«= HI 
 
 WHAT IS TO BE DONE WITH 
 THE BENHAL ARMY
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES
 
 A 
 
 V 
 
 W37f^ * 
 
 WHAT IS TO BE DONE WITH 
 THE BENGAL ARMY? 
 
 QUI HI 
 
 "Non tiili auxilio, nee defensoribiis istis 
 Tempus cget." 
 
 LONDON: 
 EFFINGHAM WILSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE. 
 
 1857-. 
 Price One Shilling.
 
 
 [The publisher begs to announce^ that the whole expense 
 of this publication has been defrayed by the author^ 
 who has directed that the entire proceeds shall be 
 paid over to the Fund for the Relief of the Indian 
 Sufferers^ imthout any deduction save the allowance 
 to the trade.]
 
 Qm-w 
 
 WHAT IS TO BE DOM WITH THE 
 BENGAL ARMY ? 
 
 What is to be done with the Bengal army — how 
 much longer are the Medo-Persian rules of an absurd 
 routine to triumph over those of common sense, and 
 official twaddle to be accepted in lieu of action ? 
 
 Are we yet for a season to continue blind to the 
 uses of adversity, and acquiesce in a system which 
 has brought our Indian empire to the verge of ruin? 
 
 The wisdom of our ancestors held it as an axiom, 
 that similia similihus curantur; and on this principle, 
 certainly, we might entrust to official imbecility the 
 task of repairing its own crimes and blunders. 
 
 Loud is now the nation's cry for vengeance on the 
 mutinous and murderous Bengal army; and loudly 
 do our officials re-echo this Carthago est delenda: it 
 is not in deprecation of this vengeance that I raise 
 my voice ; it is to show the means by which this may 
 best be obtained, and that in the clamour we may not 
 lose sight of those culprits whose dishonesty, igno- 
 rance, and infatuation combined, have caused the 
 demoralisation of that army, and with it unparalleled 
 misery to so many thousands. By all means, destroy 
 the mutineers; but^ as a necessary and happily an 
 easy preliminary step, annihilate the wretched sys- 
 tem which has just worked out its own inevitable 
 results; and thus not only will the triumph of justice 
 be complete, but the means will be afforded, through 
 which alone we can hope for success, assured and 
 final, in this struggle. 
 
 In ordinary times, it is impossible to excite any 
 strong or general interest in the concerns of posses- 
 
 B 2
 
 sions so distant as India. While all appears serene 
 there, it is assumed that everything is being carried 
 on correctly; and it is only at a juncture like the 
 present, when our possession of it appears to be pass- 
 ing from us, that any strong feeling can be excited 
 on the subject. Few then remain insensible to the 
 fact, that such a loss would, in some greater or less 
 degree, injuriously affect their personal interests; 
 and that, by retaining that coimtry, they secure a 
 certain degree of personal benefit. In this view of 
 the case, all are more or less responsible for Indian 
 misgovernment. Our present calamity may be con- 
 sidered as a Divine judgment, certainly as a warning, 
 for the imperfect discharge of an important trust 
 committed to us; and terrible, indeed, would be the 
 mockery of that wrath, which would make our ima- 
 ginary blind zeal for the spread of the Gospel, the 
 engine for the destruction of a government which has 
 uniformly and steadily discountenanced every attempt 
 to fulfil this Christian duty. 
 
 This is not a branch of the subject on which I wish 
 to dwell at great length ; but I cannot refrain from 
 entering my protest against the assertions of those 
 who pretend to trace to the efforts of the mission- 
 aries, the excitement that now threatens to overturn 
 our empire. Even ignoring all our obligations as 
 Christians, I am convinced, that had we, from the 
 first, adopted the rational and consistent course of 
 insisting that our religion should have a fair and free 
 field, though no pre-eminence, and asserted for its 
 proselytes a perfect equality licfore the law, we 
 should have pursued a policy more intelligible, and 
 less unsatisfactory to Hindoo and Mussulman, than 
 the complaisant course we have adopted, which they 
 are incapable of appreciating, and which has perpe- 
 tuated in them a vague, uneasy apprehension, that 
 underhand measures for their forcible conversion are 
 being taken, which at present we dare not avow.
 
 To expect a direct and palpable interposition of 
 Divine aid in any difficulty, is what neither Scripture 
 nor experience warrant; yet I nevertheless believe, 
 that God's blessing will avail more than the strongest 
 array of bayonets; and I wish our policy had been 
 such as to deserve it. Calamities like the present, 
 may well shake even a great philosopher's faith in the 
 axiom, that "Providence always sides with the strong- 
 bayonets." The great Napoleon (with whom the 
 saying originated) found reason to distrust it, when 
 the event he deemed an impossibility — that the arms 
 should drop from the hands of his soldiers — literally 
 came to pass. The government of India has placed 
 all its reliance on the same false principle; and, in 
 carrying it out, has made the most egregious blun- 
 ders — ^the analogy is strong : Quern Deus vult perdere 
 prius denientat. 
 
 Let us suppose, however, either that Christianity 
 does not really impose on its adherents the obligation 
 of using every means, short of coercion, for the 
 spread of the Gospel — or that, being itself a delusion, 
 the government is justified in showing a marked dis- 
 approval of the efforts made for its propagation. 
 Are we to go one step further, and, in deference to 
 the bigotry of paganism, shut out the light of reason, 
 stop the progress of civilisation, and suspend the 
 work of education — which, whether religious or secu- 
 lar, is alike fatal to the existence of heathenism? 
 Unless prepared to go this length, I cannot imagine 
 how our position will be improved, among a people 
 incapable of discriminating between the various op- 
 ponents of their superstitions — between the most 
 humble Christian, and the most profound philosoj)her 
 — between the preacher of Christ, and the preacher 
 of the goddess of reason — between the man who 
 would persuade them that there is but one only, the 
 living and true God, and the man who assures them 
 that there is no God at all, at least no Providence, 
 and therefore no need of worship.
 
 I have no hesitation in affirming that the Calcutta 
 baboos, converts to philosophy— enlightened "Young 
 Bencral " — by engrafting on their native abominations 
 the particular blackguardism of fast men in England, 
 with the nonchalance of men who believe in nothing 
 at all, have done more to excite against us the horror 
 of their countrymen, than has been caused by all the 
 real or avowed conversions to Christianity. For, as 
 all that is absolutely essential in Hindooism is, the 
 abstaining from certain kinds of food, and observing 
 certain idiotical forms and ceremonies; so, in the 
 native view, the essence of Christianity is contained 
 in the eating of so-called abominations, and disre- 
 garding those superstitious observances; and, there- 
 fore, these men are assumed to be Christian, all their 
 indignant protests notwithstanding. Avowed infi- 
 delity cannot be admitted as an offset, by the votaries 
 of a paganism, which, resting entirely on the above- 
 named works, permits them to believe in anything, in 
 everything, or in nothing, without prejudice to their 
 ortliodoxy. 
 
 I think if anything has been irresistibly demon- 
 strated during this outbreak it is, that superstitions 
 which instigate to such atrocities are dangerous to 
 the stability of any civilised government ; that to any 
 toleration their right rests exclusively on their might ; 
 and that to shirk our duty of spreading the gospel 
 will avail notliing in allaying the apprehensions of a 
 heathenism so suspicious, so savage, so idiotical, 
 treacherous and brutal. The ultimate triumph of 
 civilisation and enlightenment is inevitable; is it to 
 be supposed that Christianity — the perfection and 
 realization of these — is to be excluded from partici- 
 pation therein? If the fall of heathenism in India 
 be a mere question of time, it is equally certain that 
 the masses there must have some religion; and com- 
 mon sense suggests the policy of trying to bind them 
 to us by a common faith, even were this not our im-
 
 })eriitive duty us Christians. It is notorious that the 
 most disafFocted uf our native subjects are the pliilo- 
 sopliical Calcutta baboos; and, but for the cowardice 
 inherent in every Bengalee, they would be the most 
 dangerous. A consistent and manly policy is, there- 
 fore, not merely right, but expedient Let us dis- 
 miss all missionary officers^ civil or military : preaching 
 is not their vocation; and to these weak-minded 
 zealots, who neglect their legitimate duties, disobey 
 the government, and embarrass its action by this 
 abuse of its authority, 1 would show no mercy. l>ut, 
 while punishing impertinent interlopers, let every 
 encouragement be afforded to legitimate labourers: 
 sln'ink not from supplying them with the amplest 
 means of furthering this most desirable object; and 
 above all, give them the encouragement that would 
 result from largely availing ourselves of the services 
 of their converts, and not scrupling to prove (what 
 we only betray and perpetuate our weakness in con- 
 cealing) that we do consider the profession of Chris, 
 tianity a guarantee for a servant's fidelity. 
 
 Ten just men would have saved Sodom; and, had 
 there been even ten Christian soldiers in a native 
 regiment, no such combinations as we have seen could 
 ever have been formed to overthrow us. Our excess- 
 ive caution, we now find, has failed to avert those 
 evils we so much dreaded ; and, my belief is, that it 
 has precipitated them. At all events, instead of 
 strengthening ourselves for the inevitable shock, we 
 have to meet it in tliat state of isolation and weak- 
 ness, which we so absurdly imagined would prove a 
 safeguard. 
 
 I trust, however, we are now rid of the delusion 
 that has cost us so much ; that we have discovered 
 that our greatest danger in India is the existence of 
 a heathenism, too rancorous and insensate to be ap- 
 peased by moderation, or reasoning— that if regard 
 for the spiritual welfare of its unhappy victims be no
 
 8 
 
 sufficient cause, our own security requires such tem- 
 perate efforts to be made for assimilating their faith 
 to ours — that, while carefully abstaining from any- 
 thing like persecution, or injustice, we are determined 
 to make ourselves respected ; and, by God's blessing, to 
 hold by the sword, that which the sword has given us, 
 and shrink from our duties as little as from our rights. 
 
 As I shall have occasion to point out to how serious 
 an extent Lord Dalhousie is responsible for our pre- 
 sent disasters, I gladly avail myself of this oppor- 
 tunity of expressing my admiration of the true great- 
 ness and wisdom he showed in regard to the subject 
 of which I have been speaking. I think he is en- 
 titled to the very highest praise, both as a statesman 
 and as a Christian, for having so courageously swept 
 away all the penalties under which Christian converts 
 suffered ; and for having, moreover, so unhesitatingly 
 availed himself of the opportunities which- presented 
 themselves of introducing important improvements 
 in the moral and social condition of the Hindoos them- 
 selves. 
 
 Had he but given a like attention to the concerns 
 of the army, he would have averted those dangers 
 which now even his very best acts have aggravated. 
 
 Most creditable, I think, to ministers, is the energy 
 they have displayed in the prompt despatch to India 
 of so large a European force; nor can I concur with 
 Mr. Disraeli, in regarding the cheerful and manly 
 bearing they preserve under the difficult}^, as any 
 proof of insensibility to its magnitude : but what I 
 do most earnestly deprecate is, the i)ostponement till 
 things are settled, of the reforms necessary to effect 
 that settlement. Surely at no time can great changes 
 create less inconvenience than at the moment of a 
 convulsion, which has turned everything topsy-turvy; 
 never can a system have less claim for consideration 
 than just when, in breaking down, it manifests its in- 
 herent wortlilessness.
 
 9 
 
 No one has larger faith than I have in what may 
 possibly be effected by the unaided valour of British 
 soldiers; but, with such odds against us, it would 
 surely be madness to neglect, or defer employing any 
 means, which might give us the effective assistance of 
 large bodies of natives; not merely on the field of 
 battle but in the far more, serious, desultory warfare, 
 by which our government must thereafter expect to 
 be harassed, for an indefinite period. Yet, important 
 as are the considerations of the material aid to be 
 thus derived in the actual struggle, still more so are 
 the political advantages, which would be gained, by 
 largely employing native agency in punishing native 
 rebels. We should divert from ourselves the odium 
 which must be incurred in exact proportion to the 
 degree in which we personally engaged in those seve- 
 rities that must be inflicted : we should destroy the 
 hope of future combinations, when one formed under 
 the most favourable circumstances so signally failed, 
 and fidelity is proved to be the more profitable course; 
 and we would show the mutineers how little sym- 
 pathy their wrongs, real or pretended, can excite in 
 their owii districts, where we find an ample supply of 
 aspirants to fill their place. To me it appears im- 
 possible to over-estimate the moral effect which would 
 be produced (not merely in India, but throughout the 
 civilized world) by raising among a people, believed 
 to be hostile to our rule, and, at the critical period 
 when our position seems so isolated and perilous, a 
 fresh army, whose service, in crushing that which has 
 revolted, would prove the best guarantee for its own 
 future fidelity. In making this suggestion, I point to 
 nothing that would be impracticable, or even very 
 difficult to carry out. 
 
 For upwards of a century, we have had an un- 
 limited command of such levies as formed that Bengal 
 army, which (whatever it may now have become) 
 gained for us an empire, of which it was the decus
 
 10 
 
 and the tutamen. Laiiientablu as have been the errors 
 that gradually ruined an army that so long and so 
 faithfully served us, I cannot for an instant doubt 
 that our prestige, backed by the large force of Britisli 
 soldiers now sent out, will prove sufficient to convince 
 all India that our ultimate triumph is certain, and 
 bind to our interest those classes from which an army 
 could be raised worthy of implicit confidence. All, 
 however, must depend on the direction (whether for 
 good or evil) given it by the system we adopt from 
 the outset. If we benefit by our dear-bought expe- 
 rience, we shall steer clear of those errors by which 
 we disorganised our late army; and any retribution 
 with which we may visit their misdeeds will, then, 
 not only be safe, but will tend to strengthen the 
 authority we vindicate. 
 
 No greater fallacy could I think be imagined, than 
 that which would contemplate the possibility of re- 
 taining India mainly through the agency of British 
 troops. Though it may be necessary for a consider- 
 able time to maintain there such a force as has never 
 hitherto been thought requisite, and to make a corre- 
 sponding reduction in the number of our native 
 soldiery, yet we shall but complicate our difficulties 
 under any system which does not put at our disposal 
 a large and efficient native army. Could our country 
 even bear the drain of men required to keep up so 
 large a European force, the finances of India must 
 soon succumb, under the pressure of the enormous 
 expenditure it would occasion. The very fact, that a 
 European regiment never marches except accompanied 
 by a detachment of natives to take its guards, may 
 serve to convey to the British public some idea of the 
 exotic state of Englisli troops in India, and the im- 
 possibility of their performing general duties. 
 
 For Government to resolve to discard native trooi)S 
 from its service in Bengal, would be about as reason- 
 able as for private individuals, whose native servants
 
 11 
 
 had on this occasion misbehaved, to determine never 
 again to employ any but Europeans. 
 
 Much has been said and written as to the causes of 
 this great mutiny; but the whole matter, I think, 
 resolves itself into this, that the men were success- 
 fully tampered with, because, under our system, their 
 European officers had little or no influence over them. 
 Russian spies there may have been (though I doubt 
 it), who plied their treacherous arts on this occasion. 
 Faqueers I think it probable there were, who went 
 about the country proclaiming our approaching 
 downfall. Old Bengal (important by its wealth) did, 
 we know, keep an incessant howl over expiring 
 Hindoo orthodoxy; and no one can pretend to say 
 what means might have been resorted to by the 
 society it supports, for the preservation of its hea- 
 thenism in all its catholicity and its unclean ness. 
 Not less notorious is the hatred borne us by " Young 
 Chucherbutty " ; and it is improbable that the stream 
 of blasphemous and seditious trash (which he con- 
 cocts, it is said, over a steak and champagne) should 
 have been suspended just at the time of there being 
 hope that it would do us some injury. How far 
 matters may have been aggravated by any of these 
 or other such like causes, I cannot divine (as Sir W. 
 G. might say) ; but what I am sure of is, that the 
 Sepoys had no hatred to the government, though 
 they had no love, and would unhesitatingly have 
 stood by us against every foe, foreign or domestic, 
 had they not really believed that in serving out those 
 greased cartridges we had devised a scheme for ruining 
 their caste, It was only when they believed that we 
 were guilty of treachery to them that they fell away 
 from us. Mahomedan conspirators skilfully availed 
 themselves of the egregitjus blunder, which ignorance 
 and self-sufficiency committed; but had European 
 officers possessed but ordinary influence with their 
 men, their explanations would have been accepted, in
 
 12 
 
 preference to the distorted colouring which the agents 
 of the miscreant King of Delhi gave to the matter. 
 
 I can see no reason for the hesitation, which many 
 who know, or ought to kiiow, something of native 
 character express, about accepting the cartridge affair^ 
 as a sufficient cause for the excitement it was sup- 
 posed to have produced. I can only, indeed, express 
 my wonder that any such could conceive of a limit, 
 to the horror and rage, which would be excited in 
 Hindoos or Mahomedans, who believed they were 
 being inveigled into tasting cow's or pig's fat. 
 
 To our red tape and routine we owe it, that tliere 
 were men so idiotical as thus to outrage the feeling 
 of an army, and that there were not men who could 
 repair the mischief these idiots had effected. 
 
 People may argue that there is something inhe- 
 rently Satanic in the Sepoy's nature. Satanic, it is 
 proved that he may become ; but if he be inherently 
 so, our position in India is untenable; for, with all 
 their faults, the Sepoys are, taken as a body, the 
 " creme de la crerae" of the country. 
 
 Some systems are so dexterously devised, that the 
 one weak point under which they finally break down 
 is not observed by the projectors until the occurrence 
 of the catastrophe. Thus, the ingenious plan of 
 reducing a horse's food till the brute is rendered 
 capable of existing without any, did not betray its 
 inherent defect till the reduction had been brought to 
 a single straw; or, we may take an equally apt illus- 
 tration in the story of a camel loaded to tliat degree 
 where a single extra feather weight caused him to 
 break down. The horse or ctimel may equally well 
 be taken as types of the Indian army, the bright 
 genius under which it sank was my Lord Dalhousie 
 I do not mean to say that this illustrious nobleman 
 was the originator of the system, but^ as Falstaff 
 suggests of Worcester's rebellion, " it lay in his way 
 and he found it." I may add, he adopted it con
 
 13 
 
 ainore. He it wus who deprived the regimental 
 officers of the last vestige of esprit de corps^ by 
 stamping them yet more clearly as an inferior class of 
 men, good for nothing but to perform such drudgery 
 as their more gifted brethren had been relieved from. 
 Amazed, as he no doubt is at the result, he, happily 
 for himself, secured his reward ere the catastrophe 
 occurred. Now he may point to his marquisate and 
 pension of £5,000 per annum as proofs of the ap- 
 proval his policy met with. He may yet even twit 
 his successor with having failed to continue in this 
 dead body that spasmodic action, which he persuaded 
 the British public was a healthy and vigorous ex- 
 istence. 
 
 " The position of the native soldier in India has 
 long been such as to have hardly any circumstance of 
 his condition in need of improvement." — Dalhousie^ 
 Minute of2Sth February, 1856. 
 
 In the case of Lord Dalhousie, as one of the ablest 
 men who ever obtained such an appointment, we have 
 the best illustration of the evils of our system, which 
 throws every office of great trust, dignity, and emolu- 
 ment into the hands of the aristocratic party; and it 
 is the first of the evils, I shall notice, with which the 
 Bengal army has been cursed. Colonial governor- 
 ships are among the good things to which the British 
 oligarcliy appears to have established an indefeasible 
 right, i'ar too valuable to be voluntarily sacrificed : 
 and to appoint any one merely for peculiar aptitude 
 for such a post, and without reference to his aristo- 
 cratic coimexion, would be an innovation from which 
 the most radical of premiers would shrink aghast. 
 
 But in the list of titled nonentities who have been 
 sent out to misgovern India, Lord Dalhousie stands 
 forth in bright relief. With ability sufficient to have 
 secured him at home a position as elevated, and in 
 which he would certainly have been more useful, it 
 suited his circumstances to accept the more lucrative
 
 14 
 
 appointment. By his f^reat administrative ability, he 
 did much for the social and material improvement of 
 India, and he wanted only political honesty, and some 
 practical acquaintance with the people, to have re- 
 paired those evils which his policy had only the effect 
 of aggravating to that point at which they threaten 
 to overwhelm us. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's dishonesty, as a statesman, was, 
 throughout his viceroyalty, evinced in the aggressive 
 and ambitious policy he pursued, both in the war he 
 provoked, and in the greed which was ever framing 
 fresh pretexts for quietly pouncing upon petty native 
 states ; whose inability to defend the rights and pos- 
 sessions we had ourselves allowed them, appears to 
 him to have afforded a convincing proof of their un- 
 worthiness to continue in the enjoyment of them. 
 But, in truth, his Lordship's ambition seems to have 
 been that of a financier rather than of a conqueror — 
 of a chancellor of the exchequer rather than of a 
 premier. The game of annexation did not pay its 
 expenses ; but repeated failures only spurred him on 
 to fresh predatory achievements, till at length the 
 passion became a sort of monomania. From plunder- 
 ing semi-independent rajahs, he took to robbing 
 British subjects, and condescended to deprive govern- 
 ment creditors of one per cent, of the interest they 
 were entitled to, by an offer of repayment which he 
 well knew he was not in a position to have carried 
 out. 
 
 "Honesty is the best policy"; and, perhaps, in a 
 governor-general, some part of his Lordship's brilliant 
 talents might have been advantageously exchanged 
 for a somewhat clearer appreciation of this truth. It 
 is very obvious that his acquisitiveness has had the 
 tendency of exciting the Bengal Sepoys to do, on their 
 own account, a little — robbing, he, of course in their 
 case, admits it to be. They are, at all events, thereby 
 furnished with another plausible excuse ; for — proh
 
 15 
 
 pudor ! — even the master-stroke of the conversion of 
 the 5 per cents, has not escaped their notice ; they 
 have publicly avowed themselves the avengers of the 
 wrongs, not merely of native princes, but of the 
 moneyed interest ! ! ! 
 
 It is very easy to pooh-pooh inferences such as 
 these; but will Lord Dalhousie venture to affirm, 
 that, supposing his example did not awaken any simi- 
 lar cupidity in otliers, and, as is more than probable, 
 that other causes rendered the mutiny inevitable, we 
 should not have been better prepared to meet it, with 
 Oude, Nagpore, etc., etc., unannexed, the apprehen- 
 sions of other states not excited, and the moneyed 
 class not smarting under the conviction that they 
 had been swindled. Lord Dalhousie's policy reacted 
 most perniciously on the army, by swelling the crowd 
 of malcontents, who had no hope left of righting 
 themselves, other than in corrupting its fidelity. 
 His unscrupulous policy really justified much that 
 was said of it, and rendered belief easy in those mon- 
 strous lies that caused the outbreak. 
 
 J>ut I am considering Lord Dalhousie's adminis- 
 tration only as it affected the Bengal army; and am 
 bound to admit, that had he possessed any real ac- 
 quaintance with its constitution and requirements, 
 he might have rendered it a safe tool for supporting 
 him in any course of injustice that did not aifect its own 
 interests — in the spoliation of every semi-independent 
 rajah, or in sponging out the entire national debt. 
 
 To the mere abstract question of right or wrong, 
 Hindoo Sepoys are more indifi*erent than the noble 
 lord himself : Bengalees they detest ; and despise 
 them in regard to their religious, social, and physical 
 condition : to Mahomedans their hatred is more in- 
 tense, because mixed with fear and distrust; and as 
 for foreign emissaries. Sepoys are credulous only in 
 matters of religion, and would prefer anything that 
 might be obtained from the liberality of the govern-
 
 16 
 
 ment on denouncing them, to any promises or to any 
 amount of bribes which it would be possible for such 
 persons to distribute among them. Without nation- 
 ality, with but one bond of union that, touched upon, 
 might be equally dangerous — but with all the bear- 
 ings of which we ought, ere now, to be thoroughly 
 acquainted — men better adapted to perform every 
 service we can require, could nowhere be found, than 
 in the ignorant, simple, and indolent, though cou- 
 rageous, natives of the provinces from which the 
 Bengal army is recruited. Firmness, and judgment 
 based on experience, are all that we require to rule 
 them; but these are indispensable. 
 
 Unfortunately, Lord Dalhousie, lofty and impe- 
 rious as he was, seems to have been incapable of 
 appreciating, as despots might have done, the import- 
 ance of maintaining the efficiency of the native army; 
 and was quite ignorant of tlie means of doing so. 
 His maxim of Ceclant arma togce^ cannot in India be 
 safely carried out in the style he adopted; but with 
 him the feeling became intensified by the fact, that 
 in the toga he could see only his noble self : he was 
 not merely a civilian; but was, as it were, the im- 
 personation of the entire civil service. If he had 
 sympathy for any portion of tlie army, it was the 
 European; but financial considerations — the costli- 
 ness of the article — were probably the mainspring of 
 his solicitude for it. In the native army he saw only 
 a meaner description of servants, paid for doing his 
 bidding, of which the most important part was the 
 carrying out his mischievously aggressive policy. 
 Though in his position it would have been utterly 
 imjjossible to have gained, by personal observation, 
 any insight into their character, he uniformly acted 
 upon the theory which he framed lor himself at the 
 outset -^tliat the army could never become so dan- 
 gerous through neglect, as to warrant an expenditure 
 in reforming it, which might involve the necessity of
 
 17 
 
 deferring his plans — many of them, I confess, admi- 
 rable — for the material improvement of the coun- 
 try. 
 
 As the Governor-General has the chief authority 
 over the army, it cannot be disputed that he should 
 have the chief share of the blame for its inefficiency; 
 and Lord Dalhousie's unquestionable ability pre- 
 cludes the possibility of supposing anything but wil- 
 ful nesflect in his case. He had abundant and over- 
 whelming proof, that the system was rotten to the 
 very core: he was long on intimate terms with a 
 Gough and a Gomra — men whose mental calibre 
 must have been apparent to him in their first five 
 minutes' conversation; yet he readily acquiesced in 
 their incompetency. Their indisposition to do any- 
 thing, or suggest any thing, he probably felt a relief, 
 when he considered what such men might do, and 
 might suggest. It is generally believed, indeed, that 
 he had serious intentions of removing Lord Gough 
 from his command, at the critical period when that 
 general's wretched blundering nearly caused our ruin 
 in the Sutledge campaign. It is certain that his 
 representations influenced ministers in sending out 
 Sir Charles Napier, post-haste, to relieve him; while 
 Sir W. Gomm (whose military and general capacity 
 was known to be much on a par with Lord Gough's) 
 was unceremoniously and ignominiously turned away, 
 on presenting himself in Calcutta to take up this 
 appointment, which had first been given to him. 
 The innninence of the peril alarmed Lord Dalhousie; 
 but, the crisis having been surmounted by the despe- 
 rate valour — and, alas ! the cruel sacrifice — of British 
 soldiers, he scrupled not to bestow the chief praise 
 on the man whose incompetency was notorious to all 
 ]ndia; and had by none been deplored more vehe- 
 mently, than by his lordship. 
 
 His treatment of Sir Charles Napier, on the other 
 hand, proves that Lord Dalhousie much preferred 
 
 c
 
 18 
 
 that the army should be without any real head. His 
 amour-propre was wounded by the independence of 
 that rude old soldier. He at first blandly received 
 Sir Charles's plans, praised their wisdom, and quietly 
 shelved them — they might have been judicious 
 enough, but he had more important matters to carry 
 out. Of course, no one felt surprised that a quarrel 
 should break out between one of the most irascible 
 and one of the most haughty of men. Lord Dalhou- 
 sie's polished style, and brilliant powers of sarcasm, 
 backed by a Satanic placidity and proud humility, 
 enabled him to offer a highly plausible refutation of 
 his infuriated opponent's clumsily expressed argu- 
 ments; but few, I apprehend, will now venture to 
 deny that Sir Charles formed a more just estimate of 
 the condition and requirements of the Bengal army 
 — affected, moreover, as these were, by the general 
 policy which his lordship was carrying out. 
 
 Napier was succeeded by Gomm, who appears to 
 have felt no spark of delicacy about again accepting 
 an appointment, which had been so unceremoniously 
 cancelled, when it was felt that any " respectable old 
 gentleman " would not suffice for it. As, happily, he 
 had no opportunity of plajdng the fool anywhere but 
 in his own snug quarters at Simla, or on the pleasure 
 tours undertaken on the plea of inspecting the army, 
 he gave Lord Dalhousie great satisfaction; their only 
 serious difference of opinion having been, as to the 
 right of the Commander-in-Chief to indent on the 
 commissariat for note-paper as well as the foolscap, 
 to which it was conceded that he had an unquestion- 
 able claim I I have reason to believe that their har- 
 mony was not permanently destroyed by his lordship 
 deciding, that his excellency's pay had been fixed at 
 £I8,U00 per annum, to enable him to defray even the 
 cost of his own note-paper. 
 
 While indifferent to the fact that the army con- 
 tinued without a headj his lordship was equally indif-
 
 19 
 
 ferent to its deficiencies in regard to other members. 
 His judgment, or his honesty, in the bestowal of his 
 military patronage is illustrated in the case of his 
 nominee. General Hewitt, an officer somewhat un- 
 justly blamed for not evincing, on an emergency, 
 those qualities, of which it had always been noto- 
 rious that God had never granted him the slightest 
 modicum. 
 
 In bestowing less important military appointments 
 — except where he could gain some eclat by rewarding 
 some extraordinary achievement — his lordship was 
 not so fortunate as to inspire a general belief, that he 
 was indifferent to the chance of strengthening his 
 political interest at home, on the good old Scotch 
 principle of " claw me, claw thee," though few could 
 deny that on many occasions he could have been ac- 
 tuated only by the most disinterested private friend- 
 ship; but where neither of these motives were pal- 
 pable, he was considered, I believe, to be a good deal 
 guided by caprice. 
 
 While Lord Dalhousie considered it no part of his 
 duty to make one effort for the improvement of the 
 morality and tone of feeling among the regimental 
 officers — albeit the fact was notorious that these were 
 daily becoming lower, and injuriously re-acted on the 
 discipline of their regiments — he could, on occasions 
 where no moral turpitude was ever alleged, and where 
 only his own idiosyncracy was touched, interfere in 
 the most harsh and arbitrary manner. One instance 
 will suffice to illustrate his mode of carrying out his 
 grand principle of snubbing the military. The com- 
 mandant of the 6th N.I. he suspended from his duty, 
 and his allowances for six months, for the crime of 
 asserting his authority in the cantonment he com- 
 manded, and turning out of it an impertinent young 
 civilian who resisted it. The station staff he de- 
 prived of his appointment, for carrying out the orders 
 of his own commanding officer. The injured civilian 
 
 c 2
 
 20 
 
 illustrated the degree of forbearance he had pre- 
 viously shown by devising means still further to 
 annoy the officers of that corps. Among other 
 things he trumped up a charge of dacoitee against a 
 number of their men, Avhich (after harassing them 
 Avith a vexatious and unwarrantable prosecution) he 
 v.^as obliged to drop, and got wigged for his conduct 
 by his own superiors, not including Lord Dalhousie, 
 however. Now, as the mutinv in the 6tli N I. was 
 marked by circumstances of uncommon atrocity and 
 treachery, can we here not trace something of cause 
 and effect? Is it at all reasonable, I would ask, to 
 expect that Sepoys will res[)ect officers whom their 
 own government does not respect; that discipline 
 will be preserved, when there is, even in cantonments, 
 an imperium in imperio^ that can first defy the com- 
 mandant, then pounce upon the men themselves, and 
 subject them to a disgraceful prosecution, simply to 
 spite the officers, and prove how little dependance 
 the Sepoys need place in their protection? 
 
 But had Lord Dalhousie been blind to every other 
 sign of the times, he could not ignore tlie fiict, that 
 two mutinies had occurred durinj; his own vice- 
 royalty. The first of these was the direct conse- 
 quence of his reducing tlie Punjab allowances, and, 
 for a time, it rendered our position highly precarious, 
 though his lordship, who was at the time at sea, 
 thought proper to make very light of the matter, 
 when he returned and found it all settled. I do not 
 mean to say that the reduction of batta, which caused 
 that mutiny, was foolish, the folly consisted in failing 
 to discover that there were some radical defects in a 
 system which showed sucli results; and, if he did not 
 fail to see this, his infatuation was still greater, in 
 entirely neglecting the consideration of a remedy. 
 
 The second of the mutinies, for the neglect of which 
 Lord Dalhousie is responsible, was less serious in 
 itself, but marked by greater infatuation on his part.
 
 21 
 
 for it was never put down. The 38th Native Infan- 
 try were required to proceed down the coast by sea, 
 and they refused, so they were allowed to go by land. 
 " Let them go then, and thank God you are rid of the 
 knaves;" seems to have been literally the direction 
 given by the most noble marquis : moreover, this was 
 all the action taken upon it. We have corps raised 
 for general service; we might raise any number for 
 this purpose : yet it was to Lord Dalhousie's successor 
 that we are indebted for the very natural and obvious 
 remedy of directing that henceforth all recruits should 
 be enlisted for general service, i.e. to go by sea or 
 by land as may be required. 
 
 The supreme indifference manifested by Lord Dal- 
 housie for all that concerned the native army, and 
 his slight acquaintance with this subject, proves that 
 abilities of a very high order can neither gain their 
 possessor the peculiar aptness for the post he filled, 
 nor compensate for the want of it. I submit that 
 the first requisite for the Indian army, and not less 
 so for India in general, is, that the governor should 
 be possessed of Indian experience. 
 
 I presume no one will deny that such men as Sir 
 John Lawrence, or General Uutram, would be more 
 competent for the post of Governor-General than 
 Lord Canning can possibly be ; if so, why is not the 
 change made at once ? Simply because the cry of 
 " the right man in the right place " is disregarded, 
 and the nearest approach we can find to the principle 
 is, to put in the right man to advise the ivrong man in 
 the nice berth. If the salvation of India depended 
 upon it, I believe the feeling of Lord Canning on the 
 subject would be pronounced more worthy of consi- 
 deration by our officials. Those who, like myself, 
 depend upon India for their means of support, and 
 who would be reduced to absolute beggary were it 
 lost, cannot be expected to feel any such delicacy. 
 I speak of a Gough, or a Gomm, or a Dalhousie, or a
 
 22 
 
 Canning, simply as regards their performance of pub- 
 lic duties, and have a right to speak plainly when my 
 all is at stake. Two at least of these men, I have 
 every reason to believe, kind-hearted and estimable in 
 private life; but kind-hearted and estimable men Avho 
 undertake public duties for which they are unfit, 
 must expect to be spoken of Avith bitterness by those 
 whom their folly threatens with ruin. 
 
 Of Lord Canning I know nothing personally ; and, 
 up to the time of the outbreak, he had done little by 
 which any estimate of his ability could be formed, 
 except on the not unftiir inference, that he who gives 
 no striking proof of ability has no great ability to 
 give proof of. He now certainly appears to have 
 shown personal intrepidity; and, as far as proclama- 
 tions go, to have evinced great determination of cha- 
 racter; but his acts do not confirm this favourable 
 impression. The muzzling the press (the European 
 portion of it I mean) was assuredly a mistake; it was 
 a proof of a weak mind, for it was the press which 
 rescued England from that destruction which was 
 inevitable under the system it exposed. The rational 
 plan for the Indian government to have adopted 
 would have been to have placed the entire Bengal 
 presidency under martial law. This would liave 
 given them absolute power over the press without 
 placing them in the invidious position of direct anta- 
 gonism, or of seeming to fear, or even anticipate, any 
 hostility in that quarter. That the measure should 
 have met the cordial approval of the official mind of 
 Leadenliall street affords presumption against its wis- 
 dom ; and, when we consider the energetic use that 
 has already been made of it by the government, in 
 tlie case of the Friend of Lidia, and then contemplate 
 the supine infatuation tliat permits, at such a junc- 
 ture, the unrestricted sale of arms, we may feel very 
 grave apprehensions as to the capacity of such men to 
 surmount our present difficulties.
 
 23 
 
 It would be useless now to enquire whether the 
 Indian government did or did not show sufficient 
 promptness and judgment in their efforts to allay the 
 excitement caused by serving out greased cartridges. 
 I firmly believe that they did not : but let them have 
 the benefit of any doubt, which may be felt by some 
 of those who can appreciate the difficulty of allaying 
 the superstitious fears and apprehensions of the be- 
 nighted Hindoo mind. More to the purpose is it to 
 enquire if they are now employing every means avail- 
 able for repairing the mischief they have done. Two 
 resources there are which (as far as we yet know) the 
 government of India has entirely neglected. The first 
 is to meet conspiracy with counter- plots — treachery 
 with corruption — 'if such it can be called. Here some 
 of our politicals might have an opportunity of shining; 
 or, at least, have a chance of repairing the damage 
 done to their pretensions to astuteness, when the 
 hell-broth bubbled up, that had unobserved been so 
 long simmering under their diplomatic noses. The 
 " almighty dollar " is less influential in America than 
 the rupee in India ; the control of the public purse is 
 not of greater use to the Commons, than the command 
 of so much treasure would be to the Indian govern- 
 ment, if judiciously employed. Bribery would, ere 
 this, have opened the gates of Delhi, and enabled us 
 to present to India the edifying spectacle of the 
 Mogul scoundrel, with all his cubs, swinging in front 
 of his own palace; while by these means, too, we 
 could easily have spread dissension, distrust, and 
 weakness throughout the ranks of the insurgents. 
 
 No one could oppose any well-founded scruples to 
 such a course, least of all could the Indian govern- 
 ment, that so largely used these means in the first 
 Sutledge campaign. Captain Cunningham's book 
 gives the fullest details of these transactions ; and the 
 truth of the narrative was stamped by the govern- 
 ment that deprived him of his appointment, simply
 
 24 
 
 because he told the truth, the whole truth, and no- . 
 thing but the truth. Lord Dalhousie, who had no 
 scruples in becoming the agent for wreaking on poor 
 Cunningham the vengeance of those he had exposed, 
 was not ashamed to justify the act, on the ground 
 that, thouo-h Cunninsrham had received the court's 
 permission to make use of public documents ni 
 writing his history, it was never contemplated that he 
 would use them to the extent of an expose such as 
 this ! ! Poor Cunningham died of a broken heart ; 
 and my Lord Dalhousie lived to receive a pension of 
 £5,000 per annum, as a reward for his dutiful con- 
 duct on this and other occasions. 
 
 The second of the resources which the Indian 
 government seems to have lost sight of, is, to call 
 out all ^^ensioners for active service ; for if anywhere 
 we can tind men in whom we may repose confidence, 
 
 it is amono: those whom our fall would ruin. 
 
 - . ...1. 
 
 Officials, we know, display great ingenuity m dis- 
 covering objections to every plan, however little they 
 may evince in oifering practical suggestions; but I 
 submit that this ensures the following advantages: — 
 
 1st. A reasonable prospect of enlisting a consider- 
 able number of faithful and experienced soldiers, still 
 something better than mere food for powder, and 
 who would besides give us a moral support in the 
 country, much needed in our present circumstances. 
 
 2ndly. Exactly in proportion as we failed to obtain 
 such services, would the finances of the state be re- 
 lieved from the burthen of maintaining ungrateful 
 scoundrels ; for we could then, with a safe conscience, 
 strike all such off the establishment. 
 
 There could be no difficulty in sending purwan- 
 nahs, or at least printed notices, all through the very 
 most disturbed parts of India ; directing all pension- 
 ers to repair to any place convenient to government, 
 and which they could name. Native agency might 
 easily effect the object of circulating any number of
 
 25 
 
 such bills : it would be but a question of a few hun- 
 dred rupees. 
 
 There appears to be a beautiful harmony in the 
 opinions of Downing-street and Horse-Guards, as to 
 the value of Indian experience, in the posts of which 
 they respectively have the patronage ; and the supe- 
 rior advantages to be derived from the unadulterated 
 wisdom, which would bend everything to Downing- 
 street or Horse-Guards' regulations, rather than 
 accommodate itself to any prejudices, in which those 
 great institutions felt no sympathy. 
 
 The Horse- Guards' Commander-in-Chief, tlien, 
 comes to India with a certainty of materially bene- 
 fiting himself; but often, too, with a vague idea that 
 he may in some way also benefit the government, as 
 its chief military adviser. Accordingly, like the 
 good-natured Mazeppa, he undertakes — 
 
 " With such a hope to track 
 His seventy years * of memory back." 
 
 But as this extensive experience all bears reference 
 to the state of countries havino- nothing in common 
 with that of India, the relation, I apprehend, rarely 
 excites more attention at the council-table, than was 
 paid to the thrilling narrative of the Cossack warrior 
 by the royal Swede. 
 
 I know not that I need add anything to what I 
 have incidentally brought forward, as to the value of 
 these men; for Sir William Gon)m has himself done 
 all that could be required. I am content to rest the 
 point on the spectacle presented by this old gentle- 
 man, who has favoured the British public with a long 
 letter on the subject of this mutiny; the pith of 
 which is, that he cannot, for the life of him, *' divine" 
 wlmt made the army so naughty, as he never observed 
 
 * Or " fifty or sixty — it is all the same," as Donna Julia says.
 
 26 
 
 anything wrong. He took, no doubt, very unneces- 
 sary trouble to gibbet himself, when he illustrated 
 the intense ignorance he avowed, by adding, that he 
 could not even form an idea on the subject. The 
 loss of any idea of his can hardly be considered 
 serious ; but, unwittingly, he has thrown a good deal 
 of light on the subject, by this zany-like avowal of 
 ignorance. Knowing that it was he who for five 
 years commanded (so to speak) the army that has 
 mutinied, how few will be disposed to re-echo his 
 foolish cry of " Who 'd have thought it?"* 
 
 The Horse-Guards' generals, who come out for 
 divisional commands, are certainly less unprofitable 
 servants to the state, if it be admitted (as I suppose 
 it will) that there is less loss in paying a man £5,000 
 per annum for doing nothing, than in paying him 
 £18,000 for this return. They are, however, infe- 
 rior to Company's generals, inasmuch as the latter 
 (who have to contend only against the evil of ap- 
 proaching dotage, which is common to them both) 
 need not, through utter ignorance of native charac- 
 ter, make fools of themselves on ordinary occasions. 
 General Elphinstone (of Cabul notoriety) may be 
 taken as the type of the one class, as General Hewitt 
 no doubt is of the other; though, happily, it rarely 
 occurs that they obtain such op})ortunities of showing 
 what they really are capable of doing, or rather of 
 
 * Though I can with a clear conscience declare, that I have not 
 the slightest personal ill feehng towards Sir William Gomm, yet I 
 feel it almost impossible to speak of him with any degree of patience. 
 Here is an extract from his letter above alluded to : " To what 
 cause, to what fatality this strange outbreak is owing — by what mis- 
 understanding these miserable men have been led into such a course 
 of wickedness — I do not pretend to divine." MiseraUe men indeed! 
 but what can be said for the man who ascribes such things to 
 fatality. Nero fiddled while Rome was burning ; Gomm could only 
 write sonnets — perhaps he sang them too — while the fire was 
 smouldering in the Bengal army: and then commenced a squabble 
 with the Supreme Government, as to who was to pay for the note 
 paper he wasted on his doggrel.
 
 27 
 
 not doing. A good staff, and still more frequently 
 mere good luck, has often saved the state from the 
 natural consequences of coniiding important trusts to 
 the incompetent; and has, too, procured the garnish 
 of K.C.B. to a name, which public opinion had long 
 branded with very different characters. 
 
 For the evil of Horse-Guards' influence, there is 
 but one remedy; viz., to transfer permanently to 
 India the contingent of twenty regiments, supplied 
 by the crown; and thus, for ever sever their and 
 our connection with the Horse-Guards^ and its horse- 
 marine chiefs and generals. As I would propose 
 that the entire united army be made a royal one, I 
 can conceive no possible objection to the plan, save 
 in the interested opposition of the Horse-Guards ; and 
 of a few old fogies, who are looking out for the snug 
 berths, which they fill with so much satisfaction to 
 themselves, and real detriment to the best interests 
 of India. There would be no difficulty in arranging 
 the exchanges between the officers who wished to 
 remain in the home army, and those who preferred 
 the Indian. The rich would unhesitatingly choose 
 the former, the poor the latter — the advantages seem 
 balanced. England would be relieved of many ex- 
 penses, which unavoidably fall upon her under the 
 present system — among others, the pensions of the 
 officers, and of many men, whose service has been 
 almost entirely performed in India. 
 
 Even the finances of India might be relieved, in 
 the saving of transport-hire on reliefs, and in the 
 abolition of the useless staff kept up for Queen's 
 troops; while the efficiency of the whole army would 
 be also immensely improved. We should get rid of 
 those jealousies that still hold some sway, and see 
 the total abolition of the invidious distinction which 
 excludes the officers of twenty regiments from parti- 
 cipation iu the benefit of staff appointments. Though 
 that rule has lately been much relaxed, I question
 
 28 
 
 tlie wisdom of having done so, while no security is 
 given, that these officers will previously acquire the 
 Indian experience desirable for carrying on their new 
 duties. 
 
 The arrangement of transferring twenty regiments 
 permanently to the Indian army, need not, of course, 
 in any way affect the condition of those additional 
 regiments, that this emergency has caused to be sent 
 out: nor would it affect the present Commander-in- 
 Chief, or any officers on the general or brigade staff, 
 though their successors should be selected exclusively 
 from the reformed Indian army. 
 
 Not the least important of the benefits incident to 
 the amalgamation I propose, would be its paving the 
 way to the abolition of the Court of Directors, with 
 the corresponding nuisance — the Board of Control. 
 
 Never certainly was scheme of govermnent more 
 preposterously devised than this is to retard action, 
 exalt routine, destroy the zeal, and damp the energies 
 of its servants. It is literally the realisation and 
 embodiment of Dickens' idea of the Circumlocution 
 Office. Where it is possible to identify the particular 
 action of the Court of Directors in any affair, we 
 find it marked by a procrastinating, a make-shift, 
 and cheese-paring policy, which might have been 
 expected in the grocers and chandlers, its traditional 
 founders. They acquiesce contentedly in a lavish 
 expenditure for the notoriously inefficient staff, and 
 establishments of the army, while they ever, at the 
 very same time, display a morbid itching to clip the 
 allowances and infringe on the rights of regimental 
 officers. Tlie half batta measure, a gross breach of 
 faith, was their own bright conception ; but the series 
 of petty acts of injustice, carried out by Lord Dal- 
 housie and his predecessors, have had the cordial ap- 
 proval of the Court, where they did not actually 
 originate with it.
 
 29 
 
 The Court of Directors affords a unique and sin- 
 gular instance — probably the only one that could be 
 found since the beginning of the world — of a govern- 
 ment disliked and distrusted by all classes of its em- 
 ployees. I never knew an officer, of whatever rank, 
 who did not express and feel some contempt for the 
 Court, and who had not, moreover, some distrust as 
 to what new act of injustice it contemplated. 
 
 That this feeling has, to a very great extent, been 
 imparted to the Sepoys is certain, for they have suf- 
 ficient sagacity to perceive that a government, which 
 regards not the rights of one section of its servants, 
 will only be deterred by fear from disregarding those 
 of the other. In this view of the case, the conduct 
 of the Court has operated directly in producing this 
 mutiny, and in aggravating its character. 
 
 For my part. I cannot conceive what we gain by 
 continuing so barbarously complicated a machinery, 
 as a Court of Directors to check the Indian Govern- 
 ment, a Board of Control to check the Court, and 
 a Premier to check the Board. If this be not the 
 Circumlocution Office, or rather a conglomeration of 
 such offices, I know not what it is. Its absurdity is 
 hardly paralleled by Swift's idea of an ingenious 
 machine for cutting cabbages almost as well as a 
 common knife would do. May we not learn a little 
 common sense from the hint given us by the great 
 humourist? Is it, indeed, necessary that the Indian 
 Government should, by every mail, forward a whole 
 budget of trumpery references for the consideration 
 of eighteen old gentlemen in Leaden Hall ; and that 
 these, after the usual expenditure of fiddle faddle 
 (including abundance of twaddle), and interchange 
 with the Board of Control of a large quantity of 
 foolscap (for which one might easily suggest a much 
 more appropriate use), should write " our Governor- 
 General" that his "affectionate friends" — so they ab- 
 surdly style themselves — accede to his request, that
 
 30 
 
 unattached Ensign Snooks should, in consideration of 
 his long and faithful services, be promoted to a like 
 unattached lieutenancy on the veteran establishment? 
 If we refer to a few more important matters left to 
 their discretion, is it more satisfactory to learn that 
 
 and , who were cashiered by courts-martial 
 
 for fraud committed as bank directors, have fully 
 satisfied the Honourable Court, and Mr. Smith of 
 Cannon Row, that they were only the victims of a 
 mistaken sense of what is called " banking propriety," 
 and are to be restored forthwith to the honour, dig- 
 nity, and emolument of the posts, of which they were 
 so harshly deprived? The fact that they can turn 
 their trifling power into a source of real mischief, of 
 most serious import, is surely no argument in their 
 favour. 
 
 Independently of the thousand- and- one trifles, on 
 which these gentlemen are supposed to bring so nuich 
 wisdom and experience to bear, what work do they 
 perform? Is there any point of real importance, on 
 which the minister of the day does not trust his own 
 judgment, in preference to availing himself of the 
 costly wisdom of Leaden Hall ? Bah ! Let us pitch 
 away all this absurd machinery, and cut our cabbages 
 with a common knife. 
 
 Get rid of all the tape-worms that prey upon the 
 vitals of India, substitute a single Secretary of State 
 for that country, and let him decide — not on trifles 
 such as Snooks' claim to advancement, or on hair- 
 si)litting distinctions l)y which " banking ])ropriety " ! 
 may be thought to justify what is certainly disgraceful 
 for officers and gentlemen to do, but — on all great 
 measures of real importance, such as it would be posi- 
 tively unsafe to leave unreservedly to the discretion of 
 a Governor-General; and Avhich, certainly, are never 
 left for the final decision of the Court of Directors. 
 As to the patronage there need be no difficulty, for it 
 might be given up to public competition, by which I
 
 31 
 
 apprehend the army would secure a description of 
 officers immeasurably superior to those it owes to the 
 disinterested discrimination of Leaden Hall, or of 
 Cannon Row. 
 
 The Court has ever been an incubus on the ad- 
 vancement of India, and improvement of the army ; 
 and, under the simple system I propose, we should 
 run no risk of seeing decency outraged, as it has been 
 by this corporation. No Secretary of State, I venture 
 to hope, would presume to restore to the army officers 
 who had been cashiered on conviction of swindling ! ! ! 
 City interest, I believe, has led to more unpleasant 
 doings in Leaden Hall, than ever were perpetrated in 
 Downing Street. With the recollection of what red 
 tape and routine nearly eifected for England a short 
 time ago, it Avould be madness to perpetuate the em- 
 bodiment of these principles in our Indian Govern- 
 ment, even had they not there also produced disasters 
 incomparably greater. Red tape and foolscap may 
 literally be called the emblems of a government that 
 annually expends £30,000 on stationer}^ It would 
 be interesting to know how much of this went for 
 tape, and how much for foolscap; what the price of 
 the ink was, and what saving could have been effected 
 in that article, by omitting dots to the i's, and crosses 
 to the t's, supposing such a breach of official propriety 
 could have been permitted; but on these curious 
 points I fear no detailed information can be expected.* 
 
 But there is no expedient which could be devised 
 that would render the Bengal army trustworthy with- 
 out the aid of able and zealous officers : and it was 
 
 * In Leaden Hall it is the system itself that is the evil, and no 
 repairs, short of those required by the highlander's gun, could get 
 it into working order. It is not sti'ange, then, that we find gentle- 
 men quite useless as Directors, who might really be well fitted for 
 the post of Secretary of State for India.
 
 32 
 
 because it was not so commanded that the mutiny 
 has spread in the way we have seen. 
 
 It niay, indeed, be objected, that some officers — the 
 best and the best-liked — were ruthlessly murdered by 
 the men who affected to feel so much regard for them. 
 But it would, I think, be begging the whole question 
 to infer, from such isolated cases, that no such hold 
 could be obtained by officers over their men as would 
 ensure their remaining true to their duty, or even 
 abstaining from personal outrage to their superiors. 
 
 The confidence, which the officers appear so gene- 
 rally to have placed in the good feeling of their men, 
 has been proclaimed as irrefragable proof that they 
 had done nothing to excite their dislike. But without 
 intending to pass unqualified censure on those unfor- 
 tunate gentlemen, I apprehend that such an argument 
 
 In Canon Row we might have the energy, and promptness, to be 
 expected from a single directing mind. I say mighty because, un- 
 ha])pily, the " elegant impostor," who presides there, serves only to 
 demonstrate, that in one small foppish priggish mind may be con- 
 centrated a 1 the infirmity of purpose, the solemn trifling and fooling, 
 the procrastination, hesitation, vacillation — in fine, everything ob- 
 jectionable, that could be found among any eighteen Directors, 
 without their experience. I have heard on pretty good authority, 
 that Mr. Smith has been displaying some highly characteristic 
 traits. One is related of his having decided on cutting down by 
 one half, an indent for four brass padlocks required for the 
 Government House at Calcutta — though the Court of Directors 
 had already deliberated on this important subject, and unanimously 
 agreed to allow " our G. G." all four. Another is told of his having 
 refused to sanction the payment of passage to India for officers 
 detained here after September — and this in the face of the repre- 
 sentation made by the Court, that some of those gentlemen bave 
 been detained, because they did not reach England till after the 
 first batch of officers had been ordered out — that Government did 
 not for six weeks thereafter come to a decision as to sending out 
 any more — and that then the steamers were full for I know not 
 how long to come. Well might Lord EUenborough say, that Mr. 
 V. Smith is distrusted by Indian officers. I commend him to the 
 tender mercies of Punch, who might turn these wretched padlocks, 
 and ,he yet more wretched " locksmith," to some use in amusing 
 the public.
 
 33 
 
 cannot be adduced as proving anything in their fa- 
 vour further than that tliey could have done nothing 
 for which they deserved to get their throats cut. It 
 would be perfectly natural, whether such cases oc- 
 curred or not, that an officer, who had habitually 
 treated his Sepoys with contemptuous neglect, or even 
 harshness, should really labour under the hallucina- 
 tion that he was very much liked by them. Nay, the 
 folly and blindness, that had hitherto directed his 
 course, would be more likely than not to carry him 
 on to the absurdity of expecting from them the ut- 
 most devotion in his hour of need; and he would 
 probably not be one whit less surprised and shocked 
 at their supposed want of gratitude, than he would 
 be if he had established the most unquestionable 
 claims upon it. The mere exhibition of confidence, 
 in whatever degree, simply proves nothing. 
 
 In the first place, then, I would observe that (while 
 the Sepoys were habitually treated in a highly objec- 
 tionable manner, by a large number of officers) a far 
 larger proportion have owed their lives to the good 
 feelings of comparatively well-disposed men, than have 
 fallen victims to a misplaced, though justifiable, con- 
 fidence in them. Again, while every instance of such 
 good conduct on the part of the Sepoys directly sup- 
 ports my assertion (that they may be rendered sus- 
 ceptible to those influences, which a kind and con- 
 siderate treatment should create), I do not think, that 
 the cases of proved misconduct on their part bear as 
 strongly against my argument. The fidelity can be 
 accounted for only in one way, the villany may have 
 been influenced by a variety of causes. 
 
 The best of officers cannot be intimately acquainted 
 with more than a tenth part of the men of liis regi- 
 ment — the remaining nine-tenths, therefore, cannot 
 be directly influenced by him. Blackguards, too, of 
 course, there are in the best companies; and the love 
 of these men is not to be gained by the severity, ne- 
 
 D
 
 34 
 
 cessary for controlling them. The influence of one 
 or two good officers will not only be weakened, but 
 often quite neutralised, by the inefficienc}' or mis- 
 conduct of others: in a strife of race against race 
 this is most especially the case. The influence of two 
 or three good companies, in which there is a large 
 proportion of well-disposed men, is lost in that of the 
 remaining seven or eight chiefly containing bad ones ; 
 and thus, too, we see that corps (comparatively good 
 regiments some of them), after holding out for a time 
 against the evil influences that surrounded them, have 
 eventually succumbed to them. Without positive 
 proof, I could never believe that the Sepoys generally 
 have taken an active part, in such atrocities as are 
 recorded of them ; but that they have, in some 
 instances, actively engaged in them, and have, in very 
 many instances, passively acquiesced in them, I fear 
 is indisputable. We might well tliink that nothing 
 could be more atrocious than this, did we not actually 
 find a more monstrous villany to im})ute to them. 
 
 I have no object in defending any misconduct of 
 the Sepoys; and, in regard to the brutal outrages we 
 have heard of, I do not think it proves my feeling 
 less strong, that I would be . content with nothing 
 short of the most rigid investigation into every such 
 case, and a peculiar and fearful retribution on* the 
 monsters implicated, — instead of an indiscriminate 
 severity on all. Meantime we will best eifect our 
 object, by entering into a calm consideration of the 
 events as they have occurred; and here, I think, we 
 will find little to warrant our surprise, however much 
 there be to excite our horror, and disgust. 
 
 In every great commotion, we find the scum and 
 dregs of society occupying the most prominent po- 
 sition. As revolutionists, these n)ust necessarily be 
 noisy, and violent; and, by their first stej), they have 
 risked the only stake they had — their lives. The 
 very disposition, which makes the other party well
 
 35 
 
 affected, impairs tlie value of their support, in render- 
 ing them also averse to action ; and thus, from the 
 outset, a contemptible minority continually gathers 
 strength by its own excesses, and virulence. Eeleased 
 from all restraint, tiie wickedness of each miscreant 
 stimulates that of the other, till, maddened by crime, 
 their state becomes precisely that of infuriated 
 lunatics. 
 
 Looking to what may be called the anatf^my of 
 cruelty, we will find it pervading human nature far 
 more generally than is supposed; that, where little 
 suspected, it is developed in various degrees, simply 
 according to circumstances ; and that it is one of 
 those vices of which the ne plus ultra may easily be 
 attained, and has so been reached by hundreds of 
 millions, of all nations, creeds, and tongues. For 
 example, as far as concerns sympathy for human suf- 
 fering, the French Kevolutionists would not have 
 scrupled to perpetrate any of the atrocities, which 
 have been witnessed in India ; and, so far, then, 
 nothing has occurred, but what might naturally have 
 been expected under certain given circumstances. 
 Now what, in this instance, are the plain, unvarnished 
 facts of the case. 
 
 In the Bengal army, the proportion of natives to 
 Europeans is about 25 to 1. In native regiments it 
 is about 100 to 1 — the European officer. Among 
 the natives themselves, the Hindoos are to Mahomed- 
 ans as about 10 to 1. The Hindoos, with some good 
 points, are the votaries of a beastly and degrading 
 heathenism, whose single merit is in being so absurdly 
 contradictor}", that while it shows divine authority 
 (in precept, and example) for every crime that can 
 disgrace humanity, enjoins also some good works, in 
 addition to the jumble of childish, or disgusting 
 observances, which it declares to be necessary to 
 salvation. 
 
 As they can admit no proselytes, and — absurd 
 D 2
 
 36 
 
 though it may seem — really believe all religions to be 
 true, tliey are tolerant. As they have always been in 
 subjection, they are submissive : but, when roused by 
 any violence (real or supposed) to their idiotical rules 
 of caste, they will resist to the death, and with all 
 the frenzy of incarnate fiends. 
 
 The JMahomedans, in India little less idolatrous and 
 absurd than tlie Hindoos, are in every respect more 
 dangerous. They have a lost sovereignty to regain, 
 and an intolerant and persecuting faith to re-establish ; 
 they are, therefore, ever anxious to effect our over- 
 throw, and are very often plotting it. 
 
 To manage people of a disposition so ticklish, we 
 have a set of men, whose ignorance and infatuation 
 have been illustrated by this fresh act of folly; which 
 supposed that Hindoo or Mussulman would be indif- 
 ferent to tasting hog's lard ! 
 
 There wanted not influential and discontented Ma- 
 homedans to turn the blunder to the furtherance of 
 their ever cherished hopes; and while Government 
 went on dismissing all who refused to use the car- 
 tridges, they spread the belief throughout India, that 
 these men were punished for refusing to be made 
 Christians. 
 
 In this state of affairs, the imbecility of one of 
 those nonentities, whom our rulers delight to honor, 
 whom our wretched system exalts to high authority 
 in the land, brought matters to a climax. Some 80 
 troopers of the 3rd Cavalry, at Meerut, were sentenced 
 to imprisonment and hard labour for their contumacy 
 in refusing the cartridges; but it, of course, never 
 occurred to sucli a general, that this might produce 
 excitement, which demanded any extra jnx'caution. 
 The remaining troopers, and the men of the other 
 native regiments, were allowed the amplest facilities 
 for plotting and conspiring to obtain redress. The 
 few who did not believe in the hog's lard were the 
 intriguing Mahomedans, who were turning the affair
 
 37 
 
 to their own purposes. They primed themselves with 
 bhang, and, drunken and infuriated, rushed out to 
 the bloody work of exterminating the infidels. Their 
 fury lighted up a flame throughout the whole native 
 force, already excited and distrustful. The rest we 
 know: the worst villains (many of them, probably, 
 miscreants from the bazaar) did the work of murder; 
 but all found themselves thus committed as accessa- 
 ries, and felt they had hardly any alternative but in 
 rebellion. Before them was the opportunity of re- 
 venging a suf)posed wrong ; there was the hope of 
 plunder, and there was security for their faith. In 
 retracing their steps, they could see only courts mar- 
 tial, and hard labour, or, at best, religious degrada- 
 tion and excommunication. 
 
 All this was going on under the nose of a noodle, 
 who had at hand a European force, more than sufli- 
 cient to have crushed and annihilated double the 
 number of those rebels ; but he did nothing. He was 
 at his wits' end, if I may use an expression that would 
 suppose even a modicum of intelligence ; and the 
 whole body, unmolested, set out to re-enact, with ad- 
 ditional horrors, the same bloody scene in Delhi. 
 
 In Delhi we have carefully maintained an idiotical 
 pageantry, as if for the very purpose of perpetuating 
 the hope of Islam, in the ultimate restoration of Ma- 
 homedan rule, in all its ancient splendour. And 
 admirably has Delhi (with its rascally puppet king) 
 served as a nucleus for the rebellion, from which 
 emissaries have been despatched throughout the land, 
 to blow into a flame the disaff"ection and distrust 
 everywhere existing. 
 
 Having efl*ected the largest possible amount of 
 mischief, by their obstinacy in forcing these cartridges 
 on the army, the oflicials next published a proclama- 
 tion announcing their withdrawal ; which then, of 
 course, was regarded only as a tacit admission, that 
 the cartridges really were of the objectionable cha-
 
 38 
 
 racter supposed ; and the injustice done to the dis- 
 missed Sepoys, and to the troopers punislied as felons, 
 was, of course, considered triumphantly established. 
 
 The entire native soldiery appear to have been 
 thus tamj)ered with; and, adjured by regard to that 
 wliich they hold dearer than their honor, their money, 
 their families, or life itself, it is not wonderful that so 
 few have remained true to their salt — to the service 
 of the stranger, whose intentions they would, under 
 all the circumstances of the case, have good cause for 
 doubting. 
 
 All that has occurred, tends to confirm the opinion 
 that I have always held on two points : — 
 
 1st. That no conspiracy against us will ever obtain 
 the general support of Hindoos, that is not framed 
 on the pretext of averting an injury done to their 
 caste or religious prejudices; and, 
 
 2ndly. That no general conspiracy can ever long 
 continue concealed. 
 
 The first of these points is shown, in the rationale 
 I have given of the plot ; and it is clear, that energy, 
 and judgment, on the part of our rulers, would have 
 averted or crushed the danger; and that, had the 
 regimental officers generally possessed ordinary influ- 
 ence with their men, their explanations would have 
 been received, in preference to the distorted colouring 
 given to the matter by Mahomedan scoundrels. 
 
 The second point is confirmed by the fact, that the 
 mutiny did break out prematurely ; for I feel very cer- 
 tain that there was no conspiracy among regiments, 
 previous to the disbandment of the 19th Native 
 Infantry. 
 
 As there was hardly a regiment in which the 
 mutiny was universal, had there been a plot long in 
 agitation, it would surely have been known, and re- 
 ve;ded, by the men who resisted it to the last, at the 
 l)eril of their ])ersonal safety, and sacrifice of their 
 property. Those men, as we learn, included some of
 
 39 
 
 the most intelligent and respectable native officers, 
 and non-commissioned officers, in the corps, both 
 Hindoo and Mussulman. They were men in whom 
 the officers had always placed im[)licit — and, I am 
 happ)^ to find, a well-grounded — confidence; and it 
 would really be absurd to suppose, that having deter- 
 mined to take their stand by us, they should have 
 kept us ignorant of the plot for their and our ruin. 
 
 The mutiny in some regiments further confirms 
 what I have said, as to the evil of inefficient regi- 
 mental officers. I could mention several which 
 appear to have been commanded by men who, if not 
 greatly changed, were as unfitted by character, or 
 temper, or both, for such trusts, as men well could 
 be ; and had, besides, some officers who would be a 
 disgrace to any service: yet these corps remained 
 faithful for a certain time, notwithstanding the evil 
 influences which surrounded them. There is, there- 
 fore, prima facie proof that, if a corps remained faith- 
 ful so long under the command of a man hated, and 
 despised, it would have continued to do so still 
 longer under one respected, and beloved ; and the 
 importance of time, in afi*airs such as these, cannot 
 be too highly estimated. Each fresh defection, of 
 course, induces defection in others : the proofs given 
 of the wide-sj)read distrust of government intentions, 
 could not fail to be considered as some proof, also, 
 that the distrust was well-grounded. If it has been 
 unavoidable, that the Hindoos have remained the 
 slaves of a beastly and unreasoning superstition, we 
 must neither judge them by the light of Christianity, 
 nor feel surprised at their being so little amenable to 
 reason. 
 
 Some one — I now forget who — has expressed sur- 
 prise, at the small amount of wisdom required in 
 governing an empire; but, in considering events as 
 they have been brought about in India, 1 am struck 
 rather with the converse of the proposition — how
 
 40 
 
 much folly it requires to ruin an empire! All the 
 ingenuity, displayed in a long series of blunders, and 
 absurdities, would, after all, have failed in securing 
 the total alienation of our native army, had the sys- 
 tem but neglected to ensure the inelhciency of its 
 European officers. Here too, however, red tape and 
 routine triumphantly carried their point, and the 
 result of the labour we see. 
 
 When government systematically treated regimental 
 officers with contemptuous neglect, officers ceased to 
 interest themselves very particularly in their regi- 
 mental duties; and Sepoys began to care as little for 
 their regimental officers, as the officers cared for 
 them. I dispute not, that it would have been more 
 creditable, both to officers and men, had they been 
 superior to such considerations as appear to have 
 directed their sense of what was right ; but the senti- 
 ment is by no means a new one, being very broadly 
 set forth in the highly popular ballad of the Jolly 
 Miller ; and what I propose to show is, that the 
 estrangement originated with the government, which 
 ought to have remembered the maxim — Si vis me 
 flere, dolendum est primum tibi ipsi. 
 
 A time there was, when officers generally possessed 
 unbounded influence over their men, and among 
 those simple, ignorant creatures really were what 
 they figuratively call ma-bap (mother and father). 
 It was an influence easily enough acquired then, 
 though rarely met with now; and was independent 
 of the possession of much ability, or of any moral 
 worth. The semi-IIindooised men of the old school, 
 who lived and talked like natives, liked their society, 
 half believed in their gods, indulged in zenanas, 
 delighted in nautches, rewarded and punished un- 
 sparingly, and were invested with such powers as are 
 really necessary in governing natives, were liked and 
 respected immensely, in spite of many acts of injus- 
 tice, which they scrupled not to coimnit. Fear is,
 
 41 
 
 indeed, a necessary ingredient in the feelings, with 
 which natives should regard us; and we thus find 
 them universally agreed, that those English were the 
 men, Avhom the fates had in this kalajoog (iron age) 
 ap})ointed to be their masters. 
 
 This state of things has passed away, and with it 
 that pre-eminence of the European, which can never 
 in such force be regained ; but he might yet exercise 
 a very efhcient control, if inducement were held out 
 for the exertion required, and some facilities were 
 aiforded in the task. 
 
 It is not necessary, for acquiring this influence, 
 that officers should again become Hindooised; and 
 immorality in the present day is rather prejudicial to 
 it, especially when developed, as it now so generally is 
 in India, in the form of reckless and dishonourable 
 conduct; for whatever be the laxity of his own prin- 
 ciples, the native has a horror of the European otiicer, 
 who either cannot or will not fulfil his eng^aofements. 
 
 To make the regimental officers really efficient, 
 there are but two things required — to treat them 
 with strict justice, and exact from them a rigid per- 
 formance of their duty. Giving them what is their 
 due, government can have no real difficulty, in insist- 
 ing upon all that it is entitled to in return; but, 
 showing no concern in regard to either point, the 
 result that we find is only such as was inevitable. 
 
 While regiments continue the " Slough of Despond," 
 for those having no interest — or say, no merit — to 
 get removed to something better ; while they are 
 made the penal settlement, to which government may 
 remand those, who are found hopelessly unfit for the 
 duties of the staff — or, worse still, for those whose 
 misconduct as officers, or as gentlemen, is deemed 
 worthy of some severe mark of its displeasure; if 
 escape from regimental duty remain the one great 
 object of every officer's aspirations, and the dread of 
 a remand to it the one bugbear that haunts him, and
 
 42 
 
 damps his enjoyment of the much-coveted position 
 he now occupies; if, moreover, regiments continue to 
 be the nurseries for old field-officers to spend their 
 time in, till they reach the goal of their ambition — 
 the sinecure colonelcy; then must we expect the 
 results which common-sense points out, and our 
 experience has just confirmed. Officers wdll not inter- 
 est themselves in duties, rendered doubly onerous by 
 the addition of those of their brethren on the staff. 
 They cannot have pride in serving a government 
 which, pretending that it picks out only the best 
 men for staff employment, virtually proclaims that 
 the others are refuse^ to whom a double share of 
 unimportant duties may appropriately enough be left. 
 On discontented men, a hint that little is expected 
 from them, is not likely to be thrown away. While 
 young in the service, they may continue to hoj^e that 
 something may yet turn up; and, according to their 
 temperament, persevere in plaguing every influential 
 big- wig on whose consideration they may have claims, 
 real, or imaginary, or whose pity they may hope to 
 move through their respective relatives — to the 
 thirteenth cousin thrice removed, should they be 
 Scotch, especially if a Scotch marquis be on the throne. 
 But as these hopes have all reference to transfer to 
 another position, it is not likely that they will inspire 
 much zest for the duties, which the delay imposes; 
 and, to the non-official mind at least, it does not 
 appear probable, that an officer's interest in his men 
 will increase, in proportion to the nearness of his 
 prospect of leaving them for ever. 
 
 Men there are so charitable, that they can see no- 
 thing objectionable in the way patronage is bestowed 
 in England — nay, are struck with admiration at tlie 
 extreme disinterestedness, the strict attention to 
 merit, and that alone, which guides our public men, 
 and enables them always to put the right man in the 
 right place. Such men would probably discover as
 
 43 
 
 much to admire in the like disinterestedness of offi- 
 cials in India, where, also, there however prevails a 
 very wide-spread, though not perhaps more deserved, 
 distrust of official purity. We lately discovered that 
 the splendid qualities of a Dowb could not have en- 
 sured Dowb himself from languishing in comparative 
 obscurity, had he not been blessed with an uncle, who 
 was fortunately in a position to make them better 
 known, or appreciated, than they appear to have been 
 by the general, under whose very nose they had been 
 exhibited: otherwise, how can we suppose that the 
 virtuous Panmure would have thought it necessary 
 to interpose, at the risk of a charge of nepotism under 
 which he now so unjustly suffers. Dowhism — it may 
 now be considered a household word — has done much 
 injury even in India. A real Dowb may, on some 
 occasions, have his real merit rewarded through the 
 system; but, as not one in ten thousand will ever 
 believe that the main point is to have the merit, 
 rather than the influential uncle to reward it, we shall 
 always find, there also, that most dependence will be 
 placed on Avhat are esteemed the most likely means of 
 advancement. The system demoralizes by leading to 
 a great deal of jobbery, intriguing, and toadying; 
 but it certainly never could lead a man to feel pride 
 or pleasure in his regimental duties, or form an incen- 
 tive to a faithful and conscientious discharge of them. 
 I do not, however, believe that jobbery is so common 
 as is generally supposed; that is, I believe, men in 
 always providing themselves, their relatives, or their 
 friends with the best berths they can obtain, gene- 
 rally fancy that they deserve them : this is only hu- 
 man nature, the practical result is. the same, since 
 private feeling overpowers and blinds the judgment. 
 But I question very much whether anything is gained 
 in purity, by substituting one lot of dispensers of pa- 
 tronage iov another: what I find fault with, is the 
 pretension of being insensible to anything but the
 
 44 
 
 public good : the only remedy that I know of, is to 
 circumscribe the limits of patronage as far as possible. 
 The real grievance that officers left with their 
 regiments have to complain of is, not that they have 
 not got staff appointments (they might as well feel 
 discontented at not havino; been lords with their thou- 
 sands per annum) but that, not having the grand 
 luck to get out of the regiment, they cannot even get 
 all the little luck that is in it. 
 
 The disgust is not felt, merely at seeing the fool and 
 the knave so often preferred to a high position in 
 India ; it is because those left in the corps are obliged 
 to do the work of that fool and knave, while he re- 
 tains his position in their regiment, to the prejudice 
 of their advancement. 
 
 The position of regimental officers, as contrasted 
 with that of their brethren on the staff, would be 
 sufficiently disadvantageous under any circumstances. 
 Their pay (though pretty good for military men) is, 
 for many years, no more than is sufficient, with very 
 strict economy, to maintain them respectably; it 
 therefore affords no equivalent for banishment to a 
 country, so distant and so uncongenial to Europeans. 
 The gross pay of an ensign per month is about £20, 
 of a lieutenant £25 10s., and of a captain £41 10s., 
 with an addition of £5* for a company, if holding one : 
 while there is hardly a staff appointment to which 
 an officer can be removed, which would not, at out- 
 set, nearly double his pay if a subaltern, or at the 
 least equalise it with that of a captain. 
 
 Comparatively small as are all regimental allow- 
 ances, they are never increased on account of extra 
 work performed. Nominally there are 16 subalterns 
 borne on the rolls of a regiment, of whom about 5 on 
 the average (exclusive of adjutant and quarter-masterj 
 are actually present, and as many more on staff em- 
 ploy. But if, as I have known occur, there were but 
 * About £3 14s., after deducting unavoidable expenses.
 
 45 
 
 two present, and each had to do the work of half-a- 
 dozen, whether this were the wearisome routine duty 
 of the station, or worse one of those treasure escorts, 
 or commands, of which the authorities always manage 
 to contrive a few throughout the hot winds, and rains, 
 he would not receive any extra pay for his extra 
 trouble, or even for his extra expence. 
 
 Staff officers, on the other hand, invariably draw 
 extra pay for the extra duty of any other office which 
 may be imposed on them ; and they do so, moreover, 
 even when the duty of one of those offices becomes 
 merely nominal. 
 
 Again, officers on staff employ are usually retained 
 ])ermanently, or for many years at one station, where 
 they have the means of making themselves very com- 
 fortable, at a very small expense. Regimental officers 
 can never feel secure of remaining any time at a sta- 
 tion, and are put to immense expense by the constant 
 changes made. For such not one farthing of com- 
 pensation is allowed, or even for losses — such as the 
 value of their houses, in cantonments which the go- 
 vernment thinks proper to abandon ; or for deprecia- 
 tion of that property, by government reducing to a 
 half or a third the contingent of troops there : regi- 
 mental pay and allowances are supposed to be so large, 
 as to enable the officer to meet every contingent ex- 
 pense which he may so incur. 
 
 European articles form a considerable item in an 
 officer's expenditure, and are of course cheaper near 
 the presidency, than at remote stations. Taking beer 
 — a necessary of life in such a climate — as an ex- 
 ample, it cost 4 to 5 rupees per dozen down country, 
 and about 7 to 8 rupees at what were remote stations, 
 when government introduced the measure of deduct- 
 ing 15 per cent from the " regimental pay of officers 
 stationed within 200 miles of Calcutta." Since then 
 our frontier has been extended to Peshawur, where 
 beer costs from 12 to 14 rupees per dozen: but while
 
 46 
 
 the half batta rule is preserved down country, no 
 compensation is allowed to regimental officers, for the 
 extra expense they incur through this extension of 
 territory; though, besides, they Avere put to very 
 great additional expense, in building houses through- 
 out the Punjab. Staff allowances, on the other hand, 
 are, in very few, if in any cases, affected by the half 
 batta rule, and are calculated on a scale that compen- 
 sates for extra expenditure. 
 
 On regimental officers is thrown the entire expense 
 of supporting the character of the regiment in society. 
 No staff officers ever think of bearing any share of 
 this.. They can then feel no interest in the corps. 
 Government, which has little scruple in appropria- 
 ting the cash of its officers, however chary it may be 
 in meddling Avith that of the men, coolly ordered de- 
 ductions for the support of bands to be made from the 
 regimental allowances of all officers; but staff' pay 
 was left untouched. Thus men, in receipt of alloAV- 
 ances exceeding those of a lieutenant-colonel, may pay 
 no more than the captain, who does the duty of the 
 two in the regiment. 
 
 Regimental promotion is slow and uncertain. The 
 average service as ensign may be from 4 to 5 years, 
 and I have knoAvn extreme cases of 12 to 14. The 
 average service as subaltern is 16 to 17 years, and 
 there are numerous cases of from 20 to 24 years, A 
 majority is not usually attained in less than 30 years, 
 and may take 3 or 4 longer. About 6 years more 
 are required for a lieutenant-colonelcy, and 10 more 
 added to that for a full colonelcy. 
 
 It is, after all, but a poor service, I think, that 
 offers no better fortune than this — it certainly is very 
 miserable, as compared with that of the staff officers', 
 whose promotion in their departments is not only far 
 quicker on the average, but of incomparably greater 
 advantage to them, on account of the flir higher ratio 
 in which their allowances are increased thereby.
 
 47 
 
 Surely this might suffice for them. But no — the 
 spirit of wisdom, and of fairness, that directs Indian 
 aifairs, decrees that it shall be otherwise. Not only 
 must these meritorious gentlemen enjoy all those 
 separate and superior advantages, but they must have, 
 too, a full share of what little may be going in a 
 regiment, with which they have no connexion, but 
 what is merely nominal. 
 
 1 speak from the experience, I acquired in India 
 as a regimental officer, when I say that all we may 
 know of any particular man on the staff is, that being 
 above us in the army list, he must always be pro- 
 moted first, and stand in our way. So, after doing 
 his duty for him for about a quarter of a century, we 
 may be considered lucky if we can induce him to 
 accept £2,000 or £3,000 to retire, and thus get rid 
 of the incubus at last. 
 
 Not unfrequently it happens, that these men would 
 gain so little by promotion, that they refuse to ])ay 
 anything towards the purchase of steps; and some 
 are so mean as to decline, in the hope that regimental 
 officers Avill make good the deficit out of their own 
 pockets, rather than lose the step. I have a feeling 
 recollection, even now, of having (while an ensign on 
 £20 a month) had to contribute towards purchasing 
 the captaincy of a fellow on the staff", who was at the 
 time in the receipt of £100 per month. 
 
 Often, when a corps is ordered on service, or to 
 some pestilential district, these men are allowed to 
 remain snugly in their appointments, gaining steps 
 by the casualties occurring in tlieii^ regiment, as it is 
 called. Several men in my late regiment have gained 
 advancement in this way. But it hardly mends 
 matters to order them to join ; for, having been so 
 many years in entirely different employment, they 
 come but to displace men experienced in matters of 
 which they are profoundly ignorant ; to say nothing 
 of their being entire strangers to the men.
 
 48 
 
 It often happens, that a man after being twenty or 
 thirty years on staff employ — say Civil, or Commis- 
 sariat, or something equally foreign to his duty as a 
 soldier — has to return to his regiment (perhaps be- 
 cause promoted to a majority, or lieutenant-colonelcy, 
 or it may be as a punishment for some gross miscon- 
 duct), and thereupon supersedes some old officer in 
 the command, to which that man had been looking 
 forward for many years, as the only good thing, which 
 one having no interest could hope to get. But it 
 would be an endless task to multi})ly the cases of 
 gross wrong, which not only may occur, but which 
 constantl}^ do occur, through this idiotical system of 
 granting a monopoly of all favor to a particular class. 
 Were government to declare, they cared not whether 
 regimental officers were disheartened, and disgusted, 
 or not, we should, at least, have an intelligible ex- 
 pression of their feeling ; but when they affect to 
 ignore the existence of that discontent, and, in the 
 midst of these unparalleled disasters, suppose that no 
 part of the mischief could have arisen from such a 
 cause — that officers continued zealous in the face of 
 such discouragements — the infatuation does indeed 
 seem hopeless, since it is proof ngainst the clearest 
 demonstration of cause, and effect. 
 
 If Sepoys have no right to complain of any direct 
 breach of faith on the part of government, it may 
 be attributed to the dangerous temper they have dis- 
 played, under the suspicion that anything of the kind 
 was contemplated, rather than to any feeling of what 
 fairness, and honor demand. The way in which 
 government has, on numerous occasions, treated Eu- 
 ropean officers, whom they considered safe objects for 
 experimenting upon, incontestably proves this. 
 
 The recent virtual abolition of the Invalid Es- 
 tablishment — suggested, I believe, by my Lord Dal- 
 housie — was a striking instance of the principle that
 
 49 
 
 guides Leaden Hall. I have nothing to offer in defence 
 of the folly that devised that establishment, or of the 
 abuses which rendered it so severe a drain on the 
 resources of the state. If government thought proper 
 to hold out, among the other advantages it offered to 
 its military officers, that of an establishment to which 
 (on being invalided by a medical committee) they 
 might retire, on a rate of pay little short of what they 
 received while effective — if with the privilege they 
 coupled the absurd condition, that the officer, though 
 required to do no duty, must remain in India, 
 choosing any part of the country he liked best — 
 officers are responsible neither for the extravagance, 
 nor the absurdity. However foolishly the govern- 
 ment may have acted in devising such a scheme for 
 invalid officers, I for one, though I care not personally 
 about it, protest against this new breach of faith in 
 withdrawing the benefit. When government can 
 restore to the officer his youth, the years he has spent 
 in their service, and his constitution as it was before 
 he proceeded to that accursed country, then may they 
 reasonably and fairly tell him, that if he do not like 
 their service, he may leave it ; but till they can do 
 this, he is entitled to every advantage offered to in- 
 duce him to accept it. Of course, in some measure, 
 right is might, in this world ; and the injury I speak 
 of I do not expect to see redressed, simply because 
 I know tliat officers have no might on their side. 
 The disgust, however, that such doings excite reacts 
 injuriously on the public welfare. 
 
 The wrong here done was sustained exclusively by 
 the class performing regimental duty, for, in the 
 course of many years' service, I do not remember a 
 single instance of an officer on the staff applying for 
 transfer to the Invalid Establislunent. That numbers 
 of them were fit for nothing else, does not afi'ect the 
 question, for, practically, it was left entirely optional, 
 to invalid or to remain in the service — nominally 
 
 E
 
 50 
 
 floing duty, but really as entirely useless to the state, 
 perhaps more so. 
 
 It is, of course, open to the discretion of any 
 government to fix any rate of remuneration it pleases 
 for new comers ; and if as good men could be had at 
 half the pay now given, it would be folly to continue 
 to such the present high rates; but however impro- 
 vident the bargain, which may have been made with 
 old servants, it is dishonesty to infringe one jot of 
 their privileges. " Blessed," says the psalmist, "is he 
 that sweareth to his own hurt and changeth noty 
 
 However small may the encouragement for zeal in 
 the service be found by regimental officers, they have 
 little to complain of on the score of restricted licence 
 to behave as blackguards. 
 
 A certain amount of risk of dismissal is no doubt 
 incurred in getting drunk when on duty; but tliis 
 severity is amply compensated by the impunity with 
 which any one may, on all other occasions, make a 
 beast of himself, when the spirit moves him. The 
 dismissals for drunkenness, nunierous as they are, do 
 but form the exceptional cases, in proving tlie preva- 
 lence of this vice; and for one man dismissed for 
 being drunk, at the inopportune moment when his 
 services are rec[uired, Iqw arc suffered to remain, 
 ^vhose well-known habits render tliem lui trustworthy 
 for any duty. 
 
 Gaml)ling is against the regulations, but tliis only 
 means, that officers arc not offensively to obtrude on 
 the notice of the authorities their propensity to this 
 vice. Of what- would be considered "offi^nsive ob- 
 trusion," we may negativel}' form some idea by what, 
 at Simla — the Baden- leaden of India — goes on under 
 the noses of s\iccessive Commanders-in-Chief, and 
 does not disturb their minds. Prolmbly nothing sliort 
 of a sworn information would satisfy theni of the ex* 
 istence of what is notorious U) all. 
 
 Brigadiers, and connnandauts of reginients in the
 
 51 
 
 plains, have the same scruples against interference 
 with such recreations; and numbers of young officers 
 are ruined, by the absence of all check on indulging 
 therein. As is said to be generally the case in Eng- 
 land, these gamblers, commencing as pigeons end in 
 becoming rooks. A considerable number make gam- 
 bling the great business of their lives; and, ]:)y the 
 skill which they have acquired (if not occasionally by 
 yet more discreditable means) draw from the |)ockets 
 of the inexperienced an income, compared with which 
 that derived from their profession is of small im- 
 portance. There is one well known case, of an officer 
 who was enabled to retire on a fortune of 150,000 
 rupees, the fruits of the skill, which incessant practice 
 had given him. If there are few cases of such com- 
 petencies being thus realised, it must be remembered, 
 that gambling leads to other expensive habits; and 
 gains so acquired are usually expended on immediate 
 enjoyment ; while of the misery brought on the losing 
 party there is the clearest manifestation. 
 
 As indulgence in this vice rarely fails to destroy 
 right moral perceptions, it is not surprising that we 
 find so many men playing on the principle, that if 
 they win they may receive^ some cash — if they lose 
 they can settle everything by an I.O.I J., which they 
 never mean to take up. I have seen subalterns 
 coolly sit down to play short whist at gold mohur 
 points, ( = 32s.) when they well knew that all their 
 estate, real or personal, with their credit to boot, 
 would not suffice to meet the losses they might incur 
 in a couple of hours of such amusement. I do not 
 mean to say, that some such men may not have some 
 vague sense of the obligation of a debt of honor, even 
 while they scorn the legitimate claims of their tailors; 
 but the result, when any is obtained, is usually this, 
 that the holder of the l.O.U. must be satisfied with 
 his friend's real wish that he could meet it, while the 
 
 K 2
 
 52 
 
 detested Snip secures the reluctant liquidation of his 
 bill, liy the intervention of the Court of Requests. 
 
 Debt is another of those indulgences into which 
 the Indian Government permits regimental oiBcers to 
 phnige, to the deepest extent that their ingenuity can 
 contrive ; while it hnposes on staff officers the limit of 
 stopping short of an appearance in the Insolvent 
 Court, under the penalty of being reduced to the 
 position of mere regimental officers, the class to whom 
 the privilege of a whitewash is restricted. 
 
 Obvious, indeed, is the policy of limiting the in- 
 dulgence to that class, since the staff officers often 
 have the power of relieving their necessities in the 
 only way government considers objectionable; and so 
 alarming a proof of impecuniosity suggests grave 
 doubts of the safety of the till under such a trial. 
 But a regimental officer can do no such mischief as 
 the government feels any great concern about ; and 
 we have several distinguished men of that class, who 
 have endured incarceration, the pain of which must 
 have been much soothed by reflecting on the consi- 
 derate kindness of their masters, in allowing the 
 weary time so passed to count as service for pension ; 
 and in permitting them, when duly whitewashed, to 
 return to the bosom of their regiment — (in official 
 parlance) — " without prejudice to their rank" — pre- 
 judices as to character, of course, government is quite 
 free from! 
 
 I think I form a very moderate estimate of the 
 extent of the evil, in supposing that three-fourths of 
 all the regimental officers are pretty deeply involved 
 in debt. The enormous number of claims every 
 month brought before Courts of Requests in every 
 cantonment in India, and the fact that in nearly 
 every case the verdict is for the plaintiff', fully bears 
 out this estimate, when we consider further that these 
 claims represent only sums under 400 ru])ees. The 
 comparative paltriness of the sums, for which they
 
 53 
 
 arc so often cast, proves the depth of the embarrass- 
 ments of the officers, and how httle self-respect they 
 can have, when they incur an exposure so degrading; 
 but this is merely the ordinary part of the business, 
 and to have awards made against future pay,, for 
 many months to come, is what hundreds of officers 
 have allowed themselves to be subjected to, for many 
 years, without feeling the slightest shame about the 
 matter. Still worse cases occur, and an officer often 
 has execution-general given against him; and many 
 submit periodically to the process, with the greatest 
 composure. 
 
 As the authorities never feel called upon to take any 
 notice of such matters, we must wonder at the credulity 
 which continues to trust men who have for years ren- 
 dered themselves infamous, by habitual breaches of 
 their engagements, rather than be surprised that such 
 men should avail themselves of it, to obtain goods on 
 what — if we call things by their right names — are 
 false pretences. 
 
 Officers, who consider the immediate gratification 
 of all their propensities as an object paramount to 
 every consideration of the means which must be 
 resorted to, where their circumstances cannot affi^rd 
 this, Imve additional facilities for 2:ettino; into debt, 
 througli a set of banks, established on the philan- 
 thropic pretext of rescuing them from the clutches 
 of native usurers. The business mainly carried on 
 by these establishments is very analogous to that of 
 a class of men at home, who are generally of the 
 Hebrew persuasion, and who are ready to accommo- 
 date fast men on the strength of the expectations 
 they have outrun. The securities of these banks are 
 the debtor's position in the service, and a bond for 
 repayment by instalments from his future pay, to- 
 gether with a life insurance. They further require 
 the securityship of two or three other officers, as 
 parties to the same bond and conditions.
 
 54 
 
 To a young subalteri), the idea of getting a sum of 
 a couple of thousand rupees or so all at once, to pay off 
 old debts and dash about a little longer, is really quite 
 charming; and he cannot then, though he does after- 
 wards, see the evils, Avhich such a loan (at some 12 to 
 14 per cent, interest and charges, compounded half- 
 yearly) may bring upon hira. Many a man dates his 
 ruin from the first interview with one of these bank 
 secretaries ; and well may he do so, when, to procure 
 present gratification, he pledges his means of sub- 
 sistence (by no means superfluously large) for years 
 to come. It is no uncommon thing to see half a 
 dozen young oflEicers in a corps, each severally in- 
 debted to these banks some 3,000 or 4,000 rupees, 
 and severally security for each of the others, to this 
 tune. 
 
 Few men can long retain nice sentiments of 
 honour under the pressure of pecuniary difiiculties, 
 brought on by their own extravagance; and as it is 
 too notorious to be denied, that Indian regimental 
 officers are very generally in debt, it is not surprising 
 that the general conduct of so many of these is most 
 disreputable. It is obviously impossible for me to set 
 down names, or to record the misconduct of the many 
 blackguards I have met ; but I can appeal to every 
 officer in the service to say, whether he has any diffi- 
 culty in recalling many such names, and whether he 
 has not known instances of such persons pursuing, 
 with perfect impunity, for many years a course of 
 unblushing rascality and falsehood. I trust and 
 believe that we have a large number of officers of the 
 highest honour, and I think none of these have any 
 wish to blink the question; and that they deeply 
 deplore the fact, that, through the apathy of the 
 government, and the imbecility of those placed in 
 important commands, officers may, and do, persevere 
 in courses which here would conduct them to a 
 reformatory course of penal discipline. Officers
 
 i)0 
 
 such as these not only never can have proper in- 
 fiuence over the Sepoys, but must, in a great mea- 
 sure, prevent good officers in the same regiment from 
 having any. 
 
 If we have a re-organisation of our entire system, 
 and give to regimental officers what is their due — 
 what will enable them to feel that confidence is really 
 placed in their good qualities, and that importance is 
 attached to their efficiency, there can be little diffi- 
 culty in securing men who will give such satisfaction. 
 Real responsibility should be imposed on all placed in 
 authority, by inflicting on theia the punishment which 
 would be due for the offence they concealed. 
 
 The man who overlooked a case of drunkenness 
 should himself be removed from tlie service ; he is 
 really as untrustworthy as the drunkard is. 
 
 The man who overlooked dishonourable conduct in 
 one acting under his authority, should himself be 
 cashiered, for he proves that lie is deficient in right 
 moral perceptions. 
 
 We do not want goodnatured old women, but men 
 (where duty or honour is concerned) of unbending- 
 sternness. 
 
 The treatment of junior officers should be on the 
 same principle. Wliile men can be obtained who do 
 not drink, or lie, or cheat, or get into debt, it would 
 be folly to retain any who are known to have such 
 propensities. With regard to debt, there might ap- 
 pear to be a necessity for a less summary proceeding; 
 but a general principle might be laid down, which 
 could be acted uj)on practically. We cannot define 
 in words an exact rule on the subject, but we could 
 form a correct opinion on any case submitted ; and 
 where a man was found guilty of incurring obliga- 
 tions, which he had not a reasonable prospect of being 
 able to perform, this would be dishonourable conduct, 
 which there need be no room for hesitation in punish- 
 ing with dismissal. But we might safely go a step
 
 56 
 
 further and lay down a rule, that a man who, within 
 a certain period of time, had a certain number of 
 awards given against him by a Court of Requests 
 (unless they certified that the defence appeared to 
 have originated in a misapprehension as to liability), 
 should thereupon be removed from the service. 
 
 1 cannot see what hardship there would be in this, 
 and the good effect it would have on morality is 
 indisputable. I never had an award against me, 
 from the first day I entered the service, thougli 
 entirely dependent on my regimental pay; and there 
 are hundreds of other officers in Bengal, who can say 
 the same. Why, then, should not all be able to say 
 so? Simply because the government has never 
 cared a straw about the matter, and has given 
 them unlimited license to ruin themselves if they 
 chose. 
 
 The government that respects its officers, and gives 
 them their due, has made the first step towards 
 making them respect themselves, and render faithful 
 service to their employers. 
 
 I know not whether the late Sir Charles Napier 
 l)roposed any sweeping measures for restoring the 
 tone of feeling in the oflScers, and improving the dis- 
 cipline of the men, in the Bengal army; but it is very 
 notorious, that he was deeply imj^ressed with the evils 
 he saw in both. The feeling against him, in high 
 quarters, was much too strong to allow of his carry- 
 ing out any great measure of reform; but I presume 
 that no one will deny his com])etency to pronounce 
 an opinion on military subjects : no one will, I think, 
 venture to say, that he could not see what consti- 
 tuted the difference between regiments of good sol- 
 diers, and regiments of careless, slovenly, ill-drilled, 
 and worse-disciplined fellows — such as he declared 
 many of our Bengal corps to be, and such as they 
 contiiuied up to the time of their mutiny. 
 
 Sir Charles Napier is, I know, believed to have
 
 67 
 
 latterly conceived a prejudice to Bengal officers, from 
 the fact of there being so many notorious black sheep 
 among them. With the limited means at his com- 
 mand, it was impossible for him to have weeded out 
 more of these than he did; and, remembering how 
 pitch clefileth^ I am not surprised that he should have 
 considered the general tone of feeling lowered (as, 
 indeed, it was) by the contaminating presence of 
 such men. 
 
 By way of illustration, I could name an officer 
 who has, with perfect impunity, for fourteen years, 
 pursued a course of unblushing rascality — who once, 
 by deliberate falsehood, inveigled two of his brother 
 officers into becoming his sureties for large sums — 
 who has systematically swindled tradesmen, and had 
 his debts compromised by a trifle in the rupee — who 
 has bought goods on credit, to sell again for cash — 
 who never missed appearing before the monthly Court 
 of Requests, except just after some expose that, for 
 the time, rendered even his unblushing effrontery 
 powerless for obtaining anything on credit — who 
 made a practice of employing the men of his company 
 to obtain loans for him ; and not only borrowed from 
 the men themselves, but even from one of the regi- 
 mental sweepers — who was ordinarily spoken of as 
 " that horrid scoundrel " and who yet was asso- 
 ciated with by several of his brother officers, whose 
 own personal character was irreproachable. To com- 
 plete the sketch, I may add, that that officer held an 
 important command at the time of the outbreak, and 
 had the opportunity of showing how little influence 
 such a fellow could have over his men. I give no 
 clue to the identification of that man, when there are 
 so many of the same feather ; but, painful as it is to 
 proclaim that there are such men in our army, far 
 more painful is it to remain quiet under such a humi- 
 liation. Men as bad as the above instanced might (I 
 have every reason to believe), be found in the Bombay
 
 58 
 
 and Madras armies, in fully as great num])ers as in 
 that of Bengal. But 1 do the officers of the Queen's 
 service only strict justice when 1 say, that it would 
 be impossible to find such among them. A black- 
 guard in one of Her Majesty's regiments has a very 
 short career; and I do not see why he should conti- 
 nue any longer in one of the Indian army.* 
 
 Open insubordination towards European officers — 
 apart from a general mutiny — is, as far as I am 
 aware, utterly unknown in the Bengal army; and 
 the force of the officer's own good example, has but 
 rarely failed in securing similar attention to every 
 duty, on the part of the native soldier; but to gain 
 his affection, he must be treated as a humble friend, 
 or as a child, for such in intellect he really is. There 
 need be no bounds to indulgence, but the obvious 
 
 * Not to crowd my text with examples (which might be ahiiost 
 indefinitely multiplied) of black sheep in the Bengal army, I here 
 present some account of a brother officer of the above noted worthy. 
 
 Perhaps by the attractions of a countenance, which — adverting to 
 the gloomy prospects of Indian officers — may yet very probably gain 
 him a comfortable livelihood, in sitting as a model of the Judas 
 Iscariot type, he was enabled to acquire his first notoriety by embit- 
 tering the last days of a dying man, with whose worthless wife he 
 carried on an intrigue. But the gallant Lieutenant had an eye to 
 profit as well as to pleasure, and the mysterious disappearance of his 
 victim's silver spoons — which the Committee of Adjustment vainly 
 sought for among the effects they had to dispose of for the benefit of 
 the unfortunate children, not less than of the adulterous mother — 
 was in due time cleared up by th jsc being displayed at Iscariot's table, 
 which, I hear, they have continued to garnish for the last dozen years. 
 His course for a few years thereafter was as disreputable, as habits of 
 lying, cheating, and gambling, occasional drunkenness and pretty fre- 
 quent ajjpearances at the Court of Requests could make it. It is now 
 many years since he made a first ajjproach to respectability in eschew- 
 ing strong waters, and Courts of llccjuests ; i.e., he now meets every 
 obligation, which his ingenuity in quibbling-, or his effrontery in lying, 
 does not enable him to back out of, shuffle out of, or openly repu- 
 diate. But thus far has he progressed, and no further is he likely to 
 go: yet notorious and infamous as he has made himself, he can mix 
 in the society of officers and gentlemen, against whoso honor I know 
 nothing, save that they submit to such contamination.
 
 59 
 
 requirements of the service; and the one point on 
 which reserve should be maintained between the 
 Sepoy and his officer, is that which concerns his duty. 
 A degree of affiibiHty, while oiF duty, which would 
 probably destroy an officer's authority among any 
 other troops, is indispensable to render it irresistible 
 among natives; and a wretched joke will often have 
 the most extraordinary effect in diverting their weak 
 minds, under disappointment, hardship, or even what 
 they consider injustice. A distant bearing, when not 
 engaged on duty matters, would be fatal to any 
 attempt to gain their esteem : it is so utterly repug- 
 nant to their notions of propriety, that they can view 
 it only as a mark of dislike or contempt ; and except 
 among Calcutta baboos, I never knew or heard of 
 any native presuming upon familiarity shown him. 
 It may easily be imagined what intense bores men so 
 childish and ignorant often are — how difficult it is to 
 exhibit becoming interest in their rigmarole stories 
 and absurd fancies; but patience under the infliction, 
 will generally meet with its reward, in their esteem 
 and gratitude. 
 
 It is not altogether, though it may partly be, a 
 sycophantish feeling, that prompts the Sepoy, when 
 off duty, to go and make his salaam to his officer, 
 and bestow some of his tediousness upon him, with- 
 out having any special reason to assign for the visit. 
 He cannot, therefore, but feel deeply hurt when sum- 
 marily dismissed, as he generally is, without a word 
 of kindness or even civility, and often with some 
 insulting observation as to his being a bore. Except 
 while on detached command, there is hardly an officer 
 in the service who sees anything of his men when off 
 duty. The intimate acquaintance with Sepoy cha- 
 racter to which I lay claim, has been acquired mainly 
 through my having been so much on detachment duty, 
 when I had little or no society but theirs. As I always 
 preferred the solitude of out])osts, when it relieved
 
 60 
 
 ine from subjection to such men as commanded my 
 regiment, and as no one else cared to })urchase the 
 exemption at such a sacrifice, I have had very ample 
 opportunities for forming correct opinions on the 
 subject of which I speak. 
 
 1 cannot pretend to say, that I have anticipated 
 the course of events, just as they occurred; but I 
 have always felt, that if we had to meet any serious 
 disaifection on the part of the Sepoys, we should 
 generally find tliat their officers had not that influ- 
 ence, which would suffice to bring them back to their 
 duty. I feel equally sure, that any new attempt to 
 officer regiments on the unfair system of which I 
 complain, would lead to a like lamentable fiiilure. A 
 single officer who had no injustice to complain of, 
 would render better service in making his regiment 
 efficient, than the dozen of those discontented men, 
 who were left to growl over their luck, and curse the 
 favouritism and the injustice of the government. 
 
 I never heard of an objection suggested to a staff 
 corps, except that of the expense it would involve : 
 and this is simply a sample of those groundless asser- 
 tions, that office-men keep cut and dry, as a clencher 
 to an argument, without condescending to point out 
 the application. Expense is the thing, of all others, 
 that has no bearing whatever on the subject. 
 
 If we could yield our minds to the Hibernian 
 fancy, that a man could be a bird and in two places 
 at one time, we should, no doubt, be much struck 
 with the advantage to be derived from having Ji man 
 acting, say, as Commissariat officer in Calcutta, and 
 as officer of the day with his regiment at Lahore. 
 But would our power of imagining this, assist in 
 leading us to the realisation of the fiction? For all 
 practical purposes, the Commissariat officer in Cal- 
 cutta can be of no use in his regiment at Lahore. 
 Why, then, should we not strike him off? What 
 does this cost ? Merely the stroke oi' a pen ! It is
 
 beo^ging the question, or rather it is entering upon a 
 perfectly new and distinct question, viz. that of the 
 paucity of officers, to say that we must sup|)ly his 
 place. The fact is, he was but a myth; and the 
 mere striking off his name, no more renders it neces- 
 sary to add another regimental officer, than does the 
 keeping his name in, obviate such necessity. 
 
 I feel it almost necessary to apologise, for offering 
 any explanation of what is really so self-evident: 
 but the obtuseness which has been shown in regard to 
 this matter (clear as it appears) justifies the elaborate 
 demonstration of what might be laid down as a pos- 
 tulate — that to take nothing from anything^ as much 
 remains. If it were even suggested, that the Com- 
 missariat officer, though as a general rule non-effect- 
 ive, might be made available, on an emergency, for 
 regimental duty, I think the reply is equally obvious, 
 that his own department always requires some one to 
 attend to it, and no one is so fit for it as he himself, at 
 least we ought to suppose so. If he is removed from 
 what have become his legitimate duties, to perform 
 (at a moment's notice) others which have become 
 strange to him, government must still go to the ex- 
 })ense of getting some one to perform his. However 
 far down they may go, in promoting each to act for 
 the man above him, they must, at last, come to the 
 bottom, where a new man is required. They thus 
 have to employ two inexperienced men : a new man 
 is put in the Commissariat, where he may be kept 
 almost long enough to be of some use ; the Commis- 
 sariat man is sent to join his regiment, for the purpose 
 of ])erforming duties, which he may have entirely for- 
 gotten, and which he is probably far too old to learn, 
 even if the time so lost were no object. • 
 
 If the Commissariat office objected to permanent 
 transfer to the staff, I think no one could dispute the 
 justice of allowing him to rejoin his regiment : but he 
 could have no reason to complain of being restricted
 
 62 
 
 to one, or other, of these positions ; and it appears to 
 me to be little short of insanity, to disgust a whole 
 regiment, merely to humour still farther an indi- 
 vidual, whose position is already so far more advan- 
 tageous. 
 
 I have taken a Commissariat officer for illustrating 
 my subject; but, of course, any other staff officer 
 v/ould have done equally well; and, as far as I recol- 
 lect, the appointment of aide de camp (which from its 
 nature is temporary) is the only one, that need be re- 
 garded as an exceptive case. The various depart- 
 ments might severally be formed into corps of officials, 
 and all take the chance of preferment, which these 
 severally offered them. Honorary rank might be 
 accorded to them in such ratio as they might have 
 expected to have attained under the old system. 
 Some short probation might be previously exacted, ere 
 the final transfer to the department were made ; but 
 this, satisfactorily got through, there ought to be no 
 further change: all would thus get their due, and 
 staff officers, after all, would be incomparably better 
 off than regimental officers. 
 
 If I had now the opportunity of being offered the 
 iilternative, I would (whatever were my regimental 
 position) unhesitatingly sacrifice it, with every advan- 
 tage it might afford me under the re-orgnnisation I 
 propose; and would accept staff employ, with my 
 prospects restricted to my particular department, 
 even if 1 only obtained an addition of 30 per cent to 
 my allowances. Considering that the average differ- 
 ence between the pay of officers on the staff", and of 
 regimental officers of a like standing is fully GO per 
 cent, I think there can be little doubt as to which 
 would continue the favourite service. 
 
 These sentiments will be pronounced shockingl}' 
 low and mercenary by many distinguished gentlemen, 
 whose ample allowances place them above the neces- 
 sity of solicitude as to trifling advantages; and who
 
 63 
 
 alFect to (loplorc, tliat their own too brilliant talents 
 rendered it impossible for government to leave them 
 to follow out the natural bent of their inclinations, 
 all centred in a profession the earliest, the latest, the 
 most cherished object of their affections. Indeed, 
 this affectation of enthusiasm is carried to the extent, 
 of tabooing to the mere militaire all considerations 
 but those of honour, and glory : and their beau ideal 
 of a regimental officer, if anything like what they 
 would be in that position, is precisely the reverse of 
 what they are, in their own present circumstances. 
 However, these are not rare examples of those men, 
 who everywhere generously offer to their inferio7's the 
 most exalted rules of honor for their guidance, while 
 content witli the basest practices for themselves. 
 
 Mixed motives practically work the best in this 
 world ; and the servant, who affected to care little for 
 his own interests, might safely be charged with the 
 W(M*st designs in putting forth this palpable falsehood. 
 What we want is to get men of honor, and sense, 
 and prudence, not Quixotic knight-errants, whose 
 proper place (if they existed at all) would be in Bed- 
 lam. The measure of redress I ask, small as it is, 
 would, I think, generally satisfy regimental officers; 
 iind it would abate that unwholesome cravhig for 
 staff employ, which depresses or unsettles the minds 
 of all; while it would leave ample means to govern- 
 ment of showing due encouragement to the whole 
 race of Dowbs, present, and to come. 
 
 I cannot afford the space necessary for entering 
 into the details, which would prove how badly the 
 present system worked, in regard to the efficiency of 
 those staff" establishments, which are maintained at 
 the expense of the best interests of the army. It 
 will be sufficient to point to the departments of the 
 (^uarter-master-general, and of the Commissariat, as 
 illustrations of i\\\ that .could be said of extravagant 
 expenditure, and of thorough uselessness.
 
 G4 
 
 The former department has, in every campaign, 
 proved that no assistance whatever couhl be derived 
 from it — it was, on every occasion, the hiughing-stock 
 of the army. The latter, in the expose made on the 
 celebrated Jotee Pershad trial, left no room to doubt 
 its rotten state. 
 
 The government had the mortification of being 
 compelled, by the Supreme Court, to pay the Lalla an 
 enormous sum of money, because its officers had kept 
 no check on that contractor; and were obliged to 
 admit, that they really knew nothing about the justice 
 of the claims he advanced — what had been, or what 
 had not been supplied. 
 
 In urging that every officer on staff employ should 
 be immediately struck off the strength of his regi- 
 ment, I have distinctly stated that this in no way in- 
 volves the necessity of maintaining, in each coi'ps, the 
 same number of effective officers, as it now numbers 
 of effective, and non-effective combined. Doubtless 
 it would be desirable to have a considerable number, 
 in every regiment, of regulars; but, having secured, 
 by the measure I propose, the efficiency (because the 
 contentment) of those that remain with it, I think the 
 mere question of number might, to a considerable 
 degree, be regulated by the financial circumstances 
 of the government. 
 
 At present there are, nominally, a colonel, a lieu- 
 tenant-colonel, a major, 7 captanis, 11 lieutenants, 
 and 5 ensigns, in all 26 officers; and, as 7 of tliese are 
 permitted, by the present regulations, to be perma- 
 nently detached, there remain 18 officers who are 
 supposed to be present with the colours — the colonel 
 being always non-effective, i.e. as colonel a sinecurist. 
 Supposing a native corps of the line to have 10 com- 
 panies of 100 men each (with the usual complement 
 of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers) 
 it might be advisable to allot to it 1 lieutenant- 
 colonel, 1 major, 10 captains, and 10 subalterns.
 
 65 
 
 I do not pretend to attach any great importance to 
 this apportionment ; but 1 tliink it desirable, that the 
 proportion of subalterns and captains should be so assi- 
 milated, as to allow of the latter rjuik being attained 
 within a more reasonable time than it at present is. 
 The superior position of a captain carries with it a 
 weight, that amply repays government for the expend- 
 iture it occasions; and the encouragement that the 
 chance of quicker promotion would give young offi- 
 cers, is an advantage that is not to be lightly esti- 
 mated. With this view I would recommend, that 
 every officer should be promoted to his lieutenancy 
 after three years' service ; and the proportion of ensigns 
 and lieutenants, among the 10 subalterns, would thus 
 fluctuate according to circumstances. 
 
 The useless, sinecure colonelcy, I propose to abolish 
 altogether. It has been the bane of the service, in 
 holding out an inducement for old and incapable 
 officers to hang on, in the hope of obtaining this prize. 
 I claim, of course, for all who have at this time at- 
 tained the grade of regimental field officer, ample 
 compensation for the injury they would incur; but, 
 to all below that rank, the impetus given to promo- 
 tion would make up for any remote advantages thus 
 sacrificed. The saving which would accrue to go- 
 vernment, of the allowances drawn by colonels, would, 
 of itself, go far to meet the increased expenditure, 
 arising from the modifications 1 have suggested. 
 
 The officers required for brigade and divisional 
 commands, might be drawn from the field officers; 
 and such rank be conferred, as was suitable for the 
 command to which they were appointed. Retirement 
 should be made compulsory, immediately on an 
 officer's completing the thirty-two years' service, re- 
 quired to obtain the highest grade of pension. Retire- 
 ment should further be made compulsory on the 
 pension any officer was entitled to, if absent from his 
 duty, by reason of ill health, for any period (or pei'iods 
 
 F
 
 66 
 
 combined) amountinnj to two years, counting from 
 the date on which he could have claimed the 
 pension. 
 
 I found these suggestions on the principle, that it 
 is for the interest of Government to retain the ser- 
 vices of officers, while they are comparatively young 
 and vigorous; and to get rid of them when they 
 become old. To hold out inducements for a man to 
 remain thirty-two years, durmg the whole of Avhich 
 time (under ordinary circumstances) he may really 
 be of value to the state ; and then to dismiss him to 
 an honourable competency. The proviso I would 
 make, in the case of iiis getting sick, would avert the 
 evil of being burdened Avith men, whose ailments 
 might afford them the means of protracting the 
 period of their service, where detriment to the public 
 interests would be the only result. I think it would 
 be highly objectionable to allow the government any 
 discretionary power, in retaining the services (except 
 in time of war) of any officer who had completed his 
 period of thirty-two years' service. It is, at least, 
 extremely probable, that equally able men could, at 
 any time, be found among the juniors; and the pre- 
 tence of "special cases," and "special claims," has 
 too often been put forth in India, to cover jobbery 
 and favouritism. 
 
 For a commander-in-chief, £8,000 per annum, con- 
 solidated allowances, would be a most handsome 
 remuneration, since it suffices for a lieutenant-gover- 
 nor, officially his superior. For a general of division, 
 £3,000 per animm, consolidated, would be propor- 
 tionately ample; and for brigadiers of tlie first and 
 second class, £2,500 and £2,000 respectively. 
 
 A large saving would be effected by these reduc- 
 tions; but a far greater advantage would be obtained, 
 in having the posts filled by men comparatively 
 young, and active; and in the modification of that 
 fatal error, on which we have unhappily acted, of re-
 
 G7 
 
 serving all the sweets of the service for men, who 
 have become incapable of giving any adequate return, 
 or even of really enjoying the extravagant salaries 
 they receive. Admirably has General Hewitt proved, 
 that by thus paying a premium on senility, we effect 
 an hisurance in favour of rebellion. 
 
 The furlough regulations require to be entirely re- 
 modelled ; and, considering the unfair advantage that 
 has, on so many occasions, been taken of the helpless 
 position of officers, something, I think, might not 
 unreasonably be now expected in the way of indul- 
 gence ; but I ask nothing for them, that is not based 
 on obvious expediency. 
 
 The ponderous wisdom of Leaden Hall is ever in 
 ludicrous disproportion to the result, achieved by its 
 deliberations. The parturient mountains gave birth 
 to nothing so insignificant, as those eighteen genlte- 
 men are delivered of, in the labour of ideas affecting 
 great interests. The idiotical "Old Furlough Regula- 
 lations," had, at least, the merit of clearness and 
 perspicuity; there was, so to speak, method in the 
 madness. The Honourable Court, in the effort to 
 accommodate the folly to the present age of steam, has 
 preserved it intact, while effectually destroying the 
 precision. We have been presented with a complicated 
 set of arrangements, the difficulty of understanding 
 which is proved by the numerous references, made by 
 the Indian Government, for further explanations. The 
 value of the boon, that it was supposed the Court in- 
 tended to confer, may be estimated by the fact, that 
 so mahy regimental officers preferred remaining on 
 the old footing. Even if not so intended, the benefit 
 is really limited to staff officers, who can now return 
 to England without loss of their appointments, and 
 are thus, indeed, assured of them in perpetuity. 
 
 In the Queen's service, officers may obtain a great 
 deal of leave, without any loss of service, or of pay 
 except as regards colonial allowances ; and I appre- 
 
 F 2
 
 68 
 
 hend the indulgence has not been found prejudicial 
 to the best interests of the state, albeit the country- 
 has derived no pecuniary benefit thereby. 
 
 To nie, it appears that the view taken of the sub- 
 ject by the Horse Guards, is really the most sensible, 
 and judicious; while the disposition ever manifested 
 by the Court of Directors, to measure out the indul- 
 gence by the tape yard — to weigh, in scales of such 
 scrupulous nicety, the penn'orth handed over — 
 proves that this corporation, however admirably fitted 
 for the position it originally occupied, is little suited 
 for such a charge as the concerns of a great army. 
 
 Since no precise rule as to leave is laid down in the 
 Queen's regulations, it is impossible to determine, with 
 exactness, hoAv much any otficer might be able to ob- 
 tain ; but I speak, perhaps, within a safe margin, when I 
 say, he might fairly calculate on getting, in the aggre- 
 gate, one year in six. Admitting that, circum- 
 stanced as officers are in India, some definite rules on 
 the subject are desirable, I think the indulgence, to 
 the above-named extent, might be accorded with 
 positive gain to the state. If each grant of leave 
 were limited to one year, officers would have the 
 benefit of periodically freshening both their minds 
 and bodies, without incurring the risk of becoming 
 rusted in their dut}^; and as all distinction might 
 then be abolished between sick leave, and private 
 leave, an inducement would be offi3red to avoid get- 
 ting sick, Avhich the army list can show to be much 
 needed. 
 
 AVhere furloughs were so frequent, yet for such 
 short periods, there could be no difficulty in re- 
 gulating the distribution, so as to retain a certain 
 fixed number of officers with the regiment; and, 
 while the finances of the Government would be 
 relieved by saving the Indian allowances of the 
 absentees, an incomparably greater advantage would 
 be gained, through the heartiness with which the
 
 69 
 
 duty would be performed by those remainino;, if 
 cheered by a certain prospect of obtaining the indul- 
 gence in their turn. 
 
 Hitherto, the only result of the legislation on this 
 subject has been, to make an immense number of 
 people miserable, by keeping them stewing in India, 
 injuring themselves, and doing no good to the state; 
 with no apparent oliject, but to consume so much 
 time — just as incipient barristers are required to eat 
 so many terms. 
 
 " All work and no play, makes Jack a dull boy." 
 But the Indian officer, whether he work or not, will 
 become dull enough, if he has too much of India. A 
 little common sense brought to bear on the subject, 
 shows that it would be more judicious to force him 
 to return occasionally to England, than to concoct a 
 code of ingeniously devised restrictions on his doing 
 so. If an equal amount of efficient superintendence 
 can be kept up by a smaller number of the high-paid 
 officers, the pecuniary gain is obvious. Unliapi)ily, 
 the desirableness of securing cheerfulness, and hearti- 
 ness, among regimental officers, has never struck our 
 authorities; they have been quite satisfied if they 
 could keep them at regimental head-quarters : of the 
 rest they seem to have despaired, and no doubt recol- 
 lected that it was easy to bring the horse to the 
 water, and presumed it was hopeless to try to make 
 him drink. 
 
 The re-organization which I propose for the Bengal 
 army, involves a large augmentation of the European 
 portion, with a corresponding reduction in the native 
 part of the force; so as to bring within a safe com- 
 pass that disproportion, which nothing but the blind- 
 est infatuation could have allowed to increase so 
 enormously as it has done. 
 
 By a return of the Indian government, it would
 
 70 
 
 appear, that the proportion of European to native 
 soldiers is, in Bombay, as 1 to 9f ; in Madras, 1 to 
 J 6f ; and in Bengal, 1 to 24-| ! In estimating the 
 comparative trustworthiness of the three armies, these 
 figures are extremely significant, and suggestive ; 
 for we may not unfairly suppose, that Mahomedan 
 intriguers confined their attentions to that army, in 
 which the natives formed so overwhelming a ma- 
 jority. 
 
 Within the last twenty years,* the augmentation 
 made in the native portion of the Bengal army, 
 amounts to 24 regiments of cavalry, and 41 of 
 infantry — all irregulars, and all officered by Euro- 
 peans drawn from regiments of the line. Besides 
 this, the native corps of the line have been strength- 
 ened, to the extent of some 20,000 men ; Avhile, as a 
 counterpoise to this addition of at least 60,000 black 
 troops, the European portion has been increased by 
 2 infantry regiments, or say a couple of thousand 
 men! To Lord Dalhousie, I may remark, are we 
 mainly indebted for this state of things. The supe- 
 rior chea^^ness of native soldiers, was a point not 
 likely to escape his financial sagacity ; and about 
 three-fourths of this addition to their numbers was 
 made by him. 
 
 In Madras, on the other hand, there has, within 
 this period, been no addition whatever made to the 
 native portion of the army, though 2 Company's 
 European regiments have likewise been added to it, 
 and the same to that of Bombay. 
 
 In Bombay, the augmentation in the native force 
 amounts to but 3 corps of the line, 2 Belooch batta- 
 lions, and some half-dozen local or police corps. 
 
 So much for the temptations severally endured by 
 these armies. 
 
 I may here incidentally notice the injustice done 
 
 * Nearly the whole of this addition has however been made since 
 184C-7.
 
 71 
 
 to the Bengal service, by the favouritism sliown to 
 that of Bombay, and (though in a less degree) to that 
 of ^ladras, in the distribution of those new regiments 
 of Europeans. The Bengal army being three times 
 the size of the Bombay, and one-third larger than 
 the Madras, it is obvious that, in giving a hke aug- 
 mentation to each, Bombay officers obtained three 
 times the promotion that we got ; and even the 
 Madras men obtained one-third more. What makes 
 the injustice more palpable, is the disproportion 
 between the Queen's and the Company's European 
 troops in these presidencies. AVhile in Bengal there 
 are no fewer than 15 Queen's regiments to the Com- 
 pany's 3, in Bombay there are but 4, and in Madras 
 only 3 to the same proportion ! 
 
 But another bit of favouritism was perpetrated, for 
 the exclusive benefit of the Bombay army. It ob- 
 tained an addition of 3 native regiments of the line, 
 while its corps were being kept up at no greater 
 strength than 800 privates (at which I believe they 
 still are), whereas in Bengal, our regiments have been 
 for many years maintained at a strength of 1,000 
 privates, and no augmentation has been allowed to 
 us. If the government can suppose that this injus- 
 tice did not excite deep disgust in the minds of 
 Bengal officers, I can only marvel at their simpli- 
 city. 
 
 Exclusive of Queen's troops, artillery and sappers, 
 the Bengal army is composed* of the following regi- 
 ments : — 
 
 Europeans. Natives. 
 
 Regulars aucl Irregulars, Contingents, etc. 
 Infy, 3. Cayy, lU; Infy, 74. Cavy, 25; Inf^, 45. 
 
 And for these I would substitute : — 
 
 Europeans. Natives. 
 
 Regulars. Irregulars. 
 
 Cayy, 5 ; Inf >', 1 5. Inf >', 50. Cayy, 1 5 ; Inf ^ Pol. B"*, 50. 
 
 * It may be as well to observe, that here, as in other places, I 
 speak of things as they were previous to the disturbances.
 
 72 
 
 The infantry police battalions (each of which might 
 be raised to the strength of 1,000 men of all ranks) 
 should perform all those miscellaneous duties with 
 which, for so many years, the native regiments of the 
 line have been harassed, and their discipline and 
 general efficiency so seriously impaired. Though, of 
 course, they would suffer from the like cause, they 
 should, as far as possible, be regularly drilled, and 
 disciplined ; and in this respect, certainly, need not 
 be much inferior to the regiments of the line under 
 their present disadvantages. There would be no 
 object in establishing regular reliefs for them; but 
 they could be moved about as occasion really made 
 necessary; and besides making themselves generally 
 useful, they might be made to act with troops of the 
 line, both in the field and in cantonments. As none 
 but the best description of men should be taken, it 
 would be advisable to place them, in regard to pay, 
 on the same footing as the regular troops. 
 
 A commandant, second in command, and adjutant, 
 would suffice to officer such a corps ; and consolidated 
 allowances of 1,000 rupees, 600 rupees, and 400 
 rupees per month, respectively, would affi^rd ample 
 inducement for able-enough men to accept of the 
 permanent transfer to such appointments, obtaining 
 promotion only in those corps. 
 
 The irregular cavalry regiments might remain as 
 they are at present, except that their European 
 officers should be permanently transferred to them, 
 as in the case of the police corps. They should be 
 relieved from all the degrading offices to which they 
 are exposed, in performing civil duties; and, in fact, 
 they should be irregulars merely in name — in not 
 being officered to the extent that the regular cavalry 
 corps of the line were. 
 
 As for the 10 regular native cavalry regiments, 
 our disasters have not been altogether without be-
 
 73 
 
 neficial uses, when they enable us to get rid of this 
 expensive and useless arm of the service. People 
 have ventured to hint, that it was kept up by the 
 Court of Directors as a pet preserve of valuable 
 patronage; and that otherwise, we should (long ere 
 this) have seen it ruthlessly lopped off by the shears 
 so vigorously used, at other times, in Leadenhall- 
 street. Perhaps those corps behaved no worse than 
 the infantry of the line have done; but it would 
 be somewhat too absurd to continue longer to keep 
 up, at so enormous an expense, this black burlesque 
 on British lancers or dragoons. Let us have some- 
 thing we can really depend upon; and no one would 
 venture to say, that in five regiments of British 
 dragoons we should not have more for our money, 
 than in the ten native corps on which it is now 
 thrown away. Man for man, I believe few would 
 not prefer the irregular to the regular native cavalry 
 soldier, even with all the advantage the latter has, in 
 being mounted on a horse, which has cost the gov- 
 ernment some £60. The fact is, the native regular 
 cavalry was but little better than a great sham; 
 they never could learn to ride in the Horse-Guard's 
 fashion they were taught ; they looked very pretty 
 on parade, but that was all, or very nearly so. They 
 have done good service on some occasions; but tlie 
 misfortune was, we could never depend upon the 
 occasion. 
 
 Fifty Native Infantry Regiments of the Line would, 
 I think, be as small a force, as could be considered 
 sufficient to spread over so vast a territory (as is 
 comprised in the Bengal Presidency) the brigades, 
 and regiments necessary to occupy the numerous 
 positions where a military force is required : for an 
 army is not less indispensable for the security of the 
 state, from the fact that it may itself prove a source of 
 danger. The danger it may itself occasion, it is, in 
 some measure, within our own power to avert ; while
 
 74 
 
 the clangers, against which it guards us, are otherwise 
 entirely beyond our control. 
 
 By merging all contingents and local corps in one 
 grand army, recruited from all parts of India, we 
 destroy that cohesion which made each regiment a 
 mere body of militia men, all drawn from the same 
 districts, and united by what are, in some degree, com- 
 mon interests and feelings ; a state of things obviously 
 fraught with peril to an alien government such as 
 ours. It is, I think, our obvious policy to strive as 
 much as possible to transfer the feeling of being aliens 
 to the men themselves ; to arrange regiments so, that, 
 in whatever district they may be, the majority of the 
 men will be foreigners there, and thus be more dis- 
 posed to identify themselves with the government, 
 which is the only point all should have in common. 
 Each section of the classes which composed the 
 whole force, would thus find itself associated with 
 strangers, who (combined) were more powerful than 
 itself; and would feel itself in a foreign service, not 
 in the sense hitherto obtaining (where the govern- 
 ment alone was foreign), but much in the same way, 
 though not, of course, in the same degree that Euro- 
 pean troops are. 
 
 The advantage of having a compact army of 50,000 
 men, reserved for duties exclusively military, and 
 always with their colors, is very obvious; and they 
 would probably be more valuable than twice that 
 number selected from the present heterogeneous con- 
 glomeration of regular, and irregular corps, and con- 
 tingents, which is supposed to make up an army. 
 With fifty irregular regiments, to take all miscellane- 
 ous duties, and occupy the more settled parts of the 
 country (where a show of power is required rather 
 than the reality), I think every object desirable would 
 be attained. 
 
 In locating the European troo})s, we should be 
 chiefly influenced by a regard to their preservation ;
 
 75 
 
 and as it could hardly be said, that men who do no 
 duty, but fighting, are in time of peace required more 
 in one place than in another, it would be better, as far 
 as possible, to mass them at the most salubrious 
 stations. 
 
 In transferring twenty Queen's regiments to the 
 Indian establishment, it would be impossible to ap- 
 portion them, among the armies of the various Pre- 
 sidencies, in any ratio that might not require re-ad- 
 justment; and it Avould appear a simpler plan to 
 throw the whole European force — Royal and Com- 
 pany's troops — into one, and distribute them as might 
 be required. The advantage of having three distinct 
 native armies is obvious enough, but I see no good 
 reason why a European regiment should belong to 
 one Presidency more than to another ; though a corps 
 might (as far as was otherwise found convenient) be 
 allowed to remain in the Presidency for which it was 
 originally raised. 
 
 The difficulty that might be started as to the officers 
 having an interest in separate funds — Orphan, and 
 Military — would be very easily met, by government 
 taking these in hand. Indeed, government ought 
 from the first to have considered it a part of its own 
 obligations, to make a provision for the widows and 
 orphans of its officers, who fall in its service ; and it 
 may now repair the neglect, by taking over the assets 
 of each institution, and deducting from the pay of the 
 officers the subscriptions they paid their respective 
 funds. 
 
 It might, perhaps, object to the insolvent state of 
 the Bengal Military Fund; but I should much like to 
 know what made our fund insolvent? I acquit go- 
 vernment of having intentionally done us any wrong 
 in the matter of the exchanges, loudly though so many 
 officers declare that we have been defrauded ; but I 
 am by no means so sure that Ave are not really entitled 
 to a large sum, as to which it has made a little mis-
 
 76 
 
 take. But the real cause why our fund has become 
 so embarrassed is, that so many married men have 
 been killed in the endless campaigns, which have been 
 carried on ; and I think it is little creditable to the 
 government to withhold its aid, where the difficulties 
 have really thus been incurred in its own service. 
 
 The government has looked coolly on, while poor 
 widows have had to submit to a deduction of 10 per 
 cent, on their small pittances ; and thus have to lament 
 not only their widowhood but, the privation of what 
 is necessary for their support, through the zeal and 
 courage with which their husbands served the state. 
 Officers' allowances are tolerably liberal, and I do not 
 think, on this score, they can complain ; but if these 
 are assumed to be so large, as to justify any mean- 
 ness in transferring perpetually new burthens upon 
 them, I think the service will soon have little to re- 
 commend it. People don't care about expatriating 
 themselves, except for some decided pecuniary benefit. 
 
 While on the subject of allowances, I trust I may 
 be pardoned for offering a suggestion, of the advisa- 
 bility of reducing or raising these to round sums. 
 
 HoAv that precision was attained which has defined 
 to a fraction of a farthing, the exact money value of 
 the services of each grade, I confess I am at a loss to 
 conjecture. The genius that discovered and revealed 
 to the government, that the precise wage that should 
 monthly be paid to an Ensign (say, for example) is 
 neither more nor less than Co.'s Rs. 202*1 2'5 (repre- 
 senting in English money, 202 florins, 12 three half- 
 penny bits, and 5 half-farthings), would, I am sure, 
 have conferred an inestimable advantage on the 
 Society of Actuaries had he left a detailed statement 
 of those abstruse calculations, by which he arrived at 
 such a perfection of accuracy. The light that would 
 have thus been thrown on the science of calculations 
 would have been of inestimable benefit, in reducing it 
 to a certainty; had the paper, which has been lost to
 
 77 
 
 the world, even stopped short of the details which 
 were so triumphantly carried out in determining, with 
 a like (fractional farthing) nicety, what was the due 
 of all the other grades. 
 
 What I would suggest, however^ is, that though 
 the government has the satisfaction of knowing, that 
 it does not pay one of its servants a half of a farthing 
 more than is just the correct thing, yet this advan- 
 tage might, perhaps, be profitaljl}^ sacrificed by the 
 consideration of the gain in simplifying their accounts, 
 by adopting round numbers. Not to shock the 
 Honorable Court by too sweeping a change at the 
 outset, suppose we were to deal with the coppers. 
 Three annas and seven pies added to an Ensign's pay 
 (and representing only five-pence, one farthing and 
 a half, English), would suffice to obviate the necessity 
 of adding complication to accounts, that in any way 
 are none of the clearest. But if such an expenditure 
 were pronounced, in full conclave, to be inadmissible, 
 I think I could answer for its not exciting one-tenth 
 of the disgust, which has been occasioned by other of 
 the Court's acts, if it were to send out orders for im- 
 mediately cutting 12 annas, and 7 pies, from the pay 
 of Ensigns, and all fractional coppers from that of its 
 other servants. 
 
 I feel that I deserve the thanks of the Honorable 
 Court (when next they meet in council) for having 
 pointed out the feasibility of making a saving, which 
 I do not apprehend that they will think despicable; 
 especially when they consider, that having thus got a 
 paring off (the rind ), they may be better able, at some 
 future time, to make a dig into the cheese itself. At 
 all events, let them look at the result of the present 
 operation — say of ensigns alone, before we go on to 
 the other grades — some 750, at one shilling and six- 
 pence, half-penny, farthing, half-farthing, how much 
 would that be? Something quite worthy of the 
 Honorable Court's consideration, 1 feel very sure ;
 
 78 
 
 but I really have not time now to make the calcula- 
 tion. I must get on with my work.* 
 
 A vast deal of nonsense has, for many years past 
 been talked regarding the pampering and petting of 
 the Bengal Sepoy; and my Lord Dalhousie has en- 
 dorsed the opinion, by asserting (in the couple of lines 
 which suffice him to sum up all that is worth no- 
 ticing in regard to the native soldier) that his condi- 
 tion has been improved to that degree, at which further 
 improvement is almost an impossibility. It would, 
 perhaps, be unreasonable to demand from the noble 
 Lord explanations on a subject, which (to judge by 
 such notice as he has been pleased to bestow on it, in 
 a minutely prolix minute on the concerns of India) 
 could have had the benefit of little more than the 
 nineteen hundredth part of his attention directed 
 to it ; but I should be glad to derive, from any source, 
 information as to the nature of the improvements 
 constantly hinted at. 
 
 It is true, no doubt, that (some eighteen years ago, 
 if I recollect right) the rule was abolished, which ren- 
 dered the Sepoy liable to stoppages from his pay 
 while in hospital ; but the feeling that suggested this 
 change, though kind, was a mistaken one; and the 
 indulgence has had a most prejudicial effect, in en- 
 couragmg malingering, and shirking duty. Few good 
 men go much to hospital; consequently such obtained 
 small pecuniary benefit through the relaxation, and 
 have had much extra duty imposed on them, by tlie 
 malingering it encouraged. The indulgence should, 
 at all events, be restricted to those suffering from 
 
 * I stop not to speak — though I certainly thinlc a great deal — of 
 the indignity offered to gentlemen in tendering half farthings for 
 their acceptance. Our Government makes so much fuss ahout half 
 a farthing that it would be quite unable to understand the force of 
 an olyection such as this !
 
 79 
 
 wounds, or ill health contracted while on active ser- 
 vice. 
 
 Further, within the last dozen years, a trifle, as 
 hutting money, has been granted native soldiers ; but, 
 under certain limitations, and restrictions, that often 
 render the regulation a dead letter. 
 
 Lastly, compensation is allowed them for dearness 
 of provisions in case — as his Lordship has pleased to 
 rule — such should reach what mis^ht be called famine 
 prices. Then the government works out some abstruse 
 calculations, showing, that compensation, ranging from 
 1 to 6 or 8 half- farthings is due to each man ; and gene- 
 rously proceeds to disburse it. The generosity brings 
 its own reward in the gratification the government 
 feels in reflecting upon it, and trumpeting it forth on 
 all occasions; but I never could observe that the mu- 
 nificence excited any lively emotion among the reci- 
 pients. On the contrary, I have frequently seen it 
 taken with a grin, which was highly suggestive of the 
 witticisms passed on it in the lines; such, perhaps, as 
 the somewhat larger remuneration of three farthings 
 drew from poor Costard. 
 
 I fearlessly assert that these indulgences combined 
 have not added one rupee per annum (on the average) 
 to each soldier's pay; and, within my recollection, 
 nothing else has been done to enable the authorities 
 to reach this much vaunted ne plus ultra state of im- 
 provement in the Sepoys' condition — unless, indeed, 
 it be urged, that the sacrifice they have made of truth, 
 in the praises which, on various public occasions they 
 have bestowed on the native soldiery, constitutes a 
 real claim on their gratitude. 
 
 On the other hand, though I will not aflirm that 
 the Sepoys can complain of any gross wrong done 
 them, yet they certainly can show grounds for their 
 constant assertion, that, as our empire progresses, our 
 service becomes less valuable to them ; and that the 
 improvements, eff*ected by that enlightened policy
 
 80 
 
 which they are too ignorant to appreciate, deprive 
 them, from time to time, of privileges which, from 
 long use, they had always regarded as their rights. 
 
 First, I would remark that repeated annexations 
 have so increased our empire, as to render necessary 
 an entire change in the distribution of the army. 
 
 It is not 12 years ago since the most northerly 
 of our divisions was Sirhind; now it is Peshawur, 
 some 500 miles further. Then we had but 2 native 
 inftxntry corps, to the north of Kurnal — now there 
 are 4, within the Cis-Sutlcdge, besides 26 pushed far 
 beyond that. 
 
 In the south our frontier station was Khyouk 
 Phyoo in Arracan, where we kept one corps; now it 
 has been extended some few hundred miles further 
 to Pegu, where we have 3 regiments. 
 
 Thus 3 1 out of the 74 native infantry regiments of 
 the line, or as nearly as possible three-sevenths of that 
 arm, have been transferred, to occupy what to them 
 are foreign countries ; and wliich neither they, nor the 
 government, contemplated that they ever would have 
 to garrison. 
 
 To any one possessing the slightest acquaintance 
 with native character, it would be superfluous to 
 point out the disgust, which such changes must have 
 occasioned in the minds of these mercenaries, who, 
 sharing only in the honour and glory of our con- 
 quests, do not feel such to afford any consolation for 
 the evils incident thereto. 
 
 All the affections of the Sepoy are concentrated in 
 his own family, his sympathies extend not beyond 
 his own village; and, of course, the further he is 
 removed from that spliere, the more discontented or 
 unhappy he is. The extraordinary fatigue these men 
 so joyfully undergo in walking to their homes, the 
 expense they so cheerfully incur (in addition to the 
 sacrifice of their batta, while thus aljsent), prove the 
 force of these feelings in a race, whose natural indo- 
 lence and penuriousness are excessive.
 
 81 
 
 But so inadec^uate is now the iminerical strengtli 
 of the Bengal army for the enormous amount of duty 
 imposed upon it, that regiments have to be kept 
 eight or ten years in the Punjab, ere they can be re- 
 lieved. In the Peshawur division the troops arc 
 denied all furlough; Init during thn entire time that 
 corps remain in the I*unjab, not more than one half of 
 the men have the opportunity afforded them of visit- 
 ing their homes. The furlough season lasts from 
 April to October ; and for men who have to march 
 some 1,500 miles, in going and returning, it is ob- 
 vious that this is barely sufficient; and that the 
 greater part of the time will be occupied on the 
 journey. On the other hand, when the regiment is 
 in the north-west provinces, the seven months' leave 
 may be divided between two men, and yet allow to 
 each as long a time to spend at home. In addition 
 to this, there is a further sacrifice of a much prized 
 indulgence, granted throughout the furlough months, 
 'of thirty days' leave to three men per company, with- 
 out any loss of batta; for so few men would be able 
 to reach their homes, from any part of the Punjab, in 
 fifteen days, that the regulation hardly ever benefits 
 any one. As the commanding officer can, moreover, 
 use his own discretion in giving leave for periods of a 
 week, to such men as he thinks deserving, there is yet 
 another o^reat boon lost to the men bv being stationed 
 in the Punjab. 
 
 To estimate tlie real severity of this privation to 
 the Bengal Sepoy, wt, must consider his peculiar cus- 
 toms, and idiosyncracy. For him, a wife may be 
 called a social and religious necessity; and his first 
 thouglit, after obtaining service, is to su[)ply the 
 want, if not already married. But the Hindoo is 
 afflicted with canonical laws, more inconvenient far 
 than those invented by "Apostolical Succession" 
 churches. A period of some three months is fixed 
 upon by the Brahmins (being determined by some 
 
 G
 
 82 
 
 idiotical astrological calculations) ; and only during 
 this period, in each year, can any Hindoo marriage 
 be celebrated. 
 
 In the face of so many difficulties, we may imagine 
 what chance the young Sepoy, or elderly widower, 
 has of realising what he considers the great object of 
 his existence. As for the married men, their position 
 is scarcely better ; for, as it is repugnant to their feel- 
 ings to bring their wives to the regiment, they are 
 condemned to long years of separation, relieved only 
 by visits of the shortest duration. 
 
 I am far from asserting, that Government had no 
 right to locate these men in their newly acquired 
 territories, albeit they had been enlisted with a view 
 to employment in a far more circumscribed sphere ; 
 but I do think the policy of reducing the extra 
 allowances, drawn in such stations, Avas somewhat 
 doubtful. Extra batta is now granted only in 
 Peshawur; and the genuine delight the men exhibit, 
 when they receive the order to leave that station, 
 proves how little even money (their great idol) is 
 considered a compensation for banishment to remote 
 stations. Tlie question, however, which I am dis- 
 cussing, is not the wisdom of Lord Dnlhousie's re- 
 trenchments; it is the value of the assertion, that 
 the Sepoy's condition had been brought to the ne plus 
 ultra of improvement. 
 
 ]>ut the wliole tendency of our legislation has had 
 the effect of depriving the Sepov of many substantial 
 advantages he possessed, both in tlie profit of plunder- 
 ing, and the gratification of bullying the villages. 
 
 I hope no one Avill imagine that I am an advocate 
 for the continuance of such abuses. I only wish the 
 reform were extended to all abuses at home— that 
 those sinecurists, and pensioners, who plunder the 
 country, were summarily deprived of such means of 
 subsistence, and left to starve if indisposed to work 
 honestly. But will the illustrious \Vai'den of t'--
 
 83 
 
 Cinque Ports pretend to affirm, that a cheerful and 
 ready renunciation of the right of battening on a coun- 
 try, or on individuals should be expected only in tho 
 lower ranks, and among heathen mei'cenarics ! If not, 
 he may believe that such measures, however excellent 
 in themselves, have certainly reduced the value of go- 
 vernment employment to our Sepoys, just as it might 
 possibly become less prized by noble Lords, were 
 there no oligarchy to bestow privileges which, in their 
 case, are of course a prescriptive right. 
 
 With regard to the Sepoys, however, the broom has 
 been applied somewhat too energetically, since their 
 treatment by the civil authorities is marked by a pe- 
 culiar harshness; and, as if in spite for past offences, 
 the price of su])plies is everywhere raised: besides, 
 while the army has every year been more and more 
 harassed by commands, escorts, reliefs, and the per- 
 petual choppings, and changes, devised to make 74 
 regiments do work sufficient for about 150, the men 
 are driven to their wits ends to obtain carriage, even 
 at the greatly enhanced rates now fixed : official su- 
 pineness, corruption, and dilatoriness being all against 
 their chance of succeeding. Of course my T^ord Dal- 
 housie, whose marching establishment cost the state 
 £50,000 per annum (and who was permitted, on one 
 occasion, to expend about half as much more, through 
 providing a separate marching establishment for his 
 wife) could no more conceive why Sepoys, or their 
 officers shohld have any difficulty about carriage, 
 than the amiable princess could imagine why people 
 should ever die of huno^er, when slie heard that nice 
 buns cost but a penny a pierce. 
 
 In like manner, I dare say the noble Lord did not 
 imagine, that he inflicted any appreciable injury on 
 the Sepoys, when, on introducing cheap postage, he 
 abolished their riglit of having their letters franked. 
 But the Sepoy has no love for leUer -writing, and the 
 very strongest affection for his pice; so, important as 
 
 G 2
 
 84 
 
 were the advantages conferred .upon the general com- 
 munity by the measure, for him all that it effected 
 was, his subjection to a small tax. The two or three 
 letters per annum, which he could previously send 
 free, amply sufficed for his wants ; and he would not 
 be at the pains of Avriting any larger number, even if 
 he could dispatch them at half a farthing a piece. 
 
 I could adduce many niore examples of the fresli 
 disadvantages, that can be discovered in that condition, 
 which Lord Dalhousie conceives he has improved to 
 the uttermost; but I will content myself with a single 
 additional instance, and one that is due to Lord Dal- 
 housie himself. I refer to the difficulties that, within 
 the last four or five years, have been thrown in the 
 way of native soldiers getting transferred to the 
 pension establishment. 
 
 The very abuse of this institution, which, for so 
 many years was supinely allowed by the government 
 (es])ecially on tlie Bombay side, where it still, I be- 
 lieve, continues unchecked), the matter-of-course sort 
 of way in which any wlio had served their time were, 
 without any real incapacity for further service, granted 
 pensions if they wished to leave, naturally begat in 
 the Sepoy the idea, that regulations so convenient for 
 him would be continued in perpetuity. 
 
 Always in extremes either of supineness, or rigour, 
 the government have now^ laid down rules so strict, 
 that it is almost an impossibility for any man to get 
 transferred for a [)ension. 1 have myself seen num- 
 bers of men rejected l')y medical committees, on the 
 ground— not that they were still fit for service but — 
 that they had not that complication of infirmities, 
 wliich rendered them unfit for every kind of duty, 
 and consequently fit ol)jccts to be invalided, according 
 to the construction put upon this order by the govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Commanding officers (not to be beliind medicos in 
 the display of such zeal as does not affect their own
 
 85 
 
 interests) have now generally abstained from sending 
 up any men, who, by any make-shift, may be retained. 
 Thus they keep a man who can hardly see, but whose 
 hearing is good ; or a man as deaf as a post, but who 
 is not purblind; and the two combined give the full 
 complement of senses required! 
 
 I have seen a man, sent up because he was literally 
 a fool, rejected by the medical committee, with the 
 facetious remark that " if they invalided all the fools 
 in the army, there would be few men left in it.'* 
 Now, in tlie 52nd Native Infantry (one of the few 
 corps that have remained faithful) they have had a 
 fool for some time, and, of course, it would not do to 
 invalid him ; but that fool the other day (as we read 
 in accounts from India) very nearly excited the re- 
 giment to mutiny, by attacking the adjutant, and try- 
 ing to stab him. A less matter than this has, of late, 
 been sufficient to turn the scale a^'ainst us. 
 
 So much for particular results, accruing from not 
 invaliding fools ; while generally the consequence of 
 this penny wisdom is, that a number of useless men 
 are retained on full pay, who are themselves anxious 
 to retire on half-pay; and the government would 
 really have as efficient an army if it got rid of these, 
 without filling up their places. But of more serious 
 import was it, as bearing upon our present difficul- 
 ties, that through this cause the Sepoys entered u])on 
 the mutiny with the feeling, that whatever they sacri- 
 ficed in regard to pay, pension was now too remote a 
 contingency to l)e taken into account, and had prac- 
 tically been abolished by the Sirkar. The importance 
 of this consideration, however, I think is little likely 
 to be understood by government, if the idea has never 
 yet occurred to it, that some use might possibly be 
 made, in this emergency, of its enormous army of 
 pensioners. 
 
 I have felt no disposition to make a great deal of 
 the grievances of the Sepoys, nor do I think them of
 
 86 
 
 serious magnitude; but when so much has been said 
 in condemnation of our over-indulgence of them, and 
 when to this we are referred as the cause of their 
 disorganisation, it really becomes necessary to ascer- 
 tain the true merits of the case. Of the general 
 grounds on which, as I have shown, their discontent 
 is based, some are in a great measure unavoidable ; 
 while for others, I think, an inexpensive and efficient 
 remedy might be provided. 
 
 The very magnitude of the calamity that has be- 
 fallen us, aiFords some countervailing advantage in 
 the fact, that we shall have, in a great measure, a 
 new army to experiment upon; and will generally 
 be rid of old Sepoys, whose reminiscences it would 
 be difficult to dissociate from a state of things, to 
 wliich it would be madness to think of returning. 
 The good old times, when a Sepoy in the district 
 could obtain all he wanted, simply by demanding it 
 in virtue of his office; and could impress the first 
 villager he met — zemindar, or coolie — to carry his 
 bundle for him, would, to our new levies, be asso- 
 ciated with the sut joog or golden age; and having 
 never enjoyed the dignity and the profit of jacks-in- 
 office, they would be content with their legitimate 
 position of equality with the masses. 
 
 In regard to the question of pensions, I would 
 suggest a plan which, involving no additional ex- 
 pense, would afibrd us a substantial guarantee for 
 the fidelity of our men ; and while averting the heart- 
 burnings occasioned by withholding pensions from 
 those who considered that they had earned them, 
 would also relieve us from the supposed necessity of 
 retaining on full pay men, who, for all practical 
 purposes, had become useless. 
 
 I propose that, fixing the Sepoy's nominal pay at 
 7 rupees per month, an additional sum of 8 annas 
 per month be allotted for each, to provide a fund for 
 his retirement. To this I would add 1 rupee per
 
 87 
 
 month, to be deducted from the iiiiiu's own puy ; and 
 thus would the accumulation go on at the rate of 18 
 rupees per annum, which, at 4 per cent, compound 
 interest, would, in the course of twenty years, amount 
 to a considerable sum. The total amount of princi- 
 pal and interest might then be claimable ; while for a 
 shorter period of service, it might be fair to disallow 
 any claim to more than the accumulations (without 
 interest) of the 1 rupee per month, deducted from the 
 pay of the applicant for discharge. Of course, a few 
 special rules, to meet various circumstances, could be 
 framed. All that I need further point out is, that 
 the plan requires no agency to work it. The govern- 
 ment would pay a Sepoy 6 rupees per month ; and 
 on his discharge, the accumulations of 1r^. 8A^ per 
 month at 4 per cent, compound interest. It would 
 thus get rid of the risk of being swindled, as it now 
 is, by fraudulent pensioners ; and it would get rid of 
 the expense of pension paymasters; for wound and 
 family pensions might be commuted to a present 
 cash payment, and drawn in a contingent bill ])y the 
 officer of the man's company. 
 
 While I am by no means disposed to underrate the 
 advantage, and uses, to which our present army of 
 pensioners might be turned, I yet think that, in the 
 manner I propose, a more valuable guarantee would 
 be obtained for the fidelity of the army actually en- 
 rolled. The men would be bound, in sums propor- 
 tionate to their standing, and the trust confided in 
 them ; and had we thus held in our own hands the 
 accumulated savings, made throughout the course of 
 his service, by each man in our employ, 1 doubt 
 whether the Mahomedans would have been so suc- 
 cessful, as they have been, in their late plots. 
 
 Though unable to see that the Sepoy's lot has 
 reached that Utopian state, which my Lord Dalhousie 
 seems to have discovered, 1 think that, for all prac- 
 tical purposes, it would be sufliciently good (even as
 
 I have suggested making it) to offer inducements to 
 good men to enter the service ; and I do not think 
 the circumstances of the country would permit of 
 greater advantages being offered to them. For the 
 rest, I would recommend a few changes which, I sus- 
 pect, would not generally be regarded by them with 
 satisfaction; but which, I think, would have a salu- 
 tary effect on their discipline. These are — 
 
 The restoration of flogging for insubordination or 
 disgraceful conduct. 
 
 The re-imposition of hospital stoppages ; and the 
 
 Investing the commandant with summary power 
 to dismiss any man whose name appeared in the 
 defaulters' book a certain number of times, within a 
 certain specified period. 
 
 Further, having an entirely new system to estab- 
 lish, and chiefly new men to experiment upon, the 
 present rule of promotion by seniority should be 
 entirely set aside; which, hitherto, I do not think it 
 would have been either judicious or fair to do. 
 
 With these means of rewarding, and punishing, it 
 will be the fault of commanding officers themselves, 
 if their regiments are not maintained in a state of 
 the highest efficiency; and the government, has in its 
 own hands, the simple and obvious remedy of remov- 
 ing such gentlemen from the service. 
 
 To the subject of high and low caste men in the 
 army, I have for many years paid much attention; 
 and I prefer trusting the personal experience 1 have 
 gained, to being influenced by the clamour of those, 
 who have had less opportunity of mixing with all 
 classes. 
 
 That, physically, the high caste men of India are 
 the best fitted for soldiers, I believe no one has at- 
 tempted to deny ; and it is to this circumstance, and 
 not (as is absurdly supposed by Col. Jacob, and other
 
 89 
 
 Bombay officers) to our reverence for caste, that they 
 are indebted for the preference we give them. 
 
 Whatever may be our feelings towards the mu- 
 tineers, we must at least admit, that they have on 
 many occasions evinced remarkable courage, and reso- 
 lution ; and that if at other times they have behaved 
 with apparent pusillanimity, the novelty of their po- 
 sition in contending, for the first time, with the men 
 to whom they had so long been in subjection ; the 
 disadvantage of being without real leaders, or any 
 well concerted plan, or even object; perhaps even a 
 lingering feeling of remorse and shame ; would be 
 quite sufficient to account for this seeming inconsis- 
 tency. If their courage has been tarnished by a 
 horrible ferocity, this will neither diminish our diffi- 
 culty in subduing them, nor lessen the importance of 
 having such men on our side, instead of opposed to us. 
 
 It would be impossible to punish too severely the 
 outrages of these Sepoys; but, having done this, we 
 must be prepared to view the whole affair as an ex- 
 ceptional case, against the recurrence of which it 
 would be no remedy, to dispense with the services of 
 men, who, if they are not for us, will be against us. 
 We had better, I think, at once abandon our position in 
 India, if our dear-bought experience suggests only the 
 discarding the agency by which it was gained, instead 
 of remedying its obvious defects, by means which 
 have become equally apparent. 
 
 I can affirm — after many years' intercourse with 
 Sepoys of every caste, acknowledged as a caste at all 
 — that the Brahmins, and the Chuttries are not only 
 the most smart and soldier-like among the men, but 
 that they are the best-behaved, and the most trust- 
 worthy. As to the influence which their high caste 
 is supposed to give them, what can that amount to in 
 a regiment, where they are numbered by hundreds, all 
 of equally high caste? — things are valued, I appre- 
 hend, according to their rarity, rather than their com-
 
 90 
 
 monness. But in what respect, I should like to know, 
 can a high caste Hindostanee be more dangerous than 
 a low caste one ? What object of ambition does his 
 high caste open to the one, from which low caste ex- 
 cludes the other ? On what point, has either of them 
 feelings, or interests, which are not shared in by all 
 within the pale of Hindooism ? People talk as if 
 they supposed a disruption of the Hindoo system 
 possible; as if the lower castes were struggling to 
 obtain a fusion with the higher. Hindooism is, how- 
 ever, like Popery — it is immutable, and infallible, and 
 as incapable of accommodating itself to modern civi- 
 lisation. The Brahmin's position is secured to him 
 as long as Hindooism exists, and so is that of each of 
 the other sects : for each has something lower than 
 itself, until we come to the lowest within the pale, 
 which can turn up its nose at all outside this. 1 can- 
 not, then, imagine anything that, in a religious point 
 of view, the Brahmin could conspire to obtain, which 
 he does not already possess ; how he can be more 
 than he is — a Brahmin ! 
 
 It is not a fact^ that a Brahmin is precluded from 
 doing things which a low caste man may do with im- 
 punity, unless he be one of the lowest of the low. 
 Sepoys there are in the Bombay army, as I am in- 
 formed, who would not object to perform the nastiest 
 offices ; but I confess that I am at a loss to under- 
 stand, how qualifications such as these are any recom- 
 mendation for an employment, in which (it may be 
 presumed) they will never be called forth. 
 
 I have yet also to learn, that recruits drawn from 
 the dregs of society — from classes that for centuries 
 have been kept subject, and degraded — can reasonably 
 be expected to become imbued with the spirit desirable 
 in soldiers, immediately on their exaltation to govern- 
 ment service : or that the want of self respect would 
 be compensated, by a disposition too tame ever to be 
 dangerous ; even were it more certain, than it is, that
 
 91 
 
 thus much would be gained. We all know by ex- 
 perience, that the low caste man — down to a certain 
 point — makes more fuss about what he can, or cannot 
 do, than the Brahmin ; and the reason is obvious, that 
 the one is assured of his position, while the other is 
 not, which makes him fidgetty. In like manner, in 
 England, do parvenues prove their vulgarity, by the 
 pains they take to avoid being suspected of it. 
 
 The corps of Sappers and Miners, with which I used 
 to be pretty well acquainted, contains a large number 
 of Brahmins, notwithstanding that a great part of 
 their duty (in peace, as well as in war) consists in dig- 
 ging, and such Avork as might be supposed hurtful to 
 the dignity, and prejudices of high caste men. 
 
 Further, not only have we always had some General 
 Service corps — i.e. regiments raised to move by sea, 
 or land, as required — in which Brahmins take service 
 as freely as in any others ; but all our men are now 
 being enlisted for this General Service, and yet we 
 find Brahmins coming forward as readily as before. 
 They are very miserable while on ship board, I ad- 
 mit, but not one whit more so than any Hindoo, who 
 has a caste at all. 
 
 The nonsense talked about caste is quite sickening, 
 when we know that the Hindoos of every caste are 
 imbued with the same prejudices, bound by the same 
 rules, and, in fact, have one common feeling in their 
 particular heathenism. The Mussulman is dangerous, 
 and the Hindoo is dangerous, and each from the same 
 cause, viz., the religious prejudices which all Mussul- 
 mans, and all Hindoos, res[)ectively share in : but the 
 Soodr is not less bigoted than the Brahmin ; and the 
 evil in the Bengal army was, not that there were too 
 many Brahmins, but that there were too many Hindoos; 
 and there was, besides this, another great evil, that 
 all our men (Hindoos, or Mahomedans) were Hin- 
 dostanees. 
 
 As to the trash which Bombay officers talk and
 
 92 
 
 write of the superiority of their men to ours, it is 
 hardly worthy of notice. Till 1 find that Bombay 
 Sepoys were offered suspected cartridges, and bit them, 
 and were exposed to such machinations as the Bengal 
 Sepoys have been, and resisted them, I shall continue 
 to disbelieve even in their superior fidelity or attach- 
 ment to the Sirkar. But were it so manifested, 1 
 should then attribute this, not to the Chumars, and 
 Chundals, it numbers in its ranks, or to the gentlemen 
 it has enabled to resign their brooms, for muskets, but 
 to the fact, that it contains a great mixture of men 
 of various and irreconcUeahle creeds^ both Jew and 
 Gentile ; and men of distinct races, that have always 
 been hostile to each other. 
 
 I sincerely trust, however, that they may never be 
 exposed to the trial of having to attack Bengal troops ; 
 for if they did not join their ranks, they would cer- 
 tainly get soundly thrashed by them. 
 
 Nothing can be gained merely by mixing high 
 caste, and low caste men; the best man should be 
 enlisted, be he Brahmin, or Soodr. The point of real 
 importance is, to obtain a mixture of men of distinct 
 religions^ and of distinct races ; to mix Hindoos with 
 Sikhs, Mussulmans, Buddhists, Sonthals, Caffres, or 
 any other idolaters we can get: and, as regards 
 nationality, to mix Hindostanees with Punjabees, 
 Belooches, Duhhunees, Affghans, etc., etc. But, if 
 we only mix one caste of Hindoos with another, 1 
 feel very certain that we shall gain a distinction with- 
 out any real difference, except in a worse quality of 
 men. 
 
 Of the importance of having Christian soldiers, 1 
 have already spoken. The prospect of obtaining 
 such, at present, is far too remote, I fear, to be en- 
 titled to any prominent place am<:)ng those means, to 
 which we may trust for strengthening our position ; 
 but the object should be kept steadily in view.
 
 93 
 
 I have now stated what I conceive to have been the 
 causes of our misfortunes in India, and what appear 
 to be the most feasible remedies for them. If I have 
 been guilty of any presumption, I can only plead that 
 these are not the times for men to hesitate about 
 speaking out ; and my experience, extending over a 
 service of many yeai's, is some warrant for my having 
 formed very decided opinions. 
 
 If I write with bitterness, it must be remembered, 
 that my lot was never sweetened by any of the good 
 things of the service; and as the disgust which I 
 conceived is unquestionably genuine, so also have I 
 shown it, I think, to be not ill founded. 
 
 I cannot but feel the most serious apprehensions 
 for the stability of our Indian Empire, under such a 
 policy (IS, I think, I can now see dimly shadowed 
 forth. The Court of Directors appears to have 
 been treated as a cypher — not because they had little 
 special qualification for managing Indian affairs, but — 
 because no special qualification seems now to be 
 considered necessary, or anything to be trusted to, 
 but British ideas, and British bayonets. 
 
 Hundreds of Indian officers have, I beheve, been 
 ordered to return to India; but I understand that 
 the Court itself is unable to give them any idea of 
 what use is to be made of their services. We hear, 
 indeed, that some levies have been made in the 
 i^injab; but desultory efforts, such as these, are nei- 
 ther adequate to meet so great an emergency, nor do 
 they indicate that much importance is attached, to the 
 object of securing native assistance: while the fact 
 that no orders have yet been given for raising Com- 
 pany's European regiments in England, seems to 
 point out, more plainly, a settled determination to 
 dispense with the services of Indian officers. 
 
 If our pensions were thereby guaranteed to us by 
 the British Government, we could have little perso- 
 nally to complain of, in seeing a new system inaugu-
 
 94 
 
 rated. The right of Parliament to interfere, to any 
 extent, is unquestionable; but justice requires that it 
 should, at the same time, take upon itself every 
 liability which it permitted its late deputy (John 
 Company) to contract: otherwise, imder such a 
 change of system as seems impending, we feel it to be 
 more than probable, that we shall all very soon be 
 reduced to beggary. 
 
 ^ I have no objection to oiFer to the appointment of 
 Sir Colin Campbell to the chief command in India. 
 Under all the circumstances of the case, I think the 
 country has great reason to feel pleased with the 
 choice made, when it is assumed that the selection 
 must be restricted to Queen's officers. I have little 
 doubt that he has both the energy, and the judgment 
 required, to make the best possible use of the 
 European force, which he will shortly have at his 
 command ; nor do I even entertain a doubt that he 
 will be successful in restoring an appearance of tran- 
 quility, throughout the Bengal Presidency. But it 
 is then that difficulties more serious will arise. 
 
 We shall have the country deluged with Royal troops, 
 whose maintenance will cause an enormous drain on the 
 revenue. We shall have nearly all the military posts, 
 and commands filled by officers who, whatever else 
 they may have to recommend them, must be pro- 
 foundly ignorant of the character, habits, and customs 
 of the natives, except as regards tlie very blackest 
 side of that cliaracter. Knowing them only as one 
 entire body of miscreants, who inflicted such horri- 
 ble outrages on our helpless countrymen — consider- 
 ing tlicm as only incarnate fiends, whom any kindness 
 would but encourage to revolt — hopeless of under- 
 standing their irrational prejudices, and indifferent 
 to the importance of this — such officers would be 
 most unlikely to stop short at the just degree of se- 
 verity, whicli only maudlin humanitarians deprecate: 
 they would be utterly inititted to carry out a system
 
 95 
 
 at once stern and conciliating, sucli as is now required 
 to restore the native faith in our unsparing justice, 
 and in our considerate benevolence. 
 
 The evil would be aggravated by the swarms of 
 British soldiers spread over the country, who would 
 be still less capable of discrimination, whose feelings 
 would be still less under control, and who would 
 everywhere spread that bitterness excited by the do- 
 mination of foreigners, and which even a native can 
 feel, when so practically brought home to himself. 
 
 We should thus, in fact, render the estrangement, 
 complete, and lose that hold obtained over the native 
 mind by a system which shows, that if foreigners, we 
 become (bi/ the peculiarities of a distinct service)^ in 
 some sort, naturalised among them : through which all 
 our own personal interests are proved to be identified 
 with those of India ; our sympathies are presumed to 
 be enlisted in favour of those, among whom Ave are 
 thus settled ; and by Avhich means, comparatively few 
 can be thought quite ignorant of the right mode of 
 giving expression to them. 
 
 If I augur rightly, we should simply be devising a 
 system, which entirely ignores what is so essential, 
 that our old system broke down from not having it 
 in sufficient force. A few years perseverance therein 
 would complete our isolation, and a very few added 
 to that would see our downfall — as I would not con- 
 sider our tenure of India to be worth six years' pur- 
 chase, I feel considerable anxiety to know who will 
 then pay me my pension. 
 
 I have little more to add. I have expressed myself 
 freely ; and it might be objected that I had spoken disre- 
 spectfully of those Avho were my " honorable masters" ; 
 but " The East India Compan}'-" is now really only a 
 myth, and the directors, (in so far as they manage 
 affairs), are but like myself, public servants, and amen- 
 al)le to public opinion. If subordinates must be pro- 
 hibited from speaking of the dangers they discover in
 
 v.xj-Tv^ij vjx rto uvrn unntiitss lur lis uutieS. 
 
 The fact, however, that the Indian press has been 
 gagged, is quite sufficient to overcome any hesitation 
 f might have in speaking my mind freely. Opinions 
 may be divided as to the policy of that Pleasure ; but 
 no one would, I think, venture to maintain that those 
 who had in India acquired an insight into the evils of 
 our system there, should here be under any delicacy 
 about making the public here acquainted with them. 
 
 If I can now do no good in India, I may do some 
 little good here. Even a mild hllip like this may 
 make some of the team wink their eyes, though I 
 suspect that nothing but a good double-thonging by 
 M.P.'s will get them out of their jog-trot. 
 
 My objections to the directors are, as I have 
 already said, based on public grounds — to incapacity 
 as a corporatmi. 
 
 Individually, I have no reason to believe that one 
 is below the average of those, who are often en- 
 trusted with im])ortant public interests; but were 
 they, each and all, fifty times more able than they 
 are, I am convinced that they could do nothing but 
 mischief to the interests of India, in their corporate 
 ca]mcity, as now devised. I have made no attack on 
 the private character of any of the officials of whom 
 I have spoken. I should not have condescended to 
 such personalities, even if they had laid themselves 
 open to such attacks : and it is but justice to them to 
 admit, that they can attribute their esca])e from annoy- 
 ance on tliis score, to the fact tliat I know nothing 
 that could have so been brought against them ; even 
 if they disbelieve in the moderation wliich would 
 liave made me avoid sucli topics under any circum- 
 stances.
 
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