Alfred Rambaud THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES FROM THE LIBRARY OF FRANK J. KLINGBERG ^fefe THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA: PROBLEMS OF THE EAST AND PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST. BY ALFRED ;RAMBAUD. <: BURLINGTON, VERMONT: THE INTERNATIONAL MONTHLY. '7^^ 1900. Copyright by FREDERICK A. RICHARDSON, 1900. n,<^ . e* ADVERTISEMENT. Books upon Russia, her people and history are attracting their share of attention. That great, mysterious, distant empire, with a con- tinuous history of conquests since the day when the Mongol yoke was thrown off, with an heroic age whose traditions are as attractive as any of Western Europe; an absolute despotism, rooted in the despotism of its former Asiatic conquerors, superseding the more primitive but freer communities, having the one aim since the time of Peter the Great, to find an outlet on an unfrozen sea. Baffled in Southeastern Eu- rope, Russia has pressed at the points of least resistance until now she is about to emerge on the Persian Gulf, as she has already on the shores of Manchuria. Great Britain and Russia, "the elephant and the whale, " the great rivals in Asia, so different in their origins, their constitutions, their power of assimilation, are now face to face. M. Alfred Rambaud, the author of a history of Russia which was at once recognized by Russian and British students of Russian history as most authoritative and the best of all ac- cessible histories, is a Senator of France and has held important government positions. He is the translator of Seeley's " Expansion of T> f " <"> 1 bS93oo England" and has written many important works, relating to his own country and Russia. He is a member of the Institute and his '' History of Russia " was crowned by the French Acad- emy in 1883. The present little volume is a reprint of an essay written for The International Monthly and first printed in the September and October issues of that journal. It meets the demand for a condensed yet authoritative history of that Russia known to the world. The onward course of Russia is forcibly told in these pages. The great demand for the maga- zine numbers has induced the publishers to issue the essay separately, with a table of con- tents and divided into chapters with topical headings, knowing that as a brief presentation of Russia's development, her aims, and prob- abilities of success, there is no other book accessible to the American public which sur- passes it. CONTENTS : Chapter I. — The Origin of the Russian State and Nation. The Tartar-Mongols, Principality of Moscow. The Unity of Russia. Isolation. The Aim of Russian Diplo- macy. Chapter II. — Peter the Great. Poland. The Eastern Ques- tion. Latin and Greek Churches. Catherine the Great. Turkish Wars. Greek Independence. Crimean War. The Balkan States. Nihilism. Results of Euro- pean Wars. Nicholas ii. Chapter III. — An Asiatic Power. Wars and Treaties with Persia. A Way to the Indian Ocean. In the Caucasus. Paramount in Persia. Chapter IV. — Expansion Towards India. Napoleon. The Conquest of the Khans. In Afghanistan. The " Key OF THE Indies." In Touch With India. Abyssinia. British Over-Confidence. Chapter V. — The Opening of Siberia. Value of Siberia. Chinese Wars. Settlements on the Pacific. Chinese Cessions. Vladivostock. Russian Influence at Pekin. Chapter VI. — The China-Japan War. Interference of Russia. Conflict With Japanese Interests. Russia's Gain. Chapter VII. — Russian Concessions. Port Arthur. Railways. Loans. Corea. Germany. Great Britain. The United States. Chapter VIII. — Fruits of Diplomacy. Absolutism of Russian Government. An Enlightened Despotism. Russian Colon- ists. Race Characteristics. Religion. Population. Franco-Russian Alliance. From the Baltic to the Pacific. The Expansion of Russia THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA. The Origin of the Russian State and Nation — The Tartar-Mongols — Principality of Moscow — The Unity OF Russia — Isolation — The Aim of Russian Diplomacy. E fail to discover, however far back we go towards the begin- nings of the Russian State, any indication that this was ever destined to become a maritime power. In the ninth centurv, the Slavic tribes that were to form the first political organization designated by the name Russian, — the Slavo-Russian tribes, — occupied a territory securely shut in on the west, by the Poles and the Lithuanians ; on the north, by the Finnish tribes, the Livonians, the Tchudis, and the Ingrians; on the east, Finnish tribes again, the Vesi, the Merians, the Muromians, and two Turkish tribes, the Meshtcheraks and the Khazars, that occupied all the northern coast of the Bl^ck Sea ; allowing but a single one of the Slavo-Russian peoples to hold a position upon its shores. Except at this point, (I) 2 RUSSIA OF THE IXth CENTURY. these Slavo-Russian tribes nowhere had access to the coast. The shores of the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean were Finnish ; those of the Baltic, Finnish or Scandinavian ; those of the Black Sea were held by the Khazars, the Caucasian tribes, the Byzantine Empire, and the Bulgarians, a Finnish tribe that had imposed its name and sovereignty upon a certain number of Slavic tribes. In the East and North, the Slavs were not to be found even in those regions where afterwards rose the Russian capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg. Beyond began those immense spaces that stretch away into the depths of Central Asia, and even to the Pacific Ocean, spaces peopled with Finnish and Turkish tribes, and other branches of the Uralo-Altaic family. Then, still fur- ther east, were to be found certain peoples of the yellow race. To speak now only of the Russia of Europe, how did the Slavo-Russians, who in the ninth century held scarcely a fifth part of their present territory, succeed in securing possession of it all ? A two-fold change came about during the centuries. On the one hand, the Slavo- Russians, very venturesome in disposition, following, at first, the course of the rivers and their tributaries, spread out over the vast plains that stretch away to the Ural Mountains ; founding everywhere cities, villages, and markets right in the midst of the territory of the aborigi- nal tribes. On the other hand, they absorbed the greater THE WELDING OF THE TRIBES. 3 part of those tribes, and imposed upon them their lan- guage, religion, and even their manners and customs. A double colonization, therefore, took place, a colonization of the soil and a colonization of the native. The ancient Uralo-Altaic tribes, subjugated or absorbed by the Rus- sians, have disappeared from the map of the empire. There persist still only some scattered remnants of them, surrounded by men of Russian race and speech, and destined soon to disappear. These aborigines are to be found in fairly compact groups only in those places where the severity of the climate, the barren character of the soil, the thickness of the forest, and the desert steppes check Russian civilization, an ethnographical medley, moreover, occupying only a very small and indifferently valuable part of the European Russia of to-day.' Thus the primitive tribes of the Slavo-Russians formed an agglomeration which was everywhere well-nigh entirely shut off from any sea. This had a character essentially continental; the population was wholly agri- cultural in character, and, except as fleets of light boats descended the Dnieper in the tenth century to harass Constantinople and to commit piracy on the Byzantine shores of the Black Sea, there was nothing to indicate that it would one day come forth as a maritime power. (i) Thus the Suomi, the Karelians, and the Laplanders in Finland ; the Zyrians and the Permians, in the northeast ; the Tcheremisa, the Mordva, the Votiaki, the Meshtcheraks, and the Bashkirs on the river Volga, or between the Volga and the Ural Mountains and river. 4 THE ORTHODOX CHURCH. The Russia of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was scarcely European. She was bound to Europe only by her form of religion, and even that, borrowed from Byzan- tium, was an Oriental, an almost Asiatic form of Chris- tianity. When there came about in the eleventh century the rupture between the Latin and Catholic Church of the West, and the Greek and Orthodox Church of the East, a still higher barrier was raised between the two parts of Europe. To the Western Christians, the Greeks and the peoples that they had evangelized, the Bulgarians, the Servians, the Moldavo-Wallachians, and the Rus- sians, were only schismatics. Now, while the Catholic peoples of the West, thanks to more favorable historical circumstances, began to take shape as powerful nations in which an already well-advanced civilization went on developing, the schismatic peoples of Eastern Europe, assailed by successive invasions from Asia, and after having long served as a living bulwark against barbarism for ungrateful Europe, were checked in their historic evolution, and fell one after the other into servitude to pagan Mongols or Mohammedan Turks. The country where the Slavo-Russians first established themselves was only a prolongation of the great plains which, scarcely broken by the Ural Mountains, extend to Behring's Sea, Okhotsk Sea, and the Sea of Japan. Geographically, topographically, this primitive Russia was already Asiatic. Just as the winds from Asia swept unhindered all this immense plain, so could the migration THE TARTAR-MONGOLS. 5 of peoples and invading expeditions, at times originat- ing near the Great Wall of China, pour unchecked over the Russian plains as far as the Carpathian Mountains and the Vistula. One of those revolutions, so frequent among the nomadic tribes of Asia, brought together from 11 54 to 1227 under the blue banner of Temuchin, called Jenghis Khan, numerous tribes of shepherds and mounted nomads. They adopted as their collective name that of the Tartar-Mongols. At their head " the Inflexible Emperor," " the Son of Heaven," conquered Manchuria, the kingdom of Tangut, North China, Turkestan, and Great Bokhara, and founded an empire which extended from the Pacific to the Ural Mountains. Under the successors of Jenghis Khan, these mounted hordes, mad- dened by the fury of war and conquest, crossed into Europe, fell upon Russia, then divided into numerous principalities, carried the capital cities by assault, anni- hilated, one after the other, the armies of foot and horse sent against them, and in 1240 converted all Russia into a mere province of the Mongol Empire. The Russian princes and the chieftains of the Finnish tribes became vassals of the Great Khan,' who held his court on the banks of the Onon, an affluent of the Amur, or at (1) Consult Howorth, History of the Mongols, London, 1876. Wolff, Geschichte der Mongolen, Breslau, 1872. Leon Cahun, Introduction a V histoire de r Asie, Paris, 1896. 6 A PROVINCE OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE. Karakorum on the Orkhon, a stream emptying into Lake Baikal. They were also more directly the vassals of one of his vassals, the Khan of the Golden Horde, vi^ho was stationed at Sarai on the lower Volga. At this period the Tartar-Mongols, among whom Mohammedanism was disseminated until about 1272, were still Buddhists, Shamanists, or fetich worshipers ; at heart very indifferent in matters of religion, and strangers to any thought of propagandism or of intolerance. They, therefore, left the Russians in undisturbed posses- sion of their religion, their laws, and their own princely dynasties. They merely exacted tribute, and, in certain contingencies, military service ; and every new Russian prince must go to receive his investiture either at Sarai, or even by a journey that would occupy years, at the court of the Great Khan. There they were compelled to prostrate themselves at the foot of his throne, to defend themselves against the accusations of enemies, or of their Russian rivals ; and the Khan disposed of their heads as of their crowns. Many Russian princes were executed before his eyes. Some among these, the Russian Church honors as martyrs. Among the Russian princes who went there to pros- trate themselves before the Horde were those who had founded round about a little market-town, the name of which is met with for the first time in 1 147, anew principality, that of Moscow, one of the most insignifi- cant of the Russian states of that period. It was estab- MOSCOW— GRAND PRINCE DMITRI. 7 lished in the midst of a Finnish country, among the Muromians. It formed, therefore, a colony of primitive Russia. The princes of Moscow knew how to turn to their own advantage the Mongol yoke that weighed on all Russia. They were more adroit than the others in flattering the common master and the agents that repre- sented him in Russia. One of them, George (1303— 1325), even married a Tartar princess. In their strug- gles against other Russian princes, they always carried the controversy to the court of the Khan, who almost always decided in their favor, and sent them away with the heads of their rivals. They secured from the Khan the privilege of collecting the tribute, not only from their own subjects, but from the other princes of Russia. This function as tribute collector for the Khan raised them above all their equals ; and the more humble vassals of the barbarians they showed themselves to be, the better did they establish their suzerainty over the other Christian states. They succeeded thus in building up a powerful state, which was called the " Great Principality " of Moscow. When they felt themselves to be strong enough, and perceived that the Mongol Empire had grown sufficiently weak through internal dissension and divisions to warrant the attempt, they turned against the barbarians the power that they owed to them. In 1380, the Grand Prince DmiVri, having refused payment of tribute, defeated Mamai, the Khan of the Golden Horde, at Kulikovo on the Don. But the 8 IVAN THE GREAT. Mongols were not yet as weak as Dmitri Donskoi (hero of the Don) had thought. Tamerlane, or Timur-Leng, had just conquered Turkestan, Persia, Asia Minor, and North Hindustan. One of his lieutenants, Tokhtamysh, having vainly summoned the Grand Prince Dmitri to appear before him, marched against Moscow, captured the city and its Kremlin, sacked the other cities of the principality, and everywhere reestablished Asiatic supremacy. Nevertheless, the Mongol yoke was not to survive long the heroic effort made at Kulikovo. The great barbarian empires founded by Asiatic conquerors quickly fall to pieces. This historical law was verified in the Empire of Tamerlane, as in that of Jenghis Khan. Towards the end of the fifteenth century, the Mongol Empire of Asia was divided into the Mongol Empire of China, the Mongol Empire of India, the Mongol King- dom of Persia, and a large number of khanates in Turk- estan and Siberia; and all those states were scarcely any longer Mongol save in name. In Russia itself, the Golden Horde was broken up. From its debris were formed the czarate of Kazan on the middle Volga, the khanate, or czarate, of Sarai, or Astrakhan, on the lower Volga, the horde of the Nogais, and the khanate of the Crimea. In 1476, Akhmed, the Khan of Sarai, sent a demand for tribute to the Grand Prince of Moscow, Ivan the Great. Ivan put the ambassadors to death. Four years later, the Khan Akhmed marched upon Mos- cow with a large army. Near the rivers Oka and Ugra END OF THE MONGOL RULE. 9 he met the army of Ivan the Great ; but neither of the adversaries dared force the passage of the two rivers. They remained there several days exchanging insults and darts from the opposite shores. Then a panic simultane- ously arose in both armies ; the one fleeing in the direction of Moscow, the other in the direction of Sarai. It was in this bloodless, inglorious way that the Mongol power in Russia came to an end. The Mongol yoke had continued two hundred and fifty-six years (i 224-1480). It left in Russia traces that were for a long time ineffaceable. Before the Tartar conquest, the power of a Russian prince was founded upon European origins. It recalled the patriarchal authority of the old-time chieftains of the Slavo-Russian tribes ; the martial authority of the heads of the Scandi- navian or Variagian clans, like Rurik and other Variagian chiefs, called into Russia, it is said, by the Slavs ; and the authority, at once civil and religious, of the Byzan- tine-Roman emperors, whom the successors of Rurik, like all the barbarian chieftains of Eastern Europe, liked to take as models. After the Tartar conquest, on the contrary, the Russian princes, and especially the Grand Princes of Moscow, selected as prototypes of their own authority the Khans and Great Khans with their auto- cratic power, — coarse, irresponsible, Asiatic. From that time forward, they treated their vassals as they themselves had been treated by the Khans. Between the Grand Prince and his vassals, and between these and the peas- lo NATIVE RULERS— COSTUME. ants, the relations were those of brutal masters and tembling slaves. The sovereign of Moscov^^ did not differ from a Mongol Khan, from a Persian Shah, or from an Osmanli Sultan, save as he professed the orthodox religion. He was a sort of a Christian Grand Turk. When the title of Grand Prince seemed to him unworthy of his increased power, the title that his ambition chose was none of those that the Christian rulers of the West then bore; it was the one which the Khans of Siberia, of Kazan, or of Astrakhan had arrogated ; it was the title of Czar, which, of course, has not any etymological connection with that of Caesar, a fiction invented very much later. Such was the title that the heir of the Grand Princes of Moscow, Ivan the Terrible, solemnly took in 1547. Many other facts attest the predomi- nance of Asiatic influences over the Russia of the six- teenth century. The costumes of the Czar of Moscow and of the other great lords, the princes and boyars, were Asiatic ; Asiatic was the servile etiquette of the court ; touching with the brow the foot of the throne, and the humble formulas in which the highest personages declared themselves to be slaves; Asiatic was the seclusion of the women in the terem^ which, was a Russian harem ;' Asiatic was the equipment of the royal cavalry with their high (i) However, it is proper to call attention to the fact that the servile character of the court etiquette may also have been borrowed from Byzantium, and that the Russian terem may have had its original in the gynascium of the Greeks. THE UNITY OF RUSSIA. ii saddles and short stirrups ; their boots with the toe in the form of an upturned crescent ; their armor remind- ing one of the . Chinese and Japanese ; their curved swords, their bows and quivers, and their head-dress, which resembled a turban surmounted by an aigrette. All this Oriental apparel was to continue in vogue until the time when Peter the Great, with the violent meas- ures of an Asiatic despot, forcibly introduced into Russia the short clothing of the West, — " German dress," that is, European. With this change in costume, he also brought in the fashion of shaving the face; the holding of social gatherings, which the recluses of the terem were compelled to attend ; the etiquette of the Christian courts ; the formulary of the German bureaucracy, and the uniforms, equipments, and tactics of the armies of • the West. While Russia was still groaning under the Mongol yoke, the Grand Princes of Moscow, utilizing their ser- vitude as an instrument of power, caused the other princes to bow before the terror of the Mongol, and brought about "the consolidation of the Russian territory," that is to say, they founded the unity of Russia. When the family line of the Grand Princes and Czars of Mos- cow died out in 1598, and when there began for Russia " those troublous times {smoutnoi'e Vremia)" which the accession of the Romanofs brought to an end in 16 13, the czarate of Moscow was already a very powerful state. 12 CONQUESTS. In the North especially, by the annexation of the ter- ritories of the ancient republics of Novgorod and Pskof, the Muscovite supremacy was extended to the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean. On the west, in a series of wars against the Lithuanians and the Poles to "recover" from them Russian territory which they had formerly conquered, the Moscow czarate had carried its power beyond Pskof and Lake Peipus, and had reached the Dnieper at Kiev and Smolensk. In the South, it had reached neither the Black Sea nor the Sea of Azov, from which it was separated by the Ukraine that still belonged to the Poles, by a republic of adventurers and pirates called the Zaporovians, by the khanate of the Crimean Tartars, by the camping grounds of the Nogaian Tar- tars, and, finally, by the maritime power of the Ottomans on the Euxine. Eastward, Russian conquest and col- onization had made great advances. The uniting of the old territories of Novgorod, and the annexation of those of the republic of Viatka, brought the Muscovite domi- nation to the Ural Mountains. The conquest of the czarate of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible, in 1552, gave him all the region of the middle Volga, and the conquest of the czarate of Astrakhan, two years later, placed in his power all the lower Volga country, with a part of the coast of the Caspian Sea. Finally, the conquest of the khanate of Sibir, between the years 1579-1584, by the Cossack Irmak, carried the Russian eagles beyond the Urals, and opened before them the immensities of Siberia. IVAN THE TERRIBLE. 13 But the more extensive the Muscovite Empire became, the more it suffered from not having access to any sea which was all the year free from ice, or which would afford an outlet to the ocean. The harbors of the White Sea were closed with ice eight months of the year ; the Caspian Sea is only a great lake without an outlet. To reach the Baltic Sea, it would be necessary to battle against the Germans, the Poles, and the Swedes, the mas- ters of all its shores. To gain access to the Black Sea, there were, again, the Poles to be fought, as well as the Tartars, the Zaporovians, and the Grand Turk. Now, the European neighbors of Russia were beginning to fear this great barbarian empire. They were convinced that it would become truly a terror to them the day on which, by obtaining regular communication with the West, it could thereby learn somethmg of their civilization, their industries, and, above all, their military art. They under- stood that the backward condition of its civilization was the only safeguard against its ambitions. They, there- fore, closed against it their eastern frontiers, and barred it out of the Baltic. At the time when Ivan the Ter- rible, profiting by the decadence into which the Sword- Bearers, the religious military order of the Livonians, had fallen, took their lands away from them, and raised his flag at their port of Narva, Poles, Germans, and Swedes united against him ; they incited fresh invasion^ of the Crimean Tartars, conspiracies and rebellion among his nobility ; and, after a bitter struggle of twenty-four years. 14 ISOLATION OF RUSSIA. compelled him to abandon his conquest in 1582. So long as Narva was in the hands of the Czar, Sigismund, King of Poland, did not have a moment's peace. When English merchants began to resort there, he wrote threat- ening letters to Oueen Elizabeth, summoning her to for- bid that traffic. " Our fleet will seize all those who con- tinue to sail thither ; your merchants will be in danger of losingtheir liberty, their wives and children,and theirlives." And this confession escaped him : " We see by this new traffic the Aiuscovite, who is not only our enemy to-day, but the hereditary enemy of all free nations, furnishing himself thoroughly, not only with our guns and muni- tions of war, but, above all, with skilled workmen, who continue to prepare equipments of war for him, such as have been hitherto unknov/n to his barbaric people. * * * It would seem that we have thus far conquered him because he is ignorant of the art of war and the finesse of diplomacy. Now, if this commerce continues, what will there soon be left for him to learn ? " Thus, it was not merely unpropitious nature that kept Russia in a condition of blockade ; but the jealousy of her neighbors mounted a most rigorous guard around these "barbarians" of the North. The empire of Moscow remained condemned, like the agglomeration of Slavic tribes of the ninth and tenth centuries from which it had sprung, to a purely continental life. It was shut up to its vast northern plams like the Swiss to his moun- tains, and seemed to have as little chance of ever becom- ing a maritime power. THE AIM OF RUSSIA. 15. Hitherto, the Muscovite Empire with its military organization wholly Asiatic, with its noble-born knights and free peasants, with its infantry militia, the streltsy^ with its old-fashioned artillery, with its irregular troops of Cossacks, Tartars, and Calmucks, had been able to withstand victoriously Asiatic forces ; but it could not maintain a struggle against the regular troops and im- proved weapons of the western nations. In order to make her mark in Europe, it was necessary for Russia to become European ; but she could not become European if Europe persisted in holding her in a condition of blockade. It was a " vicious circle "; and it was reserved for the genius of Peter the Great to succeed in breaking that circle. Henceforth, we see Russian diplomacy, with tireless patience, with a shrewdness equal to its persistency, endeavoring simultaneously in all directions to pierce the blockade. She strives to secure access to the Baltic Sea ; and we shall have the Northern War of Peter the Great, the partition of Poland under Catherine II., the Einland question under the Czarina Elizabeth, and under Alex- ander I. She strives to secure access to the Black Sea ; and we shall have the Eastern Question in all its forms, from the first efforts of Peter the Great down to the war of 1877-78. of Alexander II. She strives to make her- self mistress of the Caspian Sea, and the attempt made by Peter the Great will reach an end only under Alex- ander III. She strives to secure access to the Indian i6 THE AIM OF RUSSIA. Ocean, and we shall have the wars and treaties with Persia, Afghanistan, and England. She strives to secure access to the Okhotsk Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Pacific Ocean, and we shall witness the work of Siberian colonization and all the phases of the Far Eastern Ques- tion. The matter of securing new territory concerns her much less. It has been the supreme end of her efforts, at times continued for centuries, to reach a sea, — a sea free from ice, a sea opening into the ocean. THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA IN EUROPE. Peter the Great — Poland — The Eastern Question — Latin AND Greek Churches — Catherine the Great — Turkish Wars — Greek Independence — Crimean War — The Balkan States — Nihilism — Results of European Wars — Nicholas ii. E know with what energy and alternation of success and fail- ure Peter the Great struggled against the Swedish masters of the eastern and southern shores of the Baltic. We are amazed when we reflect that a war, lasting more than twenty-one years ; a war that convulsed all Europe ; that brought the Swedes into the heart of Russia and the Russians into the centre of Germany ; that brought about the creation of a Russian army and navy under the fire of the enemy, and that numbered a score of battles on land and sea, — should have ended in results apparently so meagre as were those gained by Russia in 1721 at the Treaty of Nystad ; namely, the acquisition of four small provinces, Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, and Karelia. But these prov- (17) 1 8 FINLAND— POLAND. inces gave him on the Baltic the ports of Riga, Revel, and Narva ; they gave him also the mouths of two riv- ers, the broad Neva and the Diina, or Dvina (not to be confounded with the other Dvina that empties into the White Sea). It was on the islets of the Neva that Peter the Great had founded in 1703, on lands still disputed by the Swedes and by the floods, the capital of European Russia, St. Petersburg, protected on the west by the maritime fortress of Kronstadt. Yes, " the Giant Czar " considered himself amply repaid for his efforts of twenty-one years by the fact that for his vast continental empire, still wrapped in Asiatic darkness, he had been able "to open one window on Europe." This window was still a very narrow one. It was somewhat enlarged by Elizabeth, when, after a war fool- ishly undertaken by Sweden, she made that country, in the Treaty of Abo, 1743, surrender some districts in Finland. Later, Alexander I., during his short-lived alliance with Napoleon, conquered from his recent ally, Gustavus III., all of Finland (Treaty of Fredericksham, 1809). Russia had now no longer anything to seek in that direction. Westward, between Russia, already powerful and always war-like, and Prussia, now grown great in glory and strength, lay an extremely weak state made up of the kingdom of Poland, the grand duchy of Lithuania and some old-time Russian districts. The first three par- titions of this state (1772, 1793, 1795)5 carried the PARTITION OF POLAND. 19 Russian frontier to the Niemen, the Warthe, and the Dniester. Catherine II. completed these conquests by the annexation of Courland, which had been a vassal depen- dency of the fallen kingdom. It is to be noted, how- ever, that in what is called " the partition of Poland," Catherine II. did not acquire any Polish, but merely Lithuanian territory that formerly had been Russian. If Napoleon I. had not attempted to reestablish on the Rus- sian frontier a Polish kingdom under the name of " the grand duchy of Warsaw," perhaps Russia would not have been ambitious to secure possession of any former Polish territory. After the fall of Napoleon, the Czar Alexander I. was obliged to appropriate a considerable part of this under the name of " the kingdom of Poland," were it for no other reason than to prevent an increase of territory upon the part of the two German powers. Henceforth the western frontier of Russia was fixed. It has not changed since 1815, and, to admit the possibility of a change in the future, it would be necessary to admit the possibility of a total overturning of the European balance of power. Though Russian expansion towards the north was stopped by the icy solitudes of Lapland, westward by the frontiers of states as firmly established as the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, yet for a long time a broad way remained open to Russia in the direction of the south. The decadence of the Ottoman Empire seemed to offer her the same favorable opportunities as 20 THE DREAM OF CONSTANTINOPLE. did the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Empire. In this direction, acquisition of territory promised to be infinitely more precious. The Russians could dream of the Black Sea, the Propontis, and the ^^gean Sea becom- ing Russian lakes ; of Christian peoples of the same religion (Roumanians and Greeks), — and of some of the same religion and race (Bulgarians, Servians, Croatians, ' Bosnians, Herzegovinians, and Montenegrians), — wel- coming the armies of a Liberator Czar, and joyfully accepting the domination of Russia in exchange for that of the Ottoman ; and, finally, they could dream of Con- stantinople, the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, freed from the yoke of the infidel, and of the cross taking the place of the crescent on the dome of Saint Sophia. Nevertheless, it was, perhaps, in the direction of the south that Russia, in her schemes for expansion, after some brilliant successes, found herself the most com- pletely deceived. For a long time the sovereigns that sat upon Russia's throne at Moscow, and then at St. Petersburg, were infatuated with this Oriental mirage. The Russian Orthodox Church urged them on in this course through sympathy with the Orthodox Christians who were in subjection to the infidel. Even the Roman Catholic Church at a certain time encouraged them in the hope that the sword of the Czar might accomplish both the deliverance of the Christians and the union of the two churches., that is to say, the subordination of the Greek THE LATIN AND GREEK CHURCHES. 21 Church to the Roman. It was Pope Paul III., who, at the advice of the Greek cardinal, Bessarion, offered to the Grand Prince of Moscow, Ivan the Great, the hand of his ward, Sophia Palasologus, the niece of the last Christian emperor of Constantinople. It was at Rome that the marriage took place, and it was the Pope who gave a dowry to the heiress of the Caesars of the East.' It is from the time of this marriage that the double-headed eagle of the Palaeologus took its place on the escutcheons and standards of the Russian sovereigns. Paul III. was de- ceived in both his hopes ; for the union of the two churches was never accepted at Moscow, and many years passed before a Russian army was able to advance a step southward. The second of the Romanofs, Alexis, father of Peter the Great, set the first landmark southward in the Treaty of Andrussovo with Poland, in 1667, by acquiring a part of the Ukraine, extending as far as the upper course of the Dnieper. Vast spaces still separated the Russian and the Ottoman Empires. Nevertheless, in the coolest and shrewdest minds brooded the idea of a holy war against the infidel. Peter the Great, still young and journeying in Western Europe, learning its arts and himself wield- ing the carpenter's axe at Saardam, wrote, in 1697, ^° Adrian, the Patriarch of Moscow : " We are laboring in order thoroughly to conquer the art of the sea, so that (i) Le R. P. Prerling, La Russie et V orient — mariage d'un tsar au Vatican, Paris, 1891 ; La Russie et le saint-siege, 2 vols. Paris, 1896— '97. 22 DEFEAT BY THE TURKS. having completely learned it, on our return to Russia, we may be victorious over the enemies of Christ, and by His grace be the liberator of the down-trodden Christians. This is what I shall never cease to desire until my latest breath." Upon his return to Russia, however, his struggle with Sweden occupied all his attention. It was only in 171 1, when his enemy, Charles XII., a refugee in the domains of the Grand Turk, earnestly sought to have the latter take up arms against Russia, that Peter the Great allowed himself to be tempted by the appeal which the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, Montenegrian envoys, and Greek agents addressed to him in the name of Christians who were oppressed and ready to rise in revolt. He found immense spaces to be traversed ; and crossed the Pruth with only thirty-eight thousand starving and har- assed soldiers. He discovered that all the promises of the Levantines were unwarranted ; he met neither allies nor help ; and beset by two hundred thousand Turks, or Tartars, he had to consider himself fortunate to get back again across the rivers, after having signed the Treaty of Falksen, or of the Pruth, which restored to the Ottomans his first conquest, the city of Azov. The second southward step of the Russians was the conquest of a bit of territory that was peopled with Ser- vian colonists, and that was called New Servia. This acquisition was won by the Treaty of Belgrade in 1 739 ; but it had cost the Empress Anna Ivanovna three years CATHERINE II. 23 of war and useless victories, and nearly one hundred thousand men. The third was a gigantic step. After the first war against the Turks, Catherine II. found herself checked by the intervention of Prussia and Austria, who com- pelled her to renounce nearly all her eastern conquests, and to accept a compensation in Poland. Nevertheless, by the Treaty of Kairnaji, in 1774, she had ceded to her Azov on the Don, and Kinburn at the mouth of the Dnieper. She forced the Sultan to recognize the inde- pendence of the Tartars of the Bug, of the Crimea, and of the Kuban. This was to prepare for their annexation to Russia, which was successfully accomplished and sanc- tioned by the Constantinople Compact of 1784. All the north shore of the Black Sea and of the Dniester, as far as the Kuban River, now became Russian. The last Mohammedan states of Russia were converted into provinces of the empire, and the last vestige of " the Tartar yoke" was effaced from Russian soil. At once in the Tauric peninsula and at the mouths of the rivers arose formidable fortresses, Kherson, Kinburn, and, on a bay of the Crimea, Sevastopol was made ready to control the Black Sea. An entire Russian fleet was built up, which could in two days cast anchor before the walls of the Seraglio. The conquest of the Turkish Empire, impossible to Peter the Great, seemed\to become easy for Catherine the Great. In the triumphant journey that she next accomplished through the conquered pro- 24 SECOND TURKISH WAR. vinces, her route was crowded with triumphal arches, bearing this inscription : " The way to Byzantium." She herself provoked the second Turkish war (1787- 1792). The Russian armies, everywhere victorious, advanced to the Danube. The janissaries and spahis of the Sultan could not stop them in their course. But again did European diplomacy intervene. Catherine II. had to give up the Roumanian hospodarates^ which had been entirely subdued, and be satisfied with Otchakov, and a strip of territory between the Bug and the Dniester, and with guarantees more explicit than those of 1774 in favor of the Roumanian principalities. This arrange- ment, accomplished at the Treaty of Yassy, 1792, established over these principalities a sort of distant Russian protectorate. Thus, although four Russian interventions had already occurred, not an inch of Christian territory had been wrested from the Sultan, and not a Christian tribe had been delivered from his yoke. The fifth intervention took place under Alexander I. So long as his alliance, made at Tilsit in 1807 with Napoleon continued, his armies were victorious. The Roumanians were again conquered as far as the Danube ; Bulgaria, conquered as far as the Balkans ; and under George the Black (Kara-Georges), Servia won her inde- pendence with her own forces alone. The rupture with Napoleon compelled the Czar to sign the peace of Bucharest with the Sultan in 1 8 1 2. Of all his conquests, he retained only a bit of Roumanian territory, Bessarabia GREEK INDEPENDENCE. 25 between the Dniester and the Pruth — as also Ismail and Kilia on the lower Danube. The Roumanians and Bulgarians fell again under the Ottoman yoke, and Servia was abandoned to herself. Nevertheless, an amnesty was stipulated in favor of the Servians, and guarantees were given in favor of the Roumanians. In 1827, Nicholas I., by the Akerman Agreement, which was an explanation of the Treaty of Bucharest, caused the guarantees accorded the Roumanians to be clearly defined. As for the Servians, crushed for a time by Ottoman retaliation, they had taken up arms under Milosh Obre- novitch, and, thanks to European intervention, they obtained, with certain restrictions, their autonomy. The sixth intervention of Russia occurred on the occasion of the Greek revolution. On July 8, 1827, Russia, France, and England entered into concerted action by the Treaty of London. The united fleets of the three powers annihilated the Turkish and Egyptian fleets at Navarino (October 20). While a French army was operating in the Morea to insure Greek independence, Nicholas I. took it upon himself to settle the rest of the Eastern Question, His European army again conquered the Roumanians and Bulgarians, invaded Thrace, and entered Adrianople. In Asia, his forces occupied Turkish Caucasia. The Treaty of Adrianople, concluded in 1829, guaranteed the autonomy of Moldavia, of Wallachia, and of Servia, and consummated the independence of Greece, which was formed into a kingdom. Thus were 26 THE CRIMEAN WAR. the hopes that Peter the Great had entertained respecting the Christians of the East partially realized ; but Russia did not secure any territory in Europe except the isles of the Danubian delta ; reserving for herself freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, and an open way through the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Only in Asia did she secure a territorial indemnity. The second eastern war, undertaken by Nicholas I., and which began like the others by the conquest of the Roumanians, brought about ♦^he intervention of France and England in the Crimea, which caused the Czar Nicholas to die of grief, and which ended in the Treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856). By this treaty, his successor, Alexander II., had to renounce all the advantages gained in Europe by the Treaty of Adrianople ; to give back the delta of the Danube ; to consent to the limiting of his military power in the Black Sea ; and to abdicate his exclusive right of protection over the Danubian principal- ities, which were henceforth placed under the collective protectorate of the great powers. When France found herself engaged in a bloody duel with the German Empire, Russia profited by the occasion to have a conference called at London in March, 1871, by which she secured the suppression of article two of the Treaty of Paris, which limited her military power in the Black Sea. The last and the most decisive Russian intervention was the one provoked in 1877 by the Bulgarian massacres. THE BULGARIAN MASSACRES. 27 the Bosnian and Herzegovinian revolution, and the uprising in Servia and in Montenegro. In addition to the help of these different forces, Russia made sure of the armed assistance of the principality of Roumania, that had been formed in 1859 by the union of the two old-time hospodarates of Moldavia and Wallachia. She again made the conquest of Bulgaria and of a part of Thrace. This time, it was in plain sight of Constanti- nople that the victorious armies of Alexander II. halted. The Sultan had with which to oppose them only twelve thousand men, encamped on the heights of Tchadalcha. It seemed, therefore, to be in the power of the Czar to bring to an end the Ottoman domination in Europe, to proclaim the liberation of all the Christian peoples, and at last to plant the cross on the dome of Saint Sophia. But before the threatening demonstration of England and the disquieting attitude of Austria and Germany, he did not dare to do so. He contented himself with impos- ing upon the Porte the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878), which secured for the proteges of Russia an actual dismemberment of European Turkey. Montenegro saw its territory doubled in extent ; Servia and Roumania were declared entirely independent. The first received the districts of Nisch, Leskovatz, Mitrowitz, and Novi- bazar; the second acquired Dobrudscha, but on the condition that it return to Russia the delta of the Danube, which Wallachia had acquired in the treaty of 1856. Bulgaria was to form a vassal principality of Turkey. 28 LAST TURKISH WAR. Her territory extended from the Danube to the Black and JEgezn Seas, leaving around Constantinople and Salonica only some fragments of Ottoman territory. In Asia, Russia acquired the fortresses and districts of Batum, Kars, Ardahan, and Bayazid. Moreover, Turkey was to pay a war indemnity of three hundred and ten million rubles. Thus Russia took, so to speak, nothing for herself in Europe. It was sufficient for her that Roumania, Servia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria were completely liberated and organized. Of course, she hoped that these petty states that owed their very existence to her would be more docile to her influence than to that of the Sultan ; less accessible to the hostile influences of the German and English powers ; that their ports would be open to her, and that their armies would constitute auxiliary corps of the Russian army. An early disillusion came to the " Liberator Czar." The relative disinterestedness of which he had given proof at San Stefano did not foresee the jealousy of Austria, fostered as this was by Germany and England. Under threat of a general war, they demanded a revision of that treaty. England would have even desired that the treaty of 1856 should be taken as a basis for discus- sion, as if she could proceed with the victorious Russia of 1878 as she had done with the Russia of 1856, con- quered in the Crimea. The Czar agreed to the calling of a congress in Berlin. The treaty that was signed TREATY OF BERLIN. 29 there July 13, 1878, curtailed Montenegro of half the part assigned her, and forbade her having a navy ; took back Novibazar and Mitrowitz from Servia, and was particularly harsh towards Bulgaria ; reducing her territory by one third, and carving the remainder into two pro- vinces : Northern Bulgaria, with the title of " vassal principality," and Southern Bulgaria, under the name of the province of Eastern Roumelia, which continued under Turkish domination, but which was to be administered by a Christian government. Increase of territory was granted to Greece by the addition of a district of Epirus (Arta) and almost all of Thessaly. There was even quibbling over the territory that Russia had retained in Asia. Bayazid was taken from her, and Batum was to be dismantled and to become an open port. What especially irritated the Czar was the fact that the two powers that were thus depriving him of the fruits of his victories found means to slice ofF a share for themselves. Under the pretext of administering their affairs, Austria secured Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, by a separate treaty, England had given to her by the Sultan the island of Cyprus (30th of May and 4th of June) and a control- ling situation in Anatolia.' Emperor Alexander II. had run the danger of a European war in order to carry out his programme of " liberation." The danger still remained imminent, so (i) A. d' Avril, Negociations relatives au trait'e de Berlin et aux arrangements qui ont suivi. Paris, 1886. 30 THE PANSLAVIC AGITATION— NIHILISM. long as he did not accept the provisions of the Berlin Treaty. There threatened to spring up again, at each of the manifold incidents that arose over the task of sett- ling the boundaries of the ceded countries, armed protests, now by Greece, and now by the Albanians, against cer- tain decisions of the powers that were not to their fancy, and intrigues by Austria and England for the purpose of alienating from Russia the sympathies of the nations emancipated by her victories. In addition to this, the Panslavic agitation, which had been sufficiently strong in Russia to lead the government to run those risks in the East, did not subside. The most impetuous minds found cause of grievance against the Czar, that he had not carried out his undertaking to the end, and had his victorious regiments enter Stamboul, at the peril of a conflict with the English in the very streets of that capital. 7"he Liberals made a pretext of the constitutions granted the Roumanians, the Servians, and the Bulgarians, to demand a constitution for Russia. The Panslavist and Liberal agitation had, perhaps, some connection with the rise of another agitation which soon made its appear- ance, an agitation called Nihilism, of a character entirely revolutionary and subversive, and which fitly terminated on that tragic day of March 13, 1881, when the " Lib- erator Czar " became the " Martvr Czar." For his successor, Alexander IIL, the results of the eastern war were preparing another series of disillusions. The only fruit that Russia could still expect from her THE INGRATITUDE OF NATIONS. sacrifices and her victories was the strengthening of her influence over the Christian peoples emancipated by her, — and their eternal gratitude. Now immediately after this war the most short-sighted Russian statesmen were constrained to confess that the success of their arms had just created on that " Way to Byzantium " which Catherine 11. had so thickly strewn with premature triumphal arches, obstacles more insurmountable than those which the armies of the Sultan had ever been able to oppose to the armies of Alexander I. or of Nicholas I., — more insurmountable than the Danube or the Bal- kans, formerly bristling with the fortresses of the Otto- mans. These new obstacles consisted in the existence itself of the emancipated nations, and their attachment to their newly found freedom. Thus it was that France, after she had emancipated Belgium under Louis-Philippe and Italy under Napoleon III., found that she had raised upon her northern and southeastern frontiers barriers far more impregnable than the armies or the fortresses of Austria ; that she had closed forever against herself those Belgian and Lombard battlefields over which her ensigns of victory had so often floated. In the formation of an Italian kingdom, France created the chief obstacle in the way of her own expansion on the shores of the Mediter- ranean. The French have naturally and repeatedly denounced the ingratitude of Italy ; nor can the Russians be blamed for their grief over the ingratitude of the Roumanians, 32 ROUMANIA. the Servians, the Bulgarians, and the Greeks. But such is human nature ! The feeling of independence and of national pride among newly born peoples will always outweigh the feeling of gratitude towards their liberators. In this respect there was no difference between the peoples joined to the Russians merely by religion, like the Roumanians and the Greeks, and those who were related to them both by religion and race, like the Bulgarians and the Servians. In former times, when the Ottoman yoke rested upon them with its frightful burden, assuredly thev would all have joyfully accepted the lordship of the Czar in exchange for that of the Sultan ; but now, when it was a question of choosing between the domination of the Czar and their own inde- pendence, there could be no hesitation with any of them. The Russians had done much for the Roumanians. Even when they had been unsuccessful in wresting their territory from Turkey, they had in the treaties of Kairnaji, Yassy, Bucharest, Akerman, and Adrianople, stipulated precious guarantees for their proteges and then, later, secured for them an almost complete autonomy. In concert with France, in 1861, they had made the Sultan accept the union of Moldavia and Wallachia into one province. In 1878, they assured this principaHty of Roumania its full independence, and, in 188 1, they consented to its being organized into a kingdom. But the new King of Roumania, Charles of Hohenzollern, and his new subjects meant to remain independent of SERVIA. 33 every other power, to have their own army and navy, their own national policy and diplomacy, and to exercise the right, whenever their liberators showed themselves in the slightest degree meddlesome, to seek help even from Russia's rivals, Austria, Germany, and England, or, even more than this, from their old-time oppressor, the Sultan of Constantinople. More than once, the Roumanians raised complaint against Russia, because, in 1 8 12, she had annexed the little Roumanian district of Bessarabia, and because, in 1878, she compelled them to give back to her the islands of the Danubian delta. It was the same with the principality of Servia, also made into a kingdom in 1882, and which, according to the needs of its national or dynastic policy, did not cease to oscillate between Russian and Austro-German influ- ences. It was the same also with the kingdom of Greece, which paid no heed to the remonstrances of Russia, when her national ambition was involved, and which had no scruples in troubling the peace of the East every time that it was possible for her to raise the question of uniting to the Hellenic state either Epirus or Northern Thessaly or Macedonia or Crete. The country that was under the greatest obligation to Russia was Bulgaria. If France or England had at times assisted in the liberation of the Roumanians, the Servians, and the Greeks, it was to Russia alone that the BWgarians were indebted for this deliverance. Immediately after the " Bulgarian atrocities " of 1875, Russia had hastened 34 BULGARIA. to her help. From the condition of simple ra'ias oppressed by Turkey and cruelly treated by the Tcherkesses and the Bashi-Bazouks, she had caused them to be instantly 'raised to the dignity of a free people. At San Stefano, she had endeavored to unite them into one state, the most powerful of the Balkan peninsula ; which would have extended from the Danube to the Black and ^Egean Seas ; and she accepted only with deepest reluctance the mutilation and dismemberment that the Treaty of Berlin imposed upon " Great Bulgaria." She gave the restricted principality of Bulgaria at least a constitution when she herself had none. It was the Russian commissioner in Bulgaria, Prince Dondukof-Korsakof, who, on February 23, 1879, convoked at Tirnovo the first "constituency assembly " ; it was he who presided at the meeting of the first " legislative assembly," or Sobranie ; it was he who espoused the cause of their prince, Alexander of Batten- berg ; it was he who organized a Bulgarian army of one hundred thousand men supplied with valiant Russian officers, well equipped, well drilled, and provided with excellent artillery. Nevertheless, this people and this prince, who owed everything to Russia, began at once to practice a policy in which the advice of the Czar Alexander III. was no longer heeded. They set out to remove the Russians who had portfolios in their ministry and positions in their army. In spite of the Czar, they brought about the revolution of Philippopolis in September, 1885, which ended in the union of the Bulgarian princi- RESULTS OF EUROPEAN WARS. 35 pality and the Bulgarian province of East Roumelia, but which provoiced a bloody war with Servia, jealous at see- ing her neighbor's increase of territory. When Alexander of Battenberg had to renounce his throne in 1887, it was a prince that posed as a client of Austria and of Germany, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, whom the Bulgar- ians called to rule them. With his Prime Minister, Stambulof, he governed, — resolutely set against the in- fluence of Russia ; he discriminated against her partisans, and surrounded himself with her adversaries. And, thus, the liberation and the organization of Bulgaria, which the Czar had hoped to be able to direct, have gone on independently of him, and, in certain respects, in opposi- tion to him. Sic vos^ non vob'ts ! Alexander III.'s resentment against Bulgaria and her prince was very bitter. The somewhat imperious and meddlesome affec- tion of the early days soon turned into hostility. When Alexander III. died, in 1894, the rupture was complete between the intractable principality and the powerful empire. Thus all the wars undertaken in Eastern Europe by Russia, from Peter the Great in 171 1, down to Alexan- der II. in 1877, have ended, except in Asia and on the north coast of the Black Sea, so far as territorial expan- sion is concerned, in most meagre results. Se^ven great wars have brought her only a strip of Roumanian terri- tory between the Dniester and the Pruth, and another Roumanian bit of land in the delta of the Danube. 36 NICHOLAS II. Even this last morsel, acquired in 1829 and restored in 1856, was won back in 1877 only at the cost of vehe- ment faultfinding upon the part of the Roumanian people. Russia, whose fleets have twice — at Tchesme in 1770, and at Navarino, in 1827, — annihilated the naval power of Turkey, have never been able to secure even an island in the ^gean Sea. Thus much for material advantages. As to satisfac- tion of a moral character, the Russian soldiers have never been able to enter Stamboul, nor to pray in Saint Sophia ; and as to gratitude upon the part of the liberated peoples, we have seen what Alexander II. and Alexander III. could never have dreamed of. Their successor, the present Emperor, Nicholas II., seems to have taken it for granted that in the direction of the Danube, of the Black Sea, and of the ^gean Sea the destiny of Russia is fixed for a long time to come. In these directions, she has no longer any moral or material advantages to gain, and the age of sentimental undertakings is also at an end. Unless there should come some European overturning, the famous " Eastern Question " will have for Russia only an archaeological interest. All that Nicholas II. is doing seems to indicate that this is his conviction. He shows no interest in the party struggles and ministerial crises in the Roumanian and Servian kingdoms ; towards the Bulgarians, he shows neither jealous affection not the irreconcilable rancor of his father. Whenever the Prince and people of Bulgaria THE TURKO-GRECIAN WAR. 37 have manifested a desire for reconciliation with Russia, he has cordially welcomed them ; he sent a representa- tive to the orthodox baptism of the Crown Prince Boris, but apparently without forming any illusions as to what he might expect of his proteges. When the Cretan insurrec- tion occurred, and the war foolishly undertaken by the Greeks against Turkey was declared, he was careful not to assume a leading role., something that his three prede- cessors would not have failed to do. On the contrary, he seemed to sink Russia in the " European Concert," to associate her in all the decisions of the five other great powers, and purely and simply to accept accomplished facts. Also, when the Armenian troubles and massacres took place, he did not attempt to intervene, nor to arro- gate to himself, either by land or sea, the role of liberator of this other oppressed people. He has rather favored a temporizing policy, and has discouraged the plans formed by the other powers to send European fleets to the very walls of the Seraglio, and to impose by force reforms upon the Sultan Abdul-Hamid. On the other hand, in certain other directions, in that of the Indian Ocean, in that of British India, and in that of the China and Japan Seas, Russia has followed a very formal, a very decided policy. At once very energetic and skillful in this policy, she has, at the same time, acted in entire independence of the " European Concert." Russia in Asia THE SOUTHWARD EXPANSION OF RUSSIA IN ASIA. An Asiatic Power— Wars and Treaties with Persia— A Way to the Indian Ocean— In the Caucasus— Paramount in Persia. F the policy of the present Emperor of the Russias seems to beinspired byothcrprinciples than those of his predecessors ; if this policy has shown itself to be essentially peaceable and disinterested in Europe; if it has shifted its sphere of activity from the West in order to devote all its efforts to South- ern and especially to Eastern Asia, — this is perhaps due to the impressions made upon the Czar during his extended travels in the years 1890 and 1891, while he was still only the Czarovitch Nicholas. He visited Greece, Egypt, British India, French Indo-China, Japan, and China. Then, disembarking at Vladivostock, a powerful Russian naval station on a bay of the Sea of Japan, he returned overland to St. Petersburg, crossing the whole extent of Siberia. The Czarovitch, of course, did not give his impressions a literary form ; but one of (40) p w s fi 1 i 1 1 p s s M TO THE INDIAN OCEAN. 41 his travelling companions, Prince Oukhtomski, has pub- lished his in two luxurious volumes, magnificently illustrated by the Russian artist Karazine.' The opinions of Prince Oukhtomski seem to reveal a new element in Russian policy. Formerly the Russians were indignant over Prince Bismarck's reported observa- tion that " Russia has nothing to do in the West. Her mission is in Asia; there she represents civilization." Prince Oukhtomski is not far from holding the same opinion as did this envious foe of his country. For a few parcels of territory conquered with such difficulty in the West, what bloody wars has she not endured ? Her efforts to obtain access to the sea have been but half successful. The White Sea, blocked with ice ; the Baltic, as much Scandinavian and German as Russian, closed to her on the west by the Sound and the Belts ; the Black Sea, only yet half Russian, and closed on the southwest by the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles ; and the Mediterranean itself, with England holding Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and the Suez Canal, — are these seas, so little available, sufficient for the needs of the expansion of the mighty continental empire that Russia is to-day ? In Asia, on the contrary, who knows whether by the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf, by Afghanistan and the Indus, she is not going to be able to open her way to the Indian Ocean ? Who knows whether, (i) Le prince Oukhtomski, Voyage de Son Altesse Imperiale le Czarevitch en orient, Paris, 1898. 42 AN ASIATIC POWER. already mistress of the Okhotsk Sea, she will not become mistress also of the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, both opening with broad outlets into the immensity of the Pacific ? Now, the importance that in ancient times the Mediterranean had for mankind, and which the Atlantic possessed from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, seems to-day to be shifting to the Pacific Ocean. Of all the nations bordering on this truly universal ocean, the Russian Empire is destined to be one of the most powerful. As to territorial conquests, how are those that Russia won in little Europe, where every square mile cost her a battle, to be compared with those which, with infinitely less sacrifice and effort, she has already won, or can yet win, in Asia .? Bismarck spoke in disdain of the mission of Russia in Asia. Prince Oukhtomski speaks of it with pride : "The time has come for the Russians to have some definite idea regarding the heritage that the Jenghis Khans and the Tamerlanes have left us. Asia ! we have been part of it at all times -, we have lived its life and shared its interests -, our geographical position irrevocably destines us to be the head of the rudimentary powers of the East." From the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, Russia was a province of the Mongol Empire. Everything that constituted that Mongol Empire, however, is perhaps destined to become only a province of Russia. The capital will simply be transferred from Karakorum or from the shores of the Amur to the banks of the Neva. HEIR TO THE MONGOL EMPIRE. 43 Asiatic in their mixture of races, Asiatic in their his- tory (conquered in the thirteenth century, conquering since the sixteenth), the Russians possess to a higher degree than either the French or the Anglo-Saxons an understanding of things Asiatic. They have all the right that is possible to supplant " those colonies of the Germanic and the Latin races that are taking unwilling Asia under their tutelage." Moreover, the true succes- sor in Asia of the old-time czars or khans of the Fin- nish race is not the Bogdy— Khan who rules at Pekin, but " the White Czar who reigns at St. Petersburg." In one of the pagodas of Canton are to be seen, as Prince Oukhtomski assures us, four colossal figures, called " the kmgs of the four cardmal points," and Prince Oukh- tomski felt confident that it was to " the King of the North " that the people rendered the greatest homage. Laying aside these dreams of the future, let us see what, up to the present time, has been actually accom- plished to bring about their realization. The efforts of the Russians throughout their history as an Asiatic power are connected with one or the other of two great move- ments : her southward expansion towards Persia and British India, and her eastward expansion in the regions bordering on China, Corea, and Japan. In 1554, during the reign of Ivan the Terrible, the Russians gained a foothold on the Caspian Sea by the conquest of the czarate of Astrakhan and of the lower Volga. Towards the close of his life, Peter the Great 44 EARLY PERSIAN WARS. waged war on Persia, captured Derbend on the Caspian, and occupied the provinces of Daghestan, Shirvan, Ghilan, and Mazandaran, and the cities of Rasht and Astrabad. The unhealthy character of these regions made them " the cemetery of Russian armies," and the successors of the great Czar had to abandon them. A war undertaken by Catherine II., also in the last years of her reign, ended in the same result, and her son, Paul I., recalled the troops. In the region of the Caucasus, the Russians had gained a foothold, between the years 1774- 1784, by the acquisition of the Kuban as far as the Terek, and, strangely enough, it was not on the northern slope of the mountains, but upon the southern that they were to begin the conquest of this Caucasus. In 1783, the King, or Czar, of Georgia, Heraclius, declared him- self to be the vassal of Catherine II. in order that he might have her assistance against the Persians and the Ottomans. In 1799, his son, George XII.,' formally ceded his state to Paul I., although his son, David, con- tinued to govern until 1803, when the annexation was consummated. This acquisition brought Russia into collision with the Persians and the Ottomans on one hand, and, on another, with the independent tribes of the Caucasus. By the Treaty of Gulistan, in 1813, Persia ceded to Russia Daghestan, Shirvan, and Shusha, and (i) Dubrovine, Georges XII., dernier tsar de Georgie, el T annex- ion a la Russie (in Russian), St. Petersburg, 1897. IN THE CAUCASUS. 45 renounced all claims upon Georgia and other territories of the Caucasus. Another war broke out in 1826, which was terminated by the Treaty of Turkmanshai, February 22, 1828, by which Persia surrendered her two Armenian provinces', Nakhitchevan and Erivan. The same year, in the Treaty of Adrianople, Turkey gave over to Russia the fortresses and districts of Anapa, Poti, and Akhalzikh, and all rights (bitterly contested by the inhabitants) over Imeritia, Mingrelia, and Abkhasia. Then began, in the new possessions, the task of pacify- ing the wild mountaineers of these regions, and, also the Tcherkesses, or Circassians, of the northern slope. The Circassians and the Abkhasui roused to fanaticism by the soldier priest, the Imam Shamyl, held out against the Russians for nearly thirty years. In 1844, Russia had in the Caucasus two hundred thousand soldiers, com- manded by her best generals. The capture of Vedeni, in 1858, and the surrender of Shamyl, a year later, assured the pacification of the Caucasus. The increase of territory that Russia made at the expense of Turkey, in 1878, by the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, included the districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Olty, and the port of Batum, and fixed the boundary line between Turkey and Russia as it has since remained. Since the Treaty of 1828, Persia under the Shahs, Fet-Aly-Khan, Mohammed, Nasr-ed-Din, and Muzafer- (i) Lord Curzon, Persia and the Persian Sluestion, London, 1892. 46 PARAMOUNT IN PERSIA. ed-Din, has fallen almost entirely under Russian influ- ence. In 1837-38, the Shah Mohammed, with an army commanded by Russian officers, besieged Herat, defended by Afghans under the leadership of English officers. In 1856, the Shah Nasr-ed-Din, at the suggestion of Rus- sia, besieged and captured Herat; but the English com- pelled him to abandon his prize, by making a descent on the Persian Gulf, where they captured the port of Bushire and the island of Karrack, which they have kept. In 1841, Persia ceded to Russia the Caspian port of Ashu- rada, near Astrabad ; in 1881, Askabad was given to the same power, and, in 1885, Serakhs, — ^^all three places very important strategic points on the eastern frontier. Persia has also agreed to the building of Russian railroads that are to pass through her territory and terminate on the Persian Gulf. The present year, she has negotiated a loan of twenty-two million five hundred thousand rubles through the agency of the " bank of Persia," established under Russian auspices. This loan is pay- able in seventy-five years, and the interest is secured by all the customs revenues of the kingdom, save those of the Persian Gulf. The Shah has bound himself not to seek further loans of any other European power, and has thereby placed himself financially in the hands of Russia. It is thus that Russia, by her diplomacy, by her banks, and by her railroads, making Persia her political and com- mercial vassal, has succeeded in furthering her scheme of expansion towards the Persian Gulf and the shores of the Indian Ocean. FURTHER CONQUESTS. Expansion Towards India — Napoleon — The Conquest of THE Khans — In Afghanistan — The "Key of the Indies" — In Touch With India — Abyssinia — British Over-Confidence. OWARDS British India Rus- sian expansion was to seek still other channels. The con- quests in the Caucasus, which we have been reviewing, open- ed the way along the western and southern sides of the Cas- pian Sea. But for a long time the Russians had been endeavoring to turn the sea from its northern side. In the reign of the Empress Anna Ivanovna, hordes of Kirghiz, whose camping grounds lay to the east of the Ural River, submitted to Russia (1734). Her sway was then extended into Turkestan, that expanse of steppes and oases watered by the Jax- artes (Sir-Daria) and the Oxus (Amu-Daria), that empty (47) 48 TURKESTAN. into the Aral Sea, a region that is bounded on the west by the Caspian Sea, on the south by Persia and Afghanistan, on the east by the Chinese Empire, and on the north by Siberia. Here was located ancient Djagatai, the debris of former Mongol Empires.' When the Russians saw these vast plains spread out before them, they at first thought that they were near British India, and that an entrance to that rich peninsula would be as easy to them as it had been to so many Asiatic conquerors that had gone forth from the steppes of Turkestan or the valleys of Afghanistan. From this conviction was born the first schemes that the Russians entertained for the conquest of Hindustan. Even Peter the Great thought of it. In 171 7, he sent against Khiva an expedition under Peter Bekovitch that perished on the way, A certain A. M. de Saint Genie proposed a plan for the conquest of Hindustan to Catherine II. in 1791 ; but the most celebrated of all these projects was the one (1) Subsequently it was broken up into numerous states, the principal ones being the khanate of Khokand, with its chief cities Turkistan, Tashkend, Tchimkend, and Khodjend on the upper Jaxartes, or Sir-Daria ; the khanate of Balkh (ancient Bactria), and the khanate of Samarkand, fallen into dependency upon the khan- ate of Bokhara, on the upper Oxus, or Amu-Daria ; the khanate of Khiva on the lower Oxus; and on the Kashgar and Yarkand Rivers emptying into Lake Lob-Nor, and the Hi flowing into Lake Balkash, khanates (Kashgar, Yarkand, and Kuldja) that belonged to China. Outside of the districts inhabited by a settled people are the deserts PLANS FOR INDIAN CONQUESTS. 49 that Paul I. submitted to Napoleon Bonaparte, then first Consul of the French Republic, whose ally against Eng- land he had become. The plan was to place two armies in the field. General Knorring, with the Cossacks of the Don and other Russian troops, was to march by Khiva and Bokhara to the upper Indus, while thirty-five thousand French and thirty-five thousand Russians, that Paul I., inspired by chivalric generosity, proposed placing under the command of Massena, the conqueror of the Russians at the battle of Zurich, were to unite at Astra- bad on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea. Thence they were to make their way by Herat and Kandahar to the upper Indus to join forces with the other army. Then, altogether, French, Russians, Persians, Turcomans, and Afghans, they would pour down into India, proclaim- ing to the princes and the people of the peninsula the fall of English tyranny and their independence. " All the treasures of India were to be their recompense." The execution of this plan was even begun. The Cos- of sand over which wander nomadic tribes. To the north of the Jaxartes, are the Kirghiz, divided into several hordes, and the Turkomans, or Turkmens, on the east of the Caspian Sea. — Con- sult Krahmer, Russland in Asien, vol. i., Transkaspian und seine Eisenbahn, vol. ii., Mittel-Asien, Leipzig, 1898-99. Makcheef, Coup d'oeil historique sur le Turkestan et la marche pr ogres si'ue des Russes (in Russian) St. Petersburg, 1890. Albrecht, Russisches Central-Asien, Hamburg, 1896. H. Mozer, A tra'vers T Asie cen- trale, Paris, 1885. 50 OASES OF TURKESTAN. sacks of the Don, under their ataman^ Orlof-Denissof, were already across the Volga, when the news of the death of Paul I. recalled them to their camps.* The visionary character of this scheme has been demonstrated, during the present century, by the difficul- ties that the Russian armies have had to encounter in winning their wav over a very small fraction of the immense journey marked out in 1800. At the cost of enormous effort, the oases of Turkestan, which in the mind of Paul I. were to be simply halting places in the long march, have had to be conquered one by one ; one by one, deep valleys and rocky bluffs, defended by war- like tribes, have had to be captured and held. To-day, even with these avenues of approach secured, the goal seems as far off as it did to the optimistic imagination of the Czar Paul I. In i8;:59, Nicholas I., wishing to punish the Khan of Khiva, who was capturing Russian mer- chants and pillaging Russian caravans, despatched a body of troops commanded by General Perovski. The severe (i) General Batorski, Projets d' expedition dans r Indoustan sous Napoleon, Paul I., et Alexandre I., (in Russian) St. Petersburg, 1886. H. S. Edwards, Russian Projects against India. On the Russian Expedition in Turkestan, see Hugo Stumin, Rapports, A:/!)/x'a (translated from the German), Paris, 1874; A. N. Kou- ropatkine (at present Russian Minister of War), Turcomania and the Turcomans (translated into English from the Russian by Robert Mitchell); Skobelef, Rapports sur les campagties de iSyg-iSSi (English translation, London, 1881); Mar\'in, Russian Campaigns Among the Tekke-Turcomans (from Russian official sources). DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY TO INDIA. $1 winters of the steppes and the deep snow compelled him, when half wav to his destination, to return. Neverthe- less, the Khan, intimidated by this demonstration, liber- ated the Russian prisoners (1840), and in 1842 con- sented to acknowledge the over-lordship of Russia. Two years later, the eastern Kirghiz also submitted. In order to protect these new subjects against the Khan of Khokand it was necessary to wage war with the latter. From i860 to 1864, the leaders of the Russian troops, Perovski, Kolpakovski, Verevkine, TchernaiefF, captured the fortresses of Ak-Mesjed, Turkestan, Aulie-Ata, Tchimkend, and finally, Tashkend, a city of one hun- dred thousand souls, and the commercial emporium of that region. The Emir of Bokhara attempted to intervene, and had a " holy war " preached by the fanatical Mollahs ; but he was conquered in the battle of Irjar (1866), and promised to pay a war indemnity. However far the Russians might still be from the frontier of India, England was nevertheless disturbed at their success. The official journals of St. Petersburg amused themselves with pacific declarations, announcing that there was no intention of conquering Bokhara ; but the Czar organized the territories, already submissive, into " the general government of Turkestan," and Gen- eral Kaufmann was placed in control. The Emir of Bokhara, having refused to deliver the war indemnity that he had promised, was defeated at Zera-Bulak, and 52 CONQUEST OF THE KHANS. was compelled to sign the treaty of 1868, by which he ceded to the Russians the khanates of Samarkand and Zerafshan ; recognized a Russian protectorate, and paid an indemnity of two million rubles. The khanate of Khokand became, likewise, a vassal state. The Khan of Khiva continued to pillage caravans, and to hold in slavery Russian merchants. In 1873, three bodies of troops were sent against him ; one com- ing from the shores of the Caspian Sea under General Markozof, the second from Orenburg under General Verevkine, the third from Tashkend under Governor- General Kaufmann. The first, after a difficult march through the burning sands of the desert, was compelled to fall back. The other two entered Khiva almost with- out striking a blow. The Khan was obliged to acknowl- edge himself the vassal of " the White Czar," to cede all that part of his territory situated on the right bank of the Oxus ; to grant the Russians the rights of naviga- tion and commerce, and to submit to a war indemnity that exhausted his finances. The Khans that had yielded to the Russians were now the objects of the scorn and hatred of the more fanatical among their Mohammedan subjects. These did not cease to rise in revolt against them. The Khan of Khokand preferred to surrender his territories to Russia ; and thev were formed into the new province of P'erghana, in 1875. The same year, the Khan of Khiva offered to surrender his in exchange for a pension. The Russians did not wish to annex THE CHINESE KHANS. S3 either this khanate or that of Bokhara, less through fear of English protests than because the existence of two vassal Khans would allow them to conceal the better their political plans. They maintain them on their thrones by paying them a pension. To-day, the Khan of Bokhara is captain of a regiment of Terek Cossacks, and the Khan of Khiva is lieutenant-general of the Orenburg Cossacks. In 185 1, the Russians had obtained from China some commercial advantages in the Kuldja province. Twenty years afterwards a Mohammedan adventurer, Yakub- Khan seized the Chinese khanates of Kashgar and Yar- kand, and incited a Mohammedan rebellion in Kuldja. The Russians entered the province, giving China to understand that they would remain there until order was reestablished (187 1). They would gladly have annexed it ; but Chinese troops had been despatched ; and, after years of marching, they arrived in Kashgar (where Yakub had been assassinated in 1877), and upon the Kuldja frontier. The Russians first thought of resisting the troops and holding the province ; but the territory in dispute did not seem worth the risk of a war with China. By the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1881, they gave back Kuldja, except one district on the river Hi, and renounced their military position in Kashgar in exchange (or certain commercial advantages. To complete the conquest of Turkestan, it remained for them to subdue the nomadic Turcomans (Tekke- 54 THE TURCOMANS. Turcomans). This was the object of the brilliant cam- paigns directed by Skobelef, who carried by assault the fortress of Geok-Tepe on January 24, 1881, with a loss to the enemy of eight thousand men. Then he took Askhabad, which was afterwards ceded by Persia.' The agreement with Persia and the conquest of Turkestan brought Russia's power to the frontier of Afghanistan, which the English regard as the protecting wall of their Indian Empire. At every forward move- ment of the Russians, they protested or endeavored to secure guarantees against a new advance or tried to gain for themselves some new strategic point that would strengthen their position. They were not always suc- cessful. After the first siege of Herat by the Persians, in 1840, the English made the conquest of Kabul. Their army was driven out by an insurrection, and totally annihilated while retreating (1841). If, to save their honor, they afterwards recaptured Kabul, prudence led them to adandon it as quickly as possible (1842). After the annexation or subjection of the khanates by the Russians, the English again made their way into Kabul, and left there a resident representative, Cavagnari ; but a (i) Colonel Mallesson, The Rus so- Afghan ^estion, 1864. Sir Henry Rawlinson, Later Phases of the Central Asia Sluestion, 1875. Kouropatkine, Les confines anglo-russes (translated from the Russian by G. le Marchand), Paris, 1879. P. Lessar, La Russie et r Angleterre en Asie centrale, Paris. Marvin, The Russians at Mer'v and Herat, etc. AFGHANISTAN. 55 popular uprising, in 1879, brought about the murder of Cavagnari and eighty-seven of his retinue. The expedi- tion sent to avenge this insult was led by General Roberts,' whom we see to-day in South Africa operating against the Boers. This expedition, however, brought about as little definite result as did the former intervention in Afghanistan. In 1 88 1, the English had gained from the Russians the assurance that they had no intention of annexing the city of Merv, a very important strategic point ; but in 1884, the notables of that city presented themselves to the Russian commander at Askhabad, and made declara- tion that they accepted the lordship of" the White Czar." The English made complaint to the cabinet at St. Peters- burg. They were answered that the action of the people of Merv had been a surprise to the Russians themselves ; but that they believed that they would have committed a great mistake by rejecting a submission that was so entirely voluntary. The English had secured the appoint- ment of an Anglo-Russian commission for settling the disputed boundaries, which was to decide whether Penjdeh, another very important point, belonged to their client, the Emir of Afghanistan, or to the Turcoman subjects of Russia. The English commissioners, presided over by General Lumsden, were the first to arrive at the place \ (i) General, now Marshal, Lord Roberts has published a work, Forty -one Years in India. 56 BRITAIN VS. RUSSIA. of meeting. They began by fortifying Herat and inciting the Afghans to seize Penjdeh. Seeing this, the chief Russian commissioner, General Komarof, at the head of a strong Russian force, occupied the Zulfikar Pass, and made ready to march upon Penjdeh. While on the way thither, he was attacked by the Afghans at Kushk. He slew five hundred of their men, captured two of their flags and all their artillery (March 30, 1885). Then the English commissioners withdrew, charging Komarof with having been the aggressor. Great Britain was much irritated. Gladstone, who had the Egyptian Soudan and the Upper Burmah wars on his hands, called upon Parlia- ment for subsidies. The belief was general that a war was about to ensue between "the whale and the elephant." Then England calmed down, and accepted the explanation of the Russians, that the fight at Kushk was the result of a "mistake." In 1885 and 1887, she agreed to the Rus- sian occupation of Merv, Penjdeh, Kushk, and the Zulfikar Pass. The Russians were now within one hundred and twenty kilometres of Herat, known for so long a time as the "key of the Indies." The question of the settlement of the boundaries was scarcely disposed of, when another question presented itself in the settlement of the boundaries of the Pamirs. These form a plateau of from four to five thousand metres in altitude, known as the " roof of the world," with a rigorous climate and sparse population. This plateau commands both Afghanistan and Cashmere, THE PAMIRS— IN TOUCH WITH INDIA. 57 those two ramparts of India and Chinese Turkestan. It was broken up into petty khanates, over which the Khan of Bokhara, the vassal of the Russians, and the Emir of Afghanistan, the client of the English, laid claim to sovereignty. Neither of them had recognized until then the value of the territory. An " expedition for study," accompanied by six hundred Russian soldiers, made its appearance in Pamir in the summer of 1891, and aroused, by its presence there, the protests of the English. At the approach of winter, the Russians with- drew ; but they again appeared the following summer, in larger numbers, under the command of Colonel Yanof. They claimed that they were insulted by the Afghans, for which they inflicted upon them the bloody defeat of Somatash (July 1 2,), after which they fell back and took up their position at Kalabery on the Oxus. This clash of arms was succeeded by a diplomatic controversy. It was not until 1895, after a keen discussion between the two great powers, each contending for its own client, that they reached an agreement. The disputed region was divided between Bokhara and Afghanistan, the former receiving the little khanates of Shugnan and Roschan, and the latter the khanate of Wakhan, a narrow strip of territory, from twenty to thirty kilometres wide, which now forms " a buffer state " between the great empires of Russia and Great Britain. Even after this agreement, Russia found a pretext in 1899 for occupying the district of Sirikul, which belongs to Chinese Pamir, and which 58 ARABIA— ABYSSINIA. commands the source of the Kashgar and Yarkand Rivers (March, 1899). Great Britain having; occupied in Arabia the island of Perim in the imamate of Muscat, in order to control the outlet of the Red Sea, and to establish a coaling sta- tion in her maritime route, Russia, in 1899, also endeavored to obtain from the Imam the grant of a coal- ing station on his coast. From this arose new complaints and strenuous opposition on the part of England. Rus- sia also established herself, under color of orthodox prose- lytism, at a point quite as annoying to British interests, on the coast, and at the very capital of Menelik, Emperor of Abyssinia. A first attempt in this direction was made in 1889 by a Russian adventurer, calling himself Achinof, " the free Cossack." He took possession of the dismantled fort of Sugallo on the territory of the French colony of Obock. The former " fl«ott«<7