T t. 
 
 it 
 
 w 
 
 UC-NRLF 
 
 ^B ns T3S 
 
 swrRJTt'f 'tir-':^';*: *»% « r- 
 
 ■ D/' iHSrORED. "^ 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
KELEY 
 
 ARY 
 
 !«TY Of 
 ORNIA 
 
 ^£9:.^./^.../^ 
 
 It is requested that whoever borrows 
 ths look will return it to the owner, as 
 soon as finished. 
 
 W. T. E. Powell. 
 
 Nanteos, ■ J 
 

 r, 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2007 with funding from 
 
 IVIicrosoft Corporation 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/dharnotrestorediOOdickrich 
 
DHAR NOT RESTOBED; 
 
 IN SPITE OF 
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 AND OF 
 
 PUBLIC OPINION. 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN DICKINSON, F.R.A.S., &c., &c. 
 
 " I wish deliberately to record my fixed opinion that our immediate possessions 
 are at present very much too large, — too largo for us to defend; too large for us to 
 administer ; too large for us to instruct." 
 
 " The Empire in India," by Major Evans Bell, page 399 . 
 
 ILotttion : 
 P. S. KING, 34, PARLIAMENT STREET, S.W. 
 
 1864. 
 [price one shilling.] 
 
LOAN STACK 
 

 To LORDS ELLENBOEOUGH & STANLEY, 
 
 THE FIRST MINISTERS FOR INDIA, 
 
 WHO AFTER A LONG INTERVAL 
 
 REVIVED, BY WORD AND DEED, 
 
 THE HOPES OF INDIAN PRINCES AND PEOPLE 
 
 IN THE JUSTICE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT,— 
 
 THESE PAGES ARE RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED. 
 
 nrfA 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The bearings of the Dhar case may not at first sight 
 be apparent in England ; the vexed question of right in 
 so small a territory, may not appear to deserve the 
 careful and elaborate argument which I now publish. 
 
 In India, on the contrary, it is felt that this case is of 
 such paramount importance, as a precedent, that it not 
 only must affect the decision of a number of other cases 
 now pending, but involves ultimately the destiny of 
 every surviving Native State. 
 
 For if, after all the stir that has been made about 
 this case, the India authorities are able at last to carry 
 their point, and retain their grasp of Dhar, by a com- 
 bination of active and passive resistance, of evasion, 
 deception, and procrastination, that in the end has tired 
 out the public, it will be hopeless to fight any future 
 battle to save a Native State, and the precedent of Dhar 
 (followed immediately by those of Mysore and Oodey- 
 
PBEFACK. 
 
 pore), will become as decisive of a new system of 
 annexation, as the precedent of Sattara was of the 
 old one. 
 
 The process is, in Hamlet's phrase, "as easy as 
 " lying," — 'tis but a certain amount of British " manage- 
 " ment," and lo ! the population are '^ considered as 
 " British subjects," * and the prince is considered to 
 have " a fair allowance " out of his own revenues ! 
 
 " . . . . Last scene of all, 
 " That ends this strange, eventful history :" 
 
 A cabinet minister says, as one has said to me before 
 now, " Pensioned princes, clinging to an useless and 
 " absurd State, and prevented by this from becoming 
 " in any way useful members of society, are a class 
 " whose extinction T should be glad to see." And so 
 their knell is kn oiled ! 
 
 But is the annexation question to be settled thus 
 easily ? Can we so soon again listen to the flippant, 
 shallow, immoral reasonings which, only seven years 
 ago, caused the fearful deaths of men, women, and 
 
 * " The Pro\dnce of Mysore is not to be handed over for direct 
 *' administration of its Government to His Highness the Maharajah : 
 " the country is to be considered as British soil, and its population of 
 " four millions as British subjects ; and the arrival of the formal 
 ** despatch upon the subject from the Council of India is all that is 
 *' waited for to unite Coorg with it, under the name of the Mysore 
 " Provinces. Shall we now have the new offices in Bangalore ? — 
 bangalore Herald. "Allen's Indian Mail," February 12th, 1864. 
 
PKEFACE. HI 
 
 children, by tens of thousands, and the waste of forty 
 millions sterling within a few months, besides sowing 
 broadcast those seeds of hatred which may be still, 
 growing on to some appointed hour of judgment and 
 retribution? I say "still growing," for we learn 
 nothing of the heart of India from loyal addresses drawn 
 up by the wealthy, pacific, enlightened* inhabitants of 
 the Presidency towns, and " prosperity " letters read 
 out to the House of Commons ; w^e had plenty of such 
 things before the Rebellion, plenty of such addresses 
 even during the Rebellion, when deeds within the 
 Mofussil formed a horrible contrast to words from 
 without. 
 
 What, then, is the fatal illusion that tempts our 
 government to begin once more the " grasping " system 
 in India ? It is the illusion of irresistible force. It is 
 the presence of 80,000 British soldiers in that empire ! 
 If, they think, less than half that number, barely 
 35,000 Englishmen, sufficed to break the neck of a 
 rebellion supported by a regular army of 70,000 
 Natives, the whole number, 80,000 British soldiers, 
 with no such army to fear, and the people disarmed, 
 enable them to do what they like with the country! 
 
 *^ Though they prove that " Education " is one of our best allies in 
 India. 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 This it is which hardens and blinds our statesmen, and 
 makes them, like Macbeth, — 
 
 " . . . . take no care 
 " Who chafes, who frets, or where conspirers are." 
 
 This it is which suggests to old partisans of "the 
 '' Company" the frequent taunt: " We told you India 
 "Reformers how it would be; you have realised 
 " all the mischief of Fox s India bill ; you have 
 " given the government such an amount of Indian 
 " patronage, that a ministry once planted is virtually 
 " irremovable by the House of Commons." As if India 
 Reformers were responsible for arrangements against 
 which they uniformly protested! As if they would 
 have voted for an army of 80,000 British soldiers in 
 India, when it was plainly announced from the first, as 
 one of the greatest recommendations of the plan, that 
 by the help of the railways it would always enable the 
 government ^^ to detach from India to Europe a seasoned^ 
 ^^ practical, and efficient army of from 30,000 to 40,000 
 " men.'' * One of the wisest and best of India Re- 
 formers at once warned the country that, if so, there 
 was no security for our liberties at home; if, on any 
 occcasion of popular excitement, the government could 
 
 * " India ; its Government, Misgovernment, and Future, considered." 
 By R. J. R. Campbell, M.P., a resident of twenty-five years' experience 
 in India. 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 in a few weeks pour in such an army from India, used 
 to flesh their swords on semi-civilised races till they 
 acquired an utter indifference to human life, like those 
 Algerine soldiers of France who were so ready to sweep 
 the streets of Paris with their fusillades.* 
 
 Then, it may be said, do I deny the existence of 
 danger in India? I do deny the existence of any 
 danger from within^ that we do not wantonly and 
 knowingly, from corrupt motives, create for ourselves, 
 either by maintaining an excessive military force, or by 
 a system of v^onfiscation which drives those Native 
 Princes and landowners to despair, who, until their 
 possessions are threatened, are bound by their strongest 
 interests to support us. I do not deny the existence 
 of danger from without On the contrary, ever since I 
 
 * " Are we," said he, " resolutely to shut our eyes to the lessons of 
 " history on this subject? How were the liberties of Rome destroyed? 
 *' Precisely in this way. The extent of her conquests compelled her 
 " to maintain immense armies in her remote provinces ; and these, 
 " when summoned back, became the willing instruments of tyranny at 
 «' home. ' The decline of Rome,' says Gibbon, * was the natural and 
 *' < inevitable effect of immoderate greatness. Prosperity ripened the 
 " ' principle of decay ; the causes of destruction multiplied with the 
 " * extent of conquest ; and, as soon as time or accident had removed 
 " * the artificial supports, the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure 
 '* < of its own weight. The story of its ruin is simple and obvious; 
 " * and, instead of enquiring ivhy the Roman Empire was destroyed, we 
 '' * should rather be surprised that it had subsisted so long. Hie 
 '' ' victorious legions, who in distant wars acquired the vices of strangers 
 '* * and mercenaries, first oppressed the freedom of the republic, aiid 
 " * afterwards violated the majesty of the purple J' " — " I'he Present and 
 " Future of India," by Henry Richard. 
 
VI PKEFACE. 
 
 read the volume as a boy, I have never been able to 
 shake off the foreboding expressed by Nicholls, in his 
 " Recollections," that the downfall of the British empire 
 would begin by a struggle with a combination of 
 civilised rivals for the possession of India (like that 
 " League of Cambrai " which began the ruin of Venice). 
 Such a combination has often been projected. I have 
 reason to believe that it is steadily kept in view ; and, 
 if ever it comes, it will show at once that we have been 
 mad in relying on mere brute force to hold India 
 against the will of the people, though we shall be so 
 mad if our punishment is decreed. It is a proverb, 
 that " Quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat." 
 
 If ever that danger from without arrives, the illusion 
 of our irresistible force will be dispelled at once. Inde- 
 pendently of our difficulty in recruiting, owing to the 
 emigration, which is now extending from Ireland to 
 England, the public will of course require half of our 
 80,000 British soldiers at home ; and the remainder, in 
 India, when attacked from without, will be paralysed 
 by the hostility of the people, and unable to preserve 
 their communications ; and then will begin the down- 
 fall of the British empire. On the other hand, if we 
 chose to make the people of India friends instead of 
 enemies, I am sure we might hold that empire with an 
 army of 40,000 Englishmen, against all the civilised 
 
PREFACE. VU 
 
 nations who would ever unite against us. But I admit 
 that it will be no easy matter now to regain the good- 
 will and confidence of the natives. To do it we must 
 entirely reverse our past, and much of our present, 
 policy ; in one word, we micst keep the promises macle to 
 the people of India in the Queen's Proclamation ! 
 
 But it is said by some crafty defenders of the old 
 policy, that our constant territorial extension in India 
 (which, be it remembered, has absorbed thousands of 
 private landed estates, as well as a score of kingdoms), 
 has been, not voluntary on our parts, but a necessity,* 
 forced upon us by Providence ; that it was a divine 
 dispensation, to spread true religion and civilisation, 
 and, in their phrase, "to win India to Christ." Now I 
 flatly deny this doctrine of necessity. I do not believe, 
 although it may please God to bring good out of evil, 
 that he ever forces us to commit crimes, which are 
 forbidden by his law, and threatened with his vengeance. 
 It is not God, but the Devil, that "enters into the 
 "heart" of those who betray their friends; and it 
 is the peculiar scandal of our system, in Native 
 opinion, that we are always grasping the possessions of 
 our " friends." And I have another special reason for 
 
 * " So spake the fiend ; and with necessity, 
 " The tyrant's plea, excused his devilish acts." 
 
 Paradise Lost. 
 
VIU PEEFACE. 
 
 denying the necessity of our territorial extension in 
 India, which is this — that I have examined all the 
 public, and many of the private, acts of spoliation which 
 we have committed in that empire for years past, and 
 I never found one which was necessary. I have now 
 shown in detail that it was not necessary in the case of 
 Dhar, because, besides being an illustration of the past, 
 this case will be a precedent for the future, at a time 
 when the "grasping" system is beginning again in 
 India; and the public must decide whether it is to 
 be sanctioned by this country or not. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 ChAPTEB I. PAGE. 
 
 Introduction — ^Reasons for publishing this Work 1 
 
 Chapter II. 
 
 Action in England on learning the confiscation of Dhar — Orders 
 of the Home Government under Lord Stanley to restore the 
 Principality eventually to the young Rajah 4 
 
 Chapter III. 
 
 General circumstances which rendered every State in Central India 
 unable to control its mercenaiy troops during the summer of 
 1857 10 
 
 Chapter TV. 
 
 Two special circumstances which made the State of Dhar more 
 
 unable than other States to control its mercenary troops .... 24 
 
 Chapter V. 
 
 Action in India on receiving Lord Stanley's orders to restore the 
 Principality eventually to its young Rajah — Decision not to 
 restore it 51 
 
 Chapter VI. 
 
 Notices of the subject in the House of Commons — Second promise 
 of the Home Government under Sir Charles Wood to restore 
 Dhar to its Rajah, and evasion of this promise 82 
 
 Chapter VII. 
 
 Conclusion — Two distinct policies are in presence on this occasion — 
 
 Old political parties are resisting a new policy 90 
 
 Appendices ^ 97 
 
DHAR NOT RESTORED. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Introduction — Beasons for publishing this Work. 
 
 It is generally believed by the public, and has been 
 asserted by recent Anglo-Indian writers of authority,* 
 that a conspicuous example of renouncing the " annexa- 
 " tion policy " which preceded the rebellion, was afforded 
 by the restoration of Dhar to its Native prince. This 
 general belief is founded on the following most explicit 
 and unequivocal promise of Sir Charles Wood to the 
 House of Commons, in answer to a question by Lord 
 Stanley, on March 13th, 1860. 
 
 " Sir Charles Wood said, the noble Lord was quite 
 " right in stating that during the period of his con- 
 " tinuance in office no answer had been received to the 
 " communication to which he referred. Late in the 
 " autumn, however, a dispatch had reached the India 
 '' Office from Lord Canning, in which he justified the 
 " course he had pursued in reference to the annexation, 
 " and pointed out the future steps which he recom- 
 
 * Mr. Montgomery Martin, Major Evans Bell, &c. 
 B 
 
" mended to be taken. Having considered the subject 
 " fully, Her Majesty's Government had determined to 
 " adhere in the main to the advice which was con- 
 " tained in the dispatch which the noble Lord (Lord 
 " Stanley) had addressed to the Government of India, 
 " and Lord Canning had accordingly been directed to 
 " retain possession of the State of Dhar only until the 
 " heir to it should come of age, when he was to be 
 " restored to the territory which belonged to him. The 
 " only exception which had been made in the case was 
 " that of the outlying district which we had adminis- 
 " tered for many years, and which had paid to the 
 " Native Ruler a much larger sum than that which we 
 " had received from it. It had been deemed to be 
 " only right that when we were taxing our own loyal 
 •■* subjects in India for the expenses of the war, some 
 " contribution should be made by those whose mis- 
 " conduct had entailed that expense. Her Majesty's 
 " Government had therefore directed that the payment 
 " on account of the outlying district to which he 
 " referred should no longer be made to the Chief of 
 " Dhar, by which the revenues of India would be saved 
 " from a charge of between £2,000 and £3,000 per 
 
 " annum."* 
 
 This ministerial promise was not the only reason I 
 had for sharing in the general belief that Dhar was 
 restored to its Rajah. I thought it so much a point of 
 honour with several important Members of Parliament 
 to insist on justice being done in this case, that the 
 Indian Minister would not venture to break the engage- 
 ment he had thus publicly made with the House of 
 Commons and the country, and therefore I gave no 
 * Hansard's Debates, 2nd vol. of Session 1860, page 446. 
 
heed to rumours which reached me from time to time 
 of a breach of faith in India. 
 
 However, last autumn, to my extreme surprise and 
 mortification, I received certain information that the 
 Government of Dhar was not restored to the young 
 prince, and that there was evidently no intention of 
 restoring it. Under these circumstances I have felt it 
 my duty to bring the whole case* once more before the 
 public, and to enter more into detail than I should have 
 done if this story was fresh in men's minds, because 
 few gentlemen may now retain a vivid recollection of 
 events which happened ^ve or six years ago. 
 
 * As I may have occasion to refer to several facts and documents 
 not yet in the possession of the public, I may as well observe that 
 these facts and documents are all on record in the archives of Dhar, 
 and have been carefully verified by English eyes before I used them, 
 so that such new evidence will be forthcoming if required. 
 
CHAPTER 11. 
 
 Action in England on learning the Confiscation of Dhar — 
 Orders of the Home Government under Lord Stanley to 
 restore the Principality eventually to the young Rajah. 
 
 On Sunday, the 21st of March, 1858, I received from 
 India the distressing news that the Government had 
 confiscated the State of Dhar. On Monday, the 22nd, 
 I wrote to the President of the Board of Control (then 
 Lord Ellenborough), stating that not only was there no 
 justification whatever for this particular act of spolia- 
 tion, but that the immediate revival of a system of 
 spoliation was a shocking return for that personal 
 assistance of the Native princes, which had been so 
 thankfully acknowledged by our countrymen the year 
 before, and had contributed so greatly to save our 
 empire ; and that such an act was in flat contradiction 
 with those principles of public policy which Lord Ellen- 
 borough had himself proclaimed with such energy in 
 his evidence before the Select Committee of 1852,* and 
 which I quoted in my letter. 
 
 On Tuesday, March 23rd, I asked Mr. J. B. Smith 
 to put a question in the House of Commons about the 
 confiscation of Dhar, to which the Indian Secretary, 
 Mr. Baillie, replied that Her Majesty's Government had 
 
 * Vide Appendix- A. 
 
no information from India on the subject. I learnt, 
 from continual enquiries at the India Office, that Her 
 Majesty's Government remained without such informa- 
 tion until the month of May; but, on the 11th of 
 June, in answer to another question by Mr. J. B. Smith, 
 the Minister for India, then Lord Stanley, informed 
 the public that it was the intention of the Home Go- 
 vernment " to disallow the policy of annexation as 
 " regards the territory of Dhar, and that the present 
 " occupation of that territory was provisional only."* 
 
 In the despatch conveying that decision to India, 
 June 22nd, 1858, the Home Government, after reca- 
 pitulating the facts, thus explained the reasons for their 
 decision. " The ground upon which this forfeiture was 
 " declared, and, as we learn from subsequent papers, has 
 " since been carried into effect, was, that it is expedient 
 " to demonstrate in the most unmistakable manner, to 
 " the princes and chiefs of Malwa, that the British 
 " Government holds the Durbars responsible for the 
 " conduct of their armies, and has determined there- 
 " fore, in this case, by way of example, to visit upon 
 " the state itself the rebellion of its mercenary troops. 
 " But we do not perceive how we could consistently 
 " punish this or any other weak state for its inability to 
 " control its troops, when it was patent to the whole 
 " world that the more powerful states of Gwalior and 
 " Indore, and even the British Government itself, were 
 " unable to control theirs."f 
 
 The Home Government therefore directed that the 
 
 * Hansard, 2nd vol. of Session 1857-58, page 574. 
 t Parliamentary Paper, No 200 of 1859, page 5. 
 
attachment of the State should only continue during 
 the investigations of the Indian Government as to the 
 instigators of the outrages committed by the mercenary 
 troops ; that the members of the Dhar Durbar already 
 arrested on that charge, and sent prisoners to Mhow, 
 should be punished if convicted ; but arrangements 
 should be made for eventually restoring his " inherit- 
 ** ance " to the young Rajah, "in consideration of his 
 " youth and apparent innocence, and the good conduct 
 " of his predecessor in this ancient principality." 
 
 They concluded by desiring the Indian Government, 
 in case any circumstances with which they were not 
 yet acquainted should justify the alienation of the State 
 from the Puar family, to consider and report to them 
 for their instructions, in what manner it might be 
 appropriated as a reward to one of our native allies. 
 
 Such was the tenor of this excellent despatch, in 
 which there was only one passage that I seriously 
 object to, namely, that which affirms, para. 3, that the 
 Indian Governments having " suffered " the adoption of 
 Balla Sahib to take effect, " was a mark of especial 
 *' favour." 
 
 The analysis of this single phrase will give a deep 
 insight into the sort of India government which pre- 
 ceded the rebellion. Here is a case in which the 
 Government had no sort of claim, private or public, to 
 the estate of its deceased friend^ — a case in which it did 
 not even question the right of its late friend's (legal as 
 well as adopted) heir to his " inheritance," and yet the 
 Government considers it, not an act of simple justice, 
 but " of especial favor," to allow the "heir "to take 
 ivhat was his own hy law ! It may be said : Surely, when 
 
Lord Dalhousie's Government had been robbing crowds 
 of heirs,* whose claims by law as well as adoption were 
 as good as those of Balla Sahib, it was an act of " favor " 
 not to rob him too. Perhaps so ; but it is difficult to 
 imagine a community where it was so habitual for the 
 strong friend to rob his weaker ones, that when some- 
 body was not robbed, he was told to consider it "a mark 
 of especial favor!'' It is something revolting to the 
 Western world to imagine such a state of things, and 
 when the India Government thus openly and contempt- 
 uously set aside those notions of law and order, and 
 respect for the rights of property, which become an 
 instinct in civilized minds, and which are the best, the 
 only secure and durable foundation of political power ; 
 when it did this by an eight years' career of robbery of 
 princes, enamdars, zemindars, and huckdarsf of all 
 
 * I haye not space here, of course, to give a catalogue of the long 
 series of public and private spoliations which characterised Lord 
 Dalhousie's administration, and to give evidence of their influence on 
 the rebellion ; but the reader may find proofs enough of the correctness 
 of my appreciation in the following authorities, perhaps even in the 
 first I mention, which is the latest publication on the subject : — " The 
 Empire in India," by Major Evans Bell ; " Thoughts on the Policy of 
 the Crown towards India," by J. M. Ludlow ; " Else and Progress of the 
 Indian Mutiny : a full Examination of the alleged Causes of the 
 Insurrection," by Montgomery Martin ; " The Eebellion in India," by 
 J. Norton ; " The Sepoy Eevolt," by H. Meade ; " India : its Dangers 
 Considered in 1856," by Col. Alves ; Speech of Lord Ellenborough, 
 July 11th, 185^ — Hansard; Speech of Mr. Otway, M.P., April 28th, 
 1856 — Hansard ; " Civil Administration of Madras," by Mr. P. B. 
 Smollett, M.P. ; Evidence of Mr. J. Warden before the Colonization 
 Committee of the House of Commons in 1858 ; ** Enam Commission 
 Unmasked," by E. Knight, of Bombay. 
 
 t Vide Dinker Eao's emphatic and repeated warning to the Governt 
 ment not to interfere with the Hucks of the people. He defines Hucks, or 
 rights, as " Eights of property in land, or an ofiice or employment, or 
 any right in the largest sense of the English word." It has been said 
 by two or three of our greatest living Anglo-Indian statesmen, that 
 
8 
 
 descriptions, it could not but produce a state of moral 
 anarchy among its subjects which would incline them 
 to any outward and visible sign of their despair of 
 justice : such as dacoitee, rebellion, &c. 
 
 In the present instance it was a sad proof of the ex- 
 tent to which our national conscience had been blunted 
 by getting accustomed to the illegal and immoral 
 spoliations of Lord Dalhousie, when we find our home 
 authorities speaking of it as "a mark of especial favor " 
 if the India Government does not rob its own friend's 
 undoubted heir of his legitimate " inheritance ! " There 
 is no record of any Indian ruler who would have thought 
 of " coveting his neighbour's goods " in such a case ; 
 never any who would not have admitted the right of 
 his friend's "heir" as a matter of course; but our 
 Anglo-Indian rulers, who are so anxious to convert 
 "the Heathen" to Christianity, had absorbed such an 
 amount of " their neighbours' goods " in the last few 
 years that they were astonished at their own modera- 
 tion if they " sufi*ered " an adoption (of the legal heir), 
 and spoke publicly of it as " a mark of especial favor ! " 
 
 Finally, there was an implied menace in this phrase, 
 not perhaps intended, but flowing naturally from the 
 style of the secretary formed under the Dalhousie regime, 
 who drafted the despatch ; — there was this menace, that 
 if the heir of the Dhar Rajah only obtained right and 
 justice as " a mark of especial favor," the family " in- 
 heritance," held on such a precarious tenure, was not 
 likely to last long, as annexation could not be indefi- 
 
 they had learnt more of India jfrom Dinker Kao's conversation than 
 they ever knew before. I think most Englishmen who could see 
 Dinker Kao's " Memorandum on Indian Administration " would say as 
 much of that. * 
 
nitely prevented by so fleeting a thing as " especial 
 favor ;" and so it proved. 
 
 Nevertheless, in spite of this one sentence, the inten- 
 tion of the above despatch was excellent, and its meaning 
 was obvions. If you convict any of having been 
 traitors, by all means punish them ; but do not punish 
 an innocent prince and people for a mere "inability 
 to control mercenary troops," which they only shared 
 with far more powerful neighbouring Native States, 
 and even with the British Government itself (whose 
 inability, in fact, caused theirs, and made it inevitable). 
 Perhaps I may as well digress here to explain this fact, 
 as the " inability to control its mercenary troops " is the 
 only thing that has been proved, to this hour, against 
 the State of Dhar. 
 
10 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 General circumstances which rendered every State in Central 
 India unable to control its Mercenary Troops during the 
 Sumrrwr of I S57. 
 
 The time when the Dhar mutiny occurred, in the 
 month of Auorust, 1857, was the most critical period of 
 that revolutionary movement in India, which we desig- 
 nated " the mutiny " because it was headed by the 
 Native army, but which really was, in many parts of 
 India, a national rebellion against a government of 
 foreigners, whom the subject people felt to be aliens in 
 everything from themselves, — aliens, not merely in 
 blood, language, religion, and manners, but in interests 
 and sympathies — aliens who habitually called them and 
 treated them as " Niggers ! " 
 
 This rebellion oi' the coloured races against us was of 
 necessity begun by their army, because it was the only 
 organised body, the only power, they had left in the 
 State. One of the consequences of our system of up- 
 rooting their institutions, and treading in the dust their 
 privileged classes, was, that an army raised from the 
 inhabitants of the country should become the only 
 representative of their interests, their feelings, and their 
 force ; and it was in consequence of this exclusive 
 representation of, and intimate connection with, the 
 inhabitants of the country, that, as I foretold in 1853,* 
 
 * Compare accounts of the outbreak at Meerut, &c., "with extract 
 from '* India under a Bureaucracy," in Appendix B. 
 
11 
 
 sooner or later the Native army was sure to sympathise 
 with their countrymen* and revolt against us ; and 
 accordingly, in 1857, they did at length raise the fatal 
 cry of " Death to the Englishmen ! " which was echoed 
 by a people in revolution wherever the army set the 
 example. 
 
 At the commencement of this terrible rebellion, and 
 for some months afterwards, our greatest danger was, 
 that the Native princes might throw in their lot with 
 the army and the people, and turn all India against us ; 
 and in some places, as in Rohilcund, Oude, Bundle- 
 cund, (fee, the Native Chiefs did join the mutineers at 
 the head of their clansmen. Had they done so generally, 
 had they been merely passive, had not all the principal 
 Native Princes and Chiefs, who had hitherto escaped 
 annexation, exerted themselves actively on our side, it 
 is certain that nothing could have saved our empire 
 at that moment, and we should have had to reconquer 
 India. 
 
 For some months before the date to which I refer, 
 the conflagration in Upper India had been raging 
 almost without a check, and constantly increasing in 
 volume and intensity. The Sepoy mutiny had broken 
 out in May ; when it appeared that months of previous 
 
 * As examples of this sympathy I will mention three specific instances, 
 and many more might be given. Before Oude was annexed, the regi- 
 ments assembled in the North- West Provinces to carry out the annexa- 
 tion, united in sending a message to the King, that if he chose to resist 
 they would not fight against him. Exactly the same message was sent 
 to the Nizam by the Madras regiments on his frontier, when a report, 
 spread under Lord Dalhousie's administration, that Hyderabad was to 
 be annexed. The customary confiscations of our first Settlement 
 Officers, after the annexation of Oude, produced 40,000 petitions against 
 their proceedings from our Bengal Sepoys (probably recruits from 
 Oude). 
 
12 
 
 warning, and the general, notorious, often well-founded 
 disaffection of our Native troops, had failed to induce 
 the Government to take any precautions against the 
 bursting of that volcano which was rocking under 
 their feet, and emitting smoke and flames, and echoes 
 of subterranean thunder, long before its sheet of fire 
 rolled out. 
 
 From May to August the rebellion had been con- 
 tinually gaining strength, because Lord Canning's 
 Government could not possibly help it. The handful 
 of British troops in Northern India was so absorbed by 
 Lord Dalhousie's latest annexations that there was 
 almost no reliable force to oppose to the enemy, in a 
 line of country stretching about 2,000 miles in length, 
 from the Punjab to Pegu, and sometimes 1,000 miles 
 in breadth, from the Himmalayahs to Candeish. 
 
 This particular one, among many causes of the 
 mutiny, is not duly appreciated by the public. Before 
 we annexed the Punjab we had a compact frontier of 
 only 80 miles to guard, on the Sutlege, with no " little 
 wars " in that quarter, and a British force stationed in 
 healthy quarters in the North- West that held Upper 
 India in perfect security. After we annexed the Punjab 
 we undertook to guard a frontier of 800 miles in length, 
 with a perpetual " little war " upon it, which has re- 
 quired the permanent cantonment of several British 
 regiments in the '' deadly valley " of Peshawar, besides 
 an annual military expedition against the hill tribes 
 from our garrisons on the Indus. (One of these expe- 
 ditions is but just concluded as I write; the hill tribes 
 have been fighting desperately, and we have had a con- 
 siderable loss of officers and men.) However, the 
 result of our withdrawal of British troops from Upper 
 
13 
 
 India, to guard Lord Dalhousie's annexations,* was 
 shortly this : Out of a total British force in the Bengal 
 army of 18,815, rank and file, at the outbreak of the 
 mutiny, 2,332 men were in Oude and Pegu, 11,351 in 
 the Punjab and on its frontier, above 2,600 in neigh- 
 bouring Stations acting as supports to the Punjab, and 
 Lord Canning's Government had only 2,443 men left 
 to defend all the rest of Upper and Lower Bengal 
 and Central India ; therefore, one of the things that 
 tempted the Sepoys to revolt was, seeing the Supreme 
 Government apparently at their mercy. 
 
 Considering this unpreparedness of the Government, 
 it happened, as might have been expected, that in the 
 beginning of the struggle, for above three months and 
 a half, all our efforts seemed to end in still further ex- 
 hausting our own strength and developing that of -the 
 enemy. Our measures of concentration were frustrated 
 by our heavy loss of men. The climate, the long 
 marches, the endless number of the rebels, the exposure 
 to extreme heats and rains, in short, sickness and the 
 sword, combined to empty our ranks as fast as we could 
 close them up. Every day that the rebellion lasted 
 increased the danger of seeing all India, and several 
 warlike nations on its frontier, unite against us, and yet, 
 after drawing every European that could be spared 
 from other parts of India, our numerical inferiority to 
 the enemy in Bengal remained as great as ever. At 
 length a crisis arrived when, for a short time, our 
 situation seemed so desperate that it is impossible to 
 give an idea of it without recalling some details of the 
 scene that met the eye towards the end of the month of 
 
 * Vide Kemarks on the fallacy that " the Punjab saved India," in 
 Appendix C. 
 
14 
 
 August, 1857, and glancing successively at the isolated 
 posts where small bodies of Englishmen still maintained 
 our occupation of the country against a countless host 
 of foes, including vast masses of trained soldiers, armed 
 and equipped from our own arsenals, and abundantly 
 supplied with our own English-made artillery. I allude 
 not merely to such posts as Delhi, Agra, Cawnpore, and 
 Lucknow, but also to stations nearer home, and in our 
 notions comparatively close to Calcutta. 
 
 At Delhi, until the arrival of the last reinforcement 
 from the Punjab, our small force nominally besieging 
 the city, had really been itself besieged and nearly 
 swept away, again and again, by those sorties of the- 
 Sepoys, which were interpreted in England as ^'a proof 
 " of their weakness.'^ As it was, after the above rein- 
 forcements, we had still to fight about ten times our 
 own number of brave and disciplined troops, and had 
 they possessed unity of action, the annihilation of the 
 British force by simple overwhelming numbers could 
 hardly have been doubted ; perhaps, with all its heroism, 
 our little Anglo-Sikh army owed as much to the in - 
 testine jealousies and divisions of the enemy as to its 
 own valour ; but as yet the divisions within the walls of 
 Delhi were unknown to the world, and our force before 
 the city seemed to be fatally overmatched. 
 
 Elsewhere the case seemed equally gloomy. At Agra 
 our force had been shut up, after a defeat in the field, 
 and was then closely blockaded and completely isolated 
 and cut ofi*. At Lucknow, also, after a defeat in the 
 field, aggravated by the inestimable loss of Sir Henry 
 Lawrence, our force was besieged in the Residency, and 
 encumbered with helpless women and children, without 
 casemates to afford any shelter, without numbers 
 
15 
 
 enough to man the walls, incessantly and fiercely 
 attacked, and apparently without a chance of being 
 saved, after the retreat of Havelock. At Cawnpore, 
 Havelock, with only 700 bayonets, having lost more 
 than half his force in the attempt to penetrate into 
 Oude, had reported that he must retreat unless instant 
 reinforcements could be promised him, as the famous 
 Gwalior contingent of 8,000 men on one side, and a 
 large force from Oude on the other, were rapidly ad- 
 vancing to unite in his rear. At Allahabad, Outram, 
 when hurrying to relieve Havelock, had been suddenly 
 obliged to halt, with his communications cut off, and 
 his reinforcements taken away ; for the revolt of the 
 •Dinapore and Bhagulpore regiments, added to the 
 movements of Koor Sing's troops and the Ranegurgh 
 battalions, &c., had so alarmed the civil authorities 
 between Allahabad and Calcutta that they clutched 
 desperately at every detachment on the road for local 
 protection; and thus, out of 2,400 men destined to 
 Outram's command, 1,800 were diverted at one time to 
 flank operations. Meanwhile, the rapid fall of the 
 Ganges had rendered the river line too precarious to be 
 trusted, and it was necessary to clear 400 miles of the 
 road by movable columns before troops could be for- 
 warded by bullock train. Lastly, Calcutta was guarded 
 by 1100 soldiers and some merchant seamen from the 
 shipping in its port, with thousands of disarmed Sepoys 
 at its gates, and tens of thousands of Budmashes, who 
 might have armed them, within its walls. 
 
 And while such was the state of Bengal after every 
 European that could be spared had been drawn from 
 the minor governments, the prospect was little less 
 gloomy in the other Presidencies. In Madras, symptoms 
 
16 
 
 of disaffection had appeared in the Native army, of 
 which far too large a proportion were Mahommedans, 
 and men lived in daily fear of seeing the whole Madras 
 army swept into rebellion like a torrent, by the 
 defection of Hyderabad. In Bombay, though Lord 
 Elphinstone continued to put a bold face on the matter, 
 perhaps no man was consciously in greater danger. 
 While he continued to stamp out every spark of revolt 
 in his own government, and contrived to despatch a 
 moveable column to Central India (beyond Candeish, 
 where Kana Sahib's agents were actively at work), he 
 knew that the Bombay Native army was rotten to the 
 core, that the Mahrattas were expecting the Peshwa, 
 and the whole Deccan was in such a critical state, a 
 spark might fire the train ; and in his capital, with its 
 population of three quarters of a million, including 
 many thousands of bigoted hostile Mussulmen, he was 
 obliged to trust his safety during a Mahommedan 
 festival to a force of 300 Europeans, in the presence of 
 2,500 Sepoys who were known to be constantly plotting 
 treason. Thus, Madras and Bombay were unsafe; 
 Oude, Rohilcund, Bundlecund, the great North- West 
 Provinces of Bengal were gone ; except where, in the 
 few posts I have mentioned, few and far between, 
 British ensigns stiU showed above the waste of war, like 
 rocks above a boiling surge, occasionally lost to sight in 
 the tempest. 
 
 In fact, not only were Madras and Bombay unsafe, 
 but only one thing was wanting to set all India in a 
 blaze, and that seemed imminent, the defection of the 
 Native Princes. Their armies, their people, even ladies 
 of their zenana, and members of their families, urged 
 them by every motive they could appeal to, to attack 
 
17 
 
 the hated foreigners at the head of their countrymen. 
 It was felt that their opposition to the national move- 
 ment deprived it of all moral sanction, and neutralised 
 its temporary advantage of physical force. The body 
 wanted a head to command it, and the most passionate 
 efforts were made to gain over such princes as Scindiah, 
 Holkar, the Nizam, the Banka Baee and others. They 
 were promised empire ; they were menaced with the 
 extremities of popular fury; they were bitterly re- 
 proached with cowardly betrayal of their ancestors' 
 fame, and their own and their people's interests ; they 
 were reminded how immensely we were outnumbered, 
 how nearly we were exhausted; the mass of vulgar 
 minds (as well English as Native) could not understand 
 'why Indian Princes, why all the most enlightened of 
 the Indian race, should support the foreigners in such a 
 crisis ? 
 
 • Yet statesmen now understand the reasons that de- 
 cided Indian statesmen. They saw a doubtful present, 
 with much to lose and little to win. They looked back 
 to a stormy past. They put their trust in the future.* 
 After the rebellion, the system which preceded it could 
 not be continued ; the farmers of the revenue would be 
 set aside, and the grasping " Company's Government " 
 succeeded by a more just government of the Queen ; it 
 was good that the foreigners should have had a lesson 
 from the rebellion, but it would be fatal if they were 
 
 * " Quod bello caput? unde jus auspicium que peteretur? Quam, 
 si cuncta provenissent, sedem imperio legerent ? " 
 
 " Regna bellaque per Gallias semper fuere, donee in nostrum jus 
 concederetis." 
 
 " Quomodo sterilitatem aut nimios imbres et cetera naturae mala, 
 ita luxum vel avaritiam dominantium tolerate. Vitia erunt, donee 
 homines : sed nequa hsec continua, et meliorum interventu pensantur." 
 — Tacit. Hist. lib. IV., cap. Ixix., Ixxiv. 
 
 C 
 
18 
 
 mastered by it ; they represented a higher civilisation 
 than that of the rebels ; if the Sepoys triumphed, India 
 would revert to barbarism ; its injuries would now be 
 repaired if the foreigners remained ; they had " sown 
 " their wild oats," and would serve the country as well 
 as themselves in the maturity of their empire ; mean- 
 while the greater the danger, the greater would be the 
 gratitude^ of the English to those who enabled them to 
 surmount it. Therefore they took our side heartily, 
 and every Native statesman was our stanch friend. 
 
 But the masses are not statesmen, and do not reason 
 like them ; so the majority of the combatants on both 
 sides went on, vainly hoping or fearing that the Native 
 princes would declare against us. And now the accu- 
 mulation of disasters which I have described, was bruited 
 over India, exaggerated, as usual, by Oriental hyper- 
 bole, yet enough without exaggeration to excite an 
 ignorant, imaginative race almost to madness. It was 
 for us a terrible moment ! As at the darkest of the 
 night, just before the dawn appears, so our danger reached 
 its height in the month of August, 1857. 
 
 Was it possible at that moment for any State in 
 Central India to escape injury from the hurricane of 
 
 * It provokes a bitter smile to remember the confident hopes and 
 intense disappointment of many natives who did us " yeoman's ser- 
 vice " at that time, sometimes at the risk of their lives for days to- 
 gether ! I knew several such men who, after speculating on the honors 
 and jaghires they must receive, if we could only weather the storm, 
 found afterwards, that we, on the contrary, thought they were lucky to 
 escape hanging. I think one of my friends died of his disappointment; 
 several were in a worse position after than before the rebellion. One 
 flagrant case was that of Holkar's minister. Next to Salar Jung, and 
 Dinker Rao, Rarachunder Rao Martund was our most useful ally. Py 
 the malign influence of Col. Durand, both Maharajah and minister 
 were at first rewarded by a semi-disgrace. Holkar has since had the 
 Star of India : his minister has gained experience. 
 
19 
 
 revolt then blowing over it, and to help seeing at least 
 some of its troops carried away by the popular feeling ? 
 I say " some," because in no case did an entire army re- 
 volt. In every case some of the Native troops remained 
 faithful. In our own case many of them shared all 
 our dangers, and fought by our side from the beginning 
 to the end of the war. Indeed, we could not have done 
 without them ; and, occasionally, as in the defence of 
 Lucknow, their heroism in our cause was not to be 
 surpassed. 
 
 It should not be forgotten about these Native troops 
 that all of them were faithful a few years ago, in 
 the days of Malcolm, Metcalf, &c.; and though the 
 majority had become traitors in 1857, we have proofs 
 that, even then, there was not only every shade of 
 difference in their feelings, from the extreme of loyalty 
 to the extreme of treason, but there was the strangest 
 fluctuation between these extremes in the course of 
 the rebellion. A minority was stanch throughout ; 
 a portion were always wavering; the majority, after 
 hesitating for a shorter or longer period, generally 
 turned against us on the impulse of the moment, from 
 some unintentional provocation. 
 
 So it was in Dhar. The first symptoms of disaffec- 
 tion in the Dhar mercenaries occurred in July, just 
 after the mutinies at Mhow and Indore, each about 
 thirty miles off. But at that time the danger passed 
 rapidly away, because the majority of Holkars mu- 
 tineers having marched off to Agra the day after the 
 outbreak, when they found they could neither cajole 
 nor frighten Holkar into joining them, and the Mhow 
 troops having followed them, Holkar in a few days 
 recovered his authority sufficiently to exert himself 
 
 c 2 
 
20 
 
 once more actively on the side of the English, and the 
 example of course re-acted on Dhar. Its Government 
 was again able to control its troops, and for some weeks 
 longer it rendered essential service to the English 
 cause. 
 
 In fact, when the Bombay moveable column reached 
 Mhow on the 2nd of August, there was at first no 
 reason to fear any further revolt in that neighbourhood. 
 The natives were at first so awe struck by its presence, 
 that it would h^ve been easy to disarm any who were 
 known to be doubtful or disafiected at Indore and Dhar, 
 and to secure all the stations within a march or two of 
 Mhow, as there was no force of the enemy that could 
 oppose such measures within three or four times the 
 distance; and the Natives expected this to be done 
 almost every hour for several days after the arrival of 
 the column. 
 
 But to their great surprise, the moveable column 
 under Colonel Durand, became immoveable at Mhow 
 for nearly three months, from the 2nd of August till 
 the 20th of October ; and then, as they recovered from 
 their alarm, all the disaffected in the neighbourhood, 
 instead of fearino; us, began to think that we feared 
 them; the old influences returned, the revolutionary 
 propaganda became active again, and at the end of 
 August, apparently from a sudden impulse, the Mus- 
 sulman portion of the Dhar mercenaries broke into 
 mutiny, and seized the fort of Dhar. 
 
 Yet these very Mussulmen had distinguished them- 
 selves by zeal, steadiness, and fidelity in the British 
 service, not only before the rebellion, in campaigns 
 against the Bheels, under Captains Johnston and Evans, 
 for which they were most highly commended by those 
 
21 
 
 officers, and rewarded by the native Government, but 
 even, for some time, during the rebellion, having served 
 against the rebels to the last moment. Phenomena of 
 this sort occurred so frequently at that time, that one 
 acute observer and historian of the mutiny, Mr. Mead, 
 adduced it as a proof that there could have been " no 
 *• plot, even among the Mussulmans, to rise against the 
 " British Government,"* because the Native troops, in 
 innumerable instances, refused at first to mutiny, and 
 served us for awhile with signal fidelity against their 
 own countrymen, although they afterwards joined them. 
 The fact is, that the gradual developement of the 
 revolt among the uneducated classes will appear natural 
 to those who consider the circumstances I have been 
 describing. It was only the most highly educated and 
 enlightened of the Natives who could persistently 
 foresee and desire the return of British power. The 
 ignorant, fanatical masses saw our authority overthrown, 
 and its traces disappearing; they were not instructed 
 enough to calculate that there would soon be a turn of 
 the tide, which had been ebbing for nearly four months ; 
 they lived in an electrical atmosphere, charged with 
 storms of public opinion ; they listened to a popular 
 frenzy of antipathy to the foreigners, and exultation at 
 their disasters ; they breathed an epidemic of rebellion, 
 turning the brain of all the military classes, sooner or 
 later, and hurrying them into the vortex, although 
 they were often withheld for a time by old habits of 
 discipline, or by the counteracting influence of their 
 princes, whom they could not help respecting, though 
 they could not understand their opposition to the na- 
 tional movement. 
 
 * '' The Sepoy Revolt," page 170. 
 
22 
 
 And this, which was the history of thousands in 
 those days, was the history of these Dhar mercenaries. 
 They were long restrained by their Native Court (sure 
 to imitate the example of Holkar), long after the wave 
 of mutiny, irresistibly attracting their sympathies, had 
 reached and passed their garrison, and was flowing 
 round it. Nevertheless, they did not join their country- 
 men ; they continued to act against them ; they did 
 not break out until a circumstance occurred which was 
 calculated to provoke their fanaticism to the utmost. 
 On the 31st of August the British Agent at Bhopawur, 
 recently assisted against the Amjhera rebels by a 
 detachment of this very force, sent a " faquir " (Mus- 
 sulman saint) to be confined at Dhar, when a part of 
 the troops, of whom above three-fifths were Musselmen,* 
 rose in tumult to the cry of " Deen I " ("the faith ! ") 
 rescued the "faquir," and seized the fort of Dhar, 
 which was not difficult in the surprise of a mutiny, as 
 out of about a hundred men who formed the garrison 
 at the time, thirty of the Konkanees (who remained 
 faithful) were on guard over the treasury, while sixty 
 of the Vellaitees, having their guard at the gates, of 
 course opened them to the mutineers, who were their 
 comrades and co-reli^ionists. 
 
 * The State had then in its service 339 Mussulmen, 100 Poorbeah 
 Sepoys, 50 Bundelas, and 50 Konkanees, total 539 men. The two 
 last corps, making together 100 men, were employed by the Native 
 Government, as the most trusted portion of its troops, for treasure, 
 city, and palace guards, and owing to their stanchness throughout the 
 mutiny, they were retained at Dhar, in our service, after our confisca- 
 tion of the State. But nothing could be more illogical than for us to 
 take a portion of the Dhar troops into the British service, because they 
 had always obeyed the Native Government, and then to punish the 
 Native Government because another portion of its troops disobeyed 
 and mutinied against it. 
 
23 
 
 Such were the public and private circumstances under 
 which the mercenary troops of Dhar threw off the 
 control of its Government; and I am sure that any 
 impartial person would indorse the verdict of the Home 
 Government when Lord Stanley presided over it, that 
 " we cannot consistently punish this or any other weak 
 " state for its inability to control its troops, when it 
 " was patent to the whole world that the more powerful 
 " States of Gwalior and Indore, and even the British 
 " Government itself, were unable to control theirs." 
 
24 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Two Special Circumstances which made the State of Dhar 
 more unable than other States to control its Mercenary 
 Troops. 
 
 I HAVE shown that the "inability to control their 
 " mercenary troops " was common to every State in 
 Central India, from the British Government downwards, 
 during the summer of 1857 ; but there were special 
 circumstances which increased this inability in the case 
 of Dhar, arising from the character and conduct of the 
 British functionary. Colonel Durand, who was appointed 
 to supply the place of Sir Robert Hamilton, during his 
 temporary absence in England, as Resident at Indore, 
 and chief political agent in Malwa. 
 
 I must pause here for a moment to say, that one of 
 the most indefensible acts of our Indian Government is 
 to appoint men to an office of this sort who are known 
 to be unfit for it, through their temper or their antipathy 
 to the Natives. I am sorry to say it appears that 
 Government never scruples to do this, whatever misery 
 and mischief it may cause to Native princes and people, 
 if the officials in question have interest enough to back 
 their claim to the appointment, or if the government 
 wishes to get them out of their previous situation to 
 promote somebody in their place. The result is, that 
 the despotism of some of our Indian '* Politicals " is 
 
25 
 
 hardly credible ; nor would it ever become known, as 
 the unfortunate Native princes themselves are prevented 
 from corresponding with England, if it did not almost in- 
 variably happen that some Englishman, involuntarily 
 connected with these transactions as a public servant, 
 is so shocked by the oppression at which he is unwil- 
 lingly compelled to assist, that he sends home, at the 
 least, a private protest to his friends, which finds its 
 way to other parties, and very often, at the risk of 
 ruining his own prospects for life, appeals openly to the 
 government, or to the public, on behalf of our victims. 
 This was generally the case, to the credit of our country- 
 men be it spoken, even under the administration of 
 Lord Dalhousie, when any man who ventured to oppose 
 such proceedings was disgraced without mercy : but 
 such revelations were fruitless then, owing. to the indif- 
 ference of the English people to Indian questions, and 
 to this day the evil has never been remedied. 
 
 " What mischief is often done by Residents," says 
 Mr. Ludlow ; " how they gall and crush the Native 
 " princes, can hardly be said in too vivid terms. Lord 
 " Hastings portrait of them in 1814 is true yet to the 
 " life : — Instead, said his Lordship, of acting in the 
 " character of ambassador, he (the Resident) assumes 
 "the functions of a dictator; interferes in all their 
 " private concerns ; countenances refractory subjects 
 " against them ; and makes the most ostentatious 
 " exhibition of this exercise of authority. To secure 
 " himself the support of our government he urges 
 " some interest which, under the colour thrown upon 
 " it by him, is strenuously taken up by our council, 
 " and the government identifies itself with the Resi- 
 '* dent, not only on the single point, but on the 
 
26 
 
 '" whole tenor of his conduct." Mr. Ludlow adds : 
 " The feelings of the Chiefs and Durbars towards our 
 " politicals and their underlings are well described by 
 " one on the spot as those of * terror.' "* 
 
 Formerly our political agents in India, men of per- 
 suasive manners and enlightened, just views, exercised 
 an immense moral influence over the Native States of 
 India ;t but " we have lost our moral hold over the 
 " passions and prejudices of India," as Major Bell ob- 
 serves, J by the arroo;ance, the impatience of contradic- 
 tion, the contempt for Native arguments, and the dispo- 
 sition to appeal immediately to force, which characterises 
 our modern negociators, and latterly, our " Indian 
 " diplomacy has not only been meddling, overbearing, 
 " and rapacious, but has been eminently unsuccessful 
 " in securing its avowed objects, and dangerous and 
 " disadvantageous in the results which it has actually 
 " produced." " Even one of the best of modern Resi- 
 " dents," says Major Bell, and my experience confirms 
 this observation, one of those most anxious for the im- 
 provement of Native administration, " would consider 
 " any reform to be dearly purchased by any measure 
 " that should render the Native prince and his ministers 
 " less dependent on the Resident." ..." The fact is," 
 he adds, "that according to the accepted traditional 
 " language of our Indian political officers, all consulta- 
 " tions at a Native court, to which the Resident is not 
 " privy, and of which he has not expressed his approval, 
 
 ♦ '' Thoughts on the policy of the Crown towards India," pages 178, 
 179. 
 
 •f Having illustrated this point in a memoir of my late friend Sir 
 Claude Wade, contributed to the "Journal of the Koyal Asiatic 
 Society," I beg to refer to some extracts from that paper, in Appendix C. 
 
 t " The Empire in India," pages 391, 392, also 310, 311. 
 
27 
 
 " are called intrigues.'' " Every man, whatever his rank 
 " may be, who has access to the prince or his minister, 
 " and who is supposed to have an opinion of his own, 
 " or to give advice contrary to that of the Resident, is 
 " said to be * a man of an intriguing and turbulent 
 " disposition.' " 
 
 Such being the normal character of our political 
 agents in India, let the reader conceive how every defect 
 in that character would be aggravated by the training 
 they received under Lord Dalhousie, when not only 
 mis-statement and misrepresentation was habitually 
 and unscrupulously resorted to, to strip princes or private 
 landholders of their property; not only moral torture — 
 bullying, humiliation, and actual privation — was piti- 
 lessly applied to the victims of our rapacity, to enforce 
 their silence and submission, but when the head and 
 model of the official corps, the Governor-General himself 
 set the example of speaking to the Native Sovereigns 
 of India, as if too much despotism had made him mad 
 — ^for Lord Dalhousie, in the course of bullying the 
 Nizam into a surrender of his richest provinces, actually 
 likened him, in a letter full ^' of unworthy invective 
 "and sarcasm, to 'the dust under his feet T"* Such 
 being the master, supported by the Court, the Govern- 
 ment, and the Tijnes at home, we may imagine 
 what were his men! and of all our political officers 
 formed in the Dalhousie school, perhaps Colonel Durand 
 
 * These were the words of a Member of Parliament, of irreproachable 
 character, and who has held a high official position in this country, 
 after reading the original letter in the Archives of Hyderabad. — Vide 
 " Quarterly Keview " for July, 1858, page 265. I hear that " the dust 
 under his feet " has suddenly recollected inconveniently for us, that he 
 is a sovereign prince, and has public engagements as such ; including a 
 Treaty, that interferes with our intention of comfortably digesting 
 Mysore, " en famiUe .'" 
 
28 
 
 was its most exact representative. His temper is as 
 well-known here as it is in India. His antipathy to 
 the Natives is so marked as to prevent their holding 
 voluntarily any intercourse with him, except what 
 official business renders unavoidable. He had got into 
 difficulties in every political appointment he held before 
 he was appointed to act in Sir Robert Hamilton's 
 absence as Resident at Indore (by a curious coincidence 
 the very man who began the revolt there, was a State 
 prisoner whom Colonel Durand had formerly patronized 
 as a pretender to the musnud of Bhopal). He was 
 maintained in that appointment after writing, at the very 
 crisis of our fate, such an intemperate letter* to the noble 
 and generous Holkar, who had freely risked his life in our 
 cause,f as might have precipitated another man into 
 hostility, and this in the height of the revolution fever, 
 when Holkar might any day have rallied a hundred 
 
 ♦ For which he was reprimanded by Lord Elphinstone's Government. 
 
 f Here is an extract from the high authority I have just quoted, in 
 the " Quarterly Keview " of July, 1858 : — " The education of Holkar 
 *' from his childhood had been confided to the superintendence of a 
 " man who treated the natives of India with justice and kindness, and 
 " who ventured to respect the rights and feelings even of a ' nigger.' 
 *' The lessons taught by Sir Eobert Hamilton, and by a visit to 
 " Bombay, where he had been received by Lord Elphinstone, had not 
 " been thrown away. When the revolting regiments called out to him, 
 ** on his refusing to lead them against the EngUsh, * What would your 
 " * great ancestor have done at such a moment?' he boldly replied, 
 " ' That I cannot say ; but I know what he would not have done — he 
 *' * would not have joined the murderers of women and children ! ' His 
 " life, like that of Scindiah's, w^as threatened by the mutineers ; but 
 *' he unflinchingly persevered in his fidelity to us, saved the lives of 
 " many Christian families by receiving them in his palace, and rescued 
 " those who had fallen into the hands of hostile chiefs. The return we 
 " have made to him for these great services has been to insult him in 
 " his capital, to demand the surrender of his near relatives as traitors, 
 " and to hang summarily and with scarcely the form of, we will not 
 ** say a trial, but an inquii'y, his own subjects ! " 
 
29 
 
 thousand Mabrattas to his standard, and have turned 
 the scale against us. 
 
 Here, lest I should be suspected of exaggerating the 
 defects of Colonel Durand's temper and manners, I refer 
 the reader to an article on his appointment to the post 
 of Foreign Secretary in India, extracted from one of 
 the most respectable local journals (a journal repeatedly- 
 quoted in support of its opinions by the Home Govern- 
 ment), yiz., the Times of India* which article, though 
 complimentary to Colonel Durand, explains his unfit- 
 ness for such an office in language which is known 
 to be true by every diplomatist in India, as well as by 
 the government which sanctioned his appointment. 
 
 I must, however, particularly notice one instance of 
 Colonel Durand's indulgence of temper, because it gives 
 a clue to the secret history of this Dhar case. The 
 reader, who will refer to the first mild protest of Sir 
 Robert Hamilton, on July 5th, 1858,f against anything 
 that might " bear the semblance of injustice or plunder," 
 in our appropriating the Dhar treasure as prize money, 
 may be astonished at the truculent spirit in which 
 Colonel Durand replied to him Among other bitter 
 taunts on his change of opinions, his " suppression," 
 *' distortion," and '* evasion of important facts," Colonel 
 Durand (strong in the favour of the Govern or- General) 
 did not scruple to upbraid a superior officer, of such 
 well known respectability and experience as Sir Robert 
 Hamilton, with "the spurious tenderness which prefers 
 " that the reality of injustice be inflicted on British 
 " troops, rather than run the risk that the semblance 
 
 ♦ Vide Appendix D. 
 
 t Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, pages 14, 15, and infra 
 pages 17 to 27. 
 
" of injustice, however illusory and conjured up on 
 " false premises and ad rmseiicordiam arguments, be 
 " alleged by those who sought the destruction of our 
 " troops and the humiliation of our power, and by such 
 " as accept their bias." 
 
 Perhaps, on looking back to Sir Robert Hamilton's 
 " remonstrance," as the Supreme Government styled 
 the above-mentioned dispatch,* the reader may wonder 
 how such a very temperate statement could provoke 
 such an intemperate reply. The fact is, that (evidently 
 without intending to attack him, or then knowing the 
 extent of his culpability) Sir Robert Hamilton had 
 incidentally raised a question which gravely compro- 
 mised Colonel Durand, and made him personally 
 responsible for the disorders which had occurred 
 in the State of Dhar. Therefore it is that Colonel 
 Durand was so angry at the least remonstrance ; 
 therefore it is that he exhibited such malignity 
 against the State of Dhar, bringing forward against 
 it, in default of anything substantial, all the old 
 gossip and false charges which had already been 
 answered or explained before he wrote this minute 
 of July 26th, 1858,f because it was his interest to 
 throw the blame on the Dhar Government in order 
 to avert it from himself When anarchy, intrigue, and 
 triumphant mutiny in Dhar could be traced to his own 
 successive faults, he found it necessary to make a scape- 
 goat of the Dhar Durbar, to save his own reputation ; 
 and as I exonerate the State of Dhar, by going over 
 every separate charge against it, I shall show that 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, Xo. 30, of 1861, page 16. . 
 ■f Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, pages 17 to 27. 
 
31 
 
 Colonel Durand repeatedly and signally failed to do 
 his duty as a political agent. 
 
 The sentences in Sir Robert Hamilton's letter which 
 put Colonel Durand on his defence were these : — After 
 referring to the death of the late Rajah (which happened 
 on May 23rd, 1857), and the recognition of his adopted 
 heir, the letter continues, para. 4, " the administration 
 " under a Regency was barely'formed when the mutiny 
 " broke out." And para. 5, " Intimation of the recog- 
 " nition was made to the Durbar on the 28th of Septem- 
 " ber, 1857, but the Khillut of investiture was not then 
 " (nor has it yet been) sent." (This was written July 
 5th, 1858). Let it be observed that Sir Robert did not 
 say, " Colonel Durand left the State without a head for 
 *^ five months together." He did perhaps imply this ; 
 but at any rate he did not say, nor imply, that 
 " Colonel Durand broke up the administration, and 
 " threw the local authorities into a state of anarchy ; 
 " leaving the public servants, civil and military, without 
 " any responsible person to look to." Sir Robert did 
 not say this (though I shall), and yet Colonel Durand 
 cried out as if he was so tender on that point, that not 
 merely he could not bear to be touched on it, but he 
 could not bear to see any one approach who might 
 touch it. Now, before I deal with his mis-statements 
 about the Minister ^^with the support of the Government of 
 '''India at his back/'' let me say a few words on the 
 point of the indefinite delay of " investiture " — of that 
 public act of recognition which Colonel Durand, as an old 
 political agent, knew perfectly well to be necessary, not 
 merely as a form of law, but as a visible matter of fact, 
 to assure the native community that the succession of 
 the young Rajah was recognized by the British Govern- 
 
32 
 
 ment. He admits it himself when it suits his argument. 
 For instance, after asserting in his minute, para. 3, that 
 the Durbar was not kept in suspense, but was very 
 quickly informed of our recognition of the young Rajah, 
 he says, at para. 22, "that though his adoption and 
 " succession had been officially recognized, the sealing 
 " act, viz., the investiture by conferring a Khillut on 
 " the part of the Government of India had not been 
 " carried into effect ; strictly speaking, therefore, we 
 " had not put the minor on the Guddee (throne)." 
 
 This " sealing act^'' therefore, was indefinitely post- 
 poned ; and, with the exception of a mere verbal 
 promise to the Dhar Vakeel, about ten days or a fort- 
 night after the late Rajah's death, that is, about the 
 end of May or beginning of June, 1857, there was not, 
 even in private, any official recognition of the young 
 Rajah until the 1st of October, when a letter was at 
 length sent to him, announcing the Governor General's 
 sanction of his succession. The above verbal promise 
 was obtained by telegraph, and the permission to carry 
 it into execution ought also to have been obtained by 
 telegraph, for there never was a time when delay was 
 so dangerous. The revolt of the Malwa Contingent in 
 the Jowerah district, on the 2nd of June, and the mu- 
 tiny at Neemuch a few days after, had spread alarm 
 through all the chief to^vns in Malwa ; and if ever a 
 strong administration was needed in the world, it was 
 so at that moment in the States of Central India ; there- 
 fore a public recognition of the successor, a composi- 
 tion of the Regency, and an organisation of the Govern- 
 ment was a matter of the most pressing necessity in 
 Dhar at that crisis. 
 
 But I have already described the dictatorship usurped 
 
33 
 
 by our political agents in the Native courts, and the 
 people look to these functionaries to settle everything, 
 especially in the case of a minority ; they look to them, 
 not merely in a petty state like Dhar, but in the most 
 powerful of Native States, such as those of Scindiah 
 and Holkar, to publicly declare a successor, to compose 
 a Regency (of which they themselves are the real 
 heads), to appoint or confirm every of3.cial, and to de- 
 cide upon the appropriation of every pound of revenue ; 
 well knowing that every arrangement made without 
 their previous sanction is sure to be disallowed and 
 reversed. 
 
 It may be said, admitting all this, the only thing 
 Colonel Durand could do at first was to publicly re- 
 cognise the adoption, and thus settle the succession in 
 the eyes of the people ; and though he was to blame 
 for not doing this, the other arrangements, such as 
 composing the Regency, could not be made without in- 
 quiry and consideration, involving some little time and 
 trouble ; as the sudden death of the late prince, who 
 governed as well as reigned, in the flower of his age, 
 had taken every one by surprise, and, moreover, had 
 plunged his family into such deep grief, that it would 
 not have been decorous to force the Court to transact 
 business for a month after the funeral (which took place 
 on June 6th), as in fact they did not ; and before that 
 time Colonel Durand was in full flight for Hosung- 
 habad, having been driven from Indore, in the opposite 
 direction from Dhar, on the 1st of July. 
 
 However, I can show that this short absence of 
 Colonel Durand (he was back at Mhow en the 2nd of 
 August) does not in the least diminish his responsi- 
 bility, because a Regency was composed, with British 
 
34 
 
 official sanction, during Colonel Durand's absence, and 
 the very first thing he did on his return was to upset 
 this arrangement, without making any other in lieu of it^ so 
 that he literally kept the State without any recognised 
 head or authorised government for five months together, 
 until our troops entered it, and he recommended its 
 confiscation. This is a grave charge, but I am about 
 to produce documentary evidence to prove it. 
 
 Very soon after the late Rajah's death. Colonel Durand 
 wrote to Captain Hutchinson as follows : — " Pending 
 " final arrangements for the administration of the Dhar 
 " Principality, you will be responsible for the conduct 
 " of afikirs, and the maintenance of peace and order ; " 
 and he added that he wished him to take advantage of 
 the advice of Bappoo Sahib, the Rajah of Dewass, a 
 Puar himself, and a confidential friend of the late 
 Jeswunt Rao Puar, who was about to pay a visit of 
 condolence to the family.* 
 
 This visit, for reasons above stated, could not be paid 
 till July ; and at that date the Dewass Rajah on visiting 
 Dhar, found several candidates for the Regency, viz., 
 the two Ranees, Bheem Rao Bhonsla (brother of the 
 elder Ranee), and the experienced old minister Ram- 
 chunder Rao Bapojee, who had been eleven years out 
 of office because he incurred the late Rajah's displeasure, 
 but who was a protege of the English, enjoyed a jaghire 
 under their guarantee, and had a tolerable knowledge 
 of the English language. For these reasons, although 
 the Ranee naturally wished her brother to be chosen, 
 and several officers of state demurred to the selection 
 of the old minister, the Dewass Rajah persuaded them 
 to select at such a crisis, a person notoriously devoted 
 Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, page 7. 
 
to the English interest, and, therefore, after com- 
 municating with Captain Hutchinson and obtaining his 
 consent, Bappoo Sahib formally appointed the old 
 minister on the 22nd of July, 1857, and he had but 
 just got the administration into working order when 
 Colonel Durand returned. Will it be believed that one 
 of Colonel Durand's first acts on arriving at Mhow, was 
 to cancel this appointment ! Within four days of his 
 return, the following note, accompanying an official 
 despatch of the same tenor and date, was sent by 
 Captain Hutchinson to the Dhar Vakeel : — 
 
 "To Raghonaut Narain, Vakeel of the Dhar State, 
 " Bhopawur Agency. 
 
 " Sir, 
 
 " With reference to the appointment of the 
 " Dewan, I beg to inform you that on my reporting 
 " the same to Colonel Durand, the Ofig. Agent Govr.- 
 " Genl., he informed me that he had distinctly in- 
 " structed His Highness, Bappoo Sahib, through the 
 " Durbar Vakeel, that no appointment was to be made 
 " without his sanction and approval. You ought to 
 " have informed me of this, for you cannot bring for- 
 " ward my approval to the appointment, when Colonel 
 " Durand so distinctly gave his orders on the subject. 
 
 '' 1 am, (fee, 
 " D. A. R. E. HUTCHINSON, 
 " Bheel Agent and Pol. Assist. 
 
 '' Mhow, 6th August, 1857." 
 
 D 2 
 
36 - 
 
 The official despatch was as follows: — 
 
 Translation of a Perwanah from Captain Hut- 
 chinson, Bheel Agent and Political Assistant, to 
 Raghonaut Narain, Vakeel of Dhar, dated 6th of 
 August, 1857. 
 
 " With reference to your private letter regarding the 
 *' appointment of the Dewan, I beg to inform you that 
 *' on my communicating the same to the Offg. Agent 
 " Govr.- General, I was directed to intimate that no 
 " appointment can be made without his sanction, and 
 " the Dhar Durbar was distinctly ordered on the 
 " subject. You are therefore desired to inform me 
 '^ what has taken place." 
 
 Now be it remembered that this appointment had 
 been made as a matter of necessity, during Colonel 
 Durand's absence for an indefinite period, without the 
 least intention of offending or slighting him, but to 
 supply, in critical and dangerous circumstances, a press- 
 ing want of the State and the afflicted family,* and 
 supply it in the manner most conducive to English 
 interests. Yet, to show his resentment for this, at 
 least well-meant act. Colonel Durand, at one blow, 
 completely paralysed and dissolved the so-called Re- 
 gency ; leaving the State from that day forward, until 
 he thought it ripe for confiscation, without any supreme 
 controlling authority, backed by the support of the 
 Government of India : which I have shown to be 
 
 * The younger Ranee died broken-hearted, five months after her 
 husband, aged 20 ; and the elder Ranee, who died in 1860, at the age 
 of 32, may be said to have been worried to death by our treatment of 
 her. 
 
37 
 
 necessary now in all the Native States, to keep the 
 Officers of State in subordination, to command their 
 respect and obedience, and to prevent a conflict of 
 authority in the Durbar itself, and in the civil and 
 military services under it. The result was, of course, 
 immediate intrigue and factions, and the enlistment of 
 more mercenary troops by the rival parties to 
 strengthen themselves against each other. 
 
 Sir Robert Hamilton spoke with intense disgust in 
 his minute of such a scramble for power in Dhar 
 at such a time;* but, perhaps, he would have been 
 more lenient to a petty state of India if he had been 
 more behind the scenes in his own country. Those who 
 witnessed the intrigues which were the scandal of London 
 in February, 1855, and which kept the country for days 
 without a government, at the most alarming crisis of 
 the Crimean war, drew the moral then, not for India 
 but for England, that no amount of public danger, and 
 no prospect of the country's good, can induce ambitious 
 politicians to forego their rivalries, and postpone their 
 personal pretensions, as long as they can hope to indulge 
 their selfishness with impunity ; and if Sir Robert 
 Hamilton will look over a file of the Times newspaper 
 at that period, he will find the reckless selfishness of our 
 aristocracy denounced in far stronger language than he 
 himself applied to the aristocracy of Dhar. 
 
 However, I do not mean to defend such conduct. 
 I only say it was natural for factions to arise when 
 Colonel Durand thus paralysed the so-called Regency, 
 and left the government without a head ; and accord- 
 ingly, from the day when he cancelled the above ap- 
 pointment, the poor Ranees were surrounded with 
 * Pai'liainentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 15. 
 
38 
 
 insurmountable difficulties, and the administration of 
 Dhar fell into confusion. In vain did the unfortunate 
 minister, who found himself disgraced and impotent, with- 
 out being nominally dismissed (for the Ranees and minor 
 Rajah could not appoint any one in his room without 
 the sanction of Colonel Durand), in vain did he write 
 repeatedly to Colonel Durand, and endeavour to prove 
 his zeal by giving prompt information to the Vakeels at 
 Bhopawur and Mhow. Colonel Durand never deigned 
 to answer or even acknowledge his letters, or take any 
 notice of him again, until the Durbar of October 26th, 
 when he bullied him to his heart's content,* and told 
 him that all the responsibility for what had happened 
 should fall on him.f 
 
 It must, however, be obvious to the reader of the 
 foregoing statement, that the first and greatest of 
 the special causes which produced the inability of the 
 Dhar State "to control its mercenary troops," was 
 Colonel Durand's complete disorganisation of its Govern- 
 ment and break up of the Regency, by wantonly 
 cancelling the minister's appointment, and thus leaving 
 the Durbar in a state of anarchy, without either a 
 recognised ruler of the State, or a chief political 
 authority holding unreserved personal communication 
 with himself, and depending on his advice and support ; 
 in flagrant violation of the duties prescribed to him as a 
 resident and political agent by well knoion circular orders of 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861 ; page 22, para. 29, 30 ; and 
 page 34, para. 27. 
 
 f Accordingly, after the siege he was arrested and placed in confine- 
 ment, and had the simplicity to go on for months petitioning that he 
 might be brought to trial, declaring his innocence, and wondering 
 whether he was suspected of corresponding with the King of Delhi, 
 or what was the specific charge against him. Le pauvve homme! 
 
39 
 
 Government, which ought to have been familiar to him 
 from practice and experience, and which enjoined him 
 to remember that he was " deputed as the representative 
 " of the friendship, as well as of the power, of the 
 " British Government."* 
 
 Yet so confident was he that the Supreme Government 
 would take for granted anything he said, and would 
 not>under any circumstances enquire into the facts, in 
 spite of the strongest presumptive evidence that he had 
 mis-stated them, that he did not hesitate to make asser- 
 tions in his minute which are flatly contradicted by the 
 documents I have cited ; such as this, for instance, 
 para. 4 : ^' In composing the Regency, the minister 
 " selected was the only new coadjutor. The adminis- 
 " tration of the State continued in its usual track, and 
 " was in as uninterrupted and undisturbed action after 
 " as it had been before the death of the late Rajah ; " 
 and again at para. 20, where he says, that if the minister 
 had found any reason to complain of faction, " with the 
 " support of the Government of India at his back (!) he 
 " would assuredly have been quick enough in making 
 " such representations, had there been grounds." I 
 must leave the reader to qualify these assertions as they 
 deserve, merely remarking that this style of reckless 
 misrepresentation is common to every pro-annexation 
 minute 1 have read for the last fifteen years. 
 
 But there was another special cause for the inability 
 of the Dhar State to control its mercenary troops, 
 besides Colonel Durand's break-up of the Regency, and 
 that was his refusal to give the Native Government that 
 armed help which it had always willingly afforded us, 
 
 * These noble instructions, issued by Lord EUenborough, are dated 
 April 26th, 1842. 
 
40 
 
 as long as its troops would obey orders, and often to our 
 signal relief and advantage, — help which we were bound 
 by Treaty, by the obligation of gratitude, and by the dic- 
 tates of ordinary prudence, to giye in our turn, because 
 it was pressingly demanded by the Native Government 
 at times when it would have been easy to restore its 
 authority, always exerted in our favour, and to prevent 
 the necessity of undertaking a regular siege of the fort. 
 This refusal was the ruin of the State, and I must show 
 that the attempts to justify it are unsuccessful. 
 
 I have already explained the mischievous effects of 
 Colonel Durand's stopping the moveable column at the 
 fort of Mhow, instead of marching only ten miles 
 further to re-occupy the Residency at Indore, which 
 would have produced the best moral effect on Western 
 Malwa, and material effect too, if he had simultaneously 
 secured the neighbouring stations. 
 
 The reason publicly given for this halt at the time, 
 was, that the Residency at Indore having been much 
 injured in the mutiny of the 1st of July, Colonel Durand 
 would wait at Mhow till it was repaired;* but the 
 Natives could not believe that a "moveable column" 
 dispatched to re- occupy one of the most important sta- 
 tions and centres of influence in India, should be halted 
 before it reached its destination, merely because the acting 
 Resident did not think the old house quite comfortable 
 enough yet to accommodate him. And if they did not 
 believe this reason at first, still less did they believe it 
 when they saw the " moveable column " remain im- 
 moveable for nearly three months, at the strong fort of 
 Mhow, although the longer its immobility lasted, the 
 
 * Vich the Bombay Times of August loth, 1857. 
 
41 
 
 greater of course became the audacity and enterprise of 
 all the rebels in Malwa, who, finding that a "moveable 
 " column," under Colonel Durand, did not prevent 
 their moving where they liked, and doing what they 
 pleased, gradually congregated in his neighbourhood 
 as they were driven out of other parts, for we were 
 nowhere immoveable except at Mhow, until they at 
 length proceeded to the outrages at Bhopawar and 
 Sirdapore, on the 10th of October, which we visited on 
 the head of the boy Rajah of Dhar. Even then Colonel 
 Durand's patience was not exhausted; even then he 
 took ten days more to consider of it before he made up 
 his mind to set the "moveable column" in motion 
 again ; but as he was then obliged to give some better 
 reason for its immobility, which had produced such 
 serious consequences, than waiting for carpenters' and 
 upholsterers' work at Indore, he declared that the state 
 of the weather and muddiness of the roads had pre- 
 vented his moving before the 20th of October.* 
 
 Now, those who remember the marches that were 
 being made elsewhere by Europeans and Natives during 
 the same period, especially the marches of Greathead's 
 moveable column, which will never be forgotten in 
 Indian history, will naturally ask why Colonel Durand 
 should have been more " fettered by the rains " than 
 any other commander. For no one else was " fettered ; " 
 the fall of Delhi had been preluded by the wonderful 
 marching and fighting of Nicholson towards the end of 
 August ; immediately after its fall, in September, Wilson 
 organised and started Greathead's moveable column, 
 which, after incessant marching and fighting for several 
 
 * Para. 13 of Minute, Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 19. 
 
42 
 
 weeks, had wound up by the extraordinary forced march 
 to Agra, and rout of the Indore brigade at that place, 
 on the 10th of October, which was one of the most 
 brilliant feats of arms during the war ; after which 
 Greathead, instead of " patiently awaiting finer weather," 
 like Colonel Durand, had forthwith started again for 
 Cawnpore, where his arrival greatly contributed to the 
 success of Sir Colin's first campaign. 
 
 Yet Colonel Durand expects us to believe that all the 
 while, when other moveable columns, and the enemy in 
 his neighbourhood, could march freely enough, the 
 weather prevented his moving! The excuse is not 
 merely inadmissible, but I will show, from two other 
 assertions that he makes in the same breath, in the 
 same paragraph, that it is almost absurd. He says, to 
 illustrate his " compulsory inaction " from wet weather, 
 that " on the 19th of September he received a press- 
 " ing message from Holkar's minister to march upon 
 ^' Indore ; " and that from another quarter he learnt that 
 there was to be an insurrection at Indore, on "the 
 " Dusserah, the 28th of September." Now I must 
 notice the fact that the Dusserah begins on the 19th of 
 September, corresponding with the 1st of the Native 
 month (Auswin), because this date has a curious bearing 
 on the facts he has connected with it. The commence- 
 ment of the festival of Dusserah, or Doorga-Pooja, is 
 associated in men's minds with the cessation of the rains^ 
 as any one who knows Malwa can bear witness; the 
 rains are generally considered to have ceased before the 
 festival begins, on the 19th of September, and I am 
 informed positively that they had done so in that year, 
 1857, and yet Colonel Durand did not move for a 
 month longer ! With regard to the alleged " pressing 
 
43 
 
 " message to march upon Indore," it must be recol- 
 lected that Colonel Durand had a *^ moveable column," 
 strong in cavalry, including English cavalry, and artil- 
 lery, with a larger proportion of British infantry than 
 often fell to the lot of " moveable columns " in those 
 days, and transport enough to carry every man of that 
 valuable force to the field, if they could not walk over 
 the ten miles of good macadamised road from Mhow 
 to Indore ; in, fact he had a "moveable column" 
 strong enough for any service that could be required 
 in Malwa; and yet he says that he received this 
 " pressing message " from Indore, but did not move for 
 a month afterwards ! Of course the pressing message 
 is either an invention or a delusion, for although there 
 were then plots and disaffection at Indore, as there were 
 at Bombay, they were not half so dangerous at the 
 former place. At Bombay, the great majority of the 
 troops were disaffected ; at Indore it was no longer so, 
 it was just the reverse ; and when the Dusserah came, 
 Holkar Avas " prepared for any emergency." I repeat 
 that, from the day the bulk of the mutineers marched 
 away to Agra, Holkar had not only been recovering his 
 authority, but using it with great effect on our side, of 
 which frequent notices occur in the Bombay journals of 
 that period. 
 
 It is evident from the above enquiry that " the 
 " rains " were not a valid excuse for Colonel Durand's 
 halting the moveable column from the 2nd of August 
 to the 20th of October, and considering what brave 
 Lord Elphinstone had risked by sparing such a force at 
 such a time* it may be imagined that some disappoint- 
 
 * " The whole of Khandeish, the Deccan, and Southern Mahratta 
 " country were ripe for rebellion at any moment." — " Western India 
 
44 
 
 ment was felt at Bombay, at seeing the rebels allowed 
 to collect at their leisure, and plunder and burn within 
 easy reach of the Bombay column ; and that Colonel 
 Durand may remember " pressing messages " from other 
 quarters than Indore, when he admits " the animad- 
 " versions cast upon our unaccountable inaction."* 
 For the very meaning and object of a " moveable 
 " column " is to seek out and disperse danger within 
 a given sphere of operations, and as all the enemy's 
 regular troops, the really formidable brigades of 
 Gwalior, Indore, and Mhow, had left the country, the 
 force entrusted to Colonel Durand was amply sufficient 
 for the purpose when he reached Malwa, though his 
 long and (in his own phrase) " unaccountable inaction " 
 for nearly three months, allowed dangers to gather, 
 to grow, and spread, until when he did move at last, 
 the rebel head raised at Dhar might liave made a 
 serious resistance, and certainly would have done so if 
 the Native Court had joined it, and given it that moral 
 and quasi-legal support, the want of which always un- 
 nerved the rebels — the siege of Dhar would have been 
 a different story if the Ranee had joined her troops, 
 like the Ranee of Jhansi, instead of always opposing 
 them. 
 
 But the "rains" were not Colonel Durand's only 
 excuse for his " unaccountable inaction " at Mhow. He 
 implies that the force of the enemy (though delay in 
 
 ** has been loyal only because it has been held down by artillery ; a 
 " conspiracy all but universal having bound together the influential 
 *' classes of the Mofussil above the Ghauts" — "Not fewer than 500 
 " pieces of concealed ordnance were discovered in the Southern 
 ** Mahratta country alone." — Vide preface to " Inam Commission Un- 
 " masked," by Mr. R. Knight, editor of the Bombay Times. 
 
 * Para. 14 of Minute, Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 19. 
 
45 
 
 attacking was a sure way to increase it), and the weak- 
 ness of his column were also considerations " that gave 
 " him pause." Now, what he says on both these 
 points is so marked by exaggeration, that it looks as if 
 his mind had. been off its balance, and under some 
 delusion, at this period. 
 
 I have before said that his column was not weak — - 
 strength is, of course, a relative term — but his force 
 was amply strong enough to dispose of all the rebels, 
 or " rabble," for that would really be a more appropriate 
 term for the enemies he had to disperse, in Malwa. 
 He makes a formidable parade of these enemies in his 
 minute ;* like the roll-call in the " Iliad " before the 
 fighting begins; but he must also have invoked the 
 Muses before he penned such a description of "the 
 " state of affairs around Mhow ! " for he actually includes 
 in affairs " around Mhow," insurrections in Bundelcund 
 and south of it, hundreds of miles off, where the people 
 could no more dream of reaching him than he ever 
 dreamt of reaching them ! and, after dwelling upon the 
 Shahzadar at Mundesor, and estimating his force as 
 "at least 20,000 men by the end of August " (the date 
 of the Dhar mutiny), he describes as one of the dangers 
 " around Mhow " a petty local outbreak beyond Malwa, 
 never likely to enter it, and which had been put down 
 before the end of August in Nimawur ! He also includes 
 in dangers " around Mhow," that the Bheels had began 
 to plunder and infest the Bombay road; but these 
 Bheels, in Candeish, were at least fifty miles south of 
 the Nerbudda, and never likely to cross it, for they 
 are mere savage highwaymen, never leaving their hill 
 and jungle to fight in the open field; and, on this 
 
 * Para. 7. 
 
46 
 
 occasion, as they had broken out in Holkar's territory 
 near Sindwa, he had sent his troops to co-operate with 
 the Bheel corps, under Captain Gumming, against 
 them. In short, on analysing Colonel Durand's own 
 statement, we find no residuum of hostile force " around 
 " ]\Ihow," or anywhere near it, at the date of the 
 Dhar mutiny, except the Shahzada at Mundesor 
 and he was at least 120 miles off; a good many 
 marches, according to Colonel Durand's computation, 
 almost enough to allow our "moveable column" to 
 march to Dhar and back again, twice over, before 
 he could arrive, even if he had been inclined to do so. 
 But he knew better ; he never thought of such a thing ; 
 he had as much respect for our column as Colonel 
 Durand had for his "rabble," and a good deal more 
 reason for it ! Even if he could have persuaded the 
 bulk of his men, who came from Scindiah's adjoining 
 districts, to march away from their own locality, which 
 was not likely, such raw undisciplined levies, and all 
 the plunderers and freebooters who had joined them, 
 would have stood about as much chance as a herd of 
 cattle attacking lions, if they had ventured to attack a 
 British column, well furnished in all arms, perfect in 
 discipline, and numbering in its ranks several hundreds 
 of English soldiers ! 1 repeat that if Colonel Durand 
 really believed such a thing possible, his mind must 
 have been off its balance at this period. 
 
 However, having thus shown that his " inaction " at 
 the time of the Dhar mutiny was " unaccountable," 
 and not justified either by the weather or by the 
 strength of any hostile force in his neighbourhood, I 
 will now describe the circumstances under which his 
 refusal of the Dhar Government's urgent demand for 
 help proved the ruin of the Native State. 
 
47 
 
 The first occasion was on the mutiny of August 31st, 
 when the Mussulmen seized the fort of Dhar. Imme- 
 diate explanation of this event was forwarded by the 
 Durbar to Captain Hutchinson at Bhopawar, and to 
 Colonel Durand at Mhow, giving, in addition to the 
 facts I have before stated, a number of other details, 
 as to what the fort contained of treasure, grain, ammu- 
 niti,on, and guns, with the state of the guns, &c., and 
 praying for a detachment of the British force to punish 
 the mutineers, of whom there were probably less than 
 300 irretrievably committed at first ; so that if Colonel 
 Durand had sent a detachment at once, with a couple 
 of guns, and by the help of his elephants and camels, 
 the European infantry and the baggage could have 
 been protected from the wet, he might easily, by the 
 help of the Native Government, have crushed this 
 mutiny in the bud, though from his delay to act, in 
 seven week's time it had attracted about 2,000 rebels to 
 garrison the fort and take the field against us. In war, 
 time is invaluable ! 
 
 But not only was this first application of the Dhar 
 Government refused ; such applications were repeatedly 
 refused, and silenced for a time. As the poor Ranee 
 said, in her letter to the Governor-General,* of May 
 1st, 1858 — "From the day the Wellaitees seized the 
 " fort, constant applications for assistance were sub- 
 " mitted to the British authorities. The importunity 
 "• seemed at last to be so distasteful, that even a reference 
 
 * The only notice ever taken by the Government of this touching 
 and truthful appeal, was a curt intimation, above three months after its 
 receipt, that it must be transmitted through the official channel of 
 the " Governor-General's agency for Central India." It will be found 
 in the annexures to Sir E. Hamilton's second despatch. Parliamentary 
 Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 36, para. 37, and page 42, annexure No. 11. 
 
48 
 
 " to the subject was deemed offensive." Nevertheless, 
 although Colonel Durand adhered to his "unac- 
 " countable inaction," there are at least three proofs 
 that at this time he considered the explanation of the 
 mutiny by the Dhar Government satisfactory. 
 
 1st. He did not ask for any further explanation, 
 which he certainly would have done if he suspected the 
 Durbar of any connivance with the mutineers. 
 
 2nd. He endorsed the comments of Capt. Hutchinson 
 on this mutiny. Captain Hutchinson having said on the 
 1st of September — "The mercenaries of Dhar and 
 " Amjhera are out of the control of their respective 
 " chiefs," Colonel Durand forwarded his report, on the 
 3rd of September, with the remark — " The impotence 
 '* of every chief, great or small, to control their levies 
 " is a normal feature of the state of armed anarchy 
 " which afflicts the country."* 
 
 3rd. A month afterwards, on the 1st of October, he 
 forwarded to the Dhar Durbar the Khareeta, giving 
 the sanction of the Supreme Government to the adop- 
 tion of the young Rajah,f which he could not have 
 done if during the whole previous month he had con- 
 sidered the Durbar to be traitors. 
 
 Therefore he admitted the Durbar's explanation of 
 the mutiny, and seizure of the fort, to be satisfactory, 
 at the time it happened and for a month afterwards ; 
 and yet he had the assurance to say in his minute : 
 ** As the Dhar Durbar had in its service Konkanee and 
 " other Sepoys distinct from Affghans and Mukranees, 
 " it never was explained to my satisfaction (indeed, no 
 
 ♦ Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, page 10. 
 
 "j- Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 32, para. 6, and page 
 37, annexure 2. 
 
49 
 
 *' explanation was ever attempted), how a strong fort 
 " containing the treasure of the State, and easily tenable 
 *' by the Sepoys against the Affghans and Mukranees 
 ^' (the Mussulmen), could have passed into the hands of 
 " the latter without the connivance of the Durbar."* 
 Is it possible to conceive a more unblushing mis-state- 
 ment ? And yet this mis-statement was made the main 
 charge against the Durbar, firstly, by Lord Canning s 
 Government in 1858, and secondly, by the Home 
 Government under Sir Charles Wood in 1860. 
 
 Before I leave this part of the subject, I must cite 
 one more instance in which help was demanded by the 
 Dhar Government. On the night of the 9th of October, 
 the Mussulmen turned out in concert with all the rebels 
 in the neighbourhood to make a combined attack on 
 Bhopawur and Sirdapore. It transpired next morning 
 that they had left only a weak party in the fort, and it 
 occurred to the Ranee that the fort might be surprised 
 during the expedition, though their destination was at 
 first unknown. Accordingly she sent the news to 
 Mhow, which was delivered on the following morning, 
 October llth,f and if the rebels had not returned the 
 next day, October 12th, we might very likely have re- 
 captured the fort without firing a shot, owing to this 
 information, which would have been as much for our 
 interest as the Ranee's (I mean our public interest — of 
 course the overwhelming private interest of the Mhow 
 column was prize-money). 
 
 Since all our information at that time was derived 
 from the Durbar, I publish several of their communi- 
 cations in Appendix E, to show that at that time they 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 19, para. 12. 
 t Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, page 13. 
 
50 
 
 were again complaining to the British authorities of the 
 oppression of the rebels, and appealing to us to deliver 
 them from it. 
 
 Nevertheless, on the 12th instant, Colonel Durand, 
 on hearing of the outrages at Bhopawur and Sirdapore, 
 at once wrote to Lord Canning, that : " Dhar must of 
 " course be made responsible for the acts of the mer- 
 " cenaries it chose to enlist but could not manage." * 
 However slow to prevent the guilty, he was not slow to 
 punish the innocent ! but he had his reasons for being 
 quick this time! On the 12th of October, after the 
 destruction of two stations quite near him, he could 
 not but see at length, and fear Lord Canning would 
 see,f the fatal consequences of his " unaccountable 
 " inaction ; " therefore he hastened to throw the blame on 
 the Dhar Government, lest some one else should throw 
 it on him, — and Lord Canning fell into the snare. 
 
 The truth is, as I have shown the reader, that Colonel 
 Durand's disorganisation of the Native Government, 
 and long tolerance of its mutineers, made it more im- 
 possible for the Dhar State than for any other " to 
 " control its mercenary troops." 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, page 12. 
 
 t His Lordship's eyes do seem to have been opened for an instant, 
 though only for an instant. When the report of the destruction of 
 these stations first reached him, he inquired, " whether the force at 
 " Mhow might not have acted against the insurgents ? " But between 
 the question and the answer intervened all the operations against Dhar, 
 the siege and capture of the fort, the decision formed on Col. Durand's 
 recommendation to make the State responsible, &c., so that excuses for 
 '• unaccountable inaction," passed current easily when all was over. — 
 Vide Mr. Edmonstone's letter of Nov. 4th, and Col. Durand's reply of 
 Nov. 27th, in Parhamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, pages 14, 30. 
 
51 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Action in India, on receiving Lord Stanley's orders to restore 
 the Principality eventually to its young Rajah — Decisio7i 
 not to restore it. 
 
 The first intimation of the decision of the Home Govern- 
 ment in this case must have reached Lord Canning at 
 latest in the beginning of July, 1858,* and the despatch 
 formally announcing the orders of the Home Govern- 
 ment reached him before the end of that month ; 
 Colonel Durand being then on special duty with him 
 at Allahabad. After a few weeks' consideration, the 
 Gqvernor-General made up his mind to set Lord Stanley 
 at defiance, and flatly disobey his orders ; and on the 
 12th of August, 1858, Mr. Edmonstone, Secretary to 
 the Government of India, was directed by him to write 
 as follows to Sir Robert Hamilton, who had then re- 
 sumed charge at Indore : " The Right Honorable the 
 " Governor- General sees no reason whatever to alter or 
 " modify the orders conveyed to you on the 8th of 
 '' February last, regarding the disposal of the treasure 
 " and other property found in the fort of Dhar ; nor 
 " can his Lordship perceive any reasonable grounds for 
 '' questioning the justice of the decision conveyed in my 
 ^* letter dated 7th of December, 1857, as to the seques- 
 " tration of the Dhar State. You are requested, there- 
 
 * By a mail of about the same date as Lord Stanley's announcement 
 in the House of Commons. 
 
 E 2 
 
52 
 
 *' fore, no lonorer to delay the annoimcenieiit which you 
 " have been directed to make." * 
 
 The announcement was that the recommendation of 
 Colonel Durand on the 14th of December, 1857, had 
 been sanctioned by the Govern or- General, in Mr. 
 Bead(m's letter of February 8th, 1858,f to the effect 
 that, "as a reward to the troops engaged, and as a 
 " politic example, the treasure, guns, &c., taken in 
 " the Fort of Dhar, be granted as prize to the column 
 " then serving before the place." The decision conveyed 
 in Mr. Edmonstone's letter of December 7th, 1857, was 
 that the Governor-Generars agent should " explain to 
 " the young chief (of Dhar) that while the Government 
 " reserves to itself the right to dispose of the State 
 " hereafter in such manner as may seem fitting, he can 
 " never hope that it will be restored to him."j 
 
 ,But the Govern or- Gen era! seems not only to have 
 made up his mind to set Lord Stanley's decision on ^the 
 Dhar case at defiance, but to prevent his interfering 
 again, by never letting him know what had been done 
 in the matter. I ascertained by continual enquiry at 
 the India Office, that all the private questions on the 
 subject of the Secretary of State for India, and even a 
 public despatch to the same effect, in March, 1859,§ not 
 only failed to obtain any information, but even to 
 receive a syllable of notice, until I got Mr. Bright to 
 take up the matter in Parliament ; and Mr. Edmon- 
 stone's letter, quoted above, was never divulged till 
 nearly three years afterwards, in the session of 1861, 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 31, para. 3] . 
 f Parliamentary Paper, Xo. 200, of 185!), page 31. 
 t Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, page 28, para. 3. 
 § Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, page 6. 
 
53 
 
 when, from the supposed settlement of the question, 
 and satisfaction given to Lord Stanley the session 
 before, nobody was likely to read a Blue-book on the 
 subject, and I believe nobody in this country did read 
 it at the time. 
 
 With the help of this Blue-book I will now describe 
 the events in India which led to Mr. Bright's inter- 
 ference. 
 
 It appears that about the time when Lord Stanley 
 had this case under consideration at home, Sir Robert 
 Hamilton, who had resumed his duties as Resident in 
 the winter of 1857-58, was led to doubt the justice of 
 the measures of the Government in India. I conjecture 
 that he had heard comparatively little of the matter 
 until after the sequestration of Dhar, on the 14th of 
 February, 1858, as up to that time the Ranee and her 
 friends never doubted that as soon as we had leisure 
 we should make a stringent enquiry into the conduct of 
 those members of the Durbar who had been arrested on 
 suspicion, and that everything would then be satis- 
 factorily explained and arranged. Not a Native in 
 Malwa had any reason to apprehend that we should 
 dethrone the young Rajah ; and therefore I conjecture 
 that they did not trouble Sir Robert Hamilton much 
 about it at first, knowing how busy he was, and 
 believing that all would come right in the end, while ir^ 
 the meantime the administration was going on smoothly 
 under Captain Hutchinson. After the confiscation, on 
 the contrary, I believe that Sir Robert Hamilton waa 
 inundated with appeals for justice, and fresh information: 
 on the subject, ior months together. 
 
 The first efi^ect of this was that on the 5th of July,^ 
 1858, he addressed to the Government of India what 
 
54 
 
 he called a "reference/' and the angry Government 
 called a " remonstrance," on the aforesaid order of 
 February 8th, to treat the Dhar treasure as prize- 
 money. There was not a word in this " reference " 
 that conveyed a personal reflection on Colonel Durand, 
 or justified the violent and abusive style of his reply to 
 it. Sir Robert observed simply that ^Hhe State of 
 " Dhar had always been faithful and friendly ; " that 
 the mutinies had occurred just when its government 
 was in the difficulties of a minority ; that these diffi- 
 culties had been increased by our turning loose into 
 Malwa the mercenaries (MussulmenJ we removed from 
 the Nizam's country, at the end of 1856, against which 
 he had protested at the time ; that a number of these 
 mercenaries, being engaged by the factions who con- 
 tended for power in Dhar during the minority, to 
 strengthen themselves against each other, had seen 
 their strength, combined, and seized the fort ; that our 
 troops were marched to Dhar to dislodge them, without 
 any declaration of war against the State, and as it was 
 believed, to support the minor we had put on the 
 throne; that the Dhar officials furnished us with 
 supplies, the minor Rajah was received in Durbar by 
 the Acting Agent during the siege, and treated with 
 every consideration, and nothing passed to indicate 
 that we considered the State in rebellion, and looked 
 upon the minor Rajah and his Government as enemies ; 
 that when a breach was made, the fort was evacuated, 
 and we took possession ; but under these circumstances, 
 and " in the absence of any declaration of war," he 
 hoped the Government would re-consider its decision to 
 treat the Dhar treasure as prize-money* 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, pages 15, 16. 
 
55 
 
 Unfortunately, Lord Canninor was committed to a 
 despotic course, and already knew that Lord Stanley 
 was committed to its reversal ; his pride forbade him to 
 retract, and he handed over Sir Robert Hamilton's 
 " reference " to Colonel Durand, undoubtedly intending 
 him to treat the old Resident as " disaffected," and to 
 give no quarter to the " remonstrance."* 
 
 On this Colonel Durand wrote his Minute of July 
 22nd, 1858,f in which he endeavours to vindicate all 
 the unjust measures towards the State of Dhar, which 
 Lord Canning had been induced to sanction at his 
 recommendation. 
 
 The first thing I must notice in this Minute is, that, 
 although Colonel Durand does not scruple to charge 
 Sir Robert Hamilton with " suppression, distortion, and 
 " evasion of important facts, "J I have already convicted 
 Colonel Durand himself of suppressing and evading 
 the two most important facts in the whole case ! viz. — 
 
 1st. His break up of the Regency, and complete 
 disorganisation of the Government by cancelling the 
 Minister's appointment ; which I have proved by the 
 production of two documents, probably never seen by 
 Sir Robert Hamilton, certainly now published for the 
 first time. 
 
 2nd. The mutiny of the 31st of August, when the 
 rebels seized the fort, and held it until we marched to 
 dislodge them, and when he refused the timely assistance 
 demanded by the Native State. 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 16. 
 
 f Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, pages 17 to 27. As this 
 Minute must henceforward be often referred to, I shall confine such 
 references to its paragraphs. 
 
 X Para. 41 of Col. Durand's Minute. 
 
56 
 
 With regard to the first of these facts, Colonel Durand 
 distinctly states at para. 4 of his Minute, and confi- 
 dently assumes throughout, that, " the administration 
 " of the State was in as uninterrupted and undisturbed 
 " action after as it had been before the death of the late 
 Rajah : " he knowing better than almost any man alive 
 how untrue such a statement was I (Lord Canning 
 little understood the man he trusted to !) 
 
 With regard to the second fact, he states at paras. 
 14, 15, of his Minute, that the ^' first burst " of the 
 insurrection was the outbreak at Dhar on " the lOih of 
 " October,'^ thus utterly ignoring the outbreak and 
 seizure of the fort by the Mussulman portion of the 
 troops on the 31st of August; and suppressing the 
 forty intervening days, during which the Native Govern- 
 ment had been at their mercy, and had been compelled 
 to take into its pay about as many more of their so- 
 called " brethren and relations," some of those "parties " 
 mentioned by Colonel Durand,* who had been driven 
 from the west by an advance of Bombay troops in that 
 quarter (which advance was made, by the way, in the 
 end of August and beginning of September : for there 
 was no " unaccountable inaction " anywhere but at 
 Mhow!) 
 
 However, I will now examine in detail those portions 
 of Colonel Durand's Minute which attempt to prove 
 more against the Dhar Government than " inability to 
 control its mercenary troops ; " and I think the sub- 
 stance of them may be resolved into the following 
 specific charges : — 
 
 1st. That the government had treacherously levied 
 
 * Page 19, para. 10. 
 
57 
 
 hostile mercenary troops even before 1st of July* (date 
 of the Indore mutiny). 
 
 2nd. That the government had connived at the 
 seizure of the fort by those troops. f 
 
 3rd. That the government "began the war "J by 
 various direct or indirect acts of hostility : to wit, by 
 marching its troops to Bhopawur, Sirdapore, and 
 Gbojree on the Bombay road, and attacking and 
 burning the said places ; by repulsing our cavalry at 
 Nalcha, and forcing Major Robertson "to open the 
 " campaign by clearing the Bombay road, and covering 
 " Mundlaisir from insult ; " by welcoming the rebels on 
 their return from Sirdapore, giving their leader ar dress 
 of honour, and receiving part of the booty at the 
 palace j§ by arraying all its troops against us when our 
 column reached the fort, because several Mahratta 
 horsemen were killed in action under the walls ; || by 
 deceiving Captain Hutchinson through its Vakeel in 
 the middle of October, as to its negotiations with the 
 mutinous mercenaries, and the numbers it had en- 
 listed ; ^ by communicating with the Shahzada at 
 Mundesor, and treating his emissaries with the greatest 
 attention and civility ;** and finally by sending its 
 elephants for ammunition during the siege. ff 
 
 4th. That the government was "clearly demon- 
 " strated " to have the garrison under its orders, because 
 letters from the garrison to the Shahzada asking for 
 relief were intercepted during the siege, and because 
 when the garrison showed a white flag they asked to 
 
 * Para. 9. f Para. 12. J Paras. 34, 35, 15, 18, 21. 
 
 § Paras. 17, 15, 35. || Para. 25. 
 
 f Para. 17. ** Paras. 17, 35. ff Para. 31. 
 
58 
 
 speak to Captain Hutchinson in the presence of some 
 one of the Durbar.* 
 
 These are the various counts of Colonel Durand's 
 indictment against the Dhar Government, and I will 
 now answer them in detail, as they were assumed to be 
 true by Lord Canning, in Mr. Edraonstone's despatch 
 of August 12th, 1858, and again by Sir Charles Wood, 
 in his despatch of February 14th, 18 GO, although they 
 had all been answered before Colonel Durand's Minute was 
 written^ and were again satisfactorily answered by Sir 
 Robert Hamilton's second despatch of August 30th, 
 1858. 
 
 1st. With regard to the original entertainment of 
 these troops "contrary to repeated orders?" The late 
 Rajah had engaged every man of these troops who was 
 in the service of the Dhar Government before the 1st 
 of July; and Colonel Durand had stated on May 28th, 
 185 7,f that the late Rajah " so administered his affairs 
 " as to secure the esteem, the respect of the people and 
 " chiefs of Western Malwa, as well as the approbation 
 " of successive Residents and agents." The first enter- 
 tainment of these troops was, therefore, certainly not an 
 act of treachery, and with regard to our "repeated orders" 
 about them, it wa^ true, as asserted by Sir Robert 
 Hamilton on the 5th of July, and repeated by him, in 
 spite of Colonel Durand's contradiction, on the 30th of 
 August, 1858, that our expulsion of hordes of these 
 mercenaries from the Nizam's dominions at the end of 
 1856, did create a serious difficulty for the Malwa 
 States, in all of which, particularly in Gwalior and 
 Bhopal, their friends contrived to get many of them 
 
 * Para. 33 ; see also page 35, paras. 32, 33. 
 
 t Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, page 8. 
 
59 
 
 enlisted, because they had " got a hold," as Sir Robert 
 Hamilton observes, which he explains by adding that 
 " their jemadars were generally creditors of the State." 
 The fact is, that many of these Arabs, who are, as a 
 rule, orderly enough when regularly paid, are among 
 the most notorious usurers of India ; they seem to live 
 for money making; and consequently, with the loose 
 financial system of Native Courts, they generally get a 
 pecuniary hold on the government, wherever they have 
 been settled for some time, which makes it difficult to 
 dismiss their levies, and almost impossible to do so all 
 at once. The thing would have been done in time, 
 in obedience to our orders, throughout Malwa; but 
 Dhar was no more responsible for not doing it off 
 hand, than Scindiah was, or any other of our allies. 
 The Bhegum of Bhopal employed more of these 
 Mussulmen than any one else, and yet she has since 
 been rewarded for her fidelity by the large jaghire of 
 Bhairseah cut off the Dhar State, and formerly contri- 
 buting £10,000 a-year, or one-fifth of its income. After 
 all, the number of these Dhar mercenaries, either on 
 the 1st of July or the 31st of August, was not very 
 formidable to a moveable column containing, besides the 
 Native troops, some hundreds of British infantry and 
 cavalry ! The Dhar Mussulman force numbered 210 
 men at the late Rajah's death, and was not increased 
 until after the Court mourning was over in July. New 
 levies of 129 men were made in August, owing to the 
 intrigues I have described, raising the total of Muk- 
 ranees, Vellaitees, Pathans, and Arabs to 339 men, at 
 the time they seized the fort. During the next forty 
 days they forced the Government to enlist 258 more 
 " brethren and relations," raising the total to about 
 
60 
 
 600 men in the middle of October. But at that timt, 
 besides these troops, there were hordes of armed rebels 
 in the fort, in the town, and encamped about it, and 
 these forces, beyond even the nominal control of the 
 Dhar Government, together with its own mutineers, so 
 oppressed both the Government and the people, that the 
 Durbar again began to entreat us to deliver it from 
 their oppression, in letters which I have already referred 
 to ; and as the advance of our column took place a week 
 after these fresh entreaties were made, it was supposed 
 '* throughout Malwa," as Sir Robert Hamilton ob- 
 served,* that our advance was made in consequence of 
 these entreaties. Colonel Durand admits the presence 
 of hostile independent forces, not even nominally under 
 the control of the Dhar Government, in one of his 
 charges against the Durbar, on the 30th of October, the 
 last day but one of the siege, when he says : " a portion 
 " of their (Dhar) troops, are a part of the garrison now 
 " holding out against us." f 
 
 2nd. I have already fully answered and disproved 
 the charge of connivance in the seizure of the fort ; so 
 I need not repeat what I have said. 
 
 3rd. There are so many acts by which the Dhar 
 Government is said to have ^' begun a war," that I must 
 take them separately. 
 
 1st. Out of the four places named as the scene of 
 active hostility on the part of the Durbar, Bhopawur 
 and Sirdapore are the only two where any Dhar troops 
 went. Goojree was burnt by some Bheels, who were 
 tried, convicted, and hung for it, in March, 185 8. J 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, 'No. 30, of 1861, page 33, para. 13. 
 f Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, page 18, para. 3. 
 J Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 34, para. 22. 
 
61 
 
 With regard to Nalcha, the report cited by Colonel 
 Durand, of "the Native cavalry officer commanding 
 " the detachment," was proved to be a lie, within a few 
 days after it was made. On first hearing of this 
 " repulse at Nalcha," Colonel Durand was " very angry " 
 (as usual), and threatened, in the presence of several 
 witnesses, to make the Durbar responsible for this act 
 of hostility. But luckily he ordered an immediate 
 inquiry, which elicited the following facts : When the 
 cavalry detachment reached Nalcha, where the " troops 
 " so hostile and strong " amounted to ten local horse- 
 men and twenty police! — when the cavalry reached 
 Nalcha, the authorities ofi*ered them every kind of pro- 
 vision they required ; but happening to hear in conver- 
 sation, from a Mussulman of the place, one of the 
 countless rumours prevalent in those days, that the 
 Dhar mutineers were threatening an advance in that 
 direction, the Native officer took the alarm and returned 
 to Mhow with his detachment, without so much as' 
 having seen an enemy I Major Keating, who conducted 
 this inquiry, at once communicated the result to the 
 authorities at Mhow, and moreover at once discharged 
 the head-man of Nalcha, who had been placed in arrest, 
 and no more was heard of the matter again until 
 Colonel Durand revived it in his Minute. By the way, 
 he adds in his Minute that, the " cavalry sent out to 
 " reconnoitre towards Nalcha " were " witness to the 
 " burning of Goojree bungalow." This graphic but 
 superfluous detail is characteristic of his style, which 
 always aims at giving the " colour locale." What a 
 pain tin o^ those few words suggest : they " were witness 
 '' to the burning ! " We see the picturesque groups of 
 the Hyderabad contingent, stopping (of course before 
 
62 
 
 their repulse at Nalcha, they would not be inclined to 
 stop afterwards) — stopping on an Indian ghaut, in the 
 grey of the morning, while their gallant leader points 
 with his sword, 
 
 "And careless eyes the blood that dims it's shine." 
 
 It is a pretty picture ! but I must spoil it ; for how 
 could the cavalry see Goojree bungalow, through phy- 
 sical obstacles, over fifteen miles across country? and, 
 worse still, how could they see over four days of time ? 
 since it is certain that they returned and reported on 
 the 12th of October; and it was proved in a court of 
 justice that Goojree was not burnt till the 16th. I pre- 
 sume that Colonel Durand had forgotten the true date 
 of this event ; and, finding in the papers he referred to, 
 a rumour of it (in a report of Captain Hutchinson's) 
 four days before it actually happened, he at once ima- 
 gined this stage effect for the cavalry, to make them 
 ** witness " it. At the same time, though I can imagine 
 a man's forgetting the exact date of burning a house, 
 which was too common a thing unfortunately in those 
 days, I certainly cannot understand Colonel Durand's 
 forgetting the history of the "repulse at Nalcha," because 
 it was the explosion of this impudent fable of the " hos- 
 '* tile and strong troops " at Nalcha which enabled the 
 Mhow force to march on Dhar, as it did, eight days 
 afterwards, in two separate columns, which were about 
 twelve miles apart when they passed north and south 
 of Nalcha, 
 
 With regard to ]\Iajor Robertson's *^ opening the cam- 
 " paign by clearing the Bombay road, and covering 
 *' Mundlaisir from insult," both the " clearance " and 
 the " insult " are quite imaginary ! Major Robertson 
 soon found that not a man from Dhar had come in that 
 
63 
 
 direction, and lie did not go below the Ghauts. In 
 fact, in spite of all the rumours of those days, the Dhar 
 rebels never ventured to move south, within reach of a 
 British column. The utmost they dared was to wait 
 for the column under the guns of the fort ; and even 
 then it was, as they wrote to the Shahzada, " not of 
 "' our own free will, but at your request, and with the 
 assurance of your support." * 
 
 With regard to the attack on Bhopawur and Sirda- 
 pore, there is no evidence that the Dhar Government 
 was in any way responsible for the concurrence of its 
 mutineers in this outrage, while there is abundant 
 evidence that the Government was quite innocent of 
 their deeds, and powerless to restrain their passions, 
 including the evidence of Colonel Durand himself, 
 which I must again quote here. When the Dhar troops 
 mutinied on August 31st, Colonel Durand endorsed a 
 similar opinion from Captain Hutchinson, with the 
 words, the Dhar Government is " impotent to control 
 " itslevies."f During September he has recorded that 
 the number of these levies was " rapidly increased by 
 " the advent of parties of from twenty to forty from 
 " the side of Dohud and the west, "J which must have 
 made the Dhar Government still more "impotent to 
 " control them." (These parties were driven into Dhar 
 by our advance from Guzerat). On the 12th of Oc- 
 tober, after the attack on Bhopawur and Sirdapore, he 
 repeated that the Dhar Government " could not manage 
 
 * Vide Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, page 23, annexure 
 No. 2. 
 
 f Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, page 10, 
 
 + Parliamentary Paper, No. 130, of 180], page 19, para. 10. 
 
64 
 
 'Vits mercenaries."* Such was the uniform tenor of 
 his evidence until the outrages which had resulted from 
 his " unaccountable inaction " made it his interest to 
 throw the blame on the Dhar Government, to shift it 
 from his own shoulders. Then he changed his tone. 
 He turned quite round, and contradicted his former 
 reports, arguing that, so far from not being " able to 
 " manage its mercenaries," the Dhar Durbar "plunged 
 unprovoked into hostilities with the British Govern- 
 ment," and "began a war," and "took the initiative," 
 and " struck the first blow," by this attack on two of 
 our stations. And it is on the wholly unsupported 
 witness of this man — witness stamped on the face of it 
 with such self-contradiction — ^that our Government 
 assumed the truth of his incredible charge, that the 
 weak, divided Regency of a puny Native State boldly 
 " began a war " against the mighty power of our 
 empire, in the flowing tide of our success I For be it 
 remembered, that a complete revolution had occurred 
 in our prospects by the 10th of October ; and every 
 educated man in India knew then, that the triumph of 
 the British Government was absolutely certain. Many 
 events had contributed to this; the fall of Delhi a 
 month before, and our successes in various quarters 
 since then ; the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell, and 
 announcement of unlimited reinforcements from Eng- 
 land ; the arrival of the China troops ; and the con- 
 firmed adhesion to us of the Native princes, including 
 Holkar, the powerful neighbour, and, of course, the 
 pattern of the Dhar Ranee. For at that time the 
 younger Ranee was fast sinking, and the elder Ranee 
 was chiefly responsible for the administration, though 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, page 12. 
 
• 65 
 
 her brother, and the minister, and others took part in 
 it, not one of them being the recognised head of the 
 Durbar, which ought to have been the case, and would 
 have been if Colonel Durand had done his duty. But 
 to return to his charge. It is on record that, before 
 the mutiny of its troops, the Dhar Government ren- 
 dered us all the assistance it possibly could, and that, 
 after their mutiny, it appealed to us for help to control 
 them, until not merely refused but silenced by our 
 officers. It is on record that it sent us all the intelli- 
 gence it could of the rebels' movements, and that after 
 their return from Bhopawur and Sirdapore, when they 
 turned the guns of the fort on the town, repeatedly 
 threatened to sack it, and used to come and take what 
 they wanted without paying, besides many other out- 
 rages, the Dhar Government began again to appeal to 
 our authorities for help, as if its only hope was in the 
 British column. It is on record that vvhen at last our 
 " unaccountable inaction " ceased, and the Mhow force 
 marched against the rebels, the Dhar Government used 
 all the administrative power left it, in giving us help, 
 and procuring us supplies; and that, when we had 
 made no progress in the siege, it informed us where 
 there was a weak part in the fort, which could easily 
 be breached, and sent us persons acquainted with the 
 locality, and plans of the works, which ensured the 
 success of our operations within a few days of our 
 receiving the information — a success the more valuable 
 as it was obtained without loss to the column. And 
 with all these proofs on record of " its inability to con- 
 " trol its troops," and of its fidelity and good service to 
 us, and reliance on us both before and after the 10th 
 of October — and there is no other conceivable proof of 
 
 F 
 
^^6 
 
 fidelity that it could have given — surely it is as revolt- 
 ing to common sense to assert that the Dhar Govern- 
 ment wilfully " began a war " with us, by the attack 
 of its mutineers on Bhopawur and Sirdapore, as it 
 would be to say that the British Government " began a 
 " war " with itself, when its own mutineers plundered 
 and burnt so many other stations ! 
 
 With regard to the charge of " welcoming the rebels 
 " on their return from Sirdapore, giving their leader 
 " a dress of honor, and receiving part of the booty 
 " at the palace." First, the " part of the booty " con- 
 sisted of two three-pounder guns, which the rebels, who 
 did what they liked, brought from Sirdapore, and 
 planted outside the palace, and afterwards could not 
 take away with them, because those who got into the 
 fort again after their defeat on the arrival of our column, 
 were too much hurried, and the majority fled at once 
 to Burnugger. Second, the negotiation with the rebels 
 on their return from Sirdapore, is thus explained by 
 Sir Robert Hamilton : " When Bheem Rao came before 
 " me in December, an enquiry being commenced by 
 " me, he did not deny that he met the returning 
 " Vellaitees, but stated that he was sent with the object 
 '' to induce them to encamp outside the town, and to 
 " prevent them coming into it to plunder it, as was 
 " reported to be their intention ; his statement is an- 
 " nexed, and I am bound to add, it is supported by 
 " what I have heard from others." * This is a sufficient 
 answer to the above charge, but 1 must also add that 
 Bheem Rao (the Ranee's brother) was afterwards re- 
 leased on giving security for £200 (a tacit admission of 
 his innocence!), and that the whole authority for this 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, Xo. 30, of 1861, page 33, para. 14. 
 
f)7 
 
 alleged treachery in the Dhar Government, the whole 
 authority from first to last was a report of fugitives 
 from Bhopawur! who said it was a topic of conversation 
 in Dhar!" * Now, even in Europe, where the press has 
 so much power, the views of kings and cabinets are 
 not certainly known to the public, though they have 
 • through the press, a means of contradicting unfounded 
 rumours about them ; but in the Native States of India, 
 where, for want of a press, there is still less chance of 
 the views of princes and cabinets being certainly known, 
 and where, for want of a press, there is no means of 
 contradicting unfounded rumours t>^bout them, it does 
 seem monstrous to condemn and confiscate a State, and 
 punish its royal family with the utmost severity, on the 
 strength of mere rumours among fugitives from another 
 State ! rumours opposed to the uniform language and 
 action of the foreign State inculpated by them ! Cer- 
 tainly if we are to act in future on these principles in 
 India, if the fate of Native States is to hang upon what 
 may be said to be a '^ topic of conversation " in them, by 
 strangers who dwell in another territory, there is no 
 Native State in India that is not in danger of confisca- 
 tion, no princely family that may not anticipate the 
 undeserved punishment which fell on the house of 
 Puar. 
 
 I come now to the charge that the Government had 
 arrayed the whole of its troops against us on the day 
 we reached the fort, because several Mahratta horsemen 
 were among the slain. 
 
 I have already stated that, after confiscating the state, 
 we retained a hundred of its Sepoys, the Konkanees 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 20, and Parliamentarj 
 Paper, No. 200, of 1859, No. 317, dated Oct. 15th, 1857. 
 
 F 2 
 
H8 
 
 and Bimdelas, in our service, because they had never 
 mutinied when in the service of the Native Government, 
 and had never been arrayed against us; and I added 
 that these troops were employed by the Native State as 
 palace, city, and treasure guards, because they were 
 more trusted than the Mussulmen, or Poorbeah Sepoys. 
 Colonel Durand admits, in para. 26, that on the same 
 day that the action took place, we found the Rajah in 
 his palace in the city, with a guard of these Sepoys 
 (Konkanees and Buadelas) about him, and he admits, at 
 para. 33, that after the evacuation of the fort we found 
 the treasure guard, of Konkanees and Bundelas, still in 
 it, who made no opposition, but showed us where the 
 treasure was kept. It is therefore certain that "the 
 " whole of the Durbar troops " were not " drawn out in 
 " position against us " on the 22nd of October ; * but 
 the deaths of several non-combatants on that day, were 
 reported to the Dhar Government to have happened in 
 this Avay. When the column reached the fort, the 
 garrison turned out, and took up a position under the 
 guns of the fort, with all the armed rabble in the 
 neighbourhood, to fight us in the field. On this, most 
 of the citizens, and among them from 20 to 30 sowars, 
 went out to see the fight. These people, with the ex- 
 ception of the sowars, were unarmed ; the sowars were 
 armed because it is the custom in the East for a soldier 
 never to leave his house without his weapons, but they 
 all went merely to look on, without any intention of 
 interfering, or getting into danger themselves ; never- 
 theless, they did get into danger, and two or three of 
 them were killed by musket balls. Such was the report 
 made to the Government, which could not have foreseen 
 
 * As st::te(l by Col. Durand, in para. 25. 
 
69 
 
 this impulse of curiosity, and could not have prevented 
 the indulgence of it by any orders on a day of such 
 excitement and confusion. 
 
 With regard to the charge of " deceiving Captain Hut- 
 " chinson through its Vakeel in the middle of October, 
 " as to its negotiations with the mutinous mercenaries, 
 " and the numbers it had enlisted?" 1 have already 
 given Sir Robert Hamilton's explanation of the negotia- 
 tions referred to, and there never was any intended 
 variation from the representation made by the Ranee in 
 her letter to the Governor-General, as to the number of 
 troops in the service of the State. The Ranee stated 
 the number at 600 Mussulmen (and 1 shall hereafter 
 show that some of these Mussulmen tried repeatedly to 
 negotiate, and declared that our refusal to hear them 
 forced them into the rebel ranks), exclusive of about 
 200 others, of whom one-half were so clear from any 
 suspicion of mutiny, that we kept them in our service. 
 There may have been a mistake of the Vakeel's, by 
 giving a statement of "new" levies as "new and old 
 " levies," on the 10th of October, but it is certain that 
 there was no intention to understate their numbers, 
 because on the 12th the Vakeel informed Captain Hut- 
 chinson, in one of the letters cited by me, speaking of 
 all the mercenaries who had returned from Sirdapore, 
 whether mutineers or rebels, " it is rumoured that the 
 " Budmashes are 1,500 in number." This and other in- 
 telligence was sent when it was difficult and dangerous 
 to send communications, for the rebels tried to intercept 
 them. 
 
 With regard to the charge of " communicating with 
 " the Shahzada, and treating his emissaries with the 
 " greatest attention and civility ? " the only authorities 
 
70 
 
 were the aforesaid " fugitives from Bhopawur," and a 
 previous communication from the Dhar Government 
 itself.* 
 
 The last charge of " sending its elephants for ammu- 
 " nition during the siege," was not merely equally- 
 groundless, it was a transparent excuse for one of those 
 wanton acts of plunder that abounded in those days — 
 an act against which the Dhar Government protested 
 at once emphatically, both verbally and by letter. 
 The truth of the story was this : Five or six elephants 
 were sent out as usual — they go almost every day — ^to 
 fetch their forage, grass, or branches of trees from the 
 jungles, and the drivers had no weapons with them 
 except the axes and scythes necessary to cut forage, 
 when, the instant they left the city, not the fort, 
 they were pursued and captured by a picquet of the 
 Hyderabad contingent, always eager for " loot." There 
 was not an armed man with these elephants ; in fact, no 
 enemies could then leave the fort, or get into it, on 
 account of our picquets ; two individuals who did 
 escape from it into the town were made over to us ; and 
 at that very time the Durbar were securing and damp- 
 ing with water all the powder in the city shops, and 
 restoring to our officers all the shot and shell that came 
 from the fort, in obedience to an order from Captain 
 Hutchinson, which I print in the appendix.f This 
 incident accidentally furnishes another striking proof 
 of the innocence of the Dhar Government by showing 
 that they had not prepared the fort in any way for a 
 siege; they had not mounted twelve out of eighteen 
 heavy guns that were in the fort, and they had not 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, pages 13, 14. 
 f Vide Appendix G. 
 
71 
 
 provided ammxmition, so that when the fort was 
 evacuated, and Colonel Durand was anxious and im- 
 patient to have it blown up,* he actually could not get 
 it done for want of powder! To return to the ele- 
 phants: Colonel Durand admits in his Minutef that 
 " the elephants were claimed by the State as soon as 
 ^*' they were known to have fallen into our hands;" 
 but adds in the next paragraph, '^ that as the com- 
 " missiarat required elephants, they were sold to that 
 " department at a reasonable valuation, and the proceeds 
 '' divided among the captors by the military authorities, 
 " as an encouragement to the Nizam's cavalry." Ah ! 
 there was plenty of such encouragement in those days : 
 the passion for "loot " was indulged at that time to an 
 excess that would be incredible to home readers. 
 
 I now come to the last count of his indictment, viz., 
 that the Dhar Government was " clearly demonstrated " 
 to have the garrison under its orders, by intercepted 
 letters from the garrison to the Shahzada during the 
 siege, and by a demand from the garrison when they 
 showed a white flag, to speak to Captain Hutchinson 
 in the presence of some one of the Durbar, which 
 Colonel Durand refused to permit. 
 
 No doubt this charge may be a sufficiently " clear 
 " demonstration " of the guilt of a Native State, when 
 we have a mind to annex it, because any falsehood or 
 absurdity is reason enough, when the wolf has made up 
 his mind to devour the lamb ; but for any other 
 purpose the charge is so preposterous, that I really feel 
 degraded by the necessity of answering it. Let any 
 one look at the letters again, which are printed in the 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, page 22. 
 
 f Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 23, paras. 31, 32. 
 
72 
 
 first Dhar Blue-book,* how on earth could these letters 
 •' clearly demonstrate " that the writers were under the 
 orders of the Dhar Government ? if they proved any- 
 thing, it was the very reverse ; that the writers were 
 not under the orders of the Dhar Government, but of 
 the Shahzada, as I have no doubt they were.* More- 
 over, these letters, which are employed to prove that 
 the Government communicated with the Shahzada 
 through the garrison, these intercepted letters were not 
 from the garrison at all, but from the rebels at Bur- 
 nugger ! so easy is it for the wolf to " clearly demon- 
 " strate " the necessity of eating the lamb ! Again, 
 how could the demand of the garrison to speak to 
 Captain Hutchinson in the presence of some member of 
 the Durbar, prove anything against the Dhar Govern- 
 ment, without hearing what they had to say ? Over- 
 tures were repeatedly made by the garrison, according 
 to Colonel Durand, both before our column reached the 
 fort, and during the siege,f and on this occasion the 
 object of those who showed the white flag was explained 
 by Sir Robert Hamilton^ to this effect, that, it was 
 known to the Durbar that there were separate parties 
 of Mussulman troops in the fort, and some of these 
 wished to obtain terms, on the plea that they had not 
 joined in the attack on Bhopawur and Sirdapore, and 
 had not committed themselves against the British 
 Government. If, as Colonel Durand asserts, § the siege 
 
 ♦ Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1859, page 23. 
 
 t Parliamentary Paper, Xo. 200, of 1859, page 17, and Parliamen- 
 tary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 22, para. 24. 
 
 J Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, pages 35, 36. 
 
 § Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 26, para. 44, and 
 Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1861, page 18, para. 7. 
 
73 
 
 was " a most critical operation," atid " time was pre- 
 " cious " on the day the garrison showed the white flag, 
 he should at least have heard their proposals before he 
 refused to allow them to capitulate ; but he says, " he 
 " directed Captain Hutchinson to return with orders to 
 " open fire, which was immediately done."* Instead of 
 listening to offers of capitulation, he preferred to storm 
 what he calls " a difficult breach.."f He says that, 
 " from the form of the ramparts right and left, and the 
 " facility of defending the head of the breach, he was 
 *' surprised that Affghans should have shrunk from its 
 " defence," and that " a storm costly in life and thereby 
 " paralysing the column, might have produced results 
 " exceedingly difficult to estimate." In spite of its 
 exceeding difficulty, he estimates these " results " in the 
 next sentence, as follows : — 1st. The handing over " not 
 " only Malwa but also Rajpoot ana " as a prey to the 
 Shahzada (and his "rabble"). 2nd. Another mutiny 
 of Holkar's troops at Indore. 3rd. Setting Eastern 
 Malwa in flames, treading down the Regent of Bhopal, 
 and subverting that State from a friendly to a hostile 
 one. 4th. Not freeing the line of the Nerbudda, and 
 rolling back insurrection so as to keep the south of 
 India clear. . . . Why did he not add, setting the 
 seas on fire ? surely such ridiculous exaggeration, such 
 puffing of the importance of his own operations, is 
 quite unworthy of a British soldier. I have shown 
 how he had himself paralysed the column for nearly 
 three months at Mhow ; and what mischief it had done, 
 by encouraging the gathering of an armed rabble in the 
 neighbourhood, and permitting anarchy, rioting, and 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 200, of 1861, page 18, para. 4. 
 f Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 26. 
 
74 
 
 outrages at Dhar, Bhopawur, and Sirdapore. But I 
 have also shown that the mischiefs caused by his " un- 
 " accountable inaction," were rendered purely local, 
 and comparatively harmless, by our vigorous action at 
 the time in other parts of India. 
 
 Having thus answered every count of his indictment 
 against the Dhar Government, I must say a few words 
 on some other points in his minute, to show that he 
 completely failed to refute Sir Robert Hamilton's ob- 
 jections to appropriating the Dhar treasures as prize- 
 money. 
 
 Sir Robert had stated that our troops were marched 
 to Dhar at the request of the Native Government, to 
 dislodge the mutineers and rebels from its fort and 
 territory, and, as was believed, to support the minor 
 we had put on the throne ; that the Dhar officials 
 furnished us with supplies, &c., and the minor Rajah 
 was received by the acting agent during the siege and 
 treated with every consideration, and nothing passed to 
 indicate that we looked upon the minor Rajah and the 
 Dhar Government as enemies ; and, therefore, when 
 the fort was evacuated, we were not justified in appro- 
 priating the Dhar treasure as prize-money, without any 
 declaration of war. 
 
 Colonel Durand rests his reply to this on three 
 several grounds. 1st. That no one could have under- 
 stood that the advance of our column was to support 
 the minor we had put on the throne ; not any of the 
 States under the Central Agency, because their Vakeels 
 had been told the contrary ; and he w^as '* at a loss to 
 *' conceive who would have looked upon the movement 
 ^' of our troops in the light set forth by Sir Robert 
 " Hamilton." 2nd. That though the minor Rajah was 
 
75 
 
 received in Durbar during the siege, what passed did 
 indicate that we should treat him and his government 
 as enemies. 3rd. That although there was no necessity 
 for a declaration of war, because the Dhar Government 
 " began a war " with us, that his dismissal of one of the 
 Dhar Vakeels amounted to a declaration of war. 
 
 To take these in order, 1st. As Colonel Durand is at 
 at a loss to conceive who could have looked upon the 
 advance of our troops as meant to support the Dhar 
 Government, I will mention two or three parties who 
 must have done so : — 
 
 1st. In the communications from the Dhar Govern- 
 ment which preceded the advance of our troops, I find 
 the following phrases : "The Budmashes are increasing 
 " day by day, and therefore you will be kind enough 
 " in making arrangements for their punishment, and 
 " restoring the tranquility of the State, as it looks to 
 " you for assistance." Again: "The Durbar looks to 
 " you as its well-wisher and supporter, and hopes that 
 " you will render any assistance in your power at this 
 " critical time. You will not fail to show that kindness 
 " at this time which you showed heretofore." Again : 
 " The only confidence of the Rajah now is in you, 
 " and you should make the best arrangement in your 
 "judgment."* 
 
 2nd. In the communication from Captain Hutchin- 
 son to the Dhar Government, already referred to,f on 
 the first day of the siege, October 23rd, his letter 
 begins (after compliments) with these words : " The 
 " Durbar professes to be in friendly relations with the 
 " British Government, and on account of this the Offg. 
 
 * See Appendix F. f See Appendix G. 
 
76 
 
 " Agent to Govt. Genl. (Colonel Durand), with a 
 
 " column, had come to assist them " There is a 
 
 curious thing ! Colonel Durand is " at a loss to con- 
 " ceive " who could have supposed that the advance of 
 our column was meant to assist the Dhar Government, 
 and yet his own confidential agent, writing by his 
 orders, on the first day of the siege, says in so many 
 words, that the " column had come to assist them." 
 
 3rd. In the communication from the Ranees to 
 Colonel Durand on October the 31st, the last day of 
 the siege, after remarking that all had gone on well 
 until the mutiny of their jVIussulman troops " carried 
 " matters to the present pitch," they continue : " We 
 " have every hope of safety notwithstanding, from a 
 " patron, well-wisher, and supporter of friends, like 
 " you. You have been put to great trouble in punish- 
 " ing the rebels, and in marching to* this with troops. 
 '' We shall never torget this obligation ; the honour of 
 " the State rests with you. The support (nigahs) ol 
 ^' the Company's Government kept up 'bundobust' up 
 " to this time, and we had no trouble. These * Bud- 
 '^ mashes ' have now given us much annoyance, and 
 " your coming to punish them has caused us much 
 " satisfaction. To save the town, the rayts, and the 
 " treasure in the fort, rests with you at the present 
 "juncture, and we are satisfied that, whatever you do 
 " will promote the good of the people and the State."* 
 So they also understand that, in Captain Hutchinson's 
 phrase, the column " had come to assist them ; " and 
 Colonel Durand said not a word to undeceive them.f 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 30 of 1861, page 41. 
 t See Sir E. Hamilton's remarks on this, Parliamentary Paper, No. 
 30, of 1861, page 36, par. 34. 
 
77 
 
 Finally I deny that any of the Vakeels of the Central 
 Agency had been told that the movement of our troops 
 was an act of war against the Dhar Government, and I 
 deny that any of them looked upon it in that light. It 
 would be quite easy to examine the Vakeels now on 
 this point. 
 
 2nd. Colonel Durand's misrepresentations as to his 
 treating the Rajah " like a private gentleman, and not 
 " like the ruler of the State," at the Durbar of October 
 26th, are so clearly and authoritatively exposed by Sir 
 Robert Hamilton in his minute of August 30th, 1858,* 
 that it is scarcely necessary for me to add a word on 
 the matter, but perhaps I ought to glance at a minor 
 misrepresentation which Sir Robert passed over. 
 Colonel Durand says, para. 27, that during the siege 
 he received many messages from the Ranee, " who was 
 " anxious then to adopt the line now taken in favor of 
 " the State by Sir Robert Hamilton ;" that " his replies 
 " admitted of no misconstruction," but that, '' to put 
 " the matter beyond cavil, he requested the attendance 
 " of the minor Rajah, the minister, &c., at a public 
 " Durbar," thus implying that he took the initiative in 
 procuring this interview, which was not the case. 
 
 I have already shown that the interpretation of our 
 movement by the Ranees was the same as that of Cap- 
 tain Hutchinson ; and Sir Robert Hamilton has shown 
 that nothing occurred at the Durbar to alter that inter- 
 pretation, in spite of Colonel Durand's bullying the 
 unfortunate minister, who has had his innocence more 
 completely proved by every subsequent inquiry. I 
 will only add that the Dhar Government took the initia- 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, pages 34, 35, paras. 27 
 to 31. 
 
78 
 
 Hve in procuring this interview between the Rajah and 
 the agent, and the following translated extract from its 
 vernacular diary gives the real origin of this public 
 Durbar : — " The Durbar Vakeel was ordered to intimate 
 " to the Agent Governor-General that since his arrival 
 *' he has not been to visit the Rajah, and it was cus- 
 " tomary for him to do so on all occasions of his advent 
 " at Dhar, and this being communicated to the Agent, 
 " an interview was appointed." 
 
 3rd. I have now come to the most critical point of 
 this question, of our right to claim the Dhar treasure 
 as prize money? Colonel Durand says there was no 
 necessity for a " declaration of war," for two reasons, 
 1st. Because the Dhar Government "began a war" 
 with us, which assertion I have show^n to be untrue ; 
 2nd. Because his summary dismissal of the Dhar 
 Vakeel, with a message to the Durbar that they would 
 be responsible for all that had happened, or might 
 happen, '' was a declaration of war."" (It is worthy of 
 remark that this was the same sort of message he sent 
 to Holkar after the mutiny of his troops, and which 
 drew upon him the reprimand from Lord Elphinstone. ) 
 
 Now, I undertake to prove that he did not dismiss 
 any Dhar Vakeel, although he uttered the above threat 
 in his anger on the 12th of October, on hearing of the 
 famous " repulse at Nalcha." Captain Hutchinson had 
 told him that he suspected his own Vakeel, the Vakeel 
 of the Bhopawur Agency, Raghonath Narain, in con- 
 sequence of the rumours of fugitives from Bhopawur, 
 on which Colonel Durand wrote to him — " You may 
 " either keep or send away the Dhar Vakeel of this 
 " Agency ; " that is, the Vakeel of Colonel Durand's ow^n 
 office, Govind Vishvas Rao, a totally different person. 
 
71) 
 
 about whom Captain Hutchinson had expressed no 
 suspicion.* As the dismissal was left to Captain 
 Hutchinson's option by the words of the above note, 
 neither of the Vakeels were dismissed ; and Sir Robert 
 Hamilton has proved that Govind Rao continued to 
 regularly attend Colonel Durand, and afterwards 
 attended him, until our attachment of the State left 
 him no one to represent. Sir Robert has proved this, 
 not only by his own personal knowledge, and by an 
 affidavit of Govind Rao, but by three letters of the 
 Vakeel to Colonel Durand, during the siege, with 
 Colonel Durand's signature to the orders upon them. I 
 will only add one nnore proof, which is a letter from 
 Colonel Durand himself to the Vakeel, several days after 
 the siege; and here it is, dated 6th November, 1857, 
 addressed to Govind Vishvas Rao, and signed by 
 Colonel Durand : — " The British troops will march to- 
 " morrow from Dhar, and will halt at Teesgaon Pinjray 
 " on the 7th, and on the 8th at Nowza Kanwan, vil- 
 " lages of your territory ; and you are therefore desired 
 " to keep all sorts of supplies ready for the camp at the 
 " two villages, and repair the road, so that the troops 
 " may not find difficulties in their march." In the 
 Vakeel's answer to Colonel Durand, of the same date, 
 after describing the plundering and atrocities of the 
 mutineers and rebels in the districts referred to, he con» 
 eludes with these words : — " Owing to the oppression 
 " of the Budmashes, the neighbouring villages are all 
 " being depopulated, and therefore the Durbar is at a 
 " loss to know how to make arrangements for supplies 
 " to the British troops. However the Durbar looks to 
 " you for your kind assistance in putting down these 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 33, para. 15. 
 
80 
 
 " Budmaslies." (So they still thought, six days after 
 the siege, that "the Officiating Agent to Governor- 
 " General, with a column, had come to assist them," 
 as Captain Hutchinson had told them). 
 
 Having thus, to the best of my power, carefully 
 examined every fact and every argument used by 
 Colonel Durand to justify the severe measures recom- 
 mended by him, and adopted by the Government of 
 India, towards the State of Dhar ; and having discussed 
 every detail in which suspicion could attach to its 
 Government, I think I am fairly entitled to conclude, 
 not merely that nothing has been proved, but that 
 nothing can be proved, against the Dhar Government 
 of 1857, except the admitted inability to control its 
 mercenary troops ; and that Lord Stanley's original 
 decision on this case was the right one, that, " we 
 " could not consistently punish Dhar or any other 
 " weak State, for its inability to control its troops, 
 " when it was patent to the whole world that the more 
 " powerful States of Gwalior and Indore, and even the 
 " British Government itself, were unable to control 
 " theirs." 
 
 Unfortunately the Government of India both could, 
 and did, set the above decision at defiance. In about 
 a fortnight after the receipt of Colonel Durand's minute, 
 on the 12th of August, 1858, the Govern or- General 
 ordered Mr. Edmonstone to write a despatch to Sir 
 Robert Hamilton, adopting all Colonel Durand's asser- 
 tions and inferences, and concluding with the orders I 
 have already cited, to treat the Dhar treasure as prize- 
 money, and to adhere to the confiscation of the State. 
 In vain did Sir Robert Hamilton bravely submit further 
 explanations to the Government, on the 30th of Au- 
 
81 
 
 gust, 1858, completely refuting the arguments addressed 
 to him, and once more urging on Government that the 
 Dhar treasure was " not lawfully at its disposal ; " and 
 that the restoration of the young Rajah "would 
 " redound to the honor of our name, and be received 
 " with deep gratitude as an earnest of our clemency, 
 ^" and go far to allay the irritation and alarm which 
 " have so widely spread throughout the country, owing 
 " to the idea that our policy has aimed at getting rid 
 " of every Native chief by any pretext, so as to absorb 
 " and annex every territory held by a Native prince, 
 "whether small or great."* It was all in vain. By 
 Colonel Durand's advice Lord Canning had made up 
 his mind to punish Dhar, and he inflicted the punish- 
 ment. 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 36, para. 36. 
 
 G 
 
82 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Notices of the Subject in ilie House of Commons — Second 
 promise of the Home Government^ under Sir Cltarles 
 Wood, to restore Dhar to its Rajah^ and evasion of this 
 promise. 
 
 When in June, 1858, I sent the joyful news to India 
 that Lord Stanley had decided on the restoration of his 
 Raj to the young prince of Dhar, believing that this 
 trouble was happily over, I little thought that six years 
 afterwards I should be fighting as hard a battle as ever 
 to get this original decision carried into effect ! Yet 
 so it is. And, meanwhile, the man who sacrificed Dhar 
 to save his own reputation, has had a career of unin- 
 terrupted prosperity, and nearly carte blanche to do as 
 he liked with the Native Princes, either in the Cabinet 
 of Lord Canning, or in the Council of Sir Charles 
 Wood, or as Foreign Secretary for India. He has been 
 placed where he could "feed fat the grudge he bore" 
 to some of them. By the way, apropos to the reason 
 for sacrificing Dhar, I am sorry to say I have known 
 many instances in which the faults or blunders of 
 European officials in India have been visited on their 
 Native officers, who were either perfectly innocent, or 
 who had even protested against the conduct which gave 
 offence to the Government. Yet the head Native officer 
 has been deliberately sacrificed to save his English 
 superior. 
 
83 
 
 Long before the year 1858 was over, I was unde- 
 ceived as to the finality of Lord Stanley's decision in 
 the Dhar case. I found at home that the India office 
 could get no notice whatever taken of its despatch ; and 
 in India, that the confiscation of the State was carried 
 out so mercilessly that the privations and distress of 
 the poor Ranee and her relatives and dependents were 
 painful to think of. So matters went on till the Session 
 of 1859, when the Home Government, goaded by con- 
 tinual enquiries, began to feel that Lord Canning's 
 treatment of its decision was personally humiliating ; 
 so, as private letters could do nothing, in March, 1859, 
 another formal despatch was sent on the subject of 
 Dhar, and in April the papers in the case were given 
 to the House of Commons, on the motion of Mr. J. B. 
 Smith. Still not one word of answer could be obtained 
 from India, where the sufferings of the royal family 
 continued to increase ; so, at the close of the Session, I 
 asked Mr. Bright to notice the subject in the House, 
 which he did in such emphatic language,* and with 
 such pointed allusion to the insult offered to Lord 
 Stanley by the Governor- General, that Sir Charles 
 Wood, then Secretary of State for India, found it would 
 be absolutely necessary to give satisfaction to Lord 
 Stanley, and to English public opinion, in the ensuing 
 Session. 
 
 Accordingly he at length obliged Lord Canning to 
 reply, which he did, by entreating Sir Charles Wood 
 to uphold the confiscation of Dhar, in his letter of 
 December 6th, 1859. 
 
 But to openly affront Lord Stanley was more than 
 
 * See Hansard, 2nd vol. of 2nd Session of 1859, pages 811, 812. 
 
 G 2 
 
84 
 
 Sir Charles Wood dared do, or than any English cabinet 
 would have allowed him to do. Lord Stanley enjoyed 
 great social and political advantages by the gift of for- 
 tune. Noble birth, immense wealth, a place next to 
 the leader of the most powerful party in the State, all 
 these things nature had given him, and he had doubled 
 liis natural advantages by his intelligent application to 
 business, and particularly at the period in question, by 
 his enlightened administration of Indian affairs. Every- 
 body felt that his hardworking career at the India 
 Office had commenced an era of progress in every de- 
 partment; everybody had hailed the proclamation 
 which he advised the Queen to address to the princes 
 and people of India, and his immediate action upon it 
 by measures to stop the Inam resumptions, &c., as acts of 
 the highest statesmanship ; everybody instinctively felt, 
 and I shall presently give some better reasons than in- 
 stinct for this feeling, that the proclamation began '' a 
 ** new policy" in India, which would make our empire 
 more secure, and our rule in that country more credit- 
 able to us; finally, everybody had approved of his 
 opposing the annexation system in the case of Dhar. 
 
 It was, therefore, imperative to satisfy Lord Stanley, 
 whose honor was now at stake, and rather difficult at 
 the same time to satisfy other parties; nevertheless, 
 with Colonel Durand then at his elbow. Sir Charles 
 Wood contrived a mode of doing it, as follows: he 
 wrote a despatch, dated 14th of February, I860,* 
 destined to be kept secret until the whole affair had blown 
 over, which began by justifying Lord Canning's policy, 
 re-affirming the guilt of those members of the Dhar Go- 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, Xo. 30; of 1861, pages 45. 46. 
 
85 
 
 verninent who had been virtually acquitted in private a 
 year before, after enquiries on the spot ; especially con- 
 demning them for that seizure of the fort by the muti- 
 neers, which had been explained even toColonelDurand's 
 satisfaction at the time ; in short, entirely reversing the 
 language of the Home Government under Lord Stanley; 
 then ordering, solely as a matter of expediency, the 
 conditional restoration of the Raj to the young prince 
 when he came of age ; making the condition one by 
 which the restoration could easily be prevented at that 
 time; and meanwhile allowing Lord Canning to con- 
 fiscate the district of Bhairseah, which contributed 
 £10,000 a year, or one-fifth of the income of the State 
 of Dhar (we had taken this district under our own 
 management, for our own political purposes, and agreed 
 to pay Dhar £10,000 a year on account of it, but under 
 our management it had not yet realised so much as we 
 paid for it). 
 
 Having sent this despatch, Sir Charles Wood waited 
 confidently for Lord Stanley's expected question, and 
 when it came, soon after the opening of the session, on 
 March 13th, 1860, he promised unconditionally to the 
 House the restoration of Dhar to its young prince when 
 he came of age, and persuaded the House, by the use 
 of ambiguous language, that the only penalty inflicted 
 on Dhar, would be, at a time when all India was being 
 taxed heavily to pay the expense of the war, the con- 
 fiscation of an outlying district worth between £2,000 
 and £3,000 a year. 
 
 And so once more the afikir seemed happily settled. 
 Nobody here knew the real value of Bhairseah ; in the 
 enthusiasm of the moment the prize-money was for- 
 gotten, and Sir Charles Wood's public assurances were 
 
86 
 
 so cordially repeated hi private, that all suspicion was 
 laid asleep, and when the Blue-book was presented to 
 Parliament next year, nobody in this busy London 
 world then cared to read papers, whose interest, it was 
 supposed, had entirely passed away. 
 
 There was one, however, who evidently had a mis- 
 giving from the first, viz., the late Sir Richmond 
 Shakespeare, who had then succeeded Sir Robert 
 Hamilton as agent to Govern or- General for Central 
 India. He had noted the condition attached to the 
 restoration of the Government to the young Rajah, 
 " if he should then be reported qualified to undertake 
 " it ; " and finding that Government had sanctioned 
 the appointment of a British officer, on a salary of 
 £1,200 a year,* to manage the State till the Rajah was 
 " reported qualified," Sir Richmond determined to have 
 a man whom he could trust to do the business, and 
 teach the young Rajah how to do it, so he asked for 
 Captain Wood irom Hosunghabad, declaring that : 
 " Everything will depend upon the qualifications of the 
 *' officer. He will have a delicate and difficult duty to 
 " perform."! Such an application could not be refused ; 
 Captain Wood was appointed, and well he did his work 
 during the six months he remained at Dhar ; initiating 
 the young Rajah into more details of administration 
 during that time, than he has been allowed to learn in 
 the next three years. 
 
 And Sir Richmond Shakespeare did more than this. 
 On the plea that the former orders of Government 
 
 * It is believed by the natives that this piece of patronage, which is 
 a convenient stepping-stone for youngsters with good interest, is the 
 gi'eatest obstacle to justice in the case. 
 
 + Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, page 72, para. 31. 
 
87 
 
 about Dhar had been announced by Proclamation, he 
 issued a Proclamation, without reference to Government, 
 announcing that the young Rajah's possessions " were 
 " restored to him from that time," and promising, ab- 
 solutely and without any conditions, that " the manage- 
 " ment of them should be made over to him on his 
 " attaining his majority."* 
 
 This Proclamation was a complete poser for the 
 Government at the time. They could not recall it 
 without unmasking a fraudulent intention, and yet 
 such words bound them very awkwardly, both to the 
 Rajah and the public. At first they did not know what 
 to do. On the 13th of June, 1860, Lord Canning 
 merely noticed the irregularity of the proceeding. On 
 the 19th of December, Sir Charles Wood not merely 
 noticed the irregularity, but restated the condition of 
 making over the management to the Rajah : " If he 
 " should be qualified to undertake it,"f 
 
 Accordingly, from the time that the afikir was for- 
 gotten in England, good care was taken that the Rajah 
 never should be " reported qualified to undertake it." 
 Captain Wood was removed in due course, and then 
 followed four or five youngsters, too fond of field sports, 
 &;c., to spare many hours for public business, and too 
 ignorant themselves to teach anyone else their " delicate 
 " and difficult duties;" while the minister was appointed 
 with equal forethought, not in one sense without con- 
 sulting the Rajah's choice, for the person selected had 
 so notoriously a previous misunderstanding with the 
 Rajah, that friendly communication between them on 
 business matters was impossible; and so it is easy to 
 
 * Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, pages 76, 77. 
 t Parliamentary Paper, No. 30, of 1861, pages 77, 78. 
 
88 
 
 keep up the farce of periodically reporting the Rajah, 
 " not qualified to undertake the Government." 
 
 Now I assert, on the contrary, that he is perfectly 
 qualified to do so. He is a gentle and amiable young 
 man, master of three languages, of more than average 
 intelligence, and frank enough with his friends, though 
 he is naturally reserved with those whom he has every 
 reason to fear and distrust. In fact the pretence of his 
 incompetency is the most transparent hypocrisy. The 
 law has decided, in every civilised country, after far 
 more experience, and with far higher authority than 
 can belong to any individual judgment, the age at 
 which every man in the full possession of his faculties 
 should attain his majority, and be qualified to administer 
 his estate, whether public or private. The law did 
 decide this epoch in the life of the young Rajah of 
 Dhar, at the date of the 8th of April, 1862, when the 
 prince attained 18 years of age, which corresponds to 
 an age of two or three years later among the inhabi- 
 tants of a colder climate ; and the law had decided so 
 justly in the present instance, that not only the Rajah's 
 own subjects, but his neighbours far and near in the 
 province of Malwa, felt there could be no doubt of his 
 competency to govern, and entertained the most san- 
 guine hopes that the repeated public promises of the 
 Government, both in England and India, would be 
 fulfilled by our handing over the power we held in 
 trust for him. They felt that this case would be the 
 test of our professions of renouncing the policy of 
 "annexation;" and they now feel that if the local 
 Government is permitted by the Queen and Parliament 
 of England to break its positive and publicly proclaimed 
 promises ; to violate their law ; to treat with contempt 
 
89 
 
 their opinion ; and to virtually annex Dhar, by an in- 
 definite charge of incompetency against its prince ; 
 that similar pretexts will never be wanting in the 
 minority of Native princes ; that the promised right of 
 adoption will be a mockery ; and that no Native State 
 will be safe in future from the grasping foreigners, who 
 have resumed their work by breaking their reiterated 
 pledges to restore the principality of Dhar. 
 
90 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Conclusion. — Two distinct j^olicies are in presence on this 
 occasion — Old political parties are resisting a new policy. 
 
 Now if the reader will take a brief retrospect of the 
 leading facts of this case, I think he may be inclined to 
 ask whether some further explanation is not still 
 required ; and whether the effects produced, considered 
 as a whole, do not indicate the existence of some deeper 
 cause for the fluctuation of our policy towards Dhar, 
 than any 1 have yet mentioned ? 
 
 Let it be remembered that, in spite of the orders of 
 a Secretary of State for India, Lord Stanley, backed by 
 a strong current of public opinion at home, in spite of 
 repeated notices of the subject in the House of Com- 
 mons, in spite of the utmost opposition of the Agent to 
 Governor- General for Central India, Sir R. Hamilton, 
 and his demonstration of the innocence of the Native 
 Government, the following penalties have already been 
 inflicted on Dhar : — 
 
 1st. The Rajah was formally deposed six years ago, 
 and has not yet had the management of his State 
 restored to him. 
 
91 
 
 2nd. Not merely the State income, but the revenues 
 appropriated to the support of the Rajah's family and 
 ministers were seized in 1858, and the whole interval 
 between the confiscation of the State and the compulsory 
 partial restitution in 1860, was employed in trying to 
 intimidate and starve the Ranee and her faithful 
 adherents into submitting quietly to the loss of their 
 Raj, so that when at last orders were passed by the 
 Government of India to make an allowance to the 
 Ranee, the news only reached the unfortunate lady a 
 few days before her death, on August 10th, 1860, when 
 she literally sunk, at thirty-two years of age, under the 
 humiliations, the want, the fears, and anguish she had 
 been sufi'ering for the last two years. 
 
 3rd. On the second promise to restore the Raj, one- 
 fifth of its income was taken away by the confiscation 
 of Bhairseah. 
 
 4th. The treasure and jewels of the State, valued at 
 £80,000, were seized, the heirlooms of the family were 
 sold by public auction (to the inexpressible disgust of 
 the people), and the proceeds were divided as prize- 
 money, of which it was stated last year that every 
 private soldier would receive about £40.* 
 
 Is it not plain to any political head that these things 
 could not have been done, and done with perfect 
 impunity, without the support of a powerful party in 
 this country ? This is the point we must come to at 
 last. There are no Directors now to be the " buffers " of 
 the State carriage. It is no longer time to stop at this 
 or that " official trained up under the annexation 
 
 * See « Homeward Mail,'' Sept. 14th, 1863, page 767. 
 
92 
 
 " system." The executive officers are but subordinates 
 after all : who has been behind them, who instructed 
 them, and to whom did they look for support ? 
 
 This is a grave question, which I mean to answer as 
 clearly as I have raised it. There has been too long a 
 popular fallacy that the "annexation system" was a 
 pure invention of Lord Dalhousie Probably no ex- 
 perienced man ever believed that a young Colonial 
 Governor, as Lord Dalhousie was then, would venture, 
 without authority, to announce the fundamental change 
 of policy proclaimed in his Sattara Minute, or would 
 have been permitted to carry it into execution in the 
 sweeping style he did, throughout his administration, 
 without the deliberate sanction and previous consent of 
 the Home Government. Yet the public have been 
 credulous enough to believe that he did so, although it 
 is as contrary to the invariable practice of Government 
 to permit any officer they employ to reverse an es- 
 tablished system, without asking their leave, on any 
 vital question of State policy, as it is contrary to the 
 practice of public servants to commit such an intolerable 
 act of insubordination. For it is well explained by 
 Mr. Ludlow, who sums up all previous arguments on 
 the subject, that the " annexation system " was the 
 direct reversal of our former policy of non-annexation ; 
 which had been approved till then, by almost every 
 great Anglo-Indian statesman or writer, of whom he 
 enumerates some fifteen or sixteen, from the Duke of 
 Wellington down to Colonel Alves. 
 
 Moreover, independent of the well-known principles 
 of Government, which forbid us to believe that Lord 
 Dalhousie could have ventured to initiate such an im- 
 
93 
 
 portant policy as the '^ annexation system/' without the 
 sanction of the Home Government, I will mention 
 another reason for disbelieving it, besides this induction 
 from the rules and habits of official life. A gentleman 
 who has held some of the highest official appointments 
 in India, and whose honored name is one of those best 
 known to Anglo-Indians, told me that a friend of his 
 was staying at Bowood, the late Lord Lansdowne's 
 country-seat, when the question of " annexation " was 
 discussed by a meeting of the leaders of the Whig 
 party,* and decided in the affirmative, before ever Lord 
 Dalhousie went to India ; and that many of the claptrap 
 arguments in its favour, which we have been used to 
 read in his Minutes, or in the pages of Mr. George 
 Campbell, date from that meeting at Bowood,f when 
 Lord Dalhousie had not yet left this country. If this 
 be true, and I do not doubt its truth, though I cannot 
 give every one the same conviction by mentioning the 
 name of my informant, it certainly makes Lord Dal- 
 housie's apparent rashness disappear, and leaves him 
 only responsible for the manner in which he carried out 
 this policy, and not for its matter. But, as I said 
 before, the fact of the deliberate sanction and previous 
 consent of the Home Government, might have been in- 
 duced from known principles of Government, by those 
 
 * At the time when the " 15 millions " deficit of the Affghan war was 
 coming home to their business and bosoms. 
 
 j" In thus tracing back to the old Whigs, the *' grasping " policy 
 which provoked a rebellion, it is but fair to add that I do not suspect 
 the existence of any sympathy for that policy in the breasts of younger 
 members of the present Cabinet ; such as Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Cardwell, 
 Mr. Villiers, Mr. Milner Gibson, Lord de Grey and Ripon, &c. 
 
94 
 
 who never heard the above anecdote ; and if once it is 
 understood that the Whigs were committed, as a party, 
 to the policy so boldly proclaimed and acted on by 
 Lord Dalhousie, this connection between a great English 
 party and the annexation system, will explain, not only 
 the injustice done to Dhar, as well as many other 
 States, and the projects of farther annexation now 
 hatching in India, but all the resistance offered to Lord 
 Stanley's views, from first to last. 
 
 It was then distinctly a " new policy " that was 
 announced by Lord Stanley's advice, in the Queen's 
 Proclamation of 1858, and was simultaneously acted 
 upon, by revoking the confiscation of all the landed 
 estates in Oude, by " disallowing the policy of annexa- 
 " tion " in the case of Dhar, by measures to stop the 
 scandalous Enam resumptions, &c. 
 
 It was a new policy of the Derby Cabinet, diametri- 
 cally opposed to that of their predecessors, the Whigs, 
 and which has not been fairly carried out, owing to 
 the opposition of the Whigs. 
 
 That Proclamation contained, among others, the 
 following gracious promise to the Princes of India : — 
 " We desire no extension of our present territorial pos- 
 " sessions, and, while we will permit no aggression upon 
 " our dominions, or our rights, to be attempted with 
 " impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on 
 '^ those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, 
 " and honor of Native Princes as our own." This 
 promise, then, although merely the revival of our 
 former Conservative system in India, was clearly ** a 
 "■ new policy" in 1858 ; so that Mr. Ludlow divined 
 the true importance of the Proclamation, when he 
 
95 
 
 named it, with curious felicity, " British India's Magna 
 " Charta,"* and prophesied that, in spite of the evil 
 influences that would be at work from the first to 
 strangle its pledges, the Proclamation would survive 
 every violation of its promises, and would settle the 
 principles of our future Anglo-Indian rule. Some of 
 his phrases cast a rainbow of hope over the dark 
 clouds of opposition he foresaw ; for instance, " Words 
 ** of grace and justice, once put forth, have a power, as 
 " it were, to draw up men's acts towards their own 
 " level." Again, " How often was Magna Charta 
 '' broken, how often confirmed, before it came to be 
 " what it is now, the very corner-stone of our social 
 ^^ state?" 
 
 I believe that Mr. Ludlow's anticipations will be 
 eventually realised, and that the " new policy " pro- 
 mised by the Proclamation of 1858, and so cordially 
 welcomed at the time, by England as well as India,f 
 must be carried into efi*ect, sooner or later, by the 
 impulse of public opinion. But the performance of its 
 promises has been delayed, and is still stubbornly 
 resisted by the old evil influences ; and, in the case of 
 Dhar, it is plain that nothing but the expression of 
 
 * " Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India," page 7. 
 
 I I mean the " people of India " — of course I do not forget the 
 hostile spirit in which this conciliatory proclamation was received hy 
 " the Services," and the contrast between their passive, and not always 
 passive, resistance to the " new policy," and its enthusiastic welcome 
 by the natives ( Vide Mr. Ludlow's book, just cited, pages 9, 10, and 
 364 to 367J. But the Services will not permanently oppose the will 
 of the nation : if they see that their country is determined to act, in 
 India, on the just and conciliatary principles proclaimed by Lord 
 Stanley, they are patriotic enough to adopt them, whether they like 
 them at first or not. 
 
9G 
 
 public opinion can force an old Whig Minister, with 
 whom annexation is a confirmed habit, " to respect the 
 " rights, dignity, and honor of a Native Prince." I 
 have done all I can do by giving a statement of the 
 facts ; and I trust that members of Parliament who 
 have been duped, like myself, by the unconditional 
 promises of the Indian Minister, in public and private, 
 will sunmion him to keep his word, to abolish the 
 miserable piece of patronage that stands in the way of 
 justice, and to hand over the management of his pos- 
 sessions to the much- wronged Rajah of Dhar. 
 
97 
 
 AFPENUICES 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 Lord KlleiihorourjKs Evidence before Select Commiftee on Indian Terri- 
 tories, June 18th, 1852. — Question 2,305. 
 
 " I consider that in fact our Government is at the head of a system 
 composed of Native States, and I would avoid taking what are called 
 ^ rightful occasions of appropriating ' the territories of Native States ; 
 on the contrary, I should be disposed, as far as I could, to maintain the 
 Native States, and I am satisfied that the maintenance of the Native 
 States, and the giving to the subjects of those States the conviction that 
 they were considered permanent parts of the general Government of 
 India, would materially strengthen our authority. It was impossible 
 for me not to see the respect which our own soldiers entertained for 
 Native Princes. I felt satisfied that I never stood so strong with my 
 own army as when I was surroimded by Native Princes ; they like to 
 see respect shown to their Native Princes. I observed, on all occasions, 
 that at the commencement of any interview between the Governor- 
 General and a Native Prince, there was a coldness, and suspicion, and 
 jealousy, and after the Governor-General had treated the Native Prince 
 upon the footing of equality, and received him with honour, the whole 
 feeling of the Native Prince, of all his court, of all his people, and of 
 all his soldiers, was entirely changed : and when I paid the return 
 visit to that Prince, I saw that I had the confidence of the people 
 and of his court and army; it was the consideration shown to their 
 chief that created that great change in their feelings. The Native 
 Princes are sovereigns of one-third of the population of Hindostan ; 
 and with reference to the future condition of the country, it becomes 
 more and more important to give them confidence, that no systematic 
 attempt will be made to take advantage of the failure of heirs to con- 
 fiscate their property, or to injure, in any respect, those sovereigns in 
 the position they at present occupy." 
 
 H 
 
98 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 E:ctract from ^^ India %m(Jer a Bureaucracy,^^ ^^y J- Dichinson, published 
 in 18oS, pages 164, 165. 
 
 *'They do not take these things so quietly in the country as we do 
 here. We hear of the absorption of a Native State, and go about our 
 business, and think no more of the matter ; like a ship's crew, who 
 didy note in the log, ' run down a vessel in the night, all hands lost ; ' 
 then pursue their voyage and forget it. But these things lodge and 
 rankle in men's minds in India, where too many of our troops are in- 
 terested in this question of adoption ; and, as I said before, the free 
 press is doing its work. 
 
 ** I am convinced that the Government will, some day, regret the 
 system that is making so many enemies. It will, some day, absorb a 
 Native State too many, and feel a pang like one who has put a fruit 
 into his mouth with a hornet in it. We must not expect the Rajput 
 princes to lie still like oysters, waiting to be dredged. They are, and 
 ever were, a high-spirited, martial race, prompt to appeal to the sword, 
 and just the men to say in a fit of exasperation, ' better an end with 
 fear, than fear without an end.' Meanwhile, the Natives have a 
 stereotyped expression for us, which gives us a false confidence. We 
 tread on ice, and forget the current of passion flowing beneath, which 
 imperils our footing. The Natives seem what they know we expect 
 them to appear, and we do not see their real feelings ; we know not 
 how hot the stove may be under its polished surface. For the fire is 
 not out ; we are obliged to keep it up by our Native army, which may 
 blaze into a conflagration, and burn the empire. There may be some 
 Procida, matchless in diplomatic art and tenacity of purpose, who will 
 travel for years to knit enemies against us ; who will mine the ground 
 under our feet, and lay the train of combustibles ; there may be some 
 outrage, which will suddenly raise a cry, terrible as that which broke 
 forth when the bells of Monreale w^ere sounding to vespers, a cry of 
 ' death to the EngHshmen ; ' there may be some conspiracy of which, 
 as at Yellore, we have not even a suspicion, until the Native regiments 
 open their fire on our barracks ; and, as a merchant who is obliged to 
 throw all his treasure overboard to save the ship, a storm may arise in 
 India which will cost us more to maintain our power than aU we have 
 gained, or can ever hope to gain, by our confiscations," 
 
99 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 Fallacy tJmt the Punjab saved India, 
 
 The officials who were responsible for this enormous blunder of 
 leaving Bengal, the seat of our Empire, with its forts, arsenals, stores, 
 treasure, and communications, at the mercy of a disaffected Sepoy 
 army, at a time when misgovernment had filled India with causes for 
 insurrection, subsequently invented the phrase, "the Punjab saved 
 India," to conceal their folly. But however the popular belief in 
 this fallacy that " the Punjab saved India " may be kept up for a 
 while by journals in the interest of the government, the truth must 
 come out at last that the Punjab " almost lost India ! " by embarrassing 
 its finances, and by absorbing the European force which would either 
 have prevented or have at once crushed the mutiny. As for " saving 
 India," if the Governor of the Punjab had not sent back a portion of 
 his European force to the provinces where we were fighting for 
 existence, when he was in no personal danger whatever himself, he 
 would have been a worse traitor than the Sepoys were; but the 
 sending reinforcements to the besiegers of Delhi only began the work 
 of " saving India : " witness the dangers and difficulties encountered 
 by Lord Clyde and Sir Hugh Kose in subsequent campaigns ! 
 
 A few words will explain the financial effect of annexing the Punjab, 
 and that peculiar good fortune of being exempt from personal danger, 
 which distinguished the Governor of the Punjab from every other 
 Governor in India during the Kebellion. 
 
 To begin with the finances : In the year 1857, besides the excess 
 of European strength allotted to the Punjab, it had a Native force of 
 various descriptions, partly Sepoys, and partly their hereditary enemies 
 the Sikhs.* There were 44,000 Sepoys, with some Sikhs among 
 them; 12,000 police, horse and foot, all disciplined soldiers ; 10,000 
 called detective poHce, and a large body (number unknown) of village 
 watchmen. The total army of the Punjab numbered, with camp- 
 followers, about 400,000 men ! and therefore it is not surprising 
 that this province entailed an annual loss on the finances of India of 
 upwards of two millions sterling, as Lord Canning proved in his 
 
 • And I must observe that although the orders of the government were not 
 fully carried out, and very few Sikhs were recruited, it was, in my opinion, a 
 great mistake to introduce any of them into regiments raised from the Natives of 
 Hindoostan. Such a step could not fail to rouse the suspicions of those races who 
 for generations, from father to son, had supplied the men of our Native army : it 
 seemed evident that the government no longer trusted to them, when it was 
 gradually arming and substituting for themselves, their most dangerous enemiea. 
 
 H 2 
 
100 
 
 !Minute of November, 1861. "With regard to the other point: At the 
 very beginning of the mutiny, the danger in the Punjab disappeared 
 almost within twenty-four hours, owing to the extraordinary energy of 
 Mr., now Sir Robert, Montgomery. On the 11th of May news arrived 
 at Lahore that a Sepoy mutiny had broken out on the previous evening 
 at Meerut. On the following morning, May 12th, a hun*ied telegi'am 
 announced the seizure of Delhi, on which Sir Robert Montgomery 
 immediately made up his mind that a crisis of the first magnitude had 
 arrived, and that he would deal with it as such. Accordingly, as Sir 
 John Lawrence was then in the North, at Rawul Pindee, and there 
 was no time for communicating with him (in fact, the destiny of the 
 Punjab was decided before he could get back to Lahore I) Montgomery 
 determined to act at once in the most decisive way, on his own responsi- 
 bility ; so, without interrupting a grand ball and supper which took 
 place the same evening, his preparations were rapidly and quietly 
 made, and at daybreak next morning the Sepoy regiments at 5leean 
 Meer were disarmed witliout a blow ; Ferozapore, with its immense 
 magazines, was secured a few hours later, and expresses had been 
 despatched to all the stations previously, announcing the strong 
 measures taken at the capital, and putting all our officers on their 
 guard, which ensured the securing of all the important stations, and the 
 disarming of the Sepoys everywhere during the following month, not 
 always vrithout local risk, but always without the central power of the 
 Punjab Government being ever endangered again for an instant. 
 
 Nor was the disarmament of the Sepoys the only source of security 
 to Sir John Lawrence : the spirit of the Sikh people, and of the neigh- 
 bouring Native Princes, was at least as great an assurance. I have 
 already alluded to the '' blood-feud " between the Sikhs and the 
 Hindoostanees, dating from the atrocities pei'petrated in the 18th 
 century, by the Mogul Emperors, and not diminished by our conquest 
 of the Punjab with Sepoy armies. Perhaps it may be interesting to 
 give an example of this hereditary hostility, which has never to my 
 knowledge appeared in print. Down to the period of the mutiny there 
 was always a large annual attendance of Sikhs at the great fair and 
 famous shrines of Hurdwar, on the Ganges, and most of them travelled 
 on foot, making long and hunied marches, often of 30 miles a day. 
 Nevertheless it was their habit to stop at Sirhind, and traverse the 
 ruins, which are many miles in extent, and at least a quarter of a mile 
 from the road at their nearest point, thus wasting precious time, and 
 going far out of their way, merely for the pleasure of making a visit to 
 Sirhind, which always ended by their taking up a brick, spitting upon 
 it, and thro'ssang it down, with the vow, spoken out, whoever might he 
 iQohing on, that as they had " looted " and utterly destroyed Sirhind, 
 so they would one day " loot " and utterly destroy Delhi, and raze 
 every house in the city to its foundations. It was clear that such, 
 fellows would make pretty warm allies against the Hindoos ; and it was 
 not long before they showed what stuff they were made of. 
 
 On the 14th of May, the day after the regiments at Meean Meer 
 
101 
 
 were tlisarmed, a report spread that they would make a rush for a 
 neighbouring station, where a Sepoy regiment still retained its arms. 
 The experienced officer in charge of the district, who knew the anti- 
 pathy that existed between the races, undertook *' to raise a human 
 barrier of villagers across their road," and appealed to the country 
 people. The agriculturists of the neighbourhood, who, as it happened, 
 had formed the flower of the Khalsa army, and afterwards furnished us 
 with a splendid corps of artillerymen, veterans from K,unjeet Singh's 
 army, these men turned out at once to fight and stop the Sepoys ; they 
 barricaded the road, watched a whole night, very nearly came to blows 
 with a detachment of English, whom they took for the Sepoy advance 
 guard, and thus showed from the beginning, as on every subsequent 
 opportunity, that Sikhs were at least as hostile to Sepoys as Englishmen 
 could be, while they were as much more dangerous, in proportion as 
 they were less scrupulous than Englishmen. (A Sepoy always carried 
 his money on his person, and possessed generally £5 at least, in his 
 normal condition, while those who had plundered the treasuries had 
 often ^50 a piece : they were too well worth killing to expect any 
 quarter from Sikhs !) 
 
 The result of this popular demonstration in the Punjab, within two 
 days after the appearance of the crisis, and of similar ones on the 
 following days, showed that the old feud between the races was as 
 strong as ever, and would give us a most powerful and warlike ally 
 against Hindoostanees in the Sikh population. Consequently, when 
 a Sepoy regiment was disarmed, the Sikh element in its ranks had 
 their arms restored to them ; we used the purely Sikh corps freely 
 in disarming the Sepoys; and having the immediate and cordial 
 adherence of the neighbouring Princes, the Eajahs of Cashmere, Put- 
 tealah, Bikaneer, Bhawulpore, Kuppoorthullah, &c., to confirm the 
 loyalty of the Punjabees, we began at once to recruit an army of Sikhs 
 to invade and " loot Hindoostan ; " while the Sepoys at Delhi were 
 fools enough to whet their appetite for revenge, by mutilating some of 
 their Sikh prisoners in the most cruel way, and sending them back to 
 General Barnard's camp in that state, as an example of the vengeance 
 they meant to take on the whole nation. Finally, it happened that the 
 Sikhs were agitated at that very time by a remarkable prophecy, 
 (which, strange to say, was literally fulfilled ! ) that they, in conjunction 
 with " Topee Wallahs " (" hat wearers," or the British), who should 
 come over the sea, would reconquer Delhi, and place the head of the 
 King's son on the very spot where the head of Gooroo Teg Bahadoor 
 had been exposed one hundred and eighty years before, by the son of 
 Aurungzebe.* Afterwards, when Hodson captured the old King, and 
 
 * By the way, it is known that after the murder of his wife and children, 
 Govind Gooroo escaped to the Deccan, but it is not generally known, except to the 
 Sikhs, that their saint has a shrine at Hyderabad ! a dangerous lure for these 
 reckless, daring fellows, who would go to the ends of the earth for " loot." The 
 best of the Sikhs, Jats, are by nature first-rate agriculturists ; and to send our 
 Sikh army back to the plough, would be better for them, and safer for us. 
 
102 
 
 shot his sons, his Sikh ressaldar, remembering tlie oracle, exposed their 
 bodies for three days on the same spot. These facts show that the 
 Grovernor of the Punjab was in no personal danger whatever, and he 
 could not have avoided sending reinforcements to Dellii without the 
 most cowardly and criminal neglect of duty. 
 
 But certain parties have cDmbined to pufF Sir John Lawrence as tlie 
 *' Saviour of the Empire I " and if nobody else has sufficient courage to 
 come forward and do so, I must, if I stand alone, deny his claim to 
 such a title ; because it involves the greatest injustice to other men, and 
 especially to the (yet unannexed) Xative Princes of India. 
 
 For instance, it was stated circumstantially by the Times of December 
 1st, 1863, that ** when the existence of our power in India depended 
 on the success of the siege of Delhi," — " the siege of Delhi owed its 
 success to Sir John Lawrence," and ** would have been abandoned 
 without his energetic remonstrances ; " — that ^' with nothing but a 
 small military force, and his own undaunted courage to rely on," in the 
 midst of a hostile population, " only waiting for the least symptom of 
 weakness to rise in insurrection," Sir John Lawrence contrived to 
 suppress the mutiny of his own Xative troops, to *• hold his province 
 without any of those disastrous reverses which befel us in other parts ; " 
 and " out of his own slender resources " to send troops, and stores, and 
 artillery to Delhi, " in a position in which it would have been thought a 
 great triumph for him even to preserve the Punjab." WeU, I have already 
 answered some of these assertions with regard to the '' hostile popula- 
 tion," the *' small military force," and the *' slender resources ; " another 
 of them, that the siege of Delhi would have been abandoned but for 
 Sir John Lawrence's energetic remonstrances, was contradicted in the 
 next day's Times by Lord Lyveden ; and the remaining assertion, that 
 the siege owed its success to Sir John Lawrence, was thus contradicted 
 by anticipation in ^^the Times of India," of July 9th, 1863: "The 
 charge against Lord Canning was, that he lacked decision and daring, 
 and we hardly know what else of the kindred virtues. But it sub- 
 sequently transpired, and we suppose it will startle the writer of * Our 
 Paper' considerably to be told the fact, that Sir John Lawrence, 
 famous as he is for decision, hesitated and broke down at the siege of 
 Delhi. He advised a treaty with the insurgents, and so did the General 
 in command ! We owed it to the vacillating, undecided Canning that 
 the treaty book was not polluted with a compact with the assassins of 
 Meerut and Delhi." I do not quote the above to substitute one hero- 
 worship for another ; I object to any of them. In the fearful crisis of 
 1857, every Englishman did his best, as a matter of course, and it 
 seems invidious to proclaim any one of them, as the Timcs^ on such 
 unsubstantial grounds, proclaims Sir John Lawrence, the " Saviour of 
 the Empire ! " Moreover, it is unjust to the enlightened portion of the 
 Natives of India, who supported us through the struggle, as I show in 
 the text. 
 
 I know it may seem as if I liked to be always in opposition, if I 
 venture just now to differ from the popular estimat-e of Sir John 
 
108 
 
 Lawrence, when the press, and the political leaders on both sides, 
 have hailed him by acclamation as the best qualified Governor-General 
 that ever embarked for India. But if I cannot suppress the light that 
 is in me, it is not because I ' * like to be always in opposition ; " on the 
 contrary, after having worked hard so many years for India, and having 
 lived to see every part of the original programme of the India Reform 
 Society admitted to be right in principle, and more or less carried out in 
 practice, I cannot lilce to be for ever in " disgrace " with men in power, 
 honored with no distinction that they can withhold from me, and tlie 
 object of unconcealed aversion or suspicion to their legion of fiiendw 
 and dependents. Yet I have strong reasons for regarding the appoint- 
 ment of Sir John Lawrence with anxiety and alarm : and not the less 
 so because I admit all that is said of his energy and ability. At a time 
 when I see so many symptoms of a revival of Lord Dalhousie's system 
 in India, in reliance on a British army of 80,000 men, I cannot forget 
 that Sir John Lawrence was the most uncompromising agent of that 
 system. Sir John trusted to force, as instinctively as his brother. Sir 
 Henry Lawrence, trusted to justice and generosity, and in the Punjab 
 he had an overwhelming force, not only of the Native but the European 
 army, to support his measures. But we cannot govern all India in 
 this " zubberdust " style ; or, as a native gentleman once happily ex- 
 pressed it : " You cannot govern India on those principles with an 
 army of 300,000 Englishmen, though you might reduce it to a desert 
 with 50,000." The case of Bischen Singh may be familar to a few 
 Anglo-Indians, but scarcely any know how numerous such cases were. 
 Yet it was known to the authorities; for when Lord Ellenborough 
 brought forward this case on July 11th, 1856, — which he did in that 
 style which no orator has ever surpassed and few have equalled, — the 
 sting of the Duke of Argyle's reply was contained in the last sentence 
 ef his speech, in which he warned the House to beware what they 
 were about, as a favourable decision on this petition might affect 5,000 
 or 6,000 other such cases. 
 
 No doubt there were thousands of such cases. I am informed that 
 the last time Lord Canning visited the Punjab, when he gave back 
 quietly an immense quantity of lands that had been thus taken by Sir 
 John Lawrence, he was so astonished at the numbers of petitioners, and 
 the strength of their claims, that he asked why they had never com- 
 plained to him before ? The answer was : " If we had complained of 
 John Lawrence, we should have been stripped, not only of all he had 
 taken, but of all he had left us." In fact, the system of ruining the 
 Native aristocracy, and removing everything between our government 
 and the cultivator of the soil, was ^jarried on as vigorously in the Pun- 
 jab as in any part of India ; and therefore I say, God forbid that the 
 new Governor- General should bring back the old " grasping" system ! 
 
 Another reason for a word of warning. The greatest difficulty India 
 Reformers had to encounter twelve or fourteen years ago was the pro- 
 found respect paid by everybody in England to the " authority of the 
 Governor-General." For this reason, all the pamphlets, and speeches. 
 
104 
 
 and petitions from India in the year 1853' went for notliing. Even the 
 decision of a Cabinet Council on a Saturday, was reversed on tlie 
 following Monday, in deference to the oracle from India. And this 
 overwhelming " authority " was produced by a combination of parties 
 beyond what even the philosophic Mill could foresee. It was not only 
 the Minister, whose interest it was " to prevent inspection, to lull 
 suspicion asleep, to ward off inquiry, to inspu'e a blind confidence, to 
 praise incessantly the management of affairs in India, and, by the 
 irresistible force of his influence, make other people praise it ; " * 
 it was not only the Minister who " smothered complaint " (and a 
 Minister has always a number of disinterested friends to do his work, 
 in Parliament, in the press, and in private society), but the religious 
 world joined in the concert of praise, because of the Governor-General's 
 zeal for the propagation of Christianity in India. This consideration 
 induced the Christians of Exeter Hall, headed by powerful leaders in 
 and out of Parliament, to swallow everything, before the India Reform 
 Society put them to shame — annexations, resumptions, mal-administra- 
 tion in the judicial system, in the police system, in the system of 
 taxation, of public works, of the employment of Natives in the public 
 service, even of the practice of torture — they digested everything, to 
 unite with the Government in raising the authority of a Governor- 
 General, so zealous for the propagation of Christianity in India. Now, 
 therefore, when I see the same combination of parties employed to raise 
 above all questioning the " authority " of the new Governor-General, 
 remembering the difficulty we had before, I naturally wish to warn the 
 public in time, that the former administration of Sir John Lawrence 
 was not faultless, and that, although I sincerely hope his future course 
 may be so, if he does make any mistakes, it should not again require a 
 rebellion, a dozen years of discussion, and as much evidence and 
 expense as a dozen great trials in coui*ts of law, to make people believe 
 him fallible. 
 
 * Mill's Hist, of India, Vol. iv., page 571. 
 
105 
 
 APPENDIX D. 
 
 Extracts from Memoir of Sir Claude Wade, in the Annual Rejport of 
 the Royal Asiatic Society, 1862. 
 
 " It may be worth while to state here, in his own words, those 
 simple principles by which Sir Claude Wade achieved such extra- 
 ordinary success in all his future intercourse with the '' Lion of the 
 Punjaub " (Eunjeet Singh). ' I used my best endeavours,' he said, * to 
 follow the example of Lord Metcalfe in balancing the interests of the 
 two States, and identifying their policy, as paramount to every other 
 object. In India, it is essential to the proper care and preservation of 
 our system of alHances, that the British Agent should be regarded as a 
 friend of the chiefs among whom he resides, rather than as a mere 
 instrument for conveying the instructions or enforcing the policy of 
 their foreign masters. Our rigid rule is not congenial with their 
 national habits, and a softening agency may wisely be exercised to 
 inspire the confidence of our Indian alHes, without losing sight of the 
 views and interests of our own country.* 
 
 "It is worthy of remark that, although dealing throughout the 
 greater part of his career with men of the sword, who appeared to 
 recognise no authority but that of force. Sir Claude Wade never had 
 occasion to employ military means to effect his objects during the 
 whole course of his agencies at Loodiana or Indore." 
 
106 
 
 APPENDIX E. 
 
 {From the Times of India, July 28, 1861). 
 
 *' The appointment of Colonel Durand to the Foreign Secretaryship 
 at Calcutta, in the room of Mr. Barnes, is, we learn from the Home 
 Secretary's speech in Parliament on the 6th ultimo, desiderated by 
 no less a personage than the Viceroy himself. 
 
 " ' Lord Canning had written home, proposing that a member of the 
 Indian Council, Colonel Durand, should go out to India, and take the 
 place of Foreign Secretary ; that gallant officer being most eminently 
 fitted, in the opinion of the Governor-General, for the office.* Colonel 
 Durand has responded to the invitation, and the whole ' of the Indian 
 Council were perfectly willing that the Government of India should 
 have the assistance desired. Yet, under the existing law, the appoint- 
 ment could not be made.' 
 
 *' We are prepared to accord so much praise to Colonel Durand's 
 personal and professional character, that some of our readers may 
 possibly think us guilty of inconsistency, in suggesting, after all, that 
 such an appointment is by no means desirable. But it is the fact that 
 Colonel Durand's failure as a Political has been as conspicuous as 
 his merits as a soldier. Sir Charles Wood could hardly have chosen a 
 more unhappy illustration of the necessity of throwing open the Civil 
 Ser\ice to outsiders, than the desire to appoint Colonel Durand to an 
 office for which he is eminently unfit. That Colonel Durand possesses 
 great talents and ability of a high order, with indefatigable perse- 
 verance, we admit cheerfully, but his antecedents show that he is not 
 the man to be used with advantage in political employ. As an 
 engineer, we believe. Colonel Durand stands in the foremost ranks of 
 the army ; and no man probably has a better knowledge of, or more 
 complete insight into, our whole military system than he, while the 
 services rendered by him in the field in the Afighan War were con- 
 spicuous and real. 
 
 " Had Lord Canning, therefore, desired Colonel Durand's presence in 
 Calcutta as MiHtary Secretary, or Military Member of Council, we 
 should have hailed the appointment possibly with delight, certainly 
 
107 
 
 with satisfaction. But as Foreign Secretary we apprehend it were 
 impossible for a more unpopular nomination to have been made, short 
 of Colonel Ramsay, of Nepaul. It is becoming of increasing im- 
 portance, day by day, that our political agents all over India should 
 be distinguished by their mastery of the accomplishments, or possession 
 of the natural grace, by which intercourse with the Native princes of 
 the country are so materially assisted, while the want of that grace or 
 of those accomplishments has been conspicuous throughout the whole 
 of Colonel Durand's political career. The whole responsibility of the 
 selection rests, it seems, upon Lord Canning, and we are certainly 
 curious to know what infatuation can have suggested this extraordinary 
 nomination. Colonel Durand's administration whilst at Moulmein will 
 hardly, we presume, be allowed to be the ground of his selection, any 
 more than his success at Gwalior during the few short months of his 
 office there, which led to the expulsion of the Tarabhaee, and the dis- 
 cord and heartburnings that prevailed at the court. At Bhopal, again, 
 do we not find Colonel Durand's evil genius pursuing him still, and 
 leading him to countenance, as pretender to the Musnud, the man who 
 subsequently raised the standard of revolt against us at Indore, and drove 
 Colonel Durand himself out of Malwa ? And lastly, at Indore itself, 
 in the terrible crisis of the mutiny, is not the memory of Colonel 
 Durand's failure present to all minds? A failure, too, occm'ring at 
 one of those moments upon which history waits with * bated breath.' 
 Distinguished for a cold severity of manner, imperfectly acquainted 
 with the vernacular languages, possessing little insight into the 
 character of the people, and strongly prejudiced against them by 
 a constitutional and invincible repugnance. Colonel Durand is perhaps 
 the very last officer whom Lord Canning could advantageously 
 select as the mouth-piece of the Governor-General in public or private 
 Durbar, or as the medium of official communication with the Native 
 courts of the country. As every well-informed man in India knows, 
 it is essential to the success of a political agent that he should be dis- 
 tinguished for imperturbable mildness of manner, dignity of deport- 
 ment, and perfect command of Court language, while no officer can be 
 aught but a failure who has not learned to sympathise with and feel 
 kindly towards the people in spite of the peculiarities which we admit 
 and deplore. Colonel Durand is constitutionally unfitted for political 
 employ, and the elevation of this gentleman to the head of the political 
 service is one of those strange caprices of patronage which, were it 
 associated with any other name than that of Lord Canning (for whom 
 we have a sincere respect), we should unhesitatingly ascribe to jobbery. 
 At all events. Sir Charles Wood could hardly have stumbled upon a 
 more unhappy illustration of the fact that the public interests required 
 the throwing open of the Civil Service to such officers." 
 
108 
 
 APPENDIX F. 
 
 Oommunications from the DJuir Government ivhich lyreceded the advance 
 of the British Column. 
 
 " Abstract translation of an Urzee from the Dhar Vakeel, 11th October, 
 
 1857. 
 
 " About 10, P.M., on the 9th instant (Friday), all the Wulaitees in 
 the service of my master, that were on duty at different places in the 
 town, got under arms, and about 100 of them went towards Bhopawur; 
 but it is not exactly known to what place they intended to go. The 
 Mekranees seem also inclined to mutiny. The report of the Agent 
 going to Dhar might have caused this movement. 
 " Verbal Message. 
 " Yesterday, 10th, about 9, a.m., all the Mussulmans in the town of 
 Dhar, with a portion of the Sibundee, collecting outside the town, set 
 up a Mahomedan standard. Some Pathans from Mundisore coming in 
 have offered high pays, fifteen and twenty rupees per head. The Bud- 
 mashes that had gone towards Bhopawur plundered Government mails. 
 " (True translation). 
 (Signed) " W. E. Shakespear, 
 " Officiating First Assistant Agent to the Governor- 
 General for Central India.''** 
 
 " To Capt. A. K. E. Hutchinson, 
 
 " Bheel Agent and Political Assistant, Bhopawur. 
 " Honored Sir, 
 
 *' News came just now from Dhar that the Budmash Pathans of 
 that place, accompanied by those of Amjheera, went to Bhopawur, 
 burnt the bungalows, and, taking possession of guns and ammunition, 
 went towards Sirdapore. The bungalows of this place also they burnt, 
 and the guns and ammunition were taken possession of. In the affray 
 which ensued there a Native clerk was wounded by a bullet, and two 
 men killed — the names of whom are not yet discovered. Some men 
 are also killed at Sirdapore, but it is not known who they are. The 
 Budmashes are increasing day by day; therefore you will be kind 
 enough in making arrangements for their punishment, and restoring 
 
 ♦ Pari. Paper, No. 200, of 1859, page 
 
 13. 
 
109 
 
 the tranquility of the State, as it looks to you for assistance. I beg to 
 request that you will not leave the Jiudmashes unpunished for crimes 
 they had committed. 
 
 *' In short, the welfare of the State depends on your generosity, 
 (Signed) " Raghonath Narain, 
 
 Vaked of JJhar. 
 " 12th October, 1857." 
 
 " To Capt. A. R. E. Hutchinson, 
 
 *^ Political Assistant and Bheel Agent. 
 " Honored Sir, 
 
 " I received a letter from the Durbar yesterday, dated 11th inst., 
 that the Pathans, with Jamadar Goolkhan and others, went to !5ho- 
 pawur on the 9th inst., on their way they looted the Dawk. The 
 letter states that several parties of Pathans poured down from all 
 directions at once, and from this the Durbar concludes that there was a 
 mutual settlement amongst them. They fought with the Bheel Corps, 
 wrested from them the guns and ammunition, and set fire to the 
 Bungalow there. This is nothing but oppression and tyranny. It is 
 reported that the Budmashes will return and stop outside the town 
 near the fort. These Budmashes deserve immediate punishment ; but 
 the other Sepoys have also an internal communication with them. I 
 hear that these Budmashes have kept picquets on the public road, to 
 prevent communication that way, which is a great obstacle for post to 
 come and go. The Durbar looks to you as its well wisher and 
 supporter, and hopes that you will render any assistance in your power 
 at this critical time. You will not fail to show that kindness at this 
 time which you showed heretofore, [t is rumoured that the Bud- 
 mashes are 1,500 in number. 
 
 (Signed) " Raghonath Narain, 
 
 " Vakeel of Dhar* 
 
 " 12th October, 1857." 
 
 " Translation of an urzee from the Vakeel of Dhar to the Officiating 
 
 Agent Governor General for Central India, dated 12th October, 
 
 1857, received on the 13th October. 
 
 " The Vilaitees and Pathan mercenaries of Dhar mutinying went to 
 Bhopawur, and fighting with the detachment of Malwah Bheel Corps 
 there, and seizing their guns and ammunition, have returned to Dhar, 
 and are encamped outside. What they intend to do next is unknown. 
 No confidence whatever can now be placed in any troops (Seebundees, 
 &c.) so as to employ them against the rebels. Such I have been in- 
 formed by the Sirkar, and report to you accordingly. The only confi- 
 dence of the Rajah now is in yon, and you should make the best 
 (bundobust) arrangement in your judgment. 
 
 " (True translation.) 
 (Signed) " F. J. H. Helbert, 
 
 " Assistant Agent Governor General for Central India.''* 
 
110 
 
 APPENDIX G. 
 
 Order from Capt. Hutchinson respecting supply of ammunition to rebels. 
 
 "Abstract translation of a khareeta from Capt. Hutchinson to the 
 Kajah of Dhar, dated Oct. 23rd, 1857. 
 
 " (After compliments). The Durbar professes to be in friendly re- 
 lations with the British Government, and, on account of this, the 
 Officiating Agent to Governor-General (Col. Durand) has come with a 
 column to assist them. But we hoar that the rebels are asking the 
 Durbar to supply them with ammunition (powder and balls), and if the 
 Durbar do so, they will be treated like rebels." 
 
LIBRARY USE 
 
 RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED 
 
 LOAN DEPT. 
 
 THIS BOOK IS DUE BEFORE CLOSING TIME 
 ON LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW 
 
 W^ 
 
 "Ol^^ST^ 
 
 Jm '6e-iOA jg 
 
 '"OAN 
 
 oePT. 
 
 LD 62A-50m-7,'65 
 (F5756sl0)9412A 
 
 General Library 
 
 University of California 
 
 Berkeley 
 
^^^^^^^^'^7'^W'PfWfiif 
 
 
 
 -■ 
 
 
 
 
 i. 
 
 ■BBh.' 
 
 
 ■I •; .!•■