>N. •» ^ % .*^ Xm^ tJNIVEKSITY of CALIFORNIA COMPILATION OF — TAX LAWS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS MADE BY RALPH H. WILKIN T'xnKIt THE DiRECTJUX OF THE StATE TaX COMMISSION. Fkank F. Nolema-n. Clidirmnii. Joseph B. Sanborn, Charles C. Craig. »21 10611? TABLE OF CONTENTS. Page Cases under the Federal Constitution 3 Article 9 of Constitution of 1870 4 General Revenue Act, Revised Statutes, ch. 120 30 State Tax Commission Law 214 pi Revenue Act of 1898 for the assessment of property 225 "^ Juhl Law 262 Act in Regard to taxation of bridges across navigable waters on the Border of the State 268 Act regarding the Collection of Taxes and Special Assessments 270 Apportionment of special assessments 271 Act to restore uniformity of Taxation 272 J Inheritance Tax Act of 1909 273 Act to provide for the casual deficits in revenue 299 Act to validate the Acts of the County Board lOo Validation of tax levies for 1916 :!0l Tax for State Purposes .'{02 PREFATORY NOTE The State Tax Commission was created by an Act of the Gen- eral Assembly approved June 19, 1919 (Laws 1919, page 718). By this Act all the powers and duties imposed upon the State Board of Equalization and upon the Auditor of Public Accounts in relation to the assessment of property for taxation was trans- ferred to and to be exercised and performed by the Tax Commis- sion, and whenever in any law relating to assessment of property for taxation, abstracts, reports or schedules or other papers or documents, are required to be filed with, or any duty is imposed upon, or power vested in either the Auditor or Board of Equaliza- tion, such abstracts, etc., shall be filed with, such duty and power shall be discharged and exercised by the Tax Commission. A note to that effect has been added to each section of the Revenue statutes in this compilation to which it is deemed applicable. The annota- tions of decisions made by Mr. Albert M. Kales and Elmer M. Liessmann and published under direction of the Special Tax Com- mission in 1909 have been reprinted so far as applicable to the present law. UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. The State cannot tax property which has no situs therein, either actual or constructive, as property outside the jurisdiction of a State cannot be taxed within the due process of law clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal constitution. Keith Equipment Co. vs. Board of Eeview, 283—2-14. Inter-State commerce is not taxed by taxing property devoted to such use, and property used in inter-State commerce is not exempt from taxation by the State. People vs. Bridge Co., 287—246; Same vs. Illinois, 175 U. S. 626. The right to water power, which is an interest in real estate, is exempt where situs of such power is a place over which Congress has exclusive power of legislation. Moline Power Co. vs. Cox, 252 — 348, 358. Merchandise may cease to be interstate commerce at an intermediate point between the place of shipment and ultimate destination; and if kept at such point for the use and profit of owners and under the protection of the laws of the State it becomes subject to the taxing power of the State. General Oil Co. vs. Grain, 209 U. S. 211. The State may tax movables of a foreign corporation, which are regularly and habitually employed therein, although devoted to interstate commerce, but the taxaion of property of a foreign corporation by a state, the property not having come within its borders, violate the due process of law clause of Fourteenth Amendment to Federal Constitution. Union Tank Line vs. Wright, 249 17. S. 275. A special Act prior to Constitution of 1870 giving authority to aid improve- ments by donations or subscriptions, and levy taxes to pay the same, is part of the contract with the parties making improvements, and a subsequent constitutional provision limiting the rate of taxation is inapplicable so far as in conflict therewith. Peoria, D. and E. E. Co. vs. P., 116 — 401. The Act of 1867 (2 L, 1867, p. 6, June 13) which imposed a tax on the indi- vidual stockholders of banks, included national banks. This was not a violation of the Federal Constitution. MacVeagh vs. Chicago, 49 — 318; MacVeagh vs. Neuhaus, 49 — 330. It is lawful to impose a tax discriminating against foreign corporation, in favor of domestic corporation of same character, because foreign corpora- tions do business in tliis State only by comity. Ducat vs. Chicago, 48 — 172, affirmed 10 Wall (U. S.) 410. The State authorities may not tax property in course of transportation from one State to another, ovor one of our navigable rivers, or over any of the public highways of the country, while it is in transit, even though it should be detained by low water or ice, or other cause. Burlington L. C. vs. Willctts, 118—559. Logs shipped from one State to leased premises in another State and there kept and sent for shipment into a third State as needed, are not in transit but are snbject to tax by the State of the leased premises. Burlington Lumber Co. v.s. Willettts, 118-559, approved 209 U. S. 230. Oil passing from one State to another in pipe lines is not liable to taxation by the State through which it passes. Prairie Oil & Gas. Co. vs. Ehrhardt, 244—634. Grain in transit from one State to another, but which has come to rest in one State and been stored for the purpose of inspecting, weighing, cleaning, drying, sacking, grading, or mixing, or of changing ownership, even though only for convenience, may be taxed in that State. When grain so in transit is delayed, as by low water or ice, it is not taxable in that State. People vs. Bacon, 243—313, affirmed 227 U. S. 504. The cars of a trunk line company from one State in transit through another and not allowed to remain in the second State longer than to be passed through the State, or if shipped to points within the State, longer than is necessary for them to be unloaded and shipped back, are not taxable'in the second State. In re Appeal of Union Tank Line Co., 204—347. The State may not tax United States government bonds, held by private bank- ers. City of Chicago vs. Lunt, 52 — 414. Property of the United States, whether it is used as means for execution of powers of Federal government or not is not taxable by the State. P. vs. United States, 93—30, approved 117 U. S. 162. Imports stored in the government warehouse arc exempt from State tax. Sieg- fried vs. Kaymond, 190—428. Goods which have been imported, and are still in the original unbroken packages in which they were imported and upon which United States duties have been paid, are not subject to state tax notwithstanding they are no longer in bonded warehouse but in warehouse of the importer. In re Appeal of Pitkin & Brooks, 193—269. Imported goods in original unbroken packages are not subject to general tax. In re Appeal of Doane & Co., 197 — 376. ART. 9 OF ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION OF 1870. [Introductory: Has no application to license fees as distinguished from taxes. None of the restrictions of Art. 9 of the Constitution apply to a license fee as distinguished from a tax. Thus a municipality has power to impose saloon licenses under its general power of regulation. United States Dis- tilling Co. vs. City of Chicago, 112—19. License fee is not a tax within clause of Constitution prescribing uniformity in levying taxes. Constitvition of 1870^ does not limit power of legisla- ture to impose or authorize imposition of license to pursue calling. Wig- gins Ferry Co. vs. City of E. St. Louis, 10'2— 560; Metropolis Theater Co. vs. Chicago, 246—20. Dramshop license is not a tax. City of East St. Louis vs. Trustees of Schools, 102—489. City dram-shop license is not tax under Constitution of 1870 or 1848, Lov- ingston vs. Board of Trustees, 99 — 564. Liquor license is not a tax within the meaning of the Constitution. City of E. St. Louis vs. Wehrung, 46—392. Penalty for selling liquor without license, is not a tax. King vs. Jackson, 2—306. License fee on dogs, authorized by Act of May 29, 1879, not a tax, within this section. Code vs. Hall, 103 — 30. Under the provisions of See. 30 as found iu Starr & Curtis' Stat. 1896, p. 2225, a lew bv a city of 1% tax on fire insurance companies for the mainte- nance, use and benefit of the fire department, is within its power of regu- lation. Kunz vs. ^rational Fire Ins. Co., 169—577; Ins. Co. vs. Peoria, 156—420. Broker's license fee held to be a tax, and so semble it can be supported only under the power to tax. Braun vs. Chicago, 110 — 186. Vehicle tax was sustainable only under the power to tax and not at all under the police power of the municipality a« a license fee. Harders Stor- age Co. vs. Chicago, 235—58. Fee for services rendered by state mine inspector is not tax. C. W. & V. Coal Co. vs. P., 181—278. So-called license fee exacted from Insurance Companies are sustainable as taxes under the power to tax. See cases infra under Sec. 2, Article 9.] Although it has sometimes been said that a license fee exacted for tlic i)ur- pose of revenue is not a tax, such statement must be understood as mean- ing that it is not a tax in the sense of the property. tax authorized by the constitution, which must be levied according to valuation, since it is a tax, and is levied by virtue of par. 41, Sec. 1, Art. 5 of Cities and Villages Act. Condon vs. Village of Forest Park, 278—218. Where a tax may be lawfully levied by requiring payment of a license fee fixed by the General Assembly or the municipality authorized to levy the tax, such an occupation though lawful in itself, may be prohibited unless licensed, in order to compel the taking out of a license. Condon vs. Vil- lage of Forest Park, 278—218, 226. Taxation in proportion to value — Assessment — Tax on certain classes.] Section 1. The General Assembly" shall provide such revenue as may be needful by levying a tax, by valuation,^ so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion" to the value of his, her or its property'' — such value to be ascertained by some person or persons, to be elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise;* but the General Assembly shall have power to tax peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, hawkers, merchants, commission merchants, showmen, jug- gier.s, inn-keepers, grocery keepers, liciuor dealers, toll bridges, ferries, insurance, telegraph and express interests or business, vendors of patents, ;iii(I |)ersons or corporations owning oi' using franchises and privileges,^ in such manner as it sliall from lime to time direct by geneiiil l;i\v, uiiiform''' as to the elass upon which it operates.'' a. General Assembly: General As.siMubly may exercise taxing power subject only to restriction of thf const it 1ltin^. Condon vh. Village of Forest Park, 278—218, 225. 1. Valuation: The tax-payer is entitled to honest judgment of person elected or appointed to fix the values, and a tax founded on an assessment which from cor- rupt and malicious motives is made excessive or rendered unequal or unfair by fraudultMit practices of the officers, or whereby property is arbitrarily assessed at too high a vahiation cannot be sustained. People vs. E. Co., 286—576; P. vs. Bridge Co., 287—246. The method of levying a tax, aside from a tax on property according to valua- tion, is a matter of form and not of substance. Condon vs. Village of Forest Park, 278—218, 226. It is not within the power of the legislature to provide that different classes of property shall be valued differently. People vs. Illinois Cent. E. Co., 273—220, 251; First Nat'l Bank vs. Holmes, 246—362. Tax levy for past year must be extended on valuation of that year and not on that of present year. Town of Lebanon vs. Ohio, etc., E. Co., 77 — 539. All taxes must be levied by valuation except as provided in Sec. 9, Art. 9 of Constitution. Crane vs. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 153 — 348 (1894). "Value" means "fair cash value." 111. etc., E. and C. Co. vs. Stookey, 122 —358. Act of March 30', 1872, providing for taxation of capital stock of corpora- tions does not violate above because it is left entirely to the legislature to determine how corporations shall be taxed, so long as it does so by general law, uniform as to the class upon which it operates. Porter vs. Eockford, etc., E. Co., 76—561. Eesolutions adopted by the Board of Equalization in valuing property of cor- porations are valid. Porter vs. Eockford, etc., E. Co., 76 — 561; People's Gas Light Co. vs. Stuckart, 286—164, 169. The Local Improvement Act in so far as it authorizes a local improvement by special taxation of contiguous property, does not violate that provision of Sec. 1, Art. 9, of the Constitution requiring that taxes be levied ac- cording to valuation. Harrigan vs. Jacksonville, 220 — 134; White vs. People, 94 — 604; Murphy vs. People, 120^ — 234; Crane vs. West Chicago Park Comrs., 153—348. 2. Uniformity: An arbitrary, known and intentional violation of the rule of uniformity is an invasion of constitutional right and will not be tolerated and where assessment against property of a bridge company shows a great disparity and discrimination as compared with the assessment of all other property, which could not reaonably have arisen from an error of judg- ment, courts will relieve against violation of constitutional rule of uni- formity. People vs. K. & H. Bridge Co., 287 — 246; Eaymond vs. Trac. Co., 207 U. S. 20.. Taxes must be uniform in proportion to the value of property, and where assessors have disregarded the injunction of the law, and made an assess- ment far below its real cash value their misconduct must also follow the principle of uniformity and their assessment of all property must be at the same proportional value. People's Gas, Light & Coke Co, vs. Stuckart, 286—164. The legislature has power to provide means to maintain uon-high-sehool dis- tricts subject to requirement of constitution regarding uniformity of taxa- tion. People vs. Chicago & N. W. E. Co., 286—384, 391. The legislature has not the power to exempt from the rule of equality estab- lished by section 1 the property of any corporation, no matter for what purpose organized, except as authorized by section 3 of same article. People vs. National Box Co., 248—141, 146. The principle of uniformity is not violated by the levying of taxes for simi- lar purposes by overlapping municipalities. Board of Highway Commis- sioners vs. City of Bloomington, 253 — 164, 168. The fact machinery of pumping plant of drainage district is taxed while pumping plants of other municipalities are exempt under statute does not violate Sec. 1. Nutwood Drain. & Levee Dist. vs. Board of Keview, 255—447, 449. Provisions of section 1 of Inheritance Tax Act excluding step-children from exemption is not an unlawful discrimination in violation of Sec. 1. Peo- ple vs. Tatge, 267—634, 638. The State tax aganst property of Illinois Central must be assessed on the same proportion of full cash value as other owners arc assessed, under the general revenue law. People vs. Ky. Co., 273 — 220. Section 5 of Act of 1915 (L. 1915, p. 631), providing for payment of high school tuition out of State School fund violates principle of uniformity and equality in taxation required by section 1. Board of Education vs. Haworth, 274—538, 543. Sections 94 and 96 of Non-High School Law of 1917 docs not violate the rule of uuiformity and equality In taxation. People vs. Chicago & N. W. E. Co., 286—384, 392. The exception in Clause 4, Sec. 1 of Ecvcnue Act is unconstitutional as being an exemption not authorized by Sec. 3, Art. 9 of the Constitution. Coal Co. vs. Miller, 236—149; People vs. National Box Co., 24S— 141. Act creating State board of equalization is constitutional, and was held so under similar provision in Constitution of 1848. Its necessity arose from the uniformity provision of this Article. P. vs. Salomon, 46 — 333; Adsit vs. Lieb, 76—198. The requirement of uniformity is not violated by an Act providing that the property of a corporation shall be taxed to the corporation and that shares shall not be taxed. Loan and Homestead Ass'n vs. Keith, 153 — 609 (1894). Ex parte People's Loan and Homestead Ass'n, 153 — 655 (1894). The allowance of certain credits and deductions in assessment of i)ersonalty does not violate uniformity so long as it operates alike upon all persons and proi)erty like situated. Edwards vs. P., 99 — 340. The principle of uniformity and eqwality was not violated under Constitution of 1848 by an act requiring assessment of bank shares on July 1, instead of April 1, thowgli other property was to be assessed cm tlie latter date. MacVeagh v.h. Chicago, 49 — 318. A requirement lliat taxes due from ikhi residents bo paid at different time from those due from re.sidents is constitutional. Uhinehart vs. Schuyler, 7— (2 Gil.), 473. All incorrect valuation, if not fraudulently done, will not avoid tax on the ground of lack of uniformity. Spencer vs. P., 68 — 510. Under a similar provision in the Constitution of 1818, a statute which classi- fied all lands in the State into three classes for purpose of taxation was constitutional. Khinchart vs. Schuyler, 7 — (2 Gil.), 473. Clause 4, Sec. 3 of Eevenue Act is constitutional because it makes a proper classification of corporations and so is uniform. Tlie legislature may pro- vide one method for determining the value of the capital stock, includ- ing the franchise, of a railroad company, another method for a mining cor- poration, and still another for manufacturing corporations and may em- power the board of equalization to fix a mode of ascertaining the value of "capital stock." Sterling Gas Co. vs. Higby, 134—587; Coal E. Co. vs. Finlen, 124—666. That part of Sec. 343 infra, which attempts to limit the power of every municipality in counties of 125,000 inhabitants or over, to incur indebt- edness in excess of 2^^% of the assessed valuation, and to limit the rate of taxation in every municipality or taxing district in such counties to 5% is unconstitutional. P. vs. Knopf, 183 — 410. Assessing property of railway company higher than other property in county, or assessing it at one value in one county and at a different value in an- other county, although at less than its real value, violates the constitu- tional provision of uniformity. Supervisors Bureau County vs. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 44—229; Chicago, etc., E. C. vs. Boone County, 44—240; People's Gas Light Co. vs. Stuckart, 28G— 164. Uniformity is violated by taxing a loan made by an ordinary corporation to its stockholders and exempting a loan made by a building and loan associa- tion to its members. Loan and Homestead Ass'n vs. Keith, 153 — 609 (1894). Ex parte People's Loan and Homestead Ass'n., 153 — 655 (1894). !', An Act exempting the property of corporations Violates the requirement of uni- formity. Semble, that the exemption of any property from taxation is invalid for the same reason. Loan & Homestead Ass'n vs. Keith, 153 — 609 (1894); Ex parte People's Loan & Homestead Ass'n, 153 — 655 (1894). The rule of uniformity was violated by a tax to pay bonds issued by a county to secure the location of a State reform school, as such school was of no greater benefit to the county where located than to any other. Livingston County vs. Welder, 64—427. Uniformity is violated by assessing bank stock at par where other property is assessed at 1/3. Darling vs. Gunn, 50 — 424. Under the Constitution of 1848 a provision of a city charter exempting inhab- itants from road tax on and for roads beyond limits of city was uncon- stitutional. O'Kane vs. Treat, 25 — 557. A similar provision of the Constitution of 1848 was violated by a charter authorizing city cpuncil to levy tax on real estate, but not on improve- ments on real estate or on personal property. Primm vs. Belleville, 59 — 142. Under Constitution of 1848, the imposition of a penalty of 5% if tax not paid by a certain day, on taxpayers for delay in payment of taxes, other than costs of suit against deliquent taxpayers and penalties on sale of de- linquent property, violates the requirement of uniformiy. Scammon vs. Chicago, 44—269. A poll tax on shares violated the rule of uniformity, as they were property and not all of the same value. Nance vs. Howard, 1 Breese Beecher, 242. Under the uniformity provision of this section each tract must be assessed separatch', or assessment invalid. Accordingly we have Sees. 4 and 76 of the Eevenue Act which provide for such assessment. Constitution of 1870, Art. 9, Sec. 1, cited. Howe vs. P., 86—288. Proviso to Clause 4, Sec. 3, does not violate Sec. 1, Art. 9 of Constitution. O. G. L. & C. Co. vs. Downey, 127—201; Coal E. C. Co. vs. Finlen, 124— 666; Hub vs Hanberg, 211—43; Gas Co. vs. Higby, 134—557. Taxation of land in possession of purchaser under bond for deed, and of purchase-money notes therefor in vendor's possession, is not double taxa- tion, and so does not contravene the constitutional requirement of uni- formity. P. vs. Ehodes, 15 — 304. 3. Property: "Property" embraces a master's certificate of sale so that the general Reve- nue Act in permitting it to be taxed as such is constitutional. Wedgbury vs. Cassell, 164^-624. Franchises are property, and must be taxed under the Constitution. Ottawa Glass Co. vs. McCaleb, 81—556. Credits, choses in action, and the property given in consideration therefor are taxable. P. vs. Worthington, 21 — 171. Leasehold interests in lands owned by the State are taxable. La Salle County Manuf. Co. vs. Ottawa, 16 — 418. '-'Personal estate" includes credits and money loaned, and an Act providing for taxing personalty, and not including credits and moneys loaned, would be unconstitutional, as making an unauthorized exemption. (Con- stitution of 1848). Trustees vs. McConncll, 12—138. 4. Value to be ascertained by whom: The Act of March 10, LSfiH, empowering the board of supervisors to appoint assessors was valid. Du Page County vs. Jenks, 65 — 277. Power to fix valuation cannot be exercised by legislative, executive or judicial departments of government, but the same rests solely in the persons se- lected as the legislature directs. Ecpublic Life Ins. Co. vs. Pollak, 75 — 292; Burton Stock Co. vs. Traeger, 187—11. Board of equalization may be invested with power to make original assess- montH. Adsit vs. Licb, 76—198; Porter vs. Eockford, Etc., R. Co., 76— 561. Every person and corporation is entitled to protection of tliis provision which precludes discrimination in favor of or against any class of property, person or corporation. First NmI '1 B;nik vs. Holmes, 246 — 362, 366. 5. Privileges: .\mended Sec. 1, Art. 5, Chap. 24, Rev. Stats, and the wheel tax ordinance passed thereunder, are constitutional and arc not .invalid as exacting a license fee from vehicles using the streets, because such tax levied upon a "privilege." Harder 's Storage Co. vs. Chicago, 23.5 — 58. .\ city may tax livery stable keepers, when properly authorized by the legis- lature. Howland vs. Ciiicago, 108 — 496. JO Under Constitution of 1818, providing Art. 8, Sec. 20, that taxation should be by valuation, a poll tax was not a property tax, and hence not uncon- stitutional. Sawyer vs. Alton, 4 — (3 Scam.), 127. 6. Uniformity: This provision is not violated by a statute (L. 1883, p. 92) which imposes license fee of $150 on vendors of malt liquors and license of $500' on ven- ders of other intoxicating liquors, as the division of liquor dealers into two classes is reasonable. Timm vs. Harrison, 109 — 593. The legislature may impose the same burdens on foreign insurance company doing business in Illinois that arc imposed by such foreign States on Illinois companies doing business in those States without violating the Constitu- tion as it thereby makes a separate class of those companies. Home Ins. Co. vs. Swigert, 104—653; Ins. Co. vs. Durfee, 164 193. 7. Unclassified. Where it was pleaded that the school district was required to pay all money derived from tax on railroad into State Treasury to pay bonds issued by the town in which the district was located. It did not appear that the district was co-extensive with the town. It was unconstitutional to require a school district to pay all money derived from the tax on a railroad company into the State treasury to be applied on payment of bonds issued to that railroad company by the whole town as this might operate to impose a greater burden on this district than on other districts in the town. Allhands vs. People, 82—234. Section 1 of Constitution is only limitation upon the power of legislature to tax occupations. Metropolis Theater Co. vs. Chicago, 246 — 20. No time is fixed within which a State tax levy may be made. Morrison vs. Moir Hotel Co., 204 A. 433, 436. Other taxes.] Section 2. The specification of the objects and subjects of taxation shall not deprive the General Assembly of the power to require other subjects or objects to be taxed in such man- ner as may be consistent with the principles of taxation fixed in this Constitution. Act of 1879 which provided that foreign insurance companies shall pay a tax of 2% on gross receipts is valid by Art. 9, Sec. 2, as a tax upon "other subjects or objects" than those named in Sec. 1, Art. 9. Eaymond vs. Ins. Co., 196—329. See also Hughes vs. Cairo, 92—339; Ducat vs. Chicago, 48 — 172; P. vs. Thurber, 13 — 554; Walker vs. Springfield, 94 — 364; Kunz vs. National Fire Ins. Co., 169—577. A city cannot in the absence of authorization prohibit foreign insurance com- panies from doing business without license, as such ordinance is a revenue measure and not an exercse of police power. City of Chicago vs. Phoenix Ins. Co., 126—276. Amended Sec. 1, Art. 5, Chap. 24 Kev. Stats, and the wheel tax ordinance passed thereunder is valid because If the right to use a public street is not a privilege within the meaning of Sec. 1, Art. 9, of the Constitution, then such right of taxation falls within the designation "other subjects or objects to be taxed" mentioned in Sec. 2 of Constitution. Harder 's Storage Co. vs. Chicago, 235 — 58. 11 Occupation of horseslioers is taxable by legislature for purposes of revenue, but (semble) to justify it purely as a license there must be need for regulation. Bessette vs. P., 193—341; Price vs. P., 193—117. The General Assembly may tax other subjects and objects than those speci- fied in section 1 if the taxation is in harmony with the principles of the constitution. Condon vs. Village of Forest Park, 278 — 218, 226. Exemption.] Section 3. The property of the State, counties, and other municipal corporations, both real and personal, and such other property as may be used exclusively for agricultural and hor- ticultural societies, for school, religious, cemetery and charitable purposes, may be exempted from taxation; but such exemption shall be only by general law. In the assessment of real estate incumbered by public easement, any depreciation occasioned by such easement may be deducted in the valuation of such property. The legislature may exempt from taxation only property specified in this section. Loan & Homestead Ass'n vs. Keith, 153 — 609; People vs. Na- tional Box Co., 248-141, 146; Cong. Pub. Society vs. Board of Keview, 290—108. Section 2 of Revenue law was adopted by the legislature pursuant to the au- thority conferred by this section. Board of Directors vs. Board of Re- view, 248—590, 593. School is a place where systematic instruction in useful branches is given by methods common to schools in the common acceptation of that word, as distinguished from what are called schools where instruction is given in dancing, riding, deportment and like things. People vs. Deutsche Gemeinde, 249—132. Religious purpose is a use of property by a religious society or body of per- son.s as a stated place of public worship, Sunday schools and religious instruction. People (ex rel.) vs. Deutsche Gemeinde, 249 — 132. Enumeration in section 3 of certain specified property exempted from taxa- tion is a limitation upon the power of the legislature to exempt any other property. People vs. Deutsche Gemeinde, 249 — 132, 135. The legislature may not exempt from taxation notes taken by a building and loan association from its members. Loan & Homestead Ass'n vs. Keith, 153—609. Section 3, Art. 9, of the Constitution does not itself exempt property from taxation, but only authorizes the general assembly to do so. Thus while the Constitution authorizes the assembly to exempt property used for religious purposes, the assembly has not gone so far, but instead exempts church property used exclusively for public worship. In re Walker, 200 — 56G. A bridge owned by a city, outside the city limits, and for use of which the city charges toll, is not exempt under this section in the absence of exemption by Act of the legi.slature. In the Matter of Swigcrt, 123 — 267. .\n institution of learning which has ceased to use the property for such pur- I»OHeH is not exempt under the Constitution in absence of legislation mak- ing such exemption by general law. Edgar Collegiate Inst. vs. P., 142 — 363 (1892). 12 Separate lot used for office and dwelling of custodian of burial grounds ad- joining is not exempt by above section of Constitution in absence of legislative act. Bloomington Cemetery Ass'n vs. I'., 170 — 378. Legislature may exempt park from taxation. P. vs. Salomon, 51 — 37. An Act exempting money "collected and on hand within this State of every kind and nature of fraternal beneficiary societies and the subordinate lodges thereof ' ' is unconstitutional, as such organizations are not public charities, but are insurance companies. Supreme Lodge vs. Board of Eeview, 223—54, Miinicipal warrants issued for loan to city are subject to taxation because not property of municipality. Easton vs. Board of Eeview, 183 — 256. The exception in Sec. 1, Clause 4 of Eevenue Act in attempting to exempt certain companies not enumerated above, is void. Coal Co. vs. Miller, 236 —149. Sale of land — Return to general officer — Judgment.] Section 4. The General Assembly shall provide, in all cases where it may be necessary to sell real estate for the non-payment of taxes or special assessments for State, county, municipal or other purposes, that a return of such unpaid taxes or assessments shall be made to some general officer of the county having authority to receive State and county taxes ; and there shall be no sale of said property for any of said taxes or assessments but by said officer, upon the order or judgment of some court of record. Section 216 of Eevenue Law was enacted to carry out this section of the Constitution. Clark vs. Zaleski, 253 — 63, 74. Section 253 of Eevenue Law giving authority to foreclose tax lien in equity is in conformity with this section. People vs. Cant, 260 — 497, 499. Section 227 of Eevenue act does not violate section 4 prohibiting sale for taxes without an order or judgment of a court of record. Ziccarelli vs. Stuckart, 277—26, 33. Sale for taxes by city collector void. Gage vs. Hervey, 111 — 305. Sec. 4, Article 9 of Constitution of 1870 repeals so much of municipal special charters as authorized city collector to apply for judgment for taxes. Smith vs. P., 75—36; Hills vs. Chicago, 60^86; Parmelee vs. Chicago, 60—267; Weckler vs. Chicago, 61—142; Otis vs. Chicago, 62—299. A sale made by city collector, not a county officer, but under a judgment en- tered before this provision took effect, is valid. Garrick vs. Chamber- lain, 97—620. Without this section the power of the legislature in respect to providing for the sale of land for taxes and special assessments, and the mode to be pursued in making such sales would have been plenary. Chambers vs. P., 113—509. A sheriff in counties not under township organization may apply for sale for delinquent taxes as he is also county collector and district collector. Eyan vs. P., 117—486. Redemption — Notice.] Section 5. The right of redemption 13 from all sales of real estate for the non-payment of taxes or special assessments of any character whatever, shall exist in favor of owners and persons interested in such real estate, for a period of not less than two years from such sales thereof. And the General Assembly shall provide by law for reasonable notice to be given to owners or parties interested, by publication or otherwise, of the fact of the sale of the property for such taxes or assessments, and when the time of redemption shall expire : Provided, that occu- pants shall in all cases be served with personal notice before the time of redemption expires. Section 253 of Eevenue law giving authority to foreclose tax lien in equity is in conformity with, this section. People vs. Cant, 260 — 497, 499. Section 227 of Revenue Law does not deprive owner of property of constitu- tional right of redemption. Ziccarelli vs. Stuckart, 277 — 26, 32. Where the notice to owner states date of expiration of period for redemption, same as date of sale, a tax deed given thereunder confers no title. Wil- son vs. McKonna, 52 — 43. Under provision in Constitution of 1845 the party who claims under the tax deed has the burden of proving that prescribed notice was given. Wil- liams vs. Underhill, 58 — 137. By this provision is meant that reasonable notice shall be given to the owner, and to any other person who had a specific or other interest in the prop- erty, as shall be deemed proper in legislative discretion. Smyth vs. Neflf, 123—311. The facts of service of the notice must be particularly set out in the affidavit. Price vs. England, 109—394. The legislature may determine the kind and form of the notice as the Con- stitution is silont as to kind of notice. Section 216. Frew vs. Taylor, 106—159. The Constitution contemplates the giving of notice before the expiration of the period of redemption and therefore the three months' provision of Sec. 216 of Revenue Act is not unconstitutional as not providing for those who get possession within the three .months, "they being in position of pur- chasers pendente lite. Taylor vs. Wright, 121 — 455. Notice which states that time of redemption will expire 10/26/76 when it docs not expire until Nov. 6, 1876, is fatally defective. Gage vs. Bailey, 100 — 530. See under Sec. 216 General Revenue Act. This does not apply to sale on execution under personal judgment for delin- quent taxes. Douthett vs. Kettle, 104 — 356, Sec. 216 of General Revenue Act. was adopted in obedience to this section of the Constitution. Gape vs. Webb, 141—533; Clark vs. Zalcski, 253—63, 74, State taxes — Not to be released.] Section 6. The General Assembly sliall Iuinc ho jxjuci' 1o rclrase or discliargc any county, city, towiisliip, town or district whatever, or the inha])itants thereof, or the property therein, from their or its proportionate share of 14 taxes to be levied for State purposes, nor shall commutation for such taxes be authorized in any form whatsoever. So much of the Act of 1SG9 which required the State revenue to be collected ou valuations of the taxable property in the State remaining after de- ducting, in counties, townships, cities and towns which have outstanding indebtedness incurred in aid of the construction of railroads, the in- creased valuation of the taxable property over that of the year 1868, cannot be enforced. Kamsey vs. Hoeger, 76 — 432. An Act which exempts from taxation all parcels of land in city exceeding 10 acres until subdivided into lots of 10 acres or less, is void. Hayward vs. P., 145—55 (1893). It is unconstitutional to appropriate State taxes and revenues to a local im- provement (e. g., Kaskaskia River Navigation Company's improvements). P. vs. Lippincott, 65 — 548. An Act is void which purports to exempt a city from State taxes for twenty years, even though it requires the city to levy an equal tax for that period for improvement. P. vs. Barger, 65 — 452. The provision in the Act which imposed a gross premium tax on insurance companies (Hurds, 1899, p. 1042) that the tax shall be in full for all taxes, State and local, except on real estate, etc., was not a commuta- tion, but a mode of taxation different than by the general Revenue Law, i. e., under Sec. 1, Art. 9, Clause 2. Raymond vs. Fire Insurance Co., 196—329. Exemption of citizens of a municipality from road labor beyond corporate limits is not unconstitutional since such assessment is not a tax for State purposes. Town of Pleasant vs. Kost, 29 — 490. The legislature may by city charter provide that city shall keep roads and bridges within its limits in repair and call in male citizens to perform road labor or pay commutaton to city, and that citizens so working or paying shall be exempt from taxation by county under general road law as this operates to make the city one road district of the county and does not com- mute a tax, road labor not being a state tax. Cooper vs. Ash, 76 — 11. Under Constitution of 1848, Legislature had the i)ower to give irrevocable exemption from taxation. 111. Cent. R. Co. vs. Irvin, 72 — 452. Under Constitution of 1848 a charter exempting a corporation's property from taxation is binding on State. P. vs. Soldiers' Home, 95 — 561; overruling Northwestern University vs. P., 86 — 141, and Northwestern University vs. P., 80—333. Under Constitution of 1848 the legislature may commute tax for an equivalent burden and a charter provision exempting city property from county tax- ation in consideration of its supporting its own paupers, was valid. Hun- saker vs. Wright, 30 — 146. Under Constitution of 1848, Chap. 120, Par. 305, commuting tax on Illinois Central Railway Company for payment of fixed per centum of its gross income, is constitutional. 111. Cent. R. Co. vs. McLean County, 17 — 291. Under Constitution of 1818, Legislature may by contract grant to a corporation irrevocable exemption from taxation. State Bank vs. P., 5 — (4 Scam.), 303. 15 The State taxes to be levied against property of Illinois Central, under section 22 of its charter are the regular state tax levied on other property. People vs. Illinois Central R. Co., 273—220. Legislature has power to provide means to maintain non-high-school districts subject to requirements of constitution regarding distribution of taxation. People vs. Chicago & N. R. Co., 286—384, 391. The act of 1915 (L. 1915, p. 631), providing for payment of high school tuition from State fund, effect a release or commutation of taxes and violates sec. 6 art. 9 const. Board of Education vs. Haworth, 274 — 538, 545. To be paid to State treasury.] Section 7. All taxes levied for State purposes shall be paid into the State treasury. Abrogated Act of April 15, 1869, authorizing certain taxes to bo paid to Kaskaskia River Navigation Co. P. vs. Lippincott, 65 — 548. County taxes — Limitation.] Section 8. County authorities shall never assess taxes, the aggregate of which shall exceed seventy- five cents per $100 valuation, except for the payment of indebted- ness existing at the adoption of this Constitution, unless authorized by a vote of the people of the county. This section does not necessarily limit the power to contract a debt, but is merely a limitation upon the power to levy taxes. County of Coles vs. Goehring, 209—142. This section does not give any right to tax, but imposes a limit beyond which county authorities cannot tax. Booth vs. Opel, 244 — 317; People (ex. rel.) vs. Wabash, R. Co., 286—15, 17. Applies to taxes levied for "county purposes" only. Hence levy by county not under township organization of road tax under Road Act of April 18, 1873, in addition to the seventy-five per $100 hereby allowed, violates this section. Semble, where county is under township organization, then the town may levy a tax for town purposes in addition to county tax limit. Wright vs. Wabash, etc., R. R. Co., 120—541. Taxes provided for in Sec. 122 of Revenue Act are town taxes, not county taxes, within the meaning of this section. Wabash, etc., R. Co. vs. McCleave, 108—368. But a levy to the proper amount is good notwithstanding levy in excess of per cent, allowed by Constitution if separable. Mix vs. P., 72 — 241. A tax in excess of seventy-five cents on $100 is valid where it is levied to pay bonds issued to pay debt of county incurred prior to adoption of Constitu- tion of 1870. Chiniquy vs. P., 78 — 570. Although a tax had been once levied therefor and misapplied. County of Pope vs. Sloan, 92 — 177. Under this section and the enabling act, Chap. 34, Sec. 27 thereunder, the order for election may state substantially the amount required to be raised by the additional county tax, in which case after approximately that sum has been raised, the power to tax further under the resolution, is exhausted. Thus $15,000 over $100,000 mentioned is beyond the margin allowed. Ry. Co. vs. Knnpp, 198—318. .\ vote in favor of a tuborcnlosis .'sanitarium tax under act of 191.') (L. 1915, p. 346j docs not authorize a tax in excess of constitutional limitation, People vs. Wabash R. Co., 286—15, 36 Municipal taxes — Special assessments.] Section 9. The Gen- eral Assembly may vest the corporate authorities^ of cities, towns and villages with power to make local improvements^"^ by special assessment, or by special taxation of contiguous property,^"^ or otherwise.^'' For all other corporate purposes,^ all municipal cor- porations^ may be vested* with authority to assess and collect taxes; but such taxes shall be uniform^ in respect to persons and property, within the jurisdiction® of the body imposing the same. 1. Corporate Authorities: Authorities of municipality who are directly elected by people to be taxed, or who are appointed in some mode to which they have given their assent are corporate authorities. Thus if power were given to board of local improvements to tax it would not be given to the proper "corporate authority." The board of local improvements is not itself given power to tax, but the city is, after recommendation of the board, so that the board is a mere limitation on the power of the city and hence assessment by the city recommended by the board is valid. Givins vs. City of Chicago, 188—350. Park Commissioners have power to tax so long as board elected by people to be taxed. P. vs. Salomon, 51 — 37. The words "or otherwise" permit a city to combine general taxation with special assessment or special taxation, but not special assessment with special taxation. While a city may, by original ordinance provide that an improvement is to be paid for in part out of the general fund and in part by special taxation, after the ordinance is passed and the assessment levied the city may not change the mode of payment. Chicago vs. Brede, 218—528. Thus a city was not justified in buying up special assessment vouchers with funds out of the general taxes. Kuehner vs. City of Freeport, 143 — 92 (1892). The legislature may create Park Boards and vest them with powers of taxation for improving boulevards and parks, as it thereby creates a new class of corporations, and so comes within this section of Constitution. Park Com'rs vs. Telegraph Co., 103—35. A toll-road charter granted in 1849 must be held to have been accepted by the donee and by its grantee upon the implied condition that the right to use the highway for a road should give way as to such part thereof as should become subjected by the growth of the city and its increase in population to the control and government of an incorporated city as otherwise the legislature would practically have vested a private person with power to tax the people. Snell vs. City of Chicago, 133 — 413. The act of 1895 (L. 1895, p. 271,) for the organization of park districts and transfer of submerged lands is not unconstitutional. Van Nada vs. Goedde, 263—105, 109. The section gives cities, villages and towns the right to make local improve- ments by special assessments, special taxation or general taxation. Mer- chants Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago, 264—76, 82. 17 Amendment of 1913 to sections 57 and 58 of Local Improvement Act is not invalid as authorizing the making of local improvements by board of local improvements instead of "corporate authorities." City of Lincoln vs. Harts, 266—405, 410. Does not prevent enforcement of judgment, legal duty or obligation of muni- cipality Avithout consent of tax payers, even though tax must be levied. Drainage Comrs. vs. Comrs. Eector Drain. Dist., 266 — 536. The act of 1913 (L. 1913, p. 272,) mth reference to apportionment of cost of construction between adjoining drainage districts is not in violation of this section. Drainage Comrs. vs. Comrs. Eector Drain. Dist., 266 — 536, 539. Corporate authorities are the authorities of the municipality who are directly elected by the people to be taxed or appointed in some mode to which they have given their consent. Drain. Comrs. vs. Comrs. Eector Drain. Dist., 266—536, 539; People (ex rel.) vs. Block, 276—286, 289. la. Local Improvements: The stand-pipo, reservoir, pumping works, etc., of a system of waterworks are in no sense a local improvement, and their payment comes out of general taxes. Hughes vs. Momence, 164 — 16. Local improvement as used in this section means such improvements as are paid for by special assessment or special taxation. Loeffler vs. Chicago, 246—43, 51. Section 97a of Local Improvement Act (E. S. Ch. 24), authorizing a single improvement to be constructed jointly in two or more municipalities is void. Loeffler vs. Chicago, 246 — 43. lb. Contiguous Property; "Contiguous property" in above section refers to special taxation, and not to special assessments. Special assessments may be made upon property specially benefited whether contiguous or not. Guild, Jr., vs. City of Chicago, 82—472. A street railway located upon a street of a municipality is "contiguous prop- erty" and liable to a special assessment for a local improvement upon Buch street. Spring Creek Drain Dist. vs. E. Co., 249—260, 287. Ic. Or otherwise: The words "or otherwise" were probably inserted to prevent any possible construction of the clause which would render the special modes enumerated exclusive, bo as not to operate as a limitation upon municipal authorities to make local improvements in any other manner. Kuehner vs. City of Frecport, 143—92 (1892). The word "or" is u.sed in its ordinary disjunctive sense, meaning one or the other of two, but not both; the words "or otherwise," refer to still other modes than those thus specified and do not authorize the combination of the modes mentioned. Kuehner vs. City of Frecport, 143 — 92 (1892). The provision giving the right to vest in cities, towns and villages the right to make local improvements by special assessment or special taxation is an exception to the dominant principle of the Constitution in respect of taxa- tion, and ought not to be extended beyond the clear import of the language employed. Kuehner vs. City of Frecport, 143—92 (1892). 18 Eailvvay contiguous to proposed street improvement may bo specially taxed for the making of local improvements. Kueliucr vs. City of Trecport, 143 — 92 (1892). The constitutional principle of equality of taxation applies as well to special assessments as to the ordinary modes of taxation, and it must be imposed on all property similarly situated with respect to the proposed improve- ment. Kuehner vs. City of Frecport, 143—92 (1892). A special tax levied annually to pay for repairs of boulevards is not for a local improvement within the meaning of this section and a special tax levied for that purpose is void. Crane vs. West Chicago Park Commis- sioners, 153—348 (1894). Levee act (R. S. Ch. 42) in authorizing assessment against town for benefit to highway is valid and not in violation of this section. Vandalia Levee & Dran. Dist. vs. Vandalia R. Co., 247—114, 122. Under section 40 of Farm Drainage act (R. S. Ch. 42), special drainage district may assess special benefits to public highways and railroads. Shabbona Spec. Drain Dist. vs. Town of Cornwall, 281 — 551, 554. 2. Corporate purposes: Under Constitution of 1848 the Legislature could authorize a town to levy a tax to refund money to individuals which they subscribed to pay bounties to volunteers. Johnson vs. Campbell, 49 — 316; Stebbins vs. Leaman, 47 — 352; State vs. Sullivan, 43 — 412; Briscol vs. Allison, 43 — 291; Henderson vs. Lagow, 42—360. An Act authorizing a town to levy tax to pay bounties to volunteers, was valid under Constitution of 1848, being held a tax for "corporate pur- pose." Taylor vs. Thompson, 42 — 9. Subscription of stock to Railroad a corporate purpose. Gaddis vs. Richland County, 92—119. Subscription by city to aid construction of railroad in another State, which connected with a point on the Mississippi River opposite the city was for a corporate purpose under Constitution of 1848. Quincy, etc., R. Co. vs. Morris, 84—410. Subscription in aid of a Railway is corporate purpose. Chicago, etc., R. Co. vs. Smith, 62—268. Act which provides that all county and township taxes paid by a railway company should be paid into the State treasury as sinking fund to pay bonds issued to such railway company by various of the towns in such county imposes tax not for corporate purpose on towns in county which are not benefited by the railway. Sleight vs. P., 74 — 47. Under Constitution of 1848, the legislature may not permit a school district to subscribe for railroad stock and collect tax to pay same, as not being for corporate purpose. P. vs. Trustees of Schools, 78 — 136. P. vs. Dupuyt, 71—651; Trustees vs. P., 63—299. A county may build a new bridge in the city, necessitated by the work of drainage commissioners, and pay therefore out of the general taxes, as such is of general public benefit to the county, the county acting as an arm of the state. Vittum vs. P., 183—156; Heffner vs. Cass and Morgan, 193^ 451; People (ex rel.) vs. Burnstrom, 274 — 62, 67. 19 Act authorizing the collection of back tax, and directing that persons who had voluntarily paid such tax should be credited with their payments, is not bad as being a tax for other than corporate purposes, because the act pro- vides that the city council merely determine the amount of back taxes already levied and certify it to the county clerk. Fairfield vs. P., 94 — 244. Provision in city election law that salaries of commissioners shall be paid by the county is valid because it is for a county corporate purpose. Wetherell vs. Deviue, 116 — 631. It is not unconstitutional to require that excess of fees be paid into town treasury, as such does cot provide for taxes for other than corporate pur- poses. Kyan vs. P., 117 — iS6. Provision in Sec. 110 of Road and Bridge Act of 1879, that, upon happening of certain facts, supervisors shall with county funds aid town to pay for erection of bridge to extent of half cost, is not levying a tax for strictly local purposes but is within corporate purposes of county. Board of Super- visors of Will Co. vs. P., 110—511. It was a corporate purpose to issue and sell bonds to pay the judgment indebted- ness of the city. Stone vs. Chicago, 207 — 492. While under Sec. 2, Art. 9, of Constitution taxation whereby one county was made to pay a greater proportion of tax for the support of a State institu- tion than others, was illegal; where it was imposed to pay off bonds volun- tarily subscribed for an institution bearing such relation to the county that its introduction might be held a corporate purpose within this section, it is valid. Burr vs. Carbondale, 76 — 455. Tax by municipality to raise funds to provide a location for a State reform school is not for a corporate purpose, and bonds issued for such purpose are invalid. Livingston County vs. Welder, 64 — 427. Section 93 to 96 of School law as amended in 1917, so-called Non-high-sehool law, does not violate this section. People vs. Ry. Co., 288 — 70, 72. The city Election act which apportions expenses of township election held thereunder does not violate this section, as it does not refer to townships. BoUea vs. Prince, 250—36, 38. Legislature had power to enact subd. 16, sec. 3, art. 4 of Township organization Act authorizing electors of town lying wholly within limits of incor- porated city or village to transfer township funds from treasury of town to treasury of city or village to be used for constructing or repairing roads and bridges. People (ex rel.) vs. Burnstrom, 274r-62, 67. Logi.slature may require municipality to levy tax to create park police pension fund without violating this section. . Board of Trustees vs. Comrs. of Lincoln Park, 282—348, 354. Section 58 of Public Utilities Act which apportions part of cost of subway constructod at dangerous railroad grade crossing to municipality in which it is situated docs not create debt for purely local purposes but is for protection of general public. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. vs. County of Lake, 287—337, 342. .3. Municipal Corporations: Boani of county coiiiniissidncr.s are corporate authorities and so authorized to direct a levy of town lux. Bebl) vs. P., 172 — 376. 20 West Chicago Park Commissioners are corporate authorities. West Chicago Park Com'rs vs. Sweet, 1G7— 334. The election commissioners created by the city election law of 1885 are corporate authorities and necessary expenses incurred by them are for corporate purposes which they are empowered to incur. Wetherell vs. Devinc, 116— G31. The power to tax cannot be delegated to any other than corporate authorities, but legislature may delegate power to tax to Park Commissioners because they are the corporate authorities of the park district. Cornell vs. P., 107—372. An Act which constitutes a drainage district with certain designated persons and their successors the body politic, is void in so far as it vests such body with the power to tax, such body not being "corporate authorities." Hessler vs. Drainage Commissioners, 53 — 105. In the "Board of Directors for Leveeing the Wabash River and its tributaries on Allison Prairie," where the people had no voice in its incorporation and the taxation was not to be levied by those elected by the owners of real estate in the district to be taxed, the power to tax was void. Board, etc., Wabash River vs. Houston, 71 — 318. Where the Legislature created the drainage corporation and appointed the officers, they were not corporate authorities to whom the power of taxa- tion could be given. Gage vs. Graham, 57 — 144. Under somewhat similar provision in Constitution of 1848, an attempt to vest a private school with taxing power, is void. P. vs. McAdams, 82 — 356. Town officers making appropriation to R. R. Co. upon vote of legal voters of " town, were held corporate authorities for such purposes, under Constitu- tion of 1848, Art. 9, Sec. 5. Chicago, etc., R. Co. vs. Smith, 62—268; Decker vs. Hughes, 68 — 33. 4. Vested with authority to assess and collect taxes: Legislature may delegate power to tax which it has under Sec. 1 and 2 to municipal corporations: Under its power to regulate streets the city could not tax vehicles but the legislature had power under Sees. 1 and 2 of Art. 9 to tax the "right" to use the streets, and under Sec. 9 might delegate that to the city. Harders Storage Co. vs. Chicago, 235 — 58. Legislature may delegate power it has under Sees. 1 and 2 of Art. 9, of the Constitution, to tax sj^ecial employments to municipal authorities. City of E. St. Louis vs. Wehrung, 46—392; Wiggins vs. Chicago, 63—372. Occupation of Broker is taxable by municipality for purpose of revenue. Banta vs. City of Chicago. 172—218. Legislature may delegate power to tax to municipalities. Braun vs. City of Chicago, 110—186. This section relates only to special or uniform taxation in municipalities, and not licenses or license fees for revenue, imposed on privilege, such as city tax on insurance companies. Walker vs. Springfield, 94-364. The legislature might delegate to municipalities the power to tax a railway company's franchise to extent of its existence within the city limits. Huck vs. C. & A. R. Co., 86—352. 21 The curative act of June 14, 1917 (L. 1917, p. 744) is a valid law, does not violate this section and validated higli school taxes levied before the act was passed. People vs. Madison, 280 — 96; Same vs. Mathews; 282 — 85; Same vs. E. Co., 2S4— 87; Fisher vs. Fay, 288—11. 5. Taxes shaU be uniform: A tax levied under a village oidinance which provided for an additional water tax against each lot or parcel of ground having a building on it, the fund to (^0 to fire department, was invalid as an exercise of police power for the police power levies no tax, though it may impose a small fee but not for revenue, and this provision was for revenue and not regulation. As a tax it disregards the constitutional provision of uniformity. Lemont vs. Jenks, 197—363. Legislature may invest municipalities with authority to tax for corporate pur- poses without limitation so long as the tax is uniform as to persons and property of the same class within corporate limits. Braun vs. City of Chi- cago, 110—186. This section would be violated, by permitting a bridge within municipal limits to escape taxation because situated upon ground covered by navigable stream. St. Louis Bridge Co. vs. East St. Louis, 121—238. Where part of township in which the tax rates are highest is within limit of school district, tax must be scaled throughout the township, as otherwise town tax would not be uniform throughout township. People vs. Chicago & Alton E. Co., 247—458, 461. Uniformity of taxation is secured by the amended Eevenue law of 1909 by regarding every taxing district as a separate unit, hence that law does not violate this section. People vs. Chicago & W. Ind. R. Co., 256—388. The proviso to section 55 of Eoads and Bridges act which exempts residents of cities from poll-tax violates provision for uniformity and renders sec- tion void. Town of Dixon vs. Ide, 267 — 445. 6. Within the jurisdiction: Under Constitution of 1848 a law authorizing county to levy tax on a strip of land through which railroad ran, to pay subscription by that strip of ter- ritory, is void. Madison County vs. P., 58 — 456. Where the city charter gave the city exclusive control of streets and alleys in its limits, a road tax levied by the highway commissioners of township in 80 far as it touched inhabitants of city, was invalid. Butz vs. Kerr, 123—659. The jurisdiction of a city over its streets and highways is exclusive and tlio highway commissioners have no jurisdiction over any roads or bridges lying within the corporate limits of the city. Therefore, where the city and the town are co-extensive the city cannot levy a road tax in addition to its 2% limit. People vs. R. R. Co., 172—71. But unless it makes the city a special road district the legislature cannot exempt inhabitants of city from road tax imposed by town. O'Kanc vs. Treat, 25—557. The provision of Sec. 4()Vj of the Farm Drainage Act (Par. 115, Chap. 42, Stat, 1905) that the drainage commissioners build bridges on roads which its artificial channels intersect, the cost to be paid out of road and bridge tax, conflicts with this section as forcing a local improvement upon a town. Morgan vs. Schusselle, 228 — 106. 22 The third proviso to section 55 of Lcvoc Act (R. S., Ch. 42) requiring town to restore bridge removed by commissioners of drainage district v^'hen digging ditch across public highway is invalid. People vs. Block, 276 — 286, 289. The act of 1909 (R. S., Ch. 121) requiring each county to pay its proportionate share of cost of bridge on county line docs not violate this section. Peo- plo (ex. rel.) vs. Williamson County, 286 — 44, 48. Municipal taxes — Limitation — Private property exempt.] Section 10. The General Assembly shall not impose taxes upon municipal corporations, or the inhabitants or property thereof, for corporate purposes,^ but shall require that all the taxable property within the limits of municipal corporations shall be taxed for the payment of debts contracted under authority of law,^ such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property, within the juris- diction of the body imposing the same.^ Private property shall not be liable to be taken or sold for the payment of the corporate debts of a municipal corporation. 1. Cases where the prohibition was violated: An act which sought to compel the city to issue bonds for park against its will w^as void. P. vs. Chicago, 51—58; following P. vs. Mayor of Chicago, 51—17. It is unlawful except where there is an insurrection, or the city fails to furnish sufficient security to life and property, to. require the city to pay police officers appointed by the State, as this would be imposing a debt on the corporation without its consent. Wider vs. East St. Louis, 55 — 133. An act providing for a tax only on the district through which a R. R. ran that strip having subscribed to the R. R., is void as amounting to a tax by the State for corporate purposes of that strip or district. Madison County vs. P., 58—456. Legislature could not without its consent create a debt against a municipality and subject it to taxes for payment thereof. Marshall vs. Silliman, 61 — 218; R. Co. vs. Lake County, 287—337, 342. Under Constitution of 1848, Legislature could not validate an invalid vote to subscribe to R. R. Co. as that would compel a municipality to incur a debt for local purposes against its own wishes. Cairo, etc., R. Co. vs. Sparta, 77—505. The third proviso to section 55 of Levee Act (R. S. Ch. 42) requiring town to restore bridge removed by commissioners of drainage district when digging ditch across public highway is invalid. People vs. Block, 276 — 286, 289. Cases where it was not: Section 9 of act requiring county to pay for caro of dependent girls at indus- trial schools (R. S. Ch. 122) does not violate this section as such expenses is a means of discharging obligations resting on the State, and the State may impose such taxes in the performance of duties which relate to the general welfare of the State or which may be performed by a municipal corporation as an agency of the State. Industrial School vs. Cook County, 289—432. 23 Sees. 93 to 96 of School Law as amended in 1917, so called " Nou-higli school law does not violate this section. People vs. Ey. Co., 288 — 70, 72. Section does not prohibit the State from imposing a liability against munici- pality where the public safety and welfare requires it, and the munici- pality fails and neglects to act. Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. vs. Lake County, 287—337, 345. The act of 1909 (E. S. Ch. 121) requiring each county to pay its proportionate share of cost of bridge on county lines does not violate this section. People vs. Williamson County, 286—44, 48. The act of 1917 (L. 1917. p. 612) providing for park police pension fund does not impose tax upon municipality for corporate purpose without the con- sent of corporate authorities. Board of Trustees vs. Commissioners of Lin- coln Park, 282—348, 354. Under section 40 of Farm Drainage Act special drainage district may assess special benefit to public highways and railroads. Shabbona Spec. Drain. Dist. vs. Town of Cornwall. 281-551, 554. The curative act of June 14, 1917 (L. 1917, p. 744) is a valid law, docs not violate this section and validated high school tax levied before the act was passed. People vs. Madison, 280—96; Same vs. Woodruff, 280—476; Same vs. Mathews, 282—85; Same vs. Ey. Co., 282—87; Fisher vs. Fay, 288—11. The Police Pension Fund Act of 1909 (L. 1909, p. 133) is not in violation of section. People vs. Abbott, 274 — 380, 384. The legislature has power to direct application of revenues of a municipal corporation and subd. 16, sec. 3, art. 4 of Township Organization act authorizing electors to transfer township funds from treasury 'of town to treasury of city or village does not violate this section. People vs. Burnstrom, 274—62. Does not prevent enforcement of a judgment, legal duty or obligation without consent of tax payers, even though tax must be levied. Drainage Com- missioners vs. Commissioners Eector Drainage District, 266 — 536, 539. The act of 1913 (L. 1913, p. 272) with reference to apportionment of cost of construction between adjoining drainage districts is not in violation of this section. Drainage Commissioners vs. Commissioners Eector Drainage District, 266—536, 539. The act of 1913 CL. 1913, p. 584) providing for payment of tuition of pupils transferred outside of high school district is not in violation of provision limiting power of taxation to corporate purposes. Cook vs. Board of Directors, 266—164, 168. The City Election Act which apportions expenses of township election held thereunder does not violate this section, as it does not refer to township. BoUes V8. Prince 250—36, 38. The Levee Act (R. 8. Ch. 42) in authorizing assessment against town for bene- fit of highway is not in violation of this section. Vandalia Levee & Drainage District vs. Vandalia R. Co., 247—114, 122. Act of Legislature imposing liability upon Muinicipality for failure to ludtccl property from destruction by mobs is not imposing a tax on the municipal corporation. City of Chicago vs. Manhattan Cement Co., 178 — 380, 24 Scmble. That in ease of rebellion by miniicipallty Legislature might under Constitution of 1848 impose tax ou municipality without its consent to pay expense of suppressing rebellion. Lovington vs. Wider, 53 — 302. Constitution of 1870 does not forbid unequal apportionment between city and county, of taxes collected. Sangamon County vs. Springfield, 63 — 66. Special city charter, providing a idan of division between county and city of revenues collected by county, held, in 1876, not unconstitutional. If a deficieucy should occur, it is presumed that in supplying it, the city is made to bear its share. Board, etc., Logan County vs. Lincoln, 81 — 156. 2. Under authority of law: Under Constitution of 1848, the Auditor might register county bonds and levy tax for their payment on county. Dunnovan vs. Green, 57 — 63; Decker vs. Hughes, 68 — 33. 3. Taxes to be uniform: . See cases under same phase, supra, in Sec. 9. Municipal officers — Eligibility — Salary.] Section 11. No person who is in default, as collector or custodian of money or prop- erty belonging to a municipal corporation, shall be eligible to any office in or under such corporation. The fees, salary or compensa- tion of no municipal officer who is elected or appointed for a defi- nite term of office, shall be increased or diminished during such term. The election commissioners for Chicago and town of Cicero are municipal officers within meaning of Sec. 11. People vs. Cook County Commis- sioners, 260—345. , The Police Pension Fund Act of 1909 (L. 1909, p. 133) is not in violation of this section. People (ex rel.) vs. Abbott, 274—380, 384. A county superintendent of schools is a municipal officer within meaning of Sec. 11, Art. 9. Jimison vs. Adams County, 130 — 558. Clerk of probate court Cook county is included in that part of this section, relative to increase of salary. County of Cook vs. Sinnott 136 — 314 (1891). Limit of indebtedness — Municipal corporations.] Section 12. No county, city, township, school district, or other municipal cor- poration, shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose,^ to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five per centum on the value of the tax- able property therein,^ to be ascertained by the last assessment for State and county taxes, previous to the incurring of such indebted- ness.^ Any county, city, school district, or other municipal corpora- tion incurring any indebtedness as aforesaid,^*" shall before, or at the time of doing so, provide for the collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal thereof within twenty years from the time of contracting the same.* This section shall 25 not be construed to prevent any county, city, township, school dis- trict, or other municipal corporation, from issuing their bonds in compliance with any vote of the people which may have been had prior to the adoption of this Constitution in pursuance of any law providing therefor.^ 1. What is an indebtedness: Warrants may be dra-^-n on treasury against taxes that have been levied but uot collected, where payment is confined to the fund arising from tax- levied, and no claim against corporation is acquired. City of Springfield vs. Edwards, 84 — 626; Law vs. People, 87—385. Warrants drawn upon a particular fund, and payable therefrom only as it shall be collected, do not create indebtedness, and are valid. Fuller vs. Heath. 89—296; Booth vs. Opel 244—317. Warrants must run not against city, but against revenue levied and that alone, in order to be anticipation warrants and certificates of indebtedness for temporary loans to the city, which bear interest, arc within prohibition notwithstanding they are intended to be paid out of revenue levied for the current year, where payment is not by their terms confined to such fund. Law vs. P., 87—385; Hodges vs. Crowley, 186—310. The remedy of holder of anticipation warrants would be against the officers, and not against city. Law vs. P., 87 — 385. Burden is on person asserting validity to sustain certificates of indebtedness of the city where the limit has been exceeded. Law vs. P., 87 — 385. Warrants payable from taxes already levied though not collected, but not restricted to collection from such fund and that alone is invalid as an indebtedness in excess of the limit, where limit has already been reached, and collector cannot receive them in payment of taxes. Fuller vs. Chi- cago, 89—282. Judgments against the city slidiild l)e considered in determining whether a city is indebted beyond the constitutional limit. "Public benefits" due from the city, should not, as they represent the amounts which the city had been assessed for public benefit. The "water fund debt" should. Anticipation tax warrants should not. The amount in the city treasurer's hands for sinking fund purposes, should not. Accrued interest on float- ing indebtedness should, but not the floating indebtedness, the money to pay wliich is in llie city treasury. Stone vs. Chicago, 207—492. This section limits the amount of indebtedness; not the amount or rate of taxes to be raised. Under it, a city may not issue bonds so as to raise its indebtedness above the constitutional limit notwithstanding such bonds are payable out of the revenue of the waterworks intended to be built witii the proceeds of those bonds and a 1 cent special tax, though such a tax witliout the bonds would'be all right to create a sinking fund for the same purpose. East Moline vs. Pope, 224 — 386, "Water bonds" arc indebtedness and come within the prohibition of the pro- vi.sion above wlicre the city may, uiion cont ingnicy hr required to jniy by general taxation. City of Chicago vs. McDonald, ]7()— 418. 26 Contract of city to liavc its streets lighted for thirty years, payment for such lighting to be made monthly, does create an indebtedness but is not pro- hibited by above section, if amount city is liable for at one time, does not exceed constitutional limit, i. e., the contract will be sustained in so far as it was executed, only. City of East St. Louis vs. Gas Co., 98 — 415. A lease of waterworks for 13 years at $1,000 a year, is creating an indebted- ness of $13,000, which indebtedness is valid up to the constitutional limit, but so much of a tax levy as was to be applied on the illegal part thereof, is void. E. E. Co.' vs. People, 200—541. While the city was not bound to pay the Mueller certificates, nevertheless it proposed to mortgage some of its property, to-wit, the right to use the streets, as security therefore, and this was enough to bring them within the meaning of indebtedness. Lobdell vs. Chicago, 227 — 218. Thus certificates payable out of water funds create a debt within the meaning of this section where the funds are an existing established income belong- ing to the municipality, as where it is proposed to extend a waterworks system already existing. Schnell vs. Eock Island, 232 — 89. A city may acquire a system of waterworks by pledging the income until it shall pay for the system, and no indebtedness is created. The same rule might apply to some definite extension or waterworks where the income of the extension could be separated and applied to payment, but an obligation to pay with the income of property already owned by a city does create a debt. So a contract for furnishing electric lights to the city to be paid for monthly creates a debt. Schnell vs. Eock Island, 232 — 89. A contract by which a city purchases an electric light plant, pays therefore what it could up to the limit of indebtedness, and gives a mortgage on the plant for the balance but which stipulates that the city is not to assume or agree to pay the debt, nevertheless creates an indebtedness to the ex- tent of the mortgage, as the city had thereby invested some funds in the plant which it was liable to lose by foreclosure. The proper order to be entered in such a case would be to enjoin the payment of the mortgage indebtedness except out of the net income from the plant after paying operating expenses and the necessary repairs as an indebtedness is not created by buying property to be paid for wholly out of the income of such property. Evans vs. Holman, 244 — 596. It was a good defence to mandamus to compel the board of supervisors of the county to appropriate money to meet one-half the expenses of building two bridges, that the commissioners had no money in the treasury, and could not pay it, and that the 5% limit of indebtedness had been reached. Board of Supervisors vs. People, 222 — 10. Award of damages upon laying out new road under condemnation proceedings does not create a debt, present or contingent, within meaning of this sec- tion. Commissioners of Highways vs. Jackson, 165—24. Ordinance fixing water rates which a private company may charge, does not create indebtedness, but merely establishes, subject to review by the courts, that a greater sum than the rate fixed cannot be lawfully exacted for that commodity. City of Danville vs. Danville Water Co., 180—244. (Aflf. 180 U. S., 619.) •li Bonds payable iu the future by general taxation issued to pay city's share of cost of improvement are an indebtedness and it makes no difference the bonds are payable out of special fund. People (ex rel.) vs. Chicago & Alton K. Co., 253—191, 194. A municipal corporation, acting in good faith, may borrow money for one year and issue bonds therefor. People vs. Bowman, 253 — 234, 249. A drainage assessment is not an indebtedness within the meaning of the con- stitution. People (ox rel.) vs. Honeywell, 258 — 319. The issuance of public utility certificates under Municipal Ownership Act of 1913, to be secured by a mortgage on city light and water plant creates a debt against the city. Leonard vs. City of Metropolis, 278 — 287, 291. 2. Prohibition: Prohibition against incurring indebtedness is not against rate of tax and does not limit rate of taxation by which improvements may be made or obligations of municipalities meet, but is against voluntarily incurring an indebtedness in any manner or for any purpose and it makes no dif- fereiice under what guise the attempt is made or what form the proceed- ing takes. People (ex rel.) vs. Chicago & Alton E. Co., 253 — 191. Constitutional prohibition against incurring indebtedness is to protect property of citizens from being burdened beyond 5% of its value as ascertained by assessment for State arid County taxes, with any future indebtedness. People (ex rel.) vs. Chicago & Alton E. Co., 253—191. Constitutional limitation upon indebtedness applies to each municipal corpora- tion singly, and where one corporation embraces same territory as others, each may contract corporate indebtedness to the constitutional limit. People vs. Honeywell, 258^319. The amendment of 1913, to Sec. 6 of act concerning city hospitals, does not violate constitutional limitation. Holmgren vs. City of Moline, 269 — 248, 251. Prohibition against incurring debt applies to debts payable in future, or on contingency, and to those for current expenses as well, and a levy of a tax to pay such, will be enjoined. City of Springfield vs. Edwards, 84 — 626; Law vs. People, 87—385. Where the debts of a city exceeded this limit at adoption of the Constitution they were prohibited from increasing them. Law vs. P., 87 — 385. The levy of a tax to pay additional indebtedness incurred before levy made, will be enjoined where the debt of the city exceeds the limit. Howell vs. Peoria, 90—104. Debt contracted by city for water supply, in excess of 5% limit cannot be collected. Prince vs. Quincy, 105 — 138; Prince vs. Quincy, 105 — 215. Does not prohibit tho annexation to each other in the manner provided by the act therefor ajijtrovnd and in force April 25, 1889. True vs. Davis, 133 — 522. Contract for indebtednes.s to be jiaid in (lie future, and extending credit to the municipality beyond the constitutional limit, is void and a municipality is not liable in tort for ri'f\isal to pay an alleged indebtedness contracted in violation of constitutional provision. Prince vs. Quincy, 128 — 443. 28 Eveu though a municipal corporation is indebted to full limit allowed by the Constitution, it may levy taxes from year to year to complete an un- finished building notwithstanding its power to borrow money is exhausted. People vs. E. R. Co., 224—448. Semble, liability of city for tort is not affected by fact that its debt exceeds constitutional limit. City of Bloomington vs. Perdue, 99 — 329. The act providing manner in which municipal corporations might thereafter issue anticipation warrants against taxes already levied is not in violation of Sec. 12, Art. 9. Harrold vs. City of East St. Louis, 197A, 121, 128. 3. Ascertainment of indebtedness: The last assessment for State and county taxes previous to the incurring of an indebtedness determines the value of taxable property. Culbertson, et al. vs. City of Fulton. 127—30. Five per cent of the taxable value as ascertained by the assessment for State and county taxes by the local assessor fixes the 5 per cent limit in this section. People vs. Hamill. 134—666 (1888). "Value of taxable property," in this section, is not the actual but the assessed value. City of Chicago vs. Fishburn, 189—367, 377. 3a. Indebtedness: Semble. It is lawful for a municipality to contract a debt without providing for a direct annual tax, unless payment of such indebtedness is deferred to a fixed future period and which bears interest. This section would seem to contemplate a bonded or analogous indebtedness and a contract providing that work was to be paid for during the construction, monthly on the basis of 85 per cent of the value of labor performed and material in place, in interest bearing county orders, etc., would seem not within contemplation of the constitution. Coles vs. Goehring, 209 — 142. 4. Direct ajinual tax: The section requires that the direct annual tax shall be sufficient to pay the interest and principal. A provision which directs that the tax be used for other purposes as well or which directs that a sufficient sum shall be appropriated to that end, from any annual park tax "not heretofore specifically appropriated by law," is not in compliance with the Constitu- tion because it does not insure the fund intended to be secured; this, how- ever, does not render the Act unconstitutional, as this provision of the constitution is self-executing. The provision is to be made by the munici- pal corporation which levies the tax, and not by the legislature. The legislature need only give authority to incur the debt. Pettibone vs. W. Chicago Park Commissioners, 215 — 304. It is the duty of a city where it has incurred debt since the adoption of the Constitution of 1870, no matter what are the limitations of its charter, to provide for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to meet the interest thereon, and to liquidate the debt within twenty years. On failure to do so, and if it allows the debt to mature, the courts will compel it to levy a tax sufficient to pay the same, with the arrears of interest, at once, since the constitutional provision is self-executing. City of East St. Louis vs. P., 124—655; see also. Law vs. P., 87—385. The constitutional provision could not operate as a repeal of a clause in a city charter prohibiting the city from contracting an indebtedness in excess of an amount less than 5 per cent. City of East St. Louis vs. P., 124 — 655. 29 By annual tax, is meant only, that character of indebtedness which bears in- terest and matures in futuro. Town of Kankakee vs. McGrew, 178 — 74. If bonds are issued under Sec. 20 of Koads and Bridges Act, See. 12 secures to the bondholder the right to compel the levy of a tax in accordance therewith. People vs. Chicago B. & Q. E. Co, 248— 81, 84. The sanitary district is within provision of constitution requiring provision for tax to pay interest on debt. People vs. Day, 277 — 543, 55^. Section 12, Art. 9, requiring any municipality issuing bonds to provide for a direct annual tax to pay interest as it falls due and to pay principal in twenty years, is self-executing, so a municipality which has complied with such provision may levy and collect a tax, although it is not included in annual levy ordinance or appropriation bill required by the statute. People vs. Day, 277 — 543, 554; People (ex rel.) vs. Wabash E. Co., 281— 382; People fcx rcl.) vs. N. J. Sandberg Co., 282—24.5, 252. 5. Prior to this constitution: In determining whether a city is indebted beyond the constitutional limit, bonds to cover indebtedness incurred before the time the Constitution was adopted, should not be taken into consideration. Stone vs. Chicago, 207 —492. Bonds in excess of the limit of indebtedness might legally issue after new Constitution in force if voted for, before. Maxey vs. Williamson County, 72—207; Board of Education vs. Bolton, 104—220. Revenue — Issue of Exposition bonds by city of Chicag-o.] Section 13. The corporate authorities of the city of Chicago are hereby authorized to issue interest-bearing bonds of said city to an amount not exceeding five million dollars, at a rate of interest not to exceed five pcrccntum per annum, the principal payable within thirty years from the date of their issue, and the proceeds thereof shall be paid to the treasurer of the World's Columbian Exposition, and used and disbursed by him under the direction and control of the directors in aid of the World's Columbian Exposition, to be hold in the city of Chicago in pursuance of an Act of Congress of the United States: Pro\aded, that if, at the election for the adoption of this amendment to the Constitution, a majority of the votes cast within the limits of the city of Chicago shall be against its adoption, then no bonds shall be issued under this amendment. And said corporate authorities shall be repaid as large a pi'oportionate amount of the aid given by Hkmii as is repaid to the stockholders on the sums subscribed and paid by them, and the money so received sliall be used in the redemption of the bonds i.ssucd, as aforesaid: Provided, that said authorities may take, in whole or in part of the sum coming to them, any per- manent imi)rovemen1s ])laced on land held or controlled by tliem : And provided, further, that no such indebtedness so created shall in any part thereof be paid by the State, or fi-om any State revenue, 30 tax or fund, but the same shall be paid by the said city of Chicago alone. This section Tvas added to the Constitution of 1870 by an amendment proposed by joint resolution of the Thirty-sixth General Assembly, adopted July 31. 1890 (Extra Session L. 1890, p. 8), and adopted by vote of the people on Tuesday. November 4, 1890. Proclaimed adopted November 29, 1890. GENERAL REVENUE ACT. An Act for the assessment of property and for the levy and col- lection of taxes. [Approved March 30, 1872. In force July 1, 1872] \ What property shall be assessed.] Section 1. That the prop- erty named in this section shall be assessed and- taxed except so much thereof as may be, in this act exempted : First : All real and personal property in this State. Second: All moneys, credits, bonds or stocks and other in- vestments, the shares of stock of incorporated companies and asso- ciations, and all other personal property, including property in transitu to or from this State, used, held, ovi^ned or controlled by persons residing in this State. Third : The shares of capital stock of banks and banking com- panies doing business in this State. Fourth: The capital stock of companies and associations in- corporated under the laws of this State, except companies and associations organized for purely manufacturing and mercantile purposes, or for either of such purposes, or for the mining and sale of coal, or for printing, or for the publishing of newspapers, or for the improving and breeding of stock. [As amended by act in force July 1, 1905. L. 1905 p. 353.] See Sec. 18 Revenue Act of 1898, post. a. Effect of Act as repealing others Acts: The Kevenue Act of March 30, 1872, in connection with the amendment of May 3, 1873. worked a repeal of all prior conflicting laws, whether found in general laws, or in special charters of cities and towns. Edwards vs. People, 88—340". Clause 1: The general rule is, the taxable situs of credits is the domicile of the owner. An exception to this rule arises when the instruments of credit are in the hands of an agent of the owner for the purpose of enabling such agent to transact the business of the owner, in which business the credits consti- tute, as it were, the subject-matter or stock in trade of such business, but where in the hands of an agent outside the state for purposes not consti- tuting such business, the rule applies. In re Appeal Birden, 208—369. 31 Sec. 11 of the Building Loan and Homestead Association Act, in giving exemp- tion was declared unconstitutional by 153 — 609. The Board of Review was not justified, however, in assessing stock exempted thereunder prior to this decision, to the present owner. Appeal of Wilmerton, 206 — 15. While money employed in the business of the different agencies of the tax payer throughout the county might not be liable to tax in the jurisdiction where he has his domicile, still money in a depository in another State has its situs at the domicile of the owner and is taxable there. Tolman vs. Raymond, 202—197. Where the owner is a non-resident, his securities remaining in this State in the hands of an agent, arc only subject to taxation here, when they are left in the agent 's hands for the purpose of having them renewed or col- lected, in order that the money, realized from such renewal or collection, may be reloaned by the agent as a permanent business. Reat vs. People, 201—469. Intangible property, such as debts and choses in action, follows the domicile of the owner, but when the owner is not resident of this State and has the evidences of his credits in the hands of an agent of this State, then such credits are to be assessed in the hands of the agent. Ellis vs. People, 199—548. The general rule is, the taxable situs of credits is the domicile of the owner. But an exception to the rule when the instruments which evidence the right of the owner to receive the indebtedness which constitutes the "credits" are in the hands of an agent of the owner for the purpose of enabling such agent to transact the business of the owner, in which busi- ness the credits constitute as it were, the subject-matter or stock in trade of such business. Matzenbaugh vs. People, 194 — 108. A fund of Insurance Co. is subject to taxation so long as not paid put before April 1, notwithstanding orders to beneficiaries had been issued against it, prior to that time. Catholic Knights of Illinois vs. Board of Review, 198—441. Personal property is not subject to taxation where it has no situs in this State, cither actual or constructive. Maxwell vs. P., 189 — 551. The domicile of the creditor determines situs of credit for purposes of taxation, and if he is non-resident and the credits are not kept and permanently employed in business in this State they are not subject to taxation. Hay- ward vs. Board of Review, 189 — 235. Loans are taxable here when made by resident in other states. Scripps vs. Board of Review, 183—283. The residence of the owner, if a resident of this State, determines whore credits are taxable. Goldgart vs. P.. 106 — 25. That one who lived in New York and liad nti agoiil here, came here once in a while to look after interests which he had in this State, was not sufficient to prove his residence here as owner of credits, or .situs of credits hero. Goldgart vs. P., 100—25. Credits of a non resident, held and controlled here l>y an ag<'nt. are taxable here. Goldgart vs. P., 106 — 25. 32 This does not contemplate personal property which is passing through the State or is there for temporary purpose only, but does contemplate a boat of which the home port is here, and which is registered and put up here. Irvin vs. New Orleans, etc., E. Co., 94 — 105. Grain in warehouse placed there by agent, who bought on commission for prin- cipal, taxable against agent, and he has a lien under Sec. 256 of Eevenue Act. Walton vs. Westwood, 73—125, Where one whose domicile was in New York came into a city in a county of this State, to loan money on real estate for self and also as agent for his father, his uncle, and another, and so continued for several years, and while engaged thus, made the city his headquarters, that being the only business he had, he was taxable as to his choses in action as a resident in this State. Board of Tazewell County vs. Davenport, 40 — 197. A person need not be a citizen of the State or domiciled therein, to be amen- able to its taxing power. Board of Tazewell County vs. Davenport, 40 —197. Bonds deposited with the Auditor to secure redemption of bills issued by the banks, are taxable. Bank vs. County, 21 — 53. Where a father gives money to his children and obtains from them an instru- ment by which they agree to pay interest during his lifetime, but have the right to give their notes therefor, which notes shall be added to the prin- cipal sums to be deducted therewith from their shares in the estate at his death, such constitutes an advancement and is not taxable in the hands of the father as a loan. It is proper to ask for injunction in court of equity to restrain collection of such tax. Duckett vs. Gerig, 223 — 284. A butterfly dam, erected by Sanitary District of Chicago to protect people below it from danger, is taxable though it has never been used, is of no profit and has no market value. Sanitary District vs. Young, 285 — 351. Money and credits of a fraternal beneficiary society are taxable the same as they were before the unconstitutional amendment of 1905 to Sec. 2 of Eevenue Act, exempting moneys of such societies from taxation. People vs. Mystic Workers, 270 — 496. All property is subject to taxation unless exempt by constitution and statutes passed in accordance therewith. First Congregational Church vs. Board of Eeview, 254—220, 222. Net receipts of an insurance company are personal property and to be taxed the same as other property. People vs. Cosmopolitan Ins. Co., 246 — 442. Clause 2: An executrix who pays debts of her deceased out of funds that she holds as guardian, and then in her personal capacity files a claim against the estate for the amount, does not thereby subject herself to a tax on the money thus filed claim for, as if her own. Estate of the ward should have been taxed therefor. Schaefifer vs. Ardery, 241 — 27. It was proper to tax insurance policies in the hands of a guardian even though the money thereon was not due until sixty days after proof of death, and proof had not yet been made, on the theory that such claim comes within meaning of credits, being money due. Cooper vs. Board of Eeview, 207 —472. 83 Stock in a foreign corporation is subject to be taxed in the hands of a resident o^^•ne^, though the corporation has paid taxes thereon or upon its property in the state of creation. Greeuleaf vs. Board of Eeview, 184 — ^288; Haw- ley vs. Maiden, 232, U. S. 1. Credits are taxable, although the property for which the money is given is also taxed, but a debtor cannot be taxed on what he owes. Goldgart vs. P., 106—25. Where the term of a lease commenced March 1, and the rent was due January 1 following, the rent was not taxable until the latter date, for rent to become due is not taxable apart from land. Scully vs. P., 10-4 — 349. The State may tax money on hand on April 1, received from operation of railroads while under Federal control, by virtue of the Act of Congress providing for the operation and control of railroads enacted as a temporary war measure. Wabash E. Co. vs. Board of Eeview, 288 — 159. Clause 4: This clause applies to capital stock of a corporation incorporated under laws both of this and of other States. Ohio, etc., E. Co. vs. Weber, 96—443. This provision applies to a company formed by the consolidation of two com- panies, one chartered here and other by another State. Quiney Bridge Co. vs. Adams County, 88 — 615. Where a corporation is formed under our laws by consolidation of other com- panies, and where one of constituent companies was incorporated under the laws of this State, the new corporation thus formed is to be considered as one of the companies "incorporated under the laws of this State," within meaning of this clause. Ohio E. Co. vs. Weber, 96 — 443. The exception in the fourth paragraph of this section of Eevenue Act is uncon- stitutional as contravening the rule of equality set forth in Sec. 1, Art. 9, of the Constitution. Consolidated Coal Co. vs. Miller, 236—149; People (ex rel.) vs. National Box Co., 248—141, 145; P. vs. Federal Security Co., 255—561. Since the amendment of 1905 the local assessors are required to assess the capital stock and franchises of companies organized for mercantile or manufacturing purposes or for certain other purposes enumerated herein. Miller, Watt & Co. vs. O 'Connell, 251 — 260; People vs. Federal Security Co.. 255—561. Property exempt from taxation.] Section 2^ All property de- scribed in this section, to the extent herein limited, shall be exempt from taxation, that is to say: First— All lands donated by the United States for school pur- poses, not sohl or leased ; all property of schools, including the real estate on which the schools are located; not leased by such schools or otherwise used wilh a view to profit. Second — All proixn-ty used exclusively for rclif^ious pui'poses, or used exclusively lor school and religious purposes or for orpha- nages and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit. 1'liird — All lands used exclusively as graveyards or grounds for l)niying the dead. 34 Fourth — All unentered government lands; all public buildings or structures of whatsoever kind, and the contents thereof, and the land on which the same are located belonging to the United States. Fifth — All property of every kind belonging to the State of Illinois. Sixth — All property belonging to any county, village, or city used exclusively for the maintenance of the poor; all swamp or overflowed lands belonging to any county, so long as the same re- main unsold by such county ; all public buildings belonging to any county, township, city or incorpoi-ated town, with the ground on which such buildings are erected; all property owned by any city or village located within the incorporated limits thereof; except as heretofore been leased or may hereafter be leased by such city or village to lessees who are bound under the terms of the lease to pay the taxes on such property. All property owned by any city or village located outside the incorporated limits thereof but with- in the same county when used for the purposes of a tuberculosis sanitarium, farm colony in connection with a house of correction, or nursery, garden or farm for the growing of shrubs, trees, flow- ers, vegetables and plants for use in beautifying, maintaining and operating, play grounds, parks, parkways, public grounds, build- ings and institutions owned or controlled by such city or village ; and all property owned by any city or village outside of the cor- porate limits of same used exclusively for municipal purposes. Seventh — All property of institutions of public charity, all property of beneficent and charitable organizations, whether in- corporated in this or in any other State of the United States and all property of old people's homes when such property is actually and exclusively used for such charitable or beneficent purposes, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit; and all free public libraries. Eighth — All fire engine [s] or other implements used for the ex- tinguishment of fires, with the buildings used exclusively for the safe keeping thereof, and the lot of reasonable size on which the building is located, when belonging to any city, village or town. Ninth — All market houses, public squares or other public grounds used exclusively for public purposes ; all works, machinery and fixtures belonging exclusively to any town, village or city, used exclusively for conveying water to such town, village or city; all works, machinery and fixtures of drainage districts, when used ex- clusively for pumping water from the ditches and drains of such district for drainage purposes. 35 Tenth — All property which may be used exclusively by societies for agricultural, horticultural, mechanical and philoso- phical purposes, and not for pecuniary profit. [As amended by an act approved June 28, 1919, L. 1919, p. 770.] a. In general: Statute in force on first day of April determines whether property is exempt though petition is not considered by Board of Review until after July 1, when new law went into effect, as lieu for taxes attaches to real estate on first day of April. People vs. Logan Square Presbyterian Church, 249—9. Revenue Act of 1909 exempting property from taxation does not nave retro- spective operation. People vs. Deutsche Gemeinde, 249 — 132. Equity will enjoin the collection of a tax upon property which is exempt from taxation. Moline Water Power Co. vs. Cox, 252 — 348. One claiming exemption must clearly show that the property is within the statute. Board of Directors vs. Board of Review, 248 — 590, 595; Church vs. Board of Review, 254—220. Party claiming tax exemption must state facts and not mere conclusions, and the taxing authorities must decide question of exemption from facts stated. People vs. Deutsche Gemeinde. 249 — 132. Statutes exempting property from taxation will not be extended by judicial construction. Board of Directors vs. Board of Review, 248 — 590, 594; Church vs. Board of Review, 254^220. Clause 1: i'lovision of clause 1, exempting from taxation property of schools, is invalid. People vs. Deutsche Gemeinde, 249 — 132. IJofore the amendment of 1909 Clause 1 was thus worded: "First — All lands donated by the United States for school purposes, not sold or leased; all public school houses; all property of institutions of learning, including the real estate on which the institutions are located, not leased by such institutions or otherwise used with a view to profit." The following de- cisions dealt with Clause 1 as thus worded:) The term "public school-house" (under Act of February 12, 1853, Sec. 3; 2 Scates, 1030, ed. 1858), is confined to buildings, the title and control of which are vested in school directors. Pace vs. County Commissioners of Jefferson County, 20 — 644, I-auds of a female seminary in one common inclosure, actually used for school grounds, gardens, orchards, woodlands for fuel, and pnsturago of stock used in carrying on tht; institution, are exempt, but not a tract outside the common inclosure. Monticello Female Seminary vs. P., 106 — 398. A medical school, such as the Chicago Policlinic, not conducted with a view to profit, would come within the definition of an institution of learning. Board of Review vs. Chicago Policlinic, 233 — 268. Proof that property belonged to an institution of li'ainiiig was not enough to exempt it from taxation, but it must have liecTi shown tliat i1 was not employed Avith a view to profit. Monticello Seminary vs. Board of Re- view, 242—477. 36 After payment of all expenses of the school, a surplus whicli furnished a means of livelihood to the owners of the property, was held not exempt from taxation. Montgomery vs. Wyman, 130 — 17. This section exempts institutions of learning from taxation. Any school not conducted for profit, which gives courses of study not afforded by and of higher grade than taught in the public school system, even though it also gives the elementary studies, and even though the majority of the students avail themselves only of the lower grade of studies, may be considered an institution of learning. But the mere fact that it was a school not for profit would not exempt it; it must be a public school. People vs. St. Francis Academy, 233 — 26. A petition to prevent collection of tax on property which was claimed exempt because used for educational purposes, must show either that it was a public school house, or an institution of learning. McCullough vs. Board of Eeview, 183—375. Institution of learning is one for purpose of higher education. McCullough vs. Board of Eeview, 183—376. Where title was in the Catholic Bishop for the use of the congregation and was used by an institution of learning as playground for scholars, the title to which was not in the school nor in any person who held title for the school, it was not exempt, for it must be held by the institution or in its name by some one authorized to hold title for it. McCullough vs. Board of Eeview, 186—17. * Land is subject to taxation notwithstanding it belongs to institution of learn- ing, where buildings or institutions are not located upon it, and it is not used exclusively for interests of corporation. Presbyterian Theological Seminary vs. P., 101 — 578. A library association rented for profit is not an institution of learning nor does it fall within any of the exemptions of this section. P. vs. Peoria Mercantile Library Associations, 157 — 369 (1895). Clause 2: A religious publishing society authorized to establish and aid Sunday schools, supply Sunday school literature and otherwise promote Sunday school education and to publish and sell religious tracts and books for use in Sunday school in view of this section and See. 7 is exempt from a personal property tax on such books and supplies, where the primary purpose of the business is that of religious instruction and where profits of business are used for that purpose. Cong. Pub. Society vs. Board of Eeview, 290 —108. Provision of clause 2, Act of 1909, exempting property used exclusively for school and religious purposes is valid. People vs. Deutsche Gemeinde, 249—132. Property held by religious corporation under a contract for a deed is not exempt. People vs. Logan Square Presbyterian Church, 249 — 11. Credits consisting of bonds and notes belonging to a school and representing money derived from income of school are not exempt though it is stipu- lated they arc to be used for maintenance of school. Monticello Seminary vs. Board of Eeview, 249—481. Funds donated to school to establish free scholarships are exempt. Monticello Seminary vs. Board of Eeview, 249 — 481. 37 A parsonage is not exempt from taxation under laws of 1900. First Cong. Church vs. Board of Eeview, 254—220, 221. [Before the amendment of 1909, clause 2 was thus worded: "Second — All church property actually and exclusively used for public worship and all parsonages or residences actually and exclusively used by persons devoting their entire time to church work, when the said buildings and the land on which said buildings are located (said land to be of reasonable size for the location of said buildings) are owned by the congregation or the church authorities and not used for pecuniary profit." The following decisions dealt with clause 2 as thus worded:] So long as a building is used for public worship, it matters not that it is used also for other purposes non-secular, in aid of the main purpose, but where a building is separated from the one where public worship is had, by an alley and is used for Sunday school, social gatheriiigs, and for janitor's rooms, it is taxable. In re Walker, 200 — 566. That land may be exempt from taxation under this clause it must be used by a distinct congregation for public worship and conveyed for that purpose to the church. P. vs. Watseka Camp-meeting Association, 160^ — 576 (1896). Title to property must be in religious corporation or church society as a body, and must be actually and exclusively used for public worship and congre- gation must be organized, to entitle it to exemption. Private property used for church purposes is not exempt. Dedication of property is im- material. P. vs. Anderson, 117 — 50. Where a building erected for church purposes is partly rented out for business purposes, it is liable to taxation. First M. E. Church vs. Chicago, 26 —482. Parsonages or residences actually and exclusively used by persons devoting their whole time to religious work are not exempt, as such property itself is thereby used for secubir juii-poses. People vs. First Cong. Church, 232 —1.58. Clause 3: Lands owned by cemetery company are not exempt where they are separated from cemetery by highway, and not used as cemetery, notwithstanding they arc platted as a cemetery. P. vs. Graceland Cemetery Co., 86 — 336. The exemption docs not extend to separate lot used for oOico and dwelling of custodian of burial grounds adjoining. Bloomingtoii ('ciiiotery Associa- tion vs. P., 170—379. Clause 5: Illinois University laixls are exempt finin taxation, as they are property nt' State. Board of Illinois Industrial I'liivcrsity vs. Champaign County. 76 —184; Same vs. P., 76—187. Koal estate acquired on foreclosure of nmrtgagc to secure loan of school fumls is exempt from taxation, as that belongs to the State. City of Chicago vs. P., 80—384. Clause 6: hand dedicated to trustees of town "for the benefit of tlie owners of lots lioiil ing on the same" is subject to taxation and special assessment, as that is private propr-rty. McCJhesney vs. P., 99 — 216. \ toll-bridge owned and operated by a city for its own benefit, ami located beyond the limits of such city, and in an adjoining town, is not exempt. In re Swigert, 123—267. 106117 38 • Where a city obtains property in return for money which a city treasurer had appropriated to his own use, though this money had been raised by tax- ation, the property is not exempt from taxation. P. vs. City of Chicago, 124— G3G. Swamp lands in the hands of a county are not taxable. Piatt vs. Goodell, 97—84. Clause 7: See clause 2. supra, Cong. Pub. Society vs. Board of Eeview, where this section was considered in connection with Sec. 2, and in that case the question of a charity is discussed. The Masonic Home of the Grand Lodge of Mason of Illinois, together with the land used for its maintenance, is exempt as the property of a public charity, and the fact there is a charge on the property in the nature of an incumbrance is not material. Grand Lodge vs. Board of Eeview, 281—480. Trust fund held by directors appointed under city ordinance declaring the establishment of free public library to be erected with income from fund in future not within exemption in favor of "all free public libraries" until library is established. Board of Directors vs. Board of Eeview, 248—590. A hospital which treats all its patients alike, and charges no fee where the patient is unable to pay, and a graduated fee according to ability to pay, but in no case makes any profit; is open to all without distinction as to race, religion or color; and is maintained by voluntary contributions of charitably inclined persons, is exempt from taxation. German Hospital vs. Board of Eeview, 233 — 246; Board of Eeview vs. Chicago Policlinic, 233—268. A hospital not owned by the State or any municipal corporation, but which is open to all persons, regardless of creed, race or financial ability, except that persons having contagious diseases are not received, is a public charity and so exempt from taxation. Sisters of St. Francis vs. Board of Eeview, 231—317. In order to be exempt from taxation the property must not only be devoted to charitable purposes, but the institution owning it must be one organized for charitable purposes and not for pecuniary profit. People vs. Eavens- wood Hospital, 238—137. A fraternal benefit society whose money is derived from assessments upon its members, is not a charitable institution, entitled to be exempted from tax- ation. Catholic Knights of Illinois vs. Board of Eeview, 198 — 411. Property of Y. M. C. A. which is leased for profit is not exempt from taxation. P. vs. Y. M. C. A. of Peoria, 157—403 (1895). The mere fact that an institution is a hospital, without proof that it is or- ganized and conducted for charitable purposes, does not entitle it to exemption. P. vs. Wabash E. Co., 138—85 (1891). This clause refers only to charities created by the laws of this State. A for- eign corporation "for the disseminating moral and religious instruction, and other charities, among sailors and laborers doing business on Western waters," was not exempt. People vs. Seaman's Friend Society, 87 — 246. Clause 9: A park and playground dedicated by the owner of land, in platting a sub- 39 division, "to tlie use of occupants of said sub-division," are not exempt as public grounds even though plat is accepted by the city. People vs. Eicketts, 248—428. The occasional unauthorized use of public park by private persons to conduct automobile races, at which they charge an admission to persons willing to pay but not excluding other persons from the park, does not deprive public of right to have park exempt. Petition of City of Robinson, 281 —429. [Before the amendment of 1919, clause 9 was thus worded: "All market houses, public squares or other public grounds used exclusively for public pur- poses; all works, machinery and fixtures belonging exclusively to anj' town, village or city, used exclusively for convej-ing water to such town, village or city. ' ' The following decisions dealt with clause 9 as thus worded:] Personal property of drainage district, consisting of steam boiler, engine and machinery located in district and used to carry on business of district is not exempt. Nutwood Drain. & Levee Dist. vs. Board of Review, 255 —447, 448. ' ' Public grounds ' ' refers solely to grounds which are open for the designated use of the general public. The Sanitary District's channels cannot be said to come within that definition, and so are taxable. Sanitary District vs. Martin, 173 — 247; Same vs. Gilford, 257 — 424; Same vs. Board of Review, 258—316. Under the Constitution authorizing the legislature to exempt property of municipal corporations, providing it is by general law, and the act of legislature thereunder exempting "all market houses, public squares or other public grounds used exclusively for public purposes," lands within the district, included within the channel and right of way and devoted exclusively to the pui-pose of drainage and carrying off the sewage of the district, are exempt from taxation; but water power, dams, docks and such property located outside the Sanitary District are subject to taxation where located. Where the Sanitary District owns a single tract of land which has been assessed as a wliolo and leases a part of it, the district should make known what portion is used for public purposes, and failing so to do, the tax will stand, though part of property exempt, or, if pos- sible, an apportionment should be made. Sanitary District vs. Hanberg, 2211-480. Clause 10: rpon application by collector for judgment against land for taxes of non- exempt property, the decision of board of supervisors tliat property of fair association is exempt from taxation, is not binding on owner, i'coria Fair Association vs. P., Ill — 559. This section, as amended in 1909, includes "inccrporatcd towns" \\ithin tlic term "incorporated village.'' Under it the county clerk must ascertain which taxing district or niiiiiicipality lias the liigliest aggrcgalc jh r cciit of tax levies. He thoreiijion reduces this to 3 per cent, and thereby fixes the county rate and certain other rates. Tlie county rate so fixed must apply throughout the county and the rates for the other taxing districts must apply uniformly throughout sudi districts. Cicero vs. .loseph Haas, 244—551. 40 The amendment of 1909 is not a special tax, even if it does amount to a regu- lation of county or township affairs, because the different limitations in the act are based solely on pojnilation, and classification by population may be valid if the number of inhabitants creates substantial differences concerning the subject of the legislation. Booth vs. Opel, 244 — 317. All public property used jointly, but exclusively, for public purposes and by societies for agricultural, horticultural, mechanical and philosophical pur- poses and not for pecuniary profit is exempt. Petition of City of Eobin- son, 281—429. Rules for valuing personal property, etc.] Section 3. Per- sonal property shall be valued as follows: First: All personal property, except as herein otherwise di- rected, shall be valued at its fair cash value. Second: Every credit for a sum certain, payable either in money or labor, shall be valued at a fair cash value, for the sum so payable if for any article of property, or for labor or services of any kind, it shall be valued at the current price of such property, labor or service. Third: Annuities and royalties shall be valued at their then present value. Fourth: ^The capital stock" of all companies and associations now or hereafter created under the laws of this state,^* except^ companies and associations organized for purely manufacturing and mercantile purposes or for either of such purposes,* or for the mining and sale of coal, or for printing, or for the publishing of newspapers, or for the improving and breeding of stock, shall be so valued by the State Board of Equalization (Tax Commission) ^^ as to ascertain and determine respectively, the fair cash value of such capital stock, including the franchise over and above the as- sessed value of the tangible property of such company or associa- tion, such board shall adopt such rules and principles for ascer- taining the fair cash value of such capital stock as to it may seem equitable and just, and such rules and principles when so adopted, if not inconsistent with this act, shall be as binding and of the same effect as if contained in this act, subject, however, to such change, alteration or amendment as may be found from time to time, to be necessary by said board; Provided,^ that in all cases where the tangible property or capital stock of any company or association is assessed under this act, the shares of capital stock of such company or association shall not be assessed or taxed in this State. This clause shall not apply to the capital stock, or shares of capital stock of banks organized under the general banking laws of this State or under any special charter heretofore granted by 41 the Legislature of this State. [As amended by act in force July 1, 1905. L. 1905, p. 353.] Clause 1: Moneys, mortgages, bonds and securities should be valued the same as other property. First ^^ational Bank vs. Holmes, 246 — 362. State tax against the property of the Illinois Central Kailroad Company must be assessed on the same proportion of full cash value as other owners are assessed. People vs. Illinois Central E. Co., 273 — 220. Clause 4: Under Sec. 25 of Tax Commission Law all powers and duties now conferred or imposed upon the State Board of Equalization in relation to the assess- ment of property for taxation shall be transferred to and exercised and performed by the State Tax Commission. 1. In general: Sec. 27 must be road in connection with Sec. 3, and moans only tangible prop- erty may be assessed by assessor. Central Illinois Public Service Co. vs. Swartz, 284^108. Clause 4, Sec. 3, by giving the State Board of Equalization power to set out mode of ascertaining value of capital stock, does not violate Sec. 1, Art 9, nor Sees. 9 and 10 of the Constitution. Coal Co. vs. Finlen, 124 — 666; La Salle Co. vs. Donoghue, 127—27: Porter vs. E. Co., 76 — 561; Gas Co. vs. Higby, 134 — 557; Ottawa Glass Co. vs. McCaleb, 81—556. The power given the State Board of Equalization to make rules for assessment of capital stock of corporations is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Porter vs. Eockford, etc., E. Co., 76 — 561; E. Co. vs. Baymond, 97—212. Not unconstitutional under Sec. 1 of Art. 9, as the provision is uniform as to all of the same class. Nor is it a violation of Sees. 9 and 10 of Art. 9 of the Constitution, because the State Board only makes valuation and leaves the actual levy of taxes to the municipalities. Hub vs. Hanberg, 211 — 43. An assessment by the State Board on the equalized value of the capital stock, where a tax had already been levied on the equalized value of the tangible property, is not double taxation. Danville Mfg. Co. vs. Parks. 88 — 463. Capital stock and franchise of corporation are to be treated as personal prop- erty under statute, and a tax thereon is not a lien on real property of the company. Belleville Nail Co. vs. P., 98—399. That local assessors have assessed property which the statute commands them to assess at its fair cash value at one-third its cash value is no reason why assessment of railroad property by the State Board of Equalization at its full cash value shouM be cut down, for if any wrong was done, it was done by the town assessors and not the State Board. Illinois, etc., E. and C. Co. vs. Stookey, 122—358. Where an assessment shows a very great disparity and discrimination, whicli could not reasonably have arisen from an (Mror of judgment, courts will relieve against the violation of constitutional rule of uniformity of tax- ation. People vs. K. & H. Bridge Co., 287—246; Eaymond vs. Trac. Co., 207— U. S. 20. 2. What is capital stock? The value of the stock and franchise of a corporation may he properly arrived at by adding to the value of the stock the debts of the corporation, and deducting the value of its tangible property. Ottawa Glass Co. vs. Mc- Caleb, SI— 556. Capital stock means all property of corporation, whether tangible or intangible, and deduction of tangible property is required merely to avoid double taxation. Pacific Hotel Co. vs. Licb, 83 — 602. In distinction from terms "railroad track," "rolling stock," etc., "capital stock" means all property and rights of corporation of every kind and nature, wherever located. To this end the State Board of Equalization adopted a rule for the assessment of the capital stock of corporations, that the value of all the shares of stock, and the value of all the debt (excluding debt for current expenses) be added together, to ascertain the fair cash value of the "capital stock." or entire property (including franchise) of the corporation, and from this sum there be deducted the amount of the value of all tangible property, and that the remainder should be taken as the fair cash value of the "capital stock." Ohio, etc., R. Co. vs. Weber, 96 — 443; State Board of Equalization vs. People, 191 —549. A corporation is liable to be taxed in State of domicile upon all its property which is of such nature as to be taxable at residence of owner, and where it is a consolidated company, formed by a consolidation of a corporation in Illinois with one in Iowa, both formed for the construction of a bridge across the Mississippi Eiver, being a corporation of this State, it is to be treated as domiciled here, and so would be here taxable on all its capital stock. Keokuk Bridge Co. vs. P., 161—142. The capital stock of a corporation embraces all the property belonging to the corporation, including all rights, corporate franchises, contracts, privileges, good will and everything of value, tangible or intangible, not in separate parcels but as a homogeneous unit, and the term is not limited to shares of stock owned by shareholders. Central Illinois Public Service Co. vs. Swartz, 284—109. 2a. Under the laws of this State: Although the legislature has the power to impose taxation on a foreign cor- poration, to w^hatever extent it may choose in its discretion, as the con- dition upon which the corporation shall be allowed to exercise its fran- chises and privileges in the State, it has not empowered the State Board of Equalization to assess the capital stock of foreign corporations. Un- til proper legislation, the tax on foreign corporations is confined to its tangible property. W. U. Telegraph Co. vs. Lieb, 76 — 172. 3. Exception. Prior to Act of 1875 no distinction was made in revenue cases between rail- way companies and manufacturing companies, but they were all assessed by the State Board of Equalization. Danville Manuf. Co. vs. Parks, 88 —463. Clause 4 valid in spite of this exception. Coal Co. vs. Finlen, 124 — 666; Stirling Gas Co. vs. Higby, 134—557. Gas companies fall within the exception under this section, and are taxable under Sees. 32 and 33 of Revenue Act, which require the capital stock to be assessed. The exception of certain companies does not violate Sec. 1, Art. 9, of the State Constitution, as the legislature may well classify the different companies. O. G. L. and C. Co. vs. Downey, 127 — 201. 43 The statute, Sees. 32 and 33 of Revenue Act, requires tlie assessment by the local assessor of all corporations in the exception to Clause 4, Sec. 3. The others arc assessed by the State Board and not the local assessor. Hub vs. Hanberg, 211 — 43. The State Board of Equalization, and not the local assessor, must assess capital stock of life insurance companies. P. vs. Ward, 105 — 620. Revenue law as changed since amendment of 1905 requires the local assessors to assess capital stock and franchises of companies organized for mer- cantile or manufacturing purposes or for certain other purposes enumer- ated therein, while the capital stock and franchises of other companies must be assessed by State Board of Equalization (Tax Commission). P. vs. Lewy Bros. Co!, 250—613; Miller & Co. vs. 'Connell, 251—260; P. vs. Federal Security Co., 255—261. If main purpose for which a telephone company is organized is construction operation and maintenance of telephone lines and exchanges, its fran- chise is not assessable by the local assessor, even though one of its de- clared objects of organization is the manufacture and sale of telephones and telephone apparatus. Central Union Tel. Co. vs. Onken, 271 — 638. 4. Purely manufacturing and mercantile corporations: .\ corporation organized to buy and sell stocks and bonds of other companies and to guarantee such stocks and bonds is a mercantile corporation. Peo- ple vs. Federal Security Co., 255 — 561. Corporation organized to manufacture and deal in crushed stone, lime and cement is organized for manufacturing purposes though it has power un- der its charter to build roads composed of sand, gravel and dirt. Dolese & Shepard Co. vs. O 'Connell, 257—43, 44. A corporation organized to manufacture and sell bakers' goods is a manufac- facturing and mercantile corporation. H. H. Kohlsaat & Co., vs. Federal Security Co., 254—561. Where corporation's charter designates as one of its corporate purposes "feed- ing and dealing in cattle and other live stock," it is not a "purely manu- facturing" purpose and therefore its capital stock was to be valued by State Board. Distilling Co. vs. P., 161—101. Where corporation is chartered "to furnish light, heat and power for pub- lic and private uses," it is not a "purely manufacturing" corporation and so is to be valued by State Board of Equalization. Evanston Elec- tric Co. vs. Kochersperger, 175 — 27. 5. Valued by State Board of Equalization (Tax Commis.sion) : Fndor this clause the francliist; of a corpoiation, exce[)ting certain companies named, cannot be assessed for taxation by the local assessor but the fair cash value of the capital stock, including franchise and subtracting the tangible property assessed by local assessor, is to be assessed by State Board. Central 111. Public Service Co. vs. Swartz, 284—108. The State Board of Equalization may a.s.sess the capital stock of a corporation in the hands of the corporation, leaving it to deduct such tax from the dividends. This did not violate the rule that all property be taxed accord- ing to its value. Ottawa Glass Co. vs. McCaleb, 81 — 556. State Board of ?>|ua]izaton docs not act as a board of review in assessing cap- ital stock, but as original assessor. Pacific Hotel Co. vs. Liob, 83 — 602 44 In the absence of fraud or want of power, the courts are powerless to givt relief against an excessive assessment by the State Board of Equaliza- tion. Coal E. C. Co. vs. Finlen, 124— 6G6. . The fact that the shareholders of an Insurance Company were taxed on their shares was no objection to the assessment by the State Board of EqualiKa- tion on the capital stock. Kopublie, etc., Ins. Co. vs. PoUak, 75—292. Sec. 3, Clause 4, does not violate Sees. 9 and 10 of the Constitution, as the State Board does not levy taxes, but merely values and assesses the prop- erty. Hub vs. Hanberg, 211 — 43. The right of a corporation to use city streets does not amount to a franchise but is only a right to exercise the corporate franchise on the property of the city and the local assessor has no power to assess such right for tax- ation. Central 111. Public Service Co. vs.Swartz, 284 — 108. 5. Proviso: The proviso in clause 4 sec. 3 means that where the property of a corporation has been assessed as a whole to the corporation, the share holders shall not be assessed upon their respective interests in the corporation. Cen- tral 111. Public Service Co. vs. Swartz, 284—108. Rules for valuing- real estate.] Section 4. Real property shall be valued as follows: First — Each tract or lot of real property shall be valued at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair, voluntary sale. Second — Taxable leasehold estates shall be valued at such a price as they would bring at a fair, voluntary sale for cash. Third — When a building or structure is located on the right of way of any canal, railroad or other company leased or granted for a term of years to another, the same shall be valued at such a price as such building or structure and lease or grant would sell at a fair, voluntary sale for cash. Fourth — In valuing any real property on which there is a coal or other mine, or stone or other quarry, the same shall be valued at such a price as such property, including the mine or quarry, would sell at a fair, voluntary sale for cash. See Section 18, Revenue Act of 1898, post. A conveyance of the right to mine coal underlying a tract of land is not a mere grant of an easement but a sale of the coal itself and the conveyance of an interest in land, which may be assessed separately from the rest of the land. Simmons Coal Co. vs. Board of Eeview, 282—397. A grant of mineral land reserving mining right amounts to the separation of lands and mines, and each must be listed separately for taxation. In re Frances S. Mayor, Executrix, 134—19 (1890). Where coal has been conveyed separately from the land, the assessment of coal to one and land to another may be in proportion to the several holdings. Cons. Coal Co. of St. L. vs. Baker, 135—545 (1891). 45 It is proper to assess riglits to coal separately where so owned, even thougli the land was assessed in full at the last quadrennial assessment and the assessment of the right to the coal is made before the next quadrennial. The person to object is the owner of the land. People vs. O'Gara Coal Co., 231—172. Under Sees. 6 and 7, Chap. 94 (Kurd's Stat. 1917, p. 1985), the right obtained by a lease of oil and gas is taxable property. People vs. Bell, 237 — 332. Under Sees. 6 and 7 of Chapter 94, when the mining right in land has been conveyed, both the land and the mining right shall be taxed, and it is no defense by the owner of the mining right that the owner of the land paid taxes. Slioll Bros. vs. People, 194—24. Where the owner of the remainder in fee becomes also assignee of life estate, he is bound to pay taxes, and so, semble, if holding life estate alone. Prettyman vs. Walston, 34 — 175. Farm lands within the city limits are liable to taxation for municipal pur- poses, though not platted. Cary vs. Pekin, 88 — 154. Personal property — when listed.] Section 5. Personal prop- erty shall be listed between the first day of May and the first day of July of each year, when required by the assessor, with reference to the quantity held or owned on the first day of May, in the year for which the property is required to be listed. Personal property purchased or acquired on the first day of May shall be listed by or for the person purchasing or acquiring it. See Section 15, Rev- enue Act of 1898, post. When the capital of a banking institution, used throughout the year in the conduct of its business, is converted for a few days into government securities for the express purpose of defeating the imposition of any and all taxes, such investment is colorable and fraudulent, and its capital re- mains taxable to the same extent and in the same manner as if such con- version had never taken place. The Board of Review may assess such property. In re People's Bank of Vermont, 203 — 300. Who shall list and what listed.] Section 6. Personal property shall be listed in the manner following: First — Every person of full age and sound mind, being a resi- dent of this state, shall list all his moneys, credits, bonds or stocks, shares of stock of joint stock or other companies (when the capital .stock of such company is not assessed in this state), moneys loaiunl or invested annuities, franchises, royalties, and other personal prop- erty. Second — He shall also list all moneys and other personal prop- erty invested, loaned or otherwise controlled by him as the agent or attorney, or on account of any other person or persons, company or corporation whatsoever, and all moneys deposited, subject to his order, check or draft, and credits due from or owing by any per- son or persons, body corporate or politic. [See Section 19.] 46 Third — The property of a minor child shall be listed by his guardian ; if he have no guardian, then by the father, if living ; if not, by the mother, if living; and if neither father or mother be liv- ing, by the person having such property in charge. Fourth — The property of an idiot or lunatic, by his conserv- ator; or if he has no conservator, by the persons having charge of such property. Fifth — The property of a wife, by her husband, if of sound mind; if not, by herself. Sixth — The property of a person for whose benefit it is held in trust, by the trustee; of the estate of a deceased person, by the executor or administrator. Seventh — The property of corporations whose assets are in the hands of receivers, by such receivers. Eighth — The property of a body politic or corporate, by the president, or proper agent or officer thereof. Ninth — The property of a firm or company, by a partner or agent thereof. Tenth — The property of manufacturers and others in the hands of agent, by and in the name of such agent, as merchandise. Clause 1: Party who uses property jointly with owner under contract with him is not liable for tax on such property. Irvin vs. New Orleans, etc., E. Co., 94 — 105. Clause 6: Under Sec. 6 of Eevenue Act, it is the duty of an executor or administrator to list the personal property of his deceased in his hands in that capacity, for the purpose of taxation. McClellan vs. Bd. of Eeview, 200 — 116; Peo- ple vs. Hibernian Banking Ass'n, 245 — 522, 526. Trustee may list property held by him on which no trust is declared, but if he does not do so, it may rightfully be assessed to such trustee in name of equitable owner. P. vs. Western Seaman's Friend Society, 87 — 246. Clause 7: This section of Eevenue Act does not enlarge jurisdiction of local assessor so as to authorize him to assess capital stock of a life insurance company in the hands of receiver. Assessment properly by State Board of Equaliza- tion. P. vs. Ward, 10-5—620. Clause 9: Under our statute property may be assessed to a partnership and listed by a partner or agent, and such assessment cannot be regarded as an increase of a partner's individual assessment. Carney vs. People, 210 — 434. Clause 10: The assessor should list and assess the property in agent's name, under Sec. 83 of this act, where the agent neglects to list such property in his own name. Failure to add words "as agent" to such name will not invalidate assessment. (See cases given under Sec. 1. supra.) Lockwood vs. John- son, 106—334. 47 Where the agent has listed property in. name and on behalf of principal, he is not liable for tax thereon. Doming vs. James, 72 — 78. Where personal property listed.] Section 7. Personal prop- erty, except such as is required in this act to be listed and assessed . otherwise, shall be listed and assessed in the county, town, city, village or district where the owner resides. The capital stock and franchises of corporations and persons, except as may be otherwise provided, shall be listed and taxed in the county, town, district, city or village where the principal office or place of business of such cor- poration or person is located in this state. If there be no principal office or place of business in this state, then at the place in this state where any such corporation or person transacts business. While the general rule is that the situs of personal property follows the domicile of the owner, it is a rule of convenience, subject to legislative change, and it is not ordinarily applied to property distributed along an extended railroad. People vs. Ey. Co., 273—220, 263. Money and choses in action belonging to a resident of this state should be assessed where the owner has residence, though they are in actual pos- session of an agent who resides in another township. Ellis vs. People, 199-548. Personal property must be listed and assessed in the town, city, village or district where the owner resides. Mahany vs. P., 138 — 311 (1891). The exception in Sec. 7 refers to property held by guardians and persons in trust relations. King vs. MeDrew, 31 — 418. Where an owner resided in Kankakee County, but owned a farm in Iroquois County, the personal property on the farm in the latter county was prop- erly assessable only in the former county, but, semble, if such property is permanently situated in a school district, it would be liable to school taxes in district where located. King vs. McDrew, 31 — 418. But where one has a farm or a store or a manufactory in another county, property permanently connected with either of these concerns would be properly taxable where such concerns were situated. Mills vs. Thornton, 26—300. Listing by the owner of personalty in one town, after he had knowledge that he was about to be assessed in another, to avoid assessment in his town of actual residence, is a fraud, and payment thereon will not benefit him. Mahany vs. P., 138—311 (1891). Farm property — owner not residing^ on farm.] Section 8. When the owner of live stock or other personal property connected with a faini does not reside thereon, the same shall be listed and assessed in the town or district where the farm is situated: Pro- vided, if the farm is situated in several towns or districts, it shall be listed and assessed in the town or district in wliich the prin- cipal i)lace of business on such farm shall be. Where tracts in different counties are managed as one farm, personal property is to bo li.sted and asse.sscd in county where part of farm on which owner resides is situated, but property on another tract in the other county hav- 48 ing separate buildings nvust be listed and assessed where such land is situated. People vs. Scheifley, 252-486. This section does not apply unless the owner of the stock "does not reside" upon the farm with Avhich it is "connected," as where one owned three farms two in one county and the other partly in one and partly in the other, and these were all used as one farm. P. vs. Caldwell, 142—434. Farm is a body of land, usually under one ownership, devoted to the raising of crops, or pasture, or both, and may consist of any number of acres and may lie in two counties. P. vs. Caldwell, 142—434 (1892). Of manufactures in hands of agents.] Section 9. The prop- erty of manufacturers and others, in the hands of agents, shall be listed and assessed at the place where the business of such agent is carried on. Purchaser's interest in exempted lands, personalty.] Section 10. When real estate is exempt in the hands of the holder of the fee, and the same is contracted to be sold, the amount paid thereon by the purchaser, with the enhanced value of the investment and im- provement thereon until the fee is conveyed, shall be held to be personal property, and listed and assessed as such, in the place where the land is situated. In transitu.] Section 11. Personal property, in transitu, shall be listed and assessed in the county, town, city or district where the owner resides: Provided, if it is intended for a business, it shall be listed and assessed at the place where the property of such busi- ness is required to be listed. Nursery stock.] Section 12. The stock of nurseries, growing or otherwise, in the hands of nurserymen, shall be listed and as- sessed as merchandise. Personal property of banks and others.] Section 13. The per- sonal property of banks or bankers, brokers, stock-jobbers, insur- ance companies (except life insurance companies organized under the laws of this State), fraternal beneficiary societies (except those organized under the laws of this State), hotels, livery stables, saloons, eating houses, merchants and manufacturers, ferries, min- ing companies, and companies not specially provided for in this act, shall be listed and assessed in the county, town, city, village or dis- trict where their business is carried on, except such property as shall be liable to assessment elsewhere in the hands of agents. AIL persons, companies and corporations in this State, owning steam- boats, sailing vessels, wharf boats, barges and other water craft, shall be required to list the same for assessment and taxation in the county, town, city, village or district, in which the same "may belong, or be enrolled, registered or licensed, or kept when not en- rolled, registered or licensed. All property and assets of life in- 49 surance companies and fraternal beneficiary societies organized un- der the laws of this State (except such property as is by statute liable to assessment elsewhere) shall be assessed to the corporation or society as to a natural person in the name of the corporation or society in the county, town, city, village or district of its residence as herein provided, and not otherwise. The place where its office is located in its article [s] of incorporation shall be deemed its resi- dence : Provided, its business is actually transacted at such office, but if it shall establish its principal office in any other place than the place named in its articles of incorporation, then the place where it transacts its principal business shall be deemed its resi- dence for all the purposes of this act. In computing the taxable property of a life insurance company organized under the laws of this State, there shall be deducted from its gross assets the value of its real estate and of its personal property otherwise taxed, the net value of its outstanding policy contracts calculated according to the mortality table and rate of interest fixed by law, and all its other liabilities (except capital stock) of the same kind and nature as those treated or required to be shown as liabilities in the last ainiual sworn statement of said company to the insurance superin- tendent and therein deducted from its admitted assets in order to determine its unassigned funds or surplus, and the remainder shall be the amount of personal property for which the company shall be assessed. In computing the taxable property and funds of a fraternal beneficiary society, organized under the laws of this State, there shall be deducted from its gross assets the value of its real estate, furniture, supplies and other personal property, otherwise taxed, the net value of its benefit certificates, and all other liabilities, as testified and shown by the latest report of the insurance superin- tendent, and the remainder shall be the property and funds for which the society shall be assessed. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed. [As amended by act approved June 28, 1915. L. 1915, p. 565.1 I'ndcr this sfftion personal property of brokers may be assessed in the town where the business is carried on, and this is proper though personal prop- erty is ordinarily assessed at the residence of the owner. Carney vs. People, 210—434. If owner lists vessel in one of these three places, it cannot be taxed in other two. Halstcad vs. Adam.s, 108—609. If firm do business both as merchants and as manufacturers at two different places, they will list at each place property they had there on May Ist. Selz vs. Cagwin, 104 — G47. 50 Collection of tax on vessel out of proper district will be enjoined in chancery. Vogt vs. Ayer, 104—583. Act of February 12, 1853, requiring property of banks, brokers and companies to be listed in place of business, was not repealed by Act of 1869. See Par. 7. supra. Munson vs. Crawford, 65 — 185. Moneys and credits of a fraternal beneficiary society must be listed and as- sessed in city where society maintains its head office, though its principal officer may reside elsewhere. People vs. Mystic Workers of the World, 270—496. Repeal.] Section 13a. All laws and parts of laws inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed. [Added by act in force July 1, 1905. L. 1905, p. 356.] Section 14. The personal property of gas and coke companies, except the pipes laid down, shall be listed and assessed in the town, village, district or city where the principal works are located. Gas mains and pipes, laid in roads, streets or alleys, shall be held to be personal property, and listed and assessed as such .in the town, dis- trict, village or city where the same are laid. Gas pipes laid in roads or streets are personal property. Shelbyville Water Co. vs. P., 140—545 (1892). Section 15. The personal property of street railroad, plank road, g-ravel road, turnpike or bridge companies, shall be listed and assessed in the county, town, district, village or city where the prin- cipal place of business is located. The track, road or bridge shall be held to be personal property, and listed and assessed as such, in the town, district, village or city where the same is located or laid. Elevated railroads are railroads and not street railways within this section. Knopf vs. Lake St. Elev. E. Co., 197—212. Section 16. The horses, stages and other personal property of stage companies or persons operating stage lines, shall be listed and assessed in the county, town, city or district where they are usually kept. Section 17. The personal property of express or transportation companies shall be listed and assessed in thhe county, town, dis- trict, village or city where the same is usually kept. Consignee to list only his interest.] Section 18. No consignee shall be required to list, for taxation, the value of any property consigned to him for the sole purpose of being stored or forwarded, except to the extent of his interest in such property. Listing on behalf of others.] Section 19. Persons required to list property on behalf of others, shall list it in the same place in which they are required to list their own; but they shall list it separately from their own, specifying in each case the name of the person, estate, company or corporation to whom it belongs. 51 Right to deductions is dependent upon filing of schedule. Siegfried vs. Ray- mond, 190 — i29. Interest on bonds.] Section 20. Persons, for themselves or others, holding bonds or stocks of any kind, the principal of which bonds or stocks has been or may hereafter be exempt from taxation, sliall list the amount of accrued interest- on such bonds, ^^dthout regard to the time when the same is to be paid. Money secured by deed.] Section 21. Where a deed for real estate is held for the payment of a sum of money, such sum, so secured, shall be held to be personal property, and shall be listed and assessed as credits. Removing- — where owner assessed.] Section 22. The owner of personal property removing from one county, town, city, village or district, to another, between the first day of May and the first day of July, shall be assessed in either, in which he is first called upon by the assessor. The owner of personal property moving into this state from another state, between the first day of May and the first day of July, shall list the property owned by him on the first day of ]\Iay of such year, in the county, town, city, village or district in which he resides: Provided, if such person has been assessed, and can make it appear to the assessor that he is held for tax of the cur- rent year on the property, in another state, county, town, city or district, he shall not be again assessed for said year. See Sections 7-9, Revenue Law of 1898, post. "Moving into this State" means by the owner. Lumber shipped by a Mich- igan resident from there on May 1st to his lumber-yard in Chicago, arriv- ing May 10th, is not subject to assessment for taxes in Cook County for that year. Johnson vs. Lyon, 106 — 64. Caldwell was owner of three farms, two wholly in one county, and other partly in that and partly in another, llis residence has been on land in latter county, where cattle had been purchased and shipped onto land in one county, there to be kept only temporarily, and from there removed to land in a second county, where they were kept for sale; they are taxable in the latter county. P. vs. Caldwell, 142—434 (1892). This section does not apply where a resident brings property into the State, but only where a non-resident moves into the State. Cook vs. Board of Kcview, 195— 3G. How place of listing fixed.] Section 23. In all (luestions that may arise under this act as to the proper place to list personal property, or when the same cannot be listed as stated in this act, if l)etwcen several places in the same county, the place for listing and assessing shall be determined and fixed by the county board; and when between different counties or places in different counties, by the auditor of public accounts; and when fixed in either case, sliall be as binding as if fixed by this act. 52 Schedule.] Section 24. Persons required to list personal property shall make out, under oath, and deliver to the assessor, at the time required, a schedule of the numbers, amounts, quantity, and quality of all personal property in their possession or under their control, required to he listed for taxation by them. It shall be the duty of the assessor to determine and fix the fair cash value^ of all items of personal property, including all grain on hand on the first day of May^ and in assessing notes, accounts, bonds and inoneys, the assessor shall be governed by the same rules of uni- formity that he adopts as to value in assessing other personal prop- erty, and the assessor is hereby authorized to administer the oath required in this section and if any person shall refuse to make such schedule under oath, then the assessor shall list the property of such person according to his best judgment and information^ and shall add to the valuation of such list an amount equal to fifty per cent, of such valuation* and if any person making such schedule shall swear falsely he shall be guilty of perjury and punished ac- cordingly. Any person so required to list personal property who shall refuse, neglect or fail when requested by the proper assessor, so to do, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and on convic- tion thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding two hundred dollars and the several assessors shall report any such refusal to the county attorney whose duty it is hereby made to prosecute the same. [As amended by act approved May 31, 1879. In force July 1, 1879. L. 1879, p. 152.] See Sections 17-20, Revenue Law of 1898, post. 1. Assessors to fix value: Assessor has sole power to fix valuation in first instance; but tax-payers may require copy of schedule, and must at their peril take notice thereof, and if excessive or otherwise erroneous, have it corrected. Humphreys vs. Nelson, 115 — 45. If, after owner has delivered list of his taxable property to assessor, who accepts it without objection, the latter, without notice to owner, increases assessment above amount listed, equity will enjoin collection of increased tax. Cleghorn vs. Postlewaite, 43—428; National Bank vs. Cook, 77—622. Determination of valuation is left wholly to assessor. No valuation by owner provided for. assessor is not bound by his valuation, but the tax-payer's protection is to ask for copy of assessment (Sec. 84), which request should be made at time of furnishing list to assessor. Cleghorn vs. Postlewaite, 43_430, was under Acts of 1845, 1849 and 1853. Humphreys vs. Nelson, 115—45. Assessor has sole power to fix valuation in first instance. Humphreys vs. Nelson, 115 — 45. The town assessor cannot lawfully increase such assessment, without notice to tax-payer, after he has made assessment of personal property of tax- payer, and entered same on his books, whether such increase be attempted S3 by raising valuation of property already listed, or by adding other prop- erty to list. P. vs. Ward, 105-^20. The assessor has no power to alter assessment without notice to tax-payer, after accepting list of his personal property from him. McConkey vs. Smith, 73—313; National Bank vs. Cook, 76—622. Only where assessor accepted valuation given in such schedule, is it essential to give notice to property owner before increasing valuation. Tolman vs. Salomon, 191—203. In absence of evidence contra, assessor's valuation presumed correct. I.eper vs. Pulsifer, 37—110. Power to value property for taxation rests exclusively in oificers designated by statute and an attempted assessment by any other authority is void. Cen- tral 111. Public Service Co. v. Swartz, 284-108. 2. Items of personal property: The location on the first of May controls listing of personal property. P. vs. Caldwell, 142—434 (lSg2). 3. Assessor shall list property: Law does not require assessors to examine officers of a corporation against which a tax is assessed, upon their refusal or neglect to schedule on be- half of the corporation, but they may value it independently of the corn- pan v. New York, etc., Stock Exchange vs. Gleason, 121 — 502. 4. Penalty: This penalty will not be adjudged against estate for false return of executor. Leper vs. Pulsifer, 37—110-121. The provision making it a misdemeanor to refuse, neglect or fail to make out a schedule was omitted when such section was re-enacted as see. 19 of Kevenue law of 1898, and is repealed. People vs. Fisher. 274-117. Unclassified: It is no defense, as to property that was assessed, that ministerial officers have omitted to assess all property subject to taxation. Dunham vs. Chicago. 55—357. .•\ tax-payer is bound by his own statements as to the nature, title and value of the property made in the list which he returns for taxation, in the absence of any evidence of fraud, accident or mistake. People vs. Ey. Co., 27.3—220, 258. Form of schedule.] Section 25. Such schedulo, when com- pl(!te(l by the a.sst-.ssor in extending in a separate coluniii the value of such pi'opei'ty, shall truly and distinctly set forth: First — The uund)er of horses of all ages, and th(> value thereof. Second — The number of cattle of all ages, and the value thereof. Third- — 'I'he miniber of inulf.s and asses ol" all a value thereof. Fifth — The number of hoffs of all ajijes, and the value thei'eof. Sixth — Every sleani engine, inehidino- boilers, and Ihc value thereof. 54 Seventh— Every fire or burgiar-proof safe, and the value thereof. Eighth— Every billiard, pigeon hole, bagatelle or other similar tables, and the value thereof. Ninth — Every carriage and wagon, of whatsoever kind, and the value thereof. Tenth — Every watch and clock, and the value thereof. Eleyenth-^Every sewing or knitting machine, and the value lliereof. Twelfth — Every piano forte, and the value thereof. Thirteenth — Every melodeon and organ, and the value thereof. Fourteenth — Every franchise, the description and the value thereof. Fifteenth — Every annuity and royalty, the description and the value thereof. Sixteenth— Every patent right, the description and the value thereof. Seventeenth— Every steamboat, sailing vessel, wharf-boat, barge or other water craft, and the value thereof. Eighteenth — The value of merchandise on hand. Nineteenth— The value of material and manufactured articles on hand. Twentieth— The value of manufacturers' tools, implements and machinery (other than boilers and engines, which shall be listed as such). Twenty-first— The value of agricultural tools, implements and machinery. Twenty-second — The value of gold or silver plate and plated ware. Twenty-third — The value of diamonds and jewelry. Twenty-fourth— The amount of moneys of bank, banker, broker or stock-jobber. Twenty-fifth— The amount of credits of bank, banker, broker or stock-jobber. Twenty-sixth— The amount of moneys other than of bank, banker, broker or stock-jobber. Twenty-seventh — The amount of credits other than of bank, banker, broker or stock-jobber. Twenty-eighth — The amount and value of bonds or stocks. Twenty-ninth— The amount and value of shares of capital stock of companies and associations not incorporated by the laws of this State. 55 Thirtieth — The value of property such person is required to list as a pawnbroker. Thirty-tirst — The value of property of companies and corpora- tions other than property hereinbefore enumerated. Thirty-second — The value of bridge property. Thirty-third — The value of property of saloons and eating- houses. Thirty-fourth — The value of household or office furniure and property. Thirty-fifth — The value of investments in real estate and im- provements thereon required to be listed under this act. Thirty-sixth — The value of all other property required to be listed. Net receipts of insurance company are properly listed as "property not enumerated." People vs. Cosmopolitan Ins. Co., 246 — 142. Where board of review assesses personal property under 36th class the pre- sumption arises that such assessment was for property not included un- der any of the first 35 classes. Holt vs. Hendee, 248 — 288. The property owner must make a schedule of steam engines, boilers, etc., whether attached to realty or not. The legislature may make realty per- sonalty for purposes of taxation. Johnson vs. Eoberts, 102 — 655. Engines and boilers permanently attached to realty are personalty, for pur- poses of taxation. Shelbyville Water Co. vs. P., 140—545 (1892). A party having money in bank on the first day of May is required by thig section to list the same for taxation, notwithstanding that he owes debts poses of taxation. Shelbyville Water Co. vs. P., 140—545 (1892). Pumping machinery for water, electric light wires and water mains is per- sonal property, for purposes of taxation. Shelbyville Water Co. vs. P., 140—545 (1892). Money due under a contract for the sale of land is "credit." GriflS.n vs. Board of Review, 184—277. When assessor may examine under oath and list property.] Section 26. That whenever the assessor shall be of ()i)inion that the per.son listing property for himself or for any other person, company or corporation, has not made a full, fair and complete schedule of such property, he may examine such person under oath iji regard to the amount of the property he is required to schedule, and for that purpose he is authorized to administer oaths; and if such person shall refuse to answer under oath and a full discovciy make, the assessor may list the ])roj)erty of such person or his prin- cipal, according to his best judgment and information. If the per- son so examined sliall sweai- falsely. Iw sliall be gnilty of poi-jury. nnd punished accordingly. (See also cases under Section 24 of this act.) / 56 Assessor in administering oath to take testimony must do so within the terri- torial limits in which he is authorized to act. He cannot administer oath outside the township. Van Dusen vs. P., 78 — 645. Assessor may list and assess omitted property without notice to railway com- pany. Wabash, etc., E. Co. vs. Johnson, 108 — 11. Rules for listing credits — what debts deducted from credits.] Section 27. In making up the amount of credits which any person is required to list for himself, or for any other person, company or corporation, he shall be entitled to deduct from the gross amount of credits the amount of all bona fide debts owing by such person, company or corporation, to any other person, company or corpora- tion for a consideration received; but no acknowledgment of in- debtedness not founded on actual consideration, believed when re- ceived to have been adequate, and no such acknowledgment made for the purpose of being so deducted, shall be considered a debt within the meaning of this section ; and so much only of any liabil- ity, as surety for others, shall be deducted as the person making out the statement believes he is legally and equitably bound, and will be compelled to pay on account of the inability or insolvency of the principal debtor; and if there are other sureties who are able to contribute, then only so much as the surety in whose behalf the statement is made will be bound to contribute ; Provided, that noth- ing in this section shall be so construed as to apply to any bank, company or corporation exercising banking powers or privileges, or to authorize any deductions allowed by this section from the value of any other item of taxation than credits. Liabilities on outstanding beneficiary certificates as computed by standard tables and shown by report of the State insurance superintendent are not deductible liabilities. People vs. Mystic Workers of the World, 270^ — i96. The Illinois Central Eailroad Company is entitled, in listing its property for the purpose of State tax to deduction of bona fide debts from credits listed by it. People vs. Illinois Cent. E. Co., 273—220. Property owners are required to make a statement of their credits and deduc- tions. It is not for them to say the indebtedness equaled or exceeded the credits, and therefore refuse to list credits. Failing to do this, they can- not later enjoin assessment by Board of Eeview of credits omitted in assessments of past years. Peirce vs. Carlock, 224 — 608. The deduction of debts from credits must be done in the manner provided by this section. It is not permitted to say the indebtedness equals or ex- ceeds the credits. Morris vs. Jones, 150 — 542 (1894). Credits are not excluded by section above as an item of assessable property. Griffin vs. Board of Eeview, 184—278. The statute does not allow deductions against tangible property owned by a tax-payer, no matter what may be the character the property. Morris vs. Jones, 150—542 (1894). 57 What debts not deducted.] Section 28. No person, company or corporation shall be entitled to any deduction from the amount of any bonds, stocks, or money loaned, or on account of any bond, note or obligation of any kind, given to any insurance company on account of premiums or policies, nor on account of any unpaid sub- scription to any religious, literary, scientific or charitable institu- tion or society, nor on account of any subscription to or instalment payable on the capital stock of any company, whether incorporated or unincorporated. Deductions verified by oath — perjury — fines — statements preserved.] Section 29. In all cases Avhere deductions are claimed from credits, the assessor shall require that such deductions be veri- fied by the oath of the person, otftcer or agent claiming the same; and any such' person, officer or agent, knowingly or willfully mak- ing a fraudulent statement of such deductions claimed, so verified by affidavit, shall l)e liable to a fine of not less than $100 nor more than .$1,000, in addition to all damages sustained by the state, county, or other local corporation, to be recovered in any proper form of action in any court of competent jurisdiction in the name of the People of the State of Illinois. Such fines when recovered, shall be paid into the county treasury, and the damages, when col- lected, shall be paid to whom they belong. The assessor shall pre- serve the statement of deductions thus claimed, so verified by affi- davit, and when he returns the assessment books shall file the same with the county clerk, to be kept on file in his office for two years, and at the expiration of such time said statement of deductions shall be destroyed by said clerk, l)ut, in the meantime, shall be sub- ject only to 1li(' inspection of the officers charged with the execution of this law. Deductions mu.st bo verified l)y oath. Rcllnis vs. Barrett, 185 — 475. Shares of stock — when and how assessed.] Section 29a. The stockholders of every iMutual Jiuilding, Loan and Homestead Asso- ciation for the j)Ui'i)ose of building and improving homesteads and loaning money to the members thereof only, \\]u'ther such associa- tion is organized under the laws ol" this stale oi' ol' any other state or territory of the United Stales, shall list for taxation with the local assessor where such stockholders reside, the ii inn her of shares of stock of such associalion o\\ iies or otlier pai>ers arc rccjuircd fo lie filed witii, or duty is imposed ujMin or other power vested in either the Auditor of Public Accounts or State Board f)f P^quali/.ntion, such Bclicdule, etc., shall be (INmI, with such duty and power .shall be discharged 1)y tlie Slati' Tax ('uiiimi.ssioii. 72 All real estate denominated "railroad track" is assessable by the State Board of Equalization and all that denominated other than railroad track is assessable by the local assessor. The same real estate may not be assessed by both, however, but the nature of the real estate is not conclusively defined by its designation in the return of the railroad company. The local assessors should assess what is not railroad track and so describe it that the portion assessed by them can be identified. If they assess rail- road track, the assessment is void. I. 0. E. R. Co. vs. Gavins, 238 — 380; P. vs. Ey. Co., 248—532, 539. An assessment of property used as a railroad track by the local township assessor is void, as the exclusive power to assess railroad track and rolling stock of railways is conferred upon the State Board of Equalization. P., D. and E. E. Co. vs. Gear, 118—134. The local assessors are to assess all railway property except rolling stock, track and capital stock, which are to be assessed by State board. C. B. and Q. E. Co. vs. Siders, 88 — 320; Chicago, etc., E. Co., vs. Paddock, 75 —616. No road can complain of the omission from assessment, by State Board of Equalization of certain improvements, for all roads. C, B. and Q. E. Co. vs. Siders, 88—320. Local assessor has no power to assess right of way of railroad company, as such power is in State Board of Equalization. People vs. Wiggins Ferry Co., 257—452. Railroad tax book — Extending and collecting tax.] Section 51. The county clerk shall procure, at the expense of the county, a record book, properly ruled and headed, in which to enter the railroad property of all kinds, as listed for taxation, and shall enter the valuations as assessed, corrected and equalized, in the manner provided by this act ; and against such assessed, corrected or equal- ized valuation, as the case may require, the county clerk shall ex- tend all the taxes thereon for which said property is liable. And at the proper time fixed by this act for delivering tax books to the county collector, the clerk shall attach a warrant, under his seal of office, and deliver said book to the county collector, upon which the said county collector- is hereby required to collect the taxes there charged against railroad property, and pay over and account for the same in the manner provided in other cases. Said book shall be returned by the collector and be filed in the office of the county clerk for future use. If the railroad company returns property as "railroad track" when it should have been returned as "real estate other than denominated railroad track," it is the duty of the local assessor to list and assess such real estate as omitted property. Ey. Co. vs. People, 195 — 184. Warrant is indispensable part of tax books and its absence was ground for enjoining sale for taxes. Eeam vs. Stone, 102 — 359. Description of platted land.] Section 52. When any railroad company shall make or record a plat of any contiguous lots or par- 73 eels of land belonging to it, the same may be described as desig- nated on such plat. Telegraph Companies — Return — Schedule.] Section 53. Any person, company or corporation, using or operating a telegraph line in this state, shall, annuallj^, in the month of I\lay, return to the auditor of public accounts (Tax Commission) a schedule or state- ment, as follows : First — The amount of capital stock authorized, and the number of shares into which such capital stock is divided. Second — The amount of capital stock paid up. Third — The market value, or if no market value, then the actual value of the shares of stock. Fourth — The total amount of all indebtedness, except current expenses, for operating the line. Fifth — The length of the line operated in each county, and the total in the state. Sixth — The total assessed valuation of all its tangible property in this state. Such schedule shall be made in conformity to such instructions and forms as may be prescribed by the auditor of public accounts (Tax Commission), and with reference to amounts and values on Ihe first day of May of the year for which the return is made. Powers and duties conferred on Auditor of Public Accounts to be exercised by Tax Commission. See Note, Sec. 50, supra. Tax Commission to assess — How tax collected.] Section 54. The auditor shall annually, on the meeting of the state board of equalization, lay before said board the statement or schedule herein required to be returned to him; and said board shall assess the cap- ital stock of such telegraph company, in the manner hereinaftei- provided. The tax charged on the capital stock of telegraph com- [)anies shall be placed in the hands of county collectors, in a book provided foi- that purpose, the same as is roqnired for railroad prop- erty, ami tiijiy be included in same book willi railroad property. Powers and duties conferred on State Board of Equalization and Auditor of Public Accounts to be exercised by Tnx Commission. See Note, uikIci- Sof. FyO^ Hiiprn. Office furniture, etc.. how listed and assessed.] Section 55. The office furniture ;iii(l other personal property of telegraph companies sliall be listed jind assessed in the county, town, district, village oi' city where the same is used or kept. Penalty for false schedules, etc.] Section 56. If any person (w corporation sliall give a false or fraudulent list, scheduh^ or state- ment, required l)y this act, or shall l';iil or refuse to deliver to the 74 assessor, when called on for that purpose, a list oi" the taxal)le per- sonal property which he is required to list under this act, he or it shall be liable to a penalty of not less than !i^l() nor more than $2,000, to be recovered in any proper form of action, in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, on the complaint of any person. Such fine, when collected, to be paid into the county treasury. Perjury.] Section 57. Whoever shall willfully make a false list, schedule or statement, under oath, shall, in addition to the penalty provided in the preceding section, be liable as in the case of perjury. Real property — As of what time listed — Who liable for tax — Listed May 1st.] Section 58. All real property in this state, sub- ject to taxation under this act, including real estate becoming tax- able for the first time, shall be listed to the owners thereof, by such owners, their agents, county clerks or assessors, or the county board, and assessed for the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one, and yearly thereafter, with reference to the amount owned on the first day of May in each year, including all property purchased on that day : Provided, that no assessment of real prop- erty shall be considered as illegal by reason of the same not being listed or assessed in the name of the owners thereof. [As amended by act approved June 2, 1881. In force July 1, 1881. L. 1881, p. 133.] See Sections 7-9, 53 Revenue Act of 1898, post. Disconnected tracts of land cannot be listed together, but they should be listed separately; however, listing in smallest legal subdivisions is not required. Spellman vs. Curtenius, 12 — 409. The tax list need not give name of property owner. Zeigler vs. P., 164 — 532. Owner on 1st May liable.] Section 59. The owner of property on the first day of May in any year, shall be liable for the taxes of that year. The purchaser of property on the first day of May shall be considered as the owner on that day. See Sections 7-9, 53 Rev- enue Act of 1898, post. Leasehold interest in exempted lands.] Section 60. When real estate, which is exempt from taxation, is leased to another whose property is not exempt, and the leasing of which does not make the real estate taxable, the leasebold estate and the appurtenances shall be listed as the property of the lessee thereof, or his assignee, as real estate. Under this section, the leasehold interest the Illinois Central Eailroad con- veyed by lease became taxable as real estate in the possession of the lessee. People vs. Salt Co., 233—223. When certain lands become taxable.] Section 61. Government lands entered or located on or prior to the first day of May, shall be taxable for that year, and annually thereafter. School lands and ^5 lots sold shall be taxable in like manner as government lands. Lands and lots sold by the trustees of the Illinois and Michigan Canal shall be taxable from and after the time the full payment therefor is made. Illinois Central railroad lands and lots shall be taxable from and after the time the last payment becomes due. Swamp lands and lots shall become taxable whenever the county sells, con- veys, or agrees to convey its title: Provided, that canal, Illinois Central railroad and swamp lands and lots shall be, in other re- spects, governed, as to the time of becoming taxable, the same as government lands. See Sections 7-9, 53 Revenue Act of- 1898, post. Subdividing — Owner to plat — Record — Description — Un- paid taxes or special assessments.] Section 62. In all cases where any tract or lot of land is divided in parcels, so that it cannot be de- scribed without describing it by metes and bounds, it shall be the duty of the owner to cause such land to be surveyed and platted into lots. Such plat shall be certified and recorded. The descrip- tion of real estate, in accordance with the number and descrip- tion set forth in the plat, aforesaid, shall be deemed a good and valid description of the lot or parcel of land so described: Provided, that hereafter no new subdivision of any tract of land, lots or blocks shall be approved by a city, town, incorporated town or village of- ficer, unless all redeemable sales for unpaid taxes or special assess- ments have been redeemed and all forfeited taxes or special assess- ments have been paid as required by law and before any recorder of deeds, files and records or any city, town, incorporated town or vil- lage ofificer in charge of'such matters approves any plat or new sub- division, vacation, or dedication submitted, he shall require that a statement from the county clerk be endorsed upon any such pro- posed plat of new subdivision, vacation or dedication to the effect that the county clerk finds no reasonable tax sales or unpaid for- feited taxes against any of the real estate included in such plat. [An amended by act approved June 29, 1915. L. 1915, p. 575. The proviso of 1915 to Sec. 62 does not apply to plats submitted for approval before the proviso took efTect. I'eople vs. M:issiy the county board at any suHRO(|uent meeting thereof, is herel)y dcclai-ed legal and valid, and the taxes extended thereon shall be and remain a lion on the pr'operty against which they are extended, to the same extent as if such eciualization and action upon complaint had been had and taken on the second Monday in July. AVhereas, In some of the counties of this state, it was iiiipossil»le to e(iualize all the assessments and act upon the eomidaints of low assessment at the meeting heretofore designnlcd hy law, nud there- fore an emergency exisis to hn;iii/(. (.(|ii;ili/,a1 ions hciclofore made; this act shall take effect ;iiixcept that the amount collected by such deputy shall l)e paid to the col- 110 lector, who shall pay the same over to the proper offieer or persons. Manner in which taxes are to be collected — Kind of funds. | Section 154. The county revenue sliall be collected in gold and sil- ver coin, United States legal tender notes, current national bank notes, county orders and jury certificates, and in no other currency. The revenue for state purposes shall be collected in gold and silver coin, United States legal tender notes, current national bank notes and auditors' warrants, and in no other currency. The revenue for city purposes shall be collected in gold and silver coin, United States legal tender notes, current national bank notes, city comptrollers', city auditors' or city clerks' warrants or orders on the city treas- urer, and in no other currency. State taxes levied for any special purpose, other than to defray the ordinary expenses of the state government, shall be collected in gold and silver coin, United States legal tender notes, current national bank notes and in no other cur- rency. All other taxes shall be collected in gold and silver coin. United States legal tender notes and in current national bank notes, and in no other currency unless otherwise specially provided for, [As amended by act approved May 25, 1877. In force July 1, 1877. L. 1877, p. 171.] How collection made.] Section 155. Every town collector, and every county collector, in cases where there is no town collector, upon receiving the tax book or tax books, shall proceed to collect the taxes mentioned herein : Provided, that it shall be the duty of every county collector to prepare tax receipts in triplicate for all taxes assessed, which shall be filled out in accordance with the re- quirements of section 163 of this Act, one copy which shall be mailed by such collector at least thirty days prior to the date upon which unpaid real estate taxes become delinquent, to the owner of the property taxed, or to the person in whose name sach property is taxed, another copy of which shall be used by said collector in re- ceipting for the tax paid, and the remaining copy thereof to be re- tained by such collector. Provided, further, that there shall be printed upon each such receipt, or upon a separate slip which shall be mailed to each person assessed with the copy of the receipt here- inabove provided, a statement of the rates of the various taxes and the total tax rate. Provided, also, that the failure or neglect of the collector to mail such receipt, or the failure of the taxpayer to re- ceive the same, shall not atfect the validity of any tax, or the liability for the payment thereof. [As amended by act approved June 28, 1919. L. 1919, p. 765.] Ill Collector cannot levy on personalty to collect tax on realty. And payment of taxes under threat of sale of realty is not duress. Conkling vs. City of Springfield, 132—420. City council may not authorize payment of taxes in any funds differing from those provided by statute. Conkling vs. City of Springfield, 132 — 420. Amount of tax voluntarily paid cannot be credited on other taxes though the paid taxes was invalid. People (ex rel.) vs. Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co., 247—340, 345. Distress for taxes.] Section 156. In case any person, company or corporation shall refuse or neglect to pay the taxes imposed on him or them, when demanded, it shall be the duty of the collector to levy the same, together with the costs and charges that may ac- crue, by distress and sale of the personal property of the person, company or corporation who ought to pay the same. [Confined to personal property by Section 137. J Sale of property distrained — Surplus.] Section 157. The col- lector shall give public notice of the time and place of sale, and of the property to be sold, with the name of the delinquent, at least five days previous to the day of sale, by advertisements, to be posted up in at least three public places in the town or district where such sale is to be made. Such sale shall be by public auction, and, if practicable, no more property shall be sold than sufficient to pay the tax, costs and charges due. If the property distrained shall be sold for more than the amount of the taxes and charges due, the surplus shall be returned to the person in whose possession such property was when the distress was made, if no claim be made to such sur- plus by any other person. Tl" any other person shall claim such sui-plus, on the ground that the property sold belonged to him, and such claim be admitted by the person for whose tax the same was distrained, the surplus shall be paid to such owner. Removal within county.] Section 158. Tn case any person against whom a lax shall be assessed, under the provisions of this act, shall have icinoved from one town or district to another town or district in the same county without paying such tax, it shall be lawful for the collector having the tax books in which such tax is charged, to levy and collect such tax of the goods and chattels of the person assessed, in any town or district williin said county to which such person shall have removed, <>r rtoin pi-dpcil y of sueli person wherever the same may be found in said county. Fees on distraint.] Section 15f). In levying on and selling per- sonal property for taxes, the collector shall be governed by the same rules and be entitled to the same fees as constables arc or may be 112 for like services on executions; but in no case shall any collector eharo'c niilca^-e, unless he is compelled lo distrain property. Removal from county.] Section 160. In case any person against whom taxes have been levied, under the revenue laws of this state, in any county, town, city or district of this state, shall have removed from such county, town, city or district, after such assessment has been made, and before the collection of the same, the county clerk, when directed by the county board, shall issue a warrant under his hand and seal of office, directed to any sherifP, coroner or constable of the county, town, city or district to which such person may have removed, commanding such officer to whom the warrant may be directed to make the amount of such tax, to- gether with the costs and charges that may accrue, from the per- sonal property of the person owing such tax — distraint and sale of property under this section to be in the same manner as provided in this act for other cases of distraint and sale of personal prop- erty. The taxes which may be collected under this section shall be disposed of in the manner required by this act with respect to taxes collected in any other maimer. All other parts of this act providing for cases of failure of officers to pay over taxes, shall apply to all officers, collecting taxes under this section, who fail to pay over and correctly account at the proper time and manner for the taxes collected by them. Collection after return of county collector.] Section 161. The power and duty to levy and collect any tax due and unpaid, shall continue in and devolve upon the county collector and his successors in office, after his return and final settlement until the tax is paid ; and the warrant attached to the collector's book, shall continue in force and confer authority upon the collector to whom the same was issued, and upon his successors in office, to collect any tax due and uncollected thereon, although such books may have been returned, or the tax carried forward into any other book. This section shall apply to all collectors' books and tax warrants heretofore issued, upon which taxes may be due and unpaid, as well as those hereafter is- sued. [As amended by act approved May 29, 1879. In force July 1, 1879. L. 1879, p. 246.] Payment on part of tract — Undivided interest.] Section 162. The collector shall receive taxes on part of any lot, piece or parcel of land charged with taxes, when a particular specification of the part is furnished. If the tax on the remainder of such lot or parcel of land shall remain unpaid, the collector shall enter such specifica- tion in his return, so that the part on which the tax remains unpaid . 113 may be clearly known. The tax may be paid on an undivided share of real estate. In such case the collector shall designate on his record upon whose undivided share the tax has been paid. Owner of undivided interest in land may protect Ms interest by paying tax thereon, and need not also protect other interests. Le Moyne vs. Harding, 132—23; Lawrence vs. Miller, 86—502. Section will not be enforced to aid a scheme to enable owner of some 1,500 lots to avoid payment of taxes thereon by conveying undivided interests therein, ranging from a 1/50 to a 1/5000 part, to deter bidder at tax sales from buying the lots because of existence of such undivided interests. Glos vs. Stuckart, 277 — 346. Section has no application to proceeding in equity to foreclose a tax lien on property forfeited to the State. People vs. Cant, 260 — 497. Entry of payment — Receipt — Evidence — Name, etc., of owner.] Section 163. Whenever any person shall pay the taxes charged on any property, the collector shall enter such payment in his book, and give a receipt therefor, specifying for whom paid, the amount paid, what year paid for, and the property and value thereof on which the same was paid, according to its description in the collector's books, in whole or in part of such description, as the case may be ; and such entry and receipt shall bear the genuine signature of the collector or his deputy receiving such payment; and whenever it shall appear that any receipt for the payment of taxes shall be lost or destroyed, the entry so made may be read in evidence in lieu thereof. The collector shall enter the name of the owner, or the per- son paying tax, opposite each tract or lot of land, when he collects the tax thereon, and the post-office address of the person paying such tax. [As amended by act approved June 2, 1881. In force July 1, 1881. L. 1881, p. 136.] Sworn statements of collections to be made — Payments — Thirty day settlements with cities, etc.] Section 164. Town and district •■ollectors .shall, every thirty days, when required so to do by the proper authorities of incorporated towns, cities and villages, road and school districts, for which any tax is collected, render to said authorities a statement of the amount of each kind of tax collected for the same, and at the same time pay over to such authorities the amount so shown to be collected. [As amended by act approved May 3, 1873.] Thirty day settlements with county collector.] Section 165. Such town and distiict collectors shall, every thirty days, render a similar account of the taxes payable to the state treasury, and of the county taxes, to the county collector, and at the same time pay over the amount of such taxes to said county collector. 114 Local taxes to be paid over, etc.] Section 166. Said town and district collectors shall pay over the town, road, school and other local taxes, as may be directed in the warrant attached to the col- lector's book. Final settlement for local taxes before return.] Section 167. Each town and district collector shall make final settlement for the township, district, city, village and town taxes, charged in the tax books, at or before the time fixed in this act for paying over and making final settlement for state and county taxes collected by them. In such settlements, said collectors shall be entitled to credit for the amount of their commissions on the amount collected, and for the amount uncollected on the tax books, as may be determined by the settlement with the county collector. Duplicate receipts.] Section 168. The officer to whom any such moneys may be paid, under the preceding sections, shall deliver to the collector duplicate receipts therefor. Return of town and district collectors to the county collector — When return made.] Section 169. Town and district collectors shall return the tax books and make final settlement for the amount of taxes placed in their hands for collection, on or before the tenth day of March next after receiving the tax books : Provided, that the county collector may first notify in writing, the several town or dis- trict collectors upon what day, within twenty days after the tenth day of March they shall appear at his office to make final settlement, and at the time of making return to the county collector, each town or district collector in counties under township organization, shall make out and deliver to the county collector a detailed statement, in writing of the amount of taxes he has been unable to collect on real estate and from persons charged with personal property taxes, which statement shall show each kind of tax, the same as in the tax book delivered to him by the county clerk, and shall show the number of the page of the tax book and the number of the line of the page on which the item appears to be delinquent, and in case where no taxes have been paid -on any one page on the collector's book, the page footings of the taxes on such page may be copied into such state- ment. It shall not be necessary to give in the statement the descrip- tion of the real property delinquent, nor the names of the owners thereof, nor the names of the persons delinquent for personal prop- erty taxes. The town or district collector shall add up the delin- quent taxes in said statement and make a summary thereof, setting forth the aggregate amount of each kind of tax and the total de- 115 linquent, in the same manner as in his warrant, and shall make oath that said statement is true and correct. [As amended by act ap- proved and in force May 31, 1881. L. 1881, p. 131.] This confers authority upon the county collector to fix upon any day lie may determine, within twenty days of the lOtli day of March, upon which he will require the town collector to return his tax book and settle, and the town collector must obey on receiving his notice. Moeing vs. People, 138—513. The return of county collector is prima facie evidence of legality of personal tax, as where the residence of owner is questioned. Mahany vs. P., 138 — 311 (1891). Collector's sworn return is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated, as that the tax was due and unpaid. Karnes vs. P., 73 — 274. Form of return as to personal tax.] Section 170. If any town or district collector shall be unable to collect any tax on personal property, charged in the tax book, by reason of the removal or in- solvency of the person to whom said tax is charged, or on account of any error in the tax book, he shall, at the time of returning his book to the county collector, note, in writing, opposite the name of each person charged with such tax, the cause of failure to collect the same, and shall make oath that the cause of delinquency or error noted is true and correct, and that such sums remain due and unpaid, and that he has used due diligence to collect the same, which affidavit shall be entered upon said collector's book, and be signed by the town or district collector. [As amended by act ap- proved May 29, 1879. Tn force July 1, 1879. L. 1879, p. 247.] Cicneral aflidavit pasted in back of collector's book is not sufficient to satisfy requirement relative to charging personal property tax upon land, where there is no notation in the book opposite name of person charged with tax and there is no statement in affidavit that causes of delinquency is true and correct. People vs. Scheiflcy, 252 — 48fi, 490. The collector should enter on record "the causes of failure to collect the same" to show that personal property taxes arc delinquent. Insolvency of a party owing a i)ersonal tax is not a prerequisite for charging taxes upon his land. Shelbyvillc Water Co. vs. P., 140—545 (1892). Under former statute, the oath of town colli'ctor to his return of delinquent list' was indispensable to validity of proceedings, and where the statute re- quired oath before county treasurer, oath before county cleik was in.sufH- cient. Hough vs. Ila-stings, 18 — 312. Credits, etc.] Section 171. Upon the filing of said l)ook, the county Ci.llector shall all )w the town or district collector credit for the amount of taxes 1 herein stated to be unpaid, ami sliall credit the same to the sciveral funds for which said tax was charged. ^Vlu'n the county collector makes settlement with the county board, such statements shall l)e sufficient voucher to entitle him to credit for the 116 amount therein stated, less such amount thereof if any, that may have been collected by him. In no case shall any town or district collector, or county collector, be entitled to abatements for personal property tax until the statement and affidavit are filed. [As amended by act approved May 29, 1879. In force July 1, 1879. L. 1879, p. 247.] Form of return as to real estate.] Section 172. Each town or district collector, at the time of returning his tax book to the county collector, shall make affidavit, to be entered upon such book and subscribed by the collector, that the taxes charged against each tract or lot, or assessment of personal property remain due and unpaid at the date of making such affidavit in each case where there does not appear in the proper column the amount of such taxes as having been paid to such collector, and the date of payment and the name of any person as having paid the same ; which affidavit shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. [As amended by act approved May 29, 1879. In force July 1, 1879. L. 1879, p. 247.] The collector's report is prima facie evidence of legality of the tax. Pike vs. P., 84—80. To note what personal tax can be collected from real estate.] Section 173. Each town or district collector shall particularly note, in his returns to the county collector, all cases of personal property tax that he was unable to collect, which can be made from real es- tate of the persons owing such tax. Suit on bond.] Section 174. If the town or district collector shall forthwith cause the bond of such collector to be put in suit, amount in his hands, when required in this act, the county collector shall forthwith cause the bond of such collector to be put in suit, and recovery may be had thereon for the sum due, for all taxes and special assessments, and twenty-five per cent, thereon as damages, with costs of suit. Satisfaction piece.] Section 175. Upon the final settlement of the amount of taxes directed to be collected by any collector, in any of the towns or districts in this state, the county collector shall, if requested, give to such collector, or any of his securities, a satisfac- tion piece in writing. Satisfaction piece may be recorded — Effect.] Section 176. Such satisfaction piece may be recorded in the recorder's office, and when so recorded shall operate as a discharge of the securities and iJ7 the lien upon the property of the collector, except as to all suits commenced upon such bond within three years after the recording of the same. Delinquent defined.] Section 177. All real estate upon which taxes remain due and unpaid on the tenth day of March, annually, or at the time the town or district collector makes return of his books to the county collector, shall be deemed delinquent; and all such due and unpaid taxes shall bear interest after the first day of ]May at the rate of one per cent, per month until paid or forfeited; parts or fraotions of a month shall be reckoned as a month. And all such collections on account of interest shall be paid into the county treasury to be used for county purposes. [As amended by act approved May 29, 1879. In force July 1, 1879. L. 1879, p. 253.] "Delinquent taxes of 1903" meant taxes levied in 1902, not paid within the time specified in the statute. E. E. Co. vs. People, 207 — 312. One per cent, per month is prospective only. It is not in conflict with Consti- tuition, Art. 4, Sec. 22, which prohibits passage of special law regarding in- ■ terest on money. P. vs. Peacock, 98 — 172. This section, as amended by Act of 1879, has no application to taxes assessed and levied before amendatory Act took effect. P. vs. Thatcher, 95 — 109. Penalties should not be added to taxes the treasurer refuses to accept. People vs. Ey. T. Co., 270-477. Section does not require amount of penalty to be stated in delincjucnt list prior to judgment. People vs. Wabash E. Co., 282-218. Return of delinquent special assessment — To county collector — His duties — Transfer of amounts — Proviso as to certain cities.] Section 178. When an special assessment made by any city, town or village, pursuant to its charter, or by any corporate authori- ties, commissionei'S or persons, pursuant to law, remain unpaid in whole or in part, return thereof shall be made to the county col- lector on or before the tenth day of ^Nlarcli next after the same shall have become payable in like foniis as returns are made for delinquent land tax : Provided, that in cities having a population of one hundred thousand or more by the last preceding census of the United States or of this State such retuiii may be made on or before the first day of August for all such special assessments which remain uni)aipear. In this respect there is no differ- ence V)otween speeial assessments and other taxes authorizd by law. P. vs. Givens, 12.3—352; People vs. E. Co., 249—100. On application for judgment for taxes, a prima facie case is made by the col- Ir-ctor'a sworn n-jiDrt of lielinquent lands, together with proof of publi- cation thereof anfccts in tlic jiublication of (lie (li'liiKniciM list ;ni(i the notice of ap|)licati of iii()|icrty owner. Ziegler vs. P., 164 — 532. 16. Power to correct informality and power to allow amendments: Errors or informalities in the proceedings of officers connected witli the assess- ment, levy or collecting of a tax, not affecting the substantial justice of the tax itself, will not vitiate. P., D. and E. R. Co. vs. P., 141—483 (1892). Where back taxes amounting to $7.94 \\ere carried forward as nmouMting to $7.95, the mistake is cured hereunder. Il.ininiond vs. Carter, 155 — 579 (1895). Where actually voted at meeting, a failure of school officers to sign certificate of levy of school tax is not fatal, and tho defect may be afterwards rem- edied. Spring Valley Coal Co. vs. P., 157—543 (1895). 138 Invgularitios, informalities, omissions and defoctive acts of officers in the assessment, levy, etc., of taxes, not affecting the substantial justice of the tax itself, will not vitiate the proceedings, and the court, in its discretion, may correct the proceedings, supply defects therein and make them con- form to law, or permit the same to be done in the presence of the court, by the officer through whose neglect or default the same was occasioned. P. vs. Smith, 149— .549 (1894). Irregularities in levy of town tax held cured ])y tliis section. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. vs. P., 147—9 (1893). Where the year for which tax is levied is erroneously recited as the subsequent years in appropriation ordinance, it is mere informality. P. vs. E. Co., 189—398. Failure to furnish to the county clerk a plat properly certified was not fatal, as that was directory only, to aid the clerk to extend the tax, and cured hereby. Munson vs. Minor, 22 — 595. Omission to tax certain other property will not invalidate taxes levied on other property, and no ground for injunction. Du Page County vs. Jenks, 65 — • 275; Spencer vs. Gardner, 08—510; C, B. and Q. R. Co. vs. Siders, 88-320'; Huck vs. C. and A. R. Co., 86—352. Irregularities in appointment of assessor; appointment of one non-resident of town as assessor; omission of certain property from tax will not invalidate tax. Du Page County vs. Jenks, 65 — 275. Objection that local taxes were not levied and returned to clerk in time will not avail as to taxes levied since Act of 1873 took effect. Buck vs. P., 78—560; Chiniquy vs. P., 78—570. Omission of collector and county clerk to compare and correct list, and of collector to file affidavit on first day of term at which application for judgment is made, will not vitiate tax. Chiniquy vs. P., 78—570'. Failure of clerk to extend road tax in separate columns on collector's book does not render tax invalid. Thatcher vs. People, 79' — 597. Collection of tax on exempt property enjoined. But not of tax on aggregate valuation, because exempted property included, as that mere irregularity. Huck vs. C. and A. R. Co., 86—352. Errors and informalities in proceedings, not affecting substantial justice, are cured hereby, and do not invalidate levy or assessment. Edwards vs. P., 88—340; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. vs. Surrell, 88—535. Where name was Jacques Bros. & Co. and assessed as C. M. Jacques & Co., the mistake will not vitiate tax. Lyle vs. Jacques, 101 — 644. It is an immaterial informality that the local assessor, assessing railway prop- erty which corporation has omitted to list, lists it upon his general assess- ment roll, instead of upon blanks furnished by county clerk. Wabash, etc., R. Co. vs. Johnson, 108 — 11. The fact that various taxes against a railroad company were calculated upon the aggregate value of "railroad track" and "rolling stock" is a mere irregularity, not affecting the substantial justice of the taxes or increasing their amount, and does not vitiate the assessment. Cairo, etc., R. Co. vs. Mathews, 152—153 (1894). While an ordinance levying a tax should state in express terms the purposes for which appropriations are made, yet it was sufficient if the tax levy 139 ordinance referred to the appropriation ordinance for the objects and purposes of the tax. Spring Valley Coal Co. vs. P., 15" — .3-13 (1895); K. K. Co. vs. People, 218—463. Objection which does not go to substantial justice of the tax cannot be availed of on application for judgment, as where the town auditors did not certify the claims allowed against the town to the town clerk until after time at which he was required to certify them to the county clerk. R. Co. vs. P., 190—26. Equity wiU not restrain collection of tax merely because of assessment of corporate property under slightly erroneous name, as where A. Booth & Co., was the correct name and the book showed A. Booth Packing Company, and before the board of review, the owner of name treated the incorrect name as its name. Booth & Co. vs. Raymond, 191 — 355. Failure to specifically designate the personal property constituting the assess- ment did not vitiate the assessment. King vs. P., 193 — 533. The mere fact that it was not shown that the certificate of levy of the highway commissioners was handed to the supervisor five days before the meeting, does not invalidate the tax; nor docs the fact that it was presented to the board by the county clerk instead of the supervisor, so long as the tax was extended by authority of the board. People vs. R. R. Co., 214 — 190; People vs. R. Co., 25(3—280. Stating the name "The Board of West Park Commissioners" instead of "The Board of West Chicago Park Commissioners," is cured hereunder. Cunimings vs. People, 213 — 443. Such judgment cannot be collaterally impeached for mere matters of form. Chestnut vs. Marsh, 12—173. Variance of a quarter of a cent in amount of judgment named in deed from that of record of judgment will not vitiate. Jackson vs. Cunimings, 15—449. Ownership is admitted in a proceeding for judgment for delinquent town, road and bridge, and city taxes, where the State and county taxes on the same property had been paid by the same tax-payer. Ellis vs. People, 199—548. ^^ judgment for a delinquent special assessment is not invalidated because of an evident mistake in the published list, Avhcic the land owner is not misled, and the warrant was correctly described. Young vs. P., 155 — 247 (1895). If paper transmitted by town clerk to county clerk purports to be a copy of original certificate of highway commissioners the county clerk may extend the tax even though copy is irregular or informal. I'eople vs. Co., 248 — 36; I'eoplo v.s. Patten, 287— ;i92. Failure of proper canvassing board tn canvas return of hard roads election is not fatal to tax where there is no question but vote was in favor of tax. People vs. Green, 265 — 39. Amendinonts arc allowed with greater lilx-rality and may i)ropi'rly be allowed where there has been an attempt to comply with the law and the attempt is ineffective on account of some informality or clerical error, but they cannot Ite allowed where they add matter which is o.s.sential as a basis for the levy of the tax. People vs. R. Co., 260 — 624. Wlwre levy for county purpo.HOH is invalid because it docs not coni[)ly with rc(|uirementH as to stating several purposes for wliicli aminiiit were levied 140 it is not aided by fact board at regular meeting in June adopted a reso- lution amending levy by amplifying the insufficient descriptions of such items. People vs. R. Co., 261—70. The extension of a tax upon a certificate of levy made after first Tuesday in Soptoniber as required bj' Eoatls and Bridges Law of 1913 is invalid and such eiMtilicate cannot be considered as an amendment of a previous certificate made in compliance with sections 13 and 14 of Roads and Bridges law as it existed prior to the new law of 1913. People vs. R. Co., 269—513. Allowance of amendment to objections and leave to file additional objections are within discretion of county, and its action in that regard will not be reviewed unless there is an abuse of discretion. People vs. Huey, 277 — 561. Report of special assessment collector required to be made before April 1st by sec. 65 of Local Improvement act may be amended on collector's applica- tion for judgment, notwithstanding made after April 1. People vs. Moench Estate, 277—121. The right of highway commissioners or county board to amend their records does not depend on section 191. People vs. R. Co., 271 — 195; People vs. Ross, 272-285. Miscellaneous: But proceedings prior to judgment not invalidated by failure of judgment to find sums due. Chickering vs. Faile, 38 — 342. Where tax judgment record book shows that county judge was present, that judicial business was done, adjournment and reassembly of court, and that record of its proceedings was kept, it is enough although formal pracita or convening order is absent. Neff vs. Smyth, 111 — 100. Amendments which may be made: Certificate of levy is amenable. Keokuk Bridge Co. vs. P., 161 — 144. An amendment of the certificate of levy may be made, where the levy was valid for the purpose authorized by law and in substantial compliance with the law, but defective in matters of form. People vs. R. R. Co., 242—515. The County Court should permit amendment of objections to a tax, where such amendments contained no matter which could have surprised the people. Ry. Co. vs. People, 214 — 471. This section permits amendments to be made in judicial proceedings for the collection of taxes and under that the record of the highway commissioners might be amended to state the true action taken by the commissioners at the meeting. It was also proper to permit the certificate levying said road tax to be amended to correspond with said record. Ry Co. vs. People, 212—518; People vs. IlUnois Cent. R. Co., 271—213, 215. The court may amend the record on oral testimony of the clerk that he made a mistake in recording the date of the meeting. Ry. Co. vs. People, 207—566. An objection to a tax levy may be amended at the trial, so long as it would work no surprise to the other party. R. R. Co. vs. People, 207 — '312; People vs. R. Co., 281—500. Where the record of the proceedings of the town meeting set out that taxes • were levied for "town purposes," and as a matter of fact the proceedings set out definitely the particular purposes, the record may be amended 141 upon parol proof, but such proof must be clear. Ey. Co. vs. People, 206—565. It is proper to amend a certificate of tax levy, making it conform to what actually took place at the board meeting. Ey. Co. vs. People, 201 — 351; People vs. E. Co., 271—215. Eeturn of collector as to delinquent taxes may be amended to show cause of failure to collect personal taxes. Shclbyville Water Co. vs. P., 140 — 545 (1892). Minutes of town meeting are amendable. E. Co. vs. P., 174 — 84. It is proper to add file-mark of clerk upon published delinquent list, where it is absent, if it appears that book containing the list was delivered to the clerk of the county court within the time required by law. McChesney vs. P., 178—544. Published certificate to delinquent list is amendable, while application for judgment is still pending. McChesney vs. P., 178 — 544. Amendment of its records by a county board nunc pro tunc so as to supply omitted entry of actual levy of road tax, the amendment being before the delivery of the tax books, does not invalidate such tax, the informality being cured by this section. O. and M. E. Co. vs. P., 119 — 207. Where the complainant's property was the N. i^ of S. % of S. W. ^4 and the assessment was of N. ^2 of S. i^ of S. W. V^, a certain amount, and also the S. 14 of S. W. Vi, the same amount; being an enor in the latter description an amendment of description in assessment held proper, under statute. Waich vs. P., 79 — 521. Description by which property is assessed is amendable. Keokuk Bridge Co. vs. P., 161—141. Parol evidence is competent upon application for judgment to aid publisher's certificate. McChesney vs. P., 178 — 545. Amendments may be made where mere clerical errors. Lehmer vs. Miller, 80—601. Where agreement between parties was that judgment be entered for two-thirds of amount of taxes for certain years and for some reason it was not so entered, judgment may be amended at subsequent term nunc pro tunc, so as to show what was done. P. vs. Quick, 92 — 580. Amendment after tei-m must be upon something in the record to amend by. Filling blanks for amounts in record of judgment for taxes not permissible after term. Frew vs. Danforth, 126—242. If bonds of a town have been allowed and a valid levy made to pay the same, but certificate of town clerk erroneously states as its basis action of electors at town meeting instead of ccrtilicate of board of auditors, such certificate may be amended to show facts. People vs. E. Co., 248 — 126, 129. Error in certificate as to date of meeting of highway commissioners may be cured by amendment. l'c court cannot amend classification roll or make a classification if no classification has been made. People vs. Chicago & I. Trac. Co., 267 — 510. Cortificatc of levy may be amended to show the year from which tax is levied. People vs. E. Co., 273—110. 142 Leave to amend roconl to yliow highway commissioners held a meeting on first Tuesday in Soptcmbor, at which the amount required for road and bridges was determined hold proper where testimony shows meeting was held. People vs. 0. & A. R. Co., 274—120!). Record of highway commissioners may be amended by oral testimony, upon clear proof of the fact to show that amount of road tax was determined. People vs. Illinois C. R. Co., 271—213. Copy of special assessment roll attached to collector's warrant cannot be amended to correspond with original roll by supplying words "dollars and cents" at head of columns and inserting dollar sign and decimal point in their proper place. People vs. Brown, 261—73. The delinquent road list not sworn to as required by sec. 110 of Roads and Bridges act cannot be amended on application for judgment. People vs. Chicago & lU. Midland R. Co., 260—624. Irregularities which could not b© cured: Amendment cannot be made by virtue of section above where there is nothing upon which to base it. Where the city collector did not have warrants certified by city clerk, there was nothing on which to base amendment, as no warrant. Craig vs. P., 193 — '202. Commissioners of highways can only act in the manner and at the time specified by the statute, and their acts performed at any other time are invalid; but if they meet they may lawfully adjourn a meeting held on a proper day. Ry. Co. vs. People, 201—351. Under Sec. 119 of Road and Bridge act, the certificate is not required to state the amount for each purpose. But the town levy must do so, and failure so to do is not cured by amendment as the defect here&n is more than formal. R. R. Co. vs. People, 213—174. Application of section above does not render proceeding valid which was void ab initio. Holding a meeting of highway commissioners nearly a month earlier than provided by law (Sec. 13, Chap. 121) is a defect not cured by this section. R. Co. vs. P., 193—598. Where certain property was used at least in part, for right of way purposes and was returned by owner as "railroad track" and assessed by the State Board of Equalization, and was also assessed for that year by the local assessor, and on the latter taxes application for judgment made by the local assessor, the County Court cannot apportion the taxes of the local assessor's assessment by deducting from the assessment made by him the proportion of the property which it deemed was assessable as ' ' rail- road track" as that is the assessor's duty. Wabash R. R. Co. vs. People, 196—606. This section does not dispense with the necessity of the levy of the tax by the municipality authorized by law to levy the same, and it docs not authorize, as corrections and amendments, such acts as would vitalize a levy void ab initio. P. vs. Smith, 149—549 (1894). The certificate not filed as required by Sec. 122, supra, is not cured', hereby. Gage vs. Nichols, 135—128 (1890). If land is misdescribed in delinquent list and notice of application for judg- ment, court has no jurisdiction to render judgment against land even on personal appearance of owner. P. vs. Dragstran, 100 — 286. 143 Appearance and defense by land-owner does not make proceeding in personam, and no personal judgment can bo rendered though appearance waives defects in notice of application. P. vs. Dragstran, 100 — 286. A judgment of land for non-payment of taxes, in which only figures are used to designate the amount, and with no dollar mark or other definite means of determining w-hether the figure stand for dollars, cents or mills, is void. Potvin vs. Oades, 45 — 366. This does not go to extent of allowing court to levy tax where none was levied by the proper officers. Holland vs. P., 189 — 351. Failure of town clerk to transmit to county clerk anything purporting to be a copy of certificate of levy is not a mere irregularity or omission but is fatal. People vs. R. Co., 248—36. Failure to comply with statutory regulation in levy of a tax is not su mere in-egularitj' but a fatal omission which vitiates the tax. People vs. McElroy, 248—574, 577. In General: A. How far overvaluation is a defence to judgment: A voluntary list of property returned by a tax-payer will not be corrected on his application in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake. Dennison vs. County Commissioners, 153 — 516 (1894); People vs. Illinois C. R. Co., 273—220, 260. Overvaluation of property by assessor where not fraudulent will not be recti- fied on application for judgment against the property. Spring Valley Coal Co. vs. P., 157—543 (1895). Mere over-valuation does not, in itself establish fraud in assessment. Keokuk Bridge Co. vs. P., 176—268; P. vs. Banking Ass'n, 245—522; Bank vs. Holmes, 246—362; Sanitary Dist. vs. Gifford, 257—424; P. vs. Ey Co., 286—576. Value of bridge is not conclusively determined by original cost, or by opinions as to what it would cost to constriict it at time of assessment. Assessor need not employ bridge experts for the purpose of ascertaining value of bridge. Information may be sought by assessor from any person or persons before passing judgment ujion question of value. Experts need not be employed by assessors to determine value of property subject to assess- ment. "There is no authority in the County Court ui>on application of judgment, to either grant relief or refuse judgment unless it was made apparent that there was fraud in the making of the assessment. Keokuk Bridge Co. vs. P., ] 61-5] 4. On application for judgment against jnoiierty for taxes, a court cannot review the fjuestion of overvaluation of property, even though there was a mistake, except only, where the oflicers who made and reviewed the assessments, were actuated by wrongful or malicious motives, so as to result in fraud. People vs. Bourne, 242—61; Sanitary Dist. vs. GifTord, 257 — 424, 430; People vs. R. Co., 286—576. Asse.ssment though unequal as compared with that imposed upon other prop- erty owners, is binding in absence f)f fraud. Keokuk Bridge Co. vs. P., 161-514. Illegality of tax in entirety, if sustained, will defeat application tor judgment. Fraud must be- actually proved. Clement vs. P., 177 — 145. V.'iriance Vietwi^en delinquent list and advertisement, consisting in the ono giving name of owner as "Chesney," and the otiier giving such name as H4 1 1 'A. B. McChcsney, " is fatal, if properly availed of, -n'hero the collector knows the name of the owner as that would amount to fraud. McChesney vs. P., 178—546. To avoid tax for overvaluation it must have been fraudulent, and fraud is never presumed. Spring Valley Coal Co. vs. P., 157 — 543 (1895). Denial by collector of right to inspect record, does not defeat application for judgment of sale; must show fraudulent overvaluation. McChesney vs. P., 178—548. A tax-payer is not excused from taxes, because too much was levied and the commissioners already have more than is needed. Ey. Co, vs. People, 214—302. Courts have no power to revise assessment made by assessor, merely because of difference of opinion as to reasonableness of valuation placed upon property. Keokuk Bridge Co. vs. P., 161 — 140. The omission to assess others liable to taxation, or to assess portions of their property, or the assessment of the property of others at less than its fair cash value, while it may cause the tax-payers whose property is assessed at its fair cash value to bear an undue portion of the pubUc burden, will not affect the validity of the tax. In absence of fraud, courts are power- less to change valuation. P. vs. Lots in Ashley, 122 — ^297; Pirst Nat'l Bank vs. Holmes, 246—362, 369. Courts have no power to revalue property for taxation. Union Trust Co. vs. Weber, 96—346; Spencer vs. P., 68—510; People vs. White & Co., 286—259. Omission to assess others, no ground for denying application, in absence of fraud. Spencer vs. P., 68—510. B. Fact that all revenue needed had been raised how fax a defense: A tax-payer has no standing to bring mandamus to raise taxes where the effect would be only to place certain municipal departments in receipt of more needed funds, but operates rather to the relator 's detriment than other- wise. People vs. Olson, 215 — 620. While where a tax has been legally assessed but received and used by the wrong parties, the property is excused from further levy, an objecting tax-payer is not relieved because the county has already collected more than it could under the legal rate. Ey. Co. vs. People, 212 — 546. The mere fact that as much money as could be collected under the legal rate had been raised because numerous tax-payers paid without protest an illegal tax does not excuse another from payment of taxes legally assessed. Ey. Co. vs. People, 212—518. The county clerk may extend the city taxes at a greater rate than is required to produce the exact amount required, so long as he remains within the 2 per cent limit. E. E. Co. vs. People, 200^ — 541. The mere fact report of finance committee of county board shows a balance of more than $56,000 in county treasury on Sept. 1, does not show that the county board's levy of taxes in the amount of $51,000 to meet the expenses of county for ensuing year is invalid. People vs. E. Co., 261 — 33. C. Misdescription of land as a defense to judgment: The description of property for purpose of taxation must be sufficiently definite, so as to give the owner information of the claim mad© against his prop- erty, and in case of sale to inform the public what land is offered for sale and to enable the purchaser to obtain a sufficient conveyance. Thus where 145 a competent surveyor would have no difficulty in locating and identifying the property from it, or it is such as the parties adopted in their convey- ance, it is all right. Koelling vs. People, 196 — 353. Any description by which property can be identified by a competent surveyor with reasonable certainty, either with or without the aid of extiinsic evidence, is sufficient to sustain a tax levy. Where the complaining tax- payer objects to the description, but described the premises the same in his petition to the board, he voluntarily acknowledged the plats according to which such description was made. Otis vs. People, 196 — 542. In a suit for taxes due on forfeited property — where the delinquent list pro- duced in evidence showed that "95 ft. N. & S. by 150 ft. E. & W., S. E. corner S. %, Bloick 8," was assessed to one Lanning and immediately following was, "Balance of S. ^2 Block 8," assessed to Thos. Ward, this was sufficient description of property for which Ward assessed, when taken in connection with the Lanning assessment. Greenwood vs. La Salle, 137—225. Any description by which the property my be identified by a competent sur- veyor, with reasonable certainty, either with or without the aid of intrinsic evidence, will be sufficient. Law vs. People, SO — 268; Fowler vs. P., 93 — 116; Vennum vs. P., 188—160; People vs. Brown, 261—73; People vs. Wabash R. Co., 267—30; People vs. R. Co., 278—25, 29. Where the description of the delinquent lands was "Part lots 1 and 2 and lot 10, section 16, township 3, south, range 11, west," this was insufficient, and a judgment rendered against property of that description was void. P. vs. Eickert, 159—496. Description of two tracts of land, one reading "on a part of the S. E. quarter of S. E. quarter of sec. 3, tp. 9 south, range 6 east, 19.05 acres and thie other reading, "on a pt. west pt. S. E. N. E. and N. W. N. E. sec. 10 tp. 9 south, range 6 east," in a certain county is too uncertain to sustain tax levy. People vs. R. Co., 252—395. Where railroad property is described merely as "Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company — Railroad tracks composed of the right of way main track and second main track and turn-out and the stations and improvements of said railway company on such right of way," court is without jurisdiction to render judgment against railroad property where no amendment of description was made. People vs. R. Co., 256 — 353. D. Double asse.ssment as a defense: Objection to tax upon assessment by local assessor should be sustained when it is shown same property is right of way of railroad company which has paid taxes thereon extended on assessment by State Board of Equalization. People vs. Wiggins Ferry Co., 257 — 452. E. Federal control of railroads as a defense: The fact that railroads arc operated and controlled by act of Congress of March 21, 1918, and president's proclamation thereunder is not defense against payment of local taxes on the property. P. Vs. Bridge Co., 287—246. F. Uncla.ssificd: The general Act of 1872 works repeal of all prior conflicting laws, whether g<'neral laws or special charters of cities. Andrews vs. P., 75 — 605. 146 Where the county board in the name of the people obtains a personal judgment against a tax-payer and sells his real estate under that (Sec. 230), and a private person buys it, on finding that he has thereby acquired no title he cannot by having such sot aside be subrogated to the right of the State to proceed in rem. State may proceed in personam and in rem at the same time; but when the taxes are once paid by whatsoever means, the proceeding in rem is not available for the purpose of enforcing the rights of third parties. P. vs. Winter, 116—211. Appeals.] Section 192. Appeals from the judgment of the court may be taken during the same term to the supreme court on the party praying an appeal executing a bond to the People of the State of Illinois, with two or more sureties to be approved by the oourt, in some reasonable amount to be fixed by the court, condi- tioned that the appellant will prosecute his said appeal with effect, and will pay the amount of any tax assessment, and cost which may finally be adjudged against the real estate involved in the appeal by any court having jurisdiciton of the cause. But no appeal shall be allowed from any judgment for the sale of lands or lots for taxes, nor shall any writ of error to reverse such judgment operate as a supersedeas unless the party praying such appeal or desiring such a writ of error, shall before taking such appeal or suing out such writ of error, deposit with the county collector an amount of money equal to the amount of the judgment and costs. If in case of an appeal, or suing out of a writ of error, the judgment shall be affirmed in whole or in part, the supreme court shall enter judgment for the amount of the taxes with damages, not to exceed ten per cent., and order that the amount deposited with the collector, as aforesaid, or so much thereof as may be necessary, shall be credited upon the judgment so rendered, and execution shall issue for the balance of said judgment, damages and costs. The clerks of the supreme court shall transmit to said county collector, a certified copy of the order of affirmance, and it shall be the duty of the collector, upon re- ceiving the same, to apply so much of the amount deposited with him, as aforesaid, as shall be necessary to satisfy the amount of the judgment of the supreme court, and to account for the same as col- lected taxes. If the judgment of the county court shall be re- versed and the cause remanded for a rehearing, and if upon the rehearing, judgment shall be rendered for the sale of the land or lots for taxes, or any part thereof, and such judgment be not thereon, as herein provided, the clerk of the county court shall certify to the county collector the amount of such judgment, and thereupon it shall be the duty of the county collector to certify to the county clerk the amount deposited with him, as aforesaid, and the county 147 clerk shall credit the said judgment with the amount of such deposit, or so much thereof as will satisfy the judgment, and the county col- lector shall be chargeable with, and accountable for, the amount so credited, as collected taxes. Noting herein contained shall be con- strued as requiring an additional deposit in case of more than one appeal or writ of error being prosecuted in said proceedings. If, upon a final hearing, judgment shall be refused for the sale of lands or lots for the taxes, or any part thereof, the collector shall pay over to the party who shall have made said deposit, or his legally author- ized agent or representatives, the amount of the deposit, or so much thereof as shall remain after the satisfaction of the judgment against the premises in respect of which such deposit shall have been made. [As amended by act approved May 25, 1877. In force July 1, 1877. L. 1877, p. 174.] Under Sec. 192 of Kcveuue law of 1872 as amended by Act of 1873 — Appeals were given to Circuit Court. By Sec. 123 of Act of 1874 entitled "County Courts," "appeals may be taken" to Supreme Court. Held, that appeals could be taken to either courts. Fowler vs. Pirkins, 77 — 271. The provisions herein which requires a deposit of the amount of judgment and costs as a condition to an appeal or supersedeas does not deprive persons of the constitutional right of writ of error, for while this would be true of writ of error, it was not true of supersedeas. Bryant vs. People, 71 — 32; Andrews vs. Eumsey, 75 — 598. Amount deposited on appeal should be credited on the judgment, if affirmed, and execution issue for balance. Chicago, etc., K. So. vs. P., 153 — 409 (1894). I'ersonal judgment for costs against appellant proper on affirming judgment. Statute does not authorize costs of appeal to be taken out of land. Dur- ham vs. P., 67 — 414. 0~n a])peal bond to prosecute with effect and pay any judgment for taxes ren- dered against land, [)arty liable, though remedy against land not exhausted. Mix vs. P., 86—329. Any number of persons interested may join in bringing writ of error on judg- ment against land for taxes. Olcott vs. State, 10 — (5 (5il.), 481. Party cannot assign error on judgment entered by consent. P. vs. Owners, J0«— 442. Kntry of order defaulting defendant is not final judgment from wliiih appeal lies. Hess vs. I'., 84—247. It will be presumed, on api)eal, in the absence of a bill of exceptions, that upon application for judgment for taxes the court below heard evidence to estai>lish the [.roiicr publication of the delinquent list, even though the j)riiiter'8 certificate in tlie record docs not coiifoini to flic statute. Bass vs. P., 159—208 (189(;). Circuit cb-rk had autliorify to issue |)r(Tci)t in such case. Further issue of I»recept liy county rlcrk, in sucli case, was harmless. Frew vs. Taylor, 100—159. 148 Under this section, the clerk of circuit court in all cases of appeal, if judgment rendered against any particular piece of property, was to make and deliver to the county clerk a record of the lands and lots against which judgment was rendered, substantially as was provided for by Sec. 194. (Sec Acts under Sec. 194). Eecord hero returned held suliicient. Frew vs. Taylor, 106—159. Under old law appeal bond in appeal from judgment for tax levied by city, and in which city alone is interested, may be made payable to the city. City of Nashville vs. Weiser, 54—245. On appeal by People from an order sustaining objection to item of park tax for fe«s and salaries, appellee cannot by cross-error, question action of court in sustaining objection to item of tax for interest on bonded debt. People vs. Vogt, 262—170. Review of judgments on application for judgment and order of sale for delinquent special assessment is controlled by this section and may be either by appeal or writ of error. People vs. Chicago Title & Tr. Co., 266-224. Proceeding's in case of appeal.] Section 193. If judgment is rendered by any court, at any time, against any lands or lots, for any tax or special assessment, the county collector shall, after pub- lishing a notice for sale, in compliance with the requirements of sec- tion 182 of this chapter, proceed to execute such judgment by the sale of lots and lands against which such judgment has been ren- dered : Provided, however, that in case of an appeal from any such judgment the collector shall not sell until such appeal is disposed of. [As amended by act approved May 29, 1879. In force July 1, 1879. L. 1879, p. 249.] After judgment has been affirmed, when collector gives notice of his intended application for judgment and order of sales for other delinquent taxes or assessments, he should state in the notice that lots and lands already ordered to be sold on judgments previously rendered and which have been affirmed on appeal will be exposed for public sale at the same time. People vs. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 270—591. Appeal taken by People from judgment of County Court suspends all pro- ceedings under the judgment until appeal is disposed of. Tax sale pending appeal is void. Carne vs. Peacock, 114 — 347. Proviso to section above qualifies that part thereof which precedes it. In case of appeal, should not publish notice provided in Sec. 182 until appeal disposed of. Boynton vs. P., 166 — 67. New notice of sale is essential after affii-mance of appeal from judgment of sale. Boynton vs. P., 166 — 67. Process for sale.] Section 194. On the day advertised for sale, the county clerk, assisted by the collector shall carefuly examine said list upon which judgment has been rendered, and see that all payments have been properly noted thereon, and said clerk shall 149 make a certificate to be entered on said record, following the order of court that such record is correct, and that judgment was rendered upon the pioperty therein mentioned for the taxes, interest and costs due thereon, which certificate shall be attested by the clev-k under seal of the court and shall be the process on which all real property or any interest therein shall be sold for taxes, special as- sessments, interest and costs due thereon and may be substantially in the following form : I^ , clerk of the county court, in and for the county of . . .'. do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct record of the delinquent real estate in said county, against which judgment and order of sale was duly entered in the county court of said county, on the day of 18 , for the amount of the taxes, special assessments, interest and costs due severally thereon as therein set forth, and that the judgment and order ot' court in relation thereto fully appears on said record. [As amended by act approved May 29, 1879. In force July 1, 1879. L. 1879, p. 249. Under Sec. 194 of Eevenue Act the certificate is invalid if made before the day on -nhich property advertised, is to be sold. Should be made ou the day advertised for the sale, or void. Glos vs. Gleason, 209 — 517-520; Glos vs. Dyche, 214—417; Glos. vs. Mulcahy, 210 — 039-643; Glos vs. Hanford, 212 — 261; McCraney vs. Glos. 222 — 628. A certificate of tax sale made prior to the sale is insufficient to give deed, and does not invest the holder with ownership. Nor is he stopped after taking this position, to claim benefits under his certificate. Coombs s. People, 198—586. Certificate required by section above, if not made on day property was adver- tised for sale will not support a tax deed. Kepley vs. Foukc, 187 — 163. Certificate, required by section above, should be dated as of day of sale. Kep- ley vs. Scully, 185 — 57. Presumption is that certificate, required by section above, was made on day of date. Kopley vs. Scully, 185 — 57. Failure by clerk to make and enter upon record the certificate on whicli real property should be sold for taxes makes the sale and deed invalid. Glos vs. Randolph, 138—268 (1891). This section is mandatory. Clerk must make and enter upon record the cer- tificate required hereby and in the form provided. Sale and certificates not in confonnity hereto arc void. Ames vs. Sankey, 128 — 523. Sec. 194 as in force at this time provided that the record to be made by the county dork, shall .si)ccify among other things, "the total amount of judg- ment on each tract or lot, and the year or years for which the same is due in the same descriptive order as said property may be set forth in tlie judg- ment book." Precept that in body does not show years for which taxes were due, but which does show such years by the jdacita and certificate, conforms to rerinirement of statute that precept sh;.!! specify years. Neflf vs. Smyth, 111—100. 150 Tlio statuti' in tVux-e at this tiuio provided tliat, "The cloik of the county court shall, before the daj- of sale, make a correct record of the lands and town lots against which judgment is rendered in any suit for taxes due thereon, and which ^hall set forth the name of the owner, if known, the description of tlu' jiropi'ity, and the amount due in each tract or lot, in the same order as said property may be set forth in the judgment hook, and shall attach thereto a correct copy of the order of the court and his certificate of the truth of such record, which record so attested, shall hereafter constitute the process on which all real property shall be sold for taxes, as well as the sales of such property." Under this statute precept if not attested by clerk's certificate is void, and cannot be amended after sale so as to make sale valid. Eagan vs. Connelly, 107 — -458. Section as originally enacted made attested copy of judgment process for sale. Bell vs. Johnson, 111 — 374. Under former statute, where judgment contained everything reported by col- lector which would aid sheriff in executing order of court, failure to furnish sheriff with copy of sucli report would not vitiate sale. Manly vs. Gibson, 14—136. The old law provided that it "shall be the duty of the clerk, within 5 days after the adjournment of said court, to make out under the seal of said court, a copy of the collector's report, together with the order of the court thereon, which shall hereafter constitute the process on wkich all lands shall be sold for taxes, and deliver the same to the sheriff of Ms county." Under this law process for sale which does not recite judgment under which it is issued is void. Hinman vs. Pope, 6 — (1 Gil.), 131. Precepet under which sheriff sells for taxes is not a process within the meaning of the Constitution and need not run in the name of the people. Scarritt vs. Chapman, 11 — 443; Curry vs. Hinman, 11 — 420. Variance of process from judgment cannot be amended in collateral proceed- ing on tax title. Where the record of a judgment was for taxes for 99 cents and the precept issued on the judgment recited a judgment against the 8 lots for $1.25, this was a material variance being a difference of ^ • of amount of judgment and so operated to exclude the precept. Pitkin vs. Yaw, 13—251. The want of certificate of a county clerk to the record of a judgment is a fatal defect in the sale of land for taxes. Ogden vs. Bemis, 125 — 105. New' notice of sale is essential after aifirniance of appeal from judgment of sale. Boynton vs. P., 166 — 67. Repealed.] Section 195. [Repealed by act approved May 29, 1879. In force JiUyl, 1879. L. 1879, p. 250.] County clerk to assist in sale.] Section 196. The county clerk, in person or by deputy, shall attend all sales of real estate for taxes, made by the collector, and shall assist at the same. Entry of sale — Redemption.] Section 197. When any tract or lot shall be sold, it shall be the duty of the clerk to enter on the record aforesaid, the quantity sold and the name of the purchaser, opposite such tract or lot, in the blank columns provided for that 151 purpose ; and when any such property shall be redeemed from sale, the clerk shall enter the name of the person redeeming, the date, the amount of redemption, in the proper column. Certificates of redemption made by clerk upon deposit of redemption money under this section are competent evidence to prove redemption. Bush vs. Stanley, 122^06. This requires the county clerk to keep a book, in which it is made his duty to make a record of hinds sold at a tax sale, etc. Such record is competent and sufficient evidence of facts stated therein. Gage vs. Parker, 103 — 528. Repealed.] Section 198. [Repealed by act approved May 29, 1879. In force July 1, 1879. L. 1879, p. 250. J Forfeited tracts noted.] Section 199. All tracts or lots for- feited to the state at such sale, as hereinafter provided, shall be r.oted on said record. Sale and redemption record.] Section 200. Said book shall be known and designated as the tax judgment sale, redemption and for- feiture record, and be kept in the office of the county clerk. TAs amended by act approved May 29, 1879. In force July 1, 1879. L. 1879, p. 250.] Manner of conducting- sale. Withdrawal of special assessment from collection.] Section 201. The collector, in person or by deputy, shall attend at the courthouse in his county, on the day specified in the notice for the sale of real estate for taxes, and then and there, between the hours of nine o'clock in the forenoon and four o'clock in the afternoon, proceed to offer for sale, separately and in consecutive order, each tract of land or town oi' city lot in said list on Avhich the taxes, special assessments, interest or costs have not been paid. The sale shall be continued from day to day, until all the tracts or lots in the delinquent list shall be sold or offered for sale: Provided, however, that any city, village or town interested in the collection of any tax or special assessment, may, in default of biddei-s for same, withdraw from collection any siicli special assessmenut levied against any such tract of land or lot by the corporate authorities of such city, village or town, and in case of such withdrawal there shall be no sale of sudi tract of land or lot on account of the delinquent special assessment thereon. |As amended by act filed June 28, 1917. L. 1917, p. 658.] Where a special delinquent list is made u)!, embracing lands upon wliicli judg- ment has been reiidt-red for special assessments for certain towns, when those towns are reached in the progress of the sale, the act of the col- lector in selling the list delinquent for special assessments before selling the list for general ta-xes, was in violation of the statute. Drake vs. Og- den, 128—60.3. 152 Sales for taxes on a day different from that fixed by law, have been repeatedly held by this court to be void. Essington vs. Neill, 21 — 139. If sale was made after day fixed by law, it will be presumed that sale was adjourned under statute from day to day until sale. Mossinger vs. Ger- main, 6— (1 Gil.), G31. How sold.] Section 202. The person at such sale offering to pay the amount due on each tract or lot for the least percentage thereon as penalty, shall be the purchaser of such tract or lot : Pro- vided, that no bid shall be accepted for a penalty exceeding six (6) per cent of the amount of such tax or special assessment. [As amended by act approved June 30, 1919. L. 1919, p. 764.] This section was enacted as Senate Bill 260. House Bill 323 covered the same subject, providing for a penalty not exceeding ten per cent. House Bill •No. 323 was approved by the Governor, June 30, 1919 (L. 1919, p. 761) and Senate Bill No. 260 was approved by the Governor on June 28, 1919. The Attorney General in an opinion dated July 26, 1919 held the provisions of Senate Bill No. 260 were in force and effect. Sees. 202 and 206 do not apply to a sale under a decree foreclosing a tax lien on property which has been forfeited to the State for non-payment of taxes for more than two years. People vs. Cant, 260 — 497. The amount due includes the fees allowed the county clerk for attending sale and issuing certificate, and for making the delinquent list. Hammond vs. Carter, 155—579 (1895). Purchaser at tax sale of 9 millionth part of lot under old section is entitled, on application to proper officers, to have such fraction listed and assessed separately, in order that he may pay taxes on it. Koby vs. Chicago, 48—130. Forfeited to the state — Certificate — Sale — Notice.] Section 203. Every tract or lot so offered at public sale, and not sold for want of bidders, unless it is released from sale by the withdrawal from collection of a special assessment levied thereon, shall be for- feited to the State of Illinois: Provided, however, that whenever the county judge, county clerk and county treasurer shall certify that the taxes and special assessments not withdrawn from collection on forfeited lands equal or exceed the actual value of such lands, the officer directed by law to expose for sale lands far delinquent taxes shall, on the receipt of such certificate, offer for sale to the highest bidder the tract or lands, in such certificate described, after first giving ten days' notice of the time and place of sale, together with a description of the tract or lands so to be offered. And a certificate of purchase shall be issued to the purchaser at such sale as in other cases in this Act provided; and the county collector shall receive credit in his settlement with the custodian of the several funds, for which such tax was levied for the amount not realized by such sale. And the amount received from any such sale shall be paid by such 153 collector, pro rata, to the custodian of the several funds entitled thereto. [As amended by act filed June 28, 1917. L. '1917, p. 658.] The preceding sections do not make any provision for contingency that there be no bidders for any piece of property, this is provided for by Sec. 203. Ziccarelli vs. Stuckart, 277 — 26. Payment of current taxes will not prevent forfeiture for back taxes. Biggins vs. P., 106—270. Realty is forfeited to State when, at any regular tax sale under Revenue Act, collector shall offer land for sale, and it shall not be sold for want of bid- dors. Biggins vs. P., 106—270. Failure of collector to attend.] Section 204. If any collector, by himself or deputy, shall fail to attend any sale of lands or lots advertised according to the provisions of this act, and make sale thereof as required by law, he shall be liable to pay the amount of taxes, special assessments and costs due upon the lands or lots so ad- vertised. Said collector may afterwards advertise and sell such de- linquent property to reimburse himself for the amount advanced by him; but at no such sale shall there be any property forfeited to the state. Failure of county clerk to attend.] Section 205. If any county clerk shall fail to attend any tax sale of real estate, either in person or by deputy, or to make and keep the record, as required by this act, he shall forfeit and pay the sum of $500, and shall be liable to indictment for such failure, and upon conviction shall be removed from office. Said sum shall be sued for in an action of de])t, in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, and when recovered shall be paid into the county treasury. Payment by purchaser.] Section 206. The person purchasing any tract or lot, or any part thereof, shall forthwith pay to the col- lector the amount charged on such tract or lot, and on failui-e so to do, the said tract or lot shall be again offered for sale in the same manner as if no such sale had been made; and in no case shall Ihc sale be closed until ]);tyiiicnt is made, or the tract or lol again offered for sale. Section does not apply to a sale under a decree foreclosing a tax litMi on piup- erty which has been forfeited to the State for non-payment of taxes for more than two years. People vs. Cant, 260 — 1!I7. Section is applicable to proceedings under Local Improvement Act. Barber A. I'. Co. v.s. f;hic:igo, ]?.<) A. iL'l, 132. Certificate of purchase — Assignable — Exception. 1 Sect ion 207. 'I'lie county ch'i'k .siiall make out and deliver 1o the i)urchasei' of any lands or lol.s sold as aforesaid a certificate of purchase, to he counter- signed by the collector, describing tlic lands or lots sold as the same 154 was described in the delinquent list, date of such sale, the amount of taxes, special assessments, interest and cost for which the same was sold, and that payment has been made therefor. If any person shall become the purchaser of more than one tract or lot, he may have the Avhole or one or more of them included in one certificate. Such cer- tificate of purchase shall be assignable by endorsement and an as- signment thereof, shall vest in the assignee or his legal representa- tives, all the riglit and title of the original purchaser: Provided, That said clerk shall include in such certificate of purchase not to exceed one lot, block, tract or piece of land as listed, assessed and sold in one description, except in cases where such lot, block, tract or piece of land is owned by one party or person. [As amended by act approved May 13, 1903. In force July 1, 1903. L. 1903, p. 298.] Sale is an abandonment of all back taxes not included therein. After tax sale for taxes due and unpaid, the State cannot defeat the title of the purchaser by. a resale of the same land for taxes which wore due and might have been included in it. Law vs. P., 116 — 244. Tax deed held void, if based upon purchase by collector. Under former law which provided that "no collector shall be either directly or indirectly concerned in the purchase of any tract of land or town lot sold for taxes under penalty of $100.00." Ely vs. Brown, 183—598. Form of certificate applicable to special assessments. Barber A. P. Co. vs. Chicago, 139 A. 121, 132. Index to tax sale books.] Section 208. The county clerk is hereby authorized to make an index to tax sale records in a book, when furnished by the county — which index shall be kept in the county clerk's office as a public record, open to the inspection of all persons during office hours. Certified copy of sale lists to be sent to auditor — In twenty days after sale.] Section 209. The county clerk shall, within twenty days after any sale for taxes, make out and transmit to the auditor a transcript of sales for taxes, which shall be written on foolscap paper, made up and stitched in book form, suitable for binding. The clerk shall certify to the correctness of said transcript, under the seal of his office. Said list shall not include any tract or lots forfeited to the state at such sale. The county clerk, for failure to make out, furnish or forward said list, as herein required, shall forfeit and pay into the state treasury the sum of $500, to be recovered in an action of debt, in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, in any court in this state having competent jurisdiction. Redemption — Time of redemption — Amount.] Section 210. Real property sold under the provisions of this Act may be redeemed at any time before the expiration of two years from date of sale, 155 by payment in legal money of the United States to the county clerk of the proper county, the amount for Avhich the same was sold, to- gether with the amount of the penalty bid at such sale, if redeemed at any time before the expiration of six months from the day of sale ; if between six and twelve months, the amount for which the same was sold together with twice the amount of the penalty bid ; if between twelve ^nd eighteen months, the amount for which the same was sold together with three times the amount of the penalty bid ; if between eighteen months and two years, the amount for which the same was sold together with four times the amount of the penalty bid at said sale. The person redeeming shall also pay the amount of all taxes and special assessments accruing after such sale with seven (7) per cent penalty thereon in all cases where the pur- chaser at tlie tax sale or his assignee shall pay such subsequent tax or special assessments more than six months after such tax sale ; and it is hereby made the duty of the county clerk to include the amount of the subsequent taxes or special assessments paid by the purchaser or holder of the tax certificate in his certificate of redemption : Pro- vided, however, that the county clerk shall not be required to include any subsequent taxes or special assessments in his certificate of re- demption, nor shall the payment thereof be a charge upon the land sold for taxes, unless the purchaser, assignee, or holder of the tax certificate of sale shall have filed with the county clerk, before re- demption, an official, original or duplicate tax collector's receipt for the payment of such subsequent taxes or special assessments, and it shall be the duty of the tax collector to furnish such duplicate receipts. If the real property of any minor heir, idiot or insane person shall be sold for non-payment of taxes or special assessments, the same may be redeemed at any time after sale and before the expiration of one year after such disability be removed, upon the terms specified in this section, and upon the payment of ten (10) per cent per annum, the amount due including penalties from and after the expi ration of two years from the date of sale, which re- demption may be made by themselves, or by any person in their behalf. Tenants in common or joint tenants shall be allowed to re- deem their individual interests in real ])roperty sold under the provisions of this Act, in the same maniui' and undiM' the terms specified in this section for Ihe redemption of oilier real property; any reflemplion made shall innre to the benefit of the person having the legal or cfinilablc title to Ihe pi'operty redeemed, subject to th(^ 156 right of the person making the same to be reimbursed by the person benefited. [As amended by act approved June 28, 1919. L. 1919, p. 764.] Redemption referred to in Sec. 253 means the redemption contemplated by Sec. 210. Clark vs. Zaleski, 253—63. Where no redemption is made, Sees. 216, 217 and 219 provide for proceedure to be followed by purchaser of real estate at tax in order to secure a tax title to the property. Ziccarelli vs. Stuckart, 277 — 30. Where last day of the two years falls on Sunday it should be excluded, and parties entitled to redemption may redeem on following day. Notice stating that time for redemption expires on a given day, which falls on Sunday, is invalid, and sale thereon is voidable. Gage vs. Davis, 129 — 236. Redeeming person must pay taxes accruing after the sale as well as amount of sale, interest and penalty. Plea of redemption should allege payment thereof. P. vs. Ryan, 116—73. County clerk may require party seeking to redeem to produce receipt or cer- tificate from collector showing payment of subsequent taxes. Gage vs. Scales, 100—218. If party seeking to redeem fails by paying too little, through mistake of clerk, chancery w-ill relieve him. Gage vs. Scales, 100 — 218, Certificate of redemption is only evidence of deposit of redemption money with clerk; not of right to redeem, nor of age of depositor. Henrichsen vs. Hodgen, 67—179. Terms of redemption between owner and purchaser are fixed by law in force at date of sale, and Legislature is powerless to change them. The old Act provided that the tender be in specie; an Act changing it to legal tender ' notes is invalid. P. vs. Riggs, 56 — 483. Sec. 210 provides that any redemption shall inure to the benefit of the owner, and that a receipt of redemption money, or a return of the certificate for cancelation, will constitute a redemption. Redemption by a stranger, with color of authority, will inure to benefit of owner. Houston vs. Buer, 117—324. Where redemption is by one as agent without authority, ratification is pre- sumed. Reassignment to tax purchaser by such agent will not defeat redemption. Houston vs. Buer, 117 — 324. Redemption from tax sale by one co-tenant inures for benefit of all. Redemp- tion of -whole, and acquisition of legal title, subjected to trust for co-ten- ants. Lomax vs. Gindele, 117 — 527. Under former statutes: The reason and spirit of the statute was to give the purchaser not only double the amount he paid at the sale for taxes, but ten per cent, on all moneys he may have subsequently disbursed for annual taxes, since that day, com- puting the same from the day when the sale might have been made, in caso> the taxes were not paid. If he pays no taxes he can claim no interest. Comstock vs. Cover, 35 — 470. Act of 1839 (February 26) required parties seeking to redeem from sale during their minority to satisfy clerk by affidavit of their right. Failure of clerk to file affidavit establishing right to redeem did not prejudice their rights. Chapin vs. Curtenius, 15 — 427. 157 See. 39 of Revenue Act of 1839 applied only to femes covert owning land in their own right. Finch vs. Brown, 8 — (3 Gil.), 488. Eeceipt for redemption money, given by State Treasurer and countersigned by Auditor, is evidence of redemption. McConnell vs. Greene, 8— (3 Gil.), 590. When purchaser suffers land to be sold ag-ain.] Section 211. If any purchaser of real estate sold for taxes or special assessments shall suffer the same to be forfeited to the State, or again sold for taxes or special assessment, before the expiration of the last day of the second annual sale thereafter, such purchaser shall not be en- titled to a deed for such real property until the expiration of a like term from the date of the second sale or forfeiture, during which time the land shall be subject to redemption upon the terms and con- ditions prescribed in this act; but the person redeeming shall only be required to pay for the use of such first purchaser, the amount paid by him. The second purchaser, if any, shall be entitled to the redemption money, as provided for in the preceding section : Pro- vided, however, it shall not be necessary for any municipal corpora- tion which shall bid in its own delinquent special assessments, at any sale, in default of other bidders, to protect the property from subse- quent forfeitures or sales, as above required in this section. [As amended by Act approved May 29, 1879. In force July 1, 1879. L. 1879, p. 250.] This operates to extend life of certificate for added period holder has to wait if property again sold for taxes. Netterstrom vs. Kemeys, 187 — 617. Application of this section. Ely vs. Brown, 183 — 600. Where the property was sold in July, August and September of the year 1877, it was not sufficient to pay the penalty on the last sale, as sales in different months for taxes and special assessments on judgments rendered at same term of court, the sale being continued from time to time through such months, treated as one sale. Gage vs. Parker, 103—^28. Books, etc., evidence.] Section 212. The books and records be- longing to the oflice of county clerk, or copies thereof, certified by said clerk, shall be deemed ])iiina facie evidence to prove the sale of any land or lot for taxes or special assessments, the redemption of the same, or payment of taxes or special assessments thereon. Clerk to pay over money to successor.] The county clerk, shall, at llic expiration of his term of office, pay over to his successor in office all moneys in his hands received for redemption from sale for taxes on real estate. [As amended by Act approved May 3, 1873.] "Sale and redemption" hook nffords only evidence of manner of sale. Gage vs. Bailey, 102—11. 158 Sales in error — Entry.] Section 213. Whenevei' it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the county clerk that any tract or lot was sold, and that such tract or lot was not subject to taxa- tion, or upon which the taxes or special assessments had been paid previous to the sale of said tract or lot, or arises from a double as- sessment, or that the description is void for uncertainty, he shall make an entiy opposite to such tracts or lots in the sale and redemp- ti.m record that the same was erroneously sold, and such entry shall be prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated ; and unless auch error is disproved the county collector shall, on demand of the ii>«v]ier of the certificate of such sale, refund the amount paid and »;jiincel such certificate so far as it relates to such tract or lots. The collector shall take credit in settlement of his accounts there- ur'ter with such officers as he may be liable to for their pro rata amounts respectively paid aforesaid. [As amended by Act which be- came a law^ and in force June 26, 1895. L. 1895, p. 299.] The amendment of 1895 repeals by implication provision of Sec. 268 providing for refund of an additional one hundred percent. Heydeckcr vs. Price, 136 A. 512, 514. — Purchaser at erroneous sale paid back.] Section 214. When the purchaser at such erroneous sale, or any one holding under him, shall have paid any tax or special assessment upon the prop- erty so sold, which has not been paid by the owner of the property, he shall have the right to recover from such owner the amount he has so paid, with ten per cent, interest, as money paid for the owner's use. A purchaser at a tax sale on property of a description which does not exist may recover, from the owner of the property intended to be conveyed, the amount he paid, with 10 per cent, interest. Joliet Stove Works vs. Kiep, 230—550 affirming 132A. 457. The section does not permit purchaser at tax sale to recover from owner of un- taxable property taxes which he paid thereon. Tiflft vs. Chicago College of Medicine, 212 A. 286. Effect of receipt of redemption money.] Section 215. The re- ceipt of the redemption money of any tract of land or lot, by any purchaser, or the return of the certificate of purchase for cancel- lation, shall operate as a release of all the claim to such tract or lot under, or by virtue of the purchase. Tax deeds — Notice.] Section 216"^. Hereafter no purchaser or assignee of such purchaser of any la'nd, town or city lots at any sale of land, or lots, for taxes or special assessments, due either to the State or county, or incorporated town or city withiu 159 the same, or at any sale for taxes or levees otherwise, by the laws of this State, shall be entitled to a deed for lands or lots so purchased, until the following conditions have been complied with, to wit: Such purchaser,*^ or assignee shall serve or cause to be served ^ a written or printed, or partly written or partly printed notice ^'^ of such purchase on every person in actual pos- session or occupancy - of such land or lot ; also upon the per- son in whose name the same was taxed or especially assessed,-^ if upon diligent inquiry, he or she can be found in the county, also, the owners of or parties interested * in said land or lot, including trustees or mortgages of record, if they can upon diligent inquiry he found in the county, at least three months "' before the expira- tion of the time of the redemption on such sale, in which notice he shall state when he purchased the land or lot, in whose name taxed, the description'' of the land or lot he has purchased; for what year ^ taxed or especially assessed,* and when the time of redemption will expire.'' If n.o person is in possession or occu- pancy of such land or lot, and the person, in whose name the same was taxed or especially assessed, upon diligent inquiry cannot be found in the county, or said owners of, or parties interested in said land or lot upon diligent in(iuiry cannot be found in the county,^" then such person, or his assignee shall publish such notice in some newspaper printed and published in such county, and if no news- paper is printed in said county, then in the newspaper that is pub- lished in this State nearest to the county seat of the county ^' in which such land or lot is situated, which notice shall he inserted three times, the first time not more than five months,'- and the last time not less than three months, before the time of redemp- tion shall expire ; Provided, however, that if the owners of said land 01- lot, or said parties interested therein, cannot l)e found in the county and the person in actual occupancy is tenant to, or is in possession under said owner or said party interested therein, then service of such notice upon said tenant or occupant shall be deemed service upon said owner oi- i)arty interested: Provided, however, that if the said owneis or jiarties interested arc unknown to such purchaser or his assignee, then th(^ said publication, as to them, may he to the unknown owner oi' parties interested as aforesaid: Anfl, provided, fuflhcr, thai said notice of i)uhlieation shall include not to exceed one lot, block, liacl or piece of land as listed, as- sessed and sold in one description, except in cases where more than one lot, block, tract f)r piece of land is owned hy one pjiity or per- 160 son, in which case all the lots, blocks, or tracts owned by such person may be included in one notice. When any person who, by the terms of this section is entitled to be served with notice can- not, upon diligent inquiry be found, the affidavit in the preced- ing section provided for shall set forth particularly the inquiries made, of whom made, and when and where made. [As amended by act approved June 26, 1913. L. 1913, p. 519.] A. In General: To carry out the provisions of Sees. 4 and 5 of Article 9 of the Constitution the Legislature has imposed condition, by Sec. 216 with which the pur- chaser of real estate for delinquent taxes must comply before he will be entitled to a deed. Clark vs. Zaleski, 253 — 74. B. The notice need not describe who was purchaser; Taylor vs. Wright, 121—455. 1. Such purchaser or assignee shall serve or cause to be served: Service must be by or for purchaser or assignee at time of service. Service of notice by a person who afterwards became assignee is not sufficient. Chap- pell vs. Spire, 106—472. Service of notice may be made elsewhere than on premises. Gage vs. Bailey, 102—11. Affidavit of notice of tax which states service of such notice on A by handing the same to B, " the legal agent for said A, " is insufficient to show service on A, as must appear that agent for that particular purpose. Gage vs. Waterman, 121—115. la. Notice: Notice required by section above is essential to validity of deed. Palmer vs. Riddle, 180—462; People vs. Banks, 272—502. In order to pass title, notice of sale must be served on person in whose name the land was taxed, if a resident of the county, though color of title may be given without notice of sale and date of expiration of time of redemp- tion. Miller vs. Pence, 132 — 149. The purchaser must, in order to entitle him to a deed and to invest the county clerk with authority to execute the same, show a strict compliance with the conditions set forth in this section. Combs vs. Goff, 127 — 431. Notice for redemption should state the particular facts relied on as showing a compliance with Pars, 218, 219. Wallahan vs. Ingersoll, 117—123. Notice for redemption indispensable prerequisite of deed. Redemption after time allowed on equitable terms in absence of notice. Gage vs. Bailey, 115—646. Constitution (Sec. 5, Art. 9) guaranties that occupants shall in all cases be served with notice before period for redemption expires, and compliance with this requirement is indispensable condition precedent to right to make deed. Gage vs. Bailey, 100—530. The requirements of this section as amended, though not in force at the time of the tax roll, took effect in praesenti, and must be complied with as a prerequisite to the making of the deed. It is not void as impairing the obligation of the contract. Gage vs. Stewart, 127 — 207. 161 Amendatory Act of May 27, 1879, controls sales of land for taxes made in June of that year, as respects the notice to be given to the owner or party in- terested.' Smith vs. Prall, 133—308. Tax deed given in 1864, without notice to redeem to party to whom lands were assessed, served according to statute, is void. Under the old law the theory was that a deed obtained without notice of redemption having been given, as the statute pro\'ides, was obtained by fraud or bad faith, and therefore would not furnish color of title on which to base seven years' possession, in favor of purchaser at tax sale, though will in favor of his bona fide purchaser for value. Barnard vs. Hoyt, 63 — 341; Dalton vs. Doug- las, 63 — 337. Proof of such notice necessary to admissibility of deed in evidence. Holbrook vs. Fellows, 38 — i40. Issuance of deed -without notice to person against whom tax was assessed, of expiration of time for redemption, is unconstitutional and deed is void. Holbrook vs. Fellows, 38—440. Notice must contain every essential statutory element, if it omits one of the essential statutory requirements the deed issued pursuant thereto will be absolutely void. People vs. Banks, 272—502; Wright vs. Glos, 264—261. Sec. 216 must be strictly complied with in case of an ordinary sale of real estate for delinquent taxes, or the tax deeed will be void. Clark vs. Za- leski, 253—63. 2. On every person in actual possession or occupancy: The cutting of a few cords of wood and piling it upon land occupied by other persons, and subsequently moving it off and selling it, does not constitute such an occupation of premises by a person as to entitle him to receive notice. Hammond vs. Carter, 155 — 579 (1895). Where a strip of the land embraced in a tax sale is fenced in with land be- longing to an adjoining owner, there being no use made of nor rent paid for such strip, .sudi land-owner is not in possession of such strip within the meaning of this section requiring notice. Hammond vs. Carter, 155 — 579 (1895). Notice to "Board" is not invalidated by showing that "Baird" was in posses- sion, where it appears the identical person was personally served with notice. Hammond vs. Carter, 155 — 579 (1895). The possession or occupancy specified in the statute is one which is held ad- versely to the holder of the tax certificate. The statute never contem- plated that the tax-sale purchaser should himself create an occupancy and then serve a notice upon the occupant of his own creation. Burton vs. Perry, 146—71 (189:5). Statute in this section makes no distimt ion l)('tw('('ii actual jiossession and actual ocfui>aiicy, and does not reciuirc service of notice upon person in constructive possession or in constructive occupancy. Such a person may be beyond the limits of the State. Taylor vs. Wright, 121 — 455. Failure to servo notice on party occupying land unilcr vcrlm! lease and in ])0.'>i- Hcssion will avoid the tax deed, although notice was served on his wife. Gage vs. Lyons, 138—590 (1891). This section refers to occupants at time of service of the notice. Gonzalia vs. Bartclman, 143—634 (1892). 162 Affidavit of service on persons ' ' occupying tlie said lands when the same were sold," is insufficient, as it should be to such as are owners at time notice is served. Goiizalia vs. Bartelmau, 343 — 634 (1892). 3. The person in whose name the same was taxed, etc. : Stating that the hiiul was assessed to A is equivalent to saying that it was taxed to A. Taylor vs. Wright, 121 — 455, To entitle purchaser at tax sale, on his assignee, to deed where property has not been assessed in name of any person, it is sufficient to serve notice of sale on only party in possession, more than three months before expiration of time for redemption. Gage vs. Bailey, 10'2 — 11. Taxing a lot in the name of "J. W., " a former owner, does not tend to prove that it was specially assessed in that name. Gage vs. Webb, 141 — 533 (1892). 4. Or parties interested: Notice must be given to "owners or parties interested" in land when the notice is served. Gonzalia vs. Bartelman, 143 — 634 (1892). As the statute now is, the purchaser cannot know^, from any direction given, to whom he is expected to give the notice which the statute requires, other than to the owner. In that respect the statute must be regarded as mean- ing precisely the same as it would mean if the w^ords, ' ' or parties inter- ested," had been omitted, and having given notice to the owner, it is sufficient. Smyth vs. Neff, 123—310. Notice to each of the commissioners of a drainage district is sufficient service upon such district. Hammond vs. Carter, 155 — 579 (1895). Notice is not required to be given to persons acquiring rights in the property during the three months preceding the expiration of the time of redemp- tion. Hammond vs. Carter, 155 — 579 (1895). Notice was not required to be served upon the "owner or parties interested" by that designation prior to the amendment of 1879. Gage vs. Webb, 141—533 (1892). Notice served upon the husband of the owner is invalid. Cotes vs. Eohrbeck, 139—532 (1891). Affidavit that notice served on "Eeid & Sherwin" by handing to "Joseph • Sherwin, one of the firm, ' ' is insufficient, as it was not good service as to Eeid. Gage vs. Eeid, 118 — 35. It is not necessary to serve notice upon a mere laboring man in the employ of the owner or tenant, not the business agent of the latter, nor in any way authorized to receive such notice. The notice may include two or more tracts of land. Hammond vs. Carter, 155 — 579 (1895). Notice served on laboring man employed by property owner is not sufficient. Gage vs. Schmidt, 104—106. Under statute, notice of tax sale need not be given mortgagee of owner. Smyth vs. Neff, 123—310. Mortgagee is not entitled to notice under this section. Glos vs. Evanston B. & L. Ass'n, 186—590. 5. Three months before the expiration of the time of redemption: Provision in this section that notice of tax sale shall be given three months before expiration of constitutional period for redemption is not unconsi- tutional in that it deprives persons in possession up to the time of the tei-mination of the period of redemption, of notice, as the Constitution con- 163 templates service of notice before the expiration of the period. Taylor vs. Wright, 121 — 455. 6. Description of land: Misdescription of land in published notice invalidates deed. Esker vs. Heffer- nan, 159—38 (1895). Statute does not forbid purchaser from inserting two or more tracts in one notice, and, statute being silent, purchaser may exercise his own judgment thereon. Notice including two or more tracts in one notice, not invalid. Sec. 218, infra, contemplates more than one tract in notice. It provides that "The fee £or such publication shall not exceed $1 for each tract or lot contained in such notice." Drake vs. Ogden, 128—603; Hammond vs. Carter, 155—579. 7. For what year taxed or specially assessed: The notice is not rendered invalid by the fact that, in stating the year for which the assessment was made, the figures "889" were used instead of "1889," where other portions of such notice show fully and in detail what year the taxes were assessed for. Hammond vs. Carter, 155 — 579 (1895). Notice of tax sale hereunder which does not contain statement of the year for which the land sold was taxed is insufficient. Taylor vs. Wright, 121 — 455. Notice of expiration of redemption must state for what year real estate sold was taxed or specially assessed. Harrcll vs. Bank, 183 — 547. Notice must state for what year taxed, and if for special assessment, for what year specially taxed. Gage vs. Webb, 141—533 (1892). 8. Taxed or specially assessed: Notice required by section above should specify whether lands were sold for gf'iicral tax or special assessment. Bailey vs. Smith, 178 — 74. Notice of tax sale, failing t6 state that the sale was for a tax sale or special assessment, is void. Gage vs. Dupuy, 137 — 652 (1890), Notice must specify whether lots were sold for taxes or for special assessments. General phrase including both, insufficient. Gage vs. Davis, 129 — 236. A notice of a tax sale which states the sale of the land for "delinquent taxes and special assessments" levied for a certain year, but fails to specify whether for taxes or special assessments, is defective, and will not author- ize a deed. Stillwcll vs. Brammell, 124—338. Notice of tax sale which states that sale was for a tax or a special assessment is insufficient; notice should state which of the two it was sold for. Gage vs. Waterman, 121—115. Notice must show whether for taxes or special assessments. Harrell vs. Bank, 183-547. The notice must state whether the property was taxed or specially assessed. Thus a notice as follows: "This is to notify you, that, on the 13th day of September, 1873, Henry H. Gage purchased, and afterwards assigned the certificate of purchase to the undersigned, at a sale of lota and lands for taxes and special assessments, authorized by the laws of the State of Illi- nois, the following described real estate, ta.xed in the name of Wm. Betts, to wit: ("except street) snblot 4, all of sublots 5 and 6 of Lots 13, 15, IG and 17 in Block 2 west part of Samuel Ellis' Addition to Chicago; said taxes and asseHsmcnts wore levied for the year 1872; and that the time 1G4 of redemption thereof from said sale will expire on the 13th day of Sep- tember, 1875. ASAHEL GAGE;" is defective. Gage vs. Davis, 129—236. 9. When the time of redemption •will expire: Notice failing to state correctly the time when redemption will expire is in- valid. Brophy vs. Harding, 137—621 (1891). Inaccuracy in notice for redemption as to time when period will expire is fatal, though it extended time beyond the statutory period. Wisner vs. Chamber- lin, 117—568. Notice which states that time of redemption will expire October 26, 1876, when it does not expire until November 6, 1876, is fatally defective. Gage vs. Bailey, 100—530. Misstatement in notice of expiration of time of redemption will render tax deed invalid, even though such mistake enlarged, by misstatement, the time for redemption, and no effort to redeem was made by party notified. Benefield vs. Albert, 132—665. A notice which states the time of expiration of the period of redemption on a Sunday, is defective, and a deed predicated thereon is invalid, notwith- standing the two years expires on a Sunday, for Sunday is to be excluded by Sec. 1, Clause 11, of Chap. 131 of statute. Gage vs. Davis, 129—236. 10. If upon diligent inquiry he or she cannot be found in the county: Affidavit is insufficient which sets up diligent search simply in one particular county. Glos vs. Boettcher, 193 — 536. The affidavit need not specify the particular persons of whom diligent inquiry was made. Hammond vs. Carter, 155 — 579 (1895). Affidavit that affiant has made diligent inquiry for owner within the county is bad. He is bound to make diligent inquiry without reference to county lines. Van Matre vs. Sankey, 148—536 (1893). The statute does not peraiit the holder of the tax certificate to postpone his diligent inquiry until after he had published his notice. Burton vs. Perry, 146—71 (1893). The affidavit is fatally defective if it fails to show that the maker was not able on diligent inquiry to find in the county the owners of the property. It is not sufficient to state that he was unable to find the names of such owners. Harding vs. Brophy, 133 — 39. An affidavit for a tax deed wherein holder of certificate positively states prem- ises were not taxed or assessed in the name of any person, whereas col- lector's warrant shows the owner's name is insufficient to show diligent inquiry. Keeney vs. Glos, 258 — 555. Diligent inquiry mean what an ordinary business man or other person would understand them to mean if he sent an employe to a certain house to find the occupant, and it cannot be said an employee would discharge his duty in that regard if he went to the house on Saturday and Sundays only. Wright vs. Glos, 264—261. An affidavit that owner of premises could not be found upon diligent inquiry is overcome by testimony of the owner of legal title that he resided on the premises in question for four years, which covered entire period of redemp- tion, during which time his name was in the city directory, showing that he resided on the premises and that during spring and summer of each year he was in city all the time except Saturdays and Sunday, Wright viJ. Glos, 264—261. 165 11. Nearest the county seat of the county: Notieo of sale for taxes and expiration of redemption period must have been published in "nearest newspaper to the county, published in State." To determine that, must measure from county line. Weer vs. Hahn, 15 — 298. 12. "The firsx time not mure than five months": To make notice by publication suttieicut to authorize issue of tax deed, it must be shown that no one is in actual possession of premises within five months of expiration of time for redemption. Gage vs. Bailey, 100' — 530. Miscellaneous: Person in whose name land is taxed must be personally served with notice, it can be found in county. Burton vs. Perry, 146 — 71 (1893). Affidavit — Evidence — Perjury.] Section 217. Every such purchaser or assignee, 1)y himself or agent,^ shall, before he shall be entitled to a deed, make an affidavit ^^ of his having complied with the conditions of the foregoing section, stating particularly the facts relied on as such compliance - — which affidavit shall be delivered to the person authorized by law to execute such tax deed, and wdiich shall by him be filed with the officer having cus- tody of the record of the lands'' and lots sold for taxes and entries of redemption in the county where such lands or lots shall lie, to be by such officer entered on the records of his office, and carefully preserved among the files of his office, and which record or affidavit shall be prima facie evidence that such notice has been given. Any person swearing falsely in such affidavit shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and punished accordingly. 1. Affidavit — By whom made: Affidavit is defective which does not show ou its face that it was made by pur- chaser or his assignee personally or by an agent. Perry vs. Bowman, 151 — 25 (1894). Parol evidence cannot be introduced to show that the person making the affidavit was in ftict tlie agent of tlio purchaser. Perry vs. Bowman, 151 — 25 (1894). Allidavil required by section above, is essential to validity of deed. Palmer vs. Ri.bllc, ISO— K;;',; I'almer vs. Frank, 1()9— 92. la. Necessity of affidavit: I'urchaser's failure to show making of such affidavit will not prevent deed from furnishing colnr of litb- under statute of limitations. Whitney vs. Stevens, 89—53. Purpose of 217 rcfpiiring purchaser to (ih- affidavit sliowing (Miniiiliaiice with Sec. 216 is tn fnniish reconl evidence of cerlnin facts and \n rmnisli officer who is rer|nired to issiu- d I with :i basis for liis action. ('Inik vs. Zale.sk i, 253—63. Affidavit is junsdictional, and if no pro()er affidavit is tiled the tax dee.l issued thereon \» null and void. Wilson vs. Glos, 266 — 392. The affidavit herein re(|uired doe.s not apply to proceedings under Sec. 253. People v.s. Banks, 272—506. 166 2. What affidavit must show: Affidavit upon which tax deed is based, must show that notice of expiration of redemption period was served iipon person in whose name lots were specially assessed. Harrell vs. Bank, 183 — 548. Affidavit upon which tax deed is based, must show in whose name the lots were specially assessed. Harrell vs. Bank, 183 — 548. Affidavit should positively state that person upon whom notice is served, is owner. Glos vs. Gould, 182 — 514. Affidavit of purchaser is insufficient which states that he "caused to be served a notice on A, as owner." Glos vs. Gould, 182 — 514. Affidavit falsely stating that premises are vacant, voids deed, Langlois vs. McCullom, 181—198. Additional affidavit cannot be filed after issuance of tax deed to cure defects in original one and support new deed. Lauer vs. Weber, 177 — 120. Affidavit required by section above, should state that person upon whom notice is served, was owner at time of service. Lauer vs. Weber, 177 — 119. Where owner is non-resident, failure of affidavit for deed to state that occu- pant's possession is under non-resident owner is fatal. Esker vs. Heffer- nan, 159—38 (1895). Deed is a nullity when the affidavit does not conform to Sec. 217. Perry vs. Bowman, 151—25 (1894). Parol evidence cannot supply defects or omissions in the affidavit. Hughes vs. Carne, 135—519 (1891). Affidavit for deed showing S. A. B to be owner estops the affiant from denying that B. was owner. Hughes vs. Carne, 135 — 519 (1891). Affidavit for deed must show all that is necessary to entitle applicant to ihav« the deed executed. Hughes vs. Carne, 135 — 519 (1891). Affidavit of service of notice on "Reese Pierce & Co." by service on "L. H. Pierce" is insufficient, even if proved that was member of firm. Hughes vs. Carne, 135—519 (1891). Affidavit must show service of notice on "owners or parties interested at the time of publication." Gonzalia vs. Bartelman, 143 — 634 (1892). It is imperative that the affidavit show service of notice on the owner or the party interested. Smith vs. Prall, 133 — 308. Affidavit ought to show who served the notice, in what manner it was served, whether it was written or printed or partly written and partly printed, and when it was served. Brickey vs. English, 129 — 646. An affidavit of the service of notice, to entitle the purchaser to a deed on a tax sale, must show the names of all persons in the actual possession of the land, also the person in whose name it was taxed, and also the names of the owners or parties interested in the premises, and the service of the proper notice on them. Not naming such persons is a fatal omission. Stillwell vs. Brammell, 124—338. An affidavit for a tax deed of the service of notice to B, in the actual posses- sion or occupancy of the premises, "and as owner or party interested therein, and as the person in whose name it (land) was assessed," is fatally defective. The affidavit must show that the person served was in fact the owner or person in whose name the property was taxed. It is not sufficient that he was regarded as such. Stillwell vs. Brammell, 124 — 338. Affidavit which does not show that the affiant is the purchaser, the purchaser's assignee or agent or the assignee's agent is insufficient. Affidavit which 167 does not show that no one was in the actual possession or occupation of the land in question or that service has been made on such occupant is insufficient. Taylor vs. Wright, 121 — ±55. Affidavit of notice must show deliveiy of notice to persons in possession at time of delivery. Affidavit that A B was in possession on the 19th, and that notice was delivered to him on the 20th, is insufficient. Wisner vs. Chamlerlin, 117— 56S. Failure to make affidavit, or inaccuracy in affidavit, is fatal to tax deed based thereon, regardless of what the real facts may be. Thus, recitation in affidavit of service of notice on J. Mayer, when I. Mayer was the party in interest and actually served, vitiates it. Gage vs. Mayer, 117 — (332. Affidavit must set out particularly facts showing service of notice. Davis vs. Gossnell, 113—121. Where affidavit for tax deed does not show that notice of purchaser at tax sale was served upon persons in whose names property was assessed, tax deed may be set aside by suit by owner of land to quiet title. Gage vs. Hervey, 111—305. Manner of service and facts relied on to constitute service must be stated in affidavit. Davis vs. Gosnell, 113 — 121, following Price vs. England, 109— 395. Oral evidence is inadmissible to aid an affidavit for a tax deed. Esker vs. Hefferuan, 159—38 (1895). An affidavit for a tax deed wherein holder of certificate positively states prem- ises were not taxed or assessed in the name of any person, where collector's warrant shows the owner's name is insufficient to show diligent inquiry. Keeney vs. Glos, 258 — 555. Affidavit must show a compliance with provisions of 216 by direct and positive statement of facts, and the matter of such compliance must not be left to inference from doubtful or equivocal language. Wilson vs. Glos, 266— 392. 3. Affidavit — Where filed: Affidavit is to be lodged with sheriff before deed taken out. Whitney vs. Stevens, 89—53. Printer's fee.] Section 218. In case any person shall be com- pelled to publish suc.li notice in a newspaper, then, before any person who may liave a rij^ht to redeem such lands or lots from such sale shall be permitted to redeem, he shall pay the officer or person who by law is authorized to receive such redemption money, the amount paid for printer's fee for publLshins" such no- tice, for llic use of llie person CdiiiprlkMl 1o i)ul)lish such notice as aforesaid; tlie fee for such publication shall not exceed ■+! I'or each tract or lot contained in sucli notice. Aflvertising fee should not exceed sjil per tract. If may be less, Imt cannot bo more. Gngo vs. Bailey, 115 — 646. When entitled to deed.] Section 219. At any time after the expiration of two years from dati; of sale of any real estate for taxes 01- special assessments, if the sann? shall not have been re- dt'cnu'd, the county cleik, on r<'(|uest. and on the production of 168 the certificate of purchase, and upon compliance with the three preceding sections, shall execute and deliver to the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, a deed of conveyance for the real estate described in such certificate. Under former statute, held, that tax deed might be executed either by sheriff or his successor in office. Bestor vs. Powell, 7 — (2 Gil.), 119. Deed may include several tracts — Fee — Exception.] Sec- tion 220. When any person shall hold more than one certificate of purchase at the same sale, and for the same year's tax or spe- cial assessment, the clerk shall, on the request of the holder of such certificate, include as many tracts or lots described therein in the deed of conveyance as such person may desire and for which deed the county clerk shall have a fee of 50 cents for each certificate embraced therein: Provided, That no greater fee than $3.00 shall be charged upon any one deed: Provided, further, that said clerk shall include in such deed not to exceed one lot, block, tract or piece of land as listed, assessed and sold in one description, except in cases where such lot, block, tract or piece of land is owned by one party or person. [As amended by act approved May 13, 1903. In force July 1, 1903. L. 1903, p. 299. Form of tax deed.] Section 221. The deed so made by the county clerk under the official seal of his office shall be recorded in the same manner as other conveyances of real estate, and shall vest in the grantee, his heirs, and assigns, the title of the prop- erty therein described without further acknowledgment or evi- dence of such conveyance, and said conveyance shall be sub- stantially in the following form : STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) > ss. county. ) Whereas, at a public sale of real estate for the non-payment of taxes, made in the county aforesaid, on the day of , A. D. 19...., the following described real esate was sold, to wit: (here place description of real estate conveyed) ; and whereas, the same not having been redeemed from said sale, and it appearing that the holder of the certificate of purchase of said real estate has complied with the laws of the state of Illinois necessary to entitle (insert him, her or them) to a deed of said real estate: Now, therefore, know ye, that I county clerk of said county of , in consideration of the premises and by virtue of the statutes of the state of Illinois in such cases provided, do hereby grant and convey unto , his heirs and assigns forever, the said real estate hereinbefore described, subject, how- ever, to any redemption provided by law. 169 Given under mv hand and the seal of our court this day of A. D. 19... \ , County Clerk. A deed conveying one vigintillionth part of a lot is void upon its face and does not constitute a cloud upon title. Petty vs. Beers, 224 — 129. But if the owner conies in and asks to have it removed as a cloud, it is error to decree such removal without reimbursement to the holder of the tax deed. Jackson vs. GIos, 243—280. Where proceedings prior to deed describe land in question by a description which is void for uncertainty, the proceedings also will be void for un- certainty. Brickey vs. English, 129 — 046. The following description, ' ' W. side N. % S. E. N. W. 10 acres Sec. 8, T. 23, R. 10 quantity sold 10 acres," was sufficient in tax deed. Taylor vs. Wright, 121—455. A tax deed held void for uncertainty in description. Description in tax deed reading "part of survey No. 743, claim No. 93, township 5 S., R. 9 West, 3 P. M., Monroe county, Illinois, containing 31 35-100 acres," held void for uncertainty. Brickey vs. English, 129 — 646, following P. vs. C. and A. E. Co., 96—369. Description of land in tax deed construed by same rules as in deeds between private individuals. Blakely vs. Bestor, 13 — 708. It is not necessary to the validity of the tax deed, that it be recorded. Morgan Park vs. Knopf, 210—453. Correction of error in one deed cannot be made by issuing another. Fuller vs. Shedd, 161—462. Mandamus does not lie to compel county clerk to issue second tax deed to remedy mistake of purchaser at tax sale. Eule would be different when mistake was made by clerk. Klokke vs. Stanley, 109 — 192. Tax deed based on judgment for too large amount of tax, even to extent of a few cents, or fur tax any part of which is illegal, is void. McLaughlin vs. Thompson, 55—249. Eccital in deed of sale of two lots where judgment was against eight lots, was a fatal variance. Pitkin vs. Yaw, 13 — 251. Tax deed is not patent, and, to constitute it valid conveyance, delivery of it must be proved. Hulick v. Scovil, 9 — (4 Gil.), 159. Evidence recorded.] Section 222. County clerks shall record as evidence ui)on which deeds are issued, the application, all aflfi- davits and notices filed witli the application, the certificate of sale, and all olhei- documents and papers filed in compliance with law, and he entitled to the same fee therefor that may be allowed by law for recording deeds. [As amended by act approved May 13, 190.3. In force July 1, 1903. L. 1903, p. 299. It was the duty of the county clerk to record the tax certilicale and he is al- lowed the same fees therefor as arc allowed for recording deeds. Village of Morgan Park vs. Knopf, 210 — 453. Applies to former sales.] Section 223. The foregoing six sec- tions shall apply to all sales of real estate for taxes heretofore 170 made, as well as to such sales for taxes and special assessments hereafter to be made. Effect of deed as evidence — Repayment.] Section 224. Deeds executed by the county clerk as aforesaid shall be prima facie evi- dence ^ in all controversies and suits in relation to the right of the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, to the real estate thereby con- veyed of the following facts: First — That the real estate con- veyed was subbject to taxation at the time the same was assessed, and had been listed and assessed in the time and manner required by law. Second — That the taxes or special assessments were not paid at^ any time before sale. Third— That the real estate con- veyed had not been redeemed from the sale at the date of the deed. Fourth — That the real estate was advertised for sale in the manner and for the length of time required by law. Fifth — That the real estate was sold for taxes or special assessments as stated in the deed. Sixth— That the grantee in the deed was the pur- chaser or assignee of the purchaser. Seventh — That the sale was conducted in the manner required by law.^ [And any judg- ment for the sale of real estate for delinquent taxes rendered after the passage of this Act, except as otherwise provided in this section, shall estop all parties from raising any objections thereto, or to a tax title based thereon, which existed at or before the ren- dition of such judgment or decree, and could have been presented as a defense to the application for said judgment in the court wherein the same was rendered, and as to all such questions, the judgment itself shall be conclusive evidence of its regularity and validity in all collateral proceedings,^ except in cases where the tax or special assessments have been paid, or the real estate was not liable to the tax or assessment:] * Provided, that any judg- ment or decree of court, in law or equity, setting aside any tax deed procured under this Act, or restoring the owner of same to possession, shall provide that the claimant shall pay to the party holding such tax deed the following: All taxes and legal costs, as provided by law, with interest at five per cent per annum, to- gether with subsequent taxes and special assessments paid and the statutory fees and costs incurred ; for the service of the notices provided by law which must be served by holders of certificates of sale to occupants, owners or parties interested in real estate sold for taxes, the sum of $3.00 for each lot, block, tract or piece of land, as listed, assessed and sold in one description; for prepar- ing the affidavit of compliance with laws $1.00; the actual cost 171. paid to the county clerk for issuing said tax deed; the actual cost of recording said tax deed; $1.00 for publication fees for each lot, block, tract, or piece of land as listed, assessed and sold in one description. No final judgment or decree of court in any case either at law or in equity or in proceedings under the eminent domain Act involving the title to or interest in any land in which such party holding such tax deed shall have an interest or set- ting aside any tax deed procured under this Act shall be entered until the claimant shall make reimbursement to the party holding such tax deed and payments as herein provided in so far as it shall appear that the holder of such deed or his assignors shall have properly paid or be entitled to in procuring such deed.^ [As amended by Act approved June 28, 1919. L. 1919, p. 762. (Portion in square brackets was added by the amendment of 1879 (Laws 1879, p. 252) except words "or decree", which was added in 1885 (Laws 1885, p. 234).) « 1. How far failure to show precept or jiidgment is fatal to prima facie siifficiency of tax deed: Failure to show in evidence in first instance precept in record no longer fatal to judgment since Act of 1879. Under Sec. 224, as amended by Act of 1879, it is sufficient that tax deed was introduced to make out prima facie case. Prior to the amendment, in order to make a prima facie case, it was necessary to show judgment and precept. Eanson vs. Henderson, 114 — 528. The contrary was held prior to the amendment of 1879: Tax deed is void which is not supported by judgment or precept. Gage vs. Thompson, 161—4^3. Under this statute a tax deed is not prima facie evidence of the sufficiency of the form and manner of jjublication, and the proof thereof, and in the absence of evidence of a precept and judgment the tax title is not valid. Whilst a tax deed is, under the statute (Chap. 120, Sec. 124), prima facie evidence of certain facts, the sufficiency of the form and manner of X)ublication and proof of publication arc not of those facts. Gilbreath vs. Dilday, 152—207 (1894). In order to sustain tax deed as muniment of title, valid judgment and precept must be shown. The precept is a transcript of judgment record, embracing the covening order, notice and list of lands against which judgment is rendered, all certified to by clerk. Bell vs. Johnson, 111 — 374. To establish tax title, valid judgment, precept and affidavit must be proved. Smith vs. Hutchinson, 108—662. Under Act of 1872, a tax deed, to be used as evidence of title, must be sup- ported by valid judgment and precept. Gage vs. Lightburn, 93 — 248. Tax deed admissible as evidence of title only after proof of requisites of valid sale. Smith vs. Smith, 62—493. .\ party relying on a tax deed as title must produce a valid judgment against the land for taxes and ;i prece[)t, under wiiii'h the snle wns made. Williams v.M. Undcrliill, 5S— i:i7. 172 So imdor former similar provision it was necessary to prove judgmcut and precept before tax deed is admissible in evidence. Hinman vs. Pope, 6 — (1 Gil.), 131; Baily vs. Doolittle, 24—577. A regular tax deed, founded on a valid judomcftt and precept, is prima facie proof of every fact necessary to authorize a recovery upon it. Spellman vs. Curtenius, 12—409. Under former statute, a sheriff's tax deed, based on valid judgment and precept, is conclusive against all except former owner and those claiming under him, but the former owner and persons claiming under him can go back of judgment and show irregularities. Lusk vs. Harber, 8 — (3 Gil.), 158. Miscellaneous cases upon the effect of the tax deed as prima facie evideoice of the sufficiency of the record on which it is founded: Tax deed is prima facie evidence of fact enumerated in statute, and nothing more. To make it evidence of title must introduce in evidence notice provided by Sec. 216. Kepley vs. Fouke, 187 — 163; Holbrook vs. Fellows, 38—440. This section does not dispense with proper allegations as to title in a pica in a suit in chancery. It affects the rule of evidence only; makes tax deed prima facie evidence in some cases. Gage vs. Harbert, 145 — 530 (1892). A tax deed is only prima facie evidence of the facts therein mentioned when the controversy or suit in which it is introduced has relation to the right of the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, to the real estate conveyed by the deed. Pardridge vs. Hyde Park, 131—537. Tax deed must be supported by proof of regularity of prior proceedings where not itself made evidence thereof by statute. Skinner vs. Fulton, 39 — 484. It is presumed that proper proof that certificate was made by publishers was made in trial court in favor of deed. Dukes vs. Eowley, 24 — 210. If party attacking deed gives collector 's report and notice in evidence, any substantial defect therein will destroy prima facie case made by deed. Ballance vs.' Curtenius, 12 — 409. Where deed recited that judgment was rendered at May term, 1848, but record of judgment failed to show at what term it was rendered, the deed was not supportd by record and was fatally invalid. Young vs. Thompson, 14 — 380. Judgment held invalid under Eevised Statutes of 1845, Chap. 89, Sec. 57, unless record showed that collector's report and certificate of publication were filed and recorded with judgment record. Dukes vs. Eowley, 24 — 210. Sec. 57 of the Eevenue Act of that time required that the clerk of the Circuit Court file the collector's report and certificate of publication, and record the same in a book to be kept for that purpose. It was of this that the deed was not evidence. So under Eevised Statutes of 1845, Chap. 89, Sec. 71, held, that deed was not evidence of due filing and recording of col- lector's report and certificate of publication. Dukes vs. Eowley, 24—210. Provision in former statute requiring deposits of copies of advertisements of sale with Auditor, Treasurer and Secretary of State, held merely directory. Vance vs. Schuyler, 6— (1 Gil.), 160. Auditor's tax deeds: So where defendant rebuts presumption of proper listing by producing records showing absence of listing of such lands, claimant under deed must afi&rma- tively prove due listing. An Auditor's deed, reciting a sale of land for taxes of 1832, was read in evidence. The defendant assailed the deed by * 173 offering to show that there had been no valid listing of the land for taxa- tion. The diagram introduced was testified to by the Auditor as being all the evidence to be found in the records. This rebutted the presumption of the validity of the deed. Tibbetts vs. Job, 11 — 453; Schuyler vs. Hull, 11 — 162. Sec. 9 of January 19, 1829 — "deed from the Auditor of Public Accounts shall be evidence of the regularity and legality of the sale, until the contrary shall be made to appear ' ' — alters common-law requirement that claimant under proceedings should show regularity thereof. Graves vs. Bruen, 11 — 431. Auditor's tax deed for land sold under law in force in 1827 is not evidence of title, without proof aliunde that all stops prior to sale have complied with statute. Garrett vs. Wiggins, 2 — (1 Scam.), 335; Hill vs. Leonard, 5 — (4 Scam.), 140; Wiley vs. Beau, 6— (1 Gil.), 302; Irving vs. Brownell, 11—402; Goewey vs. Urig, 18 — 238; Arrowsmith vs. Burlingim, 4 McLean, 489. Auditor's tax deed, under Eevenue Act of 1829, held prima facie proof for plaintiffs in ejectment claiming under it without other evidence connected with it. Vance vs. Schuyler, 6 — (1 Gil.), 160; Messenger vs. Gcrmania, 6— (1 Gil.), 631. Auditor's tax deed, like patents from United States and from State, is admis- sible in evidence without proof of execution. Graves vs. Bruen, 6 — (1 Gil.), 167. Under former statute, held, that Auditor's tax deed was prima facie proof of assignment of certificate of jiurchase to grantee, and that such assignment need not be proved prior to producing deed in evidence. Wiley vs. Bean, 6— (1 Gil.), 302. 2. "That the sale was conducted in the manner provided by law": Mere error, where nut jurisdiction, e. g., variance of amount bid at sale from amount of judgment, does not vitiate proceedings. Frew vs. Taylor, 106 — 159. Abbreviations in describing premises in various proceedings, e. g., "pt. " for part, "frm" for from, "ft" for feet, do not vitiate proceedings. Here the assessment book of the county assessor was offered, the notice and return of the collector for the taxes, the judgment for, taxes, the precept and the sheriff's deed. The abbreviation appeared in these, and it was claimed rendered the property description uncertain. Blakoly vs. Bestor, 13 — 708. The deed is prima facie proof under this section that land in (luestion was sold at the time and place and in the manner reciiiircd liy law. Taylor vs. Wright, 121—455. Tax deed is invalid where there is no evidence that the day on wliicli the precept was made an omission 174 of interest ou a drainage assessment renders tbe aggregate of the tax less than is authorized by law. Hammond vs. Carter. 155 — 579 (1895). 4. Exception: The land owner may raise objections by way of collateral attack where a judgment for taxes includes either illegal taxes or illegal costs under the clause; "except, etc., or the real estate was not liable to the tax or as- sessment." Under this clause the objection that property was exempt is proper. Cemetery Co. vs. People, 204 — 4C8. Owner is not estopped by tax-sale judgment from showing that it was fradu- lently too large or excessive, where did not appear and contest. Gage vs. Lyons, 138—590 (1891). Chancery will set aside tax deed for fraud practiced by purchaser on owner. Palmer vs. Douglas, 107 — 204. Incorporated village or city has no power to levy taxes for payment of salaries of township officers, even though incorporated municipality and township are co-extensive. Tax so levied is illegal, and sale therefore void. And this section does not cure it. Drake vs. Ogden, 128 — 603, Estoppel of tax deed under this section does not extend to action of debt in personam; validity of tax must be established to siistain such action. O. and M. E. Co. vs. Highway Coni'rs, 117 — 279. 5. Payment to holder of a tax deed as a condition precedent to a decree setting it aside: Before the amendment of 1919 the proviso was thus worded: "Provided, That any judgment or decree of court setting aside any tax deed procured under this act, shall provide that the claimant shall pay to the party, holding such tax deed, all taxes and legal costs, together with all penalties, as pro- vided by law, as it shall appear the holder of such deed or his assignors, shall have properly paid or be entitled to in procuring such deed, before such claimant shall have the benefit of such judgment or decree. The fol- lowing decisions dealt with the proviso as thus worded: In the proviso to this section, "penalty" does not mean the per cent, on the purchase money required under the statute to be paid to effect a redemp- tion, but requires only that the purchaser or holder of the tax title should receive as condition of having tax deed set aside, the amount paid at the sale of the land for taxes, subsequent taxes paid, and interest at the legal rate from the dates of such payments. Gage vs. Light Co., 194 — 30. Penalty provided by statute in case of redemption will not be awarded in fixing the equitable terms of decree canceling tax deed. Glos vs. GeiTity, 190—547. Reimbursement for taxes, etc., is not essential condition to removing tax deed as cloud where it appeared that all the taxes had been paid by the claimant on the lot and the holders of the tax deeds also paid taxes on the same piece upon an erroneous description. Ely vs. Brown, 183 — 603. Reimbursement paid at tax sale with all subsequently paid taxes and assess- ments with interest, is proper condition precedent to removing cloud of tax deed. Lauer vs. Weber, 177 — 122. Amounts paid at the tax sale and taxes charged upon the land paid by pur- chaser with interest at 6 per cent, should be decreed against a complain- ant in setting aside a tax title. Cotes vs. Rohrbeck, 139' — 532 (1891), The complainant made a tender of more than what was due as condition to setting aside deed, but the court, while noting that, does not order pay- 175 meut of the amount due. That was error. The holder of deed, however, was compelled to pay costs, having refused the tender. Gage vs. Dupuy, 137—652 (1890). This cites Gage vs. Pirtle, 124—502. The "penalties" in the proviso to Sec. 224 meant penalties which the holder of the tax deed or his assignors shall have paid or be entftled to in procuring his tax deed, or otherwise. The money paid on redemption is not the same as money paid by the tax sale purchaser. Therefore, the 100 per cent, penalty for redemption is not proper in setting aside tax deed for defective notice (Sec. 216). Gage vs. Dupuy, 137—652 (1890). Defendant should not pay costs in an action to set aside the tax deed as a cloud, where the plaintitf paid all the taxes legally extended and the amount for which the lots sold, costs of tax sale and 6 per cent., because not averred that complainant made tender. McCartney vs. Morris, 137—481 (1890). The condition of the equitable relief granted upon the setting aside of a tax deed should be the payment of the amount paid at the tax sale, subsequent taxes paid and interest. An amount equal to the redemption money need not be paid. Gage vs. Pirtle, 124—502. The penalties to be paid under the proviso to this section are penalties which the holder of the tax deed, or his assignors, shall have paid or be entitled to in procuring the tax deed. Money paid on redemption is not money paid by the tax-sale purchaser, or which he was entitled to in procuring his tax deed, or otherwise. It is money paid by the land-owner, and paid, not to procure, but to prevent, a tax deed. It is not money the tax-sale purchaser was ever entitled to have. Gage vs. Pirtle, 124—502. Bill to set aside illegal tax deeds from tax sale need not contain offer to pay redemption money and interest thereon. Gage vs. Waterman, 121 — 115. Proviso to clause 7, See. 224, requiring that judgment shall direct plaintiff to refund to defendant taxes and costs paid by him and penalties recovered by him, does not apply to judgment in action or ejectment. Eiverside Co. vs. Townshend, 120—9. He who seeks to set aside tax sale for mere irregularities as cloud on his title must reimburse purchaser amount he has paid with 6 per cent, interest. Gage vs. Nichols, 112—269. Complainant in chancery suit to set aside tax sale, e. g., to perpetually enjoin county clerk from issuing deed on such sale, in order to entitle himself to relief, must refund to purchaser taxes paid, with interest. Peacock vs. CarneH, 110—09. Bill to redeem from tax sale must offer to pay purchase money, taxes paid by purchaser, and interest thereon. Moore vs. Wayman, 107 — 192. The bill was filed October 10, 1878; before the time allowed by the statute for redemption from sales; a portion of the tax consisted of certain city taxes which were not a lawful charge on the property. Compluinants offered to refund or pay the holder of the tax deed the amount of lawful taxes em- brnccd in the judgment, and iill subsequent taxes paid by him, with 6 per cent, interest. They did not, however, make tender until after suit com- menced. Held, that comi)iainant pay amount lawfully due, with 6 per cent, interest, and costs. Gage vs. Nichols, 135—428 (1890); Gagova. HiiH.se, 102—592. 176 Reimbursement of money advanced for taxes upon which deeds were based, where relics upon title by adverse possession, not prerequisite to their cancellation. Simons vs. Drake, 179 — 65. Reimbursement of money advanced for taxes upon which deed removed was based should be ordered where complainant was in possession of premises, claiming as owner at time of sale. Simons vs.« Drake, 179 — 66. Right to sue to set aside tax sale is not confined to original owner, but may bft exercised by mortgagee or any person having such an interest as would entitle him to redeem. Miller vs. Cook, 135 — 190 (1890). Tender to or offer to pay lawful taxes embraced in the judgment and subse- quent taxes with interest must be made by party asking court of chancery to set aside tax sale as cloud on title. Miller vs. Cook, 135^ — 190 (1890). Statute providing that person cannot set up invalidity of tax sale without previous tender or payment of taxes is unconstitutional. Senichka vs. Lowe,. 74^274. Act of 1861 requiring payment of redemption money and interest as condition precedent to questioning valadity of tax deed except for specified pur- poses, held unconstitutional, because amounts to compelling a party to buy justice. Similar provision in Act of 1845 (E. S. 1845, p. 448, Sec. 73) held unconstitutional and a "dead letter." Eeed vs. Tyler, 56 — ^288. Under Sec. 224 of Revenue Act, the tax deed is not prima facie evidence of the amount the holder paid. That must be proved aliunde. Glos vs. Kel- ley, 212—314. The General Assembly adopted an act in 1861 which provided that no tax deeds shall be assailed except on ground that said taxes paid before sale, that real estate not subject to taxation, or that redeemed from sale, or if notice necessary under Constitution, that it was not given; in all other cases, party wishing to contest had to deposit redemption money, with 10 per cent, interest. Held, that this was not retroactive and it would violate Constitution by depriving of property without due course of law, to hold it so. Conway vs. Cable, 37 — 82. Bill for reimbursement by tax buyer will not be entertained. The owner got judgment in ejectment. This is a separate bill for reimbursement of taxes. Gage vs. Eddy, 186—440. Mere introduction by defendants to application to register title, without proof as to what amount, if any, he paid on account of taxes does not authorize reimbursement. Tobias vs. Kaspzyk, 247 — 80. Holder of invalid tax deed is only entitled to reimbursement when his tax title is attacked and set aside in a proceeding brought for that purpose by the owner of the land. Chicago vs. Pick, 251^ — 594; O 'Council vs. Sanford, 255—49. Holder of invalid tax deed not entitled to reimbursement out of compensation awarded in condemnation proceeding instituted against holder of legal title. Chicago vs. Pick, 251 — 594; Sanitary Dist. vs. Murphy, 261 — 269. The deposit of gross sum for all the holders of tax title is a sufficient tender to relieve from any subsequent costs made by defendants in attempting to adjust their conflicting claims to reimbursement fund. Donham vs. Joyce, 257—112. Party not entitled to have tax deed set aside without reimbursing holder there- of for the money properly expended in procuring it. Kuhn vs. Glos, 257—289, 293. 17V If complainant in suit to remove tax deed as a cloud, makes no tender before filing the bill, it is error on setting aside deed to require hold of tax deed to pay costs. Kuhn vs. Glos, 257 — 289. Where notice of tender in open court is given, and defendant fails to appear and money due defendant and unknown owners is deposited with clerk and notice given defendant of such deposit, there is sufficient tender as justi- fies charging subsequent costs to defendant. Wright vs. Glos, 264 — ^261. Decree should include reimbursement for fees paid for recording the evidence of sales and issuance of tax deeds and fees for recording the deeds. Jud- son vs. Freutel, 266—24. Holder of tax deed entitled to be reimbursed for taxes paid subsequent to the time she received her deed, Strebel vs. Glos, 271 — 65. Before judgment setting aside tax certificate can be rendered, party seeking such relief must pay all legal cost and taxes, even though there be irregu- larities in levying and collecting the taxes. Whitaker vs. Iron, 206A. 124. Decree awarding to assignee of owner of land sold for taxes a surplus remain- ing after such sale does not set aside a tax deed. People vs. Ogden, 195A. 564. 6. Effect of amendment of 1879: Amendment of 1879 to this section does not affect judgment prior to its pas- sage. Ilarland vs. Eastman, 119 — 22. Amendment of May 31, 1879, does not apply to case in which default was en- tered before taking effect of amendment, and final judgment was entered after such taking effect. Stamposki vs. Stanley, 100 — 210. This provision does not apply to deed upon validity of which Supreme Court has passed before enactment of proviso. Eiverside Co. vs. Townshend, 120—9. Effect of purchase by one whose duty it was to pay taxes: Purchase by one whose duty it is to pay taxes operates as payment of taxes only. McChesney vs. White, 140-^30 (1892). Tax deed may be avoided by showing that grantee was in position making it his duty to pay taxes. Blakely vs. Bostor, 13 — 708. Person in possession not therefore bound to pay taxes. Blakely vs. Bestor, 13—708. Owner of equity of redemption considered owner of land until mortgagee en- ters for condition broken, and cannot acquire title by purchasing at tax sale. Ralston vs. Hughes, 13 — 469. Owners and persons under legal or moral obligation to pay taxes and assess- ments cannot become purchasers at tax sale. Oswald vs. Wolf, 129 — 200. Person whose duty it is to pay taxes cannot acquire title by purchasing at tax sale. Lewis vs. Ward, 99 — 525. Purchaser, under agreement with vendor to pay taxes, cannot thereby acquire title against vendor. Baily vs. Doolittle, 24 — 577. The same rule would [irobably bo held to apply to one under a legal obligation to pay the taxes who afterwani.s purchases an outstanding tax title ac- quired by a stranger. Oswald vs. Wolf, 129—200. Mortgagee of invalid tax deed holder takes title subject to infirmities. Gon- zalia vs. Bartelman, 143—634 (1892). It is duty of assignee of mortgagor to pay taxes and payment gives liim no additional right to promisea. Medley vs. Elliott, 62 — 532. 178 Agent, iu paying taxes for principal, .cannot acquire title against him. He is a trustee if he takes title in his own name. Barton vs. Moss, 32 — 50. Agent cannot acquire tax title. Gonzalia vs. Bartelman, 143 — 634 (1892). Widow of tenant in common cannot become the purchaser of a tax title where she neglected to pay the taxes on the property. McChesney vs. White, 140—330 (1892). Tenant for life is bound to pay taxes unless instiument creating estate relieves him of that obligation. Waldo vs. Cummings, 45 — 421. Persona asserting invalid claim of ownership may acquire tax title and assert it for his own benefit. Pickering vs. Lomax, 120^ — 289. But owner who acquired subsequent to levy of tax, and who assumed no ob- ligation in reference thereto, is not affected by foregoing rule and may buy at such sale. Oswald vs. Wolf, 129—200, If lands of A and lands of B arc sold together, A cannot acquire title by pur- chasing at tax sale, as he should have paid tax on his own lands before sale. Lewis vs. Ward, 99 — 525. Miscellaneous. Law in force at date of sale controls effect of tax deed, although deed is made after law is repealed and new law enacted. Garrett vs. Wiggins, 2 — (1 Scam.), 335. Tax deed not reformed in equity, because it is a purely technical title. Altes vs. Hinckler, 36 — 265. Marshaling securities does not apply in favor of tax-title holder against mort- gagee, to compel him to resort to a fund that will not affect tax title. Miller vs. Cook, 135—190 (1890). Payment of taxes previous to sale renders same void. Perkins vs. Bulkley, 166—231. When deed must be taken out.] Section 225. Unless the holder of the certificate for real estate purchased at any tax sale under this act, takes out the deed as entitled by law, and files the same for record within one year from and after the time for redemption expires, the said certificate or deed, and the sale on which it is based, shall, from and after the expiration of such one year, be absolutely null. If the holder of such certificate shall be prevented from obtaining such deed by injunction or order of any court, or by the refusal of the clerk to execute the same, the time he is so prevented shall be excluded from the computation of such time. Certificates of purchase and deeds executed by the county clerk shall recite the qualifications required in this section. Application of section above. Here did not take out deed for twenty-two years.. Gage vs. Parker, 178—459. Tax deed to be effective must be taken out within one year after expiration of period for redemption. Fuller vs. Shedd, 161 — 496. Court is not authorized to make exceptions in other cases than those enumer- ated in this section, e. g., it is not authorized to sanction the issue of a tax deed more than five years after tax sale to correct an alleged mistake of the clerk in making deed out to wrong party. Gage vs. Reid, 118 — 35, 179 Repealed.] Section 226. [Repealed by act approved May 29, 1879. In force July 1, 1879. L. 1879, p. 250. Redemption or purchase of forfeited property.] Section 227. If any person shall desire to redeem or purchase any tract of land or lot forfeited to the state, he shall apply to the county clerk, who shall issue his order to the county collector, directing him to receive from said person the amount due on said tract or lot, which shall in no case be less than ten per cent, on all taxes heretofore forfeited, and twenty-five per cent, on all taxes here- after levied and forfeited, in addition to the tax, special assess- ments, interest and printers' fees due thereon, particularly de- scribing the property and setting forth the amount due ; and upon presentation of said order to the county collector, he shall re- ceive said amount and give the person duplicate receipts there- for, setting forth a description of the property and the amount received — one of which shall be countersigned by the county clerk, and when so countersigned, shall be evidence of the re- demption or sale of the property therein described, as the case may be, but no such receipt shall be valid until it is countersigned by the county clerk. The other receipt shall be filed by the county clerk in his office, and said clerk shall make a proper entry of the redemption or sale of the property on the books in his office, and charge the amount of the redemption or sale money to the county collector. In cases of sales, the collector and clerk shall make the receipt in the form of a certificate of purchase. Prop- erty purchased under this section shall be subject to redemption, notice, etc., the same as if sold at regular })ublic tax sale. [See Sec- tion 225. As amended by act approved May 31, 1879. In force July 1, 1879. L. 1879, p. 254. Section does not deprive owner of property forfeited of constitutional riglit of redemption nor violate Sec. 4, Art. 9 of constitution prohibiting sale for taxes without a court order or judgmonl. Ziccarclli vs. Stuckart, 277 — 26. I'rovi.sions of this section jtrovides a speedy and inexpensive method of re- d(;mption or sale without resorting to chanceiy proceedings provided for in Sec. 253 and it docs not conflict with that section. Ziccarclli vs. Stuck- art, 277—20. Report and payment of money collected on forfeited lands.] Section 228. It sliall he the duly ol! the county clerk, annually, when he makes return of Ihc amount ()!' 1ax(!s levied, to report 1o the auditor the amount due the stale on account of the redemp- tion and sales of such forfeited i)i'oi)erty, and said auditor shall chiirni' the sanip to the fojlcftoi'. If the follcctor who received 180 said redemption or sale money shall be succeeded in office, he shall pay the amount in his hands over to his successor, who shall pay said amount into the state treasury when he settles for the taxes of the current year. Addition to Current Tax of Amount Due for Forfeiture — Sale.] Section 229. The amount due for general taxes and special assessments on lands and lots previously forfeited to the State and remaining unpaid on the first day of November, and on lands and lots on which such special assessments were withdrawn from collection, shall be added to the tax of the current year; and the amount thereof shall be reported against the county collector with the amount of taxes for said year; and the amount so charged for said forfeitures on general taxes and special assessments shall be placed on the tax books, collected and paid over in like manner as other taxes. The county collector is hereby authorized to adver- tise and sell said property in the manner hereinbefore required by this Act, as if said property had never been forfeited to the State ; and the county, city, town or school district may, by their agent attend such sale for taxes and buy said lands and acquire the same rights that individuals now have under the law, and acquire, hold, sell and dispose of said title thereto the same as and in the same manner as individuals may do under the laws of this State, in case of sale for taxes. Said additions and sales shall be contin- ued from year to year until the taxes and special assessments on said property are paid, by sale or otherwise. [As amended by Act filed June 28, 1917. L. 1917, p. 658. Back taxes for forfeited property need not be stated separately for eacli year. P. vs. Eeat, 107—581. If lands have been forfeited to State, whether in due form or not, interest, penalty, etc., with back tax, should be added to tax for current year. Belleville Nail Co. vs. P., 98—399. Suit for tax on forfeited property.] Section 230. The county board may, at any time, institute suit in an action of debt in the name of the People of the State of Illinois in any court of com- petent jurisdiction for the whole amount due for taxes and spe- cial assessments on forfeited property; or any county, city, town, school district or other municipal corporation to which any such tax or special assessment may be due, may, at any time, institute suit in an action of debt in its own name, before any court of competent jurisdiction, for the amount of such tax or special as- sessment due any such corporation on forfeited property, and prose- cute the same to final judgment. The county board may also, at 181 any time, institute suit in an action of debt in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, in any court of competent juris- diction against any person, firm or corporation, for the recovery of any personal property tax due from such person, firm or cor- poration, and in anj' such suit for the recovery of personal prop- erty tax, the return of the county collector that such taxes are delinquent, shall be prima facie evidence that such taxes are due and unpaid, but the fact that such taxes are due and unpaid may be proven by other competent testimony. This Act shall apply to all taxes heretofore levied against any person, firm or corpora- tion and now upon any assessment book or roll, and on the sale of any property following such judgment on execution or otherwise, any such county, city, town, school district or other municipal cor- poration, interested in the collection of said tax, may become pur- chaser at such sale of either real or personal property, and if the property so sold is not redeemed (in case of real estate) may ac- quire, hold, sell and dispose of the title thereto, the same as in- dividuals may do under the laws of this State, and in any such suit or trial for forfeited taxes, the fact that real estate or personal property is assessed to a person, firm or corporation, shall he prima facie evidence that such person, firm or corporation was the owner thereof, and liable for the taxes for the year or years for which the assessment was made, and such fact may be proved by the introduction in evidence of the proper assessment book or roll, 01- other competent proof. [As amended by Act filed June 28. 1917. L. 1917, p. 658. What court has jurisdiction. .Suit under above may be brought in proper case Ix'foro justice of the peace. Kepley vs. .Tanseii, 107 — 79. People not obliged to proceed in probate court to recover taxes due upon prop- erty of estate assessed while in hands of executor or administrator. People vs. Hibernian Bank Ass'n, 245 — 523. Tax is ntit a contract ol)ligation merely because statute allows its recovery in action of debt and the municipal court of Chicago has no jurisdiction of .suit for taxes on ground of implied contract. People vs. Dummcr, 274 — (537. Porm of declaration. In a proceeding in debt against a corporation, under Sec. 230 of the revenue law, the pleader must set out that the place of assessment was where the company's j>rincipal office was located. Gas Works vs. People, 15G — 388. I)(>claration to recover delinquent personal property tax must show that it is due ami owing in that county, and levy \)y j)roper authority on [)roperty owned by defen county treas- ury: Provided, however, llial this section shall not invalidate or increa.se the lial)ility upon the l)ond of any county collector in force prior to the passage of this Act, and that to such extent as its ap- 188 plication to any sncli existing bond would result in invalidating or increasing the liability thereon, this section shall be inapplicable thereto. [As amended by act filed June 28, 1917. L. 1917, p. 654. To pay cities, etc., every ten days.] Section 244. The county collector shall report and pay over the amount of tax and special assessments, due to towns, districts, cities, villages, corporations and persons, collected by him on delinquent property, at least once in every ten days, when demanded by the proper authorities or persons. Failure to make report — Suit.] Section 245. Any county collector failing to make the reports and payments hereinbefore required, for five days after the time specified for that purpose, or after demand made as aforesaid, the auditor or such other au- thorities or persons, may bring suit upon the collector's bond. Failure to account and pay over — Suit.] Section 246. If any county collector fails to account and pay over as required in the preceding sections, his office may be declared vacant by the coun- ty board, or by any court in which suit is brought on his official bond. Final settlement of the county collector for state taxes — Manner of making settlement.] Section 247. The county clerk shall make out and deliver to the county collector, as soon as ad- justment is made with the county board or county clerk, annually, the statements, certificates and lists, appertaining to the settlement of the accounts of such collector, which statements, certificates and lists shall be made out in proper form, under his seal of office, on blanks which it is hereby made the duty of the Auditor to furnish annually for that purpose. The collector shall deliver the same at the office of the Auditor and make a final settlement of his ac- counts, and pay the amount due the State, into the State treas- ury, on or before the first day of July next after receiving the tax books : Provided, that in all cases where the statements, certificates and lists appertaining to the final settlement of a collector are on file with the Auditor on or before the first day of July, such collector shall not be liable to any penalty by reason of failing to pay the balance found due on the account of such collector until the expiration of fifteen days after mailing said Auditor's state- ment showing balance due the State on such collector's account: Provided, further, that this section shall not be held to relieve any collector from the payment of any penalty provided in this Act, by reason of the failure to make payment to the State at other 189 time or times, as required by this or any other Act of the General Assembly of this State. [As amended by Act approved June 25, 1917. L. 1917, p. 664. Duplicate statement to auditor.] Section 248. The county clerk shall furnish a duplicate copy of said statement, duly certi- fied, whenever requested so to do by the auditor. Coirection.] If the statement of credits herein required, or any of the items therein, are objected to by the auditor, he shall return the statement to the county clerk, stating his objections, and said clerk shall examine and correct or explain the same satis- factorily, and return the statement to said auditor. Overpayment refunded.] Section 249. If any collector shall have paid, or may hereafter pay, into the state treasury, any greater sum or sums of money than are or may be legally and justly due from such collector, after deducting abatements and commissions, the auditor shall issue his warrant for the amount so overpaid, which shall be paid out of the fund or funds so over- paid on said warrant. How paid into treasury — Duplicate receipt.] Section 250. Upon ascertaining the amount due to the state from any collector or other person, the auditor shall give such person a statement of the amount to be paid, and upon the presentation of such state- ment to the state treasurer, and the payment of the sum stated to be due, the treasurer shall give duplicate receipts therefor, one of which shall be filed in the auditor's office, and entered in a book to be kept for that purpose, and the other shall be counter- signed by the auditor and delivered to the person making the payment; and no payment shall be considered as having been made until the treasurer's receipt shall be countersigned by the auditor as aforesaid. Neg-lect of duty by collector — Penalty — Recovery.] Section 251. Any county colleclor who shall fail lo pay into the State treasury, the amount of taxes due and piiyablc from such col- lector, to Ihe Stale, at the time or limrs fniuirfd i)y any 1)10- vision of Hiis Act, .shall pay to llif Stale, as a penalty for such failure, a snui of money ess than !f!500, and all damages and costs, to be recovered in an action of debt; and the auditor shall bring suit therefor, in the name of the Peopl(! of the State of Illinois — the amount recovered on such fines to be paid into the state treasury as revenue fund. Nothing in this section shall be construed as relieving the securities of a collector from liabilities incurred under a bond not approved and filed by the auditor. 210 Collector — Neglect to obtain judgment, etc.] Section 286, If any collector shall, by his oavu neglect, fail to obtain judgment at the May term of the County Court, or shall fail to present his list of delinquencies on personal property, or errors in assessment of real estate, at the time required by this act, he shall lose the benefits of any abatement to which he might have been entitled, and shall pay to the State and county the full amount charged against him, after deducting the fees allowed by this act for collecting and pay- ing over taxes. If the County Court is not held at the May term, the collector shall have further time to pay over the amount due on the delinquent list. Failure to do any duty under this act.] Section 287. If any officer shall fail or neglect to perform any of the duties required of him by this act, upon being required so to do by any person in- terested in the matter, and for the failure or neglect to perform such duty there is no other specific penalty provided in this Act, he shall be liable to a fine of not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500.00), to be recovered in an action of debt in the Circuit Court of the proper county, and may be removed from office at the discretion of the court ; and any officer Avho shall know- ingly violate any of the provisions of this act, for the violation of which there is no other specific penalty provided for herein, shall be liable to a fine of not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) to be recovered in an action of debt in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, in any court having jurisdiction and may be removed from office at the discretion of the court, and said fines when recovered shall be paid into the county treasury. [As amended by act approved June 25, 1917. L. 1917, p. 664.] The trial court refused to compel tlie assessor, when on the witness stand, to testify at what ratio to its fair cash value he had assessed all other property in his town, on the ground that it might incriminate him as under Sec. 287 of Kevenue Act. Keokuk Bridge Co. vs. P., 176—268. Refusal by clerk, assessor or other officer to do duty.] Section 288. Every county clerk, assessor, collector or other officer who shall in any case refuse or knowingly neglect to perform any duty enjoined upon him by this act, or who shall consent to or connive at any evasion of its provisions, whereby any proceeding required by this act shall be prevented or hindered, or whereby any property required to be listed for taxation shall be unlawfully exempted, or the same be entered upon the tax list at less than its fair cash value, shall, for every such offense, neglect or refusal, be liable, on the complaint of any person, for double the amount of the loss or 211 damage caused thereby, to be recovered in action of debt, in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, in any court having juris- diction, and may be removed from his office at the discretion of the court. County to furnish books and blanks — clerks to procure them.] Section 289. The county board shall direct the county clerk to pro- cure all necessary books and blanks required by this act to be used in the assessment of property and collection of taxes, at the expense of the county. County funds — Manner of keeping accounts thereof — By col- lector, etc.] Section 290. The county collector shall, on the first of every month, report to the county clerk, in writing, the amount of county tax received by him during the preceding month, showing what amount of said tax was received in money, and what amount in county orders and jury certificates. The county collector shall keep his account as collector of taxes separate from his account as county treasurer. He shall credit his account as collector with the amount of his montlily reports to the county clerk, and with the amount of insolvencies, removals, errors, forfeitures, and other credits allowed him on settlement with the county board; and as county treasurer he shall charge himself with the amount shown in his monthly report to the county clerk, as aforesaid, and such other amounts as may come into his hands as county treasurer; and he shall, as such treasurer, at the close of each month, cancel the county orders and jury certificates in his hands, and return the same with a descriptive list, giving numbers and amounts properly footed, to the county clerk, who shall carefully compare and file the same in his oflTice, sul)ject to the order of the county board, and give the treasurer a receipt for the same; which receipt shall be evidence upon which the county treasurer shall take credit in his accounts as such treasurer, with the county, subject to the approval of tlie county ])oarcl. The county board shall examine such accounts and vouchers, at such time or times, by committee or otherwise, as may l)e deemed re^iuisite. SuretieH on treasurer's bond, as collector, arc liable for his default until lie rcport.s receipt of fund to county clerk, as required by above section; after such r(i)inrt, siirolics on his bond, as troasnrer, are lialile. P. vs. Hoover, \>2 — 575. "It i.s insisted that the money reported was received by liini as collector ami not as treasurer, and he and his sureties are liable on his collector's bond . . ." Tlie eom]il('te answer to this is tliat when county collector makes report, all he reports as having received as collector is Iransfcrrcd to his account as treasurer, and he is credited with the amount as collector. ir.'iulcv vs. I'., l)."!— 249. 212 By clerk, etc.] Section 291. Each county clerk shall keep an account with the county collector, charging him with the amount of county tax placed in his hands for collection, and with the county tax received by him from sales and redemptions of forfeited prop- erty, and with any other funds, belonging to the county, that shall come into the collector's hands; and shall credit him with the amounts ascertained as required in the preceding section, charged to the county treasurer's account monthly; also, with amount of county tax on insolvencies, removals, errors, forfeited property, etc., whenever ascertained in the manner required by this act. The county clerks shall also keep a treasurer's account with the county treasurer of their respective counties. The treasurer shall be charged with the amount of money, county orders and jury certificates re- ported in the collector's monthly statements required to be made in. the preceding section, and all amounts paid to the county treasurer from other sources than the county revenue tax; and it is hereby made the duty of all persons paying money into the county treasury, for all purposes except the county taxes, to first obtain from the county clerk an order on the treasurer to receive the same ; and the treasurer shall give the person so paying duplicate receipts therefor, one of whcih shall be countersigned by the county clerk, and re- tained by the person paying over the amount, and the other filed in the county clerk's office, and the amount thereof charged against the treasurer. The treasurer's account shall be credited, monthly, with the amount of county orders and jury certificates canceled and filed in the county clerk 's office, as required in the preceding section. Definitions.] Section 292. The words and phrases following, whenever used in this act, shall be construed to include in their meaning the definitions set opposite the same in this section, when- ever it shall be necessary to the proper construction of this act. 1st. ASSESSOR — ASSESSORS. — Town, district and deputy assessors. 2d. AUDITOR — Auditor of Public Accounts. 3d. BANK — BANKER — BROKER — STOCK JOBBER. — Whoever has money employed in the business of dealing in coin, notes or bills of exchange, or in the business of dealing in or buying or selling any kind of bills of exchange, checks, drafts, bank notes, promissory notes, bonds, or other writing obligatory, or stocks of any kind or description whatsoever, or receiving money on deposit. 4th. COLLECTOR— COLLECTORS.— County, town, district and deputy collectors. 213 5th. COUNTY BOARD. — The board of supervisors — the board of county commissioners. 6th. I'REDITS. ^ — Every claim or demand for money, labor [,] interest, or other valuable thing, due or to become due, not including money on deposit. 7th. HE. — ]\rale, female, company, corporation, firm, society, singular or plural member. 8th. MONEY — MONEYS. — Gold silver or other coin, paper or other currency used in barter and trade as money, in actual pos- session, and every deposit which the person owning, holding in trust, or having the beneficial interest therein, is entitled to with- draw in money on demand. 9fh. NUMBER. — The singular number shall include the plural and the plural number shall include the singular. 10th. OATH.— Oaths or affirmation. 11th. PERSON — PERSONS. — Male, female, corporation, company, firm, society, singular or }ilural numlier. 12th. REAL PROPERTY — REAL ESTATE — LAND- TRACT — LOT. — Not ojily the land itself, whether laid out in town or city lots, or otherwise, with all things contained therein, but also all buildings, structures and improvements, and other per- manent fixtures, of whatsoever kind, thereon, and all rights and privileges belonging or in anywise pertaining thereto, except where the same may be otherwise denominated by this Act, 13th. SHARES OF STOCK — SHARES OP CAPITAL STOCK. — The shares inio which the capital or stock of every incorporated company or association may be divided. 14th. TAX — TAXES. — Any tax, special assessments or costs, interest or penalty imposed upon properly. 15th. YEAR.. — The word "year," when used in this Act, with reference to taxes of or for a year, shall mean a calendar year, beginning on the first day of January. » [As amended by act approved June 27, 11)17. L. 1917, p. 657.] Clause 12: Tunnels under the streets of Chicago privately owned arc real estate (Sec. 292 of Rovonuo Act). Thoroforo, it was proper for the local assessor to assess them, and such was not barred by tax of capital stock by State Board of Ecjualizat ion. People vs. rpliiiiii, l!21 — ~>')5. Power transmission lines of a sanitary district, whether consist iiijj: of wooden poles or steel towers on concrete b.-ises and siioii banks composed of excavated materials from channel, all on land owned by district is real estate. Sanitary Dist. vs. Young, 2H5—42^^. Power of county court, until, etc.] Section 2!).'!. In ;ill eonntics not under townshij) organizalinn, llie eoiinly eonit, or jnd^i' ol' Ihe 214 county court, as the ease may require, shall perform all the duties required in this act to be performed by the county board, or chair- man of the county board, as the case may be, in such counties, until such time as the board of county commissioners shall be duly elected and qualified in said counties. Repealing" clause] Section 294. The laws and parts of laws en- titled as hereinafter named are hereby repealed. [The acts repealed are omitted. They will be found set out in Laws 1871-2, pp. 69-71. They are again enumerated in R. S. 1874, Ch. 131, Section 5.] The repeal of said acts and parts of acts shall not be construed to impair any right existing, or affect any proceeding pending, at the time this act shall take effect ; but all proceedings for the assessment of any tax, or collection of any tax or special assessment then re- maining incomplete, may be completed pursuant to the provisions of this act. The provisions of this act shall apply to redemptions from sales made for taxes or special assessments previous to the taking effect hereof, and the mode of giving notice, and issuing deeds upon certificates of sales made for taxes. STATE TAX COMMISSION. AN ACT ill relation to the assessment of property for taxation. (Approved June 19, 1919. In force July 1, 1919. L. 1919, p. 718.) The State Tax Commission was created by an act to amend Sees. 5, 9 and 13 of the Civil Administrative Code and by adding a new section to be known as section 39a. (L. 1919, p. 9; E. S. Ch. 241/2.) Section 5 provided for the appointment of the Tax Commission, which shall consist of three officers, See. 9 each Commissioner shall receive six thousand dollars, Sec. 13 for a term of six years: the first commissioner appointed for a term of six years, one for a term of four years and one for a term of two years. Section 39a is as follows: "The State Tax Commission created by this Act shall, in its name, without any direction, supervision or control by the Director of Finance, exercise and discharge all duties now or hereafter imposed by law on it with reference to the assessment of property for taxation. All clerical and administrative functions pertaining to the business of the Tax Commission shall be discharged by the Director of Finance who shall for that purpose, act as its secretary and executive officer. General Powers and Duties of Commission^ — Local Assessment Officers] Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly: The term "local assessment officers," as used in this Act, shall mean and include township assessors, boards of assessors, the county treasurer and boards of review. 215 Powers and duties of commission.] Sectiou 2. The Tax Com- mission shall : (1) Direct and supervise as provided by this Act, the assess- ment for taxation of all real and personal property in this State to the end that all assessments of property be made relatively just and equal ; (2) Confer with, advise and assist local assessment officers rela- tive to the assessment of property for taxation; (3) Prescribe general rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for local assessment officers relative to the assessment of property for taxation, which general rules and regulations shall be binding upon all local assessment officers and shall be obeyed by them respectively until reversed, annulled or modified by a court of competent jurisdiction ; (4) Prescribe or approve the form of blanks for schedules, re- turns, reports, complaints, notices and other documents, files and records authorized or required by and provision of law relating to the assessment of property, or by any rule and regulation of the commission and all assessing officers shall use true copies of such blank forms; (5) Assess the railroad property denominated "railroad track" and "rolling stock"; (6) Assess, and value, in the manner provided by law, the capi- tal stock, including the franchise, of all companies or associations now or hereafter incorporated under the laws of this State, except companies and associations organized for purely manufacturing and mercantile puri)0ses, or for either of such purposes, or for the mining and sale of coal or for printing or for the pu])lisliing of newspapers or for the improving and breeding of stock, or for the purpose of banking, including any of such property as may have been omitted from assessment in any year or years, or which, from defective de- scription has not paid any taxes for any year or years; (7) Eciualize the valuation and assessment of property through- out the State between the different counties of the State and fix the aggregate amount of the asscssmciil foi- cjicli county npon wiiicli taxes shall be extended; (8) Keep a correct record oL" its acts and doings relative to the assessment of property and the equalization of assessments. In 0«neral: State Board of Equalization in assessing property, may act on its own ktiowl- Cflgo without evidence as to value, and it has power to increase valuation 216 returned by officers of a corporation without hearing evidence to impeach the return. People vs. Chicago, L. S. & E. R. Co., 286—576; E. Co. vs. Surrell, 8S— 535. Revenue act governs State Board of Equalization, so far as applicable. State Board of Equalization vs. P., 191—541. Clause 5: See Supra, Sees. 42, 44, 50 of General Revenue Act and cases cited thereunder. The following cases dealt with the power of the State Board of Equalization under a similar statute: Assessment void when it should have been made by State Board of Equaliza- tion and was not, but was assessed by the local assessor. Chicago, etc., R. Co. vs. P., 98—350. State Board of Equalization may increase valuation as made in the return by company's officers without first hearing evidence impeaching it. Where the railroad company fails to return lists for assessment, the Board of Equal- ization may return valuation upon what information it has, and is not required to go into exhaustive investigation in arriving at the valuation. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. vs. Surrell, 88—535. Division of aggregate value of railway track among the several counties and municipalities in proportion to length situated therein, is uniform because whole railroad is to be considered as a unit, and each part worth its pro- portionate share. Sec. 109 does not violate Sec. lOi of Art. 9 of constitu- tion as taxing corporate property, as railroad is a unit. Law vs. P., 87—385. Tn proportioning the tax among the villages through which a railroad runs, the clerk is not governed by the schedule furnished by the company to ascer- tain which those villages are. He may obtain such information from other sources. Indiana, etc., R. Co. vs. P., 154 — 558 (1894). Held, arguendo, that word "districts," as used in this section, does not refer to road districts,. but to school districts. O. and M. Co. vs. P., 119 — 207. Under former law valuation and assessment of railway was not of an un- divided part of the whole, but was of specific part situated within each county. Sangamon, etc., R. Co. vs. Morgan County, 14 — 163. A county's jurisdiction to tax railroad track is confined to vdthin its own limits. Sangamon and Morgan R. Co. vs. Morgan County, 14 — 163. Where valuation is so grossly out of the way as to show that the assessing body could not have been honest in its valuation and must have rea- sonably known that it was excessive, such fact is accepted as evidence of fraud on its part against the tax-payer. People vs. Chicago, L. S. & E. R. Co., 286—576, 579. A valuation of railroad property arbitrarily made by the State Board in dis- regard of its own rules as to valuation cannot be sustained. People vs. Chicago, L. S. & E. R. Co., 286—576. Clause 6: (See Sec. 3, clause 4 of General Revenue Act, supra.) The following cases dealt with the power of the State Board of Equaliza- tion under a similar statute: It is proper for the legislature to assess the capital stock of a corporation, including the franchise, as it has the power to determine the manner in which taxes may be levied. Coal Co. vs. Miller, 236 — 149. 217 State Board of Equalization acts as original assessor in assessing capital stock and franchise. State Board of Equalization vs. P., 191 — 533. The assessment of capital stock and franchises of corporations should be based upon fair cash value. Assessment which is fraudulently made is impeachable. State Board of Equalization vs. P., 191 — 538. Where the corporation's debts have absorbed all its property, taxation of capital stock is properly based upon value of its debt, other than current expenses. Keokuk Bridge Co. vs. P., 161 — 143. It is proper and not double taxation to assess and tax the capital stock of coi-poration, and also its tangible property. Danville B. & T, Co. vs. Parks, 88 — 170; Danville Mfg. Co. vs. Parks, 88 — 463; Pacific Hotel vs. Lieb, 83—602; Porter vs. Eockford, E. I. and St. L. E. Co., 76—561; Eepublic Life Ins. Co. vs. Pollak, 75—292; Hopkins vs. Taylor, 87—436. On application for judgment for unpaid tax the decision of State Board of Equalization can be assailed only for fraud or want of jurisdiction, as it is quasi-judicial in its nature. Connecting E. Co. vs. P., 119 — 182. Assessment of capital stock by State Board of Equalization upheld, as by that was meant not "shares," but property of corporation. Porter vs. Eock- ford, etc., E. Co., 76—561. It is easily conceivable how the capital stock of some companies might not exceed the value of their tangible property, and hence it was not review- able error for the State Board of Equalization to assess one corporation at a greater value than its tangible property and other companies' stock at the value of tangible property only. C, B. and Q. E. Co. vs. Siders, 88—320. An assessment by the State Board is at too high a rate when the property is assessed at a greater proportion of its actual value than is adopted by the board at the same time in the assessment of all other property. People's Gas Liglit Co. vs. Stuckart, 286—164. An assessment of capital stock arbitrarily made by State Board in disregard of its own rules for assessing capital stock of all corporations and without any attempt to ascertain the actual value of such capital stock by any methods open to it cannot be sustained. Calumet Dock Co. vs. O'Connell, 265—106; People's Gas Light Co. vs. Stuckart, 286—164. Capital stock of advertising company organized to do general advertising publi.shing and printing cannot be assessed by State Board of Equaliza- tion, as business need not be exclusively printing to exempt capital stock from assessment l)y State Board. Taylor-Critchfield Co. vs. Stuckart, 275—129. A cori>oration organized to Imy and sell stocks and bonds of other companies and to guarantee sudi stocks and bonds is a mercantile corporation. Peo- ple vs. Federal Security Co., 255 — 561. Assessment of franchise of corporation having the power, in addition to manufacturing, to own real estate and water power and lease and sell water i»ow«-r to others for manufacturing purposes, by local assessor is void. Moline Water Power Co. vs. Cox, 252—348. State Board of Etpiali/.ation has no power to asse.ss capital stock of mercantile corporation even though the loc;il nssessor do(>s not do so. People vs. Lewy Bros. Co., 2r.O— (Jl.!. While the State Board is not necessarily hound by market quotations of shares of stock in determining their viibn,' yet such quotations cannot be 21« disregarded and an assessment of capital stock made witliout evidence and in violation of rules of board cannot be sustained, though the assessment of tangible property by assessor is lower than it should bo. Calumet Dock Co. vs. Stuckart, 275^253. Under the rules of State Board, where there are no debts to be added to the fair cash value of shares of stock, an assessment of the capital stock can be made only in case the equalized fair cash value of the shares exceeds the equalized valuation of the tangible property. Calumet Dock Co. vs. Stuckart, 275—253. Powers of commission.] Section 3. The Tax Commission shall have power : (1) To require local assessment officers to meet with it from time to time for the purpose of considering matters relative to tax- ation. (2) To formulate and recommend legislation for the improve- ment of the system of taxation of property and for the equalization of the taxation of the State ; (3) To make such research and investigation as to the proper- ties of corporations and the true values of the franchise and proper- ties of all corporations incorporated under the laws of this State, except companies and associations organized for purely manufactur- ing and mercantile purposes, or for either of such purposes, or for the mining and sale of coal, or for printing or for the publishing of newspapers or for the improving and breeding of stock, or for the purpose of banking, as will enable it to ascertain the fair cash value of the capital stock, including the franchise, of such corporations as are assessed by it and to obtain such further data and information upon which general rules and regulations may be based ; (4) To investigate the tax system of other states and countries; (5) To request the institution of proceedings, actions and pros(!- cutions to enforce the laws relating to the penalties, liabilities and punishment of public officers, persons, or officers or agents of cor- porations for failure or neglect to comply with this Act ; (6) To order in any year a re-assessment of all real and per- sonal property, or real or personal property, or any class of personal property, in any county, or in any assessment district thereof, when in its juclgment such re-assessment is desirable or necessary, and for that purpose to cause such re-assessment to be made by the local assessment officers, and cause it to be substituted for the original assessment ; (7) To take testimony and proofs under oath and to require the production of books, papers and documents pertinent to any assess- ment, investigation or inquiry and for that purpose to subpoena and compel the attendance of witnesses ; 219 (8) To require from all State and local officers such information as may be necessary for the proper discharge of its duties; (9) To examine and make memoranda from all records, books, papers, documents, statements of account on record or on file in any public office of the State or of any county, township, road district, city, village, incorporated town, school district or any other taxing district of the State and all public officers having charge or custody of such records shall furnish to the commission infoiniation of any and all matters on file or of record in their respective offices ; (10) To adopt, from time to time, rules not inconsistent with law, for ascertaining the fair cash value of the capital stock, includ- ing the franchise, of corporations assessed by it. Certified copies of records — evidence.] Sectioii 4. Certified copies of the records of the Tax Commission pertaining to the as- sessment of property and the equalization of assessments, attested by the seal of the Department of Finance, shall be received in evi- depce in all courts with like effect as certified copies of other public • ecords. Power to administer oaths.] Section 5. Each officer in the Tax Commission, each employee of the commission and each other com- petent person specially delegated in writing for that purpose, shall have the power to administer all oaths authorized or required under the provisions of this Act. Service of subpoena.] Section 6. Any sheriff, constable or other person may serve any subpoena issued under the provision,-* of this Act. Fees and mileage of witnesses.] Section 7. The fees and mile- age oT wilnossos attending any hearing held by the tax commission under the provisions of this Act, pursuant to any subpoena, shall be the same as those of witnesses in civil cases in the Circuit Court in counties of the second class. Such fees and mileage shall be paid by the State. Compliance with subpoena — contempt.] Sections. In case any person refuses to (•onii)ly with any subpoena issued by the Tax Com- mission, or to produce or to permit the examination or inspection oC any l)ooks, papers and documents pertinent to any assessment, in- vestigation or iiKjuiry, or to testify to any matter regarding which he may be lawfully interrogated, the Circuit Court or County Covu't of the county in which such matter or hearing is pending, on appli- cation of the Tax Commission, shall compel obedience by attach- ment procccflings as for contempt, as in a case of disobedience of the requirements of a subpoena from such court on a refusal 1(i testify therein. 220 Publication of assessment — review and correction.] Section 9. Upon the completion of the original assessments to be made by the Tax Commission, it shall publish a full and complete list of such assessments in the State "official newspaper." Any person or cor- poration feeling aggrieved by any such assessment may, within ten days of the date of publication of such ''official newspaper" con- taining such list, apply to the Tax Commission for a review and cor- rection of the assessment complained of. Upon such review the Tax Commission may make such correction, if any, therein as may be just and right. Person aggrieved — appeal — record.] Section 10. Any person feeling himself aggrieved by any assessment made by the Tax Com- mission may appeal to the Circuit Court of the county in which such property or some part thereof is situated, for the purpose of having the lawfulness of such assessment inquired into and determined. The person taking such appeal shall file with the Tax Commis- sion written notice of such appeal, which notice shall state in full the grounds of such appeal. Such notice of appeal shall be filed within ten days after such assessment is made and notice given thereof. Thereupon the Tax Commission shall prepare and trans- mit to the clerk of the court to which such appeal is taken a copy of such notice of appeal and a copy of all evidence, documents, papers, books and files pertaining to such appeal, which copies shall be cer- tified to as correct by the Director of Finance. The appeal shall be heard without formal pleadings upon the record so certified by the Tax Commission. Appeals shall lie from the judgment of the Cir- cuit Court to the Supreme Court. The remedy by appeal herein provided for shall not be construed to be exclusive. Appeal not to stay assessment or extension of taxes — refund.] Section 11. No appeal to the Circuit Court from an assessment made by the tax commission shall stay or suspend any assessment or the extension of any taxes thereon. If the court, by its final judg- ment, should set aside or reduce such assessment, and the taxes so erroneously assessed shall have been paid, the person or corporation so erroneously paying such taxes shall be entitled to a refund there- of as provided by section 268 of an Act entitled, "An Act for the assessment of property and for the levy and collection of taxes," approved March 30, 1872, in force July 1, 1872. Re-assessments — order — where filed.] Section 12. Whenever it shall appear to the Tax Commission that the real or personal property in any county, or in any assessment district thereof, has not been assessed in substantial compliance with law, or has been un- 221 equally or improperly assessed, the Tax Commission may, in its dis- cretion, in any year order a re-assessment for such year of all or any class of the taxable property in such county, or assessment district thereof. The Tax Commission may order such re-assessment made by the local assessment officers. The order directing such re-assess- ment shall be filed in the office of the county treasurer of the county in which such re-assessment has been ordered, except in counties having an elective board of review in which case such order shall be filed with the board of review. Re-assessment how made and reviewed.] Section 13. Such re- assessment shall be made in the same manner and subject to the same laws and rules as an original assessment and shall be subject to review and correction by the board of review as in case of an original assessment. Board of review — correction of re-assessment — notice.] Sec- tion 14. For the purpose of reviewing and equalizing such re-as- sessment, the board of review of the county in which the re-assess- ment is made, shall review and correct such re-assessment. The Tax Commission .shall fix the time and place of the meeting of the board of review to review and correct such re-assessment. At least one week before the meeting of such board of review to review and cor- rect such re-assessment, the board of review shall publish a notice of the time and place of its meeting for such purpose in at least one newspaper of general circulation published in the county in which such re-assessment is made. The board of review shall convene at the time and place fixed in such order and shall review, correct, re- turn and certify such re-assessment in like manner, and shall have and exercise all the powers and authority given to boards of review and shall be subject to all the restrictions, duties and penalties of such boards. Custody of assessment books.] Section 15. Such local assess- ment officer while engaged in making such re-assessment, shall have custody and pos.sossion of the assessment books containing the orig- inal assessment and all property and other statements and memo- randa relating thereto, and the person having the custody thereof shall deliver such assessment books and such property to tlu^ local assessment officer on demand. Tie slinll, in making such re-assess- ment, have all the power and authority given by law to local assess- ment officers and shall be subject to all the restrictions, lialulilics and penalties imposed by law n|>oii locnl assessment, officers. Re-assessment the assessment upon which taxes levied.] Section 16. Such rc-asscssin<'nt, when completed ami rtiviewed as provided 222 herein, shall be the assessment upon which taxes for that year shall be levied and extended in the county or assessment district for which made. Books, records and blanks — compensation.] Section 17. The necessary books, records and blank forms needful for the purpose of such re-assessment shall be furnished by the same authorities that furnish books, records and blank forms for an original assessment. The local assessment officer and the members of the board of review when convened in extraordinary session for the purpose of making such re-assessment or of reviewing and correcting the same shall re- ceive the same compensation as for like service in making, or in re- viewing, an original assessment, which compensation, as well as all other expenses in making the re-assessment, shall be paid by the county on the certificate of the Tax Commission. Equalization — conmiission as authority — not to reduce aggre- gate assessed value in state.] Section 18. The Tax Commission shall act as an equalizing authority. It shall examine the abstracts of property assessed for taxation in the several counties as returned by the county clerks and the original assessments made by it, and shall equalize the assessments as in this Act provided. The Tax Commission may so lower or raise the total assessed value of proper- ty in any county as returned by the county clerk as shall make the property in such county bear a just relation to the assessed value of property in other counties. The total amount of such increase or de- crease in any one county shall not exceed ten per cent of the total assessed value of all property in the State as returned for purposes of taxation. The Tax Commission shall not reduce the aggregate assessed valuation in the State ; nor shall it increase such aggregate valuation, except in such amount as may be necessary to a just equalization. Classes of property considered — rates even and not fractional and not combined.] Section 19. The Tax Commission in equaliz- ing the valuation of property as listed and assessed in different coun- ties, shall consider the following classes of property separately, viz : personal property, railroad and telegraph property ; lands ; town and city lots ; and the capital and other property of public utilities and of companies and associations assessed by the Tax Commission and, upon such consideration determine such rates of addition to or de- duction from the listed or assessed valuation of each of such classes of property in each county, or to or from the aggregate assessed V9.1ue of each of such classes in the State, as may be deemed by the 223 Tax Conimissioii to be equitable and just, such rates being in all cases even and not fractional ; and such rates, as finally determined by the tax commission shall not be combined. Personal property. — How to be equalized.] Section 20. In equalizing the value of personal property between the several coun- ties, the Tax Commission shall cause to be obtained the State aver- ages of the several kinds of enumerated property, from the aggre- gate footings of the number and value of each ; and the value of the several kinds of enumerated property in each county shall be ob- tained at those average values; and the value of the enumerated property thus obtained, as compared with the assessed value of such property in each county' shall be taken by the Tax Commission to obtain a rate per cent, to be added to or deducted from the total as- sessed value of such property in each county. Whenever, in the opinion of the Tax Commission it is necessary, to a more just and equitable equalization of such property, that a rate per cent be added to or deducted from the value thus obtained in an^ one or more of the counties, the Tax Commission shall have the right so to do ; but the rate per cent heretofore required shall first be obtained to form the basis upon which the equalization of personal property shall be made. Lands and lots. — How to be equalized.] Section 21. Lands shall be equalized by adding to the aggregate assessed value thereof, in every county in which the Tax Commission may believe the valu- ation to be too low, such rate per centum as will raise the same to its proper proportionate value, and by deducting from the aggregate assessed value thereof, in every county in which the Tax Commission may believe the valuation to be too high, such per centum as will reduce the same to its proper value Town and city lots shall be equalized in the same manner herein provided for equalizing lands, and, at the option of the Tax Commission nuiy be combined and equalized with lands. As.scssmciit of railway property at two-thirds of actual value, and otlier property at one-third, to equalize an alleged deficiency, invalid. C. & A. R. Co. vs. Livingston Co., G8 — 458. Tract in city held to be lot, though not platted. Wiiothor it was a lot or land made considerable difference in this case in figurinf,^ amount of addi- tion by State Board of Equalization. P. vs. j'alnu'i', li;5— .'Hli. Results combined in one table.] Section 22. When the Tax Commission shall have separately considered the several classes of l)roper1y as hereinbefore ro(|nired, the results shall be comliined in one table, and the same shall he examined, compared and perl'ecled in such ninnnor as the Tax (Vjmmission shall deem best to accom- 224 plish a just equalization of assessments throughout the State, pre- serving, however, the principle of separate rates for each class of property. Partial returns from any county.] Section 23. In all cases of partial return from any county where the number of defaulting towns or districts does not exceed one-third of the whole number of towns or districts in the county, the Tax Commission may estimate the valuation in the towns or districts from which returns have not been received and may equalize the total valuation as in other cases. Rate determined certified to clerk — assessment on capital stock of corporations — railroad and telegraph companies.] Section 24. When the Tax Commission shall have completed its equalization of assessments for any year, it shall certify to the several county clerks the rates finally determined by it to be added to or deducted from the listed or assessed valuation of each class of property in the several counties. The respective assessments made by it on the capital stock, ingluding the franchise, of corporations assessed by it (other than of the capital stock of railroads and telegraph com- panies) shall be certified by it to the county clerks of the respective counties in which such companies or associations are located. And said clerk shall extend the taxes for all purposes on the respective amounts so certified, the same as may be levied on the other prop- erty in such towns, districts, villages or cities in which such com- panies or associations are located. It shall also certify to the county clerk of the proper counties the assessments of ''railroad track" and "rolling stock", and the assessments of the capital stock, including the franchise, of railroad and telegraph companies. And the county clerk shall distribute the value so certified to him to the county and to the several towns, districts, villages and cities in his county entitled to a proportionate value of such "railroad track" and "rolling stock", and capital stock, and shall extend taxes against such values the same as against other property in such towns, dis- tricts, villages and cities. Records, etc., to be delivered to commission.] Section 25. All records, books, papers, documents and memoranda pertaining to the State Board of Equalization shall, upon the taking effect of this Act, be transferred and delivered to the Tax Commission. Powers and duties imposed on board of equalization and auditor to be exercised by commission.] Section 26. On and after the taking effect of this Act all the powers and duties now conferred or imposed upon the State Board of Equalization and upon the Auditor of Public Accounts in relation to the assessment of property 225 for taxation shall be transferred to and thereafter shall be exercised and performed by the Tax Commission. Abstracts, other papers, etc., to be filed with commission.] Sec- tion 27. Whenever, in any law relating to the assessment of prop- erty for taxation, abstracts, reports, or schedules or other papers or documents, are required to be filed wdth, or any duty is imposed upon, or power vested in either the Auditor of Public Accounts or the State Board of Equalization, such abstracts, reports, schedules, or other papers or documents shall be filed with, such duty and power shall be discharged and exercised by the Tax Commission. Commission no power to change individual assessment.] Section 28. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to give the Tax Commission any power, jurisdiction or authority to review, re- vise, correct or change any individual assessment made by any local assessment officer. Repeal.] Section 29. The following Acts and parts of Acts are hereby appealed : Sections 100 to 116, both inclusive, of an Act entitled, "An Act for the assessment of property and for the levy and collection of taxes," approved March 30, 1872, in force July 1, 1872, and amend- ments thereto; Sections 50 and 51 of an Act entitled, "An Act for the assess- ment of property and providing the means therefor, and to repeal a certain Act therein named," approved February 25, 1898, in force July 1, 1898, and amendments thereto. Section 25 of an Act entitled, "An Act in regard to elections, and to provide for filling vacancies -in elective offices," approved April 3, 1872, in force July 1, 1872. REVENUE ACT OF 1898. AN ACT for the assessment' of property aud providing the means therefor, and to lepeal a certain act therein named. [Apiirovod February 25, 1898. In fdicc July ], 1898. L. 1898, p. :54.J In General: The Revenue Act of 1898 is constitutional. People (ex rel.) vs. Comrs. of Cook County, 176— r)7G. Ri-vi>nue Law of 1898 goveriis assessment of property and is a substitute sub- -lantially complete in itself i'nr the provisions of general Revenue Law on that subject. I'eople vs. Fisher, 274 — 116. Taxpayer has no vested rifjht under statutes which fix basis for assessing I)roperty, as that entire subject is within control of the legislature. Too- pic vs. Chicago & E. 111. R. Co., 248—118; P. vs. Board of Review, 290—467. Under Revenue Act of 1898 it was not the intention of the General Assembly to ri'f|iiire county clerk to provide duplicate asseBsment books for the 226 listing and assessment of personal property, to be delivered to the super- visor of assessments for the use of the assessors. People vs. Hendee, 1(>8 A. 591. County assessor in counties not under township organization — Compensation.] Section 1. That in counties not under township organization the county treasurer shall be ex officio county assessor, and he shall receive as compensation for his services as county as- sessor, the sum of five hundred dollars ($500) per annum: Pro- vided, that in counties having a population of less than 125,000 and over 50,000, he shall receive the sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000) per annum. [As amended by act approved May 15, 1903. In force July 1, 1903. L. 1903, p. 295.' In counties not under the township organization, compensation as county treasurer fixed by county board includes payment for his services as ex- officio county assessor. People vs. Wabash E. Co., 281 — 311. In counties under township organization — Assessor — Powers, duties and compensation of.] Section 2. In counties under town- ship organization of less than 125,000 inhabitants, the county treas- urer shall be ex officio supervisor of assessments in his county, and shall receive as compensation for his services as supervisor of assess- ments the sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000) per annum : Pro- vided, that in counties having a population of less than 45,000 he shall receive the sum of five hundred dollars ($500) per annum. He shall have a suitable office, to be provided and furnished by the county board, in which he shall keep, subject to the inspection of all persons who shall desire to consult the same, the assessment books returned to him as directed by law. He shall keep his office open for business from 9 o'clock a. m. to 5 o'clock p. m. of every day except Sundays and legal holidays. He may, by and with the advice and consent of the county board, appoint necessary deputies and clerks, their compensation to be fixed by the county board and paid by the county. The supervisor of assessments shall, on or before the first day of April in each year, assemble all assessors and their deputies for consultation, and shall give such instructions to them as shall tend to a uniformity in the action of the assessors and deputy assessors in his county. Any assessor or deputy assessor who shall willfully refuse or neglect to observe or follow the direction of the supervisor of assessments, which shall be in accordance with law, shall, upon conviction thereof in any court of competent juris- diction, for each offense be fined not less than fifty dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, or be confined in the county jail not ex- ceeding six months, in the discretion of the court. In counties under township organization where a town assessor shall be unable 227 alone to perform all the duties of his office, he may, by and with the advice and consent of the town board of auditors first obtained, appoint one or more suitable persons to act as deputies to assist him in making the assessment. The compensation of the township as- sessors shall be as follows : In townships containing not less than five thousand (5,000) inhabitants they shall receive not less than five dollars ($'5.00) nor more than ten dollars ($10) per day: Pro- vided, that in townships containing more than fifteen thousand (15,000) inhabitants, additional compensation may be allowed, making their entire compensation for making the assessment a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) ; in townships contain- ing less than five thousand (5,000) inhabitants they shall receive not less than two and one-half dollars ($2.50) nor more than five dollars ($5.00) per day; necessary deputy assessors shall receive not ex- ceeding five dollars ($5.00) per day. The compensation as herein provided shall be fixed by the board of town auditors and shall be based upon the time actually employed in the making of such as- sessment, and such assessors and deputies shall make affidavit of the time so employed. Population as herein used shall be deemed to be the population of such townships as ascertained by the last preced- ing federal and school census. [As amended by act approved May 15, 1903. In force July 1, 1903. L. 1903, p. 295. The provisions making county treasurer ex-officio supervisor of assessments do not create a new office but simply add other duties to the ofiice of county treasurer and ho is not entitled to separate compensation as supervisor of assessment. Foote vs. Lake County, 206 — 165; Allen vs. Fidelity Co., 269—234. In counties containing- 125.000 or more inhabitants — Board of Assessors — Election of — Organization of — Powers and duties — Deputy Assessors — Appointment of.] Section 3. In all counties of this State containing one hundred and twenty-five tliousand or more inhabitants there is hereby created and established a board of as- sessors, consisting of five persons, not more than four of whom shall be residents oi; any one city, to be known as tlu' l)oard of assessors of said county. At the regular county election to be held in such county in the year 1898 for the election of county officers there shall be elected by the legal voters of said connly five assessors, whose terms of officf; shall commence on llic fii-st day of January next ensuing, who shall hold their officr, Iwo foi- two years, two for four years, and one for six years, respectively, and until llicii' successors are elected and f|ualifipd. And every two yeais thereafter, at the regular county eleclion in said county for Ihe election of county officers, 111 ere shall be elected an assessor, oi- two assessors, as the 228 case may be, to succeed the assessor or assessors whose term of office shall expire that year, whose term of office shall commence on the first day of January next following, and shall be six years in duration and until his or their successors shall be elected and quali- fied. The assessors so elected shall qualify within ten days after the canvass of the vote is completed. Such assessors shall hold no other lucrative public office or public employment. Each of said assessors, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall take and subscribe the oath provided for in this act. At the first meeting of the board of assessors they shall determine by lot which of them shall hold ofifvce for the respective terms. The chairman of the board shall be the person having the shortest term to serve. In the years when two persons shall be serving the shortest term it shall be determined by lot which of such two persons shall be chairman. Each assessor shall receive as compensation such sum as may be fixed by the county board, to be paid out of the county treasury. In case of any vacancy in said board, or the failure of any per- son elected to that office to qualify, the board of review provided for in such counties may appoint a person to fill such vacancy until his successor shall be elected at the next regular county election. Said board of assessors shall have power to employ a chief clerk, who shall have charge of the office of such board, and such other clerical help as may be necessary, subject to the approval of the board of review as to the number thereof, who shall hold office during the pleasure of the board, and who shall take and subscribe an oath of office that he will honestly and faithfully perform all duties of such office under the direction of said board, and he shall have power to administer all oaths authorized by law to be admin- istered by assessors, and the compensation of such clerk shall be fixed by such board, subject to the approval of the board of review, not to exceed ten dollars per day, for each working day. In all townships in such counties not lying wholly within the limits of one city, the township assessor shall be ex-officio the deputy assessor to make the assessments in the township, wherein he is elected. Provided, that if, in any such township, said township assessor shall not be able, by himself alone, within the time allowed by law to make the assessment of said township, then any addi- tional deputy assessor or deputy assessors required to make such assessment, shall be residents and legal voters of such township, and shall be nominated by the board of auditors of such township, and appointed by the board of assessors only upon such nomination, and deputy assessors so appointed shall act under the supervision of 229 . the ex-officio deputy town assessors. [As amended by act approved June 26, 1913. L. 1913, p. 511.] In regard to" appoiutment of five assessors, as the Act merely provities means of assessment and is not an attempt to regulate county and township affairs. Section above held constitutional. Burton Stock Car Co. vs. Traeger, 187 — 17. Assessor and supervisor of assessments to give bond — Form of oath..] Sectioif 4. Every assessor and supervisor of assessments shall, before he enters upon the duties of his office, enter into a bond, payable to the People of the State of Illinois, in the sum of two thousand dollars or such larger sum as the county board shall determine, with two or more sufficient sureties, to be approved by the president or chairman of the county board, except in the case of the supervisor of assessments, whose bond shall be approved by the county board. Provided, that township assessors in counties having less than one hundred and twenty-five thousand inhabitants shall be required to give bond only in the sum of five hundred dol- lars each, with sureties as above provided. Said bond to be ap- proved by the supervisor of their respective towns. The condition of the bond shall be that such assessor or supervisor of assessments, as the case may l)e, will diligently, faithfully and impartially per- form each and singular the duties enjoined upon him by law, Su^h bond shall be filed in the office of the county clerk and recorded at large in a book to be provided for such bonds. The State, county, town or any municipality, corporation or person suffering any loss or damage by reason of any failure to keep and perform any of the conditions of the bond to the best of his ability may recover thereon for their or his use by .suit in the name of the People of the State of Illinois. And every assessor, deputy assessor or supervisor ol; assessments, shall, also, ])efore entering upon the duties of his office, take and subscribe to an oath, which oath shall also be filed in the office of the county clerk: Provided, that the oath of township assessors and their deputies shall be filed with thoir respective town cleiks. Said oath to be as follows: I do solemnly swear (or affirm) lliat 1 will support the Consti- tulion of the United States and llie Constitution of the State of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge all the duties of the office of assessor, deputy assessor or supervisor of assessments (as the case may be) to the best of my ability; llml 1 will wilhoul frar or favor appraise all tlu' property in said county at its fair cash value, said value to be ascertained a1 what the property would bring at a voluntary .sale in the due course of business and trade; and that I will assess said property when so appraised at one-fifth of its said cash value; that 1 will cause every person, company or corpora- 230 tioii assessed to sign his, lier or its assessment schedule, and I will administer to each and every person so signing said assessment schedule the oath thereon, and return said schedule so signed and file the same with the county clerk. Assessor, etc. — Penalty for neglect of duty.] Section 5. Any assessor or deputy assessor or supervisor of assessments or other persons, whose duty it is to assess property for taxation or equalize any such assessment, who shall refuse or knowingly neglect to per- form any duty required of him bj^ law, or who shall consent to or connive at any evasion of the provisions of this act whereby any property required to be assessed shall be unlawfully exempted in whole or in part or the valuation thereof entered or set down at more or less than is required by law, shall, upon conviction, be fined for each offense not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars and imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding one year, and shall also be liable upon his bond to the party injured for all damages sustained by such party, as above provided. Appointment of deputy assessors — Term of office — Fees — Oath — Maps.] Section 6. The board of assessors shall have power to appoint as many suitable persons as in their judgment are necessary to act as deputies, subject to the approval of the board of review as to the number and time of service of such deputies to assist them in making the assessment, who shall perform such duties as may be assigned to them by the board of assessors. They shall hold their office during the will of the board of assessors, and shall receive such compensation as shall be determined by the board not exceed- ing five dollars ($5.00) per day: Provided, that the assessors and deputy assessors of counties of one hundred and twenty-five thou- sand inhabitants or over shall be paid for their services out of the county treasury. Such deputy assessors shall, before entering upon their duties, take and subscribe the oath or affirmation prescribed for the assessors. The board of assessors shall have power and authority to make and purchase such maps and plats as will facilitate the business of their office, which maps and plats shall alM^ays be and remain in their office, and shall be open and accessible to the public. [As amended by act approved and in force April 24, 1899. L. 1899, p. 335.] What property subject to assessment and taxation.] Section 7. All property in this State shall be subject to assessment and taxation as provided by the general laws for the assessment of property and for the levy and collection of taxes except such property as may be g31 exempt therefrom by such general laws. Such property shall be listed and valued in the manner and by the persons heretofore pro- vided by law except as herein otherwise expressly provided. Property, when, how and by whom listed.] Section 8. All property subject to taxation shall be listed by the person at the place and in the manner required by law, and assessed at the place and in the manner required by law with reference to the ownership, amount, kind and value on the first day of April in the year for which the property is required to be listed including all property purchased on that day. The owner of property on the first day of April in any year shall be liable for the taxes of that year. The purchaser of property on the first day of April shall be considered as the owner on that day. Real property — When and how listed and assessed.] Section 9. All real property subject to taxation under the general revenue laws of the State, including real estate becoming taxable for the first time shall be listed in the name of the owner thereof by such owners, or persons required by law, or their agents, or the officers provided by law, and assessed for the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine (1899), and every fourth year thereafter, with reference to the amount owned on the first day of April in the year in which the same is assessed, including all property purchased on that day, which assessment shall be known as the general as- sessment, and as modified or equalized or changed as provided by law, shall l)e the assessment upon which taxes shall be levied and extended during the quadrennial period for which the same is made: Provided, that no assessment of real property shall be con- sidered as illegal by reason of the same not being listed or assessed in the name of the owner or owners thereof. Tho case of Ciozcr vs. People, 20G — 464, holding real estate is to be assessed once every four years, was decided before the iimendmont of 1905 to Sec. 35, which as amended gives board of review power to change the assess- ment of real property when it does not represent a fair valuation, although there has been no change in the property and this applies to counties of less than ]2n,rK)0 f>op\iIation. People (ex rel.) vs. St. Louis Bridge Co., 281—462. If Sanitary District desired to have its Imid which it claims is farm land assessed se[iaraiely from its other |ii asHessment of the lemnining re;il estate, 232 tlio ownor of that, and not tlic owner of the mining rights, is the one to comphiin. Re Appeal Maplewood Coal Co., 213 — 283. County clerk to make up duplicate books of lands or lots to be assessed for taxes — when triplicate.] Section 10. The county clerk shall before the first day of April, in the year 1907, and every fourth year thereafter, make up, in books to be provided for that purpose, a list of lands and lots to be assessed for taxes in the manner pro- vided in the general revenue law. He shall also annually after the adoption of this act before the first day of April make a list of lands and lots which are taxable, or which shall become taxable for the first time, and which are not already listed, and a list of lands and lots which have been subdivided and not listed by the proper de- scription. Such lists shall be made up in the manner in which the county clerk is required by the general revenue law to make such lists: [Provided, that in counties of 125,000 inhabitants, or over, said books shall be made in triplicate.] [As amended by act ap- proved May 18, 1905. In force July 1, 1905. L. 1905, p. 360.] When books and blanks for the assessment to be delivered to assessor, etc.] Section 11. It shall be the duty of the county asses- sor, the board of assessors, or the supervisor of assessments, as the ease may be, to call upon the county clerk on or before the first day of April in each year and receive the assessment books and blanks as prepared by said county clerk for the assessment of property for that year. When and how the assessor shall assess property.] Section 12. The assessor shall, before the first day of June in the year 1899 and every fourth year thereafter, in person or by his deputy, actually view and determine as near as practicable the value of each tract or lot of land listed for taxation as of. the first day of April of each year, and assess the same at the value required by law, setting down the sum in proper columns prepared therefor in duplicate books furnished him. In making such assessments he shall set down his valuation of improved tracts and lots in one column, and his value of unimproved tracts and lots in another column. He shall, also, be- tween the first day of April and the first day of June in each inter- vening year, list and assess in like manner all real property which shall become taxable and which is not upon the general assessment, and also make and return a list of all new or added building^, structures or other improvements of any kind, the value of which shall not have been previously added to or included in the valuation of the tract or lot on which such improvements have been erected or placed, specifying the tract or lot on which each of said improve- ments has been erected or placed, the kind of improvement and the 233 value which, iu his opinion, has been added to such tract or lot by the erection thereof; and in case of the destruction or injury by fire, flood, cyclone, storm or otherwise, or removal of any structures of any kind, or of the destruction of or any injury to orchard, tim- ber, ornamental trees or groves, the value of which shall have been included in any former valuation of the tract or lot on which the same stood, the assessor shall determine as near as practicable how much the value of such tract or lot has been diminished in conse- quence of such destruction or injury, and make return thereof. And in case any assessor shall fail or neglect so to do, then the supervisor of assessments shall, in the case of such new or added improvements, assess the same according to the assessment of the same property in the general assessment, and in the case of such destruction shall abate from the assessment of the tracts or lots so damaged or lessened the proper proportion thereof, estimated ac- cording to the same principles; in counties containing one hundred and twenty-five thousand or more inhabitants such books shall be made up by townships. Since the ameiidmont of 1905 to Sec. 35, the board of review has power in any year, whether it is the year of the quadrennial assessment or not, to change the assessment of real propertj^ as made in the quadrennial year when it does not represent a fair valuation, although there has been no improvements or other change in the property. People (ex rel.) vs. St. Louis Bridge Co., 281—462 (Overruled 230—61). Original assessment of property must be listed, classified and valued accord- ing to the statute and cannot be made by assessing a lump sum as tlie value of all the property of a tax ]i:iyi'r. People vs. St. Louis Bridge Co., 268—477. Under Sec. 30G of Eevenue Act, "All real property which shall become tax- able and which is not upon the general assessment," refers to two classes; all real property which shall become taxable after the county clerk has made out the lists, and all real property which is not upon the lists. The board of assessors lias the right to assess the property for the year the as- sessment was made, that was so omitted from the lists, or became taxable after they are made out, conceding that it has not the power so to do for previous years. It is not required to give notice of such assessment, as the law prescribing the time when complaints will be heard before the Board of Review is all notice that is required. People vs. Salt Co., 233 — 223. In the absence of evidence as to when assessment was actually made, the date when taxes assessed became a lien being April 1st, must be con sidered as the date of assessment. Morrison vs. Moir Hotel ("d., 20 1 A. 433. Lists — When valuation and entries to be made in duplicate and when in triplicate books — Alteration — Subdi/ision. | Seel ion ]:\. All such lists, valuations jiik] entries shiill, in counties of 125,000 inhabitants or ovei-. be made in triplicate assessment hooks; in ;ill other counties in duplicate books. The assessor shall, also, from 234 time to time, make such alterations in the description of real prop- erty as he may find necessary, and when real property has been subdivided since the making of the general assessment, shall from time to time correct the description so that they shall correspond to the subdivision, and distribute the assessment in the proper propor- tionsamong the lots or parcels into which the land shall have been subdivided ; and in case of a vacation of a subdivision readjust the description of the assessment accordingly. [As amended by act approved May 18, 1905. In force July 1, 1905. L. 1905, p. 360.] When lands chang"e in value.] Section 14. On or before the first day of June in each year, other than the year of the quadrennial assessment, the assessor shall determine the amount, in his opinion, of any change in the value of any tracts or lots of land by reason of any injury to, alteration in or addition to, the improvements thereon since the first of April in the preceding year and prior to the first of April in the current year, and add to or deduct from the assessment accordingly, setting down the amount of such change in a proper column in the assessment books. The value of lands and improvements shall be separately fixed, and shall in any assessment made hereafter be set down in separate columns in said assessor's books. The assessor shall not in any year, except the year of the quadrennial assessment, change the valuation of .any real estate or improvements or the division thereof, except as above provided in this section: Provided, however, that if at any time before judg- ment or order of sale therefor the said assessors shall discover an error or mistake (other than errors of judgment as to the valuation of any real or personal property) in any assessment of any property belonging to any person or corporation, they shall issue to the person or corporation erroneously assessed a certificate setting forth the nature of such error and the cause or causes which operated to produce the same, Avhich said certificate, when properly endorsed by the majority of board of review, showing their concurrence therein, and not otherwise, may be used in evidence in any court of competent jurisdiction, and when so introduced in evidence such certificate shall become a part of the court record and shall not be removed from the files except on an order of the court. [As amended by act approved May 18, 1905. In force July 1, 1905. L. 1905, p. 360.] The provision that the value of lands and lots shall be separately fixed and set down in separate columns in the assessor's books refers to the assessor and not the board of review. People vs. St. Louis Bridge Co., 281 — 462. 235 Judgment of assessor as to whether there has been any change in value of property in any other year than that of the quadrennial assessment is conclusive on the court in the absence of fraud, but is subject to revision by the board of assessor and for a further review by the board of review. People vs. Eobert White & Co., 286—259. The certificate to correct error or mistake authorized to be issued under the proviso to this section must be issued before the judgment or order of sale for the tax is rendered and the proviso expressly excludes error of judgment as to valuation of property being corrected. People vs. Kobert White & Co., 286—259. Personal property— When and how valued.] Section 15. Per- sonal property shall be valued as and in the manner required by law, and shall be listed between the first day of April and the first day of June of each year when required by the assessor, with refer- ence to the quantity held or owned on the first day of April iu the year for which the property is required to be listed. Personal prop- erty purchased or acquired on the first day of April shall be listed by or for the person purchasing or acquiring it. When and how personal property to be listed.] Section 16. The assessor or his deputy shall annually, between the first day of April and of June, list the taxable personal property in his county, town or district, and assess the value thereof as of the first day of April, in the manner following, to wit : He shall call at the office, place of doing business or residence of each person required by this act to list property and list his name, and shall require such person to make a correct statement of the taxable pi'operty in accordance with the provisions of this act, and the person listing the property shall enter a true and correct statement of such property owned by him on the first day of April of that year, in the form prescribed by law, which shall be signed and sworn to to the extent required by this act by the person listing the property, who shall deliver such state- ment 1o the assessor; and llic assessor shall thereupon assess the value of such proj)erty, and enter the valuation in his books: Pro- vided, if any proi)er1y is listed oi- assessed on oi- al'tcM- the first day of June, the same shall bo as legal and binding as if listed and assessed before that time. Schedule — Assessed value.] Section 17. The a.sscssor shall fur- nish to each person roquired 1o list personal property a ])rinUMl blank schedule, forms 1o be fui'iiished by the Auditor of Public Accounts (Tax Commission), ui)on which shall be piinted ;i notice subslanlialh' as follows: 236 "This schedule must be filled out, sworn to and returned to me in person or by mail at (Address) on or beiorc You are to give a full, fair cash value of the articles mentioned as well as the amount of money required to be returned. Only one-half of the several amounts will be taken and assessed for the purpose of taxation. (Signature) Assessor. ' ' There shall also be printed upon such blank the schedule now required by law, and the following, which is a part of this section : And every person required to list personal property or money shall fill out, subscribe and swear to, and return to the assessor, in person, or by mail, at the time required, such schedule in accordnace with law, giving the numbers, amounts, quantity and quality of all the articles enumerated in said schedule by him possessed, or under his control, required to be listed by him for taxation. The assessor shall determine and fix the fair cash value of all items of personal property, including all grain on hand on the first day of April, and set down the same, as well as the amounts of notes, accounts, bonds and moneys, in a column headed, "full value," and ascertain and assess the same at one-half part thereof and set down said one-half part thereof in a column headed "assessed value," which last amount shall be assessed value thereof for all purposes of taxation. The assessor or some person authorized by law to administer an oath, shall administer the oath required in this section. [As amended by act approved June 30, 1919. L. 1919, p. 727.] Under Sec. 27 of Tax Commission Law, supra, when any schedules, etc., papers or other documents are required to be filed with, or any duty is imposed upon or power vested in the Auditor of Public Accounts such schedules, etc., papers or other documents shall be filed with, such duty and power shall be discharged and exercised by the Tax Commission. In the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, a property owner is bound by a schedule of his taxable personalty given by him to the assessor. People vs. I. C. E. Co., 273—220, 258. The State is not bound by a valuation given by a property owner to the assessing oflStcer. People vs. Ey. Co., 273 — ^267. How^ real and personal property shall be valued — State Board of Equalization.] Section 18. Personal property shall be valued at its fair cash value, less such deductions as may be allowed by law to be made from credits, which value shall be set down in one column, to be headed "full value," and one-half part thereof shall be ascer- tained and set down in another column which shall be headed "as- sessed value." Real property shall l)e valued at its fair cash value. 237 estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale in the course of trade, which shall be set downi in one column to be headed "full value," and one-half part thereof shall be set down in another column, which shall be headed "assessed value." The State Board of Equalization (Tax Commission) in valuing property assessed by them shall ascertain and determine respectively the fair cash value of such property, which fair cash value shall be set down in one column to be headed "full value," and one-half part thereof shall be ascertained and set down in another column, which shall be headed "assessed value." The one-half value of all property so ascertained and set down shall be the assessed value for all purposes of taxation, limitation of taxation and limitation of indebtedness prescribed in the constitution or any statute. [As amended by act approved June 30, 1919. L. 1919, p. 727.] Under Sec. 26 of Tax Commission Law, supra, all powers and duties conferred upon the State Board of Equalization in relation to assessment of property to be exercised and performed by Tax Commission. Legislature has power to change assessed value after hard roads tax has been voted and tax must be extended upon assessed value fixed by law. People (ex rel.) vs. Cairo, V. & C. R. Co., 247—327. State tax against property of Illinois Central must be assessed on the same proportion of full cash value as other owners are assessed. People vs. Illinois Central E. Co., 273—220. Schedule — Penalty for not making.] Section 19. The assessor shall require every person to make, sign and swear to the schedule provided for by this act. If any person shall refuse to make the schedule herein required, or to subscribe and swear to the same, the assessor shall list the property of such person according to his best knowledge, information and judgment, at its fair cash value, and shall add to the valuation of such list an amount equal to fifty per cent, of such valuation. Whoever in making such schedule shall wilfully swear falsely in any material matter shall be guilty of perjury and punisliod ac- cordingly. Assessor is not bound by items or valuation in unsworn schedule. Molinc Water Power Co. vs. Cox, 252—348. Penalty not imposed for failure to file schedule where it is not the rosnlt of attempt at concealment, but from honest belief property is exemjjt. Monticollo Seminary vs. Board of Kevicw, 249 — 4S1. The provisions of this section sire tlic same as those of Sec. 24 of tlio General Revenue Act, except the provision of Sec. 24, making it a mis- demeanor to fail to make a schedule was omitted and is repealed. People vs. Fislier, 274—11';. Provision authorizing assessor to add 50 per cent where party makes no schedule is a penalty and not in violation of constitutional provision relating to leving taxes by valuntion. I'eople vs. Fisher, 274 — 110. 238 The i^rovision of Sec. 24 of Eevcnue Act of 1872 was rc-cnactcd as this section and is repealed. l'eoi:ilc vs. Fisher, 274 — 116. Person refusing- to sign and swear to schedule — Duty of assessor — Penalty.] Section 20. The assessor, deputy assessor, or some other person duly authorized by law to administer oaths shall administer the oath or affirmation attached to the assessment schedule as pro- vided by law, to each person or proper officer of corporation so as- sessed, and such person or officer of such corporation shall be re- quired to sign said assessment schedule and swear to the same, and in case any one refuses so to do, the assessor shall note the fact in the column of remarks opposite such person's name; and any as- sessor failing to have said assessment schedule so signed by the person assessed and an oath administered as required by law, or failing to make such note that the person or proper officer of the corporation refuses so to do, shall for each offence be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five thousand dol- lars ($5,000). Township assessor — Return of assessment books^ — Affidavit.] Section 21. The township assessor shall, on or before the first day of June for the year for which the assessment is made, return the assessment books to the county supervisor of assessments. Each of said books shall be verified by affidavit of the assessor substantially as follows : State of Illinois, \ > ss. • County of ) I do solemnly swear that the book or books m number, as the case may be, to which this affidavit is attached, contains a full and complete list of all of the real and personal property in the township or assessment district herein described subject to taxation for the year so far as I have been able to ascertain the same, and that the assessed value set down in the proper column opposite the several kinds and descriptions of property is a just and equal assessment of such property according to law. Authority of supervisor of assessments.] Section 22. The super- visor of assessments of the county shall have the same authority as the township assessor to assess, make changes or alterations in the assessment of property. In counties having a board of assessors — Revision of assess- ment.] Section 23. In counties having a board of assessors such board shall meet on the first Monday of June in each year for the purpose of revising the assessment of real property, and on the third 239 Monday of June of each year for the purpose of revising the assess- ment of personal property. At such meeting the board of assessors, upon application of any taxpayer or upon their own motion, shall revise the assessment and correct the same as shall appear to them to be just. Such meeting may be adjourned from day to day, as may be necessary, and the board shall iinish such revision upon or before the first day of July. AVhen such revision is completed and the change and revisions entered in the assessment books, an affi- da\dt shall be appended to each of such assessment books in the form required by law, signed by at least two of such assessors. Upon the signing of such affidavits the board of assessors shall have no further power to change the assessment or alter the assessment books so as to change or affect the taxes of that year. Where a corporation returns its list of tangible property, together with capital stock schedule showing its capital stock had no value in excess of its tangible property, and thereafter obtains from clerk of board of assessors statement showing nothing assessed on capital stock Avhich had been made by board without knowledge of corporation, whereby he makes no application to board of review, the tax on such capital stock is illegal. People vs. Morton Salt Co., 285—180. Where the board of assessors has completed the revision of assessment of personal property of a manufacturing or mercantile corporation and attached affidavit to books it cannot change assessment or alter books so as to change or affect taxes for that year. C. P. Kimball & Co. vs. O'Connell, 263—232. Where the board of assessors has completed revision of its assessment of the personal property of a manufacturing or mercantile corporation and attached affidavit to books it cannot change the assessment or affect the taxes for that year. C. P. Kimball & Co. vs. O'Connell, 263—232. Where the township assessor omits to assess any property, it is proper for the county board of assessors to assess same. Elec. Ry. Co. vs. Vollman, 213— 611. Term of township assessor, etc.] Section 24. The township as- sessor elected and qualified at the township election last preceding Ihc date on which this act shall take effect, or in case of any vacan- cies in such offices, the persons appointed to fill such vacancies sludl hokl their offices and perform all the duties thereof until January 1, next following the date of the election of their successor, and there- after their successors shall enter upon tlu'ir duties on the first day of January next following their election, and perforin Hie duties of said offiee for one year or until their successors are elected and qualified. Office of Board of Assessors, etc.. to be kept open during busi- ness hours, etc. — To furnish information to Board of Review, etc.] Section 25. The office of the Board of Assessors, the county super- visor of assessments and the county assessor shall be open all the 240 year during business hours to hear or receive complaints or sugges- tions that real property has not been assessed at proper valuation. The supervisor of assessments, county assessor, or Board of Asses- sors, as the case may be, shall furnish to the Board of Review all books, papers and information in his or their office that said board, may call for to assist them in the proper discharge of their duties. Chang-es and alterations in assessment.] Section 26. The su- pervisor of assessments shall assess, make such changes or altera- tions in the assessment of property as though originally made, and in making such changes in valuation as returned by the township assessor such changes shall be noted in a column provided therefor, and no change shall be made in the original figures. All changes and alterations in the assessment of real property shall be subject to revision by the Board of Review in the same man- ner that original assessments are reviewed. County supervisor of assessments cannot change an assessment already made without giving notice to property owner. People vs. St. Louis Bridge Co., 268—477. The language authorizing county supervisors of assessment to make changes in assessments "as though originally made" does not mean that the assessor, in changing or altering an assessment already made, acts as an original assessor. People vs. St. Louis Bridge Co., 268 — 477. Person entitled to copy of the description, schedule, etc.] Sec- tion 27. The supervisor of assessments, or in counties having a board of assessors, the chief clerk when requested, shall deliver to any person a copy of the description, schedule, return or statement of property assessed in his name or in which he is interested, and the valuation placed thereon by the assessor or the Board of Re- view. The board of assessors are not required to send notice of an assessment to property owner, but upon his request the clerk of board furnishes him a description of his assessed property and value thereof, and property owner furnished with such statement showing no capital stock assessment may rely thereon. People vs. Morton Sale Co., 285 — 180'. Schedules and statements of personal property — Custody of.] Section 28. The Board of Assessors and the supervisor of assess- ments shall deliver all schedules and statements of personal property which have been received or made up by him or them to the Board of Review when required by them in the performance of their duties. Such schedules, after the assessment is fully completed, shall be re- turned to the supervisor of assessments or Board of Assessors and shall be preserved for at least two years. Publication of assessment — Board of Review.] Section 29. As soon as the county assessor or supervisor of assessments shall have 241 completed the assessment in the year A. D. 1907, lie shall cause to be published a full and complete list of such assessment by town- ship or assessment districts, which publication shall be made on or before July 10, of each year in some public newspaper or news papers printed and published in said county : Provided, that in every township or assessment district in which there is published one or more newspapers of general circulation the list of such township or assessment district shall be published in one of said newspapers so printed and published in said township or assessment district: And, provided, that said newspaper shall not receive for the publishing of said assessment list to exceed five (5) cents per name for each person or corporation so assessed, and ten (10) cents for each description of real estate, and if impossible to secure publication at that price, that the publication ])e let to the lowest bidder at a price not exceeding five cents per tract, to be printed in pamphlet form, and shall fui-nish to the county assessor, the county supervisor of assessments and the board of review as many copies of said paper containing the assessment list as they may require, said papers so furnished not to cost to exceed five (5) cents per copy: Provided, further, that after the year 1907, the publication shall only be of the assessment of personal property and the changes made, if any, in real estate, but the real estate assessment shall be published in full every four (4) years, beginning with the year 1907 : Provided, further, that in counties of 125,000 inhabitants or over, no assess- ment of real estate shall be published as herein provided until such assssment shall have been equalized, revised or affirmed by the board of review, and when the board of review shall have acted upon the assessment list of real property, as herein provided in the year 1907 and every four years thereafter, the assessors and board of review shall cause to be published a full and complete list of such assess- ment on real pi'operty, together with all changes made by the l)oard of review under the authority of this Act, such changes to be indi- cated in a separate column, such puldication to be in pamphlel form by election districts in lieu of })ul)licatioii in ;i neusitapcr : And, provided, that the boa id of i-eview shall cause to be mailed to each tax})ayer in said election precinct a copy of the s;ii(l list for his precinct: Provided, further. th;it in case said assessment is not publislierl in conformity with law and was not mailed in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the failure to so publisli the same or mail the same shall not be considered as a valid objection to a judg- ment for tax sale in the county court. The expense of such piinting and publication shall be paid out of the county treasury. I As amended by an act approved June 21, 1919. L. 1919, p. 725.] 242 County treasurer may paj'^ expense of publishing assessments lists without previous allowance by county board. People vs. Fuller, 223 — 116, 125 (A. 141 A. 374). Appointment of — Vacancy — How filled — Compensation — Clerk. | Section 30. In coiiuties under township organization of less than one hundred twenty-five thousand (125,000) inhabitants there shall be a board of review to review the assessments made by the county supervisor of assessments. The chairman of the board of super- visors shall be ex-officio chairman of the board of review, shall be two (2) additional members of said board of review, who shall be appointed in the manner following: On or before June 1, 1918, the county judge shall appoint one (1) citizen of the county to serve as a member of the board of review of the county for one (1) year from the date of his appointment, and one (1) citizen of the county to serve as a member of the board of review for two (2) years from the date of his appointment. Each year thereafter, on or before the first day of July, the county judge shall appoint one (1) citizen of the county to serve as a member of the board of review for two (2) years from the date of his appointment. Should a member of the board of review die, resign, or be removed, the county judge shall appoint a citizen of the county to fill the unexpired term of such member. The board of review shall at all times consist of two (2) members affiliated with the political party polling the highest vote, and one (1) member of the party polling the second highest vote at the general election in the county prior to the time any appointment is made by virtue of this section. The members of the board of review shall receive as compensation the sum per day for each, day of service as shall be fixed by the county board, their time of service to be made out in due form with day and date, and sworn to by the members thereof : Provided, further, that in counties of less than one hundred twenty-five thousand (125,000) inhabitants, the members of the board of review by a majority vote each year may select some suitable person to act as clerk of said board of review, and such clerk shall receive as compensation, the sum per day for each day of service as shall be fixed by the county board. The time of service of such clerk to be made out in due form, with day and date, and sworn to by such clerk. [As amended by act approved April 18, 1919. L. 1919, p. 726. Who to constitute the board — Powers of.] Section 31. In coun- ties not under township organization the Board of County Commis- sioners shall constitute the Board of Review. All powers and duties conferred or required by this act which apply to Board [s] of Re- view in counties under township organization of less than 125,000 243 inhabitants shall apply to Boards of Eeview of counties not under township organization. They shall receive the same compensation as now allowed them by law as county commissioners. The county assessor of such counties shall have the same powers and duties, so far as the same are applicable, as are conferred by this act upon county supervisors of assessments in counties under township or- ganization. In counties of 125.000 — Board of Review of three persons — Elec- tion of — Organization and duties of.] Section 32. In counties con- taining 125,000 or more inhabitants there shall be elected at the regular county election in the year 1898 a Board of Review consist- ing of three persons, whose term of office shall commence on the first day of January next following and shall be two, four and six years respectively and until their successors shall be elected and shall qualify. At every regular county election occurring thereafter there .shall be elected a member of the Board of Review to succeed the one whose term shall expire that year, and whose term of office shall be six years and until his successor shall be elected and shall qualify. The persons so elected shall qualify within ten days after the canvass of the vote shall be completed. They shall hold no other lucrative public office or public employment. Each member before entering upon the duties of his office shall take and subscribe the oath provided for by law. At the first meeting of the Board of Review they shall determine by lot which of the members thereof shall hold office for the respective terms. Each member shall receive as compensation such sum as may be fixed by the county board, to be paid out of the county treasury'. In case of any vacancy in said board or the failure of any person elected to that office to qualify, the .judge of the county court shall appoint a person to fill such vacancy until his successor shall be elected and shall qualify, the member having the shoi'tcst term to serve shall be the chairman of such board. Form of oath to be taken.] Section 33. Each member oi" the Board of Review created by this act shall, before entering upon the duties of his office, take and subscribe to the following oath: I do most solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will, as a member of the Board of Review of assessments, faithfully perform all the duties of said office as required by law; that 1 will Inirly and impartially review the assessment of all property as made; that I will correct any and all assessments which should be corrected; that I will raise said assf'sstnc'iit or lower the same as justice may rcquii'c; that I will do ami fiorfoj-m all nets neccssai'y to pi'ocuro a full, fair and 244: impartial assessment of all property of every kind, nature and de- scription. Meeting of Board — Power of. J Section 34. The Board of Re- view shall meet on or before the third Monday in June in each year for the purpose of revising the assessment of property. At such meeting the Board of Review, upon application of any taxpayer or upon their own motion, may revise the entire assessment or any part thereof of any taxpayer, and correct the same as shall appear to them to be just, but in none of the cases provided for in this act shall the assessment of the property of any person be increased unless such person or his agent, if either be a resident or has a place of business in the county, shall first have been notified in writing and been given an opportunity to be heard. Such meeting may be adjourned from day to day as may be necessary: Provided, that the final adjournment of said Board of Review shall be on or before the seventh day of September and that no per diem com- pensation shall be paid any member of said board for services ren- dered after the date fixed for the final adjournment. [As amended by act approved May 18, 1907. In force July 1, 1907. L. 1907, p. 495. Where the parties actually appeared before the Board of Review, it is unimpor- tant that the statutory notice was not given. While an assessment of property may be impeached for fraud, a mere overvaluation or under- valuation will not, by itself and alone, establish fraud. People vs. Odin Coal Co., 238—279. In a proceeding under Sec. 230' of Revenue Act, the objection of tax-payer was that this was an original assessment, and notice was not given as provided by Sec. 328 of the Revenue Act. Held, that while notice is not required of an original assessment of personal property by a town assessor, because the statute itself gives notice of the review thereof by the Board of Review, still, notice is necessary in original assessment by Board of Review. Carney vs. People, 210 — 434. The provision in Sec. 38 of the Revenue Act that Boards of Review shall com- plete their work on or before the 7th of September is directory, and the board may continue its sessions until it has completed the. work then pending before it and sent in the books to the county clerk. Having returned the books, its jurisdiction to act for that year, except in counties of 125,000 or more inhabitants, has ceased. Barkley vs. Dale, 213 — 614; Kimball & Co. vs. O'Connell, 263—234. Powers and duties of Board of Review.] Section 35. The Board of Review shall, in any year, whether the year of the quadrennial assessment or not : First — Assess all property subject to assessment which shall not have been assessed by the assessor, and list and assess all property real or personal that may have been omitted in the assessment of 245 any year or number of years, or if the tax thereon, for which such property was liable, from any cause has not been paid, or if any such property, by reason of defective description or assessment thereof shall fail to pay taxes for any year or years, in either case the same, when discovered, shall be listed and assessed by the board in its revision of assessments, and the board may make such altera- tions in the description of real or personal property as it shall deem necessary. Second — No such charge for tax of previous years shall be made against any property prior to the date of ownership of the l)erson owning such property at the time the liability for such omitted tax was first ascertained, provided, that an assessment of real or personal property omitted from taxation by a decedent dur- ing his life time, shall be made against said property and be assessed in the name of the personal representative as executor, administra- tor or trustees of such decedent's estate. The owner of real or personal property, and the executor, administrator or trustees of a decedent, whose property may have been omitted in the assessment in any year or number of years, or on which a tax for which such property was liable, has not been paid, and the several taxing bodies interested therein, shall be given at least five days' notice in writing by the board of the hearing on the proposed assessment of such omitted property, and the board shall have full power to examine the owner, or the executor, administrator, trustees, legatees or heirs of such decedent or other person touching the ownership, kind, character, amount and the value of such omitted property or credits. Third — If the board shall determine that the property of any decedent was omitted fi-om assessment during any year or number of years or that a tax for which such property was liable has not been paid, it shall be the duty of said board to give written notice to the executor, administrator or trustees of such decedent of the as- sessments made against such property and the amount thereof, and thereupon it shiill be the duty of such executor, administrator or trustees to retain in liis di- their liands sufficient of the assets of such decedent's estate to pay the tax when extended on such assessment and it shall be tiu' duty of the county clerk to file in the County or Probate Court ;i copy of such assessment together with the rate of taxation thereon, certified by such county cleik and upon the filing of .such cei'tifioate the County or Pi-obate C'ourt .shall enter an oi-der directing such executor, administrator or 1rusl(>es to dei)osil wilh the eleik of the couit or to se(|uester sufficient ol" llie assets of said estate to pay the taxes on said assessments when extended as now provided by law oi- to enter into bond in double I lie amonnl of said 240 tax with sureties to be approved by the court conditioned for the payment of said tax when so extended, and when so extended by the county clerk the full amount of such tax shall be a claim of the first class against such estate : Provided, however, that an assess- ment of omitted property by the board of review in the manner provided in this act shall not be subject to review by any succeeding board. For the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this act, the several taxing bodies interested therein are hereby empowered to employ counsel to appear before said board and take all necessary steps to enforce the assessment on such omitted property. Fourth— On complaint in writing that any property described in such complaint is incorrectly assessed, the board shall review the as- sessment, and correct the same, as shall appear to be just. Such complaint to affect the assessment for the current year shall be filed on or before the 1st day of August : Provided, that if the assessment books containing the assessment complained of are not filed with the board of review by the 20th day of July, then such complaint shall be filed on or before ten days thereafter. The board may also, of its own motion, at any time before its revision of the assessments is completed in every year, increase, reduce or otherwise adjust the assessment of any individual or corporation, on real property or per- sonalty, making changes in the valuations thereof as may be just, and shall have full power over the assessment of any individual or corporation, and may do anything in regard thereto that it may deem necessary to make a just assessment ; but no assessment shall be increased until the person or corporation to be affected shall have been notified, and given an opportunity to be heard, except as here- inafter provided; and before making any reduction in assessments of its own motion the board of review shall give notice to the board of assessors which certified the assessment, and give such assessors an opportunity to be heard thereon. All complaints of errors, in assessments, real or personal, shall be in writing^ and shall be filecf by the complaining party with said board of review, in duplicate, and the duplicate shall be forthwith filed by the board of review with the board of assessors certifying such assessment. Complaints relating to real estate shall be classified by towns by the clerk of said board of review, and complaint relating to personal property shall be classified in such manner as the board of review shall de- termine, by order for that purpose, duly entered of record; all classes of complaints to be docketed numerically, each in its own class, in the order in which they shall be presented, as near as may be, in books kept for that purpose, which books shall always l)e 247 open to public inspection. Complaints relating to real estate shall be 'considered by towns, and complaints relating to personal prop- erty shall be heard in their order by classes, in pursuance of the order of the board, heretofore mentioned, until all complaints have been heard and passed upon by the board. In counties of 125,000 inhabitants or over, in each year, the as- sessment list of real estate, as made by the board of assessors, shall be prepared in triplicate, and the three complete lists shall be certi- fied by the assessors to the board of review when the assessment re- quired by law is completed by them. In revising assessments in any year the board of review shall note all changes it shall make in the • valuations of real estate on all of said assessment lists, and shall duly make return of one complete list to the county clerk, as required by law and one to the Board of Assessors and retain the other. On the books so retained it shall note all changes made by it in the valuation of property after that date, upon the hearings provided for in this act. And in making its annual return each year to the county clerk, and to the assessor, as herein provided, it shall enter all such changes. In other counties the -assessment list of real estate as made by the board of assessors or supervisor of assessments, shall be de- livered, when complete, to the board of review; and after the re- vision thereof has been completed by the board of review, and changes noted thereon, the same shall be duly returned to the county clerk, as required by law. After making its annual return of the revised assessment to the board of review as required by law, the board of assessors in counties of 125,000 inhabitants, or 'over, shall have the power, in any year, except the last year preceding each quadrennial assess- ment, to consider and correct the valuations of real property for the next succeeding annual assessment, in the same manner, upon complaints filed from time to time, and upon complaints filed slinll proceed to do so; and such changes as it shall make in any such valuations shall be noted upon the assessment list remaining in its custody, and include the same in its animal retui-n to tlio county clerk and the board of review. All such changes to Ix' reviewed by the board of review each year as in cases' of any assessments. i'V)i- 1lie purpose of hearing and determining complaints of errors in the valuation of real property for the next succeeding assessment thereof and correcting the valuations of any siidi ]uop- erty as shall' be just, after ils annual I'ctnrn has been made, as herein provided, the board of review shall, on the first Tuesday of November and the first Tnesday of each month thereafter until and 24 S including the first Tuesday of March in each year (except the year last preceding the quadrennial assessment) and at such other times as it may be necessary, hold public sessions at its board rooms, and continue such sessions from day to day until all complaints and other business have been disposed of. Complaints passed or un- disposed of at any session shall be first considered at the next suc- ceeding monthly session, and past complaints shall be disposed of at each session before later complaints shall be considered. Upon any hearing of a complaint, or on proposal for any increase origi- nating with said board where notice is required as herein pro- vided, the said board shall sit together, and hear the representa- . tions of the parties interested, or their representatives, and no change shall be made in any assssment of real property unless at least a majority of said board shall concur therein; and in such case an order therefor shall be made in open session, and entered of record on the books of the board : Provided that in counties of less than 125,000 inhabitants monthly sessions of the board of re- view shall not be required. Fifth — Increase or reduce the entire assessment of either real or personal property, or both, or of any class included therein if in their opinion, the assessment has not been made upon the proper basis, or equalize the assessment of real or personal property, by increasing or reducing the amount thereof, in any township, or part thereof, or any portion of the county, as may, in their opinion, be just, but the assessment of any class of property, or of any town- ship, or part thereof, or any portion of the county, shall not be increased until the board shall have notified not less than fifty of the owners of property in such township, or part thereof, or por- tion of the county of such proposed increase and given them, or any one representing them or other citizens of said territory, an opportunity to be heard. The board of assessors shall have like notice of any proposed increase or reduction, with an opportunity to be heard thereon, except where such action is taken in indi- vidual cases upon complaint. The board shall hear any person, upon request, in opposition to a proposed reduction in the assess- ment of any person; corporation or territory. Sixth — Hear and determine the application of any person who is assessed on property claimed to be exempt from taxation. If the board shall determine that any such property is not liable to taxa- tion and the question as to the liability of such property to taxa- tion has not previously been judicially determined, the decision of said board shall not be final unless approved by the Auditor of 249 Public Aceoimts (Tax Commissioner) ; and it shall be the duty oi the clerk of the board in all such cases, under the direction of the board, to make out and forward to the Auditor a full and com- plete statement of all the facts in the case. If the Auditor is satis- fied that such property is not legally liable to taxation he shall notify the board of review of his approval of its decision, and the board shall correct the assessment accordingly. But if the Auditor is satisfied that such property is liable to taxation, he shall advise the board of his objections to its decision, and give notice to said board that he will apply to the Supreme Court, specifying to what term thereof, for an order to set aside and annul the decision of the board of review. Upon receipt of such notice the clerk shall notify the person making the application aforesaid. It shall be the duty of the Auditor to then file in the Supreme Court a certified state- ment of the facts certified by the clerk as aforesaid, together with his objections thereto, and the court shall hear and determine the matter as the right of the case may be. If the board of review shall decide that property so claimed to be exempt is liable to be taxed, and the party aggrieved at the time shall pray an appeal, a brief statement of the facts in the case shall be made by the clerk, under the direction of the board, and transmitted to the Auditor, who shall present the case to the Supreme Court in like manner as hereinbefore provided. In either case the collection of the tax shall not be delayed thereby, but in case the property is decided to be exempt the tax shall be abated and refunded. Seventh — They shall, at any time before judgment, if an error or mistake is discovered (other than errors of judgment as to the valuation of any real oi- personal property), in an assessment of any real or personal property belonging to any person or corpora- tion, issue a certificate setting forth the nature of such error, and the cause or causes which operated to produce such error or mis- take, to the person or corporation erroneously assessed, which said certificate, when properly endorsed l)y the l)oard of assessors, show- ing their concurrence therein, and not otherwise, may be used in evidence in any court of competent jurisdiction, and when so in- ti'oduced in evidence such certificate sluiU Ix'conic a part ol" the court records, and shall not be removed Iroin the liles except ui)()n the order of tlie court. The term "qujidicnnial assessment," as used in lliis act shall be taken to mean the general assessment of real estate and im- provements re(|uii-ed by hiw to Ix- made once in four years. | As amended liy act approved dune 2.''), iniH. L. If) If), p. nno.] S50 In General: Assessment of property, in absence of fraud, will not be reviewed by courts. Paragraph 317, 321, 329, provide sufficient means for the tax-payer to object to unfair valuation and, failing to take advantage of that, he loses his right. Hulbert vs. P., 189—115. Valuation placed upon property subject to assessment cannot bo questioned in County Court where no complaint has been made to boards of assessors or review. Hulbert vs. P., 189 — :115. Assessment, revision of, by courts for mere error of judgment, unauthorized. Lowenthal vs. P., 192 — 228. Where the Board of Keview refuses to act, or where it does act, but acts in a manner so gross an abuse of discretion and such an evasion of positive duty as to amount to a virtual refusal to perform the duty, mandamus will lie; as where the board, advised of the unassailableness of its determina- tion of valuation, ratifies an assessment because it docs not believe it has authority to act anyway. P. vs. Comrs. of Cook Co., 176 — 586; P. vs. Webb, 256—377. New board at first meeting shall do nothing more than organize, and determine by lot terms during which its members shall hold office. P. vs. Board of Eeview, 178—349. Review of assessments should begin in July following. P. vs. Board of Review, 178—349. Review of assessments made in 1898 cannot be made at January meeting in 1899. P. vs. Board of Review, 178—350. New Act took away from local assessor and gave assessment of omitted prop- el ty to Board of Review, but modification of section above by law of 1898 docs not apply to State Board of Equalization. State Board of Equaliza- tion vs. P., 191—542; People vs. Webb, 256—364, 376. A Board of Review has no authority to punish one who refuses to say to whom notes were assigned by him, by raising his assessment to cover them. Condit vs. Widmayer, 196—623. Except where some restriction appears in act, this section applies to all counties in the State. People (ex rel.) vs. St. Louis Bridge Co., 281 — ^462. Clause 1: Since the passage of the Review Act of 1S9S, the Board of Review is the only body that has power to assess property omitted in former years. By this section the duty of the board is to "assess all property subject to assess- ment W'hich shall not have been assessed by the assessors." Stevens vs. Henry County, 218-468; P. vs. Webb, 256—376. Where a property owner has not been assessed on credits at all, the Board of Review. may in subsequent years assess credits the party owned, but which were omitted from the assessment, but where credits were assessed, aild taxes paid, even though assessed too low or some items omitted, the board has no authority to increase; on the theory that credits are assessed as one item and not as separate items. The theory here was that credits were not separable into different items, like tangible property, but must be assessed as one item and deductions made, and having been once assessed, the board cannot later seek to thresh the matter over again. Warner vs. Campbell, 238—630. Assessors, since Act of 1898, have no power to assess property omitted in former 251 years, as that changed Sec. 276 of old law. P. vs. Sellers, 179—175; Sellars vs. Barrett, 185—472.' Credits are personal property, -within meaning of section above. Sellars vs. Barrett, 185 — 472. Board of Eeview must assess capital stock of manufacturing corporation omitted in previous year, and notice of assessment of omitted property must be given by board which it was duty of assessor to give prior to Act of 1898. People (ex rel.) vs. National Box Co., 248 — 141. Section is not invalid for failing to provide for notice since Board of Eeview has power under Sees. 276 and 278 of act to give notice. People vs. Shirk, 252—95, 97. Board of Review may properly make an original assessment of omitted property in the same manner and subject to the same requirements as to notice that the assessor might make under Sees. 276 and 278. People vs. Shirk, 252—95. Mandamus will lie to compel Board of Review to list and assess omitted prop- erty. People (ex rel.) vs. Webb, 256—364. Clause 4: A tax-payer who has failed to file a schedule, and as to whose property the board of assessors made a valuation plus 50 per cent penalty, may go to the Board of Review to have such valuation corrected, but the Board of Re- view must add the 50 per cent penalty to the corrected valuation, and has no power to remove the penalty. People vs. Meachem, 241 — 415. One who is in possession of and occupying premises, and claims to be owner, is entitled to notice of reassessment of property by the Board of Review, and to object to the tax, and where it is sought to enforce such a tax, may defend without having paid the amount legally due. People vs. Gas Co., 238—113; People vs. Bridge Co., 268—481. Where the Board of Review has passed upon assessment of credits and turned in the books, it cannot at a later time assess omitted credits, notwithstanding it had, before turning in the books, notified the property owner to appear before the board for purposes of assessment. Barkley vs. Dale, 213 — 614; Kimball & Co. vs. O 'Council, 263—234. The court has no power to revise the assessment of the Board of Review as to values, though it may as to ownership of property. Carney vs. People, 210—434. The Board of Review has authority to assess property, but no authority to levy or extend taxes. While a void or illegal tax voluntarily paid can- not be recovered, still, where money was paid at the command of the Board of Review, where no tax was extended, it was not paid for any tax valid or invalid, and might oe recovered. Gannaway vs. Barricklow, 203 — 410. Provides that the Board of Review shall have full power over the as-scssment and may do anything in regard thereto that the assessors might have done. It could, therefore, transfer property for taxation from the lists of one township fo those of another, and no notice thereof is reqniK-'l. Ellis vs. People, ]!t9— 548. The Board of IJeview has no power to increase an assessment where the schedule was accepted as correct by the assessor, without notico to the owner. Cox vs. Hawkins, 199 — 68, 252 Kemedy Avhorc Board of Ecview refuses to review assessment is by mandamus. Loewenthal vs. P., 192—229; People vs. Webb, 256—364. Assessment record should show increased valuations of different kinds of prop- erty as made by Board of Review and not merely assessed valuation. But this not ground for adjoining collection of tax. American Express Co. vs. Raymond, 189—233. Evidence upon which Board of Review acted need not be produced at hearing, as where tax was raised by the board after due notice, though no formal hearing was had, but merely an informal conversation between the mem- bers of the board and complainant's agent. American Express Co. vs. Raymond, 189—233. Original assessment by Board of Review is authorized after notice to owner. Pratt vs. Raymond, 188 — 471. Hearing is legal if board acted upon complaint, though it was not made within time appointed by statute, if heard while board acting. Ayers vs. Wid- mayer, 188—125. Unsworn information not disclosed to tax -payer will support valid increase, for board is not only merely bound to act on evidence, like a jury. Earl vs. Raymond, 188—18. Presumption is that Board of Review has exercised, in fair and reasonable way, the judgment and discretion conferred upon it. Burton Stock Car Co. vs. Traeger, 187^15. Complaint, hearing, review and action by board purges valuation of mistake or fraud by board of assessors. Burton Stock Car Co. vs Traeger, 187 — 16. A person charged with a tax on property he does not own may enjoin collec- tion of tax and is not limited to a remedy before the Board of Review. Moline Water Power Co. vs. Cox, 252—348. It is the policy of our law that the whole matter of the valuation of property for taxation shall be committed to the control of the assessing authorities of the respective counties, and that a party aggrieved by an excessive valuation fraudulently or otherwise should apply to the Board of Review for a correction of the assessment. It is true equity will enjoin collec- tion of a tax on the ground of over-valuation, but complainant must allege and prove diligence in seeking to have such over-valuation cor- rected and prove over-valuation was made from some corrupt or illegal motive as to amount to constructive fraud. Sanitary Dist. vs. Young, 285—350. Where the assessor makes an assessment in disregard of schedules returned showing that corporation has no personal property in certain taxing dis- trict, the corporation is not required to bring the matter before the Board of Review before pursuing its remedy by injunction. Sanitary Dist. vs. Young, 285—351. Board of Review in making an assessment, is required to proceed as an assessor would, setting down in the column opposite the separate kinds of property the assessed value thereof, the board cannot make an assessment of personal property in a lump sum, without any designation as to character or kind of same. P. vs. Grant, 271 — 523; Holt vs. Hendee, 248—288. Board of Review is not required to enter value of the lands and lots and the improvements in separate columns, as required of the township assessor by Sec. 14. People (ex rel.) vs. St. Louis Bridge Co., 281 — 462. 253 Board of Eevicw has power iu any year, upon due notice to party to be assessed to change assessment of real property as made in quadrennial . year when it does not represent valuation of property assessed although there is no change in the property. People (ex rcl.) vs. St. Louis Bridge Co., 281—462; same vs. Same, 282—408. Valuation fixed by board of assessors for quadrennial period cannot be in- creased by Board of Eeview without notice to the owners, where there has been no improvements on the land. People vs. Casey, 286 — 89. Clause 6: Under Sec. 26 of Tax Commission Law, supra, powers and duties conferred upon Auditor of Public Account in relation to assessment of property for taxation to be exercised by Tax Commission. In reviewing the decision of the Board of Eeview, the Supreme Court may consider only whether the property was liable to taxation; the burden is on one seeking to impeach the regularity of assessment, to show irregularity or illegality. In re Appeal of Maplewood Coal Company, 213 — 283. Where the board strikes out the tax, but fails to certify it up, the county clerk has no authority to extend the omitted tax, and mandamus does not lie against him to do so. The writ should issue against the board to certify the facts to the Auditor. People vs. Opel, 207—469. The right of appeal is limited to the consideration of the question whether the Board of Eevicw has decided that exempt property be taxed. Appeal of Wilmerton, 206—15. The right of appeal from the decision of a Board of Eeview is restricted to cases in which it is claimed the property assessed is exempt from taxation. To raise the question, the appellant must so frame the record as to make it appear upon what property said increased assessment was based. Havemeyer vs. Board of Eeview, 202 — 446. "Exempt," in clause 4 above, applies to property not subject to taxation be- cause not in this State. The duty to appeal to Supreme Court is on the Auditor, not on the tax-payer. The remedy is cumulative, not exclusive. Maxwell vs. P., 189—552. Appeal from decision of Board of Eeview is restricted to cases in which it is claimed that property is exempt from, and board decides that it is liable to, taxation. Button vs. Board of Eeview, 188 — P>S9. "Exempt," as employed in clause 4 above, refers to property not within sover- eign power of State to tax. Button vs. Board of Eeview, 188 — 389. Eevenue Act denies by implication the right to apponl on other (|uestions. Keokuk Bridge Co. vs. P., 185—279. Duty of clerk of Board of Eeview, upon rec(>iviiig notice that Auditor of Public Accounts will apply to Supremo Court to annul board's decision exr'niptiug property to notify petitioning property owner such applica- tion will be made. In re Logan Square Pros. Church, 246 — 168. Eight of appeal from decision of Board of Eeview is liniilrd to cases in wliidi it is claimed that property assessed is exempt, and llie claim that property of a .'(aiiitary district which was as.sessed as real estate should have been a.ssCHsed as per.sonal estate does not involve question of cxemptitm. Sani- tary T)ist. VH. Board of Eeview, 258 — 316. Whore it is claimed asHcssmcnt is so grossly cxccHsivc as to amount to fraud, the remedy is ]>y injunction .'ind the question cannot be considered upon 254 Auditor's certificate of appeal to review decision of board. Sanitary Dist, vs. Board of Eeview, 258 — 316. Where the Supreme Court is of the opinion property is not subject to taxation the decision of the Board of Eevicw will be set aside and annulled. Petition of City of Eobinson, 281—429. The only question that can be raised in the Supreme Court on appeal from a decision of the Board of Keview assessing certain property for taxa- tion is whether the property is subject to taxation and if subject to taxation the regularity of the assessment cannot be inquired into. Simmons Coal Co. vs. Board of Ecview, -282 — 396. Clause 7: Mandamus lies to compel reconvening of Board of Eeview after September 7th, in order that it may perform omitted duty. Even after delivered books to county clerk. Here, it was a county containing 125,000 people or more. Loewenthal vs. P., 192 — 232. Notices under this act — How Given.] Section 36. All notices in this act required to be given shall be written or printed notices and shall be served personally upon the persons entitled to notice, or their agents, or by sending such notice by mail to the person so entitled to notice, or to his agent, if the residence or business ad- dress of such person is known, or by reasonable effort can be as- certained. If the address of such person can not be ascertained, then the notice shall be sent to the address of the person who last paid the taxes upon the property in question. A failure to give any notice required by this act shall not impair or affect the validity of any assessment as finally made. Board of review — When aTid how changes made upon assess- ment books.] Section 37. Whenever the board of review shall decide to reverse or modify the action of the supervisor of assess- ments or board of assessors, or county assessor, or the assessment in any case, or to change the list as completed, or the assessment or description of any property in any manner, they shall cause the changes to be made at once and entered upon the assessment books. The record of the decision of board upon a hearing for the purpose of modi- fying an assessment is made by entering it upon the assessment books, and that which the board decided to do must be determined by the record made by it. People vs. Chicago Tunnel Co., 263 — 253. When the Board of Eeview makes a change in an assessment, it is its duty to make a corresponding change in the assessment books and to show the reason, as by revaluation, or by listing, classifying and valuing property claimed to be owned by tax -payer, but omitted; and it is presumed that this was done in absence of showing to contrary. Weber vs. Baird, 208 —209. If the assessment books fail to show the action of the Board of Eevicw, or where property was omitted, the kind and class, and such records are not cured, the assessment is invalid. Weber vs. Baird, 208 — 209. 256 Where board reduces on books an assessment of real estate from six million dollars to four million dollars, oral testimony is not admissible to show that members of the board intended to reduce the assessment to three million dollars and testimony that president of board on hearing com- plaint of overvaluation stated assessment would be reduced does not show fraud, accident or mistake. People vs. Chicago Tunnel Co., 263 — 2.53. Form of affidavit to be attached to each of the assessment books.] Section 38. The board of review shall, on or before the seventh day of September annually, complete its work and make or cause to be made the entries in the assessment books required to make the assessment conform to the changes made therein by the board of review, and shall attach to each of said books an af- fidavit sip:ned by at least two members of such board, which affi- davit shall be substantially in the following form: STATE OF ILLINOIS, ] hs, County of ) We, and each of us, as a member of the board of review of the assessment of the county of , in the State of Illi- nois, do solemnly swear that the books in number , to which this affidavit is attached, contain a full and complete list of all the real and personal property in said county subject to taxation for the year , so far as we have been able to ascertain the same, and that the assessed value set down in the proper column opposite the several kinds and descrip- tions of property is, in our opinion, a just and equal assessment of such property for purposes of taxation according to law, and that the footings of the several columns in said book are correct, as we verily believe. Dated Provided, that in counties containing one hundred and twenty- five thousand or more inhabitants the board of review shall also meet from time to time and whenever necessary to consider and act upon complaints and to further revise the assessment of real property as may be just and necessary. [As amended by act aj)- provcd -May 18, 1907. In force July 1, 1907; L. 1907, p. 495. The provisions of this section that boards of review shall complete tlit-ir work on or before the 7th of September, annually, in view of Sec. 40, i.s so far directory that the board may continue its sessions until it has completed the w(nk tlicn pending and is prepared to return books to county clerk. TVukely vs. Haie, 21.3— 014 ; Kii.ibMlI & Co. vs. O'Connell, 203—234. Rules and regulations.] Section 39. The hoard of assessors and the boards of review shrrll make and pul)lish reasonable and pr(ip«'r lulcs for the guidance of persons doing l)Usinoss wilh such board and for the orderly dispatch of bnsiness. 256 Failure to complete assessment in time — Not to vitiate.] Sec- tion 40. A failiue to complete an assessment in the time required by law shall not vitiate such assessment, but the same shall be as legal and valid as if completed in the time required by law. Board of review — When to enter upon its duties.] Section 41. The township supervisors, township assessors and township clerks who have heretofore acted as the town boards of review in their respective townships and the county boards shall not hereafter have the power as such boards of review to assess, equalize, review or revise the assessment of property. The boards of review herein provided for shall meet as soon after the taking effect of this act as shall be practicable, not later than the third Mondaj^ in June, and shall thereupon at once enter upon the discharge of their duties. [As amended by act approved May 18, 1907, In force July 1, 1907 ; L. 1907, p. 495. See. 335 of Eevenue Act, in taking away the' power of the county board of Cook County to review, does not violate Sec. 1, Art. 9, of Constitution, as that provides for no Boards of Review. They are mere creatures of statute to arrive at "valuation." The provision does not violate the constitutional rule of uniformity. P. vs. Comrs. of Cook Co., 176 — ^576- 587. The provision that the county boards shall not "hereafter" have power of a Board of Review, means from the time the act was to take effect, and not merely when the new board came into being. P. vs. Comrs. of Cook County, 176^586. Board of review may examine assessor as to how assessment was made.] Section 42. It shall be lawful for the board of review to summon any assessor or any deputy or other person to appear be- fore them respectively to be inquired of under oath with respect to the method by which he or they has or have ascertained and fixed any valuation or valuations returned by him or them, and as to the correctness of any such valuation or valuations, and to administer and examine under oath the assessor or other person so summoned before them, and any assessor or person so summoned who shall fail, without good cause, to appear or appearing shall refuse to submit to such inquiry or answer such questions as may be pro- pounded to him by said board, or any member thereof, or any at- torney representing them, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars. Delivery of books containing assessments.] Section 43. When the books are so completed the board of review shall deliver one set of the books containing the assessment of real property and the books containing the assessment of personal property to the county 257 clerk, who shall file the same in his office ; one set of the books con- taining the assessment of real property shall be returned to the board of assessors, or supervisor of assessments; and when tripli- cate sets of books are required by this act, the remaining set of books containing such assessment shall remain in the office of the board of review. All such books shall be public records and open to the inspection of all persons. The assessment so completed by the board of review and certified to the county clerk and as equal- ized as provided by law, shall be the assessment upon which the taxes of that year shall be extended by the county clerk. [As amended by act approved May 18, 1905. In force July 1, 1905. L. 1905, p. 360. Conniving at any evasion of this act — Penalty.] Section 44. Any assessor, or deputy assessor, or member of the board of re- view of assessments, or board of equalization, or other person whose duty it is to assess property ior taxation or equalize any such as- sessment, who shall refuse or wilfully neglect any duty required of him by law, or who shall consent to or connive at any evasion of the provisions of this act whereby any property required to be assessed shall be unlawfully exempt in whole or in part, or the valuation thereof be set down at more or less than is required by law, shall, upon conviction, be fined for each offense not less than one hun- dred dollars ($100) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) or imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding one year, or both imprisoned and fined at the discretion of the court; he shall also be liable upon his bond to the party injured for all damage sus- tained by such party as above provided, and shall also be removed from office by the judge of the court before whom he is tried and convicted. Delivering false or fraudulent lists to assessor— Penalty.] Sec- tion 45. AVhoever, with intent to defeat or evade the law in rela- tion to the assessment of property, delivers or discloses to any as- sessor • or deputy assessor a false or fraudulent list, return or schedule of his property not exempted by law from taxation, shall be punislicd by fine not exceeding five tliousand dollars ($5,000) or inii)iisoncd in the county jail not exceeding one year, or both in the discretion of the court. Duty of state's attorney to prosecute violators — Fees — Pay- ment of salary of county assessors, etc. 1 Section 46. It is hereby made the duty of the state's attorney of each county to prosecute all violators of this act, and they shall receive as fees the sum of twenty dollars ($20) for each conviction, to be taxed as costs, and ?58 ten per cent of all fines collected. The residue of all fines collected under this act shall be paid into the county treasut-er for the use of the county. The salary of the county assessor, supervisor of as- sessments, and members of the board of assessors and board of re- view shall all be paid out of the county treasury on bills duly cer- tified and approved by the county board. Abstract of the assessment to be sent to auditor.] Section 47. The county clerk shall annually, on or before the tenth day of Sep- tember, make out and transmit to the auditor [Tax Commissioner] the abstract of the assessment of property required of the county clerk in Section ninety-eight (98) of the act entitled, "An act for the assessment of propertj^ and for the levy and collection of taxes," approved March 30, 1872, as amended. Under Sec. 27 of Tax Commission Law, supra, whenever any abstracts, reports, etc., are required to be filed with, or any duty imposed upon or power vested in the Auditor of Public Accoui^ts such abstracts, etc., to be filed with Tax Commission. County collector — Duplicate delinquent lists — When to be made and where to be filed.] Section 48. The county collector shall an- nually made out in duplicate the statement required by law, setting forth in detail the names of persons charged with personal prop- erty tax which is uncollected, and the reasons preventing such col- lection, and shall, also, at the same time, make out in duplicate a statement setting forth in detail the amount of taxes on real prop- erty which is uncollected, the names of the persons in whose name such property was listed, and the reasons preventing the collection of such taxes. He shall, also, at the same time, made out in dupli- cate a statement of all taxes collected during the year which has been returned as delinquent in any previous year, together with a description of the property upon which such taxes were levied. He shall file one of each of such duplicate statements with the county clerk and in counties of this State containing 125,000 or more inhabitants such collector shall file one of each of such, dupli- cate statements with the county clerk and the other with the city comptroller if there shall be any such officer in any of the cities within such counties. The rate per cent-^How to be Determined.] Section 49. The county clerk shall estimate and determine the rate per cent upon the proper valuation of the property in the respective towns, town- ships, districts and incorporated cities, towns and villages in their counties, that will produce, within the proper divisions of such counties, not less than the net amount of the several sums that 259 shall be required by the county board or certified to them accord- ing to law. In counties containing one hundred and twenty-five thousand (125,000) or more inhabitants the amount to which any county, city, township, school district or other municipal corporation shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose, shall not hereafter exceed two and one-half per cent, on the assessed value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment for state and county taxes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness. In any municipality or taxing district in any county or counties containing a population of 125,000 or more in- habitants in which the aggregate of the levies or taxes certified to the county clerk exceeds five per cent, a reduction shall be made by the county clerk in the taxes so certified, so as to reduce the aggregate of such taxes to five per cent, in the manner following, viz. : The rate of county taxes throughout the county shall be fixed by reducing tlie aggregate rate of taxation in the municipality or taxing district witliin the county in which such aggregate rate is the highest to five per cent, by a pro rata reduction of all the levies certified therein, exclusive of the state taxes. The rate of each of the other kinds of tax levies shall be fixed in the same manner, taking the highest rate of taxation in any part of the municipality or other taxing district, or part thereof, as the basis of ascertaining the rate of taxation to be levied by such municipality or taxing district, and making the rate of taxation within the limits thereof uniform, and reducing the aggregate rate of taxation in each dis- trict in which it exceeds five per cent, to five per cent. In ascertaining the aggregate rate of taxation, and reducing the same under the foregoing provision, taxes certified or levied for school building purposes shall not be included or taken into ac- count in any manner, or for any purpose. The limitations herein contained shall apply only to assossmonts oC prop(M-1y mndc under the provisions of this act. Section held unconsf itutional, because could not single out Cook County, as that ■would bo special law. The Act here in terms applied to Cook County- alone. The .Tuhl law infra now enacted to lake its place. Knopf vs. P., 185—25. Repealed.] Srciion 50. [Krjx'aled by act approved June 19, V.)1U. In force .July 1, 1!)19. L. 1919, p. 718. Repealed. I Seelimi 51. f Repealed by act approved June 19, 1919. In force July 1, 1919. L. 1919, p. 718. 260 Sees. 50' and 51 repealed by Sec. 29 of an Act in relation to assessment of property for taxation and by Sec. 25 of that act all powers and duties now conferred or imposed upon the State Board of Equalization were transferred to the State Tax Commission. [Laws 1919, P. 718.] When books for the collection of taxes to be delivered to col- lector.] Section 52. The county clerk shall hereafter deliver to the town, district or county collectors the books for the collection of taxes on the second day of January following the year on which such taxes are levied. [As amended by act approved May 13, 1907. In force July 1, 1907. L. 1907, p. 500. A number of dates for the performance of acts under the gen- eral revenue law chang-ed.] Section 53. All lists, schedules, returns and statements heretofore required by law to be made between the first day of May and the first day of July by the assessors or by the owner of property, or person required to list the same, shall hereafter be made between the first day of April and the first day of June of each year. The owner of personal property removing from one county, town, city, village or district to another between the first day of April and the first day of June shall be assessed in either in which he is first called upon by the assessor. The owner of personal prop- erty moving into this state from another state between the first day of April and the first day of June shall list the property owned by him on the first day of April in such year in the county, town, city, village or district in which he resides. Provided, if such person has been and can make it appear to the assessor that he is held for tax of the current year on the property in another State, county, town, city, village or district [he] shall not be again assessed for said year. All dates and times for the doing or performing of any act or thing which prior to the taking effect of this act were fixed by law with reference to the assessment of taxes between the first day of May and the first day of July, or the State Board of Equalization meeting, on the second Tuesday of August, or the collector's war- rants being returned to the collectors on the 20th day of December are respectively changed so that such acts or things shall be done or performed in the manner required by law with reference to the respective dates fixed by this act for the assessment of taxes, meet- ing of the state board of equalization, or the delivery of the col- lector's warrants to the collector. Taxes upon real property with penalties, interest and costs, that shall accrue thereon, shall be a prior and first lien on such real property from and including the first day of Apiil in the year in 261 which the taxes are levied instead of the first day of May as here- tofore Avith all the rights and incidents relating to such lien, which now are or hereafter may be provided by law : Provided, nothing in this section contained shall change or affect any rights or liabili- ties under any contract entered into before the taking effect of this act. The abstracts which the auditor prior to the taking effect of this act was required by law to obtain on the first day of May from the United States land office in this state of lands entered and located, and from the Illinois Central Railroad and canal offices of lands sold shall hereafter be obtained by him on the first day of April in each year, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and the annual reports heretofore required by law to be made by the county clerk to the auditor, of swamp and overflow lands sold for the year ending on the first day of May shall hereafter be made for the year ending on the first day of April. Board of assessors — Duties and powers of — Penalties.] Section 54. The board of assessors shall perform the duties and have the powers in relation to the assessment of property imposed upon or possessed by county or township assessors by law, and where the term assessor is used in this act it shall apply to such board of assessors and the members thereof, except in so far and in such cases as it is inconsistent with special provisions of this act in regard to the board of assessors and the members thereof, and the members of such board of assessors shall be subject to all the liabilities and penalties imposed upon assessors by this act. Provisions of the general revenue act applicable — To remain in force.] Section 55. All the provisions of the general revenue law in force prior to the taking effect of this act shall remain in force and be applicable to the assessment of property and collection of taxes except in so far as by this act is otherwise expressly pro- vided. The effect of soctiiiii is to keep in force the provisions of the gjencial Keveiiue Act except where the Act of 1898 made a different provision. People vs. Fisher, 274—116. Majority of board may act.] Section 56. Wherever, in Ihis act, the board of assessors or the board of review is authorized to act, such action may bo taken by a majority of said respective boards. In counties of 125,00 or over — Power of township assessor.] Section 57. In counties of one luDidrcd and twciily-five llionsatid inhabitants or over the township assessors shall )Kt, or levied pursuant to the mandate or judgment of any court of record. And to that end every such taxing body shall certify to the county clerk, with its tax levy, the amount thereof required for any such pur- poses. 266 111 case of a reduction hereunder any taxing body whose levy is affected thereby' and whose appropriations are required by law to be itemized, may, after the same have been ascertained, distribute the amount of such reduction among the items of its appropriations, with the exceptions aforesaid, as it may elect. If no such election is made within three months after the extension of such tax, all such items, except as above specified, shall be deemed to be reduced pro rata. [As amended by act approved June 30, 1919. L. 1919, p. 772. 1. Method of reducing rate: Where aggregate tax rates, exclusive of the levies for state, village levee, school building, high school and road and bridge purposes and for the pay- ment of bonded indebtedness, is higher in a certain city than in any other taxing district in that county the county clerk must reduce the county tax, city tax and town tax in the same proportion as is necessary to reduce the said aggregate rate to three per cent on the ^lO'Oi, but if such reduc- tion brings the county and city tax below the minimum rate fixed by law the minimum rate must be used. People vs. Chicago & E. 111. E. Co., 248 — 596. Taxing district having highest aggregate of rates, exclusive of rates mentianed in act as not subject to reduction, is taxing district to be used as standard in determining tax reduction. People vs. Chicago & Alton E. Co., 248 — 87, 90; Same vs. Ey. Co., 249—142. Taxing district within amended Eevenue law of 1909 is municipality which levies tax to be scaled. People vs. Chicago & A. E. Co., '247 — 458, 460. Sec. 1, Art. 8 of the Cities and Villages Act fixing maximum rate of $1.20 on each $100 is not repealed by provision of act for scaling taxes and if amount required by city, including amount needed to pay judgments not for bonded indebtedness or interest thereon, exceeds what will be pro- duced by rate of $1.20 on each $100 of taxable property, exclusive of bonded indebtedness and interest, the provision that no reduction of any tax levy shall diminish the amount levied pursuant to any mandate or judgment of the court, requires that the amounts required for other pur- poses shall be reduced accordingly. People vs. E. Co., 270 — 477. In making reduction of Cook County taxes, the taxes for road and bridges for parents' pension fund and for loss and cost of collection of the general fund must be included in minimum rate of forty-five cents, but taxes for bonds and judgment and interest and for actual loss and cost of collection of same is not included in said limit. People vs. Klee, 282^ — 440: 2. Taxes included in aggregate before scaling: An additional county tax levied pursuant to vote of the people for erecting an addition to the county hospital and for small building at county farm for consumptive patients is not exempt from scaling process. People vs. St. Louis Bridge Co., 261—103. If the total taxes subject to reductions will not exceed three per cent, of the taxable property, provided a certain void city tax is excluded there is no violation of the statute in respect to rates. People vs. Cairo V. & C. E. Co., 248—36. 267 Sanitary district tax not necessarily exempt from reduction as a levee tax. People vs. Chicago & Alton K. Co., 248—417. Tax of any sanitary district is subject to reduction. People vs. E. Co., 248—417; People vs. K. Co., 249—175. The county road arid bridge taxes are subject to reduction. People vs. Klee, 282 — 440. Where it is necessary for county clerk to reduce the county tax to the required rate, county tax for road and bridge purposes is subject to reduction. People vs. Sandberg, 282 — 245. County tax for loss and cost of collection is subject to reduction. People vs. Sandberg, 282—245. Tuberculosis sanitarium tax is subject to scaling. People vs. Wabash E. Co., 256—394. 3. Taxes Excluded: Hard or rock road tax is not subject to reduction under amended Eevenue law. People vs. Cairo V. & C. E. Co., 247—360. The park and library tax should be excluded before reducing the city tax whether the city has a population of more or less than 150,000, and in either case the minimum rate below which the county clerk cannot reduce the city tax does not include the rate of the tax for park and library pur- poses. People vs. Cairo V. & C. K. Co., 248 — 554. Before reducing tax for city purposes the rates of levy to pay principal and interest on bonded indebtedness and for library maintenance and library building purposes should be excluded. People vs. Chicago & E. 111. R. Co., 248—596. Tax to pay bonded indebtedness must be included in making up aggregate of rates for scaling. People vs. E. Co., 254 — 472; People vs. E. Co., 256 — 388. The "road and bridge taxes" which are excluded from reduction does not in- clude an item of county tax based upon an appropriation for roads and bridges or an item of city tax based upon an appropriation for streets, alleys and sidewalks. Peo^de vs. Illinois Cent. E. Co., 256 — 332. A tax to pay any judgment against a county is not subject to reduction and it is not necessary there be both a judgment and a m.andate for its payment, and the nature of the indebtedness or liability is immaterial. People vs. Cairo, V. & C. E. Co., 261—162; same vs. Illinois Cent. E. Co., 260—603. Where the county clerk restored the county rate to 40 cents, having scaled it below that, it is proper to add a rate to pay bonds and interest in addi- tion to the rate of 40 cents. People vs. R. Co., 270^ — 477. Though the tax for mothers' pension fund cannot be reduced in the scaling proces.s, it must be considered when taxes for other county purposes are being scaled to make the rate of 40 cents, and it is improper to add the rate per cent of mothers' pension fund to the rate of 40 cents. Pcdjilo vs. H. Co., 270—477; People vs. Sandberg, 282—247. Firemen's Pension Fund Act for June 29, 1915, ami the Police Pension Fund Act for the same )'ear, for the city of Chicngo, provide for a new and ad- ditional tax not within the terms of the Tax Reduction Act. People vs. Day, 277—543. The taxes for parents' pension is not subject to reduction. People vs. Klee, 282— 44l». 268 A tuberculosis sanitarium tax autliorized under act of 1915 is not subject to reduction. People vs. Wabash R. Co., 286 — 15. 4. Uuiforniity in Scaling: When it becomes necessary, under the provisions of the act, to reduce the rate of tax levy in trny portion of a taxing district, the act require the same per cent of reduction in the rate of such tax levy in every other part of such taxing district, in order that a uniform rate shall apply throughout each district. Town of Cicero vs. Haas, 244 — 551; People vs. R. Co., 248—87; People vs. R. Co., 248—596, 597. Where part of a township in which tax rates are highest is within limits of school district and city, and the district and city overlap, but neither are entirely with the other, town tax must be scaled throughout township. People vs. Chicago & A. R. Co., 247—458. 5. Distribution of Reduction: The county clerk in scaling taxes to reduce the total levy of the county so as to bring it within the maximum of 75 cents, has not authority to take the whole of the excess from any one item, even though the item is levied as an amount appropriated for loss occasioned by operation of the tax ex- tension law. People vs. R. Co., 266 — 150. 6. City Levy: The act of June 29, 1915 (Laws 1915, p. 291), concerning park taxes, is not in conflict with, Juhl Law as amended June 10, 1915, and the latter act alone governs as to the limitations of park taxes in excess of city taxes in cities over 50,000 and less than 150,000 population. People vs. Wabash R. Co., 276—92. TAXATION OF BRIDGES ACROSS NAVIGABLE WATERS ON THE BORDERS OF THE STATE. AN ACT to provide for the assessment and taxation of bridges across navig- able waters on the borders of this State. [Approved and in force May 1, 1873] Bridges on border of state — How assessed.] Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That all bridge structures across any navigable streams forming the boundary line between the State of Illinois and any other state, shall be assessed by the township or other assessor in the county or township where the same is located, as real estate ; and all provisions of law relating to the assessment and taxation of real estate, shall apply to the assessment and taxation of such bridges. Such assessor shall give in his description the quarter section, section, township and range in which such bridge is located or terminates in this state, together with the metes and bounds of the ground occupied by such bridge, and the approaches thereto from the end on the Illinois shore to the center of the main channel of the stream crossed by the same. For the purpose of obtaining such description the assessor may employ a competent surveyor, and the expense of making such survey and description shall be 269 charged as a tax against such property by the county clerk, on the certificate of the surveyor: Provided, that one survey of any bridge and approaches, made under this act, shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose of subsequent assessment of such bridge or approaches. Does not refer to capital stock of bridge companies, or exempt their stock from taxation. The purpose of the act was to be able to sell the bridge for de- linquent taxes. Quincy Bridge Co. vs. Adams Co., 88 — 615. Where a railroad company bought a bridge of a bridge company, and filed its statement including that as "railroad track," and such was assessed by the State Board of Equalization, it was not proper for the local assessor to tax the bridge, as the statute of 1873 (Kurd's 1899, par. 354, p. 1457) applies only to bridges not classed as railroad track. It is not necessary for Board of Equalization to tax all of bridge; only that part considered "railroad track." People vs. By Co., 206—252. A bridge owned by a railroad company must be taxed as railroad property, and by the State Board of Equalization only, but a bridge leased by a railroad company may be taxed under this Act, where the lease is not in per- petuity, and notwithstanding it is strictly a railroad bridge. Chicago, etc., E. Co., vs. P., 153 — 409 (1894). An assessor in this State, in assessing a bridge over a navigable river forming a boundary of the State, will have no right to assess any part of such bridge that is located beyond the boundary line of this State. It is duty of assessor to state length of bridge and approaches assessed. Keokuk- Hamilton Bridge Co. vs. P., 145—596 (1893). Whether bridge property was assessed more or less than it should have been, and more or less than other like property in the county, are, in the absence of fraud, questions which a court cannot consider upon an application by the People for a judgment for taxes. Keokuk, etc.. Bridge Co. vs. P., 145—596 (1893). As.sessment of bridges and approaches in one amount is proper. Keokuk Bridge Co. vs. P., 176—267. All that part of the St. Louis bridge, which lies east of the middle thread of the Mississippi Biver, as it now is, is within the State of Illinois, and being so, is subject to taxation by the State, St. Clair County, and the City of East St. Louis. St. Louis Bridge Co. vs. P., 125—226. All that part of the St. Louis bridge, with its approaches, that lies east of the middle line of the main channel of the Mississippi Biver, is within the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois for the jjurposes of State and local taxation. Buttcrnuth vs. St. Louis Bridge Co., 123 — 535. Sale of bridge, etc., for tax.] Section 2. In dd'ault of pic pay- ment of any such tax assessed against any such bridge company, as aforesaid, such bridge structure, and approaches thereto, so far as the same arc located within this state, together with the land on which the same is located, as descril)cd hy the assessor, and the franchise liolonging thereto, shall be sold for such tax at the same time and in the same manner as other real estate shall be sold in Hiich county for delincpient tax; and any county, city, town, school district, or other municii)al corporation, interested in the collection 270 of the tax levied upon such bridge, may become the purchaser at such sale, or at any sale of such property under judgment re- covered upon, or to enforce the collection of such tax; and if the property so sold is not redeemed, may acquire, hold, sell and dis- pose of the title thereto. [As amended by act approved May 3, 1877. In force July 1, 1877. L. 1877, p. 171. Repeal.] Section 3. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed. Emergency.] Section 4. Whereas, by existing law such bridge structures cannot be sold for delinquent taxes, so as to convey a good title thereto, wherefore an emergency exists why this act should take effect immediately: therefore this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage. ACT REGARDING THE COLLECTION OF TAXES AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS. AN ACT in relation to the collection of taxes and special assessments. [Ap- proved and in force May 2, 1873.] Whereas certain requirements of the general revenue law of this state, relating to the mode of advertising the list of delinquent taxes and special ass,essments, to making application for judgment thereon, and the manner of making the tax sale, are impracticable ; and whereas, it is desirable to remove existing defects as to the manner of collecting the taxes and special assessments : therefore, When description in special assessment different from tax books.] Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illi- nois, represented in the General Assembly: When a return to the county collector has been made or shall hereafter be made of any real estate delinquent for any special assessment, or annual instal- ment thereof, levied by any incorporated city, town or village, or by any corporate authorities, commissioners or persons, pursuant to law, which assessment or instalment thereof is required by law to be included in the advertisement and notice of application for judg- ment for state and county taxes, and the description or subdivision of any real estate described in such return is different from the description or subdivision thereof as described in the town or dis- trict collector's book returned to such county collector, it shall and may be lawful for the county collector to advertise all the real estate delinquent for any such assessment described in such return, ac- cording to the description thereof, as contained in such return ; but such advertisement shall be made at the same time, and shall form part of his advertisement of real estate delinquent for state and county taxes. [See Sections 178-188. 271 How described.] Section 2. Tlie said real estate, so advertised, may be described in the comity collector's delinquent return, accord- ing to the description thereof, as contained in such return and ad- vertisement ; and like proceedings shall be had to the application for judgment, and the judgment thereon, the sale and issuance of the certificate of the sale thereof, redemption from such sales and issu- ance of deeds thereon, as may be required by law to be had in regard to lands delinquent for state and county taxes. City, etc., may buy in at sale.] Section 3. Any incorporated city, town or village, or corporate authorities, commissioners, or per- sons interested in any such special assessment or instalment thereof, may become purchaser at any sale, and may designate and appoint some officer or person to attend and bid at such sale on its behalf. Emergency.] Section 4. Whereas many special assessments are now in process of collection, whereby an emergency exists why this act shall take effect immediately : therefore, this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage. APPORTIONMENT OF SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS. AN ACT concerning the apportionment of special assessments payable in in- stalments. [Approved April 13, 1875. In force July 1, 1875. L. 1875, p. 36. J Apportionment of special assessments payable in instalments.] Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, repre- sented in the General Assembly, That in all cases where any special assessment, payable in installments, has been, or hereafter shall be made by any corporate authority, for supplying water, or other cor- porate purpose, and the owner or owners of any lot, block or parcel of land so assessed, or some of them, shall desire to subdivide the same, and to apportion such assessment and the several instalments thereof in such manner that eacli parcel of such proposed subdivision shall bear its just and equitable proportion thereof, the same may be done in the manner following, to wit: TJie owner or owners of such lot, block or parcel of land shall present to such corporate authority a petition, setting forth: '1. The descriptive character of the assessment and tlie date of the confirmation of the same. 2. The names of the owners. 3. A description of the land propo.sod to be subdivided, together with the amount of each instalment thereon, and llir year or years for which the same aic duf. 4. A plat .showing the proposed subdivision. 272 ' 5. The proposed apportionment of the amours t of eae^ instal- ment on each lot or parcel according to such proposed subdivision. Such petition shall be acknowledged in the manner provided for the acknowledgment of deeds, and if such corporate authoritj shall be satisfied therewith, they shall cause to be indorsed upon or attached to such petition their approval by their clerk or secretary, under their corporate seal, and the same, so approved, shail be filed and recorded in the office of the county clerk in which such land shall be situate, and such apportioned assessment shall stand in place of the original assessment, and the same and the several instalments thereof shall be deemed duly apportioned, and the several amounts so appor- tioned shall be liens upon the several parcels charged, respectively; and for the purpose of collecting the same all proceedings shall be had and taken as if said assessment and instalments had been made and apportioned in the first instance acording to such apportioned description and amounts, and the respective owners shall be held to have waived every and all objections to such as?essment and the apportionment aforesaid: Provided, this act shall not apply to any lot, block or parcel of land on which there shall remain due and unpaid any instalment. In case the owners are unable to agree as to such apportionment, or any of them are under legal disability, one or more of them may file a petition with the circuit court of the county in which such land so assessed is situate, substantially in form as hereinbefore provided ; and in such case such corporate authority, together with all owners or persons interested, not joined as petitioners and unknown owners, if any, shall be made parties defendant, and all proceedings in relation thereto shall be had as in cases in chancery. The court may hear and determine the case according to the right of the matter. A copy of the record of the proceedings of the court in the premises in case of an apportionment, duly certified, shall be filed and recorded in the office of such county clerk, and the same shall thereupon, as to the land therein embraced, the owners thereof, the apportionment aforesaid, and the collection of the several amounts apportioned, have the same force and effect as is hereinbefore provided in cases where such corporate authorities shall approve of a petition and file and record the same. ACT TO RESTORE UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION. AN ACT to restore uniformity in the taxation of real and personal property, for all purposes, in the several counties and cities of this State. [Ap- proved January 4, 1872. In force July 1, 1872.] Uniformity restored.] Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That 273 the real and personal property within all incorporated towns and cities in every county in this state shall be taxable for all purposes, any local or special law in regard to exemption of any particular toAvn or city to the contrary notwithstanding; and all provisions of law in conflict with this act are hereby repealed ; but nothing herein shall be construed as authorizing the taxation of property allowed to be exempt by any general law now in force or that may hereafter be passed. And all laws requiring any city to support and provide for its paupers, to assume liabilities, or perform duties required of counties by the general laws of this State, are hereby repealed ; and the general laws of this State upon such subjects, in relation to coun- ties and cities, shall be applicable to all counties and cities in the State. The repealing part of this statute, i. e., Act of January 4, 1872, applies to in- corporated towns as well as to cities. Bruner vs. Madison County, 111 — 15; citing Burke vs. Monroe Co., 77—611. INHERITANCE TAX ACT OF 1909. [Introductory: Constitutionality of act upheld. The law provides for six classes, on each of which the tax is uniform, and this is sufficient. Kochersperger vs. Drake, 167—122. Inheritance tax is not "in pari materia" with the revenue tax. One taxes the right of succession to property; the other the property itself. People vs. Griffith, 245—530. The State is interested as a beneficiary in every transfer of property by death, the State acquires title to its portion of the estate immediately upon death of the owner, and such portion becomes severed from the remainder by operation of law and cannot pass either by descent or devise. National Safe Deposit Co. vs. Stead, 250—584; Northern Trust Co. vs. Buck & Eay- ner, 263—222. The Inheritance Tax law imposes a special tax, and in case of doubt the lan- guage must be construed strictly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer. In re Estate of Ullmann, 263—528, 530. The Inheritance Tax act of 1909 is a complete revision of the statute of 1895, is broader in its terms than the previous act and was designed to reach certain voluntary transfers of property which could not be taxed under the prior statute. People vs. Carpenter, 264 — 400, 403. AN ACT to tax gifts, legacies, inheritances, transfers, appointments and in- terests in certain cases, and to provide for the collection of the same, and repealing certain Acts therein named. [Approved June 14, 1909. In force July 1, 1909. Laws 1909, p. 311.] What property is subject to this act— Rates of taxation pre- scribed exemptions.] Section 1. A lax shall be and is hereby im- posed ui>()n the transfer of any proiiorty, real, personal or mixed, or of any interest therein or income tlierefrom, in trust or otherwise. 274 ( I to persons,, institutions or corporations/ not hereinafter exenij^ted, in the following cases: 1. When the transfer is by will or by the intestate laws^ of this State,^ from any person dying, seized or possessed of the property while a resident of the State.* 2. When the transfer is by will or intestate laws of property within the State and the decedent was a non-resident of the State at the time of his death.^ 3. When the transfer is of property made by a resident, or bj' a non-resident when such non-resident's property is within this State, by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift, made in contemplation of the death of the grantor, vendor or donor, or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after such death. "^ When any such person, institution or corporation becomes benefioially entitled^ in possession or expectancy to any property or the income therefrom, by any such transfer, whether made before or after the passage of this act.^ 4. Whenever any person, institution or corporation shall exer- cise a power of appointment derived from any disposition of property made either before or after the passage of this Act, such appoint- ment, when made, shall be deemed a taxable transfer under the pro- visions of this Act, in the same manner as though the property to which such appointment relates belonged absolutely to the donee of such power jyid had been bequeathed or devised by such donee by will; and ^vhenever any person or corporation possessing such a power of appointment so derived shall omit or fail to exercise the same within the time provided therefor, in whole or in part, a transfer taxable under the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to take place to the extent of such omission or failure, in the same manner as though the persons or corporations thereby becoming entitled to the possession or enjoyment of the property to which such power related had succeeded thereto by a will of the donee of the power failing to exercise such power, taking effect at the time of such omission or failure. 5. Whenever property, real or personal, is held in the joint names of two or more persons, or is deposited in banks or other in- stitutions or depositories in the joint names of two or more persons and payable to either or the survivor, upon the death of one of such persons the right of the surviving joint tenant or joint tenants, per- son or persons, to the immediate ownership or possession and enjoy- ment of such property shall be deemed a transfer taxable under the provisions of this Act in the same manner as though the whole property to which such transfer relates was owned by said parties " 275 as tenants in common and had been bequeathed to the surviving joint tenant or joint tenants, person or persons, by such deceased joint tenant or joint depositor by will. AVhen the beneficial interests to any property or income there- from shall pass to or for the use of any father, mother, lineal ancestor of decedent, husband, wife, child, brother or sister, wife or widow of the son or the husband of the daughter, or any cnild or children legally adopted, or to any person to whom the deceased, for not less than ten years prior to death, stood in the acknowledged relation of a parent : Provided, however, such relationship began at or before said person's fifteenth birthday and was continuous for said ten years thereafter: And, provided, also, that one of the parents of such person so standing in such relation shall be deceased when such relationship commenced, or to any lineal descendant of such (leeendcnt (decedent) born in lawful wedlock". In every such case the rate of tax^° shall be : One per cent on any amount up to and including the sum of fifty thousand dollars in excess of the exemption; Two per cent on the next one hundred thousand dollars or any part thereof: Three per cent on the next one hundred thousand dollars or any part thereof: Five per cent on the next two hundred and fifty thousand dol- lars or any part thereof : Seven per cent on the amount representing the balance of each individual transfer: Provided, that any gift, legacy, inheritance, transfer, appointment or interest passing to a father, mother, lineal ancestor of decedent, husband, wife, child, wife or widow of the son or the husband of the daughter or any child or children legally- adopted or to any person to whom the deceased, for not less than ten years prior to death, stood in the acknowledged relation of a parent as above provided which may be valued at a less sum than twenty thousand dollars shall not be subject to any such duty or taxes and the tax is to be levied in such cases only upon the excess of twenty thousand dollars received by each person : And, provided, further, that any gift, legacy, inheritance, transfer, appointment or interest passing to a brother, sister, which may he valued at a less sum than ten thousaiul dollais shall not be subject to any such duty or taxes and Hie lax is to be levied in such casrs only upon the excess of ten thousand dollars received by each jierson. Wlien the beju^fieial interests to any property or income llieic- froni shall pass to or for the use of any uJicle, aunt, niece, nephew or 276 any lineal descendant of such uncle, aunt, niece or nephew. In every case the rate of tax shall be : Three per cent on any amount up to and including the sum ot twenty thousand dollars, in excess of the exemption. Four per cent on the next fift}^ thousand dollars or any part thereof : Six per cent on the next one hundred thousand dollars or any part thereof : Eight per cent on the amount representing the balance of each individual transfer: Provided, that any gift, legacy, inheritance, transfer, appointment or interest passing to an uncle, aunt, niece, nephew or any lineal descendant of such uncle, aunt, niece or nephew which may be valued at a less sum than five hundred dollars shall not be subject to any such duty or taxes and the tax is to be levied in such case only upon the excess of five hundred dollars received by such uncle, aunt, niece, nephew or any lineal descendant of such uncle, aunt, niece, or nephew. In all other cases the rate of tax shall be as follows : Five per cent on any amount up to and including the sum or twenty thousand dollars in excess of the exemption : Six per cent on the next thirty thousand dollars or any part thereof : Eight per cent on the next fifty thousand dollars or any part thereof : Ten per cent on the next fifty thousand dollars or any part thereof : Twelve per cent on the next one hundred thousand dollars or any part thereof : Fifteen per cent on the amount representing the balance of each individual transfer: Provided, that any gift, legacy, inheritance, transfer, appointment or interest passing to such persons which may be valued at a less sum than one hundred dollars shall not be subject to any such duty or taxes and the tax is to be levied in such cases only upon the excess of one hundred dollars received by each person. The tax imposed hereby shall be upon the clear market value of such property," at the rates hereinabove prescribed. [Amended by act approved June 28, 1919. In force July 1, 1919.] 1. Corporations: The word "corporation'' is broad enougk to include municipal corporations of every character and applies to every cori^oration not afterwards exempted in the statute, it includes property of an interstate transferred to a coun- ty by the State of Escheat. People vs. Eichardson, 269 — 275. 2. Will or Intestate Laws: 277 Dower is subject to inheritance tax, where the widow renounced the provisions of the will in her behalf, in lieu of dower. Billings vs. P., 189 — i75. "Intestate laws," as used in section above, mean those laws which govern the devolution of estates of persons dying intestate, and include all applicable rules of the common law in force in this State. Billings vs. P., 189 — 477. The Statute of Escheat is part of intestate laws of the State and Inheritance Tax law applies to property escheated to county. People vs. Kichardsou, 269—275. The amount due widow under antenuptial contract payable to her as a sub- stitute for and in lieu of dower and other interest as widow, payable upon condition she survive the husband cannot be deducted from value of estate in determining inheritance tax. People vs. Estate of Field, 248 — 147. Bequests made by will of $5,000 to trustees named therein, on condition that they will not charge or accept any further sum for their services as execu- tors or trustees are taxable as passing by virtue of the will. People vs. Bauder, 271—446. The widow's award and' dower are subject to inheritance tax. Peoijle vs. For- syth, 27.i— 1-11. 3. Of This State: The inheritance tax does not apply to land in a foreign State, whether passed by will or not. Construing "shall pass by will or by the intestate laws of the State." Even though the will directs a conversion of such lands into money, it does not apply, as the doctrine of equitable conversion is not en- . forced in a court of law. Conncll vs. Crosby, 210—380; P. vs. Kellogg, 268 — i89. Inheritance tax may be assessed against succession to personal property owned by a resident of Illinois but situated in a foreign State. Pcoi)le vs. Union Trust Co., 255 — 108;. same vs. same, 280 — 170. 4. Resident of the State: Domicile is the place of residence, and that is not changed by merely moving to another place unless such moving is accompanied by intention to change permanently. Where one who had intended at some time in the future to change his domicile, fell sick, and was thereupon taken away by his daughter, it cannot be said that this was such change of domicile contem- plated by the Act. People vs. P^st. of iMoir, 207—180. 5. Non-resident of the State at the time of death: The stocks and bonds of domestic corporations found in a safety de])osit box in this State, the deceased being a non-resident, were taxable, but not the stocks and bonds of foreign corporations, found in the same box. i'eoplo vs. Griffith, 245—532. Shares of stock of a foreign corporation owned by a non-resident are not sub- ject to tax in Illinois, when transferred by will of the non-resident, al- though Hur-h cori-orations do business and have tangible property in Illinois. People v.s. Cuyler, 276—72; same vs. Dennett, 276— 4.{; same vs. Blair, 276— 02.'5. 6. Made in contemplation of death: Where a .«• wuy ii\n])cviy or interest therein or iTicome therefrom to mother, faflier, husband, wife, brother and sister, the widow of the son or a lineal descendant durinR the life or for a tcrni of years or' remainder to the collateral heir of the decedent, or to the 2S0 stranger in blood" or to the body politic or corporate at their decease, or on the expiration of such term, the said life estate or estates for a term of years shall not be subject to any tax and the property so passing shall be appraised immediately after the death' at what was the fair market value thereof at the time of the death of the decedent in the manner hereinafter provided, and after deducting therefrom the value of said life estate, or term of years,' the tax transcribed by this act on the remainder shall be immediately" due and payable to the treasurer of the proper coun- ty, and, together with the interests thereon, shall be and remain a lien on said property until the same is paid: Provided, that the person or per- sons or body politic or corporate beneficially interested in the property chargeable with said tax elect not to pay the same until they shall come in the actual possession or enjoyment of such property, or, in that case said person or persons or body politic or corporate shall give a bond to the People of the State of Illinois in the penalty three times the amount of the tax arising upon such estate with such sureties as the county judge may approve, conditioned for the payment of the said tax and interest thereon at such time or period as they or their representatives may come into the actual possession or enjoyment of said property; which bond shall be filed in the office of the county clerk of the proper county;" Provided further, that such person shall make a full, verified return of said property to said county judge, and file the same in his office within one year from the death of the decedent, and within that period enter into such securities and renew the same for five years. ' ' The cases containing the several phrases referred to are as follows: 1. Life estate or term for years: "Or" is construed "and" to give the effect that if a life estate or term for years go to mother, father, etc., and remainder to collateral heir of the decedent, or to a stranger in blood, then such prior estate not taxable, but if remainder to lineals, then prior estate is. Billings vs. P., 189 — 472. 2. Collateral heir or stranger to the blood: Under Sec. 2 of the inheritance tax, in order to deduct a life estate or term for years from the value of an estate in remainder, the remainderman must be a collateral heir, or a stranger to the blood' or a body politic. No other section provides any exception to immediate taxation. In re Estate of Kingman, 220 — 563. Life estate or estate for j^ears is only exempt when remainder is to collateral heir, stranger in blood, or body politic or corporate. Ayers vs. Trust Co., 187—56. 3. Appraised immediately after death: Appraisement provided for in section above should be made immediately after death of testator. Ayers vs. Trust Co., 187 — 52. 4. Deducting value of life estate or term of years: Where the wife renounces the provisions of the will, the life estate given her therein is not to be exempted, Connell vs. Crosby, 210- — i380. Tax is imposed by section above upon all interests, incomes and expectancies, except those estates for life and years exempted by the ensuing section. Ayers vs. Trust Co., 187 — 57. This Sec. 2 exempts life estate and term for years under the circumstances specified. Billings vs. P., 189 — 472, 2S1 Appiaisemeut mentioned in section above, made by deducting value of life es- tate. Avers vs. Trust Co., 187—54. 5. Tax on remainder immediately due: Payment of tax upon remainders mentioned in section above becomes due upon testator's death, except as therein otherwise provided. Ayers vs. Trust Co., 187—53. 6. Election by remainderman: Where the remainderman cannot and does not make election to give bond as provided by Sec. 2, the tax becomes due at once. People vs. Nelms, 241—571. Appraisement of life interest — Accrued tax a lien on entire prop- erty — Bond for deferred payment.] Section 2. When any property or interest therein or income therefrom shall pass or be limited for the life of another, or for a term of years, or to terminate on the expiration of a certain period the property of the decedent so pass- ing shall be appraised immediately after the death of the decedent, and the value of the said life estate, term of years or period of limitation shall be fixed upon mortality tables, using the interest rate or income rate of five per cent; and the value of the remainder in said property so limited shall be ascertained by deducting the value of the life estate, term of years or period cf limitation from the fair market value of the property so limited, and the tax on the several estate or estates, remainder or remainders, or interests shall be immediately due and payable to the treasurer of the proper county, together with interest thereon, and said tax shall accrue as provided in section three (3) of this act, and remam a lien upon the entire property limited until paid: Provided, tliat the person or persons, body politic or corporate, beneficially interested in property chargeable with said tax, elect not to pay the same until they shall come into actual possession or enjoyment of such property, then in that case said person or persons, or body politic or corporate, shall give bond to the People of the State of Illinois in a penal sum three times the amount of the tax arising from such property, limited with such sureties as the county judge may approve, conditioned for tJK' payment of the said tax and interest thereon at sncli lime or period as they or tiieir representatives may come into the actual possesion or enjoyment of said property; which bond shall be fded in the office of the county clerk of the proper county: Provided, further, that such pei-son or persons, body politic or corporate, shall make a full vei-iticd return of said ])roperty to said county judge and file the same in his office within one yesir from the death of the flecedent, with the bond and sureties as abovi' provided; iind, fur- ther, saiii person or persons, body ])olitic or cori)orate sluill renew said bond every five years after the date of the deatli ol' (Iccid.nt. 282 ISo coiiIUct exists between sections 2 and 25 as section 2 requires that a life estate doperdiug upon no condition or contingency shall be appraised and its value fixed upon mortality tables immediately after the death of de- cedent, wliereas section 25 applies if said life estate depends upon any contiiigoiicy or condition. Teoplo vs. Donohuc, 276 — 88. Interest on deferred payment of tax assessed — Bond of execu- tors and others.] Section 3. All taxes imposed by this act, unless otherwise herein provided for, shall be due and payable, at the death of the decedent, and interest at the rate of six per cent per annuni shall be charged and collected thereon for such time as said taxes are not paid: Provided, that if said tax is paid within six months from the accruing thereof, interest shall not be charged or collected thereon, but a discount of five per cent shall be allowed and deducted from said tax; and in all cases where the executors, administrators or trustees do not pay such tax within one year from the death of the decedent, they shall be required to give a bond in the form and to the effect prescribed in section 2 of this act, for the payment of said tax, together with interest. That portion of an estate which under the Inheritance Tax law vests in the 8tate accrues immediately upon the death of the decedent, and all ques- tions concerning it must be determined as of the date of the decedent's death. People vs. Kichardson, 289 — ^^275. The interest provided for on taxes remaining unpaid is not in the nature of a penalty but is a mere measure of compensation to the State for the loss of the use of the money, the provision is positive and self-executing and the county court on an appeal from the order of the county judge assess- ing the tax cannot remit the interest in the absence of authority given by statute. People vs. Baldwin, 287—87. Duties of executors and administrators.] Section 4. Any ad- ministrator, executor or trustee having any charge or trust in legacies or property for distribution subject to the said tax shall deduct the tax therefrom, or if the legacy or property be not money he shall collect a tax thereon upon the appraised value thereof from the legatee or person entitled to such property, and he shall not deliver or be compelled to deliver any specific legacy or property subject to tax to any person until he shall have collected the tax thereon ; and whenever any such legacy shall be charged upon or payable out of real estate the heir or devisee before the paying the same, shall deduct said tax therefrom, and pay the same to the executor, administrator or trustee, and the same shall remain a charge on such real estate until paid, and the payment thereof shall be enforced by the executor, administrator or trustee in the same manner that the said payment of said legacies might be enforced if, however, such legacy be given in money to any person for a limited period; he shall retain the tax upon the whole amount, but 283 if it be not in money he shall make application to the court having jurisdiction of his accounts, to make an apportionment if the case requires it of the sum to be paid into his hands by such legatees and for such further order relative thereof as the case may require The executor, administrator or trustee cannot retain out of the property that comes into his hands, as a gross amount, the entire sum of taxes imposed, hut can only retain from any legacy in his hands the tax due thereon. People vs. Union Trust Co., 255—168. Lia.bility of executors and others.] Section 5. All executors, administrators and trustees shall be personally liable for the pay- ment of taxes and interest, and where proceedings for collection of taxes assessed be had, said executors, administrators and trustees shall be personally liable for the expenses, costs and fees of collec- tion. They shall have full power to sell so much of the property of the decedent as will enable them to pay said tax, in the same man- ner as they may be enabled to do by law, for the payment of duties of their testators and intestates, and the amount of said tax shall be paid as hereinafter directed. The provision that executors, administrators and trustees shall be personally lialile for the tax applies only to property within the State at the testa- tor's death or which thereafter comes into his possession. People vs. Union Trust Co., 255—168. Where legacies are paid directly to non-resident beneficiaries by a foreign ad- ministrator out of property owned by a resident of Illinois but situated in the foreign State neither Illinois administrator nor trustee is responsible for Illinois tax on legacies so paid out. People vs. Union Trust Co., 25.5 — 168; same vs. same, 280^ — 170. A trustee has an appealable interest if he believes an inheritance tax unjust, not only to preserve the rights of the beneficiaries but to protect himself from personal liability in case he should pay a claim that should after- wards be fidjudged Illegal. People vs. Northern Trust Co., 266 — 139. Where bequests to non-resident beneficiaries have been paid by an ancillary executor out of proceeds of sales made by him under the will and approved by a court of a foreign State, of real estate, in such State, the Illinois executor cannot be compelled to pay from residuary estate or from his personal funds tax assessed on such bequests. People vs. Kellogg, Payment of tax — How made by executor and others — Receipt of state trea.surer.] Section 6. Every sum of mouey retained by any executor, administrator or trustee, or paid into his liands for any tax on any property, shall be paid by him williin thirty days there- after to the treasurer of the proper county, and the said treasurer or treasurers shall give, and every executor, administrator or trustee shall take duplicate receipts from him of said payments, one of which recf'ii)1s he shall immediately send to the slate treasurer, whose dutv i1 shall be to eharge the treasurer so receiving Ihe 1nx 284 with the amount thereof, and shall seal said receipt with the seal of his office and countersign the same and return it to the executor, administrator or trustee, whereupon it shall be a proper voucher in the settlement of his accounts; but the executo)', administrator or trustee shall not be entitled to credit in his accounts or be dis- charged from liability for such tax unless he shall purchase a receipt so sealed and countersigned by the treasurer and a copy thereof certified by him. Executor and others to give information to county treasurer.] Section 7. AA^henever any of the real estate of which any decedent may die seized shall pass to any body politic or corporate, or to any person or persons, or in trust for them, it shall be the duty of the executor, administrator or trustee of such decedent to give infor- mation thereof in writing to the treasurer of the county where said real estate is situated, within six months after they undertake the execution of their expected duties, or if the fact be not known to them within that period, then within one month after the same shall have come to their knowledge. Refunding tax retained by executor and others.] Section 8. Whenever debts shall be proved against the estate of the decedent after distribution of legacies from which the inheritance tax has been deducted in compliance with this act, and the legatee is re- quired to refund any portion of the legacy, a proportion of the said tax shall be repaid to him by the executor or administrator if the said tax has not been paid into the State or county treasury, or by the county treasurer if it has been so paid. County treasurer is not, however, authorized to retain moneys collected by him for inheritance taxes for longer period than is reasonably required for its transmission to State treasurer. P. vs. Eaymond, 188 — 458. Foreign executor transferring stocks — Notice to treasurer and attorney general — Liability of custodians.] Section 9. If a foreign executor, administrator or trustee shall assign or transfer any stock or obligations in this State standing in the name of a decedent or in trust for a decedent, liable to any such tax, the tax shall be paid to the treasurer of the proper county on the transfer thereof. No safe deposit company, trust company, corporation, bank or other institution, person or persons having in possession or under control securities, deposits, or other assets belonging to or standing in the name of a decedent who was a resident or non-resident or belonging to, or standing in the joint names of such a decedent and one or more persons, including the shares of the capital stock of, or other interests in, the safe deposit company, trust company, corporation, bank or other institution making the delivery or transfer herein 285 provided shall deliver or transfer the same to the executors, ad- ministrator or legal representatives of said decedent, or to the survivor or survivors when held in the joint names of a decedent and one or more persons, or upon their order or request, unless notice of the time and place of such intended delivery or transfer be served upon the state treasurer and attorney general at least ten days prior to said delivery or transfer; nor shall any such safe deposit company, trust company, corporation, bank or other in- stitution, person or persons deliver or transfer any securities, de- posits or other assets belonging to or standing in the name of a decedent, or belonging to, or standing in the joint names of a decedent and one or more persons, including .the shares of the capital stock of, or other interests in, the safe deposit company, trust company, corporation, bank or other institution making the delivery or transfer, without retaining a sufficient portion or amount thereof to pay any tax or interest which may thereafter be assessed on account of the delivery or transfer of such securities, deposits or other assets, including the shares of the capital stock of, or other interests in, the safe deposit company, trust company, corporation, bank or other institution making the delivery cr transfer, under the provisions of this article, unless the state treasurer and attorney general consent thereto in writing. And it shall be lawful for the state treasurer, together with the attorney general, personally or by representatives, to examine said securities, deposits or assets at the time of such delivery or transfer. Failure to serve such notice or failure to allow such examination, or failure to retain a suf- ficient portion or amount to pay such tax and interest as herein provided shall render said safe deposit company, trust company, corporation, l)ank or other institution, person or persons liable to the payment of the amount of the tax and interest due or thereafter to become dne upon said securities, deposits or other assets, includ- ing the shares of the capital stock of, or other interests in, the safe deposit company, trust company, corporation, ])ank or other institution making the delivery or transfer, and in addition thereto, a penalty of one thousand dollars; and the payment of such tax and interest thereon, or of Ihe penalty above prescribed, or both, may be enforced in an action brought by the state treasurer in any court of competent jurisdiction. Tbis soclion is constitutional. National Safe Doposit Co. vs. Stead, 250—584, anrirmo.l 1?.".2 V. P. nS. Refunding- excess of tax by state treasurer.] Sect ion 10. Wlicn any amouiit of sjiid lax sliall liave been paid erroneously 1o I lie State treasury, it shall be lawful for him on satisfactory proof 286 rendered to him by said county treasurer of said erroneous pay- ments to refund and pay to the executor, administrator or trustee, person or persons who have paid any such tax in error the amount of such tax so paid : Provided, that all applications for the repay- ment of said tax shall be made within two years from the date of said payment. The order of Counly Court on county treasurer to refund money paid in excess was erroneous; as recourse allowed by statute is to State's treasurer. People vs. Griffith, 245—532. Appraisement of property — How made.] Section 11. It shall be the duty of the county judge to ascertain whether any transfer of any property be subject to an inheritance tax under the pro- visions of this Act, and, if it be subject to such inheritance tax, to assess and fix the then cash value of all estates, annuities and life estates or terms of years growing out of said estates and the tax to w^hich the same is liable. The county judge, upon the application of any interested party, including the Attorney General, or upon his own motion as often as, or whenever occasion may require, may hear evidence and determine the fair cash value of such estate and the amount of inheritance tax to which the same is liable or the county judge may, in such case, in his discretion, where the facts are complicated and evidence is voluminous, appoint some com- petent person as appraiser to appraise the fair cash value at the time of the transfer thereof of the property of persons whose estates shall be subject to the payment of any inheritance tax im- posed by this Act. Whether the fair cash value of such estate shall be ascertained and determined by the appraiser appointed by the county judge or by the county judge, (Court) notice shall, in each case, be given by mail to all persons known to have a claim an [or] interest in such property, including the Attorney General, and to such persons as the county judge by order directs, of the time and place he will appraise such property: Provided, that in counties of the third class, because of the volume of general business trans- acted in the County Courts of such counties, the county judge in such counties of the third class may, in his direction, appoint appraisers in any and all cases. In case an appeal is taken to the County Court, it shall be the duty of the county clerk, within two days after such appeal shall have been perfected, to notify in writing the Attorney General and county treasurer. Within five days after the judgment of the County Court shall be entered on appeal, it shall be the duty of the county clerk to make and transmit a certified copy of such judgment to the Attorney General and county treasurer. Persons of full age and sui juris may, in writing, 287 waive such uotice, and consent to an immediate hearing by the county judge or the appraiser, as the case may be. Both the appraiser and the county judge are hereby authorized and empowered to use subpoenas for and to compel the attendance of Aptnesses before them, respectively, and to take the evidence of such witnesses under oath. Any person who shall be served with a subpoena to appear and testify or to produce books and papers, issued either by the county judge or by the appraiser, and who shall refuse or neglect to appear or testify or to produce books and papers relevant to such assessment, as commanded in such sub- poena, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than twenty-five dollars for each offense. Any Circuit Court or judge thereof, either in term time or vacation, upon application of the county judge or appraiser, as the case may be, may, in its or his discretion, compel the attendance of witnesses, the production of books and papers, and giving of testimony before such county judge or appraiser, as the case may be, by attachment for contempt or otherwise in the same manner as the production of evidence may be compelled before said court. 'When the evidence is taken by an appraiser, he shall make a report thereof and of such value in writing to said county judge, with the depositions of the witnesses examined and such other facts in relation thereto, and to said mat- ters as said county judge may by order require. The order of the county judge assessing and fixing an inheritance tax, together with the report, if any, of appraiser appointed by such county judge, shall be filed in the office of the county clerk. It shall be the duty of the county clerk, within five days after the tiling of such order assessing and fixing the inheritance tax, to make and transmit a certified copy of such order to the Attorney (jcneral and to the county treasurer of the county in which such assessment is had, and, also, to give notice by mail to all parties known to be inter- ested in such estate, substantially in snch form as may be pre- scribed and furnished to the county clerk by the Attorney Geiuu-al. Any person or persons, iricluding the Attorney (jcneial, dis- satisfied witii the appraisement or assessment, may api)eal there- from to the County Court of the proper county within sixty days after the nuiking and filing of such assessment order on pnyinii or giving 1o the county judge security satisfactory to \r,\y ;ill costs, together with whatever taxes shall he. fixed by the eonil : I'ro- vid<' 294 county treasurer of any county or the copy of the receipt at his option that may have been given by said treasurer for the payment of any tax under this act, to be sealed with the seal of his office, which receipt shall designate on what real property, if any, of which any deceased may have died seized, said tax has been paid and by whom paid, and whether or not it is in full of said tax; and said receipt may be recorded in the clerk's office of said county in which the property may be situated, in a book to be kept by said clerk for such purpose. Liability to taxation — How determined — Appeal to supreme court.] Section 23. AVlien any person interested in any property in this State, which shall have been transferred within the meaning of this act shall deem the same not subject to any tax under this act, he may file his petition in the county court of the proper county to determine whether said property is subject to the tax herein provided, in which petition the county treasurer and all persons known to have or claim any interest in said property shall be made parties. The county court may hear the said cause upon the relation of the parties and the testimony of witnesses, and evi- dence produced in open court, and, if the court shall find said property is not subject to any tax, as herein provided, the court shall, by order, so determine ; but if it shall appear that said prop- erty, or any part thereof, is subject to any such tax, the same shall be appraised and taxed as in other cases. An adjudication by the county court, as herein provided, shall be conclusive as to the lien of the tax herein provided upon said property, subject to appeal to the supreme court of the State by the county treasurer, or attor- ney general of the State, in behalf of the people, or by any party having an interest in said property. The fees and costs in all cases arising under this section shall be the same as are now or may here- after be allowed by law in cases at law in the county court. The county court has jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding to determine the question of liability for an inheritance tax, and on appeal from an order of the county judge assessing the tax the county court may determine both the question of liability and the matter of correct appraisal of the property and assessment thereon. People vs. Baldwin, 287 — 87. Continuation of lien— Limitation.] Section 24. The lien of the collateral inheritance tax shall continue until the said tax is settled and satisfied: Provided, that said lien shall be liri'ited to the prop- erty chargeable therewith: And, provided, further, that all in- heritance taxes shall be sued for within five days after they are due and legally demandable, otherwise they shall be presumed to be paid and cease to be a lien as against any purchaser of real estate. 295 Section 22 of Act of 1895 identical with the above section bars the lien against the property in tlio hands of purchasers, but does not bar the collection of the taxes from the person liable. Hanberg vs. ^Morgan, 203—616. This section limits lien on land for the tax to five years only in case the land is sold. People vs. Baldwin, 287 — 87. The word "purchaser'' is used in its ordinary souse and means one who buys and pays a valuable consideration for property, and does not include a devisee. People vs. Baldwin, 287 — 87. This section is positive that lien shall continue until it is settled and satisfied, there is no limitation as to lien as long as real estate contnues to be prop- erty- of one liable for the tax until the tax is fully paid, and he remains personally liable although he may have sold the real estate. People vs. Baldwin, 287—87. Highest rate in certain cases — Return of tax wrongfully imposed — Other provisions.] Section 25. AVhen property is transferred or limited in trust or otherwise, and the rights, interest or estates of the transferees or beneficiaries are dependent upon contingencies or conditions whereby they may be wholly or in part created, de- feated, extended or abridged, a tax shall be imposed upon said transfer at the highest rate which, on the happening of any of the said contingencies or conditions, would be possible under the pro- visions of this article, and such tax so imposed shall be due and payable forthwith by the executors or trustees out of the property transferred: Provided, however, that on the happening of any contingency whereby the said property, or any pait thereof is transferred to a person, corporation or institution exempt from taxation under the provisions of the inheritance tax laws of this State, or to any person, corporation or inslitution taxable at a rate less than the rate inipo.sed and paid, sucli person, corporation or institution shall i)e eJitilled to a return of so much of the tax imposed and paid as is the difference between thr amount paid and the amount which said person, corporation or institution should pay under the inheiilaiici- lax laws, with interest thereon a1 the rate of three per cent uiii per aniinni li'din llie time of payment. Such return of over-])aynu'nt shall be made in ihe maimer provided t'oi- refunds undei- section eif^ht. Kstates or interests in expectancy which ai'e conlinsicnl or de- feasible and in wliidi proceedin<>s Cor the determination of the tax have not been taken or where the taxation thereof has been held in abeyance, shall be appraised at their lull, iindimini.shed value when the persons entitled Ihert-to sIkiII come into the benclieial enjoyment or possession thereof, without diminnt ion I'ln- itr (.n account of any valuation thei-etofoi'c made of the particular estates I'or the i)ur- j)0ses of taxation, upon which said estates or interests in rxprciancy mav have been limited. 296 AVliere an estate for life or for years can be divested by the act or omission of the legatee or devisee it shall be taxed as if there were no possibility of such divesting. This section construed, iield constitutional and enforceable according to its terms. People vs. Byrd, 253 — 223; People vs. Frecsc, 267 — 164; People vs. Starring, 274 — 289; People vs. Donahoc, 276 — 88; People vs. Lowen- stein, 287—126. The court should take the highest amount which in any contingency may be- come liable to the tax, and if it is possible that upon the happening of the event which will vest a contingent remainder the entire remainder may go to one person, the court should compute the tax upon the entire re- mainder, less the statutory deduction the one remainder-man would be en- titled to. People vs. Byrd, 253—223; People vs. Starring, 274—293. Where testator bequeathed a contingent remainder to such of 41 nieces and nephews as may be alive at death of life tenant, the highest amount that in any contingency would become subject to the tax must be taken, so the remainder, after deducting the net value of the life estate and one ex- emption of $2,000 which is exemption allowed in case of transfer to a nephew or niece, should be taxed at two per cent. People vs. Freese, 267—164. Section applies to vested as well as contingent estates whenever such vested estates are liable to be defeated, extended or abridged by the conditions or contingencies provided in a will. People vs. Donahoe, 276 — 88. Section applies to any property depending upon contingencies or conditions whether or not there is a trust involved. People vs. Lowenstein, 284 — 126. A will which creates a trust in favor of the two daughters of testatrix for life with remainder to their children, with a subsequent provision that in case both daughters shall die without leaving issue the property shall be dis- tributed according to the laws of descent passes no possible interest to nephew of testatrix as warrant a tax assessed against a nephew. People vs. Camp, 285—511. Paragraph 2 applies to contingent estate, where at the time said section was enacted, the tax has been held in abeyance by the court because the es- tate had not yet vested. People vs. Lowenstein, 284 — 126. Compounding of claims — Powers of state treasurer and at- torney general.] Section 26. The state treasurer, by and with the consent of the attorney general expressed in writing, is hereby empowered and authorized to enter into an agreement wdth the trustees of any estate in which remainders or expectant estates, have been of such a nature, or so disposed and circumstanced that the taxes therein were held not presently payable, or where the interests of the legatees or devises were not ascertainable under an act to tax gifts, legacies, and inheritances, etc., in force July 1, 1885, and amendments thereto; and to compound such taxes upon such terms as may be deemed equitable and expedient; and to grant discharge to said trustees upon the payment of the taxes provided for in such composition : Provided, however, that no such 297 composition shall be conclusive, in favor of said trustees as against the interests of such ccstuis que trust as may possess either present rights of enjoyment, or fixed, absolute or indefeasible rights of future enjoyment, or of such as would possess such rights in the event of the immediate termination of particular estates, unless they consent thereto, either personally, when competent, or by guardian. Composition or settlement made or effected under the provisions of this section shall be executed in triplicate, and one copy filed in the office of the state treasurer, one copy in the office of the clerk of the county court wherein the appraisement was had or the tax was paid, and one copy delivered to the executors, ad- ministrators or trustees who shall be parties thereo. Guardian for infant.] Section 27. If it appears at any stage of an inheritance tax proceeding that any person known to be interested therein is an infant or person under disability, the county judge may appoint a special guardian of such infant or person under disability. The fees of guardian ad litem cannot be paid out of tax fund in hands of county treasurer. People vs. Pasfield, 284 — 450. Bequests to hospitals, churches and other org"anizations exempt- ed.] Section 28. AVhen the beneficial interests oi any property or income therefrom shall pass to or for the use of any hospital, re- ligious, educational, bible, missionary, tract, scientific, benevolent or charitable purpose, or to any trustee, bishop or minister of any church or religious denomination, held and used exclusively for the religious, educational or charitable uses and purposes of such church or religious denomination, institution or corporation, by grant, gift, bequest or otherwise, the same shall not be subject to any such duty or tax, but this provision shall not apply to any corporation which has the right to make dividends or distribute profits or assets among its members. The amendatory Act of 1901 to the Inheritance Tax Act was not retroactive, and where, at the time the act became effective, a tax was duo, it was not affected by that act. Here, exemption claimed on bequest for educational purposes. Conncll vs. Crosby, 210 — 380. Under the amended inheritance tax law (Sec. 2^^), exempting bequests to charitable institutions, where the deceased died before this amendment took efTect, the tax becoming payable then, it was not afTected by the amendment. This amendment is not self-executory, but requires action by the county judge, and it repeals only so much of the original act as makes such legacies taxable. It does not, therefore, operate to render the judge without jurisdiction in the matter. Provident School Assn. vs. People, 198—495. Under the amendatory Inheritance Tax .\ct of 1901, exempting rights or in- terests from tax when they shall pass to certain benevolent or charitable 298 institutions, a foreign corporation is not'includod. This Act is not uncon- stitutional, for it deals alike with all of the same class. In re Estate of Speed, 216—23, affirmed 203 U. S. 553. Section 28 is only section exempting property from the tax. People vs, Eich- ardson, 269—275, 276. Transfer defined.] Section 29. When proi)eity, or any interest therein or income therefrom, shall i)ass to or for the use of any per- son, institution or corporation by the death of another, by deed, in- strument or memoranda, such passing shall be deemed a transfer within the meaning of this act, and taxal)le at the same rates, and be appraised in the same manner and subjected to the same duties and liabilities as any other form of transfer provided in this act. Certified copies of papers to be furnished — Fees for same, | Sec- tion 30. On the written request of the county treasurer or county judge, in the county wherein an appraisement has been initiated, the clerk of the county court and in counties having a probate court, the clerk of the probate court and the recorder of deeds shall fur- nish certified copies of all papers within their care or custody, or records material in the particular appraisement, and the said clerk and recorder shall receive the same fee* or compensation for such certified copies as they would be entitled by law in other cases, which shall be paid to them by the county treasurer of the proper county, out of moneys in his hands on account of inheritance tax collections, on the presentation of itemized bills therefor, approved by the county judge of the proper county. Repeal.] Section 31. That ''An Act to tax gifts, legacies and inheritances in certain cases, and to provide for the collection of the same," approved June 15, 1895, in force July 1, 1895, as amended by act approved May 10, 1901 in force July 1, 1901, and all laws or parts of laws inconsistent herewith be and the same are hereby re- pealed : Provided, however, that such repeal shall in no wise atfect any suit, prosecution or court proceeding pending at the time this act shall take effect, or an}^ right which the State of Illinois may have at the time of the taking etfect of this act, to claim a tax upon any property under the provisions of the act or acts hereby re- pealed, for which no proceeding has been commenced; and all appeals and rights of appeal in all suits pending, or appeals from assessments of tax made by appraisers' reports, orders fixing tax or otherwise existing in this State at the time of the taking effect of this act. Under get of 1895 an estate in remainder subject to defeasance during con- tinuance of life estate was not subject to tax, nor is it subject to the tax 299 under the proviso of repealing clause of act of 1909 or saving clause Chap- ter 131, R. S., where the death of decedent did not occur until after act of 1909 took effect. People vs. Carpenter, 274—103. AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR CASUAL DEFICITS IN REVENUES. AN ACT to provide for casual deficits or failures in revenues. [Approved April 2, 1897. In force July 3, 1897. L. 1897, p. 287.] Whenever casual deficits or failures in the revenues of the state occur. I Section 1. Be it enacted by the People ol' the State o£ Illi- nois, represented in the General Assembly, That whenever casual deficits or failures in revenues of the State occur, in order to meet the same, the governor, auditor and treasurer are hereby authorized to contract debts, never to exceed in the aggregate the sum oL' two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and moneys thus borrowed shall be applied to the purpose for which they were obtained, or to pay the debts thus created, and to no other purpose : Provided, That all monies so borrowed shall be ])orrowed for no longer time than two years. Loan — How made and when awarded. | Section 2. Whenever the borrowing of money under section one of this act is contem- plated, it shall be the duty of the governor, auditor and treasurer to advertise for proposals for such loan, for ten days, in one of the daily newspapers printed in eacli of the cities of New York, Chicago and Springfield, setting forth in said advertisements the amount of debt proposed to be contracted and the time and place for the pay- ment of the principal and interest. And the loan shall be awarded to the pei-son or persons agreeing to take il at the lowest rate of interest not exceeding five pei' cenl per aiinuiii. Bonds or certificate to be registered — Interest and principal — How paid — Appropriation.] Section 8. Thei-e shall be prepared under the direction of the officers named in this act such form of bonds or certificates as they shall deem advisable, Avhicli, when issued, shall be signed by the govei-nor, auditor and hvasnnr. and shall be registered hy 1he audildi- in a book to be ke|)t hy l)ini foi' that purpose. The interest and i)iincipal of such loan shall i)e paid by the Treasurer oul of the general re\enne fund. There is hereby appropriated ou1 of any money in the lieasury a sum not exceeding the sum of two hundred and sevciily lliousand dol'ars, for llie |)ay- ment of the interest ami i)rineipal of any delUs contracted undei- this act. The audiloi- (d" public accouids is hereby awl liori/ed and directed to draw his warrants on the stale 1reasur('r for Ilie iiinount of all such ])aymeu1s. 300 AN ACT TO VALIDATE THE ACTS OF THE COUNTY BOARD. AN ACT to make legal and valid the acts of the county board heretofore done in dotcriiiiniug the amounts of all taxe^ to be raised for county purposes in their respective counties, and to make legal and valid the levy of taxes for county purposes thereunder. Approved and in force February 28, 1905. I>. 1905, p. 359.] Validating- acts of county board, heretofore done in determining amount of taxes to be raised for county purposes.] Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois represented in the General Assembly : That when the county board of any county here- tofore in determining the amounts of all taxes to be raised for county purposes in any year, has at its September session in such year determined said amounts by naming a fixed and definite sum to be so raised without naming the particular or specific purposes for which said taxes, when collected, shall be appropriated, expended or raised, and when any county board heretofore in determining the amounts of all taxes to be raised for county purposes in any year, has at its September session in such ye&r declared or provided that a certain number of cents on each one hundred dollars of valuation of property shall be raised for county purposes, not exceeding seventy-five cents on each one hundred dollars of such valuation and without naming the particular or specific purposes for which said taxes when collected shall be appropriated, expended or raised, and when any county board heretofore in determining the amounts of all taxes to be raised for county purposes in any year, has at its September session in such year declared or provided that a. certain number of cents on each one hundred dollars of valuation of prop- erty shall be raised for county purposes not exceeding seventy-five cents on the one hundred dollars of valuation of property and has named the particular or specific purposes for which such taxes when collected shall be appropriated, expended or raised, such determina- tion and the taxes assessed, levied or extended, shall be and are hereby declared to be legal and valid, anything in any law of this State to the contrary notwithstanding. This Act operates to cure failure to state purpose of a county tax levy and such Act is not unconstitutional under Sec. 8 of Art. 9 of the Constitution, as the word "aggregate" does not imply that the particular purposes for which the taxes are levied shall be specified. A curative act may be passed as to any tax where the authority was not wanting. People vs. R. E. Co., 219—94. The curative act of 1905 (Laws of 1905, p. 359) did not operate to invalidate a tax levy declared invalid by decision of the Supreme Court for failing to state the purposes of the levy. R. R. Co. vs. People, 219 — 408. 301 This Act cures the defect iu a tax of failing to specify the particular purposes for which said tax levy was made. Bowj'er vs. People, 220 — 93; People vs. E. E. Co., 219—94. Einerg"eiicy.] Section 2. AVhereas, an emergency exists, there- fore this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage. VALIDATION OF TAX LEVIES FOE 1916, An Act to maJce legal and valid annual appropriaiio-n hilU for the fiscal year A. B. 1916, and taxes levied and extended thereon in counties by law required to adopt an annu overvaluation as a dcfenre 14J payments reiKirted, list corrected 128 when made ^*^ « . 304 Assessments failure to complete in time not to vitiate 208 failure to deliver tax books not to vitiate 209 informality not to vitiate 209 owner sick or absent, assessor to leave notice 86 school district designated, assessment of personal property 81 what property shall bo assessed 30 v^rong name not to vitiate 209 Assessors appointment of, and deputy in counties not under township organization. 78 bond, under act of 1898 229 books, schedules and statements, return to county, clerk 83, 84 compensation, how fixed and paid 85 County assessor compensation 226 county treasurer shall be ex-officio 2(26 information to board -of review 239 powers and duties 226, 243 to receive books and blanks 232 duty of, oath, schedule 238 examination by board of review, as to how assessment made 256 may examine under oath 80 oath, failure to take, vacancy 79 refusal to do duty 210 to call on county clerk for assessment books and blanks 78 to fix value 52 to fix value when not obtained 81 to leave notice if person sick or absent 80 when lands change in value 234 when may examine under oath and list property 55 Auditor certify to clerks rates per cent, state tax 92 duty where locality does not pay its share of taxes 204 furnish clerks abstracts, U. S., canal and 111. Central lands 205 may sell real estate bought in by State 204 powers and duties as to assessment of property, transferred to tax commission 224 Back Taxes distinguished from forfeited tax 100 Banks capital stock of 30 dividends to be held for taxes, shares sold 63 list of stockholders to be kept 62 listing and valuing property of 48, 58 shares listed in names of owners 62 state and National, assessment of shares 61 Board of assessors appointment of deputy 227 deputy assessors, appointment, term office, fees, oath 230 duties and powers of county or township assessor imposed on. . . 261 election and organization 227 305 furnish taxpayers copy of description, schedule, etc 240 information to board of review 239 majority of board may act 261 office of, to be kept open during business hours 239 power and duties 227 revision of assessment 238 rules and regulations 255 to receive books and blanks. 232 Board of Review appeal to supreme court 24S certificate of error 249 changes and alterations in assessment of real property, revision 240 clerk 242 complaints of error in writing 246 correction of assessment 247 creation 24L delivery of books containing assessments 257 election of 243 examination of assessor as to how assessment made 256 exemptions, hearing and determination 248 failure to complete assessment in time, not to vitiate 256 form of affidavit to be attached to assessment books, completion of work 255 increase or reduce assessment of real or personal property 248 majority of board may act 261 make re-assessment ordered by tax commission 221 oath 243 notice, proposed assessment of omitted property 245 omitted property assessment of 244 powers and duties 242 publication of assessment 241 quadrennial assessment defined 249 revision of assessment on application of taxpayer 244 rules and regulations 255 schedules and statements of personal property delivered to 240 time of meeting 244 vacancy 242 when and how changes made upon assessment books 254 who to constitute 242 Bond assessor and supervisor of assessment to give 229 Books assessment books, how made 77 assessor to call for, when 78 by townships 77 changes, by board of review 254 clerk to correct errors on return of assessment 85 county clerk to procure books and blanks 211 delivery by board of review when completed 256 delivery to town clerk, to be returned July 1st 84 index to tax sale 154 306 judgment sale, redemption and forfeiture record 151 duplicate of land and lots to bo assessed, when triplicate 232 for collection of taxes, when deliver to collector 260 form of affidavit to be attached to assessment, completion of work by board of review 255 further corrections by tax commission 8.'^ lists compared «-. 78 open for inspection in office of county clerk 84 penalty, delivering before collector 's bond filed 209 railroad tax 72 separate, for cities 77 tax commission to examine books, etc., of local taxing authorities 219 to be ready for assessor May 1st 98 when records destroyed, new assessment .203 Bridges across navigable waters on borders of state ; . 268 sale of 269 where personal property of companies listed 50 Building and Loan Associations assessment of stock 57, 58 Capital Stock research and investigation to ascertain value 218 return as to, by railroad companies 70 rules for listing '59 rules for valuing 40 shall be assessed 30 tax commission to assess 60 tax commission to adopt rules for ascertaining value of 219 what is 41 where listed 47 Casual Deficits in Revenue act to provide for 299 Collection action for, on shares of bank stock 6(2 after return of county collector 112 county clerk's certificate to county collector on delivery of tax books to district collectors 104 county not under township organization a district 105 demand for special assessment when tax paid 118 distress for personal tax .• 104 extension of time, where office of collector becomes vacated 105 How to pay over taxes collected 104 lien of bond 103 manner in which taxes are to be collected 110 power of county collectors 118 proceedings against real estate for personal tax 122 receipts to be prepared in triplicate 110 removal from county 112 removal within county Ill 307 tax on telegraph companies 73 tax on omitted property added to subsequent year 207 vacancy in town or collection district, county collector to act 118 Collectors appointee to fill vacancy, keep account of collections of former collector 105 appointment to fill vacancy, not to exonerate former collector 105 auditor's suit, party aggrieved may proceed under judgment 200 bond and oath recorded 103 discharge of sureties lOg Books clerk 's statement to tax commission 101 made annually by county clerk, how made 97 state and county equalized rate stated 101 warrant annexed 101 when delivered IO3 credited for amount of taxes unpaid 115 default of, sureties may attach goods 108 deputy collectors, appointment 109 failure to attend sales I53 liability on bonds of 198 local taxes to be paid over as warrant directs II4 neglect to obtain judgment or present delinquent list 210 refusal to do duty 210 return of town and district, to county collector 11.1 sheriff collector IO5 suits against, for failure to make settlements 199 suit on bond for failure to make settlement 116 sworn statements of collections to municipalities 113 to note what personal tax can be collected from real estate 116 town or district, qualification, bond and oath 102 vacancies, how filled IO5 when bond sued by cities, etc., right of auditor 201 who not eligible as bondsman 198 Conservator to list property of ward 46 Constitution of 1870, Article 9 Commutation of taxes, not authorized 13 Corporate authorities 16 County taxes, limitation 15 Direct annual tax, to pay municipal indebtedness 24 Easement of public deducted in assessment of real estate 11 Exemption, private property not to be taken to pay debts of municipality 22 proj)erty specified 1 1 shall be only by general law i\ (icin'ral assciiilily may vest witli pnwcr to iniikc Incal irii|)i(ivi'iii('ntH. . . . K! not to release state taxes IS provide revenue 5 shall provide for reasonable notice of sale i>\' jiKiiicrty I'm taxes.... 12 IndcbtodiK'Ms, |>roliibition against 24 IjDcal irnprovcirK-nls, power 16 308 Municipal corporations, limit of indebtedness 24 power to make local improvements 16 property taxable to pay debts 22 taxes uniform 16, 2.2 Municipal officers, eligibility "24 Officers, compensation not increased or diminislied during term of office. . 24 Private property, not to be taken to pay debts of municipality 22 Prohibition against incurring indebtedness 24 Kedemption, notice before 12 right of - 12 Sale of land for taxes, by general officer and upon judgment 12 Specification of objects and subjects of taxation, not to exclude power to tax others 10 State 's taxes, not to be released 13 paid into state treasury 15 Uniformity, as to class upon which it operates 5 decisions on 6 municipal taxes 16, 2,2 Valuation, ascertained by persons, election or appointed as provided by general assembly ^ taxation in proportion to ^ World's Columbian Exposition, bond issue authorized.. 29 Contempt failure to comply with subpoena, tax commission 219 Oorporations capital stock and franchise, assessment 30 deliver to assessor sworn statement of amount of capital stock 60 manufacturing ^3 mercantile "^ property listed by whom 46 Correction of Assessment by state tax commission • • • • 220 OoTinty amount to be stated separately ^2 act to validate acts of county board 300 board to determine taxes for county purposes 92 board to examine collector 's accounts , 211 hereafter coming under provisions of act of 1898 262 limitation on rate ^"^ not under township organization, county court or judge to act 213 to furnish books and blanks 211 County Collector approval of bond 107, 108 bond and oath ^^^ certificate to, of amount of taxes to be collected 104 death of, before settlement 109 duplicate delinquent lists, when to be made and where filed 258 failure to pay taxes into treasury, penalty, recovery 189 manner of keeping account 211 309 who collects 106 County Clerk keep an account with collector 212 refusal to do duty 210 Credits deductions claimed from credits, verified by oatli 57 rules for listing 56 rules for valuing 40 Dates change in, for performance of acts under general revenue law 260 Debts what deducted from credits 56 Definitions of words and phrases used in General Revenue act 212 local assessment officers 214 Delinquent Lists county collector to make, where to be filed 258 form and contents 127 Delinquent Tax application for judgment 129 delinquent defined 117 form of return as to personal tax, affidavit 115 form of return as to real estate, affidavit 116 Destruction of Records new assessment 203 Distress fees of collector Ill for tax on personal property Ill personal tax 104 sale of property distrained, surplus Ill Equalization assessments by the county board 85 county board may complete at subsequent meeting 89 land and lots, how to bo equalized 223 personal property, how to be- equalized 223 results combined in one table 223 tax commission equalizing authority 222 Equity foreclosure of tax lien 191 Errors correction of by clerk on roturn of assessment books 85 Evidence books, j)rima facie evidence, sale of land 157 certified copy of record of tax commission 219 proof of payment of tax 113 310 tax commission, power to take testimony and proofs 218 tax deed as prima facie 170 Executors and Administrators duty to retain assets for payment of taxes 245 to list property of estate 46 Exemptions agricultural, horticultural, mechanical and philosophical purposes 35 beneficent purposes 34 determination, of, by board of review 248 drainage district, property of 34 fire department equipment 34 graveyards or burying grounds 33 hearing of claims by county board 86 hospitals ^8 lands contracted to be sold, assessed as personalty 48 municipal corporations, property of 34 old people 's homes 34 orphanages 3^ parks ^8 parsonages ^' property belonging to State of Illinois 34 public buildings and grounds 34 public charity 24 public grounds and squares 34 public lands 33 public libraries 34 religious purposes 33 school lands and property 33 school purposes 33 tuberculosis sanitariums 34 United States, property of 34 Express Companies where personal property listed 50 Extension county clerk to ascertain rates per cent 263 rate certified by tax commission 224 state, county, municipal and all other taxes 99 taxes on railroad property 72 Forfeited Property action of debt for taxes due on 180 addition, to current tax of amount due for forfeiture 180 back taxes, interest, penalty, etc., to be added 99 redemption or purchase of 179 report and payment of money collected on 179 Forms assessor to use, transmitted by tax commission 81 Franchises listing and valuing "1 Fraternal Beneficiary Societies assessment of property 311 Farm Property owner not residing on farm, listing 47 Husband and Wife husband to list property of wife 46 Inheritance Tax accrued tax lien on entire property 281 appeal, from assessment or appraisement 287 to supreme court 294 appointment or power, taxable 274 apportionment, application for 282 appraisement of property, how made 286 of life interest 281 appraisers, appointment and compensation, duties 286 attorney general, assistant 's salary 289 • supervision by 288 to enforce payment, proceedings 291 bond for deferred payment 281 where executors, administrator or trustees does not pay 282 certified copies, fees 298 collection expenses, retention by county 293 compounding of claims, powers of state treasurer and attorney general. . 296 contingent estates or interests, highest rate 295 corporations, subject to tax 274 county clerk, quarterly statement 292 county court, jurisdiction over property of non-resident decedent 291 proceedings in, failure to pay tax 291 county judge, ascertain whether property taxable 286 quarterly statements 292 county treasurer, payment to state treasurer 292 custodians of securities, notice to treasurer and attorney general 284 deferred payments, bond 281 executors and administrators, duties 282 liability for 283 and trustees to give information 284 exemptions 297 failure to pay tax 291 fees of county clerks 289 foreign executor, etc., transferring stock 284 guard i:in for iii'^jtiit 287 highest rate in certain cases 295 interest on deferred payments 282 jurisdiction, county court 291 liability to tax, how determined 294 lien, limitation 294 life estate 296 made in contemplation of death 274 payment of tax 283 erroneously, refund of excess hy state treasurer 285 }>enaity for appraiser receiving fee or reward 291 procedure in county court 29\ property or interest subject to tax 273 312 quarterly statements to county treasurer 292 rate of inheritance tax 275 highest, contingent estates or interest 295 receipt of state treasurer 288 from county treasurer 29S refunding tax retained by executor and others 284 return of tax wrongfully imposed 295 Safe Deposit Co., delivery of securities 284 securities, delivery by custodian, notice 284 state treasurer to furnish book to county judge 292, transfer defined 298 trustees, liability for tax 283 unpaid tax, proceedings to enforce payment 291 quarterly statement to treasurer 292 Insurance assessment of property of companies 48 Judgment advertisement for judgment and sale 119 application for, delinquent taxes 129 Leasehold Estates valuing 44 Levy determining maximum amount authorized 262 validation of tax levies for 1916 301 Lien collector 's bond 103 first lien on real property April 1st instead of May 1st 260 foreclosure of tax lien in equity 191 in favor of agent, etc., for tax paid 198 on personalty 195 taxes on bank stock 62 taxes upon real property first lien 191 Limitations on rate of county tax 92 Listing banks, personal property of 48, 58 capital stock of corporation 59 consignee to list inter'est only. 50 delivering false or fraudulent lists to assessor, penalty 257 express or transportation companies 50 farm property 4:7 franchises 61 gas and coke companies • 50 how places of, fixed 51 interest on exempt bonds 51 lists, schedules, returns and statements, date of making changed 260 lists, valuation and entries made in duplicate, when in triplicate 233 money secured by deed 51 313 nursery stock t 48 on behalf of others 50 pawnbrokers, propertj' of 59 personal property when and how, act of 1S9S 235 where owner resides , 47 who shall list and what listed, general revenue law 45 property, when, how and by whom listed, act of 1898 231 property in transitu 48 railroads ' property 63 railroad track in proportion to length in district 67 real estate as between towns 76 as between counties 76 name of owner and time 74 when and how listed, act of 1898 231 rolling stock, how distributed 68 rules for creditors 56 street railroads 50 telegraph companies, personal property 73 water crafts 48 where property in hands of agent listed 48 Lost Receipt entry in collector 's book evidence 113 Mines rules for valuing 44 Minors property of, listed by guardian 46 Municipal Corporations certificates of rates for, to county clerk 96 may buy in property sold for special assessment 271 Notice assessment of omitted property 207 by county collector by registered mail live days before sale 124 by purchaser at tax sale, tax deeds 158 sale of tracts forfeited to state 152 under act of 1 898, how given 254 under act of 1898, failure to give not to alTcct validity of assessment. . . . 254 Nursery Stock listed and assessed as merchandise 48 Oath of assessor and supervisor of assossnifiit, act of 1898 229 who may administer 205 Officers failure to do any duty under act 210 Omitted property assessment by bonrd of review 244 314 notice to owner 207 tax not collected added to subsequent year 207 when discovered, to be listed and tax added 206 Partnership property listed by whom 46 Payment of taxes duty of executors, administrators or trustees, omitted property 245 double payment, refunding 202, 203 entry of, and receipt for payment 113 form of receipt 118 kind of funds 110 on application for judgment payments reported and list corrected 128 on part of tract 112 taxes and special assessments may be paid before sale 128 Penalty conniving at evasion of act of 1898 257 delivering false or fraudulent lists to assessor 257 Perjuiy for making false list, statement or schedule 74 making false affidavit of notice, tax deed 165 Personal property all property subject to taxation, act of 1898 231 how assessed, assessor to call on owner 80 in transitu, where assessed 48 liable for taxes levied on real property 196 movable property of railroad 67 railroad other than rolling stock 69 rules for valuing 40 taxes lien, after books received by collector 195 telegraph companies 73 what shall be assessed and taxed 30 when property in several districts, assessment 81 when and how valued, act of 1898 235 who shall and what listed, general revenue law 45 where listed 47 Place of listing how determined 51 Plats owner to 75 Property all, when how by whom listed, act of 1898 231 Quadrennial assessment of land , 232 Railroads assessment and distribution 65-67 description of platted land 72 description of railroad track in schedule 65 315 form of schedule, and time of filing with county clerk 64 listing rolling stock in several counties 68 manner of listing and valuing property 63 other personalty of railroad, where listed 69 real estate other than railroad tracks, assessment 69 rolling stock, schedule 67 schedule, laid before Tax Commission 70 statement as to capital stock in schedule 70 tax book 72 track listed in proportion to length 67 what included in "track" 66 Rates certificate of, for towns, cities, etc., to clerk 96 computed by county clerk 91 county clerk to determine, of towns, cities, etc 98 determined by Tax Commission, certified to clerk 224 how extended, collectors ' books 98 for state purposes, how found 91 Real estate alteration in description 23d all property subject to taxation and assessment, act of 1898 230 assessor to list other lands not returned by clerk 80 assessed valuation one-half 236 change in value 234 government, school, canal and swamp lands taxable after sale 74 how tract listed between counties, towns 76 improvements 232 leasehold interest in exempted lands 74 liable for taxes on personal property 196 liens of taxes 191 list of lands not in assessment book, furnished assessor 78 of railroads, other than railroad track 69 owner liable for taxes on May 1st, General Eevenue Law 74 owner to plat, clerk if owner neglects 75 proceedings against real estate for personal tax 122 railroad right of way listed and valued as 65 rules for valuing 44 shall be assessed and taxed 30 time listed, who liable for tax 74 when and how assessed, act of 1898 » 232 when ami how listed and assessed, act of 1898 231 Re-assessment see Tax Commission Receipts duplicate to collectors, for money jtaid over 114 for payment of taxes, form H-^ rites of various taxes printed thereon 110 Record hook tax jiidgmcnt sale, redemption and forfeiture record 151 316 Redemption affidavit of notice, before entitled to tax deed 165 amount ^^^ clerk to pay over to successor, money for redemption 157 effect of receipt of redemption money 15S entry of l^^ of forfeited property 179 notice before tax deed issues 158 notice in newspaper, printer's fee to be paid by redcomor 167 real estate sold on execution in behalf of the State 201 time of 154 when purchaser suffers land to be sold again 157 deduction distribution of ^"3 method of reducing rate 266 taxes included in aggregate before scaling 266 Removal from county, warrant to place of removal 112 of owner ^1 Residence change of, where owner assessed 51 change of by owner of personal property 260 Return assessor to county clerk °3 district failing to return 90 failure to complete assessment in time not to vitiate 208 Review of assessment county board °^ equalization by county board 86 notice of meeting °^ time 81 town board °1 Revision of assessment in counties having a board of assessors 238 Sales advertisement for judgment and sale 119 auditor may sell real estate bought in by State 204 bids • 152 certificate of purchase, assignability 153 certified copy of sale lists to be sent to Auditor 154 county clerk to assist in 150 deed to issue two years after date of sale 167 entry of, on record 15" failure of collector to attend 153 failure of county clerk to attend 153 failure to publish assessment not valid objection 240 forfeited tracts noted on record 151 in case of appeal, collector not to sell until appeal disposed of 148 notice by county collector, five days before 124 317 of bridge across navigable waters, for tax 269 of property for amount of forfeiture 180 order of, application for judgment 130 payment by purchaser 153 payment of money collected on execution 202 process for, form 148 purchaser at erroneous sale, paid back 158 real estate not redeemed 202 real estate on execution in behalf of State, notice of levy given auditor, he to purchase 201 sees. 217-222 General Kevenue Law applies to former sales 169 taxes and special assessments may be paid before 128 through error, entry showing 158 time and manner of conducting 151 tracts forfeited to State, resale, notice 152 tracts not sold forfeited to State 152 withdrawal of special assessments from collection 151 Schedules assessor to fix value 5a date of making, changed 260 description of railroad track 65 false schedules, penalty 73 perjury 74 form and contents 53 furnished to each person required to list personal property 235 neglect of railroad, penalty 71 penalty for not making, act of 1898 237 railroads, filing with county clerk, and form of same 64 railroad property, laid before tax commission 71 railroads returns to Tax Commission, contents 70 refusal to sign and swear to 238 rolling stock 67 return of, by assessor to county clerk 84 statement as to capital stock, forwarded to tax commission 60 telegraph companies 73 to make out and deliver to assessor 52 School tax .state, a.s.scssed 'and collected on equalized valuation 92 Settlement settlement by town and district collectors 114 collector credited for amounts unpaid 115 final sfttlomont of county collector auditor to give duplicate certificates 190 clerk to certify valuation and amount of state taxes to auditor as credits 185 clerk to certify valuation and amount of taxes to local authorities.... 186 clerk to furnish duplicate Htatomeiit to au