D A UC-NRLF B M D71 DDl THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CROMWELL AND CHARLES X. GUSTAVUS OF SWEDEN INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, SUBMITTED TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG. " . " »o :: BY Gl^ ERXSEY JOXES, INSTRUCTOR IN EUROPEAN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA. LI^X'OL^^ neb.: STATK .JOURNAL COMPANY, PRINTERS. 1897. A-'V y V A C O'^ ^ ^' ^ C-' 4 > r r • • • * . . • • • * «• • • • * . ; . . • •• t • • * • ! • ! • • • • • • • » 1 * > ■> J > 1 ■> » 1 PREFACE. Civil wars aiv not favorable to the preservation of letters and papers of historical value, since no one is willing to preserve material which may, on the failure of his cause, compromise him in the eyes of his victorious enemies. No one is willing to preserve evidence which may subsequently convict him of treason. '' Burn this letter after the perusal of it," w^rote Col. Gilbert Talbot to the Marquis of Ormond in 1655, "'tis not good to have papers, fearing some misfortune." In the case of the English Puritan Revolution, we know that some of its prominent men destroyed their papers, for they have told us so. We infer from the general scantiness of tliese records that many others did the same. There is another reason why our records for the Interreoiium are so meagre. Charles I. had the commendable practice on the death of a secretary of state of seizing all his papers, which are novr kept in the Public Record Office. But Cromwell paid no attention to such matters. Possession of a public document during his time was synony- mous with ownersiiip ; consequently much the greater part of them are not to be found in the public archives, but in private collections. These have, to be sure, in large measure, come into the possession of the Bodleian Library and of the British Museum, and are therefore accessible, but the period of migration which they went through before finding their final depository was not favorable to their preservation, and they still remain not only fragmentary but scattered to an exas- perating degree.^ The great mine of information for the diplomatic history of the In- terregnum is the collection of dispatches kno\yn as the Thurloe Papers, which, after a career of adventure, finally came into the possession of th^ Bodleian Lil)rary. Ihe greater part of them were published in 1742 bv Thomas Birch in seven folio volumes. There is nothino: ^ o 1 The Reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission give information concerning such collections as are still in private possession. (3) 4 , . PREFACE. material among the unpublished clispatehes. Reference to the collec- tion has been facilitated somewhat by Setterwall's "Forteckning ofver Acta Svecia in 'A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe,' " Historisk Tidskrift (Stockholm), 1890. The dispatches which relate to Meadowe's and Jephson's embassies should be supplemented by the letters recently found in New Zealand by Professor Edward Jenks and published in the English Historical Reyiew, yii., 720-742. The Carte MSS. at the Bodleian contain some important letters. I examined the Clarendon State Papers with care, but hardly felt repaid for my laljor. Some of the Carte Papers have been published under the title "A Collection of Original Letters and Papers Concern- ing the Affairs of England, 1641-1660, by T. C. [Thomas Carte], 2 vols., London, 1739." Three large folio volumes of the Clarendon Papers were published at Oxford in 1767. The Tanner collection contains some negotiations between England and the countries about the Baltic, but they refer chiefly to the period of the Commonwealth. The greater part of the existing diplomatic documents of the Interreg- num are contained in these collections in the Bodleian. The college libraries at Oxford have nothing of consequence touch- ing our subject.^ There is, however, among the AVilliamson MSS. belonging to Queen's College a manuscript catalogue ^ which contains l)rief notes of negotiations between England and foreign states from about the year 1540 to 1662, with references to other volumes where they are more fully detailed. One of these volumes, designated by the mark §§§, presumably a manuscript volume belonging to Williamson's own library, has much material bearing upon English relations with Sweden and Denmark during Cromwell's time, and referring especially to matters of trade. It would seem to be valuable, but I have not been able to find any further trace of it. There is nothing at tlie Public Record Office^ worthy of mention except Bliss' Transcripts from the S\yedish Archiyes, containing a copy of Bonders Diary, and Baschet's Transcripts of Bordeaux's correspond- ence with Mazarin and Brienne. The hitter, howeyer, is much less in- 1 Coxe, Catalogus Codicum MSS. qui in Collegiis AuUsque. Oxonieusibus hodie adservantur, 2 vols. -Queen's College MSS., xxxix. Williamson was secretary of state from 1(174 to 1G78. 3R. S. Scargill-Bird, Guide to the Principal Classes of Documents preserved in the Public Record Office. Detailed information is given in the various Reports of the Deputy Keeper of Public Records. PKEFAOE. 5 striictivo than one niioht be led to expeet from the siniihirity of English and Freneh polieies toward Sweden. There were various eauses for mutual suspieion, and the relations of the two countries were by no means so cordial as they appeared outwardly. The domestic papers for this period have been calendared by Mrs. Greenland this Calendar has in turn been calendared, so far as Sweden is concerned, by Setter- wall in Historisk 'I'idskrift, 1889. Macray's Report on the Tiibraries of Sweden and the Archives and Libraries of Denmark in the Reports of the Deputy Keeper of Public Records (Reports xliii., xlv., xlvi., and xlvii.) are valuable for reference. The dispatches of the Swedish ambassadors in England have not been available to me. Those of Xieui)oort, the Dutch ambassador, are contained in De Witt's I^rieven, vol. iii. Tlie relations between Eng- land, Sweden, and the Netherlands were so inextricablv interwoven that the letters of Xieupoort are often as valuable as the dispatches of the Sw(^dish ambassadors themselves. They appear to have been but little used in this connection. The correspondence of Schlezer, the ambassador from Brandenburg, published by Erdmannsdchffer in vol- ume vii. of Urkunden und Actenstiicke, should not be neglected. Thurloe has given us two accounts of the Protector's policy in the North. One was furnished the House of Commons, February 18, 1659, in a speech reported by Burton. The other, an account of the Protector's foreign relations as a whole, was furnished the ministry of the Restoration in 1660, of which a manuscript copy is among the Stowe j\lSS. in the British Museum. The second account has l3een used by the author of the anonymous tract " Concerning the Forraigne Affaires in the Protector's Time," printed in volume vi. of Lord Somer's Tracts, but without mentioning his source. The changes in the printed tract are in fact mere changes in arrangement and style. A copy of the latter part of the manuscript, which deals with affairs in the North, was made bv Professor Grimur Thorkelin, the celebrated editor of the first edition of Beowulf, for the Royal Library of Copeniiagen.^ These accounts by Thurloe may be supplemented by a similar one lit is contained in the new (not oUI. as Macray's Report gives it) collection of MSS., 649c, in folio. It was through information kindly furnished by the Rev. Mr. Macray and Justitsr. Dr. Chr. Bruun, Librarian of the Royal Library at Copenhagen, that I was able to trace the Stowe manuscript. It is. however, not the original, Init an undated copy, with many errors in copy- ing. The part which deals with affairs in the North is printed as Appendix (A) to this work. t/ 6 PREFACE. by Meadowe, who from his experience as ambassador in the North is entitled to speak with some authority. It is entitled ''A Xarrative of the Principal Actions occurring in the Wars between Sueden and Denmark, before and after the Roschild Treaty, t~ ^ ^ together with a View of the Suedish and other Affairs, as they stood in Ger- many in the year 1675, wdth relation to England.'' The first part was in manuscript for some years before it was printed in 1677. A copy of the manuscript having, as I infer, come into the hands of Sir Roger Manley, he did not hestitate to incorporate it into his '' History of the late Warres in Denmark," published in 1670. The two ac- counts run parallel for pages witli only verbal changes. Manley was a soldier in these wars and could not very well have had so intimate a knowledge of diplomatic events. In Wieselgren's Dela Gardiska Archivet, xii., p. 145, we are informed of another work by Meadowe, " The Interest of the English in the Sound as Affaires now stand, Lon- don, 1660," but I have not been able to find a copy of it. Among historical works Avhich deal with this subject, Pufendorff's De rebus a Carolo Gustavo Suecice Bege gestis is tlie only one which covers the whole ground. Apparently it is based almost entirely upon the dispatches of the Swedish ambassadors, and is invaluable to those to whom the original correspondence is not available. It has been entirely superseded, however, for part of the period by Kalling's ^'Riksradet Frih. C. Bondes ambassad till England, 1655, akad. afh., Upsala, 1851." In this account the author has not attempted to make a critical estimate of the value of his sources, but has merely reduced Bonde's dispatches to narrative form. Indeed, he tells us that in all important passages he has used Bonde's own words. His narra- tive is nevertheless of great value. It is more detailed than Pufen- dorff's and pays more attention to exact chronology than Pufendorif seems to have thought necessary. It ends abruptly with November 25, 1655. The promised second part seems never to liave appeared. In recent historical literature there is little to mention.' The state of English records is not such as to tempt investigators to the subject. Gnrdinei''s History of the Commonwealth and Prote<'torate has not yet reached this point. The Danish work of Fridericia, Danmarks 1 "Eine eingehende acteiimassige Darstellung derselbcn (d. h., der .englisch-schwedischen Beziehungen zur Zeit Cromwells) steht iioch aus." Pribram in Archiv fiir Osterreichische Geschichte, Ixx., 100. Anm. PREFACE. ( ydiv politiske historic, has not l)eeii continued beyond lG4o. The Swcilish published sources have a provoking- way of stopping just before our period begins. Rydberg's Sveriges Traktater med frani- niandc niagtcr, has only reached (in 1891) the year Ki.'^O. Carlson's Sveriges historia under Konungarne af Pialziska Huset ((lerinan trans- lation by Petersen) gives a detailed account of Swedish affairs during this ])eriod. Erdmannsddrifer's Deutsche Geschichte, vol. i., p. 211, neq., gives a more sunuiiary account, and devotes some pages to Crom- well's plan of getting a foothold in Northern Germany (vol. i., 284, seq.) Other sources will be indicated as occasion offers. It will be noticed how few references are made to the records of Parliament, to newspapers, or to contemporary pamphlets. Foreign affairs were controlled entirely bv the Protector and his Council, and they kept their secrets so well ^ that little is to be learned from other than official sources. Even if information did occasionally leak out, the gazettes W'Ould of course not have been allowed to publish it. A convenient collection of newspaper cuttings has been published by Stace under the title ''Cromwelliana." I have taken the liberty of modernizing the spelling in all the ex- tracts quoted. The spelling of the 1 7th century was notably careless, and I see no advantage to be derived from retaining it. I cannot neglect this opportunity to acknowledge the kindness and never-failing patience of Dr. Neubauer of the Bodleian Library, who rendered me the greatest assistance in eveiy difficulty which arose in connection with the manuscripts in Oxford. GUERNSEY JONES. British Museum, April 15, 1896. lUrk. u. Actenst., vii., 742, Anm. INTRODUCTION. RELATIONS Iit:T^VP:EX ENCrLAND AND SWEDEN BEFORE THE liECUN- NINCJ OF THE NORTHERN AVAR.^ The diplomatic relations between England and Sweden before the Enoflish Pnritan Revolution were not so close nor so fruitful as the circumstances of the time would seem to have rendered inevitable. It was a period of religious wars, yet no alliance was ft)rmed between these two pillars of the Protestant faith. The fanlt of this mnst be laid at the door of the first two Stuarts, but it was not, as has been often said, the fault of their secret Catho- lic sympathies, but of their blundering personal incompetence. Their foreign policies were based upon dreams of religious toleration and mediation, upon consideration of supposed personal honor, upon the interests of blood relations, upon the influence of incompetent favor- ites, upon everything, it would seem, except the real points at issue. James' attempt to secure a position in Europe by means of which he could mediate l^etween the hostile creeds and soften their intolerance was indeed a noble one, but it required a higher order of al)ility f >!' its execution than he could tolerate in his councils. The humiliating outcome of the Spanish marriage project in 1623 marked the final failure of this policy. Just at this time, as if by happy chance, Gustavus Adolphus ascended the throne of Sweden, prepared to take advantage of the change in Englisli councils. He proposed a plan for a great Protestant alliance, which bears many analogies to Cromwell's project of thirty years later, but which was too thorough-going for the timid Stuart court. James was in no position to meet its financial ref^uirements, and the more moderate proposals of Christian IV. were accepted instead. Gustavus Adol})hus was compelled to resign his mission for a time to weaker and less wortliy hands. iDe diplomatiska forbindelserna mellan Sverige och England 1624-Maj 1630. Akad. afh. af Aron Rydfors, Upsala, 1890. De diplomatiska rorbind«;lserna radian Sverige och England 1633-M. Akad. afh. af August Heimer. Lund, 189'2. Gardiner's English History, 1603-1642. lb., 1642-49. History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, vol. i., 1649-.52. 10 INTRODUCTION. Restitution of the Palatinate. — In so far as Charles I. could be said to have had a definite foreign policy at all, it had but one object, the restitution of the Palatinate to his relations. In this of itself Gus- tavus Adolphus had no interest, and there seemed but little chance of an agreement between them. Yet, as Charles blundered in every direction, he must sometimes blunder in the direction of Sweden. There were several times when his interference in behalf of the Ger- man Protestants seemed imminent. In 1629, Sir Thomas Roe, an ardent advocate of a vigorous Protest- ant policy, was allowed to mediate a peace between Poland and Sweden, in order that Gustavus Adolphus might have free hand to interfere in Germany, though Charles would not promise in advance any active support. It was thus due to English influence under Sir Thomas Roe that Gustavus Adolphus was able to make his descent upon Germany in the summer of 1630. The victories of Gustavus Adolphus roused the greatest enthusiasm among the English people, but not in the English Court. Yet even Charles, moved by the ill success of his negotiations with Spain, France, and Austria,^ found himself, as if by accident, drifting with the current of national feelino^. Sir Henry Vane was sent to Germany in the lat- ter part of 1631 to treat for an alliance for ''the restitution of both Palatinates and the liberty of Germany." Gustavus Adolphus, how- ever, inconsiderately demanded men and money as the price of his assistance. An English fleet must protect his communications with Sweden, and the military resources of the Palatinate, in case it were restored, must be placed at his disposal during the continuance of the war. Otherwise he had no interest in the project. The English Privy Council urged upon Charles the acceptance of these terms, but he found them too straightforward. They might bring him into collision with France or Spain. He therefore proposed instead a subsidy of £10,000 a month, for which the Swedish king must use every possible endeavor to restore the Palatinate. This proposal was rejected. Gustavus Adolphus knew very well how little Charles' promises to })ay money could be relied upon. So deep Avas the emotion aroused in England by the Swedish 1 The clearest account of this part of Charles' tortuous policy is given by Gardiner, English History, 1603-1642, vii., 169-219. INTRODUCTION. 11 victories in Gcnnany, that Charles siiw in it a nproach again>t his own inactivity and th()Uo:ht it necessary to ]>roliil)it tlie gazettes from pub- lishing news of them. Xothing coiikl show more strikingly his failure to icU'ntify himself with the spirit of his j)e()ple. It w^as the fatal ditierence between Tudor and Stuart al)S()lutism. Charles received the news of the death of Gustavus Adolphus, which seemed to the English people a national disaster, with the greatest equanimity. It would be easy now, he thought, for Frederick V. to place himself at the head of the German Protestants and to win back his own. He sent him £1(3,000 for this purpose, but Frederick died before he heard what was expected of him. Another opportunity for making English influence felt in Germany offered itself in the formation of the League of Heilbronn. The League in its weakness had been obliged to accept French support, and consequently to submit to French control, but it was anxious to bal- ance the influence of France by that of England. It promised to do all that could be reasonably expected tow^ard restoring the Palati- nate. Yet Charles could not resign hope of gaining his object with less trouble through negotiation with Spain, and against the advice of his Council, he allowed this opportunity to slip. John Oxenstierna, son of the great Swedish chancellor, came to England to ask for as- sistance, but though he w^as received with every show of respect, he accomplished notliing. Somewhat later, Charles sent one ambassador after another to Sweden, but his foreign policy had long lost all coher- ence.^ Even his own councilors were in the dark as to his true aims. As an inevitable result, he ceased to be courted. * After the battle of Xordlingen, which he regarded wath the greatest equanimity, he sent the usual hollow promises to Oxenstierna, but " the Swedish chan- cellor rode off to nesfotiate with the French ambassador without vouchsafing a word in answer." Charles' duplicity had isolated Eng- land and driven the Swedes and the German Protestants into the arms of France.- During the Long Parliament and the Bepublic. — The relations be- 1 "The schemes of Charles were so complicated and unreal, that they only serve to make the brain dizzy." Gardiner, Eng. Hist., 160o-ir>42, vii., ;^52. - " No word of condemnation is too strong for the manner in which Charles treated the whole subject of his relations with the Continent. It had all the weakness of a purely selfish policy, without any of the apparent and momentary strength which a selfish policy receives from vigour of conception and boldness of action.'' lb., 391. 12 INTRODUCTION. tween Charles and Sweden were tluis far from cordial at the be- ginning of the English Civil War. In fact, Swedish sympathies were so strongly with the rebellious Scotch that in 1640 ships and ammuni- tion were promised them in case of necessity, though under the disguise of purchase. Oxenstierna was no friend to rebels, yet " he enumer- ated the breaches of the laws of the land Avhich Charles had been guilty of, both in political and religious matters," ^ and thought that under certain conditions rebellion was justifiable. Nor was the cordiality which existed between Charles and his uncle, the king of Denmark, calculated to conciliate the Swedes. It was difficult to be a friend to Denmark and not an enemy to Sweden. When the war broke out between these two powers in 1643, an am- bassador was sent by Sweden to the English Parliament asking for the cooperation of an English fleet in protecting commerce in the Baltic Sea — i. c, in operating against Denmark. The immediate cause for seeking this alliance with the English Parliament, however, disap- peared after the Treaty of Bromsebro, and in deference to the feelings of the French, the negotiations were broken off, although the English Parliament was, in consequence of rumors of a Danish-French agree- ment to come to the aid of Charles, more anxious than ever to pro- ceed with them. The execution of Charles I. brought with it naturally enough a cer- tain revolution of feeling in favor of his successor. Spiring Silver- crona, the Swedish resident at the Hague, received orders to visit Charles II., and to show him the same respect as though he were in full possession of his royal authority. Yet when Montrose in his tour of the northern courts reached Gothenburg, expecting great things, he was sadly disappointed. Christina sold him a small ship, but had no further help to offer. Great as had been the outcry throughout Eu- rope at the execution of Charles I., the cause of his successor was not regarded as it would have been one hundred and fifty years later, as the cause of kings.^ No European court would liesitate to desert him if it served its interests to do so. The reasons why Sweden was again driven to seek the friendship of the English Parliament must be sought, as before, in its relations with Denmark.^ 1 neimer, p. 43, seq. 2 Clarendon, History of the RebeUion, xi., g 250. 3 Perhaps Christina had already conceived that great admiration for Cromwell which she INTRODUCTION. 13 The treaties of Rronisebro and Westplialia had so strengthened the influence of Sweden in the Baltic that the United Provinces could not but be ap})rehensive of the future of their connnerce, and they were endeavoring to maintain the balance of power in that region bv sup- porting Denmark against its too powerful rival. In February, 1649, a detensive alliance was formed between them, although the Swedish envoys at the Hague, Appelboom and Spiring Silvercrona, i^iade everv effort to prevent it. Spiring had not only been instructed to cultivate the friendship of the English ambassadors at the Hague, but in certain events to recognize the CoinmonwTalth, and to inform them that an English embassy would be well received in Sweden. He now pro- posed to the queen that he be sent to London to prevent the success of the negotiations for an English-Dutch alliance which were being carried on there. The proposal ^vas received with favor. His letter of credence was dated at Stockholm, September 26, 1651.^ His in- structions related merely to the protection of commerce between the two nations and to the sending of an English ambassador to Sweden to carry on further negotiations. He died, however, before he had re- ceived audience, so the nature of the proposals which he was author- ized to make remained unknown to Parliament. A letter of condo- lence was sent to the queen on the event.^ Both Denmark and the States General had thouo-ht it necessary to send embassies to Enoland t(j counteract the efforts of Sw^eden. Even France took the opportu- nitv to make advances to Parliament thronoh the Swedish ambassador.^ A few months after Spiring's death, Appelboom \vas sent over from Holland for a short time to continue the negotiations. His instruc- tions contained proposals for transferring the English-Pussian trade afterwards expressed so freely. "I may tell yon this wild queen of Swede extols beyond measure the Pr. of Conde and Cromwell," wrote Sec. Nicholas, December 8, 16.54 (Nicholas Papers, ii., 112), " and speaks very slightly both of our blessed Master that is with God and of the K., whos£;shoes she is not worthy to tie." See also lb., 142, and various passages in Whiie- loeke's Journal of the Swedish Embassy. Cromwell o:ice sent his picture to her Avith a very elaborate compliment (usually printed among Milton's poetical works : but Masson thinks it was written by Marwell. Milton's Poetical Works, ii., 343, stY/.), but after her apostasy he would hear nothing more of her. Whitelocke's Memorials of English Affairs, 599. 1 A translation is contained in the Tanner Papers, Iv., fol. 64. It was to the effect that " the friendship and nearness of commerce which from ancient times and even to this day uninter- rupted hath flourished between the Swedish and English nations may more and more for the future be rooted and moreover receive greater increase. " It is indorsed, "Read, 27 January. 1651 [2]." -A copy is among the Tanner Papers, Ii., fol. 219. He died February 9, 1652, •* Ueimer, 77, saj. 1 4 INTRODUCTION. from Archangel to Xarva, Reval, and Nvea, which afterwards figured so prominently in Bonde's mission. He was also to try to mediate an ajrreement l3et\yeen Eno^land and France. / Toward the latter part of the year Benjamin Bonnell Nyas commis- sioned as Swedish resident in London.^ On April 7, 1653, Israel La>:erfeldt arriyed, ostensibly to mediate a peace between England and the Datch on the ground of " the peace and welfare of the Protestant churches," but in reality for a yery different purpose. The spirit and object of his mission is shown by the much debated proposal which he made on August 3, 1653, to the effect that the Swedes should "con- tribute all their endeayours" to supply the English with such materials of war at a reasonable price as they needed from the Xorth (copper, iron, hemp, masts, etc.), in return for the priyilege of fishing off the coast of Great Britain; but this was to be on condition that Swedish vessels should suffer no further molestation and capture by English ships of war.- The letter of Parliament to the queen on Lager- feldt's return is dated October 29, 1653.^ Bonnell was continued as resident until 1655. Whltelocke^s Embassy, IGblf.} — Appelboom had found the English, now that their relations witli Holland were becoming strained, yery eager to close an alliance with Sweden, and they were much disap- pointed that he did not remain to complete it. Hitherto all advances liad been made by Sweden. They were now to come from Parlia- ment. On December 23, 1652, even before Lagerfeldt's arrival, it was determined to send an ambassador thither, and on December 31 ^"iscount Lisle Nvas selected. His instructions'" were not ready till ^larch 22, 1653. After the expulsion of the Rump, however, he asked to be excused on tlie plea of ill healtli, and it was decided to send Richard Salwev and Mr. Strickland in his stead.^ But Salwev 1 Tanner Papers, liii., fol. 1-11. Dated October 23, 1652. '• Read 22d of Febniary,^6'i2[:i] ." - Lagerfeldt's mission is usually referred lo as though its only significance lay in its religious character, of which, in fact, it had very little. There is a manuscript volume in the Public Record Office, "Council of State: Negociations with Sweden." S. P. Sweden, xi., containing copies of the various letters, papers, etc., exchanged in the course of the negotiations, in wliich little effort is made to conceal tht.nr real nature. •' Tanner Papers, liii., fol. 57. His letter of credence was dated January 20, 1G53. * Whitelocke's Journals of tlie Swedish Emlnissy, Reeve's edition. Ranke, Eng. Gesch.. iii.. 459. Heimer, ch. iv. Fries, Erik Oxcnstierna, 149, scvy. Thurloe State Papers, vols. i. and ii. There are many papers relating to this embassy in the private collection of the Marquis of Bath. Hist. MSS. Commission, 3d Rept., App., p. 192. y Thurloe State Papers, i., 227. cEarl of Westmoreland's Papers, Hist. MSS. Comm., 10th Rept., App. 4, p. 410. Cromwell to IXTRODUCTIOX. 15 beo-trod to be excused on the oround of "untitiiess throiiirh want of freedom of spirit and l)odily health." The Swedisli enil)assy was never popuhir and it was ditiicuk t>) persuade any cue to undertake it. Finally, however, Whiteloeke was frlii'htened into accepting- it.' He left England on the ()th of Xovember and arrived at Upsala on the 2()th of December, 1 6o3. Whitelocke's instructions- were identical with those of Lisle except in one point; but the diiference is noteworthy. The war with the Dutch had in the meantime lost some of its bitterness, and some of the more severe paragraphs relating to them were omitted. Yet even with this mitigation, the significance of the embassy still lay in its hostility to Holland. Whatever expressions may have been used pointing to an underlvino; relioious motive,'^ these onlv give evidence of the extent to which religious feeling prevaded public life in England at this time; but in the course of the negotiations these motives have no material significance.^ When AMiitelocke in his first private audience with the queen dwelt upon religious matters, he was met with pleasant raillery. " ]\Iethinks you preach very well, and have now made a good sermon," she said. In his next interview, however, when he showed her a list of the Parliamentary fleet, her demeanor was very different. " This is a gallant navy indeed," she said; "1 am exceedingly taken with the description of it. * * =^ Some of these ships of yours would do good service to open the Sound. What do you think fit to be taken R. Salwey, August 11, lG5o. informing him that the Council desires to send him with Mr. Strick- land to "Swethesland, a thing too long neglected by us already, and may be of greater im- portance than aTiy design we have of that kind anywhere else." Somewhat later, Cromwell spoke in a similar strain of the relations between England and Sweden.' "And the business is of exceeding great importance to the Commonwealth, as any can be ; that it is : and there is no prince or State in Christe ;dom with whom there is any probability for us to have a friend- ship, but only the queen of Sweden." Whitelocke's Swedish Embassy, p. 14. 1 •• Rather to go the journey in great danger than to stay at home in greater." Whitelocke's Swedish Embassy, i., 85. 2 ibid., i , 85, srq. The public instructions were dated October 21, 16J3, the private instruc- tions a week later. ■<Ib., i., 29, i^cq. Advantages of the Embas.5y to the Protestant Cause. *Even with Cromwell this motive does not appear to be nearly so prominent as it afterwards became " If I tind the queen willing to join with you," asked Whitelocke, " for the gainingof the Sound, and against the Dutch and Danes, and that heartily and hopefully, shall I put that business to the utmost and are you willing to enter into such a conjunction?" To which Cromwell replied, •• If you tind them inclinable to it, put it on as far as you can, and let us hear from you what you judge best to be done in it. Xo business can be of greater consequence to us and our trade, wherein the Dutch will endeavour to overreach us ; and it were good t-) prevent them and the Dane, and first to serve our own interest." Whitelocke's Swedish Em- ba.'-sy, i., 94. 1 6 INTEODUCTION. to open and make free the passage thereof?" '^It cannot be taken out of their [the Danes'] hands but by force," she continued. "Do you think that the Commonwealth of England will give assistance in that business? " " Madam, I think they will," replied Whitelocke, " upon such just and honourable terms as may be agreed." " Do you think they will send any ships for that purpose ? " " I believe upon fit terms they will." " AVhat would you propose as fit to be done in that busi- ness?"^ Here was the real point of contact between English and Swedish interests. The old Chancellor Oxenstierna, however, held back. He was too clear-sighted not to see what far-reaching changes in Sweden's policy such an alliance would have. He also questioned the stability of the existing o-overnment in Eno-land, althouoh his fears were somewhat allaved bv Cromwell's assuming the title of Protector. Pimentelli, the Spanish ambassador, who had much influence at court, advised Whitelocke to negotiate directly with the queen. But although she took much interest in tlie project of an alliance between Sweden, Eng- land, and Spain Avhich Pimentelli proposed to meet the existing alliance between Denmark, the Netherlands, and France, she was too much oc- cupied with her abdication to exert her authority in other matters. When Pimentelli found Whitelocke not inclined to admit Spain into the alliance, he too used his influence against it. Erik Oxenstierna, who conducted the negotiations during the ill- ness of his father, placed the greatest stress upon commercial matters, desiring permission for Swedish subjects to trade with America, and to fish on the coasts of (jreat Britain, and that English traders might be established at Xarva, Reval, and Gothenburg ; but Whitelocke pro- posed that these matters be left to future negotiations in England. The time was in fact unfavorable for deciding momentous questions of policy. The accession of a new sovereign and the close of the Dutch war mvAit hrhvx chanj^es in the council of both Sweden and England. It was therefore thouglit best to leave the matter unde- cided. The treaty which bears the date April 11, l)ut wliicli was not really concluded till April 2<S, provides in general . terms for "a good, firm, sincere, and perpetual peace, amity, alliance, and correspond- ence " but leaves all means bv which the alliance would be made 1 Whitelocke's Swedish Embassy, i., 258, seq. INTRODUCTION. 1 7 effective to liirtlKT uogotiations, for wliidi pm-pose it was uiulerstood an ainbassiKlor would l)e sent to Enodand. Tlie treaty was hut an ex[)ression, in general terms, of friendship and amity and was in laet a i)Ostponement of the whole matter. On May 20, W'hiteloeke took his dei)artnre, two weeks l)efore the accession of the new sovereign \\'lio was to continue, though under very dif- ferent cireumstanees, the policy of interference on the continent which had been inaugurated by his uncle, Gustavus Adolphus. Dll^LOMATIC RELATIO]N^S BETWEEjST CROM- WELL A]N^D CH.VRLES GUSTAYUS. Rcrival of SicecUsh Aggression and Necessity of English Support. — Ever since Swediii liad emerged under Gustavus Adolphus from its position uf comparative isolation it had been driven to seek English aid in its nndcrtakini>"s on the continent. The two nations seemed not onlv bv their cjnimunitv of relioion and similarity of national char- acter, l)ut by their mutual interest in opposing the commercial suprem- acv of the Dutch, as if destined bv nature to be each other's allies.^ When Charles Gustavus on his accession to the Swedish crown set out in his "endeavour to follow the example of his famous predecessors, which was to enlarge as well as defend their dominions/'" he was likel}', in view of the resentment already arous,ed by Swedish aggres- sion, to need English aid more than ever; for, with all the brilliant successes which had crowned Swedish arms, its position with regard to its neighbors at this time was a desperate one. Each success had been at the expense of some other state, until its extended border was threatened bv an unbroken circle of foes. Denmark was smarting under the disiirace of the treaty of Bromsebro, bv which it had lost not only the provinces of Holland, Jjimtland, Herjeadalen, and the islands Gottland and Oesel, l)iit also its monopoly of the tolls in the Sound. Brandenburg had been alienated by the loss of Pommerania and the petty acts of violence in settling its boundary. Mecklenburg had lost Wismar and the customs duties in its remaining ports. The German Empire had been brought into a position of commercial de- pendence, and had been compelled to yield to the Swedish intruder a voice in its imperial government. Ferdinand III. had nuuiy old ' Whitelocke's Memorials of English Affiiirs, 602 Also Lagerfeldt in the volume mentioned above. S. P. Sweden, xi. " For God and nature having so seated these two lands and nations, that neither a too great distance between both can deprive them of all communication, or ren- der it dilUcult, nor a too great vicinity make them obnoxious to the fatal animosities incident ordinarily to neighbors." This was a favorite argument at that time. 2 "The most Heavenly and Christian Speech of the Magnanimous and Victorious King of Sweden, Charles Gustavus Adolphus, on his Death-Bed, etc." Pamphlet, London, 1660. (19) 20 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN scores to settle, both as emperor of Germany and as king of Hungary. Poland, like Denmark, was in a state of chronic hostility, for various reasons, among others from the loss of territory. Finally, the rising Russian power was already conscious of the necessity of piercing the slender slip of Swedish territory which threatened to transform the Baltic into an inland sea. Some or all of these powers were only waiting for a favorable opportunity to turn the scale of fortune. To all this came a crowning danger. The success which had attended Sweden's efforts to get possession of the Baltic ports for the purpose of controlling trade, had brought with it the uncompromising hostility of the Dutch. Any attempt to extend this oppressive rule would in- evitablv be met by the despatch of an overwhelming Dutch fleet into the Baltic, the very heart of the Swedish dominions. It would seem as if Charles Gustavus' safest course under the cir- cumstances would have been to adopt a waiting policy with Walpole's motto, Qitieta non movere. But internal difficulties prevented. Sweden was too poor to wait. Its army must be kept together at all hazards, which could only be done by throwing the expense of its maintenance upon Sweden's enemies, i, e., by declaring war. But against whom ? The extreme danger of setting the surround- ing hostile forces in motion was not lost sight of. Christopher Bonde called the attention of the Swedish Council to the special danger from the side of the Dutch, in which opinion he was seconded by Wrangel and Wittenberg.^ He argued tliat if, as had been proposed, Poland were made the seat of the war which thev were about to declare, and Sweden thus left exposed, it must not be expected that Denmark and Holland, to say nothing of the German princes, would remain idle spectators. Affairs in this quarter must hrst be made secure by a double attack on Denmark, from Sweden and from Bremen. After the Danes had been subdued and the slow-acting States General not only divided and disconcerted, but fearful of renewed hostilities on the part of the English,^ the war against Poland might be undertaken with- 1 Bedenken des Sclnvedischeii Senats, iiber die Frage : Wer von den benachbarten Potentaten, well Krieg zii fiihren notig erachtet vvorden, zu attaquiren sei? Liinig, Staats-Goncilia, ii.,557. This meeting of tlie Council was held December 11, 1654. See, also, Carlson, Schwedische Geschichte, iv.. 39, seq. Following an ancient custom, two speakers were chosen to conduct the debate on the question under consideration. Christopher Bonde was chosen to defend the policy of renewing the war. 2Pufendorff', De rebus a Carolo Gustavo gestis, lib. i., ^ 57. CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 21 out unduly ex})(tsin<i: Swodi'u. Rut to this argument answer was made, and sustained l)y tlie ()[)inion of tlie Council, that any serions menaee to Denmark's existence or welfare would be resented not only by the Germans and Dutch but by the English as well ; ^ an o})inion wliii'h subsequent events proved to be well founded. The Swtxlish statesmen thus fonnd themselves confronted with a dilennna, either horn of which threatened to involve them in a war with Holland, to whose maritime strength Sweden was particularly vulnerable. There seemed but one alternative open, to secure the snp- port of a maritime power strong enough to hold the Dutch in check ; and who should this bo but the enemies of Holland, the English? It was possible, it is true, that this English aid might be dispensed w^ith. If Sweden's enemies were numerous, they were also weak and divided, and no one conld tell what effect a bold attack might have, or what circumstances might arise to prevent them from uniting. Yet, on the other hand, English snpport might proVe to be the very keystone to the whole Swedish position. Appointment of Swedish Ambassadors. — That Charles Gustavus appreciated from the first the impoilance which his relations with Eng- land might have, there is abundant evidence to show\^ It was some months before his plans began to take definite form,'^ and it was of conrse desirable to postpone the formal embassy to England until they had been fully matured. Bnt, in the meantime, a disquieting rumor, trifling in itself, showed the desirability of having a representative at Westminster to counteract certain influences unfriendly to Sweden which appeared to be at work there. It was said that Cromwell had expressed his surprise that Danzig and the Hanse towns had not of- fered their mediation between Sweden and Poland, since their interests lay so clearly in the maintenance of peace. This report troubled Charles Gustavns exceedingly. It was true the Protector conld hardly l)e expecte<l, now that he w^as at peace with both Denmark and Hol- land, to be as anxions for an alliance with Sweden as he had been the year before ; but could it be that he was now inclined to join these 1 "Und die Teutschen, Holl- und Engellander werden es niemals zugeben, dassDanemark von Schweden xmterdruckt, und die Nordischen Kouigsreiehe in eine, alien Nachbarn formidable Monarchie gebracht werden sollton." Liinig, Staats-Concilia, ii., 557. 2 For example, the favor shown to Whitelocke. Swedish Embassy, ii., 256 and 261. 3 ' ' Annu i slutet af 1654 svafande och obestamda, antogo dessa [konungens planer for den utrikes politiken] smaningom en fastare gestalt." Carlson, i., 88 (German trans., iv., 76). 22 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN powers whose interests lay in maintaininu; peace* in the Xortli? It was decided to send an informal embassy to England to inquire whether this report was trne. Peter Julius Covet ^ was chosen for the mission. His departure was delayed for some time l)y Cromwell's dela^' in the exchange of certain formalities,^ until a sharp reminder through the Swedish resident in London set the matter rio;ht. His instructions were dated November 25, 1654. He sailed from Gothenburg early in December, but did not reach London till ]March, being some three months on the way. The object of his embassy was to obtain the ear of the Protector in order to present the king's plans in a favorable light and to meet any misrepresentations which the Dutch or others might make as to his intentions, and, in general, to prepare the way for the more formal embassy which was to follow.^ Coyet Avas followed shortly by George Fleetwood, an Englishman in Swedish service, whose appointment proved to be exceedingly im- portant on account of his connection with Cromwell's family.^ He ^ Coyet was secretary and assessor in the Swedish commerce collegium, and in high favor Avith Charles Gustavus. He was only thirty-six years old, of handsome presence, we are told, and of considerable scientific and linguistic attainments. His name appears often in the records of the following negotiations, and the part he played, though not distinguishable from that of his colleagues, seems to have been important. Cromwell testified his regard by making him Knight of the Garter, and by a valuable present and a letter to Charles Gustavus commending him highly (Milton. Literie, 117). He played an important part in subsequent Swedish affairs, being one of the principal Swedish negotiators of the treaty of Roeskilde. 2 As soon as the festivities attending his coronation ceremony were over, Charles Gustavus had sent a letter to Cromwell announcing his accession and expressing a desire to maintain the existing friendship with him (Thurloe, State Papers, ii.. 37;i). Cromwell answered in a similar strain (Milton, Literaj, 78), but though his reply is dated July 4 (or July 14 ; see Mason's Life of Milton, iv., 636), it was not sent for some time, as I suspect through motives of economy. He hoped some less expensive way would present itself for presenting his compliments than through a special envoy. ( See Coyet's instructions. I S, in which he is told to decline to carry the Protector's ratification of the treaty of Upsalaback for him. in case he should be asked to.) The delay caused some apprehension in Sweden. Not only was Coyet held back by it, but it might indicate an indifference on Cromwell's part. There appears to be some correspondence in the Swedish archives between Coyet and Oxenstierna concerning the matter. See Fries, Erik Oxen.stierna, note 15, p. 352. '^Coyet's instructions have been printed by Treffenberg, "K. Carl X Gustafs instruction for Secreterarcn Coyet under dess beskickning till England ar 1G54. Ur Upsala Universitets Hand- skriftsamlingar. Akad. afh. Upsala, 1851." Pufendorif gives a more convenient summary of their contents in two passages, lib. i., §9, and lib. ii., §86, to the latter of which the reader is referred for details. Pufendorff, however, mentions some matters not included in the instruc- tions of November 25, for which I have not been able to trace his authority : but they probably rest upon some subsequent instructions. See Fries. Erik Oxenstierna, 130. ■* His brother, Charles Fleetwood, was Cromwell's son-in-law, and held a leading position in the Protector's court. He was lord-deputy of Ireland, a member of the council of state, one of the major-generals, and the officer highest in rank in the armies of the three kingdoms. He was in complete accord with both Cromwell's foreign and domestic policy, and wa^ so high in favor that it was said Cromwell intended him to be his successor. He was absent in Ireland when his bro'.her was sent as envoy extraordinary to England, but he returned in September, CROMWKLL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 23 was to proceed to Eiiolaiid uiuU'i- the pretense of looking after liis'pri- vate interests, and was to sonnd Cromwell's attitnde towards Sweden and the ])rospivts for a closer alliance, together with tlie conditions whicli Cromwell might be expected to demand, and also to obtiiin })er- mission to enlist six or eiuht thonsand Scottish recrnits for Swedish service. His instrnctions were dated May 15, bnt he did not reach London nntil Jnly. ]>nt the principal embassy was entrusted to Christopher Bonde. That Charles Gustavns should dispatch three envoys to England within so short a time shows what importance he attached to his rela- tions with that country. If this needed further confirmation, it is fur- nished by the tact that the one first intended for this principal embassy was none other tlian Erik Oxenstierna, the Swedish chancellor, who directed the foreign aftairs of Sweden from October, 1654, till his death.^ The news that he might be expected was received with satis- faction in England as a special mark of honor, but the press of busi- ness required his presence at home, and Christopher Bonde, who stood next to him in the commerce collegium, was named in his stead.^ In view of Bonde's warning against the Dutch, which we have already noticed, and liis extensive knowledge of matters of trade, with which his negotiations were expected to be chiefly concerned, his appointment appeared to be a most appropriate one. Bonde's instructions were dated June 14, 1655.-^ So far as the 1655. George Fleetwood entered Swedish service in 1629, when he conducted a troop of horse which he had raised in England to Gustavus Adolphus' aid. He rendered important services to Sweden, and received many honors in recognition of them. He was made successively Swedish knight, baron, lieutenant-general, and member of the council of war. This was his third mission to England. The other two missions, in 1630 and 1636, respectively, had also the object of raising troops for Swedish service, and both of them had been successful. The influ- ence which he was able to exert in England was so considerable that he was retained at the post until 1660. He must be carefully distinguished from George Fleetwood, the regicide, whose name appears so often in English records of this date, else one will be sorely puzzled at the double role which he seems to be playing. 1 Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, 22-2. He died October 23, 105G. 2 Bonde was one of the most trusted of Charles Gustavus' councilors, "a God-fearing, hon- orable, eloquent, and learned man," whom even his political enemies spoke of with respect. He had studied at Oxford in his youth, and probably had a fair knowledge of the English lan- guage and of English ways, which must have been of great value to him at the Protector's court, where Latin was not extensively cultivated. Though he was but thirty-three years of age, he had already tilled important positions, and was a member of several Swedish councils. But he was most at home in matters of administration and trade, in which he appears to have had Charles Gustavus' absolute confidence, especially in his somewhat ambitious plan for breaking up the Dutch monopoly of trade in the Baltic. 3 Riksregister. A copy is in the library of the University of Upsala. So far as I can discover, they have not been printed and I have been compelled to rely solely on Pufendorti', ii., j 88. 24 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN points left by the treaty of Upsala to be determined by farther nego- tiations are concerned, they a)'e essentially the same as those of Coyet. But as concerned the question of a closer alliance, it was otherwise. In place of mere suggestion or inquiries, he was authorized to make a definite proposal in the following terms : Cromwell should, in return for concessions in point of trade, place at the king's disposal and maintain at his own expense, as long as it might prove necessary, twenty ships of war, fully equipped and mannetl ; he should further guarantee the safety of the English Channel and the open sea for Swedish com- merce, should allow the king to recruit soldiers in England and to hire ships, and should grant to Swedish merchants certain advantages in England over other foreigners, the exact nature of which was not stated. The concessions which were to be offered in return for this support were, it must be said, indefinite and illusory. The king engaged not to interfere with English commerce in such ports and lands as he should conquer; the English staple in Danzig would not be interfered with, and might even be transferred to Riga ; English ships would be allowed the same advantages in Swedish ports as Swedish ships desig- nated half-free,^ provided the English would grant equal privileges to Swedish ships in other places, or some equivalent advantage. Bonde was also instructed to call the Protector's attention to the extraordinary value of the Baltic trade, and the possibility for still greater expansion, the undeveloped resources of the surrounding country and the rivers which flowed into it. The advantages of this trade had hitherto been reaped by the Dutch, but the king was now anxious to divide it with the Protector in return for the support which he asked. Thus behind the immediate grounds for seeking an English alliance is the shadow of this great project involving the destruction of the Dutch as a maritime and sea power. Domlnimn maris balticl in the hands of this ambitious prince would have become not merely the means of plundering the Dutch trade through exorbitant tolls, but the means of supplanting it altogether." The manner in which he would divide 1 Swedish free, half- free, and ordinary ships paid duties in the ratio of 3, 4, and 5 respectively. 2These plans were not entirely unknown in Holland. See, for example, the pamphlet enti- tled " Copye Translaet, van seecker Sweedsen Brief gcschreven aen den Konick van Sweeden, etc., door desselfs Rycks-Raedt, Heer Christer Bonde, etc., waer van de geintercipieerde Orig- eneele noch voor handen, ende onder anderen klaerlijck daer uyt te lesen is, Hoe ende Waerom de Sweeden tracten, de geheele Oosterse Negocie en commercie van Amsterdam nae andere CROMWKI.L AND CHAKLES (iUSTAVUS. 25 the spoils witli his Enghsh ally, however, was left for the future to decide. BomWs Arrind in Kngland ; Inffiienceof the Dutch. — As his royal master was on the point of embarkinu: for Poland, Bonde sailed for England on the l()th of June, 1654, witli a stately train of no less than 200 attendants, '^ all generally proper and handsome men," and arrived at Gravesend on the 18th of July.^ He was met on the fol- lowing day by Covet, who gave him a most flattering aecount of the Protector's attitude. The king's plans in the Baltic, he said, stood in no danger of being interrupted ; the Protector had spoken very openly with him. On the 28th of July, Bonde w^as conducted to London by the Protector's master of ceremonies, Oliver Fleming, where he was met by Whitelocke and Strickland on behalf of the Council. Three days of generous entertainment followed, after which came the first pul)lic audience.^ "^o ambassador had been received with snch elaborate ceremony since the late king's execution," wrote one of Bonde's suite.^ However, notwithstanding this flattering reception, the ground had been made somewhat unfavorable for Bonde by the well directed efforts of the Dutch ambassador, Xieupoort. After the treaty of peace l)etween England and the States General in 1654, Xieupoort had remained in England to negotiate a further treaty con- cerning matters of trade and to obtain some relaxation of English measures directed against Dutch commerce."* When Charles Gustavus' intention of renewing the war in the North was no longer concealed, it became his duty to keep in touch with the Protector's views concerning aflairs in this region. The republican party in Holland under the leadership of DeWitt had many interests in common with Cromwell, and it was by no means impossible that the two leaders might agree upon a common policy in Plaetsen en Quartieren, jae, uyt Holland selfs, (was 't mogelyck) op Vrecmde Ghewesten te diverteren, tot af breuck en niyne van de goede Ingeseetenen van de Provantie van Hollant en West-Vrieslandt, als mede der Stadt Amsterdam voorsz. Coppenhage, lG-26 October, 1658." 1 Carlson gives several incorrect dates with reference to these embassies to England. • This is described in detail by Whitelocke, in Memorials of English Affairs, 626. Whitelocke's description has been used by Masson in his account of Bonde's embassy. Life of Milton in Connection with the History of his Time, v., 246, s((j. 3 Extracts of Johan Ekeblad's letters have been published in Wieselgren's Dela Gardiska Arehivet, viii., 216, serj. They bear evidence to the spirit of exalting confidence which pervaded the embassy. "The Dutch ask trembling what the king proposes to do," he wrote. "The Sultan of Turkey sent an envoy to the Prince of Siebenburgen to enquire about this king who swallows up whole kingdoms ; what lands he had, where they lay, etc." ♦De Witt's Brieven, vol. iii., and Aitzema, Saken van Staet en Oorlogh, vol. iii.. 1155, seq. 26 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN the Xorth. On May 7, 1655/ Xieupoort wrote that news of the siege of Danzig by the king of Sweden had arrived in London, causing much uneasiness among English merchants. He thought a proposition for an alliance between England, Denmark, and the Netherlands for the protection of the Baltic trade might be listened to. Brandenburg, however, was distrusted in England and could not be included. In his next dispatch, May 14, he tells of two conferences which he had with Thurloe in which his references to a possible alliance had been well received. The Protector, he was told, had considered the matter with his Council and Nieupoort's suggestions had been most agreeable. The Protector had expressed his surprise that Danzig did not try to secure allies. It was evident that the king of Sweden's movements were a source of some apprehension in England. On June 10, Hol- land ordered Nieupoort to propose to the Protector an alliance with Denmark and the Netherlands for the preservation of the Baltic trade." Yet it will be remembered that at this same time Covet was receiv- ino- assurances from the Protector which he considered verv satisfac- tory. It might appear at first sight as though the Protector was play- ing a double and confused part; but it seems sufficiently clear that this was not the case. A clue to his motives is furnished by Nieupoort's account of certain conferences with Thurloe. On the news of the mas- sacres in Piedmont, Cromwell had sent letters to the various powers in Europe protesting or exhorting, as the case was, and among others to the king of Sweden.^ As soon as Charles Gustavus' answer had been received, said Thurloe, they could then confer together as to what course it would be best to adopt. The Protector's policy ^vould be largely influenced by the nature of the king of Sweden's reply ; in the meantime, he could be assured that nothing would be done to prejudice the interests of Holland. It would be a s^reat thino- continued Xieu- poort, anticipating tlie Protector's whole policy in the North, if the king of Sweden could be moved, even if through a subsidy, to turn his arms from the Protestant places in Prussia against the Roman Catho- lics in the hereditary lands of the emperor, and to consent to an agreement lAU of Nieupoort's and Bordeaux's dispatches are dated according to the present mode of reckoning. -Secrete Resolutien, i., 186. Pufendorff mentions Brandenburg and Poland in this connec- tion, but the attempt to reconcile England and Brandenburg was a ditl'erent matter, and was kept separate by the Dutch. The mention of Poland seems to be an error. 3 Milton, Literce, 91 ; but undated. The date is May 25. CROMWELL AM) CHARLES (iUSTAVUS. 27 with HoUaud, or witli Holland, Dcuiuark, and England, for the regn- lation of oommorce in the Baltic.^ Soon atUT, he snggested to Thurloe that Charles Gustavns inioht be persuaded to leave Danzig and Prus- sia undisturbed and seek his advantage in other ([uarters; to wliieh Thurloe had rv'})lied that he would do what he could to further such result.- On duly l>, Xieu])oort wrote of an interview in which the Pro- tector had said that "he also would rather that the king of Sweden would leave the seaport^ unmolested and seek his advantage in the hercditarv lands in the house of Austria, to which he would contribute what he could, and that he, too, understood perfeetly the consequences of the present Swedish designs." The plan of a common movement against Austria was quite in keeping with the negotiations with France wliieh he was then carrying on, and ^vhich Xieupoort was trying, not without some influence, to further. Such was the state of affairs on Bonde's arrival in Eupfland. Xieupoort, though he stood Avell with the Protector, and had actually anticipated and proposed the policy which the Protector was then cher- ishing and afterwards followed so persistently, was openly expressing his suspicion that England and Sweden had come to a secret under- standing;^ and was receiving in return assurances that the alliance with Holland m as the very ground and foundation upon which subse- quent treaties must rest.^ Cromwell, on his part, was uneasy at Swe- den's designs against Prussia, and was not at all inclined to permit them. Not oiilv was Charles Gustavus embarkino; in his new war without first consulting the Protector,^ but his relations with Charles II., though they had no particular significance, may have added to the !'■ * * * ende rorsoght my, dat wy niet jalours \vilden wesen, dat nogh met dien Ko- ningh nogh metiemant anders iet soude gehandelt werden tot prejudice van onsen Staet, ende als se ant woordt op den voorgeroerden brief souden ontfangen hebben, dat men dan t'samen soude konnen overleggen, wat best soude dienen gedaen to werden ; Het soude myns be- dunckens al een groot werck wesen, koude die Koningh siende de animositeyt van 't Paus- dom in Savoyen, ende ook hoe de Roomsehe Geestelyckheyt gestadigh woelt in de Erflanden van den Keyser, bewogen werden, al waere bet met een geldt-subsidie. als voor desen Gustavus, omme syne Wapenen in plaetse van tegens Protestantse Stedeu in Pruyssen, in de voorge- oemde Erflanden tot afweringe van de voorgeroerde oppressien te willen gebruycken, ende ver- nieuwen met onsen Staet ofte alleen, of gemeen met desen Staet ende Denemarckcn. een defensive Alliance met ons Reglemont van de Commercie ende Navigatie op de Oost-zee." ><'ieupoort to De Witt. June 11, 1G55. - Nieupoort to De Witt, June 18, 1655. 3 Ibid. < Ibid., July 30. 5 Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time, Stowe MSS., clxxxv., fol. 187. 28 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN Protector's distrust.^ The politics of Europe were in fact in an un- settled and confused state, in which radical changes were easily possi- ble, when the occurrence of the massacres in Piedmont decided the Protector as to a definite line of policy. The negotiations with France, the Netherlands, and Sweden came to a standstill until answers to Cromwell's letters on this subject had been received. A great deal de- pended upon the attitude of Sweden, and Bonde's arrival was awaited with keen interest. Rumors and First Dijjiculties. — The brilliant audience and the sub- sequent courtesies shown the Swedish ambassador did not escape the attention of the foreign ministers at Westminster. The Protector showed Bonde great attention and often took him to Hampton Court. " The other ambassadors, who have been here a long time but can hardly obtain an interview with the Protector, are very jealous of us," wrote Ekeblad, "and cannot imagine why we are courted so." This conspicuous favoritism was thought to have great significance, as in- deed it had ; but those who had most to fear from an English-Swedish alliance inferred too much from it. " I have advertisement from Eng- land from a very good hand, that there has been long a very good un- derstanding between the king of Sweden and Cromwell," wrote Charles II.'s secretary of state. " I have also advertisement, that Cromwell and the Swedish ambassador are exceedingly intimate. They dine, sup, hunt, and play at bowls together, and never was ambassador, or indeed any man, so much caressed and regarded by Cromwell as this man is (who is a person of great esteem in Swedland), nor did he ever seek the friendship of any one so much as of this king of Swede. Some believe that France will also join with these, but I know not how that may stand with the interest of France, for I am persuaded that Sweden and Cromwell will endeavour to render themselves the protec- tors of all the reformed churches in Germany, France, etc., or at least ])r()cure from them all a kind of dependence on these godly reformers. * * I am persuaded that if there be any such close league between 1 Charles Gustavus sent a letter to Charles II. announcing his accession, in which he gave him the title King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, arid professed his good will and de- sire to assist. A copy of it, together with Charles' reply, came into Thurloe's hands (Clar. S. P., xlix., fol. 333). Correspondents sent in alarming rumors of intended Swedish aid to Charles II. Charles sent an ambassador. Sir Wm. Bellenden, to Sweden, who of course accomplished nothing. "The king is kindly disposed, but cannot alter at once what has been done by the queen," he wrote. Nicholas Papers, ii., 73. All this was of little or no importance, yet Crom- well was sensitive on this point, and it may have had some influence. CRinrWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 29 Cromwell and Sweden, one part of the desion is to make Sweden master of the Baltie Sea, and that therein, and otherwise, it may prove as rninons to the States as to many others." ^ This rnmor f )nnd credenee elsewhere, to the benefit of both Crom- well and Charles Gustavus. On the one hand, Spain tnrned a deaf ear iov a time to the appeals of Charles 11.,^ while on the other hand not only was Anstria diseonraged from actively supporting Poland/^ but the Dutch wisely refrained from assuming an aggressive attitude, which would certainly have offended the Protector and lessened the chances tor a peaceful settlement. However, notwithstanding these marked favors, Bonde's efforts to hasten the ne2:otiations met at first with no success. Bonde mio;ht re- ceive the most dinners, but Xieupoort received the most conferences, and Dutch interests had full hearing;. Bonde, like his roval master, stood very much on his dignity. He complained that there was no proper place for him to confer with any one. He could not visit Thur- loe at his house, like a private solicitor, he said, as the Dutch ambassa- dor did. To be sure, commissioners were appointed to confer with liim, with wJiom he had his first conference on August 15; but Strick- land, who Avas thought to favor the Dutch strongly, was one of the numi)er, which made Bonde cautious, while the commissioners on their part were extremely noncommittal. They dare not for their lives com- mit themselves to anvthino^, he wrote. It was evident that while the Protector was willing to hear what Bonde had to propose, he was not prepared as yet to go further. Not only did his ill health, the nego- tiations with France, and other matters engage his attention at this time, ])ut it was no easy matter to reconcile Charles Gustavus' plans with his own. The verv reason why the Swedes were so anxious for an English alliance was the reason why the English -were unwilling 1 Nicholas to Jos. Jane S. P., Dom., Interreg., c, fol. 84. •-' harles II. 's ambassador at Madrid, Sir Henry Bennet, sent most discouraging reports. See letters to Uyde in Clarendon State Papers. " Indeed their [the Spaniards'] wariness in oftend- ing those [the English] , who insult them upon every day with doing them new injuries, I cannot enough wonder at. or that they can still imagine it possible to enter upon a new treaty with them." Hyde to Sir II. de Vic, Clar. S. P.. 1.. fol. 233. 3 Pribram, Archiv fur Oesterreichische Geschi^ate, Ixxv., 430. Pribram, however, puts it a trifle too strong when he says, ' Am Hofe Charles II. hat man nie gezweifelt dass welterschiit- ternde Plane getroflfen waren." They were strongly inclined to believe it, it is true, but they would hardly have sent an amVjassador to Charles Gustavus (p. 2S, note) had they not thought there was still some hope of the contrary. "If there be any such close league," said Nicholas in the letter quoted above. 30 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN to grant it. Charles Fleetwood told Bonde in an important interview/ that " not only the Protector, but everybody who understood such mat- ters, saw that a nearer alliance with Sweden was of the greatest im- portance to England, and that Bonde's proposals were most advan- tageous ; but the cause of the long hesitancy had been the help which the king wished in the Baltic, which seemed directed against Holland. England was now at peace with that power, and the Protector consid- ered himself in honor bound not to break it.'^^ Another cause for the delav was the awaitino; the outcome of the neo^otiations with France, to which the Piedmont incident had oifered some hinclerance.^ The choice between an alliance with France or Spain was the founda- tion upon which the Protector's whole foreign policy rested, and with it his policy in the North. He could not well proceed with the latter until the former had been settled beyond question. "The peace with France was followed with a war with Spain, and all future treaties were for the most part managed with some reference thereunto." ^ CromwelVs Policy in the North. — The Piedmont massacres and the peace with France were two events which clariiied the Protector's foreign relations. After this, his aims were clear and his methods of reaching them simple. It may perhaps be well at this point to take a more careful survey of Cromwell's policy in the North, of ^vhich w^e have already had glimpses in Nieupoort's letters. In all the Protector's foreign relations, there were three objects which he never lost sight of: 1. The maintenance and extension of the Protestant religion. 2. The prevention of the restoration of Charles II. 3. The encouragement and protection of English trade. 1. The tendency of recent historians of the English Puritan Revolu- tion is to lay greater stress on its religious character. That religious hatred which on the Continent had found free play in the Tliirty Years' War, and had burnt itself out to a certain extent, had been pent up in England only to break out fiercer than ever in shame at the ignoble part England had played in this struggle. Cromwell shared with his party its over-wrought religious feeling, its savage intoler- 1 October 23, 1655. Railing, p. 27, «v/. 2 " De Hcer Protector heeft my rondt uyt verseeckert, dat hy ten aensien van Sweden geen offres ofte invitatic, dat waeren de eygen woorden, sonde acnnemen als gemeen met Hollandt." Nieupoort to De Witt, October 29, 1655. 3Xieupoort to De Witt, August 20. 1655. •• Thurloe, Foreign Affiiirs in Cromwell's Time. CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 31 aiuv ill matters of civecl, aiiJ Its cuiistaiit dread of a violent Catholic reaction.' Already in Janiiarv, l(jo4, he thought he saw clear signs of the coming storm. He informed the Swiss ambassador tiiat the Pope had formed a j^lan for reconciling the ancient rivalry Ix'tween France and Spain and turning their united arms against tlie Protest- ants, first in Switzerland and then in the rest of the world. An alli- ance between England, Switzerland, and the Netherlands seemed to him the onlv means of averting the disaster." AVlien the massacres occurred in Piedmont, the already excited pul)lic went into a panic over the event and saw in it only the beginning of a series of similar horrors, all instigated by the Ivomish Antichrist. The part which Cromwell played in this matter is well known. It seems to me, in fact, to mark the point at which his hitherto somewhat vague plans for a Protestant alli- ance took detinite forni.^ Considerations of religion took for a time precedence in his councils over all other interests (p. 41). A treaty with France was preferred to one with Spain for this among other rea- sons,^ and a plan for a Protestant counter-alliance w^as conceived which 1 He also shared the prevailing illusion that Charles Gustavus was a second crustavus Adolphus. See Railing's account of his first private interview with Bonde, also his speech to Parliament, poi!^ Even in Scotland this idea was prevalent among the Puritans. "A. long .tract of dreams I have on the success of Charles, if God help him to begin where his heroic uncle Gustave left, but all these I put in God's hands, who knoweth his own appointments." Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, A. M., Principal of the University of Glasgow, iii., 371. " For myself, since the battle of Leipsig, I have loved the house of Sweden to this day above all o her foreigners, and by the strange successes God gives to their valour, I expect more good to the Church from them than from any others ; hoAvever, that unhappy Christina's apostasy and after miscarriages, has grieved my heart." Ibid., iii., 370. " I wish Brandenburg may re- turn to his old postour, and not draw ou himself next the Swedish armies, which the Lord for- bid ; for after Sweden, we love Brandenburg next." Ibid., iii., 371. " Det gemena folket talar uppenbarligen jm borsen och gatorna, att alia larda man hafva visat utaf Daniels Prophetia och andra skal, att en Konung i Sverige och England skola omkullkasta Pafvarnas sate och gifva den sauna Guds akallen ater sitt nitta flor och bruk igen." Sonde's letter of August 23, 1655. Railing, p. 18, note 1. 2For this incident, as well as for the religious character of the Protector's policy in general, see Stern's "Oliver Cromwell und die evangelischen Rantone der Schweiz," in Sybel's His- torische Zeitschrift. xl.. pp 52-99. 3 How prevalent the idea of a Protestant union Avas at that time, not only in England, but in the Protestant world at large, is shoAvn by Rakoczy's sending an ambassador in the latter part of ir.")4 to Sweden. Denmark, the Netherlands, and England, asking to be included in any such alliance which might be formed between them. The ambassador was everywhere well re- ceived. On May 4, 1655, he had audience in London, but it was May 24 before he was able to present his mission to the Protector. (The original is in the British Museum, Add. MSS., 4156, fol. 174.) Alexander SzilagA'i, in rn<:arische Revue, 1892, p. 635. The Protector took great in- terest in the Prince of Transylvania. Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 730. * "An alliance Avith France was most agreeable to the strict intelligence the Protector had, and intended to have Avith Sweden and other princes and states in those parts, Avhich Avere of the same interest." Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in CromAvell's Time. " He intended a good cor- respondence with the Protestants of France, and to lay the foun 'ation thereof in his interposi- tions to the French king on their behalf, that their edict for liberty of conscience might be 32 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN should include not only the powers of the Xorth, but Transylvania, Brandenburg, and even France. Brandenburg was given to under- stand that an ambassador would be well received in London and that the nearotiations with Sweden would be delaved somewhat to that purpose/ 2. This plan of a great Protestant alliance is the key to Cromwell's foreign policy. If it could be realized it would be found to have very desirable consequences in other than strictly religious matters. One of the chief dangers which threatened the Protector was the incessant plots of the royalists, who found support and comfort wherever Crom- well had enemies. So long as he had enemies he could not hope to isolate Charles 11. entirely, but his point would be as good as won if he could force the king to throw himself into the arms of the Catho- lics. The proposed alliance would have accomplished this result. Charles would have been deprived of the support of the Dutch, the active assistance of Brandenburg would cease, and, especially, the sup- port of France and consequently that of the Scotch, would be taken away. Charles II. would be thrown into the arms of the Spaniards and the Irish, of all nations the most hated in England. With the royal cause identified in the minds of the English and Scotch with these intense national animosities, sharpened by religious antipathies, Cromwell could feel himself from this side fairly secure.^ 3. The 2:eneral alliance would have the final advantao-e of briuffino: order into the chaos of commercial relations in the North. Cromwell, with all his religious fervor, did not underestimate the advantages of trade. On the contrary, he regarded it as a producer observed to them, whereby, and doing them on all occasions other good offices, the oppor- tunity whereof a good intelligence with the crown itself could only give him, he might draw them into a dependence upon himself and make and preserve an interest in France in all events, and do that also which would be most acceptable to England and to all other Protes- tants in the world, whose cause and interest he prolessedly asserted, as the head and Protec- tor of them, and he had not a greater consideration than this, in casting his alliance that way and in making war against Spain and the house of Austria, the head and Protector of the Papists.'' lb. " Ick ben bedught ten aensien van de rupture met Spanic. dat men sigh hier ten hooghsten sal gelegen laeten wesen om Sweden tegens den Keyser to engageren, ende een Ligue Offensive ende Defensive op te reghten tegens het Huys van Oostenryck, funderende deselve principalyken op het interest van de Religie." Nieupoort to De Witt, October 22, 1655. There was much truth in Cromwell's remark to Schlezer that he had preferred a French to a Spanish alliance from considerations of religion. Schlezer to the Great Elector, December 14, 1655. Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 729. lUrk. u. Actenst., vii., 717. • Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. The Clarendon State Papers are our chief source of information for the royalist plots. CROMWELL AND ClIAliLES GUSTAVUS. 33 of tlio sinews of war.' The Navigation Act and the eiforts of the Trade and Navigation Committee need only be mentioned in this ennneetion. It was not indifference to these interests, therefore, wliich canstnl liim to hold aloof from Charles Gustavns' offers of privileges in tlie Ixdtie, but the unsatisfactoriness of tlie offers and the momentous eonsenuences which their acceptance would have involved. Nieupoort was repeatedly assured that the Protector understood perfectlv the consequences of the Swedish designs against Prussia. Crom\veirs acceptance of Charles Gustavus' proposals would have meant more than Swedish control of the Baltic with all the evil consequences which that involved. It would have brought about just that unfavorable politi- cal combination which he tried until the end to prevent. Charles Gustavus would have been called off from his conquest of Poland and his expecttxl invasion of Austria, to turn his arms against Brandenburg, Prussia, and Denmark; and Brandenburg, Denmark, and Holland would have been added to the Protector's already sufficiently lonp; list of enemies. The dangers of such a course were plain, but the benefits not so evident. It had always been the policy of nations having commercial inter- ests in the Baltic to keep the control of the ports in this region di- videdjL not only on account of the customs duties, but because this was the great source of ship-building supplies, which could not be allowed to fall into the hands of any one power. I can find no evidence to show that the Protector was ever tempted to abandon this policy to secure special trading privileges. Nor, indeed, until, as we shall see, at the very last, when the control of affairs in the North was slip- ping from his hands, was he willing at any price to allow the exten- sion of 8^vedish power over the Baltic.^ This may perhaps be ex- })lained in part by the fact that he appears never to have mastered the details of the complicated affairs in the North, and was, in consequence, 1 Carlyle, Speech XVIIL 2 " Xiim Borussiam tanquam granariuin Europse haut tuto Svecorum arbitrio concedi insin- uabani." Puf., ii., \ 89. " Eoque Regem ad pacem cum Polonis ineundam urgebant. ac ut Borussia decederet. (luam ipsam & Cromvellus. amicissimum so quamvis professus, ipsi in- videbat; ac ut alibi emolumentum suum qutureret volebat." Ibid., iv., g 45. " Ick kan wel bemercken, datse gantsch ongaerne souden sieu dat Deuomarckcn of door Tractaet of door Waepenen aen Sweden soude vastgemaeckt werden." Nieupoort to De Witt, Brieven, iii., 92. •'* * * Ton est icy bien aise dele voir puissant et capable de donner de la jalousie a la Maison d'Autriche, mais aussy i>eut on trouver quelque inconvenient que tout les Ports de la mer Baltique tombent soubz une mesme pui.ssance, et lorsque I'interest particulier le permet, les Ministres de cet Estat, sont aussez bous mesnagers." Bordeaux to Brienne, July 17, 1656. 3 ( L 34 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN disinclined to break with the traditional policy of all commercial na- tions having interests there/ At any rate, he assured Schlezer that his concern was not so much to secure minor trading privileges, but that the dominium maris might be properly divided. If this were maintained, other matters would right themselves.^ But while the Protector could not bring himself to support Charles Gustavus in his eifbrt to unite all the countries about the Baltic into a new kingdom of the North, which would have controlled the tolls and the maritime supplies of the Baltic, neither could he look on idly while the Dutch and Danes destroyed the power of Sweden. His interest lay in maintaining the present balance and in keeping matters in this region quiet. If Sweden could only be brought to direct its arms in the proper channel, namely, against Austria, all this imrest in the North would cease. With the Protestant alliance an accomplished fact, the Dutch need not fear for their commerce, and the Swedes, un- deterred by fear of Dutch and Danish forces in their rear, could in- vade Austria, and, if they chose, extend their conquests in this direc- tion to the Caspian Sea.^ Thus, the whole northern policy of Cromwell may be summed up in one phrase, the general Protestant alliance. All his foreign under- takings, and he had a great many, would be served by it, and could be stated in terms of it. That many motives were involved in it there can be no doubt. I shall not attempt to decide which was the domi- nant one. Perhaps Cromwell himself hardly knew, for religious and worldly interests were inextricably interwoven in the politics of the 17th centurv. But we can at least sav that it was the relio^ious motiye which furnished the key to the solution of the complicated problem. Coming between the religious wars of the first half of the 1 7th century and the dynastic and commercial wars of the second lialf, it is not to be wondered at that Cromwell's policy was influenced by each of these 1 "Er konnte von den Ursachcn der Misshelligkeit. die zwischen E. Ch. D. iind dem Konig enlstanden waren, nichts bestandigos sagen, und es wurde ihm nielit zu verdenken sein, wenn er sich so eben nicht wiirde darin finden konnen ; dann die Oerter waren etwas weit abgele- gen ; hatte keine eigentliche (lemeinschaft mit diesen Landcn : die Intcresse, die jura, die privilegia Avaren etwas verwickelt und hicselbst niclit so gar wohl bekannt." Urk. u. Actenst, vii., 734. Also, lb., p. 745. 2 " Denn der Herr Protector hat die Maxime, dass er sich nicht um die Commercien so gross, als um das dominium maris (denen jene folgcn mussen) bekiimmert." Ibid., 737. 3 Kalling, ]). 24. The Protector was indeed willing that Charles Gustavus should extend his conquests from Poland south to the Caspian Sea, but he was not willing that he should conquer the territory from Poland north to the Baltic Sea. CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUST A V US. 35 interests, and, aceordino- to the course of political events, in varying dciJ-rees. Prof/re^sfi of the Ncf/ofiafions; Neiv Difficulties. — On the 24th of October the treaty with France was brought to a conclusion. On the 2d of Xoveniber there were sisrns that the Council was readv to take up the Swedish negotiations, for a committee was appointed to confer with the Protector concerning certain matters comnuuiicated bv the Swedish anil)assador. On the 14th of November a new committee was appointed to take the same matter in hand, and was ordered to meet daily until they had prepared something to offer, and "to report the same with all possible speed.'' ^ Yet the negotiations did not make the progress Bonde desired. The Protector's suspicions had been aroused that the king's religious pretensions were not entirely sincere. Bonde's statement to the first commissioners was unfortunate and mav have come to the Protector's ear.^ Though Bonde afterwards adopted a different tone, as in his intervicAv with Fleetwood, October 25, and endeavored to give all his proposals a religious color, the Protector was suspicious. It was nothing new, he said to Schlezer, to use religion as a cloak for one's ambition.'^ Nor did Charles Gustavus improve matters by granting religious toleration to the Catholics in Poland, for though Cromwell was exceedingly tolerant towards Protestant sects, his toleration did not extend even in the slightest degree to the adherents of Rome. Bonde had, indeed, a difficult role to play, and though it is not clear how he could have proceeded differently, the impression he made was not favorable. Tt ^vas doubted whether he had sufficient instructions to enter into an alliance such as was desired. The Protector always preferred playing the part of hammer to that of anvil ; consequently, whenever negotiations proceeded unsatis- 1 S. p. Dom., Interreg., Lxxvi., 364 and 374. 2 '-The Protestant religion had now nothing to fear," he said to the English commissioners at their first meeting. "The Catholics had made no attack on it except in Savoy, and that was a matter of little importance." Railing, p. 17. "As for religion," Bonde wrote to Charles Gus- tavus, " it could, to be sure, be made to serve as a basis for a closer alliance, but the mention of it in the treaty should be avoided : for its main purpose is to protect religion and its confessors in case they are attacked by Catholics, but not to try to convert the Catholics or persecute them through a Protestant inquisition ; but to allow them free exercise of their rights so long as they do not plot against us, and to seek to inlluence them through kindness." lb., p. 17. I do not know whether this was Charles Gustavus' opinion also. In response to Cromwell's let- ter concerning these massacres, he had sent a protest to the Duke of Savoy, which is now in the archives at Turin (Lettere di principi, Svezia). 3 Schlezer to the Cireat Elector, Januarv 11. 16')(3. I'rk. u. Actenst.. vii.. 733. 36 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN factorilv, or visiting ambassadors tried to avoid the direct issue and to bargain with liim, he immediately began to discuss the plan of treat- ing through his own ambassador at the other court. Nieupoort had noticed the Protector's dissatisfaction and had encouraged it. The plan of sending an ambassador to Charles Gustavus in Poland was earnestly debated for some time, but the obstacles seemed insurmount- able. Not only did. there seem to be no suitable person to send, but the journey to Poland at this time of the year was so toilsome and dangerous, and the communication so difficult, that Thurloe told Nieu- poort it might perhaps be better to begin the negotiations with Bonde, trusting that his instructions would prove sufficient.^ Bonde's impatience had at last grown so demonstrative" that it was necessary to make some show of coming to the point. Accordingly, on December 5, three commissioners were named to carry on the negotiations. They Avere Whitelocke/ Strickland, and Fiennes. It was by these that the commercial treaty of July 17 was signed. The matter of a closer alliance was negotiated by Bonde partly with them, 1 Nieupoort to Do Witt, November 19 and 26. Edward Rolt, who had been sent to the king of Sweden with the Protector's ratitication of the treaty of Upsala, was now with the king in Poland, begging constantly to be recalled. He received many marks of preference and honor, which of course did not escape the attention of the other ambassadors there, but his mission appears to have had no further significance. No news had been received from him for a num- ber of weeks, which must have convinced the Protector of the futility of sending another ambassador thither. Rolfs instructions and dispatches are printed in volumes iii. and iv. of the Thurloe Papers. The instructions are undated, but I judge from internal evidence that they were written between the 10th and 18th of July, 1655. - Whitelocke's Memorials, p. 633. 3 Whitelocke was the most favorably inclined towards Sweden of any one of influence in England. His partisanship appeared indeed so marked that he was taken severely to account for it in the Council, and when he attended Bonde's reception of the birth of the young Prince Charles of Sweden, he tells us that the Dutch ambassador treated him coldly. " It was a very great feast of seven courses, the Swedish ambassador was very courteous to me, but the Dutch and others were reserved towards me, and I as much to them." Memorials, p. 634. He was naturally proud of his treaty of Upsala, 1654, and was anxious that something further should come of it. He appears to have formed a friendship with the Swedish chancellor, Erik Ox- enstierna, during the latter part of his stay in Sweden. Fries. Erik Oxenstierna, p. 140. Coyet had instructions to visit him with assurances of the king's esteem, and to ask his advice as to the best method of proceeding in the objects of his mission. Instructions, 'i 9. Bonde sent his secretary with greetings as soon as he had landed at Gravesend, and it was his great desire to have Whitelocke appointed commissioner, which was prevented for some time by the strained relations between Whitelocke and Cromwell, though his knowledge of Swedish affairs and trade was of course very extensive. His name occurs constantly in connection with this em- bassy, and he is always to a remarkable degree friendly to Sweden. He was also a member of the new Trade and Navigation Committee. His Memorials of the English Affairs contains cojnous references to the negotiations after the appointment of the new commissioners on De- cember 5, 1655, just at the point where Kalling's narrative breaks off. The references in the following pages to the Memorials arc to the folio edition of 1732, or to the marginal pagination of the Oxford edition of 1853. :i CROMWELL AND CHARLP:8 GU.STAVU8. 37 l)ut })rin('ij>ally with tlio Prokx'tor hiinscll'. J^oiide's diarv gives the dates hut not tlic suhjeet-niatter of audiences wliich he^an to 1)6 fre- quent at tliis time, and wliicli lie tells us were important. Xieupoort also had more frecpient audienees, and his letters become more in- structive. Yet if Bonde exjx'cted that now finally his mission would make some progress, he was destined to be again disappointed. Another cause of suspicion and delay had arisen, for Charles Gustavus had turned his arms against the Elector of J^randenl)urg. It is true the initiative had been taken by Brandenbiu-g, but Cromwell could not be expected from the fragmentary reports which reached him to know this. He saw in it an attack on a Protestant ])rince (though to be sure an unfriendly one), for the purpose of getting control of Prussia. There were omnious signs of his displeasure. His relations w^ith the Dutch ambassador became more cordial and confidential. Bonde ex plained as best he could, but with little success, and it was even said that when he beo;an as usual to testifv to his roval master's devotion to the Protestant cause, the Protector had interrupted him. The project of sending an English ambassador thither was revived, and, naturally, the Dutch encouraged the plan.^ AVhitelocke's name had been mentioned very early, but he appears to have been somewhat distrusted. Af last, however, it was decided to send him in company with Chris- topher Pack, the lord mayor of London." But AMiitelocke objected strenuously, and "endeavoured by all handsome pretences to be excused that service."^ On the 14th of eTanuary Xieupoort wrote that the Protector had said, "If the king of Sweden desisted, wtII and good, but if he continued, he would require something else than ambassa- dors."^ The news that he had desisted was received bv the Protector with great pleasure, and in a reply to a letter announcing the birth of the 1 De Witt to Nieupoort, January 7, 1656. 2 He was later the mover of the Petition and Advice. 3 This incident attracted con.siderable attention at the time. Whitelocke devotes considera- ble space to it. Memorials, 633, .srr/. See alsoNieupoorf s dispatches and Pufendorff, iii., §76. 4 •• * * de Heer Protector seyde, * * dat hy albereyts met ernst over de sacken van den Koningh van Polen ende Pruyssen met Bond en Cojet hadt gesproocken, dat hy nogh naeder met haer sonde handelen, end byaldien de Koningh van Sweden desisteert, dat het dan wel sonde wesen, maer gaet hy voort, dat'er wat anders als Ambassadeurs sal verey.scht Avorden." Thurloe assured Nieupoort that England and Holland " niet superficielycken maer inner- lycken aen den anderen moesten gebonden houden." Ibid. 38 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN young prince of Sweden lie expresses his satisfaction at the treaty of Konigsberg in the following terms : " For we make no question but the wresting of the kingdom of Poland by your arms from the Papal Empire, as it were a horn from the head of the Beast, and your peace made with the Duke of Brandenburg, to the great satisfaction of all the pious, though with growls from your adversaries, will be of very great consequence for the peace and profit of the Church. May God grant an end worthy of such worthy beginnings ! ^' ^ This " we look upon here as a very good advantage to the Protestant cause,'' wrote Thurloe, '^ hoping that if the SAvede can settle his affairs in those parts, he may be a great succour to the Protestants, who are every- where threatened by the Popish party.'' ^ Both these letters bear traces of the renewed apprehension of Cath- olic aggression which spread over England at this time.^ The Pope was endeavoring to effect a union of France and Spain, and it was re- ported that Queen Christina was going to Paris in the interest of it. "The general peace between the Popish party advanceth," wrote Thurloe to General Montague on April 28. "It is probable that a truce may be agreed upon between Spain and France for six years," he wrote on the 1 3th.^ These movements were watched closely by the Protector. They were partly favorable and partly unfavorable to the Swedish designs ; for while they made him more zealous in the cause of the Protestant union, he was still less inclined to proceed in it with- out the Dutch. If a Catholic league were effected, it would as a 1 Milton, Literse, 110. See Masson, v., 246, seq., whose translation I have used, for a detailed account of this letter ; but he seems to me to miss the point of it when he ascribes its lauda- tory tone merely to a desire to propitiate the king for the delay in Sonde's negotiations. This explanation would rob the passage I have quoted of its significance. As a matter of fact the Protector was in good humor with Charles Gustavus for the moment, and for the reasons given. 2 Thurloe to Pell, February 7, 1655-6. Landsdowne MSB., 753, fol. 259. See also Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 735. 3 " Wie ihm aber sei, so wird man alhicr je langer je mehr in dcr Opinion confirmiret, dass aus dcm jetzigcn Wesen ein rechter generaler und pur lauterer Religionskrieg werden werde." Schlezer to the Great Elector, March 16. Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 741. Ibid., 747. * Carte MSS., Ixxiv., fol. 52 and .54. Also Puf., ii., §91. It was this lack of cordiality and mu- tual trust thit prevented the co-operation of England and France in the North, notwithstanding the similarity of their aims, of which they were fully conscious. "* * * il est d'ailleurs, autant de I'intcrest du Protecteur que de Sa Ma'te que la tranquillite ne soit pas si establie en Allemagne, ny les jalousies si esteintes, que les Forces de I'Emporeur ayent libcrte de venir a la solde d'Espagne." Bordeaux to Brienne, May 22. "Je parlay [to Thurloe] des Ditferens entre le Protectour et des Provinces-Unies, et soubzles nom des celles-cy, des affaires de Suede, de la jalousie que ses progrez luy donnoient, et de I'avantage que la France et I'Anglet're re- cevroiont si ceste Couronne tournoit ses armes contre le pays de ceux qui envoyent du se- cours a I'Espagne." lb., June 20. CROMUEI.L AND ( HARLES GUSTAVUS. 39 matter of course espouse the cause of* Charles II. It was impossible to drive the Dutch and Brandenburo- to that side also. The first stage in the realization of tlie Protector's great foreign policy remained, therefore, now, as before, the pacification of the powers of the North. The Treaty of Kdnigsberg did not bring this about, but it was a long step in that direction. The more difficult task of reconciling Sweden and the Xetherlands yet remained. '^ It is true," wrote Thurloe,^ "there is some jealousy between him [Charles Gusta- vus] and the Dutch, and some unkindnesses have passed between them, but my Lord Protector is resolved to use all possible endeavours to unite and reconcile them." ^ Two Proposals for an AlUance. — On January 31, after much im- patient chafing on the part of the Swedish ambassador, articles for a treaty on the basis of this policy w^ere submitted to him. But the as- tonishment ^vith which they were received, betrays at once ho^v much the demands of Charles Gustavus and Cromwell w^ere at variance and how little Bonde had succeeded in fathoming Cromwell's real inten- tions." In an interview^ with Charles Fleetwood, Bonde expressed his indignation without measure,^ though to the English commissioners he appears to have been more reserved. "The ambassador seemed much unsatisfied with divers parts of the articles," says Whitelocke, "and said that he had no commission to treat of any matter con- cerning tlie United Provinces to be included, and was much nettled at that business. In discourse touching a general union of the Pro- testant interests, he said it would be a difficult work ; and as for his master's falling upon the emperor, he said that they in Sweden did not wish it to be so, because they doubted that then Sweden A\ould be 1 In the letter to Pell quoted above. 2 Bonde would not have been so taken aback at the nature of these proposals if he had had the privilege of reading Nieupoort's dispatches. As early as September 28, Xieupoort had written : " * * * de Protector seyde, dat het best sonde wesen Sweden mede te bewegen tot een gemeene Alliancie met hem, Engelandt, Denemarcken, de Geunieerde Provincien, ende den Keurvorst van Brandcnburgh op te reghten, in dewelcke men den anderen sonde verseeck- eren de vryheyt van de Commercie ende Navigatie." "* * * hy [Cromwell] meende om een vast ende solide werck te maken, dat men Sweden behoorde te inviteren, omme met dcsen Staet, Denemarcken, de Geunieerde Provincien ende den Heer Keurvorst een naeder defen- sive Ligue te maken, ende voorts discourerende, seyde, dat als men die ook offensive sonde willen maken, tegens het Huys van Oostenryck, dat Vranckryck daer mede wel toe be te brengen sonde wesen." Nieupoort to De Witt. January 14, 1G56. One infers from various phrases in Pufendorff that Cromwell had endeavored to make the matter clear, but that Bonde, in his impetuous desire to believe otherwise, did not give the Protector's words due weight. 3Pufendorff, iii., §77. 40 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN neglected. He declared his opinion to be, not to meddle with the great business of the Protestant Union ; nor to have to do with the United Provinces in this or any other treaty ; but he said that they might send to the king his master at their pleasure, and have a fitting answer."^ Cromwell's suspicions that Bonde was not authorized to enter into an agreement such as he desired was well founded. The negotiations were scarcely interrupted by this disagreement. In consequence of the Protector's proposal to send an ambassador to Charles Gustavus, new instructions had been sent Bonde, which he re- ceived on February 8, so that the conferences could be resumed with hardly an interruption, with wider powers and better prospect of suc- cess. The favorable outcome of the mission still seemed by no means improbable. There had been from the first two possible ways of com- ing to an agreement; either Cromwell might be bribed, as it were, to undertake with Sweden the spoliation of the Dutch trade, or Charles Grustavus must allow his arms to be directed against Austria. The first alternative had already proved impracticable. Bonde was in- structed not to renew his oflPers of trading privileges, since the English did not appreciate their value. But it seemed that Charles Gustavus must be driven to accept the second alternative. Affairs in Poland were such that the support of Cromwell seemed indispensable to Swe- den. Lisola reported at the close of 1655 that everybody in the king's following admitted that another war must follow the one then in prog- ress, though there was a difference of opinion as to with whom. Some thought with Austria, some with Russia or the Turk, some with Den- mark. If it proved to be with Austria, England and Sweden would have a common cause ; if with Russia, England could be of the great- est aid in destroying the port of Archangel and drawing the Russian trade to the Baltic; if with Denmark, the Netherlands must first be overthrown, to which end the support of England was indispensable." Nevertheless, Charles Gustavus could not bring himself to make the required concession. He tried in an ingenious manner to avoid the di- rect issue. But no subterfuge could be ingenious enough to satisfy Cromwell, who ^vas not the man to be either trifled or bargained ^vith.^ The unsuccessful outcome of Bonde's mission could now be foreseen. 1 Whiteloeke's Memorials, 634. 2 Ferdinand Hirsch in Sybel's Historische Zeitschrift, Ix., 478. 3 Gardiner, vii., 194. CROMWELL AND CHARLE.S (JU.STAVUS. 41 "The Swedish ambassador," says Whiteloeke, "received new ad- vices from the kino- liis master, concerniug the great business of unit- inof the Protestant interest; and owned that he had sufficient instruc- tions to conchide upon the general ; but that [)articulars could not so soon be determined, nor so well as upon the place ; that it would be a difficult matter to unite the several l*rotestants who have different in- terests, and that it would prove a long business : therefore his opin- ion was, that it was not a seasonable time for a general, union of the Protestant interest. But that if the king of Sweden and the Protector made a conjunction first, they might fall upon the emperor and the house of Austria, which would be of great advantage to England, es- pecially now they had war with Spain : and that some supply of money and men afforded to the king upon such a design, would be of more benefit to the Protector than the sending out of great fleets to the Indies, and to the coast of Spain, which would return no benefit to this nation." But "the opinion of the Swedish ambassador was plainly to be collected, not to admit the Dutch to be joined in a treaty with us."^ On February 15, a plan for an alliance, ostensibly on this basis, was presented by Bonde, the details of which are stated so con- cisely by Whiteloeke that I shall quote the passage below.^ The negotiations for the next few weeks turned upon this Swedish proposal. Cromwell, in his desire to keep the peace with Holland and to direct the Swedish arms against Austria, demanded that the alliance be directed expressly against Austria, Poland, and Charles Stuart. Cliarles Gustavus, however, in spite of what Bonde said to the con- trary, wanted to leave the matter of attacking Austria more or less open, to be decided according to the future course of events ; but the treaty of alliance must be so worded as to be effective against the Dutch and Danes. Consequently, he demanded that no party should be expressly named, but that it should be made against all their ene- mies. If Cromwell would not guarantee him his Polish conquests, es})ecially against Denmark and the Netherlands, he wrote on January 20, tiie alliance would be of little advantage to him."^ Cromwell, on the other hand, demanded that the league should be offensive and 1 Whiteloeke, Memorials, 033. 2 They are also given by Pufendorff (iii., g 75) under date of January 6, presumably the date of the instructions which Bonde received on February 8. 5 Pufendorff, iii., 3 75. 42 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN defensive, in order that he might be sure that Charles Gustavus would carry out the agreement. But Charles Gustavus wanted a defensive league only. Cromwell's proposal, he said, would be regarded and accepted by Austria as a declaration of war. Finally, while both Cromwell and Charles Gustavus professed to have no stronger interest than the maintenance of the Protestant cause and the promotion of the Protestant union,. they disagreed as to the best method of bringing it about. Cromwell was for immediate union of all the Protestant pow- ers. Bonde dwelt upon the difficulties of such an ambitious plan, and proposed the union of England and Sweden as a beginning, to which other powers could afterwards be drawn in. Even Nieupoort objected to Cromwell's plan as too ambitious,^ but it seems to me characteristic of its author. All these diiferences appeared during the whole course of the ensuing negotiations, and both sides held to their views with great presistency. That the negotiations proceeded so slowly is explained by the Protector's occupation with other matters. The complaint of the slowness with which business was dispatched was general among the ambassadors. It was almost impossible to obtain audience.^ Conse- quently, though Bonde's proposition was made February 15, it was some weeks before he began to realize that they were to be of no avail. But as the prospect for an agreement became more distant and it began to be evident that the king had all and more than he could at- tend to in Poland, the Protector began to grow cold.^ At this Bonde's wrath knew no bounds. He was endowed with a full share of north- ern vigor, and expressed himself accordingly. " In his country," he said to Whitelocke, ^^ when a man professed sincerity, they understood it to be plain and clear dealing ; that if one were desired to do a thing, 1 Nieupoort to De Witt, January ^14, 1656. 2 Schlezer to the Great Elector, April 25, 1656. Bordeaux to Brienne, May 29, 1656. ^Thurloe sent General Montague (Carte MSS., Ixxiii., fol. 13) a most discouraging account of Charles Gustavus' affairs, " who will meet with many difficulties more to keep his con- quests than he had to make them." The Cossacks and Tartars were on the side of Poland, Danzig was disposed to hold out to the last extremity, and a war with the ISIuscovites appeared very likely. " These things make me think that the Swede is like to have a hot summer of it, especially if we add to what is said before that the States General are sending 48 ships into the Baltic Sea to oppose him also, and are labouring all they can to engage Denmark with them. Some of the 48 ships are already sailed, but j'et nothing is pretended by them but fairness, and to have no intention but to preserve their navigation and commerce; but the Swede knows their meaning." There had been rumors of the king's defeat current in England for weeks together, which were readily believed. CK0M\VP:LI. AM) CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 43 if lie nu'aiit to do it, ho would siiy, yea, and do it accordingly: but if lie did not intend to do it, tluMi lie would at tlie first desire to be ex- cused, and not seem at one time to be willing to do it, and at another time to deny it, * * that he should have l)een contented if he might have had the honour to have laid the foundation of that great business for the glory of God, to unite the Protestant interest; and the particulars thereof to have been left to a new treaty with the king, by an ambassador from the Protector, when there might be full time to consider all grounds and circumstances thereof."' At a conference a few days later Whitelocke was commissioned by the Protector to visit Bonde and assure him of the sinceritv of the Protector's attentions. ^^According to the direction of his Highness," he tells us under date of April 7, '^ I went this morning to the Swed- ish ambassador, and delivered to him what I was directed from the Protector, as much to his Highness' advantage as I could improve it; and endeavoured to satisfy the ambassador that his Highness' inten- tions and inclinationsas to a nearer alliance with the king of Sweden were the same still as at first, and that he had a very good inclination to it, and was reallv desirous of it. ''The ambassador answered, 'That perhaps his Highness had no great mind at the first to a nearer alliance with the king of Sweden, and so might have the same intentions still : That he could not but wonder that his Highness should heretofore express himself so well inclined to that nearer alliance, and at his last audience to be so cold in it, and of another opinion tliaii he was before; which would make him seem to his master either negligent as to his service, or not at all thought worthy of regard here ; but he desired to know a certain answer, ay or no, whether he would do it or not ; and if he had no mind to it, that then there might lie a dispatch of what was left to be done upon the treaty made by me, and so he might kiss the Protector's hand and re- turn to his master.' "I, seeing him in such a humour of discontent, sought to divert him, and to satisfy him that the Protector was still very well inclined to the point of a nearer alliance with the king of Sweden, but found it diffi- cult to make him of that persuasion ; yet thought it fit to demand of him what those propositions were which he delivered to the Protector 1 Whitelocke's Memorials, G37. 44 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN concerning the nearer alliance. Whereupon the ambassador showed me the propositions he had delivered in to that purpose^ which were, ' To have a league defensive contra omnes gentes, and offensive as to the maintenance of the treaty of Augsburg ; that the Protector should con- tribute 200,000/. per annum to that design, when undertaken, and the king should have 30,000 foot and 6,000 horse in service upon it.' I asked why his excellency put the business upon the maintenance of the treaty of Augsburg, whereto England was no party ; and why rather it might not be against the house of Austria, whereof the emperor was one branch, and the king of Spain another; and said, ^As to the contribut- ing of money, he knew the Protector was not in a condition at this time to spare money, having such vast occasions of expense at present for maintenance of his navy, and by occasion of the war with Spain.' The ambassador replied, 'That he did believe the Protector was at present in no condition to part with much money, and that there would be some time before this design could be set on foot; by which time probably the Protector might be better able to spare money than now he is ; and that he thought it would be better husbandry for Eng- land to spare 200,000/. a year for this war, which would be a good diversion, and trouble the king of Spain more than we do by spend- ing two millions a year upon our fleets, and in sending to Jamaica. That it was true the treaty of Augsburg was not concerning the Eng- lish nation, but the Protestants of Germany were highly concerned in it, and consequently all Christendom ; and the emperor having broken that treaty in many points, there was a just ground thereby of falling upon him; and the reason why he mentioned the maintenance of that treaty was, because France was already obliged in a treaty with Swe- den for the maintenance of the treaty of Augsburg; and England joining likewise therein, France would be engaged with them, and that crown was a good balance. AYhereas, if tlie union with the king of Sweden should be against the house of Austria and the king of Spain, it would cause the peace which was so much endeavoured between France and Spain to be brought to effect; and France would hardly be brouglit into such an union against the liouse of Austria, because it would seem too much against the Papists in general, wherein France would be shy to join.' " This Swedish proposal and its unfavorable reception mark the last CROMWELL A>'D CHARLE.S GUSTAVUS. 45 phase of these negotiiitions which luivc any interest fur us. Though thev were continued for some months in a desultory manner, it was more for the purpose of keeping up appearances before the Dutch, tlian with the expectation of a favorable outcome. The relations be- tween England and Sweden had in fact come to this unsatisfactory stage, that each party sought to involve the other but to avoid commit- ting itself. The fatal objection to the Swedish proposition from the Pro- tectoi'^s point of view was that it would have been an agreement by which Sweden nu'ght have attacked Austria, but not one by which it must have done so. It would also probably have been construed by the Dutch as a menace, and it contiuned elements foreign to the matter inTianth The Protector complained that he did not know what might be demanded of him under cover of the treaty of Augsburg. The Swedes, on the other hand, complained that Cromw^ell was trying to involve them in a war with Austria to further his own interests, only to abandon them to make shift as best they could, when these had been secured. Cromwell had refused to grant the subsidies asked for; indeed he could not. It was seldom that he was not in want of money, but the letters of this date show tliat it ^vas a time of special embar- rassment. He argued, therefore, that as w^ar with Austria was unavoid- able for Sweden, the king had an equal interest in it with England and should not demand subsidies;^ thus showing that Sweden's fear of having to bear the brunt of the struggle was not without foundation. A Commercial Treaty ; Bonders and Coyefs Departure. — AMiile these fruitless negotiations concerning a nearer alliance and mutual aid had been going on, there had been negotiating, almost independently of them, a treaty of commerce, which was brought to a conclusion on July 17. It liad little political significance and consequently lies out- side the sco})e of this paper; yet it may be well to mention some of the matters determined by it. The plan to transfer the English trade from Archangel to the Baltic,^ though pressed hard by Bonde, finally came to nothing. The English merchants feared the Sw^edish tolls more than the long and perilous journey through the Arctic Ocean and refused to make the change. The matter of contraband and the closely allied matter of passes were 1 Pufendorff, iii., g 78, with the marginal date March 7. 2Kalling, p. 20, gives some interesting details. 46 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN the subjects of much contention and of some bitter words. The war with Spain Avas chiefly naval, and the English were determined to cut off the naval supplies of the Xorth from their rivals, and to maintain a strict search in order that they might not be smuggled under false passes. They therefore proposed a list of contraband articles which, Bonde averred, only needed the addition of copper and iron to com- prise a complete list of Swedish products. The discussions over this point occupy a large part of the pages which Whitelock gives to these negotiations. Bonde was forced in the end to give way, though his instructions required him to refer the matter to Charles Gustavus for ratification.^ In the matter of passes the Swedes fared somewhat better. The request of the Swedes for permission to recruit six or eight thousand Scotch for the king's service was at first refused" until the return of the English fleet from the West Indies, after which the Protector's aflkirs would be more settled. Permission was aftenvards granted, chiefly, it would appear, if not entirely, through Fleetwood's influence. The reports are so confused that I cannot discover how many men were actually raised. The number must have been large, but some of them, at least, did not fulfill what was expected of them.'^ The Swedes were not in the least grateful for the favor, but regarded it as serving Cromwell's own interest,* for which view there was at least some color. ^^ ^ As to the trading privileges to be granted the English in return for ' aid against the Dutch, of which we hear so much during the first part of Bonde's embassy, and so little during the last, I regret that I have not been able to discover exactly what concessions were oflPered. It seems to me probable that Bonde spoke in general terms merely, and did not descend to particulars. At any rate he made but little im- pression on the English, and in the new instructions received on Feb- ^ Coyet's instructions, § 14. This is why it forms a special article of the treaty. Pufendorff gives an abstract of the treaty (iii., § 81), and also publishes the whole text in the appendix. Dumont gives the main part of the treaty, but not the supplementary articles. Tom. vi., part ii., p. 125. 2Rolts' instructions, par. 6. Thurloe Papers, iii., 418. Thurloe told Nieupoort they were re- fused out of consideration for Dutch feelings. 3 "The levies of England which are sent over hither, signify little. They find not things answer promise or expectation, which makes them mutiny or run away, to the dishonor of our nation." Meadowe to Thurloe, June 29, 1G5S. Eng. Hist. Review, vii., 737. * Pufendorff, ii., §92. 6 Charles II. to Lord Leven. Clarendon S. P., 1., fol. 120. CRO>nVEI.L AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 47 riiarv 8 lie is told not to press the matter further. There is in the Public Record office an undated paper containing ^' ])ropositions in order to a treaty witli Sweden,"' which probably belongs to this }K3- riod. It asks for lower custom duties and more freedom in the hand- ling and sale of goods. But to English propositions of this kind Bonde objected that ^' the demands were not equal. " " All concessions were, when it came to definite particulars, found to rest after all on strict reciprocity. Cromwell's letter to Charles Gustavus on Coyet's departure is dated April 17, 1656.^ On May 3, Coyet received the order of Knight of the Grarter and a valuable present from Cromwell.^ ^Mlitelocke men- tions him again under date of May S/' but he must have sailed soon after. Bonde was ready to leave in July, but the presents which the Pro- tector intended for him were not ready, so he staid on until Septem- ber 3.*^ In his letter of credence, which extols him highly, we read : *'As for the transactions that yet remain, we have shortly to send your majesty a special embassy for those, and meanwhile may God preserve your majesty safe, to be a pillar in his Church's defence and in the affairs of Sweden."'' The failure of Bonders mission was generally attributed to Xieu- poort's influence.^ This w'as certainly the proximate reason, but a deeper reavSon was perhaps the divergences between the aims of the two rulers, neither of whom was in the habit of making concessions. The doubtful state of Charles Gustavus' fortunes and Cromwell's financial embarrassment also had undoubted influence.^ Fleehvood Remains in London. — After the departure of Covet and Bonde, Swedish interests were leff in the hands of Fleetwood, who 1 S. p., Sweden, 165G. 2 Whitelocke's Memorials. G35. •■'Milton, Literte, 117. * Whitelocke's Memorials, 644. 5 Ibid., 645. ''" * * * I'Ambas'r s'est retire apres avoir receu becoup de marques extraordinaires." Bordeaux to Brienne, September 11. ' Milton, Li terse, 125. 8 " Der jetzt a tout force regleret." Schlezer to Waldeck, June 6, 1656. ' "Ceux qui croyent co^noistre I'estat des affaires Doraestiques du Protecteur. jugent que ce n'est pas le temps de prendre aucune deliberation sur celles de dehors, et moins encore de s'engager dans une Alliance qui renouvelle la guerre avec les Provinces-Unies." Bordeaux to Brienne, August 2.3, 1656. ^ 48 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN kept his character of ambassador secret in order to frequent the court with greater freedom. So easily could he do this under cover of his family connections that it was not till December that Xieupoort dis- covered his real object/ There appears to have been no special nego- tiations for some time, although the Protector had not abandoned the plan of a closer alliance. On June 29, before Bonde's departure, the Council voted "that his Highness be reminded of speeding an am- bassador into Sweden/^ ^ and although the Protector's relations with the Dutch were already less cordial,^ the mediation of a peace between Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands was still the keystone of his policy in the ISTorth.^ On August 21 he wrote to the States General earnestly deprecating the disagreement between the United Provinces and Sweden, and urging the necessity of union amongst .Protestant states in opposition to Spain. ^ During this same month he Avrote to the king of Sweden, and on December 4 to the king of Denmark'' in much the same strain. But on December 1 Xieupoort wrote that he heard no more of sending an ambassador to Sweden. The calling of Parliament, the war with Spain, attempts to raise money, royalists and assassination plots, and the Petition and Advice were sufficient to keep the Protector occupied until well into the follo^^•ing year. Even as late as July 29, 1657, Xieupoort thought domestic matters occupied the Protector's attention more than foreign aifairs. Bremen. — But, in the meantime," there had been important though fruitless negotiations going on that Xieupoort knew nothing of. Ever since the beginning of the Polish war, the king of Denmark had been waiting for a favorable opportunity to strike back at his old antagonist. As the position of Sweden became more difficult in the spring of 1657, the attitude of Denmark grew more threatening, and it was evident 1 Nieupoort to De Witt, December 1, 1656. 2 a P. Dom., Interreg., Ixxvii., fol. 190. 8 " I like not the carriage of the Hollanders ; our ships of war and theirs scarce ever meet in the Channel but they have some scuffle or other." Thurloe to Montague, August 28, 1656. Carte MSS., Ixxiii., fol. 26. * " Les affaires de Siiede et de Pologne le touchent darvantage, et il songe encore a une Union estroitte avec cestc Couromie, la France, le Dannemark, et les Estatz-Generaux, comme a un moyon asscure de balancer la puissance de la Maison d'Autriche." Bordeaux to Brienne, No- vember 27, 1656. Also Bordtjaux to Mazarin, December 4, 1656. 5 Milton, Literae, 130, and Thurloe, v., 330, from which the date is taken. The reply of the Dutch is annexed, dated September 22. <> Milton. Literse, 151, but without the day of the month. The original in the Danish archives is dated December 4, 1656 (Macray). ' Pufendorft' gives the marginal date as February 13, for the following negotiations. CROMWELL AND CHARLPIS GUSTAVUS. 49 that a rin)tiire miglit soon bo expected. Charles Ciiistavus was siilier- iiig ehieHy Iroiu a hiek ul' money, and turneil again to Cromwell for aid, asking the loan of £'100,000. Cromwell expressed his willingness to fnrnish tlie money on a snffieient gnarantee of repayment, namelv, the possession of the I^ishoprie l>remen. Bremen was worth so mnch more than the amonnt of the proposed loan that the king at first re- garded this counter-demand as merely a means of parrying his request. Yet this was not the case. Cromwell made the proposal in all ear- nestness, and clung to it with great persistency. It was, in fact, too much in keeping with his procedure elsewhere for us to doubt his sin- cerity in it. He always had a hankering afler ports and strong places on the Continent, and we have only to take his motives in other cases and apply them to the state of affairs in the Xorth to find his motives here. We have already seen how Cromwell's policy in the North required that affairs in that region should not be disturbed. Considerations of trade demanded that the control of the Baltic remain divided as it then was; the interests of religion demanded that the two northern Protest- ant powers direct their arms against the common Catholic enemy, not against each other. In trying to secure a foothold in Bremen, Crom- well nuist have had a very definite object. It Avas directed against some one in particular, and who could this be but those who were conspiring against the existing peace in the Xorth, a peace upon which his north- ern policy, and with it his whole foreign policy, rested? As the pos-A session of Dunkirk and Mardyke w^as desired not merely as an inroad against the Spanish power, but as a means of bringing pressure to bear on France and the Netherlands,^ so the possession of Bremen must have been designed, in part, if not chiefly, to the same end with regard to Den- mark. This view is supported by the fact that the Protector Mas 'at the same time on the point of sending an ambassador, Mr. ]\Ieadowe, to Denmark to persuade Frederick to refrain from his attack on Swe- den.- His efforts would have much greater prospect of success if they 1 See Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time, or in lieu of this, Concerning Forraigne Af- faires in the Protector's Time, Lord Somer's Tracts, vi., 331, for a very lucid and concise ex- planation of the Protector's objects in Flanders. 2 On February 24, 1657, the Council voted that the Protector be recommended to send Meadowe to Denmark, and following entries in the Council Order Book show that his immediate depart- ure was intended ; but lie was held back, for reasons which are not stated, until September ;i, the day of Jephson's departure. 4 ^ 50 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN could be supported by the presence of an English force on the Danish frontier. But of course, as usual, Cromwell may liave had more than one object. The German Protestants would be encouraged by the presence of an English force, and this influence in Germany could be used in various ways, among others, it may be, to the advantage of English trade.^ '^ Being now on the continent, and considered as the patron of the Protestant interest, he stood fair for the undertaking and prose- cuting any design, to which the vicissitude of human affairs might give him opportunity."^ Finally, he was justified in demanding a secure military base of operations for so distant an midertaking.^ In short, it seems that we may accept Cromwell's own explanation of his ( chief objects, when he told Charles Gustavus that English possession ] of Bremen would keep the Dutch and Danes quiet and encourage the Protestants, while the king would be free to make better use of its garrisons elsewhere.* But the reason why Cromwell wanted Bremen was the very reason why Charles Gustavus could not surrender it. He, too, wanted a com- manding position over Denmark, but for a different reason. Cromwell had every interest in preserving peace. Charles Gustavus wanted war. He was tired of his Polish adventures, with their unsubstantial gains but very substantial ills. Denmark offered a field for something more than barren victories ; to surrender Bremen on the eve of the struggle was not to be thought of.^ He, therefore, urged various excuses, 1 One infers, this latter more from the prevailing commercial ideas of the time and Crom- well's constant efforts to extend English trade, than from any definite evidence which our sources oflt'er. It may be urged against this view, that the English occupation of Bremen was intended to be only temporary (Jephson's instructions, par. 8) unless, indeed, it can be shown that Cromwell thought the Swedes would not be in a position to redeem it. Yet the position of Bremen, controlling alike the Elbe and the Weser, was exceedingly favorable to such plans. 2Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time, referring to the possession of Dunkirk, etc. 3 Jephson's instructions, par. G. Thurloe Papers, vi., 478. » "Addebantur rationes : earn nimium a Svecia remotam; ac posse Regem militc prcesidiario alibi uti : idque Belgarum destinata valde turbaturum, Danoque scrupulum injecturum metu irruptionis in Jutiam : denique pnesentia Anglorum Protestantibus animos additum iri ad Pontificiis eo acrius resistendum." Pufendorft", iv., § 79. "The importance of the Swedish possession of Bremen as an opening into Denmark was well understood at that time. " By which the Swede * * * has betwixt his ancient patri- mony on the one side, and his new acquisitions on the other, as it were enclosed and belea- guered Denmark." Meadowe's Narrative, p. 2. "* * * het Stift Bremen, het welche soo is gelegen, dat het seer considerable is voor den Koningh van Denemarcken, die daer door, ende door het geene hy was genooksaekt gewest aj^>n Sweden in te ruymen door het gemelde Tractaet, als tusschen den haemer ende het aenbeeldt was geklemt geweest." Nieupoort to De Witt, July 29, 1G57. The significance of Charles Gustavus' marriage with the daughter of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp must not l)c forgotten in this connection. CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 51 anioiiii' others the real one, and was iiiclintH;! for a time not to press the matter further. Yet since Cromwell appeared l)ent on getting a footing in Germany, it mio-lit he possible to eome to an agreement with him at the expense of someone else. A\\)uld lie not take forcible possession of Emden and East Friesland, or Oldenburg ; or, if he considered this too ditti- eult, would he not be content with building a Ibrt on the River Stor, and taking possession of the surrounding country? He would then have no need of Bremen, which on account of its supplies of money and of troops, and its nearness to Denmark, the king could ill spare. It is not surprising that these proposals made no impression on the Protector. It was one thing to take peaceful possession of a province for furthering a definite object. It was quite another thing to turn freebooter and begin a war of wanton aggression against powers, with one at least of whom he was on terms of close friendship.^ The propositions were therefore declined. Jleadowe^s and Jephson's Mediation. — The relations between Eng- land and Sweden became more distant for a time,^ vet events soon tended to draw them together again. In spite of the constitutional struo^o-les in which Cromwell was involved, he found time to come to an agreement with ^lazarin for the invasion of the Spanish Xether- lands. Three days later the emperor of Germany died, opening a new opportunity for hostile action against the house of Hapsburg. Both Cromwell and Charles Gustavus were extremely interested in bringing the imperial crown into other hands,^ and- were prepared to second France in its efforts to accomplish this end, although it must be confessed that neither of them was in a position to make his influence very much felt in the matter. But the deciding factor in uniting 1 Various passages in Masson give us glimpses of CroniAveirs relations with the Count ot Old- enburg. As early as the middle of 1651, before the battle of Worcester, we find an envoy from the latter in London for the purpose of establishing a good understanding with the Common- wealth. Their relations were throughout most cordial, and in 1654 Count Friederick's son, Count Antony, visited England. It was with a team of spirited horses sent as a present from the count that the well known runaway incident in Hyde Park occurred. - Bedenken des Schwedischen Senats liber die Frage : Ob sich Konig Carl Gustav in Schwe- den mit Frankreich und Engelland in ein Bundniss wider das llaus Oesterreich einlassen solle? de annn 1657. Liinig, Staats-Concilia, ii., 593. The Council thought it better to await the de- velopment of the plans of Austria. 3 Lunig, Staats-Concilia, ii.. 592 Carlson, iv., 192, Anm. Urk. u. Actenst, vii., 766. Both suggested the Elector of Brandenburg as a possible candidate. There is an anonymous manu- script in the British Museum (Add. :)2093. fol. 397) advocating England's interference, chiefly on religious grounds. 52 DIPLOMATIC RELATIO^'S BETWEEN Cromwell and Charles Gustavus was the outbreak of the Danish war, closely followed by the formation of a new" alliance between Poland and Austria. Cromwell informed Charles Gustavus that if the Dutch appeared to be supporting the Danes in this matter he would take other counsels/ and he pressed again for possession of Bremen. The Danes would hardly have ventured in their present course, he said, if his former proposals had been accepted. He even reduced his demand to the possession of Stade as a basis for military o|)erations; but even this Charles Gustavus was unwilling to grant. The king could only bring himself to offer the strongholds of the Dutchy A^erden, although he might have foreseen that the possession of inland forts with no pos- sibility of relieving them by sea in case of siege,^ would be the last proposal that Cromwell would accept. The negotiations had in fact again degenerated into mere bargaining, and as usual Cromwell deter- mined to treat through his own envoys. Philip Meadowe had long been intended as ambassador to Denmark, and now Maj.-Gen. Wm. Jephson was named for a similar mission to the king of Sweden. The objects of Meadowe's mission are given in a paper entitled : " Propositio legati protectoris Anglise ad regem Danise," which was recently discovered by Dr. Joseph Weiss, and published in Historisches Jahrbuch (vol. xiv., p. 608). Meadowe has incorporated the contents of this paper into his Narrative in the following words: "England had too great an interest in the Baltic (the Mediterranean of the Xorth) to sit still ^vithout making reflection upon those commotions in tlie northern kingdoms. For besides the general concerns of a free trade, which must of necessity have suifered interruption by the con- tinuance of this war, England being at that time engaged in a war with one branch of the Austrian family, viz., with Spain, would rather the Swedish arms had been at liberty to give check to the other branch in Germany as occasion might offer, than to be diverted there- from by a war Avith Denmark. * * * jjjg [Meadowe's] business was to remonstrate how unwelcome it was to them in England to un- derstand of a rupture betwixt the two crowns, albeit they esteemed the communication thereof bv the letters and manifest^ of that kins; as an expression of friendship. That besides the effusion of Christian 1 Puf., iv., g 79. Urk. u. Actenst, vii., 762. 2 Jephson's instructions, par. 9. ^Jusjeciale armatx Danix. CROMWKI-L AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 53 bloml betwixt two nations linked tos^etlier bv the common l)on(ls of nature and reliiiion, and both of them leagued in amity with Entiland, the continuation of that war miolit in so perilous a juncture consider- ably endanger the whole Protestant cause and interest; and nothing could have happened more advantageous to Spain, with whom Eng- land was in open hostility. Besides, his majesty of Denmark could not but be sensible how much the freedom of navigation and commerce in the Baltic would be impeached thereby, to the prejudice of the neighboring nations, but of none more than England, as continually feti^hino; naval stores from those countries. He was therefore sent on the part of England to that king to offer the best and most friendlv offices for the accommodatins: all differences betwixt the two crowns, and putting a stop to so unhappy a w^ar, and to assm'e him that they would employ their utmost interest with the king of Sweden to dispose him thereto, and to that purpose had already sent a gentle- man to him."^ From subsequent negotiations, it appears that Crom- well intended to make the treatv of Bromsebro the basis of the new peace. Jephson's secret instructions^ are dated August 22, 1657. They recite that the former negotiations with Bonde had come to nothing because Bonde was not authorized to agree upon 'Hhe terms of that assistance" Avhich had been asked for, nor to place at the Protector's disposal any "places of safe retreat for his men, or secure harbours for his ships." "Furthermore, this assistance being desired by the king, and wholly upon the account of his interest, the expense and charge of such an undertaking is to be considered, if not in present, yet here- after, when it shall please God to put his majesty's affairs into a more peaceable condition." If, now, his majesty is willing to place Bremen at the Protector's disposal for this purpose, the Protector will send forces to take possession of it, and will agree to surrender it again "at any time upon demand of the crown of Sweden, being first paid the charges we shall be at over and above what shall be levied upon the country', in and about the keeping and securing the said dukedom." These instructions have on the face of them a somewhat different as- 1 Meadowe's Narrative, p. 10, seq. - Printed in Thurloe Papers, vi., 478. Tlie original manuscript, in the handwriting of Thurloe, with many erasures and corrections, evidently tlie first draft, is in the British Museum. Add. MSS. 4157, fol. 201. 54 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN pect than the foregoing, but in reality they are quite in keeping with it. For if the king had acceded to this demand, Cromwell would have been master of the situation, and could have mediated, as it were with sword in hand, and with some prospect of success. Yet he appears to have been not very confident that the proposal would be accepted, for Jephson was told not to mention the matter "unless his majesty should administer the occasion thereof, and express himself inclined to put it into our hands.'' After some difficulty in ascertaining the whereabouts of the two kings, Meadowe and Jephson were received at Copenhagen and Wis- mar respectively with special marks of honor, and both kings signified their readiness to accept the Protector's mediation. But in the course of the proposals and counter-proposals which were exchanged during the succeeding months,^ it soon became evident that neither party was willing to make the necessary concessions. Certain details could not be adjusted, because certain vital matters of policy were involved in them. The place of meeting for the commissioners presented the first difficulty. The king of Denmark proposed Lubeck as a convenient and neutral place, trusting to have the presence and support of his Polish and Austrian allies. The king of Sweden proposed some place on the inaccessible frontier of Denmark and Sweden, according to ancient custom and the treaty of Bromsebro, in order that the ambassadors of the allies of Denmark could not with any convenience attend, and he might thus sow jealousy and dissension among his enemies through a separate treaty. From this arose another dispute. The mediation had been offered between Sweden and Denmark alone, but in his dec- laration of November 3 the king of Denmark demanded that Poland and Brandenburg be included. Much anxiety was caused in .English councils by this new demand and Denmark's cause was prejudiced not a little by it ; but Denmark appeared bound by treaty not to make a separate peace. Charles Gustavus was willing to grant the ambassa- dors of the allies licenses to be present as spectators, but not as confed- erates and principals, and on this point no agreement could be reached. To these came a third difficulty. Charles Gustavus had proposed that the good officers of France be joined with those of England in the iMeadowe's account of these, Narrative, p. 19, seq., is very concise and clear. See, also, Meadowe's and Jephson's dispatches in Thurloe Papers, Pufendorff, iv., g 77, Diarium Euro- pseum, etc. CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 55 modiatKni. Denmark proposed in return tlie inelusion of the States General also. This Charles Gustavus would admit on one condition, that they first ratify tlie treaty of Elbing. But Denmark insisted ' that they be included without waiting for the ratification. So bitter was the feeling on this point that Avhen Dutch ambassadors arrived at the court of Charles Gustavus he at first refused them audience, hoping, as Jephson thouglit, to drive the Dutch to espouse openly the cause of the Danes, which would force the Protector against his will to the side of Sweden. In short, the attempt at mediation failed utterly, because neither party desired it. Neither the king of Sweden was deterred by the formidable combination of his enemies, nor the king of Denmark by the loss of Jutland, and each hoped for a favorable turn of fortune. "Mediating princes are most welcome and successful when the parties are wearied with the war, as those physicians are most happy who come in the declension of a disease." ^ Friesendroff^s Iristructmis. — At about the time of ^Nleadowe's and Jephson's departure, a Swedish ambassador, J. F. von FriesendorfP, arrived in Eno-land with instructions of a remarkable character, which for disregard of the accepted rules of political morality can hardly be matched among the papers of the time. They reveal a characteristic trait of the foreign policy of this prince, who, with all his attractive personal qualities, cannot be acquitted of violence and lawlessness in his relations with his neighbors. If Cromwell's hesitancy in engaging in the northern war could be overcome by oifers of territorial acquisition on the Baltic, then surely there need be no difficultv. Friesendorif 's secret instructions^ con- tained an elaborate system of proposals and alternatives for the Eng- lish occupation of various portions of German and Danish territory in order to induce Cromwell to tinallv lend efficient aid to Swedish 1 Meadowe, A View of the Suedish and other Affairs, p. 175. 2 They have been printed by Tresehow in Nye Danske Magazin, Tredje Bind (1810), p. 73, from a copy in the Danish archives. Pnfendorff gives a fairly complete abstract of them (lib. iv., g 82). " In irgend einer Weise tiel den Danen die Instruction in die Hande, und diese beeil- ten sich, siein Berlin mitzutheilen ; der Kurfiirst wiederum thcilte sie, wahrend der Friedens- verhandlungen in Oliva, dem kaiserlichen Hofe mit (dat. 23. Miarz 1660); so dass also diese schwedisch-englischen Geheimnisse sehr bald in weitcu Kreisen bckannt waren. Ubrigens cursirten Geriichte nber solche schwedisch-englische Abmachungen schon in Septemberl656 auf dem Reichsdeputationstag in Frankfurt ; s. Frk. u. Actenst., vii., 077." Erdmannsdorflfer, Deutsche Geschichte, i., 285, Anm. 2. " Le diet Sr. Secretaire d'Estat commenca par me desad- vouer que les Ministres de Suede eussent fait aucunes offres, soit de Glowstadt ou d'aucune autre Place." Bordeaux to Mazarin, March 5, 1658. 56 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN arms. The proposals were as follows : For the first part, Cromwell should unite his forces with those of Sweden against Denmark until the latter had been brought to a position in Avhich it was no longer to be feared "and the freedom of commerce and free passage through the Sound was restored to all nations." In order that the balance of power in the Sound might be maintained, it was proposed that Sweden resume possession of its ancient provinces, Schonen, Blecking, and Halland, together with Christina and the provinces Bohus and Drunt- heim as protection against Danish invasion,^ and finally that the County Pinneberg, and the Kremper and Wilster Marches, which had formerly belonged to Bremen, should be restored to it. As soon, now, as they had without difficulty set their house in or- der (for surely Cromwell, too, had as much to fear from Denmark and Holland as from Spain and Austria), Charles Gustavus proposed to accede to CromwelPs long-cherished desire for a common attack against the house of Hapsburg, and in addition to make certain other con- cessions which would serve not only the public interests of England, but Cromwell's private interests as well. First, the king agreed to assist in the conquest of Delmenhorst and Oldenburg (his claims to the former he abandoned in Cromwell's favor), which Cromwell should "hold as his own"; and that Cromwell should be free to take posses- sion of East Friesland, the Bishopric Munster, and as much of the Westphalian Circle as he was able to, as quarter for his troops, which advantage Charles Gustavus proposed to share also with the greater part of his army. The possession of these provinces would lend Crom- well a support in his private ambition in establishing the power of his house such as England did not offer, and would give him the oppor- tunity of attacking at his pleasure either the Danes, the Dutch, or the house of Hapsburg. A'^arious pretexts for the proposed violence were suggested, as well as methods for satisfying the injured princes. If, however, this was not sufficient, and Cromwell desired a position by which he could bring Poland and Danzig to account for past injuries, and in conjunction with Sweden, attack Austria from the side of Silesia,^ the fortification Weichselmiuide near Danzig could be given 1 Bohus and Druntheim were then being used by the Danes as bases for military operations against Sweden. 2Droysen's statement (Geschichtc d. Preussische Politik, iii., 2, 250, 2d ed.), that Silesia was offered to Cromwell by Charles Gustavus, probably rests upon a misunderstanding of this phrase. Erdmannsdorffer, Deutsche Geschichte, i., 285, Anm. 1. CRO^n\'ELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 57 him, together with a part of Ponmierelleii. C'hark^s Gustaviis would also assist in the takiiiii; of Pntzke. All these advaiitaiies were offered the Proteetor in order to e:rant him a foothold in Germany and to persnade him to engage in the com- mon struggle. Yet Charles Gustavus wonld prefer if instead ol' this he wonkl take part in the conqnest and partition of Denmark. In this ease his share ^^-ould be North Jntland, with the port Listerdiep and the neighboring islands, which would be more advantageous in sup- porting the English fleet than the proposed parts of Germany. From this, however, the king excepted the districts Koldingen and Horsens, or in lieu of the latter, Ripen, which, with the remainder of Jutland, and Schleswig, Holstein, and Fiinen, would be given to his father-in- law, the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, under Swedish and English guar- antee. The three districts, Pinneburg, Wilster, and Kremper were, however, to be detached from Holstein and reunited with Bremen. As for the rest of the Danish dominions, they were to be at the abso- lute disposal of Charles Gustavus, to be granted to whatever person he chose, or to be divided into small portions '' as might best serve the common interest." The list of alternatives was, however, not yet exhausted. If Crom- well demanded Ditmarch, with Kremper, Wilster, and the islands about Listerdiep instead of Oldenberg and Delmenhorst, this, too, could be allowed him, together with Gliickstadt; but in this case he must resign his plans on the Weser. Yet, finally, if it appeared that the only means to engage his assistance was to give him a foothold on both the Elbe and AVeser, Friesendoi'ff was authorized to gmnt this also; but the king depended upon his dexterity to avoid such extreme concessions unless they proved unavoidable. It was realized that such proposals were of a nature to awaken grave suspicions on Cromwell's part, and Friesendortf was therefore instructed to emphasize the fact that Charles Gustavus did not intend to assume the crown of Denmark himself, but only to transfer it to some friend, as the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. In addition, the Eng- lish would secure free passage through the Sound and certain privileges over all other foreigners in the lands and ports belonging to Sweden. Finally, Charles Gustavus was prepared to surrender his claims to Prussia in favor of some Protestant prince, as the elector of Bran- 58 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN denburg, although in this case it was only just that a compensation be given Charles Gustavus for his sacrifices in the Polish war. The equivalent proposed was the recognition on the part of Poland of Swedish sovereignty over Liefland and Courland and the payment of a large sum of money, and the cession on Brandenburg's part of Hinterpommerania, with something more.^ If, however, the Protector could not be moved by any means to take part in the conquest and partition of Denmark, Friesendorff must fall back on the old proposition of an alliance against Austria. If this were refused, the king would be forced to come to terms with them and the Dutch, to the detriment of Protestant interests in all parts of the world. At the very least, the Protector must take it upon him to hold the Dutch in check, and to this purpose send a fleet into the Baltic in case they made any signs of espousing the cause of Denmark. But yet, if the relations of England and Holland were such that there was no prospect of this, Holland could, "for the sake of the common interest of the Protestant religion," be tolerated in the general alliance which paragraph 11 of Friesendorif ^s instructions authorized him to propose. Friesendorff' s first efforts were to be directed against Denmark, and in order to further this, secondly, against Austria. Paragraph 11 of the instructions contains the details of a proposed alliance between Sweden, England, France, and Portugal, also Holland it might be, against the house of Hapsburg and its allies. To prevent confusion and disputes, a council of the members of the alliance would be formed to decide upon matters which should arise. Each member must furnish his appropriate quota of ships, which, however, were to be placed under a single command, Cromwell being encouraged to believe that he would be chosen. If France and Portugal desired it, the op- erations on land could be continued as thev then were, Eno;land to take position in Germany as proposed, and Sweden to act as a reserve, to be supported with subsidies in case its forces were brought into action. Finally, the proposed league must devise and execute means for de- priving the house of Hapsburg of the imperial crown. Friesendorff was ordered to sound the Protector privately before 1 He had already broached this to the Elector of Brandenburg. Carlson, iv., 242 and 244, Anm. 2. CRO^nVELL AND CIIAIILES GUSTAVUSj. 59 makino; his mission publicly known, and if ho found the Protector un- favorahly inclined, to pretend that lie was on his way to Portuoal, and had only been accidentally delayed in Knoland. Tliis he should do until the development of aifairs made further "dissimulation'' unnec- essary. The instructions were dated at W'edell on the Elbe, Aui2;ust 3, 1657. I regret that I have not been able to discover exactly how Cromwell received these proposals. There were some parts of them well calcu- lated to enlist his support. If only the matter with Denmark could be patched up and the Dutch pacified, the great Protestant alliance would seem to be on the point of being realized. It might be possible to reconcile Charles Gustavus^ proposals w^ith those for an alliance between England, Holland, and France, which the Dutch were then pressing. There is no evidence, however, that I can find, that he ever seriously entertained Charles Gustavus' proposals for dividing Ger- many and Denmark. That these proposals did not coincide in the least with his northern policy in general is, I think, sufficiently clear. ^^^hat would have become of the Protestant alliance? AVhat ^vould the Dutch have had to say, and what assistance might they not have given Charles II. ? Besides, subsequent events showed that Cromwell had no desire to reduce Denmark to a " position in which it need no longer be feared." The proposals, in short, quite apart from all moral considerations, would have involved a radical change in England's foreign relations such as a clear-sighted statesman like Cromwell would not lightly undertake. There is a tendency among historians who have touched upon this episode to link Cromwell's name with that of Charles Gustavus in the tacit rej^roach with w^hich it must be regarded; but until it has been shown that Cromwell actually enter- tained the plan for a time, this would seem to be an injustice to him. Course of the Negotiations} — The course of the ensuing negotiations 1 Piifendorff, iv., ?? 84 and 85. The documents for the succeeding pages are so scanty that it ig difficult even to keep up the appearance of a connected narrative. We have mere frag- ments, which "we can sometimes piece together, sometimes not. From English sources alone one would hardly know of the existence of Friescndortf; for in the few cases in which his name is mentioned, it is usually misspelled. There is nothing corresponding to Bonde's diary to give one a thread, however slight, to string fragments together upon. Whitelocke gives us no information. The dispatches of the foreign ambassadors, even of Nieupoort, are of little aid. Even Piifendorff, who is often our only guide, seems to me less lucid. He evidently bases his narrative on the letters of the Swedi.sh ambassadors, Avho appear to have worked largely in the dark. An examination of the Swedish archives would no doubt bring new material to light, but as is the case with so many of Cromwell's foreign enterprises, it is probable that much will never be known. 60 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN was not such as the Swedish ambassadors desired. Cromwell showed Fleetwood and FriesendorfF every attention and, as usual, asked for a few days for deliberation. Then followed those delays and excuses which characterized all Cromwell's negotiations, and which ambassa- dors at his court continually complained of. The Swedish ambassa- dors found it impossible to discover the Protector's real motives. Though English sympathy had been at first decidedly against Den- mark as the aggressive party, they found this to a certain extent changed. Charles Gustavus' military successes had in fact prejudiced his diplomatic prospects. Following their instructions, the ambas- sadors proposed an oifensive and defensive league against Austria, Spain, Poland, and Denmark and whoever might join them, in which Cromwell was asked to send a fleet into the Baltic, to continue his efforts in Flanders, to contribute subsidies, and in the meantime, before all the details could be agreed upon, to send immediate relief to Gothenburg, which was blockaded by a small Danish fleet. Cromwell complained that this was asking too much of him, but, as usual, prom- ised to consider the matter. He appears to have had definite reasons for hesitating,^ but what they were, unless it was waiting for the result of Meadowe's and Jephson's mission, or inability to find a clear thread in the tangled skein, is not clear. In order to whet his lagging en- thusiasm, Charles Gustavus sent another proposal. In return for £200,000,^ he was ready to surrender Buxtenhude and the fort on the Leber as security. What reception this proposal met with I cannot discover. For a long time the relations between England and the Netherlands had been growing less satisfactory. The ^^ marine treaty," the object of unremitted efforts on the part of the Dutch since the close of the war in 1654, had not yet been brought to a conclusion, much to Xieu- poort's chagrin. On the other hand, not only did England suspect the Netherlands of having instigated Denmark's hostility, but had grounds for l)elieving that the Dutch equipments then in progress were in- tended to act in conjunction with Spanish forces against Portugal. The Protector did not conceal these suspicions. De Witt adopted a policy similar to the one which had succeeded so 1 Jephson to Thurloe. Thurloe Papers, vi. , 604 and 629. 2 Carlson says £400,000, iv., 2i2. CROMWELL AND C'HAKLES (U'STAVUS. 61 well a low months before. He .siiixgosted a defensive treaty, this time nut between England, the United Provinces and Denmark, l)ut between England, the United Provinces and Erance.' The idea was welcomed bv the Protector, thougli not (|nite so warndy as the former one had , bei^i. It had some promise of the great alliance in it, wiiicli the Pro- tector had l)y no means yet abandoned. Still, the relations between the two powers were somewhat straineil, and Xieiipoort did not foi- the time being share the Protector's full confidence. Alx)ut the beginning of October, it seemed as if Cromwell, moved by the critical condition of Swedish affairs, had decided that some show of armed interference was necessarv. Under date of Octol>er 9," Fleetwood and Friesendorff inform the king " in hochster eyl,'^ that through the grace of God and their unflagging industry they had at last brouo-ht the Protector to a certain resolution. He had decided to come to the king's assistance and to form a close alliance with him against Austria and its allies (for reasons of state, and to appease the prejudices of the English people, he must call the child by that name), and commissioners would be appointed to confer with the Swedish ambassadors concerning the matter. He desired only a week's delay to equip a fleet and to put hLs affairs in order ; an envoy would 1)6 sent to Holland to warn the Dutch against the course they were pur- suing. He had not taken this course before from lack of money; but he thought he now had good prospects of removing this difficulty. Already, on October 3, Cromwell had issued a warrant for the equipment of a fleet. It w^as to consist of twenty ships, to be ready in fourteen davs at farthest, and to be furnished with at least three months' provisions.^ ''The design for the shijis," wrote Thurloe,^ "is to give countenance to Sweden, whose affairs are in a dangerous condi- tion, being left alone in the midst of very many powerful enemies, [the] Pole, the king of Hungary and [the] ^luscovite and the Dane, and fears also the Hollander, who gives money and if need be will send 1 Nieupoort's and De Witt's letters of May 4 and following, though without the authority of the States General. It was as first a suggestion merely, not a formal proposal. 2 The letter is printed in Handlingar roraiule Skandinavions Historia, v., 205-213. 3 Carte MSS., Ixxiii, fol. 132. The names of the vessels, their rates and the number of seamen are given, aggregating 816 guns and 4,020 men. < Carte MSS.. Ixxiii., fol 138. Thurloe to Montague, October 9, 16.57. Holograph, chiefly in cipher, imperfectly deciphered, and hard to read. It is printed, with some changes, in Thurloe Papers, vi., 582, under the heading, " Draught of a letter concerning Swedish affairs, to Gen- eral Montague." 62 . DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN the Dane the ships [eighteen in number] which were appointed to lie upon the Dogger Bank. The ministers of Sweden are of opinion that if ships [were] sent that way to wait upon the motions of [the] Hol- landers, though no act of enmity past, it would keep the Hollander from him. And for this piu'pose and no other are these ships pre- pared. * * * This is under absolute secrecy and is not to be communicated to any." The tone of this letter contrasts strangely with the boyish precipi- tation of Fleetwood and Friesendoi-if 's letter to Charles Gustavus, while their contents would hardly allow us to believe that they referred to the same matter. But the cautious and diplomatic Thurloe is a safe guide in matters of this sort (Cromwell in his enthusiasm often said too much) and it is probable that there was not very much behind this incident which raised Swedish hopes so high. At any mte, when the Dutch did not send their fleet into the Sound, the English refrained from further demonstration. It must not be forgotten that Cromwell was actuated at this time by other considerations than relations in the IS^orth. His struggle against Spain and the house of Hapsburg was still the chief point of his foreign relations,^ and his whole aim in the North was to bring affairs in this part in accord with this great issue. It is significant, therefore, that the only remonstrance which was made to Nieupoort in connection with this incident was against Holland's negotiation with Spain and its hostility towards Portugal.^ The affairs of Sweden were not mentioned. When the Dutch did not send their fleet to the Baltic, as was expected, but called it quietly home, the Protector on his part was willing to let the matter drop. To have acted otherwise would have transferred the center of his foreign policy from Spain to the North. But the Protector had expressed himself so unreservedly to Fleet- wood and Friesendorff that he felt it necessary to propose terms for a treaty, although he did so only after what seemed to the Swedes an inex- cusably long delay, and in terms very different from those they thought themselves justified in expecting. He proposed an offensive and de- fensive alliance against ''the kings of Spain, Hungary, and Poland 1 " The Protector in all these cases governs himself by the Protestant cause," wrote Thurloe on October 2, " and he thinks a peace between the two northern crowns is best for that, if it may be had." Thurloe Papers, vi., 547. * Nieupoort to De Witt, November 12. CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 63 and the house of Austria," which France, the Netherhuids, and others were to be invited to j<»in. Tlic king of Sweden must make an attack on Austria, strengthened by troops furnislic<l l)v the allies, but maintained at his e)wn expense. The Protector woukl wage war at sea against Spain, to whicli purpose the king must agree to furnisii naval material in such quantities and at such rates as might ])e agreed upon in the articles of the treaty. Cromwell bound himself to send a tieet into the Baltic if it were necessary. The allies would be asked to contribute monev.^ But this proposal, it will be noticed, looked entirely away from the complications in the North and contained no reference to them. It was merely a plan of action for the following sunnner, and cooll\' avoided the pressing issue then at hand. The Swedes complained bitterly. Even the English felt guilty. Thurloe wrote apologetically to Jephson on December 18, "If the king be disposed to the same thing, you may take occasion to tell him that this is but an essay and is intended only as a foundation to begin upon, and if he please to declare himself for the general good you are authorized and charged to perfect it with him.^'^ So loud were Friesendorif ^s protestations that the Protector promised in an evil hour to furnish the king with £30,000, with a prospect of more if he could raise it.^ The Swedes submitted with an ill grace. Yet what must have been their indignation when even this promise was not kept. " I have had many discourses with Mons. Frohendorf [Friesendorff], one of his ministers here," wrote Thurloe to Jephson, " whom I find a very ready man, but am somewhat doubtful how he represents things to his mas- ter. I fear the worst. I informed vou bv mv former letter that H. H. had promised £30,000 by monthly [)ayments; one month is past 1 Pufendorff, iv., g 84. These proposals, so far as they are given by Pufendorff, are the same as those contained in the paper " Heads of a treaty, to be made witli the king of Swetlen, for a nearer union, etc.," printed in Thurloe Papers, vii., 23, under the date of March 25, 1658, and they would appear to be practically if not absolutely identical. This would suggest the possi- bility of error in the date of the printed paper, else the English wore making the same pro- posals after the treaty of Roeskilde as before, which, however, is by no means impossilile. But I cannot verify this point, as it is not known where the original paper is preserved. Mr. Gar- diner tells me he thinks it is in private possession. I am not in a i)osition to say whether the paT)er printed in Lunig's Staats-Concilia, ii., G13, "Bedenken Konig Carl Gustavs in Schwe<len iiber das Formular des ihme vou England offerirten Bundnisses, de Anno KwS," complaining of the unreasonable trading privileges demanded by the English, refers to these proposals or to some others of which I have found no further account. 2 English Historical Review, vii., 727. 3 Pufendorff, iv., g 81, with the marginal date November 9. 64 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN and none paid, which he speaks so freely of, and of the great disap- pointment his master's affairs are put under thereby, that truly his expressions are hardly borne." ^ He explains that the reason for the non-payment was that a part of the fleet had come in unexpectedly and large sums Avere necessary to pay the men, who Avould otherwise mutiny.^ The Protector was in fact struggling to keep his head above water by means of small loans, and the payment of the promised sub- sidy was utterly impossible. It was not likely that the Protector's efforts to come to an agree- ment on the basis of an unkept promise, and without first settling the Danish matter, Avould be of much avail. His efforts to negotiate through Jephson instead of with Fleetwood and FriesendorfF had from the first met with little success. The king was waiting for the result of his proposals in London, Jephson thought. Now the matter of the promised subsidy presented a new hinderance. Both Jephson, and afterwards Meadowe, constantly urged its payment. " I do confess,'' wrote Jephson February 12, 1658, "I could wish the money had either never been promised, or paid at the time appointed. =k * * I have mucli reason to believe that this is the only cause why they proceed not with me in the treaty." Gothenburg and Fredericia ; the Partition of Denmarh Again. — In 1 English Historical Review, vii., 727. Friesendorff was the only one of the Swedish ambas- sadors who aroused the least ill-will in London. All the others appear to have been excep- tionally popular, even though their northern vigor did occasionally get the better of their cour- tesy. This letter to Jephson contains the following ugly passage, which shows how much personal bitterness had entered into the negotiations : "This long story I have told you to pre- vent any misrepresentation formed by IMonsr. Frohendorf, Avho I fear is yet enough for these things, and I hear labours to disgrace my Ld. G. Fleetwood with the king, which I should much desire might be prevented by you. If you can perceive anything of the kind the [re] . it will be a great disservice to the king's affairs if anything of the kind should be, for Avhatever Monsr. Frohendorf apprehends he is beholden to him for all the ? he hath, and you know the interest the Lord Deputy hath in the state and if he should [? see his hoorn put out by other] I believe Monsr. Frohendorp would soon find himself disabled ever to do the least thing here in any of his affairs. The truth is, had it not been [for] my Lord G., Avho solicited coun- cil here, there never had been a man obtained hence out of the old (?)." It would thus seem to be an error for Pufeudorff to accredit these negotiations entirely to Friesendorff. It will be noticed that in documents and letters signed by Fleetwood and Friesendorff, the name of the former comes first, indicating, I take it, precedence in rank as ambassador. Fleetwood appears not only to have played the chief part in these negotiations, but also a very important part in the preceding ones. His family connections gave him great advantages over the other ambassadors, who besides must have found the language a serious drawback in a court which did not speak Latin. Jephson mentioned this accusation against Friesendorff" to Charles Gus- tavus only to be assured that it had no foundation in fact. Thurloe Papers, vi., 7is. ^This was not a feigned excuse. Sir Christopher Pack loaned the government £4,000 to pay the wages of the fleet. Die. Nat. Biog. Also some others advanced money. Cal. S. P. Dom. , May 11, 1658. CROMWELL AND ( HAHLKS (iUSTAVrs. 05 our sketch of the negotiations in London, wc have Ixcn cairicd ])ast a striking; diplomatic incident of which, unfortunately, we liave hut the merest hint. Jephson had througliout shown nnich partialitv towards Charles Gustavus. He was convinced tliat he sincerely desired peace, but doul)ted whether Denmark did. He tliouirht notliiuL'" woidd <o soon incline Denmark to it as " a strict and speedy conjunction l)etween England and Sweden," and urged that a few frigates woidd be a cogent arirnment airainst Danish obstinacy.' These views were, of course, very favorable to Charles Gustavus, and we need not be surprised to find that Jephscai received in return an accurate knowledge, at least in outline, of the king's plans with regard to Denmark. On Xovember 2 Jephson sent the Council "the relation of an ac- tion perhaps as extraordinary as may fall out in an age";*" but the letter is unfortunately lost. In his next dispatch he refers to it as containing his "sense of the whole state of affairs in these parts, ujxjn the taking of Frederieksode [Fredericia]," and continues: "I know nothing in my poor opinion were more worthy his Highness, than (at this time when he hath ministers with all the most considerable Protest- ant princes and states) to propose a general meeting for the advancement of the common interest of religion, and the civil interest, and rec(jncil- ing of differences; for (until both religion and the civil interest of every state be something secured) I fear particular treaties will not do the work."^ At last in an important letter of the 24th of Xovember, he gives some clue to the contents of his letter of Xovember 2. After urging again "a general treaty betwixt all tlie Protestants," lie ])ro- ceeds, "Sir, my meaning by joining with Sweden was, that if by the king of Denmark's obstinacy the pow^r of the Baltic Sea shall b(^ devolved to other hands, you would so oblige the king of Sweden by assisting him, that he might put a part of it in your hand. Tlie places I mentioned in my letter of the 2d instant, and my oi)inion of them, according to my best intelligence, which 1 sui)pose you had not then received, they were Gott(Mil)urg and Frederieksode. I assure myself you were not l)efbre ignorant of tlie conveniences and inconveniences behmging to them, which I will not i)resume to judge of."* "1 sliall 1 See Jephson's dispatches in Thurloe Papers. ^Thurloe Papers, vi., 597. 3 Ibid., 004. He was again urging Charles Gustavus' policy, it will be noticed. *Ibid., 629. 5 66 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN not sail punctually," he says in this same letter, " to observe his High- ness' command to the king of Sweden concerning the business of Fredericksodde." The thread of evidence offered by this passage is slight, yet taken in connection with accompanying circumstances, it seems clear, that in answer to the Protector's constant demand for " security " and a mili- tary base before undertaking a distant campaign, Charles Gustavus had suggested that Fredericia and Gothenburg might serve this pur- pose. The mention of Fredericia had, of course, reference to its re- cent capture and may possibly have been intended to whet Cromwell's appetite for the whole of Jutland. I find it difficult to believe, how- ever, that the king was willing to surrender so important a port as Gothenburg, the only Swedish port without the Sound, in anything like permanent possession, especially after the efforts which had just been made to increase its importance.^ It would seem more probable that it was proposed as temporary headquarters for the English fleet, for which it was admirably suited, and had little value to the Swedes at the time from the ease with which it could be blockaded by the Danes. That proposals of this kind were made is not of itself improbable. Pufendorff gives an account^ of still more remarkable proposals, which resemble those of Friesendoi'ff 's instructions. If Cromwell would undei-take to support Sweden without reserve and strike Den- mark to the ground, Charles Gustavus would agree to its partition in the following terms : Norway, Schonen, Seeland, and Funen should be incorporated with Sweden, while Cromwell should have the whole of Jutland and Bremen ; the passage of the Sound would be free to all nations, and the prospect was offi?red of an attack on Austria. Or, if Cromwell preferred, Sweden would take only Norway and Schonen, and allow Cromwell Bremen, while the crown of Denmark would be given to another. The plan of giving Jutland to the Duke of Hol- stein-Gottorp, Cromwell taking Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, was also mentioned. But Cromwell's answer must be given soon and his ac- ceptance unreserved, else so important a position as Bremen could not be surrendered. I have not found the slightest reference to these pro- 1 Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, p. 132. 2 Lib. iv., I '^■(S, undated, but they must have come at about this time. CROMWELL AND CHARLI-:S GUSTAVUS. G7 posals among English records, unci so cannot tell wiiat impression they made. They had, however, the ver}- serions drawback of jTJving Sweden absolnte control of the su})j)lies for ship-l)uildinir, which was considered a power too great to be intrusted to one hand. 'riii> was considered a matter of vital importance at the time and is often men- tioned in the diplomatic correspondence relating to the North. It would be to no purpose to trace further the details of the ensuing negotiations. They present nothing new. One meets the same diffi- culties, the same arguments, and delays for much the same reasons.' The only episode worth mentioning is Cromwell's speech to both Houses of Parliament on January 25," which throws a flood of light on the Protectoi-'s feelings at this time. " I do believe, he that looks well about him, and considereth the estate of the Protestant affairs all Christendom over : he must needs sav and acknowledw that the "rand design now on foot, in comparison with which all other designs are but low things, is, Whether the Christian world shall be all popery? * * * I have, thank God, considered, and I would beg of you to consider a little with me: What that resistance is that is likely to be made to this mighty current, which seems to be coming from all parts on all Protestants? AMio is there that holdeth up his head to oppose this danger? A poor prince; — indeed poor ; but a man in his person as gallant, and truly I think I may say as good, as these last ages have brought forth ; a man that hath advanced his all against the i)0})ish in- terest in Poland and made his aquisition still good ^ there ' for the Protestant religion. He is now reduced into a corner; and that wliich addeth to the grief of all, — more than all that hath been spoken of before (I wish it may not be truly said !) — is. That men of our relig- ion forget this, and seek his ruin. * * * It is a design against our verv being ; this artifice, and this complex design, against the Protestant interest, — wherein so manv Protestants are not so riirlit as were to be wished! If they can shut us out of the Ixiltic S-a, and make themselves master of that, where is your trade? W'liere are vour materials to preserve your shij)ping? When* will you l)e al)le to challenge anv ri^^ht bv sea, or justifv yourself against a foreiiiii iu- vasion in your own soil? Think upon it; this is in desi gn!" 1 Pufendorff's account is very full here. Lib., iv., g 86. Lib., v.. §§ 73, 74. and 75. I have nothing of importance to add to it. 2 Reported in Burton's Diary, ii., 35L Also Carlyle, Speech XVII. 68 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN Surely it was no fault of intention that the Protector did not take a more active part in this business ! But with the imminent dangers on every hand, a bankrupt treasury, the army and civil service unpaid, Ireland unsettled, Scotland in great suiFering, England impatient, and the two Houses disputing about titles and refusing to come to busi- ness,^ Avhat could the Protector do? His efforts to mediate had come to a standstill, yet he could not bring himself to adopt a different course. A\ hile he was hesitating and waiting for a favorable turn in the course of events, an unpropitious Providence paved the way for Swedish successes ^vhich rendered hopeless his plan of reconciling the two nations, even for the preservation of their faith. Treaty of Roeskilde. — It is of course impossible to give here any account of the negotiations which preceded and followed the treaty of Roeskilde, or of the exceedingly complicated events attending Crom- well's attempt to mediate a new peace after the outbreak of the second war in August ; but it is of great interest to observe how Cromwell's attitude towards both nations was changed by these startling events, and liow his general policy was affected by the altered state of politics in the North. There are no special instructions to Meadowe concerning the treaty of Eoeskilde, but,, fortunately, both Thurloe and Meadowe have told us of the objects sought by the Protector with a candor and directness which leaves nothing to be desired. ^' The Protector," says Thurloe," '^though he wished in general the prosperity of the Swede, his ally, hoping that at last his arms might be directed the right Avay, yet did not like that tlie Swede should conquer the Dane, and possess all those coun- tries, and being thereby become powerful, engross the whole trade of the Baltic Sea, wherein England is so much concerned, and therefore he in- terposed in most serious terms with both the kings to make peace, Avhicli was accepted by both." ^'The English mediator," writes Meadowe, ^' liad two parts to act in this scene; one was to moderate the demands as far as he could in favor of the sufferer, w^ithout disobliging the Swede by a too notorious partiality. The other \vas to watch lest anything be stipulated betwixt the tAVO kings pr*:judi('ial to the inter- ests of England. It was moved that the whole kingdom of Norway 1 Inderwick, Studies in the Great Rebellion, 27. 2 Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. CR<>>rWKLL AND CIIARI.KS CT'STA VT'S:. (J9 should 1)0 rent off from Denmark and united to Sweden, with wliieli it lav eoutiiiuous: This entrenelied ui)()n I'jiuland as irivinir the Swede the sole and entire possession of the cliiet" materials, as masts, deals, piteh, tar, eopper, iron, ete., needfid for the a[)parel and ((Hiip- age of our ships, too great a treasure to be entrusted in one liand. The mediator, in avoidanee of this was the first who insinuated the })roposal of rending- Seonen and l^leeking to the Swede, which would cut off that unnecessary charge hoth crowns sustained in giirrisoning a frontier each against other, by enlarging the Swedisli dominions to the bank of the Sound, the ancient and natural boundary of Sweden. This though uneasv to the Dane because of the vicinity of those provinces to Co^xnihageu the metropolis, yet was safe for P^ngland, because by this means the Swede is become master of one bank of the Sound as the Dane is of the other, though the accustomed duty of passage (the best flower in the Danish garland) was reserved by the treaty wholly to the Dane. Thus the power over that narrow- entry into the Baltic being balanced lietwixt two emulous crowns, will be an effectual preventive of any new exactions or usurpation in the Sound." ^ Thus the efforts of the English mediator were directed chiefly, almost exclusively, to the preservation of English commercial interests. This need occasion no surprise, since the Protector had no other rule to guide him in case of a conflict between these two Protestant powers, \\1iile, of course, the interests of religion requireil that Protestant nations should not turn their arms ao^ainst each other, vet it was the interests of trade, not of religion, vAnch. was the Protector's incentive for pre- serving the stabi.s quo in the Baltic, — alwavs, as we have seen, a vital point of his policy. If he could not share in the paititiou of Den- mark for fear of giving too much }>ower t(> Sweden in the lialtic, nuich less could he allow Denmark to be entirely swallowed ui) l)y Sweden without a share in the booty. Yet lie liad no objection to Denmark's beinu; partially absorbed by Swe<len in so far as English interests would be benefited by it. The P^nglisli were, indivd, far from di<in- 1 Narrative, p. 58. See, also. View of the Suedish and Other Aflairs, p. 169, «<•'/. " For 'tis evident that the dividing the banks of the Sound betwixt the two emulous crowns, as it was done by the Roschild treaty, is greater to the security and benefit of England, etc." " I am making all the haste I can to the king of Swede, as conceiviui; his lliLrhiioss nut a little comerned in these affairs, especially in the interest of the Sound, and the trullie of the Baltic Sea." .Jephson to Henry Cromwell, February 22, 16oS. Landsdowne MSS. 822. fol. l\\\. 70 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN terested mediators. "The Swedish propositions, I confess, are very high,'' wrote Meadowe,^ "but their advantages are likewise very great." Yet, in view of the circumstances, the conditions of the treaty, while severe, were favorable to Denmark, which was due in no small meas- ure to the offices of the mediators, particularly, it would appear, of Meadowe. Frederick III. sent a letter to Cromwell thanking him for his good offices and commending Meadowe, who also received the ex- traordinary honor of the Order of the Elephant, the highest order in Denmark, together with the offer of a pension, which he tells us he refused. There were many scandalous reports concerning Meadowe circulated at that time by the Swedes and others, which may or may not have been true,^ but they have, at least, the significance of showing how bitter was the resentment felt against him. After the Treaty of Roeskilde. — The relations between England and Sweden were not altered by the treaty of Eoeskilde so much as one might have expected. The Swedes seemed not to cherish their resent- ment and the negotiations in London proceeded much as before.^ I shall not trouble the reader with an account of them, for I have noth* inff to add to what Pufendorff tells us.^ Thev illustrate how Crom- well's foreign efforts were hampered by internal difficulties, but have little further significance. The Swedes urged to the last the payment of the £30,000 which Cromwell had promised in the preceding No- vember, but Parliament had been dissolved without obtaining a grant, and though Cromwell repeated his promise, he Avas never in a position to fulfil it. In short, Cromwell was laboring under such insuperable difficulties that no definite action could be reasonably expected of him. The various proposals which were made, none of which had anything novel about them, are therefore of little interest. One notices distinctly, however, this difference in Cromwell's treat- ment of Sweden, that he is more ready to give way to the demands of 1 Meadowe to Thiirloe. Thurloc Papers, vi., 802. 2 It is difficult to get at the truth of these stories, which are to be fouud at sufficient length in Pufendorff. We should not, I think, lend them too ready credence, since they rest on the authority of Meadowe's political enemies. Pufendorff tells us, for example, that certain Dan- ish noblemen objected to one of Meadowe's station being made a member of the Order of the Elephant, and that Meadowe resigned the Order for a sum of money. But on May 31 (Meadowe to Thurloe, Eng. Hist. Rev., vii., 732) he was still in possession of the Order. However, he seems at best to have escaped Avith some loss of dignity, and felt called upon to explain in various letters to Thurloe. 3 See note, page 63. 4Puf.,v.,gg 76-83. CKOMWELL AND CHARLES (JUSTAVUS. 71 Charles Gustavus tlian before. He has lost his conti-nl «»t' iitVairs in the North, which is nowhere shown more eleaily tlian in this, that he is now prepared to yield to Sweden the j)ossession of Prussia. Meadowe's instructions of April 9, 1658/ in view of the expected ne- gotiations between Charles Gustavus and the other powers at Braunsberg for the purpose of the further pacification of the North, reads : '' * * as to his retaining of Prussia, you are very well to understand tlie mind of the kins: of Sweden therein, and in ciise vou find hi in fixed thereupon, you shall then endeavour in the treaty, yet with that circum- spection and prudence that becomes a mediator, that Prussia ma\' l)e quitted to him by the king of Poland and to that purpose endeavour by all befitting wariness to incline the ministers of the States General thereunto, who are most likely to oppose it upon the interest of trade, to satisfv whom you may procure such assurance from the king of Sweden in that of trade in reference to his and that state as may re- move that difficulty. * * * And as the matter of commerce, you are not to be wanting there to inform yourself therein and to pro- vide for the same, and the interest of this state therein, so far as you shall have opportunity. " One might infer from this and other references that interests of trade were dominant in the Protector's mind, and that the matter of the great Protestant alliance had been driven entirely into the back- ground. This is certainly true to a certain extent and lay in the gen- eral state of northern politics. "That war, wliilst it laste<l, discom- posed aifaii-s so much, as they could never be composed again," siud Thurloe.^ Yet a truer statement of the case would be this, tliat the real motive of Cromwell's policy was still antagonism to the house of Austria, but there had arisen a new and more important issue in the trade of the Baltic. Instead of the l^iedmont massacres iukI mere vague alarms, they had now a definite and tangible bone of conten- tion. "It being the design of the Imperial House to get these coun- tries and to ? you the ]>altic Sea under pretence of giving aid to the king of Denmark."^ "The Protector very nuich apprehende<l 1 S. p., Sweden, ix. They are dated April 9, 1656, but thoxigh this is an original dating, the context shows it to be an error. It should be 1658. Among other things the treaty of Roes- kilde is referred to. They are printed in Thurloe Papers, vii.. (H, where the correct date is given. 2 Burton's Diary, iii., 378. ^Thurloe to Meadowe, November 27, 1657. Eng. Hist. Rev., vii., 1'1\. 72 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN the issue of this conj unction; he thought it equally dangerous for England that the Swede should be ruined and the Dane preserved by such saviours, who after they had broken the king of Sweden would also make a prey of the Dane himself, the emperor in his assistance he gave against the Swede, revived the old design of the Austrian [eagle] stretching her wings towards the eastern sea, and planting herself upon the Baltic." ^ When the war between Sweden and Denmark was begun again in Au2'ust bv Charles Gustavus, as usual without consultiup; the Pro- tector,^ the latter renewed his efforts to restore the peace. That his policy had not undergone any material change by the treaty of Roes- kilde is shown by the similarity between these two attempts at media- tion. '^The Protector in this whole business laid this for a founda- tion, that it was not for the interest of this nation that either the Swede or Dane should be ruined in this war, and that it was ever safest for England that the Sound and those countries should remain in the hands of the Dane, and therefore as he had interposed in the first war to preserve the Dane, so he resolved by the same measures to proceed and so to manao;e these affairs that this mio;ht receive no alteration in those parts." ^ This had been the starting point of the first mediation. Again, as before, the . mediation was offered between Sweden and Den- mark alone, and without including other powers, which would compli- cate and delay matters. "That which the Protector pitched upon in this great occasion was to endeavour a present peace between the Dane and the Swede, upon the late treaty of Roskild, made by his own mediation without taking in the differences between Poland and Sweden, or the Swede and Brandenburg, or comprehending the pre- tences of the Dutch and the Emperour, which having many intrica- cies in them would require time. This the Protector did to obviate the designs of the Dutch, as also to keep open the door for making use of the arms of the Swede another wav. This was liked bv none of the contending parties, the Swede though thus beset, yet having got into his possession the Sound and all Denmark but the town of Co- penhagen, and believing that France and England would not suffer him to flinck was unwilling to be brought back again to the treaty of iThurloe, Forei§:n Affairs in Cromwell's Time. Also Cromwell's speech quoted on page 67. 2 The Protector never learned the exact causes of this war. ^Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in CromweL's Time. CRO>nVET.T. AXP rilART.ES (aSTAVLS. T-i RoskiUl. Till' Daiio was more adverse tlian lie, not (l(Hil)tiii<z: l>iit l)v the aid of his eontederates to recover all a^iaiii, and the cont'cdrrates opposed it or any treaty w ithout coni})reiien(lin«:: all their interests, and the Dutch most of all infested here, the meaning whereof was that they had all agreed totally to ruin the Swede, and tlic Dutch douljtcd not of his part in the advantage."^ These last efforts to restore the ])eace in the North could not, from the difficidties with which Cromwell was surrounded and his own fail- ing health, be other than lame and without result. They are interest- ing, not from their results, but as showing what Cromwell tried to do. The New Protector; Cronenhurg. — It would hardly be justitial)le to close this narrative without some notice of tlie affairs after Cromwell's death, since Thurloe remained secretary of state, and in only one re- gard did the administration of the foreign office suffer a material change. Richard announced that his father's policy in the North woidd he continued ;" yet in one point, unconsciously, perhaps, he departed from it. The outbreak of the war between Sweden and Denmark had so confusetl northern affairs that the Protector's plan for a great Protestant alliance had been driven entirely into the background. It had become, in fact, impracticable, and no longer coincided with the actual trend of European politics. Yet he clung to it with the greatest persistence, and as long as he lived the religious controversy was still a factor in Eiu'opean politics which could not be ignored. After his death, how- ever, it ceases to become so. The habit of referring to the ^'Protestant interest " continued for a time in England, as might be expecteil, yet not only do these phrases occur less frequently, but on<> feels instinct- ivelv that thev were less sincere. The proof that thev were so lies in the fact that the controlling motive in English foreign jxditics was no longer hostility to the Catholic house (►f Ilapsburg, but the commercial rivalrv of their Protestant kinsmen, the Dutch. It is hardly an 1 Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwoirs time. The rolaticms with the Netherliuuls are a kind of barometer which indicate the ebbs and tluws of motives uf trade in Kiiglisli for«.'i.i,Mi iM)lities. In the increased hostility here shown, we have an indication that commercial interesUs were of increasing importance, and, as we know, became, ; fter the Protector's deatli, the sole sprini? of English action in the North. We must bear in mind, in usiin,' Thurloe' .s account, that It was written in 16GU, when the domiiumt feulure of Eni:l:sli foreign policy was the rivalry of the Dutch. His whole account is colored by it. This was by no means so important a feature of the Protector's policy as one would gather from his paper, and I liavi- not always felt justitied in accepting his statements. But with thisqualiticatioii. it is of course a source of th.' liiudifst value. 2 Pufendorff, v., § 115. 74 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN exaggeration to say that the death of Cromwell marks an epoch in European history, the close of the period of religious wars. When Charles Gustavus landed in Seeland he sent a special envoy, John Leyenbergen, to England with an explanation of the causes of the war, and a request for at least twenty ships, in return for which he was ready to grant, in addition to certain staple rights, that English ships enjoy equal privileges in Sweden with Swedish unarmed ships, and that certain quantities of shipping materials be fm-nished England at a lower price. ^ But Cromwell died before receiving this message. I have found two references to another concession not mentioned by Pufen- dorff which Charles Gustavus is said to have proposed, presumably in this connection. On February 23, 1659, Mr. Topham, a burgess for York, informed Parliament that he had been told by a merchant who had carried dispatches between the English government and Charles Gustavus, that Charles Gustavus had made offer of Elsinore Castle as security for the loan of twenty English frigates.^ The subject is men- tioned again in a tract by Slingsby Bethel, entitled ^' The AVorld's ^lis- take in Oliver Cromwell,'' which was printed anonymously in 1668.^ Bethel tells us, referring to it as a sufficiently well known matter, that Cromwell and Charles Gustavus had agreed to divide the control of the Baltic between them, and that Cromwell's share was to be Elsinore Castle and Cronenburg, '^the Gibraltar of the North," together with the tolls of the Sound. Bethel shows himself throughout this tract so Avell informed^ that I was at first inclined to accept his statement, but after discovering the passage in Burton it seems to me not improbable tliat this is the source of Bethel's information. If this is true, and Bethel is merely repeating a general rumor which originated with 1 Pufendorff, v., 114. 2 "Two masters of Hull were at the Baltic, in October last, being laden with corn. One of them carried a packet from the king of Sweden, and brought one back again. He affirmed that the king offered, if his Highness of England would but lend him twenty frigates, he would deposit in our hands Elsinore Castle for his security, and I believe we might have our own terms. Nothing under Heaven concerns the English so much as that channel. Let us plant our ships in time there, and we may have advantage enough of the Hollander." Burton's Diary, iii., 436. 3 It is printed in Harleian Miscellany, i., 287, and in S ate Tracts, part i., 376. I have printed the passage under consideration as Appendix (B) to this work. < Compare, for example, his statements with regard to Ostend, Newport, and Dunkirk with those of Thurloe in Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. I have found the statement of Crom- well's Avillingness finally to yield Prussia to Charles Gustavus only in the original instruc- tions, in Pufendorff and in this tract. Bethel stood in well with the Republicans and was in a position to receive much information. I have been able to verify several statements which I found first in this pamphlet. CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 75 Topham's statement to Parliament, which in turn rested upon the statement of a merchant carrying scvret dispatclies and not, so far as we can see, in a position to know their contents, then the whole story- rests upon a very slender footing. These suspicions must be strength- ened by the fact that when Meadowe, in the spring of 1659, hinted at the English possession of Cronenburg and the island Hewen, Charles Gustavus seems not to have entertained the proposal for a moment.^ If he himself had made the same proposal a few months before, one is at a loss to account for so sudden a change in his attitude, since there appears to be no diplomatic or military event which would explain it. Yet Charles Gustavus did somethnes change his plans for no very great reason, and he may have done so in this vcase. It is impossible to decide the matter definitely without fuller information. In the meantime, those interested in the subject may be glad to have their attention called to these passages. The Partition of Denmark Again. — The ill success of Charles Gus- tavus' second invasion of Denmark and the desperate state of his for- tunes in consequence of it, made him more willing than he had ever been before to concede real advantages to England if English support could be obtained by it. Even before Cromwell's death, Pufendorif tells us of a proposal that Cromwell occupy Emden or Meppen in order to hold the Dutch in check and prevent the Austrians from rais- ing recruits in Westphalia. As soon as Charles Gustavus heard of Cromwell's death, he sent another ambassador, Gustavus Duval, to Richard with a request for aid against the Dutch similar to the one sent through Leyenbergen, but though Richard declared his readiness to enter into an offensive alliance w4th Sweden against Austria and a defensive alliance against the rest of the world, yet he gave various excuses for not furnishing the twenty ships asked for. In October Friesendorff received secret orders to offer Bremen and Verden to Richard if he would assist in the Swedish conquest of Denmark and Norway, but with the proviso that the provinces should not be delivered into English possession until after the surrender of Copenhagen. P>oth ambassadors were authorized to offer freedom from tolls in the S(jund ^ Pufendorff; vi., g 21. Downing wrote Thurloe from the Hague that the Dutch were trying to secure the same prize from the Danes. Downing to Thurloe, Thurloe Papers, vii., 427, 469, 506. and 515. Thurloe evidently believed this. "* * * and as now. in fact, they [the Dutchl had in mortgage a part of the king of Denmark's dominions, they were also to have Cronenburg Castle into their hands as security for the money expended in the war." Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. 76 DIPLOMATIC RELATIOXS BETWEEN and in Iceland in return for money and sliips.^ These offers were not without attraction for the English court. In case their policy of mediation proved fruitless, they were willing to assist the king, but only defensively, and on condition of some advantage for their costs. Meadowe mentioned Stade and Landscrone as suitable for this purpose,^ and during the summer Richard had proposed an alliance on the basis of freedom from tolls in the Sound for English commerce, equal rights with Swedes in all Swedish ports and the closing of the Sound to Eng- land's enemies.^ To this Charles Gustavus made a counter-proposal, that England take possession of Gliickstadt, Krempen, and AVilsteren, and as security for loans, Iceland, with the jurisdiction over Berghen, the claims of Norway to the Orkney Islands, and in addition Stade and Swingen, except the sovereignty over this city. Meadowe sug- gested that Cronenburg and the island Hewen would be more accept- able, which embarrassed the king greatly, since the cession of these places could not be thought of. He was driven, therefore, to recur to his old plan of dividing Denmark. Friesendorff was empowered to offer Bremen and Verden and the assistance of Sweden in obtaining Iceland and Greenland, provided Richard would aid in the conquest of Norway. If Richard were willing to go further and partition Den- mark, England would receive in addition to the above all of Jutland except the dominions of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, together with freedom from tolls in the Sound. Norway, Seeland, Fiinen and the other islands would go to Sweden. But the abdication of Richard put an end to these schemes.'* It would be an injustice to Richard, however, to emphasize these ad- venturous plans unduly. They occupied at best but a secondary place 1 Pufendorff, v., g 115. 2 Ibid., § 118. "Therefore in case of an obstinate repugnancy to the peace on the Danish part upon the terms aforesaid, to assist the Swede in a defensive way under certain cautions and restrictions. In which the case of assistance, for in war many things may be supposed and provided against whicli never come to pass, the Swede was to give real gages and pledges for the garantie of his faith. To which end the English mediator had often and closely remonstrated to him that 'twas not reasonable to put a sword into another's hand without a previous assurance of its not being made use of against one's yelf. And used it also as an argu- ment to dispose the otherwise unwilling Swede to a peace with the Dane (for a war with Den- mark was of all wars the most commodious for him) because he was not to expect an assist- ance from England which should cost him nothing. And to forecast the temper of affairs, proceeded so far as to nominate Stade upon the Elbe, and Landscroon in the Sound, to be put in case of such assistance into English hands ; which taking vent afterwards, gave occasion to that frivolous report how tliat England and Sweden had agreed together to share Denmark betwixt them." Meadowe's Narrative, p. 119. 3 Putendorff, vi., g 20, with the marginal date May 7. Carlson, iv., 331. * Ibid., g 21. Carlson, iv., 334. Soon after Charles Gustavus tried the effect of similar pro- CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS. 77 in his thoughts, and were only an alternative in case his plan of mediat- ing a peaee should tail. It was to give emphasis to this attempt at mediation that a fleet had been sent to the Sound in the autumn of 1659 under Goodson, hut it was forced to return without aecomplisiiing anything, owing to the lateness of the season. In the following sj)ring another fleet was sent out under Admiral ^lontiigue, who appeared before Copenhagen in April, not for the purpose, as both the Swedes and Danes at fii'st supposed, of unconditionally supporting the Swedish cause, but to force them to accept peace on the basis of the treaty of Koi'skilde, and to lend aid to Charles Gustavus only in so far as it might appear necessary from the attempts of the Dutch or of the confeder- ates of the Danes to defeat this object. When one considers the great difficulties under which Richard labored and his constant struggles with Parliament, his effective interference in the Baltic really does him great credit. A war with Holland over the matter was at first by no means impossible, and the presence of the English fleet in the Baltic not only prevented a more active interference by the Dutch in behalf of the Danes, but persuaded them that independent action in the Baltic was im})racticable. The first Concert of the Hague was therefore by no means a concession to the Dutch, but was quite in accordance with the English policy of armed mediation, and was moreover, although the Swedish king bitterly resented this attempted dictation, in reality an act of friendship towards Sweden. The second and third Concerts of the Hague, however, concluded by the Parlia- ment after Richard's abdication, show clearly how England's foreign influence was paralyzed by internal difficulties. It would take us too far from our subject to discuss the negotiations leading up to the treaty of Oliva, which form, moreover, a chapter in Dutch rather than in English history, since the Parliament had lost its influence over the course of affiiirs, and was compelled to resign the conduct of the me- diation into the hands of its rivals. "The truth is they made no great scruple, at least for that one time, to come under the stern of their neiffhbourino; CommouAvealth, therebv to have hettev leisure to recollect and refit the scattered planks and pieces of their own broken Repu])lic."^ posals in Holland. Erdmannsdorffer, Deutsche Geschichte, i., 337. Carlson, iv., 342. Charles Gustavus' plan was to unite Norway with Sweden, together with Cronenburg, in order to con- trol the Sound. 1 Meadowe's Narrative, p. 122. APPENDIX. A. Extract from Foreign Affairs ix Cromwell's Time, as Given BY Thurloe, 1660. (Stowe MSS., clxxxv., fol. 187.) The State of the Northern Affairs . — In the year [1655] the war broke out between Sweden and Poland, which Sweden undertook without jyiy counsel of the Protector but after he was engaged therein he sent an extraordinary ambassador to desire aid from the Protector for carrying on that war as directed by him for the advantage of the Protestant interest. In the debate of that aifair it came to a proposition and an agree- ment, that the Swede should carry his arms against the emperor and house of Austria, and that upon the foundation thereof, and the war which England and France had with Spain (the other branch of the house of Austria in the west) a league offensive and defensive should be made between England, France, and Sweden, whereunto should be invited the states of Holland, king of Denmark, and the elector of Brandenburg and other states and a concept of articles was drawn and debated between the commissioners of the Protector and the ambassador of Sweden, and communicated to the Dutch and French ambassadors. The Dutch declared their unwillingness, and apprehended danger to themselves from the success of the Swede in Poland, and took reso- lutions underhand to give him troubles, and by great promises of assistance to the king of Denmark, and by rewards to his councilors, engaged that king contrary to his own interests, to invade the king of Sweden in his Duchv of Bremen. This dre\f the king of Sweden out of Poland and set the war wholly on a new foot, and most of the princes of states in Europe found themselves concerned to intermeddle in it. (79) 80 APPENDIX. The principal combatants were the king of Sweden, Poland, and Denmark, the duke of Brandenburg who at firet joined with Sweden, fell off to Poland, the emperor also declared with him. The Dutch underhand irritate the aforesaid princes against the Swede, though openly they were in treaty with him for adjusting their own interests. The Swede had nevertheless that success against the Dane, that they had almost made a conquest of all Denmark and was bringing the Sound under his power. The Protector though he wished in general tlie prosperity of the Swede, his ally, hoping that at last his arms might be directed the right way, yet did not like that the Swede should conquer the Dane, and possess all those countries, and being thereby become power- ful, eno;ross the whole trade of the Baltic Sea, wherein Eno^land is so much concerned, and therefore he interposed in most serious terms with both the kings to make peace whicli was accepted by both, and peace ensued, thereupon, called the peace or treaty of Roskild. But the war being renewed again the next autumn the matter became more entangled. The emperor, duke of Brandenburg, kings of Poland and Denmark entered into a league of offensive and defensive [ ] against the Swede, the Dutch also declare the same way, and prepare a fleet and land forces for the assistance of the Dane. The Protector very much apprehended the issue of this conjunction, he thought it equally dangerous for England that the Swede should be ruined and the Dane preserved by such saviours, who after they had broken the king of Sweden, would also make a prey of the Dane himself, the emperor in his assistance he gave against the Swede, re- vived the old design of the Austrian [eagle] stretching her wings towards the eastern sea, and planting herself upon the Baltic. The Dutch aimed at the command of the Sound and under pre- tence that the Dane was too weak to keep it against his neighbours, would have kept it for him, and had already swallowed up [Drunt- heim] a place of great importance, mortgaged to them by the king of Denmark for money to support him in his wars, and was agreed to be delivered into his hands, so that the price of the king 5f Denmark's deliverance, was like to be the resigning himself up into the hands of the Dutch as his guardians. APPENDIX. 81 That whit'h the Protector pitched upon in this great occasion was to endeavour a present peace between the Dane and the Swede, upon the late treaty of Roskild, made by his own mediation without taking in the ditterenoes bt^twtvn Poland and Sweden, or the Swede and Bran- denburg, or comprehending the pretences of the Dutch and the em- perour, which having many intricacies in them would require time. This the Protector did to obviate the designs of the Dutch, as also to keep open the door for making use of the arms of the Swede in another way. This was liked by none of the contending parties, the Swede though thus beset, yet having got into his possession the Sound and all Denmark but the town of Copenhagen, and believing that France and England would not suffer him to flinck was unwilling to be brought back again to the treaty of Roskild. The Dane was more adverse than he, not doubting but by the aid of his confederates to recover all again and the* confederates opposed it, or any treaty without compre- hending all their interests, and the Dutch most of all infested here^ the meaning whereof was, that they had all agreed totally to ruin the Swede, and the Dutch doubted not of his part in the advantage. The Protector in this whole business laid this for a foundation, that it was not for the interest of this nation that either the Swede or Dane should be ruined in this war, and that [it] was ever safest for England, that the Sound and those countries should remain in the hands of the Dane, and therefore as he had interposed in the first war to pre- serve the Dane, so he resolved by the same measures to proceed, and so to manage these affairs that this might receive no alternation in those parts. And having communicated with France herein and finding that Court to have the same sentiments, they entered into a treaty for the mutual management thereof, wherein it was agreed that France and England should propound to the two kings of Sweden and Denmark the renewing the treaty of Roskild without comprehending any of the confederates. 2dl\'. That they should declare themselves enemies to him that re- flise it, and assist him that accept it. 3dly. That both should send to the Dutch to induce them to join in this mediation. 6 ^2 APPENDIX. 4thly. If a war should happen to England by reason of any assist- ance to be o^iven in this case that France should declare the enemies of England enemies of France, and make war against them, and e contra England to do the same for France. 5thly. That the peace being made between the Dane and Swede, France and England shall interpose to reconcile the Swede to the king of Poland and duke of Brandenburg. The ambassadors of France and England at the Hague propounded the terms aforesaid to the Dutch, but they refused, and instead thereof, prepared a general fleet and land forces to assist the Dane. England finding words would not prevail, prepared also a good fleet, and sent word to the Dutch that his fleet was prepared for the Sound, whither it should sail the first opportunity, that upon the arrival of it there, France and Eno;land would offer the mediation to Sweden and Denmark to agree with them on the treaty of Roskild, and endeavour to compel the opposing party by force, at the same time the French and English at the Hague in the [name] of both their masters de- manded of the states their declaration that no aid or assistance should be sent to the contending parties to enflame that war, and that they should call back such as they have already sent. This being done in vigorous terms brought the Dutch to a temper and persuaded them to agree to join in the mediation on the aforesaid terms, and a treaty was thereupon entered into between all the three states for managing this affair and the fleets of both states to sail thither as common friends to both kings, to bring them to a peace in the manner before expressed. At the same time a treaty was made between England and S^^'eden, that in case the king of Denmark was refractory and refused the peace, that then England would assist Sweden against them, and in recom- pense of the charges and hazards of the war, a sum of money was to be paid England and freedom to the English forever from paying toll in their passages to and from the Baltic Sea in case of success against the Dane, for the performance whereof security was to be given to England. In pursuance of this treaty the English fleet sailed to the Sound and soon after arrived the Dutch, and then the mediation was offered to both the kings in the name of the three states, and a certain day pre- APPENDIX. 83 fixed \vhether they would accept the })eace upon the terms propounded, both made great difficulty therein, and the Dutch who openly joined witli the French and English ambassadors did yet miderhand dissuade the Dane from accepting, and spun out the treaty into a length, until the English tleet returned home from the necessity of their own atiliirs, leaving the treaty unfinished, the management whereof fell into the hands of the Rump, then entered of others who took different measures of this affair. The Dutch had discovered in this and other affairs a fixed desi^^n to monopolize all trade into their own hands, that in the Mediterra- nean they hoped to obtain by occasion of that war between England and Spain, and having the carriage of all Spanish goods, and to man- age their trade to and from the Indies in their ships, they endeavoured to put such articles upon England under the notion of a free ship free goods in the marine treaty, as nu'ght free their ships from all search and molestation, whereby enemy's goods might have been car- ried with all safety, desiring thereby to draw all traffic into their own ships, and so infinitely increase their own shipping and navigation. By occasion of the wars in the eastern parts they endeavoured to engross the trade of the Baltic Sea, for having engaged the Dane to make war with the Swede, under pretence of giving him assistance, they designed to draw him into an absolute dependence upon them, and be means hereof to have the same power upon the Sound as in their own hands, a thing formerly attempted by them by taking the farm of that passage raising themselves and raising other nations at their pleasure, and as now in fact they had in mortgage a part of the king of Denmark's dominions, they were also to have Cronenburg Castle into their hands as a security for the money expended in the war. As to the trade in the East Indies where they were superior at sea, they had in their [own] intentions swallowed all ; their method in those parts was this, if the English or any other nation had driven a good trade with any of those people, their manner was presently to proclaim war with that people, and lay a ship or two at sea before the ports where the trade was, which they called a blocking up, and by colour thereof seized on all ships and goods going in or out of those parts, as trading in an enemy's country, and on this pretence seized on three English [ships] in the East Indies, richly laden, and converted 84 APPENDIX. them to their own use, the news hereof came about the same time when these negotiations were in the Sound, and satisfaction being asked of them, they at first justified the fact, but being told in plain terms that if the true value of the goods and ships according as they had been worth in case they had arrived safe, in Europe, were not paid at the day prefixed, that England would take their own satisfaction by force, they complied and paid to the merchants concerned the full value in ready money. There were no greater considerations in England in reference to for- eign interests, than how to obviate the growing greatness of the Dutch. This state of affairs in the Sound though raised by themselves seemed to give an occasion of doing something in it. The Swede was incensed against them as the authors of ruining his designs in Poland and else^ where, and would have proclaimed war against them, if England would have engaged with him therein. The king of Denmark grew weary of his assistance, and expressed great discontent towards them, seeing that in the end though he should be preserved from the Swede, he should be left in the power of the Dutch, and swallowed up with their pretenses. England was at that time in amity with both those kings, that of Sweden was not assured, but nothing of offence had happened with Denmark since the conclusion of the treaty 1654. But on the con- trar}", that king took acceptably the mediation of England, on which the peace of Roskild ensued, and sent letters of thanks for the good offices towards that crown. That which seems to be England's true interest in this occasion, was to employ their utmost efforts to accommodate the differences be- tween these two crowns, the means whereof after the Dutch did mani- festly cross that in private which they had agreed to by treaty were these. That England and France should use their joint endeavours to bring the Swede to abate of his demands to the Dane, which he could not prosecute without offence to all his neighbours, and instead thereof to prosecute his first designs against the house of Austria, following therein the example of great Gustavus, and wherein France and Eng- land would ffive him e^reat assistance both of monev and forces. The Dane being thus delivered from this dangerous war [ ] APPENDIX. 85 be induced to a coujunction Avith Swedon and to favour his designs the others, England and France becoming the sponsors of the peace and amitv between them. To let the king of Denmark see the ill effects of his friendship with the Dutch, who had many times engaged him to the hazard of his crown, merely to serve their interests, thus they engaged him against England in 1622 and now against Sweden, and when he was thus en- gaged, they imposed on him unreasonable terms of assistance, at other times would assist against him as in 1654 when they helped the Swede against him, and obliged the Danes to yield up part of his do- minions to the Swede, which he holds at this day. And thereupon to offer him the friendship of England instead of the Dutch, as that which he might depend upon in any rencontres with his neighbours contrary to the peace to be agreed upon by any one side or the other, and thereby be freed from his dependence on the Dutch, who under pretence of friendship would oppress him. The elector of Brandenburg was to be invited into this league, and to draw him off from those alliances which were contrary thereunto. There was a particular treaty on foot with Sweden and Poland, that a good correspondence might be held with that kingdom, being the ancient ally with France and useful to England in respect of our trade to Danzio; and the towns in the Rea^all Prussia, England, France, Sweden, Denmark, and Brandenburg being thus allied together upon their common interests, this was thought the best way that these affairs could be put into a reference to the interest of England in those, and the king of England being at that time upon solid terms of friendship with France, and having the advantage of ports on both sides the narrow seas, whence they could easily disturb their navigation through the channel, there was no doubt but the state of things would bring the Dutch either by fair means or force to live by their neighbours upon just and reasonable terms. 86 APPENDIX. B. Extract from The World's Mistake ix Oliver Cromwell. (Harleian Miscellany, i., 287. State Tracts, part i., 376.) But this man, who, through ignorance, is so strangely cried up in the world, was not guilty of this error in state only, but committed as great a solecism, in his designing the outing of the king of Denmark, and setting up the king of Sweden. For had the Swedes but got Copen- hagen (as in all probability, had Oliver lived, they would have done,) they had wanted nothing of consequence, but the cities of Lubeck and Danzig (which, by their then potency, they would easily have gained), of being masters of the whole Baltic Sea, on both sides, from the Sound or mouth down to the bottom of it ; by which, together with all Denmark, Norway, and the Danes' part of Holstein, which would con- sequently have been theirs (they then having, as they still have, the land of Bremen), there would have been nothing, but the small countries of Oldenberg and East Friesland, which would easily have fallen into their mouths, betwixt them and the United Netherlands, whereby Sweden would on the one side, to the north and north-east, have been as great, as France on the other, to the south and south-west ; and they two, able to have divided the western empire betwixt them. And whereas it had in all ages been the policy of the northern states and potentates, to keep the dominion of the Baltic Sea divided among several petty princes and states, that no one might be sole master of it ; because, otherwise, most of the necessary commodities for shipping, coming from thence and Nor^vay, any one lord of the whole might lay up the shipping of Europe, by the walls, in shutting only of his ports, and denying the commodities of his country to other states : Cromwell contrary to this wise maxim, endeavoured to put the wliole Baltic Sea into the Swedes' hands, and undoubtedly had (though, I suppose, ignorantly) done it, if his death had not given them that suc- ceeded him, the Long Parliament, an opportunity of prudently pre- venting it. For, if he had understood the importance of the Baltic Sea to this nation, lie could not have been so impolitic, as to have pro- jected so dangerous a design against his new Utopia, as giving the opening and shutting of it to any one prince. I am not ignorant, that APPENDIX. 87 this error is excused, by pretending that we were to have had Elsinore and Cronenburg Castle, (the first, the town, u^wn the narrow entrance of the Baltic, calletl the Sound, where all shii)s ride, and pay toll to the king of Denmark ; and the latter, the fortress, that defends both the town and ships,) by which we should have been masters of the Sound, and consequently of the Baltic : but they that know those countries, and how great a prince the Swede would have been, had he obtained all the rest, besides those two baubles ; must confess, we should have been at his devotion, in our holding of any thing in his countries. And further, if the dangerous consequence of setting up so great a prince had not been in the case, it had been against the interest of England, to have had an obligation upon us to maintain places so re- mote, against the enmity of many states and princes ; and that for these reasons : First, because the ordinary tolls of the Sound would not have de- frayed half the charge ; and, to have taken more than the ordinary tolls, we could not have done, without dra^^nng a general quarrel upon us, from most of the princes and states of the northern parts of Europe. Secondly, etc. 88 APPENDIX. C. Extract from Thurloe's Speech to Parliament, February 18, 1859. (Burton's Diary, iii., 380, seq.) This was the state of thins^s in October last. His His^hness, that now is, took these considerations : 1. The continuance of a war in these parts would infinitely hmder our trade, and be of very great prejudice to this nation; many of our manufacturers being transported and vented thither, and many of our materials for shipping and navigation being carried from thence, hither. 2. Considering what the issue of this war might be, that the Sound " was likely to be put into the hands of those that would exclude the English, or put us in such a condition, as we should be as bad as ex- cluded ; the consequence of which would be the ruin of our shipping ; hemp, pitch, tar, cordage and mast, coming all from thence, and an obstruction there, would endanger our safety. We had experience of this in our war with the Dutch, when the Dane did prohibit our access thither, which put us to great distress, having none of those commodities, but what came from our enemies at double rates. 3. His Highness considered that the emperor was likely to arrive at the design of the house of Austria, to command the Baltic, and the eastern seas, as the Spaniard already hath the command of the western seas. Thus, they Avould command all the trade of the world. Of this the Dutch were so sensible before, as they engaged the Swede to come to hinder the progress of the emperor, who is now fairer in hopes of it than ever he was in the world, they having greater posses- sions there than formerly, as two or three principal places in Holstein, by the delivery of Denmark, are already garrisoned by the emperor's forces. And I think the king of Denmark is in more danger from those that are allied with him than from his open enemies. 4. He considered that when the emperor had done his business there, he and his confederates would next pour themselves into Flanders, and APPENDIX. 89 from thenre hither into this Comiiioiiwealth, where thev intend to bring in another government, when they are ready for it. Such coun- sels, we know, are on foot, de facto , already. %5. The great danger of overthrowing the Protestant interest, in general, which we have so much reason to j)reserve and promote. His Highness, considering these mischiefs, thought himself concerned to obviate them as far as he could. We are yet in friendship with all these princes, and have no enmity with the emperor; nor would his Highness have it otherwise. He therefore thought fit to interpose upon the account of amity. You should make it your fii-st step to endeavour to reconcile those two fighting kings, thinking it to be our interest rather to preserve both, than to sutfer either to be destroyed ; and that France and you would join to take olf the Dutch and Brandenburg, if possible to reconcile the Pole and Sweden. To promote the success of this mediation, and luring all parties to a reconciliation, not excluding the house of Austria, too, his Highness thought fit and meet to send a fleet into those parts of twenty ships, to the intent to make a peace between the two kings, and of this he ac- quainted the States General. Gay lord Bros. Makers Syracuse, N. ^' PAT. JAN. 21. 1908 U. C. BERKELEY LIBRAR CDSimiD37 5/ ^^(^^ % UNIVERSITY OF CAUFORNIA LIBRARY THIS BOOK IS Dun ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY WILL INCREASE TO 50 CENTS ON THE FOURTH DAY AND TO $1.00 ON THE SEVENTH DAY OVERDUE. -•. ^-^-^i^%