I* 
 
(U/ 
 
 ////J K^<r 
 
 STUDIES IN THE LEADING OF TROOPS 
 
 BY 
 
 General J. von yERDY du Vernois, 
 
 Commander of Count Schwerin's 14th Infantry 
 Regiment (3d Pomeranian). 
 
 VOLUME I. 
 
 Tlie Infantry Division as a Part of an 
 Army Corps. 
 
 REVISED BY 
 
 Colonel von Gossler, 
 
 Commander of the 4th Infantry Regiment, Guard Corps. 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel William Gerlach, 
 
 U. S. Army, Retired. 
 
 ARMY WAR 
 COLLEGE, 
 
 LIBRARY, 
 
 6 
 
 OCT 16 1906 
 
ar 
 
 v + 
 
 \m^'^''''^ 
 
 
I 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 In order to develop and direct the war strength of a 
 nation, we must have commanders, and we must educate them. 
 While their education should in the main be of a practical 
 nature, yet there is no question but that it must go hand in 
 hand with a theoretical course of study. 
 
 Nor can we lose sight, at the outset, of how little time 
 for theoretical preparation is available to one of the military 
 profession. 
 
 He who lays claim to culture cannot dispense with a 
 general scientific foundation, to be followed by a professional 
 education. While the former almost wholly occupies the 
 school-year period of a young man, his practical education 
 should nevertheless begin as soon as possible. It is for tWs 
 reason that with cadets in military schools, public or private, 
 professional instruction can strive only for limited results, a 
 condition detrimental to the most important subject of their 
 study — Tactics. Furthermore, the field of Tactics is too large 
 and too intricate to allow the beginner to go over it thoroughly 
 during this period. As a consequence, we find it practicable 
 to treat in detail only minor situations in which he may have 
 to act at the outset of his army career, outside of which we 
 must be content with a general illustration and superficial 
 knowledge. 
 
 Although education continues after officer's rank has been 
 attained, yet an officer's career admits generally of only an 
 imperfect filling of the existing void. Although military edu- 
 cation is at present chiefly promoted by the performance of 
 actual duties, this alone is not sufficient. In addition, we need 
 intelligent guidance, and no one will deny that practical train- 
 ing will bear better fruit if it proceeds simultaneously with a 
 progressive theoretical education. Charged with this duty in 
 
 iii 
 
 ivi2i0?65 
 
iv Preface. 
 
 the must coniprclicnsivc manner is our highest military edu- 
 cational institution, the Royal War Academy, which was in- 
 deed established especially for this purpose. It would be well 
 if all young officers could attend it, but under existing condi- 
 tions this ^is impracticable, and only a small number enjoy 
 its benefits. If, upon completion of their academic course, its 
 students should imagine that their education was completed, 
 it would utterly fail in its mission. One of the most precious 
 fruits that mature there is the knowledge that is gained by 
 the combination of incessant practical work and progressive 
 theoretical education, and this enlarged knowledge ought to 
 enable the student thereafter to continue his progressive train- 
 ing by his own efforts, as it furnishes him a guide for the 
 accomplishment of this end in the most efficient manner. 
 
 With officers who, on the other hand, remain perma- 
 nently in active service with troops, opportunities for further 
 theoretical education are incomparaljly more unfavorable. 
 Their demands allow them but a few free hours, and these 
 are needed for recreation, leaving little time for strenuous 
 mental labor. Nevertheless much encouragement is offered 
 even here — scientific lectures, theoretical service compositions 
 in winter, the war-game, and practice rides are some of 
 the expedients, all of which will be more useful in propor- 
 tion to the zeal displayed in their pursuit and the skill with 
 which they are conducted. Yet a thorough, coherent course 
 of study by these means is hardly practicable, and we must 
 depend princi]ially on the pcrso)ial diliiioicc of the individual 
 officer. Here the young officer especially needs guidance and 
 help, so that he may use his time to the best advantage and 
 avoid getting on the wrong road in this difficult field. Mili- 
 tary history, doubtless the best preceptress for every one who 
 is duly prei)ared to enter her school, is dangerous company 
 for one not yet so prepared. Tactical text-books, whose lit- 
 erature is indeed extensive, are therefore all that is at the 
 command of the young officer for his progressive trainings 
 We do not at all mean to belittle the value of tactics in 
 its past forms. It has been of the greatest importance for 
 all who devote themselves to the study of the art of war, and 
 we owe it much. Notwithstanding this, the number of stu- 
 dents who have been led astrav, or never would have reached 
 
PkE^ACIv. V 
 
 their goal without the tried teachers who assisted them or 
 the helping hand of experience, is legion. Tlic novice in the 
 field of martial knowledge cannot, at this day, dispense with 
 the study of elementary or applied tactics, and it is therefore 
 insisted that text-books should adapt themselves to the needs 
 of our times. I rebel against the absolute authority with which 
 tactical text-books have for centuries ruled our entire scien- 
 tific education, and I maintain that the progressive training 
 of the officer may be accomplished in more thorough and prac- 
 tical ways than those we have so far pursued. 
 
 In sirpport of this assertion note the following: Many 
 sciences serve as a basis for the employment of troops in war, 
 while troop-leading is an art in itself. Although the material 
 required in its service is subject to relatively minor changes, 
 the problems it is called upon to solve are of such a varied 
 nature that it becomes impossible to compress them within fixed 
 boundaries. So-called applied tactics certainly attempts this, 
 yet both it and strategy appear on the field of military science: 
 as the parts which, in view of their aim, should least assume 
 a purely scientific character. 
 
 We may ^certainly strive to gain our object in different 
 ways, and if we would derive real benefit from applied tactics, 
 we will be successful if it prepares us, as far as possible, out- 
 side of real practice, for troop-leading in zvar, or to become 
 its useful organs (general stafi' officers, adjutants, or aids). 
 
 It is in reality not so important that one should be com- 
 petent to prepare a good treatise on a given theme, as that he 
 should be able to act intelligently in a case before him. Above 
 all, the first result is produced by the scientific treatment of ap- 
 plied tactics, while to perform the latter, if he would play his 
 part well, the student must be trained. In the same manner, 
 scientific treatment must wrestle with the disadvantage already 
 pointed out, that the nature of war cannot be restricted to dis- 
 tinct subdivisions; should we attempt this, the great mass of 
 conditions under v/hich we give battle could only be roughty 
 disposed of. But certainly in most cases these conditions do 
 govern, and exert a powerful influence. Instead, however, of 
 taking them into account, applied tactics gives a preponder- 
 ant value to terrane; their entire arrangement is often based 
 on the latter alone. It describes wood, village, and defile com- 
 
VI 
 
 Preface. 
 
 bat, the passage and defense of rivers, the struggle for a 
 height, actions in the mountains or on the plain. By these 
 means scientific treatises are built up, which, like all similar 
 compositions, culminate in abstract propositions, and create a 
 desire to give a rule for everything, going absolutely too far 
 in that direction. 
 
 C!onsidering applied tactics from the standpoint of its re- 
 lation to icrrane and rules, so characteristic of it, v^e observe 
 the following points, both from its historical development and 
 its substance : 
 
 The combat theory of the eighteenth century, which still 
 prevailed to some extent at the beginning of the nineteenth, 
 placed a preponderant value on elementary forms and an ex- 
 tremely limited value on terrane. Thus, we find in Tempel- 
 hoff's "History of the Seven Years' War" such words as 
 these : "The village itself must be cleared in order that two 
 battalions may march through it in line ; otherwise it cannot 
 be defended." The wars of the French Revolution caused a 
 violent upheaval in this field ; any terrane, if at all practicable, 
 was entered, and in course of time formations necessary for thi^ 
 were gradually develo])ed. Thus the terrane acquired greater 
 importance than ever before, which again illustrates the fact 
 that every innovation, as soon as it proves of actual value, 
 gains at the start at least an importance far above its intrinsic 
 worth. There was a time when disputes arose as to whether 
 a battalion should defend a mountain or the mountain defend 
 the battalion. These aberrations were certainly soon over- 
 come, but the echoes remained, although j-jcrhaps in an altered 
 manner, and in njost military dogmas the nature of terrane 
 still ])lays the most prominent ]>art. Although, however, we 
 certainly cannot question, its high value, yet, as a rule, terrane 
 is only .secondary; far more important than any consideration 
 ui f^rand tactics arc nearly always the conditions under which 
 7ve give battle — we fight for a village, a height, a wood — in 
 fact, for any locality, as we find it, though often in a differ- 
 ent maimer, yet ai:cays according to tJic means at Jiand or the 
 object of the combat. 
 
 The object for 7i'hich -n'C fight must never be regarded as 
 of secondary importance : it cannot be dismissed with the re- 
 mark that it belongs to the realm of strategy. Scientific treat- 
 
PrKe-^ace:. vii 
 
 ment has forced a division into tactics and strategy, and has 
 thus set up two distinct ideas inseparable from the independ- 
 ent action of a commander. We can never consider separately 
 the questions, Under what conditions must zve ßghtf and, // 
 we must fight; how shall we proceed? The former determines 
 the latter, and he who is taught only the latter will be robbed 
 of an element in his instruction without which no commander, 
 from lieutenant to commander in chief, can independently act 
 to best advantage. 
 
 As to rules, we can accord them only limited importance, 
 for we are able to apply them only so far as we can overlook 
 and absolutely control existing conditions. There may be 
 rules (or rather, principles) for the. arrangement of marches, 
 in so far as these, dispositions are applicable to our own troops ; 
 rules for the establishment of outposts; or rules determining 
 upon what visible objects a battery should fire under various 
 circumstances ; but for conducting an engagement on a large 
 scale no rules can be given — there they become^ simply 
 phrases, for we can then neither overlook all conditions nor 
 absolutely control them. 
 
 In war, rules that shall govern under all conditions, must 
 necessarily shrink to axioms, as in mathematics, where we say 
 that things equal to the same thing are equal to each other. 
 If they are to signify any more than this, then every new con- 
 dition must involve a new exception. The rule may enjoin 
 us to occupy the strong line, while the particular situation 
 compels us to go beyond it; the rule may direct us, because 
 we are stronger, to fight, but we retreat, for we are needed 
 more in another place. The decision must be deduced from 
 the concrete case; the rule may apply in one instance, but in 
 another it is faulty. Exact science rests upon a case already 
 demonstrated, out of which we deduce a second, and so on, 
 building up a system ; but practical life, and war above every- 
 thing else, must reckon with ever-varying, even incalculable, 
 quantities ; indeed, all it can foresee is the next immediate 
 occurrence, and even this but incompletely, and can infer 
 no second beyond it. 
 
 In spite of this, we often find in texts on strategy and 
 applied tactics sentences like these : ''Concentrate your forces 
 on the enemy's weak point" ; or, "If the enemy does this, you 
 
Mil 
 
 PrKi-aciC 
 
 must do that." W'liat becomes of the nature of war then? 
 The enemy will hardly be obliging enough to tell us his 
 strength, his intentions, or how he i)roposes to accomplish his 
 intentions. IMuch of this we only find out in the course of 
 action, often in a very surprising manner; more we learn when 
 the figiit is over; but most turns up in military history, years 
 afterwards. At Skalitz, even after the battle was over, the 
 Eighth Austrian army corps placed too high an estimate on 
 the strength of its op]:>onent, believing it had encountered two 
 Prussian^orps. Even after the campaign was over, similar 
 mistakes were made by tlie Sixth Austrian corps, and by 
 Wnuck's cavalry brigade at Nachod. A hundred examples 
 miojit indeed be cited from the engagements in 1866, where 
 portions of both sides erred in judging the strength and in- 
 tentions of their opponents, untii the official narrative cleared 
 up the situation. 
 
 The cause of all this is simple — each side endeavors to 
 conceal from its opponent whatever it does. The leaders and 
 the cavalry patrols in war cannot ride into the enemy's skir- 
 mish line 'in order to obtain information. 
 
 When the nature of war is therefore such that everything 
 on the enemy's side appears uncertain and often unknown, 
 and on our own side a wide range of misunderstandings and 
 errors (all that we call friction) develop, where shall we apply 
 a rule ? In war twice two is not always four. We can nc\'er 
 tell whether we should apply a rule, or make an exception. 
 Consequently, in this fluctuating field, all that is left for us 
 is an apj)eal to our own resources. Dcfinitcncss as to zvhat we 
 propose to do and resolute execution of our intentions — these 
 are the pilots that carry us over dangerous obstacles. And 
 for this reason it is that military virtue is rooted infinitely 
 deeper in character than in scientific attainments.^ 
 
 iThis thought always reminds me of the engagement at Nachod. 
 It was my first time in action. Things looked duhious for a time 
 on the plateau of Wenzel Hill. Companies of the advance guard, 
 and a battery, were falling back, while the columns of the main 
 body wero hurriedly moving up (he mountain pass below. The sit- 
 uation liad become critical; If the Auptrians should succeed in get- 
 ling a firm foothold on the hill, the debouchment of the corps would 
 in all probability be frustrated. During a pause, which permitted 
 calm refle<tion, I pondered all the theories concerning debouching 
 
PrK-tace;. ix 
 
 We will hope that military sciences may ever retain their 
 high importance, and that applied tactics, scientifically treated, 
 may also yield great profit, despite the fact that they will not 
 be sufficient in this form for a practical education in troop- 
 leadin,^. For here we have a real void, the filling of which 
 is doubtless necessary. This can be accomplished only by a 
 System of l^roop-leading. As a consequence Tactics and 
 Strategy will most certainly lose the importance which, in the 
 theoretical field, has up to this been accorded them in an un- 
 limited degree — they will only retain their place as an intro- 
 duction to the education of commanders. 
 
 A system of troop-leading, framed in such a comprehen- 
 sive manner that it may serve as a guide for every commander, 
 has become a necessity. We do not yet possess it. 
 
 If we approach the problem more closely, we must answer 
 two questions at the outset; What is to he taught here? and 
 lioiv shall it he taught? 
 
 We cannot ignore the fact that entirely difi^erent problems 
 fall to the lot of different commanders, in peace as well as in 
 war. During peace, for example, the company commander 
 must instruct his non-commissioned officers; the regimental 
 commander is responsible for the instruction of the commis- 
 sioned officers, Tn the company the training consists princi- 
 pally iü preparing the individual for the combat; in the bat- 
 talion we have the co-operative action of the lowest tactical 
 units. Subordinate commanders are charged with detailed 
 training and immediate execution ; as we go higher more lead- 
 ing is demanded. 
 
 In like manner material distinctions are seen in war-time. 
 The care for the subsistence of a company requires measures 
 differing from those necessary in the case of a division. Prob- 
 lems given to a platoon are very dift'erent from those given 
 to a regiment or army corps. The lieutenant posts his picket, 
 
 out of a defile that I could recall from text-books. Not one fitted 
 the case before me. I cast them aside, and asked jnyself, "What is 
 the real issue here?" The answer came spontaneously: "The ad- 
 vance guard on the height must do its best to hold it, while the col- 
 umns of the main body coming up the valley must try to reach it 
 as soon as possible and take part in the action where the fight is 
 retrograding." Prom that hour dates my aversion to tactical rules. 
 
X Preface. 
 
 the battalion occupies an outpost line, the platoon can prepare 
 itself for defense in a farm-house, while the defense of a vil- 
 lage devolves upon a battalion. 
 
 Much of what it is necessary to learn is common to the 
 entire gradation of commanders, but the view differs from 
 every round of the ladder. What use is there in a subaltern's 
 studying only the operations of armies or the conduct of bat- 
 tles?" He should be interested rather in speculating on what 
 situation he might find himself in when in the field with his 
 platoon, or at the head of a company if his captain should fall, 
 or even in charge of a battalion. It is therefore essential that 
 he should at first limit his studies, and above all that he should 
 make clear to himself the conditions he must meet in such 
 cases, before he approaches the study of grand tactics in a 
 comprehensive manner. 
 
 A theory of troop-leading should therefore start with 
 the lowest divisions, commencing with the platoon or the 
 company ; it ought to include the entire gradation of the mili- 
 tary hierarchy, up to the command of an army. An auxiliary 
 scheme might cover the education for special functions, of 
 the aides-de-camj), of the general staA' officers in their various 
 positions, of the supply departments, and of the hospital 
 corps, in an analogous manner. In some of these branches 
 we already have excellent text-books. On company duties, 
 too, we have some for non-commissioned officers. The value 
 of these is universally acknowledged. Why should we not 
 build higher? The more the demands of the various positions 
 are in time increased, the greater will be the necessity for thor- 
 ough instruction. It is no longer possible for a single person 
 to master the entire range of military knowledge and skill, 
 and consequently all the more necessary is it that we should 
 take up, on a general foundation, those problems the solu- 
 tion of which practical life may demand of the individual ac- 
 cording to his station. A work covering the whole range of 
 trooi)-lcading with regard only to special requirements of 
 war cannot bc'compiled by one man; besides the time re- 
 quired, it would call for such a mass of practical experience 
 and knowledge as we could never expect to find combined in 
 a single person. Such a system may. however, be produced 
 ])v tlu" la!)or of many, working even c]uito independently. It 
 
Pri-j^ace;. xi 
 
 is therefore greatly desired that the efforts of many comrades 
 be brought to bear in this direction. 
 
 It is not only necessary in life that we should choose to 
 do what is right, but that we should go to work in a practical 
 manner and do it. 
 
 The matter in point, when answering the second question, 
 is, How shall troop-leading be taught? What method should 
 serve as our basis? 
 
 Here, above all, we must remember that, as in every art, 
 a knowledge of war is not acquired in a rationalistic, but in 
 an empirical manner. To accomplish something creditable in 
 this field, routine is necessary above all else. But how shall 
 this routine be acquired? What should be its special aim? 
 
 In view of the nature of war as we have described it, 
 the following characteristics must be developed in a com- 
 mander of troops : 
 
 To quickly form definite and intelligent decisions; 
 
 To clearly and intelligently communicate these de- 
 cisions to others ; 
 
 To lead troops so they will accomplish ends sought; 
 
 To quickly determine upon bold enterprises and 
 promptly execute them. 
 
 Although the formation of character must be left to the 
 conditions of practical and personal life, the development of 
 the military judgment may be promoted in a theoretical man- 
 ner. /^Different roads lead in this direction; but after some 
 experience has been gained by the student, the following 
 method, in my judgment, is the best: Illustrating the divers- 
 ity of situations by continual practice on concrete cases and 
 teaching the nature of zvar through these illustrations, there- 
 by developing the faculties above mentioned by causing the 
 student to form a multitude of decisions and make his dispo- 
 sitions accordingly. 
 
 This end can best be achieved by the so-c^led applicatory 
 method, which indeed for some time past has been in use in 
 our military schools. It is true this method cannot be equally 
 applicable to all branches of learning, nor can be employed in 
 
Ml 
 
 Prkface. 
 
 cvcrv ])art of an institulioii. for llic reason that, making the 
 greatest ilemands on intlependent study, it takes up too much 
 time. It nevertheless appears to be the most advantageous 
 method for the study of tactics and military history, promis- 
 ing withal the quickest returns. 
 
 This method is eminently applicable to independent study. 
 We either create a situation, or take one already given; we 
 practice the framing of orders and instructions; we elaborate 
 the special dispositions for the march, |the length of the col- 
 umn, and time required for deployment; we next suppose the 
 receipt of reports or orders and the appearance of hostile bod- 
 ies ; and we then sketch out a plan of action; and finally such 
 measures may lead us into an engagement and force us to 
 consider dispositions for its conduct or what we may have to 
 do upon its close. Such exercises are particularly instruct- 
 ive in connection with military history. Tlicy can never he 
 broHi^ht to an end, for they arc practice work;hyQ continually 
 create new situations, which, though apparently ahvays sim- 
 ilar, are never completely alike. The task which a commander 
 sets himself or has assigned him cannot be confined to a fixed 
 form. The means at his disposal, according to strength, com- 
 position, and quality of troops; the intentions of the enemy; 
 the terrane in ail its variations ; and many other elements are 
 a marvelous kaleidoscope in which .accident may construct the 
 oddest situations. 
 
 The studies now l)eforc us are ofifered as a contribution 
 to the theory of troop-leading herein advocated and as an ex- 
 ])lication of the method suggested. They are studies for him 
 who WTites them ; for younger comrades they may serve as 
 text -books. 
 
 The conditions shown are based on actual occurrences, 
 but their elaboration is the product of fancy. This course has 
 been ])ursued because it appeared the best in a text-book, for 
 thus the critique which is contained in the reflections that fol- 
 low can move along with perfect freedom, unhampered by 
 considerations tliat would bind it as soon as the actions in late 
 wars were the real subjects of contemplation. Furthermore, 
 an imagined situation has the advantage of bringing out all 
 we intend to teach, by permitting events to take a certain 
 
i're:i^aci5. Xlll 
 
 course. This is not practicable in describing a real action, as 
 it fails to present the variety of situations demanded. 
 
 Once more let me emphasize the fact that these studies 
 simply form a text-book. /l^he diligent student who by practice 
 and theoretical studies has first acquired a sufficient under- 
 standing of war and its demands is referred to the independent 
 study of military history. The whole end of our effort should 
 culminate in this, that each should be finally competent to form 
 his own opinions, and for this military history is our best 
 guide. All that is therefore necessary at present is to point 
 out to the beginner the direction in which he may pursue his 
 studies to the best advantage. 
 
 It is also intended in this w^ork to direct attention espe- 
 cially to the training for troop-leading under the conditions of 
 grand tactics. Our entire peace training, inclusive of autumn 
 maneuvers, consists principally of detachment exercises ; a few 
 hours only are devoted to combat movements of the real bat- 
 tle unit, the division. Even our largest exercises, the maneu- 
 vers of one corps against another, still pertain in a certain de- 
 gree to detachment war, as they are necessarily constructed 
 on a general situation covering several days, and these corps 
 we can imagine only loosel}?- connected with an army. In 
 grand tactics stich a performance is rarely the zuork of an 
 army corps; the leading of a corps and its subdivisions is 
 regulated differently, if it is isolated during several days, than 
 if the movements of another corps of the same army must also 
 be taken into consideration. 
 
 Each question influences the conduct of an independent 
 leader in quite a different manner than if his command is 
 directly dependent upon another command. The officer who 
 suddenly encounters the enemy when patrolling with his pla- 
 toon must conduct his actions from a different point of view 
 than if he commanded his platoon deployed as skirmishers in 
 advance of his company. A division in an army corps will 
 generally be so situated that it must carry out an action even 
 though it be completely annihilated in doing so, and then it 
 w^ould still be promoting the general purpose ; on the other 
 hand, a division widely separated from an army would, as a 
 rule, utterly fail to accomplish its mission if it allowed itself 
 to be annihilated. At Königgrätz, Fransecky's division could 
 
XIV 
 
 Prki-aci:. 
 
 render the army no greater service than to draw upon itself as 
 much of the hostile "force as possible, unconcerned whether it 
 might thereby be wiped out. While a division under the con- 
 ditions that led to the detachment of the forces of Generals 
 Stolberg and Von Knobelsdorf for the protection of Upper 
 Silesia, would never have been justified in accepting and carry- 
 uig on an action such as Lieutenant-General von Fransecky 
 ventured for the good of the whole. 
 
 In this way material differences manifest themselves be- 
 tween the actions of completely independent bodies and bodies 
 in larger commands. While our peace exercises continually 
 furnish instruction in the first direction, they cannot do so in 
 the latter. Therefore a theoretical education which goes be- 
 yond the elementary conditions should be concerned princi- 
 pally with grand tactics and the dependent conditions that 
 exist in them. 
 
 The following studies in troop-leading deal especially with 
 situations in grand tactics, and in order to draw more advan- 
 tage from this it covers not only the sphere of action of 
 the division commander, but also the actions of commanders 
 under him, in so far as conditions before the enemy are in- 
 volved. Such a dilatation will indeed become superfluous when- 
 ever a perfect theory of troop-leading shall be available; but 
 for the present it seems to be quite necessary. 
 
 It is evident that in this form the work can be of some 
 benefit to the independent student. Where dispositions and 
 rellections are elaborated in the text, the student should never- 
 theless not shirk the labor of working them out anew for him- 
 self. How to do this will be shown in detail in the Appendix 
 to Part I.' Let the student also remember that these studies 
 are not merely reading-matter, but that they must be worked 
 over with dividers. pai)er, and pencil. 
 
 The dispositions described on the following pages as 
 having been made on various occasions lay no claim to perfec- 
 tion ; in such a difficult field as troop-leading we can hardly 
 expect that a theory be jK'rfect thrcnighout. when so much is 
 yet open f<»r discussion. I'ut even so it can be useful if the 
 
 »The student is advised to read tlie first pages of the Appen- 
 dix before proceeding witli the problems. 
 
t-REifACi:. XV 
 
 reader himself fornis an independent opinion on every situa- 
 tion. This will give him an opportunity for comparison with 
 possibly divergent opinions in the text, and for testing his own 
 judgment. In this connection we must not lose sight of the 
 fact that judgment is primarily determined by one's own indi- 
 viduality, and that we may attain success in a variety of ways. 
 
 As regards the general situation on which these studies 
 are based, the work is connected with the familiar conditions 
 that existed in t866, but as changes are made at the outset 
 (in number of troops, dispositions, and reports of what actually 
 took place), the development naturally had to take a different 
 course ; facts as they are given are therefore largely the prod- 
 uct of the imagination.^ Hence nothing herein can properly 
 he said to be a critique of actual events in the campaign of 
 1866. 
 
 Von Ve:rdy. 
 
 Berlin, June, 1870. 
 
 With the author's approval, the studies have been revised, 
 giving due consideration to Firing, Drill, and Field Service 
 Regulations. It is therefore here assumed that formations, 
 regulations, and armament were the same in 1.866 as they are 
 in 1898. 
 
 Vo?^ GOSSLER, 
 
 Colonel, Commanding 4th Infantry, Guards Corps. 
 Berlin, August, i\ 
 
 iFor example, only the general situation in this work is based 
 on real conditions, and from the moment the commander of the Sec- 
 ond infantry division initiates his own dispositions, these, their exe- 
 cution, and the incoming reports are inventions. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 BOOK L 
 
 The Infantry Division as a Part of an Army Corps. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 Page. 
 
 General situation, June,. 1866 i 
 
 vSpecial situation of the Second infantry division on June 26, 2 
 
 Its order issued for June 27 22 
 
 Comments . 28 
 
 Information received concerning the Guard corps, and dis- 
 positions made consequent thereon 36 
 
 Advance on Parschnitz 39 
 
 Comments 4^ 
 
 Rendezvous at Parschnitz 49 
 
 Comments 5^ 
 
 Problems 64 
 
 Part 2. 
 
 Expulsion of the cneniy from Trautenau 71 
 
 Time consumed in deploying 87 
 
 Resolutions of the division con.imander 89 
 
 His manngement of the engagement 98 
 
 His choice of position loi 
 
 His mode of issuing orders and seeing to their execution. . 106 
 
 His reports t^o^ 
 
 The general staff officer no 
 
 The Third infantry brigade from 8 140 to t t 130 it6 
 
 The Fourth infantry brigade from 8 140 to i J 130 I37 
 
 The division cavalry regiment from 8:40 to 11:30 I43 
 
 xvii 
 
xviii Cox ri-: NTS. 
 
 Page. 
 
 The division arlilkry rciiiiiR-nt from X:4() to i i :3c) 14^ 
 
 Problems 14S 
 
 Part s. 
 
 I >isi)Ositions of the corps rommandcr from i 1 130 a. m. to 
 
 12:45 P '11 kS^ 
 
 Comments 152 
 
 Second infantiy dixision from 1 ! 130 to 12:45 ^^3 
 
 Comments 170 
 
 The several i)arts of the division from 1 1 130 to 12:45. • • • ^7^* 
 
 Attack of tlR' division ( \2 :45 to i :45) 187 
 
 The artillery from 12 145 to 1 :45 190 
 
 The Third infantry brigade from 12:45 l-<^ i ^45 19^ 
 
 The Fourth mfantry brig^ade from 12:45 tc> 1:45 -19^ 
 
 Termination of the preparations for attack 205 
 
 Comments — conduct of the division commander 206 
 
 Comments — the Third infantry brigade 210 
 
 Comments — the P'onrth infantry brigade 222 
 
 Comments — the cavalry 226 
 
 Comments — the division artillery regiment 228 
 
 Attack of the Second infantry division until the capture of 
 the thickets north of Neu-Rognitz. and entry into the 
 
 village ( r :45 to 2 :25 p. m.) 230 
 
 Comments on the conduct of the division commander. . . .233 
 
 The Third infnnlry brigade from t 145 to 2:25 235 
 
 Comments 239 
 
 The Fourth infantry brigade from i :45 \.o 2\2^ 244 
 
 Comments 247 
 
 Oencral retrospect 25T 
 
 Invents until the retreat of the enemy (2 :20 to 4 p. m.) . . . .253 
 
 Comments 258 
 
 'J*he .several parts of the division from j :20 to 4 265 
 
 (Vtnments 271 
 
 l'rf»bl('nis 272 
 
 /'(//■/ /. 
 
 Va\(\ of llie r.allle 14 to 5 p m. ) IJ^ 
 
 Comnunts 278 
 
 The Third infanlr\ bri.<;ad<' from 4 to 5 p. ni I'f^^.^ 
 
LONTKNTS. Xl> 
 
 Page. 
 
 The Fourtli infantry brigade from 4 to 5 p. ni 293 
 
 Comments 295 
 
 Dispositions from the end of the battle until nightfall .... 300 
 
 Conmients 308 
 
 The outposts of the division from 5 p. m. until nightfall. . .319 
 
 Comments 326 
 
 The main body of the division from 5 p. m. until nightfall. .331 
 
 Comments 332 
 
 The hospital service 339 
 
 The general staff officer 349 
 
 The division's report on the engagement 350 
 
 Comments 354 
 
 Course of events with the enemy 356 
 
 Plan J. Organization of the Second infantry division and 
 First cavalry brigade. 
 
 II. Order of march during advance to Parschnitz. 
 
 Ala)^ I. Camp of the division on June 26. 
 
 II. Rendezvous at Parschnitz. 
 
 '' 111. Position at 9:50 a. m. 
 
 " IV. Position at 1 1 :30 a. m. 
 
 V. State of the fight at 12:45 P- "i- 
 
 " VI. State of the fight at i -45 p. m. 
 
 '■ Vn. Bivouac and outposts evening of Tune 2^. 
 
studies in tlie Leading of Troops 
 
 Volume I. 
 
 The Infantry Division as a Part of an Army Corps. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 GENERAL Situation. 
 
 'About the middle of June, 1866, the Second Prussian 
 Army, composed of the Guard corps and the First, Fifth, and 
 Sixth army corps, together with a cavalry division, were as- 
 sembled on the Neisse. On the 20th, the First corps was 
 thence put in march in the direction of the I Bohemian frontier ; 
 corps headquarters, the First infantry division, and corps 
 artillery arrived at Liebau June 25. On the same day the 
 Second infantry division and the First cavalry brigade ar- 
 rived at Schömberg. 
 
 War had already been declared. 
 
 The country was familiar to the troops of the First corps, 
 who had been stationed there early in June, before hostilities 
 commenced. At that time the frontier on the enemy's side 
 was being watched by the Windischgrätz dragoons, whose 
 headquarters were at Trautenau. No other hostile trops are 
 supposed to have been in the country between the frontier and 
 the Elbe, and, according to statements of inhabitants, no 
 changes- had since then been made in the occupation of the 
 frontier. 
 
V Studies in tiif: LeadiiNG of Troops. 
 
 SrJXiAE SnuATJox of the Second Infantry Division. 
 (^lap I.) 
 
 As long- as the corps should remain divided, the First 
 cavalry brigade was to be under the orders of the commander 
 
 of the Second infantry division, Lieutenant-General A / 
 
 The strength of the Second infantry division was as 
 follows r 
 
 12 battalions of infantry; 
 4 squadrons ; 
 .56 guns ; 
 I company of engineers, with division bridge train; 
 1 signal corps detachment ; 
 I ambulance company. 
 The First cavalry brigade consisted of 8 squadrons and 
 6 guns. 
 
 A field hospital was attached to the division. 
 
 (The organization of these troops is given in Plan I.) 
 
 'In the German Army a brigade is commanded by a major- 
 general and a division by a lieutenant-general; there is no title 
 "brigadier-general." — Translator. 
 
 -The formation and war strength of various units in the Ger- 
 man Army is as follows: 
 
 Infantry. — Regiment is divided into 3 battalions; battalion into 
 4 companies; company into 3 platoons. Company has 5 officers, 255 
 non-commissioned officers and men, 8 horses, and is formed up in 
 
 2 ranks. 
 
 Cavalry. — Regiment is divided into 4 squadrons; squadron into 
 4 troops. Squadron is tactical unit; it has 5 officers and 161 non- 
 commissioned officers and men, and is formed up in 2 ranks. 
 
 Artillery. — Regiment is divided into 4 battalions; battalion into 
 
 3 batteries; battery into 3 platoons. Each battery has G guns. Gen- 
 erally only 2 battalions of a regiment are attached to an infantry 
 division, a third battalion going to furnish the horse artillery for 
 the cavalry divisions, and a fourth battalion being retained at home 
 as reserve. 
 
 KiUjincer company has 5 officers, 213 non-commissioned officers 
 and men, 19 horses. Division luMdge train has 2 officers, 52 non- 
 commissioned officers and men, S7 horses, 14 vehicles. 
 
 Hiffnal corps dctadimcnt (in this instance a telegraph section) 
 2 non-commissioned olficoj-s and 10 men. 
 
 Amhulancc company has 3 officers, S nioilical oiruers. 249 non- 
 commissioned officers, men. .md allcndants, with U\ horses and 13 
 vehicles. — Translator 
 
Studies in the: Lkading of Troops. 3 
 
 The division commander had been informed of the sta- 
 rions assigned the other parts of the corps, also that the cav- 
 alry division had gone into bivouac behind Liebau. He did 
 not know, however, whether the other corps of the Second 
 Army had also left the line of the Neisse, nor did he know the 
 special task set for the First corps. The last orders received 
 were: To go into bivouac near Schömberg, secure against 
 Trautenau and Braunau, not to cross the frontier with larger 
 bodies until further orders, and to make a stand near Schöm- 
 berg should the enemy advance. • 
 
 In pursuance of this, the various parts of the division 
 were in bivouac or cantonment on the morning of June 26 as 
 follows : 
 
 Advance Guard (Major-General B ) at Bertels- 
 
 dorf (cantonment) : 
 
 1st infantry regiment; 
 ist horse battery; 
 4th squadron, ist hussar regiment. 
 Main Body, in and around Schömberg: 
 Quartered in the city — 
 
 Division headquarters ; 
 
 Headquarters, 4th infantry brigade and ist 
 
 cavalry brigade; 
 ] st and 2(1 battalions, 4th infantry regiment ; 
 Signal corps detachment. 
 In bivouac — 
 
 North of Schömberg-Trautenau road : 
 2d infantry regiment ; 
 
 1st field artillery regiment, less ist battery; 
 Engineer company with division bridge 
 
 train ; 
 Ambulance company. 
 South of vSchomberg-Trautenau road : 
 ^d infantry regiment ; 
 
 ist and 2d squadrons, ist hussar regiment. 
 I mile northeast of the city : 
 
 ist cavalry brigade. 
 North of vSchömberg: 
 Field hospital. 
 The trains were with the respective troops. 
 
4 Studie:s in the Leading oe Troops. 
 
 Left Flank Dctaclimcnt (Major \' ) pushed for- 
 ward west of and close to Alerkclsdorf : 
 
 3d battalion, 4th infantry regiment ; 
 3 troops, 3d squadron, ist hussar regiment. 
 Thj Fourth troop of the Third squadron was at division 
 hcad(|uarters. 
 
 Mounted orderlies were distributed as follows: at divis- 
 ion headquarters, i non-commissioned officer and 6 men; at 
 each infantry brigade headquarters, 2 men ; for each infantry 
 regiment, i non-commissioned officer and 8 men. With each 
 battalion were 4 to 6 cyclists. 
 
 Disposition of the Advance Guard. — The Third battalion, 
 First infantry regiment, had sent out the following outposts: 
 the Twelfth 'company, into the southern portion of Bertels- 
 dorf, one platoon occupying the exits toward Albendorf ; the 
 Ninth company, to the north of the highway, bivouacked on a 
 line with the Twelfth; the Tenth company, to the south of the 
 highway, protected by pickets during the night ; the Eleventh 
 company, as main body of the advance guard, occupying a 
 large farm-house in the center of the village. The com- 
 mander of the Third battalion had disposed of two troops 
 of the Fourth s(|uadron, F'irst hussars, in such manner that 
 one troop, as picket, occupied the heights northwest of Al- 
 bendorf; the other troop bivouacked near the main body. 
 Two mounted men were with each outpost company. At 
 nightfall the pickets would be drawn in, and in their stead 
 continuous mounted patrols would be instituted on the road 
 beyond Petersdorf. During the day the cavalry picket had 
 set out one non-commissioned officers' post on the Albendorf- 
 Bernsdorf road, and another on the Albendorf-Oualisch road. 
 Patrols would be substituted for these during the night, go- 
 ing beyond C,olden-Oels. The First and Second battalions of 
 the regiment, the remainder of the Fourth scjuadron, and the 
 battery were in village bivouacs around the farm-houses in the 
 direction of Schömberg. Tn case of attack, the advance guard 
 commander had ordered the holding of the line (xxupied by 
 the f(;remost companies. 
 
 Upon issuing from the mountain defile, the officers' pa- 
 trols previously sent out toward Trautenau on June 25 had 
 encountered hostile dragoons northeast of Parschnitz. 
 
Studies in the: Lkading of Troops. 5 
 
 The left flanking detachment of the division had moved 
 the Twelfth company toward Merkelsdorf, and sent the Ninth 
 company to the heights in the direction of Adersbach. Pick- 
 ets of these ontpost companies closely watched the communi- 
 cations near them. A non-commissioned officer and 6 hussars 
 had been assigned to the Ninth company for patrol duty, and 
 a non-commissioned officer and 10 hussars to the Twelfth. 
 The latter first established a cavalry non-commissioned offi- 
 cer's post on the height northwest of Merkelsdorf, opposite 
 Friedland, and sent the remainder of the troopers to patrol 
 through Merkelsdorf. The balance of the detachment, as main 
 body of the outposts, bivouacked on the Schomberg-Merkels- 
 dorf road, about 1% miles from the latter village. The 
 hussar patrols sent forward 6 miles from the outpost of the 
 main body had learned nothing of the enemy. 
 
 By direction of the division commander, defensive posi- 
 tions had been reconnoitered, in which he intended to deploy 
 the division in case considerable hostile forces should advance 
 to attack from Trautenau or the south. 
 
 Early on the morning of June 26 the division was in 
 receipt of the following message from corps headquarters: 
 
 2d Army, 
 
 1st Army Corps. 
 
 Headquarters. Headquarters at Liebau, 
 
 Page No. . 25 June, . 1 1 45 p. m. 
 
 The Guard corps will cross the frontier to-rnorrow, June 
 26, east of Braunau. 
 
 The division v/ill reconnoiter the roads to Braunau via 
 Weckelsdorf and Friedland, and will immediately advance to 
 the assistance of the Guard should the latter become engaged. 
 In such case, however, the advance guard of the division will 
 remain in its position toward Trautenau. 
 
 The Commanding General: N . 
 
 To the 
 
 2d Infantry Division, 
 Schomberg. 
 
 In pursuance of this, the following message was imme- 
 diately dispatched to the left flanking detachment: 
 
o Studies in tiii<: Li-adixc ok Troops. 
 
 2d Infantry Division. Headquarters at Schümberg, 
 
 26 June, I :io a. ni. 
 
 The Guard corps will cross the frontier early to-day near 
 Braunau. If it should thereby become involved in an engage- 
 ment, the division is directed to assist it. It is therefore neces- 
 sary to obtain early information relative to conditions near 
 Braunau. Vou will reconnoiter the country to Braunau by the 
 cavalry assigned to you, and establish communication with the 
 Guard. 
 
 Prompt report of the results of the reconnaissance is 
 expected. 
 To A-^ , 
 
 Major V , Lieiitenant-Gcncral. 
 
 Commanding 3d Bn., 4th Regt., 
 In bivouac before Merkelsdorf. 
 
 The general staff otlicer personally instructed the cyclist 
 entrusted with the transmission of this order about the route 
 to be taken, especially the street leading out of Schomberg, 
 and particularly enjoined him to bring back receipt showing 
 delivery of the order. He left the city at 1 130 a. m. Fifteen 
 
 minutes later Major V had been found, and the order 
 
 delivered to him. To insure delivery, the general staff officer 
 had also des])atchcd a copy of the order by a mounted mes- 
 senger, who, having first to saddle, arrived at his destination 
 TO minutes after the cyclist. Having read the order, Majoi 
 
 V handed the cyclist the following written report to 
 
 division headquarters : 
 
 Left Flank Detachment. Fiivouac west of Merkelsdorf, 
 
 26 June. 2 a. m. 
 Order of this day received. Two troops of hussars will go 
 forward toward Braunau on roads via Friedland and Weckels- 
 dorf. To support them I will hold the exits of Merkelsdorf. 
 
 To the V , 
 
 2(1 Infantry Division, Major. 
 
 Schomberg. 
 
 Major \' made his dispositions accordingly, and at 
 
 2:30 2 troops of the Tliird squadron started out in the direc- 
 tion of l^>raunau. 
 
Studiks in the Leading of Troops. 7 
 
 At 4:30 a. m. the division commander issued the follow- 
 ing order to the connnanders of the various bivouacs: 
 
 ist Army Corps, 
 
 2d Infantry Division. Headquarters at Schömberg, 
 
 Page No. . 26, 6, '66, 4:30 a. m. 
 
 Troops must hasten preparation of breakfast and then 
 hold themselves in readiness to march. 
 
 A , 
 
 Lieu tenan t-General, Commanding. 
 
 Reports received during the day from the hussar patrols 
 showed that upon the advance of the Guard only minor engage- 
 ments with hostile cavalry patrols had occurred, and that one 
 of its divisions had gone into bivouac near Braunau, the other 
 having advanced to Weckelsdorf and Merkelsdorf. In conse- 
 quence of this the division commander brought the left flank 
 detachment to Schömberg during the afternoon of June 26. 
 The Third battalion moved into bivouac beside the Third 
 regiment, and the 3 troops of hussars rejoined their regiment. 
 The cavalry patrols sent out by the advance guard had again 
 during the day encountered a hostile dragoon patrol west of 
 Petersdorf, in support of which a considerable body of cav- 
 alry, probably a squadron, was seen. 
 
 Shortly after 5 p. m. the corps order for the next day was 
 received at Schömberg: 
 
 ''To-morrow, June 2y, at 4 a. m. the First infantry divis- 
 ion and the corps artillery will march from Liebau, the main 
 body via Golden-Oels, and a flank detachment via Schatzlar, 
 and the Second infantry division with the cavalry brigade 
 from Schömberg, upon Parschnitz. There the corps will unite 
 and halt two hours, except that the First infantry brigade 
 (First infantry division), designated as advance guard, will 
 continue the advance on Trautenau and occupy the city. The 
 march will be resumed in one column in the direction of Arn- 
 au ; the Second infantry division with the Second infantry 
 brigade and the corps artillery will constitute the main body 
 of the corps." 
 
 The order closed as follows : 
 
 ''It is of paramount importance that the corps be concen- 
 trated at the earliest possible moment in a position on the left 
 
8 
 
 Studiks in Till-: TjvADiNC. Ol- Troops. 
 
 bank of the Aupa near Trautenau, both flanks protected 
 against the siuklen api)roach of hostile forces. 
 
 "The commanding general will be found with the First 
 infantry division." 
 
 At 6 p. m. the order of march of the division for the next 
 day was given out to the advance guard, Second infantry reg- 
 iment, Fourth infantry brigade, hussar regiment. First tiekl 
 anillery regiment, engineer company, signal corps detachment, 
 ambulance company, First cavalry brigade, and the field 
 hospital : 
 
 jst Army Corps, 
 2d Infantry Division. 
 Page No. . 
 
 Distribution of Troops 
 for June 2/. 
 
 Advance Guard: 
 
 (ATajor-Cicneral 1> . ) 
 
 ist Infantry Regiment. 
 Hussar Rgt. (less i tr'p) 
 ist Bn. ist F. A. 
 Fngineer Company. 
 I Amb. Co. Section. 
 
 Main Body: 
 ( In order of march.) 
 2d Infantry Regiment. 
 
 Staff 
 
 2d 
 
 1st F. A 
 
 4th Infantry Brigade. 
 1 Amb. Co. Section. 
 vSignal Cori)s Detachm't. 
 Division Piridge Train. 
 2d Field Hosi)ital. 
 ist Cavalrv Brii-ade. 
 
 1 leadquarters at Schömberg, 
 
 26, 6, '66, 6 p. m. 
 
 DnisioN Order roR Junk 27. 
 
 1. Hostile cavalry is watching 
 the frontier northeast of Traut- 
 enau. 
 
 2. The army corps will cross the 
 frontier to-morrow, June 27, and 
 unite at Parschnitz ; the Guard 
 
 •corps is near Braunau and Weck- 
 elsdorf. 
 
 The First infantry division will 
 advance at 4 a. m. from Liebau \'ia 
 Golden-Oels. 
 
 ^^ The »Second infantry division 
 will send its advance guard for- 
 ward at 4 a. m. on the road to 
 Trautenau, keeping up communica- 
 
 ' tion with the First division and at- 
 tacking the enemy wherever he is 
 seen. 
 
 4. The main body will f(^llow at 
 4:15 a. m., and the cavalry brigade 
 at 5 130 a. m. 
 
 5. The heavy baggage of the 
 main body will be jxarked after 7 
 a. m. north of Schöml)erg, and that 
 of the advance Liuard north of Der- 
 
Si UDii^s IN THK LKx\ding of Troops. 9 
 
 telsdorf in charge of Lieutenant 
 
 X , First hussar regiment, who 
 
 will also command the troop oi 
 hussars on duty at division head- 
 quarters. 
 
 6. I will be with the advance 
 guard. 
 
 A , 
 
 Lieut. -General, Conunaiiding. 
 
 COMMJ^NTS. 
 
 Distribution of First Army Corps. 
 
 It may seem strange, at first thought, that the corps was 
 not united at one point, but divided into halves about 2,y2 miles 
 ^part and occupying bivouacs near Liebau and Schömberg. 
 Such a distribution should, however, be made wherever con- 
 ditions will permit. The larger the space over which troops 
 are spread out the easier their shelter and subsistence ; furth- 
 •ermore, the number of available roads is increased, and large 
 ]iiasses can be moved more comfortably and rapidly. The art 
 of directing armies is principally founded on distributing the 
 masses over large spaces, so they may live and march while 
 retaining the ability to assemble their full force in time for 
 •decisive action. 
 
 On August 26, 1870, during their advance on Paris, the 
 Second and the Maas Armies occupied a front of about 41 
 miles ; at noon of September 2 the masses of both armies, 
 with the exception of the Sixth corps and the detached cav- 
 alry about Sedan, occupied a space a little more than 4>4 by 
 2)4 miles. 
 
 Such separation, however, must never go so far that the 
 several bodies cannot mutually support each other. In the 
 case in hand this could certainly be accomplished, for the dis- 
 tance between the two divisions was only about 4 miles, and 
 in the mountain defiles the advance of the enemy upon either 
 one of them could be considerably delayed by its advance 
 guard. Then also, in the case before us, the eventual advance 
 of the corps would be materially facilitated by the separation 
 -of the two divisions, as a great highway was at the disposal 
 
lO 
 
 Studiks IX TiiK Lkadixc. Ol- Troops. 
 
 of each for crossing the mountains. Through this the egress 
 into the vaUey of i'arschnitz, which under certain circum- 
 stances miglit be quite dangerous, could be made in half the 
 time required if the corps were conlined to a single road. 
 
 As the cavalry division of the Second Army w^as in biv- 
 ouac not far from Uebau, it was expedient to order the First 
 cavalry brigade to Schömberg. A large accumulation of cav- 
 alry, especially in mountainous country, materially increases 
 the difficulty of sheltering and subsisting. 
 
 It was an especially wise measure to place the First cav- 
 alry brigade under the orders of the commander of the Sec- 
 ond division. On the battle-field unity of command is a mat- 
 ter of course. If the fighting bodies belong to different or- 
 ganizations, and common supervision has not been previously 
 provided, the commander highest in rank on the spot assumes 
 authority. In marches and bivouacs also it is best to place 
 the various bodies alongside the same road under a common 
 commander, whenever trouble is likely to arise in movements 
 or in the use of villages for shelter, etc. If this is not done, 
 it may become necessary for superior authority to issue com- 
 plicated orders (in this case corps headquarters), which, no 
 matter how carefully worded, are not always adequate to pre- 
 vent inconvenience and friction. 
 Information in the Possession of the Division Commander. 
 
 The division commander's first information of the Guard 
 corps having left the Ime of the Neissc and approached the 
 left wing of the Second infantry division w^as contained in 
 the order from headcjuarters of the First army corps at Schöm- 
 berg that reached Liebau early on June 26. Furthermore, 
 up to this time he had no knowledge whatever of the gen- 
 eral intentions of army headquarters or of the special task 
 set for the First corps. 
 
 It may seem strange that an officer of such high rank as 
 a division commander should be so poorly informed of the 
 general situation; in some cases it is certainly true that not 
 enough is done in this direction. We must always adhere to 
 the principle that every independent commander ought to be 
 sufficiently oriented to be able to make proper dispositions in 
 unforeseen contingencies fully in accord w^ith the general war 
 situation, and on his own initiative. A commander may doubt- 
 
Studies in tiii^ Leading of Troops. i[ 
 
 less be greatly interested in what may lie beyond such infor- 
 mation, but nevertheless we should under no circumstances 
 communicate to any one more than is necessary for his guid- 
 ance in forming his own decisions in cases of emergency. The 
 secret of zvhat is being done or is intended cannot be too 
 closely guarded. 
 
 What is especially necessary for every commandLr t) 
 know is the movements of columns in his vicinity. Subdivis- 
 ions of his command must also be informed of this, else the 
 sudden appearance of marching columns may cause unneces- 
 sary delays. It is therefore quite essential that bodies of 
 troops located beside or behind each other, even though they 
 may not be parts of the same organization, should keep up 
 communication regarding all matters of importance. 
 
 But in this case the instructions given to Lieutenant- 
 General A were sufficient for all purposes. With his 
 
 attention drawn to the direction from which the enemy could 
 appear, he would know what to do if the latter attacked. That 
 he himself must not assume the offensive until further orders 
 is easily deduced from the injunction not to cross the frontier 
 with larger bodies, a precaution based on a desire not pre- 
 maturely to draw the attention of the enemy to the plan to 
 take the offensive in that direction with all forces. But no 
 time was lost in conmiunicating this purpose when the 
 Guard corps had approached the sphere of the Second in- 
 fantry division. 
 
 Bivouac of the Division. 
 
 Troops should have the benefit of roof shelter wherever 
 possible. Even when near the enemy this is practicable for 
 some of the troops, although for the most advanced forces we 
 must resort to village bivouacs and alarm quarters. During 
 the struggles of the detached army of the Grand Duke of 
 Mecklenburg around Beaugency, where the nights offered the 
 only pauses in an otherwise uninterrupted series of engage- 
 ments, the contest for farm-houses as night shelter was often 
 continued to a late hour. 
 
 In this case the limited number of villages did not allow 
 the shelter for a large number of men. Besides Schomberg 
 and Bertelsdorf, Merkelsdorf might have been so used. The 
 
12 StudiI'S IX THK Lk adtnm; 01- Troops. 
 
 objection that this village was too far distant from Schöm- 
 berg to enable the main body to give timely support to a side 
 detachment is not tenable whenever an extended service of 
 patrols is established, which wonld insure the timely discvjv- 
 ery of the enemy's approach. Furthermore, the rocky char- 
 acter of the country around Adcrsbach would greatly in- 
 crease the resisting power of the single battalion. 
 
 Stroii^th of the Advance Guard and the Left Plank 
 Detachment. 
 
 The Schomberg-Trautenau road forms the main line of 
 communication in the network of roads as far as need be con- 
 sidered here. Furthermore, it was known that there were 
 hostile forces on this road. For the present the road via Mer- 
 kelsdorf requires less consideration; the patrols found no en- 
 emy in that direction, and the above-mentioned rocky ground 
 makes the movement of large masses improbable. Conse- 
 quently the division could secure itself in that direction by a 
 small force, and only one battalion was detached toward Mer- 
 kelsdorf, while the Trautenau road was covered by three bat- 
 talions. Jf both were of eq-ual importance, however, both with 
 reference to terrane and position of opponent, it would have 
 been necessary for the division to send out two equally strong 
 advance guards. 
 
 Moreover, the advance needed only to have been formed 
 of two battalions of the First infantry regiment, the third 
 battalion being sent in the direction of Merkelsdorf. The cut 
 in the road near Bertelsdorf and the character of the moun- 
 tainous ground surrounding would presumably have enabled 
 these smaller forces to offer effective resistance in case of 
 attack until help could reach them from the nearest point. 
 The important principle of breaking up tactical units as lit- 
 tle as possible may well be disregarded in this instance ; in the 
 i)artition here illustrated a detachment had been made from 
 ihe Fourth instead of the First regiment, although it will be 
 found that under subsequent circumstances this would not 
 be justifiable. In favor of the ])artiti(Mi made the following 
 can be said: If the advance was to be made in one of the 
 two directions and it was desired to start out at once w^ith the 
 foremost troops, the third battalion of the First regiment, if 
 
Studies in tii;i: Leading of Troops. 13 
 
 detached toward IMerkelsdorf, might easily be permanently 
 separated from the regiment. If, on the contrary, a battahon 
 of the Fourth regiment formed the left flank detachment, in 
 case of an advance on Trautenau it could rejoin its regiment 
 in time; in case of an advance via Merkelsdorf, communica- 
 tion v^ith the other battalions could be re-established by plac- 
 ing them at the head of the column starting from Schömberg. 
 
 As for the cavalry, the Fourth squadron was attached to 
 the advance guard, and the Third squadron, less i troop, to 
 the left flank detachment. Considering the fact that the 
 forces were in a mountainous country where there were only 
 a few practicable roads for cavalry, a single squadron would 
 have been amply sufficient for both parties, the more so as 
 quarters should have been provided in Bertelsdorf for that 
 portion of the outpost cavalry not employed during the night. 
 We must never forget that the troops nearest the enemy en- 
 joy the least rest. We will not often be able to relieve the 
 cavalry regiment of a division ; so there is all the more reason 
 that we should lose no opportunity to do so. 
 
 As for the battery, although the valley would allow the 
 use of more than two guns in only a few places, we can gen- 
 erally find good positions for a battery in bends of a road upon 
 projecting ridges, from which it can sweep the road and ad- 
 joining territory. For this reason six guns were sent with 
 the advance guard. When it is intended to hold a section of 
 country, it beconies necessary to attach as inuch artillery as 
 possible. A limitation is naturally indicated when the ground 
 prevents the employment of \ this arm to any great extent, as 
 .in the case before us. 
 
 Another question is, Should the left flank detachment be 
 provided with artillery? In favor of an artillery support is the 
 fact that the position there would gain in power of resistance ; 
 in opposition, the fact that the division should keep its bat- 
 teries together, and that generally only so much artillery 
 should be detached as is urgently needed. Such a necessity 
 is not, however, apparent in this case, as an attack near Mer- 
 kelsdorf was not expected, at least for the time being. The 
 post there has really only the character of an observation post, 
 for the purpose of Avhich only a battalion was sent out, because 
 the very broken terrane demanded extensive measures of se- 
 
1^. Studies ix the Leading of Troops. 
 
 curity to prevent the stealthy approach of small hostile par- 
 tics. A consequence of greater dispersion is always the neces- 
 sity of posting correspondnigly strong supports for the most 
 advanced troops. On the whole, we should warn against at- 
 tempting to send a few guns with every detached battalion, 
 as was frequently done while the cordon system was still in 
 full favor. Small bodies acting independently are often forced 
 to extend too far, and then there is little left for the support 
 or protection of the artillery. The dispersion of artillery 
 should be discouraged all the more by reason of the fact that 
 the 36 guns of a division are barely sufficient to furnish the 
 necessary artillery support. 
 
 It would seem to be a mistake that engineers had not 
 been attached to the advance guard. In mountainous country 
 opportunity will always be found for their profitable employ- 
 ment with the foremost troops. 
 
 Positions of the Advance Guard and the Left Flank 
 Detachment. 
 
 As a rule, advance guards on the march take up their 
 positions during the afternoon, often not until evening. Ex- 
 amination of the ground, measures of security, etc., in this 
 case should be carried out by the simplest means. We must 
 remember that the near approach of night leaves our oppo- 
 nent no time to inform himself concerning measures taken 
 bv us, sufficiently to permit his initiation of any night enter- 
 ])rises, which are difficult under all circumstances. We shoultf 
 also remember that in day-time the discovery of movements 
 of larger hostile parties, which are the only things that can 
 cause us serious trouble, is the duty of the reconnoitering cav- 
 alry ; so on that account it is not necessary to cover the entire 
 territory i^'ith a chain of double posts and corresponding!; pick- 
 ets and outpost eojupanirs. Small patrols will think twice be- 
 fc^re riding into the center of a hostile position out of which 
 they could hardly escape if discovered. Consequently, in mod- 
 ern tactics, the measures of security taken for the protection 
 of halfini:; forces rc/V/ be routined ehietly to Ti'a/r////;,c f'oads. 
 
 JUit in this, too, there are many exceptions, among which 
 may be classed the situation of the advance guard and left 
 llank dc-tachment as ijiven in the ^tndv l)efore us. In the nar- 
 
Studif.s in the Leading of Troops. 15 
 
 row valley in front of the advance guard was the almost un- 
 broken line of the farm-houses and gardens of Bertelsdorf, 
 Albendorf, and Petersdorf, over 4 miles in length. These 
 almost totally obstructed the view to the front. Nevertheless 
 the advance guard could not be pushed forward to the exit 
 of the defile, which would be most expedient under other cir- 
 cumstances. That point is 8 miles from Sch()mberg, and to 
 occupy a position there would be a violation of the injunction 
 not to cross the frontier with larger bodies. The sides of the 
 valley being so near the road give it the character of a de- 
 file ; to the west of Bertelsdorf it widens somewhat into a 
 larger kettle-shaped space. Besides the line of communica- 
 tion existing between Oualisch and Golden-Oels, there are 
 only the country wagon-roads between Albendorf and Berns- 
 dorf and two other roads leading north from Bertelsdorf. 
 Merely to zvaich these roads zvas not suMeietit. The roads 
 leading over the mountains must be occupied at the summit 
 by a force strong enough to maintain its ground against hos- 
 tile attack until reinforcements could reach it. In territory 
 so difficult to observe, the approach of hostile parties is likely 
 to be discovered too late, all the more so because every foot- 
 path, often invisible from a distance, would be known to the 
 enemy, who has been in the country for some time. The sud- 
 den dislodgment of one of the division's posts on the summit 
 might put the troops bivouacked below in a most precarious 
 situation, [t was therefore essential to hold the high ground 
 from the outset, by separate companies especially advanced 
 for the purpose. 
 
 In this case the line of the foremost companies formjd 
 the line of resistance, although ordinarily the attack of the 
 enemy should not be met on the line of the supporting out- 
 post companies, but near the outpost reserve. Outpost com- 
 panies should resist only long enough to give the resting 
 troops time to gtt ready for action; they are not required to 
 maintain the position assigned them, but to resist the enemy 
 only for a limited time. Although the country around Bertels- 
 dorf was not favorable for the employment of cavalry, it was 
 nevertheless advisable to gain additional security by pushing 
 cavalry beyond the outpost companies. It could then discover 
 an advance of the enemy in time. During the night the at- 
 
i6 Sttdiks IX Tin- Li-adixc. or Troops. 
 
 teiilion of the cavalry should be directed toward the reacts, 
 on which it should patrol beyond either the resiMve or supporis 
 of the outposts. Taking into account the character of the 
 terrane, the sending of the foremost parties to the frontier 
 line, so that the cut in the wagon-road leading from Qualisci. 
 to the Trautenau highway and the ravine from Albendori Kj 
 Bernsdorf would be immediately in their front, appears more 
 judicious than taking uj) the positions that were actually oc- 
 cupied. In this case the main body of the advance gui^rd 
 should then be stationed in the kettle-like space west of 
 Bcrtelsdorf. 
 
 We should add that the longer we remain opposite the 
 enemy, the more care must be devoted to security, which fre- 
 (juently leads to the establishnicnt of a connected outpost line 
 — as, for example, in the blockade of a fortress. It must be 
 acknowledged that in time both sides obtain a better knowl- 
 edge of the dispositions of their opponents, and are thereby 
 offered better o])portunities to take advantage of carelessness 
 or errors of the opposing side. Even in the case before us it 
 would DC judicious, if the division remained some days longer 
 at Schömberg, to extend the sphere of security of the advance 
 guard and to establish connection with outposts of the left 
 flanking detachment and the First infantry division. 
 
 jt was the duty of the left flanking detachment to watch 
 the road from Friedland, as well as the rocky region around 
 Adersbach, and at the same time to occupy the road from 
 Merkelsdori. If it attempted to establish a connected line 
 of outposts there, its forces would be quite insufficient, as the 
 distance was nearly 2]4 miles. It nuist therefore be satisfied 
 with closing the main road and covering the country jn both 
 directions by detached 1)odies, who must institute independent 
 measures for their individual security. The strength of these 
 detached i)arlies depended on the ]:)roximity of the enemy and 
 the formation of the terrane. Contrary to the tactics of the 
 outposts of the advance guard, both outpost companies (Ninth 
 and Twelfth) put out ])ickets in day-time. Before the front, 
 outpost cavalry could not be eni])loved in the rocky coun- 
 try around Adersbaeh and Mcrkelsdorf. The infantry also 
 had to provide for its own security. Meanwhile a correct 
 assignment i»t' hussars to the dilTerent comi)anies enabled 
 
 I 
 
Studif-s in Tiiii: Lr,.\i)iNO of Tkooi'S. 17 
 
 them to send out cavalry patrols and establish a cavalry non- 
 commissioned officer's post on the left wing. 
 
 Scouting Instituted by the Outposts. 
 
 The duty to scout at long range falls upon the cavalry. 
 Even in territory which admits of the exhibition of the fight- 
 ing power of this arm only in a limited degree, it should pref- 
 erably be used, unless our own outposts are advanced close 
 upon the enemy. As in this instance the cavalry patrols which 
 had gone ahead upon the arrival of the advance guard soon 
 encountered hostile cavalry outposts behind Petersdorf, the 
 cavalry scouting zone was rather limited. It was expedient 
 in the mountainous terrane to send forward cavalry non- 
 commissioned officers' posts to points from which they couM 
 continuously observe the enemy's outposts. Under these cir- 
 cumstances the hussar picket northwest of Albendorf should 
 be ready at any moment to follow the enemy with patrols and 
 ascertain his location as soon as his withdrawal was observed. 
 
 The left flanking detachment had sent out hussars on dif- 
 ferent roads from the main outpost body to a distance of 6 
 miles. These had consequently ranged to Petersdorf, and also, 
 via Friedland and Weckelsdorf, as far as Dittersbach. Ex- 
 plicit instructions how far such patrols should reach our, when 
 the enemy is not in the near vicinity, can never be formulat- 
 ed. Ordinarily large masses of cavalry will go in advance of 
 a marching army corps. In the exceptional case before us 
 this was omitted, for it was desired to conceal the direction 
 of the intended march into the enemy's territory as long as 
 possible. Under different conditions the cavalry brigade of 
 the First army corps, or the Second cavalry division, should 
 have driven away the hostile dragoons along the frontier and 
 reached Trautenau long before the army corps arrived near 
 Schomberg or Liebau. After this its next task would be to 
 scout the entire region up to the Elbe. 
 
 But when larger bodies of cavalry are not in front, the 
 outpost cavalry must undertake the scouting. It is also the 
 business of superior commanders to send out special officers' 
 patrols, as their judgment dictates. The outpost cavalry, un- 
 der the direction of "its leader, should keep in touch with the 
 enemy. The outpost commander could also send out patrols 
 
l8 Studiks in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 from the main bddy. Jn this case the (hvision had just arrived 
 and was not yet at all oriented rei^arding the appearance oT 
 the enemy in the country around Braunau. It would not 'oq 
 wise to permit the cavalry patrols to range over this territory. 
 The civil authorities of the enemy still exercised their func- 
 tions ; the telegraph carried information to the hostile cuni- 
 manders from every direction ; the patrols, who could only 
 notice what transpired in their sphere of vision, would inva- 
 riably be watched at every stej) ; if they branched out too far, 
 they could not be efficiently supported, and hostile patrols 
 could easily have struck them a hard blow. Only the best 
 officers, with a few selected men and horses, should be sent 
 for long distances. As soon as the enemy's position is ascer- 
 tained, it is recommended to send forward entire squadrons 
 to scout or assure security, if troops are on hand. These are 
 not bound to any specific position, and can hang on to and 
 follow the movements of the enemy. The sphere of scouting 
 naturally grows larger with the increase in number of troops 
 available, but the single cavalry regiment of a division repre- 
 sents only a limited force. In the case in hand officers' pa- 
 trols went beyond Dittersbach. Whenever conditions at all 
 permit, we should observe the rule to examine the country 
 ahead of a division to a distance equal to a day's march. If 
 the division remains for any length of time in the same posi- 
 tion, and the region in its immediate vicinity is under its con- 
 trol, then a further extension of the cavalry patrolling zone 
 may follow. In their own country patrols may undertake long 
 rides at any time; but in such cases they must nevertheless 
 act cautiously. 
 
 At the same time, it is generally considered that an offi- 
 cer with a few selected horses may be emi)loyed to more ad- 
 vantage in gathering information than a whole regiment of 
 cavalry. Vet we must not overlook the fact that this propo- 
 sition ap]>lies only in a limited degree. The officer can cer- 
 tainly ni(»\-e with more secrecy and rapidity, and he can take 
 a roundabout road, without serious detriment. i»ut such an 
 employment i)resupposes that the enemy's cavalry is not in its 
 pr()])er place. ( )ur experiences in the last war are of a decid- 
 edly one-sided nature, for the h^vnch cavalry was either not 
 thus employed, or eNi' onl\- in a very injii(ticious manner. If 
 
Studiks in the: Leading of Troops. 19 
 
 hereafter we meet an enemy who during operations uses his 
 cavahy as we did, then we must famiUarize ourselves with 
 the m.axim that to see at all we must first be able to fight. 
 The training of large cavalry masses must therefore be car- 
 ried on in the most thorough manner. 
 
 As the example we are now considering involved the 
 sending of hussars to a comparatively great distance in order 
 to learn the condition of affairs at Braunau, the commander 
 of the left fiank detachment did not fail to dispatch infantry 
 for their support. Such a measure always appears wise, but 
 is especially necessary if the cavalry finds itself opposed by 
 a superior mounted force. It may then take greater risks, 
 assured that even if it should be unfortunate in an engage- 
 ment, the pursuit would come to a halt in the vicinity of the 
 infantry, which would give it an opportunity to reassemble. 
 
 Patrols were certainly sufficient to positively determine 
 whether there would be an engagement at Braunau. If there 
 should be, and the division were consequently obliged to start 
 out, it could hardly be advised too soon, in the most exhaust- 
 ive manner, regarding the state of affairs there. It would be 
 a question, however, if this could be accomplished by patrols 
 when once the enemy had instituted proper measures of se- 
 curity in the direction of the approach of the troops. It would 
 then become important to force back the cavalry covering the 
 enemy at that point, so a better view of his lines could be 
 obtained. In this connection it would have been quite right 
 to make use of the First and Second squadrons from Schöm- 
 berg in the reconnaissance in question, the more so as the 
 First cavalry brigade was available to replace them. 
 
 Selection of Defensive Positions for the Troops of the Second 
 Division in Bivouac. 
 
 The division was positively instructed to maintain itself 
 near Schömberg in case of a hostile attack; it is therefore 
 
 self-evident that Lieutenant-General A would at once 
 
 begin to plan for posting his troops. It would have been in 
 no wise superfluous if he had also made arrangements for the 
 artificial strength of the selected positions, particularly by 
 throwing up of emplacements for guns, the construction of 
 rifle-pits, preparation for defense of farm-houses, etc. The 
 
20 
 
 STrnrKs in titk Lkadtnc or Tkoors. 
 
 engineer company ofifered material assistance for these pur- 
 poses. Even the possibiHty of the enemy's approach from two 
 different directions should not have prevented the execution 
 of as much work as time and means permitted, without suc- 
 cessive demands on the stren^^th of the troops. We can still 
 learn much in this direction from the methods of the French 
 Army. As a rule, we console ourselves with the thought that 
 we will probably not remain long in one positfon, and the con- 
 sequence is, that in many instances we do too little, frequent- 
 ly nothing at all. 
 
 Even if the division should not remain long at that point, 
 it would be the duty of the commander, on account of the 
 proximity of the enemy and his unfamiliarity w^th conditions 
 prevailing on the hostile side, to prepare for defense in case 
 he should be attacked ; the preparation of field fortifications 
 could in no wise be considered superfluous. 
 
 Orders from Corps Headquarters for June 26. 
 
 The message from corps headquarters received at Schöm- 
 berg on the morning of the 26th stated that the Guard corps 
 was approaching, directed scouting towards Braunau, and con- 
 tained positive instructions as to what the division should do 
 as soon as fighting commenced near Braunau. 
 
 Even if it had not been the intention of the commanding 
 general to support the Guard corps, the time had now arrived 
 when the Second infantry division ought to be advised that 
 other troops were approaching its sphere, although up to that 
 moment it was prohibited, as already explained, in order that 
 the secret of the operations would be guarded ; no necessity 
 existed for the Second division's learning of it any earlier. 
 
 The necessity for the advance guard's remaining in posi- 
 tion toward Trautenau lay in the fact that the road thither 
 could not be left uncovered in face of the enemy's position, 
 especially if the First division should also have marched Tn 
 the direction of Braunau, in which case its flanks must be pro- 
 tected. The absence of ad\'ice in the order from corps head- 
 quarters, as to whether, in case the Second division did march 
 to the left, the part of the corps situated near Tjebau should 
 follow it, miglit be a subject for comment. This information, 
 Jiowever. could not ha\'e been i-ivcn, for at that time the com- 
 
 i 
 
Studiks in thi; Leading of Troops. 21 
 
 nianding general himself did not know. There was always a 
 possibility that the positions of the First corps might be at- 
 tacked on June 26 while the Second started to the support of 
 the Guard. The commanding general would then have the ad- 
 vance guard of the Second division at his disposal, as well as 
 the entire First division (16 battalions), with which to hold the 
 mountain roads to Liebau and Schömberg, and a departure 
 of the main body of the First division could not take place. 
 On the other hand, in compliance with orders, the main body 
 of the Second division must advance to an engagement of the 
 Guard, under any circumstances, even should the advance 
 guard of the division meanwhile be attacked. In any case, 
 it had been specifically ordered that the advance guard remain 
 in position. 
 
 Disposition of the Second Infantry Division June 26. 
 
 The Second division went into minute detail in its orders 
 to the left flank detachment. In addition, it emphasized im- 
 portant points. Such a procedure is recommendable. Sub- 
 ordinate headquarters have no insight in the more general 
 features ; what superior headquarters expect to accomplish 
 through orders given must always be precisely stipulated. 
 
 The preparation of a special order of march to cover a 
 possible advance toward Braunau did not seem necessary. 
 The troops which would be affected in such a case were either 
 in bivouac or village shelter within a narrow space. It was 
 only necessary to alarm them and order them on the spot to 
 form in such a manner that they could successively take their 
 place in the column of march as intended, except it must not 
 be overlooked to furnish the advance guard on the Trautenau 
 road, as well as the one newly formed, with the necessary 
 explanations. 
 
 It was a question whether cooking at an early hour should 
 not be enjoined, for, if an engagement should be brought on 
 in the vicinity of Braunau, it could not be foreseen, on account 
 of the great distance, whether troops would have a chance to 
 cook later in the day. The theory of early cooking is much 
 abused. Not every stomach cares to take a full meal in the 
 early morning. It requires time to cook, and had early reports 
 of fighting near Braunau come in from the hussar patrols sent 
 
22 Stl'dii-.s in tuk Lkading of Troops. 
 
 in advance, the cookini^ wonkl have to be interrupted. It is 
 advisable to order early cookini;- only when certain of not 
 being interrupted and when intense labor is likely to be 
 demanded. 
 
 The bringing of the left ilank detachment to Schümberg 
 seems quite proper, as the presence of the Guard near Mer- 
 kelsdorf afforded the necessary security on the left. As a 
 rule, it is not advisable to take a body of troops out of bivouac 
 when once established there. In this case, however, it was 
 not known what hardships the next day might bring, and the 
 distance a battalion will have to march during a day is not 
 a matter that should be treated inconsiderately, whether great 
 or small. 
 
 Division Order for JuNr: 27. 
 Distribution of Troops} 
 
 It is evident that when advancing against an enemy the 
 various parts cannot move forward in immediate succession, 
 one closely behind another, as an accident befalling the head 
 would throw the whole into disorder. In case of larger bodies 
 this compels us to segregate an advance guard composed of 
 dilTerent arms and of sufficient stability and independence to 
 insure, by deploying when the enemy is encountered, ample 
 time for the remainder of the column to assume a battle 
 formation. 
 
 In order to avoid a deployment of the whole column im- 
 mediately upon the appearance of every minor party of the 
 enemy, and to facilitate such deployment when really neces- 
 
 Un this connection let us note that we have gone too far in 
 our methodical limitation of such technical knowledge as is neces- 
 sary for a loader of troops. Thus a great number of things have 
 been handed down traditionally, such as staff duties, which are 
 common property, rather than a specialty of the staff. The art of 
 command does not lie alone in the leader of such bodies as are gen- 
 erally considered in connection with a staff — a division or army 
 corps — but it must be exercised with skill by every leader, even by 
 the lowest ranking. Command is in itself so difficult that too much 
 trouble cannot be taken to acquire it and exercise it constantly when 
 once acquired, and instruction in it must therefore begin from the 
 moment of an officer's first education in troop-leading. 
 
Studif:s in the Leading oe Troops. 23 
 
 sary, an interval of a certain distance is left between the ad- 
 vance guard and the main body. A reserve is not needed 
 while a body is on the march, although in an action the 
 very nature of combat renders it impossible for a commander 
 to dispense with a reserve up to the moment that he must em- 
 ploy it. As a rule, all that immediately participates in the 
 action is only partially, most often not at all, in the hands of 
 the highest commander. He insures a thoroughly efficient 
 service only in so far as he retains at his disposal closed bod- 
 ies of troops, or understands how to form them during the 
 various stages of an engagement. An engagement should 
 therefore never be initiated without a fighting reserve, but on 
 a march a reserve is not needed. All troops not actually en^ 
 gaged or assigned to a special task are reserves of the high- 
 est commander. 
 
 In this case the advance guard included a regiment of 
 the Third infantry brigade, the second regiment of this bri- 
 gade being at the head of the main body. If the Third brf- 
 gade had not thus been divided, and the advance guard had 
 become engaged, in order to reinforce the advance guard the 
 next undivided unit at the disposal of the division commander 
 would have been the brigade of the main body, the Fourth 
 infantry brigade. And as an order covering the whole can be 
 issued only in exceptional cases (the matter in question being 
 the immediate support of the advance guard), the division 
 commander would either have to order forward at once the 
 entire brigade, or parts of it — a regiment or battalion. As it 
 was, he could reinforce the advance guard with the remainder 
 of its owm brigade ; otherwise he would have to break up the 
 Second brigade also, and on the fighting line the brigade com- 
 mander in charge of the advance guard would have to assume 
 command over troops entirely unknown to him. 
 
 The greatest error possible, however, is the praisewor- 
 thy inclination of commanders to conduct their fight inde- 
 pendently. When this is done, the way is prepared for disorder 
 and superior control generally becomes impossible. We must 
 therefore strive to preserve as long as possible the original 
 feeling of unity that grows out of the peace relation of troops 
 ^— their battle formation. For these reasons the Second regi- 
 
24 Studies i\ Tiiiv Lkadixc, or Troops. 
 
 meiit of llic 'i liird infantry l)riga(le was placed at the head of 
 the main body. 
 
 We nuist also note that in view of the great losses which 
 occur in a short space of time in a fight of breech-loader 
 against breech-loader, it is necessary to give a much greater 
 value to strong reserves and depth formation. Had the Sec- 
 ond infantry regiment been placed in rear of the main body, 
 the division commander would have been tempted to call the 
 Third infantry brigade into action too soon, so that a reserve 
 of only one-fourth the strength of his command would have 
 remained at his disposal. Jiesides, we are taught by experi- 
 ence tliat a reserve so formed w^ould easily have slipped out 
 of the hands of the division commander, and he would then 
 have no reserve whatever at his disposal. The division com- 
 mander would be with the mass of his troops, and his atten- 
 tion would be directed to the front (where the advance would 
 be engaged), if he would not be there in person. The re- 
 serve regiment would be separated from him, out of his sight 
 and the sight of the enemy, while it would be more anxious 
 than any other body of troops to take part in the engagement, 
 for its brigade commander and comrades would be wrestling 
 with the enemy at the front. Only the slightest provocation 
 would be needed, if at all justifiable, to start a runaway to 
 the front. 
 
 Neither would it be any different with the brigade com- 
 mander in charge of the advance guard, who had only one of 
 his own regiments at his disposal. Shoiild the engagement 
 become hot and difficult on his side, he would want the other 
 regiment of his brigade also. The interval between such a 
 desire and an attempt to fulfill it is brief, and it frequently 
 happens that, in order to satisfy the desires of both that part 
 of the brigade fighting at the head and the other parts stand- 
 ing in the reserve, the separated parts become united against 
 the will of their commander. Don't say that this could not 
 happen, for here we have manifestations founded on human 
 nature, and human nature is what we must reckon with. In 
 battle, human nature on many occasions triumphs over the 
 forms that bind individuals together for C(^ncentrated action. 
 
 I'\irthermore. this policy is dictated by ex]->erience. In 
 the engagement at C.itschin. I jeutenant-( K-neral von Tum- 
 
 ii 
 
Studijcs in tmk Lkauing of Troops. 
 
 25 
 
 pling placed the two grenadier battalions of the Twelfth regi- 
 uient in the reserve of his division. The other regiment of 
 the brigade was fighting under its commander on the wooded 
 height of the Priwiszin. Suddenly the two battalions of the 
 Twelfth, in reserve, were seen taking part in the near-by en- 
 gagement at Klein Ginolitz. It is immaterial how this came 
 about, but at all events it was contrary to the intentions of 
 the division commander, and it took the whole energy of the 
 superior leading and remarkable fire discipline of this regi- 
 ment to disengage it from the fight. Exactly the same hap- 
 pened with Fransecky's division in the struggle for the Swiep 
 forest near Königgrätz, the very division that had to bear the 
 brunt of the heaviest fighting. 
 
 It is therefore not advisable to allow such an artificial sep- 
 aration with brigades. We can do this if we adhere to the 
 rule that the regiment which constitutes a brigade jointly w4th 
 the advance guard regiment should always be left at the head 
 of the main body. The same rule can apply to larger or 
 smaller bodies of troops. It has the advantage that the first 
 support of the advance guard is furnished by that body near- 
 est akin to it in organization, and the brigade commander leads 
 Ills undivided brigade into action. Besides this, the division 
 commander has at his disposal an equally strong reserve ; and 
 still further, if it becomes necessary to suddenly form another 
 advance guard, in case it is necessary to rapidly move in an- 
 other direction, it will not be necessary to break up the second 
 brigade also. 
 
 Referring to the cavalry, nearly the whole hussar regi- 
 ment was assigned to the advance guard, although it moved 
 forward on a mountainous road on which the entire regiment 
 could not be utilized. But the mountains open out near Par- 
 schnitz; the patrols of the advance guard had continuously 
 kept the region under eye, almost up to the village ; and a 
 considerable resistance on that side of the opening was im- 
 probable. As soon as the plain of Parschnitz \vas reached, 
 however, com.munication was to be established with the First 
 infafitry division ; it must be ascertained positively whether 
 Trautenau was occupied, the Aiipa valley too must be recon- 
 noitered in a southerly direction, and all that while confronted, 
 in all probability, by parts of the Windischgrätz dragoons. If 
 
26 Studif.s IX TiiK Lkai)ix(; of Troops. 
 
 the division commander would then have brought up the hus- 
 sar regiment from the rear of the division, much difficulty 
 would have been encountered, as this must be accomplished on 
 the same road alongside the »marching column, which, in any 
 event, would have caused considerable loss of time. Even 
 supposing that, contrary to expectations, the advance of the 
 opponent should have brought on an engagement while still 
 in the mountains, the one regiment could hardly have impeded 
 the movements of the foot troops if the larger part of it had 
 been attached to the rear of the advance guard. But had the 
 cavalry brigade been assigned to the advance guard, it would 
 certainly have occasioned just such a hindrance, as the length 
 of its column would have delayed the arrival of the main 
 body for at least half an hour. Under the circumstances the 
 (favalry brigade was consequently relegated to the rear of the 
 entire marching column. On a plain the division commander 
 would have sent forward the entire cavalry brigade, with the 
 addition of the greater part of the hussar regiment, as inde- 
 ]jendent cavalry, in front of the advance guard, if a separate 
 road had been assigned to the division for the march. 
 
 The hussar regiment was short one troop ; this, accord- 
 ing to the order, was under the command of an officer cliarged 
 with maintaining order in the heavy baggage of the division. 
 The division had no means to accomplish this, and an entire 
 troop was ordered on this duty during this first war march, 
 because its heavy baggage must be formed with a perfectly 
 manageable body, and the passage of the" mountain defile de- 
 manded a faultless order of march. There was no cavalry at 
 the head of the main body. The main body did not need to 
 worry about the security of its flanks in the mountain defile. 
 The mounted riflemen,' of which t non-commissioned officer 
 and 8 men were with the Second infantry regiment at the 
 head of the main body, sufficed to keep up communication be- 
 tween the main bodv and the advance guard. Resides this^ 
 
 iBesides its regular infantry, the German Army has 19 battal- 
 ions of riflemen (Jägers). Their v/ar strength is the same as that 
 of the infantry battalions, also their armament, but. owing to no 
 men being talien from the ranks for the Itmd. the number of rifles 
 is greater. A battalion may be .ittached to an army corps or a num- 
 ber of its men attached to an infantry regiment. — Translat07\ 
 
Studiks in TTir: Lkading of Troops. 27 
 
 cyclists could have been advantageously employed on the mac- 
 adamized road. As the situation was very simple, these means 
 of communication should have been sufficient; although ordi- 
 narily it would be well to use in addition a troop of cavalry 
 for this purpose, especially, for example, if a division was the 
 extreme wing of an army in level country. 
 
 Detached cavalry should be relieved at stated periods, 
 about every three days; for, being less under control on ac- 
 count of their duty, they mav be used up too rapidly. 
 
 Of the artillery, the First battalion (three field batteries) 
 was assigned to the advance guard, while the Second battal- 
 ion followed the leading regiment of the main body. The 
 artillery is the arm which can inflict damage on the enemy at 
 the greatest distance ; the bulk of it must therefore enter into 
 action before the mass of the infantry. Consequently we 
 should never venture to place artillery too far to the rear in 
 the marching column ; its place is near the front ; under cer- 
 tain circumstances, as here, several batteries may be assigne'd 
 to the advance guard. At first hardly more than six guns 
 could have gone into action in the narrow mountain valley, and 
 the activity of a stronger force of artillery would only be pos- 
 sible when the Aupa had been crossed. But for the latter pur- 
 pose it must not be left too far in rear, and the three batteries 
 of the advance guard were designated to support the infantry 
 of the advance guard when it deployed out of the mountain 
 pass, so that it could assure the debouching of the main body 
 out of the mountains. The order of march allowed the entire 
 division artillery to be brought into action as soon as six bat- 
 talions of infantry should have been deployed. 
 
 Special value must be laid on keeping each battalion of 
 artillery intact. In the situations of grand tactics single bat- 
 teries cannot maneuver on their own responsibility, as we see 
 frequently done during smiall detachment exercises. When 
 12,000 infantry are striving to reach an object, the attached 
 artillery must not attempt to improvise scenes arbitrarily, by 
 separate performances, but it must contribute its entire power 
 to the attainment of the object. But this is possible only when 
 batteries do not wander about singly, according to their own 
 ideas, but obev a common will. In grand tactics the rule is 
 to employ batteries In masses; the use of single batteries is 
 
28 ' StudUvS in THlv LEADING OF TrOOPS. 
 
 the excepiion ; and we must cling to the rule all the more per- 
 sistently by reason of the fact that the exception is often 
 enough demanded. 
 
 It is quite sKpcifluous to detail a party of troops espe- 
 cially to support artillery on the march, as artillery is then 
 always in combination with other arms ; troops march before 
 and behind it. If a company or battalion is charged with such 
 duty, we may be sure that these bodies will be lost to their 
 own organizations in action, at the same time furnishing no 
 protection for the batteries, for it will be impossible to keep 
 up with the rapidly advancing guns. It is dillerent, however, 
 when more than three batteries march in close order. In such 
 case it is recommended, especially in country where the view 
 is obstructed, to insert bodies of infantry in the marching col- 
 umn of the field artillery. The caissons of the batteries 
 follow by battalion under command of an officer; those of 
 the First battalion at the rear of the advance guard and those 
 of the Second behind the First battalion. 
 
 There is nothing else in regard to the distribution of 
 troops that calls for detailed explanation. It is well under- 
 stood that an engineer company must be with the advance' 
 guard, and that half of the ambulance company, which is 
 divided into two sections, must also accompany the advance 
 guard, the other half following the main body, and that if an 
 engagement is expected, the field hospital may be brought up 
 to the troops. 
 
 Substance of the Order. 
 
 Tlie surest means of imparting orders consists of the ver- 
 bal instructions given by a senior officer directly to those con- 
 cerned — especially so, as it afi'ords opportunity for explana- 
 tion and prevention of misunderstandings. Verbal orders 
 can also be transmitted by adjutants, aids, etc., but only in 
 cases involving a brief and positive command, such as, "The 
 
 brigade will break camp and march at once via X and^ 
 
 Y ." If, however, other conditions are to be touched on 
 
 which refer to general instructions or to other colunms, etc. 
 
 leritten orders arc unnualifiedlv preferable. 
 
 In this case tlie division, camped in separate detachments, ^ 
 a (]ei)th from main body of the advance guard to rear j 
 
 had 
 
 
S'ruDits IN THE Leading oe Troops. 29 
 
 of the cavalry brigade of about 31^ miles; written orders must 
 therefore be employed. The division might have been ad- 
 vanced, the different bodies being put in motion successively, 
 by aids. But in such an event none of the superior officers 
 would have known at first what to prepare for, and the troops 
 would have needlessly remained standing under arms long 
 before the last bodies could have been put in motion. Conse- 
 quently such an expedient is advisable only when unavoidable, 
 as would have been the case if, on account of an engagement 
 of the Guard corps at Braunau, instead of the halt that was 
 ordered, a sudden start of the main body of the Second in- 
 fantry division in that direction had been necessitated. This 
 could have been initiated all the sooner by employing aids to 
 carry verbal instructions, as the immediate orders concerned 
 only the troops bivouacking around Schömberg, the guard that 
 had been previously advanced having been required to remain 
 in position toward Trautenau. 
 
 In a written order it is necessary to inform the subordi- 
 nate officers of everything the commander knozus concerning 
 the enemy, so far as it affects the end in viezv. All channels 
 i of information unite in the hands of the division commander ; 
 ! every commander below him can only have a one-sided view 
 I of the general situation. With such a large body of troops, 
 ' the highest commander cannot be with all his subordinates or 
 give directions for every detail, and the latter can be placed 
 : m position to make proper dispositions only by first receiving 
 such general information ; and only then will they be able to 
 concentrate their attention toward the direction from which 
 the opponent is expected and make dispositions accordingly 
 and without needlessly fatiguing their troops. 
 ,; Information as to what our intentions are also belongs- 
 
 Ito the order. Yet we must not go too far in this latter direc- 
 tion. It is doubtless of interest to troops, to knpw how their 
 better informed commander views the situation ; but the com- 
 jnander must consider every eventuality carefully. Moreover, 
 a detailed statement submitted to subordinates only confuses 
 them, since they are hardly ever so placed as to recognize what 
 has actually occurred. In addition to this, one should bear in 
 mind the conditions under which an order usually reaches its 
 destination. Here army headquarters had prescribed the pro- 
 
30 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 cednre of the corps for several days, because the matter in 
 point was tlie crossing of a mountain range, and, with few 
 roads available, the army corps, separated by a day's march, 
 must move with an extended front. It was impossible to 
 direct the movements from day to day. Corps headquarters 
 was therefore in the fortunate position of being able to issue 
 orders for the next day at a very early hour. Yet such is 
 rarely the case. Ordinarily army headquarters can give out 
 their orders only after the reports of the several corps regard- 
 ing the day's events have come in. These orders get to the 
 corps not located in the immediate vicinity of headquarters 
 sometimes during the night, and the last subdivisions (bri- 
 gades and regiments) do not receive them through official 
 channels until early morning. Half asleep, with a poor light 
 to read his maps by, the commander has then to make his dis- 
 positions ; at such a time every word in the order not abso- 
 lutely necessary is objectionable. Instructions that are pages 
 in length require much time to be read, and still more time to 
 be correctly understood. The criterion of a good order w^ill 
 alw^ays be simplicity and clearness ; if one w^ord is stricken out 
 of any good order, it will become unintelligible ; and any word 
 that can be stricken out and still leaves the order intelligible 
 is superfluous and consequently harmful. 
 
 Kvery leader should therefore deliberate thoroughly on 
 how much of the information given him should be transmit- 
 ted to his subordinates. In the example we are here consid- 
 ering the division commander had to know what the com- 
 manding general purposed to do after Parschnitz had been 
 reached. I Tis division might arrive there before the other 
 division and its commanding general. What should be done 
 in such an event, if this information had not been furnished 
 
 Lieutenant-General A ? If the corps was to halt there, his 
 
 troops need not be tired out ])y hours of waiting, but could es- 
 tablish (heir bivouacs and bring up their heavy baggage. lUit if 
 it had been the intenlion lo proceed further, and if the division 
 should be called on to furnish tlie advance guard, then the 
 sejiarate |)arts must be brought up in a ditTerent formation 
 than would have ])een necessary if tlie division were later to 
 become a part of the main body of the army corps. 
 
StudiivS in the; Leading of Troops. , l 
 
 It was accordingly stated in the order of the command- 
 ing general that all would unite near Parschnitz in order To 
 continue the march from there upon Arnau in one column, 
 and further, that the Second division would join the main 
 body upon this continued march, first halting at Parschnitz for 
 two hours. 
 
 This information was absolutely essential for the division 
 commander, but only for him. As soon as Parschnitz had 
 been reached, he would certainly have been there in person 
 and have had it in his power to give the order to halt, person- 
 ally, to the subdivisions, as they arrived successively, and at 
 the same time to form them as required for the march beyond. 
 Then the separated parts of the infantry brigade, the hussar 
 regiment, the field artillery regiment, and the ambulance com- 
 pany, could have reunited there. 
 
 It was therefore sufficient to state in the division order 
 that a union would be effected with the other parts of the 
 corps near Parschnitz. By this the troops learned at the same 
 time that all which would appear on their right flank belonged 
 to the First infantry division, a friendly force. 
 
 Now that all necessary information concerning adjoin- 
 ing columns had been given, it further remained to state zvhat 
 should be done in ease the eneniv zverc encountered. The situ- 
 ation relative to this latter point was very simple, as the en- 
 emy could be expected only on the road followed by the ad- 
 vance guard. For the advance guard, however, it would be 
 necessary to add that it must attack at once, as the division 
 commander might possibly not be with it at the moment arid 
 otherwise time might be lost. 
 
 The order of march may be communicated in different 
 V/ays, either by a "distribution of troops for June 27" 
 appended to the order, or in the written order itself if 
 the order of march must necessarily be given therein. In 
 the division order for June 27 a blending of both methods 
 occurred, which is indeed customary, for in the distribution 
 of troops given separate from the text of the order the ad- 
 vance guard is specified without indication of the order of 
 march, while in the case of the main body the order of march 
 is laid down. Attention is called to the same by the words 
 I ""in order of march" under heading "main body." 
 
32 Studiks in tite Lkading of Troops. 
 
 All order of march when attaclied should give a compre- 
 hensive, easily understood illustration of the entire scheme, 
 but the sheet on which the order itself is written must also be 
 brought directly under the observation of the person for 
 whom it is intended. Whenever orders are dictated to adju- 
 tants in their vieniorandum-books, it is therefore well first to 
 give the distribution of troops and then follow with the text 
 of the order, in a distribution of troops that is not at the 
 same time the order of march, troops should be entered ac- 
 cording to arm (infantry, cavalry, field artillery) in advance 
 guard and main body. Independent cavalry, which in grand 
 tactics remains under the immediate orders of the commander 
 of the whole, is given separately in the distribution of troops ; 
 likewise, detachments sent out under special instructions. A 
 special commander for the main body was not designated in 
 this order, as it would appear superfiuous to do so. The suc- 
 cession of the different parts of the main body was designed 
 for the purposes of the march ; if, however, a fight should take 
 place, the division 4:ommander would direct these parts sepa- 
 rately. It is nevertheless permissible to appoint a commander 
 for the main body when it appears necessary. 
 
 If a special commander is designated for a part (as don.e 
 here for the advance guard), it becomes his duty to form his 
 troops in the manner in which he intends to employ them. 
 
 Especial attention should be given to the arrangement of 
 the time for starting. Unnecessary excitement ordinarily 
 causes us to OA^erlook the fact that a mass like a division, even 
 if locally separated, cannot be put in motion simultaneous!} . 
 and troops are fatigued by assembling them too soon. \\\ 
 never can tell what hardships the day will bring; and there 
 fore all the greater precaution should be taken to avoid un 
 necessary fatigue. 
 
 In the case before us the following calculation served \<> 
 fix the time of starti)i^i^: The length of the advance guard i;i 
 column of march, without security distances, was. roughly esti- 
 mated, nearly 2 miles ; the distance from the bivouac of th,' 
 main body of the advance guard to that of the main body oi' 
 the division v.as about 1V2 miles. Now, if the main bodv 
 started simultaneously with the adwuice guard, its head would 
 collide with the last sul)divisions of the latter while still 111 
 
 i 
 
Studies in Tiiß Leading of Troops. 33 
 
 bivouac, and must wait about 4 minutes before it could fol- 
 low. It is, however, desirable to maintain an interval of about 
 half a mile between the two divisions, and so the main body, 
 although located I'/z miles in rear of the advance guard, could 
 fall in 15 minutes later than it. The column of the main body 
 of the division (without the First cavalry brigade) was 
 about 3I/2 miles long, so its last subdivision woull 'ea e 
 the bivouac more than an hour after the head started out. 
 The distance from this place to the bivouac of the cav- 
 alry brigade was ij/^ miles. The latter therefore r.ee:le:l 
 to start only 45 minutes later than the head of the main 
 body, in order to follow immediately in its rear, by advancing 
 at a walk. After that the cavalry would have to follow the 
 infantry in the mountains for a distance of nearly 7 miles, 
 and could only proceed at a walk during the first 3 hours ; it 
 was therefore better to let it remain longer in bivouac, as it 
 could have easily made up the time by trotting part of the 
 way, which is more advantageous than going continually at 
 a walk. 
 
 As regards the main body, it should be noted that the 
 starting time as fixed, 4:15, naturally referred only to the Sec- 
 ond infantry regiment, which was ordered to take the lead; 
 the Second artillery battalion, which was likewise located close 
 to the highway, did not need to start until 4 130, the Third in- 
 fantry regiment at 4:40, and the Fourth infantry regiment 
 about 5 o'clock. 
 
 It is the duty of commanders to keep these facts in viezv 
 and have the troops fall in accordingly. Such a course can 
 be pursued, however, only by troops already assembled — in 
 this case, by the bodies united in one bivouac. It is assumed 
 here^that infantry heavily burdened in the field can do ^ 
 mile in from 12 to 13 minutes, including short halts. 
 
 The First field artillery battalion (Second and Third bat- 
 teries) and staff, recently assigned to the advance guard, the 
 engineer company, and the ambulance company section must 
 proceed on the highway in proper time to the rendezvous of 
 the advance guard. 
 
 If troops come together out of different villages at the 
 same rendezvous, the commander of brigade, regiment, etc., 
 will want to have his entire command together at a fixed time. 
 
34 
 
 StudiivS is Tine Lkading üi- Tkuoj 
 
 Tf larger masses are ordered to assemble in one place, the 
 arrival of each unit separately at the proper time should be 
 arranged, because waiting unnecessarily fatigues. 
 
 Referring to the division trains, the light baggage (led 
 horses and medical-, company ammunition-, ponton-, intrench- 
 ing-, and tool-wagons) had to follow immediately after the 
 organizations to which they belonged. Special care should be 
 exercised so that led horses are not turned into pack-animals, 
 but can be mounted as soon as needed. 
 
 The medical-wagons and the 4 company ammunition- 
 wagons with led horses follow the battalion marching in col- 
 umn. With cavalry regiments the medical- and ponton- 
 wagons are in rear of the regiment. The engineers keep 
 their intrenching- and other tool-wagons with them, as well 
 as their field-miners' wagons. 
 
 The heavy baggage, in the same order as the advancing 
 troop organizations, follows the last subdivision of the main 
 body at a distance of from lyl to 2 miles. To the heavy bag- 
 gage belong the headquarters, company, and squadron bag- 
 gage-, subsistence-, and forage-wagons. Each artillery head- 
 quarters has one baggage- wagon. With each battery there 
 is a supply-wagon and a field forge. In this case no am- 
 munition columns and trains were assigned to the Second 
 infantry division, because on the 27th the army corps would 
 occupy one road. If the division had been given ammunition 
 columns and several field hospitals, in case of an advance 
 against the enemy these columns would need to be brought 
 up as a first echelon in front of the heavy baggage, in order to 
 have them at hand in action. Subsistence supply columns that 
 might have been attached would have become the seco id 
 echelon to the heavy baggage. 
 
 The field hospital actually pr.'scnt was brought close to 
 the division. 
 
 According to rircumstanccs, dilYcrent dispositions wouUl 
 be allowable relative to vdistances and distribution of wagons 
 and column. In the case before us due regard had to be given 
 to tlie narrow mountain defile and the possibility of an engage- 
 ment in or in front of it. It therefore seemed expedient to 
 leave the heavy baggage of the division at SchiMiiberg or near 
 lU'rkelsdorf for the tinio being, and to bring it up when an 
 
 ( 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 35 
 
 engagement might not be likely, upon issuing from the defile. 
 The bringing up of the heavy baggage too soon must espe- 
 cially be avoided under the prevailing conditions. If an un- 
 fortunate engagement should have forced a retreat and the 
 baggage had followed too closely, a blockade of the highway 
 could scarcely have been prevented, which in turn might have 
 been followed by a rout. On the other hand, keeping in 
 view the possibility of an engagement, it would appear judi- 
 cious to take along the field hospital and place it near the rear 
 of the division. In this place also belongs the division bridge 
 train; it should properly be with the engineer company, but 
 in the mountain defile the engineers could have been used 
 with the advance guard although the train itself could not 
 have been employed there. Still it must not be left behind 
 entirely, as occasion for its use might easily have arisen in 
 the plain when crossing the Aupa. 
 
 The signal corps detachment found no immediate em- 
 ployment, and followed the rear of the division. 
 
 The formation of a special rear guard zuas not neces- 
 sary, as an attack on the rear of the column was not expect- 
 ed.' Under certain conditions, especially in a country aroused 
 to insurrection, a specially constituted rear guard cannot be 
 dispensed with. Its strength then depends on prevailing 
 circumstances. 
 
 Finally, it must always be stated where the division com- 
 mander will he located, so that all messages may reach him. 
 In this case he had chosen his place with the advance guard, 
 because his dispositions would depend on what he found at 
 its front. His presence there, however, was not at all neces- 
 sary, for if the enemy had been encountered, the commander 
 of the advance guard would have been on the spot for the pur- 
 pose of ordering what was immediately required. Neverthe- 
 less it is highly desirable that the leader of the whole should 
 gain an insight into the measures of his opponent as soon as 
 possible. For this reason, the leader will in most cases keep 
 himself with the advance guard. 
 
 ,. -• Nothing is said in zirritten orders relative to a possihh 
 retreat. These orders come into too many hands ; and at the 
 very moment when every one must strive only to gain a vic- 
 tory the troops must not be told that their commander enter- 
 
36 Studii-s IX THE Leading oe Troops. 
 
 tains thoughts of retreat. If it is desired to give directions 
 regarding a retrograde movement, it is done verbally. In this 
 case, however, no such necessity existed, for even if a retreat 
 from Parschnitz had taken place, no one would have thought of 
 inaugurating it on any other road than the one on which the 
 advance had been made ; and should the retreating forces have 
 been obliged by the enemy to take a different direction, all 
 orders previously given would have been useless. 
 
 Information Received Concerning the Guard Corps, and. 
 Consequent Dispositions. 
 
 About I a. m., June 2'], a staff officer of the Guard corps, 
 coming from Liebau, handed the following communication 
 to the commander of the Second infantry division : 
 
 Guard Corps, 
 
 1st Inf. Divis. Headquarters at Deutsch-Wernersdorf, 
 
 Page No. . 26, 6, '66, 7 p. m. 
 
 To the Commanding General, ist Army Corps, Liebau: 
 
 This division is ordered to march early to-morrow from 
 Dittersbach and Deutsch-Wernersdorf, on the Trautenau 
 road, via Adersbach, Qualisch, and Petersdorf, to Parschnitz, 
 and thence south into the Aupa valley. It is to commence 
 the march when the troops of the First army corps have 
 cleared the road ; it will remain near Qualisch until that time, 
 holding itself in readiness to support the First army corps in 
 case of resistance near Trautenau. 
 
 In order to enable the division to judge the time of start- 
 ing, it is requested that 'the commanding general advise when 
 Albendorf will probably be passed by his troops. 
 
 X , 
 
 IJ.entena)il-GeiieraI, Division Commander. 
 Pcceived : Liebau, 26, 6, '66, 11 115 p. m. 
 
 Headquarters at Liebau, 
 
 26, 6, '66, II :i5 p. m. 
 Returned to the First infantry division, Guard corps, with 
 the information that the Second infantry division and the 
 First cavalry brigade, located around Schömberg, will take 
 up their march at 4 a. m., June 27, advancing via Albendorf. 
 The column will halt for about two hours near Parschnitz, 
 
 
Studies in thk Leading oi< Troops. 
 
 37 
 
 awaiting the arrival of the remainder of the corps, whicn is 
 directed to proceed thither from Liebaii. The time of arrival 
 near Parschnitz will depend mainly on the resistance of the 
 enemy, but in no event will it take place much before 8 a. m. 
 
 The Commanding General: Y . 
 
 To the Second infantry division, at Schömberg, for its infor- 
 mation ; then immediately back to the First infantry divis- 
 ion, Guard corps, at Deutsch-Wernersdorf. 
 
 The commander of the Second infantry division added in 
 the proper place : 
 
 Contents noted. 
 
 Headquarters at Schömberg, 2y, 6, '66, 12:45 ^- ""■• 
 
 A , Lieutenant-General, 
 
 Commanding Second Infantry Division. 
 
 The staiT officer then resumed his journey to the infantry 
 division of the Guard corps. 
 
 In order that the cavalry brigade might not be cut off 
 from its infantry near Albendorf by reason of the rather late 
 start ordered, the division commander, now informed as to 
 the intended movements of the parts of the army located on 
 his left, felt called upon to give appropriate directions to the 
 cavalry brigade. 
 
 The following written message was therefore immedi- 
 ately despatched by cyclist to the commander of the cavalry: 
 
 1st Army Corps, 
 
 2d Inf. Division. Headquarters at Schömberg, 
 
 Page No. . 27, 6, '66, 1 a. m. 
 
 According to advice just received, the First infantry 
 division. Guard corps, located near Deutsch-Wernersdorf, will 
 move forward early to-day via Adersbach, advancing thence 
 on Parschnitz by the same road that is to be taken by this 
 division. 
 
 The brigade will accordingly arrange to reach the rear 
 of this division at the proper time near Albendorf, and avoid 
 being cut off from it by the head of the division of the Guard. 
 
 A , 
 
 To the Lieutenant-General, Division Commander. 
 
 1st Cavalry Brigade, 
 
 In bivouac north of Schömberg. 
 
38 Studiks in trh: Leading 01^ Troops. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 The staff officer who came from the Guard corps was 
 accompanied by a mounted rifleman, and had to pass Schöm- 
 berg en route from Liebau to Deutsch-Wernersdorf. 
 
 Although this information could be transmitted to Lieu- 
 tenant-General A by the circular letter here employed, 
 
 such means of conveying intelligence (admissible and fre- 
 quently done in time of peace) must, as a rule, be avoided in 
 war. 
 
 To assure prompt delivery, there should always be pre- 
 pared as many copies of every order, etc., as there are head- 
 quarters to receive it. 
 
 After the information had been received by the Second 
 infantry division, no transmission to subordinates was neces- 
 sary, as no further dispositions were required on their part. 
 Data concerning the march of the Guard division, as far as 
 such was necessary for commanders of separate parts, could 
 be given them by the division commander in person, in ample, 
 time at the start, when he must see them. 
 
 The fact that the Guard division sent to Liebau for infor- 
 mation as to the expected movements of the Second infantry 
 division, which was then stationed at Schömberg and was thus 
 between Liebau and the headquarters of the Guard division, 
 prompts us to give some consideration to the location of va- 
 rious headquarters. 
 
 Ordinarily every commander is stationed w^ith the bulk 
 of his troops. When, however, he is part of an army, he must 
 not forget that his movements are dependent on the orders 
 of superior authority and that he should be able to promptly 
 receive the intimations of superior authority's intentions ; in 
 this connection telegraph lines will exert material influence. 
 If, for instance, the First army corps had desired to be in 
 communication with the Guard corps by the shortest route, it 
 would have had to transfer its headquarters to Schömberg. 
 As it was, however, dependent on the orders of the com- 
 mander of the Second Army, it had to remain at Liebau. 
 as the telegraph line there (supposing there was none at 
 Schömberg) assured the most rapid communication wnth army 
 headquarters. 
 
 II 
 
STUDjKS in tue: Ll'^ADING OF TrOOPS. 39 
 
 For the same reason the division commander could not 
 remain permanently with his advance guard, no matter how 
 anxious he might have been to be informed early of moves 
 likely to be made by the enemy, as the prompt execution of 
 an order from corps headquarters was more important. Such 
 an order sent by Schömberg (passing therefore the main body 
 of the division) would have reached him with the advance 
 guard, over a mile away, and must be sent back to Schömberg, 
 traveling double this distance, before the division could be put 
 in motion. If there had been any danger in delay, the com- 
 mander of the advance guard would have been there on. the 
 spot to meet any action of the enemy, and assistance from the 
 division would have arrived just as quickly whether the divis- 
 ion commander was in Schömberg or with the advance guard. 
 
 Failure to duly consider circumstances that influence the 
 selection of headquarters can be shown to have caused un- 
 necessary delay and consequent mischief in war on many 
 occasions. 
 
 It should be further noted that either the division com- 
 mander or his general staff officer should always be present 
 at headquarters ; the absence of both at the same time is not 
 allowable. If important orders, messages or inquiries arrive 
 during their absence, division adjutants are not, as a rule, in 
 a position to take appropriate action, for usually they lack 
 general information and knowledge of the intentions of their 
 commander. 
 
 Advance on Parschnitz. 
 
 At 3 130 a. m. Lieutenant-General A mounted his 
 
 horse, and, accompanied by his staff, rode forward to the ad- 
 vance guard. 
 
 The commander of the Second infantry regiment had 
 been directed to bring the mounted riflemen up to the head 
 of the regiment. 
 
 The hussar regiment, the First field artillery battalion 
 (Second and Third batteries and staff), the engineer com- 
 pany, and the ambulance company section had arrived near 
 the reserve of the advance guard. All troops were ready 
 to fall in. On account of the great distance from the enemy, 
 and the fact that hussar patrols had already gone forward on 
 
40 
 
 Stl'dh.s i\ TiiK Lkadixc. ur Truops. 
 
 XUv. (jn\y road, llu- Third baltalion, with two troo])s of the Sec- 
 oiid scjuadron. which liad been on outpost, had brought in the 
 outpost companies, and were stationed at the southern exit of 
 iiertelsdorf, with a strong patrol ahead. 
 
 Major-General B had just assembled all his co n- 
 
 nianders around him and given them the following orders: 
 
 "The division will advance as far as Parschnitz on the road 
 to Trautenau, where it will form a junction with the First 
 infantry division, from Liebau. 
 
 "Alajor N will take command of the vanguard, con- 
 sisting of the Third, battalion, Fourth squadron, and the en- 
 ,gineer company, and will start at 4 a. m. The enemy will 
 be attacked wherever seen. Communication will be maintained 
 with the First infantry division, by means of cavalry patrols, 
 on the roads leading over the mountains. 
 
 •'Colonel D will follow with the two battalions of his 
 
 regiment, witli the First battalion of field artillery in rear of 
 the regiment as main body, at a distance of 700 yards. The 
 caissons of the artillery and the ambulance company sec- 
 tion will follow the last battery. The hussar regiment will 
 bring up the rear. 
 
 "The heavy baggage will remain assembled north of Ber- 
 telsdorf until further orders. 
 
 "Messages will reach me with the vanguard." 
 
 While the remainder of the Fourth scjuadron and the 
 engineer company moved up to the Third battalion, the bat- 
 talion commander hurried ahead and advanced the Twelfth 
 company 350 yards. 
 
 A little before 4 o'clock the several portions of the van- 
 guard were formed toward the front in the order in wdiich 
 Ihcy were to march ofT, and at 4 o'clock the advance guard 
 was .set in motion, the h^onrth scjuadron advancing farther to 
 the front at a tn.t. 
 
 In order to satisfy himself that the advance guard had 
 been formed as directed, the division commander had the sep- 
 arate l)odies march past him at the southern exit of Bertels- 
 dorf, and there awaited the main body of the division. On 
 the arrival of the main body he sent one of his aids to advise 
 the several commanders concernini^ the march of the First, 
 infantry division of the Guard. The aid was also directed* 
 
 ♦ 
 
g: on Parschnitz 
 
 PLAN II 
 
 4th Squadr. Öii Hussars, 
 
 4th Troop. 2>i Sqdrs. «75 Yds. to Main Body of Division, 
 
 300 Yds.pb. 
 
 875 Yds. 
 
 1 St Cav. Brigade. 1st Horse Battery 
 
 rain, 
 osp. 
 
 9t. , 
 
 1C80 Yd3- 
 
40 
 
 Stldii.s in 'IUI-: LKAUiM", ui* Tkuoi'S. 
 
 the only road, tlu- Third baltaHon. with two troops of the Sec- 
 ond s(|iiadr()n. which liad been on outpost, had brought in the 
 outpost companies, and were stationed at the southern exit of 
 ßertelsdorf, with a strong patrol ahead. 
 
 Major-General B had just assembled all his co n- 
 
 nianders around him and given them the following orders: 
 
 "The division will advance as far as Parschnitz on the road 
 iu Trautenau, where it will form a junction wdth the First 
 infantry division, from Liebau. 
 
 "Alajor N will take command of the vanguard, con- 
 sisting of the Third battalion. Fourth squadron, and the en- 
 gineer company, and will start at 4 a. m. The enemy will 
 be attacked wherever seen. Communication will be maintained 
 with the First infantry division, by means of cavalry patrols, 
 on the roads leading over the mountains. 
 
 "Colonel D will follow with the two battalions of his 
 
 regiment, witli the First battalion of field artillery in rear of 
 the regiment as main body, at a distance of 700 yards. The 
 caissons of the artillery and the ambulance company sec- 
 tion will follow the last battery. The hussar regiment will 
 bring up the rear. 
 
 "The heavy baggage will remain assembled north of Ber- 
 telsdorf until further orders. 
 
 "Messages will reach me with the vanguard." 
 
 While the remainder of the Fourth squadron and the 
 engineer company moved up to the Third battalion, the bat- 
 talion commander hurried ahead and advanced the Twelfth 
 company 350 yards. 
 
 A little ])efore 4 o'clock the several portions of the van- 
 guard were formed toward the front in the order in which 
 ihey were to march ofT, and at 4 o'clock the advance guard 
 was set in motion, the b'ourth sc|ua(lron advancing farther to 
 the front at a trot. 
 
 In order to satisfy himself that the advance guard had 
 been formed as directed, the division commander had the sep- 
 arate bodies march past him at the southern exit of Bertels- 
 dorf. and there awaited the main body of the division. On 
 the arrival of the main body he sent one of his aids to advise 
 the several commanders concerning the march of the First 
 infantrv division of the Guard. The aid was also directed 
 
 1 
 
PLAN II 
 
 Order of March of the Second Infantry Division /Advancing on Parschnitz 
 Forenoon of June 27, 
 
 «h Squadr. Hussars. nth, loth and Engrs. 1st Infantry. 1st Bn. 1st Field Artillery. 6th Hussars. 
 
 «h Troop. 3d Troop. 12th Co. 9th Cos. 2dBn, Ist Bn. 2»i Scjdrs. «75 Vde. to Miin Body o( DivUiOBj 
 
 #- -0--- o ■-- czno cz:c:^™™™{]'000 
 
 300 Yds. 300 Yds. .-iOO Vds. 600 Yds. 1 Amb. 
 
 Co. Sec. 
 
 Vanguard. Main Body. 
 
 Advance Guard (4770 Yds). 
 
 875 Yds to Advance Guard. 
 
 2d Infantry Reg. Staff and 2d Bn. 1st Field Arty. 4th Infantry Brigade. Co^S^e' 1st Cav. Brigade, ist Horse Battery 
 
 czjczi— .*,.*..*,.*. £:^^::]{^^:] ^ w w °'^ 'r>^ rz::^^^ 1 1 „-— -- 1 **^^^^ 
 
 1350 Yds. 113i \ds. 2720 Yds ^Field^Hos'"' 
 
 Sig. Det. ■ . 
 V 515 Yds. ^ Y 
 
 -Main Body Of Division, .5980 Yds. (with distances). 1680 Ydj- 
 
 Length o{ Columa. 
 
 Advance Guard 4770 yds. 
 
 Distance to Main Body 875 ii 
 
 Main Body (Including Bridge Train, Field Hospital, 
 
 and Sig. Detach.) 5980 " 
 
 11625 " 
 Cav. Brigade with Horse Batttery 1680 " 
 
 Total 13305 " 
 
ii 
 
 ■ 
 m 
 
 j 
 
 
 
 th 
 
 Formation bf:foric Start. 
 Vanguard. 
 
 4th troop. 
 350 yards. 
 
 3 troops. 
 350 yards. 
 1 2th company 
 350 yards. 
 
 4th squadron hussars. 
 
 . 3d battalion, ist infantry. 
 
 nth company, 
 loth company. 
 9th company, j 
 
 Engineers. 
 
 700 yards. 
 
 Main Body of Advance Guard. 
 
 2d battaHon. 
 
 ist battaUon. 
 
 ist infantry. 
 
 ,|, BattaHon of field artillery. 
 
 A Ambulance company section. 
 
 ■ ^ ist, 2d, and ^ of 3d squadrons hussars. 
 
Studies in thf, Lf,adtng oi? Troops. 41 
 
 to observe whether the cokimn was marching as ordered. 
 Meanwhile the division commander returned to the advance 
 guard. 
 
 When the advance guard started, it sent two mounted 
 riflemen to the First infantry division with the following 
 message : 
 
 Advance Guard, Bertelsdorf, 
 
 2d Infantry Division. 27, 6, '66, 4 a. m. 
 
 To the ist Infantry Division: 
 
 The advance guard started at 4 a. m. from Bertels- 
 dorf, and is advancing on the highway from Schömberg to 
 
 Parschnitz. B , 
 
 Major-General, Brigade Commander. 
 
 When the head arrived in front of Petersdorf, the divi- 
 sion halted for a short while, the column remaining in its 
 formation on the right of the road. On account of the road 
 being in a cut, the guns had to be stacked ; yet this would not 
 ordinarily have been done. 
 
 A road leading over the mountains near Albendorf had 
 allowed the sending of a hussar patrol to the valley of Gold- 
 en-Oels, in the direction of Bernsdorf, with the following 
 message : 
 
 Advance Guard, Petersdorf, 
 
 2d Infantry Division. 27, 6, '66, 5 :30 a. m. 
 
 To the ist Infantry Division: 
 
 The head of the advance guard has just reached Peters- 
 dorf. Nothing has been seen of the enemy. 
 
 B , 
 
 Major-General, Brigade Commander. 
 
 At 6:15 a. m. a non-commissioned officer and 6 dragoons 
 of the First infantry division rode up to Lieutenant-General 
 
 A- and handed him the following message : 
 
 1st Infantry Division. Beyond Bernsdorf, 
 
 27, 6, '66, 5 :25 a. m. 
 To the 2d Infantry Division. 
 
 At 4 a. m. this division began its advance on Parschnitz. 
 At a point 1,200 yards north of Bernsdorf it was delayed 
 some time by a demolished bridge, on the further side of 
 which a troop of the Windischgrätz dragoons attacked the 
 
42 Studiks in the leading of Troops. 
 
 head of the advanee guard, ])eing', however, repulsed with loss. 
 The division has just reached Bernsdorf. Hostile cavalry 
 patrols are watching us from the heights. 
 
 By command : N , Captain, 
 
 General Staff Offieer, ist hifantry Division. 
 
 The envelope that contained the message was indorsed 
 by one of the division aids, in the "received'' column, "6:15 
 a. m.," and then returned to the patrol leader with the verbal 
 remark, "Nothing new on our side." 
 
 North of Welhota the hussar troop at the head encoun- 
 tered hostile dragoons, who retreated at an increased gait in 
 the direction of Trautenau when the rest of the squadron 
 approached. 
 
 At 6:30 the head of the advance guard infantry debouched 
 from the mountains east of Parschnitz, while the main body 
 of the division reached the northern exit of Petersdorf, and 
 the head of the cavalry brigade was close to and north of 
 Bertelsdorf. 
 
 Some mounted men appeared on a line with the western 
 exit of Parschnitz. Other tiian this, nothing unusual was ob- 
 served, no troop movements being visible on the Liebau road. 
 
 Comments on the Advance on Parschnitz. 
 
 Formation cf the Advance Guard. 
 
 Even in the mountains cavalry must take the "point" in 
 advance guard formations, however limited its employment 
 may be under such conditions. It can only reconnoiter roads, 
 and finds no ground alongside of them for attack in order to 
 drive away an enemy. In this case the presence of hostile 
 dragoons was known. Neither side would hardly have at- 
 tempted an attack, although dismounted they could occupy 
 villages or narrow passes. In view of this, the advance guard 
 commander would have done better to place the entire hus- 
 sar regiment at the head; if fired on, it could have dismounted, 
 and with several squadrons (every squadron having about 60 
 carbines) it might have taken the occupied territory. It would 
 nowadays be useless to bring up a rear with 2-)4 squadrons 
 (as cavalrv with its carbines can open its own way), and be- 
 sides, it would tire both man and horse considerably. 
 
Studies in thh: Leading, of Troops. 43 
 
 Cavalry at the head of an advance guard should be sup- 
 ported by one company of infantry, which can easily step aside 
 if the cavalry is driven back, and is sufficient to stop a pur- 
 suit. On the other hand, cavalry is easily brought to a halt 
 in regions of narrow roads, and then needs infantry to drive 
 the enemy away. 
 
 If the mass of the infantry is allowed to follow the cav- 
 alry in close formation, it is impossible for it to get out of 
 the way of the latter quickly enough, if it should come dash- 
 ing to the rear; it will then be overridden and the whole 
 thrown into disorder. 
 
 The formation of a vanguard is prescribed. It should 
 consist of from a quarter to a third of the infantry, with the 
 necessary cavalry and engineers. 
 
 Batteries are not divided, and the advance guard com- 
 mander was right in not assigning any guns to the vanguard. 
 
 The engineers must not be too far from the head. A 
 single demolished bridge would obstruct the advance of the 
 entire division. Its restoration could not be effected too soon,. 
 and should therefore be taken in hand at once with the force 
 available. 
 
 In front of the Twelfth company was the "infantry 
 point," which consisted of an officer and at least a section. On 
 the road it marches in close order, because no lateral recon- 
 naissance is practicable in mountainous country and because 
 the cavalry point is in front of the infantry point. Some 
 cyclists are assigned to the latter to keep up communication 
 with the following vanguard. 
 
 In the reserve of the advance guard troops follow in 
 the order in which we would likely wish to employ them if 
 the enemy were encountered. If the vanguard meets stubborn 
 resistance so that the reserve is obliged to take part, then 
 the artillery must prepare the attack as much as it can. It 
 cannot march, however, at the very head of a separate body, 
 and in most cases should therefore follow the leading battal- 
 ion. On this occasion the battalion of artillery was placed be- 
 hind the infantry regiment of the vanguard. The first em- 
 ployment of the artillery was only possible near Parschnitz, 
 and until that time it must be under the protection of the 
 infantrv. 
 
44 Studies in the: Leading oi? TROors. 
 
 Colonel D , who started the reserve, must have 
 
 the march commence 5 minutes before 4, else the distance 
 from the vanguard would have been increased beyond 700 
 yards. 
 
 Drazving in Outposts. 
 
 It is very unwise, in the face of an enemy, to draw in an 
 outpost and place its forces at the head of the column of 
 march. By this the enemy is apprised in the quickest and 
 most certain manner that an' advance is intended. It would 
 be well, therefore, to take other troops to the head upon start- 
 ing the whole, and not assemble the outposts until the former 
 have passed them. However, in justification of the deviation 
 from this course in the case before us, the following may be 
 cited : 
 
 The enemy was not so near that he would discover at 
 once the withdrawal of the outposts. His cavalry patrols, 
 which may have dared to come forward in the mountains and 
 have in time observed the drawing in, could only return to 
 their main body in a roundabout way, and would reach there 
 most probably at a time when the march of the advance col- 
 umns had already been discovered by hostile outposts and duly 
 reported; besides, the hussar patrols were further in front, 
 and a connected outpost line had not been established. 
 
 Further, the Third battalion, designated as vanguard, was 
 pretty well united. The company designated for the extreme 
 point was already ])repared to start at the exit on the side to- 
 ward Alben dorf. So the drawing in of the outposts of the 
 Third battalion involved neither loss of time nor fear that the 
 enemy would too soon discover the preparations for the 
 march. It was, moreover, a fortunate circumstance that the 
 Third battalion was the subdivision having the best knowledge 
 of the country about to be entered, and in mountainous country 
 such a knowledge has double value. The two troops of the 
 Fourth squadron attached to the outpost, with the exception of 
 a few orderlies and patrols, were still with the reserve of 
 the outpost at 3:30 a. m. If the cavalry picket northwest of 
 Albcnrlnrf had again been posted, it would have had to remain 
 there to i)rotect the assembling of the advance guard until the 
 vanguard had approached; and after that, according to orders, 
 the cavalrv ])\ckv{ woiild have had to join the infantry of the 
 
 
 
Studiks jn the: leading of Troops. 45 
 
 advance guard. The Fourth squadron was united, and fol- 
 lowed the scouting patrols in front on the highway. 
 
 Order of March. 
 (See Plan II.) 
 
 Advance Guard. 
 Infantry regiment with light bag- 
 gage and distances i,35o Y^s. 
 
 Cavalry regiment less i troop. . . . 350 yds. 
 
 Battalion of field artillery 1,115 yds. 
 
 Engineer company 120 yds. 
 
 Ambulance company section 130 yds. 3,065 yds. 
 
 Distance between parts Ij705 yds. 
 
 Distance to m.ain body 875 yds. 
 
 Main Body, 
 (a) Troops. 
 Infantry regiment with light bag- 
 gage and distances i>35<^ yds. 
 
 Battalion of field artillery with regi- 
 mental staff 1,135 yds. 
 
 Infantry brigade 2,720 yds. 
 
 Ambulance company section 130 yds. 
 
 With distances 5,435 yds. 
 
 (b) Field Hospital and Trains. 
 
 Signal corps detachment 11 yds. 
 
 Division bridge train 340 yds. 
 
 Field hospital 165 yds. 
 
 With distances 545 yds. 
 
 Total 11,625 yds. 
 
 Accordingly the column of an infantry division advancing 
 to an engagement :s nearly 7 miles long. An order sent from 
 front to rear, going along the whole column pf troops, would 
 require about an hour to reach its destination (an order from 
 rear to front probably twice as long). 
 
 // the deployment is to be on a line zvith the vanguard, 
 then the last subdivision of troops has to advance nearly 6 
 
46 Studies in thk Lkading of Troops. 
 
 miles, Gild it xvill fake about i^ hours to deploy the entire 
 diz'isioii. 
 
 To complete our idea of the length of a mobilized division 
 the heavy baggage must also be taken into account. Its 
 length, without further assignment of subsistence columns or 
 several field hospitals, is about 2,730 yards. In case the troop- 
 wagons are to follow immediately, we would have to add the 
 distance between the rear of the division and head of these 
 wagons, 2,730 yards more. The entire length of the Second 
 infantry division in column of march thus became 17,085 
 }'ards, or nearly 10 miles. 
 
 In the example before us, however, the cavalry brigade 
 with its horse battery must also be considered. 
 
 March length of cavalry brigade 1,200 yds. 
 
 Horse battery 480 yds. 
 
 1,680 yds. 
 Heavy baggage 510 yds. 
 
 Total 2,190 yds. 
 
 We consequently have a total length for the column 
 marching early on June 2"/ from Schömberg, upon Parschnitz, 
 with advance guard formed and heavy baggage left be- 
 hind, of: 
 Advance guard, including distances 
 
 between parts 4-770 yds. 
 
 Distance from advance guard to main 
 
 body 875 yds. 
 
 Main body 5435 yds. 
 
 Cavalry brigade 1,680 yds. 
 
 Signal corps detachment, bridge train, 
 
 and field hospital 545 yds. 13.305 yds. 
 
 If the heavy baggage should follow 
 at a distance of 2,200 yards, add: 
 j^istance between troops and wag- 
 ons 2,730 yds. 
 
 Wagons 3.240 yds. 5,970 yds. 
 
 Total 19.275 yds. 
 
Studti^s in tue Li'ADixc OF Troops. 47 
 
 It should be remembered that, all normal march depths 
 here given are only approximately correct. We presuppose 
 that the troops maintain prescribed distances and are at full 
 strength. In reality such conditions do not exist, yet it is im- 
 inaterial whether the deployment of a division which requires 
 an hour and three-quarters is computed at 5 minutes more or 
 5 minutes less. The normal march depths are only intended as 
 a guide for a correct illustration, and for this ^purpose they are 
 amply sufficient.^ 
 
 Supervision of the Order of March. 
 
 It is urgently recommended that on the march every 
 commander should, as far as practicable, have his troops 
 march past him at least once each day, so he can control their 
 march discipline and observe their appearance. 
 
 If the enemy is not near and the presence of the com- 
 mander is not continuously required with the mass of the 
 troops, it is well to extend this inspection to the heavy bag- 
 gage and trains attached ; otherwise irregularities of all sorts 
 will occur. In the case in hand the division commander could 
 not remain long with the marching main body, as his pres- 
 ence near Parschnitz was presumably more necessary. 
 
 Connection with Adjoining Columns. 
 
 Connection with adjoining columns, even in mountains, 
 can in most cases be ke])t up only by mounted men and expe- 
 rienced cyclists ; these are, of course, confined to the roads, 
 and a timed return is not to be expected. This, however, is 
 not necessary, provided the other column does not fail to send 
 out patrols also, for in terrain Vv'ith an obstructed view the 
 object of these patrols is not so much to gather information 
 for the one who starts them out as to orient the commander 
 to whom they are sent. The strongest of these patrols may 
 be quite small; only when the enemy is actually in the 
 vicinity should more mounted men, yet no cyclists, be em- 
 ployed. For this reason the First division dispatched a non- 
 
 file. 
 
 1 Infantry marches by squads, cavalry by fours, and artillery in 
 
48 Studiks in THiv LkaüIxNG uf Troops. 
 
 coniniissioned officer and 6 troopers, as its head had already 
 encountered hostile cavalry. 
 
 Information received from such patrols is not without 
 value. For example, the advice as to the demolished bridge 
 indicated that the Second division would probably arrive at 
 Parschnitz before the First, and would therefore have to at- 
 tend to its own security. Further;nore, the attack of the 
 Windischgratz dragoons on the head of the First division in- 
 dicated that hostile cavalry was on that road, and that upon 
 coming out of the Parschnitz defile the Second division must 
 send a good-sized patrol to seek the opening of communTca- 
 tions with the First division. Finally, if a mountain range lies 
 between the lines of march of two columns, one will never be 
 certain that a combat starting in one valley will be heard in 
 the other. (Reference invited to the Third and Fifth divi- 
 sions in the engagement of Jicin.) 
 
 If communication is established, the detaching of parts of 
 the column not engaged to the other side of the mountain 
 may be of great benefit, especially if they are led against 
 the enemy's rear. 
 
 Measures of Security on the March. 
 
 A careful reconnaissance of the country, so frequently 
 practiced and which has been carried over from our small 
 peace exercises in grand tactics, was not admissible here. The 
 division would require the entire day to reach Parschnitz if 
 such a reconnaissance were instituted. It is hardly conceiv- 
 able that a mass of troops which could become dangerous to 
 an entire division could hide in the ground along the high- 
 way, and, if a small party should dare to do so, its own exist- 
 ence would be jeopardized. 
 
 Furthermore, it is not feasible to have a marching col- 
 umn accompanied by infantry acting as flank cover and ad- 
 vancing over mountains. Even if the latter started at the 
 same time as the advance guard, they would fall far behind on 
 account of the necessity of ascending and descending hills 
 without roads. It is possible to secure flanks in such a man- 
 ner only where ])arallcl valleys exist permitting detached col- 
 umns to march through them, \mless, however, the sides of 
 
 I 
 
Studiks in TPiK Le:ading 01? Troops 
 
 COLLEGE. 
 
 GBi5 
 
 the valley are most favorably formed. If such concHtrons;^ 
 exist, and cross valleys, on which the enemy might advance, 
 run into the road traveled, then detachments must be sent 
 into them to assure security, rejoining- in due time the rear of 
 the marching column. 
 
 Rendezvous at Parschnitz. 
 (Map IL) 
 
 As already stated, the head of the infantry of the advance 
 guard arrived at the Aupa bridge, before Parschnitz, at 
 6:30 a. m. 
 
 The division commander thence proceeded to the mead- 
 ows lying to the north, so as to get a better view of the coun- 
 try ; close in his rear rode the bearer of the headquarters flag, 
 whom the commander cautioned to keep the flag out of sight 
 whenever in proximity of the enemy. 
 
 The country around Parschnitz presented an entirely new 
 aspect. While for the last 4^ miles the troops had marched 
 in a narrow mountain valley with steep sides. In places formed 
 of rocks, the valley now opened into a broad basin, the sur- 
 rounding hills rising to a moderate height with gentle slopes, 
 their sides being steep in only a few places. 
 
 A little over a mile beyond the exit from the mountains, 
 where, on account of their white roadbeds, the junction of 
 the highways from Schömberg and Liebau could easily be 
 traced, the basin again narrowed, the sides forming a defile. 
 Through the opening there the outlines of blue mountains 
 could be seen in the distance, though they appeared to be only 
 half as high as the jiiountains in the rear, which led to the con- 
 clusion that the country there must be more level. The vil- 
 lage of Parschnitz stretched in a long line at the foot of the 
 left side of the basin up the defile ; in its gardens several large 
 stone buildings and some factory chimneys were visible. To 
 the south of the village the rise of the mountains was com- 
 paratively gradual, but about a mile off a higher ridge, thickly 
 wooded, which bordered -the distant view, lay in the way of 
 a possible march over them. Its extreme points descended 
 steeply toward the west end of Parschnitz, as well as into the 
 valley in which Raussnitz lay. Tlie Raussnitz valley could 
 
^o StudiivS in tiik Lkadixg of Troops. 
 
 iilso be surveyed for some distance, bearini;- the character of 
 a defile Hke the ground already passed. 
 
 Looking further to the west, could be seen the village of 
 WoUa. stretching up the mountain on both sides of the ravine, 
 where the Liebau highway descended into the valley over a 
 spur of the mountains. Several wooded peaks arose from the 
 heights along the highway extending from that village, the 
 elevation of which did not seem so great because of the back- 
 ground formed at a considerable distance behind them by the 
 mass of the Riesen Mountains and the Snow Peak. 
 
 It was at once clear to the division commander that the 
 rendezvous ordered at Parschnitz could not be carried out 
 without special measures being taken for security. 
 
 Nothing was to be feared from Wolta, because the ad- 
 vance of the First infantry division and its right flank de- 
 tachment sent via Schatzlar would soon be manifest there. At 
 all events, the defile in the direction of Trautenau, which was 
 situated to the southwest of Parschnitz, must be occupied un- 
 til the arrival of that part of the First infantry division des- 
 ignated for the advance guard of the army corps, and espe- 
 cial attention must be directed toward the high ground south 
 of Parschnitz and to the Raussnitz valley. Hitherto the en- 
 emy could be expected from the front only, a condition of 
 affairs that ceased, however, when the mountains were left. If 
 larger masses of the enemy were near, they could appear only 
 from Königinhof upon Trautenau, or from Josephstadt b\ 
 Evpel upon Raussnitz, or in the region between — /. c on ihc 
 left flank of the column during its further advance. 
 
 On account of the non-arrival of the First division, I lieu- 
 tenant-General A was for a moment in doubt as to 
 
 whether it would not be better to continue the march to Traut- 
 enau and get possession of the junction of the roads there and 
 the Aupa crossing. But he was not allowed to carry out this 
 project, as it was clear from the closing paragraph of the 
 corps order that for the present the desire of the command- 
 ing general was only to unite the corps on the left l)ank o\ 
 ihc .\u])a. 
 
 In the meantime the irooi)s had continued the march on 
 
 the highway. Ueutcnant-General .\ sent an order to 
 
 the First cavalrv brigade.' directing that, as soon as it had 
 
 I 
 
Stldiks in the; LKAoiNci of Troops. 51 
 
 passed Albendorf, it report the fact to the First infantry divi- 
 sion of the Guard, and he then proceeded to join Major- 
 General B , whom he met at 6:30 at the northern edge 
 
 of Parschnitz at the junction of the road from WoUa. 
 
 ATajor-General H had also taken into account the 
 
 altered conditions of the terrane, and as soon as he had crossed 
 the Aupa bridge, he had instructed the vanguard commander 
 as follows : *'Send i company and half a troop of hussars to 
 the southern exit of Parschnitz as cover toward Eypel. The 
 hussars should reconnoiter the country beyond Raussnitz. 
 This detachment will return to the division on the arrival of 
 the First infantry division, Guard corps. Also send i officer 
 and half a troop of hussars on the Liebau road to obtain in- 
 formation concerning the First infantry division. Inform 
 this officer that only a short time ago hostile cavalry was on 
 that road." 
 
 Small cavalry ])atrols had already been sent out for short 
 distances in both directions. The second troop of the Fourth 
 squadron reconnoitered the heights south of Parschnitz and 
 their vicinity. 
 
 The vanguard commander designated the Eleventh com- 
 pany of his battalion (Third battalion. First infantry) to en- 
 ter the Raussnitz valley, taking the necessary cavalry details 
 therefor from the Fourth squadron, chiefly from the Third 
 troop, which had already furnished the patrols that were pre- 
 viously detached and that had not yet returned. The two re- 
 maining troops (Fourth and First), with only a few horses, 
 look station on the road outside of the village at its northern 
 edge, which the rest of the vanguard occupied, 
 
 Major-General B then informed Colonel D 
 
 that the division would halt, and directed him to assure its 
 security by sending a battalion to the heights south of Par- 
 schnitz, the hussar troop already there to be subject to the bat- 
 talion commander's orders. Colonel D thereupon direct- 
 ed the Second battalion, at the head of the main body of the 
 advance guard, to ascend the heights on a road leading- 
 southward from Parschnitz, and to cover the division by tak- 
 ing position toward the wooded ridge and ])ushing out cav- 
 alry patrols. 
 
52 Studiks in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 Finally Major-General B sent orders to the hus- 
 sar regiment, in the rear, to come forward at a trot, not on 
 the village road, but to the north of Parschnitz, and to follow 
 the two troops of the Fourth squadron sent west of the vil- 
 lage toward Trautenau. Except for this movement, the orders 
 given had already been executed or were in process of execu- 
 tion when the division commander rode up to Major-General 
 
 B , and received from the latter the following report: 
 
 '1 have advanced i company and half a troop of hussars into 
 the Raussnitz valley with orders to cover toward Eypel until 
 the arrival of the First infantry division, Guard corps. I have 
 also sent i battalion and i troop of hussars to the heights 
 south of Parschnitz to cover the resting of the division, and 
 half a troop of hussars out on the Liebau road to the First 
 infantry division.' 
 
 Lieutenant-General A approved these preliminaiy 
 
 arrangements, and issued the following supplementary instruc- 
 tions verbally: **It is the intention of the corps commander, 
 after we have rested here, to advance with the concentrate.! 
 army corps beyond Trautenau tov/ard Arnau. This division 
 will then furnish the flank cover on the right bank of the 
 Aupa, and we can at once arrange the troops accordingly. 
 
 Have Colonel D occupy the defile west of Parschnitz 
 
 with the 2 battalions of the advance guard still in the val- 
 ley, the First battalion of field artillery (less i battery), and 
 the First squadron, and then scout toward Trautenau. You 
 will personally guard the heights south" of Parschnitz with 
 the rest of your troops, and I shall have the other regiment of 
 your brigade come up with you." 
 
 In accordance with these instructions, the brigade com- 
 mander gave the necessary directions to Colonel D , at 
 
 whose disposal the following troops were then placed : First 
 battalion and 3 companies of the Third battalion of his own 
 regiment ; 2 troops of the Fourth squadron ; i battalion of 
 field artillery less i battery. 
 
 The 2^ squadrons, united under their regimental com- 
 mander, the Third battery, designated by the artillery battal- 
 ion commander, the engineer company, and the ambulance 
 
 company section, were directed by Major-General B to 
 
 proceed by the road leading out of the village toward the 
 
Studies in tiik Li:ading o^ Troops. 53 
 
 south, to the Second battaUon of the P'irst infantry (Hill 290), 
 while the Second troop of the Fourth squadron, already sent 
 thither, had gone forward toward the center of the wooded 
 ridge. 
 
 These dispositions were made about 7 o'clock. At that 
 hour the Twelfth company of the First infantry, which was 
 at the head, had reached the western exit of Parschnitz, and 
 the two troops of the Fourth squadron in front had already 
 passed through the short defile about 700 yards distant. From 
 there the leading subdivisions of the main body of the divis- 
 ion, which were nearing the exit of the Schömberg defile, were 
 plainly visible. 
 
 Lieutenant-General A had yet to give appropriate or- 
 ders to the main body and to designate the respective stations 
 to the arriving troops. He therefore instructed his general staff 
 officer as follows : ''Ride back to the bridge over the Aupa and 
 direct the Second infantry to proceed to the heights south of 
 Parschnitz, there to report to its brigade commander. As to 
 the rest of the main body, direct the Fourth infantry brigade to 
 rendezvous west of the Wolta-Parschnitz road, the Second 
 battalion of field artillery and the cavalry brigade to the east 
 of the road with the former holding the right wing, and 
 behind these latter the bridge train, signal corps detachment, 
 and field hospital." 
 
 In making these dispositions the division commander had 
 not mentioned the ambulance company section, but the gen- 
 eral staff officer would have known that it should join the 
 other trains. 
 
 At 7:10 the general staff officer reached the bridge, which 
 was in the nick of time, the head of the Second infantry hav- 
 ing just started to cross. The regiment immediately changed 
 direction to the left. At 7:25 the battalion of artillery ar- 
 rived at the same place and was given direction on the spur 
 of the mountain projecting from Wolta across the Liebau 
 highway; there it halted and formed close column faced to 
 the west. At 7:40 the head of the Fourth infantry brigade 
 came out of the defile ; at 8 it had reached the junction of the 
 two highways west of the Wolta-Parschnitz road, the right 
 wing (First battalion, Third infantry) halting 100 paces from 
 the Liebau road, the other battalions forming as for assembly 
 
I 
 
 54 
 
 StüdiI'S IX Ti!:', Li:al)INC. OL- Troops. 
 
 on the left in one echelon. As each battalion was in place it 
 proceeded to stack arms and unsling knapsacks, falling out 
 to the front in order to make room for those in rear. The 
 Fourth infantry regiment formed the second echelon, reach- 
 ing its place at 8:25. The cavalry brigade followed at 8:45, 
 forming in brigade column, the regiments in regimental col- 
 umn beside each other, the battery in line behind them. (See 
 Map II.) 
 
 The general staff officer availed himself of the oppor- 
 tunity to seize newspapers found in the postoffice at the Aupa 
 bridge. The postmaster stated that the telephone connection 
 with Trautenau had just been severed, and some civilians 
 passing by, when questioned about the enemy, pretending 
 not to understand German, answered him \n the Bohemian 
 language 
 
 At 18 minutes after 7 the division conimander received 
 by a mounted rifleman a verbal message sent by Colonel 
 
 D , who w^as in advance on the Trautenau road, to the 
 
 effect that the bridge across the Aupa near Trautenau w^as bar- 
 ricaded and occupied by the enemy, the hussars wdio had ad- 
 vanced against it having been fired on. Lieutenant-General 
 
 A replied that the detachment must keep the enemy in 
 
 sight, but otherwise confine itself to the occupation of the farm- 
 houses located in the defile southwest of P'arschnitz. 
 
 At 8:40 the patrol sent to the First division had returned, 
 with the following report as delivered by the officer in charge : 
 "I found the First division north of Golden-Oels, where the 
 destruction of a large bridge is delaying its march. The 
 commanding general, to whom I reported, had the division 
 lialt there, but it will resume the advance at 8:30. No hostile 
 cavalry was visible, but according to the statement of an in- 
 habitant of Golden-Ols, from 30 to 50 Austrian dragoons 
 near Gu1)crs(l(>rf, who had come from the direction of Ikrns- 
 dorf, at 7 o'clock disappeared in great haste in th.^ nn untairs 
 in a westerly direction." 
 
 The i)atrol was then directed to join its s(|uadr(^n. located 
 west of l^arschnitz. 
 
 Meanwhile the greater part of the troops had passed to 
 ilieir new ])ositions under the eye of the division commander, 
 who noticed several irregularities in the movements. In one 
 
Studies in thl: Lkaüing of Troops. 55 
 
 in fa try rei^iment the shoulder-straps were rolled up instead 
 of being buttoned, in several battalions stocks had been re- 
 moved and coat collars opened, which was indeed ([uite proper, 
 as the heat was already intense ; in other battalions the men 
 had done the same thing, but without orders. In one reg- 
 iment two cases of sunstroke had occurred. Contrary to regu- 
 lations, in the Fourth infantry brigade the cartridge-wagons 
 advanced in close order in rear of the regiments, and some 
 of the led horses of the cavalry looked more like pack-animals. 
 All these irregularities were at once corrected ; and an aid 
 made note thereof, in order to call the attention of the entire 
 division to them later in the day. 
 
 Jn the meantime, Lieutenant-General A reiterated 
 
 the caution that soldiers must not enter the village singly, but 
 that men sent to get water must be assembled and taken there 
 by officers. The Fourth brigade furnished the sentinels needed 
 to enforce this regitlation, and also a non-commissioned offi- 
 cer's post at the junction of the Wolta road with the Liebau 
 highway, on the latter of which no one w^as to pass. He then 
 
 1)roceeded to Colonel D 's detachment, to examine the 
 
 territory in front with a view to a possible subsequent advance. 
 
 It may be of interest to review more closely the disposi- 
 tions of the several detached parties. 
 
 Colonel D had reached the southwest side of the 
 
 group of houses located in the defile about i.ioo yards in front 
 of Trautenau, with the Tw^elfth company, which was pre- 
 viously at the head of the vanguard. The two hussar troops 
 that had advanced toward Trautenau had found the Aupa 
 bridge barricaded and had been fired on, a report of which 
 action, as we have seen, having been sent to the division com- 
 mander. As the region up to the bridge could be observed 
 from the farm-houses, the hussars were withdrawn behind 
 
 them. With the approval of Colonel D , the commander 
 
 of the Third battalion now sent the Tenth company to the 
 height 875 yards north, with half a troop of hussars charged 
 to patrol toward Hummelhof, while the Ninth company re- 
 mained in reserve behind the farm-houses. The First bat- 
 talion of the First infantry (in double column) and the First 
 artillery battalion (less the Third battery), also the remain- 
 ing T^ troops of hussars, halted on the west edge of Par- 
 
56 Studiks tx Tin- Lkading of Troops. 
 
 schnitz, while a half-platoon of the First battalion of the in- 
 fantry with 2 mounted orderlies waded across the Aupa and 
 took post as left flank cover at the southwest extremity of the 
 steep wooded ridge. The employment of cavalry was discour- 
 aged by the abruptness of the declivity. The two companies 
 in the first line each kept a platoon under arms and rested un- 
 der their protection, without unslinging knapsacks. 
 
 At 7 o'clock Major-General B had left the north- 
 ern border of Parschnitz for the central peak of the wooded 
 ridge to the south (Hill 504), where he arrived 6 minutes 
 later; the Second battalion of the First infantry was halted 
 on the unwooded peak (Hill 290) ; the Second troop of the 
 Fourth squadron reconnoitered the woods and reported to 
 the general that nothing could be seen of the enemy south of 
 it. It was learned that the woods were about 400 paces wide, 
 and that the slope was not so steep as it had appeared to be 
 from a distance, ahhough the last portion was the most diffi- 
 cult to ascend, though practicable even for artillery, provided 
 one did not go too close to the wings of the ridge descending 
 toward the Aupa, where the slope was so great that infantry 
 could ascend only in extended order. The brigade commander 
 then went to the southern edge of the woods, to observe the 
 country with a view to the necessary dispositions for security 
 ^md a possible further advance. 
 
 A line of ravines extending from Raussnitz to the farm- 
 houses on the Liebau highway separated the wooded ridge 
 from the heights in front in a pronounced manner, up to a 
 point of junction which was nearly 450 yards southwest of 
 where the general stood (Hill 504), whence the ravines de- 
 scended steeply in both directions to the Aupa. South of the 
 connecting saddle rose a new ridge, which extended westward 
 to the southern end of Kriblitz and on which there were two 
 peaks (531 and 554) that overtopped the general's position. 
 This confined the view to the south to about ^)4 of a mile. 
 Toward the west and south the country was considerably 
 lower and permitted a good survey for about 2 miles. Toward 
 the west was the deep Kriblitz ravine, behind which were 
 l)lainly visible the Hopfen and Galgen Mountains and a part 
 of Trautcnau. T^p to this ravine the terrane seemed to be a 
 tolerably level de.dine sloping toward the Auixi and divided 
 
Studii^s in thi: Li^ading of Troops. 57 
 
 from the valley by a steep border. Toward the south the 
 country appeared generally to fall, but presented a very hilly 
 and obstructed character on account of a great number of low 
 peaks and patches of timber. Alany farm-houses (the south- 
 ern extension of Alt-Rognitz and Rudersdorf) stood out 
 against the horizon which bordered the intermingling wave- 
 like lines of the terrane. No connecting roads were visible 
 toward the south, but the highway from Raussnitz to Traut- 
 enau led over the projecting saddle into the western region 
 toward Kriblitz. 
 
 Under these circumstances it was sufficient to post a 
 small patrol where the general was then standing. A post 
 pushed forward to the heights south of the saddle would dis- 
 cover the approach of larger bodies soon enough to make 
 possible the occupation of the southern border of the woods 
 in ample time. The ground was not so favorable, however, 
 for a flank movement covering the army corps when continu- 
 ing the march. As from Trautenau the corps must follow the 
 road to Arnau, the direction of Hohenbruck alone seemed 
 available for this purpose, and there the march of the flanking 
 column across country would encounter considerable diffi- 
 culty. Hardly any course remained, therefore, but to use the 
 road from Raussnitz to Kriblitz for the greater part of the 
 troops, especially the artillery, and then to see if there was not 
 a road uniting it with Hohenbruck. This could be settled at 
 once by a reconnaissance. Some cavalry must nevertheless 
 skirt the march on the left, and follow the direct route to 
 Hohenbruck. 
 
 The Second troop of the Fourth squadron was already 
 moving toward the height east of Kriblitz. 
 
 Having oriented himself. ATajor-General B dis- 
 patched his aid to bring up the Second battalion of the First 
 infantry, with an additional troop of hussars, but to instruct 
 the remaining troops to move up to the north side of the wood- 
 ed ridge andhalt there. At 7 130 the Second battalion reported 
 to the general. The Fifth company, with 2 mounted riflem,en, 
 was sent ahead to the fork of the Raussnitz road, and it ad- 
 vanced a platoon to Hill 531. The rest of the battalion stacked 
 arms north of Hill 504. The troop brought up from the 
 Third squadron was sent forward to scout in the region be- 
 
58 Sti'diis IX Till-: Li:ai>i\<". of Tuoors. 
 
 twecn Ali-Rognitz and Raussnitz. and both this troop and 
 the Second were aUo directed to reconnoiter the roads leacHng 
 to 1 lolienbruck. 
 
 Maiur-(ieneral ii then repaired to the main body 
 
 of liis detachment, whose last division reached the rendez- 
 vous designated at 7:50. These troops consisted of the Sec- 
 ond infantry regiment, 2>S squadrons of hussars, the Third 
 battery, i company of engineers, and 1 amlnilance company 
 section. 
 
 'i"h^- ihird body detached from the (Hvision (specifically, 
 the vaiii^uard of the advance guard) at this moment consisted 
 of the Eleventh company of the First infantry and half of 
 the Third troop of the Fourth squadron of hussars which had 
 gone mto the valley of the Aup:-i leading to Raussnitz. The 
 company established itself in the garden of the most south- 
 erlv farm, sending half a platoon 550 yards to the front, 
 wliicli, in addition to the sentry over the arms, established a 
 double post on the highway and one on the right slope of 
 the valley, from whence the valley itself could be seen for a 
 long distance and communication be subsequently established 
 with the Second infantry regiment. The half-troop of hus- 
 sars, excepting two mounted orderlies, advanced toward 
 Raussnitz. 
 
 Such was the situation of the main body and detached 
 portions of the division when the division commander went 
 forward on the Trautenau road at 8:35.. As he arrived at 
 the western exit of Rarschnitz (8:40) a hussar ofhcer handed 
 
 iiim the following message from Major-General R : "A 
 
 strong hostile column of all arms is approaching Trautenau 
 on the highway from Königinhof. At 8:10 its head was about 
 1.300 vards s«)iuli ni I lohcnbruck." 
 
 COMMICNTS ox THIv Ri:XI)H7A'( )1'7. AT RaKSCIIXITZ. 
 
 A ct)nneclc(l consideration of the arrival of tlie division 
 at the rendezvous brings out the following facts: 
 
 At •):3() the head of the advance guard infantry reached 
 the .\u])a i)ridge and entered the gnnmd designated for the 
 halt. In order to cross the space which the main body of the 
 division reciuired for rendezvous, and in order to gain sufti- 
 
Studies in the Leading oe Troops. 
 
 59 
 
 cient ground in advance so it could act as cover, it had to con- 
 tinue its march until 7:10. 
 
 At 7:30 the troops taken from the column to serve as 
 flanking parties reached their designated stations. 
 
 At 8 :45 the last portion of the entire division arrived. 
 
 Leaving out of consideration the infantry point, the period 
 of the division's deployment was from 7:10 to 8:45, i hour 
 and 35 minutes. Deducting the cavalry brigade, which was 
 attached only as an exceptional measure, the division would 
 still require i hour and 12 minutes to deploy. In this case, 
 however, it is presumed that the advance guard and main body 
 kept a certain interval, and that consequently the latter did 
 not form up on a line with the advance guard, but before 
 reaching it. 
 
 If the deployment of the column had been effected at the 
 place where the infantry head halted, the figures would have 
 been changed materially, as follows : 
 
 For a column, including cavalry brigade, 13,285 yards 
 long, 2 hours and 20 minutes; if heavy baggage follows 
 (19,257 yards), about 3 hours. 
 
 For an infantry division without cavalry brigade, vvitn 
 advance guard formed on line with it, without heavy baggage 
 (about 11, 600 yards), 2 hours; with heavy baggage (about 
 16,400 yards), 2 hours and 45 minutes to 3 hours; without 
 advance guard formed (troops in uninterrupted succession), 
 without heavy baggage (about 8,740 yards), i hour and 30 
 minutes; with heavy baggage (about 14,000 yards), 2 hours 
 and 20 minutes. 
 
 From this it is seen how much time the deployment of 
 large bodies generally requires. Every deployment should 
 therefore be avoided unless absolutely necessary. For a short 
 rest, all that is needed is a simultaneous halt in the marching- 
 column. F.very deployment is a "readiness," which is not re- 
 quired on the mere probability of an engagement, but when 
 an engagement is inevitable, and therefore only when the ad- 
 vance guard meets with resistance in its progress. In gen- 
 eral a possible deployment depends upon the enemy, and can- 
 not therefore be anticipated, and in any case is dependent on 
 the terrane and one's own purposes. The ground should facili- 
 tate it, and it provides the position behind which it is pro- 
 
■6o Studii.s in TiJic Leading of Troops. 
 
 posed to fight, or the battle-field on which an attack is intend- 
 ed. In the latter case the deployment should not be made too 
 soon, because an advance in order of battle is very tiring and 
 consumes time. If the advance guard has found a somewhat 
 tenable position, it is better to remain in marching column un- 
 til the same is reached ; or, if it is desired to attain some ob- 
 jective without fighting, the troops should deploy only when 
 forced to. 
 
 In the case before us corps headquarters had ordered a 
 general rendezvous on the Aupa. 'When the Second division 
 reached Parschnitz, the First division, which had to provide 
 the advance guard, had not yet come up, and as it was not 
 practicable to proceed further, no time was lost to the whole 
 or various parts by the deployment. In addition, on debouch- 
 ing from the mountains the enemy could be expected, and it 
 was proper that preparations should be made for an engage- 
 ment if it could be done without loss of time, especially In view 
 of the fact that a simple halt on the narrow mountain road 
 would not have been judicious. 
 
 Measures of Security Taken. 
 
 It is but natural that a force in the vicinity of an enemy, 
 whether marching or assembled in rendezvous, should secure 
 itself. In level country with an unobstructed view this duly 
 can be performed by the advance guard, and even a small 
 force will be sufficient. The more difficult the terrane and 
 general conditions, however, the more care must be exercised. 
 As a rule, either too much or too little is done in this direc- 
 tion. The "too little'* may pass a thousand times with im- 
 punity, but when once the troops are thereby surprised, the 
 reputation of their commander suffers for a long time. In 
 conse(|uence of this the other extreme is frequently resorted 
 to. though at the expense of the men's strength. It must 
 never be forgotten that when troops are to be given a rest, 
 it should be done iis thoroughly as circumstances will permit. 
 
 'I'his maUer is especially neglected in the employment of 
 ca\-a]ry. both in theory and practice. In moments when a 
 few patrols would suffice, entire regiments are frequently sent 
 to the front. While the other arms rest, the cavalry is on the 
 move. We fori^et that while men can l)e encouraged bv fair 
 
 I 
 
Studieis in the: Le:ading o^ Troops. 6r 
 
 Avords and spurred on by ambition to renewed activity, it is 
 quite different with tlie horse, which must eat, drink, and rest. 
 We certainly can demand much of a horse that has been well 
 fed and in good condition at the start ; but such conditions are 
 rare, and even then we should not unnecessarily waste the 
 strength of animals. 
 
 In the majority of cases the smallest patrols will suffice. 
 Good riders on good horses and possessed of the requisite 
 boldness can venture a great deal, especially when hostile cav- 
 alry is not about. 
 
 The less the country is open to view, the more numerous 
 should be the cavalry patrols sent out, which then need a 
 supporting body of their own arm. For this reason the flank 
 
 party of Major-General B sent out a whole troop in 
 
 ■each direction, both west and southwest. 
 
 If larger bodies of the enemy are in the vicinity and his 
 cavalry is at hand, the latter will not permit our cavalry 
 patrols to look into his lines. So if we wish to orient our- 
 selves with regard to the enemy, too much cavalry cannot be 
 brought forward and to spare it would be an error. Often in 
 such cases we may find it necessary to fight in order to see. 
 Our experiences in the campaign of 1 870-1 should not govern 
 in this connection, for the French cavalry did not oppose us 
 in an efficient manner. 
 
 The sending forward of cavalry should be regulated from 
 these points of view, and it is insisted that reconnoitering and 
 scouting at long distances, under all circumstances, is particu- 
 larly the duty of cavalry. But it is the duty of higher leaders 
 to solve this problem with proper economy, for he who ex- 
 hausts his cavalry before the engagement commences, can cer- 
 tainly expect nothing of it either during or after the fight. 
 
 As specially concerns the measures for security, it may 
 be seen here how they and their sphere extend in proportion 
 to the strength of the bodies to be protected. An advance 
 guard can cover the front of its division for a certain breadth, 
 but only in the rarest cases will it suffice for the protection of 
 the flanks of an isolated division, whether on the march or 
 in position — such security can only be provided by new 
 detachments. 
 
 So the vanguard of the advance guard covered itself by 
 a troop of hussars sent to the heights south of Parschnitz, the 
 
62 StudiI'S IX TTiK Lkadixc or TrOoI'S. 
 
 ciiliro advance guard l)y a l)attaliüii and this troo]). and the 
 division by 4 battalions, 3 scjuach'on.s, and 1 battery. The 
 greater the number of troops advanced for ])urposes of secur- 
 ity, the further may they be pushed forward and their sphere 
 of scoutin«^ and security extended. 
 
 While the one l^attahon detached from the advance p^uard 
 could only secure toward the wooded summit of the moun- 
 tains, the larger detachment which followed made it prac- 
 ticable for the flank cover to reach far beyond it. 
 
 If, however, the enemy can approach only from one direc- 
 tion, through a defile, then smaller forces will suffice, accord- 
 ing" to the formation of the defile. This is exemplified by the 
 case with regard to the Raussnitz valley, already mentioned. 
 Hostile ])arties could advance through it from Josephstadt, 
 via Eypel. 1"he advance guard had to protect itself against 
 this, which it did with a company of infantry and half a troop 
 of hussars. I'ndcr the conditions of terrane that there existed, 
 this cover was ample too for the division ; accordingly it was 
 not reinforced, but ordered to remain there until the Guard 
 arrived. 
 
 Wui to keep all these detached bodies under arms wouM 
 IHirchase the rest of one half the division at the expense of 
 the other half. Yet this was not at all necessary, for by push- 
 ing out mixed detachments i.too or 1,600 yards toward the 
 west or south, the balance of the division would be fully cov- 
 ered, ai\d these detachments need only to provide for their 
 own safety within narrow limits. 
 
 So it comes to pass that in reality only the double ])Osts 
 a.nd the scouting cavalry cannot obtain rest ; but even if wc 
 did not count in the advanced troops of huss irs, the follow- 
 mg force was necessary for the security of the divi^itMi : 
 
 Iiifdiifry. 
 J'"ro;n hirM reginuiit : 
 
 loth company ' j platoon. 
 
 ijth c-ompany 1 ])latoon. 
 
 1st battalion [\ platoon. 
 
 j<\ battalion 'j platoon. 
 
 1 I til cninpany ' .: plat<K)n. 
 
 'i'otal 3 platoon"^. 
 
Studies in thk Leading oe Troops. 63 
 
 Cavalry. 
 From First hussars : 
 
 With Colonel D 's detachment: 
 
 - 4th squadron.. >^ troop 
 
 ■ With Maj.-Gen. B 's detachment: 
 
 H 4th squadron i troop. 
 
 W 3d squadron i troop. 
 
 With 2d company, ist infantry: 
 
 4th squadron y^ troop. 
 
 Total 3 troops. 
 
 Approximately, 250 infantry and no to 120 troo;ers. 
 
 Concerning other dispositions that were made, it remains 
 to be stated that, after debouching from the Schömberg de- 
 file, the conditions which had up to that time demanded a sepa- 
 ration of the hussar regiment ceased upon arriving in the 
 plain of Parschnitz and before Trautenau, and consequently 
 the separated parts had to be reassembled. 
 
 Disciplinary Measures Taken 7vifhin the Rendezvous. 
 
 In conclusion, the following remarks may be made re- 
 garding the points found fault with by the division commander: 
 The rolling up of shoulder-straps prevents troops from 
 being promptly recognized, which is particularly needful and 
 I important in time of action. Moreover, in chancing upon sin- 
 ' gle men (stragglers, for instance) we should be able to ascer- 
 tain at once to what organization they belong. 
 
 Removing the stocks may afTord great relief under cer- 
 tain circumstances, but no deviation from the regulation dress 
 i can be left to the discretion of individual commanders. Such 
 \ matters are ordered by regimental and battalion commanders; 
 
 ■ otherwise one body of troops would march with helmets and 
 another with caps, one would carry the knapsack on foot and 
 another in wagons. Such relief must be ordered for all by 
 the commander of the whole. If one body of troops enjoys a 
 relief that another does not, then discontent, disorder, and 
 want of discipline easily ensue. Therefore we should insist, 
 in war as well as in peace, on the observance of regulations, 
 and when a departure from the same becomes desirable, as in 
 
64. Studii;S in thc leading of Troops. 
 
 the instance before us, it should be ordered by the commander 
 of the cohmin. Yet it must not be forgotten to direct such re- 
 Hef when there is a necessity for it. It has been stated 
 that details of the Fourth infantry brigade were made to carry 
 water. The parts of the division that were in the Aupa Val- 
 ley would have no difficulty in quenching their thirst, but it 
 was different with the troops on the heights on the left bank 
 of that stream. The latter, when going through Parschnitz, 
 had to leave behind their water-carriers, or else drink on the 
 march while passing through the village. 
 
 With reference to the loading of the regulation wagons 
 and the detail of men to accompany them, it may be well to 
 quote here two circulars which were actually issued on the day 
 in question : 
 
 ''Company baggage-wagons were overloaded, especially 
 with imslung knapsacks, in such a manner that they were un- 
 able to keep up during the day's march. The greatest evils 
 can arise from this. Commanding officers will at once stop 
 this overloading and see that only such articles are carried on 
 the wagons as are permitted by regulations." 
 
 "The commanding general to-day has again observed that 
 loo many men are detailed with the heavy baggage, including 
 orderlies, quartermaster sergeants, and sergeant clerks, all of 
 whom do not belong to the wagons, but must remain in the 
 ranks. Regimental and battalion clerks were also with the 
 wagons, and as a rule they do not belong there, but if they 
 are sent to the baggage, men out of the ranks cannot be 
 ordered there in addition. To every regulation wagon there 
 should be detailed only t man, as a clerk or a non-combatant, 
 and with a supernumerary wagon only i man for every 2 
 vehicles at the utmost, no matter what the wagon may be 
 loaded witli." 
 
 rkoiiuais. ! 
 
 In order that the student may derive full benefit from thi^ 
 work, it is suggested that whenever he comes to a place in 
 the text where certain dispositions of troops are called for, he 
 make these dispositions liimself, according to his own ideas, 
 before reading the solutions given. 
 
Studies in Ttir: Leading oe Troops. 65 
 
 For instance, on page i is found a presentation of the 
 general situation, which states that the Second infantry divis- 
 ion and the First cavalry brigade arrived at Schömberg on 
 June 25. Following this is a statement of the special situa- 
 tion with regard to the Second infantry division, for the bet- 
 ter understanding of which a terrane sketch is added. On 
 page 3 the bivouacs of the various units are announced, but it 
 will be to the student's advantage if, before reading the an- 
 nouncement, he plan for himself how these bivouacs should 
 be arranged. 
 
 It is true the fact that the troops are already entered on 
 the sketch will naturally interfere with such a problem. Even 
 so, the question could take this form: "Will I divide the 
 troops in the samie manner a^ shown in the sketch?" The 
 answer will be, ''No" ; for a little reflection will show that if 
 the two divisions bivouac around Liebau and Schömberg, it 
 would be advisable for them to secure the exits of the defiles 
 across the frontier, which could be accomplished all the more 
 easily by reason of only cavalry being in their front. Their 
 advance guards should therefore be sent forward to these 
 points. 
 
 Thus the first disposition given in the text leads to some 
 study. The omitting to send the advance guards forward can 
 only be explained by the order not to cross the frontier, for 
 the time being, with larger bodies. This leads to a further 
 question: *'What may have induced corps headquarters to 
 give such an order?" The answer is found on page 11. 
 
 From this it is evident that circumstances leading to a 
 particular situation materially influence the dispositions that 
 must be made, and that therefore new situations lead to new 
 dispositions. All that is necessary to initiate these new ques- 
 tions is to alter the task assigned to a subdivision, the terrane 
 upon which it operates, or its strength. In all these directions 
 entirely different measures must frequently follow, especially 
 when alterations are made also with respect to the strength, 
 distance, or position of the enemy. 
 
 The following will serve as examples for new problems : 
 
 I. The Second Army remained on the Neisse. The 
 First army corps, sent to Liebau, was charged to draw the en- 
 emy's attention upon itself, and to make him apprehensive of 
 
66 Studiks in the Lkadint, of Troops. m 
 
 an invasion from that direction into Bohemia, without, how- 
 ever, taking the offensive beyond that point. 
 
 2. The First army corps, by itself, had been sent for- 
 ward to cover tlie frontier. If attacked by superior forces, it 
 should give way in a northerly direction. 
 
 In both of these events the problems would become : Po- 
 sition of the army corps. Points of view for determining 
 further conduct in order to accomplish the tasks. 
 
 3. Take the situations given in the text and i and 2 
 above, and suppose that in each case only a division, instead 
 of a corps, was at hand, or that the work had been assigned to 
 a detachment of 3 battalions, 4 squadrons, and i battery. 
 
 4. Suppose' that the roads were in mostly level country, 
 covered with small patches of timber, farms, etc., instead of in 
 the defiles of a mountainous region. Solve all previously 
 given problems on this basis. 
 
 5. Suppose it was known that there were large hostile 
 forces of all arms at Trautenau, or that these had already sent 
 forward their advance guards to Gubersdorf and Petersdort. 
 
 As an illustration of how such changes necessitate ditfer- 
 ent measures, we may cite the following: 
 
 If, in the event of giving way before strong forces of the 
 opponent, the retreat should take a northerly direction, then 
 the main force would belong at Liebau, and a detachment 
 only should be sent to Schömjjerg. 
 
 If, instead of being mountainous, the country was open 
 and level, it was not absolutely necessary to directly cover 
 both roads from Liebau and Schömberg to Trautenau ; this 
 would lead to an unnecessary dispersion. 
 
 On the other hand, if the corps should unite around Lieb- 
 au and hold the road from there to Golden-Oels, an indirect 
 securing of the Schomberg-'Frautenau road .ould be accom- 
 plished by sending a detachment forward int(^ the country 
 cast of Piernsdorf. Tliis 1)ody should remain in the closest 
 connection with the main body and advance guard, and in 
 view of this the march of a hostile column upon SclilMuberg 
 would appear to be a very hazardous undertaking. 
 
 Furthermore, in ])racticable country the service of secur- 
 ity falls to the cavalry. The entire First cavalry brigade could 
 then be sent far in advance, for the support of which only 
 
Studtks in the Leading of Troops. 67 
 
 a few battalions and some artillery would be required, and 
 the formation of other separate advance guards could be dis- 
 pensed with. 
 
 Further on in the text we come to the actual establish- 
 ment of the outposts. Here too, as in all other cases, the stu- 
 dent should picture to himself how that work would be per- 
 formed, before reading the text. Later the outpost formations 
 that would be judicious in the case of the varying situations 
 above mentioned could be considered. The following ques- 
 tions are most intimately connected with such dispositions: 
 What special measures are required in case of hostile attack? 
 Shall the advance guard fight? In what position shall the 
 attack be accepted? 
 
 The following problems, among others, also suggest 
 themselves : 
 
 Page 6: The hussars sent out toward Braunau send in 
 word that the enemy in considerable force has taken up a posi- 
 tion close to the south of the town, and that the advance guard 
 of the Guard is already engaged there. Required : order of 
 the Second infantry division for the start; message to head- 
 quarters of the First army corps; advice to the Guard corps ; 
 instructions to the advance guard commander, who is to le- 
 main in position toward Trautenau. 
 
 Page 7: I. Give a sketch of the order of the Second in- 
 fantry division for June 27 after receipt of corps order. 
 
 2. Give a sketch of the division order if the corps order 
 dispensed with the uniting of the corps near Parschnitz, and 
 directed instead that the Second division advance to Traut- 
 enau and go into bivouac there as advance guard, while the 
 First infantrv division remained near Parschnitz. (This order 
 should not provide for contingencies that cannot yet be fore- 
 seen.) Indicate the position of the division and its outposts 
 if it reaches Trautenau without seeing anything of the enemy 
 except cavalry patrols. 
 
 3. What place in the order of march should be assigned 
 to a battalion of riflemen and a battalion of the corps artillery 
 regiment, should such happen to be with the division? 
 
 Page 39: Give the orders for the advance from Schöm- 
 berg and Bertelsdorf if it is intended to assemble the outposts 
 later. i 
 
68 Studies in the Leading oe Troops. 
 
 Page 41 : i. Upon coming out of Petersdorf, the ad- 
 vance guard reports the approach of a hostile column from 
 the direction of Parschnitz. Give the dispositions of the com- 
 mander of the advance guard. 
 
 2. The head of the advance guard reports that infantry 
 and apparently a battery of the enemy had occupied a position 
 on the right bank of the Aupa, south of Parschnitz. Give 
 the orders of the commander of the advance guard ; also the 
 dispositions of the division commander. 
 
 3. When the vanguard approached the point of exit 
 from tlie defile near Parschnitz, hostile cavalry of the strength 
 of about 6 squadrons, with 2 batteries, are seen in the plain 
 north of the village. How will the debouchment of the divis- 
 ion be conducted under these circumstances? Give the orders 
 of the respective commanders. 
 
 4. The advance guard has reached the southern exit of 
 Albendorf with the head of its main body when heavy artillery 
 firing is audible from about the direction of Bernsdorf. In 
 the direction of Parschnitz only hostile cavalry patrols have 
 so far been seen. 
 
 5. The same situation, except that simultaneously the 
 advance of a hostile column from Parschnitz on Petersdorf is 
 reported. 
 
 6. The head of the division has arrived at Parschnitz ; 
 so far only hostile cavalry patrols have been visible. The 
 division receives orders to continue the march to Trautenau 
 and occupy bivouacs on the heights south of the village. Give 
 the orders for security of the march.^ 
 
 With regard to this method of study, it may be added that, 
 in cases where the student makes dispositions with reference 
 to the situation presented in the text, before he sees the solu- 
 tion given therein, the latter offers an opportunity to learn a 
 different view of the case. He either finds his own view con- 
 firmed, or he notices deviations therefrom. If the latter, it 
 leads to reflections as to what motives these deviations may 
 be based on, and it ])ermits a comparison of such motives 
 with those that he himself had in mind when making hTs 
 dispositions. 
 
 It will be noted, however, that in all problems the student 
 frames for himself by changing the situations of his own ac- 
 
Studies in the: Leading of Troops. 69 
 
 cord, he of course loses the outHnes that would be given by 
 an instructor. Yet in spite of this he will not fail to derive 
 much benefit, as all earnest reflection on war situations is in 
 itself of value, and this will be the greater as such changes in 
 individual incidents call forth deviating measures. And then 
 another question will be: "Will not the dispositions made in 
 one case answer in another? If not, why not?" Indeed, it 
 is quite true that new ideas are developed by a variation in 
 the original situation, whereby we may well consider whether 
 they could not be applied also in the first solution. 
 
 Such exercises will be especially instructive if a number 
 of students congregate to study them together. 
 
 In conclusion, there is still another way in which these 
 studies may be of benefit for the student without instructor. 
 Let him place himself in the position of a particular com- 
 mander — for instance, the commander of the Third battery. 
 Then let him picture to himself in what position the events 
 place him, upon what questions he must direct his attention in 
 the various situations, where he should personally be at each 
 moment, and what dispositions he should make. This can be 
 carried even so far as giving several commands verbally. And 
 for this also the joint study of a number of officers, especially 
 of different arms, is highly recommended. Yet such work is 
 necessarily laborious, and presupposes the earnest desire to 
 give as much time as possible to progressive studies. This 
 we all need to practice incessantly, for even a person with 
 the most favorably equipped intellect will accomplish greater 
 results if he applies himself to his purpose with zeal and 
 industry. 
 
I 
 
I 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Expulsion o^ the Enemy i^rom Trautenau.^ 
 
 We left Lieutenant-General A , at 8 40 a. ni., on 
 
 the western edge of Parschnitz, just as he received the report 
 of the enemy's advance. His first order was for the troops 
 to get under arms again, yet the situation required further 
 measures. Should the enemy continue his march beyond 
 
 Trautenau, Colonel D *s detachment, which had been 
 
 pushed forward toward the town, must very soon be involved 
 in an engagement which would afifect the whole division.^ 
 
 The question was, "Should the division be deployed in a 
 defensive position in case of contact, or would it be more judi- 
 cious to advance to the attack of the enemy?" 
 
 iThe experiences of the campaign of 1870-1 are evidence of a 
 higher demand for education in the subject of troop-leading. The 
 greatest gallantry will no longer suffice against destructive fire; it 
 must be supplemented more than ever by intelligence. This should 
 admonish us to devote ourselves with unceasing care and solicitude 
 to our education. 
 
 The less we can hope to accomplish by merely rushing ahead, 
 the more study should be given to the situation before us, and to 
 maneuvering as conditioned by the terrane. This increases the de- 
 mands on the intelligence of the leader, from the lowest to the 
 highest. 
 
 While in Part I. we considered only dispositions concerning 
 the march, we now direct our attention to the engagement itself, 
 and more particularly toi the maneuvering. 
 
 2Colonel D 's detachment, west of Parschnitz, consisted of 
 
 the First battalion and 3 companies of the Third battalion of the 
 First infantry regiment, 2 troops of the Fourth squadron of the First 
 hussar regiment, and the First battalion of the First field artillery 
 regiment, less the Third battery. 
 
 7^ 
 
72 Studies in the Lkading of Troops. 
 
 The first alternative was in accordance with the orders 
 of the corps commander, who had desired to assemble the en- 
 tire corps near Parschnitz ; the second was in accordance with 
 the plan as announced, to continue the march beyond Traut- 
 enau in the direction of Arnau. In view of the reported ap- 
 proach of considerable hostile forces, the second alternative 
 could probably only be accomplished by a fight for the posses- 
 sion of the heights of Trautenau which would become more 
 difficult the longer the enemy was allowed to establish himself 
 
 there. For this reason lyieutenant-General A resolved 
 
 to advance to the attack of the enemy. As the arrival of the 
 remaining parts of the corps could confidently be expected in 
 about an hour and a half, the division would not be de- 
 pendent on its own forces alone in carrying through the 
 
 igement. 
 
 The next question was, "How can the attack be best 
 initiated?" 
 
 This much was certain — the enemy could no longer be 
 prevented from ocupying Trautenau. Further, the character 
 of the terrane did not permit an advance of the main force 
 against the city and along the highway ; such an advance must 
 be flanked most thoroughly from the heights on the right bank 
 of the Aupa. And even should an advance be successful, the 
 group of mountains rising abruptly south of the town would 
 form a position that could hardly be taken from the front. 
 For the same reason an advance of the main body over the 
 mountains in a westerly direction did not appear practicable, 
 as it also would eventually lead to a frontal attack on this 
 strong position. 
 
 In any case the Aupa must be crossed and the right slope 
 of its valley ascended. This could be done without an en- 
 gagement only near Parschnitz, where Major-General B 's 
 
 detachment had already obtained a firiu hold on the right 
 bank, while a further advance of the main forces toward 
 the Trautenau-Königinhof road would turn the strong posi- 
 tion of the op])C)nent and would threaten his probable line of 
 letreat; by this the region north of Parschnitz would be 
 cleared, making room f(^r the deployment of the expected parts 
 
Studies in thk Lkading of Troops. 73 
 
 of the army corps, which would not be the case if the Second 
 division remained on the plain; besides, the direct line of re- 
 treat to Schömberg would be maintained. 
 
 The crossing of the Aupa near Parschnitz would require 
 that the defile southwest of that village be held, under all cir- 
 cumstances, until the arrival of the First infantry division. 
 
 The detachment of Colonel D was available for this 
 
 purpose; and although the detachment had only seven com- 
 panies of infantry, it was not probable that the enemy would 
 advance in the plain along the Liebau highway as soon as the 
 main body of the Second division advanced against Trautenau 
 over the heights on the right bank. Moreover, the defile could 
 be easily defended; the deployment of large hostile forces for 
 its attack could hardly be accomplished before 9:30; and the 
 
 immediate support of Colonel D by the First infantry 
 
 division could be expected soon after 10 o'clock. 
 
 Lieutenant-General A therefore determined to take 
 
 the offensive, on the right bank of the Aupa, with his prin- 
 cipal force, and gave the following instructions to Colonel 
 
 D , who was with him : "The enemy is advancing from 
 
 Königinhof upon Trautenau. I shall cross the Aupa with the 
 division at Parschnitz, and move against his right flank. 
 Meanwhile you will hold your position until the arrival of 
 the First division, which will probably be about 10 o'clock ; if, 
 however, the enemy should evacuate Trautenau earlier, you 
 will follow him on the highway. The cavalry brigade will 
 move up to your support, and you will place yourself under 
 the orders of its commander." 
 
 At the same time the general staff officer of the division 
 was sent in advance upon the opposite bank of the Aupa to 
 reconnoiter the enemy and the terrane. 
 
 The division commander then returned to the main body, 
 which had already fallen in, and at 8:50 gave the following 
 orders, in part verbally to those immediately concerned, in 
 part through his aids : 
 
 To the commander of the artillery regiment : "Lead your 
 Second battalion east of the Parschnitz church on the heights 
 and join the head of the Fourth brigade." 
 
74 Studiks IX IHK Lkadixg of Troops. 
 
 To the Fourth infantry brigade: ''The brigade will 
 marcli immediately to the heights by the roads leading out of 
 Parschnitz to the west of the church. The Second battalion 
 of field artillery will place itself at the head." 
 
 To the First cavalry brigade : "The brigade will at once 
 
 move u]) to the support of Colonel D 's detachment, 
 
 which is west of Parschnitz on the Trautenau highway. 
 Major-General L will at the same time assume com- 
 mand of the detachment of Colonel D , who has already 
 
 been given instructions." 
 
 To the bridge train and signal corps detachment: "The 
 division bridge train and the signal corps detachment will re- 
 turn to the north exit of Parschnitz and take position in the 
 meadow north of the road.*' 
 
 To the chief surgeon : "The division will probably be 
 engaged on the heights of the right bank of the Aupa. Have 
 the ambulance company and the field hospital follovv the troops 
 in that direction, obtaining the necessary wagons for the trans- 
 port of the wounded by requisition on the town. I shall send 
 you some cavalrymen for this work." 
 
 A mounted riileman was directed to conduct to the chief 
 surgeon half a troop from the First cavalry brigade. 
 
 Having made these dispositions, hastening on in advance 
 of the troops just starting, the division commander repaired 
 
 to Major-General B 's detachment, and as he crossed the 
 
 southern edge of Parschnitz he noticed that the parts of the 
 detachment were already in motion and were entering the 
 woods in their front. At the same time a mounted rifleman 
 approached him bringing the following message : 
 
 3d Infantry Prigadc. Heights south of Parschnitz, 
 
 27 June, 8 :40 a. m. 
 ( )n account of the proximity of the enemy, the brigade 
 is holding the southern edge of the woods lying in front of its 
 
 position. B , 
 
 ^.faior-Gcucral. 
 
 When Lieutenant-CkMieral A arrived at the north- 
 ern border of the woods, the last subdivision of the Third 
 infantry l)ri!jade had also entered it, and at the same time tl^e 
 
 i 
 
Studiks in the Leading of Troops. 75 
 
 first cannon-shot was heard in the direction of Trautenau, to 
 which the First and Second batteries were seen to reply from 
 the plain. The horse battery was also seen advancing at a 
 rapid gait. (9:10 a. m.) 
 
 Alter passing through the woods, the division commander 
 came upon the Third field battery in a covered position near 
 Hill 504; along its side the Second infantry regiment was de- 
 ploying; farther oil and in its front was the Second battalion 
 of the First infantry, near Hill 531, which was situated to 
 
 the southwest and from which Major-General B was 
 
 then returning; and the hussar regiment could be seen in its 
 advanced position extending to the patches of wood north of 
 Alt-Rognitz. Hussar patrols appeared on the heights toward 
 Kriblitz, some of them skirmishing with hostile cavalry be- 
 tween that village and Alt-Rognitz, other than which all that 
 could be seen of the enemy was a battery in action on the 
 northwestern slope of the Hopfen Mountain, behind which, 
 however, heavy clouds of dust arose, intimating the presence 
 of marching forces. 
 
 Upon coming up, Major-General B said : "Accord- 
 ing to reports of hussars, the head of the enemy's column 
 reached Hohenbruck at 8:30. Its rear, as I have personally 
 observed, has only just now entered the village. I therefore 
 estimate its strength at about a brigade. The patrols sent 
 I southward by Alt-Rognitz were forced to fall back before the 
 I enemy's uhlans, the reports of whose strength vary from i to 
 j 4 squadrons, but up. to that time they had only seen a few 
 I wagons on the road. Just now the hostile cavalry is behind 
 ! the patches of wood between Kriblitz and Alt-Rognitz. The 
 I hussar regiment sent forward against it was met with infantry 
 i fire out of the bushes. It was my intention to occupy the edge 
 i of the woods here, so as to secure the division against an ad- 
 I vance of the enemy on this side of the Aupa." 
 i By this the division commander was convinced that the 
 j approaching forces were as yet inferior, a fact which demand- 
 I ed all the more that they be promptly attacked. It was a 
 i question, however, whether they formed the advance guard 
 I of a corps in the rear. However that may be, the resolve taken 
 I by Lieutenant-General A , based on the general situa- 
 
76 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 tion, cuiild not be changed. He therefore informed Major- 
 Gcneral 1> that it was not necessary to occupy the bor- 
 der of the woods, as the Fourth brigade was now advancing 
 and he intended to attack the opponent. As the Fourth bri- 
 gade, however, had not yet arrived, the division commander, 
 for the time being, directed his whole attention to the terrane, 
 in order to arrange his further movements judiciously. 
 
 As already stated, the ridge (531 and 554) extending to- 
 ward Kri blitz divided the region south of Aupa into two sec- 
 tions. Caution demanded that the main forces be led for- 
 ward in the northern section along the right bank of the 
 Aupa, in order not to disperse them too much and endanger 
 the communication with the troops in the valley. For should 
 the enemy in course of time show himself to be superior and 
 advance along the border of the valley, Lieutenant-General 
 
 A 's command might not only be separated from the 
 
 First infantry division, but also crowded away from its own 
 line of reireat. And on the other hand, an attack across this 
 ground would lead the division against the apparently very 
 strong position south of Kriblitz. 
 
 But if the principal attack was transferred to the region 
 south of the mountain range, this position could not only be 
 turned, but the enemy probably forced to rapidly evacuate the 
 heights south of Trautenau. If the latter was not done by 
 him soon, all that could be hoped was to involve him in a 
 serious fighting condition on his withdrawal. 
 
 Yet with all these advantages, the latter plan entailed the 
 disadvantage of considerably extending the division, for in 
 any case the country to the north of the mountain range must 
 not be left out of consideration, and if serious resistance was 
 encountered between Kriblitz and Alt-Rognitz, the rearmost 
 troops would ])rol)ahly have to be employed too soon. 
 
 Notwithstanding this, Lieutenant-General A re- 
 
 .solved to make the principal attack in that «lircction, for if it 
 was successful, then the Trautenau defile would be most quick- 
 ly opened. This, for the moment, Avas of the greatest import- 
 ance. The division commander was convinced that for the 
 time being his forces were superior to the enemy, but he could 
 not tell whether this would he the case an liour later. So far 
 no furtli'jr movements of troops on the Königinhof road were 
 
 1^ 
 
Studies in tue: Leading of Troops. 77 
 
 reported, and the quicker advantage was taken of the enemy's 
 isolation the better' would be the chances of success. In ad- 
 dition, the danger of a premature disposal of the reserves was 
 to some extent neutralized i)y the expected arrival of the First 
 infantry division, as well as the proximity of the Guard di- 
 vision, which could reinforce the first line. 
 
 Meanwhile, having dismounted, he gave the following in- 
 structions to Major-General B , commanding the Third 
 
 brigade (9:23): "Attack the enemy with your 4 battalions 
 and the battery, in the direction of Kriblitz. I shall put the 
 Fourth brigade in motion south of the mountain ridge lead- 
 ing toward the village, against the enemy's line of retreat. 
 Keep your right v^'ing at the edge of the valley during the 
 advance, and do not abandon it under any circumstances. I 
 shall have the hussar regiment reconnoiter the left flank." 
 
 Major-General B made his dispositions at once. 
 
 The Third horse battery advanced to the next mountain spur 
 (Hill 366) and opened fire on the enemy's artillery on the 
 Hopfen Mountain (9:35). The Third battalion of the Sec- 
 ond infantry formed up in two echelons in company columns, 
 with the left on the Raussnitz-Trautenau road, and on the 
 same line with it and on its left was the Second battalion of 
 the First infantry. The remaining two battalions of the Sec- 
 ond infantry formed company columns and covered them- 
 selves north and south of Height 366. 
 
 In the meantime the division commander's views were 
 confirmed by the report of his general staff officer, who at 
 9:32 returned from the height in front of Kriblitz: 
 
 "The enemy is preparing to take up a position on the 
 j heights south of Trautenau. His forces do not seem to be 
 i very large, for he has only brought i battery into action, and 
 I could only see 2 battalions in its vicinity. The ravine in 
 which Kriblitz lies is deeply cut, and on the other side is cov- 
 ered at its southern end with a dense wood, so that an advance 
 over it presents great difficulty. On the other hand, the re- 
 gion south of the range of heights, extending along our front, 
 ofifers no material obstacles to an attack. Furthermore, only 
 a small force of infantry and i to 2 squadrons of uhlans could 
 be seen in it."' 
 
78 Studii^s IX Tiiiv Lkadixc of Troops. 
 
 The i^encral staff officer was then instructed to prepare 
 the report to the corps commander of the intended advance, 
 and the same was sii^ned by the division commander.^ 
 
 Meanwhile the head of the Second battaUon of field artil- 
 lery had reached the edge of the woods (near Hill 504), and 
 at 9:35 the commander of the artillery regiment and the com- 
 mander of the Fourth brigade, Alajor-General C , joined 
 
 Lieutenant-General A , who gave them the following 
 
 orders: ''The Third brigade will attack north of the moun- 
 tain ridge in our front in the direction of Kriblitz." The;i 
 
 turning to Alajor-General C : "Continue the march 
 
 with your brigade to the left of it in the direction of A't- 
 Rognitz. The hussar regiment which you see below will re- 
 connoiter on your left flank." Then to the commander of the 
 artillery: "Let the Second battalion go into position on Hill 
 531, which you see before you." 
 
 As this movement must take place under his own eyes, 
 the division comn '.ander retained the Fourth brigade as a re- 
 serve. If its head should also encounter the enemy, he coul'd 
 either put in the entire brigade, or retain a part of it as a 
 last reserve, as he thought best. Orders were sent to the 
 hussar regiment to attach itself to the left wing of the advanc- 
 ing Fourth brigade and to reconnoiter on the left flank of the 
 division, at the same time holding itself in readiness to take 
 part in the engagement. 
 
 As soon as the head of his brigade, which was marching 
 in two columns, had reached the southern cih^e of the woods 
 (near Hill 504), Alajor-General C considered it neces- 
 sary to separate his two most advanced battalions into com- 
 ])any columns; those that followed remained in column of 
 march, but halted for a short time to re-establish order, as they 
 were .somewhat disturbed 1)\' the (Hfllcult march, and to close 
 
 I2d Infantry Division. Hill 504, south of Parsc.huitz. 
 
 (MossaKo No. 1.) 27, 6, '66, 9:35 a. m. 
 
 To the Headquarters, 1st Army Ccnps: 
 
 A ho.stilo column of all arms, estimated at a brigade, has just 
 reached Trautenau from the direction of Königinhof. The front ot 
 its position is difficult to force. The main body of this division has 
 therefore crossed the Aupa aear Parschnitz. and, holding the T.ieb- 
 au highway, is advancing to the attack on the right flank of the 
 
 enemy. A , 
 
 Lieiitenant-dfeneral. 
 
 I 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 79 
 
 up, whereby a distance of 435 yards was gained from the lead- 
 ing battahon. Meanwhile the view the division commander 
 had entertained of the effect of the advance on the enemy's 
 left flank was strengthened by the first move in its execution. 
 Although the enemy's artillery on Hopfen Mountain at first 
 replied with a few shots to the fire of the Third battery, in a 
 few minutes its guns were limbered up and left the position. 
 Soon, too, clouds of dust rising in unbroken line in the cut 
 of the woods leading from the Hopfen Mountain to Alt- 
 Rognitz indicated the rapid retirement of a hostile party, 
 while small columns were observed on the high points which 
 rose to the south of this cut, moving in a southerly direction. 
 
 Lender these circumstances the division commander would 
 gladly have hastened the advance of the Fourth brigade, yet 
 he recognized that this would lead to a disorderly advance, 
 and he refrained from urging it here, as the desire of the troops 
 to get at the enemy needed to be curbed rather than incited. 
 Furthermore, nearly all parties were then in motion, and the 
 battalion of the Third brigade advancing along the crest of 
 the heights (Second battalion of the First infantry) soon be- 
 came involved in a musketry engagement with the enemy's 
 infantry on the slope turnins^ into the Kriblitz ravine. 
 
 The division commander then remounted his horse and 
 i'ode toward Hill 531, south of the Raussnitz-Trautenau road, 
 where he had a better view of the two brigades during theii 
 advance. 
 
 At 9 150 the situation was as follows :^ 
 
 The deployed leading battalions of the Fourth brigade 
 were crossing the ridge on both sides of the station of the 
 division commander (531). The Second artillery battalion 
 was stationed north of Hill 531, under cover, with thickets ex- 
 tending partially across its front. 
 
 The battalion of the Third brigade already mentioned 
 was halted in action on the western slope. Further to the right 
 the Third battalion of the Second infantry was nearing the 
 northern part of Kriblitz ; the skirmish line was about to go 
 through the village, but so far not a shot had been fired there. 
 The First battalion went to the rieht, the Second battalion to 
 
 iSee Map III. 
 
8o Studiks in the Leading of Troops. ■ 
 
 the left, in company columns in two echelons, past the Third 
 battery. The engineer company was behind the right wing 
 of the detachment. One ambulance company section was halt- 
 ed under cover 220 yards east of the Third battery, while the 
 other section was trying to find a road through the woods in 
 the rear of the Fourth infantry brigade. 
 
 Nothing could now be seen of the enemy on the Hopf en 
 Mountain, while the northern edge of the small woods south 
 of Kriblitz was strongly occupied by hostile infantry. From 
 the trend of events so far Lieutenant-General A be- 
 came convinced* that the partial engagement of the enemy had 
 taken place only to cover his withdrawal. He had no doubt 
 regarding the attainment of his immediate object, the open- 
 ing of the Trautenau defile; but there was still a possibility 
 that the situation might be turned to further advantage bv 
 inflicting serious losses on the enemy if he should succeed in 
 impeding his flank march. This, however, could only be ac- 
 complished by his left wing, in which case the present reserve 
 would be abandoned and a new formation developed. 
 
 Lieutenant-General A therefore gave the following 
 
 order to Major-General C , who was still with him : 
 
 "Continue your advance with the Fourth brigade in the direc- 
 tion of the wooded hill (425) northwest of Alt-Rognitz and 
 press the enemy, who appears to be withdrawing. In the 
 meantime the Third brigade will take possession of Trautenau 
 and the heights south of it." (9:50.) 
 
 All aid was sent with the following order to the Third 
 brigade : "The brigade will immediately take possession of 
 Trautenau and the heights south of that city, to which point 
 the detachment under Colonel D will also be sent." 
 
 This officer was further instructed: "As soon as the en- 
 emy has evacuated Trautenau, the engineers should examine 
 the crossings over the Aupa at that place, and, if necessary, re- 
 establish them. Then find the cavalry brigade and direct it 
 to hastily follow the enemy through Trautenau or west of the 
 city in the direction of Königinhof, and at the same time have 
 a squadron reconnoiter the road to Arnau. Major-General 
 
 L should be informed that the detachment of Colonel 
 
 D is no longer under his command." rgiqq.) 
 
Studi£:s in TiJi: LEADING o^ Troops. 8i 
 
 From his position the division commander could still over- 
 look the movements of both brigades. The Second battalion 
 of field artillery took position behind Hill 531 and opened fire 
 on the northern border of the Kribhtz woods, regardless of 
 the infantry fire that there reached it. The enemy soon left 
 the woods on the approach of the right wing of the Fourth 
 infantry brigade, but occupied the patch of woods at the north- 
 western exit of Alt-Rognitz (Hill 425) as well as the ground 
 along the cut in the road leading from there to Hohenbruck. 
 In the Third infantry brigade, the Second battalion of the 
 First regiment, which had hitherto been in action, disappeared 
 in the southern part of the Kriblitz ravine, while the Third 
 battalion of the Second infantry was engaged in ascending 
 the eastern slope of the Hopfen Mountain, the remaining two 
 battalions of the regiment following at about 650 yards. 
 
 The artillery fire ceased almost immediately. The lead- 
 ing battalions of the Fourth brigade (Third of the Third in- 
 fantry and Third of the Fourth infantry) had sent out skir- 
 mishers as soon as they came up to Hill 531. The four other 
 battalions so far in march had formed columns of platoons, 
 the regiments alongside each other. As soon as the top line 
 of the depression in the terrane between Alt-Rognitz and the 
 Kriblitz woods (500) was reached, fire was opened. Then 
 infantry appeared, ascending the declivity on which the, little 
 woods of Kriblitz are situated, while parts of the Third brigade 
 had halted upon the Hopfen Mountain. 
 
 At 10:25 the little hill near the northwestern exit of A!t- 
 Rognitz (425) had been evacuated by the enemy, and the bat- 
 talions of the Fourth brigade disappeared from the division 
 commander's view as they descended behind the 'depression 
 in the terrane (500). Accordingly the commander went for- 
 ward toward the north corner of Alt-Rognitz, and was met 
 en route by his general stafif officer, who had accompanied the 
 advance of the Fourth brigade, and who reported : ''The en- 
 emy is retiring in a southerly direction. The region in front 
 appeared to have been occupied by 2 battalions, to cover his 
 march. Only a brief skirmish took place with these, as they 
 withdrew soon upon our approach in the direction of Neu- 
 Rognitz, where they were joined by 3 to 4 squadrons of dra- 
 goons and uhlans. A larger column was also plainly visible 
 
82 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 retiring on the highway toward Neu-Rognitz, but it has such 
 a start now ihat it will be difficult to inflict any injury upon 
 it. I have seen a few of the enemy's dead, which, according 
 to their uniform, belong to their Twelfth regiment. In all 
 probability we are therefore opposed by a part of the Tentli 
 corps." 
 
 At the same time an aid from the Third brigade brought 
 the following message : "The enemy has evacuated Trauten- 
 au and is withdrawing upon Hohenbruck. The brigade is 
 holding the town, and is forming on the heights south of it, 
 in order to pursue the enemy. The bridges over the Aupa are 
 not damaged." 
 
 This officer was sent back with directions that the bri- 
 gade must await further orders on the heights south of Traut- 
 enau, and that the engineer company should attach itself to 
 the brigade. 
 
 The artillery fire of the enemy having commenced again, 
 the general proceeded to the little hill near the northwestern 
 exit of Alt-Rognitz. Arriving there at lo 140, it was found that 
 the view to the west was much limited by an elevation run- 
 ning parallel with the highway. Hohenbruck and the main 
 road were almost entirely liidden by it. A better view could 
 be had of the country to the south, for the elevation declined 
 in several terraces toward Alt-Rognitz and Rudersdorf. Dry 
 ravines running from a wooded elevation on one of these ter- 
 races (527) to the church of St. Paul and St. John formed 
 two oblique undulations on this slope. Beyond the most dis- 
 tant a group of hills arose, the highest point of which stood 
 out, in the far distance, beyond Neu-Rognitz. Half-way up 
 its slope this village could be seen, partially hidden by thick- 
 ets. On both sides of it and at the same height an uninter- 
 rupted forest seemed to envelop the group of hills. 
 
 The enemy evidently intended to take position again near 
 Neu-Rognitz, as it was plainly seen that he was about to oc- 
 cupy the thickets lying before the village, through which his 
 last infantry and cavalry parties were retreating, and 3 bat- 
 teries could be seen at his disposal, standing under fire before 
 the village between the little thickets. 
 
 On the side of Lieutenant-Ceneral A , the leading bat- 
 talions of the Fourth brigade were descending the northern 
 
 * 
 
Studie:s in the: Leading of Troops. 83 
 
 slope of the hollow northwest of Alt-Rognitz, while the four 
 other battalions followed across the meadow in columns of 
 platoons, passing closely by the position of the division com- 
 mander. The Third troop of the Third squadron accompanied 
 the advance of the Fourth infantry brigade on its left wing. 
 The hussar regiment (2>^ squadrons) tried to get through 
 Alt-Rognitz toward the south. On Hill 531 the Second bat- 
 talion of field artillery again came into action, firing on hos- 
 tile bodies that again appeared ascending to Neu-Rognitz. 
 Toward the northwest several wooded peaks near by com- 
 pletely obstructed the view, so that nothing could be seen of 
 the Third brigade. 
 
 Lieutenant-General A 's first act was to issue the 
 
 following instructions to Major-General C : "Take 
 
 a covered position with your brigade on both sides of this 
 height (425). At the same time secure your left flank by 
 occupying the nearest farm-buildings." (10:45.) 
 
 It was clear to the division commander that the intended 
 continuation of the advance on Arnau could not be carried 
 out as long as the enemy made a stand near Neu-Rognitz; 
 equally plain was it that the more time there was allowed the 
 enemy, the more difficult would it become to dislodge him. 
 But more important than either of these considerations was 
 the fact that although the Fourth brigade was at the com- 
 '< mander's disposal for carrying out an attack, yet the entire 
 I division was not available, and that the brigade would be 
 destroyed in the execution of an energetic attack before the 
 \ Third brigade could support it. Although he had one brigade 
 j under his eye, he could not see how matters stood with the 
 i other. A serious engagement had not yet taken place, but 
 1 nevertheless the course of events had widely separated the 
 I division into three parts, and his first concern must be to 
 1 reunite his command. It was then a question with him 
 1 whether for the time being the attack should be continued, 
 or the arrival of the other portions of the corps and the de- 
 cision of the commanding general should be awaited. 
 
 For the present he could be satisfied with the secured 
 possession of the Trautenau defile. The commanding general 
 might arrive at any m.oment, and it could not be known under 
 prevailing conditions whether he intended to advance farther 
 
84 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 on the Königinhof road or establish himself firmly on the 
 right bank of the Aupa with his entire corps. If the Second 
 infantry division attacked the enemy, there would be no other 
 alternative for the commanding general than to lead the re- 
 mainder of the corps on the same road to its assistance. Under 
 such circumstances it did not seem proper to Lieutenant- 
 General A to anticipate his superior's intentions, so 
 
 he determined to assemble his division in such a way that he 
 might effectually meet any attack by the enemy, and also 
 utilize the ground for his own advance. 
 
 Accordingly, at 10:55, ^^ sent the following written order 
 
 to Major-General B by two mounted riflemen: ''The 
 
 Third brigade, with the Fourth squadron of hussars and the 
 First battalion of artillery, will hold the highway and move 
 up to the cut in the Alt-Rognitz-Hohenbruck road, taking up 
 a covered position toward Neu-Rognitz." 
 
 Then he sent the following verbal order to the First cav- 
 alry brigade, by an aid : ''The enemy has fallen back on Neu- 
 Rognitz. Your brigade will advance to the west of the Trau- 
 tenau-Königinhof highway and observe his movements." 
 
 He also despatched the following written instructions to 
 the hussar regiment, by a mounted rifleman : "Your regiment 
 will watch the enemy to the east of the highway, and at the 
 same time examine the ground toward Eypel." 
 
 The orders given the Fourth brigade were gradually 
 carried out, the two leading battalions moving back, under a 
 heavy artillery fire, and occupying the wooded hill (425) as 
 well as the adjoining buildings in Alt-Rognitz. During this 
 retirement the Second battalion of field artillery attempted 
 to draw the fire of the hostile guns upon itself, the First and 
 Second battalion of the Third infantry took position south- 
 west of Hill 500. covered by a patch of woods, and the First 
 and Second battalions of the Fourth infantry withdrew from 
 the hostile fire by taking up a position north of Hill 425. 
 (11:10.) 
 
 After the infantry had occupied their new positions, the 
 artillery on both sides continued firing, while the division com- 
 mander and his staff returned to Hill 500. 
 
 Meanwhile the general staff ofiiccr had inquired of the 
 nearest battalions whether any jM-isoners had been taken. At 
 
Studies in the Leading oe Troops. 85 
 
 length he found some hostile infantrymen who had hngered 
 behind on the retreat from the KribUtz woods. He reported 
 the result of their examination to the division commander as 
 follows : 
 
 "According to the statements of prisoners, we are con- 
 fronted by the First infantry brigade of the Tenth corps, 
 
 under command of Colonel N . The prisoners belong 
 
 to the same regiment as the dead already found, but they 
 assert positively that the other regiment of the brigade (a 
 regiment of uhlans) and artillery is also present. They could 
 not state how many batteries. Their brigade bivouacked since 
 day before yesterday in a village close to the highway, and 
 advanced to Trautenau early this morning, where they had 
 hardly arrived when the engagement commenced. The march 
 to Trautenau had occupied only about an hour and a half. 
 It seems that the brigade therefore came from Praussnitz- 
 Kaile. 
 
 "They cannot state where the other brigades of the corps 
 are located. As late as the 25th they marched with a large 
 part of the corps through Josephstadt, where the brigade was 
 soon afterwards detached. Since then they have seen nothing 
 of their commanding general.'' 
 
 On the whole, these statements confirmed the views 
 entertained. The fact last mentioned might lead to the as- 
 sumption than on the morning of that day the corps must have 
 been quite far away from this brigade. Had this not been the 
 case and had the brigade, as advance guard, been the usual 
 distance before the corps, the commanding general would most 
 likely have informed himself in person on the 27th regarding 
 conditions at his front. On the other hand, it was nevertheless 
 strange that the enemy, who could not have escaped noticing 
 the superiority of his opponent, should have again disposed 
 himself for action in the immediate vicinity. 
 
 Yet these were only assumptions. It was still possible 
 that the commanding general of the Tenth Austrian corps 
 was present with the brigade, though the prisoners had not 
 seen him. Various assertions were made, yet without any 
 decided information being obtained, as to whether stronger 
 forces of the enemy were in the neighborhood. At all events, 
 it appeared necessary to advise corps headquarters of what 
 
86 Studies ix the Leading of Troops. 
 
 had taken place, and an aid, accompanied by a mounted rifle- 
 man, was accordingly despatched with the following inessage : 
 
 2d Inf. Division. Hill 500, northwest of Alt-Rognitz, 
 
 ( .Message No. 2. ) 27, 6, '66, 11 : 15 a. m. 
 
 To the Headquarters, ist Army Corps: 
 
 In consequence of the advance of this division on the right 
 bank of the Aupa, the enemy abandoned the position of 
 Trautenau after a slight action, and has posted himself at 
 Neu-Rognitz. 
 
 So far he has shown the First brigade of the Tenth 
 corps, 3 batteries, and several squadrons, which have appar- 
 ently been at Praussnitz-Kaile since the 25th ; nothing has as 
 yet been learned of other forces. 
 
 I am assembling the division between Alt-Rognitz and 
 Hohenbruck, holding the road to Königinhof, and await fur- 
 ther orders. A , 
 
 Lieutenant-General. 
 
 Lieutenant-General A then directed his general 
 
 staff officer to go to the Third brigade and examine the coun- 
 try along the highway with regard to attack and defense, and 
 to ascertain from there all he could of the enemy. 
 
 From the chief surgeon, who had in the meantime come 
 lip, he received the following report: "The losses worth men- 
 tioning are only those of the Second battalion of the First in- 
 fantry, which occurred in the attack on the Kriblitz woods ; 
 for these, however, a dressing station established in Kriblitz 
 is all that is necessary. The small number of wounded in the 
 PV)urth brigade have' for the present been sent to Kriblitz, as 
 well as an ambulance company section. Twenty-one wagons 
 have so far been rc(|uisitioned in Parschnitz ; these are being 
 taken to Kriblitz with the field hospital." 
 
 To this the general replied: "I cannot yet tell whether 
 the engagement will assume greater dimensions. Have the 
 field hospital and the wagons take a covered position behind 
 the Kriblitz woods." 
 
 l-'urther communication was interrupted by a report 
 brought bv a non-commissioned officer oi hussars, from Major- 
 
 ( General H , as follows: ''His Excellency, the com- 
 
 niandinj?- wneral, has just arrived with the Third brigade." 
 
Stüdiks in THi-: Leading of Troops. 87 
 
 Whereupon the division commander rode down the west- 
 ern slope of the hill, and, taking the cut in the woods north 
 of the Alt-Rognitz-Hohenbruck road, accompanied by his staff, 
 proceeded at a gallop to join the commanding general. It 
 was now 1 1 130 a. m. At the same time the leading portions 
 of the Third brigade could be seen to occupy the thickets south 
 of the cut in the road. The division was therefore in position 
 to carry out any dispositions of the commanding general. 
 
 Time Consumed in Deploying. 
 
 It was 8:40 when the news of the enemy's advance 
 reached the division commander. Although the latter issued 
 his orders at once, the entire division was not deployed on 
 line with the advance guard until 9:50, an hour later, the 
 movement having naturally been delayed by the mountainous 
 terrane. These figures show how essential it is to reconnoiter 
 the ground in front for a great distance, even for an assem- 
 bled division. 
 
 The enemy did not seriously delay the advance, and at 
 1 1 130 the division was assembled on the Hohenbruck-Alt- 
 Rognitz line, and in possession of the ground needed for the 
 debouching of the army corps from the defile. 
 
 The detachment of Colonel D and the main body 
 
 of the Third brigade had to pass over a distance of about 3 
 miles, and the Fourth brigade nearly 2i/4 miles, after the de- 
 ployment of the division was effected. Only the four battalions 
 
 under Major-General B and the two leading battalions 
 
 of the Fourth brigade executed a part of this march in bat- 
 tle formation, the four others proceeding in columns of pla- 
 toons, but roundabout routes and counter-marches could not 
 have been avoided, even if events had been otherwise or had 
 the leader so, wished it. 
 
 When it comes to practice, we must discard the ideas of 
 the drill-ground concerning movements of deployed masses. 
 On the drill-ground a brigade can cover 2^2 miles in 40 min- 
 utes. But when the terrane loses the character of a parade, it is 
 entirely different, and the time needed increases with the diffi- 
 culty of the terrane and size of the force. In this case, the ad- 
 vance of some separate bodies took half as much time again. 
 
88 Studies in thk Leading oe Troops. 
 
 and others twice as much, as if the ground had been level. In 
 this case it did not appear to be necessary for the several parts 
 of the first line to maintain the same alignment. But had the 
 united division advanced at once, with brigades formed beside 
 each other, much more time would have to be allowed for cov- 
 ering the ground. And right here we may state that by form- 
 ing cokimns of platoons too early and soon afterwards extend- 
 ing them in company columns, the commander of the Fourth 
 infantry brigade rendered the advance of the two leading bat- 
 talions of his infantry regiments more difficult; in order to 
 facilitate the march and to have his forces more available for 
 later employment, it would have been better had he left them 
 remain in colum.n of march. 
 
 Imagine for an instant an advance of deployed masses on 
 such ground as this. Here a battalion in column of platoons 
 encounters a steep height or a patch of woods, and has to fall 
 back behind the other battalions; in another place a deep 
 ravine compels one part of the company column to make a 
 detour; here a plateau permits an unhindered advance, while 
 just alongside, in a valley broken up by ditches and pools, 
 progress can be made only with difficulty. To help pass these 
 obstacles, an art of troop-leading is required. Often a leader 
 must guide an entire column as it changes direction, due, for 
 instance, to difficulties in terrane or new dispositions on the 
 part of the enemy. Then come movements to keep the troops 
 out of the enemy's sight, and especially out of his artillery fire. 
 But if, actuated simply by a desire to get at the enemy, the 
 leader pays no attention to these matters, keeping in view only 
 the rapid advance of the subdivisions most favorably situated, 
 then battalions of difl:"erent regiments will soon come together 
 and become mixed up either in one place or another, while 
 elsewhere gaps will be created ; and instead of a well-ordered 
 brigade, ready for any employment, we will have a mass lack- 
 ing in order and consequently hard to lead. A good leader 
 must keep this in mind, even though a loss of time in the case 
 of deployed l:)rigades and divisions may result. In the ex- 
 tended maneuvering of large masses, Infantry Drill Regula- 
 tions prescribe that points of march direction shall be desig- 
 nated with ])rccision, and preclude indei-)endent flank move- 
 ments being taken anionc: the troops themselves; in cases of 
 
 1 
 
Studies in the Leading o^ Troops. 89 
 
 necessity, however, communication should be established be- 
 tween such parties. 
 
 Especial value should be placed on these matters if it is 
 a question of retreat with deployed masses. 
 
 RESOLUTIONS O^ THE DIVISION COMMANDER. 
 
 When the division had arrived at Parschnitz and Lieu- 
 tenant - General A learned that the bridge over the 
 
 Aupa at Trautenau was barricaded, he saw no necessity for 
 the immediate seizure of that town. But as soon as he was ap- 
 prised of the advance of a hostile force of all arms on the 
 Trautenau-Königinhof road, he immediately broke up his 
 troops and made dispositions to gain possession of this im- 
 portant point. 
 
 From this it would seem that the general was rather in- 
 consistent in his process of reasoning. If he attributed such 
 a high degree of importance to the occupation of Trautenau, 
 it would have been simpler to continue the march there at once 
 and seize ground for debouching, than to lose valuable time 
 and permit the enemy to bring up reinforcements. 
 
 As we know, for a moment the general hesitated, unde- 
 cided whether he should go beyond the corps order or simply 
 follow its letter, which stated that it was important first to 
 unite the corps at the exit from the mountain passes, on the 
 left bank of the Aupa. He decided to pursue the latter course, 
 and so he permitted the division to complete its deployment 
 for the rendezvous. 
 
 It is questionable whether he decided correctly. For the 
 time being his forces had no further independent task; the 
 part given him was now performed; he had arrived at the 
 rendezvous at Parschnitz. 
 
 But let us closely examine the corps order once more. It 
 says positively: "It is of paramount importance that the 
 corps be concentrated at the earliest possible moment in a posi- 
 tion on the left bank of the Aupa near Trautenau, both flanks 
 protected against the sudden approach of hostile forces." To 
 carry out this intention the division had done all that was in 
 its power ; it was in place. No reproach could fall on its com- 
 mander if he awaited, near Parschnitz, the arrival of the other 
 
90 Studif.s in the Leading oe Troops. 
 
 division and further orders from the commanding general. 
 
 However, the order referred to contained some very im- 
 portant intimations concerning the intentions of corps head- 
 quarters, in that it stated: "The corps will unite there^ and 
 halt two hours, except that the First infantry brigade (First 
 infantry division), designated as advance guard, will continue 
 the advance on Traut enau and occupy the city. The march 
 will be resumed in one column in the direction of Arnau." 
 But the First infantry brigade, which was to occupy Traut- 
 enau, was not on the spot, the column of the right wing, as 
 learned from a messenger, having suffered some delay by the 
 destruction of a bridge, so that the task assigned to one of its 
 parts could not be carried out. 
 
 Nevertheless, it was intended by the corps commander to 
 occupy Trautenau and also to continue the march beyond that 
 
 town, and Lieutenant-General A knew this to be the 
 
 case. If, therefore, he had occupied Trautenau when his 
 division arrived at Parschnitz and failed to find the First 
 division there, although he certainly would have gone contrary 
 to the wording of the orders, yet he would probably have been 
 in accord with the intentions of corps headquarters. 
 
 Thus in war different measures may be taken, without 
 our being able to say that this one is correct and that one is 
 false. And more frequently does it happen, as in this case, 
 that although there may be no objection to one decision, yet 
 the other would be the more advantageous. 
 
 If the corps order had stated that the column first issuing 
 from the mountains near Parschnitz must seize Trautenau, all 
 doubt would have been removed. But this was not done. The 
 troops to perform this task were rather distinctly designated, 
 all other dispositions of corps headquarters were based there- 
 on, and what was conclusive for the decision of Lieutenant- 
 General A was, that nothing had changed in the gen- 
 eral situation since the corps order was issued. 
 
 Tliat Trautenau had been occupied had been known for 
 several days, and that it had not since been much reinforced 
 could be inferred from the fact that the advancing colunm had 
 not been met with a single shot. 
 
 'At Par.schnitz. 
 
 
 I 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 91 
 Under these circumstances, Lieutenant-General A 
 
 could hardly have been reproached for not occupying the 
 town. But the situation assumed a different aspect when the 
 approach of strong hostile forces on Trautenau was confirmed, 
 and it became possible that the enemy would make a strong 
 position of the place, instead of merely an observation post. 
 
 It was certainly clear that even if the .opponent should 
 not advance beyond Trautenau, the division could not continue 
 its rendezvous near Parschnitz with its head only 1,300 yards 
 from the enemy. Two alternatives were then open to the 
 division commander, each of which appeared equally justifi- 
 able. He could either occupy a position astride the Aupa on 
 both sides of the defile southwest of Parschnitz, and thus cover 
 the debouching of the rest of the corps, or he could attack the 
 enemy in an effort to gain possession of Trautenau. The 
 former would be in accordance with the expressed will of 
 corps headquarters and could incur no censure, the latter 
 would be the bolder course and would still be within the pub- 
 lished intentions of the corps commander. We must again call 
 attention to the fact that the corps intended to march beyond 
 Trautenau in the direction of Arnau, and to do so must occupy 
 Trautenau. And the possession of that town could be bought 
 only the more dearly the longer the enemy was allowed to es- 
 tablish himself there. Furthermore, conditions under which 
 the commanding general had issued his original orders had 
 now changed. 
 
 Instead of finding only an observation post at Trautenau, 
 it was certain that its occupation would be opposed by a still 
 larger body of troops. Under such conditions a leader of 
 troops must consider whether a deviation from the orders 
 given him is in the interest of his superior's intentions, as 
 they are known to him. In this case such a deviation could in 
 no wise be regarded as unjustifiable. 
 
 We have . already discussed the conditions that led to 
 
 Lieutenant-General A 's decision as to which bank of 
 
 the Aupa he should initiate the attack on. Inasmuch as the 
 arrival of the First infantry division was expected, he could 
 direct the crossing of the Aupa near Parschnitz, and the ad- 
 vance on the right bank, with only 7 companies, 9 squadrons, 
 and 18 guns covering the main road. If, however, he had 
 
92 Studies in the: Leading of Troops. 
 
 to depend on his own forces to carry through the engagement, 
 lie would not have dared to take the mass of his troops so far 
 from the main road. On the right bank of the Aupa, how- 
 ever, the movement took an apparently unusual course, as the 
 two brigades of the division (as yet relying wholly upon itself) 
 gradually came up alongside of each other, and thereby in- 
 creased the front extension of the division to nearly 2 miles.^ 
 Such a dispersion is too great for an attack, and only peculiar 
 conditions can eliminate the danger that is inherent in it. 
 
 In our engagements of 1866, as well as in the campaign 
 of 1870-71, we certainly found divisions extended for greater 
 distances than in this case, yet it can not be asserted that 
 they were always the result of faulty generalship. In 1866 the 
 superiority of our infantry equipped with breech-loaders per- 
 mitted such a course. In 1870-71, during the period follow- 
 ing the overthrow of the Imperial Army, it was justifiable be- 
 cause the newly formed forces of the Republic were only in 
 loose formations, instituted under the pressure of the moment, 
 whose innate qualities made them decidely inferior to our 
 troops. Both of these instances, however, are unusual; in the 
 first period of the campaign of 1870 they were exceptions, and 
 must also be considered so in future wars. We should rather 
 turn to such conditions that always develop in the case of 
 equally good opponents with approximately similar armament 
 and chiefly depending for success on the destructive effect of 
 the magazine gun. 
 
 In a frontal attack we must therefore be prepared to suf- 
 fer tremendous losses. A few moments will decide the fight- 
 ing capacity of companies and battalions, and second and third 
 lines are needed as reserves, to fill up the rapidly occur- 
 ring gaps. 
 
 At distances of less than i.ioo yards, a well-led skirmish 
 line oup^ht to be able to disperse any column advancing with- 
 out cover or unprotected by its own skirmishers; at distances 
 less than t,6oo yards the loss should be considerable. 
 
 Unless well prepared and sufficiently supported by artil- 
 lery, a frontal attack on infantry in good position nowadays 
 
 iln brining troops Into aotJon. as a rule, it Is not admlesible 
 to deploy two ])riga(les -ilonpslde of each other In the case of an 
 Independent division; when, on the contrary, divisions are not de- 
 pendent upon themselves, it can frequently be done. 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
Studies in tkk Lkadixg of Troops. 93 
 
 has little prospect of success; even a considerable superiority 
 in no wise guarantees against failure. Nevertheless the ad- 
 vantage possessed by infantry in the assault is not to be under- 
 estimated, in that under good discipline it may concentrate its 
 fire on a certain point in the line of defense and exert the prin- 
 cipal pressure on places designated for the final assault. A 
 well-planned attack will not expose closed troops to hostile 
 fire until the latter has been subdued or at least lessened by 
 skirmish fire. On level ground the prospect of a successful 
 attack does not rest upon rapidity of action or assumed spe- 
 cial formations or upon definite rules, but it rests on the plen- 
 tiful use of numerous swarms of skirmishers, whose well- 
 conducted fire at mid-range strikes the vital points in the de- 
 fender's line and so subdues it. After that, closed bodies may 
 be ordered to the assault without hesitation, and then only a 
 rush, regardless of consequences, can lead to the goal. 
 
 Weil-trained infantry with magazine guns need not fear a 
 frontal attack even on level terrane. 
 
 Although a threatening of flanks should, wherever prac- 
 ticable, be combined with a frontal attack, we should never 
 lose sight of the fact that by a deep formation alone can we 
 prevent the threatened falling to pieces of an entire body of 
 troops in consequence of large losses. 
 
 The advantages of infantry fire are, however, greater on 
 the side of the defense, and the more skirmishers the defense 
 can deploy the greater will be the eflPect produced by their 
 inherent power. 
 
 Even if relatively small reserves will, as a rule, suffice for 
 such skirmish lines, we must never overlook the danger to 
 which the flanks ar© always exposed. The longer the line, the 
 greater is this danger. And where the terrane or adjoining 
 forces do not furnish protection, troops should be placed in 
 echelon behind the threatened flanks. 
 
 It can be proved that in the campaign of 1866, when the 
 long lines of our infantry were forced to fall back, their with- 
 drawal was always the efifect of a flank attack, or even of a 
 threatened flank attack when reserves were no longer avail- 
 able. In this way the advance guard of the Fifth army corps 
 had to fall back at Nachod, its right in the woods of the Wen- 
 zels hill being turned only by i battalion, while frontal attacks 
 
94 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 of very superior forces were shattered by the effect of its 
 fire. In consequence of this, the center of their long Une was 
 also involved in retreat, and only when the center and right 
 wing were reinforced by fresh forces and were reunited in 
 a narrow space with their flanks secured, did they succeed 
 in repulsing the attack of the superior opponent on the edge 
 of the plateau.. 
 
 Near Trautenau, however, the 8 battalions of the Second 
 infantry division were not so fortunate, in a joint action 
 against single bodies of the advance guard between Alt- 
 Rognitz and Hohenbruck. Extending in a line nearly 2 miles 
 in length, the mere threatening of the left wing, which was 
 not supported, gave an impulse to retreat, which was grad- 
 ually yielded to by other parts, and finally by the right wing. 
 Although in this case the ensuing frontal attacks were re- 
 pulsed with great steadiness, yet the continued retreat brought 
 these masses in no way together, but all the further apart, and 
 the unprotected wings found no support. 
 
 We can hardly count on the flank attack of a hostile bri- 
 gade being any longer brilliantly repulsed by a few companies, 
 as was done by the left wing of Tiimpling's division at Git- 
 schin. Just as little can we count on being opposed again by 
 the shock tactics so popular with the Austrians in 1866, by 
 which single battalions can force the withdrawal of vastly 
 superior forces. 
 
 Consequently we must depend all the more on maneuver- 
 ing. But in many instances such a course is impracticable. 
 Circumstances may arise with a corps or an army that in de- 
 cisive moments make a frontal attack imperative. In such 
 cases the first line must be followed by relatively strong re- 
 serves, to make up the huge losses, and this in itself will re- 
 sult in less front extension and greater depth. 
 
 The defense, on the contrary, needs fewer reserves, and 
 may thercfon^ occupy a m^rc extended front. It should be 
 well understood that defense begins only when the enemy's at- 
 tack assumes a definite direction, and that with greatly extend- 
 ed lines it is impossible to maneuver (that is, to change front 
 or shift troops about). What formations arc best suited to 
 satisfy the requirements of both the attack and the defense 
 will be considered in detail later on. 
 
Studies in the Leading ©f Troops. 95 
 
 As regards the case in hand, it need only be stated that, 
 jor a division taking the offensive, whose artillery prepares the 
 attack, an extension of about a mile is the maximum, if we would 
 provide the attack ivith sufficient power through competent reserves. 
 It is not only almost impracticable to lead an entire force 
 when extended beyond that limit, but it will be impossible to 
 gain sufficient concentration in order to develop the necessary 
 energy at decisive points. 
 
 A dcploxment beyond these bounds does not appear suited 
 to carry through an action the extent of which canm,t he seen and 
 which as yet only permits maneuvering. 
 
 The first condition, in order to maneuver, is that the mass 
 of troops be divided into organized and connected subdivis- 
 ions. Subordinate commanders are then independently given 
 their separate tasks, while the commander-in-chief sees that 
 the parts co-operate for the common end in view. 
 
 Let us now turn to the situation before us. The advance 
 against the position southwest of Trautenau partially occupied 
 by the enemy bore the nature of a maneuver. But whether a 
 maneuver shall be resorted to, always depends on circum- 
 stances. In peace exercises, it should be remembered, we are 
 generally misled into maneuvering, by reason of the fact that 
 tliere the most effectual means of leading (moral effect) finds 
 no occasion for employment ; in practice, however, the thing 
 that is always sought in the first line is the decision of arms. 
 
 It was noticed that the enemy was in the act of approach- 
 ing from the direction of Königinhof; it was therefore prob- 
 able that the road to that town would also be his line of re- 
 treat. After the division commander had decided not to give 
 liis opponent time to firmly establish himself at Trautenau, he 
 had the choice of two moves : first, to advance with his main 
 body against the line formed by the Kriblitz ravine ; second, 
 to cover himself against this line, and, reaching out further 
 with the rest of his troops, menace the line of retreat. In the 
 first case he rnust proceed to a direct attack on the difficult 
 position behind the Kriblitz line. But the terrane limited this 
 attack to the space between the Aupa and the heights east of 
 Kriblitz (554), nearly a mile in length, and the division was 
 sufficiently strong to carry through the attack with vigor, and 
 
96 Stldiks in thk Leading of Troops 
 
 in case of a repulse tliere would be nothing to fear consider- 
 ing its own retreat. 
 
 Tn the second case, on the contrary, the extension must 
 be very great. Sufficient force w^as not available to make an 
 energetic" frontal attack and to employ any surplus in flank 
 n.iovements. If the division extended too far and attempted 
 I'., act widi its left wing against the line of retreat, it woul I 
 lun the risk of being dispersed by an attack against its own 
 center, or losing connection with the other division if the 
 .'ittack should be directed against its right wing. Uut if this 
 movement did succeed, it would certainly be the quickest way 
 of accomplishing the end in view — the capture of Trauterau. 
 
 In spite of these considerations, the division commander 
 nevertheless chose to maneuver, and he can be justified in his 
 choice only in so far as he considered the hostile force infe- 
 rior. If he had not been so convinced, prudence would have 
 demanded the frontal attack on the Kriblitz line. 
 
 The danger incident to this maneuvering might certainly 
 have been lessened if, instead of putting the 4 battalions of 
 the Third brigade in the center, he had employed there the 
 Fourth brigade, 6 battalions strong. But in this connection 
 the fact must not he overlooked, that with lari:;er bodies the 
 direction of attack is determined for the most part by the 
 direction of approach. 
 
 Had TJeutenant-General A awaited the coming up 
 
 of the Fourth brigade to utilize it in the center, precious time 
 would have been lost ; had he tried to avoid this, an.d started 
 out at once south of the ridge with the Third brigade, wliich 
 was on the spot, as advanced left wing, then the enemy would 
 be likely to evacuate Trautenau sooner, and the chances of 
 damaging him during retreat would be less. 
 
 r>ut by allowing the Third brigade to set out at first to- 
 ward the Kri])litz ravine, he could hope by this less danger- 
 ous disposition to retain the enemy in his position, and then 
 the interposition of the left wing would have a more decisive 
 effect. These dispositions gave him this further advantage, 
 that if the Fourth brigade followed in the left rear as t1ank 
 echelon, its 6 battalions were for the time being available as 
 a reserve. Should new columns of the eneniv be observed, or 
 >honld the enemy be found stronger than at first supposed, the 
 
 I 
 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 97 
 
 movement need not be pursued further and the division could 
 concentrate much easier on its threatened center than if from 
 the start the left wing had been far advanced and come in con- 
 tact with the enemy. 
 
 When the enemy withdrew in consequence of the flank 
 movement, the general did not hesitate a moment about ad- 
 vancing the Fourth brigade, which had been considered as re- 
 serve. At least the attempt to damage the opponent must be 
 made during his flank march. Under these conditions, how- 
 ever, the entire division would have got out of hand if the 
 Third brigade had not promptly received the order to assem- 
 ble and remain on the heights south of Trautenau after ob- 
 taining possession of them. Thus, at any rate, a new reserve 
 would soon be created. 
 
 As the enemy withdrew from the flanking movement in 
 time, the attempt of the Fourth brigade only resulted in bring- 
 ing him to a stand before Neu-Rognitz. Lieutenant-General 
 
 A did not continue the action, because he considered he 
 
 had carried out the intentions of the commanding general, as 
 far as they were known to him, and he did not know whether 
 the bringing on of a more extensive engagement, which would 
 have taken the corps out of the direction assigned it, was in 
 accord with the intentions of the commanding general, who 
 was expected to arrive at any moment. 
 
 He therefore preferred, first of all, to put his force in 
 such shape that it would be ready for any employment. The 
 several parts of the division were brought closer together, so 
 that it occupied a front of a little over a mile. 
 
 This is one of the most essential points for a leader's con- 
 sideration. We know from experience in action, that when 
 an important object has been attained, there is either a reck- 
 less, impetuous rush ahead, or a sort of relaxation in which 
 every one remains on the spot where he happens to be, and, 
 excited over what has just happened, forgets to think of what 
 remains to be done. 
 
 It generally happens to be the first-mentioned impulse that 
 a leader has to curb, as was the case with the two leading 
 battalions of the Fourth brigade ; yet, on the other hand, no 
 leader should let himself become infected with the spirit of 
 relaxation — lie must give the impulse for rapid assembling, 
 
98 Studiks in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 he cannot foresee what tasks may lie before him, and at all 
 events his troops must be so disposed that they zvill be ready 
 for any contingency. 
 
 The Division Commanders Management oe the 
 Engagement. 
 
 As shown above, for nearly three hours the division com- 
 nmnder had comparatively few dispositions to make, but these 
 were of great importance. He had scrupulously refrained 
 from interfering with any details ; his orders invariably went 
 to the brigades, the commander of the detachment on the Lieb- 
 au highway, the commander of the division cavalry regiment, 
 and the commander of the artillery regiment, and concerned 
 only what afifected these leaders and the entire force under 
 them. Their execution was left absolutely to the commanders 
 concerned, and only in one case was an intended movement 
 checked, and an already initiated movement in another case. 
 
 This was when Major-General B desired to occupy the 
 
 south edge of the long straggling woods so as to protect the 
 division (Lieutenant-Getieral A having meanwhile re- 
 solved to assume the offensive) and, later, when the Fourth 
 brigade advanced beyond Alt-Kognitz, and the division com- 
 mander, on arriving there, found that the situation no longer 
 demanded a continuation of the action. 
 
 By such a course alone is it possible to maintain super- 
 vision over the whole and at the same time allow the indi- 
 vidual commanders that independence which is so necessary to 
 correct leading. In war, however, such conduct meets zvith 
 great ditficuities. 
 
 First of all, we must remember that interest is involun- 
 tarily attracted l)y events close at hand ; what takes place right 
 under our eyes is of greatest moment. Furthermore, the 
 commander-in-chief is anxious to assist such of his troops as 
 are in action and in danger, by his own advice and his own 
 deed ; he would like to see even the smallest divisions of his 
 troops act just as though he himself were leading them. This 
 temptation is often very strong, and few there are who can 
 resist it. One should ne7>er Jet himself yield to if. 
 
 Rut although the division comtnander gave relatively few 
 orders for over two hours, yet the orders he did give intimately 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 99 
 
 concerned the situation of the whole army corps, and were 
 not confined alone to what was actually in sight. In order to 
 survey a general situation, we must throw aside all useless 
 details. The higher the leader, the more important for the 
 whole is every decision he is obliged to make. Movements 
 and evolutions of large masses of troops require considerable 
 time, and when once started, it is with great difficulty that 
 their direction is turned — in fact, it is impossible when contact 
 with the enemy has been established. 
 
 So weighty are these decisions and consequent disposi- 
 tions of the leader, that are conceived in time of action, that 
 they claim all his mental faculties ; from him alone can they 
 emanate, and in them his duty lies. But if he allows him- 
 self to dwell upon details, he dissipates his energies and can- 
 not focus them on his work. 
 
 Moreover, as a rule, such interference is seldom bene- 
 ficial, for the plans of subordinate commanders are thereby 
 crossed. Every commander has the right to solve his prob- 
 lems according to his own ideas, so long as he does not com- 
 mit a manifest error, and he may proceed to do so in various 
 ways. Every one chooses that which comports most nearly 
 with his character and training. He -has been placed in the 
 position he holds, in the confidence that he will fulfill the 
 duties pertaining to it; if he does not, then he should be re- 
 moved. But if is the duty of the leader to give the necessary 
 orders to his subordinates in an unmistakable manner and to 
 watch their execution, and interference should be made only 
 when it is clear that any dispositions are endangering the end 
 in view. 
 
 For example, a regimental commander is commissioned 
 to lead his regiment, and not a battalion or company. If he 
 should suddenly appear at the head of that company which 
 has first touched the enemy, he may forsooth perform bril- 
 liant deeds, but we can rest assured that he will soon be 
 ignorant of what has become of the other parts of his regi- 
 ment, which, as such, have slipped completely out of his hand. 
 And to a division commander it is of less concern what may 
 have become of a company, than that a regiment be conducted, 
 as a manageable whole, in accordance with his intentions. 
 
loo Studies in thk Leading of Troops. 
 
 In decisive nionicnts, on the other hand, it is different. 
 Here the time conies to incite the troops to their utmost efforts. 
 So when the iinal dispositions for the guidance of the whofe 
 have been made, the commander is free to hurry to his most 
 advanced hnes, where danger must be met, and, as a shining 
 example, carry all along with him. Such supreme moments 
 chance most frequently with the leader in front of his platoon, 
 or the chief of a company. The higher we ascend, the less 
 frequent they become, and only very exceptional situations 
 should prompt a commanding general to such action. In real 
 work the tasks of each leader are not similar. With the com- 
 mander of a large force they are chiefly these : he makes his 
 plans iviih due regard to general conditions ; he issues orders 
 to his subordinates in accordance therewith; he then follozcs 
 the execution of these orders, interfering only when his plans 
 have been violated or not attained. 
 
 This sounds very simple ; but in practice, as has been re- 
 marked, it is quite difficult. On account of the diversity of 
 situations that we meet in actual war, theory can give us only 
 general suggestions, but no rules ; and the training in peace' 
 exercises is efficient only when the utmost attention is paid 
 to theory, although the necessity for this may be not at all 
 apparent at the time, since, from the very nature of man and 
 events, a commander is more concerned about the deportment 
 of his troops during a peace maneuver than about his own 
 training for action. Many here are more influenced by what 
 the critique is likely to bring forth than by what the enemy 
 might do, and many a false movement is righted only by the 
 leader ])lacing himself in the skirmish fire. Those charged 
 with the conduct of maneuvers can hardly give too much at- 
 tention in this direction. It would certainly be a benefit if 
 commanders oi rej^nments and brigades would start leading 
 their troops from farther to the rear during peace exercises, 
 as must be done in war when an enemy is in front. By so 
 doing .self-restraint would be decidedly promoted among those 
 commanders who must often be called upon to act on their 
 own responsibility in the field. Infantry Drill Regulations 
 for peace exercises dwell with emphasis on the choice of posi- 
 tion, and in the case of subordinate commanders even pre- 
 scri])c how one should stand when giving orders. In peace. 
 
S'lL'DiKs IN THE Leading of Troops. ioi 
 
 niounted officers are occasionally required to dismount, at mid 
 and short distances, so they may learn to* appreciate the diffi- 
 culties of command and how to overcome them, and also to 
 familiarize their men with seeing them afoot when under 
 heavy fire. 
 
 The Division Commander's Choice of Position. 
 
 The choice of spot from which to direct troops is of espe- 
 cial value to every commander. Here too in war the govern- 
 ing conditions differ for the various degrees of leadership. 
 The division commander directing an engagement is guided 
 by other considerations than his subordinate brigade co n- 
 mander, who leads his regiments to the attack. 
 
 By wisely choosing his position a leader is enabled effect- 
 ively to resist the injurious temptation to meddle with details. 
 For this reason it is desirable that the commander should not 
 be too near the first line, but yet at a point where he can over- 
 look it, as well as the enemy ; but in doing this he should never 
 lose control of his reserves. 
 
 Accordingly, when Lieutenant-General A had made 
 
 the necessary dispositions at Parschnitz, he went forward up 
 to his most advanced lines, in order to obtain personally an 
 idea of the terrane and such movements of the enemy as could 
 be seen. At the same time he came up with troops that had 
 already been observing the opponent, and he received from 
 their commanders explanations relative to points upon which 
 reports hitherto had left him in doubt. We m'lst insist 
 that no matter how good any report may be, it cannot orient a 
 commander as well as his own personal observation, and the 
 maneuvering of large masses of troops will afford all the time 
 needed for that purpose. 
 
 To eft'ect this reconnaissance the division commander was 
 not obliged to ride around very much. By going to the cen- 
 tral peak on the wooded ridge (Hill 504), which was, more- 
 over, the easiest to reach and near vxdiich Major-General 
 
 ß was stationed, he hit upon the most favorable point 
 
 for his survey. L^pon the opinions he formed ihere he direct- 
 ed the next movements. These led the troops forward into 
 the country divided by the Kriblitz ridge. He accompanied 
 
I02 Studiks in Tnic Lkadinc, of Troops. 
 
 this advance, for by so doing he could best observe the sepa- 
 rated ])arts of the division until he oould reach Hill 531, a 
 point that for the time being afforded him a quite sufficient 
 outlook. 
 
 From the latter hill he could see into the valley of the 
 Aupa and witness the movements of both the Third and 
 Fourth brigades. So he zvas able to supervise the carrying 
 out of the movements ordered, to watch the enemy as far as 
 the terrane icould perinit, arid was posted where his ozi'n 
 troops could easily Und him. 
 
 The headquarters flag should be placed where it cannot 
 be seen by the enemy. 
 
 In observing the opponent the following were the only 
 points that were of importance : Is he advancing with an in- 
 creased force? Is he trying to hold his position? or, Is he 
 withdrawing? The details of his movements, it is true, were 
 of some importance, but, as a rule, only for the foremost line. 
 There was no necessity to ascertain whether new^ columns of 
 the enemy were approaching; such information is rarely ob- 
 tainable at early stages of the action, although, considering the 
 location of the hostile line of retreat in this case, it might 
 have been obtained had the attention of the division cavalry 
 been directed to it. 
 
 The great distance from which an engagement begins 
 makes it difficult to find a position which is both near enough 
 to observe the enemy continuously, and at the same time will 
 allow us to keep the reserves in view. Nevertheless these are 
 two conditions that the leader should never disregard ; the 
 care for the one urges him forward, while the other holds 
 liiiii back toward the rear. 
 
 ilowever, it is impossible to properly coiidiict an action 
 }!iiless the leader is fully ii} formed with reference to the 
 chief incidents in the visible movements of the enemy. Such 
 a question naturally arises more frequently with the leader 
 of a (Hxi^ion than with the leader of an army. The greater 
 liie mass to be moved, the more titne is there for reflectic^n. 
 Such reports as arc received come only from different 
 parts of the battle-field, where the advance of a few hos- 
 tile battalions is taken for a general attack by the oppon- 
 ent ; and, as a rule, reports as to what has been observed of 
 
I 
 
 Studies in thk Leading of Troops. 103 
 
 the enemy by those engaged in front are received only dur- 
 ing the initiation of a combat — if any come later, they are 
 requests for a support. Consequently the division commander 
 should personaliv oversee the most advanced line. And there- 
 fore, when Lieutenant-General A could no longer ob- 
 serve the action from Hill 531, he immediately went to Alt- 
 Rognitz, and even into the first line of his troops, in order to 
 obtain reliable information concerning the terrane and the 
 whereabouts of the enemy. 
 
 When a leader pays as close attention as this to the move- 
 ments of the enemy, it follows as a matter of course that he 
 need not pay especial attention to his oivn ßghting line. 
 
 The continued observation of the reserves, however, is 
 not so easy. We might assume that discipline would keep 
 the latter fully subject to the will of the commander-in-chief. 
 Yet there is a more dangerous enemy than the absence of dis- 
 cipline, which any efficient commander is able to forestall — 
 and that is misunderstanding and accident. For the trans- 
 mission of an order three persons are responsible : first, the 
 commander who issues the order — he may not express himself 
 distinctly, may omit something that to him appears self- 
 evident, or may give a wrong name ; second, the bearer, who 
 may not hear correctly or may misunderstand the order, or, 
 anxious to ride away, may impress it upon his mind for the 
 moment, but after he has galloped along for a few minutes 
 the words may assume a different shape as he endeavors to 
 recall them, or, even if he has retained their import, he may ex- 
 press them in a manner peculiar to himself, and so change the 
 sense of the whole ; and finally, the person to whom the order 
 is addressed, who may misunderstand or^ not fully compre- 
 hend it. Besides this, the transmission itself requires time, 
 and conditions may in the meanwhile have changed. Field 
 Service Regulations prescribe that whenever a verbal message 
 is given, the bearer of the same should repeat it. 
 
 At the battle of Ligny, for example, when the reserves 
 of the First and Second Prussian army corps were exhausted, 
 the Third corps was directed to send 2 infantry brigades 
 through Sombreff and support the center. l"he corps sent 
 only I brigade (the Twelfth), and with orders to take post 
 on the other side of Sombreff'; while the brigade claims to 
 
104 Studies ix the Leading of Troops. 
 
 nave received orders to advance via Sombreff and take post 
 at that village in order to maintain communication zvith the 
 Second corps. (4 p. m. ) If the 2 brigades of the Third 
 corps had reached the designated position, the French would 
 probably have been unable to break through the lines ; and as 
 it was, however, all that was available to oppose the assault 
 vvas cavalry. 
 
 Another example from the same period is no less inter- 
 esting. On the i8th of June, 1815, Lieutenant-General von 
 Thielemann found himself unable to initiate the march ordered, 
 from Wavre upon Couture, on account of obstructed roads ; 
 he accordingly resolved to deploy his corps on the heights 
 behind Wavre. To this end the Ninth brigade, which was still 
 south of the creek, was directed, after crossing it, to occupy 
 Wavre with 2 battalions, forming a reserve on the highway 
 with the remainder. When later this reserve was needed, it 
 was not on hand. The report of the Third army corps refer> 
 tc this as follows : 
 
 "After General von Borck' had passed through the city, he 
 was misled by a number of minor accidents to march with the 
 rest of his brigade upon Couture, under the impression that the 
 corps had in the meantime gone there and that he must join 
 its rear in accordance with a former order. Tn this way the 
 corps was deprived of 6 ])attalion5, i battery, and 2 squadrons, 
 in a manner for which no one could account ; the line of retreat 
 led directly through the center of the position, and an officer 
 sent from it was expressly told that the general might march 
 a short way down the road and post himself in reserve. It 
 was not discovered until late that a mistake must have oc- 
 curred in posting the brigade ; but it was never imagined that 
 it had gone to Couture, and so no one was sent there to bring 
 it back." 
 
 On the (jther hand, tiie rei)ort of the brigade explains this 
 "luunber of minor accidents" as follows: 
 
 "Toward noon information was received that the enemy ^ 
 was forcing back the Second army corps upon Wavre, and | 
 that it would retreat throui^h the defile, covered bv the Ninth 
 
 'ConiiiKinding the Ninth brigade. 
 
Studii:s in thj- Leading of Troops. 105 
 
 brigade, which was in front of it. The battaUons were posted 
 accordingly. 
 
 "When the rear guard of the Second corps was nearly 
 , abreast of the Ninth brigade, the written order was received' 
 i directing that it march to Couture via St. Lambert, and that 
 j it leave 2 battalions and i squadron of the Ninth brigade to 
 i occupy Wavre and defend the crossing of the Dyle. 
 j "The rest of the troops had hardly been directed to take 
 
 ! their departure, and they were just in motion, when a new 
 I order was received, which directed the covering of the left 
 I flank of the rear guard of the Second corps until its retirement 
 j was completed. 
 
 ; "The necessary dispositions were made. The 6 battal- 
 
 ions retreated on the left side of the city simultaneously with 
 the retreat of the Second corps, so that the corps would not 
 obstruct the defile. 
 
 "After the troops of the Ninth brigade had reached the 
 Brussels road on the bend around the city, and had taken post 
 there, the order to continue the march on the Brussels road 
 arrived ; the order previously received to go to Couture was 
 accordingly carrierl out, and the brigade arrived at that town 
 late in the evening." 
 
 In both cases we notice a complete disappearance of the 
 reserves, the commander not having had them immediately 
 under his eye, or at least not having been able to control them. 
 This is a point that a leader should always keep in view when 
 choosing his position. 
 
 In the case before us Lieutenant-General A changed 
 
 his position but once in an hour and a half after the fight 
 began. 
 
 In spite of our best efforts, a position cannot always be 
 found from which the entire fighting line can be observed. In 
 such case the commander should be where he can at least over- 
 look the most important part of the field of action, despatch- 
 ing to other parts reliable officers who can see for him and 
 keep him oriented. It is also desirable, when circumstances 
 will permit, that a position be selected from which communi- 
 cation with the next higher authority may be easily established. 
 
 ^Probably from headquarters of the Third army corps. 
 
io6 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 The Division Commander's IMode oe Issuing Orders and 
 Seking to Their Execution. 
 
 W'c liave already discussed the issuing of an order. See- 
 ing to its execution, however, is quite another thing. 
 
 Alost important of all in an order is lucidity ; the clearer 
 it is, the more remote is the possibility of a misunderstanding. 
 Ever remember that it is no easy matter to issue an order ; it 
 is an art that must be acquired and practiced. 
 
 The next thing is to obviate misapprehension and acci-^ 
 dent, to the best of our ability. In this the written order has 
 the advantage, but in battle its use is only practicable with 
 large masses, as in the direction of an army corps from gen- 
 eral headquarters — in short, only between superior command- 
 ers. But as the distance between commander and subordi- 
 nate is shortened, the more will the former become personally 
 involved in the action, and the more quickly must his com- 
 mands reach their destination ; and in general this can only 
 be done by a verbal order. 
 
 It is a good practice to inclose all written orders in en- 
 velopes. Carried in the hand or in the breast-pocket, pencil 
 writing is apt to become illegible. The message card is gen- 
 erally used by headquarters in the field in preparing written 
 orders. Where official paper or message cards are not at 
 hand, a field postal card, a leaf from a memorandum-book, 
 etc., will serve the purpose. 
 
 If orders are of special importance, and the troops for 
 whom thev are intended are at so great a distance that the 
 superior commander cannot supervise their execution by per- 
 sonal observation, it is well to send a second horseman with 
 the bearer. Further, if the country which the dispatch-carrier ' 
 must traverse is made insecure by hostile patrols, a second or 
 third copy should be- sent, if practicable, on different routes. 
 In the case of greater distances and at night, officers, accom- 
 panied by infantrymen in wagons, may be advantagcc^usly 
 employed. 
 
 In case of verbal transmission by officers, mounted mes- 
 sengers, orderlies, and mounted men <m- cycHsts, the carriers 
 should always repeat the message in a loud voice before 
 ridiiiL'- off. 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 107 
 
 The surveillance of the execution of an order is not diffi- 
 cult so long as troops are under the commander's eye. The 
 situation changes when this is not the case. We can never 
 be sure that a body of troops in action will send timely and 
 sufficient reports, no matter how positively this may have been 
 enjoined; the progress of the fight usually absorbs their entire 
 attention; the superior commander is seldom thought of, so 
 long as he is not on the spot. ' Experience having demonstrat- 
 ed this to be the rule, we must do our utmost to obviate the 
 evil consequences which may arise from it. 
 
 Officers should be sent to ascertain if directed move- 
 ments have been commenced; if distances are great, they 
 should be permanently attached to the different detachments 
 for that purpose, and furnished a few mounted orderlies. 
 
 For example, on July 3, 1866, strong reconnaissances by 
 the Second Army toward the Aupa had been ordered by the 
 Prussians, before reports of the presence of large hostile forces 
 on the Bistritz were received. ()n the preceding day a general 
 staff officer had accordingly been dispatched from Miletin to 
 Königinhof by the general headquarters to accompany the 
 reconnaissance. 
 
 When, on the morning of the 3d, orders were received 
 at the headquarters of the Second x\rmy to join at once with 
 all available forces the expected engagement of the First Army 
 on the right bank of the Elbe, the following officers were de- 
 spatched from the commander of the Second Army's staff: 
 one to each of the four corps of the Second Army ; upon leav- 
 ing Königinhof a general staff* officer to the headquarters of 
 the commander-in-chief, to report that the Second Army was 
 in motion pursuant to orders; also a general staff officer to 
 the nearest division of the First Army (Fransecky's), as the 
 right of the Second Army must seek to establish connec- 
 tion there. 
 
 Upon arriving at the heights of Choteboreck, whence the 
 approach of the Guard corps and the Fifth corps could be seen, 
 an officer was sent to the First, and another to the Sixth corps, 
 to satisfy themselves that these corps were actually in motion, 
 and to ascertain where their heads were located. 
 
 Just after they had ridden away, the Sixth corps was 
 seen opening the action to the left front. 
 
io8 S'rroiKs ix the Leading of Troops. 
 
 
 During- the campaign of 1870-71 also, the comniander-in- 
 cliief, as well as the commanders ()f the several corps, greatly 
 appreciated the value of obtaining- in this manner timely and 
 full information regarding events at places where they them- 
 selves could not be present. 
 
 Thus, on August 16, three general stafif officers happened 
 to be at Vionville and Mars-la-Tour, who, in view of the jios- 
 sibility of an encounter, had been sent on the afternoon of 
 the 15th from Herny to the advancing Third corps. In the 
 battle^ of Gravelotte and St. Privat two were attached ])y the 
 same headcjuarters to the Second Army ; at Beaumont some 
 to the Third, as well as to the Meuse Army; and again at 
 Sedan to the Aleuse Army by the commander-in-chief, and 
 also to the Fifth army corps,' which was turning the other 
 wing. Even two officers from the far-distant headquarters 
 of the Third Army appeared on the battle-field at Gravelotte 
 during the afternoon, and returned thither at night, after the 
 battle was ended. 
 
 All these general staff officers continually sent reports 
 during the progress of the action, and only returned when 
 the battle was over and they had informed themselves fully 
 regarding the positions of the various subdivisions and the 
 intentions of their commanders for the following day. 
 
 The detachments made for the transmission of orders and 
 information relative to the course of the battle were entirely 
 independent from these general staff officers. 
 
 Messa(;es. •* 
 
 What has been said concerning the means of convoying 
 orders applies equally to that of messages. 
 
 Field Service Regulations prescribe that all messages sent 
 by any headquarters or by any officer shall each day be num- 
 bered in a separate series for each person who shall receive 
 them. When this is done, a recipient is able to determine 
 whether all messages have reached him, or some have gone 
 astray. 
 
 This was not done in the messages sent by the recnnnoi- 
 tering detachment on June 26, but that no mischief resulted 
 is no reason for disregarding such measures of precaution. 
 
 As a general thing, advance forces cannot report too 
 much, while at the same time thcv should not fail to use dis- 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 109 
 
 crinnnation in doing so. In the face of the enemy the service 
 of spies, as a rule, proves ineffective ; it is therefore the duty 
 of the troops to furnish higher headquarters with such knowl- 
 edge concerning the enemy as is indispensable, and if neces- 
 sary concerning their own movements, and to do this in the 
 most exhaustive manner. 
 
 We must therefore consider it an error when the divis- 
 ion failed to advise corps headquarters of the arrival of the 
 Guard at Braunau on June 26, as reported by its recdtonoirer- 
 ing detachment. 
 
 As regards Lieutenant-General A the question that 
 
 immediately concerned him was, "What messag:e shall I send 
 to my commanding general, who is not also on the spot?" 
 We have seen that he sent two communications — the first rela- 
 tive to the approach of the enemy and his decision to resist him 
 on the right bank of the xA-upa, and the second conveying in- 
 formation that Trautenau had been seized. 
 
 Although these messages, as they were gotten up, con- 
 tained suthcient information relative to the situation, the 
 division, nevertheless, did too little in this direction. 
 
 Just consider for a moment the position of the command- 
 ing general. How anxiously must he have awaited further ad- 
 vice after receipt of word that half of his corps was facing 
 the enemy ! As soon as he should arrive on the First divis- 
 ion's battle-ground, the conducting of the action would d^vo've 
 upon himself ; he could therefore not be advised too soon re- 
 garding the engagement. Moreover, if the Second division 
 should be thrown back into the mountain passes before the 
 First was enabled to leave them, he would be obliged at an 
 early moment to take different measures than if it had gained 
 ground. In the latter case, cavalry and artillery reinforce- 
 ments could be quickly brought up and sent out in advance 
 of the column, which was still on the march; the first case, 
 however, would forbid this. 
 
 In any event, it would have been a wise move on the part 
 of the commanding general if he himself had hastened to the 
 front or sent forward a general staff officer as soon as he 
 heard the thunder of the cannon. 
 
 In any ordinary situation, such as this was, it is deemed 
 o-bsolutely necessary to furnish the superior commander not 
 
iio Studies in the Lkadixc. of Troops. 
 
 on the spot zcith reports of the state of aftairs at regular inter- 
 vals, per Imps every half -hour. Well-inounted aids may most 
 advantageously be used for this purpose ; but their number 
 hardly suffices for ihe demand. The division cavalry is weak- 
 ened too much by the detachment of officers, and on such oc- 
 casions it is advisable to establish relay lines, v^hich are mobile * 
 and can follow the changes in position of the commander. | 
 The First cavalry brigade could have furnished a platoon for 
 this purpose on June 27. Wheelmen, too, could have been 
 profitably used on the macadamized highway. | 
 
 The signal corps is unable to help out in such contingen- I 
 cies, as it requires from 20 to 30 minutes to lay a mile of tele- 
 graph. Flag signals, as used by the Navy, are never visible 
 for more than a mile; and besides, they require cavalrymen 
 trained in signaling, who are not available in most cases. 
 
 The General Staee Oeeicer. 
 
 The one first to come to the assistance of the division 
 commander, and the one who should always be at his side, is 
 the general staff officer. He should relieve his general of all 
 details in issuing orders. His special concern in battle is to 
 aid his commander in acquiring a thorough knowledge of the 
 situation, so that he may make judicious dispositions. This 
 he cannot do unless he absents himself at times from his com- 
 mander, who cannot be everywhere and who should change 
 liis station as little as possible ; yet he should never be a\\*ay 
 more frequently, or remain away longer, than seems to be 
 urgently necessary, and such absence should never be option- 
 al. The place of the general staff officer is at the side of his 
 general, zvhom he should never leave except by his order or 
 7\'iih his pennissi/^u. 1 
 
 Occasions for his absence arise often enough. Even when 
 the fighting line is not unusually extended, the commander, 
 from his station in the rear, can, as a rule, observe only the 
 general trend of events. He sees where the action comes to a 
 f-tandstill, and where it advances or retires, yet often he is at 
 a loss to know whv in one place progress is made and in an- 
 other the troops give way. If he tried to go everywhere, he • 
 would soon lose control of the whole. 
 
 L 
 
Studies in the: Leading of Troops. i 1 1 
 
 Although the terrane may hide the movements of part of 
 his own or the enemy's forces, or reports that he receives may 
 not be expHcit enough to enable him to form a clear idea, yet 
 it will not be wise for him to leave his position, because he 
 must keep the bulk of his troops under his eye. 
 
 Moreover, when a division is advancing upon the enemy, 
 there is not time enough for any one man to survey the large 
 terrane it will cover. Troops, too, are awaiting their orders. 
 Yet no proper disposition can be made without at least a gen- 
 eral sur^^ey of the ground. 
 
 In all such cases a leader of a large force needs someone 
 who can go and see for him, and on whose judgment he can 
 depend. This trust is the general staff officer's. He can fill 
 his position only when he has been specially trained for such 
 duty. And above all, he should, of his own volition, he ever 
 intent on lessening his commander's work as best he can. 
 
 The general staff officer must not only be able to compre- 
 hend the part that his troops are to play in the general situ- 
 ation, but also to correctly judge the several periods the 
 action necessitates, and the character of the terrane ; all of 
 which demands the most thorough education. The greatest 
 difficulty -he encounters lies in the fact that in order to judge 
 correctly he must always retain a general grasp of the entire 
 situation, whereas his duties frequently carry him to places 
 from which he can see only a part. Therefore he should not 
 fail to inform himself fully upon his return, of all that has 
 happened during his absence. 
 
 As regards ihe example before u«, at 8:50, while the 
 division commander was engaged in issuing his orders near 
 Parschnitz, the general staff' officer was instructed to recon- 
 noiter the movements of the approaching opponents, and also 
 the country on the right bank of the Aupa, with a view to an 
 attack by the division. 
 
 At 9:32 (42 minutes later) he returned to his commander 
 on Hill 504 (about a mile south of the F^arschnitz church) 
 after he had meanwhile ridden to the most advanced hussars 
 scouting toward Kriblitz. When it became impossible to ob- 
 serve any longer from this hill what was happening in front 
 of the advancing Fourth brigade, at about to o'clock he was 
 sent out to the brigade. He returned with his report at 10:25, 
 
112 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 only to leave again at J i :20 to reconnoiter the ground before 
 the Third brigade with a view to the possible continuation of 
 the advance, a region that the commanding general could not 
 see from his new position. He had not yet returned when the 
 division commander rode away. 
 
 In this period of 2>^ hours (from 8:50 to 11 :20j Major 
 
 X was present with the division staff 83 minutes and 
 
 absent 6y minutes, during which time he had ridden about 7 
 miles. His absence had been necessary, for in each case a 
 thoroughly trained officer was required; and as the division 
 had only one general staff officer who could be so employed, it 
 was certainly very difficult for him to keep himself informed 
 continually of the general course of the action. 
 
 Experience teaches that it is very desirable to attach to a 
 division staff aids who have had instruction at the war acad- 
 emy and in practice rides. These can very well take the place 
 of the general staff' officer in making reconnaissances. It is 
 certainly not wise for a division commander frequently to 
 send his general staff officer away during an engagement, un- 
 less it cannot be prevented. The latter is familiar with his 
 plans, can assist him in directing the action, and can take his 
 place if any accident should happen to him, in so far as it is 
 necessary to advise his successor regarding the situation. The 
 general staff officer must make out the report of the engage- 
 ment, which he can do only provided he has been constantly 
 near the one who directs the action. Furthermore, he must 
 see to his commander's recuperation, and keep away all things 
 that would disturb him while seeking rest. Messages are con- 
 stantly arriving during an action, and if in writing, they must 
 be opened and read in perfect composure. Before he can 
 read aloud a message that has just been brought in. he fre- 
 quently has to first sort over a number of others that have 
 accumulated, as many messages are unimportant and. if read 
 without examination, draw the commander's attention away 
 from the real course of the engagement. 
 
 It is also the duty of the general staff officer to keep away 
 all persons who have no business at headquarters, but crowd 
 around the conmiander, express their opinions in a loud voice, 
 and even presume to give advice, or otherwise create disturb- 
 ance in the staff. 
 
 i 
 
Studie:s IN THE Leading o^ Troops. 113 
 
 Under his direction the senior aid makes the details of 
 orderly officers and mounted messages, and in action observes 
 that order is maintained in the subordinate staff and among 
 the led horses. 
 
 Even when the division is not engaged his tasks are just 
 as comprehensive. 
 
 We can here study only one period of his activity, from 
 the time he was first sent away from Parschnitz at 8:50 un- 
 til he returned to the division commander on Hill 504 at 9 132. 
 
 From the division commander's message to Colonel 
 
 D , the general staff officer knew, when he left, that the 
 
 division intended to cross the Aupa near Parschnitz and ad- 
 vance on the right bank to the attack of the enemy who was 
 reported to be approaching ; he also knew that in the meantime 
 
 Colonel D 's detachment and the First cavalry brigade 
 
 must cover the Liebau highway. His orders were to recon- 
 noiter the enemy and the terrane, with a view to an attack by 
 the division. To accompUsh this he had relatively little tirfte, 
 for it was evident that the attack must commence as soon as 
 the troops had crossed the stream. The most exact and ex- 
 haustive reconnaissance is useless unless its results become 
 known at the right time. 
 
 Under these conditions it was necessary to reach a point 
 as far in front as possible and from which a good view could 
 be obtained. Such a point was only to be found south of the 
 wooded mountain ridge. Then the officer must communi- 
 cate with the commanders farthest to the front, to learn what 
 
 they had observed in the meantime. Major-General B 
 
 had already ridden forward to Hill 531 (nearly a mile north 
 of Alt-Rognitz). There the general staff officer found him, 
 and the two watched the hostile movements for a short while ; 
 then he hurried along the Kriblitz ridge to the troop of the 
 Fourth squadron, scouting in front of Kriblitz, whose leader 
 gave him some details and pointed out the spot from which 
 he could best continue his observations. 
 
 From what the hussar officer told him, he was convinced 
 that the enemy was not A^ery strong, and that he was not 
 endeavoring to advance beyond Trautenau, but was establish- 
 ing himself there. At the same time he carefully examineH 
 the character of the Kriblitz line, and perceived that a frontal 
 
114 Studies in thic Leading of Troops. 
 
 attack against it presented greater difficulties than an advance 
 south of it. 
 
 He then became anxious to go to the hussar regiment on 
 the left wing, to learn in person what had been seen there. 
 He also looked around to see whether a prisoner had not been 
 taken during contact with some of the cavalry patrols, from 
 whom he could learn what hostile troops were in front, of 
 which hitherto no one had any idea. 
 
 Upon first contact with an enemy, it is especially neces- 
 sary to ascertain whether information previously gathered 
 concerning his composition is correct. To know this quickly 
 is of the greatest value to the leader of an army. 
 
 It was found that no prisoners had been brought in, and 
 there was no time to continue the reconnaissance. At any 
 rate, its main object might be considered accomplished. Major 
 X consequently hurried back to the division com- 
 mander, whom he found at 9 :32 on Hill 504. While absent 
 42 minutes the general staff officer had traveled nearly 4 miles, 
 having stopped at times to make observations and at times to 
 converse with others. When he returned, it was found that 
 
 the report sent by Major-General B had given better 
 
 information than he was able to bring. What he learned was 
 consequently of value only as confirmation, and particularly 
 with regard to the character of the terrane. 
 
 The general staff officer might possibly have been sent out 
 sooner. Yet wc must not forget that the division had only one 
 general staff officer assigned to it, whose duties were of such 
 a manifold nature that his strength must not be used up by 
 what was immaterial or unnecessary. 
 
 For instance, had he gone forward to reconnoiter toward 
 Alt-Rognitz during the halt at Parschnitz, and in fhe mean- 
 time the enemy was seen approaching from the west or in 
 the valley from Raussnitz, he would not have been on hand 
 at the important moment of the initiation of the engagement. 
 Only when everything unnecessary has been avoided will his 
 powers be equal to his task, if an emergency should demand 
 them regardless of consequences. 
 
 His first duty on returning to the staff was to learn what 
 had been rei:)orted of the enemy during his absence, and what 
 dispositions had been made among his own troops ; also where 
 
 J 
 
Studies in thk Lejading of Troops. 115 
 
 the various subdivisions were located, and to assure himself 
 that necessary details had not been overlooked in making the 
 dispositions. 
 
 He could certainly not trouble his commander at that 
 important moment with questions, and inquiries of other mem- 
 bers of the staff could only furnish incomplete information. 
 If, in view of this condition, his general does not of his 
 own accord take the trouble to inform him, the general staff 
 officer easily looses that complete survey so necessary for him. 
 
 Among the details needing attention are the providing 
 of vehicles for the transport of wounded, arrangement of 
 movements of trains and prisoners, sending reports to higher 
 headquarters, and providing a guide familfar with the country. 
 
 This last may «eem superfluous, but it certainly is not so. 
 Even when the most minute maps are at hand, all the sections 
 of a map cannot be carried in the saddle-bags, and the unex- 
 pected course of events may suddenly call for a certain sec- 
 tion that was left behind, there having been no intimation 
 that it would be needed until next day. It thus happened in one 
 of the superior staffs at Königgrätz, which was well supplied 
 with map material, that upon going on the battle-field not a 
 single section of the proper ground could be found. 
 
 However, even when a complete map is at hand, errors 
 are not impossible. With map in hand orientation can be lost 
 during a rapid ride, where direction is often changed and at- 
 tention distracted by passing events. Finally, with the best 
 maps, mistakes with regard to distant points, such as church- 
 steeples rising behind woods, are easily possible. The old 
 saying, "A guide tied to a string is better than the finest map," 
 is as pertinent to-day as ever, and it is well to charge an officer 
 in every staff with continual observation of the country. 
 
 Another thing: Exercises on the map are not always 
 conducted in a sufficiently thorough manner. In war the value 
 of maps giving^ general surveys needs no further proof, but 
 for map studies such surveys and such general information 
 is not enough. The entire landscape should rather be men- 
 tally pictured, as has been frequently attempted in the sketch 
 before us. When we assume we have come to a certain place 
 on the map, we should stop and ask ourselves what picture 
 the landscape would present, according to the map. In this 
 
ii6 Studies in thk Leading of Troops. 
 
 manner preliminary exercises will become highly beneficial in 
 training us to make proper dispositions later on when we are 
 on the ground itself. 
 
 The Third Infantry Brigade from 8:40 to 11:30. 
 
 We left Major-General B at 7:40, as he returned 
 
 to the main body of his detachment after having reconnoitered 
 the terrane in his front. His detachment consisted of 
 3 battalions, 2d infantry regiment, 
 23^2 squadrons of hussars, 
 3d horse battery, 
 Engineer company, 
 I ambulance company section. 
 
 These troops were on Hill 290, south of Parschnitz, their 
 most advanced subdivision having moved up to the edge of 
 the woods toward the south. They had stacked arms, removed 
 packs, and rested, the cavalry and artillery dismounting. 
 
 The second battalion of the First regiment was at the 
 southern edge of the woods (near Hill 504), with guns 
 stacked also, but not with packs unslung. Its Fifth company, 
 sent forward to the Raussnitz road, had posted a platoon on 
 Hill 531 in front, and established a non-commissioned officer's 
 post in the direction of Raussnitz. 
 
 The Second troop of the Fourth squadron had advanced 
 toward Kriblitz, and the Third troop of the Third squadron 
 toward the center of Alt-Rognitz. Shortly a message from 
 the former brought the information that it could not get 
 beyond the ravine, as a larger body of hostile dragoons was 
 halted near the Hopfen iVIountain. 
 
 As this message contained no new information, it was 
 not forwarded to higher headquarters, the presence of hostile 
 dragoons at Trautenau having already been learned while 
 at Schömberg. 
 
 To save alarming the troops, the Second troop of the 
 Fourth squadron was directed to continue watching the 
 enemy's cavalry. 
 
 Nothing further hai)i)cncd until 8:28, when a non-com- 
 missioned officer of hussars, accompanied by a trooper of the 
 Third troop of the Third squadron, arrived and reported that 
 a hostile rnlnnm of all arms wa«; on the highway advancing 
 
 I 
 
Studies in thi^: Leading of Troops. 117 
 
 on Trautenau, and that at 8:10 its head was still about two- 
 thirds of a mile south of Hohenbruck. 
 
 Alajor-General B did not wish to send such im- 
 portant information to the division commander without fur- 
 ther investigation, but, as it would take too much time to 
 satisfy himself personally of its correctness, he had to be con- 
 tent with closely questioning the non-commissioned officer. 
 According to the statement of the latter, the Third troop of the 
 Third squadron had gone forward to the nearest village (Alt- 
 Rognitz) and halted north of it. Shortly afterwards great 
 clouds of dust were seen in a village about a mile away 
 (Neu-Rognitz) through which the highway passed. The 
 troop had accordingly gone through the former village and 
 taken up a covered position farther to the front, while the 
 officer in command of the troop, together with the non-com- 
 missioned officer himself, went up to a small wooded hill ( 527} 
 not far from the highway southwest of Alt-Rognitz. From 
 that point the enemy's advance could be watched from a 
 distance (in the words of the non-commissioned officer) of 
 *'not over a thousand paces." First a battalion in white coats 
 came out of the village, followed by a battery. Then more 
 clouds of dust were seen, when suddenly a squadron of uhlans 
 dashed from the side of the village against the hussars, forc- 
 ing the Third troop to retreat, and they had not yet come to 
 a halt when the officer directed him to ride on in advance as 
 fast as he could to Major-General B . 
 
 With this statement, there could be no further doubt as 
 to the correctness of the report. 
 
 As the horses of both hussars were somewhat exhausted 
 on account of their rapid ride, the general instructed an officer 
 of the regiment to take the message to the division commander, 
 and himself repaired, without having the troops fall in, to the 
 infantry platoon posted in front, where a hussar sent from the 
 Second troop of the Fourth squadron met him and handed 
 him the following message: "A hostile column is marching 
 against Trautenau on the highway from Königinhof. At 
 8:30 its head reached Hohenbruck." . 
 
 From the hill where the troop was stationed (531), by 
 looking between some peaks with a good glass, the point 
 where the houses of Hohenbruck touched the highway could 
 
ii8 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 be seen ; moving infantry was plainly visible there, the clouds 
 of dust raised by their march extending from a point north of 
 the village into the woods in front of Neu-Rognitz. The 
 troops of hussars sent in advance were also visible, in front of 
 both Kriblitz and Alt-Rognitz. 
 
 To ascertain more closely the strength of the enemy 
 more cavalry was needed, and at the same time the general 
 thought it best, in order to secure the division, to occupy the 
 southern edge of the long stretch of woods behind which the 
 main body of the detachment was located. He therefore 
 despatched his aid at 8:38 to bring up the hussar regiment, 
 and to direct the rest of his troops to come up to the southern 
 edge of the woods. At the same time the Second battalion of 
 the First regiment was directed to take up a covered position 
 as support, north of the hill (531) lying in front. 
 
 Report of his intention to prepare to occupy the southern 
 edge of the woods was sent to the division commander. 
 
 Meanwhile the general continued his observations. 
 
 At 8:50 the hussar regiment, now only 2^ squadrons 
 strong, came up to him. Its commander, who had ridden 
 on ahead, was advised of the situation and instructed to 
 advance between Kriblitz and Alt-Rognitz, in the direction 
 of Hohenbruck, and ascertain the strength of the enemy. 
 
 The Second infantry regiment began to form on the south- 
 ern edge of the woods, the Third battalion in column of pla- 
 toons on its right wing, on its left the First and Second battal- 
 ions, also in column of platoons, and covered in the woods, and 
 the Third battery took station behind the Third battalion. The 
 engineer company deployed into column of platoons^ at the 
 side of the Second battalion. 
 
 Soon afterward the Third troo]:) of the Third squadron 
 sent in the following written message: 
 3d Troop, 3d Squadron. Hill north of Alt-Rognitz, 
 
 Vist mes.sage.) 27, 6, '66, 8:54 a. m. 
 
 As yet only single baggage-wagons are passing through 
 Neu-Rognitz. At 8:54 the rear of the enemy's column is only 
 a few hundred paces from Hohenbruck. Hostile uhlans fap- 
 l)arently 4 squadrons) have halted behind the thickets east of 
 the village. 
 
 iThree platoons, of 71 men each. 
 
 
Studies in thk Lkading of Troops. 119 
 
 Shortly after 9 o'clock a hostile battery was seen on the 
 Hopfen Mountain; it opened fire on the troops in the valley 
 toward Liebau. At the same time the brigade commander 
 noticed the rear of the enemy's column entering Hohenbruck. 
 The head of the hussar regiment had reached the open coun- 
 try between Kriblitz and Alt-Rognitz, when it was met by 
 infantry fire from the thickets in front; it then turned toward 
 the forest of Alt-Rognitz. 
 
 Major-General B returned to the main body, to ar- 
 range the details for posting it, and there, on Height 504, he 
 met the division commander, and reported what had so far 
 occurred. (9:15.) The latter divulged his plan of advanc- 
 ing on the right bank of the Aupa against the enemy's flank, 
 
 and directed Major-General B to take up the march 
 
 toward KribHtz. (9:23.) 
 
 The orders that Major-General B accordingly gave 
 
 were as follows : 
 
 To the battery commander: "The brigade will attack 
 Kriblitz from the north of the projecting ridge. Prepare the 
 attack from Hill 366. The cavalry you see over there toward 
 Alt-Rognitz are our hussars. Hostile dragoons and uhlans 
 are east of Hohenbruck." 
 
 To the commander of the Second infantry regiment, who 
 had heard the order given the battery commander: "Have 
 I battalion attack the northeastern corner of Kriblitz, and the 
 Second battalion of the First regiment march along the heights 
 in front abreast of it. You will follow in the direction of the 
 northern part of Kriblitz also, with the 2 other battalions, as 
 reserve and at my disposal. The Third battery will prepare 
 the attack. A troop of hussars is watching the enemy in your 
 front." 
 
 To the commander of the Second battalion, First regi- 
 ment (up to whom he rode and delivered the order in person) : 
 "The brigade wil\ attack Kriblitz, the battery preparing the 
 attack. Make a right turn with your battalion, and connect 
 on the right with the leading battalion of the Third infantry 
 regiment, in the direction of the northeastern corner of Krib- 
 litz. The Fourth brigade will advance on your left." 
 
 The engineer company and ambulance company were in- 
 structed to follow the Second regiment. 
 
20 Studiks in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 Tlie Third battery at once sent scouts ahead to Hill 366 
 (east of Kriblitz) and the commander, riding ahead, directed 
 the battery to follow in the valley in column of platoons' at 
 a trot. When the infantry skirmishers came up, it took a 
 covered position on the eastern slope of the hill, and at 9:35 
 suddenly opened fire on the hostile artillery on the Hopfen 
 Mountain, at a distance of a little over a mile. 
 
 The commander of the Second infantry gave the new 
 point of direction to the Third battalion, which was on the 
 right wing, whereupon the battalion commander had the col- 
 umn of platoons change direction to the right toward Hill 
 366 and designated the Ninth and Eleventh companies as first 
 line, which sent forward only thin .skirmish lines, as no hos- 
 tile infantry was visible. The two other companies, with the 
 Tenth in echelon to the right, followed at 220 yards. The 
 First and Second battalions followed the Third in column of 
 platoons at a distance of 150 yards, the former on the right 
 and the latter on the left. 
 
 The Second battalion of the First regiment, which had 
 taken post south of Hill 531 with the Eighth company under 
 cover and the others at a distance of 100 yards, had the col- 
 umn of platoons of each company wheel to the right and 
 pushed its right wing (Sixth company) toward the Raussnitz- 
 Kriblitz road, the rest of the battalion forming in two lines, 
 echeloned to the left, skirmishers in front, and connecting with 
 the Third battalion of the Second infantry. The commander 
 sent the mounted riflemen to Hill 554 to watch the enemy. 
 
 At 9:40 the first line of the infantry was advancing in 
 close order on each side of the battery. The rear of the 
 brigade had left the woods near Hill 504. The heads of the 
 Fourth brigade were coming into the open at the southern 
 edge of the woods. 
 
 The hostile artillery had replied with only a few shots, 
 and had then withdrawn, together with the infantry^ and; 
 dragoons that had been stationed on the llopfen Mountain. 
 
 The Second troop of the Fourth squadron, advancing 
 through the northern end of Kriblitz, tried to gain informa- 
 
 'Three platoons. 
 
 2Rf»f'onnoitore(l by the general staff officer of the division, and 
 therefore not further reported by the Third infantry brigade. 
 
Studie:s in the Leading oi? Troops. 121 
 
 tion as to the whereabouts of the enemy ; they had to proceed 
 with caution, however, as single dragoons stiU appeared be- 
 hind the projecting hills, and it was not yet known whether 
 Trautenau was occupied. At the same time skirmishers from 
 the Third battalion of the Second infantry, having been re- 
 inforced during a short halt, were approaching the eastern 
 edge of Kriblitz. The Sixth and Eighth companies of the 
 First infantry had entered the thickets on the declivity east 
 of the village, and received a lively skirmish fire out of its 
 western section on the opposite slope. In the first excitement 
 the deployed platoons (i from each company) rushed down 
 the ravine to the attack, followed by the two supports. Order 
 among the latter was somewhat impaired on account of the 
 difficult terrane, but they still formed a closed mass, upon 
 which the skirmish fire of the enemy made such an impression 
 that the leaders ordered them to lie down. The greater part 
 of the skirmishers of both companies reached the bottom of the 
 ravine, where they found they could move neither forward 
 nor backward, and they sought cover in the sunken road and 
 near-by buildings. Their supports, deployed in the edge of 
 the woods, finally took up the fire, and were soon reinforced 
 by the Seventh company. 
 
 The losses were not inconsiderable, and a dressing station 
 was established behind the thicket, where, by order of the bri- 
 gade commander, several medical officers from the Second reg- 
 iment rendered assistance ; it did not yet seem necessary to 
 bring the ambulance company section into service. 
 
 Major-General B ordered the battalion commander 
 
 to desist from a further advance, but to hold the hill east of 
 Kriblitz. The brigade reserve (First and Second battalions 
 of the Second infantry) was directed to follow the Third 
 battalion, crossing the northern part of Kriblitz. The same 
 direction of march was given the Third battery, as it was 
 impracticable to go into action behind the Kriblitz hill (554) 
 under the effective fire of the enemy. 
 
 After crossing the ravine, the Third battalion detached the 
 Tenth company toward Trautenau as right flank cover, and 
 with the others fthe Eleventh leading) turned toward the 
 thicket occupied by the enemy, in order to join in the action 
 of the Second battalion of the First infantry. As this move- 
 
122 Studiks in the Leading oe Troops. 
 
 ment was in full accord with his plans, the brigade com- 
 mander allowed it to proceed, and repaired to the First and 
 Second battalions of the Second infantry, whose leading com- 
 panies were entering Kriblitz, after each battalion had de- 
 ployed near Hill 366 in two lines in company columns. As 
 he rode down the hill the brigade commander noticed that 
 
 Colonel D 's detachment, on the Liebau highway, was 
 
 also moving toward Trautenau. 
 
 In Kriblitz the Second troop of the Fourth squadron re- 
 ported that Trautenau had been evacuated, but that the 
 bridges were obstructed by strong barricades. The general 
 accordingly despatched the engineer company to Trautenau, 
 with directions to clear the crossings over the Aupa. and occupy 
 and reconnoiter the southern and western exits of the city, in 
 connection with the Tenth company, which had already pro- 
 ceeded thither. The next moment (it was now after 10 
 o'clock) the division commander's order to seize Trautenau 
 and the hill south of it, and to bring up Colonel D 's de- 
 tachment, was received. 
 
 The first had been done already, and as the aid who 
 brought the order had yet to go to the First cavalry brigade, 
 he was directed to give the necessary instructions at the same 
 time to Colonel D , 
 
 The enemy withdrew from the patch of woods on the ap- 
 proach of the Third battalion of the Second regiment, after 
 a slight skirmish with only 2 platoons of the Eleventh com- 
 pany. On entering the woods it encountered parts of the Sec- 
 ond battalion of the First regiment, which, when they saw 
 the enemy was retreating, followed in pursuit. These two 
 bodies were the more certain of becoming mixed up, as the 
 Ninth and Twelfth companies were also entering the woods. 
 
 About that time Major-General B , with the First 
 
 and Second battalions of the Second regiment and the battery 
 in rear, approached the deep ravine on the northeastern slope 
 of the TTopfen Mountain. The troop of hussars, which was 
 now reduced to a strength of t6 by reason of its having sent 
 patrols beyond Trautenau, was scouting on the further side 
 of the hills west of the Hopfen Mountain. 
 
 Colonel D 's column at t]ie same time suddenly halt- 
 ed in the valley, while the cavalry brigade trotted past it ; this 
 
 
Studies in thi: Le:ading of Troops. 123 
 
 delay was attributed to the obstruction of the Aupa crossing. 
 
 Major-General B then ordered the 2 battalions to 
 
 cease their pursuit of the enemy, and to assemble near the 
 main body of the brigade, south of the Hopfen Mountain. 
 It required some time to execute the order, as portions of 
 both battalions that had become mixed in the woods had fol- 
 lowed the opponent beyond the woods before order was re- 
 established. 
 
 The commander conducted the main body to Hill 504, 
 southeast of Trautenau. On account of the sunken road in 
 front, the battery was forced to make a detour, turning around 
 along the western edge of the little woods of Kriblitz, in the 
 direction of Trautenau, before making a junction again. 
 
 Before the hill was ascended hussars reported that hostile 
 infantry was marching off on the highway, and that the last 
 section had already reached Hohenbruck ; also that a battalion 
 and several squadrons were retreating through the western 
 part of the village. 
 
 This message was forwarded to the division commander, 
 with additional information to the effect that the brigade, hold- 
 ing the city, was assembling south of the Hopfen Mountain, 
 for the purpose of pursuing the enemy. 
 
 At 10:30 the main body of the brigade began to arrive at 
 Hill 504, whence the leading sections of the Fourth brigade 
 were seen approaching Alt-Rognitz. The rest of the Second 
 troop of the Fourth squadron reconnoitered the country up to 
 the sunken road leading from that village to Hohenbruck. 
 The Third battery, being necessitated to make a detour by rea- 
 son of the difficult terrane, was not able to come up in time 
 to fire upon the retreating enemy on the highway. 
 
 This was the situation when word was received from the 
 hussar patrols that had advanced farther to the west, and 
 
 shortly afterward from Colonel D also, that a column 
 
 of all arms was approaching Trautenau along the upper Aupa, 
 whose point was only }i of a mile from the city. 
 
 The news was extremely surprising. Nothing whatever 
 was known of the presence of friendly bodies in that direction ; 
 therefore they could only be the enemy. Under these circum- 
 stances the brigade's situation was a disagreeable one, inas- 
 much as it would have to change front toward the west and 
 south, and at the same time occupy the city and the hills. 
 
124 Studif:s in the Leading of TRoors. 
 
 However, before any dispositions were made, Major-Gen- 
 eral B rode forward in that direction to see for himself 
 
 whether the report was correct. But before he reached his 
 point of observation his mind was set at rest by a second mes- 
 sage from Colonel D , which stated that the approach- 
 ing body belonged to a flank detachment of the First infantry 
 division, and that his hussars had already established com- 
 munication with its dragoons. 
 
 The general returned to his brigade, where, at 10:50, he 
 was joined by one of the division commander's aids, who 
 had brought him instructions to halt on the hills until further 
 orders. 
 
 The battalions that had been deployed near the little 
 woods at Kriblitz now began to arrive with the main body. 
 Only the Tenth company was still in Trautenau. The Second 
 battalion of the First infantry posted itself at the right of the 
 Second regiment. 
 
 Soon afterward the head of Colonel D 's detach- 
 ment, coming through Trautenau, also approached the rendez- 
 vous, having moved off from the farm-buildings near the 
 Liebau highway when the brigade reached Kriblitz The 2 
 troops of the Fourth squadron that had pushed on ahead had 
 cleared away the barricades on the bridges before the engineer 
 company arrived. As the infantry did not advance on the 
 highway, but to the south of it, the First cavalry brigade was 
 able to trot forward on the latter and make use of a wooden 
 bridge to the west of the main bridge. 
 
 At Ti o'clock the head of Colonel D 's detachment 
 
 had arrived near the Third infantry briga:le and began to 
 draw up on the right at the side of the Second regiment, which 
 was formed in double platoon column. The cavalry brigade 
 formed column of troops^ alongside the highway leading to 
 Arnau, and despatched a squadron to reconnoiter the road to 
 that town. 
 
 At 11:09 the order arrived from the division commander, 
 directing the Third infantry brigade to advance as far as the 
 sunken road leading from Alt-Rognitz to ITohcnbruck, mafn- 
 taining its hold on the highway, and to occupy the hills south 
 
 n the German Army a troop is formed in two ranks. 
 
 I 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 125 
 
 of it. The brigade moved off by wings, the regiments abreast, 
 the Third battaUons in the first echelon, with the First bat- 
 taUon of field artillery to the right where the ground was bet- 
 ter suited for its movement. Shortly afterward Major- 
 General B saw the columns of the First division near- 
 
 ing Trautenau on the Liebau highway. 
 
 At II :20 the corps commander came up with the brigade, 
 
 to whom Major-General B reported what had taken 
 
 place, also the object of the movements then in progress, and 
 at the same time sent word of his arrival to Lieutenant- 
 General A . 
 
 At 1 1 :30 the Third battalion of the First regiment, less 
 the Eleventh company which was posted near Raussnitz, had 
 occupied the portion of Hohenbruck near the highway with 
 
 2 companies (one deployed and the other in close order behind 
 it). The Tenth company was on the eastern edge of the 
 patch of woods situated to the east. 
 
 The Third battalion of the Second regiment, also only 
 
 3 companies strong, deployed 2 companies, making connec- 
 tion on the left, the first line stretching beyond the sunken 
 road from Alt-Rognitz to Hohenbruck, the last company in 
 rear as reserve. Both battalions had sent their mounted rifle- 
 men to Hill 527 (southeast of Hohenbruck) to observe the 
 enemy near Neu-Rognitz. 
 
 Further to the rear at the bend of the defile toward the 
 i north were the other battalions, the First regiment on the 
 I right, the Second regiment on the left in double platoon col- 
 \ umn, the First battalion of field artillery on the right near the 
 i highway, while still to the right the leader of the Fourth 
 ! squadron was endeavoring to assemble his force as quickly 
 I as he could by bringing up the Second troop and various 
 I patrols. 
 
 jl The corps commander gave permission for the Tenth 
 
 I company of the Second regiment, which was still in Traute- 
 ij nau, and also the company of engineers, to be withdrawn. 
 i The cavalry brigade, in column of masses, occupied a cov- 
 
 ered position behind a slight elevation north of Hohenbruck. 
 
 These events with the Third infantry brigade permit of a 
 more minute investigation. 
 
126 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 Its 4 battalions (together with 2\'i squadrons of hussars, 
 a battery, an engineer company, and an ambulance company 
 section) which had been detached on the right bank of the 
 Aupa, were charged with the security of the division camped 
 in the valley of Parschnitz. 
 
 Its leader, a brigade commander, must make his dispo- 
 sitions in such a manner that the detachment could perform 
 its task even if necessary to fight. Yet as the conditions would 
 depend upon the movements of the enemy, it was impossible 
 to tell in advance whether the fight must be carried on in the 
 direction of Kriblitz or Raussnitz, or in both directions. All 
 
 that Major-General B could therefore do was to hold 
 
 the mass of his troops in readiness to strike the enemy wher- 
 ever he might approach. 
 
 To do this, it was necessary to reconnoiter in the probable 
 directions of the enemy's approach in such manner that he 
 would be promptly discovered and sufficient time gained to de- 
 ploy for action in a suitable position ; at the same time, the 
 position itself should be reconnoitered in advance. 
 
 General B 's first disposition must be governed by 
 
 these considerations. 
 
 It Vv^as at once clear to him that in case of an engagement 
 the brigade must be deployed somewhere along the southern 
 edge of the long stretch of woods in front. To facilitate ar- 
 riving there at the right moment, and at the same time to re- 
 connoiter, a battalion was pushed forward beyond the border 
 of the woods, while a troop of hussars examined the country 
 in front to the west, and another troop to the south. 
 
 Even under these conditions it was not a matter of indif- 
 ference which battalion was brought forward for the per- 
 formance of the service of security. For this task the Sec- 
 ond battalion of the Fir.st regiment was designated. By this 
 means the entire Second regiment was kept together under 
 its commander, in pursuance of the maxim not to divide 
 organizations any more than can be helped. For instance, 
 had another battalion of the First regiment been already on 
 the spot, it would have been proper to bring forward a battal- 
 ion of the Second regiment instead ; by this means the two 
 regimental commanders, each with two of his battalions, would 
 have remained with the main bodv. 
 
I 
 
 Studies in thu Leading of Troops. 127 
 
 li; is difficult to dispense with subordinate commanders in 
 the conduct of an action ; they certainly are of material aid. 
 When part of an organization is detached, its leader should 
 
 remain with its greater part. Thus Colonel D was in 
 
 command where at least 7 companies of his regiment were 
 
 still united, and General B also had 4 battalions of his 
 
 brigade in hand. On the other hand, if the battalions of a 
 regiment are dispersed separately in different directions, there 
 remains nothing for its commander to do but to watch as a 
 spectator. But as he certainly does not relish this, he attaches 
 himself to one of his battalions, which thereby acquires two 
 commanders, and nothing is gained. 
 
 The principles here laid down should never be disre- 
 garded when detachments are made. 
 
 Another question might be, Why was Major-General 
 
 B content with employing only 2 troops of hussars to 
 
 reconnoiter the roads? It is the duty of the division cavalry 
 regiment to perform all reconnaissances for the division, both 
 before and during an engagement, and even at long distances 
 if no other cavalry is present. Here there were 2^ more 
 
 squadrons at General B 's disposal. The only answer 
 
 is : A commander must never forget that many different pur- 
 poses arise with the many changes in the situation, and there 
 is no rule applicable to all cases. A commander should always 
 see how he can accomplish the object before him with the 
 least means. Now, had it not been known that hostile cav- 
 alry was in the vicinity, and had the terrane which was to be 
 reconnoitered not been so great (from the Kriblitz valley to 
 
 the valley of Raussnitz), Major-General B could have 
 
 contented himself with sending only an officer and a few se- 
 lected troopers in each direction. 
 
 The mistake is often made of sending forward the entire 
 division cavalry regiment at once, even where a few intelli- 
 gent and daring riders could obtain a better view and would 
 not be so quickly discovered. Such procedure is the imme- 
 diate ruination of the division cavalry, and sometimes occurs 
 before the first contact has taken place, nor will it be on hand 
 if suddenly needed to scout in another direction. It will sel- 
 dom be the task of the division cavalry to enter an engage- 
 ment with a view of piercing strong hostile cavalry and see- 
 
128 S'lUDItS [X TIIK LKADIXG OF TrOOPS. 
 
 ing what columns are marching l)ehin(l it; it is too weak for 
 this, although it may reinforce a cavalry division for such pur- 
 pose. When with an infantry division, it is dependent upon 
 itself, and must reconnoiter before, during, and after an en- 
 gagement. How and when the cavalry of a division should 
 take part in an action of the other arms depends on the in- 
 clinations and perceptions of its regimental and squadron 
 commanders. Yet it must not be forgotten that cavalry with 
 an infantry division has other duties to perform bi^sides 
 reconnoitering. 
 
 On the other hand, we should not demand too much of 
 the small patrols mentioned, which are conducted by officers 
 when on important reconnaissances. We cannot expect them 
 to rove alone far over the country in hostile territory with an 
 enemy near by. If they had no cavalry support behind them, 
 they would be doomed to destruction. Only a considerable 
 force of cavalry can afford to push out patrols simultaneously 
 on all roads and in every direction, and assure them the neces- 
 sary security by detaching entire squadrons and by its own 
 position. In such situations the problem can be solved only 
 by a larger mass of cavalry, and the extent and sphere of its 
 exploration is determined by its strength. It can even be ex- 
 pected that large masses of cavalry, although at great distance 
 from the main force, should not seek to avoid engagements 
 when on reconnaissance duty. 
 
 Major-General B sent forward only the snialle-t 
 
 ])Ossible number of horses, as it was yet early in the morning 
 and there was no foretelling wdiat demands might be made 
 on the cavalry during the day. Nevertheless, in view of the 
 fact that .scouting on the most extensive scale is always nec- 
 essary, such ])rocedure might not be fully justified, and for 
 this the division cavalry should be despatched when larger 
 masses of cavalry are not available. Furthermore, the situa- 
 tion was soon changed when the Second trooj) of the Fourth 
 squadron reported that hostile dragoons prevented its cross- 
 ing the Kriblitz ravine. 
 
 It was ^lesirable to obtain (|uickly some information re- 
 garding conditions at Trautenau : for this ])urpose the general 
 must allow the remainder of the hussar regiment ( J^^ squad- 
 rons) to go forward, and these would probably be involved 
 
 I 
 
Studif.s in Tiii^ Leading of Troops. 129 
 
 in a cavalry fight. But if such an action occurs near troops 
 at rest, it is bound to draw all into the engagement. The 
 bringing forward of the battery could then hardly have been 
 avoided, as well as the despatching of the leading battalion to 
 the support of the hussars while another battalion took its 
 place. Äioreover, if it had been in accordance with his inten- 
 tions, the division commander would at the start have ordered 
 the advance of the hussar regiment. And finally, the situation 
 was not new, for the presence of hostile cavalry near Traut- 
 enau was known for a long time. All these, however, were 
 only excuses. The main error remains, that neither the divis- 
 ion nor the brigade commander knew how to employ his cav- 
 alry ; the reconnaissance should have been made by the entire 
 3 regiments of cavalry at hand. 
 
 As already stated, it would have been perfectly proper 
 to place the hussar regiment in front of the advance guard 
 infantry during the advance to Parschnitz, and as soon as 
 Parschnitz had been reached by the advance guard, the cavalry 
 brigade should have been brought forward from the rear of 
 the Second infantry division. 
 
 Major-General B failed to make further disposi- 
 tions when the presence of hostile dragoons was reported near 
 KribHtz. But the entire situation changed when, at 8 128, the 
 approach of a hostile column of all arms was reported by the 
 Third troop of the Third squadron. It was necessary to ad- 
 vise the division commander of this as quickly as possible, nor 
 must any time be lost by a personal corroboration of the re- 
 port, desirable as this might have been. But to avoid sending 
 forward anything that was incorrect and thereby creating 
 alarm, the general closely questioned the non-commissioned 
 officer, and then sent his report, by an officer, to the divis- 
 ion commander, while he himself proceeded to the front to 
 reconnoiter. 
 
 As superior cavalry had driven in the troop of the Third 
 squadron and prevented a closer inspection of the enemy's 
 movements, all possible means must now be employed in order 
 to gain the neces.?ary information; and although the ground 
 in front was broken and covered with patches of woods, this 
 could only be quickly accomplished by the cavalry. 
 
 Under these circumstances the division cavalry must re- 
 pulse the cavalry of the enemy, using its whole force if nee- 
 
130 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 essary. To do this, it was essential that the superior com- 
 mander assemble at the point of danger all the cavalry avail- 
 able, and, if the achievement of the immediate object in 
 view lay in a forward movement, to see that no part of it was 
 held back as reserve. Accordingly the hussar regiment was 
 brought to the front, although, as it appears, the commander 
 did not think of the First cavalry brigade with its horse bat- 
 tery, when the use of the latter would have insured absolute 
 certainty with regard to the enemy. 
 
 It often happens upon such occasions that the responsible 
 commander is insufficiently instructed, by reason of not hav- 
 ing received a definite order or sufficient information concern- 
 ing the general situation as far as it affects him. But this 
 latter is quite necessary. Imagine for a moment that the reg- 
 imental commander has up to this time had no knowledge of 
 the messages received, and that from his former position he 
 could not obtain a good view to his front ; suddenly he is con- 
 fronted with an entirely new situation; he does not know 
 whether the dimly seen scouts riding about a mile to the front 
 are his own hussars or hostile cavalry. If at such a great dis- 
 tance friendly bodies were in his front, he would have to ad- 
 vance differently than if he must be prepared to encounter the 
 enemy at any moment. His order should therefore not simply 
 state that the approach of a hostile column of all arms on the 
 Königinhof-Trautenau highway had been reported, its head 
 having just reached Hohenbruck, and that he should advance 
 with his regiment toward Hohenbruck to reconnoiter more 
 closely, but it should state in addition that the mounted men 
 visible belonged to a troop of his own regiment that had aT- 
 ready been sent in that direction. 
 
 Major-General B should rather have worded his in- 
 structions thus : "The marching column you see over there 
 is a column of the enemy. It has just entered Hohenbruck. 
 Over there to the left front near the next village, which is 
 Alt-Rognitz, a troop of your regiment has watched the ad- 
 vance, but has been forced back by hostile dragoons. The 
 scouts there belong to that troop. Go forward in the same 
 direction and reconnoiter the enemy, as \ am anxous to be 
 ])romptly informed as to his strength. Over there on the 
 right flank, where the deeply cut ravine of Kriblitz can be 
 
Studiks in the Leading of Troops. 131 
 
 seen, is the other troop of your regiment ; but it could not ad- 
 vance farther because superior hostile dragoons are south of 
 the ravine. A battalion of infantry will occupy this hill for 
 your support in case of necessity." 
 
 Of course more time is needed for giving such instruc- 
 tions than for giving a short order, but if a commander goes 
 on in advance of his regiment, the necessary time can be found. 
 At all events, it is better to lose a few minutes than to lead 
 troops suddenly into ground and into a situation of which they 
 cannot be expected to obtain a correct and prompt survey 
 themselves. 
 
 The most frequent errors in this connection are made in 
 bringing up reserves. Nearly all the reinforcements brought 
 up at Ligny on the i6th of June, 181 5, from the reserves of 
 the First and Second Prussian army corps, received the order 
 to throw back the enemy. Thereupon the troops rushed into 
 the village, often when it was absolutely unnecessary to do so, 
 and always advanced farther beyond the edge of the village on 
 the side of the opponent, the only instructions being to "throw 
 back the enemy." In every case this resulted in their turn- 
 ing back themselves, so that the enemy again entered the vil- 
 lage on the heels of the retreating Prussians. But if the va- 
 rious comanders had known how the battle had progressed be- 
 fore they participated in these rushes, they would probably 
 have made other dispositions. It would have been better had 
 their instructions been, "Move up to Ligny and report to Gen- 
 eral X , who is now in command there." Then it would 
 
 have been the duty of the latter to instruct the various com- 
 manders, and a proper direction of the entire force, according 
 to a uniform plan, would have been possible. 
 
 In case of an unsuccessful action, the support of routed 
 cavalry is always more necessary than that of infantry. There- 
 fore, wherever possible, cavalry will be supported by infantry. 
 
 For this reason Major-General B brought his leading 
 
 battalion up to the nearest covering hill (531). 
 
 As we have seen, upon receipt of the message relative to 
 the approach of the enemy, Major-General B rode for- 
 ward to reconnoiter in person. Before placing troops in ac- 
 tion, the commander should first see for himself, if possible. 
 Of course, with larger masses this is not always practicable. 
 
132 Studies in thk Leading of Troops. 
 
 else half the day would i)e spent before troops received their 
 march directions. 
 
 Napoleon I. gave expression to the rule, "On s' engage 
 ct puis on voit." But to open an engagement in order to see 
 is nowadays dangerous. Long-range fire inflicts losses on re- 
 connoitering troops and gives rise to a partial defeat, while 
 the commander-in-chief, on account of great distances, him- 
 self can see hut little. Modern ideas rather call for reconnoit- 
 ering by cavalry, officers' patrols, and mounted riflemen, and 
 with larger forces by means of balloons, and in all cases by 
 the use of good field-glasses. 
 
 At the same time the hussars advanced, the general 
 brought the remainder of his force up to the southern edge 
 of the woods. He did not then hesitate a moment about dis- 
 turbing their rest. As it was possible that the near-by enemy 
 might soon advance to attack his brigade, the brigade must 
 be prepared for the attack. Such an advance might first be 
 expected from the direction of Kriblitz or Hohenbruck. And 
 no matter what position the Third brigade might occupy, the 
 ground about was not in its favor, as the terrane was wide, 
 the field of fire limited, and the conditions for withdrawal diffi- 
 cult. But in this, as in many similar cases, the ground had 
 to be accepted as it was, for the general situation demanded 
 that there the enemy's attack be met. 
 
 If the general had intended to deploy the brigade along 
 the southern edge of the woods (509 to 504), his choice of 
 position would not have been very fortunate. The brigade 
 was not able to occupy such an extended line ; there was noth- 
 ing for the flanks to rest upon, and no position from which 
 artillery might cover them; it was hardly possible to conduct 
 the action, and. furthermore, before its center was a command- 
 nig ridge (554 to 531) from which the entire position could 
 he taken under fire. 
 
 Tt i)robably would have been better had the brigade com- 
 mander first occupied Hill 531 with the battery and i or 2 
 battalions, keeping the other battalions behind it in close order 
 as reserve. He Would then have been in a position to give 
 i?nmediate su])port to the defense of the hill, which was not 
 unfavorably situated, and could take in flank any advance of 
 the cncniy wliicli might possibly follow from Kriblitz in a 
 
Studiks in thk Leading oi? Troops. 133 
 
 northeasterly direction. It was not within his province to ad- 
 vance independently to the attack. From his own standpoint, 
 the dispositions he intended to make for defense were the e- 
 fore perfectly correct, and the division commander could only 
 approve them, although the latter at once determined to pur- 
 sue an entirely different course. 
 
 The directions given by Major-General B when is- 
 suing his orders o the brigade for its attack upon Kriblitz, 
 which then followed, seem to be, in part, judicious. He left to 
 each unit its full independence, his orders having been direct- 
 ed to the commander of the Second infantry regiment, to the 
 independent Second battalion of the First infantry regiment, to 
 the battery, to the engineer company, and to the sanitary de- 
 tachment. At the same time he gave each subdivision its task, 
 designated the direction of march, provided for uniformity 
 in the advance, and oriented each part with reference to ad- 
 joining parts and with reference to the hussars still in front. 
 It was not necessary to tell the Second battalion of the First 
 regiment of this last fact, as the advance had been made un- 
 der its eyes. Nevertheless the brigade commander somewhat 
 anticipated the action of the battalion commander, in a correct 
 manner, by ordering a wheel to the right, by which means the 
 battalion commander could at once orient himself in the en- 
 tirely new situation. 
 
 As regards the opening of the attack, the battery com- 
 mander was not left with the direct selection of the most ap- 
 propriate position. The choice of such position is a very im- 
 portant matter, upon which the success of any decisive at- 
 tack depends. It would indeed have been rather ventureso re 
 to occupy Hill 366, as the hill was only about 1,400 yards 
 from the eastern boundary of Kriblitz. Furthermore, it was 
 not simply the question of an attack upon Kriblitz, but a flank- 
 ing of the hostile artillery upon the Hopfen Mountain. Hill 
 531, near which the advanced battalion was ])reviously sta- 
 tioned, would have been preferable, in that it would bring the 
 battery out of the infantry fire. A little more or less than a 
 thousand yards does not matter when guns are once within 
 range. But Hill 531 offered an unfavorable field of fire on 
 Kriblitz and the Hopfen Mountain ; besides, the battery would 
 soon lose connection with the infantry, and vvould remain en- 
 
^34 
 
 Studiics i\ tuk Lkadixc. of Troops. 
 
 lirely uncovered in the direction of Alt-Roi^nitz, as the hus- 
 sar regiment had been assigned a special task and was not 
 hound by consideration of the l)attery. Moreover, the posi- 
 tion east of Mill 366 seemed to be more exposed than it really 
 was. A considerable force of hostile infantry could not as 
 yet have been in Kriblitz. If a few companies did actually 
 direct their fire on the half-covered battery, sufficient skir- 
 mishers of the Third mfantry brigade would have been on 
 hand to keep down their fire. The battery alone was in a posi-- 
 lion to keep off the enemy, by using shrapnel. It would have 
 been wrong to go into action at such close range in a planned 
 attack against a position Qccupied by the enemy. 
 
 Two battalions were employed on the first line, and al- 
 though the actual attack was directed against Kriblitz, the 
 ridge along the left flank could not be ignored ; for this rea- 
 son the orders issued to the brigade were not entirely unob- 
 jectionable. The employment of 2 battalions at the outset ap- 
 pears fully sufficient ; nor can any criticism be offered against 
 joining the Second battalion of the First infantry with the 
 right-wing battalion (Third of the Second infantry), which 
 was next to it and which must first take up the new direction. 
 The common point of march direction, however, was desig- 
 nated too far to the north. According to it, the advance move- 
 inent of the Second battalion of the First infantry would bare- 
 ly touch the northern slope of Tlill 554, and this was hazard- 
 ous, as the ap])carance of hostile infantry was first to be ex- 
 pected in the southern part of Kriblitz and at the ravine. It 
 would have been better to direct the left wing of the Third bat- 
 talion of the Second regiment uj-jon the center of Kriblitz. 
 The two other battalions would remain disposable as reserves, 
 ready to be employed against Kriblitz, or also, should it be- 
 come necessary, at Ridge 554. 
 
 On the advance the brigade commander had to consider 
 the enemy a^ well as his own troops. 1 le must see that his 
 two leading battalions maintained tlie direction of march and 
 acted in concert; as for the ))attery. lie must see that it was 
 in condition for further use as soon as it had accomplished the 
 first duty assigned it ; and lastly he must see that the two re- 
 serve battalions were kept for their destined purpose. As re- 
 tiards the reserve baltalions. In- mr.<t mU lose siHit of the fact 
 
Studies in tke Leading of Troops. 135 
 
 that, since they followed their own Third battalion, after the 
 latter got under fire it would have to advance more slowly, 
 whereby the distance to the following battalions would become 
 less and they would be tempted to crowd into the first fight- 
 ing line. At any rate, such crowding happened many times 
 during our last war, and often regimental commanders al- 
 lowed themselves to be carried away in an efifort to interpose 
 the second and third lines as soon as the advance of the first 
 line had to slow up. Such a step is justifiable only in case of 
 a decisive attack after fighting that has lasted for some time 
 and a superiority of fire has been attained. In the brigade 
 commander's order to the commander of the Second regiment, 
 the injunction to "follow with the two other battalions * * * 
 as reserve and at my disposal," was therefore not superfluous. 
 But for all that, continual surveillance of the execution of the 
 order was necessary. 
 
 Which battalion of the Second regiment the regimental 
 commander should send forward and in what formation the 
 two battalions of the first line should take up the march, con- 
 cerned only the respective commanders. The brigade com- 
 mander had occasion to interfere only when he discovered a 
 manifest error, such as a battalTort advancing too long in 
 close column or failing to maintain the proper direction or 
 connections. 
 
 The first interference of Major-General B occurred 
 
 when the Sixth and Eighth companies of the First regiment' 
 advanced in rather a reckless manner ; it is true this interfer- 
 ence was somewhat late, but this may be explained by the fact 
 that the general remained with the reserve on Hill 366 as long 
 as he could overlook the fight. It was evident that the Sec- 
 ond battalion of the First infantry lost alignment, else its left 
 wing could not have gotten so far in the little woods east of 
 Kriblitz. The mounted riflemen called the battalion con- 
 mander's attention to the hostile infantry south of Kriblitz, 
 and the battalion wheeled toward the south of its own accord. 
 No criticism could be made against this, but the battalion 
 should have reported the fact at once, and under no circum- 
 stances should have permitted two of its companies to cross 
 the ravine and make an independent attack. The action de- 
 manded independence of the subordinate leaders within their 
 
136 Stl'diks in tiik Lkadixg Ol- Tkoors. 
 
 respective cominaiuls, vigilance regarding the enemy, but also 
 mindfulness of the common commander and the situation. The 
 commanders of the Sixth and Eighth companies completely 
 disregarded the two last considerations. As it was only in- 
 tended to use the Second battalion of the First regiment as 
 a containing force after it had encountered the enemy, until 
 the influence of the right wing could be exerted, the order 
 was given to the battalion commander to desist from the at- 
 tack. This order had to emanate from the brigade com- 
 mander; otherwise there w^ould have been danger that the 
 battalion com:nander would seek only to overthrow the forces 
 opposed to him, and probably used his entire unsupported bat- 
 talion for that purpose. 
 
 As the enemy did not defend Kriblitz itself, the Third 
 battalion of the Second infantry, which was on the right wing 
 and which had crossed the ravine, turned of its own accord 
 against the patch of woods still occupied by the enemy, bit 
 as that movement coincided with the intentions of the brigade 
 commander, he did not interfere. 
 
 Often movements of this character, even when conducted 
 by subordinate bodies of troops, happen to be very decisive at 
 certain stages of the action, while later disputes frequently 
 arise as to the party who should receive the credit for having 
 initiated them. Without here recalling the fact that credit 
 should not be sought in the simple performance of duty, and 
 that the degree of credit cannot be measured by a foot-rule, 
 we wish to emphasize the fact that the superior, even though 
 he has not given the order, remains responsible for all he per- 
 mits his subordinates to do under his eyes. If the brigade com- 
 mander quietly approved this turn tow^ard the ravine, it must 
 have become evident to him that his order for attack rested 
 upon a false supposition ; Kriblitz was not occupied by the 
 enemy at .all. The division commander too had only ordered 
 the attack in the '"direction of Kriblitz." Tt would have as- 
 sumed a more simple and uniform plan had the brigade com- 
 mander desiq^nated a more distant ])oint of direction, even via 
 the Hopfen Mountain. Holding of the edge of the Aui)a va" lex- 
 was assured by the echeloning of 2 battalions behind the right 
 wing. By this more judicious designation of the direction of 
 !narch it would have been possible to avoid the "left wheel" 
 
I Studii<:s in thk Leading of Troops. 137 
 
 cf the Second infantry regiment in Kriblitz, a movement that 
 : cannot be executed by skirmishers and deployed companies, 
 'and which must certainly have caused a troublesome crowd- 
 I ing among the former. The regimental commander probably 
 i regretted that he had allowed the First and Second battalions 
 ; to form company columns near Hill 366. A change of front 
 could have been executed much easier in column of march 
 or column of platoons. 
 
 The brigade commander's order for the attack supposed 
 Kriblitz to be occupied by the enemy. If the troop of the 
 Fourth squadron of hussars had made no report q(i this mat- 
 ter at the proper time, mounted riflemen were at bis disposal 
 for reconnoitering. Furthermore, it would have been advis- 
 able for him first to gallop to Hill 366 and give his orders af- 
 ter he had obtained a good view from that height. As it was, 
 the entire movement turned out favorably in the end, as the 
 enemy soon withdrew; and although the brigade did hold its 
 ground, it might have been led into very serious difficulties. 
 As soon as the right wing advanced upon the Hopfen 
 Mountain, it became necessary to obtain information relative 
 to conditions in Trautenau. If this was not done voluntarily 
 by the troop of hussars or the battalion on the right wing, the 
 brigade commander himself would have to order it. The send- 
 ing of the engineer company into the city was certainly in 
 accord with the general situation, but that fact was known 
 
 only to Major-General B , and therefore the order must 
 
 come from him. 
 
 Report of the retreat of the enemy was sent to the divis- 
 ion commander, and the latter's order for the brigade to re- 
 unite was duly executed. 
 
 I Finally, it should be stated that the uncertainty caused 
 by the news of the approach of a hostile column along the 
 Aupa shows anew how necessary it is for superior leaders to 
 have full information relative to the movements of any col- 
 umns v/ith which they are likely to come into contact. _ 
 
 The: Fourth Infantry Brigade from 8:40 to 11:30. 
 
 At 8:25 the entire Fourth infantry brigade was assem- 
 bled at the rendezvous near Parschnitz, and the Second bat- 
 talion of field artillery had also arrived there. 
 
138 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 \\ lien the report of the enemy's approach was received, 
 the brigade got under arms (8:45), and at 8:50 it received 
 orders to cross the Aupa near Parschnitz with the Second 
 artillery battalion. 
 
 The brigade commander, with the commander of the ar- 
 tillery regiment, hastened on in front, and at 9:35 arrived near 
 the division comniander, who was on Hill 504 (a mile and a 
 quarter south of Parschnitz), from whom the former re- 
 ceived instructions to continue the march for the time being 
 upon Alt-Rognitz through the open country, while the Third 
 brigade, on his right, should advance to the attack of Kriblitz. 
 The artillery commander was instructed to post the Second 
 artillery battalion on Hill 531. 
 
 The brigade advanced in two columns, the Third regi- 
 ment on the right and the Fourth on the left. The battalions 
 were in column of march, in the order of Third, Second, 
 First. When the leading squads reached Hill 504, the 2 Third 
 battalions formed company columns and were drawn out in two 
 lines at intervals of 130 yards, and distances of 220, the com- 
 panies of the second line echeloned outward. The First and 
 Second battalions remained in march formation, halting for 
 a short time to re-establish order and to close up. The com- 
 mander of the Second artillery battalion received orders by his 
 adjutant, whom he had sent ahead to his regimental command- 
 er, to take a position in readiness, covered, north of Hill 531 ; 
 this movement was executed at a trot, in order to quickly make 
 room for the infantry, and was executed in column of pieces 
 in such a manner that the entire division was deployed by the 
 command. ''Left front." Half of the caissons of the batteries 
 halted 220 yards r.orth of the battalion, a position south of 
 Hill 504 having been assigned to the remainder. 
 
 The regimental commander had not carried out literally 
 the order of the division commander to take position on Hill 
 531, and with good reason. Tn the first place, he saw no ob- 
 jective before him : besides, he first wanted to have infantrv 
 between the position and .Mt-Rognitz. ATeanwhile the battery 
 commanders were brought up fnim the po«^ition in readiness, 
 nnd .sections were assigned to the individual batteries. The 
 battery commanders dismounted while performing this duty 
 so as not to attract the attention of the enemv. Scouts kept 
 
 
Studiks in thk Leading of Troops. 139 
 
 up communication with the hussar regiment, and scouts were 
 also sent forward, by direction of the regimental commander, 
 toward Rudersdorf and Raussnitz, to secure the left flank. 
 
 At 9:50 Hill 531, where the division commander was 
 standing, was crossed by the companies of the Third battal- 
 ions, and the march direction toward the southwest assumed, 
 w^hile the left-wing battalion of the Third brigade was already 
 
 engaged near the Kriblitz ravine. Major-General C 
 
 was here informed that the enemy was evacuating Trautenau, 
 and that, in conjunction with the hussar regiment, he should 
 drive the enemy's retreating forces back as far as possible, 
 while the Third brigade should reassemble on the heights 
 south of Trautenau. 
 
 As the commander of the artillery regiment now observed 
 hostile infantry columns in retreat south of the little woods 
 of Kriblitz, he directed the Second battalion to go into posi- 
 tion. Two batteries posted themselves behind Hill 531, and 
 the left-wing battery on the eastern slope to the east of the 
 patch of woods. There they received rifle fire from the Krib- 
 litz woods, though at long range, and i battery was obliged 
 to open fire on the edge of the woods, while the others fol- 
 lowed the retreating bodies with shrapnel. In so doing they 
 were forced to fire over their own infantry, but as the latter 
 was moving down a depression in the terrane, they were not 
 endangered by the artillery fire. 
 
 The right wing of the Third battalion of the Third regi- 
 ment (the Ninth company) turned toward the woods. Two 
 platoons, deployed as skirmishers, and the third platoon, in 
 close order 210 yards to the rear, very cautiously took ad- 
 vantage of the undulations in the ground. However, the en- 
 emy soon evacuated the edge of the woods, which the company 
 entered without difficulty and came in contact with skirmish- 
 ers of the Third brigade. Some prisoners were taken. The 
 men who had pushed forward into the open terrane to the 
 south we^e received with such a brisk fire that they hurriedly 
 retreated into the woods again. 
 
 Meanwhile the enemy had also posted a strong force of 
 infantry on the isolated and wooded hill (425) at the north- 
 western entrance of Alt-Rognitz. During a short halt the en- 
 tire Ninth and Twelfth companies of the Third battalion of 
 
140 Studiics in thi; Leading of Truops. 
 
 the Fourth regiment deployed against that position as skir- 
 mishers, further to the north of the ridge in front and the 
 Eleventh company was brought up out of the second echelon 
 for the purpose of prolonging the left wing, forming two 
 platoons into a skirmish line, while the third followed in close 
 order as flank cover on the extreme left. The Tenth company 
 remained in the second line, behind the center. 
 
 The other battalions of the brigade continued the advance 
 by regiments, one alongside another, in columns of platoons, 
 from 220 to 330 yards from the battalions in front, following 
 the undulations of the terrane for purposes of shelter. 
 
 The attempt of the five leading companies of the Third 
 battalion to cross the crest of the ridge (500) without halting, 
 miscarried, as considerable losses forced the skirmishers to lie 
 down and open fire by command. With some attention on 
 the part of the platoon leaders this loss could have been avoid- 
 ed, if the skirmishers while yet unseen had lain down behind 
 the ridge, fixed sights, and had suddenly opened fire by com- 
 mand. As nothing could be seen from the bottoms, the offi- 
 cers dismounted, and, contrary to custom, the commanders of 
 the Third battalions went up into the foremost fighting line. 
 When the Eleventh company of the Fourth regiment envel- 
 oped the enemy's right flank, and the Twelfth company of 
 the Third regiment, followed by the Tenth and Eleventh com- 
 panies, had cleaned out the patch of woods west of the sunken 
 road leading from the Hopfen Mountain to Alt-Rognitz, the 
 opponent evacuated his position and retreated upon some 
 squadrons located farther to the rear. 
 
 The com])anies of the IMiird battalions in the first line 
 closely followed the retreating enemy. The greater part of 
 the Eleventh com])any of the Fourth regiment turned into 
 Alt-Rognitz, while the Tenth company of the same regiment 
 was sent to the wooded hill just abandoned by the hostile 
 forces. 
 
 The rest of the brigade crossed Ridge 500, but, as it 
 came too clo.se up(^n the slowly advancing firing line, it had to 
 be halted l)y the brigade commander at the foot; in a meadow 
 that extended to the northern slope of Hill 425 it sought cover 
 against the fire of the three hostile batteries that were posted 
 amonL-- the thickets before Neu-Roonitz. 
 
 1 1. 
 
Studies kn the Leading oe Troops. 141 
 
 The Second artillery battalion had unlimbered -on Hill 
 500, and was firing on the retreating parties below. 
 
 This was the situation when ]\Iajor-General C re- 
 ceived the order of the division commander to withdraw his 
 leading battalions and take position with the brigade on both 
 sides of Hill 425, securing his left flank; in consequence of 
 this order he sent his aid to the Third battalions with the fo"- 
 lowing instructions : 
 
 To the battalion of the Fourth reginent: "The battalion 
 will discontinue the pursuit, and will occupy the little woods 
 near the sunken road, which it has already taken." 
 
 To the battalion of the Third regiment: "The battalion 
 will discontinue the pursuit, and will occupy 'he little woods 
 near the defile, which it has already taken.*' 
 
 These orders were carried out. So as not to give the 
 enemy's artillery, which was directed against the retiring 
 Third battalions, too favorable a mark to fire upon, the lead- 
 ing companies remained in extended order, while the Tenth 
 and Eleventh companies of the Third regiment, which had 
 meanwhile assembled, marched alongside each other by squads. 
 
 At 11:10 the brigade occupied the following positions: 
 
 The Eleventh company of the Fourth regiment occupied 
 the farm-buildings nearest to the western entrance of Alt- 
 Rognitz and covered itself by sending forward a half-platoon 
 to the village street, and another before the western edge of 
 the village. The Tenth company of this regiment was on Hill 
 425 ; the rest of the battalion assembled behind it. 
 
 The Tenth and Eleventh companies of the Third regiment 
 were in the little woods west of the sunken road running from 
 the Hopfen Mountain to Alt-Ros^nitz. In the rear and as re- 
 serve was the Twelfth company, with the Ninth company, 
 which, however, consisted of only 2 platoons, part of the com- 
 pany having attached itself to the Third brigade in the Krib- 
 litz woods. 
 
 The First and Second battalions of both regiments 
 formed on both sides of the thicket lying to the east of the 
 sunken road. 
 
 So far during the engagement the formation assumed Ijy 
 the brigade in motion was that of regiments .^ide by side by 
 wings, the battalions following one behind the other. In the 
 
142 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 last moments and after its subdivisions had been reunited, the 
 Third brigade had also adopted this formation. In another 
 formation for asserfibling a brigade each line is composed 
 of the battalions of the same regiment, one regiment follow- 
 ing the other by battalions in double column. But, according 
 to Drill Regulations, the first formation was equally correct. 
 How far the advantages and disadvantages of the second are 
 observable in the progress of an action will be touched on 
 later; the first formation would, however, be preferable for 
 the march of a brigade across fields. In any case, two battal- 
 ions moving with one front can be more easily led than three, 
 obstacles can be more easily avoided, and a cliange of front 
 more easily effected. In advancing by regiments one behind the 
 other, three columns are formed, or even more than three, and 
 the center column is crowded first from one side and then the 
 other, while the columns themselves are each composed of dif- 
 ferent regiments. True, it is often said, we can march better in 
 three columns than in two ; this, however, applies only to roads, 
 while in a field the fewer columns there are the more easily cai 
 troops be kept together. Besides, with the wing formation, 
 each regimental commander has his battalions together in one 
 column. In the formation of the Fourth infantry brigade it 
 was not a question of the rigid use of the double column while 
 under hostile artillery fire. The battalions were so grouped 
 that they could withdraw independently, if at all. from the fire 
 of the opponent. The Third battalions "were still extended in 
 company columns, while the other battalions, in the second and 
 third lines, could use line of companies in platoon columns, 
 single colunm of platoons, or double column of platoons, ac- 
 cording to the terrane. 
 
 In advancing to an action it appears necessary to leave 
 the several battalions in march formation as long as possible, 
 for in such manner each battalion can cross the ground more 
 easily and with comparatively less exertion than in double 
 or single column of platoons. Often when we come near to 
 the enemy it will be possible to deploy at first only the head, 
 and to let the following battalions deploy whenever the head 
 becomes engaged as was the case here. There was no neces- 
 sitv for the first and second battalion^ forming single columns 
 
 f 
 
Studies in the Leading of Trooi's. 143 
 
 of platoons. The deployment for action could have been eas- 
 ily accomplished from the march formation. 
 
 In an advance, brigade and regimental commanders must 
 be constantly on the watch to see that the original order is 
 properly maintained. If it should be disturbed by the char- 
 acter of the terrane, it is better to halt and re-establish it. This 
 will be especially necessary in passing through woods, since a 
 formed brigade when entering woods will generally be thrown 
 out of order, as it will there meet with denser timber, hills, 
 meadows, or a view obstructed ; in such cases Regulations .spe- 
 cifically prescribe a shortening of distances. 
 
 The commander of the Fourth brigade had to see that the 
 leading battalions kept connection, and that distances were 
 preserved by the following subdivisions. He was certainly 
 right in halting the main body when it came too near the first 
 line, and was equally right, from his own standpoint, in allow- 
 ing them to follow on the heels of the retreating enemy, al- 
 though the division commander saw fit to suspend the pur- 
 suit for other reasons. 
 
 Finally, it is a question whether the Ninth and Twelfth 
 companies did right in deploying the whole line as skirmishers 
 on the crest of Ridge 500. Regulations caution against this, 
 and ]iermit '^uch a dispo<=;ition only in exceptional ca^es. How- 
 ever, the Tenth company followed as support, and the situa- 
 tion called for a rapid deployment of the skirmishers. The 
 Eleventh company, which was on the left wing, should have 
 retained i platoon in close formation under all circumstances, 
 which it in fact did. 
 
 The Division Cavalry Regiment from 8:40 to n :.7,o. 
 
 Thus far the work of the hussars consisted of scouting 
 and orderly and requisition service. Although the force was 
 indeed expended with economy, it is nevertheless seen how 
 quickly it will crumble away and become disintegrated by these 
 tasks, and it cannot be too strongly urged to proceed in this 
 with the greatest caution. 
 
 When the regiment was brought up to reconnoiter the 
 enemy's approach, it was required to be as strong as possil le, 
 since it might probably have to accomplish its purpose by 
 
144 S'r I'Dir.s in tiii: Lkadinc oi- 'I'kooi'S. 
 
 force. But the coniniander had only 2J/2 squadrons available. 
 In like maimer the leader of the Fourth squadron with the 
 advance guard saw his troopers reduced to one-half when 
 the enemy approached it. In time of war we are too prone 
 to resort to the use of entire troops, or even squadrons, instead 
 of small patrols ; in such cases the regiments may appear on the 
 battle-field possibly more scattered and reduced tiian hap- 
 pened in this case. 
 
 Considering- the fact that the same demands are made 
 on 600 horses day after day, we should not expect too much 
 from a division cavalry regiment in an engagement. Its special 
 employment should be scouting and security service for the 
 division. In this way the regimental commander can relieve 
 his general of many detailed dispositions, and become of great 
 value by his personal enterprise and industry. Although the 
 commander should not lead the mass of his regiment away 
 without orders from the division, he can scout in all directions 
 and keep up communication with adjoining columns by incaiis 
 of small patrols, linthoiit such special instructions. But this, 
 on the other hand, requires that his superior commander in- 
 form him fully as to the situation, a condition that will only 
 happen when the regimental commander makes the division 
 commander's cause his own cause, and devotes himself wholly 
 to the end in view. 
 
 If the enemy drives back the smaller ])atrols or forces 
 them to halt, then that i)art of the regiment which is still 
 intact will usually be obliged to come to their assistance. For 
 this reason it is generally the division commander's business 
 to bring the regiment to the place from which it can render 
 effective service at the right time. During the advance of 
 the division on a road in the early morning, the cavalry regi- 
 ment was accordingly attached to the advance guard. lUit 
 as the ground opened out on the left flank in the direction of 
 the enemy, only one squadron was left with the advance 
 guard, the remainder being assigned to the left Hank detach- 
 ment of Major-General B (Third brigade). ;\s soon 
 
 as the Fourtli brigade reached the left of the Third during the 
 further advance, and conditions on the left demanded scout- 
 ing at great distanrcs. tlu- tlixi^inn '•< »minandcr again had the 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 145 
 
 hussar regiment at his disposal for this purpose, only one troop 
 remaining in front of the Third brigade. 
 
 As a rule, the cavalry regiment receives its orders direct 
 from the division commander, and only when attached to a 
 separate detachment should it be placed under the orders of 
 the detachment commander. Only too frequently, when a 
 new task must be assigned a cavalry regiment so attached, it 
 is taken away without information being given to the detach- 
 ment commander concerning the altered circumstances. This 
 should not be. The superior headquarters issuing such new 
 order must communicate it to the detachment commander, 
 and it is the duty of the regimental commander, if the order 
 has not reached him through the detachment commander, to 
 report his departure to the latter. 
 
 Further, effective scouting in front of the infantry allows 
 it to remain in convenient formation for march up to the last 
 moment, and may even guard it from sudden artillery fire. 
 When conditions demand a considerable dispersion of troops, 
 it is therefore proper to assign a troop of cavalry to each of 
 the several brigades, to scout in their front, in case it does 
 not appear feasible to employ the regiment as a whole for 
 such purpose ; such indeed was done in the case before us. By 
 means of mounted riflemen infantry regiments are able to 
 scout independently in their front for distances of half a mile 
 or a mile. The Second troop of the Fourth squadron could 
 have been relieved from the duty of scouting to\tard Kriblitz 
 and replaced by mounted riflemen. The mounted riflemen sent 
 forward on Hill 554 by the Second battalion of the First reg- 
 nncnt did not conduct themselves skillfully, because they either 
 failed altogether to report the occupation of the Kriblitz woods 
 by the enemy, or else reported it too late. The leading bat- 
 talions of the Third infantry brigade did send iheir mounted 
 riflemen ahead during the last halt opposite Neu-Rognitz, but 
 those of the Fourth infantry brigade neglected fo do so. When 
 finally the Fourth squadron assembled north of Hohenbruck, 
 the commander of the Third brigade could spare it and return 
 it to the cavalry regiment, as he had under his command, 
 mounted, 2 non-commissioned oflicers and 18 riflemen. By 
 so doing the cavalry regiment would have attained a strength 
 of nearly four squadrons. 
 
1.1 6 SriKiKs IN TiiK Leading of Troops. 
 
 Tin: Division Artillkrv Rkcimknt from 8:40 to 11:30. 
 
 Only the Second battalion is seen in joint action, the bat- 
 teries of the First battahon having been otherwise employed. 
 
 Although circumstances may call for such a division of 
 force, it should be resorted to only when absolutely necessary. 
 On account of the great extension of the Second infantry 
 division a necessity existed in this case, as well as by reason 
 of the independcmt tasks assigned to the two brigades em- 
 ployed on the first line and to the advance guard. 
 
 As a rule, we should strive to keep the batteries together 
 in action under the guidance of the regimental commander. 
 The division commander should avail himself as far as prac- 
 ticable of the division artillery regiment as a closed body of 
 troops, and understand how to handle it in this sense. In 
 battle the division generally needs the combined artillery effect. 
 And even when there is only room for isolated batteries, these 
 must never develop an arbitrary activity according to the 
 personal views of their commanders. 
 
 The division commander must therefore not let his artil- 
 lery get away, but he must employ it, and give it the necessary 
 orders. The same may be said of other commanders to whom 
 artillery has been assigned. 
 
 The presence of the regimental commander in the divisictTT 
 staff was a judicious measure, but in an action he should be 
 where more*than one of his battalions are employed. 
 
 Should it become necessary to oppose the enemy in any 
 one ])lace, it will be well to employ all batteries available. 
 When the hostile artillery o])ene(l fire against the Second bat- 
 talion (less the Third battery), the horse battery did not wait 
 to see if the latter succeeded in beating off the op])0'ient, but 
 hurried forward* at once to the fighting line. Later the Third 
 battery also came into action against the same objective. 
 
 Further, should the advancing infantry become engaged 
 and objects for artillery fire appear, the artillery should ac- 
 com])any the advance as far as its (^wn security will per- 
 mit, so as to prepare for the attack as long as possible, 
 as was done by the Second battalion ujion the first start of the 
 Fourth briiiadc. As soon as the eneni\- withdrew, the artil- 
 
Stl^diks in the Lkading of Troops. 147 
 
 lery should rejoin the troops to which it belongs ; otherwise 
 it should remain in the position it has occupied as long as 
 necessary. 
 
 Although an artillery action must generally take place at 
 a distance of 1 5^ to 2 miles, in many cases we may have to 
 upen it at longer ranges. 
 
 It is seen that thus far the fight of the Second infantry 
 division succeeded, also that the regiment of artillery had but 
 few opportunities to come into action. Yet its commander 
 cannot escape censure for having permitted matters to take 
 their own course and not having himself interposed. He ac- 
 cepted all the dispositions of the division commander without 
 objection from the artillerist's standpoint, although there was 
 occasion for raising objections. Especially was this so when, 
 at 7 a. m., the division commander divided the First battalion 
 and left two of its batteries in the Aupa valley ; it was the 
 regimental commander's duty to call attention to this severance 
 of units. Besides, the regimental commander could have had 
 seven batteries at his disposition during the action, as the 
 division commander would have assigned the horse battery 
 to him, if requested, and this was sufficient for the part of the 
 advance guard in the valley of the Aupa. If he had familiar- 
 ized himself with the situation and the terrane. a decisive 
 artillery effect would have followed on the southern bank of 
 the Aupa. If he had arranged with the division commander 
 to have the First battalion, in close order, follow the Third 
 brigade, in the same manner as later the Second battalion 
 joined the Fourth brigade, he would have had all his batteries 
 in hand and could have appeared on Hill 500 ( northwest of 
 Alt-Rognitz) with 36 guns; as it was, shortly after 11 a. m. 
 the Second battalion was upon this hill, while the First bat- 
 talion was over a mile away, near Hohenbruck. Had the en- 
 gagement not come to an end at that time, it would have been 
 difficult to secure the combined employment of the artillery. 
 Near Neu-Rognitz three hostile batteries were under fire ; the 
 Second battalion could indeed dispute with them, but it was 
 not likely soon to gain superioritv over th^m. On the other 
 hand, the two battalions, if they had been united, could have 
 attained a superiority of fire in 15 minutes. 
 
148 Studii:s in the LhadixXG of Troops. 
 
 PROBLE^IS. 
 
 Here are a few problems, as at the conclusion of Part I., 
 which, by means of assumptions that may be very readily 
 suggested, can be solved in connection with the situations 
 we have just been considering. These are, however, only 
 specimens, showing how great a latitude may be given to such 
 studies by independent work. 
 
 Page 71 : The report of the enemy's approach came from 
 the flank detachment near Welhota, and stated that its ad- 
 vanced patrols had encountered the enemy, who was advanc- 
 ing from the direction of Kaussnitz. Give the dispositions of 
 the division and the various detachments. 
 
 Page 71 : Upon receiving the report of the approach 
 of hostile columns upon Hohenbruck, Lieutenant-General 
 A decided to deploy his division in a defensive posi- 
 tion and await the arrival of the First infantry division. How 
 was the division disposed? 
 
 Page 71 : After receipt of the above report, the division 
 commander decided to immediately employ the First cavalry 
 brigade and the hussar regiment for further reconnaissance. 
 Give the orders to the cavalry and a detailed statement of the 
 course pursued by the same. 
 
 Page 74: The enemy occupied Trautenau, but deployed 
 his main forces on the Kriblitz-Alt-Rognitz line. How should 
 the attack upon this position be initiated? 
 
 Page "JT. When Major-General B received the 
 
 order, he was also advised that the highway to Liebau was 
 damaged to such an extent that the arrival of the First divi- 
 sion could not be counted on for 4 hours. Shall Lieutenant- 
 General A carry out his present intentions? 
 
 Page 78: While the division commander was about t(i 
 set the Fourth brigade in motion, re])orts came in from the 
 cavalry in advance, establishing a considerable superiority of 
 the enemy and ]jlacing its strength at about an army corps. 
 What courses of action will the general decide upon? WHiat 
 orders will he give? 
 
» 
 
 Studiks in THiv Leading of Troops. i4t>- 
 
 Page 79: The division advanced in the manner dc- - 
 scribed, when advice was received of the advance of a second 
 hostile coknim in the valley of the Aupa, via Raussnitz. • 
 What orders will Lieutenant-General A issue? 
 
 Page 80: The enemy evacuated the position near Trau- 
 tenau, but, instead of retreating on the Hohenbruck road, 
 withdrew via Arnau. What will the division commander do? 
 
 Page 83: Lieutenant-General A decided to fol- 
 low the enemy after occupying the position of Trautenau. 
 Give the division commander's orders. 
 
 These assumed situations may serve as a basis for further 
 problems if the strength of the troops is changed ; for instance, 
 we could assume that, instead of the Second infantry division, 
 there was only a brigade of 6 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 2 
 batteries, or a detachment of 3 battalions, 2 squadrons, and .1 
 battery, on the spot. These troops coidd be regarded as either 
 the advance guard of a column in the rear, or as acting in a 
 perfectl}^ independent capacity. 
 
 Beginning with page 1 16, we may likewise bring the dif- 
 ferent parts of the division in entirely different situations, 
 
 either through orders from Lieutenant-General A or 
 
 measures of the enemy. For instance, Lieutenant-General 
 
 A could receive the order to hold the wooded ridge 
 
 for the time being, and at the same time be attacked from the 
 direction of Kriblitz, Alt-Rognitz, or Raussnitz. Only a small 
 detachment might advance to attack him, and so induce him 
 to make a counter-attack on his own responsibility. 
 
 Furthermore, the enemy might have occupied the country 
 about Kriblitz in force and induce the Third brigade to push 
 home the attack as soon as the Fourth brigade, on its left, 
 made no progress. It would be interesting to picture the 
 details of such an attack, with all its vicissitudes. 
 
 Assumed changes in the character of the terrane would 
 demand manifold changes in measures adopted. We might 
 assume that there was a level or rolling country from the 
 wooded Hill 504 up to the Trautenau-Hohenbruck road, or 
 that the country to the west of the Kriblitz- Alt-Rognitz line 
 was covered by a dense forest. If we apply to such a terrane 
 the various assumptions mentioned above, a multitude of new 
 
 I 
 
150 Sri'DiKs IX TiiK Lkadix«'. ok Troops. 
 
 Problems will arise, the solution of which will clearly illus- 
 trate the heterogeneity of military situations which may appear 
 to Ix; quite similar, and the study of these in all their parts 
 will afford an excellent opi)ortunity for the exercise of judg- 
 ment, resolution, and dexterity in giving orders. 
 
I 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Dispositions of the Corps Commander between ii 130 a. m. 
 
 AND 12 45 p. M. 
 
 At 11:35 Lientenant-General A came up with the 
 
 corps commander, who was with Major-General B south 
 
 of St. John's Chapel (Hill 504). He reported what had pre- 
 viously occurred, and also the state of the engagement at that 
 time. 
 
 His troops were ready to comply at once with any order 
 the corps commander might issue. (Their position is shown on 
 Map IV.) 
 
 The enemy in no wise appeared to have abandoned his in- 
 tention to offer resistance. The strip of woods along the high- 
 way north of Neu-Rognitz, the thickets northeast and east of 
 the village, as well as the Sorge quarry, appeared still to be 
 occupied by strong bodies of his infantry. Near the quarry i 
 battery which had recently come on the field had gone into 
 position, also 3 others not far from the eastern edge of Neu- 
 Rognitz, sending an occasional shrapnel into the position of 
 the First infantry brigade. 
 
 On account of the position of the corps, its aim. and its 
 connection with the Guard corps, which was expected to reach 
 Eypel during the day, the presence of the enemy so near 
 Trautenau could not be permitted. 
 
 The head of the First infantry division had become vis- 
 ible on the Liebau highway on line with the western entrance 
 to F^arschnitz, and, as its early assistance could therefore be 
 expected, the corps commander resolved to continue the action 
 with the entire force at his disposal, and to renew the attack 
 without delay. He accordingly directed Lieutenant-General 
 
 A to continue his hold on the highway, and to attack the 
 
 enemv in front and at the same time to turn his right flank. 
 
152 STUDIKS IX TliK Ll-ADIXr. Ol* TkOüPS. 
 
 The Plrst infantry division ni the meantime was to deploy 
 west of the Galgen Mountain, for the eventual support of 
 the attack. Orders were also at once despatched to the corps 
 artillery (8 batteries) to advance rapidly to the heights south 
 of Trautenau. 
 
 The cavalry brigade now passed again under the direct 
 orders of corps headquarters, of which fact the division and 
 brigade commanders were duly advised. The brigade com- 
 mander was at the same time instructed to secure the right 
 flank of the Second infantry division advancing to the attack 
 east of the liighway, not neglecting, however, to watch the 
 road to Arnau. 
 
 it took about 20 minutes to discuss past events and fur- 
 ther instructions, and at 11:55 Lieutenant-General A 
 
 was ready to issue his further orders. 
 
 At the same time the commander of the First infantry 
 division reported to the corps commander, he having hurried 
 on in advance of his troops, and stated that the point of his 
 advance guard had crossed the Aupa and was entering Traut- 
 enau. His right flank detachment (1 battalion of riflemen, 
 I squadron, 2 guns) had reached the foot of the Galgen 
 Mountain, via Nieder-Altstadt (see ^lap V.), without seeing 
 anything of the enemy, and was already in position there. 
 
 It was now foimd that the con)s artillery, which was 
 ordered to hasten up, could not soon be expected. As it was 
 placed behind the infantry, by this time it must have been far 
 back of Wolta. Ihider these circumstances the commander of 
 the First infantry division was ordered to bring up the artil- 
 lery regiment of his division and support the attack of the 
 Second division by having it take a position on the east of 
 the Galgen Mountain. (12:10 p. m.) 
 
 Shortly afterwards the battalions of the Third l)rigade, 
 then south of Ilill 504, were also seen to be moving, while at 
 the same time the general staff ofticer of the First infantry 
 division of the Guard arrived with the information that it 
 was approaching, its head on the Schomberg road about 1I/4 
 miles from Parschnitz, and that its commander was anxious 
 to know the state of the engagement, and also if he could join 
 it and give su])])ort, and if so, the i)oint of juncture. The 
 general staff officer was at once advised by the chief oi staff 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 153 
 
 of the army corps regarding past events and further inten- 
 tions; to which the corps commander added: "Tell your 
 general that I hope to overcome the resistance of the oppo- 
 nent, with my forces and without serious difficulty. The stand 
 of the enemy in such proximity, however, leads to the con- 
 clusion that he expects still further reinforcements. With a 
 view to all contingencies, I would be pleased if the Guard 
 division would be directed from Welhota upon Alt-Rognitz, 
 so as to be at hand to join in the action." 
 
 With this answer, the general staff officer left at 12:20 
 to return to the division of the Guard. At the same time 
 the point of the First infantry division reached the right flank 
 detachment west of the Galgen Alountain, where the division 
 commander made his dispositions for deployment. At 12:30 
 he had at his disposal, however, only 2 battalions of the ad- 
 vance guard, the battalion of riflemen of the right flank 
 detachment, the cavalry regiment (which had been ordered 
 up), and a battery. The third battalion of the advance guard 
 was engaged in deploying. The 5 other batteries of the 
 division artillery regiment, although ordered to advance at an 
 increased gait, had not yet arrived. The deployment of the 
 entire division and the corps artillery could not be expected 
 within less than an hour and a half, on account of the town 
 streets through which it passed being so narrow and its ad- 
 vance guard having been separated from it. 
 
 Comments on the Dispositions oe the Corps Commander 
 between 11:30 a. m. and 12:45 p. m. 
 
 As already indicated, the deployment of the enemy so 
 close to his front had convinced the corps commander that 
 he was either expecting reinforcements very soon or had al- 
 ready received them. Such a view of the situation was cer- 
 tainly not groundless. From the commanding heights south 
 of Trautenau the enemy had been able to minutely overlook 
 the approach and deployment of the Second infantry division ; 
 furthermore, the reports of the Windischgratz dragoons, who 
 had come in contact with the First division on the Liebau 
 road, must have given him the certainty of a very consider- 
 able superiority on the part of his assailant. 
 
154 Stli)1i;s jn tül-; Lkadixc, or Troops. 
 
 Unusual circumstances alone could have induced the en- 
 cniy, after a short retreat, to form his troops for action and 
 •on an extended front, .is a rule, large masses onee deployed 
 for action are forced to fight on the approach of the oppo- 
 nent, and are in no positioti to zvithdraz\.' at pleasure. To with- 
 draw, it is necessary to be in possession of highways and 
 roads, and, above all, sufficient time ; also to leave detachments 
 behind, which on the attack of the enemy will either fulfill 
 their object of covering the retreat at a great sacrifice, or, if 
 unable to hold out sufficiently long, will be thrown on the 
 trooj)s while in the act of forming columns of march. In the 
 last case the entire body of troops will find itself compelled 
 to fight with all its force, against its will, and under most un- 
 favorable conditions. 
 
 Still far more disastrous would it be to march oft" after 
 tJK most advanced line of the deployed troops is already en- 
 gaged. Unless the imfavorable situation is counterbalanced 
 ]jy superior strength, defeat can hardly be escaped. 
 
 These points are deserving of the utmost consideration 
 on the part of troop leaders. They are not as evident in maneu- 
 vers as they are in war. In proof, let us cite the engagement 
 at Weissenburg on August 4, 1870. With 4 battalions in his 
 first line and 5 in his second, General Douay deployed his weak 
 division to meet the heads of Bothmer's Bavarian division and 
 the Fifth and Eleventh Prussian army corps. As soon as he 
 ])erceived the great superiority of the enemy, it seems he was 
 sufficiently prompt in giving the order to retire. By that time, 
 however, the trooj)s were hotly engaged in front of Weissen- 
 burg and on the Lauter. It was no longer possible to with- 
 draw the troops fighting there, and the greater part of the bat- 
 talions of the second line, in support, were obliged to join \v 
 the action on the heights of the Geisberg, which ended with 
 the complete defeat of the French division. 
 
 Only extraordinarily advantageous circumstances can ad- 
 mit of exceptions to this rule, such as a strong natural ])osi- 
 lion in front, which forces the oi)ponent to restore order after 
 distur])anrc has arisen from crossing the jHxsition for the final 
 assault. -At Weissenburg, however, the fortified town and 
 the terrane along the Lauter were of no avail, by reason of 
 the overwhelming sui)eriority of the German troops, and also 
 
Studies in the Leading oe Troops. 155 
 
 the fact that the direction of their approach enabled them to 
 envelop the hostile right Hank simnltaneonsly with the attack 
 in front. 
 
 In the case before us the opponent does not even appear 
 to have occupied a strong line. Perhaps he was forced to 
 risk an engagement without hope of success, by circumstances 
 not visible to the assailant, relating, perhaps, to the direction 
 of the entire hostile army. So. there is all the more reason 
 that the First army corps should take advantage of the sit- 
 uation, although it is more likely that the opponent had al- 
 ready received reinforcements, or expected them soon, which 
 permitted him to risk an engagement at that time. 
 
 We can therefore find no fault with the commander of 
 the First army corps for deciding to continue the attack and 
 placing his entire force in readiness. The intended continua- 
 tion of the march upon Arnau certainly became dubious, 
 and for the time being prevailing conditions forbade it. The 
 strength the enemy might develop the same day or the fol- 
 lowing could not be foreseen. Moreover, his position, which 
 was only 2]/2 miles from Trautenau, the point of exit from 
 the defiles through which ran the only line of retreat of the 
 corps, permitted him to close the line of retreat at any mo- 
 ment, simply by a short advance. Nor was there any basis for 
 determining how great a force should be left behind to pro- 
 tect the point now occupied, should the march be continued. 
 Besides, the enemy from the direction of Neu-Rognitz threat- 
 ened the communication between Trautenau and Eypel, on 
 which line the Guard corps had been put in motion. 
 
 The corps commander's determination to continue the ac- 
 tion was therefore fully justified. Even should it assume 
 such dimensions as to preclude an advance of a part of the 
 corps the same day upon Arnau. the disadvantage would be 
 more than balanced by a possible victory over larger hostile 
 forces. 
 
 There was still another condition that had to be consid- 
 ered. The artillery of the two sides "was only V/i miles apart, 
 and the most advanced skirmishers only Yi mile. So in any 
 case, should the enemy stand his ground, the fire would soon 
 commence atrain. and. once commenced, the action must be 
 carried on with full vigor. 
 
156 Sti'diks J-n TiiK Ij:.\I)1X(". oi- Troops. 
 
 Thus it seemed to be perfectly proper to put the whole dis- 
 posable force in readinesfe to prosecute the attack, and accept 
 the proffered assistance of the First infantry division of the 
 (juard. We can never have too many troops on a battle-field 
 large enough for their deployment. The stronger we are, 
 the better are our prospects of victory. The truth of thes^ 
 axioms sometimes leads to too wide an interpretation of their 
 meaning. Thus we are often told to bring on the field of 
 battle all available forces; that every combination must fall 
 before a tactical victory. If this were always so, the conduct 
 of war would be much easier than it really is. 
 
 For example, if the advantage gained on the battle-field 
 might be neutralized or losses even result from the simul- 
 taneous advance of the enemy at other points, one would never 
 be justified in failing to make timely provision against such 
 danger by detaching part of his force. We must learn to dis- 
 pense on the battle-field with some of the troops available. 
 
 When the Allies were carrying out their operations against 
 Dresden on the left bank of the Elbe after the armistice of 
 1813, Napoleon, with the main body of his troops, was still 
 on the right bank of that river. The possession of König- 
 stein enabled him to cross the river with a part of his troops 
 and fall upon the rear of the Allies engaged before Dresden. 
 In view of such a contingency, the latter should have left a 
 considerable force there at the outset to secure themselves 
 against such a blow. Too little was done in that direction, 
 and tlie allied armies were threatened with annihilation, which 
 was only averted by the extraordinary bravery of the Rus- 
 sians, coupled with other favorable circumstances. 
 
 So, although battle demands the greatest ]iracticable con- 
 centration of all forces, conditions do arise which, in view of 
 the general situation, force us to employ a part of our troops 
 elsewhere. However, as many as are not needed elsewhere 
 belong on the field, where the decision of arms is expected. 
 
 A leader should not therefore lightly decline assistance 
 offered by strange troops. One is often led to do so by erro- 
 neous estimates of the situation, as well as by false pride. In 
 the engagement at Trautenau on June 2']. 1866, it is known 
 that the former was tiie reason for dechning the actually 
 nff(«rt <1 a^sistanc«' of the First infantrv (hvision of the Guard. 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 Studiks IX THE Lkadixg of Troops. 157 
 
 Examples of the latter may be learned from military history. 
 It is in the very nature of strong wills to accomplish things 
 by their own energy alone, without assistance. So it often 
 happens that a leader will say to himself: *'I and my own 
 troops will gain this victory, and will not divide the glory with 
 others. If I accept assistance, then my opportunity is lost ; for 
 a senior officer niight arrive, who would assume command and 
 carry off the honors himself." 
 
 Don't say, "I wouldn't think of doing such a thing!" It 
 has happened, and it will happen again, especially when there 
 is a chance to win a victory by one's own forces alone. We 
 must never forget that conditions may change within a short 
 space of time; and when the action goes amiss, all previous 
 scruples quickly vanish, and we welcome support that hur- 
 ries up of its own volition, though shordy before we had 
 declined it. 
 
 From this it follov/s also that the well-known rule, to 
 advance only to the sound of cannon, 's subject to exceptions. 
 Sometim.es conditions prevail which demand that a point not 
 yet assailed by the enemy be held at all hazards ; and that 
 troops posted there must not move to the assistance of their 
 sorely pressed comrades, or at least in part. Such situations 
 are of frequent occurrence. In the investment of Paris 
 (1870-71) we have numerous examples of it. 
 
 Instructions given by superior headquarters to subordi- 
 nate commanders must be explicit enough to enable them to 
 act judiciously of their own accord in situations similar to 
 those we have just been describing. The principle should al- 
 ways govern, that whenever a body of troops finds itself in 
 action, no matter how insignificant it may appear, there is a 
 decision of arms impending. Therefore every individual must 
 be animated by the desire to hasten to the spot and join in. 
 The issue is victory or defeat. Fortunately indeed, this 
 thought has become the flesh and blood of our Army. In the 
 orders to cross the frontier given to the Third Army in 1870 
 it was emphasized that if any one of the various columns 
 should encounter the enemy, adjoining columns must change 
 direction to take part in the action. In pursuance of this, the 
 Fifth Prussian corps supported P)Othmer's Bavarian division 
 at Weissenburg on the 4th of August, while the Eleventh 
 
158 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 Prussian corps advanced further than its original destination 
 in order to fall upon the enemy's right flank. 
 
 Still more are we indebted to this principle for our vic- 
 tory at Spicheren on the 6th of August. 1870, an action which 
 might easily have been turned into defeat had there been no 
 inclination among the forces to hasten to points where decis- 
 ions of arms were impending. 
 
 All that the corps commander did in the example we are 
 now considering, as measured by the foregoing standards, ap- 
 pears to be perfectly justifiable. But there is still another of 
 his measures that calls for a careful scrutiny. 
 
 At 11:55 he gave orders to the Second infantry division 
 to continue the attack. As the troops were in readiness, and 
 l>art of the enemy was less than two-thirds of a mile away, 
 the infantry action would probably begin within a short time. 
 Cjranting, however, that half an hour might elapse before the 
 actual attack, the point of the First infantry division would 
 then be deployed only to the Galgen Mountain. In the mean- 
 while the First division had advanced on the Liebau road in 
 a formation similar to that taken by the Second division on 
 the Schömberg road. (See Plan TI.) The distances between 
 the different subdivisions of the vanguard, the reserve of 
 the advance guard, and the main body of the division had 
 been well preserved. Therefore if the deployment should 
 commence at 12:30, the division could be in position between 
 the Galgen Mountain and Hohenbruck, ready to support the 
 action, only in the following order: the leading regiment al 
 r o'clock, the leading l^rigade at 1 :30, and the entire infantry 
 after 2 o'clock. 
 
 Now we come to llic (|uc-tion. What is the limit o\ the 
 fighting ])ower of a division at the i)resent time? Its defens- 
 ive strength, in a favorable position, with flanks iirotected. 
 may suffice for lialf or even an entire day even against a supe- 
 rior enemv, ])rovided its artillery has not 1)cen annihilated. Tf. 
 however, the artilk^ry has been silenced b\- the sui)eri()r tire of 
 the o])ponent. the enemy's guns will train on tlu> infantry of 
 the division, and its resistance can last but a few hours. lUit 
 in the attack by an infantry division different i)rinciples ob- 
 tain. ]\ the ground affords good co\er for the assailant's ajv 
 ])roach, one or more unsnccessful attaeks need not decide the 
 
I 
 
 Studies in the Leadixg oe Trooi-s. 159 
 
 action, and he can still carry on the fight in a desultory man- 
 ner. But if the attack must be made over open ground com- 
 manded by hostile guns, half an hour will often suffice to put 
 even a large body of attacking troops out of action, although 
 the entire force may be engaged (which, of course, must hap- 
 pen in an attack). Such indeed was the fate of Von Wedel's 
 gallant brigade of 5 battalions on August 16, 1870, during its 
 brilliant but unfortunate charge between Mars la Tour and 
 V'ionville. 
 
 -Now, although open ground in the front favors the de- 
 fense and intersected or covered ground the attack, and each 
 party to the action will seek to choose his own ground, the 
 kind of ground that we actually fight on will depend upon 
 circumstances. So we must be contented with the ground as 
 we find it. 
 
 Attacks with larger masses over unfavorable terrane can- 
 not always be avoided. If the opponent checks our progress 
 by occupying a position which for local or tactical reasons 
 cannot be turned, we must assail it, if we would advance at 
 all, no matter how difficult the ground may be. Especially is 
 this so when, in an offensive action, a brigade or division is 
 confined by other troops at the sides ; in such case it cannot 
 make a turning movement, and may be forced to pass over 
 even the most open terrane. 
 
 Later on in this study we shall attempt to illustrate how 
 such an attack should be carried through in accordance with 
 regulations ; for the present we shall make only a few remarks, 
 referring to the management of larger masses before such an 
 attack is undertaken. 
 
 In the case before us the Second infantry division could 
 have gone to pieces before Neu-Rognitz before a single regi- 
 ment of the other division had time to complete its deploy- 
 ment between the Galgen Mountain and Hohenbruck, and in 
 such an event the strength of this one regiment would have 
 been insufficient to change the condition of affairs. 
 
 The belated interposition of the First infantry division, 
 then forming up, could hardly miss being accompanied by far- 
 reaching consequences. Under the most unfavorable conditions 
 it might find itself compelled to make an entirely fresh attack, 
 and instead of the combined employment of the full force of 
 
■i6() S'i"ri)ii:s IN Tiii; Li;.\i)i.\(. oi' Tkoüps. 
 
 Hic corps, there zcifiiU/ be only an isolated employment of tzvo 
 halves. 
 
 It is therefore advisable, when eonditions will permit, not 
 ■lo begin an attack until all troops have reactied their places. 
 By so doing we can best prevent part of the force from being 
 amiihilated before the remainder is able to interfere. This 
 injunction should be heeded to-day more than ever, when we 
 V(^nsider the increased strength that the defense has gained 
 through rapid-fire guns, and especially in case the terrane as- 
 sures the defender the full use of his arms. 
 
 Even wdicn the arms of the assailant are fully equal to 
 those of the defense, the latter can maintain a superiority as 
 long as he has an extended field of fire, and before the assailant 
 has subdued him by employing a superior number of guns 
 at mid-range or shaken him by his artillery. The assailant 
 must be the stronger at points selected for the attack, so he 
 can deploy a superior force. A preponderance of fire on the 
 points of penetration must be relied on to give the decision. 
 
 There are times w hen a leader is not in a position to first 
 await the complete deployment of his troops. Should his 
 advance guard suddenly encounter the enemy, he -night often 
 have to support it by other divisions as they come up. Fur- 
 ther than this, under the pres.su re of the moment battalions 
 iwt thrown into action singly, one here and another elsewhere, 
 which leads to the severance of the higher units and mixing 
 u\j of troops, a condition of affairs that often proves fatal. In 
 such cases it is generally advisable, if conditions permit, to 
 |)re.scribe a restraining order of the advance guard, until the 
 deployment of the main body can be eflfected. 
 
 At any rate, an action will be initiated by the ])arties th-st 
 (rv. the ground, and in most cases condition^ a'-'d torranc will 
 permit the gradual employment of the ui i e fo c •. K\ten- 
 f;ive attacks, especially such as must pass over ojkmi ground 
 against a strr>ng and sufficiently manned position, proceed so 
 «apidly in our day, as alrcarly stated, that it is always recom- 
 nicndable to delay the attack until all troops intended for it 
 arc in ])osition and ready for immediate employment. 
 
 In this ease the corps cc^mmancler deviated from such 
 a course bccau.se he did not consider the strength of his oppo- 
 VKMit as verv ^reat. and he had tlu- utmost confidence in the 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 Studies in the Leading or Tkuops. i6i 
 
 ability of the division commanders and his troops. He might 
 also have been influenced by the thought that if he succeeded 
 in quickly forcing the enemy back, a part of his corps might 
 advance sufficiently far on the ^Vrnau road the same day. 
 Nevertheless, existing conditions could hardly be surveyed 
 with sufficient clearness to count with certainty on an early 
 victory, and it would have been better to have ordered the 
 attack by the Second division later, or at least not before the 
 leading brigade of the First infantry division had deployed. 
 This time would in no wise have been lost had it been skill- 
 fully utilized in preparing the attack by artillery fire. 
 
 It has always been a desirable thing to prepare an attack 
 by the use of artillery, while to-day it has become such a 
 necessity that in all cases such preparation must be made in 
 the most comprehensive manner. In like measure artillery 
 support is needed during the action. If the superior com- 
 mander precipitates his dispositions, it becomes doubtful 
 whether a sufficient number of guns can be brought up in 
 time ; at all events, it is certain there will not be enough time 
 available for preparation. 
 
 The corps commander, therefore, was quite right in plac- 
 ing a large number of guns at the disposal of the Second in- 
 fantry division. An oversight not at all insignificant, how- 
 ever, appears in the directions given for that purpose. 
 
 The duty of division artillery is naturally to first sup- 
 l^jort its own division. Corps artillery should be employed 
 wherever it appears wise to secure a massed effect. The 
 sphere of artillery is to fight at long distance ; if we would 
 therefore derive its full benefit, it should come into action 
 sooner than the infantry, and consequently its whole force 
 should, as a rule, be deployed early in the fight. For this rea- 
 son corps artillery should' not be assigned to the rear of a 
 marching column,' but rather as near the head as terrane and 
 other conditions will permit. As the leading division has at 
 its disposal a sufficient number of guns in its own artillery 
 body to initiate an action, the corps' artillery will generally be 
 l)ut between the two infantry divisions. If, however, it is 
 intended to attack the enemy in a place already reconnoitered. 
 then the mass of the artillery may be brought forward still 
 nearer the head. 
 
1 62 Studius IX TUE Lkading of Troops. 
 
 When initiating important attacks, it should be seen that 
 corps artillery is brought up to reinforce the batteries at the 
 front in proper time; this, however, does not apply "in case 
 the corps artillery itself is engaged in an independent action. 
 The commander intended to pursue such a course, but at the 
 same time he recognized that his corps was divided, and 
 marching in two columns instead of a single column. Now, 
 as the right wing division might also come upon the enemy 
 in the mountain passes, its order of march was arranged so 
 as to bring the infantry into action first. Its own batteries, 
 kept together as much äs possible, could be echeloned among 
 the infantry; but the place for the corps artillery was at tlie 
 rear of the entire column. 
 
 Should it become necessary quickly to reinforce the Sec- 
 ond division with artillery, the batteries which could arrive 
 most promptly would be called into service ; these w^ere the 36 
 guns of the Sixteenth artillery regiment of the First infantry 
 division. Taking away its own artillery from a division is a 
 measure that should be resorted to only in rare cases. We 
 should always abide by the rule that artillery should act only 
 in connection with the division to which it beloni^s. Here, 
 however, the preparation and support of the impending attack 
 could only be properly arranged by making an exceptional 
 disposition of the artillery of the First infantry division. 
 
 On the other hand, the commander of the First infantrv 
 division would have done well to hasten his artillery regijnent 
 forward to the battle-field quite early, on his own responsibil- 
 ity, under cover of his cavalry regiment. Tt is certain that tlie 
 occupation of Trautenau by the Second division was soon re- 
 ported to him by his cavalry patrols, and the fire of the guns 
 in that direction must surely have been heard, which, even if 
 not very brisk, at least indicated that the Second division was 
 in action, and it was impossible to foresee how events would 
 stand an hour later. Tlie re was therefore every inducement 
 to hasten the march as much as possible in order to reach the 
 field of action at the earliest moment. Infantry cannot main- 
 tain a quickened pace for any length of time, but cavalry and 
 artillery can. and it is therefore recommended to send these 
 arms ahead in such cases. 
 
Studies in thk Lüadinc. of Troops. 163 
 
 Finally, let us consider the horse battery attached to the 
 cavalry brigade. The expediency of such a permanent assign- 
 ment may appear questionable. Larger masses of caviilry, 
 such as divisions, certainly need artillery as soon as they pur- 
 sue independent tasks. For purposes of reconnaissance it is 
 absolutely necessary. On the battle-field the horse batteries 
 remain with the cavalry, as they are indispensable for the 
 many-sided work of the latter during and particularly after 
 an engagement. The division commander should deliberate 
 well before he employs his batteries in connection with the 
 rest of the artillery. 
 
 To attain its maximum of efficiency in the case before us, 
 the horse battery present on the field should unite its action 
 vv'ith the division artillery regiment, and with it prepare and 
 support the attack of the Second division. This could only 
 be done, however, by putting it under the orders of the regi- 
 mental commander. AH batteries on a field of action must be 
 imder the guidance of a single superior officer. 
 
 The Second Ineantry Division erom 11:30 a. m. to 
 12:45 P- ^^• 
 
 Lieutenant-General A had considered the matter 
 
 of continuing the action before the corps commander arrived, 
 so he was well posted regarding dispositions to be made when 
 he received his order. 
 
 He first turned to the commander of the First artillery 
 
 regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J , who was riding at his 
 
 side, and said (n 155) : ''The division will attack the enemy 
 before Neu-Rognitz both in front and in the flank, the flank 
 attack being made from the direction of Alt-Rognitz. Assem- 
 ble your 6 batteries under the ridge where the Second artil- 
 lery battalion is now in position, and prepare the attack. I 
 shall request the cavalry brigade to send the horse battery into 
 position on the Galgen Mountain, where the corps artillery 
 is also expected to join in the action in half an hour." Next 
 he despatched an aid to the First cavalry brigade, to request 
 the assistance of the horse battery. Then, turning to another 
 aid, he said : "Direct the Fourth brigade to form up in Alt- 
 Rognitz, with the left 550 yards from the church of St. Paul 
 
164 StiDIKS in TIIK Li'ADIXC, Ol TrOOPS. 
 
 and St. John, for a Hank attack on Xcu-Rognitz, leaving i 
 battalion south of the little Kriblitz woods at my disposal. 
 The Third brigade will advance east of the Trautenau- 
 Königinhof road, while the artillery regiment will prepare the 
 attack from the crest of Ridge 500. 1 will later give the exact 
 time for the attack to commence, i will be found with the 
 left wing of the artillery." The aid was required to repeat the 
 order before riding away. 
 
 Turning to the commander of the Third infantry brigade. 
 
 Major-General B , who had overheard his conversation 
 
 with the commanding general and the orders just given, he 
 
 said : '^Major-General B , you know the situation, and 
 
 also my intentions. Post your brigade, ready for attack, in 
 the extended woods north of Neu-Rognitz. I will give the 
 exact time for the attack later. I will be with the left wing 
 of the artillery." 
 
 By 12:04 p. m. these orders were issued. 
 
 As the corps com.mander had no further instructions to 
 give him, the division commander went up to Hill 500, north 
 of Alt-Rognitz, from which he could best survey the field of 
 attack and could assure accord in the movements of his 2 
 brigades. At 12:15 the division surgeon came up to him, and, 
 after being advised briefly of the course of action planned, 
 proposed to establish the field hospital immediately in Kriblitz. 
 to assemble the ambulance company near the eastern exit, and 
 to send it to Alt-Rognitz just as soon as he could do so. The 
 general approved of these arrangements, and ordered tliat tlic 
 troops l>e informed of them by mounted riflemen. 
 
 At 12 o'clock the commander of the First regiment of 
 field artillery had received in person the verbal order of the 
 division commander, and had then started at a gallop from 
 Hill 504 down to the First battalion, which he found in the 
 act of indepiMidently going into action near Hill 468 to engage 
 the hostile artillery northwest of Neu-Rognitz. He at once 
 put a stop to these movements, and, pointing out to the bat- 
 talion commander the position of the Secon 1 battalion, direct- 
 ed him to lead his batteries, through the sunken road south of 
 Hill 504, up to its right wing. The battalion formed column 
 of pieces to the left out of line, withdrawing by battery at a 
 trot out of range of the shrai)nel with which the hostile artil- 
 
Studies in tiik Lkadinc. ov Troops. i6.^ 
 
 lery had opened. The First horse battery had gone into ac- 
 tion at a gallop on the southern slope of the Galgen Mountain^ 
 just at the right time, and drew the enemy's fire upon itself.' 
 Nevertheless, some of the gunners of the First battalion were 
 wounded and left behind. The second echelon had halted, 
 under cover of the sunken road east of the Galgen Mountain,- 
 and followed the last battery of the battalion without being 
 fired on by the enemy. The battalion commander had hurried 
 forward, with his adjutant and several scouts, to meet the 
 regimental commander with the Second battalion. In riding' 
 forward he noticed that the batteries would be forced to keep 
 the road on account of the steepness of the hill south of Krib- 
 litz (457). He sent a scout back to the leading battery with 
 advice to that effect, and ordered the march to be continued, 
 covered, behind the ridge along the little woods south of Krib- 
 litz. On the top of this ridge, 440 yards from the right wing 
 of the Second battalion, he found the regimental commander, 
 who had hastened there to await him. He was then given the* 
 following order: *'Put your battalion in action south of the 
 little Kriblitz woods, and fire on the three hostile batteries 
 located east of Neu-Rognitz, against which the Second bat- 
 talion is already in action ; at the same time harass the infantry 
 m the patches of wood north of the village." The battatioit 
 commander thereupon called for his battery commanders, and 
 assigned to them the positions shown on the plan of the en- 
 gagement. When the batteries had gone into action, the lim« 
 bers were taken back to the edge of the woods, and 2 ammuni- 
 tion-wagons were sent to each battery from the first echeloii 
 standing near by. Contrary to the general custom, all the 
 caissons halted 440 vards on the flank, instead of in the rear of 
 the guns, covered, north of Hill 457 and near the woods ; this 
 was due to the nature of the terrane. The hostile batteries 
 east of Neu-Rognitz had not interfered with this movement, 
 as they were kept busy by the Second battalion. Although 
 the regiment had thus far used but little ammunition, and 
 had an ample supply for 3^4 hours at the ordinary rate of 
 
 fire, Lieutenant-Colonel I did not fail to appreciate the 
 
 fact that if the battle should become fiercer on the long sum- 
 mer's day, it might lead to scarcity of ammunition. He accord- 
 ino-ly sent an officer to the commander of the artillery brigade» 
 
i66 Siui)[i:s IN THE Lkading of Troops. 
 
 requesting that an artillery ammunition column be placed in 
 readiness for the reginient at Trautenau near the exit to 
 Kaussnitz. At 12:20 p. m. the First battalion opened fire with 
 all its batteries, evidently to the enemy's surprise. 
 
 Meanwhile the initiatory movements of the Third bri- 
 gade had also commenced. When Major-General B 
 
 had received his instructions from the division commander at 
 12:04 P- ^^i-» ^^^ fi^'st rode to Hill 513 (situated in the most 
 advanced line), and dismounted behind the hill with his staff. 
 Both his regimental commanders were ordered to this point, 
 where they arrived at 12:10 p. m., and received the following 
 instructions : 
 
 "The attack on the enemy's forces near Neu-Rognitz 
 will be resumed. Corps artillery has received orders to de- 
 ploy on the Galgen Mountain. The entire First regiment 
 of field artillery will go into action on Ridge 500, which you 
 see in the distance. The Fourth brigade will act against the 
 right flank of the enemy, from the direction of Alt-Rognitz, 
 while we attack his front as soon as ordered to do so by the 
 division commander. 
 
 "Colonel D [First regiment | , you will ])ropare the 
 
 attack with your fire, but do not advance beyond the line now 
 held by the Twelfth and Tenth companies. When you attack, 
 the center of your regiment will take as march direction the 
 northwest corner of the large woods north of Neu-Rognitz, 
 and you will connect with the Second regiment. 
 
 "Colonel E [Second regiment], deploy your forces 
 
 to the left of the First regiment, in a covered position ; your 
 objective will be the left wing of the same woods. 
 
 "A line separating your regiments would run from Hill 
 513 to the western edge of Hill 527." 
 
 The commanders thereupon returned t(i their respective 
 regiments. 
 
 Colonel D^ ordered his Second battalion to fall in 
 
 at once, and to deploy for the preparatory fire between Hohen- 
 bruck and the Tenth comi)any, which was near the edge of the 
 woods. The Third battalion' likewise was directed to open fire 
 with the 3 companies present. Near 12:30 the Ninth and 
 Twelfth companies from the direction of the village, followed 
 by the iMfth. Sixth, and Seventh c(^mpanies, and the Tenth 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 167 
 
 company from the direction of the edge of the woods, were 
 engaged at 900 to 1,000 yards in a brisk fire with the hostile 
 skirmishers lying north of Neu-Rognitz. The Eighth com- 
 pany was lying under cover in line in the woods on Hill 509. 
 The First battalion, under orders of the regimental com- 
 mander, moved in column of march in a depression close up 
 to Hohenbruck, where it halted under cover. The Second 
 regiment was so posted that the Third battalion (3 compa- 
 nies) moved up more closely to Hill 513, thereby making room 
 for the Second battalion, which was grouping on the same 
 line. Both battalions had posted themselves under cover in 
 two echelons in company columns, a few skirmishers in front, 
 because it was not the intention for them to open fire, by 
 reason of the great distance and the obstructed view to their 
 front. The First battalion, in column of platoons, moved up 
 behind the center of the two leading battalions. 
 
 The brigade commander inspected the positions of the 
 closed subdivisions, and when the. preparatory fire of the 
 companies of the infantry regiment was heard to be steadily in- 
 creasing, he directed that the amrunifon in lh^ cartridge- 
 wagons be at once issued. This issue proceeded prompty and 
 without difficulty in the case of the companies not under fire. 
 The companies already partially deployed sent back men under 
 a non-commissioned officer to the cartridge-wagons, who car- 
 ried the cartridges up in bags and threw the packages to the 
 men on the skirmish line. The latter found room for the 
 cartridges in their haversacks and trousers and coat pockets. 
 At 12 :45 p. m. the empty cartridge-wagons were sent back to 
 Trautenau, going east of the Hopfen Mountain. At that time 
 Major-General B again returned to Hill 513. 
 
 It could be distinctly seen that the enemy occupied the 
 foot of the line of hills from the strip of woods near the high- 
 way to the meadow situated to the east of the highway, with 
 strong lines of skirmishers. Near the patches of woods sit- 
 uated to the northeast and east of Neu-Roq-nitz large closed 
 bodies appeared, between which, as previously stated, 3 bat- 
 teries were in position not very far from the village. 
 
 When Major-General C received the order that 
 
 the division commander had sent bv his second aid (12:08 
 
i68 St um i:s in tuk Lkadix'-. of Troops. 
 
 p. 111.), he was standing with the two regimental commander': 
 between the Third and Fourth regiments. 
 
 It was a source of great satisfaction to the brigade com- 
 mander that the artillery on Ridge 50CJ was reinforced. If the 
 batteries on his side did not obtain a superiority over those 
 of the enemy, the position of the densely massed Fourth in- 
 fantry brigade w^ould be endangered by shrapnel although it 
 might be well covered. At all events, some time must elapse 
 before the First battalion of field artillery would come up, and 
 even after its arrival it would be out of the question to lead the 
 brigade to Alt-Rognitz, by a flank march, over country in full 
 view of the enemy, about ^ mile from the hostile infantry and 
 13/2 miles from the hostile artillery. As a consequence Major- 
 General C issued the follovv^ing order : 
 
 "The attack on the enemy in position ne ir Neu-Rognitz 
 will be resumed. The division artillery will prepare the as- 
 sault from the crest of Hill 500, the Third brigade attacking 
 the front from the direction of Hohenbruck, the Fourth bri- 
 gade attacking the flank from Alt-Rognitz. Orders for the 
 initiation of the attack will be issued by the division com- 
 mander. Colonel F (Third infantry] will leave i bat- 
 talion here for use by the division commander, but will ad- 
 vance with the two others behind the Second battalion of ar- 
 tillery, and, passing Hill 530 through the woods in front of 
 Alt-Rognitz, post the battalions on the Jeft wing in the sec- 
 ond line under cover. Colonel G r [Fourth infantry] 
 
 will post his regiment in such manner that it will be ready for 
 both attack and defense in the depression of Alt-Rognitz, with 
 a breadth of 875 yards and the right resting on Hill 425. 
 Messages will reach me near Hill 425. Each legiment will 
 send me i mounted officer." 
 
 Colonel F at once designated the Third battalion 
 
 to pass under the direct orders of the division commander: 
 his 3 battalion adj'.itants had already come up to him for in- 
 structions. The First and Second battalions of the Third 
 infantry, in double i^latoon cohnnns, were at once given orders 
 to start without delay, proceeding in column of march along 
 the southern e.lge of the Kriblitz woods and turning toward 
 Hill 530. At that point the regimental commander, who had 
 ridden ahead, directed i battalion upon each of the roads lead- 
 
I 
 
 Studh:s in Tili; Lkadinc. ()i- Tkoops. i6<> 
 
 ing south toward Ait-Rognitz. The shifting of tlie battahons 
 to" the left wing had been effected without serious loss, as it 
 had taken place mostly under cover; the Second battalion of 
 the Third infantry, which was in rear of the artillery battal- 
 ion, had, however, lost about 30 men by shrapnel that had 
 reached farther than expected. At 12:45 the battalions were 
 in single platoon columns at the southern edge of the woods 
 north of Alt-Rognitz. (See Map V.) The commander of 
 the Fourth infantry regiment waited until the First battalion 
 of artillery had gone into action, and when at 12:30 the fire 
 from the enemy's batteries appeared to slacken, he ordered the 
 Third battalion to shift 440 yards to the left, in the bottoms 
 near Ait-Rognitz, under cover. The Second battalion, in 
 company column, immediately took the place of the Third 
 near Mill 425. The First battalion advanced over open 
 ground with the companies in column of march, but without 
 much loss, up to and along the road leading into the center of 
 Alt-Rognitz, and about 12:45 took up a position on the south- 
 ern edge of the village to the left and alongside the Third bat- 
 talion.' The latter had sent forward 2 companies into the un- 
 dulating ground 361, which entered into a fire fight with hos- 
 tile skirmish lines at a distance of about 1,200 yards. 
 
 In the meantime the l-rigade commander had repaired to 
 the northeastern corner of the thicket in front of Mill 425, 
 where he had dismounted to observe the progress of the de- 
 ployment of his brigade. When he chanced to see the divis- 
 ion flag on the eastern hill (500), he sent his aid, on foot, up 
 to the hill, to report the dispositions he had made. The divis- 
 ion commander approved his dispositions, and sent word back 
 that he would give the order to attack as soon as the 2 bat- 
 talions of the Third infantry had arrived on the left wing. 
 
 At 12:45 the artillery regiment had gained a superiority 
 of fire over the 3 hostile batteries east of Neu-Rognitz, and 
 the hostile infantry had extended farther to the east, occupy- 
 ing the thickets along the wagon-road on the right wing. 
 
 Lieutenant-General A . who had been on Hill 500 
 
 for about half an hour, sent an aid to the hussar regiment, 
 with instructions to follow the advance of the Fourth infantry 
 brigade, and at the same time continue to keep watch over 
 the country between Rudersdorf and the Aupa by patrols. 
 
ijo Studiks IX Tin: Leading of Troops. 
 
 He also sent a niountcd rifleman with the following written 
 order to the engineer company in Trautenau : 
 
 "The company of engineers will proceed to Hohenbruck 
 and prepare that village for defense, especially along the high- 
 way, as soon as it will be no longer needed in Trautenau." 
 
 Another mounted rifleman was sent to the flank detach- 
 ment still situated near Welhota (the Eleventh company of the 
 First infantry, and half a troop of the Fourth squadron), with 
 written orders to advance to Raussnitz, where they would join 
 the division of the Guard as soon as any part of it should reach 
 there, and take direction toward Alt-Rognitz. 
 
 Comments on thk DjspOvSjtions of the Second Infantry 
 Division from 11:30 a. m. to 12:45 p-^^- 
 
 The corps commander had already ordered that the at- 
 tack be made by a turning movement. Consequently a part 
 of the forces must be put in motion against the right flank 
 of the enemy simultaneously with the advance against his 
 front. In this the division was at an advantage in its being 
 already deployed to some extent ; otherwise still more time 
 would have been lost in making preliminary movements. 
 Only most urgent circumstances can justify a simple frontal 
 attack. (See page 92, Part II.) The great strength of the 
 defense compels us to combine a frontal attack with a turn- 
 ing movement, whenever practicable. 
 
 It is essential, however, in a successful attack of this 
 kind, that, if possible, the turning movement remain con- 
 cealed from the enemy for a long time, or else that he be 
 held fast in front until it becomes effective. In this lat- 
 ter direction too much is frequently done ; as a rule, we im- 
 agine the enemy can only be effectively held in his front by 
 a more or less energetically executed attack. This is by no 
 means so H'itJi Iar_i^c>' bodies of troops: in such cases it is only 
 necessary that the troops near the enemy be held in readiiYcss 
 for the attack, since, as we have previouslv noted, the deployed 
 enemy is no longer in position to withdraw altogether from 
 the action. The battle of Oravelotte and St. Privat, August 
 18, 1870, both in general and in detail, affords examples which 
 cannot be too carefully considered. 
 
 I 
 
Studies in thi^ Leading of Troops. 
 
 171 
 
 How far the turning movement should extend can be 
 foreseen only in the lesser operations of war, and when the 
 ground can be fully surveyed. In general, it should be gov- 
 erned by the strength of troops available, else too great an 
 extension may easily follow. 
 
 In the battle above mentioned it was intended to hold the 
 enemy firmly in front until it would be possible for the left 
 wing, wheeling around, to grasp the right flank of the French 
 army. General headquarters was in error, however, in believ- 
 ing that the hostile position reached only to Amanvillers ; in 
 reality it extended beyond it to St. Privat la Montague, and 
 later even to Roncourt. 
 
 The village of Alt-Rognitz was assigned to the Fourth 
 infantry brigade as the point at which to begin the turning 
 movement. But in order to avoid a premature attack, the 
 line beyond which it should not advance was also stated, the 
 extension of the left wing having been fixed at about 550 
 yards west of the church of St. Paul and St. John. However, 
 it could not be foreseen whether the flank attack would act- 
 ually take place from that point; in the meantime the enemy 
 could have started counter-measures, or he could have extend- 
 ed his right wing and placed reserves behind it. In such a 
 case the attack of the Fourth infantry brigade would also be 
 a frontal one. 
 
 Under any circumstances, however, the combined action 
 of both brigades must be secured; otherwise, if the enemy 
 should make use of the most effective counter-measure in 
 such tactics (an offensive advance, say against the Third bri- 
 gade, to annihilate it before the too distant Fourth could ren- 
 der assistance), the whole division might be dispersed. 
 
 In view of this it seems wise that Lieutenant-General 
 A should have designated the southern exit of Alt- 
 Rognitz as the point beyond which the Fourth brigade should 
 not extend. From that point to the highway the distance was 
 about a mile and a half, and would gradually become less as 
 the two brigades advanced. Comnron action of the separate 
 bodies would probably be practicable very soon. 
 
 The division commander had reserved for himself the 
 fixing of the time for beginning the attack, as he wished first 
 to await the effect of the artillery fire. By this he assured 
 
172 Studies in the Leading oe Troops. 
 
 llie simultaneous start of both brigades. For instance, had 
 lie ordered the Third brij^ade to start as soon as the Fourth 
 advanced from Alt-Rognitz, the commander of the Third bri- 
 gade might be induced to lead forward his entire force at the 
 moment single companies of the Fourth might come out for 
 hre preparation. .Vt a mile and a quarter from Hohenbruck. 
 where the commander of the Third brigade had halted, it wa:s 
 difficult to overlook the left wing, while the operations of the 
 I'ourth brigade, in the bottoms, could not be seen at all. 
 
 Jt was therefore better for the division commander to 
 have instructed the brigades not to start before he had given 
 the orders. Everything depended on the simultaneous onset 
 of both brigades, which must be governed by the effect of the 
 artillery and the movements of the brigade on the left wing. 
 As soon then as Lieutenant-General A selected a sta- 
 tion from which he could oversee the deployment of the lat- 
 ter for attack, he was in position to chose a time for the start 
 of the Third brigade. 
 
 The division commander ])roposed to use all his troops 
 for the attack, retaining t battalion, however, at his disposal. 
 We have already stated that generally ai\ action must not be 
 initiated without a reserve, but here we may say that as the 
 corps commander v/as conducting the fight, the entire First 
 division was a fighting reserve. For the Second division it 
 meant a decisive attack, and therefore all its parts must be 
 jHit in motion in such a manner that they may proiuptly par- 
 ticipate in the action. Only absolutely necessary detachments 
 must be made, like the company near Welhota in the valley 
 of the Aupa. The front of the division is so extensive that the 
 decision would come quickly, and a few battalions held in 
 reserve far to the rear could hardly l)e led up in time to where 
 thev might be needed. They might arrive soon enough to sup- 
 port retiring forces, but to assure a victory they niust repeat 
 an attack at which a regiment or a brigade had just failed, 
 the chances for success in which in all probability would be 
 less than if retiring troops were merely supported. The main 
 \nnut is this: give the artillery .plenty of time for its work; 
 liave the terrane thoroughly reconnoitered ; and carefully (Ifs- 
 l>o.se your infantry. The support of the most advanced tn^^ps 
 is then the dnlv of the succeediuL: echelons, which must be 
 
Studii^s in the Lkadixg of Troops. 173 
 
 near enough to join in the action before hesitation in the fight 
 ing Hne grows to a retrograde movement. JVhcn the time for 
 d decidiui^ action has arrived, and it is no longer a matter of 
 merely initiating an attack, it is not advisable to detach a spe- 
 cial reserve from tJie troops that are disposable for the attack, 
 so long as there' are already other troops in readiness for 
 reserve dutv. The i battaUon that the division commander 
 retained at his disposition was to be put into action at such 
 ])oint of the attacking hne at which a clieck might occur. 
 
 We should not fail to note that the reserve put in readi- 
 ness by the First infantry division was very incomplete. In 
 the act of forming up on the right tlank of the line of battle, 
 it was not in condition to afford timely relief to the left wing 
 of the division in case it failed in the attack. In such an event 
 it would be entirely dependent upon accident at what point 
 
 J.j'eutenant-General A could rally his troops, and it 
 
 would have been better had he reserved still more of his 
 trtops, so that he could rendQr innricdiatc support to the at- 
 tacking troops at a decisive point. 
 
 As it was, his division for the time being was entirely 
 dependent upon itself, and an isolated division will not do well 
 if it attacks without a special fighting reserve. 
 
 A still greater error was seen in our battles of 1866, in 
 that brigades or divisions advancing for a decisive attack left 
 battalions behind in defensive positions in suitable sections of 
 the terrane. When the object is the forcing of a decision in 
 front, a single reserve battalion may often turn the scale ; 
 therefore, it" must not be wanting. Retiring forces, on the 
 other hand, if their power of resistance is not completely bro- 
 ken, will of themselves make a stand in a favorable position. 
 
 The issue of the orders by the division commander pro- 
 ceeded in the rotation of their importance, according to his 
 «jwn judgment. 
 
 First, instructions were verlmlly given to the commander 
 of the artillery regiment, .whose batteries must prepare the 
 attack as long as necessary. Then came the orders to the 
 Fourth brigade, wliich had to march the farthest on account 
 of the proposed turning movement before it could join in the 
 action. Finally he gave the orders to the Third brigade, which 
 l^robablv need' not start for three-quarters of an hour. 
 
174 Studiks in Til}; Ljcadi.ng of Trooi'S. 
 
 If a judicious sequence in giving orders is observed in 
 such situations, a few precious minutes may generally be 
 gained. 
 
 The issue of a regularly arranged written division order 
 for all parties could hardly be expected on account of the lit- 
 tle time available. Verbal orders were accordingly issued to 
 the various headquarters. The transmission of orders is has- 
 tened and fa 'Hi täte d if commanders keep up communication 
 with their si/^erior through staff officers. While the com- 
 mander of tl si Third infantry brigade rode up to the division 
 commander, the commander of the artillery had remained with 
 
 Lieutenant-General A . Major-General C (Fourth 
 
 infantry brigade) was nearly a mile away, by reason of the 
 situation of the combat, and his orders must be sent by one 
 of the aids. It was very fortunate that both the regimental 
 
 commanders were with Major-General C ; one of them 
 
 had his battalion adjutants with him, so that the regiment 
 ( Third infantry) could transmit its orders directly to the com- 
 panies. We should endeavor to issue in writing all orders 
 for brigades or larger units ; lack of time alone, as in this case, 
 can justify an exception. 
 
 Right here we would ngain state that it is better to make 
 your orders somewhat too explicit than to leave a subordinate 
 commander without a sufficient view of the situation. With 
 regard to the order given the comniander of the artillery, it 
 seems that the least possible was said ; but the few words that 
 were said embraced the main points necessary for the com- 
 mander to know — the objective of th^ attack, its p'an, and 
 the task which fell to the artillery regiment for the time b:- 
 ing. It said explicitly, "Assemble your 6 batteries '•' '•' '"^' 
 and prepare the attack." It could not be inferred from this 
 that the activity of the batteries would cease with the prepara- 
 tion, but rather that as soon as the infantry advanced to the 
 attack, the artillery would receive further orders, governing 
 its action during the Fight. Nevertheless the order might have 
 gone further and directed the regiment hrst to subdue the bat- 
 teries east of Xeii-Rognitz, and tlun turn its lire ui)on the 
 infantry in the patches of woods lunih of the village. 
 
 As a rule, it is the artillery that is least informed regard- 
 ing the course' of affairs. "I p to tli-.' coinnieneement of llie 
 
Studies in thk Leading of Troops. 175 
 
 action the artillery commander is with the leader of the bod^ 
 of troops to which he is attached, and the first orders neces- 
 sary for his part in the action will come from that leader. He 
 will then take command of his troops, or at least the largest 
 united body of them, but will keep up continuous communi- 
 cation with his regular commander." This is what Drill Reg- 
 ulations prescribe for the field artillery. If th^ artillery com- 
 mander is not given the necessary orders or th- general view, 
 he must insist that it be done. In the case t fore us, how- 
 ever, all that was necessary had been given in the orders. 
 
 Furthermore, it was judicious to point out at the proper 
 time, to tlie artillery commander, the plan of the leader of the 
 action, and to assign his part therein. A division commander 
 must acquire the habit of considering his 36 guns as a col- 
 lective battle unit, as he does with his infantry brigades and 
 his cavalry regiment. He would dispose of single battalions 
 of his brigades only in exceptional cases, and he must adopt 
 the same principle with reference to his batteries. 
 
 Judging from the course of the action up to 1 1 130, there 
 was always danger that the 2 battalions of field artillery 
 would become separated. Should such happen, it would have 
 been doubtful whether the 3 hostile batteries east of Neu- 
 Rognitz could have been promptly subdued, and the speecty 
 attack that was planned would then have to be aban- 
 doned; or, if the infantry attack were nevertheless under- 
 taken, it would be a very bloody affair and its outcome 
 uncertain. While so separated the First battalion of ar- 
 tillery could hardly go into action at any other point than 
 the Galgen Mountain, and as the Sixteenth regiment of field 
 artillery was also to take position there, all would have been 
 obliged to go into action at diminished intervals or in terrace 
 formation. At all events, the position would have been a very 
 crowded one. Furthermore, the division commander would 
 have lost control of half his artillery; for if the First battal- 
 ion remained near the Galgen Mountain, according to regu- 
 lations it would pass under the command of the senior artil- 
 ler}^ commander, who in this case was the commander of the 
 Sixteenth regiment. If the division commander should keep 
 the 6 batteries together under his command, he could not 
 only prepare the attack from stage to stage, but accompany 
 
1 76 Stitdiks IX TiiK Leadixg of Troops. 
 
 it with his artillery. It \v(nil(l have been still better if the artil- 
 lery could have i:^one into action farther off on the left ; it 
 would not have been necessary then to fire over the heads of 
 the infantry, although the latter was posted in a deep ravine. 
 The terrane, however, did not permit this. 
 
 As for the cavalry regiment, it was directed to follow the 
 fourth brigade and at the same time reconnoiter with patrols 
 the country between Rudersdorf and the Aupa. We know 
 from experience that such an order is a rare one, ^and that 
 generally an entire regiment is charged with reconnaissance. 
 The latter course, however, does not seem to be the correct 
 one. The engagement about to be initiated was the main 
 object in view, and for it all forces should be put in readiness. 
 For other purposes detachments only should be used, and 
 these only as far as unavoidably necessary. An advance of 
 hostile bodies between Rudersdorf and the Aupa would be in 
 the highest degree dangerous, but there was not the last indi- 
 cation that such was likely to occur. All that was necessary 
 was to take measures l)y which such a movement of the enemy 
 would be discovered in time to meet it properly, for which 
 purpose ])atrols would suffice, ^vhile the rest of the cavalry 
 could be used to advantage in the action itself. It would 
 tlien have been better to have given it such an order as would 
 permit it to join in the action according to the terrane and 
 the special conditions. 
 
 The commander of the hussar regiment interpreted his 
 order aright in his not following directly behind the Fourth 
 brigade, but keeping in line with its left wing at a distance of 
 •from 400 to 500 yards. 
 
 It is always necessary to secure the fianks (^f troops in 
 action. Rut we should l)ear in mind that, as a rule, this can 
 be accomi)lished by patrols. .\n observance of this ])rin- 
 ciple will avoid the misuse of the cavalry regiment of a divis- 
 ion that so often ()ccurs in actual war, and the regiment will 
 not be lost to its j^-oper role. 
 
 TmC v'^l'A'KRAI. 1*\RTS OK Till-; l)l\K10\. 
 
 As for the Mrst battalion of the First field artillery reg- 
 hnent. in accordan::e with i)revious arrangements it must re- 
 ceive its orders from Major-Oeneral I» until it again 
 
Studies in the Leading oe Troops. 177 
 
 reverted to its regimental commander. The latter received his 
 instructions from the division commander, in the presence of 
 
 Major-General B , on Hill 504 (south of the Hopfen 
 
 Mountain), and this made it clear to Major-General B 
 
 that he was then deprived of the command of the battalion of 
 artillery. While the commander of the artillery regiment was 
 receiving the orders of the division commander, the First bat- 
 talion was led to seek em])]oyment which was not warranted 
 by the circumstances. This will always happen when sub- 
 ordinate commanders are ambitious to achieve great results 
 and their superiors do not understand how to restrain them. 
 The difficulty increases when the two commanders are not 
 sufficiently acquainted with each other, which generally hap- 
 pens with the commanders of the infantry and the artillery 
 at the beginning of a war. This makes it all the more nec- 
 essary that an officer should acquire perfect familiarity with 
 the art of commanding troops. 
 
 The temptation that led the First battalion to act on its 
 own responsibility was indeed great. Just examine, for in- 
 stance, the situation before us. The enemy's shrapnel are 
 reaching the Third infantry brigade, in consequence of which 
 the troops suffer some losses, which cause much depression 
 when nothing is done to subdue or divert the enemy's fire. 
 Not far distant are 18 of our own guns, the arm that alone 
 is capable of accomplishing such a task at long range, and 
 vet they do not show the slightest inclination to undertake 
 'their task. Is it not natural that every one should then become 
 impatient and exclaim, *'\Vhy do you not rid us of the hostile 
 artillery? What are you here for?" In most cases the artil- 
 lery will be put to such use, but the orders for such should 
 come from the superior commander. 
 
 It was Major-General B 's duty to bring the artil- 
 lery into action there; or, if he no longer controlled it (as 
 
 was indeed the casej, then it was Lieutenant-General A 's 
 
 duty alone. Yet if the battalion should open the engagement 
 on its own account, it might bring about a more extended 
 action, for which, in the leader's opinion, the time had not yet 
 arrived, or it might become engaged on the left wing while 
 the leader needed it more urgently on the other. 
 
178 Studiks in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 Without the Tipproval of the commander of the Third 
 brigade, under whom the battahon still remained, it should 
 not, under the circumstances, take post on Hill 468 (southeast 
 of the Galgen Mountain) and open fire. Inquiry of the brigade 
 commander would not have otTended the latter, even though 
 he might not have especially recommended inquiries, for the 
 right to ask if one may act with troops under one's command 
 will be granted by every commander to the leader of an inde- 
 pendent subdivision under his orders. Abrupt answers, how- 
 ever, should always be avoided on the part of superiors, as 
 they stifle independent thought and create indifference in 
 subordinates. 
 
 As already stated, the regimental commander prevented 
 the leader of the First battalion from carrying out his inten- 
 tion to bring his battalion independently into fire on the right 
 wing. At first the batteries may not have comprehended the 
 meaning of this order, and thought it strange they should not 
 be permitted to silence a hostile battery when they could eas- 
 ily do so. But from their standpoint they could not perceive 
 the general purpose of the engagement, nor did they know 
 that soon the Sixteenth regiment would take their place and 
 they would be assigned work on the left wing. 
 
 The evacuation of a position a mile and a half from the 
 enemy ought certainly to be avoided, no less than the losses 
 resulting from a flank march, but in this case the hostile bat- 
 tery did not have the range, and the distance of the flank march 
 was not much over 200 yards, which could- be quickly covered 
 at a gallop. At all events, this temporary impleasant situa- 
 tion was for the purpose of applying the rule to deploy from 
 the start a superiority of guns in one place, so as to secure 
 their combined effect early. The fire was to be directed on 
 the hostile artillery, the batteries east of Neu-Rognitz. The 
 position south of the little Kriblitz woods assigned the First 
 battalion was almost a mile and two-thirds from the enemy's 
 batteries. This is a favorable distance for eff'ect and observa- 
 tion, although guns have a much greater range. The oppor- 
 tunity of observing the ])osition of the o|)p(^n'Mit and the effect 
 of fire d(.'creases materially with longer distances. The posi 
 tion chosen for the l^^irst battalion had the further advantage 
 of bein</ able to .'each tlir rii^lit wiuL!' <»f 'he enemv with .v 
 
I 
 
 . Studies in the: Leading of Troops. 179 
 
 f!aiiking fire. The entire artillery regiment had an extensive 
 field of fire, which was almost everywhere open. It was also 
 in a position to establish a line of fire at right angles to the 
 front. There was ample room for the 6 batteries, each bat- 
 tery having a space 100 yards wide, and the interval between 
 guns need not be shortened. The distance of 200 yards be- 
 tween the 2 battalions was caused by the terrane, and in no 
 wise interfered with the supervision of fire. It was indeed 
 impossible to sweep the ground at short distance, as the slope 
 to the southwest was very steep and the country in front could 
 not be seen. As it was, however, the danger of attack by 
 hostile infantry was very remote; our infantry was massed in 
 front of the artillery, and the division commander had reserved 
 the Third battalion of the Third infantry for emergencies. 
 
 Placing the guns behind the crest of Ridge 500-547, with 
 the muzzles above the ridge, was a wise measure. It is true 
 the enemy was assisted in determining his own range and ob- 
 serving the efi'ects of his own fire by the artillery regiment 
 having been placed near the southern point of the little Krib- 
 litz woods, but this was a measure that could not be avoided ; 
 while, on the other hand, the dark background formed by the 
 pines (especially so with the First battalion) made it difficult 
 for the enemy to obtain a good aim on the ground in front 
 where the batteries were stationed. 
 
 The position of the First battalion had been reconnoitered 
 and designated by the regimental commander. The battalion 
 commander quickly perceived that for his batteries to stand 
 at right angle to the front, they must be echeloned to the 
 right and. rear at distances of 50 to 60 yards; a formation, 
 however, which would not interfere . with the supervision of 
 fire. The First battalion was certainly poorly located for an 
 eventual retreat. But there need hardly be any fear of this, 
 and the battalion could be withdrawn to the east or west, go- 
 ing around the little Kriblitz woods. The advance of the Sec- 
 ond battalion in line to the fire position was a simple move- 
 ment ; the battalion was fired upon but little, and the advance 
 could be made under cover. With the First battalion the posi- 
 tion of each battery commander had to be designated, not 
 alone on account of the echelon formation and the steepness of 
 the slope, but also because Hill 460 obstructed the view to a 
 
.8o Studies in the Leading oi^ Troops. 
 
 certain extent, as it lay between the position and the enemy. 
 On account of the mountainous terrane, the batteries moved 
 into position at a walk, and unlimbered toward the right flank. 
 The First battery, on the right wing, was forced to carefully 
 select a position for each gun, because of the hills in front, 
 and therefore its chiefs of pieces advanced on foot. As stated, 
 the First battalion opened fire at 12:20. Special measures had 
 to be adopted at once to lessen the recoil of the pieces. 
 
 While the Second battalion had contested a fully equal 
 artillery without a decided success since 11:30, the First bat- 
 talion could expect to reach a decision very soon if no new 
 hostile batteries appeared. It seems the enemy had not ob- 
 served it go into position, and the sudden opening of fire by 
 this superior artillery must have made a strong impression. 
 
 The division commander had designated the purpose of 
 the action — the attack on the enemy before Neu-Rognitz. To 
 make this attack, it was first necessary to drive away or sub- 
 due the batteries east of the village. It was therefore entire- 
 ly proper that the right and center batteries ( First and Second 
 respectively) of the First battalion should be ordered to open 
 on the hostile artillery with increased rapidity. The center 
 battery was instructed to get the range, although the distance 
 could be reasonably well determined by the map. The task 
 of the battery on the right wing was difficult. In the first 
 place, its position was in the neighborhood of Contour 450, 
 while the opposing batteries occupied positions between Con- 
 tours 450 and 500; furthermore, some intervening wooded hills 
 forced the battery chief to use indirect fire. The left wing bat- 
 tery (Third) was directed to fire on the hostile infantry in the 
 patch of woods north of Ncu-Rognitz. As it stood on Hill 475, 
 it could overlook the hostile j^osition tolerably well, and took the 
 entire skirmish line between the highway and the northern 
 footpath under fire, as well as the troops in close order in the 
 edge of the larger piece of woods. 
 
 The commander of the First b.ittalion sent an assistant 
 observer and three motmted orderlies to Hill 513. .\ftcr sev- 
 eral rounds of shrapnel with percussion fu.se, in order to fix 
 the distance, the batteries proceeded to use shrapnel with time 
 fuse. The First battalion fired quite briskly with 2 batteries, 
 about 6 shots j)er miinite. while the M^hird battery, firitig on 
 
Studies in teik Leading of Troops. i8j 
 
 the infantry, limited itself to ordinary tire (about 4 shots per 
 minute). The men stood near the guns in the First battalion, 
 as up to that time they had received no hostile fire ; those ol 
 the Second battalion, on the contrary, who had already been 
 for some time under a damaging fire, kneeled down in order 
 to lessen their losses. 
 
 Firing over their own infantry could not be avoided. 
 However, this only occurred with the left wing of the Second 
 infantry regiment. 
 
 The horse battery on the southern slope of the Galgen 
 Mountain had come under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
 J , according to orders issued ; but as it was quite dis- 
 tant, and had a separate task, and as the commander of the 
 Sixteenth regiment of field artillery might arrive there at any 
 moment, it was left independent. It was no easy matter for 
 the horse battery to hold its own against the hostile battery 
 standing under cover on Hill 569, east of Sorge. The former 
 was completely in the open, aslant on the hill, and considerably 
 lower. 
 
 The important question of replenishing the ammunition 
 was easy of solution for the Second battalion. The battery 
 commanders had brought 3 ammunition-wagons up to each 
 battery. The first echelon was placed under cover on the 
 right wing behind Hill 500, next to its limbers, which had 
 been sent back. The battalion commander had the caissons 
 halt in the ravine north of Hill 504, and brought 3 ammuni- 
 tion-wagons for each battery up to the first echelon. The dis- 
 positions of the First battalion in this connection have already 
 been described. 
 
 From the above it is seen that a special support Is just 
 as rarely attached to artillery in action as on the march. ( See 
 Part L,' page 28.) While in the act of preparing and sup- 
 porting an attack to be undertaken by the other arms, bat- 
 teries will generally take position in the vicinity ; but it is the 
 duty of all arms to hasten to the assistance of a battery when 
 the latter is endangered. One of Blücher's general orders 
 threatened with court-martial any battalion or regiment of cav- 
 alry that did not hasten to the defense of a threatened battery 
 and thereby lose at least half its men. This feeling of true 
 brotherhood in arms must prevail in any army, and the Ger- 
 
i82 StudiI'S in Tin-: Leadixc, of Troops. 
 
 man troops have given splendid evidence of it in the last cam- 
 paign. It was this spirit that prompted Von Hindenbur^'s 
 aquadron of the Second regiment of dragoons of the (luard 
 to throw itself upon far superior cavalry at Vionville and 
 Mars la Tour on the i6th of August. 1870, in order to save 
 Von.^er Planitz's horse battery of the Guard. The same spirit 
 also' led the fusilier battalion of the Eighty-fifth regiment to 
 ailvance past the batteries of the Ninth corps on the i8th of 
 Aup^ust, 1870, but it left its commander (Major Wolff von 
 GOTtentow), 10 officers, and 370 men lying on the field. 
 
 Many such instances may be cited both on our own side 
 cind that of our opponents during the campaigns of 1866 and 
 of 1870-71. 
 
 It will therefore only be necessary to send special bodies 
 of troops for the temporary protection of batteries when 
 protection is not assured by the general dispositions. In the 
 exan^ple before us, bodies of troops w^ere everywhere near the 
 various artillery battalions, ready in case of danger to hasten 
 to their suport at the proper time. It would have been en- 
 tirely useless to charge single companies especially with this 
 ^ut^, for in case of change of position the accelerated gait 
 of the artillery would make it impossible for them to follow 
 the batteries and they would be lost also to the infantry fight. 
 But if a battery comes into a situation where it must take a 
 |>oßition apparently not sufficiently secured by the deployment 
 of other troops, then the commander-in-chief must provide for 
 its safety. If the commander-in-chief is not present, the artil- 
 lery should request the nearest body of troops to provide its 
 cover ; such a request will always be i)romptly complied with — 
 at least it is the duty of troops to do so as far as they are able. 
 
 \n the Third infantry brigade Major-General B 
 
 had the regimental commanders called up, to give them the 
 final order for attack at a moment's notice, from a point where 
 tlie entire battle-field could be surveyed. There is more neces- 
 sary to-day than ever, as the accuracy and long range of fire- 
 arms demand very cautious dispositions, and especially a thor- 
 oug1i utilization of the ground. This applies, however, not 
 only to the superior commanders, but also to leaders of smaller 
 sul>divisions. In order to issue orders in this manner, ample 
 time must be allowed, but in the heat of action the matter is, 
 
Studiks in the LEADiNi^, of Troops. 183 
 
 unfortunately, completely overlooked. When a superior com- 
 mander has carefully considered everything and formed his 
 decisions, he usually desires to have them executed at once, 
 and then nothing proceeds quickly enough for him. Let him 
 only consider how much time he himself required for mature 
 reflection, and that as much time is needed by his subordi- 
 nates. This applies even to the simplest situation, such as an 
 advance over open terrane, and is indeed the habitual prac- 
 tice on the drill-ground. But a battle-field is usually different 
 from a drill-ground; here each small undulation, each ditch, 
 each bush possesses a special utility, and companies and battal- 
 ions must make use of the advantage inherent in such feat- 
 ures. Therefore the more a leader can study his situation be- 
 forehand the better able will he be to profit by the terrane. 
 
 Our engagements of 1870-71 furnish many evidences that 
 no attention has been given to this. Regiments, even bri- 
 gades, stood for a long time in one place, the commanders 
 studying how best to attack the enemy in their front as ?b6n 
 as the order was received. The order came, but it was to 
 "wheel to the right and advance at once to the attack," an 
 entirely different direction from that prepared for. The corn- 
 niander then immediately went about instructing his subordi- 
 nate leaders, but at the same moment a second aid arrived 
 from headquarters, then a third, saying: ''The brigade must 
 hurry ; the brigade must move without delay. His Excellency 
 directs me to ask why the brigade has not yet attacked." 
 Patience was then entirely lost, and every subdivision ad- 
 vanced against the enemy by the shortest route. But the 
 shortest way is rarely the best. Tremendous losses, the break- 
 ing up of the various units, hesitation, and failure of the attack 
 are the consequences of an advance which, had it been quietly 
 considered and calmly initiated, might have had a happy result 
 with small sacrifices. 
 
 Doubtless conditions will frequently necessitate troops 
 going into action as quickly as possible, but wherever it is at 
 all practicable (and this zvill be the rule zvith larger masses), 
 it is better to give time, so the subordinate commanders may 
 be instructed with regard to the situation, and orient them- 
 selves. In this way alone will it be possible to even partially 
 reduce these exceedingly large losses. 
 
iS4 Studii:s in Tin-: Lkadixo of Troops. 
 
 The more a mass acts as a unit, the more must the in- 
 dependence of subordinate leaders naturally diminish. So 
 here we see the brigade commander not alone ordering the 
 direction to be taken by the different regiments and the lines 
 of connection and separation, but also starting the infantry 
 fire preparation in one regiment while the other was directed 
 to remain under cover. The order for attack could be given 
 immediately, with the exception of the. time for the onset, as 
 the conditions for the brigade were simple, and for the attack 
 in front different orders could hardly be expected. But all 
 the more must care be taken not to allow the planned fire 
 preparation to turn into the real attack, through the action of 
 some over-zealous and energetic subordinate leader. 
 
 In the First infantry regiment, the Third battalion was 
 divided by the insertion of the vSecond battalion. The 
 Tenth company remained isolated on the left Vv^ing. This 
 mixing up, however, could not be avoided, unless the various 
 companies had been forced to execute a flank movement under 
 hostile fire, which is an exceedingly hazardous maneuver. 
 
 The fire ])rcparation for an attack is mainly done by ar- 
 tillery. Infantry must, however, assist against smaller targets 
 at mid range, with its long-range rifle and good musketry 
 training. Six companies of the first infantry engaged in the 
 preparatory fire action on a line about 650 yards long. This 
 was done to obstruct the enemy's receiving reinforcements 
 and shifting his troops, and also to gradually wear him out.' 
 The Twelfth company, only 800 yards from the hostile skirm- 
 ishers, established itself as v/ell as it could in the most south- 
 erly farm-buildings of Ifohcnbruck, while the Ninth com- 
 pany, in order to avoid the enemy's well-placed shots, was 
 lying in a deep furrow on a field a few paces from the south- 
 ern edge of the village and 1000 yards from the enemy. Pur- 
 .suant to orders, the Second battalion lay somewhat in rear 
 of the line, the Seventh company with its skirmishers in 
 the edge of the woods; the Fifth and Sixth comi)anies came 
 out of the timber and moved slightly forward, because the 
 i:i\<f]!;Q of the woc^ds lay diagonally to the front and made too 
 good a target for the hostile skirmishers. These companies 
 jointly dei)loye{l 2 ])latoons of their own accord. In view of 
 the good musketry training, success depended ni.iinly <^u cor- 
 
I 
 
 Studies in tue Leading of Troops. 185 
 
 rectly estimating the distances and accuracy of fire. And as 
 the enemy's men were invisible, the aim was directed upon 
 certain landmarks. 
 
 The Second infantry regiment had to desist from a tire 
 preparation, as its most advanced line was over 1,100 yards 
 from the enemy's skirmish line, and the terrane covered them 
 from sight in many places. The breadth of the attack of the 
 Third brigade was in accordance with regulations (a little 
 over 1,100 yards). Each regiment brought two battalions 
 into the first line, the Second infantry regiment having, how- 
 ever, formed decidedly more deeply. 
 
 The thing for the Fourth infantry brigade to do was to 
 post its battalions as much as possible out of sight of the 
 enemy, for the flank attack. The more sudden a flank attack 
 is made, the more effective will it be. The sooner we show 
 our troops to the enemy or allow him to see them, the easier 
 it becomes for him to concert counter-measures and weaken 
 the eflfect of the assault. 
 
 The Fourth brigade was in a disadvantageous position, 
 «s it must execute a flank march directly into Alt-Rognitz, 
 under the eyes of the enemy standing on the heights. The 
 brigade commander resolved to avoid the flank march as 
 rnuch as possible. According to tactical principles, the flank 
 march should have been inaugurated from a distance: but, un- 
 fortunately, it was no longer possible to bring about this ad- 
 vantageous condition. AJajor-General C must there- 
 fore help himself as best he could. Consequently he did not 
 hesitate in making a detour with the First and Second bat- 
 talions of the Third regiment, bringing them around behind 
 the Second battalion of artillery. By so doing he unconscious- 
 ly thwarted the intentions of the division commander to at- 
 tack quickly. There was, however, still plenty of time for a 
 
 sudden attack, for when Major-General C gave his 
 
 orders, the First battalion of artillery had not yet gone into 
 position, and the latter would have to be in action for at 
 least half an hour before complete "superiority could be at- 
 tained. Long before that time the 2 battalions of the Third 
 regiment could have arrived upon the left wing. 
 
 Pursuant to orders, the commander of the Fourth regi- 
 ment did send his Third and First battalions directly into Alt- 
 
1 86 Studies in tiii; Leading of Troops. 
 
 Rognitz by the shortest route. The Third battaHon could 
 move into the village under cover of the sunken road; the 
 First battalion advanced 300 yards in the open, offering its 
 right flank to the batteries, but without serious loss, as the 
 hostile artillery at that time was hardly able to ward off the 
 fire of the batteries. There was unquestionably some danger 
 inherent in the movements of the Fourth brigade, in that the 
 enemy might advance to a counter-attack, which is the best 
 measure to prevent a turning movement. In view of the evi- 
 dent weakness of the enemy, this danger was very remote, and 
 even if he did adopt such tactics, he could be opposed with a 
 sufficient force. The Third battalion of the Fourth infantry 
 was in the front line, ready to wheel in at any moment ; the 
 Second battalion was 200 yards in rear of its right wing, 
 echeloned to the right ; the First battalion could be drawn im- 
 mediately into the fighting line at any moment, while still 
 en route to the village. The best protection was, however, ' 
 afforded by the 6 batteries of artillery, whose shrapnel could ' 
 nip any counter-attack in the bud. The security of the entire 
 movement depended mainly on the fact that the enemy's ad- 
 vance would not find the brigade unprepared. Accordingly 
 the general selected a station that afforded him a complete sur- 
 vey of the country in front. From the eastern slope of Kill 
 425 every offensive movement of the enemy could be discov- 
 ered at once, and the necessary orders to meet same could he 
 given in time. Besides, this station eminently satisfied all 
 other demands upon it. From it the movements of the gen- 
 eral's own troops, as well as the entire front of the Third bri- 
 gade, could be overlooked, and the Second battalion, which 
 was designated to advance at once in case of an emergency, 
 stood at the foot of the hill ready for any call. 
 
 The enemy could be easily aroused to activity by the fire 
 fight commenced at 1,100 yards by the 2 conipanies of the 
 Third battaHon pushed out from the village, and furthermore, 
 the fire of 2 companies at such a distance could hardly accom- 
 plish much ; accordingly this movement would better have 
 been omitted. 
 
 It is strange that the conimandor of the Fourth brigade 
 gave only the orders for the deployment, and not for the at- 
 tack. In this he was nevertheless certainly correct; for, in 
 
Studies in thk Li-adix':. of Troops. iHj 
 
 the first place, the troops were not yet in position to attack, 
 and, in the second place, the position of the enemy might 
 change considerably before they got that far. With a view to 
 giving the order for attack, he had directed that one mounted 
 officer report to him from each regiment. 
 
 Not so satisfactory, from a general standpoint, were the 
 arrangements for the care of the wounded. The main 
 dressing station at the eastern end of Kriblitz .vas too far to 
 the rear. The wounded must drag themselves over the crest 
 of Ridge 500. But the absolute necessity for having water 
 near at hand admitted of no other choice. Contrary to gen- 
 eral practice, the division surgeon ordered that all physicians 
 should remain on the fighting line, and he had a large dressing 
 station established for each brigade, one in Hohenbruck and 
 the other under cover in the western part of Alt-Rognitz and 
 under the supervision of the senior sanitary officer of "the 
 brigades. The second field hospital found a position in Krib- 
 litz that satisfied all demands upon it. 
 
 Attack or the Second Ini-axtrv Division. 
 
 (12:45 TO I 45 P. M.) 
 
 At 12:15 the division commander reached Hill 500 on the 
 left wing of the Second battalion of artillery, from which 
 point he was able to watch the movements of the Fourth in- 
 fantry brigade. Parts of the Second infantry regiment could 
 be seen in the uneven, covered ground east of Hill 513. In- 
 fantry fire was heard in the direction of Hohenbruck, but the 
 field-glass revealed no troops on the slope south of that vil- 
 lage, though the slope was plainly visible. It could be as- 
 sumed from this that the right wing of the Third brigade was 
 engaged at long distance in preparing the attack with infantry 
 fire. This fire had commenced at about 12:30, and ntnv, 15 
 minutes later, several companies joined in the fire from Hill 
 361, near Alt-Rognitz. The division commander could not 
 be sure that his fire would prove a staggering blow to the 
 enemy. But the effect of the artillery on the opponent was 
 far more evident. For nearly half an hour 5 batteries 01 the 
 First regiment of field artillery had shelled 3 hostile batteries 
 near Neu-Rognitz. Although they still replied, their fire was 
 
i88 Studii.s IX Tine Leadint. of Troops. 
 
 perceiuibly slackened, and in the oi)inion of the artillery 
 commander it was only a question of a short time when the 
 hostile batteries would be completely silenced. Several of the 
 enemy's g^uns were already seen to be out of the fight. 
 
 From what he saw, Lieutenant-General A was con- 
 firmed in his view that the enemy intended to offer a stubborn 
 resistance at Neu-Rognitz in spite of his evident inferiority; 
 but he considered the Second infantry division sufficiently 
 strong to break the resistance. In view of the character of 
 the ground, so favorable to the opponent, an immediate attack 
 and assault by the infantry would have been hazardous; he 
 therefore resolved to further pre])are the enemy's condition 
 for assault by continuous artillery fire, assisted by mid-range 
 infantry fire. The left battery (Third) of the First battalion 
 had already directed its fire on the center of the infantry posi- 
 tion, in consequence of which the hostile skirmishers had dis- 
 appeared seeking shelter; bodies in close order had also moved 
 back from the northern edge of the large section of woods 
 north of Neu-Rognitz. An evacuation of his position was, 
 however, out of question with the enemy. On the contrary, 
 he had materially extended his right wing, so that the flanking 
 attack planned was more likely to turn into a frontal one. 
 
 A division staff" officer was charged with the continuous 
 observation of the enemy's movements with a field-glass. In 
 company with him and the general staff officer, the division 
 commander, having meanwhile dismounted, proceeded to view 
 the surrounding country, as it was impracticable to make a 
 reconnaissance, on account of the little time available. 
 
 South of Hohenbruck the country rose gradually, becom- 
 mg suddenly more stee]) near the village of Neu-Rognitz. 
 The narrow strip of woods along the highway afforded the 
 enemy a good point of suj^port. and for this reason the right 
 wing of the Third brigade would find it difficult to advance 
 over rising ground without shelter. The ground east of Hill 
 527 was, however, very advantageous: from the position of 
 the Second regiment up to Ncu-Kognitz the ridge was cut up 
 by gullies. There all i)attaHons could find '^heiter, every 200 
 or 300 yards, behind undulations of the ground. The field 
 ol attack of the Fourth brigade was less favorable. .A long 
 mountain sjnir cxten«le(l from Hill 527 to the gap between 
 
Studiks in the LiCading of Troops. 189 
 
 Alt-Rognitz and Rudersclorf. Although during the first part 
 of the ascent the spur would offer effective protection against 
 the enemy's fire by reason of its sloping to the southeast, on 
 the top every assailant would be exposed to a fire at 550 to 
 750 yards range without any cover; besides, the deeply cut 
 ravine extending from Rudersdorf to Hill 527 must be crossed. 
 
 From his survey of the ground the division commander 
 judged that the left wing of the Third brigade had the best 
 nrospect of bringing the attack rapidly up to the enemy and 
 thereby carrying along the extreme wing ; in addition, the de- 
 sired point of penetration (the bend in the enemy's line) was 
 .situated directly opposite this wing. For an effective flank 
 movement it was necessary to let the 2 battalions of the Thiru 
 infantry regiment participate in the assault in the first line, 
 which could be done without hesitation, as so far not the 
 slightest indication of any threatening of the left wing had 
 been reported. 
 
 At 12 :45 the division commander called Lieutenant- 
 Colonel J , of the artillery, up to him (he was then near 
 
 by), and said: "I shall now order the infantry to begin the 
 fire-preparation and decisive attack on the enemy's position. 
 The point of penetration is the northern edge of the large sec- 
 tion of woods over there to the north of Neu-Rognitz." An 
 aid was sent to the commander of the Third brigade, with 
 orders for the brigade to open its attack by fire and then 
 assault, taking the edge of the above-mentioned woods as the 
 l^oint of penetration. The brigade commander was advise'd 
 that the Fourth brigade would conform to the movements of 
 
 the Third. After a quarter of an hour, Major-General B 
 
 Avas found near Hill 513; he had been obliged to dismount a 
 number of times and lead his horse himself on the abrupt 
 slopes, as he had neglected to bring along a mounted rifleman. 
 The brigade commander had failed to advise the division of 
 his station and the dispositions he had made. 
 
 The ranking aid had been sent on foot to the commander 
 
 of the Fourth infantry brigade, Major-General C , on 
 
 Hill 425, with orders to make the decisive attack by extend- 
 
190 STUDIKS in TIIK LEADINC. of Tr(K)PS. 
 
 ing its left wing to the wagon-road,^ after the entire brigade 
 had first prepared for the attack by infantry fire on conjunc- 
 tion with the left wing of the Third brigade, which would 
 assault the eastern part of the woods above mentioned. 
 
 Toward 1:15 the division commander noticed long lines 
 of skirmishers deploying in front of the Third brigade. They 
 lay down, right wing at the southern exit of Hohenbruck, and 
 left wing near the road. Mill 527-north\vestern exit of Alt- 
 Rognitz. The skirmishers of the Fourth brigade were climb- 
 ing up the slope south of Alt-Kognitz. Four batteries had 
 opened fire on the hostile infantry. The attack was therefore 
 progressing, and the division commander brought his single- 
 reserve battalion into the sunken road east of Hill 460. 
 
 The Artillery from 12:45 '^'o 1:45 p- ^^• 
 
 Drill Regulations would require the commander of the 
 
 First artillery regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel J ), after 
 
 receiving the order to attack, to direct an overwhelming fire 
 on the part of the enemy's ])Osition it was proposed to assault. 
 The eastern half of the northern edge of the large woods wa*? 
 assigned him as the line of penetration. Since the hostile pieces 
 continued their fire, although at longer intervals, it seemed 
 necessary to leave 2 batteries to keep up the artillery duel : ac- 
 cordingly the First battery, which was on the right wing of the 
 First battalion and using indirect fire, and the Fourth bat- 
 tery, which was on the right wing of the Second battalion. 
 were left to contend with the enemy's artillery. As regards 
 the enemy's infantry line, the regimental commander concluded 
 that a flank attack would be best. As the Third battery had 
 been firing on the infantry for some time, it was ]M-oper that 
 it should not be withdrawn for other employment; the ad- 
 joining battery could engage with it, still taking the hostile 
 infantry as a target. The Fifth and Sixth batteries would 
 then best act on the flank, as far as practicable. .\t 1 p. m. 
 
 iBy "wagon-road" will be understood the road leading from 
 the church of St. Paul and St. .lohn to the southern end of Neu- 
 Rognitz; by ".southern foot-path," the path entering the village a 
 short distance in front of the wagon-road; by "northern foot-path." 
 the patli entering the center of tlie village and passing the little 
 thicKets. 
 
Studies in the Le^vdixc of TROors. 191 
 
 the Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth batteries had the range 
 of the hostile skirmish hnes, which were lyint( down hetweei» 
 Peak 451 and the northern foot-path. At least 16 shrapne> 
 per minute struck this 900-yard line. A landmark was desig- 
 nated to each battery, so that each could shell a sei)arate sec- 
 tion of the line. 
 
 While carrying out his dispositions Lieutenant-Colone> 
 
 J could not help perceiving, that an advance of single 
 
 batteries out of this position to accompany the attack would 
 be fraught w^ith great difficulties. The slope of the ridge on 
 the side toward the enemy was steep, and the terrane so badly 
 tangled that a timely participation in the assault became doubt- 
 ful. Lieutenant-Colonel J consequently resolved to 
 
 keep the regiment for the time in action in the position it had 
 taken. However, he sent an officer to the horse battery on 
 the Galgen Mountain, requesting that it later advance beyond 
 Hohenbruck and join in the infantry attack. The officer found 
 this battery at about i p. m., but not in a very encouraging 
 condition; the opposing hostile battery had inflicted consid- 
 erable damage upon it, and it was not advisable to abandon the 
 ground in front of it. The officer thereupon rode on farther 
 to the advance guard of the First infantry division, so as to 
 bring up artillery support from there. 
 
 The Third Infantry Brigade from 12:45 to 1:45 ?• ^^■ 
 
 Major-General B , commanding the Third brigade. 
 
 had gone beyond the division commander's orders in his dis- 
 positions, in that he opened infantry fire at about 1,100 yards. 
 He had overstepped the order received at 11:55 a. m., and 
 actually commenced the lire fight Avhile only preparation for 
 the attack was demanded. But the situation of various parts 
 of the First infantry regiment at that time was such that they 
 must come into fighting touch with the hostile infantry; if 
 left alone, they must suffer severely or be forced to retire. 
 The Ninth and Twelfth companies could certainly not main- 
 tain themselves under the fire of strong hostile skinuish lines 
 for any length of time in the southern edge of Hohenbruck. 
 neither could the Tenth company at the edge of the woods 
 near Hill 513. The Second battalion of the same regiment 
 had been sent in for their support. 
 
H)2 
 
 Studihs in the Lhadtxc; of Troops. 
 
 Shortly after i p. ni. the commander of the First infantry 
 
 rej^iment, Colonel D , received from one of the brigade 
 
 ?iids the order to attack in connection with the Second infantry 
 rC^qiment. Xo further instructions were «^iven in the order, 
 as the first order to prepare for the attack had exhaustively 
 indicated the direction of the attack and the line of separation 
 from the Second infantry regiment. All further disj^ositions 
 
 vvere the concern of Colonel D alone. The latter was 
 
 standing near the eastern boundary of Hohenbruck, close to 
 (he Fifth company, somewhat sheltered from the enemy's fire, 
 w'here he could see how little protection the regiment would 
 find in the terrane during the attack, lie resolved to make 
 up for the lack of cover by a strong development of fire, and to 
 send forward dense skirmish lines, though the latter was con- 
 trary to custom. The connnander of the Third battalion was 
 near him, and he turned and gave the following verbal order : 
 "1 shall have the regiment advance to the line of the Twelfth 
 company, for a decisive fire preparation. The center of ttie 
 Second battalion, to which the Tenth company w^ill be attached, 
 will take the point of direction upon the ])roiecting point of 
 tflie woods east of the highway." This point of direction was 
 somewhat different from that ordered by the brigade com- 
 mander, due to the fact that the northwest corner of the woods 
 was not visible from Hohenbruck. The regimental adjutant 
 was promptly sent to the commander of the Second battalion 
 with the order to advance the battalion in dense skirmish line, 
 taking along the Tenth company, up to the line of the Twelfth 
 company, and give it the ])oint of direction. ITe found the 
 battalion commander with the Eighth company, and after de- 
 livering his message, hastened away to the First battalion, to 
 which he verbally transmitted the following order: "The 
 regiment will advance to the attack, the First battalion fol- 
 fowinc: the right w ing throiigli 1 iohenljruck." 
 
 At I :io p. m. these orders had n^ached the resi)ective 
 commanders, and the Fifth. Sixth, and Seventh companies 
 shnnltaneously ar >se to advance 200 yards, after the skirmish 
 line had been closed until man touched man. Although the 
 Ninth and Twelfth companies poured in a very brisk tire, the 
 skirmishers of the 3 com{)anics advancing without cover suf- 
 fered heavy loss, and tri.-d to get forward in double time upon 
 
Studies in thk Leading or Troops. 193 
 
 line with the Twelfth company. Tlie Tenth company, on the 
 left wing-, hardly lost a man, as it was protected by the pro- 
 jecting Hill 527. At 1 :i5 the skirmish line of the Second bat- 
 talion had thrown itself down, and the Fifth and Sixth com- 
 panies each had deployed 2 platoons, while the Seventh com- 
 pany, for want of room, only i platoon. A line of 330 yard.-, 
 was available for the skirmishers of the battalion, and the 5 
 deployed platoons, of 70 men each, were about sufficient to 
 jill this interval. Meanwhile the increasing losses compelled 
 the companies to deploy new skirmishers, so that only half 
 a platoon each of the Fifth and Sixth companies remained in 
 close order, and an entire platoon of the Seventh company. 
 These lay down near the edge of the woods 200 yards in rear 
 of the skirmishers, where they met with only small losses, as 
 the opponent directed his fire with considerable accuracy on 
 the skirmish line itself. The Eighth company halted to take 
 proper distance. 
 
 The fire of the Second battalion skirmishers became some- 
 what irregular after they had lain down. Casualties among 
 platoon and section leaders had a bad influence on the trans- 
 mission of orders ; after a rush the men would have to find the 
 range themselves, and then only after they had stopped to 
 get their breath. Frequently platoon leaders were obliged to 
 interfere for the purpose of putting an end to too rapid firing. 
 With the help of the seccion leaders, the men were compelled 
 to resort to a slow, well-aimed fire, averaging for each skir- 
 niisher i cartridge a minute. Even the most excited man 
 would soon be glad to moderate his unsystematic fire when 
 his right hand became tired. Uniformity in raising sights 
 had been assured throughout the ranks. Nearly all platoon 
 leaders, with the help of the skirmishers and section leaders, 
 liad fixed distances at 750 yards ; only a few platoons fired at 
 the projecting strip of v/oods, with sights at 650 yards. Wher- 
 ever sights were improperly fixed through the inexperience of 
 platoon leaders, company commanders interfered ; the latter 
 were generally in the center of their skirmish line, lying prone ; 
 only the commander of the Seventh company remained with 
 his platoon that was in close order. 
 
 It was difficult to observe the effect of the fire. The en- 
 emy occupied higlier ground, and the heads of his skirmish- 
 
194 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 ers could hardly be seen, and, although the ground was dry 
 in consequence of a long spell of hot weather, ricochets were 
 invisible, as they occurred in clover-fields and along the edge 
 of the woods, wlu-re the op})onent's skirmishers were located. 
 As the guns became heated, the men fired at the 750-yard dis- 
 tances with sights at 700 yards. Part of the men lying down 
 could not see their targets. It required much energ}^ on the 
 part of their superiors to induce them to rise on their knees, 
 to obtain a good aim. Many fired lying down, without even 
 aiming or looking up, especially where section leaders were 
 lacking; l)ut most of these were soon brought to their projK-r 
 senses by the examples of their braver comrades. Some in- 
 fantrymen started to carry wounded to the rear, and as they 
 arose from the skirmish line many of them fell under the en- 
 emy's missiles; others the file-closers reminded of their duty 
 to remain on the firing line. 
 
 At the beginning of the action 4 assistant litter-bearers 
 were detailed from each company, who, in accordance with 
 regulations, placed a red band around their left upper arm; 
 this did not, however, put them under the protection of the 
 Geneva convention. On account of the enemy's fire, these 
 bearers could not reach the advanced skirmish lines, and s*. 
 confined themselves to picking up wounded further to the rear. 
 When their wounds were slight, many of the skirmishers fight- 
 ing in front used the first-aid packets sewed inside the front 
 of the left skirt oi their coats. 
 
 The commander of the vSecond battalion of the First regi- 
 ment of infantry watched the brisk fire of the skirmishers in 
 anxiety. Although the entire contents of the ammunition- 
 wagons had been issued to the men, a shortness of cartridges 
 might be apprehended in i or 2 hours, if the present rate of 
 expenditure continued. But, as already stated, the fire soon 
 became more steady. Cartridges were taken from the numer- 
 ous wounded and killed. Xevertheless the battahon com- 
 mander, of his own accord, despatched a mounted rifieman to 
 Trautenau, to tlie advance guard of the First infantry divis- 
 ion, recjuesting that some ammimition-wagons be sent forward. 
 
 At 1:15 tile entire 'I'iiird battalion i(^ined in the attack, 
 the vSece)nd battalion having just begun the fight under which 
 it suffered such heavv losses. In order to obtain better results 
 
Studiüs in THE Leading of Troops. 195 
 
 from its fire, the Ninth company advanced on Une with the 
 Twelfth, and had to work hard to resist the fire of the enemy. 
 The commander of the Third battahon had arrived too late 
 to stop this advance, as he had intended to do, thinking it 
 necessary to continue the occupation of Hohenbruck. Fortu- 
 nately, however, the engineer company arrived at that village 
 from Trautenau, to prepare it for defense. Several companies 
 of the First battalion also entered the northern outskirts of 
 the place. The Tenth company, on the left wing of the Second 
 battalion, occupied the most advantageous position, as com- 
 pared with the others. The projecting Hill 527 limited the 
 l)readth of the field of fire very much, and the losses were 
 hardly worth mentioning. At the command of its leader the 
 company arose, in order to occupy the little woods on Hill 
 527, but it had to give up the attempt after advancing 100 
 \ ards, as, under the undiminished hits of the hostile missiles, 
 It was followed by none of the Second battalion, the com- 
 mander of which had positively prohibited a continuance of 
 the forward movement on account of the peculiar situation. 
 Left to itself at the southern edge of thicket 527, the Tenth 
 company would have been simply shot to pieces. If other 
 companies had joined in this purposeless charge, without 
 sufficient fire preparation, the attack," difficult as it already was, 
 vvould have failed in its very inception. Had the Tenth com- 
 pany been fighting by itself, the fact that it could see nothing 
 of the enemy would naturally have been an incentive to find 
 a better fire zone to the front; as a part of a larger aggre- 
 q:ation of troops, however, it must conform to the whole, 
 and must not, by individual action, imperil the conduct of the 
 engagement or its success. 
 
 The First battalion had orders to follow behind the right 
 ^ving. Later it was directed to pass through Hohenbruck, 
 •and was most favorably posted for this purpose in the sunken 
 road, formed in column of march! In order to establish a 
 <roöd survey, the battalion commander had ridden ahead at 
 full speed to the southern exit of the village; there he had 
 lost his horse by a shrapnel, and, hurrying back to meet his 
 battalion, ordered the companies to move up to the southern 
 border of the village on four difi'erent streets. The First and 
 Second companies', deployed as skirmishers (see ^^lap VI.). 
 
196 S'lUDII-.S IN TIIJC LK.M)i.\r. OF Trooi's. 
 
 joiiiecl or extcnilc«! the skirmish line, as soon as ihcy ohscrvcfl 
 the Ninth conij^any hreak down under the hostile fire. 
 Through the efforts of the platoon commanders the mixed 
 platoons were rearrani^ed and order established. Some men 
 left back in the villai^e were assembled and led to the front. 
 
 The- regimental comman.ier harl met the battalion com- 
 mander on the highway in the village and received his report 
 relative to the independent interference of the First and Sec- 
 ond companies. He could not fail to see that the situation of 
 the regiment was critical. Eight of the eleven companies 
 available were entirely deployed on the foremost line. The 
 right wing had no natural support; it therefore appeared 
 absolutely necessary to leave the Third and Fourth comj^anies 
 behind it in close order. Although the arrival of the leading- 
 subdivisions of the First infantry division was expected within 
 half an hour, the wing must be protected in the meantime 
 against an attack by the enemy. The Third and Fourth com- 
 ])anies were consequently posted in Hohenbruck west of the 
 highway, and remained at the disposal of the regimental 
 commander. 
 
 This was the situation of the First infantry regiment at 
 1 :45 p. m. It became stiil more serious when a hostile l)at- 
 tery began to fire on the skirmish line from the direction of the 
 quarry. By itself the regiment w^as hardly able to make the 
 attack. It nuist simply wait, under heavy losses, for the more 
 fortunate advance of the adjoining regiment or the interfer- 
 ence of the First infantry division. 
 
 The commander of the Secoutl infantry regiment re- 
 mained in a sheltered position near his brigade commander be- 
 hind Hill 513. After receii)t of the division order at i p. m., 
 no further orders were given to Colonel E — by Major- 
 General Vi , except the order to start. The line of pene- 
 tration desired by division headquarters (the eastern part of 
 the northern edge of the large woods) and the point of direc- 
 tion given the brigade (for the left wing the northeastern 
 corner of this .section of woods') were in exact conformity. 
 The line of .separation for the First regiment (page \()()) was 
 known. Further instructions were therefore unnecessary, as 
 the Seventh comi)any had already started upon this jvmiU of 
 direction, and the Third battalion had been ordered to seek 
 
Studiks in" Tin-: LKADixr. oi.^ Troops. 197. 
 
 connection to the left. Each of the four conii)anies on the 
 most advanced hne deployed one or two platoons sheltered ni 
 the woods, as space would permit, or reinforced to like extent 
 the weak skirmish line in front. This entire line suddenly 
 emerged from the woods, and up to 1,100 yards suffered, 
 no serious losses. As the losses increased, however, the 
 skirmishers advanced at double time, reaching the gully in front 
 of the declivity, which withdrew the greater part of them 
 from the enemy's sight. In order to fire, they advanced at a 
 walk far enough to reach an open field, which they found at 
 about 800 yards from the enemy, a portion stationing them*, 
 selves in the southern border of a little fir plantation. As 
 soon as the skirmishers lay down, the parts of the companies 
 in front that were in close order followed, and suffered little 
 loss, as the enemy w^as fully occupied by the fire of the skir- 
 mishers. At a sign from the battalion commanders, the sup- 
 ports quickly deployed forward and carried the entire line 
 ahead another 100 yards, so that at i :30 p. m., at a distance of 
 700 yards, with the right on line with the Tenth company and 
 the left on a slope projecting eastw^ard, the line had entered 
 into such a decisive fire with the enemy that the actual attack 
 could break forth at any moment. 
 
 Meanwhile such company leaders as were not wounded 
 did their best to restrain the fighting ardor of their men, so as 
 to await the approach of the companies of the second line 
 (Eleventh, Sixth, and Eighth), and the formation of the First 
 battalion for attack. The latter had begun to move at the 
 beginning of the attack, having till that time rested in column 
 of platoons near Hill 460; it crossed the difiicult terrane in 
 line of companies in columns of march. In this way they 
 could get over the ground much better; the heads too could 
 be quickly turned in the right direction, and at the southern 
 edge of the patch of woods east of Hill 513 it was found that 
 the battalion had inclined too far toward Alt-Rognitz. 
 
 In the gully the companies posted themselves on oii-.' 
 
 line. Alajor-General ß had Instructed the battalion to 
 
 advance only on his order. Any pushing forward of the 
 closed bodies, in his opinion, must lead to the assault, which 
 
 he, together with Colonel E , who was now severely 
 
 wounded, had aimed to delay until the Fourth infantry brir 
 
198 Studies in tiii; Lkading of Troops. 
 
 tj^ade was ready for the charge. A glance at the condition in 
 which the First infantr)^ regiment was sitnated did not i)roni- 
 ise an cftcctive advance from that (hrection. 
 
 In a space 48<:> yards wide and 430 yards deep, witii its 
 parts in close order and lying- down mostly sheltered, but un- 
 der a heavy skirmish fire 700 yards from the enemy, the Sec- 
 ond infantry regiment held itself in readiness for the charge 
 at any moment. In the meantime the Tenth company had 
 come up and attached itself to the First battalion. 
 
 After an hour's firing, the four deployed companies far- 
 thest to the front had hardly succeded in shaking the enemy, 
 while the artillery fire had accomplished its desired result in 
 a brief period, its shrapnel having wrought disorder in the 
 hostile skirmish lines within 45 minutes. It was therefore 
 
 with confidence that AJajor-General B could reckon on 
 
 the success of the assault when he saw the right wing of the 
 Fourth infantry brigade ascending the slope of the undulation 
 near the heights running along Alt-Rognitz. (See ]\Tap VI.) 
 
 The Fourth Infantry Brigade from 12:45 to i 45- 
 
 At 12:50 p. m. the senior aid of the division handed 
 
 Major-General C , commanding the Fourth infantry 
 
 brigade, the order to make the decisive attack in conjunction 
 with the left wing of the Third brigade, after preparation by 
 infantry fire and extending his own left to the Avagon-road. 
 
 We know that Major-General C had not yet given 
 
 the order for attack, and had taken time to understand per- 
 fectly the intentions and positions of the enemy. From the lit- 
 tle woods on Hill 425, at the northwestern exit of Alt-Rognitz. 
 he could clearly overlook the right wing of the enemy, and 
 noticed that the hostile forces extended beyond the wagon- 
 road. The enemy's skirmishers lay close to the ground and 
 fired with smokeless powder, but as far as he could see they 
 were occui)ying the ])atch of woods east of Neu-Rognitz, es- 
 tablishing their most advanced defensive position in a fir 
 thicket on the northern foot-path. (See Maps V. and VI.) 
 Against the mid-range fire from this position, the right wing 
 fif tlic Fourth infantry regiment found good protection behind 
 the extended undulations of the ground, but the rest, of the 
 
Studies in thi: Lkading of Troops. H)i) 
 
 Fourth infantry brigade, and especially those between the 
 wagon-road and the northern foot-path, were without shelter. 
 The force of an attack could not be increased by a depth for- 
 mation on the left wing, but the general thought it best for 
 the time being to reserve a battalion at that point as support, 
 although even no attack had been threatened against the left 
 Hank. 
 
 Major-General C was well aware of the division 
 
 commander's intention of quickly driving the enemy out of 
 his position. The men of the Fourth infantry brigade were 
 tired. In spite of the hostile artillery fire, the parts of the 
 Fourth regiment that were in the village had managed to ob- 
 tain a drink of water, as far as considerations of tactical order 
 would permit. But the general was not over-confident that 
 the attack would be executed w^ith the absolutely necessary 
 briskness and rapidity, particulary during the ascent of the 
 last 400 yards in front of the enemy. He accordingly decided 
 to have all knapsacks removed. 
 
 An officer from each of the regiments was stationed near 
 Major-General C . Turning to one from the Fourth in- 
 fantry, he said : "The Fourth regiment must join the Third 
 infantry brigade in the attack, the left wing of which is sta- 
 tioned at the corner of the woods over there. Your front will 
 extend until opposite the hostile battery farthest to the left." 
 Turning to the officer from the Third infantry, he said: "The 
 Third regiment, less the Third battalion, will attack along the 
 wagon-road, securing the left flank and maintaining connec- 
 tion on the right." He then added so the two officers could 
 hear: "Both regiments will unsling knapsacks." 
 
 When the officer from the Fourth regiment found his 
 
 commander. Colonel G , the latter was somwhat excited. 
 
 The premature opening of fire by the Tenth and E'tven h 
 companies had caused considerable loss. The enemy had ev- 
 idently estimated the distance correctly (about 1,100 yards) 
 and found the range. Though the skirmishers covered them- 
 selves skillfully, their fire action left much to be desired ; a 
 great number of the men could be seen rising only with great- 
 est circumspection from behind cover in order to get a shot. 
 The want of fire discipline was especially noticeable where the 
 section leaders had been put out of the fight. It was utterly 
 
2()() Studiks IX Tin: Lkadinc. oi- Troops. 
 
 impossible for ])latoon leaders on the skirmish line t(» rise, 
 as they would be immediately shot down. The rei^imental 
 commander, who, standing on the left tiank of the First com- 
 pany, could survey the situation very clearly, found his course 
 open to two alternatives — either to withdraw the skirmish line 
 out of the tire, or support it by farther extending it ; by adopt- 
 ing the latter course he would, however, commence the attack 
 without orders. Yet there was nothing gained by leaving the 
 skirmishers remain at a great distance from the enemy under 
 heavy losses. As he was thus deliberatmg the officer rode u]) 
 bringing him the order to attack. As he rode away from Hill 
 425 the officer had already given the Second battalion the 
 
 order to remove knapsacks. Colonel G immediatelv 
 
 despatched mounted ritlemen (on foot, however), to the com- 
 manders of the two other battalions with directions to remove 
 kna])sacks. This measure entailed no inconvenience on the 
 troops in close order, but the skirmishers of the Tenth and 
 Eleventh companies had to get rid of their sacks lying down, 
 and could not be watched closely enough to see that all cart- 
 ridges were taken out of the knajxsacks. as could be done in 
 the case of the other companies. 
 
 Colonel G would ])referably have used the Second 
 
 battalion behind the center of his regiment in the attack, but 
 the Third battalion seemed already so much weakened that it 
 would not do to let it advance beyond Hill 361 without flank 
 su]:)port and fully exposcvl to the hostile tire. He therefore 
 decided to use the Second battalion on the right ^ving and the 
 First battalion on the left. 
 
 An officer was accordingly despatched to the Second bat- 
 talion, with instructions for it to attack in conjunction with 
 the Third brigade, taking the corner of the thickets Ijcfore 
 mentioned as ])oint of direction for the right wing. To the 
 commander of the Third l)attalion, who had been summoned 
 
 by a mounted ritleman. Colonel O said: "The regiment 
 
 will attack the enemy's ])Osition in the direction of the batteries. 
 You will connect with the Second l)attalion, and advance upon 
 the battery at the extreme right. The Second battalion will 
 start from Hill 425 within a few minutes." The regimental 
 adjutant was sent to the commander of the l^'irst battaHi>n. 
 
Studies in thic Leading of Troops. 201 
 
 and the battery on the extreme left was designated t* > it as 
 point of direction. 
 
 It was I :io p. m. before the Second battalion could take 
 up the forward movement. The transmission of orders had 
 occupied some time. As the commander desired to bring his 
 companies forward under cover as much as possible, and as 
 they could not pass the steep grade south of Hill 425 in per- 
 fect order, he let them enter the ravine which runs past Height 
 361, in half platoon front. Upon debouching from the south- 
 western end of the ravine the leading company, the Sixth, 
 was met with such a fire that it at once deployed throughout 
 as skirmishers ; but under support of the fire of the skirmish- 
 ers of the Second regiment and of the Third battalion of its 
 own regiment it succeeded in advancing in two rushes almost 
 on line with the skirmishers of the Second regiment. Rut 
 here it found itself forced to lie prone, and to meet the en- 
 emy's fire with sights at 875 yards. 
 
 The Seventh company, near which was the battalion com- 
 mander, was halted by the latter just south of the ravine ; for 
 although there was yet room for deployment to the right, the 
 company during a further advance might have become mixed 
 with the Second regiment.- The Fifth company, which was 
 behind it, halted in the ravine. The eighth company had 
 stepped out of the ravine toward the east, but, finding skir- 
 mishers of the Third battalion in its front, was obliged to f»^re- 
 go any active participation for the time being. 
 
 ^lany w^ounded came back into the ravine from the Sixth 
 company, lying under fire in front. Some men who had not 
 been w^ounded were detailed assistant litter-bearers and took 
 ])art in removing the wounded. Thereupon the battalion com- 
 mander most energetically interposed, causing a ])latoon r.f the 
 Seventh company to deploy into the skirmish line in front, as 
 it became thinned out, and all men of the Sixth company who 
 w^re not wounded were sent ahead with it. As the com- 
 mander of the Sixth company had fallen, the commander of 
 the Seventh went up to the front line. He especially directed 
 that the men deploying should not carry the Sixth company 
 forward with them,' and that the signal for the decisive attack 
 must be awaited, which signal would come from the right. 
 The Sixth company had already ceased firing and Was prepar- 
 
202 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 ing to make a charge, but under the orders of the commander 
 of the Seventh company it promptly resumed its fire. Before 
 deploying into the lino the platoon had fixed sights at 875 
 yards. 
 
 As regards the Third battalion of the Fourth regiment, 
 the Tenth and Eleventh companies should really have waited 
 until the skirmishers of the Second battalion had arrived on 
 line with them. But when the Sixth company, in the lead, had 
 entered the ravine, the commanders of the Tenth and Elev- 
 enth companies considered that the time had come to carry 
 the fire (which had thus far been somewhat ineffective) closer 
 10 the enemy. The men were in hopes of finding better pro- 
 tection in the depression of the ground in their front, and 
 awaited anxiously for the order to ({uit the position swept by 
 hostile missiles. In the meantime the wild fire of some of 
 the men who hail lost their head made it very difficult for the 
 platoon leaders to stop the firing. Their voices could not reach 
 far enough, and only when platoon and section leaders to- 
 gether sounded their signal whistles was it jwssible to stop 
 the firing. 
 
 Upon the command, "Rise, double time, march !*' the 
 skirmishers rushed to the front over Hill 361, rapidly cross- 
 ing to the opposite side of the depression in the ground in 
 order to escape the hostile fire, which was causing heavy losses. 
 During this run of 200 yards, which could be made only with- 
 out packs, some men were left behind completely exhausted. 
 After the rapid movement ceased and the order to lie down 
 was given, the skirmishers were tmable to fire for some tiiue. 
 and not until the excitement had somewhat subsided was it 
 possible to resume a regulated fire at from 750 to 800 yards. 
 This hasty advance had demanded bloody sacrifices, but 
 it had made the advance of the Second battalion easier, as 
 the enemy gave more of his attention to the Tenth and Elev- 
 enth companies. Some of their .skirmishers could not fire, as 
 they lay too low and did not see the enemy, and when several 
 .sections began to move up farther on the slope, in order to 
 .see, the movement was quickly stopped by the platoon lead- 
 ers, as it might grow into another premature attack. Non- 
 commissioned ofiicers and lance corporals had assumed com- 
 mand in place of many platoon and section leaders wIk^ had 
 
Studies in tjik Leading of Troops. 203 
 
 been put out of the tight. Some of the men, whcj had not found 
 time to take off knapsacks and tried to do so before the rush, 
 were prevented by the file-closers behind the skirmish line, 
 who drove the men forward, but who could not prevent them 
 falling behind during the run and thus increasing the skirmisli 
 formations in depth. The supports, i platoon behind each 
 company, had followed the skirmishers pretty closely, and lay 
 down sheltered in the bottom of tlie depression. The Twelfth 
 company had received the order to advance, together with the 
 Tenth and Eleventh companies, but as the two latter did not 
 wait until it came up, the skirmishers of the Twelfth threw 
 themselves down at 1,100 yards from the enemy, in urder to 
 support by their fire the advance of the others, and advanced 
 over the bottoms in several rushes and formed on the left wing 
 of the Eleventh company. Finally, the Ninth company re- 
 mained stationary behind Hill 361 in a covered position in 
 the hands of the battalion commander. The two foremost 
 companies of the First battalion of the Fourth regiment (First 
 and Third) followed the movement of the Twelfth company. 
 The first position gained (900 and 1,000 yards from the 
 enemy) was not a favorable one, as most of the skirmishers 
 had a field of fire only when they arose to their feet. During a 
 lengthy fire preparation this continual getting up and down 
 fatigues the men. The two other companies of the First bat- 
 talion (Second and Fourth) had still remained in the village, 
 ^nd their commanders were looking for exits allowing them 
 to go around the houses in the edge of the village, which had 
 been set afire by the percussion shells of the enemy. 
 
 The regimental commander went on foot to the Ninth 
 company and asked for a trumpeter, when, at i -45 p. m., a 
 glance to the left wing of the Third brigade showed him that 
 forward movements of the supports were in progress there, 
 and a decision therefore close at hand. The parts of the 
 Fourth regiment that were on the front line had fired, with 
 varying success, for from 20 to 25 minutes. 
 
 The order to attack was received by the commander of 
 the Third regiment shortly after i o'clock, in the southern 
 edge of the woods north of Alt-Rognitz. Until that time no 
 attacking movements were observed in the other regiments 
 of the brigade on the right, but he did not wish to lose time 
 
 I 
 
204 Studies in the Lkadtng of Troops. 
 
 in ordering^ the start of the battalions under his command, as 
 they still stood far to the rear. He had still less time by rea- 
 son of the fact that the First and Second battalions of the 
 Third regiment had not yet moved far enoui^li to the left for 
 the planned advance along the wagon-road. He therefore 
 gave the following order to the two battalion commanders, 
 who were standing at his side : *'The First battalion will 
 move to the first road to the east and secure the left flank. Tlu- 
 Second battalion vvill advance to the attack from the present 
 position of the First battalion, along the wagon-road, keep- 
 ing touch with the Fourth infantry regiment. The point of 
 penetration is the junction of the wagon-road with the en- 
 emy's ])osition. 1 will accompany the first battalion." 
 
 Column of platoons was a very poor formation for the 
 Hank movement to the left in the woods. The First battal- 
 ion, however, wheeled to the left by squads in this formation, 
 and reached the road assigned it much more slowly, as would 
 naturally be expected. The Second battalion broke by com- 
 l»anies into squads, and formed columns of march in the Alt- 
 Rognitz woods in such a manner that upon emerging it was 
 in double column of march forn^ation, the companies at loo 
 yards distances and intervals, a very favorable formation for 
 winding through the streets and yards of the village. Up to 
 the village the battalion was not fired upon, but at the soutn- 
 ern edge, 1,300 yards from the enemy, the skirmishers were 
 met with a fierce infantry fire. The battalion commander, 
 seeing a glacis-like slope before him, thought he first ought 
 to oppose the unshaken enemy by fire, and about i 130 p. m. 
 he ha<l the edge of the village and an unfinished building in 
 fn^nt of it occupied by 3 com])anies. As this fire was at long 
 range, it produced no material results. Fifteen minutes later 
 the regimental commander came hurrying along to iiujuire 
 into the cau.se of the delay, and saw tiie left wing of the ad- 
 joining regiment far in advance and no connectit^n whatever 
 established with it. The battalion commander had fallen from 
 his horse and the senior ea])tain had assumed command; the 
 regimental commander ordered the latter to extend the skir- 
 mishers to the right, while he carried the First battalion for- 
 ward with the Second. Tiie First battalion was lying under 
 shelter in the northern vi\i:;v of the village in line of C(^m]')any 
 
STUDir:s IN rnt Le:ading of Troops. 205 
 
 columns. At the same time the brigade commander, who had 
 ridden up to the left wing along the sunken village street, ar- 
 rived near the Second battalion. 
 
 Termination of the Preparations for Attack, 
 
 The last instructions given to his batteries by. Lieutenant- 
 Colonel J , commander of the division artillery regi- 
 
 ■/uent, had not since been changed, although the enemy's guns, 
 which had for some time been engaged by only two batteries, 
 had again awakened to considerable activity, inflicting losses 
 chiefly on the Second battalion. The Second, Third, Fifth, 
 and Sixth batteries nevertheless kept up their fire upon the 
 hostile skirmishers northeast of Neu-Rognitz, and succeedecl 
 in preventing the arrival of reinforcements. At i 145 the reg- 
 imental commander directed the Second and Third batteries 
 10 open fire on the ground in the rear of the enemy's skir- 
 mish line, as soon as the infantry attack should advance fur- 
 ther. At the same time the officer who had been sent to the 
 horse battery on the Galgen Mountain returned with word 
 that the artillery of the First infantry division could be ex- 
 pected to go into action at any moment. More severe artil- 
 lery fire than heretofore was actually audible in the direction 
 of the Galgen Mountain. The Sixteenth regiment of field 
 artillery had gone into action. The horse l)attery made really 
 to advance with 5 guns, in order to accompany the infantry 
 aitack beyond Hohenbruck. On account of the great loss of 
 horses, it had not yet been possible to rehorse a single one of 
 the guns. 
 
 The squadrons of the First, regiment of hussars had re- 
 tained the positions they had heretofore occupied. On the 
 right wing the Fourth scjuadron had ascertained that the en- 
 emy's left did not extend beyond Sorge, and had immediately 
 reported that fact to the division commander. 
 
 The 2>4 squadrons near the church of St. Paul and St. 
 John, together with the troop of the lliird squadron on patrol 
 "duty, had found the country east of Rudersdorf completely 
 free (^f the enemy. An officer's patrol sent toward Standen/ 
 liad Tiot vet returned. 
 
 I 
 
2ü6 Studii^s in tue Li-ading of Troops. 
 
 The conimander of tho First cavalry brigade had care- 
 fully followed the procuress of the infantry attack, from his 
 station on Hill 414, southwest of Hohenbruck. The First reci- 
 iment of uhlans had been broui;ht up to this hill, througii 
 Hohenbruck. and stood under cover behind it in line of scjuad- 
 ron columns. The cuirassier regiment halted in column of 
 squadrons between the village and the hill. 
 
 The First infantry division had continued the deployment 
 southwest of Trautenau, and completed the same with tho 
 First infantry brigade at t 145 p. m. The First battalion of 
 riflemen had been pushed forward to Hohenbruck. 
 
 The left flank detachment of the Second infantry divis- 
 ion (Eleventh company of the First infantry regiment and 
 half a troop of hussars) had reached Raussnitz from Welhota. 
 
 CoM>rKNTs ON THE Conduct of thf Division Commander 
 FROM 12:45 '^'^ ^ -45 !'• ^f- 
 
 The period we have just discussed embraced the continu- 
 ation of the movements for attack and in particular the prep- 
 aration by artillery and * infantry tire. The latter lasted an 
 hour and a quarter on the right wing of the division, about 
 half an hour in its center, and only 15 to 20 minutes on the 
 left wing. The artillery has thus been active over an hour 
 and a quarter. 
 
 Circumstances may arise where long-range preparation bv 
 artillery is sufficient to allow the infantrv attack to follow 
 forthwith : indeed, conditions may be such that the artillerv 
 fire need not even be preparatory alone, but also decisive, driv- 
 ing the enemy out of his i^osition. Tn general, however, we 
 must not be misled into the belief that the moment for the 
 infantry assault has arrived as soon as some of our shrapnel 
 have driven the enemy from certain of his advanced points, 
 or their effect is even evident in his main position. We will 
 do well to abide by the rule that prcf^aratory artillery /7/r 
 sJiouhl he folloii'cd hx preparatory infantry fire. Our first 
 endeavor sliould be to advance our infantry within convenient 
 firing distance of (he enemy. 
 
 /// ///(' iiiitidlion of an attach, the artillerv sIkhiKI first 
 draw off the lire of ihr rii('ni\'s gnns. and. if possible, driw 
 
STUDIKS IX THE LKADING of Tr(3<3PS. 207 
 
 them back ; then it should direct its fire against the enemy's 
 infantry. At the same time the infantry sliould attempt to 
 bring its skirmishers as far forward as possible, so as to carry 
 its fire up to the enemy. Both of these obligations had been 
 performed by the vSecond infantry division at about i 145 p. m., 
 and the termination of the attack had drawn nearer. But 
 evident commotion in the ranks of the enemy, the gaining of 
 favorable positions, confidence in our own superiority, the 
 grasping of the hostile flanks, or similar developments must 
 be awaited before an attempt is made to effect the assault, 
 else we will have no cause to wonder if the attack does not 
 succeed, in spite of the most careful preparation. It is evi- 
 dent that if such an attack is pursued with deliberation, in our 
 day it will require more time to carry it through than ha-s 
 been the case heretofore, or, if conducted without thorough 
 preparation, will have little prospect of success. It is still more 
 certain that troops who have already undertaken one attack 
 will not very soon be available for another. 
 
 We need not think it strange that it took the brigades 
 more than an hour and three-quarters to get in position to 
 undertake the final assault, although only a short space had to 
 be traversed. Just as little should we condemn the giving of 
 explicit orders, and say that such orders cannot be given in 
 battle, as there is not sufficient time for it. The fault is, that 
 in war explicit orders are not given: they are needed at the 
 present day more than ever before, and wherever possible we 
 should try to find time to issue them in writing, which will 
 materially contribute toward the avoidance of errors. It is true, 
 in some cases explicit orders are impracticable, as, for exan*- 
 ple, when joining in an engagement where troops have just 
 about held their ov^n or have commenced to fall back. On the 
 contrary, we can find many cases in the past where there was 
 ample lime for the most explicit orders and explanations, but 
 the time was not so utilized. The drama which is enacted at 
 the front before the eyes of leaders not yet engaged is so im- 
 pressive and interesting that many a' one forgets in such mo- 
 ments the fact that he has preparations to make, and in all 
 probability he will shortly be 'called on to take part in the 
 action himself. 
 
 I 
 
^2ü8 Studies in tiik Leading of Troops. 
 
 •' ; In the case before us, the division commander had per- 
 sonally maintained a calm, expectant bearing. At 12:15 he 
 look station on Hill 500 alongside the left vving of the First 
 ■regiment of field artillery, and did not quit that position even 
 when, half an hoUi- later, he ordered the closer approach of 
 the infantry iov the fire preparation and decisive attack. In- 
 •deed, even at 1 145, he was at the same spot, not having moved 
 from it for an hour and a half, and had only once interfered 
 -with the action by issuing an order. After the artillery had 
 been assigned its duty and the infantry had been put in posi- 
 tion for the attack, he had no further dispositions to make. 
 He could survey the engagement from his elevated point of 
 observation better than if lower down with the troops. His 
 whereabouts so selected were known to all subordinate com- 
 .manders, and every mounted orderly knew where to find him. 
 ilad he instead ridden around among the troops, he would 
 c.nly have spread restlessness and made himself and those 
 about him anxious. The commander-in-chief's appearance 
 near fighting troops will never fail to make a good impres- 
 sion, while at times in the opening of a campaign it may be 
 necessary, but such a step should l)e resorted to with modera- 
 tion. When in close touch with an action the survey over 
 the whole is lost and it is more difficult to make comprehensive 
 dispositions with the necessary calmness. The' essential point 
 to consider in the choice of a station is facility to oversee and 
 manage the engagement. 
 
 Nevertheless Lieutenant-General A 's conduct seems 
 
 open to (juestion in two directions: he did not carry through 
 the flank movement around the right wing of the opponent. 
 and he did not hasten the start of the left wing of the Fourth 
 brigade after completing its deployment. Rut on both these 
 scores we must not condemn too hastily. No matter how well 
 in hand a leader may have lar^e masses of troo])s. conditions 
 of time and si)ace make the reins with whiv^h he guides them 
 extraordinarily long, and a pull flexes not bring immediate 
 response. 
 
 We have already called .attention to the danger oi a 
 suj)erior leader's causing precipitate movements through con- 
 stant urging. Such procedure is warranted only where it is 
 
I 
 
 Studies in the Leading or Troops. 209 
 
 important to renew energies once relaxed by great exertion. 
 At other times there is generally quite sufficient tendency 
 among troops to stretch every nerve to take part in an action 
 at the first possible moment. 
 
 As for the projected movement, sinc6 issuing the di^- 
 vision order at noon conditions had chäiigecl on the enemy's 
 side. He had extended his right wing. This contingency Was 
 taken into account in the order of 12:45 P- ""^v which ordered 
 the attack of the left wing along the wagon-road. The divis- 
 ion commander could not extend his front farther than this. 
 If the flank movement was not to succeed, then a frontal attack 
 must decide. Anticipating this, the division commander des- 
 ignated the center of the hostile position as the point of pene- 
 tration. Furthermore, some friction had occurred on the left 
 wing. The First and Second battalions of the Third regiment 
 of infantry took post too far to the rear and started for the 
 attack late ; moreover, the First battalion was held back in 
 reserve, whereby the attacking force upon the point at first 
 regarded as decisive was much reduced. 
 
 However, the question here concerned was not the urg- 
 ing on of troops, but the prevention of misunderstandings. 
 The Fourth infantry brigade need not have been anxious about 
 its left wing; the division commander could have relieved it 
 of its anxiety, as he was aware that the First infantry divis- 
 ion of the Guard had been requested to march upon Raussnitz. 
 
 Although the position of the division commander was 
 well selected, it afforded no view of the eastern part of Alt- 
 Rognitz, and an aid, accompanied by some mounted riflemen, 
 should have been sent there for the purpose of continually re- 
 porting the situation. When the division commander gave 
 the order to attack, he thought the left wing was in action 
 farther toward the front. When none of his troops were vis- 
 ible on the wagon-road at i 145 p. m., it became plain to him 
 that he could count but little on the action of the Third in- 
 fantry regiment. Although it was certain there was a reason 
 for this delay, yet there was no time to search it out. It 
 should not be forgotten that in executing an order a leader 
 does his own thinking and governs his action by the move- 
 ments of the enemy. 
 
2IO Studies in the Leading oe Troops. 
 
 Had the division commander wished to avoid losses and 
 a possible defeat, he could probably have delayed the latter 
 phase of the attack, the assault. But the order of the corps 
 commander to attack was perfectly plain ; the superiority of 
 the artillery was overwhelming, and even if the infantry attack 
 should really come to a standstill, the First infantry division 
 was so near that it could take a iiand in tlu- action within 
 half an h<^ur. 
 
 The general staff officer, with whom alone the division 
 commander discussed the situation, agreed with his superior 
 on all points. After the entire division had gone into action 
 
 Major X remained near his commander, in pursuance 
 
 of a positive order. The latter desired to have near him an 
 experienced officer to whom he might express himself wath 
 perfect freedom and upon whose judgment he could depend. 
 It was for this reason that, instead of sending away his gen- 
 eral stafi' officer, he em])loyed an aid to g(~> to the left win^- at 
 1 145 p. m. and obtain information with regard to conditions 
 there. 
 
 CoM.MENTs: 'i'liiv Third InEantry P>R[('..\i)i: i-ro.m 12:45 
 TO 1 :45 p. M. 
 
 On account of the terrane. the two regiments of the Third 
 infantry brigade had been compelled to deploy after (|uite 
 divergent methods. As the First regiment could find no shel- 
 ter in the terrane, it must seek protection by the development 
 of the greater i^art of its firing ]xnver. Accordingly it had ex- 
 tended its breadth, and kept only a few companies in close 
 order. At 800 yards from the enemy Its ])ower of attack from 
 out of the depth was j^retty well exhausted. The order for 
 attack had been given. The attack could not be prepared at 
 from 1,100 to 1,300 yards from the village of Hohenbruck. but 
 the enemy must be approached more closely, which was cor- 
 rectly done. It llie l^irst regiinent now forced the enemy 
 to employ all his strength to ward oti tliis attack, then the 
 Second regiment, in action elsewhere, and under more fav(^r- 
 able conditions, might break through his line of defense. 
 Kven with our far-carrying modern rifies, we will never be 
 able, by long-range fire alone, to induce an opponent on the 
 
Studif.s in the: Leadixg of Troops. 211 
 
 defensive to evacuate his position. The assailant must ap- 
 l)roach nearer and nearer. This could be done by a part of 
 the First regiment, as several platoons and 3 companies still 
 lemained ready to carry die skirmishers forward, although the 
 Eighth company was certainly too far in the rear to engage 
 in time. If the regiment had worked up to within 400 or 500 
 }'ards of the enemy while the other regiment executed the as- 
 sault, the attack of both regiments could coincide, as far as 
 effecting a decision was concerned ; but it would not be a united 
 
 assault. Colonel D could and must lead the regiment 
 
 still farther to the front after i 145 p. m. by employing his 
 last reserves, for the right wing of the division was no long- 
 er in danger, and he learned from a few mounted riflemen 
 whom he had sent out, that a whole battalion of riflemen 
 and a brigade of cavalry stood ready for support on the right 
 wing. 
 
 The most difficult task was assigned the Second infantry 
 regiment, to which the point of penetration had been given 
 with instructions to break through the hostile lines. It was 
 fortunate that the solution of this problem was favored by 
 the character of the terrane. It was not necessary to extend 
 the regiment for a copious development of its fire, as the 
 action of the artillery alone was already sufficiently effective. 
 In view of the point of direction and line of separation from 
 the other regiment, it need not extend its front over 440 yards. 
 Such a narrow and deep formation on an open plain would 
 have led to heavy losses, but here the ground afforded ample 
 protection, so that the companies in close order could also 
 retain a compact formation. 
 
 Extension and formation in attack is not dependent alone 
 on the terrane, but materially so upon the task and the rela- 
 tion to other troops. A common formation for both the Third 
 and Fourth brigades here would have been the posting of 
 regiments side by side. Regulations call specific attention to 
 the advantage of such a wing formation. In attack a de- 
 ployed front of from 1,100 to 1,300 -yards is prescribed for a 
 brigade ; a single regiment in use as a wing would, accord- 
 ing to rule, require about half this frontas^e. Consequently 
 it seems strange that in the case of the Third brigade, the 
 First regiment occupied a frontage of 800 yards and the Sec- 
 
212 STUDIKS in the LlvADlNG OF TrOOPS. 
 
 ond regiment only 450 yards. The shortness of front in the 
 case of the Second regiment was due to the fact that its right 
 wing leaned on the First regiment, and the extension of it^^ 
 left wing was limited by the designation of the point ox 
 direction. 
 
 It would have sufficed to have sent a battalion to the first 
 line, as a battalion has enough aggressive energy to carry 
 through an attack for a considerable time on a front of 450 
 yards. Nevertheless the Second infantry regiment put 2 bat- 
 talions in the first line, one beside the other. Even the reg- 
 iment adopted a wing formation with its battalions when it 
 formed up on the fighting line ; this was especially for the 
 purpose of preserving the units of command. It is self- 
 evident that order can be maintained much longer in actioii 
 if a battalion sends forward its own reinforcements than if 
 men from other battalions, whom the leader at the front does 
 not know, are deployed into the skirmish line. Besides, the 
 battalion commander and his subordinates keep the battalion 
 wholly in hand if it fights by itself. When alone, it can re- 
 spond promptly to every call; but when organizations are 
 mixed, order must first be re-established. In consequence of 
 its narrow front, the Second regiment also took a depth forma- 
 tion of about 450 yards. There were therefore about 3.000 
 assailants in a breadth of 450 yards, a little over 7 men pcr 
 yard, which is not at all too many for a decisive attack. 
 
 Colonel E— , commanding the Second regiment, was 
 
 entirely correct in not leaving the First battalion in reserve, 
 but placing it in the third echelon for attack. Losses in the 
 2 battalions at the front would soon call the First battalion 
 forward, and portions of it in close order would effect the de- 
 cision in the final assault. When, as in this case, a frontal 
 attack is to be made, the assailant must be formed deeply in 
 order, to have some reserve power for the final rush. The 
 First infantry regiment, however, was contending under en- 
 tirely diflferent conditions. It would have been well if it could 
 have preserved its deep formation, but circumstances did not 
 permit this. The enemy was in front and was widely extonrl- 
 ed, and, as the regiment was not confined on its right, it could 
 extend itself also: it must do that, if it would master its op- 
 ponent. 'Vhc dee]) formation i)rescril)cd by Regulatiotis was 
 
Studies in the; Li;ading of Troops. 2i.j 
 
 to be abandoned on account of the ground, the strength of the 
 hostile fire, and the freedom for extension, and hope for s^c-. 
 cess was based materially on the govxl marksmanship of tl^ie. 
 skirmishers. The First regiment sent 8 companies into the hrst 
 line, on a front of 800 yards, keeping in rear only, i company,; 
 as 2 were to cover the right wing. Forthwith the. 3 battf^t*- 
 ions considerably mixed were deployed beside each, otber^ 
 while it would have been better to keep i battalion; still in clos>e 
 order. The reason for the early mixing of the companies 
 will be considered later on. . I 
 
 The number of skirmishers employed determines the dens- 
 ity of the skirmish lines. Colonel D— ^- — , First infantry,, 
 intended to subdue the enemy by the development of a strong 
 fire; he therefore ordered the deployment of dense skirmish 
 lines, the men elbow to elbow. In the case of th^ Second; in-; 
 fantry regiment, which was in the woods, only one or t;>vci 
 sections were deployed in front of each of the four companies; 
 these did not fire, but were only to watch, or, in case of needf 
 turn back isolated patrols. When the order to advance wa^ 
 received, the companies formed skirmish lines as prescribe 4 
 in Regulations — /. e., with an interval of one or two paces, be- 
 tween skirmishers. These intervals must be assumed unles^ 
 otherwise ordered. By them an infantryman enjoys a cer- 
 tain freedom in m.aking use of the terrane. But above all,, 
 it is more difficult for the opponent to get his aim or mak^ 
 a hit, as missiles which are deflected laterally by ; errors of 
 the hostile skirmishers or other causes pass through the in- 
 tervals, doing no harm, whereas a dense skirmish line afford^ 
 a connected target, in which every bullet fired at proper ele^ 
 vation makes a hit. Even at mid range the Second, reginient 
 did not close the skirmish line, for the artillery had already 
 done good work and the normal skirmish line was sufficient to 
 overcome the hostile infantry. Where supports deploy iutQ 
 the line, it is done to replace losses and keep up an even fire^ 
 
 Skirmishers are not required to preserve an exact align- 
 ment. The skirmishers sent out by "both regiments were not 
 at all on the same line. Those of the First regiment had .rep 
 mained behind, with the Tenth company alone lying down 
 somewhat in advance ; the other regiment had worked for- 
 ward over too yards beyond. A skirmish line is given points 
 
314 Studies ix Tin- Lkadixo ok Troops. 
 
 of direction within or beyond the enemy's line, and one part 
 must keep in touch with tlie other. It would have been an 
 error if the skirmishers of the First regiment had attempted 
 to advance un(kr a heavy fire to within 700 or 800 yards of 
 the enemy, simply for the sake of keeping up the alignment. 
 An effective fire can be delivered just as well with sights at 
 800 yards as at 700 yards. The gain of the 100 yards' space 
 would have been bought at a great sacrifice. 
 
 As already stated, the 2 regiments of the Third infantry 
 brigade, on account of the formation of the ground, had to 
 resort to very difierent measures in order to properly initiate 
 the attack. They both had a great advantage in that their 
 acfvance up to 1,200 or 1,300 yards could be carried out un- 
 der cover. At these distances only the long-range fire of the 
 hostile infantry would be felt. On an open plain, as at St. 
 Privat in 1870, losses occurred even at 1,500 and 1,600 yards, 
 and in 1877, in the Russo-Turkish War, the Turks lying be- 
 hind intrenchments inflicted heavy losses on the Russians at 
 the same distance. The task here assigned the First infantry 
 vegiment was certainly difficult. While the other regiment 
 of the brigade found shelter in the terrane at least in some 
 places, the First had to forcibly make its advance possible by 
 ()I)ening fire at long range. In partially open terrane the mod- 
 ern attack will be divided into three periods: the advance to 
 mid-range distance, subduing the enemy by infantry fire, and 
 the assault. 
 
 The First regiment had succeeded in working up to with- 
 in 800 yards, where it found that its opponent was extended 
 m an equally broad front. It was. however, lacking in depth. 
 It was natural that signs of crumbling and a certain dissolu- 
 tion shotild be observed. The slackening of individual en- 
 ergy called for remedies and energetic measures, which were 
 immediately ai)plied. In this case the mingling of the com- 
 panies was a great drawback. On the right, in particular, 
 companies oi the First and Third battalions could be found 
 lighting promiscuously. As long as the men were of the same 
 regiment, this, however, might be allowable. Such occasions 
 furnish opportunity for brilliant display of cnergv on the part 
 frf platoon leaders, who. in general, are the soul of the skir- 
 ini.sh action on the most advanced line. When the line sud- 
 
Studiks IX TU)-: Lt;AüiNG OF Troops. 215 
 
 'lenly comes to a standstill without orders, or an ardent de- 
 sire to fall back is manifested, then it is that the i)ersonality 
 of the platoon leader will turn the ;cale, and a sharp and cor- 
 rectly given word of command will not be without influence 
 even though the moment be one of the most trying. 
 
 Very soon we will again have in our Army a large num- 
 ber of young officers without experience in war. It is well 
 to acquaint them with the dark sides of it, for the imagina- 
 tion will seldom paint these of its own volition. The young 
 officer should be taught war as it is, so that such incidents will 
 not take him completely by surprise, but find him ready to take 
 judicious measures. 
 
 Even with the most gallant and highly disciplined troops, 
 things will occur in war that we would hardly have believed 
 possible. In this study we have an opportunity to paint a scene 
 that no peace maneuvers can furnish. 
 
 Imagine, for an instant, that Hohenbruck's position on the 
 great highway to Trautenau and the events being enacted near 
 it brought many wounded men to the village, in the company 
 of attendants. On the main roads, wherever shelter was to 
 be found, large numbers of non-combatants of every sort as- 
 sembled — bands of near-by regiments and their led horses, as 
 well as the led horses of the headquarters staff, etc. Add to 
 these the cartridge-carts, medical-wagons, and various vehi- 
 cles of the ambulance company. 
 
 For a time this great aggregation of auxiliary and re- 
 serve forces remained in comparative security, but when the 
 action began to assume an uncertain mien the conditions 
 changed. The infantry at the front fell back slightly, fugi- 
 tives rushed into the village, and amidst the houses a hail of 
 bullets fell. Then all of a sudden this entire hitherto motion- 
 less mass began to surge Such of the wounded as were able 
 to walk tried to get under shelter. Men with led horses and 
 various vehicles tried to save themselves and get into motion 
 again. North of the village, on the Trautenau highway and 
 along its side, there rolled along a disorderly crowd, slowly 
 at first, then faster and faster, and finally on a dead run. If 
 it should have happened at just that moment that the squad- 
 ron of hussars posted there should wheel about and retire a 
 few hundred paces in order to open an adequate field of attack 
 
21 J Studies in ti-ie Leading of Troops. 
 
 for themselves, then the picture of a perfect rout would have 
 been Hfted before the troops. And we know that such a pict- 
 ure does not in the least tend to raise the morale of men, a 
 thing so desirable in like situations. 
 
 To obliterate this idea of a rout, it is necessary to prompt- 
 ly lead the troops forward whenever terrane and conditions 
 will permit. At the same time we must endeavor to check the 
 stream of fugitives, else they will cause all manner of mis- 
 chief; they will induce trains that have been ordered to the 
 front to turn about again; they will spread alarming news, 
 which may even reach home itself. Such a stream can only 
 be arrested by halting those in the lead, and officers and men 
 sent out on such an errand must use all the means at their 
 disposal. Under the circumstances, this work would have nat- 
 urally fallen to the Fourth squadron of the hussar regiment, 
 which would have performed it by despatching an officer witli 
 a troop. 
 
 Such events, however, did not take place during the en- 
 gagement under consideration. A few sudden stops and tend- 
 ency to give way on parts of the skirmish line of the First 
 infantry regiment were overcome by the platoon leaders, who 
 are not only the life and the impelling and directing t-lenient 
 on the foremost line, but are the ones upon whom devolve the 
 employment of the principal means of combat, fire control. 
 Even in peace a company commander cannot by his vincc 
 direct a company of lOO or 120 men firing ball cartridges. 
 How can he do it, then, with a company at war strength? 
 Fire control consequently depends on the character of the 
 platoon leader, and it devolves upon his talents to show how 
 effectively the guns entrusted to his care can be used. In Part 
 II., paragraph 55, Regulations state specifically: ''The sta- 
 tion of the platoon leader must be chosen with a view to ob- 
 serving the effect of the fire of his platoon. He forms his 
 platoon in the position assigned it, and designates its tar- 
 get either independently or in accordance with orders. He 
 watches the enemy closely, and co-operates with adjoining pla- 
 toons on the fighting line as far as he is able." 
 
 In the year 1866 the quick-firing breech-loader brought a 
 decision at close range. A tolerably trained sh(->t, who aimed 
 linrizontally, couM accomplish great results with the needle- 
 
Studies in thk Leading of Troops. ^17 
 
 gun. The victory in the infantry contest of 1870 was -du^ to 
 the advance of the German foot troops to the initial limit of 
 the range of their gun (650 yards), regardless of great losses, 
 although the gun they carried was inferior to the chassepot. 
 In our day fire superiority will be determined at ranges of 
 600 to 1,100 yards. Indispensably necessary to an advanta- 
 geous employment of the gun is the knowledge how far we 
 are from the enemy, the estimation of distances. The com- 
 pany commander will probably never be able to fix the dis- 
 tance to the enemy for the entire deployed company. The tar- 
 gets for the several platoons may be quite different. The pla- 
 toon leader is responsible for the estimate, and two or three ex- 
 perts at estimating distances are assigned him as assistants. 
 If in addition opportunity is found to allow some of the sec- 
 tion leaders to call out their estimate of distance, then the pla- 
 toon leader should be able to establish an approximately cor- 
 rect mean by taking all the estimates into consideration, and 
 order sights fixed accordingly. Intercourse between platoon 
 leader and men is regulated in action by the brief language 
 of command. This terse, sharp, and clear method of expres- 
 sion must be acquired, and calls for the most laborious ap- 
 plication. Every unnecessary word disturbs the skirmisher. 
 Wherever there is noise on the skirmish line, we may expect 
 to find poor fire discipline. 
 
 At the close of paragraph 55, Regulations state: "It 
 often happens that the one best able to see where advantage 
 can be taken of the character of the terrane or conditions with 
 the enemy, is the platoon leader on the skirmish line ; but the 
 platoon leader must satisfy himself how far he can take such 
 advantage on his own responsibility." To satisfy himself, he 
 must not only consider his own fighting line and the near-by 
 enemy, but he must also look back to the rear, to see how far 
 he is in advance of bodies in close order, and what such bodies 
 are doing. He cannot, hov/ever, accomplish all this in per- 
 son ; to assist him he has expert estimators, and he cannot in- 
 sist too strongly that one of these turn his back on the exciV 
 ing events in front, in order to watch the measures of troops 
 in the rear. How wrong it would have been had one of the 
 platoons of the First regiment sallied out from the skirmish 
 line to ^ain qround forward ! The enemy still possessed his 
 
2i8 Stüdiics in the Lkadixg of Troops. 
 
 full fighting- power, and would have directed a concentrated 
 lire on the single platoon dashing ahead. Besides, the pla- 
 toon would have entered the fire of the skirmishers lying down 
 in the rear, and thus have suffered from shots of the men of 
 its own regiment. Nor was anybody in close order at hand, 
 to quickly turn to account any advantage possibly gained. And 
 if several more platoons had joined in such a planless under- 
 taking, the situation of the skirmish line of the regiment might 
 have been critical indeed. No platoon leader, therefore, had 
 the least intention of working himself farther ahead without 
 the pressure of newly appearing subdivisions from the rear, 
 and each one concentrated his entire experience and presence 
 of mind on a correct fire control. 
 
 The advance of the Tenth company was more excusable, 
 for the patch of w^oods in its front actually afforded advant- 
 ages ; in reality, however, the seizure of the woods was value- 
 less, as at that time the border next to the enemy could not 
 have been held at a distance of 300 yards. 
 
 In the skirmish line of the Second regiment every one 
 momentarily awaited the order to advance. The platoon 
 leaders did not advance of their own accord, for they were 
 schooled so well tactically that they awaited the start of the 
 supports with perfect composure. They certainly could not 
 expect to receive an order to go ahead, as messengers or bear- 
 ers of orders could not move about in the hostile fire. This 
 was out of the question. The human voice, too, is not able to 
 shout orders for hundreds of yards amidst the crack of rifles 
 and swish of bullets. The platoon commanders must therefore 
 depend upon sight for their connection ; as soon as they should 
 see supports starting out, then the time would have come for 
 them to move also. 
 
 In action it is also possible to communicate by means of 
 sii^ns. On page 3 Infantry Drill Regulations prescribe some 
 such signs, while ''other signs must be sj^ecially invented by 
 the leader." 
 
 Should the skirmish line of the Second regiment advance 
 farther, the open ground would doubtless have compelled it 
 to do so in double time. It had advanced to the firing ])osition 
 it occupied at a run when under fire and at a walk when shel- 
 tered and in the bottoms. Unnnin«^- over ])rotected ground 
 
Studies in teu- Luading of Troops. 219 
 
 would have been a gross violation of the principle to pre- 
 serve the strength of the troops. The skirmishers of the Sec- 
 ond regiment were lying partly behind an undulation of the 
 ground, under cover, while those of the other regiment had 
 thrown themselves upon entirely open ground. The first had 
 crawled to cover in a stooping position, while the others had 
 rushed rapidly forward under the hostile fire, so as to shorten 
 the time of exposure. The skirmisliers of the First regiment 
 could have been brought forward out of their unsheltered 
 position very easily, for their condition could hardly have 
 been more perilous ; but it would have been difficult to induce 
 the skirmishers of the Second regiment to leave the protect- 
 ing undulation. 
 
 As long as a portion of the company and platoon leaders 
 are able to fight, the frictions in action can be overcome by the 
 fire and battle discipline acquired in previous training. In 
 order to exercise the necessary influence in this direction, ev- 
 ery officer and non-commissioned officer charged with these 
 duties must be locally in the proper place. Ordinarily the 
 platoon leader directs the fire of his platoon from the center, 
 a point from which his commands can best be heard to the 
 right and left. If the wind blows from the side, he goes to 
 the windward, so the sound of his voice is carried farther. 
 
 No special position is prescribed in Regulations for the 
 company commander when part of his company is deployed 
 as skirmishers. On page 95, Part IL, we find the following: 
 "The company commander must keep the control of his com- 
 pany well in hand. His instructions to the platoon com- 
 manders should be in the form of brief and lucid orders. He 
 should post himself where he believes he can best exercise con- 
 trol over all. He should see that the ammunition ibrought 
 from the rear is properly distributed to the skirmishers, using 
 for this purpose all means on the field at his command." 
 
 If only I platoon is deployed as skirmishers, the company 
 commander should keep the other parts in close order. So 
 he may meet all demands, his position in action will probably 
 be selected between the skirmishers and supports. In addi- 
 tion to the trumpeter, who remains near him in accordance 
 
2 20 STUDII-S in TIIK LEADING OF TrOOPS. 
 
 with Regulations, he will usually require one or two adroit 
 men to act as messengers. 
 
 The support is generally commanded by an experienced 
 Jitnitenant. Only a few supports were left to the First regi- 
 ment; several companies were supported by half-platoons in 
 close order, and the Seventh and Tenth companies by a pla- 
 loon each. To keep out of the shower of bullets the supports 
 very properly remained about 200 yards in ihe rear. The 
 Eighth company, however, kept back too far ; there were very 
 few bodies in close order behind the skirmish line, and there- 
 fore the company should not have taken a distance of 450 
 yards. Upon the principle that bodies of troops in close order 
 must go forward as soon as their skirmish line opens fire, the 
 Eighth company should have moved up long ago. If it 
 thought it would suflfer severely in line or platoon column, it 
 could have emerged from the woods deployed as skirmishers, 
 and closed up again upon halting. 
 
 The companies lying as support behind the skirmishers 
 adopted the platoon colunm formation. In it the men can 
 best be kept together and battle discipline preserved. Some 
 battalions, however, remained in column of march until 
 they came under a damaging fire. The F'irst battalion of 
 the First regiment could assume no other formation in the 
 sunken roadnorth.east of Hohenbruck. The passage through 
 the village, moreover, could not be efifected except in column 
 of march by companies. Upon coming out of the southern 
 edge of the village the First and Second companies even de- 
 ployed immediately as skirmishers, because there was no time 
 left to form platoon columns. The First battalion of the Sec- 
 ond regiment still retained its column of march by companies 
 after passing through the wooils, because it could not find 
 sufficient shelter in the tcrranc, and could better adapt itself 
 to the accidents of the terrane. 
 
 In order that second and tliird echelons may know what 
 direction to follow during an action, even when the ground 
 is partially obstructed from view, they are given the same 
 j)oint of direction as is assigned the skirmishers in front. The 
 main "|)oint of direction is assii^ned tc) one l)0(l\ ot troo|>s 
 alone, and it is responsible that the same is maintained; in this 
 case it was the Socond battalion of the Second infantrv, and 
 
Studii-is in THß Leading of Troops. 221 
 
 in particular its left wing-. It is evident that other bodies of 
 troops, like the First infantry regiment, who could not see 
 the northeast corner of the big woods north of Neu-Rognitz. 
 must select another point of direction, but one that shall bo 
 in accord with the conditions. The First regiment chose the 
 l^rojecting point of woods east of the highway, and charg:ed 
 the Second battalion with keeping the direction. The point 
 of direction was so chosen that it assured connection with the 
 Second infantry regiment, as ordered ; 100 yards, or even a 
 slightly greater distance, from the connecting regiment, makes 
 no dift'erence. Keeping in touch does not mean being elbow 
 to elbow, but concerted action for a common purpose. If 
 Neu-Rognitz had a church-steeple, that church-steeple should 
 have been chosen. The corners of the woods vanished from 
 sight here and there in low parts of the terrane ; therefore it 
 was necessary to carefullv choose intermediate points if the 
 designated direction would not be lost. 
 
 When the brigade had come within mid-range distance of 
 the opponent, the brigade commander could do nothing more 
 toward maintaining the direction of march. His station was 
 with the reserve — in this case, with the First battalion of the 
 Second regiment. Neither could he any longer Issue an order 
 for the decisive advance, as no one, mounted or on foot, could 
 traverse the battle-field on orderly service under such a fire. 
 
 Major-General B made his Intentions known only by 
 
 sending the First battalion into action, which, in the midst 
 of the ficht, he held under his own special disposition, of which 
 fact he duly informed Colonel E . Indeed, the First bat- 
 talion of the Second regiment did not constitute a reserve at 
 all, but a bodv In close order, to be saved until the end for 
 use in the final advance. 
 
 Strictly soeakinr, the final charge, the one Intended to 
 bring about the decision, should never be undertaken until 
 the enemv Is seen to be shaken bv the preparatorv fire. Nev- 
 ertheless, under certain conditions, the general situation may 
 compel us to make It at an earli<"'- oerlod : but /;/ such cases if 
 is always necessary to avoid undertaking: it at too orreaf a dis- 
 tance front the ot>Mnent, and to see that the successive fines 
 have previously been closed ufy to the most advanced tio^htinc: 
 front, so as to join in the action at the proper time. In such 
 
222 Studies in the Lkadinc or Troops. 
 
 an attack, that great impulse to seek a decision is especially 
 manifest in the linal charge, and to crown it with success we 
 must stake the whole force at our disposal. 
 
 When such decisive attacks are undertaken by larger 
 masses, they will entail greater sacrifices the less they are 
 favored by the ground. We should clearly understand this 
 at the outset, and undertake them only when forced to. And 
 then we must give them the most careful preparation, and. 
 when the decisive moment has come, stake all upon a singk 
 throw. 
 
 One thing is certain : When attacks by larger masses arc- 
 nowadays undertaken, it is essential to have the most perfect 
 accord among all the commanders, in viewing the situation 
 and in conducting the action; and this can only bj attai.ied 
 by the most careful training. It is for this reason that wc 
 sJwnld practice combat tactics of large forces as iJioroagJily 
 as possible, not alone on the drill-ground, hut also on the most 
 varied terrane. 
 
 Comments: The Fourth Ineantrv Brigade from 12:45 
 TO 1 :45 p. M. 
 
 The project of a flank attack upon the enemy's position 
 was all right in itself. Experience shows, however, that it 
 is exceedingly difficult to carry out such an idea right in front 
 of the opponent. According to generally accepted principles, 
 nowadays a flank attack can be made only by marching upon 
 the flank from a great distance, and at the same time holdiiiL: 
 the enemy fast by a threatened frontal attack. Tf he is not 
 held fast in the front, he will change his line, or extend it to- 
 ward the menaced flank as soon as he received re]iort of the 
 approach in that direction. Changes of front and shifting of 
 troops can be readily efl'ected by the simple and flexible form 
 in which armies move to-day. In the eighteenth century a 
 formation once established for defense was almost immovable. 
 It required a long time to concentrate troops on the threat- 
 ened points in a defensive front. In the battle o{ Leuthen 
 the clinnsiness of tlie movemi'nts of his opj)onents gave tin- 
 \ icton- to tile a^^ii'ant. iMXMlLTJrk the (^treat. At Austorlitz. 
 (.ne Mt" his few d;'fi'iisi\ e hatll.'S. Xapokon a->sirned the otTens- 
 
vSruDiEs IN THE Leadjnc oe Troops. 22.^ 
 
 ive, advancing his left wing and center in a counter-attack, 
 thus scattering the clumsy columns of the Austrians and Rus-, 
 sians as they marched past the French to make a flank attack 
 on the right wing. On the other hand, a flank attack suc- 
 ceeded sixty years later, at Königgrätz, which, although not, 
 consummated on the battle-field, was initiated and brought to 
 a finish by a strategical maneuver. At Königgrätz, and also 
 in 1870 at Gravelotte and St. Privat, the flank attack was 
 made possible only by holding the opponent fast in front. 
 
 In the study before us the division commander was in. 
 the disagreeable position of being obliged to attempt a flank, 
 attack in sight of the enemy between Alt-Rognitz and Neu- 
 Rognitz. He carried out his plan on the supposition that the. 
 enemy was weak and could not extend his front. This sup-, 
 position turned out to be erroneous. A flanking movement 
 farther around the hostile right wing might have been success- 
 ful, but then the division's front would become still more, 
 extended, and it was already a little short of 2 miles in. 
 length; and by a counter-attack an enterprising defender-, 
 could have torn asunder the line of the assailant, which was . 
 
 thin enough in the first place. Lieutenant-General A . 
 
 therefore abandoned the hope of favorable results from a flank : 
 movement, and made his calculations for success through an. 
 attack in front. It was very fortunate for this purpose thatj 
 the Fourth regiment had been formed up at the side of the. 
 Second. 
 
 Major-General C had designated a point of direc- 
 tion for each wing of the Fourth regiment, and thus limited "• 
 the front of the regiment to 550 yards. Connection with tfie 
 Third brigade was established by giving the same point of. 
 direction on the enemy's position, to the right wing of the 
 Fourth regiment and the left wing of the Third brigade — viz., 
 the northeast corner of the big woods. According to custom,- 
 the Fourth regiment should have placed 2 battalions in thc; 
 first line, and the third in a line behind ; but this would have- 
 necessitated a shifting of the Second battalion by the flank,' 
 under hostile fire, which could hardly be carried out. Coloneh 
 
 G therefore put in his battalions side by side, and this 
 
 narrowed their front. 
 
2 24 Studies in thk Lkadinc of Troops. 
 
 •' The Second battalion had only a single company in front ; 
 i>iit the First and Second battalions could form in column and 
 stipport the Third battalion at the center. Another guaranty 
 ut the maintenance of the depth of the attack was the grad- 
 irall}- narrowing width of the front, whereby the losses in the 
 skirmish line would be felt less wdien closing up to gather 
 impetus for the assault. 
 
 The wagon-road had been given as general line of march 
 direction to the Third regiment less the Third battalion. Such 
 a measure is not to be recommended, and proved of no ad- 
 vantage in this case. Roads like this are hardly ever straight, 
 v\m\ give the eye no support. So it happened that at the 
 very start the regiment lost connection to the right, and was 
 not available for the latter part of the attack (which began 
 at about i 145 p. m. ) because it was too far away and in rear 
 and had put only i battalion into action, in accordance with 
 the injudicious order of the brigade commander. The secur- 
 ity of the Hank should have been disregarded, and everything 
 <lisposed of for the attack. In case of necessity, the division 
 commander should have been requested to send the reserve 
 to the left wing. The condition became perfectly clear to the 
 i^rigade commander, who rode up to the left wing as it ap- 
 peared to be failing, and he could not help approving the dis- 
 
 |X)sitions of Colonel F , who had finally brought up the 
 
 First battalion for the attack. 
 
 A few more details in the conduct of the Fourth brigade 
 are worthy of mention. The commander of the Second bat- 
 talion of the Fourth regiment at one time interposed in the 
 sphere of authority of a company commander, and ordered a 
 platoon to deploy as skirmishers. Although this is totally 
 contrary to custom and an encroachment on the independence 
 of a subordinate, nevertheless it is comprehensible, excusable, 
 and even requisite. Ordinarily it is left entirely to the com- 
 pan\' (Commander to determine how many platoons or half- 
 platoons shall be deployed as skirmishers. A suggestion to 
 deploy a weak or a strong skirmish line can at least serve only 
 as a guide. Instructions as to how many shall be deployed are 
 not given l)y the superior. However, as here the falling back of 
 j>arls of the Sixtli company threatened to some extent to en- 
 dauL^cr the whole, and as n(» time wa< to be l(^st. the battalion 
 
STUDiii:s IN TiiK Leading of Tuoors. 225 
 
 commander promptly ordered a ]:)latoon to deploy forward 
 into line. 
 
 Platoon and -section leaders of the Third battalion of the 
 same regiment made use of the whistle on the skirmish line 
 of the Tenth and Eleventh companies, while with other com- 
 panies the voice proved sufficient. The use of the whistle^ is 
 accompanied with the disadvantage of its sphere of effect being 
 limitless. If one platoon is to cease firing in order to change 
 sights, and the leader uses his whistle, the whistling may also 
 affect adjoining platoons. In the case before us, the entire 
 line should cease firing and pay attention, and thus tne whis- 
 tling was correctly and successfully employed. 
 
 Considering the performance of the Fourth regiment after 
 a general manner, it was undoubtedly necessary that the cen- 
 ter and left wing (Third and First battalions) should advance 
 nearer to the enemy ; the left wing was almost three-quarters 
 of a mile from the opponent, and its fire could not be suffi- 
 ciently accurate; besides, an advance was especially favored 
 by the gentle rise in front. The detachment of a part of the 
 regiment jeopardized the uniformity of the attack, but still 
 more precarious was the delay in the advance of the Third 
 regiment. The nestling of the skirmishers of the Second bat- 
 talion in the edge of the village, 1,300 yards from the enemy, 
 was tactically erroneous. Although the battalion could not 
 undertake much against such a strong position, it should at 
 least have advanced to the line of the connecting regiment. 
 
 As regards the removal of knapsacks, we must agree with 
 the brigade commander; yet it is a measure concerning which 
 views differ widely. It is certainly improbable that a battal- 
 ion which has once removed its packs will ever see them^ again- 
 if the action goes amiss, and even if the engagement is suc- 
 cessful, troops that continue the pursuit of the enemy may 
 onlv get possession of their knapsacks after weeks have 
 passed. It is easy enough to say either that the knapsack is 
 generally unnecessary and therefore should be gotten rid of, 
 or that it is a necessity and therefore should never be re- 
 moved ; but neither of these propositions expresses the full 
 truth. Generally speaking, the knapsack is a part of the sol- 
 dier; it should not, as a rule, be removed, and only when ex- 
 tremely necessary. We find occasions, however, when ex- 
 
2 26 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 traordinary exertion is likely to be required, or strength has 
 already been used up to such an extent that relief must be 
 granted if further effort would be sought. Then all other con- 
 siderations vanish, and in order to accomplish the aim of 
 the moment we may lay aside the thought, ''What will be- 
 conje of the knapsacks that have been unslung?"^ In mo- 
 ments of extended rest it is always advisable to unsling knap- 
 sacks, a measure that was overlooked by division headquar- 
 ters at Parschnitz. 
 
 At I 145 the major portion of the Second division was 
 ready to enter upon the final phase of the attack. The entire 
 lour regiments had striven to advance up to eft'ective range 
 and group themselves for joint action. The front extensions 
 differed according to terrane and instructions. The First 
 regiment had a frontage of 750 yards, the Second of 450, and 
 the Fourth of 900. The first was formed in two battalions, 
 intermingled, side by side, one echeloned to the right; the 
 Second of two battalions in the first line and one in the sec- 
 ond ; the Fourth was able to lead its battalions into the fire 
 side by side and in good order. It is an established rule to 
 combine a strong fire front with depth, but circumstances will 
 make either the one or the other more essential. The demands 
 of an action vary so much that rigid forms are not suitable 
 in every case. 
 
 Comments: The Cavalry erom 12:45 t« i -45 p- ^^^ 
 The First, Second, and half of the Third squadron alone 
 remained in the hands of the regimental commander. For 
 the time being this force remained east of the church of 
 St. Paul and St. John, in pursuance of Lieutenant-General 
 A 's instructions (page 169) to follow the Fourth infantry 
 
 lAny man who has ever witnessed the relief afforded troops by 
 taking off knapsacks after a hard march, under a hot sun. over dif- 
 ficult ground, and observed with what new vim they then enter the 
 action, will concur in this view. I can still see several companies 
 of the Fifth corps at Nachod, who. almost overcome by the heat, 
 could hardly move, <'alling back in answer to words of exhortation. 
 "Yes. Major, if we only had these monkeys off our backs!" When 
 permission was given to remove the knap.sa( ks. it seemed as if the 
 men had completely forgotten nil the hardships of the hasty march 
 in the mountains under a .lune sun. 
 
Stuutes in thk Leadin«, of Troops. 237 
 
 brigade. By remaining at this place they were less able to 
 participate in the engagement, because they were nearly two- 
 thirds of a mile from the foremost line, while their advance 
 would be delayed by passing through the intervening village. 
 If cavalry is to take part in an infantry action at the proper 
 time, it must find a sheltered position near the first line, in ad- 
 dition to a proper field of attack. If the terrane does not afford 
 such a position, then a timely interposition is naturally out of 
 the question. Here the ground south of Rudersdorf was not 
 exactly favorable ; but nevertheless 2^ squadrons could have 
 posted themselves under cover near the southern edge of the 
 village. The regimental commander had done too little 
 scouting. The movements of the enemy between Neu- 
 Rognitz and Staudcnz should have been reported long before 
 they were. 
 
 Meanwhile the Fourth squadron of the regiment was be- 
 hind the right wing of the Third infantry brigade. Its leader 
 had previously taken pains to strengthen his weakened force 
 by calling up the patrols and other detached hussars. But 
 with all this he should not have lost sight of the fact that it 
 was specially important to do all he possibly could with what 
 troops he had in hand. Events certainly presented opportu- 
 nity for advantageous action. 
 
 Places where cavalry can be used are easily recognized. 
 Vs far, as the leader of the Fourth squadron could observe 
 from where he stood, his field of attack could lie only 
 south of the village. If the opponent should appear in 
 that vicinity, opportunity to employ the cavalry would soon 
 arise. But the squadron should not at the outset have taken 
 i:>ost south of Hohenbruck, for it would then have been useless- 
 ly subjected to hostile fire ; yet it could have sought a sheltered 
 position out of which it might have suddenly appeared at the 
 proper moment. The houses and gardens of Hohenbruck 
 afforded an excellent opportunity for this ; the squadron could 
 have debouched from the western. part of the place in a few 
 minutes, particularly if the road space had been widened by 
 pulling down fence's. The cavalry must hold itself in read- 
 iness to attack the enemy in flank should he possibly advance 
 for a counter-attack, or assist its own infantry in making the 
 assault. 
 
228 Studiks in the LivAding of Troops. 
 
 In judging the work of cavalry it is very unjust to 
 use the terms "fortunate attack" and "unfortunate attack" 
 in their literal sense; we should rather say "useful attack" or 
 "useless attack," which will afford a more just scale of meas- 
 uring its attainments. 
 
 Still another point deserves consideration. Whose duty 
 was it to put the Fourth squadron into action — Major-General 
 
 B 's, or the squadron commander's? In the first place, 
 
 it would have been the duty of the brigade commander to give 
 it orders, for it had been specially placed in the position it 
 occupied by his directions. But just here occurred what will 
 frequently happen in such cases : under the excitement of the 
 principal infantry action, the general did not think of the one 
 squadron. It was then the duty of its leader, the moment he 
 had carried out any previous instructions, to report in person 
 to his superior and ask what he should next do; he should 
 have looked around of his own accord, and seen if there was 
 any opportunity for his employment. War requires every 
 commander to consider where and how he may be useful, and 
 to develop independent thought and action, and not limit his 
 usefulness by waiting in every instance to be prompted by his 
 superior. 
 
 It was on this principle that the commander of the First 
 
 cavalry brigade acted. Lieutenant-General A was too 
 
 far away to permit of Major-General L 's going to him 
 
 for orders. By chosing a position from which he could "sur- 
 vey the terrane, the enemy, and the status of the engagement, 
 and at the same time keep his troops in hand," he found the 
 right point (Hill 414), and brought his troops together in 
 shelter behind the hill. From there he threatened the left 
 wing of the hostile infantry. He had his troops dismount, 
 while his officers reconnoitered the country and watched tlie 
 enenn . whose left wing was quickly IcKated. 
 
 Com Ml-:. \ IS : Tjiic Division' Au'imi.i.i.rn' K i:( . i m i: n t i'R(t,M 
 12:45 '"'<> ^ :45- 
 
 The measures taken by the First artillery regiment were 
 quite simple, as the character of the terrane did not permit 
 much changing of i)osition. Drill l\egnlati(^ns ]>rescribe in 
 
Studies in the Leading of Tkoops, 22^ 
 
 detail the conduct of artillery in attack: in order to silence 
 the hostile batteries at the order of the commander-in-chief, 
 it must "concentrate an overwhelming fire on the part of the 
 enemy's line that is to be attacked, and from a flanking posi- 
 tion whenever possible, while a portion of the batteries are 
 devoted to silencing the hostile artillery, and particularly so 
 much of the hostile artillery as can direct an effective fire 
 upon the field of attack ;" further, '"if, after the infantry attack 
 has begun, fresh hostile batteries, or such as have resumed 
 lire, should open upon the artillery, the latter must nevertheless 
 continue to support the infantry attack with its main force*" 
 This course was adopted, by direction of the regimental com*- 
 mander. The fire upon the point of assault was kept up from 
 a position which furnished a good view and which was-high 
 above the infantry. It was thus made easy to distinguisti 
 friend from foe and to observe the effect of the shots. \Xnien 
 the assailing infantry had approached within 700 oi" 800 yat-d^ 
 from the defender, the terrane behind the latter was also taken 
 under fire, in order to render it more diflicult for the enenty 
 to bring up reserves. • 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel J was able to make all these 
 
 dispositions in due season. Being near Lieutenant-General 
 
 A , he was quickly informed of the latter's intentions, 
 
 and he could clearly judge for himself, from his own station, 
 the status of the engagement. 
 
 The advance of the horse battery to accompany the in- 
 fantry attack ''at close and most effective distance,^' deserves 
 commendation. The battery leader intended to ^'strengthai 
 the attack morally by a bold participation," and saW all the 
 more occasion for this when he recognized how trying the sit- 
 utation of the First infantry regiment had become. 
 
 The belated participation of the Sixteenth field artillery 
 regiment must be charged to the unfavorable condition of the 
 streets of Trautenau. The battery of the advance gtiaixl 
 should, however, have gone into action independently, an-d 
 Avithout delay. ' ' ' . • • « 
 
230 STL'Dit:s IN Tiuc Lkading of Troops. 
 
 Attack of the Second Infantry Division till the Capt- 
 ure OF THE Thickets North of Neu-Rognitz 
 : AND Entry into the Village. 
 
 (1:45 TO 2:25 p. M.) 
 
 At 1 :45 Lieutenant-General A left Hill 500, north 
 
 of Alt-Rognitz, and went to Hill 513, between Hohenbruck 
 and Alt-Rognitz, nearer his foremost line. 
 
 Before leaving his station he received the report of the 
 division surgeon, according to which the latter had established 
 his main dressing station in the village of Alt-Rognitz, con- 
 solidating it with the dressing station previously established 
 there. The surgeon also stated that the advance guard of the 
 First division had provided for the right wing, and that it^ 
 ambulance company was already at work north of Hohen- 
 bruck, also that he had given orders to the Second field hos- 
 pital to remain in Kriblitz, and that the chief surgeon of 
 the corps would have another field hospital established in 
 Trautenau. 
 
 The division commander approved these arrangements 
 and directed that patrols be organized from the field gen- 
 darmes and orderlies, who should direct all wounded men 
 going to the rear in the vicinity of Hohenbruck and the north- 
 ern extremity of Alt-Rognitz to the respective dressing sta- 
 tions, and at the same time send back to the fighting line any 
 one going to the rear without good cause. • Prisoners were to 
 be sent to Trautenau. Besides, two patrols were sent to Hohen- 
 bruck and Alt-Rognitz for the prevention of irregularities and 
 excesses there and returning any men found absent from their 
 commands. 
 
 The general then turned toward the sunken road east of 
 Hill 460, where the Third battalion of the Third infantry reg- 
 iment was standing at his disposition, and directed its com- 
 mander to follow the attack behind the Fourth infantry reg- 
 iment. Next he determined to seek out Major-General B , 
 
 who was with the First battalion of the Second infantry reg- 
 iment, it having Ix'cn re])orted that the commander of the 
 other infantry brigade had ridden into Alt-Rognitz to the left 
 wing. 
 
STUDIb:S IN Tllli LEADING OF TrOOPS. 
 
 3^1 
 
 As he ascended the eastern slope of Hill 513 he canu- 
 across the commander of the Third infantry brigade at the 
 edge of the woods, who reported the course of action up to 
 that moment on the right wing and stated that subdivisions 
 of the First infantry division were already approaching 
 Hohenbruck, and that their artillery had gone into action on 
 the Galgen Mountain and was now under fire; he also ex- 
 pressed the opinion that the time had come to make the deci- 
 sive attack. The division commander ordered him to await for 
 a few minutes longer the eflfect of the fire of the batteries 
 which had gone into position near and upon the Galgen Moun- 
 tain. Upon being asked where a good point to observe the 
 engagement could be found, the major-general directed him 
 to the southern corner of the thicket near 513 as the most 
 suitable station. 
 
 Pioth of the general officers then started out to ride to 
 
 the point mentioned by Major-General B , and en route 
 
 were met by an officer from corps headquarters, who brought 
 word from the corps comm.ander that the First infantry bri- 
 gade had received orders to attack also via Hohenbruck, west 
 of the highway, and that the Second infantry brigade would 
 be brought up in reserve astride the highway north of the vil- 
 lage. The officer also stated that the First division of the 
 Guard corps was approaching, and that its point was only 
 about a mile and .i quarter from Alt-Rognitz and would turn 
 against the hostile right flank via Rudersdorf. 
 
 The general stalY officer of the Second infantry division 
 was instructed to inform this officer fully regarding the state 
 of the engagement and the further intentions of the division 
 commander, for the information of the commanding general. 
 
 Having arrived at Thicket 513. Lieutenant-General A 
 
 immediately repaired to its southwest edce, in order to obtain 
 a survey of conditions on the extreme right wing, which had 
 hitherto been beyond his observation. From that point he 
 observed a lively engagement taking place on both sides of 
 the highway on a line with the southern portion of Hohen- 
 bruck, and also a few isolated smaller columns farther back 
 near the edge of the thickets. Cavalry was visible on the 
 opposite side of the highway near Hill 414. Upon inquiry as 
 to whether the bodies in close order visible on the southern 
 
Qy2 Studies in the Leading oe Troops. 
 
 edge of Plohenbriick belonged to the First division, Lieutenant- 
 General A was advised that they constituted a battalion 
 
 of the Third brigade ; which occupied Hohenbruck, and which 
 would now doubtless advance with the First division as it 
 joined in the action. 
 
 Although the firing had increased considerably within the 
 last quarter of an hour, at that moment (1:58 p. m.) it ap- 
 peared to be growing all the more intense toward the south- 
 east ; the thunder of cannon and rattle of small-arms was ac- 
 companied by a continuous roll of volleys. Both generals 
 proceeded quickly to the southern corner of Thicket 513, from 
 which point they noticed that the Fourth brigade had already 
 commenced the attack, the leading troops of which were cross- 
 ing the stri]) of meadows at the foot of the ridge and rush- 
 ing up the slope. The extreme left wing of the Third brigade 
 seemed to have joined in this movement. 
 
 The division commander immediately ordered Major- 
 
 (}eneral B to join with the entire Third infantry W\- 
 
 gade in the final attack (2 p. m.). 
 
 The picture now being gradually unrolled before the 
 eyes of the division commander afforded little opportunity f(^r 
 the observation of details, but in general it could be described 
 as follows: 
 
 In his front the Second infantry regiment disappeared 
 from view in the depression near Saddle 45 1 ; it was therefore 
 doubtless making some progress. At 2\2-^ hurrahs and the 
 sound of signals were heard from that direction, while parties 
 of the enemy were seen hurriedly falling back into the wo<xls 
 north of Neu-Rognitz. The rolling terrane made it impossible 
 to see to what extent the Fourth infantry regiment partici- 
 pated in this assault ; at all events, none of the troops were 
 coming back over Ridge 527. 
 
 The advance of the First infantry regiment on the right 
 wing was decidedly difficult, and more lingering than in the 
 center of the attack. At 450 yards from the enemy the regi- 
 ment came to a halt, when it seemed almost as if it wouUl 
 succumb to a counter-attack that was seen being prepared : 
 but at the .same moment infantry and artillery debouched from 
 Hohcnbruck and cavalry moved out from ITill 414, and as 
 
SxuDircs IN TitE Leading of Troops. 
 
 33 
 
 well as could be seen amidst the clouds of rising dust the en- 
 emy was falling back on Sorge. 
 
 On the left flank of the division affairs took a different 
 shape. The troops of the Fourth brigade, which at the start 
 had rushed along the wagon-road with great intrepidity, when 
 on line with the rolling ground running southeast from Mill 
 527, came under the fire of troops occupying the thickets and 
 intermediate positions, and fell back in the direction in which 
 they had advanced, to the meadow-ground near Alt-Rognitz. 
 The view to the south of the wagon-road was obstructed, al- 
 though just there the engagement appeared to have reached 
 the utmost intensity. Suddenly the action at that point as- 
 sumed a decidedly retrograde character also, and even hos- 
 tile cavalry could be recognized coming on to the open ground 
 north of the wagon-road, against which the hussar regiment 
 advanced riding up the slope, but the distance prevented fur- 
 ther details from being seen ; this much, however, was certain : 
 the attack of the left wing had utterly failed and the troops 
 were falling back in the utmost confusion. 
 
 Lieutenant-General A at once galloped over to the 
 
 left flank to restore the action there by his presence (2:25), 
 taking a route north of Ridge 527. 
 
 Comments on the; Conduct of the Division Commander. 
 
 While issuing orders to his troops in action and observing 
 their movements, the division commander must not lose sight 
 of other necessary dispositions. 
 
 One of these is the care of the wounded. While the divis- 
 ion surgeon attends to details, at the same time it is his duty 
 to initiate or propose necessary measures. The commander 
 is always responsible for the successful carrying out of such 
 measures. In view of the character of the engagement, it is 
 apparent that the dressing station established at Kriblitz was 
 too far away to serve its purpose ; moreover, one dressing 
 station hardly seemed sufficient, on account of the dispersion 
 cf the division. 
 
 The following principle should govern in the choice of 
 location for a dressing station: that the station should 1)c 
 located as near the troops as safety will permit, and with water 
 
2,^.4 
 
 SiTDiiis IN 'IHK Kkadinc (ji* Tk()()i»s. 
 
 I 
 
 and a few suitable buildings available. If buildings are not 
 near by, then tents should be taken from the portable equip- 
 ment of wounded or fallen. 
 
 Considering the probable extent of the engagement, the 
 necessity of a field hospital could be foreseen quite early ; it 
 was therefore correct to erect at the outset the first one avail- 
 able, and under circumstances then existing Kriblitz was the 
 proper place for it. When another field hos]:)ital could h^ 
 brought up, Trautenau was the place in which to establish 
 it, as was actually done. 
 
 When the dressing station near Kriblitz was to be dis- 
 continued, all the wounded who could be transported should 
 be taken to the field hospital in Kriblitz, while the necessary 
 medical attendants and nurses for those not transportable 
 should be left back. The rest of the personnel and materiel 
 should be sent to the new dressing station in Alt-Rognitz, 
 where all the medical ofticers of the troops, previously detailed 
 for such duty, should also assemble. This could have been 
 very easily done, as the main dressing station was combined 
 with that of the troops. 
 
 The accompanying or transportation of the wounded to 
 the dressing station by men who are able to fight must be 
 forbidden under all circumstances as long as fighting is in 
 l)rogress; otherwise men would be too easily induced to with- 
 draw from danger on such pretext. Not a single man able 
 to bear arms can be spared before a decision is reached. 
 Those who are but slightly wounded must drag themselves, 
 imassisted, to the dressing station; those who are severely 
 injured arc carried there during an action by the litter-bearers 
 and assistant bearers detailed for the duty ; only when the fight 
 is over should troops assist in this work. 
 
 To see that these injunctions are carried out, as well as 
 to prevent similar disorders, it is recommended to provide for 
 special supervision. Field i^endarmcs could be used for this 
 jairposc. 
 
 Near t 130 ]). m. the h'irst division ordered its ambu- 
 lance company to take station north of lTohenl)ruck, and the 
 wounded were well cared for by it. The German flag and 
 the (icneva cross were displayed at both dressing stations. 
 Tile division surgeon directed affairs in Alt-Rognitz, while 
 
Studies in thc Leading of Troops. 235 
 
 the surgeon of the First infantry regiment was in charge of 
 the troop dressing station in Uohenbruck. 
 
 Prisoners must be assembled in large bodies as soon as 
 possible, and the escorts relieved and returned to their organi- 
 zations. Orders must therefore be issued designating a com- 
 mon place of assemblage for all bodies of prisoners sent to the 
 rear from the fighting line. 
 
 The change of station by the division commander was 
 necessary to enable him to better overlook the ground on 
 which the decisive assault must be made. He delayed the ad- 
 vance of the Third brigade for a few moments, as a few broad- 
 sides from the Sixteenth field artillery regiment would mate- 
 rially contribute to facilitating the assault. But when in the 
 meantime the right wing of the Fourth brigade began its 
 advance, he then gave orders for the Third brigade to start 
 without further delay, so as to assure the simultaneous onset 
 of all the forces of the division. It would have been easier, 
 at that critical moment, to induce the division to advance si- 
 multaneously, by trumpet calls. But in action these signals are 
 prohibited, with the exception of "Forward, double time," 
 "Fix bayonets," and "Attention," which, however, would not 
 have been suited to this particular occasion. The other sig- 
 nals are prohibited, for the reason that they might erroneously 
 be taken up, by troops they do not concern. 
 
 The unfavorable turn of events with the Fourth brigade 
 presents one of those occasions where the superior leader feels 
 it his duty to interfere personally. For this it is first of all 
 requisite that he go to the spot. Yet he must also take meas- 
 ures to meet the consequences of the local misfortune, em- 
 ploying for such purpose the troops nearest at hand. 
 
 The Third Infantry Brigade from i 45 To 2 :25. 
 
 Shortly before 1 145 Major-General B had received 
 
 a message stating thai the First battalion of riflemen was 
 advancing upon Hohenbruck, and at the same time he noticed 
 the effect of the artillery of the First infantry division upon 
 the tongue-shaped piece of woods near the highway. Under 
 these circumstances he considered cover for the right wing 
 no lono^er necessarv, and directed Colonel D to put 
 
236 Studies in thjv Leading of Troops. 
 
 llic First battalion into action. Colonel D used the 
 
 'lliird and Fourth companies, all he had left in close order, to 
 strengthen his right wing at the moment when the attack was 
 to he carried farther forward. 
 
 Soon after i 145 p. m. Major-General B believed 
 
 thai the moment for the decisive assault had arrived, as at that 
 time the whole of the Fourth brigade's most advanced line, as 
 far as he could judge, had gone into action. He was just 
 about to give the order to advance when his attention was 
 called to the division commander who was approaching, so 
 
 he first went to join Lieutenant-General A . The actions 
 
 of the two generals and events up to the issuance of the order 
 for assault liave already been described. 
 
 Tiie assault of the brigade was after the following 
 maimer : 
 
 At 2 :o5 Major-General B gave an order to ad- 
 vance to the senior captain of the First battalion of the Sec- 
 ond regiment, whose commander had taken charge of the 
 regiment in place of the regimental commander, the latter hav- 
 ing been wounded. The four companies, which had not yet 
 been fired on, began to move in column of march at route 
 step. As soon as this v/as noticed by the Eleventh, Sixth, and 
 Eighth companies, which were in the second line, they ad- 
 vanced to the attack, with drums beating, and thereby induced 
 the entire skirmish line of four companies to rise and rush 
 forward. This took place under the protecting fire of the 
 I'ourth regiment, whose skirmishers had thrown themselves 
 down after the first dash forward, and were firing. 
 
 Thi.s alternate advancing and firing by the two regiments 
 took place without previous understanding. Upon the second 
 rush the Ninth company of the Second regiment got into the 
 thickets near Hill 527, and advanced at a walk to the southern 
 edge, unseen by the enemy, ^'he Fifth and Seventh companies 
 reached »he bottom of a deep hollow, which took them out of 
 tlu' opponent's fire, but prevented their firing. The skirmish- 
 irs of the Twelfth comi)any had therefore to bear the brunt 
 of the defender's fire, and would conse(|uently have remained 
 lying down on Hill 527 had not tho leader of the Eleventh 
 (•omf)anv, which was immediately in rear, observed this, and, 
 .K'pIo\:Ti'^ liis w hoK- c-oiiip:niv forw.'ird. carrird tlu' Twelfth 
 
Studies in thiv Leading of Troops. 237 
 
 company with it. The Tenth company, coming up, made 
 use of this opportunity to take the place of the Eleventh and 
 to connect with the battalion again. When the Fifth and 
 Seventh companies had rushed up the slope and gone into 
 action again, the enemy appeared to be completely shaken by 
 the fire of six companies, as the Sixth company had in the 
 meantime also deployed on the line. 
 
 It is true that the First field artillery regiment had ceased 
 its fire upon the hostile skirmishers, the Second infantry regi- 
 ment having approached too close ; the enemy's skirmish line, 
 however, showed great gaps, and the fire of the division artil- 
 lery regiment, directed upon the ground behind it, prevented 
 reinforcements being brought up. Meanwhile the firing effi- 
 ciency of the Second infantry regiment had been greatly re- 
 duced. The severe exertion incident to running and throw- 
 ing themselves upon the ground had, unfortunately, affected 
 the pointing and aiming. A number of men who were not 
 watched fired with sights at mid-range distance. 
 
 A large number of men who were exhausted were left 
 l>ehind lying down, besides the killed and wounded. In the 
 meantime, when the skirmishers of the Second regiment 
 noticed on the left the foremost line of the Fourth regiment 
 crossing the last rise in the ground separating them from the 
 enemy, and when the Tenth and Eighth companies, formed 
 into line, approached tlie skirmish line, the entire line crossed 
 the space to within 150 yards of the enemy, in three rushes, 
 and the men threw themselves down ; platoon and company 
 leaders had drawn swords, while trumpeters and drummers 
 were sounding the advance upon the hostile position, which 
 they reached amidst loud hurrahs. 
 
 Only slight resistance was met in the enemy's line, which 
 was marked by dead and wounded. In the large woods near 
 \eu-Kognitz the fire of several hostile platoons was encoun- 
 tered. But the woods were also quickly evacuated as soon as 
 they were entered by parts of the Second and Fourth regi- 
 ments, completely mixed. The leader of- the First battalion of 
 the Second regiment, now regimental commander, who had 
 joined in the assault on foot in the absence of his own horse, 
 which was left back with the train, mounted the animal of a 
 wounded rifleman and rode to the southern edge of the big 
 
?:;S STUDU-S IX TIIK I J-ADI .\(; ( n- TkOOI'S. 
 
 thickets, and halted the troops there so as to re-estabUsh order 
 and obtain a good view of what was further required. Very 
 soon (about 2:25 p. m.) Major-General B also ap- 
 peared, who, when advised of the fortunate result of the tii?ht 
 on the right wing, ordered the Second regiment, to take Neu- 
 Rognitz. The commander of the Fourth regiment. Colonel 
 C , then came up, and wanted to put in his entire regi- 
 ment to change the unfavorable situation of the fight on the 
 left wing of the division. 
 
 On the division's right wing, the First infantry regiment 
 had not been able to seize the long stretch of thickets near 
 the highway between Hohenbruck and Neu-Rognitz, with the 
 same ease that characterized the successful advance of its 
 sister regiment upon the big woods. To be sure, the long 
 skirmish" line formed by the eight companies had willingly 
 followed the imixnus for the assault given, according to orders, 
 by the adjoining regiment on the left. But in the meantime 
 the Sixteenth field artillery regiment on the Galgen Moun- 
 tain had made an impression upon the enemy for a short time 
 onlv. and as soon as the First regiment arose it >vas compelled 
 to cease its firing. With the latter every condition was ripe 
 for an attack upon an unshaken enemy of greater frontage. 
 Although the deployment of the few remaining troops in sup- 
 ])ort, and of the fourth company, carried the line forward 
 twice, and the eighth company followed behind the center and 
 the third upon the right, both in close order, yet when three 
 or four hostile battalions advanced from the quarry for a 
 counter-attack, it appeared doubtful 10 the regimental com- 
 mander, who was (^n the right wing, whether such an attack 
 could be repulsed. 
 
 fust at that moment (2:10 p. m.), however, the matter 
 assumed a different aspect, for the ever-watchful batteries of 
 the Sixteenth field artillery regiment directed their fire upon^ 
 the assailing op])onent. and the horse battery, hurrying out of 
 Hohenbruck, opened upon the hostile battalions at i.ooo yards. 
 They hesitated, threw themselves down, and fired, while at 
 the .same time the First cavalry brigade and the Fourth squad- 
 ron of the l-'irst regiment of hussars attacked the hostile in- 
 fantry on thr left wing and Unnk. Simultaneously the First 
 b.'ittalion oi ritliMiu-.i rani'.- int«» ih«- <>])fn L:r<>nn'l tn the soiuh (Uil 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 239 
 
 of the western part of Hohenbruck. The gallant forces of the 
 enemy were completely overthrown, and though several com- 
 panies resisted the attack of the cavalry, finally the entire 
 mass, some in order and some dispersed, streamed back in the 
 direction of the quarry and highway. 
 
 The leaders in the skirmish line of the First regiment 
 availed themselves of the opportunity thus afforded to aj)- 
 proach nearer to the thickets on the highway, and when they 
 arose, at a distance of about 500 yards, for a fresh advance, 
 the hostile skirmish and artillery fire became silent and the 
 opponent was seen leaving his position. Shortly afterwards 
 a hurrah was heard on the left, which indicated that a decis- 
 ion had been reached in the center too. At 2:25 the right 
 wing of the First regiment reached the quarry, and its left 
 wing came up to the southern point of the tongue-shaped piece 
 of woods ; the mounted battery had also arrived, and the First 
 cavalry brigade and the Fourth squadron of the First hus- 
 sars were assembling near the thickets north of the quarry. 
 The enemy's infantry was seen disappearing in the ravine and 
 woods west of Neu-Rognitz. 
 
 Comments on the Attack by the Third Ineantrv 
 Brigade (1:45 to 2:25). 
 
 The success of the attack is to be attributed principally 
 to the complete fire preparation by the infantry and artillery 
 and by issuing of orders to the assaulting troops. The hos- 
 tile artillery was almost completely put out of action, and the 
 enemy's counter-attack was neutralized by the co-operation of 
 all three arms on the extreme right wing, the cross-fire of 42 
 guns making their position almost untenable. In spite of this, 
 the defenders not only held out until assaulted, but even 
 checked the frontal attack for some moments. The decision 
 was finallv secured by the flanking movement of the cavalry 
 and horse battery upon the right wing of the brigade. 
 
 It cannot be determined who gave the impetus for the 
 
 latter part of the assault. Major-General B labored 
 
 under the erroneous impression that the First infantry regi- 
 ment still had a battalion in close order at its disposal on the 
 right wing. As it was, only 2 companies were thus avail- 
 
240 Studies in the Leadixi. oe Tkoops. 
 
 able, and it would have been advisable to have asked the bat- 
 talion of riflemen to take part in the action at an early mo- 
 ment. Major-General B can, however, hardly be held 
 
 responsible for this incomplete knowledge of conditions on the 
 right wing; it was rather the duty of the commander of the 
 First infantry rcj^nment to keep him informed with regard to 
 the situation there. For delivering such information mounted 
 riflemen should be employed. 
 
 The regimental commander and his adjutant dismounted 
 in the midst of the heavy fire from the opponent. The con- 
 trol and observation of the fight demanded their entire atten- 
 tion. In such cases it is a great help if every half-hour a 
 mounted rifleman inquires whether there are any messages to 
 be sent. A more exact knowledge of the difficulties on the 
 
 right wing on the part of Major-General B , even if it 
 
 did exist, could not have delayed the initiation of the decisive 
 advance, as in the center the time was so ripe that only an 
 order forbidding assault could have prevented an attempt to 
 storm the hostile position. The skirmishers of the Fourth 
 regiment ascended the undulation in the terrane, and inde- 
 [)endently, without awaiting orders, the foremost line of the 
 Second regiment joined them. Here the leaders of the skir- 
 mish line of this regiment gave proof of their training for 
 tactically regulated independence. The regiment could neither 
 expect nor receive orders. There was no general leader for 
 the line, which was divided into small subdivisions of vary- 
 ing strength, and if one or more of these should remain 
 back, the advance would lack its united character and might 
 miscarry. 
 
 The beating of drums made it plain to all that this indc- 
 f»endent but united assault of the skirmish line was in accord- 
 ance with the ])lan of the combat, but it is questionable whether 
 the beating by all the companies of the Second and Third bat- 
 talions of the Second regiment that were yet in close order, 
 was seasonable. Regulations state on this point: "With bod- 
 ies in close order drmns will sound from the moment the as- 
 saulting movement can no longer be hidden from the enemy.'' 
 The Sixth and l^leventh companies on the crest of the ridge 
 were visible to the enemy, wliile the other company was shel- 
 tered bv a rise \n the grotmd. The somewhat premature beat- 
 
Studies in thi$ Leading of Troops. 241 
 
 iiiij^ was, however, immaterial in this case, as the commence- 
 ment of the attack could no longer be concealed. In covered 
 terrane or woods a premature heating of drums would have 
 certainly been a mistake. 
 
 The companies of the First battalion of the Second regi- 
 ment remained in column of march. For disciplinary reasons 
 we will generally form platoon column as soon as a company 
 enters the enemy's fire. Here, however, the troops were no 
 longer exposed to the subdued artillery fire, and the narrow 
 squad front furnished only a small target for infantry fire. 
 The Tenth company, which had returned from its detached 
 mission, made its way in platoon column to the second line, 
 and this rightly, too, so as to be with its battalion during the 
 assault. Some of the companies of the second line deployed, 
 while others formed into line, so that at the most the enemy's 
 missiles would take effect on two men (one behind the other) 
 instead of six. 
 
 These examples illustrate how subordinate leaders may 
 resort to the most varied measures when handling a body of 
 troops during an attack; they also illustrate what demands 
 must be made upon their circumspection and dexterity. Bri- 
 gade and regimental commanders cannot trouble themselves 
 with such details; they must concern themselves with giving 
 the direction of march and maintaining cohesion, and even 
 cohesion cannot be assured unless the subordinate leaders are 
 fully convinced that it is their duty also to strive at all times to 
 keep their troops well connected with the mass of the organi- 
 zation, for the accomplishment of wdiich it is necessary when- 
 ever practicable to concentrate the men in the most suitable 
 formation and re-establish the connections between echelons 
 where the same has been disturbed. 
 
 As for the skirmish line on the side of the aggressor, reg- 
 ulations prescribe that it must be divided into strong swarms 
 of skirmishers, and must gradually work up to the position of 
 the enemy. No rules are laid down as to whether, in the de- 
 ciscive charge, the rushes shall be made by platoons, compa- 
 nies, or battalions. But in this engagement, \vhere the oppo- 
 nent appeared to be subdued for the time being, the action of 
 the Second regiment in advancing its whole skirmish line si- 
 inultaneouslv must be approved, the more so as the regiment 
 
242 St emus ix thk LKAOixr, of Troops. 
 
 on its left was lying down firing, though later, when the de- 
 fensive fire partially revived, it would have been advisable to 
 make the rushes by battalions. According to Drill Regula- 
 tions, the length of a rush should seldom exceed lOO paces. 
 Here the skirmish line w^as 650 yards from the enemy, and 
 yet it tCKjk about 15 mnuites to change to assault at close dis- 
 tance. Over this undulating ground, 100 paces could not have 
 been covered in a single rush, for in places the advance could 
 only be made at a walk. Besides, on account of the heat, as 
 well as the character of the terrane, a long pause was needed 
 after each dash to get breath, and during the pauses it was 
 necessary to keep the enemy quieted by continuous fire. 
 
 A mutual fire support w^as especially favored by the fact 
 that in closing up toward the front fhe Second and Fourtii 
 regiments were advancing upon the salient point of the hos- 
 tile position. The diagonally sweeping fire before the front 
 of each regiment made up for the absence of cover and did 
 not allow the opponent calmly to reply. The strengthening 
 of the skirmish line on the part of the defenders by bringing 
 up reinforcements led to severe losses for the enemy, and ex- 
 emplifies the ])rinci])le that a ])osition once selected must Ik- 
 occupied densely with skirmishers when attacked, as the grad- 
 ual filling in with troops when under the assailants' fire de- 
 prives the defense of the advantage of a calm and superior 
 fire-development. 
 
 In the case of the First infantry regiment the attack was 
 made more decidedly difiicult by the regiment's lacking the 
 necessary depth. In order to carry forw^ard at least a part 
 of the skirmish line, a few bodies in close order had to be 
 brought up and deployed. The two companies (Third and 
 ICighth) lliat were available to the last C(Hdd hardly have ex- 
 erted any animating influence upon the assault, and it wa^ 
 therefore very fortunate that the other arms were attentive 
 and took jxirf pronii)tly and with(nit liesitation. When their 
 own i-a\;ilr\ ap])r()ache(l. the skirmishers took a<l vantage 01 
 tlieir opportmntv to get nearer to the enemy, and were entirely 
 right in doing so. 
 
 As already remarked, tlie interposition of the cavalry and 
 hor.sc ])atterv was very fortunate. As regards the battery, 
 it mav si-e]n strange tliat it "^houkl iake lialf an hour for it 
 
Studiks r.\ TU IC Leadi.\(. of Troops. 243 
 
 to appear south of Hohenbruck after leaving its position at 
 the Galgen Mountain ( i 145 p. m.), a distance of i mile, includ- 
 ing its detour. But it must be remembered that the high- 
 way was encumbered with all kinds of vehicles, and north of 
 the village the sunken road was blocked with cartridge- 
 wagons which had been sent ahead from the advance guard 
 of the First infantry division. Frightened villagers were try- 
 ing to reach Trautenau, and in their midst requisitioned wag- 
 ons were carrying wounded to the hospital. The battery was 
 therefore much delayed in crossing the highway. Next, a suit- 
 able road must be found through the western part of the vill- 
 age, and with the help of the squadron of the Fourth hussars 
 .>uch a road was finally opened. At any rate, the battery leader 
 is deserving of commendation for his attempt to accompany 
 the infantry attack at close distance. 
 
 On this point Drill Regulations for Field Artillery are 
 very clear, and prescribe as follows: **To facilitate an in- 
 fantry assault, the advance should be accompanied by single 
 batteries up to the nearest effective distance. The strengthen- 
 ing which an attack receives, especially in its moral relations, 
 by such accompaniment, will richly balance the losses of any 
 artillery connected therewith." The horse battery w^as nat- 
 urally in considerable danger, and could have been lost had 
 the hostile counter-attack succeeded. But even in such a case 
 "a fearless stand must be made until the last moment ; and if 
 this should lead to the loss of the guns, it will be considered 
 as meriting the highest honor." 
 
 At all events, the battery would have found reliable sup- 
 port from the First cavalry brigade, of whose presence it had 
 been informed by the Fourth squadron of hussars. 
 
 In accordance with the injunction never to wait for an 
 order to attack, Major-General L (First cavalry bri- 
 gade) resolved to make an assault as soon as he saw the hos- 
 tile infantry move out from the direction of the quarry : he 
 also advised the Fourth squadron of this move. The more 
 room he allowed the enemy to gain toward Hohenbruck, the 
 more securely could he grasp his flank. The boundary for 
 the left wing of the attack was, however, the sunken part of 
 the Hohenbruck-Sorge road, midway between the two vil- 
 lages. Although the brigade had been posted in hiding behind 
 
244 
 
 Studies i>: ttik I.kading or Troops. 
 
 Hill 414, when its leading squadrons crossed the height they 
 could be seen a little less than a mile from the enemy's posi- 
 tion. Still less could the brigade avail itself of an opportunity 
 for surprising its opponent on account of the steepness of the 
 hill, which made it necessary to go part of the distance at a 
 walk. Three squadrons of uhlans attacked in the first line, 
 with one squadron following at 150 paces as second echelon: 
 the cuirassier regiment made up the third line, giving the at- 
 tack the requisite depth. It succeeded completely, the left 
 wing of the hostile skirmish line being turned and some closed 
 platoons even cut down. The incapacitating of some of the 
 uhlans by the fire of the infantry on their own side was un- 
 avoidable; in the heat of the action the foot soldiers simply 
 failed to notice the charge, and continued their fire. The 
 pursuit by the First cavalry brigade naturally came to a halt 
 at the big woods, and upon the sounding of recall the uhlans 
 and cuirassiers assembled behind their squadron leaders. 
 
 It was not alone the cavalry who paused the moment the 
 enemy's position was taken. The First infantry regiment was 
 so exhausted, had suffered so severely, and was in such con- 
 fusion, that before penetrating the woods west of Neu- 
 Rognitz a halt for the purpose of reorganizing w^as indispens- 
 able. Likewise the Second infantry regiment, wdiich also re- 
 established order before entering the village. A pursuit l)y 
 fire was soon brought to an end by the covered condition of 
 the terrane. 
 
 The Fourth Infantry Brigade i?ro^[ i 45 to 2:25. 
 
 Howsoever ardent the desire exhibited by the Third bat- 
 talion of the Fourth infantry regiment to push forward, it had 
 not greatly distinguished itself by making its fire felt by the 
 opponent. It was this battalion, standing in the bottoms un- 
 der infantry fire at i -45. that attempted to reach the crest of 
 the rising ground in front, so as to develop the full power of 
 its own guns. The battalion w^as able to make this forward 
 move without serious loss, as the men upon the projecting 
 slope were covered at least breast high, although the skirmish- 
 ers of the Sixth company, who advanced at the same time, 
 suffered .severely, as they found only slight cover in the ter- 
 rane, and although the men of the Seventh company, who 
 
Studies in the Leadixc. of Trooi's. 245 
 
 had previously deployed, were very soon obliged to lie down 
 (a measure very sensibly resorted to also by the deployed 
 Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth companies). What rendered 
 this lying down more particularly opportune, however, wa«; 
 the fact that at the same moment the Second regiment also 
 began to advance, and needed fire support. The leading line 
 of the First battalion likewise availed itself of this sup})ort, 
 moving forward on line with the other battalions, either stoop- 
 ing or crawling. Although the Fourth regiment had com- 
 menced the decisive assaulting movement earlier than the reg- 
 iment on its right, and had removed knapsacks, later it be- 
 came possible to join the final assault with the Second. At 
 I .-45 the Fourth regiment was about 200 yards farther from 
 the enemy than was the Second, but yet the assault took place 
 elbow to elbow. At the finish only one company of the Sec- 
 and battalion (the Eighth) and one of the Third (the Ninth) 
 were in close order, and with these the battalion commanders 
 remained. When the depleted skirmish line descended into 
 the last depression before the enemy, and could make the ascent 
 for the assault only at a walk on account of the steepness of 
 the slope, the Eighth and Ninth companies delivered volleys 
 across the depression to keep down the defenders. Upon 
 breaking through the hostile line the companies of the Second 
 and Fourth regiments became badly mixed ; everybody rushed 
 into the big woods ; the Third battalion had lost the direction 
 of march, as the hostile batteries, upon which the left wing 
 had been directed, had moved away. At 2:25 p. m. the 
 regimental and battalion commanders, assisted by their sub- 
 ordinates, were engaged in unraveling this confusion when 
 
 Colonel G was called away to the First battalion of the 
 
 Fourth regiment, which was apparently falling back. 
 
 The First and Second battalions of the Third regiment 
 had not met with much success. As already stated, thp 
 commander of the Second battalion had a very severe fall, 
 and soon after i 145 the regimental commander had been 
 wounded while he was in the outskirts of Alt-Eognitz. At 
 the most trying moment, therefore, the battalions were witli- 
 out a common leader. The First battalion had just received 
 orders to carry the other forward to the attack, and as its 
 commander had no idea of the state of the engagement, he 
 
j^G Sti:i)ii:s i.v thk Lkadixg or Troops. 
 
 I>rc)ceeclc(l to deploy ail tour companies into those of the Sec- 
 ond battalion, thereby forming a mixed, almost unmanageable 
 line, which advanced by companies to within 900 or 1,000 
 yards of the enemy, suffering from the fire of the troops 
 that remained behind lying down, and finally, after using up 
 their aggressive force and finding little cover in the terrane, 
 entered upon a containing fire fight astride the wagon-road 
 and about on a line with the farm-yards near the sunken way. 
 
 On his right wing the enemy confined himself wholly 
 k) defense, except that some companies of riflemen singly 
 entered the covered region near the creek which runs toward 
 Rudersdorf, and annoyed the left wing of the Third infantry 
 regiment most severely by their accurate fire at short range ; 
 and about 2 :20 p. m. from 3 to 4 squadrons of hostile uhlans 
 were seen farther to the east along the creek, which they 
 crossed and then seemed to form themselves for attack. The 
 left wing of the Third regiment, which was now partially 
 without leaders, rallied in groups, and, unable to stand the 
 iosses by rifle-fire incident to such a formation, slowly fell 
 back upon Alt-Rognitz. Gradually the entire skirmish line 
 joined in this retrograde movement, since bodies in close order 
 were not at hand. Most of the leaders had been put hors de 
 combat, and in the turmoil of the fight the few who still re- 
 «nained were able to control only the men in their immediate 
 vicinity. 
 
 The commander of the First battalion of the Fourth regi- 
 -tnent, while pushing forward against the hostile position out 
 (}f the woods farthest to the north between the two foot- 
 paths, noticed this retrograde movement and the heavy loss 
 caused by the enemy's pursuing fire. He accordingly directed 
 fiis skirmishers to open fire upon the enemy's right wing, add- 
 ing the lM)urth company to the foremost line for this purpose: 
 but noticing the Fourth c(Mn])any forming a hook to the rear 
 and apparently falling back, he dashed out of the big woods 
 aheady captured and hastened up to the company to start it 
 forward again, when he received a shot from the hostile skir- 
 mishers lying along the southern foot-path, and w^as killed. 
 And as the brigade commander was wounded while vainly 
 altemi)ting to give the pro])er f(^rmation to the two battalions 
 «•f the Third regiment, the wing was deprived of all higher 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 247 
 
 conimand, and a complete repulse would probably have re- 
 sulted had not the Third battalion of the Third regiment come 
 to its assistance of its own accord. This battalion had been 
 ordered to follow behind the center of the Fourth regiment, 
 ])ut after marching for a time in the shelter of the street of 
 Alt-Rognitz, it had gone a little too far beyond the north- 
 ern foot-path, and was fortunately behind the left .wing of the 
 leading regiment. When the leader of the Third battalion 
 perceived the dangerous situation of the two other battalions 
 of his regiment (Third), without hesitating he deployed 3 
 companies between the left wing of the Fourth regiment and 
 the retreating skirmish line of the Third regiment, in posi- 
 tion for support, and so kept off the opposing troops that 
 were advancing from the creek. This measure met with the 
 full approval of the division commander, who galloped up 
 at the same moment, being there rejoined by the aid sent to 
 
 the left wing. Lieutenant-General A then ordered the 
 
 First battalion of the Fourth regiment and the Third battal- 
 ion of the Third regiment immediately to resume the advance, 
 and a large portion of the two other retreating battalions also 
 joined in this renewed forward movement. 
 
 The division commander directed that other troops which 
 were listlessly going to the rear be stopped by a squadron of 
 hussars in line, collected, and led back into action. The hos- 
 tile uhlans abandoned their attack when they saw 2V^ squad- 
 rons of hussars riding out of Alt-Rognitz. At 2 :25 p. m. the 
 entire left wing was on the advance, and as in the meantime 
 the big woods north of Neu-Rognitz had been seized by the 
 center^ and the counter-attack instituted by the enemy on his 
 own left had been repulsed, the thickets between the north- 
 ern and southern foot-paths were also deliberately evacuated. 
 
 COivIMENTS ON THE ATTACK OF THE Foi.^RTH InEANTRV 
 
 Brigade (1:45 To 2:25). 
 
 The attack covered a period of 40 minutes, during which 
 all the battalions were engaged. In view of the course the 
 contest took and the character of the ground it covered, we 
 will hardly be too high in estimating the loss at from 1,000 
 to 1,500 men. 
 
24S Studij-s in TiiK Lkadixg of Troops. 
 
 Yet wc must be prepared for such losses as these, for of 
 far greater consequence would have been the failure of the 
 attack by the left wing. We must also clearly understand 
 the causes that led to this unfavorable result. 
 
 Considering the position occupied by the enemy opposite 
 the left wing of the Fourth brigade, we are justified in assert- 
 ing that an attack carried out in the manner here adopted had 
 little prospect of success. We only enter a field of attack 
 similar to this, when there is no possibility of getting at the 
 enemy in any other way, or the general conditions absolutely 
 require it. It furnished scarcely any cover; toward the east 
 and in front of the left wing of the Third regiment it termi- 
 nated in meadow thickets that were sufficiently high to ob- 
 struct the view, and during the final stage of the assault it 
 necessitated a movement of 550 yards up a glacis-like slope. 
 The blame for having undertaken the attack over this terrane 
 with such limited means, does not rest upon the regimental 
 commander alone, but especially upon the commander of the 
 Fourth brigade, who had drawn the regiment too far to the 
 left and then failed to provide connection to the right with 
 the Fourth infantry, regiment ; and without sufficient depth, 
 and isolated, the First and Second battalions of the Third 
 regiment went to pieces. 
 
 The leading was also very unfortunate in miner details. 
 The battalions initiated their attacks almost without any fire 
 preparation, and as the division artillery could not play upon 
 that part of the field, it was all the more the duty of the in- 
 fantry commander to develop his whole fire power from a dis- 
 tance. But instead of this, a planless frontal attack was be- 
 gun, which, although demonstrating the gallantry of the 
 troops, could never lead to the goal. At the very outset two 
 battalions were intermingled, a measure that made leading an 
 impossibility. Advancing in densely crowded skirmish line, 
 the attack was without depth, and offered the opponent an ex- 
 cellent target at long range. The gallantry of single com- 
 ])anies rushing forward could not prevent the failure of the 
 attack, which, robbed of all support from the rear and of all 
 higher supervision, required but a slight check to throw it into 
 utter disorder. 
 
Studihs in the Leading of Troops. 249 
 
 To this must be added, that the point of march direction 
 was estabHshed too far to the left, and thereby disrupted all 
 connection with the Fourth regiment. 
 
 The responsibility for deficiency in depth rests also in 
 part on the division commander. If the latter had desired to 
 retain a battalion at his disposal, it ought not to have been 
 taken from the regiment which should outflank the enemy, 
 but from a regiment in the center; and if a reserve battalion 
 was also necessary for the frontal attack, it would have been 
 better to have selected the First battalion of the Second regi- 
 ment, while the Third battalion of the Third regiment would 
 in all probability have given an entirely different effect on the 
 left wing as it followed long after the other parts of the reg- 
 iment. 
 
 The shock that turned the advance of the First and Sec- 
 ond battalions of the Third regiment into a retreat was very 
 slight, merely the appearance of a few hostile squadrons on 
 the left flank. But as no bodies in close order were at hand 
 to protect the flank, the skirmish line was certainly greatly 
 menaced. To seek protection against the threatened cavalry 
 attack by rallying in compact groups was, however, a griev- 
 ous error, to be ascribed to the absence of leaders, and could 
 only result in serious losses, as these groups were exposed to 
 the relentless fire of the hostile infantry. All that could have 
 been done under the most unfavorable circumstances would 
 have been to wheel the extreme left of the skirmish line back- 
 ward, and permit threatened skirmishers to face about and 
 fire. The appearance of the 2^ squadrons of husars along the 
 southern edge of Alt-Rognitz was timely, and warded off the 
 attack. 
 
 The retreat of the First and Second battalions of the 
 Third infantry was checked solely by the independent inter- 
 ference of the Third battalion. It had been instructed to fol- 
 low as reserve in the center of the Fourth regiment. Its 
 leader nevertheless independently led it to the point where 
 its help was required. In such contingencies we must not wait 
 for orders. The first deployment of the battalion was con- 
 ceived as a movement in support, and the commander was 
 consequently entirely right in employing a large force (3 com- 
 panies) at the outset. The supporting position was intended 
 
250 Studihs in Till-: Lkadinc. of Troops. 
 
 to facilitate the retreat and effect a gradual disengagement 
 from the enemy. In this case, however, that purpose was 
 hnally abandoned and the attack resumed, as it was seen that 
 the enemy did not follow. Every means possible were to be em- 
 ployed to induce the other parts of the Third regiment to face 
 again to the front and take part in the assault. Crises such 
 as these are the most difficult that we encounter, and can be 
 met only by the examples and energetic interference of officers ; 
 .ind even these will indeed be valueless if losses and events 
 have so blunted the spirit of the troops that only physical re- 
 sistance, such as the riding of cavalry against them, can bring 
 them to a halt. 
 
 But little need be said regarding the Fourth infantry' reg- 
 iment; in it nearly everything passed smoothly. The pre- 
 mature start to attack, however, resembled a runaway to 
 the front. Such a breaking away out of the general position 
 at an improper moment is a gross error; but here it occurred 
 at the moment for the general attack, the commencement of 
 which was intended to be marked by the Second regiment, and 
 so did no harm. The Third battalion of the Fourth regiment 
 committed another error when it cast aside the direction given 
 it and crowded too far to the right. The faulty designation of 
 the point of direction w^as, however, to a great extent re- 
 sponsible for this, as it was given upon the enemy's batteries 
 nt the extreme right ; but the hostile artillery withdrew while 
 the attack was progressing:, and the point of direction thus 
 disappeared, so that the Third battalion inclined toward the 
 big woods, instead of the center of Neu-Rognitz as it should 
 liave done. The subsequent mingling with the Second bat- 
 talion and the Second regiment was in itself no great mistake : 
 such mingling can never be completely avoided when closing 
 up for an assault. Nevertheless it delayed the restoration of 
 order and made the leading more difficult. 
 
 One of the dispositions made by the Kigiuh and Ninth 
 companies deserves especial attention. We refer to the vol- 
 leys fired over the heads of their own skirmishers in the de- 
 pression ill front. [Tnless leaders have firm control of their 
 troops, this is a hazardous measure. But skirmish fire would 
 have been too dangerous, as it is often difficult to stop it in 
 the heat of action, which was to be (l(^ne when the skirmish- 
 
I 
 
 Studies in thk Lkading of Troops. 251 
 
 ers in front began to ascend the slope toward the enemy. The 
 only advantage of volley fire in this case lay in the assurance 
 it gave that the fire could be discontinued at any moment. It 
 was also applicable in the sense conveyed by regulations, be- 
 cause the Eighth and Ninth companies were not under elfect- 
 ive hostile fire. Except for such situations as these occurring 
 while a battle is actually in progress, the Regulations recom- 
 mend volleys only at the beginning of a fight. 
 
 General Retrospect. 
 
 The Second infantry division attacked under favorable 
 conditions; the ground in part facilitated the .assault, and the 
 defenders were inferior in number. Yet it was not achieved 
 without reverses. 
 
 As for the defenders, it must be admitted that their con- 
 duct in accepting the attack while isolated was extraordinary. 
 But such situations occur in every campaign, and may be ex- 
 plained when the weak opponent, while standing his ground, 
 expects help at every moment, or has erroneously estimated 
 the relative strength. Weissenburg and Spicheren are prom- 
 inent examples of this in the campaign of 1870-71. In the 
 former General Douay stood his ground because he under- 
 estimated the numbers of the German forces, and when he 
 wanted to withdraw, he could no longer disengage his troops : 
 in the latter engagement General Krossard counted positively 
 on the assistance of four divisions. Both these leaders acted 
 upon the basis of erroneous suppositions, and both were beat- 
 en. WHiy should not a strong mixed brigade therefore accept 
 attack when it mav soon be reinforced? Only a few minutes 
 may be calculated as necessary before help will arrive, and 
 still, in this case, the defenders may have made a mistake. 
 
 At all events, the prompt and resolute action of the Sec- 
 ond infantry division found its reward, in that the opponent 
 was overthrown before the expected help arrived. 
 
 Several general rules may be deduced from this attack by 
 an isolated division. The division did strive to outflank, but 
 it did not succeed. The frontal extent of an attacking divis- 
 ion is reckoned at i mile; here it was over 13/2 miles, for the 
 sake of a flank movement. In anv case, even the front in a 
 
252 Studies in thk Leading of Troops. 
 
 Iiank attack must be governed by the fact that in some places 
 the attack must be formed in depth. In this case the ques- 
 tion as to where the depth formation should be established, in 
 the center or on one of the wings, was determined by the 
 character of the terrane over which the main attack was to 
 be conducted. The artillery must always act against the point 
 of penetration, and the division commander is responsible for 
 seeing that this is done. In brief, his duty embraces the fol- 
 lowing general points: deploying the advance guard for the 
 protection of the artillery; taking of position by the artillerj^; 
 reconnoitering for the infantry attack; posting of the maili 
 body of the infantry; issuing the orders for the attack. 
 
 If in this case everything did not proceed according to 
 rule, it was because an unpremeditated engagement developed 
 into an attack against a position. 
 
 Long-range firearms require that the attack be formed 
 and initiated from afar, but after the attack is once started, it 
 goes straight ahead. If a formation is once neglected, it can- 
 not be restored later on (as, for example, with the Third reg- 
 iment nf infantry). The decision itself lies at mid range, and 
 all that the order for approach can have in view is the post- 
 ing of the infantry as propitiously as possible at mid-range 
 distance, to subdue the opponent by infantry fire. But when 
 artillery and infantry fire is combined to break up the hostile 
 line of defense, the main body of the assailing troops must 
 also be led against that line. The latter part of the assault, 
 the advance at close range, may be made without serious loss 
 if the enemy has been subdued, and may be facilitated by 
 fire from neighboring troops. Should, however, the losses 
 begin to increase by reason of a renewal of energy on the 
 opj)onent's side, then the attack must be kept up by the de- 
 I)loyment forward of the troops hitherto following in close 
 onkr. Standing still at close range is a sign of the Immi- 
 nent defeat of the assailants. The defenders are not shaken 
 l)y fire alone, but also by the threatened advance of the assail- 
 ants while they are being steadily reinforced. When the hos- 
 tile j)()sitinn has once been taken and the pursuing fire is over, 
 the main issue then becomes the assembling and iv-l'nnnation 
 of the victorious troops. 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 25;, 
 
 It is much easier to lead an attack if the parts are formed 
 up by wings — i. e., when men in the rear striving to reach the 
 front belong to the same regiment as those on the firing line. 
 The simultaneity of an assault is not indicated by hurrahs re- 
 sounding simultaneously from all parts engaged, but on their 
 synchronous action for the common purpose. In the engage- 
 ment just described all the troops were in action either during 
 the assault or in the warding off of the counter-attack. The 
 entire division was engaged, no part being held back. 
 
 In the end it is important to put in every man without 
 reservation ; in this the will to conquer manifests itself. The 
 necessity for the support of the commander by a multitude of 
 independent resolutions and actions by subordinate leaders 
 arises out of the impossibility of making inquiries, the de- 
 manding or awaiting orders for every eventuality, the dis- 
 tances, the sweep of bullets, and the unavoidableness of the 
 commander's remaining permanently in a certain place, where- 
 by he cannot be in every place. On this point the introduc- 
 tion to F'ield Service Regulations says distinctly : "Without 
 thought of responsibility, every officer, under all circumstances, 
 even the most extraordinary, must let his individuality be felt 
 in the highest degree in whatever he attempts to do, and even 
 without awaiting specific orders;" also, "every one, from the 
 commander-in-chief down to the lowest-ranking private, must 
 always remember that omissions or neglect constitute a more 
 serious fault than errors in judgment." 
 
 Events till the Retreat oe the Enemy. 
 (2:20^ TO 4 p. M.) 
 
 As Lieutenant-General A accompanied the left wing 
 
 of the division he was struck by the complete intermingling 
 of the men of the Eirst and Second battalions of the Third 
 infantry regiment. These troops he stopped near the farm- 
 houses along the wagon-road, and, meeting the commander of 
 the Eirst battalion, directed him to restore order. 
 
 When the general had convinced himself that the enemv 
 had abandoned all resistance in the position hitherto occupied 
 
 iThe period from 2:20 to 2:2.5 has been anticipated in the pre- 
 ceding chapters for the pnrpose of preserving connection in the 
 nnrrative. 
 
254 Sruui'is IN THE Lkadin«". ok Troops. 
 
 by liini, except in the woods south of the wagon-road, and no 
 new hostile forces appeared, and also saw that the measures 
 he had taken to restore order were progressing, he began to 
 consider what furtlier dispositions were needed. 
 
 After brief rejection, he (lesi)atched his second-rankin- 
 aid to the commander of the Third infantry brigade, after 
 giving him the following instructions: "Tell Major-General 
 
 B to follow up the advantages gained and make every 
 
 eiYort to obtain possession of Neu-Rognitz ; then find the 
 corps commander and report to him the state of the engage- 
 ment on the left wing. I shall again direct the Fourth bri- 
 gade against the thickets south of the wagon-road when order 
 is finally restored." 
 
 Next he sent another stafif officer to the north of Alt- 
 Rognitz, via the church of St. Paul and St. John, to find the 
 Ouard division and report the following to its commander: 
 "The right wing of the Second infantry division has defeated 
 its opponent and advanced along the highway, but an attack 
 of the left wing against the thickets along the wagon-road 
 has been repulsed. I am about to initiate a new attack, i 
 \\(»uld be pleased to have the support of the Guard division on 
 mv left wing, which could be best accomplished if it would 
 push forward upon Staudenz via Rudersdorf." (2:45 p. m. i 
 
 After this, Lieutenant-General A proceeded to re- 
 organize the command of the Fourth brigade. It was found 
 that its commander, as well as the commander of the Third 
 regiment, was unable to take part in the fight again, and that 
 the commander of the Fourth regiment had fallen. The com- 
 mand of the brigade therefore devolved on the senior field of- 
 ficer. Major Z (Third battalion of the Third regiment). 
 
 with wiiom the general had just been talking near the little 
 thicket, and who was readily found and brought u]). 1 le gave 
 
 Major Z the following instructions at 3 p. m. : '*V(ni will 
 
 take command of the brigade until further orders. I'ush for- 
 ward the two battalions of the Third regiment now assembling. 
 in a Hanking position toward the northeastern point of the 
 most advanced thicket near the wagon-road, for the further 
 execution <.f the attack. ila\e the other battalions advance- 
 pn»>ii)>tl\ iiprHi \\ n-i\<>;'nit/." 
 
I 
 
 Studii'S in tde Lkading of Troops. 255 
 
 The general then repaired to the point where the south- 
 ern foot-path crosses the ridge coming down from Hill 527, 
 but the numerous shots of the enemy reaching there forced 
 him to retire behind the line of the crest of the ridge. From 
 that position he was able to clearly observe the slowly pro- 
 gressing engagement of the Third brigade and the field of at- 
 tack of the Fourth brigade, and at the same time assist in re- 
 storing order in the latter. The fact that this took place in 
 his own presence exerted of itself a beneficial influence. 
 
 Even at the outset the First battalion of the Third regi- 
 ment was certainly a very small force, not many more than 
 300 men; the Second and Third battalions had also melted 
 down considerably; nevertheless, they still formed three units 
 of command, of a total strength of 1,600 to 1,700 men. 
 
 The further progress of the engagement as it was enacted 
 before the eyes of the division commander was as follow^s : 
 
 While these dispositions were being made in the Fourth 
 brigade, the fight at Neu-Rognitz did not at the start progress 
 very well. A struggle was still going on for the possession 
 of the northern portion of the village, and apparently also on 
 its west side. Hostile troops did not re-enter the terrane east 
 of the village, and the fire which had started in one of the 
 farm-houses was rapidly spreading, and a part of the south- 
 ern portion of the place was already in flames. 
 
 The First battalion of tlie Fourth and the Third battalion 
 of the Third regiment advanced between the northern and 
 southern foot-paths, towards the eastern boundry of Neu- 
 Rognitz, while the two other battalions of the Third regi- 
 ment turned toward the woods near the wagon-road. A gen- 
 eral staff ofiicer coming from corps headquarters announced 
 that in view of the victorious advance along the highway the 
 corps commander had halted the First infantry brigade, which 
 was already engaged in an advance south of Hohenbruck, in 
 order not to involve too many troops in the fight. 
 
 He was directed to recommend to -the corps commander 
 that an advance of a fresh force west of the highway would 
 probably facilitate the engagement very much, and that it was 
 all the more desirable to make rapid progress there by rea- 
 son of the fact that the left wing had so far gained little 
 ground, and had alreadv suffered severe losses. An immedi- 
 
256 Studiks IX THK Lkadinc. of Troops. 
 
 utt* sni)|K)rt of that wiiii^- did not seem necessary, in view of 
 tlic api)n)acii of tlic division of the Gnard corps. 
 ..... Äleanwhilc the hat^eries of the First regiment of field 
 artillery had left their position between Kriblitz and Alt- 
 KoK'i'i^^. »n^^l the I'irst battalion was about to issue from the 
 sunkeii road east of Hill 460 while the Second was trying to 
 find its way through the northern ])art of Alt-Ivognitz. The 
 regimental commander had ridden ahead and met Lieutenant- 
 General A — at 3:10 p. m., who ordered him to occupy 
 
 a -iK^sitioU: in readiness upon Hill 527, because the pursuing 
 fire could not be initiated before Neu-Rognitz was completely 
 (►ccui)ied. The Fourth and Fifth batteries, wdiich had arrived 
 first, were directed to fire for some time upon the thickets near 
 the wagon-road. 
 
 'riiere. upon the extreme left wing, the engagement had 
 meanwhile become more fierce. ^lajor Z was accord- 
 ingly directed to employ niore of the brigade at that point. 
 He even succeeded in turning the Third battalion of the Third 
 regiment in that direction, while the First battalion of the 
 iMuirth regiment ])enetrated the eastern boundary of Xeu- 
 •Rognitz. Tow^ard the southeast artillery fire was audible, 
 '.'ortions of the Guard must already be there and participat- 
 ing in the action, although it api)eareil strange that no officer 
 iiad arrived from the Guard division for the purpose of ar- 
 ranging details. In this connection it had, however, been ru- 
 mored among the staff that a short time before several red 
 hussars had been seen in the vicinity, w^lio could only belong 
 U» the patrols of the Guard division. As the aid previously 
 sent had not yet returned, the general despatched his senior 
 aid, with .some UK/unted riHemen, in the direction of the artil- 
 lery fire, to obtain information w ith regard to conditions there. 
 
 Soon the Third regiment succeeded in forcing its way 
 into the woods ^outh of the wagon-road, and at ^^:2=^ p. m. the 
 iMrsl battalion of the h'ourth regiment rushed into the \illage 
 near the spot where the southern foot-])ath enters. 
 ' 'I'lie fighting was now fierce only in the furthest portion 
 <»f the \illage. In order to ha\-e a reserxe on the outside, the 
 division commander, who had Mersonally assisted in assem- 
 bling the Second and Third battalions of the I'ourth regiment, 
 directed both hatli'ions to move np to the eastern boundary 
 of the bii; wood^ n<»rth o' \en-l\ognit/. 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops., 257 
 
 At 3 .-25 he rode across the southern foot-path to the 
 wagon- road near the edge of the village, where he met the 
 chief of staff of the corps, whom the corps commander, who 
 had meanwhile taken post near Hill 527, had sent to discuss 
 the situation and communicate his wishes. 
 
 This officer first of all informed the division commander 
 that corps headquarters had already received a message 
 showing that the First infantry division of the Guard, advanc- 
 ing from Rudersdorf upon Staudenz, had encountered only 
 weak hostile forces.; further, that the corps commander there- 
 fore intended to discontinue the frontal engagement as soon 
 as a proper position was reached, unless an especially favor- 
 able opportunity should present itself, as otherwise, in consid- 
 eration of the general situation of the army and the possibility 
 of a march upon Arnau, he would not extend the attack be- 
 yond the line of Neu-Rognitz. The First infantry division 
 and the corps artillery occupied a position north and south of 
 Hohenbruck. 
 
 It was finally agreed that as soon as Lieutenant-General 
 
 A had completely cleared Neu-Rognitz of the enemy, 
 
 he should content himself with holding that point. He also 
 considered it necessary to obtain possession of the big woods 
 southeast of the village, but in order to avoid needlessly heavy 
 losses he would delay the attack until the influence of the 
 Guard could be perceptible. The assistance of the entire divis- 
 ion of the Guard could, however, not be counted upon, as 
 just at that moment the aid who had been despatched to the 
 Guard division returned, reporting that only its advance guard, 
 consisting of 4 battalions of infantry, 3 batteries, and 3 squad- 
 rons of cavalry, had deployed about three-quarters of a mile 
 south of Rudersdorf, while the main body was yet far be- 
 hind ; but that all of its parts had taken up direction toward 
 Staudenz. 
 
 Hardly had the chief 'jf staff left, when it could be plainly 
 seen (3:45 p. m. ) that the hostile forces opposite the Third 
 regiment were abandoning the wooded terrane south of the 
 
 wagon-road. Major Z — ^^^ was at once directed to start 
 
 in pursuit, inflicting all damage possible on the enemy; he 
 was, however, cautioned not to advance beyond the southern 
 edge of the woods lying in front. 
 
258 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 Jicforc llic ülTensivc advance ccjuld be contiiuied upon this 
 wing, the op])onent also left the hitherto stubbornly-held south- 
 ern portion of Neu-Rognitz. The division commander, as we 
 have seen, had a])proached the village, and w^as met there by 
 
 Major-(icneral J] . The latter reported that his brigade 
 
 had exi)erienced a hard figlit and lost heavily, but that it had 
 succec(led in forcing the enemy into a decisive retreat, and 
 that the last resistance in the village had finally been overcome 
 by the Second regiment and the First battalion of the Fourth 
 regiment; he furthermore expressed the opinion that an ad- 
 vance beyond Neu-Rognitz was at that time impracticable, as 
 the enemy occupied IJill 635, lying to the southwest, with a 
 strong force of artillery, and as the wood west of the vil- 
 lage was not yet completely in the hands of the brigade. In 
 conseciucncc the brigade commander was instructed to firmly 
 establish himself in the village, first of all restoring order in 
 his command. (3:52 p. m.) At the same time the horse bat- 
 tery was observed firing in a southerly direction from the 
 quarry. 
 
 At 4 p. m. the main object of the engagement seemed to 
 have been accomplished. On the whole, it was a victory for 
 the Second division, the only question yet unsettled being how- 
 far the pursuit should extend. 
 
 Comments on the Att/vck oe the Second Infantry 
 Division from 2:20 to 4 p. m. 
 
 The necessity of Lieutenant-General A *s hasten- 
 ing to the left wing and assuming command in person there 
 has already been carefully dwelt upon. In such a decisive mo- 
 ment the following points must generally be observed: Ar- 
 rest of retreating troops and taking of steps to avoid further, 
 disadvantages incident to defeat, especially if the enemy is inj 
 hot pursuit; re-establishment of order and of the relations of 
 command, possiblv disarranged by losses; measures regard- 
 ing resr.m])tion of the i)revious objects of the engagement, 
 or the pursuance of other intentions. 
 
 On the whole, Lieutenant-General A performed all 
 
 these duties. I le was therefore correct, after the repulse of 
 the few j)ursning hostile bodies, in ordering the First battalion 
 
Studies in the Le^vdino of Troops. 259 
 
 of the Fourth regiment and the Third battahon of the Third 
 regiment to go forward again, and the two shaken battahons 
 of the Third regiment to go to the front again in connection 
 with tkem. It was nevertheless a venturesome move, for if 
 this united attack of the left also went to pieces, the brigade 
 could hardly have looked upon its day's work as successful. 
 
 A fresh advance must take place as soon as possible ; this 
 was necessary, if it was intended to utilize the force at hand. 
 The division commander had quickly recognized the correct 
 point for the attack; he discovered it in the foremost thicket 
 near the wagon-road. iJefore this was seized an advance 
 against the east front of Neu-Rognitz could not be carried out. 
 Unfortunately, no artillery preparation had been considered, 
 as the difficult terrane had seemed to make it impossible for the 
 batteries to come up. But the capture of Neu-Rognitz would 
 soon menace the flank of the enemy at the wagon-road, and 
 force him to abandon the woods. 
 
 Although the division commander interposed in the lead- 
 ing of the brigade to a greater extent than would have ap- 
 peared proper under other circumstances, he was justified in 
 so doing by reason of the disturbance in the relations of com- 
 mand occasioned by the losses suffered, as well as by reason 
 of the fact that an independent issue was being fought out by 
 Major-General B on the right wing. Further, the divi- 
 sion commander was contented with giving only general direc- 
 tions to Major Z , in the various phases of the attack, 
 
 without allowing his attention to be diverted from events in 
 the other brigade. 
 
 It is a question whether Lieutenant-General A 
 
 should have more carefully considered the dispositions to be 
 made by the Fourth brigade, before the first attack was made ; 
 its advance would certainly then have taken a different course. 
 But we must not judge by events alone. The general was 
 concerned in leading the entire division, and he could not tell 
 beforehand where his presence would be, most needed. Both 
 brigades had dangerous obstacles to overcome. At any rate, 
 the incident shows that we should not confine ourselves mere- 
 ly to the issuing of orders and general supervision of their 
 execution ; but, under certain circumstances and where time 
 and conditions permit, the manner of carrying out these in- 
 
«6o Studiks jn Tin; Lkading of Troops. 
 
 striictioiis should be discussed with suborchuate commanders. 
 For instance, if the division commander had been with IMajor- 
 
 General C before the beginning- of the first attack, he 
 
 could have issued positive instructions for taking the furth- 
 est thicket near the northern foot-path as point of direction 
 for the center of the brigade, and the extension south of the 
 wagon-road would have been avoided. 
 
 But such an interference on the ])art of the division com- 
 mander in proper time and at all important points was im- 
 ])OssibIe. The space occupied by the division was much too 
 large for this. In F^art II. we have called attention to the fact 
 that in an attack a division's frontal development should not 
 be much over a mile, if we would assure orderly direction and 
 energetic co-operation ; but in this case the division's line of 
 fire was over a mile and a half long, measuring from the farm- 
 houses near the wagon-road westward to the highway near 
 Hohenbruck. Mutual support in a concentric advance, it is 
 true, might have been possible ; nevertheless the Third bri- 
 gade was not in position for the iuuucdiatc support of the 
 Fourth. Therefore the division commander, as soon as the 
 thicket near the wagon-road was taken, moved two battal- 
 ions (Second and Third of the Fourth regiment) of the Fourth 
 brigade, as a reserve, to the eastern boundary of Neu-Rognitz, 
 where they were in a position to give timely support in any 
 direction, as the extension of the division was then reduced to 
 I mile; furthermore, on a covered terrane over which the 
 fight is still progressing, decisions are not reached as quickly 
 as u])on a plain. 
 
 The first thing the division commander directed Major 
 Z to do, as he made his further dispositions, was to ad- 
 vance with a strong force against the position the enemy had 
 occupied south of the wagon-road, l^ndisputed possession of 
 Ncu-Kognitz would certainly not have been secured until the 
 enemy was forced from the woods southeast of the village. Thisi 
 might have been accomplished more certainly and with smallei 
 loss if the attack had been brought into intimate relation with 
 the expected Hanking of the opj^onent by the Guard corps. 
 But as soon as the withdrawal of the enemy became apparent, 
 there was no further reason to delay the advance; on the con- 
 trary, a shar]) ])ursuit over ground that was obstructed from 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. -261 
 
 view might have inflicted considerable damage upon the re- 
 treating opponent. 
 
 A general survey of the course pursued by the Fourth 
 brigade shows at once that final success was rendered possible 
 only by the fact that the division commander, upon reaching 
 it, found two battalions of the Fourth brigade (First of the 
 Fourth and Third of the Third regiment) comparatively un- 
 touched. Hut he could only count on one of these ; and as the 
 reserve battalion (Third) had participated in the action inde- 
 pendently, he was no longer able to exercise any influence other 
 than that of a purely personal character. When we consider, 
 however, how the situation could have developed, especially if 
 the enemy had begun a hot pursuit, we have grounds for se- 
 rious doubt whether Lieutenant-General A 's plan for 
 
 attack was a judicious one. 
 
 According to our view, the course pursued by the divis- 
 ion commander would have been justifiable only if there had 
 been a body of troops in close order, at least two or three bat- 
 talions, disposable behind the center of his extended line of 
 battle. The general seems to have counted too much on the 
 assistance promised him by the First division. Its nearest 
 brigade, however, at Hohenbruck, was too far away to ren- 
 der any assistance whatever upon the left wing of the Second 
 division during the decisive attack. 
 
 Under these circumstances we believe it would have been 
 
 better had Lieutenant-General A arranged his attack 
 
 along different lines, particularly if he had dispensed with the 
 distant flank movement during the engagement. In the first 
 place, the enemy offered a frontal resistance only near the 
 highway and south of Saddle 451. The deployed Third bri- 
 gade sufficed to hold him fast in front and to engage him, 
 while the Fourth brigade could have remained in reserve in 
 close order and assembled behind the left wing of the former. 
 The first problem was to drive off the foremost fighting line 
 of the opponent. This included the seizure of the little thick- 
 ets near the northern foot-path, from' which point the out- 
 flanking of that part of the line of battle would then have 
 been possible, and at the same time the swarms of skirmish- 
 ers south of the saddle might probably have been dislodged. 
 If the extreme left wing of the Third brigade should prove un- 
 
262 Studies :x tiik Lkadinc, ok Troops. 
 
 able of itself to eapturc the tliickets, then the Fourth brigade 
 could have assisted by deploying several of its battalions. 
 
 Jn case the enemy should fall back, but still hold his ground 
 tn the little woods northeast of Neu-Kognitz, the Third bri- 
 gade should attack in flank, with the Fourth brigade still cov- 
 ering its left at that point, and only putting as many battal- 
 ions into action as were needed to support the attack. On 
 no account should the division have staked its entire force 
 ii\K)n a single throw unless other troo])s furnished a depend- 
 able reserve. 
 
 As regards losses, we must call attention to the peculiar 
 fact that they are general!}- overestimated by troops and un- 
 derestimated by commanders. After a fierce engagement, the 
 reassembling battalions at first glance look like diminutive 
 clusters, or the report is received from the one or two officers 
 fjresent that all that remains of a battalion is, say, 250 men, 
 though frequently, but not always, we may console ourselves 
 with the thought that the following morriing the battalion will 
 be somewhat nearer its proper strength. We must be careful 
 in sunmiing up losses immediately after an actio:;; it requires 
 a special faculty to judge them even approximately correct. 
 To do so, one shoidd have carefully observed the stubborn- 
 ness of the fight at each pomt se])arately. and should take into 
 consideration how much the terrane itself favors losses by fire. 
 The dead seen on the ground are only a guide for one par- 
 ticular point, and it is impossible to observe the effect on other 
 parts of the field; furthermore, if we wait until the next morn- 
 ing, a large portion of the killed may be buried. 
 
 Another cjuestion is. When should a mounted officer dis- 
 mount? A battalion on the line or a deployed regiment can 
 f)e managed only if the commander remains on his horse, so 
 that he can hasten at any moment to the si)ot where he must 
 give an order or where, for other reasons, his presence is de- 
 manded. IJut there is a limit to this. If the entire l)ody of 
 ti-oo))s finds itself in an infantry fire fight, and has deployed 
 all its subdivisions, a commander halting mounted in their 
 midst w(»i!ld be soon put out of the fight. We can therefore 
 eslablisli only the following rule: that leaders should remain 
 tnounled until the troops under their command are deployed, 
 when thev shotild rfismount and remain with that subdivision 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 263 
 
 which is retained in close order and available for the fight. 
 
 If the assistance of one adjutant which regulations allow 
 a brigade, regimental, and battalion commander is not suffi- 
 cient, then the leader must resort to mounted ritiemen and 
 orderlies on foot. We are not rich enough in officers to meet 
 the certainly justihable wish for a second adjutant. Nothing 
 is left, therefore, but to detail permanent orderlies from the 
 division cavalry, when mounted ritiemen are not available. 
 Though this may not be pleasant for the cavalry commander. 
 It is something that cannot be helped. 
 
 A great deal can be said on the subject of the use of cav- 
 alry patrols — since it has been alluded to here. We really do 
 meet with some peculiar views relative to the comprehension 
 of their duties. A patrol was here designated to keep up com- 
 munication between two divisions ; it rode from one division 
 to tlie other, kept track of movements made, watched now the 
 columns of one and now the columns of the other division, 
 and when it had done this, safely returned to the bivouac of 
 its regiment in the afternoon. There was no need of des- 
 patching patrols for such a purpose as this ; large bodies of 
 the enemy attempting to move forward between the divis- 
 ions would have been discovered without their assistance ; 
 their employment should therefore have had another object 
 in view. Of what use was the sending of a troop to scout the 
 country between Rudersdorf and the Aupa by the commander 
 of the First regiment of hussars, when he learned nothing 
 whatever of what was going on there ? On such a mission the 
 30 or 40 horses would be utterly useless, since for hours the 
 commander and also Ivieutenant-General A were with- 
 out knowledge of the important movements of the Guard in 
 that region, and the division commander was finally obliged to 
 send a staff officer, and later his senior aid, to find the Guard 
 division and bring information of its whereabouts. 
 
 This troop of hussars should have sent in frequent mes- 
 sages, reading about in the following manner : 
 
 1. Arrived at x o'clock on the line n-n. Only weak 
 uhlan patrols in front of us, which are turning off in the 
 direction of 3'. 
 
 2. Advanced to x. A squadron of hussars from the 
 First infantry division of the Guard corps arrived here from 
 
264 Studies in the Leading oe Troops. 
 
 ;;, and states that its division is api)r.)achini; from p to q, and 
 is now about 2i/4 miles from q. 
 
 3. Tried to s^et around the left tiank of the opponent 
 while he was engaged. Found the edge of the woods occupied 
 by infantry. Troops were visible near Staudenz, probably 3 
 battalions. The advance guard of the Guard division, con- 
 sisting of 4 battalions of infantry, 3 squadrons of cavalry, and 
 3 batteries, has already arrived near x. 
 
 4. The advance guard batteries of the Guard have just 
 opened fire from y against a hostile battery near Staudenz. 
 The infantry of the Guarvd is deploying for action at y, and 
 intends to move toward v. 
 
 5. The advance guar.l infantry of the Guard division ha? 
 gone into action against the woods northeast of Staudenz. 
 which the enemy has occupied from the direction of the vil- 
 lage. Three more batteries have also gone into action. The 
 main body is approaching, its point having already arrived 
 at .r. As the country between Rudersdorf and the Aupa is 
 sufficiently .secured and watched by the presence of the Guard, 
 I shall leave a non-commissioned ofificer with some messengers 
 here to observe the progress of the engagement, and shall 
 lead the troo]) back to the regiment. 
 
 As a matter of course, place, time, signature, etc.. should 
 appear on the messages. 
 
 In this or similar manner sliould cavalry detachments con- 
 ceive their task, and not ride about and let nothing be heard 
 from them. ''But what should T have reported? There was 
 nothing to report," is frequently heard. Even the report that 
 nothing is going on is of great benefit to the superior leader, 
 aside from the fact that he is thereby assured that the patn^l 
 is where it ought to be, and is not f<;»rgotting tlic task it was 
 sent out to accomplish. 
 
 l{qually at fault was the conduct of the hussars of the 
 Guard division, who were seen on the battle-field of the Fourth 
 infantry brigade, but failed to report to any of the higher com- 
 manders. If we desire to bring a correct report from a 
 battle-field, we cannot do .so without first having interviewed 
 its commander, to whom it is also of vast importance to get 
 information from the strange body of troops that has sent out 
 the patrol. 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 265 
 
 This faulty conduct of the hussars of both divisions may 
 
 explain why Lieutenant-General A became impatient, 
 
 and, after once despatching a staff officer, also sent his senior 
 aid on the same errand. This seems quite superfluous, as 
 the staff officer would certainly have soon returned, and it is 
 not well, either, to take the senior aid from duty on a battle- 
 field for such a purpose. 
 
 Let us caution here, that any officer (like the staff" officer 
 in this case) who has just been present in an unfortunate en- 
 gagement, must be very careful of his personal deportment 
 when sent to a strange staff. Let him deliver his message 
 there, and give such explanations as may be called for, but 
 let him beware of adding in an excited manner and by his 
 own descriptions, how badly things have gone, or how dan- 
 gerous the situation has become. He will either communi- 
 cate this unrest to others, or will cut a very comical figure if 
 a spirit of calm deliberation prevails in the staff to which he 
 is sent, as is usually the case. 
 
 The first regiment of field artillery had done all it could 
 in opening up the pursuing fire. It had left its first position 
 of its own accord, after the assailing infantry had penetrated 
 the woods north of Neu-Rognitz. At first it found no posi- 
 tion for its pursuing fire, but held in readiness on Hill 527 to 
 meet a setback at any moment, while the Fourth and Fifth bat- 
 teries had a chance to take part in the capture of the thickets 
 near the wagon-road. The zeal displa}'ed by the horse battery 
 in reopening fire against superior artillery, in the justifiable ex- 
 pectation that the vSixteenth regiment of field artillery would 
 hasten up, deserves especial commendation. It would have 
 been the duty of the corps commander to urge it to do so, if 
 necessary. 
 
 The Several Parts of the Division from 2 :20 to 4 p. m. 
 
 Details in the Fourth infantry brigade have already been 
 considered, in connection with the interference of the division 
 commander. This much, however, remains to be added : 
 
 The advance of the Third regiment against the patch 
 of woods south of the wagon -road was intended to mark the 
 commencement of a new period in the engagement. On the 
 left wing the Second company of the First battalion cleared 
 
266 Studiks in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 the bushes along the creek of hostile skirmishers, while 
 the three other companies of this battalion finally crossed 
 the meadow-bottom south of the wagon-road and gained 
 ground against a diminishing fire. The Sixth and Seventh 
 companies of the Second battalion deployed as skirmishers 
 north of the wagon -road, while the Fifth and Eighth companies 
 followed in a second line across the strip of meadow. A little 
 later the Third battalion was led in support of the attack, 
 over the southern foot-path, against the northern edge of the 
 woods, which was occupied by hostile skirmishers, who had 
 fallen back from their main position. While 9 or 10 platoons 
 kept the thickets so occupied by the enemy under a flanking 
 fire at a distance of 650 yards, the Fourth and Fifth batteries 
 of the division artillery regiment, which had arrived on the 
 center of Ridge ^2-], swept the interior of the thickets with 
 shrapnel at a distance of 1,400 to 1,500 yards. Very soon un- 
 usual commotion was perceived among the defenders in the 
 northeastern corner of the woods, which gave the First, Third, 
 and Fourth companies opportunity for a sudden charge, which 
 they successfully accomplished, landing within the timber. 
 
 The Second battalion joined this advance, also reaching 
 the woods; its Fifth company, however, being held back as 
 reserve by the battalion commander. 
 
 In the meantime the Second company had gone farthest 
 to the left, against the triangular pine plantation near the 
 source of the creek, which the opponent had evacuated when 
 it reached there. Gradually the hostile infantry was forced 
 back over the dry run and the meadows lying to the west of 
 
 it. In accordance with the instructions given Major Z 
 
 by the division commander, not to attack the strong position 
 here, but first to await the action of the Guard, the pursuing 
 skirmishers and bodies behind them in close order were halted 
 in the captured ])atches of woods upon the order of the com- 
 mander of the First battalion of the Third regiment, who was 
 then in charge of the regiment, and only patrols, some under 
 lieutenants, were sent out to follow the enemy. 
 
 By their advance south of Alt-Rognitz toward Ruders- 
 dorf the 2j/^ squadrons of the First regiment of hussars had 
 caused the hostile uhlans to fall back in the direction of 
 Staudcnz. 
 
Studies in thk Leading of Troops. 267 
 
 The commander did not care to follow farther, as the 
 entry of the Guard in the engagement made it unnecessary 
 to work around the hostile right. 
 
 The position of the various subdivisions of the Fourth 
 infantry brigade at about 4 p. m. was consequently as follows : 
 
 The First battalion of the Fourth regiment was in the 
 patch of meadows in and east of the southern end of Neu- 
 Rognitz, engaged in a skirmish fight ; behind them and north 
 of the thickets at the wagon-road were the Second and 
 Third battalions of the same regiment, brought up as division 
 reserve. 
 
 On the left wing v/ere the Second and First battalions of 
 the Third regiment, in the patch of woods south of the wagon- 
 road, with a thin skirmish line ahead and the Third battal- 
 ion in rear in close order. 
 
 The 2-J squadrons of the hussar regiment were east of 
 the creek near Hill 401. 
 
 Turning now to the Third infantry brigade, we find that 
 at 2 :20 p. m. the victorious fight of its parts engaged in front 
 had given them possession of the northern end of Neu- 
 Rognitz, as well as the woods west of the village on the road 
 from Sorge to Neu-Rognitz ; but, in spite of the comparatively 
 short combat and the previous restoration of order, all of the 
 parts of the brigade had again become mixed in the covered 
 terrane. Companies of the" First and Third battalions of the 
 First regiment, and very soon also parts of the Third bat- 
 talion of the Second regiment, which had turned out of 
 the village into the forest, were fighting in the woods to 
 the west. In the northern part of Neu-Rognitz the re- 
 mainder of the latter battalion, and also the First battalion of 
 the Second regiment, were engaged. The other battalions of 
 these regiments (Second of the First and Second of the Sec- 
 ond) had remained respectively near the quarry and in the 
 little woods northwest of the village. 
 
 The failure of the Fourth brigade's attack on the left 
 wing could not help but itifiuence the left wing of the Third 
 brigade. In the expectation of a further attack by the enemy 
 against the repulsed part of the division, the deployment of the 
 reserves in continuing the struggle for the village could not 
 be risked. Onlv whenit was evident that the enemy did not fol- 
 
268 Studiks Ix\ thk Lkading of Trooi's. 
 
 low, bin was detained and would be attacked anew, did Major- 
 General 1> turn his attention again to his own object in 
 
 the fight. In the meantime he had carefully examined the ter- 
 
 rane and situation in his front, and he directed Colonel D 
 
 to push ahead with his regiment (the First) into the woods 
 west of the main highway, and to flank from there, as far as 
 possible, the middle and southern parts of Neu-Rognitz. 
 
 Colonel E (Second regiment) was on the other hand 
 
 instructed to advance into the village. 
 
 West of the main highway the action soon started off at 
 
 a lively pace, Colonel D putting in the entire First and 
 
 Third battalions of his regiment. By this renewal of the 
 fight the troops succeeded in gradually forcing the opponent 
 out of the forest south of the Sorge-Neu-Rognitz road, from 
 which point the central part of the village could also be sub- 
 jected to a heavy fire. 
 
 An advance from the forest against tiie southern part of 
 the village was prohibited by the hostile artillery, which again 
 went into action from a point on the southern slope of Ilill 
 635, southwest of Neu-Rognitz, 6 batteries strong, while the 
 little thickets near this hill were occupied in force by fresh 
 infantry. The overthrown hostile infantry withdrew, covered 
 by a very fierce fire from that i)Osition, while the infantry 
 of the attackers su fleered considerable loss by the shrapnel 
 thrown into the forest. .Vnd when a dash on the part of the 
 Nnith and Twelfth companies against the southern part of the 
 village miscarried. Colonel T) was finally obliged to for- 
 bid any further charging out of the woods; he held the edge 
 of the woods with troops at the front, and brought all tlie 
 rest of his force into the open ground at the (juarry. 
 
 The bodies that had penetrated into Neu-R(\gnitz had 
 failed I0 make any headway against a strongly barricaded por- 
 tion of tJK' road from Sorge, and it became necessary to enter 
 the village from tho cast, which, as we have seen, was accom- 
 jilished 1)\- ilk- I'^irst l)attalioii of the I'ourtli regiment. The 
 assistanc«.- of the lattei was all tlu* more welcome to Major- 
 
 Ocneral li when, at J :45 p. m.. the junior aid of the 
 
 division came up with an order to energetically follow up the 
 advantages gained. .\s the engineer com]')any, which was no 
 kjiiLrer needed in Ilohenbrnck. .'irrived at the s.'ime time, it was 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 269 
 
 placed under the orders of Colonel E (Second regi- 
 ment ) to support the attack. The latter directed the Second 
 battalion, located in the little woods northeast of Neu-Rognitz, 
 to assail the northeastern boundary of the village from there, 
 and soon after 3 o'clock he again led the Third battalion and 
 parts of the First battalion upon and alongside the village 
 street, against the barricade. The attack succeeded perfectly, 
 and all the more easily because it was supported by a brisk 
 fire from the right wing out of the forest west of the village. 
 The engineers cleared away the barricade while still un- 
 der fire, and some of them took part in storming the adjoin- 
 ing farm-houses ; the most important of the farm-houses at 
 the point where the road entered was prepared for defense and 
 occupied by one platoon of engineers. Next the Ninth and 
 Twelfth companies were halted by the regimental command- 
 er, and assembled, and, after consulting with Major-General 
 
 P) , the regimental commander posted them as reserve 
 
 in the northern part of the village, while the rest of the troops 
 that had been engaged there were instructed not to advance 
 beyond the southern part of the village. By this time the com- 
 panies of the First and Second battalions, together with the 
 company of engineers, had succeeded in driving the enemy 
 from the southern part of Neu-Rognitz and capturing many 
 prisoners ; several groups of the opponents had tried to defend 
 themselves in the houses up to the last moment. An advance 
 beyond the southern boundary of the village was prevented by 
 the strong artillery fire. In spite of this, the engineers tried 
 to prepare the village enclosure for defense ; they also made 
 efforts to put out the fires that had started in some of the 
 buildings. The houses on the west side were occupied by the 
 First company of the Second infantry, wliile the Second com- 
 pany held those east of the highway, the Third and Fourth 
 companies being retained at the junction of the highway with 
 the wagon-road, where one platoon of the Fourth was ordered 
 to stack arms and carry to safety a number of the enemy's 
 wounded that were in the burning houses, and the other pla- 
 toon to defend the fortified farm premises. The Second bat- 
 talion was assembled outside of the village near the wagon- 
 road ; west of the village the Tenth and Eleventh companies 
 were min^led with the men of the First infanrrv regiment. 
 
270 Studiks in thk Leading of Troops. 
 
 Accordingly three bodies of the Third brigade still re- 
 mained disposable — viz., the Second battalion of the First 
 regiment, which was near the quarry ; two companies each of 
 the Third and First battalions of the Second regiment, which 
 were posted in Neu-Rognitz in clo'^e order ; and the Second 
 battalion of the Second regiment, which had assembled near 
 the wagon-road after successfully su])])(»rting tlic attack upon 
 the village. 
 
 All other parts of the Second regiment were in the vil- 
 lage mingled with the First battalion of the Fourth regiment, 
 or west of the village with parts of the First and Third bat- 
 talions of the First regiment, or dissolved into separate frac- 
 tions. The enemy's retreat was decisive, but further jnirsuit 
 was forbidden, as it was impossible at that time for the artil- 
 lery to render support. Major-General B accordingly 
 
 turned his attention again to the prompt assembling of the 
 troops. Shortly before 4 o'clock he saw the division com- 
 mander ap]:>roaching, and went to join him. 
 
 The Fourth scjuadron, which found no opi)(^rtunity for 
 action during the last period of the combat, had meanwhile 
 endeavored to find its regiment. It met it on the left wing 
 of the Fourth brigade east of the wagon-road and near Hill 
 
 401, and then reported to Major-Gen cral I> that it had 
 
 passed under the orders of regimental headquarters. Thus 
 the regiment again had about 250 horses assembled. 
 
 The First cavalry brigade had remained north of the lit- 
 tle woods at the (|uarry. 
 
 The First field artillery regiment, irnder the command of 
 l.ieutenant-Colonel J . ^vas directed by the division com- 
 mander to open fire ujmmi the hostile artillery on Hill 635. 
 This task the colonel assigned to the First battalion, which 
 had hastened uj) to Hill ^2-] (southeast of Hohenbruck), and 
 the battalion fulfilled its commission in a very creditable man- 
 ner. Tn the meantime thv Second battalion had opened fire 
 ni)on the country north of liurkersdorf, while the Sixteenth 
 field artillery regiment finally went into action between Sorge 
 and the (juarry. 'I'he cross-fire of these 7«S guns completely 
 demoralized the iiostile infantrv. So<^n afterwards the en- 
 emy's batteries withdrew from Hill r)35, and the only field of 
 fire available for the artillerv of the Second division was still 
 
Studies in thj^ Lkading o^ Troops. 271 
 
 farther to the front ; accordini^ly the guns of the First bat- 
 tahon of the First regiment hmbered up, and then those of 
 the Sixteenth regiment, to seek a suitable field for their work, 
 but none could be found. At the same moment, however, 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel J sent instructions to the Second 
 
 battalion to advance to the wagon-road. 
 
 Comments on the Engagement of the Several Parts oe 
 THE Division from 2:20 to 4 p. m. 
 
 During this period the character of the engagement 
 changed considerably. The infantry had exhausted the greater 
 part of its offensive energy, and, after order had been some- 
 what restored subsequent to the capture of the hostile posi- 
 tion, contented itself with gathering in the immediate fruits 
 of its victory by ]>ursuing the enemy as far as the southern 
 boundary of the village and the patcJies of woods. There the 
 ])ursuit must, however, be checked, at all events, if it was de- 
 sired not to engage in another combat during the afternoon, 
 which would again have t<:> be undertaken without waiting for 
 the arrival of the divisions following behind the wings. 
 
 The various parts of the Second infantry division had 
 become too cautious, by reason of the very damaging fire of 
 the enemy and their own ..'xperience, to risk entering the open 
 country south of Neu-Rognitz. in the face of a strong sup- 
 porting position on the part of the opponent, without orders 
 or a mutual understanding. Only troops who have witnessed 
 nothing but success and have not as yet been called into action 
 will allow themselves to be misled into making an attack with- 
 out due deliberation. On the contrary, troops who have wit-, 
 nessed a fierce fight will enter an engagement with a great 
 deal of anxiety. 
 
 The brief description we have just given of the last 
 periods of the engagement has casually shown the dissolving 
 tendency of a fight for a position ; it has, however, particularly 
 shown the extraordinary mdustry necessary on the part of 
 leaders in re-establishing order among their troops in spite 
 of this tendency toward dissolution. Without order judicious 
 control is impossible. It is indeed strange that after a ore- 
 carious militar}^ situation everything else will be thought of 
 
i-]2 Studiks in TiiL-: Li-ADixG or Troops. 
 
 except the re-cstahlishiiicnt of severed connections between 
 tfbops and the collecting of masses for further efficient em- 
 ployment. To keep this purpose in \ievv, not alone after the 
 engagement, but at all times during its course, is one of the 
 chief problems in the leading of troops. In the case in hand 
 its labor was materially lightened, for although the defense 
 had been obstinate in some places during the last hour and 
 a half; in general it was absolutely lacking in energy, and the 
 reserves had made no attempt to support it by a single 
 counter-blow, or to restore the combat, as had been done in 
 the earlv stages of the fight. The defense had either reached 
 the limit of endurance, or, as is more probable, the situa- 
 tion outside of the battle-fteld demanded an immediate with- 
 drawal from the ])osition that had been occupied. 
 
 The artillery had done all it could do by hastening up to 
 join in the pursuit, but on account of the unfavorable terrane 
 it (ould be of little assistance. The First cavalry brigade 
 seems to have expended its energy rather early, for it failed 
 to continue its scouting on the right wing. In accordance 
 with Regulations it should have quickly formed some of the 
 available men into double -rank bodies, regardless of their 
 former connection, and pressed the hostile left; the proper 
 formation of the various organizations could have l^een at- 
 tended to later oti. 
 
 rROlUJ'.MS. 
 
 Page 151: The Second infantry division could count o\\ 
 iio further supi)ort. 
 
 vShould it again attack the enemy at Xeu-Rognitz after 
 leaving taken possession of the region between Trautenau, 
 llohenbrnck. and Alt-Rognitz. or should it confine its efforts 
 t(» defiiise? 
 
 If the former, what dispositions must he made? 
 
 If the latter, what dispositions must the commander make 
 as soon as he rcsv)lves to assmne the defensive? 
 
 Page 163: What dispositions for attack must Ik- made if 
 the corps artillery had been present and passed under the or- 
 ders of TJeutenant-General \ ? 
 
 Ifow must the attack be led if the division had marched 
 lip throu-h 'i'raut"nau an^l stood astride the Trautenau-Neu- 
 IsOL-nitz hi''hwav? 
 
Studiks in tijk leading of Troops. 273 
 
 Was the intended turning of the opponent's flank by an 
 advance of the Fourth brigade via the church of St. Paul and 
 St. John judicious or not? 
 
 Should such a turning movement be ordered if the coun- 
 try between Alt-Rognitz and Neu-Rognitz was covered with 
 connected woods? 
 
 Pagei68: Were Major-General C 's orders judicious? 
 
 Could he have issued different orders? 
 
 Page 190: The initial movements were not executed 
 in accordance with the desires of the division commander; 
 the Third brigade went into action too soon and the Fourth 
 brigade too late. Could the general have avoided this by his 
 personal conduct or by issuing his orders differently? 
 
 Page 191 : Suppose the Third brigade was alone in posi- 
 tion. The enemy held the tongue of woods along the highway 
 and the thickets northeast of Neu-Rognitz. How should the 
 attack be started? 
 
 Page 198: In what particulars were the detailed dispo- 
 sitions for attack made by the Fourth brigade faulty? 
 
 Could they have been made in a different manner? 
 
 Page 205 : How^ could the various parts of the First in- 
 fantry division co-operate most effectively ? 
 
 Issue orders for such co-operation. 
 
PART IV. 
 
 Thk End of the: Battle. 
 
 (4 TO 5 p. M.) 
 
 The situation at 4 p. m. was as follows : 
 
 The position the enemy had so obstinately contested was 
 in the hands of the division. The Third brigade held Neu- 
 Rognitz and the woods west of the village. A continuation 
 of the advance against Hill 635, northwest of Burkersdorf, 
 which was crowned with a strong force of artillery, was hardly 
 practicable, by reason of the fact that the batteries of the divi- 
 sion would have to fight from lower ground. The portions 
 of the brigade not in the first line were assembled south of 
 the quarry of Sorge, also in Neu-Rognitz. The foremost line 
 of the Fourth brigade (Third regiment) followed the enemy 
 through the woods southeast of the village, while the Fourth 
 regiment was engaged in disentangling itself from the Sec- 
 ond, the Second and Third battalions of the Fourth being 
 in reserve along the northern border of these woods and 
 the First battalion being in the village. The First regiment 
 of hussars was halted near Hill 40 1, midway between Neu- 
 Rognitz and Rudersdorf. The First regiment of field artil- 
 lery was in position, under fire, on the ridge running in a 
 southeasterly direction from Peak 527, north of Neu-Rognitz, 
 while the horse battery, also under fir£, was near the Sorge 
 quarry. Alongside the latter the Sixteenth regiment of field 
 artillery was about to go into action. Towards the southeast 
 the artillery of the Guard could be heard. It was known that 
 other portions of the First army corps had taken up positions 
 south and north of Hohenbruck. 
 
 In view of these conditions Lieutenant-General A 
 
 placed special importance on a rapid assembling and orderly 
 formation of his troops. It seemed hardly possible to gam 
 any further benefit from the advantages already obtained, on 
 
 275 
 
276 StudiivS in TTiK Lkadi.nx OF Troops. 
 
 account of the complete exhaustion of the men. The troops 
 had been on the move since 4 o'clock in the morning, and in 
 action since 9 o'clock. The position the enemy now held could 
 not be successfully assailed without comprehensive prepara- 
 tion, so for the present the division commander must be con- 
 tent with holding the ground already gained. 
 
 Moreover, the retreat of the enemy's right wing was de- 
 cisive, the junior aid having returned at 4:30 from the south- 
 eastern corner of Neu-Rognitz, whither he had been sent for 
 observation, and reported that the batteries on the enemy's 
 left were withdrawing from the hill northwest of Burk- 
 
 ersdorf. Immediately, therefore, Lieutenant-General A 
 
 sent orders to the division artillery regiment to proceed to 
 that hill and fire upon the retreating forces. The hussar regi- 
 ment was brought to the southern end of Neu-Rognitz by a 
 non-commissioned officer of mounted riflemen to escort the 
 artillery. 
 
 The division commander accompanied this advance, as the 
 formation of the ground and the state of the engagement had 
 theretofore prevented his obtaining a perfect view of the oppo- 
 nent. It was very probable that a survey for a great distance 
 might be obtained from this very prominent peak (635). The 
 hussars took the lead, passing at a trot in column of troops 
 over the narrow open terrane between the end of the village 
 and the thickets to the south, then crossing the highway, and 
 riding up the mountain slope under cover of the First squad- 
 ron about 450 yards in advance. The First regiment of field 
 artillery had been led through Neu-Rognitz, and followed the 
 hussars. The horse battery was in rear of the artillery regi- 
 ment. Parts of the Third infantry brigade had already occu- 
 pied the tongue of woods crossing the highway near its forks, 
 while to the west the leading bodies of the brigade had aban- 
 doned the border of the woods and were marching up the 
 height. 
 
 At 4:45 the division commander reached the summit of 
 the peak, and soon afterwards the 7 batteries opened fire from 
 
 the same point on the retreating enemy. Colonel D 
 
 (First regiment), who arrived at about that time, received 
 orders to assemble his regiment there, the skirmishers of 
 which were just coming uj). 
 
Studies in the Leading oe Troops. 277 
 
 The view to the south was cut off at a distance of about 
 2;!/2 miles by a ridge, at the base of which arose the numerous 
 farm-houses and barns of the combined and compactly-built 
 villages of Deutsch-Praussnitz and Kaile, with their tiled 
 roofs plainly visible amidst the groups of trees in the gardens. 
 Toward the west and as far as these villages the country 
 seemed to be bounded by a series of peaks and declivities of 
 tolerably uniform height, over which the Königinhof road 
 passed. This road could be distinctly traced- in places as it 
 crossed the heights. The hills sloped gently toward the east 
 into an almost perfect plain, in which lay the village of Staud- 
 enz, while still further to the left the nearest farm-houses 
 of Ober-Raatsch could be seen, beyond which the peaks be- 
 came more numerous and the view more obstructed, the hori- 
 zon finally being bounded in that direction by still higher 
 elevations. 
 
 The ground from Hill 635 to the old quarry northwest of 
 Staudenz which was occupied by the division's most advanced 
 line formed an abrupt edge to the depression in front, and 
 on the whole, the entire region up to tieutsch-Praussnitz and 
 Kaile might be compared to an elongated kettle. 
 
 At the foot of the hill was the compact village of Burk- 
 ersdorf, to the south of which, and also to the east in the 
 direction of Staudenz, were well-defined patches of timber. 
 
 As already stated, the terrane was so open that it could 
 be surveyed at a glance, and any movements of the enemy in 
 it could be observed at least in their outline. South of Burk- 
 ersdorf hostile infantry was still visible, having evidently just 
 evacuated that place. The thickets farthest to the east, as well 
 as Staudenz, were still occupied. A hostile battery in the west 
 end of Staudenz was in action against Hill 635. An infantry 
 engagement could also be seen northeast of that village. 
 
 In addition, hostile columns were visible upon and along- 
 side the highway to Kaile, as well as upon the country road 
 from Burkersdorf to Deutsch-f raussnitz, the rearmost bodies 
 being about midway between Burkersdorf, Kaile, and Deutsch- 
 Praussnitz. A large force of cavalry, perhaps 3 regiments, 
 was visible south of the thickets between Burkersdorf^ and 
 Staudenz, headed toward the latter place. The highway to 
 Königinhof, on the contrary, seemed to be used only by a. few 
 
278 STüDifc:s IN Tnic L.KADixc OF Trcx>ps. 
 
 of the retreating- subdivisions. The hostile artillery that had 
 been in action on Hill 6^^ could be seen withdrawing by this 
 highway at a trot, its rear battalion having just approached 
 the two ^lills capped with windmills east of Ober-Soor. 
 
 The division commander readily perceived that under 
 these circumstances no damage could be inflicted upon the 
 enemy, who had been able to collect his forces and retire in 
 good order by posting fresh artillery and infantry on Hill 
 635. Moreover, the occupation of Staudenz and the patches 
 of \#)od afiorded good su])port for a continuation of the re- 
 treat The evacuation of Burkersdorf, just completed, and the 
 evidently good start which the masses in sight had obtained, 
 justified tlie inference that the retreat was progressing in good 
 ordef. 
 
 An opportunity to emj)loy the cavalry regiment of the 
 
 division could hardly be expected. Lieutenant-General A 
 
 therefore contented himself with directing Colonel D . 
 
 First infantry regiment, to send a battalion to Burkersdorf, 
 and instructing the commander of the First regiment of field 
 artillery to pursue the enemy as far as practicable with fire. 
 The hussar regiment was ordered to keep at the heels of the 
 oi»i)onent, and at all events to ascertain his whereabouts. 
 
 These orders had been given by 5 p. m., and the divis- 
 ion commander then turned his attention to further necessary 
 dispositions. 
 
 Comments on the Dispositions Madk in Bringing 
 THß Fight to an End. 
 
 (4 TO 5 p. M.) 
 
 II1C division brought its offensive advance to an end after 
 it had taken Neu-Rognitz and reached the little meadow val- 
 ley cast of the village. An attack on the hill northwest of 
 !Uirkers(k)rf opposite the right wing and occupied by the en- 
 emy in force offered no prospect of success, and the division 
 coniniander did not care to enter into a difficult engagement 
 in the woods on the left wing when that i^art of the field would 
 soon be evacuated i)y the ai)i)roach of the Guard. It is pos- 
 sible that the halt was also prompted by the fatigue of the 
 troops, which was in no sense slight, as well as the fact that 
 
STUDIJvS in THK L^eADING öF TrüOPS. 279 
 
 the Fourth brigade, which had already suffered a great deal, 
 would have to carry on the engagement in the woods. 
 
 Yet all these reasons are useless unless troops are ex- 
 hausted to such an extent tliat a continuation of the fight be- 
 comes an absolute impossibility. It is a leader's duty to 
 utilize every opportunity offered, to its fullest extent, and his 
 energy is best displayed when he overcomes all the obstacles 
 that present themselves in such cases. 
 
 If the help of the Guard had not been expected, then only 
 complete exhaustion and dissolution should have prevented 
 the continuation of the attack. Under no circumstances should 
 the opponent be left in possession of the woods over night ; 
 the engagement at the strip of meadow could not be continued 
 indefinitely, nor was it practicable to hold Neu-Rognitz for 
 hours under hostile artillery fire. Only two courses were open : 
 either to drive the enemy out of his position, or relinquish part 
 of the ground already gained and seek a more favorable 
 position further to the rear. 
 
 As it happened, however, the Guard had already become 
 engaged, and every minute their influence should become more 
 annoying to the enemy ; a fact which should have induced the 
 Second infantry division to continue the fight with the utmost 
 energy, for by so doing the opponent would not only have 
 been prevented from turning part of his forces against the 
 Guard, but he would have been beaten more thoroughly and 
 lastingly the more closely he w^as held in front and the more 
 difficult it w^as made for him to break off the action. The 
 flanking movement of the Guard w^ould then have been more 
 effective and the enemy's defeat more severe. 
 
 The division's suspension of its offensive advance before 
 4 p. m. cannot, therefore, be accepted as correct. It is true, 
 the general aspect of affairs made it appear probable that the 
 enemy would soon abandon the ground which the division 
 should occupy to secure the advantages already gained, but as 
 
 Lieutenant-General A had not sufficient knowledge of 
 
 the strength and situation of the enemy, he could hardly feel 
 assured on this point. Far more important, however, than 
 simply gaining a piece of ground was the opportunity here 
 offered of inflicting more serious loss upon the opponent, and 
 
28o Studies in thic Lkadinc of Troops. 
 
 this the division commander should not permit to sHp out of 
 his grasp. In war one cannot accomphsh enough : neverthe- 
 less not every man possesses the faculty of drawing the ut- 
 most advantage from a favorable situation. Tension of the 
 mind and bodily fatigue will in the end asse'rt themselves even 
 in the person of the leader. Great losses, the feeling that 
 great things have already been accomplished, fear of a pos- 
 sible setback if the troops are subjected to too great a strain, 
 all combine to put a limit to his energy, and all that can enable 
 him to surmount this difficulty is a realization of the necessity 
 for reviving the failing powers of his troops and giving a 
 fresh impetus to the weaker elements, coupled with an iron 
 will. 
 
 When, however, the heights northwest of Burkersdorf and 
 the old quarry were finally abandoned by the opponents, the 
 conditions relative to a continuation of the engagement as- 
 sumed an entirely different aspect, for it was then evident that 
 the enemy had marched off in good order, after having also 
 occupied the village of Staudenz and the woods, which were 
 very favorably situated to cover his retreat. These points 
 furnished him excellcTit positions for supports and rear guards, 
 and to have attacked the?n would have caused the division 
 greater sacrifices than could have resulted from the defender 
 holding them in his own possession for a time. Moreover, it 
 was plainly visible that the flanking movement of the Guard 
 had accomplished all that could be expected of it, and a more 
 far-reaching influence on its part was improbable after the 
 enemy had once shaken it off by his withdrawal. 
 
 When events had reached this point, attention was to be 
 turned toward the division's own condition, and this led to a 
 ])rcaking off of the engagement. 
 
 r)nc further remark must be made, however, and this has 
 reference to the leading of the army corps. The unjustifiable 
 cessation in the division's combat, which, as above stated, oc- 
 curred .shortly before 4 p. m., was in no small degree the fault 
 of the corps commander. Even before 2 ]). m. the leading 
 brigade of the First infantry division had deployed north of 
 Hohenbruck ^nd about that hour received the order to pro- 
 ceed to the attack also, via Hohenbruck and west of the high- 
 way. (See Part TIT., page 231.) lender the conditions that 
 
Studies in thk Lkading of Troops. 281 
 
 then prevailed, this order was eminently correct. Sufficient 
 forces were at hand to extend the fighting line without the 
 necessity of depriving the parts of the corps previously en- 
 gaged of their necessary reserves. An advance of this bri- 
 gade via Sorge must in any event draw off from the Second 
 division some of the enemy's forces which would otherwise 
 be employed agaii\st it. If, however, the enemy had not suffi- 
 cient troops in readiness, then the advance of the First infantry 
 brigade would flank the position the opponent had occupied 
 near Neu-Rognitz and put him in a most precarious situation, 
 unless he should evade the movement by a hasty retreat. Fur- 
 thermore, a continuation of this flank maneuver would in all 
 probability have prevented the enemy from making a new 
 stand on the hill before Burkersdorf. In any event, a timely 
 interposition by the First brigade would have lightened the 
 labors of the Second division, reduced its losses, and brought 
 the decision an hour or more earlier. 
 
 The brigade actually moved off, and had advanced a short 
 distance south of Hohenbruck, when it was retained by the 
 corps commander on account of the forward progress of the 
 action along the highway, "in order not to involve too many 
 troops in the fight." (See Part III., page 255.) Lieutenant- 
 General A was advised of this shortly after 3 o'clock; 
 
 he immediately perceived the mistake, and made recommenda- 
 tions to the corps commander that an advance of fresh forces 
 west of the highway would presumably lighten the action very 
 much. His recommendations were of no avail. 
 
 Regarding such a course we can only say, that consider- 
 ation for troops should never be carried so far as not to use 
 them at all. And whoever counts on every eventuality that 
 an uncertain future may bring forth, and tries to save his 
 troops, in the end is bound to miss many favorable oppor- 
 tunities. In the case before us it was not a question of a 
 slight skirmish by parts of the leading division, but the entire 
 division was engaged in a serious and decisive action, and it 
 should therefore have been supported as much as possible. 
 The corps commander was in a position to do this most effect- 
 ively, and his failure to do so was an unpardonable error. It 
 is in just such ways that troops are annihilated and losses mul- 
 tiplied. Had Lieutenant-General A been able to know 
 
282 Studies in thk Leading oe Troops. 
 
 U 
 
 M0 
 
 ^^M 
 '#i: 
 J^ 
 
 M 
 
 'ß 
 
 in advance that his conimandiniJ: general would leave him en 
 tirely dependent ui)on his own forces, in all probability h 
 would not have employed his entire Fourth brigade at the star 
 in the flank attack from Alt-Rognitz. but would certainly hav« 
 held back one of its regiments at his disposition as reserve. 
 
 The inactivity of the First brigade exercised no small in 
 lluence on the results of the victory. We have seen that then 
 was no pursuit, though by pursuit the most important fruit: ^ 
 of victory are gathered and demoralization spread in the rankr^^^jj, 
 of the enemy far beyond i:he battle-field. On the other handj yif, 
 theory certainly demands of pursuit more than troops caij \^^^ 
 often accomplish. How else can we explain the fact tha Uju 
 since the memorable i8th of June, 1815, our war history, S(j 1^ 
 replete with battles, cannot show a second Waterloo, althougll 'y 
 it has since become proverbial in our Army that when a vict|jjj 
 tory has been gained, the last breath of man and horse musj^ ] 
 be devoted to gathering in the fruits, a principle w^hich ha»|, 
 been instilled into us from our earliest training and the validly 
 ity of which neither the youngest lieutenant nor the oldes) j^^^ 
 general is ready to doubt? Ijjti 
 
 In explanation, let us first call to mind the condition of '. ^g 
 large mass of troops after a hotly contested action. When thd U^ 
 force has once been extended and gotten more or less out o L^j 
 the leader's hand, it is of little value, even though some smal, J ^^^ 
 separated bodies may still be capable of further activity. Wha.f'^yj 
 is needed are large closed masses under a connected leader 
 ship; but these, as a rule, are no longer to be found in theii 
 proper places. And if in the meantime the enemy has sue. ^^j 
 ceeded in restoring order in his own lines, and thus covering 1 1^ 
 the deployed masses by bodies of troops in close order, thet 1 ^^^ 
 the reckless pursuit of the victor's isolated forces will onlv leac ^^ ^^^ 
 to their sufl'ering losses heavier than those of the vanquishedl'j 
 Rut such bodies generally perceive the isolation of their posi) ^ 
 tion and the massing of the enemy's forces, and stop at th( 1 j^' 
 right moment. u '^ 
 
 T.est we be misunderstood, we will here repeat that we an I ^ 
 fully convinced that "under certain circumstances" great thing« 1 
 may be accomnlished bv a pursuit, and that we hold in hijrl'^ | 
 esteem the injunction to emplov the last bit of strength ir^ | 
 taking advantage of a victory. But, on the other hand, a pur- 
 
Studies in thk Leading of Troops. 283 
 
 suit is not always so easily undertaken as the critic imagines 
 when he says, *It is reprehensible that the enemy was not pur- 
 sued." In war conditions do not always assume such an easy 
 and simple course. 
 
 Let us pause to consider the example before us. 
 
 Anybody will at once understand that after marching and 
 fighting for 12 hours, in oppressive heat, the. troops' fighting 
 powers had so closely approached their limit that they were 
 no longer in condition to overcome the resistance of even small 
 bodies of the enemy, with the same dash as would have been 
 the case 4 or 6 hours earlier. Just as little were they fitted 
 for movements needing considerable time, such as a flanking 
 operation ; and it is certain that, in view of the severe lessons 
 they had already learned that day, they were in no condition 
 to dash upon the hostile front. 
 
 Furthermore, an advance upon the strong artillery posi- 
 tion on the Burkersdorf Hill would be extremely difficult ; in- 
 deed, a frontal attack would have hardly been practicable when 
 we consider the condition of the intermingled troops at 4 p. m. 
 in the edge of the woods opposite Burkersdorf and to the west 
 of Neu-Rognitz, especially since the terrane made support by 
 the division's own batteries very difficult. A turning move- 
 ment would have had to extend for quite a distance, which 
 would only increase the fatigue of the troops, nor were tlife 
 bodies that must initiate this from the rear in good order, 
 since the foremost line, in the woods, could, considering the 
 confusion, only be put into motion for a general frontal dash, 
 and not for a difficull; turning maneuver. A pursuit from 
 that point was therefore not feasible ; the question was rather 
 one of a fresh attack, for which the troops at that moment 
 were in no wise prepared. 
 
 Similar conditions prevailed on the left. Though the en- 
 emy could probably be followed up to the foot of tlie moun- 
 tains extending from the highway to the old quarry, it was 
 impossible to advance beyond that position, which was further- 
 more one not easily to be taken in front. 
 
 Let us remember that the assailant would have to go 
 through a forest about three-quarters of a mile wide, and un- 
 der hostile fire, and that with the view completely obstructed 
 all cohesion would be lost bevond recoverv, as well as all direc- 
 
284 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 tioii for the individual bodies. The opponent, on the othei 
 hand, was in close order, perfectly free in his movements, anc 
 able to see the approaching^ assailant while he himself was com 
 pletely obscured. 
 
 By pursuit we understand, in general, the gathering of 
 the fruits of a victory after a decision has been attained. As 
 a rule, we picture this as an uninterrupted pressing after tht 
 opponent until the limit of our strength is reached. 
 
 In the case of the Second infantry division the decisior 
 came at a moment when the enemy began his retreat ; he could 
 therefore be followed as far as practicable. But the pursuit 
 first struck a barrier after Neu-Rognitz and the woods west 
 and southeast of it had been taken, and this barrier was drawn 
 up by the opponent, who, with bodies in close order in a 
 strong position, turned and faced the victor. 
 
 After a time, the enemy left his position northwest of 
 Burkersdorf ; but even then the assailant was in no condition 
 to reap full benefit of the situation. 
 
 Yet it is certain that if the corps commander had not 
 put a stop to the projected movement of the First brigade 
 beyond Sorge, this brigade itself could have undertaken the 
 pursuit, which would probably have been done. On the other 
 iiand, it was out of the question to detail the First brigade for 
 pursuit, howsoever commendable it would have been to em 
 ploy it in rcacliiui^ a decision. The first thing to be thought 
 of is to gain a victory, and trooi:>s needed for this cannot be 
 put in motion with a view to subsequent conditions which can- 
 not be foreseen ; it cannot be perceived beforehand how mat 
 ters will stand when the decision falls. 
 
 It might further be asked why the cavalry, and i)articular- 
 ly the First cavalry brigade, was not employed. It is the spe- 
 cial (hity of tliis arm to keep at the enemy's heels; it shall (so, 
 at least, says the theory of combat) gather the trophies, and 
 spread panic far and wide. 
 
 It will be interesting here to examine more closely how 
 far the inlluence of cavalry may extend. 
 
 In the first ]>lace, the larger bodies of cavalry should re- 
 main as near as possil)le to the fighting line. Wlien the bat 
 tie was raging around Neu-Rognitz and in the woods west 
 of the village and along tlie wagon-road, the nearest infantry 
 
 Jill 
 ,' 111 
 
 JÖI 
 
 it 
 
 ( »I 
 
 ' ?oi' 
 t 
 
 !§11 
 
 Its I 
 
 m 
 
 '• 
 
 I 'f 
 ] * 
 / i 
 
Studies in th^ Leading of Troops. 285 
 
 reserve, the First infantry brigade, was south of Hohenbruck, 
 and in front of this the First cavalry brigade had finally as- 
 sembled in such manner that its left was not far from the 
 northern point of the tongue of woods at the highway between 
 Neu-Rognitz and Hohenbruck. Even after the fighting had 
 come to a standstill in front of the heights northwest of Burk- 
 ersdorf, the cavalry was standing still in the same position. 
 The nearest open ground to which it could have gone would 
 have been that east of Neu-Rognitz; but several battalions of 
 the Fourdi infantry brigade were already there and would 
 have left little room for anything else. 
 
 It was 4:32 p. m. when the report of the withdrawal of 
 
 the enemy reached Lieutenant-General A . Assuming 
 
 The most ' favorable conditions and that the cavalry brigade 
 could be summoned by the shortest route, a distance of over 
 a mile would still have to be covered in riding from the gen- 
 eral's station to the cavalry. Considering the fact that the 
 aid's horse was already tired, and counting the time needed to 
 give the order, the aid could not have delivered the necessary 
 instructions to the commander of the cavalry brigade before 
 4 :38. The brigade would then start off at a trot, and it would 
 be immateriarwhether it took the road via Neu-Rognitz or 
 Sorge. Let us assume that it chose the former; it would first 
 take" the highway, then pass around the village on the east 
 (a region difficult to traverse on account of the engagement 
 i;-oing on), and after crossing the highway, would take up a 
 covered i)osition near Hill 635. Thus it would have to pass 
 over a distance of about 2;4 miles, frequently hindered in its 
 journey by other troops. Its point could hardly have reached 
 its destination before 4 150. The length of its column of march 
 can be taken at about 1,300 yards; but in all probability this 
 would have been prolonged so that its deployment could hard- 
 ly be completed before 4:56 p. m. 
 
 The last subdivisions of the enemy had a start of at least 
 24 minutes, the rear of which was already about ^ of a mile 
 south of Burke rsdorf. The cavalry would require 12 minutes, 
 or more, before it could charge, so that it could not reach the 
 enemy in less than 36 minutes after his withdrawal, during 
 which time the latter, even if in disorder at the start, could 
 fully prepare himself for effective resistance. 
 
286 Studies in thi; Li:ai)ix<-. oi- Troops. 
 
 Furthermore, when we remember that "the opponent was 
 in no need of hurrying, that he occupied the country south 
 of Burkersdorf and the thickets to the east in order to cover 
 his retreat, evacuating- them only gracUially, also that the pur- 
 suit bv infantry ended even before this, it is evident that the 
 cavalry which would follow would on the whole not be in 
 position to achieve very great success. 
 
 But it might be argued that the example before us was 
 selected for the especial purpose of illustrating unfavorable 
 conditions of jnirsuit. This is not at all the case. The descrip- 
 tion of the conditions follows from the very dispositions that 
 were made, and the situation was the natural sequence of the 
 course the engagement had taken. 
 
 As a matter of fact, a similar result will be observed in 
 the majority of battles and engagements. Pursuit will al- 
 ways depend upon conditions on both sides, after the decision 
 has come. The degree of dissolution on the side of the victor 
 is taken into account as much as on the side of the van- 
 quished, and exce]»t the defeat degenerate into a rout, the one 
 who has been beaten will always be able to Dfifer resistance 
 in various positions. Defense is so powerful that we do 
 not attack without hesitation. It takes time to restore order 
 among ])ursuers, and all this accrues to the benefit of the van- 
 quished. After we have driven the enemy out of his position 
 by employing our entire strength, and so brought about a 
 decision, we will not always be in condition to undertake new 
 and costly partial attacks with our tired and intermingled 
 forces, against the positions which the enemy lias occupied 
 during his retreat. An instructive example of this is found 
 in the retreat of the French from Le Mans in 187 1. 
 
 in general, an exhaustive utilization of a victory will be 
 governecl by the number of fresh reserves available to break 
 the resistance of the enemy in a new light. 
 
 lUit it is LMitirely diffident when the retreat degenerates 
 into a com])lete rout, when the fleeing swarms have given up 
 all thought of further resistance. Then isolated bodies of the 
 victor may follow, and hundreds will often throw down their 
 arms before a few horsemen. 
 
 The ])ursuit after Waterloo was inaugurated under the 
 most favorable conditions, a repetition of which will not easily 
 
Studiks in thk Leadix\g of Troops. 287 
 
 occur again. The French army numbered about 60,000 men, 
 which was approximately the strength of two Prussian army 
 corps, and its retreat must consequently be regarded in a dif- 
 ferent light, as far as space is concerned, than the maneuvers 
 of our tremendous masses in the late campaigns. The extent 
 of the field makes a difference in the estimate of the situation, 
 in the issuing of orders, and in the participation of individual 
 units. In addition it must be remembered that the French 
 army had struggled up to the last moment for victory and had 
 employed its full strength, so that when Fortune decided 
 against it, its forces were shattered, with a few exceptions not 
 worthy of mention. Under such conditions the Prussian at- 
 tack in the rear of the right wing was bound to be of moment- 
 ous consequence, and when the opponent saw battalions of 
 F'russians behind him instead of the long-expected columns 
 of Grouchy, he gave no thought to resistance, but broke down 
 completely, becoming an easy prey to the victors. Gneisen- 
 au's memorable pursuit continued without interruption for 
 more than 8 miles from the battle-field, which had never been 
 entered by the mass of the victorious troops. It zvas con- 
 ducted with I battalion and 2 platoons of infantry and 6 squad- 
 rons of cavalry, and it was not until the next iiorning that a 
 larger number of squadrons reached the bivouac of these ad- 
 vanced forces. This is proof of what even small bodies may 
 accomplish against disordered and demoralized masses. 
 
 VVe trus^ we have here reduced the idea of "the last 
 breath of man and horse" to its true merit, m opposition to 
 the so frequently appearing unjustifiable criticism. The prin- 
 ciple that we must achieve the utmost possible benefit from 
 every victory remains uncontested, but how far this is prac- 
 ticable can be determined only at the station of the com- 
 manding general and with a view of the entire i:ituation. As 
 a rule, this decision is rendered afterwards, when a full knowl- 
 edge of conditions on both sides has been gained, and under 
 the most varied assumptions as to what the commanding gen- 
 eral must have known, etc. But there is a tremendous dif- 
 ference between must have known and actually did know, a 
 difference which v/e are too often led to ignore. 
 
 Thus the "neglected pursuits" may be founded more upon 
 actual conditions than would generally be admitted, and the 
 
2.88 Studies in thk Lkaoixo of Troops. 
 
 frequently criticised neglected pursuits in hundreds of battles 
 might furnish proof that war throws other considerations in 
 the scale than those generally considered in battle theories. 
 
 On the other hand, we must call attention to another con- 
 dition of frequent occurrence, but which, in our opinion, might 
 always be avoided — viz., that after many a victorious battle 
 touch ccith the enemy has been lost almost completely. 
 
 In the campaign of 1866. during the last days of June we 
 had an almost uninterrupted series of very serious engage- 
 ments in widely separated places with 6 hostile corps, and on 
 July 2 we were absolutely hi- the dark regarding the enemy's 
 whereabouts. The first order issued by the commander-in- 
 chief on July 3 (but which was not executed) began as fol- 
 lows: "As touch with the enemy has been lost, in spite of 
 an uninterrupted series of engagements,"' etc., and the official 
 report shows that on the evening of the 2d the entirely erro- 
 neous impression i)revailed that the Austrian army had re- 
 treated across the Elbe and was on the point of inaugurating 
 an advance over the river anew. 
 
 To kee]) touch with the enemy, when once gained, is the 
 duty of the cavalry ; but to accomplish this, it must be given 
 the correct direction of march by superior headquarters. If 
 this cannot be determined immediately, parties should Ix: sent 
 out on all the roads to be considered. Otherwise it can eas- 
 ily happen that a squadron following a certain road will send 
 word back after 12 hours that it has found only scattered 
 parties of the enemy, and it will then be too late to search 
 anew on other roads. Anyone at all familiar with military 
 history can readily recall examples illustrating 'his same point. 
 
 But in most cases it will he alleged that the cavalry is too 
 greatly exhausted. This is frequently the case when we are 
 only considering the strength of the horses and are of the 
 opinion that they wil! not be able io do any more work for 
 several da\s. Such notions are entirely erroneous. When 
 eaz'alry can he used, it must be used, rei:;ardless of lehether 
 the mounts may he ruined thereby or not. Vet there are 
 times when at the end of a fight the cavalry is no longer able 
 to acc(3mplish anxthing; bvit it can tre(|uen'tl\' be fcnind that 
 the reason foi thi. is that the cavalrv was ruined bv being 
 
Studies in tri; F^icxniN«; of Troops. 289 
 
 needlessly shifted about durino- the course of the entire 
 engagement. 
 
 Thk Third Ixfantrv IJrioadi: from 4 to 5 p. m. 
 
 We have seen that shortly before 4 o'clock Major-General 
 
 i; received orders to occupy the southern border of the 
 
 woods west of Neu-Rognitz, and also the village itself, where 
 he would re-assenible his brigade. 
 
 Accordingly he instructed Colonel E (Second reg- 
 iment ), who was on the spot, to assemble and form up again 
 in and west of Neu-Rognitz all parts of his regiment not re- 
 quired in holding the village. He despatched one of his aids 
 to Colonel D — ^^^ — (of the First regiment) with similar in- 
 structions, directing him to hold the woods west of Neu- 
 Rognitz. posting such troops as were necessary in and north 
 of the woods. 
 
 Turning first to the right wing of the brigade, we have 
 seen that before 4 p. m. (Part III., page 174) Colonel D — -- 
 had already made dispositions which were in full accord with 
 the intentions of brigade headquarters. After the capture of 
 the woods west of the village, he was in the thickets near 
 where the foot-path enters coming down from Hill 635, and 
 there he gave his adjutant these instructions: "Ride east 
 along the border of the timber to the corner projecting to- 
 ward Neu-Rognitz. and tell all officers that for the present I 
 forbid the crossmg of the edge of the woods. Instruct iNIajor 
 
 ^' , commanding the Third battalion, to take charge of 
 
 all troops on that side of this path, occupying the border of 
 the woods with such force as is absolutely necessary, and 
 assembling the remainder further to the rear. Then return 
 and wait for me here." 
 
 After giving these directions. Colonel D rode off 
 
 toward the west along the Qdi^c of the woods. He soon met 
 isolated skirmishers of the First battalion, and iihmediately 
 instructed a junior officer found there to occupy the line 
 up to a well-marked tree (about 400 yards distant) with 
 these .skirmishers. In the southern extremity of the woods, 
 which ]>rojects out some distance toward Hill 635, he found 
 large bodies still contending with the enemy's skirmishers in 
 
290 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 a strip of timber opposite, while a little further to the rear 
 he noticed a body in close order, also a mounted officer. He 
 joined this officer, whom he found to be the commander of 
 the Fourth company of the First regiment, and who reported 
 that he had with him 2>4 platoons of his company, i platoon 
 of which was deployed as skirmishers and the remainder 
 forming the supports the colonel had noticed. To the right 
 the colonel saw another officer with a few men of the First 
 battalion, and also quite a number of men, from different 
 companies of the First regiment, in the firing line. He was 
 satisfied that this force was fully sufficient to hold the point 
 of woods, and so he ordered the captain to take command of 
 it, but not to go beyond it unless he received specific orders 
 to that effect. If other men belonging to the regiment should 
 come up, he was ordered to form them into small squads and 
 send them back to it, as all troops not needed in action would 
 be assembled in and north of the woods. 
 
 Thereupon the colonel returned to his former station, 
 where he was joined by his adjutant, who reported that he 
 
 had executed the orders given; adding that Major Y —— 
 
 was present. The regimental commander proceeded to join 
 the latter, from whom he learned that he had ample force 
 from his own (Third) battalion on the spot to hold the edge 
 of the woods, and that, pursuant to orders, he was sending 
 back all men of other organizations. The colonel advised 
 him of the state of afi'airs on the right, and then rode on into 
 the open ground near Sorge to expedite the assembling there. 
 
 Near Sorge he found as a nucleus the Fifth and Eighth 
 companies in close order. Squads of men from dift'erent or- 
 ganizations came pouring in from all sides. These were 
 grouped first by regiments, and then fell in again by com- 
 panies. Several officers and non-commissioned officers were 
 sent out to direct to Sorge any men who might be easily led 
 in the direction of the quarry by reason of the shape of the 
 forest. 
 
 Gradually five bodies of varying strength formed not far 
 from Sorge. The first consisted of men from nearly all com- 
 l^anies of the lurst battalion of the First regiment, in all about 
 150: the .second comprised the Second battalion, which was in 
 tolerably good order; the third was made up of about 200 
 men of the Third ])attalion ; the fourth numbered about 80 
 
Studiks in thk leading of Troops. 291 
 
 men of the Third battalion of the Second regiment; the fifth 
 included about 70 men of the Fourth regiment who had be- 
 come separated from their organization during the assault 
 upon Neu-Rognitz. 
 
 Before Colonel D reached this spot, he was met by 
 
 a staff officer from brigade headquarters, who delivered the 
 order above mentioned. About 15 minutes later the staff 
 officer returned and informed the colonel that a considerable 
 number of his regiment had been collected east of the high- 
 way and directed to the vicinity of Sorge, and that the bri- 
 gade commander had instructed him to lead back to their 
 proper battalions any parts of the Second regiment found near 
 
 Sorge. Colonel D replied that only 80 men of the 
 
 Third battalion of that regiment had so far come in; adding 
 that he would send them to Neu-Rognitz immediately. 
 
 Colonel D then entrusted Major N , the com- 
 mander of the Second battalion, with the distribution of the 
 bodies approaching from the east of the highway, which con- 
 sisted of parts of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth companies, 
 as well as a few men each from the Tenths Eleventh, and 
 Twelfth companies. He directed the major to send the as- 
 sembled men of the First battalion into the woods in the direc- 
 tion of Hill 635, as soon as order was restored, where they 
 would come upon their battalion. Men of the Third battal- 
 ion, on the other hand, were sent by the colonel to the left of 
 the regiment, where he knew the remainder of their battalion 
 wa's in action. He directed the Second battalion of the First 
 regiment to remain for the present in reserve east of Sorge; 
 however, he did not await the complete restoration of order in 
 this battalion, but again went to the most advanced firing 
 line, where the artillery had just then (4:30 p. m.) ceased fire. 
 
 Fifteen minutes later Major N was in position to 
 
 send over about J 50 men to the First battalion ; he had 560 
 men of his Second battalion on the spot. Later 50 or 60 men 
 of the Third battalion arrived. The Second was still short 
 nearly 400 men, who, considering the short space of time the 
 fight consumed, could hardly all have been killed or wounded ; 
 it was reasonable to suppose that probably 100 of these had 
 either joined other troops or were still wandering over the 
 battle-field. 
 
292 
 
 SiUDiKb IN TiiK Lkadinc. Ol- Troops!' 
 
 Directly after he bad sent forward the men of the First 
 
 battahon, Major N received orders from Colonel D 
 
 to form up all subdivisions remainini^ with him, and advance. 
 
 Shortly after 4:30 Colonel D approached the south- 
 ern boundary of the forest. The troops who had hitherto 
 occupied this line had left it and were advancing upon the 
 opposite height, which the enemy's artillery had already aban- 
 doned. Soon afterwards he also saw the artillery of his own 
 side, with the hussars, advancing from the direction of the 
 highway. He met the division and brigade commanders up- 
 on Hill 635. Accordingly he sent the above-men:ioned order 
 
 back to Alajor N . A little before 5 o'clock he received 
 
 instructions from the division commander to occupy Burkers- 
 dorf with i battalion. 
 
 At that time (5 ]). m. ) the infantry of the right wing was 
 distributed as follows : In the first line, which had been joined 
 
 by the detachments sent up, was Major X with 700 men 
 
 of the First battalion on Hill 635. The greater part of the Third 
 battalion (500 men) was niarching across the open ground to- 
 ward the peak, the Eleventh company being detached. The 
 Second battalion of the First regiment, with 560 men,^ was 
 coming through the forest south of Sorge. 
 
 Turning now to the Second regiment, in ])ursuance of the 
 brigade commander's order to occupy Neu-Rognitz and assem- 
 ble the troops in the village directly west of it. Colonel E 
 
 called his adjutant and several mounted officers to his assist- 
 ance and directed the scattered bodies of the Third battalion 
 to the open ground wTst of the village, whither parts of the 
 First battalion of the Fourth regiment had also moved. The 
 First and Second battalions of the Second regiment, also the 
 company of engineers, remained in the village. 
 
 The troops were assembled in the same manner as upon 
 the right wing, and it was found that every company was ac- 
 counted for. A few men were there from the First regiment. 
 The First battalion of the Fourth regiment was still dis- 
 persed in the soutlicrn part of the village, and was gradually 
 extricated from the ranks of the Second regiment. By direc- 
 
 'Over 100 men were later led ui) by the officers and non-com- 
 missioned officers sent lo the qnarry. 
 
 . 
 
Studies in thi: Leading of Troops. 293 
 
 tion of the brigade commander, the men of the First regiment 
 
 were sent toward Sorge. In addition, Colonel E sent 
 
 all men of tlje Fourth regiment to the eastern boundary of 
 the village. 
 
 When report of the withdrawal of the enemy arrived^ 
 Colonel E ^- — hastened to the southern point of the vil- 
 lage and prevented a further pursuit on the part of the corn; 
 panics of the First battalion stationed there. Soon afterwards 
 he brought the Second battalion up to the entrance of the Aft- 
 Rognitz wagon-road. 
 
 Order had been generally established in both regiments 
 of the brigade, although the several battalions of the Second.- 
 res'iment were still short a considerable number of men. 
 
 The Fourth Infantry Brigade from 4 to 5 p. m. - 
 
 When, before 4 p. m., the withdrawal of the enemy from 
 in front of the Fourth brigade could be observed, the division 
 commander directed Major Z , acting brigade com- 
 mander, to advance still further, but instructed him not to 
 extend the pursuit beyond the southern edge of the woods in 
 front. The companies of the First and Second battalions of 
 the Third regiment, which were deployed on the foremost 
 line, had already crossed the gully and followed the retreat- 
 ing forces, though without specific instructions to do so. Ma- 
 jor Z— instructed the bodies in close order to follow in 
 
 such a manner that the company on the left wing would ad- 
 vance along the western bank of the creek coming down from 
 the old quarry, while two companies moved on the right wing 
 outside of the forest and along its western border, so as to 
 cut off the retreat of any hostile parties who might remain 
 too long in the thickets. The Third battalion of the Third 
 regiment, in reserve, was ordered to advance to the next gully. 
 
 It was not necessary to support the troops fighting in the 
 woods, as the enemy retreated hurriedly and without oflfering 
 serious resistance, some of his troops even losing their direc- 
 tion by so doing ; and when the skirmishers of the Third reg- 
 iment also lost connection, a considerable body of the enemy 
 suddenly appeared on the northern edge of the forest in front 
 of the Second and Third battalions of the Fourth regiment 
 
294 Studies ix thf. Leading of Troops. 
 
 which were there posted. On this occasion some platoons of 
 the Second hattaHon whicli (|iiickly deployed captured about 
 60 men. 
 
 The comjKinv of the Third rei^iment advancing on the 
 ieft winj^ in the direction of the old quarry very soon found 
 opportunity to take part in the action, but after a few shots 
 were fired, the enemy fell back toward the south. On the 
 right, liowever, the flank movement could not be executed, 
 as the two companies of the Second battalion came under the 
 fire of the hostile artillery on the hill northwest of Burkers- 
 dorf, in consequence of which they rushed into the strip of 
 woods projecting- westward and crossing the highway, and 
 from there opened fire upon the guns and their infantry es- 
 cort. In the meantime the remaining parts of the regiment 
 advanced farther into the thickets, until some of them reached 
 the southern edge, but in complete dissolution. Several par- 
 ties, stepping out of the border, attempted to climb the quarry 
 hill and the mountain crest running along the Staudenz road, 
 but were turned back by the fire of the hostile reserves who 
 occupied these positions in support of the retreating troops. 
 Although it was not intended to advance further, these 
 attempts would probably have been continued had not the 
 fight and the laborious march across the difficult ground com- 
 pletely exhausted the troops. But such was the situation 
 when at 4:30 p. m. the enemy abandoned the heights of 
 Staudenz and Burkersdorf. The Third regiment occupies 
 
 the old quarry hill at 4:45, and Major Z directed the 
 
 First and Third battalions to remain there while the Second 
 battalion was sent tow^ard the highway. 
 
 At 5 p. m. order had not yet been fully restored. The 
 greater part of the .First and Third battalions of the Third 
 regiment were, however, at the quarry, whither during the 
 latter phase of the action the Eleventh company of the First 
 regiment and also half a troop of the Third squadron had ar- 
 rived, having marched across the country in the direction of 
 the engagement after they had been relieved from duty in 
 the vallev of the Aupa by portions of the Guard division. The 
 Second {»altalion was in the act of taking up position at the 
 fork of the two In'ghways. 
 
Studi£:s in THt: Leadinc 01^ Troops. 295 
 
 The fourth regiment, now fairly well re-assembled by the 
 arrival of the First battalion, was stationed in reserve on the 
 wagon-road east of Neu-Rognitz. 
 
 Comments on the Dispositions oe the Third and Fourth 
 Infantry Bric.ades from 4 to 5 p. m. 
 
 The situation on the right wing of the Third infantry bri- 
 gade, and particularly with the First regiment, was one which 
 readily leads to hasty, isolated attacks. The troops, having 
 cleared the woods west of Neu-Rognitz, felt that they were 
 going ahead victoriously, and did not like to be checked in 
 their advance as long as an enemy was in sight. This tend- 
 ency, howsoever praiseworthy in itself, must be curbed, for 
 the fight carried on in the woods had played havoc with order : 
 organizations were intermingled, and bodies in close order 
 wandered about in the woods without any fixed direction of 
 march, and were generally missed at the very places where 
 they were most urgently needed; had it been desired to con- 
 tinue the attack, the fighting should have been carried beyond 
 the edge of the forest. 
 
 It is, however, difficult to exercise such restraint in front 
 of an enemy in close order. On account of the obstructed 
 view in timber, it is hardly practicable to lead from a posi- 
 tion in rear, and from a position in front of the woods it is 
 even impossible. It thus happens that a leader, carried away 
 by his eagerness for battle and animated by previous victory, 
 will frequently push forward out of a forest, with his pla- 
 toons, companies, or other troops he may have gathered to- 
 gether, to attack the opponent anew, as was done during the 
 action in the woods of Sadowa. But they are dependent upon 
 themselves alone, are not seen by adjoining bodies and conse- 
 quently not supported by them, and are not followed up by 
 supporting troops, so that such maneuvers will rarely lead to 
 success, but will rather help only to Increase the unneces- 
 sary sacrifices. These are conditions in which the superior 
 officers find it difficult to interfere. All the more, therefore, 
 should platoon and company leaders appreciate the fact that 
 after they have advanced through a wood and reached its 
 
296 Studil.s in the leading of Troops. 
 
 edge, they should not, \vith(jut great caution, dash out against 
 any enemy who may be seen on the outside. 
 
 Accordingly, as we have seen, Colonel 1) busied 
 
 himself in trying to prevent a breaking forth out of the for- 
 est, by first having the cöge of the woods occupied by the 
 foremost subdivisions, and then bringing the remainder of 
 the troops into the open ground near the Sorge quarry, there 
 to re-establish order. Such a novement is, however, fraught 
 with great obstacles, and to execute it properly, one cannot 
 be content with alone complying with the instructions word 
 for word, but must let his good judgment have ^ull sway. 
 
 The Third brigade was favored by a cessation of hos- 
 tilities just at the beginning of the period under consideration, 
 and this was sucii an occasion as generally permits a com- 
 plete re-assembling. But the main point is to think of doing- 
 it at the proper time, a precaution that experience shows is 
 taken only in the rarest cases. 
 
 The cause of this is readily ascertained. No one can 
 perceive that a fight has ended at the exact moment it comes 
 to pass ; all that the assailant can know is that for the time 
 being he does not intend to continue the i)ursuit ; all further 
 action depends particularly upon the intentions and measures 
 of the enemy. Every leader halts, and awaits what will really 
 happen ; he thinks he will be called upOn to make a quick 
 decision, and consequently does not like to leave his place 
 of observation, which he must do if he would re-assemble 
 his forces. Or in time he will conclude that he can leave 
 for a moment, but has hardly gone a few paces when he gets 
 a new view of the hostile position or discovers some new 
 movement on the enemy's part, and again he halts to observe. 
 Minute is added to minute; a quarter of an hour has passed, 
 half an hour, an entire hour, and the troops are still as much 
 disordered as before, and therefore not fit for energetic work. 
 
 lUit if the importance of re-assembling is called to mind 
 at the projier time, then the right moment will be made use 
 of; and even if the further progress of the engagement com- 
 pels us to suspend the movement before it is fully carried out, 
 we shall nevertheless have brought our forces into a better 
 condition by a partial assemblage. 
 
STUDtJ-,S IN THK LEADING OF TrOOPS. 2<) i 
 
 A higher leader Hke a division commander has the ad- 
 vantage in that more assistants are at his disposal, who can 
 observe for him and issue his orders ; it is not so with a bat- 
 talion or regimental commander: furthermore, the former 
 need not stop observing the progress of the engagement to 
 put troops in order again, which at times a regimental com- 
 mander must do, as happened with Colonel D- . 
 
 With proper attention, however, order can be re-estab- 
 lished in the first line during pauses in an action, for as long 
 as the leader is at the front the enemy cannot escape his ob- 
 servation. How order shall be restored depends in each case 
 on circumstances. We have attempted to show this in the case 
 of the right wing of the division. After the front line has 
 been put in order again, the troops must first be collected be- 
 hind i,t. Much depends upon the choice of location. Theoret- 
 ically the small farm of Sorge did not fill all the requirements, 
 as some of the troops, especially those who had advanced 
 near the highway, had not the slightest idea of its existence. 
 Therefore it was necessary to make arrangements whereby 
 the men coming out of the forest farther to the north could 
 be conducted to the rendezvous. 
 
 Where practicable, it is recommended that men be directed 
 to follow one particular road. This tends to start a single 
 stream, which can be stemmed easier at any point than if the 
 men swarm in from every part of the field. 
 
 At all events, it is of paramount importance to collect the 
 men at the rendezvous in bodies corresponding with the 
 higher units For example, if a division has been broken up 
 in an action, separate rendezvous must be chosen by the bri- 
 gades, or be assigned them. At each of these points the 
 troops of both brigades are first separated, and again sorted 
 into regiments and battalions as soon as the number present 
 permits. It is always preferable that the highest headquar- 
 ters designate the rendezvous in advance, so that an exchange 
 
 between the points can be inaugurated. Colonel D 's 
 
 steps in this direction have been described in such minuteness 
 because they best illustrate how this problem can be solved. 
 The whole situation of the Third brigade in this case also 
 illustrates how a lively engagement will mix troops. Indeed, 
 such mixing may proceed to a still greater etxent. We dis- 
 
298 Studies in riiit Leading of Troops. 
 
 tinctly remember once when, at the close of a battle and when 
 darkness was setting in, the bodies of an army corps were 
 sent back in such a mixed condition that it bei:ame necessary 
 to station officers upon the main road, over which all must 
 pass, who called out continually, "X division to the right, Y 
 division to the left" ; the rendezvous in this case were accord- 
 ingly to both sides of the road. 
 
 Wherever practicable, we should let troops assemble for- 
 ward, as was done with the forces in the thickets northeast 
 of Neu-Rognitz. 
 
 The illustration further shows that, on account of the in- 
 terruption caused by the forward movement which took place 
 during the restoration of order on the right wing, the as- 
 sembling continued for over an hour, at the end of which time 
 the troops were not even in proper formation. Nevertheless 
 they were in such condition that it was possible to correctly 
 lead them during an action. Except for the dead and wound- 
 ed, all still missing would gradually come up with their 
 battalions again, though it could hardly be counted on that 
 they would all return before midnight; and even if the troops 
 should not remain in the same place the subsequent forenoon, 
 the end of the next day might not see all with their colors. 
 
 The foregoing illustrates how difficult it is to assemble. 
 It also admonishes us at the same time to keep in mind at 
 every moment the importance of re-establishing order when 
 once lost. Yet even when a victory that has been dearly 
 gained is over with, we do not always immediately call to 
 mind this injunction, still less during, short pauses in the 
 midst of an engagement; a fact that is fully borne out by 
 experience. 
 
 In the case of the First regiment, the occupation of the 
 woods west of Neu-Rognitz afforded the protection neces- 
 sary for re-assembling the other parts ; with the Second reg- 
 iment the same was accomplished by holding the village. 
 
 The commander of the Second regiment. Colonel E , 
 
 was enabled to collect his troops without much delay. He, 
 however, occasioned a great deal of trouble by intermingling 
 the First battalion of the Fourth regiment; there was not the 
 least necessity for kcc])ing parts of that regiment with his 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 299 
 
 troops any longer; he was aware their regiment was near by, 
 and he should have sent them to it at once. 
 
 It is easy to understand the reason for the pursuit be- 
 gun on the left wing of the division by the companies of the 
 Third regiment deployed toward the edge of the forest, as 
 soon as the enemy withdrew from that point; the only ques- 
 tion was, Should Major Z cause the second line of the 
 
 regiment to follow also? Under such circumstances, deployed 
 bodies in touch with the enemy must always be supported, 
 and in no case should they be allowed to advance 1,000 yards 
 or a mile unsupported. As a rule, small bodies will follow 
 such a line, but in this instance it was necessary for the whole 
 Third battalion to follow, as the woods had to be seized; the 
 previous halt in front of the woods was only temporary and 
 demanded by other circumstances. 
 
 A leader must be cautious in regard to details when as- 
 signing direction of march to supports. It is not enough that 
 the company commanders order them to follow. The woods 
 in front were over a mile wide and almost three-quarters of 
 a mile deep. Even in maneuvers conducted in time of peace 
 we will notice that when a deployed brigade is led through 
 a dense forest of this size, frequently all cohesion will be lost 
 and it will be necessary to form the brigade up again on the 
 other side of the woods. In war we will therefore do well 
 in such cases to conduct the several parts so they will not 
 readily lose direction. Roads are then a great help. In this 
 case, however, there were no roads running north and south 
 in the woods ; a difficulty which was overcome by sending the 
 companies on the left wing along the gully coming from the 
 old quarry, and those on the right along the western edge 
 of the woods. The result of this movement was that hos- 
 tile parties which had lost their direction suddenly appeared 
 again on the northern edge, in view of the Fourth regiment, 
 which was stationed there in reserve. 
 
 Such events are indeed characteristic of every fight within 
 woods, and can always be expected, as the view is completely 
 obstructed. We need only recall the Austrian battalion at 
 Königgrätz that nnarched out of the Maslowed woods and 
 stumbled on the Prussian line of battle instead of its own, and 
 
300 Studiks in THit Leading of Troops. 
 
 fell into the hands of Humbert's squadron of the Magdeburg 
 hussars. 
 
 Accordingly it is all the more necessary to remember that 
 when entering woods all parts should not be sent in at the 
 start, but at least a few companies held in front of the border. 
 
 Neither must we neglect to shorten distances. On this 
 jjoint Infantry Drill Regulations specify distinctly: **A nar- 
 row front, close order, and strong flank reserves must be pro- 
 vided. This is particularly necessary when the fight is en- 
 tirely within the woods, the movements of bodies in close or- 
 der being then confined to roads." 
 
 The compass is another thing that must not be overlooked 
 for use in a forest. 
 
 OlSPOSlTIOXS FROM THE EnD OF THE BaTTLE (S P. M.) 
 
 UNTIL Nightfall. 
 
 We left Lieutenant -General A on Hill 635 just after 
 
 he had given Colonel D orders to occupy Burke rsdorf 
 
 with I battalion. 
 
 The left wing was made up of parts of the regiment that 
 were on the spot, and started off immediately toward the 
 northwestern part of the village. 
 
 The batteries on Hill 635 considered it necessary to re- 
 open fire on the hostile artillery, 2 batteries of which had 
 again gone into position on the higiiway near Hill 603 and 
 Hill 609, close to the mill. 
 
 Meanwhile the division commander had instructed one of 
 his aids to find the corps commander and report that the en- 
 emy held the country south of lUirkersdorf and Staudenz with 
 only a sniall force, all of his other troops having withdrawn 
 to the line Oeutsch-IVaussnitz-Kaile, and that the division 
 would bivouac south of Meu-Rognitz. on both sides of die 
 highway, and would establish outposts, keeping the enemy all 
 ihe while steadily in view. 
 
 He then directed Major-General W to assemble his 
 
 brigade east of Hill (')^S, -^'aving out the Third battalion of 
 the First regiment, which was detached at Burkersdorf. 
 
 At the same time the senior aid returned from his trip 
 tn the di\i'-ion of the (aiard. and reported as follows : "I 
 
SruDiRs IN THiC Lkading of Troops. 301 
 
 came across the advance guard of the division of the Guard 
 as it was going through woods south of Rudersdorf. The 
 division artillery had been brought to the front to support it. 
 Only a weak force opposed it. J also found the division com- 
 mander, Lieutenant-General M . He intends — " 
 
 At that point the aid was interrupted by a staff officer's 
 announcing that the corps commander was riding up with his 
 staff along the highway, coming from Neu-Rognitz. Lieu- 
 tenant-General A hurried to meet his commanding 
 
 general, to whom he reported what he had previously directed 
 his aid to report, but the aid had already delivered the mes- 
 sage in Neu-Rognitz. 
 
 After the corps commander had said a few words in 
 commendation of the work accomplished by the division dur- 
 ing the day, both generals repaired to the top of Hill 635, 
 from which point it was seen that the only changes in the 
 situation were the entrance of the Third battalion of the First 
 regiment into Burkersdorf and a further lengthening of the 
 distance between the opposing forces. It was also noticed 
 that the enemy was oft'ering no resistance near Staudenz, and 
 that the village was on the point of being occupied by other 
 troops. In answer to the corps commander's inquiry as to 
 
 what troops were near Staudenz, Lieutenant-General A 
 
 replied that a part of the division of the Guard had advanced 
 to that point, from which his senior aid had just returned. 
 The aid was then called up to complete his report, and stated 
 in addition to the above, that the Guard intended to take pos- 
 session of Staudenz, but not to advance beyond it that day ; 
 also, that he had been informed that the Second division of 
 the Guard had already reached Eypel. 
 
 The corps commander then resumed his observation of 
 the enemy's retreat. It seems as if the opponent was occupy- 
 ing Deutsch-Praussnitz and Kaile with only his rear guard 
 while he withdrevv^ his main force into the mountains further 
 to the south. All that remained north of the villages was a 
 strong body of cavalry, estimated at about 4 regiments, for 
 the purpose of covering the retreat of smaller detachments and 
 the withdrawal of troops from Staudenz. 
 
 The artillery of both sides, near the highway, kept up a 
 slow fire at a distance of 2 miles. Init as some shrapnel 
 
^o2 Studies ix tdic Lkadixc. of Troops. 
 
 went too far and fell among- the infantry of the Third bri- 
 gade at Hill 035, it was planned to send the batteries there 
 united further forward west of Burkcrsdorf under a hussar 
 escort, to drive away the 2 batteries of the enemy ; but before 
 the order could be given, the latter limbered up and disap- 
 peared behind an undulation of the ground. 
 
 Lieutenant-General A ventured to disturb the corps 
 
 commander's observations, asking that the troops be permit- 
 ted to go at once into bivouac. His request was granted, the 
 corps commander adding: "JUit if the enemy is still in his 
 position to-morrow, T shall be unable to continue the march 
 upon Arnau, and must attack him. I w^ill therefore put my- 
 self in communication with the Guard corps. However, 
 should the enemy have received reinforcements and himself 
 advance to attack, your Excellency w^ill hold your position on 
 the heights here north of Burkersdorf, and later you will re- 
 ceive a written order. The First infantry divjsion will biv- 
 ouac around Hohenbruck." 
 
 The corps commander then went over to the battalions 
 of the Third infantry brigade, which had in the meantime 
 come up. 
 
 Colonel D had returned from Burkersdorf, and 
 
 reported to the division commander as follow^s: "The village 
 is occupied by the Third battalion. All that was found there 
 of the enemy w^as a large number of stragglers, and so many 
 W'Ounded as to overcrowd the farm-houses. The thickets south 
 of the village have also been evacuated." 
 
 Majors X and Y , of the First and Third bat- 
 talions respectively of the First infantry regiment, had been 
 ordered up, and in their presence, as well as the presence of 
 Major-General B and Colonel D , the division com- 
 mander issued the following order establishing his outposts: 
 
 Hill 635, northwest of Burkersdorf, 
 Division ( )nkT Xo. 2. i-J Jnne, 5:20 p. m. 
 
 The enemy has retreated upon Königinhof and beyond 
 1 )eulsch-Praussnitz. 
 
 The Second inf<'intr\- di\ision will go into bivouac near 
 Xeu-l\ognitz. 
 
Studies in the Leading of Tr(x>ps. 303 
 
 The First and Third battaHons of the First infantry regi- 
 ment, together with the First squadron of the hussars regi- 
 ment, will hold the line eastern exit of Ober-Altenbuch-Hill 
 592 (south of Burkersdorf)-Staudenz (exelusive), the First 
 battalion and 2 troops covering as far as and including the 
 Burkersdorf-Deutsch-Praussnitz road, and the Third battal- 
 ion and 2 troops from there on to Staudenz (exclusive). 
 
 Connection will be kept up with the Guard at Staudenz. 
 
 Scouts will be sent out in the directions of Königinhof 
 and Chwalkowitz. 
 
 In case of hostile attack, Burkersdorf and the heights on 
 its west and east will be held. 
 
 As the division commander then looked around for the 
 commander of the hussar regiment, to give him the orders 
 for the First squadron, his general staff officer informed him 
 that the regiment had folknved the enemy and could be seen 
 
 south of Burkersdorf. Lieutenant-General A was fullv 
 
 satisfied with this, but he directed a staff officer to go and 
 fetch the First squadron back immediate^. 
 
 Then he turned to the commander of the Third infantry 
 brigade, and assigned him the region at the fork of the high- 
 ways as bivouac for the 4 battalions (the Second battalion of 
 the First regiment and the entire Second regiment) remain- 
 ing under his command, cautioning him to leave room for 
 the hussar and artillery regiments between his brigade and 
 Neu-Rognitz. 
 
 Then the division commander despatched his senior aid to 
 the Fourth brigade, with instructions for its putting the Third 
 regiment into bivouac southeast of Neu-Rognitz, while the 
 Fourth regiment remained wdiere it was then located, the en- 
 gineers attaching themselves to the latter regiment, and knap- 
 sacks being brought up, throughout the brigade, on requisi- 
 tioned wagons. 
 
 In the meantime the adjutants of all independent sub- 
 divisions had gradually arrived. They were referred to the 
 general staff officer, to whom the division commander had 
 commimicated his further wishes after charging him with the 
 preparation of the order, and instructing liim to repair to 
 Neu-Rognitz, with the officers, for such purpose. Among 
 
3Ö4 Studies in thii: Lkadinc; of Troops. 
 
 other things, the general stafl' officer was told to bring up the 
 signal corps detachment and division bridge train, and to 
 take especial care that the subsistence-wagons were brought 
 up also. 
 
 • Having issued these instructions Lieutenant - General 
 
 A ' rode up to the First fiel . I artillery regiment, where 
 
 the corps commander met him with the inquiry whether all 
 orders had been given. Upon replying that it had not yet 
 been done in the case of the artillery, the corps commander 
 told him not to let his presence interfere with the issuance 
 of orders. 
 
 Lieutenant-General A thereui)on told Lieutenant- 
 Colonel J to let his regiment go into bivouac west of 
 
 tiie highway and southwest of Neu-Rognitz, behind the Third 
 infantry brigade. 
 
 After that Lieutenant-General A isked permission 
 
 to turn over the command of the Fourth infantry brigade to 
 
 Colonel 1) , commander of the First regiment; this re- 
 
 (jucst was approved by the corps commander, Colonel D 
 
 being the senior regimental commander in the army corps. 
 
 The wounding of Major-Gcneral C and the death of 
 
 Colonel G- were mentioned, when a lengthy discussion 
 
 ensued concerning the losses and the course the engagement 
 had taken ; during this discussion, however, the two generals 
 continued their observation of the enemy, .vhose last subdi- 
 visions were withdrawing via Kaile. In course of conversa- 
 tion the question of the enemy's strength came up and to 
 what army corps he belonged. The task of :ollecting such 
 data had been interrupted when the general staff officer was 
 sent away, but it was recalled that the first reports compiled 
 had shown that the First brigade of the Tenth hostile army 
 corps had occupied the heights south of Trautenau, and the 
 strong resistance which the enemy developed near Neu- 
 Kognit/, as well as to the east of that village, taken in con- 
 nection with the fact that still other forces had opposed the 
 Guard, led to tlie surmise that two other brigades liad joined 
 in. the action: further, it was assumed that a fourth brigade 
 had been in reserve, and the conclusion was reached that the 
 entir'- Tenth arm\' c<>^l)>^ had been met an-l (N)n(iuered. 
 
Studies in thi^ Li:ading of Troops. 305 
 
 Although no summary of the division's losses had been 
 compiled, it was certain they were quite large. Neither could 
 the number of prisoners be ascertained. Of other trophies It 
 was said that 2 guns had been taken by a battalion of the 
 First regiment, and there were also rumors of a color hav- 
 ing been captured by the Fourth regiment. As a matter of 
 fact, however, no one could be found who had seen either 
 the guns or the colors, and no report thereof had come in; 
 all that the party there assembled could see was a shattered 
 limber lying on the southern slope of Peak 635. 
 
 The corps commander stated that during the night he 
 would have an artillery and an infantry ammunition column, 
 togetlier with two subsistence columns, brought up, to be 
 ready for distribution at 6 o'clock in the morning south of 
 Hohenbruck. 
 
 The following telegram was then sent from corps head- 
 quarters to the headquarters of the Second Army: 
 
 Neu-Rognitz, south of Trautenau, 
 Telegram No. i. 27 June, 5:45 p. m. 
 
 Victorious action of the Second infantry division against 
 the enemy's Tenth army corps, which was driven from its 
 strong position near Neu-Rognitz and pursued beyond Burk- 
 ersdorf. Numerous prisoners. Our losses quite large. Colo- 
 nel G killed. General C- wounded. First in- 
 fantry division arrived near Hohenbruck. Communication 
 with the First division of the Guard established near Staud- 
 enz. Corps headquarters to-day at Trautenau. 
 
 Headquarters First Army Corps. 
 
 This despatch was taken to Liebau. Although the exten- 
 sion of the telegraph line from Liebau to Trautenau had been 
 commenced as soon as the First division advanced, it had 
 not yet been completed. 
 
 The division commander stated that he would quarter 
 himself in Neu-Rognitz, and requested permission to go there 
 in order to attend to the issuance of orders. This request was 
 granted, and the corps commander thereupon went to inspect 
 the Third and Fourth regiments, who were getting settled in 
 their bivouacs; from there he returned to Trautenau. 
 
3o6 SruDiiis IX TiiK Leading of Troops. 
 
 Lieutenant-General A found that quarters had been 
 
 prepared for him in one of the largest farm-houses in Neu- 
 Rognitz. Except for this, everything was in great commo- 
 tion. In nearly all the dwellings wounded were to be found, 
 while still more were being brought in. Soldiers of niany 
 different organizations were wandering promiscuously, de- 
 manding supplies on their own responsibility. Squads in 
 close order from troops near by came in to get water. The 
 engineers were tearing down a couple of walls of a building 
 that had been fired and threatened to fall. Timbers and doors 
 were carried off by infantrymen for firewood. The wagons 
 of an ambulance company were on the highway, having been 
 sent ahead by the First division; but not without colliding 
 with ammunition-wagons of the infantry and artillery. Among 
 all these vehicles were several sutler wagons, strange as it 
 may seem, while in some of the farm-yards not too thickly 
 occupied by wounded the bands of three regiments have as- 
 sembled. 
 
 All this confusion disappeared shortly after the division 
 commander arrived. The ambulance company and wagons 
 were sent into the open ground east of the village. The com- 
 mander of the First battalion of the Fourth infantry regiment 
 was sent for and instructed to quickly establish order. All 
 stragglers were to be assembled and sent to their proper 
 organizations. Those not seriously wounded and able to 
 walk were to be sent back to Hohenbruck. The batt&lion com- 
 mander was further instructed to rigidly insist on tehicles 
 moving only in single file in any one direction upon the high- 
 way, and on the immediate vacating of the road by wagons 
 obliged to halt. 
 
 After he had given these preliminary instructions, the 
 division commander dismounted, and the general staff officer 
 read to him the division order which had been ])rcpared. and 
 whicli was as follows : 
 
 Division I ica(l(|uartcrs, Ncu-Rognitz. 
 Division Order No. 3. 27 June, 1866, 6 p. m. 
 
 I. The outposts, consisting of the First and Third bat- 
 talions of the First infantry regiment, with the First squad- 
 ron of hussars, will be placed on the line eastern exit of Ober- 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 307 
 
 Altenbuch-Burkersdorf-Staiidenz, connecting with the Guard 
 at Staudenz. 
 
 2. The division will bivouac near Neu-Rognitz as fol- 
 lows : 4 battalions of the Third brigade near the road fork 
 south of the village ; north of these, the First field artillery 
 regiment and the regiment of hussars (less the First squad- 
 ron) ; the Fourth brigade with the Third regiment southeast 
 of the village, and with the Fourth regiment (to which the 
 company of engineers will be attached) east of the village. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel J , First field artillery regiment, will 
 
 command the bivouac. 
 
 3. The staffs of the division and brigades will be quar- 
 tered in Neu-Rognitz, the remainder of the village being re- 
 served for wounded. 
 
 4. The heavy baggage will be brought to Neu-Rognitz. 
 The emergency ration will be issued to-day. 
 
 5. At 9 p. m. orders will be issued at the quarters of the 
 division staff. (Signed) A , 
 
 Lieutenant-General . 
 
 The division commander approved this draft, but in- 
 structed that in addition columns and trains for the replen- 
 ishing of ammunition and subsistence stores would be ordered 
 to report near Hohenbruck the following norning at 5 o'clock, 
 and that statements of losses and ammunition needed, also 
 reports of the engagement, should be handed in without delay. 
 
 The order was then dictated to the adjutants, who imme- 
 diately returned to their organizations. 
 
 The next half-hour the division commander spent in 
 resting- and taking refreshments. 
 
 When all necessary orders had been issued, conversa- 
 tion drifted to whether anything had been overlooked. The 
 events of the day were discussed, and opinions ventured on 
 what the enemy would likely do the next day, also the tasks 
 that mischt fall to the division and how they couW best be 
 accomplished. 
 
 Before 7 o'clock that evening the general was again in 
 his saddle, and took one of his aids and rode over to the out- 
 posts, where we will find him later. 
 
3o8 vStudiks IX TiiK Lkadixc op Troops. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel J , the bivouac commander, found 
 
 the greater part of such troops as had previously been in- 
 structed with regard to bivouacs already occupied in mak- 
 ing themselves comfortable and pitching tents. The Third 
 brigade was at work preparing the emergency ration. The 
 Fourth brigade was awaiting the arrival of its knapsacks. 
 
 Major N , commander of the Second battalion of the 
 
 First regiment of infantry, was detailed as bivouac officer 
 of the day. He posted a guard south of the fork of the 
 highways, another near Hill 635, and a third south of the 
 quarry near Sorge; also a special interior guard in Neu- 
 Rognitz- These measures met the approval of Lieutenant- 
 Colonel J , who directed the troops nearest the village 
 
 to post sentries at the entrances to control the intercourse 
 of individual soldiers with the village. He designated Ober- 
 Altenbuch as the source of water, wood, and straw for the 4 
 battalions of the Third brigade, and Neu-Rognitz and Sorge 
 for the remainder of the troops; the latter were permitted 
 to send officers' horses into these villages. 
 
 Comments on the Dispositions erom the Conclusion oE 
 THE Engagement (5 p. m.) until Nightfall. 
 
 The division commander's order to send only i battalion 
 to occupy Burkersdorf appears to be based on the fact that 
 the enemy's retreat was a decided one. It is recommended in 
 such cases to generally do too much rather than too little, and 
 to put the nearest adjoining troops in readiness for support, 
 even though the advance may seem devoid of danger. We 
 can never foresee what counter-measures, the enemy may 
 undertake. 
 
 Lieutenant-General A did right in advising the 
 
 corps commander of the enemy's retreat, and of the measures 
 he intended to adopt. In the rush of events this is often 
 overlooked, for one is inclined to speculate instead on what 
 orders he himself is likely to receive. It is therefore all the 
 more recommended, as we have previously remarked, for 
 higher headquarters to furnish troops in action with an officer 
 and some mounted orderlies or mounted riflemen and cyclists, 
 a thing that corps headquarters here failed to do. 
 
Studies in tke Licading of Troops. ,309 
 
 It may also be asked, **Why did the corps commander 
 not remain near the division commander after his arrival- on 
 the battle-field?" 
 
 We answer, "He acted very properly in not doing so." 
 
 The division received its first orders while on the heights 
 of Trautenau. If the corps commander had entered the fight 
 and remained continually at the side of the division com- 
 mander, he would have been greatly tempted to interfere in 
 the latter's orders, and he, instead of Lieutenant-General 
 
 A , would finally be leading the division. In so doing he 
 
 would lose a conception of the general situation. A corps com.- 
 mander must think of other things than his division com- 
 manders, who have been placed in their respective positions 
 because the commander-in-chief felt they would, do all they 
 were called upon to do. Different people may handle a prob- 
 lem after diflferent methods, but yet all arrive at its solution. 
 Above everything else must a leader hold fast to a resolution 
 that he has once made and made in a logical manner, for noth- 
 ing is so pernicious as the attempting of two persons to lead 
 the same body of troops after they have started out from 
 different premises. The division commander is responsible 
 for the execution of orders given him ; all that the corps com- 
 mander should do is to carefully watch them. Any , carps 
 commander who cannot resist the inclination to interfere in 
 the execution of movements assigned to one of his divisions 
 had better have been left with his own division and never 
 been given command of a corps. 
 
 An effort to avoid this peril is responsible for the sepa- 
 ration of higher staff's, as is so often witnessed on the battle- 
 field. 
 
 We come now to another evil, which, unfortunately, can- 
 not be altogether avoided. As soon as an engagement comes 
 to an end, it is desirable for the corps commander to com- 
 municate personally with the division commander in touch 
 with the enemy in front. By so doing the situation will -be- 
 come perfectly clear to him, and he will be able to sufficiently 
 Inform himself with regard to the enemy and the terrane. 
 But this involves a considerable loss of time. We know from 
 experience that many things are then discussed which, while 
 no doubt interesting, are hardly suitable, in view of the urgency 
 
310 Stitdiks ii\ THK Lkadixg Ol- Troops. 
 
 of the iiKMiK'nt. Ivcl us inKii;iiU' the ec^nsecjuenees of such de- 
 lays. The troops have observed that the engageuient is ended. 
 Naturally every one wants to rest after the great exertions 
 and the dangers encountered. A bivouac cannot be estab- 
 lished, as no place has been designated for one. No l3ody of 
 troops knows where to go, nor can tell whether it may not be 
 detailed for the outposts. If patience becomes exhausted and 
 an organization commences to establish a bivouac of its own 
 accord, it runs the risk of being ordered elsewhere. We there- 
 fore insist that as soon as all measures regarding the enemy 
 have been taken, under all circumstances, the first concern be 
 the security and rest of the troops. Their strength is so often 
 and so greatly tried that we cannot do too much to spare them. 
 
 In the case before us the appearance of the corps com- 
 mander at 5:10 p. m. so disturbed the arrangements that they 
 were not finished until 5 :25. a quarter of an hour later than 
 vvcndd otherwise have been the case. And when one has been 
 cm his feet for more than 12 hours, under oppressive heat 
 and in a lon^-, stubborn engagement, every minute of unnec- 
 essary delay before he can rest appears Hke an liour. 
 
 The narrative states chat the corps commander expressed 
 to Lvieutenant-General A and the troops his apprecia- 
 tion of their performances. We should certainlv advise no 
 sujK'rior to neglect this, but, on the other han(r, we would 
 warn against excessive praise. When troops have done their 
 best and suffered great losses, and the general rides past them 
 without a word, a bitter feeHng is aroused. INlen of no class 
 will stand being treated as if they were only chess-men, to be 
 Ihrown back into the box when the game is over. It may in- 
 deed l)e true that every man has simply done his duty ; but 
 duty can be performed either well or poorly, and if we con- 
 demn for the latter, we niust give praise for the former. 
 
 On the other hand, do not give excessive praise under 
 (he inspiration of the moment. The higher leader does not 
 go everywhere during an action, knows nothing of the de- 
 tails, and may be easily led to bestowing merit where it has 
 not t>een earned. The rule already laid down shoidd suffice 
 U> check any tendency to excessive praising, and the limit 
 (•f co'umendation should l)e, "You have done your full duty." 
 After a word of satisfaction has been spoken as to the 
 
Studies in tiii-: Leading of Troops. 311 
 
 work periormed. the safety and bivouac of the troops must 
 be provided for. 
 
 The service of security was assigned to the First afid 
 Third battahons of the First regiment of infantry and the 
 First squadron of the hussar regiment. When the engage- 
 ment began the advance guard was abandoned, and there was 
 no occasion for making up a new one for the evening. The 
 First and Third battalions were selected not until their bri- 
 gade commander had been consulted, and the First squadron, 
 in the opinion of the division commander, had hitherto been 
 called on for the least labor. 
 
 In this case the infantry nearest the front had been select- 
 ed, for in all probability it was still in closest touch with the 
 enemy, and at the same time was in a position to assure secur- 
 ity at the earliest moment. Furthermore, it had been best 
 able to take advantage of the last stages of the action for re- 
 storing order. These three reasons (touch with the enemy, 
 ability to promptly afford security, and well-ordered troops) 
 must always be considered in selecting the outpost. It fre- 
 quently happens, however, that the most advanced forces 
 have suffered most and are in the worst order; in such cases 
 other troops must be selected. 
 
 For keeping touch with the enemy, cavalry must be em- 
 ployed. But, on the other side, the enemy will do all he can 
 to keep it at a distance, for which purpose he will use his own 
 cavalry. Therefore the First army corps must bring up all 
 the cavalry it possessed to push the hostile squadrons back 
 and obtain a good view of the real location of the opponent. 
 The hussar regiment of the Second infantry division had very 
 properly followed the enemy, and according to regulations 
 must unquestionably remain at his heels until the cavalry out- 
 posts were established. But to establish outposts the First 
 squadron had to be ordered back. The loss of time involved 
 in this counter-marching could indeed not very well have been 
 avoided, as the commander of the hussars did not care to de- 
 lay his pursuit ; and if he waited to learn which of his squad- 
 rons was to go on outpost, before starting after the retreat- 
 ing enemy, his pursuit would have little value and touch would 
 be lost. The First cavalry brigade also should have been em- 
 
312 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 ployed in the pursuit, and that this was not done must be 
 considered an error on the part of corps headquarters : 
 
 The First cavalry bri^^ade had undertaken a daring and 
 successful attack, but by so doini;' exhausted its energy for 
 the day of the 27th. Although it might not have been 
 formed up again for a well-ordered pursuit, yet of its own ac- 
 cord it should have initiated measures for keeping in touch 
 with the enemy. Its ambition to accomplish great deeds should 
 not have died with one successful attack. The horse l)attery 
 had certainly set it a worthy example, in that it had returned 
 to the brigade after 5 o'clock. 
 
 In this case security for the division was provided by 
 the outposts of the Third brigade. This might have been 
 accomplished in still another way. When we consider the 
 proximity of the enemy and also that the foremost troops were 
 in a position which they had been ordered to defend in case 
 of hostile attack, then each of the two infantry brigades might 
 have covered them.selves by outposts in their immediate front. 
 
 vSuch a course would have to be pursued if the engage- 
 ment had not ended until darkness set in and both parties 
 had remained closely opposite each other, whether because 
 they had no strength left to crowd the opponents back or for 
 other reasons. Then there would have been no room for es- 
 tablishing outposts far to the front in the regular manner, 
 and the forces would have to be content with pusing forward 
 separate companies or battalions at short distances. These 
 would cover themselves by skirmish lines, and maintain con- 
 nection with adjoining bodies by so-called halting patrols, or, 
 as Field Service Regulations express it, standing facing the 
 enemy ready for action. 
 
 The nearer we are to the enemy the more must we make 
 use of this form of security, and at short distances nothin)«: 
 remains but to let troops rest on their arms in the position 
 they occupy and have them bivouac in rigidly tactical battle 
 formation. Many examples of this may be found, especially 
 when a decision has not been reached at nightfall. Such meas- 
 ures should, however, be resorted to only when absolutely nec- 
 essary, for it is plain that the nearer the covering trops are 
 to those who are resting tlie more will the latter be disturbed 
 and tlu' greater tlu'lr ininiiiuMit danger. Therefore, wherever 
 
Studiks in Tili, Le:ading Ol« Troops. 313 
 
 practicable, as in the case before us, outposts will be formed 
 well in advance. These must be strong enough to repulse 
 an assault by any small hostile parties, and delay the advance 
 of larger masses long enough to enable the main body to pre- 
 pare for action. 
 
 The details in the establishment of outposts is no concern 
 of a division commander; they belong to the duties of the 
 outpost commander. There were two outpost commanders in 
 this case, as two outpost sections had been formed. All the 
 division commander has to do is to designate the positions to 
 be held, approximately the line on which the outposts shall be 
 placed, the location of the wings, and the connection with ad- 
 jacent bodies. Instructions for outposts should also include 
 such points as pertain in particular to reconnaissance; such 
 
 was done in Lieutenant-General A 's order of 5 :20 p. m. 
 
 At any rate, only the simplest measures were necessary in this 
 case, as the enemy had been beaten and a night attack was 
 certainly not to be expected. Therefore 2 battalions and i 
 squadron were sufficient for the entire corps. If it should 
 come to the worst, the troops in bivouac would soon be ready 
 for action. The division commander could also be promptly 
 on hand to order up supports, should the outposts be attacked. 
 
 It goes without saying that the division must cover the 
 flanks as well as the front; but to do so, it was not neces- 
 sary to scrupulously guard the entire field, as it would suffice 
 if only the main points were held. The right flank was cov- 
 ered by the detachment sent to Ober- Altenbuch, and the pres- 
 ence of the Guard made support on the left unnecessary. The 
 First infantry division, camped near the main road to Arnau, 
 should provide for its own security. 
 
 After these orders had been issued, the division com- 
 mander's next duty was the assignment of bivouacs. 
 
 In grouping bivouacs it is well to bear in mind what it Is 
 proposed to do the following day. For the time being no one 
 knew whether the enemy would again be attacked in the 
 morning, or the corps would take up Its original task of gain- 
 ing the Arnau road by marching to the right. This much 
 . was certain, however, that until the situation cleared^ up, a 
 formation would be adopted that would successfully resist any 
 attack the enemy might make. Yet the grouping of the blv- 
 
314 Studies i\ thk Lk mmnc ok Troops. 
 
 ouacs should provide for both contingencies. Were a frontal 
 advance to be made the fol'owing morning-, the commander of 
 the First regiment would form up the advance guard with his 
 own regiment, sui)])orted by the Second regiment of the same 
 brigade. But should it be decided to go to the west, then the 
 First regiment would find itself charged with forming a left 
 Hank covering, while the rest of the Third brigade would be 
 ready to furnish the advance guard, and the Fourth brigade, 
 which had been kept close together, the main body. 
 
 In case the enemy should attack, first the line of hills 
 north of Burkersdorf would be held, and the troops were so 
 situated that the Second regiment and the Second battalion 
 of the First regiment could defend the heights west of the 
 Neu-Rognitz-Kaile road, and the Third regiment the ridges 
 cast of the road. 
 
 It may seem strange that the first line of defense should 
 be held by regiments of two different brigades, while we have 
 time and again insisted that the management of an engage- 
 ment should be left in one hand. So far, in these studies, we 
 have confined ourselves exclusively to the offensive. It will 
 be permissible here to devote a few words to the defensive. 
 Hitherto we have pointed out repeatedly that connected lead- 
 ing can only be assured by deepening the formation, and 
 never by lateral extension. Troops fighting in front must re- 
 ceive their immediate support from troops belonging to the 
 same organization, else co-operation cannot well be secured. 
 Just remember that in defense also the troops on the first line 
 are weakened by losses and fatigue, and. that it becomes evi- 
 dent that in time they will need immediate support, and that 
 the troops on the entire line alongside of them will be in the 
 same condition. It is therefore recommended in defense never 
 to assign to a body of troops any section the holding of which 
 necessitates their entire strength to be developed at the start, 
 but rather, as was done in this instance, in the case of a divis- 
 ion, to assign to each brigade at once a portion of the first 
 line of defense, and to hold back in reserve and at the dispo- 
 sition of the division commander, such battalions as are not 
 required for this pu.rpose. The commander can reinforce the 
 line of defense, or initiate a C(^unter-attack, if necessary, with 
 these reserve batt dions. 
 
Studiks in the Leading of Troops. 315 
 
 Where this principle was neglected in the campaign of 
 1870, a connected direction of the action was not possible, and 
 in almost every case injurious results can be pointed out. 
 
 In the defense of the position north of Burkersdorf, the 
 Second division, strengthened by a part of the corps artillery, 
 was sufficient to hold the hills from Peak 635 (west of the 
 highway) to the old quarry at 591, against any frontal attack. 
 The hills could be held by the Second regiment and the Sec- 
 ond battalion of the First regiment, and the ground from the 
 Kaile road up to the old quarry by the Third regiment, while 
 east of the quarry the Guard could be depended on. After 
 leaving their outpost positions, the First and Third battalions 
 of the First regiment could pass along the highway behind 
 the right wing, where they should remain in close order to 
 secure that wing. The Fourth regiment could remain in re- 
 serve near Neu-Rognitz, from which position 5 or 6 battal- 
 ions could go out around the right wing and easily advance 
 to a counter-attack with 5 to 6 battalions. 
 
 The division artillery regiment could take station on Hill 
 635, while part of the corps artillery could reinforce the left 
 wing. The hussar regiment could establish itself behind the 
 right wing, and at once send out patrols to secure the right 
 flank. 
 
 From this it is evident that a division on the defense can 
 secure a stretch of about a mile and a half against any frontal 
 attack, when it is formed up so as to afford itself some sup- 
 port; in the offensive, on the other hand, we can expect it to 
 make a successful attack only when its front does not extend 
 more than a mile. We hardly need add, however, that these 
 figures can serve only for general guidance. 
 
 Including in this scheme the entire army corps, we might 
 imagine that at the opening of the action the First infantry 
 division would be assembled near Sorge with the remainder 
 of the corps artillery and the cavalry brigade, where it could 
 be ready to extend the fighting line on the right wing by a bri- 
 gade, or to undertake a counter-attack against the x^nemy^s 
 left with its entire force, especially in the direction of the 
 Königinhof highway, which was an important point in the 
 problem. 
 
31 6 Studies ix the Leading oi^ Troops. 
 
 But let us return from this digression to the bivouacs. It 
 may seem strange that, in spite of verbal instructions given on 
 the' spot, a written order should later be issued at Neu- 
 Rognit?. This was, however, entirely proper. In the first 
 place, it. is necessary that after the close of an engagement 
 every superior commander not only await what may be or- 
 dered, but on his part also do what he can to learn the in- 
 tentions of his next superior as quickly as possible. This re- 
 quired that the adjutants of the infantry brigades, the artil- 
 lery, and the cavalry regiment, also an officer from the en- 
 gineer company, should try to find the division stafif. These 
 officers would at the same time be in position to give the divis- 
 ion commander the necessary information concerning the mo- 
 mentary positions of their subdivisions, and what they had 
 last seen of the enemy, all of which he had not yet been able 
 to survey perfectly from his station. There they would re- 
 ceive the first necessary orders, in case the same had not al- 
 ready been despatched. It is evident, however, that such or- 
 ders would be given under pressure of the moment and con- 
 tain only the most urgent directions, and mistakes could very 
 likely arise in their comprehension. Besides, when one adju- 
 tant goes and comes by himself, only .such knowledge is gained 
 as pertains to his particular body of troops. It is therefore 
 wise, after quiet is restored, to embody these separate or- 
 ders into a written one. Then errors will be avoided, each 
 party will obtain the needed survey of the whole, and the 
 troops put in order agahi more promptly, since each body will 
 l)e able to direct at once to their proper organizations strag- 
 glers who have joined. Furthermore, after a short time other 
 matters must be considered, such as the issue of rations and 
 ammunition, regarding which the general staflf officer cannot 
 give the necessary directions immediately after the engage- 
 ment, but must wait perhaps an hour before he can know 
 where the ammunition columns are stationed and what ar- 
 rangements may have been made by the field quartermaster. 
 
 The assignment of new commanders, made necessary by 
 losses in action, was here arranged after the engagement. 
 Circum.^tances will largely determine the time for making 
 such r!'.:tails, as often command must be assigned during action. 
 It v.'ould ordinardv be Ix.'st to let a commander continue lead- 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 317 
 
 ing his own troops when once engaged, unless it should be- 
 come necessary for him to take the place of his immediate 
 
 superior. If Major-General B- had been disabled, Colonel 
 
 D- should have immediately assumed command of the 
 
 Third infantry brigade, as ß. matter of course. 
 
 Despatching a telegram after an action has in view the 
 advising of superior headquarters, when these can only- be 
 reached by wire, and also the sending of news home. The 
 justice in promptly advising those at home regarding events 
 in the field has ahvays been recognized. When the fate of the 
 country is at stake, when the entire populace are making great 
 sacrifices, when members of every family are in the field, it 
 is certainly the duty of superior headquarters to send news 
 home as quickly and as exactly as circumstances will permit. 
 Although conditions usually prohibit the telling of everything 
 that has liappened, what is told must be based on the truth. 
 This would seem to be a foregone conclusion; nevertheless 
 experience has shown that all armies do not pursue such a 
 course, and history furnishes proof of misrepresentation, ex- 
 aggeration, and even lies being found in official telegrams. 
 Such is indeed deplorable, and injurious effects will never 
 fail to follow, for the truth will in the end be learned, and 
 its depressing effect will be more severe than otherwise. 
 
 Now the questions arise. What should a telegram intend- 
 ed for publication contain? and. Who has authority to send 
 such a message ? As for the first, the public's desire for news, 
 although in itself justifiable, sometimes exceeds all proper 
 bounds, and headquarters should not allow itself to be car- 
 ried away by relentless displays in newspapers. It is evident 
 that people at home like to know as much as possible, that 
 news from the seat of war is expected daily, and that if noth- 
 ing is received, the public becomes impatient. But news ?s 
 not made every day, and communication is often disturbed 
 when the theater of war is much extended and is in the en- 
 emy's country, and headquarters itself is not always in pos- 
 session of advice from the widely separated armies. Head- 
 quarters in such cases can only report what occurs within its 
 own sphere of vision, and if nothing happens, no news can 
 be sent home. But if there is still an unrest which must be 
 
3i8 StlüuvS IX the: Lkadint, of Tkooi'S. 
 
 satisfied, all that remains to do is to wire back, "Nothing new 
 to-day." 
 
 Moreover, too much care cannot be exercised regarding 
 the contents of despatches. 
 
 Just remember that news pubhslied in the capital of our 
 own country to-day is known on the same day in the capitals 
 of neutrals, and may be sent from there to the hostile camp. 
 Such telegrams must therefore contain nothing that the en- 
 emy is unable to learn through other channels, nor anything 
 from which he can benefit. Even the dating of a des- 
 patch may be dangerous, as the opponent may thereby eas- 
 ily draw important conclusions concerning your position. At 
 the (Hitbreak of the war of 1866 the Second Army did not ! 
 know whether the main Austrian army was still around Ol- , 
 mutz or had started for Bohemia, and would have given a i 
 trreat deal to learn the location of Field ^Marshal r>enedek's 
 headquarters. 
 
 An exact statement of the positions of the various army - 
 corps must also be avoided; the enemy would certainly have 
 cause for thanks if this w^ere done. In the same manner also we « 
 must avoid disclosing our intentions, else we turn traitors to 
 ourselves. Care must also be taken in stating losses and num- 
 ber of prisoners taken ; this cannot be accurately done imme- ^ 
 diately at the close of an engagement, and at first w^e had bet- 
 ter resort to the general expressions "losses heavy" or "very 
 considerable." Caution is advisable, too, in stating the num- 
 ber of colors or guns captured; commanders must await offi- 
 cial reports on these points, or should have personal knowl- 
 edge ; else errors will arise, which will later cause the reliabil- 
 ity of all telegrams to be questioned. 
 
 Telegraphic news, as far as it relates to the war situa- 
 tion, should emanate only from the headquarters of armies 
 or other independent forces; in this way alone can the pub- , 
 lishing of dangerous statements be avoided. . 
 
 Sending telegrams from detached army or corps head- 'I 
 quarters to sujierior headquarters is governed b\ different ( 
 principles. In such case it is important, after narrating-» 
 events, to give ex.-ictiy the final ])()<ition of tro.ips. as well as 
 news about tlu' enemy and whnt we intend to do the next 
 (lav r.nt all this is information wliieh must be ke])t out of 
 
 i 
 
Studies in the Leadinc. oe Troops. 319 
 
 unauthorized hands, and should be sent only by cipher. . Ac- 
 cordingly when all members of a staff accompany the comr 
 manding general on a ride, the cipher key must not be left 
 behind. This is especially necessary in the case of telegrams 
 sent to the front, which often contain instructions that re- 
 quire immediate attention. 
 
 The Outposts of the Division from 5 p. m. until 
 
 Nightfall. 
 
 (See Map VII.) 
 
 We saw that the Third battalion of the First regiment 
 advanced to Burkersdorf at about 5 o'clock and occupied that 
 village. ' . 
 
 The hussars followed the enemy, who was withdrawing in 
 a southerly direction. On the right wing the Fourth squadron 
 advanced to the thickets near the Königinhof highway and 
 southwest of Burkersdorf, the remainder of the regiment tak- 
 ing position north of the woods which crown Peak 540. From 
 both points troops were sent forward singly, one into the coun- 
 try west of the Königinhof road, another on the Burkersdorf- 
 Deutsch-Praussnitz road to a line with the next rise in the 
 ground, and another along the Neu-Rognitz-Kaile road to the 
 large strip of meadows. Some officers rode in advance of the 
 troop scouts, followed by two or three selected horses. They 
 made no headway to the front in the face of the enemy's caval- 
 ry ; they nevertheless learned that it consisted of 4 regiments 
 — I of uhlans, i of dragoons, and 2 of cuirassiers. On the left 
 communication was established with hussars of the Guard 
 division, from wdiom it was learned that Kaile had been occu- 
 pied by hostile infantry, which had fallen back in a southerly 
 direction, and that there were a few battalions and a squad- 
 ron southeast of Kaile apparently engaged in posting out- 
 posts toward the Kaile-Ober-Raatsch road. 
 
 One of the officers sent out on the right wing had mean- 
 while succeeded in getting a tolerably fair view from the 
 heights near Soor, into the opponent's position at that point. 
 At 6:30 he returned and reported that a hostile rear guard 
 of about 3 battalions and 2 batteries had kept possession of 
 the windmill hills (603 and 609), and had later sent a battal- 
 ion beyond Ober-Soor: further, that this rear guard was evi- 
 dently preparing to go into bivouac south of Ober-Soor; 
 
320 Studii^s IX THE Lkadixg of Troops. 
 
 also, that no other hostile bodies were seen in that region, 
 nor any columns niarchin"- further beyond or any on the high- 
 way to the south. 
 
 Shortly afterwards messages were received from other 
 points wlierc officers were in observation, to the efifect that 
 the hostile cavalrv was withdrawing via Kaile on Chwalkowitz, 
 but the oftker who had advanced farthest on the Burkersdorf- 
 Deutsch-Praussnitz road reported that there were still strong 
 hostile j)atrols in the latter village. 
 
 In the meantime the troops had taken up the two out- 
 post ])o^itions under protection of the cavalry, and had been 
 joined by the sqiiadrons of hussars. The information de- 
 rived from the personal reconnaissance of the commander of 
 the hussar regiment and other re])orts received concerning the 
 enemy were considered (juite sufficient, and until darkness 
 should set in only slight changes could occur, which a few 
 horsemen could observe very well. This regiment was ac- 
 cordingly placed in bivouac by its commander southwest of 
 Neu-Rognitz, having dismounted about three-quarters of an 
 hour before and watered, by sections, in Burkersdorf. Pur- 
 suant to orders, the First squadron remained with the out- 
 posts. The officers in front were instructed to continue their 
 obsen-ation of the enemy as long as daylight permitted, and 
 then to return. 
 
 A survey of the ground from the outpost position showed 
 that lUirkersdorf lay in a depression almost completely en- 
 circled by heights, and although it was still necessary to hold 
 the village as a point of support on the main road, it was evi- 
 dent that the outposts must be pushed forward on the sur- 
 rounding hills far enough to obtain a sufficiently good view 
 ahead. 
 
 The enemy had long ago abandoned the thickets lying in 
 front, to which the hussar regiment had advanced, securing 
 the infantry against surprise by detachments sent forward. 
 (t was now im|)ortant to occupy first the prominent ]')oints, 
 under cover of cavalry. 
 
 About 5:30 Major X assembled his battalion (First 
 
 of the First regiment) near Hill 635, and about the same time 
 is.sued the following outpost order to his 4 companies (there 
 being also i)resent a n(^n-commissioned officer of hussars) : 
 
Studies in th^ Leading of Troops. 321 
 
 Hill 635, 27 June, 5 130 p. m. 
 
 1. The enemy has fallen back via Ober - Soor and 
 Deutsch-Praussnitz. The main body of the division will biv- 
 ouac near Neu-Rognitz. The division staff will be quartered 
 in Neu-Rognitz. 
 
 2. The First battalion of the First regiment, with the 
 First and Second troops of the First squadron of the First 
 regiment of hussars, will secure the line eastern exit of Ober- 
 Altenbuch — Hill 592 — Burkersdorf-Deutsch-Praussnitz road, 
 inclusive. 
 
 The First company, with 6 mounted orderlies and 2 cy- 
 clists, will secure the line from the eastern exit of Ober- 
 Altenbuch to the wooded meadow, inclusive. The Second 
 company, with 6 mounted orderlies and 2 cyclists, will take 
 position in the thickets north of Hill 628 on the Königinhof 
 highway, and secure the line from the wooded meadow to the 
 Burkersdorf-Deutsch-Praussnitz road, inclusive. Until 7:30 
 p. m., the First troop of the First squadron will be responsi- 
 ble for security in front of the Second company, and will 
 reconnoiter via Ober-Soor and Deutsch-Praussnitz. 
 
 The outpost reserve will bivouac at the southern exit of 
 Burkersdorf. During the night the hussars will occupy alarm 
 quarters in Burkersdorf, i officer and 10 hussars remaining 
 with the reserve. 
 
 3. In case of attack, Hill 602 and Burkersdorf will be 
 held. 
 
 4. I will be with the outpost reserve. 
 
 After this order had been issued, the commander of the 
 First company had his troops fall in and started them at once 
 toward Ober-Altenbuch on the road from Burkersdorf, while 
 he himself rode ahead to the mountain spur 383. He coä- 
 sidered that he would be better able to oppose an enemy ad- 
 vancing from Ober-Altenbuch at that point than in the vil- 
 lage itself. He left the company at the fork of the roads 
 southeast of the village, only establishing a non-commissioned 
 officer's post on the village street. He took only a lieu- 
 tenant and half a platoon to the wooded meadow, where he 
 established a picket maintaining connection on both sides by 
 patrols. Returning to the company at 6:30, he found that the 
 
322 Studies in thk Leahinc of Troops. 
 
 6 mounted orderlies had at last arrived ; two of these he im- 
 mediately sent to the second picket (at the wooded meadow), 
 and one to the bivouac of the main body to obtain informa- 
 tion regarding the measures of security ordered. A cyclist 
 was assigned to the non-commissioner's post in the village, 
 and at the same time the post was designated as an ex- 
 amination post. After the captain had seen to it person- 
 ally that the men of the outpost company (still about twc» 
 platoons) had taken oft* accouterments and started cooking, 
 he sat down, before he himself partook of any refresh- 
 ments, and, using a message card, addressed a communica- 
 tion to the outpost commander, containing information relative 
 to the posting of his own company, and on the back of the 
 card hastily added a sketch in pencil. It was not until 7 o'clock 
 that he could find time for a short rest. 
 
 Shortly after this a message was received from the com- 
 mander of the Second company, containing information as 
 to how the latter company had covered itself, and the com- 
 mander of the First company gave the mounted orderly who 
 brought the message a short account of his own position. At 
 
 the same time Lieutenant-General A arrived, to whom the 
 
 captain also reported. The former found no fault with the 
 dispositions made, and only inquired whether regular patrols 
 in the village of Ober-Altenbuch had been established, and 
 whether a double post had been sent out on the road to the 
 wooded meadow. To both of these questions he received an 
 affirmative answer. By that time the men had finished their 
 cooking, the victuals for the non-commissioned otTicer's post 
 having been sent out to it. 
 
 As for the Second com])any. it >vas preceded by a point, 
 and went west of Burkersdorf to the little woods north of 
 Hill 628, and when the company commander observed that 
 the outpost cavalry had already taken station further to the 
 south near the highway, he contented himself with putting a 
 <l(»ul)le post only in the southern border of the little woods. 
 In close order the company prepared at once for cooking in 
 the woods, whither a non-commissioned officer fetched water 
 out of the village by a wagon. The outjiost cavalry had mack- 
 no efforts to establish comnumication with the company, not 
 even sending in :i niouiitcd orderly; the com])any commander 
 
Studies in the: Lkading of Troops. 323 
 
 therefore himself rode forward to the cavah'y picket to learn 
 what dispositions it had made. The mounted orderlies in this 
 case had erroneously ridden to the outpost reserve, and were 
 brought back by a cyclist. After infantry patrols had mean- 
 while established communication with the Second picket (at the 
 wooded meadow^ of the First company, the commander of the 
 Second company ordered that for the night a First picket 
 should take post at the southern boundary of the little woods, 
 and a Second picket on the same line, on the Burkersdorf- 
 Deutsch-Praussnitz road. On account of the proximity of the 
 enemy, the pickets, each half a platoon, were forbidden to 
 pitch tents ; the company, however, pitched tents in the little 
 woods, with the doors facing the enemy, so that the men 
 could fall in without loss of time. 
 
 The First and Second troops of the First squadron of the 
 First hussars received the outpost order at 5 45 at the south- 
 ern exit of Burkersdorf; the squadron commander was pres- 
 ent. Immediately the First troop started at a trot down the 
 Königinhof road, halting at the point of woods extending east 
 from Nieder-Soor, and sending forward a vedette of 2 men, 
 who were ordered to remain mounted. A dismounted vedette 
 of 3 men was posted on the Burkersdorf-Deutsch-Praussnitz 
 road. Patrols of 2 men were sent forward to Hill 610, east of 
 Ober-Soor, and toward Deutsch-Praussnitz, who learned that 
 nearly a mile south of these villages the enemy had established 
 a cavalry outpost line. Tlie squadron commander had gone 
 over to the left division of the outposts, to supervise the cav- 
 alry on that wing. The remainder of the Second troop had 
 remained halted south of Burkersdorf, and at 6 o'clock were 
 permitted by the outpost commander to put their horses in 
 stables. 
 
 As for the outpost reserve. Major X (First battal- 
 ion of the First infantry regiment) led it up to the southern 
 exit of Burkersdorf and sheltered it there in barns. On ac- 
 count of the proximity of the enemy, soldiers who had re- 
 moved their accouterments were directed to remain close by 
 them ; this was in accordance with regulations. Men trained 
 in field fortification prepared the southern boundary of the 
 village for defense, under the supervision of a lieutenant. 
 Major X had ridden out to the Second company, on 
 
324 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 the Königinhof hi?^h\vay, hnt as soon as he detected large biv- 
 ouac fires on the liorizon south of the villages lying in front, 
 he returned to the reserve, where he found reports regard- 
 ing the positions of the First and Second companies, also a 
 report prepared by his adjutant embodying these ; and the lat- 
 ter he signed and forwarded by a cyclist to the division com- 
 mander in Neu-Rognitz, with information in addition that the 
 main body of the enemy was in bivouac 3 to 4 miles south of 
 Deutsch-Praussnitz. At 7 p. m. he had received no advice 
 from the outpost on his left; he accordingly sent a mounted 
 rifleman thither with a sketch of his own position. Shortly 
 afterwards the First troop of hussars returned, and the horses, 
 which were considerably worn out, were sheltered in Burkers- 
 dorf. A very large number of these hussars had not yet been 
 supplied with warm victuals, so the outpost reserve promptly 
 furnished them some canned food they had prepared. A cav- 
 alry patrol still remained north of Deutsch-Praussnitz. At 
 7:30 an officer and 10 hussars of the Second troop reported 
 to the outpost commander, who directed that a patrol should 
 remain permanently during the night north of Deutsch- 
 Praussnitz; he also directed that the mounted men of the 
 Second company should patrol on the Königinhof highway. 
 The officer of hussars was to report at daybreak for special 
 instructions. 
 
 Major X dispensed with supports for the protec- 
 tion of the reserve, as the pickets appeared sufficient ; but. be- 
 sides the double posts established to the north, he also placed 
 double posts at the exits of Burkersdorf. He quartered him- 
 self on the village street in a tent improvised with pieces of 
 shelter tents, the spot being marked by a large stable lan- 
 tern. Close by him were trum])cters, cyclists, and 2 mounted 
 riflemen. 
 
 The Third battalion of the First regiment, under Major 
 
 Y , had reached Burkersdorf when the order was issued 
 
 establishing the outposts. The commander had received the 
 order on füll 635, whence he galloped back to his battalion, 
 but issued no outpost order, only directing the Ninth com- 
 pany to march to the little woods which lay on the Neu- 
 Rognitz-Kaile highway close by and north of the creek run- 
 ning to Staudenz, and the other three companies to take posi- 
 
Studies in the Leading o? Troops. t^2s 
 
 tion as reserve in the thickets east of Burkersdorf. Major 
 
 Y then rode out of the village in a southerly direction, to 
 
 hunt up the outpost cavalry assigned to him. The Third and 
 Fourth troops of the First squadron he met close to the south- 
 ern edge of the village, and proceeded with them toward th(j 
 little woods to which the Ninth company had been sent, where 
 the company commander and senior officer of hussars were 
 given the necessary information regarding the retreat of the 
 enemy, the location of bivouacs, and the boundaries of the 
 
 two outposts. Major Y ordered a non-commissioned 
 
 officer's cavalry post to establish itself in advance half-way 
 to Kaile, but otherwise left the hussars and Ninth Company 
 remain as picket. The picket infantry at once started its 
 cooking, and placed a double post at each of the two 
 
 crossings of the creek. Major Y was satisfied that the 
 
 creek could be crossed only by infantrymen in single file, 
 as it was very swampy, and he therefore approved of the 
 proposition of the company commander to establish only a 
 post under a non-commissioned officer in the thickets west of 
 Staudenz, for the purpose of effecting communication with 
 the outposts of the Guard corps. He ordered scouting to 
 be kept up continually during the night in the direction of 
 Kaile, leaving lo hussars with the company for that purpose. 
 At dark the remainder of the cavalry should go to the out- 
 post reserve, and the double post on the highway should aläo 
 assume the duties of an examination post. In case of attack, 
 the Ninth company was to oppose the enemy in its position, 
 while Hill 540 would be occupied by the reserve. 
 
 When Major Y returned to the reserve he found 
 
 Lieutenant-General A there, who received a report on 
 
 the dispositions made, and, as they seemed to be absolutely 
 correct according to the map, the division commander left for 
 
 the outpost on the right. Major Y then reduced his 
 
 report to writing in the form of a message without waiting 
 for a report from the Ninth company, as he knew its loca- 
 tion exactly. 
 
 Meanwhile a message came in from Major X rela- 
 tive to the position of the right outpost. But as Major 
 
 Y 's mind was not fully clear as to the connection of his 
 
 defensive line with the First battalion of the First regiment. 
 
326 StuOIKS IX TKt: LKAUING uV ri<(JOi'S. 
 
 he rkIc iij» to Hill 54') before it was yet -lark, ind sent word 
 k) Mnjor X , by a mounted rifleman, that in case of neces- 
 sity-lie would occu])y the wtxxls on that heic^ht. 
 
 •• When the outpost comtnander did Anally sit down near 
 the bivouac fire at the outpost reserve, he was accosted by the 
 battalion (|uartermaster. who came ridin«- up on a wheel to 
 report tliat the baggage could not possibly arrive before mid- 
 night. Major Y accordingly had shelter provided for 
 
 himself out of pieces of tents belonging to the troops, and 
 sent his horses to Burkersdorf, to which place he also per- 
 mitted all but 4 hussars to repair, on the request of the senior 
 hcissar officer. 
 
 'COMMKXTS OX TTTK EsTAi'.LISUM KN T OF TllK. Ol'TPoSTS. 
 
 The hussar regiment acted very p^roperly in following the 
 enemy and keeping touch with him, and thus covering the 
 establishment of the outposts. 
 
 The movements of the regiment illustrate the manner in 
 which the first of these measures should be performed. Had 
 itS' forces been sufficient to engage the hostile troopers in the 
 plain before Kaile, under all circumstances an attempt should 
 have been made to throw them back upon their retiring in- 
 fantry ; for if they should succeed in this, it would then be 
 an easy matter to obtain information of the enemy's where- 
 abouts, which would be useful not alone in planning the move- 
 ments of the army corps for the following day, but also in 
 establishing outposts. 
 
 liut the hus.sar regiment found itself opposed to a force 
 four times its own strength, and as long as this remained on 
 the ground it was not in ]-)osition to advance nt will. There- 
 fore all that could be done was to push out scouts tor ob- 
 .sf'rvation, and to try to send expert officers into the flanks of 
 the hostile position. At the same time the regiment must not 
 neglect to provide cover for the outposts while they marched 
 into j)osition. The positions the outposts were directed to oc- 
 cupy could not be reached by the several detachments simul- 
 tanexmsly, only at different times. And until the extended 
 (►tft|K>st line (nearly 3 miles long), which was in itself to be 
 the means of .security, was established, protection must be 
 provided farther to the front; this duty is explicitly enjoined 
 
StuDIKS IX IHK LK ADING OF TrOOPS. 327 
 
 on cavalry by Field Service Regulations (paragraph 132). 
 But the space to be covered was so broad that the regiment 
 could not perform it from a single position ; its squadrons could 
 not reach a point soon enough to prevent any sudden dash of 
 bold reconnoitering parties of the enemy. Therefore it was 
 necessary to divide the regiment. The bulk of the regiment 
 was posted opposite the enemy's principal force, at the thicket 
 near Peak 540, and on the Königinhof highway only i squad- 
 ron was employed. This single squadron would doubtless be 
 adequate for protection at the place it was assigned, as the 
 enemy's main forces had evidently not withdrawn over that 
 road. 
 
 Finally, after darkness came on the hostile cavalry could 
 not remain longer in close proximity, and as soon as its in- 
 fantry had established itself near by it could withdraw behind 
 the latter and go into bivouac. If, however, by that time the 
 hussars had not been able to get a good look at the enemy's 
 foremost line, they must still keep at the heels of the hostile 
 cavalry, and not turn back until they had seen the infantry 
 outposts and been fired upon by them, unless they had succeed- 
 ed in obtaining an adequate view of the enemy's position on 
 other roads. 
 
 The commander of the regiment of hussars, Lieutenant- 
 Colonel H , led his force into bivouac after the outposts 
 
 were established, having first detached the outpost squadron. 
 Under existing conditions this appears correct, as cavalry is 
 not able to operate successfully in large masses during the 
 night. The one squadron which remained at the front was 
 sufficient for any duty that may be demanded of the cavalry 
 later in the evening or during the night. We must not for- 
 get that the closer a body of troops bivouacs to an enemy the 
 less rest will it obtain during the night, and such cavalry as 
 is not needed at the front must therefore be sent to the rear, 
 but not so far to the rear that they cannot be on hand prompt- 
 ly the next morning. 
 
 The duty of reconnaissance and protection was taken up 
 by the infantry of the outpost after the cavalry withdrew. As 
 the day advanced it became especially necessary to guard the 
 bivouac of the division against surprise, and to accomplish 
 this result the advanced bodies must be so connected and 
 
328 Studiics in Tue Lkaiuxg of Troops. 
 
 sheltered by the ground lliat they would be able to defend 
 themselves successfully against small hostile parties, and offer 
 resistance in case of more extended attacks during the night 
 or in the early morning long enough to give the main body time 
 to form for action. This requires that they be posted as near 
 together as possible, which explains the manner in which the 
 heights surrounding Burkersdorf were occupied. 
 
 According to Field Service Regulations (paragraphs 128 
 and 129), it was not necessary to provide for readiness for 
 action, as the engagement had ended with the retreat of the 
 enemy, and the simplest measures of security would suffice. 
 To detail an advance guard after the fight would only have 
 given rise to unnecessary intermediate commands, and under 
 the circumstances it was entirely right in the division com- 
 mander's giving the orders for the outposts direct to the com- 
 manders concerned. In time it was learned that the enemy 
 had established outposts about 3 miles away, and i battalion 
 might have sufficed for providing the division's security, if 
 a special detachment had been sent from the main body to- 
 ward Ober-Altenbuch ; but the location of the two roads lead- 
 ing toward the enemy and the proximity of the latter made it 
 advisable to put 2 battalions on the outpost line, assigning to 
 each the defense of a particular road. Night was approach- 
 ing, and in the night troops move only on established roads. 
 If, therefore, the two highways and the wagon-road between 
 them were occupied, no surprise need be feared. On the left 
 was the Guard division, and on the right (toward Ober- 
 Altenbuch) the outposts were covered by an almost impassa- 
 ble stretch of wooded mountains, which an enemy would hard- 
 ly dare to enter during the night. Surprise from the west of 
 Ober-Altenbuch was practically out of the question, as the pa- 
 trols had not seen a sign of the enemy in that direction dur- 
 ing the entire day. By 2 battalions the division was amply 
 secured. 
 
 As for division order No. 2, issued at 5 :20 p. m., estab- 
 lishing the outposts, it contained all that was worth stating. 
 excei)t that the defensive positions of the outposts were not 
 distinctly indicated, l^ut on this latter point the division com- 
 mander was again obliged to 'interfere in the dispositions of 
 his sulx)rdinates, this being during his ride in the evening, 
 
Studijss in the: leading of Troops. 329 
 
 when he ordered that the First battalion of the First regiment 
 occupy Hill 602 and Burkersdorf, and the Second battalion 
 Hill 540 and the creek crossings. The defensive positions of 
 the outposts were unfavorable. Burkersdorf lay low in a val- 
 ley, and Hill 540 was a little too far to the front; but, as the 
 position was one that must be defended during the night, it 
 was necessary to secure the village and the roads. The main 
 point was to hold the enemy until the division could occupy 
 the line Hill 635-old quarry, and this could be accomplished 
 in half an hour. 
 
 The commander of the right outpost, Major X •, 
 
 issued a comprehensive order, covering practically every point 
 necessary. He could do so, as he was able to overlook the 
 terrane of his position from Hill 635. No material fault can 
 be found with his dispositions. It may seem strange that only 
 6 mounted men should be used on the right wing, near Ober- 
 Altenbuch. But the country there was quite mountainous, 
 nothing had been seen of the enemy, and to simply close the 
 village street with infantry was sufficient. The First company 
 was very properly stationed on the Ober-Altenbuch-Burkers- 
 dorf road, and made sure that the main body of the division 
 had placed sentinels and sentry squads on the roads leading 
 from Ober-Altenbuch to Neu-Rognitz. As it was without 
 cavalry protection in front, the company was at once obliged 
 to send out the non-commisioned officer's post and the picket. 
 With the Second company, however, it was different ; the hus- 
 sar picket on the highway afforded it such security that it 
 was able to go about its cooking in perfect composure. 
 
 Another thing is to be observed here. Outpost cavalry is 
 ordinarily not subject to the orders of an outpost company be- 
 hind it. Although Field Service Regulations (paragraphs 149 
 and 182) specify that infantry and cavalry must advise each 
 other as to their respective locations, experience shows that 
 often this, is done too late. Very frequently it happens that a 
 company commander, his horse all tired out, must himself 
 search out the cavalry in front to determine the degree of 
 security of his company. Especial stress must be laid on the 
 detail of. mounted orderlies for such outpost companies, 
 and their prompt arrival ready for service, for in their ab- 
 
330 Studies in the Lkaping of Troops. 
 
 sencc a C(jiiii)any coniinandcr is wicliuut the most essential 
 niediunis for sending reports and establishing connection with 
 
 outpost cavah-y and adjoining posts. Major D took the 
 
 greater ])art of the cavalry back into the village. This was 
 allowable, and is certainly advisable when horses are fatigued. 
 But it was absolutely necessary, as was done, to keep a cav- 
 alry patrol close to the enemy during the night; and in this 
 case the patrol was despatched from the outpost reserve. The 
 Second outpost company could well patrol the highway with 
 6 mounted men. 
 
 Major Y , on the other hand, established his out- 
 posts in an entirely different manner. In the first place, he 
 issued no exhaustive order, as he did not clearly compre- 
 hend the situation, and in so doing he was acting m accord- 
 ance with Field Service Regulations (paragraph 139). It 
 was quite clear that the bridges over the creek running in the 
 direction of Staudenz must be occupied, but whether addi- 
 tional measures should be taken depended upon the character 
 of the creek and its surroundings. At first he took forward 
 only I company, thus saving the others unnecessary exertion, 
 for he found that on account of the swampy nature of the 
 ground the creek could be easily held by a single company. 
 The establishment of a cavalry post under a non-commis- 
 sioned officer out on the Kaile highway was more than enough, 
 as an infantry post would have answered the same purpose. 
 The horses were tired, and should have been spared as much 
 
 as possible. On the right of the outpost line Major X 
 
 took his hussars to the outpost reserve before nightfall ; but 
 Major Y employed his as picket with the Ninth com- 
 pany. Yet there is no fixed rule for outpost measures. Ma- 
 jor Y acted under the impression that strong hostile 
 
 cavalry had been observed north of Kaile as late as 6 p. m. 
 The cavalry patrols sent out by both outi)Osts, from the out- 
 jjost reserve on the right and from the picket on the left, were 
 
 absolutely necessary. Major X preferred to supervise 
 
 the despatching of his cavalry patrols in person, as he wished 
 to give them special instructions. 
 
 The action of both outpost commanders in assigning sta- 
 bles for their surplus cavalry is very commendable. 
 
Studies in the Leading oe Troops. 331 
 
 Major X designated the outpost reserve as his hue 
 
 of resistance, while Major Y designated the -support- 
 ing company on picket duty. Both were right in view of the 
 character of the terrane. The essential principle is this: You 
 must hold your ground until the main body is ready for 
 action. Notwithstanding this, to allow oneself to be annihi- 
 lated in so doing would be a serious mistake. 
 
 The Main Body oe the Division erom 5 p. m. untie 
 
 NiGHTEAEL. 
 
 As soon as the respective adjutants returned from the 
 division commander with orders regarding bivouac sites, or 
 the same were received by orderlies from the division head- 
 quarters, the brigades immediately proceeded to the assign- 
 ments in detail. 
 
 As previously stated, the number of men in the various 
 battalions was greatly reduced ; soldiers who did not know 
 where their regiments were located joined the body of troops 
 nearest them. The written order issued from Neu-Rognitz 
 threw some light for the first time on the position of the troops, 
 but darkness was setting in, and many of the men were so 
 tired out that they must be allowed to pass the night where 
 they were; they were mustered, however, and regularly dis- 
 tributed to the various bodies of troops. 
 
 A desire for rest, after the oppressively hot day, was up- 
 permost in the majority of the organizations ; nobody was 
 inclined to cook; hunger was appeased with bread, bacon, or 
 anything the men happened to have in their haversacks. Water- 
 carriers were detailed to bring water from the nearest vil- 
 lages, under the supervision of officers, and detachments were 
 sent back to the places where the troops were engaged, to look 
 for any wounded possibly left on the battle-field. Exhaustion 
 was too great to permit of the burymg of dead, but bivouacs 
 were cleared of the bodies and arms collected in piles. 
 
 To be ready for further operations, cartridge-wagons 
 were brought up to some of the battalions, and the pouch am- 
 munition replenished. In other battalions this had to be left 
 until the next morning, as the proper vehicles could not be 
 found. In part of the Fourth regiment of infantry it had been 
 necessary to replenish ammunition even during action, espe- 
 
332 Studiics in the Leading oe Troops. 
 
 cially in ihc case of the troops on the right wing, wbich had 
 fired their last cartridges early in the action. Cartridge- 
 wagons would not be refilled until the distribution from the 
 ammunition column, which was ordered for the next morning. 
 In the artillery, the First battalion fired 803 shots, and the 
 Second battalion 1,600; so a single ammunition column could 
 replenisli them. 
 
 Comments on the Bivouac op the Main Body. 
 
 The picture we have briefly described in this instance will 
 generally be presented after every action. The greater the 
 strain has been on troops the less will their strength be and 
 the more difficulty will we have in meeting the demands of 
 theory. 
 
 We must nevertheless make clear to ourselves what these 
 demands are, and strive to fulfill them as far as permitted by 
 circumstances and the strength that is left. In any case, we 
 must at least endeavor to know what this ideal is. 
 
 71ic first thing is to get the troops ready to ßght again. 
 This includes re-establishment of order, replenishing of am- 
 munition, and finally the revival of strength. 
 
 As for the first, we have attempted to indicate ways and 
 means by which much can be accomplished even during an ac- 
 tion to maintain the cohesion of the separate bodies. The 
 more regiments and brigades are ke]:)t from being mixed the 
 more promptly can this be accomplished. Yet this is ahvays 
 difficult, and at times impossible ; but the more stress we lay 
 on such measures in peace maneuvers the more attention will 
 be paid to them in battle. The greatest obstacle in this direc- 
 tion is the excessive extension of the fighting line, a fault 
 which we easily succumb to even in peace. This can be par- 
 tially obviated if care is taken, either on the defensive or the 
 ofifensive, never to deploy a body of troops in such manner 
 that at the start it will all be on the first line. 
 
 Whether proper attention has been paid during an en- 
 gagement to the preservation of channels of transmitting or- 
 ders and to the retaining of formations once adopted, in any 
 case, when the fight is over, we must endeavor to establish 
 certain central points for the assembling of scattered elements. 
 
vStudies in the Leading of Troops. 333 
 
 Such points would naturally be with the reserves, but if the 
 reserves too have been employed, then we must resort to such 
 dismembered fragments of battalions or companies as may 
 still remain within the hands of some leader, and in part at 
 least assembled. With these the hrst dispositions must be 
 made; they are still fit for use, and may be posted in certain 
 permanent places. A large majority of stragglers will nat- 
 urally attach theniselves, and thus regiments and battalions 
 may be formed up again. The importance of collecting the 
 scattered men and dissolved organizations, at the earliest pos- 
 sible moment, and assembling them into larger bodies, is very 
 apparent. And even if not a single body in close order is to 
 be found near the fighting line, every ofticer must neverthe- 
 less appreciate the necessity of gathering as many men as 
 he can around him, regardless of their organizations, and 
 conducting them to where he may expect to find assembled 
 masses. 
 
 When, however, utter dissolution reigns after an action 
 and darkness has settled down, it is hardly to be expected 
 that order can be re-established during the night. In such 
 cases the division commander will halt the subdivisions farth- 
 est to the front and charge them with the task of security, and 
 will then repair to any body that may happen to be bivouack- 
 ing at some important point, generally near a highway, and 
 will pass the night there, for not until morning will it be pos- 
 sible for him to bring order out of chaos. 
 
 In the example under consideration, order had been re- 
 established in all regiments after the close of the engagement, 
 to such an extent that the division was in that respect in good 
 condition for further action. In addition to this, the divis- 
 ion commander knew the location of the various regiments, 
 and it was thus easy for him to assign the separate bivouac 
 sites. Yet a large number of men had not yet found their 
 proper regiments or companies ; whether they should still try 
 to find them will depend on their degree of fatigue, their 
 knowledge of where their troops are located, and the prox- 
 imity of night; otherwise they should attach themselves- to the 
 nearest battalion and wait until morning. In any case, it must 
 be insisted that all the men work zvith their utmost ability to- 
 ward the prompt restoration of order. 
 
334 SruDiEt^ IN THE Leading oe Troops. 
 
 i 
 
 The next caro is to govern the aniiiiunition supply. Reg- 
 ulations provide that company cartridge-wagons shall be 
 under the charge of the battalion wagon-master (a non- 
 commissioned officer on duty with the train) under the direc- 
 tion of the battalion commander. Cartridge-wagons are re- 
 filled either by sending them back to the ammunition columns 
 or bringing uj) the latter. 
 
 Guns should be cleanc 1 and inspected as soon as practi- 
 cable ; in the case in hand, this could hardly have been done 
 that day. 
 
 Artillery has 9 ammunition-wagons to each battery, 
 drawn up in two echelons, besides the ammunition carried in 
 the caissons. Should this not suffice, then it should resort to 
 the ammunition columns. It is therefore advisable that the 
 first echelon of wagons approach the battle-field as near as 
 possible,^ and the leader of the second echelon inform himself 
 as soon as possible of their station. If conditions demand it, 
 filled wagons from the columns may be temporarily assigned 
 directly to the batteries. 
 
 Finally, it is necessary to regain strength in order to re- 
 store our fighting capacity, and this is done by food, drink, 
 and rest. Frequently the men will prefer to lie down and 
 sleep, rather than go to work digging holes and fetching wood 
 and water for cooking a substantial meal. Nevertheless a 
 leader must insist that, in spite of all disinclination and dif- 
 ficulties, food be cooked whenever at all practicable. It is 
 impossible to foresee what the next morning will bring forth, 
 or whether there will be time enough left for ])ro|>er re- 
 freshment before work is again demanded of the troops. 
 
 To accomplish all this, first of all, food must be on hand. 
 On the battle-field requisitions generally furnish nothing, or 
 at the best only an insufficient supply. In such cases troops 
 are dependent upon the emergency ration. Of this each in- 
 fantrvman and artilleryman carries three days' supply, consist- 
 ing of caimed food, salt, coffee, and hardtack or bread. It is 
 advisable to carry bacon on the sul)sistencc-\vagons. for it 
 keeps well and can be eaten cold. Men are inclined t«^ make 
 
 iWhen ]>atteries are on the i.iarch and are separated, it is not 
 necessary that the wagons assigned to any one part shoiihl form 
 in (Mhclon. 
 
Studiks in the Lkading or Tro^x^s. ;^35 
 
 premature use of what they carry in their haversacks, an in- 
 fracticm that only the strictest supervision and interposition 
 on the part of leaders can prevent. Furthermore, hardtack is 
 universally disliked ; but although the subsistence-wagons can 
 carry three days' complete rations for each man, including tea 
 and bread, three days' supply of bread is almost too much for 
 a man to carry on his back. 
 
 At all events, the one ration used on the 27th must be 
 promptly replaced. For such purposes we have subsistence- 
 wagons, and then the commissary columns, which follow the 
 corps and are brought up as soon as possible, during the night 
 if practicable. One such column suffices for one day's supply 
 of an infantry division with corps artillery. If the subsistence- 
 wagons arrive at the bivouac in good season, then the issue 
 can be made from them direct ; but if this is repeated for some 
 time, care must be taken that the emergency ration is renewed. 
 
 Horse artillery carries two days' forage supply, and cav- 
 alry one day's. Additional supplies are carried in the forage- 
 w^agons of the supply column. Special attention must be given 
 to the supply of oats. 
 
 Through an error, no permanent columns were assigned 
 to the Second infantry division ; 2 wagon trains and i supply 
 column would have been sufficient. 
 
 The first duty of a chief quartermaster of a division dur- 
 ing an engagement is to provide sufficient wagons filled with 
 straw for carrying wounded, and to direct these to the dress- 
 ing station. Furthermore, he has to see to the timely bring- 
 ing up of the columns. Had columns been assigned to the 
 division, they would have been obliged to remain at Schöm- 
 berg until the result of the engagement appeared no longer 
 uncertain, and they could not have been ordered up until 
 then. The ground north of Sorge and to the west of the high- 
 way seems to be the most suitable place for them to estab- 
 lish a park after their arrival during the night. A chief quar- 
 termaster will request the general stafif officer to inform him 
 where the various bivouacs have been established, and then 
 await the arrival of the trains. 
 
 If the trains come up in time to issue provisions during 
 the evening, this should b.' done : if they arrive too late, the 
 necessary supplies can be sent to the various bivouacs, or ev- 
 
336 STüini'.s jx tiik Lkading ov Troops. 
 
 -erythin^' prepared (lurin,Li the nii^lit so an issue can be prompt- 
 Ay made at dayhrcik. }>eef cattle may be driven along- as far 
 as practicable, but should never be killed for immediate issue 
 to troops. For actual consumption beef should be taken from 
 the sup|>lv carried on the commissary wagons, if these are at 
 hand. This meat is then at least a day old, and much more 
 wholesome than if freshly killed. All empty wagons of the 
 ■ column ^^hould be immediately sent back to the nearest sup- 
 ply station, but in so doing will be utilized in the transporta- 
 tion of wounded in case enough wagons have not been requi- 
 sitioned for that purpose. The chief quartermaster attends 
 to this, and sees that sufficient straw is provided for bedding 
 in the wagons. Finally, he must daily submit to the chief 
 quartermaster of the corps an exact report as to how long 
 he can subsist the division with the aid of the columns as- 
 i»igned to it.^ 
 
 Turning to the general question of bivouacking, we may 
 say that a bivouac should only be established when the situa- 
 tion requires it. If practicable, we should always endeavor 
 to put the men under cover, and they should be billeted in all 
 available places in the immediate vicinity, or at least go into 
 bivouac in a village. In this case the proximity of the enemy 
 to a great extent prevented the seeking of such accommoda- 
 tions. ])esides, fighting had taken place on all sides of Neu- 
 . Uognitz, and the village would very likely be filled with 
 wounded incapable of being transported. Some of the farm- 
 houses must furthermore be cleared for shelter for the staffs, 
 as their clerical work had to be attended to. An occupation 
 of Ober-Altenbuch and Alt-Rognitz could very properly be 
 dispensed with ; men quartered in the former place would be 
 much exposed, and therefore require extensive measures of 
 security, and troops put into the latter would be too far away 
 and could not be brought up soon enough in case of a hos- 
 tile attack. As for Hohcnbruck, it was already within the 
 territory of the First infantry division. 
 
 The distribution of bivouac sites in the case of the Sec- 
 ond infantry division met all demands that could be made up- 
 
 'In t\u'. (itTinan Army the subsistence of troops is performed 
 by fhp CiMarlcriiiiistfM's })e\)artim'nt.Tr(nisla(or. 
 
Studies in thk. Leading of Troops. 337 
 
 on it. In the first place, it must be remembered that troops 
 should lie behind the position to be occupied in case of hos- 
 tile attack. Furthermore, here they were all on even, rising 
 slopes, where the ground holds the least moisture. Meadows 
 should be especially avoided as inimical to health. In addi- 
 tion to this, all of the bivouacs were protected against the 
 wind by the ridges, woods, or villages surrounding them. 
 Moreover, wood for cook-fires was easily obtainable. Pro- 
 tection against rain can be secured by shelter-tents, which can 
 be erected in a short time. 
 
 In woods care must be taken to establish a boundary in 
 rear of the bivouac (as a ravine, road, or fence), which 
 should be guarded. Otherwise troops will scatter too much; 
 some will even entirely leave the bivouac, and this has a bad 
 influence upon the readiness of troops for action. 
 
 All other considerations must give way to readiness for 
 action. In this direction some difficulty might be encountered 
 with the water supply. Here the troops, being so closely 
 assembled, were dependent on Neu-Rognitz and Burkersdorf 
 alone for water, with possibly some help from Ober-Altenbuch 
 and Sorge. 
 
 Where more freedom is allowed in the selection of biv- 
 ouacs, it is well to consider the facilities for procuring water 
 and for watering animals, and to have these facilities as near 
 at hand as possible. 
 
 The more limited the ground available is, the more care 
 must be taken to assign to each body its place precisely. We 
 must also insist in bivouac that every body of troops in close 
 order always take up its proper formation. 
 
 Under ordinary conditions, the size of the several biv- 
 ouacs must be in accordance with Field Service Regulations. 
 
 In war we will often be forced to deviate from the pre- 
 scribed order in establishing a bivouac. In this way, on ac- 
 count of the irregular formation of the ground, as seen in the 
 case of the Second battalion of the Second regiment, a battal- 
 ion may camp with some of its companies in a second line, 
 instead of the companies alongside each other in platoon col- 
 umns; for if it were desired to give the men the benefit of the 
 shelter of the bushes at the edge of the woods, then the forma- 
 tions must conform to the character of the ground. 
 
33^ Studiks in thk Lkadixg of Troops. 
 
 In such an event the places for roll-call and for the stacks 
 will be outside of the timber, while the spots where the men 
 should camp are designated within the woods. 
 
 Similar departure from regulations is necessary in the 
 location of holes for fires and sinks, so they will not annoy 
 either the troops themselves or adjoining bodies. It would 
 hardly have been practicable to construct sinks in the biv- 
 ouac of the Second infantry division; nevertheless places 
 should be designated where men could attend to the calls of 
 Nature. If troops are obliged to encamp one behind another, 
 sinks must not be located between them, but placed on the 
 flanks or in rear of the last subdivision. 
 
 In order that all these considerations may not be disre- 
 garded, a bivouac commander must be appointed. "The sen- 
 ior officer present is the commander of a bivouac." As the 
 commander of the First infantry regiment was assigned to 
 the command of a brigade, and as the other regimental com- 
 manders were either dead or wounded, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 J , of the First regiment of field artillery, was the sen- 
 ior officer in the bivouac. He must therefore camp at a spot 
 easily recognizable (in this case close to the highway) ; and 
 he must see that the place is made known to all guards ; he 
 must tissign stables, wells, and watering-places, and is respon- 
 sible for the measures of safety. 
 
 Let us now take a closer view of the bivouac southwest 
 of Neu-Rognitz. It consisted of 4 companies each of the 
 First and Second regiments, 3 squadrons, and 6 batteries. 
 The first question was. Where shall the artillery be placed? 
 Above all, it must have a clear field, in order to quickly oc- 
 cupy the position assigned it on Hill 635 ; but it should also be 
 near a main road, so that it could respond promptly in case 
 it should be needed farther to the front. For these reasons 
 Lieutenant-Colonel J stationed it near the southwest- 
 ern corner of Neu-Rognitz, close to the highway. There it 
 was i)rotccted by the hill in front and by the near-by infantry, 
 which had been specially located for that purpose in front of 
 the artillery. 
 
 Upon the right the cavalry could rest (juietlv. as nothing 
 need be feared from the direction of Ober-Altenbuch. and 2 
 
 I 
 
i 
 
 Studiks in the Leading of Troops. 339 
 
 sentry posts were in the vicinity. In case of an action, the 
 hussars could find employment only on the right wing. 
 
 It was advisable to place companies of the Second bat- 
 talion of the First regiment in the region between liill 635 
 and the highway on the right wing, so that if the ourposts 
 should fall back behind the right wing of the main body, the 
 First infantry regiment would be united. A sentry post was 
 needed on Hill 635 to secure possession of this point on the 
 right wing. 
 
 The First battalion of the Second regiment should un- 
 questionably bivouac along the highv/ay, to the east of which 
 the two other battalions were camped. 
 
 In general the following may be said with regard to the 
 arrangement of these bivouacs: If the wind came from the 
 northeast, the fire-pits behind the various bivouacs should be 
 located as far as practicable toward the west. Vehicles and 
 any sutlers on the ground would be located between the in- 
 fantry and the artillery, and sinks in the point of the woods 
 west of Neu-Rognitz that projected southward. 
 
 The interior order in the bivouac was maintained by 
 the color, standard, and park (artillery) guards. In order 
 to give rest to the troops, these guards must be limited as 
 much as practicable. For the same reason economy was 
 exercised in the establishm.ent of sentry posts, one on the right 
 near Sorge, and two in front (one on Hill 635 and the other 
 on the Burkersdorf highway). 
 
 But when all is said, the principal thing is to secure rest 
 and comfort for the troops as soon as possible. Upon arriv- 
 ing, every body of troops must begin at once to establish 
 itself, and when once engaged in this duty, every interrup- 
 tion amounts to a loss of rest, and can be justified only by the 
 
 The Hospital Service. 
 
 Let us here recapitulate the measures taken by the Med- 
 ical Department up to this time. 
 
 As soon as the engagement was expected, the fact was 
 communicated to the division surgeon, and directions of 
 march were designated for the ambulance company and field 
 hospital: At the^ame time (8:50 a. m.) the surgeon was in- 
 
340 Studies in tuk Lkadixg of Troops. 
 
 structed to requisition wagons for the transport of tlie wound- 
 ed. For this puri)osc some cavalrymen were placed at his 
 (Hsposal. 
 
 Shortly before 1 1 130 a. ni. the division commander \yas 
 advised that a dressing station had been established in Krib- 
 litz and that 21 requisitioned vehicles were on the spot. Up 
 to that time it had not been necessary to employ the ambu- 
 lance company, as the 4 litter-bearers regularly detailed by 
 each company had been sufficient to carry wounded to the 
 dressing station. This carrying of wounded was done under 
 the supervision of specially detailed non-commissioned offi- 
 cers, who were placed under the regimental surgeons, together 
 with 4 or 5 litters to each battalion taken from the two- 
 horse medical wagons. These wagons, in accordance with 
 regulations, had followed behind the battalions a? light bag- 
 gage, so that the necessary number of litters was promptly 
 available. The medical wagon belonging to the Second bat- 
 talion of the Second regiment remained at the dressing sta- 
 tion, and the necessary medicines and appliances were taken 
 from it. The surgeon of the Second regiment took charge of 
 the medical service at the station, and had a Red Cross flag 
 raised. 
 
 When near i o'clock the engagement assumed greater 
 proportions, the division surgeon put the ambulance company 
 to work and established a general dressing station at Krib- 
 litz. To this point he also brought up the field hospital. All 
 this was duly reported to the division commander at i :45 
 p. m., who was further advised that the ambulance compa- 
 nies of the First infantry division had also arrived north of 
 Jiohenbruck. These dispositions met the approval of the 
 division commander.^ We might add that if the entire am- 
 bulance comi)any of the First division had not been on hand, 
 a section of the Second division could have been advantage- 
 ously employed near llohenbruck. 
 
 In this instance the division surgeon made disposition ol 
 the ambulance coni])any of his own accord. He has the right 
 to do so when no order is received from division headquar- 
 ters and there is danger in delay ; nevertheless, an order from 
 
 iSee pages 230 and 233, Part III., for furtlier remarks on the 
 medical service. 
 
 I 
 
Studies in thk Lkading of Troops. 341 ; 
 
 division headquarters might easily have been obtained. The: 
 one who ought to make the dispositions is, however, the conT^- 
 mander of the troops ; he should decide whether the company • 
 should be set to work, how much of the company, at whaf 
 place, and whether .the temporary stations should be con-' 
 tinned or absorbed into the general dressing station. This is-' 
 prescribed in Regulations. The highest commander alone is- 
 able to surmise with any degree of certainty where the fight 
 will be more fierce ; he knows where he will carry on a dilatory' 
 action for a time ; he also knows where the assault will entail 
 the greatest sacrifices. He can best understand whether for 
 the time being it will be simply an initiatory action and the 
 decision worked out somewhere else. All these points must 
 be considered in the establishment of dressing stations and the 
 distribution of the medical personnel. ■ ■ '■ 
 
 On the right wing ample provision was made for the 
 time being by the dressing station in Hohenbruck. The estab- 
 lishing of one at the northwestern farm-house of Alt-Rognitz 
 does not seem to be a fortunate choice for a dressing station- 
 on the left wing, as the Fourth brigade would have to reach 
 out almost to the church of St. Paul and St. John before it' 
 could enter the engagement. The division surgeon was not 
 aware of this, and so he could not take it into account; but 
 the division commander should have advised him iii due sea- 
 son. In consequence of this neglect, the wounded on the e:?t- 
 treme left were over a mile and a half away from the nearest* 
 station, which is too great a distance, especially when wound- 
 ed must be carried. 
 
 The subsequent moving of the main dressing station 
 from Kriblitz to Alt-Rognitz and merging the temporary -sta- 
 tion with it was eminently correct. Here it was not reached ' 
 by infantry fire, had water near by, and need not pitch dress-; 
 ing-tents, as houses were available. The spot was marked' 
 by two flags — one the National color and the other the Red 
 Cross flag. .••■-. 
 
 To get the best service from the hospital corps; it is a15-' 
 solutely necessary for the commander to keep medical ofli'cers- 
 fully informed concerning the course of events. But beforethe** 
 beginning of an action a general survey is practicable only in 
 exceptional cases, and it is recommended not to dispose too* 
 
;542 STirnriv.- ix tttf-: Lkadin'o of Troops. 
 
 quickly of all the resources of the medical service. At first we 
 should ^ct alont^ with temporary dressint;' stations, and employ 
 the rci^imeiUal siir[;eons and medical wagons in them. It is 
 true that the latter are hardly ahle to follow troops advancing 
 over fields and frequently seeking cover^ they are often left 
 lying in a ditch, and as a rule, they lose connection with the 
 hody to which they belong. Whenever an action assumes a 
 stationary character, it is well to permit one or more temporary 
 dressing stations to be absorbed in a general dressing station. 
 
 r>ut if losses are considerable at the outset, then the am- 
 Imlancc company must go to \vork for itself; even then, how- 
 ever, it is advisable first to employ only one section ; and espe- 
 cially to allow only one of th^ hospital wagons to be un])acked. 
 When a large stream of wounded is coming in, we certainly 
 are desirous of helping them as soon as possible, and in such 
 cases we arc easily led to dispose of all the nedical service 
 at hand. But if this is done and the fight moves forward a 
 few miles, or perha])s further, then the wounded are without 
 liclp; for it is not easy to move a general dressing station to 
 the front, when once established, especially if all the litter- 
 bearers are already deployed on the field, where they may be 
 so busy that they cannot attend to the wounded assigned 
 them. 
 
 It might indeed be claimed that all the hospital corps can 
 do is to keep incessantly at work, and that it cannot be em- 
 ployed in one place when it is elsewhere fully engaged. But 
 this is not so. The requirements of wounded men differ 
 materially. Of course every man who is hurt desires to get 
 into the hands of a surgeon as so^n as possible; in many 
 cases, however, it makes little difference if this is deferred 
 for an hour, while in some cases life depends on it. Conse- 
 quently the first thing to be done when wounded arrive at a 
 dressing station is to sort them out and first attend to such 
 as re(|uire urgent assistance. But if there are hundreds o! 
 wounded possibly 2 miles from the main dressing station, 
 where tlicy cannot even be collected, and where there is no 
 surgical assistance whatever available, help which would then 
 be of service might be useless a few hours later. 
 
 This is probably the reason why Regulations provide for 
 "leaving half of the officers and non-commissioned officers of 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 343 
 
 the Medical Department with their organizations in action, 
 and half at the dressing stations. And notwithstanding this pro- 
 vision, even if the medical officers on the fighting line be ever 
 so self-sacrificing, their activity will nevertheless be limited, 
 for the necessary assistance, quietude, material, and a proper 
 place to work in will often be wanting. Furthermore, we 
 must not overlook the fact that in the more important cases, 
 those which demand the most prompt help, especially in opera- 
 tions, the lone surgeon can do nothing, but that he must have 
 surgeon assistants. 
 
 The more co-operation provided for the finding and col- 
 lecting of wounded and the greater the centralization of the 
 surgical personnel, whereby one surgeon can come to the 
 assistance of another, the greater blessing will the hospital 
 corps be. 
 
 In this connection it is recommended not only to dispose 
 of half of the surgeons with the troops, but also to send the 
 personnel of field hospitals not yet erected to the dressing sta- 
 tions ; indeed, this is expressly authorized in Field Regula- 
 tions for the Medical Department (paragraph 56). Here also 
 is it necessary for the field hospitals to be advised in good sea- 
 son, and this can only be done when the directing medical offi- 
 cers {chief surgeons of divisions and corps) reveive suitable 
 instructions from superior troop leaders. 
 
 The reason for retaining half of the regimental surgeons 
 non-commissioned officers Vv^ith their organizations and not us- 
 ing them at the dressing stations is probably that troops need- 
 ing to make a further advance will not be without surgical at- 
 tendance. In the field all surgeons are mounted, so they can 
 follow anywhere without over-exertion. Non-commissioned 
 officers of the hospital corps ought to be drilled in the use 
 of the bicycle, so they m.ay keep up prompt communication be- 
 tween the dressing stations, the troops, and the field hospitals. 
 
 As far as practicable, preliminary dressings are applied 
 on the fighting line by surgeons, non-commissioned officers 
 of the Medical Department, litter-bearers, and the troops them- 
 selves. 
 
 Besides the general dressing station established in Alt- 
 Rognitz, a temporary station at Hohenbruck, in the rear of the 
 
344 Studies in the Leading of Troops. 
 
 Ninth infantry brigade, was ordcTcd ; also a general dressing 
 station north of that village. 
 
 We will now give especial consideration to the station at 
 Alt-Rognitz. The ambulance company disposable there con- 
 sisted of a mounted captain as commander, lieutenants, a quar- 
 termaster, an orderly sergeant, and over lOO litter-bearers ; 
 the surgical personnel at hand was a chief surgeon, several 
 surgeon's and assistant surgeons, a field apothecary, non- 
 conimissioned of^cers of the hospital corps, nurses, and the 
 necessary men of the train. Besides the 2 medical and 2 bag- 
 gage-wagons, 8 ambulances were there; each of the ambu- 
 lances supplied with 6 to 9 litters. 
 
 When Lieutenant-General A first met the corps 
 
 commander, the division surgeon requested die chief quar- 
 termaster of the corps to provide more wagons, as up to that 
 moment only 21 requisitioned wagons were at hand. He in- 
 formed him, however, that the mounted men who had gath- 
 ered these wagons had been sent to Trautenau to see if they 
 could not find more. The quartermaster made arrangements 
 to have the necessary supply brought up out of the villages 
 in the vicinity. 
 
 The division surgeon also availed himself of this oppor- 
 tunity to discuss matters with the chief surgeon of the corps, 
 and to advise him of dispositions already made. The latter 
 stated that he had ordered three more field hospitals to re- 
 port at Trautenau, where he would establish rhem if neces- 
 sary: and that he would hold the Third ambulance company 
 at the disposal of corps headquarters in readiness for any 
 employment that might devolve upon it. 
 
 After that, .the division surgeon went to Hohenbruck, 
 where he found the surgeon of the First regiment, who had 
 already taken charge of the surgical work at the temporary 
 station there. After consulting with him, he hurried on to 
 Alt-Rognitz. There the ambulance company was already bus- 
 ilv employed. The farm-house at the northwest corner of the 
 village, with its two large granaries, was well adapted for 
 the purpose. The building was situated in a well-sheltered 
 position at the foot of the heights, several trees furnishing 
 shade, and a deep cut at its side was ruiming with spring 
 water. To the west of the buildings was a suitable place for 
 parking the medical and l)aggage-wagonj 
 
Studies in thi$ Li^ading of Troops. 345 
 
 flag was raised alongside the National color on one of the 
 granaries, and was visible a great distance off. Some of the 
 various regimental surgeons were already on the spot. 
 
 At that time the left wing of the Third brigade was hotly 
 engaged on the ridge east of Peak 527, and the Fourth bri- 
 gade had just left Alt-Roguitz to attack. The officer in ciiarge 
 iiad sent 4 ambulances to the field on which the Third brigade 
 was engaged, under charge of an officer, having equipped the 
 litter-bearers with the necessary dressings and restoratives. 
 The officer halted the ambulances in a depression behind the 
 left wing of the brigade, and from there sent forward the sev- 
 eral litter-bearers each to a definite point, which he distinctly 
 pointed out to them. When he rode over the ground and 
 noticed that the litter-bearers of another ambulance company 
 (that of the First division) were already at work near Hohen- 
 bruck, he contented himself with sending men in that direc- 
 tion only into the thickets on Hill 527. To the north, how- 
 ever, beyond Hill 513, the litter-bearers found several men 
 of the First and Second regiments who were severely wound- 
 ed. These, as well as wounded found elsewhere, were first re- 
 freshed and provided with first aid, then lifted on the litters, 
 and carried either to the general dressing station or to wagons, 
 according to distance. When practicable, the wagons drove 
 up to them. Whenever a wagon was filled (2 to 4 wounded), 
 it was driven back to the station under supervision of a lance 
 corporal ; arms and equipments were picked up and carried 
 along. These wagons were returned from the dressing sta- 
 tion as quickly as possible, after they were again loaded with 
 litters, and were sent to a station established on the fighting 
 line. 
 
 Those who were slightly wounded were directed to this 
 dressing station, while company litter-bearers soon caught 
 sight of the wagons and brought wounded up to them. Al- 
 though the dressing station soon became crowded with pa- 
 tients, it was still possible to examine and attend to them all. 
 
 When the wounded were brought up, they were taken out 
 of the wagons by so-called receiving details, which consisted of 
 surgeons and non-commissioned officers of the hospital corps. 
 The senior surgeon present had divided his corps of assist- 
 ing surgeons and their helpers into three parts. The duty of 
 
346 STiri)ii:s IX ihk Liai>i\<; oi- Trckjps. 
 
 the first was rcce[)tion, bedding, refreshing, examining, and 
 sorting. The second party appHed the more difficult dress- 
 ings recjuiring time. The third party performed such vital op- 
 erations as could not have been performed at the temporary 
 station. 
 
 The division surgeon soon came up, and he took charge. 
 Whenever a body of slightly wounded gathered, he had them 
 march to Trautenau, to report to the commanding officer at 
 that place, with a view to their being sent to the nearest sup- 
 ply station. It was impossible to furnish an escort during the 
 engagement ; Regulations require such details to be made by 
 division headquarters. Neither could the end of the fight be 
 awaited, for above everything else it was important that the 
 place be cleared as m.uch as possible. 
 
 In like manner those who w^ere severely wounded were 
 sent to the field hospital in Kriblitz ; those unable to walk 
 being taken in requisitioned wagons. 
 
 When the action opened, the number of wagons on hand 
 was quite sufficient ; surgical assistance, too, could be prompt- 
 ly rendered ; but as soon as the Fourth brigade became en- 
 gaged, the situation changed. As we know, the attack of the 
 left wing of this brigade miscarried in a very short time, and 
 with heavy losses. As soon as the brigade deployed west of 
 Alt-Rognitz, the commander of the ambulance company im- 
 mediately sent the Second section and all available ambulances 
 to that village, on account of the extent of the field of action. 
 The officer in charge of this section divided his force into two 
 parts, to each of which he assigned territory marked by the 
 roads in front. In a few minutes, however, the stream of 
 wounded went directly to the dressing station, and the serv- 
 ices of the entire surgical personnel were taxed to a high 
 degree. 
 
 According to Field Service Regulations for the Medical 
 Department, the division surgeon must assume command at the 
 main dressing station, whicli was done in this case. The senior 
 surgeon has to do particularly with the work of the ambulance 
 personnel. The corps surgeon, when acting as division sur- 
 geon, cannot remain permanently at one main station ; he must 
 superintend all, and not become absorbed in the work at one 
 alone. In this case the division surgeon went at once to the left 
 
Studies in the Leading of Troops. 347 
 
 wing to see personally what help might be given there. At that 
 point he found the field com])letely covered with dead and 
 wounded, regimental surgeons having been unable to accom- 
 plish anything in the general confusion. Accordingly he im- 
 mediately sought out the ambulance company officer who was 
 in the vicinity with his section; the latter could lead him to 
 the surgeon of the Fourth regiment, with whom he had 
 spoken shortly before this. Fortunately, they found the sur- 
 geon quickly. The division surgeon thereupon directed the 
 regimental surgeon to go to the farm-yard in front of the 
 church of St. Paul and St. John, and establish a temporary 
 dressing station there, and instructed him to send thither any 
 company surgeons he might meet. Moreover, he despatched 
 a mounted non-commissioned officer of the hospital train to 
 the chief surgeon of the corps, with the following written 
 recommendation : 
 
 Heavy losses on the left wing make it absolutely neces- 
 sary to use the Third ambulance company. Please send it as 
 quickly as possible to the church of »St. Paul and St. John, in 
 
 Alt-Rognitz, where Major E , surgeon, will establish 
 
 a dressing station. P , 
 
 Chief Surgeon of Division. 
 
 The division surgeon then hastened back to the main 
 dressing station, to send help from there to Major E . 
 
 The establishing of the new dressing station was a most 
 difficult task; except for location, which was rather con- 
 venient, there was nothing else at hand. The medical offi- 
 cer succeeded in finding two other surgeons, several non- 
 commissioned officers of the hospital corps, and some assist- 
 ant litter-bearers, whom he sent thither. The wounded too, 
 when they perceived the direction taken by the bearers, also 
 followed, and soon a large number of men in need of help 
 were assembled. But everything in the way of supplies was 
 wanting; even the medical wagons could not be found. There 
 was not a single mounted man at hand to look for them. 
 Finally, after more than half an hour had elapsed, the divis- 
 ion surgeon arrived with 3 medical officers, 3 non-commis- 
 sioned officers of the hospital corps, and i medical wagon ; 
 these had turned over the wounded they had in charge to their 
 colleasfues at the main station. 
 
348 Sti:uii;s ix tiik Lkadinx oi- Troops. 
 
 Even the wagons that had been requisitioned by the corps 
 quarterniaster did not arrive, as they had been appropriated 
 by the main dressing station when they had arrived at the 
 northwestern entrance of the village. No attempt was there- 
 fore made to send to the rear during the day men from the 
 newly established station ; it was preferred to shelter the men 
 in the nearest farm-buildiiigs, in which work the slightly 
 wounded were required to assist. 
 
 An hour and a half of anxiety passed, and finally the 
 Third ambulance company arrived, and order was partially es- 
 tablished. After this much had been accomplished, the divis- 
 ion surgeon thought he ought to see how matters stood oh 
 the right wing, where in the meantime a successful action 
 had been in progress, and also to see how the wounded were 
 being cared for there. On the right wing he found a tent 
 erected near the last house (which had been battered down) 
 at the northern extremity of Neu-Rognitz, and to his delight 
 observed that a section of the ambulance company of the First 
 infantry division had gone forward to that point; the section 
 had certainly all it could do. From there he wrote the fol- 
 lowing report to division headquarters : 
 
 The First ambulance company is posted north of Hohen- 
 bruck and in Neu-Rognitz, the Second at the northern ex- 
 tremity of Alt-Rognitz, and the Third in the center of the 
 village near the church. The Third ambulance company is 
 wholly without w^agons for carrying wounded. The number 
 of w^ounded cannot yet be determined, but it will exceed 1,000. 
 During the night I will remain with the Third ambulance 
 
 company. P , 
 
 Chief Sii}\(:;co)i of Division. 
 
 The work of the division surgeon and the other medical 
 officers continued without cessation during the entire night, 
 and yet little could be done for the enemy's wounded, which 
 remained on the field. Fortunately, the opponent had left 
 some surgeons for them in Neu-Rognitz and Burkersdorf 
 when he retreated. At the latter place these were assisted by 
 two surgeons who had kept up with the First regiment. The 
 litter-bearers were kept busy for several hours during tlie 
 night searching for wounded. 
 
Studies in tiik Leading of Troops. ^^49 
 
 Great difficulty was encountered when it came to trans- 
 porting the severely wounded to the nearest field hospital. 
 For instance, 400 wounded had to be sent from the main dress - 
 ing station at the northwestern extremity of Alt-Rognitz to 
 Kriblitz and Trautenau. The 21 wagons on hand could carry 
 only 4 men each, a total of 84 men for one trip ; an average 
 of 2 hours was required for each trip, going and returning. 
 The first transport started out at about 3 o'clock. By 7 p. m., 
 therefore, only 168 men could be sent to the field hospitals, 
 and 232 wounded would be obliged to remain out of doors 
 without sufficient attention. It was therefore a great help 
 when many more wagons, in the aggregate about 50, were 
 requisitioned by supreme efifort, and the main dressing station 
 was thus cleared of severely wounded before darkness set in. 
 When practicable, the wagons were fitted up with boards and 
 ropes in such a way that the beds of the patients swung back 
 and forth, whereby the jolting was not severely felt. 
 
 This, in brief, outlines the work of the Medical Depart- 
 ment on the battle-field on the 27th of June. 
 
 Tke General Staff Officer. 
 
 While the division commander was away on his trip to 
 the outposts, the general stafl:* officer, in Neu-Rognitz, debat- 
 ed whether anything further could be attended to. The nec- 
 essary arrangements for ammunition and subsistence had been 
 made. In view of the great distance from the commissary 
 wagons and the baggage, nothing could be done but to order 
 the use of the emergency ration. If the commissary wagons 
 should actually arrive at midnight, all they could do was to 
 renew the emergency ration consumed. Wliat was further 
 required to satisfy immediate wants of subsistence and forage 
 ever officer had received authority to requisition for his own 
 command, giving receipts therefor. In the field the arrival 
 of subsistence can never be definitely counted on. The men's 
 strength must be restored. It is better, however, that the 
 chief quartermaster of the division should authorize requisi- 
 tions. The chief quartermaster had indeed consulted the gen- 
 eral stafi:* officer (Major X ) about this, but immediately 
 
 thereafter went av.-ay. The major was also aware that pris- 
 
350 Studiks in tke Leading, of Troops. 
 
 oners and capture»! horses should be sent to Trautenau, and 
 that wounded men had been directed to go to Trautenau and 
 KribHtz. No orders had been issued relative to brinc^ing up 
 the heavy baggage ; indeed, this is a matter that is f requently 
 overlooked. During one of the long periods of the general 
 
 staff officer's absence, however, Lieutenant-General A 
 
 had, in good season, sent back an order directing the bag- 
 gage to follow as far as Parschnitz, as soon as the Guard had 
 passed through the mountain defiles ; also at the close of the 
 engagement he had sent orders for it to advance to Neu- 
 Rognitz, via Trautenau. However, when darkness set in, the 
 wagons were not on hand, and the general staff officer felt 
 obliged to send an orderly to meet the heavy baggage, with 
 directions that it should park before Neu-Rognitz, west of 
 the highway, as it could hardly find the various bodies of 
 troops in the darkness and might cause disturbance. 
 
 As already stated, for the night officers and men derived 
 no benefit from the heavy baggage ; at any rate, it would be 
 on hand the next morning. The timely ordering up of bag- 
 gage is often forgotten in war and in peace, or at least attended 
 to rather late. Troops judge the general staff officer in part by 
 his work in this direction, as it so materially affects their condi- 
 tion, and it is recommended rather to do too much than too 
 little as regards the baggage. A general staff officer will 
 do well to have one of his assistants remind him of this meas- 
 ure during an engagement. 
 
 After debating on these points. Major X turned 
 
 to the preparation of the report on the day's events, which he 
 just finished as his general returned (8:45 p. m.). After the 
 major stated what he had done with regarxl to the train and 
 what measures the chief quartermaster had adopted for sub- 
 sistence, and the general liad signified his approval of these 
 steps, he read the following draft : 
 
 Report of flic Second Infantry Dk'isio)i on the Eni^a^^cnioil 
 Xcar A'eu-Ro^i:^nitc, June J/, i860. 
 
 At 4 a. 111., June 27, th.' division. accom])anied by the 
 First cavalry brigade, broke l)iv(>nac near r>ertelsdorf and 
 Schömberg, and took up the march upon Trautenau (Exhibit 
 .\ : di vision order ). 
 
Studies in the Leading of TroopS; 351 
 
 At 6:30 a. m. the point reached the exit of the tnoun- 
 tain defile near Parschnitz. All that had been seen of the 
 enemy up to that time were isolated bodies of dragoons. Pur- 
 suant to orders from corps headquarters, a halt was made at 
 T^arschnitz. The First infantry division had not yet arrived, 
 though communication had been maintained with it by patrols 
 (Exhibits B and C; messages). For security during the halt, 
 
 Colonel D occupied the defile on the Liebau road, 
 
 nearly three-quarters of a mile north of Trautenau, with 7 
 companies of infantry, 2 batteries, and i squadron, while 
 Alajor-General B crossed the Aupa and took up a posi- 
 tion on the heights on the right bank with 4 battalions of the 
 Third brigade, i battery, 2i/< squadrons, and the engineer 
 company. A company of infantry and a platoon of hussars 
 were detached in the Aupa valley toward Raussnitz. 
 
 At 8:30 a. m. a message was received from the left flank 
 detachment (Exhibit D), stating that a strong hostile column 
 of all arms was marching upon Trautenau, and that its point 
 was not far from Hohenbruck. 
 
 Although the First infantry division had not yet arrived, 
 it seemed necessary, under the circumstances, to take pos- 
 session of Trautenau before the enemy could firmly establish 
 himself there. An advance upon the right bank of the Aupa 
 against the flank and line of retreat of the enemy promised 
 to lead most quickl}^ to the objective, and the main body of 
 the division was therefore directed to cross the Aupa near 
 Parschnitz and advance to the left of the parts of the Third 
 brigade which were already there. 
 
 At 9 a. m. a hostile battery opened fire from the Hopfen 
 Mountain; this fire was immediately returned by three of our 
 own batteries. In consequence of the turning movement which 
 threatened his right wing, the enemy was forced to abandon 
 his position on the heights south of Trautenau, and to hur- 
 riedly fall back upon Neu-Rognitz. The Second battalion of 
 the First regiment of infantry became involved in a livelv 
 skirmish with hostile infantry at the Kriblitz- ravine.^ 
 
 The enemy, whose strength was at first estin'iated at 
 about I infantry brigade, 4 b'ltterjes, and 4 squadrons, all of 
 the Tenth army corps, thereupon occupied the woods north 
 
352 
 
 SlUDIKS 1\ THE LlCADlXC Ol- Tkoops. 
 
 of Neu-Rogiiitz, where lie prepared for defense. As a 
 continuation of the action would, however, have deflected the 
 army corps from its intended march upon Arnau, the divis- 
 ion was again temporarily assembled, on the heights between 
 Hohenbruck and Alt-Rognitz. and the action meanwhile con- 
 tinued by artillery (Exhibit E: division order). 
 
 At 1 1 130 a. m. his excellency the corps commander ar- 
 rived upon the heights south of Trautenau, and as the First 
 infantry division at that time was in the act of approaching 
 the town, he ordered a continuation of the attack. The plan 
 of attack was to firmly hold the highway against the enemy's 
 front and at the same time turn his right flank. 
 
 For this purpose the Third brigade was verbally directed 
 to deploy for an attack against the hostile front near Hohen- 
 bruck and east of the highway. The Fourth brigade was 
 instructed to advance in the direction of the church of St. 
 Paul and St. John, its left wing covered by Alt-Rognitz, and 
 followed by the hussar regiment to turn toward the oppo- 
 nent's flank. The First regiment of artillery was ordered to 
 support the attack from Ridge soo (northwest of Alt-Rognitz), 
 and the horse battery to remain in action on die Galgen ]Moun- 
 tain until the arrival of the Sixteenth field artillery regiment, 
 which had been asked for. 
 
 In view of the threatened flank novement, the enemy, who 
 had evidently been reinforced, now also occupied the woods 
 south of the wagon-road, between Alt-Rognitz and Neu- 
 i^ognitz. and pushed skirmidiers forward into the the de- 
 pressions and low meadows in front of his position. 
 
 As soon as the Fourth brigade had completed its march, 
 
 Major-General P> advanced to the attack with the Third 
 
 brigade from Hohenbruck and the region east of it. This 
 movement involved the First regiment (which was on the 
 fight wing) in a prolonged, bloody fight, in which a hostile 
 countei -attack was only successfully repulsed by the P'irst 
 cavalry brigade and the horse battery. | 
 
 Shortly after i p. m. the hostile artillery, which had 
 taken position with T battery to the west and 3 or 4 to the 
 east of the main road, was subdued by our artillery, the Six- 
 teenth field artillery regiment having joined in the fire from 
 the G.ilcren Mountain. 
 
I 
 
 Studies in the; Li^ading of Troops. 353 
 
 About the same time the Fourth brigade had begun its 
 attack from Alt-Roguitz, thereby effecting a united attack 
 by the division. 
 
 While the Third brigade was successful in penetrating 
 the strongly occupied thickets northeast of Neu-Rognitz and 
 even gaining ground there and in the village itself, the attack 
 of the 2 battalions of the Third regiment on the left wing 
 of the Fourth brigade miscarried. These troops were met 
 with a cross-fire from the village and the thickets to its south, 
 while fresh hostile forces appeared on their flank and the en- 
 emy's artillery again took part. In spite of its heroic eflfort 
 to advance, the left wing of the brigade fell back with heavy 
 
 losses. Major-General C and Colonel F were 
 
 wounded in that action. Hostile cavalry threatened to attack 
 the retreating forces, but their attempt was abandoned when 
 the hussar regiment hurried up. 
 
 The right wing of the brigade in the meantime resolutely 
 continued the attack, and supported the overthrown battal- 
 ions so efficiently that they were able to take part in the at- 
 tack anew. 
 
 I went to the left wing in person and restored order. 
 
 Major Z took provisional command of the brigade, as 
 
 Colonel G had been killed. 
 
 While the Third brigade was gradually gaining com- 
 plete possession of Neu-Rognitz and the woods west of it, 
 the entire Fourth brigade, including its left wing, undertook 
 a fresh attack on the woods at the wagon-road, from which 
 they succeeded in driving the opponent. Strong hostile re- 
 serves, however, still held the chain of woods southeast of 
 Neu-Rognitz, also the heights toward Burkersdorf on both 
 sides of the highway. An attack upon this position was de- 
 ferred for the time being, as meanwhile a message had been 
 received (Exhibit F), stating that the First infantry division 
 of the Guard was advancing via Rudersdorf and Staudenz. 
 Under pressure of their advance, about 4 p. m. the enemy 
 evacuated his last position, and under cover of strong masses 
 of artillery and cavalry withdrew upon Deutsch-Praussnitz 
 and Kaile, which villages his rear guard held for some 
 time. A battalion of the First regiment advanced to Burkers- 
 dorf and occupied that village, while the artillery kept up a 
 
354 SruDiiiS IN TMK Lkading of Troops. 
 
 fire on the retreating forces from the heights north of Btirk- 
 ersdorf. Under the protection of the hussar regiment, \yhich 
 had been led south of Burkersdorf, outposts were estabHshed 
 on the hne Ober-Altenbuch-Burkersdorf-Staudenz. 
 
 The main body went into bivouac around Neu-Rognitz. 
 
 The losses cannot yet be ascertained, but certainly exceed 
 2,000 men. Unfortunately, in addition to the above-mentioned 
 
 officers. Colonel E , commander of the Second infantry 
 
 regiment, is severely wounded. The losses on the side of 
 the enemy appear to be considerable ; several hundred pris- 
 oners (not wounded) are in our hands. The opponent seems 
 to consist of the Tenth army corps and a cavalry division. 
 
 Lieutenant-General A gave his approval to this 
 
 draft. As the clerks had not yet arrived, it was handed to 
 one of the aids to be copied. 
 
 The division surgeon's report, which had been made in 
 pursuance of Field Service Regulations for the Medical De- 
 partment, had in the meantime arrived (this report has al- 
 ready been given), and gave assurance that everything possi- 
 ble had been done in that direction. 
 
 As the promised orders from corps headquarters were 
 yet to come in during the night and would probably call the 
 entire staff to perform some new duties, shortly after 10 
 o'clock the general dismissed his officers, who at once sought 
 out resting-places. 
 
 COMMKNTS ON THK DIVISION RkPORT. 
 
 We have quoted the division report verbatim. As far as 
 practicable, such reports must be prepared by every body of 
 troops on the same day in which the action occurs. They 
 furnish not only the materials for the later historical account, 
 but are the source of all experiences which, gained through 
 heavy sacrifices, serve to regulate the tactical training of 
 troops in time of i)eace. They are also needed in substantiat- 
 ing claims for distinction and rewards, as well as for other 
 purposes of research, and especially for refuting accusations 
 or clearing up various questions in dispute. 
 
I 
 
 Studies in the Leading oi? Troops. 355 
 
 Reports written immediately after the occurrence of events 
 bear the surest stamp of truth, forming a permanent frame- 
 work for such detailed narratives as may be called for later. 
 When these reports are put ofif, memory will step in and play 
 some most remarkable tricks, so that even the most honest 
 intention to describe only what actually took place will be 
 entangled with rare pictures that our own fancy has built up. 
 After the battle-field' has been left, human imagination meas- 
 ures time and space with entirely different standards than 
 when the battle has just ended; minutes of restless waiting 
 under a hot fire are remembered as hours, while a long period 
 of uninterrupted activity and excitement seems only a brief 
 moment. 
 
 The main points to be sought in such reports are cor- 
 rectness, brevity, and explicitness. It is advisable to state 
 only what one has seen in person jr learned through mem- 
 bers of his staff'. Unsuccessful phases of the fignt must not 
 be omitted, but acknowledged openly, as was done in this case 
 with the attack of the 2 battalions of the Third regiment of 
 infantry. Silence on such points is useless, for they are sure 
 to be rumored, and this will most certainly call into question 
 the truthfulness of the one who makes the report. Care should 
 be taken that exact statements of losses are not given out 
 immediately after an engagement; only guesses can be made 
 on these points, as well as on the intentions and strength of the 
 enemy. The statement of the exact time is also an important 
 item, although time can generally be correctly recorded only 
 in the higher staffs, where an officer may be specially charged 
 with such a duty ; when with troops we do well if we can pull 
 out a watch as the first cannon-shot is fired or as the engage- 
 ment comes to an end. 
 
 It is equally advisable to quote word for w^ord all orders 
 received or given when they are of especial importance, else 
 many differences of opinion may arise in the course of events 
 which it will be no easy task to clear up. 
 
 Often, too, troops are praised after the most exalted fash- 
 ion. For instance, it will be stated, "The regiment stormed the 
 position with unprecedented bravery," while afterwards it will 
 be seen that only 10 or 20 men were lost in driving off the 
 enemy, or that the position had been actually occupied only by 
 
356 Studies in thk Leading or Troops. 
 
 a few hostile companies. History is bound to bring real facts 
 to light, to the dissolution of all halos of glory received in this 
 manner. History does not need these voluntary exaggera- 
 tions ; its business is to explain things, and the expert will be 
 far more impressed by a simple statement of facts than by 
 grand words of commendation. 
 
 The same care that is needed in the preparation of re- 
 ports should also be exercised in keeping diaries. Here too 
 we insist that entries be actually made daily, for if we wait 
 to do this on days of leisure, queer errors are apt to creep 
 in. We remember once having looked through an old diary 
 in which the thirty-first day of June came in for special re- 
 mark. There are no rules that can be given for keeping dia- 
 ries. But it is certain that if all the entries they contain dwell 
 on the conditions of quarters or quote the names of sore-back 
 horses, such records will be useless. 
 
 Exact data collected later showed that the loss sustained 
 by the division was as follows : 
 
 Dead 20 officers, 285 men, 57 horses. 
 
 Wounded 8t officers, 1,771 men, 59 horses. 
 
 Missing officers, 91 men, 19 horses. 
 
 Total igt officers, 2,147 men, 135 horses. 
 
 The heaviest sufferer was the Third regiment of infantry, 
 having lost 37 officers and 873 men ; which goes to show that 
 the following lesson taught by Drill Regulations was well 
 learned : "The soldier must press steadily on in the advance, 
 and not halt without orders, be the losses ever so great and 
 the fire ever so destructive, for retreat leads to annihilation." 
 
 Course oe Events with the Enemy. 
 
 Tn conclusion, it may be of interest to learn something 
 about the enemy as facts became known later through pub- 
 lished reports and historical accounts. 
 
 According to these, on June 26 the Tenth corps with i 
 brigade of the First reserve cavalry division, all belonging 
 to the southern armv, were in scattered quarters around Kön- 
 iginhof, chieflv on the right bank of the Elbe. The First bri- 
 
Studies in the Leadinx. of Troops, '{\67 
 
 gade, consisting of 8 battalions, 3 squadrons, and 3 batteries, 
 had been pushed forward to Deutsch-Praussnitz. In addi- 
 tion to these, the Second dragoon regiment watched the fron- 
 tier near Trautenau. 
 
 When the presence of the First corps of the Prussian 
 army near Schömberg and Liebau became known at head- 
 quarters, the Tenth army corps received orders to advance 
 early on June 27 to Trautenau, and oppose the crossing of 
 the frontier by the enemy. 
 
 In pursuance of this, soon after 8 o'clock the First bri- 
 gade arrived near Trautenau, but found the enemy's point 
 already near Parschnitz. The considerable superiority of the 
 latter permitted him to cross the Aupa there and turn against 
 the brigade's flank. In order not to enter into an action alone, 
 it withdrew in time from the threatened turning movement, 
 and went back into the position of Neu-Rognitz. Here the 
 First battalion of riflemen occupied the woods west of the 
 highway, and the First regiment held the woods along the 
 highway and also the little woods northeast of the village. 
 The Second battalion of riflemen remained behind it in 
 reserve. One battalion of the Second regiment was sent 
 into the thickets at the wagon-road leading to Alt-Rognitz, 
 to cover the right flank, the two other battalions remaining 
 at the southern exit of Neu-Rognitz as reserve and at the 
 disposition of the brigade commander. At the latter point 
 the Third squadron of the uhlan regiment was also posted. 
 The regiment of dragoons examined the country toward Rud- 
 ersdorf and Eypel. The batteries went into position east of 
 Neu-Rognitz, being later reinforced by a horse battery which 
 came up with the cavalry brigade and took position near 
 Sorge. 
 
 The Prussian army gave the brigade ample time to estab- 
 lish itself in its position.' The attack did not commence until 
 I p. m., and was first directed against the front. 
 
 When, however, the turning movement by the Prussians' 
 left wing was later discovered, the brigade commander re- 
 inforced the battalion of the Second regiment in the thickets 
 near the wagon-road with another battalion of the regiment. 
 The last battalion of the reserve was directed by the division 
 commander (who had arrived in the meantime) to occupy 
 
358 Studies in Tiit; Leading of Troops. 
 
 Ncii-Koi^iiitz, as the Second brigade was approaching the 
 battle-field on its way from Königinhof. The Second battal- 
 ion of riflemen was brought u]^ to the advanced line. 
 
 At the same time reports were received from the dragoons 
 that new strong columns of the enemy weie advancing from 
 the north upon Rudcrsdorf. and an order was sent to the 
 Second brigade to send t regiment, with i battery, to the 
 heights of the old quarry, for the support of the extreme right 
 wing, but to leave the other regiment, with the Third bat- 
 talion of riflemen, continue their march to Neu-Rognitz. 
 
 In the meantime Prussians had considerably reinforced 
 their artillery, and compelled the 3 batteries east of Xeu- 
 Kognitz to withdraw. Soon afterwards the infantry attack 
 followed along the whole line. On the right wing it was vic- 
 toriously repulsed, where the uhlan regiment was participat- 
 ing. On the other hand, the opponent succeeded in penetrat- 
 ing the woods north and northeast of Neu-Rognitz, and short- 
 ly afterwards entered the village itself, while a counter-attack 
 started by the First and Second battalions of riflemen and a 
 battalion of the First regiment had been repulsed. 
 
 The commanding general was now forced to consider 
 whether he had best attempt to restore the action by putting 
 in his reserves; the moment appeared propitious for this. 
 
 Various reports of the approach of new hostile masses, 
 however, convinced him that a momentary success could only 
 make the general situation still worse. He already knew that 
 he had been opposed by one entire division, and the columns 
 of another advancing via Hohenbruck west of the highway 
 could be distinctly seen. The presence of such strong hos- 
 tile artillery, which was finally joined b> njw batteries from 
 the direction of Trautenau. led to the conclusion that the en- 
 tire l?russian First army corps was assembling. 
 
 lUit, in addition to this, reports had come in of the ad- 
 vance of new masses via Rudersdorf, while it w^as simultane- 
 ously learned that columns were ai)proaching from the east 
 in the Kypel defile. 
 
 Against these forces, which were estimated at two army 
 corf)s, only 15 battalions were disposable: the 2 brigades of 
 the corps and the c{)rj)s artillery were only coming up to 
 Deutsch- Traussnitz, their start havint> been delaved on account 
 
Studies in thi; Li^ading of Troops. 359 
 
 of the great distances between the various quarters in which 
 they had been sheltered upon the right bank of the Elbe. 
 
 It therefore seemed best to break off the action while 
 yet possible, in order to avoid a threatened turning of the 
 flank, and to unite the entire corps for the present in a posi- 
 tion south of Deutsch-Praussnitz-Kaile, where it could cover 
 the roads leading to the Elbe and could expect reinforcements 
 the following day. 
 
 Under the protection of the artillery, increased to 6 bat- 
 teries, which went into action southwest of Neu-Rognitz, as 
 well as the 3 battalions of the Second brigade, which now 
 occupied the heights of Burkersdorf, the troops of the First 
 brigade were successfully withdrawn from the action and put 
 in march upon Deutsch-Praussnitz. The right flank was se- 
 cured by the 3 remaining battalions of the Second brigade 
 and I battery, who had yet to continue a slight engagement 
 with bodies of the Guard north of Staudenz. 
 
 The Second brigade was supported in the plain by the 
 cavalry united there, consisting of the First brigade of the 
 First reserve cavalry division, 3 squadrons of uhlans, 4 squad- 
 rons of dragoons (in all, 19 squadrons), and 6 batteries. 
 
 Large forces of the enemy pursued only as far as 
 Burkersdorf. 
 
 The losses were 1,670 men dead and wounded and 650 
 prisoners. A considerable number of the wounded fell into 
 the hands of the enemy. 
 
 It is seen from this account that the Second infantry 
 division was engaged, in the main, against only 8 battalions, 
 7 squadrons, and 4 batteries, reinforced at the last moment 
 by 7 battalions, 12 squadrons, and 3 batteries, and that in the 
 course of the engagement its losses were very heavy- 
 
GLOSSARY FOR USE WITH MAPS. 
 
 Abth. (Abtheilung). Battalion of artillery. 
 alter Steinbruch. Old quarry. 
 Avantgarde. Advance guard. 
 
 A. W. Sentry guard. 
 
 B. (Berg). Mountain. 
 bei. To. 
 
 C. V. C. Company as outpost support. 
 Capelle. Chapel. 
 
 D. B. (Br.) T. (Tr.). Division bridge train. 
 
 D. T. (Tel.) A. (Abth.). Signal corps detachment. 
 
 Die Höhen sind in preuss. Decimal Füssen 25 dec.=9.4 m. The 
 
 heights are in Prussian 4^cimal feet (2^ ft.^=p.4 meters). 
 diesseitiger Truppen. Prussian forces. 
 Entsendet. Detached. 
 Esc. Escdr. Escadron. Squadron. 
 F. L. (Laz.). Field hospital. 
 T.W. Picket. 
 Fahrweg. Wagon-road. 
 Feld Art. Field artillery. 
 gegen. Toward. 
 
 geschlossene Abtheilungen. Troops in close order. 
 Grenze. Boundary. 
 Hainwiese. Wooded meadow. 
 Jäger. Riflemen. 
 Kirche St. Pauli und Johann. Church of St. Paul and St. 
 
 John. 
 Kirchhöfe. Churchyard. 
 Komm. General. Corps commander. 
 Marschkolonne. Columns of march. 
 n. (nach). To. 
 nördl. Fussweg. Northern foot-path. 
 
 361 
 
302 Glossary. \ 
 
 ohne. Less. 
 
 P. (Pi.) C. Engineer company. 
 
 Rechte Seit. Deckung. Right ßunk cover. 
 
 reit, (reitende) Battr. Horse battery. 
 
 Rothe Sandflur. Red sand-bed. 
 
 S. U. P. Detached A' on-coni mission cd officer's post. 
 
 San. Det. Ambulance company. 
 
 Schäferei. Sheep-fold. 
 
 Schkicht. Ravine. 
 
 Schützenlinien. Skirmish lines. 
 
 sichtbare Aufstellung des Feindes. Perceptible position of the 
 
 enemy. 
 Spitze des Gros. Head of the main body. 
 Steinbruch. Quarry. 
 südl. Fussweg. Southern foot-path. 
 u. And. 
 
 U. P. N on-commissioned officer s post. 
 Ueber. Via. 
 V. Gr. Outpost reserve. 
 von. Prom. 
 
 Vorp. Cav. in Ställen. Outpost cavalry in stables. 
 Wäldchen. Little woods. 
 Z. (Zg.) (Zug) Hus. Hussar troop. 
 Z. S. D. Ambulance company section. 
 
 ^\ 
 
 i 
 
FLAK I. 
 
 ORGANIZATION 
 
 OF THE 
 
 D. INFANTRY DIVISION AND 1st .CAVALRY BRIGADE. 
 
 Commander: Lieutenant General A. 
 General Staff Officer: Major X. 
 
 4tb lafanlry Brigade. 3d Infantry Brigade, 
 
 Major General C. .Major General B. 
 
 3d Inf. Regt. Col. P. 1st Inf. Regt. Col. D. 
 
 3d Bn. 2d Bn. 1st Bn. 3d Bn. 2d Bn. 1st Bn. 
 
 I SBBHMH ■■■■■■■ gmumi '■■■■■■i ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■I 
 
 4th Inf. Hegt. Col. G. 2d Inf. Regt. Col. E. 
 
 Bn. 2d Bn. 1st Bn. 3d Bn. 2d B. 1st Bn. 
 
 1st Hussar Regt. 
 
 Lieut. CoU H. 
 
 1st Field Artillery Regt. 
 
 Lieut. Col. J. 
 2d Bn. 1st Bd. 
 
 ß 5 4 3 2 
 
 |ll|tl|M|H|l »||t||l|l»(»«|M|« »ImImIi«]!!!!!!! l|«.|«<|M(l.||l|t •|m(«|)||(||(|||| ||m)| l|M|t l|t t{l 
 
 1st Co. 1st Bo. Engineers (with Division Brfdge Train). 
 
 Sig. Corps Det. Ambulance Co. 
 
 I 
 
 Ist Cavalry Brigade 
 
 Major General L. 
 Ut Uhlans, Col. N. lit Cuirasrvicrs. Lieut. Col. M. 
 
 1st Horse Battery, 1st Field Artillery Regt. 
 •|i «h ^|• •(• «I» «li 
 
 petach^d: 2d Uhlan Regiment to 1st Infantry Division. 
 Temporarily Attached (o2d Injantry Division: 2d Field Hospital. 
 

Map. I. Camp of Second Infantry Division on June 26 
 
 LAGE 
 
 derll-lnfanterie-Division 
 ani26-Juni 
 
 Fried land/ 
 
 Dtsck Hernejsdorf 
 
 loftuiii'v E S tttdrraSohn Berbi, (l(oc>,.tr G8\7l) 
 
 l-.tHustvWilkGri 
 
Map II. Rendezvous of the Second Infantry Division at Parschnitz. 
 
 vVerdy-t.GossIr-.Truppennihnmg 1,1. 
 
 RAST 
 
 der2-lnfanterie-Division bei \^ moiu 
 
 den27'?JuM8ühr40Miii.fra 
 
 'iumnufUiof\ .^WMmIIi^ 
 
 
 
 
 Vm^iKjl KotVchhv E S MoüsrlSok Berlm (K.ct>»trl> 
 
 l>di Instv Wi!K CTem. Berlin 
 
Map. I. Camp of Second Infantry Division on June 26. 
 
 LAGE 
 
 derD-Infanterie-Division 
 ani26-Juni 
 
 .AiüSLge 1. 
 
 llth InstvlVukKreve Btriin. 
 
Map II. Rendezvous of the Seeoad Infantry Division at Parschnitz. 
 
 iiLvVerdy-vGossIer Trufpenruhnml 
 
 Anlage IV. 
 
 RAST -.. I 
 
 der2-lnfanterie-Division bei %^ u <;//.. | 
 
 den 27H? Juni 8 Uhr 40 Mm früh ^ 
 
 D 
 
 Humnuthol \ 
 
 
 
 IfM i|\\: 
 
 vÄ*^ 
 
 -4-' 
 
 Vnli^dl^HolWHiv ES MaderiSohn BerUi, (Koch.b- b8\71) 
 
 liA InnvWIkGreve. Be; 
 
Map III- Position of the Second Infantry Division at 9.60 A. M. 
 
 Zn vVcr^vGoislerlruppiniuliruiig Heft H 
 
 FORMATION 
 
 der 2^^" Jnfantene Divisio<( 
 
 Hohenbiuck ^ 
 
 Verlag .1 K^Hoibudii, v.f S l/TitiJ.,! a i;ihr..,i1ciliti ■Jv<idi8ti--68\71.) 
 
 LidJlwi-vWilliUrevi-, Berlin 
 
Map IV. Position of the Second Infantry Division at 11.30 A. M. 
 
 . Verdy-v. Gossler, Studien I. 3. 
 
 Gefechtsplan I 
 
 LAGE 
 
 der 2!£ lafaDterie-Dimion 
 
 mn 11 Uhr 30 Minuten Vormittags. 
 
 
 Verlag l-KJlHafbuoKLvESMittler j. Soini.Bfrlmlkiirhsi.r b8/7J 
 
 Entsendet: 
 
 u • iir ,u . i '■'■ Comp. Rgt. A'o. i 
 be, Welhota ; ,^^ ^^ ^ £,^^ 
 
 _ . i / Etcadron der 
 
 Gegen Arnau { ^ CavaUrri,-Brig. 
 
 LitK h\EUt<a v TOK lirsvj Bwl. 
 
 Dil- Hähm sind in preutsSaimai Fassen ?5''««'-9a 
 
Map V. State o! the Pight at 12.45 P M. 
 
 Jes GefecMs der lis, Infanterie -Dimion 
 
 1„ Uhr 45 MinutPD Nachmittags. 
 
 VnU|i K(LEiin<itULTCSKinln i. SabLBnlmObcluu «1^11 
 
 BU. Ush^ tu,i In 
 
^erdy \ Gossler Studien I 3 
 
 Map VI State of the Fight at 1 45 P M 
 
 STAND 
 
 des Gerecbts der 2ü InfaQterie-DiTisioD 
 
 1 iJhr 45 Minuten Nachmittags. 
 
 VerUf ä K^Hofbuchh-x ESJtttlfr u Soto-BrrlmlKbckstr 68/711 
 
 Schtitienhmen 
 J * geschlo':sme Abtheüungen iüssaliger Truppen. 
 I Marschkolonne 
 _ sichtbare Aufstellung des Feindes. 
 
 Entsendet: 
 ( 2 EiCadron der 
 Gegen Arnau j ^ CavatUru-Brig. 
 
 LiÜL Iii£titui T VfiFK Orere Berlm 
 
 J) it Hohm sind mprmss.ßtämal Füssen aÄ^^-ftv* 
 
Map VII Bivouac and Outposts of the Second Infantry Division 
 on the Evening of June 27. 
 
 Biwaks und Vorposten -Aufstellung der 2"" Infanterie -Division 
 
 über Truppenfuhrung I 4 am Abend dos 21 Juni 
 
 3 
 
 - F. 
 
 —^ Hol 
 
 ^Si^ 
 
 "^ _,/" 
 
 
 i-l«Sd.KjlHiifbMUL7lS.Minlir j. Suhl Berlin (Kbelutr, tihW 
 
Zu V Veid\ Gossler Müden über Truppenfuhrung 
 
 Map VII. Bivouac and Outpoats of the Second Infantry Division 
 on the Evening of June 27- 
 
 Biwaks und Vorposten- Auf steUung der 2«" Infanterie -Divisicn 
 
 am Abtnd do» 7 Juni 
 
 tU{l.K<lBrfhuliLTES.«ittl.t 1. SitojMlmlKbclvnr. 88^1 
 
GENERAL LIBRARY- U.C. BERKELEY 
 
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