of 
 
 Hannibal 
 
 BY JACOB ABBOTT 
 
 WITH ENGRAVINGS 
 
 NEW YORK AND LONDON 
 
 HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS 
 
 1904
 
 Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year one thousand 
 eight hundred and forty-nine, by 
 
 HARPER & BROTHERS, 
 
 in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District 
 of New York. 
 
 Copyright, 1876, by JACOB ABBOTT.
 
 PBEF AC Jfi. 
 
 THE authw of this series has made it his spe- 
 eial object to confine himself very strictly, even 
 in the most minute details which he records, to 
 historic truth. The narratives are not tales 
 founded upon history, but history itself, without 
 any embellishment or any deviations from the 
 strict truth, so far as it can now be discovered 
 by an attentive examination of the annals writ- 
 ten at the time when the events themselves oc- 
 curred. In writing the narratives, the author 
 has endeavored to avail himself of the best 
 sources of information which this country af- 
 fords ; and though, of course, there must be in 
 these volumes, as in all historical narrative*, 
 more or less of imperfection and error, there ia 
 no intentional embellishment. Nothing is stat- 
 ed, not aven the most minute and apparently
 
 viii PREFACE. 
 
 imaginary details, without what was deemed 
 good historical authority. The readers, there- 
 fore, may rely upon the record as the truth, and 
 nothing but the truth, so far as an honest par- 
 pose and a careful examination have been ef- 
 fectual in ascertaining it.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 I. THK FIRST PUNIC W/ft... 13 
 
 II. HANNIBAL AT 9AGUNTUM 33 
 
 II. OPENING OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 52 
 
 T. THE PASSAGK OF THE RHONE 69 
 
 T. HANNIBAL, CROSSES THE ALPS 90 
 
 Tl. HANNIBAL IN THE NORTH OF ITALY 126 
 
 Til. THK APENNINES 144 
 
 Mil. THK DICTATOR FABIDS 163 
 
 IX. THK BATTLE OF CANNX 185 
 
 x. SCIPIO 205 
 
 ri. HANNIBAL A FUGITIVE AND AN EXILF 235 
 
 III. THK INSTRUCTION OF CARTHAttE 262
 
 r * r 
 
 MAP I ~<mtupiece. 
 
 THE BATTLE IN THE RIVER 42 
 
 THE ELEPHANTS CROSSING THE RHONE 87 
 
 HANNIBAL ON THE ALPS Ill 
 
 CROSSING THE MARSHES 161 
 
 HASDRUBAL'S HEAD 227 
 
 THE BURNING OF THE CARTHAGINIAN FLEET.. . 2413
 
 HANNIBAL. 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 THB FIRST PUNIC WAR. 
 
 HTTi<hil Rome tad Cutfaape 
 
 TT ANNIE AL was a Carthaginian general 
 *-* He acquired his great distinction as a war. 
 rior by his desperate contests with the Roman*. 
 Rome and Carthage grew up together on oppo- 
 site sides of the Mediterranean Sea. For about 
 a hundred years they waged against each other 
 most dreadful wars. There were three of these 
 wars. Rome was successful in the end, and 
 Carthage was entirely destroyed. 
 
 There was no real cause for any disagreement 
 between these two nations. Their hostility to 
 each other was mere rivalry and spontaneous 
 hate. They spoke a different language ; they 
 had a different origin ; and they lived on oppo- 
 site sides of the same sea. So they hated and 
 devoured each other. 
 
 Those who have read the history of Alexander 
 the Great, in this series, will recollect the diffi-
 
 14 HANNIBAL. [B.C.2&U 
 
 Tjre. Founding of Carthage. It* commercial ipii* 
 
 cully he experienced in besieging and subduing 
 Tyre, a great maritime city, situated about two 
 miles from the shore, on the eastern coast of the 
 Mediterranean Sea. Carthage was originally 
 founded by a colony from this city of Tyre, and 
 it soon became a great commercial and mari- 
 time power like its mother. The Carthaginians 
 built ships, and with them explored all parts of 
 the Mediterranean Sea. They visited all the 
 nations on these coasts, purchased the commod- 
 ities they had to sell, carried them to other na- 
 tions, and sold them at great advances. They 
 soon began to grow rich and powerful. They 
 hired soldiers to fight their battles, and began 
 to take possession of the islands of the Mediter- 
 ranean, and, in some instances, of points on the 
 main land. For example, in Spain: some of 
 their ships, going there, found that the natives 
 had silver and gold, which they obtained from 
 veins of ore near the surface of the ground. At 
 first the Carthaginians obtained this gold and 
 silver by selling the natives commodities of va- 
 rious kinds, which they had procured in other 
 countries ; paying, of course, to the producers 
 only a very small price compared with what 
 they required the Spaniards to pay them. Fi- 
 nally, they took possession of that part of Spain
 
 B.C. 280.] FIRST PUNIC WAR. 16 
 
 Bold and silver mine*. Mew Carthage. Ships and annj 
 
 where the mines were situated, and worked the 
 mines themselves. They dug deeper ; they em- 
 ployed skillful engineers to make pumps to raise 
 the water, which always accumulates in mines, 
 and prevents their being worked to any great 
 depth unless the miners have a considerable de- 
 gree of scientific and mechanical skill. x They 
 founded a city here, which they called New Car- 
 thage Nova Carthago. They fortified and 
 garrisoned this city, and made it the center of 
 their operations in Spain. This city is called 
 Carthagena to this day. 
 
 Thus the Carthaginians did every thing by 
 power of money. They extended their opera- 
 tions in every direction, each new extension 
 bringing in new treasures, and increasing their 
 means of extending them more. They had, be- 
 sides the merchant vessels which belonged to 
 private individuals, great ships of war belong 
 ing to the state. These vessels were called 
 galleys, and were rowed by oarsmen, tier above 
 tier, there being sometimes f ^-nd five banks 
 of oars. They had armies, too, drawn from dif- 
 ferent countries, in various troops, according as 
 different nations excelled in the different mode* 
 of warfare. For instance, the Numidians, whose 
 country extended in the neighborhood of Car
 
 16 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 280 
 
 Krnmkb*. Balearic We*. The sling 
 
 thage, on the African coast, were famous for 
 their horsemen. There were great plains in 
 Numidia, and good grazing, and it was, conse- 
 quently, one of those countries in which horses 
 and horsemen naturally thrive. On the other 
 hand, the natives of the Balearic Isles, now call- 
 ed Majorca, Minorca, and Ivioa, were famous 
 for their skill as slingers. So the Carthagini- 
 ans, in making up their forces, would hire bod- 
 ies of cavalry in Numidia, and of slingers in the 
 Balearic Isles ; and, for reasons analogous, they 
 got excellent infantry in Spain. 
 
 The tendency of the various nations to adopt 
 and cultivate different modes of warfare wat 
 far greater, in those ancient times, than now. 
 The Balearic Isles, in fact, received their name 
 from the Greek word ballein, which means to 
 throw with a sling. The youth there were 
 trained to perfection in the use of this weapon 
 from a very early age. It is said that mothers 
 used to practice the plan of putting the bread 
 for their boys' breakfast on the branches of trees, 
 high above their heads, and not allow them to 
 have their food to eat until they could bring it 
 down with a stone thrown from a sling. 
 
 Thus the Carthaginian power became groat 
 ly extended, The whole government, however
 
 B.0.280.] FIBST PUKIO WAB. 17 
 
 !"ke JOT eminent of Outhae*. The aristocracy. 
 
 was exercised by a small body of wealthy and 
 aristocratic families at home. It was very much 
 such a government as that of England is at the 
 present day, only the aristocracy of England it 
 based on anoient birth and landed property, 
 whereas in Carthage it depended on commer- 
 cial greatness, combined, it is true, with hered- 
 itary family distinction. The aristocracy of 
 Carthage controlled and governed every thing. 
 None bat its own sons could ordinarily obtain 
 office or power. The great mass of inhabitant! 
 were kept in a state of servitude and vassalage. 
 This state of things operated then, as it does 
 now in England, very unjustly and hardly for 
 those who were thus debased; but the result 
 was and in this respect the analogy with En- 
 gland still holds good that a very efficient and 
 energetic government was created. The gov- 
 ernment of an oligarchy makes sometimes a 
 very rich and powerful state, but a discon- 
 tented and unhappy people. 
 
 Let the reader now turn to the map and find 
 the place of Carthage upon it. Let him imag- 
 ine a great and rich city there, with piers, and 
 docks, and extensive warehouses for the com- 
 merce, and temples, and public edifices of splen- 
 did architecture, for the religious and civil serv- 
 
 142
 
 18 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 280 
 
 Geographical relations of the Carthaginian empire. 
 
 ice of the state, and elegant mansions and pal- 
 aces for the wealthy aristocracy, and walls and 
 towers for the defense of the whole. Let him 
 then imagine a back country, extending foi 
 come hundred miles into the interior of Africa, 
 fertile and highly cultivated, producing great 
 stores of corn, and wine, and rich fruits of every 
 description. Let him then look at the islands 
 of Sicily, of Corsica, and Sardinia, and the Ba- 
 leares, and conceive of them as rich and prosper- 
 ous countries, and all under the Carthaginian 
 rule. Look, also, at the coast of Spain ; see, in 
 Imagination, the city of Carthagena, with ita 
 fortifications, and its army, and the gold and 
 silver mines, with thousands and thousands of 
 slaves toiling in them. Imagine fleets of ships 
 going continually along the shores of the Med- 
 iterranean, from country to country, cruising 
 back and forth to Tyre, to Cyprus, to Egypt, 
 to Sicily, to Spain, carrying corn, and flax, and 
 purple dyes, and spices, and perfumes, and pre* 
 cious stones, and ropes and sails for ships, and 
 gold and silver, and then periodically returning 
 to Carthage, to add the profits they had made to 
 the vast treasures of wealth already accumula- 
 ted there. Let the reader imagine all this with 
 the map before him, so as to have a distinct
 
 B.C.280.] FIRST PUNIC WAR. 19 
 
 Borne and ttae Romans. Their character. 
 
 conception of the geographical relations of the 
 localities, and he will have a pretty correct idea 
 of the Carthaginian power at the time it com- 
 menoed its dreadful conflicts with Rome.- 
 
 Rome itself was very differently situated- 
 Rome had been built by some wanderers from 
 Troy, and it grew, for a long time, silently and 
 slowly, by a sort of internal principle of life and 
 energy. One region after another of the Italian 
 peninsula was merged in the Roman state. 
 They formed a population which was, in the 
 main, stationary and agricultural. They tilled 
 the fields ; they hunted the wild beasts ; they 
 raised great flocks and herds. They seem to 
 have been a race a sort of variety of the human 
 specie* possessed of a very refined and superior 
 organization, which, in its development, gave 
 rise to a character of firmness, energy, and force, 
 both of body and mind, which has justly excited 
 the admiration of mankind. The Carthaginians 
 had sagacity the Romans called it cunning- 
 and activity, enterprise and wealth. Their ri 
 vals, on the other hand, were characterized by 
 genius, courage, and strength, giving rise to a 
 certain calm and indomitable resolution and en- 
 ergy, which has since, in every age, been strong- 
 ly associated, in the minds of men, with the very 
 
 Word Roman
 
 20 HAMVJBAL. :B.C.280 
 
 FrogreM of Carthage and Rome Origin of the flrtt Pnnlc war 
 
 The progress of nations was much more slow 
 in ancient days than now, and these two rival 
 empires continued their gradual growth and ex 
 tension, each on its own side of the great sea 
 which divided them, for five hundred years, be- 
 fore they came into collision. At last, however, 
 the collision came. It originated in the follow- 
 ing way : 
 
 By looking at the map, the reader will see 
 that the island of Sicily is separated from the 
 main land by a narrow strait called the Strait 
 of Messina. This strait derives its name fron 
 the town of Messina, which is situated upon it, 
 on the Sicilian side. Opposite Messina, on the 
 Italian side, there was a town named Rhegram. 
 Now it happened that both these towns had 
 been taken possession of by lawless bodies of 
 oldiery. The Romans came and delivered Rhe- 
 gium, and punished the soldiers who had seized 
 it very severely. The Sicilian authorities ad- 
 ranced to the deliverance of Messina. The 
 troops there, finding themselves thus threaten- 
 ed, sent to the Romans to say that if they, the 
 Romans, would come and protect them, they 
 would deliver Messina into their hands. 
 
 The question, what answer to give to this ap- 
 plication, was brought before the Roman sea
 
 B.C. 280.] FIRST PWNIC WAR. 21 
 
 Rhegium and Metalna. A perploxinf qMrtfoa 
 
 ate, and caused them great perplexity. It seem- 
 ed very inconsistent to take sides with the reb- 
 els of Messina, when they had punished so se- 
 verely those of Rhegium. Still the Romans had 
 been, for a long time, becoming very jealous of 
 the growth and extension of the Carthaginian 
 power. Here was an opportunity of meeting 
 and resisting it. The Sicilian authorities were 
 about calling for direct aid from Carthage to 
 recover the city, and the affair would probably 
 result in establishing a large body of Carthagin- 
 ian troops within sight of the Italian shore, 
 and at a point where it would be easy for them 
 to make hostile incursions into the Roman ter- 
 ritories. In a word, it was a case of what is 
 called political necessity ; that is to say, a case 
 in which the interests of one of the parties in a 
 contest were so strong that all considerations of 
 justice, consistency, and honor are to be sacri- 
 ficed to the promotion of them. Instances of 
 this kind of political necessity occur very fre- 
 quently in the management of public affairs in 
 all ages of the world. 
 
 The contest for Messina was, after all, how- 
 ever, considered by the Romans merely &s a pre- 
 text, or rather as an occasion, for commencing 
 the struggle which they had long been desirous
 
 22 HANNIBAL. [B.(J.280 
 
 The Romans determine to build a fleet Preparation* 
 
 of entering upon. They evinced their charac- 
 teristic energy and greatness in the plan which 
 they adopted at the outset. They knew very 
 well that the power of Carthage rested mainly 
 on her command of the eeas, and that they could 
 not hope successfully to cope with her till they 
 could meet and conquer her on her own element. 
 In the mean time, however, they had not a sin- 
 gle ship and not a single sailor, while the Med 
 iterranean was covered with Carthaginian shipt 
 and seamen. Not at all daunted by this pro- 
 digious inequality, the Romans resolved to be- 
 gin at once the work of creating for themselves 
 a naval power. 
 
 The preparations consumed some time ; for 
 the Romans had not only to build the ships, 
 they had first to learn how to build them. They 
 took their first lesson from a Carthaginian gal- 
 ley which was cast away in a storm upon the 
 coast of Italy. They seized this galley, collect- 
 ed their carpenters to examine it, and set wood- 
 men at work to fell trees and collect materials 
 for imitating it. The carpenters studied their 
 model very carefully, measured the dimensions 
 of every part, and observed the manner in which 
 the various parts were connected and secured 
 together. The heavy shocks which vessels are
 
 B.C.259.J FIRST PUNIC WAR. 23 
 
 Training the oarsmen. The Roman fleet pate to sea, 
 
 exposed to from the waves makes it necessary 
 to secure great strength in the construction of 
 them ; and, though the ships of the ancients 
 were very small and imperfect compared with 
 the men-of-war of the present day, still it is sur- 
 prising that the Romans could succeed at all in 
 such a sudden and hasty attempt at building 
 them. 
 
 They did, however, succeed. While the ships 
 were building, officers appointed for the purpose 
 were training men, on shore, to the art of row- 
 ing them. Benches, like the seats which the 
 oarsman would occupy in the ships, were ar- 
 ranged on the ground, and the intended seamen 
 were drilled every day in the movements and 
 action of rowers. The result was, that in a 
 few months after the building of the ships was 
 commenced, the Romans had a fleet of one hun- 
 dred galleys of five banks of oars ready. They 
 remained in harbor with them for some time, to 
 give the oarsmen the opportunity to see wheth- 
 er they could row on the water as well as on the 
 land, and then boldly put to sea to meet the 
 Carthaginians. 
 
 There was one part of the arrangements mada 
 by the Romans in preparing their fleets which 
 was strikingly characteristic of the determined
 
 24 HANNIBAL. [BC.25& 
 
 Grappling Irons. Coorag* and nolatim of the : 
 
 resolution which marked all their conduct 
 They constructed machines containing grap- 
 pling irons, which they mounted on the prows 
 of their vessels. These engines were so oon- 
 trved, that the moment one of the ships con- 
 taining them should encounter a vessel of the 
 enemy, the grappling irons would fall upon the 
 deck of the latter, and hold the two firmly to- 
 gether, so as to prevent the possibility of either 
 escaping from the other. The idea that they 
 themselves should have any wish to withdraw 
 from the encounter seemed entirely out of the 
 question. Their only fear was that the Cartha- 
 ginian seamr- would employ their superior skill 
 and experience in naval maneuvers in making 
 their escape. ikind have always regarded 
 
 the action of the Romans, in this case, as one 
 of the most striking examples of military cour- 
 age and resolution which the history of war has 
 ever recorded. An army of landsmen come 
 down to the sea-shore, and, without scarcely 
 having ever seen a ship, undertake to build a 
 fleet, and go out to attack a power whose na- 
 vies covered the sea, and made her the sole and 
 acknowledged mistress of it. They seize a 
 wrecked galley of their enemies for their model ; 
 they build a hundred vessels like it : they prao>
 
 B.C. 254.] FIRST PUNIC WAR. 2S 
 
 BvoeMi of th Roman*. Ttt rortrml ouhima. 
 
 tioe maneuvers for a short time in port; and 
 then go forth to meet the fleets of their power 
 ful enemy, with grappling machines to hold 
 them, fearing nothing but the possibility of 
 their escape. 
 
 The result was as might have been expected. 
 The Romans captured, sunk, destroyed, or dis- 
 persed the Carthaginian fleet which was brought 
 to oppose them. They took the prows of the 
 ahips which they captured and conveyed them 
 to Rome, and built what is called a rostral pil- 
 lar of them. A rostral pillar is a column orna- 
 mented with such beaks or prows, which were, 
 in the Roman language, called rostra. This col* 
 umn was nearly destroyed by lightning about 
 fifty years afterward, but it was repaired and 
 rebuilt again, and it stood then for many cen- 
 turies, a very striking and appropriate monu- 
 ment of this extraordinary naval victory. The 
 Roman commander in this case was the consul 
 Dnilius. The rostral column was erected in 
 honor of him. In digging among the ruins of 
 Rome, there was found what was supposed to bo 
 the remains of this column, about three hun* 
 dred years ago. 
 
 The Romans now prepared to carry the war 
 into Africa itself. Of course it was easv.
 
 26 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 254 
 
 Government of ROOM. The consuls 
 
 their victory over the Carthaginian fleet, to trans- 
 port troops across the sea to the* Garth aginiac 
 shore. The Roman commonwealth was govern- 
 ed at this time by a senate, who made the laws, 
 and by two supreme executive officers, called 
 consuls. They thought it was safer to have 
 two phief magistrates than one, as each of the 
 two would naturally be a check upon the other. 
 The result was, however, that mutual jealousy 
 involved them often in disputes and quarrels. It 
 is thought better, in modern times, to have but 
 one chief magistrate in the state, and to provide 
 other modes to put a check upon any disposition 
 he might evince to abuse his powers. 
 
 The Roman consuls, in time of war, took com- 
 mand of the armies. The name of the consul 
 upon whom it devolved to carry on the war with 
 the Carthaginians, after this first great victory, 
 was Regulus, and his name has been celebrated 
 in every age, on account of his extraordinary 
 adventures in this campaign, and his untimely 
 fate. How far the story is strictly true it is 
 now impossible to ascertain, but the following 
 is the story, as the Roman historians relate it : 
 
 At the time when Regulus was elected con- 
 sul he was a plain man, living simply on Mi 
 farm, maintaining himself by his own industry,
 
 B.C.,254.] FIRST PUNIC WAR. 27 
 
 Story of Regulu. H* is made eonral 
 
 and evincing no ambition or pride. His fellow- 
 citizens, however, observed those qualities of 
 mind in him which they were accustomed to ad- 
 mire, and made him consul. He left the city 
 and took command of the army. He enlarged 
 the fleet to more than three hundred vessels. 
 He put one hundred and forty thousand men on 
 board, and sailed for Africa. One or two years 
 had been spent in making these preparations, 
 which time the Carthaginians had improved in 
 building new ships ; so that, when the Romans 
 set sail, and were moving along the coast of 
 Sicily, they soon came in sight of a larger Car- 
 thaginian fleet assembled to oppose them. Reg- 
 ulus advanced to the contest. The Carthagin- 
 ian fleet was beaten as before. The ships which 
 were not captured or destroyed made their es- 
 cape in all directions, and Regulus went on, 
 without further opposition, and landed his forces 
 on the Carthaginian shore. He encamped as 
 soon as he landed, and sent back word to the 
 Roman senate asking what was next to be done. 
 The senate, considering that the great diffi- 
 culty and danger, viz., that of repulsing the 
 Carthaginian fleet, was now past, ordered Reg- 
 alus to send home nearly all the ships and a 
 very large part of the army, and with the rest
 
 28 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 254 
 
 Ragnhu marched against Carthage. His difflcmltia* 
 
 to commence his march toward Carthage. Reg 
 ulus obeyed : he sent home the troops which 
 had been ordered home, and with the rest began 
 to advance upon the city. 
 
 Just at this time, however, news oame out 
 to him that the farmer who had had the care of 
 his land at home had died, and that his little 
 farm, on which rested his sole reliance for the 
 support of his family, was going to ruin. Reg- 
 ulus accordingly sent to the senate, asking 
 them to place some one else in command of the 
 army, and to allow him to resign his office, that 
 he might go home and take care of his wife and 
 children. The senate sent back orders that he 
 should go on with his campaign, and promised 
 to provide support for his family, and to see that 
 some one was appointed to take care of his land. 
 This story is thought to illustrate the extreme 
 simplicity and plainness of all the habits of life 
 among the Romans in those days. It certainly 
 does so, if it is true. It is, however, very ex- 
 traordinary, that a man who was intrusted, by 
 snoh a commonwealth, with the command of a 
 fleet of a hundred and thirty vessels, and an 
 army of a hundred and forty thousand men, 
 should have a family at home dependent for sub- 
 jstenoe on the hired cultivation of seven acrea 
 nf land. Still, snoh is th story.
 
 B.C,254.] FIRST PUNIC WAR. 29 
 
 Success** of Reguhu. Arriral of Greek*. The Roman* pat to flight 
 
 Regulus advanced toward Carthage, conquer- 
 ing as he came. The Carthaginians were beat- 
 en in one field after another, and were reduced, 
 in fact, to the last extremity, when an occur- 
 rence took place which turned the scale. This 
 occurrence was the arrival of a large body of 
 troops from Greece, with a Grecian general at 
 their head. These were troops which the Car- 
 thaginians had hired to fight for them, as was 
 the case with the rest of their army. But these 
 were Greeks, and the Greeks were of the same 
 race, and possessed the same qualities, as the 
 Romans. The newly-arrived Grecian general 
 evinced at once such military superiority, that 
 the Carthaginians gave him the supreme com- 
 mand. He marshaled the army, accordingly, 
 for battle. He had a hundred elephants in the 
 van. They were trained to rush forward and 
 trample down the enemy. He had the Greek 
 phalanx in the center, which was a close, com- 
 pact body of many thousand troops, bristling 
 with long, iron-pointed spears, with which the 
 men pressed forward, bearing every thing before 
 tham. Regulus was, in a word, ready to meet 
 Carthaginians, but he was not prepared to en- 
 counter Greeks. His army was put to flight, 
 and he was taken prisoner. Nothing could ex
 
 30 HANNIBAL, [B.C. 254 
 
 Kegulu* a prisoner. He U lent to Roma 
 
 oeed the excitement and exultation in the city 
 when they saw Regulus, and five hundred oth- 
 er Roman soldiers, brought captive in. A few 
 days before, they had been in consternation at 
 the imminent danger of his coming in as a ruth- 
 (ess and vindictive conqueror. 
 
 The Roman senate were not discouraged by 
 this disaster. They fitted out new armies, and 
 the war went on, Regulus being kept all the 
 time at Carthage as a close prisoner. At last 
 the Carthaginians authorized him to go to Rome 
 as a sort of commissioner, to propose to the Ro- 
 mans to exchange prisoners and to make peace. 
 They exacted from him a solemn promise that 
 if he was unsuccessful he would return. The 
 Romans had taken many of the Carthaginians 
 prisoners in their naval combats, and held them 
 captive at Rome. It is customary, in such ca- 
 ses, for the belligerent nations to make an ex- 
 change, and restore the captives on both sides 
 to their friends and home. It was such an ex- 
 change of prisoners as this which Regulus was 
 to propose. 
 
 When Regnlus reached Rome he refused tc 
 enter the chy, but he appeared before the sen- 
 ate without the walls, in a very humble garb 
 and with the most subdued and unassuming de-
 
 B.C.249.] FIRST PUNIC WAR. 31 
 
 Regain* before the Roman senate. Recnl* of hli miMtea 
 
 meanor. He was no longer, he said, a Roman 
 officer, or even citizen, but a Carthaginian pris- 
 oner, and he disavowed all right to direct, or 
 even to counsel, the Roman authorities in re- 
 peot to the proper course to be pursued. His 
 opinion was, however, he said, that the Romans 
 ought not to make peace or to exchange prison- 
 ers. He himself and the other Roman prison- 
 ers were old and infirm, and not worth the ex 
 change ; and, moreover, they had no claim 
 whatever on their country, as they could only 
 have been made prisoners in consequence of 
 want of courage or patriotism to die in their 
 country's cause. He said that the Carthagin- 
 ians were tired of the war, and that their re- 
 sources were exhausted, and that the Romans 
 ought to press forward in it with renewed vigor, 
 and leave himself and the other prisoners to 
 their fate. 
 
 The senate came very slowly and reluctantly 
 to the conclusion to follow this advice. They, 
 however, all earnestly joined in attempting to 
 persuade Regulns that he was under no obliga- 
 tion to return to Carthage. His promise, they 
 said, was extorted by the circumstances of the 
 case, and was not binding. Regulus, however, 
 insisted on keeping his faith with his enemies
 
 82 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 249 
 
 Death ol R*gnhu. Concision of the war 
 
 He sternly refused to see his family, and, bid- 
 ding the senate farewell, he returned to Car- 
 thage. The Carthaginians, exasperated at his 
 having himself interposed to prevent the suo- 
 ceas of his mission, tortured him for some time 
 in the most cruel manner, and finally put him 
 to death. One would think that he ought to 
 have counseled peace and an exchange of pris- 
 oners, and he ought not to have refused to see his 
 unhappy wife and children ; but it was certainly 
 very noble in him to refuse to break his word. 
 The war continued for some time after this, 
 until, at length, both nations became weary of 
 the contest, and peace was made. The follow- 
 ing is the treaty which was signed. It shows 
 that the advantage, on the whole, in this first 
 Punic war, was on the part of the Romans : 
 
 "There shall be peace between Rome and 
 Carthage. The Carthaginians shall evacuate 
 all Sicily. They shall not make war upon any 
 alJes of the Romans. They shall restore to the 
 Romans, without ransom, all the prisoners which 
 they have taken from them, and pay them with- 
 in ten years three thousand two hundred talent* 
 of silver." 
 
 The war had continued twenty-four year*.
 
 B.C. 234.] HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM. 33 
 
 fwentag* tf nftii- Character of Hwniiewr 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM. 
 
 FIlHE name of Hannibal's father was Haimi- 
 -- car. He was one of the leading Cartha- 
 ginian generals. He occupied a very prominent 
 position, both on account of his rank, and wealth, 
 and high family connections at Carthage, and 
 also on account of the great military energy 
 which he displayed in the command of the ar- 
 mies abroad. He carried on the wars which 
 the Carthaginians waged in Africa and in Spain 
 after the conclusion of the war with the Romans, 
 and he longed to commence hostilities with the 
 Romans again. 
 
 At one time, when Hannibal was about nine 
 years of age, Hamilcar was preparing to set off 
 on an expedition into Spain, and, as was usual 
 in those days, he was celebrating the occasion 
 with games, and spectacles, and various religious 
 ceremonies. It has been the custom in all ages 
 of the world, when nations go to war with each 
 other, for each side to take measures for propi- 
 tiating the favor of Heaven. Christian natu ns 
 at the present day do it by prayers offered in 
 143
 
 34 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 234 
 
 tteligiouj ceremonies. Hannibal'* famooi oath of enmity to Roma 
 
 each country for the success of their own arms 
 Heathen nations do it by sacrifices, libations, 
 and offerings. Hamilcar had made arrange* 
 ments for such sacrifices, and the priests wero 
 offering them in the presence of the whole as- 
 sembled army. 
 
 Young Hannibal, then about nine years of 
 age, was present. He was a boy of great spirit 
 and energy, and he entered with much enthu- 
 siasm into the scene. He wanted to go to Spain, 
 himself with the army, and he came to his fa- 
 ther and began to urge his request. His father 
 could not consent to this. He was too young 
 to endure the privations and fatigues of such an 
 enterprise. However, his father brought him 
 to one of the altars, in the presence of the other 
 officers of the army, and made him lay his hand 
 upon the consecrated victim, and swear that, as 
 coon as he was old enough, and had it in his 
 power, he would make war upon the Romans. 
 This was done, no doubt, in part to amuse young 
 Hannibal's mind, and to relieve his disappoint- 
 ment in not being able to go to war at that 
 time, by promising him a great and mighty en 
 emy to fight at some future day Hannibal re- 
 membered it, and longed for the time to come 
 rhen be oould sp to war against the Roman*
 
 B.C. 234.] HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM 3d 
 
 Hatoilcar in Spain. Hasdrubal. Death of HamUcar 
 
 Hamilcar bade his son farewell and embarked 
 for Spain. He was at liberty to extend his con 
 quests there in all directions west of the River 
 Iberas, a river which the reader will find upon 
 the map, flowing southeast into the Mediterra- 
 nean Sea. Its name, Iberus, hag been gradu- 
 ally changed, in modern times, to Ebro. By 
 the treaty with the Romans the Carthaginians 
 were not to cross the Iberus. They were also 
 bound by the treaty not to molest the people of 
 Saguntum, a city lying between the Iberus and 
 the Carthaginian dominions. Saguntum was 
 in alliance with the Romans and under their 
 protection. 
 
 Hamilcar was, however, very restless and un- 
 easy at being obliged thus to refrain from hos 
 tilities with the Roman power. He began, im- 
 mediately after his arrival in Spain, to forn. 
 plans for renewing the war. He had unde 
 him, as his principal lieutenant, a young man 
 who had married his daughter. His name was 
 Hasdrubal. With Hasdrubal's aid, he went on 
 extending his conquests in Spain, and strength- 
 ening his position there, and gradually matur- 
 ing his plans for renewing war with the Ro- 
 mans, when at length he died. Hasdrubal suo 
 seeded him. Hannibal was now, probably, about
 
 S6 HANNIBAL. [B.C.221 
 
 Eiinnib*! sent for to Spain. Opposition of Hann 
 
 twenty-one or two years old, and still in Car 
 thage. Hasdrubal sent to the Carthaginian gov 
 ernment a request that Hannibal might receive 
 an appointment in the army, and be sent oat to 
 join him in Spain. 
 
 On the subject of complying with this re- 
 quest there was a great debate ui the Cartha- 
 ginian senate. In all cases where questions of 
 government are controlled by votes, it has been 
 found, in every age, that parties will always be 
 formed, of which the two most prominent will 
 usually be nearly balanced one against the oth- 
 er. Thus, at this time, though the Hamilcar 
 family were in power, there was a very strong 
 party in Carthage in opposition to them. The 
 leader of this party in the senate, whose name 
 was Hanno, made a very earnest speech against 
 sending Hannibal He was too young, he said, 
 to be of any service. He would only learn the 
 vices and follies of the camp, and thus become 
 corrupted and ruined. " Besides," said Hanno, 
 " at this rate, the command of our armies in 
 Spain is getting to be a sort of hereditary right 
 Hamilcar was not a king, that his authority 
 should thus descend first to his son-in-law and 
 then to his son ; for this plan of making Han- 
 nibal," he said, " while yet scarcely arrived at
 
 B.C.221.] HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTITM. 37 
 
 Huutibal tele out for Spain. Frorble ImpreMlon OB the army 
 
 manhood, a high officer in the army, is only a 
 stepping-stone to the putting of the forces wholly 
 under his orders, whenever, for any reason, Has 
 drnbal shall cease to command them." 
 
 The Roman historian, through whose narra- 
 tive we get our only account of this debate, 
 says that, though these were good reasons, yet 
 strength prevailed, as usual, over wisdom, in 
 the decision of the question. They voted to 
 send Hannibal, and he set out to cross the sea to 
 Spain with a heart full of enthusiasm and joy. 
 
 A great deal of curiosity and interest was felt 
 throughout the army to see him on his arrival 
 The soldiers had been devotedly attached to his 
 father, and they were all ready to transfer this 
 attachment at once to the son, if he should prove 
 worthy of it. It was very evident, soon after 
 he reached the camp, that he was going to prove 
 himself thus worthy. He entered at once into 
 the duties of his position with a degree of ener- 
 gy, .patience, and self-denial which attracied 
 universal attention, and made him a universal 
 favorite. He dressed plainly; he assumed no 
 airs ; he sought for no pleasures or indulgences, 
 nor demanded any exemption from the dangers 
 and privations which the common soldiers had 
 to endure. He ate plain food, and slept, often
 
 38 HANNIBAL, [B.C. 221 
 
 Character of Hannibal He la elerated to the rapreme command 
 
 in his military oloak, on the ground, in the 
 midst of the soldiers on guard ; and in battle he 
 was always foremost to press forward into the 
 contest, and the last to leave the ground when 
 the time came for repose. The Romans say 
 that, in addition to these qualities, he was in- 
 human and merciless when in open warfare 
 with his foes, and cunning and treacherous in 
 every other mode of dealing with them. It is 
 very probable that he was so. Such traits of 
 character were considered by soldiers in those 
 days, as they are now, virtues in themselves, 
 though vices in their enemies. 
 
 However this may be, Hannibal became a 
 great and universal favorite in the army. He 
 went on for several years increasing his military 
 knowledge, and widening and extending his in- 
 fluence, when at length, one day, Hasdrubal 
 was suddenly killed by a ferocious native of the 
 country whom he had by some means offended. 
 As soon as the first shock of this occurrence 
 was over, the leaders of the army went in pur- 
 suit of Hannibal, whom they brought in tri- 
 umph to the tent of Hasdrubal, and instated 
 him at once in the supreme command, with cn 
 consent and in the midst of universal acclama- 
 tions As soon as news of this 3vent reached
 
 B.C.22L] HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM. 39 
 
 The River ibertu. Hannibal seek* a war with the Kom&iu 
 
 Carthage, the government there confirmed the 
 act of the army, and Hannibal thus found him- 
 self suddenly but securely invested with a very 
 high military command. 
 
 His eager and restless desire to try his strength 
 vrith the Romans received a new impulse by his 
 finding that the power was now in his hands. 
 Still the two countries were at peace. They 
 were bound by solemn treaties to continue so 
 The River Iberus was the boundary which sep- 
 arated the dominions of the two nations from 
 each other in Spain, the territory east of that 
 boundary being under the Roman power, and 
 that on the west under that of the Carthagin- 
 ians ; except that Saguntum, which was on the 
 western side, was an ally of the Romans, and 
 the Carthaginians were bound by the treaty to 
 leave it independent and free. 
 
 Hannibal could not, therefore, cross the Ibe- 
 rus or attack Saguntum without an open in- 
 fraction of the treaty. He, however, immedi- 
 ately began to move toward Saguntum and to 
 attack the nations in the immediate vicinity of 
 it. If he wished to get into a war with the Ro- 
 mans, this was the proper way to promote it; 
 for, by advancing thus into the immediate vi. 
 ijinitv of the capital of their allies, there wae
 
 40 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 219 
 
 Stratagmn of Hannibal. Fording tha rirw 
 
 great probability that disputes would arise which 
 would sooner or later end in war. 
 
 The Romans say that Hannibal was cunning 
 and treacherous, and he certainly did display, 
 on some occasions, a great degree of adroitness 
 in his stratagems. In one instance in these pre- 
 liminary wars he gained a victory over an im- 
 mensely superior force in a very remarkable 
 manner. He was returning from an inroad 
 npon some of the northern provinces, laden and 
 encumbered with spoil, when he learned that 
 an immense army, consisting, it was said, of a 
 hundred thousand men, were coming down upon 
 his rear. There was a river at a short distance 
 before him. Hannibal pressed on and crossed 
 the river by a ford, the water being, perhaps, 
 about three feet deep. He secreted a large body 
 of cavalry near the bank of the stream, and push- 
 ed on with the main body of the army to some 
 little distance from the river, so as to produce 
 the impression upon his pursuers that he WM 
 pressing forward to make his escape. 
 
 The enemy, thinking that they had no time 
 to lose, poured down in great numbers into the 
 stream from various points along the banks ; 
 and, as soon as they had reached the middle of 
 the current, and were wading laboriously, half
 
 B.C. 219.] HANNIBAL .HT SAGI'NTUM. 4* 
 
 Great battle In the River Tagus. Victory of Hai-niba, 
 
 submerged, with their weapons held above theii 
 heads, so as to present as little resistance as pos- 
 sible to the water, the horsemen of Hanniba. 
 rushed in to meet and attack them. The horse, 
 men had, of course, greatly the advantage ; for, 
 though their horses were in the water, they were 
 themselves raised above it, and their limbs were 
 tree, while their enemies were half submerged, 
 and, being encumbered by their arms and by 
 one another, were nearly helpless. They were 
 immediately thrown into complete confusion, 
 and were overwhelmed and carried down by the 
 current in great numbers. Some of them suc- 
 ceeded in landing below, on Hannibal's side; 
 but, in the mean time, the main body of his 
 army had returned, and was ready to receive 
 them, and they were trampled under foot by 
 the elephants, which it was the custom to em- 
 ploy, in those days, as a military force. As 
 soon as the river was cleared, Hannibal march- 
 ed his own army across it, and attacked what 
 remained of the enemy on their own side. He 
 gained a complete victory, which was so great 
 and decisive that he secured by it possession of 
 the whole country west of the Iberus, except 
 Saguntum, and Saguntum itself began to be 
 iteriously alarmed.
 
 4 HANKIBAL. [B.C. 218, 
 
 H*BBlbl ttacki it 
 
 The Saguntines sent ambassadors to Rome 
 lo ask the Romans to interpose and protect them 
 from the dangers which threatened them. These 
 onoassadors made diligent efforts to reach Rome 
 as soon as possible, but they were too late. On 
 pome pretext or other, Hannibal contrived to 
 raise a dispute between the city and one of the 
 neighboring tribes, and then, taking sides with 
 the trihe, he advanced to attack the city. The 
 Haguntines prepared for their defense, hoping 
 HOOD to receive succors from Rome. They 
 strengthened and fortified their walls, while 
 Hannibal began to move forward great military 
 engine* for battering them down. 
 
 Hannibal knew very well that by his hostili- 
 ties against this city he was commencing a con- 
 test with Rome itself, as Rome must necessa- 
 rily take part with her ally. In fact, there is 
 DO doubt that his design was to bring on a gen- 
 eral war between the two great nations. He 
 began with Saguntum for two reasons: first, 
 H would not be safe for him to cross the Iberus, 
 and advance into the Roman territory, leaving 
 o wealthy and powerful a city in his rear ; and 
 f&en, in the second place, it was easier for him 
 to find pretexts for getting indirectly into a 
 with Saguntum, and throwing the odi-
 
 B.C. 218.] HANNIBAL \T SAGUNTUM 43 
 
 ProgreM rf the dcgs. Hanirfh* pumika 
 
 am of a declaration of war on Rome, tnan to 
 persuade the Carthaginian state to renounce 
 the peace and themselves commence hostilities 
 There was, as has been already stated, a Terr 
 strong party at Carthage opposed to Hannibal. 
 who would, of course, resist any measures tend- 
 ing to a war with Rome, for they would con- 
 sider such a war as opening a vast field for grat- 
 ifying Hannibal's ambition. The only way, 
 therefore, was to provoke a war by aggression* 
 on the Roman allies, to be justified bv the ben 
 pretexts he could find. 
 
 Saguntum was a very wealthy and powertm 
 city. It was situated about a mile from the 
 sea. The attack upon the place, and the de 
 fense of it by the inhabitants, went on for some 
 time with great vigor. In these operations, 
 Hannibal exposed himself to great danger. He 
 approached, at one time, so near the wail, ID 
 superintending the arrangements of his soldiers 
 and the planting of his engines, that a neav> 
 javelin, thrown from the parapet, struck him on 
 the thigh. It pierced the flesh, and inflicted ao 
 severe a wound that he fell immediately, and 
 was borne away by the soldiers. It was sever- 
 al days before he was free frcm the danger itt- 
 curred by the loss of blood and the fever wnieft
 
 46 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 218 
 
 Hannibal recover*. The falario* 
 
 follows such a wound. During all this time his 
 army were in a great state of excitement and 
 anxiety, and suspended their active operations. 
 Ae soon, however, as Hannibal was found to 
 be decidedly convalescent, they resumed them 
 again, and urged them onward with greater en- 
 ergy than before. 
 
 The weapons of warfare in those ancient days 
 were entirely different from those which are now 
 employed, and there was one, described by an 
 ancient historian as used by the Saguntines at 
 this siege, which might almost come under the 
 modern denomination of fire-arms. It was call- 
 ed thefalarica. It was a sort of javelin, con- 
 sisting of a shaft of wood, with a long point of 
 iron. This point was said to be three feet long. 
 This javelin was to be thrown at the enemy 
 either from the hand of the soldier or by an en- 
 gine. The leading peculiarity of it was, how- 
 ever, that, near to the pointed end, there were 
 wound around the wooden shaft long bands of 
 tot0, which were saturated with pitch and cither 
 combustibles, and this inflammable band was 
 et on fire just before the javelin was thrown 
 AJS the missile flew on its way, the wind fanned 
 the flames, and made them burn so fiercely, that 
 when the javelin struck the shield of the soldiai
 
 B.C.21S.I HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM. 47 
 
 Arrlral of the Roman ambassador*, Hannibal'* policy 
 
 opposing it, it could not be pulled out, and tke 
 shield itself had to be thrown down and aban- 
 doned. 
 
 While the inhabitants of Saguntum were 
 vainly endeavoring to defend themselves against 
 their terrible enemy by these and similar means, 
 their embassadors, not knowing that the city 
 had been attacked, had reached Rome, and had 
 laid before the Roman senate their fears that 
 the city would be attacked, unless they adopted 
 vigorous and immediate measures to prevent it. 
 The Romans resolved to send embassadors to 
 Hannibal to demand of him what his intentions 
 were, and to warn him against any acts of hos- 
 tility against Saguntum. When these Roman 
 embassadors arrived on the coast, near to Sa- 
 guntum, they found that hostilities had com- 
 menced, and that the city was hotly besieged 
 They were at a loss to know what to do. 
 
 It is better for a rebel not to hear an order 
 which he is determined beforehand not to obey. 
 Hannibal, with an adroitness which the Cartha- 
 ginians called sagacity, and the Romans treach- 
 ery and cunning, determined not to see these 
 messengers. He sent word to them, at the shore, 
 that they must not attempt to come to his camp, 
 fcr tho country was in such a disturbed oondi*
 
 48 HJLNNIBAL. [B. C. 318 
 
 Hannibal tends embascadon to Carthag*. Tb* HOBIAB embasBadon 
 
 tion that it would not be safe for them to land ; 
 and besides, he could not receive or attend to 
 them, lor he was too much pressed with the ur- 
 gency of his military works to have any time tc 
 pare lor debates and negotiations. 
 
 Hannibal knew that the ambassadors, being 
 thnu repulsed, and having found, too, that the 
 war had broken out, and that Sagnntum was 
 aotnaliv beset and besieged by Hannibal's ar- 
 mies, would proceed immediately to Carthage 
 to demand satisfaction there. He knew, also, 
 that Hanno and his party would very probably 
 espouse the cause of the Romans, and endeavor 
 to arrest his designs. He accordingly sent his 
 own embassadors to Carthage, to exert an influ- 
 ence m his favor in the Carthaginian senate, and 
 endeavor to urge them to reject the claims of 
 the Romans, and allow the war between Rome 
 and Carthage to break out again. 
 
 The Roman embassadors appeared at Car- 
 thage, and were admitted to an audience before 
 the senate. They stated their case, represent- 
 ing tnat Hannibal had made war upon Sagun- 
 tom in violation of the treaty, and had refused 
 oven to receive the communication which had 
 heen sent him by the Roman senate through 
 them. They demanded that the Carthaginian
 
 B.C.218.J HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM. 49 
 
 .'artte* ID the Carthaginian *ente. Speech of U&nao 
 
 government should disavow his acts, and delivei 
 him up to them, in order that he might receive 
 the punishment which his violation of the treaty, 
 and his aggressions upon an ally of the Romans, 
 ao justly deserved. 
 
 The party of Hannibal in the Carthaginian 
 senate were, of course, earnest to have these pro- 
 posals rejected with scorn. The other side, with 
 Hanno at their head, maintained that they were 
 reasonable demands. Hanno, in a very ener- 
 getic and powerful speech, told the senate that 
 he had warned them not to send Hannibal into 
 Spain. He had foreseen that such a hot and 
 turbulent spirit as his would involve them in 
 inextricable difficulties with the Roman power. 
 Hannibal had, he said, plainly violated the treaty. 
 He had invested and besieged Saguntum, which 
 they were solemnly bound not to molest, and 
 they had nothing to expect in return but that 
 the Roman legions would soon be investing and 
 besieging their own city. In the mean time) 
 the Romans, he added, had been moderate and 
 forbearing. They had brought nothing to the 
 charge of the Carthaginians They accused no- 
 body but Hannibal, who, thus far, alone was 
 guilty. The Carthaginians, by disavowing his 
 acts, could save themselves from the responsi- 
 144
 
 50 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 218 
 
 Bscoe proposes to giTe up Hannibal. Defense of Hannibal's friends 
 
 bility of them. He urged, therefore, that an 
 embassage of apology should be sent to Rome, 
 that Hannibal should be deposed and delivered 
 ap to the Romans, and that ample restitution 
 thould be made to the Saguntines for the inju- 
 ries they had received. 
 
 On the other hand, the friends of Hannibal 
 urged in the Carthaginian senate their defense 
 of the general. They reviewed the history of 
 the transactions in which the war had origina- 
 ted, and showed, or attempted to show, that the 
 Saguntines themselves commenced hostilities, 
 and that consequently they, and not Hannibal, 
 were responsible for all that followed ; that, un- 
 der those circumstances, the Romans ought not 
 to take their part, and if they did so, it proved 
 that they preferred the friendship of Saguntum 
 to that of Carthage ; and that it would be cow- 
 ardly and dishonorable in the extreme for them 
 to deliver the general whom they had placed ia 
 power, and who had shown himself so worthy 
 of their choice by his courage and energy, intc 
 the hands of their ancient and implacable foes. 
 
 Thus Hannibal was waging at the same time 
 two wars, one in the Carthaginian senate, where 
 the weapons were arguments and eloquence, and 
 the other under the walls cf Saguntum, which
 
 B.C. 218.1 HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM. 51 
 
 Hannibal trlamDbant Saguntum fatla 
 
 was fought with battering rams and fiery jave- 
 lins. He conquered in both. The senate de- 
 cided to send the Roman embassadors home 
 without acceding to their demands, and the 
 walls of Saguntum were battered down by Han- 
 nibal's engines. The inhabitants refused aL 
 terms of compromise, and resisted to the last, 
 so that, when the victorious soldiery broke over 
 the prostrate walls, and poured into the city, it 
 was given up to them to plunder, and they killed 
 and destroyed all that came in their way. The 
 disappointed embassadors returned to Rome 
 with the news that Saguntum had been taken 
 and destroyed by Hannibal, and that the Car- 
 thaginians, far from offering any satisfaction for 
 the wrong, assumed the responsibility of it them- 
 selves, and were preparing for war. 
 
 Thus Hanniba) accomplished his purpose of 
 opening the way for waging war against the 
 Roman power. He prepared to enter mto the 
 contest with the utmost energy and zeal. The 
 conflict that ensued lasted seventeen years, and 
 is known in history as the second Punie war. 
 It was one of the most dreadful struggles be- 
 tween rival and hostile nations which the gloomy 
 history of mank ind exhibits to view. The events 
 that occurred will be described in the subse- 
 quent chaotors.
 
 62 HANNIBAL. [B.C.217 
 
 Fall of flanuo's party. rower of Hannibal 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 OPENING OP THE SECOND PUNIC WAE. 
 
 the tide once turns in any nation 
 in favor of war, it generally rushes on 
 with great impetuosity and force, and bears all 
 before it. It was so in Carthage in this in- 
 stance. The party of Hanno were thrown en- 
 tirely into the minority and silenced, and the 
 friends and partisans of Hannibal carried not 
 only the government, but the whole community 
 with them, and every body was eager for war. 
 This was owing, in part, to the natural conta- 
 giousness of the martial spirit, which, when felt 
 by one, catches easily, by sympathy, in the heart 
 of another. It is a fire which, when once it be- 
 gins to burn, spreads in every direction, and con- 
 umes all that comes in its way. 
 
 Besides, when Hannibal gained possession of 
 Saguntum, he found immense treasures there, 
 which he employed, not to increase his cwn 
 private fortune, but to strengthen and confirm 
 His civil and military power. The Saguntinos 
 did every thing they could to prevent the*e
 
 B.C.217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR. 53 
 
 Desperate valor of the Sagvntine*. Hannibal's disparities of the spoils 
 
 treasures from falling into his hands. They 
 fought desperately to the last, refused all terms 
 of surrender, and they became so insanely des* 
 perate in the end, that, according to the narra- 
 tive of Livy, when they found that the walls 
 and towers of the city were falling in, and that 
 all hope of further defense was gone, they built 
 an enormous fire in the public streets, and heap 
 ed upon it all the treasures which they had time 
 to collect that fire could destroy, and then that 
 many of the principal inhabitants leaped into 
 the flames themselves, in order that their hated 
 conquerors might lose their prisoners as well as 
 their spoils. 
 
 Notwithstanding this, however, Hannibal ob- 
 tained a vast amount of gold and silver, both in 
 the form of money and of plate, and also much 
 valuable merchandise, which the Saguntine mer- 
 chants had accumulated in their palaces and 
 warehouses. He used all this property ta 
 trengthen his own political and military posi- 
 tion. He paid his soldiers all the arrears due 
 to them in full. He divided among them a 
 large additional amount as their share of the 
 spoil. He sent rich trophies home to Carthage, 
 and presents, consisting of sums of money, and 
 jewelry, and gems, to his friends there, and to
 
 54 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Hannibal choan one of the suffetei. Nature of the office 
 
 those whom he wished to make his friends. The 
 result of this munificence, and of the renown 
 which his victories in Spain had procured for 
 Him, was to raise him to the highest pinnacle 
 af influence and honor. The Carthaginians 
 chose him one of the suffetes. 
 
 The suflfetes were the supreme 1 executive offi- 
 cers of the Carthaginian commonwealth. The 
 government was, as has been remarked before, 
 a sort of aristocratic republic, and republics are 
 always very cautious about intrusting power, 
 even executive power, to any one man. As 
 Rome had two consuls, reigning jointly, and 
 France, after her first revolution, a Directory 
 of Jive, so the Carthaginians chose annually two 
 suffetes, as they were called at Carthage, though 
 the Roman writers call them indiscriminately 
 suffetes, consuls, and kings. Hannibal was now 
 advanced to this dignity ; so that, in conjunc- 
 tion with his colleague, he held the supreme 
 civil authority at Carthage, besides being in- 
 rested with the command of the vast and vic- 
 torious army in Spain. 
 
 When news of these events the siege and 
 destruction of Saguntum, the rejection of the 
 iemands of the Roman embassadors, and the 
 vigorous preparations making by the Cartha
 
 B.C. 217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR. 53 
 
 HTM* excitement at Rome. Fearful anticipation*. 
 
 ginians for war reached Rome, the whole city 
 was thrown into consternation. The senate 
 and the people held tumultuous and disorderly 
 assemblies, in which the events "which had oc- 
 curred, and the course of proceeding which it 
 was incumbent on the Romans to take, were 
 discussed with much excitement and clamor 
 The Romans were, in fact, afraid of the Car- 
 thaginians. The campaigns of Hannibal in 
 Spain had impressed the people with a strong 
 sense of the remorseless and terrible energy of 
 his character ; they at once concluded that his 
 plans would be formed for marching into Italy, 
 and they even anticipated the danger of his 
 bringing the war up to the very gates of the 
 city, so as to threaten them with the destruc- 
 tion which he had brought upon Saguntum. 
 The event showed how justly they appreciated 
 his character. 
 
 Since the conclusion of the first Punic war, 
 there had been peace between the Romans and 
 Carthaginians for about a quarter of a century. 
 During all this time both nations had been ad* 
 vanoing in wealth and power, but the Cartha- 
 ginians had made much more rapid progress 
 than the Romans. The Romans had, indeed, 
 been very successful at the onset in the formei
 
 56 HANNIBAL. [B.O.21? 
 
 Mew embassy to Carthage. W 
 
 war, but in the end the Carthaginians nad 
 proved themselves their equal. They seemed, 
 therefore, to dread now a fresh encounter with 
 these powerful foes, led on, as they were now to 
 be, by such a commander as Hanniba' 
 
 They determined, therefore, to send a second 
 embassy to Carthage, with a view of making 
 one more effort to preserve peace before actual- 
 ly commencing hostilities. They accordingly 
 elected five men from among the most influ- 
 ential citizens of the state men of venerable 
 age and of great public consideration and 
 commissioned them to proceed to Carthage and 
 ask once more whether it was the deliberate 
 and final decision of the Carthaginian senate 
 to avow and sustain the action of Hannibal 
 This solemn embassage set sail. They arrived 
 at Carthage. They appeared before the senate. 
 They argued their cause, but it was, of course, 
 to deaf and unwilling ears. The Carthaginian 
 orators replied to them, each side attempting to 
 throw the blame of the violation of the treaty 
 on the other. It was a solemn hour, for the 
 peace of the world, the lives of hundreds of 
 thousands of men, and the continued happiness, 
 or the desolation and ruin of vast regions of 
 ountry, depended on the issue of the debate
 
 B.C.217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR. 57 
 
 Frultiei negotiation*. The embaaiadon retain, 
 
 Unhappily, the breach was only widened by the 
 discussion. "Very well," said the Roman 
 commissioners, at last, " we offer you peace or 
 war, which do you choose ?" " Whichever you 
 please," replied the Carthaginians ; " decide for 
 yourselves." " War, then," said the Romans, 
 "since it must be so." The conference was 
 broken up, and the embassadors returned to 
 Rome. 
 
 They returned, however, by the way o 
 Spain. Their object in doing this was to ne- 
 gotiate with the various kingdoms and tribes in 
 Spain and in France, through which Hannibal 
 would have to march in invading Italy, and en- 
 deavor to induce them to take sides with th 
 Romans. They were too late, however, for 
 Hannibal had contrived to extend and establish 
 his influence in all that region too strongly to 
 be shaken ; so that, on one pretext or another, 
 the Roman proposals were all rejected. There 
 was one powerful tribe, for example, called the 
 Volaoians. The embassadors, in the presence 
 of the great council of the Volscians, made 
 Known to them the probability of war, and in- 
 vited them to ally themselves with the Romans. 
 The Volsoians rejected the proposition with a 
 sort of scorn. " We see," said they, " from the
 
 38 HANNIBAL [B.C.217 
 
 Reply of the VoUclaiu. Council of Gaul* 
 
 fate of Sagunturm, what is to be expected to re- 
 sult from an alliance with the Romans. After 
 leaving that city defenseless and alone in its 
 straggle against such terrible danger, it is in 
 vain to ask other nations to trust to your pro- 
 tection. If you wish for new allies, it will be 
 best for you to go where the story of Saguntura 
 is not known." This answer of the Volsoiana 
 was applauded by the other nations of Spain, as 
 far as it was known, and the Roman embassa- 
 dors, despairing of success in that country, went 
 on into Gaul, which is the name by which the 
 country now called France is known in ancient 
 history. 
 
 On reaching a certain place which was a cen- 
 tral point of influence and power in Gaul, the 
 Roman commissioners convened a great martial 
 council there. The spectacle presented by this 
 assembly was very imposing, for the warlike 
 counselors came to the meeting armed complete- 
 ly and in the most formidable manner, as if 
 they were coming to a battle instead of a con- 
 sultation and debate. The venerable embassa* 
 dors laid the subject before them. They des- 
 cantcd largely on the power and greatness of 
 the Romans, and on the certainty that they 
 should conquer in the approaching contest, and
 
 B.U.217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR. 5S 
 
 l-nmvltuotu cene. RepnUe of the mbMdara 
 
 they invited the Gauls to espouse their cause, 
 and to rise in arms and intercept Hannibal's 
 passage through their country, if he should at- 
 tempt to effect one. 
 
 The assembly could hardly be induced to hear 
 the embassadors through ; and, as soon as they 
 had finished their address, the whole council 
 broke forth into cries of dissent and displeasure, 
 and even into shouts of derision. Order was at 
 length restored, and the officers, whose duty it 
 was to express the sentiments of the assembly, 
 gave for their reply that the Gauls had never 
 received any thing but violence and injuries 
 from Rome, or any thing but kindness and good- 
 will from Carthage ; and that they had no idea 
 of being guilty of the folly of bringing the im- 
 pending storm of Hannibal's hostility upon their 
 own heads, merely for the sake of averting it 
 from their ancient and implacable foes. Thai 
 the embassadors were every where repulsed. 
 They found no friendly disposition toward the 
 Roman power till they had crossed the Rhone. 
 
 Hannibal began now to form his plans, in * 
 very deliberate and cautious manner, for a march 
 Into Italy. He knew well that this was an ex- 
 pedition of such magnitude and duration as to re- 
 quire beforehand the most careful and well-oon
 
 60 HANNIBAL IB.C.21/ 
 
 Hannibal's kindness to hi* soldier*. He mature* hi* design* 
 
 sidered arrangements, both for the forces which 
 were to go, and for the states and communities 
 which were to remain. The winter was com- 
 ing on. His first measure was to dismiss a 
 large portion of his forces, that they might visit 
 their homes. He told them that he was intend- 
 ing some great designs for the ensuing spring, 
 which might take them to a great distance, and 
 keep them for a long time absent from Spain, 
 and he would, accordingly, give them the inter- 
 vening time to visit their families and their 
 homes, and to arrange their affairs. This act 
 of kind consideration and confidence renewed 
 the attachment of the soldiers to their command. 
 er, and they returned to his camp in the spring 
 not only with new strength and vigor, but with 
 redoubled attachment to the service in which 
 they were engaged. 
 
 Hannibal, after sending home his soldiers, re- 
 tired himself to New Carthage, which, as will 
 be seen by the map, is further west than Sa- 
 gunturn, where he went into winter quarters, 
 and devoted himself to the maturing of ais de- 
 signs. Besides the necessary preparations foi 
 hia own march, he had to provide for the gov- 
 ernment of the countries that he should leave 
 He devised various and ingenious plans to pre>
 
 B.C.217.J SECOND PUNIC WAR. 
 
 Humlbl'( plan for the goremmeot of Spain in his tbstanen. 
 
 vent the danger of insurrections and rebellion* 
 while he was gone. One was, to organize an 
 army for Spain out of soldiers drawn from Af- 
 rica, while the troops which were to be em- 
 ployed to garrison Carthage, and to sustain th 
 government there, were taken from Spain. By 
 thus changing the troops of the two countries, 
 each country was controlled by a foreign sol- 
 diery, who were more likely to be faithful in 
 their obedience to their commanders, and less 
 in danger of sympathizing with the populations 
 which they were respectively employed to con- 
 trol, than if each had been retained in its own 
 native land. 
 
 Hannibal knew very well that the various 
 states and provinces of Spain, which had refused 
 to ally themselves with the Romans and aban- 
 don him, had been led to do this through the 
 influence of his presents or the fear of his pow- 
 er, and that if, after he had penetrated into It- 
 aly, he should meet with reverses, so as to di- 
 minish very much their hope of deriving bene- 
 fit from his favor or their fear of his power, there 
 -would be great danger, of defections and revolts 
 As an additional security against this, he adopt- 
 ed the following ingenious plan. He enlisted a 
 body of troops from among all the nation* of
 
 62 HANN HAL [B.C. 217 
 
 U aiinib&Ti brother HasdrubaL He IB left in charge of Spain 
 
 Spain that were in alliance with him, selecting 
 the young men who were enlisted as much as 
 possible from families of consideration and influ- 
 ence, and this body of troops, when organized 
 and officered, he sent into Carthage, giving the 
 nations and tribes from which they were drawn 
 to understand that he considered them not only 
 as soldiers serving in his armies, but as hosta- 
 ges, which he should hold as security for the 
 fidelity and obedience of the countries from 
 which they had come. The number of these 
 soldiers was four thousand. 
 
 Hannibal had a brother, whose name, as it 
 happened, was the same as that of his brother- 
 in-law, Hasdrubal. It was to him that he com- 
 mitted the government of Spain during his ab- 
 sence. The soldiers provided for him were, as 
 has been already stated, mainly drawn from 
 Africa. In addition to the foot soldiers, he pro- 
 vided him with a small body of horse. He left 
 with him, also, fourteen elephants. And as he 
 thought it not improbable that the Romans 
 might, in some contingency during his absence, 
 make a descent upon the Spanish coast from 
 the sea, he built and equipped for him a smaU 
 fleet of about sixty vessels, fifty of which were 
 of the first class. In modern times, the mag-
 
 B.C.217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR. 63 
 
 Preparation* of the Roman*. Their plan far th* war 
 
 nitude and efficiency of a ship is estimated by 
 the number of guns she will carry ; then, il 
 was the number of banks of oars. Fifty of 
 Haedrubal's ships were quinqueremes, as they 
 were called, that is, they had five banks of oars 
 
 The Romans, on the other hand, did not neg- 
 lect their own preparations. Though reluct- 
 ant to enter upon the war, they still prepared 
 to engage in it with their characteristic energy 
 and ardor, when they found that it could 'not 
 be averted. They resolved on raising two pow- 
 erful armies, one for each of the consuls. The 
 plan was, with one of these to advance to meet 
 Hannibal, and with the other to proceed to Sic- 
 ily, and from Sicily to the African coast, with 
 a view of threatening the Carthaginian capital 
 This plan, if successful, would compel the Car- 
 thaginians to recall a part or the whole of Han- 
 nibal's army from the intended invasion of It- 
 aly to defend their own African homes. 
 
 The force raised by the Romans amounted ta 
 aoout seventy thousand men. About a third of 
 these were Roman soldiers, and the remaindei 
 were drawn from various nations dwelling in 
 Italy and in the islands of the Mediterranean 
 Sea which were in alliance with the Romans 
 Of these troops six thousand were cavalry Of
 
 fr* HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 the Roman fleet Drawing lot* 
 
 course, as the Romans intended to cross into 
 Africa, they needed a fleet. They built and 
 equipped one, which consisted of two hundred 
 nd twenty ships of the largest class, that 
 la, quinqueremes, besides a number of smaller 
 and lighter vessels for services requiring speed. 
 There were vessels in use in those tunes largei 
 than the quinqueremes. Mention is occasion* 
 ally made of those which had six and even sev- 
 3n banks of oars. But these were only employ- 
 ed as the flag-ships of commanders, and for 
 other purposes of ceremony and parade, as they 
 were too unwieldy for efficient service in action. 
 Lots were then drawn in a very solemn man- 
 ner, according to the Roman custom on such 
 occasions, to decide on the assignment of these 
 two armies to the respective consuls. The one 
 destined to meet Hannibal on his way from 
 Spain, fell to a consul named Cornelius Scipio. 
 The name of the other was Sempronius. It 
 devolved on him, consequently, to take charge 
 of the expedition destined to Sicily and Africa 
 When all the arrangements were thus made : 
 the question was finally put, in a very solemn 
 and formal manner, to the Roman people for 
 their final vote and decision. " Do the Roman 
 people decide and decree that wa? shall be de
 
 B.C.217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR. 65 
 
 ReHglow cr*mfiii)*. Hannibal rnareh 
 
 olared against the Carthaginians?" The de- 
 cision was in the affirmative. The war was 
 then proclaimed with the usual imposing cere- 
 monies. Sacrifices and religious celebrations 
 followed, to propitiate the iavor of the gods, and 
 to inspire the soldiers with that kind of cour- 
 age and confidence which the superstitious, 
 however wicked, feel when they can imagine 
 themselves under the protection of heaven. 
 These shows and spectacles being over, all 
 things were ready. - 
 
 In the mean time Hannibal was moving on, 
 ts the spring advanced, toward the banks of the 
 Iberus, that frontier stream, the crossing of 
 which made him an invader of what was, in 
 tome sense, Roman territory. He boldly passed 
 the stream, and moved forward along the coast 
 of the Mediterranean, gradually approaching the 
 Pyrenees, which form the boundary between 
 France and Spain. His soldiers hitherto did 
 not know what his plans were. It is very lit- 
 tle the custom now for military and naval com- 
 manders to communicate to their men much in- 
 formation about their designs, and it was still 
 Less the custom then ; and besides, in those days', 
 the common soldiers had no access to those 
 means of information by which news of every 
 145
 
 6 HANNIBAL. [B.C.217 
 
 The Pyrenees. DUcontent in Hannibal a army. 
 
 sort is now so universally diffused. Thus, 
 though all the officers of the army, and well- 
 informed citizens, both in Rome and Carthage, 
 anticipated and understood Hannibal's designs, 
 his own soldiers, ignorant and degraded, knew 
 nothing except that they were to go on some 
 distant and dangerous service. They, very dke- 
 ly, had no idea whatever of Italy or of Rome, 
 or of the magnitude of the possessions, or of the 
 power held by the vast empire which they were 
 going to invade. 
 
 When, however, after traveling day after day 
 they came to the foot of the Pyrenees, and found 
 that they were really going to pass that mighty 
 chain of mountains, and for this purpose were 
 actually entering its wild and gloomy defiles, 
 the courage of some of them failed, and they be- 
 gan to murmur. The discontent and alarm 
 were, in fact, so great, that one corps, consist- 
 ing of about three thousand men, left the camp 
 in a body, and moved back toward their homes 
 On inquiry, Hannibal found that there were ter 
 thousand more who were in a similar state of 
 feeling. His whole force consisted of ovei om 
 hundred thousand. And now what does the 
 reader imagine that Hannibal would do in snob 
 an emergency? Would he return in pursuit
 
 B.C. 217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR. 67 
 
 Hannibal's addrei*. The discontented sent horn* 
 
 of these deserters, to recapture and destroy them 
 as a terror to the rest? or would he let them 
 go, and attempt by words of conciliation and en- 
 couragement to confirm and save those that yet 
 remained ? He did neither. He called togeth- 
 er the ten thousand discontented troops that 
 were still in his camp, and told them that, since 
 they were afraid to accompany his army, or un- 
 willing to do so, they might return. He want- 
 ed none in his service who had not the courage 
 and the fortitude to go on wherever he might 
 ead. He would not have the faint-hearted and 
 the timid in his army. They would only be a 
 burden to load down and impede the courage 
 and energy of the rest. So saying, he gave or- 
 ders for them to return, and with the rest of the 
 army, whose resolution and ardor were redoubled 
 by this occurrence, he moved on through the 
 passes of the mountains. 
 
 This act of Hannibal, in permitting hia dis- 
 contented soldiers to return, had all the effect 
 of a deed of generosity in its influence upon vfi 
 minds of the soldiers who went on. We must 
 not, however, imagine that it was prompted by 
 a spirit of generosity at all. It was policy. A 
 seeming generosity was, in this case, exactly 
 what was wanted to answer his ends. Hanni
 
 68 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Ti Ufaoitjr. The PyreacM pawed. 
 
 bal was mercilessly cruel in all cases where he 
 imagined that severity was demanded. It re 
 quires great sagacity sometimes in a command- 
 er to know when he must punish, and when it 
 is wisest to overlook and forgive. Hannibal, 
 like Alexander and Napoleon, possessed this sa- 
 gacity in a very high degree ; and it was, doubt- 
 less, the exercise of that principle alone which 
 prompted his action on this occasion. 
 
 Thus Hannibal passed the Pyrenees. .The 
 next difficulty that he anticipated was in cross- 
 ing the River Rhone.
 
 B.C.217.] PASSAGE OF THE RHONE. 69 
 
 Difflcnltie* antieiptted. ReoouoteHif prty 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 THE PASSAGE OP THE RHONE. 
 
 rTANNIBAL, after he had passed the Pyr- 
 * * enees, did not anticipate any new diffi- 
 culty till he shonld arrive at the Rhone. He 
 knew very well that that was a broad and rap- 
 id river, and that he must cross it near its 
 month, where the water was deep and the banks 
 low; and, besides, it was not impossible that 
 the Romans who were coming to meet him, 
 under Cornelius Soipio, might have reached 
 the Rhone before he should arrive there, and be 
 ready upon the banks to dispute his passage 
 He had sent forward, therefore, a small detach- 
 ment in advance, to reconnoiter the country and 
 select a route to the Rhone, and if they met 
 with no difficulties to arrest them there, they 
 were to go on till they reached the Alps, and 
 explore the passages and defiles through which 
 his army could best cross those snow-covered 
 mountains. 
 
 It seems that before he reached the Pyreneei 
 that is, while he was npon the Spanish side of
 
 70 HANNIBAL. [B.C.217 
 
 Bom* tribe* reduced. Alarm of the Oauli 
 
 them, some of the tribes through whose territo. 
 ries he had to pass undertook to resist him, 
 and he, consequently, had to attack them and 
 reduce them by force ; and then, when he waa 
 ready to move on, he left a guard in the terri- 
 tories thus conquered to keep them in subjec- 
 tion. Rumois of this reached Gaul. The 
 Gauls were alarmed for their own safety. They 
 had not intended to oppose Hannibal so long as 
 they supposed that he only wished for a safe 
 passage through their country on his way to 
 Italy; but now, when they found, from what 
 had occurred in Spain, that he was going to 
 conquer the countries he traversed as he passed 
 along, they became alarmed. They seized their 
 arms, and assembled in haste at Rusoino, and 
 began to devise measures of defense. Rnsoino 
 was the same place as that in which the Ro- 
 man embassadors met the great council of the 
 Gauls on their return to Italy from Carthage. 
 
 While this great council, or, rather, assembly 
 j* amiies, was gathering at Rusoino, fail of 
 threats and anger, Hannibal was at Hliberis, a 
 town at the foot of the Pyrenean Mountains 
 He seems to have had no fear that any opposi 
 ion which the Gauls could bring to bear against 
 aim would be successful, but he dreaded the
 
 B.C. 217.J PASSAGE OF THK RHONE. 71 
 
 Ths Alp* DtfflorUty of their pMetg* 
 
 delay. He was extremely unwilling to spend 
 the precious months of the early summer in 
 contending with such foes as they, when the 
 road to Italy was before him. Besides, the pass- 
 es of the Alps, which are difficult and laborious 
 at any time, are utterly impracticable except 
 in the months of July and August. At all 
 other seasons they are, or were in those days, 
 blocked up with impassable snows. In modern 
 times roads have been made, with galleries cut 
 through the rock, and with the exposed places 
 protected by sloping roofs projecting from above, 
 over which storms sweep and avalanches slide 
 without injury; so that now the intercourse 
 of ordinary travel between France and Italy, 
 across the Alps, is kept up, in some measure, 
 all the year. In Hannibal's time, however, the 
 mountains could not be traversed except in the 
 summer months, and if it had not been that the 
 result justified the undertaking, it would have 
 been considered an act of inexcusable rashness 
 and folly to attempt to cross with an am y at 
 all. 
 
 Hannibal had therefore no time to lose, and 
 that circumstance made this case one of those 
 in which forbearance and a show of generosity 
 were called for, instead of defiance and force
 
 72 HANNIBAL [B.C.21/ 
 
 BiumibaTi message to the GmmU. Sacces* of hi* policy 
 
 He accordingly sent messengers to the oounoi. 
 at Rnscino to say, in a very complaisant and 
 affable manner, that he wished to see and oon- 
 fcr with their princes in person, and that, if 
 they pleased, he would advance for this pnr- 
 POM toward Ruscino; or they might, if they 
 preferred, come on toward him at Illiberis, 
 where he would await their arrival. He in- 
 vited them to come freely into his camp, and 
 aid that he was ready, if they were willing to 
 receive him, to go into theirs, for he had come 
 to Gaul as a friend and an ally, and wanted 
 nothing but a free passage through their terri- 
 tory. He had made a resolution, he said, if 
 the Gauls would but allow him to keep it, that 
 there should not be a single sword drawn in hi 
 army till he got into Italy. 
 
 The alarm and the feelings of hostility which 
 prevailed among the Gauls were greatly allay- 
 ed by this message. They put their camp in 
 motion, and went on to Illiberis The princes 
 and high offiodrs of theii armies went to Han 
 nibal's camp, and were received with the high- 
 est marks of distinction and honor They were 
 loaded with presents, and went away charmed 
 with the affability, the wealth, and the generos- 
 ity of their visitor. Instead of opposing hi*
 
 B.C. 217.] PASSAGE OF THE RHONB. 73 
 
 Cornelia* Bcipio. He embark* hi* army 
 
 progress, they became the conductors and guide* 
 of his army. They took them first to Rusoino, 
 which was, as it were, their capital, and thence, 
 after a short delay, the army moved on without 
 any further molestation toward the Rhone. 
 
 In the mean time, the Roman consul Soipio, 
 having embarked the troops destined to meet 
 Hannibal in sixty ships at the mouth of the 
 Tiber, set sail for the mouth of the Rhone. 
 The men were crowded together in the ships, 
 as armies necessarily must be when transport- 
 ed by sea. They could not go far out to sea, 
 for, as they had no compass in those days, 
 there were no means of directing the course of 
 navigation, in case of storms or cloudy skies, 
 except by the land. The ships accordingly 
 made their way slowly along the shore, some- 
 times by means of sails and sometimes by 
 oars, and, after suffering for some time tho 
 hardships and privations incident to such a vcy- 
 age the sea-sickness and the confinement of 
 such swarming numbers in so narrow a space 
 bringing every species of discomfort in their 
 train the fleet entered the mouth of the Rhone. 
 The officers had no idea that Hannibal was 
 near They had only heard of his having cross- 
 ed the Iberus. They imagined that he was
 
 74 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Both armies on the Rhone. Exploring party 
 
 still on the other side of the Pyrenees. They 
 entered the Rhone by the first branch they 
 came to for the Rhone, like the Nile, divides 
 aear its mouth, and flows into the sea by ser- 
 sral separate channels and sailed without con- 
 cern up to Marseilles, imagining that their en- 
 emy was still hundreds of miles away, entangled, 
 perhaps, among the defiles of the Pyrenees. In- 
 stead of that, he was safely encamped upon the 
 banks of the Rhone, a short distance above them, 
 quietly and coolly making his arrangements for 
 crossing it. 
 
 When Cornelius got his men upon the land, 
 they were too much exhausted by the sickness 
 and misery they had endured upon the voyage 
 to move on to meet Hannibal without some 
 days for rest and refreshment. Cornelius, how- 
 ever, selected three hundred horsemen who were 
 able to move, and sent them up the river on an 
 exploring expedition, to learn the facts in re- 
 spect to Hannibal, and to report them tc him. 
 Dispatching them accordingly, he remained him- 
 felf in his camp, reorganizing and recruiting 
 iis army, and awaiting the return of the party 
 chat he had sent to explore. 
 
 Although Hannibal had thus far met with nc 
 opposition in his progress through Gaul
 
 B.C.217.J PASSAGE OF THE RHONE. 75 
 
 Feelings of the Gauls in respect to HannibaL 
 
 It must not, on that account, be supposed that 
 the people, through whose territories he was 
 passing, were really friendly to his cause, or 
 pleased with his presence among them. An 
 army is always a burden and a curse to any 
 country that it enters, even when its only ob- 
 ject is to pass peacefully through. The Gauls 
 assumed a friendly attitude toward this dreaded 
 invader and his horde only because they thought 
 that by so doing he would the sooner pass and 
 be gone. They ware too weak, and had too few 
 means of resistance to attempt to stop him ; and, 
 as the next best thing that they could do, re- 
 solved to render him every possible aid to hast* 
 en him on. This continued to be the policy of 
 the various tribes until he reached the river 
 The people on the further side of the river, how- 
 ever, thought it was best for them to resist. 
 They were nearer to the Roman territories, and, 
 consequently, somewhat more under Roman in- 
 fluence. They feared the resentment of the Ro- 
 mans if they should, even passively, render any 
 oo-operation to Hannibal in his designs ; and, as 
 they had the broad and rapid river between them 
 and their enemy, they thought there was a rea- 
 sonable prospect that, with its aid, they could 
 exclude him from their territories altogether.
 
 76 HANNIBAL. IB.C.217 
 
 The Gaul* beyond the river oppose Hannibal** paauge. 
 
 Thus it happened that, when Hannibal came 
 to the stream, the people on one side were all 
 eager to promote, while those on the other were 
 determined to prevent his passage, both parties 
 being animated by the same desire to free their 
 country from such a pest as the presence of an 
 army of ninety thousand men ; so that Hanni- 
 bal stood at last upon the banks of the river, 
 with the people on his side of the stream wait- 
 ing and ready to furnish all the boats and ves- 
 sels that they could command, and to render 
 every aid in their power in the embarkation, 
 while those on the other were drawn up in bat- 
 tle array, rank behind rank, glittering with 
 weapons, marshaled so as to guard every place 
 of landing, and lining with pikes the whole extent 
 of the shore, while the peaks of their tents, in 
 vast numbers, with banners among them float- 
 ing in the air, were to be seen in the distance 
 behind them. All this time, the three hundred 
 horsemen which Cornelius had dispatched were 
 lowly and cautiously making their way up th j 
 liver from the Roman encampment below. 
 
 After contemplating the scene presented to 
 his view at the river for some time in silence, 
 Hannibal commenced his preparations for cross- 
 ing the stream. He collected first all the boata
 
 B.C.217.J PASSAGE OF THE RHONE. 77 
 
 Preparation* for crosdng tbe rirar. Boat buildiig 
 
 of every kind which could be obtained among 
 the Gauls who lived along the bank of the riy- 
 er. These, however, only served for a begin- 
 ning, and so he next got together all the work- 
 men and all the tools which the country could 
 furnish, for several miles around, and went to 
 work constructing more. The Gauls of that re- 
 gion had a custom of making boats of the trunk* 
 of large trees. The tree, being felled and out 
 to the proper length, was hollowed out with 
 hatchets and ad2es, and then, being turned bot- 
 tom upward, the outside was shaped in such a 
 manner as to make it glide easily through the 
 water. So convenient is this mode of making 
 boats, that it is practiced, in oases where suffi- 
 ciently large trees are found, to the present day 
 Such boats are now called canoes. 
 
 There were plenty of large trees on the bank* 
 of the Rhone. Hannibal's soldiers watched the 
 Gauls at their work, in making boats of them, 
 until they learned the art themselves. Some 
 first assisted their new allies in the easier por- 
 tions )f the operation, and then began to fel! 
 large trees and make the boats themselves 
 Others, who had less skill or more impetuosity 
 chose not to wait for the slow process of hoi 
 owing the wood, and they, accordingly, would
 
 78 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Kafir The enemy look on in rilenca 
 
 fell the trees upon the shore, out the trunks of 
 equal lengths, place them side by side in the wa- 
 ter, and bolt or bind them together so as to form 
 a raft. The form and fashion of their craft was 
 of no consequence, they said, as it was for one 
 passage only. Any thing would answer, if it 
 would only float and bear its burden over. 
 
 In the mean time, the enemy upon the oppo- 
 site shore looked on, but they could do nothing 
 to impede these operations. If they had had ar- 
 tillery, such as is in use at the present day, they 
 could have fired across the river, and have blown 
 the boats and rafts to pieces with balls and sheila 
 as fast as the Gauls and Carthaginians could 
 build them. In fact, the workmen could not 
 have built them under such a cannonading ; 
 but the enemy, in this case, had nothing but 
 spears, and arrows, and stones, to be thrown 
 either by the hand, or by engines far too weak 
 to send them with any effect across such a 
 stream. They had to look on quietly, there- 
 fore, and allow these great and formidable prep 
 araiions for an attack upon them to go on with- 
 out interruption. Their only hope was to over- 
 whelm the army with their missiles, and prevent 
 their landing, when they should reach the bank 
 at last in their attempt to cross the stream
 
 B.C.217.J PASSAGE OF THE RHONE 79 
 
 Difficulties of crowing * rtTer. Hannibal'i tactic* 
 
 If an army is crossing a river without any 
 enemy to oppose them, a moderate number of 
 boats will serve, as a part of the army can be 
 transported at a time, and the whole gradually 
 transferred from one bank to the other by re 
 peated trips of the same conveyances. But 
 when there is an enemy to encounter at the 
 landing, it is necessary to provide the means of 
 carrying over a very large force at a time ; for 
 if a small division were to go over first alone, 
 it would only throw itself, weak and defense- 
 less, into the hands of the enemy. Hannibal, 
 therefore, waited until he had boats, rafts, and 
 floats enough constructed to carry over a force 
 all together sufficiently numerous and powerful 
 to attack the enemy with a prospect of success 
 
 The Romans, as we have already remarked, 
 say that Hannibal was cunning. He certainly 
 was not disposed, like Alexander, to trust in 
 his battles to simple superiority of bravery and 
 force, but was always contriving some strata- 
 gem to increase the chances of victory. H 
 did so in this case. He kept up for many days 
 a prodigious parade and bustle of building boats 
 and rafts in sight of his enemy, as if his sole 
 reliance was on the multitude of men that he 
 could pour across the river at a single transpor-
 
 80 HANNIBAL. {B.C. 217. 
 
 Hanniba''* H^Btagem.. Detachment under Hanno, 
 
 tation, and he thus kept their attention closely 
 riveted upon these preparations. All this time, 
 however, he had another plan in course of exe- 
 cution. He had sent a strong body of troops 
 eoretly up the river, with orders to make their 
 way stealthily through the forests, and cross 
 the stream some few miles above. This force 
 was intended to move baok from the river, as 
 soon as it should cross the stream, and coma 
 down upon the enemy in the rear, so as to at- 
 tack and harass them there at the same tima 
 that Hannibal was crossing with the main body 
 of the army. If they succeeded in crossing the 
 river safely, they were to build a fire in the 
 woods, on the other side, in order that the col- 
 umn of smoke which should ascend from it 
 might serve as a signal of their success to Han- 
 nibal. 
 
 This detachment was commanded by an offi- 
 cer named Hanno of course, a very different 
 man from Hannibal's great enemy of that name 
 in Carthage Hanno set out in the night, ~AOV 
 ing baok from the river, in commencing hi* 
 march, so as to be entirely out of sight from 
 the Gauls on the other side. He had some 
 guides, belonging to the country, who promised 
 to show him a convenient place for crossing
 
 B.C.217.J PASSAGE OF THE RHONE. 81 
 
 Success of Hanno. The flfM& 
 
 The party went up the river about twenty-fire 
 miles. Here they found a place where the wa- 
 ter spread to a greater width, and where the 
 current was less rapid, and the water not BO 
 deep. They got to this place in silence and se 
 orecy, their enemies below not having suspect- 
 ed any such design. As they had, therefore, 
 nobody to oppose them, they could cross much 
 more easily than the main army below. They 
 made some rafts for carrying over those of the 
 men that could not swim, and such munitions 
 of war as would be injured by the wet. The 
 rest of the men waded till they reached the 
 channel, and then swam, supporting themselves 
 in part by their bucklers, which they placed 
 beneath their bodies in the water. Thus they 
 all crossed in safety. They paused a day, to 
 dry their clothes and to rest, and then moved 
 cautiously down the river until they were near 
 enough to Hannibal's position to allow their sig 
 nal to be seen. The fire was then built, and 
 they gazed with exultation upon the column of 
 nnoke which ascended from it high into the air 
 Hannibal saw the signal, and now immedi- 
 ately prepared to cross with his army. The 
 horsemen embarked in boats, holding their 
 horses by lines, with a view of leading them 
 14 "e
 
 82 HANNIBAL. [B.C.217 
 
 of the rivnr Scene of couftuiion 
 
 into the water so that they might swim in com- 
 pany with the boats. Other horses, bridled and 
 a-ccoutered, were put into large flat-bottomed 
 boats, to be taken across dry, in order that they 
 might be all ready for service at the instant of 
 landing. The most vigorous and efficient por- 
 tion of the army were, of course, selected for 
 the first passage, while all those who, for any 
 cause, were weak or disabled, remained behind, 
 with the stores and munitions of war, to be 
 transported afterward, when the first passage 
 should have been effected. All this time the 
 enemy, on the opposite shore, were getting their 
 ranks in array, and making every thing ready 
 for a furious assault upon the invaders the mo 
 ment they should approach the land. 
 
 There was something like silence and order 
 during the period while the men were embarking 
 and pushing out from the land, but as they ad- 
 vanced into the current, the loud commands, and 
 shouts, and outcries increased more and more, 
 and the rapidity of the current and of the eddies 
 by which the boats and rafts were hurried down 
 tht stream, or whirled against each other, soon 
 produced a terrific scene of tumult and confu- 
 sion. As soon as the first boats approached the 
 land, the Gauls assembled to oppose them rush-
 
 B.C. 217.J PASSAGE OF THE RHONE. 8? 
 
 * t tack of U anno. Flight of the Gaute 
 
 ed down upon them with showers of missiles, 
 and with those unearthly yells which barbarous 
 warriors always raise in going into battle, as a 
 means both of exciting themselves and of terri- 
 fying their enemy. Hannibal's officers urged 
 the boats on, and endeavored, with as much 
 ooolness and deliberation as possible, to effect a 
 landing. It is perhaps doubtful how the con- 
 test would have ended, had it not been for the 
 detachment under Hanno, which now came 
 suddenly intc action. While the Gauls were 
 in the height of their excitement, in attempting 
 to drive back the Carthaginians from the bank, 
 they were thunderstruck at hearing the shouts 
 and cries of an enemy behind them, and, on 
 looking around, they saw the troops of Hanno 
 pouring down upon them from the thickets 
 with terrible impetuosity and force. It is very 
 difficult for an army to fight both in front and 
 in the rear at the same time. The Gauls, after 
 a brief struggle, abandoned the attempt any 
 longer to oppose Hannibal's landing. They fled 
 down the river and back into the interior, leav- 
 ing Hanno in secure possession of the bank, 
 while Hannibal and his forces came up at theii 
 leisure out of the water, finding friends instead 
 of enemies to receive them.
 
 84 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Transportation of the elephants. Manner of doing It 
 
 The remainder of the army, together with 
 the stores and munitions of war, were next to 
 be transported, and this was accomplished with 
 little difficulty now that there was no enemy to 
 disturb their operations. There was one part 
 of the force, however, which occasioned some 
 trouble and delay. It was a body of elephants 
 which formed a part of the army. How to get 
 Jhese unwieldy animals across so broad and rap- 
 id a river was a question of no little difficulty 
 There are various accounts of the manner in 
 which Hannibal accomplished the object, from 
 which it would seem that different methods 
 were employed. One mode was as follows: 
 the keeper of the elephants selected one more 
 spirited and passionate in disposition than the 
 rest, and contrived to teaze and torment him so 
 as to make him angry. The elephant advanced 
 toward his keeper with his trunk raised to take 
 vengeance. The keeper fled ; the elephant pur- 
 sued him, the other elephants of the herd fol- 
 lowing, as is the habit of the animal on snob 
 occasions. The keeper ran into the water as 
 if to elude his pursuer, while the elephant and 
 a large part of the herd pressed on after him. 
 The man swam into the channel, and the ele- 
 phants, before they could check
 
 B.C. 217.] I ASSAGE OP THE RHONE. 83 
 
 A new plaa. Hnge reft* 
 
 Sou nd that they were beyond their depth. Some 
 swam on after the keeper, and crossed the river, 
 where they were easily secured. Others, terri 
 fied, abandoned themselves to the current, and 
 were floated down, struggling helplessly as they 
 went, until at last they grounded upon shallows 
 or points of land, whence they gained the shore 
 again, some on one side of the stream and some 
 on the other. 
 
 This plan was thus only partially successful, 
 and Hannibal devised a more effectual method 
 for the remainder of the troop. He built an 
 immensely large raft, floated it up to the shore, 
 fastened it there securely, and covered it with 
 earth, turf, and bushes, so as to make it resem- 
 ble a projection of the land. He then caused a 
 second raft to be constructed of the same size, 
 and this he brought up to the outer edge of the 
 other, fastened it there by a temporary connec- 
 tion, and covered and concealed it as he had 
 done the first. The first of these rafts extend- 
 ed two hundred feet from the shore, and was 
 fifty feet broad. The other, that is, the outer 
 one, was only a little smaller. The soldiers 
 then contrived to allure and drive the elephants 
 over these rafts to the outer one, the animals 
 imagining that tbev had not left the land The
 
 N? HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 The elephants got safely over. The reconnoitering parties 
 
 two rafts were then disconnected from each 
 other, and the outer one began to move with its 
 bulky passengers over the water, towed by a 
 number of boats which had previously been at- 
 tached to its outer edge. 
 
 As soon as the elephants perceived the mo* 
 tion, they were alarmed, and began immediate- 
 ly to look anxiously this way and that, and to 
 crowd toward the edges of the raft which was 
 conveying them away. They found themselves 
 hemmed in by water on every side, and were 
 terrified and thrown into confusion. Some 
 were crowded off into the river, and were drift- 
 ed down till they landed below. The rest soon 
 became calm, and allowed themselves to be 
 quietly ferried across the stream, when they 
 found that all hope of escape and resistance 
 were equally vain. 
 
 In the mean time, while these events were 
 occurring, the troop of three hundred, which 
 Soipio had sent up the river to see what tidings 
 he could learn of the Carthaginians, were slow 
 ly making their way toward the point where 
 Hannibal was crossing; and it happened thai 
 Hannibal had sent down a troop of five h turned, 
 when he first reached the river, to see if they 
 oould learn any tidings of the Romans. Nei
 
 PASSAGE OF THE RHONE. 89 
 
 The dtechments meet A battle etma 
 
 ther of the armies had any idea how near they 
 were to the other. The two detachments me* 
 roddenly and unexpectedly on the way. They 
 were sent to explore, and not to fight ; but as 
 they were nearly equally matched, each was 
 ambitious of the glory of capturing the others 
 and carrying them prisoners to their camp. 
 They fought a long and bloody battle. A great 
 number were killed, and in about the same 
 proportion on either side. The Romans say 
 they conquered. We do not know what the 
 Carthaginians said, but as both parties retreat- 
 ed from the field and went back to their respect- 
 ive camps, it is safe to infer that neither could 
 boast of a very decisive victory.
 
 90 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 tVe Alp*. Their sublimity and graadeoi 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 HANNIBAL CROSSES THE ALPS. 
 
 FT is difficult for any one who has not actual 
 *- ly seen such mountain scenery as is present- 
 ed by the Alps, to form any clear conception 
 of its magnificence and grandeur. Hannibal 
 had never seen the Alps, but the world was 
 filled then, as now with their fame. 
 
 Some of the leading features of sublimity and 
 grandeur which these mountains exhibit, result 
 mainly from the perpetual cold which reigns 
 upon their summits. This is owing simply to 
 their elevation. In every part of the earth, as 
 we ascend from the surface of the ground into 
 the atmosphere, it becomes, for some mysteri- 
 ous reason or other, more and more cold as we 
 rise, so that over our heads, wherever we aro> 
 there reigns, at a distance of two or three milea 
 above us, an intense and perpetual cold. Thia 
 is true not only in cool and temperate latitudes, 
 but also in the most torrid regions of the globe 
 If we were to ascend in a balloon at Borneo at 
 midday, when the burning sun of the tropics
 
 B.C.217.] CROSSING THE ALPS. 91 
 
 Perpetual cold In the upper region* of the atmospfiare. 
 
 was directly over our heads, to an elevation of 
 five or six miles, we should find that although 
 wo had been moving nearer to the sun all the 
 time, its rays would have lost, gradually, all 
 kheir power. They would fall upon us as bright- 
 ly as ever, but their heat would be gone. They 
 would feel like moonbeams, and we should bo 
 surrounded with an atmosphere as frosty as that 
 of the icebergs of the frigid zone. 
 
 It is from this region of perpetual cold that 
 hail-stones descend upon us in the midst of sum- 
 mer, and snow is continually forming and falling 
 there ; but the light and fleecy flakes melt be- 
 fore they reach the earth, so that, while the hail 
 has such solidity and momentum that it forces 
 its way through, the snow dissolves, and falls 
 upon us as a cool and refreshing rain. Rain 
 cools the air around us and the ground, because 
 it comes from cooler regions of the air above. 
 
 Now it happens that not only the summits, 
 but extensive portions of the upper declivities of 
 the Alps, rise into the region of perpetual win* 
 ter. Of course, ice congeals continually there, 
 and the snow which forms falls to the ground 
 as snow, and accumulates in vast and perma- 
 nent stores. The summit of Mount Blanc it 
 covered with a bed of snow of enormous thick-
 
 92 HANNIBAL. [B.C.21> 
 
 Their terrible fore* 
 
 ness, which is almost as much a permanent ge- 
 ological stratum of the mountain as the granite 
 which lies beneath it. 
 
 Of course, during the winter months, the 
 whole country of the Alps, valley as well as 
 oil, is covered with snow. In the spring the 
 snow melts in the valleys and plains, and high- 
 er up it becomes damp and heavy with partial 
 melting, and slides down the declivities in vast 
 avalanches, which sometimes are of such enor- 
 mous magnitude, and descend with such resist- 
 less force, as to bring down earth, rocks, and 
 even the trees of the forest in their train. On 
 the higher declivities, however, and over all the 
 rounded summits, the snow still clings to it* 
 place, yielding but very little to the feeble beams 
 of the sun, even in July. 
 
 There are vast ravines and valleys among the 
 higher Alps where the snow accumulates, being 
 driven into them by winds and storms in the 
 winter, and sliding into them, in great avalanoh 
 as, in the spring. These vast depositories of 
 now become changed into ice below the sur- 
 face; for at the surface there is a continual 
 melting, and the water, flowing down througl 
 the mass, freezes below. Thus there are val 
 leys, or rather ravine*, some of them two
 
 B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS. 93 
 
 rhe glacier*. Motion of the to* 
 
 three miles wide and ten or fifteen miles long, 
 filled with ice, transparent, solid, and blue, hun- 
 dreds of feet in depth. They are called glacier*. 
 And what is most astonishing in respect to these 
 icy accumulations is that, though the ice is per- 
 fectly compact and solid, the whole mass is found 
 to be continually in a state of slow motion down 
 the valley in which it lies, at the rate of about 
 a foot in twenty-four hours. By standing upon 
 the surface and listening attentively, we hear, 
 from time to tune, a grinding sound. The rocks 
 which lie along the sides are pulverized, and are 
 continually moving against each other and fall- 
 ing ; and then, besides, which is a more direct and 
 positive proof still of the motion of the mass, a 
 mark may be set up upon the ice, as has been 
 often done, and marks corresponding to it made 
 upon the solid rocks on each side of the valley, 
 and by this means the fact of the motion, and 
 the exact rate of it, may be fully ascertained. 
 
 Thus these valleys are really and literally 
 rivers of ice, rising among the summits of the 
 mountains, and flowing, slowly it is true, but 
 with a continuous and certain current, to a sort 
 of mouth in some great and open valley below. 
 Here the streams which have flowed over the 
 surface above, and descended into the maw
 
 94 HANNIBAL. [B.C.217 
 
 Crevice* and chasms. Situation of the Alps 
 
 through countless crevices and chasms, into 
 which the traveler looks down with terror, con- 
 centrate and issue from under the ice in a tur- 
 bid torrent, which comes out from a vast arch- 
 way made by the falling in of masses which tha 
 water has undermined. This lower end of the 
 glacier sometimes presents a perpendicular wall 
 hundreds of feet in height ; sometimes it crowds 
 down into the fertile valley, advancing in some 
 unusually cold summer into the cultivated coun- 
 try, where, as it slowly moves on, it plows up 
 the ground, carries away the orchards and fields, 
 and even drives the inhabitants from the villa- 
 ges which it threatens. If the next summer 
 proves warm, the terrible monster slowly draws 
 back its frigid head, and the inhabitants return 
 to the ground it reluctantly evacuates, and at- 
 tempt to repair the damage it has done. 
 
 The Alps lie between France and Italy, and 
 the great valleys and the ranges of mountain 
 land lie in such a direction that they must be 
 crossed in order tc pass from one country to the 
 ether. These ranges are, however, not regular 
 They are traversed by innumerable chasms, 
 fissures, and ravines; in some places they rise 
 hi vast rounded summits and swells, covered 
 with fields of spotbss snow; in others they
 
 B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS. 95 
 
 Romd over the Alp*. Sublime Meaer/ 
 
 tower in lofty, needle-like peaks, which even 
 the chamois can not scale, and where scarcely 
 a flake of snow can find a place of rest. Around 
 and among these peaks and summits, and 
 through these frightful denies and chasms, the 
 roads twist and turn, in a zigzag and constant- 
 ly ascending course, creeping along the most 
 frightful precipices, sometimes beneath them 
 and sometimes on the brink, penetrating the 
 darkest and gloomiest defiles, skirting the most 
 impetuous and foaming torrents, and at last, 
 perhaps, emerging upon the surface of a glacier, 
 to be lost in interminable fields of ice and snow, 
 where countless brooks run in glassy channels, 
 and crevasses yawn, ready to take advantage 
 of any slip which may enable them to take down 
 the traveler into their bottomless abysses. 
 
 And yet, notwithstanding the awful desola- 
 tion which reigns in the upper regions of the 
 \lps, the lower valleys, through which the 
 streams finally meander out into the open plains, 
 and by which the traveler gains access to the 
 rablimer scenes of the upper mountains, are in- 
 expressibly verdant and beautiful. They are 
 fertilized by the deposits of continual inunda- 
 tions in the early spring, and the sun beats 
 down into them with a genial warmth in sum-
 
 96 ANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Beanty of the Alpine scenery. Plcturecque tccnerj 
 
 mer, which brings out millions of flowers, of the 
 most beautiful forms and colors, and ripens rap- 
 idly the broadest and richest fields of grain 
 Cottages, of every picturesque and beautiful 
 form, tenanted by the cultivators, the shepherds 
 and the herdsmen, crown every little swell in 
 the bottom of the valley, and cling to the decliv- 
 ities of the mountains which rise on either hand. 
 Above them eternal forests of firs and pines 
 wave, feathering over the steepest and most 
 rocky slopes with their somber foliage. 8tiT 
 higher, gray precipices rise and spires and pin- 
 naoles, far grander and more picturesque, if not 
 so symmetrically formed, than those construct- 
 ed by man. Between these there is seen, here 
 and there, in the background, vast towering 
 masses of white and dazzling snow, which crown 
 the summits of the loftier mountains beyond. 
 
 Hannibal's determination to carry an army 
 Into Italy by way of the Alps, instead of trans- 
 porting them by galleys over the sea, has al- 
 ways been regarded as one of the greatest un- 
 dertakings of ancient tunes. He hesitated for 
 some time whether he should go down the 
 Rhone, and meet and give battle to Soipio, or 
 whether he should leave the Roman army to its 
 oonrse, anrl proceed himself directly toward tha
 
 B.C. 217.] CROSSING THB ALPS. 07 
 
 Hannibal determine* to CTOM the Alp*. HU army follow* 
 
 Alps and Italy. The officers and soldiers of 
 the army, who had now learned something of 
 their destination and of their leader's plans, 
 wanted to go and meet the Romans. They 
 dreaded the Alps. They were willing to en- 
 zounter a military foe, however formidable, for 
 this was a danger that they were accustomed 
 to and could understand; but their imagina- 
 tions were appalled at the novel and awful im- 
 ages they formed of falling clown precipice* of 
 ragged rocks, or of gradually freezing, and be- 
 ing buried half alive, during the process, in eter 
 nal snows. 
 
 Hannibal, when he found that his soldiers 
 were afraid to proceed, called the leading por- 
 tions of his army together, and made them an 
 address. He remonstrated with them for yield- 
 ing now to unworthy fears, after having suc- 
 cessfully met and triumphed over such dangers 
 as they had already incurred. " You have sm 
 mounted the Pyrenees," said he, "you have 
 crossed the Rhone. You are now actually in 
 tight of the Alps, which are the very gates of 
 access to the country of the enemy. What do 
 you conceive the Alps to be ? They are noth 
 ing but high mountains, after alL Suppose 
 they ire higher than tho Pyrenees, they do not 
 
 l4r-7
 
 08 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Hannibal's speech to his winy. IU effecU 
 
 reach to the skies ; and, since they do not, they 
 can not be insurmountable. They are sur- 
 mounted, in fact, every day ; they are even in- 
 habited and cultivated, and travelers continv.al- 
 ly pass over them to and fro. And what a sin- 
 gle man can do> an army can do, for an army 
 is only a large number of single men. In fao^ 
 to a soldier, who has nothing to carry with him 
 but the implements of war, no way can be too 
 difficult to be surmounted by courage and en- 
 ergy." 
 
 After finishing his speech, Hannibal, finding 
 his men reanimated and encouraged by what 
 he had said, ordered them to go to their tents 
 and refresh themselves, and prepare to march on 
 the following day. They made no further op- 
 position to going on. Hannibal did not, how- 
 ever, proceed at once directly toward the Alps. 
 He did not know what the plans of Scipio might 
 be, who, it will be recollected, was below him, 
 on the Rhone, with the Roman army. He did 
 not wish to waste his time and his strength in 
 a contest with Scipio in Gaul, but to press on 
 and get across the Alps into Italy as soon as 
 possible. And so, fearing lest Scipio should 
 strike across the country, and intercept him if 
 he should attempt to go by the most direct
 
 B.C 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS. 99 
 
 Scipio moves after Hannibal. Sad regtige*. 
 
 route, he determined to move northwardly, up 
 the River Rhone, till he should get well into 
 the interior, with a view of reaching the Alps 
 ultimately by a more circuitous journey. 
 
 It was, in fact, the plan of Scipio to come up 
 with Hannibal and attack him as soon as possi- 
 ble ; and, accordingly, as soon as his horsemen, or, 
 rather, those who were left alive after the battle, 
 had returned and informed him that HanmbaJ 
 and his army were near, he put his camp in i no- 
 tion and moved rapidly up the river. He armed 
 at the place where the Carthaginians had crossed 
 a few days after they had gone. The spot was 
 in a terrible state of ruin and confusion. The 
 grass and herbage were trampled down foi the 
 circuit of a mile, and all over the space wore 
 spots of black and smouldering remains, whera 
 the camp-fires had been kindled. The tops and 
 branches of trees lay every where around, their 
 leaves withering in the sun, and the groves and 
 forests were encumbered with limbs, and reject- 
 ed trunks, and trees felled and left where thej 
 lay. The shore was lined far down the stream 
 with ruins of boats and rafts, with weapona 
 which had been lost or abandoned, and with tha 
 bodies of those who had been drowned in the 
 passage, or killed in the contest on the shora
 
 100 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 
 
 Perplexity of Scipto He nil* back to Italy. 
 
 These and numerous other vestiges remained, 
 but. the army was gone. 
 
 There were, however, upon the ground 
 groups of natives and other visitors, who had 
 oome to look at the spot now destined to become 
 so memorable in history. From these men 
 Soipio learned when and where Hannibal had 
 gone. He decided that it \ms useless to at- 
 tempt to pursue him. He was greatly perplex- 
 ed to know what to do. In the casting of lots, 
 Spain had fallen to him, but now that the great 
 enemy whom he had come forth to meet had 
 Jeft Spain altogether, his only hope of intercept- 
 ing his progress was to sail back into Italy, and 
 meet him as he came down from the Alps into 
 the great valley of the Po. Still, as Spain had 
 been assigned to him as his province, he could 
 not well entirely abandon it. He accordingly 
 sent forward the largest part of his army into 
 Spain, to attack the forces that Hannibal had 
 left there, while he himself, with a smaller 
 force, went down to the sea-shore and sa'led 
 back to Italy again. He expected to find Ro- 
 man forces in the valley of the Po, with which 
 he hoped to be strong enough to meet Hanoi, 
 bal as he descended from the mountains, if he 
 should succeed in effecting a passage over them
 
 B.C.217J CROSSINO THE ALPS. 101 
 
 Hannibal approaches the Alp*. A dangerous defile, 
 
 In the mean time Hannibal went en, draw- 
 ing nearer and nearer to the ranges of snowy 
 summits which his soldiers had seen for many 
 days in their eastern horizon. These range* 
 were very resplendent and grand when the sun 
 went down in the west, for then it shone di- 
 rectly upon them. As the army approached 
 nearer and nearer to them, they gradually with- 
 drew from sight and disappeared, being con- 
 cealed by intervening summits less lofty, but 
 nearer. As the soldiers went on, however, and 
 began to penetrate the valleys, and draw near 
 to the awful chasms and precipices among the 
 mountains, and saw the turbid torrents descend- 
 ing from them, their fears revived. It was, how- 
 ever, now too late to retreat. They pressed for- 
 ward, ascending continually, till their road grew 
 extremely precipitous and insecure, threading 
 its way through almost impassable defiles, with 
 rugged cliffs overhanging them, and snowy sum- 
 mits towering all around. 
 
 At last they came to a narrow defile through 
 which they must necessarily pass, but which 
 was guarded by large bodies of armed men as- 
 sembled on the rocks and precipices above, ready 
 to hurl stones and weapons of every kind upor 
 them if they should attempt to pass through
 
 102 HANNIBAL. [B.C.217 
 
 The army encamps. The nu untainaen 
 
 The army halted. Hannibal ordered them to 
 encamp where they were, until he could consid- 
 er what to do. In the course of the day he 
 learned that the mountaineers did not remain 
 at their elevated posts during the night, on ac- 
 count of the intense cold and exposure, know- 
 ing, too, that it would be impossible for an army 
 to traverse such a pass as they were attempt- 
 ing to guard without daylight to guide them, 
 for the road, or rather pathway, which passes 
 through these defiles, follows generally the course 
 of a mountain torrent, which flows through a 
 succession of frightful ravines and chasms, and 
 often passes along on a shelf or projection of the 
 rook, hundreds and sometimes thousands of feet 
 from the bed of the stream, which foams and 
 roars far below. There could, of course, be no 
 hope of passing safely by such a route without 
 the light of day. 
 
 The mountaineers, therefore, knowing that it 
 was not necessary to guard the pass at night- 
 its own terrible danger being then a sufficient pro- 
 tection were accustomed to disperse in the even- 
 ing, and descend to regions where they could find 
 shelter and repose, and to return and renew their 
 watch in the morning. When Hannibal learned 
 this, he determined to anticipate them in getting
 
 B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS. 103 
 
 Hannibal's ctratagem. Itt racceM. 
 
 ap upon the rocks the next day, and, in order to 
 prevent their entertaining any suspicion of hi 
 design^ he pretended to be making ail the ar 
 rangements for encamping for the night on the 
 ground he had taken. He accordingly pitched 
 more tents, and built, toward evening, a great 
 many fires, and he began some preparations in- 
 dicating that it was his intention the next day 
 to force his way through the pass. He moved 
 forward a strong detachment up to a point near 
 the entrance to the pass, and put them in a for- 
 tified position there, as if to have them all ready 
 to advance when the proper time should arriv.i 
 on the following day. 
 
 The mountaineers, seeing all these prepara- 
 tions going on, looked forward to a conflict on 
 the morrow, and, during the night, left their 
 positions as usual, to descend to places of shel- 
 ter. The next morning, however, when they 
 began, at an early hour, to ascend to them again, 
 they were astonished to find all the lofty rocks, 
 and cliffs, and shelving projections which over- 
 hung the pass, covered with Carthaginians. 
 Hannibal had aroused a strong body of his men 
 at the earliest dawn, and led them up, by steep 
 climbing, to the places which the mountaineers 
 nad Jeft, so as to be there before them. The
 
 104 HANNIBAL. [B.C.217 
 
 Astonishment of the mountaineers. Terrible conflict In the defile 
 
 mountaineers paused, astonished, at this spec- 
 tacle, and their disappointment and rage were 
 much increased on looking down into the val 
 ley below, and seeing there the remainder of 
 the Carthaginian army quietly moving through 
 the pass in a long train, safe apparently from 
 any molestation, since friends, and not enemies, 
 were now in possession of the cliffs above. 
 
 The mountaineers could not restrain their 
 feelings of vexation and anger, but immediately 
 rushed down the declivities which they had in 
 part ascended, and attacked the army in the de- 
 file. An awful scene of struggle and confusion 
 ensued. Some were killed by weapons or by 
 rooks rolled down upon them. Others, contend- 
 ing together, and struggli g desperately in pla- 
 ces of very narrow foothold, tumbled headlong 
 down the rugged rocks into the torrent below ; 
 and horses, laden with baggage and stores, be- 
 came frightened and unmanageable, and crowd- 
 ed each 3ther over the most frightful precipices. 
 Hannibal, who was above, on the higher rocks, 
 looked down upon this scene for a time with 
 the greatest anxiety and terror. He did not 
 dare to descend himself and mingle in the affray, 
 for fear of increasing the confusion. He soon 
 found, however, that it was absolutely necessa
 
 B.C. 2]?.] CROSSING THE ALPS. 105 
 
 Attack of Hannibal. The miruntaineert defeated. 
 
 ry for him to interpose, and he came down aa 
 rapidly as possible, his detaohment with him. 
 They descended by oblique and zigzag paths.; 
 wherever they could get footing among the rooks, 
 and attacked the mountaineers with great fury 
 The result was, as he had feared, a great in- 
 crease at first of the confusion and the slaugh- 
 ter. The horses were more and more terrified 
 by the fresh energy of the combat, and by the 
 resounding of louder shouts and cries, which 
 were made doubly terrific by the echoes and 
 reverberations of the mountains. They crowd- 
 ed against each other, and fell, horses and men 
 together, in masses, over the cliffs to the rugged 
 rooks below, where they lay in confusion, some 
 dead, and others dying, writhing helplessly in 
 agony, or vainly endeavoring to crawl away. 
 
 The mountaineers were, however, conquered 
 and driven away at last, and the pass was left 
 clear. The Carthaginian column was restored 
 to order. The horses that had not fallen weib 
 calmed and quieted. The baggage which had 
 been thrown down was gathered up, and the 
 wounded men were placed on litters, rudely con- 
 tracted DU the spot, that they might be borne 
 on to a place of safety. In a short time all were 
 ready to move on, and the march was accord
 
 106 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Hie army pause* to refresh. Scarcity of food 
 
 ingly recommenced. There was no further dif- 
 ficulty. The column advanced in a quiet and 
 orderly manner until they had passed the defile. 
 At the extremity of it they came to a spacious 
 fort belonging to the natives. Hannibal took 
 possession of this fort, and paused for a little 
 time there to rest and refresh his men. 
 
 One of the greatest difficulties encountered 
 by a general in conducting an army through 
 difficult and dangerous roads, is that of provid- 
 ing food for them. An army can transport its 
 own food only a very little way. Men travel- 
 ing over smooth roads can only carry provisions 
 for a few days, and where the roads are as dif- 
 ficult and dangerous as the passes of the Alps, 
 they can scarcely carry any. The commander 
 must, accordingly, find subsistence in the coun- 
 try through which he is marching. Hannibal 
 had, therefore, now not only to look out for the 
 safety of his men, but their food was exhausted, 
 and fee must take immediate measures to secure 
 * supply. 
 
 The lower slopes of lofty mountains afford 
 usually abundant sustenance for flocks and 
 herds. The showers which are continually fall- 
 ing there, and the moisture which comes down 
 the sides of the mountains through the ground
 
 JB.C.217.] CROSSING THE ALPS. 107 
 
 Herds and flock* upon the mountains. Foraging parties 
 
 keep the turf perpetually green, and sheep and 
 cattle love to pasture upon it; they climb to 
 great heights, finding the herbage finer and 
 sweeter the higher they go. Thus the inhab- 
 itants of mountain ranges are almost alwayi 
 shepherds and herdsmen. Grain can be raised 
 in the valleys below, but the slopes of the mount- 
 ains, though they produce grass to perfection, 
 are too steep to be tilled. 
 
 As soon as Hannibal had got established in 
 the fort, he sent around small bodies of men to 
 seize and drive in all the cattle and sheep that 
 they could find. These men were, of course, 
 armed, in order that they might be prepared to 
 meet any resistance which they might encoun- 
 ter. The mountaineers, however, did not at' 
 tempt to resist them. They felt that they were 
 conquered, and they were accordingly disheart 
 enod and discouraged. The only mode of saving 
 their cattle which was left to them, was to drive 
 them as fast as they could into concealed and 
 inaccessible places. They attempted to do this, 
 and while Hannibal's parties were ranging up 
 the valleys all around them, examining every 
 field, and barn, and sheepfold that they could 
 find, the wretched and despairing inhabitants 
 Were flying in all directions, driving the cow*
 
 108 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Collecting cattle. ProgreM of the army 
 
 and sheep, on which their whole hope of sub- 
 sistence depended, into the fastnesses of the 
 mountains. They urged them into wild thick 
 sts, and dark ravines and chasms, and over dan 
 gerous glaciers, and up the steepest ascente t 
 wherever there was the readiest prospect of get- 
 ting them out of the plunderer's way. 
 
 These attempts, however, to save their little 
 property were but very partially successful 
 Hannibal's marauding parties kept coming 
 home, one after another, with droves of sheep 
 and -cattle before them, some larger and some 
 mailer, but making up a vast amount in alL 
 Hannibal subsisted his men three days on the 
 food thus procured for them. It requires an 
 enormous store to feed ninety or a hundred 
 thousand men, even for three days ; besides, in 
 all such cases as this, an army always waste 
 and destroy far more than they really consume. 
 
 During these three days the army was not 
 tationary, but was moving slowly on. The 
 way, though still difficult and dangerous, was 
 at least open before them, as there was now no 
 enemy to dispute their passage. So they went 
 on, rioting upon the abundant supplies they had 
 obtained, and rejoicing 'in the double victory 
 they were gaining, over the hostility of the poo-
 
 B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS. 109 
 
 Canton*. An ecabuoga 
 
 pie and the physical dangers and difficulties of 
 the way. The poor mountaineers returned to 
 their cabins ruined and desolate, for mountain- 
 aers who have lost their cows and their sheep 
 have lost their all. 
 
 The Alps are not all in Switzerland. Some 
 of the most celebrated peaks and ranges are in 
 a neighboring state called Savoy. The whole 
 country is, in fact, divided into small states, 
 called cantons at the present day, and similar 
 political divisions seem to have existed in the 
 time of the Romans. In his march onward 
 from the pass which has been already described, 
 Hannibal, accordingly, soon approached the 
 confines of another canton. As he was advanc- 
 ing slowly into it, with the long train of his 
 army winding up with him through the valleys, 
 he was met at the borders of this new state b^, 
 an embassage sent from the government of it. 
 They brought with them fresh stores of provis- 
 ions, and a number of guides. They said that 
 they had heard of the terrible destruction which 
 had come upon the other canton in consequence 
 of their effort to oppose his progress, and that 
 they had no intention of renewing so vain an at- 
 tempt They came, therefore, they said, to of* 
 for Hannibal their friendship and their aid
 
 110 HANNIBAL [B.C. 217 
 
 Hannibal suspicion* 
 
 They had brought guides to show the army the 
 best way over the mountains, and a present of 
 provisions ; and to prove the sincerity of their 
 professions they offered Hannibal hostages. 
 These hostages were young men and boys, the 
 sons of the principal inhabitants, whom they 
 offered to deliver into Hannibal's power, to be 
 Kept by him until he should see that they were 
 faithful and true in doing what they offered. 
 
 Hannibal was so accustomed to stratagem 
 and treachery himself, that he was at first very 
 much at a loss to decide whether these offers 
 and professions were honest and sincere, or 
 whether they were only made to put him off his 
 guard. He thought it possible that it was their 
 design to induce him to place himself under their 
 direction, so that they might lead him into some 
 dangerous defile or labyrinth of rocks, from which 
 he could not extricate himself, and where they 
 oould attack and destroy him. He, however, do- 
 rided to return them a favorable answer, but tc. 
 watoh them very carefully, and to proceed un- 
 der their guidance with the utmost caution and 
 oare He accepted of the provisions they of. 
 fered, and took the hostages. These last he de- 
 livered into the custody of a body of his soldiers 
 and they marched on with the rest of tha armv
 
 flC.217.] CROSSING inn ALPS. 113 
 
 rreachery of the moonttlneen. They attack uiiiw 
 
 Then, directing the new guides to lead the way, 
 the army moved on after them. The elephants 
 went first, with a moderate force for their proteo* 
 tion preceding and accompanying them. Then 
 came long trains of horses and mules, loaded 
 with military stores and baggage, and finally 
 the foot soldieys followed, marching irregularly 
 in a long column. The whole train must have 
 extended many miles, and must have appeared 
 from any of the eminences around like an 
 enormous serpent, winding its way tortuously 
 through the wild and desolate valleys. 
 
 Hannibal was right in his suspicions The 
 embassage was a stratagem. The men who 
 sent it had laid an ambuscade in a very narrow 
 pass, concealing their forces in thickets and in 
 chasms, and in nooks and corners among the 
 rugged rooks, and when the guides had led the 
 army well into the danger, a sudden signal was 
 given, and these concealed enemies rushed dowa 
 upon them in great numbers, breaking into their 
 ranks, and renewing the scene of terrible uproar, 
 tumult, and destruction which had been wit 
 nessed in the other defile. One would hare 
 thought that the elephants, being so unwieldy 
 and so helpless in such a scene, would have beea 
 
 the first objects of attack. But it was not x 
 
 148
 
 114 HANNIBAL. t B.C.217 
 
 Fbe elephants. Hannlbal'i army divided. 
 
 The mountaineers were afraid of them. They 
 had never seen such animals before, and they 
 felt for them a mysterious awe, not knowing 
 what terrible powers such enormous beasts might 
 be expected to wield. They kept away frcm 
 them, therefore, and from the horsemen, and 
 poured down upon the head of the column of 
 foot soldiers which followed in the rear. 
 
 They were quite successful at the first onset. 
 They broke through the head of the column, 
 and drove the rest back. The horses and ele- 
 phants, in the mean time, moved forward, bear- 
 ing the baggage with them, so that the two por- 
 tions of the army were soon entirely separated. 
 Hannibal was behind, with the soldiers. The 
 mountaineers made good their position, and, as 
 night came on, the contest ceased, for in such 
 wilds as these no one can move at all, except 
 with the light of day. The mountaineers, how- 
 ever, remained in their place, dividing the army, 
 and Hannibal continued, during the night, in a 
 state of great suspense and anxiety, with th 
 elephants and the baggage separated from him 
 and apparently at the mercy of the enemy. 
 
 During the night he made vigorous prepara- 
 tions for attacking the mountaineers the nexl 
 day As so n as th morning light appeared,
 
 B.C.217.] CROSSING THE ALPS. 115 
 
 Hannibal's attack on the mountaineer*. They embarrau hit march. 
 
 he made the attack, and he succeeded in driving 
 the enemy away, so far, at least, as to allow 
 him to get his army together again. He then 
 began once more to move on. The mountain- 
 eers, however, hovered about his way, and did 
 aL they could to molest and embarrass his 
 march. They concealed themselves in ambus- 
 cades, and attacked the Carthaginians as they 
 passed. They rolled stones down upon them, 
 or discharged spears and arrows from eminen- 
 ces above ; and if any of Hannibal's army be- 
 came, from any reason, detached from the rest, 
 they would cut off their retreat, and then take 
 them prisoners or destroy them. Thus they 
 gave Hannibal a great deal of trouble. The} 
 harassed his march continually, without pre- 
 senting at any point a force which he could 
 meet and encounter in battle. Of course, Han- 
 nibal could no longer trust to his guides, and he 
 was obliged to make his way as he best could, 
 sometimes right, but often wrong, and exposed 
 to a thousand difficulties and dangers, which 
 those acquainted with the country might have 
 easily avoided. All this time the mountaineers 
 were continually attacking him, in bands like 
 those of robbers, sometimes in the van, and some- 
 times in the rear, wherever the nature of the
 
 116 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217. 
 
 Hannibal's indomitable perseverance. He encampa 
 
 ground or the circumstances of the inarching 
 army afforded them an opportunity. 
 
 Hannibal persevered, however, through all 
 these discouragements, protecting his men as 
 far as it was in his power, but pressing earn- 
 estly on, until in nine days he reached the sum- 
 mit. By the summit, however, is not meant 
 the summit of the mountains, but the summit 
 of the pass, that is, the highest point which it 
 was necessary for him to attain in going over. 
 In all mountain ranges there are depressions, 
 which are in Switzerland called necks,* and the 
 pathways and roads over the ranges lie always 
 in these. In America, such a depression in a 
 ridge of land, if well marked and decided, is 
 called a notch. Hannibal attained the highest 
 point of the col, by which he was to pass over, 
 in nine days after the great battle. There 
 were, however, of course, lofty peaks and sum- 
 mits towering still far above him. 
 
 He encamped here two days to rest and re- 
 fresh his men. The enemy no longer molested 
 him. In fact, parties were continually coming 
 into the camp, of men and horses, that had got 
 lost, or had been left in the valleys below. 
 
 * The French word is col. Thus, there is the Col de Balme, 
 the Col de G6ant, &c.
 
 B.C. 217.J CROSSING THE ALPS. 117 
 
 Return of straggling parties. Dreary I eenery of th commit 
 
 They came in slowly, some wounded, othen 
 exhausted and spent by fatigue and exposure. 
 In some cases horses came in alone. They were 
 horses that had slipped or stumbled, and falle'i 
 among the rocks, or had sunk down exhausted 
 by their toil, and had thus been left behind, and 
 afterward; recovering their strength, had fol- 
 lowed on, led by a strange instinct to keep to 
 the tracks which their companions had made, 
 and thus they rejoined the camp at last in safety 
 In fact, one great reason for Hannibal's de- 
 lay at his encampment on or near the summit 
 of the pass, was to afford time for all the miss- 
 ing men to join the army again, that had the 
 power to do so. Had it not been for this ne- 
 cessity, he would doubtless have descended some 
 distance, at least, to a more warm and sheltered 
 position before seeking repose. A more gloomy 
 and desolate resting-place than the summit of 
 an Alpine pass can scarcely be found. The 
 bare and barren rocks are entirely destitute of 
 vegetation, and they have lost, besides, the sub- 
 lime and picturesque forms which they assume 
 further below. They spread in vast, naked 
 fields in every direction around the spectator, 
 rising in gentle ascents, bleak and dreary, the 
 surface whitened as if bleached by the perpet*
 
 118 HANNIBAL. [B.C.217 
 
 Btonni In the mountains. A dreary encampment 
 
 nal rains. Storms are, in fact, almost perpet- 
 ual in these elevated regions. The vast cloud 
 which, to the eye of the shepherd in the valley 
 below, seems only a fleecy cap, resting serenely 
 npon the summit, or slowly floating along the 
 iides, is really a driving mist, or cold and stormy 
 rain, howling dismally over interminable fields 
 of broken rocks, as if angry that it can make 
 nothing grow upon them, with all its watering 
 Thus there are seldom distant views to be ob- 
 tained, and every thing near presents a scene 
 of simple dreariness and desolation. 
 
 Hannibal's soldiers thus found themselves in 
 the midst of a dismal scene in their lofty en- 
 campment. There is one special source of dan- 
 ger, too, in such places as this, which the low- 
 er portions of the mountains are less exposed to, 
 and that is the entire obliteration of the path- 
 way by falls of snow. It seems almost absurd 
 to speak of pathway in such regions, where 
 there is no turf to be worn, and the boundlwn 
 fields of rocks, ragged and hard, will take no 
 trace of footsteps. There are, however, gener- 
 ally some faint traces of way, and wheie these 
 fail entirely the track is sometimes indicated by 
 small piles of stones, placed at intervals along 
 the line of route. An unpracticed eye would
 
 B.C.217.] CROSSING THE ALPS. 119 
 
 A mow storm 
 
 scarcely distinguish these little landmarks, in 
 many cases, from accidental heaps of stoL.es 
 which lie every where around. They, howev- 
 er, render a very essential service to the guides 
 %nd to the mountaineers, who have been accus- 
 tomed to conduct their steps by similar aids in 
 other portions of the mountains. 
 
 But when snow begins to fall, all these and 
 every other possible means of distinguishing the 
 way are soon entirely obliterated. The whole 
 surface of the ground, or, rather, of the rocks, 
 is covered, and all landmarks disappear. The 
 little monuments become nothing but slight in- 
 equalities in the surface of the snow, undistin- 
 guishable from a thousand others. The air is 
 thick and murky, and shuts off alike all distant 
 prospects, and the shape and conformation of 
 the land that is near ; the bewildered traveler 
 has not even the stars to guide him, as there is 
 nothing but dark, falling flakes, descending from 
 an impenetrable canopy of stormy clouds, to be 
 seen in the sky. 
 
 Hannibal encountered a snow storm while on 
 the summit of the pass, and his army were very 
 much terrified by it. It was now November. 
 The army had met with so many detentions 
 and delays that their ionrjev had been protract-
 
 120 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 The army resumes iu march. Hannibal among the pioneers 
 
 ed to a late period. It would be unsafe to at- 
 tempt to wait till this snow should melt again. 
 As soon, therefore, as the storm ended, and the 
 ol >uds cleared away, so as to allow the men to 
 *ee the general features of the country around, 
 the camp was broken up and the army put in 
 motion. The soldiers marched through the snow 
 with great anxiety and fear. Men went be- 
 fore to explore the way, and to guide the rest 
 by flags and banners which they bore. Those 
 who went first made paths, of course, for those 
 who followed behind, as the snow was tram 
 pled down by their footsteps. Notwithstanding 
 these aids, however, the army moved on very 
 laboriously and with much fear. 
 
 At length, however, after descending a short 
 distance, Hannibal, perceiving that they must 
 soon come in sight of the Italian valleys and 
 plains which lay beyond the Alps, went forward 
 among the pioneers, who had charge of the ban- 
 ners by which the movements of the army were 
 directed, and, as soon as the open country be- 
 gan to come into view, he selected a spot where 
 f 1 3 widest prospect was presented, and i ml tod 
 ' - army there to let them take a view of the 
 -Dutiful country which now lay before them, 
 e Alps are very precipitous on the Italian
 
 B.C.fci?.] CROSSING THE ALPS. 121 
 
 ( irrt right of Italy. Joy of the army. Hannibal' ipek 
 
 side. The descent is very sudden, from the cold 
 and ioy summits, to a broad expanse of the most 
 ItLxoriant and sunny plains. Upon these nlains, 
 arhioh were spread out in a most enct anting 
 landscape at their feet, Hannibal and his sol- 
 liers now looked down with exultation and de- 
 light. Beautiful lakes, studded with still more 
 beautiful islands, reflected the beams of the sun. 
 An endless succession of fields, in sober autum- 
 nal colors, with the cottages of the laborers and 
 stacks of grain scattered here and there upon 
 them, and rivers meandering through verdant 
 meadows, gave variety and enchantment to the 
 view. 
 
 Hannibal made an address to his officers and 
 men, congratulating them on having arrived, at 
 last, so near to a successful termination of their 
 toils. " The difficulties of the way," he said, 
 "are at last surmounted, and these mighty bar- 
 riers that we have scaled are the walls, not only 
 of Italy, but of Rome itself. Since we have 
 jcassed the Alps, the Romans will have no pro- 
 tection against us remaining. It is only one 
 battle, when we get down upon the plains, or 
 at most two, and the great city itself will be 
 entirely at our disposal." 
 
 The whole army were much animated and
 
 122 HANNIBAL. |B.C. 217 
 
 fatiguei of the march. New di fflcultiw 
 
 encouraged, both by the prospect which present- 
 ed itself to their view, and by the words of Han- 
 nibal, They prepared for the descent, antici- 
 pating little difficulty ; but they found, on re- 
 omimenoing their march, that their troubles 
 ffere by no means over. The mountains are 
 far steeper on the Italian side than on the other, 
 and it was extremely difficult to find paths by 
 which the elephants and the horses, and even 
 the men, could safely descend. They moved on 
 for some time with great labor and fatigue, un- 
 til, at length, Hannibal, looking on before, found 
 that the head of the column had stopped, and 
 the whole train behind was soon jammed to- 
 gether, the ranks halting along the way in suc- 
 cession, as they found their path blocked up by 
 the halting of those before them. 
 
 Hannibal sent forward to ascertain the cause 
 of the difficulty, and found that the van of the 
 army had reached a precipice down which it 
 was impossible to descend. It was necessary 
 to make a circuit in hopes of finding some prac- 
 ticable way of getting down. The guides and 
 pioneers went on, leading the army after them, 
 and soon got upon a glacier which lay in theii 
 ra) There was fresh snow upon the surface, 
 covering the ice and concealing the crevasse*,
 
 BC.217.] CROSSING THE ALPS. 123 
 
 March over the glacier. A formidable burin 
 
 as they are termed that is, the great cracks 
 and fissures which extend in the glaciers down 
 through the body of the ice. The army moved 
 on, trampling down the new snow, and making 
 At first a good road- way by their footsteps ; but 
 very soon the old ice and snow began to be 
 trampled up by the hoofs of the horses and the 
 heavy tread of such vast multitudes of armed 
 men. It softened to a great depth, and made 
 the work of toiling through it an enormous la- 
 bor. Besides, the surface of the ice and snow 
 sloped steeply, and the men and beasts were 
 continually falling or sliding down, and getting 
 swallowed up in avalanches which their own 
 weight set in motion, or in concealed crevasses 
 where they sank to rise no more. 
 
 They, however, made some progress, though 
 slowly, and with great danger. They at last 
 got below the region of the snow, but here they 
 encountered new difficulties in the abruptness 
 and ruggedness of the rocks, and in the zigzag 
 and tortuous direction of the way. At last they 
 came to a spot where their further progress ap- 
 peared to be entirely out off by a large mass of 
 rock, which it seemed necessary to remove in 
 order to widen the passage sufficiently to allow 
 them to go on. The Roman historian says that
 
 124 HANN.BAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Hannibal cnU hi* way through the rock*. 
 
 Hannibal removed these rooks by building great 
 fires upon them, and then pouring on vinegar, 
 which opened seams and fissures in them, by 
 means of which the rocks could be split and 
 pried to pieces with wedges and crowbars. On 
 reading this account, the mind naturally pauses 
 to consider the probability of its being true. As 
 they had no gunpowder in those days, they were 
 compelled to resort to some such method as the 
 one above described for removing rooks. There 
 are some species of rook which are easily crack- 
 ed and broken by the action of fire. Others re- 
 sist it. There seems, however, to be no reason 
 obvious why vinegar should materially assist in 
 the operation. Besides, we can not suppose 
 that Hannibal could have had, at such a time 
 and place, any very large supply of vinegar on 
 hand. On the whole, it is probable that, if any 
 such operation was performed at all, it was OK 
 a very small scale, and the results must have 
 been very insignificant at the time, though the 
 fact has since been greatly celebrated in history. 
 In coming over the snow, and in descending 
 the rocks immediately below, the army, and es- 
 pecially the animals connected with it, suffered 
 a great deal from hunger. It was difficult to 
 procure forage for them of any kind. At
 
 B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS. 126 
 
 The army in Mfety on the plain* of Italy. 
 
 length, however, as they continued their de- 
 icent, they came first into the region of forests, 
 and soon after to slopes of grassy fields descend- 
 ing into warm and fertile valleys. Here the 
 inimals were allowed to stop and rest, and re- 
 new their strength by abundance of food. The 
 men rejoiced that their toils and dangers were 
 over, and, descending easily the remainder of 
 the way, they encamped at last safely on the 
 pUins of Italy.
 
 126 HANNIBAL. [KC.217 
 
 Miaerabie condition of the army. Its grow !o*w* 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 HANNIBAL IN THE NORTH OF ITALY. 
 
 Hannibal's army found themselves 
 on the plains of Italy, and sat down qui- 
 etly to repose, they felt the effects of their fa- 
 tigues and exposures far more sensibly than 
 they had done under the excitement which they 
 naturally felt while actually upon the mount- 
 ains. They were, in fact, in a miserable con- 
 dition. Hannibal told a Roman officer whom 
 he afterward took prisoner that more than thir- 
 ty thousand perished on the way in crossing the 
 mountains; some in the battles which were 
 fought in the passes, and a greater number still, 
 probably, from exposure to fatigue and cold, and 
 from falls among the rocks and glaciers, and 
 diseases produced by destitution and misery. 
 The remnant of the army which was left on 
 reaching the plain were emaciated, sickly, rag- 
 ged, and spiritless; far more inclined to He 
 down and die, than to go on and undertaKe the 
 oonquest of Italy and Rome. 
 
 After some days, however, they began to re- 
 cruit Although they had been half starved
 
 B.C. 217.] HANNIBAL IN ITALY. 127 
 
 Feeling* of Hannibal's soldier*. Finns of Sciplo 
 
 among the mountains, they had now plenty of 
 wholesome food. They repaired their tattered 
 garments and their broken weapons. They 
 talked with one another about the terrific scenes 
 through which they had been passing, and the 
 dangers which they had surmounted, and thus, 
 gradually strengthening their impressions of the 
 greatness of the exploits they had performed, 
 they began soon to awaken in each other's 
 breasts an ambition to go on and undertake the 
 accomplishment of other deeds of daring and 
 glory. 
 
 We left Scipio with his army at the mouth 
 of the Rhone, about to set sail for Italy with a 
 part of his force, while the rest of it was sent 
 on toward Spain. Scipio sailed along the coast 
 by Genoa, and thence to Pisa, where he landed. 
 He stopped a little while to recruit nis soldiers 
 after the voyage, and in the mean time sent or- 
 ders to all the Roman forces then in the north 
 of Italy to join his standard. He hoped in thii 
 way to collect a force strong enough to enccutt' 
 ter Hannibal. These arrangements being made. 
 he marched to the northward as rapidly as pos- 
 sible He knew in what condition Hannibal's 
 army had descended from the Alps, and wished 
 V attack them before they should have time to
 
 128 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Ibe aruilea approach each other. Feeling! of Hannibal and Sclpio 
 
 recover from the effects of their privation* and 
 Bufferings. He reached the Po before he saw 
 any thing of Hannibal. 
 
 Hannibal, in the mean tirra, was not idle 
 AJB soon as his men were in a condition to mov. 
 he began to act upon the tribes that he found at 
 the foot of the mountains, offering his friendship 
 to some, and attacking others. He thus con- 
 quered those who attempted to resist him, mov- 
 ing, all the time., gradually southward toward 
 the Po. 'That river has numerous branches, and 
 among them is one named the Tioinus. It was 
 on the banks of this river that the two armies 
 at last came together. 
 
 Both generals must have felt some degree of 
 solicitude in respect to the result of the contest 
 which was about to take place. Scipio knew 
 very well Hannibal's terrible efficiency as a war 
 rior, and he was himself a general of great dis 
 tinotion, and a Roman, so that Hannibal had nc 
 reason to anticipate a very easy victory. What- 
 ever doubts or fears, however, general officers 
 may feel on the eve of an engagement, it is al- 
 ways considered very necessary to conceal them 
 entirely from the men, and to animate and en 
 courage the troops with a most undoubting con 
 that they will gain the victory.
 
 B.C-.217.J HANNIBAL IN ITALY. 129 
 
 Addreu of Sciplo to the Roman army. 
 
 Both Hannibal and Scipio, accordingly, made 
 addresses to their respective armies at least so 
 gay the historians of those times each flne ex- 
 pressing to his followers the certainty that the 
 other side would easily be beaten. The speech 
 attributed to Scipio was somewhat as follows : 
 
 " I wish to say a few words to you, soldiers, 
 before we go into battle. It is, perhaps, scarce 
 ly necessary. It certainly would not be neces- 
 sary if I had now under my command the same 
 troops that I took with me to the mouth of the 
 Rhone. They knew the Carthaginians there, 
 and would not have feared them here. A body 
 of our horsemen met and attacked a larger body 
 of theirs, and defeated them. We then advanced 
 with our whole force toward their encampment, 
 in order to give them battle. They, however, 
 abandoned the ground and retreated before we 
 reached the spot, acknowledging, by their flight, 
 their own fear and our superiority. If you had 
 been with us there, and had witnessed these 
 facts, there would have been no need that I 
 should say any thing to convince you now how 
 easily you are g >ing to defeat this Carthaginian 
 foe. 
 
 " We have had a war with this same nation 
 
 before. We conquered them then, both by land 
 149
 
 130 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217. 
 
 Address of Scipio to the Roman army. 
 
 and sea ; and when, finally, peace was made, we 
 required them to pay us tribute, and we contin- 
 ued to exact it from them for twenty years 
 They are a conquered nation; and now this 
 miserable army has forced its way insanely over 
 the Alps, just to throw itself into our hands 
 They meet us reduced in numbers, and exhaust- 
 ed in resources and strength. More than half 
 of their army perished in the mountains, and 
 those that survive are weak, dispirited, ragged, 
 and diseased. And yet they are compelled to 
 meet us. If there was any chance for retreat, 
 or any possible way for them to avoid the ne- 
 cessity of a battle, they would avail themselves 
 of it. But there is not. They are hemmed in 
 by the mountains, which are now, to them, an 
 impassable wall, for they have not strength to 
 scale them again. They are not real enemies ; 
 they are the mere remnants and shadows of en- 
 emies. They are wholly disheartened and dis- 
 couraged, their strength and energy, both of 
 soul and body, being spent and gone, through 
 the cold, the hunger, and the squalid misery 
 they have endured. Their joints are benumbed, 
 their sinews stiffened, and their forms emacia- 
 ted. Their armor is shattered and broken, theii 
 horses are lamed, and all their equipments worn
 
 B.C. 217.] HANNIBAL IN ITALY. 131 
 
 Hannibal's ingenious method of introducing hit speech. 
 
 out and ruined, so that really what most I fear 
 is that the world will refuse us the glory of the 
 victory, and say that it was the Alps that con- 
 quered Hannibal, and not the Roman arrry. 
 
 " Easy as the victory is to be, however, we 
 must remember that there *s a great deal at 
 stake in the contest. It is not merely for glory 
 that we are now about to contend. If Hannibal 
 conquers, he will march to Rome, and our wives, 
 our children, and all that we hold dear will be 
 at his mercy. Remember this, and go into the 
 battle feeling that the fate of Rome itself is de- 
 pending upon the result." 
 
 An oration is attributed to Hannibal, too, on 
 the occasion of this battle. He showed, howev- 
 er, his characteristic ingenuity and spirit of con- 
 trivance in the way in which he managed to at- 
 tract strong attention to what he was going to 
 say, by the manner in which he introduced it 
 He formed his army into a circle, as if to wit* 
 ness a spectacle. He then brought in to the 
 center of this circle a number of prisoners that 
 he had taken among the Alps perhaps they 
 were the hostages which had been delivered to 
 him, as related in the preceding chapter. Who- 
 ever they were, however, whether hostages of 
 captives taken in the battles which ha J been
 
 132 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Cnrtoui combat Effect on the army 
 
 fought in the defiles, Hannibal had brought 
 them with his army down into Italy, and now 
 introducing them into the center of the circle 
 which the army formed, he threw down before 
 their, such arms as they were accustomed to use 
 in their native mountains, and asked them wheth- 
 er they would be willing to take those weapons 
 and fight each other, on condition that each one 
 who killed his antagonist should be restored to 
 his liberty, and have a horse and armor given 
 him, so that he could return home with honor. 
 *he barbarous monsters said readily that they 
 juld, and seized the arms with the greatest 
 vidity. Two or three pairs of combata n t" ' re 
 allowed to fight. One of each pair was killed, 
 and the other set at liberty according to the 
 promise of Hannibal. The combats excited the 
 greatest interest, and awakened the strongest 
 enthusiasm among the soldiers who witnessed 
 them. When this effect had been sufficiently 
 produced, the rest of the prisoners vrere sent 
 away, and Hannibal addressed the vast ring of 
 soldiery as follows : 
 
 " I have intended, soldiers, in what yon have 
 now seen, not merely to amuse you, but to give 
 you a picture of your own situation. You are 
 hemmed in on the right and left by two seas,
 
 B.C. 217.] HANNIBAL IN ITALY. 133 
 
 Hannibal's speech to his army. HU words of encouragemaad. 
 
 and you have not so much as a single ship upon 
 either of them. Then there is the Po before 
 you and the Alps behind. The Po is a deeper, 
 and more rapid and turbulent river than the 
 Rhone ; and as for the Alps, it was with the ut- 
 most difficulty that you passed over them when 
 you were in full strength and vigor; they are 
 an insurmountable wall to you now. You aro 
 therefore shut in, like our prisoners, on every 
 side, and have no hope of life and liberty but in 
 battle and victory. 
 
 " The victory, however, will not be difficult. 
 I see, wherever I look among you, a spirit of 
 determination and courage which I am sure will 
 make you conquerors. The troops which you 
 are going to contend against are mostly fresh 
 recruits, that know nothing of the discipline of 
 the camp, and can never successfully confront 
 such war-worn veterans as you. You all know 
 each other well, and me. I was, in fact, a pu- 
 pil with you for many years, before I took the 
 command. But Scipio's forces are strangers to 
 one another and to him, and, consequently, have 
 no common bond of sympathy ; and as for Scipic 
 himself, his very commission as a Roman gen- 
 eral is only six months old. 
 
 " Think, too, what a splendid and prosperoui
 
 134 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Hannibal s promise*. His real feeling* 
 
 career victory will open before you. It will 
 conduct you to Rome. It will make you mas- 
 ters of one of the most powerful and wealthiest 
 cities in the world. Thus far you have fought 
 your battles only for glory or for dominion ; 
 now, you will have something more substantial 
 to reward your success. There will be great 
 treasures to be divided among you if we con- 
 quer, but if we are defeated we are lost. Hem- 
 med in as we are on every side, there is no 
 place that we can reach by flight. There is, 
 therefore, no such alternative as flight left to as, 
 We must conquer." 
 
 It is hardly probable that Hannibal could 
 have really and honestly felt all the confidence 
 that he expressed in his harangues to his sol- 
 diers. He must have had some fears. In fact, 
 in all enterprises undertaken by man, the indi- 
 cations of success, and the hopes based upon 
 them, will fluctuate from time to time, and 
 cause his confidence in the result to ^bb and 
 flow, so that bright anticipations of success and 
 triumph will alternate in his heart with feelingt 
 of discouragement and despondency. This ef- 
 fect is experienced by all ; by the energetic and 
 decided as well as by the timid and the falter- 
 ing. The former, however, never allow these
 
 B.C. 217.] HANNIBAL m ITALY. 135 
 
 Hannibal's energy and decision. His steady resolution, 
 
 fluctuations of hope and fear to influence their 
 action. They consider well the substantial 
 grounds for expecting success before commenc- 
 ing their undertaking, and then go steadily for- 
 ward, under all aspects of the sky when it 
 shines and when it rains till they reach the 
 end. The inefficient and undecided can act 
 only under the stimulus of present hope. The 
 end they aim at must be visible before them all 
 the time. If for a moment it passes out of view, 
 their motive is gone, and they can do no more, 
 till, by some change in circumstances, it comes 
 in sight again. 
 
 Hannibal was energetic and decided. The 
 time for him to consider whether he would en- 
 counter the hostility of the Roman empire, 
 aroused to the highest possible degree, was 
 when his army was drawn up upon the bank* 
 of the Iberns, before they crossed it. The Ibe 
 rus was his Rubicon. That line once over- 
 stepped, there was to be no further faltering. 
 The difficulties which arose from time to time 
 to throw a cloud over his prospects, only seem- 
 ed to stimulate him to fresh energy, and to awa- 
 ken a new, though still a calm and steady reso- 
 lution. It was so at the Pyrenees; it was so 
 at the Rhone ; it was so among the Alps, wher
 
 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 21? 
 
 Hannibal'i unfaltering conrmga. Movements of Sclpk 
 
 the difficulties and dangers would have induced 
 almost any other commander to have returned ; 
 and it was still so, now that he found himself 
 hut in on every hand by the stern boundaries 
 of Northern Italy, whish he could not possibly 
 hope again to pass, and the whole disposable 
 force of the Roman empire, commanded, too, by 
 one of the consuls, concentrated before him. 
 The imminent danger produced no faltering, 
 and apparently no fear. 
 
 The armies were not yet in sight of each oth- 
 er. They were, in fact, yet on opposite sides 
 of the River Po. The Roman commander con- 
 cluded to march his troops across the river, and 
 advance in search of Hannibal, who was still 
 at some miles' distance. After considering the 
 various means of crossing the stream, he deci- 
 ded finally on building a bridge. 
 
 Military commanders generally throw some 
 sort of a bridge across a stream of water lying 
 in their way, if it is too deep to be easily forded, 
 unless, indeed, it is so wide and rapid as to make 
 the construction of the bridge difficult or im- 
 practicable. In this latter case they cross as 
 well as they can by means of boats and rafts, 
 and by swimming. The Po, though not a very 
 Large stream at this point, was too ileep to be
 
 B.C. 217.] HANNIBAL iv ITALY. 137 
 
 Bcipio'i bridg* OTor * r - 1 ' iie arm T eroMat tfa* rirar 
 
 forded, and Soipio accordingly built a bridge. 
 The soldiers out down the trees which grew in 
 the forests along the banks, and after trimming 
 ff the tops and branches, they rolled the trunks 
 into the water. They placed these trunks side 
 by side, with others, laid transversely and pinned 
 down, upon the top. Thus they formed rafts, 
 which they placed in a line across the stream, 
 securing them well to each other and to the 
 banks. This made the foundation for the bridge, 
 and after this foundation was covered with oth- 
 er materials, so as to make the upper surface a 
 convenient roadway, the army were conducted 
 across it, and then a small detachment of sol- 
 diers were stationed at each extremity of it aa 
 a guard. 
 
 Such a bridge as this answers a very good 
 temporary purpose, and in still water, as, for 
 example, over narrow lakes or very sluggish 
 streams, where there is very little current, a 
 floating structure of this kind is sometimes built 
 for permanent service. Such bridges will not, 
 however, stand on broad and rapid rivers liable 
 to floods. The pressure of the water alone, in 
 such cases, would veiy much endanger all the 
 fastenings; and in cases where drift wood or 
 ice is brought down by the stream, the floating
 
 138 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Hannibal's warlike operation*. He concentrate* his army 
 
 masses, not being able to pass under the bridge, 
 would accumulate above it, and would soon 
 oear upon it with so enormous a pressure that 
 nothing could withstand its force. The bridge 
 would be broken away, and the whole accumu- 
 ation bridge, drift-wood, and ice would be 
 oorne irresistibly down the stream together. 
 
 Scipio's bridge, however, answered very well 
 for his purpose. His army passed over it in 
 safety. When Hannibal heard of this, he knew 
 that the battle was at hand. Hannibal was him- 
 self at this time about five miles distant. While 
 Soipio was at work upon the bridge, Hannibal 
 was employed, mainly, as he had been all the 
 time since his descent from the mountains, in 
 the subjugation of the various petty nations and 
 tribes north of the Po. Some of them were 
 well disposed to join his standard. Others were 
 allies of the Romans, and wished to remain so. 
 He made treaties and sent help to the former, 
 and dispatched detachments of troops to intim- 
 idate and subdue the latter. When, however, 
 he learned that Scipio had crossed the river, he 
 ordered all these detachments to come immedi- 
 ately in, and he began to prepare in earnest for 
 the contest that was impending. 
 
 He called together an assembly of his soldiers,
 
 B.C. 217.] HANNIBAL IN ITALY. 139 
 
 Hannibal addreise* hU soldier*. He promises them land* 
 
 and announced to them finally that the battle 
 was now nigh. He renewed the words of en- 
 couragement that he had spoken before, and in 
 addition to what he then said, he now promised 
 the soldiers rewards in land in case they proved 
 victorious. " I will give you each a farm," said 
 he, " wherever you choose to have it, either in 
 Africa, Italy, or Spain. If, instead of the land, 
 any of you shall prefer to receive rather an equiv- 
 alent in money, you shall have the reward in 
 that form, and then you can return home and 
 live with your friends, as before the war, under 
 circumstances which will make you objects of 
 envy to those who remained behind. If any of 
 you would like to live in Carthage, I will have 
 you made free citizens, so that you can live there 
 in independence and honor." 
 
 But what security would there be for the 
 faithful fulfillment of these promises ? In mod- 
 ern times such security is given by bonds, with 
 pecuniary penalties, or by the deposit of titles 
 to property in responsible hands. In ancient 
 days they managed differently. The promiser 
 bound himself by some solemn and formal mode 
 of adjuraticn, accompanied, in important cases, 
 with certain ceremonies, which were supposed 
 to seal and confirm the obligation assumed. In
 
 140 HANNIBAL. [B.C 217 
 
 tUtifjrtng promise. Omea* 
 
 this case Hannibal brought a lamb in the pres- 
 ence of the assembled army. He held it before 
 them with his left hand, while with his right 
 he grasped a heavy stone. He then called aloud 
 upon the gods, imploring them to destroy him 
 as he was about to slay the lamb, if he failed 
 to perform faithfully and fully the pledges that 
 he had made. He then struck the poor lamb a 
 heavy blow with the stone. The animal fell 
 dead at his feet, and Hannibal was thenceforth 
 bound, in the opinion of the army, by a very 
 solemn obligation indeed, to be faithful in ful- 
 filling his word. 
 
 The soldiers were greatly animated and ex- 
 cited by these promises, and were in haste to 
 have the contest come on. The Roman sol- 
 diers, it seems, were in a different mood of 
 mind. Some circumstances had occurred which 
 they considered as bad omens, and they were 
 very much dispirited and depressed by them. 
 It is astonishing that men should ever allow 
 their minds to be affected by such wholly acoi 
 Cental occurrences as these were. One of them 
 eras this: a wolf came into their camp, from 
 one of the forests near, and after wounding sev- 
 era men, made his escape again. The other 
 was more trifling still. A swarm of bees
 
 B.C. 217.] HANNIBAL IN ITALY. 141 
 
 Tb tattl*. The Romans thrown into eoafndoa 
 
 into the encampment, and lighted upon a tree 
 just over Soipio's tent. This was considered, 
 for some reason or other, a sign that some ca- 
 lamity was going to befall them, and the men 
 were accordingly intimidated and disheartened 
 They consequently looked forward to the battle 
 with uneasiness and anxiety, while the army of 
 Hannibal anticipated it with eagerness and 
 pleasure 
 
 The battle came on, at last, very suddenly, 
 and at a moment when neither party were ex- 
 pecting it. A large detachment of both armies 
 were advancing toward the position of the other, 
 near the River Tioinus, to reoonnoiter, when 
 they met, and the battle began. Hannibal ad- 
 vanced with great impetuosity, and sent, at th 
 same time, a detachment around to attack hie 
 enemy in the rear. The Romans soon began 
 to fall into confusion; the horsemen and foot 
 soldiers got entangled together; the men were 
 trampled upon by the horses, and the horse* 
 were frightened by the men. In the midst of 
 this scene, Soipio received a wound. A consul 
 was a dignitary of very high consideration H 
 was, in fact, a sort of semi-king. Th officers, 
 and all the soldiers, so fast as they heard that, 
 the consul was wounded, were terrified and dis-
 
 142 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Sclplo wounded. The Roman* driven back across the rirer 
 
 mayed, and the Romans began to retreat. 
 Soipio had a young son, named also Seipio, who 
 was then about twenty years of age. He was 
 fighting by the side of his father when he re- 
 ceived his wound. He protected his father, got 
 him into the center of a compact body of caval- 
 ry, and moved slowly off the ground, those in 
 the rear facing toward the enemy and beating 
 them back, as they pressed on in pursuit of 
 them. In this way they reached their camp, 
 Here they stopped for the night. They had 
 fortified the place, and, as night was coming on, 
 Hannibal thought it not prudent to press on and 
 attack them there. He waited for the morning. 
 Scipio, however, himself wounded and his army 
 discouraged, thought it not prudent for him to 
 wait till the morning. At midnight he put his 
 whole force in motion on a retreat. He kept 
 the camp-fires burning, and did every thing else 
 in his power to prevent the Carthaginians ob- 
 serving any indications of his departure. Ilia 
 army marched secretly and silently till they 
 reached the river. They recrossed it by th 
 bridge they had built, and then, cutting away 
 the fastenings by which the different rafts were 
 held together, the structure was at once de- 
 stroyed, and the materials of which it was com-
 
 B.C. 2.17.] HANMBALIN!TAL\ 143 
 
 The Roman* dertruy tfae bridge OTCT the Tidnu* 
 
 posed floated away, a mere mass of ruins, down 
 the stream. From the Ticinus they floated, 
 we may imagine, into the Po, and thence down 
 the Po into the Adriatic Sea, where they drifted 
 about upon the waste of waters till they were 
 at last, one after another driven by storms upoa 
 the sandy shores.
 
 144 HANK BAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Hannibal pursue* the Romans. He take* lome prUonere, 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 THB APENNINES. 
 
 AS soon as Hannibal was apprised in the 
 morning that Soipio and his forces had left 
 their ground, he pressed on after them, very 
 earnest to overtake them before they should 
 each the river. But he was too late. The 
 main body of the Roman army had got over. 
 There was, however, a detachment of a few 
 anndred men, who had been left on Hannibal's 
 side of the river to guard the bridge until aD 
 the army shomd have passed, and then to help 
 in cutting it away. They had accomplished 
 this before Hannibal's arrival, but had not had 
 time to contrive any way to get across the river 
 themselves. Hannibal took them all prisoners. 
 The condition and prospects of both the Ro- 
 man and Carthaginian cause were entirely 
 changed by this battle, and the retreat of Soipio 
 across the Po. All the nations of the north of 
 Italy, who had been subjects or allies of the Ro- 
 mans, now turned to Hannibal. They sent 
 embassies into his camp, offering him theii
 
 B.U.JM.7.J THE APENNINES 
 
 Revolt of some Hauls from the Romans. Hanniba! crosse* the river 
 
 friendship and alliance. In fact, there was a 
 'arge body of Gauls in the Roman camp, who 
 were fighting under Scipio at the battle of Ti- 
 oinus, who deserted his standard immediately 
 afterward, and came over in a mass to Hanni- 
 bal. They made this revolt in the night, and, 
 instead of stealing away secretly, they raised a 
 prodigious tumult, killed the guards, filled the 
 encampment with their shouts and outcries, and 
 created for a time an awful scene of terror. 
 
 Hannibal received them, but he was too sa- 
 gacious to admit such a treacherous horde into 
 his army. He treated them with great consid- 
 eration and kindness, and dismissed them with 
 presents, that they might all go to their respect- 
 ive homes, charging them to exert their influ- 
 ence in his favor among the tribes to which they 
 severally belonged. 
 
 Hannibal's soldiers, too, were very much en- 
 couraged by the commencement they had made. 
 The army made immediate preparations for 
 crossing the river. Some of the soldiers built 
 rafts, others went up the stream in search of 
 places to ford . Some swam across. They could 
 adopt these or any other modes in safety, for the 
 Romans made no stand on the opposite bank tc 
 oppose them, but moved rapidly on, as fast ai 
 1410
 
 146 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217. 
 
 Dismay of the Romans. Sempronius recalled to Italy. 
 
 Scipio could be carried. His wounds began to 
 inflame, and were extremely painful. 
 
 In fact, the Romans were dismayed at the 
 danger which now threatened them. As soon 
 as news of these events reached the city, the 
 authorities there sent a dispatch immediately 
 to Sicily to recall the other consul. His name 
 was Sempronius. It will be recollected that, 
 when the lots were cast between him and Scip- 
 io, it fell to Scipio to proceed to Spain, with a 
 view to arresting Hannibal's march, while Sem- 
 pronius went to Sicily and Africa. The object 
 of this movement was to threaten and attack 
 the Carthaginians at home, in order to distract 
 their attention and prevent their sending any 
 f resh forces to aid Hannibal, and, perhaps, even 
 co compel them to recall him from Italy to de- 
 fend their own capital. But now that Hanni- 
 bal had not only passed the Alps, but had also 
 crossed the Po, and was marching toward Rome 
 Scipio himself disabled, and his army flying 
 before him they were obliged at once to aban- 
 don the plan of threatening Carthage. They 
 *ent with all dispatch an order to Sempronhw 
 to hasten home and assist in the defense of 
 Home. 
 
 Scmpronius was a man of a very prompt and
 
 B.C. 217.J THE APENNINES. 147 
 
 Suffering! of Sclpio from his wound. He U joined by Semprooint 
 
 impetuous character, with great confidence in 
 his own powers, and very ready for action. He 
 came immediately into Italy, recruited new sol- 
 Jiers for the army, put himself at the head of 
 his forces, and marched northward to join Scipio 
 in the valley of the Po. Scipio was suffering 
 great rain from his wounds, and could do but lit- 
 tle toward directing the operations of the army 
 Ho had slowly retreated before Hannibal, the 
 fever and pain of his wounds being greatly ex- 
 asperated by the motion of traveling. In this 
 manner he arrived at the Trebia, a small stream 
 flowing northward into the Po. He crossed this 
 stream, and finding that he could not go any 
 further, on account of the torturing pain to which 
 it put him to be moved, he halted his army, 
 marked out an encampment, threw up fortifica- 
 tions around it, and prepared to make a stand- 
 To his great relief, Sempronius soon came up 
 and joined him here. 
 
 There were now two generals. Napoleon 
 used to say that one bad commander was bet- 
 ter than two good ones, so essential is it to suc- 
 cess in all military operations to secure that 
 promptness, and confidence, and decision wh ich 
 can only exist where action is directed by one 
 single mind. Sempronius and Scipio disagreed
 
 148 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 21 
 
 Tbe Roman commander* disagree. Sklnnihe 
 
 as to the proper course to be pursued. Sempro- 
 nius wished to attack Hannibal immediately. 
 Scipio was in favor of delay. Sempronius at- 
 tributed Soipio's reluctance to give battle to th 
 dejection of mind and discouragement produced 
 by his wound, or to a feeling of envy lest he, 
 Sempronius, should have the honor of conquer- 
 ing the Carthaginians, while he himself was 
 helpless in his tent. On the other hand, Scipic 
 thought Sempronius inconsiderate and reckless, 
 and disposed to rush heedlessly into a contest 
 with a foe whose powers and resources he did 
 not understand. 
 
 In the mean time, while the two command- 
 ers were thus divided in opinion, some skirmish 
 es and small engagements took place between 
 detachments from the two armies, in which Sem- 
 pronius thought that the Romans had the ad- 
 vantage. This excited his enthusiasm more 
 and more, and he became extremely desirous tc 
 bring on a general battle. He began to be quite 
 out of patience with Scipio' s caution and delay. 
 The soldiers, he said, were full of strength and 
 courage, all eager for the combat, and it was 
 absurd to hold them back on account of the fee- 
 bleness of one ick. man. " Besides," said he, 
 "of what use can it be to delay any longer!
 
 B.C. 217.] THE APENINNBS. 149 
 
 Sempronlui eager for battle. Hannibal* stratagem. 
 
 We are as ready to meet the Carthaginians now 
 as we shall ever be. There is no third consul 
 to oome and help us ; and what a disgrace it is 
 for us Romans, who in the former war led our 
 troops to the very gates of Carthage, to allow 
 Hannibal to bear sway over all the north of It- 
 aly, while we retreat gradually before him, 
 afraid to encounter now a force that we have 
 always conquered before." 
 
 Hannibal was not long in learning, through 
 his spies, that there was this difference of opin- 
 ion between the Roman generals, and that Sem 
 pronius was full of a presumptuous sort of ardor 
 and he began to think that he could contriv 
 some plan to draw the latter out into battle un- 
 der circumstances in which he would have to 
 act at a great disadvantage. He did contrive 
 such a plan. It succeeded admirably ; and the 
 case was one of those numerous instances which 
 occurred in the history of Hannibal, of success- 
 ful stratagem, which led the Romans to say that 
 his leading traits of character were treachery 
 and cunning. 
 
 Hannibal's plan was, in a word, an attempt 
 to draw the Roman army out of its encamp- 
 ment on a dark, cold, and stormy night in De- 
 cember, and get them into the river. This rir
 
 150 ilANfiiBAi.. [B.C.217 
 
 I>tail of Elaiinibal's scheme. The ambuscada. 
 
 er was the Trebia. It flowed north into the Po, 
 between the Roman and Carthaginian camps. 
 His scheme, in detail, was to send a part of his 
 army over the river to attack the Romans in the 
 night or very early in the morning. He hoped 
 that by this means Sempronius would be induc- 
 ed to come out of his camp to attack the Car- 
 thaginians. The Carthaginians were then to 
 fly and recross the river, and Hannibal hoped 
 that Sempronius would follow, excited by the 
 ardor of pursuit. Hannibal was then to have a 
 strong reserve of the army, that had remained 
 all the time in warmth and safety, to come out 
 and attack the Romans with unimpaired strength 
 and vigor, while the Romans themselves would 
 be benumbed by the cold and wet, and disor- 
 ganized by the confusion produced in crossing 
 the stream. 
 
 A part of Hannibal's reserve were to be plac- 
 ed in an ambuscade. There were some mead 
 ows near the water, which were covered in 
 many places with tal grass and bushes. Han- 
 nibal went to examine the spot, and found that 
 this shrubbery was high enough for even horse- 
 men to be concealed in it. He determined to 
 place a thousand foot soldiers and a thousand 
 horsemen here, the most efficient and coura-
 
 15,0.217.] THE APENNINES. Ill 
 
 Two thousand chosen men. Hannibal'* manner of choosing them 
 
 geous in the army. He selected them in the 
 following manner : 
 
 He called one of his lieutenant generals to 
 the spot, explained somewhat of his design to 
 him, and then asked him to go and choose from 
 the cavalry and the infantry, a hundred each, 
 the best soldiers he could find. This two hund- 
 red were then assembled, and Hannibal, after 
 surveying them with looks of approbation and 
 pleasure, said, " Yes, you are the men I want, 
 only, instead of two hundred, I need two thou- 
 sand. Go back to the army, and select and 
 oring to me, each of you, nine men like your- 
 selves." It is easy to be imagined that the sol- 
 diers were pleased with this commission, and 
 that they executed it faithfully. The whole 
 force thus chosen was soon assembled, and sta- 
 tioned in the thickets above described, where 
 they lay in ambush ready to attack the Romans 
 after they should pass the river. 
 
 Hannibal also made arrangements for leaving 
 a large part of his army in his own camp, ready 
 for battle, with orders that they should partake 
 of food and refreshments, and keep themselves 
 warm by the fires until they should be called 
 upon. All things being thus ready, he detach- 
 ed a body of horsemen to cross the river, and
 
 152 IlAWNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Attack on the Roman camp. Success of Hannibal's stratagem 
 
 see if they could provoke the Romans to come 
 out of their camp and pursue them. 
 
 " Go," said Hannibal, to the commander of 
 this detachment, " pass the stream, advance to 
 the Roman camp, assail the guards, and when 
 the army forms and comes out to attack you, re- 
 treat slowly before them back across the river." 
 
 The detachment did as it was ordered to do 
 When they arrived at the camp, which was 
 soon after break of day for it was a part of 
 Hannibal's plan to bring the Romans out before 
 they should have had time to breakfast Sem- 
 pronius, at the first alarm, called all the soldiers 
 to arms, supposing that the whole Carthaginian 
 force was attacking them. It was a cold and 
 stormy morning, and the atmosphere being fill- 
 ed with rain and snow, but little could be seen. 
 Column after column of horsemen and of in- 
 fantry marched out of the camp. The Cartha- 
 ginians retreated. Sempronius was greatly ex- 
 cited at the idea of so easily driving back the 
 assailants, and, as they retreated, he pressed on 
 in pursuit of them. As Hannibal had antici- 
 pated, he became so excited in the pursuit that 
 he did not stop at the banks of the river. The 
 Carthaginian horsemen plunged into the stream 
 in their retreat, and the Remans, foot soldier*
 
 B.C.217.J THE APENNINES. 153 
 
 Bempronhu crosses the rlrer. Impetuous attmck of Hannibal 
 
 and horsemen together, followed on. The stream 
 was usually small, but it was now swelled by 
 the rain which had been falling all the night. 
 Tho water was, of course, intensely cold. The 
 hwsemen got through tolerably well, but th^ 
 foot soldiers were all thoroughly drenched and 
 benumbed ; and as they had not taken any food 
 that morning, and had come forth on a very 
 sudden call, and without any sufficient prepara- 
 tion, they felt the effects of the exposure in the 
 strongest degree. Still they pressed on. They 
 ascended the bank after crossing the river, and 
 when they had formed again there, and were 
 moving forward in pursuit of their still flying 
 enemy, suddenly the whole force of Hannibal's 
 reserves, strong and vigorous, just from their 
 tents and their fires, burst upon them. Thoy 
 had scarcely recovered from the astonishment 
 and the shock of this unexpected onset, when 
 the two thousand concealed in the amouscade 
 eame sallying forth in the storm, and assailed 
 the Romans in the rear with frightful shout* 
 and outcries. 
 
 All these movements took place very lapidly. 
 Only a very short period elapsed from the time 
 that the Roman army, officers and soldiers, were 
 quietly sleeping in their camp, or rising slowly
 
 154 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Situation of the Roman army. Terrible conflict 
 
 to prepare for the routine of an ordinary day, be- 
 fore they found themselves all drawn out in bat- 
 tle array some miles from their encampment, 
 and surrounded and hemmed in by their foes. 
 The events succeeded each other so rapidly as 
 to appear to the soldiers like a dream ; but very 
 soon their wet and freezing clothes, their limbs 
 benumbed and stiffened, the sleet which was 
 driving along the plain, the endless lines of Car- 
 thaginian infantry, hemming them in on all sides, 
 and the columns of horsemen and of elephants 
 charging upon them, convinced them that their 
 situation was one of dreadful reality. The ca 
 lamity, too, which threatened them was of vast 
 extent, as well as imminent and terrible; for, 
 though the stratagem of Hannibal was very sim- 
 ple in its plan and management, still he had ex- 
 ecuted it on a great scale, and had brought out 
 the whole Roman army. There were, it is said, 
 abcut forty thousand that crossed the river, and 
 about an equal number in the Carthaginian 
 army to oppose them. Such a body of combat- 
 ants covered, of course, a large extent of ground, 
 and the conflict that ensued was one of the most 
 torrible scenes of the many that Hannibal as- 
 sisted in enacting. 
 
 The conflict continued for many hours, the
 
 1>.(J.!217.J THE APENNINES. 155 
 
 Utter defeat of Che Roman*. Sceoa after die hottta 
 
 Romans getting more and more into confusion 
 all the time. The elephants of the Carthagin* 
 ians, that is, the few that now remained, made 
 great havoo in their ranks, and finally, after a 
 combat of some hours, the whole army was 
 broken up and fled, some portions in compact 
 bodies, as their officers could keep them togeth- 
 er, and others in hopeless and inextricable con- 
 fusion. They made their way back to the riv- 
 er, which they reached at various points up and 
 down the stream. In the mean time, the con- 
 tinued rain had swollen the waters still more, 
 the low lands were overflowed, the deep places 
 concealed, and the broad expanse of water in 
 the center of the stream whirled in boiling and 
 turbid eddies, whose surface was roughened by 
 the December breeze, and dotted every where 
 with the drops of rain still falling. 
 
 When the Roman army was thoroughly bro- 
 ken up and scattered, the Carthaginians gave 
 np the further prosecution of the contest. They 
 were too wet, cold, and exhausted themselves 
 to feel any ardor in the pursuit of their enemies. 
 Vast numbers of the Romans, however, attempt- 
 ed to recross the river, and were swept down 
 and destroyed by the merciless flood, whose forca 
 they had not strength enough remaining to with
 
 15C HANNIBAL. IB.C.217 
 
 Various battles of Hannibal. Scarcity of food 
 
 stand. Other portions of the troops lay hid in 
 lurking-places to which they had retreated, un- 
 til night came on, and then they made rafts on 
 which they contrived to fleet themselves back 
 across the stream. Hannibal's troops were too 
 wet, and cold, and exhausted to go out again 
 into the storm, and so they were unmolested in 
 these attempts. Notwithstanding this, howev- 
 er, great numbers of them were carried down 
 the stream and lost. 
 
 It wa* now December, too late for Hannibal 
 to attempt to advance much further that season, 
 and yet the way before him was open to the 
 Apennines, by the defeat of Sempronius, for 
 neither he nor Scipio could now hope to make 
 another stand against him till they should re- 
 ceive new re-enforcements from Rome. During 
 the winter months Hannibal had various battles 
 and adventures, sometimes with portions and de- 
 tachments of the Roman army, and sometimes 
 with the native tribes. He was sometimes in 
 great difficulty for want of food for his army, 
 until at length he bribed the governor of a cas- 
 tle, where a Roman granary was kept, to delivei 
 it up to him, and after that he was well supplied. 
 
 The natives of the country were, however, 
 not at all well disposed toward him, and in the
 
 B.C.217.] THB APENNINES. 157 
 
 Valley of the Arno. Crossing the Apennines 
 
 oourse of the winter they attempted to impede 
 his operations, and to harass his army by every 
 means in their power. Finding his situation 
 uncomfortable, ne moved on toward the south, 
 and at length determined that, inclement as the 
 season was, he would cross the Apennines. 
 
 By looking at the map of Italy, it will be 
 seen that the great valley of the Po extends 
 across the whole north of Italy. The valley of 
 the Arno and of the Umbro lies south of it, sep- 
 arated from it by a part of the Apennine chain. 
 This southern valley was Etruria. Hannibal 
 decided to attempt to pass over the mountains 
 into Etruria. He thought he should find there 
 a warmer climate, and inhabitants more well- 
 disposed toward him, besides being so much 
 nearer Rome. 
 
 But, though Hannibal conquered the Alps, 
 the Apennines conquered him. A very violent 
 storm arose just as he reached the most exposed 
 place among the mountains. It was intensely 
 aoll, and the wind blew the hail and snow direct- 
 ly into the faces of the troops, so that it was im- 
 posfeible for them to proceed. They halted and 
 turned their backs to the storm, but the wind 
 increased more and more, and was attended 
 with terrific thunder and lightning, which filled
 
 158 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 217 
 
 Terrific rtorm. Death of the elephant* 
 
 the soldiers with alarm, as they were at such 
 an altitude as to be themselves enveloped in the 
 cloud* from which the peals and flashes were 
 amitted. Unwilling to retreat, Hannibal order 
 cd the army to encamp on the spot, in the best 
 eh alter they could find. They attempted, ac- 
 cordingly, to pitch their tents, but it was impos- 
 sible to secure them. The wind increased to a 
 hurricane. The tent poles were unmanageable, 
 and the canvas was carried away from its fast- 
 enings, and sometimes split or blown into rags 
 by its flapping in the wind. The poor elephants, 
 that is, all that were left of them from previous 
 battles and exposures, sunk down under this 
 intense cold and died. One only remained alive. 
 Hannibal ordered a retreat, and the army 
 went back into the valley of the Pa. But Han- 
 nibal was ill at ease here. The natives of the 
 country were very weary of his presence. Hia 
 army consumed their food, ravaged their coun- 
 try, and destroyed all their peace and happiness. 
 Hannibal suspected them of a design to poison 
 him or assassinate him in some other way. He 
 was continually watching and taking precau- 
 tions against these attempts. He had a great 
 many different dresses made to be used as dis- 
 guises, and false hair of different colors
 
 B.C 217.J THE APENNINES. 159 
 
 Hannibal'i uneaslne**. Ha CTOMM tfan Apennines 
 
 fashion, so that he could alier his appearance 
 at pleasure. This was to prevent any spy 01 
 assassin who might come into his camp from 
 identifying him by any description of his dress 
 and appearance. Still, notwithstanding these 
 precautions, he was ill at ease, and at the very 
 earliest practicable period in the spring he made 
 a new attempt to cross the mountains, and was 
 now successful. 
 
 On descending the southern declivities of the 
 Apennines he learned that a new Roman army, 
 under a new consul, was advancing toward him 
 from the south. He was eager to meet this 
 force, and was preparing to press forward at 
 once by the nearest way. He found, however, 
 that this would lead him across the lower part 
 >f the valley of the Arno, which was here very 
 broad, and, though usually passable, was now 
 overflowed in consequence of the swelling of the 
 waters of the river by the melting of the snows 
 upon the mountains. The whole country was 
 now, in fact, a vast expanse of marshes and fens- 
 Still, Hannibal concluded to cross it, and, in 
 the attempt, he involved his army in difficulties 
 and dangers as great, almost, as he had encoun- 
 tered upon the Alps. The waters were rising 
 ontinuaily; they filled all the channels and
 
 160 HANNIBAL- [B.C. 217 
 
 Perilous march. Hannibal's sickaoa* 
 
 spread over extended plains. They were so 
 turbid, too, that every thing beneath the surface 
 was concealed, and the soldiers wading in them 
 were continually sinking into deep and sudden 
 ahannels and into bogs of mire, where many 
 were lost. They were all exhausted and worn 
 out by the wet and cold, and the long continu- 
 ance of their exposure to it. They were four 
 days and three nights in this situation, as their 
 progress was, of course, extremely slow. The 
 men, during all this time, had scarcely any 
 sleep, and in some places the only way by which 
 they could get any repose was to lay their arms 
 and their baggage in the standing water, so aa 
 to build, by this means, a sort of couch or plat- 
 form on which they could lie. Hannibal him- 
 gelf was sick too. He was attacked with a vio- 
 lent inflammation of the eyes, and the sight of 
 one of them was in the end destroyed. He was 
 not, however, so much exposed as the other 
 officers ; for there was one elephant left of all 
 those that had commenced the march in Spain, 
 and Hannibal rode this elephant during the four 
 days' march through the water. There were 
 guides and attendants to precede him, for th 
 purpose of rinding a safe and practicable road, 
 and by thoir aid, with the help of the animal's 
 -acitv. ho got safelv throusrh.
 
 B.C.216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUS. 163 
 
 Alarm at Rome. Tb coaral Plaminia* 
 
 I 
 
 CHAPTER VIIL 
 THE DICTATOR FABIUS: 
 
 N the mean time, while Hannibal was thus 
 rapidly making his way toward the gates of 
 Rome, the people of the city became more and 
 more alarmed, until at last a general feeling 
 of terror pervaded all the ranks of society. Cit- 
 izens and soldiers were struck with one common 
 dread. They had raised a new army and put 
 it under the command of a new consul, for the 
 terms of service of the others had expired. 
 Flaminius was the name of this new command- 
 er, and he was moving northward at the head 
 of his forces at the time that Hannibal was con- 
 ducting his troops with so much labor and diffi- 
 culty through the meadows and morasses of the 
 Arno. 
 
 This army was, however, no more successful 
 than its predocessors had been. Hannibal con- 
 trived to entrap Flaminius by a stratagem, as 
 he had entrapped Sempronius before. There is 
 in the eastern part of Etruria, near the mount- 
 ain*, a lake called Lake Thrasymene. It hap-
 
 164 HANNIUAL. [BC.21b 
 
 Another stratagem. Confidence of Flaminhu 
 
 pened that this lake extended so near to the 
 base of the mountains as to leave only a narrow 
 passage between a passage but little widei 
 than was necessary for a road. Hannibal con- 
 trived to station a detachment of his troops in 
 ambuscade at the foot of the mountains, and 
 others on the declivities above, and then in some 
 way or other to entice Flaminius and his army 
 through the defile. Flaminius was, like Sem- 
 pronius, ardent, self-confident, and vain. He 
 despised the power of Hannibal, and thought 
 that his success hitherto had been owing to the 
 jiefficiency or indecision of his predecessors. 
 For his part, his only anxiety was to encounter 
 him, for he was sure of an easy victory. He 
 advanced, therefore, boldly and without concern 
 into the pass of Thrasymene, when he learned 
 that Hannibal was encamped beyond it. 
 
 Hannibal had established an encampment 
 openly on some elevated ground beyond the pass, 
 and as Flaminius and his troops came into the 
 narrowest part of the defile, they saw this en- 
 campment at a distance before them, with a 
 broad plain beyond the pass intervening They 
 supposed that the whole force of the enemy was 
 there, not dreaming of the presence of the strong 
 detachments which were hid on the slopes of
 
 B.C.216.J THB D CTATOR FABIUS. 16> 
 
 Complete rout of the Romano. Effect* of the battle 
 
 the mountains above them, and were looking 
 down upon them at that very moment from be- 
 nind rocks and bushes. When, therefore, the 
 Romans had got through the pass, they spread 
 out upon the plain beyond it, and were advan- 
 cing to the camp, when suddenly the secreted 
 troops burst forth from their ambuscade, and, 
 pouring down the mountains, took complete pos- 
 session of the pass, and attacked the Romans in 
 the rear, while Hannibal attacked them in the 
 van. Another long, and desperate, and bloody 
 contest ensued. The Romans were beaten at 
 every point, and, as they were hemmed in be- 
 tween the lake, the mountain, and the pass, 
 they could not retreat; the army was, accord- 
 ingly, almost wholly cut to pieces. Flaminius 
 himself was killed. 
 
 The news of this battle spread every where, 
 and produced the strongest sensation. Hanni- 
 bal sent dispatches to Carthage announcing 
 what he considered his final victory over the 
 great foe, and the news was received with the 
 greatest rejoicings. At Rome, on the other 
 aand, the news produced a dreadful shock of dis- 
 appointment and terror. It seemed as if the 
 last hope of resisting the progress of their terri 
 hie enemy was gone, and that they had nothing
 
 166 HANNIBAL. [U/J.216 
 
 Panic of the Romans. Their superstitions fear* 
 
 now to do but to sink down in despair, and await 
 the hour when his columns should come pour- 
 ing in through the gates of the city. 
 
 The people of Rome were, in fact, prepared 
 for a panic, for their fears had been increasing 
 and gathering strength for some time. They 
 wera very superstitious in those ancient days 
 in respect to signs and omens. A thousand tri- 
 fling occurrences, which would, at the present 
 day, be considered of no consequence whatever, 
 were then considered bad signs, auguring terri- 
 ble calamities ; and, on occasions like these, 
 when calamities seemed to be impending, every 
 thing was noticed, and circumstances which 
 would not have been regarded at all at ordinary 
 times, were reported from one to another, the 
 stories being exaggerated as they spread, until 
 the imaginations of the people were filled with 
 mysterious but invincible fears. So universal 
 was the belief in these prodigies and omens, that 
 they were sometimes formally reported to thu 
 senate, committees were appointed to inquire 
 into them, and solemn sacrifices were offered t 
 " expiate them," as it was termed, that is, to 
 avert the displeasure of the gods, which the 
 ornens were supposed to foreshadow and portend. 
 
 A very curious list of these omens was re>
 
 B.C.216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUB 167 
 
 Omen* end bad iign. Thnir Influence 
 
 ported to the senate during the winter and 
 spring in which Hannibal was advancing to- 
 ward Rome. An ox from the cattle-market 
 had got into a house, and, losing his way, had 
 3limbed up into the third story, and, being fright- 
 ened by the noise and uprear of those who fol- 
 lowed him, ran out of a window and fell down 
 to the ground. A light appeared in the sky in 
 the form of ships. A temple was struck with 
 lightning. A spear in the hand of a statue of 
 Juno, a celebrated goddess, shook, one day, of it- 
 self. Apparitions of men in white garments 
 were seen in a certain place. A wolf came into 
 a camp, and snatched the sword of a soldier on 
 guard out of his hands, and ran away with it. 
 The sun one day looked smaller than usual. 
 Two moons were seen together in the sky. This 
 was in the daytime, and one of the moons was 
 doubtless a halo or a white cloud. Stones fell 
 out of the sky at a place called Picenum. Tbii 
 w%8 one of the most dreadful of all the omens, 
 though it is now known to be a common occur* 
 leuoe. 
 
 These omens were all, doubtless, real occur- 
 rences, more or less remarkable, it is true, but, 
 of course, entirely unmeaning in respect to 
 their being indications of impending calamities
 
 168 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 216 
 
 Curious transformations. Importance attached to these itorie* 
 
 There were other things reported to the senate 
 which must have originated almost wholly in 
 the imaginations and fears of the observers. 
 Two shields, it was said, in a certain camp, 
 sweat blood. Some people were reaping, and 
 bloody ears of grain fell into the basket. This, 
 of course, must have been wholly imaginary, 
 unless, indeed, one of the reapers had cut his 
 fingers with the sickle. Some streams and 
 fountains became bloody ; and, finally, in one 
 place in the country, some goats turned into 
 sheep. A hen, also, became a cock, and a cock 
 changed to a hen. 
 
 Such ridiculous stories would not be worthy 
 of a moment's attention now, were it not for the 
 degree of importance attached to them then. 
 They were formally reported to the Roman sen- 
 ate, the witnesses who asserted that they had 
 seen them were called in and examined, and a 
 solemn debate was held on the question what 
 should be done to avert the supernatural influ- 
 ences of evil which the omens expressed. The 
 senate decided to have three days of expiation 
 and sacrifice, during which the whole people of 
 Rome devoted themselves to the religious ob- 
 servances which they thought calculated to ap- 
 pease the wrath of Heaven. They made vari-
 
 BC.216.J THB DICTATOR FAB us. 169 
 
 FererUb excitement at Rome. News of the battla 
 
 ous offerings and gifts to the different gods, 
 among which one was a golden thunderbolt of 
 fifty pounds' weight, manufactured for Jupiter, 
 whom they considered the thunderer. 
 
 All thjse things took place before the battle 
 at Lake Thrasymene, so that the whole com- 
 munity were in a very feverish state of excite 
 ment and anxiety before the news from Flamin- 
 has arrived. When these tidings at last came, 
 they threw the whole city into utter consterna- 
 tion. Of course, the messenger went directly 
 to the senate-house to report to the government, 
 but the story that such news had arrived soon 
 spread about the city, and the whole population 
 crowded into the streets and public squares, all 
 eagerly asking for the tidings. An enwmous 
 throng assembled before the senate-house call- 
 ing for information. A public officer appeared 
 at last, and said to them in a loud voice, " We 
 have been defeated in a great battle." He would 
 say no more. Still rumors spread from one to 
 another, until it was generally known through- 
 out the city that Hannibal had conquered the 
 Roman army again in a great battle, that great 
 numbers of the soldiers had fallen or been taken 
 prisoners, and that the consul himself was slain 
 
 The night was passed in great anxiety and
 
 170 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 21d 
 
 Gatherings of the people. ArriTal of itragglera 
 
 terror, and the next day, and for several of the 
 succeeding days, the people gathered in great 
 numbers around the gates, inquiring eagerly for 
 news of every one that came in from the coun- 
 try. Pretty soon scattered soldiers and small 
 bodies of troops began to arrive, bringing with 
 them information of the battle, each one having 
 a different tale to tell, according to his own in- 
 dividual experience in the scene. Whenever 
 these men arrived, the people of the city, and 
 especially the women who had husbands or sons 
 in the army, crowded around them, overwhelm- 
 ing them with questions, and making them tell 
 their tale again and again, as if the intolerable 
 suspense and anxiety of the hearers could not 
 be satisfied. The intelligence was such as in 
 general to confirm and increase the fears of 
 those who listened to it ; but sometimes, when 
 it made known the safety of a husband or a son, 
 it produced as much relief and rejoicing as it 
 did in other ca&es terror and despair. That ma- 
 ternal love was as strong an impulse in those 
 rough days as it is in the more refined and culti- 
 vated periods of the present age, is evinced by 
 the fact that two of these Roman mothers, on 
 seeing their sons coming suddenly into their 
 presence, alive and well, when they had heaH
 
 B.C.216.] THE DICTATOK FABIUS. 171 
 
 Appointment of dictator Fabiu* 
 
 that they had fallen in battle, were killed at 
 once by the shock of surprise and joy, as if by a 
 blow 
 
 Ir seasons of great and imminent danger to 
 the commonwealth, it was the custom of the 
 Romans to appoint what they called a dictator, 
 that is, a supreme executive, who was clothed 
 with absolute and unlimited powers ; and it de- 
 volved on him to save the state from the threat- 
 ened ruin by the most prompt and energetic ac- 
 tion. This case was obviously one of the emer- 
 gencies requiring such a measure. There was 
 no time for deliberations and debates ; for delib- 
 erations and debates, in periods of such excite- 
 ment and danger, become disputes, and end in 
 tumult and uproar. Hannibal was at the head 
 of a victorious army, ravaging the country which 
 he had already conquered, and with no obstacle 
 between him and the city itself. It was an 
 emergency calling for the appointment of a dic- 
 tator. The people made choice of a man of 
 groat reputation for experience and wisdom, 
 named Fabius, and placed the whole power of 
 the state hi his hands. All other authority was 
 suspended, and every thing was subjected to 
 his sway. The whole city, with the life and 
 property of every inhaV> ; tant, was placed at hi*
 
 172 HANNIBAL. [B.C.216 
 
 Measures of Pabius. Religious ceremonies. 
 
 disposal ; the army and the fleets were also un- 
 der his command, even the consuls being sub- 
 ject to his orders. 
 
 Fabius accepted the vast responsibility which 
 ais election imposed upon him, and immediately 
 began to take the necessary measures. He first 
 made arrangements for performing solemn re- 
 ligious ceremonies, to expiate the omens anJ 
 propitiate the gods. He brought out all the 
 people in great convocations, and made them 
 take vows, in the most formal and imposing 
 manner, promising offerings and celebrations in 
 honor of the various gods, at some future time, 
 in case these divinities would avert the threat- 
 ening danger. It is doubtful, however, whether 
 Fabius, in doing these things, really believed 
 that they had any actual efficiency, or whether 
 he resorted to them as a means of calming ana 
 quieting the minds of the people, and producing 
 that composure and confidence which always 
 results from a hope of the favor of Heaven. If 
 this last was his object, his conduct was emi* 
 nently wise. 
 
 Fabius, also, immediately ordered a large evy 
 of troops to be made. His second in command, 
 called his master of horse, was directed to make 
 this lovy, and to assemble the tr wps at a olace
 
 B.C. 21o'.j THE DICTATOR KABIUS. 173 
 
 M inucius. Supreme authority of a dictator 
 
 called Tibur, a few miles east of the city. 
 There was always a master of horse appointed 
 to attend upon and second a dictator. The 
 name of this officer ir the case of Fabius was 
 Minucius. Minucius was as ardent, prompt, 
 and impetuous, as Fabius was cocl, prudent, 
 and calculating. He levied the troops and 
 brought them to their place of rendezvous. Fa- 
 bius went out to take the command of them. 
 One of the consuls was coming to join him, with 
 a body of troops which he had uniler his com- 
 mand. Fabius sent word to him that he must 
 come without any of the insignia of his author- 
 ity, as all his authority, semi-regal as it was in 
 ordinary times, was superseded and overruled 
 in the presence of a dictator. A consul wag 
 accustomed to move in great state on all occa- 
 sions, lie was preceded by twelve men, bear- 
 ing badges and insignia, to impress the army 
 and the people with a sense of th* greatness oJ 
 his dignity. To see, therefore, a consul divesf. 
 ed of all these marks of his power, and coming 
 into the dictator's presence as any other office! 
 would come before an acknowledged superior, 
 made the army of Fabius feel a very strong 
 sense of the greatness of their new commander's 
 dignity and power
 
 174 HANNIBAL. [B.C 216 
 
 ProeluMtion of F shins. Progress of H nnibJ 
 
 Fabius then issued a proclamation, which he 
 sent by proper messengers into all the region of 
 country around Rome, especially to that part 
 toward the territory which was in possession of 
 Hannibal. In this proclamation he ordered all 
 the people tc abandon the country and the towns 
 which were not strongly fortified, and to seek 
 shelter in the castles, and forts, and fortified 
 cities. They were commanded, also, to lay 
 waste the country which they should leave, and 
 destroy all the property, and especially all the 
 provisions, which they could not take to their 
 places of refuge. This being done, Fabius 
 placed himself at the head of the forces which 
 he had got together, and moved on, cautiously 
 and with great circumspection, in search of his 
 enemy. 
 
 In the mean time, Hannibal had crossed over 
 to the eastern side of Italy, and had passed down, 
 conquering and ravaging the country as he went, 
 an til he got considerably south of Rome. He 
 *eems to have thought it not quite prudent to 
 idvanoe to the actual attack of the city, after 
 the battle of Lake Thrasymene; for the vast 
 oopulation of Rome was sufficient, if rendered 
 desperate by his actually threatening the cap- 
 ture and pillage of the city, to overwhelm bis
 
 BC.216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUS. 175 
 
 PoHcy of Fabiun. He decline* fighting 
 
 army entirely. So he moved to the eastward, 
 and advanced on that side until he had passed 
 the city, and thus it happened that Fabius had 
 to march to the southward and eastward in or- 
 der to meet him. The two armies came in 
 sight of each other quite on the eastern side of 
 Italy, very near the shores of the Adriatic Sea. 
 
 The policy which Fabius resolved to adopt 
 was, not to give Hannibal battle, but to watch 
 him, and wear his army out by fatigue and de- 
 lays. He kept, therefore, near him, but always 
 posted his army on advantageous ground, which 
 all the defiance and provocations of Hannibal 
 could not induce him to leave. When Hanni- 
 bal moved, which he was soon compelled to do 
 to procure provisions, Fabius would move too, 
 but only to post and intrench himself in some 
 place of security as before. Hannibal did every 
 thing in his power to bring Fabius to battle, 
 but all his efforts were unavailing. 
 
 fn fact, he himself was at one time in im- 
 minent danger. He had got drawn, by Fabi- 
 a's go>od management, into a place where ho 
 was surrounded by mountains, upon which Fa- 
 bius had posted his troops, and there was only 
 one defile which offered any egress, and this, 
 too, ^abius had strongly guarded. Hannibal
 
 176 HANNIBAL. [JJ.C. i 
 
 Hnnnilial's danger. Stratagem of the fiery oxen. 
 
 resorted to his usual resource, cunning and 
 stratagem, for means of escape. He collected 
 a herd of oxen. He tied fagots across then 
 horns, filling the fagots with pitch, so as to make 
 them highly combustible. In the night on which 
 he was going to attempt to pass the defile, he 
 ordered his army to be ready to march through, 
 and then had the oxen driven up the hills 
 around on the further side of the Roman de- 
 tachment which was guarding the pass. The 
 fagots were then lighted on the horns of the 
 oxen. They ran about, frightened and infuri- 
 ated by the fire, which burned their horns to 
 the quick, and blinded them with the sparks 
 which fell from it. The leaves and branches of 
 the forests were set on fire. A great commo- 
 tion was thus made, and the guards, seeing the 
 moving lights and hearing the tumult, suppos- 
 ed that the Carthaginian army were upon the 
 heights, and were coming down to attack them. 
 They turned out in great hurry and confusion 
 to meet the imaginary foe, leaving the pass un 
 guarded, and, while they were pursuing the 
 bonfires on the oxens' heads into all sorts of dan- 
 gerous and impracticable places, Hannibal qui- 
 etly marched his army through the defile an.J 
 reached a place of safety.
 
 B.C.216.J THE DICTATOR FABIUS. 177 
 
 Unpopularity of Fabini. Hannibal'* sg*city 
 
 Although Fabius kept Hannibal employed 
 and prevented his approaching the city, still 
 there soon began to be felt a considerable de- 
 gree of dissatisfaction that he did not act more 
 decidedly. Minucius was continually urging 
 him tc gi>^ Hannibal battle, and, not being 
 able to induce him to do so, he was continually 
 expressing his discontent and displeasure. The 
 army sympathized with Minucius. He wrote 
 home to Rome too, complaining bitterly of the 
 dictator's inefficiency. Hannibal learned all 
 this by means of his spies, and other sources of 
 information, which so good a contriver as he 
 has always at command. Hannibal was, of 
 aourse, very much pleased to hear of these dis- 
 sensions, and of the unpopularity of Fabius. 
 He considered such an enemy as he so pru- 
 dent, cautious, and watchful as a far more 
 dangerous foe than such bold and impetuous 
 commanders as Flaminius and Minucius, whom 
 he could always entice into difficulty, and then 
 easily conquer. 
 
 Hannibal thought he would render Minucius 
 a iittle help in making Fabius unpopular. He 
 found out from some Roman deserters that 
 the dictator possessed a valuable farm in the 
 , and he sent a detachment of his troops 
 1*412
 
 178 HANNIBAL. [B.C.21B 
 
 Plot* igainrt Fabiu*. He got* to Rome 
 
 there, with orders to plunder and destroy the 
 property all around it, but to leave the farm of 
 Fabius untouched and in safety. The object 
 was to give to the enemies of Fabius at Rome 
 occasion to say that there was secretly a good 
 understanding between him and Hannibal, and 
 that he was kept back from acting boldly in 
 defense of his country by some corrupt bargain 
 which he had traitorously made with the enemy 
 . These plans succeeded. Discontent and dis- 
 satisfaction spread rapidly, both in the camp 
 and in the city. At Rome they made an ur- 
 gent demand upon Fabius to return, ostensibly 
 because they wished him to take part in some 
 great religious ceremonies, but really to remove 
 him from the camp, and give Minucius an 
 opportunity to attack Hannibal. They also 
 wished to devise some method, if possible, of 
 depriving him of his power. He had been ap- 
 pointed for six months, and the time had not 
 yet nearly expired ; but they wished to shorten, 
 or, if they could not shorten, to limit and di- 
 minish his power. 
 
 Fabius went to Rome, leaving the army un- 
 der the orders of Minucius, but commanding 
 him positively not to give Hannibal battle, nor 
 expose his troops t) any danger, but to pursu*
 
 B.C.216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUS. 179 
 
 Minucius nsk a battle. Speech of Fabiu* 
 
 steadily the same policy which he himself had 
 followed. Tie had, however, been in Rome only 
 a short time before tidings came that Minuciuj 
 had fought a battle and gained a victory. There 
 were boastful and ostentatious letters from Mi- 
 nucius to the Roman senate, lauding the ex- 
 ploit which he had performed. 
 
 Fabius examined carefully the accounts. He 
 compared one thing with another, and satisfied 
 himself of what afterward proved to be the truth, 
 that Minucius had gained no victory at all. He 
 had lost five or six thousand men, and Hanni 
 bal had lost no more, and Fabius showed that 
 no advantage had been gained. He urged upon 
 the senate the importance of adhering to the 
 line of policy he had pursued, and the danger 
 of risking every thing, as Minucius had done, 
 on the fortunes of a single battle. Besides, he 
 said, Minucius had disobeyed his orders, which 
 'vero distinct and positive, and he deserved to 
 oo recalled. 
 
 In saying these things Fabius irritated and 
 exasperated his enemies more than ever. " 1 lere 
 is a man," said they, "who will not -only not 
 fight the enemies whom he is sent against him- 
 self, but ne will not allow any body else to fight 
 them. Even at this distance, when his soconJ
 
 180 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 216 
 
 Fabius return* to the army. He is deprived of the supreme power 
 
 in command has obtained a victory, he will not 
 admit it, and endeavors to curtail the advant- 
 ages of it. Kc wishes to protract the war, that 
 be may the longer continue to enjoy the su- 
 prome and unlimited authority with which we 
 lave intrusted liim." 
 
 The hostility to Fabius at last reached such a 
 oitch, that it was proposed in an assembly of the 
 people to make Minucius his equal in command, 
 Fabius, having finished the business which call- 
 ed him to Rome, did not wait to attend to the 
 discussion of this question, but left the city, and 
 was proceeding on his way to join the army again, 
 when he was overtaken with a messenger bear- 
 ing a letter informing him that the decree had 
 passed, and that he must thenceforth consider 
 Minucius as his colleague and equal. Minu- 
 cius was, of course, extremely elated at this re- 
 sult. " Now," said he, " we will see if some- 
 thing can not be done " 
 
 The first question was, however, to decide on 
 what principle and in what way they should 
 share their power. " We can not both command 
 at once," said Minucius " Let us exercise tha 
 power n alternation, each one being in author- 
 ity ftr a day, or a week, or a month, or any 
 othor period that you prefer "
 
 B.C 216.J THE DICTATOR FABIUS. 181 
 
 Dlrisiou of power. Ambuscade of Hannibal 
 
 " No," replied Fabius, " we will not divide 
 the time, we will divide the men. There are 
 four legions. You shall take two of them, and 
 the other two shall be mine. I can thus, per- 
 haps, save half the army from the dangers in 
 which I fear your impetuosity will plunge all 
 whom you have under your command." 
 
 This plan was adopted The army was di- 
 >rided, and each portion went, under its own lead- 
 er, to its separate encampment. The result was 
 one of the most curious and extraordinary oc- 
 currences that is recorded in the history of na- 
 tions. Hannibal, who was well informed of alJ 
 these transactions, immediately felt that Minu- 
 oius was in his power. He knew that he was 
 so eager for battle that it would be easy to en- 
 tice him into it, under almost any circumstan- 
 ces that he himself might choose to arrange. 
 Accordingly, he watched his opportunity when 
 there was a good place for an ambuscade near 
 Minucius's camp, and lodged five thousand men 
 in it in such a manner that they were concealed 
 by rocks and other obstructions to the view. 
 There was a hill between this ground and the 
 camp of Minucius. When the ambuscade vras 
 eady, Hannibal sent up a small force to take 
 possession of the top of the hill, anticipatinc
 
 182 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 216 
 
 Hannibal'i ucces. Kablus come* to the rescua, 
 
 that Minucius would at once send up a strong- 
 er force to drive them away. He did so. Han- 
 nibal then sent up more as a re-enforcement. 
 Minucius, whose spirit and pride were now 
 aroused, sent up more still, and thus, by degrees, 
 Hannibal drew out his enemy's whole force, 
 and then, ordering his own troops to retreat be- 
 fore them, the Romans were drawn on, down 
 the hill, till they were surrounded by the am- 
 buscade. These hidden troops then came pour- 
 ing out upon them, and in a short time the Ro- 
 mans were thrown into utter confusion, flying 
 in all directions before their enemies, and en- 
 tirely at their mercy. 
 
 All would have been irretrievably lost had it 
 not been for the interposition of Fabius. He 
 received intelligence of the danger at his ow i 
 camp, and marched out at once with all his 
 force, and arrived upon the ground so oppor- 
 tunely, and acted so efficiently, that he at once 
 completely changed the fortune of the day. He 
 saved Minucius and his half of the army from 
 utter destruction. The Carthaginians retreat- 
 ed in their turn, Hannibal being entirely over- 
 whelmed wiMi disappointment and vexation at 
 being thus deprived of his prey. History relates 
 that Minucius had the candor and good sense,
 
 B.C.216.J THE DICTATOR FABIUS. 
 
 Speech of Minuciu*. The Roman army again united. 
 
 after this, to acknowledge his error, and yield to 
 the guidance and direction of Fabius. He call- 
 ed his part of the army together when they 
 reached their camp, and addressed them thus : 
 " Fellow-soldiers, I have often heard it said that 
 the wisest men are those who possess wisdom 
 and sagacity themselves, and, next to them, 
 those who know how to perceive and are will- 
 ing to be guided by the wisdom and sagacity 
 of others ; while they are fools who do not know 
 how to conduct themselves, and will not be 
 guided by those who do. We will not belong 
 to this last class ; and since it is proved that we 
 are not entitled to rank with the first, let us 
 join the second. We will march to the camp 
 of Fabius, and join our camp with his, as before. 
 Wo owe to him, and also to all his portion of 
 the army, our eternal gratitude for the noble- 
 ness of spirit which he manifested in coming to 
 our deliverance, when he might so justly have 
 lelt us to ourselves." 
 
 The two legions repaired, accordingly, to the 
 camp }f Fabius, and a complete and permanent 
 reconciliation took place between the two divis- 
 ions of the army. Fabius rose very high in the 
 general esteem by this transaction. The term 
 of his dictatorship, however, expired soon afte/
 
 184 HAWWIBAL. [B.C.216 
 
 Character of Fablus. Hi i ntrgrlty 
 
 this, and as the danger from Hannibal was now 
 less imminent, the office was not renewed, but 
 consuls were chosen as before. 
 
 The character of Fabius has been regarded 
 with the highest admiration by all mankind. 
 Ho evinced a very noble spirit in all that he 
 did. One of his last acts was a very striking 
 proof of this. He had bargained with Hanni- 
 bal to pay a certain sum of money as ransom 
 for a number of prisoners which had fallen into 
 his hands, and whom Hannibal, on the faith of 
 that promise, had released. Fabius believed 
 that the Romans would readily ratify the treaty 
 and pay the amount; but they demurred, be- 
 ing displeased, or pretending to be displeased, 
 because Fabius had not consulted them before 
 making the arrangement. Fabius, in order to 
 preserve his own and his country's faith unsul- 
 lied, sold his farm to raise the money. He did 
 thus most certainly protect and vindicate hi* 
 Dwn honor, but he can hardly be said to hart 
 aved that of the people of Rome
 
 B.C. 215.] BATTLE OF CANNJJ. IB/! 
 
 excited by the battle of Cannja. Variou* military opefationj 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 THE BATTLE OF 
 
 FT! HE battle of Cannae was the last great bat 
 -*- tie fought by Hannibal in Italy. This con- 
 flict has been greatly celebrated in history, not 
 only for its magnitude, and the terrible despera- 
 tion with which it was fought, but also on ac- 
 count of the strong dramatic interest which the 
 circumstances attending it are fitted to excito. 
 This interest is perhaps, however, quite as much 
 due to the peculiar skill of the ancient historian 
 who narrates the story, as to the events them- 
 selves which he records. 
 
 It was about a year after the close of the dic- 
 tatorship of Fabius that this battle was fought 
 That interval had been spent by the Roman 
 consuls who were in office during that time in 
 various military operations, which did not, how- 
 ever, lead to any decisive results. In the mean 
 time, there were great uneasiness, discontent, 
 and dissatisfaction at Rome. To have such a 
 dangerous and terrible foe, at the head of forty 
 thousand men, infesting the vicinage of theii
 
 186 HAHNIIAL. [B.C. 215 
 
 Btate of the public mind MRom*. n plbeln and patrician* 
 
 city, ravaging the territories of thoir friends and 
 allies, and threatening continually to attack the 
 city itself, was a continual source of anxiety 
 and vexation. It mortified the Roman pride, 
 too, to find that the greatest armies they could 
 raise, and the ablest generals they could choose 
 and commission, proved wholly unable to cope 
 with the foe. The most sagacious of them, in 
 fact, had felt it necessary to decline the contes* 
 with him altogether. 
 
 This state of things produced a great deal of 
 ill humor in the city. Party spirit ran very 
 high ; tumultuous assemblies were held ; dis- 
 putes and contentions prevailed, and mutuav 
 criminations and recriminations without end 
 There were two great parties formed : that of 
 the middling classes on one side, and the aris- 
 tocracy on the other. The former were called 
 the Plebeians, the latter the Patricians. The 
 division between these two classes was very 
 great and very strongly marked. There was, 
 in consequence of it, infinite difficulty in the 
 election of consuls. At last the consuls irere 
 chosen, one from each party. The name -f the 
 patrician was Paulus ./Emilius. The name of 
 the plebeian was Varro. They were inducted 
 irto office, and wero thus put jointly into po*
 
 B.C.215.J BATTLE or CANNJL 187 
 
 The consuls jEmilius and Varro. 
 
 of a vast power, to wield which with 
 any efficiency and success would seem to re- 
 quire union and harmony in those who held it, 
 and yet ,#5milms and Varro were inveterate 
 and implacable political foes. It was often so 
 in the Roman government. The consulship 
 was a double-headed monster, which spent half 
 its strength in bitter contests waged between 
 its members. 
 
 The Romans determined now to make an 
 effectual effort to rid themselves of their foe. 
 They raised an enormous army. It consisted 
 of eight legions. The Roman legion was an 
 army of itself. It contained ordinarily four 
 thousand foot soldiers, and a troop of throe 
 nundred horsemen. It was very unusual it 
 have more than two or three legions in the fie. 
 at a time. The Romans, however, on this oc- 
 casion, increased the number of the legions, and 
 also augmented their size, so that they contain- 
 ed, each, five thousand infantry and four hund- 
 red cavalry. They were determined to make 
 a great and last effort to defend their city, and 
 save the commonwealth from ruin. /Emilius 
 and Varro prepared to take command of thii 
 great force, with very strong determinations t* 
 make it the means of Hannibal's destruction.
 
 188 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 215 
 
 elf -confidence of Varro. Caution of JEmiHui 
 
 The characters of the two commanders, how- 
 ever, as well as their political connections, were 
 very dissimilar, and they soon began to mani- 
 fest a very different spirit, and to assume a 
 very different air and bearing, each from the 
 other. ^Emilius was a friend of Fabius, and 
 approved of his policy. Varro was for greater 
 promptness and decision. He made great prom- 
 ises, and spoke with the utmost confidence of 
 being able to annihilate Hannibal at a blow 
 He condemned the policy of Fabius in attempt- 
 ing to wear out the enemy by delays. He saiJ 
 it was a plan of the aristocratic party to pro- 
 tract the war, in order to put themselves in 
 high offices, and perpetuate their importance 
 and influence. The war might have been end- 
 ed long ago, he said ; and he would promise the 
 people that he would now end it, without fail, 
 the very day that he came in sight of Hannibal. 
 
 As for ^Emilius, he assumed a very different 
 tone. He was surprised, he said, that any man 
 could pretend to decide before he had even left 
 the city, and while he was, of course, entirely 
 ignorant, both of the condition of their own 
 army, and of the position, and designs, and 
 strength of the enemy, how soon and under 
 what circumstances it would be wise to give
 
 B.C. 215.] BATTLE OF UANWJJ. 189 
 
 Vlewi of <Emiliu. Counsel of Fabiiu 
 
 him battle. Plans must be formed in adaptation 
 to circumstances, as circumstances can not ba 
 made to alter to suit plans. He believed that 
 they should succeed in the encounter with 
 Hannibal, but he thought that their only hope 
 of success must be based on the exercise of 
 prudence, caution, and sagacity ; he was sure 
 that rashness and folly could only lead in fu- 
 ture, as they had always done in the past, to 
 discomfiture and ruin. 
 
 It is said that Fabius, the former dictator, 
 conversed with yEmilius before his departure 
 for the army, and gave him such counsel as his 
 age and experience, and his knowledge of the 
 character and operations of Hannibal, suggest- 
 ed to his mind. " If you had a colleague like 
 yourself," said he, " I would not offer you any 
 advice ; you would not need it. Or, if you 
 were yourself like your colleague, vain, self- 
 onceited, and presumptuous, then I would be 
 ilent; counsel would be thrown away upon 
 you. But as it is, while you have great judg- 
 ment and sagacity to guide you, you are to bo 
 placed in a situation of extreme difficulty and 
 peril. If I am not mistaken, the greatest diffi- 
 culty you will have to encounter will not be th 
 ooen enemy you are going to meet upon the
 
 190 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 215. 
 
 ConTertttion between Fabiu* and jRmfliu*. 
 
 field. Yoo will find, 1 think, that Varro will 
 give you quite as much trouble as Hannibal 
 He will be presumptuous, reckless, and head 
 strong. He will inspire all the rash and ardent 
 young men in the army with his ovrn enthusi 
 astio folly, and we shall be very fortunate if 
 we do not yet see the terrible and bloody scenes 
 of Lake Thrasymene acted again. I arn sure 
 that the true policy for us to adopt is the one 
 which I marked out. That is always the proper 
 course for the invaded to pursue with invaders, 
 where there is the least doubt of the success of 
 a battle. We grow strong while Hannibal 
 grows continually weaker by delay. He can 
 only prosper so long as he can fight battles and 
 perform brilliant exploits. If we deprive him 
 of this power, his strength will be continually 
 wasting away, and the spirit and courage of 
 his men waning. He has now scarce a third 
 part of the army Which he had when he crossed 
 the Iberus, and nothing can save this remnant 
 from destruction if we are wise." 
 
 ^Emilius said, in reply to this, that he went 
 into the contest with very little of encourage- 
 ment or hope. If Fabius had found it so diffi- 
 cult to withstand the turbulent influences of 
 hi* master of horse, who was his subordinate
 
 3.C. 215.J BATTL.K OF CANNA. 191 
 
 Resolution of Emilia*. Tho eonruLt join tin army. 
 
 officer, and, as such, under his command, how 
 could he expect to restrain his colleague, who 
 was entitled, by his office, to, full equality with 
 him. But, notwithstanding the difficulties which 
 be foresaw, he was going to do his duty, and 
 ibide by the result ; and if the result should be 
 unfavorable, he should seek for death in the con- 
 flict, for death by Carthaginian spears was a far 
 tighter evil, in his view, than the displeasure 
 and censures of his countrymen. 
 
 The consuls departed from Rome to join the 
 army, ./Emilius attended by a moderate number 
 of men of rank and station, and Varro by a much 
 larger train, though it was formed of people of 
 the lower classes of society. The army was or- 
 ganized, and the arrangements of the encamp- 
 ments perfected. One ceremony was that of ad 
 ministering an oath to the soldiers, as was usu 
 al in the Roman armies at the commencement 
 of a campaign. They were made to swear that 
 they would not desert the army, that they would 
 never abandon the post at which they were sta- 
 tioned in fear or in flight, nor leave the ranks ex- 
 cept for the purpose of taking up or recovering 
 a weapon, striking an enemy, or protecting 
 friend. These and other arrangements being 
 completed, the army was ready for tne field
 
 192 H ANN! HAL. (B.C. 216 
 
 Situation of Hannibal. Scarcity of food 
 
 The consuls made a different arrangement in 
 respect to the division of their power from that 
 adopted by Fabius and Flaminius. It was 
 agreed between them that they would exercise 
 their common authority alternately, each for a 
 iay. 
 
 In the mean time, Hannibal began to find him- 
 self reduced to great difficulty in obtaining pro- 
 visions for his men. The policy of Fabius had 
 been so far successful as to place him in a very 
 embarrassing situation, and one growing more 
 and more embarrassing every day. I T d coald 
 obtain no food except what he got by plunder, 
 and there was now very little opportunity for 
 that, as the inhabitants of the country had car- 
 ried off all the grain and deposited it in strong- 
 ly-fortified towns ; and though Hannibal had 
 great confidence in his power to cope with the 
 Roman army in a regular battle on an open 
 field, he had not strength sufficient to reduce 
 citadels or attack fortified camps. His stock 
 of provisions had become, therefore, more and 
 more nearly exhausted, until now he had a sup- 
 ply for only ton days, and he saw no possible 
 mode of increasing it. 
 
 His great object was, therefore, to bring :n 
 battle Varro was ready and willing to give
 
 B.C.215.] BATTLE op CANNJB. 193 
 
 Sufferings of Hannibal's troops. Defeat of a foraging party 
 
 him battle, but ^Emilius, or, to call him by his 
 name in full, Paulus ^Emilius, which is the ap- 
 pellation by which he is more frequently known, 
 was very desirous to persevere in the Fabian 
 policy till the ten days had expired, after whiob 
 he knew that Hannibal must be reduced to ex- 
 treme distress, and might have to surrender at 
 once to save his army from actual famine. In 
 fact, it was said that the troops were on such 
 short allowance as to produce great discontent, 
 and that a large body of Spaniards were pre- 
 paring to desert and go over together to the Ro- 
 man camp. 
 
 Things were in this state, when, one day, 
 Hannibal sent out a party from his camp to pro- 
 cure food, and ^Emilius, who happened to hold 
 the command that day, sent out a strong force 
 to intercept them. He was successful. The 
 Carthaginian detachment was routed. Near'y 
 two thousand men were killed, and the rest fled, 
 by any roads they could find, back to Hanni- 
 bal's camp. Varro was very eager to follow 
 them there, but JEmilius ordered his men to 
 halt. He was afraid of some trick or treachery 
 on the part of Hannibal, and was disposed to be 
 satisfied with the victory he had already won. 
 
 This little success, however, only inflamed 
 1413
 
 194 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 216 
 
 Hannibal'* pretended' abandonment of hia camp. 
 
 Varro's ardor for a battle, and produced a gen- 
 eral enthusiasm in the Roman army ; and, a day 
 or two afterward, a circumstance occurred which 
 raised this excitement to the highest pitch. 
 Some reconnoiterers, who had been stationed 
 within sight of Hannibal's camp to watch the 
 motions and indications there, sent in word to 
 the consuls that the Carthaginian guards around 
 their encampment had all suddenly disappeared, 
 and that a very extraordinary and unusual si- 
 lence reigned within. Parties of the Roman 
 soldiers went up gradually and cautiously to 
 the Carthaginian lines, and soon found that the 
 camp was deserted, though the fires were still 
 burning and the tents remained. This intelli- 
 gence, of course, put the whole Roman army 
 into a fever of excitement and agitation. They 
 crowded around the consuls' pavilions, and clam- 
 orously insisted on being led on to take posses- 
 sion of the camp, and to pursue the enemy. 
 " He has fled," they said, " and with such pre- 
 cipitation that he has left the tents standing and 
 his fires still burning. Lead us on in pursuit 
 rfhim.' 
 
 Varro was as much excited as the rest. He 
 was eager for action. JEmilius hesitated. He 
 made particular inquiries He said they ought
 
 B.C.215.] BATTLE OF CANNJE. 193 
 
 Mission of Statilin*. The stratagem discoTernd 
 
 to proceed with caution. Finally, he called up 
 a certain prudent and sagacious officer, named 
 Statilius, and ordered him to take a small body 
 f horsemen, ride over to the Carthaginian camp, 
 ascertain the facts exactly, and report the re- 
 milt. Statilius did so. When he reached the 
 lines he ordered his troops to halt, and took 
 with him two horsemen on whose courage and 
 strength he could rely, and rode in. The three 
 horsemen rode around the camp and examined 
 every thing with a view of ascertaining whether 
 Hannibal had really abandoned his position and 
 fled, or whether some stratagem was intended. 
 When he came back he reported to the army 
 that, in his opinion, the desertion of the camp 
 was not real, but a trick to draw the Romans 
 into some difficulty. The fires were the larg- 
 est on the side toward the Romans, which indi- 
 cated that they were built to deceive. He saw 
 money, too, and other valuables strewed about 
 upon the ground, which appeared to him much 
 more like a bait set in a trap, than like property 
 abandoned by fugitives as incumbrances to flight 
 Varrc was not convinced ; and the army, hear- 
 ing of the money, were excited to a greater ea- 
 gerness for plunder. They could hardly be re- 
 strained. Just then, however, two slaves thai
 
 196 HANNIBAL. IB.C.213 
 
 Chagrin of Hannibal and the Romans. Apvlta 
 
 had been taken prisoners by the Carthaginian* 
 some time before, came into the Roman camp. 
 They told the consuls that the whole Cartha- 
 ginian force was hid in ambush very near, wait- 
 ing for the Romans to enter their encampment, 
 when they were going to surround them and 
 cut them to pieces. In the bustle and move- 
 ment attendant on this plan, the slaves had es- 
 caped. Of course, the Roman army were now 
 satisfied. They returned, chagrined and dis- 
 appointed, to their own quarters, and Hannibal, 
 still more, chagrined and disappointed, returned 
 to his. 
 
 He soon found, however, that he could not 
 remain any longer where he was. His provis- 
 ions were exhausted, and he could obtain no 
 more. The Romans would not come out of 
 their encampment to give him battle on equal 
 terms, and they were too strongly intrenched 
 to be attacked where they were. He determ- 
 ined, therefore, to evacuate that part of the coun- 
 try, and move, by a sudden march, into Apulia. 
 
 Apulia was on the eastern side of Italy. The 
 River Aufidus runs through it, having a town 
 named Cannae near its mouth. The region of 
 the Aufidus was a warm and sunny valley, 
 which was now waving with ripening grain
 
 B.C.215.] BATTLE OF 
 
 Hannibal marches Into Apulia. The Roman* follow him. 
 
 Being further south than the place where ha 
 had been, and more exposed to the influence of 
 the sun, Hannibal thought that the crops would 
 be sooner ripe, and that, at least, he should have 
 a new field to plunder. 
 
 lie accordingly decided now to leave his camp 
 in earnest, and move into Apulia. He made 
 the same arrangements as before, when his de- 
 parture was a mere pretense. He left tents 
 pitched and fires burning, but marched his 
 army off the ground by night and secretly, so 
 that the Romans did not perceive his departure ; 
 and the next day, when they saw the appear 
 anoes of silence and solitude about the camp, 
 they suspected another deception, and made no 
 move themselves. At length, however, intel- 
 ligence came that the long columns of Hanni- 
 bal's army had been seen already far to the 
 eastward, and moving on as fast as possible, 
 with all their baggage. The Romans, after 
 much debate and uncertainty, resolved to fol- 
 low. The eagles of the Apennines looked down 
 upon the two great moving masses, creeping 
 slowly along through the forests and valleys, 
 like swarms of insects, one following the other 
 led on by a strange but strong attraction, draw- 
 Ing them toward each other when at a distance
 
 198 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 
 
 The new encampment*. Dissensions between the consult 
 
 but kept asunder by a still stronger repulsion 
 when near. 
 
 The Roman army came up with that of Kan- 
 nibal on the River Aufidus, near Canna?, and 
 the two vast encampments were formed with 
 all the noise and excitement attendant on the 
 movements of two great armies posting them- 
 selves on the eve of a battle, in the neighbor- 
 hood of each other. In the Roman camp, the 
 confusion was greatly aggravated by the angry 
 disputes which immediately arose between the 
 consuls and their respective adherents as to the 
 course to be pursued. Varro insisted on giv- 
 ing the Carthaginians immediate battle. ^Emil- 
 ius refused. Varro said that he must protest 
 against continuing any longer these inexcusa- 
 ble delays, and insist on a battle. He could 
 not consent to be responsible any further for 
 allowing Italy to lie at the mercy of such a 
 scourge. ^EmiKus replied, that if Varro did 
 precipitate a battle, he himse.f protested against 
 his rashness, and could not be, in any degree, 
 responsible for the result. The various officers 
 took sides, some with one consul and some with 
 the other, but most with Varro. The dissension 
 filled the camp with excitement, agitation, and 
 ill will.
 
 B.C. 215.1 BATTLE OF CANNES. 199 
 
 Flight at' the inhabitants. Maneuvers. 
 
 In the mean time, the inhabitants of the 
 country into which these two vast hordes oi 
 ferocious, though restrained and organized com- 
 batants, had made such a sudden irruption, 
 were flying as fast as they could from the aw- 
 ful scene which they expected was to ensue. 
 They carried from their villages and cabins 
 what little property could be saved, and took 
 the women and children away to retreats and 
 fastnesses, wherever they imagined they could 
 find temporary concealment or protection. The 
 news of the movement of the two armies spread 
 throughout the country, carried by hundreds oi 
 refugees and messengers, and all Italy, looking 
 on with suspense and anxiety, awaited the result 
 
 The armies maneuvered for a day or two, 
 Varro, during his term of command, making 
 arrangements to promote and favor an action, 
 and ^Emilius, on the following day, doing every 
 thing in his power to prevent it. In the end, 
 Varro succeeded The lines were formed and 
 the battle must be begun. ^Emilius gave up 
 the contest now, and while he protested earnest- 
 ly against the course which Varro pursued, ha 
 prepared to do all in his power to prevent a de- 
 feat, since there was no longer a possibility of 
 avoiding a collision.
 
 HANNIBAL. [B.C.215 
 
 The oattle of Cannae. Another itratafMQ 
 
 The battle began, and the reader must imag- 
 ine the scene, since no pen can describe it. Fif- 
 ty thousand men on one side and eighty thou- 
 sand on the other, at wcrk hard and steadily, 
 for six hours, killing each other by ever/ possi- 
 ble means of destruction stabs, blows, strug- 
 gles, outcries, shouts of anger and defiance, and 
 screams of terror and agony, all mingled to- 
 gether, in one general din, which covered the 
 whole country for an extent of many miles, all 
 together constituted a scene of horror of which 
 none but those who have witnessed great battles 
 can form any adequate idea. 
 
 It seems as if Hannibal could do nothing 
 without stratagem. In the early part of this 
 conflict he sent a large body of his troops over 
 to the Romans as deserters. They threw down 
 their spears and bucklers, as they reached the 
 Roman lines, in token of surrender. The Ro- 
 mans received them, opened a passage for them 
 through into the rear, and ordered them to re- 
 main there. As they were apparently unarm- 
 ed, they left only a very small guard to Keep 
 them in custody. The men had, however, dag 
 gers concealed about their dress, and, watcning 
 a favorable moment, in the midst of the battle, 
 they sprang to their feet, irew out their
 
 B.C 215.J BATTLE OF CANN.K. 20] 
 
 / 
 
 Defeat of the Romans. ^Emilias wounded 
 
 ons, broke away from their guard, and attacked 
 the Romans in the rear at a moment when they 
 were so pressed by the enemy in front that they 
 oould scarcely maintain their ground. 
 
 It was evident before many hours that the 
 Roman forces were every where yielding. From 
 slowly and reluctantly yielding they soon began 
 to fly. In the flight, the weak and the wound- 
 ed were trampled under foot by the throng who 
 were pressing on behind them, or were dispatch- 
 ed by wanton blows from enemies as they pass- 
 ed in pursuit of those who were still able to fly. 
 In the midst of this scene, a Roman officer nam- 
 ed Lentulus, as he was riding away, saw before 
 him at the road-side another officer wounded, 
 sitting upon a stone, faint and bleeding. He 
 stopped when ho reached him, and found that it 
 was the consul ^Emilius. He had been wound- 
 ed in the head with a sling, and his strength 
 was almost gone. Lentulus offered him hia 
 horse, and urged him to take it and fly. ^Emil- 
 ias declined the offer. He said it was too late 
 for his life to be saved, and that, besides, he had 
 no wish to save it. " Go on, therefore, your- 
 self," said he, " as fast as you can. Make the 
 oest of your way to Rome. Tell the authorities 
 there, from mo, that all is lost, and they must
 
 202 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 215 
 
 Death of J-'rniliuB Escape of Van*. 
 
 do whatever they can themselves for the defense 
 of the city. Make all the speed you can, or 
 Hannibal will be at the gates before you." 
 
 jEmilius sent also a message to Fabius, de 
 Blaring to him that it was not his fault that a 
 battle had been risked with Hannibal. He had 
 done all in his power, he said, to prevent it, and 
 had adhered to the policy which Fabius had 
 recommended to the last. Lentulus having re- 
 ceived these messages, and perceiving that the 
 Carthaginians were close upon him in pursuit, 
 rode away, leaving the consul to his fate. The 
 Carthaginians came on, and, on seeing the 
 wounded man, they thrust their spears into his 
 body, one after another, as they passed, until 
 his limbs ceased to quiver. As for the other 
 consul, Varro, he escaped with his life. At- 
 tended by about seventy horsemen, he made his 
 way to a fortified town not very remote from 
 the battle-field, where he halted with his horse- 
 men, and determined that he would attempt i 
 rally there the remains of the army. 
 
 The Carthaginians, when they found the vi<v 
 tory complete, abandoned the pursuit of the en- 
 emy, returned to their camp, spent some hours 
 in feasting and rejoicing, and then laid down to 
 tletjp. They were, of course, \veJ. exhausted
 
 B.C. 215.] BATTLE OF CANN*. 203 
 
 Condition of the battle-field. The wounded and dying 
 
 by the intense exertions of the day. On th 
 fieH where the battle had been fonght, the 
 wounded lay all night mingled with the dead, 
 filling the air with cries and groans, and writh- 
 ing in their agony. 
 
 Early the next morning the Carthaginians 
 oame back to the field to plunder the dead bod- 
 ies of the Romans. The whole field presented 
 a most shocking spectacle to the view. The 
 bodies of horses and men lay mingled in dread- 
 ful confusion, as they had fallen, some dead, oth- 
 ers still alive, the men moaning, crying for wa- 
 ter, and feebly struggling from time to time to 
 disentangle themselves from the heaps of car- 
 casses under which they were buried. The dead- 
 ly and inextinguishable hate which the Cartha- 
 ginians felt for their foes not having been ap- 
 peased by the slaughter of forty thousand of 
 them, they beat down and stabbed these wretch- 
 ed lingerers wherever they found them, as a sort 
 of morning pastima after the severer labor? of 
 the preceding day. This slaughter, howe\w, 
 eould hardly be considered a cruelty to the 
 wretched victims of it, for many of them bared 
 their breasts to their assailants, and begged for 
 the blow which was to put an end to their pain. 
 In exploring the field, one Carthaginian soldiei
 
 204 HANNIBAL [B.C. 215 
 
 The Roman and Carthaginian soldier. Immense plunder 
 
 was found still alive, but imprisoned by the dead 
 body of his Roman enemy lying upon him. The 
 Carthaginian's face and ears were shockingly 
 mangled. The Roman, having fallen upon hirr 
 when both were mortally wounded, had contin- 
 ued the combat with his teeth when ho could 
 no longer use his weapon, and had died at last, 
 binding down his exhausted enemy with his own 
 dead body. 
 
 The Carthaginians secured a vast amount of 
 plunder. The Roman army was full of officers 
 and soldiers from the aristocratic ranks of soci- 
 ety, and their arms and their dress were very 
 valuable. The Carthaginians obtained some 
 bushels of gold rings from their fingers, which 
 Hannibal sent to Carthage aa a trophy of hi* 
 victory
 
 B.C.213.J SCIFIO. 205 
 
 Heaoon of IlannibuTt imcee**. The Hclpto* 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 SCIPIO 
 
 rilHE trae reason why Hannibal oould not 
 be arrested in his triumphant career seems 
 not to have been because the Romans did not 
 pursue the right kind of policy toward him, but 
 because, thus far, they had no general who was 
 his equal. Whoever was sent against him soon 
 proved to be his inferior. Hannibal oould out- 
 maneuver them all in stratagem, and could con- 
 quer them on the field. There was, however, 
 now destined to appear a man capable of coping 
 with Hannibal. It was young Scipio, the one 
 who saved the life of his father at the battle of 
 Ticinus. This Scipio, though the son of Han- 
 nibal's first great antagonist of that name, is 
 commonly called, in history, the elder Scipio; 
 for there was another of his name after him, 
 who was greatly celebrated for his wars against 
 the Carthaginians in Africa. These last two 
 received from the Roman people the surname 
 of Africanus, in honor of their African victories, 
 the one who now comes upon the stage was
 
 206 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 215 
 
 Fragment! of the Roman army. Scipio elected commander 
 
 called Scipio Africanus the elder, or sometimes 
 simply the elder Scipio. The deeds of the Scipio 
 who attempted to stop Hannibal at the Rhone 
 and upon the Po were so wholly eclipsed by 
 his son, and by the other Scipio who followed 
 him, that the former is left out of view and 
 forgotten in designating and distinguishing the 
 others. 
 
 Our present Scipio first appears upon thfe 
 stage, in the exercise of military command, aft- 
 er the battle of Cannae. He was a subordinate 
 officer and on the day following the battle he 
 found himseif at a place called Canusium, which 
 was at a short distance from Cannae, on the way 
 toward Rome, with a number of other officers 
 of his own rank, and with broken masses and 
 detachments of the army coming in from time 
 to time, faint, exhausted, and in despair. The 
 rumor was that both consuls were killed. These 
 fragments of the army had, therefore, no one to 
 command them. The officers met together, and 
 unanimously agreed to make Scipio their corn- 
 nander in the emergency, until seme superior 
 officer should arrive, or they shou d get orders 
 from Rome. 
 
 An incident here occurred which showed) in 
 a striking point of view, the boldness and energy
 
 B.C.215.J SCIPIO. 207 
 
 Scipio'g energy. Cace of Metellu* 
 
 of the young Scipio's character. At the very 
 meeting in which he was placed in command, 
 and when they were overwhelmed with perplex- 
 ity and care, an officer came in, and reported 
 that in another part of the camp there was an 
 assembly of officers and young men of rank, 
 headed by a certain Metellus, who had decided 
 to give up the cause of their country in despair, 
 And that they were making arrangements to 
 proceed immediately to the sea-coast, obtain 
 ships, and sail away to seek a new home in 
 some foreign lands, considering their cause in 
 Italy as utterly lost and ruined. The officer 
 proposed that they should call a council and de- 
 liberate what was best to do. 
 
 " Deliberate !" said Scipio ; " this is not a 
 case for deliberation, but for action. Draw your 
 swords and follow me." So saying, he pressed 
 forward at the head of the party to the quarters 
 of Metellus. They marched boldly into the 
 apartment where he and his friends we B in con- 
 sultation. Scipio held up his sword, and in * 
 rt;ry solemn manner pronounced an oath, bind- 
 ing himself not to abandon his country in this 
 the hour of her distress, nor to allow any other 
 Roman citizen to abandon her. If he should be 
 guilty of such treason, he called upon Jupiter, b>
 
 208 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 
 
 Metelhu yield*. Consternation at Rom 
 
 the most dreadful imprecations, to destroy him 
 utterly, house, family, fortune, soul, and body. 
 
 " And now, M^tellus, I call upon you," said 
 he, "and all who are with you, to take the 
 same oath. You must do it, otherwise you 
 have got to defend yourselves against these 
 swords of ours, as well as those of the Cartha- 
 ginians." Metellus and his party yielded. Nor 
 was it wholly to fear that they yielded. It was 
 to the influence of hope quite as much as to 
 that of fear. The courage, the energy, and the 
 martial ardor which Scipio's conduct evinced 
 awakened a similar spirit in them, and mado 
 them hope again that possibly their country 
 might yet be saveil. 
 
 The news of the awful defeat and destruction 
 of the Roman army flew swiftly to Rome, and 
 produced universal consternation. The whole 
 city was in an uproar. There were soldiers in 
 the army from almost every family, so that ev- 
 ery woman and child throughout the city was 
 distracted by the double agitation of inconsola- 
 ble grief at the death of their husband or their 
 father, slain in the battle, and of terrible fear 
 that Hannibal and his raging followers worn 
 about to burst in through the gates of the city 
 to murder them. The streets of the city, anc?
 
 B.C. 215. J BCIPIO. 209 
 
 The senate adjourn*. Hannibal refuse* to march to Roma 
 
 especially the Forum, were thronged with vast 
 crowds of men, women, and children, who filled 
 the air with loud lamentations, and with crie 
 of terror and despair. 
 
 The magistrates were not able to restore 01- 
 aer. The senate actually adjourned, that the 
 members of it migtrt go about the city, and use 
 their influence and their power to produce si- 
 lence at least, if they could not restore compos- 
 ure. The streets were finally cleared. The 
 women and children were ordered to remain at 
 home. Armed patrols were put on guard to 
 prevent tumultuous assemblies forming. Men 
 Were sent off on horseback on the road to Canu- 
 gium and Cannae, to get more accurate intelli- 
 gence, and then the senate assembled again, and 
 began to consider, with as much of calmness as 
 they could command, what was to be done. 
 
 The panic at Rome was, however, in some 
 measure, a false aarm, for Hannibal, contrary 
 to the expectation of all Italy, did not go to 
 Rome. His generals urged him very strongly 
 to do sc Nothing could prevent, they said, his 
 gaining immediate possession of the city. But 
 Hannibal refused to do this. Rome was strongly 
 fortified, and had an immense population. His 
 army, too, was much weakened bv the battle of 
 
 1414
 
 210 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 214 
 
 Hannibal makes hig head-quarters at Capua. 
 
 Cannae, and he seems to have thought it moat 
 prudent not to attempt the redaction of Rome 
 until he should have received re-enforcements 
 from home. It was now so late in the season 
 that he could not expect such re-enforcementa 
 immediately, and he accordingly determined to 
 gelect some place more accessible than Rome 
 and make it his head-quarters for the winter 
 He decided in favor of Capua, which was a 
 large and powerful city one or two hundred 
 miles southeast of Rome. 
 
 Hannibal, in fact, conceived the design of re- 
 taining possession of Italy and of making Capua 
 the capital of the country, leaving Rome to it- 
 self, to decline, as under such circumstances it 
 inevitably must, to the rank of a second city. 
 Perhaps he was tired of the fatigues and haz- 
 ards of war, and having narrowly escaped ruin 
 before the battle of Cannae, he now resolved that 
 he would not rashly incur any new dangers. 
 It was a great question with him whether he 
 should go forward to Rome, or attempt to build 
 up a new capital of his own at Capua. The 
 question which of these two he ought to have 
 done was a matter of groat debate then, and it 
 has been discussed a great deal by military men 
 In every age since his day. Rigfct or wrong,
 
 B.C. 214] SCIPIO. 211 
 
 Hannibal sends Mago to Carthage. Mage's speech 
 
 Hannibal decided to establish his own capital 
 at Capua, and to leave. Rome, for tho present, 
 undisturbed. 
 
 He, however, sent immediately to Carthage 
 for re-enforcements. The messenger whom he 
 sent was one of his generals named Mago. 
 Mago made the best of his way to Carthage 
 with his tidings of victory and his bushel of 
 rings, collected, as has been already said, from 
 the field of Canme. The city of Carthage was 
 greatly excited by the news \vhich he brought. 
 The friends and patrons of Hannibal were elat- 
 ed with enthusiasm and pride, and they taunt- 
 ed and reproached his enemies with the opposi- 
 tion to him they had manifested when he was 
 originally appointed to the command of the ar- 
 my of Spain. 
 
 Mago met the Carthaginian senate, and in a 
 very spirited and eloquent speech he told them 
 how many glorious battles Hannibal had fuught, 
 and how many victories he had won. He had 
 contended with the greatest generals that the 
 Romans could bring against him, and had con- 
 quered them all. He had slain, ^e said, in all, 
 ovei two hundred thousand men. All Italy was 
 now subject to his power ; Capua, was his capi 
 tai, and Rome had fallen. He concluded bv
 
 212 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 214 
 
 The big of ring*. Debate In the Carthaginian senito 
 
 saying that Hannibal was in need of considera- 
 ble additional supplies of men, and money, and 
 provisions, which he did not doubt the Cartha- 
 ginians would send without any unnecessary 
 delay. He then produced before the senate the 
 great bag of rings which he had brought, and 
 poured them upon the pavement of the senate- 
 house as a trophy of the victories which he had 
 been announcing. 
 
 This would, perhaps, have all been very well 
 for Hannibal if his friends had been contented 
 to have left the case where Mago left it; but 
 some of them could not resist the temptation of 
 taunting his enemies, and especially Hanno, 
 who, as will be recollected, originally opposed 
 his being sent to Spain. They turned to him, 
 and asked him triumphantly what he thought 
 now of his factious opposition to so brave a 
 warrior. Hanno rose. The senate looked to- 
 ward him and were profoundly silent, wonder- 
 ing what he would have co reply. Hanno, 
 with an air of perfect ease and composure, 
 .poke somewhat as follows : 
 
 " I should have said nothing, but should have 
 allowed the senate to take what action they 
 oleased on Mago's proposition if I had not been 
 particularly addressed. As it is, I will say that
 
 BC. 214.] SCIPIO. 213 
 
 The speech of Hanno in the Carthaginian lenate. 
 
 [ think now just as I always have thought 
 We are plunged into a most costly and most 
 aseless war, and are, as I conceive, no nearer 
 the end of it now than ever, notwithstanding 
 all these boasted successes. The emptiness of 
 them is clearly shown by the inconsistency of 
 Hannibal's pretensions as to what he has dona, 
 with the demands that he makes in respect tc 
 what he wishes us to do. He says he has con- 
 quered all his enemies, and yet he wants us to 
 send him more soldiers. He has reduced all 
 Italy the most fertile country in the world 
 to subjection, and reigns over it at Capua, and 
 yet he calls upon us for corn. And then, to 
 crown all, he sends us bushels of gold rings as 
 a specimen of the riches he has obtained by 
 plunder, and accompanies the offering with a 
 demand for new supplies of money. In my 
 opinion, his success is all illusive and bollow. 
 There seems to be nothing substantial in hia 
 situation except his necessities, and the heavy 
 burdens upon the state which these necessities 
 impose." 
 
 Notwithstanding Hanno's sarcasms, the Car- 
 thaginians resolved to sustain Hannibal, and tc 
 send him the supplies that he needed. They 
 were, however, long in reaching him. Vanoui
 
 214 HANNIBAL. [B.C.214 
 
 Progress of the war. Enervation of Hannibal's army 
 
 difficulties and delays occurred. The Romans 
 though they could not dispossess Hannibal frorr 
 his position in Italy, raised armies in different 
 countries, and waged extended wars with the 
 Carthaginians and their allies, in various parts 
 of the world, both by sea and land. 
 
 The result was, that Hannibal remained fif- 
 teen or sixteen years in Italy r engaged, during 
 all this time, in a lingering struggle with the 
 Roman power, without ever being able to ac- 
 complish any decisive measures. During this 
 period he was sometimes successful and victori- 
 ous, and sometimes he was very hard pressed 
 by his enemies. It is said that his army was 
 very much enervated and enfeebled by the com- 
 forts and luxuries they enjoyed at Capua. Cap- 
 ua was a very rich and beautiful city, and the 
 inhabitants of it had opened their gates to Han- 
 nibal of their own accord, preferring, as they 
 said, his alliance to that of the Romans. Tha 
 officers as the officers of an army almost al- 
 ways do, when they find themselves established 
 in a rich and powerful city, after the fatigues 
 of a long and honorable campaign gave them- 
 selves- up to festivities and rejoicing, to games, 
 shows, and entertainments of every kind,, which 
 they soon learned infinitely to prefer to the tt>4 
 and danger of marches and battles.
 
 B.C.214.) SCIPIO. 21 
 
 Decline of the Carthaginian power. MaroeJu* 
 
 Whatever may have been the cause, there is 
 no question about the fact that, from the time 
 Hannibal and his array got possession of their 
 aomfortable quarters in Capua, the Carthagin- 
 ian power began gradually to decline. As Han- 
 nibal determined to make that city the Italian 
 capital instead of Rome, he, of course, when es- 
 tablished there, felt in some degree settled and 
 at home, and was less interested than he had 
 been in plans for attacking the ancient capital 
 Still, the war went on; many battles were 
 fought, many cities were besieged, the Roman 
 power gaining ground all the time, though not, 
 however, by any very decisive victories. 
 
 In these contests there appeared, at length, a 
 new Roman general named Marcellus, and, ei- 
 ther on account of his possessing a bolder and 
 more active temperament, or else in consequence 
 of the change in the relative strength of the two 
 contending powers, he pursued a more aggress- 
 ive policy than Fabius had thought it prudent 
 to attempt. Marcellus was, however, cautious 
 and wary in his enterprises, and he laid his 
 plans with so much sagacity and skill that he 
 was almost always successful. The Romans 
 applauded very highly his activity and ardor, 
 without, hcwever, forgetting their obligation*
 
 216 HANNIBAL. fRC.214 
 
 Success of the Romans. Sx?ge of Opu 
 
 to Fabius for his caution and defensive reserve. 
 They said that Marcellus was the sword of 
 their commonwealth, as Fabius had been ita 
 ihield. 
 
 The Romans continued to prosecute this sort 
 of warfare, being more and more successful the 
 longer they continued it, until, at last, they ad- 
 vanced to the very walls, of Capua, and threat- 
 ened it with a siege. Hannibal's intrenohments 
 and fortifications were too strong for them to 
 attempt to carry the city by a sudden assault, 
 nor were the Romans even powerful enough to 
 invest the place entirely, so as completely to 
 shut their enemies in. They, however, en- 
 camped with a large army in the neighbor- 
 hood, and assumed so threatening an attitude 
 as to keep Hannibal's forces within in a state 
 of continual alarm. And, besides the alarm, it 
 was very humiliating and mortifying to Car- 
 thaginian pride to find the very seat of their 
 power, as it were, shut up and overawed by an 
 wiemy over whom they had been triumphing 
 themselves so short a time before, by a contin- 
 ued series of victories. 
 
 Hannibal was not himself in Capua at the 
 time that the Romans came to attack it. He 
 marchtxL however, immediately to its relief, and
 
 B.C. 214.] SCIPIO. 217 
 
 Hannibal'* attack on the Roman camp. He marche* to Rome, 
 
 attacking the Romans in his turn, endeavored 
 to compel them to raise the siege, as it is tech 
 nically termed, and retire. They had, however, 
 so intrenched themselves in the positions that 
 they had taken, and the assaults with which he 
 encountered them had lost so much of their 
 former force, that he could accomplish nothing 
 decisive. He then left the ground with his 
 army, and marched himself toward Rome. He 
 encamped in the vicinity of the city, and threat- 
 ened to attack it; but the walls, and castles, 
 and towers with which Rome, as well as Capua, 
 was defended, were too formidable, and the 
 preparations for defense too complete, to make 
 it prudent for him really to assail the city. His 
 object was to alarm the Romans, and compel 
 them to withdraw their forces from his capital 
 that they might defend their own. 
 
 There was, in fact, some degree of alarm 
 awakened, and in the discussions which took 
 place among the Roman authorities, the with- 
 drawal of their troops from Capua was propos- 
 ed ; but this proposal was overruled ; even Fa- 
 bras was against it. Hannibal was no longer 
 to be feared. They ordered back a small de- 
 tachment from Capua, and added to it such 
 forces as they could raise within tie city, and
 
 218 HANNIBAL [B.C. 214 
 
 Preparation* for a battle. Prevented by storm* 
 
 then advanced to give Hannibal battle. Tiw 
 preparations were all made, it is said, for an en- 
 gag sment, but a violent storm came on, so vio- 
 lent as to drive the combatants back to their 
 respective camps. This happened, the great 
 Roman historian gravely says, two or three 
 times in succession ; tbe weather immediately 
 becoming serene again, each time, as soon as 
 the respective generals had withdrawn their 
 troops from the intended fight. Something like 
 this may perhaps have occurred, though the 
 fact doubtless was that both parties were 
 afraid, each of the other, and were disposed to 
 avail themselves of any excuse to postpone a 
 decisive conflict. There was a time when Han- 
 nibal had not been deterred from attacking the 
 Romans even by the most tempestuous storms 
 Thus, though Hannibal did, in fact, in the 
 end, get to the walls of Rome, he did nothing 
 but threaten when he was there, and his en- 
 campment near the city can only be considered 
 as a bravado. His presence seems to have ex- 
 oited very littie apprehension within the city 
 The Romans had, in fact, before this time, lost 
 their terror of the Carthaginian arms. To snow 
 their contempt of Hannibal, they sold, at public 
 cotion the land on which Lt> was encamped,
 
 liX K)6.] SCIPJO. 219 
 
 MM it Action. HMdrubal eroMe* the Alps 
 
 while he was upon it besieging the city, and it 
 brought the usual price. The bidders were, 
 perhaps, influenced somewhat by a patriotic 
 spirit, and by a desire to taunt Hannibal with 
 in expression of their opinion that his occupa- 
 tion of the land would be a very temporary en- 
 cumbrance. Hannibal, to revenge himself for 
 this taunt, put up for sale at auction, in his own 
 camp, the shops of one of the principal streets 
 of Rome, and they were bought by his officers 
 with great spirit. It showed that a great change 
 had taken place in the nature of the contest be- 
 tween Carthage and Rome, to find these vast 
 powers, which were a few years before grap- 
 pling each other with such destructive and ter- 
 rible fury on the Po and at Cannae, now satis- 
 fying their declining animosity with such squib- 
 bing as this. 
 
 When the other modes by which Hannibal 
 attempted to obtain re-enforcements failed, he 
 made an attempt to have a second army brought 
 over the Alps under the command of his broth- 
 er Hasdrubal. It was a large army, and in their 
 march they experienced the same difficulties, 
 though hi a much lighter degree, that Hanniba. 
 had himself encountered. And yet, of the whole 
 mighty mass which set out from Spain, noth-
 
 220 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 206 
 
 Liriw and Nero. Division of the province* 
 
 ing reached Hannibal except his brother's head, 
 The circumstances of the unfortunate termina- 
 tion of Hasdrubal's attempt were as follows : 
 
 When Hasdrubal descended from the Alps, 
 rejoicing in the successful manner in which he 
 had surmounted those formidable barriers, he 
 imagined that .all his difficulties were over. He 
 dispatched couriers to his brother Hannibal, in 
 forming him that he had scaled "the mountains, 
 ind that he was coming on as rapidly as possi- 
 ble to his aid. 
 
 The two consuls in office at this time were 
 named, the one Nero, and the other Livius 
 To each of these, as was usual with the Roman 
 consuls, was assigned a particular province, and 
 a certain portion of the army to defend it, and 
 the laws enjoined it upon them very strictly not 
 to leave their respective provinces, on any pre- 
 text whatever, without authority from the Ro- 
 man Legislature. In this instance Livius had 
 oeen assigned to the northern part of Italy, and 
 Nero to the southern. It devolved upon Livius, 
 therefore, to meet and give battle to HasdrubaJ 
 on his descent from the Alps, and to Nero tc 
 remain in the vicinity of Hannibal, to thwart 
 his plans, oppose his progress, and, if possible, 
 conquer and destroy him, while his colleague
 
 S.C.206.J dcipio. 221 
 
 The Intercepted letters. Nero's perplexity 
 
 prevented his receiving the expected re-enforce- 
 ments from Spain. 
 
 Things being in this state, the couriers whom 
 Hasdrubal sent with his letters had the vigi- 
 lance of both consuls to elude before they could 
 deliver them into Hannibal's hands. They did 
 succeed in passing Livius, but they were inter- 
 cepted by Nero. The patrols who seized these 
 messengers brought them to Nero's tent. Nero 
 opened and read the letters. All Hasdrubal's 
 plans and arrangements were detailed in them 
 very fully, so that Nero perceived that, if he 
 were at once to proceed to the northward with 
 a strong force, he could render his colleague such 
 aid as, with the knowledge of Hasdrubal's plans, 
 which he had obtained from the letters, would 
 probably enable them to defeat him ; whereas, 
 if he were to leave Livius in ignorance and 
 alone, he feared that Hasdrubal would be suc- 
 cessful in breaking his way through, and in ulti- 
 mately effecting his junction with Hannibal. 
 Under these circumstances, he was, of course, 
 rery earnestly desirous of going northward to 
 render the necessary aid, but he was strictly for- 
 bidden by law to leave his own province to entei 
 that of his colleague without an authority from 
 Rome, which there was not now time to obtain
 
 222 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 21)6 
 
 Laws of military discipline. Their strictness and < verity 
 
 The laws of military discipline are very strict 
 and imperious, and in theory they are never to 
 be disobey ed. Officers and soldiers, of all ranks 
 and gradations, must obey the orders which they 
 receive from the authority above them, without 
 looking at the consequences, or deviating from 
 the line marked out on any pretext whatever. 
 It is, in fact, the very essence of military sub- 
 ordination and efficiency, that a command, once 
 given, suspends all exercise of judgment or di 
 cretion on the part of the one to whom it is ad 
 dressed ; and a good general or a good govern 
 ment would prefer generally that harm should 
 be done by a strict obedience to commands, 
 rather than a benefit secured by an unauthor- 
 ized deviation from them. It is a good prin- 
 ciple, not only ir war, but in all those cases in 
 social life where men have to act in concert, and 
 yet wish to secure efficiency in action. 
 
 And yet there are cases of exception case* 
 where the necessity is so urgent, or the advant- 
 iges to be derived are so great ; where the in 
 terests involved are so momentous, and the suc- 
 cess so sure, that a commander cone udes to 
 disobey and take the responsibility. The re 
 ponsibility is, however, very great, and the 
 danger in assuming it extreme. He who in-
 
 BC.206.] SCIPIO. 223 
 
 Danger of violating discipline. An illustration. 
 
 curs it makes himself liable to the severest 
 penalties, from which nothing but clear proof 
 of the most imperious necessity, and, in addi- 
 tion to it, the most triumphant success, can sav* 
 him. There is somewhere in English history 
 & story of a naval commander, in the service of 
 an English queen, who disobeyed the orders of 
 his superiors at one time, in a case of great 
 emergency at sea, and gained by so doing a very 
 important victory. Immediately afterward he 
 placed himself under arrest, and went into port 
 as a prisoner accused of crime instead of a com- 
 mander triumphing in his victory. He sur- 
 rendered himself to the queen's officers of jus- 
 tice, and sent word to the queen herself that he 
 knew very well that death was the penalty for 
 his offense, but that he was willing to sacrifice 
 his life in any way in the service of her majesty. 
 He was pardoned ! 
 
 Nero, after much anxious deliberation, con 
 eluded that the emergency in which he found 
 himself placed was one requiring him to take 
 the responsibility of disobedience. He did not, 
 however, dare to go northward with all his for- 
 ces, for that would be to leave southern Italy 
 wholly at the mercy of Hannibal. He selected, 
 therefore, from his whole force, which consisted
 
 224 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 206 
 
 Plan* of Nero. A nL'ht nirircK. 
 
 of forty thousand men, seven or eight thousand 
 of the most efficient and trustworthy ; the men 
 on whom he could most securely rely, both in 
 respect to their ability to bear the fatigues of 
 a rapic* march, and the courage and energy \* ith 
 which they would meet Hasdrubal's forces in 
 battle at the end of it. He was, at the time 
 when Hasdrubal's letters were intercepted, oc- 
 cupying a spacious and well-situated camp. 
 This he enlarged and strengthened, so that 
 Hannibal might not suspect that he intended 
 any diminution of the forces within. All this 
 was done very promptly, so that, in a few hours 
 after he received the intelligence on which he 
 was acting, he was drawing off secretly, at 
 night, a column of six or eight thousand men, 
 none of whom knew at all where they were g<ing. 
 
 He proceeded as rapidly as possible to the 
 northward, aad, when he arrived in the north- 
 ern province, he contrived to get into the camp 
 of Livius as secretly as he had got out from H 
 own. Thus, of the two armies, the one where 
 an accession of force was required was gnatly 
 strengthened at the expense of the other, with- 
 out either of the Carthaginian generals having 
 suspected the change. 
 
 Livius was rejoiced to get so ODDortune a re.
 
 B.C. 206.] SCIPIO. 
 
 Liviu* and Nero attack EaidmbaL Haodmbal orders a retreat 
 
 enforcement. He recommended that the troops 
 should all remain quietly in camp for a short 
 tim% until the newly-arrived troops could rest 
 am J recruit themselves a little after their rapid 
 and fatiguing march ; but Nero opposed this 
 plan, and recommended an immediate battle. 
 He knew the character of the men that he had 
 brought, and he was, besides, unwilling to risk 
 the dangers which might arise in his own camp. 
 in southern Italy, by too long an absence from 
 it. It was decided, accordingly, to attack Has- 
 drubal at once, and the signal for battle was 
 given. 
 
 It is not improbable that Hasdrubal would 
 have been beaten by Livius alone, but the ad- 
 ditional force which Nero had brought made 
 the Romans altogether too strong for him. Be- 
 sides, from his position in the front of the bat- 
 tle, he perceived, from some indications that his 
 watchful eye observed, that a part of the troops 
 attacking him were from the southward ; and 
 he inferred from this that Hannibal had been 
 defeated, and that, in consequence of this, the 
 whole united force of the Roman army was ar- 
 rayed against him. He was disheartened and 
 discouraged, and soon ordered a retreat. He 
 was pursued by the various divisions of thfl Ro 
 1415
 
 226 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 206 
 
 Butchery of HaMrubal'g army. Hasdrnbal'i death 
 
 man army, and the retreating colurins of the 
 Carthaginians were soon thrown into complete 
 confusion. They became entangled among riv- 
 ers and lakes ; and the guides who had under- 
 taken to conduct the army, finding that all waa 
 lost, abandoned them and fled, anxious only to 
 eave their own lives. The Carthaginians were 
 toon pent up in a position where they could not 
 defend themselves, and from which they could 
 not escape. The Romans showed them no mer- 
 cy, but went on killing their wretched and de- 
 spairing victims until the whole army was al- 
 most totally destroyed. They cut off Hasdru- 
 bal's head, and Nero sat out the very night after 
 the battle to return with it in triumph to his own 
 encampment. When he arrived, he sent a troop 
 }f horse to throw the head over into Hannibal's 
 camp, a ghastly and horrid trophy of his victory 
 
 Hannibal was overwhelmed with disappoint 
 ment and sorrow at the loss of his army, bring 
 ing with it, as it did, the destruction of all hit 
 hopes. " My fate is sealed," said he : " all is lost. 
 I shall send no more news of victory to Car- 
 thage. In losing Hasdrubal my last hope is gone." 
 
 While Hannibal was in this condition in Ita- 
 ly, the Roman armies, aided by their allies, were 
 gaining gradually against the Carthaginians in
 
 B.C. 204. j Seine. 229 
 
 Progress of the Roman arm*. Successes of Sciplo 
 
 various parts of the world, under the different 
 generals who had been placed in command by 
 the Roman senate. The news of these victories 
 came continually home to Italy, and encouraged 
 and animated the Romans, while Hannibal ant) 
 his army, as well as the people who were in al 
 liance with him, were disheartened and depress 
 ed by them. Scipio was one of these generab 
 commanding in foreign lands. His province wai 
 Spain. The news which came home from his 
 army became more and more exciting, as he 
 advanced from conquest to conquest, until it 
 seemed that the whole country was going to be 
 reduced to subjection. He overcame one Car- 
 thaginian general after another until he reached 
 New Carthage, which he besieged and conquer- 
 ed, and the Roman authority was established 
 fully over the whole land. 
 
 Scipio then returned in triumph to Rome 
 The people received him with acclamations 
 At the next election they chose him consul 
 On the allotment of provinces, Sicily fell to him, 
 with power to cross into Africa if he pleased. 
 It devolved on the other consul to carry on the 
 war in Italy more directly against Haniibal 
 Scipio levied his army, equipped his fleet, and 
 Railed for Sicily
 
 230 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 204 
 
 fldplo In Africa. Carthage threatened 
 
 The first thing that he did on his arrival in 
 hu province was to project an expedition into 
 Africa itself. He could not, as he wished, face 
 Hannibal directly, by marching his troops into 
 the south of Italy, for this was the work allotted 
 u> his colleague. He could, however, make an 
 incursion into Africa, and even threaten Car- 
 thage itself, and this, with the boldness and ardor 
 which marked his character, he resolved to do. 
 
 He was triumphantly successful in all his 
 plans. His army, imbibing the spirit of enthu- 
 siasm which animated theii commander, and 
 confident of success, went on, as his forces in 
 Spain had done, from victory to victory. They 
 conquered cities, they overran provinces, they 
 defeated and drove back all the armies which 
 the Carthaginians could bring against them, 
 and finally they awakened in the streets and 
 dwellings of Carthage the same panic and con- 
 ternation which Hannibal's victorious progress 
 had produced in Rome. 
 
 The Carthaginians being now, in thoir turn, 
 y educed to despair, sent embassadors to Scipio 
 to beg for peace, and to ask on what terms he 
 would grant it and withdraw from the country 
 Scipio replied that he could not make peace 
 It rested with the Roman senate, whose servant
 
 B.C 204.] SCIPIO. 231 
 
 Hannibal recalled 
 
 he was. He specified, however, certain terms 
 which he was willing to have proposed to the 
 senate, and, if the Carthaginians would agree 
 tc them, he would grant them a truce, that is, 
 ft temporary suspension of hostilities, until the 
 answer of the Roman senate could be returned. 
 
 The Carthaginians agreed to the terms. They 
 were very onerous. The Romans say that they 
 did not really mean to abide by them, but ac- 
 ceded for the moment in order to gain time to 
 end for Hannibal. They had great confidence 
 in his resources and military power, and thought 
 that, if he were in Africa, he could save them. 
 At the same time, therefore, that they sent their 
 ambassadors to Rome with their propositions for 
 peace, they dispatched expresses to Hannibal, 
 ordering him to embark his troops as soon as 
 possible, and, abandoning Italy, to hasten home, 
 to save, if it was not already too late, his native 
 city from destruction. 
 
 When Hannibal received these messages, he 
 was overwhelmed with disappointment and sor- 
 row. He spent hours in extreme agitation, 
 s nnetimes in a moody silence, interrupted now 
 and then by groans of despair, and sometimes 
 attering loud and angry curses, prompted b> 
 the exasperation of his feelings. He, however,
 
 232 HANNIBAL. [B.C.204 
 
 Hannibal raise* a new army. The Romans capture hU ipiei 
 
 oould not resist. He made the best of his way 
 to Carthage. The Roman senate, at the samo 
 time instead of deciding on the question of 
 peace or war, which Scipio had submitted to 
 them, referred the question back to him. They 
 sent commissioners to Scipio, authorizing him 
 to act for them, and to decide himself alone 
 whether the war should be continued or closed, 
 and if to be closed, on what conditions. 
 
 Hannibal raised a large force at Carthage, 
 joining with it such remains of former armies 
 as had been left after Scipio's battles, and he 
 went forth at the head of these troops to meet 
 his enemy. He marched five days, going, per- 
 haps, seventy-five or one hundred miles from 
 Carthage, when he found himself approaching 
 Scipio's camp. He sent out spies to reconnoi- 
 ter. The patrols of Scipio's army seized these 
 spies and brought them to the general's tent, 
 as they supposed, for execution. Instead of 
 punishing them, Scipio ordered them to be led 
 around his camp, and to be allowed to see every 
 thing they desired. He then dismissed them. 
 that they might return to Hannibal with the u 
 formation they had obtained. 
 
 Of course, the report which they brought in 
 respect to the strength and resources of Seipio'*
 
 B.C. 201.] So IP 10. 
 
 Negotiations. Interview between Hannib*. and Scipio 
 
 army was very formidable to Hannibal. He 
 thought it best to make an attempt to negoti- 
 ate a peace rather than to risk a battle, and he 
 accordingly sent word to Scipio requesting a 
 personal interview. Soipio acceded to this re- 
 quest, and a place was appointed for the meet- 
 ing between the two encampments. To this 
 spot the two generals repaired at the proper 
 time, with great pomp and parade, and with 
 many attendants. They were the two greatest 
 generals of the age in which they lived, having 
 been engaged for fifteen or twenty years in per- 
 forming, at the head of vast armies, exploits 
 which had filled the world with their fame. 
 Their fields of action had, however, been wide- 
 ly distant, and they met personally now for the 
 first time. When introduced into each other's 
 presence, they stood for some time in silence, 
 gazing upon and examining one another with 
 intense interest and curiosity, but not speaking 
 a word. 
 
 At length, however, the negotiation was open- 
 ed. Hannibal made Scipio proposals for peace. 
 They were very favorable to the Romans, out 
 Scipio was not satisfied with them He de- 
 manded still greater sacrifices than Hannibal 
 was willing to make The r'/sult, after a long
 
 234 HANNIBAL. [B.C.20L 
 
 The but battln. Defeat of the Cartbaginlui* 
 
 and fruitless negotiation, was, that each general 
 returned to his camp and prepared for battle. 
 
 In military campaigns, it is generally easy 
 for those who have been conquering to go on t 
 eonquer : so much depends upon the expectations 
 with which the contending armies go into bat- 
 tle. Soipio and his troops expected to conquer. 
 The Carthaginians expected to be beaten. The 
 result corresponded. At the close of the day 
 on which the battle was fought, forty thousand 
 Carthaginians were dead and dying upon the 
 ground, as many more were prisoners in the Ro- 
 man camp, and the rest, in broken masses, were 
 flying from the field in confusion and terror, on 
 all the roads which led to Carthage. Hannibal 
 arrived at the city with the rest, went to the 
 senate, announced his defeat, and said that he 
 could do no more. " The fortune which once 
 attended me," said he, "is lost forever, and 
 nothing is left to us but to make peace with 
 oar enemies on any terms that they may thuu 
 fit to impose "
 
 B.C.200.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE. 235 
 
 Bannlbal't conqwit*. Pwtmfal portoiu 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 HANNIBAL A FUGITIVE AND AN EXILE. 
 
 CTANNIBAL'S life was like an April day. 
 -*--*- Its brightest glory was in the morning. 
 The setting of his sun was darkened by clouds 
 and showers. Although for fifteen years the 
 Roman people could find no general capable of 
 maintaining the field against him, Scipio con- 
 quered him at last, and all his brilliant con- 
 quests ended, as Hanno had predicted, only in 
 placing his country in a far worse condition 
 than before. 
 
 In fact, as long as the Carthaginians confined 
 their energies to useful industry, and to the pur- 
 suits of commerce and peace, they were pros 
 porous, and they increased in wealth, and in- 
 fluence, and honor every year. Their ships 
 went every where, and were every where wel- 
 come. All the shores of the Mediterranean were 
 visited by their merchants, and the comforts and 
 the happiness of many nations and tribes were 
 promoted by the very means which they took 
 to swell their own rich 33 and fame. All might
 
 236 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 200 
 
 The danger of a spirit of ambition and conquest. 
 
 have gone on so for centuries longer, had not 
 military heroes arisen with appetites for a more 
 piquant sort of glory. Hannibal's father was 
 one of the foremost of these. He began by con- 
 quests in Spain and encroachments on the Ro- 
 man jurisdiction. He inculcated the same feel- 
 ings of ambition and hate in Hannibal's mind 
 which burned in his own. For many years, the 
 policy which they led their countrymen to pur- 
 sue was successful. From being useful and 
 welcome visitors to all the world, they became 
 the masters and the curse of a part of it. So 
 long as Hannibal remained superior to any Ro- 
 man general that could be brought against him, 
 he went on conquering. But at last Scipio 
 arose, a greater than Hannibal. The tide was 
 then turned, and all the vast conquests of half 
 a century were wrested away by the same vio- 
 lence, bloodshed, and misery with which they 
 had been acquired. 
 
 We have described the exploits of Hannibal, 
 in making these conquests, in detail, while those 
 of Scipio, in wresting them away, have been 
 passed over very briefly, as this is intended as 
 a history of Hannibal, and not of Scipio. Still 
 Scipio's conquests were made by slow degrees, 
 and they consumed a long period of time. He
 
 B.C. 200.] HANNIBAL AN EXILK. 237 
 
 , Gradual pro grew of Sdpio'i Tictorie*. 
 
 wa but about eighteen years of age at the bat- 
 tle of Cannae, soon after which his campaigns 
 began, and he was thirty when he was made 
 consul, just before his going into Africa. He 
 was thus fifteen or eighteen years in taking 
 down the vast superstructure of power which 
 Hannibal had raised, working in regions away 
 from Hannibal and Carthage during all this 
 time, as if leaving the great general and the 
 great city for the last. He was, however, so 
 successful in what he did, that when, at length, 
 he advanced to the attack of Carthage, every 
 thing else was gone. The Carthaginian power 
 had become a mere hollow shell, empty and 
 vain, which required only one great final blow 
 to effect its absolute demolition. In fact, so far 
 spent and gone were all the Carthaginian re- 
 sources, that the great city had to summon the 
 great general to its aid the moment it was 
 threatened, and Soipio destroyed them both to- 
 gether. 
 
 And yet Soipio did not proceed so far as lit 
 erally and actually to destroy them. He spared 
 Hannibal's life, and he allowed the city to stand ; 
 but the terms and conditions of peace which he 
 exacted were such aa to put an absolute ana 
 perpetual end to Carthaginian dominion. By
 
 SJ38 HANNIBAL [B.C. 200 
 
 Severe conditions of peace exacted by Scipio. 
 
 these conditions, the Carthaginian state was al- 
 .owed to continue free and independent, and 
 even to retain the government of such territo- 
 ries in Africa as they possessed before the war ; 
 but all their foreign possessions were taken 
 away ; and even in respect to Africa, their ju- 
 risdiction was limited and curtailed by very hard 
 restrictions. Their whole navy was to be given 
 to the Romans except ten small ships of three 
 banks of oars, which Scipio thought the govern- 
 ment would need for the purposes of civil ad- 
 ministration. These they were allowed to re- 
 tain. Scipio did not say what he should do with 
 the remainder of the fleet : it was to be uncon- 
 ditionally surrendered to him. Their elephants 
 of war were also to be all given up, and they 
 were to be bound not to train any more. They 
 were not to appear at all as a military power 
 in any other quarter of the world but Africa, 
 and they were not to make war in Africa ex- 
 cept by previously making known the occasion 
 for it to the Roman people, and obtaining theii 
 permission. They were also to pay to the Ro- 
 mans a very large annual tribute for fifty years. 
 There was great distress and perplexity in 
 the Carthaginian councils while they were de- 
 bating these cruel terms. Hannibal was in fa
 
 B.C 200.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE. 239 
 
 Debate* in the Carthaginian senate. 
 
 var of accepting them. Others opposed. They 
 thought it would be better still to continue the 
 struggle, hopeless as it was, than to submit to 
 terms so ignominious and fatal. 
 
 Hannibal was present at these debates, but 
 he found himself now in a very different posi- 
 tion from that which he had been occupying for 
 thirty years as a victorious general at the head 
 of his army. He had been accustomed there to 
 control and direct every thing. In his council* 
 of war, no one spoke but at his invitation, and 
 no opinion was expressed but such as he waa 
 willing to hear. In the Carthaginian senate, 
 however, he found the case very different 
 There, opinions were freely expressed, as in a 
 debate among equals, Hannibal taking his place 
 among the rest, and counting only as one. And 
 yet the spirit of authority and command which 
 he had been so long accustomed to exercise, lin- 
 gered still, and made him very impatient and 
 uneasy under contradiction. In fact, as one of 
 the speakers in the senate was rising to animad- 
 rert upon and oppose Hannibal's views, he un- 
 dertook to pull him down and silence him by 
 force This proceeding awakened immediately 
 uoh expressions of dissatisfaction and displeas- 
 ure in the assembly as to show him very clearly
 
 240 HA.NNIBAL. [B.C. 20u 
 
 Term* of peace compiled with. Surrender of the elephant* and ihipt 
 
 that the time for such domineering was gone 
 He had, however, the good sense to express th 
 regret he soon felt at having so far forgotten the 
 laties of his new position, and to make an am- 
 pie apology. 
 
 The Carthaginians decided at length to ao- 
 cede to Soipio's terms of peace. The first in- 
 stalment of the tribute was paid. The elephants 
 and the ships were surrendered. After a few 
 days, Scipio announced his determination not to 
 take the ships away with him, but to destroy 
 them there. Perhaps this was because he 
 thought the ships would be of little value to the 
 Romans, on account of the difficulty of manning 
 them. Ships, of course, are useless without sea- 
 men, and many nations in modern times, who 
 could easily build a navy, are debarred from 
 doing it, because their population does not fur- 
 nish sailors in sufficient numbers to man and 
 navigate it. It was probably, in part, on this 
 account that Soipio decided not to take the Car- 
 thaginian ships away, and perhaps> he also want 
 od to show to Carthage and to the world that hi 
 object in taking possession of the national prop. 
 erty of his foes was not to enrich his own coun- 
 try by plunder, but only to deprive ambitious 
 soldiers of the power to compromise any longer
 
 B.C.200.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE 243 
 
 8cipio burns the Carthaginian fleet Feelings of the spectator* 
 
 the peace and happiness of mankind by expe- 
 ditions for conquest and power. However this 
 may be, Scipio determined to destroy the Car- 
 thaginian fleet, and not to convey it away. 
 
 On a given day, therefore, he ordered all the 
 galleys to be got together in the bay opposite 
 to the city of Carthage, and to be burned. 
 There were five hundred of them, so that they 
 constituted a large fleet, and covered a large ex- 
 panse of the water. A vast concourse of peo- 
 ple assembled upon the shores to witness the 
 grand conflagration. The emotion which such 
 a spectacle was of itself calculated to excite 
 was greatly heightened by the deep but stifled 
 feelings of resentment and hate which agitated 
 every Carthaginian breast. The Romans, too, 
 as they gazed upon the scene from their en- 
 campment on the shore, were agitated as well, 
 though with different emotions. Their faces 
 beamed with an expression of exultation and 
 triumph as they saw the vast masses of flanv 
 and columns of smoke ascending from the sea, 
 ppjclaiming the total and irretrievable ruin of 
 Carthaginian pride and power. 
 
 Having thus fully accomplished his work, 
 Scipio set sail for Rome. AH Italy had been 
 filled with the fame of his exploits in thus de-
 
 244 HANNIBAL. [B.C 200 
 
 Bciplo Bafts to Rome. HU reception 
 
 stroying the ascendency of Hannibal. The city 
 of Rome had now nothing more to fear from its 
 great enemy. He was shut up, disarmed, and 
 helpless, in his own native state, and the terror 
 which his presence in Italy had inspired had 
 passed forever away. The whole population of 
 Rome, remembering the awful scenes of con- 
 sternation and terror which the city had so of- 
 ten endured, regarded Scipio as a great deliverer 
 They were eager to receive and welcome him 
 on his arrival. When the time came and he 
 approached the city, vast throngs went out to 
 meet him. The authorities formed civic pro- 
 cessions to welcome him. They brought crowns, 
 and garlands, and flowers, and hailed his ap- 
 proach with loud and prolonged acclamations of 
 triumph and joy. They gave him the name of 
 Africanus, in honor of his victories. This was 
 a new honor giving to a conqueror the name of 
 the country that he had subdued ; it was in- 
 Tented specially as Scipio's reward, the deliv- 
 erer who had saved the empire from the great- 
 est and most terrible danger by which it had 
 ever been assailed. 
 
 Hannibal, though fallen, retained still in Car- 
 thage some portion of his former power. The 
 glory of his past exploits still invested his char-
 
 B.C. 192.J HANNIBAL AN EXILE. 245 
 
 Hauu&al'i position and standing at Carthage. 
 
 actor with a sort of halo, which made him an 
 object of general regard, and he still had great 
 ni powerful friends. He was elevated to high 
 office, and exerted himself to regulate and im- 
 prove the internal affairs of the state. In these 
 efforts he was not, however, very successful. 
 The historians say that the objects which he 
 aimed to accomplish were good, and that the 
 measures for effecting them were, in themselves, 
 judicious; but, accustomed as he was to the 
 authoritative and arbitrary action of a military 
 commander in camp, he found it hard to prac- 
 tice that caution and forbearance, and that 
 deference for the opinion of others, which are 
 so essential as means of influencing men in th 
 management of the civil affairs of a common- 
 wealth. He mado a great many enemies, who 
 did every thing in their power, by plots and in- 
 trigues, as well as by open hostility, to accom- 
 plish his ruin. 
 
 His pride, too, was extremely mortified and 
 humbled by an occurrence which took place 
 very soon after Scipio's return to Rome. There 
 was some occasion of war with a neighboring 
 African tribe, and Hannibal headed some forces 
 which were raised in the city for the purpose, 
 ind went rat to prosecute it The Roman*
 
 246 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 192 
 
 Orders from Rome. Hannibal's mortification 
 
 who took care to have agents in Carthage tc 
 keep them acquainted with all that occurred, 
 heard of this, and sent word to Carthage to 
 warn the Carthaginians that this was contrary 
 to the treaty, and cou d not be allowed. The 
 government, not willing to incur the risk of 
 another visit from Scipio, sent orders to Han- 
 nibal to abandon the war and return to the city, 
 riannibal was compelled to submit; but after 
 having been rfbcustomed, as he had been, for 
 ipany years, to bid defiance to all the armies 
 ai - 1 n ^a which Roman power could, with their 
 utmost exertion, bring against him, it must 
 have been very hard for such a spirit as his to 
 find itself stopped and conquered now by a word. 
 All the force they could command against him, 
 even at the very gates of their own city, was 
 *nce impotent and vain. Now, a mere message 
 and threat, coming across the distant sea, seeks 
 him out in the remote deserts of Africa, and in 
 a moment deprives him of all his power. 
 
 Years passed away, and Hannibal, though 
 compelled outwardly to submit to his fate, was 
 restless and ill at ease. His scheming spirit, 
 purred on now by the double stimulus of re- 
 sentment and ambition, was always busy, vainly 
 endeavoring to discover some plan by which he
 
 B.C. 192.] HANNIBAL AN .rixiLK. 24? 
 
 8yrl aad PboBoicU. King Antiochu* 
 
 might again renew the struggle with his ancient 
 foe. 
 
 It will be recollected that Carthage was orig- 
 inally a commercial colony from Tyre, a city 
 on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. 
 The countries of Syria and Phoenicia were in 
 the vicinity of Tyre. They were powerful com- 
 mercial communities, and they had always re- 
 tained very friendly relations with the Cartha- 
 ginian commonwealth. Ships passed continu- 
 ally to and fro, and always, in case of calami- 
 ties or disasters threatening one of these regions, 
 the inhabitants naturally looked to the other 
 for refuge and protection, Carthage looking 
 upon Phoenicia as its mother, and Phoenicia re- 
 garding Carthage as her child. Now there was, 
 at this time, a very powerful monarch on the 
 throne in Syria and Phoenicia, named Antiochus. 
 His capital was Damascus. He was wealthy 
 and powerful, and was involved in some diffi- 
 culties with the Romans. Their conquests, 
 gradually extending eastward, had approached 
 the confines of Antiochus's realms, and the twi 
 nations were on the brink of war. 
 
 Things being in this state, the enemies of 
 Hannibal at Carthage sent information to the 
 Roman senate that he was negotiating and plot.
 
 248 HANNIBAL. [B.C 192. 
 
 Hannlba.'* Intrigues with Atticchus. Embassy from Rom* 
 
 ting with Antiochrss to combine the Syrian and 
 Carthaginian forces against them, and thug 
 plunge the world into another general war. 
 The Romans accordingly determined to send an 
 smbassage to the Carthaginian government, and 
 to demand that Hannibal should be deposed 
 from his office, and given up to them a prisoner, 
 in order that he might be tried on this charge. 
 
 These commissioners came, accordingly, to 
 Carthage, keeping, however, the object of their 
 mission a profound secret, since they knew very 
 well that, if Hannibal should suspect it, he 
 would make his escape before the Carthaginian 
 senate could decide upon the question of sur- 
 rendering him. Hannibal was, however, too 
 wary for them. He contrived to learn their 
 object, and immediately resolved on making his 
 escape. He knew that his enemies in Carthage 
 were numerous and powerful, and that the ani- 
 mosity against him was growing stronger and 
 stronger. He did not dare, therefore, to trust 
 to the result of the discussion in the senate, but 
 determined to fly. 
 
 He had a small castle or tcwer on the coast, 
 about one hundred and fifty miles southeast of 
 Carthage. He sent there by an express, order-
 
 B.C 192.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE. 249 
 
 Flight of mnnibaL Island of Cercina. 
 
 also made arrangements to have horsemen ready 
 at one of the gates of the city at nightfall. 
 During the day he appeared freely in the public 
 streets, walking with an unconcerned air, as if 
 his mind was at ease, and giving to the Roman 
 embassadors, who were watching his move- 
 ments, the impression that he was not medi- 
 tating an escape. Toward the close of the day, 
 nowever, after walking leisurely home, he im- 
 mediately made preparations for his journey. 
 As soon as it was dark he went to the gate of 
 the city, mounted the horse which was provided 
 for him, and fled across the country to his cas- 
 tle. Here he found the vessel ready which he 
 had ordered. He embarked, and put to sea 
 
 There is a small island called Cercina at a 
 little distance from the coast. Hannibal reach- 
 ed this island on the same day that he left hia 
 tower. There was a harbor here, where mer- 
 chant ships were accustomed to come in. He 
 found several Phoenician vessels in the port, 
 some bound to Carthage Hannibal's arrival 
 produced a strong sensation here, and, to a<v 
 count for his appearance among them, he said 
 he was going on an embassy from the Cartha- 
 ginian government to Tyre. 
 
 He was now afraid that some of these vessels
 
 250 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 192 
 
 Stratagem of Hannibal. He tail* for Syria 
 
 that were about setting sail for Carthage might 
 carry the news back of his having being seen at 
 Cercina, and, to prevent this, he contrived, with 
 his characteristic cunning, the following plan 
 He sent around to all the ship-masters in the 
 port, inviting them to a great entertainment 
 which he was to give, and asked, at the same 
 time, that they would lend him the main-sails 
 of their ships, to make a great awning with, to 
 shelter the guests from the dews of the night 
 The ship-masters, eager to witness and enjoy 
 the convivial scene which Hannibal's proposal 
 promised them, accepted the invitation, and or- 
 dered their main-sails to be taken down. Of 
 course, this confined all their vessels to port. In 
 the evening, the company assembled under the 
 vast tent, made by the main-sails, on the shore. 
 Hannibal met them, and remained with them 
 for a time. In the course of the night, how- 
 ever; when they were all in the midst of thoir 
 carousing, he stole away, embarked on board 
 ship, and set sail, and, before the ship-masters 
 could awake from the deep and prolonged slum- 
 bers which followed their wine, and rig then 
 main-sails to the masts again, Hannibal was far 
 out of reach on his way to Syria. 
 
 In the mean time, there was e great excite
 
 B.C. 192.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE. 251 
 
 Excitement at Carthage. Hannibal safe at Ephem 
 
 m^nt produced at Carthage by the news whioK 
 spread every where over the city, the day aftei 
 his departure, that he was not to be found 
 Great crowds assembled before his house. Wild 
 and strange rumors circulated in explanation 
 of his disappearance, but they were contradic- 
 tory and impossible, and only added to the uni- 
 versal excitement. This excitement continued 
 until the vessels at last arrived from Cercina, 
 and made the truth known. Hannibal was 
 himself, however, by this time, safe beyond the 
 reach of all possible pursuit. He was sailing 
 prosperously, so far as outward circumstances 
 were concerned, but dejected and wretched in 
 heart, toward Tyre. He landed there in safe- 
 ty, and was kindly received. In a few days he 
 went into the interior, and, after various wan- 
 derings, reached Ephesus, where he found Anti- 
 ochus, the Syrian king. 
 
 As soon as the escape of Hannibal was made 
 known at Carthage, the people of the city im- 
 mediately began to fear that the Romans would 
 consider them responsible for it, and that they 
 should thus incur a renewal of Roman hostility. 
 In order to avert this danger, they immediately 
 sent a deputation to Rome, to make known the 
 fact of Hannibal's flight, and tc express the r-
 
 252 HANNIBAL [B.C. 192 
 
 Carthaginian deputies. The change of fortune 
 
 gret they felt on account of it, in hopes thus te 
 save themselves f.om the displeasure of their 
 forn idable foes. It may at first view seem very 
 ungenerous and ungrateful in the Carthaginian* 
 to abandon their general in this manner, in the 
 hour of his misfortune and calamity, and to take 
 part against him with enemies whose displeas- 
 ure he had incurred only in their service and 
 in executing their will. And this conduct of 
 the Carthaginians would have to be considered 
 as not only ungenerous, but extremely incon 
 sistent, if it had been the same individuals that 
 acted in the two cases. But it was not. The 
 men and the influences which now opposed 
 Hannibal's projects and plans had opposed them 
 always and from the beginning ; only, so long as 
 he went on successfully and well, they were in 
 the minority, and Hannibal's adherents and 
 friends controlled all the public action of the 
 city. But, now that the bitter fruits of his am- 
 bition and of his totally unjustifiable encroach- 
 ments on the Roman territories and Roman 
 rights began to be realized, the party of his 
 friends was overturned, the power reverted to 
 the hands of those who had always opposed him, 
 and in trying to keep him down when he wa* 
 once fallen, tltir action, whether politically
 
 B.C. 192.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE. 253 
 
 Hannibal's unconquerable spirit Hi* new plan* 
 
 right or wrong, was consistent with itself, and 
 can not be considered as at all subjecting them 
 to the charge of ingratitude or treachery. 
 
 One might have supposed that all HannibaPa 
 hopes and expectations of ever again coping with 
 his great Roman enemy would have been now 
 effectually and finally destroyed, and that henc& 
 forth he would have given up his active hostility 
 and would have contented himself with seeking 
 some refuge where he could spend the remain 
 der of his days in peace, satisfied with securing, 
 after such dangers and escapes, his own person- 
 al protection from the vengeance of his enemies 
 But it is hard to quell and subdue such indomit 
 able perseverance and energy as his. He wag 
 very little inclined yet to submit to his fate 
 As soon as he found himself at the court of An- 
 tiochus, he began to form new plans for making 
 war against Rome. He proposed to tho Syrian 
 monarch to raise a naval force and put it under 
 his charge. He said that if Antiochus would 
 give him a hundred ships and ten or twelve 
 thousand men, he would take the command of 
 the expedition in person, and he did not d/*** 
 that he should be able to recover his lost ground, 
 and once mere humble his ancient and formida- 
 ble enemy. He would go first, he said, with
 
 254 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 190 
 
 Hannibal sends a secret messenger to Carthage. 
 
 tiis force to Carthage, to get the co-operation 
 and aid of his countrymen there in his new 
 plans. Then he would make a descent upon 
 Italy, and he had no doubt that he should soon 
 regain the ascendency there which he had for- 
 merly held. 
 
 Hannibal's design of going first to Carthage 
 with his Syrian army was doubtless induced 
 oy his desire to put down the party of his ene- 
 mies there, and to restore the power to his ad- 
 heients and partisans. In order to prepare the 
 way the more effectually for this, he sent a se- 
 cret messenger to Carthage, while his negotia- 
 tions with Antiochus were going on, to make 
 known to his friends there the new hopes which 
 he began to cherish, and the new designs vhioh 
 he had formed. He knew that his enemies in 
 Carthage would be watching very carefully for 
 any such communication ; he therefore wrot 3 no 
 letters, and committed nothing to paper which, 
 on being discovered, might betray him. He ex- 
 pi ained, however, all his plans very fully to hia 
 messenger, and gave him minute and careful 
 Instructions as to his manner of communicating 
 them. 
 
 The Carthaginian authorities were indeed 
 aratching very vigilantly, and intelligence was
 
 I3.C 190.J HANNIBAL AN EXILE. 2M 
 
 The Placards Excitement produced by them 
 
 brought to mem, by their spies, of the arrival 
 of this stranger. They immediately took meas- 
 ures for arresting him. The messenger, who 
 was himself as vigilant as they, got intelligence 
 of thi in his secret lurking-place in the city, 
 and determined immediately to fly. He, how- 
 ever, first prepared some papers and placards, 
 which he posted up in public places, in which 
 he proclaimed that Hannibal was far from con- 
 sidering himself finally conquered ; that he was, 
 on the contrary, forming new plans for putting 
 down his enemies in Carthage, resuming his 
 former ascendency there, and carrying fire and 
 gword again into the Roman territories ; and, in 
 the mean time, he urged the friends of Hanni- 
 bal in Carthage to remain faithful and true to 
 his cause 
 
 The messenger, after posting his placards, 
 fled from the city in the night, and went back 
 to Hannibal. Of course, the occurrence pro- 
 duced considerable excitement in the city. It 
 aroused the anger and resentment of Hannibal's 
 enemies, and awakened new encouragement and 
 hope in the hearts of his friends. Further than 
 this, however, it led to no immediate results. 
 The power of the party which was opposed to 
 Hannibal was too firmly established at Carthage
 
 256 HANNIBAL. [B.C. J IK) 
 
 Roman commissioners. Supposed Interview of Hannibal and Scipio 
 
 to be very easily shaken. They sent informa- 
 tion to Rome of the coming of Hannibal's emis- 
 sary to Carthage, and of the result of his mis- 
 sion, and then every thing went on as befora 
 
 In the mean time, the Romans, when they 
 learned where Hannibal had gone, sent two or 
 three commissioners there to confer with the 
 Syrian government in respect to their intentions 
 and plans, and watch the movements of Hanni- 
 bal. It was said that Scipio himself was joined 
 to this embassy, and that he actually met Han- 
 nibal at Ephesus, and had several personal in- 
 terviews and conversations with him there. 
 Some ancient historian gives a particular ac- 
 count of one of these interviews, in which the 
 conversation turned, as it naturally would do 
 between two such distinguished commanders, 
 on military greatness and glory. Scipio asked 
 Hannibal whom he considered the greatest mil- 
 itary hero that had ever lived. Hannibal gave 
 the palm to Alexander the Great, because he 
 had penetrated, with comparatively a very smali 
 number of Macedonian troops, into such re 
 mote regions, conquered such vast armies, and 
 brought so boundless an empire under his sway 
 Scipio then asked him who he was inclined to 
 plaoe next to Alexander. He said Pvrrhuft.
 
 B.C. 190.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE. 257 
 
 Hannibal's opinion of Alexander and Pyrrhns. Anecdote* 
 
 Pyrrhus was a Grecian, who crossed the Adri- 
 atic Sea, and made war, with great success, 
 tgainst the Romans. Hannibal said that he 
 gave the second rank to Pyrrhus because he 
 ystematized and perfected the art of war, and 
 %jso because he had the power of awakening 
 i feeling of personal attachment to himself on 
 the part of all his soldiers, and even of the in- 
 aabitants of the countries that he conquered, 
 beyond any other general that ever lived. Soip- 
 to then asked Hannibal who came next in or- 
 der, and he replied that he should give the third 
 rank to himself. "And if," added he, "I had 
 conquered Scipio, I should consider myself as 
 standing above Alexander, Pyrrhus, and all the 
 generals that the world ever produced." 
 
 Various other anecdotes are related of Han- 
 nibal during the time of his first appearance in 
 Syria, all indicating the very' high degree of 
 estimation in which he was held, and the curi- 
 osity and interest that were every where felt to 
 see him. On one occasion, it happened that a 
 vain and self-conceited orator, who knew little 
 of war but from his own theoretic speculations, 
 was haranguing an assembly where Hannibal 
 was present, being greatly pleased with the op- 
 p -tunity of displaying his powers before so dis- 
 1417
 
 HANNIBAL. [BC. 190 
 
 Hannibal't effort* prore rain. Antiochujt agree* to give him up 
 
 tinguished an auditor. When the discourse 
 wa? finished, they asked Hannibal what he 
 thought of it. "I have heard," said he, hi reply, 
 '* many old dotards in the course of my life, but 
 this is, verily, the greatest dotard of them all." 
 
 Hannibal failed, notwithstanding all his per- 
 severance, in obtaining the means to attack the 
 Romans again. He was unwearied in his ef- 
 forts, but, though the king sometimes encour- 
 aged his hopes, nothing was ever done. He re- 
 mained in this part of the world for ten years, 
 striving continually to accomplish his aims, but 
 every year he found himself further from the 
 Attainment of them than ever. The hour of 
 his good fortune and of his prosperity were ob- 
 viously gone. His plans all failed, his influence 
 leclined, his name and renown were fast pass- 
 ing away. At last, after long and fruitless 
 contests with the Romans, Antiochus made a 
 treaty of peace with them, and, among the art- 
 icle of this treaty, was one agreeing to give up 
 Hannibal into their power 
 
 Hannibal resolved to fly. The place of refuge 
 which he chose was the island of Crete. He 
 found that he could not long remain here. He 
 bad, however, brought with him a large amount 
 of treasure ant 1 when about leaving Crete again,
 
 B.C 190.J HANNIBAL AN EXILB. 
 
 Hannibal's treasure*. His plan for securing them. 
 
 he was uneasy about this treasure, as he had 
 gome reason to fear that the Cretans were in- 
 tending to seize it He must contrive, then,, 
 some stratagem to enable him to get this gold 
 away. The plan he adopted was this : 
 
 He filled a number of earthen jars with lead, 
 covering the tops of them with gold and silver. 
 These he carried, with great appearance of oau 
 tion and solicitude, to the Temple of Diana, a 
 very sacred edifice, and deposited them there, 
 under very special guardianship of the Cretans, 
 to whom, as he said, he intrusted all his treas- 
 ures. They received their false deposit with 
 many promises to keep it safely, and then Han- 
 nibal went away with his real gold cast in the 
 center of hollow statues of brass, which he car- 
 ried with him, without suspicion, as objects of 
 art of very little value. 
 
 Hannibal fled from kingdom to kingdom, and 
 from province to province, until life became a 
 miserable burden. The determined hostility of 
 the Roman senate followed him every where 
 harassing him with continual anxiety and fear, 
 and destroying all hope of comfort and peace 
 His mind was a prey to bitter recollections of 
 the past, and still more dreadful forebodings foi 
 thu future. He had spent all the morning of
 
 260 HANNIBAL [B.C. 182 
 
 flbunibal'i unhappy condition. The potion of poiion. 
 
 his life in inflicting the most terrible injuries on 
 the objects of his implacable animosity and hate, 
 although they had never injured him, and now, 
 in the evening of his days, it became his des- 
 tiny to feel the pressure of the same terror and 
 suffering inflicted upon him. The hostility 
 which he had to fear was equally merciless with 
 that which he had exercised ; perhaps it was 
 made still more intense by being mingled with 
 what they who felt it probably considered a just 
 resentment and revenge. 
 
 When at length Hannibal found that the Ro- 
 mans were hemming him in more and more 
 closely, and that the danger increased of his fall- 
 ing at last into their power, he had a potion of 
 poison prepared, and kept it always hi readiness, 
 determined to die by his own hand rather than 
 to submit to be given up to his enemies. The 
 time for taking the poison at last arrived. The 
 wretched fugitive was then in Bithynia, a king* 
 dom of Asia Minor. The King of Bithynia 
 sheltered him for a time, but at length agreed 
 t: give him up to the Romans. Hannibal 
 learning this, prepared for flight. But he found, 
 on attempting his escape, that all the modes of 
 exit from the palace which he occupied, even 
 the secret ones which he hart xpressly contm-
 
 B.C. 182.] HANNIBAL AN Kxins. 26} 
 
 Hannibal fails In hi* attempt to escape. He poison* himself 
 
 ed to aid his flight, were taken possession of and 
 guarded. Escape was, therefore, no longer pos- 
 sible, and Hannibal went to his apartment and 
 sent for the poison. He was now an old man, 
 nearly seventy years of age, and he was worn 
 down and exhausted by his protracted anxieties 
 and sufferings. He was glad to die. He drank 
 ine poison, and in a few hours ceased to breath*
 
 262 CARTHAGE DESTROYED. [B.C. 146 
 
 Destruction The third Punic war 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 THE DESTRUCTION OF CARTHAGE. 
 
 THE consequences of Hannibal's reckless 
 ambition, and of his wholly unjustifiable 
 aggression on Roman rights to gratify it, did 
 not end with his own personal ruin. The flame 
 which he had kindled continued to burn until 
 at last it accomplished the entire and irretriev- 
 able destruction of Carthage. This was effect- 
 ed in a third and final war between the Cartha- 
 ginians and the Romans, which is known in 
 history as the third Punic war. With a narra- 
 tive of the events of this war, ending, as it did, 
 in the total destruction of the city, we shall 
 close this history of Hannibal. 
 
 It will be recollected that the war which 
 Hannibal himself waged against Rome was the 
 second in the series, the contest in which Reg- 
 ulus figured so prominently having been the 
 first. The one whose history is now to be given 
 is the third. The reader will distinctly under- 
 stand the chronological relations of these con- 
 tests by the following table:
 
 B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED. 265 
 
 Chronological table of the Punic wan. 
 
 TABLE. 
 
 Data 
 BC. 
 
 EreoU. 
 
 Panic Wm. 
 
 964 
 
 
 
 2(52 
 
 Naval battles in the Mediterranean 
 
 L 
 
 M9 
 
 Regulus sent prisoner to Rome . . . I 
 
 24 years. 
 
 Ml 
 
 Peace concluded .... j 
 
 
 
 Peace for 94 year*. 
 
 
 217 
 
 tie 
 
 Hannibal attacks Saguntnm . . . 
 
 
 2ifl 
 
 ate 
 
 Battle of Cannae .... . 
 I conquered by Scipio 
 
 L 
 
 17 year*. 
 
 wo 
 
 Peace concluded 
 
 
 
 \ 
 
 
 
 Peace for 52 year* 
 
 
 148 
 140 
 
 War declared . . 1 
 Carthage destroyed > 
 
 Ill 
 
 year*. 
 
 These three Punio wars extended, as the ta- 
 ble shows, over a period of more than a huml
 
 264 HAHNIBAU [B.C. 148 
 
 Character of the Punic wan. Intervals between then 
 
 red years. Each successive contest in the se* 
 ries was shorter, but more violent and desper- 
 ate than its predecessor, while the intervals of 
 peace were longer. Thus the first Punio war 
 continued for twenty-four years, the second 
 about seventeen, and the third only three 01 
 four. The interval, too, between the first and 
 second was twenty-four years, while between 
 the second and third there was a sort of peac* 
 for about fifty years. These differences were 
 caused, indeed, in some degree, by the accident- 
 al circumstances on which the successive rup- 
 tures depended, but they were not entirely ow- 
 ing to that cause. The longer these belligerent 
 relations between the two countries continued, 
 and the more they both experienced the awful 
 effects and consequences of their quarrels, the 
 less disposed they were to renew such dreadful 
 struggles, and yet, when they did renew them 
 they engaged ir them with redoubled energy 
 ef determination and fresh intensity of hate. 
 Thus the wars followed each other at greatei 
 intervals, but the conflicts, when they came, 
 though shorter in duration, were more and more 
 desperate and merciless in character. 
 
 We have said that, after the close of the second 
 Punic war, there was a sort of peace for aboul
 
 B.C. 148 j CARTHAGE DESTROYED. 265 
 
 Aalmoiitie* and dissension*. Ifamidta 
 
 fifty years. Of course, during this time, one gen- 
 eration after another of public men arose, both 
 in Rome and Carthage, each successive group, 
 on both sides, inheriting the suppressed animos- 
 ity and hatred which had been cherished by their 
 predecessors. Of course, as long as Hannibal 
 had lived, and had continued his plots and 
 schemes in Syria, he was the means of keeping 
 up a continual irritation among the people of 
 Rome against the Carthaginian name. It is 
 true that the government at Carthage disavowed 
 his acts, and professed to be wholly opposed to 
 his designs ; but then it was, of course, very 
 well known at Rome that this was only because 
 they thought he was not able to execute them. 
 They had no confidence whatever in Carthagin- 
 ian faith or honesty, and, of course, there could 
 be no real harmony or stable peace. 
 
 There arose gradually, also, another source 
 of dissension. By referring to the map. the read- 
 er will perceive that there lies, to the westward 
 of Carthage, a country called Numidia. This 
 country was a hundred miles or more in breadth* 
 and extended back several hundred miles into 
 the interior. It was a very rich and fertile re- 
 gion, and contained many powerful and wealthy 
 cities. The inhabitants were warlike, too, and
 
 266 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 148 
 
 Humidian horsemen. M1n1iti 
 
 were particularly celebrated for their cavalry. 
 The ancient historians say that they used to 
 ride their horses into the field without saddles, 
 and often without bridles, guiding and controll- 
 ing them by their voices, and keeping their 
 seats securely by the exercise of great personal 
 strength and consummate skilL These Ni> 
 midian horsemen are often alluded to in th<? 
 narratives of Hannibal's campaigns, and, in fact, 
 in all the military histories of the times. 
 
 Among the kings who reigned in Numidia 
 was one who had taken sides with the Romans 
 ji the second Punic war. His name was Mas- 
 jiissa. He became involved in some struggle 
 for power with a neighboring monarch named 
 Syphax, and while he, that is, Masinissa, had al- 
 lied himself to the Romans, Syphax had joined 
 the Carthaginians, each chieftain hoping, by 
 this means, to gain assistance from his allies 
 in conquering the other. Masinisea's patrons 
 proved to be the strongest, and at the end of the 
 second Punic war, when the conditions of peace 
 were made, Masinissa's dominions wore en- 
 iarged , and the undisturbed possession cf them 
 confirmed to him, the Carthaginians being bound 
 by express stipulations not to molest him in any 
 way.
 
 B.C. 148.J OARTHAGE DESTROYED. 267 
 
 fartle* at Rome and Carthage. Their difference* 
 
 In commonwealths like those of Rome and 
 Carthage, there will always be two great par- 
 ties struggling against each other for the pos- 
 session of power. Each wishes to avail itself 
 of every opportunity to oppose and thwart the 
 other, and they consequently almost always take 
 different sides in all the great questions of pub- 
 lic policy that arise. There were two such par- 
 ties at Rome, and they disagreed in respect to 
 the course which should be pursued in regard 
 to Carthage, one being generally in favor of 
 peace, the other perpetually calling for war. 
 In the same manner there was at Carthage a 
 similar dissension, the one side in the contest 
 oeing desirous to propitiate the Romans and 
 avoid collisions with them, while the other par- 
 ty were very restless and uneasy under the 
 pressure of the Roman power upon them, and 
 were endeavoring continually to foment feelings 
 of hostility against their ancient enemies, as if 
 they wished that war should break out again. 
 The latter party were not strong enough to 
 bring the Carthaginian state into an open rap- 
 ture with Rome itself, but they succeeded at 
 last in getting their government involved in a 
 dispute with Masinissa, and in leading out an 
 army to give him battle.
 
 268 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 148 
 
 Masinissa prepare* for war. Hwdrubal 
 
 Fifty years had passed away, as has already 
 been remarked, since the close of Hannibal's 
 war. During this time, Scipio that is, thtj 
 Scipio who conquered Hannibal had disappear- 
 ed from the stage. Masinissa himself was very 
 far advanced in life, being over eighty years of 
 age. He, however, still retained the strength 
 and energy which had characterized him in his 
 prime. He drew together an immense army, 
 and mounting, like his soldiers, bare-back upon 
 his horse, he rode from rank to rank, gave the 
 necessary commands, and matured the arrange- 
 ments for battle. 
 
 The name of the Carthaginian general on 
 this occasion was Hasdrubal. This was a very 
 common name at Carthage, especially among 
 the friends and family of Hannibal. The bear- 
 er of it, in this case, may possibly have receiv- 
 ed it from his parents in commemoration of the 
 brother of Hannibal, who lost his head in de- 
 scending into Italy from the Alps, inasmuch as 
 during the fifty years of peace which had elajis- 
 ed, there was ample time for a child born afte/ 
 that event to grow up to full maturity. At any 
 rate, the new Hasdrubal inherited the inveter- 
 ate hatred to Rome which characterized his 
 cxamesake, and he and his party had contrived
 
 B.C. 148. 1 CARTHAGE DESTROYED. 
 
 Carthage declare* war. Parallel between Hannibal and Hagdrubal 
 
 to gain a temporary ascendency in Carthage, 
 and they availed themselves of their brief pos- 
 session of power to renew, indirectly at least, 
 the contest with Rome. They sent the rival 
 leaders into banishment, raised an army, and 
 Hasdrubal himself taking the command of it, 
 they went forth in great force to encounter 
 Masinissa 
 
 It was in a way very similar to this that 
 Hannibal had commenced his war with Rome, 
 by seeking first a quarrel with a Roman ally. 
 Hannibal, it is true, had commenced his ag- 
 gressions at Saguntum, in Spain. HasdrubaJ 
 begins in Numidia, in Africa, but, with the ex- 
 ception of the difference of geographical locality, 
 all seems the same, and Hasdrubal very proba- 
 bly supposed that he was about to enter him- 
 self upon the same glorious career which had 
 immortalized his great ancestor's name. 
 
 There was another analogy between the two 
 cases, viz., that both Hannibal and Hasdrubal 
 had strong parties opposed to them in Carthage 
 In the incipient stages of their undertakings. 
 In the present instance, the opposition had been 
 violently suppressed, and the leaders of it sent 
 Into banishment ; but still the elements remain- 
 d, ready, in case of any disaster to Hasdni
 
 270 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 148 
 
 Vrttle with Maainissa. Defeat of the Carthaginian* 
 
 arms, or any other occurrence tending to dimin- 
 ish his power, to rise at once and put nim down. 
 Hasdrubal had therefore a double enemy to con- 
 tend against: one before him, on the battle- 
 field, and the oth'er, perhaps still more formida- 
 ble > in the city behind him. 
 
 The parallel, however, ends here. Hannibal 
 conquered at Saguntum, but Hasdrubal was 
 entirely defeated in the battle in Numidia. The 
 battle was fought long and desperately on both 
 sides, but the Carthaginians were obliged to 
 yield, and they retreated at length in confusion 
 to seek shelter in their camp. The battle was 
 witnessed by a Roman officer who stood upon 
 a neighboring hill, and looked down upon the 
 scene with intense interest all the day. It was 
 Scipio the younger Scipio who became after- 
 ivard the principal actor in the terrible scenes 
 which were enacted in the war which followed 
 He was then a distinguished officer in the Ro- 
 man army, and was on duty in Spain. His 
 commanding general there had sent him to Af- 
 rica to procure some elephants from Masiiiissa 
 for the use of the army. He came to Numidia, 
 accordingly, for this purpose, and as the battle 
 between Masinissa and Hasdrubal came on 
 while he was there, he remained to witness it
 
 B.C. 148.] CARTHAUE UESTROYED. 271 
 
 Tke younger Scipio. A spectator of the battl* 
 
 This second Scipio was not, by blood, any 
 relative of the other, but he had been adopted 
 Vj the elder Scipio's son, and thus received his 
 name ; so that he was, by adoption, a grand- 
 son. He was, even at this time, a man of high 
 consideration among all who knew him, for his 
 great energy and efficiency of character, as well 
 ai for his sound judgment and practical good 
 sense. He occupied a very singular position at 
 the time of this battle, such as very few great 
 commanders have ever been placed in ; for, as 
 he himself was attached to a Roman army in 
 Spain, having been sent merely as a military 
 messenger to Numidia, he was a neutral in this 
 contest, and could not, properly, take part on 
 either side. He had, accordingly, only to take 
 his place upon the hill, and look down upon the 
 awful scene as upon a spectacle arranged for 
 his special gratification. He speaks of it as if 
 he were highly gratified with the opportunity 
 he enjoyed, saying that only two such cases had 
 ever occurred before, where a general could 
 look down, in such a way, upon a great battle- 
 field, and witness the whole progress of the fight, 
 oimself a cool and disinterested spectator. H 
 was greatly excited by the scene and he speaks 
 particularly of the appearance of the reterut
 
 272 HAKNIBAL. [JB.C.14 
 
 Negotiations for peace. Scipio made, urnplr* 
 
 Masinissa, then eighty-four years old, who rode 
 all day from rank to rank, on a wild and impet- 
 uous charger, without a saddle, to give his orders 
 to his men, and to encourage and animate them 
 by his voice and his example. 
 
 Hasdrubal retreated with his forces tc his 
 oamp as soon as the battle was over, and in- 
 trenched himself there, while Masinissa advanc- 
 ed with his army, surrounded the encampment, 
 and hemmed the imprisoned fugitives in. Find- 
 ing himself in extreme and imminent danger, 
 Hasdrubal sent to Masinissa to open negotiations 
 for peace, and he proposed that Scipio should 
 act as a sort of umpire or mediator between the 
 two parties, to arrange the terms. Scipio was 
 not likely to be a very impartial umpire ; but 
 still, his interposition would afford him, as Has- 
 drubal thought, some protection against any 
 excessive and extreme exorbitancy on the part 
 of his conqueror. The plan, however, did not 
 succeed. Even Scipio's terms were found by 
 Hasdrubal to be inadmissible. He required 
 hat the Carthaginians should accord to Masi- 
 aissa a certain extension of territory. Hasdru- 
 bal was willing to assent to this. They were 
 to pay him, also, a large sum of money. He 
 , also to this. They were, moreover, *c
 
 B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED. 273 
 
 HMdrnbM surrenders. Term* imposed by MiuinUaa 
 
 allow Hasdruba-'s banished opponents to return 
 to Carthage. This, by putting the party op- 
 posed to Hasdrabal once more into power in 
 Carthage, would have been followed by his own 
 fall and ruin ; he could not consent to it. Ho 
 remained, therefore, shut up in his camp, and 
 Scipio, giving up the hope of effecting an ac- 
 commodation, took the elephants which had 
 been provided for him, and returned across the 
 Mediterranean to Spain. 
 
 Soon after this, Hasdrubal's army, worn out 
 with hunger and misery in their camp, com- 
 polled him to surrender on Masinissa's own 
 terms. The men were allowed to go free, but 
 most of them perished on the way to Carthage. 
 Hasdrubal himself succeeded in reaching some 
 place of safety, but the influence of his party 
 was destroyed by the disastrous result of his 
 enterprise, and his exiled enemies being recall 
 ed in accordance with the treaty of surrender, 
 the opposing party were immediately restored 
 to power. 
 
 Under these new councils, the first measure 
 of the Carthaginians was to impeach Hasdrubal 
 on a charge }f treason, lor having involved his 
 country in those difficulties, and the next wa 
 to send a solemn embassy to Rome, to aoknowl-
 
 274 HANNHAL. [B.C. 148 
 
 , Carthaginian embassy to Rome. Their mission fruitleM 
 
 edge the fault of which their nation had been 
 guilty, to offer te> surrender Hasdrubal into 
 their hands, as the principal author of the deed, 
 and to ask what further satisfaction the Romans 
 demanded. 
 
 In the mean time, before these messengers 
 arrived, the Romans had been deliberating what 
 to do. The strongest party were in favor of 
 urging on the quarrel with Carthage and de- 
 claring war. They had not, however, come to 
 any positive decision. They received the depu- 
 tation, therefore, very coolly, and made them no 
 direct reply. As to the satisfaction which the 
 Carthaginians ought to render to the Romans 
 for having made war upon their ally contrary 
 to the solemn covenants of the treaty, they said 
 that that was a question for the Carthaginians 
 themselves to consider. They had nothing at 
 present to say upon the subject. The deputies 
 returned to Carthage with this reply, which, of 
 course, produced great uneasiness and anxiety. 
 
 The Carthaginians were more and more de- 
 siroue now to do every thing in their power to 
 avert the threatened danger of Roman hostility 
 They sent a new embassy to Rome, with still 
 more humble professions than before. The em- 
 bassy set sail from Carthage with very little
 
 B.C. 148.] CARTHAOE DESTROYED. 275 
 
 Another embxty. The Roman* declare wmt 
 
 hope, however, of accomplishing the object of 
 their mission. They were authorized, never- 
 theless, to make the most unlimited conces- 
 sions, and to submit to any conditions what- 
 ever to avert the calamity of another war. 
 
 But the Romans had been furnished with a 
 pretext for commencing hostilities again, and 
 there was a very strong party among them now 
 who were determined to avail themselves of this 
 opportunity to extinguish entirely the Cartha- 
 ginian power. War had, accordingly, been de- 
 clared by the Roman senate very soon after the 
 first embassy had returned, a fleet and army 
 had been raised and equipped, and the expedi- 
 tion had sailed. When, therefore, the embassy 
 arrived in Rome, they found that the war, which 
 it was the object of their mission to avert, had 
 been declared. 
 
 The Romans, however, gave them audience. 
 The embassadors expressed their willingness to 
 submit to any terms that the senate might pro- 
 pose for arresting the war. The senate replied 
 that they were willing to make a treaty with 
 the Carthaginians, on condition that the latter 
 were to surrender themselves entirely to the 
 Roman power, and bind themselves to obey such 
 orders as the consuls, on their arrival in Africa
 
 276 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 148 
 
 rfegotiation* for peace. The Romans demand hoatage* 
 
 with the army, should issue ; the Romans, on 
 their part, guarantying that they should con- 
 tinue in the enjoyment of their liberty, of theii 
 territorial possessions, and of their laws. A 
 proof, howBver, of the Carthaginian honesty of 
 purpose in making the treaty s and security for 
 their future submission, they were required to 
 give up to the Romans three hundred hostages. 
 These hostages were to be young persons from 
 the first families in Carthage, the sons of the 
 men who were most prominent in society there, 
 and whose influence might be supposed to con- 
 trol the action of the nation. 
 
 The embassadors could not but consider these 
 as very onerous terms. They did not know what 
 orders the consuls would give them on their ar- 
 rival in Africa, and they were required to put 
 the commonwealth wholly into their power. 
 Besides, in the guarantee which the Romans 
 offered them, their territories and their lawi 
 were to be protected, but nothing was said of 
 their cities, their ships, or their arms and mu- 
 nitions of war. The agreement there, if execu- 
 ted, would put the Carthaginian commonwealth 
 wholly at the mercy of their masters, in respect 
 to all those things which were in those days 
 most valuable to a nation as elements of power
 
 B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED. 27? 
 
 Cruelty of the hostage system. Return of the smhMM tori 
 
 Still, the ambassadors had been instructed to 
 make peace with the Romans on any terms, and 
 they accordingly acceded to these, though with 
 great reluctance. They were especially averse 
 to the agreement in respect to the hostages. 
 
 This system, which prevailed universally in 
 ancient times, of having the government of one 
 nation surrender the children of the most dis- 
 tinguished citizens to that of another, as secu- 
 rity for the fulfillment of its treaty stipulations, 
 was a very cruel hardship to those who had to 
 suffer the separation ; but it would seem that 
 there was no other security strong enough to 
 hold such lawless powers as governments were 
 in those days, to their word. Stern and rough 
 as the men of those warlike nations often were, 
 mothers were the same then as now, and they 
 suffered quite as keenly in seeing their children 
 sect away from them, to pine in a foreign land, 
 in hopeless exile, for many years ; in danger, too, 
 continually, of the most cruel treatment, and 
 even of death itself, to revenge some alleged 
 governmental wrong. 
 
 Of course, the embassadors knew, when thy 
 returned to Carthage with these terms, that 
 they ware bringing heavy tidings. The news, 
 hi fact, when it came, threw the oomrounito
 
 278 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 148 
 
 Consternation in Carthage Its deplorable conditioa. 
 
 into the most extreme distress. It is said that 
 the whole city was filled with cries and lamen- 
 tations. The mothers, who felt that they were 
 about to be bereaved, beat their breasts, and 
 tore their hair, and manifested by every other 
 sign their extreme and unmitigated woe. They 
 begged and entreated their husbands and fathers 
 not to consent to such cruel and intolerable con- 
 ditions. They could not, and they would not 
 give up their children. 
 
 The husbands and the fathers, however, felt 
 compelled to resist all these entreaties. They 
 could not now undertake to resist the Roman 
 will. Their army had been well-nigh destroy- 
 ed in the battle with Masinissa ; their city was 
 consequently defenseless, and the Roman flee* 
 had already reached its African port, and the 
 troops were landed. There was no possible 
 way, it appeared, of saving themselves and their 
 city from absolute destruction, but entire sub- 
 mission to the terms which their stern conquer* 
 ore had imposed upon them. 
 
 The hostages were required to be sent, with- 
 in thirty days, to the island of Sicily, to a port 
 on the western extremity of the island, called 
 Lilybffium Lilybseum was the port in Sicily 
 nearest to Carthage, being perhaps at a distance
 
 BC. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED. 27S 
 
 Selecting the hostage*. The boor of parting. 
 
 of a hundred miles across the waters of the 
 Mediterranean Sea. A Roman escort was to 
 oe ready to receive them there and conduct 
 them to Rome. Although thirty days were al- 
 lowed to the Carthaginians to select and send 
 forward the hostages, they determined not to 
 avail themselves of this offered delay, but to 
 send the unhappy children forward at once, that 
 they might testify to the Roman senate, by this 
 their promptness, that they were very earnestly 
 desirous to propitiate their favor. 
 
 The children were accordingly designated, 
 one from each of the leading families in the 
 city, and three hundred in all. The reader 
 must imagine the heart-rending scenes of suf- 
 fering which must have desolated these three 
 hundred families and homes, when the stern 
 and inexorable edict came to each of them that 
 one loved member of the household must be se- 
 lected to go. And when, at last, the hour ar- 
 rived for their departure, and they assembled 
 upon the pier, the picture was one of intense 
 and unmingled suffering. The poor exiles stood 
 bewildered with terror and grief, about to part 
 with all that they ever held dear their parents, 
 their brothers and sisters, and their native land 
 to go thev knew not whither, under the care
 
 280 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 
 
 The parting scene. Grief Mid dep*lr 
 
 of iron -hearted soldiers, who seemed to know 
 no feelings of tenderness or compassion for theii 
 woes. Their disconsolate mothers wept and 
 groaned aloud, clasping the loved ones wha 
 were about to be torn forever from them in theii 
 arms, in a delirium of maternal affection and 
 irrepressible grief; their brothers and sisters, 
 and their youthful friends stood by, some almost 
 frantic with emotions which they did not at- 
 tempt to suppress, others mute and motionless 
 in their sorrow, shedding bitter tears of anguish, 
 or gazing wildly on the scene with looks of do- 
 spair ; while the fathers, whose stern duty il 
 was to pass through this scene unmoved, walk- 
 ed to and fro restlessly, in deep but silent dis- 
 tress, spoke in broken and incoherent words to 
 one another, and finally aided, by a mixture of 
 persuasion and gentle force, in drawing the 
 children away from their mothers' arms, and 
 getting them on board the vessels which wens 
 to convey them away. The vessels made sail, 
 and passed off slowly from the shore. The 
 r -^ers watched them till they could no longei 
 be seen, and then returned, disconsolate and 
 wretched, to their homes ; and then the grief 
 and agitation of this parting scene was succeed- 
 ed by the anxious suspense which now pervad
 
 B.C. 148. J CARTHAGE DESTROYED. 2bJ 
 
 Adrance of the Roman army. Surrender of Utica 
 
 ed the whole city to learn what new dangers 
 and indignities they were to suffer from the ap- 
 proaching Roman army, which they knew must 
 now be well on its way. 
 
 The Roman army landed at Utioa. Utioa 
 was a large city to the north of Carthage, not 
 far from it, and upon the same bay. When 
 th.e people of Utica found that another serious 
 collision was to take place between Rome and 
 Carthage, they had foreseen what would prob- 
 ably be the end of the contest, and they had de- 
 cided that, in order to save themselves from the 
 ruin which was plainly impending over the sis- 
 ter city, they must abandon her to her fate, and 
 make common cause with Rome. They had, 
 accordingly, sent deputies to the Roman senate, 
 offering to surrender Utica to their power. The 
 Romans had accepted the submission, and had 
 made this city, in consequence, the port of de- 
 barkation for their army. 
 
 As soon as the news arrived at Carthage 
 that the Roman army had landed at Utioa, the 
 people sent deputies to inquire what were the 
 .orders of the consuls, for it will he recollected 
 they had bound themselves by the treaty to 
 obey the orders which the consuls were to bring. 
 They found, when they arrived there, that the
 
 282 HANNIBAL, [B.C. 148 
 
 Demands of the Roman*. Tho Carthaginians comply 
 
 bay was covered with the Roman shipping. 
 There were fifty vessels of war, of three banks 
 of oars each, and a vast number of transports 
 besides. There was, too, in the camp upon the 
 shore, a force of eighty thousand foot soldiers 
 and four thousand horse, all armed and equipped 
 in the most perfect manner. 
 
 The deputies were convinced that this was a 
 force which it was in vain for their countrymen 
 to think of resisting. They asked, trembling, 
 for the consuls' orders. The consuls informed 
 them that the orders of the Roman senate were, 
 first, that the Carthaginians should furnish them 
 with a supply of corn for the subsistence of their 
 troops. The deputies went back to Carthage 
 with the demand. 
 
 The Carthaginians resolved to comply. They 
 were bound by their treaty and by the hostages 
 they had given, as well as intimidated by the 
 presence of the Roman force. They furnished 
 the corn. 
 
 The consuls, soon after this, made another 
 demand of the Carthaginians. It was, that they 
 should surrender to them all their vessels of 
 war. They were more unwilling to comply 
 with this requisition than with the other ; but 
 they absented at last. They hoped that the de-
 
 B.C. 148.J CARTHAGE DESTROYED. 283 
 
 fhe Romans demand all the munitions of war. Their great number 
 
 cnands of their enemies would stop here, and 
 that, satisfied with having weakened them thus 
 far, they would go away and leave them ; they 
 oould then build new ships again when bettei 
 times should return. 
 
 But the Romans were not satisfied yet. They 
 sent a third order, that the Carthaginians should 
 deliver up all their arms, military stores, and 
 warlike machines of every kind, by sending them 
 into the Roman camp. The Carthaginians were 
 rendered almost desperate by this requisition. 
 Many were determined that they would not 
 submit to it, but would resist at all hazards. 
 Others despaired of all possibility of resisting 
 now, and gave up all as lost ; while the three 
 hundred families from which the hostages had 
 gone, trembled for the safety of the captive 
 children, and urged compliance with the de- 
 mand. The advocates for submission finally 
 gained the day. The arms were collected, and 
 carried in an immensely long train of wagons 
 to the Roman camp. There were two hundred 
 thousand complete suits of armor, with darts 
 and javelins without number, and two thousand 
 military engines for hurling beams of wood and 
 stones. Thus Carthage was disarmed. 
 
 All these demands, however unreasonable
 
 284 HANNIBAL. [B.C.148 
 
 Brutal demand* of the Roman*. Carthage to be destroyed 
 
 and cruel as the Carthaginians deemed them, 
 were only preliminary to the great final determ- 
 ination, the announcement of which the con- 
 suls had reserved for the end. When the arms 
 had all been delivered, the consuls announced 
 to their now defenseless victims that the Roman 
 senate had come to the determination that Car- 
 thage was to be destroyed. They gave orders, 
 accordingly, that the inhabitants should all leave 
 the city, which, as soon as it should be thus vacat- 
 ed, was to be burned. They might take with 
 them such property as they could carry ; and 
 they were at liberty to build, in lieu of this their 
 fortified sea-port, an inland town, not less than 
 ten miles' distance from the sea, only it must 
 have no walls or fortifications of any kind. As 
 soon as the inhabitants were gone, Carthage, 
 the consuls said, was to be destroyed. 
 
 The announcement of this entirely unparal 
 leled and intolerable requisition threw the whole 
 oity into a phrensy of desperation. They could 
 not, and would not submit to this. The en- 
 treaties and remonstrances of the friends of the 
 hostages were all silenced or overborne in the 
 burst of indignation and anger which arose from 
 the whole city. The gates were closed. The 
 pavements of the streets were torn up, and
 
 B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED. 285 
 
 Desperation of the people. Prepwatiom for deft 
 
 buildings demolished to obtain stones, which 
 were carried up upon the ramparts to serve in- 
 stead of weapons. The slaves were all liberat- 
 ed, and stationed on the walls to aid in the de- 
 fense. Every body that could work at a forge 
 was employed in fabricating swords, spear- 
 heads, pikes, and such other weapons as could 
 be formed with the greatest facility and dis- 
 patch. They used all the iron and brass that 
 could be obtained, and then melted down vases 
 and statues of the precious metals, and tipped 
 their spears with an inferior pointing of silver 
 and gold. In the same manner, when the sup- 
 plies of flax and hempen twine for cordage for 
 their bows failed, the beautiful sisters and moth- 
 ers of the hostages out off their long hair, and 
 twisted and braided it into cords to be used as 
 bow-strings for propelling the arrows which 
 their husbands and brothers made. In a word, 
 the wretched Carthaginians had been pushed 
 beyond the last limit of human endurance, and 
 had aroused themselves to a hopeless resistance 
 in a sort of phrensy of despair. 
 
 The reader will recollect that, after the bat- 
 tle with Masinissa, Hasdrubal lost all his influ- 
 ence in f 'arthage, and was, to all appearance, 
 hopelessly ruined. He had not, however, then
 
 286 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 14t 
 
 Haadrabal. Destruction of the Roman flea 
 
 given up the struggle. He had contrived to as- 
 semble the remnant of his army in the neigh- 
 borhood of Carthage. His forces had been grad- 
 ually increasing during these transactions, as 
 those who were opposed to these concessions to 
 the Romans naturally gathered around him. 
 He was now in his camp, not far from the city, 
 at the head of twenty thousand men. Finding 
 themselves in so desperate an emergency, the 
 Carthaginians sent to him to come to their suc- 
 cor. He very gladly obeyed the summons. He 
 sent around to all the territories still subject to 
 Carthage, and gathered fresh troops, and col- 
 lected supplies of arms and of food. He ad- 
 vanced to the relief of the city. He compelled 
 the Romans, who were equally astonished at 
 the resistance they met with from within the 
 walls, and at this formidable onset from with- 
 out, to retire a little, and intrench themselves 
 in their camp, in order to secure their own safe- 
 ty. He sent supplies of food into the city He 
 also contrived to fit up, secretly, a great many 
 fire-ships in the harbor, and, setting them in 
 flames, let them drift down upon the Roman 
 fleet, which was anchored in supposed security 
 in the bay. The plan was so skillfully man- 
 aged that the Roman ships were almost all de-
 
 B.C. 146.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED. 2.^7 
 
 Horrors of the liege. Heroic valor of the Carthaginhux. 
 
 stroyed. Thus the face of affairs was changed 
 The Romans found themselves disappointed foi 
 the present of their prey. They confined them- 
 selves to their encampment, and sent home to 
 the Roman senate for new re-enforcements and 
 supplies. 
 
 In a word, the Romans found that, instead 
 of having only to effect, unresisted, the simple 
 destruction of a city, they were involved in what 
 would, perhaps, prove a serious and a protract- 
 ed war. The war did, in fact, continue for two 
 or three years a horrible war, almost of exterm- 
 ination, on both sides. Scipio came with the 
 Roman army, at first as a subordinate officer ; 
 but his bravery, his sagacity, and the success 
 of some of his almost romantic exploits, soon 
 made him an object of universal regard. At 
 one time, a detachment of the army, which he 
 succeeded in releasing from a situation of great 
 peril in which they had been placed, testified 
 their gratitude by platting a crown of grass, and 
 placing it upon his brow with great ceremonj 
 and loud acclamations. 
 
 The Carthaginians did every thing in tha 
 prosecution of this war that the most desperate 
 valor could do; but Scipio's cool, steady, and 
 well-calculated plans made irresistible progress.
 
 288 HANNIBAL. [B.C.145 
 
 Battering engines. Attempt to destroy them. 
 
 and hemmed them in at last, within narrower 
 and narrower limits, by a steadily-increasing 
 pressure, from which they found it impossible 
 to break away. 
 
 Scipio had erected a sort of mole or pier upon 
 the water near the city, on which he had erect- 
 ed many large and powerful engines to assault 
 the walls. One night a large company of Car- 
 thaginians took torches, not lighted, in their 
 hands, together with some sort of apparatus for 
 striking fire, and partly by wading and partly 
 by swimming, they made their way through 
 the water of the harbor toward these machines. 
 When they were sufficiently near, they struck 
 their lights and set their torches on fire. The 
 Roman soldiers who had been stationed to guard 
 the machines were seized with terror at seeing 
 all these flashing fires burst out suddenly over 
 the surface of the water, and fled in dismay. 
 The Carthaginians set the abandoned engines 
 on fire, and then, throwing their now useless 
 torches into the flames, plunged into the watei 
 again, and swam back in safety. But all thie 
 desperate bravery did very little good. Scipio 
 quietly repaired the engines, and the siege went 
 on as before. 
 
 But we can not describe in detail all the pax
 
 B.C. 145.J CARTHAGE DESTROYED. 
 
 The ctty stormed. A desperate struggle 
 
 ticulars of this protracted and terrible straggle 
 We must pass on to the closing scene, which 
 as related by the historians of the day, is an al- 
 most incredible series of horrors. After an im- 
 mense number had been killed in the assaults 
 which had been made upon the city, besides the 
 thousands and thousands which had died of fam- 
 ine, and of the exposures and hardships incident 
 to such a siege, the army of Scipio succeeded 
 in breaking their way through the gates, and 
 gaining admission to the city. Some of the in- 
 habitants were now disposed to contend no long- 
 er, bu to oast themselves at the mercy of the 
 conqueror. Others, furious in their despair, were 
 determined to fight to the last, not willing to 
 give up the pleasure of killing all they could of 
 their hated enemies, even to save their lives. 
 They fought, therefore, from street to street, 
 retreating gradually as the Romans advanced, 
 till they found refuge in the citadel One band 
 of Soipio's soldiers mounted to the taps of the 
 houses, the roofs being flat, and fought their 
 way there, while another column advanced in 
 the same manner in the streets below. No im- 
 agination can conceive the uproar and din of 
 such an assault upon a populous city a horrid 
 mingling of the vociferated commands of the 
 1419
 
 290 UANNIBAI.. [B.C. 145 
 
 The peop.e retreat to the citadel. The city fir..<i 
 
 officers, and of the shouts of the advancing and 
 victorious assailants, with the screams of terror 
 from affrighted women and children, and dread- 
 ful groans and imprecations from men dying 
 maddened with unsatisfied revenge, and biting 
 the dust in an agony of pain. 
 
 The more determined of the combatants, with 
 Hasdrubal at their head, took possession of the 
 citadel, which was a quarter of the city situ- 
 ated upon an eminence, and strongly fortified 
 Scipio advanced to the walls of this fortifica- 
 tion, and set that part of the city on fire which 
 lay nearest to it. The fire burned for six days, 
 and opened a large area, which afforded the Ro- 
 man troops room to act. When the troops were 
 brought up to the area thus left vacant by the 
 fire, and the people within the citadel saw that 
 their condition was hopeless, there arose, as 
 there always does in such cases, the desperate 
 struggle within the walls whether to persist in 
 resistance or to surrender in despair. There 
 was an immense mass, not far from sixty thou- 
 sand, half women and children, who were de- 
 termined on going out to surrender themselves 
 to Soipio's mercy, and beg for their lives. Has- 
 drubal's wife, leading her two children by her 
 side, earnestly entreated her husband to allow
 
 B.C. 145.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED. 291 
 
 HatdrubaTi wife. Haadrubal surrender* 
 
 her to go with them. But he refused. There 
 was a body of deserters from the Roman camp 
 in the citadel, who, having no possible hope of 
 escaping destruction except by desperate re- 
 sistance to the last, Hasdrubal supposed would 
 never yield. He committed his wife and chil- 
 dren, therefore, to their charge, and these de- 
 serters, seeking refuge in a great temple with- 
 in the citadel, bore the frantic mother with them 
 to share their fate. 
 
 Hasdrubal's determination, however, to resist 
 the Romans to the last, soon after this gave 
 way, and he determined to surrender. He is 
 accused of the most atrocious treachery in at- 
 tempting thus to save himself, after excluding 
 his wife and children from all possibility of es- 
 caping destruction. But the confusion and din 
 of such a scene, the suddenness and violence 
 with which the events succeed each other, and 
 the tumultuous and uncontrollable mental agi- 
 tation to which they give rise, deprive a man 
 who is called to act in it of all sense and rea- 
 son, and exonerate him, almost as much, from 
 moral responsibility for what he does, as if he 
 were insane. At any rate, Hasdrubal, aftei 
 hutting up his wife and children with a fari 
 ons gang of desperadoes who could not possibly
 
 292 HANNIBAL. [B.C. 145 
 
 The citadel fired. Resentment and despair of Hudrubal'i wifa 
 
 surrender, surrendered himself, perhaps hoping 
 that he might save them after all. 
 
 The Carthaginian soldiers, following Hasdru- 
 bal's example, opened the gates of the citadel, 
 and let the conqueror in. The deserters were 
 now made absolutely desperate by their danger, 
 and some of them, more furious than the rest, 
 preferring to die by their own hands rather than 
 to give their hated enemies the pleasure of kill- 
 ing them, set the building in which they were 
 shut up in on fire. The miserable inmates ran 
 to and fro, half suffocated by the smoke and 
 scorched by the flames. Many of them reached 
 the roof. Hasdrubal's wife and children were 
 among the number. She looked down from 
 this elevation, the volumes of smoke and flame 
 rolling up around her, and saw her husband 
 standing below with the Roman general per- 
 haps looking, in consternation, for his wife and 
 children, amid this scene of horror. The sight 
 of the husband and father in a position of safe- 
 ty made the wife and mother perfectly furious 
 with resentment and anger. " Wretch !" she 
 creamed, m a voice which raised itself above 
 the universal aln, " is it thus yon seek to save 
 vour own life while you sacrifice ours ? I can 
 ant reach vou in vour own person, but T kill
 
 B.C. 145.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED. 293 
 
 Carttage destroyed. Ita present condition. 
 
 you hereby in the persons of your children." 
 So saying, she stabbed her affrighted sons with 
 a dagger, and hnrled them down, straggling all 
 the time against their insane mother's phren- 
 *y, into the nearest opening from which flames 
 were ascending, and then leaped in after them 
 herself to share their awful doom. 
 
 The Romans, when they had gained posses- , 
 sion of the city, took most effectual measures 
 for its complete destruction. The inhabitants 
 were scattered into the surrounding country, 
 and the whole territory was converted into a 
 Roman province. Some attempts were after- 
 ward made to rebuild the city, and it was for a 
 long time a place of some resort, as men lin- 
 gered mournfully there in huts that they built 
 among the ruins. It, however, was gradually 
 forsaken, the stones crumbled and decayed, veg- 
 etation regained possession of the soil, and now 
 there is nothing whatever to mark the spot 
 where the city lay. 
 
 War and commerce are the two great antag- 
 onistic principles which struggle for the mas- 
 tery of the human race, the function of the one 
 being to preserve, and that of the other to de- 
 stroy. Commerce causes cities to be built and
 
 2U4 HANNIBAL. [E.G. 145 
 
 War and commerce. Antagonistic principle*. 
 
 fields to be cultivated, and diffuses comfort and 
 plenty, and al^ the blessings of industry and 
 peace. It carries organization and order every 
 where ; it protects property and life ; it disarm* 
 pestilence, and it prohibits famine. War, on 
 the other hand, destroys. It disorganizes the 
 social state. It ruins cities, depopulates fields, 
 condemns men to idleness and want, and the 
 only remedy it knows for the evils which it 
 brings upon man is to shorten the miseries of 
 its victims by giving pestilence and famine the 
 most ample commission to destroy their lives. 
 Thus war is the great enemy, while .commerce 
 i& the great friend of humanity. They are an- 
 tagonistio principles, contending continually for 
 the mastery among all the organizations of men. 
 When Hannibal appeared upon the stage, he 
 found his country engaged peacefully and pros- 
 perously in exchanging the productions of the 
 various countries of the then known world, and 
 promoting every where the comfort and happi- 
 ness of mankind. He contrived to turn all these 
 energies into the new current of military ag- 
 gression, conquest, and war. He perfectly suc- 
 ceeded . We certainly have in his person and 
 history all the marks and characteristics of a 
 great military hero. He gained the most splen-
 
 B.C. 145.' CARTHAGE DESTROYED. 295 
 
 HannibmFi greatoOM ai a military hero. 
 
 did victories, devastated many lands-, embarrass- 
 ed and stopped the commercial intercourse which 
 was carrying the comforts of life to so many 
 thousand homes, and spread, instead of them, 
 every where, privation, want, and terror, with 
 pestilence and famine in their train. He kept 
 the country of his enemies in a state of inces- 
 sant anxiety, suffering, and alarm for many 
 years, and overwhelmed his own native land, 
 in the end, in absolute and irresistible ruin. IB 
 a word, he was one of the greatest military be* 
 roe* that the world has ever known. 
 
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