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THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
 
 BETWEEN 
 
 CROMWELL 
 
 AND 
 
 CHARLES X. GUSTAVUS OF SWEDEN 
 
 INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF 
 
 PHILOSOPHY, SUBMITTED TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
 
 FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG. 
 
 
 
 " . " »o :: 
 
 BY 
 
 Gl^ ERXSEY JOXES, 
 
 INSTRUCTOR IN EUROPEAN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA. 
 
 LI^X'OL^^ neb.: 
 
 STATK .JOURNAL COMPANY, PRINTERS. 
 
 1897. 
 
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 PREFACE. 
 
 Civil wars aiv not favorable to the preservation of letters and papers 
 of historical value, since no one is willing to preserve material which 
 may, on the failure of his cause, compromise him in the eyes of his 
 victorious enemies. No one is willing to preserve evidence which 
 may subsequently convict him of treason. '' Burn this letter after the 
 perusal of it," w^rote Col. Gilbert Talbot to the Marquis of Ormond in 
 1655, "'tis not good to have papers, fearing some misfortune." In 
 the case of the English Puritan Revolution, we know that some of its 
 prominent men destroyed their papers, for they have told us so. We 
 infer from the general scantiness of tliese records that many others did 
 the same. 
 
 There is another reason why our records for the Interreoiium are 
 so meagre. Charles I. had the commendable practice on the death of 
 a secretary of state of seizing all his papers, which are novr kept in 
 the Public Record Office. But Cromwell paid no attention to such 
 matters. Possession of a public document during his time was synony- 
 mous with ownersiiip ; consequently much the greater part of them 
 are not to be found in the public archives, but in private collections. 
 These have, to be sure, in large measure, come into the possession of 
 the Bodleian Library and of the British Museum, and are therefore 
 accessible, but the period of migration which they went through before 
 finding their final depository was not favorable to their preservation, 
 and they still remain not only fragmentary but scattered to an exas- 
 perating degree.^ 
 
 The great mine of information for the diplomatic history of the In- 
 terregnum is the collection of dispatches kno\yn as the Thurloe Papers, 
 which, after a career of adventure, finally came into the possession of 
 th^ Bodleian Lil)rary. Ihe greater part of them were published in 
 
 1742 bv Thomas Birch in seven folio volumes. There is nothino: 
 
 ^ o 
 
 1 The Reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission give information concerning such 
 collections as are still in private possession. 
 
 (3) 
 
4 , . PREFACE. 
 
 material among the unpublished clispatehes. Reference to the collec- 
 tion has been facilitated somewhat by Setterwall's "Forteckning ofver 
 Acta Svecia in 'A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe,' " 
 Historisk Tidskrift (Stockholm), 1890. The dispatches which relate 
 to Meadowe's and Jephson's embassies should be supplemented by the 
 letters recently found in New Zealand by Professor Edward Jenks 
 and published in the English Historical Reyiew, yii., 720-742. 
 
 The Carte MSS. at the Bodleian contain some important letters. 
 I examined the Clarendon State Papers with care, but hardly felt 
 repaid for my laljor. Some of the Carte Papers have been published 
 under the title "A Collection of Original Letters and Papers Concern- 
 ing the Affairs of England, 1641-1660, by T. C. [Thomas Carte], 2 
 vols., London, 1739." Three large folio volumes of the Clarendon 
 Papers were published at Oxford in 1767. The Tanner collection 
 contains some negotiations between England and the countries about 
 the Baltic, but they refer chiefly to the period of the Commonwealth. 
 The greater part of the existing diplomatic documents of the Interreg- 
 num are contained in these collections in the Bodleian. 
 
 The college libraries at Oxford have nothing of consequence touch- 
 ing our subject.^ There is, however, among the AVilliamson MSS. 
 belonging to Queen's College a manuscript catalogue ^ which contains 
 l)rief notes of negotiations between England and foreign states from 
 about the year 1540 to 1662, with references to other volumes where 
 they are more fully detailed. One of these volumes, designated by the 
 mark §§§, presumably a manuscript volume belonging to Williamson's 
 own library, has much material bearing upon English relations with 
 Sweden and Denmark during Cromwell's time, and referring especially 
 to matters of trade. It would seem to be valuable, but I have not 
 been able to find any further trace of it. 
 
 There is nothing at tlie Public Record Office^ worthy of mention 
 except Bliss' Transcripts from the S\yedish Archiyes, containing a copy 
 of Bonders Diary, and Baschet's Transcripts of Bordeaux's correspond- 
 ence with Mazarin and Brienne. The hitter, howeyer, is much less in- 
 
 1 Coxe, Catalogus Codicum MSS. qui in Collegiis AuUsque. Oxonieusibus hodie adservantur, 
 2 vols. 
 
 -Queen's College MSS., xxxix. Williamson was secretary of state from 1(174 to 1G78. 
 
 3R. S. Scargill-Bird, Guide to the Principal Classes of Documents preserved in the Public 
 Record Office. Detailed information is given in the various Reports of the Deputy Keeper of 
 Public Records. 
 
PKEFAOE. 5 
 
 striictivo than one niioht be led to expeet from the siniihirity of English 
 and Freneh polieies toward Sweden. There were various eauses for 
 mutual suspieion, and the relations of the two countries were by no 
 means so cordial as they appeared outwardly. The domestic papers 
 for this period have been calendared by Mrs. Greenland this Calendar 
 has in turn been calendared, so far as Sweden is concerned, by Setter- 
 wall in Historisk 'I'idskrift, 1889. Macray's Report on the Tiibraries 
 of Sweden and the Archives and Libraries of Denmark in the Reports 
 of the Deputy Keeper of Public Records (Reports xliii., xlv., xlvi., and 
 xlvii.) are valuable for reference. 
 
 The dispatches of the Swedish ambassadors in England have not 
 been available to me. Those of Xieui)oort, the Dutch ambassador, are 
 contained in De Witt's I^rieven, vol. iii. Tlie relations between Eng- 
 land, Sweden, and the Netherlands were so inextricablv interwoven 
 that the letters of Xieupoort are often as valuable as the dispatches of 
 the Sw(^dish ambassadors themselves. They appear to have been but 
 little used in this connection. The correspondence of Schlezer, the 
 ambassador from Brandenburg, published by Erdmannsdchffer in vol- 
 ume vii. of Urkunden und Actenstiicke, should not be neglected. 
 
 Thurloe has given us two accounts of the Protector's policy in the 
 North. One was furnished the House of Commons, February 18, 
 1659, in a speech reported by Burton. The other, an account of the 
 Protector's foreign relations as a whole, was furnished the ministry of 
 the Restoration in 1660, of which a manuscript copy is among the 
 Stowe j\lSS. in the British Museum. The second account has l3een 
 used by the author of the anonymous tract " Concerning the Forraigne 
 Affaires in the Protector's Time," printed in volume vi. of Lord Somer's 
 Tracts, but without mentioning his source. The changes in the printed 
 tract are in fact mere changes in arrangement and style. A copy of 
 the latter part of the manuscript, which deals with affairs in the North, 
 was made bv Professor Grimur Thorkelin, the celebrated editor of the 
 first edition of Beowulf, for the Royal Library of Copeniiagen.^ 
 
 These accounts by Thurloe may be supplemented by a similar one 
 
 lit is contained in the new (not oUI. as Macray's Report gives it) collection of MSS., 649c, in 
 folio. It was through information kindly furnished by the Rev. Mr. Macray and Justitsr. Dr. 
 Chr. Bruun, Librarian of the Royal Library at Copenhagen, that I was able to trace the Stowe 
 manuscript. It is. however, not the original, Init an undated copy, with many errors in copy- 
 ing. The part which deals with affairs in the North is printed as Appendix (A) to this work. 
 
 t/ 
 
6 PREFACE. 
 
 by Meadowe, who from his experience as ambassador in the North is 
 entitled to speak with some authority. It is entitled ''A Xarrative of 
 the Principal Actions occurring in the Wars between Sueden and 
 Denmark, before and after the Roschild Treaty, t~ ^ ^ together 
 with a View of the Suedish and other Affairs, as they stood in Ger- 
 many in the year 1675, wdth relation to England.'' The first part 
 was in manuscript for some years before it was printed in 1677. A 
 copy of the manuscript having, as I infer, come into the hands of Sir 
 Roger Manley, he did not hestitate to incorporate it into his '' History 
 of the late Warres in Denmark," published in 1670. The two ac- 
 counts run parallel for pages witli only verbal changes. Manley was 
 a soldier in these wars and could not very well have had so intimate a 
 knowledge of diplomatic events. In Wieselgren's Dela Gardiska 
 Archivet, xii., p. 145, we are informed of another work by Meadowe, 
 " The Interest of the English in the Sound as Affaires now stand, Lon- 
 don, 1660," but I have not been able to find a copy of it. 
 
 Among historical works Avhich deal with this subject, Pufendorff's 
 De rebus a Carolo Gustavo Suecice Bege gestis is tlie only one which 
 covers the whole ground. Apparently it is based almost entirely 
 upon the dispatches of the Swedish ambassadors, and is invaluable to 
 those to whom the original correspondence is not available. It has 
 been entirely superseded, however, for part of the period by Kalling's 
 ^'Riksradet Frih. C. Bondes ambassad till England, 1655, akad. afh., 
 Upsala, 1851." In this account the author has not attempted to 
 make a critical estimate of the value of his sources, but has merely 
 reduced Bonde's dispatches to narrative form. Indeed, he tells us that 
 in all important passages he has used Bonde's own words. His narra- 
 tive is nevertheless of great value. It is more detailed than Pufen- 
 dorff's and pays more attention to exact chronology than Pufendorif 
 seems to have thought necessary. It ends abruptly with November 
 25, 1655. The promised second part seems never to liave appeared. 
 
 In recent historical literature there is little to mention.' The state 
 of English records is not such as to tempt investigators to the subject. 
 Gnrdinei''s History of the Commonwealth and Prote<'torate has not 
 yet reached this point. The Danish work of Fridericia, Danmarks 
 
 1 "Eine eingehende acteiimassige Darstellung derselbcn (d. h., der .englisch-schwedischen 
 Beziehungen zur Zeit Cromwells) steht iioch aus." Pribram in Archiv fiir Osterreichische 
 Geschichte, Ixx., 100. Anm. 
 
PREFACE. ( 
 
 ydiv politiske historic, has not l)eeii continued beyond lG4o. The 
 Swcilish published sources have a provoking- way of stopping just 
 before our period begins. Rydberg's Sveriges Traktater med frani- 
 niandc niagtcr, has only reached (in 1891) the year Ki.'^O. Carlson's 
 Sveriges historia under Konungarne af Pialziska Huset ((lerinan trans- 
 lation by Petersen) gives a detailed account of Swedish affairs during 
 this ])eriod. Erdmannsddrifer's Deutsche Geschichte, vol. i., p. 211, 
 neq., gives a more sunuiiary account, and devotes some pages to Crom- 
 well's plan of getting a foothold in Northern Germany (vol. i., 284, 
 seq.) Other sources will be indicated as occasion offers. 
 
 It will be noticed how few references are made to the records of 
 Parliament, to newspapers, or to contemporary pamphlets. Foreign 
 affairs were controlled entirely bv the Protector and his Council, and 
 they kept their secrets so well ^ that little is to be learned from other 
 than official sources. Even if information did occasionally leak out, 
 the gazettes W'Ould of course not have been allowed to publish it. A 
 convenient collection of newspaper cuttings has been published by Stace 
 under the title ''Cromwelliana." 
 
 I have taken the liberty of modernizing the spelling in all the ex- 
 tracts quoted. The spelling of the 1 7th century was notably careless, 
 and I see no advantage to be derived from retaining it. 
 
 I cannot neglect this opportunity to acknowledge the kindness and 
 never-failing patience of Dr. Neubauer of the Bodleian Library, who 
 rendered me the greatest assistance in eveiy difficulty which arose in 
 connection with the manuscripts in Oxford. 
 
 GUERNSEY JONES. 
 
 British Museum, April 15, 1896. 
 lUrk. u. Actenst., vii., 742, Anm. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 RELATIONS Iit:T^VP:EX ENCrLAND AND SWEDEN BEFORE THE liECUN- 
 
 NINCJ OF THE NORTHERN AVAR.^ 
 
 The diplomatic relations between England and Sweden before the 
 Enoflish Pnritan Revolution were not so close nor so fruitful as the 
 circumstances of the time would seem to have rendered inevitable. 
 It was a period of religious wars, yet no alliance was ft)rmed between 
 these two pillars of the Protestant faith. 
 
 The fanlt of this mnst be laid at the door of the first two Stuarts, 
 but it was not, as has been often said, the fault of their secret Catho- 
 lic sympathies, but of their blundering personal incompetence. Their 
 foreign policies were based upon dreams of religious toleration and 
 mediation, upon consideration of supposed personal honor, upon the 
 interests of blood relations, upon the influence of incompetent favor- 
 ites, upon everything, it would seem, except the real points at issue. 
 
 James' attempt to secure a position in Europe by means of which 
 he could mediate l^etween the hostile creeds and soften their intolerance 
 was indeed a noble one, but it required a higher order of al)ility f >!' 
 its execution than he could tolerate in his councils. The humiliating 
 outcome of the Spanish marriage project in 1623 marked the final 
 failure of this policy. Just at this time, as if by happy chance, 
 Gustavus Adolphus ascended the throne of Sweden, prepared to take 
 advantage of the change in Englisli councils. He proposed a plan for 
 a great Protestant alliance, which bears many analogies to Cromwell's 
 project of thirty years later, but which was too thorough-going for the 
 timid Stuart court. James was in no position to meet its financial 
 ref^uirements, and the more moderate proposals of Christian IV. were 
 accepted instead. Gustavus Adol})hus was compelled to resign his 
 mission for a time to weaker and less wortliy hands. 
 
 iDe diplomatiska forbindelserna mellan Sverige och England 1624-Maj 1630. Akad. afh. 
 af Aron Rydfors, Upsala, 1890. De diplomatiska rorbind«;lserna radian Sverige och England 
 1633-M. Akad. afh. af August Heimer. Lund, 189'2. Gardiner's English History, 1603-1642. lb., 
 1642-49. History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, vol. i., 1649-.52. 
 
10 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Restitution of the Palatinate. — In so far as Charles I. could be said 
 to have had a definite foreign policy at all, it had but one object, the 
 restitution of the Palatinate to his relations. In this of itself Gus- 
 tavus Adolphus had no interest, and there seemed but little chance of 
 an agreement between them. Yet, as Charles blundered in every 
 direction, he must sometimes blunder in the direction of Sweden. 
 There were several times when his interference in behalf of the Ger- 
 man Protestants seemed imminent. 
 
 In 1629, Sir Thomas Roe, an ardent advocate of a vigorous Protest- 
 ant policy, was allowed to mediate a peace between Poland and 
 Sweden, in order that Gustavus Adolphus might have free hand to 
 interfere in Germany, though Charles would not promise in advance 
 any active support. It was thus due to English influence under Sir 
 Thomas Roe that Gustavus Adolphus was able to make his descent 
 upon Germany in the summer of 1630. 
 
 The victories of Gustavus Adolphus roused the greatest enthusiasm 
 among the English people, but not in the English Court. Yet even 
 Charles, moved by the ill success of his negotiations with Spain, France, 
 and Austria,^ found himself, as if by accident, drifting with the current 
 of national feelino^. Sir Henry Vane was sent to Germany in the lat- 
 ter part of 1631 to treat for an alliance for ''the restitution of both 
 Palatinates and the liberty of Germany." Gustavus Adolphus, how- 
 ever, inconsiderately demanded men and money as the price of his 
 assistance. An English fleet must protect his communications with 
 Sweden, and the military resources of the Palatinate, in case it were 
 restored, must be placed at his disposal during the continuance of the 
 war. Otherwise he had no interest in the project. The English 
 Privy Council urged upon Charles the acceptance of these terms, but 
 he found them too straightforward. They might bring him into 
 collision with France or Spain. He therefore proposed instead a 
 subsidy of £10,000 a month, for which the Swedish king must use 
 every possible endeavor to restore the Palatinate. This proposal was 
 rejected. Gustavus Adolphus knew very well how little Charles' 
 promises to })ay money could be relied upon. 
 
 So deep Avas the emotion aroused in England by the Swedish 
 
 1 The clearest account of this part of Charles' tortuous policy is given by Gardiner, English 
 History, 1603-1642, vii., 169-219. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 11 
 
 victories in Gcnnany, that Charles siiw in it a nproach again>t his own 
 inactivity and th()Uo:ht it necessary to ]>roliil)it tlie gazettes from pub- 
 lishing news of them. Xothing coiikl show more strikingly his failure 
 to icU'ntify himself with the spirit of his j)e()ple. It w^as the fatal 
 ditierence between Tudor and Stuart al)S()lutism. Charles received the 
 news of the death of Gustavus Adolphus, which seemed to the English 
 people a national disaster, with the greatest equanimity. It would be 
 easy now, he thought, for Frederick V. to place himself at the head 
 of the German Protestants and to win back his own. He sent him 
 £1(3,000 for this purpose, but Frederick died before he heard what 
 was expected of him. 
 
 Another opportunity for making English influence felt in Germany 
 offered itself in the formation of the League of Heilbronn. The 
 League in its weakness had been obliged to accept French support, and 
 consequently to submit to French control, but it was anxious to bal- 
 ance the influence of France by that of England. It promised to 
 do all that could be reasonably expected tow^ard restoring the Palati- 
 nate. Yet Charles could not resign hope of gaining his object with 
 less trouble through negotiation with Spain, and against the advice of 
 his Council, he allowed this opportunity to slip. John Oxenstierna, 
 son of the great Swedish chancellor, came to England to ask for as- 
 sistance, but though he w^as received with every show of respect, he 
 accomplished notliing. Somewhat later, Charles sent one ambassador 
 after another to Sweden, but his foreign policy had long lost all coher- 
 ence.^ Even his own councilors were in the dark as to his true aims. 
 As an inevitable result, he ceased to be courted. * After the battle of 
 Xordlingen, which he regarded wath the greatest equanimity, he sent 
 the usual hollow promises to Oxenstierna, but " the Swedish chan- 
 cellor rode off to nesfotiate with the French ambassador without 
 vouchsafing a word in answer." Charles' duplicity had isolated Eng- 
 land and driven the Swedes and the German Protestants into the arms 
 of France.- 
 
 During the Long Parliament and the Bepublic. — The relations be- 
 
 1 "The schemes of Charles were so complicated and unreal, that they only serve to make 
 the brain dizzy." Gardiner, Eng. Hist., 160o-ir>42, vii., ;^52. 
 
 - " No word of condemnation is too strong for the manner in which Charles treated the whole 
 subject of his relations with the Continent. It had all the weakness of a purely selfish policy, 
 without any of the apparent and momentary strength which a selfish policy receives from 
 vigour of conception and boldness of action.'' lb., 391. 
 
12 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 tween Charles and Sweden were tluis far from cordial at the be- 
 ginning of the English Civil War. In fact, Swedish sympathies were 
 so strongly with the rebellious Scotch that in 1640 ships and ammuni- 
 tion were promised them in case of necessity, though under the disguise 
 of purchase. Oxenstierna was no friend to rebels, yet " he enumer- 
 ated the breaches of the laws of the land Avhich Charles had been 
 guilty of, both in political and religious matters," ^ and thought that 
 under certain conditions rebellion was justifiable. 
 
 Nor was the cordiality which existed between Charles and his uncle, 
 the king of Denmark, calculated to conciliate the Swedes. It was 
 difficult to be a friend to Denmark and not an enemy to Sweden. 
 When the war broke out between these two powers in 1643, an am- 
 bassador was sent by Sweden to the English Parliament asking for the 
 cooperation of an English fleet in protecting commerce in the Baltic 
 Sea — i. c, in operating against Denmark. The immediate cause for 
 seeking this alliance with the English Parliament, however, disap- 
 peared after the Treaty of Bromsebro, and in deference to the feelings 
 of the French, the negotiations were broken off, although the English 
 Parliament was, in consequence of rumors of a Danish-French agree- 
 ment to come to the aid of Charles, more anxious than ever to pro- 
 ceed with them. 
 
 The execution of Charles I. brought with it naturally enough a cer- 
 tain revolution of feeling in favor of his successor. Spiring Silver- 
 crona, the Swedish resident at the Hague, received orders to visit 
 Charles II., and to show him the same respect as though he were in 
 full possession of his royal authority. Yet when Montrose in his tour 
 of the northern courts reached Gothenburg, expecting great things, he 
 was sadly disappointed. Christina sold him a small ship, but had no 
 further help to offer. Great as had been the outcry throughout Eu- 
 rope at the execution of Charles I., the cause of his successor was not 
 regarded as it would have been one hundred and fifty years later, as 
 the cause of kings.^ No European court would liesitate to desert him 
 if it served its interests to do so. The reasons why Sweden was again 
 driven to seek the friendship of the English Parliament must be 
 sought, as before, in its relations with Denmark.^ 
 
 1 neimer, p. 43, seq. 
 
 2 Clarendon, History of the RebeUion, xi., g 250. 
 
 3 Perhaps Christina had already conceived that great admiration for Cromwell which she 
 
INTRODUCTION. 13 
 
 The treaties of Rronisebro and Westplialia had so strengthened the 
 influence of Sweden in the Baltic that the United Provinces could not 
 but be ap})rehensive of the future of their connnerce, and they were 
 endeavoring to maintain the balance of power in that region bv sup- 
 porting Denmark against its too powerful rival. In February, 1649, 
 a detensive alliance was formed between them, although the Swedish 
 envoys at the Hague, Appelboom and Spiring Silvercrona, i^iade everv 
 effort to prevent it. Spiring had not only been instructed to cultivate 
 the friendship of the English ambassadors at the Hague, but in certain 
 events to recognize the CoinmonwTalth, and to inform them that an 
 English embassy would be well received in Sweden. He now pro- 
 posed to the queen that he be sent to London to prevent the success 
 of the negotiations for an English-Dutch alliance which were being 
 carried on there. The proposal ^vas received with favor. His letter 
 of credence was dated at Stockholm, September 26, 1651.^ His in- 
 structions related merely to the protection of commerce between the 
 two nations and to the sending of an English ambassador to Sweden 
 to carry on further negotiations. He died, however, before he had re- 
 ceived audience, so the nature of the proposals which he was author- 
 ized to make remained unknown to Parliament. A letter of condo- 
 lence was sent to the queen on the event.^ Both Denmark and the 
 States General had thouo-ht it necessary to send embassies to Enoland 
 t(j counteract the efforts of Sw^eden. Even France took the opportu- 
 nitv to make advances to Parliament thronoh the Swedish ambassador.^ 
 
 A few months after Spiring's death, Appelboom \vas sent over from 
 Holland for a short time to continue the negotiations. His instruc- 
 tions contained proposals for transferring the English-Pussian trade 
 
 afterwards expressed so freely. "I may tell yon this wild queen of Swede extols beyond 
 measure the Pr. of Conde and Cromwell," wrote Sec. Nicholas, December 8, 16.54 (Nicholas 
 Papers, ii., 112), " and speaks very slightly both of our blessed Master that is with God and of 
 the K., whos£;shoes she is not worthy to tie." See also lb., 142, and various passages in Whiie- 
 loeke's Journal of the Swedish Embassy. Cromwell o:ice sent his picture to her Avith a very 
 elaborate compliment (usually printed among Milton's poetical works : but Masson thinks it 
 was written by Marwell. Milton's Poetical Works, ii., 343, stY/.), but after her apostasy he 
 would hear nothing more of her. Whitelocke's Memorials of English Affairs, 599. 
 
 1 A translation is contained in the Tanner Papers, Iv., fol. 64. It was to the effect that " the 
 friendship and nearness of commerce which from ancient times and even to this day uninter- 
 rupted hath flourished between the Swedish and English nations may more and more for the 
 future be rooted and moreover receive greater increase. " It is indorsed, "Read, 27 January. 
 1651 [2]." 
 
 -A copy is among the Tanner Papers, Ii., fol. 219. He died February 9, 1652, 
 
 •* Ueimer, 77, saj. 
 
1 4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 from Archangel to Xarva, Reval, and Nvea, which afterwards figured 
 so prominently in Bonde's mission. He was also to try to mediate an 
 ajrreement l3et\yeen Eno^land and France. 
 / Toward the latter part of the year Benjamin Bonnell Nyas commis- 
 sioned as Swedish resident in London.^ On April 7, 1653, Israel 
 La>:erfeldt arriyed, ostensibly to mediate a peace between England and 
 the Datch on the ground of " the peace and welfare of the Protestant 
 churches," but in reality for a yery different purpose. The spirit 
 and object of his mission is shown by the much debated proposal which 
 he made on August 3, 1653, to the effect that the Swedes should "con- 
 tribute all their endeayours" to supply the English with such materials 
 of war at a reasonable price as they needed from the Xorth (copper, 
 iron, hemp, masts, etc.), in return for the priyilege of fishing off the 
 coast of Great Britain; but this was to be on condition that Swedish 
 vessels should suffer no further molestation and capture by English 
 ships of war.- The letter of Parliament to the queen on Lager- 
 feldt's return is dated October 29, 1653.^ Bonnell was continued as 
 resident until 1655. 
 
 Whltelocke^s Embassy, IGblf.} — Appelboom had found the English, 
 now that their relations witli Holland were becoming strained, yery 
 eager to close an alliance with Sweden, and they were much disap- 
 pointed that he did not remain to complete it. Hitherto all advances 
 liad been made by Sweden. They were now to come from Parlia- 
 ment. On December 23, 1652, even before Lagerfeldt's arrival, it 
 was determined to send an ambassador thither, and on December 31 
 ^"iscount Lisle Nvas selected. His instructions'" were not ready till 
 ^larch 22, 1653. After the expulsion of the Rump, however, he 
 asked to be excused on tlie plea of ill healtli, and it was decided to 
 send Richard Salwev and Mr. Strickland in his stead.^ But Salwev 
 
 1 Tanner Papers, liii., fol. 1-11. Dated October 23, 1652. '• Read 22d of Febniary,^6'i2[:i] ." 
 
 - Lagerfeldt's mission is usually referred lo as though its only significance lay in its religious 
 character, of which, in fact, it had very little. There is a manuscript volume in the Public 
 Record Office, "Council of State: Negociations with Sweden." S. P. Sweden, xi., containing 
 copies of the various letters, papers, etc., exchanged in the course of the negotiations, in wliich 
 little effort is made to conceal tht.nr real nature. 
 
 •' Tanner Papers, liii., fol. 57. His letter of credence was dated January 20, 1G53. 
 
 * Whitelocke's Journals of tlie Swedish Emlnissy, Reeve's edition. Ranke, Eng. Gesch.. iii.. 
 459. Heimer, ch. iv. Fries, Erik Oxcnstierna, 149, scvy. Thurloe State Papers, vols. i. and ii. 
 There are many papers relating to this embassy in the private collection of the Marquis of 
 Bath. Hist. MSS. Commission, 3d Rept., App., p. 192. 
 
 y Thurloe State Papers, i., 227. 
 
 cEarl of Westmoreland's Papers, Hist. MSS. Comm., 10th Rept., App. 4, p. 410. Cromwell to 
 
IXTRODUCTIOX. 15 
 
 beo-trod to be excused on the oround of "untitiiess throiiirh want of 
 freedom of spirit and l)odily health." The Swedisli enil)assy was 
 never popuhir and it was ditiicuk t>) persuade any cue to undertake 
 it. Finally, however, Whiteloeke was frlii'htened into accepting- it.' 
 He left England on the ()th of Xovember and arrived at Upsala on 
 the 2()th of December, 1 6o3. 
 
 Whitelocke's instructions- were identical with those of Lisle except 
 in one point; but the diiference is noteworthy. The war with the 
 Dutch had in the meantime lost some of its bitterness, and some of the 
 more severe paragraphs relating to them were omitted. Yet even with 
 this mitigation, the significance of the embassy still lay in its hostility 
 to Holland. Whatever expressions may have been used pointing to 
 an underlvino; relioious motive,'^ these onlv give evidence of the extent 
 to which religious feeling prevaded public life in England at this time; 
 but in the course of the negotiations these motives have no material 
 significance.^ When AMiitelocke in his first private audience with the 
 queen dwelt upon religious matters, he was met with pleasant raillery. 
 " ]\Iethinks you preach very well, and have now made a good sermon," 
 she said. In his next interview, however, when he showed her a list 
 of the Parliamentary fleet, her demeanor was very different. " This is a 
 gallant navy indeed," she said; "1 am exceedingly taken with the 
 description of it. * * =^ Some of these ships of yours would do 
 good service to open the Sound. What do you think fit to be taken 
 
 R. Salwey, August 11, lG5o. informing him that the Council desires to send him with Mr. Strick- 
 land to "Swethesland, a thing too long neglected by us already, and may be of greater im- 
 portance than aTiy design we have of that kind anywhere else." Somewhat later, Cromwell 
 spoke in a similar strain of the relations between England and Sweden.' "And the business 
 is of exceeding great importance to the Commonwealth, as any can be ; that it is : and there 
 is no prince or State in Christe ;dom with whom there is any probability for us to have a friend- 
 ship, but only the queen of Sweden." Whitelocke's Swedish Embassy, p. 14. 
 
 1 •• Rather to go the journey in great danger than to stay at home in greater." Whitelocke's 
 Swedish Embassy, i., 85. 
 
 2 ibid., i , 85, srq. The public instructions were dated October 21, 16J3, the private instruc- 
 tions a week later. 
 
 ■<Ib., i., 29, i^cq. Advantages of the Embas.5y to the Protestant Cause. 
 
 *Even with Cromwell this motive does not appear to be nearly so prominent as it afterwards 
 became " If I tind the queen willing to join with you," asked Whitelocke, " for the gainingof 
 the Sound, and against the Dutch and Danes, and that heartily and hopefully, shall I put that 
 business to the utmost and are you willing to enter into such a conjunction?" To which 
 Cromwell replied, •• If you tind them inclinable to it, put it on as far as you can, and let us 
 hear from you what you judge best to be done in it. Xo business can be of greater consequence 
 to us and our trade, wherein the Dutch will endeavour to overreach us ; and it were good t-) 
 prevent them and the Dane, and first to serve our own interest." Whitelocke's Swedish Em- 
 ba.'-sy, i., 94. 
 
1 6 INTEODUCTION. 
 
 to open and make free the passage thereof?" '^It cannot be taken out 
 of their [the Danes'] hands but by force," she continued. "Do you 
 think that the Commonwealth of England will give assistance in that 
 business? " " Madam, I think they will," replied Whitelocke, " upon 
 such just and honourable terms as may be agreed." " Do you think they 
 will send any ships for that purpose ? " " I believe upon fit terms 
 they will." " AVhat would you propose as fit to be done in that busi- 
 ness?"^ Here was the real point of contact between English and 
 Swedish interests. 
 
 The old Chancellor Oxenstierna, however, held back. He was too 
 clear-sighted not to see what far-reaching changes in Sweden's policy 
 such an alliance would have. He also questioned the stability of the 
 existing o-overnment in Eno-land, althouoh his fears were somewhat 
 allaved bv Cromwell's assuming the title of Protector. Pimentelli, 
 the Spanish ambassador, who had much influence at court, advised 
 Whitelocke to negotiate directly with the queen. But although she 
 took much interest in tlie project of an alliance between Sweden, Eng- 
 land, and Spain Avhich Pimentelli proposed to meet the existing alliance 
 between Denmark, the Netherlands, and France, she was too much oc- 
 cupied with her abdication to exert her authority in other matters. 
 When Pimentelli found Whitelocke not inclined to admit Spain into 
 the alliance, he too used his influence against it. 
 
 Erik Oxenstierna, who conducted the negotiations during the ill- 
 ness of his father, placed the greatest stress upon commercial matters, 
 desiring permission for Swedish subjects to trade with America, and 
 to fish on the coasts of (jreat Britain, and that English traders might 
 be established at Xarva, Reval, and Gothenburg ; but Whitelocke pro- 
 posed that these matters be left to future negotiations in England. 
 The time was in fact unfavorable for deciding momentous questions 
 of policy. The accession of a new sovereign and the close of the 
 Dutch war mvAit hrhvx chanj^es in the council of both Sweden and 
 England. It was therefore thouglit best to leave the matter unde- 
 cided. The treaty which bears the date April 11, l)ut wliicli was 
 not really concluded till April 2<S, provides in general . terms for "a 
 good, firm, sincere, and perpetual peace, amity, alliance, and correspond- 
 ence " but leaves all means bv which the alliance would be made 
 
 1 Whitelocke's Swedish Embassy, i., 258, seq. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 1 7 
 
 effective to liirtlKT uogotiations, for wliidi pm-pose it was uiulerstood 
 an ainbassiKlor would l)e sent to Enodand. 
 
 Tlie treaty was hut an ex[)ression, in general terms, of friendship and 
 amity and was in laet a i)Ostponement of the whole matter. On May 
 20, W'hiteloeke took his dei)artnre, two weeks l)efore the accession 
 of the new sovereign \\'lio was to continue, though under very dif- 
 ferent cireumstanees, the policy of interference on the continent which 
 had been inaugurated by his uncle, Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
Dll^LOMATIC RELATIO]N^S BETWEEjST CROM- 
 WELL A]N^D CH.VRLES GUSTAYUS. 
 
 Rcrival of SicecUsh Aggression and Necessity of English Support. — 
 Ever since Swediii liad emerged under Gustavus Adolphus from its 
 position uf comparative isolation it had been driven to seek English 
 aid in its nndcrtakini>"s on the continent. The two nations seemed not 
 onlv bv their cjnimunitv of relioion and similarity of national char- 
 acter, l)ut by their mutual interest in opposing the commercial suprem- 
 acv of the Dutch, as if destined bv nature to be each other's allies.^ 
 When Charles Gustavus on his accession to the Swedish crown set out 
 in his "endeavour to follow the example of his famous predecessors, 
 which was to enlarge as well as defend their dominions/'" he was 
 likel}', in view of the resentment already arous,ed by Swedish aggres- 
 sion, to need English aid more than ever; for, with all the brilliant 
 successes which had crowned Swedish arms, its position with regard 
 to its neighbors at this time was a desperate one. Each success had 
 been at the expense of some other state, until its extended border was 
 threatened bv an unbroken circle of foes. Denmark was smarting 
 under the disiirace of the treaty of Bromsebro, bv which it had lost 
 not only the provinces of Holland, Jjimtland, Herjeadalen, and the 
 islands Gottland and Oesel, l)iit also its monopoly of the tolls in the 
 Sound. Brandenburg had been alienated by the loss of Pommerania 
 and the petty acts of violence in settling its boundary. Mecklenburg 
 had lost Wismar and the customs duties in its remaining ports. The 
 German Empire had been brought into a position of commercial de- 
 pendence, and had been compelled to yield to the Swedish intruder a 
 voice in its imperial government. Ferdinand III. had nuuiy old 
 
 ' Whitelocke's Memorials of English Affiiirs, 602 Also Lagerfeldt in the volume mentioned 
 above. S. P. Sweden, xi. " For God and nature having so seated these two lands and nations, 
 that neither a too great distance between both can deprive them of all communication, or ren- 
 der it dilUcult, nor a too great vicinity make them obnoxious to the fatal animosities incident 
 ordinarily to neighbors." This was a favorite argument at that time. 
 
 2 "The most Heavenly and Christian Speech of the Magnanimous and Victorious King of 
 Sweden, Charles Gustavus Adolphus, on his Death-Bed, etc." Pamphlet, London, 1660. 
 
 (19) 
 
20 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 scores to settle, both as emperor of Germany and as king of Hungary. 
 Poland, like Denmark, was in a state of chronic hostility, for various 
 reasons, among others from the loss of territory. Finally, the rising 
 Russian power was already conscious of the necessity of piercing the 
 slender slip of Swedish territory which threatened to transform the 
 Baltic into an inland sea. Some or all of these powers were only 
 waiting for a favorable opportunity to turn the scale of fortune. To 
 all this came a crowning danger. The success which had attended 
 Sweden's efforts to get possession of the Baltic ports for the purpose 
 of controlling trade, had brought with it the uncompromising hostility 
 of the Dutch. Any attempt to extend this oppressive rule would in- 
 evitablv be met by the despatch of an overwhelming Dutch fleet into 
 the Baltic, the very heart of the Swedish dominions. 
 
 It would seem as if Charles Gustavus' safest course under the cir- 
 cumstances would have been to adopt a waiting policy with Walpole's 
 motto, Qitieta non movere. But internal difficulties prevented. Sweden 
 was too poor to wait. Its army must be kept together at all hazards, 
 which could only be done by throwing the expense of its maintenance 
 upon Sweden's enemies, i, e., by declaring war. 
 
 But against whom ? The extreme danger of setting the surround- 
 ing hostile forces in motion was not lost sight of. Christopher Bonde 
 called the attention of the Swedish Council to the special danger from 
 the side of the Dutch, in which opinion he was seconded by Wrangel 
 and Wittenberg.^ He argued tliat if, as had been proposed, Poland 
 were made the seat of the war which thev were about to declare, and 
 Sweden thus left exposed, it must not be expected that Denmark and 
 Holland, to say nothing of the German princes, would remain idle 
 spectators. Affairs in this quarter must hrst be made secure by a 
 double attack on Denmark, from Sweden and from Bremen. After 
 the Danes had been subdued and the slow-acting States General not 
 only divided and disconcerted, but fearful of renewed hostilities on the 
 part of the English,^ the war against Poland might be undertaken with- 
 
 1 Bedenken des Sclnvedischeii Senats, iiber die Frage : Wer von den benachbarten Potentaten, 
 well Krieg zii fiihren notig erachtet vvorden, zu attaquiren sei? Liinig, Staats-Goncilia, ii.,557. 
 This meeting of tlie Council was held December 11, 1654. See, also, Carlson, Schwedische 
 Geschichte, iv.. 39, seq. Following an ancient custom, two speakers were chosen to conduct 
 the debate on the question under consideration. Christopher Bonde was chosen to defend the 
 policy of renewing the war. 
 
 2Pufendorff', De rebus a Carolo Gustavo gestis, lib. i., ^ 57. 
 
CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 21 
 
 out unduly ex})(tsin<i: Swodi'u. Rut to this argument answer was 
 made, and sustained l)y tlie ()[)inion of tlie Council, that any serions 
 menaee to Denmark's existence or welfare would be resented not only 
 by the Germans and Dutch but by the English as well ; ^ an o})inion 
 wliii'h subsequent events proved to be well founded. 
 
 The Swtxlish statesmen thus fonnd themselves confronted with a 
 dilennna, either horn of which threatened to involve them in a war 
 with Holland, to whose maritime strength Sweden was particularly 
 vulnerable. There seemed but one alternative open, to secure the snp- 
 port of a maritime power strong enough to hold the Dutch in check ; 
 and who should this bo but the enemies of Holland, the English? It 
 was possible, it is true, that this English aid might be dispensed w^ith. 
 If Sweden's enemies were numerous, they were also weak and divided, 
 and no one conld tell what effect a bold attack might have, or what 
 circumstances might arise to prevent them from uniting. Yet, on the 
 other hand, English snpport might proVe to be the very keystone to 
 the whole Swedish position. 
 
 Appointment of Swedish Ambassadors. — That Charles Gustavus 
 appreciated from the first the impoilance which his relations with Eng- 
 land might have, there is abundant evidence to show\^ It was some 
 months before his plans began to take definite form,'^ and it was of 
 conrse desirable to postpone the formal embassy to England until they 
 had been fully matured. Bnt, in the meantime, a disquieting rumor, 
 trifling in itself, showed the desirability of having a representative at 
 Westminster to counteract certain influences unfriendly to Sweden 
 which appeared to be at work there. It was said that Cromwell had 
 expressed his surprise that Danzig and the Hanse towns had not of- 
 fered their mediation between Sweden and Poland, since their interests 
 lay so clearly in the maintenance of peace. This report troubled 
 Charles Gustavns exceedingly. It was true the Protector conld hardly 
 l)e expecte<l, now that he w^as at peace with both Denmark and Hol- 
 land, to be as anxions for an alliance with Sweden as he had been the 
 year before ; but could it be that he was now inclined to join these 
 
 1 "Und die Teutschen, Holl- und Engellander werden es niemals zugeben, dassDanemark von 
 Schweden xmterdruckt, und die Nordischen Kouigsreiehe in eine, alien Nachbarn formidable 
 Monarchie gebracht werden sollton." Liinig, Staats-Concilia, ii., 557. 
 
 2 For example, the favor shown to Whitelocke. Swedish Embassy, ii., 256 and 261. 
 
 3 ' ' Annu i slutet af 1654 svafande och obestamda, antogo dessa [konungens planer for den 
 utrikes politiken] smaningom en fastare gestalt." Carlson, i., 88 (German trans., iv., 76). 
 
22 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 powers whose interests lay in maintaininu; peace* in the Xortli? It was 
 decided to send an informal embassy to England to inquire whether 
 this report was trne. Peter Julius Covet ^ was chosen for the mission. 
 His departure was delayed for some time l)y Cromwell's dela^' in the 
 exchange of certain formalities,^ until a sharp reminder through the 
 Swedish resident in London set the matter rio;ht. His instructions 
 were dated November 25, 1654. He sailed from Gothenburg early 
 in December, but did not reach London till ]March, being some three 
 months on the way. The object of his embassy was to obtain the ear 
 of the Protector in order to present the king's plans in a favorable light 
 and to meet any misrepresentations which the Dutch or others might 
 make as to his intentions, and, in general, to prepare the way for the 
 more formal embassy which was to follow.^ 
 
 Coyet Avas followed shortly by George Fleetwood, an Englishman 
 in Swedish service, whose appointment proved to be exceedingly im- 
 portant on account of his connection with Cromwell's family.^ He 
 
 ^ Coyet was secretary and assessor in the Swedish commerce collegium, and in high favor Avith 
 Charles Gustavus. He was only thirty-six years old, of handsome presence, we are told, and 
 of considerable scientific and linguistic attainments. His name appears often in the records 
 of the following negotiations, and the part he played, though not distinguishable from that 
 of his colleagues, seems to have been important. Cromwell testified his regard by making him 
 Knight of the Garter, and by a valuable present and a letter to Charles Gustavus commending 
 him highly (Milton. Literie, 117). He played an important part in subsequent Swedish affairs, 
 being one of the principal Swedish negotiators of the treaty of Roeskilde. 
 
 2 As soon as the festivities attending his coronation ceremony were over, Charles Gustavus 
 had sent a letter to Cromwell announcing his accession and expressing a desire to maintain 
 the existing friendship with him (Thurloe, State Papers, ii.. 37;i). Cromwell answered in a 
 similar strain (Milton, Literaj, 78), but though his reply is dated July 4 (or July 14 ; see Mason's 
 Life of Milton, iv., 636), it was not sent for some time, as I suspect through motives of economy. 
 He hoped some less expensive way would present itself for presenting his compliments than 
 through a special envoy. ( See Coyet's instructions. I S, in which he is told to decline to carry 
 the Protector's ratification of the treaty of Upsalaback for him. in case he should be asked to.) 
 The delay caused some apprehension in Sweden. Not only was Coyet held back by it, but it 
 might indicate an indifference on Cromwell's part. There appears to be some correspondence 
 in the Swedish archives between Coyet and Oxenstierna concerning the matter. See Fries, 
 Erik Oxen.stierna, note 15, p. 352. 
 
 '^Coyet's instructions have been printed by Treffenberg, "K. Carl X Gustafs instruction for 
 Secreterarcn Coyet under dess beskickning till England ar 1G54. Ur Upsala Universitets Hand- 
 skriftsamlingar. Akad. afh. Upsala, 1851." Pufendorif gives a more convenient summary of 
 their contents in two passages, lib. i., §9, and lib. ii., §86, to the latter of which the reader is 
 referred for details. Pufendorff, however, mentions some matters not included in the instruc- 
 tions of November 25, for which I have not been able to trace his authority : but they probably 
 rest upon some subsequent instructions. See Fries. Erik Oxenstierna, 130. 
 
 ■* His brother, Charles Fleetwood, was Cromwell's son-in-law, and held a leading position in 
 the Protector's court. He was lord-deputy of Ireland, a member of the council of state, one 
 of the major-generals, and the officer highest in rank in the armies of the three kingdoms. 
 He was in complete accord with both Cromwell's foreign and domestic policy, and wa^ so high 
 in favor that it was said Cromwell intended him to be his successor. He was absent in Ireland 
 when his bro'.her was sent as envoy extraordinary to England, but he returned in September, 
 
CROMWKLL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 23 
 
 was to proceed to Eiiolaiid uiuU'i- the pretense of looking after liis'pri- 
 vate interests, and was to sonnd Cromwell's attitnde towards Sweden 
 and the ])rospivts for a closer alliance, together with tlie conditions 
 whicli Cromwell might be expected to demand, and also to obtiiin })er- 
 mission to enlist six or eiuht thonsand Scottish recrnits for Swedish 
 service. His instrnctions were dated May 15, bnt he did not reach 
 London nntil Jnly. 
 
 ]>nt the principal embassy was entrusted to Christopher Bonde. 
 That Charles Gustavns should dispatch three envoys to England 
 within so short a time shows what importance he attached to his rela- 
 tions with that country. If this needed further confirmation, it is fur- 
 nished by the tact that the one first intended for this principal embassy 
 was none other tlian Erik Oxenstierna, the Swedish chancellor, who 
 directed the foreign aftairs of Sweden from October, 1654, till his 
 death.^ The news that he might be expected was received with satis- 
 faction in England as a special mark of honor, but the press of busi- 
 ness required his presence at home, and Christopher Bonde, who stood 
 next to him in the commerce collegium, was named in his stead.^ In 
 view of Bonde's warning against the Dutch, which we have already 
 noticed, and liis extensive knowledge of matters of trade, with which 
 his negotiations were expected to be chiefly concerned, his appointment 
 appeared to be a most appropriate one. 
 
 Bonde's instructions were dated June 14, 1655.-^ So far as the 
 
 1655. George Fleetwood entered Swedish service in 1629, when he conducted a troop of horse 
 which he had raised in England to Gustavus Adolphus' aid. He rendered important services 
 to Sweden, and received many honors in recognition of them. He was made successively 
 Swedish knight, baron, lieutenant-general, and member of the council of war. This was his 
 third mission to England. The other two missions, in 1630 and 1636, respectively, had also the 
 object of raising troops for Swedish service, and both of them had been successful. The influ- 
 ence which he was able to exert in England was so considerable that he was retained at the 
 post until 1660. He must be carefully distinguished from George Fleetwood, the regicide, 
 whose name appears so often in English records of this date, else one will be sorely puzzled at 
 the double role which he seems to be playing. 
 
 1 Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, 22-2. He died October 23, 105G. 
 
 2 Bonde was one of the most trusted of Charles Gustavus' councilors, "a God-fearing, hon- 
 orable, eloquent, and learned man," whom even his political enemies spoke of with respect. 
 He had studied at Oxford in his youth, and probably had a fair knowledge of the English lan- 
 guage and of English ways, which must have been of great value to him at the Protector's 
 court, where Latin was not extensively cultivated. Though he was but thirty-three years of 
 age, he had already tilled important positions, and was a member of several Swedish councils. 
 But he was most at home in matters of administration and trade, in which he appears to have 
 had Charles Gustavus' absolute confidence, especially in his somewhat ambitious plan for 
 breaking up the Dutch monopoly of trade in the Baltic. 
 
 3 Riksregister. A copy is in the library of the University of Upsala. So far as I can discover, 
 they have not been printed and I have been compelled to rely solely on Pufendorti', ii., j 88. 
 
24 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 points left by the treaty of Upsala to be determined by farther nego- 
 tiations are concerned, they a)'e essentially the same as those of Coyet. 
 But as concerned the question of a closer alliance, it was otherwise. 
 In place of mere suggestion or inquiries, he was authorized to make 
 a definite proposal in the following terms : Cromwell should, in return 
 for concessions in point of trade, place at the king's disposal and 
 maintain at his own expense, as long as it might prove necessary, twenty 
 ships of war, fully equipped and mannetl ; he should further guarantee 
 the safety of the English Channel and the open sea for Swedish com- 
 merce, should allow the king to recruit soldiers in England and to 
 hire ships, and should grant to Swedish merchants certain advantages 
 in England over other foreigners, the exact nature of which was not 
 stated. 
 
 The concessions which were to be offered in return for this support 
 were, it must be said, indefinite and illusory. The king engaged not 
 to interfere with English commerce in such ports and lands as he 
 should conquer; the English staple in Danzig would not be interfered 
 with, and might even be transferred to Riga ; English ships would be 
 allowed the same advantages in Swedish ports as Swedish ships desig- 
 nated half-free,^ provided the English would grant equal privileges to 
 Swedish ships in other places, or some equivalent advantage. Bonde 
 was also instructed to call the Protector's attention to the extraordinary 
 value of the Baltic trade, and the possibility for still greater expansion, 
 the undeveloped resources of the surrounding country and the rivers 
 which flowed into it. The advantages of this trade had hitherto been 
 reaped by the Dutch, but the king was now anxious to divide it 
 with the Protector in return for the support which he asked. Thus 
 behind the immediate grounds for seeking an English alliance is the 
 shadow of this great project involving the destruction of the Dutch as 
 a maritime and sea power. Domlnimn maris balticl in the hands of 
 this ambitious prince would have become not merely the means of 
 plundering the Dutch trade through exorbitant tolls, but the means of 
 supplanting it altogether." The manner in which he would divide 
 
 1 Swedish free, half- free, and ordinary ships paid duties in the ratio of 3, 4, and 5 respectively. 
 
 2These plans were not entirely unknown in Holland. See, for example, the pamphlet enti- 
 tled " Copye Translaet, van seecker Sweedsen Brief gcschreven aen den Konick van Sweeden, 
 etc., door desselfs Rycks-Raedt, Heer Christer Bonde, etc., waer van de geintercipieerde Orig- 
 eneele noch voor handen, ende onder anderen klaerlijck daer uyt te lesen is, Hoe ende Waerom 
 de Sweeden tracten, de geheele Oosterse Negocie en commercie van Amsterdam nae andere 
 
CROMWKI.L AND CHAKLES (iUSTAVUS. 25 
 
 the spoils witli his Enghsh ally, however, was left for the future to 
 decide. 
 
 BomWs Arrind in Kngland ; Inffiienceof the Dutch. — As his royal 
 master was on the point of embarkinu: for Poland, Bonde sailed for 
 England on the l()th of June, 1654, witli a stately train of no less 
 than 200 attendants, '^ all generally proper and handsome men," and 
 arrived at Gravesend on the 18th of July.^ He was met on the fol- 
 lowing day by Covet, who gave him a most flattering aecount of the 
 Protector's attitude. The king's plans in the Baltic, he said, stood in 
 no danger of being interrupted ; the Protector had spoken very openly 
 with him. On the 28th of July, Bonde w^as conducted to London by 
 the Protector's master of ceremonies, Oliver Fleming, where he was 
 met by Whitelocke and Strickland on behalf of the Council. Three 
 days of generous entertainment followed, after which came the first 
 pul)lic audience.^ "^o ambassador had been received with snch 
 elaborate ceremony since the late king's execution," wrote one of 
 Bonde's suite.^ However, notwithstanding this flattering reception, 
 the ground had been made somewhat unfavorable for Bonde by the 
 well directed efforts of the Dutch ambassador, Xieupoort. After the 
 treaty of peace l)etween England and the States General in 1654, 
 Xieupoort had remained in England to negotiate a further treaty con- 
 cerning matters of trade and to obtain some relaxation of English 
 measures directed against Dutch commerce."* When Charles Gustavus' 
 intention of renewing the war in the North was no longer concealed, it 
 became his duty to keep in touch with the Protector's views concerning 
 aflairs in this region. 
 
 The republican party in Holland under the leadership of DeWitt 
 had many interests in common with Cromwell, and it was by no means 
 impossible that the two leaders might agree upon a common policy in 
 
 Plaetsen en Quartieren, jae, uyt Holland selfs, (was 't mogelyck) op Vrecmde Ghewesten te 
 diverteren, tot af breuck en niyne van de goede Ingeseetenen van de Provantie van Hollant 
 en West-Vrieslandt, als mede der Stadt Amsterdam voorsz. Coppenhage, lG-26 October, 1658." 
 
 1 Carlson gives several incorrect dates with reference to these embassies to England. 
 
 • This is described in detail by Whitelocke, in Memorials of English Affairs, 626. Whitelocke's 
 description has been used by Masson in his account of Bonde's embassy. Life of Milton in 
 Connection with the History of his Time, v., 246, s((j. 
 
 3 Extracts of Johan Ekeblad's letters have been published in Wieselgren's Dela Gardiska 
 Arehivet, viii., 216, serj. They bear evidence to the spirit of exalting confidence which pervaded 
 the embassy. "The Dutch ask trembling what the king proposes to do," he wrote. "The Sultan 
 of Turkey sent an envoy to the Prince of Siebenburgen to enquire about this king who swallows 
 up whole kingdoms ; what lands he had, where they lay, etc." 
 
 ♦De Witt's Brieven, vol. iii., and Aitzema, Saken van Staet en Oorlogh, vol. iii.. 1155, seq. 
 
26 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 the Xorth. On May 7, 1655/ Xieupoort wrote that news of the siege 
 of Danzig by the king of Sweden had arrived in London, causing much 
 uneasiness among English merchants. He thought a proposition for 
 an alliance between England, Denmark, and the Netherlands for the 
 protection of the Baltic trade might be listened to. Brandenburg, 
 however, was distrusted in England and could not be included. In 
 his next dispatch, May 14, he tells of two conferences which he had 
 with Thurloe in which his references to a possible alliance had been 
 well received. The Protector, he was told, had considered the matter 
 with his Council and Nieupoort's suggestions had been most agreeable. 
 The Protector had expressed his surprise that Danzig did not try to 
 secure allies. It was evident that the king of Sweden's movements 
 were a source of some apprehension in England. On June 10, Hol- 
 land ordered Nieupoort to propose to the Protector an alliance with 
 Denmark and the Netherlands for the preservation of the Baltic trade." 
 Yet it will be remembered that at this same time Covet was receiv- 
 ino- assurances from the Protector which he considered verv satisfac- 
 tory. It might appear at first sight as though the Protector was play- 
 ing a double and confused part; but it seems sufficiently clear that this 
 was not the case. A clue to his motives is furnished by Nieupoort's 
 account of certain conferences with Thurloe. On the news of the mas- 
 sacres in Piedmont, Cromwell had sent letters to the various powers in 
 Europe protesting or exhorting, as the case was, and among others to 
 the king of Sweden.^ As soon as Charles Gustavus' answer had been 
 received, said Thurloe, they could then confer together as to what 
 course it would be best to adopt. The Protector's policy ^vould be 
 largely influenced by the nature of the king of Sweden's reply ; in the 
 meantime, he could be assured that nothing would be done to prejudice 
 the interests of Holland. It would be a s^reat thino- continued Xieu- 
 poort, anticipating tlie Protector's whole policy in the North, if the 
 king of Sweden could be moved, even if through a subsidy, to turn his 
 arms from the Protestant places in Prussia against the Roman Catho- 
 lics in the hereditary lands of the emperor, and to consent to an agreement 
 
 lAU of Nieupoort's and Bordeaux's dispatches are dated according to the present mode of 
 reckoning. 
 
 -Secrete Resolutien, i., 186. Pufendorff mentions Brandenburg and Poland in this connec- 
 tion, but the attempt to reconcile England and Brandenburg was a ditl'erent matter, and was 
 kept separate by the Dutch. The mention of Poland seems to be an error. 
 
 3 Milton, Literce, 91 ; but undated. The date is May 25. 
 
CROMWELL AM) CHARLES (iUSTAVUS. 27 
 
 with HoUaud, or witli Holland, Dcuiuark, and England, for the regn- 
 lation of oommorce in the Baltic.^ Soon atUT, he snggested to Thurloe 
 that Charles Gustavns inioht be persuaded to leave Danzig and Prus- 
 sia undisturbed and seek his advantage in other ([uarters; to wliieh 
 Thurloe had rv'})lied that he would do what he could to further such 
 result.- On duly l>, Xieu])oort wrote of an interview in which the Pro- 
 tector had said that "he also would rather that the king of Sweden 
 would leave the seaport^ unmolested and seek his advantage in the 
 hercditarv lands in the house of Austria, to which he would contribute 
 what he could, and that he, too, understood perfeetly the consequences 
 of the present Swedish designs." The plan of a common movement 
 against Austria was quite in keeping with the negotiations with France 
 wliieh he was then carrying on, and ^vhich Xieupoort was trying, not 
 without some influence, to further. 
 
 Such was the state of affairs on Bonde's arrival in Eupfland. 
 Xieupoort, though he stood Avell with the Protector, and had actually 
 anticipated and proposed the policy which the Protector was then cher- 
 ishing and afterwards followed so persistently, was openly expressing 
 his suspicion that England and Sweden had come to a secret under- 
 standing;^ and was receiving in return assurances that the alliance 
 with Holland m as the very ground and foundation upon which subse- 
 quent treaties must rest.^ Cromwell, on his part, was uneasy at Swe- 
 den's designs against Prussia, and was not at all inclined to permit 
 them. Not oiilv was Charles Gustavus embarkino; in his new war 
 without first consulting the Protector,^ but his relations with Charles 
 II., though they had no particular significance, may have added to the 
 
 !'■ * * * ende rorsoght my, dat wy niet jalours \vilden wesen, dat nogh met dien Ko- 
 ningh nogh metiemant anders iet soude gehandelt werden tot prejudice van onsen Staet, ende 
 als se ant woordt op den voorgeroerden brief souden ontfangen hebben, dat men dan t'samen 
 soude konnen overleggen, wat best soude dienen gedaen to werden ; Het soude myns be- 
 dunckens al een groot werck wesen, koude die Koningh siende de animositeyt van 't Paus- 
 dom in Savoyen, ende ook hoe de Roomsehe Geestelyckheyt gestadigh woelt in de Erflanden 
 van den Keyser, bewogen werden, al waere bet met een geldt-subsidie. als voor desen Gustavus, 
 omme syne Wapenen in plaetse van tegens Protestantse Stedeu in Pruyssen, in de voorge- 
 oemde Erflanden tot afweringe van de voorgeroerde oppressien te willen gebruycken, ende ver- 
 nieuwen met onsen Staet ofte alleen, of gemeen met desen Staet ende Denemarckcn. een 
 defensive Alliance met ons Reglemont van de Commercie ende Navigatie op de Oost-zee." 
 ><'ieupoort to De Witt. June 11, 1G55. 
 
 - Nieupoort to De Witt, June 18, 1655. 
 
 3 Ibid. 
 
 < Ibid., July 30. 
 
 5 Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time, Stowe MSS., clxxxv., fol. 187. 
 
28 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 Protector's distrust.^ The politics of Europe were in fact in an un- 
 settled and confused state, in which radical changes were easily possi- 
 ble, when the occurrence of the massacres in Piedmont decided the 
 Protector as to a definite line of policy. The negotiations with France, 
 the Netherlands, and Sweden came to a standstill until answers to 
 Cromwell's letters on this subject had been received. A great deal de- 
 pended upon the attitude of Sweden, and Bonde's arrival was awaited 
 with keen interest. 
 
 Rumors and First Dijjiculties. — The brilliant audience and the sub- 
 sequent courtesies shown the Swedish ambassador did not escape the 
 attention of the foreign ministers at Westminster. The Protector 
 showed Bonde great attention and often took him to Hampton Court. 
 " The other ambassadors, who have been here a long time but can 
 hardly obtain an interview with the Protector, are very jealous of us," 
 wrote Ekeblad, "and cannot imagine why we are courted so." This 
 conspicuous favoritism was thought to have great significance, as in- 
 deed it had ; but those who had most to fear from an English-Swedish 
 alliance inferred too much from it. " I have advertisement from Eng- 
 land from a very good hand, that there has been long a very good un- 
 derstanding between the king of Sweden and Cromwell," wrote 
 Charles II.'s secretary of state. " I have also advertisement, that 
 Cromwell and the Swedish ambassador are exceedingly intimate. They 
 dine, sup, hunt, and play at bowls together, and never was ambassador, 
 or indeed any man, so much caressed and regarded by Cromwell as 
 this man is (who is a person of great esteem in Swedland), nor did he 
 ever seek the friendship of any one so much as of this king of Swede. 
 Some believe that France will also join with these, but I know not how 
 that may stand with the interest of France, for I am persuaded that 
 Sweden and Cromwell will endeavour to render themselves the protec- 
 tors of all the reformed churches in Germany, France, etc., or at least 
 ])r()cure from them all a kind of dependence on these godly reformers. 
 * * I am persuaded that if there be any such close league between 
 
 1 Charles Gustavus sent a letter to Charles II. announcing his accession, in which he gave 
 him the title King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, arid professed his good will and de- 
 sire to assist. A copy of it, together with Charles' reply, came into Thurloe's hands (Clar. S. P., 
 xlix., fol. 333). Correspondents sent in alarming rumors of intended Swedish aid to Charles 
 II. Charles sent an ambassador. Sir Wm. Bellenden, to Sweden, who of course accomplished 
 nothing. "The king is kindly disposed, but cannot alter at once what has been done by the 
 queen," he wrote. Nicholas Papers, ii., 73. All this was of little or no importance, yet Crom- 
 well was sensitive on this point, and it may have had some influence. 
 
CRinrWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 29 
 
 Cromwell and Sweden, one part of the desion is to make Sweden 
 master of the Baltie Sea, and that therein, and otherwise, it may prove 
 as rninons to the States as to many others." ^ 
 
 This rnmor f )nnd credenee elsewhere, to the benefit of both Crom- 
 well and Charles Gustavus. On the one hand, Spain tnrned a deaf 
 ear iov a time to the appeals of Charles 11.,^ while on the other hand 
 not only was Anstria diseonraged from actively supporting Poland/^ 
 but the Dutch wisely refrained from assuming an aggressive attitude, 
 which would certainly have offended the Protector and lessened the 
 chances tor a peaceful settlement. 
 
 However, notwithstanding these marked favors, Bonde's efforts to 
 hasten the ne2:otiations met at first with no success. Bonde mio;ht re- 
 ceive the most dinners, but Xieupoort received the most conferences, 
 and Dutch interests had full hearing;. Bonde, like his roval master, 
 stood very much on his dignity. He complained that there was no 
 proper place for him to confer with any one. He could not visit Thur- 
 loe at his house, like a private solicitor, he said, as the Dutch ambassa- 
 dor did. To be sure, commissioners were appointed to confer with 
 liim, with wJiom he had his first conference on August 15; but Strick- 
 land, who Avas thought to favor the Dutch strongly, was one of the 
 numi)er, which made Bonde cautious, while the commissioners on their 
 part were extremely noncommittal. They dare not for their lives com- 
 mit themselves to anvthino^, he wrote. It was evident that while the 
 Protector was willing to hear what Bonde had to propose, he was not 
 prepared as yet to go further. Not only did his ill health, the nego- 
 tiations with France, and other matters engage his attention at this 
 time, ])ut it was no easy matter to reconcile Charles Gustavus' plans 
 with his own. The verv reason why the Swedes were so anxious for 
 an English alliance was the reason why the English -were unwilling 
 
 1 Nicholas to Jos. Jane S. P., Dom., Interreg., c, fol. 84. 
 
 •-' harles II. 's ambassador at Madrid, Sir Henry Bennet, sent most discouraging reports. See 
 letters to Uyde in Clarendon State Papers. " Indeed their [the Spaniards'] wariness in oftend- 
 ing those [the English] , who insult them upon every day with doing them new injuries, I cannot 
 enough wonder at. or that they can still imagine it possible to enter upon a new treaty with 
 them." Hyde to Sir II. de Vic, Clar. S. P.. 1.. fol. 233. 
 
 3 Pribram, Archiv fur Oesterreichische Geschi^ate, Ixxv., 430. Pribram, however, puts it a 
 trifle too strong when he says, ' Am Hofe Charles II. hat man nie gezweifelt dass welterschiit- 
 ternde Plane getroflfen waren." They were strongly inclined to believe it, it is true, but they 
 would hardly have sent an amVjassador to Charles Gustavus (p. 2S, note) had they not thought 
 there was still some hope of the contrary. "If there be any such close league," said Nicholas in 
 the letter quoted above. 
 
30 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 to grant it. Charles Fleetwood told Bonde in an important interview/ 
 that " not only the Protector, but everybody who understood such mat- 
 ters, saw that a nearer alliance with Sweden was of the greatest im- 
 portance to England, and that Bonde's proposals were most advan- 
 tageous ; but the cause of the long hesitancy had been the help which 
 the king wished in the Baltic, which seemed directed against Holland. 
 England was now at peace with that power, and the Protector consid- 
 ered himself in honor bound not to break it.'^^ Another cause for 
 the delav was the awaitino; the outcome of the neo^otiations with 
 France, to which the Piedmont incident had oifered some hinclerance.^ 
 The choice between an alliance with France or Spain was the founda- 
 tion upon which the Protector's whole foreign policy rested, and with 
 it his policy in the North. He could not well proceed with the latter 
 until the former had been settled beyond question. "The peace with 
 France was followed with a war with Spain, and all future treaties 
 were for the most part managed with some reference thereunto." ^ 
 
 CromwelVs Policy in the North. — The Piedmont massacres and the 
 peace with France were two events which clariiied the Protector's 
 foreign relations. After this, his aims were clear and his methods of 
 reaching them simple. It may perhaps be well at this point to take a 
 more careful survey of Cromwell's policy in the North, of ^vhich w^e 
 have already had glimpses in Nieupoort's letters. 
 
 In all the Protector's foreign relations, there were three objects 
 which he never lost sight of: 1. The maintenance and extension of the 
 Protestant religion. 2. The prevention of the restoration of Charles 
 II. 3. The encouragement and protection of English trade. 
 
 1. The tendency of recent historians of the English Puritan Revolu- 
 tion is to lay greater stress on its religious character. That religious 
 hatred which on the Continent had found free play in the Tliirty 
 Years' War, and had burnt itself out to a certain extent, had been 
 pent up in England only to break out fiercer than ever in shame at the 
 ignoble part England had played in this struggle. Cromwell shared 
 with his party its over-wrought religious feeling, its savage intoler- 
 
 1 October 23, 1655. Railing, p. 27, «v/. 
 
 2 " De Hcer Protector heeft my rondt uyt verseeckert, dat hy ten aensien van Sweden geen 
 offres ofte invitatic, dat waeren de eygen woorden, sonde acnnemen als gemeen met Hollandt." 
 Nieupoort to De Witt, October 29, 1655. 
 
 3Xieupoort to De Witt, August 20. 1655. 
 
 •• Thurloe, Foreign Affiiirs in Cromwell's Time. 
 
CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 31 
 
 aiuv ill matters of civecl, aiiJ Its cuiistaiit dread of a violent Catholic 
 reaction.' Already in Janiiarv, l(jo4, he thought he saw clear signs 
 of the coming storm. He informed the Swiss ambassador tiiat the 
 Pope had formed a j^lan for reconciling the ancient rivalry Ix'tween 
 France and Spain and turning their united arms against tlie Protest- 
 ants, first in Switzerland and then in the rest of the world. An alli- 
 ance between England, Switzerland, and the Netherlands seemed to him 
 the onlv means of averting the disaster." AVlien the massacres occurred 
 in Piedmont, the already excited pul)lic went into a panic over the event 
 and saw in it only the beginning of a series of similar horrors, all 
 instigated by the Ivomish Antichrist. The part which Cromwell played 
 in this matter is well known. It seems to me, in fact, to mark the 
 point at which his hitherto somewhat vague plans for a Protestant alli- 
 ance took detinite forni.^ Considerations of religion took for a time 
 precedence in his councils over all other interests (p. 41). A treaty 
 with France was preferred to one with Spain for this among other rea- 
 sons,^ and a plan for a Protestant counter-alliance w^as conceived which 
 
 1 He also shared the prevailing illusion that Charles Gustavus was a second crustavus 
 Adolphus. See Railing's account of his first private interview with Bonde, also his speech to 
 Parliament, poi!^ Even in Scotland this idea was prevalent among the Puritans. "A. long 
 .tract of dreams I have on the success of Charles, if God help him to begin where his heroic 
 uncle Gustave left, but all these I put in God's hands, who knoweth his own appointments." 
 Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, A. M., Principal of the University of Glasgow, iii., 371. 
 " For myself, since the battle of Leipsig, I have loved the house of Sweden to this day above 
 all o her foreigners, and by the strange successes God gives to their valour, I expect more good 
 to the Church from them than from any others ; hoAvever, that unhappy Christina's apostasy 
 and after miscarriages, has grieved my heart." Ibid., iii., 370. " I wish Brandenburg may re- 
 turn to his old postour, and not draw ou himself next the Swedish armies, which the Lord for- 
 bid ; for after Sweden, we love Brandenburg next." Ibid., iii., 371. " Det gemena folket talar 
 uppenbarligen jm borsen och gatorna, att alia larda man hafva visat utaf Daniels Prophetia 
 och andra skal, att en Konung i Sverige och England skola omkullkasta Pafvarnas sate och 
 gifva den sauna Guds akallen ater sitt nitta flor och bruk igen." Sonde's letter of August 23, 
 1655. Railing, p. 18, note 1. 
 
 2For this incident, as well as for the religious character of the Protector's policy in general, 
 see Stern's "Oliver Cromwell und die evangelischen Rantone der Schweiz," in Sybel's His- 
 torische Zeitschrift. xl.. pp 52-99. 
 
 3 How prevalent the idea of a Protestant union Avas at that time, not only in England, but in 
 the Protestant world at large, is shoAvn by Rakoczy's sending an ambassador in the latter part 
 of ir.")4 to Sweden. Denmark, the Netherlands, and England, asking to be included in any such 
 alliance which might be formed between them. The ambassador was everywhere well re- 
 ceived. On May 4, 1655, he had audience in London, but it was May 24 before he was able to 
 present his mission to the Protector. (The original is in the British Museum, Add. MSS., 4156, 
 fol. 174.) Alexander SzilagA'i, in rn<:arische Revue, 1892, p. 635. The Protector took great in- 
 terest in the Prince of Transylvania. Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 730. 
 
 * "An alliance Avith France was most agreeable to the strict intelligence the Protector had, 
 and intended to have Avith Sweden and other princes and states in those parts, Avhich Avere of 
 the same interest." Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in CromAvell's Time. " He intended a good cor- 
 respondence with the Protestants of France, and to lay the foun 'ation thereof in his interposi- 
 tions to the French king on their behalf, that their edict for liberty of conscience might be 
 
32 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 should include not only the powers of the Xorth, but Transylvania, 
 Brandenburg, and even France. Brandenburg was given to under- 
 stand that an ambassador would be well received in London and that 
 the nearotiations with Sweden would be delaved somewhat to that 
 purpose/ 
 
 2. This plan of a great Protestant alliance is the key to Cromwell's 
 foreign policy. If it could be realized it would be found to have very 
 desirable consequences in other than strictly religious matters. One 
 of the chief dangers which threatened the Protector was the incessant 
 plots of the royalists, who found support and comfort wherever Crom- 
 well had enemies. So long as he had enemies he could not hope 
 to isolate Charles 11. entirely, but his point would be as good as won 
 if he could force the king to throw himself into the arms of the Catho- 
 lics. The proposed alliance would have accomplished this result. 
 Charles would have been deprived of the support of the Dutch, the 
 active assistance of Brandenburg would cease, and, especially, the sup- 
 port of France and consequently that of the Scotch, would be taken 
 away. Charles II. would be thrown into the arms of the Spaniards 
 and the Irish, of all nations the most hated in England. With the 
 royal cause identified in the minds of the English and Scotch with 
 these intense national animosities, sharpened by religious antipathies, 
 Cromwell could feel himself from this side fairly secure.^ 
 
 3. The 2:eneral alliance would have the final advantao-e of briuffino: 
 order into the chaos of commercial relations in the North. 
 
 Cromwell, with all his religious fervor, did not underestimate the 
 advantages of trade. On the contrary, he regarded it as a producer 
 
 observed to them, whereby, and doing them on all occasions other good offices, the oppor- 
 tunity whereof a good intelligence with the crown itself could only give him, he might draw 
 them into a dependence upon himself and make and preserve an interest in France in all 
 events, and do that also which would be most acceptable to England and to all other Protes- 
 tants in the world, whose cause and interest he prolessedly asserted, as the head and Protec- 
 tor of them, and he had not a greater consideration than this, in casting his alliance that way 
 and in making war against Spain and the house of Austria, the head and Protector of the 
 Papists.'' lb. " Ick ben bedught ten aensien van de rupture met Spanic. dat men sigh hier 
 ten hooghsten sal gelegen laeten wesen om Sweden tegens den Keyser to engageren, ende een 
 Ligue Offensive ende Defensive op te reghten tegens het Huys van Oostenryck, funderende 
 deselve principalyken op het interest van de Religie." Nieupoort to De Witt, October 22, 1655. 
 There was much truth in Cromwell's remark to Schlezer that he had preferred a French to a 
 Spanish alliance from considerations of religion. Schlezer to the Great Elector, December 
 14, 1655. Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 729. 
 
 lUrk. u. Actenst., vii., 717. 
 
 • Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. The Clarendon State Papers are our chief 
 source of information for the royalist plots. 
 
CROMWELL AND ClIAliLES GUSTAVUS. 33 
 
 of tlio sinews of war.' The Navigation Act and the eiforts of the 
 Trade and Navigation Committee need only be mentioned in this 
 ennneetion. It was not indifference to these interests, therefore, wliich 
 canstnl liim to hold aloof from Charles Gustavns' offers of privileges in 
 tlie Ixdtie, but the unsatisfactoriness of tlie offers and the momentous 
 eonsenuences which their acceptance would have involved. Nieupoort 
 was repeatedly assured that the Protector understood perfectlv the 
 consequences of the Swedish designs against Prussia. Crom\veirs 
 acceptance of Charles Gustavus' proposals would have meant more than 
 Swedish control of the Baltic with all the evil consequences which that 
 involved. It would have brought about just that unfavorable politi- 
 cal combination which he tried until the end to prevent. Charles 
 Gustavus would have been called off from his conquest of Poland and 
 his expecttxl invasion of Austria, to turn his arms against Brandenburg, 
 Prussia, and Denmark; and Brandenburg, Denmark, and Holland 
 would have been added to the Protector's already sufficiently lonp; list 
 of enemies. The dangers of such a course were plain, but the benefits 
 not so evident. 
 
 It had always been the policy of nations having commercial inter- 
 ests in the Baltic to keep the control of the ports in this region di- 
 videdjL not only on account of the customs duties, but because this was 
 the great source of ship-building supplies, which could not be allowed 
 to fall into the hands of any one power. I can find no evidence to 
 show that the Protector was ever tempted to abandon this policy to 
 secure special trading privileges. Nor, indeed, until, as we shall 
 see, at the very last, when the control of affairs in the North was slip- 
 ping from his hands, was he willing at any price to allow the exten- 
 sion of 8^vedish power over the Baltic.^ This may perhaps be ex- 
 })lained in part by the fact that he appears never to have mastered the 
 details of the complicated affairs in the North, and was, in consequence, 
 
 1 Carlyle, Speech XVIIL 
 
 2 " Xiim Borussiam tanquam granariuin Europse haut tuto Svecorum arbitrio concedi insin- 
 uabani." Puf., ii., \ 89. " Eoque Regem ad pacem cum Polonis ineundam urgebant. ac ut 
 Borussia decederet. (luam ipsam & Cromvellus. amicissimum so quamvis professus, ipsi in- 
 videbat; ac ut alibi emolumentum suum qutureret volebat." Ibid., iv., g 45. " Ick kan wel 
 bemercken, datse gantsch ongaerne souden sieu dat Deuomarckcn of door Tractaet of door 
 Waepenen aen Sweden soude vastgemaeckt werden." Nieupoort to De Witt, Brieven, iii., 92. 
 •'* * * Ton est icy bien aise dele voir puissant et capable de donner de la jalousie a la 
 Maison d'Autriche, mais aussy i>eut on trouver quelque inconvenient que tout les Ports de la 
 mer Baltique tombent soubz une mesme pui.ssance, et lorsque I'interest particulier le permet, 
 les Ministres de cet Estat, sont aussez bous mesnagers." Bordeaux to Brienne, July 17, 1656. 
 
 3 
 
( 
 
 L 
 
 34 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 disinclined to break with the traditional policy of all commercial na- 
 tions having interests there/ At any rate, he assured Schlezer that 
 his concern was not so much to secure minor trading privileges, but 
 that the dominium maris might be properly divided. If this were 
 maintained, other matters would right themselves.^ 
 
 But while the Protector could not bring himself to support Charles 
 Gustavus in his eifbrt to unite all the countries about the Baltic into a 
 new kingdom of the North, which would have controlled the tolls and 
 the maritime supplies of the Baltic, neither could he look on idly while 
 the Dutch and Danes destroyed the power of Sweden. His interest 
 lay in maintaining the present balance and in keeping matters in this 
 region quiet. If Sweden could only be brought to direct its arms in 
 the proper channel, namely, against Austria, all this imrest in the 
 North would cease. With the Protestant alliance an accomplished 
 fact, the Dutch need not fear for their commerce, and the Swedes, un- 
 deterred by fear of Dutch and Danish forces in their rear, could in- 
 vade Austria, and, if they chose, extend their conquests in this direc- 
 tion to the Caspian Sea.^ 
 
 Thus, the whole northern policy of Cromwell may be summed up in 
 one phrase, the general Protestant alliance. All his foreign under- 
 takings, and he had a great many, would be served by it, and could be 
 stated in terms of it. That many motives were involved in it there 
 can be no doubt. I shall not attempt to decide which was the domi- 
 nant one. Perhaps Cromwell himself hardly knew, for religious and 
 worldly interests were inextricably interwoven in the politics of the 
 17th centurv. But we can at least sav that it was the relio^ious motiye 
 which furnished the key to the solution of the complicated problem. 
 Coming between the religious wars of the first half of the 1 7th century 
 and the dynastic and commercial wars of the second lialf, it is not to 
 be wondered at that Cromwell's policy was influenced by each of these 
 
 1 "Er konnte von den Ursachcn der Misshelligkeit. die zwischen E. Ch. D. iind dem Konig 
 enlstanden waren, nichts bestandigos sagen, und es wurde ihm nielit zu verdenken sein, wenn 
 er sich so eben nicht wiirde darin finden konnen ; dann die Oerter waren etwas weit abgele- 
 gen ; hatte keine eigentliche (lemeinschaft mit diesen Landcn : die Intcresse, die jura, die 
 privilegia Avaren etwas verwickelt und hicselbst niclit so gar wohl bekannt." Urk. u. Actenst, 
 vii., 734. Also, lb., p. 745. 
 
 2 " Denn der Herr Protector hat die Maxime, dass er sich nicht um die Commercien so gross, 
 als um das dominium maris (denen jene folgcn mussen) bekiimmert." Ibid., 737. 
 
 3 Kalling, ]). 24. The Protector was indeed willing that Charles Gustavus should extend his 
 conquests from Poland south to the Caspian Sea, but he was not willing that he should conquer 
 the territory from Poland north to the Baltic Sea. 
 
CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUST A V US. 35 
 
 interests, and, aceordino- to the course of political events, in varying 
 dciJ-rees. 
 
 Prof/re^sfi of the Ncf/ofiafions; Neiv Difficulties. — On the 24th of 
 October the treaty with France was brought to a conclusion. On the 
 2d of Xoveniber there were sisrns that the Council was readv to take 
 up the Swedish negotiations, for a committee was appointed to confer 
 with the Protector concerning certain matters comnuuiicated bv the 
 Swedish anil)assador. On the 14th of November a new committee was 
 appointed to take the same matter in hand, and was ordered to meet 
 daily until they had prepared something to offer, and "to report the 
 same with all possible speed.'' ^ 
 
 Yet the negotiations did not make the progress Bonde desired. 
 The Protector's suspicions had been aroused that the king's religious 
 pretensions were not entirely sincere. Bonde's statement to the first 
 commissioners was unfortunate and mav have come to the Protector's 
 ear.^ Though Bonde afterwards adopted a different tone, as in his 
 intervicAv with Fleetwood, October 25, and endeavored to give all his 
 proposals a religious color, the Protector was suspicious. It was 
 nothing new, he said to Schlezer, to use religion as a cloak for one's 
 ambition.'^ Nor did Charles Gustavus improve matters by granting 
 religious toleration to the Catholics in Poland, for though Cromwell 
 was exceedingly tolerant towards Protestant sects, his toleration did 
 not extend even in the slightest degree to the adherents of Rome. 
 Bonde had, indeed, a difficult role to play, and though it is not clear 
 how he could have proceeded differently, the impression he made was 
 not favorable. Tt ^vas doubted whether he had sufficient instructions 
 to enter into an alliance such as was desired. 
 
 The Protector always preferred playing the part of hammer to 
 that of anvil ; consequently, whenever negotiations proceeded unsatis- 
 
 1 S. p. Dom., Interreg., Lxxvi., 364 and 374. 
 
 2 '-The Protestant religion had now nothing to fear," he said to the English commissioners 
 at their first meeting. "The Catholics had made no attack on it except in Savoy, and that was 
 a matter of little importance." Railing, p. 17. "As for religion," Bonde wrote to Charles Gus- 
 tavus, " it could, to be sure, be made to serve as a basis for a closer alliance, but the mention of 
 it in the treaty should be avoided : for its main purpose is to protect religion and its confessors 
 in case they are attacked by Catholics, but not to try to convert the Catholics or persecute 
 them through a Protestant inquisition ; but to allow them free exercise of their rights so long 
 as they do not plot against us, and to seek to inlluence them through kindness." lb., p. 17. I 
 do not know whether this was Charles Gustavus' opinion also. In response to Cromwell's let- 
 ter concerning these massacres, he had sent a protest to the Duke of Savoy, which is now in 
 the archives at Turin (Lettere di principi, Svezia). 
 
 3 Schlezer to the Cireat Elector, Januarv 11. 16')(3. I'rk. u. Actenst.. vii.. 733. 
 
36 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 factorilv, or visiting ambassadors tried to avoid the direct issue and to 
 bargain with liim, he immediately began to discuss the plan of treat- 
 ing through his own ambassador at the other court. Nieupoort had 
 noticed the Protector's dissatisfaction and had encouraged it. The 
 plan of sending an ambassador to Charles Gustavus in Poland was 
 earnestly debated for some time, but the obstacles seemed insurmount- 
 able. Not only did. there seem to be no suitable person to send, but 
 the journey to Poland at this time of the year was so toilsome and 
 dangerous, and the communication so difficult, that Thurloe told Nieu- 
 poort it might perhaps be better to begin the negotiations with Bonde, 
 trusting that his instructions would prove sufficient.^ 
 
 Bonde's impatience had at last grown so demonstrative" that it was 
 necessary to make some show of coming to the point. Accordingly, 
 on December 5, three commissioners were named to carry on the 
 negotiations. They Avere Whitelocke/ Strickland, and Fiennes. It 
 was by these that the commercial treaty of July 17 was signed. The 
 matter of a closer alliance was negotiated by Bonde partly with them, 
 
 1 Nieupoort to Do Witt, November 19 and 26. Edward Rolt, who had been sent to the king of 
 Sweden with the Protector's ratitication of the treaty of Upsala, was now with the king in 
 Poland, begging constantly to be recalled. He received many marks of preference and honor, 
 which of course did not escape the attention of the other ambassadors there, but his mission 
 appears to have had no further significance. No news had been received from him for a num- 
 ber of weeks, which must have convinced the Protector of the futility of sending another 
 ambassador thither. Rolfs instructions and dispatches are printed in volumes iii. and iv. of 
 the Thurloe Papers. The instructions are undated, but I judge from internal evidence that 
 they were written between the 10th and 18th of July, 1655. 
 
 - Whitelocke's Memorials, p. 633. 
 
 3 Whitelocke was the most favorably inclined towards Sweden of any one of influence in 
 England. His partisanship appeared indeed so marked that he was taken severely to account 
 for it in the Council, and when he attended Bonde's reception of the birth of the young Prince 
 Charles of Sweden, he tells us that the Dutch ambassador treated him coldly. " It was a very 
 great feast of seven courses, the Swedish ambassador was very courteous to me, but the Dutch 
 and others were reserved towards me, and I as much to them." Memorials, p. 634. He was 
 naturally proud of his treaty of Upsala, 1654, and was anxious that something further should 
 come of it. He appears to have formed a friendship with the Swedish chancellor, Erik Ox- 
 enstierna, during the latter part of his stay in Sweden. Fries. Erik Oxenstierna, p. 140. Coyet 
 had instructions to visit him with assurances of the king's esteem, and to ask his advice as to 
 the best method of proceeding in the objects of his mission. Instructions, 'i 9. Bonde sent his 
 secretary with greetings as soon as he had landed at Gravesend, and it was his great desire to 
 have Whitelocke appointed commissioner, which was prevented for some time by the strained 
 relations between Whitelocke and Cromwell, though his knowledge of Swedish affairs and 
 trade was of course very extensive. His name occurs constantly in connection with this em- 
 bassy, and he is always to a remarkable degree friendly to Sweden. He was also a member 
 of the new Trade and Navigation Committee. His Memorials of the English Affairs contains 
 cojnous references to the negotiations after the appointment of the new commissioners on De- 
 cember 5, 1655, just at the point where Kalling's narrative breaks off. The references in the 
 following pages to the Memorials arc to the folio edition of 1732, or to the marginal pagination 
 of the Oxford edition of 1853. 
 
:i 
 
 CROMWELL AND CHARLP:8 GU.STAVU8. 37 
 
 l)ut })rin('ij>ally with tlio Prokx'tor hiinscll'. J^oiide's diarv gives the 
 dates hut not tlic suhjeet-niatter of audiences wliich he^an to 1)6 fre- 
 quent at tliis time, and wliicli lie tells us were important. Xieupoort 
 also had more frecpient audienees, and his letters become more in- 
 structive. 
 
 Yet if Bonde exjx'cted that now finally his mission would make 
 some progress, he was destined to be again disappointed. Another 
 cause of suspicion and delay had arisen, for Charles Gustavus had 
 turned his arms against the Elector of J^randenl)urg. It is true the 
 initiative had been taken by Brandenbiu-g, but Cromwell could not be 
 expected from the fragmentary reports which reached him to know 
 this. He saw in it an attack on a Protestant ])rince (though to be 
 sure an unfriendly one), for the purpose of getting control of Prussia. 
 There were omnious signs of his displeasure. His relations w^ith the 
 Dutch ambassador became more cordial and confidential. Bonde ex 
 plained as best he could, but with little success, and it was even said 
 that when he beo;an as usual to testifv to his roval master's devotion 
 to the Protestant cause, the Protector had interrupted him. The 
 project of sending an English ambassador thither was revived, and, 
 naturally, the Dutch encouraged the plan.^ AVhitelocke's name had been 
 mentioned very early, but he appears to have been somewhat distrusted. 
 Af last, however, it was decided to send him in company with Chris- 
 topher Pack, the lord mayor of London." But AMiitelocke objected 
 strenuously, and "endeavoured by all handsome pretences to be excused 
 that service."^ On the 14th of eTanuary Xieupoort wrote that the 
 Protector had said, "If the king of Sweden desisted, wtII and good, 
 but if he continued, he would require something else than ambassa- 
 dors."^ 
 
 The news that he had desisted was received bv the Protector with 
 great pleasure, and in a reply to a letter announcing the birth of the 
 
 1 De Witt to Nieupoort, January 7, 1656. 
 
 2 He was later the mover of the Petition and Advice. 
 
 3 This incident attracted con.siderable attention at the time. Whitelocke devotes considera- 
 ble space to it. Memorials, 633, .srr/. See alsoNieupoorf s dispatches and Pufendorff, iii., §76. 
 
 4 •• * * de Heer Protector seyde, * * dat hy albereyts met ernst over de sacken van den 
 Koningh van Polen ende Pruyssen met Bond en Cojet hadt gesproocken, dat hy nogh naeder 
 met haer sonde handelen, end byaldien de Koningh van Sweden desisteert, dat het dan wel 
 sonde wesen, maer gaet hy voort, dat'er wat anders als Ambassadeurs sal verey.scht Avorden." 
 Thurloe assured Nieupoort that England and Holland " niet superficielycken maer inner- 
 lycken aen den anderen moesten gebonden houden." Ibid. 
 
38 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 young prince of Sweden lie expresses his satisfaction at the treaty 
 of Konigsberg in the following terms : " For we make no question 
 but the wresting of the kingdom of Poland by your arms from the 
 Papal Empire, as it were a horn from the head of the Beast, and your 
 peace made with the Duke of Brandenburg, to the great satisfaction of 
 all the pious, though with growls from your adversaries, will be of 
 very great consequence for the peace and profit of the Church. May 
 God grant an end worthy of such worthy beginnings ! ^' ^ This " we 
 look upon here as a very good advantage to the Protestant cause,'' 
 wrote Thurloe, '^ hoping that if the SAvede can settle his affairs in those 
 parts, he may be a great succour to the Protestants, who are every- 
 where threatened by the Popish party.'' ^ 
 
 Both these letters bear traces of the renewed apprehension of Cath- 
 olic aggression which spread over England at this time.^ The Pope 
 was endeavoring to effect a union of France and Spain, and it was re- 
 ported that Queen Christina was going to Paris in the interest of it. 
 "The general peace between the Popish party advanceth," wrote 
 Thurloe to General Montague on April 28. "It is probable that a 
 truce may be agreed upon between Spain and France for six years," 
 he wrote on the 1 3th.^ These movements were watched closely by the 
 Protector. They were partly favorable and partly unfavorable to the 
 Swedish designs ; for while they made him more zealous in the cause 
 of the Protestant union, he was still less inclined to proceed in it with- 
 out the Dutch. If a Catholic league were effected, it would as a 
 
 1 Milton, Literse, 110. See Masson, v., 246, seq., whose translation I have used, for a detailed 
 account of this letter ; but he seems to me to miss the point of it when he ascribes its lauda- 
 tory tone merely to a desire to propitiate the king for the delay in Sonde's negotiations. This 
 explanation would rob the passage I have quoted of its significance. As a matter of fact the 
 Protector was in good humor with Charles Gustavus for the moment, and for the reasons given. 
 
 2 Thurloe to Pell, February 7, 1655-6. Landsdowne MSB., 753, fol. 259. See also Urk. u. 
 Actenst., vii., 735. 
 
 3 " Wie ihm aber sei, so wird man alhicr je langer je mehr in dcr Opinion confirmiret, dass 
 aus dcm jetzigcn Wesen ein rechter generaler und pur lauterer Religionskrieg werden werde." 
 Schlezer to the Great Elector, March 16. Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 741. Ibid., 747. 
 
 * Carte MSS., Ixxiv., fol. 52 and .54. Also Puf., ii., §91. It was this lack of cordiality and mu- 
 tual trust thit prevented the co-operation of England and France in the North, notwithstanding 
 the similarity of their aims, of which they were fully conscious. "* * * il est d'ailleurs, 
 autant de I'intcrest du Protecteur que de Sa Ma'te que la tranquillite ne soit pas si establie en 
 Allemagne, ny les jalousies si esteintes, que les Forces de I'Emporeur ayent libcrte de venir a 
 la solde d'Espagne." Bordeaux to Brienne, May 22. "Je parlay [to Thurloe] des Ditferens 
 entre le Protectour et des Provinces-Unies, et soubzles nom des celles-cy, des affaires de Suede, 
 de la jalousie que ses progrez luy donnoient, et de I'avantage que la France et I'Anglet're re- 
 cevroiont si ceste Couronne tournoit ses armes contre le pays de ceux qui envoyent du se- 
 cours a I'Espagne." lb., June 20. 
 
CROMUEI.L AND ( HARLES GUSTAVUS. 39 
 
 matter of course espouse the cause of* Charles II. It was impossible 
 to drive the Dutch and Brandenburo- to that side also. 
 
 The first stage in the realization of tlie Protector's great foreign 
 policy remained, therefore, now, as before, the pacification of the 
 powers of the North. The Treaty of Kdnigsberg did not bring this 
 about, but it was a long step in that direction. The more difficult task 
 of reconciling Sweden and the Xetherlands yet remained. '^ It is true," 
 wrote Thurloe,^ "there is some jealousy between him [Charles Gusta- 
 vus] and the Dutch, and some unkindnesses have passed between them, 
 but my Lord Protector is resolved to use all possible endeavours to 
 unite and reconcile them." ^ 
 
 Two Proposals for an AlUance. — On January 31, after much im- 
 patient chafing on the part of the Swedish ambassador, articles for a 
 treaty on the basis of this policy w^ere submitted to him. But the as- 
 tonishment ^vith which they were received, betrays at once ho^v much 
 the demands of Charles Gustavus and Cromwell w^ere at variance and 
 how little Bonde had succeeded in fathoming Cromwell's real inten- 
 tions." In an interview^ with Charles Fleetwood, Bonde expressed 
 his indignation without measure,^ though to the English commissioners 
 he appears to have been more reserved. "The ambassador seemed 
 much unsatisfied with divers parts of the articles," says Whitelocke, 
 "and said that he had no commission to treat of any matter con- 
 cerning tlie United Provinces to be included, and was much nettled 
 at that business. In discourse touching a general union of the Pro- 
 testant interests, he said it would be a difficult work ; and as for his 
 master's falling upon the emperor, he said that they in Sweden did 
 not wish it to be so, because they doubted that then Sweden A\ould be 
 
 1 In the letter to Pell quoted above. 
 
 2 Bonde would not have been so taken aback at the nature of these proposals if he had had 
 the privilege of reading Nieupoort's dispatches. As early as September 28, Xieupoort had 
 written : " * * * de Protector seyde, dat het best sonde wesen Sweden mede te bewegen tot 
 een gemeene Alliancie met hem, Engelandt, Denemarcken, de Geunieerde Provincien, ende 
 den Keurvorst van Brandcnburgh op te reghten, in dewelcke men den anderen sonde verseeck- 
 eren de vryheyt van de Commercie ende Navigatie." "* * * hy [Cromwell] meende om 
 een vast ende solide werck te maken, dat men Sweden behoorde te inviteren, omme met dcsen 
 Staet, Denemarcken, de Geunieerde Provincien ende den Heer Keurvorst een naeder defen- 
 sive Ligue te maken, ende voorts discourerende, seyde, dat als men die ook offensive sonde 
 willen maken, tegens het Huys van Oostenryck, dat Vranckryck daer mede wel toe be te 
 brengen sonde wesen." Nieupoort to De Witt. January 14, 1G56. One infers from various 
 phrases in Pufendorff that Cromwell had endeavored to make the matter clear, but that Bonde, 
 in his impetuous desire to believe otherwise, did not give the Protector's words due weight. 
 
 3Pufendorff, iii., §77. 
 
40 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 neglected. He declared his opinion to be, not to meddle with the 
 great business of the Protestant Union ; nor to have to do with the 
 United Provinces in this or any other treaty ; but he said that they 
 might send to the king his master at their pleasure, and have a fitting 
 answer."^ Cromwell's suspicions that Bonde was not authorized to 
 enter into an agreement such as he desired was well founded. 
 
 The negotiations were scarcely interrupted by this disagreement. In 
 consequence of the Protector's proposal to send an ambassador to 
 Charles Gustavus, new instructions had been sent Bonde, which he re- 
 ceived on February 8, so that the conferences could be resumed with 
 hardly an interruption, with wider powers and better prospect of suc- 
 cess. The favorable outcome of the mission still seemed by no means 
 improbable. There had been from the first two possible ways of com- 
 ing to an agreement; either Cromwell might be bribed, as it were, to 
 undertake with Sweden the spoliation of the Dutch trade, or Charles 
 Grustavus must allow his arms to be directed against Austria. The 
 first alternative had already proved impracticable. Bonde was in- 
 structed not to renew his oflPers of trading privileges, since the English 
 did not appreciate their value. But it seemed that Charles Gustavus 
 must be driven to accept the second alternative. Affairs in Poland 
 were such that the support of Cromwell seemed indispensable to Swe- 
 den. Lisola reported at the close of 1655 that everybody in the king's 
 following admitted that another war must follow the one then in prog- 
 ress, though there was a difference of opinion as to with whom. Some 
 thought with Austria, some with Russia or the Turk, some with Den- 
 mark. If it proved to be with Austria, England and Sweden would 
 have a common cause ; if with Russia, England could be of the great- 
 est aid in destroying the port of Archangel and drawing the Russian 
 trade to the Baltic; if with Denmark, the Netherlands must first be 
 overthrown, to which end the support of England was indispensable." 
 Nevertheless, Charles Gustavus could not bring himself to make the 
 required concession. He tried in an ingenious manner to avoid the di- 
 rect issue. But no subterfuge could be ingenious enough to satisfy 
 Cromwell, who ^vas not the man to be either trifled or bargained ^vith.^ 
 The unsuccessful outcome of Bonde's mission could now be foreseen. 
 
 1 Whiteloeke's Memorials, 634. 
 
 2 Ferdinand Hirsch in Sybel's Historische Zeitschrift, Ix., 478. 
 
 3 Gardiner, vii., 194. 
 
CROMWELL AND CHARLE.S (JU.STAVUS. 41 
 
 "The Swedish ambassador," says Whiteloeke, "received new ad- 
 vices from the kino- liis master, concerniug the great business of unit- 
 inof the Protestant interest; and owned that he had sufficient instruc- 
 tions to conchide upon the general ; but that [)articulars could not so 
 soon be determined, nor so well as upon the place ; that it would be a 
 difficult matter to unite the several l*rotestants who have different in- 
 terests, and that it would prove a long business : therefore his opin- 
 ion was, that it was not a seasonable time for a general, union of the 
 Protestant interest. But that if the king of Sweden and the Protector 
 made a conjunction first, they might fall upon the emperor and the 
 house of Austria, which would be of great advantage to England, es- 
 pecially now they had war with Spain : and that some supply of money 
 and men afforded to the king upon such a design, would be of more 
 benefit to the Protector than the sending out of great fleets to the 
 Indies, and to the coast of Spain, which would return no benefit to 
 this nation." But "the opinion of the Swedish ambassador was 
 plainly to be collected, not to admit the Dutch to be joined in a treaty 
 with us."^ On February 15, a plan for an alliance, ostensibly on this 
 basis, was presented by Bonde, the details of which are stated so con- 
 cisely by Whiteloeke that I shall quote the passage below.^ 
 
 The negotiations for the next few weeks turned upon this Swedish 
 proposal. Cromwell, in his desire to keep the peace with Holland and 
 to direct the Swedish arms against Austria, demanded that the alliance 
 be directed expressly against Austria, Poland, and Charles Stuart. 
 Cliarles Gustavus, however, in spite of what Bonde said to the con- 
 trary, wanted to leave the matter of attacking Austria more or less 
 open, to be decided according to the future course of events ; but the 
 treaty of alliance must be so worded as to be effective against the 
 Dutch and Danes. Consequently, he demanded that no party should 
 be expressly named, but that it should be made against all their ene- 
 mies. If Cromwell would not guarantee him his Polish conquests, 
 es})ecially against Denmark and the Netherlands, he wrote on January 
 20, tiie alliance would be of little advantage to him."^ Cromwell, on 
 the other hand, demanded that the league should be offensive and 
 
 1 Whiteloeke, Memorials, 033. 
 
 2 They are also given by Pufendorff (iii., g 75) under date of January 6, presumably the date 
 of the instructions which Bonde received on February 8. 
 
 5 Pufendorff, iii., 3 75. 
 
42 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 defensive, in order that he might be sure that Charles Gustavus would 
 carry out the agreement. But Charles Gustavus wanted a defensive 
 league only. Cromwell's proposal, he said, would be regarded and 
 accepted by Austria as a declaration of war. Finally, while both 
 Cromwell and Charles Gustavus professed to have no stronger interest 
 than the maintenance of the Protestant cause and the promotion of the 
 Protestant union,. they disagreed as to the best method of bringing it 
 about. Cromwell was for immediate union of all the Protestant pow- 
 ers. Bonde dwelt upon the difficulties of such an ambitious plan, and 
 proposed the union of England and Sweden as a beginning, to which 
 other powers could afterwards be drawn in. Even Nieupoort objected 
 to Cromwell's plan as too ambitious,^ but it seems to me characteristic 
 of its author. All these diiferences appeared during the whole course 
 of the ensuing negotiations, and both sides held to their views with 
 great presistency. 
 
 That the negotiations proceeded so slowly is explained by the 
 Protector's occupation with other matters. The complaint of the 
 slowness with which business was dispatched was general among the 
 ambassadors. It was almost impossible to obtain audience.^ Conse- 
 quently, though Bonde's proposition was made February 15, it was 
 some weeks before he began to realize that they were to be of no avail. 
 But as the prospect for an agreement became more distant and it 
 began to be evident that the king had all and more than he could at- 
 tend to in Poland, the Protector began to grow cold.^ At this Bonde's 
 wrath knew no bounds. He was endowed with a full share of north- 
 ern vigor, and expressed himself accordingly. " In his country," he 
 said to Whitelocke, ^^ when a man professed sincerity, they understood 
 it to be plain and clear dealing ; that if one were desired to do a thing, 
 
 1 Nieupoort to De Witt, January ^14, 1656. 
 
 2 Schlezer to the Great Elector, April 25, 1656. Bordeaux to Brienne, May 29, 1656. 
 
 ^Thurloe sent General Montague (Carte MSS., Ixxiii., fol. 13) a most discouraging account 
 of Charles Gustavus' affairs, " who will meet with many difficulties more to keep his con- 
 quests than he had to make them." The Cossacks and Tartars were on the side of Poland, 
 Danzig was disposed to hold out to the last extremity, and a war with the ISIuscovites appeared 
 very likely. " These things make me think that the Swede is like to have a hot summer of it, 
 especially if we add to what is said before that the States General are sending 48 ships into the 
 Baltic Sea to oppose him also, and are labouring all they can to engage Denmark with them. 
 Some of the 48 ships are already sailed, but j'et nothing is pretended by them but fairness, and 
 to have no intention but to preserve their navigation and commerce; but the Swede knows 
 their meaning." There had been rumors of the king's defeat current in England for weeks 
 together, which were readily believed. 
 
CK0M\VP:LI. AM) CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 43 
 
 if lie nu'aiit to do it, ho would siiy, yea, and do it accordingly: but if 
 lie did not intend to do it, tluMi lie would at tlie first desire to be ex- 
 cused, and not seem at one time to be willing to do it, and at another 
 time to deny it, * * that he should have l)een contented if he 
 might have had the honour to have laid the foundation of that great 
 business for the glory of God, to unite the Protestant interest; and the 
 particulars thereof to have been left to a new treaty with the king, 
 by an ambassador from the Protector, when there might be full time 
 to consider all grounds and circumstances thereof."' 
 
 At a conference a few days later Whitelocke was commissioned by 
 the Protector to visit Bonde and assure him of the sinceritv of the 
 Protector's attentions. ^^According to the direction of his Highness," 
 he tells us under date of April 7, '^ I went this morning to the Swed- 
 ish ambassador, and delivered to him what I was directed from the 
 Protector, as much to his Highness' advantage as I could improve it; 
 and endeavoured to satisfy the ambassador that his Highness' inten- 
 tions and inclinationsas to a nearer alliance with the king of Sweden 
 were the same still as at first, and that he had a very good inclination 
 to it, and was reallv desirous of it. 
 
 ''The ambassador answered, 'That perhaps his Highness had no 
 great mind at the first to a nearer alliance with the king of Sweden, and 
 so might have the same intentions still : That he could not but wonder 
 that his Highness should heretofore express himself so well inclined 
 to that nearer alliance, and at his last audience to be so cold in it, and 
 of another opinion tliaii he was before; which would make him seem 
 to his master either negligent as to his service, or not at all thought 
 worthy of regard here ; but he desired to know a certain answer, ay or 
 no, whether he would do it or not ; and if he had no mind to it, that 
 then there might lie a dispatch of what was left to be done upon the 
 treaty made by me, and so he might kiss the Protector's hand and re- 
 turn to his master.' 
 
 "I, seeing him in such a humour of discontent, sought to divert him, 
 and to satisfy him that the Protector was still very well inclined to the 
 point of a nearer alliance with the king of Sweden, but found it diffi- 
 cult to make him of that persuasion ; yet thought it fit to demand of 
 him what those propositions were which he delivered to the Protector 
 
 1 Whitelocke's Memorials, G37. 
 
44 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 concerning the nearer alliance. Whereupon the ambassador showed me 
 the propositions he had delivered in to that purpose^ which were, ' To 
 have a league defensive contra omnes gentes, and offensive as to the 
 maintenance of the treaty of Augsburg ; that the Protector should con- 
 tribute 200,000/. per annum to that design, when undertaken, and the 
 king should have 30,000 foot and 6,000 horse in service upon it.' I 
 asked why his excellency put the business upon the maintenance of the 
 treaty of Augsburg, whereto England was no party ; and why rather it 
 might not be against the house of Austria, whereof the emperor was one 
 branch, and the king of Spain another; and said, ^As to the contribut- 
 ing of money, he knew the Protector was not in a condition at this 
 time to spare money, having such vast occasions of expense at present 
 for maintenance of his navy, and by occasion of the war with Spain.' 
 The ambassador replied, 'That he did believe the Protector was 
 at present in no condition to part with much money, and that there 
 would be some time before this design could be set on foot; by which 
 time probably the Protector might be better able to spare money than 
 now he is ; and that he thought it would be better husbandry for Eng- 
 land to spare 200,000/. a year for this war, which would be a good 
 diversion, and trouble the king of Spain more than we do by spend- 
 ing two millions a year upon our fleets, and in sending to Jamaica. 
 That it was true the treaty of Augsburg was not concerning the Eng- 
 lish nation, but the Protestants of Germany were highly concerned in 
 it, and consequently all Christendom ; and the emperor having broken 
 that treaty in many points, there was a just ground thereby of falling 
 upon him; and the reason why he mentioned the maintenance of that 
 treaty was, because France was already obliged in a treaty with Swe- 
 den for the maintenance of the treaty of Augsburg; and England 
 joining likewise therein, France would be engaged with them, and that 
 crown was a good balance. AYhereas, if tlie union with the king of 
 Sweden should be against the house of Austria and the king of Spain, 
 it would cause the peace which was so much endeavoured between 
 France and Spain to be brought to effect; and France would hardly 
 be brouglit into such an union against the liouse of Austria, because 
 it would seem too much against the Papists in general, wherein France 
 would be shy to join.' " 
 
 This Swedish proposal and its unfavorable reception mark the last 
 
CROMWELL A>'D CHARLE.S GUSTAVUS. 45 
 
 phase of these negotiiitions which luivc any interest fur us. Though 
 thev were continued for some months in a desultory manner, it was 
 more for the purpose of keeping up appearances before the Dutch, 
 tlian with the expectation of a favorable outcome. The relations be- 
 tween England and Sweden had in fact come to this unsatisfactory 
 stage, that each party sought to involve the other but to avoid commit- 
 ting itself. The fatal objection to the Swedish proposition from the Pro- 
 tectoi'^s point of view was that it would have been an agreement by 
 which Sweden nu'ght have attacked Austria, but not one by which it 
 must have done so. It would also probably have been construed by 
 the Dutch as a menace, and it contiuned elements foreign to the matter 
 inTianth The Protector complained that he did not know what might 
 be demanded of him under cover of the treaty of Augsburg. The 
 Swedes, on the other hand, complained that Cromw^ell was trying to 
 involve them in a war with Austria to further his own interests, only 
 to abandon them to make shift as best they could, when these had 
 been secured. Cromwell had refused to grant the subsidies asked for; 
 indeed he could not. It was seldom that he was not in want of money, 
 but the letters of this date show tliat it ^vas a time of special embar- 
 rassment. He argued, therefore, that as w^ar with Austria was unavoid- 
 able for Sweden, the king had an equal interest in it with England 
 and should not demand subsidies;^ thus showing that Sweden's fear of 
 having to bear the brunt of the struggle was not without foundation. 
 
 A Commercial Treaty ; Bonders and Coyefs Departure. — AMiile 
 these fruitless negotiations concerning a nearer alliance and mutual aid 
 had been going on, there had been negotiating, almost independently of 
 them, a treaty of commerce, which was brought to a conclusion on 
 July 17. It liad little political significance and consequently lies out- 
 side the sco})e of this paper; yet it may be well to mention some of 
 the matters determined by it. 
 
 The plan to transfer the English trade from Archangel to the Baltic,^ 
 though pressed hard by Bonde, finally came to nothing. The English 
 merchants feared the Sw^edish tolls more than the long and perilous 
 journey through the Arctic Ocean and refused to make the change. 
 
 The matter of contraband and the closely allied matter of passes were 
 
 1 Pufendorff, iii., g 78, with the marginal date March 7. 
 2Kalling, p. 20, gives some interesting details. 
 
46 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 the subjects of much contention and of some bitter words. The war 
 with Spain Avas chiefly naval, and the English were determined to cut 
 off the naval supplies of the Xorth from their rivals, and to maintain 
 a strict search in order that they might not be smuggled under false 
 passes. They therefore proposed a list of contraband articles which, 
 Bonde averred, only needed the addition of copper and iron to com- 
 prise a complete list of Swedish products. The discussions over this 
 point occupy a large part of the pages which Whitelock gives to these 
 negotiations. Bonde was forced in the end to give way, though his 
 instructions required him to refer the matter to Charles Gustavus for 
 ratification.^ In the matter of passes the Swedes fared somewhat 
 better. 
 
 The request of the Swedes for permission to recruit six or eight 
 thousand Scotch for the king's service was at first refused" until the 
 return of the English fleet from the West Indies, after which the 
 Protector's aflkirs would be more settled. Permission was aftenvards 
 granted, chiefly, it would appear, if not entirely, through Fleetwood's 
 influence. The reports are so confused that I cannot discover how 
 many men were actually raised. The number must have been large, 
 but some of them, at least, did not fulfill what was expected of them.'^ 
 The Swedes were not in the least grateful for the favor, but regarded 
 it as serving Cromwell's own interest,* for which view there was at 
 least some color. ^^ 
 ^ As to the trading privileges to be granted the English in return for 
 ' aid against the Dutch, of which we hear so much during the first part 
 of Bonde's embassy, and so little during the last, I regret that I have 
 not been able to discover exactly what concessions were oflPered. It 
 seems to me probable that Bonde spoke in general terms merely, and 
 did not descend to particulars. At any rate he made but little im- 
 pression on the English, and in the new instructions received on Feb- 
 
 ^ Coyet's instructions, § 14. This is why it forms a special article of the treaty. Pufendorff 
 gives an abstract of the treaty (iii., § 81), and also publishes the whole text in the appendix. 
 Dumont gives the main part of the treaty, but not the supplementary articles. Tom. vi., part 
 ii., p. 125. 
 
 2Rolts' instructions, par. 6. Thurloe Papers, iii., 418. Thurloe told Nieupoort they were re- 
 fused out of consideration for Dutch feelings. 
 
 3 "The levies of England which are sent over hither, signify little. They find not things 
 answer promise or expectation, which makes them mutiny or run away, to the dishonor of 
 our nation." Meadowe to Thurloe, June 29, 1G5S. Eng. Hist. Review, vii., 737. 
 
 * Pufendorff, ii., §92. 
 
 6 Charles II. to Lord Leven. Clarendon S. P., 1., fol. 120. 
 
CRO>nVEI.L AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 47 
 
 riiarv 8 lie is told not to press the matter further. There is in the 
 Public Record office an undated paper containing ^' ])ropositions in 
 order to a treaty witli Sweden,"' which probably belongs to this }K3- 
 riod. It asks for lower custom duties and more freedom in the hand- 
 ling and sale of goods. But to English propositions of this kind 
 Bonde objected that ^' the demands were not equal. " " All concessions 
 were, when it came to definite particulars, found to rest after all on 
 strict reciprocity. 
 
 Cromwell's letter to Charles Gustavus on Coyet's departure is dated 
 April 17, 1656.^ On May 3, Coyet received the order of Knight of 
 the Grarter and a valuable present from Cromwell.^ ^Mlitelocke men- 
 tions him again under date of May S/' but he must have sailed soon 
 after. 
 
 Bonde was ready to leave in July, but the presents which the Pro- 
 tector intended for him were not ready, so he staid on until Septem- 
 ber 3.*^ In his letter of credence, which extols him highly, we read : 
 *'As for the transactions that yet remain, we have shortly to send your 
 majesty a special embassy for those, and meanwhile may God preserve 
 your majesty safe, to be a pillar in his Church's defence and in the 
 affairs of Sweden."'' 
 
 The failure of Bonders mission was generally attributed to Xieu- 
 poort's influence.^ This w'as certainly the proximate reason, but a 
 deeper reavSon was perhaps the divergences between the aims of the two 
 rulers, neither of whom was in the habit of making concessions. The 
 doubtful state of Charles Gustavus' fortunes and Cromwell's financial 
 embarrassment also had undoubted influence.^ 
 
 Fleehvood Remains in London. — After the departure of Covet and 
 Bonde, Swedish interests were leff in the hands of Fleetwood, who 
 
 1 S. p., Sweden, 165G. 
 
 2 Whitelocke's Memorials. G35. 
 •■'Milton, Literte, 117. 
 
 * Whitelocke's Memorials, 644. 
 
 5 Ibid., 645. 
 
 ''" * * * I'Ambas'r s'est retire apres avoir receu becoup de marques extraordinaires." 
 Bordeaux to Brienne, September 11. 
 
 ' Milton, Li terse, 125. 
 
 8 " Der jetzt a tout force regleret." Schlezer to Waldeck, June 6, 1656. 
 
 ' "Ceux qui croyent co^noistre I'estat des affaires Doraestiques du Protecteur. jugent que ce 
 n'est pas le temps de prendre aucune deliberation sur celles de dehors, et moins encore de 
 s'engager dans une Alliance qui renouvelle la guerre avec les Provinces-Unies." Bordeaux 
 to Brienne, August 2.3, 1656. 
 
^ 
 
 48 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 kept his character of ambassador secret in order to frequent the court 
 with greater freedom. So easily could he do this under cover of his 
 family connections that it was not till December that Xieupoort dis- 
 covered his real object/ There appears to have been no special nego- 
 tiations for some time, although the Protector had not abandoned the 
 plan of a closer alliance. On June 29, before Bonde's departure, the 
 Council voted "that his Highness be reminded of speeding an am- 
 bassador into Sweden/^ ^ and although the Protector's relations with the 
 Dutch were already less cordial,^ the mediation of a peace between 
 Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands was still the keystone of his 
 policy in the ISTorth.^ On August 21 he wrote to the States General 
 earnestly deprecating the disagreement between the United Provinces 
 and Sweden, and urging the necessity of union amongst .Protestant 
 states in opposition to Spain. ^ During this same month he Avrote to 
 the king of Sweden, and on December 4 to the king of Denmark'' in 
 much the same strain. But on December 1 Xieupoort wrote that he 
 heard no more of sending an ambassador to Sweden. The calling of 
 Parliament, the war with Spain, attempts to raise money, royalists 
 and assassination plots, and the Petition and Advice were sufficient 
 to keep the Protector occupied until well into the follo^^•ing year. 
 Even as late as July 29, 1657, Xieupoort thought domestic matters 
 occupied the Protector's attention more than foreign aifairs. 
 
 Bremen. — But, in the meantime," there had been important though 
 fruitless negotiations going on that Xieupoort knew nothing of. Ever 
 since the beginning of the Polish war, the king of Denmark had been 
 waiting for a favorable opportunity to strike back at his old antagonist. 
 As the position of Sweden became more difficult in the spring of 1657, 
 the attitude of Denmark grew more threatening, and it was evident 
 
 1 Nieupoort to De Witt, December 1, 1656. 
 
 2 a P. Dom., Interreg., Ixxvii., fol. 190. 
 
 8 " I like not the carriage of the Hollanders ; our ships of war and theirs scarce ever meet in 
 the Channel but they have some scuffle or other." Thurloe to Montague, August 28, 1656. 
 Carte MSS., Ixxiii., fol. 26. 
 
 * " Les affaires de Siiede et de Pologne le touchent darvantage, et il songe encore a une Union 
 estroitte avec cestc Couromie, la France, le Dannemark, et les Estatz-Generaux, comme a un 
 moyon asscure de balancer la puissance de la Maison d'Autriche." Bordeaux to Brienne, No- 
 vember 27, 1656. Also Bordtjaux to Mazarin, December 4, 1656. 
 
 5 Milton, Literae, 130, and Thurloe, v., 330, from which the date is taken. The reply of the 
 Dutch is annexed, dated September 22. 
 
 <> Milton. Literse, 151, but without the day of the month. The original in the Danish archives 
 is dated December 4, 1656 (Macray). 
 
 ' Pufendorft' gives the marginal date as February 13, for the following negotiations. 
 
CROMWELL AND CHARLPIS GUSTAVUS. 49 
 
 that a rin)tiire miglit soon bo expected. Charles Ciiistavus was siilier- 
 iiig ehieHy Iroiu a hiek ul' money, and turneil again to Cromwell for 
 aid, asking the loan of £'100,000. Cromwell expressed his willingness 
 to fnrnish tlie money on a snffieient gnarantee of repayment, namelv, 
 the possession of the I^ishoprie l>remen. Bremen was worth so mnch 
 more than the amonnt of the proposed loan that the king at first re- 
 garded this counter-demand as merely a means of parrying his request. 
 Yet this was not the case. Cromwell made the proposal in all ear- 
 nestness, and clung to it with great persistency. It was, in fact, too 
 much in keeping with his procedure elsewhere for us to doubt his sin- 
 cerity in it. He always had a hankering afler ports and strong places 
 on the Continent, and we have only to take his motives in other cases 
 and apply them to the state of affairs in the Xorth to find his motives 
 here. 
 
 We have already seen how Cromwell's policy in the North required 
 that affairs in that region should not be disturbed. Considerations of 
 trade demanded that the control of the Baltic remain divided as it then 
 was; the interests of religion demanded that the two northern Protest- 
 ant powers direct their arms against the common Catholic enemy, not 
 against each other. In trying to secure a foothold in Bremen, Crom- 
 well nuist have had a very definite object. It Avas directed against some 
 one in particular, and who could this be but those who were conspiring 
 against the existing peace in the Xorth, a peace upon which his north- 
 ern policy, and with it his whole foreign policy, rested? As the pos-A 
 session of Dunkirk and Mardyke w^as desired not merely as an inroad 
 against the Spanish power, but as a means of bringing pressure to bear 
 on France and the Netherlands,^ so the possession of Bremen must have 
 been designed, in part, if not chiefly, to the same end with regard to Den- 
 mark. This view is supported by the fact that the Protector Mas 'at 
 the same time on the point of sending an ambassador, Mr. ]\Ieadowe, 
 to Denmark to persuade Frederick to refrain from his attack on Swe- 
 den.- His efforts would have much greater prospect of success if they 
 
 1 See Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time, or in lieu of this, Concerning Forraigne Af- 
 faires in the Protector's Time, Lord Somer's Tracts, vi., 331, for a very lucid and concise ex- 
 planation of the Protector's objects in Flanders. 
 
 2 On February 24, 1657, the Council voted that the Protector be recommended to send Meadowe 
 to Denmark, and following entries in the Council Order Book show that his immediate depart- 
 ure was intended ; but lie was held back, for reasons which are not stated, until September ;i, 
 the day of Jephson's departure. 
 
 4 
 
^ 
 
 50 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 could be supported by the presence of an English force on the Danish 
 frontier. 
 
 But of course, as usual, Cromwell may liave had more than one 
 object. The German Protestants would be encouraged by the presence 
 of an English force, and this influence in Germany could be used in 
 various ways, among others, it may be, to the advantage of English 
 trade.^ '^ Being now on the continent, and considered as the patron of 
 the Protestant interest, he stood fair for the undertaking and prose- 
 cuting any design, to which the vicissitude of human affairs might 
 give him opportunity."^ Finally, he was justified in demanding a 
 secure military base of operations for so distant an midertaking.^ In 
 short, it seems that we may accept Cromwell's own explanation of his 
 ( chief objects, when he told Charles Gustavus that English possession 
 ] of Bremen would keep the Dutch and Danes quiet and encourage the 
 Protestants, while the king would be free to make better use of its 
 garrisons elsewhere.* 
 
 But the reason why Cromwell wanted Bremen was the very reason 
 why Charles Gustavus could not surrender it. He, too, wanted a com- 
 manding position over Denmark, but for a different reason. Cromwell 
 had every interest in preserving peace. Charles Gustavus wanted war. 
 He was tired of his Polish adventures, with their unsubstantial gains 
 but very substantial ills. Denmark offered a field for something more 
 than barren victories ; to surrender Bremen on the eve of the struggle 
 was not to be thought of.^ He, therefore, urged various excuses, 
 
 1 One infers, this latter more from the prevailing commercial ideas of the time and Crom- 
 well's constant efforts to extend English trade, than from any definite evidence which our 
 sources oflt'er. It may be urged against this view, that the English occupation of Bremen was 
 intended to be only temporary (Jephson's instructions, par. 8) unless, indeed, it can be shown 
 that Cromwell thought the Swedes would not be in a position to redeem it. Yet the position 
 of Bremen, controlling alike the Elbe and the Weser, was exceedingly favorable to such plans. 
 
 2Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time, referring to the possession of Dunkirk, etc. 
 
 3 Jephson's instructions, par. G. Thurloe Papers, vi., 478. 
 
 » "Addebantur rationes : earn nimium a Svecia remotam; ac posse Regem militc prcesidiario 
 alibi uti : idque Belgarum destinata valde turbaturum, Danoque scrupulum injecturum metu 
 irruptionis in Jutiam : denique pnesentia Anglorum Protestantibus animos additum iri ad 
 Pontificiis eo acrius resistendum." Pufendorft", iv., § 79. 
 
 "The importance of the Swedish possession of Bremen as an opening into Denmark was 
 well understood at that time. " By which the Swede * * * has betwixt his ancient patri- 
 mony on the one side, and his new acquisitions on the other, as it were enclosed and belea- 
 guered Denmark." Meadowe's Narrative, p. 2. "* * * het Stift Bremen, het welche soo is 
 gelegen, dat het seer considerable is voor den Koningh van Denemarcken, die daer door, ende 
 door het geene hy was genooksaekt gewest aj^>n Sweden in te ruymen door het gemelde 
 Tractaet, als tusschen den haemer ende het aenbeeldt was geklemt geweest." Nieupoort 
 to De Witt, July 29, 1G57. The significance of Charles Gustavus' marriage with the daughter 
 of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp must not l)c forgotten in this connection. 
 
CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 51 
 
 anioiiii' others the real one, and was iiiclintH;! for a time not to press the 
 matter further. 
 
 Yet since Cromwell appeared l)ent on getting a footing in Germany, 
 it mio-lit he possible to eome to an agreement with him at the expense 
 of someone else. A\\)uld lie not take forcible possession of Emden 
 and East Friesland, or Oldenburg ; or, if he considered this too ditti- 
 eult, would he not be content with building a Ibrt on the River Stor, 
 and taking possession of the surrounding country? He would then 
 have no need of Bremen, which on account of its supplies of money 
 and of troops, and its nearness to Denmark, the king could ill spare. 
 It is not surprising that these proposals made no impression on the 
 Protector. It was one thing to take peaceful possession of a province 
 for furthering a definite object. It was quite another thing to turn 
 freebooter and begin a war of wanton aggression against powers, with 
 one at least of whom he was on terms of close friendship.^ The 
 propositions were therefore declined. 
 
 Jleadowe^s and Jephson's Mediation. — The relations between Eng- 
 land and Sweden became more distant for a time,^ vet events soon 
 tended to draw them together again. In spite of the constitutional 
 struo^o-les in which Cromwell was involved, he found time to come to 
 an agreement with ^lazarin for the invasion of the Spanish Xether- 
 lands. Three days later the emperor of Germany died, opening a 
 new opportunity for hostile action against the house of Hapsburg. 
 Both Cromwell and Charles Gustavus were extremely interested in 
 bringing the imperial crown into other hands,^ and- were prepared to 
 second France in its efforts to accomplish this end, although it must be 
 confessed that neither of them was in a position to make his influence 
 very much felt in the matter. But the deciding factor in uniting 
 
 1 Various passages in Masson give us glimpses of CroniAveirs relations with the Count ot Old- 
 enburg. As early as the middle of 1651, before the battle of Worcester, we find an envoy from 
 the latter in London for the purpose of establishing a good understanding with the Common- 
 wealth. Their relations were throughout most cordial, and in 1654 Count Friederick's son, 
 Count Antony, visited England. It was with a team of spirited horses sent as a present from 
 the count that the well known runaway incident in Hyde Park occurred. 
 
 - Bedenken des Schwedischen Senats liber die Frage : Ob sich Konig Carl Gustav in Schwe- 
 den mit Frankreich und Engelland in ein Bundniss wider das llaus Oesterreich einlassen solle? 
 de annn 1657. Liinig, Staats-Concilia, ii., 593. The Council thought it better to await the de- 
 velopment of the plans of Austria. 
 
 3 Lunig, Staats-Concilia, ii.. 592 Carlson, iv., 192, Anm. Urk. u. Actenst, vii., 766. Both 
 suggested the Elector of Brandenburg as a possible candidate. There is an anonymous manu- 
 script in the British Museum (Add. :)2093. fol. 397) advocating England's interference, chiefly 
 on religious grounds. 
 
52 DIPLOMATIC RELATIO^'S BETWEEN 
 
 Cromwell and Charles Gustavus was the outbreak of the Danish war, 
 closely followed by the formation of a new" alliance between Poland 
 and Austria. Cromwell informed Charles Gustavus that if the Dutch 
 appeared to be supporting the Danes in this matter he would take 
 other counsels/ and he pressed again for possession of Bremen. The 
 Danes would hardly have ventured in their present course, he said, if 
 his former proposals had been accepted. He even reduced his demand 
 to the possession of Stade as a basis for military o|)erations; but even 
 this Charles Gustavus was unwilling to grant. The king could only 
 bring himself to offer the strongholds of the Dutchy A^erden, although 
 he might have foreseen that the possession of inland forts with no pos- 
 sibility of relieving them by sea in case of siege,^ would be the last 
 proposal that Cromwell would accept. The negotiations had in fact 
 again degenerated into mere bargaining, and as usual Cromwell deter- 
 mined to treat through his own envoys. Philip Meadowe had long 
 been intended as ambassador to Denmark, and now Maj.-Gen. Wm. 
 Jephson was named for a similar mission to the king of Sweden. 
 
 The objects of Meadowe's mission are given in a paper entitled : 
 " Propositio legati protectoris Anglise ad regem Danise," which was 
 recently discovered by Dr. Joseph Weiss, and published in Historisches 
 Jahrbuch (vol. xiv., p. 608). Meadowe has incorporated the contents 
 of this paper into his Narrative in the following words: "England 
 had too great an interest in the Baltic (the Mediterranean of the 
 Xorth) to sit still ^vithout making reflection upon those commotions in 
 tlie northern kingdoms. For besides the general concerns of a free 
 trade, which must of necessity have suifered interruption by the con- 
 tinuance of this war, England being at that time engaged in a war 
 with one branch of the Austrian family, viz., with Spain, would rather 
 the Swedish arms had been at liberty to give check to the other 
 branch in Germany as occasion might offer, than to be diverted there- 
 from by a war Avith Denmark. * * * jjjg [Meadowe's] business 
 was to remonstrate how unwelcome it was to them in England to un- 
 derstand of a rupture betwixt the two crowns, albeit they esteemed 
 the communication thereof bv the letters and manifest^ of that kins; 
 as an expression of friendship. That besides the effusion of Christian 
 
 1 Puf., iv., g 79. Urk. u. Actenst, vii., 762. 
 
 2 Jephson's instructions, par. 9. 
 ^Jusjeciale armatx Danix. 
 
CROMWKI-L AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 53 
 
 bloml betwixt two nations linked tos^etlier bv the common l)on(ls of 
 nature and reliiiion, and both of them leagued in amity with Entiland, 
 the continuation of that war miolit in so perilous a juncture consider- 
 ably endanger the whole Protestant cause and interest; and nothing 
 could have happened more advantageous to Spain, with whom Eng- 
 land was in open hostility. Besides, his majesty of Denmark could 
 not but be sensible how much the freedom of navigation and commerce 
 in the Baltic would be impeached thereby, to the prejudice of the 
 neighboring nations, but of none more than England, as continually 
 feti^hino; naval stores from those countries. He was therefore sent 
 on the part of England to that king to offer the best and most 
 friendlv offices for the accommodatins: all differences betwixt the two 
 crowns, and putting a stop to so unhappy a w^ar, and to assm'e him 
 that they would employ their utmost interest with the king of Sweden 
 to dispose him thereto, and to that purpose had already sent a gentle- 
 man to him."^ From subsequent negotiations, it appears that Crom- 
 well intended to make the treatv of Bromsebro the basis of the new 
 peace. 
 
 Jephson's secret instructions^ are dated August 22, 1657. They 
 recite that the former negotiations with Bonde had come to nothing 
 because Bonde was not authorized to agree upon 'Hhe terms of that 
 assistance" Avhich had been asked for, nor to place at the Protector's 
 disposal any "places of safe retreat for his men, or secure harbours for 
 his ships." "Furthermore, this assistance being desired by the king, 
 and wholly upon the account of his interest, the expense and charge of 
 such an undertaking is to be considered, if not in present, yet here- 
 after, when it shall please God to put his majesty's affairs into a more 
 peaceable condition." If, now, his majesty is willing to place Bremen 
 at the Protector's disposal for this purpose, the Protector will send 
 forces to take possession of it, and will agree to surrender it again "at 
 any time upon demand of the crown of Sweden, being first paid the 
 charges we shall be at over and above what shall be levied upon the 
 country', in and about the keeping and securing the said dukedom." 
 These instructions have on the face of them a somewhat different as- 
 
 1 Meadowe's Narrative, p. 10, seq. 
 
 - Printed in Thurloe Papers, vi., 478. Tlie original manuscript, in the handwriting of Thurloe, 
 with many erasures and corrections, evidently tlie first draft, is in the British Museum. Add. 
 MSS. 4157, fol. 201. 
 
54 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 pect than the foregoing, but in reality they are quite in keeping with 
 it. For if the king had acceded to this demand, Cromwell would have 
 been master of the situation, and could have mediated, as it were with 
 sword in hand, and with some prospect of success. Yet he appears 
 to have been not very confident that the proposal would be accepted, 
 for Jephson was told not to mention the matter "unless his majesty 
 should administer the occasion thereof, and express himself inclined 
 to put it into our hands.'' 
 
 After some difficulty in ascertaining the whereabouts of the two 
 kings, Meadowe and Jephson were received at Copenhagen and Wis- 
 mar respectively with special marks of honor, and both kings signified 
 their readiness to accept the Protector's mediation. But in the course 
 of the proposals and counter-proposals which were exchanged during 
 the succeeding months,^ it soon became evident that neither party was 
 willing to make the necessary concessions. Certain details could not 
 be adjusted, because certain vital matters of policy were involved in 
 them. The place of meeting for the commissioners presented the first 
 difficulty. The king of Denmark proposed Lubeck as a convenient and 
 neutral place, trusting to have the presence and support of his Polish 
 and Austrian allies. The king of Sweden proposed some place on the 
 inaccessible frontier of Denmark and Sweden, according to ancient 
 custom and the treaty of Bromsebro, in order that the ambassadors 
 of the allies of Denmark could not with any convenience attend, and 
 he might thus sow jealousy and dissension among his enemies through 
 a separate treaty. From this arose another dispute. The mediation 
 had been offered between Sweden and Denmark alone, but in his dec- 
 laration of November 3 the king of Denmark demanded that Poland 
 and Brandenburg be included. Much anxiety was caused in .English 
 councils by this new demand and Denmark's cause was prejudiced not 
 a little by it ; but Denmark appeared bound by treaty not to make a 
 separate peace. Charles Gustavus was willing to grant the ambassa- 
 dors of the allies licenses to be present as spectators, but not as confed- 
 erates and principals, and on this point no agreement could be reached. 
 To these came a third difficulty. Charles Gustavus had proposed that 
 the good officers of France be joined with those of England in the 
 
 iMeadowe's account of these, Narrative, p. 19, seq., is very concise and clear. See, also, 
 Meadowe's and Jephson's dispatches in Thurloe Papers, Pufendorff, iv., g 77, Diarium Euro- 
 pseum, etc. 
 
CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 55 
 
 modiatKni. Denmark proposed in return tlie inelusion of the States 
 General also. This Charles Gustavus would admit on one condition, 
 that they first ratify tlie treaty of Elbing. But Denmark insisted ' 
 that they be included without waiting for the ratification. So bitter 
 was the feeling on this point that Avhen Dutch ambassadors arrived at 
 the court of Charles Gustavus he at first refused them audience, hoping, 
 as Jephson thouglit, to drive the Dutch to espouse openly the cause of 
 the Danes, which would force the Protector against his will to the side 
 of Sweden. In short, the attempt at mediation failed utterly, because 
 neither party desired it. Neither the king of Sweden was deterred by 
 the formidable combination of his enemies, nor the king of Denmark 
 by the loss of Jutland, and each hoped for a favorable turn of fortune. 
 "Mediating princes are most welcome and successful when the parties 
 are wearied with the war, as those physicians are most happy who 
 come in the declension of a disease." ^ 
 
 Friesendroff^s Iristructmis. — At about the time of ^Nleadowe's and 
 Jephson's departure, a Swedish ambassador, J. F. von FriesendorfP, 
 arrived in Eno-land with instructions of a remarkable character, which 
 for disregard of the accepted rules of political morality can hardly be 
 matched among the papers of the time. They reveal a characteristic 
 trait of the foreign policy of this prince, who, with all his attractive 
 personal qualities, cannot be acquitted of violence and lawlessness in 
 his relations with his neighbors. 
 
 If Cromwell's hesitancy in engaging in the northern war could be 
 overcome by oifers of territorial acquisition on the Baltic, then surely 
 there need be no difficultv. Friesendorif 's secret instructions^ con- 
 tained an elaborate system of proposals and alternatives for the Eng- 
 lish occupation of various portions of German and Danish territory 
 in order to induce Cromwell to tinallv lend efficient aid to Swedish 
 
 1 Meadowe, A View of the Suedish and other Affairs, p. 175. 
 
 2 They have been printed by Tresehow in Nye Danske Magazin, Tredje Bind (1810), p. 73, 
 from a copy in the Danish archives. Pnfendorff gives a fairly complete abstract of them (lib. 
 iv., g 82). " In irgend einer Weise tiel den Danen die Instruction in die Hande, und diese beeil- 
 ten sich, siein Berlin mitzutheilen ; der Kurfiirst wiederum thcilte sie, wahrend der Friedens- 
 verhandlungen in Oliva, dem kaiserlichen Hofe mit (dat. 23. Miarz 1660); so dass also diese 
 schwedisch-englischen Geheimnisse sehr bald in weitcu Kreisen bckannt waren. Ubrigens 
 cursirten Geriichte nber solche schwedisch-englische Abmachungen schon in Septemberl656 
 auf dem Reichsdeputationstag in Frankfurt ; s. Frk. u. Actenst., vii., 077." Erdmannsdorflfer, 
 Deutsche Geschichte, i., 285, Anm. 2. " Le diet Sr. Secretaire d'Estat commenca par me desad- 
 vouer que les Ministres de Suede eussent fait aucunes offres, soit de Glowstadt ou d'aucune 
 autre Place." Bordeaux to Mazarin, March 5, 1658. 
 
56 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 arms. The proposals were as follows : For the first part, Cromwell 
 should unite his forces with those of Sweden against Denmark until 
 the latter had been brought to a position in Avhich it was no longer to 
 be feared "and the freedom of commerce and free passage through the 
 Sound was restored to all nations." In order that the balance of 
 power in the Sound might be maintained, it was proposed that Sweden 
 resume possession of its ancient provinces, Schonen, Blecking, and 
 Halland, together with Christina and the provinces Bohus and Drunt- 
 heim as protection against Danish invasion,^ and finally that the 
 County Pinneberg, and the Kremper and Wilster Marches, which had 
 formerly belonged to Bremen, should be restored to it. 
 
 As soon, now, as they had without difficulty set their house in or- 
 der (for surely Cromwell, too, had as much to fear from Denmark and 
 Holland as from Spain and Austria), Charles Gustavus proposed to 
 accede to CromwelPs long-cherished desire for a common attack against 
 the house of Hapsburg, and in addition to make certain other con- 
 cessions which would serve not only the public interests of England, 
 but Cromwell's private interests as well. First, the king agreed to 
 assist in the conquest of Delmenhorst and Oldenburg (his claims to 
 the former he abandoned in Cromwell's favor), which Cromwell should 
 "hold as his own"; and that Cromwell should be free to take posses- 
 sion of East Friesland, the Bishopric Munster, and as much of the 
 Westphalian Circle as he was able to, as quarter for his troops, which 
 advantage Charles Gustavus proposed to share also with the greater 
 part of his army. The possession of these provinces would lend Crom- 
 well a support in his private ambition in establishing the power of his 
 house such as England did not offer, and would give him the oppor- 
 tunity of attacking at his pleasure either the Danes, the Dutch, or the 
 house of Hapsburg. A'^arious pretexts for the proposed violence were 
 suggested, as well as methods for satisfying the injured princes. If, 
 however, this was not sufficient, and Cromwell desired a position by 
 which he could bring Poland and Danzig to account for past injuries, 
 and in conjunction with Sweden, attack Austria from the side of 
 Silesia,^ the fortification Weichselmiuide near Danzig could be given 
 
 1 Bohus and Druntheim were then being used by the Danes as bases for military operations 
 against Sweden. 
 
 2Droysen's statement (Geschichtc d. Preussische Politik, iii., 2, 250, 2d ed.), that Silesia was 
 offered to Cromwell by Charles Gustavus, probably rests upon a misunderstanding of this 
 phrase. Erdmannsdorffer, Deutsche Geschichte, i., 285, Anm. 1. 
 
CRO^n\'ELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 57 
 
 him, together with a part of Ponmierelleii. C'hark^s Gustaviis would 
 also assist in the takiiiii; of Pntzke. 
 
 All these advaiitaiies were offered the Proteetor in order to e:rant 
 him a foothold in Germany and to persnade him to engage in the com- 
 mon struggle. Yet Charles Gustavus wonld prefer if instead ol' this 
 he wonkl take part in the conqnest and partition of Denmark. In this 
 ease his share ^^-ould be North Jntland, with the port Listerdiep and 
 the neighboring islands, which would be more advantageous in sup- 
 porting the English fleet than the proposed parts of Germany. From 
 this, however, the king excepted the districts Koldingen and Horsens, 
 or in lieu of the latter, Ripen, which, with the remainder of Jutland, 
 and Schleswig, Holstein, and Fiinen, would be given to his father-in- 
 law, the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, under Swedish and English guar- 
 antee. The three districts, Pinneburg, Wilster, and Kremper were, 
 however, to be detached from Holstein and reunited with Bremen. 
 As for the rest of the Danish dominions, they were to be at the abso- 
 lute disposal of Charles Gustavus, to be granted to whatever person 
 he chose, or to be divided into small portions '' as might best serve the 
 common interest." 
 
 The list of alternatives was, however, not yet exhausted. If Crom- 
 well demanded Ditmarch, with Kremper, Wilster, and the islands 
 about Listerdiep instead of Oldenberg and Delmenhorst, this, too, 
 could be allowed him, together with Gliickstadt; but in this case he 
 must resign his plans on the Weser. Yet, finally, if it appeared that 
 the only means to engage his assistance was to give him a foothold on 
 both the Elbe and AVeser, Friesendoi'ff was authorized to gmnt this 
 also; but the king depended upon his dexterity to avoid such extreme 
 concessions unless they proved unavoidable. 
 
 It was realized that such proposals were of a nature to awaken 
 grave suspicions on Cromwell's part, and Friesendortf was therefore 
 instructed to emphasize the fact that Charles Gustavus did not intend 
 to assume the crown of Denmark himself, but only to transfer it to 
 some friend, as the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. In addition, the Eng- 
 lish would secure free passage through the Sound and certain privileges 
 over all other foreigners in the lands and ports belonging to Sweden. 
 Finally, Charles Gustavus was prepared to surrender his claims to 
 Prussia in favor of some Protestant prince, as the elector of Bran- 
 
58 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 denburg, although in this case it was only just that a compensation be 
 given Charles Gustavus for his sacrifices in the Polish war. The 
 equivalent proposed was the recognition on the part of Poland of 
 Swedish sovereignty over Liefland and Courland and the payment of 
 a large sum of money, and the cession on Brandenburg's part of 
 Hinterpommerania, with something more.^ 
 
 If, however, the Protector could not be moved by any means to take 
 part in the conquest and partition of Denmark, Friesendorff must fall 
 back on the old proposition of an alliance against Austria. If this 
 were refused, the king would be forced to come to terms with them 
 and the Dutch, to the detriment of Protestant interests in all parts of 
 the world. At the very least, the Protector must take it upon him to 
 hold the Dutch in check, and to this purpose send a fleet into the 
 Baltic in case they made any signs of espousing the cause of Denmark. 
 But yet, if the relations of England and Holland were such that there 
 was no prospect of this, Holland could, "for the sake of the common 
 interest of the Protestant religion," be tolerated in the general alliance 
 which paragraph 11 of Friesendorif ^s instructions authorized him to 
 propose. 
 
 Friesendorff' s first efforts were to be directed against Denmark, and 
 in order to further this, secondly, against Austria. Paragraph 11 of 
 the instructions contains the details of a proposed alliance between 
 Sweden, England, France, and Portugal, also Holland it might be, 
 against the house of Hapsburg and its allies. To prevent confusion 
 and disputes, a council of the members of the alliance would be formed 
 to decide upon matters which should arise. Each member must 
 furnish his appropriate quota of ships, which, however, were to be 
 placed under a single command, Cromwell being encouraged to believe 
 that he would be chosen. If France and Portugal desired it, the op- 
 erations on land could be continued as thev then were, Eno;land to take 
 position in Germany as proposed, and Sweden to act as a reserve, to 
 be supported with subsidies in case its forces were brought into action. 
 Finally, the proposed league must devise and execute means for de- 
 priving the house of Hapsburg of the imperial crown. 
 
 Friesendorff was ordered to sound the Protector privately before 
 
 1 He had already broached this to the Elector of Brandenburg. Carlson, iv., 242 and 244, 
 Anm. 2. 
 
CRO^nVELL AND CIIAIILES GUSTAVUSj. 59 
 
 makino; his mission publicly known, and if ho found the Protector un- 
 favorahly inclined, to pretend that lie was on his way to Portuoal, and 
 had only been accidentally delayed in Knoland. Tliis he should do 
 until the development of aifairs made further "dissimulation'' unnec- 
 essary. The instructions were dated at W'edell on the Elbe, Aui2;ust 
 3, 1657. 
 
 I regret that I have not been able to discover exactly how Cromwell 
 received these proposals. There were some parts of them well calcu- 
 lated to enlist his support. If only the matter with Denmark could 
 be patched up and the Dutch pacified, the great Protestant alliance 
 would seem to be on the point of being realized. It might be possible 
 to reconcile Charles Gustavus^ proposals w^ith those for an alliance 
 between England, Holland, and France, which the Dutch were then 
 pressing. There is no evidence, however, that I can find, that he ever 
 seriously entertained Charles Gustavus' proposals for dividing Ger- 
 many and Denmark. That these proposals did not coincide in the 
 least with his northern policy in general is, I think, sufficiently clear. 
 ^^^hat would have become of the Protestant alliance? AVhat ^vould 
 the Dutch have had to say, and what assistance might they not have 
 given Charles II. ? Besides, subsequent events showed that Cromwell 
 had no desire to reduce Denmark to a " position in which it need no 
 longer be feared." The proposals, in short, quite apart from all moral 
 considerations, would have involved a radical change in England's 
 foreign relations such as a clear-sighted statesman like Cromwell 
 would not lightly undertake. There is a tendency among historians 
 who have touched upon this episode to link Cromwell's name with 
 that of Charles Gustavus in the tacit rej^roach with w^hich it must be 
 regarded; but until it has been shown that Cromwell actually enter- 
 tained the plan for a time, this would seem to be an injustice to him. 
 Course of the Negotiations} — The course of the ensuing negotiations 
 
 1 Piifendorff, iv., ?? 84 and 85. The documents for the succeeding pages are so scanty that it 
 ig difficult even to keep up the appearance of a connected narrative. We have mere frag- 
 ments, which "we can sometimes piece together, sometimes not. From English sources alone 
 one would hardly know of the existence of Friescndortf; for in the few cases in which his 
 name is mentioned, it is usually misspelled. There is nothing corresponding to Bonde's diary 
 to give one a thread, however slight, to string fragments together upon. Whitelocke gives us 
 no information. The dispatches of the foreign ambassadors, even of Nieupoort, are of little 
 aid. Even Piifendorff, who is often our only guide, seems to me less lucid. He evidently bases 
 his narrative on the letters of the Swedi.sh ambassadors, Avho appear to have worked largely 
 in the dark. An examination of the Swedish archives would no doubt bring new material to 
 light, but as is the case with so many of Cromwell's foreign enterprises, it is probable that 
 much will never be known. 
 
60 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 was not such as the Swedish ambassadors desired. Cromwell showed 
 Fleetwood and FriesendorfF every attention and, as usual, asked for a 
 few days for deliberation. Then followed those delays and excuses 
 which characterized all Cromwell's negotiations, and which ambassa- 
 dors at his court continually complained of. The Swedish ambassa- 
 dors found it impossible to discover the Protector's real motives. 
 Though English sympathy had been at first decidedly against Den- 
 mark as the aggressive party, they found this to a certain extent 
 changed. Charles Gustavus' military successes had in fact prejudiced 
 his diplomatic prospects. Following their instructions, the ambas- 
 sadors proposed an oifensive and defensive league against Austria, 
 Spain, Poland, and Denmark and whoever might join them, in which 
 Cromwell was asked to send a fleet into the Baltic, to continue his 
 efforts in Flanders, to contribute subsidies, and in the meantime, 
 before all the details could be agreed upon, to send immediate relief to 
 Gothenburg, which was blockaded by a small Danish fleet. Cromwell 
 complained that this was asking too much of him, but, as usual, prom- 
 ised to consider the matter. He appears to have had definite reasons 
 for hesitating,^ but what they were, unless it was waiting for the result 
 of Meadowe's and Jephson's mission, or inability to find a clear thread 
 in the tangled skein, is not clear. In order to whet his lagging en- 
 thusiasm, Charles Gustavus sent another proposal. In return for 
 £200,000,^ he was ready to surrender Buxtenhude and the fort on the 
 Leber as security. What reception this proposal met with I cannot 
 discover. 
 
 For a long time the relations between England and the Netherlands 
 had been growing less satisfactory. The ^^ marine treaty," the object 
 of unremitted efforts on the part of the Dutch since the close of the 
 war in 1654, had not yet been brought to a conclusion, much to Xieu- 
 poort's chagrin. On the other hand, not only did England suspect the 
 Netherlands of having instigated Denmark's hostility, but had grounds 
 for l)elieving that the Dutch equipments then in progress were in- 
 tended to act in conjunction with Spanish forces against Portugal. 
 The Protector did not conceal these suspicions. 
 
 De Witt adopted a policy similar to the one which had succeeded so 
 
 1 Jephson to Thurloe. Thurloe Papers, vi. , 604 and 629. 
 
 2 Carlson says £400,000, iv., 2i2. 
 
CROMWELL AND C'HAKLES (U'STAVUS. 61 
 
 well a low months before. He .siiixgosted a defensive treaty, this time 
 nut between England, the United Provinces and Denmark, l)ut between 
 England, the United Provinces and Erance.' The idea was welcomed 
 bv the Protector, thougli not (|nite so warndy as the former one had , 
 bei^i. It had some promise of the great alliance in it, wiiicli the Pro- 
 tector had l)y no means yet abandoned. Still, the relations between 
 the two powers were somewhat straineil, and Xieiipoort did not foi- the 
 time being share the Protector's full confidence. 
 
 Alx)ut the beginning of October, it seemed as if Cromwell, moved 
 by the critical condition of Swedish affairs, had decided that some 
 show of armed interference was necessarv. Under date of Octol>er 
 9," Fleetwood and Friesendorff inform the king " in hochster eyl,'^ 
 that through the grace of God and their unflagging industry they had 
 at last brouo-ht the Protector to a certain resolution. He had decided 
 to come to the king's assistance and to form a close alliance with him 
 against Austria and its allies (for reasons of state, and to appease the 
 prejudices of the English people, he must call the child by that name), 
 and commissioners would be appointed to confer with the Swedish 
 ambassadors concerning the matter. He desired only a week's delay 
 to equip a fleet and to put hLs affairs in order ; an envoy would 1)6 
 sent to Holland to warn the Dutch against the course they were pur- 
 suing. He had not taken this course before from lack of money; but 
 he thought he now had good prospects of removing this difficulty. 
 
 Already, on October 3, Cromwell had issued a warrant for the 
 equipment of a fleet. It w^as to consist of twenty ships, to be ready 
 in fourteen davs at farthest, and to be furnished with at least three 
 months' provisions.^ ''The design for the shijis," wrote Thurloe,^ "is 
 to give countenance to Sweden, whose affairs are in a dangerous condi- 
 tion, being left alone in the midst of very many powerful enemies, [the] 
 Pole, the king of Hungary and [the] ^luscovite and the Dane, and 
 fears also the Hollander, who gives money and if need be will send 
 
 1 Nieupoort's and De Witt's letters of May 4 and following, though without the authority of 
 the States General. It was as first a suggestion merely, not a formal proposal. 
 
 2 The letter is printed in Handlingar roraiule Skandinavions Historia, v., 205-213. 
 
 3 Carte MSS., Ixxiii, fol. 132. The names of the vessels, their rates and the number of seamen 
 are given, aggregating 816 guns and 4,020 men. 
 
 < Carte MSS.. Ixxiii., fol 138. Thurloe to Montague, October 9, 16.57. Holograph, chiefly in 
 cipher, imperfectly deciphered, and hard to read. It is printed, with some changes, in Thurloe 
 Papers, vi., 582, under the heading, " Draught of a letter concerning Swedish affairs, to Gen- 
 eral Montague." 
 
62 . DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 the Dane the ships [eighteen in number] which were appointed to lie 
 upon the Dogger Bank. The ministers of Sweden are of opinion that 
 if ships [were] sent that way to wait upon the motions of [the] Hol- 
 landers, though no act of enmity past, it would keep the Hollander 
 from him. And for this piu'pose and no other are these ships pre- 
 pared. * * * This is under absolute secrecy and is not to be 
 communicated to any." 
 
 The tone of this letter contrasts strangely with the boyish precipi- 
 tation of Fleetwood and Friesendoi-if 's letter to Charles Gustavus, 
 while their contents would hardly allow us to believe that they referred 
 to the same matter. But the cautious and diplomatic Thurloe is a safe 
 guide in matters of this sort (Cromwell in his enthusiasm often said 
 too much) and it is probable that there was not very much behind this 
 incident which raised Swedish hopes so high. At any mte, when the 
 Dutch did not send their fleet into the Sound, the English refrained 
 from further demonstration. It must not be forgotten that Cromwell 
 was actuated at this time by other considerations than relations in the 
 IS^orth. His struggle against Spain and the house of Hapsburg was 
 still the chief point of his foreign relations,^ and his whole aim in the 
 North was to bring affairs in this part in accord with this great issue. 
 It is significant, therefore, that the only remonstrance which was made 
 to Nieupoort in connection with this incident was against Holland's 
 negotiation with Spain and its hostility towards Portugal.^ The affairs 
 of Sweden were not mentioned. When the Dutch did not send their 
 fleet to the Baltic, as was expected, but called it quietly home, the 
 Protector on his part was willing to let the matter drop. To have 
 acted otherwise would have transferred the center of his foreign policy 
 from Spain to the North. 
 
 But the Protector had expressed himself so unreservedly to Fleet- 
 wood and Friesendorff that he felt it necessary to propose terms for a 
 treaty, although he did so only after what seemed to the Swedes an inex- 
 cusably long delay, and in terms very different from those they thought 
 themselves justified in expecting. He proposed an offensive and de- 
 fensive alliance against ''the kings of Spain, Hungary, and Poland 
 
 1 " The Protector in all these cases governs himself by the Protestant cause," wrote Thurloe 
 on October 2, " and he thinks a peace between the two northern crowns is best for that, if it may 
 be had." Thurloe Papers, vi., 547. 
 
 * Nieupoort to De Witt, November 12. 
 
CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 63 
 
 and the house of Austria," which France, the Netherhuids, and 
 others were to be invited to j<»in. Tlic king of Sweden must make 
 an attack on Austria, strengthened by troops furnislic<l l)v the allies, 
 but maintained at his e)wn expense. The Protector woukl wage war 
 at sea against Spain, to whicli purpose the king must agree to furnisii 
 naval material in such quantities and at such rates as might ])e agreed 
 upon in the articles of the treaty. Cromwell bound himself to send 
 a tieet into the Baltic if it were necessary. The allies would be asked 
 to contribute monev.^ 
 
 But this proposal, it will be noticed, looked entirely away from the 
 complications in the North and contained no reference to them. It 
 was merely a plan of action for the following sunnner, and cooll\' 
 avoided the pressing issue then at hand. The Swedes complained 
 bitterly. Even the English felt guilty. Thurloe wrote apologetically 
 to Jephson on December 18, "If the king be disposed to the same 
 thing, you may take occasion to tell him that this is but an essay and 
 is intended only as a foundation to begin upon, and if he please to 
 declare himself for the general good you are authorized and charged 
 to perfect it with him.^'^ So loud were Friesendorif ^s protestations 
 that the Protector promised in an evil hour to furnish the king with 
 £30,000, with a prospect of more if he could raise it.^ 
 
 The Swedes submitted with an ill grace. Yet what must have been 
 their indignation when even this promise was not kept. " I have had 
 many discourses with Mons. Frohendorf [Friesendorff], one of his 
 ministers here," wrote Thurloe to Jephson, " whom I find a very ready 
 man, but am somewhat doubtful how he represents things to his mas- 
 ter. I fear the worst. I informed vou bv mv former letter that H. 
 H. had promised £30,000 by monthly [)ayments; one month is past 
 
 1 Pufendorff, iv., g 84. These proposals, so far as they are given by Pufendorff, are the same 
 as those contained in the paper " Heads of a treaty, to be made witli the king of Swetlen, for 
 a nearer union, etc.," printed in Thurloe Papers, vii., 23, under the date of March 25, 1658, and 
 they would appear to be practically if not absolutely identical. This would suggest the possi- 
 bility of error in the date of the printed paper, else the English wore making the same pro- 
 posals after the treaty of Roeskilde as before, which, however, is by no means impossilile. But 
 I cannot verify this point, as it is not known where the original paper is preserved. Mr. Gar- 
 diner tells me he thinks it is in private possession. I am not in a i)osition to say whether the 
 paT)er printed in Lunig's Staats-Concilia, ii., G13, "Bedenken Konig Carl Gustavs in Schwe<len 
 iiber das Formular des ihme vou England offerirten Bundnisses, de Anno KwS," complaining 
 of the unreasonable trading privileges demanded by the English, refers to these proposals or 
 to some others of which I have found no further account. 
 
 2 English Historical Review, vii., 727. 
 
 3 Pufendorff, iv., g 81, with the marginal date November 9. 
 
64 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 and none paid, which he speaks so freely of, and of the great disap- 
 pointment his master's affairs are put under thereby, that truly his 
 expressions are hardly borne." ^ He explains that the reason for the 
 non-payment was that a part of the fleet had come in unexpectedly 
 and large sums Avere necessary to pay the men, who Avould otherwise 
 mutiny.^ The Protector was in fact struggling to keep his head above 
 water by means of small loans, and the payment of the promised sub- 
 sidy was utterly impossible. 
 
 It was not likely that the Protector's efforts to come to an agree- 
 ment on the basis of an unkept promise, and without first settling the 
 Danish matter, Avould be of much avail. His efforts to negotiate 
 through Jephson instead of with Fleetwood and FriesendorfF had from 
 the first met with little success. The king was waiting for the result 
 of his proposals in London, Jephson thought. Now the matter of the 
 promised subsidy presented a new hinderance. Both Jephson, and 
 afterwards Meadowe, constantly urged its payment. " I do confess,'' 
 wrote Jephson February 12, 1658, "I could wish the money had 
 either never been promised, or paid at the time appointed. =k * * 
 I have mucli reason to believe that this is the only cause why they 
 proceed not with me in the treaty." 
 
 Gothenburg and Fredericia ; the Partition of Denmarh Again. — In 
 
 1 English Historical Review, vii., 727. Friesendorff was the only one of the Swedish ambas- 
 sadors who aroused the least ill-will in London. All the others appear to have been excep- 
 tionally popular, even though their northern vigor did occasionally get the better of their cour- 
 tesy. This letter to Jephson contains the following ugly passage, which shows how much 
 personal bitterness had entered into the negotiations : "This long story I have told you to pre- 
 vent any misrepresentation formed by IMonsr. Frohendorf, Avho I fear is yet enough for 
 
 these things, and I hear labours to disgrace my Ld. G. Fleetwood with the king, which I should 
 much desire might be prevented by you. If you can perceive anything of the kind the [re] . it 
 will be a great disservice to the king's affairs if anything of the kind should be, for Avhatever 
 
 Monsr. Frohendorf apprehends he is beholden to him for all the ? he hath, and you know 
 
 the interest the Lord Deputy hath in the state and if he should [? see his hoorn put out by 
 other] I believe Monsr. Frohendorp would soon find himself disabled ever to do the least thing 
 here in any of his affairs. The truth is, had it not been [for] my Lord G., Avho solicited coun- 
 cil here, there never had been a man obtained hence out of the old (?)." It would thus 
 
 seem to be an error for Pufeudorff to accredit these negotiations entirely to Friesendorff. It 
 will be noticed that in documents and letters signed by Fleetwood and Friesendorff, the name 
 of the former comes first, indicating, I take it, precedence in rank as ambassador. Fleetwood 
 appears not only to have played the chief part in these negotiations, but also a very important 
 part in the preceding ones. His family connections gave him great advantages over the other 
 ambassadors, who besides must have found the language a serious drawback in a court which 
 did not speak Latin. Jephson mentioned this accusation against Friesendorff" to Charles Gus- 
 tavus only to be assured that it had no foundation in fact. Thurloe Papers, vi., 7is. 
 
 ^This was not a feigned excuse. Sir Christopher Pack loaned the government £4,000 to pay 
 the wages of the fleet. Die. Nat. Biog. Also some others advanced money. Cal. S. P. Dom. , 
 May 11, 1658. 
 
CROMWELL AND ( HAHLKS (iUSTAVrs. 05 
 
 our sketch of the negotiations in London, wc have Ixcn cairicd ])ast a 
 striking; diplomatic incident of which, unfortunately, we liave hut the 
 merest hint. Jephson had througliout shown nnich partialitv towards 
 Charles Gustavus. He was convinced tliat he sincerely desired peace, 
 but doul)ted whether Denmark did. He tliouirht notliiuL'" woidd <o 
 soon incline Denmark to it as " a strict and speedy conjunction l)etween 
 England and Sweden," and urged that a few frigates woidd be a cogent 
 arirnment airainst Danish obstinacy.' These views were, of course, 
 very favorable to Charles Gustavus, and we need not be surprised to 
 find that Jephscai received in return an accurate knowledge, at least 
 in outline, of the king's plans with regard to Denmark. 
 
 On Xovember 2 Jephson sent the Council "the relation of an ac- 
 tion perhaps as extraordinary as may fall out in an age";*" but the 
 letter is unfortunately lost. In his next dispatch he refers to it as 
 containing his "sense of the whole state of affairs in these parts, ujxjn 
 the taking of Frederieksode [Fredericia]," and continues: "I know 
 nothing in my poor opinion were more worthy his Highness, than (at 
 this time when he hath ministers with all the most considerable Protest- 
 ant princes and states) to propose a general meeting for the advancement 
 of the common interest of religion, and the civil interest, and rec(jncil- 
 ing of differences; for (until both religion and the civil interest of every 
 state be something secured) I fear particular treaties will not do the 
 work."^ At last in an important letter of the 24th of Xovember, he 
 gives some clue to the contents of his letter of Xovember 2. After 
 urging again "a general treaty betwixt all tlie Protestants," lie ])ro- 
 ceeds, "Sir, my meaning by joining with Sweden was, that if by the 
 king of Denmark's obstinacy the pow^r of the Baltic Sea shall b(^ 
 devolved to other hands, you would so oblige the king of Sweden by 
 assisting him, that he might put a part of it in your hand. Tlie places 
 I mentioned in my letter of the 2d instant, and my oi)inion of them, 
 according to my best intelligence, which 1 sui)pose you had not then 
 received, they were Gott(Mil)urg and Frederieksode. I assure myself 
 you were not l)efbre ignorant of tlie conveniences and inconveniences 
 behmging to them, which I will not i)resume to judge of."* "1 sliall 
 
 1 See Jephson's dispatches in Thurloe Papers. 
 ^Thurloe Papers, vi., 597. 
 
 3 Ibid., 004. He was again urging Charles Gustavus' policy, it will be noticed. 
 *Ibid., 629. 
 5 
 
66 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 not sail punctually," he says in this same letter, " to observe his High- 
 ness' command to the king of Sweden concerning the business of 
 Fredericksodde." 
 
 The thread of evidence offered by this passage is slight, yet taken 
 in connection with accompanying circumstances, it seems clear, that in 
 answer to the Protector's constant demand for " security " and a mili- 
 tary base before undertaking a distant campaign, Charles Gustavus 
 had suggested that Fredericia and Gothenburg might serve this pur- 
 pose. The mention of Fredericia had, of course, reference to its re- 
 cent capture and may possibly have been intended to whet Cromwell's 
 appetite for the whole of Jutland. I find it difficult to believe, how- 
 ever, that the king was willing to surrender so important a port as 
 Gothenburg, the only Swedish port without the Sound, in anything 
 like permanent possession, especially after the efforts which had just 
 been made to increase its importance.^ It would seem more probable 
 that it was proposed as temporary headquarters for the English fleet, 
 for which it was admirably suited, and had little value to the Swedes 
 at the time from the ease with which it could be blockaded by the 
 Danes. 
 
 That proposals of this kind were made is not of itself improbable. 
 Pufendorff gives an account^ of still more remarkable proposals, 
 which resemble those of Friesendoi'ff 's instructions. If Cromwell 
 would undei-take to support Sweden without reserve and strike Den- 
 mark to the ground, Charles Gustavus would agree to its partition in 
 the following terms : Norway, Schonen, Seeland, and Funen should 
 be incorporated with Sweden, while Cromwell should have the whole 
 of Jutland and Bremen ; the passage of the Sound would be free to 
 all nations, and the prospect was offi?red of an attack on Austria. Or, 
 if Cromwell preferred, Sweden would take only Norway and Schonen, 
 and allow Cromwell Bremen, while the crown of Denmark would be 
 given to another. The plan of giving Jutland to the Duke of Hol- 
 stein-Gottorp, Cromwell taking Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, was also 
 mentioned. But Cromwell's answer must be given soon and his ac- 
 ceptance unreserved, else so important a position as Bremen could not 
 be surrendered. I have not found the slightest reference to these pro- 
 
 1 Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, p. 132. 
 
 2 Lib. iv., I '^■(S, undated, but they must have come at about this time. 
 
CROMWELL AND CHARLI-:S GUSTAVUS. G7 
 
 posals among English records, unci so cannot tell wiiat impression 
 they made. They had, however, the ver}- serions drawback of jTJving 
 Sweden absolnte control of the su})j)lies for ship-l)uildinir, which was 
 considered a power too great to be intrusted to one hand. 'riii> was 
 considered a matter of vital importance at the time and is often men- 
 tioned in the diplomatic correspondence relating to the North. 
 
 It would be to no purpose to trace further the details of the ensuing 
 negotiations. They present nothing new. One meets the same diffi- 
 culties, the same arguments, and delays for much the same reasons.' 
 The only episode worth mentioning is Cromwell's speech to both 
 Houses of Parliament on January 25," which throws a flood of light 
 on the Protectoi-'s feelings at this time. " I do believe, he that looks 
 well about him, and considereth the estate of the Protestant affairs all 
 Christendom over : he must needs sav and acknowledw that the "rand 
 design now on foot, in comparison with which all other designs are 
 but low things, is, Whether the Christian world shall be all popery? 
 * * * I have, thank God, considered, and I would beg of you to 
 consider a little with me: What that resistance is that is likely to be 
 made to this mighty current, which seems to be coming from all parts 
 on all Protestants? AMio is there that holdeth up his head to oppose 
 this danger? A poor prince; — indeed poor ; but a man in his person 
 as gallant, and truly I think I may say as good, as these last ages have 
 brought forth ; a man that hath advanced his all against the i)0})ish in- 
 terest in Poland and made his aquisition still good ^ there ' for the 
 Protestant religion. He is now reduced into a corner; and that wliich 
 addeth to the grief of all, — more than all that hath been spoken of 
 before (I wish it may not be truly said !) — is. That men of our relig- 
 ion forget this, and seek his ruin. * * * It is a design against 
 our verv being ; this artifice, and this complex design, against the 
 Protestant interest, — wherein so manv Protestants are not so riirlit as 
 were to be wished! If they can shut us out of the Ixiltic S-a, and 
 make themselves master of that, where is your trade? W'liere are 
 vour materials to preserve your shij)ping? When* will you l)e al)le 
 to challenge anv ri^^ht bv sea, or justifv yourself against a foreiiiii iu- 
 vasion in your own soil? Think upon it; this is in desi gn!" 
 
 1 Pufendorff's account is very full here. Lib., iv., g 86. Lib., v.. §§ 73, 74. and 75. I have 
 nothing of importance to add to it. 
 
 2 Reported in Burton's Diary, ii., 35L Also Carlyle, Speech XVII. 
 
68 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 Surely it was no fault of intention that the Protector did not take 
 a more active part in this business ! But with the imminent dangers 
 on every hand, a bankrupt treasury, the army and civil service unpaid, 
 Ireland unsettled, Scotland in great suiFering, England impatient, and 
 the two Houses disputing about titles and refusing to come to busi- 
 ness,^ Avhat could the Protector do? His efforts to mediate had come 
 to a standstill, yet he could not bring himself to adopt a different 
 course. A\ hile he was hesitating and waiting for a favorable turn in 
 the course of events, an unpropitious Providence paved the way for 
 Swedish successes ^vhich rendered hopeless his plan of reconciling the 
 two nations, even for the preservation of their faith. 
 
 Treaty of Roeskilde. — It is of course impossible to give here any 
 account of the negotiations which preceded and followed the treaty of 
 Roeskilde, or of the exceedingly complicated events attending Crom- 
 well's attempt to mediate a new peace after the outbreak of the second 
 war in August ; but it is of great interest to observe how Cromwell's 
 attitude towards both nations was changed by these startling events, 
 and liow his general policy was affected by the altered state of politics 
 in the North. 
 
 There are no special instructions to Meadowe concerning the treaty 
 of Eoeskilde, but,, fortunately, both Thurloe and Meadowe have told 
 us of the objects sought by the Protector with a candor and directness 
 which leaves nothing to be desired. ^' The Protector," says Thurloe," 
 '^though he wished in general the prosperity of the Swede, his ally, 
 hoping that at last his arms might be directed the right Avay, yet did not 
 like that tlie Swede should conquer the Dane, and possess all those coun- 
 tries, and being thereby become powerful, engross the whole trade of the 
 Baltic Sea, wherein England is so much concerned, and therefore he in- 
 terposed in most serious terms with both the kings to make peace, Avhicli 
 was accepted by both." ^'The English mediator," writes Meadowe, 
 ^' liad two parts to act in this scene; one was to moderate the demands 
 as far as he could in favor of the sufferer, w^ithout disobliging the 
 Swede by a too notorious partiality. The other \vas to watch lest 
 anything be stipulated betwixt the tAVO kings pr*:judi('ial to the inter- 
 ests of England. It was moved that the whole kingdom of Norway 
 
 1 Inderwick, Studies in the Great Rebellion, 27. 
 
 2 Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. 
 
CR<>>rWKLL AND CIIARI.KS CT'STA VT'S:. (J9 
 
 should 1)0 rent off from Denmark and united to Sweden, with wliieli 
 it lav eoutiiiuous: This entrenelied ui)()n I'jiuland as irivinir the 
 Swede the sole and entire possession of the cliiet" materials, as masts, 
 deals, piteh, tar, eopper, iron, ete., needfid for the a[)parel and ((Hiip- 
 age of our ships, too great a treasure to be entrusted in one liand. 
 The mediator, in avoidanee of this was the first who insinuated the 
 })roposal of rending- Seonen and l^leeking to the Swede, which would 
 cut off that unnecessary charge hoth crowns sustained in giirrisoning 
 a frontier each against other, by enlarging the Swedisli dominions to 
 the bank of the Sound, the ancient and natural boundary of Sweden. 
 This though uneasv to the Dane because of the vicinity of those 
 provinces to Co^xnihageu the metropolis, yet was safe for P^ngland, 
 because by this means the Swede is become master of one bank of 
 the Sound as the Dane is of the other, though the accustomed duty of 
 passage (the best flower in the Danish garland) was reserved by the 
 treaty wholly to the Dane. Thus the power over that narrow- entry 
 into the Baltic being balanced lietwixt two emulous crowns, will be 
 an effectual preventive of any new exactions or usurpation in the 
 Sound." ^ 
 
 Thus the efforts of the English mediator were directed chiefly, almost 
 exclusively, to the preservation of English commercial interests. This 
 need occasion no surprise, since the Protector had no other rule to guide 
 him in case of a conflict between these two Protestant powers, \\1iile, 
 of course, the interests of religion requireil that Protestant nations 
 should not turn their arms ao^ainst each other, vet it was the interests 
 of trade, not of religion, vAnch. was the Protector's incentive for pre- 
 serving the stabi.s quo in the Baltic, — alwavs, as we have seen, a vital 
 point of his policy. If he could not share in the paititiou of Den- 
 mark for fear of giving too much }>ower t(> Sweden in the lialtic, nuich 
 less could he allow Denmark to be entirely swallowed ui) l)y Sweden 
 without a share in the booty. Yet lie liad no objection to Denmark's 
 beinu; partially absorbed by Swe<len in so far as English interests 
 would be benefited by it. The P^nglisli were, indivd, far from di<in- 
 
 1 Narrative, p. 58. See, also. View of the Suedish and Other Aflairs, p. 169, «<•'/. " For 'tis evident 
 that the dividing the banks of the Sound betwixt the two emulous crowns, as it was done by 
 the Roschild treaty, is greater to the security and benefit of England, etc." " I am making all 
 the haste I can to the king of Swede, as conceiviui; his lliLrhiioss nut a little comerned in 
 these affairs, especially in the interest of the Sound, and the trullie of the Baltic Sea." .Jephson 
 to Henry Cromwell, February 22, 16oS. Landsdowne MSS. 822. fol. l\\\. 
 
70 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 terested mediators. "The Swedish propositions, I confess, are very 
 high,'' wrote Meadowe,^ "but their advantages are likewise very great." 
 
 Yet, in view of the circumstances, the conditions of the treaty, while 
 severe, were favorable to Denmark, which was due in no small meas- 
 ure to the offices of the mediators, particularly, it would appear, of 
 Meadowe. Frederick III. sent a letter to Cromwell thanking him for 
 his good offices and commending Meadowe, who also received the ex- 
 traordinary honor of the Order of the Elephant, the highest order in 
 Denmark, together with the offer of a pension, which he tells us he 
 refused. There were many scandalous reports concerning Meadowe 
 circulated at that time by the Swedes and others, which may or may 
 not have been true,^ but they have, at least, the significance of showing 
 how bitter was the resentment felt against him. 
 
 After the Treaty of Roeskilde. — The relations between England and 
 Sweden were not altered by the treaty of Eoeskilde so much as one 
 might have expected. The Swedes seemed not to cherish their resent- 
 ment and the negotiations in London proceeded much as before.^ I 
 shall not trouble the reader with an account of them, for I have noth* 
 inff to add to what Pufendorff tells us.^ Thev illustrate how Crom- 
 well's foreign efforts were hampered by internal difficulties, but have 
 little further significance. The Swedes urged to the last the payment 
 of the £30,000 which Cromwell had promised in the preceding No- 
 vember, but Parliament had been dissolved without obtaining a grant, 
 and though Cromwell repeated his promise, he Avas never in a position 
 to fulfil it. In short, Cromwell was laboring under such insuperable 
 difficulties that no definite action could be reasonably expected of him. 
 The various proposals which were made, none of which had anything 
 novel about them, are therefore of little interest. 
 
 One notices distinctly, however, this difference in Cromwell's treat- 
 ment of Sweden, that he is more ready to give way to the demands of 
 
 1 Meadowe to Thiirloe. Thurloc Papers, vi., 802. 
 
 2 It is difficult to get at the truth of these stories, which are to be fouud at sufficient length in 
 Pufendorff. We should not, I think, lend them too ready credence, since they rest on the 
 authority of Meadowe's political enemies. Pufendorff tells us, for example, that certain Dan- 
 ish noblemen objected to one of Meadowe's station being made a member of the Order of the 
 Elephant, and that Meadowe resigned the Order for a sum of money. But on May 31 (Meadowe 
 to Thurloe, Eng. Hist. Rev., vii., 732) he was still in possession of the Order. However, he seems 
 at best to have escaped Avith some loss of dignity, and felt called upon to explain in various 
 letters to Thurloe. 
 
 3 See note, page 63. 
 4Puf.,v.,gg 76-83. 
 
CKOMWELL AND CHARLES (JUSTAVUS. 71 
 
 Charles Gustavus tlian before. He has lost his conti-nl «»t' iitVairs in 
 the North, which is nowhere shown more eleaily tlian in this, that 
 he is now prepared to yield to Sweden the j)ossession of Prussia. 
 Meadowe's instructions of April 9, 1658/ in view of the expected ne- 
 gotiations between Charles Gustavus and the other powers at Braunsberg 
 for the purpose of the further pacification of the North, reads : '' * * 
 as to his retaining of Prussia, you are very well to understand tlie 
 mind of the kins: of Sweden therein, and in ciise vou find hi in fixed 
 thereupon, you shall then endeavour in the treaty, yet with that circum- 
 spection and prudence that becomes a mediator, that Prussia ma\' l)e 
 quitted to him by the king of Poland and to that purpose endeavour 
 by all befitting wariness to incline the ministers of the States General 
 thereunto, who are most likely to oppose it upon the interest of trade, 
 to satisfv whom you may procure such assurance from the king of 
 Sweden in that of trade in reference to his and that state as may re- 
 move that difficulty. * * * And as the matter of commerce, 
 you are not to be wanting there to inform yourself therein and to pro- 
 vide for the same, and the interest of this state therein, so far as you 
 shall have opportunity. " 
 
 One might infer from this and other references that interests of 
 trade were dominant in the Protector's mind, and that the matter of 
 the great Protestant alliance had been driven entirely into the back- 
 ground. This is certainly true to a certain extent and lay in the gen- 
 eral state of northern politics. "That war, wliilst it laste<l, discom- 
 posed aifaii-s so much, as they could never be composed again," siud 
 Thurloe.^ Yet a truer statement of the case would be this, tliat the 
 real motive of Cromwell's policy was still antagonism to the house of 
 Austria, but there had arisen a new and more important issue in the 
 trade of the Baltic. Instead of the l^iedmont massacres iukI mere 
 vague alarms, they had now a definite and tangible bone of conten- 
 tion. "It being the design of the Imperial House to get these coun- 
 tries and to ? you the ]>altic Sea under pretence of giving aid to 
 
 the king of Denmark."^ "The Protector very nuich apprehende<l 
 
 1 S. p., Sweden, ix. They are dated April 9, 1656, but thoxigh this is an original dating, the 
 context shows it to be an error. It should be 1658. Among other things the treaty of Roes- 
 kilde is referred to. They are printed in Thurloe Papers, vii.. (H, where the correct date is 
 given. 
 
 2 Burton's Diary, iii., 378. 
 
 ^Thurloe to Meadowe, November 27, 1657. Eng. Hist. Rev., vii., 1'1\. 
 
72 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 the issue of this conj unction; he thought it equally dangerous for 
 England that the Swede should be ruined and the Dane preserved by 
 such saviours, who after they had broken the king of Sweden would 
 also make a prey of the Dane himself, the emperor in his assistance he 
 gave against the Swede, revived the old design of the Austrian [eagle] 
 stretching her wings towards the eastern sea, and planting herself 
 upon the Baltic." ^ 
 
 When the war between Sweden and Denmark was begun again in 
 Au2'ust bv Charles Gustavus, as usual without consultiup; the Pro- 
 tector,^ the latter renewed his efforts to restore the peace. That his 
 policy had not undergone any material change by the treaty of Roes- 
 kilde is shown by the similarity between these two attempts at media- 
 tion. '^The Protector in this whole business laid this for a founda- 
 tion, that it was not for the interest of this nation that either the Swede 
 or Dane should be ruined in this war, and that it was ever safest for 
 England that the Sound and those countries should remain in the hands 
 of the Dane, and therefore as he had interposed in the first war to 
 preserve the Dane, so he resolved by the same measures to proceed and 
 so to manao;e these affairs that this mio;ht receive no alteration in those 
 parts." ^ This had been the starting point of the first mediation. 
 Again, as before, the . mediation was offered between Sweden and Den- 
 mark alone, and without including other powers, which would compli- 
 cate and delay matters. "That which the Protector pitched upon in 
 this great occasion was to endeavour a present peace between the 
 Dane and the Swede, upon the late treaty of Roskild, made by his 
 own mediation without taking in the differences between Poland and 
 Sweden, or the Swede and Brandenburg, or comprehending the pre- 
 tences of the Dutch and the Emperour, which having many intrica- 
 cies in them would require time. This the Protector did to obviate 
 the designs of the Dutch, as also to keep open the door for making use 
 of the arms of the Swede another wav. This was liked bv none of 
 the contending parties, the Swede though thus beset, yet having got 
 into his possession the Sound and all Denmark but the town of Co- 
 penhagen, and believing that France and England would not suffer 
 him to flinck was unwilling to be brought back again to the treaty of 
 
 iThurloe, Forei§:n Affairs in Cromwell's Time. Also Cromwell's speech quoted on page 67. 
 2 The Protector never learned the exact causes of this war. 
 ^Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in CromweL's Time. 
 
CRO>nVET.T. AXP rilART.ES (aSTAVLS. T-i 
 
 RoskiUl. Till' Daiio was more adverse tlian lie, not (l(Hil)tiii<z: l>iit l)v 
 the aid of his eontederates to recover all a^iaiii, and the cont'cdrrates 
 opposed it or any treaty w ithout coni})reiien(lin«:: all their interests, and 
 the Dutch most of all infested here, the meaning whereof was that 
 they had all agreed totally to ruin the Swede, and tlic Dutch douljtcd 
 not of his part in the advantage."^ 
 
 These last efforts to restore the ])eace in the North could not, from 
 the difficidties with which Cromwell was surrounded and his own fail- 
 ing health, be other than lame and without result. They are interest- 
 ing, not from their results, but as showing what Cromwell tried to do. 
 
 The New Protector; Cronenhurg. — It would hardly be justitial)le to 
 close this narrative without some notice of tlie affairs after Cromwell's 
 death, since Thurloe remained secretary of state, and in only one re- 
 gard did the administration of the foreign office suffer a material change. 
 Richard announced that his father's policy in the North woidd he 
 continued ;" yet in one point, unconsciously, perhaps, he departed from 
 it. The outbreak of the war between Sweden and Denmark had so 
 confusetl northern affairs that the Protector's plan for a great Protestant 
 alliance had been driven entirely into the background. It had become, 
 in fact, impracticable, and no longer coincided with the actual trend of 
 European politics. Yet he clung to it with the greatest persistence, 
 and as long as he lived the religious controversy was still a factor in 
 Eiu'opean politics which could not be ignored. After his death, how- 
 ever, it ceases to become so. The habit of referring to the ^'Protestant 
 interest " continued for a time in England, as might be expecteil, yet 
 not only do these phrases occur less frequently, but on<> feels instinct- 
 ivelv that thev were less sincere. The proof that thev were so lies in 
 the fact that the controlling motive in English foreign jxditics was no 
 longer hostility to the Catholic house (►f Ilapsburg, but the commercial 
 rivalrv of their Protestant kinsmen, the Dutch. It is hardly an 
 
 1 Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwoirs time. The rolaticms with the Netherliuuls are a kind 
 of barometer which indicate the ebbs and tluws of motives uf trade in Kiiglisli for«.'i.i,Mi iM)lities. 
 In the increased hostility here shown, we have an indication that commercial interesUs were 
 of increasing importance, and, as we know, became, ; fter the Protector's deatli, the sole sprini? 
 of English action in the North. We must bear in mind, in usiin,' Thurloe' .s account, that It 
 was written in 16GU, when the domiiumt feulure of Eni:l:sli foreign policy was the rivalry of the 
 Dutch. His whole account is colored by it. This was by no means so important a feature of 
 the Protector's policy as one would gather from his paper, and I liavi- not always felt justitied 
 in accepting his statements. But with thisqualiticatioii. it is of course a source of th.' liiudifst 
 value. 
 
 2 Pufendorff, v., § 115. 
 
74 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 exaggeration to say that the death of Cromwell marks an epoch in 
 European history, the close of the period of religious wars. 
 
 When Charles Gustavus landed in Seeland he sent a special envoy, 
 John Leyenbergen, to England with an explanation of the causes of the 
 war, and a request for at least twenty ships, in return for which he was 
 ready to grant, in addition to certain staple rights, that English ships 
 enjoy equal privileges in Sweden with Swedish unarmed ships, and 
 that certain quantities of shipping materials be fm-nished England at a 
 lower price. ^ But Cromwell died before receiving this message. I 
 have found two references to another concession not mentioned by Pufen- 
 dorff which Charles Gustavus is said to have proposed, presumably in 
 this connection. On February 23, 1659, Mr. Topham, a burgess for 
 York, informed Parliament that he had been told by a merchant who 
 had carried dispatches between the English government and Charles 
 Gustavus, that Charles Gustavus had made offer of Elsinore Castle as 
 security for the loan of twenty English frigates.^ The subject is men- 
 tioned again in a tract by Slingsby Bethel, entitled ^' The AVorld's ^lis- 
 take in Oliver Cromwell,'' which was printed anonymously in 1668.^ 
 Bethel tells us, referring to it as a sufficiently well known matter, that 
 Cromwell and Charles Gustavus had agreed to divide the control of 
 the Baltic between them, and that Cromwell's share was to be Elsinore 
 Castle and Cronenburg, '^the Gibraltar of the North," together with 
 the tolls of the Sound. Bethel shows himself throughout this tract so 
 Avell informed^ that I was at first inclined to accept his statement, but 
 after discovering the passage in Burton it seems to me not improbable 
 tliat this is the source of Bethel's information. If this is true, and 
 Bethel is merely repeating a general rumor which originated with 
 
 1 Pufendorff, v., 114. 
 
 2 "Two masters of Hull were at the Baltic, in October last, being laden with corn. One of 
 them carried a packet from the king of Sweden, and brought one back again. He affirmed 
 that the king offered, if his Highness of England would but lend him twenty frigates, he would 
 deposit in our hands Elsinore Castle for his security, and I believe we might have our own 
 terms. Nothing under Heaven concerns the English so much as that channel. Let us plant 
 our ships in time there, and we may have advantage enough of the Hollander." Burton's 
 Diary, iii., 436. 
 
 3 It is printed in Harleian Miscellany, i., 287, and in S ate Tracts, part i., 376. I have printed 
 the passage under consideration as Appendix (B) to this work. 
 
 < Compare, for example, his statements with regard to Ostend, Newport, and Dunkirk with 
 those of Thurloe in Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. I have found the statement of Crom- 
 well's Avillingness finally to yield Prussia to Charles Gustavus only in the original instruc- 
 tions, in Pufendorff and in this tract. Bethel stood in well with the Republicans and was in a 
 position to receive much information. I have been able to verify several statements which I 
 found first in this pamphlet. 
 
CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 75 
 
 Topham's statement to Parliament, which in turn rested upon the 
 statement of a merchant carrying scvret dispatclies and not, so far as 
 we can see, in a position to know their contents, then the whole story- 
 rests upon a very slender footing. These suspicions must be strength- 
 ened by the fact that when Meadowe, in the spring of 1659, hinted at 
 the English possession of Cronenburg and the island Hewen, Charles 
 Gustavus seems not to have entertained the proposal for a moment.^ 
 If he himself had made the same proposal a few months before, one is 
 at a loss to account for so sudden a change in his attitude, since there 
 appears to be no diplomatic or military event which would explain it. 
 Yet Charles Gustavus did somethnes change his plans for no very 
 great reason, and he may have done so in this vcase. It is impossible 
 to decide the matter definitely without fuller information. In the 
 meantime, those interested in the subject may be glad to have their 
 attention called to these passages. 
 
 The Partition of Denmark Again. — The ill success of Charles Gus- 
 tavus' second invasion of Denmark and the desperate state of his for- 
 tunes in consequence of it, made him more willing than he had ever 
 been before to concede real advantages to England if English support 
 could be obtained by it. Even before Cromwell's death, Pufendorif 
 tells us of a proposal that Cromwell occupy Emden or Meppen in 
 order to hold the Dutch in check and prevent the Austrians from rais- 
 ing recruits in Westphalia. As soon as Charles Gustavus heard of 
 Cromwell's death, he sent another ambassador, Gustavus Duval, to 
 Richard with a request for aid against the Dutch similar to the one 
 sent through Leyenbergen, but though Richard declared his readiness 
 to enter into an offensive alliance w4th Sweden against Austria and a 
 defensive alliance against the rest of the world, yet he gave various 
 excuses for not furnishing the twenty ships asked for. In October 
 Friesendorff received secret orders to offer Bremen and Verden to 
 Richard if he would assist in the Swedish conquest of Denmark and 
 Norway, but with the proviso that the provinces should not be delivered 
 into English possession until after the surrender of Copenhagen. P>oth 
 ambassadors were authorized to offer freedom from tolls in the S(jund 
 
 ^ Pufendorff; vi., g 21. Downing wrote Thurloe from the Hague that the Dutch were trying 
 to secure the same prize from the Danes. Downing to Thurloe, Thurloe Papers, vii., 427, 469, 
 506. and 515. Thurloe evidently believed this. "* * * and as now. in fact, they [the Dutchl 
 had in mortgage a part of the king of Denmark's dominions, they were also to have Cronenburg 
 Castle into their hands as security for the money expended in the war." Foreign Affairs in 
 Cromwell's Time. 
 
76 DIPLOMATIC RELATIOXS BETWEEN 
 
 and in Iceland in return for money and sliips.^ These offers were not 
 without attraction for the English court. In case their policy of 
 mediation proved fruitless, they were willing to assist the king, but 
 only defensively, and on condition of some advantage for their costs. 
 Meadowe mentioned Stade and Landscrone as suitable for this purpose,^ 
 and during the summer Richard had proposed an alliance on the basis 
 of freedom from tolls in the Sound for English commerce, equal rights 
 with Swedes in all Swedish ports and the closing of the Sound to Eng- 
 land's enemies.^ To this Charles Gustavus made a counter-proposal, 
 that England take possession of Gliickstadt, Krempen, and AVilsteren, 
 and as security for loans, Iceland, with the jurisdiction over Berghen, 
 the claims of Norway to the Orkney Islands, and in addition Stade 
 and Swingen, except the sovereignty over this city. Meadowe sug- 
 gested that Cronenburg and the island Hewen would be more accept- 
 able, which embarrassed the king greatly, since the cession of these 
 places could not be thought of. He was driven, therefore, to recur to 
 his old plan of dividing Denmark. Friesendorff was empowered to 
 offer Bremen and Verden and the assistance of Sweden in obtaining 
 Iceland and Greenland, provided Richard would aid in the conquest 
 of Norway. If Richard were willing to go further and partition Den- 
 mark, England would receive in addition to the above all of Jutland 
 except the dominions of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, together with 
 freedom from tolls in the Sound. Norway, Seeland, Fiinen and the 
 other islands would go to Sweden. But the abdication of Richard 
 put an end to these schemes.'* 
 
 It would be an injustice to Richard, however, to emphasize these ad- 
 venturous plans unduly. They occupied at best but a secondary place 
 
 1 Pufendorff, v., g 115. 
 
 2 Ibid., § 118. "Therefore in case of an obstinate repugnancy to the peace on the Danish 
 part upon the terms aforesaid, to assist the Swede in a defensive way under certain cautions 
 and restrictions. In which the case of assistance, for in war many things may be supposed 
 and provided against whicli never come to pass, the Swede was to give real gages and 
 pledges for the garantie of his faith. To which end the English mediator had often and closely 
 remonstrated to him that 'twas not reasonable to put a sword into another's hand without a 
 previous assurance of its not being made use of against one's yelf. And used it also as an argu- 
 ment to dispose the otherwise unwilling Swede to a peace with the Dane (for a war with Den- 
 mark was of all wars the most commodious for him) because he was not to expect an assist- 
 ance from England which should cost him nothing. And to forecast the temper of affairs, 
 proceeded so far as to nominate Stade upon the Elbe, and Landscroon in the Sound, to be put 
 in case of such assistance into English hands ; which taking vent afterwards, gave occasion to 
 that frivolous report how tliat England and Sweden had agreed together to share Denmark 
 betwixt them." Meadowe's Narrative, p. 119. 
 
 3 Putendorff, vi., g 20, with the marginal date May 7. Carlson, iv., 331. 
 
 * Ibid., g 21. Carlson, iv., 334. Soon after Charles Gustavus tried the effect of similar pro- 
 
CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 77 
 
 in his thoughts, and were only an alternative in case his plan of mediat- 
 ing a peaee should tail. It was to give emphasis to this attempt at 
 mediation that a fleet had been sent to the Sound in the autumn of 
 1659 under Goodson, hut it was forced to return without aecomplisiiing 
 anything, owing to the lateness of the season. In the following sj)ring 
 another fleet was sent out under Admiral ^lontiigue, who appeared 
 before Copenhagen in April, not for the purpose, as both the Swedes 
 and Danes at fii'st supposed, of unconditionally supporting the Swedish 
 cause, but to force them to accept peace on the basis of the treaty of 
 Koi'skilde, and to lend aid to Charles Gustavus only in so far as it might 
 appear necessary from the attempts of the Dutch or of the confeder- 
 ates of the Danes to defeat this object. When one considers the great 
 difficulties under which Richard labored and his constant struggles 
 with Parliament, his effective interference in the Baltic really does 
 him great credit. A war with Holland over the matter was at first 
 by no means impossible, and the presence of the English fleet in the 
 Baltic not only prevented a more active interference by the Dutch in 
 behalf of the Danes, but persuaded them that independent action in 
 the Baltic was im})racticable. The first Concert of the Hague was 
 therefore by no means a concession to the Dutch, but was quite in 
 accordance with the English policy of armed mediation, and was 
 moreover, although the Swedish king bitterly resented this attempted 
 dictation, in reality an act of friendship towards Sweden. The second 
 and third Concerts of the Hague, however, concluded by the Parlia- 
 ment after Richard's abdication, show clearly how England's foreign 
 influence was paralyzed by internal difficulties. It would take us 
 too far from our subject to discuss the negotiations leading up to the 
 treaty of Oliva, which form, moreover, a chapter in Dutch rather than 
 in English history, since the Parliament had lost its influence over the 
 course of affiiirs, and was compelled to resign the conduct of the me- 
 diation into the hands of its rivals. "The truth is they made no 
 great scruple, at least for that one time, to come under the stern of 
 their neiffhbourino; CommouAvealth, therebv to have hettev leisure to 
 recollect and refit the scattered planks and pieces of their own broken 
 Repu])lic."^ 
 
 posals in Holland. Erdmannsdorffer, Deutsche Geschichte, i., 337. Carlson, iv., 342. Charles 
 Gustavus' plan was to unite Norway with Sweden, together with Cronenburg, in order to con- 
 trol the Sound. 
 1 Meadowe's Narrative, p. 122. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 A. 
 
 Extract from Foreign Affairs ix Cromwell's Time, as Given 
 
 BY Thurloe, 1660. 
 
 (Stowe MSS., clxxxv., fol. 187.) 
 
 The State of the Northern Affairs . — In the year [1655] the war 
 broke out between Sweden and Poland, which Sweden undertook 
 without jyiy counsel of the Protector but after he was engaged therein 
 he sent an extraordinary ambassador to desire aid from the Protector 
 for carrying on that war as directed by him for the advantage of the 
 Protestant interest. 
 
 In the debate of that aifair it came to a proposition and an agree- 
 ment, that the Swede should carry his arms against the emperor and 
 house of Austria, and that upon the foundation thereof, and the war 
 which England and France had with Spain (the other branch of the 
 house of Austria in the west) a league offensive and defensive should 
 be made between England, France, and Sweden, whereunto should be 
 invited the states of Holland, king of Denmark, and the elector of 
 Brandenburg and other states and a concept of articles was drawn 
 and debated between the commissioners of the Protector and the 
 ambassador of Sweden, and communicated to the Dutch and French 
 ambassadors. 
 
 The Dutch declared their unwillingness, and apprehended danger 
 to themselves from the success of the Swede in Poland, and took reso- 
 lutions underhand to give him troubles, and by great promises of 
 assistance to the king of Denmark, and by rewards to his councilors, 
 engaged that king contrary to his own interests, to invade the king of 
 Sweden in his Duchv of Bremen. 
 
 This dre\f the king of Sweden out of Poland and set the war 
 wholly on a new foot, and most of the princes of states in Europe 
 found themselves concerned to intermeddle in it. 
 
 (79) 
 
80 APPENDIX. 
 
 The principal combatants were the king of Sweden, Poland, and 
 Denmark, the duke of Brandenburg who at firet joined with Sweden, 
 fell off to Poland, the emperor also declared with him. 
 
 The Dutch underhand irritate the aforesaid princes against the 
 Swede, though openly they were in treaty with him for adjusting their 
 own interests. 
 
 The Swede had nevertheless that success against the Dane, that they 
 had almost made a conquest of all Denmark and was bringing the 
 Sound under his power. 
 
 The Protector though he wished in general tlie prosperity of the 
 Swede, his ally, hoping that at last his arms might be directed the 
 right way, yet did not like that the Swede should conquer the Dane, 
 and possess all those countries, and being thereby become power- 
 ful, eno;ross the whole trade of the Baltic Sea, wherein Eno^land is so 
 much concerned, and therefore he interposed in most serious terms 
 with both the kings to make peace whicli was accepted by both, and 
 peace ensued, thereupon, called the peace or treaty of Roskild. But the 
 war being renewed again the next autumn the matter became more 
 entangled. The emperor, duke of Brandenburg, kings of Poland and 
 Denmark entered into a league of offensive and defensive [ ] 
 
 against the Swede, the Dutch also declare the same way, and prepare 
 a fleet and land forces for the assistance of the Dane. 
 
 The Protector very much apprehended the issue of this conjunction, 
 he thought it equally dangerous for England that the Swede should be 
 ruined and the Dane preserved by such saviours, who after they had 
 broken the king of Sweden, would also make a prey of the Dane 
 himself, the emperor in his assistance he gave against the Swede, re- 
 vived the old design of the Austrian [eagle] stretching her wings 
 towards the eastern sea, and planting herself upon the Baltic. 
 
 The Dutch aimed at the command of the Sound and under pre- 
 tence that the Dane was too weak to keep it against his neighbours, 
 would have kept it for him, and had already swallowed up [Drunt- 
 heim] a place of great importance, mortgaged to them by the king of 
 Denmark for money to support him in his wars, and was agreed to be 
 delivered into his hands, so that the price of the king 5f Denmark's 
 deliverance, was like to be the resigning himself up into the hands of 
 the Dutch as his guardians. 
 
APPENDIX. 81 
 
 That whit'h the Protector pitched upon in this great occasion was 
 to endeavour a present peace between the Dane and the Swede, upon 
 the late treaty of Roskild, made by his own mediation without taking 
 in the ditterenoes bt^twtvn Poland and Sweden, or the Swede and Bran- 
 denburg, or comprehending the pretences of the Dutch and the em- 
 perour, which having many intricacies in them would require time. 
 
 This the Protector did to obviate the designs of the Dutch, as also 
 to keep open the door for making use of the arms of the Swede in 
 another way. 
 
 This was liked by none of the contending parties, the Swede 
 though thus beset, yet having got into his possession the Sound and 
 all Denmark but the town of Copenhagen, and believing that France 
 and England would not suffer him to flinck was unwilling to be brought 
 back again to the treaty of Roskild. The Dane was more adverse 
 than he, not doubting but by the aid of his confederates to recover all 
 again and the* confederates opposed it, or any treaty without compre- 
 hending all their interests, and the Dutch most of all infested here^ 
 the meaning whereof was, that they had all agreed totally to ruin the 
 Swede, and the Dutch doubted not of his part in the advantage. 
 
 The Protector in this whole business laid this for a foundation, that 
 it was not for the interest of this nation that either the Swede or Dane 
 should be ruined in this war, and that [it] was ever safest for England, 
 that the Sound and those countries should remain in the hands of 
 the Dane, and therefore as he had interposed in the first war to pre- 
 serve the Dane, so he resolved by the same measures to proceed, and 
 so to manage these affairs that this might receive no alternation in those 
 parts. 
 
 And having communicated with France herein and finding that 
 Court to have the same sentiments, they entered into a treaty for the 
 mutual management thereof, wherein it was agreed that France and 
 England should propound to the two kings of Sweden and Denmark 
 the renewing the treaty of Roskild without comprehending any of the 
 confederates. 
 
 2dl\'. That they should declare themselves enemies to him that re- 
 flise it, and assist him that accept it. 
 
 3dly. That both should send to the Dutch to induce them to join in 
 this mediation. 
 6 
 
^2 APPENDIX. 
 
 4thly. If a war should happen to England by reason of any assist- 
 ance to be o^iven in this case that France should declare the enemies of 
 England enemies of France, and make war against them, and e contra 
 England to do the same for France. 
 
 5thly. That the peace being made between the Dane and Swede, 
 France and England shall interpose to reconcile the Swede to the 
 king of Poland and duke of Brandenburg. 
 
 The ambassadors of France and England at the Hague propounded 
 the terms aforesaid to the Dutch, but they refused, and instead thereof, 
 prepared a general fleet and land forces to assist the Dane. 
 
 England finding words would not prevail, prepared also a good fleet, 
 and sent word to the Dutch that his fleet was prepared for the Sound, 
 whither it should sail the first opportunity, that upon the arrival of 
 it there, France and Eno;land would offer the mediation to Sweden and 
 Denmark to agree with them on the treaty of Roskild, and endeavour 
 to compel the opposing party by force, at the same time the French 
 and English at the Hague in the [name] of both their masters de- 
 manded of the states their declaration that no aid or assistance should 
 be sent to the contending parties to enflame that war, and that they 
 should call back such as they have already sent. 
 
 This being done in vigorous terms brought the Dutch to a temper 
 and persuaded them to agree to join in the mediation on the aforesaid 
 terms, and a treaty was thereupon entered into between all the three 
 states for managing this affair and the fleets of both states to sail 
 thither as common friends to both kings, to bring them to a peace in 
 the manner before expressed. 
 
 At the same time a treaty was made between England and S^^'eden, 
 that in case the king of Denmark was refractory and refused the peace, 
 that then England would assist Sweden against them, and in recom- 
 pense of the charges and hazards of the war, a sum of money was to 
 be paid England and freedom to the English forever from paying toll 
 in their passages to and from the Baltic Sea in case of success against 
 the Dane, for the performance whereof security was to be given to 
 England. 
 
 In pursuance of this treaty the English fleet sailed to the Sound and 
 soon after arrived the Dutch, and then the mediation was offered to 
 both the kings in the name of the three states, and a certain day pre- 
 
APPENDIX. 83 
 
 fixed \vhether they would accept the })eace upon the terms propounded, 
 both made great difficulty therein, and the Dutch who openly joined 
 witli the French and English ambassadors did yet miderhand dissuade 
 the Dane from accepting, and spun out the treaty into a length, until 
 the English tleet returned home from the necessity of their own 
 atiliirs, leaving the treaty unfinished, the management whereof fell into 
 the hands of the Rump, then entered of others who took different 
 measures of this affair. 
 
 The Dutch had discovered in this and other affairs a fixed desi^^n 
 to monopolize all trade into their own hands, that in the Mediterra- 
 nean they hoped to obtain by occasion of that war between England 
 and Spain, and having the carriage of all Spanish goods, and to man- 
 age their trade to and from the Indies in their ships, they endeavoured 
 to put such articles upon England under the notion of a free ship 
 free goods in the marine treaty, as nu'ght free their ships from all 
 search and molestation, whereby enemy's goods might have been car- 
 ried with all safety, desiring thereby to draw all traffic into their own 
 ships, and so infinitely increase their own shipping and navigation. 
 
 By occasion of the wars in the eastern parts they endeavoured to 
 engross the trade of the Baltic Sea, for having engaged the Dane to 
 make war with the Swede, under pretence of giving him assistance, 
 they designed to draw him into an absolute dependence upon them, and 
 be means hereof to have the same power upon the Sound as in their 
 own hands, a thing formerly attempted by them by taking the farm of 
 that passage raising themselves and raising other nations at their 
 pleasure, and as now in fact they had in mortgage a part of the king 
 of Denmark's dominions, they were also to have Cronenburg Castle 
 into their hands as a security for the money expended in the war. 
 
 As to the trade in the East Indies where they were superior at sea, 
 they had in their [own] intentions swallowed all ; their method in 
 those parts was this, if the English or any other nation had driven a 
 good trade with any of those people, their manner was presently to 
 proclaim war with that people, and lay a ship or two at sea before the 
 ports where the trade was, which they called a blocking up, and by 
 colour thereof seized on all ships and goods going in or out of those 
 parts, as trading in an enemy's country, and on this pretence seized on 
 three English [ships] in the East Indies, richly laden, and converted 
 
84 APPENDIX. 
 
 them to their own use, the news hereof came about the same time 
 when these negotiations were in the Sound, and satisfaction being asked 
 of them, they at first justified the fact, but being told in plain terms 
 that if the true value of the goods and ships according as they had 
 been worth in case they had arrived safe, in Europe, were not paid at 
 the day prefixed, that England would take their own satisfaction by 
 force, they complied and paid to the merchants concerned the full value 
 in ready money. 
 
 There were no greater considerations in England in reference to for- 
 eign interests, than how to obviate the growing greatness of the Dutch. 
 This state of affairs in the Sound though raised by themselves seemed 
 to give an occasion of doing something in it. The Swede was incensed 
 against them as the authors of ruining his designs in Poland and else^ 
 where, and would have proclaimed war against them, if England 
 would have engaged with him therein. The king of Denmark grew 
 weary of his assistance, and expressed great discontent towards them, 
 seeing that in the end though he should be preserved from the Swede, 
 he should be left in the power of the Dutch, and swallowed up with 
 their pretenses. 
 
 England was at that time in amity with both those kings, that of 
 Sweden was not assured, but nothing of offence had happened with 
 Denmark since the conclusion of the treaty 1654. But on the con- 
 trar}", that king took acceptably the mediation of England, on which 
 the peace of Roskild ensued, and sent letters of thanks for the good 
 offices towards that crown. 
 
 That which seems to be England's true interest in this occasion, 
 was to employ their utmost efforts to accommodate the differences be- 
 tween these two crowns, the means whereof after the Dutch did mani- 
 festly cross that in private which they had agreed to by treaty were 
 these. 
 
 That England and France should use their joint endeavours to bring 
 the Swede to abate of his demands to the Dane, which he could not 
 prosecute without offence to all his neighbours, and instead thereof to 
 prosecute his first designs against the house of Austria, following 
 therein the example of great Gustavus, and wherein France and Eng- 
 land would ffive him e^reat assistance both of monev and forces. 
 
 The Dane being thus delivered from this dangerous war [ ] 
 
APPENDIX. 85 
 
 be induced to a coujunction Avith Swedon and to favour his designs the 
 others, England and France becoming the sponsors of the peace and 
 amitv between them. 
 
 To let the king of Denmark see the ill effects of his friendship with 
 the Dutch, who had many times engaged him to the hazard of his 
 crown, merely to serve their interests, thus they engaged him against 
 England in 1622 and now against Sweden, and when he was thus en- 
 gaged, they imposed on him unreasonable terms of assistance, at other 
 times would assist against him as in 1654 when they helped the 
 Swede against him, and obliged the Danes to yield up part of his do- 
 minions to the Swede, which he holds at this day. 
 
 And thereupon to offer him the friendship of England instead of 
 the Dutch, as that which he might depend upon in any rencontres with 
 his neighbours contrary to the peace to be agreed upon by any one side 
 or the other, and thereby be freed from his dependence on the Dutch, 
 who under pretence of friendship would oppress him. 
 
 The elector of Brandenburg was to be invited into this league, and 
 to draw him off from those alliances which were contrary thereunto. 
 
 There was a particular treaty on foot with Sweden and Poland, that 
 a good correspondence might be held with that kingdom, being the 
 ancient ally with France and useful to England in respect of our trade 
 to Danzio; and the towns in the Rea^all Prussia, 
 
 England, France, Sweden, Denmark, and Brandenburg being thus 
 allied together upon their common interests, this was thought the best 
 way that these affairs could be put into a reference to the interest of 
 England in those, and the king of England being at that time upon 
 solid terms of friendship with France, and having the advantage of 
 ports on both sides the narrow seas, whence they could easily disturb 
 their navigation through the channel, there was no doubt but the state 
 of things would bring the Dutch either by fair means or force to live 
 by their neighbours upon just and reasonable terms. 
 
86 APPENDIX. 
 
 B. 
 
 Extract from The World's Mistake ix Oliver Cromwell. 
 
 (Harleian Miscellany, i., 287. State Tracts, part i., 376.) 
 
 But this man, who, through ignorance, is so strangely cried up in the 
 world, was not guilty of this error in state only, but committed as great 
 a solecism, in his designing the outing of the king of Denmark, and 
 setting up the king of Sweden. For had the Swedes but got Copen- 
 hagen (as in all probability, had Oliver lived, they would have done,) 
 they had wanted nothing of consequence, but the cities of Lubeck and 
 Danzig (which, by their then potency, they would easily have gained), 
 of being masters of the whole Baltic Sea, on both sides, from the 
 Sound or mouth down to the bottom of it ; by which, together with all 
 Denmark, Norway, and the Danes' part of Holstein, which would con- 
 sequently have been theirs (they then having, as they still have, the land 
 of Bremen), there would have been nothing, but the small countries of 
 Oldenberg and East Friesland, which would easily have fallen into 
 their mouths, betwixt them and the United Netherlands, whereby 
 Sweden would on the one side, to the north and north-east, have been 
 as great, as France on the other, to the south and south-west ; and they 
 two, able to have divided the western empire betwixt them. 
 
 And whereas it had in all ages been the policy of the northern states 
 and potentates, to keep the dominion of the Baltic Sea divided among 
 several petty princes and states, that no one might be sole master of it ; 
 because, otherwise, most of the necessary commodities for shipping, 
 coming from thence and Nor^vay, any one lord of the whole might 
 lay up the shipping of Europe, by the walls, in shutting only of his 
 ports, and denying the commodities of his country to other states : 
 Cromwell contrary to this wise maxim, endeavoured to put the wliole 
 Baltic Sea into the Swedes' hands, and undoubtedly had (though, I 
 suppose, ignorantly) done it, if his death had not given them that suc- 
 ceeded him, the Long Parliament, an opportunity of prudently pre- 
 venting it. For, if he had understood the importance of the Baltic 
 Sea to this nation, lie could not have been so impolitic, as to have pro- 
 jected so dangerous a design against his new Utopia, as giving the 
 opening and shutting of it to any one prince. I am not ignorant, that 
 
APPENDIX. 87 
 
 this error is excused, by pretending that we were to have had Elsinore 
 and Cronenburg Castle, (the first, the town, u^wn the narrow entrance 
 of the Baltic, calletl the Sound, where all shii)s ride, and pay toll to 
 the king of Denmark ; and the latter, the fortress, that defends both 
 the town and ships,) by which we should have been masters of 
 the Sound, and consequently of the Baltic : but they that know those 
 countries, and how great a prince the Swede would have been, had he 
 obtained all the rest, besides those two baubles ; must confess, we should 
 have been at his devotion, in our holding of any thing in his countries. 
 And further, if the dangerous consequence of setting up so great a 
 prince had not been in the case, it had been against the interest of 
 England, to have had an obligation upon us to maintain places so re- 
 mote, against the enmity of many states and princes ; and that for these 
 reasons : 
 
 First, because the ordinary tolls of the Sound would not have de- 
 frayed half the charge ; and, to have taken more than the ordinary tolls, 
 we could not have done, without dra^^nng a general quarrel upon 
 us, from most of the princes and states of the northern parts of 
 Europe. 
 
 Secondly, etc. 
 
88 APPENDIX. 
 
 C. 
 
 Extract from Thurloe's Speech to Parliament, 
 
 February 18, 1859. 
 
 (Burton's Diary, iii., 380, seq.) 
 
 This was the state of thins^s in October last. His His^hness, that 
 now is, took these considerations : 
 
 1. The continuance of a war in these parts would infinitely hmder 
 our trade, and be of very great prejudice to this nation; many of our 
 manufacturers being transported and vented thither, and many of our 
 materials for shipping and navigation being carried from thence, 
 hither. 
 
 2. Considering what the issue of this war might be, that the Sound " 
 was likely to be put into the hands of those that would exclude the 
 English, or put us in such a condition, as we should be as bad as ex- 
 cluded ; the consequence of which would be the ruin of our shipping ; 
 hemp, pitch, tar, cordage and mast, coming all from thence, and an 
 obstruction there, would endanger our safety. 
 
 We had experience of this in our war with the Dutch, when the 
 Dane did prohibit our access thither, which put us to great distress, 
 having none of those commodities, but what came from our enemies 
 at double rates. 
 
 3. His Highness considered that the emperor was likely to arrive 
 at the design of the house of Austria, to command the Baltic, and the 
 eastern seas, as the Spaniard already hath the command of the western 
 seas. Thus, they Avould command all the trade of the world. Of 
 this the Dutch were so sensible before, as they engaged the Swede to 
 come to hinder the progress of the emperor, who is now fairer in 
 hopes of it than ever he was in the world, they having greater posses- 
 sions there than formerly, as two or three principal places in Holstein, 
 by the delivery of Denmark, are already garrisoned by the emperor's 
 forces. 
 
 And I think the king of Denmark is in more danger from those 
 that are allied with him than from his open enemies. 
 
 4. He considered that when the emperor had done his business there, 
 he and his confederates would next pour themselves into Flanders, and 
 
APPENDIX. 89 
 
 from thenre hither into this Comiiioiiwealth, where thev intend to 
 bring in another government, when they are ready for it. Such coun- 
 sels, we know, are on foot, de facto , already. 
 
 %5. The great danger of overthrowing the Protestant interest, in 
 general, which we have so much reason to j)reserve and promote. 
 
 His Highness, considering these mischiefs, thought himself concerned 
 to obviate them as far as he could. We are yet in friendship with all 
 these princes, and have no enmity with the emperor; nor would his 
 Highness have it otherwise. He therefore thought fit to interpose 
 upon the account of amity. 
 
 You should make it your fii-st step to endeavour to reconcile those 
 two fighting kings, thinking it to be our interest rather to preserve both, 
 than to sutfer either to be destroyed ; and that France and you would 
 join to take olf the Dutch and Brandenburg, if possible to reconcile the 
 Pole and Sweden. 
 
 To promote the success of this mediation, and luring all parties to a 
 reconciliation, not excluding the house of Austria, too, his Highness 
 thought fit and meet to send a fleet into those parts of twenty ships, to 
 the intent to make a peace between the two kings, and of this he ac- 
 quainted the States General. 
 
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