^*:s?^'^y^^^^r3SiB^ 
 
 

 
 ^.iT''- 17^ 
 
^f/^ 
 
 -yio 
 
 -A3 
 
 THE CAUSES FOR THE FAILURE 
 OF OTERMIN'S ATTEMPT TO 
 RECONQUER NEW MEXICO 
 1681-1682 
 
 By CHARLES W. HACKETT 
 
 University of California 
 
 REPRINTED FROM "THE PACIFIC OCEAN IN HISTORY" 
 BY H. MORSE STEPHENS AND HERBERT E. BOLTON. 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, PUBLISHERS, NEW YORK 
 
 Copyright, 1917, By The Macmillan Company. 
 
if^lrv- 
 
 THE CAUSES FOR THE FAILURE OF OTERMIN^S 
 ATTEMPT TO RECONQUER NEW MEXICO, 1681-82 
 
 Charles W. Hackett 
 
 The occasion for a discussion of the causes for the failure of 
 Governor Otermm's attempt to reconquer New Mexico in the 
 winter of 1681-82, as well as for a new and intensive study of the 
 broader field of which it is a part, namely, the Pueblo revolt and 
 the reconquest, is the recent acquisition of hitherto unused sources 
 from the Mexican and Spanish archives. These sources, collated 
 with materials in the New Mexico archives, the Bancroft Collec- 
 tion, and the Peabody Museum, cause the whole subject to be 
 seen in a new and different light. In the present paper a meagre 
 sketch of the narrative of the Otermm expedition, the outlines 
 of which are already well known, will be necessary, but emphasis 
 will be laid not only upon the actual causes for the failure of the 
 expedition, but upon some of the most important related facts 
 upon which new light has been thrown. 
 
 As a result of the Pueblo uprising in New Mexico in August 
 1680, in which three hundred and eighty civilians and twenty-one 
 missionaries lost their lives, the survivors, numbering over two 
 thousand five hundred souls, including three hundred and seven- 
 teen Indian allies, retreated under the leadership of their governor, 
 Don Antonio de Otermin, to the monastery of Nuestra Senora 
 de Guadalupe del Paso. There succor was had for the half- 
 starved, half-naked, and foot-sore refugees, through the kindness 
 of Father Ayeta, the Franciscan custodio and procurador general 
 of the province, who fortunately had just arrived at El Paso from 
 the city of Mexico with a wagon train of supplies for the mission- 
 aries of the province. There a halt was called and temporary 
 settlements were established in the vicinity of Guadalupe del 
 
 439 
 
440 THE PACIFIC OCEAN IN HISTORY 
 
 Paso. At San Lorenzo, one of these settlements located about 
 twenty-five miles below the pueblo of El Paso, headquarters for 
 the governor and for the cahildo of Santa Fe were established, and 
 there the provincial form of government was maintained in all 
 of its detail.^ 
 
 In December Father Ayeta went to Mexico City, carrying with 
 him the oflBcial records of the revolt and of the retreat, and various 
 petitions from the governor and leading citizens for supplies so 
 that they might attempt a reconquest of the lost province. On 
 January 7, 1681, the Junta General began a consideration of the 
 New Mexican situation and by the end of the month had arrived 
 at a decision. The refugees were to be supplied with corn and 
 meat until October 1 at royal expense ; grain and implements for 
 farming were to be furnished so that the settlers might become 
 self-sustaining; money was allowed for one hundred and fifty 
 pobladoreSj or settlers, at an annual stipend of two hundred and 
 fifty pesos each ; fifty soldiers, at the current wage of three hundred 
 and fifteen pesos annually, were provided for a presidio, which was 
 to remain at El Paso until the province was reconquered; and 
 last and most important of all, orders were given for Otermin 
 to attempt at once a reconquest of New Mexico so that the refu- 
 gees might return to their ruined homes. It is thus seen that 
 the settlement of the New Mexico refugees at El Paso was intended 
 to be only temporary. To Father Ayeta the Junta General on 
 February 1, 1681, assigned the duty of conducting the relief train 
 to El Paso and of carrying the orders of the superior government 
 to Governor Otermin.^ 
 
 In the meantime conditions at El Paso had been going from 
 bad to worse and before Father Ayeta finally arrived a number 
 of serious dangers had arisen. In March news had come that 
 the Pueblos, allied with the Apaches, were planning to attack El 
 
 1 See Hackett, The Revolt of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico in 1680, in The 
 Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, vol. 15, pp. 93-147 ; and The 
 Retreat of the Spaniards from New Mexico in 1680, and the Beginnings of El Paso, 
 in The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, vol. 16, pp. 137-168, and 259-276. 
 
 ' Auttos tocantes; dl Alsamiento de Los Yndios de la Provincia de la Nucha Mexico, 
 folios 92-121, Mss. in the Archivo General y Publico de Mexico, Provincias 
 Internas, tomo 37. (See Bolton, Guide to Materials for the History of the United 
 States in the Principal Archives of Mexico, 94.) Transcripts of the documents in 
 the above-cited expediente are now in the private collection of Dr. Herbert E. 
 Bolton, to whom I am indebted for their use. 
 
THE CAUSES OF OTERMIN'S FAILURE 441 
 
 Paso, in which they expected to be joined by the Christian Pueblos 
 there and by the native Mansos and Sumas Indians.^ The suppHes 
 furnished by Father Ayeta had only been calculated to last until 
 March 1, 1681, at which time it was thought succor could be had 
 from Mexico City. By April 5, however, no word had come from 
 there and the store of supplies had run so low that unless replen- 
 ished it could last the settlers only thirty more days. Urgent 
 appeals for help were sent to the governor of Nueva Vizcaya, and 
 foraging expeditions were sent to Casas Grandes and Parral to 
 buy grain and cattle on the credit of the governor's name.^ In 
 July the Piros and Tigua allies had plans all laid to revolt, kill 
 as many Spaniards as possible and then return to their pueblos ; 
 but these plans were discovered in time to be suppressed.^ Many 
 of the refugees had deserted upon their arrival at El Paso, and in 
 the face of starvation and danger of Indian attacks discontent 
 was so strong that many others left their families in El Paso 
 and went to Casas Grandes, Parral, and other adjacent places in 
 search of individual succor, while others deserted in the full sense 
 of the word. In short, matters were such that Governor Otermin 
 officially recorded his belief that if the situation was not relieved 
 soon El Paso would either have to be abandoned, thereby in- 
 creasing the risk to all northern New Spain, or the settlers must 
 needs die of starvation.* 
 
 It was not until September 7, 1681, that Father Ayeta reached 
 San Lorenzo with the belated train of supplies from Mexico City 
 and the orders from the superior government for Otermin to at- 
 tempt a reconquest of the province. But before his arrival the 
 news that the viceroy and Junta General had given instructions 
 for Otermin to lead a military expedition to New Mexico had 
 been received, and an official announcement had been made at 
 both San Lorenzo and the pueblo of El Paso nearly a week before 
 
 1 Tanto Sacado a la Letra de los autos fulminados de los Indios que Binieron del 
 nuevo mexo. llamados Alonsso Shimitigua Baltasar y thomas que su Thenor a la letra 
 es Como se Sigue, folios 1-8. Mss. in the Bancroft Collection. 
 
 2 Expediente, No. 4, folios 1-9. Original Mss., in the New Mexico Archives at 
 the Library of Congress. (See Twitchell, The Spanish Archives of New Mexico, 
 vol. 2, pp. 3-4.) 
 
 3 Expediente, No. 7, folios 1-16 (incomplete) in ibid. (See Twitchell, op. cit., 
 69-70) ; folios 17-18. These two folios of the expediente, having become separated 
 from the rest, are in the Bancroft Collection. 
 
 * Expediente, No. 4, folios 1 and 9, in ibid. 
 
442 THE PACIFIC OCEAN IN HISTORY 
 
 the arrival of Father Ayeta.^ This news was but a signal for a 
 fresh outburst of discord and discontent among the settlers, for 
 after what they had just passed through an expedition to New 
 Mexico proved a most unwelcome subject. Father Ayeta him- 
 self best described the general situation. He stated that when 
 he reached Parral on August 2, he heard rumors that the settlers 
 at El Paso had come to regard the reconquest as impossible be- 
 cause additional soldiers were not being sent from Mexico. This, 
 he said, surprised and grieved him, for when he left El Paso the 
 year before he felt that the citizens were so anxious for help to 
 return to a reconquest of their country that to accomplish it they 
 would even be willing to eat stones ; that without any doubt the 
 greatest joy in the world would be theirs on the day when the 
 viceroy would supply them with- necessities for returning to the 
 proposed reduction.^ But on the 9th of September, the people 
 having been called together by Otermm, even before the viceroy's 
 despatch had been read to them, "there was not lacking one," 
 so Father Ayeta stated, "to cause difficulties and embarrassments. 
 From which, and from many reports which he received in a short 
 time, he learned that all the sincerest courage, zeal, the promises, 
 and the desires to return to the conquest manifested in Salineta, not 
 only by their mouths but over their signatures, which the superior 
 government holds, had been changed to cold indifference. And he 
 learned that there was no dearth of leading citizens who in place 
 of strength caused weakness. But he did what human strength 
 could to encourage them and he remonstrates with his Lordship 
 for having failed to aid him in carrying the heavy load which he 
 bears as his strength permits. . . . And some being relatives of 
 others and following their leadership, the matter reached such a 
 state that the expense having been incurred, it was seen that it 
 would be most difficult to make the entrada. And, were it not that 
 God never permits that there be lacking many good men where 
 there are bad, who promptly and obediently, without replies or 
 metaphysics, enter into the service of the king, due credit being 
 
 1 Autos Pertenecientes a el alcamiento de los Yndios de La Proyfl del nuebo Mexfio 
 Y la entrada, Y subcesos de ella que se hico para su recuperacion, folio 62. Transcripts, 
 in Bolton Collection, of Mss. in the Archive General y Piablico de Mexico, Provin- 
 cias Internas, 34. (See Bolton, Guide, 92.) Also Expediente, No. 8, folio 1, New 
 Mexico Archives. (See Twitchell, op. cit., 70.) 
 
 2 Autos Pertenecientes, etc., folio 61. 
 
THE CAUSES OF OTERMlN'S FAILURE ' 443 
 
 given to his Lordship who led many out of the error they had 
 been in by his good example, there would have been no entrada." ^ 
 
 In the face of all this dissatisfaction Otermm the day after 
 the arrival of Father Ayeta began preparations for carrying out 
 the viceroy's orders. A general muster of the citizens and a re- 
 view of all of their equipment was begun and orders were issued 
 for all deserters to return to El Paso. The aid of the officials of 
 Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora was implored in this matter, but it 
 is worthy of note that not a half dozen of such deserters responded 
 to their governor's call in the two months preceding the departure 
 of the expedition.^ 
 
 In the meantime dissatisfaction at El Paso grew apace and 
 again on September 21, Father Ayeta came to the rescue. Speak- 
 ing of himself in the third person he says : " It was asked of him that 
 he continue the aid, for if he agreed and continued to give it diffi- 
 culties would be removed. So he granted anew another 2000 
 cattle and 2000 fanegas of grain in the name of his Majesty." 
 In this way actual opposition to the plans was quieted and the 
 next day the governor began making the payments to the set- 
 tlers. The following day the list of soldiers for the presidio was 
 made known and the soldiers paid. Ayeta is authority for the 
 statement, however, that the supply money was so placed that 
 the number of dissatisfied settlers exceeded the number of 
 satisfied ones, "an accident," he adds, "which the great prudence 
 of his Lordship overcame and made bearable that the service of 
 their majesties might be accomplished. And for his part his 
 Paternity took all possible precautions, caressing them and 
 petting them, with no slight mortification and disgust, until God 
 wished that they should move." ^ 
 
 Finally on November 5 the force left Guadalupe del Paso. 
 On November 7 at the Ancon de Fray Garcia, six leagues above 
 Guadalupe, a general review and muster was held and. it was found 
 that there were one hundred and thirty trained soldiers, sixteen 
 raw recruits, one hundred and twelve Indian allies, twenty-eight 
 
 1 Autos Pertenecientes, etc., folios 62-63. 
 
 ' Expediente, No. 8, folios 1, 33, and 65 in New Mexico Archives. (See Twitchell, 
 op. cit., 70.) 
 
 ' Expediente, No. 6, folios 28-30 in New Mexico Archives ; Expediente, No. 5, 
 folios 1-26 in ibid.; Expediente, No. 8, folios 34-40, in ibid.; Autos Pertenecientes, 
 63. 
 
444 THE PACIFIC OCEAN IN HISTORY 
 
 servants, nine of whom were armed, at least three reUgious, in- 
 cluding Father Ayeta, and one boy, thus making a total of about 
 two hundred and ninety persons. The soldiers carried in all nine 
 hundred and forty-eight horses and mules and the religious doubt- 
 less thirty or forty more. The military equipment was deficient 
 in many respects. Excepting Governor Otermin and Francisco 
 Xavier, the Secretary of Government and War, only twenty-five 
 soldiers were provided with complete outfits of personal arms 
 and full cavalry equipment. Thirty-six others carried outfits 
 of personal arms, but were not provided with full cavalry equip- 
 ment; three possessed complete outfits of personal arms only; 
 thirty-four had a full outfit of personal arms w^ith the exception of 
 a terno; and one carried all his personal arms with the exception 
 of a terno and a leather jacket. Of the other forty-five one pos- 
 sessed only an arquebus, another only a leather shield, while 
 among the remaining forty-three there were in all fourteen swords, 
 fourteen arquebuses, ten shields (chimales), eight leather shields 
 (adargas), six daggers, two jackets, four lances and three leather 
 jackets. None of these men possessed more than one of each 
 kind of the above mentioned articles, while only six men possessed 
 as many as four of the articles.^ 
 
 While by this time actual opposition to the expedition had 
 been hushed there was still an almost utter lack of confidence in 
 the success of the undertaking. This is best illustrated by a 
 statement of Otermin himself, made in the auto calling for the 
 muster of November 7, to the effect that he believed it would be 
 impossible to succeed on the expedition, which, he said, he was 
 forced to undertake out of deference to his " obligation as a vassal 
 and in order to give just fulfillment to the mandates and orders" 
 of the viceroy and Junta General.^ During the first fourteen or 
 fifteen days of the march the soldiers were tractable, seeing, as 
 Father Ayeta stated, that there was no remedy for it. But as 
 they approached the settled country of the Pueblos even the most 
 meritorious began to fear the first encounter with the Indians.^ 
 Selecting seventy of the most valorous ones Otermin with them, 
 
 1 Autos Pertenecientes, folio 4 ; Expediente, No. 8, folios 65-73, in New Mexico 
 Archives. 
 
 2 Expediente, No. 8, folio 65, in New Mexico Archives. 
 » Autos Pertenecientes, folio 63. 
 
THE CAUSES OF OTERMIN'S FAILURE 445 
 
 on December 6, surprised and captured Isleta and soon after 
 received the submission of the entire population, numbering ^ve 
 hundred and eleven souls/ and not fifteen hundred and eleven, as 
 Bancroft states.^ 
 
 On the eighth of December Otermin despatched the lieutenant- 
 general of the cavalry, Juan Dominguez de Mendoza, with seventy 
 mounted soldiers and some Indian allies to reconnoiter the country 
 above, while he occupied himself with various duties in Isleta. The 
 Indians above Isleta had heard of the arrival there of the Spaniards 
 and at once had taken to the mountains. Mendoza was gone 
 ten days and advanced as far as La Cieneguilla, passing through 
 the pueblos of Alameda, Puaray, Sandia, San Felipe, Santo Do- 
 mingo, and Cochiti. At La Cieneguilla parleys were held with the 
 assembled Indians, numbering over one thousand warriors, and 
 peace pacts were made, by the terms of which Mendoza was to 
 allow the Indians three days in which to submit to the Spaniards' 
 rule and return to their pueblos. He and his men then returned 
 to Cochiti to await the expiration of the period. At the end of 
 that time, no Indians having come, it was ascertained through 
 spies and through deserters from the Indian camp that the Indians 
 had only made terms in order to gain time, that warriors from 
 all over the kingdom were flocking to the standard of Catiti, Don 
 Luis Tupatu and other native chieftains, and that there were 
 several well laid schemes to entrap the Spaniards and get rid of 
 them at one fell swoop. l&SOCItfttlJtK^IW 
 
 As soon as Mendoza learned this he beat a hasty retreat and the 
 next day joined Otermm's division, which by this time had ad- 
 vanced northward from Isleta and was encamped opposite the 
 pueblo of Alameda, which the governor had already destroyed, 
 together with Puaray and Sandia.^ It may be remarked in pass- 
 ing that the records kept by Otermin at this time disprove the 
 long accepted theories as to the location of the three above-men- 
 tioned pueblos and show conclusively that Alameda was about 
 eight leagues above Isleta and on the same or west side of the 
 stream, that Puaray was one league above Alameda but on 
 
 1 Auto8 Pertenecientes, folios 8 and 101-102. 
 * Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, p. 188. 
 ' Autos Pertenecientes, folios 10-57. 
 
446 THE PACIFIC OCEAN IN HISTORY 
 
 the east bank of the river and that Sandia was one league above 
 Puaray and on the same side of the stream.^ 
 
 The return of the Mendoza party with its discouraging reports 
 was the real turning point in the outward policy of the expedition. 
 Whatever had been the half-hearted attitude up to that time there 
 could henceforth be no doubting the keen opposition to remain- 
 ing in the country. Father Ayeta stated that Otermin, disgusted 
 with the failure of the Mendoza party, determined to select 
 seventy men and go in person to chastise the rebels. To ascertain 
 the general opinion on this point Father Ayeta made a touf of 
 the camp. He found in some of the soldiers "such rebelliousness 
 and in others such arguments" that he realized the hopelessness 
 of the project. "Those who had horses," he added, "looking 
 at nothing but their own convenience, although the sky should 
 fall, would not lend them to their own fathers, much less to the 
 governor." In short, not ten men were found who were willing 
 to accompany the expedition.^ To discuss the general situation 
 Otermin, on December 23, called a junta de guerra? Father 
 Ayeta, the first one of the thirty-one participants to give an 
 opinion, stated emphatically that he did not believe that there 
 was any prospect of Otermm's being able to inflict further punish- 
 ment on the apostates, and recommended a retreat to Isleta,* so 
 that that pueblo might be safeguarded until a decision could be 
 reached. With Father Ayeta, who had done so much to inspire 
 the soldiers for the undertaking, discouraged, there could be little 
 hope for further efforts at reconquest. In the discussion that 
 followed emphasis was laid on the fact that the unusually hard 
 winter had so exhausted the horses that many soldiers were doing 
 scout duty on foot; that the Isleta Indians were deserting and 
 returning to apostasy while those loyal to the Spanish cause were 
 liable to be attacked by the rebels; and that the place where 
 they were was unsuited for defense, and short of firewood. The 
 majority voted to retreat for the present to Isleta. Four voted 
 to continue the entrada and three were in favor of leaving for San 
 Lorenzo at once. Otermin, as can be imagined, yielded to public 
 
 1 See Hackett, The Location of the Tigua Pueblos of Alamedor, Puaray, and Sandia 
 in 1681, in Old Santa Fe, vol. 2, pp. 381-391. 
 ' Autos Pertenecientea, folios 63-64. 
 ' Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
 4 Ibid., foUo 64. 
 
THE CAUSES OF OTERMIN'S FAILURE 447 
 
 opinion and ordered a retreat to Isleta, where his force arrived on 
 December 30. The next day another junta was held, and it was 
 unanimously agreed to retreat at once to El Paso. Isleta was 
 burned as were all of the other pueblos visited except San Felipe, 
 Santo Domingo, and Cochiti, and on January 2 the force began its 
 march down the river. ^ 
 
 In summing up the achievements of the expedition little 
 can be said. A distance of more than a hundred and twenty-five 
 leagues had been traversed. Five hundred of the sixteen thousand 
 apostates had been absolved and received again into the church, 
 although over one hundred of these had apostasized again during 
 the Spaniards' absence. Eight pueblos, including Isleta, which 
 was the only one that was not found deserted, had been burned, 
 and with them a quantity of grain estimated at four thousand 
 fanegas. Three other deserted pueblos had been sacked and a 
 great quantity of beans and other things consumed. Only one 
 encounter with the Indians is recorded and this was at Isleta, 
 the only pueblo as far south as the Piros country which did not 
 participate in the revolt of the preceding year. There the na- 
 tives only let fly a few arrows, for, being attacked at daybreak, 
 they were unable to ascertain who the invaders were, and at first 
 took them to be Apaches. The offensive operations of the Men- 
 doza party, as we have seen, amounted to nothing. In short it 
 is worthy of comment that the death, or even the wounding, of 
 not a single person on either side is noted. 
 
 What then can be assigned as the cause for so little having been 
 accomplished on so long an expedition ? The actual opposition en- 
 countered before the expedition set out, the lack of confidence in the 
 undertaking from the governor down, even from the very begin- 
 ning, and the unwilling resignation to the inevitable on the part of 
 the soldiers on the march could only presage an unsuccessful 
 expedition. Under such conditions there could have been little 
 hope for overcoming such trials and discouragements as were 
 caused by the severe weather, the failure of the horses, and the 
 flight of the Indians to the mountains rather than surrender, 
 while a vigorous offensive campaign against the apostates was out 
 of the question. 
 
 1 AiUoa Pertenecientea, folios 65-95. 
 
448 THE PACIFIC OCEAN IN HISTORY 
 
 That such a campaign was possible, however, and that the 
 failure of the expedition was not regarded by the officials as due 
 to a scarcity of men and equipment was pointed out in no uncer- 
 tain terms by the royal fiscal in Mexico City later on. His review 
 of the expedition is interesting and altogether enlightening. He 
 says in part : " In the pueblos which were set on fire more than 
 4000 fanegas of grain were burned, besides a great quantity of 
 beans. And it must be noted that this quantity did not include 
 that which the carts and pack train carried and that which they 
 threw to the animals ; that in the pueblos of Cochiti, San Felipe, 
 San Ildefonso, Santa Ana, and Sia, there was a great quantity of 
 grain and other supplies, as the lieutenant-general, Juan Dominguez, 
 related in those letters of which mention has been made ; that at 
 least there might have been collected another 4000 fanegas, which 
 he left to the enemy, and likewise the houses of the above- 
 mentioned pueblos, without having set fire to them. And it seems 
 that if the governor had ordered that all of said grain should be 
 collected in the pueblo of Puaray, which is in the central part 
 and at a short distance from the others, he could have made him- 
 self secure in it, having plenty of grain to sustain his force, and to 
 feed to the horses and mules at night, taking them out during 
 the day to feed in the fields, for in his letters the lieutenant in- 
 formed him that on both sides of the river the feed and stubble was 
 more than good in that vicinity. And having finished gathering 
 in the crop of corn there could not fail to have been a large quantity 
 of husks and stalks of the corn itself, equally good feed for the 
 horses and mules. In this way it would have been possible to 
 maintain the army many months in the said pueblo, which 
 is in the central part of the province and from ten to twelve 
 leagues distant from the villa of Santa Fe. And the apostates 
 being in the sierras during the snowy season, without houses, 
 and with few provisions, the discomforts of cold and hunger 
 would have reduced them to the necessity of submission, while 
 the cause for the weakness of the horses, which was the main 
 pretext for the retreat, would have been removed, since with 
 a few days of rest and feeding on corn they would have been 
 fatter and stronger than when they left the camp of San Lorenzo. 
 And the other pretext, that the surrendered Indians in Isleta were 
 
THE CAUSES OF OTERMIN'S FAILURE' 449 
 
 in danger, vanishes because of the ease with which they could have 
 been taken with the army to the said pueblo of Puaray where they 
 would be more secure than left alone as they were in Isleta, merely 
 on the strength of their word and with the power of carrying away 
 the many provisions which they had there. 
 
 "And when their safety is doubted that doubt may be dis- 
 pelled by what persons experienced in Indian warfare say, for 
 example will not be found in all New Spain where Indians have 
 dared to offer battle to so many persons as the army numbered, 
 mounted, provided with arms and ammunition, and intrenched 
 in a pueblo, nor even to attack those with less defence unless it 
 were by surprise. For it continually happens that twenty armed 
 men with powder and munitions, make thousands of Indians re- 
 treat although it may be in the open country. And when any- 
 one attempts to deny this pure and notorious truth, laying aside 
 many other examples to prove it, that will be sufficient which the 
 governor himself experienced in the villa o| Santa Fe. For not- 
 withstanding that all the apostates had been called together for the 
 uprising, and that this news had caught him unawares and with- 
 out any preparation to resist such a general assemblage, and the 
 Indians, being so wrought up that in all of the other pueblos of 
 that district they had already killed the priests and all the Span- 
 iards, without sparing the children and women, yet the said gov- 
 ernor, having placed himself in defense with only one hundred 
 men who could bear arms, not only repelled the attack of such a 
 multitude of Indians as had surrounded him, but, having repulsed 
 them, put them to flight, killing more than three hundred, besides 
 forty-seven others whom they caught in a house where they killed 
 them with lances. And seeing that his lieutenant-general in Rio 
 Abajo, Alonso Garcia, was not giving him aid, he decided to leave, 
 retiring with his followers from the said villa of Santa Fe, as he 
 did, the greater part of them coming on foot and burdened with 
 women and children and the necessary supplies. And with only 
 one hundred horses he came retreating through the same pueblos 
 of Sandia, Alameda, and Isleta, where the apostates had risen. 
 In this way, with very few supplies, and in sight of the enemy who 
 followed them, revealing themselves on the hills and ridges, he 
 marched to the place called Fray Cristobal, which is distant from 
 
450 THE PACIFIC OCEAN IN HISTORY 
 
 the villa and capital of Santa Fe, from where they set out, seventy- 
 leagues, without the apostates having dared to give him battle 
 in all this distance with its very narrow passes, nor to come upon 
 them, in spite of the fact that they [the Indians] had a great num- 
 ber of horses, and some guns, powder, and ammunition, which 
 they had taken from the Spaniards. 
 
 "And, if on that occasion, when they were so disordered and 
 were travelling on foot and with so great a number of women and 
 children, and the few horses which they were bringing lean, on 
 account of having been shut up the nine days that they were 
 besieged, the Indians did not dare to attack them, even when they 
 passed through the same pueblos, then it is clearly demonstrated 
 that if those who were of the opinion that the army should retire 
 would recall this event they would find all the motives with 
 which they upheld the retirement to have vanished. For, in order 
 to maintain themselves in the pueblos referred to they had the 
 supplies in them which have already been mentioned ; with eight 
 hundred and fifty horses and other animals ; provided with arms 
 and munitions and without women and children to defend ; and 
 the apostates in the woods and mountains in the season of much 
 snow, burdened with a whole rabble and with very few provisions ; 
 so that it was very likely not only that it could maintain itself 
 but also that the rebels would necessarily have to surrender. 
 Meanwhile they could have sent for aid to El Paso, Casas Grandes, 
 and Parral for their greater security. 
 
 " Comparing then, the forces and supplies with which the gover- 
 nor retired at the time of the uprising with those which are found 
 in his second retreat the great difference will be recognized. And 
 if the enemy then did not have the boldness to attack him they 
 would have less boldness now, seeing our men better provided and 
 in greater number. And it is not reasonable that there should 
 have been horses and mules able to retreat more than one hun- 
 dred and thirty leagues and yet insuflBcient and too lean to go 
 back to burn the pueblos of San Felipe, Santo Domingo, and 
 Cochiti, and the provisions which were in them, which duty the 
 lieutenant-general Juan Dominguez de Mendoza had failed to 
 execute. For it is only six leagues, and from ten to twelve to 
 the villa of Santa Fe, from the pueblo of Sandia where the 
 
THE CAUSES OF OTERMIN'S FAILURE, 451 
 
 retreat was begun, thereby frustrating the recovery of that kingdom 
 which they had so well under way that it was certain of success 
 if he had maintained himself in the said pueblos." ^ 
 
 Such, in support of the above conclusions, was the opinion of 
 the royal fiscal, when, upon the receipt of the official autos kept 
 by Governor Otermm, he made a report to the viceroy. 
 
 1 Autos Pertenecientes, folios 116-118. 
 
4