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 THE UNIVERSITY LIB'^ARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. SAN DIEGO 
 
 LA JOLLA, CALIFORNIA 
 
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 <JN]VLH',llr Ol (,AI IKJHNIA, SAN UlEf^O 
 
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 3 1822 00308 1395 
 
 . X
 
 presented to the 
 UNIVFRSIT^' LIRRAHY 
 
 r\T\TR^ITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 SAN DIFGO 
 
 by 
 
 Dr. D. Frankville
 
 The 
 European War 
 
 August 1914 — March 1915 
 
 By 
 
 Anthony Arnoux, Ph. D., LL. B. 
 
 VOLUME I 
 
 RITTER & COMPANY 
 
 BOSTON, MASS. 
 
 1917
 
 FIFTH EDITION 
 
 COPYRIGHT 1917 
 ANTHONY ARNOUX
 
 INDEX. 
 
 I. History of Europe from 1871 to the War. 
 II. The Outbreak of the War. 
 
 III. The Campaign in the West. The Invasion of 
 
 Belgium. 
 
 IV. The Campaign in the West. Tjie Invasion of 
 
 France. 
 
 V. The Campaign in the West. The Battle of the 
 
 Marne. 
 VI. The Campaign in the West. The Battle of the 
 Aisne. 
 
 VII. The Campaign in the West. The Siege of 
 Antwerp. The Battles of Ypres. 
 
 VIII. The Campaign in the West. From Noyon to 
 the Vosges. 
 
 IX. The Campaign in the East. East Prussia. 
 
 X. The Campaign in the East. Poland. 
 
 XL The Campaign in the East. Galicia. 
 
 XII. The Turco-Russian Campaign. 
 
 XIII. The Serbian Campaign. 
 
 XIV. Kiao-Chou and South Africa Campaign. 
 XV. The Naval War. North Sea. . 
 
 XVI. The Naval War. High Seas. 
 
 XVII. The Naval War. The Mediterranean and 
 
 Black Sea. 
 Appendix.
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 HISTORY OF EUROPE FROM 1871 TO 
 THE WAR 
 
 In the early part of 1871, a result largely of the 
 Franco-Prussian war, the German empire came into 
 being, as the creation of Bismark, under the leadership 
 of the Prussian king. 
 
 The treaty of 1871, which terminated this war, took 
 from France the two provinces of Alsace and Lor- 
 raine, and united them to the German empire. This, 
 as regards the larger portion of the territory and as 
 regards the language and the characteristics of the 
 majority of the people inhabiting these countries, was 
 a reversion to their original political affiliations, as 
 the bulk of these territories had been taken away 
 from Germany, partly by force and partly by fraud, by 
 Louis XIV of France. The city and fortress of Metz 
 and its surrounding district, how-ever, were French- 
 speaking and had never been German, either politi- 
 cally or by affiliation, hence Bismark at the time of 
 the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany 
 opposed the inclusion of Metz in the territory an- 
 nexed, but the military leaders in Germany at the 
 time viewed the continued possession of the fortress 
 by France as a danger to the future tranquillity of the 
 German empire, and Bismark, therefore, against his 
 judgment, acquiesced in its being included in the ter- 
 ritory to be taken. 
 
 Viewed from the political standpoint, the future 
 course of European history proved the soundness of 
 Bismark's contention. By language, by religion and 
 by national feeling. Metz belonged to France, but, 
 more important than the fact that Metz became Ger- 
 man, was the fact that the possession of this French- 
 speaking, French-feeling people by Germany, gave life 
 in France to continuous agitation for its return to the 
 
 9
 
 History of Europe— 1871 to the War 
 
 motherland by the only means possible, re-conquest. 
 
 Though, possibly, in the course of time, France 
 might have acquiesced in the taking from it of the 
 German-speaking parts of Al>ace- Lorraine, the con- 
 tinued spectacle of the French-speaking inhabitants 
 of the territory of Metz at their very doors, excited 
 and irritated them a> no other conceivable cause could 
 have done, and made thetn most eager for it3 re-io- 
 corporation into the territory of I'rancc. and this de- 
 sire, as regard> the lesser portion of the conquered 
 territory, speedily included the whole of the conquered 
 territory'. 
 
 For many years m France, up to the outbreak of 
 this war of 1914, the rallying call of every political 
 adventurer, whether it was a P.oulanger or a Paul 
 Delourredc. and one which found an immediate re- 
 sponse in the hearts of French people, was the re- 
 taking from the hated German^ of Alsace and Lor- 
 raine. 
 
 Therefore, for forty years, in every possible way. 
 the flame of the resentment, which, unfortunately, ex- 
 isted in a portion of the inhabitants of Alsace and Lor- 
 raine, against Germany was fanned by the French, by 
 inflammatory speeches, by caricatures, in literature, 
 in poetry and by everv conceivable means, legitimate 
 or illegitimate, which one people can take to incite 
 another to open or sullen rebellion. The works of 
 liie caricaturist. Hansi, which have attained world- 
 wide reputation (caricatures so gross that they verge 
 on positi^ c indecency), were circulated extensively 
 through* »ut Franco in the last three or four years pre- 
 ceding tlu' war. and greatly aided in increasing French 
 resentment against Germany. 
 
 Another fact ari«iing from the war of 1870. wliich 
 was not without influence in the pre>^ent condition of 
 affairs, and which fact really constitutes the com- 
 mencement of the antagonism between Kngland and 
 Germany, was that, during the Franco-Pru^-sian war. 
 England's .sympathies ran vcrv stronglv with France, 
 and this vympathv was not confined to mrrr verbal 
 expressir^n. but more substantial proofs were given. 
 Many British fought on the .«;ide of France in a qiiarrel 
 in whirh their nation had no cause for interference. 
 and firitish manuf.Trturers sccretlv supplied munitions 
 of war to th«- I'rmrh. a fact which was ascertained by 
 
 10
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 the German Government and forthwith given as much 
 publicity as possible. 
 
 Moreover, a portion of the British press, which is 
 almost untrammelled in its license, not liberty, and 
 almost as vehement and vituperative in its forms of 
 expression as the American press, had espoused the 
 French cause with undue enthusiasm and had vented 
 its partisanship in almost daily diatribes and fulmina- 
 tions against Germany for its alleged harshness in 
 conducting the war, for its demand for Alsace and 
 Lorraine, for its demand for the indemnity, and in 
 general vituperation against the German people and 
 German army. Necessarily the German newspapers, 
 the only organ for expression of opinion which was 
 at the disposal of the German people when these ut- 
 terances of the British press came to their notice, 
 retaliated in kind and a war of invective ensued which 
 lasted for several years and created the seed of mutual 
 mistrust and dislike. 
 
 At this point it is well to note that sufficient atten- 
 tion has not been paid by historians to the role which 
 is played by the modern press, in creating animosities 
 between peoples. Self-restraint at times of excite- 
 ment appears to be unknown and in espousing the 
 cause of one side or the other the press knowingly 
 prints the grossest falsehoods, if calculated to injure 
 in the eyes of the public to which it addresses itself, 
 the cause which it dislikes — nothing too noble, noth- 
 ing too holy for these anonymous and ignorant scrib- 
 blers to defame. 
 
 Here it may be said that probably never in the 
 history of the world has any press so generally and 
 so grossly misconducted itself, so disregarded the 
 rules of elementary decency, fairness and justice as 
 has the press of the United States in the present war. 
 Nor has it hesitated wilfully to misrepresent the rules 
 of international law and to distort historical facts in 
 order to delude the public. 
 
 This feeling of mutual distrust and lack of con- 
 fidence between the peoples of Great Britain and of 
 Germany was increased a little later by the conduct 
 of the British press and people in the crisis of 1875. 
 
 At this time, France having paid off the indem.nity 
 exacted by the Peace of 1871, ranged herself in oppo- 
 sition to Germany on a question of policy, and war 
 
 11
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 nearly resulted, in fact, war would have resulted, had it 
 not been for the expressed purpose ol Great Britain to 
 intervene therein. 
 
 Shortly after this came the Congress of Berlin in 
 1878. By this Conj^jress the iiuiependence of Scrvia 
 and Bulgaria, which, though practically existing be- 
 fore, had been unrecognized by the powers, was fixed 
 and defined, the status of Rumania settled, while 
 Bosnia and Herzogovina were turned over to Austria 
 for administration, with powers so great that the 
 turning ovei amounted practically to annexation to 
 the dual monarchy. Unfortunately, the Congress of 
 Berlin did not proceed along broad and permanent 
 lines. 
 
 The Turko-Russo war had just been concluded and 
 had left behind it several sources of bitterness. Dur- 
 ing this war, at the last moment, England had inter- 
 fered and prevented Russia from obtaining what had 
 been the main object of her policy for generati<Mis — 
 the possession of Constantinople. Russia's disappoint- 
 ment on this occasion was extreme, and she came to 
 the Congress of Berlin in a hostile mood towards most 
 of the powers, particularly towards England, which 
 condition of affairs prevented the Congress from es- 
 tablishing the bases of a lasting situation iti the 
 Balkans. 
 
 After the Congress of Berlin, l-'rance for a tinv 
 turned her attention to the gathering together of a 
 colonial empire (though, as a matter of fact, she had 
 begun to m?ke some moves in this direction almost 
 immediately after the war"), and embarked in con- 
 quests far from her home shores in Asia, .^frica. Mad- 
 ap^scar and elsewhere, and. finally in liUK at the 
 outbreak of the war, had succeeded in gathering to- 
 gether the largest colonial empire possessed by any 
 power in the world, with the exception of Great 
 Britain. 
 
 The French, who are not in any sense of the wonl 
 a commercial people, thus found a sphere of activity 
 which was in harmony with their national character 
 True it is that these colonics in no wise conduced 
 to their national prosperity, and that after once having 
 made them colonics their administration was so ex- 
 ceedingly complicated by red tape and bureaucratic 
 officials tha; the colonies remained without colonists, 
 
 1?
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 contributing little to the good of the world or the 
 mother country. While the French have a great gift 
 for conciliating and winning the confidence of un- 
 civilized peoples, they have not the English power of 
 making a colony prosper and of becoming a source of 
 strength and profit to the mother country. 
 
 After a time this new toy failed to occupy the minds 
 or the desire for glory of the French, and their eyes 
 were again turned toward their northern neigh- 
 bor, and from this time, about 1890, we may note a 
 rise in the flood of French hatred toward Germany, 
 which had during the colony adventure been some- 
 what abated. 
 
 In the time which had elapsed since the Congress 
 of Berlin, the relations of Great Britain and Germany 
 had not grown better, in fact, they had grown worse. 
 The growing commercial expansion of Germany which 
 had resulted in her beginning to oust Great Britain 
 from many of the markets of the world, which that 
 country had regarded for centuries as almost her pri- 
 vate property, had aroused in Great Britain a sense of 
 decided uneasiness. 
 
 Immediately after the Congress of Berlin, Germany 
 formed a defensive alliance with Austria, which was 
 intended to check Russia's aggressive methods. In 
 speaking of this. Lord Salisbury said : "To all those 
 who care for the peace of Europe and take an interest 
 in the independence of nations, I would exclaim *A 
 crowning mercy has been vouchsafed to the world.' " 
 
 Although it may not be apparent at the moment to 
 Great Britain that her greatest statesman of the last 
 hundred years spoke the truth in these words, it is 
 well within the bounds of possibility that before even 
 a few years from the present time shall have passed, 
 she will recognize that his vision of the future was 
 keener and truer than that of the pygmies who today 
 control her government, and who have made her take 
 up arms in aid of the great menace to the future peace, 
 prosperity and happiness of the entire world — Russia. 
 
 Four years after, this league was strengthened by 
 the adherence of Italy thereto. This adherence was 
 the result of the occupation of Tunis, by France, which 
 country Italy had for a long time intended herself to 
 annex, and her intense annoyance at being forestalled 
 finally resulted in her entering into the alliance of 
 
 13
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 those op>pt)S€<l lo I'Vancc. 'riu»> tlif .siiiuc ci>nilici gave 
 France cause for anxiety as to her position in North 
 Africa, and f trrfii:t!Kiu<l (u-nnaiiy un the continent of 
 ICuropc. 
 
 Ahout this time, to be precise, in the year 1882, 
 lireat liritani inter\eneil in Kgypt against Arabi 
 I'asha. with the result that ^iie put an end to the more 
 *»r leas cordial relations which had, prior to that time, 
 existctl between her gi»vcrntnent and that of Turkey. 
 as 'Turkey regarded this intcr\entiun as an interfer- 
 ence with her sn^•erei^n ri«»hts u\er Egypt. The 
 situation thus created was taken advantage of by 
 (lermany. which at that time showed great interest in 
 and thereafter aided Turkey in many ways, particu- 
 larly during her first war with Cjrecce. and in the Bal- 
 kan wars. C'lcrtnany thu.«> succeeded in convincing her 
 that she was Turkey ;. only friend among the powers 
 of Europe. 
 
 In 1H9H. at the time . >t the visit <>i the Kaiser to the 
 ll«)l\ l..iM<l. the I'.agdad Kailway scheme first took defi- 
 nite shaj)e. and on the occasion of his visit to the Sul- 
 tan, the Emperor not only obtained concessions for the 
 Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem from that monarch, but 
 he also obtained from the Sultan a \ crbal consent to 
 the construction of the Bagdad Kailway. the I'ortc fi- 
 nally in lIMiV issuing a firman authorizing that enterprise. 
 
 The Bagdad kailway then took shape, and in 1903 
 tlie German Bagdad Syndicate secured a concession to 
 extend its line to Koweit on the Persian (iulf. It was 
 evident that this would form a short route of ct)nnec- 
 tion between Europe and India, and particularly if, as 
 was contemplated, it was connected with the European 
 lines by a tunnel under the Bosphorus, since there 
 would be then throujih connection from Ostend or 
 Antwerp to the Persian T.ulf. with very serious results 
 to British shipping ititerestN. 
 
 To the Turks it appeared that this new line would 
 double the military strength of the Ottoman Empire, 
 and that, furthertnnre. the prosperity f»f Mesopotamia 
 and Asia Minor would revive, stimulatetl as it would 
 be by innnigration from luirope into these rich coun- 
 tries. Consequently, England l>e^an to scrutinize the 
 Bai^d.id scheme very closely, and finally assumed ati 
 attitude J)f (>pp<»sition, veiled to a degree in that 
 Itritafn t^nlv opposed the original scheme as far as it 
 
 11
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 concerned the Persian Gulf, alleging that this would 
 enable Germany and Turkey to send troops quickly to 
 the confines of Persia and thus to India. 
 
 Years had elapsed during these negotiations, during 
 all of which the Teutonic ascendency in Constantino- 
 ple had grown stronger. Therefore, all the more rea- 
 son had the English for opposing this German scheme 
 of pacific i)enetration to the Persian Gulf, where the 
 ♦British had long enjoyed an extremely valuable trade, 
 so in lull Sir Edward Grey demanded that if the rail- 
 way were built to the Gulf, it should be purely a com- 
 mercial undertaking. This was brought about not 
 only by Germany's ascendency in Turkey, but by the 
 fact that when the Czar visited the Kaiser at Potsdam 
 in November, 1909, they conferred together on the 
 subject of this railway, and Russia agreed not to op- 
 pose the scheme, but even to link up that railway with 
 her Persian lines, Germany, in return, recognizing thai 
 Russia had special political and strategic interests in 
 North Persia. Germany further secured permission 
 from the Sultan to complete and improve the branch 
 line from Damascus south, past the east of the Dead 
 Sea and the Sinaitic Peninsula to Mecca. This was 
 represented as a semi-philanthropic enterprise, intend- 
 ed to lessen the hardships of the pilgrims proceeding 
 to Mecca, but from the British viewpoint was intended 
 to menace Egypt, and besides that it came within 
 striking distance of the Suez Canal. 
 
 The subsequent history of the Bagdad Railway need 
 not here be told in extenso. Suffice it to sav that Eng- 
 land's opposition to its construction resulted in a com- 
 promise, and that France was recognized as having an 
 interest in the results of such compromise, although she 
 had no real interest whatever in the country affected, 
 it never having been considered within the sphere of 
 her influence. 
 
 This compromise was a diplomatic and commercial 
 defeat for Germany, and did not tend to improve her 
 relations with Great Britain, 
 
 Russia and Germany in 1884 drew a little closer to- 
 gether than they had been in the years immediately 
 following the treaty of Berlin, and in that year signed a 
 new treaty which in fact revived the "Three Emperor" 
 league of 187'^, and immediately afterwards Russia an- 
 
 '15
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 nexed Merv to\vards the Indian border, thereby bring- 
 injj about considerable uneasiness in Great Britain. 
 
 For some years, in tact since 1876, Germany had 
 been castinj^ rather interested glances on the situa- 
 tion in South Africa. In that year the Boer Re- 
 public^ sent a delegation to Berlin for the purpose of 
 recjuesting Germany to protect them against what 
 they even then foresaw as prol)ahlc — their annexation 
 to Cape Colony, tlie I'ocis claitniiig even at that early 
 period that such was undoubtedly the design of Cireat 
 Britain. From this interest in African affairs during 
 the next few years s]>rang several sources of bitterness 
 between Great Britain and Germany, the Delagoa 
 hay incident being the most important. Space will 
 not ]icrinit entering into details (^f the various nego- 
 tiations and intrigues of the next few years, but as a 
 result. Germany expanded considerably in Africa and 
 gained the Cameroons in 18^5. German Fast .Africa 
 iHH«i-lS!»(i and German New Guinea 1884-1885. 
 
 It is worthy of remark that this colonial expansion 
 (»f Germany occurred at a time when her fleet was 
 comparatively insignificant, and that in the very early 
 stages of this expansion, two British governments, that 
 of Mr. ("iladstone and that of Lord Salisbury, looked 
 I'oon that expansion as an indication of commendable 
 development. Mr. Gladstone indeed went so far as to say 
 "if Germany is to become a colonizing |K»wer, all I can say 
 is 'God speed her' and hail her in entering upon that cause, 
 in her associating herself with us in carrying the light of 
 civilization to the places that depend upon it, to the more 
 backward and less civilized regions of the world." 
 
 But it is apparent that Great Britain quickly changed 
 her opinion as soon as the British merchants found 
 that the tremendous commercial and manufacturing 
 expansion of (iermany, accompanied with the thor- 
 • lUijhne'^s and foresi^'htedness with which its manufac- 
 turers and merchants attacked the prol)lem of the dis- 
 tribution I't their products, was as a result, menacing 
 P.ritish commercial supremacy everywhere. From the 
 year 1888 to the present time this feeling of antago- 
 nism has constantly grown stronger and more vindent 
 .imong the British commercial classes, which in turn 
 have influenced the policy of the British government. 
 
 From 1890 onward. France and Russia. — Russia hav- 
 ing severed her treaty relation with Germany.— had en- 
 tered into some sort d alliance. I'xactly how far this 
 
 16
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 alliance went at that time we do not know, but we do 
 know that it was directed against Germany. As has 
 been pointed out, the French hatred of Germany had been 
 revived in 1890 and had entered upon a fresh and stronger 
 life, France claims, and always has claimed, that this 
 alliance was defensive, but the difference between a de- 
 fensive and an offensive alliance is really only a question 
 of a favorable opportunity presenting itself. In 1895 this 
 alliance was publicly announced by the French and Rus- 
 sian fleet appearing together at the opening of the Kiel 
 Canal, and in 1904, shortly after the death of Queen Vic- 
 toria, was tacitly adhered to by Great Britain. 
 
 The alliance between Russia and France was entered 
 into from different motives by the interested parties. 
 The motive of France was to secure protection and aid 
 against Germany, protection against possible aggresion on 
 the part of Germany, aid in the great design of the 
 recovery of Alsace and Lorraine, and the humiliation of 
 Germany to the same extent that Germany had humili- 
 ated her in '71. These objects have been sometimes dor- 
 mant and sometimes conscious, but ever-present under- 
 lying motives of all French action in the political sphere 
 in the last forty years. 
 
 The Russian motive was a financial one. France is 
 one of the richest countries in the world, not in re- 
 sources but in liquid assets. Russia had and has enor- 
 mous undeveloped resources and a great governmental 
 need for money. In the mind of Russia, France was a 
 gold mine to be exploited, and during the years that fol- 
 lowed, most nobly was this gold mine exploited. The 
 French, as has been said, are not a commercial people, 
 and, led away by the possibilities of achieving the poet- 
 ical object of revenge on the hated Teuton, were for a 
 long time available on anv and every occasion for ad- 
 vances of greater or smaller magnitude. 
 
 Not only were these French investments made in gov- 
 ernmental securities of Russia, but the French embarked 
 on many private enterprises for the development of Rus- 
 sian resources, considering that the development of such 
 resources would give Russia additional funds, which 
 eventually could be used for the great purpose. After 
 many years, however, as the great purpose appeared no 
 nearer attainment, and as Russia's demands for money 
 were insatiable, there was a momentary slackening in the 
 readiness of France to open her purse, so that the last 
 few loans made to Russia were not made with the same 
 
 17
 
 Histon- of Europe— 1871 to the War 
 
 enthusiasm as those before, and had the condition at- 
 tached that these advances should be spent in their en- 
 tirety in increasing^ the Russian army, in providing strate- 
 gic railroads, and increasing Russia's preparation for war. 
 
 The last loan in 1912 had particularly stringent con- 
 ditiotis annexed. Then it was that Russia raised iier 
 army to a peace strength of l,250,00u, and began 
 building a complete s>!fstem of strategic railroads 
 along the German borders. These were not finished 
 when the storm broke. 
 
 There is. perhaps, no person more responsible for 
 the understanding between France, Russia and Eng- 
 land than Kdward \'II. Queen Victoria was one of the 
 ablest diplomats of her time, and Edward V'll. who, to 
 a large degree, inherited her talent, shortly after his 
 accession started on a series of journeys to the chiefs 
 of state of many of the European countries, which had 
 as their object the improvement of England's relations 
 with such countries. 
 
 At this time the relations of England with France 
 were particularly bad. The old historic hatred still 
 existed amoni; the intellectuals, and the hatred of the 
 mob had been stimulated by recent events in tiic Boer 
 War, the sympathies of France running almost unani- 
 mously with the Boers in the conflict. 
 
 The writer speaks from personal knowledge on this 
 point, having lived in France continuously from the 
 latter part of 1900 to the end of 190«; and from per- 
 sonal observation knows that, in the years after the 
 Boer war, it was inadvisable for an English woman 
 to walk the streets of Paris unescorted. 
 
 The Kint,^ ably assisted by the heads of the govern- 
 ment of the day in Orcat l^ritain, very .<;kilfully played 
 on the French hatred of Germany during his first visit, 
 which visit was duly returned by the French President. 
 Little by little the relations grew better, and finally, in 
 1904, an agreement in regard to several matters in dis- 
 pute between the countries, particularly in relation to 
 Egypt, was reached, and hatred very soon changed al- 
 most to love. France perceived the overwhelming ad- 
 vantage it would be to her. already allied with Russia, 
 to have the greatest sea power in the world on more 
 fricndlv terms with her, when the moment came for 
 striking at the ever haterl "Allemagne.'* 
 
 Other journe^'<» produced equally happy results, and 
 
 18
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 the effect was to group all of the elements in Euro- 
 pean politics opposed to Germany together and to 
 constitute forces outside of Europe which would op- 
 pose German expansion either territorially or commer- 
 cially by all possible means. 
 
 During the ten years from 1890 to 1900, this com- 
 mercial and industrial expansion went on with ever 
 increasing rapidity, while during this time several 
 causes for friction arose between Germany and Great 
 Britain and Germany embarked on the crowning sin 
 of her career, to British eyes, the creation of a great 
 navy. 
 
 Up to the launching of the Dreadnought by Great 
 Britain, Germany's efforts at creating a navy able to 
 cope with hers were not remarkably successful, owing 
 to the great advance in constructed ships Great Britain 
 possessed. 
 
 But the success of this dreadnought type of battle- 
 ship, which practically sent all ships constructed be- 
 fore it to the junk heap, was Germany's opportunity 
 which she improved, starting in on a well reasoned 
 plan of construction that in a very few years raised 
 her navy to the second strongest in the world, and 
 bade fair in a few years more to create a fleet fully as 
 strong as that of Great Britain. This latter power did 
 not view this proceeding on Germany's part with 
 equanimity. She has herself for many years added to her 
 fleet on the principle of keeping always equal in strength 
 to the two strongest fleets which could be opposed to it. 
 
 Germany's program of construction obliged Great 
 Britain to strain every financial nerve to maintain the 
 established proportion. So g^eat was this strain that 
 on one occasion she proposed to Germany that the 
 construction of warships in the future be limited. She 
 was willing to pledge herself to only build five ships 
 to each three built by Germany. Somehow or other 
 the merits of this proposition did not appear clear to 
 Germany, so the race in construction continued and 
 the British middle classes, who largely had to pay the 
 cost of the British construction, and whom Germany 
 was also injuring by taking their customers from them 
 in the world's markets in fair and open competition, did 
 not have their love for Germany increased. 
 
 After the introduction of the construction of battle- 
 ships of the dreadnought and super-dreadnought type, 
 it was at once apparent to the German naval authorities 
 
 19
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 that unless the Kiel Canal was widened and deepened, 
 so that ships of this size and draft of water were able 
 to use this channel, the two great naval ports of Kiel 
 ami \\ illichnshavon would be completely isolated from 
 each otlicr and, besides that, the ships in the Baltic 
 would have great difficulty in passing luio the North 
 Sea, if opposed. Consequently the deepening and 
 widening of the Kiel Canal was determined upon and 
 the date for the completion of tiiis work was fixed for 
 1915. But after the work was started, it was concluded 
 to hurry it through as rapidly as possible, and it con- 
 sequently wa> finished in the spring of 1911, most op- 
 portunely, as subsequent events have shown, for the 
 safety of the German empire. 
 
 The Jameson raid, however, was to occasion the first 
 open break between Great Britain and Germany. The 
 exigencies of space preclude a lengthy discussion, but 
 suffice it to say that the action of Germany, or of the 
 German Kaiser, in his famous telegram to Kruger, in- 
 creased the resentment in Great Britain, which, fed by 
 the ever increasing commercial rivalry of C.crmany and 
 Germany's sin in creating a navy, has grown stronger 
 and strtinger since that date until the present time. 
 
 One or two incidents during the following ten years 
 added considerable fuel to the flame. The principal one 
 of these incidents was Morocco. Morocco was an in- 
 dependent nation whose sultan, e.xtremely careless in 
 money matters and extravagant to boot, had gradually 
 allowed himself to fall under the financial control of 
 Franco, which was casting covetous eyes on his do- 
 mains, and had a well matured plan f<.«r annexing them 
 at the earliest possible moment. 
 
 (Germany had built herself a large and profitable 
 trade in Morocco, her commercial travelers, with their 
 characteristic energy and their preparedness to cope 
 with ktcal conditions, h.'uing secured an outlet of con- 
 siderable importance there. By an annexatif)n and the 
 infliction on the country of a high protective tariff as 
 regards the products of foreign countries, her own pro- 
 ducts after annexation naturally entering free, France 
 would have been al)le to cause the loss of nearly all of 
 this trade to Germany. In addition to this, Germany 
 needed and required cf>aling stations for her fleet, and 
 Morocco already had entered into negotiations with 
 Germany looking toward the concession of an ap- 
 propriate site on her coast for such purpose. 
 
 90
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 The defeat of this not unnatural desire on the part of 
 of a naval F>ower added additional piqu'ancy to the plan of 
 annexation in French eyes, and, of course, was not ill- 
 viewed by Great Britain, since between Germany and the 
 German colonies in Africa, Germany possessed no port 
 at which her warships could coal, though England pos- 
 sessed several. The results of this embroilment were the 
 calling of the Algeciras Conference, January andj March, 
 1906; the sacrifice by France of her foreign minister, 
 Delcassc, and the voting by France, in 1905 of $300,000,- 
 000 to make good the defects of her army organization, 
 including a large sum for strategic railroads. Germany 
 failed at the Algeciras convention, and a compromise 
 resulted, which amounted to a diplomatic defeat for her. 
 
 During the years that have elapsed since Russia was 
 last referred to, Russia had fought a war with Japan, 
 and suffered an ignominious defeat by an adversary 
 much weaker in wealth, men and resources. 
 
 In 1909, France and Germany came to an agreement 
 regarding Morocco, which was signed at Berlin on the 
 19th of February, 1909. By this France recognized the 
 independence of Morocco, which was the essence of the 
 German contention. On the other hand. Germany agreed 
 that the French should be charged with the maintenance 
 of order in the interior. This France undertook, and, by 
 way of making her maintenance of order conduce to 
 her plans, proceeded by drastic policies, interfered in 
 the domestic politics of Morocco through "Agents Provo- 
 cateurs," caused a storm and then took severe measures 
 to appease the storm she had thus raised. This ultimately 
 led to the Agadir incident. 
 
 Germany, seeing her commercial interest threatened 
 by this scheme of maintenance of interior order by the 
 French and its results, which amounted practically to 
 annexation, protested, and, when nothing came of this 
 protest, sent the warship Panther to iVgadir in July, 
 1911, in order 'to help and protect German subjects 
 and clients in these regions." Even an English author 
 of authority, Dr. Rose, acknowledges that much could 
 be said in favor of some such step, for as matters then 
 stood, German interests were certain to sutfer unless 
 she made a stand against French expansion in Morocco. 
 
 But this, however, was not the view taken by the 
 British government, because the British ministry pro- 
 tested against the action of Germany and made it clear 
 that the presence of the Panther at Agadir was regarded 
 
 21
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 as an unfrioiully act, and as a result the whole affair 
 trended dangerously near war. This war, however, 
 was averted, temporarily at least, by the restraining 
 influence of the German emperor upon the ani^er of 
 the German people. Eventually the Morocco (juestion 
 was settled by concession by France of territory in 
 French Congo to Germany, in return for which Ger- 
 many gave France a free hand in Morocco, which has 
 been followed by a French protectorate. 
 
 The whole affair embittered the relations of France 
 and Germany to an even greater degree than they 
 were previously. 
 
 Meanwhile, in the spot that has been named the 
 storm center of Europe, — Turkey, the so-called Balkan 
 States, and South Austria, — a situation was developing 
 which was rapidly becoming the most complex in mod- 
 ern history, if not in the history of the world. The small 
 states created by the congress of Berlin, — Serbia, Bul- 
 garia and Rumania. — had had a troubled existence. In 
 the case of Rumania and Bulgaria, the tumultuousness 
 of their existence has been more a result of circum- 
 stances and environment than of their own will. But 
 this has not been true in the case of Serbia which has, 
 since the days of its recognition as a semi-independent 
 principality under Turkish suzerainty a hundred years 
 ago, distinguished itself by its utter incapability to 
 maintain and conduct a civilized government, by its 
 aggressiveness towards its neighbors, by its ignorance, 
 governmental and popular, by its recognition of as- 
 sassination as a legitimate and commonplace adjunct of 
 political action. There is probably no people on the 
 face of the earth which ranks lower in education of any 
 kind, in public and private morality, than the Serbians, 
 and as one result this small country has for many years 
 been a sotirce of trouble to all its neighbors. 
 
 Tt'^ oHginal cause of contention with Austria arose 
 manv years ago and sprang from Austria's trcattnent 
 of Serbian pigs. These animals Serbia raised in quan- 
 tities. She was unable to export them into Turkey, 
 because pork is not used by the Turk^ Bulgaria pos- 
 sessed her own supply, and consequently the only out- 
 let for Serbia's «;iirplns pigs was Xustria. l)ut the bar- 
 rier f<i a treatv existrd between the two countrie*^. and 
 as Hungary raised sufficient pigs to supply the re- 
 quirements of the Austrian people, this barrier was 
 not. in spite of Serbia's manv appeals, removed. 
 
 22
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 Americans cannot assuredly blame Austria or any 
 other country for having a protective tariff. 
 
 The Serbian hatred of Austria began with this eco- 
 nomic cause. Her political dissatisfaction arose from 
 the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As has been 
 before stated, these tv^^o provinces, which had originally 
 formed a part of the empire of Turkey, and had never 
 been politically united to Serbia, were separated from 
 the Turkish empire by the Congress of Berlin, though 
 Turkey retained her sovereignty over them and by the 
 Congress were turned over to Austria for administra- 
 tion. These provinces lie between Serbia and the 
 Adriatic on the west, and though there were railways 
 by which Serbia could transport her inconsiderable ex- 
 portations, she was possessed with the idea that of 
 right these provinces should belong to her, though title 
 she had none of any character. 
 
 This feeling was further intensified by the fact that 
 a portion of the inhabitants of these provinces were 
 Serbians by race, although they never had been politi- 
 cal subjects of the Kingdom of Serbia, and as a result, 
 from the year 1879 onward, with the exception of a few 
 years in which a better feeling prevailed, under Kings 
 Milan and Alexander, there has been friction between 
 Austria and Serbia on this subject as well as on others. 
 On this particular subject the friction was greatly in- 
 creased from the year 1903, when King Alexander was 
 assassinated and Peter Karageorgevitch, a tool of Russia, 
 was elected to the Serbian throne, whereby Serbia and the 
 Serbian government became a mere outpost for Russia, 
 and was instigated by Russia to provoke and harass in 
 every possible way her neighbor, Austria. Serbian in form, 
 but Russian in fact, this aggression became virulent at and 
 after the annexation in 1909 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
 During the years 1879-1909 that Austria had held 
 these as administrator, she had expended large sums of 
 money upon the provinces from the funds of the empire ; 
 she had built roads, railroads, telegraphs, telephones 
 and all the other material constructions of an advanced 
 civilization, and had instituted a complete system of pri- 
 mary and secondary education. She had introduced full 
 and complete religious liberty, and had done everything 
 feasible for the improvement of the people, morally, 
 mentally and physically, and the annexation was simply 
 the formal announcement of what was an actual fact. 
 
 In 1912 the Christian states of the Balkans, forced 
 
 23
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 thereto by various acts of Turkey, formed a league 
 against her, and attacking her, nearly drove her from 
 Europe in the course of a month. Unfortunately they 
 quarrelled among themselves in regard to the division 
 of the booty, and here again the original cause of 
 the quarrel was the covetousness of Serbia. The 
 upshot was that a second war broke out between the 
 victor> of the fir>t war, which wa> furtiier complicated 
 by the entrance therein of Rumania, which attacked 
 Bulgaria unexpectedly, the parties to this combat being 
 originally Bulgaria on one side and Serbia and Greece 
 on the other. After considerable time this war was set- 
 tled by the Congress of Powers held in London in 1913. 
 
 During the course of the two wars. Serbia had 
 struck to the westward and had forced her way through 
 Albania, capturing Avalona on the Adriatic coast. The 
 Albanians, who (ictcsted the Serbians as much as any 
 other of their neighbors, protested most vehemently to 
 the powers against this possession and annexation of 
 their countrv by a bitterly despised fc»e. with the result 
 that Serbia was ordered and forced by the Powers to 
 evacuate Albania, her dream of getting to the Adriatic 
 through Albania being thus shattered. 
 
 This brief resume of the history of Europe for the 
 pa>t forty-five years will perhaps help to some under- 
 standing of the causes and influences which led up to the 
 crisis of August, 1914. A glance still remains to be given 
 to the exact political conditions in the various countries 
 now at war at the moment of the outbreak of the war. 
 
 In Germany, in the middle of June. 1914, apparently 
 political conditions were quiet. There was. it is true, 
 the habitual uneasy feeling as to the intentions of her 
 eastern neighbor. Ru^^sia. Nothing extraordinary ap- 
 peared on the surface and there was apparently no 
 cloud in the political sky. The same may be said of Aus- 
 tria. The rclation.s of the component states of the dual 
 monarchy had never been better than they were in the 
 middle I't June, 1914. and general contentment among 
 the peoples comprising the empire appeared to be 
 greater than it had been for many years. 
 
 Tn France, except for the ^^candal excited by the Cail- 
 laux trial, and the glimpses that were given of the cor- 
 ruption of many of the leading French politicians, 
 nothing extraordinary wa*^ to be noticed. There too, 
 everything wa«* apparently calm. 
 
 24
 
 . History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 In England, there was a very different condition of 
 affairs. In June, last, Great Britain was apparently on 
 the brink of a civil war, arising from the Irish question, 
 which crisis the government had shown itself prac- 
 tically unable to handle, as it had shown itself thereto- 
 fore unable to deal with the extravagances of the so- 
 called Suffragettes. 
 
 This is, perhaps, because the present English govern- 
 ment is a government existing only as a result of the 
 union of three political parties, the Liberals, the Labor 
 and the Irish, any one of which by itself is in the mi- 
 nority. Consequently, like all governments which have 
 not behind them a united party and which have to 
 please three masters instead of one, it was and is feeble 
 and vacillating, and particularly was this true last June, 
 because the members of this government knew that its 
 fall was a question of but a very short time. 
 
 In Russia the situation was reasonably good. Internal 
 troubles of the empire had lessened in the last few years 
 to a considerable degree, and the country and its people 
 were much quieter. The army, in accordance with the 
 requirements of France, had been recently largely in- 
 creased and the work necessary for the strategic de- 
 fence of the Russian empire on the German border was 
 in a process of completion. A strong war party had 
 risen in the empire under the lead of Grand Duke Nico- 
 las Nicolaievitch, which desired, at the earliest possible 
 opportunity, a war, in order to wipe away the ?tain 
 which the Japanese defeat had put on the Russian es- 
 cutcheon, and if possible, to carry out the cardinal arti- 
 cle of Russia's political creed : the advance southward 
 to a warm water port. 
 
 Besides this, the Russian intrigue in the Balkans had 
 advanced to such a point that the responsible heads of 
 the Russian government knew that in a very short 
 time, the situation would become so menacing and so 
 dangerous as to force some definite solution of the 
 Balkan problem, which solution Russia intended to see 
 was favorable to Russian policies and Russian inter- 
 ests. The Balkans had not by any means assumed a 
 normal condition after the second Balkan war, and the 
 legacy of hatred which that engendered was still aa 
 acute as on the day that Bulgaria w^as lacerated by 
 Serbia, the wretched, and Rumania, the cunning. 
 
 Greece was watching with voracious eyes her chance 
 
 25
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 to obtain some title to the remaining Turkish islands 
 which she had already occupied. 
 
 Serbia was faithfully fulfillinj^ her mission as Rus- 
 sia's trouble maker. 
 
 Italy's relation with the Triple Alliance, while nomi- 
 nally the same as in the earlier years of her being a 
 partner, have not been in fact anything like as cordial 
 for the paiit few years, for the reason that her relations 
 with Austria and Germany had not worked to her ad- 
 vantage in the Mediterranean, the field which she had 
 chosen as the sphere of her influence. It became evi- 
 dent to her that with French and English opposition, 
 she could not proceed to fulfill what she euphemistical- 
 ly tenucd her legitimate aspirations on the North Afri- 
 can coast, and that Germany and Au.stria were not in 
 a position to help her by force to achieve these aspira- 
 tions, in the face of French and luiglish opposition. Con- 
 sequently, she drew closer to England, with whom, for 
 that matter, she had been always more or less on friend- 
 ly terms, and through England's influence, she drew 
 closer to France. The result was that neither France 
 nor England opposed her in her aspirations to annex 
 Tripoli. Since that time she has felt perhaps even more 
 friendly towards France and England than .'^he has to 
 Germany, and her old hatred of Austria has to a larg^ 
 extent been revived. 
 
 The Kaiser, who is intellectually not only the strong- 
 est monarch of our time in Europe but the strongest 
 since Napoleon, has been the bone of di.spute for many 
 year-. It is not, however, my purpose here to defend 
 him from his enemies, as \x){h he and his country are 
 able to defend themselves. I shall merely point out 
 that, hated as he is by a large number, he is loved and 
 admired by an even larger number, and that no man 
 since the days of Napoleon has ever had <o large a fol- 
 lowing absolutely devoted to him. 
 
 I will further point out that on several occasions he 
 has. against the wishes of his government and of his 
 people, preserved alone the peace of Europe, as was 
 abundantlv trstifird to on the occasion of the twenty- 
 fifty anniversary of his accession, by many men of high 
 standinj,' in the pf»litical world of Europe, who were 
 competvit to -peak of the difficulties which surrounded 
 him ; this was barely a year ago. 
 
 In England, from the moment of his accession, the 
 
 26
 
 History of Europe — 1871 to the War 
 
 Kaiser has been the butt of caricature and criticism, 
 some from ignorance and some from malice. His dis- 
 missal of Bismark in the very early years of his reign 
 and the famous cartoon which Punch published upon 
 that occasion, "Dropping the Pilot," was the start of 
 the prejudice against him in the minds of the English 
 and Americans more than probably any other cause, 
 and the flame thus started has not lacked fuel. 
 
 The Kaiser has been systematically represented to 
 both the English and American people as the personi- 
 fied opposition to those ideals which they hold most 
 dear, which is untrue. He has moreover been repre- 
 sented as being, even in Germany, the oppressor of his 
 people. In the refutation of this one need only call at- 
 tention to the most extraordinary unanimity with 
 which he has been supported ever since he came to the 
 throne and in the present crisis by the German people 
 as a whole, which far exceeds the unanimity with which 
 Abraham Lincoln was supported by the American peo- 
 ple in the War of the Rebellion or George Washington 
 in the Revolution, or with which the British govern- 
 ment of today is supported by the British people. No 
 doubt, being human, the Emperor has his faults, but he 
 possibly has his virtues as well. 
 
 27
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 
 
 On June 28. 1914, at Sarajevo, Bosnia, a boy under 
 twenty, Gavrilo Prinzip, shot and killed the Archduke 
 Francis Ferdinand d'Este, the heir presumptive to the 
 throne of Austro- Hungary and his consort, the Prin- 
 cess of Hohensburg. The reason for this killing waa 
 because the murderer, Prinzip, who had for the four 
 years preceding the murder, according to his own 
 statements, been a student of a college in Belgrade, 
 had there finally become convinced that all the south- 
 ern Slav districts of Austro-Hungary, including Bos- 
 nia and Herzegovina, must be taken away from that 
 monarchy by force if necessary, and that to do this was 
 the mission of Serbia. By a peculiar irony of fate, it so 
 happened that the Archduke was a partisan of the plan 
 which had been proposed among the Austrian politi- 
 cians that the dual monarchy of Austro-Hungary 
 should be changed to a triple monarchy, the third part- 
 ner being the Slavs of the empire, organized into a 
 kingdom of their own like that of Hungary. 
 
 As a re.^ult of this murder .\ustria addressed this 
 note to Serbia on July 23rd, 1914. 
 
 "On the 31st of March. 1909, the Serbian minister 
 in Vienna, on the instructions of the Serbian govern- 
 ment, made the followinq: declaration to the Imperial 
 and Royal Government :" 
 
 "Serbia recognize^ that the fait accompli regarding 
 Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently 
 she will conform to the decision that the Powers may 
 take in conformity with article 25 of the Treaty of 
 Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Pow- 
 ers. Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards 
 the attitude of protest and opposition which she has 
 adopted with regard to the annexation since last aut- 
 umn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direc- 
 tion of her policy with reqrard to Austria-Hungary and 
 to live in future on good neighborly terms with the 
 latter." 
 
 "The history of recent years, and in particular the 
 painful events of the 28th of June last, have shown the 
 existence of a subversive movement with the object of 
 detaching^ a part of the territories of Austria-Htmgary 
 
 2fi
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 from the monarchy. The movement, which had its 
 birth under the eye of the Serbian Government, has 
 gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides 
 the Serbian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism 
 and a series of outrages and murders." 
 
 "Far from carrying out the formal undertakings con- 
 tained in the declaration of the 31st of March, 1909, 
 the Royal Serbian Government has done nothing to 
 repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal 
 machinations of various societies and associations di- 
 rected against the monarchy, and has tolerated unre- 
 strained language on the part of the press, the glori- 
 fication of the perpetrators of outrages, and the parti- 
 cipation of officers and functionaries in subversive agi- 
 tation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda 
 in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all 
 manifestations of a nature to incite the Serbian popu- 
 lation to hatred of the monarchy and contempt of its 
 institutions." 
 
 "This culpable tolerance of the Royal Serbian Govern- 
 ment had not ceased at the moment when the events 
 of the 28th of June last proved its fatal consequences 
 to the whole world." 
 
 "In order to give a formal character to this under- 
 taking, the Royal Serbian Government shall publish 
 on -the front page of its "Official Journal" of the 26th 
 June (13th July) the following declaration:" 
 
 "The Royal Government of Serbia condemns the 
 propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e., 
 the general tendency of which the final aim is to de- 
 tach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories 
 belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal con- 
 sequences of these criminal proceedings. 
 
 "The Royal Government regrets that Serbian offi- 
 cers and functionaries participated in the above-men- 
 tioned propaganda and this compromised the good 
 neighborly relations to which the Royal Government 
 was solemnly pleded by its declaration of 31st of 
 March, 1909. 
 
 "The Royal Government, which disapproves and re- 
 pudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to inter- 
 fere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part 
 whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to 
 warn officers and functionaries and the whole popu- 
 
 29
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 lation of the kingdom, that henceforward it will pro- 
 ceed with the utino5t rigour ai^ainst persons wiio may 
 be Ruiity t>i >uch machinations, whicii it will use all 
 its efforts ic> anticipate and suppress. " 
 
 'Thi> declaration shall simultaneously be communi- 
 cated to the Koyal army as an order of the day by his 
 Majesty the Kinj^ and shall be published in the Offi- 
 cial KuUetin' of the Army." 
 "The koyal Serbian Ciovcrnnicnt further undertakes:" 
 
 1. "To suppress any publication which incites to 
 hatred and contempt of the Austro- Hungarian Mon- 
 archy and tile general tendency of which is directed 
 again>t hi territorial integrity;" 
 
 2. "To dissolve immediately the society styled Na- 
 rodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propa- 
 ganda, and to proceed in the same manner against 
 other societies and their branches in Serbia wliich en- 
 gage in propaganda against the Austro- Hungarian 
 Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the 
 necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved 
 from continuing their activity under another name and 
 form ;" 
 
 .'). "To eliminate without delay from public instruc- 
 tion in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and 
 also as regards the methods of instruction, everything 
 that serves or might serve, to foment the propaganda 
 against Austria-Hungary;" 
 
 I. "To remove from the military service, and from 
 the administration in general, all officers and fnnction- 
 a'fics giiilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro- 
 Hnngarian Government reserves to itself the right of 
 communicating to the Koyal Government ;" 
 
 5. "To accept the collaboration in Serbia of repre- 
 sentatives of the Austro-IIungarian Government in 
 the suppression of the subversive movement directed 
 against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy; 
 
 6. "To take judicial proceedings against accessories 
 to the plot of the 28th of June who are on Serbian terri- 
 tory. Delegates of the Aiistro-Himgarian Government 
 will take part in the investigation relating thereto; 
 
 7. "Tr) proceed without delay to the arrest of Major 
 Voja Tankosic and of the individual named Milan 
 Ciganovic. a Serbian state employe, who have been 
 compromised by tlie results of the magisterial enquiry 
 at Sarajevo; 
 
 ao
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 8. "To prevent by effective measures the co-opera- 
 tion of the Serbian authorities in the illicit traffic in 
 arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and 
 punish severely the officials of the frontier service at 
 Shatbatz and Loznitza guilty of having assisted the 
 perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating their 
 passage across the frontier ; 
 
 9. "To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government 
 with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utter- 
 ances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and 
 abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, 
 did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th June to 
 express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility 
 to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and finally," 
 
 10. "To notify the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
 ment without delay of the execution of the measures 
 comprised under the preceding heads. 
 
 "The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the 
 reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 
 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July." 
 
 The reply of the Serbian government to this note 
 was as follows : 
 
 "The Royal Serbian Government have received the 
 communication of the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
 ment of the 10th, instant, and are convinced that their 
 reply will remove any misunderstanding- which may 
 threaten to impair the good neighborly relations be- 
 tween the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the King- 
 dom of Servia. 
 
 "Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Impe- 
 rial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand 
 over for trial any Serbian subject, without regard to 
 his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime 
 of Sarajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more espe- 
 cially they undertake to cause to be published on the 
 first page of the 'Journal Officiel,' on the date of the 
 13th (26) July, the following declaration: 
 
 "The Royal Government of Serbia condemn all 
 propaganda which may be directed against Austria- 
 Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at 
 ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian 
 Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and 
 they sincerelv deplore the baneful consequences of 
 these criminal movements. The Royal Government 
 regret that, according to the communication from 
 the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Serbian 
 
 31
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 officers and ufficials should have lakcn part in the 
 above- im-ntiunetl propaganda, and llms conipronused 
 the good ncit:hb«,)urly relations to wliich the Royal Serbian 
 Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration 
 of the 31st March, lyuy, which declaration disapproves 
 and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with 
 the destiny of the inhabitants «)f any part whatsoever, 
 of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty 
 to formally warn the officers, officials, and entire popu- 
 lation of the kingdom that henceforth they will take 
 the most rigourous steps against all such persons as 
 are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which 
 they will use their utmost endeavor." 
 
 "This declaration will be brought to the knowledge 
 of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name 
 of His Majesty the King, by His Royal Highness the 
 Crown Prince Alcxan<ler. and will l)e published in the 
 next official army bulletin. 
 
 "The Royal Government further undertake: — 
 
 "1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of 
 the Skuptchina a provision into the press law provid- 
 ing for the most severe punishment of incitement to 
 hatred vr contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
 archy, and for taking action against any publication the 
 general tendency of which is directed against the terri- 
 torial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government 
 engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution 
 to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 
 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such pub- 
 lication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present 
 impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 
 of the Constitution. 
 
 "2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the 
 note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish 
 them with any that the 'Xarcnlna Odbrana' and other 
 similar societies have committed up to the present any 
 criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of 
 any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Gov- 
 ernment will accept the demand of the Imperial and 
 Royal Government, and will dissolve the 'Narodna Od- 
 brana' Society and every other society which may be 
 directing its efforts against Au.stria- Hungary. 
 
 "3. The Royal Serbian Government undertake to re- 
 move without delay from their public educational es- 
 tablishments in Servia all that serves or could serve 
 
 89
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 to foment propaganda against Auhtria-lJungary, 
 whenever the Imperial and Royal Government fur- 
 nish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda. 
 
 "4. The Royal Government also agree to remove 
 from military service all such persons as the judicial 
 enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed 
 against the integrity of the territory of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial 
 and Royal Government to communicate to them at a 
 later date the names and the acts of these officers and 
 officials for the purposes of proceedings which are to 
 be taken against them. 
 
 "5. The Royal Government must confess that they 
 do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the 
 demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government 
 that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration 
 of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government 
 upon their territory, but they declare that they will 
 admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle 
 of international law, with criminal procedure, and with 
 good neighbourly relations. 
 
 "6. It goes without saying that the Royal Govern- 
 ment consider it their duty to open an enquiry against 
 all such persons as are, or eventually may be, impli- 
 cated in the plot of the 15th June, and who happen to 
 be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards 
 the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian 
 agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the 
 Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Govern- 
 ment cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would 
 be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of 
 criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases 
 communications as to the results of the investigation 
 in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian 
 agents. 
 
 "7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very 
 evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Command- 
 ant Voja Tankosic. As regards Milan Ciganovic, who 
 is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and 
 who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) 
 bv the directorate of railways, it has not yet been pos- 
 sible to arrest him. 
 
 ******** 
 
 "8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and ex- 
 tend the measures which have been taken for prevent- 
 ing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the 
 frontier. It goes without saying that they will imme- 
 
 33
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 diateiy order an enquirj- and will severely punish the 
 frontier officials on the Shabatz-Loznitza line who 
 have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of 
 the crime of Sarajevo to pass. 
 
 "9. The Royal Government will gladly give ex- 
 planations of the remarks made by their officials, 
 whether in Serbia or al)road, in interviews after the 
 crime and which according to the statement of the 
 lin{>erial and Royal Government were hostile towards 
 the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Gov- 
 ernment have communicated to them the passages in 
 question in these remarks, and as soon as they have 
 shown that the remarks were actually made by the 
 said officials, althoutjh the Royal (lovernmcnt will 
 itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs. 
 
 "10. The Royal Government will inform the Impe- 
 rial and Royal Government of the execution of the 
 measures comprised under the above heads, in so far 
 as this has not already been done by the present note. 
 as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried 
 out. 
 
 "If the Imperial and Royal Government are not sat- 
 isfied with this reply, the Serbian Government, con- 
 sidering that it is not to the common interest to pre- 
 cipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as al- 
 ways, to accept a pacific understanding, either by re- 
 ferring this question to the decision of the Interna- 
 tional Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers 
 which took part in the drawing up of the declaration 
 made bv the Serbian Government on the IRth f^lst) 
 March. 1909." 
 
 It will be observed that the ultimatum of the Aus- 
 trian Government brought charges of the most serious 
 character against the Serbian Government itself; in 
 relation, not only to the crime at Sarajevo, but also 
 to its having both dircctlv and indirectly, and with 
 guilty knowledge, approved and supported Serbian 
 societies which had as their object the overthrow of 
 the Austrian Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
 and the breakif>g up. if possible, of the Austria-Hun- 
 garian monarchy. 
 
 Great stress has been laid bv the pscudo moralists 
 on the dutv of larcre state'; to avoid coercing small 
 states, since the bctrinnincr '^f this war. If this proposi- 
 tion is trtie. that large states are hotmd bv a moral 
 ohlifration not to rorrre small states, it is also true that 
 small ^ates anp equally bound to so conduct themselves 
 
 B4
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 in their relations to large states at. not to merit a legit- 
 imate chastisement. Otherwise, the obligation would be 
 unilateral. 
 
 In the case of Serbia and Austria, the ground for 
 Serbia's agitation, both governmental and private, against 
 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, was the fact that 
 Serbians, by race, inhabit the territory of the Austria- 
 Hungarian Monarchy, who have, however, never be^n 
 subjects of Serbia. 
 
 The territory which the Austria-Hungarian Mon- 
 archy annexed in 1909 belonged legally to Turkey, and 
 neither the whole nor any part of it had ever belonged 
 to Serbia. As a matter of fact, since 1878, by the 
 decision of the Powers of Europe at the Congress of 
 Berlin, this territory had, to all intents and purposes, 
 formed part of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy. 
 With equal justice could the Republic of Haiti argue 
 that because the majority of the inhabitants of the State 
 of Mississippi are negroes, and it is a negro Republic, 
 that the State of Mississippi should belong to it. How 
 the citizens of the United States would view an or- 
 ganized conspiracy, governmental and private, on the 
 l>arL of the Haitians to bring this result about, can 
 easily be imagined. 
 
 The Narodna Odbrana itself, mentioned specifically 
 by name in the Austrian ultimatum, was a secret soci- 
 ety whose headquarters were in Belgrade, Serbia. Its 
 objects, according to its own prospectus, were the use 
 of every possible open and secret means to cause a dis- 
 ruption of the Austria-Hungarian Monarchy, and it ad- 
 vocated the separation from that monarchy of certain 
 provinces, viz. : Bosnia. Herzegovina, Croatia. Slavonia, 
 and some of the southern counties of Hungary. 
 
 This society also maintained an active propaganda for 
 war against Austria-Hungary. 
 
 Gen. Bozo Jankovic was the president of this society, 
 and accepted the presidency when he was upon the active 
 list of the Serbian army. 
 
 These facts are matters of common knowledge. In 
 order to connect the actions of Gavrilo Prinzip with 
 those of the Narodna Odbrana, and, through it, with 
 the Serbian government, it will be necessary to examine 
 briefly the testimony at the trial of Prinzip, the principal 
 conspirator, and of the other witnesses. 
 
 A word about Austrian criminal procedure. A crim- 
 inal trial in Austria takes place in pubHc, and the law 
 expressly provides that every adult person not bearing 
 
 35
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 arms who desires shall be admitted to the sessions of 
 the court. The defendants are represented by attor- 
 neys, and if they have none, the court appoints attor- 
 neys to represent them. The judg^inent of tlie court 
 must he based solely on evidence presented in open 
 court at the time <>l the trial. The defendants arc al- 
 lowed the fullest liberty at the trial, in briii^inj; out 
 every bit of eyidence which they, or their c-unvrl, may 
 consider will strengthen their defense. 
 
 The trial itself proceeds very much ak>nj; the lines 
 of a trial in England. Prior to the trial, however, the 
 procedure differs considerably from that of England 
 or .America, but follows the procedure obtaining in 
 nearly every European country, except England. The 
 Grand Jury does n(H exist. I>ut. in its place, is what is 
 known as the examining judge, before whom the rep- 
 resentative of the Cnnvn (the District Attorney in 
 our practice), produces such witnesses as he deems 
 serviceable in establishing the charges. The judge ex- 
 amines these witnesses, and also examines the de- 
 fendants in rebuttal of the charges, these defendants 
 being aided, if they so choose, by c<»unsel. 
 
 This special judge, or examining judge, then deter- 
 mines whether or not the evidence is sufficient to war- 
 rant him in sending the defendants beft^re the court 
 for trial. 
 
 This examining judge is never a member of the 
 court before which the case is heard at trial. 
 
 In the Sarajevo case the defendants were arraigned 
 before the examining magistrate, and the evidence ad- 
 duced before him was sufficient in his judgment to 
 send them before the court for trial for the murder of 
 the Archduke. 
 
 The trial itself took place before three judges; two 
 judges and a presifling judge. These were assisted 
 by two assistant judges who, in case of disability, 
 would have taken the places (^f any one of the regular 
 members of the court. The evidence adduced before 
 the examining magistrate was all known to the defend- 
 ants and their counsel before the trial itself. This is 
 even more favorable for the defendants than the 
 .American procedure, since in most cases the evidence 
 which is presented U) the .American Grand Jury which 
 indicts the defendant, and whose proceedings are en- 
 tirely ex parte, is rarely known to the defendants or 
 their counsel prior to the actual trial. 
 
 36
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 On the trial itself the following admissions were made 
 by the defendants against their interest: 
 
 Nedjelko Cabrinovic, who threw the bombs at the 
 Archduke, admitted that the secretary of the Narodna 
 (Jdbrana, a Major in the Royal Serbian Army, one 
 Milan Vasic, had supplied him with money and instruc- 
 tions in Belgrade; that he was employed by Zivojiu 
 Barcic, a member of the executive staff of the Narodna 
 Odbrana and the head and director of the Serbian Gov- 
 ernment Printing Office; that his society taught that 
 it was the duty of every member to find means that the 
 southern Slav districts of Austria-Hungary should be 
 detached from the Monarchy by force, and be united 
 with Serbia. 
 
 , iSti the spring of 1914, on hearing of the impending 
 arrival of the Archduke in Sarajevo, he discussed with 
 Prinzip and Joko Bajic what action should be taken. 
 The last named was a member of the Xarodna Od- 
 brana. The result of this consultation was that they 
 entered into communication with Milan Ciganovic, an 
 official of the Serbian State Railroads, one of the leaders 
 of the Narodna Odbrana. He took them to Major 
 Tankosic, who was assistant chief of the Serbian Gen- 
 eral Staff. This officer supplied Prinzip and himself 
 with six bombs and four Browning pistols, and also 
 gave them sufficient cyanide of potassium to enable them 
 to commit suicide in case of necessity. 
 
 In April. 1914, Zivojin Barcic, formerly the employer 
 of the witness, introduced him to the Crown Prince of 
 Serbia, with whom he had a long conversation. This 
 conversation was after the projected visit of the Arch- 
 duke to Sarajevo was known, and took place late in 
 the evening. The defendant refused to state the sub- 
 ject of the conversation. These two officials of the 
 Serbian Government, Ciganovic and Major Tankosic, 
 then sent them to a Major Povic in Sabac, who sup- 
 plied them with false passports, etc.. and, in his turn, 
 sent them on to a Serbian Captain. Joco Provanic, in 
 Noslica. 
 
 The defendant, Gavrilo Prinzip, the actual mur- 
 derer, admitted knowing Major Tankosic and Cigano- 
 vic; admitted having received money, poison, bombs 
 and pistols from Major Tankosic ; and letters to the 
 officials of the Xarodna Odbrana at various points on 
 the road from Belgrade to Sarajevo ; and having writ- 
 ten Danilo Hie in May, 1914, from Belgrade, asking 
 
 37
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 him for his aid m the murder plot which was being 
 hatched against the Archduke. 
 
 Trit'ko Grabcz was annilier of llie principal defend- 
 ants. He corroborated the admissions of Prinzip and 
 Cabrinovic concerning the transactions in Belgrade 
 with Major Tankosic and Ciganovic. and the receipt of 
 the bombs, pistols, money and letters from them. He 
 further stated that the bombs handed to them in Bel- 
 grade, by Major Tankosic, were exactly like those 
 which were manufactured in the Royal Serbian Arsenal 
 at Kragukejwac. Danilo Ilic, another defendant, cor- 
 roborated this testimony. 
 
 Vaso Cubrilovic, of Sarajevo, another defendant, 
 was introduced by a friend named Gykuic to the de- 
 fendant, Danilo Hie, and was by him informed that 
 everything had been arranged in Belgrade for the 
 murder ni the Crown Prince, that weapons would be 
 supplied. 
 
 One Popovic, another defendant, stated that he had 
 been asked by Cabrinovic to join the conspiracy 
 against the Crown Prince, did so. was given a bomb by 
 Ilic, and posted to thri>w the same at the Crown 
 Prince, hut did not have the courage to throw it. 
 
 Valiko Cubrilovic, another defendant, testified that 
 he had met Boso Milanovic. a president of the Narodna 
 Odbrana, at Sabac, and that he had made a secret 
 propaj.^anda for that society in Bosnia, admitted that 
 the chairmen of all Serbian societies in the towns of 
 Bosnia wore members of the executive staff of the 
 Narodna Odbrana, and that he knew that a strong 
 revolutionary committee stood behind Prinzip and his 
 confederates. He admitted knowledge of the Serbian 
 origin of the bombs. 
 
 Jovanovic. another defendant, admitted being a 
 special agent of the Narodna Odbrana. that he talked 
 over the murder of the Prince with the other de- 
 fendants, and had concealed the weapons in his house 
 at Tuzla, later taking them to Doboj. 
 
 Milan Kranjcevic, another defendant, admitted that 
 it was a matter of common knowledge among .nil his 
 friends that the Narodna Odbrana had supplie«l the 
 homb<i for the murder of the Crown Prince, and that 
 it had previous knowledge of the whole plot; further 
 admitted that the object of the wholr prop.ngnnda of 
 the \ar*^.dna Odbrana was to establish a great Slav 
 empire under the leadership f)f the Karagyorgyevics. 
 
 38
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 Two witnesses, not defendants, who had ^een at 
 prior times members of the Narodna Odbrana, testified 
 that this Narodna Odbrana received subsidies from the 
 Serbian Government and was allowed the privilege of 
 using arms, etc.. taken from the State Arsenals of 
 Serbia. The defendant, Cabrinovic, corroborated these 
 statements. 
 
 Drajutin Stojanovic, an official of the Serbian State 
 Railroads, testified that after the Balkan war all arms, 
 bombs and other weapons in the hands of any one in 
 Serbia were collected by the Serbian Government and 
 placed in state arsenals; that this measure had been 
 most thoroughly carried out, so that, at the time of the 
 murder, it would have been impossible (the sale or the 
 possession of weapons of any character being forbid- 
 den), to have obtained arms or bombs from any source 
 but the Serbian Government or the Narodna Odbrana, 
 its agent. 
 
 Certain pamphlets published in Belgrade, the capital 
 of Serbia, by the Narodna Odbrana, were submitted in 
 evidence, which contained among other things, exhorta- 
 tions to the Serbian population to incite revolutions 
 in Austria-Hungary ; that being the only way to destroy 
 the Monarchy ; and, further, Serbian youths were asked 
 to follow the example of Bodjanzerajic who attempted 
 to murder the Governor of Bosnia, General Baresania. 
 
 It was further proved that the Crown Prince Alex- 
 andria of Serbia, on the occasion of the visit of the 
 delegates of the Austrian Southern Slav Universities 
 to Belgrade, in 1912, received two students, named 
 Vladmir Balizic and Luja Rusic, in secret audience, 
 supplied them with money, and that soon thereafter Luki 
 Jekic attempted the murder of Barescale, the Governor 
 of Croatia, and that at the time of the trial of the said 
 Luki Jekic a Serbian professor from the University of 
 Belgrade came to Zagrac and brought greetings of the 
 Crown Prince Alexandria of Serbia to all the defend- 
 ants. The witness, Henry Shulz, a defendant in that 
 trial, was a recipient of these greetings from the Crown 
 Prince of Serbia. '!'. ' 
 
 Two witnesses, Theo. Popovic and Trazimir Kovozic, 
 testified that they knew that the Narodna Odbrana had 
 suppHed 68,000 crowns to aid in the defense of Luki 
 Jekic. 
 
 The result of this trial was that all of the defendants 
 
 39
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 who participated iii the actual killinj;. who were over 
 the ape <>f twenty vears, were sentenced to death, and 
 this sentence was carried out. I'rin/ip himself and two 
 others were sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. The 
 rea>on wliy these were not sentenced to death was be- 
 cause the law of Austria forbids the sentencing to 
 death of anv murderer who has not reacheci the aj^e of 
 20 years at the time of the commission of tlic murder. 
 From the admissions of the dcfendant> alone, at the 
 trial. I think, as a lawyer, that any court would have 
 been justified in drawinij the following conclusions: 
 
 1st — That i'rinzip and his fellow conspirator^ were 
 supplied with weapons and money by persons who 
 were members of the Narodna ( )dbrana, and also offi- 
 cials of the Serbian Government ; 
 
 2nd — That the weapons so sui)plicd were taken from 
 the Serbian Royal militar> arsenals, and that the Ser- 
 bian Government permitted this Narodna Olbrana 
 Society to take weapons therefrom ; 
 
 .3rd — That thi>^ said society, the Xarodna Odbrana, 
 was a society whith had for its object the taking by 
 force, or by intrigue, of territory from another govern- 
 ment, with which government Serbia was at peace, and 
 that these objects were known to the Serbian Gov- 
 ernment : 
 
 4th — That the Serbian Government, knowing these 
 objects, aided the said society, the Narodna Odbrana, 
 with money, arms, and generally by every means in its 
 power which might contribute to the accomplishment 
 of the flesigns of the said society, and that, in fact, the 
 said socictv was a mere cloak to enable the Serbian 
 Government, in case of need, to avoid responsibility. 
 Considering these facts, the tone of the ultimatum of 
 the Austrian Government to the Serbian Government 
 does not seem strange. 
 
 As tf» the other clauses in the ultimatum of .\u>tria. 
 Serbia, in its reply, admits the truth and justice of the 
 majorit>. 
 
 Under these circumstances and in view of the his- 
 tory of Serbia's relations with Austria-Hungary, it be- 
 cornes at once rcadilv apparent that the Serbian reply 
 to the Austrian ultimatum was merely an attempt to 
 gain time, in order for the Government of Serbia to 
 make "^uch arrangements with Russia as would enable 
 her to escape the consequences of her beini:, as a gov- 
 ernment, an accessory to the crime of murder In view 
 
 40
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 of all these facts, Sir Edward Grey's statement that he 
 had never seen one State address to another independ- 
 ent State a document of so formidable a character, be- 
 comes at once estimable at its true value, particularly 
 when it is considered how the point of view of England 
 has greatly changed in a very short time, as regards 
 Serbia. In 1909, Sir Fairfax Cartwright, the British 
 Ambassador to Vienna, said: "Make war and deal 
 quickly with Serbia before anybody can stop you. The 
 end of Serbia will be a blessing for all Europe." These 
 remarks were publicly made in Vienna to an Austrian 
 personage, and have never been denied. 
 
 Sir E. de Bunsen, occupying precisely the same posi- 
 tion, said, only a comparatively few days before Eng- 
 land took up arms on behalf of Serbia: "Be convinced 
 that the whole English nation condemns the criminals 
 of Sarajevo. We are tired of being thrown again into 
 disquietude by this little country, and there is no Eng- 
 lishman who does not wish heartily that Serbia should 
 receive a sound and lasting lesson." 
 
 Apparently this British Ambassador to Vienna was 
 mistaken. There was one Englishman who did not 
 wish that Serbia should receive the fit punishment for 
 her crimes, and he was a powerful Englishman, no less 
 than Great Britain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir 
 Edward Grey, the tool in this whole proceeding of 
 Sazonoff. 
 
 The two clauses which were particularly objected to, 
 in the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, were the fifth, 
 which required Serbia to accept the collaboration of 
 representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government 
 in the -suppression of the various revolutionary move- 
 ments in Serbia directed against Austria ; and the 
 sixth, requiring the Serbian Government to take judi- 
 cial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 
 28th of June in Serbian territory, and to allow dele- 
 gates of the Austrian Government to take part in the 
 investigation relating thereto. 
 
 As regards the sixth, the matter is not without 
 precedent, and. curiously enough, it is a precedent 
 created by Austria at the request of Serbia. 
 
 One of the numerous political assassinations which 
 disgrace Serbian history took place on June 10. 1868, 
 when Prince Michael of Brenovic. of Serbia, was mur- 
 dered in the Royal Park of Topsidir in Belgrade. Ser- 
 bia traced the murder to Serbians residing in south- 
 
 41
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 ern Hungary. An investigation was started by the 
 Government of Hungary, and in the course of this in- 
 vestigation Serbia asked the Government of Hungary 
 that some of her government officials should be al- 
 lowed to participate in such investigation, which 
 Hungary permitted. This participation by Serbia in 
 this Hungary investigation was on all fours with the 
 participation that Austria asked in the sixth clause of 
 her ultimatum, and as she had already granted the 
 same thing to Serbia, it seems peculiar, unless Serbia 
 had very, very good reasons of an unavowable char- 
 acter, that she should refuse to grant Austria what 
 Austria had granted her. 
 
 The clamor in regard to the sixth clause of the Aus- 
 trian ultimatum arises from a misunder'^tanding of its 
 purport. There was no request to participate in any trial 
 which might result from an investigation. There was a 
 request to participate in the investigation itself before 
 the Juge (I'lnstniction or examining magistrate, whose 
 functions have been pointed out in the summary of the 
 Sarajevo trial, and unless Austria had participated 
 there and had had some direction of the matters which 
 should be investigated, does any human being pretend 
 to say, knowing the history of the Serbian Govern- 
 ment, the characteristics and moral character of the 
 Serbian people, and the utter subserviencv of the Ser- 
 bian judges, that such investigation would liave been 
 more than a farce? The word used in the ultimatum 
 was- "recherche," which has a definite and positive 
 meaning known to every jurist-consult in the world. 
 In the Serbian Government's reply, the term "enquete 
 judicairc" is used, which also has a definite and posi- 
 tive meaning, and is not the same thing, or anything 
 like the same thing, as "recherche." This the Serbian 
 Government well knew, and its use of the former term 
 in its reply when Austria u.scd the latter in its ultima- 
 tum was simply to confuse the issue and endeavor to 
 represent .Austria as demanding the right that her 
 judges shf)uld sit with the Serbian judge's, which was 
 false. With the facts •sustaining Au<stria's contention, 
 proved at the preliminary examination, the Serbian 
 judge's thereafter could not rscapc applying the law, 
 but had this examination been left in the hands of sub- 
 servient Serbian magistrates entirely, nothintr wotild 
 have iK'en oa<;ipr for them than to so guide anrl direct 
 the investigation as to make the result what is known 
 in America as a "white wash " 
 
 42
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 Precedents for such intervention are numerous in 
 continental jurisprudence and have been invariably 
 granted. We Americans must not suppose that our 
 own system of procedure is the only one in the world, 
 or is necessarily the best. 
 
 With these explanations, the case of Austria against 
 Serbia, and the justness and moderateness of her de- 
 mands, can safely be left to the judgment of fair- 
 minded people. 
 
 From the time of the sending of the Austrian ulti- 
 matum events moved rapidly. The reply of Serbia 
 was deemed insufficient by Austria, and war was de- 
 clared on the 28th day of July. On the 25th day of 
 July, Russia took her first affirmative action, when 
 her Ambassador at Vienna was instructed to request 
 an extension of the time allowed Serbia. On the same 
 day the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg saw the 
 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who intimated 
 to him his intention of endeavoring to force Austria 
 to retreat from the stand which she had taken ; claim- 
 ing that Austria's action was, in reality, directed 
 against Russia, and that she aimed at overthrowing 
 the present status quo in the Balkans and establish- 
 ing her own hegemony there; and who further stated 
 that if Great Britain took her stand firmly with France 
 and Russia there would be no war. 
 
 At this same interview the Russian Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs stated that Russia would not allow 
 Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominat- 
 ing occupying power in the Balkans. (English White 
 Paper No. 17.) The Russian Minister of Foreign Af- 
 fairs in this made a declaration of war in fact, if not 
 in form. Evidently at this time Great Britain con- 
 templated a possible participation with Russia and 
 France in any war that might come, since this British 
 Ambassador took npon himself to say to the Russian 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs that "England could play 
 the roll of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better 
 purpose as a friend, who, if her counsels of modera- 
 tion were disregarded, might one dav be converted 
 into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's 
 ally at once " This is very strong language for an 
 ambassador to use in reference to a possible action by 
 his government and would never have been used had 
 there not been an already existing understanding. 
 
 At this time the Emperor of Germany was absent 
 from Berlin on a cruise in Scandinavian waters; on 
 
 43
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 the y6th he returned. During this time the i^crbian 
 Government was occupied in appeahng tfi every 
 known power td save it, but, except in the ca.sc of 
 Russia, witli comparatively little result, the Kcncral 
 dispositit»n among the pDwers seeming to be (as a 
 reading of the correspondence will show) that Serbia's 
 past history and present pcrfurnianccs did not entitle 
 her to much sympathy or any protection. 
 
 Mefore this date an important but little noticed tele- 
 gram had passed between the British Ambassador at 
 Rome and the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. This 
 dispatch, dated the '^iJrd day of July (the very day on 
 which the ultimatum was ^ent from Austria to Serbia), 
 states that such .\mbassadnr knew that the Italian 
 Government had. at that time, been made cognizant 
 of the note: to use \u^ own lantruai^^e "which will he 
 addressed to Serbia." 
 
 Sir Edward Grey has since made the statement that 
 Italy wa^ left in ignorance of the contents of this com- 
 munication. How he can make tlii« statement seems 
 puzzling, in view i>f the fact that he did know, from 
 the British Ambassador at Rome, on the very day the 
 ultimatum was delivered that the Italian Govenitnent 
 was cognizant of its contents. (No. .'is. Kngli>h W bite 
 Paper.) This is not. however, the only thing concern- 
 ing which an explanation mav be demanded by history 
 from Sir Edward Grey. 
 
 The next day, the '^8th. many exchanges of tele- 
 grams between the various Ministers of Forcig-n Af- 
 fairs and the .Xmbas.sadors took place. There are 
 none which call for much comment except the one 
 (No. }.'i) frc^m the {British .\mbassador at Berlin to 
 Sir Edward Grey, wherein the .\nibassadf>r stated that 
 the German Secretary- of State informed him that if 
 Russia mobilized against Gennany. the latter would 
 have to follow suit ; and. on his demanding what was 
 meant hv the expression "mobilized against Germany." 
 was informed that it meant a mobilization by Ru^^sia 
 in the north, anil tbnt the Russian system of tnobilizn- 
 tion was sn complirated that it might be difficult ex- 
 actly tn hxate her mobilization, and that Germany 
 would, therefore, ha^ '■ ♦■■ bo ^crv r.ireftd n.>« ♦<> be 
 taken bv surprise. 
 
 That Russia atui 1 i.uu-e liad been for mam yrars in 
 an offensive and <lcfensive alliance directed against 
 Cermanv is the in«;tifiration for Germany's not do<;in'ng 
 fri }<r fnWfn Kv <Mrtiri'-c vvliirb wa< inulotibt (>(11\ tbr in- 
 
 •11
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 tention, could such intention be carried into effect. 
 Sir Edward Grey know the conditions upon which 
 Germany would not take the definite action (jf mobiliza- 
 tion. Knowing this, it would seem that, had his desire 
 been for peace, he would have brought the full weight 
 of his influence upon Russia to induce Russia to com- 
 ply with this requirement on the part of Germany, 
 which was lUKiucstionably both reasonable and necessary. 
 
 Whether he did this or not, the dispatches exchanged 
 in the next four or five days show more conclusively 
 than any argument would. From this maze of dis- 
 patches we extract that the only serious proposal made 
 by Sir Edward was to call a conference of the repre- 
 sentatives of England, France, Germany and Italy to 
 examine the possibility of a way out of the situation. 
 
 In the case that this proposal had been accepted, 
 what justice could Austria have expected from such a 
 conference? France, absofutely hostile to all Teutonic 
 pretensions of any character; England, who had shown 
 her hand against Germany at Algeciras, in the Persian 
 Gulf, in the matter of the Bagdad Railroad: one of 
 these powers formally (France), and another inform- 
 ally (England), allied wnth Russia, Austria's real op- 
 ponent in the dispute : Italy a doubtful factor, and one 
 susceptible, owing to her interests in the Mediter- 
 ranean, to coercion by England and France, which co- 
 ercion would undoubtedly have been exerted in case of 
 necessity. This proposition was simply to put Austria's 
 case before a tribunal which was already packed, so as 
 to inevitably secure a decision adverse to her, by a 
 vote of three to one. Naturally, Austria could not ac- 
 quiesce in any such arrangement. 
 
 On the 27th (No. 56), the Russian Ambassador in 
 Vienna informed the Austrian Under-Secretary of 
 State for Foreign Affairs that if actual war broke out 
 with Serbia it would be impossible to localize it, for 
 Russia was not prepared to give way again as she had 
 done on previous occasions. 
 
 On the 28th the British Ambassador to Vienna saw 
 the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Ambas- 
 sador begged the Foreign Minister to believe that if, in 
 the course of the present grave crisis, ''our point of 
 view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise 
 not from want of sympathy with many just complaints 
 which Austria-Hungary had against Serbia, but from 
 the fact that,, whereas, Austria-Hungary put first her 
 
 45
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 quarrel with Scrbiri, you (Sir Edward) were anxious 
 in the first instance tor the peace of Europe." 
 
 This phrase "peace of Europe" strikes the keynote 
 of Sir Edward Grey s entire pretence in all subsequent 
 nej?otiation>. which Sir Edward Cirey adopted merely 
 ft)r the purpose of s.^tisiying that portinii i ,f Eni,'lish 
 public opinion, which would have balked at g"inj.( to 
 war to sustain the right of one country to furtlicr a 
 conspiracy to murder the officials of another country 
 and to prevent the guilty country from receiving the 
 punishment which was its due. 
 
 On the '-ihth, the Imperial Government of Russia 
 announced the mobilization in the military conscrip- 
 tions of ( )dessa. Kieff. Moscow and Kazan (No. 70 
 White Paper), and thus took the decisive action, since 
 Moscow is one of the northern circumscriptions, which 
 Germany, on the t27th (in No. 43 already quoted), had 
 said would be followed by her own moi)ili/.ation. Mr. 
 Sazonoff knew of this intention of (Germany, which 
 had been announced twenty-four hours before, since it 
 was communicated tu him at once by Sir Edward Grey, 
 on his learning it from the British Ambassador at Ber- 
 lin, and this mobilization was, therefore, with malice 
 aforethought, particularly as there was no military or 
 other reason for mobilizing the Moscow circumscrip- 
 tion. Southern Russia could have supplied all the 
 troops which would l)c necessary for an attack upon 
 Austria, had it not been Russia's intention, from the 
 beginning, to make a good job of it and attack Ger- 
 many, too. The year before she had raised her peao* 
 army to 1,250,000 men, 500,000 more, in round num- 
 bers, than the German army. Why? 
 
 Information of such mobilization was comnuinicated 
 by the Russian Ambassador to Germany. After order- 
 ing mobilization. Russia set up the plea (No. 78) that 
 a week or more would in any case elap«;e before the 
 mobilization was completed, which would give time to 
 work out the situation. 
 
 By this time Sir Edward Grey had made up his mind 
 to acquiesce in the somewhat novel political doctrine 
 that a conspiracy to murder the high officials of one 
 country may be initiated and carried forward by an- 
 other country without the second country l)cing con- 
 sidered guilty of any wrong doing, and had announced 
 this decision on the 27th m the House of Commons, 
 
 46
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 for which, on the 2l»th (No. S'6) he was duly thanked 
 by the Prime Minister of Serbia. 
 
 On the 29th the relations of France and of England 
 to each other commenced to be defined, and Sir Edward 
 Grey, in Dispatch No. 87, proceeds to define the British 
 attitude in the whole controversy, which is of so great 
 importance that I quote it verbatim here : 
 
 "SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE. 
 
 "Foreign Office, Julv 29, 1914. 
 "Sir, 
 
 "After telling M. Cambon today how grave the 
 situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell 
 the German Ambassador today that he must not be 
 misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into 
 any sense of false security that we should stand aside 
 if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were 
 now making in common with Germany, failed. But I 
 went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it neces- 
 sary to tell him also that public opinion here ap- 
 proached the present difficulty from a quite different 
 point of view from that taken during the difficulty as 
 to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco 
 the dispute was one in which France was primarily 
 interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in 
 an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel 
 on France on a question that was the subject of a special 
 agreement between France and us. In the present case 
 the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in 
 which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the ques- 
 tion became one between Austria and Russia we should 
 not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then 
 be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav — 
 a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea 
 had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over 
 a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and 
 France became involved, we had not made up our minds 
 what we should do; it was a case that we should have 
 to consider. France would then have been drawn inta 
 a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to 
 her alliance, her honour and interest oblige her to en- 
 gage. We were free from engagements, and we should 
 have to decide what British interests required us to do. 
 I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, 
 we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, 
 and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowskv not to 
 
 47
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 count on our siamiing ii>nW, hut it would not be fair 
 that 1 >lu.uld let M. Camhun he misled into supposing 
 that this meant that we had decided what to do in a 
 contingency that 1 still hoped miglit not arise. 
 
 "M. Cainbon said that I had explained the situation 
 ver)- clearlv. He understood it to l>e that in a IJalkan 
 quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teu- 
 ton and Slav, we should not feel called to intervene: 
 should (.ther issues be raised, and (icrmany and France 
 become involved, so that the question became one of 
 the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it 
 was necessary for us to do. lie seemed quite prepared 
 for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it. 
 •Fie said French opinion was calm, but decided. He 
 anticipated a demand from Germany that France vyould 
 be neutral while Germany attacked F^ussia. This as- 
 surance France, of course, could not give ; she was 
 bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked." 
 
 Then, carrying out the intention expressed in Dis- 
 patch No. 87. Sir Edward Grey further defined his po- 
 sition in Dispatch No. S9 as follows: 
 
 SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN." 
 "Foreign Office. July 29, 1911. 
 
 "Sir, 
 "After speaking to the German Ambassador this 
 afternoon about the European situation. I said that I 
 wished to say to him. in a quite private and friendly 
 way, something that was on my mind. The situation 
 was verv gra\e. W'hilc it was restricted to the issues 
 at present actually in\'olved we had no thought if in- 
 terfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, 
 and then France, the issue might be so great that it 
 would involve all European interests; and T did not 
 wish him to be misled bv the friendlv tone of our con- 
 versation — which I hoped would continue — into think- 
 ing that we should stand aside. 
 
 "Tie said that he quite understood this, but he asked 
 whether I meant that we should, iinder certain cir- 
 rnm'Jtances. intervene? 
 
 "I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use 
 anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply 
 pressure bv sa\ ing that, if things became worse, we 
 should intervene. There would be no question of our 
 intervening if Germany was nnt involved, or even if 
 
 4fi
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 France was not involved. But we knew very well that, 
 if the issue did become such that we thought British 
 interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at 
 once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just 
 as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped 
 that the friendly tone of our conversations would con- 
 tinue as at present, and that I should be able to keep 
 as closely in touch with the German Government in 
 working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to 
 keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it in- 
 volved practically every European interest, I did not wish 
 to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly 
 tone of all our conversations had mislead him or his 
 Government into supposing that we should not take ac- 
 tion, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so 
 misled, the course of things might have been different. 
 
 "The German Ambassador took no exception to what 
 I had said ; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what 
 he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situa- 
 tion." 
 
 On the 30th France defined her position in No. 99: 
 
 "SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY. 
 
 (Received July 30.) 
 (Telegraphic) "Paris, July 30, 1914. 
 
 "President of the Republic tells me that the Russian 
 Government have been informed by the German Gov- 
 ernment that unless Russia stopped her mobilization 
 Germany would mobilize. But a further report, since 
 received from St. Petersburg, states that the German 
 communication had been modified, and was now a re- 
 quest to be informed on what conditions Russia would 
 consent to demobilization. The answer given is that she 
 agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives 
 an assurance that she will respect the sovereigntv of 
 Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the Aus- 
 trian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an inter- 
 national discussion. 
 
 "President thinks that these conditions will not be 
 accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace be- 
 tween the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If 
 His Majesty's Government announced that England 
 would come to the aid of France in the event of a con- 
 flict between France and Germany as a result of the 
 present differences between Austria and Serbia, there 
 
 49
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 would Ik- Mo war. lor (.iermajiy \vi»ul<l at once modify 
 her attitude. 
 
 "I explained to him how difficult it would be for 
 His Majesty's Government to make such an announce- 
 ment. Init he said that he must maintain that it would 
 be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. 
 She does not desire war. and all that she has done at 
 present is to make preparations for mobilization so as 
 not to be taken unawares. The IVench Government 
 will keep His Majesty's (f«nernnunt iiifortned of every 
 thinq- that may he done in that way. 'Phev have reliable 
 information tJiat the German troops arc concentrated 
 round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there 
 were a gfencral war on the Continent it would inevita- 
 bly draw Encflaiid into it for the protection of her vital 
 interests. A declaration now of her intention to sup- 
 port France, whose desire it is that peace should be 
 maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany 
 from j^oinp to war." 
 
 Notice how Sazonoff. Cambon from the bcijinning, 
 and Poincare in this, harp on England's declaring her- 
 self with them. 
 
 England folhjws it on the .same day witli N'«». 101 : 
 
 "SIR EDW ARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCIIEN. 
 (Telegraphic). "Foreign Office. July 30, 1914. 
 
 ""Sour telegram of 29th July. 
 
 "His Majesty's Government cannot lor a moment 
 entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should 
 bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. 
 
 "What lie asks us in effect is to engage to stand by 
 while French colonies are taken and hVance is beaten 
 so long as Germany docs not take French territory as 
 distinct from the colonies. 
 
 "From the material {)oint of view such a proposal is 
 unacceptable, for France, without further territory in 
 Europe bcim,' taken from her. could be so crushed as to 
 lose her position as a Great Power, aiid become sub- 
 ordinate to German policy. 
 
 "Altogether, apart from that, n would he .i disgrace 
 for us to make this bargain with Germany at the ex- 
 pense of h'rance. a disgrace from which the gocnl name 
 r»f this country would never recover. 
 
 "The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain 
 away whatever obligation or interest we have as re- 
 
 50
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 gards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not enter- 
 tain that bargain either. 
 
 "Havinj^^ said so much, it is unnecessary to examine 
 whether the prospect of a future general neutrality 
 agreement between England and Germany offered posi- 
 tive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying 
 our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to 
 act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any 
 such unfavorable and regrettable development of the 
 present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates. 
 
 "You should speak to the Chancellor in the above 
 sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of main- 
 taining the good relations between England and Ger- 
 many is that they should continue to work together to 
 preserve the peace of Europe ; if we succeed in this ob- 
 ject, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, 
 I believe, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. 
 For that object His Majesty's Government will work 
 in that way with all sincerity and good-will. 
 
 "And I will say this : If the peace of Europe can be 
 preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own 
 endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to 
 which Germany could be a party, by which she could be 
 assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be 
 pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, 
 and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this 
 and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last 
 Balkan crises, and, Germany having a corresponding 
 object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has 
 hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of defi- 
 nite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more 
 acute than any that Europe has gone through for gen- 
 erations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief 
 and reaction which will follow may make possible 
 some more definite rapprochement between the Powers 
 than has been possible hitherto." 
 
 The last part of this dispatch was written with one 
 eye on the nonconformist conscience of England. 
 
 All of this time, it must be noticed, there is no ques- 
 tion of Belgian neutrality in any shape, form or man- 
 ner, and that England is willing to go to war without 
 regard to this, unless Germany accepts certain condi- 
 tions, the acceptance of which conditions, in view of 
 the fact that France and Russia were both ready to 
 attack Germany, by Germany, would have simply 
 
 51
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 amounted to suicide on Germany's part. By what right 
 England, if not allied to these powers (in spite of the 
 denials of Sir Kdward drey) should seek to circum- 
 scribe Germany's military and naval action against 
 France, secm*^ impossible to understand; and the only 
 conclusion that can be reached from a close examina- 
 tion of these dispatches is that the nej^otiations by Sir 
 Edward Grey with Germany were from the beginning 
 poisoned by bad faith on the part of Sir Edward Grey. 
 
 On the 'U^X, Russia mobilized completely, although 
 Germany had not at this time mobilized. (X(^. 11'^) 
 
 On the same day (No. 112) Germany decided to take 
 the first step towards mobilization, "Kriegsgcfahr." 
 For obvious reasons, the British Government has chosen 
 to print the German dispatch before the Russian 
 (No. 113). The text of the German dispatch, however, 
 shows that the action of Germany was taken subse- 
 quent to the action of the Russian mobilization. 
 
 Ab<nit this time Sir Edward Grey found another 
 moral issue; and, having found it. addressed duplicate 
 dispatches to the French and (^lerman G<j\ ernments 
 (No. 114): 
 
 "SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE AND 
 
 SIR E. GOSCHEN. 
 (Telegraphic). "Foreign Office, July ;U, 1914. 
 
 "I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but 
 in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany it be- 
 comes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view 
 of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) 
 Government is prepared to engage to respect neutrality 
 of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it. 
 
 "A similar request is l)eing addressed to German 
 (French) Government. It is important to have an 
 carlv answer." 
 
 This brint:-> tis U> the c^cneral subject of the neutrality 
 of Belgium. 
 
 But before taking up this intricate and involved sub- 
 ject, it is perhajis advisable to dispose of the dis- 
 |)atches container! in the White Paper, as far as space 
 permits, and to show how Sir Edward Grey deceived 
 the British public and misled the i^ritish .Vmbassador 
 at St. Pcterslnirg, his own subordinate. 
 
 It is now known that on July 30th Sir Edward Grev 
 was about to resign, because the majority of the Cabi- 
 net refused to go to war with Germany on account of 
 
 58
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 Serbia and preferred to throw over Great Britain's 
 naval and other engagements with France, which, on 
 July 30th, Cambon urged Great Britain to execute 
 without delay. (White Paper 105, and its enclosures.) 
 
 The British Cabinet being, in a sense, all at sea, per- 
 suaded Sir Edward Grey to withdraw his resignation 
 and to stay on, and on the 31st of July he agreed to re- 
 main until Germany's position as regards Belgium was 
 determined. Early on August 1st the British Cabinet 
 met and drew up a memorandum concerning the neu- 
 trality of Belgium, which Sir Edward Grey was to 
 submit to Lichnowsky. White Paper 123 gives Sir 
 Edward Grey's account of his interview with the Ger- 
 man Ambassador, and shows that at about 1 :30 P. M. 
 of August 1st the German Ambassador asked Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey the question whether, if Germany gave a 
 promise not to violate Belgium's neutrality, Great 
 Britain would remain neutral. Sir Edward Grey was 
 further pressed as to whether he could not formulate 
 conditions in which Great Britain would remain neu- 
 tral, and the Ambassador even suggested that the in- 
 tegrity of France and her colonies might be guaran- 
 teed. To this offer, which we now know was made 
 with authority by the German Ambassador, Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey said that he felt obliged to refuse definitely 
 any promise to remain neutral on any terms, and could 
 only say that "we must keep our hands free." This 
 dispatch is so extremely important that T quote it in 
 full : 
 
 (No. 123) "SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E." 
 GOSCHEN. 
 
 "London, Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 
 
 "Sir: I told the German Ambassador today that the 
 reply of the (German Government with regard to the 
 neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great re- 
 gard, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feelint: 
 in this country. If Germany could see her way to give 
 the same assurance as that which had been giv- 
 en to France, it would materially contribute to relieve 
 anxiety and division here. On the other hand, if there 
 were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one 
 combatant, while the other respected it. it would be 
 extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this 
 country. I said that we had been discussing this ques- 
 tion at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to 
 tell him this T gave him a memorandum of it. 
 
 53
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 "He (kskiti oit- uluthtr, tj Girmany jt,'a; t- a promise 
 not to liohttt- lii'li^iitni ii,utrality, we :iiouUi t'n^'Oj^t* to 
 rrMidiii ncutrai. 
 
 "\ replied that 1 cuuM not say that: our hands were 
 still I'rcc, and wc were considcrinj; what our attitude 
 should be All 1 could say was that our attitude 
 would be determined largely by public opinion here. 
 I did not think that we could give a promise of neu- 
 trality on that condition alone. 
 
 ■■'nit' Atnbossiuior pressed lue as to zchether J could 
 not /oniudote londttioiis on ichich riv would remain 
 nfutral. He d en stated that the integrity of France 
 and her colonies mi^ht be guaranteed. 
 
 "I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any 
 promise to remain ncutrai on similar terms, and I 
 could only say that we must keep our hands free." 
 
 Sir Edward Grey gave no information to his col- 
 lea^mes of these offers of Lichnowsky on August 1st, 
 and when the Cabinet met the next morning, .Aug^^st 
 2nd. he concealed them from the entire Cabinet as he 
 did from the House of Commons on August 3rd. But 
 for this concealment of Sir Edward Grey. Belgium 
 would not have been turned into a shambles, and Rus- 
 sia would undoubtedly have accepted Austria's ac- 
 quiescence in tlie terms that Sazonoff hi^uself dictated 
 to Pnurtales at 2 V. M. on July 3(»th, whicli are men- 
 tioned in Dispatch 97 from Sir G. Buchannan to Sir 
 Edward Grey. 
 
 The conversation between the German Ambassador 
 and Sir Edward Grey, which is referred to in Dispatch 
 123. was not known f(»r weeks after it occurred. When 
 Parliament met on August 27th. Sir Edward Grey was 
 asked in. the House whether he had submitted Lich- 
 nowsky 's proposals to the Cabinet, and why these pro- 
 posals difl not fully meet the desires of the British 
 Cabinet. Sir Edward Grey admitted, in his answer to 
 this interrogation, that be bad disclosed this dispatch 
 to no one at the time and for several days thereafter, 
 claiming that Lichnowsky was speaking for himself 
 only and had not been authorized by Berlin to propose 
 such terms. 
 
 In making this last statement. Sir Edward Grey did 
 not explain win he did not in this interview raise the 
 questirjn with Lichnowsky as to his specific authority, 
 which would have been the natural thing to do, since 
 Tjrhnowskv made the very propositions which tho
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 British Cabinet had stated that they would insist 
 upon ; nor why he immediately wired them to Goschen, 
 the Ambassador of England to Berlin, to prevent the 
 latter 's getting into cross purposes with the British 
 Foreign Office in the matter. 
 
 The fact is, and cannot be doubted, that at the time, 
 August 1st, 1914, Lichnowsky made these proposals ro 
 Sir Edward Grey, Sir Edward Grey knew that they 
 were authoritative and would bind the German Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 Ambassadors, in such grave situations as were then 
 existing, do not make unauthorized propositions. Fur- 
 thermore, the German correspondence shows that 
 Lichnowsky was authorized to make this offer. It is 
 an English scholar of standing, Dr. Connybeare of Ox- 
 ford, who characterizes Sir Edward Grey's answer to 
 the interpellation in Parliament on x\ugust 27th as a 
 mode] of hard lying; and goes even further, in a lately 
 published letter: 
 
 "One thing we must insist upon for her," (Great 
 Britain) "is that that sinister liar, Sir Edward Grey, 
 who forever has peace on his lips and war in his heart, 
 should go. We cannot trust him and his accomplice, 
 Sazonoff, to make peace for England." 
 
 Sazonoff himself has lied and lied constantly 
 throughout all the negotiations betw^een the Powers 
 which preceded the declaration of war. No. 133 in the 
 English White Papers shows that at the time Russia 
 ordered her mobilization, Austria had signified her 
 willingness to discuss the substance of the Austrian 
 ultimatum to Serbia, that Sazonoff had expressed his 
 satisfaction thereat and had said it was desirable that 
 the discussion should take place in Tvondon with the 
 participation of the Great Powers. 
 
 Russia intended w-ar from the very beginning of the 
 conflict. She had raised her army from twelve hun- 
 dred and fifty .thousand men in peace only a short time 
 before, which necessitated a counter increase on Ger- 
 many's part. She had assembled forces of everv kind 
 that she was capable of assembling early in the Spring 
 of 1914, and she intended, and had intended, for a long 
 time, to launch her legions on the march to Constan- 
 tinople in that fateful year. 
 
 France, that "peaceful democracy," which for forty 
 years has been biding her time and w-aiting her mo- 
 ment, like a revengeful woman, and which now is pos- 
 ing as having been desirous of peace, had an oppor- 
 
 55
 
 The Outbreak ot the >X^ar 
 
 lunit) iL> in-iiro peace, ii >hc had really wished it. had 
 she rephcd, when sIjc was asked hy Germany what her 
 intentions were in the crisis, that >lie did n»n propose 
 to supp<-)rt Russia in attempting the justify, by the force 
 of arms, murder, as a means of political action. But 
 France, who needed a strait-jacket to keep her out of 
 a cjuarrel wliich wa^ not hers, in the whole business, 
 was willing to support anything and everything, pro- 
 vided she gratified that insane obsession of hers, which 
 sprang from iier offen<led conceit, towards Germany 
 for having taken from her, in 1870. territory, the larger 
 portion of which she herself, in the reign of Louis 
 XI\'. had taken from (lermanv !)y force of arms, and 
 held by that title. 
 
 The subject, in all its bearings, is too long and too 
 intricate to be here discussed at greater length. 
 
 There is a most excellent work by M. V. Price en- 
 titled. "The Diplomatic History of the War," which 
 gives all the diplomatic disi)atches and co-relates them 
 to one anotiicr and with contemporaneous evidence, in 
 so far as this is ascertainable. Any fair-minded man 
 of reasonable intelligence, who will read this book 
 carefully, will inevitably be driven to the conclusion 
 that Sir Edward Grey is the person upon whom the 
 responsibility for the expansion of the war from more 
 than a local quarrel between Austria and Russia will 
 be placed by history; and that to accomplish the end 
 which lie had in view from the very beginning. Sir Ed- 
 ward Grev did not disdain to deceive both his col- 
 leagues of the Cabinet, the Houses of Parliament, and 
 the people of England. 
 
 Some day perhaps Morley will speak and then the 
 dots will be placed on the i's of this whole affair. 
 
 During the I'Vench Revolution, the territory' now 
 known as P.elgium had become a part of the Republic 
 of France. It embr.accd with great enthusiasm the most 
 violent of the political doctrines taught by the French 
 Revolution. Subsequent to the fall of Napoleon, it was 
 united with Holland, but in 18.'10 revolted, and a Eu- 
 ropean scandal had ensued, in some sense, which neces- 
 sitated the intervention of the great Powers. Accord- 
 ingly, on the lAth of November. IS.'Jl, a treaty was en- 
 tered into luiwecn Great I»ritain. Austria, France. Prus- 
 sia anfl Rus'^ia. on \\\c one part, and P.elgium on the 
 other, relative to the separation of Belgium from Hol- 
 land. This treaty affected the present war only in its 
 7(h ,iiif| '.?r.t!i articles. .Xrticle 7 is "Belgium, within the
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 limits specified in Articles 1, 2 and 4, shall form an inde- 
 pendent and perpetually neutral state. It shall be 
 bound to observe such neutrality towards all other 
 states." 
 
 Article 25 is "The courts of Great Britain, Austria, 
 France, i'russia and Russia guarantee to His Majesty, 
 the King of the Belgains, the execution of all of the 
 preceding Articles." 
 
 These articles are quoted at length from "Map of 
 Europe, by Treaty," by Edward liurstlet, Librarian 
 and Keeper of the Papers, Foreign Office, London, 
 1875. There have been so many versions of the articles 
 of this treaty affecting the neutralization of Belgium 
 quoted in the daily press, and elsewhere, in an al- 
 tered form, that it is deemed advisable to give a 
 version of the text from a work of authority. This 
 treaty was entered into between the Powers and Bel- 
 gium, but Holland, however, refused to accept the 
 treaty, and war took place between Belgium and Hol- 
 land, with the result that the going into full effect of 
 the treaty was postponed until 1839, when another 
 treaty (which was preceded by a treaty of separation 
 between Belgium and the Netherlands, and a treaty be- 
 tween the Powers on the one part, and the Netherlands 
 on the other, had been entered into, both being signed 
 on the same day), between the Powers on the one part, 
 and Belgium on the other, was entered into at London 
 on the 19th of April, 1839. By its Second Article the 
 treaty of the 15th of November, 1831, between their 
 Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great 
 Britain and Ireland, etc., and His Majesty, the King of 
 of the Belgians, is declared not to be obligatory upon 
 the high contracting parties. And by the First Article 
 Her Majesty, etc., declared that "the Articles hereunto 
 annexed, and forming the tenor of the treaty, conclud- 
 ed this dav between His Majesty, the King of the Bel- 
 gians, and His Majesty, the King of the Netherlands, 
 the Crown Duke of Luxemburg, are considered as hav- 
 ing the same force and validity as if they were textu- 
 ally inserted in the present Act. and that they are thus 
 placed under the guarantee of their said Majesties." 
 
 The Seventh Article of the treaty, referred to in the 
 First Article of the treaty between Great Britain, etc., 
 and Belgium, of the 19th of April, 1839, is "Belgium, 
 within the limits specified in Articles 1. 2 and 4. shall 
 form an independent and perpetuallv neutral State. It 
 
 67
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 shall he bound to ubservc >uch neutrality towards all 
 other States." 
 
 Thus was Belj^um neutralized. This neutralization 
 continued down to the year 1870 intact ; though, in the 
 year 181<». at a moment when war apparently threat- 
 ened. France notified liclj^um that unless .she defended 
 her neutralization, she (France), would violate it. no 
 overt act was committed. 
 
 In l.'sTt* the Franct»-l'russian \\ ar broke out, and Mi 
 Gladstone, who, for many reasons, did not consider that 
 the Treaty of 183U was at the time binding upon the 
 parties thereto, caused another treaty to be entered 
 into between Great Britain and the North German Con- 
 federation, by His Majesty, the King of Prussia; 
 wherein and whereby the North German Confederation 
 agreed to respect the neutralization of Belgium as long 
 as the same was respected by I'Vaiice ; and tlie Oueen 
 of England, on her part, obligated herself "in the event 
 that the armies of France should violate that neutral- 
 ity through the hostilities between the North German 
 Confederation and France, she will be prepared to co- 
 operate with His Prussian Majesty for the defense of 
 the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed 
 upon; emj)loying for that purpose her na\al and mili- 
 tary forces to insure its observations and to maintain, 
 in conjunction with His Prussian Majesty, then and 
 :hereaftcr. the independence and neutrality of Belgium. ' 
 
 -Nrticle 3 of this treaty runs as follows: "This treaty 
 shall be binding on tlie high cf)ntracting parties during 
 the continuation of the present war between the North 
 German Confederation and France, and for twelve 
 montlis after the ratification of anv treaty of peace con- 
 cluded between tho'^e parties, and on the expiratifMi of 
 that time, the independence and neutrality of I'clgium 
 will, so far as the high contracting parties are respect- 
 ively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore in Ar- 
 ticle I. of the Ouintuple Trcatv nf the l!>th of April. 
 
 A precisely similar treaty was on the 1 1th of .August 
 entered into with France. The Treaty of Peace was 
 made on the IRth of ^fay. 1871. and the ratifications 
 were exchanged on the 20th of May following. These 
 two treaties of IhTO. relative to Belgium. fluTcfor*-. ex- 
 pired, bv the limitatiftns contained in their Third Arti- 
 cle. f)n the 20th of May. 1872. 
 
 The treaties above cited contain the basis on which 
 
 58
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 it is sought to hold the present German Empire as re- 
 sponsible for violating the neutrality of Belgium. 
 
 The first question wiiich suggests itself tu tiie reader 
 of those treaties is the following: How is the German 
 Empire, which was not in existence as a sovereign state 
 in the years 1831, 1839 or 1870, bound by these treaties? 
 
 The Treaty of 1831 was signed by the King of Prus- 
 sia, as was the treaty of 1839. The Treaty of 1870 
 was signed by the King of Prussia for the North Ger- 
 man Confederation. The German Empire and Prussia 
 are entirely separate political units ; as separate as are 
 the United States and the State of New York; and the 
 Kingdom of Prussia bears much the same relation to 
 the Empire of Germany as the State of New York does 
 to the United States of America. 
 
 The North German Confederation was organized as 
 a result of the War of 1866 with Austria, and was com- 
 posed of the German states north of the Main, and did 
 not include Wurtemburg, Bavaria and the other states 
 of the south ; and as these separate sovereignties were 
 not members of the North German Confederation \ at 
 the time of tlie signing of the Treaty of 1870, it ^s 
 extremely difficult to see by what process of reasoning 
 these South German states were affected by a treaty of 
 the North German Confederation. 
 
 The Empire of Germany united the North and South 
 German States in one political federation, very similar 
 in its constitution to the United States, under the head- 
 ship of the King of Prussia, as Emperor of Germany. 
 But the Kingship of Prussia did not fuse into the 
 Empireship of Germany ; the two offices are as distinct 
 as those of the Governor of New York and the Presi- 
 dent of the United States. The mere fact that the two 
 offices happen to be held by the same individual does 
 not confuse their functions and prerogatives. Nor 
 does the sovereigntv of the Kingdom of Prussia merge, 
 except so far as provided by the act constituting the 
 Empire, into the sovereignty of the German Empire. 
 This lack of fusion in many important attributes of 
 sovereignty is shown by the fact that to this dav Sax- 
 ony. Bavaria and Wurtemburg maintain diplomatic rep- 
 resentatives abroad, and receive those of foreign coun- 
 tries. Great Britain had diplomatic representatives in 
 several of the separate States in the Empire at the mo- 
 ment of the outbreak of the war ; thus recognizing that 
 
 59
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 the sovcreitj^ntN <>t ihcsi- siato was i\ot fused in those 
 of the ICnijiirt-. 
 
 The whole iK»litical scheme of the German Empire 
 is a fetltratioii and not a union. If any new state was 
 admitted intt* tins federation. subse(|uent to the nego- 
 tiation of a treaty by the Geriiian Empire, in pursuance 
 of the treaty-making powers confcrretl vipon it by the 
 constituti(»n, there is no doubt that such entering state 
 would be bound by such treaty ; but that is a totally dif- 
 ferent case from the (icrman I'.inpire Winj; Ixnuid by 
 treaties negotiated prior to its creation by one ( Prus- 
 sia), or by more than one, (North German Confeder- 
 ation) of the separate sovereign States which after- 
 wards became federated, unless subsequent to the fed- 
 eration such treaties were assumed by the German Em- 
 pire in the manner, and accor«linp to the forms, pre- 
 scribed by its constitution. There has never lieen any 
 pretence that any treaty which had been duly entered 
 into by. say, Bavaria, prior t(» its joining the German 
 Empire as one of the federated states has an^ binding 
 force upon the German Empire, nor has such a conten- 
 tion been advanced in relation to any treaty made by 
 any of the federated sovereiijn states, except Prussia, 
 which the pseudo-sentimentalists contend bound the 
 German Empire in 1831 and IbM. thirty odd years be- 
 fore the German Empire came into existence, by its 
 signature to the treaties guaranteeing the neutralizatii^i 
 of Belgium. 
 
 In the history of the L iiiled Slale> there i.> an in- 
 cident which proves both the folly and the absurdity of 
 this contention. What is now tlie state of Texas was 
 once the republic of Texas and had entered into treaty- 
 relations, as such republic, with various countries of the 
 world. SubstHjuent to tiie entrance into tiiese treat}' 
 relations, the rei)ublic of Texas divested itself of a por- 
 tion of its sovereignty by accepting the Constitution of 
 the United States, and entered the rni<»n as a state. 
 There never has been, and never will be. any contention 
 that the treaties which Texas had entered into with 
 foreign countries iMnmd the United States, on Texas be- 
 coming one of the states composing the Union. 
 
 .Another thing: neither the Treaties of IRMl nor of 
 1830 contained anv time limitation. Cotmcqucntly. 
 they were revocal>le by any one of the guarantors at 
 will : and. l)eing so revocable, the oidy qiie.stion which 
 could arise in connection with their being revoked was 
 
 60
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 the character of notice which any of the sovereign 
 states, composing the guarantors, should give to the 
 guaranteed state or to its co-guarantors. 
 
 International law is not precise on this point, but it 
 may be said that a declaration of war is one form of 
 notice. 
 
 Russia, one of those nations which is now posing 
 as being moved in this war by altruistic regard for the 
 rights of small nations (although her history would not 
 lead anyone to suspect that heretofore she had been 
 troubled with any such scruples), has, on several occa- 
 sions, put forward the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus 
 which is recognized by the great writers on internation- 
 al law as being a tacit condition in every treaty, and 
 which means that a total change of circumstances is a 
 cause in itself of the termination of any treaty obliga- 
 tion. This doctrine was accepted by the Powers as an 
 excuse for Russia's repudiation of the clauses of the 
 Treaty of Paris neutralizing the Black Sea and also of 
 her engagements as to Batum contained in the Treaty 
 of Berlin. In neither of these cases has the change 
 of circumstances been so total as is the case in both 
 Germany and Belgium, since the making of the Treaties 
 of 1831 and 1839. At the time of the signing of the 
 Treaties of 1831 and 1839, Belgium was a small and in- 
 significant country, both in point of area and popula- 
 tion, with little foreign commerce, with no army worthy 
 of the name, and with none of those attributes of 
 strength which are a part of sovereignty. 
 
 In 1914 the situation had decidedly changed; Bel- 
 gium had become, in proportion to her area, one of the 
 most populous countries of the world, enjoying a large 
 and lucrative foreic^n commerce ; was a manufacturing 
 country of great importance ; had raised and maintained 
 an army which, in proportion to her population, re- 
 quired the military services of a very considerable per- 
 centage thereof ; had thoroughly fortified her chief 
 strategic points and had acquired colonies. In short, 
 had taken on all the attributes of any other of the mod- 
 ern states. There was no longer any need for her re- 
 maining in the emasculated position of a neutral state ; 
 and it is an axiom of law that when a reason for a thing 
 fails, the thing fails. 
 
 The writer expresses no personal opinion as to wheth- 
 er or not this change was so great in itself as to con- 
 stitute a case for the fitting application of the doctrine 
 
 61
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 which Russia had already applieil. as shown in less 
 ■strong cases, hut merely points out that this doctrine is 
 recognized in. and has the sanction of. the law of na- 
 tions. 
 
 Another pt>int de>crves attention, in view of the re- 
 lations of France, IJel^iuni and Germany. Uy the lan- 
 guage of the 7th Article of the orij^inal Treaty of IBiH. 
 which was a^ain used in tlu- Treaty ul IHIV.t, Iklgium 
 was bound to observe perpetual neutrality tv)\vard> all 
 other states, and this necessarily assumes that she 
 would maintain an attitude of strict impartiality as be- 
 tween all other states; and it follows necessarily that if 
 she departed from this attitude of strict impartiality, 
 the state to whcise tii>a(lvantage she so dLjjartcd cmiltl 
 not be longer bound by any engagement that it had 
 contracted toward Belgium. 
 
 In other words, iielirium's maintenance of an attitude 
 of strict itupartiality was a condition precedent to any 
 of ihe guaranteeing states maintaining a like attitude. 
 
 r.elgium fortified the towns commanding the main 
 routes from Germany into France, and also fortified 
 Antwerp in comparatively recent years. I'eculiarly 
 enough, the first set of fortifications commanding the 
 routes from Germany into I'Vance also commanded the 
 German frontier. She erected no like fortifications 
 commanding the French frontier, which she permitted 
 to lie open. 
 
 The explanation of r)elgium ff>r the construction of 
 these fortresses was that they were purely for the pur- 
 poses of defense. We will accept this explanation as 
 fact, and will not comment on the peculiarity that, 
 geographically, their positions seem to indicate that 
 defense was necessary only ag.iinst Germany. 
 
 In 190.'), France made a special appropriation of three 
 hundred million dollars for the strengthening of her 
 fortific.itions and the putting of her army into a I)ette!" 
 condition as regards artillery and other equipiuent. 
 .'\ considerable portion of this money was spent on im- 
 proving the condition of the fortresses which com- 
 manded the Belgian border, and which, in a strategic 
 sense, dove-tailed the Uelgiati fortresses towards Gtcr- 
 many and completed the defensive scheme of these 
 Belgian fortificatir)ns against an invasion coming from 
 Germany. 
 
 In ISOfi Germany did a thing which now appears, in 
 the eyes of the pseudo-sentimentalists, to have, been a 
 
 6t
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 heinous crime. She built strategic railways along- the 
 Belgian frontier, and by this means made it possible to 
 comciilraU' ircjops in large numbers at strategic points 
 on that I'rontier. 
 
 It is to be noted that this acti(jn was only taken af- 
 ter France had strengthened her fortresses on the Bel- 
 gian border, and Belgium had greatly strengthened her 
 fortresses which commanded the road to Germany. In 
 the cases of both France and Belgium, these fortresses 
 were for the purpose of defense only, according to tiiese 
 two nations, but they nevertheless did make a chain of 
 strong i)laoes which could have been used with great 
 advantage in an invasion of Germany from France 
 through Belgium. Under these circumstances, the con- 
 struction of strategic railways by Germany may also be 
 conceived to be for defensive purposes ; but the pseudo- 
 sentimentalists will have none of this, these railways 
 were for offensive purposes, and for no other. 
 
 This digression from the main subject, that is to say, 
 the consideration as to whether or not Belgium per- 
 formed her obligations under the Treaties of 1831 and 
 1839, is necessary to understand the full scope of what 
 follows. 
 
 In the year 1906, without advising Germany of such 
 consultation, the Chief of the Belgian General's Staff, 
 Major-General DuCarne, entered into a series of con- 
 versations with the military attache of the British 
 Legation. Col. Barnardiston. in Brussels. The original 
 report of General DuCarne discloses that as early ag 
 January, 1906, consultations took place between the 
 Belgian Government and the British Government over 
 steps to be taken by them against Germany. The other 
 details will be found in the conversation itself, which 
 will be found in the Appendix. 
 
 In the year 1912, Col. Bridges, who had succeed.ed 
 Col. Barnardiston, and General Jungbluch, then chief 
 of the Belgian General's Staff, continued these conver- 
 sations; and in 1911 Baron Greindl, the Belgian Min- 
 ister in Berlin, in a communication to the Belgian Min- 
 ister of Foreign Affairs, shows his knowledge of the ex- 
 istence of these plans and makes a protest against them 
 as being, in a large sense, a violation of Belgium's 
 duties towards Germany under the Treaties of 1831 
 and 1839. 
 
 The writer makes no comment on these documents 
 — they speak for themselves sufficiently strongly — 
 
 63
 
 The Outbreak of the War 
 
 merely pointing out that, whatever the British Govern- 
 ment may >ay as re^^ards the lack of importance of 
 these conversations and the lack of authority of her 
 representatives, nations do not reveal their military 
 secrets to each other except where there is a clear un- 
 derstanding between them as to the willingfncss of both 
 parties to enj^a^e in joint action. 
 
 I'urther, was not Belgium in honor bound to advise 
 Germany of these conversations and their substance 
 under her treaty obligation of neutrality? 
 
 To sum up. it seems hardly probable that in law the 
 Empire of Germany was bound by the Treaties of 
 18;31 or 18:^9, which were entered into by only one of 
 the component states of the present German Empire, 
 whicli Empire did not exist at the time of the making 
 of the treaties. 
 
 Second: — That, even if the present German Empire 
 "tNCre bound by such treaties, the action of Belgium, in 
 « nt».riii;.r into ilkj.jal niililary relaliuns with Cireat Hrit- 
 nin. as evidenced by the docunicnts hereinbefore re- 
 ferred to, absolved the German Empire from further 
 obligations under such treaties. 
 
 Third : — That, furthermore, the doctrine of the ter- 
 mination of a treaty obligation by total change of cir- 
 cumstances was applicable in the present case. 
 
 Fourth : — That, in any event, the exigencies of the 
 military situation on the first day of August. 101 1. con- 
 stituted, and still continue to constitute, under the law 
 of nations, a sufficient justification for the German in- 
 v;t'' •; f lii'l^'iuni. 
 
 No nation is expected to pre>^eiit its throat to the 
 knii'i ; .mv! any Nt.itcsinan. of .-in\- nation, who, in ,in 
 occasion of overwhelming necessity for his own nation, 
 wo'dd deoin >nch necessity sulvirdinatc to a treaty 
 right of any other nation, would be false to his duty 
 to his own nation: self preservation being the first law 
 of national existence, as it is of individual existence. 
 
 The Siii)reine Court of thi> I'nited States, for on.- 
 aiithorifv. ha<< alrcadv s.iid : "It i>; not to he presuinefl 
 that the legislative department of the Government will 
 likely pass laws which are in conflict with the treaties 
 of tho country, but that cirrninst.Tnccs may arise which 
 would not only justify the Government in disregarding 
 their stipulations, but demand, in the interests of the 
 cr)uiitrv. that it ^^honbl do so Th<Te r.Tti he tin ques- 
 tion that imexpertcfl events may call for a change in 
 the policv of a country." 
 
 64
 
 - CHAPTER 111. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST 
 
 INVASION OF BELGIUM. 
 
 During the night of August 1st the Adolph bridge, 
 a fine viaduct which spans one of the great gorges at 
 Luxemburg, was seized by the Germans. The Grand 
 Duchess, Marie Adelaide, placed her motor car across 
 the bridge while Mr. Eyschen, a member of the Cabi- 
 net, attempted to hand to the officer, commanding the 
 German advance guard, a copy of the treaty of 1867. 
 General V'andvck, the commandant of Luxemburg, 
 was also present. 
 
 While these events had been taking place on the 
 bridge, the Luxemburg government received a tele- 
 gram from the Imperial Chancellor stating that the 
 acts against the Grand Duchy had been taken in no 
 hostile sense, but were only such measures as were 
 necessary to secure the safety of German troops by 
 protecting Luxemburg and its railways against an at- 
 tack by the French. Luxemburg thus being peacefully 
 seized, no time was lost in strengthening the German 
 position bv the usual military measures, and the in- 
 vading forces settled down to wait until that portion 
 of the German army which had been detailed for 
 making the movement through Belgium, hereinafter 
 described, had advanced to that point in their cam- 
 paign at which the co-operation of the army in Lux- 
 emburg would be ' necessary in the general forward 
 movement into France. 
 
 A German army, departing from the base of Aix-la- 
 Chapelle, proceeded by rail to Herbesthal, and cross- 
 ing the Belgian frontier, occupied Limberg, the first 
 Belgian town on the road to Liege. This occupation 
 took place without military opposition and the army 
 pressed forward to Verviers. Before the infantry 
 reached this place a small Belgian force had been 
 driven out of it by German cavalry advance guard. 
 The inhabitants here offered no resistance and conse- 
 quently the occupation was orderly. On the same day 
 
 65
 
 The Campaign in the West 
 
 Dlher German lroop> also entered Hclj^juin at Uale- 
 leim, Francoiichainp and Sta\clot. n<i opposition be- 
 n^ otiered anywhere. 
 
 A portion of the German troops then turned south- 
 ward down the valley of the Meuse. advancinj^ to- 
 wards Liege by Herve and found the bridge of the 
 Meuse and the Trois Font tunnels blown up. The 
 ittempt to sei/.e the bridges across the Meuse by Vur- 
 .)rise was therefore a failure, and the effort to replace 
 them by temporary i)ontoon bridges, the Belgians at 
 first successfully resisted, but this resistance was soon 
 overcome and the Germans advanced to Liege. 
 
 .'\t the same time that this southward movement 
 was taken another (icrman force advanced northwest- 
 wardly from the German frontier towards Vise, a 
 small town just outside the Dutch frontier and oc- 
 cupying a strategic position of importance on the 
 flank of any force advancing from the east towards 
 Liege. This advance was delayed on the road lie- 
 cause the bridges had been blown up and others had 
 to be built under a heavy fire from concealed Belgian 
 troops. This delay caused the capture of \*ise, which 
 should have been made prior to the assault u]m)U 
 Liege, to be postponed until .Tftcr the general assault 
 upon Iviege had been l>egun 
 
 After fierce fighting, ho\^c^^i. m which the civilian 
 population took part, the Germans entered \ise and. 
 in spite of the reports originally published in the Eng- 
 lisii Press, as the London Times afterwards admitted, 
 they did not massacre the inhabitants of this place. 
 Some few civilians, caught, with arms in their hands, 
 were shot in accordance with the rules of war. but this 
 was all. until after the retirement of the Belgian forces 
 when, the inhabitants l)eing assembled in the centre 
 of the town, the commander of the German troops 
 made them an address, explaining that "Germany was 
 not at war with Belgium, but that the inhabitants of 
 the occupie<l towns nuist submit to German military law 
 and that any atlemjjt upon the tr«K>ps would immediate- 
 ly l)e punished with death." 
 
 As this officer was finishing these words, a pistol 
 shot rang out from the crowd and he fell. shot. Sum- 
 mary procediire was adopted. Those present in the 
 vicinity from whence the sh(»t came were seized and 
 immerliately executed, a^ would hnve hapfx-ncfl with 
 nnv armv in this world.
 
 Invasion of Belgium 
 
 Liege, to the southward in the valley of the Meuse, 
 has been jirominent in the history of this portion of 
 Europe for himdreds of years. The name first appears 
 in 720 when it was made the seat of a bishopric, the 
 bishop also having temi)oral power and under this 
 govermnent of its prince-bishop, llie city remained 
 until Vi\)2, when it was occupied by a French contin- 
 gent commanded by Lafayette, This government 
 then fell and Liege became a part of the French Re- 
 public. »■ ♦ 
 
 In modern times Liege had become the centre oi 
 the coal mining industry of Eastern Belgium, and one 
 of the most important industrial towns in Europe, fam- 
 ous particularly for the manufacture of arms and wea- 
 pons of all kinds in the LSO factories located in the city 
 devoted to this purpose, besides which the zinc foun- 
 dries and engine factories and the cycle works of Liege 
 were all world famous. Situated at the juncture of the 
 Ourth and Meuse rivers, the town itself is pleasant and 
 well laid out and its surroundings beautiful. 
 
 A garrison of about 32, .500 held the modern fortifi- 
 cations of the city, which were deemed untakable, un- 
 der the command of General Leman, one of the ablest 
 of Belgian commanders. In the preceding years at the 
 suggestion and with the aid of France, these forts had 
 been fully equipped with all necessary supplies and were 
 in condition for a long siege, which it was expected 
 they would be able to sustain, being among the best prod- 
 ucts of one of the most distinguished constructors of 
 modern fortifications. Practically all these forts were of 
 the disappearing turret type and hence furnished little 
 or no target to attacking forces. 
 
 On the morning of the 5th of August, a remarkabh 
 warm day, the bombardment began. Masses of Ger- 
 man cavalry which had preceded the advance of the 
 artillery and covered it, skirmished along a wide front 
 from Forts Emborg, Chandfontaine and Evegne on 
 the eastern front to well below the city on the south. 
 This movement of artillery protected by the cavalry, 
 as before stated, continued until the 8th, the town 
 being completely occupied on the 7th when the Belgian 
 garrison in the town retired. 
 
 Here again, unfortunately, a number of the civilian 
 population participated in the fighting and fired upon 
 the German troops from ambush. When discovered, 
 these were summarily tried and immediatelv executed. 
 
 67
 
 The Campaign in the West 
 
 in accordance with the code of war. The fact that 
 non-combatant Belgians took part in the defence of 
 Liege as well as at Vise has been repeatedly admitted 
 by the British chroniclers of the war and a supporting 
 statement to this effect appears on the 332nd page of 
 the history of the war publi>hed by the London Times. 
 Under these circumstances the Germans were well 
 within those rules which have governed war-making 
 since almost the beginning of history as regards a civil 
 population participating in hostilities. 
 
 The artillery brought up by the Germans proved 
 inadequate to the taking of the forts, and operations 
 did not progress rapidly until the arrival of heavy 
 artillery. The German troops were under the com- 
 mand of General Von Emmich. who had with him at 
 first a portion only of the Seventh Army Corps. These 
 troops were afterwards re-enforced by the Reserves of 
 the 7th Corps and finally by the 10th and 5Hh Corps, 
 but the greater portion of the last mentioned Army 
 Corps did not reach the scene until after the reduc- 
 tion of the forts. 
 
 Contemporary accounts narrating attacks upon the 
 fort by the Germans in massed formation with a con- 
 sequent loss of 25.000 men were pure fiction, intended 
 for tl\e delectation of the British and French public. 
 
 During the three or four days' wait, while tiic heavy 
 artillery was being brought up. skirmishes took place 
 between the troops in the forts and the German troops, 
 which, as stated, on August 7th. had practically occu- 
 pied the town with varying results, but finally on the 
 9th of the month, the heavy artillery got up and was 
 placed in position. A few shots from those monster 
 pieces reduced all the forts except the four on the 
 northwest side rtf the town, the second line of defense. 
 Tlii*; »:econd line of defense was able to hold out until 
 the 21st of August. 
 
 The big qun-^ used on this occasion were a novelty. 
 The so-called 42 centimeter, (16.i inches,) required 
 fi>r the h.iiiling <tt eaiji gun l.'J traction engines of the 
 broad wheel, steam roller type. Each gun was in four 
 pieces, each piece being drawn bv three engines, the 
 extra engine being a road tester, and a helper on 
 gra<Ies. Accr»rding to the testimony of eye witnesses, 
 nothing s«> terrible has ever been seen in war as the 
 effect of the great shells fired from these guns on the 
 Fjegc forts. The steel turrets which had been sup- 
 posedly capable of resisting anv modern artillerv were 
 
 68
 
 Invasion of Belgium 
 
 broken through as though they were porcelain, and 
 men were not simply killed or wounded, they were 
 blackened, burned and smashed. Not only here, but 
 in the subsequent sieges, these guns proved that there 
 is no known system of defensive fortification which is 
 able to resist their projectiles. Earth works seem to 
 have a far greater resistance than the elaborate forti- 
 fication of steel, concrete and stone. 
 
 The check to the German forces, of which so much 
 was made in the press at the time of the siege of 
 Liege, amounted therefore to four days. On the fifth 
 day, that is to say, on August 11th, all the important 
 |)]:ioes in tlic town itself were in the German hands 
 and the German army proceeded southward down the 
 valley of the Meuse. Huy was soon taken, offering 
 comparatively little opposition, and the army soon 
 found itself before the extensive and costly fortifica- 
 tions of Namur, which represented the crowning work 
 of the military genius, Brialmont, in the science of 
 fortification. 
 
 Namur served as no better than a trap for its un- 
 fortunate defenders. Strongly fortified as it was by 
 a garrison of Belgians adequate to its defence and 
 ably directed, who were aided by a large number of 
 French troops which had advanced from the impor- 
 tant French garrison town of Givet located a little to 
 the south, forty-eight hours sufficed to terminate the 
 resistance here and to force its French defenders to 
 fall backward to their base at Givet, while such of the 
 Heigian defenders as were left, retreated precipitously 
 to the west. A part of the victorious German troops, 
 now mustering three full armv active corps and one of 
 the reserve, were hard on the heels of the retreating 
 French and. proceeding by forced marches, reached 
 Givet almost as soon as they, while another part 
 marched westward towards Charleroi. 
 
 At Givet one of the bloodiest fights of the war took 
 place, and the French, comprising about 70,000 were 
 hurled back and out of Givet with enormous losses. 
 The army of General von Emmich had reached its 
 appointed position for the general invasion of France, 
 and here for the time being we will leave it. 
 
 While these events were happening in the valley of 
 the Meuse, another German army, also leaving the base 
 of Aix-la-Chappelle, marched westward in the general 
 direction of Brussels, proceeding along the general 
 
 69
 
 The Campaii^n in the West 
 
 line of Tongjes. St. Troiul. TirlenuMit and Louvain. 
 The march of its main body was paralleled by a por- 
 tion of the forces which had been at Licpc. and ad- 
 vanced northward from Tongres to llazlett. and then > 
 fnniol \\r>itwar«l. procecdinir throuc:ii Hiest and 
 Aerschot to Rrusscls. The P.elqian'^, who had a field 
 army of about ?on.OOO men. opposed as str<in^ a re- 
 sistance as they were able and severe fightinij took 
 place at many points on the march, and. .oti-ii.l.rincf 
 its strenjj[th, this Relf^ian army did well. 
 
 Tonijres was seized by about 7,(»00 ficnuaii cav;iiry 
 on AuRiist I'th and the supporting; infantry marched 
 into that place on the lOth. That day the cavalry 
 which had moved before alonp different roads, joined 
 issue with the Belfiian troops at St. Trond, Tirlemont 
 and other places further west. This was not. how- 
 ever, an attack in force, but a feelinj; out of the enemy. 
 
 Hazlett, on the northern line, was attacked the next 
 dav by a German cavalry division supported by one 
 battalion of infantry apainst which was opposed a 
 Relijian force of one cavalry/ division and a brig^ade 
 of infantry. A sustained fipht took pkue. the town 
 being won and lost three times. The Beljijians 
 thouijht that it was the intention of the Germans to 
 proceed in force along this line. Hazlett to Dicst. with 
 the intention of turning the flank of their position 
 which ran in a general .sense from Diest through Tirle- 
 mont south to Gcmbloux. and resisted very strenu- 
 ously the movement in this direction. 
 
 Several days passed in cavalry skirmishes anil 
 finally on the Kth dav of August. Germany commenced 
 its serious forward movement with strong infantry 
 columns. The French bv this time had taken con- 
 tact with the Belgian army, having entered Belgium 
 on the Mth day of .\ugust by Charleroi. and ad- 
 vanced northward therefrom in the direction of 
 Wavrc. The first German movement was to throw a 
 strong cf)lumn of infantry supported by artillery 
 southward t»n St. Trond. to the south and on Wavre, 
 and to occupy the same, breaking the Belgian line 
 under Jodoigne and interposing it^^clf between the end 
 of the Belgian line and the advancing French. At 
 the samr time, a general .idvanee to«>k place on the 
 north and south lines which formed the remainder of 
 the Belgian front. Diest at the north, Tirlemont in 
 its centre, and Hongacrde were almost simultaneously 
 attacked tiv large forces and. while at points a very
 
 Invasion of Belgium 
 
 vigorous defence was ]>m up, ii l)ecanie evident that 
 llie Ijclj^dans would not withstand the attack of the Ger- 
 man artillery and tiic German infantry. 
 
 Hence, the Belgian Army could not remain in its po- 
 sition ; heavy losses had already weakened it. particular- 
 ly its cavalry, to such an extent that total destruction 
 stared it in the face. Accordingly, on the night of Au- 
 gust ITth, leaving two brigades of troops to protect its 
 rear, the entire Belgian army began to retreat in the 
 direction of Antwerp. 
 
 Before this retreat began, the Belgian general staff 
 had debated at some length which direction this re- 
 treat should take, wdiethcr it should fall back to the 
 westward and, concentrating at Louvain, attempt to 
 defend that town in the hope of saving Brussels, or 
 whether it should fall back completely to Brussels and 
 make its stand in front of the Belgian capital. Space 
 forbids more than the recording of the decision ar- 
 rived at, which was that it would be impolitic for 
 many reasons to attempt to defend either Louvain or 
 Brussels and that the retreat should, therefore, be o 
 the northwest in the hope of being able to bring the 
 Belgian army under the defence of the guns of the 
 fortress of Antwerp, which was considered then one 
 of the strongest of Europe and which supposedly 
 would afford an untakable base, from which the fu- 
 ture operations of the Belgian army could be con- 
 ducted. 
 
 This retreat was conducted in fairly good order, the 
 two brigades which were left behind succeeding in 
 holding back the German forces for a sufficient length 
 of time to enable the retreating troops to draw off in 
 reasonably good order and to attain their projected 
 base without losses of moment. What was left of 
 these two brigades subsequently managed to gain the 
 base also. 
 
 At Brussels during these important days, there was 
 more or less panic. At first there was talk of defend- 
 ing the city. The civil guard which had formed a 
 bone of contention between the Germans and the 
 Belgians from the first, as to its being recognized as 
 a regular military force, dug intrenchments and built 
 barricades. On the morning of the i8th after receiv- 
 ing the news of the retreat of the Belgian army from 
 the battle line previously occupied, the government 
 transferred the capital from Brussels to Antwerp. 
 Rumors of a British advance, of a French advance, and 
 
 71
 
 The Campaign in the ^ est 
 
 of plans of tiie Allies, whereby Brussels \va> to be the 
 bait to draw on the Gernaans, who were ti« be inter- 
 cepted and crushed by the Allies before rtacliiiig that 
 city, circulated through the town in a hundred vary- 
 ing ft)rins. and gave courage to the people, but with 
 the departure of the government and with the influx 
 from the east of thousands of the inhabitants of the 
 country of all classes who had deserted their homes 
 iK-tt re the approaching ricriuan forces, these false 
 hope-i iK'gaii to fade and the seriousness of the situ- 
 ation began to be recognized. 
 
 The more sober and the more intelligent of the 
 population perceived the futility of attempting to de- 
 fend the city particularly with tiie civil guards, whose 
 value in a military sense was more than doubtful. After 
 much consultation, it was determined that the city 
 should be surrendered without defence, and on the 
 I9th the burgomaster of Brussels posted a proclamation 
 throughout the city, stating that the occupation of the 
 town by the (iermans was imminent, and exhorted the 
 population to remain calm and to avoid panic. 
 
 On the next day the burgomaster, Mr. Max, went 
 forward in a motor car, accompanied bv hi? sheriffs, 
 in his scarf of office, and met the advancing German 
 army. Its commander received him formally and 
 asked him whether his powers were sufficient to au- 
 thorize him to surrender the city unconditionally, as 
 otherwise it would be taken by force. The burgo- 
 master made such surrender and was then told that 
 he would be held personally responsible for the good 
 conduct of the citizens of the town. Arrangements 
 were then made for the German troops to enter and 
 occupy the citv on the same day, which was duly 
 done. The German Commander, General Sixtus von 
 .\rnim, issued a proclamation which was placarded 
 in I'russels in which, after mentioning that German 
 troops would pass through the town for some days 
 and f'-r whom lodLring. foofl an(l sujiplics must he pro- 
 vided, went on to guarantee the preservation of the 
 city and the safety of its people in the event that the 
 population promptly furnished the supplies requisi- 
 tioned and committed no act of aggression atr^inst the 
 troops. At the same time he warned the inhabitants 
 that in the event of any act of aggression of any kind 
 taking place, the *.cvercst measures would be resorted 
 to. 
 
 Tb.-it ni'trrnf.. .11 -.f fv«r> o'clock the formal cntr>* was 
 
 72
 
 Invasion of Belgium 
 
 made by about 40,000 troops before a large gathering 
 of the inhabitants of Brussels. This was the first time 
 that an opportunity had been afforded to inspect the 
 German troops in war equipment, and great was the 
 surprise of the onlookers to find that the familiar Ger- 
 man uniform had completely disappeared, and that 
 the entire army was dressed in a greenish gray. Not 
 only were the men so dressed, but the wagons, both of 
 the commissary and the train, the guns, in short all of 
 the equipment, was painted a like color. The troops 
 quicklv took possession of the strategic points of the 
 city in an orderly manner and all fear of violence or 
 of intimidation was quickly removed. The burgo- 
 master was continued in charge of much of the rou- 
 tine work and local administration, though the Ger- 
 mans appointed a civil governor of their own to take 
 supreme charge of the affairs of the city. An indem- 
 nity of $40,000,000, as a war levy, was imposed upon 
 the town, payment of which for the time being was 
 impossible on account of the funds of the banks and 
 of the city itself having been transferred to Antwerp. 
 
 The entry into Brussels finished the first phase of 
 the war in Belgium, that is, that phase of the war In 
 which the Germans were engaged solely with Belgiaa 
 troops. Henceforth the fighting was not only with the 
 Belgians, but Avith the French and English. 
 
 One feature of the war in Belgium which deserves 
 remark, was the extraordinary use which the Belgians 
 made of motor cars in defending their territory. 
 Numbers of these cars on which a light gun had been 
 mounted and protected by hastily devised armor, were 
 sent flying up and down the roads in front of the 
 advancing Germans, opposing their progress. This 
 novel weapon of defense proved in many cases extra- 
 ordinarily effective. In the sequel this idea was 
 adopted by all the armies and carried to a much higher 
 degree of perfection in its offensive power, than were 
 these first armored motor cars, but the credit of the 
 idea of this use of motors seems to belong fairly to the 
 Belgians. 
 
 During this defense the world was startled and 
 shocked by continued stories of the perpetration of 
 atrocities of all kinds and nature by the advancing 
 armies. The lack of familiarity with war and the 
 passion which so many people have for believing the 
 extraordinarily horrible, caused these tales to be given 
 wide credence, but later it was found that the vast ma- 
 
 73
 
 The Campaii^ii in the West 
 
 jority were purr invcuiii>n> df ilic vaj^aiies t»i a dis- 
 eased imai;inaii«.)n. A specimen ot these extrai>rdinary 
 stores was the one put in circulation in Scotland by a 
 >ciunp {jirl concerniiijf the mutilation of her sister by 
 German soldiery, which was circulated tiimuj^hout 
 the world, and which proved sub.seijueiitly to be an 
 iiu]>n<len! tahriration. the nuitilated sister never hav- 
 ing been in Hcli^'ium. aiul beinp: at the time of the 
 allcijed nuitilatinn at Huddersfield. peacefully engaged 
 in the arduous duties of her profession as a nurse, at 
 a sick bed. The British courts subsccjuently convicted 
 this snrl ^^^ fortrer>'. she having pnxluced letters pur- 
 porting to be written by her sister and a companion 
 and *^old them to the press; l)Ut the denial uf the story 
 was never given one-hundredth <>f the ])rominencc 
 which the original fabrication had. 
 
 Unquestionably in every army there are some brutes 
 who misconduct themselves, but the discipline of the 
 German army, which is the most severe of any army 
 in the world, undoubtedly reduced the crimes of such 
 brutes as it possessed to a minimum. That there were 
 men and women summarily shot in considerable num- 
 bers for breaches of the laws of war. such as -^hooting 
 froi7i houses upon passing troops or isolated soldiers, 
 of setting fire to houses in which troops were sleep- 
 ing; or as at Liege, for instance, siiooting on a sentry, 
 and after he had fallen, a woman, forgetful of her sex, 
 coming out of the house from which the sht)t had l)een 
 tircfl and gouging out the eyes of the fallen man with 
 a pair of scissors, and other affairs e(|ually repugnant, 
 both to the laws of iuimanitv and of the laws of war, 
 is' undoubtedly true. These things have happened 
 in <verv war in the history of the world. They ha|)pcned 
 in our Civil War; they happened in our war with 
 Spain : they happened in the march to Pekin ; they 
 have happened in the Philippines, even so recently aS 
 the ^.eiznre of \cra Cruz they ha))pene(l also; and 
 when the time comes, if it ever does come, that the 
 allied troops enter Germany, they will happen there 
 also. 
 
 There have been comparisons drawn between the 
 defences of the Tyrol against Xapoleon bv Andreas 
 Jlofer and his cf>mrades. and the defence of non- 
 combatant H«-Igians of the P«elgian territory against 
 the German forces, but the cases are not analogous. 
 .Andrea«» Hofcr and his men took the field and fought 
 iprnlv. and were, in some degree at least, distinctively 
 
 7\
 
 Invasion of Belgium 
 
 uniforined. They did not shoot from the house tops 
 of occupied towns or, from other like places of con- 
 cealment, fire on unsuspecting troops. Their war 
 was conducted as war, and not as a f(jrm of assassi- 
 nation. Yet Napoleon did not concede to Hofer and 
 his comrades the ri.L;hts of war, but shot them when 
 he captured them, but they were men enough to suf- 
 fer the consequences of the acts, which they knew the 
 enemy regarded as illegal, with courage, without ap- 
 pealing to the whole world to save them from the con- 
 sequences of their acts. 
 
 Complaint has also been made of the indemnities 
 which were levied by the Germans on certain of the 
 Belgian cities, and the popular but mistaken idea 
 seems to be that the moneys secured by these indem- 
 nities were applied to their own purposes by the Ger- 
 mans. This is, however, not true in anything like its 
 entirety. As we have seen in the case of Brussels, the 
 funds of the city had been sent away to Antwerp, 
 where they were no longer available for any purpose. 
 Now it requires money to run a city and to pay the 
 salaries of the employes of that city, as well as other 
 expenses of administration, and a large portion of this 
 fund raised by these indemnities has been and is being 
 applied to the expenses of the municipality and towns. 
 
 Special stress has been laid by the enemies of the 
 Germans on the happenings in the towns of Dinant, 
 Malines, Tirlemont, and on the report of the commis- 
 sion appointed by the Belgian government to inves- 
 tigate a report on the alleged outrages perpetrated by 
 the German troops during this invasion of Belgium. 
 There is before the writer the report of this commis- 
 sion, which was supposed to be composed of eminent 
 legal and scientific experts. There is not one case from 
 one cover to the other whicli is supported by evidence 
 of sufficient weight to justify a police magistrate in 
 holding the defendant to bail in a simple case of as- 
 sault and battery, though the commission started with 
 the object of examining the facts and the witnesses to 
 support these facts from a judicial viewpoint. 
 
 As to the happenings at these towns, although 
 space will not admit of a minute discussion of each 
 case, it can be stated with confidence in nearly every 
 case that the punishment which fell upon the towns 
 was provoked. Louvain. a university town with a 
 . number of students in it. and a population like that 
 of any university town, peculiarly sensitive to its own 
 
 7.5
 
 The Campaign in the West 
 
 merits, was occupied by the German troops. From 
 the first moment of occupation, friction and trouble 
 characterized the relations between tlie troops and the 
 people. Finally after repeated isolated attacks by 
 snipers, concealed in the houses, a jj^cncral attack, 
 which appears to have been the result of a prear- 
 ranged understanding, was made upon the German 
 troops as they were gping about their duties, many of 
 them were killed, and street fighting between the 
 troops and civilians became general. 
 
 Durin-^ this fighting fire broke out and very seri- 
 ously damaged the town, burning several costly, in- 
 teresting and historic buildings with their contents. 
 Through the effort^^ of the troops, the most famous 
 building, the town hall, was saved. As a result of 
 these overt acts by the populace, many of them were 
 seized and shot. 
 
 The Belgians claimed that the affair was caused l>y 
 a body of German soldiers being driven out of Malines 
 bv the- Uelgians and falling back ujx>n Louvain. The 
 German troops in Louvain, who. as a result of their 
 looting the cellars of a people with a fine taste in good 
 wine, were fthis is the allegation, wine not brandy), 
 intoxicated, and mistaking their returning comrades 
 for Belgian troops, fired upon them. Hut to anyone 
 who knows the strict discipline which prevails in the 
 German army, the story is as absurd as it is mali- 
 cious, and furthermore, as a fact, no German troops re- 
 treated from Malines to Louvain during the whole time 
 of the fighting in Belgium. 
 
 The stories of Louvain and of Malines and of the 
 other places are merely a part of the organized cam- 
 paign of slander against the German troops. 
 
 The bulk of the German troop^^ which entered Brus- 
 sels remaineri there hut a few days, as the compaign 
 in the south required their presence there. Con- 
 sequently, after the city was fully (|uieted, the 
 army moved to the south towards Charleroi and 
 Mons. leaving only a garrison of sufficient strength to 
 in'iure the tranduillity nf the town, and thereafter for 
 ten days other troops in large numbers, cnming from 
 the eastward poured throuj^'li I'ru'^scls and marched to 
 the south to reinforce the army which had originally 
 taken Brussels, and then proceeded southward. Dur- 
 ing this time also, other troops from the German ba.sc 
 moved southward through the valley of the Meuse to 
 Liege, and thus turning to the westward proceeded to 
 
 76
 
 Invasion of Belgium 
 
 take contact with those troops which went south from 
 Brussels. The German line of battle, when this move- 
 ment was conii)lete(l, extended northward from Givet, 
 up the valley of the Meuse to Namur, thence west- 
 ward to Charleroi and Mons, and thence to Tournai, 
 the line from Mons to Tournai, however, at this time 
 not being' particularly strong". 
 
 While these things were happening in Belgium, the 
 German force which had entered Luxemburg in the 
 earlier days of war, had strengthened its position 
 there and thrown out columns to the westward running 
 through Neufchatcau, which had taken contact with 
 Von Emniich's arniv at Givet, so that this army too 
 had reached its appointed position for the advance on 
 France. Further east, the army advancing from Metz 
 had taken contact with the army to the westward at 
 Luxemburg, and stretched out to the southeast 
 through Luneville and Bacarrat at St. Die. 
 
 In the east, in Alsace and Lorraine, the French had 
 made a counter thrust in the hopes of relieving the 
 pressure on Belgium, and to concentrate the German 
 attention in this quarter as much as possible during 
 the time that was necessary for the full mobilization 
 of the French army, and to give time to the British 
 arrr^y, which was preparing in England, to get up. 
 From the first week in August, it was apparent that 
 the length of time required for the British army to 
 begin to move, would delay the French action in con- 
 nection with it, and therefore the French general-in- 
 chief ordered the French troops to occupy Muelhausen 
 in Alsace, to cut the bridges of the Rhine at Humingue 
 and below, and to protect the attack of the French 
 troops operating further to the west in Lorraine. 
 
 This operation began by the French troops carry- 
 ing Muelhausen and throwing the Germans towards 
 Strasburg. This success, however, was only moment- 
 ary, as the Germans returning in force, re-occupied 
 Muelhausen and drove the French troops before 
 them in disorder and heavily punished, back to 
 the French fortress of Belfort. This French move- 
 ment, though undertaken according to the French re- 
 ports, with the purpose above mentioned, was also 
 probably undertaken to satisfy the Paris populace, the 
 real governing force in France, in its desire for "la 
 revanche." and in order to give the population a theme 
 for oratory in the partial deliverance of the sacred soil 
 of Alsace from the foot of the Teuton. 
 
 77
 
 CHAPTER 1\ 
 illK C AMPAKJN IN THE WEST 
 
 INVASION OF FRANCE. 
 
 On tlic '-Unh ui August the (icrnian concentration 
 in South lielgium and Luxenil>urj^ was finished, and 
 their troops were ready to advance. These troops 
 comprised >evcn to ei};ht army corp^, 280.0f»fl to 
 .■Jl*U.<»»iU men, with four cavalry divisions and appro- 
 priate artillery and train, and stretched on a long line 
 from Mons in lielgium, tu the eastern border of Lux- 
 emburg with the largest forces between Mons and the 
 valley c>f the Meuse. 
 
 From the authoritative and detailed summary of the 
 German forces in the official report of the I'Vcnch 
 General Staff, it will be seen how exaggerated were 
 the contemporary claims of their enemies, particularly 
 of the British, that the German army attacking them 
 in the west comprised from 700,000 to 1.000,0(»0 -com- 
 batants and outnumbered them in a proportion at that 
 time said t(^ be fri>m T) to '.] to 2 to 1. .\s a matter of 
 fact, the French, P>rrtish and Belgian forces on this 
 western line outnumbered the . Germans, and von 
 Kluck fought his way nearly to Paris against superior 
 forces of the enemy. 
 
 This as>ertion is proved !>> the official reports on 
 this portion of the campaign, issued by the French 
 General Staff, which stated on the 21st qjt August that 
 their operations in this region began with ten army 
 corps, two tfj three army corps more tlian the Ger- 
 mans possessed, with<^)ut including the forces of the 
 English, which by this time had come up and taken 
 their positions in the battle line near Charleroi and 
 Mons. and the Belgians who were further to the west 
 but in comparatively small numbers. The account 
 that will be adopted a^^ a foundation (qt the narration 
 of the retreat nearly to Paris of the forces of the 
 Allies, will be that of the French General Staff, as this 
 certainly cannot be accused of uuflue prejudice in 
 f.T\<.r rif tile Grimans 
 
 78
 
 Invasion of France 
 
 The serious figlitinj^ conimeiu-ed with an iinijortant 
 battle, Charleroi beinj^the centre, the Hne running east 
 and west therefrom. Charleroi, a city of some 30,000 
 inhabitants, the centre of the South Belgium iron in- 
 dustry, was first entered on August. 21st by a few 
 German hussars who were thrown back. The same 
 day the German artillery opened on Charleroi and 
 Thuin. This was Friday. On Saturday the Germans 
 assaulted Charleroi and the bridges above and below 
 it at Thuin and Chatelet, but were stoutly resisted. On 
 Sunday there was a desperate struggle in Charleroi 
 itself, and on Monday after a terrific hand-to-hand 
 fight, the Turcos were driven out of the town by the 
 Prussian guard. The Sambre from Xamur to Mau- 
 beuge had been seized by the Germans. The British 
 army completed its concentration on Friday the 21st, 
 and on the 22nd, it took up a position extending from 
 the fortress of Conde to the north of Valenciennes, 
 through Mons to Binche on the east. There were two 
 corps, the 1st and 2nd. and two cavalry brigades, one 
 of which was at Binche. During the 22nd and 9;5rd 
 the cavalry and airmen reconnoitered the ground in 
 front of them and reported that the Germans were in 
 comparatively small force. 
 
 On the 23rd, Sunday, towards three in the afternoon, 
 a strong force of Germans attacked the British along 
 the line of the Conde-Mons Canal, forcing the .second 
 corps to retreat to Bray and the cavalry to evacuate 
 Binche, which the Germans promptlv occupied. The 
 British were to a certain extent surprised, and the pow- 
 erful German artillery played havoc among them, with 
 the result that that night the British forces were com- 
 pelled to fall back to a position which had previously 
 been reconnoitered, resting on the left on the fortress 
 of Maubeuge and extending on the right to Janlein 
 southeast of Valenciennes. The English had opposed to 
 them the 4th and 0th German army corps, while the 
 2nd was executing a turning movement on the left 
 from the direction of Tournai, but they never took 
 contact with this corps. Consequently they fought at 
 about equal numbers. 
 
 Over to the east the Germans had taken possession 
 of the entire northern bank of the Sambre, and had 
 forced the passage of the same. The French offensive 
 had therefore failed and this reverse was serious, the 
 reasons for which are complex. There were in this 
 movemcnt'inflividual and collective failures, imprudences 
 
 79
 
 The Campaign in the ^X■est 
 
 committed under the lire «>i the enemy, divisions ill 
 engaged, rash deployments and precipitate retreats, 
 premature waste of men and finally the inadequacy of 
 certain of the French troops and their leaders, both as 
 regards the use o£ infantry and artillery. In conse- 
 quence of these lapses the Germans, turning to ac- 
 count the difficulties of their enemies were able to se- 
 cure the maximum profit which the superiority of their 
 subaltern complements gave them. 
 
 In spite of this defeat the French manoeuvre still 
 had a chance for success if their left and the English 
 army secured a decisive result. This was not the case. 
 On August '^3rd. as stated, the Germans crossed the 
 Sambre and the French left wing fell back to the line 
 of Beaumont-Givet. and on the same day the British 
 army fell back after a severe German attack upon it 
 from the position which it had taken up on the 22nd. 
 On the 2r)th and 26th the Britisii army was harrj 
 pressed and its retreat became hurried. It had lo.-t 
 severely during the previous fighting and had received 
 onlv one brigade of infantrv in reinforcement, which 
 had been stationed on the 21th a little south of Quar- 
 oble to support its left flank. The Ith division under 
 General Snow was at Le Cateau, but unavailable. 
 
 The I'rcnch claim that this British retreat rendered 
 their defense of the frontier on the spot extremely 
 perilous and in the report of the general staff state 
 that after the 24th the English never kept their hold 
 until after crossing the Marnc and that their rapid 
 retreat, coinciding with the defeat inflicted upon the 
 French themselves in I^elgian Luxeml)urg helped tj 
 accelerate the action of the enemy's right wing. 
 Hence the French were confronted with the problem 
 whether to defend the frontier under the conditions 
 above stated or to execute a strategic retreat, which 
 was delivering to the enemy a part of the national soil, 
 but which would permit them to resume the defense rt 
 the time of their own choosing. 
 
 General Joffre determined on the second alternative. 
 The British lay the blame for their being forced to 
 retreat on the fact that General Soudet who had 
 promised to support their left with his cavalry corps, 
 did not do so owing to his horses being too tired to 
 move and that the French retreated on their right. On 
 the extreme wc^t <,i the lino during this time the Ger- 
 mans harl occupied Lille and routed the French 
 at Bethunc and captured Cambrai. while west of Cam- 
 
 80
 
 ' Invasion of France 
 
 brai tlicy had inflicted another severe defeat on the 
 French at Bapaume and tlireatened Arras. A force of 
 French troops under General d'^Vmade hurriedly en- 
 tered Arras and defended it. From this position oi 
 the Britisii and German troops, it will be seen that on 
 the 2Jth the British left wing was in serious danger 
 of envelopment. 
 
 The next day, the 25th, a general retirement began 
 of the British to the road joining Cambrai and Le 
 Cateau. This retreat was fairly skilfully conducted, 
 severe fighting took place at Marolies and at Landre- 
 cies. With varying fortunes the retreat continued on 
 the 26th, 27th and 28th, when the British line halted 
 on the line Noyon-Charmange-La Fere. During all 
 this time the British claim to have been opposed by 
 enormously superior forces, but as a matter of fact, 
 there were only three German army corps to two 
 British Army Corps and General Snow's division, 
 which on the last two days had the help of General 
 d'Aniade with two French reserve divisions, who were 
 attacking the right wing of these three German corps, 
 from Arras. 
 
 When General Joffre made this strategic retreat he 
 was perhaps somewhat influenced by the events that 
 were happening along the river Meuse. The German 
 forces which had descended the valley of the Meuse 
 from Namur, passing through Dinant and capturing 
 Giyet, keeping to the left bank all this way, succeeded 
 near Givet in crossing the river, and the possession of 
 the triangle of country from the environs of Mamur 
 to La Mare and from La Mare to Givet, enabled them 
 to turn the French defences on the left bank of the 
 Meuse. The wooded country between Givet and 
 Mezieres permitted the French to oppose a desperate 
 resistance to the invaders at points, and this \vas pa--- 
 ticularly true at Charleville which the Germans 
 reached on the 25th day of August and where both 
 sides distinguished themselves by desperate gallantry, 
 but at length resulted in a French defeat. Again at 
 Signav and IWblange the fighting was fierce but the 
 French were obliged to retreat abandoning this place 
 and Mezieres. 
 
 On August 27th the main body of the French in the 
 centre gained some slight success, and on the 28th this 
 slight success continued. General Joffre had three 
 conditions which had to be fulfilled in his effort to pre- 
 pare the offensive before that offensive could be taken. 
 
 81
 
 The Campaign in the West 
 
 First, the retreat had to be carried oui in order under 
 a succession of counter attacks which would keep the 
 enemy busy. Second, the extreme point of this re- 
 treat must be fixed in such a way that the different 
 armies should reach it sinmltaneously and should at 
 the moment of reaching it be ready to resume the of- 
 fensive all together. Third, if circumstances permit- 
 ted of a resumption of the offensive before tliis point 
 should be reached, such circumstances must be utilizeil 
 by the whole of the French forces and the British 
 forces. 
 
 This local success of the '-iTth and ViHth fulfilled tlic 
 first principle of the retreat and thanks to them the 
 main body was able to fall back on the l>uzancy-Le 
 Chcsne-Bouellemont line. While this movement was 
 going on, further to the right another force obtained 
 local success at Othain and another at Spincourt. A^ 
 a result again of these local successes the scattered 
 units on the left bank of the Meuse were able to unite 
 and cross the Meuse and join in the acti(m of the 
 French centre. This manoeuvre reunited the French 
 armies and ma<lc them available for the offensive. 
 
 On August 2()th a new army composed of two army 
 corps, five reserve divisions and a Moorish brigade. 
 was constituted. This army was ordered to assemble 
 in the region of Amiens between August 27th and 
 September 1st. and take the offensive against the Ger- 
 mans by uniting its action with that of the British 
 army which it was expected at that time would be ">m 
 the line Ilam-Rray-Sur-Somme. but the hope of tak- 
 ing the offetisivc under this disposition of the allied 
 troops was rendered vain ])y the rapidity of the march 
 of the Germans' right wing, which continued pound 
 ing on the Allies' left anrl driving back the British be- 
 fore it. 
 
 On August 27th the retreating British army got into 
 cxtrcmelv serious trouble at St. Quentin and had it 
 not been fr)r the promnf action of General Joffre. who 
 momentarily sacrificed his manoeuvre and disengaged 
 them by an attack, it is quite possible that the 
 hulk of their armv would have been cither captured 
 or destroyed. The next dav the British abandonr'l 
 the line Rovon-T,a Fere anrl retreated to take up 
 a position on the line Compiegne-Soissons along the 
 River ,\isne This falling bark of the British im- 
 covered on the 31st of August the French left flank, 
 and the general line of battle thus modified contained
 
 Invasion of France 
 
 waves which had to be redressed before the French 
 could pass to the offensive. The projected mobiliza- 
 tion of an army in Amiens was also defeated by the 
 rapidity which von Kluck's army had manoeuvred, as 
 that army had seized Amiens before the new army 
 which the French were endeavoring to create had a 
 chance to assemble. 
 
 The result of this occupation and the exposure of 
 the left flank of the French line of battle by the Brit- 
 ish resulted, first, in a further retreat by the British ; 
 secondly, in a postponement by Gen. Joffre of the 
 offensive and the continuance of retreat, since a defeat 
 under the conditions in which he found himself would 
 have cut off the French field armies from Paris and 
 from the British, and at the same time from the new 
 army which was to assemble at Amiens and was actually 
 assembling further south. 
 
 To understand this, a glance on the positions of the 
 German troops on September 2nd is necessary. The 
 German cavalry northwest of Paris had crossed the 
 Oise and had occupied Chateau Therry. The first army, 
 under Gen. von Kluck, which now comprised four army 
 corps and a reserve corps, had passed Campeigne ; the 
 second army, under Gen. von Buelow, three army corps, 
 two reserve corps, was around Laon ; the third army, 
 under Gen. von Hansen, two army corps and a reserve, 
 had crossed the Aisne between Chateau Pordei and 
 Attieaux. More to the east the fourth, fifth, sixth 
 and seventh German armies, twelve army corps, four 
 reserve corps and several Ersatz formations were 
 stretched between Vouviers and Verdun and from Ver- 
 dun to the Vosges. 
 
 It will therefore be seen that the French left, if 
 they had expected battle in their then position, would 
 have been in great peril through the British forces and 
 the new French army operating more to the westward 
 having given way. Gen. Joffre decided to continue 
 the retreat and fixed the extreme limit therefor as the 
 line Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur Seine, Arcis-sur Aube, 
 Vitry-le Francois and the region to the north of Bar- 
 le-Duc. If, however, there was a possibility of initiating 
 an offensive before reaching this line, that would per- 
 mit the co-operation of the whole of the French forces, 
 it was to be made. 
 
 During the time that these things were happening 
 in the field, several important things were happening 
 
 83
 
 The Campaign in the >X'est 
 
 in Paris, aiul a glance ai tlicin i^ perhaps necessary. 
 
 On the *^*7lh of August, General Gallicni was ap- 
 pointed Governor of I'aris and charged with the duty 
 of organizing the newly created army called the "Army 
 of the defense vi I'aris." 
 
 On the -."Jth of August, in consequence of certain 
 internal dissension, the French cabinet resigned. It 
 is stated, and apparently with some authority, that a 
 portion of the old cabinet desired to secure peace at 
 any price, and had made propositions to Germany 
 lookinij t<> the brinj^Mng aliout of the cessation of hos- 
 tilities. This infi>rmatioii coming to the knowledge of 
 the President of France and the Premier of the Admin- 
 istration, it was deemed wise to purge and reform the 
 cabinet, for which purpose the cabinet resij^ned. 
 X'ivianiii. the premier of the old cabinet, the same day 
 reorganized a new cabinet eliminating those not agree- 
 ing with the policy of contiiniing the war. and adding 
 in their places other statesmen who were in accord 
 with his own views and those of the President. On 
 the vMid of September the capital of France was tran.s- 
 ferred to Bonleaux from Paris and the I'resident and 
 the ministry left f«'r that place. 
 
 During the time that these events were taking place 
 in the west, the situation in the east from \'ouviers 
 to tile Swiss frontier had necessarily ncn received at- 
 tention. The French had made, early in .\ugust. an 
 attack on Neuf Chateau in Luxemburg but had been 
 driven back therefrom with heavy losses by the Ger- 
 mans, who followed them up, surrounded the fortress 
 at Longwv and proceeded to a siege thereof. This fort 
 put up a magnificent resistaticc under its comiviandant. 
 the brave Colonel Darche, and did not surrender until 
 ,\ugnst 27th. the resistance of this garrison seriously 
 retarding the advance of the Orman army, based on 
 Trevr<. under the command of the Crown Prince 
 Finally. hf)wever. after the surrender of Longwv. this 
 arnn advancerl and seized a large portion of the forest 
 of .\rgonne, and i?i connection with the armv im- 
 me<liatelv to the east threw a line of tro<ips in a semi- 
 circle around the fortress of Verdun, completely iso- 
 latintr it from the north and east. 
 
 Nothing of anv great importance had happened dur- 
 ing this peri<»fl further to the east, althotigh there ha I 
 been hcavv fitrhting. but without bearing on the gen- 
 eral result. The only movements of strategic impor- 
 tance in the eastern pf>rtion of this field Ixing thosr 
 which have already been discassed. 
 
 84
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST 
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 
 
 On September 5th it appeared that the situation 
 which General Joffre had manoeuvred for and for 
 which he had so long waited, existed. The first German 
 army movins^, perhaps slightly too rapidly for the 
 rest of the German line in its effort to envelope the 
 French left, had crossed the river Grand Morin, and 
 reached the region of Chauffry to the south of Rebais 
 a:nd of Esternay, its object being to cut off the portion 
 of the French and British lines opposing it from Paris 
 and to crush them. The second army lay on the line 
 Champaubert-Etoges-Bergeres and Vertus. The third 
 and fourth armies between them reached Chalons sur 
 Marne and Bussy le Repos. The fifth Triancourt- 
 Les Islettes and Julvecourt. The sixth" and seventh 
 armies were engaged further to- the east. 
 
 But here is the capital difference between the situa- 
 tion of September 5th and that of September 2nd, the 
 envelopment of the French left was no longer po'^;- 
 sible in the position of the two armies. The French 
 left had been obliged to take up a position on the line 
 Sezanne-Villers-St. Georges and Courchamps aside, 
 while the British forces were gathered between the 
 Seine and the Marne and the newlv created army 
 which was to have mobilized at Amiens and which 
 events forced to mobilize much further to the south, 
 flanked this British force, and both were closely con- 
 nected with the rest of the French forces. General 
 Joffre seeing this situation took from his right two 
 new armv corps, two divisions of artillery and two 
 divisions of cavalry which he threw into his left wing 
 to reinforce it. On the evening of the 5th he sent out 
 a general order to all the commanders of his army 
 corps orderinir them to attack. 
 
 "The hour has come." he wrote, "to advance at all 
 
 85
 
 The Campaii^n in the ^'est 
 
 costs and to die where you stand rather than to give 
 way." 
 
 In the meantime, General von Kluck had started to 
 move eastwardly from Chantilly' to Meaux and Con- 
 toniniieres and thi> infkction towards the left exposed 
 the right to the offensive action of the French army of 
 Amiens, the British and the army of the garrison of 
 Paris under General Galliiini. as well as to the offen- 
 sive action of the French left from its above described 
 position. Von Kluck's reason for this movement was 
 probablv a double one. The situation in the eastern 
 campaign had necessitated the withdrawal of troops 
 from tiie German centre for use in the campaign in 
 Eastern Prussia and also necessitated a closing in to- 
 wards the left, which movement, when completed, 
 would have permitted an attack in force on the French 
 centre. This mo\ement nf the first German army to 
 the left was a bold and most perilous operation which 
 required General von Kluck to execute a flank march 
 in front c>f vastly superior forces. Had this been sue 
 cessfully carried out, the French centre in all proba- 
 bility would have been broken, but, as will be seen, 
 the full measure of success did not attend this 
 manoeuvre. 
 
 During the night of Sej^tembcr 5th the French left 
 army reached the front Penchaud-St. Souflct and \'er. 
 On tile (ith and 7th it threw itself vigorously upon 
 von Kluck's right towards the Ourcq. On the Kth, 
 the next day, the Germans who had in great haste 
 reinforced von Kluck's right by bringing the second 
 and fourtli Army Corps back to it, obtained some suc- 
 cess bv attacks of extreme violence and ocupied Ret/, 
 Thurv and Natuil. but in spite of this the French 
 troops held their grounds well. During the day of 
 the 0th the fighting was very violent all along General 
 von Kluck's front, and indecisive. During that night 
 the French left was reinforced and put in condition 
 for a new attack on the next dav. On the 10th. how- 
 ever, which was a Thursday, the first German army 
 beat a rather hastv retreat, which obliged the second 
 armv to conform, and which in turn drew back thw 
 whole German line running to the eastward. 
 
 The French left had wHl sustained its three-fold 
 role of supporting' the nrittsh on its left and support- 
 ing the French c«^ntre on its right which for three 
 davs «5tond the brunt of the shock, ancl had succeeded 
 in defeating an«l throwing bnck the German armv in 
 
 86
 
 The Battle of the Marne 
 
 front of it. it is true that this army was reinforced 
 by a large portion of the army of the garrison of 
 Paris, but in any event, full credit must be given to 
 the French left as unquestionably any glory that was 
 gained by either the British or the remainder of the 
 French army at this point of the Marne, was due to 
 its heroic action. The German retreat continued all 
 the day of the 10th and on the 11th, nor did it stop 
 till the line to the north bank of the River Aisne was 
 reached. The River Aisne runs roughly parallel to 
 the Marne and some forty miles to the northward. 
 This distance measures on its front the extent of the 
 retreat of the German right wing from its most south- 
 erely position. On arrival here on the north bank of 
 the Aisne, in which trenches and defensive positions 
 had already been prepared for them, the German right 
 halted and, turning, faced the enemy, except at Sois- 
 sons. where the pursuing French left wing succeeded 
 in crossing the river. 
 
 We will now turn our attention for a moment to 
 what happened in the German centre during the period 
 in which the combats last described were taking place 
 between the German right and the French left aided 
 by the British. 
 
 The French centre, which on the 5th of September 
 was composed of a new army created on the 29th of 
 August, and one of those which at the beginning of 
 the campaign had been engaged in Belgian Luxem- 
 burg, occupied, on September 5th, a line running 
 Sezanne-Mailly-Humbauville Chateau Beauchamp- 
 Bignicourt-Blesmes-Marupt-Le Montoy. The Ger- 
 man army, in view of its right wing having been ar- 
 rested and its projected enveloping movement de- 
 feated, made a desperate attempt on the 7th and 10th 
 of September to pierce the French centre to the east 
 of Fere-Champeaux, with a temporary measure of 
 success on the 8th and 9th. forcing the French to re- 
 treat a not inconsiderable distance. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 9th, however, the French 
 commander took a general offensive and succeeded in 
 beating back the Germans on his left towards the 
 marshes of St. Gond, and in the evening succeeded in 
 making a flank attack upon the German forces, and 
 particularly on the Guard which had attacked his own 
 right army corps. The Germans were taken by sur- 
 prise by this bold manoeuvre and fell back hastily. 
 The next day more ground was gained and on the 
 
 87
 
 1 he Campaign in the W est 
 
 lltli, liic I'Tcnch crossed the Manic beiwcen Tours- 
 sur-Alanie and Sarry, driving the liennans in front 
 of them, and on the T^lh the Germans reached a posi- 
 tion already prepared tor them north tif the Camp- 
 de Chali>n. where ilie retreat .stopped, and tlie Gernians 
 to<.)k up the piisitioii which they have since main- 
 tained. 
 
 The operations on the ca.-^lcni pen tion of ihis battle 
 line were of notliinj; like the ^a^le importance or in- 
 terest as those in the west, which have been described, 
 nor did the Germanij retreat to anylliiii^ like the same 
 extent. Heavy fighting took place at intervals on the 
 eastern part of this line, but aside from a small gain 
 towards the Argonne and the withdrawal of the Ger- 
 man forces which had been operating between Xancy 
 and the \'osges, the results were, in point of territory 
 gained by the French comparati\ ely small. The Ger- 
 man retreat was nearly always in good order and 
 without detracting from the credit undoubtedly due 
 to the French troops with their grand defence and 
 their splendid courage, it must be remembered that 
 the Germans were very considerably outniinibcrcd. 
 
 This statement is, of course, not in accordance with 
 the early reports of this fighting received via London 
 which represented the struggle as being conducted 
 on very unecpial terms, the superiority resting enorm- 
 ously in numbers with the Germans. The French 
 official report by the general staff of this fighting is- 
 sued several months later, when facts were more ac- 
 curately known, however, makes no such claim. This 
 report estimates the aggregate number of men en- 
 gaged on both sides as somewhere in the vicinitv of 
 2.250,000, of whom perhaps 000.000 or 050,000 were 
 Germans. For one moment of the offensive of the 
 French left wing ni.:ainst General von Kluck's Gcrinan 
 right wing, the [British played a highly spcctacul.ir 
 part and did imdoubtcdly contribute to the victory, 
 but that this victory is entirely or even largelv at- 
 tributable to them. is. of course, an exaggeration. 
 The P.ritish army here, as elsewhere, in s<^mc degree 
 at least, had the adxantage of a greater i>ubliritv of 
 its effort>* than the French enjoyed. The real credit 
 for thi»i victory is to he given the French troops of the 
 line of the left wing and left centre, who had sufficient 
 morale to take the offensive, after manv davs of dis- 
 couraging retreat, at the word of command, and to 
 «ii^tain dtiring the first three dav; of the battle as 
 
 88
 
 The Battle of the Marne 
 
 saults of a very formidable nature and to repulse them, 
 and to gain ground in spite of them. 
 
 One great effect of this victory, and perhaps the 
 greatest, was the enforced retirement of the army of 
 the Crown Prince in the east, which undoubtedly 
 saved Verdun. One of its important defences. Fort 
 Tyron, was afterwards found to have been on the 
 verge of surrender, the fort itself had been reduced to 
 a heap of ruins ; its garrison to 11 men with only four 
 guns workable. Forty-eight hours more and Fort 
 'J'yron would probably have been taken with the result 
 that Verdun would have been cut off. 
 
 While thes events were going on on the ])attle line, 
 behind the battle line an event of considerable importance 
 was taking place. When the Germans advanced south- 
 ward through France they invested the French fortress 
 of Maubeuge and left its capture to be completed at 
 leisure. A few days were necessary to bring up the 
 famous guns which had done such extraordinary work 
 at Liege and Namur, and after their arrival and instal- 
 lation, a couple of days sufficed to end the resistance 
 of Maubeuge. By the capture of this fortress the Ger- 
 mans made prisoners of 40,000 French troops, together 
 with a large quantity of artillery and munitions of war, 
 and, what is more important even, secured their com- 
 munications in their rear from any danger of successful 
 attack from this point. The capture of this stronghold 
 also freed the besieging forces and enabled them to march 
 southward to join their hard pressed comrades. 
 
 The battle of the Marne lasted realh- seven full days. 
 At the time of the fighting it was considered to have 
 lasted several days longer, but now that we see it in 
 perspective and draw therefrom a just sense of its pro- 
 portion to precedent and subsequent events, we perceive 
 that the real battle finished on the evening of the 12th 
 of September. The next three days were uneventful. 
 
 89
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 TIIK CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST 
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 
 
 On Tuesday, the 15th of September, the prepared 
 {Ktsitions of the German army had hciii reached and 
 it lay in a line across France beginnintr at Noyon on 
 the west and running thence castwardly through Vic- 
 sur-Aisnc, north of Soissons. the Mount of Laon, the 
 heights north and east of Rheims. and on a line north 
 of Ville-sur-Tour-de-Varennes and thence to Le-Bois- 
 de-Fourges on the Meuse north of Verdun. As a re- 
 sult of the fall of Maubeuge, considerable heavy ar- 
 tillery had been brought to the enemy as well as fur- 
 ther reinforcements. 
 
 For four days the French and British made frontal 
 attacks upon this line but found it so strong that it 
 wa<^ impossible for them to make headway in spite 
 of determined sustained attacks, and it became obvi- 
 ous that the position would be seriouslv defended. 
 On the Ifith, Sir John French's army was reinforced 
 by another division, that is, approximately 20.000 men. 
 which brought the English force up to about its origi- 
 nal strength. By the ISth the British and French had 
 reconnojtered the position of the dermans and found 
 that it had been long prepared and was of extremely 
 formidable character. The German forces were dis- 
 posed just behind the crest of the ridges or followed the 
 edges of the woods, and were protected against a di- 
 rect attack bv barbed wire entanglements and rabbit 
 fencing, while every avenue of approach was covered 
 by cross fire. Indeed this pf)sitir>n consisted f^f a series 
 of natural fortresses of hills. wr>ods and quarries, in 
 some places backed by eight or nine successive lines 
 of trenches. 
 
 An artillery duel of great violence had taken place 
 for several davs and had had no effect on the general 
 position of either armv or the whole length of this 
 line Tlu- allied cr)nimandcrs. appreciating that in the 
 sifn.Tti..Ti fhf fiMTif.d attacks would be worse than use- 
 
 90
 
 The Battle of the Aisne 
 
 less, since it was extremely doubtful whether any ad- 
 vance could be made, and in any event there was the 
 certainty of enormous loss of life, after consultation, 
 determined to try and turn the German right wing. 
 To this end, General deCastelnau, supported by the 
 bulk of the British trocjps, worked. Their intention was 
 to proceed in a direct northerly line from a point a 
 little to the west of Noyon, but the German forces 
 succeeded in deflecting the end of this line from a 
 northerly course and forcing it west. 
 
 The first point occupied by the French in the ex- 
 tension of their flank was Peronne, and thence they 
 endeavored to work towards St. Quentin, but were 
 forced to the westward. This movement continued 
 for some time and heavy fighting took place daily. 
 As fast as the French advanced to the north^ they 
 were deflected and forced to the west with the final 
 result that a fierce battle took place between the left 
 wing of the Allies and the right wing of the Germans 
 from September 20th to October 10th, along the line 
 which stretches roughly from Compeigne, where the 
 Oise from the north joins the Aisne in its southward 
 flow from the wooded hill country of the Argonne, 
 to the sea. This line was about 120 miles from the 
 north of Dunkirk to Compeigne. The plan that Gen- 
 eral Joffre adopted, as has been said, was to work 
 around the German right wing north of Compeigne 
 and, by moving eastward, to compel the enemy to 
 evacuate the Somme, the Scheldt and the Oise and 
 ultimately the Aisne, the Sambre, the Dendre and the 
 Meuse. 
 
 Compeigne is about forty miles from Paris and a 
 similar distance from Amiens. From the Oise at 
 Compeigne to the Somme a plain extends practically 
 on the same level as the great plain which is bounded 
 by the Scheldt from Cambrai to its southern mouth, 
 and by the Channel from that mouth to the low hills 
 wliich run from the south of Calais around the west 
 of St. Omer, Bethune and Arras to the south of Cam- 
 brai. These hills or heights, which between Albert 
 and Peronne approach the north bank of the Somme, 
 divide the plain of this river from that of the Scheldt. 
 Along the eastern edge of the plain of the Somme 
 flows the Oise and on its left bank between Com- 
 peigne and La Fere to its mouth, the ground rises near 
 Lassigny and Noyon. The Somme rising a little to 
 the north of St. Quentin flows southwest to Ham 
 
 91
 
 The Campaign in the West 
 
 turn> iiurtluvcst to Peroniie and thon flows westward 
 to Amiens, and a few miles above which it receives the 
 waters of the Ancre. The sources of this tributary of 
 the Somnie are near Bapaume, the town on the high 
 road from Amiens to Cambrai. lietween Amiens and 
 Rapaume is the town of Albert. High roads join 
 Bapaiune to Arras and Cambrai and to Peronnc on 
 the Soinme From I'eronne a road and railroad run 
 soutliwest to Compeij^ne. halfway between them is 
 Royc and to the east the railroad between Roye and 
 Compcipnc and Lassigny. At Compeij;nc the Oise 
 and the Aisne meet. 
 
 By Septcniber 1st deCastclnau's right wing had 
 pushed up the west of the CJisc to the neigliborhood 
 of Xoyon. \'iolcnt encounters ensued in the regions 
 of Lassigny. From Lassigny the French moved to- 
 ward Roye, wliilc their left wing seizetl Pcronne. 
 The Germans, alarmed at the menace to their com- 
 munications through St. (Juentin, which was some 
 twenty miles from F^eroiine, prt)mptly brought up 
 heavy reinforcements and on the morning of the 2.5th 
 the I'Vench near Xoyon began to be pushed back. The 
 French hurried up fresh troojjs and the offensive was 
 resumed. 
 
 During the last week of September (leneral Joffre 
 discovered that the Gcrmatis in this district were in 
 such force that they were able to meet the outflanking 
 manoeuvre by a counter strike, which in its turn 
 would outflank him. To prevent this, he determined 
 to extend hi^ left northwest to .\rra< Lens-I.illc. and 
 thus threaten again the enem\'s flank by mnving 
 through .\rras on Cambrai and behitul Cambrai on 
 Le Catcau and from Lens on \'alencienne>, .ind be- 
 hind it the lost fortress of Maubeugc. If the French 
 succeeded in occupying the area in the j)arallelogram 
 Cambrai A'alencicnncs-Maubeuge and I.e Cateau. the 
 Germans r>n the S«»mme. the Oise and the Aisne. would 
 have lost control over the tw<i r.iilw.ixs .-..inniunicat- 
 ing with Liege, their base of supplier. 
 
 .\'c) doubt this plan was attempted in the hope of 
 having st)me influence on the siege of Antwerp, which 
 was now going on and which will be described later. 
 To carry f)Ut this new plan another aniu under Gen- 
 eral Maud'huy was assembled northwest of flcCastel- 
 nau's army which h.id been. u|) to the present time, en- 
 deavoring to outflank the German right and was from 
 now on to adopt a defensive role preventing the Ger- 
 
 92
 
 The Battle of the Aisne 
 
 mans penetrating^ further between the Soinme and the 
 Oise and thus cuttin}; the communications of Maud- 
 'huy's army which ran south towards Amiens. 
 
 This army was concentrated around Arras and Lens 
 on the hei^^hts between the plains of the Somme and 
 the Scheldt. A portion of the cavalry was north of 
 Lens in touch with territorials moved south from 
 Dunkirk. In the vast plain which stretches from the 
 Scheldt between Cambrai and Ghent to the sea be- 
 tween Calais and Ostend lies the city of Lille, at this 
 time occupied by French territorials. 
 
 The first move of this army was to drive the Ger- 
 mans out of Arras and then the position of the army 
 was as follows : The right rested on Ancre, the left 
 extended from Arras through Lens to Lille, the centre 
 was in Arras. Looking to the eastward Arras is the 
 apex of a triangle of which the base line is Lille-Cam- 
 brai. in front of that line near Cambrai-Lille stood 
 Douai. The Germans were in force between Douai 
 and Cambrai and from Cambrai west to near Bapaume. 
 Lens is to the south from Arras and Lille. Douai was 
 garrisoned by French territorials. Maud'huy's plan 
 seems to have been to move the mass of his army 
 through Arras and Douai on Valenciennes. 
 
 The German plan was to capture Lille and advance 
 from Turcoing down both banks of the Lys from 
 Bethune and St. Pol, and while this turning movement 
 was in progress to capture Douai and Lens, and seizing 
 the heights northwest of Arras, cut the roads between 
 that city and St. Pol, w^hen it would be possible to roll 
 Maud'huy's army back to the Somme. 
 
 Fighting began on the 30th of September at Vitry-en- 
 Artois, a village about twelve miles up the Arras and 
 Douai road. Other skirmishes took place the same 
 day at several places, and all that day the troops of 
 both sides w-ere moving into position. The next day, 
 October 1st. the real battle began and opened with an 
 artillery duel which lasted all day on this front. Dur- 
 ing the day the Germans attacked Douai from Valen- 
 ciennes and Cambrai and capturing the place drove 
 out the French territorials. The French brought up 
 reinforcements to Arras during the night in the hope 
 of being able to retake the place the next day. Octo- 
 ber 2nd, the battle continued as it did on the 3rd. On 
 Monday, the 4th, the Germans pushed the centre of 
 the French left wing back west of Lens and Maud'huy 
 
 93
 
 The Campaign in the West 
 
 was obliged to abandon Arras and fall back to the hills 
 west of that town. 
 
 On October tJth, the Geiniaiis bombarded Arra> and 
 attempted to penetrate the town, but French rein- 
 forcenunts arrivini;, after hand-to-hand fightinj^ they 
 were dri\cn out of the town. Away to the northeast 
 on the road from Arras to Lille, the battle continued 
 to rape. Douai and Lens had, as we know, been cap- 
 tured by the Germans, but the fightinj^ in the direc- 
 tion of St. Pol had not been so favorable to tliein. On 
 October 7th the (icrman line extended irou\ Cambrai 
 through Douai U> the cast of Lens. Lille had been 
 shelled since the Ith and on the Gth the Germans sur- 
 rounded the city on three sides, but were repulsed by 
 the French territorials, who put up a really splendid 
 defense of the city for troops of that class. 
 
 It was around the Uh that Maud'huy's offensive liad 
 been broui^'ht to a standstill. To meet this situation 
 General Joffre concentrated still another army be- 
 tween Lens and Dunkirk and transferred the British 
 expeditionary forces to the extreme western end of the 
 line. General d'Urbal took command of this army 
 while General Foch was f^iven supreme command of 
 the four armies — deCastclnau's, Maud'huy's. Sir John 
 French's and d'Urbal's. General Foch fixed his head- 
 quarters at DouUens. north of Amiens, and half way 
 between Arras and Abbeville. By the 8th of October 
 these forces were all in position. It is worthy of note 
 here that Sir John French, the British field marshal, 
 and his force were strictly subordinate to General 
 Foch, and remained so while the operations on this 
 extreme west of the line were beinp^ carried out. 
 
 On October 5th, before the .Mlies' army was com- 
 pletely ready, the Germans blew up the railroad line 
 which connected Lille and Cambrai with Hazcbrouck 
 and Calais. The plan of the Allies was to sweep the 
 Germans back through Ypres and Lille and then join 
 hands with the Belgians and Rawlinson's corps in the 
 north and drive the enemy back from Brussels. At 
 this time Antwerp was on the point of falling and the 
 Belgian and liritish auxiliary forces were retreating 
 south pursued by the ficrmans. The French rein- 
 forced their troops largely and probably were in su- 
 perior force to the British 
 
 On October 9th the position of the Allies was as 
 follows: The army of General deCastelnau stretched 
 across the plain of the Somme from the region of 
 
 94
 
 The Battle of the Aisne 
 
 Compeigne to the heights north of that river, the left 
 wing rested on the Ancre west of Bapaume. Upon 
 the hills northward between Arras and the plain of the 
 Scheldt as far as Bethune were disposed the troops 
 comprising the army of Maud'huy and held Arras at 
 the edge of the plain. The army of General d'Urbal 
 held both sides of the canal of Calais, the canalized 
 Aa and the portion of the canal St. Omer-Lille, which 
 lies between St. Omer and Bethune, and also the line 
 of the canal from Wharton which runs south of Dun- 
 kirk through Fumes to Nieuport. 
 
 Leaving these forces in this position we will now 
 turn our attention to what happened in the northwest 
 of Belgium during the time occupied by the move- 
 ment we have been describing here. 
 
 95
 
 CHAPTER s 11. 
 
 TIIK C'AMI'AIGN IN TUK WEST 
 
 THE SIEGE OF ANTWERP 
 THE BATTLE OF YPRES 
 
 Aiiiwirj) was iiUcndcd to be the great stronghold of 
 Mcigium. and was defended by three rings of forts in 
 addition to the defenses of its natural position, being 
 practically encircled by the Rivers Scheldt, Rupel and 
 Nethe. The first line of outer forts was very inodern, 
 only having been completed in I'Jl.'J and armed with 
 modern armament of very high power. The second 
 ring of forts had been constructed by Brialmont in 
 187U, while the third or inner ring of forts, placed at 
 regular intervals of *^'^0U yards, at an average distance 
 of about .3500 yards from the enceinte of the city itself, 
 were old. having been built in 18G9 or thereabouts. 
 
 In view of the deflection of French to the west, fur- 
 ther south, it became necessary for the Germans to 
 take this city, and towards the end of September it 
 became evident that a serious movement by the Ger- 
 mans was pending in this direction. There had been 
 various encounters and petty skirmishes between the 
 time that the I'elgian army had withdrawn from Brus- 
 sels to the sliclter of the forts of Antwerj), but these 
 had amounted to little. The only important event that 
 had taken place was that (m the 7th of September 
 when General von Hoehn had forced the Belgian 
 troops to withdraw from Mclle and arranged with the 
 city of Ghent to deliver supplies to his army. The 
 places fixed for the delivery of these supplies Indi- 
 cated the route which (.cneral von Hoehn's troops 
 were to follow and as this was France, the Belg'ans 
 determined to make a sortie in force from .\ntwcrn on 
 Tcrmond and Liere. 
 
 The Belgian left recaptured .Most and i)ushed its 
 way to and beyf)nd Aersclmt, while the right re- 
 occupied Malincs and penetrated to Nosscghen and 
 
 96
 
 The Siege of Antwerp 
 
 Cortenberg to the northeast of Brussels. The fight- 
 ing during this sortie was probably the heaviest of 
 the war in Belgium. The Belgians themselves lost 
 very heavily and it was said that the Germans also 
 suffered severely. A portion of General von Boehn's 
 army returned to help in this fight against the entire 
 German position in Belgium and it was presumably 
 this operaton that brought about the immediate at- 
 tack upon Antwerp. The Germans did not first pro- 
 ceed, curiously enough, to cut communication between 
 Antwerp and the coast at Ostend and Zeebrugge, 
 which would have cut off any line of retreat to the 
 south by the garrison or any means by whch it could 
 receive reinforcements. The reason for this was be- 
 cause it was thought Ostend was held in great force 
 by the British, which was not so. 
 
 Consequently the advance on Antwerp began from 
 the direction of Brussels and the fighting opened near 
 Termonde on September 26th and 27th. The Belgians 
 were driven out at first, but returned and drove out 
 the Germans, while a similar result attended the fight- 
 ing at Lebbekke on the 27th. Attempts were made to 
 cross the river at Schellebelle on the west and Baes- 
 rode on the east, but these attempts were probably 
 schemes intended to distract the attention of the Bel- 
 gian army from the real attack. This real attack was 
 launched from the south and on the 27th of Septem- 
 ber the Germans advanced as far as Malines and bom- 
 barded the town ; its inhabitants fled to Antwerp. On 
 the 28th the Germans had advanced beyond Malines 
 and were within reach of the southernmost part of 
 Antwerp. Forts Waelhem and Wavre-St. Catherine, 
 were immediately attacked on the 28th and 29th. The 
 German attacking force was about 70,000 men and 
 they had brought with them 28-centimeter artillery. 
 
 Wavre-St. Catherine was the first fort to be silenced 
 on the 29th of September. It had been badly smashed 
 to begin with by German bombardment, and half its 
 guns were out of action when a magazine blew up 
 ruining the fort completely. It was abandoned, and 
 Forts Waelhem and Fort Lierre then bore the brunt 
 of the attack. In the rear of Waelhem were the main 
 water works of Antwerp, and on September 30th these 
 were destroyed and the great reservoir burst, which 
 flooded* part of the Belgian trenches and cut off the 
 city'.'^ water supply. Fort Waelhem fought gallantly 
 through the 1st of October and was then abandoned. 
 
 97
 
 The Campaign in the West 
 
 On the same date Forts Koiiiiigshoyckt and Lierre 
 were silenced. The boinbardnient up to tliis time had 
 Ix'cii I'roin a distance of about I'^.'^Ou yards. 
 
 VS ith the fall of these forts, the situation of Ant- 
 werp became practically hopeless and on the «Jnd, the 
 nd^jan government started to remove to Ostend, but 
 changed its plan.^. A marine brigade and two naval 
 brigades together with some heavy naval guns luidii 
 command of General Paris, were thrown into the city 
 late in the evening of Saturday, (.)ctol>cr 3rd, under the 
 direct orders of the British First IvOrd of the Admir- 
 alty, Winston Churchill. I'or this Mr. Churchill was 
 afterwards bitterly criticised because a large propor- 
 tion of these naval brigades consisted of very young 
 men who liad recently joined and were so untraineil 
 that the\ literally did not know how to use a rifle. 
 Tlieir equipment was also sadly inadequate. These 
 numbered all told about 8,000 men. It is possible, 
 liowever, that this was only a part of the force intended 
 to be sent to Antwerp and that developments elsewhere 
 J »re vented the sending of the remainder. 
 
 On the 3rd of rK-tober, the outer forts having been 
 silenced, the German guns were brought closer to the 
 river and sought, on the morning of October 4th. to 
 force a passage at Waelhem. but were repulsed by 
 the Belgians. The Cermans then turned their atten- 
 tion to a point further ea.stward l>etwcen Duffel an<l 
 Lierre. The figlit here lasted the night of OctolK'r 
 4th and the day and night of October Sth, and was 
 quite severe, the British marines aiding the Belgian 
 defenders. By the afternoon of October 5th it became 
 evident that the iWst trenches could no longer be 
 held and the defending forces withdrew several hun- 
 dred yards. In the early morning of (^ctolx*r <)th the 
 Germans succeeded in crossing the river. On the /ith 
 of October the exodus of citizens hr\d begun from 
 the town and from this time forward till its fall, great 
 numbers of fugitives moved out of the citv towards 
 Ghent and to the southward and the Dutch frontier on 
 the north. 
 
 The government of Belgium left on the 7th for 
 Ostend, and the oil tank*; of the city, which was the 
 oil depot for Belg^iiun. Holland and a |xirtion of 
 France, were set on fire, as it was evident that the 
 city could not much longer be defended. On* the Hth 
 a notice of l>otnbardment was sent by the German 
 commander to Gen. Degui.se. the Belgian commander. 
 
 U8
 
 The Siege of Antwerp 
 
 unless the city was immediately surrendered. This 
 surrender was refused. The bombardment was not 
 begun until a few minutes before midnight of the 7th. 
 Durmg the 7th the British and Belgian troops began 
 to withdraw, accompanied by about 200,000 of the 
 population, the majority going northward to the 
 Dutch frontier and crossing. The bombardment con- 
 tinued the Hth and on Friday, October 9th, all of the 
 troops being supposed to be out of the town, the bur- 
 gomaster went out between 8 and 9 o'clock to meet 
 the German commander, and surrender the city. At 
 noon the Germans entered the city through the gate 
 of Malines. 
 
 General Von Boehn has been rather severely criti- 
 cised and with apparent justice both for not having 
 seized the railway northward and westward from Ant- 
 werp previously to the time he actually did so, which 
 was on the evening of October 9th, when the Germans 
 penetrated as far as the railroad line at Lookoren, 
 and for his tardiness in pursuing the retreating troops 
 to the southward, Ghent not being taken until the 
 12th nor Bruges until the 15th. The effect of this w^as 
 to permit the Allies to withdraw unharassed beyond 
 Ostend and to join the allied line of battle at the Yser. 
 Had they arrived there twenty-four hours earlier, the 
 whole of the Belgian army and the bulk of the British 
 naval marines would have been made prisoners. As 
 it was, the German attack forced about 2,000 of the 
 8,000 naval force into Holland and captured about 600 
 or 700 at Neuiken ; some 20,000 Belgian troops also 
 succeeded in crossing the Dutch frontier. 
 
 -•After the fall of Antwerp, as has already been 
 stated, the Germans turned to the southward and ad- 
 vancing slowly, occupied Ghent on the 12th and 
 Ostend on the 15th of October. This time was 
 utilized by the Belgian infantry and British naval bri- 
 gade to make good their escape. No defense of mo- 
 ment was put up at either of these places, and from 
 Ostend a portion of the naval brigades went to Eng- 
 land. The Belgian army turned southward along the 
 coast and succeeded in effecting a junction w^ith the ex- 
 treme western end of the allied line south of Nieuport. 
 From Ostend the Belgian government moved to 
 Havre, France, it having made an arrangement w^ith 
 France that it should have the same rights at Havre 
 as were accorded by Italy to the Pope under the "Law 
 
 99
 
 The Campaii^n in the West 
 
 of Guarantecii, " that is to say, practically ex-tenito- 
 riality. Many refugees fled from Ostend to England, 
 the last boat leaving on October 14th. 
 
 The importance of taking Antwerp. Ostend and the 
 Belgian sea coast was very consideralde, in that it 
 gave Germany a basis for submarine and air craft op- 
 erations against Great Britain. In the sequel the im- 
 I)ortance oi this will be more fully realized. 
 
 While thf Belgian army was retreating to the banks 
 of the Vser and the British Fourth corps was attempt- 
 ing to protect the flank of this retiring division by 
 occupying the country between Bruges-^'pres, Gen- 
 eral I of ire was also engaged in his third attemi)t to 
 turn the right wing oi the main German army. The 
 Germans had bombarded Lille on the 10th of October, 
 had passed westwardly. between it and the Lys, and 
 were in the vicinity of Merville to the north of the St. 
 Omer-La Basscc-lJlle canal. As the right wing of the 
 German army opi)osing Maud'huy extended from La 
 Bassee, Lille ran the risk of being completely isolated 
 and its garrison captured. 
 
 In order to i)revent this, the offensive had to be re- 
 sumed immediately. All the French movements had 
 been brought to a standstill after Maud'huy 's unsuc- 
 cessful advance through Arras, which has been re- 
 ferred to. There were available on the 9th for this 
 renewed offensive, General d'Urbal's army, based on 
 Dunkirk, the British 7th Infantry Division, and the 
 .3rd Cavalry Division south of Bruges. These were 
 all fully employed and the only hope for Lille lay in 
 being able to combine the 2nd and 3rd corps and the 
 cavalry of the British army now moving from the 
 .•\isne north, with a movement from Dixmude of the 
 British force there and French marines under Rear 
 .\dmiral Ronarc'h, together with a division of French 
 troops under General Grossetti. which were to be 
 thrown into Nieuport. This threw the bulk of the 
 work of J^aving Lille itself on the British 2nd corps 
 and Maud'huy 's army. 
 
 Maud'huy's army was to make a frontal attack and 
 the British to pivot from the French po'.ition to the 
 west of La Bassee and to attack in flank the German 
 position there. This movement opened with cavalry 
 combat.s on the f»th. Idth and 11th in which the French 
 and British gained some success, and cleared the 
 lountrv of the German horsemen The 2nd British 
 
 100
 
 The Siege of Antwerp 
 
 corps reached the Aire-Bethune-Canal October 11th, 
 crossed the canal the same day, its left wing working 
 in a northeasterly direction. On the 12th this wing 
 was brought in the direction of Merville from whence 
 the French cavalry had driven the German horsemen, 
 as already noted. The intention was then to move 
 tliese corps into the line Laventi-Lorgis, the first men- 
 tioned place being a little to the southeast of Estaires, 
 and the second a few miles to the north of La Bassee. 
 To cut this manoeuvre the Germans extended their 
 right. The whole of the 2nd British corps advanced 
 to the attack but made little headway, owing to the 
 obstacles in the way and the severe resistance which 
 it encountered. 
 
 A general engagement followed but the English did 
 not gain ground. The French cavalry corps joined in 
 the battle and gained some ground on the roads to 
 Estaires-Richebourg. On October 13th the corps 
 pivoting on Givenchy two miles due west of La Bas- 
 see, wheeled to the south and endeavored to get astride 
 the La Bassee-Lille road in the neighborhood of 
 Furnes. Here they made a slight advance on the 
 14th and this advance was continued to some degree. 
 On the 15th they forced the Germans off the La Bassee- 
 Estaires road and took up the line Pont de Ham- 
 Croix Barbee. On the 16th the 9th Infantry Brigade 
 captured the village of Herlies b}' bayonet charge, but 
 with this capture the British offensive movement came 
 to an end, terminating in the failure of its object, the 
 driving of the Germans out of their position at La 
 Bassee and the saving of Lille. 
 
 We will now see what happened at Lille during the 
 time of this movement. 
 
 On the 10th of October a German cavalry patrol 
 rode up to the city hall and asked for the Mayor. 
 While they were parleying, French cavalrymen ar- 
 rived and the Germans were thrown back. A bom- 
 bardment with the heavy artillery was begun by the 
 Germans at 5 o'clock. This started a panic, the pop- 
 ulace taking refuge in cellars. Towards 7 o'clock the 
 bombardment increased in violence, though the later 
 night was comparatively calm. On October 11th from 
 8 o'clock in the morning until dusk, the bombardment 
 was resumed and shells fell incessantly, fire broke out 
 in several places and the people streamed out of the 
 city. 
 
 The next day. the 18th, from 6 o'clock in the morn- 
 
 101
 
 The Campaii^n in the West 
 
 ing till dusk, the bombardment continued and finally 
 on the 13th, as it was seen that tiiere was no hope of 
 succor from the I'rcnch. wlmse artillery couUl be 
 heard in the distance, but who were unable lo ^cl 
 close en<:)Ui;h to aiil the town, tlie city surrendered. 
 Ci-imparatively little daniaj^e was dune by the bom- 
 bardment, and this was concentrated mostly around 
 the northern railroad station and the Hue de la Gare 
 leading to it. An eye witness to the (jcrnian entry, 
 who was in Lille for a week after its occupation by 
 the Germans, wrote that the Germans on the entry 
 behaved well. They were apparently under strong 
 and admirable discipline. They set themselves at 
 once to put ou{ the fire ; the ordinary police were left 
 in charge of the town, though there were German 
 soldiers stationed in all the streets. Civilians with 
 arms in their possession were told that they were 
 liable to be shot at once. During bombardment few 
 civilians suffered, the principal losses being among 
 the Algerian troops defending the town. After the 
 occupation the Germans brought in a number of large 
 guns, dug intrenchmcnts and erected barbed wire de- 
 fences around the town. 
 
 With the falling of Lille, however, the most import- 
 ant industrial town in France and a control of the en- 
 tire manufacturing and mining district of northern 
 France fill into ihc hands of the Germans. The economic 
 importance of this will be shown later. 
 
 While Lille was being captured. General d'Urbal 
 north of the Lys, was winning the only victory of any 
 importance that the French won in this series of ac- 
 tion*;. The Germans here were less numerous, the hulk« 
 of their forces in this terrain having been sent to the 
 eastward to the ^^iege of Lille. Consequently. General 
 d'l^rbal was inabled to make headway. From the Lys 
 westward to the ocean the country is very flat, while 
 next to the coast is a district composed of reclaimed 
 marshes drained bv canaN and dikes. The character 
 of this country is agricultural and not industrial. Ry 
 October 11 tb the whole of the coa^t and the rcclnitncd 
 marsh land was in the hatuh of the .\llies and the 
 German line extentled from Mont dcs-Cats-Meteren 
 and thence to the south of Estaircs on the Lys. 
 
 The aim of the GermaiT^ was to remain on the de- 
 fensive until the army released from ,\ntwrrp and 
 other reinforcements could join them. Thev took 
 cverv advantage of the ground, roncealinc: themselves 
 
 102
 
 The Siege of Antwerp 
 
 in the trenciies, woods and hills and below bridges. 
 Even their front was covered by barbed wire entangle- 
 ments. The line they had to defend was longer than 
 that of Etaires-La Bassee, however, and the enemy 
 considerably outnumbered them. The weather and 
 the hostility of the population were also against them. 
 
 On the 13th of October the British advanced in 
 force eastward on the line St. Sylvester-Caestre-and 
 Strazelle station. This put them on the main road 
 between Cassel and Bailleul, and threw them across 
 the one railroad from Hazebrouck to Ypres, while at 
 Strazelle Station itself they cut the railroad from 
 Hazebrouck to Armentieres and Lille. From this 
 base a general advance was made on the German po- 
 sition and by nightfall the British and French had 
 made considerable advance in all directions and cap- 
 tured Meteren and Oultersteene. and engaged in force 
 the right of the German troops at Mont des-Cats. The 
 result of these operations was that the German posi- 
 tion became untenable and they fell back. As a con- 
 sequence the French and British entered Ypres and 
 held it. 
 
 The next day, October 13, a movement was made 
 by the Allies towards Neuve Eglise, which position 
 was subsequently consolidated. Various other small 
 advances were made north and northeast of these po- 
 sitions during the next two or three days, the Ger- 
 mans retreating continuously, but slowly, until the 
 16th when all the country on the north bank of the 
 Lys and some six or seven miles below Armentieres 
 was evacuated and fell into the hands of the Allies. 
 
 On the 18th and 19th an attack was made on Roul- 
 ers to the northeast of Ypres and the Germans re- 
 treated temporarily, but the Allies' possession did not 
 last long, for the Germans returning in greater forces 
 drove them out. On October 19th an attempt was 
 made to drive the Germans through Menin by the 
 British, but this resulted in failure. On this same day 
 a German advance on Roulers forced back the Brit- 
 ish forces in this vicinity. 
 
 This British left had now lost most of the ground 
 acquired in the prior advance and events were taking 
 place over to the eastward which made a further 
 movement along this line of doubtful value. Never- 
 theless, as a diversion the 1st British Corps was 
 thrown forward on the 20th from Ypres towards 
 Thourout. the ultimate object being the capture of 
 
 103
 
 The Campaign in the ^X''esr 
 
 Hiuj;c>. ii Is worthy <.»i rcuKuk. thai uii tlu> ilatc. the 
 V0)!i ui <. October, the first ili vision ot the Indian expe- 
 <lition:iry force, which Great Britain liail summoned 
 to htr aid. thus pitting the .Asiatic against the Euro- 
 pean for the first time on a European battlefield, was 
 beginning to arrive at its concentration area. Tliis 
 movement noahward. however, did not have the effect 
 desired. 
 
 The battle of the Vser had been in progress noNV. 
 for days while the battle of Vpres was about to 
 begin. Under this title "The Battle of the Ypres" arc 
 included the fighting from October IGth onward be- 
 tween the sea at Kieuport Baths and Dixmude. which 
 is also known a> the battle of the Vser. and the strug- 
 gle which commenced on October llith from Dixmude 
 through Vpres and Armentieres on the Lys and thence 
 to La Bassee. The battle of the Yser is divided into 
 two parts. In the first the Belgian and I'rench ma- 
 rines under Rear Admiral Ronarc'h defended the 
 lower course of the Vser and the canal for a week 
 from October IGth. In the scc«>nd halt the army of 
 General d'Urbal backed the forces of the Belgians. 
 This battle opened by the British attack nn Dixmude 
 on the 16th of October. 
 
 General Joffre called upon the Belgians on the 16th 
 to hold tlic line of the Vser and its bridge heads for 
 forty-eight hours, promising them relief at the end 
 of this time. From the sea to Dixmude. as the crow 
 flies, is .some ten miles; from Dixmude to Vpres 13 
 miles; from Ypres to .A.rmentiercs 12 miles, and from 
 the Lys at .'\rmcntieres to Bcrhuscn 1.') miles, inaking 
 a total of 50 miles, but the actual length held by the 
 allied troops from October IHth was perhaps ten miles 
 more in that line following the north bank of the wind- 
 ing bank of the Vser from Xieuport and Dixmude, 
 and from this town the forest of Houthulst. 
 
 From Xieuport and Dixmude the line was held by 
 the British, aided by the French marines, who occu- 
 pied Dixmude and the neighborhood with outposts 
 thrrtwn well out in front. From this town it ran past 
 Zorelehe to Warneton on the Lys. This portion of 
 the line was held by French marines, the Briti^h un- 
 der General Rawlinson, two French Territorial Divi- 
 sions and a part of the French cavalry. From 
 Warneton to Bcthune the line wa.s held by tw. . British 
 army crj*^, Conncau's cavalry cor[)s and tin Britisli 
 cavalry. The actual position of the Belgians was as 
 
 104
 
 The Siege ot Antwerp 
 
 follows: 2nd division at Nieuport; to its right the 1st 
 division, between the 1st division holding the line to 
 Dixmudc was the 4th, the French marines were in 
 Uixnmde and the oth Belgian Division in support. The 
 whole force was about 55i,UOO men. 
 
 The German plan involved the capture of Dixmude, 
 the crushing of the Belgians and a further advance to 
 turn the Allies' left. Between Dixmude and Nieuport 
 ran the canalized river Yser, which is built up to from 
 15 to 20 feet above the level of the land through which 
 it runs, with a tow path on each side, this canalized 
 river forming, properly defended, an almost untakable 
 fortification. Southwest of the canal about two miles is 
 the embankment of the railroad which connects Dixmude 
 with Nieuport. This is also raised a considerable dis- 
 tance above the surrounding countrv and forms a sec- 
 ond line of defense in the event of the enemy crossing 
 the \ ser. The countr\- north and northeast of the Yser 
 is flat and boggy, so is the country between the Yser 
 and the railroad. Trenches dug in this land are al- 
 most immediately flooded with water. The land at high 
 tide is below sea level and can easil)^ be flooded by 
 opening the sluices of the protecting dikes, which keep 
 the sea out. Any advance southward from a short 
 distance west of Dixmude would be exposed to the 
 fire from the guns of a fleet lying off the shore. 
 
 From this description of the Yser, it will be seen 
 how valuable and how important the preventing of 
 turning movements of the entire French left wing and 
 the British across this canalized river was. If the 
 advance had been broken through at any point, dis- 
 aster in its worst form would have probably over- 
 whelmed the entire French wing from Roye-Nieuporr, 
 and in addition to this the channel ports of Calais and 
 Dunkirk would have fallen into the hands of the enemy. 
 The loss of these channel ports would have been of the 
 greatest importance to Great Britain as she could have 
 been threatened vitallv therefrom. 
 
 For this reason, it can be seen what importance the 
 Germans attached to the breaking through of the op- 
 posing line here, but at the same time from the de- 
 scription of the country to the east of Dixmude here- 
 tofore given, it will be seen how almost physically 
 impossible it was going to be to overcome the obsta- 
 cles of not only the opposing troops, but of the floods 
 which thev could call to their assistance as well as the 
 bombardment of the territory from the sea to which 
 
 105
 
 The Campaii^n in the West 
 
 the GcrInan^ wuuUl have had no chance of replying. 
 This German effort west of Dixinude, which cost 
 rnanv thtmsands of Hves, is open to the severest criti- 
 cism and tlie :^allantry with which the effort was made 
 d«x\s iiui redeem the lethtiical mistake. The attacks on 
 Dixmude and the attempt to pierce the opposing lines 
 ai this point was a different matter entirely, the condi- 
 tions not heinp at all similar. The efforts of the Ger- 
 mans on the 16th in their attacks on Dixmude were 
 confined to a reconnaissance. 
 
 Towards sunset of the Uith, however, the German 
 heavy artillery bcf^an shclling^ from near Eessen the 
 French and British dcfendinu^ Dixmude. The puns 
 ceased firing and an infantry attack was made which 
 was repulsed, but fighting continued during the night 
 and towards midniglu a charge of the Germans car- 
 ried the first French trenches, but at dawn the French 
 delivered a counter attack and regained the lost 
 trenches. 
 
 The day of the 17th was quiet. At 11 o'clock the 
 German artillery ceased firing. During this day the 
 French brought up further artillery and now the Ad- 
 miral commanding the defenses had seventy-two 
 pieces at his disposal. The 18th was quiet in this 
 •section. This f|uiet resulted from a counter offensive 
 which had been taken by General d'L'rbal and the 
 British on his right on the 17th, which attacked Ger- 
 man troops coming from Roulers towards Dixmude 
 and cleared the forest of them and demonstrated to- 
 wards R<^)ulers. General d'lrbnl was striking at this 
 town and the next day. the 18th, the French tnedital- 
 ing an advance on Thourot. asked for aid from Ad- 
 miral Ronarc'h, who accordinglv sent a force to 
 Eessen. This same day while the French were en- 
 gaged in this attack against Thourot. the Germans at- 
 tacked the Belgians' advanced positirm from I.om- 
 bartzyde to Keyem and captured at sunset Mankens- 
 ver-Keyem. Keyem was of the highest importance 
 since from it the Germans could march on Dixmude 
 or strike at Pervysc and break the Belgian line. It 
 therefore harl to be retaken at all costs b\- the .Allies 
 and the Belgian 4th division was hurled forward that 
 night, drivini,^ the Germans from the \ illage 
 
 On the IJMh a general attack was made bv the (tcr- 
 mans and. to help the attack on Dixmude. columns 
 from Rruge^'-Ghent were directed on RotiIer«. The 
 town was captured that evening. Rcerst. between 
 
 inn
 
 The Siege of Antwerp 
 
 Keyeni and Dixmude was captured on the Thourot 
 front and a desperate effort was made to take Keyem. 
 
 The French marines and the Belgian 5th Division 
 were ordered to advance from Dixmude and recover 
 Beerst. The ground in front of this village is quite 
 flat, intersected by dikes overflowing with water, the 
 only cf^ver being here and there a leafless hedge. The 
 first battalion of marines was almost cut to pieces. 
 The second battalion was more fortunate and reached 
 the village where terrific house-to-house fighting took 
 place. Another battalion was hurriedly thrown in and 
 at 5 oclock Beerst was taken, but owing to the vic- 
 tory at Roulers and the launching of a column from 
 that place on Dixmude, it had to be abandoned as 
 soon as taken and Keyem also fell into German hands. 
 Between Keyem and Nieuport the Germans had been 
 cannonading the enemy, and at Lombartzyde were 
 making a strong effort to strike through, which they 
 would probably have done had it not been for the 
 bringing up by the British on the sea of three moni- 
 tors, which, being of light draught, could approach 
 close to the shore and which were armed with 6-inch 
 guns. The use of these forced the Germans back. 
 
 The Germans, however, did not give up but con- 
 tinued the attempt, though their losses were frightful. 
 This continued all the next day and further to the 
 west the Germans, on the 20th captured Schoor and 
 Mankensvere. In front of Dixmude, in the mean- 
 time, heavy howitzers had been brought up and were 
 raining shells on the town. 
 
 The next day, the 21st, was one of the most critical 
 of the struggle. General Joffre himself took command 
 and hurried French troops to reinforce the line. The 
 Ninth French Army Corps was to come to Ypres, an- 
 other reinforcement was to arrive immediately after- 
 wards, and it was General Joffre's intention with these 
 and the Belgian and British troops to assume the 
 Dffensive and drive the Germans eastward. But this 
 :ould not be done until the 24th. 
 
 To attempt to relieve the pressure on Dixmude the 
 French centered a large force to threaten the forest 
 Houthulst which the Germans had occupied, but this 
 operation, while at first fairly successful, w^as stopped 
 in the afternoon. From this time the battle from 
 Bethune to Nieuport became a purely defensive one 
 Dn the part of the Allies on the Yser. 
 
 107
 
 The Campaign in the >X'est 
 
 At daybreak the '^Ist, the Germans hurled them- 
 selves on the French and lUlgians around Dixniude. 
 The bunibardincnt was very lieavy, a--^ liigli as fifty 
 shell> a minute being counted. Eight separate at- 
 tacks were made on the trendies protecting iJixniude. 
 The Germans fought with splendid courage, but were 
 unal)le to reach the trenches owing to the btiff defense 
 oi tile l-'reMch marines. Towards sunset the Tjernians 
 crossed the Vser south of Dixmude and took St. 
 Jacques Cappele wiiere hand-to-hand fighting took 
 place and they were repulsed. Krom Schoor northwest, 
 an attack had been launched at Schoorbakkc, but this 
 was also repulsed. 
 
 C>n the 21st the bombardment continued, both sides 
 rushing reinforcements up, and fought without rest 
 all through the day. The Allies' flotilla continued 
 steaming up and down the coast firing at the German 
 trenches and batteries on tlie shore. That night the 
 Germans got across the canal and took Terveate while 
 assaults were made on the Belgian second division 
 above Nicuport and around Lombartzyde. On the 
 23rd the French 4ynd Division and the 9th Army 
 Corps reached the front under General Grossetti. 
 
 Meanwhile south of Xieuport the Belgian 1st and 
 4th Divisions were pushed back towards the railway 
 embankment between Pervyse and Ramschappelle. 
 This same day the British flotilla attacked Ostend. 
 with no particular result. C)n the night of the 23rd 
 and 24th. fourteen assaults were made on Dixmude. 
 but all were beaten off and the town which was now 
 a mass of ruins, was still in the hands of the .Allies. 
 The French had come up in force and from this date 
 the Belgian troop.>> were withdrawn for rest. 
 
 While visiting the Indian troops on this western end 
 of the Flanders battle line. Lord Roberts was stricken 
 with pneumonia, which resulted fatally on the 14th of 
 November. Tn him died not only England's greatest 
 soldier, but her most gallant in the wide sense of the 
 word, a great tighter in acttial combat and one who 
 detested vilification from a safe distance, the favor- 
 ite metho<l of fighting <>i the small-minded. In his de- 
 parture he carried with him the respect of his enemies 
 and the love of his own people, the noblest tributes 
 that can be paid a soldier. 
 
 At dawn on Monday, the 2t>th, the Gentians made 
 another f^'cat effort to hew their wav along the coast, 
 
 lOR
 
 The Siege of Antwerp 
 
 and their troops advanced along the Mankensvere road, 
 and threw pontoon bridges over the river and canal. 
 The infantry got across and made a determined attempt 
 to carry Nieuport by storm. The French brigade had 
 to call on the Belgians, who had just left the trenches, 
 for help, so that their rest was not of great length. 
 
 The Germans were not able to take Nieuport and 
 turned to the south towards the villages of Ramscappelle 
 and Pervyse, and here in front of Pervyse occurred one 
 of the most desperate fights of the campaign, which re- 
 sulted in a draw, but the Germans could not hold their 
 ground as it was marsh land, and impossible for troops 
 to remain in anv time. For several days the struggle 
 continued bitterly all along this line, the contending 
 forces alternatively advancing and retreating in a small 
 space of territory not more than two or three miles wide, 
 both sides fighting with all the energy of despair. 
 
 On the night of October 26th. th^ dikes protecting the 
 lowland country from the incursion of the sea, and from 
 the waters of the Yser, which, as it will be remembered 
 here, is canalized, the river being at a higher level, 
 as a result, than the land, were cut by the Belgians and 
 the country overflowed. This proved a serious source of 
 embarrassment for the Germans and prevented their ad- 
 vance towards the goal for which they were aiming, the 
 French seaports of Dunkirk and Calais. In the previous 
 fighting, the losses to both sides were tremendous and 
 what remained of the Belgian army was for the second 
 time cut to pieces. On the whole neither side was success- 
 ful in making any permanent gain of any movement. 
 
 Bv the end of the first week in November, both sides 
 were exhausted and for the next few days the battle lan- 
 guished, but towards the 10th of November, activity be- 
 gan again to some degree and the Germans were suc- 
 cessful in occupying Dixmude. Though on the other 
 end of the line under consideration at Nieuport, the Allies 
 made some slight gain and by the 16th were threatening 
 Dixschoote, this advance was of little advantage. The 
 effect of opening the dikes and flooding the country by 
 the Belgians, which has been mentioned above, was to 
 turn all of West Flanders practically into a lake. About 
 the 1st of November, bad weather set in. which added to 
 the difficulties of the contending forces in this flooded 
 area and made activities still further languish, until fin- 
 ally almost unbroken quiet settled on this scene, and this 
 quiet was only broken by occasional skirmishes and 
 artillery duels, which became less and less as the 
 
 109
 
 The Campaign in the West 
 
 weather grew worse, and the contest settled down 
 into a lest of enthiraiKc, with occasional flashes of ac- 
 tivity by both sides, none uf which resulted in any 
 tactical bucccss. 
 
 l-'ruiu time to time both sides announced a resump- 
 tion of the offensive, the Allies in the middle of De- 
 ceml)cr, making the most conspicuous effort of this 
 character. Thev gathered a considerable army com- 
 posed i'f both French and British, and made a deter- 
 mined eflnrt for some days, but tiiis effort was fruit- 
 less and {gradually dwindled away to nothing. The 
 ultimate result was thai, except with interchanging 
 insignificant advances at various points along the 
 line, the po,sitif)ns of the contendini^ armies remaine<l 
 the same as ab<.>ve. Then came the truce of Christ- 
 ina-', which here, as elsewhere along ihf western bat- 
 tle line, paralyzed all effort for several days, and there- 
 after practically all through the months of January 
 and l*"ebruary, much the same qualities characterized 
 this }K)rtion oi the western battle line as had settled 
 down on the rest. The country was in no condition 
 ti» tight over, and the conditions l)eing siuh as they 
 were, it would ha\ e been folly on the i)art of the com- 
 manders to call on their men for any great or extra- 
 ordinary effort. But to the North on the coast during 
 this time, however, the Germans were not idle. They 
 established an important submarine base at Zee- 
 bnigge. bringing submarines and materials from Ger- 
 many and from this base launched attacks on the Eng- 
 lish commerce in the channel and around the coast. 
 From time to time the Allies attacked this position 
 both from the sea and from the air, but on the whole 
 accomplished little nr nothing 
 
 NO
 
 CHAPTER Vlir. 
 THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST 
 
 FROM NOYON TO THE VOSGES. 
 
 We will now return to the eastern portion of the line, 
 from Noyon to the Vosges, and follow the course of 
 events there from the ISth of September onward. On the 
 19th of September the French were driven out of the 
 fort of Rriemont, Nogent, Abesse and Beru on the 
 heights to the north of Rheims, where the Germans es- 
 tablislied themselves, and on the 2()th began to bombard 
 the French position at Rheims. It was during this and 
 the succeedings days that the cathedral at Rheims suf- 
 fered owing, the German say, to its use by the French 
 for observation purposes and to the establishing of bat- 
 teries near it, as well as guns on its roof for the purpose 
 of bringing down aeroplanes. It is difficult to say 
 whether this was true, but the damage to the cathedral 
 was, for their own purpose, greatly exaggerated by tlie 
 French, and in the carrying out of this exaggeration cer- 
 tain American residents of Paris figure, — one an archi 
 tect. — who were supposed to be neutral, but who for the 
 purposes of their own, possibly not connected with the 
 future wearing of a bit of red ribbon, were more intense 
 in their outcries than the French themselves. 
 
 The cathedral at Rheims is one of the most beautiful 
 and most interesting, both architecturally and historically 
 of the French cathedrals. It was here that for hundreds 
 of years all the French kings, up to and including Charles 
 X, with the exception of Louis XVIII, were anointed 
 and crowned, and where the consecrated oil which was 
 used in the anointing, which the legend goes, was 
 brought down from Heaven, was kept. This cathedral, 
 too, had been hallowed by the presence of that purest of 
 all patriots, Joan of Arc, who gave all and asked for 
 nothing. There is perhaps no nobler figure in all history 
 than that of the nineteen-year-old girl who was after- 
 Ill
 
 The Campaign in rhc West 
 
 wards burned at the slake at Rouen as a heretic and 
 blasplicnier, and there is certainly n(Mie who ran a more 
 marvelous career. 
 
 The writer lived lOr nearly two years at the "(jolden 
 Lion" directly oj)i)osite tlie main portals of the cathedral, 
 and knows the building as well as he knows any build- 
 ing in the world. From the photographs of the cathedral 
 and other like evidences, from letters and verbatim state- 
 ments made to him by two or three competent persons 
 who have seen the cathedral since the bombardment, it 
 would seem that the exaggeration spoken of was mali- 
 cious and in the nature of a propaganda. The view is 
 l)orne out by the fact that since this l>ombardment. the 
 most exposed portions of the cathedral have been cov- 
 ered to a very considerable height with sand bags to 
 protect the carvings anrl ornaments from damage. It 
 would seem to stand to rea.son that, had the cathedral 
 been so damaged as was then stated in September and 
 October of 1014. and reduced to a condition of sucii 
 utter ruin as represented, there would have been little 
 left to so protect, and no object in so doing. That the 
 magnificent, great window was damaged, but not ir- 
 reparably, is very probablv true, but the towers and the 
 nain lx>dy of the cathedral are. and the photogra]>hs 
 prove this contention, but Httle injured. 
 
 Be this as it may. however, even if the cathedral was 
 totally destroyed, it falls into the first class of atrocities, 
 if one can use this word in relation to a material ob- 
 ject, as laid down by the London Economist in its article 
 on the bombardment of the luiglish seacoast towns, which 
 is quoted in full in connection with the rlesrription of 
 that bombardment. 
 
 ( )n the 21st the French succeeded in ca|)turing the 
 heights of Lassigny. west of Noyon and Mesnilles-Hur- 
 lus-Massignes in their centre. The result of this change 
 and other minor changes during the next few days 
 brought the allied positions to a line which ran from the 
 extreme south of Alsace through St. Die in the X'osges, 
 Luneville on the Meurthe. Pont-a-Mousson on the Mo- 
 selle. Consenvoyi on the Meuse. Monfaucon. Oranrl Pre. 
 in the .Argontie, Sowain-Fort-de-la romprlje. a line west 
 and south <if Berru-Rrimont and Craconne- Noyon. The 
 re.st of the line to the south has alrcadv been given in 
 the accotmt of tho western battles. 
 
 The battle from \ovon east had nowdegeneratedinto 
 a prolonged stalemate. The bombarflment of Rlirims con- 
 tinued and reached its climax on the 28th. From every 
 
 118
 
 From Noyon to the Vosges 
 
 part of the line came the same style of attack and coun- 
 ter attack, without any change in the positions except 
 that, on the l^oth of September, the Germans, by a bril- 
 liant effort, pushed along the so-called promontory of 
 Hattonchatel between the Meuse and the Moselle, 
 south of Verdun, and reaching down to St. Mihiel 
 where, attacking the forts Paroisses and Camp des 
 Remains the next day by a series of brilliant charges, 
 and hard fighting, they succeeded in crossing the Meuse, 
 and after a violent contest St. Mihiel and the two forts 
 mentioned were taken, with the result that the Ver- 
 dun-Toul fortress barrier was broken. 
 
 The question now was, whether the Germans could 
 drive through the gap they had broken in the line of 
 this barrier fortress and invest and in due course, cap- 
 ture Verdun, with its garrison, to the north St. Mihiel, 
 and thus remove the greatest thorn in their side. Ver- 
 dun is tile key to France and until it is in possession 
 of the German troops, their hold upon the territory 
 occupied cannot be secure. Paris itself is nothing like 
 so great a prize, since, besides its strategic import- 
 ance, the possession of Verdun would open up new and 
 better lines of communication with Germany than are 
 now in German possession. 
 
 The capture of St. Mihiel was one of the most bril- 
 liant feats of arms during the war, and its continued 
 possession in the face of the almost continual attack 
 which had been made upon it since by the French in 
 large force, is an even more brilliant feat of arms. From 
 now on the combat along all the eastern portion of this 
 line degenerated into an absolute impasse ; one day re- 
 sembling another in its monotony. Artillery duels took 
 place from time to time at various points on the line, 
 but these were unsupported by infantr}'- attacks, and 
 resulted in nothing, although taking toll of human Hves 
 every day. This condition of affairs continued until the 
 New Year, nothing taking place w^hich is worth detailing. 
 
 The one bright spot in all this dreary winter to the 
 men in the cold, damp trenches, was the informal truce 
 which obtained for a few hours Christmas Day, when 
 the enemies left their trenches and mingled, exchanging 
 the greetings of the season and thus exemplifying most 
 forcibly the old proverb : "One touch of nature makes 
 all the world akin." These few hours of good will 
 among the men cheered the dreary life in the trenches, 
 under circumstances which the average well-fed, com- 
 
 113
 
 The Campaign in the West 
 
 fortably housed reader cannot begin to imagine. Vet it 
 shows the adaptability of human beings to conditions 
 no matter how hard, and how these men managed to 
 secure for ihnuseKc^ by the exercise of tlieir own in- 
 j;enuity many ameliorations of their condition, which 
 would l)e believed almost impossible. 
 
 It may be mentioned that in one place the Uiilers of a 
 ruined factory served to provide hot water for an under- 
 ground bathing establishment, which the men set up; in 
 another place a deep excavation underground, which was 
 made by the men outside their hours of duty, was fitted 
 up and used as a theatre, on the stage of which the talent 
 of the trenches fouml an op|)ortunity to display itself. 
 Behind the British lines throughout the winter, the love 
 of sport asserted itself and where the opportunity offeree!, 
 as a relief from the sterner doings on the front, daih 
 contests in football between regiments and battalions 
 tcxjk place. Often from the German trenches came 
 the sound of music of really high class, the national 
 passion for music finding expression even under these 
 circumstances. Several newspapers, if the word may be 
 u<;ed to apply to one-sheeted journals, copies of whicli lie 
 before me as I write, were set, printed and published at 
 various points along the line. Their contents arc mostly 
 intended to be comic, and present the incidents of this 
 war in the trenches in a light totally different from that 
 in which the average non-combatant sees it. 
 
 I'amiliarity breerls contempt, even with death, and the 
 sudden and violent ending of life which, uiuler ordinary 
 circumstances, would be a tremendous shock, in the 
 trenches apj>ears after a very short time, as one of the 
 ordinary incidents of the day. This is not a manifesta- 
 tion of carelessness, nor heartlcssncss. but a striking il- 
 lustration of how custom blunts the feeling, atnl how the 
 extraordinary rapidly l)ecomes the ordinary among hu- 
 man beings. 
 
 Most interesting, and sometimes pathetic, an the mani- 
 festations of extraordinary ijigenuity in ada])ting things 
 •which, rreaterl for one purpose and ajjparently incapable 
 of serving anv other, arc nevertheless turned into a hun- 
 dred other uses. These are too numerous to enter into. 
 but exist in tliOusand.s of instances. 
 
 Thu«!. daily warfare flragged its monotonous length 
 along ii!ibrok»n by any incident deviating from the com- 
 monplace of the trenches. 
 
 In December General Joffre announced, or perhaps, 1 
 
 Hi
 
 From Noyon to the Vosges 
 
 should say, was said to have announced, that the gen- 
 erals of the Allies were about to take a general offensive, 
 and that the moment had arrived when the invaders 
 would be driven out of France. This announcement, 
 however, not being followed by any particular advance or 
 even activity on the part of the Allies, presumably it 
 never was said but was merely the idea of some corre- 
 spondent as to what would be the most interesting to his 
 readers to have the general say. 
 
 The calm remained unbroken until the 14th of January, 
 when, after three days* hard fighting across the Aisne 
 from Soissons, the French, who had installed themselves 
 solidly on the north bank of the river and sought to ex- 
 tend their lines further, were in the course of an offen- 
 sive, not only driven back to their old positions but driven 
 completely out of these, and south of the river. 
 
 All told, this fight lasted some eight days and the battle 
 in many respects, closely resembled that of Antietam, the 
 bloodiest of our civil war. The battle opened in Napo- 
 leonic fashion, with a heavy artillery attack, followed by 
 a well delivered and well sustained infantry charge, 
 which hurled the Germans well back from their first posi- 
 tions. The French entrenched in the ground won, and 
 then in their turn sustained an artillery attack, followed 
 by an infantry advance. For four days the fighting con- 
 tinued, while hand to hand struggles of the most desper- 
 ate character raged. On the fourth day the Germans 
 attacked in force on the eastern wing, and Von Kluck's 
 veterans succeeded in driving through five lines of 
 French trenches and attacking the French centre, which 
 they broke, driving the French across the river Aisne 
 completely, and taking the seven villages on the north 
 bank. The losses were enormous, the French estimated 
 to be about 12,000, and the Germans' a little less. The 
 battlefield was covered until the end of January with the 
 corpses of the unburied dead. Some of the victims, 
 curiously enough, had managed to get a package of ci- 
 garettes from their pockets for the last smoke, before dy- 
 ing. 
 
 As a counter to this, the British announced the capture 
 of La Bassee, and for a few hours London rejoiced, but 
 only for a few hours, as this report turned out to be the 
 product of the pure, or impure, imagination of a British 
 reporter in Holland several hundred miles from the scene 
 of alleged combat. 
 
 During this month there was heavy fighting in the 
 
 - 115
 
 The Campaign in the West 
 
 vicinity of St. Mihiel. with continual skirmishing and ar- 
 tillery duels akxiR the whole line, but otherwise there 
 was nothing of the slightest moment or even of transient 
 interest. Late in January, the French launched an 
 .)ffensive in Champagne, which operated in the district 
 immediately tmrth x'li Le Mesnil and Terthes. Thi>. 
 movenu-nt was nuuk- in f<>rcc aiul continued for nearly 
 a month. Kven*- effort was made by direct frontal at- 
 tacks to pierce the German lines, but at the end of Feb- 
 ruary, the effort was abamloned. A net gain of a couple 
 of nules over a nine-mile front, was the total result, and 
 this grounil was purchased at the price of certainly uK^re 
 than :}n.n(»o killed and woiuided. 
 
 The rest of the line all through February had the usual 
 character of fighting, skirmishing and artillery duels, 
 with occasional infantry attacks. The weather, which 
 had iK'Comc worse during February than in the preceding 
 months, aided in bringing about a general cpiict all along 
 the line. Such storm centres as there wen-, were in Av- 
 gonne and the di.slricl around St. Mihiil. but the gains 
 and losses counter-balanced each other. 
 
 The result of the German campaign >ums up as fol- 
 lows : Materially, the Germans held on March 1st only 
 about *) per cent, of the territory within the geographi- 
 cal limits of France, but in this small territory the Ger- 
 mans old the homes of one-tenth of the pt)pulation of 
 France and nearly one-half of industrial France. Pas- 
 de-Calais. Xord, Aisne, Ardennes. Meuse and Meurthe- 
 et-Moselle arc the departments of France of which the 
 Germans hold all or the larger and most valuable parts. 
 In these arc the mines, the foundries and the factories, 
 the dairies and farms, which produce the wealth and th^ 
 strength of modern France. This narrow strip held in 
 the German grip produces 70 per cent, of the coal mined 
 in France, 90 per cent, of all the native-mined iron and 
 ju>t half ui the republic's output of manufacturing ar- 
 ticles. I'rancc stands fotirth aiuon^ the nations of the 
 world as a producer of iron and steel and this industry 
 is centred and contained in northern France where arc 
 the raw materials. In the departments of the north and 
 part of Calais, there arc a hun«lred thousand miners em- 
 ployed, usually. Practically the entire supplv of fossil 
 coal is mined hero. The iron mines of the Meiirthc-ct- 
 ^foselle alone furnisherl H\ |)cr cent, of the total French 
 output of ir«)n, this region being reckr^ncfl (»nc of the 
 richest irf»n producing centres of the world. The depart- 
 ment of the Nord, all but a few square miles of its coa.si 
 
 116
 
 From Noyon to the Vosges 
 
 lines, is in the possession of the Germans and is the fit ■^t 
 department of both agricultural and industrial impor- 
 tance in France, and in this department and the depart- 
 ments of Pas-de-Calais, Meuse and Meurthe-et-Moselle 
 are the great metal working plants and the most im 
 portant machine works of France. 
 
 In this same department further is the greater part of 
 the land's textile industry, the cotton, woolen and linen 
 weaving, and the working of lace and embroidery, the 
 weaving of carpets and dyeing. Flour mills, brick kilns, 
 distilleries, glass works, potteries, shoe and hat factories, 
 tobacco factories and large plants for the production of 
 hardware, enamelled iron hollow ware and edged tools 
 are sprinkled through this, the most thickly populated 
 region of the republic, in profusion. Most of the French 
 cabinet work is done in the shops in the territory occupied 
 by the Germans and most of the French sugar is pro- 
 duced from the beet fields which are also held. The.-e 
 departments are also the site of the most intensive agri- 
 culture in France, if not in the world. Everywhere 
 throughout the region where there are no mines and fac- 
 tories, smiling gardens and well cultivated farms take 
 their place. This is the wheat region of France and of 
 the sugar beet, besides which are grown cereals, fruits, 
 hops, tobacco, flax. This is also the centre of the cattle 
 raising industry and of the largest and best known dairies. 
 Some idea of the comparative richness may be had 
 from the fact that, while the average per acre value of 
 all France for the land is about $150, that of these 
 northern departments is $235, over 50 per cent, greater. 
 The moral effect of the occupation of this territory is 
 also great, and its practical effect upon the revenue of 
 the French government is still greater. This one- 
 tenth of the population pays about one-quarter of all 
 the internal revenue of France, and furnishes in ordi- 
 nary times to the French army over one-tenth of its 
 troops. The majority of the classes of 1915, 1916 and 
 1917. which the French government is now incorpo- 
 rating into the army, who are residents of this section, 
 the government will be unable to bring under the 
 colors. 
 
 117
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE campai(;n in the east 
 
 EAST PRUSSIA. 
 
 The Hast i'rus>iaii l)order and the border of Poland 
 presented equally to Germany and Russia a difficult 
 and interesting problem in regard to tlieir defence, 
 owing to topographical features. East Prussia, the 
 most bleak and dreary of the German provinces, is a 
 flat, sandy plain which slopes from the Vistula north 
 and north-eastward to the sand dunes of the Baltic, 
 and as it nears the Baltic sinks below the level of that 
 sea but rises again towards the coast. The immediate 
 frontier of Russia is not easy of defence nor is it until 
 that tangle of lakes, woods and .^wamps known as 
 Mazuria is reached, at some little distance from that 
 frontier, that the defendable area, so to speak, properly 
 begins. 
 
 This Mazuria is an extremely difficult country for 
 military operations and its full possession is a g^reat 
 asset from the defensive standpoint. In addition to its 
 natural defenses, it is also protected by a rather intri- 
 cate series of block-houses and equipped with stra- 
 tegic railroads which make the movement of troops 
 through it and behind it. further to the west, easy for 
 its defenders, and gives them the chance to move large 
 mas'^es of troops rapidly hither and thither a>^ the 
 necessities of the moment may require. 
 
 The northern part of the Russian front bordering 
 on East TVussia is a wild and desolate country full of 
 forest-. >mall lakes, marshes and bog<;. and in the 
 southern half is the great forest of Xtign-^fiwo, which 
 nearly fills it. The town of Suwalki stands in its 
 midst. Further south the German frontier is (defend- 
 ed by the strong fortress of Thorn and then south of 
 that come another succession of marshes cut by the 
 river Wartha. who-e vallev at the frontier is a wide 
 one. Sriuth of the river marches again occur and 
 make penetration difficult anywhere to the Au'='trian 
 frontier 
 
 118
 
 East Prussia 
 
 The means of communication along this portion of 
 the German frontier were in a very advanced state, the 
 strategic railroads having been carried to a great de- 
 gree of development. Russia's strength and Russia's 
 danger was the so-called Polish salient. A reference 
 to the map will show that this salient juts out into 
 Germany and Austria like a peninsula projecting into 
 the sea. On the north and west roughly, it is bounded 
 by Prussian and on the south by Austrian territory. 
 This salient contains the most important industrial 
 cities of Russia in addition to all the important coal 
 mines of western Russia, as well as metallurgical 
 establishments of importance. It is not anything like 
 as well equipped in railroads as the Prussian territory 
 to the west, but Russia had recently entered into the 
 construction of an elaborate system of strategic rail- 
 roads, at almost the positive order of France, that 
 country having made such construction a condition of 
 the later loans to Russia. Unfortunately, however, 
 for Russia, this construction had proceeded with usual 
 Russian slowness and was nothing like completed 
 when the war broke out. 
 
 The Polish country from Warsaw to the frontier is 
 a flat plain with extensive marshes covering quite a 
 portion of the area. North of the Vistula, Poland is 
 an open wooded plain which extends northward to the 
 Narew, above which are marshes of great extent. It 
 will be noticed in the narrative that marshes and topo- 
 graphical conditions generally have a very important 
 bearing upon this portion of the Eastern campaign. 
 Soutli Poland, watered by the Pilitza, is higher than 
 the northern portion, much more heavily wooded and 
 may be described as a flat country intersected by occa- 
 sional deep gullies, or gorges, the whole making a 
 rather difficult country to campaign over. 
 
 At the outbreak of the war, the Russian army was 
 heralded throughout the world, by reason of its vast 
 numbers, as the factor which would bring about a 
 speedy termination of the conflict and which in a com- 
 paratively few' weeks would be marching into Berlin. 
 The English press nicknamed it the "steam roller" and 
 this nickname was immediately taken up by the 
 Americans. 
 
 As we will see in the sequel, the giant had feet of 
 clay. The great defects in the organization of its army 
 and the character of the troops which composed it, as 
 well as in their equipment, were accentuated by the
 
 The Campaign in the East 
 
 glaring incompetency of its commander-in-chief, the 
 Grand Uukc Xicolai Xicolaivitch. This Grand Duke, 
 who had licld a >ubordinate cununand under General 
 Kuropalkjn in the canipai^jn against Japan, and had 
 not di>tin^uislicd liiniseli therein, liad, on his return 
 from the east, both by reason of his position as Grand 
 Duke, and by reason of his inclinations, made himself 
 the head of the Russian n\ilitary party. For some 
 years, after the crushinj^ defeat that Russia experi- 
 enced at tlic hands i>f the Japanese, this party was 
 comparatively feeble, but after the internal troubles of 
 Russia had become to a lar};e degree (luicted and liie 
 nation began to rise from the depression into which it 
 had been thrown by the Japanese <lefcat, its power 
 rapidly strengthened and. as the throne was occupied 
 by an amiable, wcU-ineaning. biu weak character, ilie 
 Grand Duke soon gained the mastery, not only in a 
 military but in a political sense and, to all intents and 
 purposes, when the war broke out was the master of 
 Russia more than the Czar. Of limited capacity, but 
 of unbounded conceit, this sinister personage unites in 
 his character, his aims and his ambitions all of the 
 worst qualities of the Russian autocracy, without ])os- 
 sessing any of its better. .\ Peter the Great, physi- 
 cally, he lacks the intellect which redeemed that brute 
 from his own brutalities and made him a great and 
 constructive leader of the Russian state. 
 
 The first military movement made by Russia after 
 the outbreak of tlic war was t() undertake, gaily and 
 light-hcartedh , the invasion of Eastern Prussia with 
 some 600,000 men, divided into two armies, that of the 
 Narcw, under General Samsonoff and that of the Xie- 
 men, under General Rennenkampf. General Rennen- 
 kampf struck directly west from behind the river Nie- 
 men, while General Samsonoff advanced from the 
 south by \'ialla and Lyck to beyond the Ma/urian 
 lakes, and by a second line of advance through Mlawa- 
 Soldau. On the 6th of .\ugust the Ru'^sian cavalry 
 division crossed the frontier south of Eydtkuhnen, and 
 two davs later a small force of Russian infantry was 
 gkirnii'^hing to the north towards Tilsit. .\ larger cav- 
 alry- raid took place on the lOth and in the opinion of 
 General Reimenkampf, who saw this fighting, an easy 
 victory lay before the Russians. 
 
 The general advance of the army of the Nicmen took 
 place on the 16th of August, and on the 17th the Rus- 
 sian advance engaged the German First Arniv Corps, 
 
 120
 
 East Prussia 
 
 which fought a delaying action at Stalluponcn, which 
 was the first considerable battle in this campaign. The 
 contest was hard fought and when the Germans fell 
 back they took with them some of the Russian artil- 
 lery and a considerable number of prisoners. The Rus- 
 sian defense, considered as a whole, had a front of 
 approximately thirty-five miles ; Pilkallen on the north 
 to Goldap on the south. The centre followed the line 
 of road and railroads from Stalluponen to Gumbinnen. 
 The country here is flat and without natural defenses. 
 The Germans had only part of one first line corps with 
 parts of two reserve corps, and were outnumbered by 
 more than two to one. 
 
 The Russians continued to advance and cleared the 
 town of Pilkallen of the Germans, who held it, and 
 who fell back southwest to Gumbinnen, in front of 
 which the main battle was fought the next day, Aug- 
 ust 30th. Gumbinnen is tw^enty-two miles from the 
 Russian frontier. General Rennenkampf made a front- 
 al attack on the enemy's centre and after a stiff fight 
 of fourteen hours the German centre withdrew, the 
 wings holding out a little longer, but eventually the 
 entire German forces fell back to Insterburg, taking 
 with them an important number of Russian prisoners. 
 It must be remembered that these were delaying ac- 
 tions, and that in each case the retreat w^as foreseen 
 and was part of the strategy of the campaign. The Ger- 
 man cavalry recaptured Pilkallen on the 20th, but was 
 driven out again on the 21st, the fighting continuing 
 throughout that day in Goldap. The Russians pressed 
 forward to Insterburg and by the 24th had occupied 
 it in force. 
 
 From this point Rennenkampf s advance was practi- 
 cally unopposed, and his final position was running 
 across East Prussia in a northerly and easterh-^ line 
 from Tilsit to a point well south of Konigsburg. 
 
 The Germans had now drawn General Rennenkampf 
 into the position which they wished him to occupy. 
 Meanwhile the army of the Narew advanced rapidly 
 and successfully from the south. This armv also num- 
 bered 250,000 to 300,000 men. The advance was made 
 along three lines — northwest by the Warsaw, Mlawa 
 and Soldau railroad ; second, to Lyck by the railroad 
 from Osowiec and thence turning south of the lakes 
 to Johannesburg; third, to Lyck as above and thence 
 by a wider detour around Lake Spirding. The German 
 resistance here was intentionallv weak. A delaying 
 
 121
 
 The Campaii^n in the East 
 
 action was fought in Soldau by a brigade of landwehr 
 who, of course, were forced back opposed by many 
 times their own strength. Niedcnbur^ fell next, then 
 .\!lcn>-tcin. wliich the landwthr defended more or less 
 feebly, and then followed the hottest engagement of 
 the series at Frankcnau, where Samsonoff's right de- 
 feated the 20th German corps and forced it back to 
 Osterode. 
 
 On the "Mth the Russians had driven the enemy out 
 of that part of East Prussia which lay ea^t and west of 
 the main railway line. Kenncnkampf now turned and 
 faced southwest on the line Fricdland-Gerdauen-Nor- 
 denburg-Angerburg, while Samsonoff occupied the 
 triangle Soldau-Allcnstein-Frankcnau. Together these 
 armies totalled about 600.000 men. 
 
 The moment had cotiic for the Germans to strike, 
 and with the moment had come the man, General Paul 
 von Hindenburg, who. when the war broke out was 
 aged ♦JT, and had retired from the army a short time 
 previously. He began his military service with the 
 Austrian campaign, and also fought in the French 
 war. Thereafter he served with the First Army Corps, 
 at Konigsburg, and through this •service he became 
 interested in the problem of the relation of the Mazu- 
 rian lakes to the successful defence of East Prussia, 
 of which province he was a native, and on the border 
 of which lay his paternal acres. For many years he 
 studied this district minutely, and it is said pushed his 
 studies to such an extent that he actually knew from 
 personal inspection every foot of the ground comprised 
 in this region. He was fortunate in having associated 
 with him a brilliant soldier as chief-of-staff. General 
 von Ludendorff. 
 
 Von Hindenburg confronted a difficult strategic 
 problem when he took command of the German forces 
 in East Prussia on the 23rd dhy of August. He had 
 only ven- limited forces and those verv largely com- 
 posed of second line troops with which to defeat two 
 armies, either one numerically superior to hi<^ lorce, 
 and which had nearly united, so that «=pecd was one 
 of the e'J'^entials in the event that he intended, as he 
 dicl, to attack them separately before their union. He 
 elected first of all to deal with Samsonoff's army, and 
 if he were favored by fortune in this attack, to strike 
 Rennenkampf'J. The superb railroad system of Prus- 
 •^ia worked night and day getting together his army 
 for him. He had with him the ?Oth Corps, and some 
 
 122
 
 East Prussia 
 
 landwehr. From Konigsburg he drew the First Corps 
 and its reserve auxiliary. The garrison of Graudenz 
 and Thorn also sent troops, which consisted mainly of 
 landweher. He also gathered together a considerable 
 number of heavy guns. With this force, more than 50 
 per cent, of which were landwehr and landsturm for- 
 mations, he confronted Samsonoff's arm}-, which out- 
 numbered his, and which was composed entirely of 
 first line troops. 
 
 The Russians had been lulled to sleep by their easy 
 advance, as the Germans had intended they should. As 
 stated, Samsonoff's army was massed within the tri- 
 angle Soldau-Allenstein-Frankenau. The road from 
 Osterode and Soldau and the two railroads which come 
 towards Soldau from Eylau. Graudenz and Thorn 
 had not been occupied. Von Hindenburg's first move 
 was to make himself master of Soldau junction and to 
 seize the railroad, which was done just three days after 
 he took command. This line could have been easily 
 defended, there being marshes in front and a good road 
 behind. The importance of this loss was seen almost 
 at once by Samsonoff as it cut him off from his main 
 line, both of retreat and for supplies. 
 
 On the 27th he attempted to retake Soldau but was 
 unable, for topographical reasons, to concentrate his 
 superiority in numbers into a superiority at a vital 
 point, and, therefore, the only result he accomplished 
 was to dislocate his forces to defend his left, as a result 
 of which he was driven backward to Niedenburg with 
 his isolation made almost complete. 
 
 On the left the German forces were active. At Ho- 
 henstein a hot fight took place, the Russians in super- 
 ior numbers endeavoring to break von Hindenburg's 
 line to the northwest. The fight lasted three days, the 
 26th, 27th and 28th, the Russians having opposed to 
 them landwehr troops until the afternoon of the 3rd 
 day, when the first line troops came up and the Rus- 
 sians were routed by bayonet charges. On the 27th 
 and 28th von Hindenburg took the first step to sur- 
 round Samsonoff by turning him with his right wing 
 at Niedenburg, which having been taken, gave his left 
 wing an enormous extension. The Russians, two 
 days before, had abandoned Allenstein, not realizing 
 that it was the key to their position. By this exten- 
 sion of the left wing the Germans regained the use of 
 their main railway as far as Rothfliess and the branch 
 line which runs to Ortelsburg. 
 
 123
 
 The Campaign in the East 
 
 The next move of von Hindenhur^ was lo transport 
 by every possible inean> of comejance — railroad, mo- 
 tors, bicycles, and e\cn by hcjrses — all of the infatitry 
 that lie couUI possibly niana^^c to so transport around 
 the Ku>>ian rij^ht to the rather distant town of Uisch- 
 ofsbur;^'. This force then took Wartenburi^; from the 
 railroad and moved to l^assenhcim, which was cap- 
 tured after the stiffcst fight of the niovenient. 
 
 l{y the evening of the I'Oth von liindenburj^ was in 
 position. The (iernians then held three good roads all 
 the way around three sides of the Russian position, 
 their hcav\ iiun> were in place on these roads, and that 
 evcniiii;; they began flinging shells at will upon the 
 Russian troops within the triangle of their batteries. 
 The almost incredible had been done. An inferior 
 force, numerically, had surrounded a superior force, 
 and held it in the marshes, lakes and swamps, guarding 
 it in a grip from which there was no escaping. Von 
 Hindenburg's minute knowledge of the topography of 
 the country enabled him to make one man do the work 
 of three by utilizing the swamps and lakes so that only 
 the causeways between them were obliged to be held, 
 while the Russians, not possessing this knowledge, 
 were drowned as often as they were shot, and lost en- 
 tire batteries of artillery and troops of cavalry in the 
 mud of the swamps. 
 
 The only question which remained for them was 
 how many could escape from this trap by the f>nly pos- 
 sible exit, the road from Ortclsburg to |oliamie<burg. 
 By the '^Oth. whole regiments were laying di>wn their 
 arms, and Samsonoff's army presented the appearance 
 of a disorganized mob. 
 
 Samsonoff made an effort on the .ilst to try and or- 
 ganize the retreat and went to the tirin:^ line where he 
 was killed by a shell, and with him (General TcstitcU 
 his chief of staff, and t)ther officers. Oencral Martos, 
 another corps commander, was captured fleeing in his 
 motor car. .Ml t<»ld, the Russians lost about JH).00() 
 uiiwoun«li(l prisoner-^ in this fij^ht ; in killed, wounded 
 and drowned men they lost nearly as many more. 
 Only one and one-half ct)rps escaped on the ( )rtels- 
 burg road, and only isolated fragments of other corps 
 or cavalry divisions are said to have broken through 
 to the Russian frontier or north to Renncnkampf. This 
 was as complete a victory, probably, as has ever been 
 won on any singK- battlefield and the peculiar jiart is, 
 
 124
 
 East Prussia 
 
 that it was won by an army numerically inferior to 
 the defeated army. 
 
 It was nuw Rennenkampf's turn. Vun llindenburg 
 without a pause for rest or reorganization, struck up 
 north, passed Nordenburg-Angerburg-Goldap to Gum- 
 binnen-Eydtkuhnen to intercept the retreat that Ren- 
 nenkampf had already begun on hearing from the fu- 
 gitives who had reached him, of Samsonoff's annihila- 
 tion. Rennenkampf, however, retreated too rapidly 
 and succeeded in avoiding more than rear guard ac- 
 tions. These, however, were expensive to him and 
 cost him the loss of some 30,000 prisoners, with about 
 an equal amount of casualties, besides which, his re- 
 treat was so hurried that he abandoned over one hun- 
 dred and fifty guns and enormous quantities of muni- 
 tions of war. 
 
 On September 11th, the Russians had evacuated In- 
 sterburg and the German troops crossed the Russian 
 border on the 15th. The Russian reserve army from 
 Grodno, of three corps, which had advanced to cover 
 Rennenkampf's retreat was defeated at Lyck with 
 heavy losses, and again at Augustowo. Suwalki, the 
 capital of the province of that name, was occupied by 
 the Germans on September 15th, and General von 
 Morgen here took actual conduct of operations for the 
 Germans. The Russians, a few days later, changed 
 their commanding general and Ruszky took charge of 
 the defence. 
 
 The Germans had only four corps in Russia, and it 
 is probable here that they made a tactical mistake in 
 attempting, with so weak a force, to attack the Niemen 
 line of defence. It is true that in East Prussia they 
 had been able to make these four corps do the work of 
 twelve, but there they had the advantage of a perfect 
 railroad system, which they lacked in Russia, and 
 there they also had the use of roads which were suited 
 for motor traffic. Such roads did not exist in the low 
 boggy, forest-covered country into which they had to 
 advance. The Germans moved along the one. good 
 road which traversed the swampy valley of immense 
 marshes of the Bohr towards Grajawo-Bailystok. The 
 crossing of the river was defended by the little town of 
 Osowiec, which ranks as a fortress, and has solid con- 
 crete forts mounted with heavy guns. The whole place 
 is practically impassable and can be attacked only 
 from the causeway leading to it. 
 
 The Germans began to bombard on September 27th 
 
 125
 
 The Campaign in the East 
 
 and continued fur lour days and niglUs without rest. 
 The bombardment took place from a distance of five 
 miles, the infantry never being nearer than four miles. 
 The difficulties being insurmountable, tlie siege was 
 ibatidnned October 1st and the German forces retreated 
 to German soil, which abandonment was brought about 
 not only on account of the unexpected difficulties in 
 the siege of the fortress, but also because the larger 
 operations on the Xiemen had failed. 
 
 A fortnight after, the Russians advanced westward 
 over the same route that the Germans had taken in 
 their retreat, and twu weeks later were attacking the 
 Germans in Lyck. 
 
 Rennenkampf's rear guard crossed the Xiemen on 
 September v'.^rd, and the Germans were then in pos- 
 session of all the chief strategic points in the country 
 between that river and tiieir own frontier. Tiie chief 
 physical feature of this region is the enormous forest, 
 thirty miles long and twenty miles wide, on whose 
 western edge Augustowo is situated. Chains of lakes 
 stretch on either side of the road from Suwalki to 
 Seiny. beginning again on the southeast side of Seiny 
 and continuing on either side of the road Surino to 
 the Xiemen. 
 
 The German plan was to cross the Niemen. and to 
 seize the railroad at or about Grodno. Ruszky wished 
 not only to throw them back from the Xiemen. but to 
 disorganize their communications by taking the little 
 town of Augustowo, vital, because it controls the only 
 good roads in this vicinity, and thus force them back 
 on their own frontier. The Xiemen in itself was a for- 
 midable obstacle. It is a deep river, more than 200 
 yards wide, and bridges exist only at Grodno and Oli- 
 ta, both strr)ng places, besides which the right bank, 
 which the Russians held, is high, the left bank, where 
 the Germans were, is low, and. what is more impor- 
 tant, very swampy. 
 
 The Germans made two attempts to cross the river 
 at the same time, the northerly attempt at Druskcniki, 
 twenty-five miles north of Grodno. Three attempts 
 to cross here were made on September ^Rth, and 
 though bravely made, were successfullv repulsed. The 
 Germans, towards evening, being attacked by the Co.«<- 
 sacks. who had managed to swim tlic river, fell back. 
 Another attempt was made nearer to Grodno at So- 
 potskinkie. Here the Rii«^sian infantry, intrenched on 
 tlie left bank and supported by heavy guns on the 
 
 126
 
 East Prussia 
 
 heights of the right bank, succeeded in repelling the 
 Germans. Tiie Germans then retreated towards Aug- 
 ustowo by tile few roads along which a retreat was 
 possible, and were followed by the Russians, who 
 eventually bombarded Augustowo, the town falling to 
 them on the afternoon of October 1st. 
 
 It was at this time that the German forces at Oso- 
 wiec returned. The Germans fell back to Suwalki and 
 were also defeated there and at Mariampol further 
 north, on October 3rd and 4th respectively. They then 
 fell back to the frontier with the Russians following. 
 From this time forward to the middle of November 
 the Germans and Russians faced each other in lines of 
 trenches that followed practically the line of the fron- 
 tier each side, dug themselves in elaborately and 
 strengthened their positions with all possible defences, 
 — wire entanglements, concealed gun pits, etc. Neither 
 side made any real effort to advance. 
 
 In the middle of November the German defence 
 weakened and the Russians again reached Lyck and 
 attacked Stalluponen in the north for the second time 
 on November 14th, while in December they slowly 
 penetrated for the second time the Mazurian lake re- 
 gion. The German forces were all recent formations 
 and not in large numbers, and as long as the Russians 
 did not advance beyond Gumbinnen-Angerburg-Lotze 
 and Johannesburg, the Germans did not seem to be 
 troubled. All through December the Russians held 
 this area with only local skirmishes now and then, 
 only sufficient activity being shown by the Germans, 
 in order to apparently give notice of their presence 
 from time to time to the enemy. The Russian and the 
 English press again began to talk of the march to 
 Berlin. The New Year found the situation still un- 
 qhanged. 
 
 The same situation continued all through the month 
 of January, with nothing more important than local 
 skirmishes. It must be remembered that the winter in 
 this quarter of the world is extremely severe, and that 
 it is impossible for even Russians (who are, by the 
 way. not as accustomed to living in the open air in the 
 depths of winter as is the popular impression), to 
 campaign to any great degree in the open. The Rus- 
 sians had hoped that when the Mazurian region was 
 completely frozen over, they would be able to ad- 
 vance across the lakes and marshes on the ice. but 
 during the month of January, cold as it was. the Ger- 
 
 127
 
 1 he Campaign in the Hast 
 
 man? managed lu keep ihe>e lakes open by the use of 
 ice breakers, and this hupe was dashed. 
 
 From time to time during this month of January, 
 however, there were confHcts gjachially increasing in 
 imjx)rtance, iKtwecn the Cicnuans and the Kussi:uis in 
 this east I'olish ilistrict. Tlie i)riiicipal one took place 
 ou tlic '^Uih of January at Gunibinnen, and in the last 
 days of the month another attempt was made by the 
 Russians to advance in force towards Konigsburg. 
 This had a measure of success and the Russians again 
 gaincil ground, almost reaching their favorite jKJsition 
 in the Slazurian I^akes. This tendency continued for 
 several tlay>. and finally it became apparent that a for- 
 mitlable movement was being launched by the Russians 
 with the object of again invading Kast Prussia in force. 
 As has been saitl, the (.iernian forces here were neither 
 great in numbers, nor was their (juality at all good. 
 Consequently, on February 1st the Russians got to the 
 north of I'ilkallen and Gumbinnen and were driving 
 these German forces before them. On February 2nd, 
 the Russians advanced after severe fighting to the west 
 of I'ilkallen and from thence onward the drive was ac- 
 centuated during the next few days. The Russian bul- 
 letins again teemed with accounts of the capture of 
 various East Prussian towns. By the 9th of I'cbruary 
 without doubt they had penetrated into ICast Prusssia 
 nearly as far as they had on the prior occasion. 
 
 The fighting took place largely in the Mazurian I^ke 
 district and had really become a menace to this section. 
 The usual streams of refugees poured through East 
 Prussia into the other parts of Germany, telling stories 
 of the most outrageous cruelties committed !)v the Cos- 
 sacks and other troops of the Russian advance forces. 
 Further to the north the right wing of this invading 
 force extenfled past Tilsit almost to Memel, Tilsit itself 
 having fallen momentarily into the possession f)f the 
 Russians. 
 
 Towarfl the middle of the month, however, this 
 movement came to an untimely end. and this end was 
 due to the same general to which the victorv of Tan- 
 nenhurg in Augu.st was due, von Hindenburg. Quietly, 
 as is this general's wont, and apparently without the 
 knowledge of the Russians, he assembled three armies, 
 again aided by the magnificent railroad svstem of Ka.st 
 Prussia, some of which troops were drawn from the 
 polish front sotnc broiight on from the garrison of 
 
 128
 
 East Prussia 
 
 Thorn and Berlin, and others brought back from Gali- 
 cia where they had been aiding the Austrians in their 
 defence of the Carpathians. 
 
 The first army was assembled towards Rothfliess and 
 Bischofsburg, then running southerly towards Ortels- 
 burg, with its base at Allenstein. The second army was 
 .further north, running roughly from Allenburg along 
 the railroad to Angerburg, while the third army ran 
 between Insterburg and Gumbinncn. 
 
 The Russians thought they had stolen a march upon 
 von Hindenburg and he indulged them in this notion 
 by apparently acting upon the line of offense towards 
 Warsaw, and then suddenly launched the three armies, 
 whose position has been described, in simultaneous at- 
 tacks upon the Russian commander, General Baron 
 Sievers. 
 
 The frontal attack was made by the troops of the 
 second army, and while the Russians were busy repel- 
 ling this, two other attacks were made upon them, one 
 from the north and one from the south by the first and 
 third army. As a result of this combined attack, the 
 Russian army was cut to pieces, even more completely 
 than at the famous battle of Tannenburg. 
 
 In point of numbers the forces were about equal. The 
 battle began on the 6th day of February and fighting 
 continued for nine days. The main battle, however, 
 was over on the 10th of February, was mostly fought in 
 a driving snowstorm, and it is to be attributed to the 
 fact that this snowstorm was driving to the north and 
 into the eyes of the German flanking army advancing 
 from the north, impeding their progress seriously, that 
 any of the Russian forces escaped. On the 10th the 
 Germans had taken over 90,000 prisoners besides inflict- 
 ing casualties which are supposed to exceed that num- 
 ber, and which have never as yet been accurately stated. 
 The scattered remnants of General Baron Siever's army 
 were hurled back across the Prussian border and pur- 
 sued well into Russian territory. 
 
 The retreat has been described by eyewitnesses as 
 being the worst rout which has befallen any army in 
 recent wars. From the most advanced position in 
 East Prussia as far back east as Suwalki and Augus- 
 towo in Russian territory, abandoned guns and auto- 
 mobiles, wrecked and overturned wagons, sledges 
 and ammunition caissons encumbered the way; and 
 rifles, blankets and other equipment lay in thousands 
 
 129
 
 The Campaign in the East 
 
 where thrown by the fleeing troops. At the street 
 comers in the towns of Suwalki and Augustowo were 
 great heaps of abandoned rifles and bayonets, while 
 large bands of Russian prisoners, many of whom sur- 
 rendered without firing a shot, were frequently en- 
 countered along the roadside. Dead horses and sol- 
 diers who had fallen and frozen where they lay were 
 everywhere in evidence, and, as said before, this was 
 true of all the roads leading from the battlefield, well 
 into Russian territory. After February 10th, the en- 
 gagement was fought wholly in Russian territory. 
 
 The fleeing Russians who had escaped the slaughter 
 in East Prussia retreated precipitately by the roads 
 leading through the forest of Augustowo, passed that 
 town, which fell into German hands, as did Suwalki, 
 the capital of the government of the same name, and 
 continued their flight to the east. Ossowiec and Os- 
 trolcnka were reached by the Germans in their victor- 
 ious advance, while in the north the rush of the Ger- 
 man troops brought them to a point only 12 miles dis- 
 tant from Grodno. 
 
 This pursuit, between February 10th and 14th, 
 netted the Germans another 40,000 prisoners. One 
 Russian corps, which had taken refuge in the depths of 
 the forest of Augustowo, and refused to surrender, was 
 cut off almost to the last man. 
 
 The total casualties in this retreat will never be 
 known. The number of prisoners captured by the 
 Germans exceeds that of any battle in modern history, 
 even that of Sedan. Cannon in this one fight, to over 
 300 in number, fell into German hands, besides count- 
 less numbers of machine guns, enormous quantities 
 of munitions of war, such as provisions, ammunition, 
 rifles, etc. 
 
 The German pursuers made good their positions in 
 Russia, and started to besiege Ossowiec, which siege 
 was proceeding at the time this record closed. Another 
 force advanced to the eastward through Ostrolenka 
 with the design of reaching the main railroad from 
 Petrograd and Warsaw and cutting it, thus preventing 
 the movement of any further supplies of munitions of 
 war reaching the Russians of the Warsaw line. 
 
 Another force in the extreme north proceeded to 
 make thrusts at Grodno. These thrusts did not yield 
 great results and were finally abandoned. 
 
 At the time this record closes. March 1st, the move- 
 ment towards the railroad had not reached fruition. 
 
 1.30
 
 East Prussia 
 
 The Russians, who had re-formed to the eastward, 
 were attempting to drive the German advance posts 
 back. In this they had not been successful, but had 
 merely added to their previous stupendous losses. 
 
 This victory added fresh laurels to the crown of the 
 victor of Tannenburg and Lodz, and once more proved 
 that strategy, not numbers, is, after all, the main factor 
 in modern battles. 
 
 181
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 THK CAMPAIGN IN THE EAST 
 
 POLAND. 
 
 During the month of August, while the events here- 
 inbefore narrated were taking place in East Prussia, 
 and the Russians had stripped Central Poland, to 
 the line of Warsaw defences, of their troops, in order 
 to aid in their movement in East Prussia, the Germans, 
 perceiving that the Russians had denuded this terri- 
 tory of troops to a large extent, took advantage of 
 this weakness and pushed forward to Koiii from 'I horn 
 castwardly through Central Poland. In the midst of 
 other and more interesting events, this movement 
 was lost sight of. but by successive advances towards 
 the end of September it finally reached Lodz, having 
 driven the opposing Russians for l'-*n miles before it. 
 The effect of this showed the excellence of the Ger- 
 man strategy, since the presence of this column in this 
 position in the middle of September paralyzed, to a 
 very large degree, the efforts of the Russian armies 
 in the south of Galicia, and eventually forced the with- 
 drawal of Russian troops in very considerable num- 
 bers from the Galician territory. 
 
 On arriving at Lodz, about the .')th of September, 
 this column made no further effort to advance for a 
 time, and occupied itself in holding the territory won. 
 
 On the 2r)th of September General vou IHndenburg 
 was put in commancl of this movement and given the 
 task of conquering Poland, and fresh German troops 
 were added to enable him to accomplish his ta>k. One 
 body of these fresh forces, starting from Thorn, ad- 
 vanced along the left bank of the river Vistula and the 
 railway to \Vloclawek. Another started from Hreslau 
 and proceeded via Czestochowa towards Piotrkow and 
 Novo Radomsk. Another advanced from the direction 
 of Cracow northeasterly along the left bank of the Vis- 
 tula towards Kielce;this advance partly took the Rus- 
 sians by surprise. They had assumed that the terror 
 of their bulletins, if not of their armies, would cause 
 the Germans to await their onslaught behind the 
 
 132
 
 Poland 
 
 strongly entrenched and fortress-prptected frontier line 
 from Thorn to Czestochowa, and at first they inter- 
 posed no formidable obstacles to the German advance 
 which was made with characteristic rapidity, and 
 which, by the 8th of October, had taken up a position 
 extending practically from Wyszogrod to Skierniewice; 
 \ivhile the army advancing from the southeast had 
 nearly attained the Russian fortress of Ivangorod. 
 So that, on the 14th of October, the whole of that por- 
 tion of Poland bounded on the north and east by the 
 Vistula river was either in German possession or in 
 German control, with the exception of a small area 
 around Warsaw and an equally small area around Ivan- 
 gorod. 
 
 On October 15th the advance was thrown forward 
 further, and the Germans penetrated within ten miles 
 of Warsaw ; on the 16th another three miles were 
 gained, so that evening the German forces were within 
 seven miles of the capital of Poland. 
 
 The actual forces engaged in the immediate attack 
 on Warsaw did not exceed four army corps, of whom 
 comparatively few were first line troops. 
 
 On this date, the 16th of October, the City of War- 
 saw was in panic and the population streamed out of 
 the city in all directions to the eastward. The officials, 
 the State Bank and the other financial institutions 
 fled; while the British Colony distinguished itself, ac- 
 cording to the Warsaw papers, by the rapidity with 
 which they executed their retreat. 
 
 As has been said, the Russians were surprised, and 
 the city at this time was defended by only two army 
 corps. It is true that hurry orders had been sent to 
 the Russian military bases, Brest-Litovsk, Bialystok 
 and Grodno, to hurry forward reinforcements. 
 
 On Sunday, October 17th, the Germans were at the 
 edge of the town, with their projectiles exploding 
 within the town limits. That afternoon the Russian 
 defending forces were at the last gasp ; cut to pieces 
 and discouraged, they had retreated from their de- 
 fenses, and there was a period at this time, of a few 
 hours, when the Germans could have entered Warsaw, 
 to all intents and purposes, unopposed. The Germans, 
 however, did not know these facts. It seems to be the 
 only time in the campaign either East or West that 
 the German commanders were not kept in thorough 
 touch with the enemy's movement by their air-craft, 
 or other means of obtaining intelligence; and, conse- 
 
 133
 
 The Campaign in the East 
 
 quently, they not only did not avail themselves of the 
 situation, but actually at this critical moment ceased 
 their attack, which, had they known it, could then have 
 been driven home with little or no opposition. 
 
 After the Russian troops streamed back into the 
 town during the few hours that the German attack 
 was suspended, they were, to a degree, reorganized 
 and sent back to the lines of defense, so that when the 
 Germans resumed the attack the road was no longer 
 open. The defending Russians managed to hold that 
 night, and the next morning some reinforcements 
 reached them and brought the news that further and 
 much greater reinforcements were actually on the 
 way and would arrive as soon as steam could bring 
 them there. This was the 18th. That evening a divi- 
 sion of the Siberian troops, hurriedly taken from the 
 forces in Galicia, reached the town, and all that night 
 and all the next day, and for several days thereafter, 
 the Russians poured in regiment after regiment from 
 the northeast and south, until they had nearly a million 
 men assembled at this critical point. 
 
 Some criticism has been directed at General von 
 Hindenhurg, in the first place, for having made a front- 
 al attack on Warsaw with such a comparatively weak 
 force, and also for not having pushed that attack home 
 at the critical moment. The first criticism may have 
 some elements of justice, but the second criticism is de- 
 void of foundation, because General von Hindenburg, 
 in not pushing the attack home, only exercised a salu- 
 tary caution, since he had no reason to suppose that 
 the Russian commanders would have left Warsaw so 
 comparatively undefended, and all tlic circumstances, 
 as they presented themselves at the time, indicated a 
 trap laid by the Russians. 
 
 On the 20th of October the Russian army advanced 
 from Warsaw and in its turn took the defensive, and 
 on the 21st the Germans, after severe fighting at 
 Blonie, were obliged to fall back, owing to their left 
 having been turned by another Russian force which ad- 
 vanced down the Vistula and occupied Sochaczcw. The 
 Germans' magnificent defense at Blonie gave the Si- 
 berians. Russia's crack troops, reason to remember 
 them : though they themselves suffered quite severely. 
 
 Tvangnrod, during the time these events were hap- 
 pening at Warsaw, was also being attacked by the 
 German's. This fortress, of the fir'^t class, is on the 
 ri\rr \'i';tn1,T nbotit slxtv miles below Wnr'^aw. On 
 
 134
 
 Poland 
 
 the 16th of October the German attacking forces, 
 which were also comparatively weak, began to bom- 
 bard the fortress with heavy guns, and the next two or 
 three days were occupied in attempts to cross the 
 river and to get closer to the fortress ; but in this they 
 were not successful. The main attack on the fortress 
 was directed from a little village, Kozienice, a couple 
 of miles from the Vistula, standing on the ridge which 
 separates the plain from the gully in which the Vistula 
 runs. 
 
 The Polish rivers, like the rivers in the Middle West 
 of the United States, have gouged out for themselves 
 a bed which lies at a considerable distance below the 
 level of the surrounding country, so that to reach them 
 it is necessary to descend considerably. This gully, 
 or valley, varies in width as do the gullies and beds 
 of our Western rivers, but is usually much wider than 
 the actual stream of the river; this wideness being 
 brought about by the gouging of the river in time of 
 flood, when it rises and outspreads its usual banks. 
 Anyone who has seen the Red River or any other of 
 the larger streams in the southwest, can form an exact 
 idea of the Polish rivers. 
 
 This bank on which the village of Kozienice stands 
 had been, to a degree, fortified by the Germans, but 
 the nature of the grounds were such that these for- 
 tifications cannot be said to be extremely formid- 
 able. On the night of the 20th the Russian troops 
 managed to cross the river well below the village, and, 
 struggling through the heavy ground on the river bot- 
 tom, attained the height on the right of the German 
 position. This once accomplished, the Russians 
 brought up more troops until they were in such force 
 that the right of the German position was driven in, 
 which had the effect of forcing the entire German line 
 to abandon its position on the ridge and to retreat into 
 the woods on the East. These woods extended East 
 and West for perhaps ten miles, and into these woods 
 the Russians poured. The woods were so thick that 
 artillery could not be handled therein and the fighting 
 was almost entirely with the bayonet and rifle. The 
 Russians poured in division after division, until they 
 outnumbered the Germans over three to one. For 
 nine days the conflict in this comparatively small for- 
 est continued, and it was not until the evening of the 
 9th day that the Russian forces succeeded in clearing 
 the woods of the enemy. How fierce this battle was 
 
 135
 
 The Campaign in the East 
 
 may be reali/cd when it is stated that the Russians, 
 after the fi^lit, buried 16.000 of tlicir own dead, and 
 their total loss was probably not less than tiO.OOO to 
 62,000. The German loss was about v»r).0O(>: The effect 
 of the driving out of the Germans from the wood was 
 to cause them to fall back on Radom. which town the 
 Russians occupied on October 28th. Kive days more 
 broujjht them to Kielce, where, on Xovember 3rd, a 
 battle which, in any other war. would have l)een con- 
 sidered a very serious one, took place, and which was 
 contested with bitterness. The fipht lasted all through 
 the night of the .'3rd and 4th of Xovemi)er. and was de- 
 cided adversely to the Gcrman-.\ustrian force by two 
 o'clock in the afternoon of Xovcmber 1th. The losses 
 on both sides here were very heavy, the Russian Cos- 
 sacks, in particular, suffering most severely. About 
 two o'clock in the afternoon of November 4th, the 
 Teutonic .Mlies began to retreat; which retreat was 
 continued until the Polisli borders near Cracow and 
 Czestochowa were reached. 
 
 In front of Warsaw, as has been said, on October 
 21st, the Germans began to fall back. On the 22nd the 
 fighting was on tiic Bzura and near Lowicz ; and by 
 the 28th. the Germans having been obliged to give 
 ground in the invasion itself, the Russians occupied 
 Lodz. The German retreat continued ; the lines of re- 
 treat being along the line of Lowicz towards Thorn in 
 the northwest and towards the Warta River a little to 
 the southwest. And on the 0th of November the Ger- 
 man forces had retreated beyond the Warta River, 
 basing themselves on Kalisch and Czestochowa. How- 
 ever, one of the main objects of the original German 
 advance had been achieved : the Russian pressure on 
 Galicia, to the south, had been forced to relax to a verj 
 
 to a verv 
 ;ult well 
 
 considerable degree. This had been a rest 
 worth achieving, since the Russians had been obliged 
 to withdraw forces therefrom, which might have, and 
 probably would have, insured the speedy conquest of 
 the whole |)rovincc. 
 
 On November Hth. the Germans took up a defensive 
 position along the Warta River, but the capture of 
 Kolri. on the left bank, by the Russians, forcing them 
 to fall back again, this retreat carried them I»ack 
 to the strongly entrenched j)ositions which had been 
 prepared fluring the si.x weeks preceding, for the 
 special purpose of furnishing a defensive line to bar 
 any Russian invasion of Silesia As has been said, 
 
 136
 
 Poland 
 
 this Russian line stretched along the line of Kalisch 
 and Czestochowa, along the Warta River. The Rus- 
 sians then ceased operations for several days, while 
 waiting to concentrate their full strength in men and 
 artillery before joining battle on this new front where 
 the Germans had chosen the battlefield and had every 
 advantage of study and preparation of the territory. 
 
 The Germans on this line also had the advantage of 
 easy communication with the rear from their position 
 and consequent improvement in the supply of food and 
 of artillery projectiles. 
 
 After concentrating their army, however, the Rus- 
 sians arrived at the conclusion that this position was 
 too strong for a frontal attack and began drawing off 
 to the southeastward towards Galicia. The Germans, 
 seeing this, took advantage of the Russian indecision, 
 and, leaving enough men on this line to hold the Rus- 
 sians (and only enough), transported with as much 
 rapidity as possible all of the remaining men north- 
 wards to Thorn, to which center they also drew men 
 from East Prussia and from their reserves; thus or- 
 ganizing a new army. Further strength was gained 
 by transporting to this point a large part of the caval- 
 ry forces which had hitherto been employed in the 
 western field where the coming winter had made their 
 services no longer necessary. 
 
 By the 11 th of November this army was concen- 
 trated. 
 
 The Russian cavalry had been raiding in the direc- 
 tion of Thorn and even to the South of it across the 
 German border. As usual, the Russians were imper- 
 fectly acquainted with the movements of the enemy's 
 troops, and this cavalry (mostly Cossacks), which had 
 rather rashly advanced into German territory, woke up 
 on the 12th of November to find itself surrounded, 
 and was mercilessly cut to pieces ; not over ten per cent, 
 of its numbers succeeded in reaching safety. This was 
 done by the cavalry brought from the western field. 
 Immediately after this, this newly assembled army ad- 
 vanced into Poland again in two columns, one on the 
 north and one on the south side of the Vistula. On 
 November 15th the army on the north bank of the 
 Vistula attacked the Russians at Lipno, some twenty 
 miles north of Wloclawek, and inflicted an important 
 defeat upon them, and continued advancing to the east- 
 ward. South of the Vistula, the Germans advanced to 
 Plock with almost incredible speed, and attacked this 
 
 137
 
 The Campaimi m the East 
 
 town; following this up by advancing on Kutno, 
 Lenczwei and Unignow, ten miles south of Kolo. Thus, 
 in a few days, they regained more than half the ground 
 which they had ceded in the last days of October. 
 
 A battle was joined here on the 16th of November, 
 between the Russians who had been hastily thrown 
 forward from Warsaw and those German forces which 
 extended in a line from Flock on the Vistula almost 
 due southwest to I'nignow on the W'arta. 
 
 In the south, at the same time, the force which was 
 entrenched on the southern Warta held the line from 
 Sieradz to Czestochowa. 
 
 This battle only lasted a short time, when tlie Rus- 
 sians were driven back badly beaten and the Germans 
 resumed their advance, sending back into Prussia the 
 twenty odd thousand prisoners which they had taken 
 during the fight. 
 
 The next day the Russians were again defeated be- 
 tween Dubie and Leczyca, and driven nortiieast along 
 the Bzura towards Lowicz. Continuing to pursue, 
 the Russians reached Lowicz on the 20th, and, passing 
 that place, established themselves between it and Ski- 
 erniewice, while, on the 18th, fighting began around 
 Lodz. For the next ten days a desperate fight took 
 place; the Russians attempting an enveloping move- 
 ment in the vicinity of Lodz and Lowicz, and announc- 
 ing, day after day, in flamboyant bulletins, the anni- 
 hilation of one army corps, the capture of another, the 
 breaking of the German line, and the panic-stricken 
 retreat of the entire German army. Unfortunately for 
 them in these bulletins, "the wish was father to the 
 thought." and the Russian projected movement was 
 announced as an accomplished one. For one moment 
 the army of General von Mackenseii. which had over- 
 extended itself in an effort to cut the railroad, was in 
 danger. But its cohesion and marching powers, the 
 steadfastness of the German soldiers, and the co-ordi- 
 nation the German officers had worked out in man- 
 oeuvres, extricated it from its somewhat difficult 
 position ; while the main German army, having re- 
 ceived heavy reinforcements, was able to resume the 
 advance, and in place of a Russian victory the final 
 outcome of this two weeks' battle was the capture of 
 Lodz on December 6th. and with it some 40,000 Rus- 
 sian prisoners. 
 
 It i'- not, however, to be supposed that these results 
 were gained without great losses, though these losses 
 
 138
 
 Poland 
 
 were perhaps mitigated in the minds of the survivors 
 by the knowledge that they had involved much heavier 
 losses upon their Russian opponents. The deductions 
 to be drawn from a careful study of the German offi- 
 cial reports of this two weeks' action and of the Rus- 
 sian general staff's precis, is that the Russian losses in 
 the fighting in this terrain which culminated in the 
 capture of Lodz on the 6th of December were not less 
 than 150,000, and that these losses were peculiarly 
 important, in that three of the Siberian army corps, 
 which are the best of the Russian troops, were, to all 
 intents and purposes, wiped out of existence as units. 
 
 On the 8th of December, the German line occupied 
 a position stretching from the south bank of the Vis- 
 tula (Glovno and How having fallen into their hands), 
 due south a distance of about forty miles from Warsaw. 
 
 While these things were going on south of the Vis- 
 tula, north of the Vistula the German army operating 
 in that field was advancing steadily to the eastward; 
 and a new army, starting from Soldau, on the East 
 Prussian border, had struck southwardly towards 
 Warsaw from the north, advancing through Mlawa; 
 and on the 7th of December captured Przasnysz, twen- 
 ty miles to the eastward of Mlawa. At Przasnysz 
 about 10.000 Russians were taken prisoners, and on 
 the 8th the Germany army advanced from Przasnysz to 
 Ciechanow on the railroad leading towards Novo 
 Georgievsk. Here they were attacked by a superior 
 Russian force and were successfully driven back out 
 of the positions that they had won at Przasnysz, 
 through Mlawa and back to and across the Nieden- 
 burg, Soldau and Lappenburg line within the borders 
 of East Prussia. This same Russian army which 
 forced them back, reached, with its left wing, to Dob- 
 rzyn on the right bank of the Vistula, about ten miles 
 from Plock. At this point, (Dobrzyn), when the Rus- 
 sians reached it, the Germans on the north bank were 
 discovered attempting to throw pontoon bridges 
 across the Vistula near to the established communica- 
 tion with the other bank. This attempt, the arrival 
 of the Russian army frustrated. These positions were 
 reached about Christmas. 
 
 The German army south of the Vistula, after severe 
 fighting, forced back the Russians to the Bzura river 
 and defeated them on December 15th at Sochaczew, a 
 town only thirty miles east of Warsaw, capturing the 
 railroad communication between Lodz and Warsaw. 
 
 139
 
 The Campaign in the East 
 
 On the 18th the Germans captured Lowicz with a 
 great many prisoners, and driving the Russians across 
 the Bzura river, forced them to take up a new posi- 
 tion along tlic right l)ank of the Bzura river on the line 
 of the \'istula river, Sochaczew anil Skicrnicwice. In 
 their retreat the Russians l>urned the bridges over the 
 Bzura. Nevertheless, the Germans, a few days later, 
 just before Christmas, forced a passage at Sochaczew 
 and at Skierniewice, the Russians again falling back. 
 
 Between Christmas and the first of January, severe 
 fighting took place along a line south of the Vistula and 
 along the Bzura, Rawka and Pilica rivers, which re- 
 sulted in practically no materially changed position 
 during the week. On this front this situation has con- 
 tinued from the early days of January to the time of 
 the closing of this record on the first of March. There 
 has been severe fighting along the lines of tlicse three 
 rivers, and at intervals the Germans have made slight 
 advances from their position, but only to be driven 
 back. 
 
 During the latter weeks of this period the character 
 of the fighting here assumed much of tlic character of 
 the fighting in the West ; that is, both sides were so 
 thoroughly entrenched, and their efforts so well pro- 
 tected, that neither side could make any impression on 
 the line of the other. 
 
 Artillery duels, varying in severity, have taken place 
 from time to time, but. as said, the whole situation has 
 remained practically what it was in the early days of 
 January. 
 
 Another reason for this comparative inaction was the 
 change in the weather towards the middle of January, 
 when heavy falls of snow occurred and made the move- 
 ment of troops and their train practically impossible 
 for some time. 
 
 The campaign in North I'nland, between the Vistula 
 river and the East Prussian border, was modified early 
 in January, by the events in East Prussia which have 
 been alrearly narrated. 
 
 In South Poland, during this time tlie Germans suc- 
 ceedcfl in extending their lines to the east of Czesto- 
 chowa. During this process there wcro no particularly 
 rcmarkal)le ocrnrrcnces, altliough the advance was 
 
 Juite considerable, .so that when this record closes the 
 rcrman and. in the .southern extremity, the .Austrian 
 front, follows the line to Tomaszow, Kiclce and the 
 Nida river, to the Galician border. 
 
 140
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 THE CAMPAIGN IN THE EAST 
 
 GALICIA 
 
 Austria was able to mobilize more rapidly than Rus- 
 sia and to take advantage of this fact, it was planned 
 at the start to invade South Poland. An army under 
 General Dankl, consisting- of about five army corps, 
 was to advance from its base on Przemysl and Jaros- 
 lau and push upwards between the Vistula and the 
 Bug to Lublin and Kohln. These towns seized, 
 this army would cut the Warsaw-Kieff railroad and 
 throw open the road beyond towards the communica- 
 tions in the rear of Warsaw. Another army was placed 
 under General von Auffenburg which was to advance 
 northeast from Lemburg, thus dominating Eastern 
 Galicia from the Bug to the Dneister, which army num- 
 bered at the beginning 200,000 men. A third army, 
 under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, was to push 
 out from the left flank of General Dankl and, crossing 
 the Polish border, occupy Kielce and Radom. 
 
 As is known, Russia mobilized faster than was ex- 
 pected and as a result the Austrian campaign was not 
 carried out in the form planned. In a very short time, 
 the Russians gathered a much superior force to the 
 Austrians in front of them, but during the time between 
 this concentration and the taking the offensive, the 
 Russian general staff adopted a delaying plan of ac- 
 tion. Against the main Austrian advance of General 
 Dankl no serious resistance was immediately offered, 
 and it was permitted to nearly reach Lublin. 
 
 General Dankl's army crossed the frontier west of 
 Tangorod on August 10th. Slight skirmishing with 
 the Russian frontier posts took place and these fell 
 back. A small fight took place at Goraj, and something 
 more serious at Krasnick, where the Austrians defeated 
 a larger Russian force and made quite a number of 
 prisoners. The Russians then fell back towards Lublin 
 and Kohln to Zamosc on the right, and the Archduke's 
 
 141
 
 The Campaign in the East 
 
 army advanced to the positions which it had intended 
 to take. 
 
 General Ivanoff, in the meantime, had been massing 
 an army on the line from Lublin and Koliln, a well 
 chosen concentration area, as it was on one oi Russia's 
 important railroads to Warsaw in one direction and to 
 Kicft and Odessa in the other. From the middle of 
 August the Russian forces here probably amounted to 
 about 450,000 to 500,000 men. The Austrians, when 
 within fifteen miles of Lublin, took contact with tliese 
 forces and found themselves checked first, and then 
 held up by a force much j^reater than their own, but it 
 was not. however, at this time, the intention of these 
 Russian forces to take the offensive. Events had to 
 happen, according to their plan, to the southwest 
 before the moment would have been right to attack the 
 Austrian force opposed to them. 
 
 General von Auffcnburg's army which, as has been 
 said. had. as its first task, to threaten but not to push 
 much beyond the frontier in the direction of the Rus- 
 sian fortress Dubro, Rorwo-Neutzh, besides Vladimar- 
 \'olynsk. His chief business was to hold back any Rus- 
 sian advance which might occur in this quarter and to 
 protect General Dankl on flank and rear. As Dankl ad- 
 vanced, skirmishes began all along this border of Galicia. 
 On August 6th the Austrians captured the I^emburg- 
 Odcssa railroad near Podolia and blew up an arch of the 
 railroad bridge. On August 11th the town of Brody on 
 the Leniburg-Kieff railroad, was attacked by Russian 
 cavalry, and on August l^Uh a fight occurred at Sokal. 
 the terminus of the railroad line to Rawa and Ruszka 
 and Lcmburg. The Austrian brigade was rather roughly 
 handled here and fell back towards Lemburg. This 
 incident was of strategic importance and it was, there- 
 fore, the most momentous fighting which had occurred. 
 
 On August 17th the Russians took a general offen- 
 sive, and the chief command of the army opposing von 
 Auffenf)urg was given to General Ruszky, who had 
 studied Galicia minutely for many years. He had fore- 
 seen that some day Russia would attack .\ustria in this 
 exposed province, and had made it his business, by all 
 possible means, to thoroughly inform himself of the 
 topography thereof, even going so far as to spend 
 months in that province in disguise, making foot jour- 
 neys for the purpose of increasing his knowledge of 
 the local topography. Associated with him was General 
 
 142
 
 Galicia 
 
 Brusiloff. The total force under Ruszky was not less 
 than 14 army corps with several divisions of cavalry, 
 a total well over 650,000 men. Thus he had more than 
 twice as many men as von Auffenburg could oppose 
 to him, and on finding out the strength of his opponents, 
 von Auffenburg drew on the Archduke's army for re- 
 inforcements. On August 17th, Ruszky, flinging his 
 forces into the Austrian left and center, crossed the 
 frontier on the 22nd, and occupied Brody with no op- 
 position, on the 23rd. On the 22nd, Brusiloff, who 
 commanded the left of the Russian army under Ruszky, 
 crossed the frontier at Noloczysh, the frontier station 
 of the Lemburg-Odessa railway. The seizure of the 
 railroads gave the Russians little advantage because 
 their railroad equipment, cars., etc., are not of the same 
 gauge as that used by other European countries, and 
 when the Austrians retreated here, their own rolling 
 stock was sent away before the retreat. However, a 
 good road ran toward Lemburg, along which Brusiloff 
 sent his cavalry which forced the Austrians out of Tar- 
 nopol after some fighting on August 23rd. The Aus- 
 trians fell back to the line of the Zlota-Lipa, which flows 
 into the Dniester. On the 25th and 26th of August there 
 was some heavy fighting along this river, particularly 
 at Brazezany. This position was finally carried and the 
 Austrians fell back towards Halicz on the Dniester. 
 
 While the Russian left was thus pounding the Aus- 
 trian right, Ruszky was hammering the left and center. 
 After crossing the frontier at Brody, Ruszky's army 
 spread out on a wide front, the center pushing straight 
 in a direct line towards Lemburg, while the right, 
 moving westwardly, pressed with all its weight on the 
 Austrian left, trying to drive a wedge between the 
 army of von Auffenburg and that of Dankl to the north. 
 Ruszky's own left marched southward trying to join 
 Brusiloff. The fighting was severe and both sides 
 lost heavily, but here, as usual, the Russian generals 
 did not spare the lives of men to accomplish their end 
 and the Austrians, fighting gallantly, were over- 
 powered by the weight of numbers and driven back. 
 General Ruszky finally succeeded at the end of the 
 week in forcing his way into Tomascow, and in driving 
 back the enemy's center to the Bug and across the 
 railroad to Zlocow. 
 
 By this time Brusiloff had brought his right in touch 
 with Ruszky's left. The united Russian armies then 
 
 143
 
 The Campaign in the East 
 
 ajjjxuiltcd ihe Austrian j)o>iiit)n along tlic seventy or 
 eighty miles fnmt stretching from Bush in the north 
 to Halicz and the Dniester on the south. The fight- 
 ing here was very severe, the severest ])robably on any 
 front tluring the war. and the Anstrians resi>tecl strenu- 
 ously until a breach was made in their lines on August 
 31st. This breach nuule the entire line give way and a 
 retreat was effected in some disorder. On September 
 2n»l the Austrian army fell back west of a line which 
 ran from Grtnleck tt) Kawa and Kuska. 
 
 When von .\uffenburg"> army fell back from Lem- 
 burg to the Gri>deck-Kawa-Kuszka line, it there found 
 a new line of defense which had been prepared for it. 
 This retreat in reasonably go<xl order, in view of the 
 arm) *s previous rough liandling. was quite to the credit 
 of the .Austrian general, and hcrr fresh troops were 
 thrown into this line. Immediately after the capture 
 of Lcmburg. this force wa.s attacked at Grodeck in the 
 south of Rawa-Ruszka ,in the north. The fighting was 
 very severe at the northern |X)int and lasted eight whole 
 days and nights, the Anstrians fighting gallantly, mak- 
 ing stands in one single mile at no less than eight dis- 
 tinct points. Owing to the enormous numerical superi- 
 ority of the Russians, they were compelled to give way, 
 but this was without dishonor. 
 
 On this point we may cite the testimony of the cor- 
 respondent of the London Times who examined the 
 battle field a very few <lays after the fighting and bears 
 witness to the extraordinary tenacity, obstinacy and 
 gallantry with which the Austrians had defended their 
 position under very discouraging conditions. In fact, 
 it may be said here, in view of the criticism to which 
 the Austrian troops had been subjected by the Ameri- 
 can press (which criticisms were the result of crass ig- 
 norance), that all through this Galician campaign when 
 Austrians and Russians had met on anything like even 
 terms, the Russians invariably were defeated. The 
 Russians can only win when they outnumber their op- 
 pc)nents, which is shown, not only in this Galician cam- 
 paign, but in the Polish and Caucasian. 
 
 Oil the afternoon of the eighth day of battle the north- 
 cm end of the Austrian line lay at Rawa-Ruszka, and 
 by nightfall of that day, September lUh, the centre 
 gave way, also. The residt of this was that on the ISth 
 Saml)or was taken aiul Jaroslau fell on September 21st. 
 Thfiiu'li liftwcfii tlu'sr two places there wnc a heavy 
 
 144
 
 Galicia 
 
 fight at Jabrow, Chrow to the south was taken on Sep- 
 tember 24th. The capture of this place surrounded the 
 fortress of Przemysl on the east, north and south, and 
 behind this defence the brave army of von Auffenburg 
 had already taken refuge. 
 
 It must be remembered that, in considering this cam- 
 paign, in addition to the disadvantage of being out- 
 numbered two to one, the Austrians had another great 
 and serious difficulty to contend with. The country be- 
 yond the Galician border and the city of Lemburg is 
 largely inhabited by Ruthenians. These are of a re- 
 ligious faith closely resembling the Russian Orthodox 
 church, and for many years, that church by means of 
 secret agents, excited among the Ruthenians, who are 
 Slavonic by race, the desire of uniting themselves to 
 the Orthodox mother church and becoming an integral 
 part thereof. This propaganda had been going on for 
 more than twenty-five or thirty years, and the Ruthe- 
 nians, when the Russians entered Galicia, believing the 
 promises made by these agents as to the temporal and 
 spiritual advantage which would accrue to them as a 
 result of Galicia's becoming Russian, aided the Russian 
 army by every means in their power, betraying to them 
 the position and movements of the Austrian army. 
 
 It is a satisfaction to say, however, that since the 
 Russian occupation of this portion of Galicia, and its 
 coming under Russian government, the Ruthenians 
 have found out that the old proverb that "all that glit- 
 ters is not gold," is particularly true of Russian prom- 
 ises, and that they are being subjected to persecutions 
 by the Russian authorities in charge of this portion of 
 Galicia, and are feeling in more ways than one the 
 thongs of the Russian knout. A traitor, though he may 
 be of momentary use, is never an object of admiration, 
 even to those he serves. 
 
 Lemburg is the largest city of Galicia, and from it 
 radiate railway lines in all directions. Its importance 
 was. therefore, considerable to the Russians, as it gave 
 them direct communication with Kieff, Odessa. Dubrow, 
 Rognor and Warsaw. There need be no surprise that 
 no attempt was made to hold Lemburg ; the city is with- 
 out defenses of any kind, and any attempt to defend 
 it would merely have resulted in its ruin and destruc- 
 tion. The Russians claim to have taken 64,000 pris- 
 i-ners during this fight and they estimate the Austrian 
 losses at 130,000. These figures betray the usual exu- 
 
 146
 
 The Campaign in the East 
 
 berance of Russian imajjination. Divided by two, the 
 figures would probably be more nearly correct. 
 
 Alter the capture of Lemburg, Count Bobrinsky was 
 appointed Governor General of the city and the prov- 
 ince, and within less than a month from the day that 
 the Russians entered the city, — there being many Jews 
 in the population — the Russians characteristically cele- 
 brated the victory by a pogrom in which not only the 
 chief Rabbi, but with him some sixty or seventy of his 
 co-religionists were killed or wounded. The other usual 
 features of this variety of festivities were, of course, 
 present. 
 
 Turning now to the operations to the north where 
 we had left General Dankl facing the army of General 
 Ivanutf in the middle of August. Nothing much hap- 
 pened until the early days of September. Un the 4th of 
 that month the Russian army assumed the offensive 
 along the line of front between the Vistula and the 
 Bug. The rcmaiiuler of the troops which had oppo.sed 
 the Austrian army, the great bulk having been sent to 
 re-inforce General von Auffenburg, was increased by 
 two further corps ajid a few (»ermans. During the last 
 days of .August and the first few days of September, 
 there was considerable heavy skirmishing in the fron- 
 tier region between Zomac and Sokal, and finally the 
 Russians succeeded in driving a wedge through Tomas- 
 cow, inflicting a severe and definite defeat upon the 
 army of the Archduke, which fell back upon Tarngorod. 
 
 On September 2nd, as a result of the defeat of von 
 Auffenburg and the driving of this wedge by the Rus- 
 sians, the situation of General Dankl's army became so 
 critical that he was forced to attempt to break through 
 the Russian defences in front of Lublin, or. failing 
 there, to fall back. On that day an attack was made 
 upon the Russian line. At first this attack was success- 
 ful and the Austrians reached within a few miles of 
 Lublin, but ultimately the attack was thrown back and 
 the Austrians were forced to retreat. The Knglish have 
 filled the newspapers of the world with the reports of 
 the scientific strategy which was displayed by General 
 French in his retreat from Mons before an equal force 
 of Germans. This retreat was as nothing compared 
 to the difficulties and obstacles which General Dankl 
 overcame in drawing off his army before a force of 
 Russians which outnumbered him at least two to one, 
 in the enemy's country. 
 
 M6
 
 Galicia 
 
 Petrograd assumed that this Austrian army was de- 
 stroyed, and with the characteristic impetuosity of 
 statement, which has been one of the two leading fea- 
 tures of the Russian bulletins in this war, the other be- 
 ing plain fabrication, announced the fact, but as in 
 many other instances, the sequel did not bear them out. 
 The exact details of the fighting during the retreat are 
 lacking, but we know that there was heavy fighting at 
 Schodals, and again at Krasnick, and also Frampol. At 
 Zamosc, the Russians were temporarily held, but the 
 retreat continued until the Austrian army reached the 
 frontier. From this point on the operations became 
 involved, and the retreat did not stop until by Septem- 
 ber 33rd, Dankl's army had been driven back to the 
 line of the Wisloka. On the way to this position on 
 the Wisloka on September 13th, in crossing the San, 
 they suffered very severely, the Russians shelling the 
 bridges upon which they crossed, as a result of which 
 many were forced through the bridges and drowned in 
 addition to those killed by the shell fire itself, and the 
 Russians also took many prisoners. 
 
 The Russians were now in front of Przemysl, and 
 they succeeded by September 26th and 27th in com- 
 pletely investing this fortress for the first time. The 
 Austrian defense was in the hands of General Kus- 
 maneh. Przemysl is technically a fortified camp of 
 considerable circumference, and in addition, besides 
 the outer defense works, in the centre is a town of 
 over 50,000 inhabitants, a very large proportion of 
 these being Jews. The fortress was, on the occa- 
 sion of this first investment, amply provisioned for a 
 year, and it was a misfortune for the Austrians that 
 the fortress was thereafter relieved, since when it was 
 relieved, its store of provisions and munitions of war 
 was drawn upon to supply the food for the army fight- 
 ing outside, which had an unfortunate effect on its fate 
 in the second investment. 
 
 As soon as the Russians surrounded this fortress, it 
 was called upon to surrender. On refusal an attempt 
 to take the place by storm was made, which was re- 
 pulsed with enormous losses. This attempt was given 
 up and the Russians planned a regular investment till 
 such time as heavy siege guns could be brought up and 
 a way prepared for assault. In the middle of the fol- 
 lowing month, November, the Austro-German offensive 
 forced the Russians back from this fortress, so that 
 
 147
 
 The Campaign in the East 
 
 there was unrestricted communication with the exte- 
 rior world. This period of freedom lasted only about 
 ten or twelve days, and when the Austrians once more 
 receded, towards the end of Noveml>er. the fortress 
 was aj^ain surrounded by the Russians and the lines 
 drawn more tightly than they had been before. 
 
 The heavy sic^c gims the Russians intendetl to bring 
 up, however, did not arrive until well into January, 
 1915. At this time a determined effort was beinj^ made 
 to relieve the fortress from the direction of the Car- 
 pathians, and it was decided to wait before bei^inning 
 the bombardment until the danger of its beinp relieved 
 by this attempt had passed away, for even though un- 
 successful, the sieg^e puns and their e(iuipment might be 
 captured. The real bombardment of the fortress did 
 not begin until after March 1st. 1915. and hence will 
 not be treated here. During the intervening time from 
 the end of November to March 1st. the Russians kept 
 a large force of from rj.*). (»(»(» to I'lO.OOO men surround- 
 ing the forts, and from time to time making efforts for 
 its capture by st(^rtning. 
 
 All the Russian losses in front of Przemysl are, rea- 
 sonably stated, killed, wounded and died from disease, 
 to have exceeded 100.000. At the end of September, 
 the Russians were in control of all of Eastern Oalicia, 
 and held Lemburg. Jaroslau, Brody. Busk. Grodeck, 
 Tarnopol. Sambor. BrazcTiany and other towns of im- 
 portance, with the railroad systems between them. 
 They also controlled the rich Calician oil fields which 
 were of great importance to the Teutonic allies, and 
 their advance guards were already in Southern Galicia 
 at the entrance to the passes traversing the Carpathians 
 into flungary. Przemysl alone of the important 
 positions in this portion of Galicia was in the hands of 
 the Austrians. 
 
 Towards the end of September, the Austrians began 
 to show some signs of taking the offensive, which 
 they did about the first of October, attacking from 
 the southwest and from the southeast, the main attack 
 coming from the southwest. This advance moved slowly 
 and cautiously, and, for a time, met with consider- 
 able successes, and before it the Russians gradually 
 fell back, though bitterly contesting the territory 
 ceded, until the first week in October when the Rus- 
 sian line had reached a position behind the San River, 
 vvhich constituted a formidal)lc obstacle to the success- 
 ful rush of the .'\ustrian advance. 
 
 148
 
 Galicia 
 
 Another force of Austrians made a diversion a little 
 further to the east, and succeeded in relieving the 
 fortress Przemysl, so that, on October 10th, the entire 
 western line of this fortified camp was clear of the 
 Russians, although the eastward line was still invested 
 by them. 
 
 The Austrians made a capital mistake in their treat- 
 ment of this fortified camp at this time, in that they 
 drew on this source for nearly all the munitions of war 
 and provisions which were contained therein and which 
 would have been sufficient to have sustained the fort- 
 ress for a year with its original garrison. In the sequel, 
 as will appear when the capture of this fortress by the 
 Russians is dealt with, this prevented the fortress from 
 holding out the length of time which it would have 
 done under favorable circumstances. 
 
 About this time the autumnal rains set in and 
 made the movement of troops and their train difficult; 
 and particularly did this affect the movements of the 
 ammunition train. 
 
 On the 13th of October a very severe engagement 
 took place on the west bank of the San, and fighting 
 began on the Przemysl front. On the 16th there was 
 very heavy infantry fighting to the south and south- 
 west of that fortress. 
 
 From the 18th to the 22nd of October, for four days, 
 the Austrians tried with great gallantry to effect a 
 crossing of the San, which was absolutely essential if 
 their offensive was to be pushed forward and Galicia 
 cleared of the Russians. This effort, gallant as it was, 
 was not successful, and the Austrians lost heavily; so 
 heavily, in fact, that the resumption of the defensive 
 by the Russians was possible. 
 
 The high water mark of this Austrian attack seems 
 to have been on or about the 22nd of October. A 
 few days later the Russians again began to advance, 
 fierce fighting occurred around Jaroslau, and on the 
 88th of October the Austrians received a severe defeat 
 near Sambor, a little further to the south. The 29th, 
 30th and 31st of October fighting continued between 
 the Austrian rear guards and the Russian advance 
 guards, and the Austrians were slowly, but surely, 
 forced backward. This retreat was conducted with 
 great skill on the part of the Austrian general, von 
 Auffenberg; and particularly did Gen. Bohm-ErmolH, 
 who was in command of the Austrian Cavalr}^ Force, 
 
 149
 
 The Campaign in the East 
 
 distingui>h himself, but the Russians, who had been 
 reinforced, outnumbered the Austrians so greatly that 
 tlicre was no possibility of successful opposition by 
 the Austrians to the Russian flood of numbers. 
 
 On the 22nd of November the Russians definitely 
 assumed the offensive along the whole line of the 
 San, and began crossing the river to the westward, 
 which operation they succeeded in completing by the 
 ith of November, establishing themselves in well 
 fortified positions on the west bank of that river. 
 
 On November 6th the Austrians were in full retreat, 
 and this retreat did not end until towards the end of 
 the month when the River Dunajcc was reached and 
 crossed by them, when they made a stand on the other 
 side of this stream. Their hold here, the Russians were 
 never able to break. The west bank of the River 
 Dunajec was, for northern Galicia, the limit of the Aus- 
 trian retreat. It is true that at this time there were 
 various reports, emanating from partisan sources, of 
 the city of Cracow hoing invested by the Russians and 
 its siege begun, but these reports had no basis in fact, 
 and Cracow itself was never very seriously menaced. 
 Some few reconnoitering parties of Russians did cross 
 the Dunajec and push their raids a little to the west- ' 
 ward of this river, but these attacks were sporadic and 
 presented no serious danger to the town. 
 
 When the Russians found that they were unable to 
 break through this barrier on the west bank of the 
 Dunajec. they turned tlieir attention to the south, and 
 successful advances carried them through Jaslo, Krasno 
 and Sanok to the foothills of the Carpathians, and, in 
 some cases, they forced the passes leading through 
 these mountains and advanced down the southern 
 slope to the first town in Hungary. Bartficld and the 
 Munkacs region being the extreme southern limits of 
 this advance. From these towns, however, earlv in 
 December, they were expelled and thrown back to the 
 northern «;lopc of the Carpathians. 
 
 In East Galicia their progress was practically unim- 
 peded. Moving from I.embnrg southcastwardly. they 
 attacked, one after another, the towns of Stry. Halicz, 
 Stanislau and Kolomea. and overran all ca^^tcrn Galicia. 
 The .Austrians were not here in great force, .nnd. as 
 usual, the Russians were present in crushing numbers, 
 so that there was little left for the .Xiistrians to do but 
 
 to <.tr,-.t 
 
 150
 
 Galicia 
 
 The Russians continued this advance into the Austrian 
 crown lands of Bukowina, which lie in the extreme south- 
 east of Galicia, between that province and Hungary. 
 Czemowitz fell into Russian hands on the 27th of No- 
 vember, and tlie Russian movement southward in that 
 province, while resisted strongly by the Austrians, pur- 
 sued a victorious course, town after town falling into 
 their hands, until, by the middle of January, not only 
 had Bukowina been completely invested, but detachments 
 of Russian troops were moving along the Roumanian 
 border in Transylvania and across the mountain passes 
 of southern Bukowina, Borgo, Rodna and Strol into 
 northeastern Hungary, while all the other mountain 
 passes of the Carpathians, from the Borgo to the Uzsok, 
 had again fallen into Russian hands. 
 
 At this time, however, Hungary became alarmed, and, 
 as a result of her appeals, Germany came to the rescue 
 and a forward movement, supported by German troops, 
 was begun. This forward movement began on the Buko- 
 winean end of the line, and, during the month of January, 
 and early February, this fighting was pushed with such 
 energy that the Russians were completely cleared out of 
 Bukowina; the capital, Czernowitz, being retaken c«i 
 the first of February, the Russians being driven over the 
 border a few days later. 
 
 This offensive was then pushed to the northwest, and 
 the Russians were successfully forced out of Kolomea, 
 Nadworna and Stanislau, and thrown back to the other 
 side of the north bank of the Dniester River, north of 
 Halicz. 
 
 As the record closes, these advances were held, and 
 eastern Galicia, to the line of the Dniester and Pruth 
 Rivers, had been completely cleared of the invading 
 forces. 
 
 During these months in the Carpathian Mountains 
 the tide of battle ebbed and flowed. One day the Rus- 
 sians were successful in making an advance, to be 
 hurled back the next. And this fighting went on under 
 tremendous difficulties, occasioned by the weather con- 
 ditions in the mountains. The northern slope of the 
 Carpathians is one of the coldest regions of Central Eu- 
 rope, and the temperature drops lower and the snow- 
 fall is much heavier than it is in Northern Poland. 
 The Austrian and Russian troops fought under condi- 
 tions of great hardship all of these months of Decem- 
 ber, January and February. 
 
 151
 
 The Campaign in the East ' 
 
 The ol)ject of the Austriaiis was to prevent the Rus- 
 sians from p<nirinp from the Carpatliians into Hungary 
 and establishing themselves there; and this the Aus- 
 trians succeeded in achieving, though some of the most 
 violent figliting in the world's history took place in 
 these mountains at a height of from 4,000 to G.OOO feet 
 in deep sncnv. 
 
 On the first of March the general position continued 
 as alx^ve. and may be descril)cd as iH'ing that the Rus- 
 sians held all the passes of the Carpathians from 
 Delatyn Pass westward, including the approaches to 
 the Heskid. Turka, directly north of the Uzsok, the 
 approaches to Lupkow and the Dukla Pass, while the 
 Pass of Mezo I^borcz was in their hamls and they had 
 here succeeded in establishing themselves to a degree 
 on the southern slope of the mountain. 
 
 Too much praise cannot be given to the Austrian 
 Army for its determined defense of the southerly slopes 
 of the line of the Carpathians in this three months' 
 battle from the end of Xovcmbcr to the first of March. 
 By holding here, they made the Russian campaign 
 come to a standstill, and a standstill is as apt to l>e a 
 fatality in military campaigning as in the battle of life; 
 remaining stationary for any considerable time is apt 
 to be followed by retrogressive movements ; and of 
 this retrogressive movement on the part of the Rus- 
 sians, the first warnings could be noticed in the latter 
 days of February. 
 
 Much criticism and much sarcasm have fallen upon 
 the Austrian Army during these three months, but 
 probably no army in any recent campaign in Europe 
 had to contend with such great difficulties as did the 
 Austrian Army during this period, and the verdict of 
 history will certainly be that it acquitted itself with 
 great distinction under verv adverse circumstances. 
 
 152
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 TURKO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 
 
 Turkey had had in the last ten years a rather trou- 
 bled history, not only internally, but externally. The 
 revolt of the young Turks in June, 1908. reversed the 
 government of the empire, and in 1911 Italy attacked 
 her, gained Tripoli and seized some of the Turkish 
 islands. In 1912 the Balkan League made an attack 
 upon Turkey and succeeded in almost driving her out 
 of Europe, in fact, her frontier v^as pushed very close 
 to Constantinople, the Enos-Midia line being desig- 
 nated as Turkey's western frontier by the treaty of 
 peace. Thereafter, however, when Bulgaria, Servia 
 and Greece, her former allies, came to blows, Turkey 
 recaptured Adrianople, and retained that city by the 
 treaty of Bucharest. 
 
 For some years the Turkish army had been under- 
 going reorganization under German direction, and in 
 the autumn of 1913, the German military mission had 
 largely increased in numbers, and apparently has 
 achieved a very considerable result, backed as it was 
 and is by the influence of Enver Pasha, the ablest man 
 who has become a power in Turkey for many years. 
 The Turks are naturally good fighters, particularly the 
 infantry, which has always shown itself to be relied 
 upon for a stubborn defense, but the question, of 
 course, arises as to whether in the short time that has 
 been available for the reorganization and training of 
 the army anything like efficient results have been 
 brought about. 
 
 About 5,000 German officers and non-commissioned 
 officers have been injected into the Turkish army, and 
 this has presumably given strength to the organiza- 
 tion of the troops. 
 
 On October 30th the Russian ambassador demanded 
 his passports and left Constantinople the next day, and 
 Turkey had entered the war on the side of the Teutonic 
 allies. When the war began the Turkish army was 
 mobilized almost at once and, so far as can be exactly 
 
 153
 
 Turko-Russian Campaign 
 
 computed, there were under the colors on October 31st, 
 some oJO.OUii trainctl men and irregulars, witli men in 
 process of training to an e(iual number. Of this army 
 about 200,000 were left in and aroiuid Constantinople, 
 and about 150,000 were thrown toward the Russian 
 frontier, the remainder being held for the invasion of 
 Persia and the movements toward Hg)pt. 
 
 Very shortly after Turkey entered the war, England, 
 who had for many years been supreme in Egypt, though 
 recognizing the sovereignty of the Turks over that coun- 
 try, threw off the mask and deposed the Khedive, elevat- 
 ing a member of his family to the rather precarious posi- 
 tion of Sultan under British protection. The EngHsh 
 had also maintained a garrison force of approximately 
 10,000 to 12,000 men in Eg>'pt from the British regular 
 army, and had in addition organized and officered the 
 native army. At the commencement of the war, the regu- 
 lar troops had been withdrawn, but their places had been 
 taken by troops fumished by Australia, Canada and a 
 considerable force of English second line troops, the 
 so-called Territorials. It is impossible to say how many 
 men were thus mustered, but it is safe to say that the 
 a&Ri'^&^tc amounted to several times that of the regular 
 British garrison withdrawn. 
 
 The cajnpaign against Russia was opened by the Rus- 
 sians early in November, who. after various skirmishes 
 with small bodies of Turkish troops, succeeded in cap- 
 turing a position dose to Koprikevi on the road to Erze- 
 rum. The frontier is a mountain wall running from the 
 Black Sea on the west to Ararat on the cast, and the 
 motmtains there attain a vcrv great height, in places 
 reaching lO.oOO to 11.000 feet. The only roarls afford- 
 ing communication cross these mountain heights at right 
 angles and arc buried in snow during the winter. There 
 is one railroad running south from Kars to Sari Kamish 
 just north of the Turkish frontier. Batum is the centre 
 of the Russian oil fields, and is located on the Black Sea, 
 j^ little north (>f the frontier. 
 
 • The Ru'^siau troops, who advaiKed to Kopri Keui, did 
 not remain there long, as on November 13th the Turks, 
 by this, had got up a force of troops which, though still 
 inferior to the Russian troops in point of numl>crs. were 
 able to clrive them out. The Russians, however, were 
 strongly reinforced and after three days' fighting, on 
 November SJoth again took possession of the town. 
 
 'I'hc Turks howrvcr, in the plan of campaign which 
 
 154
 
 Turko-Russian Campaign 
 
 they had adopted, had no intention of acting upon the 
 defensive. Towards the end of November they started 
 an advance from a base at Erzerum where by this time 
 they had concentrated three army corps. The Russian 
 mihtary base was Kars. The distance between these two 
 positions is about 100 miles, and both are situated son. e 
 6,000 feet above the sea, while the road between them 
 rises to a much greater height, the whole country b .- 
 tween being a jumble of mountain ranges and hif^h 
 valleys. The Turks expected and assumed that the 
 Russians would move their main forces forward from 
 Kars to Erzerum, because by this road, the railroad as 
 far as Sari Kamish could be utilized and would bring 
 the Russian troops to within fifteen miles of the Turk- 
 ish frontier. This Russian force advancing along this 
 line was to be held and, at the same time, columns would 
 be sent around on the left for an enveloping attack 
 against the Russians' right flank and their base at Kars. 
 Another Turkish force was to advance from the coast 
 against Ardahan and form the extreme Turkish 1-^ft. 
 
 Enver Pasha disposed, all told, of perhaps 120,000 
 men to carry out this manoeuvre; the Russians out- 
 numbered him by about 30,000. The Russians were at 
 first pushed back to Khorusau, which is about 30 miles 
 south of Sari Kamish, and held this place through heavy 
 fighting to the first of January or thereabouts. An- 
 other force moved to the north on Ardahan in order to 
 ultimately occupy Kars and to cut the railroad running 
 from Sari Kamish to that place. This force succeeded 
 in capturing Ardahan on January 1st. The remnants of 
 the 9th and 10th army corps, which had struggled through 
 the mountains at great heights, and were greatly impeded 
 by snow in so doing, were unable to join the 11th corps 
 at Sari Kamish on Christmas day as intended, but the 
 10th finally got through and began attacking the rail- 
 road north of this place two or three days later. The 
 9th corps got up late and, though it occupied Saganuk 
 Heights at Sari Kamish, it arrived too late to permit 
 the movement being carried out as originally planned. 
 The 10th corps, as a result of being unsupported, was 
 driven out of its position on January 1st and, on January 
 3rd, the first corps was driven out of Ardahan. In both 
 of these actions the Russian force outnumbered the Turks. 
 
 Thus the 10th and 1st corps being in retreat, the 9th 
 corps north of Sari Kamish found itself in a desperate 
 position, and was surrounded and very badly cut up. 
 
 155
 
 Turko-Russian Campaign 
 
 The Russians, with their customry disregard for the 
 truth, reported that they had captured the entire 9th 
 corps. This was an absolute falsehood ; they captured 
 some 6,000 men together with Iskan Pasha, and killed 
 and wounded about 4,000 more; the remainder suc- 
 ceeded in reaching the base. The 11th corps proceeded 
 from lieyond Kliorusau and forced its way to Karanghu, 
 thus saving the lOth corps, since tlic Russians were 
 compelled to cease their pursuit of the lOth corps and 
 hurry troops to Karanghu where a long, fierce struggle 
 began and lasted until January 17th when the 11th 
 corps was defeated, but drew off in good order towards 
 Erzerum, which it reached after a heavy fight at Yeni- 
 koi. The 10th corps, thanks to this diversion by the 
 11th corps, succeeded in reaching its base and was 
 joined by tiie remainder of the 9th and 1 Ith corps. In 
 the north the 1st corps was driven from Ardahan and 
 the Chorok valley. 
 
 At the end of January the Turks made another 
 movement forward in the country around the Chorok 
 River and the region of Sultain Seilem. At -Alty they 
 also resumed the offensive, pushing forward a column 
 which, however, was held. [)uring February the Turks 
 forced their offensive forward and succeeded in driving 
 the Russians completely out <>f Turkish territory, and 
 in the last days of March fighting was resumed in Rus- 
 sian territory towards Ratum, .Mty and Sari Kamish, 
 and a forward movement towards Kars was once more 
 initiated. The Russian bulletins concerning this fight- 
 ing are greatly to be distrusted, even more so than their 
 bulletins of events in Poland and Oalicia. In the fight- 
 ing in early January, they announced that thev had 
 taken 74.000 prisoners in one week. Thi*n, subsequently, 
 in February, apparently forgetful of their assertion c n 
 ccrning this week in January, they announced that the 
 total Turkish prisoners taken from the beginning of hos- 
 tilities to the mifidlc of February, amounted to 17.450! 
 
 Another campaign between the Turks and the Tv.s 
 sians took place in Persia. It will be remembered th.it 
 Russia has been for many years stealing Persian terri- 
 tory in the north and has generallv interfered with and 
 harasser! the Persian gr)vcrnment. her object l>eing to 
 bring about a condition of anarchy there, whi Mi would 
 give her a plausible excuse for the annexatiop. of th.it 
 country. In this laudable scheme for the past throe or 
 four years, she has had the support of Great Rritain, 
 who. herself, is desirous of annexing that portion of 
 
 166
 
 Turko-Russian Campaign 
 
 Persian territory which surrounds the Persian Gulf. 
 In the west and south, Turkey has encroached upon 
 Persian territory and has, to a small degree, pushed 
 her boundary forward to the west side of Lake Urmia. 
 Affairs in Persia, besides, have been complicated by 
 internal dissension. 
 
 Fighting took place between the Turks and the Rus- 
 sians around Lake Urmia, to the north of Lake Urmia 
 in November and again in December, with indecisive 
 results. This fighting, which was of an irregular char- 
 acter, continued in this region all through January and 
 February, neither side seeming to obtain any perma- 
 nent advantage. Further to the south the Turks made 
 an advance in the early part of January and entered 
 Tabriz, and advanced further to Sufian and Marand, 
 on the south towards Julfa. The Russians sent a force 
 southward and, after defeating the Turks at Sufian, re- 
 entered Tabriz. The last of January the Turks made 
 another advance and again drove the Russians out of 
 Tabriz and re-took Sufian. Towards the end of Feb- 
 ruary the Russians again took Sufian and fighting was 
 going on between this place and Tabriz late in Feb- 
 ruary. 
 
 Near the Persian Gulf there has been fighting be- 
 tween the Turks and English. The English had some 
 years before practically annexed the town of Basra 
 at the head of the Gulf and established a protectorate 
 by rather dubious means over Koweit on this western 
 side near Basra. Before the outbreak of hostilities 
 the government of India, in whose jurisdiction these 
 two non-British towns are placed, deemed it prudent 
 to strengthen its forces in the Persian Gulf. To this 
 end the Poona Brigade was sent to the island of Bah- 
 rain, where it had arrived before war broke out be- 
 tween Turkey and Great Britain. 
 
 This island is also not British territory. It seems 
 peculiar that England should violate the rule of the 
 sanctity of neutral territory in the Gulf of Persia which 
 she so loudly asserts in Europe. When hostilities broke 
 out between Turkey and Great Britain, this brigade 
 was moved forward and reached the bar at the mouth 
 of the Shatt-el-Arab, and mounted the stream to the 
 village of Faro which was immediately taken. A small 
 garrison was left here and the mai;i force proceeded up 
 the river to Abadan, the headquarters of the Anglo- 
 Persian Oil Company, of somewhat peculiar history. 
 
 167
 
 Turko-Russian Campaign 
 
 The expedition passed this place and proceeded lo San- 
 iyeh where it was disembarked. Un November 11th a 
 Turkish reconnoitering force attacked the position. On 
 the Tith, having been joined in the nicantnne by rein« 
 torcemenls, the entire force advanced towards Basra, 
 and after a fairly warm figlit at Saliil in wljicli the 
 British casuaUics were al)out lou, the Turks evacu- 
 ated Basra and the British river force entered the city 
 on November '^Srd. The Turks, who retreated from 
 Basra, toc)k up a position at Kurna at tlic junction of 
 the Tigris and Euphrates, these rivers beiniaf known as 
 Shait-ei-Aral). from this point to the sea. 
 
 Un December 'Jnd the British started an expedition 
 against Kurna by river forces and by troops. Eventu- 
 ally on December 'Jth this town was taken, but only 
 after a gallant defense by the Turks, who lost, approx- 
 imately, :i,on(»; the I'.ritish casualties were within the 
 vicinity of 5U(>. 
 
 In January some 5,000 Turks estal)lished themselves 
 on the Katta Canal, about seven miles from Mezera 
 Camp, These were driven out on January 20th by a 
 British force advancing from both sides of the river 
 from Kurna to Mezera. but only after the British had 
 suffered rather heavily. After this episode until the 
 end of February, no further hostilities have been re- 
 ported from this region. 
 
 Sixty-five miles south of the Damascus-Mecca rail- 
 road, across the sandy plain of Tina, lies Egypt. Across 
 this jilain in the last year of the 18th century. Napoleon 
 had moved an army, and from that time to the present, 
 it has never been crossed by a military force, in fact 
 such crossing was deemed impossible. When the Turks 
 made up their minds to launch an expedition against 
 the Suez Canal and against Egypt, they planned to cross 
 this sandy desert, the very idea of their doing so being a 
 source of amusement to tlieir opi)oncnts. Nevertheless, 
 they did. They moved forward in twct columns, — 
 from Jerusalem to El Arish, and thence to Kantara on 
 the Canal, following the westerly caravan route, while 
 another force inovcd along the older caravan route, from 
 Akaba towards the town of Suez. The force comiK)S- 
 ing this later expedition was mostlv irregulars with a 
 backl)one of regular artillery and a small force of regu- 
 lar military. 
 
 The British had concentrated on the canal a force 
 amounting to alK)Ut 70,000, the bulk of which were Aus- 
 tralians with some few British regular troops intcr- 
 
 158
 
 Turko-Russian Campaign 
 
 mingled. Owing to their loyalty being doubted, no 
 native Egyptian troops were with this force. In fact, 
 at this time as at the present, the attitude of the na- 
 tives in Kgypt was giving the British just cause for 
 anxiety. Their high-handed, arbitrary course in de- 
 throning the legitimate Khedive and in substituting for 
 him a creature of their own, had aroused great resent- 
 ment among the native Egyptians, who saw in this 
 action the last shred of their independence vanish. 
 
 This British force entrenched itself along the canal, 
 protecting its front by all the many devices used in 
 modern warfare, had with it a reasonably strong force 
 of artillery, and was further supported by the guns of 
 the warships in the canal, of which the British at this 
 time took absolute possession, closing it to commerce, 
 although it does not belong to Great Britain and does 
 belong a private company. 
 
 Towards February 1st the Turkish advance guard 
 reached the canal near Suez and succeeded in driving 
 the British across the canal to the west bank. The 
 British report of this series of actions, which took place 
 at this point, and which represents them as skirmishes 
 of no particular importance, and with little loss to them 
 are not entirely to be relied upon. The Turks, as we 
 will find, when the full list of casualties at this point 
 are made public, inflicted much heavier losses upon 
 the British than they had been given credit for, and did 
 succeed, as has been said, in driving them completely 
 from their positions on the east bank of the Canal. 
 
 Except in small parties too weak to be effective 
 against the force on the west bank where was the main 
 British position, the Turkish forces could not cross the 
 Canal, and, consequently, after several days of effort, 
 the main body withdrew and retired a few marches into 
 the desert where it is still maintaining itself. In the 
 interval British reconnoitering forces have endeavored 
 to determine its position and some skirmishing has 
 taken place. 
 
 The other expedition against the Canal, which ad- 
 vanced along the western route from El Arish, sent 
 forward advance parties which reached the Canal at 
 El-Kantara and took contact with the British forces 
 there a few days later than the arrival of the eastern 
 expedition at Suez. For some reason not known this 
 force retreated after a few skirmishes with the British, 
 and rejoined its main body, which went into camp a 
 little to the north of El Arish where it now is. 
 
 159
 
 Turko-Russian Campaign 
 
 The future developments of the Turkish campaign 
 against Hg}pt will depend largely on the result of the 
 attack of the Allies on Constantinople and Smyrna and, 
 possibly, also on the completion of a branch railroad 
 which the Turks are said to be ctmslructing towards the 
 Suez Canal from the Damascus and Mecca Railway. 
 
 In addition to the political war, the Sultan of Tur- 
 key, who is, at the same time, Calipha, and successor 
 of the i'rophet, in the eyes of the majority of those 
 professing the Mohammedan religion, declared the 
 Jedah, or Holy War, which was duly proclaimed by the 
 Sheik ul Islam, the religious head of the Church. By 
 tliis declaration of a Holy War upon Great Britain, 
 France and Russia, it became the duty of every true 
 believer to oppose these Powers, not only with arms, 
 but by every other means in his power: and this proc- 
 lamation, being addressed to the whole orthodox Mo- 
 hammedan world, was expected to produce considerable 
 results, not only in Turkey itself, but among the Mo- 
 hammedans living in other political units of the world; 
 more particularly India, Persia, Afghanistan, Egypt, 
 the French Colonies on the northern coast of Africa, 
 and other places where the Mohammedan element of the 
 population is the stronger. 
 
 At the present writing, the results of this proclama- 
 tion of the Holy War are not fully known. There have 
 been rumors and reports of Mohammedan unrest and 
 uneasiness occasionally translating themselves into 
 uprisings in various parts of the world ; notably, the 
 northwestern border of India. There have also been 
 reports of unrest in Algeria, Tunis and Morocco, while 
 the situation in Egypt is said to be one of extreme 
 tension. 
 
 How serious and how grave the situation really is, 
 cannot definitely be said, owing to the extreme rigidity 
 of the censonship of all news coming from countries 
 which would be liable to be affected by this declaration 
 of a Holy War. But, from scattering reports which 
 leak through, it is safe to say that in most of the Mo- 
 hammedan countries there is great uneasiness, and 
 that the situation, particularly in India, is a very grave 
 one. The revolt of the Mohammedan regiment of 
 British Indian trf>ops at Singapore, early in the year, 
 which was looked upon as sporadic and unimi>ortant at 
 the time of its occurrence, in the light of suhscqiicnt re- 
 ports docs not seem so unimportant as originally thought. 
 
 160
 
 Turko-Russian Campaign 
 
 Huucvcr, the facts necessary to form an opinion of the 
 extent and gravity of the results produced by this Holy 
 War are not fully known, and so the consifleration of 
 the subject must be postponed until later, when the facts 
 are more fully known and when, as a result, a more in- 
 telligent judgment can be arrived at. 
 
 161
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 THK SKKHIAN CAMI^AKJN 
 
 The Serbian army at the time of ihc declaration of 
 war with Austria liad had only six months' rest from 
 the war with llulgaria. and its troops were thus, more 
 than those of any other nation, war hardened, antl, while 
 in fact they were outnunil)ered. yet it nnist he remein 
 bered that nearly every man was a veteran, v^erbia 
 Iwpan mobilization «>n July *^<ith, the date that Baron 
 Giesl. the Austro-1 lungarian minister, left Belp^rade. On 
 the da\ of declaration of war. which was July 2Sth. she 
 had but a few troops at lalj^rade. it seems peculiar 
 that the Austrians (lid not immediately seize that city, 
 even though with a small ft>rce. as it would have .saved 
 them much trouble thereafter. However. Austria had 
 at this time onlv one division concentrated between 
 Semlin. directU opiKJsite Belgrade, and Panscova, a little 
 to the eastward, and this force was possibly too small 
 to enable them to take the offensive in the manner 
 suggested. 
 
 The Austro-Serbian frontier exten(l> o\ei .i length of 
 alxmt ;H(» miles, and is bounded on the north by the 
 Danube and Save rivers, and on the west by the Drina. 
 The Drina and the Save are shallow and have fords at 
 intervals, hence their cn^ssing is not a matter of very 
 great difficulty. The Serbian general staff was unable, 
 of cour.se. to foresee at what point along the frontier the 
 advance w<tuld Ik.- made into Serbia, and they concluded. 
 con.se(juently. that in place of attempting to defend at 
 all points on the frontier, it would be advisable for 
 them to i)€rmit the Austrians to advance into Serbian 
 territory, and there inflict u|)on them, if |Ktssible, a 
 strategic clef eat. 
 
 I'Vojn July '^itth to .\ugust llili. the .\ustrians made 
 eighteen attempts to cross the frontier at various |M>ints. 
 their object undoubtedly being to divert the attention 
 of the Serbians frtMU that |)oint at which their .serious 
 invasion was to Ik- la\mchcd. The Serbians, who ha<I 
 a cordon of out|>osts all along the frontier, were able 
 
 162
 
 The Serbian Campaign 
 
 bv means of the \varni11j4s which ihcy received iunu these 
 advance guards, to send sufficient forces to each of the 
 frontier points to repulse these feints at invasion. 
 
 It finally became apparent thai the serious invasion 
 would be made on the western frontier by crossing the 
 Drina river and moving forward on the town of Loz- 
 nitza, which movement began on August 12th. In front 
 of the town of Loznitza, the Drina has frequently 
 changed its channel, and in so doing cut out numerous 
 small islands, which are an aid to an army attempting 
 to cross the river in either direction. The Austrians 
 seized the largest of these islands. Kuriachista. and used 
 that as a base for their operations. The Serbian forces 
 at this point made such resistance as lay in their power, 
 and then retired to the heights behind Loznitza. The 
 Austrians threw a pontoon bridge over the river and 
 the 13th Army Corps entered Serbian territory. On 
 the same day. that is August 12th, the River Save 
 was crossed at the north of Shabatz. The island of 
 Drenovatz was seized and then detachments were thrown 
 across to the Serbian shore, which established themselves, 
 and drove back the Serbian troops there stationed, who 
 retired to the hills to the southeast of the town. The 
 Austrian advance guard then occupied the town and 
 constructed a pontoon bridge across the river to Klenak. 
 The Drina was crossed at two other points. Zvornik 
 and Liubovia. Thus the Austrians had several columns 
 heading towards Valiero, which town may be taken as 
 their objective point. 
 
 The plain of Matchya. wliicli is absolutely flat, is much 
 broken up by cultivated fields and woodland, and lies 
 north and west of Shabatz, l^eing bounded by the Save 
 on the east and north and on the west by the Drina. To 
 the southeast the ground is undulating with excellent 
 defensive positions, while due south the mountain chain 
 of the Tzer rises abruptly otit of the plain and stretches 
 directly across from the Drina to the Dobrava river. 
 The south slopes of this chain are not as steep as those 
 of the north, and fall slowly into the valley of the L.esh- 
 nitza river which is divided from the vallev of tlie Jadar 
 river by the Iverak mountains. 
 
 It was along the Jadar "that the hardest fighting took 
 place, subsequent to August r2th. and hence the river 
 has given its name to the battle. On the left bank of 
 the Jadar to its junction with the Drina. a rolling plain 
 runs south to the Guchevo mountains. In all this dis- 
 
 163
 
 The Serbian Campaign 
 
 trici ilicre is only .>nc road, in our sense «.ii the WL'id. 
 from Shabaiz to Lozniua. There are mud roads run- 
 ning through the district, but these are hardly ileserv- 
 ing the name oi highways, and even of these there are 
 lew. t.J)therwise. the communications consisted of traib 
 beaten by traffic cross the fields and mountains. Due 
 great difficulty the Austrians encountered was the lack 
 of maps. Serbia, a> has been seen from the descriptions 
 g^ven of this particular section of the country, is dif- 
 ficidi to campaign owing to the lack of communications 
 and the almost total lack of maps, both which, of course, 
 constitute a great advantage lor the ilefending army, as 
 it inevitably contains men who rcsitle in the particular 
 di.«.iricts and know every foot of the ground. 
 
 In order U) carry out offensive military operations 
 against \alier<i, po.»session of lx>th the moniuain ranges 
 and of tiie few roads is necessary. General I'utnik was 
 in charge of the Serbian strategy. It may be noted here 
 that General J'utnik considered that no persons with 
 any self res|)ect would either l)e a reporter or a corres- 
 pondent for a newspaix'r. or Ix? a politician. Holding 
 thoc opinions, tlic general nalurally eliminated from 
 all contact with the Serbian army any rei)rcsentative of 
 the hated classes. As a result our knowledge of what 
 actually did happen in the Serbian campaigns is limitecl 
 because correspondeius were also l>anished from tin- 
 Austrian forces. 
 
 .\ general movement westward of the Serbian army 
 took pK'ice as soon as it was seen that the main opera- 
 tions of the .\ustrians were being directed against V'ali- 
 ero and not down the Morara valley. I'art of the sec- 
 ond and the whole third of the Serbian armies were 
 sent to the Jadar valley, and the remainder of the second 
 army was sent towards Shabatz to resist the invaders 
 there. Un August 14th, the Austrians made an attack 
 on the heights <»f Koznitza and succeeded in driving 
 back the Serbian forces which had retired there at the 
 time of the passage of the river. These were thrown 
 back to Jarel)itzc where they were joined by reinforce- 
 ments and proceeded to entrench themselves on a front 
 of ten miles, extending from north to south over the 
 town across the Jadar valley. The next couple of day.'^ 
 were occupied by both sides in jjreparing for the com- 
 ing conibat. the principal strength oi the Serbians' 
 effort being an attempt to prevent the juncti<Mi of the 
 \'-irian trtxips C(»ming from Shab.U/ >-<.nil) ..f this, and 
 
 164
 
 1 he Serbian Campaign 
 
 moving on JUoznitza east. Skirmishes toolc place, with 
 this object in view. 
 
 On the 16th a fight took place at Tekerish between 
 an Austrian defending- column and the Serbian left 
 flank, which resulted in heavy losses to the Serbians, 
 though the Austrians did not fare much better. The 
 Serbians, however, were able to retreat as far as the 
 line Kosa-Kik, where, reinforcements meeting them, 
 they dug in and held the line. On the IGth the Ser- 
 bians also lost Poporparlok, but this advance was not 
 followed out as it should have been, and at Beglok the 
 Serbians defeated the Austrians in a slight skirmish. 
 From Poporparlok the Austrians now developed a vig- 
 orous offensive in an attempt to turn the Serbian left 
 and capture the road to Valiero, which succeeded in 
 taking Jarebitze, and forced the Serbians to retire to 
 Soldatovitcha where they were joined by the force 
 who fell back on Krupani. 
 
 The extreme right of the Serbian arm\-, while these 
 things were taking place to the south, had defeated the 
 Austrian advance coming south from Shabatz and 
 Belikawimen, and had forced them back in the direc- 
 tion from whence they came, and had thus prevented 
 the joining of those forces with the Austrian forces at 
 the south. This subsequently turned out to exercise a 
 very important influence on the Austrian campaign. 
 As soon as the Serbian forces had rested, they pressed 
 northward towards Shabatz in pursuit of the fleeing 
 Austrian army, and found that this town had been 
 strongly fortified by field works and obstacles, and 
 was provided with heavy artillery so that they could 
 not take it. However, they invested it in such a way 
 as to prevent any attempt to leave it. and then awaited 
 the arrival of reinforcements. 
 
 On the TTth an Austrian column was defeated at 
 Troyan. one of the most important points in the Tzer 
 mountains, and another column was defeated at Parlog 
 >o that the Serbian centre was relieved, leaving only the 
 left wing in trouble. On the 18th it became absolutely 
 necessary for the Austrian army in Shabatz to attempt 
 to join the Austrian troops farther to the south. At 
 first they were successful in throwing back the Serbian 
 forces opposing them, but the Austrians pressed their 
 advantage too slowly w^hich gave the Serbians oppor- 
 tunity to bring up reinforcements, thus preventing the 
 
 165
 
 The Serbian Campaign 
 
 Austrian culuinn irom Shabaiz advancing to the soutli. 
 \ arious skirini>hc«» took place on the other fronts of 
 the hne this siune day, in one of which the Serbians suc- 
 ceeded in cai)tiirin^ an inijK^rtant position in Kosanin- 
 g^ad. which paved tlie way for their operations against 
 kashuhitchu. On the extreme soutli on this same day 
 the Serbians recaptured Soldatovitcha and were now in 
 a position for a general fi»rward advance. 
 
 In the meantime, on the liUh, the Austrians at Sha- 
 batz made another effort tt) advance which was success- 
 iid to the extent that the Serbians were thrown further 
 to the right bank of the Dobrava river. ( )n the I'.Kh 
 the Austrian^ were defeated, practically all along the line 
 in the south, and they fell back aband«)ning the fort of 
 l'oi)orparlok and Rutchiplast. while on the 2Uth the 
 Serbian army in the north was able to cross the Dobrava 
 and establish themselves on the left bank. 
 
 ( )n the '^Ist the Austrians were in retreat everywhere. 
 And in the next day or two their entire force recrossed 
 the Driiia River and the invasion of Serbia at this point 
 was abandoned. The Serbs, who had cn»ssed the Do- 
 brava river on August *2<tth, followed up their advantage 
 and pressed north towards Shabatz. The whole of the 
 21st a stubborn combat took place in front of the town. 
 (>n August 22nd this combat continued and. on August 
 2;Jrd. the Serbians, who had managed to get up their 
 artillery, began a Ixniibardment of the .\ustrian trenches 
 with ninety-eight guns, but during the night, .\ugust 22- 
 2.'5. the Austrians had evacuated Shabatz. 
 
 The afternoon of the 2.'{r(l the Scrl)ian tnx^ps came 
 to the banks of the Save again, and the Austrian inva- 
 sion of Serbia was for the time ended. ( )ne reason for 
 its ending was that .\ustria had been compelled by 
 events in Poland and (ialicia during the campaign with 
 Russia, not only to materially change the plan of cam- 
 paign against Serbia, but also to withdraw from the 
 army invading Serbia fidly one-half its strength, which 
 left it numerically inferior to the Serbian army. Under 
 these conditions it was evident that the Austrians had 
 biu a small chance of success, in view of the difficult 
 topography of the country through which this campaign 
 had to be conducted. Numbers do not always govern 
 the issue, but a mountainous and rugged country, held 
 by a determined enemy knowing the points of vantage, 
 is a «liffictdt one to campaign in <uccessfullv. .ind can 
 
 I fir,
 
 The Serbian Campaign 
 
 only be so campaigned wiien the invading force is nu- 
 merically superior to that of the enemy. 
 
 In this campaign the Austrians lost, all told, about 
 25,000 men. The Serbians lost, at least, an equal num- 
 ber. Few prisoners were taken on either sifle, but the 
 Austrians lost practically all the war material which 
 changed hands. 
 
 After I he defeat of tlie first Austrian invasion of 
 Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro undertook an invasion 
 of Southern Bosnia. This amounted to little, from a 
 military standpoint ; the advance, at its maximum, did 
 not amount to more than a few miles into Austrian ter- 
 ritory and no substantial results were achieved. 
 
 This lasted for six or seven weeks, when Austria 
 began, about the 21st of November, another advance 
 into Serbia, crossing the Kolubara River, and forcing 
 the Serbians on the next day to execute a retreat to- 
 wards Belgrade. This invasion was pushed with con- 
 siderable vigor, with the result that the Austrians cap- 
 tured Belgrade on the 2nd of December and then turned 
 southward in a movement against central Serbia. This 
 had, however, hardly begun when Austria was obliged 
 to hurriedly recall, for use in Galicia. where the situation 
 was at that time threatening, four of the five army corps 
 which she had in Serbia. As a result, knowledge of this 
 coming to the Serbian commanders, the Serbians took 
 a new offensive, and driving the one army corps of the 
 Austrians before them, succeeded on the 14th of Decem- 
 ber in occupying Belgrade ; the Austrians withdrawing 
 from Serbia completely on the following day. This re-- 
 verse terminated any active fighting in Serbia, but the 
 Serbians were exhausted, so that since then there has 
 been almost absolute quiet along the Serbian front. 
 
 On January 2nd an epidemic of typhus commenced 
 to rage in Serbia, and it is still raging with great vio- 
 lence. It is said that tens of thousands of Serbians 
 have died of this malady, and the efforts which have 
 been made to control it have not met with any success. 
 It is partially accounted for by the filthy personal hab- 
 its of the Serbians and the prevalence in Serbia, at the« 
 same time of this epidemic of typhus, of a plague of 
 disgusting vermin which are everywhere and which act 
 as carriers of this terrible disease. 
 
 Many devoted physicians from the neutral countries, 
 
 167
 
 The Serbian Campaign 
 
 who, moved by humanity, have gone to Serbia to aid 
 in fighting this epidemic, have laid down their Hves in 
 that service. It seems fitting that this real altruism 
 and real devotion to humanity on the part of these 
 physicians should not ]>a>s unrecognized. 
 
 168
 
 CliAP'I^Ek XI \. 
 KIAO-CHAU AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 In the early pari of the war Englanchabtoni.shed the 
 white world by the publication of the Treaty of Alli- 
 ance between herself and Japan, which bound England 
 to operate with Japan against her white brothers under 
 certain conditions, and introduced Japan, a yellow- 
 skinned race, as a factor in the affairs of the white 
 races. This treason to ethnic considerations will very 
 possibly bear bitter fruit for the traitor in the not very 
 distant future. 
 
 Early in August Great Britain asked the Imperial 
 Government of Japan for assistance under the terms 
 this Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Japan's reply to Great 
 Britain's demand, w^as, on the 15th of August (to use 
 the Japanese phraseology), "to give advice to the Ger- 
 man Government," which advice was to the effect that 
 Germany turn over to her before the 23rd day of 
 August the German Colony of Kiao-Chau on the east- 
 ern coast of China. In the language of Europe, this 
 advice would have been called an ultimatum. To this 
 ultimatum Germany did not reply, and on the 24th day 
 of August Japan issued a declaration of war against 
 Germany. 
 
 The reason alleged by Japan was that Germany was 
 making Kiao-Chau a base for warlike preparations^ 
 and her armed vessels were cruising the seas of east- 
 ern Asia, menacing the commerce of Great Britain and 
 Japan. 
 
 As far as the allegation that Germany had at that time 
 interfered with the commerce of Japan in any way was 
 concerned, the statement was simply and purely false. 
 
 Kiao-Chau, of which Tsing-Tau is the capital, had 
 originally come into Germany's possession as a repara- 
 tion from China for the murder of two German mis- 
 sionaries. Originally seized for a temporary- occupa- 
 tion for this reason, a long lease of the territory was 
 obtained. Germany proceeded to turn an uninviting 
 
 169
 
 Kiao-Chau and South Africa 
 
 niud-tlat into uiw ul iIk- uu»t attraLti\e oi the Euro- 
 pean colonies in the tar East. So attractive had the 
 town become, thanks to German efforts, that it had 
 ittained the position oi being the reco<^nized summer 
 >vaterinj;-placc of the whites all over the East. 
 
 The naturally Hue harbor had been developed by 
 the erection of a massive breakwater nearly three 
 miles long and by the construction of |)iers, docks and 
 jetties, until tiic port was the finest in the East. Hand- 
 some and commcnlious buildings of all kinds, including 
 hospitals, schools and water-works, were built, and 
 built with that solidity which characterizes (ierman 
 construction nearly everywhere. 
 
 While the material side was thu>> given great atten- 
 tion, at the same time the educ;iti<>nal and social side of 
 the colony's life was not neglected, and. at the time of 
 the attack by japan, there was a comj)lete system of 
 ■schools operated, not only for the whites, but for the 
 Chinese inhabitants also; which system was distin- 
 guished by the usual (^lerman excellence in educational 
 matters. 
 
 The health of the nati\e inhabitants was alsd care- 
 fully looked after, and hospitals for their special bene- 
 fit had been established. All told, dermany had spent 
 on this possession over one hundred and fifty million 
 iloljars ; most of which was contributed by the Im- 
 perial Exchequer, the local taxes being light. 
 
 W hen japan entered upon her campaign, like her 
 ally she veneered her real object with Pecksniffian 
 hypocrisy, in the hope of deceiving the neutral world 
 as to her ulterior objects, and she alleged and inserted 
 this in her ultimatum, that her object in taking Kiao- 
 Chau from Germany was because Germany had by force 
 compelled China to grant the lease which was Ger- 
 many's title to the territory, and that said granting of 
 such lease brought about by such a cause was an im- 
 moral abuse f>f strength by Germain at the ex|)en'JC of 
 China; that '^he (japan), actuated by purely altruistic 
 motives, intended, should Kiao-Chau come into her 
 possession as the result of her declaration of war upon 
 Germanv and the '^ubseriucnt campaign, to return the 
 same to the original possessor, China, thus rectifying 
 the abuse of "Strength of which Germany had In-en giiihv. 
 
 To a large extent, the neutral peoples were deceived, 
 and this deception was aided by the gift of a small sum 
 of money fsrime thf>u'^nnds of dollar^^) bv the Mikado 
 
 170
 
 Kiao-Chau and South Africa 
 
 t(j icrlaiii American missionary S(Kiclics in Japan about 
 this time; which gift made these missionaries most en- 
 thusiastic and ap])arently disinterested proclaimers of the 
 purity of Japan's motives in this war. 
 
 Kiao-Chau has now been in possession of Japan for 
 many months, and, curiously enough, each successive 
 month of Japan's possession has found a new and ex- 
 tremely specious reason why it has not been handed over 
 to China and why it has become more and more import- 
 ant for Japan to retain its possession. 
 
 By way of proving the truth of her allegations of 
 altruistic solicitude for the welfare of China, Japan 
 opened her land campaign against Kiao-Chau by a vio- 
 lation of Chinese territory on the 2nd day of September, 
 191-i, when she landed troops in the Chinese province 
 of Shan-tung and maintained them there against the 
 protest of China. 
 
 Japan blockaded Tsing-Tau by sea on the 27th of 
 August, and occupied certain Chinese islands in the 
 vicinity of the harbor mouth as a basis for these opera- 
 tions. The Japanese fleet, however, contented itself 
 with maintaining a blockade and only occasionally spas- 
 modically bombarded the exterior defenses of the harbor. 
 
 The land forces landed on the 2nd of September, 1914. 
 but were unable to make much progress for a consider- 
 able time, owing to the autumnal rains which had trans- 
 formed the country all around the territory of Kiao- 
 Chau into a bog. and made the rivers and streams which 
 flowed through this territory impassable. Therefore, 
 the Japanese land forces were obliged to remain nearly 
 inactive at Lungkow and other places in Chinese territory 
 for a considerable time. 
 
 On the 13th of September they captured the railroad 
 station at the Chinese town of Kiao-Chau, which is 
 twenty-two miles distant from Tsing-Tau and outside 
 of the German leased territory of Kiao-Chau. During 
 this period Tsing-Tau was attacked several times by 
 air-craft and bombs dropped, with no particular result. 
 
 On the 23rd of September British forces arrived to 
 co-operate with the Japanese under General Barnardis- 
 ton, and the world was treated for the first time in its 
 history to the sepctacle of a white Brigadier-General 
 acting under the orders of a Japanese General. 
 
 On the 2Gth of September, the Japanese began their 
 advance, the floods having somewhat abated ; and that 
 day drove the Germans by assault from the ground be- 
 
 171
 
 Kiao-Chau and South Africa 
 
 tween the rivers Paisha and Li-Tshuni;. and continued 
 thus advancing on the two following days until they 
 attained positions within five miles of the central for- 
 tress, which the success of this movement almost cotn- 
 pletely invested. 
 
 On the 'JiUh of Septemhcr the Japanese fleet landed 
 a force which successfully occupied Lao-Shan Ilarltnr. 
 very close to the town of Tsing-Tau. 
 
 On September 3uth the Japanese sank a German 
 destroyer, but lost, themselves, two mine sweepers. 
 The next day tlie Germans made an effort to repel the 
 Japanese attack both by land and by sea, but, owing to 
 the enormous disparity between the forces, were unsuc- 
 cessful. 
 
 On the ."{rd of Octol)er the Japanese laid violent 
 hands on the Shan-tung Railroad from Tsinganfu to 
 W'eiksin. which was largclv ont^-idc n\ the tcrritdrv 
 leased by China to Germany. 
 
 The psendo-sentimentalist>^ whd ha\ c tiiied tiic air 
 with their clamor concerning' the alleged German viola- 
 tion of the neutrality of IVlgium. have tiovor fonnd it 
 fitting to make any protest in regard to the deliberate 
 violation of Chinese neutrality bv the Japanese during 
 these operations around Kiao-Chau. There is appar- 
 ently in the minds of these persons a great distinction 
 between violation^ of neutrality ; if such violations are 
 bv the Germans, or alleged to be by the Germans, they 
 are highlv reprehensible ; but if bv those fighting 
 against the Germans, they are a measure of real neces- 
 sity and permissible ; but no violations I)y the Germans 
 are. by these peculiarly constituted intellect'^, consid- 
 ered to be ever real necessities, 
 
 Whv this distinction is made, as it is made, by the 
 pseudo-sentimentalists and the adherents of the Skibo 
 School of altruistic philandering, is not di.^^cerniblr. 
 At all events, the Japanese, these practical altruists, 
 seized this railroad and subsequently occupied the Chi- 
 nese territorv of "S'weihsien. The Germans |)Uf up '^uch 
 defense as was possible, but, being out-numbered in 
 proportions of ten or twelve to one. necessarily their 
 efforts could not accomplish much, and when the 
 Prince Heinrich hill, a dominant position which com- 
 manded all forts of Tsing-Tau. was taken, it was evi- 
 dent that the defence could not last much longer. 
 
 On the I'Jth of October the combined Japanese and 
 
 I'.ritish f ■"■■ - ^t ir,. Jti 1 r„.titi,.ii 1,. becin a cotmr-il l^.m.
 
 Kiao-Chau and South Africa 
 
 bardineiu from the sea, whieli wdb commenced. Tlie- 
 Kaiser and litis forts received the most attention and 
 were considerably injured by this bombardment. 
 
 (Jn the 31 st day of (Jctober the general lx)mbardment 
 I'rom both land and sea was begun anrl continued until 
 the "th da\' of November, the i^>ritish and Japanese ad- 
 vancing steadily. On the ?th of November the fortress 
 hoisted the wliite flag, and at eight o'clock on that even- 
 ing the terms of capitulation were signed. On the 10th 
 of November the Governor General formally surrendered 
 the leased territory and the garrison to the Japanese 
 General, Kaimo. 
 
 .\t the time" of the surrender, the (Jerman forces were 
 about 3,500 strong, the Japanese land forces engaged in 
 the siege itself were about 30,000 strong, the British 
 forces 1,500 strong, and the Japanese fleet comprised, all 
 told, some 32 vessels with 8,0(/0 or 9,000 men. The 
 curious allies lost some 300 killed and 1,:jOI) wounded. 
 The Germans surrendered a few small gunboats, other' 
 unimportant craft, one Austrian cruiser, the Kaiserine 
 Elizabeth, which had been in the harbor, having been 
 blown up before the surrender. The Japanese lost one 
 cruiser, the Takachiho. blown up by a mine, 243 of her 
 crew being drowned ; and also some small craft, and a 
 loss in lives in these naval afairs of about 350. 
 
 Thus was an outpost of white civilization transferred 
 to the Japanese. 
 
 In late September and early October the revolt of 
 the Boers, under Colonel Maritz, broke out in South 
 Africa, and a force assumed to be about 10,000, which 
 was subsequently somewhat increased, took the field 
 against the British. 
 
 Late in October this force was joined by the Boer 
 Generals Dewet and Beyers. Owing to our lack of in- 
 formation, it is impossible to give any connected account 
 of this campaign. The censorship exercised over news 
 from South Africa was exteremely severe,' and only 
 from time to time did bits of information reach us. It 
 would not appe^ar, however, that by the end of the year 
 the rebels had been completely subdued. 
 
 General Dewet was captured at Waterburg in Brit- 
 ish Bechunaland, on the first of December. General 
 Beyers is reported to have been killed in the fighting, 
 and the fate of Colonel Maritz is not known with abso- 
 lute certainty at the present time, though it is prob- 
 able that he has perished. 
 
 173
 
 Kiao-Chau and South Africa 
 
 The other fighting in Africa between tiic IJritish and 
 the Germans is also wrapped by considerable mys- 
 tery. We know that there lias been fighting of con- 
 siderable .severity from time to time in the German 
 CoK'nies in Africa, in the T.elgian Congo, and in the 
 northern portions of the States ttf the South African 
 L'nion ; hut here, again, owing to cinnmunication being 
 practically in the hands of Great Britain, we have no 
 information from which any reasonable account of 
 this fighting could be given. The British casualty 
 list published in the London Times would indicate 
 that such successes as have been achieved by the Brit- 
 ish have been paid for with a consiileral)le number of 
 lives. But this does not give us sufficiently detailed 
 facts upon which t.> b:i«^e nii\- de<cripti' mi <■'' «'ir «ani- 
 oaign. 
 
 174
 
 cii.\i''i'I':k w 
 
 THE NAVAL WAR— NORTH SEA 
 
 ( Hi Monday. August ord, Great Britain called all her 
 naval reserves to the colors and extended the time of 
 service of all unexpired men in the royal navy to five 
 years. This was the first active war measure Great 
 Britain took, and was followed immediately by the de- 
 parture of what is known as the "home fleet" on August 
 5th for the North Sea. under instructions to "seek out 
 the enemy and destroy it." 
 
 This fleet was under the command of Admiral Sir 
 John Jellicoe. The area of the district of the North Sea 
 which was to be covered by this fleet is 380 miles wide 
 to the north from Denmark to the Scotch coast, and 21 
 miles to the south between Dover and Calais, while the 
 north and south distance between these two lines was 
 about 360 miles. However, much of the sea included in 
 this area is not navigable by large ships, owing to shal- 
 lowness. On the English side this sea could be entered 
 from a hundred ports, while on the German side there 
 were luit four or five ports of sufficient depth of water 
 for large ships. 
 
 The first action which took place was between the 
 Amphion, the third destroyer flotilla, and the German 
 auxiliary cruiser Konigen Louise, about forty miles from 
 Antwerp. The German vessel was originally a Hamburg- 
 American liner, and at the outbreak of the war had been 
 converted into a mine layer. The Amphion gave chase 
 to this vessel and summoned her to surrender a few 
 hours later, on catching up with her. She refused to 
 surrender and was sunk, and twenty-eight wounded men 
 of her crew were brought into Harwich and landed by 
 a destroyer. 
 
 The Amphion herself, however, did not survive very 
 long. The very next day. in fact, she struck a mine and 
 sank at once. She was a cruiser of 3.440 tons, the loss 
 of life was considerable, though a large percentage 
 
 175
 
 The Naval War — North Sea 
 
 ui lier crew was saved. A few days afterwards, Sun- 
 day, Augfust i)th, the submarine made its first appear- 
 ance in the war in a»i attack on the first light cruiser 
 squadron of the Britisli navy by two or more Cerman 
 under-sea boats. Tliis encounter ended disastrously for 
 the submarines, the I -l"> Ix-ing >unk by the r.inninghaiu 
 and no damage being inflicted uikmi the cruiser squadron. 
 
 By this lime the Xorih Sea and the channel hatl been 
 fairlv well s<>wn with mines by b<.'lh liritish and Ger- 
 mans, navigation hail become dangerous to merchant 
 V esseis, and was exciting considerable irritation among 
 neutrals, who feared that their merchantmen would be 
 injured by these mines. .\t this moment, however, 
 little came of this feeling, though 'Subsequently the ma- 
 jt»rity of the neutral government^ protested to the eom- 
 ^atants without avail. 
 
 Mine ^weepers were put into operation almost imme- 
 Jiately by the British, and for this purpose the well- 
 known North Sea trawlers were used. The method of 
 mine sweeping is simple, but at the same time dan- 
 i^jerous. to the vessels engaged in the operation. Two 
 vessels are employed, between which a steel hawser is 
 stretched and allowed to fall to the bed of the sea. The 
 vessels at each end of the hawser then move forward 
 at the same speed, and in this manner sweep the bed 
 ji the ocean with the steel hawser between them. \\ hen 
 the hawser strikes the mooring of a mine it breaks 
 through the f^ame and the mine rises to the surface 
 of the water. An armed vessel, usually a destroyer, 
 follows the trawlers, anri when a mine rises to tJie sur- 
 face explodes it. 
 
 The third week of August a sweep by the British 
 fleet was made of the entire waters betw-een the ('er- 
 man and the British coasts, but without result. The 
 ships of the enemy were apparently still stowed away 
 in their safe harbors or under the gtms of Helgoland. 
 \ few days later a fight took place in 1 lelgoland Bight 
 A certain activity in the enemies' cruisers had been 
 noticed for some days preceding and an attempt was 
 made to draw them out by a British force arranged in 
 the following manner: 
 
 In front were two sw ift cruisers, the Arethusa. brand 
 new, and the Fearless, accompanied by the first and 
 third flotillas of destroyers. Behind them a cruiser 
 squadron, and behind this a fleet of battle crui.sprs, 
 amr^ng which were sr^me of the strongest vessels of the 
 
 176
 
 The Naval War— North Sea 
 
 British navy, the admiral in charge of the operations 
 ^eing on one of tlie battle cruisers. On August 21st, 
 i message came from the advance guard, the Arethusa 
 and the Fearless, stating that they were engaging the 
 enemy's cruisers, and the cruiser fleet almost immedi- 
 ately received instructions from the admiral to proceed 
 to their assistance. 
 
 This they did, but to no- avail, as before they had 
 reached the Fearless, which had drawn the enemy 
 away from his coast, the ships of the enemy had aban- 
 doned the pursuit. However, on the 28th of August 
 the Fearless and the Arethusa ran into a point about 
 six miles south and three miles west of Helgoland 
 Bight accompanied by a fleet of small cruisers. 
 Towards eight o'clock, the day was fine but extreme- 
 ly hazy. Three vessels became visible through the 
 mist to the English ships, and these turned out to be 
 German destroyers. The course was slightly altered, 
 and at half-past eight the Arethusa began to fire, as 
 did some of the destroyers, the rest of the destroyers 
 coming into action a few minutes afterwards. 
 
 At this time three German cruisers of about five 
 thousand tons each were sighted. These ships came 
 into action and the fight became general. The German 
 fire was fairly well directed and the Arethusa came in 
 for severe handling. At ten o'clock she was forced to 
 leave the battle line temporarily, only one gun work- 
 ing, and engage in repairs, but after staying out of the 
 fight for an hour she was able to return. It is a mys- 
 tery why the German cruisers, seeing her plight, did 
 not close in on her and finish her off, which could 
 have been easily done. 'On her return to the fight the 
 Arethusa was again hit, and her feed tank damaged, 
 which materially reduced her speed. 
 
 Shortly after this one of the German cruisers, it be- 
 came evident, was very badlv off, two of her funnels 
 being shot away, also her mainmast, and she was on 
 fire amidships. She nevertheless continued to fight on 
 spiritedly, firing from her foremost aft guns. Th's 
 cruiser was the Mainz, which though slightly superior 
 in size, was inferior in armament and speed to the Brit- 
 ish vessel, besides being considerably older. Up to thv? 
 time the fight had been waged between light cruisers 
 and destroyers only. The battle cruiser fleet had taken 
 no part, but towards half-past twelve the Lion arrived 
 on the scene, and perceiving the Koln in front of h.-^r, 
 
 177
 
 The Naval War — North Sea 
 
 nrcil two salvio. which mI Ikt on lire. Slic .>ank within 
 a lew minutes 
 
 Several of thv litrtiiaii destroyers l)v tliis time had 
 l>cen severely damaged and another Cierman cruiser, the 
 Ariadne, was in the latter action set on fire and sunk. 
 The Mainz went down gallantly, absolutely wrecked be- 
 low and aloft, and with her whole midships aflame, she 
 sank with «)ne gun forwarti and one giui aft still in action. 
 Four baiile cruisers, n(.>ne of which was under 2o,iH)0 
 tons, the Lion, tlie (Jueeu Mary, the Invincible and the 
 Xew /ealan«l, finally took pan in this navai fight, so 
 that it is not wonderful that three light, unprotected 
 cruisers aiul a few destr«)yers were sunk. 
 
 The British lost sixty-nine men killed and wounde<l. 
 Tio ship iK'ing permanently injured. The Germans lost 
 the three protected cruisers mentioned and several de- 
 stroyers and about ^T^t men (lr«>wned or killed, with 300 
 taken prisoner. 
 
 Ju.st after this battle a rather dramatic incident took 
 place. The Defender, a F'.ritish vessel, lowered her 
 trailer for some purpose. l'.eft»re its return a larger 
 vessel came up and opened fire on the Defender and 
 <lrove her away. The men in this trailer as a result 
 foun<l themselves without food, twenty-five miles from 
 the nearest land, and that land an enemy's, and. sur- 
 rounded by fog and foes, had not a very pleasant prospect 
 l)efore them. Suddenly through the water alonside of 
 them the British submarine K- 4 shot up, opened her 
 conning tower, took the men on Ijoard. shut up the con- 
 ning tower again, dove and brought them all home safely, 
 two huuflred and fifty miles. 
 
 r>n the whole, however, this action r»f the Melgolanti 
 r.ight was rather of a minor character. 
 
 The next loss that occurred to either navy was that 
 of the Speedy, on Sei)lember .'kd, by striking a mine. 
 This was an old British gunlH)at of no particular imporl- 
 ancc. and few lives were lost. Two days later, on Sep- 
 tember r»th. the Pathfinder, a British light cruiser of 
 2,940 tons and a crew of two hundred anrl sixty-eight be- 
 came the first victim of a German submarine. The loss of 
 life was considerable, and as the sinking took place off 
 the l-'irth of l<*orth. an important naval ba>^e. it created 
 considerable excitement and worry in Great Britain. 
 
 The next victim was the German light cniiser. the 
 Hela. which on September l.'ith was stmk by the British 
 siibmarine E-9 six miles south of Helgoland. This 
 
 178
 
 The Naval War— North Sea 
 
 vessel carried a crew of one hundred and scventy-eiglit, 
 but was not of very great value as a fighting ship. 
 
 In the earlier part of September, the British admiralty 
 issued an order to the British warships in the Channel 
 and the North Sea that, in view of the fact that mine 
 laying was still going on, that as the order stated no 
 ship dared show the German flag in the North Sea, 
 it was obvious that these mines must be laid by vessels 
 under neutral flags, and henceforth all such neutral 
 vessels must be searched. ( )n September 11th, a rather 
 violent storm broke out and continued with more or less 
 severity for the next ten days, culminating in what is 
 technically known as a whole gale on the 18th, with a 
 very high wind. 
 
 Un the morning of the 22nd, the wind having moder- 
 ated somewhat, the three British armored cruisers, tho 
 Aboukir, the Hogue, and the Cressy, started out from 
 the harbor where they were lying to go on patrol duty. 
 These cruisers had just separated to go to their stations, 
 which were three miles apart, when about six A. M. the 
 Aboukir was seen to reel violently and then settle down 
 with a list to port. In the words of an eye witness, "there 
 was only one explosion, and most of the spectators were 
 of the opinion that she had struck a mine," and, follow- 
 ing the first impulse, bt)th the Cressy and the Hogue 
 closed in to save lives. At seven o'clock both were with- 
 in a quarter of a mile of her. 
 
 The Aboukir had started to lower her sea boats, but 
 the list had become so great that the boats stuck and 
 could not be gotten away. The sun was shining very 
 brightly and the red glow of her copper bottom with the 
 pink naked bodies of her men as they climbed down her 
 sides made an unforgettable picture. Some jumped into 
 the water, others sat down and slid down the sides, 
 others contented themselves with walking a few paces 
 as the vessel keeled over. 
 
 Suddenly, with two tremendous crashes, the Hogue 
 was struck, both torpedoes exploding in the same place 
 just aft of the starboard after-bridge. The ship leaped 
 up like a spurred horse, and as she was a vessel of 12.000 
 tons, this gives some idea of the force of the explosion. 
 • The Hogue's two sea boats had been cleared away, to- 
 gether w^ith her launch, in aid of the Aboukir. and the 
 later, with a number of the saved on board, ran very 
 close to her port bow, when, seeing the Hogue struck, 
 she stood off a few yards and waited. The men stood 
 
 179
 
 The Naval War — North Sea 
 
 quietly by tui ilic iiuyuc, waitiiii; lor tlic order to jump, 
 and parsing tlic time in slipping off their clothes. In a 
 moment or two the order came, and the men went in. 
 Lnfortunately, by far the j^reaier majority went over 
 tlie port bow, close to where the launch lay. The Hoj;ue 
 disappeared about six minutes after she had been 
 struck and scores of them clung to the gunwales of the 
 launch until she was unable to stand the strain and fell 
 to pieces, precipitating her own crew and those un- 
 fortunates already saved from the Abuukir. All those 
 from the llogue who were lost perished here. .\s the 
 Hogue went down she partially righted herself and her 
 steam picket boat and her steam pinnace both floated 
 off her undamaged, and in this manner many of the 
 survivors were saved. 
 
 Hv this time the Cressy came up and opened fire 
 witli both batteries on the sui)marinc, whose periscope 
 was visible, but she herself was almost immediately 
 struck amidships by tw(j torpedoes and sank in less 
 than two minutes. Phe Titan of Rotterdam, the Flora 
 of Vmuiden. two Dutch boats, and a Lowestoft traw- 
 ler, which happened to be in the vicinity, closed in and 
 rescued all who were saved from the three ships. The 
 total loss of life was about <»'» officers and 1,400 men. 
 The cruisers themselves were old and their loss did not 
 materially weaken the British fleet. 
 
 .'\s a result of this, on the 3rd of October, notice wa.-> 
 given bv the British admiralty that they had adopted 
 counter measures to tlie Ocrman policy of mine laying 
 and submarine activities, and had laid mines in the 
 area embraced between latitude 51.1.') Xorth to r^]AO 
 North and longitude 1.35 East and 3 East. 
 
 The next episode in the North Sea was the sinking of 
 the Ilawke, a British cruiser of 7,3.')0 tons, which was 
 torpedoed by German submarines, and the Theseus, her 
 sister ship was also attacked at the same time, but was 
 not damaged. Of the crew of 541, only 73 were saved. 
 The llawkc was an oM ship and her loss was not of great 
 importance. Two days after this, on October 17th. the 
 British new light cruiser Undaimted. accompanied by 
 three destrovcrs, engaged four German destrovors, the 
 S-llT). S-117', S-118 and S-11J>, off the Dutch coast. The 
 Undaunted was a sister ship to the .\rcthusa, which 
 figured in the battle off Helgoland. .All the German 
 destroyers were sunk while the British loss was only 
 five men wotmded and practically no damage to the vcs- 
 
 180
 
 The Naval War— North Sea 
 
 sels. The German loss in lives was somewhere in the 
 vicinity of 300, and 31 were taken prisoner. The fig-ht 
 lasted about two hours and began at a range of from 
 four to five miles. 
 
 About October 18th, the British in some mysterious 
 manner lost the submarine E-3. No details of her end 
 have ever been made public, the fact alone was stated. 
 On October 27th, the Audacious, a new dreadnought of 
 25,000 tons, came to a mysterious end off the northern 
 Irish coast. This was one of the most powerful vessels 
 of the British battle fleet. This loss was concealed for 
 many days from the British public, and from the world, 
 by the British admiralty, and to tliis day it is unknown 
 whether she struck a mine or was torpedoed by a sub- 
 marine. The whole affair is shrouded in mystery. The 
 loss of life was very slight, — only two men, — as she 
 was surrounded by other vessels, some warships and 
 some merchant vessels, who took off her crew when it 
 was seen that she was doomed to sink. 
 
 Between this and the end of the month, from Octo- 
 ber 25th to 30th, the British claim to have destroyed 
 two submarines in the North Sea by shell fire. The 
 numbers of these vessels are, however, unknown, and 
 no details were given. If they were sunk, the loss of 
 life would have been 24. On the last day of October, 
 the Germans torpedoed and sank the Hermes in the 
 North Sea, a medium sized protected cruiser of an old 
 type, with a loss of 22 lives ; and on the 3rd of Novem- 
 ber the D-5, a British submarine, struck a German 
 mine near Helgoland and was destroyed with all her 
 crew of 21. During November two German submarines 
 were lost, one on the 13th, off the Belgian coast, which 
 was rammed by a French warship and sent to the bot- 
 tom with a loss of her entire crew of 12, and one, the 
 U-18, on the 23rd, which the British sank in the same 
 manner in the North Sea, but of her crew only one was 
 lost, the other seventeen being made prisoner. 
 
 The German submarines during this month became 
 extremely bold, entering the harbors on the British 
 coast almost at will in spite of their defense of mines 
 and nets. The only casualty to the British fleet, how- 
 ever, resulting from this, was the loss of the Niger, a 
 small torpedo gunboat, which was blown up in the very 
 harbor of Deal, and besides the vessel 15 lives were lost. 
 
 On the 26th of November an old British battleship, the 
 Bulwark, blew up in a most mysterious manner while 
 
 181
 
 The Naval War -North Sea 
 
 lying at tlic diK-k in Sliccrncss Harbor. No salisfaciurv 
 explanation of what produced the explosion on her has 
 ever been made. The Britisli admiralty officials investi- 
 ^led, and reiK»ned that the expk)sii>n liad taken place in 
 lier magazines, but the evidence .supporting this conclusion 
 is not of the most convincing nature, although it is hard 
 to say what else could Iiave caused this explosion in 
 broad daylight in the early morning. Of her crew of 
 T80. T50 disappeared. The word "disappeared" is the 
 only word which can be useil in describing what happened 
 in this catastrtjphe. as almost nothing of any of them 
 was ever found. 
 
 During the month of Xovember the Berlin, an auxil- 
 iary cruiser, which escaped from the Bahic with a view 
 of joining the (ierman warships still at liberty in the 
 outer ocean, and engaged in commerce raiding, found 
 that after getting out of the Baltic it was impossible for 
 her to gain the outer sea, and consequently she entered 
 the harbor of Trondhjeim, Norway, and there interned 
 until the cntl of the war. 
 
 Dn Xovemlx^r l.Uh, the first of the raids, which were 
 made by the Germans on the English coast, took place. 
 Eight ships were employed in this raid, including the 
 three battle cruisers, Seydlitz, Moltke and \ on der Tann, 
 the armored cruisers Bluecher and Vorck, lx)th com- 
 paratively old vessels, though of great speed, and three 
 unjjrotected cruisers. The objective was Yarmouth, 
 which was bombared at long range, but little damage 
 was done. The evident purpo.sc ni the raid was more 
 psychological than material. 
 
 The coast of Great Britain had not been attacked by 
 hostile warships in over a hundred years, and the moral 
 effect produced upon the British people was considerable, 
 although the material effect was slight. This raid was 
 followed by another on ncccml)er IHth, on Scarborough, 
 Whitby and HartlepcH)!. which resulted in a very con- 
 siderable loss of life in all three places. Great c<immcnt 
 was created by these raids, and an attenij)t was made to 
 place them outside of the attacks which are justified by 
 the rules of war. hut a careful examination of the case 
 does not lead to that conclusion, and as far as the Hartlc- 
 pools go. they were not only defended but fortified 
 towns. 
 
 The London Ec«)nf)mist. in its issue of December 2Gth, 
 lf>14. disctissing the bombardinent of these three towns, 
 9»y» amr»nR other things: 
 
 18?
 
 The Naval War— North Sea 
 
 "In warfare there are two species of atrocities — those 
 which are unavoidable accidents and those which are 
 mere brntahties committed by either an individual or by 
 the orders of a commanding officer. A shell aimed at a 
 fort or barracks, and which explodes among private 
 dwellings and kills women and children, is an example 
 of the first kind. Cruelty to prisoners or deliberate firing 
 on the Red Cross is an example of the second kind. 
 Hardly a newspaper on either side but what has attrib- 
 uted countless atrocities of this sort to the enemy, and 
 denied all accusations made against their own sides. 
 
 "We have assumed the burden and responsibilities of 
 war, and if the enemy is successful in piercing our de- 
 fenses, it behooves us to face the fact with calm and 
 fortitude. We must be prepared and expect to endure 
 our part of the common suffering, and be thankful that, 
 so far, our share has been a slight one compared with 
 those of our Allies. The bombardment of undefended 
 towns is forbidden by the recognized conventions of naval 
 warfare. Unhappily, no agreement as to the definition 
 of an undefended town has ever been achieved. The 
 term 'undefended' is certainly very much wider Jhan 'un- 
 fortified.' For instance, in ratifying the conventions of 
 The Hague conference on this subject, the British gov- 
 ernment, supported by those of Germany and France, in- 
 sisted that the laying of contact mines off a harbor should 
 be sufficient to expose the same to bombardment. 
 
 "The conventions further direct that even in the case 
 of defended towns, the commander of an attacking force 
 must give due notice of bombardment, but only when 
 military exigencies allow (again a British reser: ation) , 
 which clearly they do not in the case of a sudden raid ; 
 that the enemy must do his best to spare churches, civic 
 buildings, hospitals and the like (but o»/a') where these 
 are distinguishable by the exhibition of large rigid panels 
 divided into white and black triangles. And here it may 
 be remarked that the official British Manual of Military 
 Law lays it down that its towns and its defences coii- 
 stitutc an indivisible whole. 
 
 "Finally, the immunity of undefended towns does not 
 extend to military works, establishments or depots or 
 to any workshops or plant capable of supplying military 
 needs — excc])tions that would probably be held to cover 
 railway stations, bridges and coal stores whether in pub- 
 lic or private ownership. 
 
 "Now. Hartlepool is clearly a defended town. The 
 
 183
 
 The Naval War— North Sea 
 
 war office rep<»rted that the German vessels eny;aged 
 the fortress, which replied and drove the enemy oft. 
 The Germans, on the other hand, pretend to have 
 silenced its puns. There were presumably <>ther mill- 
 tan- targets as well, for shells are reported to have 
 been dropped on the royal engineers' and infantry 
 lines. It is clear, however, that the town suffered far 
 more than the militant' works. This may have been 
 the result of malice, or carelessness, or incompetence, 
 or it may have been inevitable in the case of a bombard- 
 ment at considcrabU rantje on a misty morning. 
 
 "At Whitby, the chief officer of the coast guard 
 stated that the whole fire was directed at the signal 
 station. This was a legitimate target. It is a fact that 
 the shells were scattered over a very wide area. 
 
 ".\t Scarborough, the circumstances are much more 
 obscure. There is a castle, but it is said to have had 
 no long range guns. The first shot struck the castle, 
 the second the coast guard station. This looks as 
 though military action was intended, at any rate, at 
 first. What otlier targets there may have been we can- 
 not say, \)UX we have no official information regarding 
 the military disposition at Scarborough. 
 
 "There is one consideration which seems t<i have 
 been lost sight of by some people. It is this — that, as 
 indicated above, several proposed restrictions upon the 
 freedom of bombardment have been resisted by the 
 British government in the past. In view of our posi- 
 tion as a paramount naval power, the decision was 
 very likely a wise one, at least from a military point 
 of view, but we must be prepared to take the conse- 
 quences, and we shall cut a very poor figure before 
 the world if wc complain when others turn to our rlis- 
 advantage the freedom we have ourselves reserved. 
 
 "There seem to be people to whom any hostile ac- 
 tion directed against the coasts of this country appear*; 
 in the light of an intolerable affront, but it is in<leed 
 difficult to look with the eye of an impartial historian 
 at the actions of your enemies. To discover their 
 atrocities and expose them, is thought to be a patriotic 
 task. To acknowledge that yotir own government or 
 your allies have ever offended in the least against in- 
 ternational law is a kind of treason. 
 
 "Before we give vent to an excess of fnry. certainly 
 before wc indict a whole nation. Irt us rrmrttihcr that 
 our mm nary has hern cnn^at^rd in similar of>crations, 
 
 18i
 
 The Naval War— North Sea 
 
 fraught with possible loss to the life and property of 
 non-combatants. If coast towns are garrisoned, they 
 are not likely to escape bombardment when the ene- 
 my's fleet gets within range. And if, at the end of the 
 war, an impartial neutral commission were to convict 
 the British as well as the German navy of bombarding 
 unfortified towns, merely because soldiers were quar- 
 tered in them, and of thereby killing or wounding 
 many women and children, then some of the letters, 
 speeches and articles recently published would be stultified. 
 
 "It is certainly to be hoped that in attacking the 
 coast defenses of the enemy, our fleet will succeed in 
 inflicting greater military damage at a less cost of 
 civilian suffering, and we trust to the skill and hu- 
 manity of our commanders to see that this is so, but 
 the fact remains that coast towns have to take their 
 chance. The killing of women and children, and of 
 civilians generally, is an abomination, but war itself is 
 an abomination and will always be so." 
 
 Colonel Maude, the leading British authority on mili- 
 tary custom, in commenting on this bombardment, ex- 
 presses views in harmony with those stated above. 
 Further, that an attack on an enemy's coast analogous 
 to the bombardment of these three English coast towns 
 was considered by British naval officers with favor is 
 proved by what happened as a result of the mimic war 
 in the British naval manoeuvres of 1888. During these 
 manoeuvres a British squadron bombarded several un- 
 defended watering places in Scotland and in the north 
 *of England. A controversy concerning this action 
 arose, brought about by a letter to the London Times 
 from Mr. T. E. Holland, who denounced this bombard- 
 ment as a breach of international law. Several dis- 
 tinguished naval officers and several authorities on 
 international law replied to him, among whom was 
 Lord Charles Beresford, who wrote the London Times, 
 August 18, 1888: "The whole art of war is to strike at 
 the enemy's weakest points wherever they are and 
 whatever they be. There is no sentiment after the ac- 
 tion commences. I say boldly and openly that if an 
 officer could damage his enemy and procure panic or 
 demoralization in the enemy's country, he would be 
 wrong to demur a moment in exacting a ransom or in 
 bombarding a sea-port town if the opportunity occurs." 
 
 This view, the concensus of opinion of the majority 
 who participated in the discussion, is upheld as the cor- 
 
 185
 
 The Naval War— North Sea 
 
 rect one. It ihcac bombardnuiit.N .iiv legal and in ac- 
 conlancc with the rules <tl war for r»riti>li ship> lo prac- 
 lice. docs it not folluw that they are equally legal for all 
 the worhl "' l-'urtluMMJore, in this ver) war, llriiish otficiai 
 reports >lu>\v that British ships on the coast of Asia 
 Minor bi«mbarded Turkish villages and forts which were 
 fully as much undclcndcd as these English coast towns, 
 and therein Turkish women and children were killed in 
 numbers, i'he dales and places of thc^e bombardments 
 were: December 1st and ;{rd. .\kba ; December !;20th, 
 Rapaz ; December ',ilst, Deurtyvc; December xJ3rd, 
 Voumourtalik and Sarisseki; January 5th, Karadivar. 
 
 An undue amtnint of space has perhaps been given 
 this matter, but in \ iew of the deluge nf malicious abuse 
 poured forth by a large portion of the British and 
 American Press on the German naval commanders at 
 the time of these raids, compounded in almost equal 
 parts of ignorance of military law and prejudice, it is 
 thought that the expression in permanent form of the 
 opinions of those competent to judge, is an act of justice. 
 
 By way of retaliating for these raids, the British 
 made a combined attack on the (icrman warships in 
 Cuxhaven harbor, by seven sea planes, which were es- 
 corted by a light cruiser and destroyer force, together 
 with submarines. This attack was delivered at day- 
 break, starting from a p(Mnt in the vicinity of Helgo- 
 land. The ships were seen by the C^.ermans from Helgo- 
 land, and two Zeppelins, some sea planes and several 
 submarines were sent out to attack them. As a result 
 of this discovery, a novel combat took place, viz: sub-, 
 marines, /ejipclins and sea planes, against cruisers. 
 By rapid manoeuvring the Briti^^h cruisers succeeded 
 in avoiding the submarines, while the Zeppelins were 
 put to fliglit bv the guns of the Undaunted and the 
 Arethusa. The British ^ea planes were more successful, 
 in that they succeeded in dropping bombs near enemy's 
 ■^hips. but did not hit anything. This combat lasted 
 three hours, during which no surface vessels attacked 
 the British fleet, which remained in its position until 
 three of the seven airmen engaged in the attack on 
 Cuxhaven had returned. 
 
 What damage was done in thi*^ Cuxhaven raid is not 
 known. The B.ritish claim that its moral effect was 
 great. Of the seven aviators, all returned in safety, 
 though four of them lost their machine^. 
 
 At the beginning of the war. there were constrticting 
 in Rrifi«.b yards f«»r the accomit of I'ra/il. three monitors 
 
 186
 
 The Naval War — North Sea 
 
 inounting a number of powerful, long range guns. These, 
 with all other vessels constructing for foreign powers in 
 British yards were taken by Great Britain, as she had 
 an absolute right to do, according to the practice of na- 
 tions, on the outbreak of the war, and these monitors 
 were used with considerable effect from October on- 
 wards, in support of the left flank of the Belgian army, 
 along the Belgian seacoast. Naval balloons observed 
 and reported the shore positions which the squadron 
 was consequently able to bombard with some effect. 
 This bombardment continued intermittently for weeks, 
 and on November 23rd Zeebrugge, which the Germans 
 had made a submarine base, received particular attention 
 from this bombarding squadron. 
 
 (Jn the 24th of January, 1915, a British squadron of 
 battle cruisers and light cruisers, with destroyer flotillas, 
 was patrolling the North Sea when the flash of guns was 
 noticed to the southeast. A few minutes afterwards the 
 light cruiser Aurora reported to the fleet that she was 
 engaged. The fleet turned to the southeast at an in- 
 creased speed, sending forward the light cruisers and 
 destroyer flotilla to take contact with the enemy and re- 
 port their movements. These instructions were antici- 
 pated by the Arethusa, which reported that the enemy's 
 ships consisted of three battle cruisers, the armored 
 cruiser Bluecher, six light cruisers and some destroyers. 
 The British fleet was composed of five battleships, the 
 Lion, Tiger, Princess Royal, New Zealand and Indom- 
 itable, the Tiger and Lion being among the newest and 
 most powerful ships of the navy, with particularly high 
 speed. The Princess Royal was another new ship of 
 equal size and speed to the Lion and Tiger. All three of 
 these are known as battle cruisers. 
 
 The German fleet consisted of three battle cruisers, 
 the Moltke. the Seydiitz, a new and very fast battle- 
 cruiser, and the Derflinger. These three are all of equal 
 speed with the Lion and Tiger of the British fleet. The 
 other German vessel was the Bluecher, an armored 
 cruiser about six or seven years old, running about three 
 to four knots an hour slower than the other vessels. As 
 will be seen in the sequel, this lack of speed proved her 
 undoing. There were also a number of destroyers. 
 
 The German ships, on sighting the British, changed 
 their course to southeast. The British working up to 
 full speed, steered southward. At 7.30, the Germans 
 came in sight on the port bow at a distance of 14 miles 
 
 187
 
 The Naval War — North Sea 
 
 and -^tcainmg ia>t. The British then altered their course 
 to southeast, parallel to the eiicuiv ancl settled down to 
 a stern chase. Speed wa>' j^raduaily increased to 28f/j 
 knots an hour and the squadron gradually drew up to 
 within 20,o«H) yards of the rear German ship, the Bluccher. 
 
 The Cierinans were j^rocccdinj^ in sinj^lc line ahead, 
 with a light cruiser in front and on starhoard l)cam. 
 
 The first shot of the battle was fired by the Lion at 
 8 :5v*. but the vessel was too far distant for her ^^uns 
 to reach. Shots w ere fired afterward at intervals to test 
 the ranj;e and at 9:10 the Blucher was hit by tlie Lion 
 for the first time. At i> :"20 the Tiger had gotten up with- 
 in range of the lyncher and opened fire on her, while 
 the Lion turned her attention to the next ship in the 
 German line, which is said to have been hit several 
 times at 18,000 yards. The Princess Royal now drew 
 up in range and opened fire on the Blucher. which 
 slackened speed and Ijccame exposed to the guns of 
 the New Zealand. The Princess Royal then shifted 
 her fire to the third ship in the (icrman line, and at 
 this point the German destroyers threatening an at- 
 tack on the British fleet, the British destroyer division 
 passed ahead oi their battle cruisers. At M:15 the Lion 
 was engaging the light German ship as was the Tiger. 
 The Princess Royal was still engaged with the third 
 ship, which was on fire, while the Blucher. her speed 
 still slackening, was tiie target of the New Zealand. 
 
 The Germans changed course slightly, which man- 
 oeuvre was made the re.lson fur a corresponding change 
 by the British. The I'luchcr at H>:l.") had fallen con- 
 siderably astern of the other vessels, was on fire, had a 
 heavy list, and was unable to defend herself. .\t 11:03 
 the Lion suffered an injury which put her out of the 
 battle line, and the British admiral tran^^fcrred his flag 
 to a destroyer, and thence to the Princess Royal. Ixtard- 
 ing her at 11.4'.. and rejoining on her the rest of the 
 squadron to the north, meeting them returning at noon. 
 
 .About 11:20. the Blucher. which had been falling 
 steadilv l)chind. sank. Of her crew alK)Ut 2."»0 were saved. 
 A few minutes after the remaining vessels of the Ger- 
 man squadron ran into the German mine fields, where 
 it was not deemed prudent for the British vessels to fol- 
 low. The Seydlitz and the Derflinger were both con- 
 siderably injnrcfl in this fight. Of the British ves.9cl8. 
 the Tyion was badly injured, having been strnrk. accord- 
 ing tf» official report, rightcen times, and it was only by 
 
 188
 
 The Naval War— North Sea 
 
 consuniniatc seamanship on the part of her captain that 
 she avoided foundering. She was towed to port by the 
 Indomitable, and four months later had not resumed her 
 l)lace on the active list of the navy. The Tiger was also 
 hit and considerably damaged. Her damages, however, 
 were not as great as those of the Lion. The torpedo boat 
 Meteor was destroyed. The British loss in hves in this 
 action ran to 16 men killed and 49 wounded. 
 _ Nothing further of interest happened until the first day 
 of January, 1915, when the Formidable, a battleship of 
 15,000 tons, was torpedoed by German submarines and 
 sunk in the channel. Curiously enough she was a sister 
 ship of the Bulwark, whose end by a mysterious explo- 
 sion has been hereinbefore narra'ted. The Formidable 
 was struck between 3 and 3.30 o'clock in the morning, 
 and of her, crew of 800, only 301 were saved. Though 
 an old boat, she was still of considerable fighting value. 
 Captain Loxley, her commander,distinguished himself 
 by calmness and courage, remaining on the bridge until 
 the last, directing operations and going down with his 
 ship in accordance with the tradition of the sea. 
 
 From this time onward until the adoption of a new 
 submarine policy by the Germans, there is little to chron- 
 icle in naval warfare in the channel or the North Sea. 
 On January 26th, 1915, Germany adopted a measure 
 of conservation for the civil population only, by means 
 of a company organized for such purposes, of all food 
 stuffs in Germany. This company was given authority to 
 take over all stocks of food anywhere in the empire'ex- 
 ceedinga specified amount, varying with the different 
 foods, and to warehouse the same, and sell it in quanti- 
 ties which were fixed per capita to the people of the em- 
 pire, at not exceeding a definitely specified maximum 
 price. The object of this legislation was to prevent the 
 possibility of scantiness in one part of the empire and 
 plentifulness in another, and to further prevent the 
 undue and arbitrary advance of prices by private deal- 
 ers. The above is an accurate summary of its import- 
 ant provisions. 
 
 On February 3rd, Great Britain, immediately on re- 
 ceipt of the general information that a policy of conserv- 
 ation had been adopted, and before a copy of the decree 
 could have been in the hands of her government, and 
 therefore before that government could have known 
 either the scope or the purpose of the measure, asserted 
 that this was a confiscation of the foodstuffs in Germany 
 
 189
 
 The Naval War — North Sta 
 
 for nuliiary purln)^t•^. rcialiaicil b\ jdaciiig all Icxxlstntfs 
 of anv kind \.\\Km the list of contraband of war. and an- 
 nounced that her warships had orders to seize tlie com- 
 mercial ships of neutral countries prtKceding to Germany 
 with carj^ocs of this character; and further, to seize, on 
 suspicion, neutral shi|)s procee<Iing to neutral {X)rts laden 
 with such carjjoes. unless >uch ships c(ndd clearly prove 
 that the idtimate ilestination <»f their cargi»es was not 
 either Germany or Austria. 
 
 This constilutetl an absolutel\ unprecedented act in- 
 fringing ujK)n the rights of neutral powers and practi- 
 cally anuumtedtoa claim that the iiigh seas were private 
 property of Great I'ritain. and not the highway of the 
 world's commerce. Furthermore, never Inrfore in the 
 history of the world had any nation made all foinlstuffs. 
 destined for the civil i>opulation of its enemy, conirabanrl 
 of war. Kxtremelv arbitrary and without .sanction of 
 precedent, this action violated th<* principle that Great 
 i>ritain had always lieretofore contended for in her deal- 
 ings with other combatant nations, she being a neutral. 
 ' It is further to Ix* remarked that she did not blockade 
 the German coa.st either in form or fact, but she did 
 claim the right to examine the cargoes of neutral ships 
 an\ where uih»ii the high seas. The scheme of |)rocedure 
 is. of course, more convenient than exjjosing ships of 
 war to the risks of a blockailing station, but it neverthe- 
 less constitutes a great breach of what may be called the 
 common rights of humanity to the ocean as a highway. 
 .\nd here it may be remarked that in the whole history 
 (jf Great liritain, from the time that she fir.st secured 
 preiK)nderance of maritime |)owcr. C()Upled with its neces- 
 sary adjunct of preponderance of naval power, she has 
 always been disregardful of the rights of i»ther nations, 
 as though the Almighty had made the seas her own 
 property. She has asserted this doctrine, sometimes with 
 mildness, sometimes with brutality, but always with con- 
 sistency. 
 
 From a neutral stan<li)onu. the real issue involved in 
 this war is whether or not (treat Britain can force her 
 absolute control of the seas tij)on an unwilling worM. 
 No one can blame Great Britain for asserting this con- 
 trol ; it is to the advantage of her people and it is the 
 duty of her statesmen or of the statesmen of any coun- 
 try, to use the strength and power of that country to 
 promote the advantage of the people thereof, but the 
 blatju* is to l)c laid at the do*>rs of those nations which
 
 The Naval War— North Sea 
 
 have so great a lack of feeling of nationality as to ac- 
 quiesce in this reduction to the status of pri\ate prop- 
 erty of Great Britain of that which was manifestly in- 
 tended as a free and untramnicled highway of copi- 
 nierce l)etween the different nations of the world. The 
 subject is too important and t(K) vast to be UKjre than 
 alluded lo here. At some future time 1 hope to have the 
 opportunity of discussing this (juestion more at length. 
 
 As a result of this arbitrary action by Great Britain 
 Germany, on February 4th, issued a notice whereby she 
 established a blockade of the waters immediately ad- 
 jacent to the British Isles and the northern and western 
 coasts of France, and warned the neutral powers that it 
 was her intention to sink, without notice, all British, 
 French and Russian mercantile ships found within that 
 area after the 18th day of February, and further, warn- 
 ing neutrals that ships of theirs entered the area de- 
 scribed at their own risk. The limits of si)ace forbid the 
 full discussion of the apparent legal defects of this Ger- 
 man blockade of the British Isles using the submarine as 
 a means of blockade. This new weapon of naval war- 
 fare changes to a very great degree the conditions under 
 which blockades are hereafter to be conducted, and 
 necessitates the taking of greater risks by neutral ship- 
 ping in the event that submarines are to be used, while it 
 is self-evident that, owing to their peculiar character and 
 limitations, the rules of blockade, which have hereto- 
 fore obtained, can no longer be considered satisfactory. 
 
 This whole question will probably, after this war is 
 finished, be regulated by appropriate international ac- 
 tion. 
 
 As a sort of retaliation for an illegal act of Great 
 Britain, however, this submarine blockade stands upon 
 a totally different footing. From the beginning of this 
 war to the date on which these words are written, the 
 Allies have seemed to take the position that they were 
 entitled to fix the rules under which Germany should 
 wage war, and to be bound b}- no rules themselves. 
 In other words, in their view, sauce for the goose was 
 not sauce for the gander. They have invoked repeat- 
 edly against Germany the sanction of conventions of 
 The Hague conferences which were not binding to the 
 combatants in the least, owing to the fact that in the 
 years prior to the war Great Britain, for purposes of 
 its own, had not ratified these conventions, which by 
 their very terms required the ratification of all com- 
 
 191
 
 The Naval >X^ar — North Sea 
 
 batant powers to be bindinj^ on any. This contention, 
 tojicther with other absurd propositions of interna- 
 tional law. has been advanced by the Allies with the 
 manite>t purpose of confusing the issue in the minds 
 of the peoples of the neutral countries.' 
 
 Accordingly ofi February 17tl). when the nulice to<ik 
 effect. Germany began to sink British merchant ves- 
 sels wherever found, without warning, and in the 
 eight or ten days succeeded in destroying by means of 
 the submarines ten British ships, besides one or two 
 neutral vessels. While the material effect of this 
 bUickade was perhaps not very considerable in view 
 of the enormous number of vessels arriving at or leav- 
 ing the British Isles, the moral effect was consider- 
 able, as evidenced by the successive steps taken to 
 meet the emergency by Great Britain. On the 2-1 th 
 of February, she closed the Irish and N'orth channels 
 to all navigation. The same day. Germany, by procla- 
 mation, added the Orkney and Shetland Islands to the 
 war zone. On March 1st. this blockade had been in 
 operation such a short time that it was impossible to 
 say how great its material effects would be in the 
 long run. 
 
 [d'Z
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 THE NAVAL WAR— HIGH SEAS 
 
 When the war broke out, the British squadrons 
 available outside of European waters, were distributed 
 pretty nearly as follows : 
 
 China Station — One battleship, four cruisers, six 
 smaller vessels, eight destroyers, four torpedo 
 boats and three submarines. 
 East Indian Station — One battleship, two cruisers, 
 
 four smaller craft. 
 Cape Station — Three cruisers. 
 New Zealand — Three cruisers, one small cruiser. 
 West Coast of Africa — Three small cruisers. 
 West Coast of America — Three small cruisers. 
 East Coast of South America — One cruiser. 
 Australian Coast — One battle cruiser, three light cruis- 
 ers, three destroyers, two submarines. 
 In addition, a fourth cruiser squadron, consisting of 
 five ships, was on the point of returning from Mexico 
 in the West Atlantic. When hostilities opened a num- 
 ber of fast liners were immediately put in commission 
 as auxiliary cruisers under naval commanders. Further- 
 more, a number of merchant steamers were, at the re- 
 quest of the owners, provided with guns for the pur- 
 pose of defence in the event of being chased. It is im- 
 portant to remember this, because hereafter this arm- 
 ing of merchantmen will become a matter of some im- 
 portance. France and Russia only had some few and 
 unimportant vessels far from their bases. 
 
 Against this force of the Allies there were some eight 
 or nine German cruisers abroad, several of very high 
 speed, all efficient for commerce destroying purposes. 
 In addition to these Germany had some merchant vessels 
 and liners which were converted into auxiliary cruisers 
 precisely the same as the British have done, although for 
 some reason best known to themselves the British have 
 claimed in print that the liners so converted by the Ger- 
 mans were in reality privateers, whereas the liners so 
 converted by them were men-of-war. The reason for 
 
 193
 
 The Naval War- -High Seas 
 
 this distinction is nut appurcni to any but tlie British 
 mind. Both sides threw thonjsclvcs with zeal into the 
 kvork of captnriii)^ the enemy's merchant vessels. Nec- 
 essarily the Germans were at a i^rcat disadvantaj^^c in 
 this game, owing to the lack of ports where they could 
 obtain coal and supplies, which abounded for Great 
 Britain all over the world, and consc(|uently the Ger- 
 man cruisers were, from the beginning, inevitably 
 doomed to be captured or sunk in the course of time, 
 unless they sought internment in foreign harbors. 
 
 The first German converted cruiser to be disposed of 
 was the Kaiser VVilhelm der Grosse, which, on August 
 v7th, was sighted by the British cruiser Highflyer, of 
 5,600 tons, carrying six-inch guns, and faster than the 
 (ierman ship by a c«»u|)le •>! knots. .\t ilie linic the 
 Highflyer sighted her, the Kaiser was coaling, and all 
 evidence points to the fact that she was in Spanish co- 
 lonial waters, and hence the attack on her was illegal. 
 This case nearly conforms with the attack on the Dres- 
 den in Chilean waters, which will be hereafter referred 
 to. liefore the Kaiser could separate her-^elf imnx her 
 collier and take to her heels, the 1 lighflyer was in range. 
 Of course, there, it could be with but one result, the 
 liner being greatly outclassed in the matter of ordnance. 
 She put up a fight, hit the cruiser a few times, killing 
 one man and wounding five, but was sunk shortly, 
 though her crew was rescued by the attendant collier. 
 
 This fight took place within three miles of the coast 
 of Africa, near the Reo de ( )ro. Bef<jre she was sunk, 
 the Kaiser had sunk one British vessel, the llyarles, off 
 Pernambuco, and had held up the Cape Mail steamer, 
 Galician. which. howc\er, she did not sink. 
 
 On the 1 1th of September a fight took place off the 
 east coast of South America, between two of these con- 
 verted cruisers, the Carmania being the B.ritish repre- 
 sentative, and the German ship of like nature, and near- 
 ly equal force, the Caj) Trafali^ar. The fight here was 
 stubborn ; for two hours they banged away at each 
 other at a range of from 9,000 to .S,000 yards, but never 
 .vithiji the latter distance. It is said that the British hits 
 »vere mr)stly in the hull or mar the water line, while the 
 r.crman hits were mostly in the boats and ui)i)er work«. 
 f^oth sides took their punishment without weakening, 
 (n the night tin- C.tp Trafalgar wriil down, most of the 
 :rcw saving themselves on a German collier with which 
 the captain was in wireless communication rlnring the 
 
 104
 
 The Naval War — High Seas 
 
 fight. The Cap Trafalgar started to burn after the action 
 was half an hour old, and capsized before she sank. The 
 Carmania had nine men killed and 'iC) wounrled. The 
 loss on the Cap Trafalgar is unknown. 
 
 On September 2Uth, in Zanzibar harbor, the British 
 :ruiser Pegasus, which had done considerable destruc- 
 tion in German East Africa, met her fate. 
 
 The Germaii cruiser Konigsberg entered the harbor 
 ind attacked her. In a short time the Pegasus was badly 
 'mattered and was beached, with 2o killed and SO wounded 
 )ut of her crew of 234. The Konigsberg steamed away 
 ind disappeared for a long time, but was finally found, 
 as will be narrated in due course. 
 
 Other exploits of the Piritish cruisers were as follows : 
 The Berwick captured the Spreewald, which had been 
 fitted up as an auxiliary cruiser, and also sank several 
 German merchant vessels and captured others, besides 
 an American and Norwegian ship. The French cruiser 
 Conde made one capture in the North Atlantic. The 
 V^armouth in the East Indian ocean sank the Hamburg- 
 A.merican liner Markomania. 
 
 While these things were going on, the German cruiser 
 Karlsruhe made life exciting for the commanders of 
 British merchant vessels in the Atlantic, as in two weeks 
 she intercepted and destroyed no less than thirteen steam- 
 ers. During her career she nearly equalled the record 
 of the cruiser Emden, the most successful of the German 
 merchant raiders, whose story merits a separate account. 
 The eventual fate of the Karlsruhe is somewhat shrouded 
 in mystery, and apparently, from the best information we 
 have, an explosion took place on board her in the West 
 Indies in late November, and she sank. Her crew suc- 
 ceeded in reaching Germany, it is-^aid, in safety. 
 
 In the Pacific the Leipzig and Nurnberg had consid- 
 erable success, while the Dresden and Strassburg and 
 Bremen had some successes of minor importance in the 
 South and West Atlantic. When Japan took a hand in 
 the war on August 15th by sending an ultimatum to 
 Germany demanding the surrender of Kiao-Chau, there 
 were quite a number of German men-of-war in the har- 
 bor, most of them of minor importance, and one Austrian 
 cruiser. Two of the German vessels, however, the 
 Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, were important fighting 
 units, being armored cruisers of 11,400 tons each. These 
 had, however, left as soon as the ultimatum reached 
 Germany, and started on a cruise in the Pacific. During 
 
 195
 
 The Naval War— High Seas 
 
 the course of this crui>c. uii Stpi. vviul, ilie\ arrived off 
 I'apeeia. the chief tt>\vn of Tahiti, a Ireucli colony in the 
 Southern Pacific, and licre they sank a y:unboat. shelled 
 ;uul practically destroyed the town. This incident is 
 sjHjken of by the llritish as a cruel and absolutely use- 
 less proceeding, but during their expedition against New 
 Pojnerania in the Bisniark Archipelago, ihcy did the 
 same thing, which, oi course, was different. We will 
 hear of the subse(|uent exploits of these cruisers later. 
 The most romantic and most interesting career of any 
 vessel on either siile during the war. was that of the 
 l-".mden. The I-'mden was a small ves-sel of 3,,")(>(> tons, 
 with a speed of alx)ut 25 knots and a light armament. 
 She was built for just such service as that which she 
 |>erforn)ed. Too weak to fight a war vessel of any 
 >trength, .she was strong enough for her purpose, fast 
 enough to catch her prey and al>o fa.st entnigh to suc- 
 cessfully run away when necessary. Capt. Carl von 
 Mueller, her commander, handled her with great ability, 
 and managed to always have her appear at the sj>ot where 
 she was least expected, and whence, after reaping a har- 
 vest of merchantmen, he made her as unaccountably dis- 
 ap])ear. It may be assumed that tlie l«erman captain 
 had some information by wireless which aitled him. In 
 any case, he was a very courageous and enterprising man 
 and a thoroughly good sportsman, as even his enemies 
 admitted. 
 
 During the career of the iCmden, she often varied the 
 dull routine of capturing merchantmen by atlventure. 
 For instance: One evening she suddenly appeared in 
 Madras Roads, the last place in the world where she was 
 expected, shelled the oil tanks, set them afire, exchanged 
 her compliments with Fort George and retired. Again, 
 on October 2Tth, disguising herself by an extra dumm\ 
 funnel and flying the Japanese colors, she ap|x.'ared in the 
 British harbor of Penang and gave the Russian cruiser 
 Jcmtchug a startling surpri.se by hoisting the German 
 colors as .soon as within range. She torpedoed her twice, 
 sending her to the l>>ttom. wliich fate the I'rench destroy- 
 er Mousquet also shared a little dulside of the harbor. 
 This operation comj)leted, she shelled the fort for a few 
 nnnute.-> and then mysteriously vanished into the night. 
 I ler bag of merchantmen was the largest made by any 
 German cruiser. The Fmdcn also had the luck to pick up 
 a collier whenever the coal in her own bmikcrs was run- 
 ning low. At times she was accompanied bv (juitc a fleet. 
 
 196
 
 The Naval War — High Seas 
 
 since it was her captain's invariable practice to sink his 
 prizes, reserving one in which to send all the crews 
 and passengers from the others into port. This he was 
 obliged to do, as there was no chance of his taking his 
 prizes into friendly port, nor did he have room on his 
 own ship for the crews and passengers of the sunken 
 merchantmen. 
 
 Some sentimentalists have alleged tliat the destruc- 
 tion of enemy's vessels by this warship was contrary 
 to international law as they manufactured it, and at the 
 time aided in filling the columns of newspapers by 
 letters of protest. Their understanding of the law, 
 however, was imperfect, as it is today and always has 
 been quite within a captain's rights to destroy an ene- 
 my's property at sea or anywhere else. These critics 
 confused the rule applying to a neutral nation with the 
 rule applying to an enemy nation. 
 
 On November 10th came the end of the Emden's 
 career. She suddenly appeared in accordance with her 
 usual habit at Keeling, Cocos Island, south of tiie Malay 
 Peninsula, between it and Australia, and sent a boat 
 ashore, whose crew were ordered to destroy the wire- 
 less. During the time, however, which elapsed between 
 her being sighted and recognized and her boat's crew 
 arriving the wireless was at work and succeeded in ad- 
 vising the Sydney of the Australian navy, which was 
 near at hand, that the long-sought Emden was where she 
 could get at her. The Australian, which was at but a little 
 distance, promptly appeared, and an action took place. 
 
 The fight, in the nature of things, could not be a pro- 
 longed one. The Emden was set on fire and driven 
 ashore, where she burned completely. Her crew suffer- 
 ed heav\^ losses, but her gallant captain was saved and 
 taken to Australia, whence she was sent to England. The 
 boat crew which landed on the island and witnessed the 
 arrival of the Sydney, seized a small trading schooner 
 and escaped. Afterwards, according to one version of 
 their subsequent adventures, they were captured, and 
 according to another, they succeeded fn reaching 
 safety, after a rather romantic career. 
 
 The story of how the Emden got away from Kiao- 
 Chau has not often been told, and is rather interesting. 
 She left there after Japan and Germany were at war 
 and there was every chance of her being caught by Jap- 
 anese vessels, with whom she could not come to action 
 with any hope of success. The expected happened, and. 
 
 197
 
 The Naval >X ar— High Seas 
 
 shortly after leaving her anchorage she icU in with a 
 Japanese armored cruiser, but it was not the three- 
 funnelled Enidcn nor a black, white and red German 
 man-of-war ensij^n that passed the Japanese armored 
 ship, but a ves-sel witli four funnels flying the British 
 white ensign, whose crew, as she steamed by the Jap- 
 anese, lined the rail and gave her three hearty English 
 cheers, while her ensign dipped. 
 
 During the seven weeks that she was at large she 
 destroyed 70,UU0 tons of Jiritish shipping, the total 
 money value of wli<'<e cargoes is computed to be about 
 $20,060,00<i 
 
 The relief of (ireai IJriiain ai llu- news of llie I'm 
 den's destruction was great. For weeks she had been 
 hunted over tlie Indian ocean and the Eastern Pacific 
 by warships of the allied powers and had skilfully elud- 
 ed them all. It is but due, however, to the British to 
 say that in their treatment of the captain and crew of 
 this vessel, and in tiicir admiration of the ingenuity and 
 courage with which the Emdcn had been handled, in 
 one case at least during this whole war. they were true 
 to the finer traditions of their race. 
 
 During August, September and October, some Brit- 
 ish and some Japanese took possession of the German 
 island> in the Pacific, making prisoners of the officials. 
 Among these were Upolu Island, Samoa, New Pomer- 
 ania, Solomon Islands, German New Guinea, Caroline 
 Islands, the Marshall Group, etc., etc., etc. 
 
 .•\fter their attack upon Papeeta, the Scharnhorst and 
 the Gncisenau sailed for the coast of Chile in South 
 America. During the v(\vage thither, the Dresden, the 
 Nurnhurg and the Leipzig managed to join them. On 
 the Oth of November the British admiralty received in- 
 formation that an action had been fought on the 1st of 
 November between these vessels and the British ar- 
 mored cruisers Good Hope, Monmouth and the light 
 cruiser Glasgow, and the Otranto. an auxiliary cruiser. 
 This news was not at first credited because the admir- 
 alty had sent an old battleship named the Canopus to 
 join the British fleet, which was commanded by Rear 
 Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock. which, liad she ar- 
 rived in time, would have given, the admiralty thouglit, 
 the Briti'>h '^quadrun the superiority. Biit the Canopus 
 had not arrived. 
 
 The Good IIoj)!- u.l^ an armored cruiser i>f 1 1,000 tons, 
 the Monmouth of O.ROO tons, and lx)th were over twelve 
 
 infi
 
 The Naval War— High Seas 
 
 years old ; the Glasgow was a light cruiser of 4,800 tons, 
 and the Otranto, the auxiliary cruiser, was of 12,100 
 tons. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were sister ships 
 of ll,(iOO tons and were completed in 1907. The Dresden 
 and Xurnlnirg were small cruisers, ;{,G00 tons, the Leip- 
 zig was a still smaller vessel. A comparison of guns in 
 the two squadrons is as follows: Germany, sixteen 8.2 
 inch, twelve G inch ; thirty-four 1 inch, forty twenty-four 
 pounders, sixteen ."i-pounders. British, two 9.2 inch; 
 thirty-two (> inch; ten 4 inclv twenty 12-pounders and 
 ten 3 pounders. 
 
 On Sunday, November 1st, the Good Hope, Mon- 
 mouth and Glasgow sighted the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, 
 Leipzig and Dresden about half past four in the after- 
 noon. There was a strong wind and a very considerable 
 sea. Both squadrons were steaming to the southward 
 and the Germans kept out of range and declined action 
 till sunset, when the light gave them an important ad- 
 vantage, the British fleet being silhouetted between them 
 and the sun. At sunset the battle began and lasted about 
 two hours. Both the Good Hope and the Monmouth 
 caught fire early therein, but they continued fighting un- 
 til dark, when an explosion took place on the Good Hope 
 and she foundered. Just as dark came on the Monmouth 
 closed with the enemy in a gallant attempt to ram, but 
 she was sunk in the attempt quite close to the enemy's 
 ships. The battle finished at about half past nine. The 
 Glasgow, which was damaged. and set on fire, quit the 
 fight, about half past seven, and took no part in the fight 
 thereafter, nor did the Otranto at any time. The Nurn- 
 burg of the German fleet also took no part in the battle, 
 coming up too late. 
 
 After the battle, three ships of the German fleet went 
 into the harbor of Valparaiso and, as far as was per- 
 mitted, repaired damages. Their loss was said to have 
 been slight. The British loss was 1,670 killed and about 
 GO or 70 wounded on the Glasgow. 
 
 After this the squadron sailed to the southward, passed 
 through the straits of Magellan, proceeding very slowly, 
 and nothing definite w^as heard of it until the 8th of De- 
 cember. In the meantime, the British, being roused by the 
 severe defeat off the Chilean coast, took every means 
 possible to destroy this German squadron, which had be- 
 come an imperative necessity and which it was also 
 necessary to accomplish in the shortest possible time. 
 Consequently, they organized and sent out. we know 
 
 199
 
 The Naval War — High Seas 
 
 positively, iwd tleet>, lo uiic ut which uiulcr Admiral 
 Sturdcc, the German squadron fell a prey. The British 
 squadron was comprised of the Invincible, the Inflexible, 
 the Carnavoii, the C.lasgow. the survivor of the l»attle 
 off the Chilean coast, the Kent, the Cornwall, the Bristol, 
 the Macedonia and the Canopus. The Kent ami Corn- 
 wall were sister ships of the Monmouth. The Carnavon 
 was an armored cruiser of 10,Hr)0 tons, the Cornwall and 
 Bristol were sister ships, while the Invincible and In- 
 flexible were battle cruisers of 2b knots speed, and each 
 carryinj^ eight 12 inch guns. The Canopus was an old 
 battleship. This British fUci dutclasscd the German 
 squadron about 2 l-:;^ to 1. 
 
 Admiral Sturdee's squadron was despatched in abso- 
 lute secrecy, and no one except the I'.nglish admiralty 
 had any knowledge of its departure. W hat information 
 German Admiral von Spce had l)een able to gather con- 
 cerning the enemy's movements since the sinking of the 
 Monmouth and Good Hope, has never become known, 
 but what is quite certain is that he was miaware of the 
 arrival of the squadron commanded by .\<imiral Sturdee. 
 Admiral von Spec had made f<»r the I-'alkland Islands 
 with the intention of seizing th<Mii ;.n,I ilm*. supplying 
 himself with a much needed ha^> 
 
 After the Glasgow fled southward from ihc battle off 
 the Chilean coast, she jiicked up the Canopus 2()o miles 
 further down and both these shii)s pn)ceeded to the 
 Falkland Islands, where they arrived on November 8th. 
 They were then directed to proceed to Montevideo, but 
 on their voyage tliither were intercepted by wireless and 
 ordered to return to the Falklands. On December Tth 
 the remainder of the squadron arrived. 
 
 On the morning of Decemlier Mth, the l(X)kout on Sap- 
 per Hill .signalled "two men-of-war in the offing." and 
 the Kent was ordered to reconnoitcr. At !>.20 the two 
 leading ships of the Germans, the Gncisenau and the 
 Xurnburg, came w ithin range oi the Canopus in the har- 
 bor, which opened fire at them across the lowland, at a 
 range of 10,000 yards. The Germans hoistcfl their colors 
 and turned away. A few minutes later, seeing the Kent, 
 they ahered their cotirse as though alxnit t«i clo.sc with 
 her. but at alxmt the time it seems that the Invincible 
 and Inflexible were seen over the lowland, so the (tcr- 
 mans at once altered (heir course :uid increased speed to 
 join tlieir consorts. 
 
 At 1>.4/) the entire British squadron, except the Bristol, 
 
 , 200
 
 The Naval War — High Seas 
 
 proceeded out of tlie harbor, the Carnavon leading. The 
 five ships of the Germans appeared clearly in sight to the 
 southeast, hull down. The visibility was at its ma.ximum, 
 the sea was calm, with a bright sun, clear sky and a light 
 breeze from the northwest. At 10. 2U the British ad- 
 miral made signal for a general advance, the battle 
 cruisers taking the lead ; at 11.15 speed was ea.sed to 
 enable the other cruisers to get into position. The enemy 
 was still maintaining its distance, and at 12. ^0 it was de- 
 cided to attack with the two battle cruisers and the Glas- 
 gow. 
 
 At 12.4? a signal to open fire and engage the enemy 
 was made. The Inflexible opened the fire at 12.55, the 
 Invincible following suit, the target in both cases being 
 the light cruiser. This light cruiser, the Leipzig, in about 
 half an hour, turned away with the two other light cruis- 
 ers, the Nurnburg and the Dresden, to the southwest, and 
 were followed by the Kent, Glasgow and Cornwall of 
 the British fleet. The fight developed finally into three 
 separate actions, the British battle cruisers directing 
 their fire on the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau which 
 replied, opening fire at 1.30. The range varied from 
 13,500 yards to 16,500 yards. At about 2 P. M. the 
 Gneisenau turned away and a second chase ensued until 
 2.45 p. m., when the battle cruisers again opened fire 
 which was replied to by the Germans at 2.55. The 
 Scharnhorst was hit twice and was set on fire, while the 
 Gneisenau was hit by the Inflexible more than once. 
 
 At 3.30 the Scharnhorst turned, which turn was dic- 
 tated by a desire to bring her starboard guns into action, 
 her port battery having been damaged. The fire on her 
 had grown worse. She kept up the fight, but at 4.04 P. 
 M., suddenly listed heavily to port and at 4.17 she 
 sank with her flag flying. The Gneisenau passed on the 
 far side of her late flagship and continued a determined 
 but ineffectual effort to finish with the two battle 
 cruisers. A few minutes after 5. she was evidently in 
 serious straits and her fire slackened. At 5.15 one 
 shell from the Gneisenau struck the Invincible. This 
 was her last effort. At 5.30 P. M. she stopped, badly 
 on fire, but continued to fire from time to. time with 
 a single gim. At 5.40 the 'British squadron closed 
 in on the Gneisenau, whose flag continued flying. At 
 6 P. M. she keeled over suddenly, lay for a few min- 
 utes on her beam ends, and sank. Her prisoners of war 
 reported that her ammunition had given out about 5.30. 
 
 301
 
 The Naval War— High Seas 
 
 About 150 men were picked up alter llie aciii'ii, l)ut 
 some were dead. 
 
 When the Dresden and the other light cruiser 
 turned away from the tight at about 1 V. M., they 
 were pur>ued by three of tlie British ships, the Glas- 
 gow, the Kent and the Cornwall, The Licpzij; was 
 unable to distance the Glasgow, was l)adly hit, and, 
 though she kept afloat until 9 P. M., she was on fire 
 from 7 o'clock. Eighteen of her crew were saved. 
 
 The Nurnberg was equally unfortunate. The Kent 
 got within range of her at about 5 P. M., and at G.30 
 she was on fire above, the Kent by this time having 
 closed to within 3,00(i yards. She kept up her fire 
 until about 6.50, but turned over and sank conif>l< t.lv 
 at about 7.15. Seven survivors were rescued. 
 
 The Dresden managed to make her escape, iier 
 speed was greater than that of her consorts, and the 
 only vessel which could catch her, the Glasgow, was 
 engaged with the Liepzii;. The two transports or 
 colliers which accompanied the German fleet, the 
 Baden and Santa Isabel, were sunk by the Mace- 
 donia. Had the British arrived forty-eight hours 
 later, the Falkland Islands would probably have been 
 in German hands and would have cost hundreds of 
 H\cs to regain. 
 
 The effect of this victory was to completely clear 
 the southern Pacific seas of all German ships except 
 the Dresden, and her escape necessitated employing 
 several British ship< in her search which could have 
 been otherwise employed, and indirectly led to tlie 
 loss of a Japanese cruiser. 
 
 The G.erman loss at the battle of the Falkland Islamic 
 was. as close as can be figured, about 1600 men. all 
 billed. The British loss we do not know, but from what 
 can be conjectured, it was slight, not more than thirty 
 or forty killed and a few wounded. 
 
 The Konigsberg. which sank the Pega'^U'^ in Zan- 
 zibar harbor, as hereinbefore told, wa>^ l)ottled up in 
 the Rufigi river on the east coast of .\frica in Novem- 
 ber. After a chase bv a British cruiser she took refuge 
 in this rivei and managed to force her way up stream 
 until she was out of range. A coal vessel, the Kew- 
 bridcre. and a cable ship, the Duplex, were requisitioned 
 and sunk in the channel of the "Stream, so as to prevent 
 her coming out. This was not done without los-^ of 
 life. The Konigsberg then concealed herself bv fas- 
 tening palm branche-i to her masts and fimnels. mak- 
 
 202
 
 The Naval War— High Seas 
 
 in^ her indistinguishable from the sea. This difficulty 
 the British overcame by bringing an aeroplane down 
 the coast which flew inland and marked the position 
 of the German cruiser by smoke bombs, thus enabling 
 her to be destroyed by artillery carried to land from 
 the British cruisers. 
 
 In the Baltic little took place after the sinking of 
 the Palada and the internment of the Berlin. On the 
 18th of December the Friedrich Carl, the German ar- 
 mored cruiser, struck a mine in the Baltic and was 
 lost, 378 of her crew going down with her. Occasional 
 attacks on Russian towns along the shore of the Baltic 
 were made, Libau being the principal point aimed at 
 by the German ships, but the results do not appear to 
 have been commensurate with the efforts. The Rus- 
 sian navy remained in its ports, which policy of pru- 
 dence is not at all surprising in view of its weakness. 
 
 A complete list of the ships lost to March 1st by the 
 several contending powers will be found in the ap- 
 pendix. 
 
 2{y,i
 
 CHAl'l hK \\ II. 
 
 THE NAVAL WAR^ 
 
 MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK 
 
 SEA 
 
 In the early pari of tlie war, the western part of the 
 Mediterranean was larjjely turned over to the bVench to 
 guard. Two Ciernian sliips. the ()oel^n and the Breslau. 
 were in the Mediterranean, cut off from tlie possibihty 
 of rejoining the main German naval force. The Goeben, 
 which was near the Algerian coast, proceeded thither and 
 threw a few shots into Rone, but learning tiiat a portion 
 of the Trench fleet was searching for her. she went 
 across and put into the port ^)f Messina, near which she 
 had been jcjincfl by the Hreslau. At tiie expiratitni of the 
 time limit fixed by the Italian authorities for the stay of 
 these ves.sels. which was forty-eight hours, on August 
 8th both left Messina for an unknown destination. This 
 destination turned out to be the Dardanelles, where they 
 arrived after many adventures, successfully eluding ves- 
 sels of the French fleet, and of the British fleet from 
 Malta. 
 
 The Knglish fleet at .Malta at the begitming of hostili- 
 ties consisted of three battle cruisers, four armored 
 cruisers and four light cruisers, besides smaller craft. 
 Otherwise, during the early days of the war. there was 
 little that ha{)pene(! in the Mediterranean of interest. 
 The French endeavored to bottle up the .Austrian fleet 
 at Pola. and to that end botnbarded Cattaro, but were 
 successful only to a degree in their operation. They suc- 
 ceeded on the Ifith of .'\tigust in sinking a small .Austrian 
 cruiser, the Zenta. The only real effect the I'Veiich ofx^r- 
 ation had was to blockade to commerce all the .Austrian 
 ports from Trieste as far as Pola. 
 
 Early in the war the Britisb government, finding that 
 the Suez Canal was lacing used as a sanctuary, or refuge, 
 from capture, by merchant ships, put presstirc on the 
 F.g)'ptian government, which, of course, wa'i and is a 
 
 201
 
 The Naval War 
 
 creature of Great Britain, to expel them from this sup- 
 posedly neutral territory, with an absolute disregard 
 for the rules of international law which had heretofore 
 obtained. 
 
 In the ,JJaltic nothing of great interest happened. The 
 German fleet had to pay a certain amount of attention 
 to the Russian fleet, because while this was not very 
 formidable, to leave the Baltic altogether unguarded by 
 sea would be to invite the landing of Russian troops on 
 the defencless German coast. While performing this 
 guard duty, the Germans were unfortunate enough to 
 lose the cruiser Magdeburg on the 27th of August. 
 She ran ashore in the fog and was blown up by her 
 crew. Some time afterwards, the Russians, hearing of 
 this accident, made the claim of having destroyed her, 
 but this is not probable. 
 
 Only one battle took place in the Baltic between the 
 Russians and the Germans. On October 10th three 
 Russian armored cruisers, Admiral Makaroff, Palada 
 and Bayan, were doing patrol duty in the northeastern 
 Baltic. In the morning the Admiral Makaroff was at- 
 tacked by a submarine of the enemy and several tor- 
 pedoes were fired at her, but none took effect. In the 
 afternoon of October 11th, this submarine attacked the 
 Bayan and the Palada. The cruisers fired on the sub- 
 marine, but in spite of this the submarine got home on 
 the Palada with a torpedo and struck her probably 
 under her magazine, with the result that she sank im- 
 mediately, carrying all her ill-fated crew, numbering 
 568, with her. She was built in 1906 and had a dis- 
 placement of 7,775 tons. 
 
 On the 26th of October, Duala, German West Africa, 
 was moved against and on the 31st a joint land and naval 
 expedition was launched against the town, the French 
 cruiser Bruix taking a prominent part in the operations, 
 and this culminated in the occupation of Buea on No- 
 vember loth. There were also operations about the same 
 time in the Red Sea, the first against Sheik Seyd Penin- 
 sula. This was undertaken by the battleship Duke of 
 Edinboro, supported by a battalion and a half of Indian 
 troops, and resulted in the Turks being driven out of Fort 
 Tuba and captured by the British with slight casualties. 
 Akaba and its fort on the Gulf of Akaba were captured 
 by the British cruiser Minerva on November 7th without 
 casualties. On the 8th of November Faro, at the mouth 
 of the Shatt-el-arab, was also captured by an expedition 
 
 205
 
 The Naval War 
 
 comprising the British cruiser Odin, a few troops and a 
 naval brigade. 
 
 \\ c will now ...; .. glance on the operaiioa^ in the 
 Black Sea, resulting from the acts of war by Turkey 
 against Russia and her entrance into the European con- 
 tlict. On ( )ctober *^l>th the now Turkish cruisers, the 
 former Ciennan Goebcn and fireslau. which, as we have 
 seal, in the early part of the war took refuge in Turkish 
 waters, and were sold by Germany to Turkey, appeared 
 in the Black Sea and, on ( )ctobcr ^Dth, bombarded sever- 
 al iM)rts on the northern Russian coasts tliereof. This 
 action uas followed the next day by Russia declaring 
 that a state of war existed l>etwein herself and Turke\, 
 and on the 1st of November, the Goeben boml)arded Se- 
 vastopol, throwing over a hundred shells into the town, 
 and, it is said, inflicting some damage. Various naval 
 skirmishes thereafter look place in the Black Sea. the 
 most imi>ortant of which was on the '.)th. when the Rus- 
 sians Ixjinbarded the Turkish forts on the Armenian 
 coasts of tiic Black Sea. 
 
 The onlv fight which took place between the Russian 
 and Turkish fleets in the Black Sea was on the 18th of 
 November, when the Russian fleet aiK)Ut ncK>n was re- 
 turning from a cruise along the Anatolian coast and was 
 nearly abreast of Sevastopol, the Goeben and the Breslau 
 were seen. The Russian fleet immediately took battle for- 
 mation and opened fire at a range of S.OOO yards, with the 
 enemy on their starboard. The Efstafi is said to have hit 
 the Goeben with her first salvo and caused a fire. The 
 action then became general, tiic (joeben concentrating her 
 fire on the Russian flagship. The battle lasted only four- 
 teen minutes when the Goeben withdrew. The Russian 
 casualties were four officers and twenty-four men killed 
 and wounded, but it is said that the material damage 
 was slight. The I'.reslau remained in the offing, taking 
 no part in the action. 
 
 The next appearance of the Goeben was off Batum 
 but was only momentary. On the .'Ird of November the 
 .Mlies with a small squadron as a reply to the Turkish 
 attack on the Russian Black Sea forts, bombarded tlie 
 Dardanelles forts at long range. No damage resulted to 
 either side and probably the intention of this attack was 
 merely to ascertain the range of the guns of the forts. 
 
 The dcsultnrv 1x)mbarding continued for some time, 
 but the attacking fleet was not yet recruited to the neces- 
 sary .strength for the general attack. The entrances to 
 
 206
 
 Mediterranean and Black Sea 
 
 the Dardanelles were known to be mined scientifically, 
 hut nothing^ of any importance occurred here for many 
 weeks, the only event which is worthy of notice bein^ 
 the exploit of the British submarine li-ll on December 
 13th, which entered the Dardanelles on that date, and 
 after diving- under five rows of mines, torpedoed the 
 old Turkish battleship Alessoudiyeh, which was guard- 
 ing the mine field. Although pursued by torpedo boats 
 and fired on by the forts, the B-U managed to get 
 away safely. There was little loss of life/ on the Mes- 
 soudiyeh and her sinking cannot be regarded as a se- 
 rious loss on account of her age and lack of power, This, 
 however, does not detract from the unquestioned gal- 
 lantry of the exploit accomplished by the B-11. 
 
 The Dardanelles straits are extremely difficult for 
 submarine invasion, owing to the swift currents which 
 always jare running through them and which, in addi- 
 tion to their onward motion, often cause local whirl- 
 pools and eddies on their striking a projection, besides 
 which the five rows of mines add very enormously to 
 the danger. In fact, this exploit may be considered as 
 one of the most brilliant single exploits performed by 
 the British during the naval war. 
 
 On January 5th, the British fleets shelled the capital 
 of German East Africa, destroying all the vessels in 
 the harbor, and on the 7th of January the Turkish ship 
 Goeben, which had been repaired after her damage in 
 the action with the Russian fleet in November, was 
 again injured by running on a Russian mine towards 
 the Russian Black Sea coast. 
 
 Various other raids by the Russians and Turks on 
 each other's coasts in the Black Sea took place from 
 time to time, none of which was of any great impor- 
 tance, the only one worthy of notice being that by the 
 Russian fleet on January 23rd on the northern Turk- 
 ish coasts in the Black Sea. 
 
 On February 15th the Russian fleet came out of Pola 
 and bombarded Antivari on the Dalmatian coast. 
 
 From time to time during January and February the 
 Allies made more or less desultory attacks on the Dar- 
 danelles, but with ndl appreciable effect upon the forts 
 guarding the straits. There is nothing else to chronicle 
 prior to March 1st, the date of the closing of thi- record. 
 
 307
 
 STATISTICS 
 
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 
 
 Known inlcrnaiionally as the Ausiro-llungarian mon- 
 archy, really consisting of two states, the Austrian Em- 
 pire ami the Kingdom of Hungary, according to the 
 Compromise of 18(>7 arc perfectly intlepentient of each 
 other, having, however, a dose ix)litical union through 
 the identity of tlie sovereign and the ooinniunity of cer- 
 tain departments of state affairs. 
 
 The common head is the Emperor ut Austria and the 
 ApostoHc King (Apostoli Kiraly) of Hungary. 
 
 The common departments of state affairs are <1) For- 
 eign affairs. {"2) military and naval affairs, and (3) 
 finance, as far as it relates to common affairs. 
 
 Legislative power relating to common affairs is vested 
 in the so-called Delegations. These, — there are two, — 
 consist of sixty members each, .selected from the Parlia- 
 ments of their respective countries. 
 
 Resides this political connection there is a commercial 
 union. This is not permanent, Init is renewed every ten 
 years, the last renewal being in 1907. This amounts to 
 a customs and commercial union, with the same coinage, 
 weights and measures, a joint bank of issue, while the 
 monopolies and ta.xes connected with salt, tobacco, spir- 
 its. Ijeer, sugar and mineral oil are administered on iden- 
 tical princijiles in Ixtth countries. 
 
 The tlircc ministries for common affairs are Foreign 
 Affairs, War and Common Finance. 
 
 Austria-Hungary lies in the geographical heart of 
 luiropc. The following are its chief natural defenses 
 considered as a whole : Towards liavaria. the I'ichtel 
 Mountains, the Bohmerwald. the Inn and the Salzach ; 
 towards Switzerland, the Salle, the Alps and the Rhmc ; 
 towards Italy, the High Alps, the I^go di Garda and the 
 Arnic Alps; towards Serbia, the Save and tlic Danube; 
 towards Rumania, the South F,ast and South Carpathi- 
 ans; towards rfermany. the Rie.sen and Iscr C.cbirge 
 and the Erz-Gcbirgc. These natural defences arc suj)- 
 plemented by artificial defences as follows: In Galicia, 
 Cracow and the fortified and entrenched camp of Przcm- 
 ysl ; in Hungar)' on the left of the Ti'^za. Gyulafchervar. 
 
 208
 
 Statistics 
 
 Arad and Temesvar; on the Danube, Komarom, Peter- 
 varad and Ursova ; in iJalniatia is the coast fortifica- 
 tion of Cattaro; in Istria, Pola, a fortified naval har- 
 bor. The Alpine frontiers in the Tyrol have defenses 
 on all the routes, and also between Tyrol and the 
 Adriatic Sarajevo is a fortified place. Neither of the 
 capitals and Vienna and Budapest are defended. 
 
 Pola is the chief naval port, and is strongly fortified, 
 both towards land and sea, and has been recently en- 
 larged and can accommodate the entire fleet, Triest is 
 the great storehouse and also an arsenal of the navy. 
 
 The Austrian Hungarian army reflects the peculiar 
 constitution of the Dual Monarchy. The first line is 
 under the Common Army. The Austrian Landwehr 
 and Landsturm are, however, entirely separate from 
 the Hungarian Landwehr, (Honved) and Landsturm 
 (Nepfolkeles). 
 
 Military service is compulsory and universal through- 
 out the Empire, extending to all races. Liability extends 
 from the 19th to the end of the 42nd year and active 
 service usually begins in the 21st year. In the Common 
 Army and both Landwehrs continuous service is for 2 
 years (3 for the cavalry and horse artillery) followed by 
 10 years in the reserve, and then 2 years in the reserve of 
 the Landwehr. At the completion of the 12th year of 
 service the soldier passes to the Landsturm, where he re- 
 mains until his 42nd birthday. 
 
 Both Austrian Landwehr and Hungarian Honved are 
 permanently embodied and train their own recruits. 
 When the young men of proper age present themselves 
 each year to perform their military service numbers are 
 drawn. Those who draw the lowest are allotted to the 
 Common Army until the required contingent is obtained. 
 This is fixed at 167,263. of whom 6,000 are for the navy. 
 The next lowest go to the Landwehrs, the contingent for 
 the Austrian being 28,000 and the Hungarian 25,000. The 
 remainder of those physically fit pass into the Ersatz or 
 supplementary reserve. 
 
 The Ersatz reserve is intended primarily to maintain 
 the strength of the units on field services and there are 
 separate Ersatz reserves for the Common Army and the 
 Landwehrs. These undergo eight weeks' training the first 
 year and thereafter the same training as the other reserves 
 of the force to which they belong. 
 
 The weapon used is the Mannlicher magazine rifle 
 
 209
 
 Statistics 
 
 nicxJcl \)o, calibre 31J. The cavalry carry the Mannlicher 
 carbine of like calibre. 
 
 The field gi\n f irts a shrapnel of 14 1-2 lbs. The field 
 howitzer batteries arc armed with a 10.5 cm. piece weigh- 
 ing 1,000 pounds and firing a ^0 lb. shell. The mountain 
 gim is the 7 cm. malleable bronze gun, weighing 257 lbs., 
 shell 10 1-2 lbs. .Ml batteries have six guns in time of 
 war, except mountain batteries, which have four. 
 
 The total peace strength of the Austrian army was, 
 in 19i;5, ;i4,(Mt') officers, 390.249 men and 89,877 horses. 
 The war strength is about 860.000 troops of the first line 
 (actives and first two years of reserves) 1,250,000 troops 
 of the second line (eight years of reserves) 500,000 
 Krsatz reserves and 1,500,000 troops of the thir<l line. 
 
 In 191 ;} the budget contained the following sums for 
 the Army: Common .Xrmy $88,590,000; Hungarian 
 Honved $17,Tl^v^0<Ml ; Austrian Landwchr $11,894,350; 
 Bosnian establishment $1.()25.000. Tlie Landslurms are 
 provided for separately in the particular expenses of 
 Austria and Hungary. 
 
 The .Austrian navy is a joint expense and there was 
 expended for naval purp<iscs in 1913 $15,006,147. in 1912 
 $14,501,000 and in 1911 $13,674,500. 
 
 At the end of 1914 the effective strength was: Dread- 
 noughts, 4; I 're- Dreadnoughts. 12; armored cruisers, 3; 
 torpedo giml)oats, 7 : destroyers, 18 ; torpedo boats, 63 ; 
 submarines, 15. 
 
 In addition to those there was a flotilla of monitors 
 used on the Danube and other rivers. 
 
 The names of the principal ships of the navy will l>e 
 found on the opposite page. 
 
 The personnel of the navy consisted in 1913 of 9oT 
 officers and cadets, 1513 mechanicians, engineers, doc- 
 tors, etc., and alxjut 15,500 sailors. 
 
 The general debt of Au.stria Hungary in 1913 was 
 $1,047,154,000, bearing interest at from 3 to 5 per cent., 
 with an annual interest charge of $47,900,000. 
 
 The common monetary unit of the Austrian Hungarian 
 monarchy is the crown, which is equal to 20.3 cents in 
 Anurirau money. The empire uses the gold standard. 
 
 AUSTRIA. 
 Au.stria proper has a Parliament (Reichsrath) con- 
 sisting of two houses, the I'pper or Herren House, com- 
 posed of princes of the blood, 11 in 1913, HI nobles who 
 fXTupy hereditary seats. 17 archbishops and bishops and 
 
 210
 
 Statistics 
 
 AUSTRIAN NAVY 
 
 DREADNOUGHTS 
 
 Begun Name Displacement Main Armament 
 
 1910 Veribus Unitis 20,300 12 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 1910 Teggethoff 20,300 12 12-in., 12 6-in, 
 
 1910 Prinz Eugen 20,300 12 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 1910 Svent Istvan 20,300 12 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 e Power 
 
 Speed 
 
 25,000 
 
 20 
 
 25,000 
 
 20 
 
 25,000 
 
 20 
 
 25,000 
 
 20 
 
 PRE-DREADNOUGHTS 
 
 1893 Monarch 5,()00 
 
 1893 Wien 5,000 
 
 1893 Budapest .5.600 
 
 1899 Hapsburg 8,300 
 
 1899 Arpad 8,300 
 
 1899 Babenberg 8,300 
 
 1901 Erzherzog Karl 10,000 
 
 1901 Erz. Friedrich 10,000 
 
 1901 Erz. Ferdinand Max. . . 10,000 
 
 1907 Erz. Franz Ferdinand. 14, 500 
 
 1907 Radetzky 14.500 
 
 1907 Zrinyi 14,500 
 
 4 9.4- 
 
 in. 
 
 6 6-in. 
 
 
 8,000 
 
 17.0 
 
 4 9.4- 
 
 in. 
 
 6 6-in. 
 
 
 8,000 
 
 17.0 
 
 4 9.4- 
 
 in. 
 
 6 6-in. 
 
 
 8,000 
 
 17.0 
 
 3 9.4- 
 
 in. 
 
 12 6-in. 
 
 
 15,000 
 
 19 
 
 3 9.4- 
 
 in. 
 
 12 6-in. 
 
 
 15,000 
 
 19 
 
 3 9.4- 
 
 in. 
 
 12 6-in. 
 
 
 15,000 
 
 19 
 
 4 9.4- 
 
 in. 
 
 12 17.6- 
 
 in. 
 
 18,000 
 
 20 
 
 4 9.4- 
 
 in. 
 
 12 17.6- 
 
 in. 
 
 18,000 
 
 20 
 
 4 9.4- 
 
 in. 
 
 12 17.6- 
 
 in. 
 
 18,000 
 
 20 
 
 4 13-i 
 
 n.. 
 
 8 9.4-in. 
 
 
 20,000 
 
 20 
 
 4 13-i 
 
 n.. 
 
 8 9.4-in. 
 
 
 20,000 
 
 20 
 
 4 13-i 
 
 n., 
 
 8 9.4-in. 
 
 
 20,000 
 
 20 
 
 CRUISERS (Armored) 
 
 1890 Maria Theresa 5,200 2 7. 6-in., 8 6-in. 
 
 1896 Kaiser Karl VI 6,300 2 9.4-in.. 8 6-in. 
 
 1901 St. Georg 7,300 2 9.4-in., 5 7-in., 4 6-in. 
 
 9,000 
 12,300 
 15,000 
 
 19.0 
 20.0 
 22 
 
 CRUISERS (Protected) 
 
 1887 Kaiserin Elisabeth .... 4^000 8 6-in. 
 
 1887 Kaiser F. Joseph 4.000 8 6-in. 
 
 1896 Zenta . . .' 3,400 8 4.7-in. 
 
 1896 Aspern 2,400 8 4.7-in. 
 
 1896 Szigetvar 2,400 8 4.7-in. 
 
 1908 Admiral Spaun 3,500 7 4.1-in. 
 
 1911 Saida 3,500 9 4.1-in. 
 
 1911 Helgoland 3,500 9 4.1-in. 
 
 1911 Novara 3,.500 9 4.1-in. 
 
 8,000 
 
 20 
 
 8,000 
 
 20 
 
 7,200 
 
 20 
 
 7,200 
 
 20 
 
 7^200 
 
 20 
 
 20,000 
 
 26 
 
 25,000 
 
 27 
 
 25,000 
 
 27 
 
 25,000 
 
 27 
 
 211
 
 Statistics 
 
 of life members, not less than 160 or more than 170, 
 nominated by the Emperor on account of being distin- 
 guishecl in art or science or who have renderetl signal 
 services to church or state. 
 
 The Lower House (Abgcordnclcnhausj is elected by 
 all Austrian male citizens over the age of 24, who have 
 resided one year in the place where they vote, l)y uni- 
 versal, equal and ilirect suffrage. 
 
 In Lower Austria. Upper Austria, Salzburg, Carniola, 
 Moravis, Silesia, VorarllK'rg and Bukowina voting for 
 raembcrs of the Lower House is compulsory and absten- 
 tion is punished. 
 
 The term vi the Lower House is six years and mem- 
 bers receive compensation and meet annually, electing 
 their own officers. All constitutional matters concerning 
 rights, duties and interests that are common to all the 
 provinces of Austria must be regulated by the Keichs- 
 ralh. Members of either House can propose legi.^lalion 
 which, to become law, must pass both Houses and be 
 approved by the Executive. 
 
 The ministry is responsible to the Reichsrath. In ad- 
 dition to this central legislative body, there is a Diet in 
 each province, which occupies itself with local legislation, 
 fulfilling very much the same funclii)ns as the American 
 state legislatures. There are 17 of these Diets in all. 
 Each commune has an elective council which takes 
 charge of local affairs. 
 
 The iKjpulation of Austria proper in 1900 was 26,921,- 
 671; in lOKi iJH,:?^ 1,;U0, thus showing an annual increase 
 of .89. Of this population 1 1,O.M.022 were males and 
 14,5:n.yi2 females. The ethnic elements on the basis of 
 language were : 
 
 German . U,050,266 
 
 Kuhcminii .\I'm;i\ lan aiKi .^i;iv.tk . 6,435,983 
 
 Kuthcniati 3.:.18,8.^4 
 
 Slovene 1 2.'.2,940 
 
 Serbian and Croatian "^T.'i.sa* 
 
 Italian an.! I ..li.. 7f.>H.422 
 
 Rumania :275,n5 
 
 .Magyar in,<t74 
 
 These are all of Austrian birth and parents. It is im- 
 {Kirtant not to confuH' race with nationality in reading 
 these statistics. ( )f Rumanians, born in Rumania, there 
 are .■{,.*»78 resident in .\ustria, not included in the Ru- 
 manians mentioned in the alx)vc tables. 
 
 The average births from 1906 to 1912. inclusive, were 
 just under 9tO.(»()(». Religious libcrtv is a leading prin- 
 
 21?
 
 Statistics 
 
 ciple of the Austrian constitution and the Minister of 
 Ecclesiastical Affairs will grant legal recognition to any 
 religious bodies if their doctrine, worship, constitution 
 and designation contain nothing illegal or immoral (Stat- 
 ute of May 20, 18Ti). The large majority, 78.8 per cent., 
 of the population are Roman Catholics, Protestants only 
 forming ^.1 per cent, and Jews 4.6( per cent, thereof. 
 
 In 1911 there were 24,220 elementary schools in the 
 empire, with 110,607 teachers and 4,533,734 pupils en- 
 rolled, a total numher of 4,88."j,734 children of school 
 age. Attendance is compulsory from 6 to 14 throughout 
 Austria generally, in four provinces till 12 only, and in 
 one till 13. Instruction is in the local language. Thus, of 
 these schools, in 9,180 German was used, in G,033 
 Czech, in 7,809 other Slav dialects, etc. Secondary, 
 higher and technical education is well provided for. 
 
 The cultivated area in 1912 reached 28,304,933 hec- 
 tares (49,141,489 acres), held by 2,856,349 holders, of 
 whom 2,054,035 were owners. 
 
 The statistics of the leading crops for three years 
 will be found on the following page. 
 
 Mining is an important industry, employing over 
 175,000 workmen and in 1912 producing the following 
 quantities and values of the leading mineral and metal- 
 lic products : 
 
 Minerals Metric tons fCrowns Metric tons Crowns 
 
 Gold 301.920 603,840 204* 662,775 
 
 Silver 217,935 4.076.705 49,355* 4,905,366 
 
 Copper 173,537 1,668,525 30,572 4,613.740 
 
 Quicksilver . . . 1,177,797 2,882,630 7,626 3,972,912 
 
 Zinc 346,747 2.887,256 172,979 10,555,550 
 
 Iron 29,266,857 27,364,903 17,598.505 143,893,646 
 
 Lead 279,515 6,567,943 199,934 9,521,859 
 
 Graphite 453,748 1,869,998 — — 
 
 Brown Coal ...362,836,895 141,045,962 — — 
 
 Coal 157.978.895 162,600,453 — — 
 
 *Kilogrammes. 
 
 fThe crown is 20.3 cents. 
 
 Manufacturing is extensively carried on in the large 
 cities. In manufacturing, the character of the plants 
 differs according to locality. In the large cities are 
 many important modern establishments, such as iron 
 foundries, vehicle factories, glass works, sugar mills, 
 and plants for manufacturing woolen and cotton goods, 
 leather goods, furniture, etc. In the smaller towns 
 and mountain hamlets, handwork is carried on to an 
 enormous extent. 
 
 213
 
 Statistics 
 
 The commercial marine of Austria is as follows: 
 
 Vessels Ton- Crews Vessels Ton- Crews 
 
 Sea-going vessels 
 Coasting vessels 
 
 nage 
 
 1911 1011 1911 
 186 384,553 4.965 
 1.008 35,311 4,811 
 
 nage 
 
 1012 1912 1013 
 
 193 407.016 8,378 
 
 1,603 35,428 4,87S 
 
 Fishing vessels, etc. 14,435 
 Total 
 
 37,966 34,082 14,960 28,808 35,311 
 
 T-.L'29 437,830 43.858 16,764 471,252 45,567 
 
 STATISTICS OF LEADING CROPS 
 
 ACREAGE 
 
 1910 1911 1912 
 
 Wheat 2,997.540 3.001,272 3,112,983 
 
 Barlev . 2.720,767 2.708.792 2.632,780 
 
 Oats'. 4.527,554 4,638.803 4.611,320 
 
 Rye 5.090.621 4.992.722 8,019.381 
 
 Maize (1st crop) 764,692 742.462 748,891 
 
 Spelt • 13,449 14,976 15,373 
 
 Buckwheat (1st crop") 170.959 169.200 167,404 
 
 Buckwheat (2nd crop) 208.564 205,707 204,fl3« 
 
 Mixed Corn 121.830 95,372 111,150 
 
 Other kinds (1st crop) 89.310 87.527 76,711 
 
 P.'Uo 625.592 625.730 636,404 
 
 PRODUCE 
 
 1910 1911 1912 
 
 Wheat 7.051.746 7,130,757 8.444.702 
 
 Barley 7.86.n,650 8,404.871 8.981.688 
 
 Oats 15,329.670 16,380.755 17.731,556 
 
 Rye 13,627.589 12.751.977 14 490,30-» 
 
 Maize (ISt crop) 2,026,950 1,431607 1.822,660 
 
 Spelt 69.845 95,093 128,407 
 
 Buckwheat (1st crop) 1.413,809 1.313.127 998.951 
 
 Buckwheat (2nd crop) 1,14.'.. 572 768 659 654.476 
 
 Mixed Corn 1.428.271 1.110,474 1,492.376 
 
 Other kinds (1st Crop> 770,802 r,73.416 497.515 
 
 Pill 5,176.820 4.746,771 4 007,515 
 
 214
 
 Statistics 
 
 There are 8,053 miles ol railroad in Austria, owned 
 by the state ; state lines, 8,053 miles ; private companies' 
 lines worked by the State, 430 miles ; private companies' 
 lines worked by themselves, 5,637 miles ; of foreign 
 companies in Austrian territory, 20,798 miles. 
 
 There are 9,859 post offices, 7,171 telegraph offices 
 and there were 369,671,096 telephone conversations 
 held in 1912. 
 
 The separate debt' of Austria in 1913 was $1,484,489,- 
 000, bearing interest at from 3 to 4 per cent., with an 
 annual charge of $63,851,000. 
 
 HUNGARY. 
 
 The Hungarian Parliament (Orszaggyules) has leg- 
 islative authority for Hungary and for Croatia and Sla- 
 vonia in matters which concern these provinces in com- 
 mon with Hungary proper. It consists of an Upper 
 House (Forendihaz) and a Lower House (Kepviselo- 
 haz). 
 
 The House of Magnates consists of the adult Arch- 
 dukes, certain Hungarian princes, counts and barons, 
 at least 24 years old, and paying at least 6,000 crowns 
 a year land tax, whose families possess the right of 
 hereditary peerage, 50 ecclesiastical representatives of 
 the Roman Catholic, Greek and Protestant churches, life 
 peers appointed by the crown not exceeding 50 in number, 
 life peers elected once for all by the upper he-use, 17 state 
 dignitaries, members ex-officio. 3 delegates of Croatia, 
 Slavonia, and the governor of Fiume. 
 
 The lower house, or house of representatives, is elected 
 by the vote of all male citizens, of 20 years of age, who 
 pay a small direct tax on house property or land, or on 
 an income varying with occupation ; but in all cases low. 
 Members of the lower house are paid. Parliament must 
 meet annually. The executive power of the kingdom is 
 iri a responsible ministry, consisting of a presidency and 
 nine departments. 
 
 The provinces of Croatia and Slavonia have autonomy 
 for 'home affairs, public instruction, and justice. These 
 provinces also have their own provincial diet, consisting 
 of 90 members, elected for five years. 
 
 The local government in Hungary is divided into com- 
 munes and municipalities. The electoral right is pos- 
 sessed by every male inhabitant over 20 years of age. who 
 for two years has paid the state tax. 
 
 The population of Hungary in 1910 was 20,886,487, 
 
 215
 
 Statistics 
 
 of whom 10,345;133 were males and 10,541,164 were 
 females. The averajje yearly increase percent, was 0.86. 
 The ctlniic clcnicnt.s of the ti>tal population on the 
 basis ot lanj,'uag^e \va> as follows in iyi<»: 
 
 HuiiRarun iM.ikiyar) lO.OSO.STS 
 
 CcruKin a,o:»7.435 
 
 Slovak 1.907,970 
 
 Rmn.inian 2.949.031 
 
 Uutlu'iii.iii 472,r)b7 
 
 Croiitian l.^;i;{.162 
 
 Scrl)ian 1,106,471 
 
 Others 44i9.2,s.'i 
 
 It is ai;ain to be remarked that none of the Rumani- 
 ans or Serbians shown in the tabic have ever lx*cn 
 citizens <ir .subjects of those political units designated 
 by the terms Rumania and Serbia. 
 
 The total birtlis in Hungary for the year^. 1908 to 
 1912, inclusive, averaf^e about 7tj8,00(t. 
 
 There is |)crfeLi equality anu»ng all legally recognized 
 religions. Tiiese are : The Roman and Greek Catholic, 
 the Evangelical (Augsburg and Helvetian), Unitarian. 
 Greek Oriental, Gregorian Armenian, the Baptists, and 
 the Jewish. Each has an independent administration 
 of its own affairs. 
 
 The Roman Catholics form 52.1 per cent, of the pop- 
 ulation, the Protestants 19, the Greek Oriental 14.3, 
 the Jews 4.5. 
 
 Public education in Hungary is compulsory for chil- 
 dren from () to 12 years, and repetition courses for chil- 
 dren from 12 to 15 years; the industrial law of 1854 
 rccjuires special courses for apprentices; and by the law 
 of 1891 children from 3 to 6 years may be sent to infant 
 schools, unless otherwise provided for. Every com- 
 mune is bound to maintain an infant school. In 1912 
 there were 2.885 such schools with 252,750 infants at- 
 tending. Every commune is bound to have a primary 
 school if the number of scliool age is 30. In 1912 tliere 
 were 19.521 primary schools, with 49,150 teachers and 
 2,969,111 pupils. The total number of children of 
 school age was 3,548.305. 
 
 Secondary, technical and higher education are amply 
 provided for. 
 
 The production(of wheat, corn, oats, l)arley and rye 
 in 1912 was as follows: 
 
 \Vhc;«t l84.ft4.3.SC2 bushels 
 
 Corn .. •..•OR. 14,1.004 Unslidi* 
 
 Oat« ..." so.ornns? huslipU 
 
 Raricv 72,11 0,35« l.nshcU 
 
 Ryr . '.rt,fl73.2ftO bu-ihds 
 
 2 I ('.
 
 Statistics 
 
 The total area of all cultivated lands in Hungary in 
 1912 was H(),26U,2;i9 acres. 
 
 In Hungary there were (April, 1913) 2,0()o,019 horses, 
 905 mules, 1(5,157 asses, 6,200,807 cattle (including 161,- 
 683 buffalos), 0,659,858 sheep, 6,824,057 pigs, 268,752 
 goats, and 607,986 beehives. The exports of horses, 
 cattle, and sheep far exceed the imports. 
 
 Miningemploys about 79,000 persons and the salt works 
 3,000. The principal productions are iron ore, pig iron 
 and lignite. 
 
 Manufactures employ 12.8 per cent, of the earning 
 population, or 1,127,130 persons. Clothing, foodstuffs, 
 iron and metals, buildings, wood and bfjne, machinery, 
 earthenware and glass are the principal industries. The 
 beet sugar industry is also a large one. 
 
 The commerical marine of Hungary in 1912 : 
 
 Number of Tonnage Crews 
 vessels 
 
 Sea-going vessels 68 127,96;i 1,518 
 
 Coasting vessels 160 10,730 753 
 
 Fishing vessels, etc 305 594 86'.) 
 
 Total 533 139,289 3,131 
 
 Of the total number of vessels 133 of 137,416 tons 
 were steamers, and 400 of 1873 tons were sailing vessels. 
 
 The following are the railway statistics for 1912 : 
 State lines 5,061 miles ; companies' lines worked by the 
 state 6,170 miles; companies' lines worked bv companies 
 2,102 miles; total length, 13,333 miles. 
 
 In 1912 there were 6,489 postoffices, 4,994 telegraph 
 offices and 201,504,419 telephonic conversations were 
 held. 
 
 The separate debt of Hungary in 1911 was $1,267,- 
 801,000, bearing interest at from 3 to 4^ per cent., with 
 an annual charge of $53,763,000. 
 
 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
 The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were, by 
 the treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878), handed over to 
 the Austro-Hungarian government for administration 
 and military occupation. By autograph letter of the Em- 
 peror, of October 5, 1908, addressed to the premiers of 
 the two states, the sovereignty of his Majesty, the Em- 
 peror-King, was extended over these two provinces. 
 The direction of their administration is exercised by 
 the Bosnian bureau. A new constitution was proclaimed 
 
 217
 
 Statistics 
 
 on February :<ioth, lyio. A diet chosen by imiversal 
 suffrage is competent to ileal with provincial finance, 
 taxes, railways, police, public works and civil and crim- 
 inal law, subject to Austrian or Hungarian veto. This 
 diet is elected and the number of seats are apportioned 
 among the divers religions practised. At present the 
 Jews have one seat, the Roman Catholics IG, the Ma- 
 hometans 'v4 and the Orthodox 'M. The government ap- 
 points besides, 20 members. 1 representing the authori- 
 ties, the other IG being the spiritual heads of the various 
 religions. 
 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina contain G districts with an 
 area of 19.TGS square miles. The population in 1S>1U was 
 1,898.044 (994,852 males and 903,192 females) and in 
 1912 there were 81,994 births. 
 
 Elementary education is free and under circumstances 
 compulsory. In the village schools the teaching of prac- 
 tical agriculture has been lately introduced. There are 
 altogether about l.Htiu elementary schools and provision 
 is made for higher instruction. 
 
 The agricultural population in 1910 was 87 per cent, 
 of the whole, but agriculture is still in a low state of 
 development though the soil is very fertile. Forest land 
 occupies 49.8 per cent, of the whole area. 
 
 Maize, wheat, barley, oats, rye, millet and buckwheat, 
 potatoes, flax and hemp are cultivated. 
 
 In these provinces in 1910 there were 221,981 horses, 
 1,308,9:30 cattle, 1,393,068 goats, 2,499,422 sheep and 
 52T,271 swine. 
 
 Minerals are abundant; mining is now carried on 
 (mainly by the government) for iron and copper, man- 
 ganese, chromium, quicksilver and coal. 
 
 Manufacturing is still in its infancy. 
 
 There were in 1912 l,2ir) miles of railway, 222 post- 
 offices, and a small telephone service. 
 
 Military service is compulsory over 21 years of age. 
 The native troops comprise 4 infantry regiments. 4 bat- 
 talion scadre of reserve. 4 sections of train, 1 battalion 
 of Jagers with a total of 7.200 men on peace footing. 
 
 BELGIUM 
 
 According to the constitution of 1831 Belgium is "a 
 constitutional representative and liereditary monarchy." 
 The royal succession is in the direct male line in the or- 
 der^ primogeniture. No act of the King can have effect 
 
 218
 
 Statistics 
 
 unless countersigned by one of his ministers who thus 
 becomes resjjonsible for it. 
 
 The Parliament consists of two chambers, the Senate 
 and the Chamber of Representatives. The Senate con- 
 sists of 120 members, each of whom must be at least 
 forty years of age; 27 of these are elected by the Pro- 
 vincial Councils, a number equal to half the membership 
 of the Chamber of Representatives is elected directly by 
 vote of the electors, who possess the same qualifications 
 as electors for the Chamber, except that each elector 
 must be thirty years old. Senators must pay at least $240 
 yearly in direct taxes or have an income from real estate 
 of $2,400. The term is 8 years. All members of the 
 Chamber of Deputies are elected directly. Their num- 
 ber, at present 186, is proportioned to the population, one 
 to each 40,000. The term is four years, one half retir- 
 ing every second year, except that after a dissolution a 
 general election takes place. Deputies must be 25 years 
 of age. 
 
 The franchise is peculiar. Every citizen over 25 years 
 of age, domiciled in the same commune for at least one 
 year, has one vote. Citizens 35 years of age, having 
 children and paying one dollar or over a year house tax, 
 and citizens 25 years of age owning real property worth 
 $400, or having a corresponding income from such class 
 of property, or who has received for two years an income 
 of twenty dollars a year from government funds, has a 
 supplementary vote. Every citizen over 25, who has re- 
 ceived a diploma of higher instruction, or a certificate of 
 higher secondary instruction, or who fills, or has filled, 
 offices, or engaged in private professional practice imply- 
 ing at least average higher instruction, has two supple- 
 mentary votes. No person, however, can have more 
 than three votes. Voting is compulsory and a failure to 
 vote is punished. 
 
 Deputies receive $800 and transportation. 
 
 The Parliament must meet annually in November and 
 sit at least 40 days. 
 
 The King has power to convoke on extraordinary oc- 
 casions, and can dissolve either or both houses, separate- 
 ly or simultaneously. In case of dissolution, a new elec- 
 tion must take place in forty days and a meeting of the 
 newly-elected Parliament within sixty days. Money 
 bills and bills relating to the army must originate in the 
 low^er house. 
 
 The executive consists of 11 departments under the 
 
 219
 
 Statistics 
 
 following^ ministers: i'rcsidrtu of Council and Wa.r, 
 Science and Art, Interior, Finance, Aj^icnlture and Pub- 
 lic Works, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Colonies. Industry 
 and Labor. Railways, Marine anil of Post an Tele- 
 graphs. 
 
 The principle of proportional representation of parties 
 obtains in all elective offices. 
 
 The provinces atul comtnunes have a large amount of 
 autonomous g»)vcrnnient. though the system is extremely 
 intricate and the central government has a kind of super- 
 visi.»ry |x)\\er. To descrilK- tliis system would exceed the 
 space available, however. 
 
 The population of Pelgiuni in PJlu was 7,423,784. the 
 increase per annum for the ten preceding years was 109 
 per cent. i)( this jxjpulation 3,()8O,7*J0 were males, and 
 ;J, 742. 994 females, or yh males for every 100 females. 
 Of this populatiiMi li ,>i'A:i ,'-V.i i s|)oke French only. ;i,«?v'(»,- 
 6\i'^ I'leniish oniy, .U.ilo C.erman only, 871,'.iht> French 
 and Flemish, T l.l'lt.j French and German, 8.Go2 Flemish 
 and Cerman and 52,.i47 all three languages. The total 
 nimiber of births in 1910 was 176,4KK 
 
 The vast niajc^rity of the inhabitants are Roman Cath- 
 olics, though all religions under the usual reserves are 
 permitted and the state does not interfere in any way 
 with the internal affairs of the churches. Part of the 
 income of the priests and ministers is paid from the na- 
 tional treasury; this in lin;{ amountetl to sj^l. IH.},(>4^» to 
 Catholics. *2;{,K»0 to Protestants and $*^,00(» to Jews. The 
 census makes no intjuiry as to religious ])rofessitin and 
 hence the memlxJrs of each faith cannot l>e given. 
 
 Primary eilucation cost in 1910 $11,477..'>10. There 
 were in 1911 T,r»!to primary schools with 9;^l,^';iO pupils, 
 3,18<» infant sch(X)ls with 27o,!»ll pupils and 41.940 
 adult primary schools with 2 16,292 i)U|)ils. There arc 
 al.so many private or free schools imder tx'clesiasticaJ 
 care. Ample provision is ma<le for secondary and higher 
 education. 
 
 The percentage of illiteracy in I'.elgium is, however, 
 fairly high; in 1910 13.1 per cent, of the population over 
 the age of 8 could loeither read nor write. 
 
 The lielgian deht on January Ist, 19i;{, was $74T.«06,- 
 747. Uaring interest at 2).- and -i j)er i^nl. 
 
 The army is recruited partly by voluntary enlistment 
 antl partly by conscription, the latter consisting of 49 
 per cent, of the aimual contingent. N'ohintaiy enlj>^tment 
 i& retained for those who wish to make the army a pro- 
 
 220
 
 Statistics 
 
 fession. Engagements are for five and seven years for 
 those less than 18 years old, and three and five for those 
 older. Compulsory recruits serve 15 months in the in- 
 fantry, engineers' and garrison artillery, one year and 
 nine months in the field artillery and two years in the 
 cavalry. The annual contingent is 33,000. 
 
 The total length of service is eight years in the first 
 line or "active army" and five years in the reserve. Re- 
 servists are called to the colors for brief periods of 
 training at stated intervals. 
 
 The peace strength of the army authorized is 3,300 
 officers and 50,300 men ; the war strength is estimated 
 at 350,000, 170,000 field army, 140,000 fortresses, etc., 
 and the remainder train, commissary, sanitary troops, 
 etc. In addition there is the gendarmerie of 3,800 men, 
 half mounted, and the Garde Civique, 46,000 men with 
 large reserves. 
 
 The infantry is armed with the Mauser rifle. The field 
 artillery has the shielded Krupp quick-fire gun, calibre 
 7.5 cm. 
 
 The army estimates for 1914 were $20,220,000. Bel- 
 gium has no navy. 
 
 The following table shows the agricultural products for 
 the latest vear available. Of the 7,298,474 acres of total 
 area, 4,290,090 are under cultivation, 1,289,614 are forest 
 and the remainder fallow or uncultivated, roads, marshes, 
 rivers, etc. 
 
 The principal crops for the two years 1911 and 1912 
 yielded : 
 
 Crop Acreage Produce in cwt. 
 
 1911 1912 1911 1912 
 
 Wheat 398,423 396,499 8,432,736 8,219,836 
 
 Barley 88,313 84.279 1,904,358 1,822,041 
 
 Oats 638,591 647,612 12,353,477 10,021,930 
 
 Rye 647,543 650,077 12,176,821 10,653,382 
 
 Potatoes 386,800 387,009 2,702,847 3,253,067 
 
 Beet Sugar 145,061 152,851 1,482,518 1,702,535 
 
 Tobacco 10,542 9,922 166,874 197,352 
 
 In 1912 there were 262,709 horses, 1,830,747 horned 
 cattle and 1,348,514 pigs. 
 
 Of the important industries the following may be men- 
 tioned : artificial silk, motor cars, glass, iron, steel, lace 
 (particularly hand made), linen and gloves. 
 
 Coal mining is a very important industry. In 1912 
 145,670 persons were employed and 2,972,000 tons were 
 raised, of a value of about $76,088,800. 
 
 Pig iron in 1912, 2,301,290 tons ; manufactured iron 
 
 221
 
 Statistics 
 
 334,750 tons; btocl ingots 2,ol5,4uu tons; steel rails 1,- 
 yo3,2u7 tons; *'y4,:G4 of raw and 121,226 tons of re- 
 fincil raw sugar were produced in VJll. Tlie Belgian 
 ntercham niarnie in 1U12 embraced i)"! steamers of 174,- 
 U21 tons burthen. 
 
 The total length of roads, mostly paved with stone, 
 was 25.446 miles; navigable water-ways 1,2^58; length of 
 railways .'),()41, nearly all uwneil by the state. There were 
 1,7U8 pc^stolficcs, l,G7y*telegraph offices, and there were 
 i;{o,2U(»,4T2 telephonic conversations held in 1912. 
 
 Belgium has one colony, Belgian Congo, located in 
 western Africa. This colony, founded by Leopold II. of 
 Belgium and originally known as the Congo Independent 
 State, was aimcxed to Belgium formally in 1908. It has 
 an area of 909,654 square miles and a population esti- 
 mated at 15,000,000. The chief pnxlucts are rubber, 
 [jalm nuts and palm oil, white copal, cocoa and ivory. 
 
 FRANCE 
 
 The government of France is republican in form. 
 L'nder tiie constitution the legislative power i-^ vested in 
 the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and the execu- 
 tive power in the President and the Ministry. 
 
 The President is elected for a term of seven years by 
 an absolute majority of the Senate and Chamlx'r voting 
 together as one body. He selects a ministry from the 
 two chambers, promulgates and ensures the execution 
 of the laws, appoints to all civil and military posts, par- 
 dons, and is responsible only in case of high treason. 
 The President concludes treaties with foreign powers, 
 only those affecting the area of France or her colonics 
 needing approval by the legislature, and he must have 
 the assent of the legislature to declare war. Every act 
 by the President must be countersigned by a minister. 
 He can dissolve the Chamber of Deputies with the con- 
 sent of the Senate. In case of vacancy, a new President 
 is at once elected. 
 
 The mini.sters, whose numl>er varies, are usually, but 
 not necessarily, members of the Senate or Chamber of 
 Deputies. The President of the Council ch(X)ses his 
 colleagues. Each minister has the direction of one of the 
 great administrative departments, and is responsible to 
 the Chaml>crs for his acts, while the ministry as a whole 
 is responsible for the general policy of the government. 
 
 222
 
 Statistics 
 
 The Ministry resigns on an adverse vote in the 
 Chamber of Deputies. 
 
 The Senate is composed of 300 members elected for 
 nine years from citizens over forty, one-third retiring 
 every three years. The election is indirect and is made 
 by an electoral body composed of delegates chosen by 
 the Municipal Council of each commune in proportion 
 to population and of the Deputies, Councillors, Gen- 
 eral and District Councillors of the department. 
 
 Deputies are elected for four years by universal suf- 
 frage from citizens twenty-five years of age at least. 
 Deputies need not live in their districts but can be a 
 candidate in one district only. A deputy must have a 
 clear majority of the vote to be elected on the first 
 voting, otherwise another election takes place, when 
 a plurality elects. There are in all 597 deputies. 
 
 The legislature must meet on the 2nd of January 
 each year and must sit five months in each year. It can 
 be convoked by the President at any time, and must be, 
 if one-half of each Chamber so demands. The Presi- 
 dent can adjourn the legislature, but not for more than 
 one month nor more than twice in the same session. 
 
 All bills, except money bills, can originate in either 
 Chamber. Bills appropriating money must originate in 
 the Chamber of Deputies. Bills can be presented by 
 either the Government or by a member. 
 
 The Senate, as a High Court of Justice, tries cases 
 of treason and the like. Both Senators and Deputies 
 are paid $3,000, the President of both Chambers $17,- 
 000. The President of the Republic receives $240,000 
 and has certain allowances. 
 
 France has, besides, a special institution called the 
 Council of State. The Minister of Justice presides and 
 the council is composed of Councillors, Masters of Re- 
 quests (Maitres des Requetes) and Auditors, all named 
 by the President. Its duties are to prepare rules for 
 the public administration, act as judge in the last re- 
 sort in administrative suits, and to give its opinion on 
 such questions as the government may submit to it. 
 
 France is divided into 87 departments, under the di- 
 rection of a Prefect and several Sub-prefects, appoint- 
 ed by the central government. The Prefect is thus a 
 representative of the Executive. He supervises the 
 execution of the laws, issues police regulations, nom- 
 inates subordinate officials and has under his control 
 all officials of the state. 
 
 223
 
 Statistics 
 
 The unit of local g«ovenimeiit Is the commune, of which 
 there arc 3G.v v*l>. whose size and j>opulatioii varv gjeatly. 
 from less than ^00 to many thousands. EUich commune 
 has a mayor and numicipai council elected by universal 
 suftrasje. The mayor is both the representative of the 
 commune and the agent of the central government; he 
 is also the head of the local police and acts imder the 
 orders of the Prefect. 
 
 The next unit is the canton (v.'Jll in all;, usually com- 
 posed oi 1? communes, though this varies and sometimes 
 large connmuies are divided into several cantons. Each 
 canton is the seat of a justice of the peace (juge de paix ). 
 otherwise it is not an administrative unit. 
 
 The district or arrondissemcnt (362) has an elective 
 council with as many mcmliers as there are cantons, its 
 chief function being to allot the taxes among the com- 
 mimcs. A varying number of districts form a depart- 
 ment, with an elected general-council, one councillor for 
 each canton. These deliberate upon all the economical 
 affairs of the department, the roads, the normal schtxjis, 
 the poor, the repartition of taxes among the districts, 
 etc. Their decisions are controlled by the fVefect and 
 may Ik annulled by the President. 
 
 The population of P'rance in March, 1911, was 39,601,- 
 d09, of whom 1,132,69(1 were foreigners. The total 
 number of births in 1912 was T50,().")l and the birthrate 
 per 1,000 was only 19, the lowest in the world. (Ger- 
 many 40, Great Britain 3T). Xo religion is now recog- 
 nized by the State, but the vast majority of the population 
 is Catholic, or nominally so. 
 
 Education in France is now compulsory from 6 to 13 
 years of age. In France and .'Mgcria in 1912 the public 
 and private schools embracing these years were 82,787 
 in number, had 158,787 teachers and 5,682,362 pupils, 
 and the co.st thereof to the state was $47,000,000. More 
 advanced e<lu(alion is also well provided for. Illiteracy 
 is comparatively low, in 1912 3 per cent, of the con- 
 scripts could neither read nor write, and in 1910 2.1 per 
 cent, of men and 3.2 per cent, of women who were mar- 
 ried signed the register with a cross. 
 
 The French national debt on Januarv 1st. 1913, was 
 $6,570,299,167 and the interest charirc $263.66 1.861. 
 
 In addition to the national debt the departineuts and 
 communes were indebted more than $1,100,000,000. 
 
 France has a coast line of 1,760 mile<^. 1..'Kt4 on the 
 
 224
 
 Statistics 
 
 Atlantic and 456 on the Mediterranean. The land fron- 
 tier extends over J, 575 miles, of which 1,156 are along 
 the Belgian, German. Swiss and Italian frontiers and 
 119 along the Spanish. 
 
 The fortified places are specially administered. Paris, 
 which is considered the center of defense, is surrounded 
 by a wall which has 97 bastions, 17 old forts and 38 new 
 advanced forts, or batteries, the whole forming two en- 
 trenched camps at St. Denis and Versailles. The strong- 
 holds of the first class in the north and east are Verdun 
 Toul, Epinal, IJelfort, Maubeuge, La Fere, Reims, Lan- 
 gres, Dijon and Besancon. Towards the Italian frontier 
 are^Briancon, Grenoble and Lyons. There are also a few 
 isolated forts d'arrets near Nancy, Luneville, Remire- 
 mont, Nice, and other towns. Toulon, Rochefort, Brest 
 and Cherbourg are naval harbors defended by forts. 
 
 Military service in France is compulsory and it is uni- 
 \ ersal in the fullest sense of the term, no exceptions be- 
 ing allowed except for physical disability. Liabilit)- to 
 service extends from the age of 20 to 48. According 
 to the law of 191;) the term of service in the ranks of the 
 first line is three years, and the men join at 2(». When 
 this service is ended the soldier then passes into the re- 
 serve for 11 years, after which he passes into the terri- 
 torial army for 7 years: finally completing his service 
 with 7 years in the territorial reserve. Men in the re- 
 serve of the active army are recalled to the colors for 
 .vtwo terms of four weeks' service during their stay in the 
 reserve, and the territorials once for two weeks. 
 
 Owing to the length of reserve service, the number of 
 reservists of the active army is very large, over 2.000 per 
 battalion, and on mobilization this reserve not only brings 
 the battalions up to war strength but a corresponding re- 
 serve unit is formed, with a varying surplus for depot. 
 
 The strength of the French armv on a peace footing 
 in the spring of 1914 was 790,000. ' 
 
 The military budget of France for 1914 called for the 
 expenditure of $287,298,310. 
 
 The naval budget for 1914 was $117,031,538. Cher- 
 bourg, Brest. Lorient, Rochefort and Toulon are the 
 naval ports. The French navy is manned partly by con- 
 scription and partly by voluntary enlistment. The time 
 of service is the same as that in'the army. A summary 
 of French ships at the end of 1913 is as follows: 
 
 225
 
 Statistics 
 
 Coinplrte at end of 
 
 1914 1915 
 
 Drcailnuu>;bt> .7 11 
 
 Prc-Drcadnoiight battleships* -1 1» 
 
 Pre-Drcadnoiight armored cruisers 19 19 
 
 Protected Cruisers 12 18 
 
 Torpedo gunboats, etc. . . 7 7 
 
 Destroyers ..87 — 
 
 Torpedo boats .159 — 
 
 Submarines . . .76 — 
 
 •Six of these, the Danton class, are "Scmi-Urcadnoughts." 
 
 The table on pa^es "-'^7 and V'iS ^\\i:s the French 
 armorclad .ship.s and first-class cruisers, those in l)oId 
 face tvpe were not completed August 1, 1914: 
 
 Of the total area of France 1.10.712.1)13 acres, 23,068.- 
 117 acres were forest in 1011 and 5»8.0l8,30.3 were un- 
 der crops, fallow and ;;rass. 
 
 The following' table shows the area under the lead- 
 inj^ crops and the production ( 1 metric ton : 2205 lbs.) 
 for two vears : 
 
 Crop 
 Wheat . 
 .Mixed Corn 
 
 Rye 
 
 Barley 
 
 Buckwheat 
 
 Oats 
 
 Maize ... 
 
 Potatoes 
 
 Beetroot, suga: 
 
 Tobacco 
 
 Colza . . 
 
 Hemp 
 
 On January 1st. 1912. the number of farm animals 
 was: Horses .3,2.36.110. mules 19 1,0 JO. asses 360..590. 
 cattle 14,43.')..530. sheep 16, 4 2. '3.3.3(1, pigs 6,719,.')70. 
 goats 1.124,180. 
 
 Mining is an important industry, employing 223.969 
 workers and producing in 1912 41.308,.'i80 metric tons 
 of coal and lignite. le.-'iOO.OOO of iron ore, and of fin- 
 ished metal products. 4,826..563 metric tons of pig iron 
 and 1,103.688 of worked steel. 
 
 Manufactures are also important, the most important 
 being those of clothing of all kinds (938,90.') workers') ; 
 woodwork (701.695); building, etc. (S.^O.ISO) ; linen 
 garments (212,716); leather (334,203); iron work and 
 tool making, etc., (291.246) ; pottery (166,831) ; foundry 
 work (282.656); cotton, silk and wool textiles (465.- 
 148) lace, etc (156,5.';4). 
 
 226 
 
 .\ 
 
 rca 
 
 Pro<i 
 
 luce 
 
 ( 1.000 
 
 acres) 
 
 ( 1.000 metric tons) 
 
 I'.ML' 
 
 191.3 
 
 1912 
 
 1913 
 
 •i. '_'.'■;'.' 
 
 16.16.T 
 
 •.•09.915 
 
 S78,332 
 
 :tiH 
 
 311 
 
 15.546 
 
 15,838 
 
 -'/»•■>.•> 
 
 2.956 
 
 12.1,822 
 
 135.553 
 
 1.H77 
 
 1.889 
 
 110,142 
 
 109,402 
 
 1.1. ^.^ 
 
 — 
 
 .50.069 
 
 — 
 
 0.26.S 
 
 9.877 
 
 .M 5,4 16 
 
 543.381 
 
 1.191 
 
 — 
 
 60.2H6 
 
 — 
 
 .i.908 
 
 .1.792 
 
 1.502,515 
 
 1.298.495 
 
 6:?7 
 
 .')77 
 
 722.210 
 
 603,009 
 
 .IS 
 
 25 
 
 3.262 
 
 1,622 
 
 63 
 
 — 
 
 •J,995 
 
 — 
 
 34 
 
 — 
 
 1.386 
 
 —
 
 Statistics 
 
 FRENCH NAVY 
 PRE-D-REiADNOUGHTS 
 
 B«Kun Name Displacement Main Armament Horae Power Speed 
 
 1890 Jaureguibcrry 11,324 2 12, 2 lO.b, 8 5.5-in. 14,000 16 
 
 about about 
 
 1890 Charles Martel 12,000 2 12, 2 10.8, 8 5.5-in. 15,000 18 
 
 to Carnot 12,000 3 12. 2 10.8, 8 5.5-in. 15,000 18 
 
 1902 Massena . 12,000 2 12, 2 10.8, 8 5.5-in. 15,000 18 
 
 Bouvet 12,000 2 12, 2 10.8, 8 5.5-in. 15,000 18 
 
 1893 Charlemagne 11,260 4 12-in., 10 5.5-in. 14,500 18 
 
 1893 St. Louis 11,260 4 12-in., 10 5.5-in. 14,500 18 
 
 1893 Gaulois 11,260 4 12-in., 10 5.5-in. 14,500 18 
 
 1897 Henri IV 8,950 2 10.8-in, 7 5.5-in. 11,500 18 
 
 1898 Suffren 12,728 4 12-in., 10 6.4-in. 16,000 18 
 
 1901 Republique 14,865 4 12-in., 18 6.4-in. 18,000 18 
 
 1905 Patrie 14,865 4 12-in., 18 6.4-in. 18,000 18 
 
 1901 Democratic 14,865 4 12-in., 10 7.6-in. 18,000 1& 
 
 to Verite 14,865 4 12-in., 10 7.6-in. 18,000 18 
 
 1905 Justice 14,865 4 12-in., 10 7.6-in. 18,000 18- 
 
 1906 Diderot 18,000 4 12-in., 12 9.4-in. 22,500 19^ 
 
 1906 Danton 18,000 4 12-in., 12 9.4-in. 22,500 19. 
 
 1906 Condorcet 18,000 4 12-in., 12 9.4-in. 22,500 19 
 
 1906 Vergniaud 18,000 4 12-in., 12 9.4-in. 22,500 1& 
 
 1906 Voltaire 18,000 4 12-in., 12 9.4-ln. 22,500 19 
 
 1906 Mirabeau 18,000 4 12-in., 12 9.4-in. 32,500 19 
 
 DREADNOUGHTS 
 
 1910 Jean Bart 23,400 12 12-in., 22 5.5-in. 36,000 
 
 1910 Courbet 23,400 12 12-in., 22 5.5-in. 36,000 
 
 1911 France 23,400 12 12-in., 22 5.5-in. 36,000 
 
 1911 Paris 23,400 12 12-in., 22 5.6-in. 36,000 
 
 SUPER-DREADNOUGHTS 
 
 1912 Bretagne 23,550 10 13.4-in., 22 5.5 in. 29,000 21 
 
 1912 Lorraine 33,550 10 13.4-in., 22 5.5 in. 29,000 21 
 
 1912 Provence 23,550 10 13.4-in., 22 5.5 in. 29,000 21 
 
 1912 Beam 25,387 12 13.4-in., 4 5.5-in. 29,000 21.5 
 
 1912 Gascogne 25,387 12 13.4-in., 4 5.5-in. 29,000 21.5 
 
 1912 Flandre 25,387 12 13.4-in., 4 5.5-in. 29,000 21.5 
 
 1912 Languedoc 25,387 12 13.4-in.. 4 5.5-in. 29,000 21.5 
 
 1912 Normandie 25,387 12 13.4-in.. 4 5.5-in. 29,000 21.5 
 
 ARMORED CRUISERS 
 
 1892 Pothuau 5,360 2 7.6-in., 10 6.4-in. 10,000 19 
 
 1895 Jeanne d'Arc 11,270 2 7.6-in., 14 5.5-in. 28,500 21 
 
 1897 Montcalm 9,517 2 7.6-in., 6 4-in.. 4 4-in. 19,600 21 
 
 1897 Dupetit Thouars 9,517 2 7.6-in., 6 4-in., 4 4-in. 19,600 21 
 
 1897 Gueydon 9,517 2 7.6-in., 6 4-in., 4 4-in. 19,600 21 
 
 1898 Desaix 7J00 8 6.4-in.. 4-in. 17.100 21 
 
 1898 Dupleix 7,700 8 6.4-in., 4-in. 17,100 21 
 
 227
 
 Statistics 
 
 FRENCH NAVY— (Continued) 
 ARMORED CRUlSHRvS— (Continued) 
 
 Bofun N«m« Dlsplacemant Main Armament Horae Power 89««d 
 
 19y8 Klcbcr 7.7(Hi >< «i 4-in.. 4-in. 17.100 21 
 
 189tt Condc 10.060 :.' 7.6-in., 8 6.4-iii.. 6 4-in. 20,500 21 
 
 lgy9 Gloire lO.ueti 3 7.6-in., 8 6.4-in., 6 4-in. 20,500 21 
 
 1199 Admiral Auhi- 10.060 "J 7.6-in., 8 6.4-in., 6 4-in. 20,500 31 
 
 Marseillaise 12.4 H, 4 7.fl-in., 16 6 4-in. 27,500 32 
 
 L. Ganibcit.i .. I2,41h 4 7.fl-in., 16 6.4-in. 27.500 22 
 
 1900 I. Ferry 12.41t. 4 7.0-in., 16 6.4-in. 27,500 32 
 
 to Victor HuKu 12.411. 4 7.6-in., 16 6.4-in. 27,600 22 
 
 1904 J. Michclet 13,641 4 7.6-in., 12 6.4 in. 29,0O(i 23.-. 
 
 Ernest Kenan 13.644 4 7.6-in., 12 6.4-in. S6.000 28.5 
 
 1905 Edgar Qujnc; .14,:<0n m 7.6-in. 40,000 24 
 1905 W. Rosseau i »,:.0"» i« 7 6-in. 40.000 24 
 
 PRINCII'M. PROTECTED CRUISER? 
 
 189:5 D'Entrecastcaux 8.014 2 9.4-in., 12 5.5-in. 14.600 18 
 
 1895 Guichen 8,200 2 6.4-in.. 6 6.4 in. 24.000 23 
 
 189.'-. Chateaurcnault 8.20n 8 6.4-in., 6 6.4-in. 17.000 83 
 
 1897 J. dc la Graviere n.-'iOO 8 6.4-in. 17.000 23 
 
 •1914 Six new minor cruisers. 
 
 VI 
 
 Minor cruisers include the aerial depot ship Foudre, the Descartes. 
 3.088 tons (designed 1892), 4 6.4-in.. 6 5.5-in. guns, present speed ahoiit 
 15 knots; 3 Friant type, 4,000 tons (dc^iRned l«ltn, 6 6.4-in., 4 4-in. guns, 
 speed about 17 knots; Lavoisier and D'Estrecs, 2,300 tons (designed 
 IHO'J) 4 5.5-in., 2 4-in. guns, speed ahont 20 kTiots; also 2 old cruisers of 
 Jean Bart rla'^s. and a few prunboats, etc. 
 
 228
 
 Statistics 
 
 Fisheries, including tli<JM of Al;^eria, employ 129,000, 
 but this industry has declined of late. 
 
 On December 31, 1911, the French mercantile navy 
 consisted of 15,949 sailing vessels of 624,621 tons net, 
 with crews of 701,888, and 1,780 steamers of 838,118 
 tons, with crews of 281,038. Only 223 of these steam- 
 ers were engaged in ocean navigation. 
 
 There were 23,899 miles of national roads in France 
 on January 1, 1912, besides vicinal roads. 
 
 The length of railroad line open to traffic, in 1912, 
 was 26,390 miles of lines of general interest and 6,001 
 miles of local interest. Some of these lines are worked 
 by companies strictly supervised by the state and 
 others are worked by the state. 
 
 In 1912 there were 14,634 postoffices, 22,500 tele- 
 graph offices and there were 396,102,000 telephonic 
 communications. Telegraphs and telephones belong 
 to the state. 
 
 France has a large colonial empire, a summary of 
 which follows: 
 
 Year of Area in 
 
 IN ASIA: Acquisition Sq. Miles Population 
 
 India 1679 196 273,000 
 
 Annam :*...^V 1884 
 
 Cambodia 1862 
 
 Cochin-China 1861 309,980 14,500,000 
 
 Tonking 1884 
 
 Laos 1892 
 
 Total Asia 310,176 14.773,000 
 
 IX AFRICA: 
 
 Algeria, Northern Territory 1830 80,197 5,069,522 
 
 Algeria, Southern Territory 1902 141,870* 494,306 
 
 Sahara .•.■••.•,.■. 1,544,000^ tSOO.OOO 
 
 Tunis ,.?."..'. 1881 45,779 1,878,620 
 
 Senegal 1637-1889 ... 1,250,000 
 
 Upper Senegal and Niger.. 1893 ... 5,100,000 
 
 Guinea 1843 1,585,8101 1,900,000 
 
 Ivory Coast 1843 . . . 1,400,000 
 
 Dahomey 1893 . . . 900,000 
 
 Mauritania 1893 ... 250,000 
 
 Congo 1884 553,030 3,900,000 
 
 Reunion 1649 970 174,000 
 
 Madagascar 1643-1896 226,015 3,257,895 
 
 Mayotte 1843 840 94,400 
 
 Somali Coast 1864 5,790 14,000 
 
 Total Africa 4,184,401 25,681,243 
 
 829
 
 Statistics 
 
 Year of Are* in 
 
 IN AMIIKICA Acquisition Sq. Miles Population 
 
 St Pierre and Miquelon . . 1635 90 4.800 
 
 Guadeloupe 1634 6ft8 212.500 
 
 Martinique 1635 378 185.400 
 
 Guiana . . 1626 34.060 48.800 
 
 Tot.ll Aniciu .. 35,222 450,900 
 
 IN OCEANIA: 
 
 New Caledonia 1854-1887 7.200 50,500 
 
 Tahiti, etc 1841-1881 1.544 30,600 
 
 Total Oceania 8,744 81,100 
 
 Grand Total 4,538.543 40.986.24J 
 
 * Including the Algerian Sahara. 
 + Including Military Territories. 
 t .^pproxiniuf f fiuinrcs 
 
 GERMANY 
 
 The constitution of the Empire bears date April 1. 
 1871. By its terms all the states of Germany "form an 
 eternal union for the protection of the realm and the 
 care of the welfare of the German people. 
 
 In its general structure of government the German 
 empire bears a close resemblance to the scheme of the 
 federal union of the United States. There, as here, the 
 several component states retain full sovereignty, except 
 as to matters covered by the powers conceded to the 
 government of the empire. 
 
 Under the constitution, the supreme direction of mili- 
 tary and iK)litical powers is vested in the Kmpcror. Ar- 
 ticle II of the Constitution further declares the Emperor 
 to represent the Empire internationally and gives him 
 power to make war. if defensive, to make peace, as well 
 as enter into treaties with other nations and to appoint 
 and receive ambassadors, etc. 
 
 But when treaties relate to matters regulated by im- 
 perial legislation, and when war is not merely defensive, 
 the Emperor must have the consent of the Rundesrath. 
 
 The legislative functions are vested in the Bundcsrath, 
 which, like the .American Senate before, in response to 
 popular clamor, the histf>rir tmities and the balance of
 
 Statistics 
 
 power so nicely adjusted by the framers of the Ameri- 
 can constitution were ignorantly destroyed, represents 
 the component states of the Empire, in their s()\ereij<n 
 capacity. The Bundesrath has Gl members appointed 
 for each session by the Oovernment-of the individual 
 states. 
 
 The Bundesrath, in many of its functions, has the 
 same power as the American Senate. 
 
 The Reichstag, the lower house of the German Parlia- 
 ment, has ;i9T members and is elected by universal suf- 
 frage, by ballot, for a term of five years. Its members 
 receive payment. The number of electors in 1(»12 amount- 
 ed to 14,442,387, of whom 12,260,731 actually voted. 
 
 Both the Bundesrath and the Reichstag must meet 
 in annual session. With the consent of the Bundes- 
 rath, the Emperor can prorogue and dissolve the 
 Reichstag. Without its own consent, the porogation 
 cannot be for a greater period than 30 days and. if dis- 
 solved, new elections must take place in sixty, and a 
 new session in ninety days. 
 
 All laws for the Empire must receive the votes of an 
 absolute majority of both the Bundesrath and the 
 Reichstag. This latter body elects its own officers. 
 
 Law^s passed by the Parliament are promulgated by 
 the Emperor, which promulgation, like all other official 
 acts of the Emperor, requires the counter-signature of 
 the Chancellor of the( Empire. 
 
 The Emperor is assisted by fourteen ministers. 
 These, however, do not form a Ministry of Cabinet, 
 but act independently of each other, under the direc- 
 tion of the Chancellor. 
 
 The population of Germany, census of 1910, and the 
 area, by separate states, will be found on the follow- 
 ing page. 
 
 Of this population 4,231,189 spoke a language other 
 than German only. 
 
 The males numbered 32,040,166, females 32,885,827. 
 In 1911 the births numbered 1,927,039 and in 1912 
 1,925,883. ' 
 
 The number of foreigners in Germany is 1,259,873. 
 
 The constitution provides for entire liberty of con- 
 science and for complete} social equality among all re- 
 ligious confessions. The relation between church and 
 states varies in the different individual states. The Jesuit 
 order is interdicted in all parts of Germany. Protestants 
 
 . 231
 
 Statistics 
 
 form 61.6 of the population. Cathulics 36.?, Jews I, 
 Koiuan Catholics are in the maioritv in NKace-l.orraiiie, 
 Havaria aiul Baden. 
 
 CENSUS OF uno 
 
 Population 
 
 Stales ol I". i.i.iMt. IfllO 
 
 Prussia 40.l6r>,21'.> 
 
 Bavaria . . . fl.9S7.20l 
 
 WiirttemhiirK 2,437,S74 
 
 Baden -'.142,883 
 
 Saxony, Kingdom m 4.806.661 
 
 Mccklenl.urK'-Srhw fillO.O.^O 
 
 Hesse 1.282.0ftl 
 
 OldenburK 483,042 
 
 Brunswick 4'i4.339 
 
 Saxony. Grand Dnchv of 417,149 
 
 MecklcnhurK-Str. 106.442 
 
 Saxc-^^ciningen 'J78,762 
 
 .•\nhah , .131.128 
 
 Saxc-Cohurg-Gotha 2J7.177 
 
 Saxc-.\hcnburg 'ilG.lSS 
 
 Lippe 1S0.937 
 
 Waldeck 61.707 
 
 Schwarzburg-Rud. . 100.702 
 
 Schwarz!>urg-SoiKi. s<.».917 
 
 Rcuss Junr. Branch . l.'>2.7.")2 
 
 Schaumburg-Lippc 46,652 
 
 Rcuss Elder Branch . 72.76'.» 
 
 Uamhure 1.014,664 
 
 Luberk 116,.')9'.» 
 
 Bremen 299.526 
 
 .Msace-I.ortMinr 1.874,014 
 
 Tota' rt4.925,»93 
 
 .\rca English 
 
 sq. miles 
 
 134,616 
 
 29.292 
 
 7,584 
 
 5,828 
 
 5.780 
 
 :).068 
 
 2.966 
 
 2,4H2 
 
 1,418 
 
 1.397 
 
 1.131 
 
 9SS 
 
 888 
 
 764 
 
 511 
 
 469 
 
 433 
 
 363 
 
 333 
 
 319 
 
 131 
 
 122 
 
 160 
 
 115 
 
 99 
 
 5.604 
 
 208.780 
 
 liLstrmtiun i:. general and compuUory in Germany. 
 I'he laws of Prussia, which provide for the estahlish- 
 inent of elementary schools supported by local taxation 
 and compel all parents to send their children to these or 
 other scnools, have been adopted, with slight modifica- 
 tions, in all the states of the empire. 
 
 In r.ni there were a total of 61, ^r)? elementary schools 
 in the Empire, employing 148,219' male and 39.2f)8 fe- 
 male teachers with 5,1.57,460 lx>ys and 5.152,50:5 girls 
 enrolled. In addition there were 4S0 private schcxjls with 
 '.'6,151 children enrolled. The most ample provision is 
 made for secondary and higher education. 
 
 1(1 191? the percentage of illiteracy was .05 among the 
 iHrriiit'^. The cost of schools ift very difficult tf> state
 
 Statistics 
 
 exactly, as the expense is not met by the central govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Compnlsory insnrance of workmen against sickness, 
 the employers' liability iaw and the insurance of work- 
 men against old age and infirmity, originated in Ger- 
 many, as has practically all reasonable .social legislation, 
 some of which has been copied by England and the 
 United States. 
 
 The debt of the German Empire amounted to $1,804,- 
 568,200 in October, 1913, which bears interest at from 
 3 1-2 to 4 per cent. At the date mentioned, there were 
 important set-offs in invested funds, which materially 
 reduced this total. 
 
 The separate states also have individual debts, aggre- 
 gating a very large sum, but hold assets, railways, in- 
 vested funds, etc., nearly offsetting this debt. 
 
 Germany has a total frontier length of 4,570 miles. 
 On the north it is bounded for 293 miles by the North 
 Sea, Denmark 47 miles and the Baltic 927 ; on the south 
 well-defined mountain ranges and the Lake of Con- 
 stance separate it from Austria 1,043 miles, and Swit- 
 zerland 256; on the east, it is bounded by Russia for 
 843 miles; on the west by France 242 miles; Luxem- 
 berg 111, Belgium 70 and Holland 377. 
 
 The Empire is divided into 10 fortress districts: 1st, 
 Konigsberg District contains Konigsberg, first class, 
 Danzig, first class land and coast; Pillau and Memel, 
 coast; 2nd Boyen Posen : (1st) Glogan (2) Neisse 
 (1st) Glatz; 3rd Berlin: Spandau, Magdeburg, Kus- 
 trin, all first class, Turgau (2nd) ; 4th Mainz : May- 
 ence, Ulm, Rastatt, all first class; 5th Metz : (1st) 
 Diedenhofen (2nd), Bitsch (2nd); 6th Cologne: Co- 
 logne, Coblentz, both first class, Wesel, Saarlouis, both 
 second; 7th Kiel: Kiel, first class, Friedrichsort, Cux- 
 haven, Geestemunde, Wilhelmshaven, Swinemunde, 
 the lastl five coast ; 8th Thorn : Thorn, Grandenz Vis- 
 tula Passages, Dirchau, all second class ; 9th Strass- 
 burg: Strassburg, first class. New Breisact; 10th Mu- 
 nich : Inglodstat, first class, Germersheim. second 
 class. 
 
 These fortresses are all connected with each other 
 by means of underground telegraphs, while strategical 
 railway lines lead from the principal military centres 
 towards the frontiers. 
 
 Military service in Germany is compulsor}' and uni- 
 
 233
 
 Statistics 
 
 \crsal. Liability commencc> at the age of 17 and ends 
 at 45. 
 
 The term of service in the First Line or active army 
 i> sc\ en years, two in the ranks and five in the reserve, 
 except in the cavalry and htirse artillery . where it is 
 three in the ranks and four in the reserve. During the 
 period of reserve the soldier joins his corps twice for 
 a training perioci nf not more than eipht weeks. 
 
 The next stage is five years in the First l^an of the 
 Landwehr. During this service there are two training 
 periods of eight to fourteen days. 
 
 This service completed, the soldier passes into the 
 Second Ban of the Landwehr. and remains there till 
 he finishes his 39th year, when he passes into the 
 Second Ban of the Landsturm until he reaches the age 
 of 45. 
 
 The First Ban of the Landsturm consists of all those 
 from 17 to '^9, who for one reason or another, have re- 
 ceived no military training; these pass into the Second 
 Ban on reaching their 39th birthday. 
 
 Well educated young men arc permitted to. perform 
 one year's service only as volunteers, provided they 
 pay all their own expenses. These supply almost all 
 the Reserve and Landwehr officers. 
 
 The Er.satz reserve is composed of young men fit for 
 military service, but who are in excess of the number 
 required for the annual contingent of recruits. They 
 are liable to three trainings of ten, eight and six weeks, 
 respectively. Owing to the very large number of 
 young men in Germany, this speci^al re.ser\ e runs to 
 about 160,000 a year. 
 
 Saxony, the XII and XL\ Corps. \\ urltemburg. the 
 Xin. and Bavaria tliree corps have certain special 
 arrangemcnt>; ; the rest of the I'jnpire musters IS corps 
 in peace. 
 
 The total peace strength ot the Cerinan .\riny in 
 191.'^ was ;iH,Mn.| officers. r.M.CSl mi'n and ir.r'.HlfJ 
 horses. The tr)tal strength of the field army, i. e., the 
 active arm\ and its reserves, on this basis would be 
 about 2,150,000 men. The military expenditure for the 
 year 1913 was $168,682,981. 
 
 The expenditiiti- f. .r the the n.iv\- in ini I was estimated 
 at $107.785,34t; 
 
 S84
 
 Statistics 
 
 The ships are divided between the Baltic and North 
 Sea stations. The chief naval establishments are at 
 Kiel on the Baltic and Wilhelmshaven on the North 
 Sea, and the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal across the Schles- 
 wig-Holstein neck from Kiel to the Elbe, which was 
 opened in June, 1896, and recently deepened and en- 
 larged to permit ships of any burden to pass freely to 
 and fro between these ports. 
 
 The following is a statement of the strength of the 
 German fleet at the outbreak of the war: 
 
 Effective at end of 
 Class 1914 1915 
 
 Dreadnoughts 31 23* 
 
 Pre-Dreadnought battleships 21 20 
 
 Old and coast service battleships 2+7 2+7 
 
 Armored cruisers 9 9 
 
 Protected cruisers 38 40 
 
 Destroyers 152 164 
 
 Torpedo boats (old) 47 47 
 
 Submarines 37 or more 
 
 *Three others will be nearly completed. 
 
 The list of the German Navy will be found on pages 
 237, 238 and 239. 
 
 The German navy is manned by the obligatory ser- 
 vice of the maritime and semi-maritime population. 
 The naval personnel is about 73,000 plus a reserve of 
 about 110,000. Practically the entire fleet is always in 
 commission. Very elaborate precautions are taken to 
 keep the personnel free from certain diseases which im- 
 peril efficiency, with success. 
 
 According to the latest returns 91 per cent, of Ger- 
 man land is productive. 
 
 , The areas of the principal crops in acres and the 
 yield were as follows for 1913 : 
 
 Areas Metric Tons 
 
 Wheat 4,935.222 4,655,956 
 
 Rye 16,035.347 12,222.394 
 
 Barley 4,134,527 3,673,254 
 
 Oats 11,095,388 9,713,965 
 
 Potatoes 8,530,077 54,121,146 
 
 Hay 14,808,492 29,184,994 
 
 There were in 1912 4,516,297 horses, 20,158,738 
 cattle. 5,787,848 sheep, 21,885,073 swine and 3.383,971 
 goats. 
 
 23,^
 
 Statistics 
 
 Forotry in Geriiwny is an industry of great impor- 
 tance, conducted under the care of the state. The 
 total area oi the forests is 3 l,.'>(i'J.800 hectares, of wliich 
 about hall belongs to the governtnent, cither of the 
 Empire or the states. The yield is over 2(i.ooO.(MM) cubic 
 yards oi limber and 'J3,(mm>,iioo of fircwo<3d. 
 
 Mining is a very important German industry. The 
 quantities of the principal minerals raised are as folU>ws 
 tor \9Vi: 
 
 Metric tons 
 
 Coal . 174,875,297 
 
 Lignuc S0,934.7y7 
 
 Iron Ore J7.19y,»44 
 
 Copper Ore U74,28:. 
 
 Zinc Ore 643, 59S 
 
 Lead Ore 142.8:t'J 
 
 23G
 
 Statistics 
 
 GERMAN NAVY 
 
 Begun 
 
 1899 
 1889 
 1885 
 
 to 
 
 1898 
 1899 
 
 and 
 
 1900 
 1901 
 
 to 
 
 1903 
 1903 
 1904 
 
 and 
 inor, 
 
 1907 
 1907 
 1907 
 1907 
 1907 
 1908 
 1908 
 1908 
 1909 
 1909 
 1909 
 1909 
 1909 
 1910 
 1910 
 1910 
 1910 
 1911 
 1911 
 1911 
 1912 
 1911 
 1912 
 1913 
 
 1913 
 1913 
 1914 
 1914 
 
 Name Displacement 
 
 K. F. Wilhelm 9,b4o 
 
 Worth 9,840 
 
 K. Friedrich 111 11,180 
 
 K. Wilhelm II 11,180 
 
 K. Wilhchn der Grosse 11,180 
 
 K. BHrl)arossa 11,180 
 
 K. Karl der Grosse. . .11,180 
 
 Wittelsbach 12,000 
 
 MecklenburR 12,000 
 
 Zahringen 12,000 
 
 Wettin 12,000 
 
 Schwaben 12,000 
 
 Braunschweig 13,200 
 
 Elsass 13,200 
 
 Preussen 13,200 
 
 Lothringen 13,200 
 
 Hessen 13,200 
 
 Deutschland 13,200 
 
 Hanover 13,200 
 
 Pommern 13,200 
 
 Schleswig-Holstein ...13,200 
 Schelsien 13,200 
 
 DRKADN( 
 
 Westphalen 18,500 
 
 Nassau 18,500 
 
 Rheinland 18,500 
 
 Posen 18,500 
 
 Von der Tann 19,000 
 
 Thuringen 20,500 
 
 Ostfriesland 20,500 
 
 Helgoland 20,500 
 
 Oldenburg 20,500 
 
 Moltke 23,000 
 
 Goeben 23,000 
 
 Kaiser 24,700 
 
 Friedrich der Grosse. .24,700 
 
 Kaiserin 24,700 
 
 Konig Albrecht 24,700 
 
 Prinz Regent Luitpold.24,700 
 
 Seydlitz 25,000 
 
 Konig 24,700 
 
 Grosser Kurfurst 24,700 
 
 Markgraf 24,700 
 
 Kronprinz 24,700 
 
 Derflinger 
 
 Lutzow 28,000 
 
 Ersatz Hertha 28,000 
 
 about 
 
 Ersatz Worth 30.000 
 
 "T"' 30,000 
 
 E. K. Friedrich III.. ..30,000 
 E. Viktoria Louise .... 
 
 .Main Ai'iiiament 
 
 Horse Power 
 
 Speed 
 
 6 11-in.^ 
 
 6 4.1-iii. 
 
 9,500 
 
 15.0 
 
 G ll-in., 
 
 6 4.1-in. 
 
 y,500 
 
 15.0 
 
 4 9.4-in., 
 
 14 6-in. 
 
 13,000 
 
 17.5 
 
 4 9.4-in., 
 
 14 6-in. 
 
 13,000 
 
 17.5 
 
 4 9.4-in., 
 
 14 6-in. 
 
 13,000 
 
 17.5 
 
 4 9.4-in. 
 
 14 6-in. 
 
 13,000 
 
 17.5 
 
 4 9.4-in. 
 
 14 6-in. 
 
 13,000 
 
 17.5 
 
 4 9.4-in. 
 
 18 6-in. 
 
 15,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 9.4-in. 
 
 18 6-in. 
 
 15,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 9.4-in. 
 
 18 (i-in. 
 
 15,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 9.4-in. 
 
 18 6-in. 
 
 15,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 9.4-m. 
 
 18 6-in. 
 
 15,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 ll-in., 
 
 14 6.7-in. 
 
 16,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 11-m., 
 
 14 6.7-in. 
 
 16,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 ll-in., 
 
 14 6,7-in. 
 
 16,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 ll-in., 
 
 14 6.7-m. 
 
 16,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 ll-in.. 
 
 14 6.7-in. 
 
 16,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 11-in.. 
 
 14 6.7-in. 
 
 16,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 11-in., 
 
 14 6.7-in. 
 
 16,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 11-in., 
 
 14 6.7-m. 
 
 16,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 11-in.. 
 
 14 6.7-in. 
 
 16,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 11-in., 
 
 14 6.7-in. 
 
 16,000 
 
 IS 
 
 OUGHTS 
 
 
 
 12 ll-in., 
 
 12 6-in. 
 
 20,000 
 
 21 
 
 12 11-in., 
 
 12 6-in. 
 
 20,000 
 
 21 
 
 12 11-in., 
 
 12 6-in. 
 
 20,000 
 
 21 
 
 12 11-in., 
 
 12 6-in. 
 
 20,000 
 
 21 
 
 8 11-in., 
 
 10 6-in. 
 
 80.000 
 
 28 
 
 10 12-in., 
 
 14 6-in. 
 
 23,000 
 
 20.5 
 
 10 12-in., 
 
 14 6-in. 
 
 23,000 
 
 20.5 
 
 10 12-in., 
 
 14 6-in. 
 
 23,000 
 
 20.5 
 
 10 12-in., 
 
 14 6-in. 
 
 23.000 
 
 20.5 
 
 10 11-in.. 
 
 12 6-in. 
 
 ' 
 
 28 
 
 10 11-in., 
 
 12 6-in. 
 
 
 28 
 
 10 12.2-in 
 
 ., 14 6-in. 
 
 35,000 
 
 21 
 
 10 12.2-in 
 
 ., 14 6-in. 
 
 35,000 
 
 21 
 
 10 12.2-111 
 
 ., 14 6-in. 
 
 35,000 
 
 21 
 
 10 12.2-in 
 
 ., 14 6-in. 
 
 35,000 
 
 21 
 
 10 12.2-in 
 
 .. 14 6-in. 
 
 35,000 
 
 21 
 
 10 11-in., 
 
 12 6-in. 
 
 63.000 
 
 26.5 
 
 10 12-in., 
 
 14 6-in. 
 
 55.000 
 
 — 
 
 10 12-in., 
 
 14 6-in. 
 
 55,000 
 
 — 
 
 10 12-in., 
 
 14 6-in. 
 
 55.000 
 
 — 
 
 10 12-in., 
 
 14 6-in. 
 
 55j000 
 
 — 
 
 8 12-in., 
 
 12 6-in. 
 
 
 — 
 
 15-in.. K) G-in. 
 15-in., IC) 6-in. 
 lo-in., 16 6-in. 
 
 237
 
 4 'J.4-in.. 
 
 12 6-in. 
 
 13,600 
 
 17; 
 
 2 9.4-111.. 
 
 10 6-in. 
 
 15.700 
 
 20 
 
 4 8.2-111., 
 
 10 6-in. 
 
 18.000 
 
 20 
 
 4 8.2-in., 
 
 10 6-in. 
 
 18.000 
 
 20 
 
 4 8.2-in., 
 
 10 6-in. 
 
 19.000 
 
 21 
 
 4 8.2-iii., 
 
 10 6-in. 
 
 19.000 
 
 21 
 
 8 8.2-in., 
 
 fi 6-in. 
 
 26,000 
 
 25 
 
 8 8.2-in., 
 
 6 6-in. 
 
 26,000 
 
 25 
 
 12 8.2-in., 
 
 . 8 6-in. 
 
 40.000 
 
 25 
 
 Statistics 
 
 GERMAN NAVY— (Continued) 
 
 COAST DEFENCE BATTLESHIPS. 
 
 B«guB Nam* Dlaplkcvment Main ArntAinani Ilorer Tower Sp«*4 
 
 1888 Siegfried ^.lOO 3 9.4-in. 51.100 14 to 15 
 
 Hciinilall 4.100 3 9.4-in, 51.100 14 to 15 
 
 Hagcn . •♦.lOO 3 9.4-in. 51,100 14 to 15 
 
 •o Frithjot -t.lOO 3 9.4-in. 51,100 14 to 15 
 
 }lildcbran.l 4.100 3 9.4-in. .'M.lOO 14 to 15 
 
 Odin .. ■♦.150 3 9.4-in. 51,100 14 to 15 
 
 1892 .\cgir 4.150 3 9.4-in. 51,100 14 to 15 
 
 .\K.\H >KKD CRUISERS. 
 
 1896 Furst ilismark 10,700 
 
 1898 Prinz Heinrich 8.'J:!0 
 
 1900 Prinz .Adalbert •J.O.^O 
 
 1901 Prinz F. Karl 9.050 
 
 1902 Roon 9,500 
 
 1903 Yorck 9,500 
 
 1904 Scharnhorst 11,500 
 
 1905 Gneisenaii 11.500 
 
 1906 Blucher 1 VOOO 
 
 PROTECTKD CRUISERS. 
 
 lny2 Kaisenn Augusta 6.300 12 4-in. 12.000 20 
 
 1893 Gefion 4.108 10 4-in. 7.000 18 
 
 1895 Freya 5.650 2 8.2-in.. 8 6-in. 10.000 18.6 
 
 Hertha 5.650 2 8.2-in.. 8 6-in. 10.000 18.5 
 
 and Victoria Luise 5.650 2 8.2-in.. 8 6-in. 10,000 18.5 
 
 Vincta 5.6!SO 2 8 2-in.. 8 6-in. 10.000 18.5 
 
 \H'>6 Hansa 5.650 2 8.2-in.. 8 6-in. 10.000 18.5 
 
 1897 Gazelle 2.«45 10 4-in. 8.500 21 
 
 and Niobe 2.645 10 4-in. 8.500 81 
 
 1898 Xymphe 2.645 10 4-in. 8.500 21 
 
 1899 .\riadnc 2.650 10 4-in. 8.500 21 
 
 and Amazonc 2.650 10 4-in. 8.500 21 
 
 Medusa 2.6.'50 10 4-in. 8,500 21 
 
 1900 Thetis 2.650 10 4-in. 8.500 21 
 
 1900 Frauenlob 2.715 10 4-in. 8.500 21.5 
 
 and .Arcona 2,715 10 4-in. 8..100 21.5 
 
 1901 Undine 2.715 10 4-in. 8.500 81.5 
 
 1902 Rremcn 3,250 10 4-in. 11.000 23 
 
 Berlin 3.2.')0 10 4-in. 11.000 88 
 
 xc Lubrck 3.250 10 4-in 11.000 83 
 
 Hamburg 3.250 10 4-in 11.000 83 
 
 1904 Munchen 3.250 10 4-in 11.000 88 
 
 1904 Leipzig 3.2.'.0 10 4-in. 13.200 23.5 
 
 1004 Danziff 3,250 10 4-in. 13.200 23.5 
 
 1905 Konigsberg 3,400 10 4-in. 13.210 83.5 
 
 1905 Stuttgart 3.4.'>0 10 4-in. 13.200 88.5 
 
 238
 
 Statistics 
 
 GERMAN NAVY— (Continued) 
 
 PROTECTED CRUISERS— Continued. 
 
 Begun Name Displacement Main Armament 
 
 1905 Nurnberg :{,450 10 4-iii. 
 
 1905 Stettin :i,450 lO 4-in. 
 
 1906 Eniden 3,600 12 4-in. 
 
 1906 Dresden 3,600 12 4-in. 
 
 1907 Kolberg 4,300 12 4-in. 
 
 1907 Mainz 4,300 12 4-in. 
 
 1908 Koln 4,350 12 4-in. 
 
 1908 Augsberg 4,350 12 4-in. 
 
 1910 Strassburg 4,550 12 4-in. 
 
 1910 Breslau 4,550 12 4-in. 
 
 1910 Magdeburg 4,550 12 4-in. 
 
 1910 Stralsund 4,550 12 4-in. 
 
 1911 Karlsruhe 4,900 12 4-in. 
 
 1911 Rostock 4,900 12 4-in. 
 
 1912 Grandenz 
 
 1912 E. Irene — 
 
 1913 E. Gefion 
 
 1913 E. Hela 
 
 1914 E. Gazelle 
 
 1914 E. Xiobe 
 
 Horse Power 
 
 Speed 
 
 13,200 
 
 23.S 
 
 13,200 
 
 23.5 
 
 13,500 
 
 24 
 
 13,500 
 
 24 
 
 20,000 
 
 26 
 
 20,000 
 
 26 
 
 30,000 
 
 26 
 
 30,000 
 
 26 
 
 30,000 
 
 28 
 
 30,000 
 
 28 
 
 30,000 
 
 28 
 
 30,000 
 
 28 
 
 26,000 
 
 — 
 
 26,000 
 
 — 
 
 239
 
 Statistics 
 
 The total \'alue of thtrse ores in thtg year was $674,- 
 (•uu.OOO. 
 
 The production of German foundries in 1911 was as 
 follows : 
 
 Metric ton>> Value 
 
 Pig Iron 15,574.03y $220,000,000 
 
 Zinc 243,784 26,000,000 
 
 Lead 161, 450 11,000,000 
 
 Copper 37.455 11,000.000 
 
 Kislieries are fairlv iniportunt. Jii >ca fishing and 
 inland fishi^}^^ t>ver il.'J.Oou persons arc cniplnyed and 
 the vahjc ofi fish can^dit is r.ver $100.nO(),a<^). 
 
 rfiTinan inanufacttire is among tlic m*»i imixirtatn 
 in tlu- World, iron is made in I'nissia. Alsacc-I-or- 
 raine. Havaria and Saxony ; steel in Rhenish Prussia ; 
 textiles in Sax(»ny. Westphalia and Silc-^-ia; cotton 
 j^oods in Alsace-Lorraine. Wurttcmberg. Baden and 
 Bavaria ; woolens in Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria; silk 
 in Rhenish Prussia. Alsace and Baden ; sugar is made 
 in Prussia. Brunswick. Anhalt and Bavaria; glass, por- 
 celain and earthenware in Silesia, Thuringia. Bavaria 
 and Saxony ; clocks and woodenwarc and f^ys in Wurt- 
 tcmberg and Bavaria. 
 
 ( )f the vast army of people employed in ricrmany 
 only 13,000 were under the age of 11. 
 
 German mercantile shipping ranks next to that oi 
 Great Britain and in 191 ;i employed some Hn.OOO sail- 
 ors. 2.7r)'2 sailing vessels with a tonnage of 198.2^8 and 
 *.i.0()8 steamers with a tonnage of 2. (?.">.*), }!»(;. These 
 figures are exclusive oi vessels of less than 17^2 tons 
 gross tonnage. 
 
 The German railroad system, with the exception of 
 2,217 miles of standard gauge and 70!> miles of narrow 
 gauge, belongs to the various states of the Kmpire and 
 totals 36,139 miles, including the private lines. 
 
 The post and telegraph services are retained in the 
 hands of their resfiective state governments, as are the 
 telephones. Except those of Bavaria and Wurttcm- 
 berg. these are all united for the purpose of adminis- 
 tration and operation in an imperial union. There 
 were 41,102 pr)<;t offices and 18.107 telegraph offices in 
 the Empire, and ?,300.000.nnn telephonic conversa- 
 tions took place in 1912. 
 
 240
 
 Statistics 
 
 The German Empire has a colonial system of con- 
 siderable importance. The following is a list: 
 
 IN AFRICA , ...... 
 
 Date of Estimated Estimated 
 
 Acquisition Area White Native 
 
 Sq. Miles Population Pop. 
 
 Togo 1884 33,700 368 1,031,978 
 
 Kamerun 1884 191,139 1,871 2,648,720 
 
 German South West 
 
 Africa 1884-90 322,450 14,830 79,556 
 
 German East 
 
 Africa 1885-90 384,180 5,336 7,645,770 
 
 Total African Possessions . . 931,460 22,405 11,406,024 
 IN ASIA 
 
 Kio-Chow 1897 200 ... 168,900 
 
 IN THE PACIFIC 
 
 German New Guinea: — 
 
 Kaiser Wilhelm's 
 
 Land 1885-86 70,000 
 
 Bismark Archipelago 1885 20,000 
 
 Caroline Islands 1899 
 
 Palau or Pelew 
 
 Islands 1899 560 1,427 600,000 
 
 Marianne Islands 1899 250 
 
 Solomon Islands 1886 4,200 
 
 Marshall Islands 1886 150 ... ■ ... 
 
 Samoan Islands: — 
 
 Savaii 1899 660 557 34,579 
 
 Upolu 1899 340 
 
 Total Pacific Pos- 
 sessions 1884-99 96,160 1,984 634,579 
 
 Total Foreign De- 
 pendencies ...1884-99 1,027,820 24,389 12,041,603 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 The British Empire, in its entirety, has an area of 
 11,429,078 square miles, and contains 424,775,160 
 inhabitants. It will, however, in this summary, be 
 impossible to deal in detail with anything but the United 
 Kingdom. 
 
 The government of the United Kingdom is, by its 
 constitution, vested in the King, acting through a re- 
 sponsible ministry, as executive, with the supreme 
 legislative power given to Parliament. In theory, the 
 Crown has' a power of veto on acts of Parliament, but 
 it is never used. 
 
 The present form of Parliament, as divided into two 
 Houses of Legislature, the Lords and Commons, dates 
 from the middle of the Fourteenth century. 
 
 241
 
 Statistics 
 
 The annual ses»iun oi i'arlianicnt begins in February 
 in each year, and la>ts as lonjr as may be deemed 
 necessary. Every session must end with a prorogation. 
 and all bills not then passed, laps>e. A dissolution may 
 (KTCur by will of the sovercii;n, or by proclamation, usu- 
 all} during recess, or by lapse of time, the statutory 
 limit o! the duraiion of any rarliaiiiciit Ixing five years. 
 
 Money, bills, passed by the Commons, if not passed 
 by the House of Lords without amendment, become 
 inw without their concurrence on rcccivinj.; the roya' 
 assent. Other hills of a publi-: character become law 
 without the ct)nsent of the upper house, if passed by 
 the lower house in three successive sessions and re- 
 jected each time by the upper house, on receiving' tlie 
 royal assent, provided that at least two years !iave 
 elapsed between the second readintj at the first passage 
 and the third reading at the third passage. 
 
 The House of Lords consists of peers, who hold then 
 seats {I) by hereditary right; (2) by creation of the 
 sovereign; (3) by virtue of office; (Law Lords, Arch- 
 bishops, etc.); (4) by election for life (Irish peers); 
 (5) by election for duration of rarliamcnt (Scotch 
 peers) The full house at present would consist of 638 
 
 The House of Commons consists (^f members repre- 
 senting County, Borough and University constituencies 
 in the three divisions of the United Kingdom. No one 
 under 21 years of age can be a member and clergymen 
 of the Church of Kngland, the Church of Scotland, the 
 Roman Catholic Church, sheriffs, government contract- 
 ors, and returning officers are disqualified from sitting 
 as members. Members of the Lower House are paid. 
 
 Every elector must be of full age and must l>c regis- 
 tered in the electoral lists. I'roperty qualifications arc 
 restricted to counties and to such boroughs as have 
 county privileges, and are quite intricate in character, 
 but do not affect the great mass of the electorate. 
 
 In ]in\ the number of electors was H. 18 1,263. 
 
 The executive power is exercised, though nominally in 
 the King, by a committee of ministers called the Cabinet, 
 the size of which varies. 
 
 Local g(»vernment is by county councils, in each of the 
 62 administrative counties, which differ in area from the 
 geographical counties. This is an elective lx>dy. which 
 in its turn, co-opts a prescril)od munbcr of aldermen. 
 Aldermen sit for six years, councilmen for three. Women 
 
 248
 
 Statistics 
 
 are eligible to these offices. The legislative jurisdiction 
 of this body is very wide. 
 
 Administrative counties arc again divided into districts 
 which also elect councils, who have charge of local af- 
 fairs. These again in the "rural districts" are divided 
 into civil parishes, which also have an elective council. 
 
 The cities are apart from this system of government 
 and are governed by municipal corporations chartered 
 by the Crowm The same general principles of local gov- 
 ernment obtain in Scotland and Ireland. 
 
 The total population of the Kingdom was, in 1911, 45,- 
 370,530, of whom 22,016,661 were males. The decennial 
 rate of increase for the last period was 9.1 per cent. In 
 1912 there were 1,096,518 births. 
 
 Civil disabilities on account of religion do not attach 
 to any class of British subjects. In England the Church 
 of England is by law established, but the exercise of all 
 religions is freely allowed. 
 
 In Scotland the Church of Scotland is established and 
 is Presbyterian. In Ireland there is no established church. 
 The bulk of the inhabitants of the United Kingdom are 
 Protestants. 
 
 In England and Wales elementary education is under 
 the control of the Board of Education and sufficient 
 school accommodations must be provided in every dis- 
 trict for all resident children between the ages of 5 and 
 14. The local authorities maintain the schools and con- 
 trol the expenditures. In addition to these schools there 
 are many schools maintained by the Church of Eng- 
 land, the Catholics and other religious denominations, as 
 well as some private schools. The total number of all 
 elementary schools on July 1, 1913. was 21,358, with 
 6,075,024 registered pupils. 
 
 In Scotland control of the schools is in the hands of 
 the Scotch Educational Department and, as in England, 
 the local management is confined to the local authorities. 
 In 1913 there were 3.370 schools with 841,427 registered 
 pupils. In Ireland the system is much the same as in 
 Scotland and in 1912 there were 8.253 schools and 668,- 
 974 registered pupils. The Parliamentary grants for 
 education totalled about $90,000,000 in 1912, the remain- 
 der being supplied locally. Very few schools are ab- 
 solutely free in Great Britain. 
 
 Insurance against sickness, unemployment, as well as 
 old age pensions, have been introduced into British legis- 
 lation in the past few rears. 
 
 243
 
 Statistics 
 
 The British naticmal debt on March 31, 1014, ainount- 
 etl to {?3,iT3,l»^^i,!^37, bearing interest at 2 1-4 per cent. 
 
 The British army is the only important army in the 
 world recruited by vohintary enlistmoit. That of the 
 United Kingdom is divided into the Regular Army and 
 the Territtirial Army. The Regular Army serves every- 
 wlicre, and it is customary to refer to these troops as the 
 British Army in contradistinction to the "Native Army," 
 or "Indian .\rmy ' in India, or to the "Ixxal I'orces" in 
 South .\trica or the Colonies. 
 
 The Regular Army in time of peace consists of the 
 permanently emb<xlied troops, the Army Reserve and the 
 Special Reserve. 
 
 Service in the permanently embodied portion of the 
 Regular Army and the Army Reserve is for twelve years, 
 with permission in certain cases to extend to twenty-one 
 years. Of the original twelve years, three to nine are 
 spent with the colors, i.e., on permanent service, and the 
 remainder with the Army Reserve. The Special Reserve 
 serve six years, undergo five months' preliminary train- 
 ing, and thereafter are called up annually for three 
 weeks, the infantry for six days in musketry in addition. 
 The age of enlistment in Regulars and Si>ccial Reserve 
 is from 18 to 25. 
 
 The Territorials are intended for home defense. The 
 term of service is four years. The age limits for en- 
 listment are IT to •i'i, inclusive. The requirements of 
 training arc a fortnight in camp and a certain number of 
 drills varying in different branches, also a musketry 
 course for arms in wiiich it is necessary. 
 
 Cavalry and infantry are armed with the I^c-Enfield 
 rifle, calbre 3(i;5. The Regular army has a Impounder 
 for horse artillery, an lh-p(jun<ler lor field artillery, a 
 40-pounder field howitzer and a 60-pounder for heavy 
 artillery. 
 
 The establishment of Regular troops on January 1, 
 1914. numlx-red ISIJOO; of the Armv Reserve 14(5. 756, 
 of the Special Reserve 63,089; of the Territorials 251,- 
 756. The expense of this force amounted to $140,365,150. 
 
 There are also 78,476 British troops in India and a 
 native army of 164,000 with 3.'), 700 reservists. Another 
 force exists, made up of luiropcans and Eurasians, called 
 the volunteers, numbering about 39.ooo, with 3,000 re- 
 servists. This army cost in the year 1914 about $106,- 
 
 000,000. 
 
 244
 
 I 
 
 Statistics 
 
 The British navy is the largest in the world and the 
 upkeep cost in 191;M4 was $237,701,291. 
 
 The total naval force of all ranks numbered, in 191-1, 
 146,000, with reserves of 50,077. 
 
 The condition of the fleet in the beginning of 1914 is 
 shown in the following table : 
 
 Complete by end of 
 Class 1914 
 
 Super-Dreadnoughts (1) 16 
 
 Dreadnoughts lo 
 
 Pre-Dreadnought battleships 40 
 
 Cruisers 50 
 
 Light cruisers 76 
 
 Torpedo gunboats 18 
 
 Sloops, gunboats, etc 23 
 
 Destroyers (about) 248 
 
 Torpedo boats (2) (about) 100 
 
 Submarines (about) 85 
 
 (1) "Super-Dreadnoughts' are those carrying guns of or 
 over 13.5 inch. No distinction is made between so-called 
 Dreadnought battleships and Dreadnought "cruisers" — the 
 latter being simply fast battleships, now known as "battle 
 cruisers." For lesser craft the 1913 revised official classifica- 
 tion is followed. 
 
 (2) Including "coastal destroyers" and many very old 
 torpedo boats. 
 
 The units of this fleet will be found on pages 247, 248, 
 249 and 250. 
 
 The total arable land in the United Kingdom is about 
 19,746,000 acres, but as Great Britain cannot raise 
 enough to anything like feed herself, her agricultural 
 resources need not be dwelt on. 
 
 In 1913 there were in Great Britain 2,14 7,083 horses, 
 11,895,122 cattle, 2'J^,549,817 sheep and 3,293,816 pigs. 
 
 Over 98,000 men were employed in the fisheries of 
 Great Britain in 1913. 
 
 The mining industry is important; 1,117,148 persons 
 were employed therein in 1912 ; iron ore, lead, tin and 
 zinc were the principal metallic minerals produced, while 
 coal was the principal non-metallic (260,416,338 tons). 
 Welsh coal is the standard steam coal of the world. 
 
 England is the greatest manufacturing nation in the 
 world. This is so well known that only a summary of the 
 principal products of her industry will be given. Tex- 
 tiles, cotton, woolen and linen yarns and piece goods are 
 made to a value of more than $1,000,000,000 a year. 
 Iron, steel and other furnace products are also produced 
 in enormous quantities. 
 
 2^5
 
 Statistics 
 
 III 1912 the vessels regfistered as belonging lo the 
 United Kingdom were: Sailing vessels, 8.510, with a 
 tonnage of 90?. 718; steam vessels, 12.38?. tonnage 10,- 
 99?,o7;i : a total of 20,89? vessels; and tonage of 11,-. 
 894,791. This enormous fleet gave employment to 386,- 
 806 men. 
 
 In 191? there were ?3.in miles of railway in the 
 kingdom, all owned by private companies; 24,354 post- 
 officfs. 1I.014 telcgraj^h offices and tliero were nearly 
 1,500,000 miles of telephone line. The telegraph and 
 telephone systems are operated by the government. 
 
 Great Britain has the largest colonial empire of 
 any power in the world. These colonies are divided 
 into three classes : 
 
 1. The Crown colonies, entirely controlled by the 
 home government. 
 
 ?. Those possessing representative institutions in 
 which the Crown has no more than a veto on legisla- 
 tion, but the home government retains the control of 
 public officers. 
 
 3. Those possessing responsible government which 
 the home government has no control over. 
 
 Two of these colonies, Canada and Australia, have 
 taken steps towards possessing a navy. Canada has two 
 old cruisers, the Xiobe and the Rainl)ow. Australia 
 has the Australia, a dreadnought battle cruiser, the 
 Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane, protected cruisers, 
 and six destroyers. 
 
 \C,
 
 Statistics 
 
 BRITISH NAVY 
 
 PRE-DKliADNOUGHTS 
 
 Begun Name Displacement 
 
 1893 Majestic 15,000 
 
 Magnificent 15,000 
 
 and Mars 15,000 
 
 Prince George 15,000 
 
 Victorious 15,000 
 
 1894 Jupiter 15,000 
 
 1894 Caesar 15,000 
 
 and Illustrious 15,000 
 
 1895 Hannibal 15,000 
 
 1896 Canopus 12,950 
 
 Glory 12,950 
 
 and Ocean 12,950 
 
 Goliath 12,950 
 
 Albion 12,950 
 
 1897 Vengeance 12,950 
 
 1897 Formidable 15.000 
 
 and Irresistible .^. 15,000 
 
 1898 Implacable 15,000 
 
 1898 London 15,000 
 
 1899 Bulwark 15,000 
 
 1899 Venerable 15,000 
 
 1899 Duncan 14,000 
 
 1898 Exmouth 14,000 
 
 1898 Cornwallis 14,000 
 
 1898 Russell 14,000 
 
 1900 Albemarle 14,000 
 
 1900 Queen 14,000 
 
 1901 Prince of Wales 15,000 
 
 1901 King Edward 16,350 
 
 1902 Dominion 16,350 
 
 1902 Commonwealth 16,350 
 
 1902 Zealandia 16,350 
 
 1903 Hindustan 16,350 
 
 1903 Hibernia 16,350 
 
 1904 Africa 16,350 
 
 1904 Britannia 16,350 
 
 1903 Swiftsure 11,800 
 
 1903 Triumph 11.800 
 
 1904 Lord Nelson 16,600 
 
 1905 Agamemnon 16,600 
 
 Main Armament Horse Power 
 
 =!peed 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 12,000 
 
 16 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 12,000 
 
 16 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 12,000 
 
 16 
 
 4 12-in.. 12 6-in. 
 
 12,000 
 
 16 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 12,000 
 
 16 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 12,000 
 
 16 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 12,000 
 
 16 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 12,000 
 
 16 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 12,000 
 
 16 
 
 4 12-in, 12 6-in. 
 
 13,500 
 
 18.5 
 
 4 12-in, 12 6-in. 
 
 13,500 
 
 18.5 
 
 4 12-in, 12 6-in. 
 
 13,500 
 
 18.5 
 
 4 12-in, 12 6-in. 
 
 13,500 
 
 18.5 
 
 4 12-in, 12 6-in. 
 
 13,500 
 
 18.5 
 
 4 12-in, 12 6-in. 
 
 13,500 
 
 18.5 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 15,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 15,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 15,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 15,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 15,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 15,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 18,000 
 
 19.5 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 18,000 
 
 19.5 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 18,000 
 
 19.5 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 18,000 
 
 19.5 
 
 4 12-in.. 12 6-in. 
 
 18,000 
 
 19.5 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 18,000 
 
 19.5 
 
 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 15,000 
 
 18 
 
 4 12, 4 9.2, 10 6-m. 
 
 18,000 18.5 
 
 to 19 
 
 4 12, 4 9.2, 10 6-in. 
 
 18,000 18.5 to 19 
 
 4 12, 4 9.2, 10 6-in. 
 
 18,000 18.5 to 19 
 
 4 12, 4 9.2, 10 6-in. 
 
 18,000 18.5 
 
 to 19 
 
 4 12, 4 9.2, 10 6-in. 
 
 18,000 18.5 to 19 
 
 4 12, 4 9.2, 10 6-in. 
 
 18,000 18.5 
 
 to 19 
 
 4 12, 4 9.2, 10 6-in. 
 
 18,000 18.5 to V.t 
 
 4 12, 4 9.2, 10 6-in. 
 
 18,000 18.5 to 19 
 
 4 10-in., 14 7.5-in, 
 
 14,000 19 to 20 
 
 4 10-in., 14 7.5-in. 
 
 14,000 19 to 20 
 
 4 12-in., 10 9.2 in. 
 
 16.750 
 
 18.5 
 
 4 12-in., 10 9.2 in. 
 
 16.750 
 
 18.5 
 
 DREADNOUGHTS 
 
 1905 Dreadnought 17,000 10 12-in. 
 
 1905 Invincible 17,250 8 12-in. 
 
 1906 Indomitable 17,250 8 12-in. 
 
 1906 Inflexible 17,250 8 12-in. 
 
 1906 Bellerophon 18,600 10 12-in. 
 
 1906 Temeraire 18,600 10 12-in. 
 
 1907 Superb 18,600 10 12-in. 
 
 1907 St. Vincent 19.250 10 12-in. 
 
 1907 Collingwood 19,2.50 10 12-in. 
 
 1908 Vanguard 10.2.")0 10 12-in. 
 
 ?47 
 
 23,000 
 
 21 
 
 43,000 
 
 27 
 
 43,000 
 
 27 
 
 43,000 
 
 27 
 
 23,000 
 
 21.5 
 
 23,000 
 
 21.5 
 
 23,000 
 
 21.5 
 
 24,500 
 
 22 
 
 24,500 
 
 22 
 
 24,500 
 
 22
 
 Statistics 
 BRITISH NAVY— (Continued) 
 
 DREADNOUGHTS— Continued. 
 
 B«cun N^mr Displacement Uain Armament Horse Power Speed 
 
 1008 N'cptiinc 19.900 10 12-in. 35,000 21 
 
 1909 IndcfatiKable 18.750 8 12-in. 43,000 27 
 
 1909 Hercules 20.000 10 12-in. 25,000 31 
 
 I'JIO Colossus 20.000 10 12-in. 25^000 21 
 
 1909 Oric^n 22.500 10 13.5-in. 27.000 21 
 
 1909 Thunderer 22.500 10l3.5-in. 27,000 21 
 
 1910 Monarch 22.500 10 13.5-in. 27,000 21 
 
 1910 Conqueror 22.500 lO 13.5-in. 27.000 21 
 
 1909 Lion* 26.350 8 13.5-in. 70.000 30 
 
 1910 Princess Royal* 26,3.SO 8 13.5-in. 70.000 30 
 
 1910 King George 24.800 10 13.5 in. 31,000 21 
 
 1910 Centurion 24.800 10 13.5 in. 31,000 21 
 
 1911 .\jax 24.800 10 13.5 in. 31,000 21 
 
 1911 Audacious 24.800 10 13.5 in. 31,000 21 
 
 1911 Queen Mary 2'<,8.10 8 13.5-in. 78,000 28 
 
 1911 Bcnbow 2."),000 10 13.5-in., 12 6-in. 30,000 21 
 
 1911 Emperor of India ....2.'.,000 10 13. .'.-in.. 12 6-in. 30,000 21 
 
 1912 Iron Duke 2.'.,000 10 13.5-in.. 12 6-in. 30.000 21 
 
 1912 Marlborough 2.-..0OU s i3.5-in. 78.000 28 
 
 1912 Tiger 29.000 H 13.5-in. 78,000 28 
 
 1912 Qutcn Elizabeth 27,500 8 i5-in.. 12 6-in 58.000 25 
 
 1912 Valiant 27.500 ,s 15-in.. 12 6-in. 58.000 25 
 
 1913 Warspitc . 27.500 s 15-in.. 12 6-in. 58,000 25 
 
 1913 Barham 27,500 S 15-in.. 12 fl-tn. 58,000 25 
 
 1913 Malava 27, .500 •=< 15-in.. 12 6-in. 58,000 25 
 
 1913 Royal Sovereign 25,750 — 31.000 21 
 
 1913 Royal Oak 25,750 — 31.000 21 
 
 1913 Ramilics 25,7.50 — 31.000 21 
 
 1914 Resolution 25,750 — 31.000 21 
 
 1914 Revenge 25.750 — 31.000 21 
 
 •Rattle Cruisers. 
 
 CRUISERS 
 
 1897 Cressy 12,000 
 
 1897 Hogue 12,001) 
 
 1897 Sutlej .12.000 
 
 1898 .^bonkir 12.00<I 
 
 1898 Eruyalus 12.000 
 
 1898 P.arrhante 12.000 
 
 1898 Drake 14,100 
 
 1898 Good Hope 14.100 
 
 1899 Leviathan 14,100 
 
 1899 King Alfred 14.100 
 
 1899 Essex 9.800 
 
 1898 Kent 9.80<| 
 
 1899 Motimouth 9.800 
 
 1899 Berwick 9.800 
 
 1900 Cornwall 9.800 
 
 1900 Suffolk «.800 
 
 1900 Cumberland . O.'iOM 
 
 9.2- 
 
 9.2- 
 
 0.2- 
 
 9.2- 
 
 9.2- 
 
 0.2- 
 
 9.2- 
 
 9.2- 
 
 9.2- 
 
 9.2- 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 A-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 n.. 12 
 n.. 12 
 n., 12 
 n.. 12 
 n.. 12 
 n.. 12 
 n.. 16 
 n.. 16 
 n., 16 
 n.. 16 
 
 6-in. 
 6-in. 
 6-in. 
 6-in. 
 6-in. 
 6-in. 
 6-in 
 6-in. 
 6-in 
 fl-in 
 
 21,000 
 
 21.000 
 
 21.000 
 
 21.000 
 
 21.000 
 
 21,000 
 
 30,000 
 
 30,000 
 
 .{0 000 
 
 30 000 
 
 22.000 23 
 
 22,000 23 
 
 22,000 23 
 
 22,000 23 
 
 22,000 23 
 
 22,000 23 
 
 22.000 23 
 
 21 
 
 21 
 
 21 
 
 21 
 
 21 
 
 21 
 
 24 
 
 24 
 
 24 
 
 34 
 to 24 
 to 24 
 to 24 
 to 24 
 to 24 
 to 24 
 to 24 
 
 248
 
 Statistics 
 
 BRITISH NAVY— (Continued) 
 
 CRUISERS— (Continued) 
 
 Begun Name 
 
 1901 Donegal 
 
 1901 Lancaster 
 
 1901 Devonshire 
 
 1901 Argyll 
 
 1901 Antrim 
 
 1902 Roxburgh 
 
 1902 Carnarvon 
 
 1902 Hampshire 
 
 1902 Black Prince 
 
 1903 Duke of Edinburgh 
 1903 Warrior 
 
 1903 Achilles 
 
 1904 Natal 
 
 1904 Cochrane 
 
 1904 Minotaur 
 
 1904 Shannon 
 
 1905 Defence 
 
 1905 Edgar 
 
 1899 Hawke 
 
 1900 Theseus 
 
 1900 Endymioii 
 
 1900 Grafton 
 
 1900 Gibraltar 
 
 1889 Crescent 
 
 1890 Royal Arthur 
 
 1895 Terrible 
 
 1895 Diadem 
 
 1896 Europa 
 
 1896 Spartiate 
 
 1896 Ariadne 
 
 1897 Amphitrite 
 
 1897 Argonaut 
 
 1888 Philomel 
 
 1888 Sappho 
 
 1889 Sirius 
 
 1889 Melpomene 
 
 1889 Astraea 
 
 1889 Charybdis 
 
 1889 Forte 
 
 1889 Fox 
 
 1889 Hermione 
 
 1889 Eclipse 
 
 1889 Minerva 
 
 1889 Talbot 
 
 1889 Venus 
 
 1894 Isis 
 
 1895 Dido 
 
 1895 Doris 
 
 1895 Diana 
 
 1895 Juno 
 
 1896 Vindictive 
 
 1896 Pelorus 
 
 1895 Pegasus 
 
 1898 Pyramus 
 
 Displacement 
 
 9,800 
 
 9,800 
 
 10,850 
 
 10,850 
 
 10,850 
 
 10,85(1 
 
 10,850 
 
 10,850 
 
 13,550 
 
 13,550 
 
 13,550 
 
 13,55(1 
 
 13,550 
 
 13,550 
 
 13,550 
 
 14,500 
 
 14,500 
 
 7,350 
 
 7,350 
 
 7,350 
 
 7,350 
 
 7,350 
 
 7,700 
 
 7,700 
 
 7,700 
 
 14,200 
 
 1 1,000 
 
 11,000 
 
 11,000 
 
 11,000 
 
 11,000 
 
 11,000 
 
 2,575 
 
 3,400 
 
 3,400 
 
 3,400 
 
 4,360 
 
 4.360 
 
 4,360 
 
 4,360 
 
 4,360 
 
 5,600 
 
 5,600 
 
 5,600 
 
 5,600 
 
 5,600 
 
 . 5,600 
 
 5,600 
 
 5,60«) 
 
 5 600 
 
 5.750 
 
 2.135 
 
 2,1 3:1 
 
 2,135 
 
 6 6-in. 
 6 6-in. 
 6 6-in. 
 6 6-in. 
 6 6-in. 
 6 6-in. 
 10 6-in. 
 10 6-in. 
 4 7.5-in. 
 4 7.5-in. 
 4 7.5-in. 
 4 7.5-in. 
 4 7.5-in. 
 10 7.5-in, 
 10 7.5-in 
 10 6-in. 
 10 6-in. 
 10 6-in. 
 10 6-in. 
 10 6-in. 
 10 6-in. 
 12 6-in. 
 12 6-in. 
 16 6-in. 
 
 Main Armament 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 7.5-in., 
 
 7.5-in., 
 
 7.5-in., 
 
 7.5-in., 
 
 7.5-in., 
 
 7.5-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in,, 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 9.2-in., 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-tn. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 4.7-in. 
 
 6-in., 6 4.7-in. 
 
 6-in., 6 4.7-in. 
 
 6-in., 6 4.7-in. 
 
 6-in., 8 4.7-in. 
 
 6-in., 8 4.7-in. 
 
 6-in., 8 4.7-in. 
 
 6-in., 8 4.7-in. 
 
 6-in., 8 4.7-in. 
 
 6-in., 6 4.7-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 6-in. 
 
 4-in. 
 
 4-in. 
 
 4-in. 
 
 Horsf I'owei- 
 
 22.000 23 
 
 22,000 23 
 
 21,000 
 
 21,000 
 
 21,000 
 
 21,000 
 
 21,000 
 
 21,000 
 
 23,500 
 
 23,500 
 
 23,500 
 
 23,500 
 
 23,500 
 
 23,500 
 
 23,500 
 
 27,000 
 
 27,000 
 
 12,000 
 
 12,000 
 
 12,000 
 
 12,000 
 
 12,000 
 
 12,000 
 
 12,000 
 
 12,000 
 
 25,000 
 
 16.500 
 
 16.500 
 
 18,000 
 
 18,000 
 
 18,000 
 
 18,000 
 
 4,000 
 
 9,000 
 
 9,000 
 
 9,000 
 
 9,000 
 
 9,000 
 
 9,000 
 
 9,000 
 
 9.000 
 
 9,600 
 
 9,600 
 
 9,600 
 
 9,600 
 
 9,600 
 
 9,600 
 
 9,600 
 
 9,600 
 
 10, 
 
 7, 
 
 7, 
 
 7. 
 
 18.5 
 
 18.5 
 
 18.5 
 
 18.5 
 
 18.5 
 
 18.5 
 
 18.5 
 
 18.5 
 
 000 
 
 000 
 
 000 
 
 000 
 
 •Speed 
 to 24 
 to 24 
 22.S 
 22.5 
 22..-. 
 22.5 
 22.5 
 22.5 
 22.6 
 22.5 
 22.5 
 22.5 
 22.5 
 22.5 
 22.5 
 22.5 
 22.5 
 19 
 19 
 19 
 19 
 19 
 19 
 19 
 19 
 22 
 20.5 
 20.5 
 21 
 21 
 21 
 21 
 16.5 
 20 
 20 
 20 
 19.5 
 19.5 
 19.5 
 19.5 
 19.5 
 
 to 19 
 
 to 19 
 
 to 10 
 
 to 19 
 
 to 19 
 
 to 19 
 
 to 19 
 
 to 1") 
 
 19 
 
 20.5 
 
 20.5 
 
 20.5 
 
 249
 
 Statistics 
 
 BRITISH NAVY— (Continued) 
 CKUl^iliK^— J. Continued) 
 
 Hri 111 Ntiine DUpUcem«nt Main Armament 
 
 .^.'> Proserpine 2.135 8 4-in. 
 
 - ^ Psyche -.135 8 4-in. 
 
 - '« I'ionccr . . -'-00 8 •i-in. 
 
 l.sy^ Highflyer 5.600 11 6-in. 
 
 IMOO Hcrincs 5.600 u 6-in. 
 
 I'JOI liyaointh 5,600 n 6-in. 
 
 1901 C'hallenger 5.800 ii «-in. 
 
 1901 Adventure 2,670 9 4-in. 
 
 1901 .Xtttntive 2.670 9 4-in. 
 
 1901 Pathfintlei . 2.940 9 4-in. 
 
 1902 Patrol 2.940 9 4-in, 
 
 1904 Sentinel 2.895 9 4-in. 
 
 1904 Skirmisher ...< 2,895 9 4-in. 
 
 1W4 lM>r\vard 2,850 9 4-in. 
 
 1904 iM^rcsight 2,850 9 4-in. 
 
 1907 Hoadicea 3.300 6 4-in. 
 
 1909 Bellona 3.300 6 4-in. 
 
 1909 Bristol . . .1.000 2 6-in.. 6 4-in. 
 
 1908 r.lasROw 5.000 2 6-in., 6 4-in. 
 
 1910 r.Ioucestrr 5,000 2 6-in., 6 4-in. 
 
 1910 Liverpool 5.000 2 6-in., 6 4-in. 
 
 1910 Newcastle 5,000 2 6-in., 6 4-in. 
 
 1910 Weymouth 5.100 8 6-in. 
 
 1910 Falmonih 5.100 8 6-in. 
 
 1910 Yarmouth 5.100 8 6-in. 
 
 1910 Dartmouth 5,100 8 6-in. 
 
 1909 Blonde 3.350 10 4-in. 
 
 1919 Blanche 3.350 10 4-in. 
 
 1910 .\ctive 3,440 10 4-in. 
 
 1911 .^mphiou 3.440 10 4-in. 
 
 1911 Fearless 3,440 10 4-in. 
 
 1910 Chatham 5.300 8 6-in. 
 
 1910 Southampton 5,300 8 6-in. 
 
 1911 Dublin 5.300 8 6-in. 
 
 1911 BirminRham 5.300 9 6-in. 
 
 1911 Nottingham 5.300 9 6-in. 
 
 1912 Lowestoft . .',,300 9 6-in. 
 
 1912 .Arethusa . .(.520 2 6-in., 6 4-in 
 
 1912 .Aurora . ;i.520 2 6-in.. 6 4-in 
 
 1912 Ga'atca . . :t.520 2 6-in,, 6 4-in 
 
 1912 Inconstant :t.52<i 2 6-in.. 6 4-in 
 
 1913 Royalist . .1.530 2 6-in., 6 4-in 
 
 1913 I'enelope :h,520 2 6-in., 6 4-in 
 
 1913 Fhacton 3,52(i 2 6-in.. 6 4-in 
 
 1913 Undaunted 3.52(1 2 6-in., 6 4-in 
 
 1913 Champion 3.700 3 6-in.. 6 4-in. 
 
 1913 Caroline 3,700 3 6-in.. 6 4-in. 
 
 1913 Cordelia 3.700 3 6-in.. 6 4-in. 
 
 1913 Comut 3,700 3 6-in.. 6 4-in. 
 
 1913 Cleopatra 3,70«) 3 6-in.. 6 4-in. 
 
 1914 Conquest 3.700 3 6-in.. 6 4-in. 
 
 1914 Calliopf 3.700 3 6-in.. 6 4-in. 
 
 1914 Caryst'Tt . 3.700 3 fi-in.. 6 4-in. 
 
 1914 4 Pro . . 
 
 850 
 
 HuiBf Powpr 
 
 Speed 
 
 7.000 
 
 20.") 
 
 7,000 
 
 20.5 
 
 9,800 
 
 21V.; 
 
 10,000 
 
 20 
 
 10.000 
 
 20 
 
 10,000 
 
 20 
 
 12.500 
 
 21 
 
 15.925 
 
 S5 
 
 14.900 
 
 85 
 
 16.500 
 
 25 
 
 16.500 
 
 26 
 
 17.000 
 
 25 
 
 17.000 
 
 U 
 
 15.000 
 
 25 
 
 19,000 
 
 25 
 
 18.000 
 
 25 
 
 18,000 
 
 25 
 
 22.000 
 
 25 
 
 22,000 
 
 25 
 
 22.000 
 
 25 
 
 22.000 
 
 25 
 
 22.000 
 
 25 
 
 25.000 
 
 25 
 
 25.000 
 
 25 
 
 25.000 
 
 25 
 
 25.000 
 
 25 
 
 18,000 
 
 85 
 
 18.000 
 
 25 
 
 18.000 
 
 25 
 
 18.000 
 
 25 
 
 18.000 
 
 25 
 
 25.000 
 
 25 
 
 25.000 
 
 25 
 
 25.000 
 
 25 
 
 
 87 
 87 
 27 
 30 
 
 
 
 30.000 
 
 30.000 
 
 30 
 
 30.000 
 
 30 
 
 30.000 
 
 30 
 
 30.000 
 
 30 
 
 30.000 
 
 30 
 
 30.000 
 
 30 
 
 30.000 
 
 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .^ 
 
 
 —
 
 Statistics 
 
 RUSSIA 
 
 The government of Russia, since tlie year 1905, is 
 styled a constitutional hereditary monarchy, but, in 
 fact, the legislative, executive and judicial powers con- 
 tinue to be united to a great extent in the Emperor, 
 who continues to bear the title, of Autocrat. 
 
 On August 6, (19 O.S.) 1905, the first step towards 
 a representative government was made, and an elective 
 body of representatives of the country, empowered with 
 consultative power only, and named the States Duma, 
 was created. A few months later, October 17 (30) a 
 new law was promulgated, conferring on the Duma 
 legislative powers. At the same time the principles of 
 the inviolability of the person and of freedom of con- 
 science, speech, assembly and association were promul- 
 gated by the Emperor, and it was established that no 
 law should come into effect without the approval ot 
 the Duma and the Council of the Empire (established 
 1810). 
 
 Under a manifesto! of February 20 (March 5) 1906, 
 the Council of the Empire was transformed into a 
 legislative council. 
 
 In effect, the representative government thus created 
 was a two-chambered legislature, the upper house be- 
 ing the Council of the Empire, the lower the Duma, 
 but both with very restricted powers. 
 
 The Council of the Empire consists of an equal num- 
 ber of elected members and of members appointed by 
 the Emperor, who convokes and prorogues the Council 
 annually. 
 
 All members of the Council must be 40 years of age 
 and have an academical degree. The President and 
 Vice President are appointed by the Emperor. Elective 
 members are eligible for nine years, one-third being 
 elected every three years. 
 
 The election is indirect. Each assembly of the Zem- 
 stvo (defined in another paragraph) of each province 
 elects one member. Six are elected by the Synod of the 
 Orthodox Church, six by the Academy of Sciences and 
 the Universities, twelve by bourses of commerce and 
 industry, eighteen by the nobility, and six by the land 
 owners of Poland, all of these bodies acting through 
 their representatives. 
 
 The election of the Duma is also by indirect means, 
 and 19 made by electoral bodies of the chief towns of 
 governments or provinces and of the greatest cities, com- 
 
 251
 
 Statistics 
 
 posed of delegates chosen by tlie district or town elec- 
 tive autlK>rities. 
 
 The electors are : All ItKlgers in towns occupying lor 
 12 months Kxlging let to them, all clerks of state, munic- 
 ipal or railway administration ; in the country, all 
 owners of a determinate area of land, different in the 
 various districts, or of non-industrial estates of more 
 than 50,0i)0 roubles in value ; the volvsts or peasant com- 
 munities are each represented by two delegates, and 
 matiu factories with more than AO workmen, by one dele- 
 gate per lOOO workmen. 
 
 These two bodies have equal legislative ix)wcrs, the 
 same right of initiative in legislation and of addressing 
 questions to the nunistry, but cannot receive either dep- 
 utations <»r petitions. Sessions are public. Every 
 measure passed by l)oth houses must be submitted for 
 Imperial sanction by the President of the Council. Bills 
 rejected by the Czar can not be passed again the same 
 session. 
 
 The adnwnistration of the Jimpire is entrusted to great 
 l)oards or councils. The most important are the Holy 
 Synod, the Ruling Senate, the Committee of Ministers. 
 the Council of Ministers. 
 
 The Empire is divided into governments and pnAinccs 
 and these again into districts or circuits. There are 78 
 governments and "21 provinces, these latter mostly i" 
 Asia. These districts in European Rus.sia are again 
 divided into 17,075 cantons. The principal government 
 and district officers are appointed by the central authori- 
 ties. In the cantons or parishes, the government, in-so- 
 far as the lands of the peasantry are c<^icernc<l, and part 
 of the local a<lministration, is entrusted to the people. 
 The cantons arc presided over by an elder clecteil by the 
 cantonial assembly, which is compo.scd of delegates of 
 the village community in the proportion of one man to 
 every ten houses. 
 
 Each village elects an elder and also a tax collector by 
 universal suffrage, and every householder has a voice in 
 the communal meetings. 
 
 The Zcmstvos are the di.strict and provincial assemblies 
 composed of rci)rc.scntatives elected by the peasantry, 
 the householders in the towns and the landowners. 
 
 The towns anrl cities have municii>al institutions of 
 their own, in .'M provinces, modeled on the Zem.sivos. 
 
 Finland had a different system, but since the war l>e- 
 gan, its ancient institutions arc stated to have l)ccn al)ol-
 
 Statistics 
 
 ished. The Baltic provinces are in the same case. 
 
 The Russian Empire comprises one-seventh of the 
 world's surface. Its area is 8,417,118 square miles. The 
 population was estimated in 1912 by the Central Statis- 
 tical Committee (only one census has been taken of late 
 years, that of 1897) at 171,059,900, of which 122,550,- 
 700 is in European Russia, 12,776,100 in Poland, 3,140,- 
 100 in Finland, 12,288,100 in Caucasus, the remainder in 
 Asia. According to the last census, 76.93 per cent, of 
 the population of European Russia were Slavs. 
 
 In 1910 there were 5,680,480 births in the territory of 
 the Empire, the birth rate, 44.2, being one of the highest 
 in the world. Of late years there are more immigrants 
 into Russia than emigrants from. The vast majority of 
 the people live in the country, there being 710,000 vil- 
 lages with a population of 1,00€ or less. 
 
 The established religion of the Empire is the Graeco- 
 Russian. officially called the Orthodox Faith. The Em- 
 peror is thQ head of the Church ; he appoints to every 
 office therein, and is restricted only so far as to leave 
 the bishops and prelates the privilege of proposing 
 candidates. Practically the Procurator of the Holy 
 Synod enjoys wide powers in church matters. 
 
 With the exception of the restraints laid on the Jews, 
 all religions may be. freely professed in the Empire in 
 theory ; in practice, however, the dissidents have been 
 and are still severely persecuted. 
 
 Most of the schools of the empire are under the Min- 
 istry of Public Instruction. 
 
 According to the last issue (1913) of the "Year Book 
 of Russia," published by the Central Statistical Commit- 
 tee, the numbers of all kinds of schools and of children 
 attending them, on January 1, 1911, will be found on 
 page 254. 
 
 The total expenditure for education in Russia, not 
 all for schools, was in round figures $81,000,000 in the 
 budget estimates of 1913. 
 
 The Russian national debt in 1913 was $4,511,316,061, 
 most of which has been borrowed in France. 
 
 Russia has an extensive frontier, both by sea and 
 land, protected by fortifications of various classes. 
 
 The most important fortresses and forts are divided 
 into three classes as follows : In the first class are War- 
 saw, Novogeorgievsh, Brest-Litovsk, in the Warsaw 
 district, and Kovna in the Velna district. The second 
 class consists of Kronstadt and Sveaborg in the Petro- 
 grad and Finland district ; Ivangorod in the Warsaw 
 
 253
 
 Statistics 
 
 district; Kerch in the Odessa district; Libau in the Vil- 
 no district and \'ladivo^lok ii< the Arnuir district. In 
 the tliird chis> are Xiluirj; m tlie I'inland district; Se- 
 vastopol and L'st-Dvinsk in the \'ehia district and Kars 
 and Batum in Caucasus district. Tlicro are also 46 
 places unclassed. 
 
 .\,M.., M ALL KINDS or SCHOOLS 
 JANUARY 1. 1911. 
 
 European Russia 'n4l-' 
 
 I'oland ti,776 
 
 Ciscaucasia ... -.780 
 
 Transcaucasia 2,693 
 
 Siberia .">,687 
 
 Central .\sia . '.»,587 
 
 I'otal 117.941 
 
 CHILUKL.N AITENJMNL. IHL.M JANUARY 1. 1911. 
 
 Fligli Middle Special 
 schools schools schools 
 
 European Russia .'i7,691 
 
 Poland 4.010 
 
 Ciscaucasia .... 
 
 Transcaucasia.. 3.186 
 
 Siberia .1.241 
 
 Central Asia... 
 
 351,65.') 
 20,345 
 9,899 
 12,99:) 
 20.852 
 11,555 
 
 193.486 
 18,020 
 3.225 
 2,894 
 8,274 
 3,144 
 
 Trimary 
 schools 
 
 5.192.090 
 282,735 
 176.66<J 
 115,668 
 273,851 
 108,909 
 
 Toul 
 
 5,794.922 
 325,110 
 189,793 
 131,683 
 306;!18 
 123,608 
 
 Total 65.218 427.301 328,983 6.149.922 6.871,334 
 
 Military '^crvire in Russia is uni\(Msal and ooinpnl- 
 sorv and hcpins at the age of 20 and extends to the 
 rnd f>f the -l.'Jrd vf-ar. Owinp to the extent of the Em- 
 pire there arc three armies, known as the army of Euro- 
 pean Russia, of the Caucasus, of Asia. 
 
 ?r,4
 
 Statistics 
 
 Service in the' first line or active army is for three 
 years in the infantry and field artillery, four years other 
 arms. This completed, the soldier is then transferred to 
 the Reserve (Zapas) where he serves fourteen or fif- 
 teen years, having two trainings of six weeks each dur- 
 ing this period. The soldier then passes into the "Opol- 
 chcnie," where he remains five years. The Cossack> 
 hold their lands by military tenure and serve during life, 
 providing their own horses and equipments. At 19 they 
 are trained two years at home, then enter for four years 
 the "first category" regiment of their district, then to the 
 "second category" regiment for another four years and 
 to the "third category" regiment for another four years, 
 after which five years are passed in the reserves. Except 
 the time spent in the first category regiment, the men 
 live at home. 
 
 The "Opolchenie" army is divided into two classes or 
 bans. The first includes the trained men, and the young 
 men surplus to the annual contingent, and all are em- 
 bodied in the active army in case of war. The second 
 ban of the "Opolchenie" comprises all those exempted 
 from actual service, those not quite up to the physical 
 standard, the older classes of the surplus men, — in a 
 word, is the levy "en masse." 
 
 There is a system of one year volunteers in Russia 
 which furnishes the officers, largely required for the re- 
 serve troops on mobilization. 
 
 The field army of Russia has a grand total of about 
 1,850,000 men, the reserves about 2,400.000. 
 
 The Russian infantry is armed with "3 line" rifle, 
 model 1891. It is a 5-cartridge magazine rifle, 299 cali- 
 bre. The cavalry and the Cossacks carry a similar rifle, 
 2 3-4 inches shorter in the barrel. The artillery uses a 
 Q.F. shielded gun model 1902, firing a shell of 13 1-2 lbs. 
 
 The military budget of Russia for 1913 amounted to 
 $478,878,600. ' 
 
 The naval budget for 1913 was $121,250,000. The 
 Russian Navy is subject to special conditions, such as do 
 not affect the navies of other powers, owing to the 
 geographical conditions of the Empire, to meet which, 
 Russia is obliged to maintain four distinct fleets. Of 
 these the most important in regard to European rela- 
 tions in the Baltic fleet, though the Black Sea fleet is also 
 of some importance. 
 
 The chief base of the Baltic fleet is Kronstadt, which 
 is heavily fortified. The Gulf of Finland is usually 
 
 255
 
 Statistics 
 
 blocked with ice from November to April. The new 
 port of Libau in Courland is. however, ice free. 
 
 In the Black Sea. Sevastojx)! is the chief naval base 
 and is appropriately fortified. 
 
 The number of officers and men is about 53,600. The 
 following is a statement of the strength of the Russian 
 fleet, including ships building and provided for, but 
 excluding training ships, transports, and non-effective 
 vessels : 
 
 H.M.TIC FLEKT 
 
 At the end of 
 
 1913 1914 1915 
 
 Dreadnoughts — 4 * 
 
 Prc-Dreadnought battleships 4 4 4 
 
 Pre-Dreadnought armored cruisers 6 .« 6 
 
 Protected cruisers 6 • H 
 
 Torpedo gunboats, etc ? ? ? 
 
 Destroyers 78 — 114 
 
 Torpedo boats ? ? ? 
 
 Submarines ? ? ? 
 
 BLACK SEA FLEET 
 
 At the end of 
 
 1913 1914 1915 
 
 Dreadnoughts — — 3 
 
 Prc-Dreadnought battleships 6 6(?) 6 
 
 Armored cruisers — — — 
 
 Protected cruisers 2 11 13 
 
 Destroyers 25 ? ? 
 
 Torpedo boats 16 ? ? 
 
 Submarines 14 ? ? 
 
 There are also two armored gunboats, and various 
 very old tori>edo boats and gimboats. 
 
 The Caspian flotilla, which is not included in the 
 above statement, consists of a few small gunboats and 
 steamships. 
 
 The tables on pages 257 and 258 of the Russian ar- 
 mor-clad fleet and principal cruisers arc arranged in 
 chronological order. 
 
 Russia i^ almost purely an agricultural country and 
 her crops are among the greatest in the world as will be 
 seen fr^m the following harvest for 1912: 
 
 Wheat (winter) 23.221.160.000 lbs. 
 
 Wheat (summer) 34.440,400.000 lbs. 
 
 Rye (winter) 64, 000. .'.00,000 lbs. 
 
 Rve (summer) 0.00fi,ft40,000 lbs. 
 
 Oats 38, fli 1.960,000 lbs. 
 
 Rarley 27. .189. 400.000 lbs. 
 
 Potatoes 92.7.'50.680,OOO lbs. 
 
 Hay 149.080.080.000 lbs. 
 
 256
 
 orse i'ower 
 
 bpueu 
 
 4iJ,000 
 
 az 
 
 4;i,ooo 
 
 zz 
 
 iZ.OOO 
 
 zz 
 
 45i,000 
 
 2a 
 
 Gtt.OUO 
 
 26.J 
 
 66,UUU 
 
 26.0 
 
 66,000 
 
 26.5 
 
 66,000 
 
 26.5 
 
 16,500 
 
 lb 
 
 16,500 
 
 lC5 
 
 16,500 
 
 lb 
 
 17,600 
 
 16 
 
 Statistics 
 
 RUSSIAN NAVY 
 DREADNOUGHTS 
 
 Name Displacement Main Armament 
 
 Gaiigoot 23,a00 12 12-111., 16 4.7-in. 
 
 Toltava 23,300 12 12-iii., 16 4.7-in. 
 
 Fetropavlovsk 23,300 12 12-in., 16 4.7-in. 
 
 Sevastopol 23,300 12 la-iii., 16 4,7-in. 
 
 liorodino 26,000 y 14-iii., 20 5-in. 
 
 Ismail 2a,000 9 14-iu., 20 5-in. 
 
 Kinburn 2»,000 y 14-in., ao 5-in, 
 
 iNavarin 28,000 y 14-in., 20 5-in. 
 
 PRE-DREADNOUGHTS 
 
 Tsessarevitch 13,400 4 12-in., 12 6-in, 
 
 Slava 13,200 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 Imperator Pavel 13,200 4 12-in., 12 6-in. 
 
 Andreas Pervozanny. .17,200 4 12-in., 14 8-in. 
 
 CRUISERS 
 
 Rossia 12,530 4 8-in., 22 6-in. 
 
 Diana 6,600 8 6-in. 
 
 Auroro 6,600 8 6-in. 
 
 Askold 6,500 12 6-in. 
 
 Bogatyr 6,500 12 6-in. 
 
 Uleg 6,500 12 6-in. 
 
 Gromboi 12,336 4 8-in., 22 6-in. 
 
 Zhemchug 3,200 8 4.7-in. 
 
 Makaroff 7,887 2 8-in., 8 6-in. 
 
 Pallada 7,887 2 8-in., 8 6-in. 
 
 Bayan 7,887 2 8-in., 8 6-in. 
 
 Rurik 15,000 4 10, 8 8, 20 4.7 ii 
 
 Svietlana 6,750 12 6-in. 
 
 Grieg 6,750 12 6-in. 
 
 Boutakoff 6,750 12 6-in. 
 
 Spiridoff 6,750 12 6-in. 
 
 Mooraviev 4,500 8 5-in. 
 
 Amursky 4,500 8 5-in. 
 
 Xevelskoy 4,500 8 5-in. 
 
 BLACK SEA FLEET 
 
 DREADNOUGHTS 
 
 1911 Ekaterina H 22,500 12 12-in., 20 5-in. 25,000 21 
 
 1911 Imperitza Maria 22,500 12 12-in.. 20 5-in. 25,000 21 
 
 iqil Alexander HI 22.500 12 12-in.. 20 5-in. 25,000 21 
 
 18,000 
 
 18.5 
 
 11,600 
 
 20 
 
 11,600 
 
 20 
 
 19,500 
 
 23 
 
 20,000 
 
 22 
 
 20,000 
 
 22 
 
 18,000 
 
 19.5 
 
 17,000 
 
 23 
 
 16,500 
 
 21 
 
 16,500 
 
 21 
 
 16,500 
 
 21 
 
 19,700 
 
 21 
 
 
 30 
 30 
 '-10 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 27.5 
 
 27,400 
 
 27.400 
 
 27. o 
 
 27,400 
 
 27.5 
 
 257
 
 Statistics 
 
 RUSSIAN NAVY— (Continued.) 
 PRE-DREADNOUGHTS 
 
 Mam* Dtaplacement Main Armament tloraa Power Speed 
 
 G. Pobiedonosetz 10,000 6 12-in. (old), 7 fl-in. 12,600 16 
 
 Tri Sviatitelia 12,490 -t i2-iii.. b 6-in., 7 fl-in. 10,600 17 
 
 Rostislav 8.800 -i 10-in., 8 6-in. 8,500 16 
 
 Pantelcimon 12,480 4 12-in., 16 6-in. 10,600 17.5 
 
 Ivan Zlatoust 12,480 4 12-in., 4 8-in., 12 6-in. 10,600 17.5 
 
 Efstafi 12,480 4 12-in., 4 8-in.. 12 6-iii. 10,600 17.5 
 
 CRUISERS 
 
 Kagul 6,500 12 6-in. 20,000 23 
 
 Pamiat Merkuria 6,500 12 6-in. 20,000 23 
 
 Lazaroff 7.000 16 6-in. 30 
 
 Nahkimoff 7.000 16 6-in. 30 
 
 268
 
 Statistics 
 
 The total number of horses in the Empire was 33,- 
 170,000, cattle 48,896,000, sheep and goats 74,066,000, 
 and pigs 13,509,000. 
 
 State forests cover 478,779,195 acres. 
 The soil of Russia is rich in ores of all kinds and the 
 mining industry is steadily increasing. Gold, platinum, 
 silver, pig iron, coal, naphtha, salt are among the prin- 
 cipal productions of the mines and furnaces, the coal 
 production^ being in 1911, 28,414,000 tons, steel 2,887,- 
 000. pig iron 3,589,000. The Russian oil fields are also 
 of importance. 
 
 Manufactures are backward, employing only 2,151,- 
 191 hands in 1913. Sugar production is important, but 
 varies greatly in quantity. The fisheries are the third 
 in the world. 
 
 In 1913 Russia possessed 1016 steamers of 486,913 
 tons burden, and 2,577 sailing vessels with a carrying 
 capacity of 256,844 tons. The railway development of 
 Russia is very backward. Vast as the country is, it 
 possesses only 46,573 miles of railroad ; 33,898 of this 
 mileage is owned by the government, the rest by private 
 companies. 
 
 There are about 35,000 post-offices and 20,000 tele- 
 graph offices ; the telephone is not greatly developed. 
 
 Russia has two tributary states in Asia : Bokhara 
 and Khiva. 
 
 SERBIA 
 
 Serbia is nominally a constitutional monarchy and ita 
 present organic law is the constitution, voted by the 
 Great National Assembly January 2, 1889. The execu- 
 tive! power is vested in the King, assisted by a council 
 bf eight ministers, who are individually and collective- 
 ly responsible to the King and the National Assembly. 
 
 The legislative authority is exercised by the King, in 
 conjunction with the National Assembly, or "Narodna 
 Skupshtina." The State Council, appointed partly by 
 the King and partly by the National Assembly, is al- 
 ways sitting and deals with a variety of administrative 
 questions, semi-judicially. 
 
 The National Assembly is composed of 166 deputies, 
 elected by the people. To sit in such assembly one must 
 be a Serbian, 30 years of age, and permanently resid- 
 ing in Serbia, paying 30 dinars a year in direct taxes, and 
 not a minister, state councillor, judge, communal mayor 
 
 259
 
 Statistics 
 
 or middle schoul or univcisiiy pruiessor. Tlie term of 
 oiiicc Is lour years and ll»c a>scmbly mccl^ ever) ) ear 
 on September 'Zlsi. 
 
 Counties, districts and municipalities iiave their own 
 administrative assemblies. For administrative purposes 
 Serbia is divided into 17 provinces or counties, 81 dis- 
 tricis, 1 183 comnmnes and 81 towns. 
 
 The area ot Serbia is ii^.bUl square miles and the 
 population is -l.iilT.Uy^, this including the territory 
 added as a result of two Balkan wars. 
 
 In lyiv* tiiere were, in the old territory, lli.:;io« 
 births. 
 
 The State religion of Serbia is Greek Orthodox, and 
 there are very few adherents of other churches. 
 
 IClementary education in Serbia is comjmlsory and in 
 all the primary schools under the Ministry of Kduca 
 tion it is free. In 1U09 only 11 per cent, of the popula 
 tion could read and write. In the same year there were 
 i,2d6 elementary schools, with 2,581 teachers and 138.- 
 434 pupils, and the expenditure on these schools wab 
 $840,000. On January 1. 1'J13, the Serbian debt 
 amounted to $128,384,108 at six and seven per cent, 
 interest. 
 
 Military service is compulsory and universal. Lia- 
 bility is from 18 to 50 years of age, but recruits join at 
 21 and complete their service at 15. The National 
 Army has three Bans. The first is the active army and 
 its reserves. The second Ban consists of reserve troops 
 and the third is the territorial army. There is also the 
 levee en masse, which contains all males l>etween 18 
 and 50. Service in the infantry is for one and one- 
 quarter years, for artillery and cavalry two years. This 
 completed, the soldier passes into the army reserves, 
 where he remains until ten years of service are com- 
 pleted. Then service of six years in the second Ban 
 and eight in the third Ban ensue. 
 
 The Serbian infantry is armed with the Mau-^cr rifk-. 
 model 99, calibre 7 mm. 
 
 The military budget for 1913 was $933,095 
 
 At Ni'^h a scries of forts is being built. At Zayechar 
 near the Bulgarian frnnlicr. arc five fort.s, and Pirot is 
 al.so provided with works. 
 
 Serbia is an agrictiltnral r<nintry. where almost every 
 peasant rnltivatos his own land. The li<»ldings vary in 
 HJze, from 10 to 30 acres mostly. 
 
 The area and ])rn(liirc of the principal crops for 
 thrr* years wore .is follow.^ : 
 
 260
 
 Statistics 
 
 Area in acres Produce in cwts. 
 
 1911 1911 
 
 Wheat <j:>4,«35 8,200.4452 
 
 Barley 254,593 1,974,650 
 
 Oats 258,789 1,442,536 
 
 Rye 123,218 855,199 
 
 Maize 1,442,638 13,261,866 
 
 Beetroot sugar 11,263 1,804,540 
 
 There were in liill in Serbia 152,61 r horses, 957,911 
 cattle, ;i,8(i8,Hl.-) sheep, 863,544 pigs and 627,427 goats. 
 
 The Serbian forests cover an area of 3,818,620 acres, 
 but are badly managed and hence less profitable than 
 they might be. 
 
 Serbia has considerable mineral resources, but these 
 are poorly worked. 
 
 Serbian manufactures are in a rudimentary condition. 
 
 Serbia has a total of 974 miles of railroad and 3,495 
 miles of highway, many of them in a ruinous condition. 
 There were 1,556 post-offices in the country in 1912, 211 
 telegraph offices and about 61,000,000 telephonic con- 
 versations were held in that year. 
 
 TURKEY 
 
 The fundamental law of the Empire is based on the 
 Koran. Next to the Koran the laws of "Hadith," a 
 code formed of the supposed sayings and opinions of 
 Mahomet and the sentences and decisions of his im- 
 mediate successors are binding upon the sovereign as 
 well as his subjects. 
 
 Forms of constitution after the model of the West 
 European states were drawn up at various periods by 
 successive Ottoman governments, the first in 1839, the 
 most recent embodied in a decree of Sultan Abdul- 
 Hamid II. of November, 1876. 
 
 This provides for the security of personal liberty 
 and property: for the administration of justice by irre- 
 movable judges; the abolition of torture, the freedom 
 of the Press, and the equality of the Ottoman subjects. 
 Islam is declared to be the religion of the state, but 
 freedom of worship was secured to all creeds, and all 
 persons, irrespective of religion, were declared eligible 
 to public office. 
 
 Parliament consists of two houses, a chamber of depu- 
 ties and a Senate. Senators must be forty years of age 
 and are appointed by the Sultan. Deputies are elected 
 by an indirect method.. Each six hundred electors elect 
 one electoral delegate and each ten of these electoral del- 
 
 261
 
 Statistics 
 
 ejjates choose on<) deputy. Electors nuist be Ottoman 
 subjects at least '.'5 years of age, wliile electoral dele- 
 gates must be 30. 
 
 Civil L)r military nfficals can be candidates, but must 
 roi^^n their appointment if elected. 
 
 This is the Constitution at present theoretically in 
 force. 
 
 The executi\e pt>\ver is exercised by the Sultan 
 through a Cabinet lesponsible to him. This Cabinet 
 \ aries in size and at present consists of r<? members. 
 
 The whole of the Empire is divided into Vilayets or 
 governments, at the head of the administration of 
 which is a \ ali, or governor general, rejjrescnting the 
 Sultan, and assisted bv a provincial council. 
 
 The \ilayet3 are sub(li\ idcd into Sanjaks or minor 
 provinces, and these in turn into Kazas or districts. At 
 the bottom of the list is the Karie or village. These 
 minor divisions are subjected to minor authorities. 
 Mutesarifs. Kaimakams and Mnktars, under the super- 
 intendency of the \'ali. 
 
 All subjects, however humble their (Origin, are eligi- 
 ble to. and may fill, the highest offices of the state. 
 
 The Turkish Empire is made of (1) Turkey in Eur- 
 ope; (2) Turkey in .Asia; (3) Provinces of the Isle of 
 Samos and Cyprus, but the tenure of the latter is 
 merelv nominal, if even that. 
 
 The total area may be estimated at T10.',i2l square 
 miles and its total population at 21.273.000. Mahometan- 
 ism is the established state religion. The Sultan as 
 Calipliis Supreme Head. The chief ecclesiastical dig- 
 nitary is the Sheik-al-Islam. but his functions are judi- 
 cial and legal rather than spiritual, lie is a member of 
 the Cabinet. 
 
 A number of non-Mahometan native communities or 
 "millets" are recognized by the Turkish government. 
 
 In Turkey, elementary education is nominally ohlig- 
 atorv for all children of both sexes. The most recent 
 enactment on the subject is a Pro\isional Law of Octo- 
 ber 6. 1IM.3. Under tliis law all children from 7 to 16 
 are to receive primarv instruction, which may. how- 
 ever, be given in State schools, schools maintained by 
 communities, or private schools, or subject to certain 
 tests at home. The schools in the Empire number 
 about 3fi.23n and contain approximately 1.331.000 
 pupils. 
 
 <')n September II, II»1.<. tin- Turkish debt anv)unted 
 
 262
 
 Statistics 
 
 to $675,654,000 at various rates of interest. The bulk of 
 the debt is secured by administered revenues. 
 
 Adrianople is the principal fortress in European 'I\ir- 
 key ; technically it is an entrenched camp. On the land 
 side, Constantinople is defended by the lines of Chatalja. 
 The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, the approaches by 
 sea, are both fairly strongly fortified. 
 
 Smyrna is defended to some extent and so is Krzerum 
 in Armenia. 
 
 Military service in Turkey, according to the decree of 
 August, 1909, is compulsory and universal. 
 
 Liability commences at the age of 20 and lasts for 20 
 years. Service in the first line or active army, called the 
 Nizam, is for nine years, three in the ranks and six in 
 the reserve. The soldier next passes to the i-ledif or sec- 
 ond line and remains therein for another nine years. 
 Finally he completes his service with two years in the 
 Mustahfiz. Reserves are liable to be summoned annually 
 for six weeks' training and the Redif for one month in 
 alternate years. 
 
 The Redif is of two classes, the first, of the men who 
 have served three years with the colors, and the second 
 of men who for various reasons were exempted for 
 service with the colors, and who, after a short training, 
 pass directly into the Redif category. 
 
 The approximate peace strength of the Turkish army 
 is about 230,000; on a war footing, about 1,400,000 
 would be, it is thought, available. 
 
 The Turkish infantry is armed with the 7.6.5mm. Mau- 
 ser magazine rifle, model 1890. The artillery uses the 7.5 
 cm. Q. F. Krupp guns and in 1914 a large number of 
 Schneider Q. F. and Skoda Q. F. howitzers were added. 
 The average cost of the army in late years in peace has 
 been about $49,000,000, including the expenditures for 
 the 42,000 members of the gendarmerie, which is really 
 a military force. 
 
 Crews are raised for the Turkish navy by both con- 
 scription and voluntary enlistment. The term of service 
 is twelve years, five in active service, three in the re- 
 serve and four in the Redif. The navy has a nominal 
 strength of about 31,000 in all ranks, besides 9.000 ma- 
 rines. 
 
 The names of the principal ships are shown on the fol- 
 lowing page. 
 
 263
 
 Statistics 
 
 PRINCIPAL SHIPS OF TURKEY'S NAVY. 
 
 DREADNOUGHTS 
 
 B«run Nam* DIaplaccment Main Armament Hon* Power 8p«*d 
 
 1912 Osman* 27,500 14 12-in., 20 6-in. 45,000 22 
 
 1913 Reshadich 23.000 10 13.5-in., 16 fi-in. 31,000 21 
 
 1918 Fatiht — 
 
 OLD BATTLESHIPS 
 
 1874 Mcssoudiyeh 10,000 2 9.2-in.. 12 6-in. 11.000 18 
 
 1891 Torghout RcissJ 10.000 2 9.2-in.. 12 6-in. 11,000 16 
 
 1891 Barbaroius Hairredinct-.lO.oeo 6 ii-in.. 8 4-in. 10,000 17 
 
 CRUISERS 
 
 1903 Medjidieh 3,300 2 6-in.. 8 4.7-in. 12.500 32 
 
 1913 Hnmidiveli 3.800 2 «-in., 8 4.7-in. 12,000 22 
 
 •Purchased from Brazil. tOrdercd in .^p^iI. 1914, being built in 
 N'ewcastlc. |Fv-r,/-rnirin ).;ttfl.ship<;. 
 
 ?ri4
 
 Statistics 
 
 'l"he soil in Turkey for the most part is very fertile, but 
 agncullure is most primitive. The principal products are 
 tobacco, cereals of all sorts, cotton, figs, nuts, olives, etc. 
 In 1911 164,979,000 bushels of wheat, 119,90;j,960 
 bushels of barley, 200,000 bales of cotton were produced. 
 Mining is of some importance. Copper, iron, zinc, coal 
 (the production of this is very rapidly increasing) and 
 the precious metals are produced in important quantities. 
 The fisheries are also important. Besides fish, sponges, 
 mother of pearl and pearls figure quite largely in the re- 
 turns. 
 
 Manufactures are mostly quite primitive. 
 The shipping of the Turkish Empire in 1911 consisted 
 of 120 steamers of 66,678 tons, 963 sailing vessels of 
 205,641 tons. 
 
 The length of railroads in Turkey on January 1, 1913, 
 was 3,882 miles. There are 6,000 miles projected and 
 under construction. 
 
 There are 1,632 post-offices in the Empire and 1,017 
 telegraph offices. 
 
 2 (I, 5
 
 SECRET AGREEMENTS 
 
 DOCUMENT NO. 1. 
 
 Report of General Diicarne, Chief of the Belgian Gen- 
 eral Staff, to the Belgian Minister of War. 
 
 "Confidential 
 
 "Letter to the Minister 
 "Concerning the Confidential Conversations 
 
 "Brussels, April 10. 1906. 
 
 "Mr. Minister: 
 
 "I have the honor to report to you briefly about the 
 conversations which I had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barn- 
 ardistun and which have already been the subject of my 
 oral coniiiuinications. 
 
 "The first visit took place in the middle of January. 
 Mr. Bamardiston referred to the anxieties of the General 
 Staff of his country with regard to the general political 
 situation and because of the possibility that war may 
 soon break out. In case Belgium shoidd be attacked, the 
 sending of alx)ut 100, (><K) troops was provided for. 
 
 "The Lieutenant-Colonel asked me how such a meas- 
 ure would be regarded by us. I answered him. that 
 from a militar>' |X)int of view it could not Ije but favor- 
 able, but that this question of intervention was just as 
 much a matter for the political authorites, and that, 
 therefore, it was my duty to inform the Minister of War 
 about it. 
 
 "Mr. Barnardiston answered that his Minister in 
 Brussels would speak alxiut it with our Minister of For- 
 eign Affairs. 
 
 "He proceeded in the following sense: The lantling 
 of the English troops would take place at the I'rcnch 
 coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk and Calais, .so as to 
 hasten their movements as much as possible. The entry 
 of the English into Belgium would take place only after 
 the violation of our neutrality by Germany. A landing 
 in .Antwerp would take much more time, lK*cause larger 
 transports would be needed, and because on tlie other 
 hand the safety would be less complete. 
 
 266
 
 Secret Agreements 
 
 "This admitted, there would be several other points 
 to consider, such as railway transportation, the question 
 of requisitions which the English army could make, the 
 question concerning the chief command of the allied 
 forces. 
 
 "He inquired whether our preparations were sufficient 
 to secure the defense of the country during the crossing 
 and the transportation of the English troops — which he 
 estimated to last about ten days. 
 
 "I answered him tiiat the places Namur and Liege 
 were protected from a "coup de main" and that our field 
 army of 100,000 men would be capable of intervention 
 within four days. 
 
 "After having expressed his full satisfaction with my 
 explanations, my \isitor laid emphasis on the following 
 facts: (1) that our conversation was entirely confiden- 
 tial; (2) that it was not binding on his government; 
 (3) that his Minister, the English General Staff, he and 
 I w^ere, up to the present, the only ones informed about 
 the matter; (i) that he did not know whether the opin- 
 ion of his Sovereign has been consulted. 
 
 * * * 
 
 "In a following discussion Lieutenant-Colonel Bar- 
 nardiston assured me that he had never received confi- 
 dential reports of the other military attaches about our 
 army. He then gave the exact numerical data of the 
 English forces; we could depend on it, that in 12 or 13 
 days 2 armv corps. 4 cavalry brigades and 2 brigades 
 of horse infantry would be landed. 
 
 "He asked me to study the question of the transport 
 of these forces to that part of the country where they 
 would he useful, and he promised to give me for this 
 purpose details about the composition of the landing 
 army. 
 
 "He reverted to the question concerning the effective 
 strength of our field army, and he emphasized that no 
 detachments should be sent from this army to Namur 
 and Liege, because these places were provided with 
 garrisons of sufficient strength. 
 
 "He asked me to direct my attention to the necessity 
 of granting the English army the advantages which the 
 regulations concerning the military requisitions pro- 
 vided for. FinalK he insisted upon the question of the 
 chief command. 
 
 "I answered him that I could say nothing with refer- 
 
 267
 
 Secret Agreements 
 
 enoe to this la^^t point and promised him that I would 
 
 >tvid\ thf other que'sti<>">- .-irefnlU 
 
 • » * 
 
 "Later on the Engli>h Military Attaclie confirmed 
 his former calculations: \2 days would at least be nec- 
 essary to carry out the landinp^ at the French coast. 
 It would take a considerably lonpcr time (1 to ^'^ 
 months) to land lOo.ooo men in Antwerp. 
 
 "Upon my objection that it would be unnecessary to 
 await the end of the landing in order to bepin with the 
 railway transportations, and that it would be better to 
 proceed with these, as when the troops arrived at the 
 qoast. Lieutenant-Colonel Rarnardiston promised to 
 g^ve mc exact data is to the numl^er of troops that 
 could be landed daily. 
 
 "As regards the military requisitions, I told my vis- 
 itor that this question could be easily regulated. 
 
 ♦ ♦ ♦ 
 
 "The further the plans of the English General Staff 
 progressed, the clearer became the details of the prob- 
 lem. The Colonel assured mc that one-half of the Eng- 
 lish arnn could be landed within 8 days; the rest at 
 the conclusion of the I'-^th or 13th day. with the excep- 
 tion of the Horse Infantry, which could not be counted 
 upon until later. 
 
 "In spite of this 1 thought I had to insist again upon 
 the necessitv of knowing the exact number of the daily 
 shipments, in order to regulate the railway transporta- 
 tion for every day. 
 
 "The English Military Attache conversed with me 
 about several other questions, namely: 
 
 "(1) The necessitv of keeping the operations secret 
 and of demanding strict secrecy from the Press; 
 
 "(2) The advantage*^ which would accrue from giv- 
 ing one r.elgian officer to each, English General Staff, 
 one interpreter to each commanding officer, and gen- 
 darmes to each unit of troops, in order to assist the 
 
 British prilicc troops. 
 
 * * « 
 
 "In the course i another interview Lieutenant- 
 Colonel P..Trnardiston and I studied the combined oper- 
 ations to take place in the event of a German offensive 
 with Antwerp as it«i object and under the hypothesi*; 
 of the German troops marching through our '"iinfrv 
 in order to reach the French Ardennes. 
 
 "In this qttcstinn. the Colonel t;nid he quite ncneed
 
 Secret Agreements 
 
 with the plan which 1 had submitted to him, and he as- 
 sured me also of the approval of General (jrierson, 
 Chief of the English General Staff. 
 
 "Other secondary questions which were likewise set- 
 tled had particular reference to intermediary officers, 
 interpreters, gendarmes, mai)s, photographs of the uni- 
 forms, special copies, translated into English, of some 
 Belgian regulations, the regulations concerning the im- 
 port duties on English provisions, to the accommodation 
 of the wounded of the allied armies, etc. Nothing was 
 resolved on as regards the activity which the Govern- 
 ment or the Military authorities might exert on the Press. 
 
 * * * 
 
 "During the final meetings which 1 had with the 
 British Attache, he informed me about the numbers of 
 troops which would be daily disembarked at Boulogne, 
 Calais and Cherbourg. Tlvftj.di.stance of the last place, 
 which is necessary for technical considerations, will in- 
 volve a certain delay. The first Corps would be disem- 
 barked on the lUth day, and the second on the loth day. 
 Our railways would carry out the transportation so that 
 the arrival of the first Corps, either in the direction of 
 Brussels-Louvain or of Namur-Dinant, would be as- 
 sured on the 11th day, and that of the second on the 
 IGth day. 
 
 "I again, for a last time, and as emphatically as I 
 could, insisted on the necessity of hastening the sea- 
 transports so that the English troops could be with us 
 between the 11th and 12th day. The happiest and most 
 favorable results can be reached by a convergent and 
 simultaneous action of the allied forces. But if that 
 co-operation should not take place, the failure would 
 be most serious. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that 
 everything serving to this end would be done, 
 
 ! "In the course of our conversations, I had occasion 
 to .convince the British Military Attache that we were 
 willing, so far as possible, to thwart the movements of 
 the enemy and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the 
 beginning. 
 
 "Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston on his part told me 
 that, at the time, he had little hope for any support or 
 intervention on the part of Holland. At the same time 
 he informed me that his Government intended to trans- 
 fer the basis of the British commissariat from the 
 
 209
 
 Secret Agreements 
 
 French coa>i to Antwerp .i> suoii as all German ships 
 were swept off the North Sea. 
 * * * 
 
 "In all our ct>nversations the Colonel regularly in- 
 formed me about the secret news which he had con- 
 cerning the military circumstances and the situation of 
 our Kastern neighlK>rs. etc. At the same time he em- 
 phasizetl that Belgium was under the imperative neces- 
 sity to keep herself constantly informed of the hap- 
 penings in the adjoining Rhinelands. I had to admit 
 that with us the surveillance-service abroad was, in times 
 of peace, not directly in the hands of the General Staff, 
 as our Legations had no Military Attaches. But 1 was 
 careful not to a<lmit that I did not know whether the 
 espionage service which is prescrilx-d in our regidations 
 was in working order or not. lUit I consider it my 
 duty to {xiint out this jxtsition which places us in a state 
 of evident inferiority to oiW neighbors, our presumable 
 enemies. ^-^i'" 
 
 "Major-Gcnrral, Chief of the General Staff. 
 ( Initials of General Ducarne.) 
 
 "Note. When 1 met General Gricrson at Compiegne, 
 during the manoeuvres of 1!M)6, he assured me the result 
 of the re-organization of the English army would be 
 that the landing of loO.Ooo would be assured and that, 
 moreover, they would stand ready for action in a shorter 
 time than has been assvuned alxne. 
 
 "Concluded September, 1906." 
 (Initials of General Ducame.) 
 
 ANGLO-BELGIAN AGREEMENTS. 
 
 DOCUMENT NO. 2. 
 
 Minutes of a Conference Between the Belgian Chief of 
 the General Staff, General Jungbluth, and the British 
 Military Attache, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. 
 
 (Lieutenant-Colonel Harnar<liston, British Military 
 Attache in Brussels, was succeeded in his office by 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. Likewise, General Du- 
 rarnc was succeeded, as Chief of the Belgian Staff, by 
 General Jungbluth. .\ conversation between Colonel 
 Briflges and General Jungbluth was committed to 
 
 270
 
 Secret Agreements 
 
 writing, and that writing was also found at the Bel- 
 gian Foreign Office. The document, which is dated 
 April 23r(l and is presumed to belong to the year 1912, 
 is marked "confidentielle" in the handwriting of Graf, 
 v.d. Straaten, the Belgian Foreign Secretary. This is 
 the translation :) 
 
 "Confidential 
 
 "The British Military Attache asked to see General 
 Jungbluth. The two gentlemen met on April 23rd. 
 
 "Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the General that 
 England had at her disposal an army which could be sent 
 to the Continent, composed of six tli visions of infantry 
 and eight brigades of cavalry — together 100,000 troops. 
 She has also everything which is necessary for her to 
 defend her insular territory. Everything is ready. 
 
 "At the time of the recent events, the British Govern- 
 ment would have immediately effected a disembark- 
 ment in Belgium (chez nous), even if we had not asked 
 for assistance. 
 
 "The General objected that for that our consent was 
 necessary. 
 
 "The Military Attache answered that he knew this, 
 but that — since we were not able to prevent the Ger- 
 mans from passing through our country — England would 
 have landed her troops in Belgium under all circum- 
 stances (en tout etat de cause). 
 
 "As for the place of landing, the Military Attache did 
 not make a precise statement ; he said that the coast was 
 rather long, but the General knows that Mr. Bridges, 
 during Easter, has paid daily visits to Zeebrugge from 
 Ostende. 
 
 "The General added that we were, besides, per- 
 fectly able to prevent the Germans from passing through." 
 
 DOCUMENT NO. 3. 
 
 Report of Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister in Berlin, 
 to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 (On the 23rd of December, 1911, Baron Greindl, 
 then and for many years Belgian Minister in Berlin, 
 made a report to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 There was found in Brussels a copy of this report ; 
 although a copy, the official character of this third docu- 
 ment found in Brussels is evident from the official 
 
 271
 
 Secret Agreements 
 
 imprint on the puijcr on which the copy stands. Tlic 
 first page reads: 
 
 Section. ... N\> Enclosure. . . . 
 
 Reply to No. General Department Of lice oi 
 
 llrllU'i.m l.ciration. NO. :U^\>2 — Hi'Hi. 
 
 lierlin. Deceniher ^3, TJll. 
 Mii«.ii\ Conficieniial. 
 What IS Itclgiun) to do in case of war ; 
 
 Mr. Minister: 
 I Iwve had the honor to receive ihc dispatch of the 
 ^<J7 Novenil)er last. 1' without docket numlier, registra- 
 tion number 1 108. 
 
 Baron Greindl's report is an extremely long one. 
 The writer reveals with i^rent astuteness the ulterior 
 motives underlying tin ICnj^lish proposal and draws 
 attention to the danger of the situation in which Bel- 
 gium had become inxolved l)y a one-sided partisanship 
 in favor of the Powers ni the Entente. In this very 
 detailed report, dated Oec. 2'6. 1911. I'.aron Grcindl ex- 
 plains that the plan of the General .\rmy Staff for the 
 defense of Belgian neutrality in a Eranco-German 
 war as communicated to him only concerned the (jues- 
 tion as to what military measures should be adopted 
 in case Germany violated l>elgian neutrality. The 
 hypothesis of a Erench attack on Germany through 
 Belgium had. however, just as nmch probability in it- 
 self. The (lii)loniat then goes on in the following 
 manner : 
 
 '*From the Erench side danger threatens not only in 
 the south of Luxemburg, it threatens us ou our entire 
 joint frontier. We are not reduced to conjectures for 
 this assertion. We have positive evidence of it. 
 
 "Evidently the project of an outflanking movement 
 from the north forms part of the scheme of the 'En- 
 tente Cordiale.' If that were not the case, then the 
 plan of fortifvinj; Elushinp would nf«t hnvr called forth 
 such an outburst in Paris and London. The reason 
 why they wished that the Scheldt should remain for- 
 tified, was hardly concealed by them. Their aim was 
 to be able to transport an English garrison, imhin- 
 dcred, to Antwerp, which means to establish in our 
 countrv a basis of operation for an offensive iti the di- 
 rection of the Ivowcr Rhine and Westphalia, and then 
 to make us throw our lot in with them, which would 
 not be difficult, for. after the surrender of our national 
 center of refui^c. we would, through our nwn fault, 
 renounce every pos«;it)ility of opposing the demands of 
 
 27?
 
 Secret Agreements 
 
 our doubtful protectors after having been so unwise 
 as to permit tbeir entrance into our country. Colonel 
 Barnardiston's announcements at the time of the con- 
 clusion of the 'Entente Cordiale,' which were just as 
 perfidious as they were naive, have shown us plainly 
 the true meaning of things. When it became evident' 
 that we would not allow ourselves to be frightened by 
 the pretended danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the 
 plan was not entirely abandoned, but modified in so 
 far as the British army was not to land on the Belgian 
 coast, but at the nearest French harbors. 
 
 "The revelations of Captain Faber, which were de- 
 nied as little as the newspaper reports by which they 
 were confirmed or completed in several respects, also 
 testify to this. This British army, at Calais and Dun- 
 kirk, would by no means march along our frontier tp 
 Longwey in order to reach Germany. It would di- 
 rectly invade Belgium from the northwest. That would 
 give it the advantage of being able to begin operations 
 immediately, to encounter the Belgian army in a re- 
 gion where we could not depend on any fortress, in 
 case we wanted to risk a battle. Moreover, that would 
 make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in all 
 kinds of resources and, at any rate, to prevent onr mo- 
 bilization or only to permit it after we had formally- 
 pledged ourselves to carry on our mobilization to the 
 exclusive advantage of England and her allies. 
 
 "It is therefore of necessity to prepare a plan of bat- 
 tle for the Belgian army also for that possibilitv. This 
 is necessary in the interest of our military defense as 
 well as for the sake of the direction of our foreign 
 policy, in case of war between Germany and France." 
 
 273
 
 NAVAL LOSSES 
 
 TO MARCH 1ST. 1916. 
 
 Torpedo boats, destroyers, submarines and other 
 small vessels omitted. 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Aug. 7 — Amphion, protected cruiser North Sea 
 
 Sept. 4 — Speedy, torpedo gunboat North Sea 
 
 6 — Patlifinder, protected cruiser Nortli Sea 
 
 7 — Warrior, protected cruiser Bosphorus 
 
 20 — Pegasus, protected cruiser Zanzibar 
 
 22 — Aboukir, protected crui.ser North Sea 
 
 22 — Cressy, protected cruiser North Sea 
 
 22 — Ilogue, protected cruiser North Sea 
 
 Oct. 15 — Hawke, protected cruiser North Sea 
 
 27 — Audacious, dreadnought Irisii Coast 
 
 31 — Hermes, protected cruiser North Sea 
 
 Nov. 1 — Monmouth, armored cruiser Chilean Coast 
 
 1 — Good Hope, armored cruiser Chilean Coast 
 
 11 — Niger, torpedo gunboat Deal 
 
 26 — Bulwark, battleship Sheerness 
 
 Jan. 1 — Formidable, battleship Channel 
 
 Number vessels lost, 16. 
 
 GERMANY 
 
 Aug. 5 — Panther, gunboat 
 
 20 — H. \"on Wissman, gunboat 
 27 — Magdeburg, protected cruiser 
 28 — Mainz, protected cruiser 
 28 — Koeln, protected cruiser 
 28 — .Ariadne, protected cruiser 
 Sept. ir> — Hela, small cruiser 
 Nov. 4 — Vorck, armored cruiser 
 7 — Jaguar, gunboat 
 7 — Luchs, gunboat 
 7 — litis, gunboat 
 7 — C^rmoran, gunboat 
 7 — Ti|L,'er, guni)oat 
 7 — Emden. protected cruiser 
 Dec. 8 — Scharnhorst. armored cruiser 
 8 — Gneisenau, armored cruiser 
 8 — Lcif)zig, protected cruiser 
 8 — Nurnberg, protected cruiser 
 Jan. 24 — Rlucher, armored cruiser 
 Number vessels lost, 19. 
 
 274 
 
 Mediterranean 
 
 Gulf of Finland 
 
 Helgoland 
 
 Helgoland 
 
 1 lel'^oland 
 
 North Sea 
 
 Wilholinshaven 
 
 Tsingtau 
 
 Tsingtau 
 
 Tsingtau 
 
 Tsinj^tau 
 
 Tsingtau 
 
 Indian C^cean 
 
 South .Atlantic 
 
 South .Atlantic 
 
 South .Atlantic 
 
 South Atlantic 
 
 North Sea
 
 Naval Losses 
 
 AUSTRIA 
 
 Aug. 16— Zenta, cruiser Antivari 
 
 Oct. 23 — Temes, gunboat 
 
 Nov. 6— Kaiserin-Klisaheth, cruiser Kia-Chow 
 
 FRANCE 
 Oct. 28 — Zelee, gunboat 
 
 28 — Mousquet, destroyer 
 
 RUSSIA 
 
 Oct. 11 — Pallada, armored cruiser 
 28 — Jemtchug, cruiser 
 29 — Donetz, gunboat 
 
 JAPAN 
 
 Sept. 4 — Shiratage, destroyer 
 Oct. 17 — Takachicho, cruiser 
 
 TURKEY 
 
 Oct. 31 — Burak Reis, gunboat 
 Dec. 13 — Messudiyeh/battleship 
 
 Dardanelles 
 
 275
 
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