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CHINA AND HER NEIGHBOURS 
 
CHINA AND HER 
 NEIGHBOURS 
 
 France in Indo-China, Russia and China, 
 India and Thibet. 
 
 R. S. GUNDRY 
 
 That which hath been is that which shall be ; and that which hath been done is that 
 which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun. Is there a 
 thing whereof men spy, See, this is new? it hath been already, in iho ages 
 which were before us."— Eccles. i. 9, 10. 
 
 WITH MAPS 
 
 London: CHAPMAN and HALL, Ltd. 
 
 1893 
 \^All rights reserved"] 
 
T)55 
 
 a^7 
 
iietJtcateK 
 
 TO 
 
 SIR THOMAS F. WADE, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., 
 
 LATE HEU MAJESTY S MlNlSTEJi AT PEKING. 
 
 V66857 
 
INTEODUCTION. 
 
 The following essays, which have appeared from 
 time to time in the periodical press, are repub- 
 lished, with such emendations and additions as the 
 development of events seemed to require, in the 
 belief that the retrospect they afford may not be 
 without value at the present crisis in the Far East. 
 
 Owing to the time and form of original publication, 
 the chapters may, at first sight, appear somewhat 
 disjointed, — each having been designed to describe a 
 separate episode. But the very fragmentary cha- 
 racter of the narrative serves to throw up into 
 stronger relief the continuity of purpose in the 
 various adventures of the Great Powers whose deal- 
 ings with China and her Tributaries are set forth. 
 It is, indeed, only by bearing in mind this fixed and 
 persistent policy on the part of Russia and France, 
 that the separate episodes of that policy can be 
 properly valued and fitted into their appropriate 
 places in the general scheme. 
 
 The series of papers, for example, on French 
 operations in Indo-China, written to elucidate the 
 several events as they took place, will, it is believed, 
 be found to furnish a fairly complete narrative of 
 the whole course of that remarkable enterprise, 
 
X INTRODUCTION, 
 
 which can hardly fail to interest the political moralist 
 at the moment when it has culminated in the most 
 cynical aggression of modern times. The dual motive 
 of hostility to England and the glorification of France, 
 which has animated French policy in Asia, has 
 undergone no variation whatever since France had 
 a policy in Asia at all. Monarchies, Republics, and 
 Empires succeed each other, but the spirit remains 
 the same through all these superficial changes. It 
 is candidly avowed, and there need be no delicacy 
 in putting the truth in plain language. 
 
 The attempt to gain a footing in Indo- China 
 during the reign of Louis XVI. was avowedly 
 dictated by the hostility to England which is con- 
 spicuous in the tone of French journalism at the 
 present day. The facilities which such a position 
 would give for harassing English commerce were 
 frankly put forward, by Mgr. Pigneau de Behaine, 
 as reasons for giving King Gya-long the help which 
 was to be paid for by the cession of Tourane ; and 
 the remarkable treaty in which the bargain was 
 recorded exacts privileges that were expressly de- 
 signed to make Annam an arsenal, dockyard, and 
 recruiting ground for France in Eastern Asia. 
 
 And so in the case of Siam. Louis the Fourteenth's 
 remarkable attempt to establish French " influence " 
 in Siam was dictated by jealousy of England 
 and Holland, as much as by a desire to promote 
 French commerce. The two Protestant Powers 
 were believed to derive much of the wealth which 
 enabled them to make head against him, in Europe, 
 
INTRODUCTION. xi 
 
 from the trade they earned on with Asia ; and 
 the French Government of the day rejoiced at the 
 prospect of dealing a blow at that prosperity by 
 installing French garrisons, and setting up a hostile 
 tegime^ at Mergui and Bangkok. The impression 
 that the tale of Siamese embassies to Louis XIV. 
 arose out of a masquerading attempt, by Madame de 
 Maintenon, to amuse a hla^e and senile king, is hardly 
 yet fairly dispelled. But the first Siamese embassy 
 reached France in 1685, when Louis was at the 
 height of his power and in the prime of life. His 
 garrisons had been turned out of Siam, and the 
 whole project had collapsed, more than twenty years 
 before his death. The detailed account of those 
 embassies and of their political motives which will 
 be found in the following pages may show that the 
 annexations and protective duties of the present day 
 are the modern development of the policy which 
 inspired Colbert and Louis XIV. 
 
 A curious feature which may strike us, in connec- 
 tion with each of these attempts, is the share taken 
 by the Church in prompting the political adventure. 
 It is Mgr. Pallu, Bishop of Heliopolis, who inspires 
 the beginnings of French intercourse with Siam, and 
 it is a Jesuit Missionary named Tachard who helps 
 to inflate the conception of military ascendency. It 
 is Mgr. Pigneau de Behaine, Bishop of Adran, who 
 conceives and organizes the whole scheme of French 
 intervention in Annam, and who thus literally and 
 practically laid the foundation of the Indo-Chinese 
 Empire Avhich his countrymen are trying to build up. 
 
xii INTRODUCTIOlSr, 
 
 at the present day. It is the Abbe Hue who sug- 
 gests to Napoleon III. that the opportunity is a 
 good one for re-asserting French influence at Saigon ; 
 and there are mysterious rumours of a (half-caste) 
 Cambodian Christian visiting M. de Montigny, at 
 Singapore, just as he was about starting on a tour 
 of diplomatic visits to the Courts of Eastern Asia, 
 in 1856, to suggest that a French protectorate would 
 be welcomed by [? a section of] the Khmers. 
 
 This traditional motive should be borne in mind 
 when surprise is expressed at the apparent divergence 
 between the attitude of the Republican Government 
 towards the Church at home and abroad. Propa- 
 gandismwas connoted with commerce in the projects of 
 Richelieu and Colbert. The Empire was carrying out 
 this policy in striving to exalt the position of France 
 as protector of oriental missions ; and the Republic 
 upheld the tradition to the extent, it was understood, 
 of threatening to denounce the Concordat, when it was 
 proposed, some years ago, to break up the system by 
 inducing European governments to undertake, each, 
 the protection of its own missionary subjects. Ger- 
 many and Italy had acquiesced, and the Vatican had 
 even agreed to appoint a Legate to watch over the 
 interests of the Church, at Peking, when France 
 temporarily upset the scheme by the energy of its 
 opposition. 
 
 In the first six chapters of the present volume, 
 an attempt has been made to depict the successive 
 stages in the construction of the French colonial 
 edifice. There is no pretence of describing, in detail. 
 
INTRODUCTION, xiii 
 
 the military operations. Saigon, Cambodia, Tong- 
 king, Annam, Siam — each annexation is dealt with, in 
 turn, chiefly as a political episode ; and the fact that 
 mention is made, frequently years beforehand, of 
 the next contemplated aggression, may serve to ex- 
 pose the holloAvness of the wrongs which were 
 put forward, as excuses for military action, when 
 the convenient moment arrived. The Intranslgeant, 
 indeed, avowed the other day, with perfect frankness : 
 " We are going to Siam under pretext of avenging 
 an insult to our flag, but really with the idea of 
 making a new conquest." And the admission ade- 
 quately describes the value of French protestations. 
 
 The paper on " France and Saigon " was written 
 for the Norih-Ghina Herald after a visit to the Colony, 
 in 1873, when the idea of gaining a foothold in 
 Tongking was beginning to take shape and the 
 Saigon Independant Avas already advocating a pro- 
 tectorate over the remainder of Annam. De Lao^ree's 
 discovery of the Song-Koi had fired the Colonial 
 imagination ; Dupuis was engaged in testing its 
 practicability as a channel of commercial intercourse 
 with Yunnan; and de Carne was urging, in the 
 Revue des Deux Mondes, that coercion must be 
 employed if the King persisted in obstructing French 
 designs: England was trying to attract the trade 
 to Burmah ; and " it is not," he exclaims, '' at the 
 moment when, by a stroke of good luck, it depends 
 on ourselves to forestall her, that it behoves us 
 to halt before the susceptibilities of a despot who 
 cannot conceive liberty of commerce without 
 
xiv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 occupation of territory, and who repulses our 
 merchants as if they were the forerunners of our 
 soldiers ! When one decides on a war of conquest, 
 it would appear that one accepts beforehand the 
 consequence of success, and the opening of Tongking 
 is a necessary sequel of our establishment in the six 
 provinces of Lower Cochin-China." A protectorate, 
 in short, — or at least complete freedom of trade in 
 the ports of Tongking, guaranteed by the installation 
 of a French Resident at the Annamese capital, — was 
 the only means of securing the desired end and of 
 escaping a deadlock " ou nous acculeraient une 
 timidite sans excuse aussi bien que des scrupules par 
 trop naifs." One scarcely knows whether most to 
 admire the unconscious tribute paid to Annamese 
 foresight, or the simulated indignation at suspicions 
 whose justice is practically admitted in the con- 
 cluding phrase. The sentence is, at any rate, worthy 
 of note because it strikes the keynote of French 
 policy in Indo- China. Subsequent proceedings have 
 been precisely characterized by the unscrupulous 
 aggression, disguised under a pretence of moral 
 indignation, which is here commended with such 
 sublime unconsciousness of the incongruity displayed. 
 The historical sketch which forms the basis 
 of the chapter on " Cambodia " was contributed to 
 the London and China ExjJress, at the time M. 
 Thomson was stripping King Norodom of the last 
 shreds of political independence, and premonitory 
 mutterings of derivative claims were beginning 
 to disturb the Court of Bangkok. It had been all 
 
INTRODUCTION. xv 
 
 very well, ten years previously, for de Cam^ to ex- 
 patiate on the political skill and firmness which had 
 defeated Siam and obtained the surrender of Cam- 
 bodia to the exclusive protectorate of France ; but it 
 had been discovered, now, that Cambodia had once 
 been a much larger geographical expression. Gamier 
 had pointed out the necessity of hoisting the flag at 
 Stung-treng and Khong, and had recorded M. de 
 Lagree's opinion that the province of Tonly Repu 
 ought to be reclaimed: the recognition of Siamese 
 rights over Battambong and Angkor had become a 
 source of acute regret ; and Dr. Ne'is was beginning 
 to discover that there were tribes, even so far north 
 as the frontier of Tongking, who were held in 
 bondage by Siam. 
 
 The essay on " France and Tongking " appeared in 
 the Contemporary Beview, at the moment when 
 French intervention was taking the form of con- 
 quest ; and that on " France and Annam " in the 
 Westminster, twelve months later, when the action 
 of the French Government had brought China into 
 the field. 
 
 " China and Her Tributaries " was written about 
 the same time, for the National Beview, for the 
 purpose of explaining the nature of China's relations 
 with her neighbours and the continuity of the feudal 
 tie which France was pretending to ridicule in the 
 case of Annam ; while " France and Siam " was 
 published two months ago, in the same Review, at 
 the moment when definite expression was being 
 given to the ulterior aspirations that had been fore- 
 
xvi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 shadowed, from time to time, in previous essays. A 
 second chapter has been added, to trace the develop- 
 ment of the enterprise, and to explain more precisely 
 the English and Chinese interests which seem likely 
 to mar the perfection of the original design. It will 
 be seen that Siam has repudiated vassalage or any 
 kind of tributary relationship to her more powerful 
 neighbour. She cannot, therefore, appeal now, as of 
 right, for the help which China might, or might not, 
 be willing to aiFord. But the Imperial Cabinet 
 seems disposed to avow a natural anxiety in claims 
 that involve the extension of the French frontier 
 along the southern border of Yunnan. It may 
 not feel much more concerned than England about 
 what happens on the Southern Meikong; but it 
 would hardly be surprising if it shared the distaste 
 of England to annexations of territory that touch 
 China as nearly on the South as they touch British 
 Burmah on the East. French newspapers exhaust 
 themselves in ironical references to former English 
 annexations, by way of retort upon English criticisms 
 of French proceedings in Siam. The annexation of 
 Burmah, especially, is pointed to as a precedent which 
 completely cuts the ground from under our feet. 
 But the fact is overlooked that that annexation was 
 forced upon us by intrigues which were designed 
 to draw Mandalay under the influence of France, and 
 which were alleged to contemplate the annexation to 
 Tongking of the very region which England and 
 China have again stepped in to protect. It is over- 
 looked, also, that our dislike to French encroach- 
 
INTRODUCTION. xvii 
 
 ments is inspired quite as much by an instinct of 
 commercial self-defence as by any feeling of political 
 jealousy or antagonism. Where England goes, all 
 the world is free to follow : Burmah is as much 
 open to French trade as to English — to Rouen and 
 Lille as to Manchester and Bradford — but where 
 France goes nothing English is admitted, if protec- 
 tive duties can keep it out. 
 
 Our interest in Indo-China might easily become 
 acute in presence of a Franco-Russian alliance ; 
 and the generally-admitted existence of at least a 
 tacit entente may lend interest to the grouj) of essays 
 depicting the relations of China with her northern 
 neighbour. For England's interest in Russian 
 encroachments in the North is scarcely less, or less 
 vivid, than it is in French annexations, in the South ; 
 and those encroachments are made, in every case, at 
 the cost of the great empire which stretches half 
 across Asia, from Corea to the Pamirs. The chapters 
 on " Kuldja " and " Russia and China," reprinted 
 respectively from the Times and the Fortnightly 
 lieview — though dealing, in the main, with distinct 
 phases of intercourse — will serve to exhibit the 
 political relations between the two giant Powers. 
 The former was written at the moment when the 
 Kuldja difficulty had just been settled by the Treaty 
 of St. Petersburg, in 1881 ; and the latter while 
 attention was being directed, last year, to Russian 
 proceedings in the Pamirs. 
 
 Nor are our interests confined to the neighbourhood 
 of our Indian frontier. It is one of the penalties of 
 
xviii INTRODUCTION, 
 
 our commercial greatness that we are sensitive to 
 any increase in the maritime resources of a possibly 
 hostile Power. We are interested, therefore, in 
 Russian proceedings on the Amoor as well as on 
 the Helmund. Relegated, on the eastern coast of 
 Siberia, to ports which are more or less ice-bound 
 during a portion of the year, Russia would be 
 almost less than human, as well as less than aggres- 
 sive, if she did not look wistfully across the fron- 
 tier of Primorsk to the open harbours of Corea. 
 The essays on " Corea " and " Port Hamilton," which 
 are reproduced from the Westminster Review, will 
 explain the steps by which the Hermit Kingdom 
 was drawn within the vortex of modem intercourse, 
 and by which its integrity has been safeguarded. 
 The former was written soon after Chinese per- 
 suasion and the force of events had induced the 
 little kingdom to open its doors ; and the latter 
 shortly after our withdrawal from the group of 
 islands which had been occupied by the British fleet 
 during the disaccord that arose, in 1886, out of 
 Russia's attitude towards Afghanistan, and had 
 nearly burst into flame at Pendjeh. Neither China 
 nor Corea appears to believe too implicitly in the 
 value of the guarantees; but the jealousy with 
 which Russian encroachment would be viewed by 
 others than China, and by others even than Great 
 Britain, may help to render efiicacious paper en- 
 gagements that might prove less reliable with less 
 substantial backing. 
 
 In sum, therefore, we find a remarkable similarity 
 
INTRODUCTION, xix 
 
 between the political conditions in Asia and Europe. 
 India and China, which ask nothing but to be let 
 alone, are confronted by Russia and France, much as 
 Germany and Austria are confronted in Europe ; and 
 their common interests must tend to ally them in an 
 attitude of mutual defence which would probably 
 jcommand, in an emergency, the sympathy of Japan. 
 For it is evident that, by exercising alternative or 
 simultaneous pressure in the North-west and South- 
 east, the two great Western Powers might create a 
 degree of military tension and political unrest as ex- 
 hausting as, and even more intolerable than, that 
 existing in Europe. Even neutral Belgium has an 
 Eastern representative in Korea ; and the position of 
 England, in Europe, finds a not inapt parallel in the 
 considerable power of Japan. 
 
 The three concluding chapters deal with a topic 
 of less Imperial consequence, but of not less interest, 
 perhaps, to the general reader. 
 
 Russian movements in northern Thibet have had, 
 so far, a purely exploratory character ; though the 
 facility with which Cossack detachments find their 
 way along the trail of the traveller, and pave the way 
 fol* emissaries of a less visionary class, may lead us 
 to watch with interest any region towards which 
 Russian attention appears to be directed. Thibet is 
 shielded, at present, in a great degree, by Chinese 
 Turkestan. But frontiers, in these remote regions, 
 are less clearly defined than would appear from 
 school maps ; and there are unsettled districts along 
 the boundary between Kashgaria and Kashmir 
 
XX INTRODUCTION. 
 
 which account for much Chinese, and some Indian, 
 anxiety about Russian movements across the Pamirs. 
 Our own present interest, however, is confined to 
 re-opening commercial intercourse across the Hima- 
 layas. The attempt made by Warren Hastings, in 
 1774, which was defeated, then, by Chinese antago- 
 nism, has been taken up again during this genera- 
 tion, and seems in a fair way of being carried, now, 
 with Chinese goodwill, to a successful issue. 
 
 The project inspired the provisions for roads and 
 transit dues which found place in Sir Ashley Eden's 
 treaty with Sikhim, in 1861 : it was given diplo- 
 matic expression, seventeen years ago, in the Anglo- 
 Chinese Convention of Chefoo, and was taken up with 
 more directness a decade later — though with results 
 that promised ill, at first, for the attainment of the 
 object in view. A mission to Lhassa, which had been 
 organized in India with the consent of China, was 
 abandoned in consequence of the hostile attitude 
 of the Lamas ; and the latter, encouraged by this 
 negative success, pushed their antagonism to the 
 point of occupying territory which had long been 
 considered, at Calcutta, as within the British-Indian 
 sphere. They were, of course, driven out ; but it 
 has taken several years to re-knit the broken diplo- 
 matic threads. Negotiations do not often progress 
 rapidly where China is alone concerned ; they were 
 still less likely to do so where Calcutta and Lhassa 
 were involved. 
 
 The settlement of the matter seems to have been 
 eventually left to those two capitals ; and an agree- 
 
INTRODUCTION. xxi 
 
 ment was shortly reached in which the project of 
 commercial intercourse was accepted, and the 
 suzerainty of India over Cis-nivean Sikhim formally 
 recognized. A Convention, signed by the Chinese 
 Amban and Lord Lansdowne, at Calcutta, in 
 March, 1890, was promptly ratified at London and 
 Peking, and has been followed by commercial 
 negotiations, at Darjeeling, which are believed to 
 be at length approaching a termination. The papers 
 in which the position was reviewed, at intervals, 
 in the National and Westminster Bevieivs, may be 
 useful as collating the several episodes in the story, 
 and conveying some information regarding a little 
 known region of Central Asia. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Introduction . . ix 
 
 FRANCE IN INDO-CHINA. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 France and Saigon 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 France and Cambodia 17 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 France and Tongking 35 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 France and Annam 72 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 China AND Her Tributaries 117 
 
 CHAPTER YI. 
 France and Siam . . . . , . , .148 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 England, China and Siam 177 
 
xxiv CONTENTS. 
 
 EUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 CHAPTER YIII. 
 KULDJA 203 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 COREA 217 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 Port Hamiltois- 268 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 Russia and China 295 
 
 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 Projects of Commercial Intercourse .... 323 
 
 CHAPTER Xni. 
 The Position in 1888 353 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 SlKHIM 374 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 Progress of Negotiations 405 
 
FEANCE IN INDO-CHINA, 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 FRANCE AND SAIGON. 
 
 During the reign of Louis XVI. an Annamese 
 Prince appeared at the French Court, under the 
 guidance of Mgr. Pigneau de Behaine, Bishop of 
 Adran, to ask assistance against rebels who had 
 deposed and driven his father to flight. The oppor- 
 tunity was tempting. The titular king could be in 
 no position to haggle about terms : France could 
 exact what political recompense she chose ; while the 
 pre-eminence of the Church and the position of its 
 missions could be proportionately strengthened and 
 assured. The Bishop's proposals were accepted, and 
 on November 28th, 1787, a treaty was concluded 
 at Versailles, by which the French King promised 
 the required aid on certain remarkable conditions 
 which were avowedly conceived in a spirit of 
 hostility to England, and with a view to the advan- 
 tage of having a foothold in Cochin-China in the 
 event of war. Louis was to equip an expeditionary 
 force which would help the deposed monarch to 
 recover his throne ; and the latter, in return for this 
 assistance, undertook to furnish, as soon as tran- 
 
 B 
 
2 FRANCE AND SAIGON- 
 
 quillity had been restored to his State, all the material 
 necessary for the construction of fourteen ships of the 
 line ; and to admit, wherever the French chose to 
 station them, consuls who should be allowed to build 
 ;shipe /whef evjer they chose, and take wood for the 
 purpbsefi*om any forest in the kingdom. A corps 
 .'df-^.t'lfe^gji/.X^a^i'^l officers was to be sent out, in 
 furtherance of this design, who should form a per- 
 manent establishment in Cochin-China. The bay 
 and peninsula of Tourane, with two neighbouring 
 islands, were to be ceded to France ; the King of 
 Annam was to furnish an army of 60,000 nien if the 
 French were attacked in these possessions by any 
 foreign Power, and France was to have the right of 
 levying and drilling 14,000 Annamese soldiers for use 
 in its Indian wars. Circumstances were to prevent 
 the complete execution, or even the ratification, of 
 this remarkable agreement ; but the Bishop was able 
 to take back with him to Saigon certain ships, officers, 
 and appliances of war, by whose aid King Gya-long 
 regained his throne ; and France never forgot the 
 " interests " and " rights " which she thus acquired. 
 Most of those who had been concerned in the 
 adventure withdrew after it had been carried to 
 a successful conclusion. But Messrs. Chaigneau 
 and Vannier remained more than thirty years 
 in Gya-long's service ; and a son of the former, who 
 was born at Hue, has left us a record^ of events down 
 to the year 1825, in which these last members of the 
 expedition finally retired to France. 
 
 1 Souvenirs de Hue. Par Michel Du'c Chaigneau. 
 
BISHOP PIGNEA U DE BEHAINE. 3 
 
 The Kingdom of Annam, as it existed under 
 Gya-long, extended, at that time, over " almost all the 
 littoral of Indo- China, comprising Tongking, Cochin- 
 China, part of Cambodia," and certain islands off the 
 coast, including the well-known Paracels which bear 
 such an evil reputation as a source of danger to 
 navigation in the China Seas. It was bounded, in 
 fact, "on the north by China, on the south by 
 Cambodia, on the east by the China Sea, and on the 
 west by the mountains of Lao, which extend the 
 whole length of the frontier ; " and it was divided 
 into eight jDrovinces, of which Sai-Gon was the 
 richest, most extensive, and most fertile. It was in 
 this province of Sai-Gon that Mgr. Pigneau shel- 
 tered, in 1774, the then fugitive Annamese King ; 
 and laid the foundation, in so doing, of the intimacy 
 that was to eventuate in his European mission and in 
 the present aspirations of his countrymen after Indo- 
 Chinese Empire. It was upon Sai-Gon that the 
 expeditionary force which he was able to organize 
 was directed, and it was here that the military 
 preparations were made which were to establish King 
 Gya-long upon the throne of Annam. 
 
 The elder Chaigneau died in 1832, but his son 
 lived to see the province which had been the scene 
 of the Bishop's exploits brought under the dominion 
 of his countrymen, and made the starting point for a 
 fresh career of conquest. The French are, in fact, 
 treading now, on their own account, almost in the 
 footsteps of Gya-long. 
 
 It was ecclesiastical influence that was again to 
 
 B 2 
 
4 FRANCE AND SAIGON. 
 
 furnish the motive for interference. The outbreak 
 of revolution in France had, as we have seen, 
 prevented the ratification of the so-called treaty 
 which Bishop Pigneau and the advisers of Louis 
 XVI. had seen fit to compose. No attempt had 
 even been made to put its more important pro- 
 visions in operation ; and the commercial intercourse 
 it contemplated had been fitful and constrained. 
 Ecclesiastical enterprise continued ; but the counte- 
 nance and support which the missionaries received 
 from a monarch whom they had placed under 
 considerable obligation was withdrawn under his 
 successor. Jealous, no doubt, of the organization 
 and influence they had attained, the advisers of 
 Minh-Man advised a policy of repression, which 
 degenerated into persecution ; and the casual visits 
 of French cruisers during the first half of the present 
 century were made chiefly for the purpose of remon- 
 strating against some aggression on missionaries or 
 their converts. 
 
 Matters stood thus when the Anglo-French expe- 
 dition set out against China, in 1857. With the 
 traditional ability and tenacity of his class, which 
 never loses sight of a right once acquired, the Abbe 
 Hue took this opportunity to claim the interest of 
 the Emperor for the cause of the persecuted Church 
 in Annam, and recalled the treaty of Versailles as 
 a useful basis for negociations. The claims of 
 humanity and civilization were a sufficient ground 
 for interfering, to exact reparation for the murder 
 of Catholic priests and guarantees of religious 
 
THE EXPEDITION OF 1857—8. 5 
 
 freedom for missionaries and their converts in 
 future ; but the provisions of this remarkable treaty- 
 might open up further possibilities ; the missionaries 
 had pointed out " that commerce *would find solid 
 advantages in a fertile country which had numerous 
 and good ports and valuable products certain to find, 
 throughout Europe, important and lucrative markets." 
 It is not clear that any design of annexation ex- 
 isted at the time ; perhaps the idea developed with 
 further exploration and the impossibility of bringing 
 the Am^mese Government to terms. Had the latter 
 been mor^ompliant, it might have escaped with the 
 fate of China — an obligatory treaty of commerce, and 
 guarantees of religious toleration. The event, how- 
 ever, was to prove that what had been looked forward 
 to as a military promenade was to entail considerable 
 effort. The information which the French had 
 received led them to believe that the Annamese 
 Government was feeble, the people discontented and 
 disafi'ected, and that active aid might be expected 
 from the Christian converts. The result seems to 
 have completely negatived this expectation. The 
 Government proved well organized, and able to ofi*er 
 prolonged resistance despite constant reverses. The 
 people were more warlike and better armed than the 
 Chinese, and possessed stronger works ; though they 
 were of course inferior to European troops. 
 
 Thes^ were the circumstances in which the 
 Admiral, Rigault de Genouilly, commanding the 
 French squadron then in Chinese waters, Avas 
 informed that the Emperor "willed to put « stop 
 
6 FRANCE AND SAIGON. 
 
 to the constantly recurring persecutions against 
 Christians in Cochin- China, and to secure them 
 the efficacious protection of France." He was 
 ordered accordingly, after the signature of the 
 treaty of Tientsin, to transfer his forces to Annam 
 to obtain the object indicated. The fleet which 
 had been operating in China was to carry out the 
 Emperor's instructions, with the addition of three 
 ships-of-war and 500 troops which were dispatched 
 to reinforce it from France. The co-operation 
 of Spain was also secured, and the Government 
 of Manilla contributed some 450 native and 550 
 Spanish troops and the armed despatch boat El Cano, 
 Including the latter, the expedition now numbered 
 13 ships, the Nemesis, Fhlegeton, Primauguet, Ava- 
 lanche, Dragonne, Fusee, Mitraille, Gironde, Saone, 
 Dordogne, Meurthe, Durance, and El Cano, With 
 this force Admiral Rigault de Genouilly decided to 
 establish his headquarters in the bay of Tourane, an 
 excellent harbour situated about thirty miles south 
 of the river Hue, on which the capital is situated. 
 
 The officers who had aided King Gya-long to 
 regain his throne had superintended the construction, 
 there, of strong fortifications, from which a serious 
 resistance was now anticipated. But in this, as in 
 other respects, the information given proved mis- 
 leading ; for the works defending the bay were taken 
 with sHght loss, on September 1st, 1858. Having 
 gained this base of operations, however, Admiral 
 Rigault found himself only at the beginning of his 
 difficulties. The Annamese showed no disposition 
 
THE CAPTURE OF SAIGON. 7 
 
 to treat ; heat and illness combined to break down 
 his men ; and the forces at his disposal were insuffi- 
 cient to permit an advance on the capital, which 
 experience in China had shown to be the best method 
 of bringing an oriental Government to terms. The 
 only serious movement which appeared open to him 
 was against Saigon — then known to be a fortified 
 post on the river of that name, and to be a depot of 
 rice for the supply of Hue. The capture of Saigon 
 would, therefore, deprive the Annamese of an im- 
 portant basis of supply and, it was hoped, humiliate 
 it in the eyes of Siam and Cambodia who might be 
 induced to join in attacking their hereditary foe. 
 
 On February 9th, 1859, the French squadron 
 destined for this expedition, comprising the corvettes 
 Fhlegeton and Primauguet, the gunboats Alarme, 
 Avalanche and Dragonne, transports Saone, Durance 
 and Meiirthe, and the Spanish despatch boat El 
 CanOy reached the mouth of the Saigon river ; and 
 on the following day the Annamese works defending 
 the harbour of Cap Saint-Jacques were carried. 
 The days from the 11th to the 15th were spent in 
 ascending the river and carrying the various forts 
 and stockades, which offered different degrees of 
 resistance, along the banks. 
 
 Saigon was found to be defended by two forts on 
 the south bank of the river and by a citadel on the 
 north. On the 16th the forts were taken, and on 
 the 17th the more serious work of carrying the citadel 
 was accomplished, with slight loss, before noon. 
 This fortress, one of the most important in Cochin- 
 
8 FRANCE AND SAIGON. 
 
 China, was inhabited only by Government employes 
 and its garrison. According to a description given 
 by a member of the expedition : — " Four gates, 
 which had been solidly barricaded with stones and 
 earth, gave access to it. A large boulevard ran 
 around, and in the middle rose immense buildings 
 destined to warehouse the tribute rice from the 
 provinces of the south. A few dwelling-houses of 
 the high officials alone broke, by their quaint 
 architecture and the brilliant colours with which 
 they were covered, the monotony of the great 
 buildings. The stable of the war elephants also 
 occupied a considerable space." Saigon was, in 
 fact, a fortress and depot of the first importance, 
 and we may judge from the Admiral's despatch 
 how serious a loss it must have been to the Anna- 
 mese Government. " Two hundred guns [he writes] 
 of iron or bronze have fallen into our hands, and 
 we have also taken a corvette and seven or eight war 
 junks still on the stocks. The citadel contained a 
 complete arsenal. Counting what we found in the 
 forts, we may estimate the hand arms at 20,000 
 gingals, guns, pistols, lances, pikes, and sabres. We 
 found, everywhere, enormous quantities of powder. 
 The citadel alone contained eighty-five tons in cases 
 and barrels, without counting an enormous quantity 
 of cartridges. The projectiles were in proportion ; 
 the magazines also contained saltpetre and sulphur, 
 lead and military equipments of every kind, enough 
 rice to feed 6000 or 8000 men for a year, and a mili- 
 tary chest containing msh to the value of 130,000 
 
THE CAPTURE OF SAIGON. 9 
 
 francs. In property taken or destroyed, comprising 
 the value of the citadel, which I purpose razing from 
 top to bottom, it may be estimated that the Anna- 
 mese Government will sustain here a loss of 20,000,000 
 francs." 
 
 The d isaster did, in fact, bring King Tu-du'c to 
 the point of opening negociations ; but he was not 
 yet sufficiently humiliated to acquiesce in the cession 
 of Saigon, the recognition of French " rights " at 
 Tourane, and the opening of his principal ports to 
 commerce, which Admiral Rigault prescribed as 
 bases of agreement. Hostilities were accordingly 
 resumed. But before the French had had time to 
 push their advantage, the renewed outbreak of 
 war in China led to the recall of all the available 
 forces from Cochin-China, to join in the second ex- 
 pedition to Tientsin. Tourane was definitely aban- 
 doned; and a sufficient garrison, only, was left in 
 Saigon to hold its o^vn until circumstances should 
 permit the resumption of active operations. 
 
 The Annamese availed themselves of the oppor- 
 tunity to hem in their adversaries. Saigon is 
 situated on the point of a peninsula formed by two 
 branches of the river ; and when the conclusion 
 of the Chinese war enabled Admiral Charnier to 
 go to the assistance of his countrymen, the Anna- 
 mese had constructed a treble line of earthworks, 
 studded with cannon, from bank to bank, about a 
 mile in the rear of the French position. Operations 
 were promptly begun, with the object of dislodging 
 them from this position. The French carried the 
 
10 FRANCE AND SAIGON 
 
 first line at the point of the bayonet, to find them- 
 selves checked by a point blank volley from the 
 second ; and when their artillery had so far silenced 
 the Annamese batteries as to enable the stormers to 
 carry this also by assault, they found themselves in 
 presence of a third work, from which a still hotter 
 reception was experienced, and which caused still 
 heavier loss as the excited soldiery refused to retire for 
 the operation of their artillery, but pressed forAvard 
 with the bayonet. This was the chief engagement of 
 the war; and though plucky resistance was after- 
 wards experienced at every available point, the whole 
 of lower Cochin-China was gradually overrun and 
 subjugated, and finally constituted a French 
 dominion, of which Saigon is now the capital. 
 
 It was not, however, till two years after the close 
 of Admiral Charnier's campaign that the Colony 
 attained its full dimensions. The old vice-royalty 
 of Sai-Gon, it may be remembered, contained six 
 provinces ; but only three were at first annexed. 
 The treaty of Saigon, concluded on June 6th, 1862 
 — after providing, of course, for the toleration of 
 Christianity and protection of converts — ceded to 
 France the three provinces of Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, 
 and Dinh Tuong, with the island of Pulo Condore. 
 French merchants and French war-ships were to 
 have full rights of navigating the great river of 
 Cambodia (le grand fleuve de Cambodge) and all its 
 branches. Annam undertook to make no cession of 
 territory to a foreign power without the assent of 
 France. The ports of Tourane, Balat and Kwang-o 
 
THE TREATY OF SAIGON. ii 
 
 were to be opened to French and Spanish commerce. 
 In cases of future diplomatic intercourse, French or 
 Spanish envoys were to be received by the king at 
 Hue. Annam^ undertook to pay an indemnity of 
 4,000,000.\^'And then follow two curious articles, 
 affecting the three remaining provinces of the old 
 satrapy, which were soon to furnish an excuse for 
 incorporating these, also, in the new dominion. By 
 Art. X. the inhabitants of these three provinces 
 (Vinh-luong, An-gian and Ha-tien) were to be 
 alloAved to traffic freely in the three French provinces ; 
 while Article XI. ran as follows : — 
 
 The Citadel of Yinh-luoFig shall be occupied for the present by 
 French troops without, however, interfering in any way with the 
 Annamese officials. It will be surrendered to the King of 
 Annam as soon as he has stopped (aura fait cesser) the rebellion 
 which exists at present by his orders in the provinces of Gia-dinh 
 and Dinh Tuong .... 
 
 What might have been expected of course fol- 
 lowed. These three provinces became a form of 
 annoyance for the French ; and Admiral Grandiere 
 incorporated them, in 1867, in French territory. 
 
 The town of Saigon is situated on a deep but 
 rather narrow river of the same name, sixty miles 
 from Cap St. Jacques. It is said to have been once 
 the capital of Cochin-China, under the earlier Nguyen 
 sovereigns, while Tongking was still the dominant state 
 and before King Gya-long had succeeded in welding 
 the whole littoral under his supremacy by Bishop 
 Pigneau's aid ; but the Court was subsequently moved 
 to Hue, out of reach of the pirates who found con- 
 
1 2 FRANCE AND SAIGON. 
 
 venient haunts in the numerous creeks that intersect 
 the low land between it and the sea. The country 
 on either side of the river, for the first thirty miles, 
 is swamp covered with dense jungle inhabited by 
 monkeys and tigers. But marks of habitation 
 become more frequent as you ascend, until the 
 neighbourhood of Saigon is richly and completely 
 cultivated. The creeks which intersect this plain 
 afford admirable means of carriage, and make the 
 town a natural entreimi for the commerce, as 
 well as a convenient political centre, of the colony. 
 A writer, who was present at the first capture of 
 the city, says "all the country surrounding the 
 citadel was occupied by the town of Saigon, com- 
 posed chiefly of wooden houses covered with straw ; 
 though there rose here and there, in the midst of 
 these, a few built of brick and roofed with tiles. 
 These houses, nearly all constructed with a good 
 deal of art, had each a well cultivated garden, and 
 were surrounded by great trees whose shade pro- 
 tected them against the burning rays of the tropical 
 sun. At the furthest extremity of Saigon was 
 the Chinese district, which was the commercial 
 quarter of the town, and recalled by its ap- 
 pearance the cities on the coast of China." But 
 hardly one stone of the citadel is now left stand- 
 ing on another. The Annamese town has also nearly 
 disappeared, the houses having no doubt been de- 
 stroyed for military reasons during the siege ; and a 
 great portion of the site is now covered by the broad 
 streets and more ambitious buildinirs of the French 
 
SAIGON. 13 
 
 conquerors. The irrepressible Chinaman, only, holds 
 his own. Choleyn, as the Chinese district is called, 
 is still the commercial quarter of Saigon, and a 
 great proportion of the trade of the colony passes 
 through Chinese hands. The Annamese, who are 
 fewer than one would expect, live chiefly along the 
 south branch of the river, and in detached villao-es 
 on the outskirts. 
 
 It is almost needless to say that, in laying out the 
 foreign quarter, the French have displayed the 
 characteristic taste of their nation. The streets are 
 broad and well lined with trees, after the fashion 
 of Boulevards ; and a fine esplanade forms an 
 agreeable lounge on a summer evening. A large 
 building at the eastern end, which first strikes the 
 eye in coming up the river, belongs to the Hongkong 
 baker from whose shop came the poisoned bread in 
 1859 ; but he pleads, I believe, innocence of that 
 crime, throwing the blame on one of his subordinates 
 as having been seduced by the Canton ofiicials. Most 
 of the business premises are, naturally, either on the 
 river or nearly adjacent. Further inland, the houses 
 are much scattered, and stand back in compounds 
 shrouded with rich tropical foliage. An extensive 
 Botanical Garden has been laid out in the environs, 
 and a Zoological collection made in it, after the 
 Parisian model. The Gardens are distant about half 
 an hour's drive from the landing place, and the road 
 to them gives a very fair view of the town and 
 suburbs. A missionary edifice in their neighbour- 
 hood, La Maison de Sainte Enfance, carefullv closed 
 
14 FRANCE AND SAIGON. 
 
 as usual against intrusion by the curious, attracts 
 attention from the peculiar semi- oriental style of its 
 architecture. A handsome palace built for the 
 Governor, after the model of the Tuilleries, is worth 
 a visit ; and one drives, of course, to the Chinese 
 quarter, if one wishes to take away a complete 
 impression of the town ; but the houses here, like 
 the " gharry " in which you travel, are identical with 
 those at Singapore. 
 
 A favourite drive is to the tomb of Bishop Pigneau 
 de Behaine ; partly because of the half-romantic 
 interest attaching to the spot, partly because the 
 drive is interesting in itself, and gives as good an 
 idea of the surrounding country as the drive to the 
 Botanical Gardens does of the town. The same writer 
 whom I have already quoted, speaks enthusiastically 
 of " the great plains cultivated with sugar-cane and 
 rice, the centenarian trees rising majestically aloft 
 and spreading wide their leafy bram^hes, the plan- 
 tains and lemon trees with their green foliage lighting 
 up the vast fields " — which adorn the environs. 
 But though these features are undoubtedly present, 
 his brilliant word-painting conveys rather too 
 gorgeous an impression of the reality. The Plain 
 of Tombs, in which the famous "Tombeau de 
 I'Eveque d'Adran is situated," lies four or five 
 miles to the back of Saigon, and is dotted, as its 
 name implies, with graves — of which many are said 
 to date from the time when Saigon was a royal 
 city. The road runs through a plain, rich in tropical 
 vegetation, and sparsely studded with homesteads of 
 
THE BISHOPS TOMB, 15 
 
 the Annamese peasants. We pass through one 
 large village which, in the multiplicity of pigs, 
 fowls and children, the huts open to the road, and 
 general characteristics, recalls, again, the outskirts of 
 Singaj)ore ; for in personal appearance, as well as 
 in characteristic habits, the Annamese greatly re- 
 semble the Chinese, to whom they are of coui-se a 
 cooTiate race. Even the dress differs in fashion 
 rather than in character ; that of the officials almost 
 exactly resembling the old Chinese style under the 
 last (Ming) dynasty. 
 
 I have said that Bishop Pigneau's tomb is, for 
 various reasons, one of the lions. But — in my ex- 
 perience at least — linguistic and other difficulties 
 rendered getting to it nearly as hard a task as 
 reaching one of the ruined cities of the interior. 
 The search occupied from 11 a.m. to 6.30 p.m. ; 
 involving two separate excursions and the complete 
 exhaustion of two ponies. Indeed we only dis- 
 covered it at last by wandering about the country 
 with a photograph which we had bought in 
 Saigon, and which a peasant more intelligent than 
 the rest at last recognized. He succeeded in direct- 
 ing the driver to the neighbourhood ; and after 
 much further wandering, we were at last guided into 
 the heart of a clump of trees and found ourselves 
 in front of the long-sought mausoleum. It proved to 
 be essentially Chinese in character — exactly like a 
 small Chinese tem23le — with screen in front and 
 walled all round. A large expanse of roof with the 
 familiarly curved gables, supported on wooden pillars ; 
 
i6 FRANCE AND SAIGON. 
 
 in the centre a raised bed of whitened brick, bearing 
 no inscription ; and at the back an altar and tablet, 
 also in Chinese style and bearing Chinese characters. 
 Here was the last resting-place of the man who may 
 be regarded as the pioneer of his countrymen in 
 Cochin-China. 
 
 We have seen that the colony now comprises six 
 provinces. The population is estimated at about 
 2,000,000. Its natural resources are said to be 
 great, and it may, with good government, become a 
 valuable possession. Admiral de la Grandiere made 
 the fatal blunder, at iirst, of repelling the Hong Kong 
 merchants who showed an inclination to open branch 
 establishments at Saigon : the colony was French, 
 and all advantages were to be for the French ! But 
 the error of this policy was soon recognized when it 
 was found that few Frenchmen came forward ; and 
 commerce has been carried on by English, German, 
 and Chinese merchants. Rice is the principal export, 
 the suitability of the plains for its cultivation 
 enabling the production of a far greater quantity 
 than is needed for the food of the comparatively 
 few inhabitants ; but the land is fertile and well 
 suitable for the production of other tropical pro- 
 ducts. 
 
 [The Report of Mr. Treralott, the British Consul at Saigon, 
 states the export of rice during 1892 at 540, OCO tons, valued at 
 2,200,OOOZ. The other principal exports were fish, coprah, cotton, 
 pepper, silk, &c., aggregating some 450,000/. No statistics of 
 imports were available.] 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 FRANCE AND CAMBODIA. 
 
 Within twelve months after the signature of the 
 Treaty of Saigon, it was found that French in- 
 terests required the extension of a protectorate over 
 Cambodia. Buffeted between Cochin-China and 
 Siam, that unfortunate State had ended by becoming 
 tributary to both ; and it appeared inconsistent 
 with the dignity and duty of France to abandon an 
 inherent right which she had of course acquired 
 with her new possession. 
 
 The origin and history of the Khmers have been 
 the subject of keen discussion ever since Mouhot's 
 researches disclosed to the world the splendid 
 architectural remains which every succeeding visitor 
 appears to view mth equal admiration. It seems, 
 however, to be now generally admitted that tradition 
 and the evidence of style point to an Indian source ; 
 how much soever the race may have been debased 
 by Malay and Mongolian admixture. The ruins of 
 Angkor clearly represent what was once the centre 
 of a rich, powerful and civilized State. At what 
 date that civilization was founded, and how long it 
 endured are among the most interesting and difficult 
 problems offered by the Indo-Chinese peninsula. 
 
i8 FRANCE AND CAMBODIA, 
 
 It is clear, at any rate, that it must have lasted 
 during several centuries, and then, from causes 
 which can only be surmised, was rapidly ex- 
 tinguished. A considerable State implies consider- 
 able resources ; and the country is, in fact, fertile, 
 metalliferous, and admirably watered. All pros- 
 perity has, however, long since disappeared under 
 conditions of chronic warfare. For the last hun- 
 dred years, at any rate, Cambodia has been a 
 battle-ground for Annam and Siam ; and its political 
 structure has been knocked to pieces, and its old 
 civilization effaced, by their continued blows. The 
 three provinces of Vinh-luong, An-gian and Ha-tien, 
 last annexed by the French to Saigon, are said to 
 have once belonged to Cambodia, but to have been 
 reft away by the Annamese. It is certain that its 
 power extended, once, much farther up the valley 
 of the Meikong, for a Dutch embassy which as- 
 cended that river in 1641 mentions that its sovereigns 
 were being driven back by the repeated attacks of 
 the Laos : and one of the first acts of the reigning 
 dynasty in Siam was to annex the provinces of 
 Battambong and Angkor, on the east of the Great 
 Central Lake which is a distinguishing feature of 
 the country. 
 
 The whole peninsula seems to have been at that 
 time in a turmoil. Annam had rebelled against 
 Gya-long, who was trying to recover his throne by 
 French aid : a change of dynasty had occurred simul- 
 taneously in Siam ; and Cambodia seems to have 
 been buffeted helplessly in the general disturbance. 
 
SIAMESE AND ANNAMESE INTERVENTION. 19 
 
 The Siamese legend is that the Cochin- Chinese 
 and Cham Malays who occupy the southern sea- 
 board had combined to drive out the reigning 
 Khmer princes, and that the intervention of Siam 
 was with the object of restoring the latter to power. 
 The help was, at any rate, effective ; and, as usual in 
 such cases, the country fell completely under Siamese 
 influence. The Annamese were too much occupied 
 with their own troubles to interfere ; and when, in 
 1795, the Siamese replaced a Cambodian prince in 
 power, they retained Battambong and Angkor, and 
 affirmed a protectorate — which, in Asia, means 
 suzerainty and tribute — over the remainder of the 
 kingdom. 
 
 It seems evident, from even the imperfect mate- 
 rials available, that a normal and fertile cause of 
 Cambodian decadence has been family dissension 
 and intrigue. Fraternal jealousies have led to 
 quarrels at home and intervention from without. 
 If one prince leant on Siam, the other fled to Annam ; 
 and each court was willing to support a claim in 
 which its own pride and influence were involved. 
 Cambodia thus became a chronic battle-ground 
 between opposing factions, instead of offering a solid 
 front to the aggressor. The intrigues of Annam 
 evidently recommenced with the recovery of its 
 internal tranquility ; and differences arose among 
 the Cambodian princes as to the advisability of 
 leaning towards a State that was developing pre- 
 ponderant power. Dissensions of this kind invariably 
 meant disturbances at home, and appeals for help by 
 
 c 2 
 
20 FRANCE AND CAMBODIA. 
 
 the disputants to one or other of the neighbouring 
 powers. The upshot in the present case seems to have 
 been first war, and then an agreement that the king 
 should be reinstated and should pay tribute to both 
 his neighbours. 
 
 The years 1830-40 were evidently another epoch of 
 general turmoil in this unfortunate region. This is 
 the period during which French maps show Annamese 
 authority as extending over Cambodia and the valley 
 of the Meikong. It was, in fact, a period when the 
 Laos of Wienchang rebelled against Siam, and when 
 the Annamese evidently succeeded in excluding 
 Siamese influence, temporarily, from the Khmer 
 kingdom. As Siamese records express it, " The 
 Cochin-Chinese came and directed the affairs of the 
 country by laws and modes entirely Cochin-Chinese, 
 at which the Cambodians were indignant, and 
 unanimously rose and slaughtered them in every 
 province. They then placed themselves, anew, under 
 Siamese protection, and entreated that a Siamese 
 army should be sent to aid them." The result, as a 
 matter of fact, clearly was that the Siamese regained 
 the upper hand, quelling the revolt of the Laos, and 
 recovering their predominant position in Cambodia. 
 Hostilities lasted, however, several years ; and were 
 only terminated in 1845 by the surrender of the 
 Annamese claim to supremacy, and a return to the 
 former system of tribute payment to both Hue 
 and Bangkok. The prince who was confirmed on 
 the throne of Cambodia, as a consequence of these 
 events, was Nuck Phra Ong Duang, the father 
 
FRENCH INTER VENT ION 2 1 
 
 of the present king. He died in 1860, at the moment 
 when France was breaking down the Annamese 
 power at Saigon ; and his son, Nuck Phra Ong 
 Rajawaddy, whom the French call Norodom, began 
 to reign in his stead. 
 
 The chronic dissensions, however, at once revived 
 and facilitated the extinction of the last vestige of 
 Cambodian independence. King Norodom had 
 hardly ascended the throne before his brother, Ong 
 Wartha (or Si Votha, as the French call him), excited 
 a revolt which the Siamese temporarily suppressed, 
 but which we shall find again in active operation 
 during the earlier stages of French rule. 
 
 It is generally difficult to get at the first origin of 
 anything. The attempt usually discloses some 
 anterior motive, which has probably arisen out of 
 some other collateral consideration. It is difficult, 
 for instance, to say in the case of France whether 
 policy or religion — the priest or the statesman — first 
 started the nation, in any given case, on the quest of 
 glory and territorial dominion. We are indebted to 
 M. Moura^ for the information that, so long ago 
 as 1854, there appeared in Singapore a Christian 
 mandarin of Portuguese descent, who represented to 
 the French Consul that he had been sent by the King 
 of Cambodia to contract a French alliance. What 
 motive can have impelled him to this step, seeing 
 that France had at the time no " interests " east of 
 Pondichery, is a question which French missionaries 
 might perhaps be able to answer. The news had 
 ^ Le Koyaume de Cambodge. Paris, 1883. 
 
22 FRANCE AND CAMBODIA. 
 
 possibly got abroad that M. de Montigny was about 
 to visit certain Eastern countries, with a view to 
 open up relations and intercourse. As a matter of 
 fact he did visit Bangkok the following year, and 
 negociate a treaty between France and Siam — of 
 which French merchants, however, neglected to avail 
 themselves to any appreciable extent. But he 
 appears to have been imprudent enough to men- 
 tion a purpose of going on to Cambodia, in pur- 
 suance of this mysterious invitation ; whereupon 
 the King of Siam sent a messenger to forbid his 
 vassal indulging in any such divagation ; and M. 
 de Montigny, after waiting a while at Kamput, in ex- 
 pectation of a communication from Udong which 
 never came, had to go on to China, re infectd. Moura 
 further asserts, on we know not what authority, 
 that the intention of the king had been to place 
 Cambodia under the Protectorate of France, and 
 to cede to the latter the provinces of Saigon which 
 the Annamese had reft from his ancestors' possession ! 
 Is it possible that we have, here, the germ of the 
 idea that was to expand into Saigon-Cambodian 
 dominion ? The story sounds improbable in so far 
 as concerns King Ong Duang, who appears to have 
 been a genuine friend of Siam ; but it is not 
 impossible that the mission may have had a less 
 responsible origin. The cession would, at any rate, 
 have been a cheap one, as the provinces in question 
 had long since passed out of the Cambodian grasp. 
 
 However this may be, the French Protectorate 
 was imminent. And the plea for its assertion was 
 
THE TREATY OF 1863. 23 
 
 ready to hand in the tributary relations already 
 existing between Cambodia and Annam. The first 
 move towards its establishment was made in 1863, 
 when Admiral de la Grandiere visited the then 
 capital, Udong ; and, under cover of the prestige 
 arising from recent French conquests, seems to have 
 found little difficulty in persuading the King to 
 accept a treaty of which the first article ran : — " The 
 Emperor of the French will assist and protect Cam- 
 bodia." It is true, Norodom is said to have pro- 
 tested, at Bangkok, that he had signed under a sense 
 of powerlessness to refuse ; but though Siam showed 
 great jealousy of the encroachment on ground where 
 she had long been predominant, she could not ven- 
 ture on open resistance. The question, however, 
 soon came to a head. There had, as yet, been no 
 opportunity for the ceremony of coronation, amid the 
 troubles attending Norodom's succession ; and the 
 King of Siam wished him to come to Bangkok for 
 the purpose. The French objected to this implicit 
 recognition of a suzerainty which it was their policy 
 to discredit and evict: but an understanding was 
 eventually come to that the coronation should be 
 performed at Udong, by Siamese and French repre- 
 sentatives having equal powers ; and an opening was 
 thus effected for further negociations which eventu- 
 ated in the well-known treaty of 1867, by which 
 Siam formally recognized the French Protectorate, 
 and relinquished aU claim to tribute or other mark 
 of vassalage for herself — on two precise conditions. 
 France undertook never to take possession of Cam- 
 
24 I'RANCE AND CAMBODIA. 
 
 bodia for the purpose of incorporating it in Cochin- 
 China ; and agreed that the provinces of Battambang 
 and Angkor, which had, as we have seen, been 
 Siamese since 1795, should remain in Siamese 
 possession. It was agreed, further, that the boun- 
 dary between Cambodia and the provinces in ques- 
 tion should be surveyed and defined by a joint 
 French and Siamese Commission, and this was done 
 in 1868. Since 1867, Siamese influence may be said 
 to have disappeared from the councils of Cambodia. 
 
 We have, however, somewhat anticipated the 
 course of events, in order to complete the elimination 
 of Siam from the scene. Fresh internal troubles 
 had in the meantime arisen, under the leadership of 
 one Pucombo, who appears to have established a 
 great personal ascendency over the people ; and the 
 rebellion initiated by this leader, on the East, was 
 supplemented by another insurrection under one 
 Assoa, in the South. The French accused the 
 Annamese mandarins of the border provinces of 
 sustaining both, or at least of allowing them to use 
 Annamese territory as a base. The latter eventually 
 vindicated themselves, in one direction, by giving up 
 Assoa ; but Pucombo overran the country almost to 
 the gates of the capital ; and the French had an 
 opportunity of exercising their protective duties by 
 sending an expedition (under Colonel Reboul), which 
 broke up the insurrectionary force and compelled its 
 leader to seek safety in flight. His death, twelve 
 months later, ended a rebellion which had at one 
 time spread over the whole kingdom except the 
 
THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE, 25 
 
 metropolitan province. During its course the capi- 
 tal was removed to its present site, Phnom-peng; 
 and at its close (in 1867) x\.dmiral de la Grandiere 
 annexed the Annamese provinces of Vinhluong, 
 Angian, and Hatien, whose Governors he accused 
 of having favoured the insurrection. By June, 1867, 
 order had been so far restored that two hundred 
 men and two gunboats, stationed at Phnom-peng, 
 were considered a sufficient garrison. 
 
 A note of antao:onism to Siam was struck when, 
 in 1868, the King addressed, or was caused to 
 address, to the French Government, a protest against 
 the establishment of Siamese Customs at the northern 
 end of the Great Lake. He, at the same time, asserted 
 his rights over the little provinces of Molu-prey an d 
 Tonli-repu — the occupation of which by Siam was 
 alleged to be recent and irregular ; and of these, as 
 well as Battambong and Angcor, we may some day 
 hear again, though nothing seems to have come of 
 the protest for the moment. French authority 
 was, in the meantime, being steadily consolidated, by 
 extending and defining the power of the Resident 
 and in other ways. In June, 1874, right of free 
 transit was granted to produce coming from Bat- 
 tambong and Angkor to Cochin China: the same 
 prerogative had been granted, a few years previously, 
 to Laotian produce having the same destination ; 
 and these measures, together with the neutraliza- 
 tion of the lake, which had been agreed on between 
 the French and Siamese Governments with the 
 object of removing all obstacles to trade and 
 
26 FRANCE AND CAMBODIA. 
 
 fisheries, proved of some advantage in promoting 
 the flow of commerce to Cochin China. 
 
 So far, however, the hand of France had been felt 
 but lightly. The time was approaching when her 
 interference would become more active. In the 
 course of May, 1876, the Prince Si Votha— whom 
 we have seen showing active dissatisfaction at 
 his brother's nomination to the throne — furtively 
 quitted Bangkok, where he had been practically 
 interned, and made for the region bordering on the 
 river Meikong. He appears to have gone first to 
 Tonly-repu, where he set to work to raise partisans 
 and prepare for an invasion of Cambodia. In this 
 region, and in the neighbouring Cambodian territory 
 — where there was, according to M. Moura, much 
 agitation and discontent owing to the bad administra- 
 tion of the provincial mandarins — his agents were able 
 to raise numerous recruits. They had, we are told, 
 " orders to be considerate to the people, to enrol 
 only volunteers, and to pay in full for whatever was 
 damaged or consumed. And this novel method of 
 proceeding in time of trouble filled the people 
 with astonishment and admiration, and gained them 
 over more than aught else to the cause of the pre- 
 tender." The Siamese Government despatched a 
 special commission to Siem-rap, the capital of 
 Angkor, to maintain neutrality on Siamese territory ; 
 and wrote to the French expressing anxiety at 
 Votha's escape, and saying they had sent mandarins 
 in pursuit with orders for his arrest, and forbidden 
 the supply to him of arms or provisions in all dis- 
 
ONG VOTHA'S REBELLION. 27 
 
 tricts under Siamese rule. The French seem to 
 have contented themselves, at first, with sending 
 two gunboats into the Meikong, to reassure the 
 population and prevent their fleeing from the 
 threatened trouble. Votha's proceedings were not, 
 at any rate, greatly hampered ; for he was strong 
 enough, in June, to invade the province of Kam- 
 pong Sorai and besiege the citadel, though he was 
 defeated and driven into the border province of 
 Molu-prey. The repulse, however, was only tem- 
 porary, as he managed to enlist under his banner 
 the remnant of Pucombo's following, who had 
 been living in the half-settled provinces east of the 
 Meikong, and was soon in a position to resume his in- 
 cursions. Offers of a pension at Saigon, or a welcome 
 and forgiveness at Bangkok, failed to tempt him ; 
 and by February, 1877, he had made such headway 
 that the French judged it necessary to organize an 
 expedition, by which he was finally defeated and 
 driven into the forests of Stiengs ; and so, for the 
 second time. King Norodom was secured on his 
 throne. 
 
 It will be remarked, however, that his protectors 
 were somewhat tardy in coming to the rescue. The 
 rebel prince was able to invade Kampong Sorai in 
 June, 1876 ; but it was not till February, 1877, 
 that the French undertook to suppress him. Admiral 
 Duperre appears to have seized the opportunity to 
 dictate certain reforms in the constitution, which 
 were probably much needed, but which the King 
 and his entourage showed no disposition to accept. 
 
28 FRANCE AND CAMBODIA. 
 
 The Governor, however, had means of pressure by 
 withholding help ; and on January 15th, 1877, his 
 Majesty acquiesced in a scheme, of which the follow- 
 ing were the principal features. Certain exalted 
 titles which involved huge retinues and a useless 
 drain upon the State resources were abolished, and 
 a fixed income was allotted to the Royal personages 
 who held them in lieu of the provinces which they 
 had previously held as appanages. A portion of the 
 revenue was set aside for public works, instead of 
 the whole passing under the King's control. The 
 country had been split into a ridiculous number of 
 provinces, and these were to be reduced, with a cor- 
 responding decrease in the number of functionaries. 
 Officials were forbidden to trade. Villages were to 
 have the right of electing their own head men. 
 Taxation was re-organized. Labourers were to be 
 allowed to redeem, for a small sum, the ninety days 
 of labour they owed to the State. The duration of 
 leases was to be extended (the State being constitu- 
 tional owner of the land). Slavery without re- 
 demption to be abolished ; increased facilities to 
 be given for redemption, with severe penalties 
 against the capture of slaves in the bordering 
 (savage) districts ; and the French Resident was to 
 have the right of entree into the King's Council. 
 Having secured the promulgation by edict of these 
 and other reforms, the Admiral, as we have seen, or- 
 ganized an expedition which promptly defeated and 
 put the rebels to flight. 
 
 But though the King had been persuaded to 
 
POLITICAL REFORMS. 29 
 
 accept the scheme, it by no means followed that it 
 would be put in immediate operation. The history 
 of the next few years seems, in fact, to have been 
 one of effort towards this end, resulting in the 
 tightening of pressure and the gradually increasing 
 introduction of the French element into the ad- 
 ministration. To meet the cost of this increasingly 
 active intervention, a new convention was dictated, 
 in November, 1881, whereby the produce of certain 
 taxes, amounting to about 1100,000, was especially 
 reserved for the expenses of the protectorate. The 
 judicial powers of the Saigon tribunals were extended, 
 so far as Europeans were concerned, all over Cam- 
 bodia ; and Franco- Annamese immigrants were with- 
 drawn from Cambodian, and placed under French or 
 Mixed, jurisdiction, according as they alone or Cam- 
 bodians also were concerned. Other changes were 
 effected in the following year, and other restrictions 
 imposed, which it is unnecessary to trace in detail 
 as everything is comprised, over-ridden, and swamped 
 in the exhaustive list of concessions exacted by M. 
 Thomson in the final treaty (!) of June 17th, 1884. 
 
 The story of the negotiations which preceded the 
 signature of this document was told at the time, in 
 the Saigonnais, with an unconscious satire amusing 
 to those who read between the lines of the semi- 
 official record. The ostensible object of M. Thomson's 
 visit was to obtain the King's consent to the inclu- 
 sion of Cambodia in the Customs Union, lately 
 imposed from Paris upon the new Indo-Chinese 
 Empire. And Article XVI. of the Treaty of 1863— 
 
30 FRANCE AND CAMBODIA. 
 
 by which " the Emperor of the French [undertook] 
 to honestly assist the King so as to enable him to 
 collect duties from traders and enable them to pro- 
 ceed to sea" — was relied on as giving right and 
 power to insist on acquiescence. It is difficult to 
 say what may have been the precise object in view 
 when this clause was penned, but we may assume 
 that it hardly contemplated the imposition of a 
 Customs tariff devised at Paris, and its collection by 
 French officers. The King, at any rate, whatever 
 he may have thought of the advantage of inclusion 
 in the proposed Union, seems to have shown a strong 
 objection to handing over the collection of his 
 revenues to French officials. He urged, apparently, 
 that his prestige would be destroyed if he agreed 
 to entrust foreigners with the administration of his 
 Customs, and insisted (" without," remarks the 
 Saigo7inais, "perceiving the personal rudeness of 
 the demand " ! ) that the Governor should telegraph 
 to Paris for fresh instructions. His struggles were, 
 however, of course useless, and resulted only in 
 plunging him deeper in the mire. As he declined 
 to recognize the logic of the deduction from the 
 Treaty of 1863, M. Thomson decided to have a 
 treaty about which there should be no future pos- 
 sibility of mistake. Without recapitulating the 
 measures taken in pursuance of this view, it will 
 be sufficient to note that as the King kept him 
 at arm's length M. Thomson, having caused the 
 Palace to be surrounded, informed him that there 
 was no longer any question of the Customs conven- 
 
FURTHER REFORMS. 31 
 
 tion, but of a new arrangement " which, confirming 
 the Treaty of 1863, would enable France to fulfil 
 thenceforth, in the Kingdom of Cambodia, the 
 functions incumbent on her and would prevent a 
 repetition of the insults to which the Government of 
 the Republic had been exposed." What passed 
 subsequently, the Saigonnais knows not. "It is 
 reported that the Governor used the words ' sub- 
 mission or abdication.' " In any case, a quarter of 
 an hour had hardly elapsed before " the King 
 of Cambodia, overcome by the energy and withal 
 calmness of the Governor," signed the treaty. 
 
 The purport of this remarkable document is suffi- 
 ciently implied in the first article, which sets forth 
 that " The King accepts all the administrative, 
 judicial, financial, and commercial reforms which the 
 French Republic may think well to introduce, in the 
 future, to facilitate the accomplishment of its pro- 
 tectorate." A shadow of power is reserved to him 
 by Art. II., for the purpose probably of keeping 
 within the lines of the Franco- Siamese Treaty of 
 1867, which promises that France will not incor- 
 porate Cambodia in Cochin-China ; but that power 
 is gradually whittled away, in eight more articles, 
 till little but a shadow and a pension of <^300,000 
 remain. It is an indication of the sweeping nature 
 of the changes, that individual proprietorship was 
 henceforth to be substituted for the State ownership 
 of the land. The King roused himself, subsequently, 
 to address a protest to the President against a treaty 
 " imposed upon him by force, and at the bayonet's 
 
32 FRANCE AND CAMBODIA. 
 
 point ;" and there was some disposition at first, in 
 Paris, to evince sympathy with him and to blame 
 M. Thomson for his harshness. But it appeared that 
 the latter had really acted under directions from 
 home; and nothing more was heard of this last 
 phase in the history of Cambodia as an independent 
 kingdom. 
 
 A Proclamation which was issued to the Cam- 
 bodian people, on the day after the King's signature 
 had been obtained, affirmed once more the benefi- 
 cence of French rule and the brilliancy of the future 
 which awaited Cambodia under its new constitution. 
 
 REPUBLIQUE ERANCAISE. 
 
 •' By a Convention signed at Phnom-penh on June 17th, 1884, 
 H.M. Norodom King of Cambodia, and M. Charles Thomson 
 Governor of Cochin- China acting in the name of the Government 
 of the French Kepublic, agreed to realize the reforms recognized 
 as necessary in the interests of the Camhodiaii people. The new 
 arrangement confirms and completes the fundamental treaty of 
 August 11th, 1863, between France and Cambodia, and respects 
 the ancient laws and customs of the kingdom as far as they are 
 compatible with the eternal principles of right and human pro- 
 gress, which alone make nations great, happy, and free. In con- 
 sequence of this accord and the goodwill which exists between 
 the two Governments, measures will be taken in the immediate 
 future by which slavery in Cambodia will disappear, in order that 
 all Cambodians may enjoy their liberty. The land, which has up 
 to the present belonged to the Crown, will be ceded to communes 
 and individuals in full ownership. Churches and temples will 
 retain the lands they actually occupy. French officials will be 
 sent to the provinces, to direct matters in concert with the Cam- 
 bodian authorities, so that justice may be rendered equally to all, 
 and that the taxes be applied to works of public utility — the con- 
 struction of bridges, roads, canals, telegraphic lines, serving to 
 
THE TREATY OF 1884. 33 
 
 facilitate communication in all parts of the kingdom. A munici- 
 pality will be charged to administer the town of Phnom-penh. 
 Commerce and industry will become more prosperous^ order and 
 tranquility guaranteed, individual property constituted ; and the 
 welfare of all Cambodians will increase daily. Such, briefly, will 
 be the chief results of the new Convention by which H.M. Noro- 
 dom I. has just cemented the bonds of friendship which have so 
 long united France and Cambodia. The Government of the 
 French Republic, Protector of Cambodia, will always have for its 
 end to ensure, by wise dispositions, the liberty and welfare of the 
 Cambodian people. H.M. the King of Cambodia and the Governor 
 of Cochin- China reckon on the zeal and devotion of the Cambodian 
 officials to impart to the population the intentions of the two 
 Governments, and to aid them in the accomplishment of the work 
 of peace, justice, and civilization. 
 
 (Signed) The Governor of Cochin- China, 
 
 Charles Thomson. 
 Done at Phnom-penh, June 18th, 1884. 
 
 Five months after the signature of the new treaty, 
 M. Thomson took the opportunity of personally instal- 
 ling the first members of the new Municipal Council ; 
 pronouncing an oration which is reported at 
 length in the Journal Officiel of Saigon, and which 
 was read, doubtless, with a glow of patriotic satis- 
 faction by every Frenchman whose sense of humour 
 did not overcome his national appreciation of 
 dramatic effect. "To liberate and regenerate 
 Cambodia, to raise the moral and intellectual level 
 of its inhabitants, to initiate them in the principles 
 which are the basis of modern society, while respect- 
 ing their religious and national creeds, to develop 
 the natural riches of the country, while caring for 
 all wants and respecting all rights : such is the great 
 and noble mission which France, faithful to her 
 
 D 
 
34 FRANCE AND SAIGON. 
 
 historical traditions, has undertaken ; such is the 
 work which will be accomplished, avec le concours 
 de toutes les intelligences et de toutes les bonnes 
 volontes." The English language is hardly adapted 
 to an explicit rendering of these final expressions, 
 so they may well be left in their native vagueness 
 and beauty. 
 
 To ask that the picture should be immediately 
 realized would be to prove oneself void of poetic 
 imagination. But it may be hoped, for the sake of 
 the Cambodians themselves, that they will make the 
 best of the inevitable, and accept the destiny which 
 France and civilization have decreed. Assuming, 
 as we do, that their independence is irretrievably 
 lost, it were well that they accepted quietly the 
 new regime. For, though we are far from thinking 
 French rule an unmixed blessing to native races, 
 it offers a guarantee of order which alone will be 
 welcome to a people whose recent history had been 
 one of chronic civil war and invasion. However 
 harsh the course adopted, much may be forgiven the 
 French if, by restoring order and respecting native 
 rights, they render possible the fulfilment of one 
 tithe of the brilliant programme which M. Thomson 
 enounced. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 FRANCE AND TONGKING. 
 
 The consolidation of French dominion in the south 
 was followed, shortly, by the discovery of interests 
 in Tongking. '' On June 5th, 1866, the harbour 
 of Saigon offered the common enough spectacle of 
 two little gunboats making their final preparations 
 for a start." ^ The travellers on board " were commis- 
 sioned to ascend the great river, whose fertile delta 
 they and those around them had so often traversed, 
 and no limit of distance or time was assigned to the 
 enterprise. The thoughts of the colony had long 
 been turned with curiosity and impatience towards 
 this interior about which such great uncertainty 
 prevailed. The period of conquest was past. ... It 
 was to the organization and exploration of the coun- 
 try that the attention of the local Government now 
 required to be directed. Here was a vast field still 
 open to the ambitions of the expeditionary troop, and 
 one promising results more fertile, and discoveries 
 more glorious, than the sterile pursuit of pirates who 
 
 ' " Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine." Par Francis Gamier. 
 
 D 2 
 
36 FRANCE AND TONGKING, 
 
 could never be caught, or unequal combats against 
 an enemy who was always beaten." The Govern- 
 ment had, in fact, decided on the exploration of the 
 valley of the Meikong ; and the journey was to lead 
 to the annexation of Tongking. 
 
 The history of Tongking as a separate State may 
 be said to date from the early part of the fifteenth 
 century. Till then it had been at times a vassal, at 
 times a virtual province of China. So early, indeed, 
 as the ninth century it seems to have made an eiFort to 
 throw off the yoke, and succeeded in asserting a par- 
 tial independence ; but it was not till about 1428 
 that it extorted a final recognition of its autonomy.' 
 A general named Le then succeeded in expelling the 
 Chinese troops and founding a dynasty which endured, 
 through various vicissitudes, for more than three 
 hundred years. The forms, customs, and prejudices 
 of Chinese civilization still prevailed, and the supre- 
 macy of the Chinese Emperor was still admitted : 
 the Kings of Tongking received investiture at the 
 hands of his delegates, on their accession, and sent 
 tribute periodically to the Celestial capital. But the 
 conditions were changed : they were vassals, hence- 
 forward, instead of subjects. The Le dynasty re- 
 ceived its first shock, and was well-nigh overthrown, 
 about a hundred years after the death of its founder. 
 It was, however, re-established by a general named 
 Nguyen, who forthwith assumed the title of Regent ; 
 the monarchs falling into the position oirois faineants^ 
 from which they never recovered. The death of this 
 ^ " Lettres Bdifiantes, etc. : Tableau Historique du Tonquin." 
 
INTERNAL DISSENSIONS, 37 
 
 minister was the signal for a division of power which 
 caused untold misery to the country and its inhabi- 
 tants. He was followed in his dignity of Regent by 
 a son-in-law named Trinh, while his son Nguyen 
 Hwang was appointed governor of a dependency 
 corresponding approximately with the region known 
 to us as Annam, which had been conquered and de- 
 tached from the adjoining kingdom of Chiampa. 
 What ensued may be guessed beforehand. Chafing 
 at the control of his brother-in-law, Nguyen Hwang 
 threw off the yoke and, while admitting the nominal 
 suzerainty of Tongking, proclaimed himself otheriyise 
 independent. Efforts to reduce the southern king- 
 dom to submission gave rise to constant hostilities, 
 but the Nguyens maintained their independence and 
 gradually extended their rule over the remainder of 
 Chiampa, a district nearly represented by the present 
 French colony of Saigon. 
 
 Matters were in this position when, towards the 
 close of the eighteenth century, a formidable revolu- 
 tion occurred, which overwhelmed Le, Trinh and 
 Nguyen in a common ruin. Court intrigues had 
 led to the usual appeals for external aid. The 
 Tongkingese had been invited to enter Annam, 
 and had taken the normal course of setting up as 
 masters where they had been asked to intervene 
 as friends. A successful insurrection against them 
 had been followed by a counter-invasion of Tong- 
 king, which was subjected, in turn, by the victorious 
 Annamese. The last " Le " king fled to China, 
 where he died ; while the last " Nguyen " fled to 
 
38 FRANCE AND TONGKING. 
 
 Siam, where he was persuaded by the Bishop of 
 Adran to solicit, from France, the help that was to 
 enable him to recover his throne and to weld the 
 whole Eastern littoral into the kingdom over 
 which we find him reigning under the style of Gya- 
 long. 
 
 But to be governed by a Nguyen meant, in the eyes 
 of the Tongkingese, to be subject to Annam ; and 
 they seem never to have acquiesced willingly in the 
 change. They wished, at the time, that the Le dynasty 
 should be restored in the person of a brother of their 
 last sovereign ; and " Le " pretensions have ever 
 since been a thorn in the side of Annam. Powerless 
 though it must have been to stave off its eventual 
 fate, the Annamese Government might probably 
 have held out longer against France, in 1860, but 
 that it found itself attacked on two sides. The par- 
 tisans of the former dynasty had taken the opportu- 
 nity to break out in rebellion in Tongking, under a 
 reputed scion of the ancient house.^ Numbers of 
 Tongkingese appear to have joined the movement ; 
 and within less than eight months the insurgent 
 leader had overrun a great portion of the country. 
 An army sent against him was utterly defeated ; 
 and the Court of Hue was driven to make peace 
 with France and Spain, to save itself from overthrow. 
 Relieved thus from pressure in the South, it was 
 able to put forth its whole strength against the in- 
 
 ' Le Phung, said to be a Christian pupil of one of the local 
 Catholic Seminaries. He was wrecked, taken and executed, two 
 years later, in an abortive attempt on the Annamese capital. 
 
THE MEIKONG EXPEDITION. 39 
 
 surgents ; and eventually succeeded in crushing the 
 movement. 
 
 It was natural that the rebel leaders should make 
 overtures to the foreigners who were operating against 
 the common enemy ; and, if the French had then 
 cared to annex Tongking, here was no doubt an easy 
 opportunity. In addition to the prestige of his birth, 
 the pretender was supposed, as a Christian, to have 
 the sympathy of the Christian population whom it was 
 the avowed object of the expedition to protect ; and it 
 was believed that a simple demonstration would en- 
 courage a general rising in his favour. The Spanish 
 commandant was inclined to espouse his cause, but 
 Admiral Bonard refused to acquiesce : ^ the reputa- 
 tion of Saigon was then in the ascendant, and it was 
 there the French flag was to be planted : the Red 
 River was not yet known, nor could the importance 
 its discovery was to give Tongking be possibly fore- 
 seen. The step which was to turn French attention 
 to the north, was the despatch of the expedition 
 whose departure Gamier has described for us in the 
 opening lines of the present chapter. One of the 
 problems of the day was to open up commercial in- 
 tercourse with the western provinces of China ; and 
 it was hoped that this river, which descends from the 
 mountains of Thibet, traverses the whole length of the 
 Indo-Chinese peninsula, and discharges itself through 
 French territory into the China Sea might prove a 
 practicable route. The result was disappointing so 
 
 ^ " Histoire de I'lntervention Fran^aise au Tongking," par F. 
 Komanet du Caillaud. 
 
40 FRANCE AND TONGKING. 
 
 far as the Meikong was concerned, as its channel 
 proved to be broken by impassable rapids : but the 
 travellers made an unexpected hit. The Mahomme- 
 dan rebellion was then at its height in Yunnan, 
 and the objection of the Chinese officials to their 
 passage through rebel territory compelled them to 
 quit the Meikong soon after passing the frontier, and 
 pursue an easterly route. The result was that they 
 reached, at Yuen-kiang, the banks of a river coming 
 out of Yunnan and tending towards the Gulf of 
 Tongking, which promised a solution of the problem. 
 Credit cannot be claimed for the discovery as a new 
 one in a geographical sense, for the river is laid down 
 in the old Jesuit maps ; but it was certainly reserved 
 for M. de L agree and his companions to call atten- 
 tion to its existence and to its capabilities as a com- 
 mercial route. It is this river, known as the Hung 
 Kiang, or Red River, in Chinese territory, and Song 
 koi, in Tongking, which has excited all the subse- 
 quent interest of the French in Tongking. To hold 
 Tongking was not only to possess a fertile province, 
 but to control a highway of communication with 
 Yunnan ; and France became as anxious to obtain 
 that hold as China and Annam were loth that it 
 should pass into her possession. 
 
 The first to explore the new route was a French- 
 man named Dupuis. Yunnan was still in the worst 
 throes of the rebellion which had so long defied the 
 efforts of the Imperial Government for its suppres- 
 sion, and Dupuis resolved to visit the Imperialist 
 headquarters, establish relations with the mandarins, 
 
THE SONGKOI, 41 
 
 and endeavour to utilize the Red River for the im- 
 port of arms and munitions of war. Yunnan is 
 famous for metallic Avealth, and he calculated on 
 taking payment in ores which he would carry away 
 by the same route to a foreign market. Having 
 found the officials at Yunnan-foo ready to accept his 
 overtures, his next step was to ascertain that the 
 river was really practicable for his purpose ; and he 
 succeeded in making his way down its course suffi- 
 ciently far to satisfy himself on that point. The 
 navigation became practicable at the town of Mang- 
 hao, which is well within the Chinese frontier. 
 There were rapids of doubtful practicability for 
 steamers between that and Laokai, some seventy 
 miles lower down, but none which could not be sur- 
 mounted by native boats. There are, however, other 
 than physical difficulties to be considered, when it is 
 a question of transit through Asiatic kingdoms. 
 Nature may provide highways ; but the obstructive- 
 ness of the governing powers, or the existence of 
 local disturbance, are obstacles nearly as difficult to 
 overcome as natural barriers. Although the frontiers 
 of China and Tongking were supposed to be conti- 
 guous, there existed, between the limits of the strictly 
 settled districts, a strip of territory inhabited by 
 aboriginal tribes more or less submissive, but par- 
 tially independent of either. The area of this doubt- 
 ful borderland and the degree of authority exerted 
 over it by the neighbouring governments depend, no 
 doubt, to some extent upon the measure of tran- 
 quility in the adjacent provinces. If these are in 
 
42 FRANCE AND TONGKING. 
 
 insurrection, or the hands of the authorities are other- 
 wise weakened, the borderland escapes from control, 
 and becomes a field of refuge for the scum that is 
 cast off in the turmoil of Oriental warfare. This was 
 the case when Dupuis made his exploratory journey. 
 The Taeping and Mahommedan rebellions had dis- 
 organized the adjoining provinces of China: the 
 French war and insurrections in Tongking had seri- 
 ously weakened the Government of Annam. Before 
 the Mussulman insurrection, Manghao had been under 
 the authority of a border chief, tributary to China, 
 whose principal residence was at Laokai. Certain 
 Cantonese appear to have profited by that outbreak 
 to displace him at these two stations, but none the 
 less maintained order and successfully promoted trade. 
 They were still in possession of Manghao at the time 
 of Dupuis' visit, but had been ousted from Laokai 
 by a body of Taeping refugees from the Chinese 
 province of Kwangse ; and these, under the name 
 of Black Flags, on account of their distinguishing 
 colours, become the Kroumirs of the tale. 
 
 His explorations ended, Dupuis returned by the 
 same route to complete his arrangements with his 
 Chinese clients. By them he was commissioned to 
 procure large quantities of arms and munitions of 
 war ; letters of credence were given him to the 
 Annamese officials ; and extensive commercial 
 operations, having for their basis the metallic products 
 of Yunnan, were, it is said, promised countenance 
 and support as soon as peace was restored. So far, 
 all seemed promising enough. Unfortunately, how- 
 ever, a very small error is sufficient to upset an 
 
DUPUIS' EXPEDITION. 43 
 
 elaborate calculation, and the error in this case seems 
 to have been a misconception of the probable 
 attitude of the Annamese Government. It was 
 too much taken for granted that the letters of the 
 Yunnan Mandarins would smooth away obstacles, 
 and that the fact of the arms being destined for China, 
 a friendly and suzerain State, would ensure them 
 against hindrance. The illusion was natural, perhaps, 
 but it was complete ; and the result proved, for the 
 hundredth time, how unsafe it is to rely on Orientals 
 acting in accordance with Western logic. In the 
 meantime, however, happily ignorant of the obstacles 
 he was to encounter, Dupuis made his way back to 
 Hankow, and from thence to France, for the purpose 
 of executing his commission. His endeavours to 
 interest the French Government in his project appear 
 to have been fairly successful, though he was refused 
 official support. One request only was granted. 
 Dupuis wished to repair in person, on his return, to 
 the Annamese capital in order to obtain recognition 
 of his character as a Chinese emissary. He was 
 persuaded that it would assist him in this object if he 
 were allowed to make the visit in a French ship ; and 
 he was promised that measure of support. But the 
 Government would do nothing further; he must 
 act, in other respects, at his own risk. 
 
 Thus assured at least of the sympathy of his 
 Government, Dupuis purchased and shipped the 
 supplies of which he was in quest, and set out on his 
 return to make the necessary preparations for their 
 transport. Hong Kong offered the greatest facilities 
 for the purpose, and it was there he organized his 
 
44 FRANCE AND TONGKING. 
 
 expedition. As the extent of these preparations is 
 an important feature in the case, we may note that 
 they involved the purchase of two discarded English 
 gun-boats and a small steam sloop, besides the hire 
 of a 400-ton junk — the whole manned by a crew of 
 twenty-five Europeans and 150 Asiatics armed with 
 breech-loaders. The Annamese mandarins may well 
 have been startled when such a flotilla came to seek 
 passage through the heart of Tongking. Having all 
 in readiness, he went next to Saigon, to ask for the 
 man-of-war which he had been promised should 
 convey him to Hue. The despatch vessel Bourayne 
 had, in effect, been designated for this service ; but 
 her commander, M. Senez, who had just returned 
 from an exploring expedition along the shores of 
 Tongking, strongly dissuaded him from the project. 
 His opinion was that, so far from seeking authori- 
 zation from the Court of Hue, the best chance of 
 success lay in anticipating any action the latter might 
 possibly take. The expedition would, he considered, 
 become unrealizable directly the Annamese G-ovem- 
 ment was informed of it, and more unrealizable still 
 if the Government of Saigon recommended it.^ It is 
 important to note that this advice tended materially 
 to alter the scope of the enterprise, and to reduce it 
 from a pioneer expedition which was to prepare the 
 way for the formal opening of the Red River, to a 
 sort of dash past a blockade which, even if successful, 
 
 ^ *' L'lntervention Fraii9aise au Tonkin," p. 57. I have been 
 greatly indebted to M. Romanet du Caillaud's compendious work 
 for the facts of this narrative. 
 
FRENCH INTEREST A VO WED. 45 
 
 would be more likely to leave the Annamese 
 authorities irritated at the intrusion than disposed 
 to favour a second attempt. From the point of view 
 of an adventurer wishing to make a single lucrative 
 voyage, the more high-handed proceeding probably 
 held out the best chance of success. From the point 
 of view of the French Government, desirous of 
 opening up Tongking and the Red River to foreign 
 trade, there were two courses open. The more 
 legitimate was to let Dupuis incur the opposition of 
 the Court of Hue, and make that opposition a 
 starting-point for diplomatic insistence. The other 
 was to let him/<xr da se, with the certainty that, if 
 he failed, a complication would be created in which 
 France could intervene, and which would give her an 
 opportunity of dictating terms. The French Govern- 
 ment would probably have preferred the former 
 course. It was interested in the experiment, but was 
 too much under the influence of recent disaster to 
 approve any procedure that might entail com- 
 plications. The Saigon authorities, more absorbed 
 in their own affairs, and already looking on Tongking 
 as a vital object of colonial policy,^ were probably less 
 
 ^ "Notre etablissement dans ce riche pays limitrophe de la 
 Chine et debouche naturel de ses riches provinces sud-occidentales 
 est, selon moi, une question de vie ou de mort pour I'avenir de 
 not re domination dans I'Extreme Orient. Nous devons j prendre 
 pied soit comme allies du roi Tu Due, pour y retablir son autorite 
 et I'y faire respecter, soit par une occupation militaire qui ne serait 
 que trop justifiee le jour ou la cour de Hue nous aurait donne la 
 preuve de sa mauvaise foi et de sa repugnance a conclure avec 
 nous un arrangement definitif ." — Despatch of Admiral Dvpr^ to 
 the Minister of Marine and the Colonies^ d. May 19th, 1873. 
 
46 FRANCE AND TONGKING. 
 
 unwillino^ to see the waters troubled. Be this as it 
 may, the advice of M. Senez was followed. The 
 visit to Hue was abandoned ; Dupuis was to present 
 himself unannounced off the mouth of the Red River, 
 and endeavour to ascend it in his double capacity of 
 merchant and Chinese emissary, offering to pay all 
 legitimate dues and charges that Avould be exacted 
 from a Chinese or Annamese trader. He returned 
 accordingly to Hongkong for his flotilla ; and the 
 Bourayne^ which was about, by a happy coincidence, 
 to start on a second voyage of exploration, preceded 
 him into Tongkingese waters. 
 
 M. Senez' instructions were to visit the Bay of Cua 
 Cam, through which the Red River flows into the 
 Gulf, and to ascend the river itself as far as Hanoi, 
 the capital city of Tongking. These objects were 
 carried out. On November 1st, 1872, he entered the 
 estuary ; and on the 6th, having left his ship at 
 anchor, arrived in a launch before the walls of Hanoi. 
 Almost simultaneously Dupuis arrived off the port 
 of Cat-Ba. M. Senez' reception at the Tongkingese 
 capital was not cordial, nor was it without a consider- 
 able display of firmness that he was able to exact the 
 attention he considered his due. He succeeded, 
 however, in the end ; and, after visiting the pro- 
 vincial cities of Bac-Ninh and Hai-Dzuong, made his 
 way to Kwang-yen, where the Annamese Viceroy was 
 at that moment residing. It was in the neighbour- 
 hood of this city that Dupuis' flotilla was anchored ; 
 and when M. Senez and the Annamese Commissioner 
 exchanged visits, his project naturally came up for 
 
JDUFUIS. 47 
 
 discussion. What passed at the interview might have 
 been safely predicted. The Viceroy listened to M. 
 Senez' argument, and seemed impressed by his 
 enumeration of the advantages that would result from 
 the opening of Tongking to commerce : " but," he 
 asked, " would they appreciate all those advantages 
 at Hue ? " He objected, moreover, to the authority 
 with which Dupuis had been furnished by the 
 Chinese Commander-in-Chief, as seriously informal : 
 a viceroy, only, was in a position to address the 
 Annamese Government ; and again, not the Viceroy 
 of Yunnan, but the Viceroy of Canton was the official 
 with whom communication was always held. 
 Nothing, in short, could now be done but refer the 
 question to Hue for decision ; and as M. Senez 
 assured him that the French Government took an 
 interest in the enterprise, he would exert his personal 
 influence in Dupuis' favour. Eighteen days was 
 named as the time required for the receipt of an 
 answer, and it was agreed that Dupuis should anchor 
 below the forts in the interval. 
 
 Having thus done all that lay in his power to 
 promote the enterprise, M. Senez left on November 
 20th on his return to Saigon ; but with his depar- 
 ture the spirit of obstruction regained the ascendant. 
 The natives were forbidden to have dealings with 
 Dupuis or his people. He was given to understand 
 that the answer from Hue might very likely be three 
 months, instead of eighteen days, in arriving ; and 
 the advisability was suggested of his returning to 
 Hongkong, and there awaiting the decision. To have 
 
48 FRAA'CE AND TONGKING. 
 
 acquiesced in these intimations would, of course, have 
 been to abandon the enterprise. He replied that he 
 would wait the eighteen days ; and then, answer or 
 no answer, would proceed on his voyage. The expiry 
 of the term found the officials as far as ever from 
 sanctioning his advance. He acted, accordingly, as 
 he had declared, and made his way to Hanoi, which 
 he reached exactly a month after the departure of the 
 Bourayne for Saigon. It is needless to dwell on the 
 turmoil which a step so unprecedented caused in the 
 minds of the Annamese officials. The gates of the 
 citadel were closed, and the guard was placed under 
 arms. Dupuis appears to have succeeded in calming 
 their fears, but not in allaying their opposition. He 
 must still wait for the reply from Hue ! And they 
 hid away every native boat out of sight, in the mean- 
 time, that he might not be able to tranship his cargo 
 for the river voyage. Dupuis, however, again got 
 tired of waiting for the answer that never came. 
 Having obtained a hint where he would find some of 
 the hidden boats, he went the length of helping him- 
 self to three ; and, transhipping to these as much of 
 his cargo as they would carry, succeeded in making 
 his way with them to the Yunnan frontier. No 
 actual resistance was offered ; the officials contenting 
 themselves with putting difficulties in the way of 
 getting food or labour along the route. Even the 
 Black Flags did not oppose his passage ; though, as 
 on the occasion of his first visit, there was a lack of 
 cordiality in their reception ! The authorities in 
 Yunnan appear to have been pleased with his success. 
 
DUPUIS, 49 
 
 The Viceroy gave him fresh letters of recommendation 
 to the chief Annamese officials, and moved the Vice- 
 roy of Canton to write also in his favour. 
 
 He had started from Hanoi on January 18th. He 
 got back there on April 30th — to find his new letters 
 as little efficacious as the first. The former Viceroy 
 had left, and his successor displayed uncompromising 
 hostility. Orders were issued forbidding the inhabi- 
 tants to have any dealings with Dupuis or his com- 
 panions, to sell them any kind of provisions, or to 
 hire them boats for transport. The further precau- 
 tion was taken of barring the northern reaches of the 
 river, to prevent any renewed attempt to ascend ; 
 and, this done, the Commissioner threatened to burn 
 his ships if he did not quit Tongking. Dupuis, 
 who had taken the precaution of bringing 120 
 Chinese soldiers as boatmen from Yunnan, enlisted 
 150 more who ofi^ered their services — a proceeding 
 which raised his forces to 500 men — and awaited the 
 attack. It is hardly necessary to add that the 
 Annamese hereupon delayed execution of their 
 threat. They appealed, instead, to the Governor of 
 Saigon, to rid them of his contumacious subject.^ 
 And this brings us to the first act of French inter- 
 
 ^ It is right to add that the Annamese Government had already 
 addressed Admiral Dupre on the subject, and had elicited the 
 following sensible advice : — " Mon avis est," the Admiral wrote, 
 •'que le parti le plus sage a prendre serait de laisser M. Dupuis 
 continuer son voyage, s'il consent a payer les droits etablis, a ne 
 pas susciter de troubles, a ne debarquer ni armes ni munitions sur 
 toute votre territoire." 
 
50 FRANCE AND TONGKING. 
 
 vention — an episode which resembles a chapter of 
 Dumas, rather than a tale of modern history. 
 
 We have seen that the Government of Saigon, 
 eager to strengthen its position and extend its 
 influence in the Far East, was inclined to a more 
 adventurous policy than its superiors. The question 
 of Tongking was, in fact, not the only one pressing 
 for solution. Although the King of Annam had 
 been compelled to cede, in the treaty of 1862, the 
 three provinces which formed the nucleus of the 
 colony, he had not recognized the subsequent annexa- 
 tions which had doubled its area. A new treaty Avas 
 wanted, to settle this and other questions, but the 
 king showed no inclination to sign one, and the 
 Saigon authorities were getting irritated at the 
 delay. On his return from his voyage of exploration 
 through the estuary of the Red River, M. Senez 
 advised the use of Tongking as a lever to extort the 
 concession ; and, whatever we may think of the 
 morality of the scheme, he must be allowed credit 
 for discernment. Tongking Avas the most vulnerable 
 and most valuable part of the Annamese monarchy, 
 and disturbance in Tongking always meant a com- 
 pliant disposition at the Court of Hue. A military 
 occupation would be preferable ; but, as such a pro- 
 ject would have small chance of approval under 
 existing circumstances, he suggested the encourage- 
 ment of insurrection as an alternative : a " Le " Pre- 
 tender to be placed at the head of the movement, 
 and some mercantile house in Saigon to furnish arms 
 under the secret guarantee of the colonial Govern- 
 
DUPUJS. 51 
 
 ment. The last insurrection had only succumbed, he 
 considered, for want of arms : if these were provided 
 the Tonofkino-ese had an excellent chance of recover- 
 ing their independence, and would be glad to place 
 themselves under the protectorate of France. M. 
 Senez appears to have found in Admiral Dupre a 
 willing listener, and we shall see hereafter that the 
 seed did not fall on barren ground. 
 
 In the meantime, Dupuis' proceedings Avere being 
 made the subject of urgent complaint by the 
 Annamese Government; and Admiral Dupre ap- 
 pears to have so far admitted the justice of the 
 remonstrance as to point out that the existing treaties 
 forbad French subjects to reside in the interior, and 
 that he had therefore better withdraw. Dupuis 
 refused. He was, he said, an emissary from the 
 Government of Yunnan, to begin with ; but he was 
 entitled to do what he desired, even as a Frenchman : 
 the treaty gave Frenchmen all the privileges of the 
 most favoured nation and, consequently, the same 
 rights as were possessed by the Chinese who traded 
 and travelled with full liberty throughout the king- 
 dom of Annam. He sent, moreover, an agent, in the 
 person of M. Millot, who seems to have given the 
 Admiral a favourable impression of his proceedings ; 
 the upshot being that His Excellency not only pro- 
 mised to endeavour, semi-officially, to obtain for 
 Dupuis an indemity of $250,000 for the hindrance 
 he had encountered, but actually gave an official 
 guarantee for a loan of $30,000 from a local bank, to 
 meet his immediate requirements. 
 
 E 2 
 
52 FRANCE AND TO NG KING, 
 
 The political condition of Tongking was naturally- 
 discussed, and M. Millot was able to report one fact 
 of especial interest. The partisans of the "Le'* 
 d3masty were again agitating, and had even made 
 overtures to Dupuis for help, which the latter, how- 
 ever, had refused, on the ground that politics were 
 not within his province. It is easy to conceive that, 
 to a mind impressed by M. Senez' suggestions, the 
 opportunity offered by such a complication must 
 have been very seductive.^ Admiral Dupre appears 
 to have regarded it as too favourable to Ido neglected. 
 The Court of Hue had begged him to send an officer 
 with a small escort to settle the Dupuis difficulty : 
 he would do so ; and selected for the purpose 
 Francis Gamier, the senior surviving member of the 
 expedition which had first brought the Red River 
 into notoriety. He telegraphed to France a state- 
 ment of his intentions and his reasons, accepted all 
 the responsibility, and asked to be let alone to do 
 his best. 
 
 The instructions Garnier received appear to have 
 left him wide discretion, both in regard to Dupuis 
 and his own proceedings. He himself, in a letter to 
 his family, says he had full liberty to act as he 
 
 ^ " Sans doute alors Tamiral, quand il eut fait faire a M. Dupuis 
 une avance de trente mille piastres, pensa-t-il avoir trouve cette 
 maison de commerce, dont parlait le projet de M. Senez, qui sous 
 la guarantie financiere occulte de la France pourrait fournir des 
 armes aux insurg^s. Une grande partie du materiel de guerre de 
 M. Dupuis . . . etait encore a Hanoi : et d'un jour a I'autre on 
 pouvait armer les insurges."— V Intervention Frangaise au Tong- 
 king ^ pp. 79, 81. 
 
GARNIER'S EXPEDITION. 53 
 
 thought best.^ In an official letter to his Govern- 
 ment, Admiral Dupre speaks of having told him to 
 establish himself securely at the spot which he might 
 consider most convenient for carrying out his mission. 
 A despatch to the Court of Hue, written at the 
 moment of Garnier's departure, tersely recapitulates 
 outstanding grievances,^ and insists on the opening 
 of Hanoi and the Red River to trade. " Here I 
 am," Garnier wrote from Hanoi, " en train de fonder 
 soit un protectorat fran9ais soit une nouvelle colonie, 
 selon le degr^ d'obstruction que montrera la cour de 
 Hue." Indeed, the admiral frankly expresses this 
 threat, two months later, when even the capture of 
 Hanoi had failed to induce compliance with his 
 demands. " Si vous ne vous hatez de faire le traits," 
 he writes to the Annamese Government in December, 
 "notre sejour au Tongking se prolongera; nous 
 serons for9es d*en completer I'occupation pour ad- 
 ministrer directement le pays, ou de chercher dans 
 la famille royale ancienne celui de ses membres qui 
 a le plus de droit pour regner sur le pays, a 1 etablir, 
 et le soutenir de nos armes." He was, in fact, 
 resolved to establish French influence, either by 
 treaty or annexation, and Garnier was to take 
 the steps he thought most conducive to that end. 
 
 ^ '^Comme instructions cart6 blanche! I'amiral se rapporte a 
 moi." 
 
 ^ " Demarches des Annamites aupres du gouvernement ctranger 
 de Hongkong, mauvais traitemens infliges aux Chretiens, mepris 
 des jiasseports delivres aux missionaires." — Admiral Dupre to the 
 Government of Annamj October 11th, 1873. 
 
54 FRANCE AND TO NG KING. 
 
 The strength of his escort appears somewhat 
 inconsistent with the magnitude of the design. 
 It comprised thirty soldiers under Lieutenant de 
 Trentinian, besides the crew, fifty-six in number, of 
 the despatch boat D'Esfrees, in which he sailed. Two 
 more gunboats, however, were shortly sent after him, 
 raising his total force to 212 men, of whom twenty- 
 four were Asiatics, and eleven guns. Gamier reached 
 Hanoi on November 5th, 1873. The chief Annamese 
 authority in Tongking was Nguyen Tri-phuong, the 
 general who had opposed the French in the campaign 
 of Saigon. He had the reputation of being intensely 
 hostile to foreigners, and it soon became evident that 
 there was little chance of an amicable understand- 
 ing. Gamier said he had come to negotiate a treaty 
 of commerce which should open the Red River to 
 navigation. Nguyen declared he had no power to 
 entertain that question, and requested him simply 
 to judge and punish Dupuis in accordance with the 
 request which had been addressed to the Governor 
 of Saigon to that effect. Gamier posted a proclama- 
 tion that, as the Annamese Government had sent to 
 Saigon for assistance, he had come to see how things 
 were going on ; and that the French intended to drive 
 away pirates, foster commerce, and so bring wealth 
 to the country. Nguyen immediately posted another, 
 forbidding native or Chinese merchants to have any 
 intercourse with the French Commandant, who had 
 been sent to drive out Dupuis and had no right to 
 meddle in the affairs of the country. The position, 
 in fact, became so strained that, only three days 
 
GARNIER TAKES HANOI. 5$ 
 
 after his arrival, Gamier had resolved to attack the 
 citadel, and was only dissuaded by Bishop Puginier, 
 who apprehended that such a step would lead to 
 reprisals on the Converts, to the abandonment of 
 their posts by the Annamese officials, and the con- 
 sequent access of serious disorders in the province. 
 
 The delay, however, was only temporary, as Garnier 
 conceived an alternative measure which it was im- 
 impossible the Governor could tolerate. Failing to 
 persuade the latter to open Tongking of his own 
 motion, and dissuaded by the Bishop from a resort 
 to force, he resolved to place himself alongside the 
 Annamese authorities, and himself give the necessary 
 orders ! He ' accordingly issued a proclamation de- 
 claring the Red River and various ports open to 
 trade under French protection, and fixing a customs* 
 tariff. Of course the Mandarins had the placards 
 torn down as soon as they were put up. Garnier then 
 presented an ultimatum demanding the disarmament 
 of the citadel, the issue of orders to all the governors 
 of provinces to obey the instructions of the French 
 envoy, and permission for Dupuis to enter freely 
 into Yunnan. The ultimatum was ignored ; and 
 on the following day the citadel was attacked and 
 carried. 
 
 Hanoi was taken on November 20th, and Gamier 
 at once put forth a proclamation disclaiming any 
 idea of annexation, and throwing the responsibility 
 of what had happened on the local Mandarine. He 
 had been sent there by the Governor of Saigon to 
 open up commercial intercourse, but the Mandarins 
 
56 FRANCE AND TONGKING. 
 
 were obstinate and regardless of the interests of the 
 people ; he was obliged therefore to depose them, 
 and was about to invite the co-operation of the 
 respectable and intelligent classes in filling their 
 places and maintaining order. He requested, at 
 the same time, all the minor officials to remain at 
 their posts, and caused fresh seals of office to be 
 prepared, which asserted the protectorate of France 
 over Tongking. This was practically to assume, at 
 any rate for the time being, the government of the 
 province ; and for the time being, also, M. Puginier's 
 prediction was fulfilled. The greater part of the 
 officials ran away, others tried to organize resistance, 
 and bands of brigands scoured the country ; anarchy 
 reigned supreme.^ It may seem strange that, having 
 gone so far, he did not play the card which M. Senez 
 had indicated, and encourage a revolt in favour of 
 some " Le " pretender. He did, in fact, take into 
 his service, in the capacity of adjutant-general, the 
 chief of the " Le " party, who assured him he could 
 dispose of four or five thousand followers. But M. 
 Puginier appears to have dissuaded him from going 
 further, doubting the possibility of finding a " Le " 
 who would fulfil the required conditions of capacity 
 and descent ; and Garnier seems to have abandoned 
 the idea. At any rate, the insurgent card was not 
 played, and respect for the king was blandly affirmed, 
 while the royal fortresses were captured and the 
 royal officers superseded and imprisoned. 
 
 ^ " L'anarchie etait a son coinble."— Z'/w^erven/iow Fran^ais&y 
 #c., p. 123. 
 
OCCUPIES THE WHOLE DELTA. 57 
 
 It would carry us far beyond our proposed limits 
 to describe in detail the incidents of the ensuing 
 month. With feverish energy, but with resolution 
 and success, Garnier set to work to organize the 
 territory he had practically conquered, and to extend 
 his authority over the neighbouring districts. With 
 an audacity born no doubt of first success as well as 
 of conscious superiority, handfuls of men were sent 
 oiF to destroy forts and coerce recalcitrant officials. 
 M. Balny d'Avricourt, with the gunboat Espingole 
 and seventeen marines, received the submission of 
 the governor of Hungyen, took the fortified town of 
 Phu-ly, — if that can be called " taking " where the 
 defenders fly without firing a shot, — and on Decem- 
 ber 5th carried by assault the provincial city of 
 Haidzuong. On the same day, by a course of pro- 
 cedure which may be described as unscrupulous and 
 violent or clever and dashing, according to the view 
 taken of Garnier's whole procedure, M. de Haute- 
 feuille obtained possession of Ninh-Binh. The suc- 
 cessful officer was, in each case, installed as governor 
 of the province he had conquered ; and the capture 
 of Nam-dinh by Gamier himself, who placed Dr. 
 Harman in charge, completed the subjection of the 
 delta of the Red River. The Annamese authority 
 had collapsed like a house of cards. 
 
 Events had passed so rapidly that there had been 
 no time, as yet, for the intervention either of the 
 Saigon Government or of the Court of Hue. Dele- 
 gates from both quarters were about to arrive, and the 
 occupation of Tongking was to terminate as quickly 
 
58 FRANCE AND TONGKING. 
 
 as it had been effected. Among symptoms that 
 some at least of the royal officers were beginning to 
 recover breath, was the formation of an army in the 
 province of Sontay, having in its vanguard the 
 famous Black Flags of the Upper Red River, which 
 began to advance menacingly in the direction of 
 Hanoi. Garnier had made arrangements for attack- 
 ing this army with all the force at his disposal when, 
 on December 19th, there came an ambassador from 
 Hue, whose instructions gave promise of an under- 
 standing in the sense desired by the Saigon Govern- 
 ment. He refrained accordingly from carrying out 
 his design ; issued a proclamation announcing the 
 suspension of hostilities ; and, relying on the ambas- 
 sador's promise that this should be forwarded to 
 the Annamese camp, relaxed the vigilance which 
 seemed now unnecessary. He was actually engaged 
 in discussing the terms of a treaty with the royal 
 envoy, when the alarm was given that the Annamese 
 army was advancing and that the Black Flags were 
 actually firing on the ramparts. The attack was 
 repelled ; but, in attempting to follow up his success, 
 Garnier found that he had to deal with opponents 
 less contemptible than the Annamese. Firing 
 occasionally, as they retreated, the Chinese eventu- 
 ally halted behind an earthwork and faced their 
 pursuers. Gamier attacked them with a handful of 
 men, at the point of the bayonet, but it was his last 
 act of daring. He stumbled and fell while running 
 forward in advance ; and in an instant the Black 
 
DEATH OF GARNIER. 59 
 
 Flags were u]3on him, and stabbed him with their 
 spears, while his followers fell back to escape a similar 
 fate. Rallying, at a short distance, the latter suc- 
 ceeded in again compelling the Chinese to retire, by 
 the superiority of their fire, and recovered the bodies 
 of their leader and of another soldier who had fallen ; 
 but both had been decapitated, and their heads 
 carried off in triumph. Nor was this all. M. Balny 
 d'Avricouii:, having also repelled the assailants on 
 the side of the citadel which had be6n entrusted to 
 his care, sallied out, in ignorance of what had 
 happened, to support his chief ; and again the con- 
 tempt of the enemy which the French had learnt 
 during the first days of their success, was to prove 
 fatal. He found the Black Flags in position behind 
 an entrenched village, which he, like Gamier, 
 thought to carry with a rush. They did not, how- 
 ever, even wait for his attack. After a volley which 
 killed one of their assailants, they sallied forth to meet 
 the remainder. M. Balny was surrounded and 
 killed ; and his handful of followers were obliged to 
 beat a rapid retreat. These successive disasters at 
 length taught discretion. M. Bain de la Coquerie, 
 upon whom the command now devolved, confined 
 himself to strengthening his position in the citadel, 
 and awaited the reinforcements which he had already 
 heard were on their way. Three hours had not 
 elapsed, in fact, after the events described, when a 
 letter was brought from the Commander of the 
 I) Seres, announcing his arrival with 100 marines and 
 
6o FRANCE AND TONGKING, 
 
 a supply of food and munitions of war, which 
 removed all apprehension for the safety of the 
 garrison. 
 
 Thoroughly alarmed by Gamier s proceedings, the 
 Annamese Government had, in the meantime, fol- 
 lowed up its written remonstrances by sending 
 ambassadors to endeavour to arrange matters with 
 the Government of Saigon. These had been met, as 
 the local authorities in Tongking had been met, by 
 a declaration that the Dupuis affair was a matter of 
 detail ; the first and essential thing was the con- 
 clusion of the required treaty. Negotiations had 
 thereupon been entered into, and terms practically 
 arranged, when the envoys declared their powers 
 insufficient to bring matters to a conclusion. Nguyen- 
 Van-tuong returned accordingly to Hue, accom- 
 panied by M. Philastre, for further instructions; 
 and, having obtained the king's assent subject to the 
 settlement of affairs in Tongking, went on to the 
 scene of action to bring about the desired arrange- 
 ments. The two emissaries arrived in the Bay of 
 Cua-Cam on December 24th ; Gamier had been 
 killed on the 21st; the conduct of affairs fell, 
 therefore, entirely into their hands. 
 
 We fail to discover what were M. Philastre's 
 precise instructions, but it is not hard to divine the 
 motives which influenced his proceedings. The 
 French Government had sent out orders forbidding 
 a military occupation of Tongking : he had a 
 promise that the treaty should be signed directly 
 affairs in that province were settled ; and he appears 
 
TERMS ARRANGED, 6j 
 
 to have been in haste to terminate a situation which 
 his own judgment condemned. 
 
 M. Philastre and Nguyen Van-tuong arrived, as 
 we have seen, in the bay of Cua-Cam on December 
 24th. They reached Haidzuong on the 29th. Three 
 days later, the French garrison of that toAvn was 
 withdrawn, and the citadel restored to the Annamese. 
 They reached Hanoi on January 3rd, and orders 
 were issued for the evacuation of Ninh-binh and Nam- 
 dinh with equal promptitude. A convention^ for 
 the surrender of Hanoi quickly followed ; and pro- 
 vision was made, in this, for the movements of 
 Dupuis. He and his expedition were to withdraw 
 to Haiphong, whither the French troops were also 
 to retire and to remain pending the formal conclusion 
 of the treaty. If Dupuis wished to pursue his 
 journey into Yunnan, he was to be at liberty to do 
 so, but with a limited escort and sufficient arma- 
 ment only for his personal defence in the districts 
 which were beyond Annamese control ; nor was he 
 to return till the Red River had been formally 
 opened to foreign commerce. A French resident 
 was to be stationed at Hanoi ; Garnier's tomb there 
 was to be respected ; and a plenary amnesty was 
 promised to all who had been compromised during 
 the French occupation. 
 
 The evacuation took place on February 12th, and 
 M. Philastre returned to Saigon in company with the 
 Annamese delegate. Garnier's labour, however, had 
 
 ^ "Convention du 6 Fevrier, relative u I'^vacuation de la citadelle 
 de Hanoi.'* 
 
62 FRANCE AND TONGKING. 
 
 not been lost. His action, to quote the words of a 
 letter written to him by Admiral Dupre's aide-de- 
 camp, had simplified everything. M. Senez' advice 
 to use Tongking as a lever had been followed and 
 had been successful: the treaty was assured. The 
 worst sufferers were the unfortunate Tongkingese who 
 had accepted Garnier's overtures, or had been other- 
 wise compromised or suspected during the French 
 occupation. M. Philastre had exacted, it is true, a 
 promise of plenary amnesty for the past and a gua- 
 rantee against persecution for the future ; but the 
 promise, as might have been foreseen, ^Droved hardly 
 worth the paper it was ^vritten on. Massacres and 
 persecutions of Christians ensued immediately on the 
 Avithdrawal of the French troops ; and the temporary 
 officials whom Gamier had appointed were driven 
 to seek safety in flight. A number petitioned to be 
 taken to Saigon. Some were massacred with their 
 families. Mr. Rheinart, indeed, who had been 
 appointed in the new capacity of French Resident 
 at Hanoi, found his position so intolerable, in con- 
 sequence of these events and the unfriendly attitude 
 of the Viceroy, that he withdrew to Haiphong and 
 subsequently resigned altogether a post he found to 
 be untenable. 
 
 We have seen that the terms of a treaty had been 
 nearly arranged before M. Philastre's visit to Tong- 
 king. That visit had been paid on the assurance 
 that, when matters had been settled there, the treaty 
 should follow. It remained, now, to exact fulfilment 
 of that promise ; and after some further demur the 
 
THE TREATY OF 1874. 63 
 
 document was signed. Two days later, the chief 
 ambassador, Le Tuan, died — it was suspected by 
 his own hand, in dread of the reception that might 
 await him on his return to Hue. By this treaty ^ 
 the annexation of the three provinces taken by 
 Admiral De la Grandiere, in 1867, was formally 
 recognized. Chinese suzerainty was tacitly set aside 
 by a clause recognizing the entire independence of 
 Annam in respect of every foreign Power ; and the 
 supremacy of France was implicitly substituted, by 
 the king's undertaking to conform his foreign policy 
 to that of the Republic. He was promised, in return, 
 any help he might require to maintain internal order 
 in the kingdom, to defend it against foreign attack, 
 or to j)ut down piracy on the coasts. He was to 
 have an immediate present of ^\^ gunboats, with a 
 quantity of munitions of war ; and France was to 
 place at his disposal drill instructors, engineers, ex- 
 perts to organize a Customs Service, and professors 
 to found a College. What remained unpaid of the 
 indemnity exacted, in 1862, for expenses incurred in 
 the conquest of Saigon, was remitted : full tolerance 
 was promised to teachers and professors of the Chris- 
 tian religion : three ports in Tongking and the whole 
 course of the Red River were to be open to 
 foreign trade. French Consular agents were to be 
 appointed at the several open ports, and given autho- 
 rity over foreign residents of whatever nationality. 
 French subjects or other foreigners desiring to settle 
 
 ^ '' Traite conclu a Saigon le 15 Mars, 1874, entre la France et 
 le Royaume d'Annam." 
 
64 FRANCE AND TONGKING. 
 
 at any of the aforesaid ports must register themselves 
 with the French Resident : Frenchmen or other 
 foreigners desiring to travel in the interior must 
 procure a passport to be granted by a French au- 
 thority: disputes between Frenchmen and other 
 foreigners, or between foreigners and foreigners, were 
 to be judged by French tribunals ; and disputes 
 between foreigners and Annamese, by a French and 
 Annamese magistrate sitting together ; while crimes 
 committed by Frenchmen or other foreigners on 
 Annamese territory were to be judged at Saigon. 
 This treaty was followed six months later by a 
 second, designed to regulate commercial intercourse ; 
 and in this France explicitly renewed " the pro- 
 mise made to the Annamese Government in Art. 2 
 of the Treaty of March 15th, to make every eiFort to 
 destroy both land and sea pirates, especially in the 
 vicinity of the towns and ports opened to foreign 
 commerce." Some difficulty was experienced in ob- 
 taining the assent of the Annamese to this supple- 
 mentary treaty ; but the event again proved the 
 wisdom of M. Senez' remark, that the lever to move 
 the Court of Hue was to be found in Tonfirkin^. A 
 fresh insurrection, which followed the French evacua- 
 tion, reduced the Government to submission ; but 
 placed the French in the disagreeable position of 
 having to iight those who were most friendly to their 
 presence : for, however distasteful some of the con- 
 ditions imposed may have been, the king promptly 
 showed his appreciation of others by claiming the 
 help promised to maintain order in the State. The 
 
TO NG KING OPENED TO COMMERCE. 65 
 
 help was given ; the -^ Le " flotilla was captured or 
 destroyed, and the insurgents were driven back into 
 the mountains of Cat-ba. It is superfluous to add 
 that the disinclination of the Annamese Court to 
 give effect to the treaty revived with the disappear- 
 ance of the danger, and that it was with difficulty 
 Admiral Dupre exacted the exchange of ratifications. 
 Eventually, however, the formality was accomplished. 
 Consuls were appointed, and Customs officers sent to 
 Haiphong and Hanoi in pursuance of its terms ; and 
 on September 15th, 1875, Tongking was declared 
 open to foreign commerce. 
 
 The treaty of 1874 was to settle all pending ques- 
 tions, and to place the relations between Saigon and 
 Hue on a clear and definite footing ; it was to assert 
 French influence in Annamese politics, and to main- 
 tain French supremacy in Tongking. As a matter 
 of fact it failed in two cardinal points. By establish- 
 ing the machinery of a Protectorate in one clause, 
 while it affirmed Annamese independence in another, 
 it placed French authority in an equivocal position 
 towards other Western Powers : and it failed to 
 secure the capital object of opening up a peaceful 
 channel of commercial intercourse with Yunnan. 
 
 No Power could allow its subjects residing in a 
 country recognized as independent, to be subjected to 
 the jurisdiction of French agents or carried off into 
 French territory to be judged ; and more than one 
 European Government refused to recognize it on 
 those grounds. A new treaty was therefore required, 
 explicitly asserting a Protectorate, if that position was 
 
 F 
 
66 FRANCE AND TONGKING. 
 
 to be maintained, and the Governor of Saigon was 
 instructed to seize the first opportunity of re-opening 
 the question.^ But that was not all. Seven years 
 after the Red River had been declared open to the 
 frontiers of Yunnan, its waters were still closed to 
 foreign commerce ; and the state of the country 
 generally was worse than before. Whether those 
 remarkable Black Flags, who appeared at one time 
 as invaders, at another as allies, and seem really 
 to have been paid mercenaries of the Annamese 
 Government — whether the obstruction were really of 
 their creating, or whether a general state of lawless- 
 ness were the cause, there could be no doubt that 
 the country was unsafe for foreign travel. Nor is it 
 surprising this should be the case. The disorganiza- 
 tion caused by the operations of Gamier and the 
 repeated insurrections, in Tongking, would tax a 
 stronger Government than that of Annam to repair. 
 We have seen that insurrection followed immediately 
 on the withdrawal of the French in 1874. Again, in 
 1878, a force collected in China by a general named 
 ^' Le," who had previously held a commission in the 
 Chinese army, overran four provinces, penetrated to 
 Bac Ninh within twenty miles of the capital, and 
 was only suppressed by the help of a Chinese con- 
 tingent. A French subject named Francelli was 
 murdered near Hanoi in 1880 ; other Frenchmen 
 were attacked in the following year, and the water- 
 ways generally were notoriously unsafe. 
 
 ^ Despatch from the Minister of Marine and the Colonies to the 
 Governor of Saigon, d. January 10th, 1879. 
 
PUBLIC INSECURITY, 67 
 
 Obviously, however, the French could not be 
 expected to let the clauses affecting the Red River 
 lie dormant. If the Annamese Government had 
 not been able, in seven years, to restore order, they 
 might fairly urge that the time had come for them 
 to undertake the task. By the treaty of 1874 they 
 had promised to do all in their power to put down 
 piracy and disorder, and they were willing to fulfil 
 the pledge. Nor was this all. The French had 
 persistently declined to admit the presence of Chinese 
 interests or authority in Annam, and had gone so 
 far as to stultify their own position by inserting in 
 the treaty of 1874 a clause expressly designed to 
 combat any such assumption. Yet the fact was 
 obtrusively evident that Chinese influence was a 
 substantial element in the situation. In the 
 words of a Saigon correspondent of the Be'piiblique 
 Fran^aise : — 
 
 " Les Chinois, reguliers ou irreguliers, imperiaux ou drapeaux 
 noirs, prenant de plus en plus pied sur le territoire tonkinois, y 
 genant de plus en plus le commerce et y parlant decidement en 
 maitres, on a prie Hue d'agir et de se debarrasser de ces botes 
 genants, de ces intrus, les seuls qui tirent profit de nos traites de 
 1874. La cour de Hue, qui d'ailleurs est de connivence avec tons 
 ces Fils du Ciel, cela n'est douteux pour personne, repondit qu'elle 
 etait trop faible et a elle seule impuissante." 
 
 It was resolved, accordingly, to send a fresh expe- 
 dition ; and in March, 1882, Captain Riviere set out 
 from Saigon with two sloops-of-war, eight gunboats, 
 and 620 marines, for the ostensible purpose of 
 strengthening the garrison of Hanoi, and of taking 
 order with the irregularities that were neutralizing 
 
 i' 2 
 
68 FRANCE AND TONGKING. 
 
 the treaty stipulations with regard to the Red River. 
 If the Black Flags got in his way, they must be 
 brushed aside ; but he was to avoid hostilities as far 
 as possible, and especially to avoid conflict with 
 Chinese Imperial troops. M. de Vilers' instructions, 
 in short, were unexceptionable. Yet Riviere seems 
 to have acted as though he had been directed to 
 precipitate a crisis. 
 
 The expedition was despatched in accordance with 
 the terms of the treaty by which France engaged to 
 help maintain order ; but the Annamese officials 
 seem to have viewed the matter in a strangely 
 different light. If France was bound to afford help 
 when asked, Annam was not bound to ask it, nor to 
 accept it unasked : so far, therefore, from welcoming 
 the French troops, they closed the gates of the citadel, 
 while the Commander-in-chief of the province drew 
 his forces together as though to resist their action. 
 Considering that these preparations amounted to 
 actual menace. Riviere seems to have resolved on 
 decisive action. He not only informed the 
 Viceroy that his attitude was calculated to provoke 
 hostilities, but required the acceptance of a new 
 convention which exacted, among other trifles, the 
 withdrawal of all Chinese troops from Tongking. 
 The Viceroy replied, of course, that he had no power 
 to entertain any such question ; and as he maintained 
 this inability, in face of a threat to use force, Hanoi 
 was bombarded and carried by assault. The Viceroy 
 and Commandant committed suicide ; the Governor 
 was held a prisoner in his palace, and the French Com- 
 
RIVIERES EXPEDITION. 69 
 
 mander-in- chief took possession of the Custom-houses 
 where the duties were ordered to be collected for the 
 benefit of the French treasury. A situation had 
 been once again created which would give France an 
 excuse for employing her strength to impose what 
 terms she chose on the Court of Hue. 
 
 So far as between France and Annam. There was, 
 
 however, a third Power, which the French had 
 
 shown a disposition to ignore, but which seemed 
 
 disinclined to let itself be so quietly effaced. We 
 
 have seen that China claimed Annam as a vassal and 
 
 tributary State ; and there could be no doubt that 
 
 the claim rested on centuries of recognition and on 
 
 the possession of a very real influence in the country. 
 
 The kings of Annam had been always invested, on 
 
 their accession, by delegates of the Emperor of China ; 
 
 the ceremony taking place in the very city of Hanoi 
 
 which had now, again, passed into French occupation. 
 
 Once in four years an embassy bearing tribute was 
 
 sent to Peking ; a-nd we have seen, more than once, an 
 
 appeal made by Annam and granted by China, for help 
 
 in cases of emergency. The contest was, then, really 
 
 between French and Chinese influence in the country, 
 
 and events were tending to define that position. 
 
 Nor was the tie of suzerainty and vassalage the only 
 
 one which would lead China to espouse the cause of 
 
 her tributary. Just as France would consider an 
 
 aggressive movement by Germany on Belgium a 
 
 menace to her own safety, or as England would 
 
 oppose Russian encroachment in Afghanistan, so was 
 
 China interested in the threatened supersession of 
 
70 FRANCE AND TONGKING. 
 
 Annamese authority on her southern frontier. The 
 substitution of a powerful and militant for a weak 
 and submissive neighbour might, indeed, disturb a less 
 conservative nation ; and when, to this consideration, 
 was added the avowed object of obtaining control 
 over the course of a river which rises in Chinese 
 territory and constitutes a channel of communication 
 with the sea, it would be strange if Chinese states- 
 men acquiesced calmly in the change. It would 
 have been wiser, no doubt, if they had taken up 
 a decided attitude sooner; but they are slow to 
 move, and notoriously indifferent to danger while it 
 is remote from their doors. When the treaty of 1874 
 was communicated to China, in common with other 
 Powers, Prince Kung took occasion, certainly, to re- 
 mark ^ that Annam was tributary to China, that what 
 Chinese troops were there had been sent at the re- 
 quest of a tributary power, and that the stipulations 
 for commerce with Yunnan appeared to overlook the 
 fact that Yunnan was not open to foreign trade. 
 But it was not till the preparations of the French, in 
 1880-1, gave evidence of renewed activity, that the 
 Imperial authorities showed themselves alive to the ur- 
 gency of the question. Current rumours as to French 
 projects led the Marquis Tseng to remark, then, at the 
 French Foreign Office, that China had not ceased to 
 regard Annam as a vassal State nor, either in her 
 character as suzerain or neighbour, could she view with 
 indifference anything which might alter the inter- 
 national relations of the country ; but his overtures 
 ^ Prince Kung to Count de Rochechouart, June 15th, 1875. 
 
CHINESE INTERESTS. 71 
 
 were treated with so much brusqueness that it would 
 seem the Government had decided to override a posi- 
 tion they found it impossible to contest. Annam, wrote 
 M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire — and China was invited 
 to take note of the fact, — was free from any bond 
 (affranchi de tout lien quelconque) to any other 
 Power than France ; and the French Government 
 could not, therefore, enter into any explanations with 
 a foreign Government about circumstances of which 
 it must be the sole judge. It had so long been the 
 fashion to regard China as an inert mass, devoid of 
 energy or impulse, that it was no doubt thought in 
 the last degree unlikely she would be moved to active 
 interference on behalf of her tributary. The patience 
 with which she persisted in trying to find a diplo- 
 matic solution probably encouraged this impression. 
 Yet the manner in which she wakened up when 
 threatened by Russia in Central Asia might have 
 shown that she could assert her dignity, on occasion, 
 and might even prove a troublesome neighbour to 
 the French in Tongking. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 FRANCE ATsD ANNAM. 
 
 At a moment when French proceedings in the Far 
 East are attracting general attention, when interven- 
 tion in Tongking has led to annexation, and the idea 
 of a protectorate over Annam has expanded into a 
 dream of Indo-Chinese Empire, it may not be unin- 
 teresting to review the earlier stages of the adven- 
 ture, and to read afresh the story of ecclesiastical 
 intrigue and military adventure involved in the 
 career of the missionary bishop who laid the founda- 
 tion of French interests in the country. The facts 
 are instructive, as evincing the continuity of national 
 policy despite governmental changes, and have, 
 besides, a dash of romantic interest which may help 
 to relieve the painfully commonplace details of 
 annexation and exaction that have characterized more 
 recent proceedings. The date is the close of the last 
 century : the curtain rises upon a scene of rebellion 
 and anarchy such as Oriental histories too frequently 
 disclose. 
 
 About 1765-70, the reigning king of Annam 
 nominated as his successor the son of a concubine, in 
 supersession of his legitimate heir. At his death, 
 a minister whom he had interested in the design 
 carried it into execution, but made himself so 
 
POLITICAL TROUBLES. 73 
 
 obnoxious that an influential party invited the inter- 
 vention of the King of Tongking. The latter marched 
 south at the head of a formidable army and exacted 
 the surrender of the culprit. Not satisfied, however, 
 with having achieved this object, the Tongkingese 
 set about overrunning the country on their own 
 account ; whereupon one Nhac incited the people to 
 resistance, and succeeded in driving out the invaders. 
 He placed, then, a prince of the blood royal tem- 
 porarily on the throne ; but soon quarrelled with and 
 put him to death, and declared himself king. The 
 (illegitimate) prince whose usurpation and weak- 
 ness had caused the trouble had, in the meantime, 
 been captured and killed also ; and Nguyen-anh 
 remained sole legitimate pretender to the throne. 
 His efforts to make head against Nhac met with 
 some success at first, in the southern provinces ; but 
 the success was ephemeral, and he had to seek 
 safety in flight. 
 
 A somewhat similar drama had in the meantime 
 being played in Tongking, where a king who died in 
 1782 had also nominated as his successor the son of 
 a concubine. The leading mandarins combined to 
 set him aside in favour of the legitimate heir, with 
 the usual result of creating two factions ; and a 
 state of anarchy ensued which led to an appeal for 
 help to Annam. Nhac, who was now supreme in the 
 south, willingly obeyed the summons ; overran the 
 country and of course, in his turn, refused to quit ; 
 thus reversing the scale and subjecting Tongking 
 to Annam. 
 
74 FRANCE AND ANNAM. 
 
 It will be readily understood that the Catholic 
 missionaries, who had gained a firm footing in 
 Annam, found their position jeopardized in the pre- 
 vailing anarchy. Among these was M. Pigneau de 
 Behaine, Bishop of Adran, who seems to have been 
 in high credit with the (legitimate) royal family, and 
 is said even to have saved the life of Nguyen-anh, by 
 concealing him in his house when hard pressed by 
 the rebels, in Saigon. His is the central figure in 
 the following story, which we open by quoting a 
 letter written by him, from Pondichery, to the 
 College of Foreign Missions at Paris : — 
 
 In the month of March, 1782, obliged to abandon Cochin- 
 China, I withdrew to Cambodia with the College. The famine 
 was very severe, and if I had not taken the precaution to send 
 provisions, we could not have subsisted there. Hardly had we 
 arrived when the rebel chief despatched troops thither. I went 
 and hid myself with my scholars and the rest of our people in the 
 most frightful deserts, where I remained two months. Then, the 
 king of Cochin-China having re-entered his States, I returned 
 near him with my people ; but it was only, alas ! to prepare for a 
 fresh flight. This time we had no other refuge to seek but the 
 islands of the Gulf of Siam. I made all necessary preparations, 
 and at the first news of the approach of the rebels we set out. 
 Never, since my arrival from India, had I enjoyed such tranquility 
 as I found in the island where we stayed. We occupied ourselves 
 there solely with our salvation and that of our people, who were 
 perfectly resigned to endure the trials which Divine Providence 
 seemed to have in store. In effect, we soon heard that the king 
 was at not more than half a day's distance, and that the rebels were 
 pursuing him. The king gave battle, which he lost, together with 
 nearly all the naval force which remained to him.^ 
 
 * Lettre de Mgr. d'Adran a MM. du Seminaire des Missions 
 Etrangeres, March 20th, 1785. — It may be well to explain that, 
 by "Cochin-China," the bishop means more particularly the 
 southern portion of the Annamese kingdom. 
 
MGR. PIGNEAU DE BEHAINE. 75 
 
 Seeing all hope of return to Cochin- China cut off 
 by this fresh disaster, the bishop fled with his 
 neophytes to the capital of Siam, where he found 
 means to bestow them in safety ; and seems to have 
 been trying to make his way to Pondichery when he 
 came again in contact with the fugitive prince. 
 Having missed the monsoon, he (the bishop) had, 
 with his followers, been spending some months at the 
 island of Pulo-way ; and at this point we will again 
 take up his narrative : — 
 
 After having repaired our little barque^ we quitted our solitude 
 with the greatest regret, and sailed for Pulo-punjan, with the 
 intention of traversing from that point the Gulf of Siam. Here 
 we met, for the second time, the king of Cochin-China, who told 
 me how he had been carried off to Siam, and dwelt on the duplicity 
 of the Siamese, who, under pretext of replacing him on the throne, 
 had only made use of his name to pillage the people. It was there 
 that he confided to me his son, aged six, whom I have brought 
 hither. 
 
 After describing his voyage, and lauding the devo- 
 tion of his Cochin-Chinese attendants, the bishop 
 continues : — 
 
 Another matter in which I want your help, is to procure the 
 education of the young prince with whom I am charged. I should 
 like, whichever way things may turn, to have him brought up in 
 the Christian religion, and to compensate him for the temporal 
 crown he has lost by the hope of another much more precious and 
 more durable. It is only you who can render me this service. . . . 
 If, eventually, the king should turn to the English or the Dutch, 
 who will not fail to re-establish him in his States, you perceive 
 how useful it will be to have done at least what one could for his 
 child. He is only six years old, and already knows his prayers. 
 He is full of intelligence and of ardour for all that concerns religion. 
 A thing which seems inconceivable to many people is that he 
 
76 FRANCE AND ANN AM. 
 
 should have attached himself to me without regretting his father, 
 mother, grandmother, nurses, and more than five hundred men 
 who all burst into tears when he left them. The Christians 
 attributed it to the special grace of God, and drew from it con- 
 jectures very favourable to our religion. The gentiles, who were 
 less well-informed, said I had bewitched him. The two man- 
 darins, his governors, and six soldiers, who constitute his guard, 
 are already well instructed,, and will be baptized at Pentecost. 
 
 The meeting here described took place in 1784 ; 
 and Mgr. d'Adran is said to have led the fugitive to 
 hope for help from France. However this may be, 
 the answer to the letter we have quoted seems to 
 have been an order to come in person with his 
 pupil to Europe. He obeyed, of course, and we iind 
 them, in 1787, at the Court of Versailles, appealing 
 to Louis XVI. for help to place Nguyen-anh on the 
 throne he had never yet been able to occupy. The 
 thought may suggest itself, that the negotiations 
 which ensued were slightly one-sided : on the one 
 hand a child of eight with his (French) guardian ; 
 on the other, the royal ministers, in a position to 
 exact what terms they chose for their assistance. 
 Such as they were, however, they seem to have 
 marched merrily. The good bishop evidently lost 
 no time, after his arrival, in pressing his views ; and 
 it must be confessed that the following memorandum, 
 in which he embodied them, contains a great deal of 
 worldly wisdom for one who had been so long 
 isolated from the world and devoted to religious 
 pursuits. It is interesting, as showing the spirit 
 of hostility to England in which the negotiations 
 were conducted, and especially interesting at the 
 
SUGGESTS ESTABLISHMENT IN ANN AM. 77 
 
 present moment, when French ambition is again 
 
 striving to create a rival empire in the East.^ 
 
 *'The political scale in India appears so heavily inclined to the 
 side of England that it must seem very difficult to redress the 
 balance. Perhaps an establishment in Cochin-China would be 
 the most certain and efficacious method that could be employed. In 
 effect, if you glance at the productions of Cochin-China and the 
 situation of its ports, it is easy to conceive the great advantage 
 that would arise from establishing ourselves there, both in peace 
 and war. 
 
 1. We may assume that the most certain means of combating 
 the English in Asia is to ruin or weaken their commerce. In 
 time of peace we should much diminish the profit they derive 
 from their trade with China, by carrying it on at less cost and 
 with greater facility than they. 
 
 2. In time of war it would be easy to interdict this commerce 
 to any hostile nation ; for by cruising about the exit from the 
 Straits, or more surely still at the Bocca Tigris which is at the 
 entry of the Canton river, we should be sure of hindering all 
 coming out or going in, whenever we chose. 
 
 3. We should find, in Cochin-China, easy and inexpensive means 
 of repairing and careening ships, and even of building new ones. 
 
 4. We should find everything needed for revictualling our 
 squadron, and supplying other colonies with necessaries. 
 
 * Vide " La Cochin-Chine et le Tonquin," Par Eugene Yeuillot. 
 Paris 1859. M. Yeuillot is frankness itself on this score : ^' La 
 France n'accepte qu'avec peine et provisoirement la suprematie 
 maritime de I'Angleterre. Cepeudant nous venous, dans les mers de 
 rindo-Chine, au sixieme rang — apres le Portugal (Introduction, 
 
 p. iii.) Kous ne sortirons de cette position humiliante que 
 
 le jour on le pavilion fran9ais flottera dans I'Asie orientale sur une 
 
 terre Fran9aise L'empire d'Anam nous est ouvert, et c'est 
 
 la que nous devons nous etablir. [The Indian mutiny was in 
 progress at the time, and M. Veuillot goes on to say, p. xiv.], La 
 France n'a point a craindre un malheur semblable a celui de 
 I'Angleterre, et ne veut point le meriter. Le motif determinant 
 de son enterprise est puisee dans les profondeurs du sentiment 
 general, il est genereux et chretien ! " 
 
78 FRANCE AND ANNAM. 
 
 5. We might, in case of need, find there help in men, troops, 
 seamen, &c. 
 
 6. We should be able easily to check the English in the pro- 
 jects they seem to entertain, of spreading themselves towards the 
 East (s'etendre d la c6te de VEst). 
 
 The force of the bishop's arguments appears to 
 have quickly approved itself to Louis XVI. and his 
 advisers ; for we find his projects exactly embodied 
 in a convention signed at Versailles, on November 
 28th, 1787, by the Comte de Vergennes and the 
 Comte de Montmorin on behalf of the French king, 
 and by the little prince Canh-dzue on behalf of his 
 father. This document is sufficiently curious to 
 deserve full translation, both as an evidence of the 
 political schemes of the day, and because it is fre- 
 quently appealed to by the French as a basis of their 
 rights in Cochin- China. If it is difficult, for out- 
 siders, to regard a treaty composed under such con- 
 ditions as serious, it is evident that the French 
 negotiators were very clearly alive to the advan- 
 tages which might be extracted from it : — 
 
 1. There shall be an offensive and defensive alliance between 
 the two kings of France and Cochin-China ; they shall be bound 
 to lend each other, mutually, succour and assistance against the 
 enemies of one or the other of the contracting parties. 
 
 2. In consequence, there shall be equipped and placed under 
 the orders of the king of Cochin-China, a squadron of twenty 
 French ships of war, of sach a standard as the requirements of 
 his service may exact. 
 
 3. Five European regiments, and two regiments of colonial 
 native troops, shall be embarked without delay for Cochin-China. 
 
 4. His Majesty Louis XYI. undertakes to furnish, within a 
 few months, the sum of one million dollars, of which 500,000 
 
THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES. 79 
 
 shall be in specie, and the rest in saltpetre, cannons, muskets, and 
 other military armament. 
 
 5. From the moment the French troops enter on Cochin- 
 Chinese territory, they and their generals will receive the orders 
 of the king of Cochin-China. 
 
 On the other hand : — 
 
 1. The king of Cochin-China undertakes to furnish, as soon as 
 tranquility shall be restored in his States, and on the simple 
 requisition of the French ambassador, everything necessary in the 
 shape of equipment, rigging, and provisions, to put on the sea 
 without any delay fourteen ships of the line ; and for the perfect 
 execution of this article there shall be sent from Europe a corps 
 of naval officers and warrant officers who shall form a permanent 
 establishment in Cochin-China. 
 
 2. H.M. Louis XVI. shall have resident consuls on all parts of 
 the coast of Cochin-China, wherever he shall judge fit. These 
 consuls shall be authorized to construct, or cause to be constructed, 
 vessels, frigates, and other ships, without interference, on any 
 pretext, from the Government of Cochin-China. 
 
 3. The ambassador of H.M. Louis XVI. at the Court of 
 Cochin-China shall have the right to cut wood for the construc- 
 tion of vessels, frigates, and other ships, in all the forests wherever 
 he may find any suitable. 
 
 4. The king of Cochin-China and his Council shall cede in 
 perpetuity to His Most Christian Majesty, his heirs and successors, 
 the port and territory of Hansan (bay and peninsula of Tourane), 
 and the adjacent islands of Fai-fo on the south and Hai-wen on 
 the north. 
 
 5. The King of Cochin-China engages to furnish the necessary 
 men and materials for the construction of forts, bridges, roads, 
 wells, etc., which shall be considered necessary for the safety and 
 defence of the concessions made to his faithful ally the King of 
 France. 
 
 [Article 6 merely regulates the conditions of government in the 
 ceded districts.] 
 
 7. In case His Most Christian Majesty determine to make war 
 in any part of India, it shall be permitted to the commander-in- 
 chief of the French troops to make a levy of 14,000 men, whom 
 he shall drill in the same manner as in France, and who shall be 
 instructed according to French discipline. 
 
8o FRANCE AND ANNAM, 
 
 8. In case any Powers should attack the French on Cochin- 
 Chinese territory, the King of Cochin-China shall furnish at least 
 60,000 soldiers, whom he will equip and maintain at his cost, etc. 
 
 This remarkable treaty, in which the infant son of 
 a fugitive prince is made to grant such immense con- 
 cessions, has two grave defects. It was never ratified, 
 and never executed. The revolution which broke 
 out in France two years later effaced, for the moment, 
 all thought of such distant projects ; though sufficient 
 help was actually afforded the Cochin- Chinese prince, 
 to give a semblance of justification to the claim that 
 it found practical acceptance. And this brings us to 
 the second phase of Mgr. d' Adran's curious adventure. 
 
 When the bishop — who had been named pleni- 
 potentiary, and charged with the execution of 
 the treaty he had brought about — arrived at 
 Pondichery, he found the governor inclined to look 
 askance at the projects he was desired to forward. 
 M. de Conway had been ordered to provide, as van- 
 guard of the expeditionary force, four frigates, 1600 
 men, and some field artillery. He seems, however, 
 to have hesitated and delayed till the French resi- 
 dents at Pondichery themselves took up the project, 
 and equipped two ships, besides providing arms and 
 ammunition. Certain volunteers accompanied this 
 expedition, and the governor consented, some months 
 later, to place a frigate and several officers at the 
 bishop's disposal. 
 
 Mgr. Pigneau reached Saigon in 1789. Nguyen- 
 anh had been able in the meantime to resrain a 
 footing in that province, but the French contingent 
 
LORD MACARTNEY AT TOURANE. 8i 
 
 — ^however inadequate to carry out the terms of the 
 treaty — was sufficient to give useful help. The 
 French officers set promptly to work to organize an 
 effective force ; helping to cast cannon, build ships, 
 and drill troops with whom the king was able 
 to take the offensive and reduce the whole littoral 
 to submission. Frequent reference is made to the 
 presence of French officers, in the course of the long 
 campaign ; and the fortifications of Hue and Hanoi, 
 the capitals respectively of Annam and Tongking, 
 bear evidence of European design. Curious collateral 
 evidence of the reality of the political position came 
 under the notice of Lord Macartney, during his 
 memorable expedition to China, at this very epoch. 
 The opening up of commercial relations with Cochin- 
 China was, in fact, one of the avowed objects of the 
 mission, in pursuance of which he called at Tourane, 
 in 1792, during his outward voyage. He deferred 
 presentation of his letters, judging it more politic to 
 wait till he had accomplished his primary mission to 
 Peking. He took occasion, however, to deliver his 
 presents, with which the king was much pleased, 
 permitting the English to travel into the country 
 and examine it as much as they desired. Lord 
 Macartney ^ found the district, " with a considerable 
 part of the kingdom of Cochin-China," still in posses- 
 sion of the usurper, whose antagonist (i.e. Nguyen- 
 anh), "the descendant of the former sovereigns of 
 the country, was in possession of some of the southern 
 
 ^ V. " Macartney's Embassy to China." By Sir George Staunton, 
 Bart. Vol. i. p. 328. 
 
 G 
 
S2 FRANCE AND ANN AM. 
 
 districts of the kingdom, and was in daily hope of 
 such succour from Europe as might enable him to 
 recover all the possessions of his ancestors. . . . 
 Some individuals from France " had already joined 
 him, and given hope of further assistance ; of which 
 the party in power at Tourane were fully cognisant, 
 as they at first feared that the English fleet repre- 
 sented the threatened expedition. And a letter to 
 Lord Dundas, then President of the East India 
 Board, gives a curious confirmatory hint of the 
 projects and political motives that were inspiring the 
 French adventure. "They supposed," writes Lord 
 Macartney, "that the quantity of gold extracted 
 from the Cochin-Chinese mountains, and the vast 
 quantity of sugar manufactured in its plains and 
 sold at a price lower than in any other part 
 of the world, would render a settlement in the 
 neighbourhood profitable. But, above all, they con- 
 ceived that, by stationing frigates there on the ap- 
 proach of war, they might easily intercept our ships 
 bound for or returning from Canton." 
 
 It is beyond our purpose to follow the incidents of 
 the civil war, with which we are concerned only so 
 far as it involves the action of Mgr. d'Adran and 
 its consequences. Nguyen-anh's gradual recovery of 
 authority over Saigon and Annam, his conquest of 
 Tongking, his ascent of the throne under the style 
 of Gya-long, and his recognition (in 1804) by 
 China are matters of historical notoriety. The 
 bishop did not live to see the complete triumph 
 oi\i\^ 'protege ^ but he reached the threshold, as it were, 
 
BISHOP PIGNEA US ASCEND ENC V. S3 
 
 of the final scene ; and the occasional glimpses we 
 catch of his career show him in a position of high 
 regard and influence at the Annamese Couii;. It 
 was natural that the services he had rendered should 
 gain for him this place in the king's esteem, and 
 equally natural that it should excite the jealousy and 
 envy of the native mandarins. A letter (May 30th, 
 1795) written by him from Saigon will serve to 
 illustrate both his position and the assaults to which 
 it was obnoxious : — 
 
 Nineteen notables {grands du royaume) joined in representing 
 to the king that prudence forbad my being left any longer charged 
 with the education of the young prince ; that, being a foreigner 
 and of a different religion, it was impossible but that I should 
 imbue him with my principles. They besought his Majesty 
 accordingly to place him in the hands of literati (mandarins lettres), 
 who would give him an education similar to that of his ancestors. 
 The king, indignant, threw the memorial on the ground, recalled 
 all the services which I had rendered to the State, to himself, to 
 his son and his family, and added ; " It is astounding that, after 
 having done so little in recogniton of so many benefits, you should 
 dare to urge me to the most monstrous ingratitude." 
 
 The bishop seems, however, to have deemed it wise 
 to bow to the storm ; and affirms that he not only 
 dissuaded the king from punishing the intriguers, but 
 persuaded him that it would be wiser to let him par- 
 tially efface himself, than to excite the enmity of his 
 Court. Some fear of his Majesty's conversion, if we 
 may trust Mgr. d'Adran's narrative, seems to have 
 been at the bottom of the movement. One of the 
 principal mandarins had shown a strong proclivity 
 towards the new doctrine, and people argued : If so 
 
 G 2 
 
84 FRANCE AND ANNAM. 
 
 able and erudite a man could not hold out against 
 the reasoning of the foreign bishop, how would it be 
 ^with the king and the prince ? 
 
 The influence of the prelate, however, and the 
 intrigues of the mandarins were soon to be terminated 
 by the action of a greater power. Mgr. d'Adran 
 died, four years later, while travelling with his pupil ; 
 and, making all allowance for the enthusiasm of his 
 colleagues, we cannot but infer from the description 
 of his obsequies that it was felt, even at Court, that 
 a great figure had passed away. 
 
 The light of Cochin-China [writes M. Lelabousse] is extin- 
 guished ; the pillar of the kingdom is overthrown ; desolation is 
 everywhere ; mourning is general. Mgr. d'Adran fell ill early in 
 August, in the province of Qui-nhon, whither he had gone with 
 his royal pupil, who never moved without his wise mentor. The 
 king sent his physicians, and employed all possible means to save 
 the life of one who had so often saved his. He even came in 
 person with his son to visit him, and shed many tears on perceiving 
 the uselessness of his endeavours.' 
 
 The bishop died on October 9th, 1799, in his fifty- 
 eighth year, and was buried on December 16th, at a 
 spot of his own selection, in the environs of Saigon, 
 which may still be discovered by the curious visitor. 
 It was, at the period in question, " a pleasant coun- 
 try garden, which he had himself been in the habit of 
 cultivating, some three miles from the town ; " but 
 the garden has disappeared, and the tomb is now 
 smothered amid the brushwood which has overgrown 
 the locality. 
 
 ' Lettres Edifiantes. 
 
 Ax 
 
DEATH OF BISHOP PIGNEAU. 85 
 
 Thither (we are told) the prelate had been in the habit of 
 retiririg from time to time, with his royal pupil, for relaxation 
 from the worry of the Court and the fatigue of study ; thither he 
 went with the missionaries, to refresh them by a little repose from 
 their toil; and there he found a remedy for his own troubles, 
 declaring that he forgot them directly he arrived. 
 
 And there, with almost royal pomp, the king 
 
 caused his remains to be interred. We pass over 
 
 the description of the religious ceremonies with 
 
 which the Roman Church so well knows how to exalt 
 
 the memory of the dead, while appealing to the 
 
 imagination of the living. The reader will easily 
 
 conceive the crowd of converts, the blaze of tapers, 
 
 the display of images, ornaments, and tapestry: it 
 
 is more to our present purpose to describe the An- 
 
 namese share in the procession : — 
 
 All the king's guards, comprising more than 12,000 men, with- 
 out counting those of the prince his son, were under arms and 
 drawn up in two lines, the field guns in front; 120 elephants 
 with their escort and their officers marched on either side. Drums, 
 trumpets, military music, both Cochin-Chinese and Cambodian, 
 fusees, fireworks — nothing was lacking. More than two hundred 
 lanterns of different shapes, besides a prodigious number of torches 
 and tapers, illuminated the mournful procession. At least 40,000 
 people, both Christians and pagans, followed the funeral. The 
 king was there with all the mandarins of the different corps ; and, 
 strange to say, even his mother, his sister, the queen, his concu- 
 bines, his children, all the ladies of the Court considered that, for 
 a man so above the common, everyday customs should be set 
 aside ; all came, and went the whole way to the tomb. 
 
 It would require a literal translation of M. Lela- 
 bousse's letter to enumerate all the marks of esteem 
 and regret which the king showered on the memory 
 of the deceased prelate. The identical flags which 
 
86 FRANCE AND ANNAM. 
 
 his Majesty was in the habit of having carried along- 
 side him in battle were carried alongside the coffin 
 on its way to the grave. A handsome tomb (in 
 native style) was erected to his memory ; and, in 
 pursuance of native custom, the king issued an edict 
 eulogizing his services and his abilities and express- 
 ing sorrow at his loss. 
 
 The young prince with Avhose fortunes he had 
 been so intimately associated survived him only two 
 years, and it is easy to conceive that his death was 
 a severe blow for the Missions. Still, the goodwill 
 which Mgr. d'Adran's services had gained seems to 
 have endured after his death; for though we find 
 occasional complaints of the king's lukewarmness — 
 resulting probably from the fact that he had to con- 
 sider the prejudices of his people, while the mis- 
 sionaries would have liked him to exalt Christianity 
 by edict — we find, also, instances in which he sup- 
 ports them and their cause. An attempt made by 
 Louis XVIII, to revive the dormant treaty of Ver- 
 sailles seems to have alarmed the Court during the 
 closing years of Gya-long's reign, and to this in- 
 troduction of the political spectre the persecution 
 which broke out under his successor may perhaps 
 be traced. 
 
 M. Michel Chaigneau,^ who was born and bred at 
 Hue, tells us how his father was stirred by the ap- 
 pearance, in 1817, of two French ships in the bay. 
 For twenty years the adventurers had been apparently 
 forgotten: Revolution, Republic, and Empire had 
 ^ Souvenirs de Hue. Par Michel Du'c Chaigneau. 
 
DEC A V OF FRENCH INFL UENCE. 87 
 
 come and gone since they had sailed from France : 
 a Bourbon was again on the throne ; and the Due 
 de Richelieu had written, asking M. Chaigneau's 
 opinion as to the best means of developing commerce. 
 The incident seems to have awakened a desire to 
 revisit France, and Chaigneau set sail, with the 
 King's consent, in 1819. But the parting was 
 final: Gya-long died in 1820, and with his death 
 may be said to terminate the first chapter of French 
 intervention in Annam. 
 
 With his death, also, passed away the glamour of 
 the influence which the French, and especially the 
 Missions, had enjoyed as a consequence of Mgr. 
 Pigneau's personal and political prestige. M. Chaig- 
 neau returned the following year, with the rank of 
 consul, and with a number of presents from Louis 
 XVIII. to the reigning king. It would have been 
 better, perhaps, if he had brought nothing more. 
 But he was the bearer also of instructions to conclude 
 a treaty. Gya-long had, as we have seen, died in 
 the interval ; his successor appears to have received 
 the French king's letter and presents with fitting 
 courtesy ; but he declined absolutely to entertain 
 the question of a treaty. It was, he said, useless : 
 his people could not go to France, and the French 
 were already at liberty to come and trade at Tourane 
 like other people. It was a political mistake to 
 press the matter, in presence of these dispositions. 
 Minh-Mang refused altogether to receive a fresh 
 letter brought soon after by Captain Bougainville, 
 who was accredited as envoy to the Annamese 
 
S8 FRANCE AND ANNAM. 
 
 Court ; and MM. Chaigneau and Vannier judged 
 it wise to withdraw, in 1824, from a country where 
 they felt themselves objects of distrust. 
 
 It was not, however, till five years later that the 
 growing dislike of the new king to the foreigners 
 and their converts broke out into open violence. 
 The native Christians were the first to sufifer ; but in 
 1833 the persecution extended to the missionaries 
 also; and from that year to 1840 thirteen French 
 and Spanish priests were executed or died in prison. 
 For a moment then the king seems to have been 
 alarmed at what he had done. His father had re- 
 commended him to diplomatize — to discourage 
 Christianity, but not to persecute; to keep the 
 missionaries at a distance, but not to kill them, as 
 that might lead to French intervention which was 
 to be avoided at all cost. In 1839, accordingly, he 
 sent a mission to France, which Louis Philippe 
 declined to receive ; but the report which the 
 members brought back seems to have convinced him 
 that he had nothing to apprehend. His death, 
 about the time of their return, was followed by 
 renewed persecution under his successor. An 
 opportune visit of a French corvette in 1843 secured 
 the release of five priests who were in imminent 
 danger: a similar visit, next year, procured the 
 surrender of another who was under sentence of 
 death ; and Admiral Lapierre, who visited Tourane 
 in 1847, found occasion to destroy the Annamese 
 fleet by which he believed himself menaced. The 
 persecution continued under Tu-duc, who came to 
 
PERSECUTION. 89 
 
 the throne a year later ; a visit by M. de Montigny, 
 in 1857, only aggravating the evil. These casual 
 visitations, indeed, seem only to have increased the 
 irritation of the Annamese sovereigns against the 
 class to whose presence they attributed the annoy- 
 ance. M. de Montigny had been commissioned to 
 negotiate a treaty, having for its leading features — 
 free exercise of the Catholic religion ; freedom of 
 commerce ; the residence of a consul at the capital, 
 and the cession of Tourane or of a neighbouring 
 island for the establishment of a French factory ; 
 but he found himself unable to open serious negotia- 
 tions. It was soon after his return, re infedd, that the 
 Emperor Napoleon resolved on the expedition under 
 Admiral Rigault de Genouilly, at the close of the 
 China war, which resulted in the acquisition of 
 Saigon and has entailed the annexation of the whole 
 kingdom. 
 
 The circumstances which induced French inter- 
 vention in Tongking,^ and which have led on, step 
 by step, to the annexation of that province and 
 to the declaration of a protectorate over Annam 
 have been described in a previous chapter. The 
 immediate impulse seems to have come from Saigon ; 
 but it will be seen, from the foregoing pages, 
 that it was an impulse in consonance with a policy 
 devised during the last century and that has always 
 had warm supporters in France. 
 
 The Annamese might, possibly, have staved oiF 
 
 * " Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine, 1866-8," par Francis 
 Gamier. 
 
90 FRANCE AND ANNAM. 
 
 their fate by favouring, instead of obstructing, the 
 commercial projects which had fascinated French 
 imagination. But the official and semi-official 
 correspondence which is freely quoted by M. du 
 Caillaud tends to justify the impression that, although 
 Gamier's mission was ostensibly diplomatic, there 
 was a perfect willingness at Saigon to create a 
 " situation " which should lead to more vigorous 
 intervention, and to the acquisition of a permanent 
 foothold on the banks of the river which had become 
 an object of interest. The course of action adopted 
 was, at any rate, eminently calculated to provoke 
 the hostilities which ensued ; for no nation which 
 retained a shred of power or self-respect could 
 tolerate the assumption of superior authority which 
 provoked the mandarins to resistance. 
 
 France was, however, still gasping, after her death- 
 struggle with Germany, and unprepared as yet for 
 the colonial enterprises into which she has subse- 
 quently plunged. The fortresses Gamier had 
 occupied were given up, and the expeditionary 
 troops withdrawn after the Saigon Government had 
 exacted, as the price of evacuation, a treaty which 
 secured, on paper, most of the privileges which it 
 professed itself anxious to acquire. Ports Avere 
 opened, and consuls and customs officers appointed, 
 in 1875, in accordance with the provisions of this 
 document; but no sustained effort appears to 
 have been made to enforce the provisions, regarding 
 the navigation of the Songkoi, which had been 
 the avowed motive of the expedition. Complaints 
 were frequent, however, of piracy, Black Flags 
 
RIVIERE'S EXPEDITION AND DEATH. 91 
 
 and otlier obstacles, for which the Annamese 
 Government was held responsible ; and eventually, 
 in 1882, Commander Riviere was despatched, with a 
 force as inadequate as Garnier's, to insist on, and 
 effect, the suppression of these evils. History re- 
 peated itself. Received with a coolness verging on 
 repulsion, by the officials he came ostensibly to 
 reinforce, Riviere, like Garnier, took umbrage, and 
 took Hanoi, without apparently reflecting that he 
 was thereby justifying the suspicions he depre- 
 cated. Again the remarkable spectacle was seen of 
 a handful of Frenchmen invading the delta ; and 
 again the Annamese appealed to the Black Flags for 
 help. Again these redoubtable auxiliaries advanced ; 
 and again the French, repeating the mistake of rating 
 them at the same value as the Annamese levies, 
 incurred a severe repulse. Riviere was killed, under 
 almost the same circumstances as his predecessor ;, 
 and his death sealed the fate of Tongking. 
 
 France had recovered, by this time, from the 
 exhaustion of her great war, and was ready to 
 approve the cry that Riviere must be avenged and 
 French prestige restored. Saigon urged its favourite 
 idea of political expansion : financiers dwelt on the 
 reports of metallic wealth, of which there had always 
 been a tradition, and which Dupuis' adventure ^ had 
 fostered : credits were voted, and troops sent freely 
 forward. The colonial " idea " burst, in fact, into full 
 bloom. What was to have been merely an avenging 
 
 ^ Dupuis* own narrative of his journey will he found in the 
 Bulkiin de la Soci^te de Qeographie, July and August, 1877. 
 
92 FRANCE AND ANNAM. 
 
 expedition grew into a war of conquest. All pre- 
 tence of merely avenging Riviere's death disappeared. 
 Not only was the annexation of Tongking demanded ; 
 but Annam itself was attacked, on the plea 
 that it was wickedly obstructing execution of the 
 treaty of 1874 — fostering resistance, in other words, 
 to the French invasion. Its capital. Hue, was taken ; 
 a treaty dictated, by which the king recognized 
 the protectorate of France over all his dominions ; 
 and the seal of office, which he and his predecessors 
 had held for centuries as vassals of China, was 
 destroyed. 
 
 The defects of the treaty of 1874 had now been 
 technically cured, but the French were farther 
 than ever from that peaceful and lucrative traffic 
 with Yunnan which had been alleged as the high 
 motive of their policy. China, alarmed at the 
 prospect of a conterminous frontier with a militant 
 and restless power, intervened on behalf of her 
 vassal. Despite the warnings of its Representative 
 at Peking, the French Government had chosen to 
 disregard her protests with a persistence which 
 suggested a very willingness to provoke war; and 
 the presence of Imperial troops in the Annam ese 
 ranks showed that she accepted the challenge. 
 It seemed for a moment that a solution had 
 been reached, under the auspices of M. Bourree, by 
 which China was to retain control over the northern 
 region, abandoning the territory south of the Songkoi 
 to France ; but this settlement was condemned as 
 
NEGOCIATIONS AT TIENTSIN, 93 
 
 inadequate at Paris, and excessive at Peking, and the 
 struggle went on. 
 
 The intervention of the Chinese had been, so far, 
 indirect. Imperial soldiers had been encountered ; 
 but Sontay and Bac-ninh had been avowed as the 
 first stations of Imperial interest : to attack Sontay 
 would be to attack China, and its garrison had 
 been strengthened accordingly. To leave the 
 Chinese in Sontay, however, would be to stultify the 
 rejection of the Bourree convention ; so the French 
 pushed forward to the attack and, after several 
 months of preliminary fighting, succeeded in occupy- 
 ing the disputed posts. 
 
 The Marquis Tseng had, in the meantime, with- 
 drawn from Paris ; but the Grand Secretary, Li 
 Hung-chang, who had shown a wise disinclination to 
 commit his country to war a outrance, consented 
 to re-open negociations which resulted in the 
 signature, at Tientsin, on May 11th, 1884, of a 
 treaty eminently favourable to France, by which 
 China undertook to withdraw from Tongking, 
 to recognize the French treaties with Annam, and 
 to open her adjacent frontier to commerce ; France 
 agreeing, on her side, to hold the frontier inviolate, 
 and to respect the fiction of a Chinese suzerainty. 
 
 The series of mishaps — to use no stronger word — 
 by which, first its representatives in the East, and 
 subsequently the French Cabinet itself contrived to 
 upset this arrangement, form one of the most 
 curious episodes in the diplomatic history of this 
 
94 FRANCE AND ANNAM. 
 
 remarkable campaign. Captain Fournier's presenta- 
 tion of a memorandum to the Chinese plenipotentiary, 
 naming the dates on which he required the several 
 fortresses to be handed over, commenced the difficulty. 
 The Chinese affirm that they protested against the 
 dates named as impracticable, and that Captain 
 Fournier thereupon ran his pen through the con- 
 tested clauses ; while the latter affirms that he did 
 nothing of the kind, and that Li Hung-chang had 
 specifically accepted the dates and stipulations called 
 in question. The correspondence, in which these 
 antagonistic statements were affirmed and denied 
 before the world, must surely be unique in the 
 annals of diplomacy. 
 
 Captain Fournier's view of the case is contained in 
 the following letter to M. Ferry : — 
 
 T affirm, upon my honour, that I neither altered nor cancelled, 
 either by erasures or in any other way, any of the dates and 
 stipulations of the note of May 17th, handed to Li Hung-chang. 
 I affirm that Li Hung-chang expressly told me that the evacuation 
 of the Chinese garrisons would be effected by him within the time 
 fixed in that note. I affirm that it was with his entire assent that 
 I addressed to the President of the Council (M. Ferry) and to 
 General Millot the telegrams inserted in the Yellow-book. I may 
 add that I gave all possible publicity to the agreement concluded 
 in this last interview. I reported it immediately to Admiral 
 Lespes, who had to see the Viceroy on the very next day and 
 converse with him on the same subject. I handed in the telegram 
 sent by me to General Millot in French, at the Chinese telegraph 
 office in Tientsin, where all the officials are the functionaries of the 
 Viceroy's Yamen. An hour afterwards Li Hung-chang had this 
 telegram in his hand, which he could read, and which, like all 
 political telegrams, was transmitted to the Tsung-li Yamen. Such 
 a step taken by the French negotiator ; the Viceroy's silence, after 
 
THE FOURNIER EPISODE. 95 
 
 all the opportunities thus given him of protesting against the 
 telegram which he had in his hands, and which so distinctly- 
 committed him — a telegram which was then published in the 
 Chinese newspapers, and the stipulations and dates of which were 
 publicly read on May 20th before the Chamber of Deputies by the 
 Pre?^ident of the Council — can they leave the slightest doubt as to 
 the perfect certainty on my part, that no misunderstanding could 
 exist between the Viceroy and myself on the questions treated in 
 the note of May 17th ? 
 
 Whereupon Li Hung-chang's Secretaries addressed 
 the following affirmation to the Nortli-China Herald : 
 
 Tientsin, November 24:th, 1884. 
 Sir, — Being informed that Captain Fournier, in a letter that 
 has been made public, denies having made the erasures in the 
 Fournier Memorandum presented to Li Chung-t'ang on the 17th 
 May last, we beg to state that we were present at the interview 
 Captain Fournier had with His Excellency on that day, and we 
 positively declare that we saw with our own eyes Captain Fournier 
 with his own hand make the said erasures and put his initials 
 thereto. — We remain, yours obediently, 
 
 Ma Kien-tschong. 
 
 Lo FONG-LOH. 
 
 "Devant ces suzerainetes la," wrote a witty 
 Frenchman, speaking of Chinese pretensions in 
 Annam, "on salue et on passe." Before con- 
 tradictions such as these, one might exclaim, we can 
 only hold our peace dumfounded. It is clear, at any 
 rate, that the Chinese Minister did not sign the 
 document which Captain Fournier left on his table 
 — mangled or intact as the case may be ; and more 
 careful diplomacy would surely have exacted this 
 precaution before taking action upon it. Colonel 
 Dugenne was, however, sent forward, on the date 
 
96 FRANCE AND ANN AM. 
 
 named, to occupy the city of Langson, not only 
 with a force lamentably insufficient, but with means 
 of interpreting so inadequate that he was unable to 
 translate a letter in which the Chinese commander 
 responded to his summons. The whole embroglio, 
 in fact, from this point becomes simply inconceivable. 
 Colonel Dugenne's instructions were to halt and com- 
 municate with his superiors, if the Chinese showed 
 signs of opposition. He was met, as we have seen, by 
 a letter which, when eventually translated (at Shang- 
 hai !), was found to acknowledge the Tientsin treaty, 
 but to plead that the ^vriter had not yet received 
 instructions to withdraw, to deprecate precipitancy, 
 and to suggest reference to Peking. We can, 
 perhaps, not blame him for ignoring a communica- 
 tion he could not read, though we may stand 
 aghast at the negligence which left him in that pre- 
 dicament. But he was clearly able to communicate 
 in some degree, for he understood that the Chinese 
 commander subsequently asked ten days in which 
 to complete the evacuation ; and yet, in the face 
 of that demand and of his own instructions, he 
 responded by requiring the latter to quit at once, 
 intimating that he would recommence his forward 
 movement in an hour. He did so, was fired on, and 
 forced to retreat with loss. 
 
 These circumstances, which we find admitted 
 in evidence taken before a Committee of the 
 Chamber, and corroborated by Colonel Dugenne's 
 recall, scarcely justified the assumption on which M. 
 Ferry precipitately acted— that there had been 
 
HOSTILITIES RECOMMENCE. 97 
 
 wilful treachery on the part of the Chinese, for which 
 a heavy indemnity should be paid or heavy reprisals 
 inflicted. It is likely that no one regretted, sub- 
 sequently, more deeply than the French Premier, the 
 precipitancy which led to the overthrow of a useful 
 treaty and the commencement of a useless war. It 
 has been suggested, indeed, that there was a willing- 
 ness to keep uj) the quarrel, in order to exact an 
 indemnity, if not to carry out a suggestion made by 
 Riviere, that the three southern provinces of China 
 should be added to Tongking ; but we acquit M. 
 Ferry of any such extravagant design. If it had, 
 at any rate, ever seemed to him practicable, he was 
 soon to realize more clearly the degree of resistance 
 to be expected. 
 
 M. Challemel-Lacour had spoken of China as a 
 quantite negligeable, and the French Government 
 declined even to recognize, as '^ war," the operations 
 which it was about to undertake. It was simply 
 going to punish, and exact an indemnity for, one of 
 those acts of treachery from which it seems to be 
 the destiny of the French so frequently to suffer. 
 Fighting was, however, resumed not only in 
 Tongking but on the China coast. Taking advan- 
 tage of a condition of things which was not " war," 
 Admiral Courbet made his way peacefully past the 
 forts that guard the entrance to the Min ; and 
 then demanded the surrender of a much inferior 
 Chinese squadron that lay in the harbour of Foo- 
 chow. A hopeless resistance simply entailed useless 
 slaughter ; and Paris had news that the first act of 
 
 H 
 
98 FRANCE AND ANNAM. 
 
 retributiou had been accomplished. The blockade of 
 Formosa had less glorious results ; General Liu Min- 
 chiian succeeded, in fact, in repulsing an attack on 
 Kelung : but the blockade was maintained, and 
 might have been kept up till now without affecting 
 the result of the struggle, if French naval superiority 
 had not enabled the Admiral to exert pressure in the 
 north. The Chinese soldiers improved their reputa- 
 tion, too, amid the Highlands of Tongking : it was 
 only after much fighting that General Negrier was 
 able to occupy, on February 13th, 1885, the citadel 
 of Lano;son which would have been surrendered 
 in the previous June, if Colonel Dugenne had had 
 patience to wait a fortnight. That disaster, how- 
 ever, combined with the uneasiness which Admiral 
 Courbet's cruisers were creating in the neighbour- 
 hood of the Yangtze, impelled the Chinese to make 
 peace. It is possible that they might have been less 
 pliant if they had been less hasty, for Langson was 
 recovered, and General Negrier wounded and com- 
 pelled to retreat, on March 28th ; but the Protocol 
 of Paris had been signed in the interval, and China 
 adhered to the agreement. 
 
 The first article of this Convention was in itself an 
 admission that France had gained nothing by the 
 campaign to which M. Ferry had committed her ; for 
 it simply provided for the ratification of the Foumier 
 Convention. 
 
 ** China consents to ratify the Convention of Tientsin of May 
 11th, 1884, and France declares that she has no other end in 
 view than the full and complete execution of that treaty." 
 
BISHOP PIGNEAU'S PROJECT FULFILLED. 99 
 
 Hostilities were to cease at once : the blockade of 
 Formosa was to be raised : Chinese troops were to 
 withdraw within the frontier of Yunnan; and the 
 Annamese kingdom was tacitly surrendered into 
 the hands of France by the recognition of the treaty 
 which had been dictated at Hue. 
 
 The Protocol of Paris was the virtual outcome of 
 Bishop Pigneau's predication. In acquiring the 
 foothold he had indicated, the Republic was really 
 requiring Annam to fulfil the bargain which had 
 been entered into by her fugitive prince, a century 
 previously at Versailles. No one familiar with the 
 far-reaching policy of the Roman Church will fail to 
 apprehend that the Bishop's design was twofold, and 
 that the more intimate purpose was probably not that 
 put most frankly forward. The extension of French 
 influence and French dominion in the East meant 
 the extension of her protectorate over Catholic mis- 
 sions, and increased opportunity for the extension of 
 those missions themselves. What more likely to 
 produce these results than a scheme of military 
 adventure and eventual dominion, eminently con- 
 sonant with French character and aspirations? 
 Political exigencies delayed its execution. The 
 downfall of the monarchy and the Napoleonic wars 
 abruptly broke the threads ; but, even with the 
 accession of Louis XVIII. we see a tentative effort 
 to reknit them ; and the Abbe Hue is at hand to 
 awaken the attention of Napoleon III., when the close 
 of the Anglo-French war with China left a powerful 
 expedition available, in 1858, for driving home the 
 
 H 2 
 
loo FRANCE AND ANNAM. 
 
 wedge which Louis XVI. had pointed. The treaties 
 of Saigon of 1862 and 1874, the treaty of Hue of 
 
 1883, and the treaties with Cambodia in 1663 and 
 
 1884, are the political offspring of the treaty of 
 Versailles in 1787. After the lapse of a century, the 
 dream of the Bishop seems approaching realization. 
 The flag of France has been planted along the whole 
 eastern seaboard of Indo- China, and the foundation 
 of the empire which was to compensate for the loss 
 of India has been laid. 
 
 When the Governor of Saigon seized a pretext 
 to extort from King Norodom, in 1884, a treaty 
 practically handing over Cambodia to French rule, 
 the Saigo7inais took occasion to predict that the 
 whole trans-Gangetic peninsula was destined to come 
 under the protectorate of France. The expression 
 was sweeping, considering that large districts of the 
 peninsula were already owned by England ; but it was 
 well understood that Siam was proximately indicated. 
 Materials for quarrel, when the moment might 
 arrive — in the south, in the shape of two provinces 
 that once belonged to Cambodia, but which have 
 passed under the rule of Siam ; while Dr. Neis was 
 making scientific researches among the Laos tribes in 
 the north — and making treaties with them, it is said, 
 as well, to bring them within the fold of the great 
 protectorate. The very thought of further aggression 
 was of course repudiated at Paris ; but so were, once, 
 the ideas of annexing Tunis and Tongking ; and 
 the Court of Bangkok can hardly be blamed for 
 feeling alarm at the attitude of its new neis^hbour. 
 
EARL Y DESCRIPTION OF TONGKING. loi 
 
 11. 
 
 As we set out on our historical excursion in com- 
 pany with Mgr. Pigneau de Behaine, it may be worth 
 while glancing back at some contemporary and even 
 earlier writings, for a notion what Tongkiag was like 
 before dynastic wars and outside interference,, had, 
 wrecked its prosperity. For Tongking' was VLoi 
 always the terra incognita it had become early in 
 tlie present century. Portuguese, Dutch, and English 
 merchants had factories there during the seventeenth 
 century ; and even after these were abandoned, a 
 desultory commerce appeal^ to have been kept up 
 till towards the close of the eighteenth. It was in 
 1637 the Dutch first landed in the country, and they 
 found the Portuguese already established. The 
 English seem to have arrived nearly about the same 
 period ; and a flourishing foreign settlement is said 
 to have existed, at one period, at Hung-yen, which 
 was then the centre of foreign commerce. We will 
 let Captain Alexander Hamilton,^ " who spent his 
 time from 1688 to 1723 trading and travelling by sea 
 and land," tell the story of their withdrawal : — 
 
 Tonquin is the next place I must steer to, of course, where the 
 English and Dutch both had their factories ; but the English 
 Company's affairs being a little out of order^ they withdrew theirs 
 in 1698; and the Dutch, finding but little advantage by their 
 trade in Tonquin, withdrew theirs about six years after. How- 
 ever, the English had a private trade pretty good till the year 
 
 ^ " A Description of the East Indies." By Captain Alexander 
 Hamilton. Pinkerton's Collection, vol. viii. p. 483. 
 
102 FRANCE AND ANNAM, 
 
 1719, that (s*c) an English ship from Bengal mined it by an act 
 of violence. The ship, being laden and ready to sail, fell down 
 the river to Catcheo, the capital city of Tongking ; and in defiance 
 of the known laws of the country, the supercargo got a Tonquin 
 girl on board, in order to carry her with him ; but her friends, 
 missing her, informed the civil magistrate, who sent to demand 
 her ; but the supercargo would not resign his mistress ; whereupon 
 act&^ o,f ^l^stiJity ensued, and some were killed on both sides, and 
 Capiain Wallace, who commanded the ship, had the fortune to*be 
 ' pjie. '()f 'th^ slain'/ However, the English bravely carried off their 
 prize fbilf I never heard any thing more of the Tonquin trade since. 
 
 The depredators, however, or some others of their 
 countrymen, must have subsequently made their 
 peace, for we learn from Pere Richard,^ who wrote in 
 Paris, in 1778, that English ships still traded to 
 Tongking ; though they were debarred from ascend- 
 ing the river on account of another act of impro- 
 priety. Up to 1730, or thereabouts, they had been 
 allowed to come up to the capital ; but a certain ship 
 was found smuggling some copper, and fought its 
 way out to escape seizure. Trade was thereupon 
 suspended till 1742, when the English again made 
 their peace, though they were excluded from the 
 river. 
 
 As to the articles of which the Tongking trade 
 consisted, we are inclined to again rely on Captain 
 Hamilton, who was evidently a man of much expe- 
 rience : — 
 
 The country is prodigiously fruitful in all things necessary for 
 the conveniency and support of life. They have abundance of 
 raw silk, and manufacture part of it in wrought silks, but none 
 fine. Their baaz is the best, which they generally dye black. It 
 
 ^ Vide Pinkerton, vol. ix. 
 
EESOUjRCES of TONGKING. 103 
 
 wears very long, because it is soft and well spun, and the oftener 
 it is washed, the colour looks brighter, if blacker may be so called. 
 They make bowls, cups, and tables of rattans, and cover them very 
 neatly with lack of various colours, and gild them. They have 
 also some porcelain, but very coarse and ill-painted. And those 
 are the commodities for exportation from Tonquin. 
 
 Earlier, however, than either of these writers, we 
 have an exhaustive paper by one S. Baron,^ who 
 appears to have been born in Tongking, but to have 
 been of English nationality. He bears somewhat 
 similar testimony as to the articles of export, among 
 which silk was evidently the most important ; but 
 adds a remark discouraging to those who lay stress 
 on the metallic wealth of the country : — 
 
 Neither have they any gold but what comes from China. Their 
 silver is brought in by English, Dutch, and Chinese trading to 
 Japan. They have iron and lead mines, which afford them just 
 enough of those minerals to serve their occasions. 
 
 He is contradicted, however, on this point by 
 Richard, who declares that gold is found in the sands 
 of the rivers and the clefts of the rocks, adding 
 that there are, besides, (gold) mines which are 
 worked by the Chinese, while the natives them- 
 selves work mines of copper, iron, and lead. 
 
 Baron, who wrote about 1685, seems to have been 
 unsuccessful in his trade, and a little put out with 
 Tongking: a prince by whom he had got himself 
 adopted, went mad on the death of his grandfather, 
 ^' which was," he says, " the overthrow of my busi- 
 
 * " A Description of the Kingdom of Tonqueen." By S. Baron, 
 a native thereof. Churchill's Collection, vol. vi. 
 
I04 FRANCE AND ANNAM, 
 
 ness, by incapacitating him to protect me in my 
 greatest trouble and necessity." His description of 
 the country, government, institutions, etc., is, how- 
 ever, exhaustive ; and the following paragraph has 
 especial interest : — 
 
 Though the Chova (Regent) values foreign trade so little, yet he 
 receives from it, embarrassed as it is, considerable annual income 
 into his coffers, as taxes, head-money, impositions, customs, etc. 
 But though these amount to vast sums, yet very little remains in 
 the treasury, by reason of the great army he maintains, together 
 with several other unnecessary expenses. In fine, it is pity so 
 many conveniences and opportunities to make the kingdom 
 flourishing should be neglected ; for if we consider how this 
 kingdom borders on two of the richest provinces of China, it will 
 appear that, with small difficulty, most commodities of that vast 
 empire might be drawn hither ; and great store of Indian and 
 European commodities, especially woollen manufactures might be 
 vended there. Nay, would they permit strangers the freedom 
 of this inland trade, it would be vastly advantageous to the 
 kingdom ; but the Chova (jealous that Europeans should discover 
 too much of his frontiers, by which certainly he can receive no 
 injury) has, and will probably in all times to come, impede this 
 important affair. 
 
 Richard's remarks on the same subject bear a 
 suspicious resemblance to Baron's, whose paper he 
 evidently had before him when ^vriting his own. 
 He, too, opines that a considerable trade would be 
 possible if greater facilities were allowed. " But the 
 administration has not yet opened its eyes to these 
 sources of public prosperity; they keep in a false 
 dread of revolutions and invasions from foreign 
 forces which they fear the pretence of commerce 
 might favour " : — a remark which has a curious 
 significance at a moment when this "pretence of 
 
RESOURCES OF TO NG KING. 
 
 IC5 
 
 commerce " has led to the very real invasion of the 
 French. 
 
 Rumours of mineral wealth always possess a 
 strange fascination. Pere Regis once wrote of a hill 
 of j)ure silver in Korea ; and a tale that Korean 
 kings were once buried in golden coffins led, not 
 many years ago, to a filibustering expedition to rifle 
 the graves. Korea proved, however, to be a very 
 ordinary country indeed when foreigners gained 
 access to it ; and it seems probable that the French 
 will have a like experience in Tongking. Mineral 
 wealth figured largely in the pictures of rich 
 resources and abundant trade which they were 
 told would become theirs when Annamese obstruc- 
 tion had been put doAvn. A commission appointed 
 to investigate the question under the presidency of 
 the Inspector- General of Mines reached, however, a 
 more qualified conclusion. The presence of gold and 
 silver is indicated in Thai-nguyen, gold and tin in 
 Cao-binh, and copper in Tuyen-kwan and Hung-hoa. 
 Official exploration was, however, advised, to gather 
 more precise information ; the chief sources, at pre- 
 sent, being Annamese documents and common re- 
 port. Only " with regard to the coal measures on 
 the coast of Tongking and the adjacent islands," was 
 it admitted that information and investigation were 
 sufficiently advanced for work to be commenced at 
 once.^ Nor did the very thorough inquiries under- 
 
 ^ A Company has been formed in Hong-Kong to work these 
 mines, mainly with British capital, under the title "SocieteFrancaise 
 des Charbonnages du Tongking," with a capital of 4,000,000 frs. 
 
io6 FRANCE AND ANNAM. 
 
 taken by Mr. Colquhoun, on the spot, lead him to 
 much more halcyon conclusions. The " wealth," it 
 will be remembered, lay in two directions : it 
 awaited development in Tongking itself, and it was 
 to be drawn down the valley of the Songkoi from 
 Yunnan. Here are Mr. Colquhoun's ^ conclusions on 
 both heads : — 
 
 The principal source of Yunnan wealth is mineral ; but China 
 must effectively open the Songkoi, and allow the mines to be 
 worked, before any great afflux can come from this source. Most 
 of the mines are far removed from the Songkoi, and the river is 
 not navigable to a degree which can create any great carrying 
 trade. For that purpose, according to the French themselves, a 
 railway is needed. Finally, what is urged in regard to the mines 
 of Tonquin — namely, the fact that mines far removed from the 
 scene of industries do not pay — must be borne in mind . . . 
 
 The (Hongay) coal might perhaps compete with the Australia, 
 China, and Japan coal, sold at Hong-Kong ; analysis has shown 
 its quality to be excellent. Iron, lead, zinc, tin, and gold, exist 
 in different parts — mainly in the Songkoi basin — but whether it 
 will pay to exploit them, I cannot offer any opinion. 
 
 In regard to the agricultural resources of the 
 country, he speaks with greater confidence. The 
 principal staple is rice, of which there are two crops 
 annually ; other products being the castor-oil plant, 
 mulberry, cotton, sugar-cane, plantain, and sweet 
 potato ; silk is largely produced, but the quality is 
 poor ; the tobacco is condemned as insipid ; in- 
 Further considerable sums have been sunk. Large quantities of 
 coal appear to be in view, but it has not yet been made available in 
 marketable quantities, although shareholders are assured that they 
 are on the verge of success. 
 
 " The Truth about Tongking " (Correspondence of the Times). 
 By Arch. R, Colquhoun, London, 1884. 
 
FRENCH PROTECTIVE TARIFF. icy 
 
 ferior indigo and false gambier are also produced. 
 Little tea is grown ; but in Laos, bordering on 
 Yunnan, a fine quality known in China as PuerH tea 
 is produced, and the French hope to divert the ex- 
 port to Tongking — an expectation in which, however, 
 Mr. Colquhoun appears to doubt their success, unless 
 they make a rail along the whole course of the 
 Songkoi — the very river whose alleged value as a 
 waterway was the alleged motive of the campaign. 
 
 More significant, however, than even the doubts 
 thrown on the truth of the prospectus by which 
 France was persuaded to plunge into the Indo- 
 Chinese adventure, was the small share she had 
 succeeded in acquiring, of the trade that had 
 actually been done since she acquired a footing 
 in the country by the treaties of 1874. Taking 
 the year 1880 as a fair instance — before com- 
 merce had been disturbed by the recent invasion, 
 — Mr. Colquhoun pointed out that 97^ per cent, 
 of the imports into Tongking came from Hong- 
 Kong, and only \ per cent, from Saigon ; while 79 
 per cent, of the exports also went to the British 
 colony, and only 16 per cent, to Saigon. And resort 
 would, he predicted, be had to protection, in the 
 endeavour to reverse all this, directly the French 
 deemed themselves in a position to act. The pre- 
 diction was promptly verified. Early in 1884, the 
 Saigon Government was requested to submit to the 
 Colonial Council a Customs tariff whose operation, it 
 was intended, should embrace Annam and Tongking. 
 Saigon had been free, so far, from Customs dues. 
 
io8 FRANCE AND ANNAM. 
 
 A restrictive policy was tried when the colony was 
 first organized, but it was found so absolutely pro- 
 hibitive of progress that more liberal principles were 
 adopted, and the field thrown open to foreign enter- 
 prise which had built up what trade the port enjoyed. 
 With the exception of an export duty on rice, the 
 Colonial Budget depended on internal and direct 
 taxation, such as on land, licenses, and excise ; and 
 the colonists were able to plead that, under this 
 system, the finances had flourished, and a surplus of 
 $400,000 had been accumulated against accident or 
 emergency. 
 
 Their idea had been that the acquisition of 
 Tongking would mean the aggrandizement of 
 Saigon, that absorption of Annam meant a con- 
 solidated Indo-Chinese Empire, of which Cochin- 
 China would be the metropolitan province and 
 Saigon the capital. When it became apparent that 
 there was no likelihood of its enjoying this access of 
 dignity and advantage, but that Saigon was simply 
 asked to sacrifice its free trade in the interests of 
 symmetry and of French manufacturers, consider- 
 able opposition was manifested. The official pro- 
 gramme was, of course, adopted; but not before 
 the opposing views had been expressed with 
 much force and clearness. The determining mo- 
 tive, however, it was explained, was the necessity 
 for protecting French industry. The confession was 
 humiliating, but it had to be made : " French 
 industry required to be protected against its foreign 
 rivals. In Saigon, as elsewhere, English and German 
 
PROTECTIVE TARIFF. 109 
 
 products were taking the place of French products : 
 without protection French industry was conquered 
 beforehand ; and that was why, appeaUng to the 
 patriotism of Cochin- China, a sacrifice was asked 
 from it, in order to help national industry and enable 
 it to fight with equal weapons— at least in colonies 
 acquired by French blood and treasure — against 
 foreign industry." ^ It is difficult to appreciate the 
 precise nature of the " equality " indicated : the 
 idea would rather seem to be, to pit Frenchmen at 
 scratch weights against foreigners with a heavy 
 handicap. But the motive at any rate is clear 
 enough, and it is needless to add that a consenting 
 majority acquiesced in the Government scheme. 
 
 Having small belief in the efficacy of such attempts 
 to help, by legislation, national industries that were 
 unable to help themselves, British merchants con- 
 nected with the East predicted that the measures 
 resorted to were more likely to strangle what trade 
 existed than to divert it into French channels. " Trade 
 flows, they argue, between Hongkong and Tong- 
 king, because that is its natural course ; because the 
 articles required by Tongking are of Chinese pro- 
 duction and come from Hong Kong, or of English 
 production and stored in Hong Kong ; and the pro- 
 hibitive measures resorted to — instead of substituting: 
 
 ^ The Journal Officiel de la Cochin- Chine Fran^aise of 
 November 3rd, 1884, contained a full report of a meeting of the 
 Colonial Council at which the subject was debated. The tariff 
 adopted, under pressure from Paris, imposed duties varying from 
 5 to 10 per cent., with a deduction not yet fixed, but indicated 
 at from 50 to 70 per cent., in favour of French products. 
 
no 
 
 FRANCE AND ANNAM, 
 
 Saigon for Hong Kong as the commercial entrepot of 
 Cochin-China, or substituting French for English 
 products in the Indo-Chinese market — are more 
 likely to strangle what trade exists, and hinder the 
 development which is looked forward to on the 
 restoration of order." ^ 
 
 Judging, then, from the past, the prospect that 
 France will get an adequate return for the blood and 
 treasure she has expended do not seem brilliant. 
 Military gratification she may find, and the satisfac- 
 tion of possessing in the Far East a great territory, 
 with prospects and possibilities of further extension. 
 The interests will be served, too, of that propaganda 
 whose spokesman Mgr. d'Adran constituted himself 
 when putting forward his notable project, and whose 
 views we have seen Mgr. Freppel defending, when 
 supporting at the Tribune the policy of colonial 
 extension. But of actual substantial recompense, in 
 the sense in which Englishmen are apt to interpret 
 the word, experience teaches us to be less hopeful. 
 France seems to have lost — if we are to take the 
 instance of Canada as proving that she once possessed 
 — ^the knack of colonizing. She raises her flag in 
 the hope that trade will follow, but it does not. 
 That the delta of Tongking is fertile and may pro- 
 vide valuable material for export is certain, as it is 
 that a certain amount of foreign goods would find 
 their way into consumption under a settled and 
 liberal regime. But experience tends to show that 
 merchants other than French would be the principal 
 
 * Vide London and China Express, December 22nd, 1884. 
 
FliOSFECTS OF TRADE. iii 
 
 instruments of that trade, if it were left unhampered, 
 while the trade itself will be choked by the protective 
 measures contemplated. Saigon is a capable colony, 
 but what commerce exists is carried on chiefly by 
 English, German, and Chinese -(irms : it is a 
 Frenchman who once remarked that there are, there, 
 so many officials governing each other ! Nor is 
 there reason to anticipate that things will eventuate 
 much otherwise in Tongking. Of the mines, on 
 which so much stress has been laid by advocates of 
 annexation, it would be premature to say more than 
 that the existence of metals seems clearly indicated, 
 but the possibility of exploiting them profitably is a 
 problem as yet unsolved. There remain, of course, 
 the elastic possibilities of commerce with China, 
 which suggested themselves to Baron two hundred 
 years ago, and which form a prominent feature in 
 the French programme of to-day. That such com- 
 merce has existed in a certain measure is certain, 
 and that it may be considerably augmented, Dupuis' 
 experience would seem to show ; though the singular 
 conditions of his adventure forbid us to accept 
 it as precisely indicative of what might be 
 expected from sober commercial enterprise. The 
 Songkoi is no doubt a valuable stream ; but its 
 capacity as a water-way seems to have been exag- 
 gerated in the minds of those who first indicated the 
 possibility of tapping South-western China by this 
 route. It is certainly navigable for some distance — 
 as far, according to Mr. Colquhoun, as Konence, — 
 for steamers of light draught ; but its upper waters 
 
112 FRANCE AND AN NAM. 
 
 " are impeded by sandbanks, rocks, and rapids," and 
 are " impracticable from November to March, except 
 for boats under four tons;" while above Laokai 
 (near the Chinese frontier) the river " is useless for 
 trade." 
 
 Annam proper seems to be comparatively poor 
 and thinly populated ; but we have the testimony of 
 earlv visitors that Tonorkino; was once a flourishino: 
 and populous kingdom. Populous it still is, if the 
 estimate of 10,000,000 may be taken as approxi- 
 mately correct. Flourishing it may again become, 
 if order and good government are restored to it 
 under French auspices. But there is reason to 
 apprehend that the very measures which are being 
 taken to favour French trade will tend rather to 
 hinder commercial progress. 
 
 III. 
 
 The protocol of Paris was followed (June, 1885) 
 by a formal treaty, in which China recognized all 
 the treaties concluded between France and Annam ; 
 agreed to join in delimiting the boundaries between 
 Tongking and Chinese territory, and to permit trade 
 across the frontier. Both powers promised to respect 
 these frontiers, and to do their best to suppress the 
 prevalent laAvlessness and brigandage on either side. 
 Subsequent conventions defined the terms on which 
 trade should be canned on, and named Meng-tse in 
 
TRADE ON THE SONG KOI. 113 
 
 the province of Yunnan, and Lungchow in tlie pro- 
 vince of Kwangse, as the stations through which it 
 should pass : China was to post Customs' officers 
 there, and France to appoint Consuls. The de- 
 limitation was accomplished, and Custom houses 
 were opened in 1888. The latest reports of the 
 officers in charge will indicate the degree of success 
 that has attended the project of tapping the trade 
 of Western China by this route. There passed 
 through the station of Mengtze, in 1892, imports to 
 the value of about 290,000L (H.Tls. 1,149,000), and 
 exports to the value of about 185,000Z. (H.Tls. 
 786,865). The figures are not enormous, but neither 
 are they contemptible. It should be noted, more- 
 over, that they show a tendency to steadily increase. 
 Each year's total has been greater than the last, and 
 the foreign goods imported make their way, each 
 year, further into the interior. It has been suggested 
 that a lowering of the dues and the introduction 
 of steam on the West River, which drains this 
 region towards Canton, would prove that a portion 
 of the trade which finds its way up the Songkoi is 
 really diverted from the Si-kiang. But we have to 
 deal only with the present situation. The poirr- 
 parlers that have been going on with a view of 
 inducing China to open up that channel of trade have 
 not yet reached an issue ; and trade may prove, after 
 all, to prefer the Songkoi route. That merchandise 
 to the value of nearly half a million sterling should 
 find its way between Tongking and Yunnan by this 
 channel shows that the glowing prophecies by which 
 
 I 
 
114 FRANCE AND ANN AM, 
 
 France was led into the adventure were not baseless ; 
 but it proves, also, that they were very highly coloured, 
 for the amount is certainly not commensurate with 
 the language held, nor with the magnitude of the 
 efforts involved. Still less do French manufacturers 
 appear to have profited by the opportunity ; for 
 more than half (in value) of the entire import trade 
 consisted of Indian yarn, which was almost exactly 
 paid for by the export of 2000 tons of Yunnan tin ; 
 while the Commissioner's remark that " no steamers 
 reached Laokai during the season of high water," 
 seems to verify Mr. Colquhoun's estimate of the 
 navigable capacity of the river. 
 
 We have been dealing, so far, with the trade 
 route to Yunnan. But an opening had also been 
 stipulated for, into Kwangse, by way of the famous 
 city where Colonel Dugenne experienced his defeat, 
 and from which even General Negrier was subse- 
 quently compelled to retreat. We have noted Mr. 
 Colquhoun's impression that a railway is needed, even 
 along the valley of the Songkoi. The need was 
 quickly recognized as urgent, if anything were to be 
 made of the route via Lungchow ; and a railway 
 was begun, two years ago, to facilitate transport by 
 this route. The total length was to be seventy 
 miles. The section from Phulang-Thuong to Bade 
 was to have been completed in April, 1892, and the 
 remainder in July, 1893. As a matter of fact, 
 however, twenty miles only were opened last De- 
 cember. Some work has been done on the remain- 
 ing fiftv ; but " no one," the Commissioner remarks 
 
TRADE VIA LANG SON. 115 
 
 "is willing to predict when the line will reach 
 Langson." The total value of the trade which 
 passed along this route last year, in the meantime, 
 was 9000Z. ! 
 
 It would be incorrect, probably, to infer that the 
 figures quoted represent the total trade between 
 China and Tongking ; because some merchandise, no 
 doubt, finds its way along other than the regular 
 roads. But they suffice to afford an estimate of the 
 real value of the waterway which de Carne urged 
 his countrymen to acquire at all hazards, and at the 
 sacrifice of all scruple. 
 
 A word may be added as to the degree of 
 success the French have attained in pacifying the 
 country. It must be remembered that the incapacity 
 and misgovernment of the Annamese officials and the 
 insecurity of the waterways were the alleged excuses 
 for intervention, at first, and for occupying the country 
 in the long run. These were the pleas put forward 
 by Garnier when he " placed himself alongside " the 
 Annamese mandarins in 1874. They were the pleas 
 alleged in justification of Riviere's expedition, and 
 the eventual annexation of the province in 1884. 
 It is perhaps scarcely surprising that, for a long 
 time after that event, " anarchy " again " reigned 
 supreme," as it did after Garnier's meteoric intru- 
 sion, but the French have had time now to prove 
 the superior efficiency of their administration. Yet 
 H.B.M.'s Consul at Saigon remarks, in his report on 
 the trade of Indo- China for 1892, that "the almost 
 daily reports of collisions in the interior [of Tong- 
 
 I 2 
 
ii6 FRANCE AND ANN AM, 
 
 king] and the recent attack upon the Hongay 
 coal mines point to a state of great insecurity.'* 
 The remark is borne out by the language of the 
 local press. The frequency with which we hear of 
 piratical outrages and of punitive military expe- 
 ditions seem, in fact, to forbid the inference that 
 the French have, as yet, been much more successful 
 than the Mandarins who had control at the time of 
 Dupuis' expedition. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES^ 
 
 The prominence which has been given, by recent 
 events, to the question of Chinese suzerainty over 
 Annam, suggests a brief inquiry into the relations 
 subsisting between the Great Empire and its neigh- 
 bours. What is the real position in which the Em- 
 peror stands towards these so-called tributary states, 
 and what the actual political value of the tribute he 
 claims to receive ? The case of Lord Macartney, who 
 travelled through the whole length of the Empire, in 
 happy ignorance that the words "Tribute-bearer" 
 were inscribed on the flags floating above his barge, 
 at once suggests itself in point. The idea seems 
 ridiculous in our eyes ; but it would probably have, 
 seemed equally ridiculous to a Chinaman, at that 
 time, that a foreign emissary should dream of ap- 
 proaching the Emperor in any other capacity : the 
 very term " Solitary Man," which is one of his 
 alternative titles, precludes the idea of his being 
 approached as an equal. 
 
 It would be a mistake, therefore, to ridicule the 
 pretensions of China to suzerainty in Eastern Asia 
 
 * The National Review^ June, 1884. 
 
ii8 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES. 
 
 because she made the mistake, at first, of including 
 Western nations in the same category as her neigh- 
 bours. The argument would probably be more 
 correct, that she made that mistake because her 
 superiority over the countries with which she was 
 acquainted was so manifest, that she conceived she 
 was equally superior to the rest of the world. China 
 was the " middle kingdom," surrounded by barbarian 
 States permitted to exist by Imperial favour and to 
 bask occasionally, in the persons of their envoys, in 
 the sunshine of the Imperial presence. " As high as 
 the heavens are above the earth," lately wrote an 
 American naval officer, who had come much in con- 
 tact with Chinese officials, "so high is his (the 
 Chinaman's) conceit ; as deep as the waters of the sea 
 is the measure of his contempt for the outside bar- 
 barian." And no doubt this is, in a measure, still 
 true. In spite of all that has passed, national vanity 
 and contempt for foreigners hold their o^vn in the 
 mind of the great mass of the literati. Statesmen 
 who have come much in contact with our representa- 
 tives, and have seen evidences of our civilization and 
 power, know better. Such men as Li Hung-chang, 
 the great minister whose name figures prominently 
 in every phase of Chinese politics, appreciate the 
 real position of affairs ; and — more or less, in pro- 
 portion to their greater or less experience or ignor- 
 ance — the idea of superiority is fading from the 
 minds of his colleagues. 
 
 It was otherwise at the time of Lord Macartney's 
 visit. From a Chinese point of view, all presents 
 
CHINESE IDEAS OF TEIBUTE. 119 
 
 oifered to the Emperor then were "tribute"; and 
 we were set down as tributary accordingly, and en- 
 rolled as such, together with Portugal, Holland, and 
 the Pope, in the pages of the Ta-tsing Hwei-Tien (an 
 elaborate work^ on Chinese constitutional law and 
 polity), where the arrival and departure of our 
 ambassador, his interviews, and his presents, find 
 faithful record. It is noteworthy, however, that the 
 last edition of this work issued was in 1820 ; and it 
 is scarcely to be supposed that the Imperial Cabinet 
 would take its stand, to-day, by the list of " tribu- 
 taries " there published. Many things have happened 
 since then, and it is likely the next editor will see 
 reason to make many alterations. There exists, 
 moreover, even in the Chinese mind, a subtle dis- 
 tinction between tribute and tribute. Everything 
 presented to the Emperor is presumed to be offered 
 by inferiors to a superior ; but it may be merely a 
 complimentary offering of the products of the country, 
 or it may be an obligatory tender of articles definitely 
 prescribed. Lord Macartney's embassy may be taken 
 as an illustration of one extreme ; the annual Corean 
 embassies to Peking as an illustration of the other. 
 
 Quite apart, however, from any fanciful assump- 
 tion, there exists a real preponderance and political 
 superiority on the part of China, over her immediate 
 neighbours, which it would be a mistake to ignore, 
 
 ^ The China Review of October, 1883, contains an interesting 
 paper by Mr. G. Jamieson, of H.M.'s Consular Service, founded 
 on this work, from which Mr. Jamieson translates many curious 
 records of tribute sent and " tributary" visits paid. 
 
I20 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES. 
 
 because, in her ignorance and conceit, she has been 
 guilty of wild exaggeration. Corea, Nepaul, Burmah, 
 Annam, and the Liuchius, are distinctly tributary 
 States ; Thibet is a dependency, Tartary a portion of 
 the empire ; and, as already suggested, the very 
 existence of this coruscation of satellites was calcu- 
 lated to foster the dream of universal superiority 
 from which she has had to be rudely awakened. The 
 degree of dependence of these several States varies, 
 no doubt, in proportion to their importance and their 
 distance from their giant neighbour ; but all are more 
 or less under the glamour of her influence. Corea is 
 the most dependent ; Burmah the least so ; but even 
 of Burmah it may be affirmed that the Chinese 
 Governor-General of Yunnan was, at any rate till 
 within the last few years, regarded as a greater 
 magnate than the Viceroy of British India — a Power 
 which had reft away half the country, and which 
 held the rest in the hollow of its hand. 
 
 Recognition of the tributary status is shown 
 by the payment of tribute, by the form of 
 address (as from an inferior to a superior) and by 
 acceptance of the Chinese Calendar ; the more inti- 
 mate dependents also receive investiture and a seal 
 of office at the hands of a Chinese delegate ; while in 
 the case of the less intimate the ceremony is per- 
 formed under the authority of letters patent. The 
 nature of the tribute is fixed, as well as the times of 
 despatch, and the route by which it shall be sent. 
 The envoys of Corea come direct to Peking ; those of 
 Nepaul, by way of Chentu, the capital of Szechuen ; 
 
PRESCRIBED FORMS OF TRIBUTE. 121 
 
 those of Burmah, by way of Yunnan-foo, the capital 
 of Yunnan ; those of Annam, by way of Kwei-lin, 
 the capital of Kwangsi ; those of Liuchiu, by way of 
 Foochow, the capital of Fohkien. And the governors- 
 general of these several provinces are charged, 
 respectively, with the conduct of all matters soever 
 relating to each particular State. Corea sends tribute 
 every year ; Nepaul once in ^Ye ; Burmah once in 
 ten; Annam once in four; Liuchiu once in two. 
 The character and amount of the presents are defined, 
 and it is exacted that the accompanying letters shall 
 be in the so-called "petitionary" form used by 
 Chinese officials in addressing the Throne. Thus we 
 find the Emperor Kanghi minuting with his own 
 hand, on a letter from the King of Corea : "It lacks 
 respect ; let the Board of Rites examine and report ; " 
 — and the King was condemned to a fine of 10,000 
 ounces of silver, and to lose, during three years, the 
 presents made by the Emperor in return for the 
 annual tribute. While, on an occasion during the 
 reign of Kienlung, when the tribute sent from Annam 
 did not correspond with the amount which it was 
 then customary to pay, the whole was sent back 
 with orders that the mistake should at once be cor- 
 rected. The acceptance of the Calendar, again, is 
 one of those formulas which, in the East, have a 
 meaning that seems extravagant to our ideas, but 
 which cannot be disregarded with safety in inter- 
 course with Asiatic sovereigns. The compilation of 
 the Calendar is, in China, exclusively an imperial 
 privilege, and every year it is formally promulgated 
 
122 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES, 
 
 and disseminated through the Empire. To receive 
 it is to admit oneself subject and tributary ; to refuse 
 it is to place oneself in open insurrection. 
 
 Such appear to be the outward and visible signs 
 of respect which China expects from her so-called 
 tributaries ; and it must be admitted that there is, 
 in all this, something very different from the mere 
 assumption of national vanity. Beyond, however, 
 requiring the fulfilment of these conditions, she really 
 interferes very little in their affairs, unless in case of 
 invasion, or of some serious internal trouble where 
 her help is sought or her own interests appear to be 
 threatened. A brief glance at her historical rela- 
 tions with the several States on the list will serve to 
 explain more clearly their several positions. 
 
 CoREA. — The vassalage of Corea appears to date 
 almost from the dawn of its history as a homogeneous 
 kingdom. The first monarch who established an 
 ascendency over the whole country recognized the 
 overlordship of the Chinese Emperor, to whose help 
 he had been largely indebted; and his successors 
 have clung faithfully to the fortunes of their suzerains. 
 Each change of dynasty in China has found the 
 Corean ruler involved in the defeat of the falling 
 house. When the Mings succeeded, at the close of 
 the fourteenth century, in overthrowing the Mongol 
 power, the reigning dynasty in Corea shared its down- 
 fall ; and, similarly, we find Corea siding with the 
 Mings in the war which resulted in the overthrow 
 and supersession of the latter by the Manchus. A 
 Manchu army then invaded the country, and dictated 
 
CORE A, 123 
 
 at the capital, in 1637, the treaty which continues to 
 the present day to govern its relations with Peking. 
 Under it, the king has to ask and accept investiture 
 at the hands of a Chinese mandarin specially dele- 
 gated for the purpose, whom he goes out of the city 
 to meet on his arrival, and whom he receives and 
 lodges with every mark of respect. He has to send 
 a yearly embassy to Peking, with certain specified 
 articles of tribute,^ and receives certain customary 
 presents in return. 
 
 Nor, on the other hand, has China been remiss 
 when grave crises in Corean history have called for 
 her intervention. At the time of Taiko-Sama's great 
 invasion, in 1592, we find her exerting her whole 
 might in favour of her dependent. Quite lately she 
 has virtually imposed, by her influence, terms of 
 intercourse with foreign powers ; and, on the occur- 
 rence of an emeute and coup d'etat caused by this 
 violent change in the national policy, she sent 
 soldiers to the capital, restored order, and carried off 
 to China the father of the king, who was the leader 
 of the revolt. Of course, it may be said she acted in 
 her own interest, and in pursuance of her own 
 policy : the Japanese invasion was directed beyond 
 
 ^ The following is a list of the Corean tribute : — 100 oz. of gold, 
 1000 oz. of silver, 10,000 bags of rice, 2000 pieces of silk, 300 
 pieces of flax cloth, 10,000 pieces of common cloth, 400 pieces of 
 hemp cloth, 100 pieces of fine hemp cloth, 1000 rolls of large 
 paper, 1000 rolls of small paper, 2000 knives, 1000 buffalo-horns, 
 40 painted mats, 200 lbs. of dye-wood, 10 bushels of pepper, 100 
 tiger-skins, 100 deer-skins, 400 beaver-skins, 200 blue squirrel- 
 skins. 
 
124 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES. 
 
 Corea, against China; and the foreign treaties are 
 designed to safeguard Corea, as an outlying bulwark 
 of China, against Russia. But, as was shown 
 lately in the case of Tongking, their capacity to act 
 as buffers in warding off hostile contact is, in the 
 eyes of China, not the least useful function of the 
 petty States which surround her. 
 
 In the case of none other, however, is her authority 
 so directly exercised as in that of Corea. Of the 
 extent to which it stretches, and the minutiaB to 
 which it descends, an appeal from a Corean king (in 
 1694) for permission to change his queen may be 
 quoted as an amusing instance. Childless for a 
 number of years he had, he writes, at length a son 
 by a concubine. 
 
 His birth caused me incredible joy. I at once took for queen 
 the mother who bore him ; but I made herein a mistake which 
 has caused many suspicions. I compelled Queen Min-chi, my 
 wife, to withdraw into a private house, and I made Chang-chi 
 Queen in her stead. Now, I reflect that Min-chi has received the 
 patent of rank from your Majesty^ that she has ruled my house, 
 has assisted me in the sacrifices, has served both my grandmother 
 and my mother, and wore mourning for three years for them 
 with me. According to the laws of nature and justice I ought to 
 have treated her with honour, but I allowed myself to be carried 
 away in my imprudence. After the thing was done I regretted 
 it extremely. Now, in order to conform to the wishes of the 
 people of my kingdom, I desire to restore to Min-chi the dignity 
 of Queen, and to replace Chang-chi in the rank of concubine. 
 Thus the government of the family will be in order, and the 
 foundation of good morals and the welfare of the State will be 
 rectified. 
 
 His Majesty goes on to apologize, on these grounds, 
 for venturing to trouble the Emperor several times 
 
NEPAUL. 125 
 
 about such a matter, and ends by begging a consent 
 which it is gratifying to know was accorded ; dele- 
 gates were sent to re-crown Ming-chi, with presents 
 of splendid robes and all due formalities.^ It will be 
 admitted, however, that a prince who cannot crown 
 or uncro^vn his wife without the Emperor's approval 
 is somewhat dependent. 
 
 Nepaul. — Chinese influence over Nepaul has pro- 
 bably waned, of late, in proportion as British power 
 in India has waxed ; still, the Rajah continues to 
 send the prescribed missions. The actual terms of 
 the present tribute appear to have been imposed 
 after the Goorkha invasion of Thibet, in 1792. 
 WaiTen Hastings had been endeavouring to open up 
 commercial relations with Lhassa, and the Thibetan 
 Minister is said to have shown himself more favour- 
 ably disposed than was pleasing to the Chinese.* 
 However that may be, it is clear that, soon after the 
 last British Envoy's departure, he conceived it wise 
 to take refuge with the Rajah of Nepaul ; and the 
 latter, soon after his arrival, invaded Thibet and 
 overran the country. China, however, sent an army 
 which defeated the Nepaulese in two battles, pene- 
 trated their country, and compelled them to purchase 
 peace by restoring all their plunder and paying 
 tribute to the Emperor. The Chinese general is said 
 to have been a former Viceroy of Canton, and hostile 
 to the English. At any rate, he closed the frontier 
 
 ^ " Histoire de I'Eglise de Coree." Par Ch. Dallet, Paris, 1874. 
 2 Narrative of the Mission of G. Bogle to Thibet^ by Clements 
 R. Markham. 
 
126 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES, 
 
 by establishing a chain of posts along the southern 
 border of Thibet and Bhootan, and this isolation has 
 ever since been maintained. The Nepaulese appealed 
 to their conquerors for help, not long after, on the 
 occasion of a dispute with the British about some 
 territory which we claimed but which they refused 
 to surrender, and it is fair to say that the appeal 
 was promptly answered. Three Chinese mandarins 
 were sent to Khatmandu, and an army after them. 
 Letters were interchanged between these and the 
 Governor-General, the former repeating what the 
 Nepaulese had stated, and asking explanations which 
 the latter gave. Presents were shortly after sent by 
 the Commissioners, saying they were satisfied, and 
 the incident closed. The most noteworthy sentence 
 in the correspondence, for our present purpose, is in 
 reply to a proposal by Warren Hastings that the 
 Emperor should station an officer at Khatmandu to 
 act as referee in case of trouble. "Be it known to 
 you," the Commissioners replied, " that the Goorkha 
 Rajah has long been a faithful tributary of the 
 Chinese Government, and refers himself to it when- 
 ever occasion requires." 
 
 Quarrels between Nepaul and Thibet have some- 
 what ruffled the current of intercourse at times ; and 
 Sir Jung Bahadoor was credited, some years ago, 
 with a threat to break off the relationship altogether. 
 It has, however, endured, and we find in the Peldn'g 
 Gazette of the 20th May, 1876, a memorial from the 
 Chinese resident at Lhassa, announcing the receipt 
 of the usual "petition" from Nepaul, requesting 
 
THIBET. 
 
 127 
 
 information as to the period for sending tribute, 
 " couched in language reverentially submissive, and 
 expressive of the most devoted loyalty." 
 
 He (the Resident) accordingly makes report thereof for the 
 Imperial information and, looking upwards^ asks of the Celestial 
 Grace whether permission may be granted to send the tribute 
 offerings at the regular date. . . . He has to add that the King 
 aforesaid makes mention of the birth of a grandson, which he 
 thinks it his duty to report. He (the Resident) has expressed 
 congratulation in reply, and has sent back an Imperial donation of 
 two rolls of embroidered satin, to which he has added on his own 
 account a roll of wide satin, by way of congratulatory largess, in 
 furtherance of his Sovereign's desire to cherish tenderly the 
 foreigner with a liberality that knows no bounds, 
 
 Thibet. — Thibet scarcely comes within the cate- 
 gory of feudal states, as it has ceased, since 1746, to 
 have an independent existence. Up to that period, 
 a native sovereign owning fealty to the Emperor 
 still held a more or less nominal sway over the 
 country. But a revolt which broke out in the reign 
 of Kienlung led to its complete subjugation, and to 
 the placing of the entire government in the hands of 
 the Dalai Lama,^ assisted by four ministers of his 
 own choosing, under the supreme control of two 
 Chinese Residents who became in reality Regents of 
 Thibet. 
 
 Very little is known as to the degree of control 
 China really exercises at Lhassa ; but the assump- 
 
 » « Illustrations of the Lamaist System of Thibet," by W. F. 
 Mayers. Vol. iv. of the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society 
 of London, 1869. Mr. Mayers' paper was designed to illustrate 
 the method in which the Lamaist succession in Thibet is per- 
 petuated, and is full of curious information on the subject. 
 
128 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES. 
 
 tion would probably not be far \vrong that her 
 influence is considerable, but her actual power slight. 
 Settling difficulties with the border States would 
 seem to be one of her chief functions : we have 
 already seen her intervening once or twice in case 
 of Nepaul; and bickerings between Thibetans and 
 Nepaulese seem to be frequent causes of trouble. 
 There have been published recently^ in the 
 Peking Gazette^ several memorials from the Chinese 
 Resident, about a fresh quarrel arising out of the 
 plunder of some Nepaulese traders, at Lhassa, which 
 threatened at one time to lead to war. It was com- 
 posed, however, eventually, under Chinese mediation, 
 by Thibet undertaking to pay compensation and to 
 punish the robbers. 
 
 It was China, as we have seen, which closed the 
 Himalayan passes in 1792 ; and, on the several oc- 
 casions when British-Indian officials have tried to 
 re-open them, the Thibetans have usually expressed 
 themselves willing but have averred that the 
 decision lay at Peking. The Chinese, on the other 
 hand, locate the difficulty at Lhassa, and plead 
 Thibetan timidity and opposition. They have, how- 
 ever, ended by accepting the responsibility : the 
 (Chefoo) Convention negotiated with China by Sir 
 Thomas Wade, in 1876, contained a special article, 
 sanctioning the despatch of a British mission 
 of exploration — either from China by way of 
 Szechuen and Thibet into India, or from India 
 by way of Thibet and Szechuen into China ; and a 
 memorial in the Peking Gazette of the 18th of June, 
 
BURMAH. 
 
 129 
 
 1877, from the Resident at Lhassa, shows that the 
 import of the negotiations was promptly commu- 
 nicated to the Thibetan authorities. The memorialist 
 had, he said, received a communication from the 
 Board of Foreign Affairs, " stating that Europeans 
 have stipulated for entry into Thibet ; " it was there- 
 fore " indispensable that the officers filling the 
 various Commissionerships should be intelligent and 
 active persons, without which it would be difficult to 
 maintain authority and order, . . ." He accordingly 
 advises that two Imperial Commissioners in Western 
 Thibet, whose term of office had expired, be retained 
 in their posts for another term. 
 
 It is evident, from the Resident's expression, that 
 the Chinese expected immediate effect to be given to 
 the stipulation ; and that they interpreted it in a 
 sense wider than the words implied. The intention 
 was, in fact, to pave the way for renewed commercial 
 intercourse between India and Thibet ; but the 
 Commissioners must have had a weary time if they 
 were retained in office as proposed, for circumstances 
 long delayed execution of the project. The point 
 which concerns us, however, is the assertion of 
 control and acceptance of responsibility implied in 
 the agreement. 
 
 BuKMAH. — The connecting tie in the case of 
 Burmah is probably slighter than in that of any 
 other of the neighbouring states. Tribute is due 
 only once in ten years, instead of at the much shorter 
 intervals we find prevailing where the dependence is 
 more marked ; and, instead of being, as in the case 
 
 K 
 
130 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES. 
 
 of Annam, a natural result of cognation, the relation- 
 ship, such as it is, has been imposed and enforced by 
 war. Colonel Burney has taken the trouble to 
 compile, from the chronicles of the Kings of Prome 
 and Ava, a narrative^ of the various wars between 
 Burmah and China, which throws much light on the 
 relations between the two countries, and has the 
 advantage of giving the Burmese view of the 
 question. 
 
 The claim to tribute would seem, from this story, 
 to have arisen about the middle of the eleventh 
 century, as a consequence of a Burmese invasion of 
 China, undertaken to obtain possession of a Buddha's 
 tooth. The relic is alleged, by the Burmese chronicle, 
 to have refused to quit China — probably because the 
 Burmese were not strong enough to take it. King 
 Anauratha, however, is said to have had a meeting 
 with the Emperor, though under what circumstances 
 is not stated. What does seem clear is that he entered 
 into some engagement, or committed himself in some 
 way which the Chinese interpreted to mean an accep- 
 tance of tributary relations. The Burmese version 
 of the tale is that the Emperor supplied him with 
 food dressed in various gold and silver vessels, which 
 he, on his departure, delivered to the Emperor's 
 religious teacher, with directions to dress food in 
 them daily, and make offerings of it to the Sacred 
 Tooth. However this may be, it is clear that the 
 
 * " Some Account of the Wars between Burmah and China, 
 etc." By Lieut.-Colonel H. Burney. Journal of fhe Asiatic 
 Society of Bengal for 1837, vol vi. 
 
INVASIONS OF BURMAH, 131 
 
 proceeding -whatever it was — induced subsequent 
 Emperors of China to demand presentation of the 
 same kind of vessels, as tribute due. It is equally- 
 clear, however, that the position has not always been 
 acquiesced in by Burmese sovereigns. A refusal of 
 tribute, at the close of the thirteenth century, led to the 
 great invasion by Kublai Khan, which is described 
 in remarkably varying terms by Marco Polo and the 
 Burmese chroniclers, Marco Polo declaring that the 
 invading army was composed of the gleemen and 
 jugglers ^ of Kublai's Court, while the Burmese speak 
 of 6,000,000 of horse and 2,000,000 of foot ; and 
 declare that these had to be repeatedly reinforced 
 before ultimately achieving victory ! The main facts 
 appear to be that the Chinese Emperor sent to demand 
 the customary gold and silver vessels ; but the King, 
 instead of complying, slew the whole of the embassy, 
 whereupon the Emperor sent an army which overcame 
 the Burmese and occupied their capital (a.d. 1284). 
 A fresh invasion is recorded in the year 1300 — in pur- 
 suance, this time, of a legitimate function of suzerainty, 
 the object being to restore a king who had been 
 dethroned by rebels. In 1442 we find the Chinese 
 again sending " to demand vessels of gold and silver, 
 which they declared King Anauratha had presented 
 as tribute ; " and in 1477, another similar demand 
 led to the verge of war. There appears, according to 
 
 * The idea of an army composed of gleemen and jugglers 
 appears so extravagant that the thought suggests itself whether 
 Marco was thinking of the remarkable athletic performances which 
 characterize Chinese drill, and which might not unnaturally 
 suggest the idea of mountebanks. 
 
 K 2 
 
132 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES. 
 
 Chinese admission, to have been a breach of relations 
 from the reign of Kiatsing in 1522 to that of Kien- 
 lung in 1721, when the arrival of a Burmese mission 
 at Pekinof is ao:ain recorded. The resoldered connec- 
 tion, however, was soon again disturbed. The last 
 and probably the hardest fought of the many inter- 
 national wars broke out in 1765, and lasted four 
 years, ending in a treaty dated December 13th, 1769, 
 which has since secured peace and commerce between 
 the two countries. The Burmese claim to have had 
 the best of the long struggle, in that they successfully 
 kept out the Chinese invaders ; and they declare that 
 the ultimate proposals for peace came from the 
 Chinese. There is a decided flavour of the tradi- 
 tional claim to tribute in the words : "If the sun- 
 descended King sends presents we shall send presents 
 in return," which are said to have been used in the 
 Chinese overture, as that is precisely the usual 
 course of procedure exacted. But the treaty (as 
 translated by Colonel Burney) certainly disguises 
 the obligation under language as little distasteful as 
 possible to Burmese pride, merely stipulating that 
 " the princes and officers of each country shall move 
 their respective sovereigns to transmit and exchange 
 affectionate letters in gold, once every ten years." 
 
 So much for the question from the point of view 
 of Burmese story. We have, here, little evidence of 
 what was done during the long intervals of peace ; 
 but we have evidence of a claim to tribute asserted 
 by China for 800 years, and enforced, at times, 
 by invasion when Burmese kings were willing to 
 repudiate the obligation. It may be interesting, in 
 
BURMAH, 133 
 
 conclusion, to illustrate the actual practice at the 
 present day, by extracts from one of those " affec- 
 tionate letters," as printed in the Pelcing Gazette of 
 December, 1874. Communication between the two 
 countries had been interrupted for some time on 
 account of the Mahomedan rebellion in Yunnan ; but 
 at the close of 1874, the Governor- General of that 
 province reported that a Burmese official had made 
 his way to the provincial capital, " bringing a letter 
 to the effect that the King, having heard of the 
 restoration of order, had sent him to ask what 
 arrano^ements should be made about tribute and other 
 matters." He was instructed " that action should be 
 taken according to the existing rules," etc., etc. ; and 
 then we have one of those tit-bits of Chinese 
 officialism which serve, better than an essay, to 
 illustrate the national vanity. After dilating on 
 " the glorious influence exerted by the sovereigns 
 of the present dynasty in securing the tributary 
 allegiance of Burmah after an interruption of 
 two centuries," the Governor- General goes on to 
 observe that, although the language used in the 
 despatch *Ms respectful and submissive in the fullest 
 degree, without a word of self-assertion or arrogance, 
 still the King has not described himself by name and 
 surname,^ and has made use of much that is improper 
 in the enumeration of his titles. It is to be feared, 
 consequently, that the rules of propriety might be 
 transgressed in the address to the Throne which will 
 
 ^ This has reference to tho Chinese custom which exacts that 
 an inferior official, addressing a superior, shall describe himself 
 only by name, and not by his rank or official status. 
 
134 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES. 
 
 be presented with the tribute ; " and it is asked that 
 a " proper form " may be supplied from Peking, to 
 replace that which was lost among the official archives 
 destroyed during the rebellion. It must be admitted 
 that the King's letter (as translated into Chinese), 
 when the tribute-bearers actually started, goes far 
 to justify the pretension. It is couched in terms of 
 extravagant humility and adulation : — 
 
 " As the sun-flower bows before the sun, so does all mankind 
 turn with adoration towards your imperial person. . . . Eecently, 
 owing to war and rapine on the borders, communication had long 
 been interrupted ; but the horrors of strife are now happily over, 
 and the universe returned to tranquility. This letter has, con- 
 sequently, been respectfully drawn up," and is accompanied by 
 the articles stated.^ The whole are placed in charge of an envoy, 
 " who is charged to respectfully convey them to the palace gate, 
 and to humbly crave that his great Majesty the Emperor will 
 deign to receive the offerings, and will further graciously lend ear 
 to the feelings of obedience, respect and submission entertained by 
 your vassal." 
 
 The mission thus heralded crossed the frontier on 
 
 ^ The following is a list of the Burmese tribute : One letter in 
 gold ; a Burmese stone image of the God of Longevity ; five tame 
 elephants ; £f pair of ivory tusks, weighing 90 catties (120 lbs.) ; 
 three jade-stcne articles, weighing 210 catties (280 lbs.) : eight 
 gilt- frame and inlaid mirrors ; two red jewel gold rings ; two 
 more gold rings ; eight pieces of yellow, red, and green^ Spanish 
 stripes; ten pieces thick heavy shirtings; ten pieces of foreign 
 crape ; ten fine handkerchiefs ; twenty foreign carpet rugs ; 
 10,000 sheets of gold leaf; 10,000 sheets of silver leaf; eight 
 catties of sandal-wood ; nine catties of red sandal-wood ; ten 
 bottles of scent ; ten bottles of pomade ; four No. 4 size orna- 
 mented boxes ; fifty !N"o. 5 size ornamented boxes ; five pictures 
 of elephants; fifteen peacocks' tails. — ^Vide Peking Gazette^ 15th 
 May, 1875. 
 
ANNAM, T35 
 
 February 1st, 1875, and left Peking on the return 
 journey on November 18tb of the same year. 
 
 Annam. — The interest of China in Annam, or 
 Annan as it is called in Chinese records, is said to 
 date from 214 B.C. About that period, according to 
 Chinese story,^ the Emperor Tsin-chi-wang overran 
 the region now knoAvn as Tongking, and transplanted 
 thither 50,000 Chinese families, who spread and 
 multiplied, as is the Chinese wont, and gradually 
 introduced the Chinese written character, customs, 
 religion, and entire system of government and 
 politics. The new territory at first formed an 
 integral portion of the Chinese Empire, under the 
 name of Ngan-an ; but it is not surprising that so 
 remote a province should eventually seek its inde- 
 pendence, and this appears to have been so far 
 accomplished, after a severe struggle, about 875 a.d., 
 that a native prince was left in possession of the 
 throne, on condition of sending tribute every three 
 years. It would be tedious to enter into details of 
 the next 900 years. The story is full of wars and re- 
 bellions and Chinese inroads — sometimes to " restore 
 order," sometimes to replace a dethroned king. The 
 native sovereigns appear to have resisted the Mongol 
 conquerors of China in the thirteenth century, but 
 were forced to submit; and the Emperor (Kublai 
 Khan) recognized the reigning family on condi- 
 tion, as before, of a triennial tribute, which was to 
 consist of gold, silver, precious stones, medicine, 
 
 \ Lettres Edifiantes. Tableau historique de la Cochin- Chine. 
 
136 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES. 
 
 ivory, and rhinoceros horns ; a Chinese Resident 
 being imposed on the court. 
 
 A further measure of independence seems to have 
 been acquired under the Mings ; and the Annamese 
 princes seem to have been loth to recognize the 
 subsequent ascendency of the Manchus. It was 
 not, in fact, till some years after North China 
 had been subdued that these invaders succeeded 
 in establishing their ascendency in the South. The 
 reign of the first Manchu emperor is commonly dated 
 from 1644, but it was not till 1661 that the King of 
 Annam " sent a letter submitting his allegiance ; " 
 nor does he seem to have been very fixed in his 
 ideas, even then, for it is'only in 1664 that he "applies 
 to be invested as king." He was ordered, in reply, 
 to hand back the patent and seal of ofi^ce which he 
 had received from the emperors of the last (Ming) 
 dynasty, when " his application would be considered." 
 Finally, in 1666, the formalities are completed. 
 " The hereditary Prince of Annam, Le Wei-shih, sent 
 the Ming patent and seal, whereupon a mission was 
 despatched bearing the imperial letters patent and a 
 camel-knob silver-gilt seal, in order to instal him as 
 king." Seventeen years later, Le Wei-shih has 
 been succeeded by Le Wei-cheng, who applies for 
 investiture in turn ; and again, in 1761, emissaries 
 are sent to invest Le Wei-jui, nephew of the pre- 
 ceding, carrying with them a new seal made of silver 
 inlaid with gold and inscribed with Manchu characters, 
 for his use. 
 
 Le Wei-jui seems to have been, practically, the 
 
A KING OF ANN AM VISITS PEKING. 137 
 
 last of his house ; for now comes the record of 
 the convulsion which overthrew the Le dynasty 
 and resulted in the elevation of Bishop Pigneau's 
 protege to the throne. His grandson seems to have 
 been installed, but the ceremony can hardly have 
 been completed before he was expelled from Tongking. 
 " In 1789," runs the entry, which I am tempted to 
 quote at length from Mr. Jamieson's interesting 
 translation, " there was internal strife in Annan. Le 
 Wei-chi threw away the seal and absconded, and the 
 people of the country put forward Yuen Kwang-ping 
 as chief. He respectfully continued the former 
 allegiance, and begged to be allowed to come in 
 person to Peking to see the Emperor." 
 
 China seems to have acquiesced in the proposal. 
 The provincial treasurer of Kwangsi was instructed 
 to convey letters of investiture, a new seal was issued, 
 and in the following year the visit was paid. The 
 motive was to congratulate the Emperor Kien- 
 lung on the attainment of his eightieth year, and on 
 the day of the ceremony, the King " was assigned a 
 place next below the princes of the first order." He 
 was received with high favour, and an extraordinary 
 number of presents was showered upon him. The 
 opportunity seems to have been taken, also, to suggest 
 certain alterations in the incidence of the tribute. 
 A vassal going to visit his suzerain, in Europe, under 
 such conditions would probably have asked to have 
 it lightened. But the King of Annam wants the 
 dates made more frequent; and so a decree (1792) 
 orders that "xinnan shall send tribute, henceforward, 
 
138 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES. 
 
 every two years instead of every three as formerly, 
 and a mission to Peking every four years instead of 
 every six." And these modifications were continued 
 when, ten years later, the founder of the present 
 dynasty sent to ask for investiture in turn ; for 
 Yuen Kwang-ping's term was short. In 1802, 
 "Yuan Fu-ying (Nguyen-Anh) attacked Annan, 
 whereupon the reigning king abandoned the seal and 
 absconded. Yuan Fu-ying subdued the territory of 
 Annan and sent messengers with tribute to ask for 
 investiture. He also prayed that a new name might 
 be given to his kingdom. In reply, it was ordered 
 by decree that the name of the country should be 
 changed to Yueh-nan, and, in conformity with the 
 regulations, letters patent were granted conferring 
 upon him the rank of king. A new seal was also 
 issued, and the Lieut.-Govemor of Kwangse was in- 
 structed to proceed to the country and invest him." ^ 
 We have seen that the Annamese tribute is held 
 to be due biennially ; though, on account of the great 
 distance from Hue to Peking, two quotas are per- 
 mitted to be sent simultaneously. Every four years, 
 accordingly, may be seen, in the Peking Gazette., a 
 record of the arrival and departure of the Annamese 
 Mission with its stated tribute and imperial presents 
 in return. The last was in 1881, and it may not be 
 
 ^ This was the outcome of the French episode. The investment 
 of Yuen Kwang-ping and Yuen Kwang-tsuan seem to point to the 
 successful invasion of Tongking by Nhac, and the temporary 
 ascendency of the (Nguyen) prince whom he placed on the 
 throne. 
 
ANNAMESE TRIBU2E. 
 
 139 
 
 uninteresting to quote the King's letter to the 
 Emperor, on that occasion : — 
 
 My nation, a tributary state from time immemorial, has been 
 graciously confirmed in its possession by You. It has been 
 ordained that the tribute day shall recur once in four years, 
 without change. On each occasion offerings have obediently been 
 sent. On the 8th day of the first moon of the 6th year of 
 Kwangsii, the appointed time having come round, I requested, 
 through the Governor of Kwangcsi, Your permission to start, and 
 I received an answer from him, appointing the 1st day of the 
 9 th moon for admission across the frontier. When I received 
 these commands, I was filled with thankfulness and awe. That 
 the hills and streams of my country enjoy security and rest is 
 because I have obeyed your behests ; and we have not failed, 
 generation after generation, to send our bounden tribute. Now 
 the day is at hand once more, and I am again permitted to send 
 my offerings. Truly this is because You have deigned to con- 
 sider my loyalty and love, and the hearts of my subjects are 
 satisfied and grateful. As is the duty of a vassal prince, gazing 
 from afar at the Heavenly Abode, I have entrusted to my envoy 
 Yuan-shun, and others, various offerings ^ to be presented to you. 
 In all humbleness I await your acceptance of them. 
 
 It may be added that the Peking Gazette of March 
 20th contains the usual report that the mission had 
 passed the frontier and reached the provincial capital, 
 where the governor entertained them at a banquet. 
 
 ^ The following is a list of the Annamese tribute : 2 elephants' 
 tusks; 2 rhinoceros horns ; 45 catties (=60 lbs.) of betel nuts; 
 45 catties of grains of paradise ; 600 ozs. of sandal- wood ; 300 ozs. 
 of garroo-wood ; 100 pieces of native silk ; 100 pieces of white 
 silk; 100 pieces of raw silk ; 100 pieces of native cloth. — In ad- 
 dition to the regular tribute, there are extraordinary occasions, 
 such as marriages, birthdays, coming of age, coronations, etc., when 
 the Court of Hue is bound to send two pairs of elephant's tusks, 
 four rhinoceros horns, 100 rolls of each of three different kinds of 
 satin, and 100 rolls of cotton cloth. 
 
I40 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES. 
 
 His Excellency adds, moreover, that having noticed 
 that " the mission was ill-supplied with clothing, 
 insufficient, indeed, to supply changes for so long a 
 journey, he presented them with a further supply of 
 silk and fur clothing at his own expanse ! " 
 
 We have seen that a notable feature in the tribu- 
 tary relationship is the acceptance from the Emperor 
 of a seal of office ; and it is not a little curious to 
 observe that, when signing the new treaty imposed 
 on him by the French, the King gave up to M. 
 Patenotre the seal so held by his predecessors, which 
 the French forthwith destroyed. 
 
 The nature of China's connection with what she 
 now calls the Kingdom of Yueh-nan may be judged 
 from the above outline ; and it may be judged also 
 with what degree of truth the French could pretend 
 to regard the connection as having only a legendary 
 interest. 
 
 The Liuchius. — The little group of islands knoAvn 
 as the Liuchius are the subject of a mixed claim, 
 which recently brought China and Japan to the 
 verge of war, and which still remains unsettled. 
 Lying midway between the two countries, they have 
 not unnaturally fallen under the influence of both ; 
 and the manifestation by Japan of an inclination to 
 annex them altogether, gave the signal for an angry 
 protest by China. 
 
 The suzerainty of China seems to date from the 
 accession of the Ming dynasty, towards the close of 
 the fourteenth century, when Hung-wu, the first 
 Ming emperor, persuaded them to acknowledge de- 
 
THE LIUCHIUS. 141 
 
 pendency ; and these relations, once established, have 
 continued to be acknowledged to the present day. 
 Successive princes have received investiture at the 
 hands of an Imperial delegate, and sent the customary 
 tribute ^ to the Celestial capital. 
 
 At the same time, however, the islands seem to 
 have fallen under the influence of Satsuma, and were 
 regarded as so clearly an appanage of that princi- 
 pality that, on the abolition of feudalism and assump- 
 tion of power by the Mikado, they were reorganized 
 on the same footing as the rest of Japan, and made 
 a prefectural district. 
 
 Whether of their own motion or under Chinese 
 inspiration it would be difficult to determine, the 
 inhabitants petitioned China against this undisguised 
 absorption, and China remonstrated energetically 
 on behalf of her 'protege. The dispute reached an 
 acute stage, and was more than once nearly escaping 
 from the hands of diplomacy. It was, however, 
 brought back within the paths of negotiation under 
 the advice of General Grant, at the time of his visit 
 to the East; and Japanese and Chinese plenipo- 
 tentiaries were duly commissioned to bring about an 
 agreement. This took the simple form of dividing 
 the property, Japan taking the northern and China 
 the southern half; and on this basis everything 
 seemed settled ; the day was even fixed for the ex- 
 change of ratifications, and for entry on possession 
 
 ^ The Liiichiuan tribute consists of 126 peculs of sulphur, 30 
 peculs of copper, and 10 peculs of white tin. 
 
142 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES. 
 
 of the respective islands, when suddenly the Chinese 
 backed out. They had, they said, been instructed 
 to negotiate terms of agreement ; but the terms, 
 when come to, had necessarily to be submitted for 
 the Emperor's instructions, and he desired to consult 
 the Grand Superintendents of Trade before deciding. 
 Considering this a deliberate slight, and failing to 
 hold the Chinese to their bargain, the Japanese with- 
 drew from the negotiation, and declared the agree- 
 ment null. The question was thus blown back into 
 the air ; but the Japanese remain in possession. 
 
 SiAM. — Siam is also classed by the Chinese among 
 tributary states, but the Siamese themselves deny 
 the impeachment. Looking at the facts from an 
 Oriental point of view, however, it is difficult to 
 escape the conclusion that there is ground for 
 the Chinese pretension ; and that the simple fact is 
 that Siam, alone among the Celestial satellites, has 
 thrown off her traditional allegiance. It seems be- 
 yond dispute that, for several centuries, the Siamese 
 rulers sent triennial embassies with presents to 
 Peking ; though they have now, for thirty years, 
 given up the custom, and are willing to minimize its 
 original import. We may quote, from the archives 
 of Peking, two instances in illustration of the prac- 
 tice. In the twelfth year of Kanghi (a.d. 1673), 
 "the kingdom of Siam applied for investiture. 
 The imperial patent and a camel-knob silver-gilt seal 
 were issued to the tribute messengers." And when, 
 a century later, a new " chief of Siam named Ching- 
 hwa sent messengers with tribute, carrying a letter 
 
SIAM. 
 
 143 
 
 asking to be enrolled as a feudatory," ^ the Chinese 
 Cabinet again sent him letters patent and a silver- 
 gilt seal, in accordance with this precedent. 
 
 Two documents, published some years ago in the 
 Shanghai press,^ enable us to obtain a fuller in- 
 sight into the facts of the case. There appeared 
 in the Pelcing Gazette^ towards the close of 1869, 
 a translation of a memorial from the High Officials 
 of Fohkien, stating that a request had readied 
 them from Siam to be permitted to resume the 
 despatch of tribute, which had been interrupted 
 then for eighteen years owing to the disturbed state 
 of the empire during the Taeping Rebellion. Her 
 rulers had expressed to a Chinese official, who was 
 sent to Bangkok to buy wood for the Foochow 
 Arsenal, her wish to resume more intimate relations ; 
 and he undertook to be the bearer of a so-called 
 " petition," which the memorialists now sent up for 
 the Imperial decision. This document, as translated 
 in the pages of the Pelcing Gazette, was to the fol- 
 lowing effect : — 
 
 *' Our depraved rulers have, from generation to generation, been 
 invested by the Celestial Sovereigns, and have paid tribute without 
 intermission. During the second year of Hienfung, however 
 (1852), an embassy returning from Peking, whither it had pro- 
 
 * The customary Siamese tribute (we learn from Mr. Jamieson's 
 excerpts from the Ta-Tsing Hwei-tien) consisted of elephants, 
 rhinoceros horns, elephant tusks, cardamoms, laka wood, lucraban 
 seed, cassia lignea and sandal wood, ebony and sapan wood, cutch, 
 gamboge, sulphur, camphor, kingfishers' skins and peacocks' 
 feathers. 
 
 2 Vide North-China Heralcl, 11th December, 18G9, and 12th 
 April, 1870. 
 
144 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES. 
 
 ceeded to pray for an investiture, was attacked and spoiled in the 
 neighbourhood of Yung-cheng, in Honan. The principal linguist 
 was killed, an envoy wounded, and the imperial presents were 
 lost. ... In the second year of Tungchih, the Governor- General 
 of Canton notified that the requests preferred by that embassy 
 had been acceded to, but that no steps had been taken to return 
 thanks for the imperial favour thus displayed. On this, my prin- 
 cipal Ministers drew up a petition setting forth that the Eulers 
 of Siam have respectfully and loyally rendered tribute to the 
 Celestial Sovereigns from generation to generation, and that their 
 duties as subordinates have been faithfully discharged. Since the 
 second year of Hienfung's reign tribute had not, however, been 
 forwarded, owing to the disturbed state of the Celestial Empire 
 rendering its safe transit impossible. . . . Were it, however, 
 allowable to forward the tribute to Tientsin, an 'embassy could 
 be specially formed." To this application no answer had been 
 received, and as (continued the king) " I, who have lately 
 ascended the throne, am anxious to «pay tribute as has been cus- 
 tomary, I respectfully pray your direction as to how I shall 
 proceed." 
 
 It must be admitted that if this version of the 
 despatch can be trusted, the admission is complete of 
 the various points required to establish tributary 
 relationship. The embassy in question was on its 
 way to solicit investiture ; the periodicity and con- 
 tinuity of the tribute are admitted, and the request 
 for permission to change the route is an admission of 
 the existing rule. 
 
 However that may be, the publication of these 
 documents evoked from Bangkok a semi-official pro- 
 test against the assumption of China and the 
 inference drawn, to the following effect : — 
 
 Burmah and Cochin-China were tributary, yes ! and both had 
 endeavoured to throw off their allegiance, but had failed. But 
 Siam had never come into collision with China, and never had 
 
SIAMESE PROTEST. 145 
 
 occasion to pay tribute. What had happened was simply this. 
 In the year 1350, the King removed his capital to Ayuthia (on 
 the Meinam), and Chinese ships came and traded. The Siamese 
 wished to join in the trade ; and the King accordingly sent an 
 ambassador to go and ask for friendly relations with China. The 
 Emperor acquiesced, and opened the port of Canton ; but the 
 Chinese exacted such heavy duties that the Siamese traders lost. 
 The King then sent another ambassador "in charge of a royal 
 letter, with a request to give annual presents to China in order to 
 save the duties." This request also was granted. " An ambassador 
 was permitted to go once in three years, and Siam obtained 
 privileges for the vessels which conveyed him. . . . The Emperor 
 gave a great amount of presents in return ; and the Siamese, 
 perceiving this to be to their advantage, continued to send 
 presents as a uniform practice ; but they did so out of a desire to 
 secure the advantages of trade, and for that purpose only." 
 
 And so again with reference to the alleged application for 
 investiture. " A new sovereign having ascended the throne, royal 
 letters were despatched to all nations in friendly treaty relations 
 — to China the same as to other countries ; although, no presents 
 having been sent for eighteen years, it was not clear whether the 
 Government of China would receive them ; so a letter was 
 •written asking to send an ambassador with presents by the nearer 
 route of Tientsin." The Chinese refused, replying that '* to allow 
 the ambassador to go by Tientsin would be contrary to custom : 
 let him be sent by way of Canton, as formerly ! The Siamese 
 Government received this intimation with regret," as they had 
 wished to send an embassy via Tientsin in the hope that it would 
 be "treated somewhat in the same manner as those which had 
 been sent by western nations." As it was, the matter had been 
 dropped " until the Government of China was willing to receive 
 them in what the Siamese Government considered a proper 
 manner." 
 
 The explanation is plausible, and the attempt to 
 put the present-giving practice in a light favourable 
 to Siamese intelligence and independence, ingenious ; 
 but we can hardly blame the Chinese for regarding 
 
 L 
 
146 CHINA AND HER TRIBUTARIES. 
 
 these periodical missions as tributary in their degree. 
 It is not essential that a nation should be conquered 
 to become tributary ; and Siam appears, for her own 
 purposes, to have fulfilled certain requirements — 
 until, having broken through the custom for a while 
 during the Taeping Rebellion, she concluded to reject 
 it altogether, and try to place her relations on the 
 same footing as those of western powers. As a 
 matter of fact, the Government has since acted in 
 accordance with the purpose here expressed. That 
 is to say, not only has it taken no further steps 
 to re-open political intercourse, but, when China 
 sent an envoy to Siam, to require that the 
 despatch of tribute should be resumed, he is said to 
 have encountered a peremptory refusal. Nor, 
 curiously enough, do the Siamese appear to have 
 lost anything by their recalcitrance. Ships flying 
 the white elephant of Siam are admitted into tiie 
 Chinese ports open to foreign trade, on the same 
 footing as those of other nations having the most 
 elaborate treaty rights. 
 
 We have now glanced, in succession, at the various 
 kingdoms which really fall under the shadow of the 
 Great Empire. We find the dependence implicit in 
 the case of Corea and Annam ; slighter and more 
 vague in the case of Burmah and Nepaul ; Avhile 
 Siam has altogether broken oiF tributary relations, 
 and the Liuchiu Islands are a subject of dispute 
 between China and Japan. The origin of the rela- 
 tionship may have been different in difi*erent cases. 
 In that of Annam it grew out of colonization ; in that 
 
SUMMARY. 147 
 
 of Burmah it seems to have been imposed by military 
 force ; while Siam sought it for purposes of com- 
 mercial advantage. But it is hard to escape the 
 conclusion that nations which are held bound to 
 send given presents, by given routes, at given inter- 
 vals, and which conform to the obligation, are 
 " tributary " ; or that rulers who are held bound to 
 address the Emperor with nearly the same form of 
 respect that would be used by a Viceroy, are ^' de- 
 pendent," in the sense which the Chinese claim. 
 And not only so, but — with the exception of Siam, 
 which, as we have seen, has throAYii off the yoke, and 
 Nepaul, which probably yields to the pressure she 
 feels on her northern frontier — there is reason to 
 believe that, so far from feeling the obligation 
 irksome, they have thought it a high privilege to be 
 allowed to bask, at given intervals, in the sunshine 
 of the Imperial presence. How far that sentiment 
 may be affected by recent events is a question diffi- 
 cult to answer. It seems hardly possible the Empire 
 should escape, Avith undiminished prestige, from an 
 ordeal making manifest its inability to protect its 
 vassals. But custom has, in the East, a wonderfully 
 enduring force ; and China has for centuries loomed 
 so large in the eyes of her neighbours, that her 
 influence will probably survive, with little apparent 
 injury, the effect of her discomfiture. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 FRANCE AND SIAM. 
 
 Thirty-four years have passed since Napoleon HI. 
 was persuaded to utilize the Expeditionary force 
 then on its way back from Tientsin, to conquer 
 Cochin-China and found a French colony at Saigon. 
 There were great potentialities in the enterprise, and 
 the " forward " school of politicians were not slow to 
 make them evident. It was discovered that Cam- 
 bodia had been tributary to Annam as well as to 
 Siam, and that the duty devolved upon France of 
 assuming the responsibilities and privileges of her 
 new acquisition. Then the dual suzerainty was 
 found inconvenient ; and negotiations were entered 
 into which resulted in the cession, by Siam, of the 
 sole protectorate to France — with the reservation, 
 only, that Cambodia should never be incorporated 
 as a Cochin-Chinese province. Then an expedition 
 sent, under M. de Lagr^e, to explore the Meikong, 
 detected advantages that would result from plant- 
 ing the French flag along its banks ; and when 
 Dupuis had proved the practicability of reaching 
 Yunnan by way of Hanoi, it occurred to certain 
 
PROJECTS OF AGGRESSION. 149 
 
 people in Paris and at Saigon that it would be 
 well to occupy Tongking. The desirability had 
 now become evident of strengthening the Central 
 Power whose outlying dependencies had been de- 
 tached, and the blessings of civilization in the 
 shape of a French protectorate were conferred upon 
 Annam. 
 
 It seemed now, for a moment, that the natural 
 limit of things had been reached. The Annamese 
 empire had been once more compacted, and the 
 mountains which separate it from the valley of the 
 Meikong form an admirable scientific frontier. But 
 historical students discovered that the kings of Cam- 
 bodia had once owned a much larger territory than 
 they now possessed, and that former kings of Annam 
 had collected tribute in the Meikong valley. France 
 clearly inherited all rights and duties this might be 
 held to imply ; and the potential claim was worked 
 up till M. Ribot was moved to declare, two years ago, 
 in the Chamber of Deputies, " that all the countries 
 lying eastward of the Meikong, from the point where 
 it leaves China, should belong to France." Now, 
 the bearings of this observation, like an equally 
 famous one of Captain Cuttle's, lie in the application 
 of it. English interest is keenly concerned in the 
 maintenance of Siam as a buffer State between 
 Burmah and French territory. That interest might 
 remain languid so long as French activity was con- 
 fined to the lower Meikong ; but it might conceivably 
 become acute if the claim were pushed to its poten- 
 tial limits ; for it not only involves the annexation of 
 
I50 FRANCE AND SI AM, 
 
 a region someAvhat larger than Annam itself, which 
 Siam alleges to have been under her own jurisdiction 
 for more than a hundred years, but it would involve 
 the alignment of France with our own frontier in the 
 north, and the absorption of territory which the 
 Anglo-Burmese Delimitation Commission has just 
 ceded to Siam. It will scarcely be wasted time, 
 therefore, to review certain facts that bear upon the 
 French claim. Political boundaries in the Far East 
 are frequently ill-defined ; and in the Indo-Chinese 
 peninsula, especially, warfare seems to have been 
 well-nigh constant and the tangle of races to have 
 become well-nigh inextricable. Certain historical 
 outlines are, however, perceptible, and history is 
 always useful in throwing light on modern develop- 
 ment. 
 
 French relations with Siam date back, as is well 
 known, to the days of Louis XIV. ; and though the 
 episode forms a well-kno^vn chapter of Oriental 
 history, the details are sufficiently curious to deserve 
 recapitulation at a time when Republican statesmen 
 seem bent on reviving the policy and projects of the 
 Great Monarch. Many strange things were done 
 during those early days of European adventure when 
 Holland and Portugal and France and England were 
 striving with jealous rivalry to obtain concessions 
 and commercial privileges along the coast-line of 
 Southern Asia ; but it would be hard to find an inci- 
 dent surpassing in eccentricity the attempt made by 
 the French to convert and dominate Siam. They 
 were curious times, in many ways. Nations that 
 
LOUIS XIV, X51 
 
 were hostile to each other in Europe carried their 
 quarrels to India and Indo- China. Sects that were 
 in rivalry at Rome carried their differences to China 
 and Japan, Individual adventurers were carving 
 out for themselves careers that led to power and 
 fortune. Intrigue was rampant, diplomacy little 
 scrupulous, and the propaganda overbearing in 
 fanatical activity and aggression. One of the most 
 dissolute of kings was finding salvation under the 
 seductive influence of Madame de Maintenon and 
 Pere la Chaise : Colbert was trying to push French 
 commerce ; and both were willing to establish French 
 influence in Siam, with a view to the advancement of 
 the Church, the extension of trade, and the exalta- 
 tion of the monarch who conceived himself the im- 
 personation of France. When, therefore, Mgr. Pallu, 
 who had been hospitably entertained by King Phra 
 Narai, returned to Europe with projects of ecclesias- 
 tical, political, and commercial adventure, he gained 
 a ready hearing at the French Court. 
 
 Phra Narai, who was then King of Siam, seems to 
 have been constitutionally liberal. He had not only 
 admitted the English and Dutch to trade in his 
 dominions, but had sent to Goa to invite commercial 
 relations with the Portuguese. There was, therefore, 
 nothing surprising in his willingness to receive the 
 French ; though it is by no means unlikely that politi- 
 cal motives may have predisposed him to welcome re- 
 lations with a country which stood out as a rival to 
 Holland. The Dutch Power loomed large, at that 
 epoch, in the Eastern seas, and a king of Siam might 
 
152 FRANCE AND SI AM. 
 
 think it wise to cultivate good relations with the 
 Sovereign who had just concluded the Treaty of 
 Nimeguen. The missionaries naturally took every 
 opportunity to extol his greatness, for the firmer the 
 foothold France could gain the stronger would be the 
 position of the Church in Siam. When, therefore, 
 the Vautour, bringing letters and presents from 
 Louis XIV., arrived oiF the mouth of the Meinam (in 
 September, 1680), Deslandes-Boureau was allowed 
 all the commercial facilities he could desire, and Phra 
 Xarai was persuaded to send a responsive Embassy. 
 Three Siamese officials and a suite of twenty persons, 
 accompanied by a French priest as conductor and 
 interpreter, set sail in the same year. But the ship 
 which carried them was lost, with all on board, in a 
 hurricane off the coast of Madagascar ; and it was 
 not till three years later that a Siamese Embassy put 
 in an actual appearance at Versailles. 
 • The broad outline of the ensuing episode forms, of 
 course, a well-known chapter of Oriental history ; 
 but its details were hidden away in the French 
 Colonial archives till M. Lanier^ had the happy 
 thought of disinterring them at a moment when 
 French interest in Indo-China had received a fresh 
 impulse. Confirmatory researches at the Quai 
 d'Orsay subsequently enabled M. Marcel ^ to add 
 some quaint particulars to the narrative ; and we are 
 
 ' "Relations de la France et du Eoyaume de Siam, &c." Ver- 
 sailles, 1883. 
 
 ' " L'Expedition de Siam en 1687." Reoue de VEtrdme Orient, 
 October-December, 1884. 
 
FHAULKON. 
 
 . ^53 
 
 indebted to these writers for a story of romantic 
 adventure, of unscrupulous intrigue, of pretension on 
 the part of France, and resentment and eventual 
 rebellion in Siam, that might tax our credulity if it 
 were less well authenticated by extant records. The 
 records, however, are there — French as well as 
 Siamese : letters from kings and ministers, from 
 envoys and missionaries, from military officers and 
 commercial agents — and they have enabled the 
 picture to be reproduced with circumstantial detail. 
 Gi'eek and Jesuit, abbe and factor, ambassador and 
 mandarin, assume their places upon the stage, and 
 afford a curious picture of the motives which pre- 
 vailed in the French Court and disturbed the Eastern 
 world during the closing years of the seventeenth 
 century. 
 
 By one of those romantic chances to which the 
 times were favourable, a Greek named Phaulkon had 
 found his way to the Siamese capital, and had suc- 
 ceeded in attaining a position of considerable wealth 
 and power. His commercial talents had recom- 
 mended him to the Prime Minister, who had, in turn, 
 recommended him to the King ; and both seem to 
 have trusted him largely in the management, at 
 least, of foreign and commercial affairs. This man 
 appears to have thrown himself heart and soul into 
 the French interest. If it is often difficult to gauge 
 the character of living statesmen in days of complete 
 publicity, it is much more difficult to appreciate the 
 motives that influenced a Greek adventurer holding 
 a difficult position at an Oriental Court, two cen- 
 
154 FRANCE AND SIAM. 
 
 turies ago. Messrs. Lanier and Marcel appear to 
 concur in regarding him as an unscrupulous intriguer, 
 careless of the interests of a too confiding master. 
 But the surmise may be admissible that his motives 
 were less wholly selfish. The elevation of a foreigner 
 could hardly fail to excite the envy, hatred, and 
 malice of Siamese courtiers, and Phaulkon might well 
 feel the want of exterior support. It is by no means 
 unlikely that in forwarding French interests, in pro- 
 tecting French missionaries, and admitting French 
 soldiers, he may have been influenced measurably by 
 a desire to make powerful friends. But it is not un- 
 reasonable to suppose that he was actuated, also, by 
 a wish to secure political support for Siam. The 
 Power which had just annexed Bantam was impor- 
 tuning for concessions on the coast of Tenasserim, and 
 Phra Narai seems to have been in full accord with 
 Phaulkon's policy of setting up France as a counter- 
 poise to Holland. If the Most Christian King aimed 
 at wholesale conversion where Phaulkon contem- 
 plated toleration, and at military and political pre- 
 dominance where he contemplated alliance, it is not 
 fair to hold the Greek altogether responsible. What- 
 ever his defects, he appears to have promoted com- 
 merce, inspired wise laws,^ and helped the King to 
 hold at bay the Burmese, who were soon to settle the 
 question of Tenasserim by reaving it once for all from 
 
 * Mrs. Leonowens tells us that he is still remembered by his 
 Siamese name of Vicha-yen (cool wisdom) ; that traces of his 
 handiwork are still visible in the laws, buildings, and fortifications ; 
 and that all marvellous works are still attributed to gods, genii, 
 devils, or to the Vicha-yen ! — " The English Governess at the 
 Siamese Court." London, 1871. 
 
SIAMESE EMBASSY TO FINANCE. 155 
 
 the Siamese grasp. He fills, at any rate, such a 
 remarkable place in the narrative that it was neces- 
 sary to fix attention upon his personality, in order 
 to appreciate one of the principal forces in the poli- 
 tical game. 
 
 It has been noted that the first Siamese Emissaries 
 were engulfed before reaching the Cape. But the 
 news had not reached Ayuthia three years after the 
 event. Mgr. Pallu had, in the meantime, been again 
 to Europe and brought back fresh letters from Louis 
 XIV., which Phra Narai was persuaded to acknow- 
 ledge by sending other envoys — personally conducted, 
 again, by a French priest. The fact that this 
 Mission sailed in an English ship may serve to 
 indicate that the French Company had not yet 
 availed itself very largely of the opening offered ; 
 and this comparative subordination of the com- 
 mercial to the clerical element is a leading feature 
 in the entire episode. The religious idea, as 
 Deschamps has pointed out,^ was in the ascendant. 
 In the charters of the West India as well as of the 
 East India Companies — under Richelieu as well as 
 Colbert — the duty of promoting Christianity is 
 connoted with the extension of commerce ; and it 
 is evident from the records before us that the idea 
 dominated Louis XIV. in his dealings with Siam. 
 Colbert and de Seignelay might see the wisdom of 
 encouraging commerce, and of competing with 
 Holland for the wealth which enabled her to hold 
 out against France in Europe ; but Pere la Chaise 
 
 ^ '' Histoire de la Question Coloniale en France." Paris, 1891. 
 
156 FRANCE AND SI AM. 
 
 evidently liad a hand in shaping the course of 
 negotiations. A return Embassy was decided on. 
 A converted Protestant named de Chaumont and a 
 converted rake named de Choisy were selected as its 
 chiefs ; and the following extract from their in- 
 structions will explain, better than any dissertation, 
 the objects it had in view : — 
 
 " The principal object [writes de Seignelay] which His Majesty 
 had in resolving to send an embassy to Siani is the hope, which 
 the missionaries have given, of the advantage that religion would 
 derive ; and the hopes they have conceived, on sufficiently plau- 
 sible grounds, that the King of Siam, touched by this mark of 
 esteem, would finally make up his mind (acheveroit de se deter- 
 miner) to embrace the Christian religion for which he has 
 already shown much inclination. His Majesty relies with the 
 greater confidence that his intention in this respect will be 
 executed, as he knows that the Sieur Chaumont makes particular 
 profession of piety. 
 
 " His Majesty wishes also, in this voyage, to procure all possible 
 advantages for the commerce of his subjects in the Indies." — etc., 
 etc. 
 
 The French had, in the meantime, evidently been 
 placed on a most friendly footing : the missionaries 
 had been allowed to institute stations and establish 
 hospitals ; while Deslandes had been given every 
 facility for commerce, and had only his superiors to 
 thank if the English and Dutch were allowed to 
 do the bulk of the business. De Chaumont had a 
 gorgeous reception, in which every possible con- 
 cession was made to European custom. The mis- 
 fortune was that the whole edifice was built upon 
 illusion. While Phra Narai wanted a defensive 
 alliance, and Phaulkon wanted support and Colbert 
 
FRENCH EMBASSY TO SI AM. 157 
 
 wanted commerce, Louis wanted the eclai of a grand 
 diplomatic conversion. And so, while the King 
 talked about Holland, and Phaulkon talked com- 
 merce, de Chaumont talked conversion, about which 
 Phra Narai had never dreamed. The Greek did his 
 utmost, as interpreter, to round off the edges of the 
 conversation; but eventually the shock came. To 
 a direct question by de Chaumont, the Siamese 
 monarch replied drily that he saw no reason for 
 abandoning a religion which his countrymen had 
 exercised uninterruptedly for more than 2000 years ! 
 The disillusion was terrible ; and the envoys 
 appear to have realized that the conclusion of a 
 treaty^ giving ample facilities to missionaries and 
 remarkable concessions to the Company could not 
 be expected to compensate, in the eyes of the Most 
 Christian King. The view of the Siamese, "that 
 heaven was a great palace which could be reached by 
 many roads," would be simply incomprehensible to 
 the monarch who was about revoking the Edict of 
 Nantes ; and Phaulkon met blank inattention when 
 he broached the question of an offensive and de- 
 fensive alliance to which all these concessions had 
 doubtless been intended to lead up. The resources 
 of Greek subtlety were not, however, exhausted. 
 Foiled in his attempt to come to an understanding 
 with the French Envoy, he looked about for other 
 means, and found in a Jesuit named Tachard a 
 congenial ally. The disciples of Loyola have always 
 
 ^ Signed at Louvo (the King's palace) by de Chaumount and 
 Phaulkon, 10th December, 1685. 
 
158 FRANCE AND SIAM. 
 
 been willing to mix politics with religion ; and have 
 often mixed them, in the East, to their own detriment. 
 In erudition and suppleness Tachard seems to have 
 been a typical member of the order. He threw 
 himself into Phaulkon's plans ; and de Choisy frankly 
 admits that he and de Chaumont became, thence- 
 forward, mere puppets on the stage. 
 
 It was resolved to carry the negotiations to Paris ; 
 and Phra Narai was persuaded to despatch a fresh 
 Embassy, of which, it need hardly be added, Tachard 
 was to be the inspiring genius. Failing a dramatic 
 conversion, political pre-eminence might conciliate 
 the vanity of the French King ; and a Jesuit might 
 persuade Jesuits that more gradual methods would 
 be more likely to result in success : the missionaries 
 had ample opportunities to preach, and proselytize 
 if they could ; and Phaulkon offered to admit French 
 garrisons into the ports of Mergui and Bangkok. 
 The bait took. The Siamese were received with 
 distinction at Versailles ; and a responsive Embassy 
 was sent, under La Loubere and Ceberet de la 
 BouUaye, accompanied by a detachment of troops 
 under Des Farges who was to take possession of the 
 proffered ports. Louis was willing, perhaps, to 
 procure the Compagnie des Indes some compensation 
 for the loss he was inflicting on it by forbidding the 
 importation of Indian cottons, which were found to 
 compete inconveniently with French manufactures. 
 It seems, moreover, to have been impressed upon 
 him that the establishment of commerce would best 
 conduce to the execution of his other purposes ; for 
 
SECOND FRENCH EAIBASSY, 159 
 
 the Envoys are instructed to " mettre les Fran^ais 
 en estat de faire tout le commerce de toutes les 
 Indes " ; remembering always, however, that the pro- 
 motion of religion is the ulterior object which his 
 Majesty has in view ! La Loubere, accordingly, 
 was to inform himself about the politics, resources, 
 military strength, and general condition of the 
 country ; Ceberet was to negotiate a commercial 
 treaty ; while Des Farges was to fortify himself 
 in the promised positions, with the aid of work- 
 men whom he was to require from the King of 
 Siam. 
 
 The Envoys set sail from Brest on March 1st, and 
 reached the Meinam on September 27th, 1687. But 
 again the divergence between the pretensions of 
 Louis and the intentions of Phra Narai became 
 quickly apparent. The ideas of France were the 
 exaltation of the Church and military occupation 
 and predominance in Siam ; but Phaulkon declined 
 to hand over the promised fortresses unless the 
 French took an oath of fidelity, not only to the 
 King but to himself! " Au Roi de Siam, passe 
 encore," was the not unnatural exclamation ; " mais 
 a Phaulkon jamais." Rather than go back empty- 
 handed, however, they consented to the exigency, 
 though the event was to prove that the obligation 
 lay lightly on their minds : and the Greek then 
 fulfilled his portion of the compact. French gar- 
 risons under Des Farges and Du Bruant were 
 admitted into Bangkok and Mergui ; ample privi- 
 leges were given to missionaries ; and Ceberet was 
 
i6o FRANCE AND SI AM. 
 
 enabled to conclude a treaty which gave the Com- 
 pany complete freedom of trade, with civil and 
 criminal jurisdiction over its servants, the right of 
 establishing factories where it pleased (en quelque 
 lieu que ce soit du royaume), the promise of an 
 island near Mergui — a treaty, in fact, which gave 
 something like a monopoly of foreign trade with 
 every conceivable facility for carrying it on. La 
 Loubere, however, kept harping on the question of 
 religion with a persistence that may well have 
 seemed inexplicable in face of the large toleration 
 that had been promised and decreed. It was diffi- 
 cult, indeed, for anyone who retained a measure of 
 common sense to realize the fatuous credulity of 
 Louis about this royal and national conversion, 
 which the missionaries dangled before his eyes and 
 which the Ambassadors were instructed to press for 
 as a sort of diplomatic concession. If [ivrote La 
 Bruyere] — 
 
 " If one assured us that the secret motive of the Siamese 
 Embassy was to induce the Most Christian King to renounce 
 Christianity, and give free course to Buddhist priests who were 
 making their way into our houses to commend their religion to 
 our wives and children and ourselves, who had built pagodas in 
 the middle of our towns and set up metal images to be adored — 
 with what laughter and contempt should we not receive such an 
 extravagant proposition ! Yet we go 6000 miles over sea to make 
 seriously, to all those peoples, propositions which must appear to 
 them equally foolish and ridiculous." 
 
 Even that picture fails to represent the full ex- 
 travagance of the situation, for "those peoples" 
 were actually permitting what would have appeared 
 
RELIGIOUS FANATICISM. i6i 
 
 SO monstrous if the situation had been reversed ! 
 But that was not enough. If Phaulkon pointed to 
 the toleration afforded, the Envoys rejoined that 
 mosques and Hindu temples were tolerated also ; and 
 desired that the King should be told, in so many words, 
 that Louis' object was the advancement of Chris- 
 tianity! — not tolerance, in fact, but intolerance — the 
 imposition on Siam of the regime which he was impos- 
 ing on France. No wonder the worldly-wise Tachard 
 could scarcely veil his contempt under a hint that 
 the Apostolic Missionaries did not understand enough 
 Siamese, and that they must wait till the Jesuits had 
 mastered the language to see the King brought round ! 
 An interchange of letters was going on, all this 
 time, with Versailles ; and the utterances of the 
 French Court might almost tempt one to believe 
 that Dumas' romance of the substitution of one 
 twin for another erred only in supposing it to have 
 been defeated by D'Artagnan's perspicacity. While 
 the successor of Colbert writes politics and commerce, 
 the priests invoice church furniture ; while Seignelay 
 instructs Des Farges about his fortifications, Louis 
 orders him to exact from his soldiers the observance 
 of Friday fasts, proper behaviour in church, a 
 respectful bearing towards ecclesiastics, and ab- 
 stinence from " berlands, academies, et autres lieux 
 de debauche." Such an atmosphere of cant and 
 cross-purposes could hardly fail to be redolent of 
 intrigue. Phaulkon set himself to attach Des Farges 
 to his own interests. Tachard schemed for the 
 advancement of the Society of Jesus over the mis- 
 
 M 
 
i62 FRANCE AND SIAM. 
 
 sionaries who had preceded it in the field. Veret, 
 who was officiating as local agent for the Compagnie 
 des Indes, hated Phaulkon and was ready to conspire 
 against him and his Jesuit ally. The populace were 
 angered by the indiscipline of the French troops, 
 who conducted themselves as though they were in a 
 conquered town. The jealousy of the Notables had 
 been excited by the foreign leanings of the King and 
 the aggressive attitude of the intruders ; and it is 
 not a little curious to find the Siamese Envoy, who 
 had been the object of so much flattery at Versailles, 
 among the chief leaders of the reaction which was to 
 overthrow the political edifice and whelm stage and 
 performers in a common ruin. 
 
 Phaulkon was too familiar with the Siamese not to 
 perceive the dangerous nature of the forces that were 
 at work. It was in a despairing effort, no doubt, to 
 induce Louis to modify his attitude and to send a 
 more supple Representative, that he persuaded Phra 
 Narai to despatch another Embassy and to accredit, 
 again, his ally Tachard. The failure to effect more 
 sweeping conversions had to be palliated and ex- 
 plained ; and both Tachard and Phaulkon agreed in 
 throwing the onus on the bishops and the Mission- 
 aires Apostoliques. The discretion of the Jesuits, on 
 the other hand, was lauded ; and Tachard was com- 
 missioned to assure not only Louis XIV., but Pope 
 Innocent, of Phra Narai's full intention to protect 
 the Christians in his kingdom. He met a favourable 
 reception at Rome ; and, with Pere la Chaise near 
 the height of his influence, found the way smoothed 
 
O VERTHRO W OF PHA ULKON, 163 
 
 for him at Versailles. Negotiations with Seignelay 
 resulted in a fresh agreement, which may remind us 
 of the famous treaty negotiated by Bishop Pigneau, 
 a hundred years later, that paved the way for 
 the assertion of French interests in Cochin-China. 
 Its drift may be inferred from the fact that Louis 
 sent with it, as a proof of goodwill, fifty French 
 gentlemen to act as a Royal Guard, under the 
 command of the Marquis d'Eragny who was to have 
 supreme control over all French interests in Siam. 
 M. Lanier scarcely exaggerates, in fact, when he 
 thus sums up the situation : — 
 
 '^ Louis XIV,, with the complicity more or less unforeseeing of 
 Phaulcon, designed to complete by these measures the conquest 
 of Siam. He occupied the approaches at Bangkok and Mergui. 
 The troops under Des Farges overawed Siamese discontent, and 
 closed the mouth of the Meinam against foreign enemies. The 
 Marquis d'Eragny, installed at Court master of the Palace and the 
 person of the King of whom he was instituted guardian, — at once 
 captain, councillor, diplomat, and chief judge, — was to exercise 
 under the guise of an obedient servant, a real protectorate disguised 
 under the name of friendship, and impose if necessary by force, 
 the suzerainty of the great Western King on this Asiatic vassal 
 thus tardily undeceived," 
 
 It had been realized, however, before Burns, that 
 " the best-laid schemes of mice and men gang aft 
 aglee." All these beautiful arrangements were to be 
 defeated by the unreasonable objection of the people 
 for whose benefit they were designed. Before the 
 expedition could set sail, a revolution at Ayuthia 
 had swept away King, Greek, and garrison. 
 
 A dangerous feeling of irritation had, as we have 
 seen, been long brewing at the Siamese capital. 
 
 M 2 
 
1 64 FRANCE AND SI AM, 
 
 Phra Phret Raxa, an official who seems to have 
 occupied the position of Master of the Horse (and 
 Elephants), placed himself at the head of the mal- 
 contents. The Dutch were evidently ready to give 
 them something more than moral support ; and the 
 personal jealousies at which we have hinted were to 
 exert a paralyzing influence on French action. Get- 
 ting wind of the danger that was brewing, Phaulkon 
 appealed in hot haste to the French garrison for 
 support. But, after marching as far as Ayuthia, 
 Des Farges allowed himself to be dissuaded by 
 Veret and the missionaries, and returned to Bangkok, 
 where he remained deaf alike to entreaty and re- 
 proach. The conspirators, accordingly, found their 
 way clear. They surrounded the Palace ; overcame, 
 easily, what little resistance was offered ; and accom- 
 plished their revolution with ridiculous ease. A 
 certain obscurity shrouds the fate of Phra Narai, 
 though native report credits him with suicide when 
 he saw that his enemies had triumphed : Phaulkon 
 was tortured and put to death with every species of 
 contumely ; and Phra Phret Raxa laid hold on the 
 reins of power. 
 
 Too late, then, Des Farges decided on resistance. 
 French interests had been bound up with Phaulkon 
 and Phra Narai ; but it was not, seemingly, till they 
 were dead that he began to realize the fact. He 
 refused to evacuate Bangkok, and held out against 
 the efforts of the Siamese helped, it is alleged, by the 
 Dutch — till provisions began to fail. Compelled, 
 then, to surrender and accept the offer of transport 
 
FRENCH INTERESTS EFFA CED, 1 65 
 
 to Pondichery, he tamislied his reputation by giving 
 up Phaulkon's widow, who had thrown herself on 
 French protection. It was part of the agreement 
 that Mergui also was to be surrendered ; but that 
 had been already accomplished. Constrained by want 
 of water, the garrison had cut their way out, and 
 taken refuge on board a French ship in harbour. It 
 was consistent with the romantic nature of the episode 
 that they should be wrecked on the coast of Pegu 
 and rescued by a Siamese vessel. It was consistent 
 also with the curious obliquity of perception which 
 characterizes too many of the actors in the drama, 
 that Des Farges should return from Pondichery, 
 occupy an island off Mergui and write, thence, to 
 make fresh overtures which, it is hardly necessary to 
 add, the Siamese promptly declined. 
 
 It seems to have been perceived in France, if it 
 had not been apparent to Des Farges, that the death 
 of Phaulkon meant the close of the opportunity. 
 The expedition which had been destined for Ayuthia 
 was diverted to Pondichery, whence the Siamese 
 Envoys were forwarded to Mergui. Informal nego- 
 tiations seem to have gone on, from time to time, 
 during the next ten or fifteen years ; but they were 
 only the flickerings of the candle before it went out. 
 The Siamese were willing to admit French commerce 
 pure and simple ; but the Great Monarch could 
 conceive no status other than that of military occu- 
 pation. We find, accordingly, an opening which had 
 been effected, in 1697, by the irrepressible Tachard, 
 closed because Louis wanted to occupy the forts at 
 
i66 FRANCE AND SI AM. 
 
 Mergui. The son and successor of Plira Phret Raxa 
 showed himself willing, six years later, to accept in- 
 tercourse with France on the same terms as with 
 other nations; but Louis still wanted advantages, 
 and so got nothing. The whole matter then dropped ; 
 and it was not till 150 years later that another 
 French Envoy was to open negotiations on a basis 
 more in accord with modern ideas. 
 
 At the time these events were taking place on the 
 Meinam, a Laotian Power was enthroned in the Mei- 
 kong valley, with its capital at Wien-chang, nearly in 
 the heart of the peninsula; and a Dutch Mission, 
 which ascended the river in 1641, mentions that the 
 Cambodians were being compelled to retire before 
 its unceasing attacks. Soon after, however, accord- 
 ing to Garnier,^ it split into two principalities ; and 
 the Siamese and Annamese began a struggle for its 
 heritage which ended, eventually, in favour of Bang- 
 kok. The Siamese affirm that the Annamese and 
 Cambodians were expelled, about a hundred years 
 ago, by the founder of the present dynasty; and 
 claim to have held the country — loosely, ho doubt, 
 but to the exclusion at least of rivals — ever since. 
 The conditions have not been those of a Roman 
 Peace : there was a great revolt in 1829 ; there have 
 been incursions of Chinese banditti in the north, 
 and there has been fighting with Cochin-China 
 about Cambodia in the south. A map published ^ 
 only last year, by M. Fauvel, shows the Annamese 
 
 ^ *' Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine." 
 ^ In the Revue Frangaise, 
 
THE MEIKONG VALLEY, 167 
 
 boundary of 1838 as overpassing even the Meikong ; 
 but it is difficult to resist the impression that this 
 must represent, at the best, a temporary circum- 
 stance, even if it have any other foundation than the 
 probable truth that the Laos have occasionally paid 
 tribute to Hue as well as to Bangkok, The per- 
 sistency with which French -writers refer to this date 
 seems indeed to indicate that they regard it as im- 
 portant to reduce the unassailable fact of Siamese 
 occupation within the briefest possible limits. Their 
 contention would seem to be that the suppression of 
 the Laos revolt indicates its real origin ; and M. de 
 Lanessan twits the Siamese, in his famous work,^ with 
 only having been in possession of the disputed terri- 
 tory for fifty years. But even if this contention 
 were admitted, the French claim would not be per- 
 ceptibly strengthened, for it is at least an admission 
 that Siam had been in possession for half a century 
 at the time he ^vrote ; and the map of Europe would 
 be seriously disturbed if a general attempt were 
 made to re-arrange it with reference to a date prior 
 to 1836. There was no doubt, at any rate, about 
 the state of things in 1866 ; for we find M. de Lagree 
 calling upon the Siamese authorities at Stung-treng 
 and Khong for the boats and accommodation which 
 " they had been ordered to supply, from Bangkok ;" 
 and Garnier admits incidentally that Siamese juris- 
 diction extended up to the Annamese mountains, as 
 far as Attopeu, " which was the farthest eastern pos- 
 session of Bangkok." He perceives, certainly, very 
 ^ " L'Expansion Coloniale de la France." Paris, 1866. 
 
1 68 FRANCE AND SI AM. 
 
 excellent reasons why the French flag should be 
 hoisted at various trading centres along the river 
 bank, with a view to fostering and developing the 
 commerce that was to spring up under its shade ; 
 but the population is Laos and the Authority is 
 Siamese. 
 
 The motive of de Lagree's expedition was to 
 examine the navigability of the Meikong and the 
 commercial capabilities of the region which it drains. 
 It was hoped that it might prove a practicable chan- 
 nel of intercourse with Yunnan, besides offering 
 facilities for trade with the country along its banks. 
 And that hope seems still to inspire French colonial 
 policy, notwithstanding that it is now kno^vn to be 
 broken by impassable rapids, and that the prospects 
 of local trade appear slight and unpromising. Gar- 
 nier's own observations point inevitably to these 
 conclusions, though his sanguine temperament 
 enabled him, as Mr. Archer ^ suggests, " to see the 
 colours of the rainbow in a grey sky." Mr. Archer, 
 however, was free from any such hallucination, and 
 his sober conclusions can hardly fail to command 
 interest at the present crisis : — 
 
 " The prospects of French trade in the Me-kong Valley have 
 of late years been vaunted to such a degree that I must take this 
 opportunity to state that it seems to me impossible for a candid 
 observer to conceive how French commerce can compete with the 
 present trade of the country or find a profitable field in these 
 regions. French goods are not suited to the people, and must 
 
 ^ Report on a Journey in the Meikong Valley. By W. J. 
 Archer, H.M.'s Consular Service in Siam. Siam (Blue Book) 1 
 of 1892. 
 
PROSPECTS OF TRADE. 169 
 
 naturally be too expensive for them. It is hardly necessary to 
 say that France cannot export piece-goods, yarn, or ironware, as 
 cheap as Manchester and Birmingham, and it is precisely such 
 goods that the people will buy. Communications in all the 
 country east of Luang Prabang are so bad that to bring goods 
 from Annam or Tonkin it would be necessary to incur an enormous 
 outlay on improving the means of transport. Even were this 
 done, I doubt whether Manchester or Birmingham goods such as 
 the people require, subject to a high protective tariff and to the 
 cost of transport by road, railway, or steamer, could undersell the 
 imports from Bangkok. The only serious attempt that could be 
 made to dispose of French goods in these regions would be (say) 
 to prohibit all other imports. On the whole, this would not be 
 quite an undesirable consummation, for it would restrict the people 
 to their own manufactures, which are of better taste and stronger 
 texture than any imported goods ; and it would tend to preserve 
 the industries of the country, which are threatened extinction by 
 increased facilities for obtaining foreign goods. However, I am 
 convinced that the present trade of Luang Prabang need not fear 
 French competition ; but, anyhow, it is so inconsiderable, and has 
 so little room for development, that it is hardly worth making 
 efforts to improve it. The plain facts are that Luang Prabang and 
 its sister provinces on the north-east are a mass of mountains with 
 hardly any soil available for plain cultivation, and with a spai-se 
 population, chiefly nomadic, that tends to emigrate westward to 
 the richer territories of ^an and Chiengmai." 
 
 And again, with regard to the prospects of navi- 
 gation : 
 
 " I do not in the least believe that steamers can ever be ad- 
 vantageously employed on this river for trading purposes. I^o 
 steam-boat could safely make head against the treacherous current 
 up the rapids or shoot them on the way down. . . . The regions 
 of rapids in the Me-kong below Luang Prabang may be roughly 
 pi iced in the following separate localities : Tha Diia, Chiengkhan, 
 Kemarat, Khon, and Preatapang. Granted that steamers could 
 be brought above these different rapids and navigated in the still 
 reaches between them, how is the transport between the principal 
 towns on the river to be effected? Are there to be unloading and 
 
I70 FRANCE AND SI AM, 
 
 reloading stations, and roads made past the rapids 1 If so, what 
 is likely to be the cost of transport of small quantities of goods 
 from Cambodia to Luang Prabang % It hardly requires a practical 
 mind to make the proper answers to these questions ; and I think 
 I can do no better than quote the remark of the Commissioner at 
 Luang Prabang, who, when a French traveller was trying to 
 convince him of the practicability of bringing steamers up to 
 Luang Prabang, silenced him by saying that he would undertake 
 to build wharves for them at his owm expense as soon as they 
 arrived. But the absurdity of a scheme for the navigation of the 
 Me-kong, from a commercial point of view, may be judged best 
 by comparing it to a similar undertaking on the Me-nam. If a 
 regular steam service up a large river from a port like Bangkok, 
 that feeds the whole of the rich, populous valley above it, is 
 hardly profitable, it is inconceivable that it should be more so up 
 a difficult river, through a poor, mountainous, and sparsely- 
 populated country. The high expectations recently raised of the 
 navigability of the Me-kong can only come from those who have 
 their own purposes to serve in leading the French commercial 
 classes to suppose that there is a great possible market for French 
 goods in a country that offers absolutely no such prospect. . . . 
 It appears to me that the perusal of M. Garnier's work must 
 necessarily bring an impartial observer to the conclusions that the 
 Me-kong is difficult of navigation, the population small, and the 
 trade insignificant. Trade naturally finds the route best suited 
 to it, and that to Bangkok is the only one of any importance for 
 the Me-kong Yalley from Cambodia to Luang Prabang ; but when, 
 moreover, the Siamese Government completes the construction of 
 the railway to Korat, which it is about to undertake, neither 
 Cambodia nor Annam can have any chance of competing with 
 Korat for the trade of the Me-kong Valley. Korat is the natural 
 feeder of that country ; and there can be no doubt as to its 
 importance as a trade centre^ nor as to the necessity for railway 
 communication with Bangkok." 
 
 Mr. Archer did not extend his journey to the 
 Lower Meikong. He quitted the river at Chieng- 
 khah (about 18 N.), where it makes its second great 
 easterly bend ; but Garnier's observations and recent 
 
DIFFICUL TIES OF NA VIGA TION. 1 7 1 
 
 experiments confirm his statements as to the imprac- 
 ticability of the lower rapids. Khong and Stung- 
 treng, which the French have recently occupied, are 
 the capitals, respectively, of the provinces next above 
 Cambodia. Stung-treng, which stands on the east 
 bank of the Meikong, contained at the time of Gar- 
 nier's visit about 800 inhabitants, all Laotians. 
 What commerce it possessed was in the hands of 
 Chinese, who brought up betel nut, sugar, salt, and 
 silk and cotton goods, and took back cardamom, wax, 
 lacquer, ivory, skins, and trifling articles of native 
 manufacture. Both provinces lie to the left of the 
 Meikong ; but the town of Khong stands on an island 
 in the river bed, just above the rapids of Khone, 
 which have so far been found impassable by 
 steam. Gunboats are accordingly being sent out in 
 pieces, to be put together above the rapids ; and the 
 Colonial Government has voted a subvention of 
 $20,000 for the purpose of placing a cargo steamer 
 on the upper reach, which is navigable to Kemaret 
 and possibly farther during a certain period of the 
 year. In point of commercial importance Khong 
 seems about on a par with Stung-treng. Garnier is 
 emphatic, however, in his declaration that the French 
 flag must be hoisted, not only on the island but on 
 the right bank, " to protect the transshipment of 
 merchandise at the cataract." It is true, the right 
 bank is Siamese ; but so, as we have seen, was the 
 whole region. That, however, is a trifle : it had 
 once been Cambodian ! And M. de Lagree returned 
 from an exploration of the Tonly Repou, a little river 
 
172 FRANCE AND SI AM. 
 
 which falls into the Meikong on the west, with a 
 conviction that France ought also to acquire the 
 province of that name, which she might fairly claim 
 on Cambodia's behalf as Siam had only gained pos- 
 session of it, a generation or so previously, through 
 the rebellion of a Cambodian Governor who had 
 thrown himself on the protection of Bangkok ! It 
 is true the Siamese describe the event in question 
 as an appeal for Siamese protection during one of 
 the chronic invasions of Cochin- China ; but that only 
 shows the perversity of the Siamese ! And so on 
 up the river. The protection of the French flag was 
 equally required at Bassac, " whose natural advan- 
 tages point it out as one of the points in the Lower 
 Laos where French influence should be most solidly 
 planted." 
 
 The records of the expedition seem, indeed, to 
 have been a sort of Peter the Great's will, tracino- a 
 scheme of French adventure. But even Garnier, to 
 do him justice, does not appear to have dreamed of 
 anything so sweeping as the annexation of the region 
 between the Meikong and the Annamese crest. 
 Those who have read his monumental work will not 
 need to be reminded that it contains two maps, one 
 of which was compiled from the best sources at his 
 disposal, before setting out, while the other was the 
 result of careful survey and inquiry elucidated by all 
 the help the Siamese could give, during the course 
 of his journey ; and it is significant that, while the 
 former makes the Siamese boundary run along the 
 crest of the mountains, the latter brings it only a 
 
SI AM PROPOSES ARBITRA TION. 1 7 3 
 
 very little farther to the west. The maps, therefore, 
 constitute a pertinent admission of the state of 
 things in 1866-8. 
 
 Nothing, indeed, is more curious than the French 
 complaints of " encroachment," by Siam, in a region 
 where Garnier found her officials established, and 
 where her authority is alleged to have been pre- 
 dominant for more than a hundred years. The 
 complaint seems based, mainly, on alleged breaches 
 of an agreement to maintain the status quo pending 
 definite delimitation. An agreement to that effect 
 appears to have been proposed by Siam herself, when 
 French claims upon the eastern half of the Meikong 
 valley began (about 1888) to take official shape. 
 Siam asked then, and has repeatedly asked since, 
 that the frontier should be surveyed and delimited. 
 Pending such a settlement, she proposed the ob- 
 servance of a neutral zone, 30 miles wide, between 
 the 13th and 19th degrees of latitude. This was, 
 she considered, already a concession, as the whole 
 tract was under her jurisdiction and it was for the 
 French to disprove her claim. There does seem, 
 hoAvever, this much ground for the charge — that 
 both parties failed to observe, strictly, the limits 
 of the neutral zone. Siam declares that the 
 Franco- Annamese began encroaching on their side, 
 and that she was driven to advance on hers if she 
 would not see the territory occupied in her despite ; 
 while a recent article in the Revue Fran(;aise accuses 
 the Siamese of having taken up positions close to the 
 Annamese slope and of having, in one case, even 
 
174 FRANCE AND SI AM, 
 
 passed the watershed and approached within thirty- 
 miles of Hue. This is the muddying of the water 
 which excited so much indignation in the French 
 Press, and which the French representative at Bang- 
 kok was instructed to terminate, once for all, by 
 asserting a claim to the whole leffc bank of the Mei- 
 kong, and by demanding that Siam should evacuate 
 all her military posts to the east of that river. 
 
 The storm had, as we have seen, been long brewing. 
 The idea that French " rights " might be made to 
 stretch to the Meikong found casual expression soon 
 after the extension of the Protectorate over Annam 
 and Tongking. Neis, Pavie, and other travellers 
 began, at first casually, and afterwards systemati- 
 cally, to explore and map out the whole Laos country. 
 The subject was discussed by M. de Lanessan, the 
 present Governor- General of French Indo-China, in 
 the work written after his visit to the peninsula in 
 1886, and has been kept alive by the Deloncles and 
 politicians of the adventurous colonial school. But 
 it was when Siam decided to make a railway to 
 Korat that it took form and substance, and was 
 elevated into a political maxim. In the work already 
 quoted, de Lanessan had gone so far as to urge that 
 that project should be thwarted by every possible 
 means. French interests lay in trying to drain the 
 commerce of the country south-eastward towards 
 Cambodia and Cochin-China, while the Korat railway, 
 as we have seen with Mr. Archer, would encourage 
 its tendency to flow south-westward to Bangkok. 
 It was time to do something if that conclusion was 
 to be defeated ; and hence, apparently, the resolve 
 
FRANCE OCCUPIES DISPUTED TERRITORY. 175 
 
 to obtain timely possession of the rival channel. On 
 March 1st last, 206 years exactly after de Chaumont 
 set sail from Brest, M. Develle announced that he 
 had come to an understanding with the Colonial 
 Department as to the measures to be taken to ensure 
 French rights. The occupation of Khong and 
 Stung-treng by a Franco-Annamese contingent 
 quickly followed. Another force, marching across 
 the mountains farther north, descended the valley of 
 the Se-bang-hien, pushing the Siamese before them, 
 to the banks of the Meikong opposite Kemaret. A 
 telegram, dated June 3rd, announced that the post 
 of Kham Muon, on the river Kading, had been 
 vacated at the summons of M. Luce ; and a further 
 telegram, dated ten days later, stated that all posts 
 occupied by the Siamese in the territories between 
 Kham Muon, Houten and Nong Kay had been eva- 
 cuated, and that the Siamese had recrossed the 
 Meikong to the right bank. The occupation of these 
 places would, in fact, complete the clearance of the 
 Lower Laos, as distinguished from the northern or 
 Luang Prabang region ; and France was, doubtless, 
 well assured that no one would contest her progress 
 so far. 
 
 It is above the parallel of 18° N. that English and 
 Chinese interests tend to become acute ; and it 
 remains to be ascertained how much farther she will 
 be allowed to advance along the upper reaches of 
 the river. Even the territory claimed by M. Ribot — 
 the left bank up to frontier of Yunnan — would hardly 
 satisfy the more eager politicians. M. Demanche ^ 
 ^ Revue Francaise, Juno 15tb, 1893. 
 
176 FRANCE AND SI AM. 
 
 urges, for instance, that Annamese domination once 
 extended nearly up to the crest of the watershed 
 which divides the Meikong from the Meinam ; M. 
 de Lanessan has, himself, expressed aspirations after 
 the basin of the Se-moun, while a work entitled 
 La France et UAngleterre en Asie ^ contains a 
 series of maps suggesting various divisions of the 
 peninsula, ranging from the preservation of a 
 diminished Siamese kingdom in the south to a com- 
 plete partition in which even Yunnan is coloured 
 French ! These may be taken as the irresponsible con- 
 ceptions of irresponsible writers ; but there has been 
 just published, under official auspices, a splendid map ^ 
 which all available information has been utilized to 
 complete — except that it leaves the question of 
 frontier absolutely blank! It would have been 
 satisfactory to infer that this implied a willingness 
 to consider the dispute open to negotiation and 
 settlement by historic proof: nothing could be 
 fairer than the Siamese proposal that both sides 
 should bring forward evidence in support of their 
 respective claims, and that resort should be had to 
 arbitration in case of inability to agree. The high- 
 handed action of the Government, however, quickly 
 precluded any such supposition ; and France can 
 hardly complain if the world choose to suspect her 
 of inability to substantiate her claim. 
 
 ^ Par Philippe Lehault. Paris, 1892. 
 
 ^ Carte de I'lndo-Chine dressee sous les auspices da Ministre 
 des Affaires Etrangeres et du sous-Secretaire d'Etat des Colonies; 
 par les Capitaines Cupet, Friquegnon et de Malglaive, Mernbres 
 de la Mission Pavie, etc. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 ENGLAND, CHINA, AND SIAM. 
 
 We have seen that Siam met the French demand that 
 she would recognize Annamese rights on the left 
 bank of the Meikong, by expressing a willingness to 
 do so as soon as they were defined, and by proposing 
 that a Commission should be appointed to examine 
 the merits of the contention. We have seen, also, 
 that the French Government apparently ignored the 
 proposal, and confined itself to insisting on its claim. 
 The facts that Garnier found the Siamese dominant 
 throughout the Meikong valley, that de Lanessan is 
 constrained to admit they had been established there 
 for at least fifty years, and that Chaigneau, who 
 carries us back to the beginning of the century (he 
 having lived at Hue many years prior to 1820) 
 expressly afiirms that Annam was then bounded by 
 the mountains which extend down its western 
 frontier — seem to have been ignored or treated as of 
 no account. It has been shown, in previous chap- 
 ters, that the project of enlarging their posses- 
 sions at the expense of Siam had been long present 
 in the minds of French politicians, and the time 
 
 N 
 
178 ENGLAND, CHINA, AND SUM. 
 
 had arrived for putting it in execution. La Fon- 
 taine only stereotyped a familiar fact, in noting 
 that pretexts are seldom lacking when quarrel has 
 been determined on. The facts that a French official 
 and his escort were killed while conducting the 
 Siamese magistrate out of Kham-muon, that a French 
 officer was captured by local levies who objected to 
 the occupation of Khong, and that certain French gun- 
 boats were fired on while ascending the Meinam in 
 defiance of the treaty and of their own instructions, 
 were as good pretexts as any other for pressing 
 matters to an issue. The Litransigeant admitted : 
 ^' We are going to Siam under pretence of avenging 
 an insult, but really with the idea of making a new 
 conquest." 
 
 At a Cabinet Council held on July 18th, it was 
 resolved, accordingly, to present an ultimatum in the 
 following terms: — (1) Recognition of the rights of 
 xlnnam and Cambodia to the left bank of the Meikong 
 and the islands ; (2) evacuation of the posts held 
 there by the Siamese within one month's time ; (3) 
 satisfaction for the various aggressions against 
 French subjects in Siam and French ships and 
 sailors in the Meinam ; (4) punishment of the cul- 
 prits and pecuniary indemnities to the families of 
 victims ; (5) indemnities of two million francs for 
 various damages inflicted on French subjects; (6) 
 immediate deposit of three million francs as a gua- 
 rantee for these claims or, in default, an assignment 
 by way of security of the revenues of Battambong 
 and Angkor. Should these terms not be accepted. 
 
SIAMESE REPLY TO ULTIMATUM. 179 
 
 the French Minister would leave, and the coast be 
 blockaded forthwith. 
 
 The reply of the Siamese Government was admir- 
 able. It again regretted that no precise definition 
 had ever been given of what it was to understand by 
 the expression " rights of the Empire of Annam and 
 of the Kingdom of Cambodia on the left bank of 
 Meikong." It had always been ready to abandon 
 any territories over which those rights could be 
 proved, and had proposed, five months earlier, to 
 submit all contested points to international arbitra- 
 tion. Yielding now, however, to the pressure of 
 circumstances, it consented to delimitation on the 
 following terms : " All territory on the left bank of 
 the Meikong south of a line drawn [practically along] 
 the eighteenth degree of north latitude, to be re- 
 garded as Annamese and Cambodian territory; the 
 river below this point becoming the line of separa- 
 tion, and the use of the islands in the river being 
 common to the three conterminous States." For 
 the rest, reparation would be made as demanded, 
 and 3,000,000 francs would be immediately deposited 
 to cover the griefs enumerated ; though — " believing 
 that, after proper inquiry, this sum would be 
 found to exceed the amount of indemnities claim- 
 able — the king relied upon the justice of the French 
 Government to refund any balance that might re- 
 main available after the settlement of the different 
 cases." 
 
 The French, however, declined any such qualified 
 concession, and ordered the immediate institution 
 
 N 2 
 
i8o ENGLAND, CHINA, AND SI AM. 
 
 of the threatened blockade. What was perhaps 
 more serious — a cry for the occupation of Battam- 
 bong and Angkor made itself heard ; and the king, 
 feeling that hesitation would only open the door 
 to further requirements, supplemented his answer 
 by an expression of unreserved acquiescence. 
 
 Even this failed, however, to satisfy the growing 
 exigencies of the French Government. Accepting 
 the submission in a tone which seemed to imply 
 that the contumacy shown might have entailed un- 
 known penalties at the hands of a less benevolent 
 Power, M. Develle went on to formulate additional 
 conditions as guarantees for the execution of the 
 first demands. (1) France was now to occupy the 
 port and river of Chantaboon, pending the evacua- 
 tion of the left side of the Meikong by Siam ; (2) No 
 Siamese troops were to be allowed within 25 kilometres 
 of the Meikong ; (3) Siam was to have no armed 
 vessels on the Great Lake ; (4) The French were to 
 have a right to establish consulates at Nan and 
 Korat. 
 
 The idea of imposing a second ultimatum, as a 
 guarantee for the execution of the first, is so remark- 
 able that the thought occurs whether a certain 
 section of French politicians were not disappointed 
 that the Siamese surrender placed a limit to their 
 enterprise. It is, as we have seen, patent that 
 the recent aggression is the outcome of a long- 
 planned design; and it is equally certain that the 
 provinces of Battambong and Angkor have long 
 been objects of envy to French colonial politicians. 
 
BATTAMBONG AND ANGKOR. i8i 
 
 Writing several years ago, the present Governor- 
 General of Indo-China recorded his impression of 
 this region in the following terms : 
 
 " The Great Lake has not merely a great economic importance ; 
 it has also an immense political value. The entire possession of 
 that great depression and of the basin which it drains is one of 
 the most important desiderata of the work which we have hitherto 
 pursued in an empirical way, but which we can and should accom- 
 plish henceforth systematically. The western part of the lake 
 especially — namely, the part which our too ignorant or too careless 
 diplomacy ceded to Siam with the provinces of Battambong and 
 Angkor — is one of the vital points of the peninsula, from whatever 
 point of view, commercial, political, or military, we regard it." 
 
 And again : 
 
 " All the efforts of the Government of Indo-China should be 
 directed towards repairing the injuries inflicted by the deplorable 
 treaty of 1867. It may be said that the interest of Siam is also 
 at stake. In assuring to her the protection of her independence, 
 which is destined to be constantly threatened by England, we 
 might easily obtain, without striking a blow, a modification of 
 the treaty of 1867, which would secure for Cambodia not only 
 the whole of the Great Lake, but also the provinces of Battambong 
 and Angkor, which ought to constitute, in this point of the Indo- 
 Chinese peninsula, the limit of our reasonable ambition." 
 
 It was the known existence of these aspirations that 
 caused the stipulated lien on the revenues of Battam- 
 bong and Angkor to be viewed with so much 
 apprehension ; and it is by the light of these aspira- 
 tions that we must judge the proposal to occupy 
 Chantaboon when it seemed likely that Siam would 
 be able to prevent the execution of that clause. 
 Chantaboon is the second port in point of impor- 
 tance in the Siamese dominions, and is situated in 
 the Gulf of Siam, on the river of the same name. 
 
i82 ENGLAND, CHINA, AND SIAM. 
 
 The trade is carried on chiefly by Chinese, though 
 a British company holds a concession for working the 
 deposits of precious stones for which the neigh- 
 bouring mountains are famous. But what is more 
 significant is that it is the port of Battambong ; and 
 here is what M. de Lanessan has to say regarding 
 it: 
 
 " Battambong communicates by a march of five or six days 
 with Chantaboon, a port in the Gulf of Siam, inhabited princi- 
 pally by colonies of Annamese and Chinese. This route has now 
 acquired much importance in consequence of the working of the 
 sapphire mines of Payrinh, and it is by this way that arms and 
 munitions of war are introduced into Cambodia. If we succeeded 
 in utilizing our new position in Annam so as to demand from Siam 
 the protection of the Annamese, who are very numerous through- 
 out the whole of the Lower Meinam, on the coast^ and especially 
 at Chantaboon, we should necessarily be led to place a vice- 
 consul at the port, which interests us in many ways, and at which 
 no one could dispute the preponderant influence of our agent." 
 
 It is scarcely surprising, in presence of these re- 
 marks, and of the obvious superfluity of the occu- 
 pation as a guarantee, that apprehension should be 
 felt lest there lurk behind the demand a possibility 
 of further complications that might indefinitely 
 retard the withdrawal of the occupying force. It 
 is true that all this was written when the author 
 was in a position of greater freedom and less re- 
 sponsibility ; but the very fact that he does now 
 hold the post in which, of all others, he may be sup- 
 posed able to influence French policy in Indo-China 
 must tend to confirm the apprehension with which 
 these ancillary demands are viewed. The BepuUique 
 
FRENCH CLAIMS ON THE MEIKONG. 183 
 
 Frangaise has indeed admitted, with the frankest 
 cynicism, that Siam is not out of the wood. "After 
 satisfaction has been obtained, we must (it says) give 
 the king to understand that at the first outbreak 
 on his part we will seize two of his provinces as 
 security." Which those two provinces would be, we 
 may now be able to infer. Nor should the fact that 
 these are only side issues, appearing as it were in- 
 cidentally among French demands, be allowed to 
 obscure our perception of their gravity ; for they 
 clearly constitute a possible danger to the integrity of 
 Siam in which England has avowed a vital interest. 
 The French Government has committed itself to an 
 explicit declaration of its intention to respect this 
 integrity, and Lord Rosebery has doubtless " taken 
 note " of the assurance ; but a more definite under- 
 standing will be desirable, to strengthen the treaty 
 of 1867 in respect to provinces which constitute 
 a vital portion of the kingdom. 
 
 The language of the ultimatum regarding the 
 Meikong was judiciously vague. It demanded re- 
 cognition of the rights of Annam and Cambodia to 
 the left bank of the river and the islands, without 
 indicating at what point those rights began. But 
 M. Ribot had pre\dously defined them as extending 
 from the frontier of Yunnan to the sea ; and some 
 less responsible politician, inebriated apparently by 
 the exuberance of his own imagination, was found 
 to affirm that they extended up to 23° north. 
 Seeing that this would carry them well within the 
 frontier of Yunnan, it is scarcely surprising that the 
 
1 84 ENGLAND, CHINA, AND SI AM. 
 
 Chinese representative should have taken occasion 
 to call at the Quai d'Orsay and remark that Siam 
 had no territory to cede, so far north as the parallel 
 indicated ; while England no doubt hinted that 
 there existed, even two degrees lower, territory 
 lately belonging to Burmah which she had yielded to 
 Siam on the express condition that it should not be 
 ceded to another Power. 
 
 Siam offered, as we have seen, in her first reply, 
 to yield everything up to 18° north. That would 
 practically mean giving up the eastern half of the 
 old kingdom of Wien-chang, which she finally ex- 
 tingushed in 1834, and which is now commonly 
 known as the Lower Laos. There would remain 
 the principality of Luang Prabang and the States 
 of Kiang-cheng and Kiang-hung. The interests 
 of England and China will presumably safeguard the 
 two latter. It remains to be ascertained, only, 
 where the boundaries should be fixed ; and how 
 far the " buffer " principle may be held to permit, 
 or hinder, the partition of Luang Prabang. 
 
 A good deal has been said about feudal relations 
 between China and Siam. It was announced by 
 telegram, from Tientsin, that China was preparing to 
 take up the cause of her tributary, and was pre- 
 paring even to come to her help. The statement 
 emanated, doubtless, from a Chinese source ; but it 
 must, I think, have originated in exaggeration or 
 misconception, in so far as it expressed a thought of 
 championing the whole cause of Siam. 
 
 China has, apparently, tributary rights over the 
 
CHINESE INTERESTS IN SIAM. 185 
 
 province of Kiang-hung, which lies astride the Mei- 
 kong immediately below Yunnan : but Kiang-hung 
 is not Siamese. She has also, undoubtedly, great 
 interests in Siam. She is interested in the territory 
 along the left bank of the Meikong as far south as 
 Luang Prabang, through which her caravans pass 
 from Yunnan on their way to traffic with the Shan 
 States and Burmah. She has also the great interest 
 implied in the residence at Bangkok and, indeed, 
 throughout the whole country, of immense numbers of 
 her subjects who are occupied in various industrial 
 pursuits and do the greater part of the retail trade. 
 M. Gaston Rautier estimated, some years ago, in 
 the Bevue Fra7i^aise, that there are in Siam as many 
 Chinese as Siamese. Taking the total population at 
 10,000,000, he estimated that it is made up of nearly 
 one-third Chinese, one-third Siamese, with Malays, 
 Laotians, and Cambodians in about equal propor- 
 tion, for the rest. The Chinese are, he says, all over 
 the country, in every rank of life, competing in 
 every occupation, and tending to absorb the whole 
 trade. The Government revenues, even, are often 
 farmed to them. And he proceeds to argue that 
 this preponderance of Chinese is a political danger, 
 because the time may come when they may refuse 
 obedience to Siamese laws. 
 
 It is obvious, at any rate, that the presence in 
 Siam of such a vast number of her subjects must give 
 China an immense influence, if the interests of the 
 Empire impelled her to stir up a political move- 
 ment. But, far-reaching as that influence may 
 
i86 ENGLAND, CHINA, AND SIAM. 
 
 be, I do not think China would be disposed to 
 assert, or Siam to admit, the existence of tributary 
 relations between the two Courts. That such rela- 
 tions have existed in the past seems beyond dis- 
 pute ; though they were far from being of the in- 
 timate nature that characterized those with Annam. 
 Chinese statements about tribute require to be taken 
 with reserve, for every envoy who approached the 
 Emperor was spoken of as a " tribute-bearer," and 
 every present which he brought, as " tribute." But 
 there was, as we have seen in a previous chapter, a 
 difference between these vague pretensions and the 
 precise relations by which vassalage was really de- 
 fined ; and Siamese kings do appear to have com- 
 plied, from time to time, with certain prescriptions 
 which justified China in considering them tributary, 
 in a difi^erent sense from the European nations whose 
 occasional embassies flattered her pride. 
 
 The Court records^ of the Manchu dynasty speak 
 of Siam under the name of Sien-lo, and say that 
 it sent an envoy requesting to be enrolled as tribu- 
 tary, in the reign of Shun-chih, though it was not 
 till several years later, in the reign of Kanghi, that a 
 patent and a seal of office were issued (1673), investing 
 the ruler as king ; and it is curious to note a con- 
 temporary decree providing that, as the Siamese 
 ships have to come a long sea journey, any article 
 of tribute that may have been damaged during the 
 journey need not be replaced. A century later, 
 
 * Vide '^ The Tributary Nations of China." By G. Jamieson. 
 China Itevieiv, 1883. 
 
FORMER TRIBUTARY RELATIONS. 187 
 
 again, a new " chief of Siam " sent " messengers with 
 tribute ; " and it is interesting to note, this time, a 
 reference to the wars between Burmah and Siam. 
 In the year 1766, the record runs, ^' the country- 
 was broken up by the attacks of Burmah, and the 
 dynasty changed to.that of a family named Cheng." 
 But the new ruler " sent a mission of tribute in 1786, 
 and obtained investiture as king ; a silver-gilt seal of 
 office being handed to the envoys, together with the 
 patent of investiture, to carry back." It would be 
 tiresome to multiply quotations ; but one more in- 
 stance may perhaps be noted, as showing that the 
 Siamese were disposed, from the first, to assert a supe- 
 riority over some other dependents of the Empire. 
 In the very first year of his reign, the great Emperor 
 Kien-lung was called upon to decide a grave question 
 of etiquette arising out of these aspirations. The 
 Siamese envoy had, it would seem, asked to be 
 treated on the same terms as Corea ; that is, by being 
 invited to sit down and have tea in the Audience 
 Hall. But it was decided that this favour was 
 allowed Corea because her envoys were nearly on a 
 par with ministers of the Empire, which was not the 
 case with other tributaries such as Annam and Siam: 
 only in case these states sent a brother or son 
 of the reigning prince, as envoy, could the favour 
 sought be accorded. 
 
 At what time precisely these relations lapsed no one 
 knows, probably, but those concerned. But it may 
 be taken as unquestionable that the letter ^ addressed 
 
 ^ See ante, chap. v. p. 143. 
 
1 88 ENGLAND, CHINA, AND SI AM. 
 
 twenty years ago to the iV.-O. Eerald represents 
 the attitude of the Siamese Government at the 
 present day. China, we know, is conservative ; she 
 interferes very little with her tributaries — especially 
 with distant ones ; and means were, I believe, taken, 
 subsequently to that letter, to convey to the Siamese 
 Court that things would be made easy for it if it 
 would fall back on the ancient ways. The king 
 was, however, obdurate in refusing to send envoys 
 otherwise than by way of Tientsin, and so the matter 
 dropped. It might have been better, perhaps, if 
 he had been less punctilious; for, though China 
 did not succeed in saving Tongking, she was the 
 means of causing its conquest to be so costly that 
 France might have hesitated to plunge into a similar 
 enterprise if she had avowed as much interest in the 
 Meikong as she avowed in the Songkoi. 
 
 As matters now stand, China will not interfere, 
 and never dreamed, probably, of interfering, to pro- 
 tect Siam from loss of territory on the Lower Meikong; 
 though she was undoubtedly disturbed by the French 
 advance, and her anxiety might become more acute 
 if the Meikong were overpassed and French "in- 
 terests " were found to extend to the watershed of 
 the Meinam. She has asserted, however, and Eng- 
 land is understood to admit, her interest in Kiang- 
 hung. It has been shown in a previous chapter 
 that, by M. de Lanessan's own admission, Siam was 
 in possession of the Lower Meikong, at any rate, fifty 
 years ago. Even that is a fairly long title as things 
 go, in a quarter of the world where perpetual warfare 
 
KIANG-HUNG IN 1837. 189 
 
 between Annamese and Siamese, Laos, Khmer, 
 Burman and Shan seems to have been the normal 
 condition as far back as we are able to penetrate ; 
 and we have, curiously enough, the unimpeachable 
 testimony of an English officer to the position of 
 affairs in Kiang-hung at that very date. The 
 Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal for 1837 
 contains an account of a journey made by Lieut. 
 MacLeod from Maulmain to Kiang-hung, which has 
 exceptional interest at the present crisis. 
 
 MacLeod's object was to open up trade with that 
 region, and to persuade Chinese and Shan traders to 
 prolong their journeys to British territory. He made 
 his way first to Zimme, which was then, as now, under 
 Siamese authority, where he found Chinese merchants 
 residing, and where a Chinese caravan arrived during 
 his stay. The Siamese wanted him to go on by the 
 left bank of the Meikong, being moved by jealousy 
 of the Burmese whose authority prevailed in the 
 State of Kiang-tung through which he would have 
 to pass if he persisted in a northerly route. The 
 Chinese, however, advised him that the way through 
 Kiang-tung was the best ; so he persevered, and was 
 allowed to proceed. 
 
 He found Kiang-tung governed by a native (Shan) 
 Tsawbwa, from whose revelations we gain a curious 
 glimpse of the turmoil into which the country had 
 been thrown by the constant warfare between 
 Burmah and Siam. He was, he told MacLeod, one 
 of six brothers who had rebelled thirty years pre- 
 viously against the Burmese and placed themselves 
 
I90 ENGLAND, CHINA, AND SIAM. 
 
 under the protection of Siam. His brothers were 
 still interned at Zimme ; but he, seeing reason to dis- 
 trust Siamese promises, had broken back to his 
 native place and again become tributary to Ava, 
 though he seemed to have little affection for one, 
 more than for the other, of his neighbours. 
 
 Pursuing his journey through a region which had 
 been lately overrun by the Siamese, and seemed 
 to be slowly recovering from the ruin which Oriental 
 incursions usually leave behind, MacLeod made his 
 way next to Kiang-hung ; and it is his observations 
 on the political position there, that have special in- 
 terest at the present moment. The town stood in 
 21-58° N. and 100-39° E., on the face of a hill on the 
 right bank of the Meikong which varied, here, from 
 300 to 650 feet in breadth according to the season. 
 It was, he found, the capital of a large province. It 
 was tributary to Burmah, to which it " made certain 
 offerings of submission and dependence once in three 
 years," and which had a representative there to look 
 after its interests. But it was also tributary to 
 China, to which " it paid a regular land revenue and 
 other taxes, to collect and regulate which an estab- 
 lishment of Chinese officers and clerks was kept." 
 At a dinner given him at the palace, he found 
 not only the Tsawbwas but the attendants clad in 
 Chinese costumes and the dinner completely 
 Chinese. It is interesting to note, moreover, that 
 the Shans seemed thoroughly well affected towards 
 their Chinese overlords : these insisted on the 
 regular payment of taxes, and Avrote long letters 
 
CHINESE INFL UENCE. 191 
 
 about a few farthings, but they never took or kept 
 any sum they were not entitled to. 
 
 MacLeod wanted to continue his journey to 
 Szumao, the frontier town of Yunnan; but was 
 restrained from doing so until permission could be 
 obtained from the Chinese authorities. He caused 
 these to be informed accordingly ; but he might have 
 spared himself the trouble. The Chinese have, as 
 we have seen, but one idea in regard to foreign 
 envoys : they all bring tribute, and are all bound 
 to travel by a given route. " British ships," ran the 
 answer, " daily visit Canton ; and that was the proper 
 route for an officer deputed on a mission to go : they 
 had consulted their historical records, but could not 
 find any precedent for an ofS.cial coming that way ; 
 if he insisted in doing so, it would be necessary to 
 refer the matter to Peking ! " ' 
 
 MacLeod next proposed to cross the Meikong and 
 return by the left bank ; but if there is one thing 
 which an Oriental dislikes, it is change. He had come 
 by way of Kiang-tung, and he must go back by way of 
 Kiang-tung. Besides, the Burmese were as anxious 
 to get him back as the Chinese were to prevent his 
 going on. He returned accordingly by the way he 
 had come, little dreaming that his narrative would be 
 appealed to, fifty-five years later, as proof of Chinese 
 " rights " against the pretensions of France. 
 
 So much for Kiang-hung. Shan by nationality, 
 it appears to be Chinese by political affinity; and 
 England, as the heir of Burmah, is understood to 
 purpose yielding her interest to China, in the course 
 
192 ENGLAND, CHINA, AND SIAM, 
 
 of the frontier rectifications that are now in progress 
 along the Burmo-Chinese frontier. 
 
 The adjoining province of Kiang-cheng is in a 
 somewhat similar case, except that Burmese claims 
 were here shared with Siam. Like Kiang-hung, it 
 sits astride the Meikong ; and England yielded it to 
 Siam, in the course of frontier delimitation between 
 the two States, on the understanding that Siam 
 should not cede it to any other Power. She 
 was, therefore, in a position to object to its cession to 
 France, and to insist on its being upheld as a buiFer 
 between French and British territory. She 
 had, also, ulterior interests, which were no doubt 
 present in the minds of our diplomatists when ar- 
 ranging for its future safety. Kiang-cheng figures 
 prominently in the scheme of railway communication 
 with Yunnan which Mr. Holt Hallet has so warmly 
 advocated, and upon whose advantages Lord 
 Lamington dwelt in a recent address to the London 
 Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Hallett's scheme in- 
 volved a Siamese trunk-line, from Bangkok to 
 Szumao, which England should tap at Raheng by a 
 branch line from Maulmain. Siam does not seem 
 to have fallen in with that idea, and is confining 
 herself, at present, to a line from Bangkok to Korat 
 which she purposes, or did purpose, extending to 
 Nong-kay. This, she appears to conceive, will best 
 meet her own requirements ; and extensions towards 
 China may be left to international enterprise. If 
 these extensions are ever made, it is through Kiang- 
 cheng and Kiang-hung that they would have to 
 
BUFFER TERRITORY, 193 
 
 run ; and as the Siamese and Chinese tariffs are only 
 five per cent., while the French impose heavy 
 duties on everything that is not French, we may be 
 pardoned for preferring that Kiang-cheng and Kiang- 
 hung should continue, respectively, Siamese and 
 Chinese. It may be taken, probably, that England 
 and China have expressed that wish with sufficient 
 defmiteness during recent negociations ; and that the 
 only remaining question is to ascertain the area over 
 which these provinces extend. That is the problem 
 with which diplomacy is at present concerned. It 
 would be premature, therefore, to do more than 
 indicate a river called the Nam-u, which runs into 
 the Meikong near Luang Prabang, and a mountain 
 range on the N.E, which seems to constitute its 
 watershed, as affording, possibly, the requisite 
 materials for its solution. 
 
 There remains the principality of Luang Prabang 
 ^vhich used apparently to be independent, in the days 
 when the Laos ruled in the Meikong Valley, but which 
 has long since become a dependency of Siam. The 
 Lower Laos may be taken as having passed, now, 
 under the dominion of France. How far the Upper 
 Laos is to undergo a similar fate is a question upon 
 which no decisive statement has yet been made, but 
 in regard to which grave apprehensions are enter- 
 tained. There is no doubt that the French are ex- 
 tremely anxious to acquire this region. The town of 
 Luang Prabang, which is situated at the corner of 
 the second great bend, has already been designated 
 on French maps as the objective point of a line of 
 
 
 
194 ENGLAND, CHINA, AND SIAM. 
 
 railway from Tongking. Mr. Archer speaks of it 
 as " a large straggling village of bamboo huts inter- 
 spersed with brick temples." He describes the river 
 valley here as narrow, with very little plain country. 
 The people live, like the Chinese, mainly on fish, 
 rice and pork. Fever is very prevalent, and even 
 the Siamese troops quartered there are said to con- 
 sume inordinate quantities of quinine. Possession 
 of Luang Prabang, however, would carry with it 
 possession of all the territory comprised in the elbow 
 of the first great bend ; and it is for that reason so 
 much interest attaches to this section of the French 
 claim. A map which was drawn by Mgr. Taberd, 
 then Bishop of Cochin-China, in 1838 — a date to 
 which the French are fond of referring — though 
 asserting an Annamese claim to the Middle 
 Meikong, excludes Luang Prabang and, indeed, 
 all west of 104°. MacLeod also remarks that 
 Luang Prabang was distinctly tributary to Siam, 
 to which it paid tribute ^' of ivory, eaglewood " and 
 other produce ; and the tendency has certainly been 
 to convert vassalage into implicit subjection, and to 
 strengthen the exercise of Siamese jurisdiction, in the 
 interval. He adds, however, that it " is said to be also 
 tributary to Cochin-China and China,^ to the former 
 of which it sends presents triennially, and to the 
 latter once in eight years." 
 
 ^ It is curious to find mention made in the Chinese Court records 
 of a Laos state, named Nan-chang, sending tribute for the first 
 time (a.d. 1730) during the reign of Kienlung. The country is 
 described as lying south of Yunnan, and adjoining Burmah. V. 
 China Review^ ut supra. 
 
TRIE UTAR V RE LA TIONS. 195 
 
 It would be difficult to find a more perfect object 
 lesson of the confused relations between these border 
 states, out of which France has evolved such exag- 
 gerated claims. Lower Cochin-China, Annam, and 
 Tongking have formed, for centuries, one dominion ; 
 Siam and Burmah were equally sovereign states 
 looking up, in a greater or less degree, to the prepon- 
 derant mass of China ; but all the petty states along 
 their borders seem to have paid tribute to each more 
 powerful neighbour. The French Protectorate over 
 Cambodia was evolved out of the fact that it paid 
 tribute to Cochin-China as well as to Siam. It is 
 quite possible that the Lower Laos was once in similar 
 case. Writing of the basin of the Se bang-hien, M. 
 de Lanessan says, "up to 1830, the Annamese ad- 
 ministered these provinces either directly or through 
 the intermediary of the local chiefs, collecting tribute 
 and taxes. About 1830 they were driven back by 
 the Siamese to the chain of mountains which border 
 the Meikong valley, and have not since been able to 
 recover the lost ground." Siam contends, as we 
 know, that the alleged possession merely implies that 
 the Annamese intervened during an insurrection. The 
 incident may, however, serve to explain the political 
 instability and unrest which led these states to make 
 presents, indiscriminately, to neighbours so much more 
 powerful than themselves. It does not necessarily 
 follow that the tribute meant, in each case, an acknow- 
 ledgment of equal rights. A kingdom can no more 
 serve two masters than a man, though both may be 
 willing to propitiate a powerful friend. The influence 
 
 o 2 
 
196 ENGLAND, CHINA, AND SIAM. 
 
 of Siam was unquestionably predominant in Cam- 
 bodia, though tribute was also paid to Annam. 
 Kiang-hung was mainly Chinese, though it had 
 tributary relations with Burmah ; and Luang 
 Prabang is essentially Siamese, even if it has had 
 secondary relations with Annam. The Siamese 
 authorities, who were unwilling that MacLeod should 
 travel through Kiang-hung because it was Burmese, 
 were willing that he should travel along the east 
 bank of the Meikong because it was Siamese. When 
 the so-called Hos burst into the country, after the 
 French invasion of Tongking, it was the Siamese who 
 restored order. French surveyors on the Upper Mei- 
 kong have travelled, quite lately, with Siamese assist- 
 ance. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the 
 Siamese should have challenged the French to pro- 
 duce proof of the claims which they so confidently 
 advanced — nor, perhaps, that the French should 
 avoid debating the issue. 
 
 We may be in a position, now, to estimate with 
 tolerable accuracy the rival forces and interests 
 that are at work in this much-vexed region. Siam 
 was precluded, as we have seen, from appealing to 
 China as her overlord, because she had protested 
 her independence and had refused to acquiesce 
 in relations that might wear a tributary aspect. 
 She was precluded, similarly, from appealing to 
 England, because she rejected an English Protec- 
 torate when it was offered her, I believe, some years 
 ago ; before its assertion would have involved acute 
 antagonism to the still inchoate projects of France. 
 
CHINESE INTERESTS. 197 
 
 She could appeal, however, to both England and 
 China, as interested parties ; and it lay with those 
 Powers to define where their interests began. The 
 interests of China in Indo-China are, as we have 
 seen, enormous : there is an immense Chinese popu- 
 lation in Siam and, indeed, throughout the whole 
 peninsula — in Burmah and the Straits Settlements 
 as well as in Tongking and Saigon. It would 
 be in her power to foment a rebellion that would 
 shake the French position to its foundations, and to 
 help it by pouring troops across the frontier of 
 Yunnan into the Meikong valley, as she poured 
 them out of Kwangtung through Langson into 
 Tongking. China, however, prefers peace ; and so 
 long as her frontiers are guarded at Kiang-hung, 
 and her caravan routes are protected through 
 Kiang-cheng and Luang Prabang, she wiU let 
 sleeping dogs lie. She will do well, however, to 
 assert her influence and her power with more em- 
 phasis in time of peace, if she would exercise the 
 weight to which her position entitles her, in the 
 councils of the Far East. There was a time when 
 people were disposed to smile at the power of China ; 
 when they were disposed, in fact, to smile at every- 
 thing Chinese. But she is becoming recognized as 
 a substantial fact, and she must resolve to sustain 
 her role. She cannot, consistently with her dignity, 
 disavow ulterior interests in a country where so many 
 myriads of her subjects are domiciled ; and she would 
 do well to declare that interest by exhibiting the 
 dragon flag, occasionally, in the Meinam. 
 
3 98 ENGLAND, CHINA, AND SI AM. 
 
 England is in somewhat similar case. Her pos- 
 sessions are conterminous with those of Siam 
 throughout the whole length of the peninsula ; and 
 she naturally prefers the neighbourhood of a peace- 
 ful and commercial people to that of a restless 
 military power. The commercial interests of France 
 in Siam are infinitesimal. The last report by 
 H.B.M.'s Consul at Bangkok showed that eighty- 
 seven per cent, of the whole shipping that entered 
 and cleared at that port, in 1892, was British. 
 1,242,000Z., out of 1,386,000Z. worth of the ex- 
 ports went to Singapore and Hongkong, while 
 1,172,000L out of 1,296,000/. worth of imports came 
 from those two British colonies. French interests, 
 on the other hand, were represented by one steamer 
 which runs monthly between Saigon and Bangkok, 
 and which carried, last year, cargo to the value ol 
 8000Z. — less than \ per cent, of the total trade. 
 
 It has been pointed out that the tendency of trade 
 with the interior is to flow towards the mouth of 
 the Meinam ; and that it was, seemingly, the 
 inception of the Bangkok-Korat railway which fired 
 French resolution to get possession of the Meikong. 
 We can sympathize, in a measure, wdth France. 
 Much was hoped, at first, from Saigon, at the 
 mouth of an important branch of the Meikong: 
 then it was found desirable to go a little further, and 
 take in the Cambodian delta : then it was revealed 
 to Garnier, during his celebrated expedition up the 
 Meikong, that the French flag should be hoisted at 
 Stung-treng and Khong and Bassac, and other 
 
FRENCH PROJECTS. 199 
 
 stations which might serve as depots for the trade 
 of the Laos : then the discovery was made of the 
 river connecting Yunnan with the Gulf of Tongking 
 Avhich de Carne advised his countrymen to acquire at 
 all hazards, with the certainty that its possession 
 would eclipse British efforts to open up trade with 
 Yunnan. Well ! Saigon had been annexed, Cambodia 
 had been annexed, Tongking had been annexed ; 
 and still the demand for French manufactures had 
 not come. Gamier's project should be tried ! It 
 signified nothing that rapids, falling little short of a 
 cataract, barred the ascent of the river at Khong : a 
 Decauville railway might be made to transport goods 
 past the obstacle, and steamers sent out in pieces to 
 be put together above it. The river was certainly 
 navigable between Khong and Kemmaret ; and there 
 was hope that Luang Prabang might be reached 
 during four months of the year. All this had been 
 resolved on, when Siam finally resolved to make a 
 railway from Bangkok to Korat. 
 
 No one was better aware than the present 
 Governor-General of French Indo-China what that 
 meant. Let railways be constructed, he wrote, 
 some years ago, and " neither the Meikong nor the 
 Tongking route could struggle against them : "^ the 
 greatest efibrts should therefore be made to prevent 
 that consummation, and endeavour to deflect the 
 commercial current towards French possessions. The 
 efibrt having failed, apparently, if it was ever made 
 — the Korat railway being in course of construction 
 ^ " L'Indo-Chine Fran9aise," p. 478. 
 
200 ENGLAND, CHINA, AND SIAM. 
 
 — nothing remained but an effort to annex the Mei- 
 kong. Not only the mouths, but the channel and the 
 valley of the great river would then be under French 
 control ; and Manchester goods could be hindered by 
 the application, to them, of the same methods by 
 which it had been endeavoured to exclude them from 
 Tono^kino^. 
 
 The probability is that the attempt will succeed 
 in about the same degree. Manchester goods pass 
 in diminished quantities through the French Cus- 
 toms nets ; but the perverse Indo-Chinese cannot, 
 somehow, be persuaded to take an equal quantity 
 of Rouen manufactures in their stead. Commercial 
 possibilities serve as a lure to draw the French 
 nation continually on to further aggression. Rouen 
 is being perpetually assured that it will be able to 
 ^' best " Manchester, if just this one more province, 
 this one more river, this one more valley be 
 brought within the scope of the French protective 
 tariff; but the result usually disappoints expecta- 
 tions, and it is possible that the chief result of this 
 new attempt to develop French commerce Avill be 
 to increase the number of functionaries whom a 
 clear-sighted Frenchman once described as being 
 principally occupied a s adminisirer eux-memes. 
 Neither a Consul at Korat nor a Consul at Nan is 
 likely to succeed in diverting commerce from the 
 channel which experience has shown to be most 
 convenient, and which the projected railway Avill 
 increasingly develop. But French consuls at Nan 
 and Korat might conceivably, excite a feeling of 
 
FUTURE POLICY, 201 
 
 unrest that might facilitate further political adven- 
 ture. A river is a bad frontier, even if it marks an 
 ethnical division ; but the Meikong constitutes no 
 such divison. All the states in its valley appear to 
 sit astride it. Nan sits astride it ; and even when 
 the French have reft away half its territory the 
 population of the two halves will remain the same. 
 It is easy to conceive that the consul at Nan might, 
 under these circumstances, become a disquieting 
 influence, just as a consul at Chantaboon might exert 
 a disquieting influence over the Annamese section of 
 the inhabitants of that important town. Korat is 
 on the Se-moun, which is an affluent of the 
 Meikong ; and M. de Lanessan has frankly indicated 
 the basin of the Se-moun as within the scope of 
 French aspirations. Some years ago, M. Deloncle 
 tried to obtain, from the King of Siam, a conces- 
 sion to make a canal across the isthmus of Kra 
 between the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Siam. 
 The project failed, as the project of obtaining a 
 footing in Burmah failed, about the same time ; but 
 M. le Mjnre de Vilers is said to have instructions to 
 revive it while negotiating the new treaty that will 
 be required to consecrate recent changes. If the 
 canal were constructed, British shipping would 
 certainly profit by it most ; yet England would 
 probably look askance at the acquisition, by a French 
 company, of a broad belt of land exactly at the point 
 where Siam is spliced, as it were, with Tenasserim. 
 
 These are among the reflections which occasion 
 anxiety as to the future course of French policy. 
 
202 ENGLAND, CHINA, AND SIAM. 
 
 Declarations of a purpose to respect the integrity 
 of Siam would carry more conviction if we had 
 a distinct assurance where that integrity begins. 
 It is to be hoped that pending negotiations will 
 result in defining the position, and in a clear under- 
 standing that both China and England would resent 
 any further advance. Events are tending to show 
 more clearly, every year, that the interests of the 
 two nations in Eastern Asia are closely allied. The 
 same great military Powers press on the frontiers 
 of each ; and it is conceivable that a situation might 
 arise in which each might be able to render the other 
 effective help. I am not one of those who apprehend 
 that China will some day overrun the world ; but 
 the immense numbers of frugal and hardy men whom 
 she can pour, and continue pouring, across her 
 borders in any given direction would make her a 
 valuable ally in the conceivable event of our being 
 concerned, simultaneously, to uphold a common 
 interest. 
 
EUSSIA AND CHINA, 
 
 CHAPTER YIII. 
 
 THE KULDJA DIFFICULTY. 
 
 Few questions would have seemed, at a first glance, 
 more easy of adjustment than that which arose 
 between Russia and China, in 1880, regarding the 
 occupation of Kuldja and Hi ; yet it was allowed, 
 by the unskilful diplomacy of the Chinese at the 
 outset, to grow into the dimensions of a serious 
 quarrel which reached, at one time, the verge of war, 
 and continued for a whole year of uncertain issue. 
 The incident is so characteristic of the diplomatic 
 habits of the two nations, and deals with such a 
 curious episode of Central Asian politics, that it may 
 be worth while to take a retrospective glance over its 
 origin and history. 
 
 The Mahomedan uprising in Chinese Turkestan 
 that resulted in the erection of a considerable dis- 
 trict of Central Asia into an independent State, with 
 which the Governments even of India and of Russia 
 thought it worth while to open direct negotia- 
 tions, will be fresh in the minds of our readers ; ^ 
 and no further reference need be made to Yakoob 
 
 ' Times, April 18th, 1881. 
 
204 RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 Khan and his short lived power, than to indicate that 
 uprising and the subsequent struggles between Andi- 
 jan and Tungan as the first origin of the Russo- 
 Chinese difficulty. It was during the anarchy that 
 accompanied the progress of the insurrection, and 
 when Tso Tsung-tang had barely commenced the 
 work of reconquest, that Russia declared herself 
 obhged to occupy the town and district of Kuldja, 
 in order to maintain quiet and ward off disturbance 
 from her own frontiers. Recognizing, however, 
 the fact that it was Chinese territory, she notified 
 the Peking Government of the step she had taken, 
 and undertook to yield up possession whenever 
 the latter was in a position to reoccupy it and re- 
 establish settled authority. Cut off from her depen- 
 dency by the Desert of Gobi and by the insur- 
 gent provinces she was trying to subdue, China, 
 whether satisfied or not, was obliged to acquiesce till 
 she had succeeded in her task ; but when Kash- 
 garia, exhausted by its wars and deprived by death 
 of the leadership of Yakoob, had collapsed, and she 
 had been able to re-occupy the revolted districts of 
 Turkestan, she promptly reclaimed the gage. 
 
 Established in Kashgar, Aksu, and the other cities 
 of the Altishahar, the Chinese general proceeded to 
 demand fulfilment of the Russian promise. He Avas 
 on the frontier, prepared to garrison the town and 
 re-establish the Imperial rule: let the Russians 
 retire ! The request was not refused ; but neither did 
 Russia show herself disposed to surrender, so easily 
 and unconditionally, territory which she had perhaps 
 
THE TREATY OF LIVADIA, 205 
 
 thought, as did other on-lookers at the commence- 
 ment of the struggle, that China would never be in 
 a position to reclaim. Difficulties were raised, and 
 conditions put forward which the Chinese Government 
 strenuously resisted. Russia had, they said, occupied 
 the district for her own and not for Chinese con- 
 venience, avowedly for the purpose of maintaining 
 order. China was now in a position to resume 
 occupation and maintain order herself; and they 
 expected, or professed to expect, that her claim to do 
 so would be frankly recognized. 
 
 Failing to bring about a satisfactory settlement 
 with the Russian Ambassador at Peking, the Em- 
 jDresses-Regent and their advisers sent Chung-how, a 
 mandarin of rank and a connexion of the Imperial 
 family, as Minister-Plenipotentiary to St. Petersburg, 
 to urge their claims ; and — making every allowance 
 for the wide difference between preferring a request 
 and procuring its concession — it is easy to appreciate 
 the disappointment and irritation of the Imperial 
 Cabinet at the result of his mission. So far from 
 obtaining a recognition of the Chinese claims to a 
 surrender pure and simple of the Kuldja territory, 
 Chung-how entered into a contract by which he 
 agreed to receive a part instead of the whole of the 
 disputed country ; and, in addition to engaging to 
 pay five millions of roubles for expenses of occupa- 
 tion, he rectified frontiers and granted commercial 
 privileges with a liberality which the Russians must 
 have deemed truly Oriental. Instead of ratifying 
 this ti*eaty when presented for their approval, the 
 
2o6 RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 Empresses-Regent utterly repudiated it and threw 
 Chung-how into prison, under sentence of death. 
 Resenting this conduct, and in response to the hostile 
 attitude assumed by China, Russia began to prepare 
 for war. The Government of the Czar sent consider- 
 able reinforcements of ships and men to the Chinese 
 coasts and frontier ; while China, on her side, began 
 to look to her defences, made large purchases of muni- 
 tions of war, and hurried additional troops towards 
 the possible scenes of conflict. 
 
 This was the position of affairs, and the outbreak 
 of hostilities seemed imminent, when one more 
 attempt was made to bring about a peaceful solution. 
 The Marquis Tseng, Chinese Ambassador at the 
 Court of St. James's, was ordered to St. Petersburg 
 to endeavour to amend the action of his predecessor ; 
 and Colonel Gordon, in response, it is understood, to 
 an indirect invitation from the Imperial Government, 
 went personally to Peking and threw the -weight of 
 his great personal influence into the scale of peace. 
 The efforts of both were so far successful that the 
 danger of immediate collision was staved off. The 
 energetic representations of the Marquis Tseng in- 
 duced his Government to refrain from an act of 
 punishment which would have been condemned as 
 barbarous, and would have alienated the sympathy of 
 every civilized Power ; while wiser counsels seem to 
 have calmed the excitement of the War party, and 
 induced a clearer perception of possible consequences. 
 Chung-how was reprieved and subsequently par- 
 doned, and Russia agreed to re-open negotiations. 
 
THE MARQUIS TSENG'S MISSION. 207 
 
 ' Breathing time was thus gained, during which a 
 peaceful solution might be found for what had, how- 
 ever, grown into a serious international difficulty. 
 If two men who are on the point of fighting can be 
 restrained for a few moments and induced to talk 
 over the matter in dispute, the chances are that, 
 even if the quarrel be not made up, they will 
 part without a blow being struck. If the griev- 
 ance be tangible, it will be referred to a court of law ; 
 if it be sentimental, the greater portion of their rage 
 will evaporate in strong language, and time will do 
 the rest. But quarrels between nations are, un- 
 happily, not so easily settled. The principle of inter- 
 national courts has not yet met with universal accept- 
 ance, and if the demands made are such as either 
 thinks cannot be yielded without sacrifice of national 
 honour, there is nothing left but the arbitrament of 
 the sword. No nation willingly surrenders territory 
 which it regards as an integral part of its posses- 
 sions ; and China is to the full as conservative in this 
 respect, as Russia is acquisitive. The latter is little 
 prone to yield what she has once grasped, and China 
 can with difficulty be brought to give up what she 
 regards as her own. The problem was, therefore, to 
 find a solution by which the national pride of China 
 might be saved, while the demands of Russia were 
 still partially satisfied. It must be admitted that the 
 task thus imposed upon the Marquis Tseng, of amend- 
 ing a position rendered more difficult than it was 
 originally by the action of his predecessor, was neither 
 easy nor enviable ; nor was the position of afiiiirs at 
 
2o8 RUSSIA AND CHINA, 
 
 his own capital such as to Hghten the difficulty. 
 For the crisis found the leading Chinese statesmen 
 separated into two distinct camps, and seems to have 
 accentuated their differences. The Reactionary and 
 War party was headed, at Court, by Prince Chun, 
 father of the present Emperor, and among the great 
 provincial satraps by Tso Tsung-tang, the Governor- 
 General of Eastern Turkestan ; while the Moderate 
 Progressist party, headed by Prince Kung and the 
 Grand Secretary, Li Hung-chang — more keenly alive, 
 perhaps, to the danger of the situation — desired to 
 maintain peace. 
 
 The circumstances which led to the installation of 
 the present occupant of the Imperial Throne will be 
 remembered by all who have followed the course of 
 Chinese politics ; but a few words of recapitulation 
 may help to elucidate the situation. The natural 
 course, when the last Emperor, Tung-che, died child- 
 less, would have been to elect from among the 
 members of the Imperial clan a child who should be 
 adopted as his son, and during whose minority the 
 newly- widowed Empress would govern as Regent. 
 But the Empresses Dowager of Hienfung, who had 
 enjoyed the sweets of power during the long minority 
 of Tung-che, saw an opportunity, too good to be 
 passed by, of regaining the position they had lost. 
 Overruling the claims of other aspirants in favour of 
 a child of four, they adopted him as a son to Hien- 
 fung, and* thus brought the new Sovereign under 
 their own tutelage instead of that of their daughter- 
 in-law, whose subsequent early death removed all 
 
THE POLITICAL SITUATION AT PEKING. 209 
 
 further danger of opposition or intrigue. Now 
 Chinese custom requires that the father of a child so 
 elected should hold entirely aloof from politics and 
 from interference in his son's affairs, the extreme 
 parental authority which is so marked a feature in 
 Chinese polity being obviously incompatible with the 
 equally complete subservience due by a subject to his 
 ruler. So far, however, from regarding this theory, 
 Prince Chun seems to have succeeded in gaining 
 at the capital an influence overshadowing that 
 of his brother. Prince Kung (whose name is familiar 
 as the Prime Minister and leading statesman of 
 China after the death of Hienfung), and to have 
 had, moreover, the powerful support of the Regent 
 Empress who takes the most active part in State 
 affairs. It was, indeed, to this support, which 
 gave them the virtual use of the Imperial name, that 
 the War party were greatly indebted for the influence 
 they enjoyed. For, though Li Hung-chang had 
 infinitely more friends than his rival, Tso, in the 
 ranks of the mandarinate, and reckoned the Governors 
 of the chief provinces of the Empire as relatives or 
 political allies, he and they were powerless in oppo- 
 sition to the Imperial mandate, unless prepared to 
 break out in open rebellion. 
 
 This, then, in the spring of 1880, seems to have 
 been the political position at Peking. Prince Chun 
 and the Empresses-Regent were eager for war ; and 
 Tso Tsung-tang, with the tattered legions which had 
 never dared to meet the army of Yakoob Khan, 
 vainly believed himself able to cope with the Russian 
 
 p 
 
2IO RUSSIA AND CHINA, 
 
 forces ; while Li Hung-chang and other great satraps 
 who, with a juster appreciation of the relative 
 strength of China and Russia, desired peace, were 
 dominated by the power of the Imperial name. There 
 is no need to dwell on the circumstances of Colonel 
 Gordon's visit, or on the intrigues which attended 
 his advent. It is enough to say that he paid a visit 
 of several days to the great Viceroy with whom he 
 had acted in the days of the Taeping rebellion ; and, 
 both to him and subsequently to the high authorities 
 at the capital, urged every argument in favour of 
 peace. Exposing the weakness of their forts and 
 ships, and the unwieldiness and imperfection of their 
 whole military organization, he is said to have 
 warned the Chinese that the outbreak of hostilities 
 at Kuldja would be followed by an invasion of Man- 
 churia from the Amoor, and that they might expect 
 a hostile army, within two months, before the gates of 
 Peking. He left, moreover, with Li Hung-chang, at 
 his departure, a memorandum on the military power 
 of China and how that power can be best developed, 
 which should be read at length by those who have 
 been inclined to accept the Chinese at their 
 own value, and to estimate them as a possible 
 factor even in European politics. It may be 
 sufficient to say, here, that it advises them to 
 retain their own military system as best suited to 
 their capacity, and warns them against essaying 
 pitched battles with foreign troops in which they 
 would almost certainly be broken up and defeated. 
 They should cultivate skirmishing ; utilize their 
 
GORDON VISITS PEKING. 211 
 
 faculty for throwing up earthworks; rely on the 
 capacity for quick movement given by the absence of 
 kit and baggage, to harass and worry the enemy 
 while avoiding close conflict ; depend chiefly on 
 breech-loaders, and eschew heavy artillery ; lay them- 
 selves out, in fact, for the irregular warfare in which 
 their numbers, frugality, and hardihood would give 
 them an advantage, instead of attempting to emulate 
 the solid organization and expensive armaments of 
 Western nations. The same with ships, the same 
 with torpedoes ; plenty of them, but small and 
 cheap. And " China needs," wrote her adviser, " no 
 Europeans or foreigners to help her in carrying out 
 this programme : if she cannot carry out what is 
 here recommended, then no one else can do so." The 
 memorandum hinted, even, at the removal of the 
 Emperor to one of the cities of the interior ; Peking 
 being too vulnerable, owing to its proximity to the 
 sea. But the answer to this suggestion is said to 
 have been prompt and emphatic : removal from 
 Peking would mean the downfall of the dynasty and 
 was, therefore, beyond the pale of consideration. 
 
 Short as it was, then, the visit of such an out- 
 spoken adviser seems to have been an important fac- 
 tor in bringing about a more intelligent view of the 
 position, among the statesmen in power ; but Gordon's 
 counsels were, no doubt, powerfully aided by the 
 representations of their own Ambassador at the 
 Russian capital. One of the first acts of the 
 Marquis Tseng was to procure the reprieve, and ulti- 
 mate release, of his unfortunate predecessor. The 
 
 p 2 
 
212 RUSSIA AND CHINA, 
 
 following edict, which appeared in the Peking Gazette 
 of August 12th, 1880, was significant of the change 
 that circumstances were combining to bring 
 about : — 
 
 " A decree was issued some time since temporarily remitting 
 the sentence of decapitation which had been passed upon Chung- 
 how, but ordering that he should continue to be kept in prison. 
 Tseng Ki-tso (the Marquis Tseng) was also called upon to act 
 with due care and attention in the matter of the treaty that had 
 to be discussed. The Tsung-li Yanien now report that they have 
 received a telegram from Tseng Ki-tse to the effect that he is now 
 discussing the settlement of the various matters under dispute, 
 and that he begs the Yamen to appeal on his behalf to the Throne 
 for the exercise of clemency. As an act of special grace, we 
 command that Chung-how be released forthwith." 
 
 Sanguine politicians saw room for hope that 
 statesmen who could find such excellent reasons for 
 complying with the requirements of Russia in this 
 case, without mentioning their real motive, would be 
 successful in rounding the corner of the more serious 
 difficulties that awaited solution. The long interval 
 which had elapsed without a settlement being 
 reached showed that there was, at least, a growing 
 willingness on either side to avoid a conflict, though 
 it also showed that the difi'erences which had arisen 
 were by no means easy of adjustment. But neither 
 were there wanting those who believed Russia 
 willing to avail herself of the opportunity to extend 
 her frontiers in a direction remote from Kuldja, and 
 to make the valley of the Hi a stalking-horse for 
 assumed designs on the seaboard of Corea. The 
 alleged project was openly discussed in the Eastern 
 
APPREHENSIONS REGARDING CO RE A. 213 
 
 Press, and a writer in Japan drew the following 
 glowing picture of the advantages to be gained : 
 
 *' Admiral Lessofsky's own forces are in themselves equal to the 
 conquest of the peninsula and to the permanent occupation of its 
 strategic points. But if the attack were combined with an 
 invasion of Russian troops from the side of Manchuria, Corea 
 would in a very short time become Russian territory, and Russia 
 would then possess a magnificent Pacific coast line, with noble 
 harbours, open water, unsurpassed sites for dockyards, arsenals, 
 and naval establishments, and unparalleled positions for domina- 
 ting Japan on the east and Northern China on the western side. 
 The conquest would be so easy, the gains, both political and 
 strategic, so valuable that we have no doubt the reports which 
 have reached us both from Europe and China are correct, and we 
 may expect to see the seizure of Corea during the commencement 
 of the spring." 
 
 There is little use in discussing schemes that, 
 whether present or not at any period in the minds 
 of Russian statesmen, certainly never appear to have 
 been put forward by them. It may well be that, at 
 St. Petersburg as well as at Peking, opposing 
 counsels were striving for the mastery, and that the 
 same spirit which occasionally dictates the annexa- 
 tion of large tracts in Central Asia, in defiance of 
 orders from the capital, urged the present oppor- 
 tunity for the extension of the Russian sea-board on 
 the Pacific. Nor is it unlikely that, if war had 
 ensued, the integrity of Corea would have been 
 seriously jeopardized. The risk was, in any 
 case, averted, and the task of persuading the 
 little kino-dom to admit foreio:ners within its coasts 
 and borders reserved for more peaceful efforts. 
 We have only to deal with the situation as it must 
 
214 RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 have presented itself to the Chinese Envoy on his 
 arrival at the Russian capital ; and that was, 
 fortunately, not complicated by the introduction of 
 any such extraneous difficulty. 
 
 The ultimate issue remained, as it was, long un- 
 certain ; and those who best understand the Chinese 
 character will probably attribute the preservation of 
 peace, at a time when the least false step would have 
 precipitated war, mainly to the prompt action of 
 Russia in preparing for the latter contingency. It 
 is probable that the appearance of a Russian 
 squadron, weighing on their coasts, powerfully 
 seconded the efforts of the wiser Chinese statesmen to 
 hold at bay the party who seem, for a time, to 
 have paralyzed the Government and constrained it 
 to act in a manner that must have rendered 
 successful diplomatic action almost impossible. It 
 will be fortunate for the future destinies of the 
 Empire if the more intelligent Chinese realize that 
 it is to those restraining influences, and to the mutual 
 good sense and forbearance of those who influenced 
 and conducted the prolonged negotiations, that the 
 preservation of peace is due. China had everything 
 to lose by war, for which she was utterly unprepared : 
 the outlay would have been ruinous to her already 
 straitened exchequer ; while defeat would not only 
 have entailed loss of territory and a heavy indemnity, 
 but would have shaken the dynasty to its founda- 
 tions. We should, ourselves, have suffered from the 
 disorganization of a great trade, of which by far the 
 larger portion falls to our share, and other nations 
 
WAR AVERTED. 215 
 
 would have suffered in proportion to their lesser 
 interests. The assurance is, indeed, said to have 
 been given that, in the event of hostilities, Shanghai 
 and the other Treaty ports south of Pechili would not 
 be included in the Russian scheme of operations ; and 
 it is likely that the Czar would have been anxious to 
 avoid complications with other Powers through 
 interference with the great trading stations on the 
 Yang-tse and the Southern coasts. But trade is 
 affected by other influences than direct blockade ; 
 and not the least injurious among these would have 
 been the increased exactions to which China would 
 have been driven to resort, and which would probably 
 have lasted, as in the case of the Taeping rebellion, 
 long after actual hostilities had ceased. 
 
 The Marquis Tseng and his advisers deserve, 
 therefore, hearty congratulations upon the suc- 
 cessful result of their diplomacy. By the Treaty 
 of St. Petersburg, Russia consented to give back 
 nearly the whole territory originally in dispute, 
 including the important Tekkes Valley (the 
 surrender of which was the principal offence of the 
 former Envoy), and the command of the passes in 
 the Tien-shan. And that the Marquis Tseng should 
 have succeeded in gaining this important point, 
 under infinitely greater difficulties than those which 
 induced Chung-how to yield it, testifies to the 
 intelligence which guided his negotiations, and 
 proves the justice of the allegation that it was 
 the unskil fulness of Chinese diplomacy, at the outset, 
 which allowed a question so capable of adjustment to 
 
2i6 RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 grow into tlie dimensions of an international diffi- 
 culty. 
 
 Nor is that all. The Treaty of 1881 revives stipu- 
 lations, for the right of navigation on the Manchurian 
 rivers, which had been omitted from the Russo- 
 Chinese Treaty of 1860, and which may well become 
 of first-class importance in future eventualities. 
 Some modifications are made, in accordance with 
 the wish of the Chinese, to lessen the number of 
 Consulates which Russia was empowered to institute 
 for the purpose of facilitating commercial intercourse ; 
 and certain conditions are laid down for the future 
 control of the trade which it is anticipated may 
 grow up over the vast region in which the 
 possessions of the two empires are contiguous. 
 It is not surprising, on the other hand, that the 
 pecuniary indemnity which was required in the 
 Treaty of Livadia should bear larger proportions in 
 the new agreement : for not only was the Russian 
 occupation of Kuldja considerably prolonged by the 
 refusal of the Chinese Government to ratify that 
 Treaty, but the cost of the occupation was naturally 
 enhanced by the uncertainty of the political position. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 COREA.^ 
 
 By a combination of circumstances, nofe the least 
 curious of which is that the weight of China was 
 thrown into the scale of progress, the last kingdom 
 in Asia to maintain a policy of seclusion was 
 persuaded, in 1882, to open its gates and have inter- 
 course with the outside world. In the spring of 
 that year. Admiral Schufeldt on behalf of the United 
 States, Admiral Willes on behalf of Great Britain, 
 and the commander of the Stosch gunboat on behalf 
 of North Germany, signed, at a village on the banks 
 of the Han river, treaties by which Corea agreed to 
 open certain of her ports, for purposes of commerce, 
 to foreign ships, residents and visitors. The project 
 had been long incubating — frequently essayed, and 
 as frequently defeated. The persistency of its seclu- 
 sion, the almost ludicrous tenacity with which it 
 was defended, had thrown a gleam of romance over 
 the little Hermit Kingdom, and helped to invest it 
 with an interest altogether disproportioned to what 
 was known, or assumed, of its population or political 
 importance. It may not be amiss, therefore, before 
 
 ' Written in July, 1884. 
 
2i8 CO RE A. 
 
 the halo is altogether dispersed, to glance back at 
 its early history and at the chain of events which 
 eventually decided it to enter the modern political 
 arena. 
 
 There is always a disposition to invest the unknown 
 with something of the marvellous, and Corea has 
 come in for its full share of curiosity and romantic 
 legend. Horses three feet high, hens with tails three 
 feet long, hills of pure silver, and kings buried in 
 golden coffins, have been among the tales told of the 
 remote peninsula. The rigidity of the seclusion of 
 course made accurate information, regarding either 
 the country or its inhabitants, difficult to obtain ; 
 and, although they can certainly not be said to have 
 no history — for they have a very chequered one — 
 the Coreans have done their best to realize that con- 
 dition by leaving it unwritten, and throwing us on 
 Chinese and Japanese sources for what facts we may 
 glean regarding it. Through the medium of Chinese 
 merchants returning to Newchwang from the great 
 fair held annually near the " Corean Gate ; " through 
 the medium of the embassy which comes once a year 
 to Peking with tribute to the Emperor ; through 
 the mouth of some shipwrecked mariner, who 
 made his way back to civilization with quaint tales 
 to tell of a people among whom he was, at any rate, 
 generally treated with kindness — information more 
 or less reliable occasionally filtered. But to the 
 adventurous pioneers of the Church of Rome 
 a more intimate knowledge was vouchsafed of the 
 strange land and its inhabitants ; and to them we have 
 
EARL V HIS TOR V. 219 
 
 largely been indebted for the chief facts known 
 regarding it. 
 
 Separated from Chinese territory by the Yaloo 
 river on the north-west, and from Japan by a hun- 
 dred miles of sea on the south-east, the peninsula is 
 sufficiently isolated by Nature to favour its indepen- 
 dence, but too near both countries to escape their 
 interference. The earliest glimpses of its history 
 reveal a state of almost continual warfare among 
 divers tribes of Tartar origin, who eventually con- 
 solidated themselves into the three States of Sinla, 
 Petsi and Kaoli ; and these again, for centuries, 
 appear to have been almost perpetually at war either 
 among themselves or with China and Japan, varying 
 the internecine programme only by an occasional 
 alliance against a foreign adversary. It is not till 
 the eleventh century that we find the whole country 
 united into a single kingdom, which took the name 
 of Kaoli from the tribe that finally acquired the 
 ascendency. It was natural that the new State 
 should at once feel and admit the ascendency of its 
 great neighbour. The first king recognized the 
 suzerainty of the Chinese emperor ; and the relation- 
 ship seems to have been, from the first, of a very 
 close character. So intimate indeed was it that 
 when, three hundred years later, the Chinese suc- 
 ceeded in overthrowing the Mongol power, the 
 Corean dynasty shared its downfall. The first Ming 
 emperor dethroned the reigning king, whom he had 
 found fighting in the hostile ranks, and replaced him 
 by a Chinese partisan whose family have now for five 
 
220 COREA. 
 
 hundred years retained possession of the throne. 
 The new king drew closer his relations with the 
 suzerain State, and organized a system of govern- 
 ment very much after the Chinese model, which has 
 remained in force to the present day. He divided 
 the country into provinces and districts ; removed the 
 capital to nearly the centre of the kingdom, where it 
 is better situated for purposes both of administration 
 and defence ; and consolidated his power by a tribu- 
 tary agreement with China, and an alliance of friend- 
 ship with Japan. 
 
 Two hundred years of comparative peace followed 
 the wise measures of this able Sovereign, during 
 which the people had time to become accustomed to 
 an orderly and settled life. At the end of that 
 time, however, the calm was disturbed by the most 
 terrible invasion the country had yet suffered. In 
 the year 1592 Fidejosi, then Tycoon of Japan, having 
 rendered himself undisputed master at home, resolved 
 to turn his arms against China, and poured an army 
 of 200,000 men into Corea, which he designed to use 
 as a stepping-stone towards its neighbour. This was 
 a time when the influence of Christian missionaries 
 in Japan was nearly at its height, and the Tycoon is 
 said to have had a double motive for his adventure. 
 Disliking the Christians, but unwilling to persecute 
 them openly, he is said to have recruited the invad- 
 ing army principally from their ranks, and placed at 
 its head Christian princes whom he designed to 
 keep henceforth in practical banishment, compen- 
 sating them with Corean territories for those which 
 
JAPANESE INVASION. 221 
 
 they were never more to revisit ! Curiously enough, 
 we are indebted to the enterprise of an early English 
 publisher for a translation of the first authentic infor- 
 mation which became available, of the fate of the 
 invaders. " Three severall testimonies concerning 
 the mighty kingdom of Coray . . . collected out of 
 the Portugale lesuites yeerely laponian epistles," 
 printed by Hakluyt in the year 1600, give a curiously 
 interesting account of this great expedition which, 
 failing utterly in its object, exercised nevertheless a 
 material influence on Corea. The project seems to 
 have been unpopular in Japan, which was already 
 impoverished by internal wars and could ill support 
 the crushing expense. So feared, however, was the 
 Tycoon, that no one dared oppose him ; and we are 
 told — to give an idea of his power and splendour — 
 some curious particulars of a grand sporting expedi- 
 tion in which he indulged his nobles before the start, 
 when " his game had so good successe that he caught 
 above 30,000 fowles of all sortes ; " though it is dis- 
 tressing to learn that, "for his greater recreation, 
 and for the more solemnitie of the game," he was 
 imposed upon by the addition of " many dead fowles, 
 which the laponians with certain poulders or com- 
 positions know how to preserve sweete in their 
 feathers a long time." 
 
 The preparations were carried out upon a scale 
 commensurate with the importance of the under- 
 taking. The vanguard of the invading force, sent 
 forward to effect a landing, was completely suc- 
 cessful ; the Corean " gunnes of 2 spannes and \ 
 
222 CO RE A. 
 
 long, which instead of bullets discharged with a 
 terrible noise woodden arrowes headed with forked 
 points of yron," proving no match for the " brazen 
 ordinance" of the Japanese, who carried the prin- 
 cipal fortresses by assault and quickly overran the 
 country ; driving the king himself to seek refuge 
 in China. It is noteworthy that the prince who led 
 the attacking force, and achieved this brilliant suc- 
 cess, was a Christian ; and the missionaries fail not 
 to congratulate themselves, in the quaint language 
 of the translator, that it " had pleased his diuine 
 maiestie to lay the honour of all this warre upon 
 Christian lords." The Japanese had, however, by no 
 means an easy time thereafter ; for the Coreans, aban- 
 doning the open country to the invaders, took refuge 
 in the woods and mountains, whence they carried on 
 a guerilla warfare while their ships harassed the 
 smaller vessels of the Japanese. Nor, although 
 Corea lay at his feet, could the Tycoon advance a 
 step farther in his projected invasion of China. The 
 Coreans had, of course, called on their neighbours for 
 assistance ; and the latter, menaced as well in their 
 own safety, collected troops on the banks of the 
 Yaloo, which they commanded with their war junks 
 so effectually that they were able to transport 
 an army into Corea and attack their would-be 
 invaders. The Japanese were victorious in two 
 pitched battles that ensued ; but the Tycoon, 
 though successful in the field, seems to have realized 
 that the conquest of China was a task beyond his 
 
THE JAPANESE EXPELLED, 223 
 
 power,^ and eventually withdrew a great portion of 
 his troops. 
 
 The lull was, however, only temporary. With 
 characteristic assumption, the Chinese appear, three 
 years later, to have sent an embassy to Japan with 
 proposals for tributary relations, which so enraged 
 the Tycoon that he again poured his troops into 
 Corea, and began fresh preparations for an inva- 
 sion of China — to which his death shortly put an 
 end. The Chinese again crossed to the assistance 
 of their allies, and appear this time to have suc- 
 ceeded in breaking up the invading army. Many of 
 the Japanese were killed ; some returned to Japan ; 
 many are said to have settled in the southern dis- 
 tricts of Corea, where the local dialect testifies to 
 the influence of Japanese intercourse. Terms of 
 peace were eventually agreed on (in 1615), by which 
 the Japanese acquired the island of Tsusima, and the 
 right to keep a garrison of 300 men at Fusan (a port 
 in the south-east comer of the peninsula, imme- 
 diately opposite that island), which they retained 
 and exercised for 260 years. Though by no means 
 the only occasion on which Corea was made a battle- 
 ground by the Japanese, this was the most serious 
 and the last of their invasions. The remains of forti- 
 fied camps in various parts of the country still 
 
 ^ Two years after the outset of the expedition, in 1594, Father 
 Organtino Brixiano, speaking of the Tycoon's usual success in war, 
 says, " This late warre of China onely excepted, which far sur- 
 mounted all his forces. Howbeit, in the kingdom of Coray he 
 maintaineth yet great garrisons, as well to keep his honour, as to 
 constraine the Chinians to sue for peace." 
 
224 COREA. 
 
 testify to the completeness of their occupation, and 
 the Coreans are said to admit that the best firearms 
 thev possess are those left behind by the Japanese. 
 
 The somewhat severe experiences which had 
 attended, and partly helped to effect, the consolida- 
 tion of Corea into a nation, were now drawing to a 
 close. The same fidelity to the fortunes of the 
 suzerain dynasty which had brought down upon it 
 the wrath of the Mings, was to subject it to one 
 more invasion when the latter fell before the attack 
 of the Manchus ; for a Manchu army invaded 
 Corea and dictated at the capital, in 1637, the 
 terms which continue to govern its relations with 
 China to the present day. It would be super- 
 fluous to describe, here, the forms and cere- 
 monies, and the articles of tribute, which constitute 
 the outward and visible signs of Chinese overlord- 
 ship. Suffice it to say that, while exacting implicit 
 recognition of her own preponderance, China seems 
 practically to leave her tributaries to manage their 
 own affairs, unless her help is sought or her own 
 interests appear to be threatened. We have already 
 seen her hand shown, on more than one occasion, under 
 these circumstances ; and we shall see her taking 
 action, with vital effect, in the dramatic scenes which 
 mark the awakening of Corea to international life. 
 
 Since the conclusion of that treaty, Corea has 
 been at peace with both her neighbours and able, 
 till within the last twenty years, to maintain the 
 seclusion she so much desired. Until the beginning 
 of the present century— when the doctrine preached 
 
HAMELS SOJOURN IN COREA. 225 
 
 by Roman missionaries in China began to filter across 
 the frontier, and to provoke a fitful and uncertain 
 intercourse between them and the few Coreans who 
 had been attracted by the new religion — the only 
 fresh glimpse we obtain of the interior of the country 
 and its inhabitants is afforded by the well-known 
 story of Henry Hamel/ who was wrecked ofi* the 
 Corean coast in 1653, and detained there twelve 
 years as a prisoner at large. As a source of informa- 
 tion his narrative has of course passed out of date, 
 but as a record of remarkable adventure, and for its 
 quaint account of the people and their customs, it 
 well deserves a passing notice. Hamel sailed in a 
 ship which left Texel for Japan on January 10th, 
 1653 ; and, after calling at Taewan to land a new 
 Governor for the settlement which the Dutch then 
 claimed in Formosa, was caught in a typhoon and 
 wrecked on the Corean island of Quelpart, where 
 thirty-six only, out of a crew of sixty-four, succeeded 
 in landing. They were received so kindly by the 
 local magistrate that, in the words of the narrator, 
 " we may afiirm we were better treated by that 
 idolater than we should have been among Christians ;" 
 but they were soon to learn that their prospects were 
 not altogether so bright as this experience might 
 have led them to infer. They were astonished, after 
 some six weeks of this hospitable detention, to find 
 themselves one day in presence of another foreigner 
 who had become an unwilling object of Corean 
 
 ^ Vide Pinkerton's " Collection of the best and most interestinor 
 Voyages and Travels," vol. vii, 
 
 Q 
 
2 26 CO RE A. 
 
 hospitality. He was, he told them, also a Dutchman, 
 by name Wettevree, and had been sent by the king 
 to interpret, as soon as news of their arrival had 
 been received at the capital. He had been five-and- 
 twenty years in the country, having been captured 
 with two others who had been sent ashore for water 
 from the Dutch frigate Ouderlces ; and there was, he 
 feared, no chance of escape. As a matter of fact, 
 at the end of nine months they also were carried 
 before the king, who refused their request to be 
 sent to Japan, saying it was not the custom of 
 Corea to suffer strangers to depart out of the king- 
 dom, but promised to provide them with all 
 necessaries, and enlisted them in his life-guards, 
 with an allowance of 100 lbs. of rice-per month as 
 wages ! One or two attempts to escape were 
 frustrated, and an appeal to the Chinese ambassador 
 seems to have been especially disastrous. They had 
 been ordered not to stir out during his visit : two of 
 of them did so, notwithstanding, and caught hold of 
 his bridle to ask protection, but were seized, im- 
 prisoned, and died. The rest were banished to a 
 distant spot, and were so hardly treated that they 
 were reduced to begging, to get clothes. At the 
 expiry of nine years their numbers were reduced to 
 twenty-two ; and these, in consequence of a terrible 
 famine which supervened, were distributed among 
 three different cities to facilitate their maintenance. 
 Eventually, in 1665, a few of the survivors contrived 
 to buy a boat with a little money they had been 
 able to earn, and made their way to Nagasaki, 
 
STATE OF THE COUNTRY. 227 
 
 where they found themselves again among their own 
 countrymen. 
 
 It would lead us far to enter into Hamel's quaint 
 description of the country, which was still suffering 
 from the recent Japanese and Manchu wars, and 
 groaning under the exactions the latter had entailed. 
 The political relations with China are clearly and 
 accurately sketched ; and what is said of the trade 
 with China and Japan would have been almost 
 equally applicable, twenty years ago. The system of 
 military service is also well described. A sketch of 
 the punishments in vogue speaks more highly for 
 the ingenuity than the humanity of a people who 
 could tolerate them. The following tale, at any 
 rate, could scarcely be surpassed in the records of 
 the Holy Office which was practising, at that period, 
 in the West : — 
 
 The king having desired his brother's wife, who was excellent 
 at her needle, to embroider him a vest, that princess, bearing him 
 a mortal hatred, stitched in between the lining and the outside 
 some charms and characters of such a nature that his Majesty 
 could enjoy no pleasure nor take any rest while he had it on. At 
 length, suspecting the matter, he had the vest ripped, and found 
 out the cause. Hereupon the king ordered her to be shut up in 
 a room, the floor whereof was of brass, and ordered a great fire to 
 be lighted underneath, the heat whereof tormented her till she 
 died. 
 
 And when a high official ventured to remonstrate 
 against so cruel a sentence, the king ordered him to 
 have twenty strokes on his shin bones, and to be 
 decapitated. The punishments for marital offences 
 were equally severe and ingenious. If a woman 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 CO RE A. 
 
 killed her husband, she was buried alive up to the 
 shoulders in a highway, and an axe laid by her, with 
 which all passengers who were not noblemen were 
 obliged to give her a stroke on the head till she 
 died. Gay bachelors caught infringing the sanctity 
 of the domestic hearth were liable to be stripped to 
 their drawers, to have their faces daubed with lime, 
 an arrow run through each ear, and a little drum 
 fastened on the back which was beaten at all the 
 cross-streets — the whole ceremony winding up with 
 a flagellation. 
 
 We come now to events nearer our own time, 
 in which the propaganda of Rome and the proceed- 
 ings of its emissaries begin to play a prominent and 
 interesting part. In the year 1784,^ a young Corean 
 named Le, who had come to Peking in the suite of 
 the tribute-bearing embassy, applied to the Roman 
 Catholic Mission for books and instruction in the 
 science of mathematics, of which he was naturally 
 fond. The missionaries profited by the occasion to 
 lend him books on religion, which awakened his 
 interest and led to his eventual conversion. As 
 usual in such cases, the neophyte set himself, directly 
 on his return, to propagate the new creed he had 
 learned, among his relations and friends ; and with so 
 much success that, in less than five years, he had, 
 according to Mgr. Govea, gained 4000 adherents. 
 As may be imagined, however, the doctrine acquired 
 
 ^ Lettres Edijiantes. Relation de retablissement du Chris- 
 tianisme dans le royaume de Coree. Par Mgr. Govea, eveque de 
 Pekin, 1797. 
 
FIRST MISSIONARIES. 229 
 
 from a convert who had had only a few months' 
 instruction, and disseminated again at second-hand 
 by men who had caught the crude idea from his con- 
 versation, was of a somewhat obscure description ; 
 and it hardly needed a special appeal, to persuade 
 the Bishop of Peking that it was time to send a more 
 qualified teacher. The frontier was, however, 
 guarded, with extreme jealousy, and careful pre- 
 cautions were necessary. It was arranged that a 
 missionary should proceed to a certain spot, at a 
 given date, in the following year, and should there 
 be met by converts who would guide him through 
 the Corean lines. The priest was punctual to his 
 appointment, but not so his intended hosts, and, 
 after waiting fruitlessly for a given time, he returned 
 to Peking. The blank continued. Neither letter 
 nor news was received from the Corean Christians 
 for more than two years ; but two converts made 
 their way to Peking, at the close of 1793, with 
 news of a severe persecution which had occurred 
 in the interval. 
 
 The trouble had arisen from the same cause which 
 had produced a similar effect, at a moment when 
 there seemed a prospect that Christianity might gain 
 a hold in China. It is unnecessary to expatiate, here, 
 on the nature of the reverence paid by the Chinese 
 and cognate races to the memory of their dead, or to 
 recapitulate the arguments for and against tolera- 
 tion, which were terminated by a decree from Rome 
 condemning the practice. Suffice it to say that the 
 question had also been asked by the first converts in 
 
230 COREA. 
 
 Corea, whether it was permissible to erect ancestral 
 tablets, or to keep those already in existence ; and 
 the Bishop of Peking, as in duty bound under Pope 
 Clement's Bull, had replied in the negative. Two 
 enthusiastic brothers had at once acted literally on 
 this opinion, and burned objects which were held 
 sacred in the eyes of their relations and neighbours. 
 A tremendous outcry was naturally raised, which 
 had compelled the interference of the Government 
 and led to measures of persecution which had term- 
 inated, for the present, in the torture and execution 
 of the two oiFenders. 
 
 The tenacity of the Roman Church finds admirable 
 expression in the courage, perseverance, and self- 
 sacrifice of its emissaries ; and, whatever we may 
 think of a system which seems to prove more often a 
 firebrand than a message of peace, we cannot with- 
 hold admiration from its devoted exponents. A 
 footing once gained is never abandoned ; and after 
 the fiercest persecution there always remain some 
 enthusiasts, over whose head the storm has passed, 
 ready to welcome a new pastor. Corea has been no 
 exception to the rule. No sooner had the persecu- 
 tion which followed this act of iconoclasm subsided, 
 than a priest was successfully introduced across the 
 frontier, to instruct and impart new life to the 
 converts. Nor, it is affirmed, has the flock ever 
 since been left unguarded. Persecution has followed 
 psrsecution ; but from Jacques Yelloz, the first 
 missionary to cross the frontier, who suffered martyr- 
 dom in 1800, to Mgr. Ridel, who has returned to 
 
PERSECUTION OF CONVERTS. 231 
 
 Europe with health shattered by the anxieties and 
 hardships undergone during the latest outbreak, 
 there have always been some priests alternately 
 tolerated or hiding in the country, and the spark 
 lighted by the young Corean attache has never been 
 quite extinguished. 
 
 We come now to the first link in the chain of 
 events which have tended gradually to bring Corea 
 within the sphere of modern politics. On July 7th, 
 1866, a Roman Catholic missionary arrived in a 
 Corean boat at Chefoo, with a tale of dire persecu- 
 tion. Two bishops, nine priests, and a number of 
 Christians of both sexes had been massacred, many 
 of them after judicial tortures of atrocious cruelty. 
 Three members of the mission only survived, and 
 M. Ridel had been chosen to carry the news to China, 
 and endeavour to procure assistance. It was to the 
 French authorities, naturally, that he addressed him- 
 self ; and both Admiral Roze, the Commandant of 
 the French fleet in Chinese waters, and M. de 
 Bellonet, then charge-d' affaires at Peking, lent a sym- 
 pathetic ear to his protest.^ The Chinese Govern- 
 ment, which was first appealed to, as suzerain, for 
 redress, declined any responsibility in the matter ; 
 though the missionaries learned afterwards, in Corea, 
 
 ^ M. de Bellonet, indeed, was moved by his indignation to pen 
 a sentence of deposition against the Corean king, which subsequent 
 events made rather ridiculous : — " The same day on which the 
 king of Corea laid his hands on my unhappy countrymen was the 
 last of his reign. He himself declared its end, which I, in my 
 turn, solemnly declare to-day." — Vide "tT.S. Diplomatic Corrcsp.," 
 vol. ii. for 1867, p. 424. 
 
232 COREA, 
 
 that it had ^vritten to the king, condemning 
 the persecution as calculated to bring him into 
 trouble with the French, whose power he could 
 not hope to oppose. An expedition was accord- 
 ingly resolved on, and Admiral Roze assembled 
 at Chefoo, for that purpose, a squadron com- 
 prising the Giierriere frigate, the corvettes La;p- 
 lace and Primavget, the despatch- vessels Deroulede 
 and Kienchan, and the gunboats Tardif and 
 Lebrethon. 
 
 The receipt of this news in Corea had one notable 
 result. There had arrived at Chefoo, within a few 
 weeks after M. Ridel, the crew of a small American 
 schooner which had been lost on the eastern shore of 
 the Yellow Sea. They had been twenty-five days in 
 Corea, fed and well treated by the authorities, and 
 forwarded overland to China. The same thing had 
 happened in the case of another shipwrecked crew, a 
 few months previously ; and the contrast between 
 this kind treatment of shipwrecked sailors and the 
 massacre of resident Christians had given rise 
 to significant comment among foreign residents 
 in China. Whether news of French threats at 
 Peking and of the hostile preparations at Chefoo 
 had influenced the change of conduct, or whether 
 the Corean Government were alarmed at the in- 
 dications of a desire to open up commercial inter- 
 course sho^vn in the recent visits of one or two 
 foreign ships to the coast — a vessel despatched 
 by Admiral Roze to survey the approaches to 
 the capital learned that another American schooner 
 
FRENCH EXPEDITION, 
 
 233 
 
 (the General Sherman), which had gone ashore a 
 month previously in the Pieng-an river, had been 
 burned as she lay, and all hands murdered. 
 
 The city of Han-yang, more commonly called Soul 
 " the capital " of Corea, was found to be situated in 
 37-30° N., and 124-30° E., on the banks of a river 
 named the Han, which flows into the Yellow 
 Sea. The channel seemed navigable, for steamers of 
 moderate draught, to within a short distance of the 
 walls. The entrance was protected by fortifications 
 on the island of Kang-hwa, but these did not appear 
 to be garrisoned. Having obtained this information. 
 Admiral Roze started from Chefoo with the ex- 
 peditionary force on October 11th, arrived ofFKahg- 
 hwa on the 14th, and occupied it, after a merely 
 nominal resistance, two days later. The Coreans 
 were apparently taken by surprise, having perhaps 
 thought that the danger had passed with the with- 
 drawal of the surveying expedition. The forts along 
 the banks of the river were found ungarrisoned, and 
 Kang-hwa itself, a considerable fortress containing 
 large stores of munitions of war, was practically 
 undefended. A letter was received, a few days 
 later, inviting Admiral Roze to come or send 
 delegates to Soul, to talk over matters in a 
 friendly spirit ; but he replied that, if the Corean 
 authorities wished to treat, they had better come 
 to Kang-hwa. This attitude was meant, no doubt, 
 to be impressive, but the event proved it to be 
 slightly premature. So far all had gone well ; 
 but the expedition was about to collapse with a sud- 
 
234 COREA. 
 
 denness contrasting remarkably with the expectations 
 raised by M. de Bellonet's denunciations and Admiral 
 Roze's hauteur. 
 
 It may be well to explain, with reference to the 
 present and subsequent complications, that the 
 reigning King of Corea is not the son of the last 
 Sovereign, who died childless ; but, like the reigning 
 Emperor of China under similar circumstances, was 
 adopted into the royal family from a remote branch. 
 He was still a child at the time of these occurrences, 
 and the Government was administered by his father 
 who, under the title of Regent, exercised nearly 
 despotic power, and seems to have been the incarna- 
 tion of the spirit of exclusion that had characterized 
 his country. The persecution was ascribed mainly to 
 his influence, and he now ordered a general levy to 
 resist the invader. Parties of soldiers began to 
 appear on the banks of the river, in the neighbour- 
 hood of the French position, and spies brought news 
 that an attack was intended. A party sent out 
 to reconnoitre along the road leading to Soul 
 was surprised and severely handled ; and, though 
 the sailors succeeded in driving the Coreans 
 from the earthworks behind which they had been 
 concealed, the reconnaissance was not pushed farther. 
 Shortly after, news was brought that 300 soldiers 
 had effected a landing during the night on the island 
 of Kang-hwa itself ; and that the process was to be 
 continued until a sufficient force had been gathered 
 to make an attempt on the French position. Another 
 reconnaissance was accordingly ordered, with an 
 
THE FRENCH WITHDRA W. 235 
 
 even worse result. The party, of about 150 men, 
 had reached within 120 yards of the fort, when sud- 
 denly the walls were manned and a volley was fired 
 which killed three and wounded thirty-five of their 
 number. A sortie of the garrison was repulsed, but 
 the French judged it wise to retire and carry back 
 their wounded to camp. The disastrous termination 
 of these X\no movements appears to have persuaded 
 Admiral Roze that the force at his disposal ^ was in- 
 sufiicient to prosecute the enterprise to a successful 
 issue, in face of Corean hostility. It was no longer 
 a question whether he should go to Soul or the 
 Coreans come to him : the expedition was at a dead- 
 lock. He had rejected the first overtures, and was 
 not strong enough to impose terms. 
 
 A retreat was accordingly decided on. The city 
 of Kang-hwa was burned, with its public offices and 
 royal palace ; the munitions of war which it con- 
 tained were destroyed ; its library of 300 volumes, a 
 number of curious specimens of native industry and 
 art, and silver ingots to the value of some 8000/. 
 were carried off; and the troops re-embarked. An 
 intention of returning in the spring was expressed, 
 but was never carried out. Mexican affairs were 
 causing the French Government much trouble at the 
 time, and Corea was allowed to fall into oblivion. It 
 is satisfactory to know that Messrs. Feron and Calais, 
 the two other surviving members of the mission, 
 
 ^ Vide Moniteur, 27th December, 1866, and 7th January, 1877. 
 Also M. Ridel's narrative in " L'histoire de I'Eglise de Coree,'* 
 vol. ii. pp. 578 et seq. 
 
2 36 CO RE A. 
 
 succeeded in escaping to China ; but the persecution 
 of native Christians, as was to be expected, broke 
 out with renewed fury after the departure of an ex- 
 pedition which had been powerless to coerce, and 
 able only to cause injury and irritation. Left to 
 himself, with the conviction that he had fairly re- 
 pulsed his assailants, the Regent grew more and 
 more despotic, and more confirmed in his hatred of 
 foreigners and in his policy of exclusion. 
 
 A vein of comedy runs through the story of the 
 next attempt to enter the Forbidden Land, though 
 the attempt itself was held sufficiently grave to 
 involve the leaders in serious difficulty with their 
 judicial authorities. Royal remains, stolen calves, 
 defeated treaties, silver bullion, grey shirtings and 
 golden coffins combine to form the elements of a tale 
 worthy the pen of a Cooj)er or an Edgar Poe. On 
 July 7th, 1868, a subject of the United States named 
 Jenkins was indicted before his Consul at Shanghai, 
 for having, 
 
 together with others Dot amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
 American Consulate, entered in and upon the steamer China on a 
 scandalous and unlawful expedition to Corea, for the purpose of 
 exhuming for his own profit the body of a deceased Sovereign of 
 Corea, to the evil example of others, and against the peace and 
 dignity of the people of the United States/ 
 
 The object of the defence was, naturally, to tell as 
 little as possible of a story about which no one but 
 they could know the full particulars ; but sufficient 
 came out to give a tolerably clear idea of the adven- 
 ture, and that has since been supplemented by the 
 1 Vide North-Cliina Herald, July 11th, 1868. 
 
A PRIVATE EXPEDITION. 237 
 
 published narrative of Mr. Oppert/ one of the 
 " others " referred to in the indictment. 
 
 The patent facts were that Oppert had chartered 
 the steamer with money advanced by Jenkins, that 
 an unusually large crew of over 100 Manila-men and 
 Chinese had been engaged, and that a quantity of 
 arms had been taken in at Nagasaki, en route, which 
 were distributed on board. The further impression 
 seems to have been, that a French missionary had 
 told the adventurers of the whereabouts of a grave 
 containing a gold coffin, in which lay the remains of 
 a former king of Corea ; and that these gentlemen 
 had undertaken an expedition with the view of 
 possessing themselves of that curious property ; 
 that they had carried out their purpose so far 
 as making the voyage to Corea, but had failed 
 in their ulterior design and got into a more or 
 less serious row with the natives. Jenkins was 
 acquitted, chiefly it would seem because there 
 was a doubt as to the jurisdiction of the court. 
 Oppert, who was called as a witness at the trial, 
 spoke of a treaty which he had hoped to negotiate 
 with Corea, and of possible contracts for grey shirt- 
 ings, as among the objects of the trip ; while the 
 owner of the steamer hinted at silver bullion, as an 
 element which he had expected to find in her return 
 cargo. But the bearing of these remarks was not 
 made clear, at the time, to the minds of the audience, 
 and it is to the pages of Mr. Oppert's book that we 
 must look for the key of the riddle. We agree with 
 
 ^ "A Forbidden Land, &c." By Ernest Oppert, London, 1880. 
 
238 COREA. 
 
 him that " the circumstances are so exceptional and 
 unusual, and the character of the voyage itself is so 
 out of the common," that it is desirable to give a 
 clear statement of reasons and motives. 
 
 It should be premised that Mr. Oppert had already- 
 made one tentative voyage to Corea, in the hope of 
 opening up commercial intercourse, and was known 
 to be much interested in the country ; so that he 
 naturally became intimate with the missionaries who, 
 as we have seen, had fled to China from the recent 
 persecution. It appears, then, that Pere Feron, 
 one of these gentlemen, came to him one day and 
 said : — 
 
 '' I have always looked to you as the one person able and willing 
 to help us. If I now place the means in your power to bring 
 the Regent and his Government to submit to the demand for 
 opening up the country, and sign treaties to that effect with foreign 
 powers, will you undertake another voyage to put this in 
 execution ? " 
 
 Somewhat astonished, as he well might be, at this 
 overture, Mr. Oppert nevertheless expressed willing- 
 ness, provided the scheme looked feasible ; and 
 M. Feron went on to unfold it in the following 
 terms : 
 
 *^ The Regent, a person of very superstitious disposition, laid 
 great store upon the possession of some old relics which had been 
 in his family for long years, and which were kept guarded .in a 
 secluded place belonging to him. The possession of these relics 
 was thought to ensure the fortune of himself and his family, and 
 they were accordingly much treasured, and looked upon with a 
 kind of superstitious awe." [So much so that M. Feron's Corean 
 friends advised him that] "the temporary possession of these 
 objects would be tantamount to investing their holders with an 
 
PROJECTS DEFEATED. 239 
 
 almost absolute power, and equivalent to having possession of the 
 capital itself." 
 
 Whether these " relics " (? reliques) really consisted 
 of the golden cof&n of the Shanghai legend, or what 
 was their exact nature, is not definitely stated. But 
 M. Feron appears to have so convinced himself, and 
 so convinced Mr. Oppert, of the importance attached 
 to their possession, that the attempt was resolved on, 
 in the belief that they could be used to extort what- 
 ever conditions were wished from the Corean Govern- 
 ment. That one of these conditions would have been 
 an agreement to tolerate Christianity and missionary 
 enterprise, may be taken as beyond doubt. Whether 
 possibilities of ransom and concession of commercial 
 privileges may explain the vague allusions, at the 
 trial, to grey shirtings and specie freight, must 
 remain uncertain ; for the attempt, as we know, 
 failed. 
 
 The difficulty of the undertaking seems to have 
 been commensurate with its eccentricity. It was 
 necessary to ascend an inlet which was only navi- 
 gable during thirty hours, once a month, at spring 
 tides ; and the locality in question was distant some 
 four hours' good walking from the landing-place. 
 This spot was successfully reached in a steam-launch, 
 and a number of the crew, carrying arms and tools, 
 set out on a march into the hills in further prosecu- 
 tion of the search. The relics, whatever they may 
 have been, were found enclosed by an immense 
 mound, which was penetrated with much difficulty 
 and labour, only to find a further obstacle in the 
 
240 COREA. 
 
 shape of a huge stone slab which they had neither 
 tools nor time to remove. Many hours had passed, 
 the return march was before them, and the tide 
 must be caught. Reluctantly, therefore, the project 
 was abandoned, and the " relics " were left in peace in 
 their native soil. 
 
 No opposition seems to have been offered to this 
 remarkable journey of armed strangers through the 
 country, and a collision which did occur at the place 
 of embarkation is attributed by Mr. Oppert to the 
 indiscreet appropriation of a calf, by one of his 
 followers, rather than to any general feeling of 
 hostility to the intrusion. Such is the history of 
 this curious adventure, as told by its leader and 
 chief; and so abortively ended the second grand 
 attempt to open up intercourse with the Forbidden 
 Land. 
 
 Moved, no doubt, by the destruction of the 
 General Sherman and her crew, the Grovernment of 
 the United States next resolved to try to open nego- 
 tiations with this jealously guarded country. Mr. 
 Low, then United States Minister at the Court of 
 Peking, was entrusted with the task ; and Admiral 
 Rogers, commanding the United States naval 
 squadron in Chinese waters, was instructed to accom- 
 pany him on the mission, " with a display of force 
 adequate to support the dignity of the United 
 States Government." While given the means, how- 
 ever, of upholding this dignity if necessary, Mr. 
 Low's instructions were far from being of a warlike 
 character. In language of studious moderation, he 
 
THE AMERICANS WITHDRAW. 241 
 
 was told to try to secure a treaty for the protection 
 of shipwrecked mariners ; bat, while maintaining 
 firmly the right of the United States to this end, " to 
 exercise prudence and discretion, and avoid a con- 
 flict by force unless it could not be avoided without 
 dishonour." ^ He was also told to endeavour, as 
 M. de Bellonet had done, to enlist the influence of the 
 Chinese Government to further his designs. But the 
 latter again declined interference, and consented 
 only to forward a letter from Mr. Low to the Corean 
 Government, announcing the expedition and explain- 
 ing its object. 
 
 In May, 1871, the American fleet, comprising the 
 Colorado (flagship), Alaska and Benicia (second 
 rates), and Monocacy and Palos, gunboats, assembled 
 at Nagasaki preparatory to the start ; and on the 
 29th of that month it anchored ofl" the mouth of the 
 Soul river, at the same spot which Admiral Roze 
 had selected four years previously. Immediately on 
 its arrival, certain oflicials presented themselves, who 
 were assured of the friendly purpose of the visit, and 
 informed that the Admiral intended making a survey 
 of the river but would wait a few days, before start- 
 ing, to enable his object to be fully explained and 
 understood. On June 1st, accordingly, four steam- 
 launches, followed at a convenient distance by the 
 two gunboats, set out on the proposed expedition. 
 Two hours' steaming brought them to the island of 
 Kang-hwa, which the French had occupied during 
 
 ^ Despatch from Secretary Fish to Mr. F. F. Low, dated 
 April 20th, 1870. 
 
 R 
 
242 COREA. 
 
 their brief sojourn, and which was destined to prove 
 the limit of progress of the new visitors. In 1866 
 the batteries had been found empty, and the fortress 
 only slightly held. This time, both were fully garri- 
 soned ; and, as the launches were being swept past 
 by the tide, a fire was opened on them from some 
 seventy pieces of artillery which the Coreans had 
 thought, with pardonable vanity, must inevitably 
 sink everything within range. The bad gunnery of 
 the artillerymen, however, and poor character of the 
 projectiles defeated their object ; and the boats 
 swept, almost unscathed, through the feu d'enfer that 
 had been prepared for their reception. Opening fire 
 in their turn, they were soon able to shell the 
 Coreans out of their position, and clear a way for 
 return to the fleet, where the sound of the firing had 
 created a not unnatural anxiety. 
 
 Admiral Rogers seems to have considered that this 
 incident left him no option but to obtain an apology 
 or chastise his assailants. He had come with quite 
 friendly intent, but if the Coreans persisted in treat- 
 ing as enemies everyone who approached their shores, 
 they must pay the penalty of their mistake. Ten 
 days were let pass, to give time for the Govern- 
 ment to explain what might possibly have been an 
 unauthorized act of the mandarin in command ; but, 
 as no message of any kind was received, it was re- 
 solved, at the expiry of that period, to destroy the 
 fort in order to punish the insult to the flag. This 
 was successfully effected by a landing party of 650 
 men, supported by the armed launches and gunboats 
 
THE AMERICANS WITHDRA W. 243 
 
 of the fleet. A plucky resistance was oiFered by the 
 garrison, but the superior arms and discij)line of the 
 Americans prevailed. The fort was carried by storm, 
 with the loss of an officer and two privates killed and 
 six wounded : the magazines were exploded ; and on 
 the following day the party returned to the fleet 
 anchorage. But if the insult to the flag had been 
 avenged, nothing had been done, either by peaceful 
 message or forceful chastisement, towards gaining the 
 objects of the expedition. The Corean Government 
 remained impervious and uncompromising in its 
 refusal of intercourse. The following characteristic 
 letter, addressed by the Corean authorities to 
 Admiral Rogers, tersely expresses their attitude of 
 resolute isolation : — 
 
 In the year 1868 a man of your nation, whose name was Febiger, 
 came here and communicated and went away ; why cannot you 
 do the same % In 1866 a people called the French came here ; 
 and we refer you to them for what happened. This people has 
 lived 4000 years in the enjoyment of its own civilization^ and 
 we want no other. "We trouble no other nation — why do you 
 trouble us % Our country is in the extreme east, and yours in the 
 extreme west : for what purpose do you come so many thousand 
 miles across the sea % Is it to inquire about the ship destroyed 
 (the General Sherman) 1 Her men committed piracy and murder, 
 and they were punished with death. Do you want our land 1 
 That cannot be. Do you want intercourse with us % That cannot 
 be, either. 
 
 To an off'er to parole the wounded and prisoners, 
 it was answered : " Do as you please ; if you keep 
 them too long, they will suffer heavy punishment 
 from us when released." What was to be done with 
 such a people ? The American Minister and Admiral 
 
 R 2 
 
2 44 CORE A, 
 
 Avisely decided to withdraw, for the present, from an 
 expedition they could not hope to prosecute to 
 success with the force at their disposal, and report 
 a position of affairs which had become too serious 
 to be dealt with under their instructions. As 
 a matter of fact, the American Government appears 
 to have resolved to abandon a project which 
 promised no result equal to the difficulties in pros- 
 pect ; and, once again, the Coreans were left to their 
 isolation, and to the conviction, no doubt, that they 
 had successfully repelled the attempted invasion of 
 another barbarian power. 
 
 Still, notwithstanding the bold front shown, the 
 barriers were really tottering to their falh The 
 Japanese were the first to establish formal relations. 
 Having been, themselves, only recently brought to 
 conclude treaties with Western Powers, they seem to 
 have thought they would like to negotiate one on 
 the same model with Corea ; and the Coreans, dis- 
 turbed no doubt by recent events, but disposed rather 
 to accept as allies than repel as intruders a neigh- 
 bouring and well-known nation, acquiesced in the 
 proposal. On February 26th, 1876, there was signed 
 accordingly, at the now familiar island of Kang-hwa, 
 a treaty of peace and friendship by which the inter- 
 change of ambassadors, the appointment of consuls, 
 and the opening of certain ports in Corea to Japanese 
 trade, were regularly provided for. And this was 
 followed, eighteen months later, by a supplementary 
 agreement laying do^vn regulations for trade and 
 making certain additional provisions, among which it 
 
TREATY WITH JAPAN. 245 
 
 is only worth while to particularize a clause stipula- 
 ting for the kind treatment of shipwrecked foreigners, 
 of the exact nature the Americans had wished to 
 dictate. The end, however, was not quite yet. This 
 acquiescence in the overtures of Japan by no means 
 implied a willingness to enter into relations with 
 other foreign powers. The Japanese, as we have 
 seen, were old acquaintances ; and they appear to 
 have attained their end rather by flattering the spirit 
 of isolation than from any tendency on the part of 
 the Corean Government to relax its vigilance. The 
 Duke of Genoa, who paid a flying visit to the country 
 in the Italian frigate Vittor Pisani, in the summer of 
 1880, found the old spirit still in force ; and was 
 persuaded that the Japanese not only subserved the 
 Corean policy, but were tending, by their brutal 
 treatment of the people, to intensify the feeling of 
 hostility to foreign intrusion. 
 
 The Duke's visit seems to have been undertaken 
 as much out of curiosity as any other motive ; but 
 an expressed desire to thank the Corean Govern- 
 ment for kind treatment of an Italian sailor, who had 
 been wrecked two years previously on the island of 
 Quelpart, afforded an excuse for trying to approach 
 the ofiicials at the ports visited. The new Japanese 
 settlements of Fusan and Gensan were selected, as 
 aflbrding the easiest means of access ; but the Duke 
 had been warned that, though he would certainly 
 receive courtesy, he would hardly have the real assis- 
 tance of the Japanese in his eflbrts to open up inter- 
 course; and the result seems to have justified this 
 
246 COREA. 
 
 prediction. He failed, at any rate, to obtain an inter- 
 view with, or even to get a letter transmitted to, the 
 prefect of Torai, which embraces the port of Fusan ; 
 and only succeeded better at Gensan, by threatening 
 to send the letter with an escort of Italian marines if 
 he could get no Corean to carry it. Such as it was, 
 however, his intercourse mth the people seems to 
 have been friendly and interesting. He was accom- 
 panied by Mr. Donald Spence, a member of H.B.M. 
 Consular Service and an excellent Chinese scholar, as 
 interpreter ; and the difficulty seems to have been to 
 answer the questions sufficiently fast, rather than to 
 get into conversation at all. The Corean spoken 
 language is totally different from the Chinese ; but 
 Mr. Spence found that every one, even among the 
 poorest classes, could read and write the Chinese 
 character; and communication was kept up by 
 tracing characters in the air, on the sand, or on the 
 hand as opportunity offered. The prefect of Yung- 
 hing even brought himself to pay a visit to the 
 Vittor Pisani, under the threat mentioned ; and an 
 amusing account is given, in Mr. Spence's report,^ of 
 the scene that took place in the cabin of the frigate 
 on the occasion. Conversation was carried on by 
 writing, or in dumb show ; the crowd of attendants, 
 in the meantime, eating, drinking, and smoking every- 
 thing that was offered them or that they could lay 
 hands on, and carrying off empty bottles and biscuit 
 tins as valuable mementoes of their visit and specimens 
 
 ^ Report by Mr. Spence of his visit to Corea, with H.R H. the 
 Duke of Genoa : dated Shanghai, September 9th, 1880. 
 
VISIT BY THE DUKE OF GENOA. 247 
 
 of foreign art. The prefect could not, however, be 
 persuaded to undertake the responsibility of forward- 
 ing a letter to the capital ; he could only be brought, 
 at last, to take a copy of one which had been pre- 
 pared, and which he promised to transmit, along 
 with a report of his visit, to the Governor of the 
 Province. 
 
 So far, then, beyond accepting from the Japanese 
 a treaty on a Western model, the Coreans could 
 hardly be said to have derogated greatly from their 
 traditional policy. But events were tending to bring 
 about a greater change, and to induce them to plunge 
 boldly into the stream on whose brink they were 
 shivering. We have seen that the father of the 
 reigning monarch represented the ancient Toryism 
 of the country in its most intense form; but it 
 seems to be a curious fact that Corea, like England, 
 has its Liberal as well as its Conservative party ; 
 and the king himself— mainly, it is said, through the 
 influence of his wife, who comes of a Liberal 
 stock and is said to have tampered, even, with 
 Christian teaching — inclines to the Liberal side. 
 His coming of age and personal assumption of power 
 were, therefore, the signal for a change of policy. 
 Liberals were installed in places of power, while the 
 regent and his allies retired in dudgeon to their 
 estates. So that, when circumstances brought the 
 Foreign question once more to the front, political 
 conditions were favourable to its solution. It was 
 reserved for the great Chinese Minister, Li Hung- 
 chang, to bring it to an issue. 
 
248 COREA. 
 
 With what exact degree of truth it is difficult to 
 say, Russia has been credited with a yearning to 
 possess, on the Asiatic coast, a harbour more fitted 
 for winter quarters than her Amoor territory can 
 boast ; and the so-called Port Lazaref, in Corea, has 
 been indicated as a special object of her ambition. 
 This inlet, which is known in local parlance as Yung- 
 hing, and is situated between SQ-IO"" and 39*20° N., 
 and 125-10° and 125-20° E., constitutes a splendid 
 harbour which is not frozen in Avinter, and would 
 have been in every way a desirable acquisition. The 
 project is said to have been put forward during 
 the dispute with China anent the ownership of 
 Kuldja which threatened, at one time, to eventuate 
 in hostilities that would have rendered such a harbour 
 of first-class value ; and it is said that China advised 
 the Corean Government, as the best means of pro- 
 tecting itself against such a contingency, to accept 
 the friendly intercourse which foreigners were press- 
 ing upon it. However that may be, and whatsoever 
 the motive may have been, Li certainly advised the 
 king to accept foreign intercourse, and his counsel 
 was accepted. Treaties Avere negotiated, through his 
 instrumentality, with the United States, Great Bri- 
 tain, and Germany ; and were formally signed, when 
 all had been cut, dried, and prepared, at the village 
 of Jenchuan, in the neighbourhood of the capital. 
 
 It was not likely that such a complete subversion 
 of the national policy would pass imchallenged. 
 There is always, in every State, a party opposed to 
 change because it is change ; and we have seen that 
 
ATTACK ON THE JAPANESE LEGATION 249 
 
 this party lacked neither representatives nor leaders 
 in Corea. The Chinese Government passed through 
 a severe ordeal after we had compelled it, in 1858, 
 to abrogate pretensions that were a very article of 
 faith with the ruling classes. The foreign wars and 
 internal convulsions which followed the acceptance 
 of European intercourse in Japan attracted, for a 
 time, an interest scarcely less than had been excited 
 by the romantic descriptions of its first visitors. 
 Corea, a country broadly divided by faction, could 
 not hope to pass unscathed through a similar change ; 
 and the ex-Regent and his allies were, as a matter of 
 fact, hatching a plot which should everthrow their 
 opponents and replace themselves in power. Already, 
 in the spring, there had been rumours of political 
 dissension, and of hostile demonstrations against 
 Japanese settlers ; and on July 23rd, 1882, the storm 
 burst. In the afternoon of that day, the Japanese 
 Ambassador received a note from the Governor of 
 Soul, saying the mob had risen, that he was endea- 
 vouring to put them down but feared his ability 
 to do so, and that the members had better keep 
 inside the Embassy and prepare for contingencies. 
 The Legation did, in effect, become the object of 
 attack, and was gallantly defended by the inmates 
 till fire was applied to the neighbouring houses. 
 Mr. Hanabusa and his countrymen, some thirty in 
 number, then determined to cut their way out ; and, 
 after a futile attempt to obtain shelter at the palace, 
 made their way to the seacoast, where they seized a 
 boat and were fortunate in finding the British gun- 
 
250 CORE A, 
 
 boat Flying Fish, which took them on board and 
 conveyed them to Nagasaki. They had, however, 
 lost eight of their number during the retreat, 
 besides others who had been killed in Soul. Later 
 reports were received, to the effect that the rioters 
 had subsequently proceeded to the palace and had 
 either murdered, or intimidated into committing 
 suicide, the Queen, the Crown Prince and several of 
 the highest officials, while the ex-Regent had grasped 
 the reality of power. 
 
 Intense excitement was naturally caused by the 
 receipt of this intelligence in Japan, and steps were 
 at once taken to exact reparation. Mr. Hanabusa 
 was sent back to Soul on board an ironclad, with a 
 fitting escort, and preparations were made for war if 
 the employment of force became necessary. China 
 acted, however, in this emergency with a promptitude 
 little to be expected from her usual dilatory habits. 
 Directly the news arrived. Ma Kien-chung, an active 
 and intelligent official who had just returned from a 
 mission to India, was despatched with an ironclad 
 squadron and several thousand soldiers, to the scene 
 of action ; and grave fears were entertained lest war 
 between China and Japan should arise out of the 
 imbroglio. Such a contingency was, however, fortu- 
 nately averted by the good sense of the respective 
 Governments. Japan recognized that redress for the 
 outrage was her ultimate object, while China made 
 use of her influence and preponderating force, to 
 overawe the reactionary party and restore the king 
 and his ministers to power. Terms of settlement, 
 
CHINESE INTERVENTION, 251 
 
 under these conditions, were speedily arranged. 
 The Corean Government, which made no attempt to 
 palliate the wrong done in defiance of its authority, 
 and could only endeavour to mitigate the Japanese 
 demands, agreed to pay ^500,000 to defray the cost 
 of Japanese military preparations, and ^50,000 as 
 compensation to the families of those who had been 
 killed' during the riot. The maintenance of a Japanese 
 guard at the Legation for a year, the execution of 
 certain ringleaders, the opening of an additional port, 
 and the despatch of a mission of apology to Kioto, 
 were other conditions with which Japanese amour- 
 prajpre appears to have been amply satisfied ; while 
 the Chinese envoy, to put an end once for all to the 
 ex-Regent's machinations, carried him off to China, 
 where an Imperial edict subsequently ordered him 
 to be interned. The temptation is great to repro- 
 duce a full translation of this characteristic docu- 
 ment, which gives a concise summary of the course 
 of events and recapitulates the Regent's political 
 crimes, but we must confine ourselves to the con- 
 cluding terms : — 
 
 Considering [runs the Imperial utterance] the constant arrogance 
 with which he has intimidated his sovereign, and his plot that 
 endangered the State, he should he punished with all the rigour 
 of the law. But we bethink ourselves of the ties of kindred that 
 render him an object of reverence to the prince, and that if heavy- 
 sentence be meted out to him the latter will be involved in a state 
 of helpless misery. For these reasons we, of our special favour, 
 most leniently lighten his sentence. Let Le Cheng-ying escape 
 the punishment due to his crimes, and live at peace at Paoting-foo 
 in Chihli, nor ever return to his country. 
 
 Successful treachery is no disgrace to an Oriental, 
 
252 CO RE A, 
 
 and many a mandarin head Avill have wagged with 
 delight when the story was told, in China, of the 
 arrest of the Corean rebel. Ma paid a visit to Soul, 
 accompanied as was natural by a strong escort, invited 
 the object of his attention to dinner, carried him off 
 in a sedan-chair from the heart of the capital, and 
 placed him on board a Chinese ironclad, almost before 
 his partisans could hear the news or gather breath 
 to interfere if they had been disposed to incur such 
 a risk. There is a dash of the ludicrous in this 
 closing incident ; so effectual is the extinction of 
 the rebel leader, and so complete the answer afforded 
 to the questions which had been raised, as to the 
 reality of Chinese suzerainty over the country. 
 
 Before these vio;orous measures, the Conservative 
 opposition seems to have collapsed. The kins; 
 resumed the reins of power, and shoAved a disposition 
 to act loyally on the new lines. Even the queen 
 came back to life, the fate destined for her having 
 been averted by putting forward one of her maids to 
 receive the fatal cup, while her Majesty escaped to a 
 neighbouring village where she remained in hiding 
 till the storm was past. 
 
 It remained for the Governments with which Corea 
 had been persuaded to conclude treaties, to ratify 
 these engagements and clench the new policy. Some 
 hesitation appears to have been felt, for a moment, on 
 account of the ill-defined nature of Corean relations 
 to Peking. These were quite well understood, no 
 doubt, by the parties concerned ; but Western Powers 
 might be pardoned for desiring to know more 
 
UNITED STATES TREATY. 253 
 
 precisely wlietlier they were dealing with an inde- 
 pendent kingdom or with a vassal state. They had 
 seen China disclaiming responsibility when appealed 
 to by M. de Bellonet and M. Low ; yet interposing, 
 with sovereign authority, in the difficulty with Japan. 
 The United States appear to have decided on ignor- 
 ing the complication, and looking directly to Soul. 
 As nearly as possible twelve months after Admiral 
 Schufeldt's first visit. General Foote arrived off the 
 mouth of Han river ; and ratified copies of the Ameri- 
 can treaty were exchanged at Soul, on May 19th, 
 1883, with a degree of pomp and circumstance that 
 would have well become a more pretentious State. 
 The ceremony — marking as it did, for Corea, a final^ 
 severance with the past — has many points of interest ; 
 and a sketch of the proceedings, condensed from the 
 narrative of an eye-witness, may be worth preserva- 
 tion. 
 
 The Council of Ministers were present in full Court dress of 
 dark green satin, while the American Minister was accompanied 
 by nine officers of the Monocacy^ besides his personal suite. . . . 
 The rich robes of the Corean noblemen, the plain black of the 
 American Legation, the glittering epaulettes and lace of the naval 
 officers, combined to make a scene both novel and striking, the 
 more so when it is considered that the object of the assembly was 
 to complete the destruction of a nation's political traditions. On 
 the following day, General Foote and his suite were received in 
 audience by the King, who wore a round-topped hat, with fan- 
 shaped wings sticking out behind ; his dress consisting of a single 
 garment of bright red silk with long flowing sleeves, secured at the 
 waist by a belt of crimson and gold ; while on each shoulder and 
 on the breast were large dragons in heavy gold embroidery. 
 Altogether, his Majesty appears to have very favourably impressed 
 his visitors, and the usual expressions of satisfaction at the 
 establishment of friendly relations were appropriately formulated. 
 
u 
 
 254 COREA. 
 
 A most successful banquet was given at the Foreign Office in 
 the evening, when the building was brilliantly illuminated ; and 
 two days later the Americans returned to their vessel well pleased 
 with their visit, and not a little surprised at the magnificence of a 
 reception which appears to have far exceeded their most sanguine 
 expectations. 
 
 As already stated, the Cabinets of London and 
 Berlin were in less haste to accept the situation. 
 The prompt and decisive intervention of China, at 
 the time of the anti- Japanese outbreak, had so clearly 
 marked the vassalage of Corea that any engage- 
 ment entered into with her assumed a fresh signifi- 
 cance ; and doubts were felt as to the wisdom of 
 concluding, with her, a treaty less liberal in many 
 respects than that governing our relations with 
 China. Mr. Aston, of H.M.'s Consular Service in 
 Japan, was sent accordingly to Corea to collect 
 information regarding the country and its resources, 
 and to prepare the way, if possible, for the desired 
 modifications. It will be sufficient to add that the 
 Corean Government was persuaded to yield the 
 points at issue, and that Sir Harry Parkes succeeded, 
 during a subsequent visit to Soul, in obtaining a 
 revised treaty — more likely in every respect to 
 promote commercial intercourse. It would be 
 tedious to enter on an analysis of its provisions ; 
 but two marked variations from the Chinese 
 exemplar claim a word of comment. Opium is 
 expressly excluded ; and, as opium seems happily 
 ^to be neither grown nor used in Corea, this pro- 
 vision wiU have the sympathy even of those who 
 deprecate the sacrifice of the Indian trade for 
 
OTHER FOREIGN TREATIES. 255 
 
 the benefit of the native cultivator in China, where 
 the product and the habit are alike ineradicable. A 
 second remarkable variation from the prevalent type 
 of our treaties with the Far East, is the absence of 
 a clause stipulating for freedom of missionary enter- 
 prise ; and this leads us to remark on the absence 
 of France from the list of nations that joined in the 
 new departure. The precise circumstances under 
 which the clause in question was excluded were not 
 explained ; but it is not difficult to conceive that 
 the internal and external troubles to which the 
 advent of Roman missions had given rise, indisposed 
 the Corean Government to grant them a firmer 
 foothold. Neither America, England, nor Germany 
 would be disposed to enforce such a concession ; 
 though France, virtually uninterested in commerce, 
 and concerned chiefly to assert political influence and 
 advance the cause of Oriental missions, might decline 
 a convention from which her favourite clause was 
 absent.^ Germany soon after concluded a treaty 
 nearly identical with the British. Russia was in 
 no haste to join a rush which she can hardly have 
 regarded with favour ; but she could not afford 
 to hold aloof, and soon followed the general 
 example. 
 
 As a necessary consequence of the seclusion in 
 
 ^ A treaty was subsequently negotiated (4th June, 1886), 
 containing a clause designed, apparently, to admit missionaries 
 by a side-wind as teachers. French residents may (Art. ix.) 
 engage Corcaus as literati, interpreters, etc. ; and, reciprocally. 
 Frenchmen may be similarly engaged by Coreans. 
 
256 COREA. 
 
 which the Coreans had hitherto dwelt, few foreigners 
 had had an opportunity of becoming intimately- 
 acquainted with them or their country. Hamel gave, 
 as we have seen, an excellent idea of the nature 
 of the Government and the state of civilization pre- 
 vailing in his day ; but his narrative has long passed 
 into the domain of archaeology. British Consular 
 officers, who pushed quickly through the half- 
 opened barriers, are already giving valuable informa- 
 tion regarding the commercial resources and general 
 aspect of the country. But it is to the missionaries 
 of Rome that we have still to look for an exhaustive 
 picture of Corean life ; and the curious reader will 
 find, in the introductory chapters of M. Dallet's 
 characteristic work,^ a succinct account of the lan- 
 guage, institutions, manners, and customs of the 
 people, as well as of the topography and products 
 of the soil. 
 
 The people seem to be Mongolian in type, though 
 there are local traces of Japanese admixture. They 
 are said to be superior, physically, to both Chinese 
 and Japanese, though their standard of education 
 and civilization is lower, and they are less polished 
 in manner. They are frank-mannered towards 
 foreigners, and in the last degree curious as to the 
 strange countries and people from whom they have 
 been cut off. Mr. Oppert, on the occasion of his 
 remarkable voyages, Mr. Spence, in describing the 
 visit of the Duke of Genoa, Mr. Aston, in relating 
 
 ^ ''L'histoire de I'Eglise de Coree," etc. Par. Ch. Dallet, 
 Miss. Apostoliqiie. Paris, 1874. 
 
THE POSITION OF WOMEN. 
 
 257 
 
 his experiences, and Mr. Carles, during a more 
 recent tour, all bear testimony to these features in 
 their character ; and, if their curiosity impels them 
 to a somewhat disagreeable familiarity, this will pro- 
 bably resolve itself into a willingness for friendly 
 intercourse, as the novelty wears off. Even M. 
 Dallet, who can certainly not be accused of sparing 
 their defects, pays a high tribute to their hospitality 
 and their generous readiness to help each other. 
 His description of the state of morality is singular, 
 but it seems on the whole to be low. Despite certain 
 superficial marks of respect, women are alleged to 
 be singularly liable to outrage, and to enjoy im- 
 munity from legal responsibility for the simple but 
 uncomplimentary reason that they are not supposed 
 to be responsible for their acts : so remarkable, in 
 fact, is the state of affairs depicted, that we cannot 
 help fancying the writer has been inspired to lay on 
 the colour with a somewhat heavy brush. The 
 testimony of recent foreign visitors goes chiefly to 
 emphasize their extreme timidity. Mr. Carles, who 
 has made an extensive tour through the two central 
 provinces, says : — 
 
 The seclusion in which they [the women] and even girls live is 
 marvellous. No matter how poor the hovel in which we were 
 stopping, it was rare that we got even a glimpse of a woman in 
 the house ; and when met on the road they either struck off at 
 right angles or, turning their backs on us, stood still until we had 
 
 Some of this may of course be due to fear of 
 strangers ; and it is curious to note that, according 
 
 s 
 
258 COREA, 
 
 to M. Dallet, if they have grave disabilities they 
 have also some quaint privileges, not the least 
 remarkable of which is the right to circulate freely 
 at all hours, even at night, in the streets of the 
 capital ; whereas no man can go out between 9 p.m. 
 and 2 a.m., except in case of absolute necessity, 
 without exposing himself to a heavy fine. 
 
 The government is founded on the Chinese model, 
 with national variations; and, as in China, Con- 
 fucianism tempered by Buddhism is the prevailing 
 religion. But the Buddhistic element is said to 
 command little affection ; the temples are few and 
 poor, and the priests rank low in the social scale. 
 As in China, the so-called worship of ancestors is the 
 one cult which touches the heart of the people ; and 
 the uncompromising war which Christian mis- 
 sionaries have declared against this practice is a chief 
 cause of the difficulties and hostility they encounter, 
 in both countries. What seems a curious survival 
 of Fire Worship deserves a passing notice : — 
 
 La plupart ties families [writes M. Dallet] conservent precieuse- 
 ment le feu dans la maison, et font en sorte de ne jamais le 
 laisser eteindre. Si un pareil malheur arrivait, ce serait pour la 
 famille le pronostic et la cause des plus grandes infortunes. 
 
 It is related, for instance, of a nobleman who was 
 told by a slave that there was no fire in the house, 
 that, quitting his guests, he rushed to the different 
 braziers and examined the ashes with feverish 
 anxiety. At last he perceived a spark ; and, though 
 we may suspect the verbal accuracy of the com- 
 prehensive speech with which he is credited, we may 
 
PHYSICAL ASPECTS. 25^ 
 
 note with interest the implied significance of the 
 cult. 
 
 Victoire, s'ecrie-t-il, en rentrant dans le salon ; les destins de 
 ma race ne sont pas encore termines. J'ai recouvre ce feu quo 
 mes ancetres se sont fidelement transmis depuis dix generations, et 
 je pourrai a mon tour le l^guer a mes descendants. 
 
 In its physical aspect, the peninsula of Corea 
 presents a remarkable likeness to the peninsula 
 of Italy. An axial range of mountains, similar in 
 trend and appearance to the Apennines, runs along 
 its whole length, close to, and parallel with, the 
 eastern coast. Consequently, the streams running 
 into the Pacific are but short mountain torrents, 
 tumbling in a few miles from source to sea ; while 
 those running into the China Sea are rivers of a 
 certain magnitude, flowing through cultivated or 
 cultivable plains. These physical peculiarities mark 
 the distribution of the population and the present 
 productive area of the country. Roughly speaking, 
 the portions of the peninsula which lie to the west 
 of the watershed are the most populous and fertile. 
 
 The valleys are fertile and fairly cultivated, though 
 there does not seem to be, among their products, very 
 much available for exportation to Europe. Cotton, 
 hemp, flax, tobacco, indigo, hides and furs have been 
 among the articles exported through the Japanese ; 
 and these with, possibly, some silk, appear to indicate 
 the principal elements of foreign commerce. " Of 
 silk culture " Mr. Spence saw none in the country ; 
 but, he adds, " they spin the cocoons of the wild 
 
 s 2 
 
26o COREA. 
 
 ailanthus, and I procured hanks of their silk which 
 to my inexperienced eye seemed closely to resemble 
 Shantung silk." The tea shrub grows wild, but is 
 also neglected. Hempen clothes are universally worn 
 by the labouring classes, and the thread is spun 
 much finer than would be possible with European 
 hemp. '' It must," Mr. Spence thinks, " be the 
 same as the Chinese flax which grows in the 
 neighbourhood of Newchwang ; and, as the im- 
 portation of that fibre into England has long been 
 desired by our flax-spinners, and is only restricted 
 on account of its high price, attention will probably 
 be drawn to the Corean hemp as an article of com- 
 merce." The cotton shrub thrives, and white 
 cotton cloth is largely manufactured. Tobacco and 
 indigo are also grown ; and, most valuable of all, the 
 ginseng root which plays so important a part as a 
 tonic and restorative in the Chinese pharmacopoeia. 
 Some idea of the value of this product may be formed 
 from the fact that the duty paid on it in one year, 
 at the Chinese frontier station, is said to have ex- 
 ceeded 100,000L One of the chief curiosities is a 
 remarkably small race of ponies, which are smaller 
 and more shapely than our own Shetland breed. 
 Another source of wealth which has been much 
 neglected, is timber. The nature and capabilities of 
 the country at the point where the peninsula merges 
 into the continent are little known, further than 
 that it is said to be richly wooded and that it is 
 traversed by the greatest of the Corean rivers. But, 
 even if this source failed, the grandly wooded range 
 
PRODUCTS, 26 1 
 
 which we have seen on the eastern coast is covered 
 with seemingly illimitable supplies. 
 
 The population, which is estimated at from eight 
 to ten millions, is sparse except at a few principal 
 centres, and generally poor ; and the standards of 
 comfort and industry are low. " Of ornamental art 
 work," pyrites Mr. Spence, " such as porcelain, bronze, 
 
 etc., they have none The ceramic art is quite 
 
 rudimentary, and they attach an excessive value to 
 the commonest Japanese ware." Their greatest ex- 
 cellence seems to be attained in the manufacture of 
 paper made from hemp, which is so strong that 
 it is difficult to tear, and, as in Japan, is oiled 
 and made into excellent waterproofs. The cabinet- 
 makers also, according to Mr. Carles, show a certain 
 amount of skill in their manufactures, and the brass 
 and wicker work are not without finish. 
 
 The. crudity of the financial arrangements is suffi- 
 cient to indicate a very primitive state of trade. It 
 required two ponies, each bearing a load of 280 lbs., 
 to carry currency to the value of 30/., for which 
 Mr. Carles' party had occasion. Ahnost the same 
 difficulty might be predicated of the copper cas/t 
 which form the prevailing medium of exchange in 
 China ; but the Chinese have invented an elaborate 
 system of banking whereas, in Corea, though " mer- 
 chants are said occasionally to give bills on each 
 other," the aiTangements are of a very restricted 
 character. The Chinese have also a sufficiency of 
 silver, which they cast into shoes of sycee of standard 
 purity; whereas, in Corea, ^* failing paper and 
 
262 COREA. 
 
 copper cash^ silver ingots and gold-dust are to be 
 bought sometimes, but not in large quantities, nor of 
 a fixed standard." Obviously, if the people have 
 made so little progress in finance, it is because they 
 have not trade of sufficient volume to require a more 
 elaborate system. The state of things indicated is, 
 in fact, not far removed from barter. 
 
 It is time, with these few prosaic facts, to close our 
 sketch of the so long Forbidden Land. A curious 
 change has come over the scene since Father 
 Frois described to wondering ears the great invasion 
 of Fidejosi, and Henry Hamel narrated his strange 
 experiences among a stranger people. As yet, the 
 romance partly holds. A recent letter in the North- 
 China Herald J describing a sacrificial visit by the 
 king to the temple of Confucius, deals with a bar- 
 baric pomp of procession, a quaintness of costume, 
 an idiosyncrasy of ceremonial as striking as any of 
 the pictures which have been drawn for us, of 
 Eastern life. 
 
 Mounted warriors resplendent in robes of various colours . . . 
 then more flags, and a row of trumpeters, behind whom walked 
 an officer bearing a red silk banner on which was embroidered a 
 disk in the most brilliant gold thread. After the banners came a 
 bevy of officers surrounding a man (the king) on horseback, 
 dressed in a scarlet robe with gold embroidery on the chest and 
 back, a lacquer belt studded with amber medallions, etc., etc. 
 Before and behind the king open sedan-chairs were carried, and 
 after these came a large covered litter, borne on the backs of 
 ponies, which was draped inside and out with leopard skins. 
 More mounted warriors and soldiers . . . were succeeded by a 
 fresh batch of trumpeters, who marched in advance of a second 
 banner similar to the one carried before the king, except that it 
 
SURVIVING CEREMONIAL, 263 
 
 "was blue instead of red. Then came a second litter, in which 
 was seated a diminutive boy dressed like the king, who, I was 
 informed, was the Crown Prince. After the litter came more 
 trumpeters, warriors, and foot-soldiers, and the procession had gone 
 
 by. 
 
 We have here doubtless, as the writer suggests, an 
 exact reproduction of a solemnity that has been 
 observed for centuries but which will probably soon, 
 now, become a thing of the past. Cavalry officers 
 who are obliged " to maintain their balance by 
 clutching hold of a handle fastened to the peak of 
 the saddle for that purpose," and who have " one 
 servant to lead the pony and another to hold them 
 on," are an anachronism in these days of Uhlans and 
 utilitarianism. But while they last — both proces- 
 sions and warriors — they will secure for the descrip- 
 tive letters of first visitors some of the quaint 
 interest which clings to the experiences of Hamel 
 and Wettevree. " It is altogether," writes the same 
 correspondent, " a strange country, this hermit 
 kingdom. The pale, monotonous colours affected by 
 the common people in their dress ; the noiseless way 
 in which they move about ; the total lack of wheeled 
 vehicles ; the absence of street cries, or indeed of 
 shouting of any sort, have a most weird effect ; and 
 as one passes through the silent, white-clad multi- 
 tude, one almost finds oneself wondering whether it 
 is all real, or whether one has not been suddenly 
 transported to dreamland." 
 
 A similar interest attached to Japan, when that 
 country first opened its doors to foreign visitors ; 
 
264 COREA. 
 
 and there seems a remarkable similarity to Japan, in 
 the thoroughness with which both Government and 
 people are accepting the intercourse they had so 
 long been at pains to repel. Let us hope that there 
 will be no cause for reaction from all this empres- 
 sementy but that it will settle down into steady 
 working without the collisions, friction, and other 
 unpleasant experiences that have characterized our 
 early relations with other Oriental peoples. 
 
 It may be interesting to append an extract from 
 the last report by H.M. Consul- General, on the trade 
 of Corea (for 1892), to illustrate how far experience 
 has modified the impressions of earlier visitors, and 
 what has been the eiFect so far, upon the little king- 
 dom, of the strange influences with which it has been 
 brought in contact. Two great drawbacks to the 
 development of trade are, still, want of proper 
 currency arrangements and want of roads. Various 
 minting experiments have been made, but without 
 apparently much success. After describing them, 
 Mr. Hillier goes on to say : 
 
 While it must be admitted that, under present circumstances, 
 the outlook is not encouraging, it would, I think, be premature to 
 say that reform is impossible. It must be remembered that it is 
 only a decade since Corea emerged from a condition of complete 
 isolation, before which time all communication with the outside 
 world, except under strict limitations, was absolutely prohibited. 
 With the opening of the country to foreign commerce a new state 
 of things commenced, and the history of the past few years has 
 afforded undeniable evidence of the desire of the ruler of the 
 
TRADE AND PROSPECTS. 265 
 
 kingdom to do everything in his power to develop the resources of 
 his domain, and to follow the example set by the neighbouring 
 empire of Japan. Amongst the enterprises which owe their initia- 
 tion to his personal energy, and have been supported entirely by 
 his private funds, the following is by no means an exhaustive list : 
 a paper manufactory, a match factory, gardens for the cultivation 
 of the mulberry and the breeding of silkworms, looms for weaving 
 flilk and satin fabrics, a model farm conducted on Western 
 principles for the growth of foreign cereals and the breeding of 
 foreign stock, a powder manufactory and arsenal, a steamer com- 
 pany for developing trade with non-treaty ports, foreign schools, 
 a foreign hospital for the treatment of indigent sick, a Government 
 mint, an army drilled in the foreign fashion^ a postal system, etc. 
 
 The melancholy fact has to be admitted that not one of these 
 undertakings has been carried to a successful issue, with the 
 exception, perhaps, of the foreign school, which still continues to 
 exist, and would certainly flourish if encouragement were given to 
 the pupils it turns out. The money absorbed in these enterprises 
 forms a formidable total, and it is hardly to be wondered at that 
 the King begins to weary of experiments that have cost him a 
 fortune, and for which there is nothing to ghow but deserted 
 buildings and rotting machinery. The fault lies in the system 
 that has been adopted. There is no reason why, under proper 
 conditions, success should not have attended almost all of them. 
 
 The error that has hitherto been committed is to carry on these 
 undertakings as Government concerns with capital supplied by the 
 Sovereign and filtering through native hands. The system must 
 be changed if success is to be attained. What is wanted is to 
 interest foreigners themselves, and to embark foreign capital in 
 these schemes. The responsible authorities have hitherto been 
 deluded into the belief that this country is a second El Dorado, 
 and they consequently meet any overtures for the working of 
 mines, etc., with exorbitant demands for the sale of concessions, 
 followed by royalties which are practically prohibitive. The 
 capabilities of the country in the matter of mineral wealth have 
 never been properly tested, but it has certainly been proved that 
 gold and other minerals do exist in sufficient quantities to be 
 worked at a profit if the taxes upon the output are not exorbitant. 
 It would be perfectly possible to secure the right of taking over 
 
266 COREA. 
 
 such mines when the Government was ready to work them with 
 any degree of success, and meanwhile a steady revenue could be 
 obtained with no pecuniary risk whatever. As regards the actual 
 debts of Corea, they are, comparatively speaking, trifling, and it 
 would be a simple matter to pay them off in a year or two if the 
 attempt were seriously made, and no more money was sunk in 
 futile efforts to recover past losses by new undertakings under 
 Corean management. Local taxation, as at present levied, would 
 yield a fair revenue under honest management ; but it must be 
 years before a change can be expected in this quarter. 
 
 The agricultural capabilities of the country can be testified to 
 with confidence. Not more, possibly, than half the available land 
 is at present under cultivation, and the export of grain could 
 easily be increased tenfold, and would be increased if facilities 
 were given for bringing it to the sea coast. But roads must be 
 made, and it is the business of no one to make them. Until this 
 fact is recognized there is no likelihood of any great increase in 
 the export trade of this country, upon the extent of which the 
 import trade must depend. A bad agricultural year like the past 
 season makes an immediate impression, but none the less there is 
 a steady if gradual improvement, which will, I venture to predict, 
 continue to go on in spite of the great drawbacks to its develop- 
 ment which I have endeavoured to indicate. 
 
 The total export trade of Corea in 1892 amounted 
 to $3,296,490, of which $852,721 was rough gold; 
 and the imports to $4,598,485, of which rather less 
 than half seems to have been represented by English 
 cotton goods. The total foreign trade of Corea, as 
 exhibited in the Customs Returns, thus amounts to 
 about 1,000,000Z. But ,Mr. Hillier suggests that 
 these figures do not by any means represent the 
 total trade of the country. 
 
 It has been estimated, indeed, that it would be safe to double 
 them. However that may be, it is certain that foreign goods in 
 no inconsiderable quantities are landed at places and ports along 
 
PRESENT TRADE. 267 
 
 the coast which are not open to foreigners. At Pingyang, on the 
 west coast^ there is constant communication by junk with the 
 Chinese mainland, and on the south and east coast there is not a 
 bay or inlet in which Japanese fishing boats are not to be found. 
 These vessels are constantly going and coming from Japan, and it 
 is more than probable that they bring over with them small 
 parcels of goods for sale at the various places which they frequent. 
 There are no custom-houses to take cognizance of their proceedings, 
 and no preventive service of any kind exists except at the treaty 
 ports. Lastly, allowance must be made for the trade on the 
 Russian and Chinese frontiers. No returns of this trade are pro- 
 curable, but there is every reason to believe that the value is 
 appreciably increasing. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 PORT HAMILTON.^ 
 
 The difFuseness of Blue-Books has been a standard 
 subject of criticism since Blue-Books began, and is 
 one cause, without doubt, that so very few of her 
 Majesty's lieges peruse these records of their coun- 
 try's current history. Life is not long enough to 
 disentangle the thread of a story from the jumble of 
 despatches and telegrams, departmental correspon- 
 dence and ambassadorial reports which go to make up 
 these official records of a political episode. Yet the 
 story is usually interesting when we do make up our 
 minds to unravel it, and lets light into many dark 
 corners which Press telegrams and even correspon- 
 dents' letters had failed to illumine during the course 
 of the episode. 
 
 Such a story has been given us in a Blue- 
 Book about Port Hamilton. Here is no striking 
 description of newly discovered lands. The Namhow 
 islands themselves are unproductive and uninterest- 
 ing, and the proceedings of the occupying force seem 
 to have been of the most prosaic description. The 
 
 ' Written in August, 1887. 
 
NEW IMPORTANCE OF COREA. 269 
 
 interest lies in the side-light thrown on cun^ent 
 history, in the glimpses we obtain of national 
 sympathies and antipathies, and of political leanings 
 and counteracting influences, which go to make up 
 the sum of high policy in the East as well as in the 
 West. 
 
 Few more curious cases of political evolution 
 have occurred, of late, than the sudden rise into 
 notoriety of the little kingdom of Corea, of which the 
 Namhow group (constituting Port Hamilton) is an 
 appanage. A few. years ago, Corea was still outside 
 the pale of European politics. It would hardly be 
 an exaggeration to say it has now become, in one 
 sense, the Belgium of Eastern Asia — a spot on 
 which Chinese, Japanese, and Russian jealousies tend 
 to converge, and in whose future England also takes 
 a lively interest. The story of its darker days and of 
 the experiences which heralded its entry into inter- 
 national life has been briefly told in the preceding 
 chapter. There was room, at the time the king 
 and his advisers were persuaded by China to enter 
 into relations with Western Powers, for much 
 speculation as to its social and commercial future ; 
 but there seemed no special reason to anticipate the 
 development of Russo-Chinese antagonism which 
 has brought it into strategical importance, or the 
 access of Anglo-Russian hostility which has given 
 notoriety to its outlying possession. All this, how- 
 ever, happened, and Corea soon found itself mixed 
 up in a political turmoil that might well make it look 
 back, yearningly, to the days of its isolation. For if 
 
27© PORT HAMILTON, 
 
 the acceptance of European intercourse has marked a 
 subversion of past conditions, it has energized latent 
 forces. The story of Japanese invasions and Chinese 
 interventions, of foreign intrusion and angry isola- 
 tion, of Oriental intrigue and Western adventure — 
 all this passed suddenly, as it were, into ancient his- 
 tory ; but fresh jealousies and antagonisms came to 
 supplement, and in a measure to supplant the old. 
 Chinese and Japanese interests remained, though 
 undergoing rapid transformation ; while England 
 and Russia found one more point of contact and 
 antagonism. A likeness to Belgium has been sug- 
 gested, but it is in point of political situation and not 
 of commercial or national importance. The opening 
 of Corea has, in fact, been rather disappointing from 
 a commercial point of view. It yields gold, which 
 might be extracted in greater quantity by more 
 scientific methods ; it has products which might be 
 increased in value under better government and more 
 
 /enlightened auspices. But it is not its mineral or 
 agricultural resources that have lifted it into sudden 
 importance. It is the fact of its situation at a point 
 where great national interests and rivalries tend to 
 converge. Corea is an old battle-ground of China 
 
 /and Japan ; and though the latter may have no 
 thought, now, of realizing the dream of conquest 
 which dictated the invasion of Tycosama, there may 
 linger a flavour of jealousy in her attitude towards 
 the protectorate which, after much vacillation, China 
 is at length decidedly asserting. That feeling, which 
 springs more from political tradition than from 
 
RUSSIA, 271 
 
 present aspirations, may be trusted to yield before 
 greater and more urgent interests. The crucial fea- 
 ture of the situation is dread of Russian encroach- 
 ment. China, which has already had practical experi- 
 ence of this proclivity, on the Amoor, seems determined 
 to maintain Corea as a buffer between herself and 
 her northern . neighbour : determined, knowing that 
 acquiescence would entail war sooner or later, to 
 risk it sooner rather than later, in order to prevent 
 Russia pressing down on the Yaloo river and weigh- 
 ing, from a Corean harbour, on the entrance to the 
 Yellow Sea and the approaches to Peking. Japan, 
 which has already had to exchange Saghalien for the 
 rocky chain of the Kurile Islands, is scarcely less 
 anxious than China to avert the presence of Russia 
 on the opposite side of the Japanese Sea and of the 
 Corean Strait. England's interest is less vital, but 
 not less real. That interest is to fend oiF Russia fromT 
 the China Sea. The most southerly harbour Russia 
 at present possesses on the Pacific coast is Vladivo- 
 stock,^ in 43*7 N. ; and Vladivostock is frozen up 
 four months of the year. England is anxious she 
 should not establish herself farther south, in a 
 harbour open at all seasons, from whence her ships 
 
 ^ The position which Eussia has obtained on the Tumen river 
 (dnring negotiations for the delimitation of the Eusso- 
 Chinese frontier in that region) is about 1° farther south than 
 VJadivostock, and may possibly come to supersede it, as the 
 latter has superseded Nicolaefsk ; but the change would scarcely 
 be material to England from the point of view we are indicating, 
 though it might have the inconvenience for China of raising up 
 an important Russian station at the portals of Manchuria. 
 
272 PORT HAMILTON, 
 
 might issue in case of war to harass English com- 
 merce on the China coast or, still farther afield, in 
 the Pacific Ocean. And so it happens that England, 
 China, and Japan are impelled, by mutual interests, 
 to resist Russian encroachment on Corea. 
 
 These, then, were the political conditions when the 
 British Government resolved, in April, 1885, to 
 occupy the three little islands situated in the mouth 
 of the Corean Strait, which our sailors had christened 
 Port Hamilton. The great object of Russian ambi- 
 tion on the Corean coast was well known to be an 
 inlet at the head of Yung-hing (or Broughton) bay, 
 lying between 39 '10 and 39*20 N., which she has 
 named Port Lazareif ; and more than one scare had 
 been occasioned, at Peking, by rumours that she was 
 about settling herself in possession. As a point well 
 suited to countervail the advantages of such a posi- 
 tion, English ofiicials had kept an eye on Port 
 Hamilton ; and a glance at the map seems to justify 
 the selection. Though not actually land-locked — for 
 there are outlets between Yesso and Niphon and 
 between Niphon and Kiushiu, to say nothing of the 
 northerly route through La Peyrouse Strait — the 
 Sea of Japan is so far enclosed that the Corean Strait 
 forms the easiest and most natural outlet into the 
 China Sea ; and Port Hamilton, lying in the centre 
 of the Strait, practically commands that outlet, be- 
 sides being in convenient proximity to the channel 
 r between Niphon and Kiushiu. Port Hamilton, there- 
 fore, in the hands of Russia — and there was reason to 
 apprehend that, if we did not occupy it, Russia would 
 
SITU A TION OF PORT HAMILTON, 2 7 3 
 
 — meant a convenient naval station from whence to 
 harass English commerce on the China coast ; while 
 Port Hamilton in the hands of England meant a station 
 where our ships could rendezvous and re-coal, and 
 around which they could cruise to prevent such raids — 
 a station directly in the path of Russian ships descend- 
 ing from Vladivostock or Port LazarefF, a depot some 
 1500 miles nearer than Hongkong, ifit became neces- 
 sary to attack the chief Russian station on the 
 Pacific coast. Such, were, without doubt, the consi^ 
 derations which induced the British Government, 
 during the height of the Pendjeh scare, to order the 
 Admiral commanding our fleet on the China station 
 to occupy Port Hamilton. 
 
 There never has been, however, and probably 
 never will be, a topic on which opinions do not 
 differ, and Port Hamilton is no exception to the 
 rule. Sir Harry Parkes, our late representative at 
 Peking, never ceased to insist on its importance. 
 Admirals Ryder and Shadwell, former commanders- 
 in-chief on the China station, were equally impressed 
 with its value. But Admirals Willes and Dowell, who 
 immediately succeeded those officers, and Admiral 
 Hamilton who came after them, are of a different 
 opinion. The convenience of the place seems beyond 
 dispute; the situation is, in fact, ideal; it is the 
 possibility and cost of fortifying and defending it 
 that are called in question. A large initial outlay 
 and a considerable garrison would, it is contended, 
 be necessary to make it self-dependent ; and its 
 protection, without these precautions, would hamper 
 
274 PORT HAMILTON. 
 
 much more than its possession would aid the move- 
 ments of our fleet. These considerations, however, 
 only assumed prominence at a later date. The 
 question of the moment was not whether we could 
 make the place a northern Hongkong, but whether 
 it was likely to be useful as it stood, and especially 
 whether we could afford to let it pass into other 
 r hands. The Government of the day decided that we 
 could not, and telegraphed to Sir W. Dowell, on 
 April 14th, 1885, the laconic order : 
 
 " Occupy Port Hamilton, and report proceedings." 
 
 To which the Admiral replied, on the following 
 day : 
 
 *^ Agamemnon, Pegasus and Firebrand leave immediately for 
 Port Hamilton to occupy harbour. Not to hoist flag until further 
 orders, unless Russian men-of-war come in." 
 
 And a further telegram, dated May 12th, reports 
 that the incident in question had taken place : 
 
 " Russian volunteer ship Vladivostoch visited Port Hamilton 
 10th May, remaining twenty-four hours. Union Jack hoisted on 
 the island. Formation of harbour mines and other defences being 
 proceeded with." 
 
 So, simply and briefly, was efl*ected the British 
 occupation of Port Hamilton. Twenty-four hours 
 previously, it may be safely afiirmed, hardly one 
 European in a million had known that the islands 
 exist; nor was the proportion much greater of 
 Englishmen who knew where they are situated, 
 when news came of their occupation. The incident, 
 however, raised them at once into notoriety. They 
 became a subject of comment in nearly every Euro- 
 
 V^ 
 
JAPANESE INTEREST, 275 
 
 pean capital, of question after question in Parlia- 
 ment, of frequent comment in the Press, and of 
 diplomatic attention from all the four Powers whose 
 interests have been shown to cluster in their 
 neighbourhood. 
 
 The Admiralty orders given and executed, the 
 Foreign Office accordingly took up the running. "\ 
 The islands are Corean territory ; Corea is a tribu- 
 tary of China ; and Japan could not be indiiFerent 
 to the occupation, by England, of a position imme- 
 diately opposite her coast. It is more than probable 
 that diplomatic soundings had been taken, both at 
 Peking and Tokio, if not in Soul itself, before the 
 order for occupation was issued ; and we shall risk 
 little in assuming that the two former, at least, were 
 tacitly content with a measure designed to exclude 
 Russia. They would have preferred, no doubt, that 
 the islands should remain in their previous insignifi- 
 cance ; but they were willing to have them occupied 
 by England, to avert a worse fate. So much would 
 seem probable, and such is the inference that may 
 be fairly drawn from the tenor of the replies to the 
 communication which it behoved us to make to the 
 respective Cabinets. 
 
 Japan acknowledged the intimation in a few well- 
 chosen words, and then apparently held her hand. 
 The following, at any rate, is the only despatch from 
 our representative at Tokio which bears upon the 
 subject : — 
 
 " While acknowledging the courtesy of Her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment, the Foreign Minister replies that Japan cannot view without 
 
 T 2 
 
276 PORT HAMILTON, 
 
 concern the occupation of a place so adjacent, even by a Power 
 with whom her relations are so cordial. He wishes to learn, when 
 proper, what arrangement has been made with Corea. His 
 Excellency reserves further remarks." 
 
 China and Corea were more awkwardly situated. 
 However well disposed they might be to see the 
 islands under a safe aegis, they were likely to be 
 vexed by the representations of a Power which was 
 less willing to see Port Hamilton become a British 
 station ; and the existence and effect of these repre- 
 sentations became soon apparent. Nothing could be 
 more courteous or more cordial than the Marquis 
 Tseng's reply to the communication Avhich Lord 
 Granville made to him on April 27th. 
 
 '* . . . As these islands [wrote the Chinese Minister] belong to 
 the kingdom of Corea, a country which is not only conterminous 
 with China but which is a vassal of the Chinese Empire, the 
 reported occupation of them by a foreign Power naturally could 
 not be viewed without concern at Peking. This feeling, however, 
 I am happy to be able to inform your lordship, has in some 
 measure been allayed by the assurance contained in the commu- 
 nication under reply, that the occupation would only be of a 
 temporary nature, and that Her Majesty's Government, being 
 desirous of not doing anything which would be injurious to the 
 prestige of China, would be prepared to come to such an agree- 
 ment with the Chinese Government as would not be hurtful 
 to Chinese rights and interests in those parts. The Imperial 
 Government, after having taken due note of this assurance, and 
 of the statement that, but for the exigency of circumstances. Her 
 Majesty's Government would, before authorizing the occupation of 
 the islands, have sought to come to an understanding with the 
 Chinese Government on the subject, have instructed me to 
 request your lordship to inform me of the kind of agreement 
 which Her Majesty's Government would propose, in order to 
 secure these objects." 
 
CHINA ACQUIESCES, 277 
 
 The assent of China was affirmed, denied, and re- 
 affirmed, during the discussions to which the occupa- 
 tion gave rise. It is at any rate clear, from this 
 language, that the Imperial Government was willing 
 to recognize the accomplished fact ; and a strong 
 inference as to previous understanding may be drawn 
 from the following draft agreement, which Lord 
 Granville was able to submit (within twenty-four 
 hours) in immediate response to the Chinese Minister's 
 request : — 
 
 *^ Earl Granville, K.G., Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of 
 State for Foreign Affairs, and the Marquis Tseng, Envoy Extra- 
 ordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from His Imperial Majesty 
 the Emperor of China, having met this day at the Foreign Office, 
 an exchange of views took place with regard to the possible 
 occupation of Port Hamilton by Great Britain. 
 
 " The Marquis Tseng stated, in answer to Lord Granville's 
 inquiry, that he was authorized by his Government to declare that, 
 in the event of the British Government desiring, at any time, to 
 occupy the islands lying off the south Coast of Corea, known by 
 the name of ' Port Hamilton,' His Imperial Majesty the Emperor 
 of China would offer no objection to such occupation ; and Earl 
 Granville having taken due notice of this declaration, it was 
 mutually agreed that from the day on which Her Britannic 
 Majesty should deem it advisable to occupy those islands they 
 should be acknowledged by His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of 
 China as lawfully occupied and administered by England. 
 
 " It is understood between the two High Contracting Parties 
 that Her Britannic Majesty's Government shall, at the expiration 
 of twelve months from the date of occupation, pay to the Corean 
 Government the whole of the revenue that may have been received 
 by them from the islands, and a similar sum at the expiration of 
 every twelve months during the continuance of the occupation of 
 the islands by Great Britain, deducting therefrom and paying to 
 China any portion of that revenue which has hitherto been paid to 
 China by Corea as tribute in regard to these islands. 
 
278 PORT HAMILTON. 
 
 " It is also understood that the British occupation is not to 
 prejudice either the rights or the privileges of the subjects of 
 Corea inhabiting the islands," 
 
 If the second paragraph did not speak for itself, a 
 strong conchision might be drawn from the very- 
 promptitude of the reply : diplomatists do not for- 
 mulate such documents oiF-hand, nor utter them 
 officially without previous consultation. Everything, 
 in fact, seemed settled, and all susceptibilities con- 
 ciliated. Nine days later, however, a disturbing 
 influence had clearly been at work ; and the Marquis 
 Tseng was obliged, on May 6th, to communicate the 
 following polite refusal, by his Government, of the 
 proposed arrangement : 
 
 *'The Chinese Government would have been much gratified 
 had circumstances permitted their meeting the views of Her 
 Majesty's Government in the matter of the proposed occupation ; 
 but in view of the Eussian Minister at Peking having given the 
 Yamen to understand that, should the Chinese Government consent 
 to a British occupation of the islands forming Port Hamilton, the 
 Eussian Government would feel it necessary to occupy some other 
 island or portion of the kingdom of Corea ; also in view of the 
 possibility of Japan following in the same course, the Chinese 
 Government regret that, in order to avoid these inconveniences 
 and the possible complications which might result from them, they 
 cannot authorize their Minister to sign the arrangement proposed 
 by Her Majesty's Government, and instruct him to express the 
 hope that Her Majesty's Governmeiit will not find it necessary to 
 occupy the islands." 
 
 It is rather amusing to note that all this passed in 
 full view of the fact that the occupation had been 
 effected ; and it is significant that, even on May 
 18th, the Chinese Government acquiesced in the 
 laying of a cable between Port Hamilton and the 
 
COREA PROTESTS. 279 
 
 moutli of the Yangtze. Nor is it till six months^ 
 later, when the Afghan difficulty had subsided, 
 and Russian protests had evidently become urgent, 
 that we find any serious remonstrance against the 
 continued presence of our ships. 
 
 Before passing, however, to these subsequent 
 negotiations, we may take the opportunity of seeing 
 how Corea treated the occupation of what was really 
 her territory, however outlying and slightly held. 
 Her assent also has been affirmed, but it is fair to 
 say that no such inference can be drawn from the 
 published despatches. These express, rather, surprise, 
 objection, and nervous fear of ulterior complications. 
 The King's first step was to send two high officials to 
 ask explanations, and to lodge a protest with the 
 English Admiral ; and his next to address (May 20) 
 to our representative, at his capital, the following 
 emphatic protest : — 
 
 " A rumour has lately reached me from the ^ inner seas ' that 
 Her Britannic Majesty's Government has designs upon the island 
 of Chii Wen, otherwise called Port Hamilton. 
 
 " This island is a possession of my Government which no other 
 country has the right to trespass upon, such an act being justified 
 by no principle of international law. The intelligence caused me 
 alarm and suspicion, which it is inexpedient that I should give 
 clear expression to, and some days ago officers were sent to the 
 island in question to ascertain whether the rumour was true or 
 not. Although they have not yet returned, I have received an 
 official communication from you, which is a note sent from the 
 Legation at Peking, upon careful perusal of which I learn from its 
 purport that I must now give credence to the correctness of the 
 earlier report. It is inconceivable that a Government like that of 
 Great Britain, which attaches importance to the obligations of 
 comity, and has a clear perception of the requirements of inter- 
 
28o PORT HAMIL TON, 
 
 national law, should act in a manner so unexpected, and I am 
 inexpressibly astonished at the disappointment of the hopes which 
 I had formed. 
 
 *^ If Her Majesty's Government does attach importance to the 
 obligations of comity, she will reverse her aims and at once with- 
 draw from this island, to the great good fortune of my country, 
 while she will also secure the respectful admiration of all. Should 
 she fail to do so, the moral obligations of my Government will 
 not allow them to remain silent spectators of this proceeding, 
 which they will, moreover, make known to all countries with whom 
 they have Treaty relations, and submit the proceeding to the test 
 of public opinion. 
 
 ** This matter admits of no delay, and I therefore send you this 
 preliminary letter, giving an explicit expression of my views, to 
 which I earnestly beg the favour of an immediate reply." 
 
 No time was lost in assuring the President of the 
 Corean Foreign Office, in reply, that " the occupation 
 had been brought about by force of circumstances ; 
 that it was in no way intended to prejudice the 
 veritable interests of Corea, and that there was no 
 desire whatever to menace her integrity." A 
 
 ( willingness was further expressed to come to any 
 satisfactory arrangement, and a rent of 5000Z. was 
 subsequently offered. Tempting, however, as this 
 price must have been to a poor Government, the 
 King evidently dared not accept it; and we need 
 probably go no farther than a letter from Mr. 
 Consul-General Baber, dated October 23rd, 1885, to 
 
 , find an explanation of the refusal. The President 
 of the Corean Foreign Office had, Mr. Baber reports, 
 called on the previous evening, 
 
 ♦' to inquire whether any communication had been received from 
 Her Majesty's Government in reply to his letter of the 7tli July, 
 remonstrating against our occupation of Port Hamilton. M. 
 
RUSSIAN OBJECTION. 281 
 
 Waeber (the representative of Eussia) had, on the previous day, 
 been pressing him somewhat closely on the matter, asserting that 
 he had learnt that a project was on foot by which Corea was to 
 sell Port Hamilton to Great Britain. The President further 
 requested Mr. Aston to repeat to the British Government the 
 representation of the difficulty in which our occupation of the 
 islands had placed Corea with regard to other Powers." 
 
 It is clear indeed that, at Soul as well as at 
 Peking, the motive of our occupation was perfectly 
 understood, and that the wish to be rid of us was 
 dictated much more by fear of Russia than by 
 irritation at our presence. The very protest we 
 have quoted — formal and almost indignant though 
 it sounds — was withdrawn shortly after, at the 
 instance of our Consul-General, supported probably 
 by the Chinese Government ; and even the Nanhow 
 islanders seemed to comprehend that our presence 
 implied no shadow of hostility to their Government. 
 It is likely, in fact, that the language of the official 
 utterances lost nothing in vigour from the presence 
 in the Foreign Office of a gentleman named von 
 Mollendorff, who had been delegated by the Grand 
 Secretary, Li Hung-chang, to assist Corea in her 
 foreign relations, but who took up an attitude 
 hostile to his patron, and so favourable to Russian 
 influence, that he was displaced and recalled during 
 the course of the episode. 
 
 Once more, in the summer of 1886, we find the 
 Corean Government urging the embarrassing posi- 
 tion in which it was placed by our continued pre- 
 sence ; but the project of safeguarding the islands 
 in some other way had already come to supersede, 
 
282 PORT HAMILTON. 
 
 in the mind of Her Majesty's Government, any 
 question of ulterior occupation, and the King and 
 his Ministers were destined to be very soon relieved 
 of their anxiety. 
 
 We return, now, to the negotiations with China 
 which constitute the important feature of the 
 episode. Reference has been made to a despatch 
 from Peking of October 14th, 1885, mentioning that 
 Li Hung-chang had raised seriously the question of 
 our prolonged occupation : 
 
 *' The Russian question had [said the Grand Secretary] now 
 been settled, and it was time that the British Government did 
 something to put an end to the present unsatisfactory state of 
 things, which placed the Chinese Government in a very unpleasant 
 position vis-a-vis to other Powers, and, if continued, was even 
 calculated to mar the friendship between England and China. 
 The question was a very grave one, and ought not to be allowed 
 to drag on in this unsatisfactory way. Corea had declined, and 
 he now thought rightly so, to part with any of her territory, and 
 he could assure me, as a fact within his own positive knowledge, 
 that if the Corean Government accepted to rent the island, a 
 demand would be presented from another quarter, within ten days, 
 for the cession of other territory on the same terms." 
 
 This position was still more clearly formulated 
 in a communication made to the Foreign Office by 
 Sir Halliday Macartney, on March 11th, 1886, by 
 direction of the Marquis Tseng : 
 
 " He [Sir Halliday] stated that ' the Russian Minister at 
 Peking has on several occasions urged the Chinese Government 
 to obtain the withdrawal of the British force from the islands 
 forming Port Hamilton, and has stated that, in the event of the 
 British occupation being continued, Russia would feel obliged to 
 occupy some place in Corea.' Under these circumstances. Sir H. 
 Macartney was instructed to ask what were the intentions of Her 
 
CHINA URGES WITHDRAWAL. 283 
 
 Majesty's Government with regard to the prolongation of the 
 occupation of Port Hamilton, which it was understood, at the time 
 it was made, was to be only of a temporary nature.'* 
 
 Lord Salisbury had, however, already intimated, 
 in reply to the observations of the Grand Secretary, 
 that England would be ready to withdraw if the 
 Chinese Government would undertake that the 
 islands should not be occupied by any other foreign 
 country. And Lord Rosebery, who had in the 
 meantime taken up the seals, now (April 14th) 
 elaborated that suggestion into a formal proposal : 
 
 " Her Majesty's Government have no desire to prolong the 
 occupation of Port Hamilton in opposition to the wishes of the 
 Chinese Government, but it appears to them that it would be 
 against the interests both of China and England if it were to be 
 occupied by another European Power. If the Chinese Government 
 are prepared to guarantee that no such occupation shall take 
 place, one of the chief objects which Her Majesty's Government 
 had in view in taking possession of Port Hamilton would be 
 accomplished. 
 
 " Should the Chinese Government be unwilling to undertake 
 such a responsibility, Her Majesty's Government would suggest 
 that China should propose to Kussia and to the other Powers 
 interested, to enter into an international arrangement guaranteeing 
 the integrity of Corea. If this proposal is accepted. Her Majesty's 
 Government would be ready to become parties to the arrangement, 
 and to retire at once from Port Hamilton on the understanding 
 that it should be recognized as forming part of the guaranteed 
 territory of Corea." 
 
 It was, as is well known, on these lines that a 
 solution was eventually reached ; and we may 
 perhaps pause here, while the Chinese Government 
 is considering and working out the suggestion, to 
 review the opinions of Her Majesty's naval officers 
 
284 PORT HAMILTON, 
 
 as to the value of Port Hamilton as a possession. 
 The geographical position of the islands had, as we 
 have seen, strongly commended them to Admirals 
 Ryder and Shadwell, as a naval station, and a 
 glance at the map must certainly sustain that im- 
 pression. But their successors in command looked 
 at the matter from another standpoint. So early as 
 May 20th, 1885, within %nq weeks of the occupation, 
 Admiral Dowell telegi-aphed : 
 
 " As long as we have command of the sea, Hongkong sufficient 
 base. Port Hamilton can be shelled from without unless fortified ; 
 consequently must have squadron for its protection. It could be 
 used as an anchorage whenever necessary, without occupation. 
 Any Power holding it permanently must make a second Malta 
 of it. I have taken captains' opinion ; they quite agree with 
 me." 
 
 And again, on July 15th : 
 
 " I think it my duty to again point out that, unless Port 
 Hamilton is adequately fortified and garrisoned, it must be a 
 source of weakness to the navy rather than strength. I am glad 
 to observe that Sir Cooper Key when suggesting, in 1882, the 
 occupation of Port Hamilton, recommended that it should be made 
 ' a first-class fortress ' ; if this were done I should certainly 
 advocate its retention." 
 
 These two paragraphs appear to contain the 
 kernel of the question. Made a first-class fortress, 
 Port Hamilton would be a valuable possession ; but 
 its openness to attack from three separate entrances 
 would make it " a source of weakness to the navy 
 rather than of strength," unless this were done ; 
 instead of being a safe coaling station and place of 
 resort for our ships in emergency, it would require 
 the constant presence of an efficient squadron to 
 
CONSIDERED INDEFENSIBLE. 285 
 
 protect it ; and it would be wiser to rely for supplies, 
 in ease of war, on a steam flotilla to accompany the 
 fleet. Admiral Willes, who appears to have been 
 consulted during the occupation, clearly expresses 
 this view in a letter dated January 7th, 1886 : 
 
 *' I went to Port Hamilton several times during my command, 
 and I still hold the opinion which I then formed, that Port 
 Hamilton is useless and expensive in ordinary peace times, and 
 in war or during one of the * periodical scares ' would be a source 
 of weakness, as the Admiral in command would have to detach 
 some of his ships to defend the islands (forming the harbour) 
 instead of employing them in the protection of our commerce. 
 
 " It was said, last spring, that if England did not take possession 
 of Port Hamilton some other nation would. A short study of the 
 chart and a few minutes' reflection will show that this is absurd. 
 Only the nation which ' commands the sea ' can hold our new 
 acquisition, for the islands are practically barren. 
 
 " It is supposed that, in war, a coaling-station in the northern 
 part of the command is necessary. I am not of that opinion. 
 Steam colliers properly fitted must be filled with Welsh coal at 
 Hongkong, and follow our ships." 
 
 Captain Long, of the Agamemnon^ writes : 
 
 " If the place is to be a base for, and not to be a tax upon, the 
 navy, it will require a garrison and fortifications. At present it 
 requires the constant presence of a large proportion of the naval 
 force on the station, to preserve the flag from insult in the event 
 of war." 
 
 Admiral Hamilton, finally, writing in December, 
 1885, says : 
 
 " Considering that military defence is still a work of time, it 
 cannot be expected Port Hamilton can become, as Sir Cooper Key 
 considered necessary, a first-class fortress for many years. Its 
 defence must therefore, till then, devolve on the navy. Until it is 
 properly fortified I look on its occupation ' as a source of weakness 
 in war time to the cruising power of the squadron in the China 
 
286 PORT HAMILTON, 
 
 command.' ... I quite concur in the views of my predecessor, 
 as expressed in his letter of the 28th of May last, as to our true 
 base for naval work being a steam flotilla, which can always be 
 obtained here, to accompany the tleet with the necessary coal, 
 provisions, stores, &c., and a temporary base established at the 
 most suitable port on the enemy's coast, near the port to be 
 attacked." 
 
 And the Lords of the Admiralty, summing up 
 the case in March, 1886, opine that, 
 
 "unless it be the intention of Her Majesty's Government to 
 fortify and garrison the island, so as to place it in a proper condi- 
 tion of defence to resist the attack of iron-clads, their Lordships 
 are decidedly of opinion that it is not advisable to retain possession 
 of Port Hamilton. 
 
 '* It is impossible, however, to overlook the fact that, if Her 
 Majesty's Government is prepared to incur the expense of placing 
 the island in an efficient state of defence, its possession might 
 prove valuable to the squadron in the China Seas." 
 
 ^ The nation has not, assuredly, shown any un- 
 willingness to spend money on the defence of 
 coaling stations ; but political motives no doubt 
 combined with these qualified opinions as to the 
 value of Port Hamilton to dissuade the Government 
 from putting forward any proposal for its permanent 
 
 (^retention. It would have been clearly impolitic to 
 prolong an occupation, begun with China's goodwill, 
 in defiance of China's opposition. The solution 
 suggested in Lord Rosebery's despatch of April 14th 
 met all difiiculties; and Sir John Walsham was 
 able, on November 5th, 1886, to inform Lord 
 Iddesleigh that China had obtained the requisite 
 assurances from Russia, and was able therefore to 
 give the required guarantee to Great Britain. The 
 
RUSSIA GUARANTEES INTEGRITY OF COREA. 287 
 
 following extract from the Chinese despatch will 
 explain the present situation : 
 
 ** A long time has now elapsed, and British vessels of war con- 
 tinue to hold these islands, thus giving rise to embarrassing 
 questions from without. For instance, rumours have recently 
 been disseminated from Corea that Russia was interfering with 
 China's feudatory. The Chinese Government accordingly de- 
 manded an explanation from Russia as to the existence or other- 
 wise of this fact, and in due course the Russian Foreign Office 
 gave the Chinese Minister Liu the most frank assurances that the 
 Russian Government had absolutely no such intentions. M. 
 Ladygensky, the Russian Charge-d' Affaires at Peking, further went 
 to Tien-tsin at the orders of the Russian Foreign Office, and had 
 several personal conversations with the Grand Secretary Li, to 
 whom he repeated and enlarged upon the answer earlier given to 
 the Minister Liu. He also stated that the Russian Government 
 gave a sincere promise that, if the British would evacuate Port 
 Hamilton, the Russian Government would not occupy Corean 
 territory under any circumstances whatsoever, 
 
 " The Grand Secretary Li then told M. Ladygensky that what 
 was feared was that after the British vessels of war had retired 
 from these islands they would be again taken possession of by 
 some other Power. Russia, therefore, must guarantee that she 
 would not hereafter seize these islands, and on the faith of this 
 guarantee China could officially address the British Government, 
 and urge their speedy evacuation. 
 
 " In course of time, M. Ladygensky, in obedience to instructions 
 from the Russian Government, gave a most explicit guarantee, 
 distinctly declaring that in the future Russia would not take 
 Corean territory. 
 
 " The Chinese Government is therefore naturally in a position, 
 on the faith of the guarantee of the Russian Government, to give 
 a guarantee to the British Government ; and in making this com- 
 munication as is their bounden duty, to Her Britannic Majesty's 
 Minister, they would express a hope that he will lose no time in 
 communicating the above particulars to Her Majesty's Government, 
 with a view to the issue of orders for the evacuation of Port 
 Hamilton by their vessels of war, so that friendly relations may 
 thereby be consolidated." 
 
288 PORT HAMILTON. 
 
 The object of later negotiations having been thus 
 obtained, Her Majesty's Government at once intimated 
 to the Chinese and Corean Governments their readi- 
 ness to terminate the occupation. Despatches from 
 those Governments, expressing satisfaction at the 
 decision and appreciation of the loyalty with which 
 Her Majesty's Government had acted, terminate the 
 series ; and a telegram from Admiral Hamilton, dated 
 February 28th, 1887, 
 
 "Flag hauled down at Port Hamilton on 27th," 
 
 closes the episode as laconically as it was opened. 
 
 The British occupation of Port Hamilton is then 
 at an end. It remains only to sum up the results of 
 the adventure, and to examine the conditions which 
 the settlement has brought about ; for the incident 
 involves a political departure more pregnant than 
 might be apparent at a surface glance. Port 
 Hamilton belongs, as we have seen, to Corea ; and 
 the first reply (in January, 1886) of the Chinese 
 Government, to our suggestion that they should 
 occupy it themselves or give us a guarantee that it 
 would not be occupied by any other European Power, 
 was that " the territory was Corean, and that it was 
 not the practice of China to occupy her vassals' 
 territory; that they did not see how they could 
 undertake that the islands would not be occupied by 
 any other European Power ; and that such an under- 
 taking was not a matter of immediate concern." We 
 are not concerned, here, with the nature of the 
 relations between China and her tributaries in the 
 
CHINESE SUZERAINTY. 289 
 
 past. Suffice it to say that, although perfectly under- 
 stood between the Middle Kingdom and its neigh- 
 bours, those relations have proved apparently less 
 intelligible to Western Powers — insufficiently definite, 
 at any rate, to withstand the influence of changing 
 conditions ; and China, as explained of late by the 
 Marquis Tseng,^ seems determined to place them on 
 a less equivocal footing for the future. 
 
 " The arrangements [writes the Marquis] for the government of 
 her vassal States which, until the steamer and the telegraph 
 brought the East and the West so near, had been found sufficient, 
 having on different occasions of late led to misunderstandings 
 between China and foreign Powers, and to the loss of some of the 
 more important of her possessions, Cliina, to save the rest, has 
 decided on exercising a more effective supervision over the acts of 
 her vassal princes, and on accepting a larger responsibility for 
 them than heretofore. The Warden of the Marches is now 
 abroad and looking to the security of China's outlying provinces 
 of Corea, Thibet, and Chinese Turkestan. Henceforth, any hostile 
 movements against these countries, or any interference with their 
 affairs, will be viewed at Peking as a declaration on the part of the 
 Power committing it of a desire to discontinue its friendly relations 
 with the Chinese Government." 
 
 Her Imperial Crown having, in short, lost some of 
 its brightest jewels,^ she is determined to protect the 
 remainder. The Marquis guards himself, it is true, 
 by a protest that he is writing irresponsibly ; but 
 neither can we forget that he took, immediately on 
 
 ^ " China : The Sleep and the Awakening." By the Marquis 
 Tseng. Asiatic Quarterly Review , January 1887. 
 
 "^ Annamand Tongking, Burmah, Siam, and the Liuchiu Islands 
 — all once more or less tributary — have all passed away, more or 
 less, from allegiance ; while Russia has absorbed a large slice of 
 the old Manchu country, the cradle of the reigning dynasty. 
 
 U 
 
290 FORT HAMILTON. 
 
 his arrival, a prominent position qn the Foreign 
 Board at Peking. We may, therefore, fairly look 
 on the Chinese guarantee in the case of Port Hamilton 
 as one feature only in a larger scheme of policy. 
 Port Hamilton will he protected, not only because it 
 has strategical importance, but because it is Corean 
 territory and Corea is a vassal State ; and the 
 declaration which China has obtained from Russia 
 applies not only to Port Hamilton, but to all Corea. 
 ^ The English occupation has, therefore, been fruitful 
 at least to this extent: it has strengthened the 
 Chinese position in Corea, and it has been the means 
 of eliciting from Russia a declaration not only that 
 she will not touch Port Hamilton, but (indirectly) 
 that she will refrain also from occupying Port 
 LazarefF, inasmuch as she promises to respect com- 
 pletely the integrity of Corea. The declaration 
 might not stand the test of exigency in time of war, 
 but it has at least the advantage of removing appre- 
 hension of suprise in time of peace. 
 
 That Port Hamilton will be guarded as safely 
 under the Chinese aegis as by British artillerymen 
 and marines, even the Chinese would hardly venture 
 to affirm. There is always a prospect, when the 
 pendulum has swung too far one way, that it will 
 swing too far the other ; and there is a tendency, 
 in Europe, to pass from the qiiantite negligeahle 
 theory which prevailed before the Franco- Chinese 
 war, to an over-estimate of China as a military 
 power. Hue has very reasonably urged that the 
 ease of our success in the war of 1841-2 was due more, 
 
PORT HAMILTON SAFEGUARDED, 291 
 
 eveiij to the superiority of our arms than to that of 
 our men ; and that what was condemned as cowardice 
 on the part of the Chinese was really, in part at 
 least, an intelligent recognition of the utter hopeless- 
 ness of the conflict. The better success of their 
 recent stand in Tongking and Formosa was due no 
 doubt, in great measure, to the better weapons they 
 have tardily obtained. These at least gave confidence 
 to the soldier, though they did not magically inspire 
 brigades with discipline, nor officers with dash and 
 tactical skill. That the Chinese should themselves 
 be elated at the successful resistance offered by their 
 troops in the highlands of Tongking is, perhaps, 
 natural. Their pride and courage had been depressed 
 by the issue of former conflicts with Europe, and 
 both revived with the first shadow of encouragement. 
 But though her almost limitless numbers will always 
 make China a formidable antagonist, it will be long 
 before the looseness of Chinese discipline and the in- 
 capacity of Chinese officers will be so far amended as 
 to make a Chinese army a fair match for that of any 
 Western Power, in pitched battle ; while the in- 
 capacity of her fleet was the chief reason she had 
 eventually to surrender Tongking. The fact has 
 been recognized at Peking, and great eftorts are being 
 made to increase the strength and efficiency of her 
 armament afloat. The English officers who had 
 been helping to organize her navy withdrew at the 
 outbreak of hostilities with France ; but it is possible 
 that a war involving the safety of Port Hamilton 
 might be fought under different conditions ; and the 
 
 u 2 
 
292 PORT HAMILTON. 
 
 presence, on board, of a few foreigners might not 
 impossibly energize the capabilities of a nominally 
 powerful iron-clad fleet. 
 
 r Port Hamilton, therefore, declared to be so im- 
 plicitly under Chinese protection that any attempt to 
 occupy it would entail war with China, will be in a 
 very different position from a mere outlying posses- 
 sion of a kingdom powerless in itself and hardly 
 protected by its ill-understood relations with the 
 Chinese Empire — a group of islands lying half- 
 derelict in mid-channel, a sort of No Man's Land, at 
 (the mercy of the first comer. It was one thing to 
 steam in and " squat " on this neglected spot ; it will 
 be quite another, now it is distinctly understood that 
 China would resent the intrusion. We may rely, 
 therefore, that no foreign Power will venture on 
 such a step, unless war with China has been either 
 decided on or declared ; and it is not unlikely that, 
 in such case, others than China might avow an interest 
 in the event. There seems no room, therefore, for 
 criticizing the decision of the British Government to 
 yield up Port Hamilton to Corean and Chinese hands. 
 We may regret losing hold of a place so conveniently 
 situated as a coaling station for our ships in these 
 northern seas — a station that would become, too, of 
 increasing value as our interests in the Pacific grow 
 and develop with the establishment of communica- 
 tion between Canada and our Eastern settlements. 
 But it would have been bad policy to sacrifice China's 
 confidence and friendship, over a wider field, for the 
 sake of a possession whose value would be measurably 
 
DISLIKED AS A NAVAL STATION, 293 
 
 lessened by the mere fact of her disapproval ; to say 
 nothing of the fact, which has been sufficiently em- 
 phasized, that its retention would almost certainly 
 have involved a counterbalancing annexation by 
 Russia. Our occupation has served at least one-half 
 its purpose, in evoking a guarantee that neither it 
 nor any other Corean port shall be used against us. 
 To have retained it would have been to jeopardize 
 these results, and to invite at least one of the dangers 
 which its occupation was designed to counterpoise. 
 
 We have seen, then, that the story of Port Hamilton 
 involves political considerations of wider scope than 
 the mere incident of its occupation, for strategical 
 purposes, at a moment of quarrel. That occupation 
 has disclosed political leanings, and hastened the 
 development of political groupings, that may exert a 
 powerful influence on future history in the East. 
 It is reported that China has begun to fortify 
 the islands over which she has extended her aegis. 
 The natives will, in that case, probably regret the 
 change ; and those who have been prone, of late, to 
 criticize the British soldier, might learn a useful 
 lesson in questioning the Nanhow fishermen as 
 to their relative experience of the respective garri- 
 sons.^ However that may be, the change will, we 
 may rest assured, be cordially welcomed by those 
 
 ^ It is a remarkable fact that, although we had at times over 
 2000 men in the place, no single case of interference with the 
 women occurred. It may be inferred from this how excellent was 
 the discipline, and how sincere were the thanks expressed by the 
 native headmen, on the departure of the Marines, for the respect 
 paid to their customs. 
 
294 PORT HAMILTON. 
 
 upon whom the task of occupation devolved ; for it 
 is no exaggeration to say that Port Hamilton is, to 
 naval men, an object of cordial detestation. If it 
 represent to them, in future, a memory of skilful 
 enterprise, it will also be a tradition of wearisome, 
 dreary stay. If they sometimes look in at their 
 temporary anchorage, they will recall the day when 
 the Union Jack floated over Observatory Island with 
 far less regret than they regard, from time to time, 
 the painted fragments of ancient storehouses which 
 recall our former occupations of Chusan.^ 
 
 ^ This island which was occupied by ns in 1840-6, and again 
 in 1860, was also protected, on our withdrawal, by a guarantee 
 against occupation by any other foreign Power. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 Writing after a recent visit to Manchuria, with 
 the fate of Burmah and Tongking fresh in his 
 recollection, the present Minister of the United 
 States at Peking hazarded a conjecture that " the 
 vast outlying territories on the north and west of 
 the Chinese Empire . . . will some time be sub- 
 jected to a similar experience ; " and Sir Thomas 
 Wade, late H.M.'s representative in China, has 
 expressed even graver apprehensions in speaking of 
 the ignorance and apathy of the Chinese. He dis- 
 claims, it is true, any purpose of "pointing particu- 
 larly either to Russia, or France, or ourselves, or 
 anybody else, as directly menacing the independence 
 of China " ; but he goes even beyond Colonel Denby 
 in the " dread with which he looks forward to the 
 possibility of her succumbing to a foreign power, out 
 of sheer backwardness and inertia." 
 
 The words are pregnant with suggestion regard- 
 ing the possibilities of the future in Eastern Asia. 
 They echo, too, an anxiety which finds expression in 
 high places in China itself; for, though the charge 
 of ignorance is true as regards the mass of the 
 people, there are enlightened statesmen who can 
 perceive the danger. Nor do they, less guarded than 
 
296 HUSS/A AND CHINA. 
 
 Sir Thomas Wade, make any secret of the quarter to- 
 wards which their apprehensions are directed. It is 
 the Power whose frontiers march with their own from 
 the Pamirs to the Pacific whose restlessness excites 
 their alarm, and with which events seem tending to 
 bring them into ever closer contact. 
 
 Fifty years ago, the Chinese Emperor claimed to 
 rule as a sovereign or suzerain over the whole enor- 
 mous stretch of territory from the 73rd parallel of 
 west longitude to the Pacific coast, and from about 
 50° north to the China Sea and the Indian Ocean. 
 Chryse has since been reft from his grasp : Siam has 
 thrown off allegiance, Annam and Tongking have 
 passed under the protectorate of France, Burmah has 
 been drawn under the aegis of the Kaiser-i-Hind. 
 But, though curtailed on the south, the Chinese 
 Empire still extends over the whole great mass of 
 highlands known to us as Thibet, Turkestan, Mon- 
 golia, and Manchuria : and along 3200 miles of 
 northern frontier it is conterminous with Russia. 
 More than once during the last two thousand years, 
 this great territory has been subdued, lost and 
 brought again under the Chinese yoke. The early 
 emperors of the reigning dynasty had, last, to recon- 
 struct the empire their fathers had shattered. Mon- 
 golia was again subjected : Chinese rights were 
 successfully asserted against Russia on the Amoor ; 
 and Kien-lung (1735-96) — in defiance, it is said, of 
 the advice of his councillors, who opposed the annex- 
 ation as a probable source of weakness rather than of 
 strength— forced his authority on Thibet, and re- 
 
RUSSIAN ENCROACHMENTS ON THE A MOOR. 297 
 
 duced Sungaria and Eastern Turkestan. For nearly 
 a hundred and fifty years the fruits of these vic- 
 tories were preserved ; but then the long peace was 
 broken up. The great Mahomedan insurrection 
 which gave excuse for the Russian occupation of 
 Kuldja reft away, for a time, the whole region along 
 the Central Asian trade route, from Shense to 
 Kashgar, and seemed likely, for a moment, to result 
 in a fresh dismemberment of the empire. Dynastic 
 and national pride, however, were engaged ; and by 
 a mixture of arms, intrigue and diplomacy ; by the 
 perseverance, victories, massacres, and bribery of 
 Tso Tsung-tang, and by the skilful diplomacy of the 
 Marquis Tseng and his foreign colleagues, these pro- 
 vinces have been again recovered. 
 
 It has been otherwise in Manchuria ; and nothing 
 is more significant of the change that has taken place 
 in European appreciation of events in the Far East, 
 than the contrast between the interest shown in the 
 Chinese recovery of Kuldja and the inattention amid 
 which Russia was able, thirty years ago, to effect a 
 vastly more important annexation on the Pacific 
 coast. It is, indeed, only lately that the real value of 
 this great territory seems to have dawned on Chinese 
 statesmen, their perception having been sharpened by 
 a keen appreciation of threatened loss. 
 
 The Russians made their first appearance in Man- 
 churia about the time of the Manchu conquest of 
 China. Certain Cossacks sent out from Tomsk to 
 collect tribute had continued advancing till they 
 stood (in 1637) on the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk ; 
 
298 RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 and the news they brought back led to the despatch 
 of others, Avho established themselves on both banks 
 and erected fortresses at Albazin and Kamarskoi 
 before China was ready to cope with the emergency. 
 It would be superfluous to dwell on the exploits of the 
 adventurers during the next nine years ; Mr. Raven- 
 stein,^ to whom we are indebted for an admirably 
 succinct narrative of the invasion, thus summarizes 
 the results : 
 
 " The natives appear to have been exposed to all manner of 
 ■extortion. Tribute was levied to an unlimited extent without any 
 commensurate good being conferred. No settlements of tillers of 
 the soil were founded. The resources of the country were soon 
 exhausted by perpetual foraging expeditions of Kussian adven- 
 turers. When they (the Russians) first arrived on the Amoor 
 the natives cultivated fields and kept cattle. Ten years afterwards 
 those fields had become deserts, and a country which formerly 
 exported grain could not even support its own reduced population." 
 
 The reports that reached Moscow had begun, how- 
 ever, to inspire a more definite purpose of annexation, 
 and one Stepanoif was sent with a force of 3000 men 
 to effect that object. But the Chinese, who had been 
 preoccupied, and comparativelv indifferent to the 
 earlier raids, began to turn serious attention to this 
 invasion. An army of 10,000 men was despatched 
 to the scene ; and StepanofF, after repulsing with 
 much valour an attack on Kamarskoi, was slain with 
 270 of his men in attempting to re-descend the 
 river. Several years seem to have elapsed, after this 
 disaster, before the Russians again entered the 
 Amoor basin ; but the project was too tempting to 
 ^ "The Russians on the Amoor." 
 
THE TREATY OF NERCHINSK. 299 
 
 be relinquislied, and a renewed occupation of 
 Albazin led to renewed hostilities in which the 
 Chinese were again successful. They threw a strong 
 garrison into Aigun, on the right bank of the 
 Amoor, and from thence advanced westward^ driving 
 the Russians before them till all the settlements on 
 the lower Amoor and its tributaries had been cap- 
 tured, or destroyed. Intermittent hostilities con- 
 tinued during three following years ; but negoti- 
 ations were opened in 1686 with the object of 
 preventing, in future, these perpetual collisions ; and 
 a frontier was eventually settled that left Nerchinsk 
 and the Upper Shilka to the Russians, but excluded 
 them from the Amoor basin, which was affirmed to 
 belong entirely to China. 
 
 The treaty of Nerchinsk held good for a hundred 
 and sixty years. There were encroachments by 
 hunters, and troubles arising from ill-defined tribal 
 boundaries ; a fresh convention was even negotiated, 
 for the mutual surrender of deserters, in 1768. But 
 the frontier remained unaltered ; nor was it till the 
 middle of the present century that Russia resumed 
 her movement of aggression. Full of fish ; running 
 through broad tracts of pasture and cultivable land ; 
 having forests of valuable timber and gold-fields on 
 its banks ; navigable for nearly two thousand miles, 
 up to the point of junction of its parent rivers ; and 
 receiving four great tributaries, the Dzeya and 
 Bureyn on the north, and the Sungari and Usuri on 
 the south, besides minor affluents — the Amoor might 
 well excite the cupidity of the Governors of Irkutsk. 
 
300 jRUSSIA AND CHINA 
 
 But it was the means it afforded of access to Kamts- 
 chatka and the Pacific coast, that led to its final 
 appropriation. Already, in 1854, Lieutenant Orloff 
 had entered it from the Pacific, and founded Niko- 
 laefsk and Marinsk as trading stations — on land, be 
 it noted, belonging to China. When, during the 
 Crimean War, the superiority of the English fleet 
 rendered these places inaccessible by sea, the idea 
 occurred to MouraviefF, who was then Governor of 
 Eastern Siberia, of reaching them by means of the 
 Amoor. The Chinese protested, but did not venture 
 to oppose : the journey was accomplished ; and 
 MouraviefF went to St. Petersburg to advise the 
 acquisition of a region and a waterway of such 
 evident value. His project was approved. Times 
 had changed since Kanghi had imposed terms at 
 Nerchinsk : the Taeping rebellion was convulsing 
 China Proper ; the Anglo-French aimies were 
 threatening Peking ; and he was able to exact a 
 treaty containing the following vital clause : 
 
 " The left bank of the river Amoor, from the river Argoun to 
 its mouth, shall belong to the Empire of Russia, and its right bank 
 down to the river XJsuri, to China. The territories situated between 
 the river Usuri and the sea, as up to the present, shall be possessed 
 in common by the Empires of China and Russia until the frontier 
 between the two states shall be defined, . . ." 
 
 Regaining confidence with the repulse of the Allies 
 at Taku, the Chinese showed a disposition to repu- 
 diate this concession; but the capture of Peking 
 brought them again to their knees : General 
 IgnatiefF succeeded, in 1860, in imposing a fresh 
 
TREATIES OF 1858 AND i86o. 301 
 
 treaty confirming the first and ceding, besides, the 
 whole coastline between the Usuri and the sea as 
 far south as the Tumen river which constitutes the 
 boundary of Corea. 
 
 Russia has since been frequently accused of a 
 desire to overleap the Tumen and add Corea to her 
 Pacific seaboard : Vladivostock, her most southern 
 port, is ice-bound during a portion of the year, 
 whereas the harbours of Corea are free from that in- 
 convenience. She repudiates, of course, any such 
 conception, and placed her disclaimer on record 
 during the negotiations that attended our withdrawal 
 from Port Hamilton. China seems hardly yet con- 
 vinced ; having observed perhaps, like ourselves, that 
 circumstances are occasionally too strong for the 
 good intentions of the Czar. She may find, however, 
 in the conflicting interests of others, a safety greater 
 than even treaties could ensure ; for other great 
 Powers have been showing, lately, an interest in the 
 once Hermit Kingdom that may prove its best safe- 
 guard against annexation to Primorsk. 
 
 The next negotiation carries us to the opposite 
 end of the long frontier, and marks a change in the 
 tone of Chinese diplomacy. The Anglo-French war 
 is at an end ; rebellion has been put do^^vn, and the 
 Imperial Government no longer feels helpless amid a 
 chaos of disaster. The Amoor is ceded and gone ; 
 but the Hi, at least, may be reclaimed. Chung- 
 how's famous treaty, which so nearly cost him his 
 head, has never been made public ; but the sur- 
 render of the Tekkes Valley is known to have been 
 
302 RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 one of its most objectionable features, and it is 
 further understood to have rectified frontiers and 
 conceded privileges with somewhat reckless freedom. 
 It is to the credit of the Marquis Tseng that he was 
 able to recover the lost ground, and to procure 
 the surrender of Kuldja without more serious con- 
 cessions than the right to appoint Russian consuls 
 at various points in Mongolia and Turkestan and 
 facilities for commercial intercourse. 
 
 One important reason for China's anxiety to 
 recover Kuldja was that it constituted, in Russian 
 hands, an open door into Sungaria ; and it is mainly 
 because they command passes into Kashgaria that 
 she is disturbed by Colonel YanofF's occupation of 
 the Pamirs. For it would be the very madness of 
 land-hunger to covet them for the sake of territorial 
 possession, and the idea of the Chinese ever crossing 
 them to attack Ferghana may be simply dismissed 
 with a smile. Captain Younghusband's excellent 
 map ^ enables us to appreciate the situation, by 
 following the Russian movements and noting wherein 
 they clash with Chinese interests and claims. A line 
 drawn diagonally from N.W. to S.E. will guide us 
 from the Russian base at Khokand past Karakul 
 (which is admittedly Russian), past the Rangkul 
 (which Russia claims, but which China asserts to be 
 within her sphere), to Aktash, on the River Aksu (in 
 about 37-35 N. and 74*55 E.), where a Russian post 
 has now been established. A little to the N.N.E. of 
 
 1 " The Pamirs and Adjacent Regions." Froccedings of R.G.S. 
 April, 1892.) 
 
CHINESE TURKESTAN. 303 
 
 Aktash is Tagliarma, where there is said to be also 
 a Russian outpost ; a little to the S.W. is Boshai 
 Gumbaz, where Captain Younghusband came in 
 contact with Colonel Yanoff in 1891 ; and N.W. 
 from Boshai we find the Alichur, where a brush 
 between Afghans and Cossacks is reported to have 
 lately occurred. So that the Russians would seem 
 to have encircled the Great and Little Pamirs, and 
 taken up positions not only on the frontiers of 
 Wakhan and Shighnan but within the province of 
 Sarakul, which is an admitted appanage of Chinese 
 Turkestan. 
 
 It has been a leading principle of China's policy to 
 surround herself with " buffer " States, and Tur- 
 kestan itself is probably valued less as a dependency 
 than as an outwork masking the approach to her 
 north-west provinces. When the tribes were in- 
 dependent they were prone to invade China — the 
 blaze lighted by Yakoob Khan spread to the frontiers 
 of Pechili — and so the policy was adopted of trying 
 to hold them subject at home, instead of having to 
 repel them from her threshold. Kashgaria, has, 
 however, been a traditional worry, and is likely to 
 become a still graver source of anxiety under the 
 changed conditions that result from Russia's occupa- 
 tion of Khokand. Colonel Mark Bell,^ who traversed, 
 in 1887, the great Central Asian trade route from 
 China to Kashgar, opines frankly — and it will be 
 noted that he is in accord with the advisers of Kien- 
 
 1 "From Peking to Kashgaria." Proceedings of the B.G.S, 
 (February, 1890.) 
 
304 RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 iuno^— '^ that it must be considered an unnatural de- 
 pendency of China, impossible to defend against 
 Russia so long as the Chinese troops are not trained 
 and led by European officers, and without com- 
 munication by rail between it and Shense." The 
 immense distances, the badness of the roads, and the 
 intervening desert are important elements in this 
 assumption; but the incapacity of the Chinese 
 garrisons to oppose an European force is equally 
 essential. " They are," he says, " either Chinese 
 braves practically uninstructed, under totally unin- 
 structed officers, of no value against a trained Euro- 
 pean force ; or local militia, a force of negative value." ^ 
 It is 3400 miles from Peking to Kashgar by the route 
 which Colonel Bell followed, and'2500 by a straighter 
 route across Mongolia which was traversed by 
 Captain Younghusband about the same time. The 
 mere mention of these distances is sufficient to affirm 
 the urgency for railway communication, if the ter- 
 ritory is to be made defensible. Yet these very 
 distances — and it is the longer route, across Shense 
 and Kansuh, which a railway must admittedly follow 
 — make the undertaking only less gigantic than the 
 Siberian railway itself, and assuredly beyond reach 
 of the Chinese Government under its present organ- 
 ization. A section might be within their means : 
 say from Singan, the capital of Shense, to the border 
 
 ^ [The upoome of the Pamir question has induced the Chinese 
 to meet this defect. We have heard, lately, of the despatch of 
 troops, guns and drill instructors, from Peking to Turkestan ; 
 and a considerable Chinese force is said to bo now massed on the 
 frontier.] 
 
ENGLISH INTERESTS. 305 
 
 of the Gobi Desert; but even that involves 1000 
 miles ; and the whole Dominion is on the other side 
 of this desert, which Colonel Bell declares to be 
 practically impassable for an army if its only outlet, 
 Hami, is held by a hostile force. 
 
 We are concerned in these remote regions, on 
 account of their proximity to India, as much as in 
 the growth of Russian power on the Pacific. Yet 
 we seem to have done but little to arrest Russian 
 progress towards our frontier. The Government of 
 India — reflecting it is to be feared, in this respect, 
 the alternations of impulse at home — seems to have 
 had no continuous policy : at one time doing the 
 wrong thing with surprising energy, at another 
 neglecting to avail itself of opportunities made to its 
 hand. During the meteoric career of Yakoob Khan 
 — at the risk, nay, with the certainty, of offending 
 China, it did not hesitate to accredit an envoy to the 
 usurper, in the hope of strengthening Kashgaria as a 
 buffer between ourselves and Russian territory. But 
 since he has passed away and Chinese rule has been 
 re-affirmed, we have done little to promote a more 
 efficient alliance. Englishmen have, it is true, paid 
 frequent visits to the region. From Sir Douglas 
 Forsyth to Captain Younghusband there has been a 
 going to and fro of travellers, with more or less of 
 official cognizance and approval ; but ought we to 
 •have depended on transitory visits? The political 
 relations of Turkestan now centre in Peking, and it 
 should not have been difficult to obtain Chinese 
 sanction to the appointment of a permanent repre- 
 
 X 
 
3o6 RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 sentative. Even as a question of commerce this 
 might be worth while, for much of the fine wool 
 which goes to make the shawls of Kashmere is said 
 to come from Turfan in Chinese Turkestan. But that 
 is not all. A. British consul at Kashgar avouM be a 
 means of letting light into the darkness that now 
 shadows Central Asian politics. Tlie local Chinese 
 officials are incapable of comprehending the scope 
 and jDurport of Russian proceedings ; and the states- 
 men of Peking would be benefited, even more than 
 ourselves, by intelligent reports. For the Russians 
 are always busy. Russian explorers have been 
 hovering for years round the confines of Thibet, 
 while others wander in Mongolia and Turkestan. 
 Colonel YanofF began by exploring the Pamirs ; and 
 it is much to be feared that, if China does not awake 
 in time, she will find the " exploration " carried on 
 past Aktash into the region between Kashgaria and 
 Thibet, with the result of enclosing the former in a 
 semicircle whose arms will tend ever to approach. 
 
 But Turkestan offers only one point of contact 
 with Russian territory. North of Turkestan lies 
 Sungaria ; north again of Sungaria, and north of the 
 Altai mountains, Uliasutai ; and east of Uliasutai, 
 conterminous throughout its whole length with 
 Siberia, Mongolia stretches up to the Khingan moun- 
 tains which divide it from Manchuria. In the prin- 
 cipal cities throughout this vast region, Art. X. of 
 the St. Petersburg treaty permits Russian consuls to 
 be stationed, while Art. XII. stipulates that " Russian 
 trade shall be free, at present, in all the region, as 
 
RAIL WA V PROJECTS. 30 7 
 
 far as the Great Wall ; [though] this immunity shall 
 be abrogated when development of trade necessitates 
 a customs tariff." And Russian traders appear, in 
 effect, to be everywhere making way. At Hami 
 they have been established several years. There are 
 Russian shops at Uliasutai and at Kobdo. There is 
 a Russian consul at Kashgar with an escort of fifty 
 Cossacks ; and Colonel Bell found a Russian merchant 
 at Suchau, even within the Great Wall, within the 
 frontier of Kansuh. 
 
 Turkestan and Mongolia are, however, regions of 
 great distances ; and it has been plausibly contended 
 that China's best way of defending them would be 
 by attacking Eastern Siberia in case the emergency 
 arose. It is, indeed, mainly towards Manchuria that 
 Russia professes to be looking with apprehension 
 when she speaks of China's aggressive designs ; and 
 it may not be uninteresting to examine a little 
 closely the actual position of affairs in a region which 
 the Chinese, on the other hand, are trying to fortify 
 against Russia. 
 
 Before the Emperor Kwangsii took over the reins 
 of power, the clever woman who had been governing 
 the Empire as Regent had pronounced in favour of 
 railways ; but had postponed their introduction till 
 the Emperor should be old enough to throw his 
 personal weight into the scale. His accession proved 
 the signal for a storm of opposition which threw the 
 whole question again into the crucible, whereupon 
 he appealed to the great provincial satraps for their 
 opinion ; and it may not be out of place to glance, 
 
 X 2 
 
3o8 RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 here, at certain of tlie replies which bear upon the 
 Russian question. Liu Ming-chlian, who cond acted 
 the defence of Formosa against the French, and who 
 is designated for command in the North in case of 
 disagreement with Russia about the Pamirs, has, he 
 says, " read in the papei's " that — 
 
 "the Russian Czar had ordered a railway 3000 miles long, from 
 Tomsk to Sta (? Vladivostock) within 200 miles of the Chinese 
 province of Hei Lung Kiang .... This shows that the 
 mouths of the Russians water for our Manchurian provinces. 
 Let us then make ourselves strong while we have yet time. And 
 we cannot take a better means to that end than the extension of 
 railways." 
 
 Hwang Pen-nien, then Governor of Kiangsu, is 
 equally emphatic in his allusions : 
 
 " China now finds herself in a different position vis-a-vis the 
 world from any which she has occupied during the last four 
 thousand years. Europe and Asia are now united in a way that 
 they have never been before, and this union has been effected by 
 no sudden exertion of force, but by a natural and gradual 
 development of events. To return to her old isolation would be 
 now a hopeless task for China, and while preserving those great 
 principles which have given her pre-eminence in the past, she 
 must now assimilate to herself, circumspectly and discriminately, 
 so much of the spirit of the age as will prevent her from being 
 outwitted and exploited by her astute Western competitors. The 
 first railways that China should build, therefore, should be one 
 from Tientsin to Shan Hai Kuan, thence on to Hei Lung Iviang, 
 another to Ninguta in Kirin [all in Manchuria], a third north- 
 west from Shensi and Kansu to Hi, and a fourth to Kashgar. 
 We shall then be able to send troops, money, &c., anywhere 
 in our empire within ten days, and besides that, we shall be 
 able to found prosperous colonies in these outlying regions, of 
 people who in China proper are only a starving proletariat 
 and a source of trouble to the Government, but who, once 
 
KIRIN, 
 
 309 
 
 transplanted tliither, will be able to find a fruitful field for 
 their now unemployed labour, and will turn the desert into a 
 garden." 
 
 It would be wearisome to revieAv the causes which 
 hindered the inception, even, of these great projects ; 
 personal jealousies, timid counsels, national ex- 
 clusiveness all had their share. Suffice it to say 
 that the construction of a line northward from 
 Tientsin towards Manchuria was eventually sanc- 
 tioned, and that the work has so far advanced that 
 the despatch of troops during the late disturbances 
 in that region was materially facilitated. This line 
 will be gradually extended to Moukden, the capital 
 of Manchuria, and onward to Kirin, the strategic 
 centre of the dependency. In the first thrill of 
 the alarm which the great Siberian project excited, 
 extensions to Port Arthur and to the Amoor were 
 earnestly discussed. Engineers were even commis- 
 sioned to make a preliminary survey of the route, 
 and it seemed likely that both schemes would be 
 pushed forward with the promptitude their im- 
 portance demands. But it is the misfortune of 
 China that even her best statesmen seem to lack 
 energy or influence to carry out the reforms whose 
 wisdom they can discern, and the project has tem- 
 porarily shrunk from those comprehensive schemes 
 to a slower process of construction. 
 
 The delay is to be regretted, for Kirin is, without 
 doubt, an important terminus. Situated in about 
 48^ N. and 127 E., on the upper waters of the 
 Sungari, it is in communication, by means of that 
 
3IO RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 river and its affluents, with Tsitsihar, Sansien, and 
 other principal places in northern Manchuria. Its 
 importance has been recognized by the construction, 
 there, of an arsenal which astonished Mr. James ^ by 
 its completeness and efficiency — " a large establish- 
 ment filled with foreign machinery, with boilers and 
 engines, and steam-hammers, such as one might see 
 at Woolwich or at Elswick, all erected and managed 
 by Chinese [trained, of course, under foreigners in 
 China] without foreign assistance of any kind," and 
 turning out apparently excellent weapons, from 
 repeating rifles to machine guns. Kirin is, in fact, 
 the centre upon which all traffic between China 
 Proper and Northern Manchuria seems to converge. 
 Yet it is nearly four hundred miles from Newchwang, 
 the nearest port, and the intervening roads have 
 been described as the worst in the world and 
 practically impassable except in winter when hard 
 frozen. So that a railway would have commercial 
 as well as strategic value. If, indeed, the Chinese 
 had the energy of the Canadians, they would push 
 on the line past Kirin into the vast unoccupied 
 regions of the north and east. Seventy years ago 
 Chinese emigration into Manchuria was forbidden ; 
 and though the prohibition was removed in 1820, 
 the absence of organization and uncertainty of life 
 and property prevented, at first, any considerable 
 movement. Gradually, however, the tide has 
 gathered strength: millions of Chinese are said to 
 
 ^ *^A Journey in Manchuria," by H. E. M. James, H.M. 
 Bombay C.S. 
 
MILITAR V PRE PAR A TIONS, 3 1 1 
 
 have crossed the frontier during the last twenty- 
 years, and there is now little unoccupied land in 
 the southern province. The emigrants are stretching, 
 therefore, ever farther north, overflowing even into 
 Mongolia and spreading out like a fan over Kirin 
 and Tsitsihar. Tens of thousands migrated thither 
 during a late famine in the north ; myriads more 
 have since followed in their wake; and China's 
 wisest policy would be to encourage the movement 
 by every means in her power, for not only is it a 
 relief to her o^vn congested districts but the barrier 
 of population is one of the best she can raise against 
 foreign intrusion. Russia understands this well, 
 and is said to entertain a lively fear of the pro- 
 gressive increase of Chinese colonization in the Usuri 
 region, where the few Russian settlers command but 
 indifferent success. 
 
 But if her construction of strategic railways is likely 
 to be slow, China is pushing forward military pre- 
 parations more consistent with her instincts and 
 traditions. It is almost impossible to ascertain, even 
 approximately, the strength of her garrisons in these 
 outlying portions of her empire. The true relation 
 between the actual and paper strength of a Chinese 
 regiment is, in fact, so indeterminate that it would 
 be difficult to form a reliable estimate, even with 
 the returns of the Chinese War Office before one. 
 Colonel Bell accounts for a considerable number, 
 scattered in this city and in that, in Sungaria and 
 Turkestan; he heard, for instance, of 20,000 men 
 around Hami, though he only verified the presence 
 
312 RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 of 2000 as an actual garrison in the city. But 
 whatever may be the case in the north-west/ 
 Manchuria is, without doubt, much more strongly 
 held. There are, that is to say, many thousand 
 soldiers with many Winchester rifles and many 
 Krupp guns. Mr. James found " throngs of young 
 Manchu recruits who were, in fact, members of the 
 militia being turned into regulars ;" and the work 
 has since gone steadily on. Some 30,000 fairly 
 drilled men are said to be now concentrated in 
 Kirin, besides a still larger number at Sansien ; and 
 it is proposed, I believe, to create fortified camps at 
 Tsitsihar in the north-west, and at Ninguta, which 
 lies nearly on the same parallel as Kirin, near the 
 Usuri frontier. These four places would thus form 
 a strong quadrilateral, obstructing any advance up 
 the valley of the Sungari, which seems to be con- 
 sidered the only practicable line of apjDroach for a 
 northern invader. There are other military stations 
 at Hulan Pei'rh and Aigun (opposite the Russian 
 toAvn of Blagoveschensk), on the northern (Amoor) 
 frontier ; at Hunchun near the frontier of Corea ; 
 and at Boduna, or Petuna, on the west, near the 
 junction of the Nonni and Sungari rivers. But it is 
 at Sansien, which would incur the first brunt of 
 attack by an enemy advancing up the Sungari, that 
 the Chinese have concentrated their chief strength. 
 
 ^ A recent Peking Gazette mentions that during the year 1888 
 various provinces of China proper were required to furnish the 
 Governor- General of Kansuh with subsidies amounting to 
 Tls. 4,800,000, in order to support the army maintained in 
 Kansuh and Turkestan for the defence of the north-west. 
 
THE MANCHURIAN RIVERS. 313 
 
 Distances are great in this region ; and though it is 
 the first important obstacle a Russian force would 
 encounter, Sansien lies one hundred and eighty 
 miles south of the Amoor, and three hundred miles 
 from Khabarofka, the chief military station as well 
 as the capital of the new Russian province of 
 Primorsk. It is surrounded on three sides by 
 rivers, and is said to be of great natural strength. 
 It has, however, one element of weakness. Failing 
 communication with the sea — of which more anon — 
 it depends for supplies upon the provincial city of 
 Kirin, from which it is distant about two hundred 
 and fifty miles by land and water ; and a like 
 difficulty seems to affect every station that has been 
 named. 
 
 From every point of view, then, railways across 
 Manchuria would be an inestimable advantage. But 
 what is almost more surprising than the slowness to 
 improve communications by land, is that the Chinese 
 should neglect the means of access by water which 
 have been expressly secured by the very treaties 
 that register the Russian depredation. It has been 
 mentioned that Sansien depends for its supplies upon 
 Kirin, which has to draw them in turn from the 
 port of Newchwang. But Sansien is on the Sungari, 
 and Art. I. of the treaty of Aigun (1858 J, while 
 preparing the way by its vague allusions for the 
 eventual cession of the great territory lying between 
 the Usuri and the sea, contains the following 
 important clause : — . 
 
 " The navigation of the Amoor^ the Sungari, and the Usuri is 
 
314 RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 only permitted to vessels of the Chinese and Kussian Empires ; 
 the navigation of these rivers is forbidden to vessels of e very- 
 other State." 
 
 The stipulation was omitted from the treaty nego- 
 tiated two years later, by General IgnatiefF, at 
 Peking ; but it was expressly revived by the 
 Marquis Tseng, in the treaty of St. Petersburg, in 
 1881.^ Yet it may, I think, be safely affirmed 
 that the Dragon flag has never yet been shown on 
 these rivers. It may well seem inconceivable, in 
 face of the efforts China has made to create a navy 
 of modern ships, that such an obvious method of 
 employing them with effect should have been 
 neglected. If she can send a squadron of ironclads 
 to Singapore and Japan, she can surely send gun- 
 boats on to the Amoor. The right of navigation is 
 a valuable one, both commercially and strategically. 
 But it is necessary, for either purpose, to assert and 
 preserve the right, and to ascertain the channel by 
 practical experience in time of peace. There is, at 
 present, a commercial steamer company trading on 
 the Amoor, founded, I believe, somewhat like the 
 Delagoa Bay Railway Company, with English money 
 but under a Russian organization ; and rumour has 
 it that so jealously does Russia guard the rights 
 secured by her by the quoted treaties, that not an 
 Englishman or even a Chinaman is allowed among 
 
 ^ Art. XVIII, ''The stipulations of the treaty concluded at 
 Aigoun . . . concerning the rights of the subjects of the two 
 empires to navigate the Amoor, the Sungari, and the Usuri, and 
 to carry on trade with the populations of the riverine localities, 
 are and remain confirmed." 
 
THE CHINESE AS SOLDIERS. 315 
 
 the crews of these boats. By all means let the 
 railway be hastened on : a railway to Kirin would 
 not only facilitate the despatch of troops and stores, 
 but would have the ulterior advantage of opening 
 up a fertile country which is now hidebound for 
 want of communication with the coast. But it 
 surpasses one's conception even of Chinese " back- 
 wardness and inertia," that the assistance which 
 Chinese warships on the Amoor and light draught 
 gunboats on the Sungari and Usuri rivers might 
 afford, in case of war, should be ignored. 
 
 It would seem to the Chinese like leaving out the 
 part of Hamlet to omit mention, in a review of the 
 military strength of Manchuria, of the naval station 
 which has been especially designed as a fortified 
 port, arsenal, and dockyard for their fleet and a 
 basis of defence for their capital. But Russia might 
 overrun the whole country, or China might recover 
 Primorsk, without Port Arthur having a word to 
 say, unless a naval policy varying widely from that 
 hitherto in vogue be adopted as an integral portion 
 of the military scheme. 
 
 The military strength of China has been the 
 subject, by turns, of extreme depreciation and of 
 wild exaltation. M. Challemel-Lacour spoke of her 
 as a quantite negligeable before the outbreak of the 
 war which cost M. Ferry his career. Then, after 
 her soldiers had made a stand amid the highlands of 
 Tongking, and had repulsed an ill-planned attack 
 on Kelung, opinion veered round and people saw 
 visions of Chinamen overrunning the world. It is 
 
3i6 RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 hardly necessary to say that, in this as in most other 
 cases, the middle is the safer course. Immense 
 numbers of men with arms of precision in their 
 hands can never be safely despised ; especially when 
 those men are frugal, hardy, and enduring. But 
 there is a general failure among Chinese statesmen 
 to realize that educated, skilled, and daring leaders 
 are as essential to success as re]3eating rifles. To go 
 back to the Franco-Chinese war for an illustration — 
 without referring to the eccentricities of the southern 
 squadron, Avhich cut a worse than ridiculous figure 
 off the Yangtze Cape, the Chinese had, in the north, 
 two swift and heavily armed Armstrong cruisers 
 that could have sunk any vessel in the French fleet 
 except the ironclads, and of those they had easily 
 the heels. In the hands of dashing officers these 
 two ships alone could have rendered the blockade of 
 Formosa impossible, by attacking the French at long 
 bowls while themselves out of range, and steaming 
 ofl* at will if an ironclad came to the fore. Yet they 
 never left the shelter of Port Arthur ! And as with 
 the navy so with the army. It is open to question 
 whether a certain tendency to slovenliness ^ , and 
 looseness of habit would not prevent the Chinaman 
 from being ever drilled up to the standard of the 
 Sepoy; and it may be contended, further, that 
 something more than endurance, docility, or even a 
 
 The Peking correspondent of the Times lately affirmed that 
 the Russian military attache in that capital had ascertained that 
 all the Krupp guns and rifles in Manchuria are being ruined by 
 neglect. 
 
INCOMPETENCY OF CHINESE OFFICERS. 317 
 
 readiness to accept death, is required to make a fight- 
 ing man. There is a want of discipline in that 
 higher sense which implies absolute certainty that 
 commands will be obeyed and duty done. If there 
 could be added the spirit of the Russian soldier who, 
 at a time of such cold that it was necessary to 
 change the sentry every two hours, was overlooked 
 for four and found dead at his post, a higher tribute 
 might be passed ; but it is just this indefinable 
 something which marks the contrast and the defect. 
 It is not, however, the caj)acity of the Chinese 
 soldier so much as the incapacity of his ofiicers 
 which is our present object of concern. China needs 
 to educate a whole series of ofiicers, from general 
 downwards, who would recognize that war is a 
 science, and that an ofiicer s duty is to lead as well 
 as to direct. The considerable force organized by 
 Li Hung-chang in the environs of Tientsin is well 
 armed and (for Chinese) well drilled. The few 
 European instructors have doubtless succeeded, too, 
 in the course of years, in creating a very consider- 
 able and excellent leaven of non-commissioned 
 officers. But it is commissioned officers, officers 
 with the skill to plan and the daring to lead, in 
 which the Chinese army is so lamentably deficient ; 
 and various circumstances combine to neutralize the 
 best source whence these defects could be supplied. 
 China could probably attract, into her service, English 
 and other half-pay officers who would serve her 
 faithfully and well. But she is too vain and jealous 
 to give them full power, even if she were not de- 
 
3i8 RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 terred by the reflection that her army would be 
 disorganized by their withdrawal at the first breath 
 of war, as the English officers were withdrawn from 
 the Chinese fleet at the outbreak of hostilities with 
 France. Otherwise, the prospect of an English 
 alliance in the future, with English disciplining help 
 in the present, might convert China into a valuable 
 ally against the day of struggle on the Indian 
 frontier. It may be doubted whether she could be 
 relied on to observe the conditions of a strict 
 alliance, binding her beforehand to take action in a 
 given emergency. But it is far from impossible that 
 such an alliance might come to pass, by sheer force 
 of gravitation, when the emergency arose. It will, 
 however, be by so much the less efficient if it is not 
 provided for by careful defensive provision. A 
 Chinese army and Chinese fleet, with English stiffen- 
 ing and help, might be able to recover their own 
 lost ground, and effect an important diversion in 
 Eastern Siberia while we were engaged in Candahar. 
 The Russians themselves have recognized the possi- 
 bility of such an event: Turkey, it has been re- 
 marked, is no longer to be reckoned on, and Persia 
 is too weak ; but Chinese, instructed by British 
 officers and supported by British money and arms, 
 might render excellent service. 
 
 But why, it may be asked, so much stress on all 
 these things ? Russia professes to be strengthening 
 her garrison from pure precaution, and China is in 
 the last degree unlikely to cross the Usuri with 
 deliberate purpose of reconquest. Where is the risk. 
 
RISKS OF COLLISION-, 319 
 
 if Russia so emphatically repudiates aggressive 
 designs, and China so certainly excludes them ? The 
 answer is that there is always the risk of chances. 
 Nothing could have been more emphatic than Russia's 
 repudiation of an intention to annex Merv and other 
 territory up to the frontier of Afghanistan ; yet the 
 annexation occurred. Russia scouts the idea of in- 
 vading India, yet we fortify the north-west frontier 
 against her by every means that science can supply. 
 And Manchuria is far more open to attack than 
 Candahar ; and China is a country even better worth 
 possessing than Hindustan. Officials act irresponsibly, 
 and the Russian Government sustains instead of 
 reprehending and disavowing them ; and this may 
 happen, any day, at any point along the vast con- 
 tiguous frontiers of Tartary and Siberia. Take the 
 Pamir question, for instance. The Russian Foreign 
 Office never put forward any claim to the Pamirs 
 when negotiating the treaty of St. Petersburg with 
 the Marquis Tseng ; merely asking him, as his 
 predecessor was asked at Livadia, to recognize 
 Mount Maltabar (39-30 N. and 74 E.) as the extreme 
 limit of their common frontier. Yet Russian 
 eclair ears have expelled Chinese soldiers from the 
 neighbourhood of Yesh-el-kul, which is far away 
 south, in the district of Alichur, and are taking up 
 positions in a region which Prince Gortschakoff 
 actually recognized, in 1873, as belonging to Yakoob 
 Khan. There is always risk of disturbance in 
 territory loosely held and imperfectly settled. There 
 may be difficulties with the tribes, difficulties with 
 
320 RUSSIA AND CHINA, 
 
 robbers, difficulties about cattle-lifting, difficulties 
 about gold-fields, or a collision between soldiers. 
 There may be troubles, again, in Turkestan that may 
 give excuse for another occupation of Kuldja. There 
 may occur difficulties, any day, about the gold-fields 
 on the banks of the Amoor. The Isihir, a Siberian 
 semi-official paper, gave quite a romantic description, 
 not long ago, of a community of gold diggers in a 
 corner of Chinese Manchuria, on the bank of the 
 Tumen River. The spot was said to be in a wild 
 country, difficult of access ; and it had been some 
 time before the Chinese even knew that the diggers 
 were there. When they did, they sent troops to 
 assert their rights, and some alarm was excited by 
 reports of a collision between them and the Russian 
 forces. The whole thing was greatly exaggerated ; 
 and the effervescence, whatever it was, promptly 
 calmed do^vn. But the incident may be noted as an 
 example of what might occur if ever an aggressive 
 frontier officer should be in command near a similar 
 region, on a similar emergency, with an aggressive 
 governor-general enthroned at Irkutsk. And the 
 gold-fields on the Amoor are more extensive, more 
 approachable, and more wealthy than this placer on 
 the Tumen. 
 
 There is danger too, from the veiy proximity of 
 Russian and Chinese camps : for Russian and Chinese 
 soldiers in Manchuria are, it may be feared, less well 
 in hand than Russian and Austrian soldiers on the 
 frontiers of Galicia. The Governor-General of 
 Eastern Siberia is constantly urging, now, that his 
 
CHINESE PREPARATIONS. 321 
 
 military position should be strengthened in view of 
 Chinese preparations. There may, some day, arise a 
 case of the wolf and the lamb ; and he may then find 
 himself sufficiently strong to take the water, once 
 for all, under his protection. That will not, probably, 
 happen yet — not till the Siberian railway is more 
 advanced, and till there are greater facilities for the 
 transport of reinforcements in case the emergency 
 should arise. But the Russians are not likely to 
 dally with their work, like the Chinese. A few 
 versts of the section up the Usuri valley, from 
 Vladivostock towards the Amoor, were completed 
 in time for the Czarewitsch to open them, as he 
 passed through, in 1891 ; and the fortifications of 
 Vladivostock have been rendered, it is considered, 
 impregnable against any attack they might conceiv- 
 ably incur. The pace, on the other hand, at which 
 China is travelling seems almost a satire on Russian 
 exclamations. If her decision to make a railway 
 across Manchuria had really the aggressive purpose 
 St. Petersburg professes to detect, she would surely 
 try to anticipate the completion of the rival route. 
 Yet Prince Mestchersky, in the Grashdanin, lately 
 accused the Novoe Vremya of attempting to create 
 popular ill-feeling against the Chinese, "which 
 would be a terrible danger for Russia," by its com- 
 ments on the situation. He is so far right that 
 the Chinese could, at the present moment, sweep 
 the Russians out of the Usuri province. Whether 
 they could keep them out is another question, and 
 they show little disposition to attempt its solution. 
 
322 J^l/SS/A AND CHINA. 
 
 Their anxiety takes, in fact, an opposite direction — ■ 
 an anxiety stimulated, no doubt, by previous ex- 
 perience and hardly likely to be lessened by the 
 present incident in the Pamirs. 
 
 It is always rash to prophesy, and especially so 
 in dealing with a people of whom Sherard Osborn 
 pithily remarked that the best way to judge them is 
 to decide what an Englishman would probably do, 
 and to conclude that they will do the opposite. It is 
 certain, however, that China resents and has pro- 
 tested against the Russian advance ; and the reported 
 despatch of an expeditionary force to the Rangkul 
 would appear to be evidence of a purpose to stand 
 by the objections he has raised. But we are con- 
 cerned, for the moment, with the situation as it is 
 at present. And enough has probably been said to 
 show why it is that, at Peking no less than at Con- 
 stantinople and Calcutta, the bugbear of Russian 
 aggression is ever present ; and why Chinese man- 
 darins have come to admit that a railway to Kirin 
 would be a desirable possession, in case another 
 MouraviefF or another Ignatieif should think that 
 the Sungari as well as the Amoor and the Usuri 
 ought to belong to the Czar. 
 
INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 PROJECTS OF COMMERCIAL INTERCOURSE. 
 
 A HUNDRED and twenty years ago, Warren Hastings 
 conceived the idea of opening up commercial rela- 
 tions between India and Thibet ; and there seemed a 
 likelihood, at first, that he would effect his object. 
 Circumstances conspired subsequently to defeat it, 
 and it was allowed to lapse altogether under his im- 
 mediate successors ; but attention has been directed 
 towards the Himalayas, of late, with renewed in- 
 terest, and the threads of Hastings' policy have 
 been gathered up with better assurance that they 
 will lead, this time, to a successful issue. 
 
 There may not, at a first glance, seem any neces- 
 sary connection between the constitution of Thibet 
 and the problem of commercial intercourse with its 
 inhabitants. That constitution is, however, so 
 peculiar that some perception of it is essential if 
 we would realize the position. The great reform in 
 Thibetan Buddhism out of which it has been 
 
 Y 2 
 
3J4 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 developed is, of course, familiar to students of 
 Eastern literature ; but a few words of recapitula- 
 tion will not be out of place, to clear the ground for 
 the general reader. 
 
 Not only had the Buddhism practised in Thibet 
 become strongly tainted, in the fourteenth century, 
 with the heresies which had corrupted its purity 
 in India; but "both the people and their native 
 sovereigns were dominated by an hereditary priest- 
 hood, who had engrafted on the Buddhist doctrine 
 of monasticism and celibacy a supplementary religious 
 code in which Brahminical ideas were distinctly 
 apparent." ^ To rectify these abuses, and advocate a 
 return to the earlier and purer doctrines of the 
 faith, there arose, about the beginning of the fifteenth 
 century, a young priest named Tsung Kaba who, 
 issuing from an obscure monastery on the confines of 
 China and Thibet, witnessed during his lifetime the 
 complete overthrow of the influence of the Ssakia 
 priesthood, and the substitution of his own doctrines 
 for those hitherto in vogue. So great, indeed, was 
 his success that he was able, at his death, to bequeath 
 his influence to his two principal disciples — called 
 respectively the Dalai Lama and Panshen Lama — 
 whose successors have come to be hierarchs of 
 Thibet ; and not only so, but the belief has come to 
 prevail that the soul of Tsung Kaba himself passed 
 into the former, " and that the imperishable spirits 
 of both are born and reborn again into the world in 
 
 * IllustraUons of the Lamaist System in Thibet. By W. F. 
 Mayers. 
 
THE LAMAIST SYSTEM. 325 
 
 perpetual succession." ^ Hence the well-known fact 
 that, as soon as either dies, search is made to dis- 
 cover the child into whose body the spirit has passed ; 
 and that child becomes Dalai or Panshen Lama, 
 keeping up the continuity of the succession. It is 
 necessary to keep in mind these well-known features 
 of the Thibetan creed, in order to explain the origin 
 of the dual hierarchy which has been evolved out of 
 the religious conception. 
 
 The revolution out of which the present system 
 was elaborated, occurred in 1746. Native sove- 
 reigns, owing fealty to China, had still held a more 
 or less nominal sway over Thibet up to that time ; 
 but a revolt which broke out in the middle of the 
 eighteenth century led to their complete abolition, 
 and to the placing of the chief authority in the 
 hands of the Dalai Lama, under the supreme control 
 of two Chinese Residents (called Amban) who be- 
 came, in reality. Regents of Thibet. It was, perhaps? 
 natural that to the senior of the two hierarchs 
 should fall the greater share of influence under the 
 new arrangement : but neither was the other ignored ; 
 
 ^ I have relied on Mr. Mayers' interesting paper in sketching 
 this account of the curious dual papacy which prevails in Thibet. 
 A highly- wrought description of Tsung Kaba's birth and noviciate, 
 and of the tree which grew from his hair, will be found in the 
 Abbe Hue's sparkling pages — he and M. Gabet having stayed 
 some months at the monastery founded on the spot. Hue seems 
 rather to confuse the attributes of the Panshen Lama with those 
 of an official called Nomen Khan, whom he speaks of as " Spiritual 
 Emperor." But this is one of the mistakes he makes when trying 
 to define a system of polity he failed to clearly fathom during his 
 short stay in the country. 
 
326 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 for, while to the Dalai Lama was allotted the 
 temporal power, to the Panshen Lama was confided 
 the maintenance of the purity of religion. And so, 
 while the former resides in the capital, Lhassa, in 
 the province of U, the latter dwells at the monastery 
 of Tesliu Lumbo, near Shigatze, in the province of 
 Tsang. 
 
 These, then, were the conditions which Warren 
 Hastings found existing when he first endeavoured, 
 in 1774, to open up intercourse with Thibet ; and 
 we may go on, now, to review the story of that 
 pioneer mission, as Mr. Markham ^ has told it in his 
 introduction to the journal of its enterprising chief. 
 
 The Himalayan States, in the last century, were 
 far from being so peaceful as at the present day. 
 About the year 1770, especially, they seem to have 
 been in a general turmoil. The Goorkhas, under 
 Prithi Narayan, had just conquered Nej^aul ; while 
 the little State of Sikhim, crushed between that 
 country and Bhootan, was worried alternately by 
 both. The immediate origin of the episode with 
 which we are now concerned was an invasion of 
 KoochBehar, in 1772, by a Bhootanese chief named 
 Deb Judhur. The Rajah appealed to Calcutta for 
 help, and Hastings despatched a small force under 
 Captain Jones, which drove the Bhootanese back to 
 their hills and forced them to sue for peace. The 
 Teshu Lama thereupon wrote a letter of intercession, 
 on their behalf, which gave an opening for further 
 
 * Narrative of the Mission of Bogle to Thibet, ^c, with Intro- 
 duction by Clements R. Markham. London, 1876. 
 
BOGLES MISSION, 327 
 
 negotiations. The misconduct of the Deb was 
 admitted ; " but I now," wrote the Lama, " take 
 upon myself to be his mediator, and to represent to 
 you that he is dependent on the Dalai Lama who 
 rules this country," and who would be annoyed if 
 the campaign against him were pressed. With far- 
 sighted statesmanship, Hastings at once acquiesced ; 
 and, having thus gratified the Lama, proceeded to 
 follow up the step he had gained. He came to terms 
 with the Deb, and despatched a young civil servant 
 named Bogle, accompanied only by Dr. Hamilton 
 and one Purungir Gosain, to visit the Teshu Lama 
 and open up commercial relations, if possible, with 
 Thibet. Bogle set out in 1774, travelling by way of 
 Kooch Behar to Tassisudon, the capital of Bhootan ; 
 concluded a satisfactory agreement with the Deb ; 
 and pursued his journey into Thibet, by way of 
 Parijong, in the autumn of the same year. It was, 
 as we have seen, to the Teshu Lama that he was 
 accredited ; but news of his approach was, of course, 
 communicated by the latter to Lhassa. 
 
 The Dalai Lama was at the time a child, and the 
 Regent seems to have assumed an attitude unfriendly 
 to the mission — so much so that the Teshu Lama 
 wrote, in deference to his wish, desiring that Bogle 
 would return to India. But neither Hastings nor 
 Bogle were men easily rebuffed. They persuaded 
 the Teshu Lama to write again to Lhassa, repre- 
 senting that the English had stayed hostilities 
 against Bhootan at his request ; and the Regent 
 then consented to his reception. He refused. 
 
328 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 however, to allow him to come to Lhassa and 
 neglected to answer his letters, though he received 
 his servants and accepted some trifling presents. 
 The Teshu Lama, however, who was staying at the 
 time at Desheripgay, on the north of the Tsanpo, 
 received him in a most friendly manner, and took 
 him back to Teshu Lumbo, where quarters were 
 given him in the monastery and every consideration 
 was shown him. A very cordial personal friendship 
 sprang up, in fact, between Bogle and his host ; so 
 much so that something nearer akin to grief than to 
 regret seems to have been felt at parting ;^ we shall 
 see, in the course of the narrative, that the Thibetan 
 belief in re-incarnation has lent to this friendship a 
 curious significance and continuity. Still, no great 
 political progress was made, owing to the jealousy of 
 the Regent, whom Bogle seems to have thought under 
 the influence of the Chinese, but the Teshu Lama 
 said more could probably be done when the Dalai 
 Lama assumed the reins of power. " You know," he 
 
 ^ " Teshu Lama repeated his concern at my departure, the 
 satisfaction he had received in being informed of the customs of 
 Europe, and concUided with many wishes for my prosperity, and 
 that he would not fail to pray to heaven on my behalf. He spoke 
 all this in a manner and with a look very different from the 
 studied and formal compliments of Hindustan. I never could 
 resign myself to taking a last leave of anybody ; and what from 
 the Lama's pleasant and amiable character, what from the 
 many favours and civilities he had shown me, I could not help 
 being particularly affected. He observed it and, in order to cheer 
 me, mentioned his hope of seeing me again. He threw a handker- 
 chief about my neck, put his hand upon my head, and I retired." 
 — Bogle's Journal. 
 
TURNER'S MISSION. 329 
 
 said, in bidding Bogle good-bye, " what difficulty I 
 had about your coming into the country, and how I 
 had to struggle with the jealousy of Gesub Rimboche 
 and the people at Lhassa. Even now, they are 
 uneasy at my having kept you so long. I am in 
 hopes my letter to the Lama will have a good effect 
 in removing this jealousy ; and I expect that in a 
 year or two the government of the country will be 
 in the Dalai Lama's hands, when I will inform the 
 Governor, and he may then send an Englishman to 
 me and to the Dalai Lama." But communications 
 had, he added, better pass through native hands in 
 the meantime. 
 
 Bogle returned to India in 1775, and was about 
 to set out on a fresh mission to Thibet in 1777, when 
 news came that the Teshu Lama had been summoned 
 to Peking. It was hoped that even this diversion 
 might turn out advantageously, as it was arranged 
 that Bogle should meet his friend at the Chinese 
 capital, and return with him possibly to Lhassa ; but 
 a double calamity came to defeat that purpose. The 
 Lama died at Peking^ in November, 1780, and Bogle 
 died at Calcutta in April, 1781. 
 
 The check was regrettable, but Hastings was not 
 •easily discouraged. News reached Calcutta, in 1782, 
 that the infant re-embodiment of the Teshu Lama had 
 been discovered ; and he thereon despatched Captain 
 
 ^ The Lama seems to have been accompanied to Peking by 
 Purungir Gosain, who stayed for a time afterwards at Teshu 
 Lumbo with the Regent, and was eventually dismissed with most 
 friendly messages. 
 
33© INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 Turner to congratulate the new Lama, and renew the 
 previous friendly intercourse. Following Bogle's 
 route across Bhootan, Turner reached Teshu Lumbo 
 in September, 1783. He found the late Lama's 
 brother acting as regent, and experienced a very- 
 friendly reception at his hands. He was allowed an 
 interview with the infant Lama, who impressed him 
 by an intelligence and dignity of bearing " which 
 almost seem to confirm the assurance of the Thibetans 
 that he could understand everything, though he could 
 not yet speak " ! ^ and returned to India at the end of 
 the year. 
 
 This was, however, destined to be the last chapter 
 of the volume which Hastings had so cleverly opened. 
 His career as Governor of India closed in 1785, and 
 the whole scheme of border policy which he had 
 inaugurated collapsed with his departure. Boiling 
 over still with the turbulence which had impelled 
 them to effect the conquest of Nepaul, the Goor- 
 khas determined, in 1792, to proceed to an invasion 
 of Thibet. The excuse was some question of debased 
 currency ; the real motive, apparently, a desire to 
 possess themselves of riches stored in Teshu Lumbo, 
 about which their imagination had been fired by the 
 tales of a refugee monk. The Goorkha army, 18,000 
 strong, marched from Khatmandu to Teshu Lumbo 
 with extraordinary rapidity, and took and sacked 
 the palace without meeting any resistance. The 
 Regent fled to Lhassa with the young Lama, and des- 
 patched urgent entreaties for help to Peking. The 
 
 ^ An Account of an Embassy to the Court of. the Teshu Lama in 
 Thibet. By Captain Samuel Turner. London, 1806. 
 
CHINESE INTERVENTION. 331 
 
 Chinese sent an envoy to demand restitution and, 
 on receipt of a defiant reply, despatched an army of 
 70,000 men under General Sun Fo to punish the 
 invaders. The General seems to have acted with 
 remarkable energy. He defeated the Goorkha army 
 in a pitched battle, overtook and defeated them again 
 at the entrance to the passes, and followed them into 
 Nepaul. The fugitives rallied twenty miles from 
 their capital, but Sun Fo gained another decisive 
 victory, which closed the campaign, in September of 
 the same year.^ The Nepaulese had to restore their 
 plunder, and to promise to send an embassy with 
 tribute to Peking every five years. 
 
 British policy, throughout the entire episode, seems 
 to have been pitiably weak. We might, as Mr. 
 Markham suggests, have endeavoured to control the 
 Goorkhas at the outset, thus earning the gratitude of 
 Thibet and obviating the Chinese expedition which 
 entailed the subsequent isolation. But Lord Com- 
 wallis did nothing. To an appeal from the Nepaulese 
 for help, he replied that we were too much interested 
 in commerce with the Chinese to oppose them ; but 
 offered mediation, and made a similar proposal in 
 reply to a letter from the Dalai Lama acquainting 
 him with the Chinese victory. He did actually send 
 
 ^ It is curious to note that the Chinese general had with him 
 leathern artillery, which, although it only stood some half-dozen 
 rounds and then hurst, served him admirably in the mountains 
 from its portability. During this last battle it is reported that he 
 fired his guns into his own army from the rear, to drive them 
 against the Nepaulese ! His losses, both on this occasion and 
 throughout the whole march through the snowy range, were 
 fearful, but his numbers carried him through. 
 
332 INDIA AND THIBET, 
 
 Colonel Kirkpatrick to Khatmandu with that object, 
 but the Chinese general had already settled matters 
 his own way ; he had closed the passes into Thibet 
 against natives of India, and closed they have re- 
 mained to the present day. The opportunity was 
 missed. "We had lost all the fruits of Hastings' 
 policy, together with the friendship of the Lamas ; we 
 had excited the jealous suspicion of the Chinese, and 
 the scorn of the Nepaulese." 
 
 Here the matter practically rested till the oc- 
 currence, in 1884, of a fresh quarrel between Nepaul 
 and Thibet called fresh attention to the subject. For 
 nearly a century the prohibition imposed by the 
 Chinese general had been maintained ; and the 
 Himalayas continued to be a social as well as a geo- 
 graphical barrier between India and Thibet. Inter- 
 course of some sort was kept up, through the medium 
 of the Himalayan States. Some Indian goods found 
 their way into Thibet, and some Thibetan products 
 filtered through into India ; but the difficulties of 
 transport and the weight of transit charges prevented 
 any considerable trade, while the prejudices of the 
 Lamas combined to direct what actually existed 
 through Nepaul, instead of allowing it to pass along 
 the shorter route through Sikhim. So rigidly was 
 the exclusion enforced that it was thought a triumph 
 of enterprise when certain Pundits,^ trained by the 
 
 ^ General Walker, late Surveyor-General of India, has done 
 justice to the achievements of these gentlemen, in a paper entitled 
 ' Four Years' Journeyings through Great Thibet, &c.," read before 
 the E.G.S. in December, 1884. 
 
LAMAIST OBSTRUCTION. 333 
 
 Indian Geographical Department, succeeded in cross- 
 ing the frontier under the guise of merchants, and 
 obtaining some knowledge of the country. Cooper's 
 plucky attempts ^ to make his way across the 
 Thibetan frontier, both from China and Assam, and 
 Prejevalsky's later experiments from the north, are 
 familiar reminiscences. But to all these attempts the 
 Yellow-robed followers of Tsung Kaba, who appear 
 to have inherited the full influence of their Red- 
 capjDed predecessors,^ opposed a successful resist- 
 ance. And the Chinese, holding Thibet by a loose 
 tie, and caring chiefly for peace, have acquiesced in 
 (if they did not inspire) a policy that was far from 
 shocking their o'svn instincts. 
 
 The time was, however, at hand when the selfish- 
 ness and greed of these sectarians were to furnish a 
 weapon against their own ascendency. There is held 
 
 ^ Travels of a Pioneer of Commerce in Pigtail and Petticoats. 
 By T. T. Cooper. 1871. 
 
 ^ The temptation is irresistible to quote, here, the exquisite bit 
 of irony in which Bogle summarizes the great Tsong-kaban 
 reformation : — " It may be necessary to state that there are two 
 sects of clergy in Thibet distinguished by, and classed under, the 
 names of Yellow Caps and Red Caps. ... In times of old there 
 were violent disputes between them, in which the Yellow Caps 
 got the victory, as well by the assistance of the Tartars as by their 
 superior sanctity. But as I adhere to the tenets of this sect, and 
 have acquired my knowledge of religion from its votaries, I will 
 not here say much upon the subject lest it should be thought 
 spiteful. I may be allowed, however, just to mention two things 
 which must convince every unprejudiced person of the wicked 
 lives and false doctrines of the Ked Caps. In the first place many 
 of the clergy marry ; and in the next they persist, in opposition to 
 religion and common sense, in wearing red caps." 
 
334 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 every New Year, in Lhassa, a kind of carnival, 
 during which the Ministers of State practically resign 
 their duties into the hands of the great Lamaseries.-^ 
 In 1884, the monks of the Debang Monastery, which 
 seems one of the largest in .the capital, took advan- 
 tage of the opportunity to plunder certain Nepaulese 
 traders to the extent, it was said, of half a million 
 rupees. The Nepaulese Government demanded full 
 restitution, which the Thibetans refused. Nepaul 
 prepared for war ; and the mediation of the Chinese 
 Residents barely succeeded in effecting a compromise. 
 About the same time, and with the idea possibly of 
 closing the whole southern frontier under stress of 
 Nepaulese threats, the Thibetans also blocked the 
 trade route to Darjeeling ; and the Government 
 of Bengal thereupon deputed Mr. Colman Macaulay 
 to visit the frontier and ascertain the real position of 
 affairs. 
 
 There appear to be three principal passes into the 
 section of Thibet which, driven doAvn like a wedge 
 between Sikhim and Bhootan, offers the readiest 
 access from India to the interior. The southernmost 
 
 ^ Hue confirms this abdication of the Executive Power. On 
 the third day (he says) of the New Year, innumerable bands of 
 Lamas from all the neighboiiring monasteries rush into Lhassa, 
 where they stay six days, the ostensible object being to visit the 
 celebrated Morou Monastery. '^ Pendant ce temps les tribunaux 
 sont fermes, le cours ordinaire de la justice est suspendu, les 
 ministres et les fonctionaires publics perdent en quelque sorte 
 lenr autorite, et toute la puissance du Gouvernement est abandonnce 
 a cette armee formidable de religieux bouddhistes." The result is 
 great disorder^ and occasional rioting and fighting. — Souvenirs (Tun 
 Voyage dans le Thibet et la Tartarie^ vol. ii. cap. viii. 
 
SIKHIM, 335 
 
 (the Jeylep) lies nearest to Darjeeling ; the Pari- 
 jong, on the east, was traversed by Bogle on his way 
 from Bhootan. It was part of Mr. Macaulay's mission 
 to ascertain the possibility of making a road up the 
 Lachen Valley to a third pass, called Kongralama, on 
 the west ; and it was here, seemingly, that he met 
 the Governor of Kombajong, into whose district this 
 third route gives outlet. It may be added that all 
 three roads appear to concentrate on Gyantze, whence 
 they again diverge — north-westward to Shigatze, the 
 city of the Teshu Lama, and north-eastward to 
 Lhassa, the chief city of Thibet. 
 
 Wedged in between Nepaul on the one side and 
 Bhootan on the other, Sikhim sits astride the best 
 road and the most natural line of communication 
 between Darjeeling and Lhassa. Like its neighbours, 
 its policy has always been closely dependent on that 
 of Thibet. The Rajah resides, indeed, during six 
 months of the year in Thibetan territory, passing only 
 the remaining six in his own capital, Tumloong. 
 Like its neighbours, also, Sikhim claimed authority, 
 in days gone by, over a considerable tract of the 
 fertile Himalayan slopes ; but, like them, it has been 
 pushed back and punished by successive confiscations 
 for the raids which its subjects were wont to 
 perpetrate on adjacent British territory. Darjeeling 
 itself, with all the (then jungle-covered) hills now 
 occupied by the great tea-gardens which contribute 
 yearly increasing subsidies to the Indian crop, was 
 once Sikhimese territory ; though it had long passed 
 under British administration when the ill-advised 
 
336 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 arrest, in 1850, of two Englishmen (Drs. Campbell 
 and Hooker) who had ventured on an expedition 
 into the mountains, led to the confiscation of the 
 rental that had been so far paid. Even that lesson, 
 however, and the withholding of 23,000 rupees 
 which had been paid in annual compensation for 
 some previously annexed territory, failed to restrain 
 the marauding habits of the people ; and a fresh 
 expedition became necessary, eleven years later, 
 which placed our relations with Sikhim on the 
 present footing. That expedition, commanded by 
 Colonel Gawler, and accompanied by Mr. Ashley 
 Eden as special envoy, occupied Tiimloong, and 
 imposed a treaty whose most important provisions 
 were permission to English subjects to circulate 
 freely through Sikhim, the encouragement of trade 
 with India, reduction of the exorbitant transit dues 
 which had been previously exacted on merchandise 
 passing between India and Thibet, and the construc- 
 tion, to facilitate that trade, of the very road whose 
 obstruction at the Jeylep Pass gave occasion for Mr. 
 Macaulay's visit. 
 
 Once only, it would seem, since Hastings' day, had 
 any meeting occurred between British and Thibetan 
 officials ; and that only incidentally, on the threshold 
 of Thibet. The Rajah of Sikhim having taken 
 occasion, in 1873, to visit the Lieutenant-Governor 
 of Bengal, at Darjeeling, Mr. Edgar was deputed in 
 the autumn to return the visit. The Rajah was then 
 staying in Thibet, and Mr. Edgar offered to follow 
 him thither ; but the Governor of Parijong, who met 
 
NEGOCIATIONS WITH CHINA. 337 
 
 him on the frontier, pleaded the Chinese interdict 
 against intercourse. The impression left on Mr. 
 Edgar's mind, however, — as with those who preceded 
 and folloAved him — seems to have been that the 
 Thibetans themselves were far from being indisposed 
 to friendly intercourse ; though the Governor, of 
 course, was bound by his instructions. The Rajah, 
 who came into Sikhim to meet Mr. Edgar, concurred 
 with his ministers in saying that the key of the 
 situation was at Peking: let a declaration be 
 obtained from Peking that the obstacles now put in 
 the way of intercourse Avere unauthorized, and the 
 hands of our well-wishers would be strengthened to 
 break down the barrier. 
 
 Like his predecessor, Mr. Macaulay experienced a 
 friendly greeting ; but he, equally with Mr. Edgar, 
 encountered the non-possumus of political tradition. 
 The Teshu Lama had died just before his visit, and 
 nothing seemed more natural to the Thibetans than 
 that Bogle's successor should ask about the re- 
 embodiment of Bogle's friend ; but not even these 
 amenities could lessen the force of the interdict. 
 The Regent sent a cordial reply to the letter which 
 Mr. Macaulay despatched to him, and wrote to the 
 Viceroy in equally friendly terms : but the solution 
 of the frontier question was alleged to lie, now as 
 formerly, at Peking; and to Peking, accordingly, 
 it was resolved to turn. An effort should be made 
 to take up the threads again where Warren Hastings 
 had dropped them, and Mr. Macaulay was entrusted 
 with the conduct of the negotiations. 
 
338 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 Fortunately for his chances of success, the ground 
 was somewhat prepared on the Chinese as well as on 
 the Thibetan side. The growing desire to penetrate 
 Thibet and open up intercourse with its people had 
 found an echo in the British L eolation at Pekino: : 
 and Sir Thomas Wade had taken the precaution, in 
 negotiating the Chefoo Convention of 1876, to 
 append the following clause : — 
 
 Her Majesty's Government, having it in contemplation to send 
 a mission of exploration next year by way of Peking through 
 Kansuh and Kokonor, or by way of Szechuen, to Thibet, and 
 thence to India, the Tsungli Yamen, having due regard to the 
 circumstances, will, when the time arrives, issue the necessary 
 passports, and will address letters to the High Provincial 
 Authorities and to the Residents in Thibet. K the Mission 
 should not be sent by these routes, but should be proceeding 
 across the Indian frontier to Thibet, the Tsungli Yamen, on 
 receipt of a communication to that effect from the British minister, 
 will write to the Chinese Resident in Thibet ; and the Resident, 
 with due regard to the circumstances, will send officers to take 
 due care of the mission, and passports for the mission will be 
 issued by the Tsungli Yamen, that its passage be not obstructed. 
 
 No step having yet been taken to make this 
 clause available, it might perhaps have been held, in 
 literal strictness, to have lapsed ; but the delay in 
 ratifying the Convention, caused by diflBculties about 
 the opium agreement, had no doubt something to do 
 with the neglect ; besides, we were on excellent 
 terms with China, and had every reason to anticipate 
 that our overtures would be well received. The 
 ratification of the Convention in the summer of 
 1885 having removed, therefore, the last hitch in its 
 validity, and it having no doubt been ascertained 
 
MR, MA CA ULA TS MISSION. 339 
 
 by private inquiry that the way before him was 
 fairly clear, Mr. Macaulay was sent to Peking in the 
 autumn of that year, to obtain the sanction of the 
 Chinese Government to the prosecution of the enter- 
 prise. An inkling of his purpose had already 
 filtered through the Passes, and there had been time 
 for the voice of Lhassa conservatism to make itself 
 heard at the imperial capital. Mr. Macaulay found 
 the Grand Secretary, Li Hung-chang, who had 
 acted as plenipotentiary in negotiating the Con- 
 vention, well disposed to forward his views ; but the 
 ministers of the Tsung-li Yamen were inclined to 
 raise difficulties. A report had, they said, been 
 received from the Chinese Resident at Lhassa, 
 alleging that the Thibetan people were hostile to the 
 project and begging that the exclusion might be 
 maintained : of what use would it be to issue pass- 
 ports, in face of such opposition ? The excuse is such 
 a stereotyped one, where Chinese officials wish "not 
 to do it," that a suspicion might have been justified 
 as to the precise origin of the demurrer. The 
 truth seems to have been, however, that the 
 Senior Chinese Resident had been persuaded to play 
 this card in the interest of the Lama faction ; and 
 Mr. Macaulay was able, from his own experience, to 
 throw some light upon the case ; for, while represen- 
 tations were being made from Lhassa, to Peking, that 
 the Thibetans were hostile, the Thibetans had 
 declared to him that it was China which was 
 obstructive and had shown him, at the frontier, a 
 Chinese placard prohibiting intercourse ! The 
 
 z 2 
 
340 INDIA AND THIBET, 
 
 Ministers at once denied responsibility for this 
 device, and vindicated their own good faith by pro- 
 mising to give the passports sought, and to write to 
 Lhassa that "the Mission was sent to establish 
 relations of amity, to promote commercial intercourse 
 between India and Thibet, and to be the bearer of 
 messages of friendship and respect to the Dalai Lama, 
 in all of which objects it had the concurrence and 
 support of the Imperial Government."^ The 
 Resident was also instructed to issue proclamations 
 at the frontier and elsewhere, to remove any 
 suspicion that the Emperor was unfavourable to the 
 entry of British subjects into Thibet. Everything 
 appeared satisfactorily settled. It was resolved to 
 defer the Mission till May, in order to allow ample 
 time for communication with Lhassa ; but prepara- 
 tions were made to start at the time named. 
 
 The Lamas were not yet, however, at the end of 
 their resources, and we were to have one more lesson 
 in the frequency of slips between the cup and the lip. 
 The personnel of the Embassy had assembled at 
 Darjeeling, and the intended presents been collected ; 
 everything was in readiness for a start, but there 
 was unaccountable delay. Favourable reports were 
 telegraphed from Darjeeling, about its probable 
 reception, but still it did not move ; and then, 
 simultaneously from Calcutta and from Peking, came 
 rumours of a hitch. The Chinese, while expressing all 
 good wishes for success, feared lest the constitution of 
 the Mission should excite opposition ; while from 
 
 * Correspondence of the Standard, February, 1886. 
 
ALARM AT LB ASS A. 341 
 
 India came reports of terror among the Thibetans, 
 and of contemplated hostility. 
 
 Subsequent information, which has filtered through 
 from both ends of the long line, across the Hima- 
 layas on the one side and through China on the 
 other, enables us to form a tolerably just estimate of 
 what actually occurred. The report that negotia- 
 tions for the purpose of opening up relations between 
 India and Thibet were being seriously revived gave 
 rise, naturally, to much discussion in a city where 
 questions of foreign intercourse were usually nar- 
 rowed to relations with the Suzerain Power or 
 squabbles with Nepaul. It appears, so far as can 
 be gathered, that the bulk of the laity and a con- 
 siderable number even of the Lamas were in favour 
 of the project ; but a powerful section of the latter 
 class — a section largely interested in trade, from 
 which they succeed, at present, in extracting a maxi- 
 mum of profit ^ — were opposed to a change which 
 threatened their monopoly ; and the influence of the 
 Lamas in the ecclesiastical centre of Buddhism is, it 
 may be conceived, predominant. They resorted, as 
 we have seen, to the stereotyped plan of causing it to 
 be represented at Peking that the general feeling in 
 Thibet was hostile to the project. That report seems 
 to have been so contrary to fact, that the Junior 
 
 1 Hue confirms the recent testimony from Darjeeling, as to 
 the avarice and usury of the Lamas. '^ Les Lamas^ mis d'abord 
 en possession de la majeure partiedu numeraire par les dons volon- 
 taires des fideles, centuplent ensuite leur fortune par des procedes 
 usuraires dont la friponnerie Chinoise est elle meme scandalisee." 
 — Souvenirs, etc. 
 
342 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 Resident is said to have resigned rather than endorse 
 it ; but it had influence at Peking, while uncontra- 
 dicted, and genuine apprehension was felt there lest 
 trouble should arise. 
 
 Nor were we, ourselves, without blame. The 
 organization of the projected Mission was too 
 pretentious. It was to comprise, besides Mr. 
 Macaulay, who held the position of Chief Envoy, 
 Mr. Paul (who had accompanied him to the frontier 
 in the beginning of 1885) as secretary; Colonel 
 Tanner, surveyor ; Dr. Oldham, geologist ; Dr. 
 Cunningham, naturalist ; Dr. Leahy, medical 
 officer ; Mr. Warry, of the Chinese Consular Ser- 
 vice, as interpreter ; Baboo Srutt Chundra Dass, 
 who had already distinguished himself in Thibetan 
 exploration ; Captain Elwes, and Captain Gwatkin 
 commanding the escort which was to consist 
 of some three hundred persons. And the climax 
 was assuredly reached when the Under-Secretary for 
 India, while admitting that the object of the 
 Mission was " to confer with the Chinese Commis- 
 sioners and the Lhassa Government as to the re- 
 sumption of commercial relations between India and 
 Thibet," could add in Parliament, that, " looking 
 to the delicate nature of the Mission, it had not been 
 thought advisable to appoint a special commercial 
 representative." Here was a Mission, having an 
 avowedly commercial object, about to start with 
 every other but a commercial representative — a 
 mission to an ignorant and superstitious people, 
 to whom the aspect of a theodolite would be more 
 
THE MISSION ABANDONED, 343 
 
 terrifying than a mountain howitzer, composed 
 entirely of scientific men, and accompanied by an 
 escort whose numbers would give it the appearance 
 of an armed reconnaissance rather than a peaceful 
 embassy. It was not so that Bogle opened his 
 approaches ; nor can we be surprised if the actual 
 size of the party were exaggerated, and its purpose 
 distorted, in Thibet. 
 
 Still, the Lamas seem, as a matter of fact, to 
 have had so little confidence in the success of their 
 machinations, that they sent an emissary to meet 
 Mr. Macaulay at the frontier, to try and effect a 
 compromise by inducing him to halt at Gyantze — an 
 important trade centre half-way to Lhassa — and 
 enter, there, upon the negotiations contemplated ; so 
 that, faultily constituted as it was, the Mission had 
 apparently a fair chance of succeeding if it had 
 persevered. But it never got so far. It never even 
 started. In face of rumours from Lhassa and warn- 
 ings from Peking, the Chinese and English Govern- 
 ments seem to have both taken alarm. News came, 
 suddenly, that it was countermanded. The escort 
 was recalled, the 'personnel dispersed, the presents 
 were scattered, and the Lamas left masters of the 
 situation. And not only so, but the withdraAval was 
 consecrated in a convention ^ signed at Peking, in the 
 following terms : — 
 
 Inasmuch as inquiry into the circumstances, by the Chinese 
 Government, has shown the existence of many obstacles to the 
 
 ^ Art. IV. of Convention relating to Burmah and Thibet, July 
 24th, 1886. 
 
344 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 Mission to Thibet provided for in the separate article of the 
 Chefoo Agreement, England consents to countermand the Mission 
 forthwith. With regard to the desire of the British Govern- 
 ment to consider arrangements for frontier trade between India 
 and Thibet, it will be the duty of the Chinese Government, after 
 careful inquiry into the circumstances, to adopt measures to 
 exhort and encourage the people with a view to the promo- 
 tion and development of trade. Should it be practicable, 
 the Chinese Government shall then proceed carefully to consider 
 trade regulations ; but if insuperable obstacles should be found to 
 exist, the British Government will not press the matter unduly. 
 
 This clause has been criticized as an unnecessary 
 abandonment of the vantage ground provided by the 
 Chefoo Agreement. Even admitting, it was urged, 
 that there was good, reason for not pressing the 
 Mission, an explanatory despatch would have suf- 
 ficed, without this formal renunciation. It must be 
 remembered, however, that the main purpose of the 
 Convention was to settle the question of British 
 supremacy in Burmah, and we were doubtless un- 
 willing to insist on any matter of secondary impor- 
 tance. It must be remembered, too, that there is 
 here recognized, for the first time, a formal purpose 
 of opening up relations between India and Thibet, 
 and that we had reason to believe the Chinese 
 Government sincere in their avowed purpose to 
 forward that design. So that, even if there be room 
 to question the formula employed, the gains were 
 unquestionably material. 
 
 But if this apparent concession was really a 
 diplomatic victory, at Peking, the case was quite 
 otherwise on the Thibetan frontier ; for the Lamas, 
 encouraged by their success, ventured to enter 
 
PROSPECTS OF TRADE. 345 
 
 British Sikhim and erect forts across the very road 
 we had so anxiously fostered. The Rajah was, of 
 course, powerless to expel the intruders, and the 
 duty devolved upon us of accomplishing that task. 
 It would not probably involve any great effort ; 
 but a military expedition was the last thing to 
 which the Indian Government desired to have re- 
 course. One cause of trouble was that the Thibetans 
 were already unnecessarily alarmed, and forceful 
 measures would be likely to make matters worse. 
 Yet, there the matter stood. The vantage ground 
 of the Chef 00 Convention had been exchanged for 
 the somewhat curiously worded agreement signed, 
 in 1886, at Peking ; the Thibetan passes had 
 been closed rather more tightly than before, 
 and the work must be commenced afresh. Fortu- 
 nately for the prospect of doing this successfully, 
 China was animated by the best disposition towards 
 us, and was herself willing that more light should be 
 let into the dark corners of Central Asia, where her 
 own statesmen even see imperfectly, and where she is 
 every year finding herself in closer contact with 
 the aggressive power of Russia. Whether en- 
 lightened by surer private intelligence of her own, 
 or convinced by what we have been able to communi- 
 cate, she seemed to understand that she had been 
 deceived as to the feeling of the Thibetan people, and 
 to be willing to support a fresh endeavour to reknit 
 the broken skein. 
 
 Of the commercial results which may be antici- 
 pated from open intercourse, we have fair data on 
 
346 INDIA AND THIBET, 
 
 which to prophesy ; for a certain amount of trade has, 
 despite all hindrance, been steadily kept up. The 
 route favoured by the Lamas is, as we have seen, 
 through Nepaul ^ ; but a small and growing trade 
 has been fostered since the Treaty of 1861 opened 
 a road through Sikhim. The Darjeeling cor- 
 respondent of the Times, whose telegrams so well 
 describe the movements and motives of the Mission, 
 waxes enthusiastic when this portion of the subject 
 is approached. " Everywhere," he exclaims, 
 
 we hear complaints of the stagnation of trade. Here is a large 
 market waiting, if we only insist on admission. The Thibetans 
 prize broadcloth above all things ; they have begun to learn 
 the use of piece goods, and a demand to which there is hardly 
 any limit is springing up for them. Knives and hardware of all 
 kinds are eagerly sought ; they are large consumers of tobacco 
 and indigo ; and even with the existing restrictions on trade, the 
 staples are gradually increasing. As regards tea, the question is 
 not clear; but it is an instructive fact that within 100 miles of 
 Darjeeling is a people which drinks tea morning, noon, and night, 
 which uses practically no other beverage, and yet obtains its supply 
 from districts of China 1200 miles away. 
 
 With respect to the return trade, the chief articles would be 
 gold, musk, live stock, and, above all, wool and woollen goods. 
 The quantity of sheep's wool and of the fine wool of the shawl- 
 goat available is prodigious ; and it is now almost worthless from 
 the absence of demand. Doubtless other articles of trade would 
 appear as commerce developed. The richest part of Thibet is 
 practically within a stone's throw, and the inhabitants, who 
 are from the highest to the lowest keen traders, are debarred 
 from intercourse with India through sheer ignorance and the 
 tenacity of tradition. 
 
 ^ A great trade between India and Thibet is said to have been 
 carried on by this route, before the Goorkha conquest of Nepaul, 
 in 17(39 ; but was almost annihilated by the heavy exactions then 
 imposed, and by the subsequent untoward events. 
 
TEA. 347 
 
 Mr. Macaulay was able, even in the present condition of the 
 roads, to march with a large suite from Kongralama. On the 
 other hand, Shigatz is fully thirty days' journey from Khat- 
 mandoo, in JSTepaul. Yet it will hardly be believed that the 
 greater part of the trade between India and Thibet goes through 
 Nepaul. It is a tedious journey, and duties are levied on goods 
 both on entering and leaving Nepaul. No trade thus handicapped 
 could flourish. We have a railway to Darjeeling. There is then 
 a fortnight's journey at the outside, and no duties are levied in 
 Sikhim. Yet we can do nothing, while the sturdy little 
 Nepaulese and Cashmerees have traders all over Thibet. Even 
 Kussian products and fabrics are working into the market, for 
 Russia has a Consul at Urga ; but no British subject is allowed to 
 cross the frontier. 
 
 As a matter of fact, however, Tea seems to be at the 
 rgot of the commercial difficulty, and the following 
 extract from a subsequent article in the same paper 
 may serve to explain this crucial cause of Lama 
 hostility :— 
 
 " There is, it must be admitted, one great obstacle in the way 
 of a compromise with China which shall open Thibet to the 
 British trader, and that is the * brick-tea ' monopoly. This strange 
 monopoly is at the bottom of Chinese prejudice and Thibetan 
 hostility, and, when understood, goes far to account for both. The 
 Thibetan has one passion in life — tea. To obtain a suflSciency of 
 this is the great end and aim of his existence. The tea he con- 
 sumes is not the familiar leaf with which the European markets 
 are supplied ; it is a peculiar fermented preparation, highly exhila- 
 rating and slightly intoxicating, and is only made in the western 
 part of the province of Sz-chuan. The plant which furnishes it 
 grows on the banks of the Ya-ho. The leaves are gathered when 
 they are about an inch long, moistened with spittle, and rolled 
 into little balls the size of a tea-cup, and then allowed to ferment. 
 As soon as fermentation has set in they are firmly pressed into 
 moulds shaped like a brick and dried over a charcoal fire. Thus 
 prepared, the commodity is ready for the Thibetan market. In 
 China the sale of this brick-tea is a strict Government monopoly . 
 
348 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 and as the quantity exported every year is something like eight 
 million pounds, an enormous revepne is derived from Yat-tsow 
 merchants to whom it is farmed. In Thibet, again, the retail trade 
 is, by law, in the hands of the Lamas, or priests ; the Thibetan 
 is, therefore, entirely at their mercy, and is made to pay 
 through the nose for his favourite beverage. When ready for 
 market the tea is packed in small boxes containing about twenty 
 pounds, and carried on men's backs two hundred miles to Ta-tsian- 
 loo. Thence, again, it has to go to Bathang, a sixty days' journey* 
 on yaks, a;nd is finally sold in Thibet at prices ranging from 4s. per 
 pound for the best quality to Is. 6^. English money for inferior 
 varieties. As matters are now, and with the existing restrictions 
 on trade along the Thibetan frontier, there is no competition, and 
 no possibility of competition. The Chinese Government, the Yat- 
 tsow merchants, and the Lamas share between them a very profit- 
 able monopoly. But the Assam tea-planters calculate that, were 
 they allowed facilities for trading such as are now sought, they 
 could lay down the brick-tea at Sudiya, on the Brahmapootra 
 River, at four to six annas per pound, with a good profit to them- 
 selves ; and as the journey to Bathang, if a fairly good road were 
 made, would only occupy twenty days — as against sixty the other 
 way — they would knock the Chinese out of the market altogether. 
 This is perfectly well understood both at Peking and in Lhassa ; 
 and under the circumstances the objection entertained in both 
 quarters to English traders and travellers is quite intelligible." 
 
 It is a little remarkable that a great power like 
 British India should have consented to sit, for so 
 many years, under the sentence of exclusion. It 
 may be, however, that we waited instinctively until 
 the pear was thoroughly ripe. Darjeeling, which is 
 the natural entre'pot for Indo-Thibetan trade, has 
 been annexed ; Sikhim has been brought under 
 British influence, and thrown open to transit ; a 
 railway from Calcutta enables goods to be laid 
 down at the entrance to the Himalayas. Only 
 political barriers prevent intercourse which the 
 
FEELING IN THIBET, 349 
 
 Thibetan people appear ready to welcome. The 
 maintenance of the obstruction has been attributed 
 to China, and it is too consistent with the former 
 attitude of Chinese statesmen to leave room for 
 doubt that the hostility of the Lamas was in sympathy, 
 formerly, with the prejudices of the Suzerain Power. 
 A change has, however, come over the councils of 
 Peking ; and it is clear, as we have already seen, that 
 we do not, even in Thibet, lack powerful friends, 
 for we have encountered nothing but friendliness and 
 goodwill at Teshu Lumbo, while the hostility seems 
 to emanate from Lhassa, the centre of monasticism 
 of a more worldly order. 
 
 It is, of course, difficult to gauge the precise 
 feeling of the Thibetan people, but what we hear 
 from Darjeeling agrees fairly with what we glean 
 from other sources. Hue declares that they are free 
 from the exclusive notions which have characterized 
 Chinese policy,^ and that his own expulsion was 
 the work of the Chinese Resident, in opposition to 
 the will of the Thibetan Regent ; and, though Hue's 
 opinions may not always be accepted without re- 
 serve, it is inconceivable that he can have lied so 
 outrageously as must be the case if his elaborate 
 
 1 ^* Les Thibetains ne professent pas a I'egard des autres pen pies, 
 ces principes d'exclusion qui font le caractere distinctif de la 
 nation chinoise ; tout le monde est admis a Lha-sa ; chacun peut 
 aller et venir, se livrer au commerce et a Tindustrie, sans que 
 personne s'avise d'apporter la moindre entrave a sa liberte . . . 
 II est probable que les Anglais ne seraient pas plus repousses que 
 les autres des frontieres du Thibet, si leur marclie envahissante 
 dans rindoustan n'avait inspire une legitime terreur an Tale 
 Lama." — >^OMrewm, ^'c. Hue, vol. ii. cap. vi. 
 
350 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 account of the Regent's personal bearing, and of the 
 circumstances attending his departure, be discredited. 
 The chances are that there are differences of opinion 
 in Thibet, as well as elsewhere, and it would be 
 little surprising if there were two parties where 
 power is so curiously divided. 
 
 A curious side-light is thrown upon the situation 
 by a Memorial which found publicity, in China, just 
 after the incidents we have been relating. Bhootan, 
 as we have seen, is tributary to Thibet, and indi- 
 rectly, therefore, to Peking. The Chinese Amban at 
 Lhassa are, therefore, charged also with the control 
 of affairs in Bhootan ; and the Memorial in question 
 describes a Bhootanese embroglio in which the 
 Resident had found himself called upon to intervene. 
 Some time, apparently, in 1885 two Bhootanese 
 Penlos or district governors rebelled against the 
 Rajah, with the alleged purpose of offering the 
 country to the English ; and got so far the upper 
 hand that they beleaguered the Prince and 
 drove certain of his partisans to take refuge in 
 Thibet. He (the Resident) sent Chinese and Thibetan 
 officials and troops to restore order, and the rebels 
 melted away at their approach. One of the Penlos 
 committed suicide, and the other submitted. The 
 notable features of the case are that the Penlos are 
 stated to have relied on English help : that one of 
 the strategic movements of the Chinese commander 
 was to cut off their retreat into India : and that? 
 after general harmony had been restored, " the ruler, 
 head-men and others . . . declared with one voice 
 
ATTITUDE OF CHINA. 351 
 
 that, from that time forward, they were all ready to 
 lay aside their previous enmities, and to join heart 
 and strength with Thibet in resisting the English." 
 The Resident obviously thinks he has attained a 
 political triumph. 
 
 The occurrence of an avowedly pro-English move- 
 ment in Bhootan, at the time the question of inter- 
 course was being revived in Thibet, is remarkable. 
 It looks very much as though the Penlos represented 
 a pro-intercourse party which had the upper hand in 
 Bhootan^ but was incontinently extinguished by the 
 Chinese Resident at Lhassa and the Lama faction. 
 It is never safe to fancy that one has fathomed the 
 intricacies of Chinese diplomacy. But we probably 
 catch, here, a tardy note of the old exclusiveness that 
 had so long inspired the policy of the Suzerain 
 State. There is reason, as we have seen, to suppose 
 that, whatever may have been the attitude of Chinese 
 statesmen in the past, they are willing to concur in 
 our design of opening up intercourse with Thibet at 
 the present. But it seems clear that no great pains 
 had been taken to prepare the Resident for the 
 change of purpose, or, at any rate, that that purpose 
 does not extend to Bhootan. 
 
 It is interesting, in the meantime, to trace back 
 the story to Bogle's early mission, and to realize the 
 curious isolation of the country we desire to approach. 
 Three Europeans only — Hue, Gabet, and Manning 
 — have succeeded in reaching Lhassa during the 
 present century. Natives of India have succeeded 
 from time to time in crossing the frontier ; notably 
 
352 INDIA AND THIBET, 
 
 the Pundit Nain Singh, who is now living in retire- 
 ment on lands granted to him by the Government in 
 reward for his services, and Baboo Srutt Chundra 
 Dass, who succeeded in penetrating Lhassa itself 
 and who was to have been associated with the 
 abandoned mission. But against Europeans — with 
 the exception of the three just named — whether 
 approaching from the Indian or the Chinese side, 
 the frontiers have remained sealed. Blakiston tried 
 to reverse the Abbe Hue's route, after the last China 
 War ; but failed to reach even the frontier. Cooper, 
 also, tried to make his way through Szechuen, but 
 was turned back by the Lamas from Bathang, and 
 found it equally impossible to effect an entrance 
 from Assam. Everything had, seemingly, been 
 made smooth for Mr. Macaulay's recent attempt ; 
 but the moral resistance of Lamadom defeated him 
 on the south, as more practical measures had, six 
 months earlier, closed the Keria mountains against 
 Prejevalsky on the north. There is, however, an 
 ominous tottering of old walls among the hitherto 
 exclusive nations of the East. The hermit kino:dom 
 of Korea has opened its doors ; and Thibet cannot 
 expect much longer to escape its fate. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 THE POSITION IN 1888. 
 
 The spring of 1888 found matters very much in 
 the position in which they had been left in the 
 autumn of the previous year. Thibetan troops were 
 still blocking the road through Sikhim, and the 
 Lamas seemed as far as ever from relaxing their 
 opposition. China had been promised that ample 
 time should be allowed for the exertion of her influ- 
 ence to procure their withdrawal ; but it was also 
 made clear that we could not tolerate the rebuff im- 
 plied by their presence on the Indian side of the 
 Himalayan crest ; and that, failing their retreat, we 
 should be compelled to drive them from the position 
 they had taken up. We waited eighteen months 
 while China did its best, or professed to be doing its 
 best, by pacific means, to procure this result ; and 
 only after that long interval was notice sent to the 
 intruders that they would be turned out by force if 
 they had not voluntarily withdrawn. 
 
 The 15th March was the date fixed. Our troops 
 then advanced slowly, in order to give them time 
 to run away; and, after a show of resistance, 
 they availed themselves of the privilege. They 
 
 A a 
 
354 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 were attacked five days after the date named, and 
 driven out of an advanced work ; but promptly 
 vacated their camp itself, before the advance of the 
 British, two days later. The physical difficulties 
 of the expedition were, indeed, greater than the 
 military ; for the position to be attacked was 13,000 
 feet above the sea-level, and the roads were deep 
 in snow. What was almost worse was that we 
 gained little by our action, beyond the satis- 
 faction of expelling the intruders from British 
 soil ; for they only retired to the Jeylep Pass, and 
 there fortified themselves afresh, while Col. Graham 
 established himself at Gnatong, within the Indian 
 frontier. Both parties seem, then, to have referred 
 matters afresh to Peking. 
 
 There was, it must be confessed, a dash of absurdity 
 in the situation. Here, nearly on the roof of the world, 
 were British and Thibetans encamped over against 
 each other, waiting for a deus ex machind in the 
 shape of a Chinese mandarin to release them from 
 their difficulty. Nothing could be farther from our 
 wish than to annoy China, or to anger the Thibetans, 
 by invading Thibet ; nor anything, we imagine, much 
 farther from the wish of China than such a develop- 
 ment of the quarrel. Yet neither British threats nor 
 Chinese pressure appeared able to modify the situa- 
 tion. So far from giving in, the Lamas appealed to 
 China for assistance, while England was expecting 
 her to persuade them to relax their opposition. The 
 appeal was additionally awkward because one secret 
 of China's hold on Thibet is, undoubtedly, the protec- 
 
THIBET NOT A HOMOGENEOUS STATE. 355 
 
 tion she has always been ready to afford. But her 
 statesmen are said to have been equal to the occasion : 
 " If the Thibetans had, as they affirmed, already de- 
 feated their opponents, Chinese help was [they replied] 
 manifestly unnecessary ! " The story comes from 
 Calcutta, and may not be literally above suspicion ; 
 but we can scarcely refuse it entire credit, for it has 
 a flavour so intensely Chinese that we can almost 
 see the mandarins laughing in their sleeves while 
 formulating the answer. 
 
 But though we can imagine that Peking statesmen 
 were not above a quiet chuckle, we may do them 
 the justice to believe that they were really anxious 
 their intervention should prevail. Their interests 
 were, in fact, doubly at state ; for they had to prove 
 to England that they could control their vassal, as well 
 as to sustain their role of Protectors in Thibet; and it 
 may not be inopportune, while the opposing forces are, 
 like difficulty itself, almost literally in the air, to exa- 
 mine a little more closely the factors of the problem. 
 
 Let us turn for a moment to Lhassa ; using the 
 word advisedly, in preference to " Thibet," because 
 one of the errors we have to unlearn is a conception 
 of the great region, so designated on our maps, as an 
 integral State governed from, and having, Lhassa as 
 a political capital. "A supposition (writes Mr. 
 Colborne Baber ^) seems to prevail among Europeans 
 that the region which geographers have included 
 
 ^ " A Journey of Exploration in Western Szu-chnan." By E. 
 Colborne Baber. Koyal Geographical Society Supplementary 
 Papers. 1882. 
 
 A a 2 
 
356 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 under the general name of Thibet is an integral State 
 sub-divided for administrative purposes into separate 
 provinces. Although this assumption is quite 
 erroneous, some palliation of it may be found in the 
 general use by Tibetans of the term Peu (pronounced 
 as in French), which is written Bod. ... A Tibetan 
 arriving at Ta-chien-lu (in China) from Lhassa, on 
 being asked from what country he has come, will 
 often reply from Teu Peu, meaning High or Upper 
 Tibet. Perhaps Teu Peu is the source of our 
 ^ Tibet,' and if so it is equally correct to write Tibet 
 or Thibet, since the word Teu is pronounced indif- 
 ferently with or without an aspirate. A native em- 
 ploys the expression Peu Lumbo (Tibet country) to 
 designate en bloc all Tibetan-speaking nationalities, 
 without intending to convey the least insinuation 
 that they are subject to Lhassa. The state of which 
 that city is the capital is called Lhassa De (territory of 
 Lhassa) . . . and is merely one, though admittedly the 
 most prominent of a large number of states governed 
 by kings very little disposed to imagine themselves 
 subordinate to the King or Regent of Lhassa." The 
 error is evidently as great as it would have been to 
 speak of Italy, before its unification, as a homogeneous 
 state governed from Rome. There is, in Central 
 Thibet, a state called Lhassa De, of which Lhassa is 
 the capital, and which the Dalai Lama — or his 
 Government, however constituted — does really rule ; 
 and it is without question the most important in 
 Thibet, whereas the States of the Church were of 
 minor proportion in the Roman hierarchy. Other- 
 
THE ROME OF BUDDHISM, 357 
 
 wise, for purposes of illustration, the parallel between 
 Lhassa and Rome — between Thibet and Italy in the 
 days of its disunion — is sufficiently instructive. 
 Whatever may be the constitution of Lhassa De : 
 whether the Dalai Lama be really a political as well 
 as a spiritual chief; or whether there be, among 
 the four Kalons or ministers through whom he 
 governs, one so superior as to be virtually prince 
 or king, as Mr. Colborne Baber appears disposed to 
 surmise, there is no doubt that the Dalai Lama 
 is venerated throughout all Thibet as implicitly as 
 the Pope is venerated throughout Latin Christen- 
 dom. The parallel might be extended, even, to 
 embrace people and language. There are fair- 
 haired Venetians in the north of Italy and dark- 
 haired Sicilians in the south; still Italy is, at the 
 present day, a national and linguistic as well as a 
 geographical expression ; and the same thing, with 
 the same explanations and the same reservations, 
 may be said of Thibet. There are tall and fresh- 
 coloured Thibetans in the east, and short and dark- 
 haired Thibetans in the west ; but all alike use the 
 Thibetan language, and all call themselves men of 
 Bod, though without implying subserviency to 
 Lhassa otherwise than as a Spaniard would admit 
 spiritual subserviency to Rome. 
 
 So much, then, seems clear. Lhassa De, the state 
 bordering on Sikhim, is only one, though the most 
 important, among a congeries of states covering the 
 great region known to us as Thibet. And, whatever 
 the personal share taken by the Dalai Lama in its 
 
358 INDIA AND THIBET, 
 
 government, the preponderance of the monastic ele- 
 ment within its borders and in its councils is un- 
 doubtedly so great that we are justified in speaking, 
 as we do, of " the Lamas " as a dominant influence. 
 
 A question next suggests itself, as to the source of 
 the hostility which is shown at Lhassa to intercourse 
 with British India ; for that hostility is not believed 
 to be instinctive in the Thibetan people. Hue 
 declares, as we have seen, that exclusiveness is not 
 a characteristic of the country. "Everyone (he 
 affirms) is admitted to Lhassa ; everyone can go and 
 come, and work or trade, without anybody dreaming 
 of interfering."^ But he also adds — indicating, no 
 doubt, an important element of the opposition we are 
 now encountering — "It is probable the English 
 would not be repelled more than other people, if 
 their invading march in India had not inspired the 
 Dalai Lama with legitimate fear." Bogle, as we 
 shall presently see, found traces of the same feeling, 
 though he was disposed to attribute his difficulties 
 mainly to Chinese inspiration. Without labouring 
 the point, then, we may take it for granted that we 
 have here one cause of hostility ; and to political, 
 may very possibly be added a spice of ecclesiastical, 
 jealousy. Buddhism is by no means an intolerant 
 religion, but no hierarchy likes to see its position 
 endangered ; and it is quite likely that British-Indian 
 intercourse involves danger, or at least disturbance, 
 in the minds of the Thibetan priesthood. A third, 
 
 ^ '* Souvenirs d'un Voyage dans le Thibet," vol. ii. cap. 4. 
 
TEA. 359 
 
 and a very important, influence is unquestionably 
 commercial. By far the most important article of 
 commerce between China and Thibet is tea; and 
 the interests bound up in this trade are relatively 
 immense. " Tea," writes Mr. Cooper/ " is, for the 
 Thibetans, the prime necessary of life ; to their need 
 of it may be ascribed the final success of the Chinese 
 conquest of Eastern Thibet. Their whole business of 
 life seems to be to procure a sufficiency of it ; and it 
 is no cheap luxury, for the Lamas — keeping in their 
 hands the retail, as the Chinese monopolize the 
 wholesale, trade — by this means reduce the people 
 to absolute dependence on them, exacting in return 
 for the precious article labour and produce. Grain, 
 yaks, sheep, horses, and even children, are given to 
 the rapacious priesthood in exchange for tea." And, 
 extravagant as the language may appear, we have 
 high authority for believing that it is fairly in accord 
 with facts. " To the Thibetan," writes Mr. Baber,^ 
 ** tea is more than a luxury : it is an absolute neces- 
 sary. Deprived of the costly but indispensable 
 astringent, he suffers from headache, grows nervous, 
 restless, out of condition, and altogether unhappy. 
 In outlying districts mothers are careful to keep the 
 seductive beverage from their children lest they 
 should grow up unable, on occasion, to go without it." 
 And information gleaned from, among others, an 
 
 * "Travels of a Pioneer of Commerce," ut supra, cap. xiv. 
 ' In an instructive paper on "The Chinese Tea Trade with 
 Thibet," published in the Gazette of India, Nov. 8th, 1879. 
 
36o INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 apostate Lama, convinced him that Mr. Cooper 
 hardly exaggerates the tyranny and rapacity of the 
 priestly vendors. 
 
 So far the demand. We come now to its influence 
 on the question of intercourse with India. The day 
 has passed when China possessed a monopoly of 
 supply. Tea could, the Lamas are well aware, since 
 the development of its cultivation on the Himalayan 
 slopes, be imported more easily from the south than 
 from the east, for access to Lhassa De is infinitely 
 easier from Darjeeling than from Bathang ; and we 
 may conceive the alarm which such a prospect must 
 excite among the men who now control the trade 
 with Szechuen. Not only do the Chinese find 
 a lucrative market in Thibet for the refuse of their 
 plantations — " tea brushwood," Mr. Baber calls it, to 
 which *^ the veriest sweepings of the Assam godowns " 
 would be preferable ; but the Lamas, who have suc- 
 ceeded in monopolizing the supply, are profoundly 
 interested in maintaining the present conditions. The 
 price of common Szechuen brick tea in Lhassa is said 
 to be about half a rupee a pound; but the price 
 " rises in a ratio altogether out of proportion to the 
 distance of the market from the tea route, and very 
 quickly reaches a figure which puts the article beyond 
 the purchasing power of the country people." This 
 state of things arises, however, not from the difiicul- 
 ties and dangers of the bye-roads so much as from 
 the policy of the Lamas, who, being the traders and 
 money-lenders of the country and the only capitalists, 
 
CHINESE EXCLUSIVENESS. 361 
 
 have many motives for confining the traffic in a 
 channel which they can most easily direct to their 
 own advantage. They make greater and steadier 
 profits by restricting the trade to one main line, along 
 which they can monopolize it, than they could do by 
 opening new markets in districts at a distance from 
 their lamaserais, where it would be liable to stray 
 from their control. This they can the more easily 
 effect because the supply of tea is inferior to the 
 demand, and because it is not liable to much fluctua- 
 tion. It would be easy to multiply illustrations, but 
 sufficient has been said to show what a hold on Thibet 
 the craving for tea has given China as the sole source 
 of supply : what a hold their monopoly gives the 
 Lamas over the people ; and what interest they have 
 in opposing change. 
 
 Turning, now, to the political position and influence 
 of the Suzerain Power, we enter a much less lucid 
 atmosphere. Still the surmise would not, pro- 
 bably, be far wrong that — though differing in motive 
 — Lamas and Mandarins have sympathized, in the 
 main, in the policy of exclusion that has prevailed. 
 It is due to this exclusiveness that the amount of 
 European evidence at our command is slight, but all 
 that we have points to this conclusion. While 
 admitting that the Thibetans — however little exclu- 
 sive by disposition — viewed with apprehension the 
 march of English conquest, Bogle and Hue concur in 
 attributing the actual opposition they encountered, 
 to Chinese influence-. The tea question had not then 
 
362 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 arisen, to energize Lama obstruction, and fear of 
 English aggression was rather a latent than an active 
 force ; but the opposition of China was clear and 
 unequivocal. Already, at Tassisudon, the capital of 
 Bhootan, Bogle was met by the objection that inter- 
 course " might give offence to the Emperor of China." 
 A Nepaulese official who visited him at Teshu Lumbo 
 declared that, " although well disposed towards the 
 Government (of India), the Regent (of Lhassa) was 
 afraid of giving umbrage to China, and had there- 
 fore, ordered him, in case he visited the Residents, 
 not to let them know that he (Bogle) was an English- 
 man." Some Kashmere merchants, conversing with 
 him about the production of gold in Thibet, objected 
 that, " if extensive quantities of the metal were ex- 
 ported to Bengal, the Emperor of China would be 
 displeased." Emissaries sent by the Regent himself 
 to compliment Bogle replied, to his advocacy of trade, 
 that the Regent " would do all in his power, but that 
 he and all his countrymen were subject to the Em- 
 peror of China ; " whereat Bogle exclaims, " This is 
 a stumbling-block that crosses me in all my paths." 
 It was, in fact, the burden of the answer to all his 
 attempted negotiations, whether with the Teshu 
 Lama in person or with others. 
 
 It was due also to Chinese influence that Manning, 
 who enjoys to this day the distinction of being the 
 only Englishman who has penetrated Lhassa, was 
 sent back by the way he came, after his remarkable 
 excursion, thirty -six years later. Manning, who was 
 a medical man by profession, and had qualified him- 
 
MANNINGS JO URNE V TO LHASSA. ^6t, 
 
 self for his project by the study of Chinese at Canton, 
 succeeded, in 1811, in reaching Lhassa alone and 
 unaided — mainly, it would seem, by the help of these 
 two accomplishments, for the Chinese servant he took 
 with him appears to have been of doubtful assistance. 
 He doctored certain Chinese soldiers whom he found 
 at Parijong, on the Bhootan frontier, so successfully 
 that they prevailed on their commander to let him 
 accompany them to Gyantze, where he received a 
 passport allowing him to proceed to the capital. And 
 not only did he reach Lhassa, but he had more than 
 one interview with the very Dalai Lama, by whom 
 he was sentimentally impressed.^ Manning's impres- 
 sion of the bearing of the Chinese towards the 
 Thibetans was unfavourable ; and the frequent prac- 
 tice of sending to Lhassa mandarins who had fallen 
 into disgrace at home, did not, in his opinion, con- 
 duce to amicable relations. It is (he remarks) bad 
 policy ; and he " cannot help thinking, from what he 
 had seen and heard, that the Thibetans would view 
 Chinese influence in Thibet overthroA\ai without 
 many emotions of regret, especially if the Ruler 
 under the new influence were to treat the Grand 
 Lama with respect ; for that is a point in which the 
 haughty mandarins are somewhat deficient, to the 
 no small dissatisfaction of the good people of Lhassa." 
 He had not been long at Lhassa before he per- 
 
 ^ "This day saluted the Grand Lama. Face poetically affect- 
 ing : Could have wept. Very happy to have seen him and his 
 blessed smile." — "Journal of Thomas Manning," edited by 
 Clements R. Markham. 
 
364 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 ceived that lie was himself an object of suspicion 
 to the said mandarins, and heard that a report had 
 been sent to the Emperor, embodying the substance 
 of interrogatories administered to his Chinese servant. 
 What he hoped was that he would be sent, or allowed 
 to proceed, to Canton by way of Szechuen, as Hue 
 was thirty years later ; but what actually happened 
 was — as we are left to gather from fragmentary 
 notes, for his journal comes, here, to an abrupt end — 
 that an imperial decree of some sort arrived about 
 the new year, in consequence of which he was handed 
 back by the way he came, while his servant was sent 
 overland to China. 
 
 It is curious that Hue, as well as Manning, found 
 the Chief Resident at Lhassa to be a Tartar mandarin 
 who had been disgraced for mismanagement of matters 
 connected with the English at Canton. The Dalai 
 Lama was an infant at the time (1844) the French 
 missionaries made their way to the capital ; but it is 
 noteworthy that they were impressed as favourably 
 by the Thibetan Regent, as Bogle had been by the 
 Teshu Lama, and that they are emphatic in ascribing 
 their expulsion to the sole action of the Chinese 
 Resident, Ke-Shen. They had, in fact, been so kindly 
 received by the Thibetans, and felt their position so 
 assured, that they began to think of opening com- 
 munication with Europe ; and actually obtained, 
 according to their own account, the assent of the 
 Regent to M. Gabet going to Calcutta, by way of 
 Bhootan, for the jiurpose. But they had calculated 
 without Ke-Shen, who was not disposed to tolerate, 
 
CHINESE INFLUENCE. 365 
 
 in Thibet, a propaganda which was at the time 
 discountenanced in China. The Regent, according to 
 Hue — who, though not an unbiassed, can hardly be 
 rejected as an altogether untrustworthy witness — 
 demurred emphatically to withdrawing from them 
 " the protection and liberty which were accorded, in 
 Thibet, to all strangers and especially to men of 
 prayers." But Ke-Shen was inexorable, and insisted 
 not only oh their departure, but on their being sent 
 by the long and difficult journey through China to 
 Canton, instead of by the comparatively short and 
 easy one to Calcutta. " I do not permit you to stay 
 here," he said, " but it is the will of the great Em- 
 peror, and not mine. I do not permit you to go by 
 way of India, because the laws of the Empire forbid 
 it ; " but everything should be, and everything was, 
 done for their comfort. The parting from the Regent 
 appears to have been as pathetic as Bogle's from the 
 Teshu Lama ; and the expression on both sides, of a 
 hope to meet again, heartfelt and sincere. His High- 
 ness gave them clearly to understand that he yielded 
 to pressure, and that he was displeased at the 
 coercion. 
 
 Ke-Shen pleaded the Imperial will and estab- 
 lished custom, and he was doubtless right. The 
 closure of the Himalayan passes, after the Nepaulese 
 war of 1792, would commend itself to the Chinese 
 mind as so simple and effectual a way of shutting 
 out trouble, that it was sure to be approved at Peking ; 
 though diiFerent Residents seem to have exercised a 
 discretionary power, with the effect of additionally 
 
366 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 vexing the intruder to be ejected. Manning, who 
 wanted to travel through China, was right-about- 
 faced to India. Hue and Gabet, who wanted to go 
 to India, were sent back through China. And so 
 things went on, narrowing down from precedent to 
 precedent, tiU we find Mr. Edgar — who made his way 
 to the Jeylep Pass on a mission from Calcutta, in 1873 
 — bluntly refused permission to cross the frontier. 
 It was vain to quote the precedents of Bogle and 
 Turner. *' The present arrangement had," said the 
 Governor of Parijong, " been made thirty years ago, 
 by the Chinese Envoy, Ke-Shen, who had arranged 
 that the direct management of frontier affairs should 
 be committed to the Amban, or Chinese Residents, 
 and that there should be no intercourse between 
 Thibet and British India ; all he (the Governor) had 
 to do was to obey orders." Mr. Edgar was also told 
 — and the incident may help to throw light on the 
 general situation — that "much uneasiness was felt 
 in Thibet at the threatening attitude of the Nepaulese, 
 which obliged the Dalai Lama and his advisers to 
 make up their differences with the Amban, in order 
 to be secure of help from China." Tea has been 
 indicated as one secret of the Chinese hold on Thibet ; 
 and the sense of military dependence is probably 
 another. Everything by comparison. Europeans 
 think poorly of Chinese organization for war, but to 
 the Thibetans it may well seem preponderant. And 
 China appears, to do her justice, to have fairly ful- 
 filled her sovereign duty. Whether against the Kal- 
 mucks, against Nepaul, or against Kashmere, her 
 
MR. COOPER'S JOURNEY. 367 
 
 help has alwciys been forthcoming ; and it is quite 
 likely that the Thibetans, an unwarlike race, have 
 become so accustomed to look to Peking for help that 
 the sense of military dependence acts as a strong 
 political retainer. They may not love China much, 
 but they fear Nepaul more ; and are convinced, 
 probably, of the truth of the maxim that it is wiser 
 to bear the ills they have than to fly to others that 
 they know not of. 
 
 We are concerned, however, for the moment, with 
 the degree rather than with the secret of Chinese 
 influence, and with the evidence that it has been 
 used, till quite recently, to shut out intercourse with 
 Hindustan. Whether he dictated, or whether he 
 merely gave expression to a policy of exclusion, the 
 Chinese Resident at Lhassa appeared always, to 
 foreigners, as the moving spirit of obstruction, while 
 the Thibetan authorities were held up as models of 
 kindly hospitality. All this was now about to be 
 reversed — reversed, at any rate, in appearance ; for 
 I deprecate any accusation of pretending to interpret 
 with certainty the secret workings of Chinese 
 diplomacy. Lama hostility was about to become 
 apparent as an active force, and the Chinese Resident 
 as a subservient rather than a directing influence. 
 
 The first to experience the change was Mr. Cooper, 
 who set out from Shanghai in 1868, accompanied 
 only by a Chinese interpreter, with the purpose of 
 making his way across the frontier of Szechuen, 
 through Eastern Thibet, into Assam. And here, for 
 the first time, probably, tea comes into play as a 
 
368 INDIA AND THIBET. 
 
 factor in the problem. Mr. Cooper's object was to 
 open up a new mart for the produce of our Assam 
 tea-plantations ; and though his journey had the 
 countenance of China, he was repelled from the 
 frontier of Thibet. No attempt was made to procure 
 for him an imperial passport, though he had, it is 
 needless to say, the cordial sympathy and support of 
 H.M. Legation. But Sir Walter (then Mr.) Medhurst, 
 H.M. Consul at Hankow, procured for him from the 
 Viceroy at Wuchang a letter which seemed- likely, so 
 far as the Chinese were concerned, to remove all 
 difficulties ; for he was able, on arriving at the capital 
 of Szechuen, to exchange this for a passport 
 addressed to the Chinese Resident at Lhassa, which 
 bore on its face that the Resident should exchange it 
 for one authorizing him to proceed to Nepaul or 
 Darjeeling. Armed with this high permit he 
 succeeded in reaching Bathang, but was there 
 informed privately, by the Magistrate, that he 
 would certainly be hindered from proceeding, the 
 Chinese Resident at Lhassa having written to say 
 that the Lamas had given notice he would not be 
 allowed to cross the frontier. The magistrate — who 
 was in a dilemma between his orders from the 
 Viceroy and his instructions from the Resident — 
 seems, indeed, to have become highly indiscreet in his 
 revelations, for he affirmed that the Resident was in 
 the habit of receiving large sums, from the Lamas, to 
 keep out foreigners. 
 
 It was, at any rate, Mr. Cooper found, perfectly 
 understood in the neighbourhood that orders had been 
 
LAMA HOSTILITY. 369 
 
 sent from Lhassa to stop him at all hazards ; and the 
 accuracy of the rumour was curiously confirmed by 
 the language of a memorial addressed from Lhassa to 
 Peking, in anticipation of his visit, of which he after- 
 wards procured a copy. This document, which 
 purports to give the tenor of a petition received from 
 " all the gentry, heads of monasteries, priests, and com- 
 mon people " of the country, sets out that Thibet is 
 the country of Buddha, and "inhabitants of no other 
 country, except the Nepaulese, with whom continual 
 trade and intercourse are kept up, are allowed to 
 cross the border to travel." Reference is then 
 made to Hue and Gabet, who were at once sent back 
 by Ke-Shen, but whose visit still so offended the 
 tutelary deities that all sorts of miseries fell upon the 
 country, for years afterwards. And now letters of 
 instruction had arrived, intimating that Englishmen 
 are desirous of travelling in Thibet. 
 
 The news of this probable arrival of foreigners has already 
 thrown priests and people alike into a state of excessive alarm, 
 and they have all prayed [the writer] to make the matter the 
 subject of a memorial [to the effect that they should not come to 
 travel]. If, in spite of our opposition, they persist in coming, 
 your servants can only band together all the tribes professing the 
 same religion, and, with unanimity of purpose, do our utmost to 
 prevent them. ... It is now reported that an English doctor 
 named Cooper has come from Szechuen to travel in Thibet, and 
 men's minds have been filled with alarm which it is impossible to 
 prevent. . . . Further, in Eastern and Western Thibet, there are 
 over 100,000 Lamas, not one of whom but is of the most obstinate 
 and determined character ; and to the commands of these Lamas 
 alone the whole population render obedience. These men are 
 opposed to the officers or people of other countries entering their 
 territory, and their determination is not to be broken down. . , . 
 
 B b 
 
37b INDIA AND THIBET, 
 
 To sum up ; the Thibetan Lamas will, to the death, prevent 
 people from visiting their country ; and if the Lamas have so 
 made up their minds, the hearts of the people will be still more 
 excited ; and though I am desirous of bringing the matter to an 
 amicable settlement, it will be impossible for me to obey [the 
 letter of instructions]. If the people are allowed to come and 
 travel in Thibet, it will be impossible to prevent the commission 
 of outrages against them as soon as ever they cross the borders. 
 ; . . [The Emperor is therefore prayed to arrange with the 
 English Government that no one shall be allowed to travel in 
 Thibet]. 
 
 I have quoted from the memorial at some length, 
 because it so well expresses the spirit of the 
 opposition we have encountered, and because it is 
 instructive to note how curiously the tactics 
 threatened coincide with what we have heard of the 
 attitude assumed towards the Macaulay Mission. A 
 long stride farther has been made, since Cooper's 
 day, towards gaining Chinese support. The Chefoo 
 Convention of 1876 and the expressed consent of the 
 Chinese Government in 1886 legalized, for Mr. 
 Macaulay, what was only tacitly permitted in Mr. 
 Cooper; but each encountered determined opposi- 
 tion from the Lamas, who enjoyed apparently, in 
 each case, the countenance and help of the Chinese 
 Resident. The revolution has since been completed : 
 it is Lhassa which now stands out as the centre of 
 opposition ; and it is to the Chinese, instead of the 
 Thibetan, capital that we now look for goodwill and 
 support. 
 
 It may be doubtful whether China could sud- 
 denly reverse the current of her influence. The 
 changes of incumbency at the Lhassa Residency have 
 
ATTITUDE OF CHINA. 371 
 
 been lately frequent — reflecting, probably, phases of 
 effort to effect political change. That we have the 
 support of the Imperial Cabinet may be reasonably 
 assumed — a lukewarm support it may be — made up 
 of some willingness to oblige England and a great 
 desire to avoid complications, qualified by a wish 
 that things could have remained as they were ; for it 
 is easy to conceive that the question is causing it both 
 trouble and anxiety. The Imperial Government 
 hardly possesses, even in China proper, the decided 
 power which the Queen's Government exercises in 
 England ; and its hold over remote dependencies is 
 proportionately less firm. It is easy to believe, 
 therefore, that it cannot absolutely control the 
 Lamas, if it would. It is possible that, if an impera- 
 tive order were sent, it would be obeyed ; but it is 
 also probable that there might ensue disturbances 
 which the Resident has no adequate power to 
 control ; and it would be extravagant to suppose 
 that the Chinese would willingly incur the cost and 
 trouble of a military expedition to coerce the 
 Thibetans in English interests. We have heard 
 enough of the Lamas to know that they are not, as a 
 class, distinguished by the amiability which, in their 
 higher representatives, fascinated Bogle and Manning. 
 They have, on the contrary, an evident capacity for 
 turbulence which would be certainly stimulated by 
 abrupt interference with their interests. In the 
 mouth of the Chinese Government, therefore, the 
 order to " settle " means not necessarily concession, 
 but "compromise." It may be, as Bogle judged, 
 
 B b 2 
 
372 INDIA AND THIBET, 
 
 and as India has always affirmed, that the Thibetan 
 people, and even the Thibetan rulers, are not 
 averse to commercial intercourse : they have not 
 much love for China, and would be as willing, 
 probably, to get their tea from Darjeeling as from 
 Tatsienlu. But rulers and people do not constitute 
 the whole state of Lhassa: the Lamas are more 
 numerous, more powerful, and more actively 
 interested than either, and it looks very much as 
 though they were controlling the situation. 
 
 Enough has now been said, if not to elucidate the 
 question, at least to show that its solution is less easy 
 than people in England, looking at the surface, 
 might be inclined to fancy. Apart from the great 
 prestige which she has enjoyed in Eastern Asia, the 
 two main secrets of China's hold on Thibet have 
 been the somewhat incongruous ones of tea and 
 military prestige. China was alone able to supply 
 the leaf for which the Thibetans crave ; China has 
 been looked to, to protect them against the Nepaulese 
 and other warlike neighbours. If the frontiers were 
 opened to a competing supply of tea, and aid 
 withheld in face of what the Lamas, of course, repre- 
 sent as Indian aggression, dangerous questions as to 
 the value of the Chinese connection might arise. We 
 cannot withhold from the Imperial Government a 
 measure of sympathy in the difficulty ; but neither 
 need we ignore that it brought on itself a large 
 measure of the trouble. For half a generation, 
 the question had been before it as one that must 
 be eventually faced. Years had passed since it 
 
CHINESE DILATORINESS, 373 
 
 was formulated in the Convention of Chefoo, yet 
 the emergency found it apparently untouched. 
 It must, therefore, be held partly responsible for 
 the excitement that arose on an attempt to bring 
 the matter to an issue, and that eventuated in the 
 military operations to which the Government of India 
 found itself committed. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 SIKHIM. 
 
 We left the British and Thibetans facing each other 
 on the crest of the Himalayas, awaiting the action 
 of Chinese diplomacy. The challenge of the Lamas 
 had been most reluctantly taken up, and their troops 
 driven out of British Sikhim ; but a halt had been 
 then called, to give further opportunity for Chinese 
 mediation. Six months passed without a sign 
 that progress was being made. There was going 
 and coming of emissaries between Lhassa and 
 Peking ; one Chinese Resident was even recalled 
 in disgrace, and replaced by Chang Keng, the 
 Deputy-Governor of Hi, who had strict injunctions 
 to compose the quarrel. Nothing resulting, how- 
 ever, from these combinations, the Indian Govern- 
 ment decided, in 1888, to take the matter once 
 more into its own hands. Colonel Graham was 
 ordered to clear the road by force, since the 
 Thibetans would not vacate it of good will ; and in 
 two sharp actions, on September 21st and 24th, their 
 garrisons were driven out of the Jeylep and Tunko 
 passes, and pursued headlong into Chumbi. This 
 display of vigour seemed to have the effect of 
 
THE CHINESE ENVOY, 375 
 
 somewhat hurrying the wheels of Lhassa statesman- 
 ship, as the Rajah of Sikhim came into the British 
 camp, and was quickly followed by a Chinese 
 emissary who announced that the Resident was 
 doing his utmost to control the situation and was 
 coming in person to open negotiations. 
 
 It might have been wiser if we had stayed awhile 
 on Thibetan soil, now that we had reluctantly 
 entered it. Our presence might have strengthened 
 the hands of the Chinese Resident, who had, un- 
 questionably, a difficult task to perform. It was 
 decided, however, to return to Gnatong, and the 
 consequence became apparent in a further interval 
 of delay. Nearly three months passed before 
 Chang Keng reached the British camp ; and he 
 took up the position, then, of a champion rather 
 than a diplomatist. However urgent his instruc- 
 tions might be, to prevent any further develop- 
 ment of the quarrel, the Lamas would, of course, 
 expect him to support their cause ; and they suc- 
 ceeded so far as to persuade him to assert Chinese 
 suzerainty over Sikhim. That the Rajah might be 
 a feudatory of Lhassa (lud the Trans-nivean province 
 of Chumbi was a proposition no one wanted to 
 dispute, but that the Cis-nivean province should be 
 recognized as Indian was an elementary feature of 
 the situation, and the Envoy's refusal to admit this 
 view caused an immediate deadlock. He was, in 
 fact, about returning to Lhassa when the Imperial 
 Government intervened. Gnatong was in tele- 
 graphic communication, fortunately, via Calcutta, 
 
376 SI K HIM. 
 
 with Peking, and Chang Keng's announcement of 
 his intention to withdraw was met by a prompt 
 order to stay where he was until a settlement could 
 be discovered. It may not be uninteresting, while 
 negotiations are in progress, to trace the story of the 
 little State which has sprung into such sudden 
 notoriety as a recent battle-ground and prospective 
 trade route between its two greater neighbours. 
 
 " Commanding, confessedly, the grandest known 
 landscape of snowy mountains in the Himalayas and 
 hence in the world," the view from Darjeeling is, 
 writes Sir Joseph Hooker,^ unparalleled for the 
 scenery it embraces. The snow-clad mass of Kin- 
 chinjunga, rising 21,000 feet above the level of the 
 observer, out of a sea of intervening wooded hills, is 
 only forty-five miles distant ; " whilst, on a line 
 with its snows, the eye descends below the horizon 
 to a narrow gulf 7000 feet deep in the mountains 
 where the Great Kungeet, white with foam, threads 
 a tropical forest with a silver line. To the north- 
 west, towards Nepaul, the snowy peaks of Kubra 
 and Jummoo (respectively 24,005 and 25,312 feet) 
 rise over the shoulder of Singaleelah, whilst eastward 
 the snowy mountains appear to form an unbroken 
 range, trending north-east to the great mass of 
 Donkia (23,176) and thence south-east to the 
 fingered peaks of Tunkola and the silver cone of 
 
 ^ Himalayan Journals ; or, Notes of a Naturalist. By Joseph 
 Dalton Hooker. London, 1854. — There are within the field of 
 view twelve mountains over 20,000 feet. The nearest snow is 
 thirfcy-two miles, and the farthest seventy-three miles distant. 
 
DARJEELING, 377 
 
 Chola, gradually sinking into the Bhootan Mountains 
 at Gipmoochi (14,509)." — The view described is 
 practically a view of Sikhim ; and no one who 
 has had the good fortune to visit Darjeeling can 
 peruse without a sense of vivid pleasure the ex- 
 quisite description in which Hooker recalls the 
 surpassing splendour of the scene. A tumbled 
 mountain mass, made up of great heights and 
 deep-cut ravines, of heavy forest and foaming 
 torrent, in which rises and descents of six thou- 
 sand feet and more are common in passing from 
 valley to valley, sometimes in a single day's 
 march — Sikhim fulfils the wildest conception of 
 mountain grandeur. Kinchinjunga itself is within 
 its borders : over Chola and Tunkola are the passes 
 into Chumbi which our soldiers have lately traversed. 
 The Snowy Range marks, in fact, roughly, the 
 frontier of Thibet. 
 
 Hidden thus in the recesses of the Himalayas, 
 screened from the lowland by our hill-station of 
 Darjeeling, shrouded as it were in virgin forest, 
 Sikhim is too small a political unit to have attracted 
 notice outside af Hindostan. As a region possessing 
 scenery of surpassing beauty and flora of luxuriant 
 wealth, it has been explored by travellers like Sir 
 Joseph Hooker and Sir Richard Temple, who have 
 given us fascinating descriptions of its natural beauty: 
 as a troublesome neighbour, it has had to be coerced 
 by soldiers like Colonel Gawler, who has left a 
 humorous picture of its physical difficulties: as a 
 vassal State and a possible hyphen between India 
 
378 SIKHIM, 
 
 and Thibet, it has been visited by political officers 
 like Mr. Edgar. But of history, in the literary sense, 
 it has practically none ; for what there was of local 
 record — a remarkable and beautiful manuscript kept 
 in the monastery of Pemyongchi — was destroyed 
 by the Nepaulese in 1814. What little is known 
 of its earlier story has been summarized by Cap- 
 tain Temple in the Introduction to his father's 
 diaries.^ Practically, however, as he remarks, no 
 European has even seriously inquired into it, nor is 
 there much promise of valuable result if the task 
 were undertaken. It is sufficient for us to know 
 that the Rajah's family came originally from Thibet, 
 and attained to princely rank, about three hundred 
 years ago, in the person of one Penccho Namage, who 
 was then settled at Gantok. There had occurred in 
 Thibet, not long previously, the great Tsong-Kaban 
 reformation which divided the Thibetan world as 
 effectually as Luther divided European Christendom ; 
 and many lamas of the older but defeated sect had 
 migrated to Sikhim. Penccho seems to have taken 
 these under his protection and, by their help, to 
 have raised himself to the throne. The event has 
 interest as illustrating the connection with Thibet 
 which has been a dominant factor in Sikhimese 
 polity, and deserves note for that reason ; but it is 
 not till towards the close of the eighteenth century 
 that Sikhim looms upon the Indian horizon — or 
 
 * Journals kept in Hyderabad^ Kashmir , Sikhim^ <^c. By Sir 
 E. Temple. Edited by Captain R. C. Temple. 
 
NEPAULESE INCURSIONS. 379 
 
 that it begins, at any rate, to figure as an element 
 in Anglo -Indian politics. 
 
 Sikhim is referred to as " Bramascjon " by Van de 
 Putte, who gathered his information from a son of 
 the Rajah then visiting the Court of Lhassa, and as 
 " Demo-jong " by Bogle half a century later ; but 
 neither of them crossed the frontier, nor does this 
 nomenclature do much more than signalize its 
 existence. Bogle learned, certainly, that there was 
 a path across it between India and Thibet,^ but no 
 thought of utilizing it occurred, evidently, either to 
 him or to Hastings. It was, in fact, closed at the 
 moment by the same cause which was impelling 
 them to seek a way through Bhootan. The Goor- 
 khas, who had throttled the traditional highway 
 through Nepaul by their exactions, had extended 
 their conquest over the Sikhimese lowland and 
 interfered, in this direction also, between India and 
 Thibet. Bogle's references to Sikhim are, in fact, 
 made only with regard to the anxiety caused by 
 Goorkha turbulence. " There was," exclaimed the 
 Teshu Lama — and the sentence is worth quoting as 
 a declaration of suzerainty — ^' no trusting them ; for 
 though their Rajah had promised, over and over again, 
 that he would never encroach a finger's breadth on 
 
 ^ *' The commodities of Bengal used to be conveyed into Thibet 
 through the Murung (Sikhimese lowland) and a province adjoin- 
 ing to it which is subject to Lhassa and governed by a chief 
 styled Demo-jong. The fakirs, when expelled from Nepaul, 
 generally frequented this road ; but, being esteemed unhealthy, it 
 was not adopted by any creditable merchants." — Narrative of the 
 Mission of George Bogle to Thibet, 
 
38o ' SIKHIM. 
 
 Thibetan territory, he had now attacked Demojoug's 
 country which was subject to Lhassa." 
 
 Sikhim comprised at that period what may, for 
 convenience of illustration, be described as three 
 sections : (1) the Trans-nivean province of Chumbi, 
 bounded on the north and east by Lhassa-De and 
 Bhootan ; (2) the region known as the Cis-nivean 
 Sikhim, bounded on the north and west by Lhassa- 
 De and Nepaul; (3) the district of Darjeeling, 
 including a tract at the foot of the Himalayas then 
 known as the Murung. The first was, and is, ad- 
 mittedly Thibetan soil : the second has passed under 
 the influence, and the third into the actual possession, 
 of British India. Sikhim is, in fact, literally astride 
 a dividing range of the Himalayas, with one leg 
 on the Thibetan and one on the Indian slope. It 
 is from Cis-nivean Sikhim that we were lately 
 obliged to expel the Thibetan troops ; and it is 
 the passes leading from the Cis-nivean to the Trans- 
 nivean province that we are anxious to open. 
 
 It would be worse than wearisome to follow, here, 
 the tangled skein of local quarrel that began with 
 the rise of Goorkha power and terminated only, in 
 1817, with our own appearance on the scene. We 
 are concerned with the incident which entailed the 
 barring of the Thibetan frontier; and the fewest 
 possible words will suffice to maintain the connection 
 of the story. — Having subjugated Nepaul, the 
 Goorkhas were, as we have seen, at the time of 
 Bogle's mission, threatening to extend their conquest 
 over Sikhim. They had overrun the Murung, and 
 
CHINESE INTERVENTION. 381 
 
 were invading the hill region, when a Thibetan army- 
 was sent to oppose them. The incident closed with 
 their retreat from Sikhim proper^ on certain terms 
 which are irrelevant to our purpose, but in their 
 retaining possession of the Murung which figures 
 thenceforth, as a sort of counter in the game of 
 Himalayan politics. They were, however, quieted 
 only for the moment ; they invaded, sixteen years 
 later, the very territory of the Dalai Lama, and 
 advanced as far as Shigatze which they took and 
 sacked ; whereupon the Chinese came to the assist^ 
 ance of their feudatories and wound up a victorious 
 campaign by closing the southern frontier against 
 natives of Hindostan. ^^ So careful were they," says 
 Turner, whose narrative ^ forms the staple record of 
 the event, " to avail themselves of every possible 
 advantage within their reach, that they even 
 occupied an intermediate country between Bhootan 
 and Nepaul, the territory of a petty chief denomi- 
 nated Rajah of Segwin, or Seccum [Sikhim] .... 
 and from this period, unhappily, is to be dated 
 the interruption which has taken place in the 
 regular intercourse between the Company's posses- 
 sions and the territory of the Lama." 
 
 The *^ intermediate country " in question was the 
 province of Chumbi, of which we have heard so much 
 in connection with recent operations, and which is 
 destined to so much prominence as a highway and 
 
 * An Account of a^i Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama 
 in Thibet, ^c, tit supra. 
 
382 S2KHIM. 
 
 possible entrepot of Indo-Thibetan trade, that it may 
 be worth while quoting Hooker's description of its 
 characteristics : — 
 
 *' Choombi is the general name given to a large Thibetan 
 province that embraces the head of the Machoo river, and includes 
 Phari, Eusa, Choombi, and about thirteen other villages, cor- 
 responding to as many districts that contain from under a dozen 
 to three hundred houses each, varying with the season and state 
 of trade. The latter is considerable, Phari being, next to Dar- 
 jeeling, the greatest Thibetan, Bhotan, Sikhim, and Indian 
 entrepdt along the whole Himalaya east of Nepaul. The general 
 form of Choombi valley is triangular, the broader end northwards ; 
 it is bounded by the Chola range on the west, from Donkia to 
 Gipmoochi, and by the Kamphee or Chakoong range to the 
 east. These meridional ranges approximate to the southward, so 
 as to form a natural boundary to Choombi. The Machoo River, 
 rising from Chumulari, flows through Choombi and enters Bhotan 
 at a large mart called Rinchingoong, whence it flows to the plains 
 of India. . . . The Choombi district is elevated, for the only 
 cultivation is a summer or Alpine one, neither maize, rice, nor 
 millet being grown there : it is also dry, for the great height of 
 the Bhotan Mountains and the form of the Machoo valley cut off 
 the rains, and there is no dense forest : it is very mountainous, 
 all carriage being on men's and yaks' backs ; and is populous for 
 this part of the country, the inhabitants being estimated at 3000 
 in the trading season. . . . From Choombi to Lhassa is fifteen 
 long days' journey for a man mounted on a stout mule." 
 
 It is essential to the comprehension of recent events, 
 that the political and geographical distinction between 
 the Cis-nivean and Trans-nivean provinces be clearly- 
 realized ; and it may even be worth mentioning 
 that, when Hooker succeeded in making a detour 
 through Chumbi from the Kongralama to the Donkia 
 pass, "nothing would induce the Thibetan guard 
 
BRITISH INTER VENTION. 383 
 
 who accompanied him to cross into Cis-nivean 
 Sikhim, which they regarded as Company's territory." 
 
 It was the British war with Nepayl, in 1814, that 
 led to the attraction of Sikhim within the sphere of 
 Indian politics. The Rajah required little persuasion 
 to array himself on our side, against his predatory 
 neighbours ; but he suffered badly, at the outset, for 
 his temerity. His troops were driven across the 
 Teesta; the country was overrun, the monasteries 
 were plundered, and that act of vandalism was com- 
 mitted which deprived the world for ever of a section 
 of Himalayan history ! However, we were, of course, 
 victorious on the west ; and the Rajah — partly as a 
 reward, but mainly with a view of setting up Sikhim 
 as a buffer between Nepaul and Bhootan — was taken 
 (in 1817) under Indian protection, and replaced in 
 possession of the vexed Murung region. 
 
 Fourteen years of tranquillity followed, but at the 
 end of that period a fresh process of disintegration 
 began. There broke out, in 1828, a frontier dispute 
 between Sikhim and Nepaul which occasioned a 
 visit to Darjeeling, by Mr. J. W. Grant, that resulted 
 in its acquisition by the British. What is now a 
 flourishing to"svn was then a paltry viUage ; what is 
 now an important centre of tea and cinchona cultiva- 
 tion was then impenetrable jungle. But Mr. Grant 
 was so impressed with its potential value as a sana- 
 torium, a commercial depot, and a military station if 
 need be, that he induced Lord William Bentinck to 
 negotiate for its cession. There was a little delay in 
 realizing the project, but the Rajah was eventually 
 
384 SIKHIM, 
 
 persuaded (in 1835) to yield the territory in exchange 
 for a pension of 300/. For some years all went 
 smoothly between the new settlement and the parent 
 State ; but a change for the worse ensued with the 
 advent, into Sikhim, of a new Minister who is de- 
 scribed as a Thibetan of the worst Lama type. The 
 institution of slavery, which seems common along the 
 Thibetan border/ and the propensity for kidnapping 
 British subjects from the plains, were at the root of 
 the new trouble. But a crisis was caused by the 
 seizure and imprisonment of Dr. Campbell, then 
 Superintendent of Darjeeling, in the preposterous 
 hope of obtaining, among other things, the rendition 
 of certain runaways who had found refuge on 
 British territory. The incident occurred while he 
 was travelling with Dr. Hooker on one of those 
 adventurous journeys to which we are indebted for 
 the latter's graphic sketches. 
 
 Hooker was the first European to thoroughly 
 explore and describe Sikhim. His steps have since 
 been often trodden : Colonel Gawler has sketched 
 for us the expedition of 1861, which occupied Tum- 
 loong and exacted the treaty designed to open up 
 communication with Thibet ; Mr. Edgar has described 
 a visit paid by him to the Rajah in 1873 ; and Sir 
 Richard Temple has given us a pleasing diary of 
 
 1 Captain Gill, for instance, writing of Bathang, on the Chinese 
 frontier, says : " Slavery is a great institution. There are rich 
 families who own 500 or 600 slaves. ... A family always 
 counts its riches in slaves and cattle." — B,iver of Golden Sand, 
 vol. ii. eh. v. 
 
THE PEOPLE. 385 
 
 excursions througli British Sikliim in 1875 ; but for 
 charm of description and comprehensive observation, 
 the Rimalaijan Journals still hold the field. Hooker's 
 main object was, of course, botanical research, but 
 his narrative ranges widely beyond the flora which 
 it was his special purpose to examine. A lover of 
 Nature able to appreciate the magnificent scenery, 
 and an observer capable of sketching a quaintly 
 interesting people, he has given us a book of travel 
 which is not only fascinating in itself but a valuable 
 contribution to the geography of the Himalayan 
 region. 
 
 Not the least curious feature in Sikhimese polity 
 is the variety of races hemmed into Cis-nivean 
 Sikhim. The most numerous as well as most 
 attractive element is the Lepcha, which prevails 
 south of the snowy range, and is most friendly to 
 British rule ; but there are also Limboos and Moormis 
 on the side of Nepaul ; Thibetans, ijur sang, in the 
 regions bordering on Thibet ; Bhooteas, who have 
 immigrated from Bhootan; Mechis, who dwell in 
 the forest bordering on the plain ; and Magras, who 
 appear to be remnants of an aboriginal race displaced 
 by the Lepchas, as the latter have been encroached 
 on by the hardier races of Thibet and Bhootan. All 
 except the Mechi, who is Indo-Chinese, are of 
 markedly Mongolian origin, and all are impregnated, 
 in a greater or less degree, with the religion and 
 customs of Thibet, though all have languages and 
 customs of their o^vn ; and it is, as Hooker remarks, 
 not a little curious that six or seven different tribes 
 
 c c 
 
386 SIKHIM, 
 
 should dwell in peace and unity, in such a confined 
 territory, under a Sovereign whose temporal power 
 is unsupported by even the semblance of force. It 
 is probably the veneer of Buddhism and of Thibetan 
 civilization which constitutes the cement ; for even 
 the Lepchas, who are the least affected by it, pay an 
 implied reverence to the Lama creed. The Sikhimese 
 belong to the " Red Cap " or unreformed sect, the 
 Yellow-capped followers of Tsong Kaba, though in 
 the ascendant in Thibet, having never made way on 
 the southern slopes of the Himalayas. Buddhist 
 temples are numerous, and a large number of the 
 people seem to pass through a religious apprentice- 
 ship, spending a certain period in the monastery, and 
 returning anon to cultivate the soil. The principal 
 of these establishments is Pemyongchi ; and the 
 appreciation of natural beauty which has charac- 
 terized the religious of all ages seems to have 
 pre-eminently influenced the selection of its site ; 
 for the view of the Snowy Range from it is one 
 of the finest in Sikhim, "the eye surveying at 
 one glance the vegetation of the tropics and the 
 poles. Deep in the valleys the river-beds are but 
 3000 feet above the sea, and are choked with fig- 
 trees, plantains, and palms. To these succeed 
 laurels and magnolias and, higher up still, oaks, 
 birches, and chestnuts from 4000 to 10,000 feet. 
 Pines succeed for 2000 feet higher, and give place to 
 a skirting of rhododendrons and berbery," while 
 high above all towers the giant height of Kinchin- 
 junga, "the snow descending in one continuous 
 
A SIKHIMESE MONASTERY, 387 
 
 sweep from 28,000 to a level of 15,000 feet, radiating 
 from the summit along spur and shoulder for ten or 
 fifteen miles towards each part of the compass." 
 Nor does the building seem unworthy of the situa- 
 tion ; the marvel being, indeed, how a people so 
 poor can have managed to erect such a comparatively- 
 handsome structure. The ornamentation and cha- 
 racteristics are of course essentially Thibetan, " the 
 square end of every beam being ornamented either 
 with a lotus flower or Thibetan characters, while the 
 walls are covered with allegorical paintings of lamas 
 and saints expounding and in contemplation, with 
 glories round their heads, mitred and holding the 
 dorje and jewel." 
 
 While admitting the Thibetan religion, however, 
 the Sikhimese appear to have excluded some objec- 
 tionable features of Thibetan polity ; for polyandry, 
 among the Lepchas at any rate, is declared to be 
 unknown and polygamy rare. Mention has been 
 already made of the attractive qualities of this 
 curious people, and Hooker never tires of paying 
 tribute to their kindness and good-humour. " A 
 gloomy-tempered or morose master they avoid, an 
 unkind one they flee ; but if they serve a good 
 hill's-man like themselves, they will follow him with 
 alacrity through every hardship, sleep on the cold 
 bleak mountain exposed to the pitiless rain without 
 a murmur, lay down their heavy burden to carry 
 their master over a stream, or give him a helping 
 hand up rock or precipice — do an3rthing, in short, 
 but encounter a foe ; " for the Lepcha seems to be a 
 
 c c 2 
 
388 SIKHIM. 
 
 vei'itable coward, and it is, perhaps, his peaceful 
 disposition which has preserved him from extinction 
 at the hands of his hardier and more warlike neigh- 
 bours. Their standard of civilization may be low, 
 and their talents few ; but " they are conspicuous for 
 their honesty, their power as carriers and moun- 
 taineers, and their skill as woodsmen ; for they 
 build a waterproof house with a thatch of banana 
 leaves in the lower, and of bamboo in the elevated, 
 regions, and equip it with a table and bedsteads for 
 three persons, in an hour, using no implement but 
 their heavy knife." Dr. Hooker seems indeed, on 
 the whole, to have carried away a most pleasing 
 impression of his temporary hosts. Trouble and 
 hindrance he encountered, but they arose from the 
 ill-will of the chief Minister or Dewan, and in no 
 way from unkindliness in the people. There were 
 times when he came near to starvation, but never 
 through the indisposition of his neighbours ; there 
 were times when the locality was so poor that they 
 had not food to give, and times when they dared 
 not, or dared only surreptitiously, sell what they 
 had ; but hospitality and kindness seem to have 
 been the prevailing characteristics when the neigh- 
 bourhood was fertile and circumstances were pro- 
 pitious. Presents^ of fruit, fowls and eggs, rice, 
 
 ^ The following, sent on one occasion by the Rajah, may serve 
 as a typical and comprehensive catalogue : — A brick of Thibet 
 tea ; 80 lbs. of yak butter, done up in yak-hair cloth ; 3 loads of 
 rice, and 1 load of murwa for beer ; rolls of Thibetan bread ; 
 fowls, eggs, dried plums, apricots, jujubes, currants, and sultana 
 raisins (purchased at Lhassa, but imported from N.W. Thibet), 
 and some trays of coarse white salt dug in Thibet. 
 
MANNERS AND CUSTOMS. 389 
 
 butter, and beer seem to have poured in, indeed, at 
 times with inconvenient profusion. 
 
 The Journals are full of characteristic touches 
 portraying the manners and customs of the people, 
 their dress, houses, and pursuits, as vividly as their 
 physical surroundings. Here, for instance, is an 
 interview with the Rajah, which gives us an estimate 
 of Sikhimese civilization at its best : — 
 
 " A roofed shed of neat bamboo wattle, about twenty feet long. 
 Two Bhooteas, with scarlet jackets, and with bows in their hands, 
 stood on each side of the door, and our chairs were carried before 
 us for our accommodation. Within was a wicker throne six feet 
 high, covered with purple silk, brocaded with dragons in white 
 and gold, and overhung by a canopy of tattered blue silk, with 
 which material part of the wall was also covered. An oblong box 
 containing papers, with golden dragons on it, was placed on the 
 stage, or throne, and behind it was perched, cross-legged, an odd, 
 black, insignificant-looking old man with twinkling, upturned eyes. 
 He was swathed in yellow silk, and wore on his head a pink silk 
 hat with a flat, broad crown, from all sides of which hung floss 
 silk. This was the Kajah, a genuine Thibetan, about seventy 
 years old." 
 
 And here is a village high up in the Himalayas 
 (11,480 feet), close on the Thibetan frontier, which 
 introduces us to the opposite extreme : — 
 
 " The village of Tallum consists of a few wretched stone huts, 
 placed in a broad part of the valley, which is swampy and crossed 
 by several ancient moraines. . . . The cottages are from four to 
 six feet high, without windows, and consist of a single apartment 
 containing neither table, chair, stool, nor bed ; the inmates huddle 
 together amid smoke, filth, and darkness, and sleep on a plank ; 
 and their only utensils are a bamboo churn, copper, bamboo, and 
 earthenware vessels for milk, butter, etc." 
 
 Dr. Hooker's first journey occupied the winter of 
 1848-9, and resulted in a magnificent botanical col- 
 
390 SIKHIM. 
 
 lection, comprising, among other trophies, the Hima- 
 layan rhododendrons, which were afterwards planted 
 at Kew. Not yet content, however, he started again 
 in the autumn of 1849, and was joined by Dr. Camp- 
 bell, who wished to see the Rajah about various 
 causes of difference. The description of this journey 
 introduces us to fresh delights and fresh drawbacks 
 of Himalayan travel. The travellers see false sunsets 
 in the eastern sky ; they encounter glaciers and hot 
 springs — in one of which a coolie, who had gone 
 back to look for a thermometer he had dropped, 
 elected to pass the night as a comfortable refuge ! 
 A vagrant Thibetan, who '^ gained a livelihood by 
 going up and down the country blessing, cursing, 
 and doing other such necessary business," dances for 
 alms. They meet with scenery that defies descrip- 
 tion, and cold that is almost intolerable. Eventually, 
 however, they reach Tumloong, the capital of Cis- 
 nivean Sikhim, and opportunities are afforded of 
 sharing the hospitality and observing the life of the 
 people, by which the Journals largely profit. Allu- 
 sion has been made to the ethnic and political kin- 
 ship between Sikhim and Thibet, and the likeness 
 extends to dress and manners. Here, for instance, is 
 a cameo of a lady which may serve as a comparison 
 to the picture of the Rajah on a former page. Dr. 
 Hooker is at Tumloong, and approaches 
 
 *' a concourse of women dressed in their pretty striped and crossed 
 cloaks, who had brought tokens of good will : amongst them 
 . . . , conspicuous from large necklaces of amber (in lumps the size 
 of a fist), corals, and silver filagree work, with which her neck and 
 
DRESS OF WOMEN, 391 
 
 shoulders were loaded. She wore on her head a red tiara, 
 bedizened with seed pearls and large turquoises, and a gold fillet 
 of filagree bosses united by a web of slender chains. Her hair 
 (plaited in long tails) was elaborately woven with beads, and her 
 cloak hooked in front by a chain of broad silver links studded 
 with turquoises. White silk scarves, the emblems of peace and 
 friendship, were thrown over our heads by each party ; and rice, 
 eggs, kids, goats, and murwa beer poured in apace, to the great 
 delight of our servants." 
 
 Amber, pearls, coral, and turquoises seem to be 
 the favourite ornaments in Thibet. Gill and Bogle 
 have given us similar sketches of the women of Ba- 
 thang and Lhassa-De ; and a picture of the mother 
 of the Teshu Lama, drawn for us by Turner, is 
 simply an enlarged photograph of the Sikhimese 
 lady just described. Whether, in fact, the pages 
 before us be Gill's, Hue's, Turner's, or Hooker's ; 
 whether the locality be the Chinese frontier or the city 
 of Lhassa, Bhootan, Teshu Lumbo, or the cajDital of 
 Sikhim, we are met by the same peculiarities. An 
 oratory at Tumloong is adorned with paintings by 
 Lhassa artists. A colony of Thibetans, who have 
 come to pasture their cattle near Kinchinjow, dis- 
 play the " butter ornaments " made familiar to us by 
 Hue. Lamas, turquoises, coral, amber, tsanba,^ 
 
 ^ Barley-meal mixed in tea. The Thibetans habitually put 
 butter and salt (or soda) in their tea ; adding barley-raeal to make 
 a repast. A correspondent of the Calcutta Englishman draws an 
 amusingly wry face at the tea (mixed with butter and salt) offered 
 him on the occasion of a recent visit to the Eajah of Sikhim. 
 Hue speaks of tea and meal (tsanba) as the customary food of the 
 Thibetan people. "If one will traverse the desert and reach 
 Lhassa, one must resign oneself to eating tsanba.'* In every 
 house entered by Captain Gill in the marches of Szechuen, *' butter, 
 cheese, and tsanba, were immediately forthcoming ! " 
 
392 SIKHIM. 
 
 khatas, and profuse hospitality meet us at every 
 turn. The difficulty is, where customs are strange, 
 to convey in a few words the import of the com- 
 parisons they suggest. Nothing short of parallel 
 quotations from the several writers named would 
 adequately meet the case, and such elaborate repro- 
 duction is evidently impossible within these limits. 
 
 Dr. Hooker's last picture, however, introduces 
 us to a custom so peculiar and so widely prevalent 
 that it deserves a more elaborate description. 
 Nothing in the whole range of Thibetan etiquette 
 is more curious than the khata, or " scarf of 
 felicity," which flutters perpetually before our 
 eyes. We have just seen white scarves thrown 
 over the heads of Dr. Hooker and his party 
 by his Sikhimese hosts. Turner exchanges khatas 
 at every turn during his journey through Bhootan, 
 and makes memoranda to investigate their import — 
 which fail in their purpose, but leave him still more 
 impressed by the custom. On the occasion of 
 Bogle's farewell to the Teshu Lama, the latter 
 " throws a handkerchief about his neck ; " and 
 readers may remember the meeting with the Deb 
 Patza and his wife, when Bogle "is so taken up in 
 getting a handkerchief ready for the former that he 
 does not observe the lady till she is passed," not- 
 withstanding which, the Deb " courteously declined 
 to receive my handkerchief till he had given me 
 his." A few dozen khatas were among the purchases 
 Captain Gill found it necessary to make before 
 setting out from Tatsienlu ; and he mentions, among 
 
KHATAS. 593 
 
 their uses, that " pious people visiting a lamaserai 
 generally tie one on the rails in front of the image 
 of Buddha " — a ceremony akin to that which 
 Turner underwent on quitting Teshu Lumbo, when 
 he " bound a white scarf round the capitals of each 
 of the four columns that stood within the apartment 
 he had occupied." So universal, indeed, is the cus- 
 tom, so all-pervading the part the khata plays in 
 Thibetan etiquette, that we turn to Hue for a 
 full description of its uses. The khata, or scarf of 
 felicity, is, he tells us, "a piece of silk whose fineness 
 approaches that of gauze. Its colour is white with 
 an azure tint. Its length is about three times its 
 breadth ; and the two extremities end, usually, in 
 fringe. There are khatas of all sizes and prices, for 
 it is an object with which neither rich nor poor 
 can dispense. No one ever sets out without carrying 
 a provision of them. When one goes to pay a visit 
 of etiquette, when one wishes to ask a service or 
 express thanks for one rendered, one begins by dis- 
 playing a khata. One takes it in both hands, and 
 offers it to the person one wishes to honour. If two 
 friends who have not seen each other for some time 
 chance to meet, their first care is to offer each other 
 a khata. That is done with as much warmth, and 
 as quickly, as one shakes hands in Europe. It is 
 customary also, in writing, to enclose a little khata 
 in the letter. One would hardly believe the impor- 
 tance the Thibetans, the Si Fan, and all the peoples 
 who live towards the west of the Blue Sea, attach to 
 the ceremony of the khata. For them it is the 
 
394 SIKHIM. 
 
 purest and most sincere expression of all noble senti- 
 ments. The finest words, the most magnificent 
 presents, are nothing without the khata. With it, 
 on the contrary, the commonest objects acquire an 
 immense value. To refuse a favour asked for, khata 
 in hand, would be to express contempt for all pro- 
 prieties." The custom seems as prevalent on 
 the slopes of the Himalayas as on the borders 
 of Szechuen, on the shores of Koko-Nor as in the 
 capital of the Dalai Lama : and Mr. Colbome Baber 
 even tells us that there is found, in the forest land 
 bordering on China, a kind of moss growing pendent 
 on the trees somewhat in the shape of a scarf, which 
 the Thibetans call " fairy khata." 
 
 There are few regions where a sharp line can be 
 drawn, and affirmation made that there exist, on 
 either side, distinct races of different types, instincts, 
 and religion ; but nowhere, probably, could such a 
 line be drawn with greater approach to accuracy. 
 What Turner writes of Bhootan is true, approxi- 
 mately, of Sikhim : " So wide a difi'erence is evident 
 between them and their neighbours of Bengal, that, 
 were a stranger to both desired to give an opinion of 
 them when placed together, he would not hesitate to 
 pronounce them natives of regions the remotest from 
 each other, and would never suppose that they 
 belonged to a contiguous soil." 
 
 It is time, however, to turn from these glimpses of 
 Himalayan life, and resume our sketch of the politi- 
 cal situation. We had declared a protectorate over 
 Sikhim, in 1817, with a view of setting bounds to the 
 
DR. CAMPBELL ARRESTED. 395 
 
 extension of Goorkha power ; we had acquired Dar- 
 jeeling in 1835, both as a sanatorium and as a 'place 
 d'armes in case it became necessary to affirm the 
 position taken up. The time was now approaching 
 when the fact of British ascendency and the situation 
 of Sikhim in a direct line between Calcutta and 
 Lhassa, were to suggest its adaptability as a highway 
 for trade between the two regions. 
 
 We left Dr. Campbell intent on visiting the Rajah 
 with a view to improve, if possible, our relations 
 with Tumloono^, but under the shadow of an outraoe 
 that was to provoke a diametrically opposite result. 
 Affairs began badly, with a misunderstanding that 
 might have been avoided by a clearer appreciation 
 of Thibetan etiquette. Campbell seems to have 
 been huffed because he was not at once received in 
 audience. As a matter of fact, however, it is the 
 Thibetan — and, for that matter, Chinese — custom to 
 leave the visitor a day of rest before woiTying him 
 with visits. Bogle and Turner had precisely the 
 same experience in Bhootan and Thibet, and were 
 impressed by the consideration that allows a guest 
 this repose on his arrival from a journey. Dr. 
 Campbell, however, impatient of delay, set out with 
 his companion on an excursion to the frontier. 
 Their purpose had been to make a detour through 
 Chumbi, but they were stopped at Chola by the 
 Thibetan guard, and had retired to Chumanako 
 when, suddenly, without warning, Campbell was 
 knocked down and pinioned by the Sikhim ese 
 escort. There seems no necessary connection be- 
 
396 SIKHIM. 
 
 tween the two incidents. One was a misunderstand- 
 ing ; the other, apparently, an act of political pres- 
 sure. For there was, Dr. Hooker was assured, no 
 complaint or ill-feeling against himself ; he was free 
 to travel where he chose : the animus was against 
 Campbell, who would be held in durance at Tum- 
 loong till the Governor- General confirmed certain 
 articles which he would be required to subscribe ! 
 To seize the representative of a neighbouring State 
 and confine him till he should become amenable 
 seems, in fact, a recognized practice in the border 
 region ; and it is illustrative of a difficulty others 
 than Sikhimese occasionally experience in viewing 
 matters from other than an habitual standpoint, that 
 Hooker descanted in vain on the immorality of the 
 proceeding. 
 
 Still, though consonant possibly with Himalayan 
 law, the arrest seems to have appeared, even to the 
 Sikhimese, of questionable taste, and was attributed 
 by the victims to the sole influence of the Dewan 
 and his clique. The aged abbot of Pemyongchi came 
 in person to remonstrate ; a certain Cheboo Lama, 
 who played a conspicuous part, afterwards, in Hima- 
 layan politics, was loyal in his friendship ; and a 
 vehement protest from Lord Dalhousie seems at last 
 to have carried conviction that the arrest would 
 not be considered, at Calcutta, the every-day 
 incident it appeared at Tumloong. It was deter- 
 mined, accordingly, to restore the hostages without 
 awaiting fulfilment of the conditions ; but so obtuse 
 did the Dewan seem, to the last, to the enormity of 
 
PUNITIVE MEASURES. 397 
 
 the wrong, that he actually set out for Darjeeling 
 with them in custody, taking merchandise and ponies 
 for sale at Titalyah as though nothing had happened. 
 His courage oozed away, however, as Darjeeling 
 was neared ; and he eventually let his prisoners go, 
 halting himself on the north of the frontier. 
 
 It is significant of the progress since made in our 
 conception of mountain warfare, that the General 
 commanding at Darjeeling feared to venture on a 
 punitive expedition. Troops were collected at Dar- 
 jeeling ; but even Sir Charles Napier was afraid to 
 launch them, lest a Thibetan army should be sum- 
 moned and they should be overwhelmed in the 
 mountains. Other means of coercion, fortunately, 
 were at hand. The Rajah's pension was stopped ; 
 all Sikhim south of the Rungeet was annexed, and 
 the dismssal of the Dewan was secured by this 
 pressure. The punishment was, however, imperfect, 
 and failed in ultimate effect ; for the Rajah was so 
 impoverished that we were obliged to restore his 
 income ; the Dewan regained his former influence, 
 and renewed troubles compelled the adoption, ten 
 years later, of the measures from which Sir Charles 
 Napier had shrunk. 
 
 The propensity for kidnapping — that prolific 
 source of border trouble — was at the root of the 
 new difficulty. British subjects were periodically 
 carried off; our demands for restitution failed of 
 effect ; and the Government of India decreed, in 
 1860, the seizure of Rinchipoong — a district lying 
 between Nepaul and the great Rungeet — as a means 
 
398 SIKHIM, 
 
 of pressure. The occupation was effected by 
 Captain Murray and a body of native sappers, 
 without opposition ; but they were attacked, three 
 weeks later, by a mixed force of Thibetans and 
 Bhooteas, and obliged to retreat in confusion. The 
 task had been undertaken with inadequate means 
 and, but for the warning and goodwill of the 
 Lepchas, might have resulted in worse disaster. 
 This repulse brought matters to a climax, and it 
 was decided to send an expedition to convince the 
 Court, once for all, of the necessity for submission. 
 The command was given to Colonel Gawler, who 
 has left us a graphic description ^ of the difficulties of 
 the march — for it turned out to be a promenade 
 only. There had been great preparations, but they 
 were put to little use ; there were numerous breast- 
 works, but they were vacated on our approach ; the 
 Dewan had even tried to enlist Bhootanese help, but 
 either his heart or his allies seem to have failed him at 
 the pinch. Tumloong was reached practically with- 
 out fighting ; and a treaty was imposed which had, 
 for one important object, the facilitation of trade 
 between India and Thibet. The Government had 
 been slow in concentrating its purpose, but the 
 decision was at last taken, and found expression in 
 the foUowinof clauses : — 
 
 "(11) On all goods passing into or out of Thibet, Bhootan, or 
 Kepaul, the Government of Sikhim may levy a duty [not to 
 
 ^ " Sikhim : With Hints on Jungle and Mountain Warfare." 
 By Colonel Gawler. London: 1873. 
 
TREATY OF 1861. 399 
 
 exceed 5 per cent, ad valorem'], when a pass shall be given 
 exempting such goods from any further liability. 
 
 **(13) In the event of the British Government desiring to open 
 out a road through Sikhini, with the view of encouraging trade, 
 the Sikhira Government will raise no objection thereto, and will 
 afford every protection and aid to the party engaged in the work. 
 If the road is constructed, the Government of Sikhim undertakes 
 to keep it in repair." 
 
 Clauses 17 and 19 bind the Rajah to refrain from 
 hostilities against neighbouring States, to submit 
 disputes to British arbitration, and not to cede any 
 portion of his territory without our assent ; while 
 clauses 18 and 20 provide that "the whole military 
 force of Sikhim shall join and afford every aid and 
 facility to British troops Avhen engaged in the hills," 
 and that " no armed force belonging to any other 
 country shall pass through Sikhim without the 
 sanction of the British Government." Suzerainty 
 could not well be more emphatically asserted ; nor 
 could any agreement be more hopelessly and help- 
 lessly broken than these two clauses were broken 
 during recent operations. With the ulterior stipula- 
 tions — provisions against a recurrence of disorder, 
 and affirming rights of trade and travel — we are not 
 now concerned. It will suffice to add that, since 1861, 
 the Sikhimese have been on their good behaviour. 
 
 Here, for thirteen years, the matter again rested. 
 The road stipulated for in Article 13 was promptly 
 made, from Darjeeling to the Jeylep Pass, and trade 
 grew in response to the facilities offered ; but it was 
 carried on solely by hill-men, the frontier being 
 closed as tightly as ever against natives of the plain. 
 
400 SIKHIM, 
 
 It was not till 1873 that a willingness was shown to 
 re-knit the threads of Hastings' policy, and recover 
 the privilege of access to Thibet which Bogle and 
 Turner had laboured to obtain. Early in that year, 
 Dr. Campbell and Colonel Gawler — the two men who 
 had had, probably, most to do with establishing 
 British influence in Sikhim — presented to the Secre- 
 tary of State a memorandum summarizing the 
 position, and urging upon him the opportuneness of 
 a new departure. The population was friendly : 
 Sikhim offered the shortest and most direct route 
 between Lhassa and British territory ; the Chola 
 Pass was open nearly all the year round ; and 
 Chumbi, a large market town, whence there is a good 
 road to Lhassa, is only three hours' journey from 
 the frontier. By a branch extension of the East 
 Indian Railway to the foot of the Darjeeling hills, the 
 transport of Indian and English goods intended for 
 Thibet, as well as our Darjeeling tea trade, would be 
 greatly facilitated. The head of the Sikhimese 
 religion, moreover, was in Thibet. Many of the 
 officials were Thibetans, and the Rajah himself 
 received a salary from Thibet, and spent half his 
 time at Chumbi within the Thibetan frontier. With 
 the advantages here enumerated, there could, it was 
 suggested, be no great difficulty in establishing a 
 consular agency at Chumbi to begin with, and in 
 eventually sending an envoy to Lhassa. 
 
 Whatever share it may have had in producing the 
 result, the date of this document coincides remark- 
 ably with a movement in the direction indicated. 
 
PROJECTS OF INTERCOURSE. 401 
 
 The old Rajah had lately died. In the summer of 
 1873 the new Rajah visited Sir George Campbell at 
 Darjeeling : in the autumn of that year his pension 
 was increased, and Mr. Edgar paid him a return 
 visit, at which the question of opening up intercourse 
 with Thibet was seriously discussed,^ Refused per- 
 mission to enter Chumbi^ Mr. Edgar was, never- 
 theless, visited at Chola not only by the Rajah 
 and his chief Minister, but by the very ex-Dewan 
 Namgay — the hero of Dr. Campbell's arrest in 
 1849, and of his repulse in 1860 — who now 
 professed himself anxious to further our projects. 
 There would, it was affirmed, with an unanimity in 
 singular contrast to the event, be no difficulty with 
 Thibet : it was China which had sealed the passes, 
 and it depended upon China to reopen them : the 
 Emperor held the key of the situation. Twelve 
 more years were to pass before a resolution was 
 taken to approach the Chinese Government in the 
 sense suggested. But two important steps had been 
 gained in the interval : the railway suggested by 
 Messrs. Campbell and Gawler had been completed to 
 the foot of the Himalayas, and a clause inserted by 
 Sir Thomas Wade in the Convention of Chefoo, 
 recognizing the purpose of Englishmen to travel 
 between India and China, through Thibet. 
 
 The story merges, henceforth, in the larger field 
 of Indo-Chinese policy. We have seen the little 
 State disclosed (in 1730) by Van De Putte — the 
 
 * "Keport on a Visit to Sikliim and the Thibetan Frontier." 
 By J. Ware Edgar, C.S.I. Calcutta. 1874. 
 
 D d 
 
402 SIKHIM. 
 
 first European who ever completed the journey from 
 India, through Lhassa, to China ; and we have seen 
 the Rajah defended (in 1775), as a feudatory of the 
 Dalai Lama, against the aggression of Nepaul. We 
 have seen how the hindrance of the old trade route 
 through Nepaul, after the Goorkha conquest of that 
 country in 1763, led Hastings to seek an alternative 
 way through Bhootan. We have seen Sikhim 
 indicated by Bogle as a sort of bye-lane between 
 India and Thibet, of no great account owing to 
 malaria and other causes ; and we have seen its 
 passes closed, in common with the whole Thibetan 
 frontier, by the Chinese, in 1792. We have followed 
 the development of British influence, from its incep- 
 tion, in 1814, to the acquisition of Darjeeling in 
 1835, the annexation of the Murung in 1849, and the 
 emphatic assertion of Indian suzerainty in 1861. 
 And we have traced the project of opening up 
 Sikhim as a highway between India and Thibet, from 
 the first conception of the idea, down to the Macaulay 
 Mission and the incidents to which it has given rise. 
 If the hostile attitude of the Lamas involve a con- 
 tradiction of the hopes we had been led to entertain, 
 Sikhimese history may, perhaps, help us to a solution 
 of the puzzle. We have seen Dr. Campbell arrested 
 by the ofiicial clique, in opposition to the popular 
 wish ; and we have seen the Lepchas warning him 
 beforehand, and screening him after the attack at 
 Rinchipoong, in defiance of the policy of their 
 ofiicials. The surmise might not be very wild that 
 we have, here, an index to the situation in Thibet — 
 
THE POLITICAL SITUATION, 403 
 
 a hostile clique of Lama officials disposing of the 
 State forces in opposition to the wish of a singularly 
 submissive people. Nothing surprised Dr. Hooker 
 more than the submission of the Sikhimese to the 
 extortion and oppression of which the Dewan 
 Namgay was guilty. His unpopularity was evident ; 
 he disposed of no repressive force ; and nothing could, 
 it seemed to the visitor, have been easier than to 
 overthrow him. Yet the people submitted, and went 
 on submitting, as they appear to submit to the 
 oppression of his brethren, in Thibet. 
 
 These glimpses of the past enable us to appreciate 
 also, more clearly, the rival claims of Thibetan and 
 Indian suzerainty over which the negotiations at 
 Gnatong made temporary shipwreck. If it is 
 obvious, from the foregoing pages, that the Lamas 
 were justified in regarding Sikhim as an ancient 
 dependency of Lhassa, it is equally clear that the 
 Cis-nivean region has passed under the influence of 
 Calcutta. Bound by the treaty of Tumloong to join, 
 with his whole force, any British troops engaged in 
 the Himalayas, the Rajah was subsidized by Thibet 
 to guard the very passes we have been concerned to 
 open. If there is one province in respect to which 
 he is a pensioned feudatory of India, there is another 
 in respect to which he is a subsidized dependent of 
 Lhassa. Owing his very possession of Cis-nivean 
 Sikhim to British protection, he was bound by race, 
 tradition, and every natural affinity to the Power 
 which was arrayed against his real protectors. 
 
 We encountered, therefore, a Sikhimese question 
 D d 2 
 
404 SIKHIM. 
 
 in addition to a Thibetan question — a complicated 
 question of Himalayan politics, in addition to one of 
 complicated commercial rivalry — a storm in a tea- 
 pot, perhaps — but a storm which it was rather more 
 difficult to appease because it was concentrated in so 
 small a focus. 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. 
 
 So far, then, as the actual accomplishment of our 
 purpose was concerned, the close of 1889 found 
 matters very little advanced. We had driven the 
 Thibetans out of British Sikhim, and cleared the 
 passes into Chumbi ; but the Lamas seemed as far 
 as ever from coming to terms. The Chinese Govern- 
 ment had become urgent in its instructions that a 
 settlemeht should be arranged; but its envoy had 
 only succeeded, so far, in superadding a question of 
 suzerainty to the question of intercourse. Better 
 sense and better counsels were, however, about to 
 prevail, Mr. James Hart, of the Imperial Maritime 
 Customs Service, was sent to assist in finding a 
 solution, and — whether spontaneously or under in- 
 structions from Peking — Chang Keng was led to 
 - perceive that one half of Sikhim was really on the 
 Indian slope. Negotiations were accordingly resumed, 
 with a better prospect of success. The points at 
 issue were, in fact, practically settled with this ad- 
 mission and the acceptance, in principle, of commercial 
 intercourse. It remained, only, to consecrate them 
 
4o6 PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. 
 
 in a Convention ; and the following terms were 
 eventually reached : — 
 
 I. — The boundary of Sikhim and Thibet shall be the crest of 
 the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikhim 
 Teesta and its affluents, from the waters flowing into the Thibetan 
 Machu and northwards into other rivers of Thibet. The line 
 commences at Mount Gipmochi, on the Bhootan frontier, and 
 follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it 
 meets Nepal territory. 
 
 IE. — It is admitted that the British Government, whose 
 protectorate over the Sikhim State is hereby recognized, has 
 direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and 
 foreign relations of that State ; and, except through and with 
 the permission of the British Government, neither the ruler of the 
 State nor any of its officers shall have official relations of any 
 kind, formal or informal, with any other country. 
 
 III. — The Government of Great Britain and Ireland and the 
 Government of China engage reciprocally to respect the boundary 
 as defined in Article I., and to prevent acts of aggression from 
 their respective sides of the frontier. 
 
 IV. — The question of providing increased facilities for trade 
 across the Sikhim-Thibet frontier will hereafter be discussed, with 
 a view to a mutually satisfactory arrangement, by the high 
 contracting Powers. 
 
 V. — The question of pasturage on the Sikhim side of the 
 frontier is reserved for further examination and future adjustment. 
 
 VI. — The high contracting Powers reserve for discussion and 
 arrangement the method in which official communications between 
 the British authorities in India and the authorities in Thibet shall 
 be conducted. 
 
 VII. — Two joint commissioners shall, within six months from 
 the ratification of this Convention, be appointed, one by the 
 British Government in India, the other by the Chinese Resident 
 in Thibet. The said commissioners shall meet and discuss the 
 questions which, by the last three preceding articles, have been 
 reserved. 
 
 VIII. — The present Convention shall be ratified, and the 
 ratifications shall be exchanged in London, as soon as possible after 
 the date of the signature thereof. 
 
CHINESE ENVOY AT CALCUTTA. 407 
 
 Having reached this conclusion, Chang Keng found 
 no difficulty in continuing his journey to Calcutta ; 
 and it is satisfactory to learn that he appeared 
 pleased and impressed with his visit. He had a 
 fitting reception, and the signature of the Conven- 
 tion was accomplished with fitting ceremony. The 
 incident was a memorable one, in many respects. 
 It marked, probably, the most distinct recog- 
 nition China had yet vouchsafed, of the change which 
 had come over her relations with the outer world ; and 
 it marked the first act of direct intercourse between 
 two great Asiatic Empires whose mutual interests 
 must draw them into more and more intimate rela- 
 tions. 
 
 The Convention was ratified in August, 1890 : 
 but the terms of commercial intercourse have not 
 even yet been settled. Mr. Hart has been pursuing 
 the negotiations which he successfully inaugu- 
 rated, but has found himself confronted by a prob- 
 lem of extreme difficulty. We have seen how great 
 and how complicated are the interests concerned in 
 the tea trade ^ between China and Thibet ; and 
 how gravely they must be afiected by the sudden 
 admission of a new competitor, whose produce 
 could be placed on the market at a much less 
 
 1 Not only is there the question of trade, hut it has he en stated 
 lately, in the Shanghai press, that China distributes a great 
 quantity of brick tea, in largess, to the Lama hierarchy which 
 finds profit in selling it to the people ; and that the Dalai Lama 
 has made this the ground of a memorial to the Emperor re the 
 proposed opening of Thibet to Indian tea. 
 
4o8 PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS 
 
 comparative cost. It is not surprising, therefore, 
 that prolonged discussion should have ensued ; but 
 it is understood that terms of compromise have 
 been arranged, and that the announcement of a 
 definite agreement may be shortly expected. The 
 negotiations have been conducted with exemplary 
 patience ; but patience was called for, in dealing 
 with a jealous and excited clique and a nervous 
 people. There were mistakes, at first, on both sides. 
 The constitution of the Macaulay Mission was a 
 mistake : the eclat given to it was a mistake. The 
 furious alarm of the Thibetans, and their advance 
 into Sikhim were mistakes — mistakes both stupid 
 and deplorable, but less incomprehensible than might 
 have been the case if history were not at hand to 
 suggest an explanation. Their prejudices and ap- 
 prehensions will doubtless be considered, at the early 
 stages of the intercourse which is now confidently 
 anticipated. A British Consul at Chumbi, and the 
 right to trade in Chumbi might satisfy, for the moment, 
 the exigencies of the situation. The important object 
 is to get the door ajar. Ulterior advance might be 
 indicated for subsequent arrangement; but an 
 important step would have been gained if an 
 agreement were reached that Indians and Thibetans 
 should meet, and trade, on Thibetan soil. 
 
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