HJ 
 
 8&Z3 
 
 
 UC-NRLF 
 
 
 ON 
 
 THE LOAFS RAISE!; BY ME, PITT 
 
 DURING THE FIRST FRENCH WAR, 
 1793-1801. 
 
 WITH 
 
 soM, f 8TATEMENTS IN DEFENCE OF THE METHODS OF 
 FUNDING EMPLOYED. 
 
 BY W1LLAM NEWMAECH, 
 
 OF THE HONORARY SECRETARIES OF THE STATISTICAL SOCIETY. 
 
LIBRARY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 Accession Class 
 
ON 
 
 THE LOANS EAISED BY MR PITT 
 
 DURING THE EIRST FRENCH WAR, 
 1793-1801 ; 
 
 WITH 
 
 SOME STATEMENTS IN DEFENCE OF THE METHODS 
 OF FUNDING EMPLOYED. 
 
 BY WILLIAM NEWMARCH, 
 
 ONE OF THE HONOKABY SEC liET ABIES OF THE STATISTICAL SOCIETY. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 EFFINGHAM WILSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE; 
 
 HARRISON, 59, PALL MALL; 
 AND NISSEN & PARKER, 43, MARK LANE. 
 
 MARCH, 1855. 
 
GENERAL 
 
 HUNTED BY HARRISON AND SONS, 
 10NDON GAZBTTE OFFICE, ST. MARTIN'S LANE. 
 
PREFACE, 
 
 THE substance of the Paper now issued as a pamphlet was commu- 
 nicated as a verbal statement to the Statistical Society at its 
 Meeting on the 19th (February) ultimo ; and the discussion on the 
 statement so made was adjourned to the Meeting to be held on the 
 19th (March) instant. 
 
 At this particular time the subject to which the Paper relates 
 happens to possess some interest; and hence it has occurred, that, 
 acting on representations and requests from a variety of quarters, I 
 have been led to convert into a distinct publication a Paper intended 
 in the first instance to be no more than an ordinary contribution to 
 the Statistical Journal. 
 
 I cannot and do not expect that an attempt, so slight and feeble 
 as the present, to correct in some measure the prevalent miscon- 
 ceptions of the real merits of Mr. Pitt's financial measures during 
 the First French War, can obtain more than a very limited and 
 transient attention. Something, however, will have been accom- 
 plished if it shall appear to any of my readers that this is precisely 
 one of those cases in which abstract generalization is to be most dis- 
 trusted, and in which neither can truth be made plain, nor justice be 
 done, until we have first patiently put together the facts. 
 
 GLOBE INSURANCE, COENHILL, 
 London, IQth March, 1855. 
 
 99512 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 I'AGE 
 
 i. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS entertained of MR. PITT'S Policy as regards 
 
 the LOANS raised from 1793 to 1801 1 2 
 
 11. Specific allegations against MR. PITT, and some suggested Answers.... 2 3 
 
 HI. The OUTBREAK of the WAR, 1st February, 1793. The Political 
 
 Events which immediately led to it 3 5 
 
 iv. COMMERCIAL EMBARRASSMENTS, and SCARCITY, in the early part 
 
 of 1793 5 7 
 
 v. The FIRST LOAN of the War of 4,500,000*. in March, 1793. Its 
 
 History and its Terms 7 10 
 
 vi. Statement of the SEVEN FURTHER LOANS, which it is proposed to 
 examine in detail. The 11,000,000*. of February, 1794. The 
 Floating Debt of Navy Bills 1012 
 
 vii. The 18,000,000*. of 1st February, 1795. The condemnation by 
 
 MR. Fox of the ADVANCES made to the EMPEROR 12 13 
 
 vin. The 18,000,000*. of December, 1796. The Committee of Inquiry 
 
 with reference to it 13 14 
 
 ix. The LARGE FUNDING of Navy and Exchequer Bills in November, 
 1796. Failure of the attempt to accomplish the operation in the 
 4 and 5 Per Cents 1415 
 
 x. Gloomy state of affairs 1796-97. LOYALTY LOAN of 18,000,000*. in 
 December, 1796. Its History, Terms, and the Loss entailed by 
 it on the Subscribers. Loan of April, 1797 16 18 
 
 xi. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS, justified by the foregoing DETAILS. Those 
 
 Conclusions are in Favour of MR. PITT 18 19 
 
 xn. The DIFFICULTIES which prevented LARGE TAXATION, 1793-1798. 
 
 Rapid succession of BAD HARVESTS, but great efforts made 2022 
 
 xiii. Great Influence produced by false Calculations of the weakness of 
 the ENEMY, and by false reliance on the SINKING FUND. Testi- 
 mony of MR. BURKE and LORD GRENVILLE 22 25 
 
VI CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 xiv. Statement of the QUESTION as regards the COMPARATIVE ELIGI- 
 BILITY of contracting Loans in Low RATE and HIGH RATE Funds 25 27 
 
 xv. The strong PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS in favour of preferring 
 
 CONSOLS or a Low Rate Fund 27 28 
 
 xvi. The COMPARATIVE RESULTS of the TWO METHODS as applied to 
 
 the Ten Largest Loans, 1793-1801 2832 
 
 xvii. The Same as regards the LOAN of 8,000,000/. of March, 1847 .... 3233 
 
 xvni. MR. PITT'S Doctrines relative to RAISING WAR SUPPLIES within 
 
 the YEAR .. 3337 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 A. LOANS raised by Mr. Pitt, 1793-1801. CAPITALS FUNDED in the 
 
 several kinds of Stock 39 
 
 B. LOANS raised by Mr. Pitt, 1793-1801. QUANTITY OF STOCK given 
 for every 100/. Money. Market Prices of Stock at the time of the 
 Loan ; 40 
 
 C. LOANS raised by Mr. Pitt, 1793-1801. Amount of the ANNUAL 
 
 INTEREST on each Loan 42 
 
 D. INCOME of the United Kingdom 1792-1802; and also for 1815, 1825, 
 
 and 1852 44 
 
 E. EXPENDITURE of the United Kingdom same years 45 
 
 F. Net Revenue of Great Britain at seven dates, between 1712 and 1789 46 
 
 G. IMPORTS and EXPORTS. Great Britain. Official Values. Period 
 of American War 1777-83. Peace 1784-92. First French War 
 1793-1802 47 
 
 H. CORN. Prices and IMPORTATIONS during the three Decennial 
 Periods 1761-70, 1771-80, and 1781-90; and for each year 1791- 
 1802 49 
 
 I. SUBSIDIES to Foreign States 1793-1801 51 
 
 J. TERMS of the LOANS raided by FRANCE 1815-1848 52 
 
CONTENTS. Vll 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ] MR. PITT'S BUDGETS 1793-1801. Abstract of New Taxes imposed, 
 
 with the estimated produce when proposed to Parliament 53 
 
 L, MOTIONS made in Parliament for PEACE, December 17 ( J2 to May 1797 56 
 
 M. MARKET PRICES of Stocks, Long Annuities, and of Scrip, and 
 Omnium, in each month, from January 1791 to December 1800, 
 with columns of the Equated Prices 58 
 
 N. DETAILED COMPUTATIONS of the effect produced in a period of 
 years by the Difference of terms between Loans contracted in Low 
 Rate and High Rate Stocks 64 
 
 0. Similar Computations as regards the Loan of 8,000, 000/., of March 
 
 1847 66 
 
 P, STATEMENT IN DETAIL of the TERMS of the several Loans 1793-1801, 
 as given by Mr. Grellier in the Third Edition (1812) of his work 
 on the subject 67 
 
 Q. GENERAL View of ALL the LOANS raised during the entire Period of 
 the War, or from 1793 to 1806; and computations as to the 
 General Comparative effect of raising the Extra Expenditure by 
 Loans, or by Supplies within the Year 74 
 
 R. General Observations on the Contents of some of the Appendices .... 79 
 
ON 
 
 THE LOANS RAISED BY MR. PITT 
 
 DURING THE FIRST FRENCH WAR, 
 1793-1801; 
 
 WITH 
 
 SOME STATEMENTS IN DEFENCE OF THE METHODS 
 OF FUNDING EMPLOYED. 
 
 I. General Impressions entertained of Mr. Pit? * policy as regards the 
 Loans raised from 1793 to 1801. 
 
 AMONG those persons who by taste or occupation are led to interest 
 themselve in questions relating to the General Finance of the country, 
 and especially in questions relating to the Funding System and the 
 National Debt, I believe it would be difficult to find many who are 
 not prepared to express very strong censure of the financial policy of 
 Mr. Pitt, during the first French War of 17931802, as that policy 
 was displayed in the contraction of Loans. 
 
 The intemperate accusations of a period of violent contest between 
 political parties, holding scarcely an opinion in common, have, as 
 regards Mr. Pitt's measures of finance, survived to subsequent gene- 
 rations ; and it is not altogether to our credit that we should con- 
 tinue to repeat the abstract censures originated by the enemies of 
 Mr. Pitt, and neglect almost wholly to make ourselves familiar with 
 the real nature of those extreme practical difficulties which were cer- 
 
 A 
 
2 On the LOANS raised by MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 tainly considered by the public who supported Mr. Pitt as a complete 
 vindication of the financial expedients he found himself compelled to 
 employ. 
 
 "War was declared against England and Holland by the National 
 Convention on the 1st February, 1793 : and the definitive treaty of 
 Peace was signed at Amiens on the 25th March, 1802. On the first 
 of these dates the funded capital of the Debt was 238 on the second 
 574 Millions Sterling; during nine years of war therefore the funded 
 capital of the Debt was increased by 336 Millions. Mr. Pitt ceased 
 to be Premier a year before the Peace, or on the 17th of March, 
 1801; but in reality his was the mind which devised the system, in 
 accordance with which these 336 Millions were added to the Debt. 
 
 Now for this amount of debt inscribed the actual sum received 
 in money was about 223 Millions ; or, in general terms, only two- 
 thirds of the capital created ; and hence arises the censure and the 
 accusation. I pass over all that part of the controversy which relates 
 to the policy and the management of the "War, and therefore over all 
 those questions which relate to the plan of opposing the enemy by 
 subsidies of money to Continental Allies, and I confine myself to the 
 censures and the accusations which have been, and are, directed 
 against the manner in which this great debt was contracted. 
 
 II. Specific allegations against Mr. Pitt, and some suggested Answers. 
 
 It is said, then, that there were two capital faults, viz., ignorance 
 of some of the simplest rules of finance ; and gross extravagance in 
 the manner in which the Loans were brought into the market. 
 
 It is laid down as a fundamental rule, obligatory on all finance 
 ministers in this country, and as especially binding on Mr. Pitt, 
 that all Loans shall be raised at the market rate of interest at the 
 time ; that the amount of capital funded shall in no way exceed the 
 capital actually raised in money; and that consequently it is the 
 duty of the Minister practically to disregard any considerations of 
 difficulty to the Exchequer, arising from the proposal of novel terras 
 in a straitened money market, or of excessive pressure to a commu- 
 nity already suffering from inordinate burdens and extreme dangers. 
 'it is alleged that Mr. Pitt systematically violated these canons 
 of finance, and violated them without any sufficient necessity, and 
 certainly, it is said, without any compensating advantage. In point 
 of fact there have been, and I dare say there are, persons who believe 
 that the whole of the 103 millions of debt which represents the 
 difference between the money received and the capital created wag 
 a loss to the country of the grossest and most gratuitous kind ; 
 a loss wholly unrelieved by any trace of justification or deduction. 
 
 The real gravity of the charge, however, is found in those quarters 
 where, with great force and ingenuity of reasoning, it is urged that 
 
The Five Propositions it is intended to Maintain. 3 
 
 it was the duty of Mr. Pitt to have raised the loans of the First 
 French "War in strict accordance with the principle of paying a rate 
 of interest for each loan equal to the market value of money at the 
 time ; and, adopting such a course, to have enabled the country, on 
 the return of peace, to have materially reduced the annual rate of 
 interest, and therefore the annual charge of the debt. And further, 
 that it was not less his plain policy than his distinct duty to have 
 raised a very much larger portion of the Supplies within the year ; 
 and in that manner, especially during the earlier years of the War, 
 to have avoided those onerous loans which have descended to our- 
 selves unredeemed and perhaps but little susceptible of redemption. 
 
 In referring to the party which holds these views I would be 
 understood to do so with great respect. It includes names of the 
 greatest eminence ; and if I venture to call in question their opinions 
 on the subject now under discussion, I do so for the specific reason 
 that, as far as I can judge, those opinions have been formed on abstract 
 grounds, and not after a careful examination of the particular facts 
 and circumstances which marked the whole of the period from 1793 
 to 1801, and placed Mr. Pitt in situations of financial difficulty, 
 which were wholly new, and happily since then have had no 
 parallel. 
 
 I am sanguine enough to suppose that such a careful examina- 
 tion as I have just mentioned will show in a very decisive manner 
 (1) That it would have been practically impossible to have 
 raised most of Mr. Pitt's loans in the amounts, and at the times re- 
 quired, if the principle of borrowing at par had been enforced : 
 (2.) That even if the money had been raised in Five per cent., instead 
 of mainly in Three per cent. Stock, the difficulties would have been 
 frequently excessive, and in every case the rate of interest, and there- 
 fore the annual charge, very considerably higher: (3.) That when the 
 facts are properly examined there is no adequate justification for 
 imputing extravagance to the Minister, as regards the manner in 
 which the loans were raised ; nor for believing that in the contracts 
 actually entered into, the country did not obtain the full benefit of 
 whatever ~bonafide competition could be excited among persons qua- 
 lified by wealth and character to afford proper security for a punctual 
 fulfillment of their engagements: (4.) That in the anxious and 
 difficult situation of this country during most of the years of the 
 [Revolutionary War it was a consideration so pressing as to become a 
 necessity of the first order, not to increase, even by the smallest 
 avoidable amount, the pressure of the existing taxes : and (5.) That 
 as a general result it was not possible, with a due regard to the 
 exigences of the time especially during the six years 1793-98, both 
 inclusive' to raise within the year by means of old and new taxes a 
 larger revenue than was actually obtained. 
 
 III. The Outbreak of the War 1st February, V7$3.The Political 
 Events which immediately led to it. 
 
 We can hardly commence an examination of the financial mea- 
 sures of the War without first referring to some of the principal cir- 
 cumstances affecting this country at the time of its outbreak in the 
 second month of 1793. 
 
 A 2 
 
4 On the LOANS raised by MB. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 The message from the King to Parliament which, on the 28th of 
 January, 1793, accompanied a copy of the correspondence between 
 Lord Grenville, the Foreign Secretary, and M. Chauvelin (the per- 
 sonage who had communicated with the British Government on the 
 part of France since the dethronement of Louis XVI., in the 
 August previously) described the hostile steps then adopted as 
 "measures necessary for opposing views of aggrandizement and 
 " ambition on the part of France, which would be at all times dan- 
 " gerous to the general interests of Europe, but are peculiarly so 
 " when connected with the promulgation of principles which lead to 
 " the violation of the most sacred duties, and are utterly subversive 
 " of the peace and order of all civilized society;" and it w r ould be 
 difficult perhaps to describe in language more free from ambiguity 
 the real origin of the "War which was then entered upon by Great 
 Britain. It was a War which could be no longer avoided, if this 
 country was to exert any influence in restraining the power of France 
 within its former limits ; and in any degree repress that violent 
 democratic fanaticism which led the revolutionarv party to enter 
 upon a career of foreign propagandism, subversive, as the Message 
 said, of the peace and order of all civilized society. 
 
 This country and Holland were the last of the leading powers of 
 Europe to take up arms against France ; and if it hud not been for 
 the atrocious measures which had marked the conduct of the Jacobin 
 party, during the nine or ten months immediately preceding the out- 
 break of the War, it may be considered certain that there would have 
 been no departure from the scrupulous neutrality which Great 
 Britain had observed since the Assembly of the States General in 
 May, 1789. 
 
 It is too much the habit to forget that the character and aspect 
 of the Revolution became 'seriously changed for the vrorse after 
 the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on the 29th of Sep- 
 tember, 1791 ; and when, in consequence of the fatal decree which 
 disqualified the members of that body from being again elected, the 
 supreme power passed into the hands of the obscure and penniless 
 adventurers w r ho composed the great majority of the second chamber 
 which arose out of the Revolution, and which, under the name of the 
 Legislative Assembly, commenced its sittings on the 1st October, 
 1791. This representative body continued in existence for a few 
 weeks short of a year (to the 20th September, 1792), or until the 
 meeting of that third chamber which, under the name of the National 
 Convention, has left behind it one of the most terrible histories 
 which has come down to us in an authentic form. 
 
 But if the crisis reached its culminating point under the Con- 
 vention, we must in justice not forget that the seeds of nearly 
 all the subsequent crimes and mischiefs were sown during the 
 eleven months from October, 1791, to September, 1792, and in this 
 interval, the Legislative Assembly held in its hands the fate of 
 France and the peace of Europe. Mignet is not a historian likely to 
 bear testimony against the popular cause of the Revolution; but 
 even he confesses that " 1'oeuvre de TAssemble'e Constituante perit 
 moina par ses d6fauts que par les coups des factions. Placee 
 entre V aristocratic et la multitude, elle fut attaquee par 1'une et 
 
Suddenness of the outbreak of War. 5 
 
 envahie par 1'nutro." It was under the Legislative Assembly tliat 
 the Feuillant Ministry was turned out (March, 1792) ; and the 
 Girondist Ministry, which took its place, led or compelled by the riot 
 of the 20th June (1792), the massacre of the Swiss Guard of the 
 10th .August, and the still more terrible massacre in the prisons of 
 the 2nd September to commit itself to those ultimate measures for 
 the destruction of royalty, and the delegation of absolute power to 
 the mob of Paris, which, in the course of a very short time, intro- 
 duced anarchy and violence into every department of the State. 
 
 The first measure of the National Convention was an unanimous 
 vote (20th September, 1792) for the abolition of royalty, the estab- 
 lishment of a republic, and the declaration that that year was the 
 "Year I. of the French Republic." Louis and his family were 
 already in prison, and the great spectacle of the autumn of 1?92 was 
 the debates which preceded the arraignment of the King, and which 
 intervened between the trial and the execution. That execution took 
 place on the 21st of January, 1793, and it was this event which, so 
 far as this country was concerned, suddenly converted a previous 
 neutrality into a state of declared war. 
 
 I say suddenly converted; for there is abundant evidence to 
 prove that so firmly persuaded were all classes of the determination 
 of Mr. Pitt to preserve peace as long as possible, that in no 
 branch of trade was there the least appearance of doubt or sus- 
 pense on the ground of apprehended war, till within a few weeks 
 of the actual outbreak; and until it became obvious that with 
 an incendiary government, like that which had possessed itself 
 of power in France, it would be impossible for this country to 
 remain on friendly or even neutral terms. Even so late as the 
 20th December, 1792, five weeks only before the outbreak of the 
 War, the vote taken for the Sea and Land forces for the year 1793 
 was for only 20,000 seamen and 5000 marines for the Navy, at 
 a cost of 1, 300,OOOZ. ; and for 17,344 men for the Army, at a cost of 
 579,1747. When war had been declared, the addition made (llth of 
 February, 1793) to the Navy was 20,000 men (1,040,0007.), and to 
 the Army 9,945 men (437,8377.) ; additions which subsequent expe- 
 rience bitterly taught us were far too small. 
 
 There can be no reasonable question but that our calculations 
 on continued peace had led to such a reduction of establishments 
 that when hostilities had to be commenced in 1793 we were, in the 
 most emphatic sense, unprepared to carry them on with vigour ; and 
 if further evidence had been required on this point, it has been 
 recently furnished by the publication of the correspondence and 
 papers of General Sir Harry Calvert,* who, as aide-de-camp to the 
 Puke of York, in the campaigns of 1793 and 1794-5, is a perfectly 
 competent witness. 
 
 IY. Commercial Embarrassment, and Scarcity, in the early 
 part 0/1793. 
 
 The War commenced under circumstances of great internal 
 embarrassment in this country. 
 
 * " Journals and Correspondence of General Sir Harry Calvert, Bart." Edited 
 by his son, Sir Harry Verney, Bart. (Hurst and Blackett) 1853. 
 
6 On the LOANS raised ly MB. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 The Harvest of 1792 was the third of the dark series of seasons 
 of deficient produce which marked the fourteen years from 3.789 to 
 1802 (both inclusive). The harvests of 1789 and 1790 had been 
 defective, but that of 1792 was seriously unfavourable. At the end 
 of September (1792) the price of wheat had risen to 535. 4d. (from 
 40s. lid.), and on the 9th of November following exportation was 
 prohibited, and importation was allowed at a low duty. 
 
 But there was aggravated Mercantile Discredit as well as Scarcity. 
 "Immediately preceding the declaration of war," says Mr. Tooke 
 (Hist, i., page 176), " there was a great revulsion and derangement 
 " of commercial credit, not only in this country but in the principal 
 " trading cities of the continent of Europe." *0f that discredit the 
 War was in no sense the origin. It arose out of a train of causes 
 of a special nature and of long continuance. The failures began in 
 November, 1792, "When," says MacPherson, "there were no fewer 
 than 105 ; and there w r ere very few months in all the years preceding 
 1792 wherein the Gazette, that doleful register of commercial mis- 
 carriage, had exhibited above the half of that number." (Annals, iv., 
 254). The War did not of course tend to relieve embarrassments 
 already so chronic. " The unprecedented number of bankruptcies 
 " in November," I again quote MacPherson, as a contemporary 
 of the period, "was prodigiously exceeded by the number and 
 amount of those which took place in the spring and summer of this 
 year (1793), viz. : 
 
 105 in March, 1793 
 209 May 
 
 158 in June, 1793 
 108 July 
 
 188 April 
 
 " Many houses of the most extensive dealings and most established 
 " credit failed, and their fall involved vast numbers of their corres- 
 " pendents and connexions in all parts of the country. In the general 
 " distress and dismay every one looked on his neighbour with caution, 
 " if not suspicion. It was impossible to raise any money upon the 
 " security of machinery and shares in canals, for the value of such 
 " property seemed to be annihilated in the gloomy apprehensions of 
 " the sinking state of the country, its commerce, and manufactures ; 
 " and those who had any money, not knowing where they could place 
 " it with safety, kept it unemployed and locked it up in their 
 " coifers." 
 
 There is abundant collateral testimony that this dismal picture 
 is not overcharged. To the failures of the merchants and manu- 
 facturers was added the still more disastrous failure of numerous 
 Country Banks.* 
 
 In April (1793) the distress became so severe that it was neces- 
 sary for the Government to apply extraordinary measures of relief; 
 and at a meeting of merchants at the Mansion House on the 23rd 
 (April), it was agreed to apply to Mr. Pitt to advance Exchequer 
 Bills on the security of goods, and merchandize, and other property. 
 Parliament was accordingly applied to, and on the 29th (April), 
 
 * The total number of Bankruptcies was as follows : 
 
 1791 769 of which 1 was a Country Bank. 
 
 1792 934 1 
 
 1793 1,956 26 were Country Banks. 
 
Funded Debt on 5th January, 1793. 7 
 
 Exchequer Bills to the extent of 5,000,000?. were ordered to be applied 
 as advances;* and it is exceedingly discreditable to the Opposition that 
 they attempted to convert even this obvious and imperative measure 
 of interference, into a ground of charge against the Minister and into 
 a source of party triumph. Mr. Fox thought it worth while to 
 contend seriously that the proposal to make temporary advances to 
 merchants on ample security, and at a high rate of 'interest, was 
 even in the midst of such a crisis, a violation of the Constitution, 
 and a suspicious means of placing undue power in the hands of 
 the Executive. The measure, however, was perfectly successful, and 
 in point of fact, the moral effect produced by the assurance that 
 assistance could be obtained prevented in most cases, any assistance 
 being applied for. 
 
 V.The First Loan of the War of 4,500,0002. in March, 1793. Its 
 History and its Terms. 
 
 "We are now in a condition to trace the history of the First Loan 
 raised by Mr. Pitt on the opening of the war. 
 
 The amount of that Loan was 4,500,OOOZ., and it was raised in 
 3 per cent. Consols, at the rate of 72Z. money for every 100Z. Stock, 
 or according to the more convenient mode of quoting the terms of 
 such transactions 138Z. 16s. Stock for every 100Z. Money, and the 
 rate of interest therefore to the lender was 41. 3s. 4<d. per cent, per 
 annum. The bargain for the Loan was concluded between the llth 
 and 17th of March, 1793. 
 
 It is important to have before us a statement of the quantity of 
 Funded Debt standing under the different denominations of Stock, on 
 the 5th of January, 1793, or at the time when this loan was contracted, 
 and such a statement will be found in the following figures : 
 
 Amount of the Funded Debt of Great Britain as it stood on 5th January, 1793. 
 (Compiled from Dr. Uamilton,p. 319.) 
 
 Funds. Stock. Stock. 
 
 3 per cent. Consols "107,400,000 
 
 3 ,, Reduced 41,540,000 
 
 148,940,000 
 
 3 per cent. South Sea Stock and Annuities 24,065,000 
 
 3 Annuities, 1751 1,919,000 
 
 3 ,, Annuities, 1726 1,000,000 
 
 Bank of England 11,686,000 
 
 187,610,000 
 
 4 per cent. Consols 32,750,000 
 
 5 Navy 17,869,000 
 
 238,229,000 
 
 The total annual charge for annuities of various kinds, existing on 5th January, 
 1793, was 1,293,000/. ; and of this sum, as far as can be ascertained, 680,000/. 
 were " Long Annuity," expiring 5th January, 1360. The remaining 613,000/. were 
 annuities for lives and short terms. At, say, 20 years' purchase, the 680, OOOJ. per 
 annum Long Annuities would represent a capital of 13,600,000/. 
 
 It is very material to observe upon this statement, that the two 
 great descriptions of Stock, the 3 per cent. Consols and the 3 per 
 cent. Eeduced amounted to more than 60 per cent, of the total of 
 
8 On the LOANS raised by MB. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 the funded debt ; and that the 4 and 5 Per Cents, were of compa- 
 ratively small amount. 
 
 The First Loan of 4,500,OOOZ. now in question has been very 
 severely criticised, as being at a single leap, a gross departure 
 from sound principles. It is said that the Loan ought to have been 
 negotiated by open or individual subscription ; and ought to have been 
 raised in either 4 or 5 per cent, stock. Now what are the facts ? 
 
 On the llth of March, 1793, Mr. Pitt laid the Budget before the 
 House in a speech full of detail, and after showing that the deficiency 
 in the Ways and Means was 4,500,000?. he added, that he proposed to 
 raise that sum by " individual loans, but the particular terms of such 
 " loans he had not specified, nor even his desire of entering into them 
 " at all till the accounts were fairly before the House, and every one 
 " apprized of the state of the revenue of the country." He then read 
 a figured statement, in which he estimated that 'the money could 
 be obtained at the rate of 75 per cent. Mr. Pitt's speech concluded 
 with an appeal for the support of the House under the trying cir- 
 cumstances of the country ; and this gave Mr. Sheridan an opportunity 
 for saying " that the speech contained little novelty in it, except the 
 " novelty of introducing, on a day devoted to figures, all the arts of 
 " declamation. The right honourable gentleman had suddenly laid 
 " down his pencil and slate, as it were, and grasping his truncheon, 
 " had finished with an harangue, more calculated for the general of 
 " an army going to storm a Trench redoubt than a minister of finance 
 " discussing accounts in the sober hour of calculation with the 
 " stewards and attorneys of a burdened and patient people." 
 
 On the 17th March, 1793, Mr. Pitt stated to the House the terms 
 of the loan (already given above), and he said that he had desired 
 to raise the money in 4 and 5 per cents., but had found it imprac- 
 ticable to do so. He admitted that the actual terms were more 
 onerous than he had expected, but he had had no choice, for he had 
 received tenders from only one set of persons. After a few general 
 objections from Mr. Fox, the subject dropped. 
 
 We find the same statement in substance in the very useful work 
 by Mr. Grellier,* who says, " It was originally intended to have raised 
 " this loan in 4 or 5 per cent, stock, but the embarrassed state of 
 " commercial credit having caused a scarcity of money, the Minister 
 " only received offers from one set of subscribers; and as they pre- 
 " ferred 3 per cents., it was judged expedient to conclude the bargain 
 " in that stock, at the price of 72, although that price was between 
 4< 4 and 5 per cent, under the current price ;" and Mr. Grellier adds 
 " that Mr. Pitt admitted that the terms were much more disadvan- 
 " tageous to the public than might have been expected, but having 
 " done every thing in his power to excite a competition but without 
 " effect, the terms were the best he could procure." 
 
 Now if we remember that this Loan was required about five weeks 
 after the declaration of War had come suddenly upon the nation, and 
 in the midst of that commercial distress, which, we have seen, com- 
 
 * " Terms of all the Public Loans, by J. J. Grellier, with an Appendix, by 
 R. W. Wade. Third Edition, 1812." Mr. Grellier was Cashier of the Royal Ex- 
 change Assurance; and, as he died in 180 ( J, be was a contemporary of the earlier 
 loans of the war. 
 
First Loan of March, 1793. 9 
 
 pelled the Government to interfere specially in the very next month, 
 (April), we may discern some reasons why persons having the com- 
 mand of capital should not be willing to lend it to the Government 
 except on terms which left them a large margin for meeting unfavour- 
 able contingencies. 
 
 But further, we have the statement of Mac Pherson, that " when 
 " the war was declared the funds immediately felt the shock, and 
 " the 3 per cents, fell almost instantly from 79| to 70." This 
 was a fall of 9^ per cent., and indicated a degree of instability which 
 no prudent contractor could attempt to face, unless fortified by very 
 favourable terms. And favourable as the terms were, the Scrip of 
 the loan bore no higher a price on its appearance than \\- 2 premium ; 
 and while that price was 1 never exceeded, so long as the Scrip was 
 in the market, the quotation fell at one time to a small fraction 
 above par. Such a statement of the market value of the Scrip is of 
 itself strong evidence that even at the rate of 72, the contractors for 
 the loan were barely reimbursed for the risk attending the operation. 
 
 We may apply, 'however, another test. It may be assumed that 
 about the time of the contract, the market prices of the several kinds 
 of Stock were as follows, and at those prices yielded the rates of 
 annual interest stated, viz. : 
 
 March, 1793. 
 
 3 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 4 per Cents. 
 
 5 per Cents. 
 
 Long 
 Annuity. 
 
 Market prices 
 
 
 
 77 
 
 
 89 
 
 
 104 
 
 Y ears' Purcb. 
 
 *n 
 
 Yielding per cent. ) 
 per annum . / 
 
 3 18 
 
 493 
 
 4 16 2 
 
 4 10 
 
 Equated Prices 
 
 77 
 
 102 
 
 128 
 
 
 Here we have a most striking depreciation of market value of the 
 4 and 5 Per Cents, as compared with Consols ; a depreciation of (102- 
 89), 13 per cent, as regards the 4 Per Cents., and of (128-104) 24 
 per cent, as regard the 5 Per Cents. And it does not require much 
 financial skill to understand, that if the Minister had persisted in 
 raising the loan in 5 Per Cents., he would have had to pay for the 
 money, not 42. 3s. 4d. per cent., but (as I have estimated for pur- 
 poses of calculation to be presently referred to), at the very least, 
 5Z. 2s. per cent., or 18s. 4d. per cent. more. 
 
 "What are we to say then to the accusations of having needlessly 
 resorted to a close clique of contractors, and of having extravagantly 
 selected the 3 Per Cents, as the Stock in which to seek for tenders ? 
 There is 110 foundation in fact for these censures ; on the contrary, 
 Mr. Pitt did every thing in his .power to excite a public competition, 
 and to obtain the money in a high rate stock. He did not succeed, 
 and for the sufficient reason that the difficulties of the money market 
 were too great, and the perils and uncertainties of the time too per- 
 plexing to render it possible for the British Government even when 
 acting through a minister, so popular and powerful as Mr. Pitt, to 
 
10 
 
 On the LOANS raised by MH. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 obtain the command of a few millions, except upon terms which did 
 not involve any novelty and which left a very considerable margin to 
 the subscribers. And we shall find as we proceed that it was sub- 
 stantially the same sufficient reason which year after year left the 
 Government no choice but to obtain the necessary loans not in the 
 form which they would most like, but in that particular manner, 
 which the exigencies of the time rendered most attractive to those 
 who had capital to spare. 
 
 A r l. Statement of the Seven further Loans, which it is proposed to 
 examine in detail. The 11,000,0002. of February, 1794. 2%e 
 moating Debt of Navy Sills. 
 
 It will be seen from the Tables A. B. C. in the Appendix, that 
 between March, 1793, and February, 1801, there were Eighteen 
 Loans, or operations of Funding of Navy and Exchequer Bills, opera- 
 tions in their nature equivalent to loans. 
 
 To examine each of these eighteen cases in the detail just applied 
 to the 4,500,OOOZ. raised in the second month of the War, would be 
 quite incompatible with the limits of this Paper; and moreover, it 
 would lead to a monotonous repetition of statements, not different 
 in substance from those which have been already given with reference 
 to the loan of March, 1793. 
 
 It will be the most convenient course, therefore, and it will fully 
 answer my present purpose to confine my observations in detail 
 to the circumstances connected with seven further cases, viz : 
 
 Date. 
 
 Money Raised. 
 
 At Average 
 rate per Cent. 
 
 Stocks. 
 
 1794 (5th Feb.) 
 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 *. d. 
 4 11 5 
 
 Loan in 3's, 4's, and Long 
 
 1795 (23rd Feb ) 
 
 18,000,000 
 
 4 16 2 
 
 Annuity. 
 Ditto. 
 
 , (May) .. . 
 
 4,600,000 
 
 7 10 . 
 
 The Imperial Loan in 3's 
 
 (7th Dec.) 
 
 18,000,000 
 
 4 13 6 
 
 and Annuity for 25 years. 
 Loan in 3's and Long An- 
 
 1796 (Nov.) 
 
 13,029,000 
 
 5 7 11 
 
 nuity. 
 Navy and Exchequer Bills 
 
 (1st Dec.) 
 1797 (26th April) 
 
 18,000,000 
 14,500,000 
 
 5 12 6 
 6 7 . 
 
 funded. 
 Loyalty Loan in 5's and 
 under special conditions. 
 Loan in 3's, 4's, and Long 
 Annuity. 
 
 The Budget for the year 1794, was laid before the House in a speech 
 of considerable length on the 5th February. 
 
 Mr. Pitt stated the deficiency in the "Ways and Means, to be 
 raised by loan, as 11,000,OOOZ. ; and proceeded to say, that he had 
 thought it a prudent course to arrange conditionally for the loan. 
 He said, "in negotiating the loan he had endeavoured to encourage 
 " a free and open competition among inonied men, without having 
 " anything to do with the distribution of it ; taking care only that 
 " the biddings should be of such responsibility as to insure pay- 
 
Second Loan of February, 1794'. 
 
 11 
 
 ment of the first deposit, which might be considered as the 
 security to the public for the rest. Five most respectable sets 
 of monied men hud offered, and the overtures were such as might 
 have been expected. The terms were highly favourable to the 
 public ; and what was also desirable he hoped safe to the lenders. 
 For every 1002. money, they were to receive 100Z. stock, 3 per cent. 
 Consols ; 251. stock 4 per cents, and lls. 5d. Long Annuity. At 
 the current prices of the day, these were worth 99Z. 19s. 9r/. 
 " This, perhaps, was the first instance of a loan in which the fractional 
 " difference between the sum borrowed and the sum to be paid, was in 
 " favour of the public ; arid in which the discount on prompt payment 
 " was the only premium to the lender. The discount on 90/. viz : the 
 " sum remaining to be paid after the first deposit for eleven months, 
 " at 3 per cent, was 21. 9s. (5d., which added to 99Z. 19s. 9d. made 102Z. 
 " 9s. 3d. for every 100Z. of the loan. This was no doubt a considerable 
 " premium, but the smallest he believed that had ever been given." 
 On this very clear statement, it is hardly necessary to append any 
 comment. It was listened to by the Opposition in silence, a circum- 
 stance which would not have happened if there had been any 
 possibility of raising a question. 
 
 It must not escape notice, however, that the whole of that portion 
 of the funded capital which was in excess of the quantity of 3 per 
 cent, stock, (11,000,0002.) taken as the basis of the operations, was in 
 4 per cents, and in Long Annuity ; and if we refer to the relative 
 prices of the 5 per cents, we shall find abundant practical reasons 
 why a funding in that stock was not attempted. At the time of the 
 negotiations, the market prices were 
 
 February, 1794. 
 
 3 per Cents. 
 
 4 per Cents. 
 
 5 per Cents. 
 
 Long Annuity. 
 
 Actual Prices 
 
 
 
 67 
 
 
 84 
 
 
 101 
 
 Years' Purch. 
 20 
 
 Yielding per cent. 1 
 per annum / 
 
 496 
 
 4 15 3 
 
 4 19 
 
 4 15 
 
 Equated Prices 
 
 67 
 
 90 
 
 113 
 
 
 We find in the depreciation of the 5 Per Cents, given by these 
 figures, a tolerably plain reason why they were excluded from the 
 plan. The Scrip of this loan, however, was not very lucrative to the 
 subscribers, for it came out at only 1^-2 premium, and fell very 
 shortly to a very small fraction above par. 
 
 In the course of the Budget Speech, from which I have already 
 quoted, there is a passage with reference to the kind of Floating Debt, 
 called Navy Bills ; that is, Bills issued by the authorities acting under 
 the Admiralty, in payment of stores and provisions required for the 
 Fleet, and which during the American War, and (in spite of Mr. Pitt's 
 efforts) also during the last War, were a fertile source of embarrass- 
 ment to the Exchequer. 
 
 Mr. Pitt said, in the speech of the 5th February, 1794, " In the 
 " course of the last year (1793) the Navy Debt had increased 
 
12 On the LOANS raised by MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 ' 3,200,0007. This he did not mean to leave, as in former times, 
 ' accumulating till the end of the War. He meant to make imme- 
 diate provision for the interest of the whole sum ; to fix a period 
 for the payment of Navy Bills in ready money within fifteen 
 months after their being issued ; and instead of allowing no interest 
 till six months after the date of the bills, (which had been the 
 former practice) to allow 4 per cent, interest from the time of 
 issuing. This he was informed by persons well-qualified to judge, 
 would put an end to the discount on Navy Bills, which had always 
 in time of War been so disadvantageous to the public." 
 
 These were great reforms, and great steps in the path of sound 
 economy ; but notwithstanding, the advantages offered by this 
 description of security, such wag the high rate of interest borne by 
 money during the years from 1793-1801, that Navy Bills were con- 
 stantly at a considerable discount. 
 
 VII.- The 18,000,0007. of 1st February, 1795. The condemnation, 
 by Mr. Fox, of the advances made to the Emperor. 
 
 With the year 1795 began the period of greatest difficulty 
 experienced during the whole course of the struggle from 1793 
 to 1815, in obtaining the loans necessary for the service of the year. 
 
 The 4| millions in March, 1793, was obtained at 47. 3s. 4d. 
 per cent.; the 11 millions in February, 1794, at 47. lls. 5d., per cent. ; 
 but the 18 millions required in February, 1795, was only obtained 
 at 47. 16s. Id., per cent; and if we include the rate of 77. 10s., per 
 cent., paid for the 4\ millions raised in April and May, 1794, for 
 the Emperor of Austria, under the guarantee of Great Britain (and 
 which, in point of fact, became four years later (1798), a charge on 
 the Consolidated Fund), the average rate of interest paid for the 
 1 8 millions was considerably more than 47. 16s. 2 d. ; for the terms of 
 that Loan and of the Imperial Loan were in a measure made to 
 support each other. 
 
 The Budget for 1795 was introduced on the 23rd of February, 
 and the terms of the loan of Eighteen Millions were then stated, viz., 
 1007. stock, 3 per cent. Consols, 337. 6s. 8d. stock, 4 Per Cents. ; 
 and 8s. Qd. Long Annuity for 65 years, or till 1st January, 1860, for 
 every 1007. money, with certain concessions to the subscribers of 
 being entitled to specified proportions of the Imperial Loan. 
 
 The Table B in the Appendix will show the relative prices of the 
 different kinds of stocks at the time of the negotiation. 
 
 About three weeks previous (5th February, 1795) to the intro- 
 duction of the Budget, a Message from the King had been sent to 
 the House of Commons, asking for the guarantee of Great Britain to 
 a Loan of 4,600,0007., to be raised in London, on behalf of the 
 Emperor of Austria; and out of that message, and the policy it 
 involved, there arose several important and animated debates. 
 
 On Mr. Pitt's motion for an Address, in accordance with the 
 Message, Mr. Fox moved a strong amendment, and the division w T as 
 173 to 58. Very few persons would now undertake to defend 
 Mr. Pitt's plan of largely subsidizing foreigners, and it is no part of 
 my present object to go into that question. It must be remembered, 
 however, that there were special difficulties of treaty and otherwise 
 
Two Loans of Eighteen Millions each in 1795. 13 
 
 pressing upon Mr. Pitt, of which we have no accurate means of 
 estimating the proper force. 
 
 Mr. Fox was never more formidable than when he argued against 
 the expenditure of English money in remittances to foreigners, of 
 whose good faith and efficiency we had no sufficient evidence ; and 
 his speech of the 5th of February (1795), against the Imperial 
 Loan was on of his most striking efforts. He said, " With respect 
 " to the general policy of employing foreign troops in this war, 
 " he could not help arguing from experience that little reliance 
 " was to be placed upon them. The right honourable gentleman 
 " (Mr. Pitt) knew how much of the money of this country had been 
 " already squandered for such aid ; and everybody knew what had 
 " been the conduct of our Allies. It had been confessed that there 
 " were points in the conduct of Austria difficult to explain. He 
 " believed it not only difficult but impossible to explain these points 
 " in any satisfactory manner. It was no wonder that the right hon- 
 " ourable gentleman declined entering into a detail of conduct which 
 " involved everything that was suspicious. [Mr. Fox then referred to 
 " instances]. In the latter part of the campaign it was said that the 
 " Austrians acted better. Possibly they might, for then they began 
 " to be paid for their trouble ; but was it not notorious that the Duke 
 " of York was left, at only thirty miles distance, to judge of their 
 intentions by speculations, as he might have done of the intentions 
 of an enemy. He might be asked, if we did not send these subsidies 
 what should we do ? He would answer Add the money to our 
 naval strength, and depend upon our own exertions, instead of 
 depending on treacherous allies." 
 
 The Scrip of the 18 million loan of February, 1795, came out at 
 l|-2 premium. In the course of the summer it reached 11 premium, 
 in consequence of a favourable turn in the campaign. 
 
 VIII. The 18,000,OOOZ. of December, 1795. The Committee of 
 Inquiry with reference to it. 
 
 The Budget for 1796 was introduced on the 7th December, 1795, 
 and it was part of the "Ways and Means to raise a second loan of 
 18 millions. 
 
 The terms were 120Z. stock, 3 per cent. Consols ; 251. stock, 3 per 
 cent. Eeduced; and 6s. Qd. Long Annuity; equal on the whole to 
 a rate of interest to the lender of 4Z. 13s. Qd. per cent, per annum. 
 
 The contract for this loan excited considerable discussion. On 
 the 8th of December (1795), the day after the Budget, a Royal 
 Message was sent to both Houses, intimating his Majesty's disposi- 
 tion to meet any overtures for peace ou the part of France, and that 
 announcement, coupled with favourable news from the seat of war, 
 led to a considerable rise in the funds, and in the scrip of the new 
 loan. Mr. Grellier snys : " The terms of this loan excited considerable 
 " discussion ; and it appeared, on an investigation of the business, 
 " that it might have been negotiated at 3s. Long Annuity per cent. 
 " less; but the Minister thought himself under some obligation to 
 " accede to the proposal of the subscribers to the last loan. The 
 " terms were settled on the 25th November, 1795." At the con- 
 clusion of the Budget speech (of the 7th of December) Mr. Pitt 
 
14 On the LOANS raised ly MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 referred at considerable length to the special circumstances which 
 had led him to accord a preference to Mr. Boyd and his party as the 
 contractors for the loan of the preceding February. A petition had 
 been presented to the House by Mr. Morgan and his friends, the 
 party who conceived that they had cause of complaint against the 
 nature of the dealing with Mr. Boyd. The petition alleged, among 
 other things, that the Minister had departed from the plan of open 
 competition. Mr. Pitt's answer was " that the plan of making the 
 " biddings an open competition was the plan which of all others he 
 " was most anxious to adopt in this as in all former loans. It 
 " appeared, however, that no real competition could take place until 
 " those who were engaged in the former loan had paid up the 
 " money ; and it also appeared that it was not usual for any appli- 
 " cation to be made for payment of a new loan till the former had 
 " been completed." After entering into further details Mr. Pitt 
 concluded by saying that " he was sensible that by his conduct in 
 " this affair he had exposed himself to much misconstruction. He 
 " could only take refuge in his own intentions, and rely with confi- 
 " dence on the candour, the fairness, and the justice of the House." 
 The topic, however, was taken up with great vigour by the 
 Opposition, and on the 15th December, (1795) Mr. William Smith 
 moved for a Committee to " Enquire into the circumstances of the 
 Negotiation of the late Loan." Mr. Pitt seconded the motion, and 
 thanked Mr. Smith for bringing it forward, stipulating that the 
 Committee should be a Select Committee, and not a Committee of 
 the whole House. On the 9th February (1796), Mr. Smith presented 
 the Report of the Committee, with a great mass of evidence ; and pro- 
 posed to the House as an individual member, forty resolutions of great 
 length, in which were discussed in detail the minute points upon 
 which the whole case of the complainants rested. These resolutions 
 were of course hostile to the Government ; but the first of the series 
 is important, as proving that even in the opinion of Mr. Pitt's most 
 decided opponents, the policy up to that time pursued inhe negotia- 
 tion of loans, w r as not considered to be censurable. The words are 
 " That it appears to this House that the principle of making Loans 
 for the public service by free and open competition, uniformly pro- 
 fessed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has been very generally 
 recognized as affording the fairest prospect of public advantage." 
 Mr. Smith's resolutions were debated at great length on the 26th 
 February, and negatived by 171 to 23. Many curious details 
 might be gathered from the debate ; but I must pass them by, and 
 content myself by observing that the protracted discussions to which 
 the negotiation of the loan in question gave rise, prove very clearly 
 that whatever might have been Mr. Pitt's inclination to extravagance 
 he was not in a position to gratify such an inclination with impunity, 
 in the face of an opposition so watchful and courageous as the party 
 led by Mr. Fox. 
 
 IX. The Large Funding of Navy and Exchequer Bills in November, 
 1796. Failure of the attempt to accomplish the operation in the 
 5 per cents. 
 In November, 1796, a Funding of Navy and Exchequer Bills was 
 
Large Funding of Navy Bills in November, 179G. 
 
 15 
 
 undertaken on a scale more extensive than any preceding operations 
 of the kind. And it appears to have been determined to make this 
 .Funding a fair test of the degree of support which the public would 
 give to any attempt to raise money in a high-rate stock. The Bills to 
 be funded were divided into four series, according to certain peculi- 
 arities of date, but the average amounts of Stock placed at the option 
 of the holders, for each 100Z. of Bills funded were as follows : 
 
 November, 1796. 
 
 3 per Cents. 
 
 4 per Cents. 
 
 5 per Cents. 
 
 Options Offered .... 
 
 
 176 stock 
 
 
 138 stock 
 
 
 118 stock 
 
 Yielding per cent. 1 
 per annum J 
 
 550 
 
 5 10 
 
 5 18 
 
 And as far as can be ascertained the market prices at the time of 
 the operation were as follows : 
 
 November, 1798. 
 
 3 per Cents. 
 
 4 per Cents. 
 
 5 per Cents. 
 
 Market Prices 
 
 
 56 
 
 
 
 72 
 
 
 
 86 
 
 Yielding per cent. ) 
 per annum j 
 
 570 
 
 5 11 1 
 
 5 16 3 
 
 Compared with the actual market prices, therefore, the rates 
 yielded by the option in the 3 and 4 per cents, were unfavourable 
 but in the 5 per cents, favourable. 
 
 It will be observed also, that a Bonus of 5s. per cent, was offered 
 to those w r ho took the 4 in preference to 3 per cents. And of no less 
 than 13^. per cent, to those who took 5 per cents, in preference to 3's. 
 With the advantage even of these Bonuses, what were the results ? 
 The answer is as follows : 
 
 The total amount of Bills funded was 13,029,399^. ; and the stock 
 selected by the holders under the options was 
 
 In 3 Per Cents. 
 4 .. 
 5 
 
 18,438,000 stock 
 
 870,000 
 2,305,000 
 
 21,613,000 
 
 = 85 per cent. 
 - 4 
 11 
 
 100 
 
 These figures are exceedingly striking, and seem to prove by the 
 comparatively trifling amounts taken in 4 and 5 per cents, under cir- 
 cumstances highly favourable to the disposal of funds of that character, 
 the practical repugnance of the public to deal in descriptions of 
 Stock not in the highest degree marketable at all times, and to any 
 extent. 
 
1C On the LOANS raised by MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 X. Gloomy state of affairs 1796-97. Loyalty Loan of 18,000,000?. in 
 December, 1796. Its History, Terms, and tlie Loss entailed by it 
 on the Subscribers. Loan of April, 1797. 
 
 I have now to notice the loan of 18 millions, of December 1796, 
 known as the LOYALTF LOAN. 
 
 This loan was obtained under circumstances so peculiar and full 
 of interest, as to raise its subscription from the rank of a mere 
 financial incident, into an event which exercised no small influence on 
 the progress of the War. 
 
 At the close of 1796, this country was fast approaching that 
 darkest hour of the struggle the deepest shade of which was reached 
 in the early part of 1797. I will quote the description given in the 
 Annual Register of the state of the country in the last two months 
 of 1796 and the early part of 1797, as the testimony not only of an 
 able and impartial, but of a contemporary authority. The passage 
 runs thus : " While either the imprudence of our councils, or the 
 " adversity of events, involved a necessity of heavy and even severe 
 " taxation, other discouraging circumstances accompanied or followed 
 " this evil in close succession. Difficulty crowded on difficulty, 
 " danger on danger. On the return of Lord Malmesbury towards 
 " the close of 1796, from the unsuccessful negotiation at Paris, the 
 " British funds suffered a greater depression than was experienced 
 " at any period of the American War. Insurrections prevailed in 
 " many parts of Ireland, discontents in all. An unexampled run on 
 " the IBank of England was followed by a suspension of payments in 
 " specie. A mutiny of unprecedented extent and inveteracy raged 
 " in the ISTavy ; symptoms of discontent began to appear in the 
 " Army ; the public dissatisfaction and alarm were expressed in peti- 
 " tions from all quarters for a change of measures if not of ministers ; 
 " and the wild and darkening forest threatened to close around us." 
 
 The Session of 1796-97 began as early as the 27th September, 
 1796, and after the formalities attendant on the opening of a New 
 Parliament had been gone through, the Royal Speech (6 October) 
 adverted, among other topics, to the threat of invasion from France. 
 
 On the 18th October, the ministry proposed as a measure of 
 internal defence, a levy, under stringent regulations, of 15,000 men 
 from the different parishes of the country ; a supplemental corps of 
 militia of 60,000 men ; and a corps of 20,000 irregular cavalry ; and 
 it was in the midst of the excitement and discussions following on 
 these proposals, that the annual Budget was presented on the 7th 
 December, 1796. 
 
 The deficiency of Ways and Means was stated to be 18 millions, 
 and for that amount Mr. Pitt had made provision by a loan brought 
 before the public in a manner and with a result both extraordinary. 
 
 Mr. Pitt appears to have judged, after protracted consultation 
 with the Bank Directors, that to attempt to raise so large a sum as 
 18 Millions, in the then perilous condition of the country, by the 
 agency of ordinary contractors would be an operation of exceeding cost 
 and very doubtful success. It was determined, therefore, to throw the 
 subscription open to the public, and to appeal to the patriotism of 
 the country for support, and it was also determined to raise the money 
 
Loyalty Loan, December., 1790. 17 
 
 in Five Per Cent. Stock; and a 5 per cent, stock being selected, it 
 becomes for our present purpose an interesting question, what were 
 the terms offered as likely to be accepted ? Those terms were suffi- 
 ciently onerous to the public. For every 100Z. money the lenders had 
 112Z. 105. stock 5 per cents., dating from the previous quarter-day 
 10 October, 1796 ; these 5 per cents, were declared to be irredeem- 
 able, unless with the consent of the proprietors, until the expiration 
 of three years after all the 5 per cent, stocks, existing at the date of 
 this loan, should be redeemed or paid off; with an option, moreover, 
 to the proprietors of the stock of this loan to be paid off at par within 
 two years after the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace, and in 
 either case of repayment of this loan, the holders to have the right 
 of claiming the repayment either in 100Z. money, or in 133Z. 6s. Sd. 
 3 per cent. Consols for every 100Z. stock cancelled. 
 
 Even with these stringent safeguards to the lenders against future 
 contingencies^ is quite certain that the loan could not have been raised 
 at the rate offered, viz., 51. 12s. 6d. per cent., per annum, except under 
 the special circumstances of the appeal to the patriotism of the country. 
 From the very first the undertaking was a source of loss to the 
 subscribers, as far as market value was concerned. For a few days 
 the scrip bore 10s. premium ; it then fell to a discount of 4 5 per 
 cent., and that discount became no less than 15^ per cent, in March, 
 1797. 
 
 No combination of adverse influences, however, could extinguish 
 the spirit of the nation ; and it remains on abiding record as one of 
 the most striking manifestations of the indomitable will of the people 
 of this country, that in the very midst of the threatening cloud of 
 discouragements which pressed upon them on all sides at the close 
 of the fourth year of the war, they responded to the call of the 
 Government for aid, and in the course of fifteen hours subscribed 
 18 Millions to a loan which stood almost then at a discount in the 
 market. 
 
 I again resort to the Annual Kegister for a contemporary descrip- 
 tion of the enthusiastic manner in which the public responded to 
 the appeal : " Monday, 5th December, 1796. The following mode of 
 " raising the loan of 18 millions was proposed, and recommended 
 " by the Bank Directors, on Wednesday last. One million was 
 " subscribed by the Bank in their corporate capacity, and 400,OOOZ. 
 " by the Directors individually ; and before the close of the books on 
 " the first day (Thursday, 2nd December), 5,000,OOOZ. were subscribed 
 " by different merchants and others. At ten o'clock this morning. 
 " (Monday, 5th December) the parlour doors of the Bank were 
 " opened before which time the lobby was crowded. Numbers could 
 " not get near the books at all, while others, to testify their zeal, 
 " called to the persons at the books, then signing, to put down their 
 " names for them as they were fearful of being shut out. At about 
 " twenty minutes past eleven the subscription was declared to be 
 " completely full, and hundreds in the room were reluctantly obliged 
 " to go away. By the post innumerable orders came from the country 
 " for subscriptions to be put down, scarcely one of which could be 
 " executed ; and long after the subscription list was closed persons 
 " continued coming and were obliged to depart disappointed. It is 
 
18 On the LOANS raised by MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 " a curious fact, and well worth stating, that the subscription was 
 " completely filled in fifteen hours and twenty minutes, viz., two 
 " hours on Thursday, six on Friday, six on Saturday, and one ditto 
 " and twenty minutes on Monday. The Duke of Bridgewater actually 
 " tendered a draft at sight on his banker for the 100,OOOZ. which he 
 " subscribed to the new loan, which could not of course be accepted 
 " as the Act is not yet passed." 
 
 The losses to the holders of Scrip in the loan raised in this man- 
 ner, and as we have seen on terms apparently so favourable to the 
 lenders, became so great and notorious, that on the 31st May, 1797, 
 Mr. Pitt proposed to Parliament to afford them relief to the extent 
 of adding 7s. 6d. Long Annuity to the terms already granted, an addi- 
 tion which would have raised the immediate rate of interest to 61. per 
 cent, per annum. 
 
 In urging this proposition, Mr. Pitt said that the subscribers 
 to the Loan " were to be considered as persons who came forward 
 " to aid the public service without personal advantage, for there 
 " was no chance in their favour at the time ; they must have viewed 
 " it as a transaction in which they were likely to lose rather than to 
 " gain, and the burthen of that loan was considerably less than it must 
 " have been had they not come forward in the way they had done. 
 " The loan was 4 per cent, discount before the payment of the deposit ; 
 " the discount afterwards rose to 7, 8 ; and was now at 14 per cent. The 
 " subscribers had, however, made good their several payments, a cir- 
 " cmnstance which would not the less dispose the House to assist 
 them." Mr. Pitt's motion was carried by 40 to 26 ; but when the 
 report was brought up next day (1st June), the division was 36 to 
 35 and the proposition was then dropped. 
 
 I may add, that the short Peace of Amiens enabled some of the 
 holders of the stock of the Loyalty Loan to claim repayment under 
 the terms of the Act, and some little embarrassment to the Chan- 
 cellor of the Exchequer was created inconsequence. 
 
 The last of the Eight Cases selected for particular reference (see 
 page 10, ante) is the Loan of 14,500,OOOZ. raised in April, 1797, at a 
 rate of interest equal to 61. 7s. per cent, per annum, the highest rate 
 paid for any of the loans which have been raised in this country since 
 the American war. 
 
 The funds selected were 3 per cent. Consols, 3 per cent. 
 Eeduced, 4 per cents., and a Long Annuity of 6s. ; and after the 
 statements already made on the subject of the difficulties of the coun- 
 try at the period of this loan I may be allowed perhaps to say in 
 general terms, arid without adducing details, that onerous as the 
 terms were, they were the best that could be obtained by exciting a 
 competition among responsible parties. 
 
 XI. General Conclusions, justified by the foregoing details. Those 
 conclusions are in favour of Mr. Pitt. 
 
 It will probably be considered that the details I have now con- 
 cluded with reference to Eight of the Loans raised by Mr. Pitt, afford 
 very strong evidence in support of the Three First of the Five pro- 
 positions which I began by stating. 
 
 These three propositions were in substance, (1) That, from the 
 
General Conclusions Justified by tJie, Details given. 19 
 
 practical difficulties of the time, the amounts required by way of 
 loan could not have been obtained at the periods, and in the large 
 sums required, if the principle of borrowing at Par had been rigidly 
 enforced : (2.) That even if the principle of borrowing only in 
 Five Per Cents, had been enforced the difficulties would have been 
 almost insurmountable, and the terms in all cases exceedingly 
 more onerous than the rates actually given: and (3.) That there 
 is no reason whatever for supposing that the contracts entered 
 into were not the best that could be obtained by a resort, as far as 
 possible, to the check of competition ; and that, 'in point of fact, re 
 peated attempts were made by Mr. Pitt to negotiate the loans in 
 stocks bearing a higher rate than three per cent. 
 
 To the remaining Two of the Five propositions, namely, (4.) That 
 the situation of the country rendered it necessary to keep down the 
 annual burdens as far as possible: and (5.) That particularly during 
 the first six years of the war (1793-98), as large a revenue was raised 
 within the year as could be obtained under the exigencies of the 
 time, I will presently address myself. 
 
 I have said that practically it would have been impossible to have 
 raised the loans under consideration at Par ; and although that phrase 
 will convey a sufficiently distinct meaning to persons familiar with 
 these inquiries, it may be well to introduce here a definition, and it 
 shall be in the words of one of the most distinguished supporters of 
 the Par Method. 
 
 Borrowing at par then means " to restrict the stock created 
 in the lenders' favour to the amount of the loan, and to make the 
 required bonus (or inducement to persons to subscribe) by raising 
 the rate of interest" (McCulloch's Funding System, p. 435) : 
 Or, to give an illustration, to have as many different kinds of 
 stocks as there have been different rates of interest paid on different 
 loans : As for instance the 4|- millions raised in March, 1793, would 
 have been a special 4Z. 3s. 4d. per cent. Stock ; the 11 Millions of 
 February, 1794, would have been a 4Z. lls 5d. stock ; the 18 millions 
 of February, 1795, a 4Z. 16s. 2d. stock, and so on through the fifty 
 funding operations of the last war. It is happily not my task to 
 defend a theory which assumes the contemporaneous existence of 
 half a century of different kinds of public securities ; but if borrow- 
 ing at Par has any definite meaning at all, such would have been its 
 practical effects if enforced from 1793 to 1815. 
 
 A medium course between borrowing at par that is, always at 
 the market rate of interest at the time and borrowing in 3 per cent, 
 stock, would have been to borrow in a High Rate Stock, such as the 
 Five per cents. As regards most of the loans a Five per cent, stock 
 might have been employed, but at the expense only of a considerably 
 higher rate of interest than was paid in the Low Rate Stock of 3 per 
 cent. ; and for all the purposes of trying the question of low and high 
 rate methods of funding, during the period 1793-1801, it seems to 
 me that we may safely disregard the Par hypothesis, as being too far 
 removed from any possibility of adoption, or even endurance, and 
 confine the question to the respective merits of the THBEE and FIVE 
 per cent. Methods. 
 
 B 2 
 
20 
 
 On the LOANS raised by MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 XII. The Difficulties which prevented large taxation, 1793-1798. 
 Sapid succession of Sad Harvests. Great efforts made. 
 
 Let us now return to the two last of the five propositions. 
 
 It has been said that a much larger amount of taxes ought to 
 have been imposed immediately on the outbreak of the War ; and, 
 therefore the necessity for loans so large prevented by considerable 
 additions to the ordinary revenue. I candidly confess that, when I 
 began this inquiry, I held, not perhaps a strong but a moderately 
 distinct opinion, in favour of this view; and I must also confess that 
 an investigation into the facts has compelled me to relinquish that 
 opinion altogether. 
 
 This is not the proper occasion on which to go at length into so 
 large and general a topic. At present it is a topic which occurs in a 
 form collateral only to the main purpose of this Paper, and therefore 
 I propose to do no more than refer to it incidentally. 
 
 The primary consideration in viewing such a question is the cha- 
 racter of the Seasons, and the price of Corn ; and the following state- 
 ment, compiled from Mr. Tooke's History, will show the rapid 
 succession of Unfavourable Harvests between 1792 and 1800. 
 
 Harvest 
 of 
 
 General Character of Crop. 
 
 Average Price of Wheat 
 in England per Winch. 
 (8 bush.) Qr. during Har- 
 vest Year of 1st Sept. 
 to 1st Sept. 
 
 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1791 
 
 Very abundant. 
 
 
 1792 
 
 Extremely wet summer. Wheat crop very inferior. 
 
 
 1793 
 
 Summer very dry. Winter corn moderately good, 
 
 '93-'94 2 10 2 
 
 
 but spring corn generally deficient. 
 
 
 1794 
 
 Summer hot and forward. Great damage occasioned 
 
 '94-'95 355 
 
 
 by drought. 
 
 
 1795 
 
 Winter of 1794-95 very severe. Spring and summer 
 
 '95-'96 44. 
 
 
 of 1795 cold and stormy. Produce very deficient. 
 
 
 1796 
 
 Winter of 1795-96 very mild. Harvest of 1796 
 
 '96-'97 2 14 4 
 
 
 abundant and well secured. 
 
 
 1797 
 
 Season on the whole unfavourable, and produce 
 
 '97-'98 2 13 6 
 
 
 deficient. 
 
 
 1798 
 
 Crops moderately productive and secured in good 
 
 >98-'99 2 15 3 
 
 
 order. 
 
 
 1799 
 
 Winter of 1798-99 extremely rigorous. Spring and 
 
 '99-'00 56. 
 
 
 summer of 1799 cold and ungenial. Produce ex- 
 
 
 
 ceedingly deficient 
 
 
 1800 
 
 Spring very wet. Summer hot. Harvest weather 
 
 'OO-'Ol '6 11 . 
 
 
 at first favourable; but as the general result more 
 
 
 
 than half the crop deficient or severely damaged. 
 
 
 We have here Six Deficient Harvests in the first nine years of 
 War, viz., 1792, '93, '94, '95, '99 and 1800, and in Appendix H further 
 details are given of the sacrifices which these deficient years imposed 
 upon the country. 
 
Six Bad Harvests, 1792-1800. 21 
 
 The dearth was perhaps the more severely felt, because it came upon 
 the country as something of which there had been no recent example. 
 To the end of 1790 this country had required hardly any supplies of 
 corn from abroad, and had had the benefit of an extremely low 
 average price. For the twelve years to the end of 1792 the average 
 annual price was not more than 2Z. 85. per quarter for wheat ; for the 
 first three years of the War (1793-4-5) the price was 3Z. 7*., or forty 
 per cent, higher ; for the next five years (1796-1801) the price was 
 41., or seventy per cent, higher. There was a constant drain also 
 for the cost of foreign supplies of corn. For the years 1794-5 the 
 Import Cost of Foreign Corn was Two Millions and a Half sterling ; 
 for the five years 1796-1800 it was Three Millions and a Quarter ster- 
 ling, or not 'far short of 10 per cent, of the total real value of all the 
 Imports. Not only were the ports thrown completely open, but large 
 bounties were paid on cargoes of corn imported. In the fourth year 
 of the war (1796) the amount paid for bounties was 574,OOOZ. ; in 
 1801 it was 1,420,0002. It was the intense distress, arising out of 
 the scarcity, which mainly led Mr. Pitt to propose early in 1796 those 
 extensive modifications of the Poor Law which during recent years 
 have been so largely discussed. 
 
 We have already seen that the War opened amidst severe com- 
 mercial distress, and during the first three or four years of the strug- 
 gle the effect of the utterly disorganized state of Europe operated to 
 the great depression of the trade of this country. When our Naval 
 victories had cleared the seas of almost every hostile flag ; and when 
 the colonial conquests had given us a monopoly almost of the trade of 
 the world ; that monopoly, aided by the rapid extensions of our manu- 
 facturing industry, drew into this country no small part of the wealth 
 of Europe ; but we did not possess these advantages till after 1798, 
 and during the First Six Years of the conflict the Ministry had to con- 
 tend with an accumulation of difficulties, such as, I believe in my con- 
 science, had never been encountered before, and such as assuredly, 
 has not been encountered since. 
 
 Famine, disaster in the field, treacherous allies, the failure of two 
 attempts to obtain peace from an arrogant enemy, discontent and 
 rebellion in Ireland, a paralyzed commerce, a failing revenue and 
 increasing burdens ; a tendency if not to sedition at least to the most 
 violent forms of political agitation at home, and a Parliamentary 
 Opposition distinguished above all others in the history of party by 
 the ability, the courage and the perseverance of its leaders vehe- 
 mently antagonistic to the war and to the Minister who carried it on. 
 These were the difficulties under which Mr. Pitt persevered; and 
 now, at the distance of sixty years, when the embers of the fierce 
 opposition he had to meet have long since died out, we can all afford 
 to admire the brave and hopeful spirit with which he, and the great 
 majority of the nation who supported him, met the hardships that 
 pressed upon them. We can also well afford to admire the gallantry 
 of the small band, who, thinking too favourably of the principles and 
 power of France, fought for six years a hopeless battle against the 
 policy of the War. 
 
 But it is by no means true that vigorous efforts were not made to 
 increase the taxes even from the first. 
 
22 On the LOANS raised by MB. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 In Appendix K will be found a detail of the Budgets proposed by 
 Mr. Pitt from 1793 to 1801, and it is a document to be read with 
 interest and profit. The New Taxes proposed at the end of the 
 first twelvemonth (5th February, 1794) amounted to no less than 
 913,OOOZ. ; the following year they were 1,666,OOOZ. ; in 1796 they 
 were 1,592,OOOZ. ; and even in the deep gloom of the December 
 of that year (1796), the minister had confidence enough to propose 
 further new taxes to the amount of 3,436,0007. We must remem- 
 ber also that in the early part of 1796 he had been compelled to 
 withdraw his proposed Legacy Duty on Real Estate. In 1798 
 came the Trebled Assessed Taxes, the .Redemption of the Land Tax, 
 the Voluntary Contribution, and other imposts and plans amounting 
 to 8,263,0002. ;* and, at length, in 1799 that great and final measure, 
 long in contemplation but not possible at an earlier period, the 
 Income Tax (of 10 per cent.), estimated to produce 7,500,000?. 
 
 XIII. Great Influence produced by false calculations of the weakness 
 of the Enemy, and by false reliance on the Sinking Fund. 
 Testimony of Mr. Burke and Lord Orenville. 
 
 There were two circumstances, however, whicli during the earlier 
 years affected materially the Financial Plans of Mr. Pitt, as regarded 
 the War Expenditure ; and one of those circumstances continued to 
 affect the policy pursued with reference to loans even beyond the 
 termination of the contest in 1815. 
 
 The first of these circumstances was (1.), The general opinion 
 entertained when the War broke out that it was merely a casual 
 interruption of peace, and would soon terminate; and this opinion 
 was very confidently supported on the two grounds, first, of the 
 utter inability of a chaotic government, such as existed in France, 
 to carry on an external war with vigour ; and, secondly, of the rapidly 
 approaching exhaustion in France of every species of financial credit 
 and stability. (2.) The second circumstance was the delusive belief 
 in the efficacy of the Sinking Fund to save this country from the 
 perils of an accumulating Debt. 
 
 I cannot go into much detail on either of these topics, and I 
 must content myself by the general allegation, supporting it by only 
 a single extract from Mr. Pitt's speech, on the Address of 30th 
 December, 1794, and confining myself to a few sentences of the pas- 
 sage in which he expressed his confident belief in the approaching 
 exhaustion of the finances of the enemy, " I have even," he said, 
 " the authority of Tallien for saying that the French cannot main- 
 " tain their Assignats without contracting their expences and dimi- 
 " nishing their forces ; and it should be recollected that this is their 
 " only resource. Is it then too much to say, that their resources are 
 " nearly at an end ? It is this unlimited power, which the French 
 
 * It was, if I remember rightly, with reference to the Treble Assessed Taxes, 
 that one of the most vigorous and popular of the opposition songs was composed. 
 The following stanza was exceedingly popular : 
 
 What were the taxes last year ? 
 
 A trifle that we can remember ; 
 Enough to make a man swear 
 From January until December. 
 
Errors Committed as to the Finances of France. 23 
 
 " Convention have assumed, to purchase or to seize all property as 
 " suited their purposes, that accounts for the stupendous scale of 
 " operations which they have been enabled to pursue. This circum- 
 " stance completely solves the phenomenon, which otherwise would 
 " appear so inexplicable and is adequate to all those miraculous 
 " efforts which have attended the progress of the French Revolution, 
 *' and which seemed to baffle all reasoning, as much as they have 
 " exceeded all human expectation. In all these circumstances, we 
 " have then sufficient inducements to carry on the war, if not with the 
 " certainty of faith, yet at least with the confidence of expectation."* 
 These views were by no means confined to Mr. Pitt, they were 
 entertained by most well informed persons in the early part of the 
 War ; and, in the opening pages of that last, and in many respects, 
 most marvellous of the writings of Mr. Burke, the Letters on a Re- 
 gicide Peace, published towards the end of 1796, we may read a state- 
 ment in language such as Mr. Burke only could command of the 
 state of public opinion, with reference to France after the abolition of 
 the monarchy in August, 1792 : "Deprived," the passage in the First 
 Letter runs, " of the Old Government, deprived in a manner of all 
 " Government, France fallen as a monarchy, to most speculators 
 " appeared more likely to be an object of pity or insult according to 
 " the disposition of the circumjacent powers, than to be the scourge 
 ' and terror of them all; but out of the tomb of the murdered monarchy 
 ' in France has arisen a vast, tremendous, unformed spectre, in a far 
 ' more terrific guise than any which ever yet overpowered the imagi- 
 nation and subdued the fortitude of man. Going straight forward 
 to its end, unappalled by peril, unchecked by remorse, despising all 
 common maxims, and all common means, that hideous phantom 
 overpowered those who could not believe it was possible that France 
 could at all exist except on the principles which habit rather than 
 nature had persuaded them were necessary to their own particular 
 welfare, and their own ordinary modes of action. The R/epublie of 
 Regicide with an annihilated revenue, with defaced manufactures, 
 with a ruined commerce, with an uncultivated and half depopulated 
 country, with a discontented, distressed, enslaved, and famished 
 people, passing with a rapid, eccentric, and incalculable course from 
 the wildest anarchy to the sternest despotism, has actually con- 
 quered the finest parts of Europe ; has distressed, disunited, and 
 broken to pieces all the rest ; and so subdued the minds of the rulers 
 in every nation, that hardly any resource presents itself to them 
 except that of entitling themselves to a contemptuous mercy by 
 a display of their imbecility and meanness. At first the French 
 force was too much despised, now it is too much dreaded. Incon- 
 siderate courage has given way to irrational fear." 
 
 There was then the hallucination of the Sinking Fund and surely 
 the history of that device affords materials for one of the most curious 
 
 * Tom Paine's tract, "The Decline and Fall of the English System of Finance," 
 dated at Paris, 8th April, 1796, was intended as an answer to Mr. Pitt's frequent 
 references to the desperate situation of the credit of the republic. The motto of the 
 pamphlet, " On the verge, nay, in the gulph of bankruptcy," was taken from one of 
 Mr. Pitt's speeches. 
 
24 On the LOANS raised ly MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 chapters in the checquered narrative which traces the progress of 
 the human mind in freeing itself from gross and mischievous errors. 
 Eastern legends have hardly ventured upon any more startling 
 paradox than the enthusiasm of all the leading minds of a commer- 
 cial nation in support of a plan arithmetically absurd, and bringing 
 with it no immediate advantage, but on the contrary, the continuance 
 of present imposts exceedingly hard to be borne. From the date, 
 however, of the Sinking Fund Act of 1786 to the final adoption of 
 Dr. Hamilton's views by Parliament in 1828, the scheme revived by 
 Dr. Price continued in the punctual discharge of its useless functions 
 and during the first half of that period the most implicit reliance 
 was placed in the power of the contrivance to mitigate the evils of 
 accumulating debt. The diffusion of this financial faith pervaded all 
 parties. It was held as firmly on the Opposition as on the Ministerial 
 side of both Houses. It pervaded all the pamphleteers ; and we 
 search in vain through the fierce essays of Mr. Morgan and Lord 
 Lauderdale for any expression of doubt as to the solemn duty of 
 upholding the Sinking Fund. In truth, the support of that institu- 
 tion by Mr. Pitt was almost the solitary merit which the Opposition 
 admitted him to possess. 
 
 It is fortunate, however, that we are able to refer on this subject 
 to the testimony of one of the most distinguished of the statesmen 
 who contributed to the original adoption of Price's Scheme, and who 
 also lived to contribute, with no backward zeal, to the correction of 
 the error. In the admirable essay* published by Lord Grenville in 
 1828, there is the following passage : 
 
 " But in the days of Price the principles of 1716 regained the 
 " public favour, and in 1786 they were re-established by almost 
 " universal acclamation as the main bulwark of our finance, and the 
 " unfailing sources of incalculable benefit. To this change the cir- 
 " cumstances of the moment powerfully contributed. At the close of 
 " the American War the loss of our long-cherished colonies, to whose 
 " possession such false notions of advantage had been attached, the 
 " magnitude of the debt incurred in that fruitless contest, and the 
 " deficiency of the revenue created to defray its charge, had thrown 
 " over our financial prospects a cloud of distrust and apprehension 
 " scarcely to be imagined but by those who witnessed it. Nor w r ere 
 . " there wanting strong grounds for these impressions, exaggerated as 
 " they were. The real pressure of our burdens was at that time 
 " exceedingly severe ; more grievous, perhaps, in proportion to our 
 " wealth, than in any succeeding period of our greatest difficulties. 
 " The nation gave way therefore to an almost universal panic on 
 " this subject. The ordinary course of our finance was thought no 
 " longer adequate to our necessities; resort must be had for safety, it 
 " was said, to some new, or at least to some long untried, expedient. 
 
 " Under these circumstances it was that the project of establish- 
 " ing a new Sinking Fund, which should accunuilate uninterruptedly 
 " at compound interest, through every vicissitude of peace and war, 
 " and which on that assumption would be demonstrably capable of 
 
 * " Essay on the Supposed Advantages of a Sinking Fund," by Lord Grenville, 
 1828. The pamphlet is dated Dropmore, 15th March, 1828, and was published in 
 a somewhat incomplete state in order to be ready early in the session of that year. 
 
Errors arising out of the Sinking Fund. 25 
 
 " being carried to any assignable amount, captivated all imaginations. 
 " The country grasped, almost without inquiry, at promises of relief 
 " so specious and so ample, adopting with unbounded confidence a 
 " remedy proclaimed on no light authority to be of efficacy nothing 
 " less than omnipotent. 
 
 " It can be no reproach to any individual to have partaken largely 
 " in these feelings no reproach, I trust, to any public man to have 
 " co-operated with earnestness and zeal both in preparing and sup- 
 " porting a measure so consonant to the wishes of his country ; and 
 " least of all can censure be attached, on this account, to that able 
 " and excellent Statesman who framed and carried through the Act of 
 1786. Allowing for the impressions at that time so generally pre- 
 ' valent, there is, on the contrary, much of his conduct on that occa- 
 ' sion for which he is justly entitled to the highest praise. "With 
 ' an ardent and generous spirit, devoting all his energies to the 
 ' national prosperity, he risked, and in no small degree surrendered, 
 ' his highly valued popularity to the necessity of a large additional 
 1 taxation, which that measure compelled him to establish and main- 
 ' tain. This was no light sacrifice, nor did he feel it such ; but he 
 ' anticipated, in return, with unspeakable delight, the full tide of 
 ' wealth, which in some distant, but auspicious moment, the results 
 ' of these disinterested exertions were to pour upon his country. 
 ' What he so ardently wished he willingly believed. His persua- 
 1 sion of the great advantages of a Sinking Fund, to be continued in 
 ' War, and to be upheld by borrowing in all periods of deficiency, was 
 ' therefore deeply rooted, not in his judgment only but in his feelings. 
 " To these opinions he clung with unvarying fondness ; and his 
 " provisions for giving effect to them, although, on more than one 
 " occasion widely departed from by his successors, still form, even 
 " in the present moment, the leading features of the system, in so 
 " far as it can still be said to exist at all." 
 
 XIV. Statement of the Question as regards the Comparative Eligibility 
 of contracting Loans in Low Hate or High Rate Funds. 
 
 I have now reached the closing division of the inquiry. I have 
 endeavoured to adduce, at least some reasons for believing that the 
 great and perplexing difficulties of the period from 1793 to 1801 
 compelled the Government to frame its financial measures very 
 much according to the current circumstances of the time ; and that, 
 as regards the Loans raised by Mr. Pitt, they were raised with the 
 advantage of every precaution on his part to accept such terms only 
 as arose in each case out of a competition the most extensive and 
 bond fide which it was possible to excite. 
 
 The general and conclusive answer therefore to those persons who 
 exclaim against the onerous burdens entailed by Mr. Pitt's Loans is 
 exceedingly short, and consists in a simple statement of fact, namely, 
 that the* Loans were required for purposes of national defence, in a 
 period of great distress and peril, and that, with every advantage of 
 an open market, the money could only be obtained at the prices given. 
 Whether or not therefore the burden arising out of these transac- 
 tions be or be not onerous, is a consideration wholly beside the ques- 
 tion. The bargain was fairly performed on the side of the Lender 
 
26 On the LOANS raised ly MB. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 and, unless the doctrines of repudiation are to be introduced, it must 
 be as fairly performed on the side of the Borrower. 
 
 And here the defence of the Funding Operations of the first 
 French War might cease, as being complete on the first and para- 
 mount ground of the particular facts. The Loans were raised in the 
 openest manner, and on the best terms that could be obtained, and 
 there is an end of the whole case. 
 
 But the defence admits of being carried further than this. The 
 impugners of Mr. Pitt's Loans are willing to admit some of them 
 entirely, and others only as an assumption, that while there was no 
 extravagance in the manner of settling the contracts, there was a 
 great error of judgment in selecting as the fund to be employed a 
 Three per cent, or Low Rate Stock instead of a High Hate Stock 
 meaning by High Rate Stock either Five Per Cents, or funding at Par. 
 Now, as I have already said, it appears to me that while the Par 
 Method may be exceedingly ingenious as a hypothesis, it is too far 
 removed from possible reality to admit of discussion ; and further, 
 that the question can only be fairly tried as between Three and Five 
 per cent, stock. 
 
 I arn quite content to discuss it on this ground, and I think it 
 may be made to appear, by a fair and reasonable line of argument, 
 that in spite of all the manifold statements to the contrary, the loans 
 raised by Mr. Pitt in the Low Rate Stocks, have not entailed upon 
 the country the heavy losses with which they have been so constantly 
 charged. 
 
 Ko small part of the misapprehension which prevails in the argu- 
 ments on these subjects is traceable to what appears to be a very 
 singular oversight, as regards the real nature of the Market, in which 
 the Public Funds are the principal commodity dealt in ; and as to the 
 real nature of the majority of the great operations which are carried 
 on in that Market. 
 
 We are frequently reminded, and no one disputes the fact, that 
 the National Debt consists not of Capital but of Perpetual Annuities. 
 The State has bound itself to pay certain half yearly annuities, and 
 has deprived the holders of these annuities of any right to call for 
 their redemption; hence, it is argued, and on abstract grounds very 
 justly, that the only point which the public and the stock jobbers 
 have to consider is the precise arithmetical relation between the value 
 of different amounts of annuity ; and it is said that any marked pre- 
 ference of relative price borne by an Annuity of 3 over one of 5 per cent, 
 is a departure from obvious rules, so gross as to be almost ridiculous. 
 From these premises follows, quite logically, the conclusion that the 
 State must of necessity be a large loser when it is so misguided as to 
 borrow in 3 per cent, instead of 5 per cent stock ; inasmuch as 
 while the 5 per cent do, the 3 per cent, do not, admit of future 
 reduction. And this liability to the reduction of the annuity is the 
 only qualifying circumstance which the doctrine admits. It is allowed 
 ' That all the funds are redeemable at par, and that if the 3 per 
 ' cents, rose to 75, the 4 per cents, should rise to 100, and the 
 ' 5 per cents, to 125 ; and, therefore, the actual price of the 4's or 
 ' 5's could never much exceed par. So soon as the 5 per cents, rise 
 ' above par, the financier will offer payment, and by doing so induce 
 
Question between Low and High Rate Stocks. 27 
 
 the creditors to submit to a reduction of interest. The holders of 
 a 3 ar 5 per cent, fund have thus a prospect of gain ~by the rise 
 of value, in which the 5 per cent, stockholders do not participate ; 
 and in like manner when the 3 per cents, rise above 75, the holders 
 of that stock have a further gain, in which the 4 per cent, stock- 
 holders do not participate. In consequence of these expectations, 
 the price of 4 per cents, is higher compared with that of the 5 per 
 cents.; and the price of the 3 per cents, higher than that of either 
 of the others ; than the proportion of the rates of interest ; and 
 " loans are transacted in 3 per cents, on easier terms. The lender 
 " expects to gain by the rise of the stock, and what he gains the 
 <f public loses at repayment or redemption."* 
 
 These are the clear words of Dr. Hamilton, and it is not a little 
 curious, that while his strong and lucid mind detected all the plausi- 
 ble fallacies of the Sinking Fund, it should have overlooked, not 
 merely the obvious, but the constantly practical operation of those 
 differences between Three and Five per cent, stock, and which he haa 
 so distinctly stated in the paragraph quoted. 
 
 XY. The Strong Practical Considerations in favour of preferring 
 Consols, or a Low Hate Fund. 
 
 In considering the abstract doctrine just described, we are met 
 at the outset with the fact that the great mass of the business on 
 the Stock Exchange consists, not of the purchases and sales of bond 
 fide investors, but of the continued operations of speculators in the 
 rise and fall of prices during what is called the ' Account.' 
 
 Whether for good or evil ends, but certainly on the whole for good 
 ends, the Stock Exchange is a vast market where men employ masses 
 of capital in dealing backwards and forwards in the different Stocks ; 
 and, like all other great markets, custom, convenience, and self- 
 interest have gradually set up certain conditions which govern in a 
 great measure the movements of the whole body of operators. One of 
 the best established of these conditions is, that any new kind of stock, 
 attempted to be introduced with success, must be marketable at all 
 times and to any extent. It must be of a nature which every body 
 understands it must be free from new conditions and it must be 
 also free from future contingencies in the estimation of which hardly 
 two persons will agree. Now, it is the fact, that for the last hundred 
 years the 3 per cent. Consols have been the kind of fund which, 
 beyond all others, has fulfilled these conditions of eligibility in the 
 most pre-eminent degree. From the circumstance of the amount of 
 the funded capital of this Stock, always greatly exceeding in mag- 
 nitude the funded capital of any other kind of stock, Consols have 
 admitted of speculative operations being carried on in them far 
 beyond anything that could be prudently undertaken in any other 
 Fund ; and hence it has followed, that from the nature, and habit, 
 and constitution of the Stock Market, 3 per cent. Consols have 
 relatively been worth more to the dealers in that market than any 
 other kind of stock ; and the higher relative price so existing, how- 
 ever ridiculous it may appear to abstract reasoners, is a price per- 
 fectly legitimate on all grounds of dealing. And one of the main 
 reasons of the preference for Consols, after allowing for the mag- 
 * " Hamilton's Inquiry," 3rd edition, 1818, p. 250. 
 
28 On the LOANS raised by MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 nitude of the fund, has always been their exemption from embarrassing 
 hazards of future redemption particularly as they have the great 
 safeguard of a year's notice being necessary before the holders can 
 be compelled to accept payment at par. 
 
 It has been alleged in the course of discussions which have taken 
 place on these subjects, that an obligation on the State to redeem, 
 only at Par has been too lightly conceded to the contractors of loans, 
 and that, by the exercise of a little more care and skill, terms of 
 redemption much more in favour of the public could have been secured. 
 
 As far as I am aware, however, these are allegations wholly of a 
 theoretical nature, and resting on no solid ground of experiment or 
 experience ; but, in point of fact, attempts have been made to raise 
 loans in Consols, and other kinds of stock, with an option to redeem 
 at some price under par ; and we have the distinct testimony of no 
 less a personage than Mr. Huskisson, that when an attempt of this 
 nature was made by himself, (while in office as Secretary of the 
 Treasury from 1806 to 1808, under the Duke of Portland's govern- 
 ment,) it was found to be totally impracticable. No responsible set 
 of persons would make any bid ivhatever under such conditions. 
 Mr. Huskisson stated the fact as follows, in his speech of the 
 3rd March, 1813, on the state of the Finances : " The price of the 
 " public stocks does not depend upon the value of the dry annuity. It 
 " is a joint consideration of this annuity and of the prospect of an 
 " increase in the value of the nominal capital, that operates upon the 
 " mind of the purchaser. I had a pretty strong proof of this when 
 " I myself was in office. From a wish to guard the public against 
 " the great loss of redeeming, perhaps at par, 3 per cents., which 
 " might have been borrowed at 60, I proposed to the bidders for the 
 " loan to make the 3 per cents, redeemable at 80, and they would 
 " not bid at all upon the proposal" At the time when Mr. Huskisson 
 offered this limit of 80, the 3 per cents, were under 60, and a margin 
 of 33 per cent, upon a price of 60 was no small allowance, and yet 
 the contractors would not listen to the suggestion ; and for reasons 
 perfectly sufficient, on grounds both of individual interest, on their 
 part, and of general advantage as regards the public; for it is certain 
 that the higher value borne by Consols, in consequence of the 
 absence of embarrasing conditions, has been a source of great con- 
 venience, and of no small profit, to the State in its operations of 
 finance. 
 
 The fact is, therefore, that from the operation of the two causes 
 which have been named, viz. (1.) of the pre-eminent eligibility of 
 Consols as a Stock Exchange commodity, and (2.) of the extreme 
 non-eligibility of High-Rate Funds as a Stock Exchange commodity, 
 the actual difference of price between Consols and Five per cents., as 
 the media of New Loans, has been generally so great as to make it 
 prudent and profitable to adopt the Low-Kate method. And speci- 
 fically this was the actual fact during the first French War. 
 
 XVI. Comparative Results of the Two Methods as applied to the 
 Ten Largest Loans, 1793-1801. 
 
 Nor is it true, as Dr. Hamilton implies, that what the holder of 
 3 per cent, stock gained by a rise in its price, the public wholly lost. 
 
 For there were the accumulations of the Difference of the Smaller 
 
Comparative Results of tlie Two Methods. 
 
 29 
 
 annual charge, arising out of the smaller interest paid on loans raised 
 in Consols, as compared with the Larger annual charge, which must have 
 been paid on the same loans if they had been raised in Five per cents. 
 
 And we shall find in the accumulations of this Difference of 
 Annual Charge almost a complete set-off against the excess of the 
 amount of capital in created Consols, beyond the amount of money 
 actually obtained. 
 
 In the following Table I have collected the Ten Largest Loans 
 raised between 1793 and 1807. In the second column is inserted 
 the rate of interest actually paid in low-rate stocks ; in the fourth 
 column, the rate at which, from a careful consideration of the cir- 
 cumstances of each case, I am led to believe must have been paid 
 if the money had been raised in Five per cents. : and then working 
 out, as shown in detail in Appendix N, the Difference of annual 
 charge thence arising, the result as For or Against the Five per cent, 
 method, as shown in the fifth and sixth columns. 
 
 LOANS, 1793-1801. Summary of COMPARATIVE RESULTS of the TEN LARGEST 
 LOANS as actually raised in Low RATE Stocks, and as they would have been 
 raised in FIVE per Cents.* 
 
 1. 
 
 Actual!; 
 
 2. 
 f Raised. 
 
 3. 
 LOANS AND DATES. 
 
 4. 
 
 Estimated 
 Average 
 Rate if 
 raised in 
 FIVE 
 PER CKNTS. 
 
 5. 
 Result T 
 Against 1 
 Cent, me 
 on 1st Jai 
 
 6. 
 
 or and 
 IVE per 
 thod as 
 i., 1826. 
 
 Money. 
 
 At Average 
 Rate. 
 
 Against. 
 
 For. 
 
 
 4,500* 
 
 S. d. 
 434 
 
 i. LOAN, 1793 (Mar. llth) 
 
 s. 
 5 2 
 
 Stock. 
 
 
 4,406 
 
 Stock. 
 
 
 11,000 
 
 4 11 5 
 
 n. 1794 (Feb. 5th) 
 
 5 5 
 
 2,560, 
 
 .... 
 
 18,000 
 
 4 16 2 
 
 iv. 1795 (Feb. 23rd) 
 
 5 10 
 
 6,962 
 
 
 18,000 
 
 4 13 6 
 
 vi. (Dec. 7th) 
 
 5 7 
 
 3,792 
 
 .... 
 
 7,500 
 
 4 12 6 
 
 vin. 1796 (May) 
 
 5 10 
 
 3,696 
 
 .... 
 
 13,029 
 
 5 7 11 
 
 x. NAVY BILLS, 1796 (Nov.) 
 
 6 5 
 
 4,900 
 
 
 14,500 
 
 6 7 
 
 xn. LOAN, 1797 (April 26th) 
 
 7 2 
 
 1,290 
 
 .... 
 
 17,000 
 
 6 4 11 
 
 xiv. 1798 (May 1st) 
 
 7 2 
 
 1,584 
 
 .... 
 
 15,500 
 
 5 5 
 
 xvi. 1799 (June 7th) 
 
 5 18 
 
 
 1,385 
 
 20,500 
 
 4 14 2 
 
 xvii. 1800 (Mar. 10th) 
 
 5 7 
 
 
 549 
 
 139,529 
 
 533 
 
 5 18 
 
 29,190 
 
 1,934 
 
 27,256 
 
 * The OOO's at the unit end of the larger amounts in Table are omitted. Thus 
 4,500 is 4,500,0000^. As stated in the next page, the calculations, of which this Table 
 is the summary, have the concurrence of Mr. Hendriks, who, as Actuary of the Globe 
 Insurance, is the colleague of myself in my capacity of Secretary to that Company. 
 
30 
 
 On tJie LOANS raised by MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 This Statement gives a result of 27,256,0007. in favour of the Low 
 Rate Method at the commuted date of 1 January, 1826, taking 6 per 
 cent, as the rate of assumed interest, and making due allowance for 
 the operation of the amount of Long Annuity, involved in the several 
 cases. The details in Appendix N will show fully the mode of 
 arriving at these results, and as they have the concurrence of Mr. 
 Hendriks, whose skill and soundness as an Actuary requires no 
 praise of mine, they may be accepted with confidence. Views may 
 differ as to some elements of the calculation, and for the reconcile- 
 ment of such differences no conclusive test can be laid down. For 
 myself, I have endeavoured to exhibit the case fairly, and I have a 
 confident persuasion that if the statement contains errors of exagge- 
 ration on one side, it contains errors of an opposite kind on the 
 other. 
 
 These explanations being given, we may now introduce the fol- 
 lowing Summary of the comparative results of the Low E-ate and 
 High Bate methods, as connected with the Ten Largest Loans raised 
 by Mr. Pitt : 
 
 Statement of the COMPARATIVE RESULTS of the TEN LARGEST LOANS, 1793- 
 1801, as actually raised in Low RATE Stocks, and as estimated in FIVE 
 per Cent. Stocks. 
 
 I. As AT DATES WHEN raised, 1793-1801. 
 
 Five per Cent. 
 
 Method 
 Estimated. 
 
 Elements of Comparison. 
 
 Low RATE, or 
 ACTUAL 
 METHOD. 
 
 
 139,529,000 
 
 164,496,000 
 118 
 
 5 18 
 8,222,000 
 
 Sum Actually raised in Money 
 
 Funded Capital (or Stock) created 
 
 Quantity of Stock given for each 100?. Money 
 
 ( Average rate of interest paid to lender, including, "j 
 
 as regards the Low Rate Stock, the Long An-> 
 
 { nuity granted J 
 
 Amount of Annual Interest on Stock Created 
 
 Long Annuity till 5th January, 1860 
 
 
 139,529,000 
 
 224,082,000 
 160 5 
 
 533 
 
 6,894,000 
 312,000 
 
 8,222,000 
 
 7,206,000 
 
Comparative Results of the Two Metlwds. 
 II. As ON IST JANUARY, 1826. 
 
 31 
 
 Five per Cent. 
 
 Method 
 Estimated. 
 
 Elements of Comparison. 
 
 Low RATE, oa 
 ACTUAL 
 METHOD. 
 
 
 
 164,496,000 
 
 94,293,000 
 
 Stock in FIVE per cents. 
 created. 
 
 assumed as Originally 
 
 258,789,000 
 
 [Add, for the accumulation of the Difference of 
 ) 1,016,OOOZ. per annum between the larger sum 
 ] of Annual Interest payable on FIVES, and the 
 I smaller sum payable on Low RATE Stocks. 
 
 j Total amount of Debt as on 1st January, 1826, on 
 I FIVE per cent, method. 
 
 Stock at Low Rates (actually), originally created .... 
 
 Add, for Funded Capital, equivalent to the charge of I 
 the Long Annuity of 312,000^. as on 1st January, / 
 1826 J 
 
 Surplus in Favour of the Low RATE method 
 
 224,082,000 
 7,446,000 
 
 231,528,000 
 27,261,000 
 
 258,789,000 
 
 258,789,000 
 
 I am quite aware that, in many quarters, a strong opinion is 
 entertained to the effect, that even from the commencement of the 
 War in 1793, a very considerable portion of the Loans could have 
 been raised, not only in Pive per cents., but if it had been so desired 
 even in Terminable Annuities ; and that funding operations conducted 
 in Terminable Annuities, would have involved only a slight addition 
 to the terms actually paid in 3 per cents. 
 
 Upon mere financial grounds a public loan contracted in Termi- 
 nable Annuities is, perhaps for the State, the form of borrowing the 
 most desirable, for at the lapse of the term the annual burden of the 
 debt ceases. But connected with the plan of Terminable Annuities, 
 there are other considerations of a higher and more general nature 
 than those of mere finance ; and when the whole question has to be 
 discussed, it will appear, I think, that while Terminable Annuities 
 may be employed with advantage as one of several forms of funding, 
 it would be exceedingly unwise to resort to them as the sole, or even 
 as the principal method. 
 
 As concerns the Loans of 1793-1801, it will be evident from the 
 facts contained in different parts of the Appendix, that the depreci- 
 ation of Long Annuities, as compared with Consols, was always so 
 great as to render it practically impossible to have selected Long 
 Annuities as the predominant stock in which to seek for eligible 
 tenders. In May, 1798, for example, Long Annuities fell to a price 
 of 13 years purchase, yielding a rate of 11. 12s. per cent., while 
 Consols were yielding only 61. 5s. ; and while, further, Long Annuities 
 themselves had been quoted at 21^, in March, 1793, yielding 4Z. 10*. 
 
32 On the LOANS raised by MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 against a then contemporary price of Consols which yielded 3Z. 18s. 
 And generally we are fully justified by the evidence, in concluding 
 that if it was not only unprofitable, but on many occasions absolutely 
 impossible for Mr. Pitt to raise the loan in Five per cents. ; it would 
 have been still more unprofitable, and still further removed from possi- 
 bility, to have attempted to raise the same sums exclusively or mainly 
 in Long Annuities. I am quite aware that as a matter of mere calcu- 
 lation, nothing is more easy than to show that a Long Annuity is a 
 species of investment as eligible as Consols. Still the practical answer 
 must be that they are commodities not suited to the market, and 
 only to be sold there at a depreciated price. 
 
 XVII. The same Comparative Results as regards the Loan of 
 8,000,OOOZ. of March, 1847. 
 
 Nor is at all true that the great practical depreciation of High 
 Bate, as compared with Low Rate Stocks was confined to the period 
 of the last War. The causes which led to that depreciation are even 
 in more active existence now than they were then; and I cannot 
 better illustrate this statement than by referrring to the terms of 
 the very last Loan raised in this country the Loan, namely, of 
 8,000,OOOZ., raised in Consols by Sir Charles Wood, in March, 1847, 
 for the purpose of meeting the extraordinary expenses of the Irish 
 Famine. And we shall find, on examining the terms of that trans- 
 action, that notwithstanding the very severe criticisms which were 
 directed at the time against the method actually pursued of borrow- 
 ing in Consols, the adoption of that course admitted of very ample 
 justification. 
 
 The Loan was concluded with Messrs. Barings, and Messrs. 
 Rothschilds on Monday, the 1st March, 1847. On Saturday, the 
 27th of February, the price of Consols was 90 ; and of 3 per cents. 
 92^ ; and as will be remembered these 3j's were the intermediate 
 stage between the 3^'s reduced in 1844, and the ultimate reduction 
 to 3 per cent, in 1854. The 3J's, therefore, were the Stock of 
 highest denomination then in the market. The terms of the Loan 
 were 89 money for 1001. Consols Stock ; or what is the same thing 
 lllf Consols Stock for 100Z. Money ; and the rate of interest was 3Z. 7s. 
 Now saying nothing of 5 per cents, as being a stock almost obsolete, 
 let us suppose that Government had been desirous of raising the 
 Eight Millions in a 3 J per cent, stock, so as to have the advantage of 
 reducing the interest at some future time then we cannot suppose 
 that in a 3^ per cent, fund the biddings would have been higher than 
 93 ; or 107*. 10s. stock for every 100Z. money or 3/. 15s. 3d, per 
 cent, per annum. 
 
 Opinions will differ as to the period within which a 3| per cent, 
 stock could have been reduced to 3 per cent. Assume, however, that 
 that period would have been fifteen years. Then as shewn in detail in 
 Appendix O, the accumulation during fifteen years of the annual saving 
 (of 32,9162. per annum) of interest in favour of the Consols-Method, 
 would have amounted to 434,OOOZ., and that large accumulation must 
 be taken into account as a set off" against any contingent advantages 
 of borrowing in a Higher rated fund. In adopting the hypothesis of 
 a 3 Per Cent. Fund instead of Consols, the question is placed in the 
 
liaising the Supplies within the Year. 33 
 
 most favourable form as regards the High Kate Theory. A 3J per 
 cent. Stock would be far less exposed to early reduction, than either a 
 4 or 5 Per Cent. Fund and hence the Stock Exchange value of the 
 3 j per cent. Scrip, would be relatively higher than for Scrip of 4 or 5 
 per cent. It will hardly be contended, however, that a small 3^ per 
 cent. Fund of about Eight Millions, would have been a very eligible 
 description of security, after the conclusive reasons assigned by 
 Mr. Gladstone, in 1853, for redeeming the small South Sea Funds,-^ 
 reasons resting, in no small measure, on the precise ground of the 
 ineligibility of Funds of small extent as objects of investment or 
 fields of operation, 
 
 XVIII. Mr. Pitt's doctrines relative to raising War Supplies within 
 
 the Year. 
 
 It was in introducing (on the 24th November, 1797) the 
 Budget for 1798, that Mr. Pitt prominently adverted to the 
 necessity which had arisen for raising a large part of the Supplies 
 within the Year; and he proposed in that Budget New Taxes 
 to the extent of Seven Millions, as a supply in part for a defi- 
 ciency of Nineteen Millions raising the remaining twelve millions 
 by loan. 
 
 The whole of Mr. Pitt's argument on that occasion is adjusted and 
 balanced with extreme care ; and, while he pleaded with irresistible 
 earnestness for the necessity of a large addition to the taxes of the 
 year, he carefully guarded himself against any maintenance of the 
 doctrine that it was politic or just not to obtain part of those supplies 
 by additions to the Debt. "We ought," he said, " to consider how 
 " far the efforts we shall exert to preserve the blessings we enjoy will 
 " enable us to transmit the inheritance to posterity unencumbered 
 " with those burdens which would cripple their vigour which would 
 " prevent them from asserting that rank in the scale of nations which 
 " their ancestors so long and so gloriously maintained. It is in this 
 " point of view that the subject ought to be considered. Whatever 
 " objections might have been fairly urged against the Funding System 
 " in its origin, no man can suppose that after the form and shape 
 " which it has given to our financial affairs ; after the heavy burdens 
 " which it has left behind it; tve can now recur to the notion of raising 
 " in one year the whole of the supplies which a scale of expense so 
 " extensive as ours must require. If such a plan be evidently im- 
 " practicable, some medium, however, may be found to draw as much 
 " advantage from the funding system as it is fit, consistently with a 
 " due regard for posterity, to employ ; and, at the same time, to 
 " obviate the evils with which its excess would be attended. To 
 " guard against the accumulation of the funded debt, and to con- 
 " tribute that share to the support of the struggle in which we are 
 " engaged, which our ability will permit, without inconvenience to 
 " those who are called upon to contribute, appear to me essentially 
 " necessary ; and the great object of such a practical scheme must be 
 " to allot fairly and equally to every class that portion which each 
 " ought to bear." 
 
 The principles laid down in this passage admit of but little exten- 
 
 o 
 
34 On the LOANS raised ly MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 sian or modification. At the present time, as in 1797 and more 
 emphatically perhaps than in 1797 the real difficulty in all discus- 
 sions relating to the manner of raising the Yearly Expenses of the 
 War is found in these preliminary and delicate problems, which are 
 to define in practical language the " safe medium" between Taxing 
 and Funding, described by Mr. Pitt. We have to find as had Mr. 
 Pitt some working scheme which shall raise immediately, by new 
 burdens, as large a sum as the national industry can bear, without 
 injuring or dislocating that niceely-balanced system upon the unin- 
 terrupted vigour of which the collection of any Taxes at all, present 
 or future, depends. And we also as had Mr. Pitt have to find 
 some practical means of so disposing those New Burdens that they 
 shall raise within the year, " fairly and equally from every class," 
 whatever contributions it may be considered necessary to obtain, not 
 by borrowing on the faith of the future, but by an assessment levied 
 on tho present generation. 
 
 Ifc is urged upon us by high authorities, and in language embracing 
 ever\ tone of earnestness, that, whether on grounds of duty or of 
 interest, it will be our wisest course to adopt measures the opposite 
 of th >se which were adopted by Mr. Pitt from 1793 to 1798; and 
 deteriiiine therefore that by Taxes, and not by Loans, we will meet 
 near;y all the increased expenditure arising out of the Present 
 War.' 
 
 So far as Self- Interest is concerned we are told, (1.) That a War 
 expenditure supplied by Loans is an expenditure drawn not from the 
 income, but from the capital of the country ; (2.) That imposing 
 therefore no immediate pressure by the imposition of new and 
 heavier taxes, it renders the country indifferent as to the prolonga- 
 tion of War, and careless as to the most economical methods of 
 carrying it on ; (3.) That drawn from accumulations of Capital em- 
 ployed productively, instead of being obtained by retrenchments of 
 the current expenditure of individuals, Public Loans raised to supply 
 an exhausted Exchequer are the most direct means of laying the 
 heaviest pressure of the War on the Labouring Classes, and for the 
 obvious reason that the amounts of Capital which are absorbed as 
 Loans would, if not so absorbed, have been employed in extending 
 and improving the field of productive industry ; (1.) and lastly, That 
 striking in this manner at the root of all progress in material pros- 
 perity, Loans so obtained, and so applied, are impoverishments and 
 anticipations of the future exceedingly full of peril. 
 
 On the ground of Duty and Moral Obligation it is said, (1.) That 
 a principle of equity forbids one generation to contract, for purposes 
 of War, obligations which will descend as heavy burdens to the 
 generations yet to come ; and (2.) That for the perils of the Present, 
 nothing beyond the property and persons of the Present can, on 
 grounds of right, be laid under contribution. 
 
 To these allegations answers full and sufficient do not appear to 
 be wanting ; assuming always that the discussion is to be conducted, 
 not as an abstract problem, the conditions of which may be true 
 perhaps, amidst a more perfect species or in a happier planet, but with 
 distinct and constant reference to the actual condition of this coun- 
 try at the present time. 
 
Raising Supplies within the Year. 35 
 
 Adverting to the arguments, as far as possible, in their order, it 
 may be said : 
 
 That, in the first place, it is by no means generally true, that, in 
 this country, a public income considerably exceeding in amount the 
 income of recent years, could be raised by any appliance of taxes, the 
 effect of which would be simply to diminish individual expenditure, 
 leaving former and current accumulations of capital unimpaired. Any 
 large additions to the present taxes particularly to the present 
 Income Tax of six per cent. would in a multitude of quarters, and a 
 variety of forms, be paid by encroachments on capital. Those upon 
 whom the tax fell would make a compromise between immediate self- 
 denial and inroads on their accumulated funds. Nor, (2) in the pre- 
 sent state of the political institutions, of the education and public 
 opinion of this country, can it be argued, except as a pure suggestion, 
 that the mere circumstance of raising part of the supplies by Loans 
 would in any sensible degree diminish the desire even of any class 
 for an early and solid peace 
 
 Still less (3) is it true, in a general or unqualified sense, that 
 in this country, any such sum as is likely to be required as Loans 
 would sensibly diminish the amount of Capital which can be fully 
 and profitably employed in productive industry, and therefore 
 mainly in the disbursement of wages. So far as actual researches 
 have 'been carried, by the most competent enquirers, there is 
 is good reason to believe that the accumulation of capital in this 
 country is so vast and so rapid as to lead to an annual waste and 
 destruction of capital, the amount of which when expressed in figures 
 sounds almost fabulous; and it is from these overflowings from this 
 constant current of leakage that the Loans would be obtained. 
 In what manner a Government Expenditure so supplied would affect 
 the Labouring Classes no writer is more entitled, both by his ability 
 and his independence of judgment, to say, than Mr. Mill ; and his 
 words are as follows : " When Government Loans are limited to the 
 " overflowings of the National Capital, or to those accumulations 
 ' which would not take place at all unless suffered to overflow ; they 
 ' occasion no privation to any one at the time, except by the payment 
 ' of the interest, and may even be beneficial to the Labouring Class, 
 1 during the time of their expenditure, by employing in the direct 
 ' purchase of labour, as of soldiers, sailors, &c., funds which might 
 ' otherwise have quitted the country altogether." (Principles, 
 B. v. C. 7.) 
 
 It may be urged, in addition to this statement of Mr. Mill's, that 
 not only would the Labouring Class receive indirect benefit from the 
 expenditure of Loans raised in the manner described, but that they 
 would be exposed to an inordinate degree of suffering and pressure if 
 the extra supplies were raised by additional Taxes. If these addi- 
 tional Taxes were in the form of new imposts of Customs and Excise, 
 and additions therefore to the existing Indirect sources of Revenue, 
 the Labouring Class would feel the pressure of the War, not merely 
 to the full extent of the Tax, but to the much larger extent to which 
 it is quite well known that heavy Indirect Taxes operate in raising 
 prices to the retail consumer. If they were in the form of new 
 Imposts of a Direct nature, heavy additions, for example, to the 
 
 c 2 
 
36 On the LOANS raised by MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 Assessed Taxes, or to the House or Income Tax, the effect (saying 
 nothing of the gross and inherent injustice of the apportionment oi 
 the Income Tax upon the classes who actually pay it) would still fall 
 in a great measure upon that part of the population which depends 
 on wages and the smaller retail trades ; and, in point of fact, one of 
 the most cogent objections to any large increase of immediate bur- 
 dens consists in the extreme difficulty of so adjusting them that, 
 again to use the words of Mr. Pitt, " the scheme shall allot fairly 
 " and equally to every class that portion which each ought to bear." 
 In a poor country it might be true that money taken by the State 
 as Loans would be Capital drawn, in the most literal sense, from the 
 exchange and the workshop. With us the time is yet distant when 
 supplies so raised, will do more than reduce the magnitude of the 
 annual investments in foreign mines, and of the annual adventures in 
 speculative foreign funds. 
 
 And as regards the last of the (4) allegations the answer seems 
 to be equally clear, and to be little more than a logical consequence of 
 the reply just given to the allegation which precedes it. For if we 
 absorb as public loans only that capital which fails to find profitable 
 employment at home, we do nothing to impoverish or emperil the 
 future by inroads on those accumulated funds which are essential to 
 the progress of the community. On the contrary, our apparent extra- 
 vagance is the real economy, "for we leave untrammelled to the fullest 
 extent the springs and impulses of that vast and intricate organi- 
 sation, by the strength and compactness of which, much more than 
 by a few millions of debt, the character of the future will be really 
 determined. Our trade, industry, and invention kept free from the 
 friction of taxes, especially at this period of transition, will be a legacy 
 to our successors far more valuable than a public debt diminished by 
 a tew millions ; and here again we have the benefit of the testimony of 
 Mr. Mill. "It may reasonably," he says, "be taken into consideration, 
 "that in an improving country the necessary expenses of Government 
 " do not increase in the same ratio as capital or population ; any bur- 
 ' then, therefore, is always less and less felt ; and since those extra- 
 ' ordinary expenses of Government which are fit to be incurred at all 
 ' are mostly beneficial beyond the existing generation, there is no 
 ' injustice in making posterity pay a part of the price if the incon- 
 'venience would be extreme of 'defray ing the whole of it by the 
 " exertions and sacrifices of the generation which first incurred it."- 
 (Principles, B. v., C. 7.) 
 
 The objection to Loans, on grounds of Moral Obligation, are not 
 more formidable than those which involve merely economical consi- 
 derations. 
 
 Assuming a War to be necessary and just, (and of that question 
 the recognised and established Government of a country existing at 
 any particular time must be regarded for our present purpose as the 
 legitimate and final judge,) it is hard to see on what solid foundation 
 a difference can be set up between expenditure incurred for improve- 
 ments and expenditure incurred for defence. For capital invested in 
 the prosecution of public works, for harbours, drainage, or lines of 
 transit, by the common voice, the future inhabitants of a country 
 may be fairly charged by the generation which settles the scheme and 
 
Raising Supplies within the Year. 37 
 
 carries through the work. But is it not plain that the simplest idea 
 of possession involves the idea of defence ? Where is the wisdom of 
 improvement if no means are to be taken to preserve the improve- 
 ments from outward assault ? The more closely the plea of exempting 
 posterity, on grounds of right, from charges bequeathed to them by 
 former generations is examined, the more untenable and deceptive most 
 of its positions will be found. What sufficient answer for example 
 can be given to the fundamental objection that there is nothing in 
 the constitution of the world or in human nature which entitles 
 posterity to claim an inheritance, enriched only by the fruits of wis- 
 dom and self-denial, and altogether free from incumbrances heaped 
 up by error and misfortune. The present generation are in no sense 
 mere life-tenants of the inheritance so far as the analogy of a 
 life-tenancy can be made to apply. We are heirs in full and indefea- 
 sible enjoyment of the fee of the estate. Doubtless it is incumbent 
 upon us, not less by considerations of morality than upon grounds 
 of enlightened self-interest, to strive conscientiously and patiently to 
 bequeath to our children, freed from as many blemishes as possible, 
 and strengthened, beautified, and expanded, the inheritance we 
 received from our fathers. But in directing our best efforts to the 
 performance of this task, we shall err greatly if we take too confined 
 a view of the full liberty of action and of choice which resides in 
 ourselves; and of the full share of responsibility which on all grounds 
 of right attaches to every future occupant of a country found by 
 him in the possession of a fame, a polity, and an industrial order, 
 the reward of long ages of sacrifice and labour, to which he has con- 
 tributed nothing. 
 
 This is a train of reasoning and reflexion growing naturally and 
 almost inevitably out of a detailed examination of the financial 
 policy of Mr. Pitt during the early years of the last long conflict 
 with France. In a more eminent degree, perhaps, than in any Minis- 
 ter of Finance of the last hundred years, there was combined in Mr. 
 Pitt a clear appreciation of general principles, tempered by a still 
 clearer appreciation of the modifications and corrections of which 
 they stand in need when converted into rules of practice. The expe- 
 rience he had to guide him was far less applicable and extensive than 
 that which is available to ourselves ; and in his time we had barely 
 done more than raise the framework of that branch of science which 
 has since accomplished so much in smoothing the task of men en- 
 trusted with Government. He had to contend with new and bewil- 
 dering theories, with sources of danger and failure, happily known 
 to us only by report; and certainly it will not be questioned 
 that the period of his financial administration was beset by internal 
 and external difficulties more numerous and perplexing than have 
 been encountered by any other minister of this country since the 
 settlement of our constitution in its present form. After the lapse 
 of sixty years, we find ourselves, in no insignificant degree, in cir- 
 cumstances similar to those of Mr. Pitt in 1793 ; and we shall hardly 
 maintain the reputation of our country for practical views if, in 
 dealing with the immediate exigencies of the one period, we fail to 
 give full weight to the lessons which may be drawn for the experience 
 of the other. 
 
On the LOANS raised by MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 A. .LOANS raised by Mr. Pitt, 1793-1801. CAPITALS FUNDED in the 
 
 several kinds of Stock 39 
 
 B. LOANS raised by Mr. Pitt, 1793-1801. QUANTITY OF STOCK given 
 for every 100/. Money. Market Prices of Stock at the time of the 
 Loan 40 
 
 C. LOANS raised by Mr. Pitt, 1793-1801. Amount of the ANNUAL 
 
 INTEREST on each Loan 42 
 
 D.- INCOME of the United Kingdom 1792-1802; and also for 1815, 1825, 
 
 and 1852 44 
 
 E. EXPENDITURE of the United Kingdom same years 45 
 
 F. Net Revenue of Great Britain at seven dates, between 1712 and 1789 46 
 
 Q < IMPORTS and EXPORTS. Great Britain. Official Values. Period 
 of American War 1777-83. Peace 1784-92. First French War 
 1793-1802 47 
 
 H. CORN. Prices and IMPORTATIONS during the three Decennial 
 Periods 1761-70, 1771-80, and 1781-90; and for each year 1791- 
 1802 49 
 
 I. SUBSIDIES to Foreign States 1793-1801 51 
 
 J. TERMS of the LOANS raised by FRANCE 1815-1848 52 
 
 K. MR. PITT'S BUDGETS 1793-1801. Abstract of New Taxes imposed, 
 
 with the estimated produce when proposed to Parliament 53 
 
 L. MOTIONS made in Parliament for PEACE, December 1792 to May 1797 56 
 
 M, MARKET PRICES of Stocks, Long Annuities, and of Scrip, and 
 Omnium, in each month, from January 1791 to December 1800, 
 with columns of the Equated Prices 58 
 
 N. DETAILED COMPUTATIONS of the effect produced in a period of 
 years by the Difference of terms between Loans contracted in Low 
 Rate and High Rate Stocks 64 
 
 0. Similar Computations as regards the Loan of 8,000,000/., of March 
 
 1847 66 
 
 P. STATEMENT IN DETAIL of the TERMS of the several Loans 1793-1801, 
 as given by Mr. Grellier in the Third Edition (1812) of his work 
 on the subject 67 
 
 Q. GENERAL View of ALL the LOANS raised during the entire Period of 
 the War, or from 1793 to 1806; and computations as to the 
 General Comparative effect of raising the Extra Expenditure by 74 
 
 Loans, or by Supplies within the Year. 
 
 R. General Observations on the Contents of some of the Appendices .... 79 
 
Appendix A- Capitals Raised" 
 
 39 
 
 
 TOTAL. 
 Per Cent. 
 Per Annum. 
 
 -53 Tj< . OJ . CO . CO l^ - to .CO -HO . <M 
 
 > < r t 
 
 OS 
 
 o 
 
 by Lenders. 
 
 4 
 
 l^j lO CO CO . CO . r-l 
 
 ^ : :"::: : : : 
 
 
 Brest obtained 
 
 In 
 
 5 per Cents. 
 
 ^ . t>. . o 
 
 
 'o 
 
 1 
 
 ^ . 00 . 
 
 
 1 
 
 Pi 
 
 S : . :co : : . : : :o : o : : : : : 
 
 ^-1 P 4 
 
 
 
 In 
 
 3 per Cents. 
 
 GO O ^^ O t^-% t iO I 4O iO C^ iO TH iO 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 1 II illl S2sS S 1 i i S 1 
 
 IO 
 
 
 1 
 
 CO CO ^t ^ r~* ^D CO O "^ i"^ O CD CO ^* O t^^ C^l O* 
 
 i-H 
 CO 
 
 a 
 
 aj 
 
 : il :| : : : 3 I S Tl Tl : 7l Ti 7l 
 
 CO 
 
 en 
 
 i 
 
 10 
 
 ^ ^ ^H" rjToTo" 
 (M 
 
 CO 
 
 a 
 
 B 
 
 . . . - .g - - 
 
 Q(^ : t^ : o : : : : : oo ' co co " : : : : : : : : : 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 M | 
 
 (M CO of 
 
 
 
 g 
 
 irt o O OS CO OS CO O OJ CO O O O4 *> iO "^ "^ '"' OS 
 Oj Ol O O -OOO !>. * t>. CO O OOCO OOOJ O^H OOCO 
 
 C35 
 10 
 
 
 PI 
 
 CO 
 
 ^ cT i-T : OtT : co"co' O* -00 O) oTco" o"^O i-4 ifT Oreo" Vrf" 
 J ^, ,-HOl rHr-< CM COO! OJ TC 
 
 1 1 
 
 CS1 
 
 
 
 A <^ ^ ^~^ ^G ^."i ^ ^ ^ ^ 
 
 i flt|| ^77 4 1 * |7 1 s 3 
 
 _ fe OH M &M QOg^jg^ COOS Q ^ ^ 
 
 
 : 
 r 
 
 c 
 
 < 
 
 ! 
 
 h 
 
 wben Contracted for. 
 
 ^ iS ^ f?tS*3 S ^ ^ S S S 
 
 C/5 -^ if3 ^O t> CO OS O ^H 
 
 
 
 
 t>, t^ l> 4> 4> 4"^ t>* OO OO 
 
 
 | 
 
 jfs 
 
 or^. oooo o<ooo ooo ooo oo oo oo 
 O O- OO>OO O(N<MO OOOQ OOO OO OO OO 
 (X) *ft O O^ O^O'-O *O<NOO OiTSO OOO iOO OO OiO 
 
 CSJ 
 CO 
 
 1 
 
 s 
 
 ill 
 
 * S- 2-2- --22 2-- 2-" 2" 2- S- 
 
 CQ 
 
 
 
40 On the LOANS raised by MB. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 B. LOANS raised by MR. PITT, 1793-1801. QUANTITY OF STOCK given for 
 
 Sum 
 Actually 
 Raised 
 in 
 Money. 
 
 Loans. 
 
 For every 100 Money advanced, the Contract 
 gave Stock and Long Annuity as lollows 
 
 3 
 
 per Cts. 
 
 4 
 
 per Cts. 
 
 5 
 
 per Cts. 
 
 Long 
 Annuity. 
 
 Total 
 Rate Paid. 
 
 
 4.500 
 
 11,000 
 1,907 
 
 18,000 
 1,490 
 
 1793. Loan (11 Mch.) 
 
 Stock. 
 138-8 
 
 100- 
 100- 
 
 Stock. 
 25- 
 33-3 
 
 Stock. 
 
 101 
 108 
 
 s. d. 
 
 N 
 
 . 11 5 
 
 for 66-25 yrs. 
 
 . 9 6 
 for 65'25 yrs. 
 
 s. d. 
 434 
 
 4 11 5 
 5 1 . 
 
 4 16 2 
 5 8 . 
 
 1794. Loan ... (5 Feb.) 
 
 Navy Bills (April) 
 1795. Loan (23 Feb.) 
 
 Navy&Victe (Ap.l) 
 
 18,000 
 4,600 
 
 Loan (7 Dec.) 
 ,, Imperial Loan (28 May) 
 
 145- 
 83'3 
 
 
 .... 
 
 6 6 
 for 64-25 yrs. 
 5 . . 
 for 25 yrs. 
 
 4 13 6 
 7 10 . 
 
 7,500 
 4,226 
 
 1796. Loan (May) 
 Navy & Viet* (May) 
 
 145- 
 
 
 104 
 
 5 6 
 for 63-75 yrs. 
 
 4 12 6 
 
 5 4 7 
 
 13029 
 
 Navy & Exch (Nov.) 
 
 176- 
 
 138- 
 
 118 
 
 
 5 7 11 
 
 18,000 
 
 ,, Loyalty Loan ....(1 Dec.) 
 
 .... 
 
 
 112-5 
 
 
 5 12 6 
 
 13,000 
 1,500 
 
 [1707. Engl. & Irish Loan (2 Apl.) 
 
 175- 
 
 20- 
 
 
 . 6 . 
 for 62-75 yrs. 
 
 6 7 . 
 
 1,620 
 
 Imperial Loan.... (29 Apl.) 
 
 226-5 
 
 
 .... 
 
 
 6 15 6 
 
 15,000 
 2,000 
 3,000 
 12,500 
 3,000 
 
 /1798. Engl. & Irish Loan (1 May) 
 ,, Loan (Dec.) 
 
 200- 
 187-5 
 175- 
 
 .... 
 
 .... 
 
 . 4 11 
 for 61 '75 yrs. 
 
 6 4 11 
 5 12 5 
 5 5 . 
 
 il799. Engl. & Irish Loan (7 June) 
 
 18,500 
 2,000 
 
 Il800. Engl. & Irish Loan (1 Mch.) 
 
 157' 
 
 
 
 .... 
 
 4 14 2 
 
 25,500 
 2,500 
 
 V1801. Engl.&IrishLoan(17Feb.) 
 
 175-75 
 
 
 .... 
 
 .... 
 
 555 
 
 202,372 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 559 
 
Appendix B. Stock given per 100/. Money, 
 every 100 Money. Market Prices of STOCK at the time of the Loan. 
 
 41 
 
 Actual MAEKKT PRICES at time of Contract. 
 
 Bales Yielded by Actual Market Prices. 
 
 3 
 
 per Cents. 
 
 per Cents. 
 
 5 
 
 per Cents. 
 
 Long 
 Annuity. 
 
 3 
 
 per Cents. 
 
 4 
 
 per Cents. 
 
 per Cents. 
 
 Long 
 Annuity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Years 
 Purchase. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 77 
 
 89 
 
 104 
 
 2U 
 
 3 18 2 
 
 493 
 
 4 16 2 
 
 4 10 
 
 67 
 
 84 
 
 101 
 
 20 
 
 496 
 
 4 15 3 
 
 4 19 
 
 4 15 
 
 68 
 
 85 
 
 106 
 
 20^ 
 
 482 
 
 4 14 1 
 
 4 14 4 
 
 4 13 
 
 62 
 
 79 
 
 95 
 
 184 
 
 4 16 9 
 
 5 1 3 
 
 553 
 
 5 4 
 
 62 
 
 78 
 
 95 
 
 18* 
 
 4 16 9 
 
 527 
 
 553 
 
 5 4 
 
 65 
 
 83 
 
 102 
 
 19i 
 
 4 12 3 
 
 4 16 5 
 
 4 18 
 
 4 15 
 
 65 
 
 79 
 
 97 
 
 18* 
 
 4 12 3 
 
 5 1 3 
 
 531 
 
 5 4 
 
 65 
 
 81 
 
 97 
 
 18 
 
 4 12 3 
 
 4 18 9 
 
 5 3 1 
 
 5 8 
 
 65 
 
 81 
 
 97 
 
 18 
 
 4 12 3 
 
 4 18 9 
 
 5 3 1 
 
 5 8 
 
 56 
 
 72 
 
 86 
 
 16* 
 
 5 7 
 
 5 11 1 
 
 5 16 3 
 
 6 2 
 
 57 
 
 73 
 
 86 
 
 16 
 
 553 
 
 597 
 
 5 16 3 
 
 6 2 
 
 48 
 
 60 
 
 74 
 
 14 
 
 6 5 
 
 6 13 4 
 
 6 15 1 
 
 7 
 
 48 
 
 60 
 
 74 
 
 14 
 
 6 5 
 
 6 13 4 
 
 6 15 1 
 
 7 
 
 48 
 
 58 
 
 71 
 
 13 
 
 6 5 
 
 6 17 11 
 
 7 10 
 
 7 12 
 
 54 
 
 66 
 
 80 
 
 15 
 
 5 11 1 
 
 6 1 3 
 
 6 5 
 
 6 10 
 
 60 
 
 74 
 
 88 
 
 17 
 
 5 
 
 5 8 1 
 
 5 13 7 
 
 5 14 
 
 62 
 
 81 
 
 94 
 
 18* 
 
 4 16 9 
 
 4 18 9 
 
 565 
 
 5 3 
 
 57 
 
 77 
 
 91 
 
 17* 
 
 553 
 
 5 3 11 
 
 5 9 11 
 
 5 10 
 
On the LOANS raited ly MB. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 
 Equal, exclu- 
 sive ofManage- 
 nient to an In- 
 terest of per 
 Cent, per Ann. 
 
 "^ ^< O . CM CO CO >. I-H CO .CO I-H o CM iC 
 
 o 
 
 
 iil 
 
 I-H OOCTi CO I-H O I-H OOOO OO OO O 
 CO^CO^i-HCMC^OCOOOOO ^ OO O O O 
 
 -HiO 00 CO CO CO iM *> O OJi-H Oi-l OO O T* 
 
 
 
 o^ 
 
 r-T 
 
 oq^ 
 cT 
 
 1 I 
 
 1 
 
 isip 
 
 CM T* !>. CM * - <M OOOO OO OO O CO -* 
 f-H Ol CO CO CM O I-H OOOO OO OCO O CO -^ 
 CO COCO t-^ l>. Tt< CO i-HOOO <C OO CM -^ f-i 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 l^i 
 
 i-Hf-H ,_ rH r-t _ ,_( <M 
 
 3 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 
 CM O O O O O 
 OOOOO O 
 
 :t>.: 0:00 : : o : o 
 
 (N 
 O) 
 
 "c 
 
 ft 
 
 I; * CM o ' oo o o" " co" * CM 
 
 CO CO O CO CM Tf Tl< 
 
 r- " 
 CO 
 
 f Annual 
 
 <i 
 
 eis : co: 10:^*0 co::: CM : i : 
 
 $ : co : co : co CM co : : : co : o : : 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 J 
 
 ' O CO ' CM i i O ' : ; 
 
 <N t O 
 
 CTJ 
 
 co" 
 
 
 .2 
 1 
 
 O O O 
 00 
 
 ^ : o :" o" : - : ? : ^o : o" ": : I '- '- : - 
 
 ^H CM ^H 
 
 
 
 o 
 
 l-H 
 
 O 
 
 
 CO 
 
 col 
 
 Pi 
 
 o ooooo ooooo o o 
 o ooooo ooooo o o 
 o o o o o o o o o o o o o 
 ^J tC cT | o" : co o" ^ PO" I-H o" o co* co" ccT co" 
 
 rH CO O 4r** FHI CO O t^ r~4 O *"H OO Cft ^ 
 
 r-^ r-T 
 
 8,146,000 
 
 
 
 1 If !p! in? !| I? I 1 ! 
 
 
 
 
 ['! i I I ! ! 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 ? \-''A 1 1 1 1 i i 
 
 
 
 
 CO ^* if$ ^O 1^* CO Oi O r*4 
 
 IN* i> "* i*> ** i> t>* t>, IN^ oo co 
 
 
 
 si's 
 
 Ot>* OOOO OOOO OOO OOO OO OO OO 
 OO OOOO O<NC4O OOG^ OOO OO OO OO 
 -, . ^O O O^ O Tt^ O O iO C4 O O O O O O O O iO O *O O if3 tO 
 
 CO 
 
 
 5f| 
 
 "* r-HrH CO'-iOD^ ** ^ CO 00 COpHrH OCMCO CMCO QOCM O<N 
 
 CXI 
 
 o 
 
 CNJ 
 
Appendix A, B, C. Remarks thereon. 43 
 
 These Three Tables, A, B, and C will, it is believed, give a clear 
 insight into the nature and terms of the funding operations of 1793 
 to 1801. 
 
 The materials of the Tables have been chiefly obtained from 
 Dr. Hamilton, but the precise dates, quotations of prices, rates of 
 interest, &c., have been obtained from original sources. 
 
 It will be seen that, throughout these Tables, except in Table C, 
 I have not pretended to give precise figures below the thousandth or 
 third digit from the unit end : in other words, I have considered 
 myself at full liberty to dispense generally with the first three unit 
 figures, in order to secure more space and greater lucidity in the 
 arrangement of the numerous columns. 
 
 For the purposes of a general scientific inquiry like the present, 
 it seems to me that an approach to accuracy of the nature now 
 described is every way adequate. The case would be different if 
 the object in view was not to reason on general results, but to balance 
 a statement of account for the purposes of audit. 
 
 I also avail myself of this opportunity of saying that the same 
 principle of discarding the three, and sometimes the four unit figures, 
 has been followed throughout all the Tables of this Appendix. 
 
 As already mentioned at page 7 ante, all the Long Annuities 
 quoted in these Three tables, A, B, and C, expire on 5th January, 
 1860. The annuity of 51. granted in connexion with the Imperial 
 Loan of 1795 was for 25 years only. The amount, therefore, of 
 Long Annuity, granted from 1793 to 1801, was only 311,792Z. per 
 annum, equal, at say, an average price of 18 years' purchase, to a 
 capital of 5,612,0002. 
 
 In the statements generally given of the Loans raised during the 
 whole of the First French War, 1st February, 1793, to the Peace of 
 Amiens, 17th March, 1802, it is usual to include the 8,910,450?. of 
 Exchequer Bills funded in November, 1801 at an average rate of 
 interest equal to 51. 5s. Qd. ; and also the loan of March, 1802, of 
 26,000,0001 (viz., 23 millions for England, and 2 millions for Ireland), 
 raised at an average rate of 31. 19s. 2d. These two operations, 
 however, do not fall properly under the category of the Loans, of 
 which the present Paper professes to treat, and hence their omission 
 in the preceding Table. In Appendix Q (page 64 seq.) a general view 
 will be found of all the Loans of the whole period from 1792 to 1816. 
 
 APPENDIX B. INCOME. 
 
On the LOANS raised lij ME. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 oi 
 
 i> ^ o t> o> t> oo 
 
 O O <X> "3< I-H OS CO 
 
 "* O 
 CO GO 
 
 <* 
 
 m 
 m 
 
 n 
 O 
 
 OS 
 tO 
 
 2 o 
 
 * 
 
 to * M* co co 
 
 CO CO 
 
 CO 
 
 b 
 co 
 
 t> 
 
 <M 
 
 !>. 
 
 CO 
 
 2 
 
 l>. OS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 f OS OO O O GO I--. 
 
 t>. OS 
 
 !>. 
 
 to OS 
 
 O 
 
 <N 
 
 -* OS 
 
 l-H 
 
 CO <> CO 
 
 ^ 
 
 CO 
 CO 
 
 o o 
 
 CO 
 
 o 
 
 CO 
 
 O 
 l> 
 
 <* 00 
 (N 
 
 CJ 
 
 
 
 oo * ^ o *>. -^ in 
 
 > CO i i OS t> t> 
 
 b o in 4t< c<j 
 
 ? ? 
 
 <N 
 
 CO 
 
 t> 
 
 
 CO 
 CO 
 
 o 
 oo : : 
 ca : 
 
 CO 
 
 m 
 
 00 
 CO 
 CO 
 
 (N 
 
 Oi 
 
 ih 
 m 
 
 GO 00 
 
 rt< in 
 b oo 
 
 CO 
 
 OJ 
 
 l-H O l-H t>. 00 CO O 
 
 co co I-H o in ^ m 
 
 S S3 
 
 CO 
 
 o 
 
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 to 
 
 m os 
 
 00 
 
 c- 
 
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 m 
 
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 <p o 
 
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 t>. 
 
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 o 
 
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 g 
 
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 CO 00 <N : f^H I!H 
 
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 >. in 
 
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 ^t* 
 
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 i 111 : i1i 
 ll i 1 1 1 Jl 
 
 O W <1 M cc (^ P!^, 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN 
 JRELAND 
 
 Raised by Taxation . 
 
 Loans Raised 
 Exch., and other Bills Fur 
 Contribution East India C 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 1 
 
 TOTAL RECEIPTS 
 
 Exch., and other Bills Issi 
 Balance at commencement 
 
 oi 
 
 o co *>. >-H to <M co 
 o oo co in t^ o r-i 
 
 53 
 
 p-H 
 CO 
 
 
 
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 00 
 
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 CO : 
 
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 l>. 
 
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 <N 
 
 <> m 
 
 Tf i-H 
 
 
Appendix E Expenditure, 1792-1802. 
 
 45 
 
 i 
 
 t^ -* <M 
 
 00 
 
 GO 
 
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 co o I-H os to 
 
 to 
 
 l-H CO 
 
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 _ rH rj< ^ CM 
 
 CM 
 
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 CO 
 
 ,_, 
 
 S 
 
 O rH CM 
 
 in 
 
 *>. * rH CO CO 
 
 
 CM to 
 
 CO 
 
 CO 
 
 
 OS rH 
 
 o 
 
 in CO rH 
 
 rH 
 
 CM rH 
 
 CO 
 
 in 
 
 
 
 
 
 l-H 
 
 
 
 CM 
 
 
 CM O CO 
 
 in 
 
 rH in to o CM 
 
 OS 
 
 to 
 
 to 
 
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 1 
 
 H rH CM 
 
 OS rH 
 
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 in t>. rt< to co 
 
 CM CM 
 
 to 
 
 tb 
 
 
 rH 
 
 OS 
 CO 
 
 
 fr.i 
 
 
 
 
 * J oL ' 
 
 
 
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 3 : 
 
 
 
 
 -8 2 1 
 
 
 
 -S 
 
 fCS I 
 
 
 
 
 a : 
 
 
 
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 PQ 
 
 
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 ^ : 
 
 
 
 
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 *3 o : 
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 1 = I 
 
 S 
 
 | | 
 
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 & 
 
 
 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 
 a 
 
 J5 : Is 
 
 'S 
 
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 > 
 
 ' ^ C : 
 
 r> 
 
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 i 
 
 Q ; *, " 
 
 "o 
 
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 <s> S o 
 
 
 : - 
 
 13 
 
 H 
 
 q 
 
 "8 J 3 I 
 
 
 
 i a -2 -S 
 
 
 % * ~ 
 
 (1 
 
 s 
 
 
 Is *3 "S 
 
 ^ 
 
 8* >* fl v 
 
 e 
 
 3 S 1 1 
 
 CO 
 
 EH 
 
 
 s g .> g 
 
 PH O rH 
 
 
 < 6 1 2 
 
 
 " .s s a 
 
 03 ^ ^v 
 
 
 
 c5 
 
 ? T 
 
 GO 
 O 
 
 CM CO O *>. O 
 
 O tO in rH Tjt 
 
 CM 
 
 
 
 o 
 
 00 
 
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 t^ to CM ^ 
 
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 CO tO !>. 
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 GO in t>- I-H CM 
 
 m co in CM co 
 
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 00 
 
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 CM 
 
 t>. in rH CM 
 
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 CM *>. m *> o 
 
 l _ l 
 
 in m -* 
 
 ^ 
 
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 CO CM CO 
 
 m 
 
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46 
 
 On the LOANS raised ly MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 These Tables D and E of the Eevenue and Expenditure, from 1792 
 to 1802, have been compiled from the materials given by Mr. Mar- 
 shall, in that monument of industry and skill, his quarto book of 
 tables. The figures have been taken from the statement, ]X~o. 11 of 
 his Second Part. Previous to the year 1800, there were considerable 
 discrepancies in most general statements relating to finance, and 
 while there is every reason to believe that the figures given in these 
 tables (D and E), are substantially correct, it is quite possible that 
 they may differ in some respects from similar returns to be found 
 in other works of reputation. It was not the least of Mr. Pitt's 
 administrative reforms that he put an end in a great measure to con- 
 fused statements of public documents by introducing a greatly im- 
 proved system of statistical records. 
 
 It may be added that the Yotes of men for the Navy were 45,000 
 for 1793 ; 85,000 for 1794 ; 100,000 for 1795 ; 110,000 for 1796 ; and 
 120,000 for 1797-8-9, and 1800. 
 
 It is not easy to state with equal clearness the number of Land 
 Forces. The votes for Militia and Eencible Corps were in 
 
 
 
 1793 250,000 
 
 1794 1,240,000 
 
 1795 1,631,000 
 
 1796 1,820,000 
 
 1797 
 1798 
 1799 
 
 1,972,000 
 3,798,000 
 4,532,000 
 
 F. Revenue of Great Britain. Net Payments into the Exchequer in the 
 
 Years as under. 
 
 
 Years. 
 
 Customs. 
 
 Excise. 
 
 Stamps. 
 
 TuTAL. 
 
 1712. 
 
 Peace of Utrecht 
 
 
 1,315 
 
 
 1,650 
 
 
 93,000 
 
 
 
 3,043 
 
 1740. 
 
 Spanish War 
 
 1,302 
 
 2,580 
 
 117,000 
 
 3 997 
 
 1756. 
 
 I Commencement of Seven Years' ) 
 1 War * 1 
 
 1,670 
 
 3,351 
 
 129,000 
 
 5,150 
 
 1762. 
 1774. 
 
 1784. 
 
 End of ditto 
 Commencement of American War 
 End of ditto 
 
 1,854 
 2,567 
 3,326 
 
 4,592 
 4,570 
 5,584 
 
 265,000 
 not given 
 
 6,711 
 7,137 
 12,995 
 
 1789. 
 
 Peace 
 
 3,164 
 
 6,861 
 
 
 15,460 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 These figures are compiled mainly from statements given by Sir 
 John Sinclair's (Hist. Pub. Rev., II., 165). They are inserted as 
 convenient indications of the amount of the Revenue in the earlier 
 periods of last century. 
 
Appendix G. Imports and Exports, 1793-1807. 
 
 47 
 
 . IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, Great Britain. Official Values. Period of the 
 American War, 1777-83. Period of Peace 1784-92. First French 
 War 1793 to 1801. 
 
 Imports. 
 
 1777-79 (3 yrs.) 
 
 EXPORTS. 
 
 From 
 India and 
 China. 
 
 From 
 all other 
 Parts. 
 
 TOTAL. 
 
 TOTAL. 
 
 British 
 Produce and 
 Manufactures. 
 
 Foreign 
 Merchan- 
 dize. 
 
 
 
 1-36 
 
 
 10-32 
 
 
 11-70 
 
 
 
 13-10 
 
 
 8-40 
 
 
 4-71 
 
 1-35 
 
 10-40 
 
 11-77 
 
 1780-83 (4 ) 
 
 13-12 
 
 9-00 
 
 4-13 
 
 3-15 
 
 13-48 
 
 16-63 
 
 1784-88 (5 ) 
 
 16-50 
 
 13-00 
 
 4-60 
 
 2-65 
 
 16-44 
 
 19-07 
 
 1789-92 (4 ) 
 
 21-77 
 
 16-00 
 
 5-77 
 
 3-50 
 
 15-76 
 
 19-26 
 
 1793 
 
 20-39 
 
 13-90 
 
 6-49 
 
 4-46 
 
 17-83 
 
 22-29 
 
 1794 
 
 26-75 
 
 16-72 
 
 10-03 
 
 5-76 
 
 16-97 
 
 22-73 
 
 4795 
 
 27-31 
 
 16-52 
 
 11-78 
 
 3-37 
 
 19-80 
 
 23-18 
 
 1796 
 
 30-42 
 
 19-10 
 
 11-32 
 
 3-94 
 
 17-07 
 
 21-01 
 
 1797 
 (1793-97) 
 
 1798 
 
 28-91 
 
 16-90 
 
 12-01 
 
 4-21 
 
 17-50 
 
 25-70 
 
 26-76 
 
 16-63 
 
 10-32 
 
 7'62 
 
 18-03 
 
 25-65 
 
 33-80 
 
 20-00 
 
 13-80 
 
 4-28 
 
 22-56 
 
 26-84 
 
 1799 
 
 36-00 
 
 24-00 
 
 12-00 
 
 4-94 
 
 25-63 
 
 30-57 
 
 1800 
 
 43-15 
 
 24-30 
 
 18-85 
 
 6-59 
 
 26-20 
 
 32-79 
 
 1801 
 (1798-1801) 
 
 46-90 
 
 25-70 
 
 21-20 
 
 5-86 
 
 23-10 
 
 28-96 
 
 39-96 
 
 23-50 
 
 16-46 
 
 These figures are compiled mainly from the Common's Report on 
 the Outstanding Demands on the Bank of England, March, 1797 ; 
 and from the Annual Register for 1799, (p. 189). 
 
 It will be seen that the figures give the Official Value only, that 
 is the value as ascertained, according to a Custom House scale 
 of prices fixed in 1697, and, therefore, entirely obsolete. Some 
 approximation to the Real value was obtained by the declarations 
 made by merchants under the Convoy Act of 1797, for the years 
 1798 to 1800 ; those declarations give the following result, viz., 
 
 EXPORTS. REAL VALUE. Declarations under Convoy Act 0/1797. 
 
 
 Year. 
 
 British 
 Merchandize. 
 
 Foreign 
 Merchandize. 
 
 Total. 
 
 
 1798 
 
 
 
 33-15 
 
 
 
 not given. 
 
 
 
 not given. 
 
 
 1799 
 
 38-94 
 
 11-35 
 
 50-29 
 
 
 
 1800 
 
 39-47 
 
 16-36 
 
 55-83 
 
 
48 
 
 On the LOANS raised by MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 These results do not materially differ in the totals from a calcu- 
 lation of real value made at the Custom House by Mr. Irving, the 
 Inspector, and which was as follows : 
 
 
 Year. 
 
 British 
 Merchandize. 
 
 Foreign 
 Merchandize. 
 
 Total. 
 
 
 
 1799 
 
 
 40*08 
 
 
 8-91 
 
 
 
 48'99 
 
 
 
 1800 
 
 45-57 
 
 9-82 
 
 55-40 
 
 
 Mr. Hose, however, in his pamphlet (" Brief Examination," &c.), 
 and it was almost an official paper, gives, perhaps, the best statement 
 now obtainable of the real value of the exports and imports between 
 1789 and 1805. It is to be borne in mind, however, that the public 
 returns of the Custom House only began to be settled into any- 
 thing like accurate form until after the year 1800, and then mainly 
 in pursuance of reforms of detail introduced by Mr. Pitt, who had 
 felt most painfully in working out his fiscal plans, the absence 
 of an adequate body of public statistics. Mr. Eose's table is as 
 follows : 
 
 Statement of the Average Annual Real Value of Imports and Exports. 
 Great Britain, during Periods of Five Years 1789-92, 1795-98, 1802-05, 
 as given in Mr. Rose's pamphlet of 1806. 
 
 Periods. 
 
 Exports. Real Value of 
 
 Real Value of 
 Imports 
 into 
 Great Britain. 
 
 British Goods. 
 
 Foreign and 
 Colonial Goods. 
 
 Total. 
 
 1789-92 (4yrs.) 
 
 
 
 27,135,000 
 
 
 
 7,770,000 
 
 
 34,905,000 
 
 
 37,784,000 
 
 1795-98 (4 ) 
 
 30,648 
 
 12,393 
 
 43,042 
 
 42,261 
 
 1802-05 (4 ) 
 
 42,505 
 
 14,106 
 
 56,611 
 
 53,240 
 
Appendix H. Prices, $c., of Corn, 1761-1803. 
 
 49 
 
 H, CORN. PRICES and IMPORTATIONS, <Sfc. t during the Three Decennial 
 Periods, 1761-70, 1771-80, 1781-90. 
 
 Periods. 
 
 Average 
 Price of 
 Wheat. 
 
 Wheat. 
 Average Annual Excess of 
 
 Barley and Malt. 
 Average Annual Excess of 
 
 Exports. 
 
 Imports, 
 
 Exports. 
 
 Imports. 
 
 
 s. d. 
 
 Qrs. 
 
 Qrs. 
 
 Qrs. 
 
 Qrs. 
 
 1761-70.. 
 
 2 2 . 
 
 106,000 
 
 
 177,000 
 
 
 1771-80... 
 
 2 5 10 
 
 
 29,000 
 
 32,000 
 
 
 1781-90.... 
 
 2 8 . 
 
 
 64,000 
 
 96,000 
 
 .... 
 
 ffote. In these thirty years there were only four years during which the annual 
 average price was materially above the low average of the whole period, viz., 1765, 
 1767; '68; '70. 
 
 CORN. PRICES and IMPORTATIONS during each of the Thirteen Years 1701- 
 1803, with the Amount of BOUNTY PAID on Corn Imported. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Average 
 Annual Price 
 per Imperial 
 Quarter 
 of Wheat. 
 
 Estimated for Home Consumption. 
 
 Estimated 
 Import 
 Cost. 
 
 Bounties 
 Paid for 
 Corn 
 Imported. 
 
 Wheat 
 Flour. 
 
 All other 
 Kinds. 
 
 Total 
 
 
 s. d. 
 
 Qrs. 
 
 Qrs. 
 
 Qrs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 1791 
 
 287 
 
 222,000 
 
 842,000 
 
 ,064,000 
 
 1,596,000 
 
 
 1792 
 
 230 
 
 470, 
 
 918, 
 
 ,388, 
 
 1,735, 
 
 
 1793 
 
 293 
 
 22, 
 
 1,189, 
 
 ,211, 
 
 1,211, 
 
 
 1794 
 
 2 12 3 
 
 490, 
 
 973, 
 
 ,463, 
 
 2,194, 
 
 
 1795 
 
 3 15 2 
 
 328, 
 
 1,149, 
 
 ,477, 
 
 2,954, 
 
 .... 
 
 1791) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 to 
 1795) 
 
 2 13 8 
 
 306,000 
 
 1,012,000 
 
 1,321,000 
 
 1,940,000 
 
 
 1796 
 
 3 18 7 
 
 313,000 
 
 557,000 
 
 870,000 
 
 2,610,000 
 
 574,000 
 
 1797 
 
 2 13 9 
 
 880, 
 
 1,100, 
 
 1,980, 
 
 3,960, 
 
 28, 
 
 1798 
 
 2 11 10 
 
 461, 
 
 717, 
 
 1,178, 
 
 2,356, 
 
 1, 
 
 1799 
 
 390 
 
 396, 
 
 932, 
 
 1,328, 
 
 3,320, 
 
 
 1800 
 
 5 13 10 
 
 463, 
 
 585, 
 
 1,048, 
 
 4,192, 
 
 45, 
 
 17961 
 to 
 1800! 
 
 3 13 5 
 
 503,000 
 
 780,000 
 
 1,281,000 
 
 3,288,000 
 
 130,000 
 
 1801 
 
 5 19 6 
 
 1,264,000 
 
 874,000 
 
 2,138,000 
 
 10,690,000 
 
 1,420,000 
 
 1802 
 
 3 9 10 
 
 1,424, 
 
 982, 
 
 2,406, 
 
 6,015, 
 
 715, 
 
 1803 
 
 2 18 10 
 
 647, 
 
 636, 
 
 1,283, 
 
 2,566, 
 
 44, 
 
 1801 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 to 
 
 428 
 
 1,112,000 
 
 838,000 
 
 1,942,000 
 
 6,212,000 
 
 726,000 
 
 1803J 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 On the LOANS raised ly MB. PITT, 1798-1801. 
 
 The figures given in the preceding page are for the ordinary 
 Calendar Year of January to December ; and, as regards the prices of 
 wheat, therefore, do not indicate the real effect produced on the 
 markets by the character and results of each harvest. In order to 
 render this important point as distinct as possible, I insert the 
 following table of the monthly average price of wheat in England, 
 arranging the months in Harvest Years, or from September in one 
 year to August of the next, so as to include in each column the prices 
 affected mainly by only one harvest. The quotations are for the 
 Winchester eight-bushel quarter; and as 1 Imperial quarter = 
 rOl>15 Winchester quarters, the corresponding quotations, if given 
 for Imperial quarters, would be, say sevenpence in the pound, liigher 
 tha'i the figures in the table. The table has been compiled from 
 a return given by Mr. Tooke (Hist. Prices, ii. 390). The average 
 prices of the different months should be referred to in connexion 
 with the information contained in the other divisions of the 
 Appendix. 
 
 MONTHLY AVERAGE PRICES of Wheat (per Winchester Eight-Bushel Quarter] in 
 Englmd, arranged in HARVEST YEARS of 1st September to 1st September, from 
 1st January, 1793, to 1st September, 1802. 
 
 Harvest 
 Year. 
 
 1793. 
 
 '93-'4. 
 
 '94-'5. 
 
 '95-'6. 
 
 '96-'7. 
 
 '97-'8. 
 
 '98-'9. 
 
 '99- 
 1800- 
 
 *. d. 
 3 15 5 
 
 1800- 
 '01. 
 
 1801'-2. 
 
 Sept 
 
 8. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 289 
 
 8. d. 
 
 2 11 6 
 
 s. d. 
 6 19 . 
 
 s. d. 
 345 
 
 s. d. 
 2 18 10 
 
 s. d. 
 2 10 . 
 
 s. d. 
 5 5 10 
 
 s. d. 
 4 10 4 
 
 Oct 
 
 
 2 7 . 
 
 2 11 . 
 
 3 16 9 
 
 3 1 3 
 
 3 . 2 
 
 287 
 
 436 
 
 566 
 
 3 17 5 
 
 Nov 
 Dec 
 
 
 272 
 
 2 12 10 
 
 439 
 
 2 19 9 
 
 2 16 4 
 
 2 7 11 
 
 499 
 
 6 . 2 
 
 3 11 1 
 
 2 7 H 
 
 2 11 9 
 
 3 19 10 
 
 3 1 10 
 
 2 18 5 
 
 2 8 10 
 
 4 2 11 
 
 5 10 10 
 
 3 19 7 
 
 289 
 
 2 15 . 
 
 363 
 
 2 17 3 
 
 2 12 9 
 
 285 
 
 4 13 10 
 
 6 12 6 
 
 3 15 5 
 
 Jan 
 
 2 7 . 
 
 2 10 1 
 
 2 16 8 
 
 4 12 . 
 
 2 15 . 
 
 2 11 2 
 
 295 
 
 4 14 8 
 
 6 18 1 
 
 3 16 5 
 
 Feb 
 March .. 
 
 2 6 10 
 279 
 
 2 10 7 
 
 2 18 3 
 
 4 13 6 
 
 2 12 6 
 
 2 9 10 
 
 2 10 . 
 
 5 1 11 
 
 7 5 9. 
 
 3 14 5 
 
 2 9 10 
 
 2 16 7 
 
 4 10 7 
 
 2 14 11 
 
 2 11 3 
 
 293 
 
 4 16 10 
 
 6 18 9 
 
 3 15 5 
 
 2 10 10 
 
 2 19 11 
 
 5 . . 
 
 298 
 
 2 10 2 
 
 2 10 3 
 
 5 7 10 
 
 7 14 4 
 
 3 13 6 
 
 April 
 
 299 
 
 9 11 2 
 
 321 
 
 468 
 
 299 
 
 2 11 7 
 
 2 13 5 
 
 5 11 11 
 
 711 9 
 
 399 
 
 May 
 June 
 
 2 11 5 
 
 2 11 3 
 
 3 4 10 
 
 3 15 7 
 
 298 
 
 2 11 10 
 
 3 . 10 
 
 6 . 2 
 
 6 10 4 
 
 3 5 3 
 
 297 
 
 2 11 1 
 
 323 
 
 4 7 5 
 
 298 
 
 2 11 2 
 
 2 U 10 
 3 4 . 
 
 5 13 4 
 
 756 
 
 396 
 
 2 11 2 
 
 2 11 6 
 
 3 10 1 
 
 4 2 . 
 
 2 10 . 
 
 2 11 . 
 
 6 5 . 
 
 6 8 11 
 
 3 7 . 
 
 July 
 
 2 11 1 
 
 2 11 11 
 
 445 
 
 4 1 . 
 
 2 10 5 
 
 2 10 9 
 
 369 
 
 6 14 10 
 
 6 15 2 
 
 ^74 
 
 Aug 
 
 2 10 6 
 
 2 12 6 
 
 584 
 
 3 15 11 
 
 2 12 . 
 
 2 11 3 
 
 3 13 . 
 
 532 
 
 619 
 
 3 9 . 
 
 2 11 . 
 
 2 11 11 
 2 10 2 
 
 477 
 
 3 19 8 
 
 2 10 10 
 
 2 11 . 
 
 3 7 11 
 
 6 1 . 
 
 687 
 
 379 
 
 355 
 
 444 
 
 2 14 4 
 
 2 13 6 
 
 2 15 3 
 
 5 6 . 
 
 6 11 . 
 
 3 13 1 
 
Appendix I. Subsidies to Foreign States, 1793-1801, 51 
 
 I. SUBSIDIES and LOANS to FOREIGN STATES, 1793 to 1806, from Parlia- 
 mentary Paper y No. 466, of 1854, and therefore the latest Official Return 
 on the subject. 
 
 
 
 1793. Hanover 492,000 
 
 Hesse Cassel 190, 
 
 Sardinia 150, 
 
 832,000 
 
 1794. Prussia 1,226,000 
 
 Sardinia 200, 
 
 Hesse Cassel 437, 
 
 Hesse Darmstadt 102, 
 
 Baden 25, 
 
 Hanover ; 560, 
 
 2,550,000 
 
 1795. Germany, Imperial Loan (35 Geo. III. cap. 93) .... 4,600,000 
 
 Baden 2, 
 
 Brunswick 98, 
 
 Hesse Cassel 317, 
 
 Hesse Darmstadt 80, 
 
 Hanover 478, 
 
 Sardinia WM 150, 
 
 5,725,000 
 
 1796. Hesse Darmstadt 20,000 
 
 Brunswick 13, 
 
 33,000 
 
 1797. Hesse Darmstadt 57,000 
 
 Brunswick 7, 
 
 Germany, Imperial Loan (37 Geo. III. cap. 59) 1,620, 
 
 1,684,000 
 
 1798. Brunswick 7,000 
 
 Portugal 120, 
 
 127,000 
 
 1799. Prince of Orange 20,000 
 
 Hesse Darmstadt 5, 
 
 Russia 825, 
 
 850,000 
 
 1800. Germany 1,066,000 
 
 German Princes 500, 
 
 Bavaria 501, 
 
 Russia 546, 
 
 2,613,000 
 
 1801. Portugal 200,000 
 
 Sardinia 40, 
 
 Hesse Cassel 100, 
 
 Germany 150, 
 
 German Princes 200, 
 
 690,000 
 
 Total 1793 to 1801, or till the Peace of Amiens ^15,104,000 
 
 D 2 
 
52 On the LOANS raised ly MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 J. Statement of the TERMS of the LOANS raised ly FRANCE, 1815-1848. 
 
 Dates. 
 
 Sum Borrowed 
 in Sterling. 
 25 Francs = 1. 
 
 Fund. 
 
 Negotiated at the 
 Price per 100 
 Money of 
 
 Rate of 
 Interest 
 to Lender. 
 
 1815 (May & June) 
 
 
 
 1,434,528 
 
 5 Per Cent. 
 
 Per Cent. 
 51 23 
 
 s. d. 
 9 15 2 
 
 1816 & 1817 
 
 2,790,520 
 
 
 
 57-26 
 
 8 14 8 
 
 1817 
 
 316,961 
 
 
 59-16 1 
 
 890 
 
 1817 & 1818 
 
 13,802,600 
 
 
 
 average price J 
 
 57-51 1 
 average price' 
 
 8 13 11 
 
 1813 (19 May) .... 
 
 7,916,376 
 
 j 
 
 66-50 
 
 7 10 4 
 
 (9 Oct.) 
 
 6,600,000 
 
 
 
 67-00 
 
 793 
 
 1821 (June) 
 
 280,000 
 
 if 
 
 87-07 
 
 5 14 10 
 
 (9 Aug.) 
 
 8,564,732 
 
 
 
 85-55 
 
 5 16 11 
 
 1823 (10 July) ... 
 
 16,555,239 
 
 
 
 89-55 
 
 5 11 8 
 
 1830 (12 Jan.) ... 
 
 3,200,000 
 
 4 Per Cent. 
 
 102-07 
 
 3 18 4 
 
 1831 (19 Apl.) ... 
 
 4,800,000 
 
 5 per cent. 
 
 84-00 
 
 5 19 
 
 ,, 
 
 817,556 
 
 
 
 100-00 
 
 500 
 
 ,1832 .(8 Aug.) 
 
 6,000,000 
 
 4 per cent. 
 
 98-50 
 
 5 1 6 
 
 1835 (27 Aug.) .... 
 
 3,647,630 
 
 M 
 
 97-25 
 
 423 
 
 (29 Sept.) .... 
 
 992,704 
 
 tl 
 
 9780 
 
 4 1 10 
 
 1836 (SOMch.) .... 
 
 929,463 
 
 3 per cent. 
 
 81-25 
 
 3 13 10 
 
 (9 July) 
 
 592,272 
 
 ,, 
 
 80-40 
 
 3 14 8 
 
 1837 (25 Aug.) .... 
 
 3,753,239 
 
 4 per cent. 
 
 100-00 
 
 400 
 
 (12 Dec.) .... 
 
 339,408 
 
 tt 
 
 100-00 
 
 400 
 
 1815-37 
 1841 
 
 83,337,228 
 6,000,000 
 
 3 per cent. 
 
 78-5H 
 
 673* 
 3 16 6 
 
 1844 
 
 8,000,000 
 
 
 84-75 
 
 3 10 9 
 
 1847-49 
 
 10,000,000 
 
 >f 
 
 ( 84-75 
 { to 
 
 3 10 9 
 to 
 
 
 
 
 ( 75-25 
 
 3 19 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1815-49 
 
 107,337,228 
 
 
 
 5 15 7f 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * Average rate of Interest at which .5,304,875 of Rentes were sold for 
 83,337,228. 
 
 t Average rate at which 6,201,000 of rentes were sold for 107,337,000 
 capital. 
 
 This statement (J) of the terms of the French Loans is intro- 
 duced as an interesting collateral document. It will be seen that in 
 spite of 5 per cent, being the prevailing description of rente, it was 
 profitable towards the end of the period to negotiate the loan almost 
 exclusively in 3 or 4 per cents. 
 
Appendix K.Mr. Pitt's Budgets, 1793-1801. 53 
 
 K. MR. PITT'S BUDGETS, 1793-1801. NEW TAXES Imposed, with the 
 Estimated Produce when proposed to Parliament. 
 
 In the following Paper I have arranged in order the principal 
 items of Mr. Pitt's Budgets from 1793 to 1801, and I have classified 
 as far as possible the several taxes under the general divisions of 
 Customs, Excise, &c. A very interesting chapter might be written 
 on the character of the taxes proposed in these successive budgets, 
 but at present I can now do no more than present the facts. 
 
 1793 (Four Items.) 
 (Budget introduced llth March, 1793.) 
 
 
 
 Assessed Taxes. Ten per cent, additional 90,000 
 
 Game Duty 17,000 
 
 107,000 
 
 Stamps Bills and Receipts 68, 
 
 Excise British Spirits 112, 
 
 287,000 
 
 1794 (Eight Items) 
 (Budget introduced 5th February, 1794) 
 
 Customs ....Foreign Brandy and Rum 136,000 
 
 Slate, Stone, & Marble carried coastwise 30, 
 
 166,000 
 
 Excise British Spirits 107,000 
 
 Bricks and Tiles v 70, 
 
 Glass, Crown and Plate 52, 
 
 Paper 63, 
 
 292, 
 
 Stamps ....Solicitors Indentures' 25, 
 
 Taxes Extra Taxes of 1791 continued 430, 
 
 913,000 
 
 1795 (Ten Items.) . 
 (Budget introduced 23rd February, 1795.) 
 
 Customs ....Wine Imported 500,000 
 
 Tea 180, 
 
 Coffee and Cocoa 40, 
 
 Fruits, Silk, Timber, and Coals 187, 
 
 907,000 
 
 Excise ... Home and Foreign Spirits 259,000 
 
 259, 
 
 Stamps ....Marine Insurances 130,000 
 
 Life Insurances 30, 
 
 Receipt and other Stamps 68, 
 
 228,000 
 
 Post Office. Limitations in franking 40, 
 
 Assessed Taxes Hair Powder (21*. per head.) .... 210, 
 
 '. i i - 1,644,000 
 
54 On the LOANS raised by ME. PITT, 1798-1801, 
 
 1796 (Ten Items.) 
 (Budget introduced 7th December, 1795) 
 
 
 
 Legacy Duty on Real and Personal Estate 250,000 
 
 The proposal for the Legacy Duty on Real estate 
 
 was defeated, and involved a reduction of 136, 
 
 114,000 
 
 Customs . ..Tobacco 170,000 
 
 Wines and Sweets 600, 
 
 Sugar, drawback repealed 180, 
 
 .. 950 
 
 Excise Salt 32,000 
 
 Hats 40, 
 
 __________ 79 
 
 / ^, 
 
 Assessed Taxes... .10 per cent, additional 140,000 
 
 Horse Duty additional 116, 
 
 Horse Duty New rates 100, 
 
 Dogs '. 100, 
 
 456, 
 
 1,592,000 
 
 1797 (Twenty-nine Items.) 
 
 (Budget introduced 7th December, 1796, and a Supplementary Budget 
 26th April, 1797.) 
 
 Customs ....Tea 240,000 
 
 Coffee and Cocoa 30, 
 
 Sugar 280, 
 
 Bar Iron 43,- 
 
 Brimstone, Hemp, &c Ill, 
 
 Coals, 5*. per chaldron 100, 
 
 Sugar, drawbacks repealed 22, 
 
 826,000 
 
 Excise Auctions 40,000 
 
 Bricks 36, 
 
 Spirits 220, 
 
 Scots Distilleries 512, 
 
 808, 
 
 Stamps ....Small Duties 30,000 
 
 Additions , 320, 
 
 Conveyance Deeds 90, 
 
 Copies of Deeds 50, 
 
 Probates of Wills 40, 
 
 Bills of Exchange 40, 
 
 Advertisements 20, 
 
 Newspaper Stamps .-.. 94, 
 
 Allowance Certificates 15, 
 
 Gold and Silver Plate 30, 
 
 Fire Insurance 35, 
 
 764, 
 
 Post Office Increased Rates 250, 
 
 Assessed Taxes House Tax altered 290,000 
 
 Stage Coaches 60, 
 
 Horses employed in Agriculture 180, 
 
 Watches, Clocks, &c 200, 
 
 Male Servants 34, 
 
 Pleasure Horses 24, 
 
 788, 
 
 3,436,000 
 
Appendix K.Mr. Pitt's Budgets, 1793-1801. 55 
 
 1798 (Seven Items.) ' 
 (Budget introduced, 24th November, 1797.) 
 
 
 
 Customs ....Convoy Tax on Imports and Exports.. 1,500,000 
 
 Tea Ill, 
 
 1,611,000 
 
 Excise Salt 502, 
 
 Assessed Taxes.... Former assessments Trebled 4,500,000 
 
 Armorial Bearings 150, 
 
 4,650, 
 
 Voluntary Contribution 1,500, 
 
 8,263,000 
 
 [Mr. Pitt's plan for the Redemption of the Land Tax was introduced 
 2nd April, 1798.] 
 
 1799. 
 (Budget introduced, 3rd December, 1798.) 
 
 Income Tcu\...Ten per cent, on all Incomes of 200/. and) 
 
 above, with smaller graduated rates on Incomes > 7,500,000 
 
 of 60/. to 200/ J 
 
 1800. 
 (Budget introduced, 24th February, 1800.) 
 
 Customs ....Tea 130,000 
 
 Spirits, Home and Foreign 220, 
 
 350,000 
 
 1801 (Fourteen Items.) 
 (Budget introduced, Vjth February, 1801.) 
 
 Customs ....Tea 30,000 
 
 Calicoes, drawbacks repealed 155, 
 
 Timber 95, 
 
 Pepper 119, 
 
 Sugar 166, 
 
 Raisins 10, 
 
 Lead 120, 
 
 695,000 
 
 Excise Paper 130,000 
 
 Various Duties 261, 
 
 391,000 
 
 Stamps ....Bills of Exchange 112,000 
 
 Marine Insurance 145, 
 
 Conveyance Stamps 93, 
 
 350,000 
 
 Post Office.... Increased rates 150,000 
 
 Assessed Taxes.... Horses of all kinds 306,000 
 
 1,892,000 
 
 TOTAL OF TAXES IMPOSED IN THE EIGHT YEARS 25,877,000 
 
56 On the LOANS raised by ME. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 L. STATEMENT of the MOTIONS made in PARLIAMENT ly the Party in 
 OPPOSITION to MR. PITT in order to DKFEAT the Prosecution of the WAR, 
 from December, 1792, to May, 1797. 
 
 In the following List only those Motions are included which were 
 intended to raise, and which did raise formal discussions. If all the 
 minor amendments and proceedings which had the same end in view 
 had been included, the catalogue would have been unwieldly. 
 
 A short statement is also given of the three abortive negotiations 
 for Peace, which took place in 1796, 1797, and 1800. 
 
 The List given in this Appendix, even when taken alone, is a very 
 remarkable catalogue and may serve to suggest, although a't best but 
 faintly, some idea of the inveterate and protracted nature of the 
 opposition of the Whig party to the War, and to the Ministry by 
 whom that War was carried on. It is true that Mr. Pitt maintained 
 his numerical majority, but it is easy to understand that the anxiety 
 and interruption occasioned by the constant necessity of meeting 
 the attacks of Mr. Fox and his supporters must have been very 
 great. The debates also had considerable eifect in increasing the 
 difficulties of the Government cut of doors. 
 
 Session 13th December, 1792, to 22st June, 1793. 
 
 1792. 15 Dec. Mr. Fox Motion for sending a Minister to Paris to treat with 
 the Provisional Government of France. Negatived without a 
 division. 
 
 ,, 21 Dec. Marquis of Lansdowne (Lords) Motion to same effect. Nega- 
 tived without a division. 
 
 1793. is Feb. Mr. Fox. Resolutions against the War with France. Negatived 
 270 to 44. 
 
 ,, 21 Fob, Mr. Grey. Motion for an Address to restore Peace with France. 
 Negatived without a division. 
 
 28 Feb. Mr. Sheridan. Motion for a Committee of the Whole House to 
 inquire into the truth of the reports of Seditious Practices. 
 Negatived without a division. 
 
 ,, 17 June. Mr. Fox. Motion for Re-establishment of Peace with France. 
 Negatived 187 to 47. 
 
 Session 21st January, 1794, to llth July, 1794. 
 
 1794. 23 Jan. Earl Stanhope (Lords) Motion for acknowledging the French 
 
 Republic. Negatived without a division. 
 17 Feb. Marquis of Lansdowne (Lords) Motion for Peace with France. 
 
 Negatived 103 to 13. 
 ,, 6 Mch. Mr. Whitbread. Motion for separate Peace with France. 
 
 Negatived 138 to 26. 
 ,, 4 April. Earl Stanhope (Lords) Motion against any interference with the 
 
 internal Government of France. Negatived without a division. 
 ,, 30 May. Mr. Fox. Motion for putting an end to the War with France. 
 
 Negatived 208 to 55. 
 ,, 30 May. Duke of Bedford (Lords) Motion in same terms. Negatived 
 
 113 to 13. 
 
 Session 30th December, 1794, to 27th June, 1795. 
 
 1795. 5 Jan. Earl Stanhope (Lords) Motion against interfering in the internal 
 
 state of France. Negatived 61 to 1. 
 
 26 Jan. Mr. Grey. Motion for Peace with France. Negatived 269 to 86. 
 ,, 27 Jan. Duke of Bedford (Lords) Motion in same terms. Negatived 
 
 88 to 15. 
 24 Mch. Mr. Fox. Motion for a Committee on the State of the Nation. 
 
 Negatived 219 to 63. 
 
UNIX 
 
 Appendix L. Motions in. 7 Vm#i#fjfor Peace, 1792-.97 57 
 
 1795. 30 Mch. Earl of Guilford (Lords) Motion in same terms. Negatived 
 
 104 to 14. 
 ,, 27 May. Mr. Wilberforce. Motion respecting Peace with France. 
 
 Negatived 86 to 20. 
 5 June. Earl of Lauderdale (Lords) Motion in same terms. Negatived 
 
 53 to 8. 
 
 Session 29th October, 1795, to 19th May, 1796. 
 
 ,, 8 Dec. A Message from the King announced that " such an order of 
 
 things had been established in France as had rendered him 
 willing to meet any disposition to negotiation on the part of 
 the enemy, with an earnest desire to give it the fullest and 
 speediest effect." 
 
 9 Dec. Mr. Sheridan. Amendment on the Address in reply to the 
 King's Message. Negatived without a division. 
 
 The Negotiation with Prance began in March, 1796, and after 
 various delays, Lord Malmsbury was accredited to Paris on the 13th 
 October, 1796, and the negotiation was finally and abruptly broken 
 off by the French Directory on the 20th December, 1796, and its 
 failure announced in the London Gazette 011 the 27th December, 
 1796. N 
 
 1796. 15 Feb. Mr. Grey. Motion respecting a Negotiation for Peace with 
 
 France. Negatived 189 to 50. 
 ,, 10 Mar. Mr. Grey. Motion for a Committee on the State of the Nation. 
 
 Negatived 207 to 45. 
 
 ,, 10 May. Mr. Fox. Motion respecting the conduct of the War with 
 France. Negatived 216 to 42. 
 
 Session 27th September, 1796, to 2Qth July, 1797. 
 
 1796. 30 Dec. Mr. Fox. Amendment on the Address relative to rupture of the 
 
 Negotiation with France. Negatived 212 to 37. 
 1797. 23 Mch. Earl of Oxford (Lords) Motion for Peace with France. 
 
 Negatived 52 to 16. 
 27 Mch. Earl of Suffolk (Lords) Motion for dismissing Mr. Pitt. 
 
 Negatived 104 to 17. 
 10 April. Mr. Pollen. Motion for Peace with France. Negatived 291 
 
 to 85. 
 ,, 10 May. Mr. Whitbread. Motion of Censure on Mr. Pitt, for his conduct 
 
 with respect to the Seamen. Negatived 237 to 63. 
 19 May. Alderman Combe. Motion for dismissing the Ministers. 
 
 Negatived 242 to 59. 
 ;, 30 May. Duke of Bedford (Lords) Motion in same terms. Negatived 
 
 91 to 14. 
 
 A Second Negotiation for Peace with France was originated by 
 the English Government in an official note from Lord Grenville to 
 the French Executive, dated 1st June, 1797, and in pursuance of 
 arrangements arising out of that note, Lord Malmsbury, as British 
 Plenipotentiary, met citizens Letourneur, Pleville de Pelley, and 
 Maret, at Lisle, on the 6th July, 1797. The Negotiation was finally 
 broken oif by France on the 6th October, 1797. Lord Malmsbury, 
 by the orders of France, had quitted Lisle for London on the 22nd 
 September, 1797. 
 
 Session 2nd November, 1797, to 29th June, 1798. 
 
 The systematic opposition to the War may be considered to have 
 been terminated with the month of May, 1797. On the 26th of that 
 
58 On the LOANS raised ly ME. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 month, Mr. Grey moved for leave to introduce a Bill for effecting a 
 Parliamentary Eeform, and was defeated by 256 votes to 91. The 
 principal members of the Whig Party then seceded from the House, 
 and persevered in their non-attendance for one or two Sessions. In 
 the Session, therefore, which opened in November, 1797, Mr. Pitt 
 was left comparatively free from attack : Mr. Tierney was active in 
 opposition, but the violent warfare of party was, for the time, at an 
 end. 
 
 It may be added that a communication on the subject of a Peace 
 was made by M. Talleyrand, minister for foreign affairs to Bona- 
 parte, as First Consul, in the form of a note to Lord Grenville, dated 
 Paris, 25th December, 1799. The overtures, however, made by 
 France were of a nature which could not be accepted, and the cor- 
 respondence was terminated by Lord Grenville in a note, dated 20th 
 January, 1800. 
 
 M. MARKET PRICES OF STOCKS, 1791-1800 (both inclusive), with the 
 Market Prices of the SCRIP and OMNIUM of NEW LOANS, and also with 
 Collateral Columns^ showing the EQUATKD PRICES of 3, 4, and 5 per Cent. 
 Stocks, assuming the Price of the 3 per Cents, to be given. 
 
 The following Tables for each year from 1791 to 1800, both in- 
 clusive, have been obtained by examination of the returns given for 
 each month in the Gentleman's Magazine. Those returns were fur- 
 nished by the brokers whose names they bear, and give the highest 
 and lowest price of each kind of stock, on each week day of each 
 month : and of their accuracy, and sufficiency for the present pur- 
 pose, there can be no question. 
 
 In forming the following Tables the highest and lowest price in 
 each month has been given, after a careful reference to the daily 
 fluctuations so recorded. The quotations have been confined to 3 per 
 Cent. Consols ; 4 per cent., and 5 per cent, stocks, and to Long 
 Annuities, as sufficient for the object now in view. 
 
 The columns appropriated to New Loans contain an abstract 
 of all that is recorded under the heads of Scrip and Omnium, terms 
 too familiar to require any explanation here. 
 
 The three columns of Equated Prices are inserted in order that 
 the eye may at once perceive the difference between the actual prices 
 of the 4 and 5 per cents., and the price which they ought to have 
 borne so as to yield only the same yearly interest as the 3 per cents. 
 
 The following statement of the Due-Dates of the half-yearly Divi- 
 dends of the several kinds of public stocks should be borne in mind 
 in examining the tables of prices: 
 
 3 per cent. Consols ... 5th January and 5th July. 
 
 4 Annuities 5th April and 10th October. 
 
 5 ,, Annuities ditto. 
 
 Long Annuities 1860 ditto. 
 
 The Long Annuities have been granted at various periods, and 
 principally as supplemental additions to Loans principally raised in 
 permanent stocks. All the Long Annuities expire on 5th of January, 
 1860; and the quarter's annuity between the preceding half-yearly 
 date of 10th October, 1859, and the day of expiry, will be paid on 
 5th January, 1860. They may be considered therefore as Annuities 
 running to the end of the year 1859. 
 
Appendix M. Monthly Market Prices of Stocks, 1791-1800. 59 
 
 1791. 
 
 Jan 
 Feb 
 
 ACTUAL PRICES IN MARKET. 
 
 Equated Prices of 4's and 5's to the 
 Price of 3's. 
 
 3 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 4 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 5 per Cents. 
 
 Long 
 Annuities. 
 
 3's. 
 
 4's. 
 
 5's. 
 
 133 
 135 
 133 
 
 130 
 135 
 136 
 
 136 
 141 
 150 
 
 147 
 145 
 147 
 
 80 -80* 
 80 -81* 
 76 -82 
 
 76 -81 
 80 -82 
 81-83 
 
 81 -82* 
 82 -89 
 88 -90 
 
 87 -89 
 89 -88 
 87*-90 
 
 101*-103* 
 102 -102* 
 102*-103* 
 
 97 -101 
 100 -102 
 101 -102 
 
 101 -104 
 104 -107 
 104 -105 
 
 104* 
 100*-101* 
 101*-103* 
 
 119 -121* 
 118*-119 
 115 -121 
 
 114*- 11 9* 
 119 -120* 
 120*-121 
 
 118 -120 
 116 -123 
 117 -118 
 
 115 -118 
 117*-1184 
 118 -119 
 
 Years' 
 Purchase. 
 24 
 24 
 24 
 
 24 
 22 -23 
 23*-24 
 
 24 
 
 24 -26* 
 26* 
 
 25* 
 26 -27* 
 
 80 
 81 
 80 
 
 78 
 81 
 82 
 
 82 
 85 
 90 
 
 88 
 87 
 88 
 
 106 
 108 
 106 
 
 104 
 108 
 109 
 
 109 
 113 
 120 
 
 117 
 116 
 117 
 
 March 
 
 April 
 May 
 June 
 
 July 
 Auff. 
 
 Sept 
 
 Oct 
 Nov. 
 
 Dec 
 
 1792. 
 
 Jan 
 
 ACTUAL PRICES IN MARKET. 
 
 Equated Prices of 4's and 5's to the 
 Price of 3's. 
 
 3 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 4 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 5 per Cents. 
 
 Long 
 Annuities. 
 
 3's. 
 
 4's. 
 
 5's. 
 
 90 -92 
 92 -96* 
 96 -97 
 
 92 -97 
 87 -95 
 91* 
 
 91 
 90 -92* 
 88*-91 
 
 89 -91 
 83 -90* 
 74 -83 
 
 102 -103* 
 103 -107 
 104 -105* 
 
 100 -105 
 97 -101 
 100 -101 
 
 100 -103 
 101 -103 
 100*-102 
 
 100* 
 95 -100 
 88-95 
 
 116* 
 116*-120 
 119 -120 
 
 118*-120 
 118 -119 
 119 -120 
 
 117-118 
 116 -118 
 
 116 -118* 
 113 -118* 
 104 -113^ 
 
 Years' 
 Purchase. 
 26 
 26 
 26 -28 
 
 28 
 26 
 26 -26* 
 
 26 
 26* 
 26 
 
 25* 
 23 -25* 
 21* -23 
 
 91 
 94 
 96 
 
 94 
 92 
 91 
 
 91 
 91 
 90 
 
 90 
 85 
 80 
 
 121 
 
 125 
 128 
 
 125 
 122 
 121 
 
 121 
 
 121 
 120 
 
 120 
 113 
 
 107 
 
 151 
 156 
 160 
 
 156 
 153 
 152 
 
 152: 
 152 
 
 150 
 
 isa 
 
 141 
 133 
 
 Feb 
 
 March 
 
 April 
 May 
 
 June 
 
 July 
 Aug 
 
 Sept 
 Oct 
 
 Nov 
 Dec 
 
60 
 
 On the LOANS raised by ME. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 1793. 
 
 Jan. , 
 Feb. 
 
 Actual Prices in Market. 
 
 New Loans. 
 Actual Prices. 
 
 Equated Prices of 4's and 
 5's to the Price of 3's. 
 
 3 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 4 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 5 per Cents. 
 
 Long 
 Annuities. 
 
 3 per Cent. 
 Scrip. 
 
 3's. 
 
 4's. 
 
 5's. 
 
 78 -73 
 74 -71 
 
 72 -77 
 
 77 -79 
 744-77 
 76 -77 
 
 794-77 
 78 -76 
 734-76 
 
 744-75 
 74 -75 
 74 -75 
 
 92 -89 
 89 
 
 89 -90 
 90 -91 
 
 91 -944 
 93 -94 
 92 -93 
 
 88"-89 
 88 -90 
 
 107 -104 
 104 -102 
 104 -111 
 
 107 -109 
 108 -107 
 108 -109 
 
 111 
 110 -1174 
 106 -105 
 
 1064 
 106 -108 
 109 
 
 Years' 
 Purchase. 
 23 -22 
 
 214-22 
 
 22 
 22 
 
 224 
 224 
 22 
 
 21 
 
 214 
 
 14-2 Pm. 
 1 -14 Pm. 
 1 -14 Pm. 
 
 1 -1| Pm. 
 1 -14 Pm. 
 14-2 Pro. 
 
 14-2 Pm. 
 4 1 Pm. 
 i Pm. 
 
 75 
 72 
 75 
 
 78 
 75 
 76 
 
 78 
 77 
 75 
 
 75 
 75 
 75 
 
 100 
 
 96 
 100 
 
 104 
 100 
 101 
 
 104 
 103 
 100 
 
 100 
 100 
 100 
 
 125 
 120 
 125 
 
 130 
 125 
 126 
 
 130 
 128 
 125 
 
 125 
 125 
 125 
 
 March 
 
 April 
 May 
 June 
 
 July 
 
 August 
 Sept 
 
 Oct 
 
 Nov. 
 
 Dec 
 
 
 1794. 
 
 
 Actual Prices in Market. 
 
 New Loans. 
 Actual Prices. 
 
 Equated Prices of 
 4's and 5's to the 
 Price of 3's. 
 
 3 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 4 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 5 
 
 per Cents. 
 
 Long 
 Annuities. 
 
 3 per Cent. 
 Scrip. 
 
 4 per Cent. 
 Scrip. 
 
 Omnium. 
 
 3's. 
 
 4's. 
 
 5's. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Years' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Purchase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jan 
 
 74 -68 
 
 89 -84 
 
 
 20* 
 
 
 .... 
 
 
 72 
 
 96 
 
 100 
 
 Feb 
 
 67 -65 
 
 84 -83 
 
 ibi 
 
 20 
 
 
 
 
 66 
 
 88 
 
 110 
 
 March 
 
 68 -66 
 
 82 -83 
 
 101 
 
 20 
 
 2 Pm. 
 
 
 
 67 
 
 90 
 
 113 
 
 April 
 
 67 -71 
 
 85 
 
 101-106 
 
 204 
 
 H-2 Pm. 
 
 14-3 Pm. 
 
 2 -64 Pm. 
 
 69 
 
 92 
 
 115 
 
 May.... 
 
 70 -71 
 
 84 -85 
 
 103-104 
 
 20 
 
 2 -3 Pm. 
 
 3 -4 Pm. 
 
 6 -5 Pra. 
 
 70 
 
 93 
 
 117 
 
 June.... 
 
 71 -68 
 
 85 -83 
 
 103-104 
 
 20 
 
 4-14 Pm. 
 
 2 -3 Pm. 
 
 54-3 Pm. 
 
 70 
 
 93 
 
 117 
 
 July.... 
 
 67 -69 
 
 83 -85 
 
 
 20 
 
 1 -14 Pm. 
 
 2 -3 Pm. 
 
 4-3 Pm. 
 
 68 
 
 90 
 
 113 
 
 Aug 
 
 66 -68 
 
 84 -85 
 
 1014 
 
 20 
 
 1 -14 Pm. 
 
 .1 -H Pm. 
 
 
 67 
 
 89 
 
 112 
 
 Sept. 
 
 67 -64| 
 
 85 
 
 102 
 
 20 
 
 1 -14 Pm. 
 
 1 -14 Pm. 
 
 1 Dis. 
 
 65 
 
 87 
 
 108 
 
 Oct 
 
 644-66 
 
 83 
 
 994-100 
 
 
 1 -14 Pm. 
 
 1 -14 Pm. 
 
 
 65 
 
 87 
 
 108 
 
 Nov 
 
 66 -68 
 
 85 -83 
 
 100-102 
 
 194-21 
 
 .... 
 
 
 
 67 
 
 8i) 
 
 112 
 
 Dec 
 
 69 -64 
 
 85 -80 
 
 103-100 
 
 20 -184 
 
 .... 
 
 
 
 65 
 
 87 
 
 108 
 
Appendix M Monthly Market Prices of Stocks, 1791-1800. 61 
 
 1795. 
 
 
 Actual Prices in Market. 
 
 NEW LOANS. 
 ACTUAL PRICES. 
 
 Equated Prices of 
 4's and 5's to the 
 Price of 3's. 
 
 3 per Ceut. 
 Consols. 
 
 4 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 5 
 
 per Cents. 
 
 Long 
 Annuities. 
 
 Omnium. 
 
 3's. 
 
 4's. 
 
 5's. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Years' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Purchase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jan 
 
 65 -61 
 
 81 -79 
 
 99 -96 
 
 19 -18 
 
 
 63 
 
 84 
 
 105 
 
 Feb. ... 
 
 63 -62 
 
 79 -80 
 
 97 -95 
 
 18* 
 
 
 63 
 
 84 
 
 105 
 
 March 
 
 62 -63 
 
 79 
 
 95 
 
 18* 
 
 l*-2 Pm. 
 
 63 
 
 84 
 
 105 
 
 April .. 
 
 62 -65 
 
 78 
 
 95 -99 
 
 184 
 
 l*-5 Pm. 
 
 64 
 
 85 
 
 107 
 
 May... 
 
 65 -f>6 
 
 78 -79 
 
 99 -97 
 
 I8| 
 
 3 -6 Pm. 
 
 65 
 
 87 
 
 108 
 
 June.... 
 
 65 -67 
 
 79 -81 
 
 97*-98* 
 
 m 
 
 6 -9 Pm. 
 
 66 
 
 88 
 
 110 
 
 July... 
 
 67 -70 
 
 81 -83 
 
 
 19 
 
 8 -11 Pm. 
 
 68 
 
 91 
 
 113 
 
 Aug.... 
 
 66 -68 
 
 82 -84 
 
 97 -99 
 
 19*- 20 
 
 12 Pm. 
 
 67 
 
 89 
 
 112 
 
 Sept... 
 
 67 -69 
 
 84 -86 
 
 98 -101 
 
 IH 
 
 
 68 
 
 91 
 
 113 
 
 Get 
 
 69 -67 
 
 84 -85 
 
 100-101 
 
 19 
 
 
 68 
 
 91 
 
 113 
 
 Nov 
 
 67 -68 
 
 83 -86 
 
 101-103 
 
 19 
 
 
 67 
 
 89 
 
 112 
 
 Dec 
 
 68 -70 
 
 83 -87 
 
 101-103 
 
 18*-20 
 
 7 -10 Pm. 
 
 69 
 
 92 
 
 115 
 
 1796. 
 
 
 Actual Prices in Market. 
 
 NEW LOANS. 
 ACTUAL PKICKS. 
 
 Equated Prices of 
 4's and 5's to the 
 Price of 3's. 
 
 3 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 4 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 per Cents. 
 
 Long 
 Annuities. 
 
 Omnium. 
 
 3's. 
 
 4's. 
 
 5's. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Years' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Purchase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jan 
 
 71 -68* 
 
 84*-85* 
 
 104-101 
 
 19* 
 
 9 -10 Pm. 
 
 70 
 
 93 
 
 117 
 
 Feb 
 
 68|-67| 
 
 85*-84 
 
 100-101 
 
 19* 
 
 10-8 Pm. 
 
 67 
 
 89 
 
 113 
 
 March 
 
 67*-70 
 
 85 -85* 
 
 100 
 
 
 9 -11 Pm. 
 
 68 
 
 91 
 
 114 
 
 April .. 
 
 69 -66* 
 
 84 -82* 
 
 100-99 
 
 18* 
 
 11-6 Pm. 
 
 68 
 
 91 
 
 114 
 
 May.... 
 
 66*-62* 
 
 83 -80 
 
 99 -96 
 
 l*-17i 
 
 3* Pm. 
 
 64 
 
 85 
 
 107 
 
 June.... 
 
 62*-64* 
 
 81 -79 
 
 96 -94 
 
 17* 
 
 2 Pm. 
 
 63 
 
 84 
 
 105 
 
 July.... 
 
 64*-60* 
 
 80 -79 
 
 95 -89 
 
 18 -17* 
 
 6 -7 Dis. 
 
 62 
 
 83 
 
 103 
 
 Aug 
 
 60 -58* 
 
 79 -78 
 
 89 -88 
 
 16 -17 
 
 
 59 
 
 79 
 
 98 
 
 Sept. .. 
 
 58 -56 
 
 77 -74 
 
 88 -82 
 
 17 -16 
 
 
 57 
 
 76 
 
 95 
 
 Oct 
 
 60 -57 
 
 
 83 -89 
 
 
 
 58 
 
 77 
 
 97 
 
 Nov 
 
 60 -57 
 
 75-72 
 
 89 83* 
 
 16-16* 
 
 Loyalty 
 
 58 
 
 77 
 
 97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Loan 
 
 57 
 
 76 
 
 95 
 
 Dec 
 
 58 -57* 
 
 7 2* -74 
 
 86 -88 
 
 16 
 
 *Pm.-*dis. 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 On the LOANS raised by MB. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 1797. 
 
 
 Actual Prices in Market. 
 
 New Loans. 
 Actual Prices. 
 
 Equated Prices of 
 4's and 5's to the 
 Price of 3's. 
 
 3 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 4 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 5 
 
 per Cents. 
 
 Long 
 Annuities. 
 
 Loyalty 
 Loan. 
 
 Omnium. 
 
 3's. 
 
 4's. 
 
 5's. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Years' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Purchase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jan 
 
 55 -561 
 
 711-73 
 
 821-84 
 
 16 
 
 4 -5 dis. 
 
 
 55 
 
 73 
 
 92 
 
 Feb 
 
 56 -51 
 
 74 -66 
 
 83 -76 
 
 16 -151 
 
 7 -101 dis. 
 
 
 53 
 
 71 
 
 88 
 
 March 
 
 51 50 
 
 67 
 
 77 -72 
 
 15 
 
 11-151 dis. 
 
 .... 
 
 50 
 
 67 
 
 83 
 
 April .. 
 
 51 -48 
 
 
 73 -76 
 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 67 
 
 83 
 
 May .... 
 
 48 
 
 62-60 
 
 76 -74 
 
 14 
 
 1-2 Pm. 
 
 .... 
 
 48 
 
 65 
 
 81 
 
 June.... 
 
 47 -53 
 
 60 -64 
 
 75 -781 
 
 131-14 
 
 2-lllPm. 
 
 
 49 
 
 66 
 
 80 
 
 July.... 
 
 52 -55 
 
 64 -65 
 
 78 
 
 141-15 
 
 11- 4 Pm. 
 
 
 53 
 
 71 
 
 88 
 
 Aug 
 
 511-521 
 
 64 -651 
 
 75 -77 
 
 15 
 
 .... 
 
 10 Pm. 
 
 51 
 
 68 
 
 85 
 
 Sept.... 
 
 52 -48 
 
 61 -65 
 
 75 -72 
 
 u* 
 
 
 11-14 Pm. 
 
 50 
 
 67 
 
 83 
 
 Oct 
 
 48 -50 
 
 61 -59 
 
 71 -73 
 
 13^ 
 
 
 4 -2 Pm. 
 
 49 
 
 66 
 
 80 
 
 Nov 
 
 49 -48 
 
 59 -591 
 
 72 -71 
 
 131 
 
 
 
 48 
 
 65 
 
 81 
 
 Dec 
 
 48 -49 
 
 59 -60 
 
 72 
 
 13 -131 
 
 
 4 Pm. 
 
 48 
 
 65 
 
 81 
 
 1798. 
 
 
 Actual Prices in Market. 
 
 NEW LOANS. 
 ACTUAL PKICES. 
 
 Equated Prices of 
 4's and 5's to the 
 Price of 3's. 
 
 3 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 4 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 per Cents. 
 
 Long 
 Annuities. 
 
 4- per Cent. 
 Scrip. 
 
 Omnium. 
 
 3's. 
 
 4's. 
 
 5's. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Years' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Purchase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jan 
 
 49J-471 
 
 59 
 
 70 
 
 131 
 
 
 
 48 
 
 65 
 
 81 
 
 Feb 
 
 47 -50 
 
 60 -61 
 
 69 -71 
 
 131-14 
 
 
 .... 
 
 48 
 
 65 
 
 81 
 
 March 
 
 49 -51 
 
 61 -63 
 
 71 -73 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 67 
 
 83 
 
 April .. 
 
 48 -50 
 
 
 71 -74 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 49 
 
 66 
 
 82 
 
 May.... 
 
 48 -481 
 
 58-60 
 
 71 -75 
 
 131 
 
 
 .... 
 
 48 
 
 65 
 
 81 
 
 June.... 
 
 49 -491 
 
 61 -60 
 
 76 
 
 14 
 
 1 -2 Pm. 
 
 
 49 
 
 66 
 
 82 
 
 July... 
 
 49 -50 
 
 61 -63 
 
 74 .75 
 
 14 
 
 1 -2 Pm. 
 
 
 50 
 
 67 
 
 83 
 
 Aug 
 
 49 -50 
 
 64 -66 
 
 76 -78 
 
 14 -15 
 
 3 -7 Pm. 
 
 
 50 
 
 67 
 
 83 
 
 Sept 
 
 49 -51 
 
 65 
 
 77 -79 
 
 14 -15 
 
 5 -7 Pm. 
 
 
 50 
 
 67 
 
 83 
 
 Oct 
 
 51 -53 
 
 67 
 
 80 -82 
 
 
 7 -12 Pm. 
 
 
 52 
 
 69 
 
 87 
 
 Nov 
 
 53 -57 
 
 65 -70 
 
 82 -87 
 
 
 18-20 Pm. 
 
 New Loan. 
 
 55 
 
 73 
 
 92 
 
 Dec 
 
 53 -55 
 
 65 -68 
 
 82 -83 
 
 151 
 
 
 1 Pm.par. 
 
 54 
 
 72 
 
 90 
 
Appendix M.MontUy Market Prices of Stocks, 1791-1800. 63 
 
 1799. 
 
 
 Actual Prices in Market. 
 
 New Loans. 
 Actual Prices. 
 
 Equated Prices of 
 4's and 5's to the 
 Price of 3's. 
 
 3 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 4 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 5 
 
 per Cents. 
 
 Lonj* 
 Annuities. 
 
 Omnium. 
 
 3's. 
 
 4's. 
 
 5'S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Purchase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Years' 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jan 
 
 55 -53 
 
 66 -68 
 
 80 -82 
 
 15* 
 
 1 Dis. 
 
 54 
 
 72 
 
 90 
 
 Feb 
 
 52 -54 
 
 68 -70 
 
 81 -84 
 
 15|-16 
 
 * dis 1 Pm. 
 
 53 
 
 71 
 
 88 
 
 March 
 
 53 -54 
 
 70 -71 
 
 82 -84 
 
 16 
 
 
 53 
 
 71 
 
 88 
 
 April .. 
 
 53 -55 
 
 70 
 
 82 -85 
 
 16 
 
 
 54 
 
 72 
 
 90 
 
 May... 
 
 55 -56 
 
 69 -70 
 
 88 -86 
 
 16 
 
 .... 
 
 55 
 
 73 
 
 92 
 
 June.... 
 
 56 -62 
 
 70 -76 
 
 87 -88 
 
 16 -17 
 
 4 -8 Pm. 
 
 58 
 
 77 
 
 97 
 
 July... 
 
 61 -66 
 
 76 -83 
 
 90 -96 
 
 m-j9 
 
 6 -12 Pm. 
 
 63 
 
 84 
 
 105 
 
 Aug. .... 
 
 62 -68 
 
 81 -86 
 
 93 -99 
 
 19 
 
 9 -20 Pm. 
 
 65 
 
 87 
 
 108 
 
 Sept .. 
 
 69 -61 
 
 86 -83 
 
 94 -98 
 
 i9* 
 
 20-8 Pm. 
 
 67 
 
 89 
 
 112 
 
 Got 
 
 61 -58 
 
 76^-74 
 
 98 -88 
 
 17* 
 
 11-3 Pm. 
 
 60 
 
 80 
 
 100 
 
 Nov 
 
 59 -63 
 
 74 -77 
 
 91 -94 
 
 u* 
 
 5 -10 Pm. 
 
 61 
 
 81 
 
 101 
 
 Dec. ... 
 
 61 -62 
 
 76 -77 
 
 90 -92 
 
 18 
 
 10 Pm. 
 
 61 
 
 81 
 
 101 
 
 1800. 
 
 
 Actual Prices in Market. 
 
 New Loans. 
 Actual Prices. 
 
 Equated Prices of 4's and 
 5's to the Price of 3's. 
 
 3 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 4 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 5 per Cents. 
 
 Long 
 Annuities. 
 
 Omnium. 
 
 3's. 
 
 4's. 
 
 5's. 
 
 Jan 
 Feb 
 March 
 
 April 
 
 60|-63i 
 60*-62* 
 
 62 -63 
 
 63 -64 
 63 -64 
 64 -64* 
 
 62 -65 
 63 -65 
 64^-65 
 
 63 -67 
 64 -63 
 64 -62* 
 
 76^-78 
 77^-80 
 80 -81 
 
 82 -83 
 81 -82 
 81 -82 
 
 81 -84 
 83 -85 
 84 -85 
 
 80 -84 
 80 -81 
 78 -80 
 
 91 
 92 -94 
 94 -95 
 
 96 -98 
 98 
 98 -99 
 
 96 -99 
 97 -99 
 98 -99 
 
 98 -99 
 99 -99 
 98 
 
 Years' 
 Purchase. 
 18 
 18 
 18* 
 
 19 
 18* 
 
 It* 
 19* 
 19* 
 
 19* 
 
 19 
 
 18 
 
 9-10 Pm. 
 H-2 Pm. 
 1 -2 Pm. 
 
 2 -3 Pm. 
 H-2 Pm. 
 1 Pm. 
 
 2 -4* Pm. 
 3 -5 Pm. 
 4*-6 Pm. 
 
 3*-4J Pm. 
 2 -4 Pm. 
 -3 Pm. 
 
 61 
 61 
 62 
 
 63 
 63 
 64 
 
 63 
 64 
 65 
 
 65 
 64 
 63 
 
 81 
 
 81 
 83 
 
 84 
 83 
 
 85 
 
 83 
 85 
 87 
 
 87 
 85 
 83 
 
 101 
 101 
 103 
 
 105 
 103 
 107 
 
 103 
 107 
 108 
 
 108 
 107 
 103 
 
 May 
 June 
 
 July 
 
 Auer. . 
 
 Sept 
 
 Oct 
 Nov 
 Dec 
 
 
64 On the LOANS raised by ME. PITT, 1793-1802. 
 
 N. DETAILED COMPUTATIONS of the Effect Produced during a Period of 
 Years by the ANNUAL SAVING of INTEREST on Loans Contracted in Low 
 RATE Stocks as compared with HIGH RATE Stocks. 
 
 This Appendix refers to the Table which, at page 29 of the text, 
 shows the comparative results of the Ten Largest Loans, (1793-1801,) 
 as actually raised in Low-Rate Stocks, and as they would have been 
 raised in Five per cents., carrying the computation to the 1st January, 
 1826, as a date which may be considered as a fair mean date. 
 
 The two following detailed calculations, relating to the Loan of 
 4,500,0002, of llth March, 1793, and the Loan of 18,000,0007., of 
 23rd February, 1795, will sufficiently illustrate the mode in which the 
 general result of 27,256,OOOZ., in favour of the Low-Rate Method (see 
 page 29 ante) is arrived at. Similar calculations were made for the 
 other Eight Cases, but it is not considered necessary to print more 
 than the two following examples; and the detailed form in which the 
 several steps of the process are explained in the computations pre- 
 clude the necessity of further elucidation of that process here. 
 
 As a matter of fact the 5 per cents, were reduced to 4 per cents., 
 from 1st January, 1823 ; the 4 per cents, to 3| per cents., from 1st 
 January, 1831 ; the 3 per cents, to 3^'s, from 1st January, 1845 ; 
 and the 3^'s to 3 per cents., from 1st January, 1855. There were 
 some fractional differences of date ; but for the present general pur- 
 pose they may be disregarded. In truth, therefore, 5 per cents, 
 created in, say, 1795 were not actually reduced to 3's till sixty years 
 afterwards (1st January, 1855). 
 
 Now to follow out the calculation through all the several stages 
 of reduction of interest would, for the present object, be a needless 
 refinement, and it seems to me that all substantial purposes will be 
 served by taking the 1st January, 1826, as a Mean Date, on which to 
 assume the reduction of the 5 per cents, to 3 per cents. 
 
 It also seems to me that Six per cent, is a fair and proper rate of 
 interest to assume in reckoning the accumulations. During the War 
 money left in the pockets of the people was certainly worth 6 per cent, 
 to the State. Some objections may be made to the rate of 80 as the 
 price of stock assumed in the calculation ; and it may be said that 
 the 1st January, 1826, was a period of great depression. My reply 
 is that, taken as a whole, I believe that I have put the case fairly. 
 It is quite open to any one to carry out the computation in all its 
 details, but I do not think that his result would differ very much from 
 mine. 
 
 It will be seen by the prices given in Appendix M, and the Rates 
 of Interest given in Appendix B, that the Long Annuities always 
 bore a low relative price compared with Consols, and nearly always a 
 low relative price as regards 4 per cents., and even 5 per cents ; and 
 we are justified in assuming, even by the evidence contained in the 
 present Paper, that it would have been impracticable, perhaps impos- 
 sible, to have raised the Loans of 1793-1801 to a greater extent in 
 Long Annuities than was actually accomplished. If this part of the 
 case could be more fully investigated I am led to believe that the 
 conclusion now suggested would be amply sustained. The Long 
 Annuities answered very well as a supplemental element of the Fund- 
 
 
Appendix N. Detailed Computation of Annual Saving. 65 
 
 ing, but they could not have borne the weight of any considerable 
 part of the operation. Asa matter of mere calculation a very plausi- 
 ble case may be made in favour of Long Annuities as a practical mode 
 of borrowing; but we cannot too constantly remember that, in nego- 
 tiating public loans, there are contractors and stock-jobbers to be 
 consulted as well as ingenious calculations to be made ; and, on this 
 point, the passage from Mr. Huskisson's speech of 3rd March, 1813, 
 on the state of the Finances and the Sinking Fund (quoted in the 
 text at page 28 ante), should be borne in mind. 
 
 LOAN 23 FEBRUARY, 1795 ..18,000,000. 
 
 STOCK ACTUALLY CREATED. "'^rea^d Anmnty 
 
 3's. 4's. 5's. 3's. 4's. 5's. 
 
 , s. d. ( for 
 
 [4 16 2 18,000,000 6,000,000 nil. 540.000 240,000 nil. 85,500J 65 
 
 x , v I yrs. 
 
 Totals... 
 
 24,000,000 Stock. 
 
 865,500 Interest. 
 
 EstimatedAverage 
 Rate at which the 
 Loan could have 
 been raised in 5 
 Per Cents, say 
 110 Stock ... 
 
 5 10 . 
 
 19,800,000 
 
 990,000 
 
 Differences 4,200,000 Stock. 
 
 124,500 Interest. 
 
 Amount at 6 per cent, of 124.500/. per 
 annum (1795-1825) for 31 years, = 
 10,558, OOO/. money, which con- 
 verted into 3 per cent. Stock at 80 
 as on 1st Jan. 1826, gives 
 
 13,197,000 
 
 Difference 
 
 8,997,000 Stock. 
 
 From which deduct 2,035,000 
 
 Leaves Net Difference AGAINST the! 
 Five Per Cent. Method as on 1st) 6,962,000 Stock. 
 Jan., 1826 ) 
 
 Being the value at 3$ per cent, on 1st Jan., 
 1826, of 85,5001. per annum Long An- 
 nuity, having34 years to run = 1 ,628, OOO/. 
 money, which at 80 gives 3 Per Cent. 
 Stock 2, 035, OOO/. 
 
66 On the LOANS raised ly MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 LOAN, 11 MARCH, 1793. 4,500,000. 
 
 STOCK ACTUALLY CREATED. 
 
 Interest on Stock 
 created. 
 
 Long 
 Annuity. 
 
 
 3's. 4's. 
 
 5's. 
 
 3's. 4's. 
 
 5's. 
 
 
 Average Rate ac- 
 tually paid 
 
 *.d. 
 434 6,250,000 nil. 
 
 
 nil. 
 
 
 187,500 nil. 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 
 nil. 
 
 
 
 nil. 
 
 ,> 
 
 Totals 6,250,000 
 
 Stock. 
 
 187.500 
 
 Interest. 
 
 
 Estimated Average"\ 
 
 Rate at which the 
 
 Loan could have 
 been raised in 5 
 
 550 = 4,725,000 
 
 ,, 
 
 236,250 
 
 
 
 
 Per Cents, say 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 105 Stock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Differences - 1,525,000 Stock. 
 
 Amount at 6 per cent, of 48,750J. per"] 
 annum (1793-1825) for 33 years = I 
 5,931,000/. money, which converted \ 5,931 ,000 
 into 3 per cent. Stock at 80 as on I 
 1st Jan. 1826, gives J 
 
 Net Difference AGAINST the Five Per) 
 Cent. Method, as on 1st Jan. 1826 I 
 
 oon 
 ' uu 
 
 + 48,750 Interest. 
 
 (0.) SIMILAR COMPUTATIONS AS REGARDS THE LOAN FOR IRELAND, OF 8,000,000. 
 
 1 MARCH, 1847. 
 
 Average rate 
 of Interest. 
 
 STOCK CHEATED. 
 
 Annual Interest. 
 
 
 3's. Si's. 
 
 3's. Si's. 
 
 As actually raised in 3 per cents., at)* 1* ' 
 111-7 Stock, per 100/. money f 3 
 
 
 8,938,000 
 
 
 268,156 
 
 
 8,938,000 Stock. 
 
 268,156 Interest. 
 
 As estimated to he raised in 3 per) 
 
 
 
 cents., at 107'5 Stock, per 100/. >3 15 3 
 
 = 8,602,000 ,, 
 
 301,072 
 
 money j 
 
 
 
 
 336,900 Stock. 
 
 ,+ 32,916 
 
 Amount of 32,91 G/. per ann. in 15<v 
 
 
 ~ 
 
 years, at 5 per cent, per ann.,1 
 converted into 3 per cent. Stock, at j 
 
 770,000 
 
 
 sav 90 .. 
 
 
 
 Surplus in favour of 3 Per Cent Method .... 434,000 Stock. 
 
 This Appendix O is referred to in the text (page 32, ante), and 
 shows the detail of the calculations the result of which justifies us in 
 assuming, that in the course of fifteen years, the difference in favour of 
 the 3 per cent. Method of borrowing would amount to434,OOOZ. stock, 
 at 90, or say 391,OOOZ., money. It will be seen, that the calculation, 
 in this case, is precisely the same in principle as the calculations 
 referred to at length -in the last Appendix N. 
 
Appendix P. Mr. Orellier's Details. 67 
 
 P. STATEMENT in Detail of the TERMS of the SEVERAL LOANS 1793-1801, 
 as given by MR. GRELLTER in the Third Edition (1812) of his WORK on 
 
 I have already referred in the text (page 8) to the very useful 
 book by Mr. Grellier, intitled " Terms of all the Loans which have 
 been raised for the Public Service," &c., originally published in 1805, 
 and the third and last edition of which appeared under the Editor- 
 ship of " R. W. Wade, Secretary to the Committee of the Stock 
 Exchange," in 1812. 
 
 As this book is now very rarely met with, I am glad of the oppor- 
 tunity of embracing in this Appendix those portions of it which relate 
 to the Loans of 1793-1801. I have printed the several statements 
 precisely as they are given by Mr. Grellier, venturing only upon a few 
 verbal alterations not worth particularizing. I may say, however, 
 that there is some difficulty in ascertaining in all cases the precise 
 dates on which the Loans were finally contracted for by Mr. Pitt; 
 for, as regards most of those transactions, the Minister gradually 
 adopted the course, as on the whole most convenient, of arranging 
 conditionally for the Loan before introducing his Budget. Pracr 
 tically, therefore, the date of the Loan was some days earlier than its 
 public and formal announcement. I have taken some pains to settle 
 these exact dates, and I hope generally with success 
 
 1793 March. 
 Loan of 4,500,0002. 
 
 " For every 72 1. Money advanced 
 
 100Z. Stock, 3 per cent. Consols; the interest from 5th Jan. 1793. 
 
 The instalments were 10 per cent, on 4th April, 10 per cent, on 
 31st May, on 19th July, and on 16th August ; 15 per cent, on 27th 
 September, on 8th November, on 13th December ; and finally on 24th 
 January, 1794. 
 
 Those who paid in the whole on or before the 12th December 
 were allowed discount at 3 per cent, per annum, from the day of 
 completing their payment to the 24th January, 1794. 
 
 It was originally intended to have raised this Loan on 4 or 5 per 
 cent, stock ; but the embarrassed state of commercial credit having 
 caused a scarcity of money the minister only received offers from one 
 set of subscribers : and, as they preferred 3 per cents, it was judged 
 expedient to conclude the bargain in that stock at the above price, 
 which was between 4 and 5 per cent, under the current price. It 
 was intended that the Commissioners for liquidating the Debt should 
 have been admitted to subscribe for 1,650,OOOZ., which the amount 
 of the fund at that time would have enabled them to have done ; but 
 this measure was relinquished from the considerations that the daily 
 purchases made by the Commissioners contribute materially to keep 
 up the price of stocks ; and that by such subscription the period 
 when the 5 per cents, would become redeemable would be delayed. 
 
 Mr. Pitt admitted that the terms were much more disadvanta- 
 geous to the public than might have been expected ; but, having done 
 everything in his power to excite a competition without effect, they 
 were the best he could procure." 
 
 js 2 
 
68 On the LOANS raised by MK. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 1794. 5th February. 
 
 LOAN of 11,000,OOOZ. 
 
 " For every 100Z. Money advanced 
 
 ]OOZ. Stock, 3 per cent. Consols ; the interest from 5 Jan. 1794. 
 
 25Z. Stock, 4 per cents. . . ditto 10 Oct. 1793. 
 
 Us. 5d. Long Annuity for 66^ years, ditto ditto 
 
 The instalments were 10 per cent, deposit ;'10 per cent, on 15th 
 April, on 6th June, and on 18th July ; 15 per cent, on 29th August, 
 on 17th October, on 28th November, and finally on 13th January, 
 1795. 
 
 Those who paid in the whole at any time before the 27th of 
 November were allowed discount at 3 per cent, per annum, on the 
 sum paid in advance, from the day of completing their payment to the 
 13th January, 1795 ; and if the whole of their contribution was paid 
 on or before the 2nd of April were entitled to receive the half-year's 
 annuity, due the 5th April, on the 4 per cents, and Long Annuity ; 
 or if the whole contribution was paid on or before the 2nd July, the 
 7th October, or the 2nd of January, were entitled to receive the 
 respective half-year's annuities then becoming due." 
 
 1795. 23n? February. 
 
 LOAN of 18,000,0002. 
 
 " For every 100Z. Money advanced 
 
 100Z. Stock 3 per cent. Consols ; the interest from 5th January. 
 
 33Z. 6s. 8d., Stock 4 per cents. ditto 10 Oct. 1794. 
 
 8s. 6d. Long Annuity for 65 years; ditto 10 Oct. 1794. 
 
 With an agreement that for every 100Z. the contributor should 
 be at liberty to contribute 33Z. 6s. 8d. to every Loan not exceeding 
 6,000,OOOZ. 'for the service of the Emperor ; and in case no such Loan 
 should be guaranteed by Parliament should have a further Long 
 Annuity of 4s. 6d. for every 100Z. ; or if the Loan should be less than 
 6,000,000?. a further Annuity in the proportion of Gd. per cent, for 
 every 750,OOOZ. the proposed Loan should fall short of 6,000,0002. 
 The Imperial Loan was afterwards fixed at 4,600,OOOZ ; the additional 
 Long Annuity granted according to the agreement was therefore Is. 
 per cent. 
 
 The instalments were 10. per cent, deposit ; 10 per cent, on 17th 
 April, on 12th June, and on 17th July ; 15 per cent, on 28th August, 
 on 23rd October, on 27th November, and finally on 15th January, 
 1796. 
 
 Those who paid in the whole before the 20th March were allowed 
 discount at 3 per cent, per annum, from 23rd January, 1795, to the 
 15th January, 1796 ; and those who paid in the whole after that time, 
 but before the 27th November, were allowed discount from the day 
 of completing the subscription to the 15th January, 1796. 
 
 The Imperial Loan being 4,600,OOOZ. the subscribers to the above 
 Loan for every 100Z. contributed the further sum of 25Z. lls. lrf., 
 towards the Imperial Loan, the terms of the latter being for every 
 100Z. advanced 83Z. 6s. 8d., 3 per cents, and an Annuity of 5Z. for 
 25 years." 
 
Appendix P. Mr. Grellier's Details. 69 
 
 1795. 1th December. 
 LOAN of 18,000,OOOJ. 
 
 " For every 100/. Money advanced 
 
 120/. Stock, 3 percent. Consols ; the interest from 5th July, 1795. 
 
 251. Stock, 3 per cent. Eeduced from the 10 Oct. 1795. 
 
 6s, 6d. Long Annuity for 64^ years ; ditto. 
 
 The instalments were 10 per cent. 10th December, 1795 ; 10 per 
 cent. 20th January, 1796, on 18th March, and on 20th May ; 15 per 
 cent. 011 22nd July, on 9th September, on llth November, and finally 
 on 16th December. 
 
 Those who paid in the whole before 30th December, 1795, were 
 allowed discount at 3 per cent, per annum, from the day of com- 
 pleting the payment to the 16th December, 1796 ; and those who 
 paid in the whole after 30th December, 1795, and before 10th Novem- 
 ber, 1796, were allowed the usual discount 3 per cent, per annum. 
 
 The terms of this Loan excited considerable discussion ; and it 
 appeared on an investigation of the business, that it might have been 
 negotiated at 3s. Long Annuity per cent, less; but the Minister 
 thought himself under some obligation to accede to the proposal 
 of the subscribers to the last Loan. The terms were settled 25th 
 November, 1795, a short time previous to which the Commissioners 
 for liquidating the Debt, who had hitherto made all their purchases 
 in 3 per cents., began to purchase in the/ow per cents. ; a measure, 
 which however proper in itself, certainly was not very judiciously 
 timed, if it was then intended to make the Loan wholly in 3 per cents. 
 Upon a Message to Parliament (relative to peace), soon after the 
 Loan was fixed ; and the Commissioners resuming their purchases 
 in 3 per cents., the Omnium got up to 10 and 11 per cent, pre- 
 mium." 
 
 1796. May. 
 LOAN of 7,500,000?. 
 
 " For every 100/. Money advanced 
 
 120?. Stock, 3 per cent. Consols ; the interest from 5 Jan. '96. 
 
 25Z., Stock 3 per cent. Eeduced ; ditto 5th April. 
 
 5s. 6d. Long Annuity for 63| years ; ditto 5th April. 
 
 The holders of Exchequer bills, issued pursuant to the Exchequer- 
 bill Acts, of the preceding year, or on the Vote of Credit, or the 
 Consolidated Fund, were at liberty to pay in the same as cash, in 
 making their payments on this Loan. 
 
 The instalments were 10 per cent, on 26th April ; 10 per cent, 
 on 27th May, on 28th June, and on 29th July ; 15 per cent, on 19th 
 August, on 23rd September, and finally on 26th October. 
 
 Those who paid in the whole at any time on or before the 22nd 
 September, were allowed discount, at 3 per cent, per annum, from 
 the day of completing their payment to the 26th of October. 
 
 The Omnium was at first at a premium of 2^ per cent., but soon 
 fell to a discount, which, becoming considerable, the holders of the 
 Omnium pawned at the Bank petitioned the Directors to make the 
 last payment, and hold the Omnium for some time. The direct object 
 of the petition was refused, but it was agreed to admit the repayment 
 
70 On the LOANS raised by MB. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 of the sums advanced by the Bank on the Omnium receipts, by three 
 instalments, one4hird on the 21st October, which was the period 
 limited, in the bond given by the parties pawning, for the re-paynient 
 of the whole money advanced ; one-third on the 26th November ; 
 and one-third on the 22nd December ; the parties paying 5 per cent, 
 interest, and making the last payment on the Loan themselves." 
 
 1796.!^ December. 
 18,000,OOOJ. LOYALTY LOAN. 
 
 " For every 100/. Money advanced 
 
 112Z. 105., 5 per cents., from 10th October, 1796, irredeemable, un- 
 less with the consent of the Proprietors, until the expiration of three 
 years after the 5 per cents, existing at the time this Loan was made, 
 shall have been redeemed or paid off; but with an option, on the part 
 of the Proprietors, to be paid at par, at their desire, on giving six 
 months previous notice, at any shorter period, not less than two 
 years from the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace. The payment, 
 in either case, to be made in money, or, at the option of the holder, 
 in 3 per cent, stock, at the rate of 133Z. 6s. Sd. t 3 per cent. Consols, 
 for every 100Z. 5 per cents. 
 
 The instalments were 10 per cent. 13th January ; 10 per cent. 
 17th March, on 21st April, and on 2nd June ; 15 per cent, on 21st 
 July, on 25th August, on 28th September, and finally on 31st October. 
 
 Those who paid before 13th January were allowed discount at 
 5 per cent, per annum to that time, and on 90/. discount at 3 per 
 cent, from 13th January to the 31st October. Those who paid in 
 the whole between the 13th January and the 17th March were 
 allowed discount at 3 per cent, per annum on 10Z. from 17th March, 
 and on 80Z. from the day of completing their payment to 31st 
 October. Those who paid in the whole between the 17th March and 
 the 28th September were allowed the usual discount, at 3 per cent., 
 from the day of completing their pavment to the 31st of October. 
 
 The subscription to this Loan, since known by the name of the 
 Loyalty Loan, was opened 1st December, 1796, and before twelve 
 o'clock on Monday the 5th the whole 18,000,000/. was subscribed, 
 and much more might have been obtained." 
 
 1797. 26th April. 
 LOAN of 14,500,0002. 
 
 " Eor every 100Z. Money advanced 
 
 1251. Stock 3 per cent. Consols; interest from 5th Jan. 1797. 
 
 50Z. Stock 3 per cents. Eeduced ditto 5th April. 
 
 201. Stock 4 per cents. . ditto 5th April. 
 
 6s. 6d Long Annuity for 62f years, ditto 5th April, 
 upon condition that the Subscribers should be entitled to contribute 
 in proportion to an intended Loan of 3,500,OOOZ. for the Emperor of 
 Germany, and that, if provision should not be made for an Imperial 
 Loan to the amount proposed, a deduction of 6d. per cent, should be 
 made from the Long Annuity of 6s. 6d. for every million that the 
 Imperial Loan should be less than three millions and a half. 
 
Appendix P. Mr. Grellier's Details. 71 
 
 The instalments were 10 per cent, on 28th April ; 10 per cent. 
 oa 26th May, on 21st June, on 18th July, and on 15th August ; 
 15 per cent on 15th September, on 17th October, on 17th November, 
 and finally on 29th December. 
 
 Those who paid in the whole on or before the 17th November 
 were allowed discount at 4 per cent, per annum, from the day of 
 completing their contribution to the 2Uth December ; and those who 
 paid in any part of the contribution before the days fixed for pay- 
 ment of the same, were allowed discount at 5 per cent, on the sum 
 so paid in advance, from the day of payment to the days on which 
 such sum would have become payable. 
 
 The Imperial Loan being fixed at 1,620,0002. the Long Annuity 
 was reduced to 6s. per cent., according to the agreement. The terms 
 of the Imperial Loan were 226Z. 105. Imperial 3 per cents, for every 
 . advanced ; interest from 31st January." 
 
 1798. ls May. 
 LOAN of 17,000,000^. 
 
 every 100?. Money advanced 
 
 1502. Stock 3 per cent. Consols ; the interest from 5th Jan. '98. 
 
 501. 3 per cent, lieduced ; ditto 5th April. 
 
 4s. lid. Long Annuity for 61j years ditto 5th April. 
 
 The instalments were 10 per cent, on 30th April ; 15 per cent, 
 on 23rd May ; 15 per cent, on 22nd June, on 20th July, and on 
 23rd August ; 10 per cent, on 21st September, on 23rd October, 
 anclfinally on 23rd November. 
 
 Those who paid in the whole on or before 22nd October were 
 allowed discount skfive per cent, per annum, from the day of com- 
 pleting their contribution to the 23rd November. The terms were 
 settled on the 23rd April. 
 
 Exchequer-bills issued pursuant to 37 Geo. III., c. 10, and e. 
 144, were receivable as cash on the deposit or first instalment, also 
 3,000,000?. which had been raised by Exchequer-bills in anticipation 
 of the Loan, was repaid by making the bills receivable to the amount 
 of 1,200,000?. on the second instalment, and 1,800,000?. on the third 
 instalment. The Bank was likewise authorized to retain 3,000,000^. 
 which they had advanced on Exchequer-bills out of the fourth, fifth, 
 and sixth instalments. 
 
 The Assessed Taxes were charged with the interest and redemp- 
 tion of a capital equal to the stock created by eight millions of this 
 Loan, which charge was afterwards transferred to the Income-tax; but 
 the subscribers had nothing to do with this arrangement, the whole 
 loan being charged as usual on the consolidated fund, two millions of 
 the sum borrowed was for the service of Ireland." 
 
 1798. 7th December. 
 LOAN of 3,000,000?. 
 
 " For every 100?. Money advanced 
 
 100?. stock 3 per cent. Consols, the interest from 5th Jan. '99. 
 
 And 87?. 9s. Qd. 3 per cent. Reduced, ditto 10th Oct. '98. 
 
72 
 
 On the LOANS raised ly MK. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 The instalments were 10 per cent, on 14th December, 1798 ; 30 
 per cent, on 22nd January, 1799, on 8th February, and on 22nd 
 February. 
 
 As the whole sum was thus to be advanced within a short period, 
 no discount was allowed for prompt payment. The extent of the 
 Loan was expected to have been sixteen or eighteen millions, but it 
 was thought proper to negotiate only 3 millions, and to defer the 
 remainder a lew months, till the returns on the Income-tax were 
 obtained. On the 7th December, the day on which the terms of the 
 Loan were settled, 3 per cent Consols were 52, the offers that were 
 made were as follows : 
 
 
 Consols. 
 
 Reduced. 
 
 Robarts, Goldsmid, and E. P. Salomons . . . 
 
 100 
 
 s. d. 
 90 10 
 
 Boyd and Company 
 
 100 
 
 89 13 6 
 
 J. Battye, tor the Stock Exchange 
 
 100 
 
 89 10 
 
 D. Giles 
 
 100 
 
 88 15 
 
 Boldero, for the Bankers . . 
 
 100 
 
 87 9 6 
 
 
 
 
 1799. 5th June. 
 LOAN of 15,000,0002. 
 
 " For every 100/. Money advanced 
 
 123/. Stock 3 per cent. Consols, the interest from 5th July, 1799. 
 
 50/. ditto Reduced ditto 5th April. 
 
 The instalments were 10 per cent, on llth June ; 15 per cent, on 
 19th July ; 15 per cent, on 20th August ; 15 per cent, on 20th Sep- 
 tember, on 22nd October, on 22nd November, and finally on 20th 
 December. 
 
 Those who paid in the whole on or before the 21st November 
 were allowed discount at five per cent, per annum, from the day of 
 completing their contribution to the 20th December. The whole 
 sum allowed for discount was 162,612Z. 9s. 2d. 
 
 This Loan was settled 5th June ; Mr. Pitt proposed the above 
 terms, and left the contractors to offer on Long Annuity ; but three of 
 the parites agreeing to take it without any Long Annuity it was 
 divided equally between them. The Omnium experienced great vari- 
 ations ; the premium was at first 4 and 5 per cent., on 20th August 
 it had risen to 19}, and on the 3rd September was at 22 ; it soon 
 after fell considerably, and on the 14th October was at 4, 2J, 3f ; 
 but on 18th November had got up again to 12. 
 
 Three Millions of the sum borrowed was for the service of the 
 Government of Ireland. The Income Tax was charged with the inte- 
 rest and redemption of a capital equal to eleven millions of this 
 Loan." 
 
Appendix P. Mr. Grellier't Details. 73 
 
 1800. 2lst February. 
 LOAN of 20,500,0002. 
 
 " For every 100/. Money advanced 
 
 110Z. stock 3 per cent Consols, the interest from 5th Jan. 1800. 
 
 47Z. ditto Eeduced ditto 10th Oct. 1799. 
 
 The instalments were 10 per cent, on 28th February ; 10 per 
 cent, on 10th April; 10 per cent, on 16th May; 10 per cent, on 
 20th June ; 10 per cent, on 18th July ; 10 per cent, on 22nd Au- 
 gust ; 10 pe.- cent, on 19th September, on 17th October, on 21st 
 November, and finally on 12th December. 
 
 Those who paid in the whole on or before the 20th November 
 were allowed discount at 4 per cent, per annum, from the day of 
 completing their contribution to 12th December. The whole sum 
 allowed for discount was 176,6727. 18s. Qd. 
 
 The contract was made on the 21st February. There were five 
 lists formed, but three of them viz., Messrs. Robarts and Company, 
 Sir F. Baring, and Mr. Giles, bid the same terms, by agreement, and 
 took the Loan between them. The other offers were ; 
 
 
 Consols. 
 
 Eeduced. 
 
 The Bankers , 
 
 110 
 
 51f 
 
 The Committee of the Stock Exchange 
 
 110 
 
 49 
 
 
 
 
 Notwithstanding the high terms on which the loan was taken, it 
 bore a premium of 2^ per cent, immediately. The premium did not, 
 however, at any time get above 7 per cenir., and it was at this price, 
 only for a day or two, towards the end of September. 
 
 'Two millions of the sum borrowed was for the service of Ireland. 
 The Income-tax w r as charged with the interest and redemption of a 
 capital equal to the stock created by 13^ millions of this loan." 
 
 1801. IGtk February. 
 
 LOAN of 28,000,000^. 
 
 " For every 100Z. money advanced 
 
 125Z. stock 3 per cent. Consols, from 5th January, 1801. 
 
 501. 15s. ditto Eeduced, from 10th October, 1800. 
 
 The instalments were 10 per cent, on 20th February, on 17th 
 April, on 15th May, and on 19th June ; 15 per cent, on 17th July ; 
 10 per cent, on 21st August, on 18th September ; 15 per cent, on 
 16th October ; and finally 10 per cent, on llth December, 1801. 
 
 Those, who paid in the whole on or before the 15th October, 
 were allowed discount at 5 per cent, per annum from the day of com- 
 pleting their contribution to the llth of December. 
 
 The terms of this Loan were settled on the 16th of February, 
 and it was taken between two lists. The other offers were as 
 follows : 
 
74 
 
 On the LOANS raised by MB. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 
 Consols. 
 
 Reduced. 
 
 The Bankers 
 
 125 
 
 57 
 
 Newnham Everett and Co. 
 
 125 
 
 56 
 
 Smith Payne and Smiths 
 
 125 
 
 56 
 
 The Committee of the Stock Exchange 
 
 125 
 
 53 
 
 
 
 
 The Omnium was at first at a premium of 3 per cent. ; but, on the 
 24th of February, was at 1^, and on the 4th of March at only f ; 
 about three weeks after it got up to 6, and on the 17th of April to 
 10, from which time it fluctuated between 5 and 10^ till the 2nd of 
 October, when, on the signing of the preliminaries of peace being 
 known, it rose from 6f , the price of the preceding day, to 18 per 
 cent., and on the 20th of October was at 25 per cent, premium." 
 
 Q. GENERAL VIEW of all the Loans raised during the ENTIRE PERIOD of 
 the War, or from 1793 to 1815 ; and Computations as to the General Com- 
 parative Effect of raising the Extra Expenditure by Loans or by Supplies 
 within the Year. 
 
 There are two valuable Tables (at pages 422 and 445) in 
 Mr. McCulloch's Treatise on Taxation and the Funding System, 
 which taken together, and with the addition of a few supplemental 
 columns, present perhaps the most complete and concise view to be 
 met with of all the Loans of the entire period of the War of 1793- 
 1815. Both Tables are compiled from Parliamentary Papers, and 
 are believed to exhibit the facts as accurately as the state of the 
 accounts in the several departments admits. These two Tables are 
 included in this Appendix, and are marked I. and II. 
 
 Table I. is founded upon the Table at page 445 of Mr. McCulloch's 
 Treatise, and presents a general view of the total operations of each 
 year as regards Money raised, Capital Funded, the Annual Charge of 
 the Loans in the form of Dividends and Long Annuity, and the 
 operations of the Sinking Fund ; and in two special columns, 4 and 
 11, statements will be found (in col. 4) of the Average Amount 
 of Stock given in each year for the money actually raised in that 
 year ; and (in col. 11) of the average rate of Interest paid for the 
 money so obtained. These columns are useful, as reducing the 
 general results into a form more intelligible and concise perhaps than 
 any other. 
 
 The general result of the Table (I.) is, that from 1793 to 1816 
 the Money raised and the Stock created were as follows : 
 
Appendix Q. General View of all the Loans, 1793-181$. 75 
 
 1793-1816. 
 
 Money Actually 
 Raised. 
 
 Capitals Funded. 
 
 Annual Charge, 
 
 Actually raised 
 
 mils. 
 
 584,87 
 
 mils. 
 879,29 
 
 mils. 
 30,17 
 
 Operation of Sinking) 
 Fund ) 
 
 188,52 
 
 302,91 
 
 9,17 
 
 Leaving 
 
 396,35 
 
 576,38 
 
 21,00 
 
 The Table has been divided into groups of years corresponding, 
 as far as possible, with the operation of certain important causes 
 affecting the War, or the mode of raising the Supplies. The years, 
 for example, 1793-1797 was the period of greatest difficulty, and 
 the period also when the largest part ol the Supplies was raised by 
 Loan. The following is the Table 
 
 TABLE I. Loans 1792-1816. Money actually Raised ; Capitals Funded ; Annual Charge ; 
 and Sinking Fund Operations distinguishing the whole period into terms of years.. 
 (Compiled principally from Parl. Paper, No. 145, Session 1822.) 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 i 4 
 
 5 
 
 6 I 7 
 
 8 
 
 9 10 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 Capitals Funded, 
 
 Annual Charge on Capitals 
 Funded. 
 
 SINKING FUND 
 OPERATIONS. 
 
 Average 
 Kate 
 
 MONEY 
 
 KAISKD. 
 
 Years. 
 
 and 
 Rate Per Cent, 
 of Capital 
 for 
 
 Divi- 
 dends 
 
 Long 
 
 Total. 
 
 Portions 
 of 
 Loans paic 1 
 
 Dividends 
 on Stock 
 Purchased 
 
 Stock of 
 all kinds 
 Purchased 
 
 of 
 Interest 
 Paid 
 
 
 
 100 Money. 
 
 on 
 
 Stock. 
 
 Annuity. 
 
 
 over to 
 Sinking 
 
 by 
 Sinking 
 
 y 
 
 Sinking 
 
 Money 
 Raised 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fund. 
 
 Fund. 
 
 Fund. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Per Cent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 S. d. 
 
 4,53 
 
 1793 
 
 6,25 
 
 139 
 
 19 
 
 
 19 
 
 1,63 
 
 6 
 
 2,17 
 
 446 
 
 12,91 
 
 1794 
 
 15,67 
 
 121 
 
 54 
 
 6 
 
 60 
 
 1,87 
 
 8 
 
 2,80 
 
 4 13 . 
 
 42,09 
 
 1795 
 
 55,54 
 
 132 
 
 1,99 
 
 14 
 
 2,13 
 
 2,14 
 
 10 
 
 3,08 
 
 5 1 3 
 
 42,76 
 
 1796 
 
 56,94 
 
 133 
 
 2,25 
 
 2 
 
 2,27 
 
 2,64 
 
 13 
 
 4,39 
 
 5 6 . 
 
 14,62 
 
 1797 
 
 29,02 
 
 198 
 
 89 
 
 4 
 
 93 
 
 3,36 
 
 20 
 
 6,71 
 
 6 7 . 
 
 116,88 
 
 (93-97) 
 
 163,42 
 
 139 
 
 5,86 
 
 26 
 
 6,12 
 
 11,64 
 
 57 
 
 19,15 
 
 547 
 
 18,00 
 
 1798 
 
 35,62 
 
 197 
 
 1,07 
 
 3 
 
 1,10 
 
 3,98 
 
 23 
 
 7,86 
 
 623 
 
 12,50 
 
 1799 
 
 21,87 
 
 175 
 
 65 
 
 
 65 
 
 4,29 
 
 21 
 
 7,22 
 
 5 4 . 
 
 18,50 
 
 1800 
 
 29,04 
 
 157 
 
 87 
 
 
 87 
 
 4,62 
 
 22 
 
 7,31 
 
 4 14 . 
 
 34,41 
 
 1801 
 
 55,95 
 
 162 
 
 1,77 
 
 .... 
 
 1,77 
 
 5,12 
 
 25 
 
 8,09 
 
 529 
 
 23,00 
 
 1802 
 
 30,35 
 
 131 
 
 90 
 
 1 
 
 91 
 
 5,68 
 
 24 
 
 7,73 
 
 3 19 . 
 
 106,41 
 
 (98-02) 
 
 172,83 
 
 162 
 
 5,26 
 
 4 
 
 5,30 
 
 23,69 
 
 115 
 
 38,21 
 
 4 19 5 
 
 223,29 
 
 '93-'02 
 
 336,25 
 
 150 
 
 11,12 
 
 30 
 
 11,42 
 
 35,33 
 
 172 
 
 57,36 
 
 522 
 
 10,00 
 
 1803 
 
 16,00 
 
 160 
 
 48 
 
 3 
 
 51 
 
 6,02 
 
 31 
 
 10,53 
 
 5 2 . 
 
 10,00 
 
 1804 
 
 18,20 
 
 182 
 
 54 
 
 .... 
 
 54 
 
 6,52 
 
 34 
 
 11,39 
 
 5 8 . 
 
 21,52 
 
 1805 
 
 39,54 
 
 183 
 
 1,14 
 
 
 1,14 
 
 7,18 
 
 37 
 
 12,23 
 
 5 5 10 
 
 18,00 
 
 1806 
 
 29,88 
 
 166 
 
 89 
 
 
 89 
 
 7,83 
 
 38 
 
 12,81 
 
 4 18 10 
 
 59,52 
 
 (03-06) 
 
 103,62 
 
 173 
 
 3,05 
 
 3 
 
 3,08 
 
 27,55 
 
 140 
 
 46,96 
 
 534 
 
76 On the LOANS raised by MB. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 TABLE I. Continued. 
 
 I 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 6 1 7 
 
 8 
 
 9 10 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 Capitals Funded. 
 
 Annual Charge on Capitals 
 Funded. 
 
 Sinking Fund 
 Operations. 
 
 Average 
 Rate 
 
 Mouey 
 raised. 
 
 Years. 
 
 and 
 Rate Per Cent, 
 of Capital 
 for 
 
 Divi- 
 dends 
 on 
 
 Long 
 
 Total. 
 
 Portions 
 of 
 Loans paid 
 
 Dividends 
 on Stocks 
 purchased 
 
 Stock of 
 all kinds 
 Purchased 
 
 of 
 Interest 
 Paid 
 on 
 
 
 
 100 Money. 
 
 Stock. 
 
 Annuity 
 
 
 over to 
 Sinking 
 Fund. 
 
 by 
 Sinking 
 Fund. 
 
 by 
 Sinking 
 Fund. 
 
 Money 
 Raised. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Per Cent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 s. d. 
 
 12,20 
 
 1807 
 
 18,37 
 
 150 
 
 58 
 
 
 58 
 
 8,91 
 
 42 
 
 14,17 
 
 4 15 . 
 
 12,00 
 
 1808 
 
 13,69 
 
 114 
 
 59 
 
 
 59 
 
 9,55 
 
 43 
 
 13,96 
 
 4 18 2 
 
 19,53 
 
 1809 
 
 22,17 
 
 113 
 
 90 
 
 5 
 
 95 
 
 10,17 
 
 45 
 
 14,35 
 
 4 17 2 
 
 16,31 
 
 1810 
 
 19,81 
 
 121 
 
 76 
 
 
 76 
 
 10,81 
 
 48 
 
 15,66 
 
 4 13 4 
 
 24,00 
 
 1811 
 
 29,24 
 
 121 
 
 1,15 
 
 4 
 
 1,19 
 
 11,54 
 
 54 
 
 18,15 
 
 4 18 . 
 
 84,04 
 
 (07-11) 
 
 103,28 
 
 122 
 
 3,98 
 
 9 
 
 4,07 
 
 50,98 
 
 232 
 
 76,29 
 
 4 16 10 
 
 27,87 
 
 1812 
 
 40,74 
 
 182 
 
 1,48 
 
 .... 
 
 1,48 
 
 12,44 
 
 63 
 
 21,11 
 
 562 
 
 58,76 
 
 1813 
 
 93,73 
 
 159 
 
 3,14 
 
 9 
 
 3,23 
 
 14,18 
 
 72 
 
 24,12 
 
 5 9 10 
 
 18,50 
 
 1814 
 
 24,69 
 
 133 
 
 85 
 
 
 85 
 
 12,75 
 
 57 
 
 19,15 
 
 4 11 10 
 
 45,13 
 
 1815 
 
 70,89 
 
 157 
 
 2,58 
 
 
 2,58 
 
 11,90 
 
 61 
 
 20,28 
 
 5 14 . 
 
 3,00 
 
 1816 
 
 3,00 
 
 100 
 
 9 
 
 
 9 
 
 11,49 
 
 55 
 
 18,51 
 
 3 . . 
 
 153,26 
 
 ('12-'16) 
 
 233,05 
 
 152 
 
 8,14 
 
 9 
 
 8,23 
 
 62,76 
 
 308 
 
 103,17 
 
 5 7 5 
 
 296,82 
 
 1803-16 
 
 439,95 
 
 149 
 
 15,17 
 
 21 
 
 15,38 
 
 141,29 
 
 680 
 
 226,42 
 
 537 
 
 520,11 
 
 1793-1816 
 
 776,20 
 
 149 
 
 26,29 
 
 51 
 
 26,80 
 
 176,62 
 
 852 
 
 283,78 
 
 5 3 . 
 
 64,75 
 
 Irish Loans. 
 
 103,03 
 
 159 
 
 3,26 
 
 .... 
 
 3,32 
 
 11,87 
 
 57 
 
 19,08 
 
 525 
 
 584,87 
 
 GENERAL ) 
 TOTAL. / 
 
 879,29 
 
 150 
 
 29,61 
 
 51 
 
 30,17 
 
 188,52 
 
 917 
 
 302,91 
 
 5 3 . 
 
 Note. In both Tables I. and II. it has been considered sufficient for the general purposes in view, 
 and in order not to perplex the eye, to omit throughout foe four figures at the unit end of each amount. 
 Thus, 4,50 represents 4,500,000, and (in col. 6 & 7,) 6 represents 60,000, and 19 represents 190,000. 
 In col. 9 also, 10 represents 100,000. 
 
 The next Table (II.) is of a more special character than the last. 
 It was first inserted by Sir Henry Parnell in his work on Financial 
 Beforni, and was framed for the purpose of shewing that if all the 
 Supplies after 1792 had been raised within the year the nation would 
 have been able to carry on the whole of the contest for a cost of 
 377 Millions, instead of a cost of 429 Millions, which is the sum 
 stated as actually obtained by Loan. The principle employed in the 
 Table is to shew, first, in cols. 2, 3 and 4, the Expenditure required 
 to pay for the services of each year, plus the annual charge of the 
 Debt as it stood on 5th January, 1793 ; and then inserting in col. 7 
 the Actual Net Kevenue of each year, to deduce in the two last cols. 
 (6 & 7) the excess of Revenue or of Expenditure. 
 
 It is then argued that in all those years in which upon the plan 
 assumed, the Expenditure appears to be in excess, the amount of 
 that excess was allowed by the system of the Loans to remain in the 
 pockets of the public, to be employed by them in pursuit of profit. 
 
Appendix Q. General View of all the Loans, 1793-1816. 77 
 
 A computation is then made of the accumulation, year by year, at the 
 rate of 5 per cent., compound interest of all the Excesses of Expen- 
 diture and all the Excesses of Revenue, and the difference between 
 the two is held to exhibit the result to the nation. For example : 
 
 
 The Excesses of Expenditure 1792-1816, are given as amounting to\ 
 
 195,870,000/., and the accumulation of the yearly sums composing I .. QQ, ~ 0ft 
 
 this total, reckoning 5 PER CENT, compound interest, would stand | ' 
 
 in 5th January, 1817 as J 
 
 The Excesses of Revenue are given as 44,520,000/., and on a similar) ,,. non nnrk 
 
 basis would stand at . ,.../ ".^0,000 
 
 Leaving.... 377,851,000 
 
 as a sum for which, it is said, the whole expenses of the War might 
 have been defrayed, had all the Supplies been raised within the 
 year. And as the sum actually raised by Loans was 429 Millions, the 
 balance against the Loan Method is said to be, say, 52 Millions. 
 
 It is admitted that this mode of viewing the case is purely hypo- 
 thetical, and it seems also to be admitted that it would have been 
 absolutely impossible to have raised year by year all the money re- 
 quired by means of current taxes. The hypothesis therefore can only 
 be examined as such, and the whole inquiry can be regarded as no 
 more than an exercise of ingenuity. 
 
 The whole of the formidable result however of the 52 Millions 
 depends entirely upon the rate of interest being assumed to be 5 per 
 cent. In point of actual fact that rate is too low. Money left in the 
 pockets of the people from 1792 to 1816 was worth to them, and 
 therefore to the nation, fully 6 per cent, per annum ; and in support 
 of this statement, reference may be made to the evidence given in 
 1822, before the Select Committee on the Usury Laws. 
 
 At Six per cent., therefore, and still adhering to the figures given 
 in the Table 
 
 
 
 The Excesses of Expenditure would amount to 484,800,000 
 
 And the Excesses of Revenue to 38,200,000 
 
 446,600,000 
 Money obtained as Loans 429,000,000 
 
 Leaving 17,000,000 
 
 as a balance in Favour of the Loan Method. 
 
 And this result is every way as conclusive, in its way and 
 degree, as the more formidable result of the 52 millions. How far 
 either of the tests can be said to have any practical value I leave 
 others to determine. The following is the Table : 
 
 Table II 
 
78 
 
 On the LOANS raised by MR. PITT, 1793-1801. 
 
 TABLE II. INCOME AND EXPENDITURE, 1792-1816, showing the results which 
 would have taken place if the FUNDED DEBT had not been increased after 
 1792 ; in other words, if all the Supplies had been raised within the Year. 
 (Compiled principally from Returns laid before the Finance Committee, of 
 which Sir Henry Parnell was Chairman.) 
 
 1. 
 
 Years. 
 
 2 
 
 3. 1 4. 
 
 EXPEHDITUEE. 
 
 5. 
 
 NET 
 REVENUE, 
 
 exclusive 
 of 
 Loans. 
 
 6. 
 Exc< 
 
 7. 
 
 S3 Of 
 
 Interest on 
 Total Debt 
 as it stood 
 5th January, 
 1793. 
 
 Expenditure 
 for War, 
 Colonies, 
 Home Govern- 
 ment, &c. 
 
 Total 
 Expenditure. 
 
 Expendi- 
 ture. 
 
 Revenue. 
 
 1792.... 
 1793 
 
 
 9,62 
 9,62 
 9,62 
 9,62 
 9,62 
 9,61 
 
 
 7,67 
 14,76 
 19,70 
 34,30 
 45,81 
 36,20 
 
 
 17,29 
 24,38 
 29,32 
 43,92 
 55,43 
 45,82 
 
 
 
 19,26 
 19,84 
 20,19 
 19,88 
 21,45 
 23,12 
 
 
 
 4,*53 
 9,13 
 24,04 
 33,98 
 22,69 
 
 
 1,96 
 
 1794 .... 
 
 1795 
 
 1796 
 
 1797 ... 
 
 (92-97) 
 
 1798 
 1799 
 1800 
 
 57,71 
 
 158,44 
 
 216,16 
 
 123,74 
 
 94,37 
 
 1,96 
 
 9,61 
 9,61 
 9,61 
 9,61 
 9,61 
 
 33,28 
 
 38,16 
 39,07 
 40,69 
 29,61 
 
 42,89 
 47,78 
 48,68 
 50,30 
 39,21 
 
 31,03 
 35,60 
 34,14 
 34,11 
 36,37 
 
 11,85 
 12,17 
 14,54 
 16,18 
 2,85 
 
 .... 
 
 1801 
 
 1802 
 (98-02) 
 (1792-1802^1 
 
 1803 
 1804 
 
 48,05 
 
 180,81 
 
 228,86 
 
 171,25 
 
 57,59 
 
 .... 
 
 105,76 
 
 339,25 
 
 445,02 
 
 294,99 
 
 151,96 
 
 1,96 
 
 9,58 
 9,58 
 9,55 
 9,54 
 
 28,29 
 37,87 
 44,76 
 
 45,48 
 
 37,87 
 47,45 
 54,31 
 55,02 
 
 38,61 
 46,17 
 50,90 
 55,79 
 
 i^28 
 3,42 
 
 74 
 
 "77 
 1,51 
 
 1805 
 
 1806 
 (03-06) 
 1807 
 
 38,25 
 
 156,40 
 
 194,65 
 
 191,47 
 
 4,70 
 
 9,52 
 9,10 
 9,10 
 9,10 
 9,10 
 
 43,97 
 49,82 
 52,27 
 52,55 
 58,64 
 
 53,49 
 58,92 
 61,38 
 61,65 
 67,75 
 
 59,34 
 62,50 
 63,72 
 67.14 
 65,17 
 
 2,57 
 
 5,84 
 3,57 
 2,34 
 5,49 
 
 1808 .... 
 
 1809 
 
 1810 
 1811 
 
 (07-11) 
 1812 
 
 45,92 
 
 257,25 
 
 303,19 
 
 317,87 
 
 2,57 
 
 17,24 
 
 9,10 
 9,10 
 9,10 
 9,10 
 9,10 
 
 60,60 
 77,40 
 76,23 
 60,56 
 31,91 
 
 69,70 
 86,51 
 85,32 
 69,66 
 41,00 
 
 65,04 
 68,75 
 71,13 
 72,21 
 62,26 
 
 4,67 
 17,76 
 14,19 
 
 i's's 
 
 21,26 
 
 1813 
 1814 
 1815 
 1816 
 
 (12-16) 
 (1803-16) 
 1792-1816 
 
 45,50 
 
 306,70 
 
 352,19 
 
 339,39 
 
 36,62 
 
 23,81 
 
 129,67 
 
 720,35 
 
 850,03 
 
 848,73 
 
 43,89 
 
 42,56 
 
 235,43 
 
 1,059,60 
 
 1,295,05 
 
 1,143,72 
 
 195,87 
 
 44,52 
 
Appendix R. Concluding Observations. 79 
 
 R. General Observations on the Contents of some of the Appendices. 
 
 IN framing the several Appendices, I have endeavoured to accom- 
 pany them with such comments as appeared to be necessary to 
 remove any ambiguity as regards the more immediate purpose of 
 the figures they contain. It will be convenient, however, to avail 
 myself of the final pages of the Paper to introduce some statements 
 which could not be inserted with equal propriety elsewhere. 
 
 And referring in the first instance to the monthly Prices of Stocks, 
 given in Appendix (M), I would draw attention to the circumstance 
 of the great relative depreciation of 4 and 5 per cents, as compared 
 with 3's in 1791, and still more decidedly in 1792. The rise of the 
 3 per cents, to 97, in February , 1792, led to an expectation that the 
 5's, and most probably the 4's, would be reduced. Peculiar circum- 
 stances prevented such a measure being adopted ; but what was 
 considered the narrow escape of the 4's and 5's from reduction in 
 the summer of 1792 operated, to the prejudice of High Bate Stocks, 
 for sometime after the commencement of the War. When the 3 per 
 cents, fell to 60 and 50, it was but natural that the former difference 
 between the market prices of 3's and 5's should be materially dimin- 
 ished. No depression of the 3's, however, sufficed to remove that 
 difference wholly ; and it will be seen that even from October, 1797, 
 to September, 1798, during which time the 3 per cents, where under 
 50, there was still a relative depreciation of 4's of not less than 7 per 
 cent., and of 5's of not less than 10-12 per cent. The extent and 
 frequency of the actual dealings in the market in the 4's, and 5's, 
 and in Long Annuities were exceedingly limited compared with the 
 dealings in Consols, and it is not at all unusual to find several 
 months in succession, during which there is not more than, perhaps, 
 a single quotation in each of these descriptions of security. 
 
 In the early part of the War the Long Annuities had, say, 65 
 years to run and that was a term so extended as to affect the secu- 
 rity but little in practical value on the mere ground of its terminable 
 character. And even when the Income-tax of 10 per cent, was 
 imposed in 1799, the Long Annuities had still 61 years unexpired, 
 and the Tax, therefore, did not affect them in any degree so oppres- 
 sively as the present Income-tax has affected, for the last few years, 
 the Long Annuities now in the market. During 1797 and 1798 the 
 Long Annuities experienced a greater depression than any other 
 kind of public security, and it will be seen that for the half-year, 
 October, 1797 to March, 1798, they stood at 13 and 14 years'pur- 
 chase. There does not appear to be any reason for supposing that 
 Mr. Pitt could have employed Long Annuities to any important 
 extent as a method of funding for the loans he required. 
 
 With reference to the observations, at page 19 of the text, on the 
 real meaning of the theory which prescribes borrowing at Par, it 
 is necessary to point out, that so long as the Usury Laws were 
 considered to be an essential part of our legislation, the legal limi- 
 tation of the rate of interest to 5 per cent, per annum, would have 
 been regarded as a bar to the creation of any public Stock bearing a 
 higher rate than 5 per cent. Practically, therefore, the only course 
 open to a Minister, determined to borrow only at Par, would have 
 
80 Appendix E. Concluding Observations. 
 
 been in Long Annuities, or in some other description of Annuities ; 
 and the highest rated Stock to which he could have had recourse 
 would have been 5 per cents. There is, therefore, the more reasou 
 in favour of the course adopted in the Paper, namely, a course which 
 tries the question between the Low Bate and High Rate methods by 
 a comparison of 3 and 5 per cents. 
 
 The figures in Appendix Gr, relative to the course of the Import 
 and Export Trade, before and after the opening of the War, are full 
 of curious interest. It will be seen that, during the American War 
 (1777-83), there was scarcely any increase in the volume of the 
 external trade. During the first five years (1784-88) after the Peace 
 of Paris the trade increased about 50 per cent., and a considerable 
 part of that increase was with India, and comparing 1784, the first 
 year of the Peace, with 1792, the last year of the Peace, there was an 
 increase in 1792 of 70 or 80 per cent. As we have only the Official 
 values to guide us we can do no more than speak in very general 
 terms. After 1793, it will be seen that there was a rapid increase in 
 the Transit Trade, that is, in the import and re-export of foreign 
 merchandize. The great increase in the export of British manu- 
 factures did not begin till 1798, and generally it was not till after 
 that year that the external trade of the country really entered upon 
 that career of marvellous expansion which occurred during the last 
 War. MacPherson makes several statements which indicate the 
 enormous amount of the transfers of capital which took place to this 
 country after it became apparent that it was the only safe asylum for 
 property remaining in Europe. 
 
 It should be mentioned in connexion with the statement at page 
 22 of the difficulty of raising large supplies by taxes early in the 
 War, that even Mr. Pitt's estimate of 7 millions as the produce of 
 the 10 per cent. Income-tax was found to be very greatly beyond 
 the sum actually obtained. It will be seen from Appendix D that 
 the whole produce of the tax in 1800, the second year of its assess- 
 ment, was under 5 millions. 
 
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