the tribesmen who were on the move across the valley, reached the vil- lage, only to get a volley from his own friends, delivered his message and carried back another to Major Worlledge. Other instances of de- votion and gallantry could be given, but enough has been said to show that, as at Maizar, the Malakand, Chakdara, and the Samana* our troops acquitted themselves in splendid fashion." General Jeff"reys in his official despatch afterwards reported several conspicuous acts of gallantly during the fighting on the 16th September, and amongst them, as most remarkable, the behaviour of the Guides under Major Campbell, Captain Hodson and Lieutenant Codrington when they relieved the company of the 35th Sikhs which had got isolated, at which time Havildar Ali Gul of the Guides particularly distinguished himself. Captain Ryder and Lieutenant Gunning with the relieved company of the 35th Sikhs and Captain Cole with one squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers did valuable service. Other Officers specially mentioned were Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, 35th Sikhs, and Captain F. Duncan, 23rd Pioneers (distinguished himself when Lieutenant Hughes was killed), Captain Birch, E.A., and the men of No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, Lieutenant Watson, R.E. (wounded three times), Lieutenant J. M. C. Colvin of the Sappers, and Major Hamilton, D.A.A.-G. In subsequently reporting the Mamund Valley action to Army Head-Quarters, Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, to whom General Jeffreys had reported events, entered into a full and detailed examina- tion of all the facts. As this day's fighting has been much discussed and in some quarters severely criticised, we give in an appendix virtually * Not yet related. ( 88 ) the whole of Sir Bindon Blood's despatches, these being the only official data available from which an opinion as to the tactics of the day can fairly be formed. All was quiet in the camp at Inayat Kili on the night of the IVth September. At six the following morning, the available strength of the 2nd Brigade moved to attack the fortified village of Damodolah. The tribesmen appeared in considerable numbers, and firing began at 8-45. The 35th Sikhs crowned the spurs to the right of the village, and the 38th Dogras and the Battery occupied positions on the left, the Guides Infantry in the centre, and the Buffs in reserve. The village was carried and completely destroyed. The retirement was brilliantly exe- cuted by the Guides, and the enemy had no chance of rushing. The Buifs covered the homeward march of the brigade, inflicting loss on the tribesmen, who pursued. Much grain was captured. The casualties were : — 35th Sikhs — killed, 1; wounded, 2. 38th Dogras — killed, 1 ; wound- ed, 2. Guides— rcouJJtierf, 1. Tiring ceased at 2-30. Sunday, the 19th of September, was free from fighting, but some further jjunitive work was carried out, owing to the fact that the Mamunds, who had by this time sent in their jirgahs, neverthe- less refused to comply with the terms imposed by General Jeff'reys, This clan, which numbers only about 1,500 fighting men, was show- ino- much determination, and though' now suing for mercy, still refused to surrender its own rifles and those captured in the attack on September 16th. It was desirable, therefore, to demol- ish the fortifications of the villages in the centre of the Mamund Valley, and on the morning in question the force moved out against the village of Zagadirai, four or five miles from Inayat Kili, and destroyed it. No opposition was encountered, and later in the day jirgahs began to come in again. These jirgahs were informed by General Jeffreys that no proposals would be entertained unless their arms were surrendered. One day's grace was given to allow of this being made known. Much indignation was excited in the force by the news that the tribesmen had disinterred the bodies of the Mahomedan native soldiers killed in the recent fighting and had insulted their remains. The following day (September 20th) Sir Bindon Blood, who had been kept well informed of events by means of the heliograph, was able to report from Nawagai to Army Head-Quarters that he had not found it necessary to reinforce General Jeffreys' Brigade, which had proved ( 89 ) itself quite equal to dealing with the Mamuuds, " in fact (he telegraphed), since Thursday night wlien the tribesmen inflicted such heavy losses upon the brigade, the operations in the Maniuud Valley seem to have been completely successful." Successful they had undoubtedly been, but hostilities were far fi^om being over. At the very time when Sir Bindon Blood at Nawagai was telegraphing that the end of the fighting in the Watelai Valley was now in view. General Jeffreys' Brigade was obliged to march out to attack the fortified village of Zagai (once owned by Umra Khan). Sharp fighting ensued, chiefly with the Buflfs on the right, and severe loss was inflicted upon the tribesmen. The village was taken and the retirement cleverly executed. Firing began at 8-50 a.m. and ceased at 12-30. A re- connaissance by a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers had revealed the fact that the village was strongly held. The Buffs were on the right, the 38th Dogras in the centre, the Guides Infantry on the left, and the 35th Sikhs in reserve. Firing began on the left at 8-50, and the guns came into action near the centre about 9-15. The Buffs, who had fur- ther to go, were engaged about 9-20. The enemy as usual retired, snip- ing ; the village was occupied, and all the fortifications were destroyed. At 11 A.M. the retirement began, and immediately afterwards the tribesmen gathered on the flanks. On the left, the Guides Infantry were threatened by about 600 tribesmen displaying standards. These were dispersed by long range fire. On the right, the Buffs retired with admirable discipline, in spite of very sharp fire. Excellent prac- tice was made with the Lee-Metfords ; Lieutenant F. S. Reeves's section killed five men at one valley. The Dum-Dum bullet was most effective. Lieutenant R. E. Power was slightly wounded in the right arm, but after the wound was dressed he returned to his company. Lieutenant Keen was shot through the left arm and in the body. After the Buffs ■were clear of difficult ground, the line of the regiment lay across the open fields, and the enemy from cover fired with effect, several men be- ing wounded. Firing ceased when the troops got clear, as the enemy did not dare to follow into the open. On the extreme left, considerable numbers of the enemy appeared. Captain E. H. Cole's squadron trotted forward, causing the tribesmen, ever in terror of cavalry, to bunch together. The Battery immediately exploded two shells with great effect, and this ended the action. The brunt of the fighting fell to the Buffs. The casualties were : two Officers wounded (Second-Lieutenant G. N. S, Keene, Unattached List, and Lieutenant E. E. Power of the ( 90 ) Buffs) ; British soldiers — tvounded : Buffs, 9 ; Native troops — 38tb Doj^- ras, 2. Total casualties, 13. On the night of the 21st September, firing into camp took place, and several animals and one native orderly were wounded, and on the 22nd the important village of Dag was captuied — together with great stores of grain — with the loss of one killed and two wounded. In the 2nd Brigade alone the losses of a single week amounted to 14 British OfKcers and 153 men, besides nearly 150 transport animals, cavalry horses, and Officers' ponies. But General Jeliieys had now demonstrated the ability of his troops, when not divided into a number of weak parties, to sweep the valley from end to end. General Jeffreys and his Brigade may now be left, settling accounts with the Mamunds, while the movements of General Wodehouse's Brigade with Sir Bindon Blood at Nawagai are brought up to date. -^