■'.' .>/'• WM 2IO '^^^ THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY: ,|JC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY G OOP 005 859 4 7^ THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR. AUTHORISED TRANSLATIONS. The Psychology of Attention. Second Edition. Pages, 121. Cloth, 75 cents. Paper, 25 cents. The Diseases of the Will. Pages, 134. Cloth, 75 cents. Paper, 25 cents. The Diseases of Personality. Second, Revised Edition. Pages, 163. Cloth, 75 cents. Paper, 25 cents. Full Set, Cloth, net, $1 7S- The Open Court Publishing Co. CHICAGO, ill. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY BY TH. RIBOT PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE AND EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY IN THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE AUTHORISED TRANSLATION THIRD, REVISED EDITION CHICAGO THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY FOR SALE BY Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner & Co., London. 1898 TRANSLATION COPYRIGHTED BY THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO. 1891. Biomedical library J5 2/au^ ^U4y^n^%^ 635166 PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION. Since these studies were first published (in 1884), the ques- tions involved in the disorders and alterations of the personality- have given rise to numerous works.* It is not my intention here to epitomise those investigations. That would furnish matter for a separate volume. If we pass in review all the cases in which the personality, the unity of the ego, has been at all impaired, from slight and fugitive partial alterations to complete metamorphosis, we shall be able, I think, to divide them into two large groups : spontaneotis altera- tions and provoked alterations. The first, or natural alterations, are to be reached only by ob- servation and in grave cases spring from some deep and permanent disorder of the vital functions. The second, the artificial alterations, produced by experiment, usually by hypnotism, come from without, do not always penetrate to the profoundest parts of the individual, and remain essentially superficial and transitory, unless by repetition they create a new mental habitude. Although the history of our subject does not go very far back, — *Binet and Fere, Le magnitisme animal: Binet, Etudes de psychologie ex* ferhnentale: Pierre Janet, V automatistne psychologique ; Azam, Hypnotisme, double co7iscience et alterations de la personnalite ; Bourru and Burot, Varia' tions de la personnalite : Paulhan, Vactiviti mentale et les iliments de V esprit ; W. James, Principles 0/ Psychology, vol. i, ch. x, numerous articles in the Pro' ceedings of the Society for Psychical Research: Max Dessoir, Das Doppd-Ich, etc., etc. vi THE DISEASES OE PERSONALITY. extending, at most, over forty years, — it has two periods. In the first, spontaneous alterations were exclusively studied ; in the sec- ond, following the renaissance of hypnotism, psychologists were wholly occupied with provoked and artificial disorders. While fully recognising the significance of the last-named class, I am yet inclined to believe, till proof is brought to the contrary, that the spontaneous alterations, which are the principal and almost exclu- sive subject of the present volume, still remain the solidest data for the study of the morbid manifestations of personality. Th. Ribot. Paris, May, 1891. TABLE OF CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION. PAGE Definition and division of the subject i Consciousness : nature and origin 3 Consciousness, a perfection of definite physiological events. , , 6 Facts supporting this hypothesis 7 Importance of the psychical factor 16 CHAPTER I. ORGANIC DISORDERS. The sense of the body, its importance and complexity 18 Slight variations of the personality in the normal state 29 More serious cases 32 Cases of double personality 33 Personality of double monsters 36 Personality of twins 43 CHAPTER n. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS. Classification 51 Depressions and exaltations of the personality 53 Their alternation in circular insanity 57 Complete metamorphosis of the personality 59 Sexual characters : eunuchs, hermaphrodites, opposite sexu- ality 61 Total transformation of character 67 Foundations of the personality : personal unity and identity the psychic expression of the unity and identity of the or- ganism 81 viii THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY, - CHAPTER III. DISORDERS OF THE INTELLECT. PAGE Alterations proceeding from parassthesia and dyssesthesia 92 Alterations proceeding from hallucinations 100 Cerebral dualism and double personality: discussion 106 Role of the memory 113 Role of ideas ; transformations proceeding from above ; their superficial character ; " possessed " and hypnotised subjects 117 Disappearance of the personality in mystics 123 CHAPTER IV. DISSOLUTION OF PERSONALITY, v Progressive dementia : cases of real double personality; periods of the dissolution 126 Attempt at a classification of the diseases of the personality; three principal types : alienation, alternation, substitution. , 133 CONCLUSION. Zoological individuality and its ascending evolution 138 Colonial consciousness 140 Physical synthesis and psychical synthesis of personality in man 145 The ego is a co-ordination 150 Index 159 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY INTRODUCTION. I. By ''person" in psychological language we under- stand generally the individual, as clearly conscious of itself, and acting accordingly : it is the highest form of individuality. To explain this attribute, which it reserves exclusively for man, metaphysical psychology is satisfied with the hypothesis of an ego, absolutely one, simple, and identical. Unfortunately, however, this is only illusive clearness and a semblance of solu- tion. Unless we attribute to this ego a supernatural origin, it will be necessary to explain how it is born, and from what lower form it proceeds. Accordingly, experimental psychology must propound the problem differently, and treat it by different methods. Experi- mental psychology learns from natural scientists that in the majority of cases it is difficult even to establish the characteristics of individuality, which are far less complex than those of personality. Hence it mistrusts simple solutions, and, far from regarding the question as solved at the outset, it looks for the solution at the close of its researches, as the result of long and labor- ious investigations. Therefore, it is but natural that the representatives of the old school, slightly be- wildered at the situation, should accuse the adherents 2 THE DISEASES OE PERSONALITY. of the new school of '< filching their ego," although nothing justifying such a charge has ever been at- tempted. However, the language and the methods of the two sides are now so different, that all mutual understanding is henceforth impossible. At the risk of increasing the already extant confusion, I propose to investigate what teratological, morbid, or simply rare, cases can teach us concerning the forma- tion and disorganisation of personality, though without the pretension of treating the subject in its entirety, deeming such an undertaking at present premature. Personality being the highest form of psychic indi- viduality, the preliminary question arises : What is the individual? There are few problems that have been more debated in our time among naturalists, or that remain more obscure for the lower stages of ani- mal life. This is not the place to go into the details of the problem. At the close of our work, after we have studied the constituent elements of personality, we shall consider this question as a whole. It will then be time to compare personality with the lower forms through which nature has essayed to produce it, and to show, that the psychic individual is the expression of an organism, being, as that is, low, simple, inco- herent, or unified and complex. For the present, it will be sufficient to recall to readers at all familiar with the subject, that in descending the animal scale we always see the psychic individual formed of a more or less complete fusion of simpler individuals, as also ''a colonial consciousness " created by the co-operation of local consciousnesses. These discoveries of modern naturalists are of the utmost importance to psychol- ogy. By them the problem of personality is completely transformed. Henceforth that problem must be stud- INTRODUCTION. 3 ied from below ; while we are led to ask, whether the human person itself is also not vn tout de coalition — a whole by coalition — the extreme complexity of which veils from us its origin, and the origin of which would remain impenetrable, if the existence of elementary forms did not throw some light upon the mechanism of that fusion. The human personality — the only one of which we can speak with any fitness in a pathological study — is a concrete whole, a complexus. To know it, we must analyse it. But analysis here is disastrously ar- tificial, since it disjoins groups of phenomena which are not juxtaposed, but co-ordinated, their relation be- ing that of mutual dependence, not of simple simulta- neousness. Still, the work is indispensable. Adopting a division both clear and, as I trust, self-justified, I shall study successively the organic, affective, and in- tellectual conditions of personality, chiefly emphasising their anomahes and disorders. Our final study of the subject will permit us to group anew these disjoined elements. II. But before entering on the exposition and interpre- tation of facts, it will be profitable, in the interests of clearness and candor, to get first some understanding of the nature of consciousness. It is not a question here of a monograph, embracing, so to speak, the whole of psychology; it will suffice to present the problem in a precise form. Neglecting details, we are confronted with only two hypotheses : the one, a very old hypothesis, which re- gards consciousness as the fundamental property of '* the soul " or ''mind," as that which constitutes its es- 4 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. ■\ sence ; the other, a very recent theory, which regards it as a simple phenomenon, superadded to the activity of the brain — as an event having its own conditions of ex- istence, appearing and disappearing according to cir- cumstances. The first hypothesis has held sway for so many centuries, that it has become an easy matter to appraise its merits and deficiencies. It is not for me to call this theory to the bar ; I shall restrict myself to show- ing its radical incompetence to explain the unconscious life of the mind. For a long time it took no notice of this unconscious life. The precise and profound views of Leibnitz upon this question were forgotten or, at least, were not applied ; and up to the present century, the most renowned psychologists (with few excep- tions) wholly limited themselves to consciousness. When finally the problem was thrust upon them, and it became plain to all that to reduce psychic life to the exclusive data of consciousness was a conception so poor and scant as to be practically useless — then great confusion arose. So-called ^'unconscious states" were admitted — an ambiguous and half-contradictory term, which has spread rapidl}', and has its equivalent in all languages, but which clearly betrays the period of con- fusion in which it was born. What are these uncon- scious states? Prudent writers attest their existence, without any attempt at explanation. The more ven- turesome speak of ''latent ideas," of "unconscious consciousness "; expressions so vague and inconsistent that many authors have frankly admitted their defects. In fact, if the soul be conceived as a thinking sub- stance, of which the states of consciousness are modi- fications, it will be impossible without manifest contra- diction to impute to it unconscious states ; all shifts INTRODUCTION. 5 of language or of dialectic are of no avail here ; and as we cannot deny the high importance of these uncon- scious states as factors of the psychic life, there is no exit from this inextricable situation. The second hypothesis escapes from all this logom- achy; it precludes the factitious problems that crop up in the first (for example, whether consciousness is a general or particular faculty, etc.), and we may fear- lessly claim for it the benefits of the lex parcimonice. It is simpler, clearer, and more consistent. In con- trast to the other, it may be characterised by saying that it expresses the unconscious in physiological terms (states of the nervous system), and not in ps}^- chological terms (latent ideas, non-felt sensations, etc.). But this is only a particular case of the hypoth- esis, which must be considered in its entirety. We will first remark that consciousness, like all general terms, must be resolved into concrete data. Just as, generally speaking, there is no will, but only volitions, so also, generally speaking, there is no con- sciousness, but only states of consciousness. They alone are the reality. To defaie the state of conscious- ness, the fact of being conscious, would be a futile, supererogatory task ; it is a datum of observation, an ul- timate fact. Physiology tells us that its production is always associated with the activity of the nervous sys- tem, particularly of the brain. But the reverse does not hold true. All psychic activity implies nervous activity, but all nervous activity does not imply psychic activity. Nervous activity is far more extensive than psychic activity. Consciousness, therefore, is some- thing superadded. In other words, it is to be con- sidered, that every state of consciousness is a complex event, which supposes a particular state of the ner- 6 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY, vous system ; that this nervous process is not an adsci- titious, but an integral part of the event ; what is more, that it is its basis and fundamental condition ; that, when produced, the event exists of itself, but as soon as consciousness is added, it exists /^r itself ; that con- sciousness completes and perfects the event, but does not constitute it. By this hypothesis it is easy to understand how all manifestations of psychic life, sensations, desires, feel- ings, volitions, memories, reasonings, inventions, etc., may be alternately conscious and unconscious. There is nothing mysterious in this change of states, since in all cases the essential conditions, i. e., the physiologi- cal conditions, for each event remain the same, while consciousness is simply its perfection. It remains to establish why this perfection is some- times present, and sometimes wanting. For, if in the physiological phenomenon itself there were not something more present in the first case than in the second, the victory would indirectly remain with the adverse hypothesis. Could it be proved that every time that certain physiological conditions exist, con- sciousness appears ; that whenever they are wanting, consciousness disappears; and whenever they vary, consciousness also varies — then we should no longer have an hypothesis, but a scientific truth. We are still very far from this goal. In any event, we may be sure that consciousness itself will not furnish the neces- sary light. As Maudsley justly observes, conscious- ness cannot at the same time be effect and cause — cannot be itself and its molecular antecedents. It lives only for a moment, and cannot by a direct intuition re- turn to its immediate physiological antecedents ; be- INTRODUCTION. 7 sides, to revert to those material antecedents, would be to lay hold of, not itself, but its cause. At present it would be chimerical to attempt even a rough establishment of the necessary and sufficient conditions of the appearance of consciousness. We know that the cerebral circulation, in the double aspect of quantity and quality of blood, is of great importance. A palpable proof of this is furnished by experiments on the heads of freshly beheaded animals. We know that the duration of the nervous processes in the centres is also of influence. Psychometric researches demon- strate daily that the more complex a state of conscious- ness is the longer time it requires, and that, on the other hand, automatic acts — primitive or acquired, the rapidity of which is extreme — do not enter conscious- ness. We can also assume that the appearance of consciousness is connected with the period of dis- assim.ilation of the nervous tissue, as Herzen has ex- haustively shown.* All these results, however, are only partial conquests ; the scientific knowledge of the genesis of a phenomenon supposes the determination of all its essential conditions. The near future, perhaps, will furnish these. In the meantime, to corroborate our hypothesis, it will be more profitable to show, that it alone explains a chief character (not a condition) of consciousness — its inter- mission. To avoid at the outset all dubiousness, I shall observe that it is not a question here of the dis- continuity of the states of consciousness among them- selves. Each has its limits, which, while permitting it to associate with others, at the same time preserve its peculiar individuality. It is not this that occupies us * La condizione fisica della cosczenza, Rome, 1879, and Le cerveau et Vacti- viti cerebrate , 1887. 8 THE DISEASES OE PERSONALITY. here, but simply that well-known fact that conscious- ness has its interruptions, or, as we say in popular parlance, that ''we do not always think." It is true, this assertion has been contested by the majority of metaph3^sicians. They never have fur- nished proofs in the support of tlieir position, and as all appearances are against it, the onus pi-obandi ^NOvXdi naturally seem to lie with them. Their whole argu- ment reduces itself to asserting that since the soul is essentially a thinking subject, it is impossible that consciousness should not always exist in some degree, even when no trace of it is left in memory. But this is simply a begging of the question, since it is pre- cisely their major premise that the hypothesis main- tained by us contests. Their alleged proof, in fine, is simply a deduction drawn from a contested hypothesis. It is beyond our plan here to examine this in detail ; a summary will suffice. If, discarding all preconceived ideas, we abide by the simple observation of facts, we are confronted with the following great practical difficulty, that it is often impossible to decide whether the case presented is unconsciousness or amnesia (lack of memory). If a state of consciousness appears, lasts onl}' a short time, does not organise itself in memory, leaves no trace of its passage, it is as good as non-existent for the individ- ual. Now, the existence of such evanescent conscious- nesses is demonstrated : it is not an absence of con- sciousness, but an absence of m.emory. Excluding such cases, others remain, where for impartial criti- cism it is impossible not to admit that the complete disappearance of consciousness is the sole probable hypothesis. It has been maintained that there is no sleep with- INTRODUCTION. 9 out dreams ; bur this is a purely theoretical assertion. The sole argument of fact that can be pleaded in sup- port of it is, that sometimes a sleeper, addressed or questioned, makes a proper reply, yet upon waking has no recollection of the matter. However, this fact does not justify a general conclusion. It is to be further remarked — and this is an im- portant point — that all who have investigated whether perfect cerebral sleep exists have been cultured and active minds, (psychologists, physicians, men of let- ters,) in whom the brain is ever upon the alert, like a delicate instrument vibrating to the touch of the slightest excitation, and possessed, as it were, of a habitude of consciousness. Thus, it happens that the very men who propound the problem: ''Do we al- ways dream ? " are really the least competent to supply a negative solution. But this is not the case with peo- ple engaged in manual occupations. A peasant living remote from all intellectual agitation, limited to the same occupations and the same routine of life, in gen- eral does not dream. I know several, who regard dreams as a rare accident of nocturnal life. Besides, some men of remarkable intellectual activity (Lessing, Reid, and others) affirm they have never dreamed. It is hardly probable that some sleeps, succeeding periods of great ph3^sical fatigue, are not, at least momentarily, free from dreams. In surgical operations artificial anaes- thesia is rarely pushed to the point of absolute insensi- bility. It seems, however, that in some cases, studied by good observers * on their own persons, complete un- consciousness has been produced for a period varying from a few seconds to a minute and more. In epileptic * See Lacassagne, Mimoires de Vacadimie de midecine, v. iii, 1869, pp. 30 and 36. 10 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. vertigo, known also by the names of ^^ petit vial^'' '^ ab- sence,'' ^^ attack," a complete loss of consciousness is often observed, accompanied by a sudden interruption of sentences and their resumption, after the attack, at precisely the same point.* But I ascribe without hesi- tation to the account of pure amnesia the states known by the name of ''ambulatory comitial automatism," which lasts days and hours. Moreover, in coming back to the normal state many of these sick persons volun- tarily declare that ''they seem to have awaked from a dream." Shocks and blows on the head, sudden com- motions usually produce unconsciousness with retroac- tive amnesia ; that is to say, the events immediately preceding the accident leave behind no traces in the memory, while there is produced thus in the mental life of the patient a gap varying in duration from a fev/ seconds to several minutes. Dr. Hamilton, who has studied these accidents minutely from the point of view of medical jurisprudence, f and has collected twenty-six authentic cases, believes he can establish a law that retroactive amnesia is directly proportional to the duration of unconsciousness. If the last is partial and brief, retroactive amnesia embraces only a few seconds ; if it is total and long, the amnesia increases proportionately. J I do not see what objections can be made to facts of this kind, unless, indeed, we revert to the inevit- * Numerous examples maybe found in all authors treating of epilepsy. For interrupted conversations, see especially Forbes Winslow, On Obscure Di- seases of the Brain and Mind, p. 322 et seq.; Maudsley, Pathology of Mind, (French Trans.) pp. 9, 10; Fuel, De la catalipsie (Mem. de I'acad. de med., 1856, p. 475)- ^ Loss of Consciousness, in the Proc. of the Medico-legal Society of New York, 3rd series, 1886, p. 206 et seq. i This passage, from the words "Besides, some men, etc.," replaces in the later editions of Les Maladies de la Personnaliti a passage from Despine. — Trans. INTRODUCTION, ii able hypothesis of states of consciousness that leave no traces in memory ; but, I repeat, this is a gratuitous hypothesis, destitute of probability. People who are subject to fainting spells with loss of consciousness, well knov/, that pending their duration they might fall down, hurt a limb, or upset a chair, yet on recovering their senses, not have the faintest idea of what had taken place. Is it likely that if these sufficiently se- rious accidents had been attended with consciousness, they would not have left some memory lasting at least a few seconds ? We do not deny for a moment that, in certain circumstances, normal or morbid (for ex- ample in hypnotised subjects), states of consciousness leave no apparent trace on awaking, but can later be revived ; we are willing to restrict to any desired limits the instances of complete interruption of conscious- ness ; but we have shown that there are some^ and it would suffice if there were only one, to raise insur- mountable difficulties against the hypothesis of the soul as a thinking substance. By the contrary hypoth- esis, everj^thing is easily explained. If consciousness is an event dependent upon definite conditions, there is no cause for wonderment if it is sometimes lacking. It would also be possible, if this were the occasion to treat exhaustively this problem, to prove, that by our hypothesis nothing uncertain or contradictory is presented by the relations of the conscious to the un- conscious. The term '^ unconscious " may always be paraphrased thus : a physiological state, which, at times and in fact most frequently accompanied by consciousness, or at its origin having been so, in the present case is not so accompanied. This character- istic, although negative as psychology, is positive as physiology. It affirms that in every psychic event the 12 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. fundamental and active element is the nervous pro- cess, that the other is only a concomitant. Accord- ingly, there is no further difficulty in comprehending that all manifestations of psychic life can by turns be either unconscious or conscious. For the first case, it is necessary and sufficient that there be produced a definite nervous process, that is that there be put into play a definite number of nervous elements, forming a definite association, to the exclusion of all other ner- vous elements and of all other possible associations. For the latter, it is necessary and sufficient that sup- plementary conditions, be they what they may, be added, without alteration of the nature of the phenom- enon, except making it conscious. We further com- prehend how unconscious cerebration can perform such heavy tasks noiselessly, and, after long incuba- tion, reveal itself in such unexpected results. Each state of consciousness represents only a very feeble portion of our psychic life, because at ever}' instant it is sup- ported and, as it were, instigated by unconscious slates. Each volition, for example, dives to the very depths of our being ; the motives that accompany and ap- parently explain it, are never more than a feeble part of its true cause. The same is true of a great number of our sympathies, and the fact is so manifest that even minds completely unused to observation often wonder at being unable to explain their aversions or sympathies. It would be wearisome and beside our purpose to continue this demonstration. If the reader wishes, he may turn to the chapter *' Phenomenology" in Hart- mann's "Philosophy of the Unconscious."* Here he will find classified all the manifestations of the uncon- * English Translation, by W. G. Coupland, London, Trubner & Co. INTRODUCTION. 13 sclous life of the mind, and he will see that there is not a single fact there cited which is not explained by the hypothesis here defended. One point still remains to be examined. The the- ory that regards consciousness as a phenomenon, and which is the outcome (as might easily be shown, if the digression were opportune) of the fundamental prin- ciple of physiology that '^ reflex action is the type of nervous action and the basis of all ps3^chic activity," has seemed to many benevolent persons paradoxical and disrespectful. To them it seems to rob psychol- ogy of all its solidity and dignity. They are loth to admit that the highest manifestations of nature arc unstable, fugitive, superadded, and subordinate as to their conditions of existence. But this is simply a prejudice. Consciousness, whatever its origin and nature, loses not an iota of its real value : it should be appraised in itself; and for him who places himself at the point of view of evolution, not the origin, but the elevation attained, is of consequence. Experience, moreover, shows that the higher we ascend the scale, the more complex and unstable are the natural com- pounds. If stability afforded the true measure of dig- nity, then the minerals would occupy the first rank. This purely sentimental objection, therefore, is not admissible. As to the difficulty of explaining by this hypothesis the unity and continuity of the conscious subject, at present it would be premature even to moot this subject. In due time this problem, too, will find its solution. There is, however, one weak point in this hypothesis of consciousness as a mere phenomenon. Its most con- vinced partisans have defended it in a form that has procured them the name of theorists of pure automa- 14 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. tism. According to their favorite comparisons, con- sciousness is like the flash of light thrown from a steam-engine, which illuminates it, but has no influence on its movements ; its efflcacy is that of the shadow that accompanies the steps of the traveller. Viewed simply as forceful illustrations of the doctrine, no ob- jection is to be taken to these metaphors ; but viewed strictly, they are exaggerated and inexact. Conscious- ness, in itself and by itself, is a new factor, and in this there is nothing mystical or supernatural, as we shall see. In the first place, by the hypothesis itself (the state of consciousness supposing physiological conditions more numerous, or at least other, than the same state when unconscious) it follows that two individuals, the first being in the first state, the second in the other, all other things being equal, are strictly not comparable. Still stronger reasons might be adduced — not logi- cal deductions, but facts. When a physiological state has become a state of consciousness, it has acquired thereby a special character. Instead of taking place in space, that is to say, instead of admitting of concep- tion as the putting into play of a certain number of nervous elements, occupying a definite spatial extent, it has assumed a position in tijue ; it has been produced after this, and before that, while for the unconscious state there is no before nor after. It has been rendered susceptible of being recalled, that is to say, recognised as having occupied a precise position among other states of consciousness. It has become, accordingly, a new factor in the psychic life of the individual — a re- sult that may serve as a starting-point for some new (conscious or unconscious) work ; and far from being the product of a supranatural operation, it is reducible INTRODUCTION, 15 to that organic registration which is the basis of all memory. For greater precision, let us take a few examples. Volition is always a state of consciousness — the affir- mation that a thing must either be done or prevented ; it is the final and clear result of a great number of conscious, subconscious, and unconscious states ; but once affirmed, it becomes in the life of the individual a new factor, and, in its new position, it marks a result, the possibility of being begun again, modified, pre- vented. Nothing similar exists with respect to auto- matic acts not accompanied by consciousness. Nov- elists and poets, usually good observers of human na- ture, have frequently described the well-known condi- tion in which a passion — love or hate — long brooded upon, unconscious, ignorant of itself, at last sees light, recognises, affirms itself, becomes conscious. Then its character changes ; it redoubles its intensity, or is stopped by antagonistic motives. Here, too, con- sciousness is a new factor, which has modified the psychological situation. One may, by instinct, that is, by unconscious cerebration, solve a problem, but it is probable that on some other day, at some other mo- ment, the same person will succumb to a similar prob- lem. If, on the other hand, the solution has been reached by conscious reasoning, a failure is not likely to occur the second time ; because every step forward marks a position v/on, and from that moment on we no longer grope in the dark. This, however, does not diminish in the least the part played by unconscious work in all human discoveries. These examples taken at hazard will suffice to show, that the metaphors referred to are true of each state of consciousness in itself. In itself, it is indeed 1 6 THE DISEASES OE PERSONALITY. merely a light without efficacy, the simple revelation of an unconscious work ; but in relation to the future development of the individual it is a factor of supreme importance. What is true of the individual is true also of the species, and of the succession of the species. In the sole point of view of the survival of the fittest, and ir- respective of psychological considerations, the appear- ance of consciousness upon earth v/as a fact of the first magnitude. Through it experience, that is to say, adaptation of a higher order, became possible for the animal. It is not for us to investigate its origin. On this point, very ingenious hypotheses have been ad- vanced, which enter the domain of metaphysics, and which experimental psycholog}^ is not obliged to dis- cuss, since it takes consciousness as a datum. It is probable that consciousness was produced like every other vital manifestation, first, in a rudimentary form, and, to all appearances, without much efficacy. But from the moment it was able to leave behind it a ves- tige, to build up in the animal a memory, in a psychic sense, which capitalised its past for the profit of its future, from that moment a new chance of survival was created. To unconscious adaptation, blind, acci- dental, dependent upon circumstances, was added a conscious adaptation, uninterrupted, dependent upon the animal, surer and quicker than the other ; and that abridged the work of selection. The role of consciousness in the development of psychic life is thus evident. If I have dwelt at length upon this point, it is because the advocates of the hy- pothesis here supported have considered it only as it actually is, without occupying themselves with the results of its appearance. They have said that it il- V INTRODUCTION, 17 luminates ; but they have not shown that it adds. To repeat once more our position : consciousness, in it- self, is simply a phenomenon, simply an accompani- ment. If animals existed, in which at every instant it appeared and disappeared, without leaving behind it the slightest traces, it would be rigorously correct to call such animals spiritual automatons ; but if the state of consciousness leaves behind it traces, records itself in the organism, then it not only acts as an indi- cator, but also as a condenser. The metaphor of the automaton is no longer acceptable. This being ad- mitted, many of the objections to the theory of con- sciousness as a phenomenon fall of themselves. The theory is completed, without being invalidated. CHAPTER I. ORGANIC DISORDERS. I SHALL dwell at length upon the organic conditions of personalit}' ; for everything is based upon them, and they explain all. Metaphysical psychology, with log- ical consistency, has paid no attention to these condi- tions ; for this science derives its ego from above, not from below. With us, however, the elements of per- sonahty must be sought for in the most elementary phe- nomena of life j it is they that give it its distinctive mark and character. It is the organic sense, the sense of the body, usually vague and obscure, but at times very clear in all of us, that constitutes for each animal the basis of its psychic individuality. * It is that ' * prin- ciple of individuation " so much sought after by scho- lastic doctors ; for directly or indirectly all rests upon it. We may regard it as highly probable, that the farther we descend in the animal scale the more the sense of the body preponderates, down to the point where it becomes the entire psychic individuality. But * Incidentally, I may observe that a great metaphysician, Spinoza, plainly supports the same thesis, although in different terms: "The object of the idea that constitutes the human soul is the body .... and nothing else." " The idea that constitutes the formal existence of the human soul is not sim- ple, but composed of several ideas." {Ethics, part ii. propositions 13 and 15. See also the scholium of prop. 17.) ORGANIC DISORDERS. 19 in man and the higher animals the turbulent world of desires, passions, perceptions, images, and ideas covers up this silent background. Except at intervals, it is forgotten, because it is unknown. It is here as in so- ciety. The millions of human beings that make up a great nation are reduced, both for itself and others, to a few thousand men, who constitute its clear conscious- ness, and epitomise its social activity in all its aspects, its politics, its industry, its commerce, and its intel- lectual culture. Yet it is these millions of unknown beings — limited in mode and place of existence, quietly living and quietly passing away — that make up all the rest ; without them there is nothing. They constitute that inexhaustible reservoir, from which, by rapid or abrupt selection, a few come to the surface. But these favorites of talent, power, or wealth themselves enjoy only an ephemeral existence. Degeneracy — always fatally inherent in that which rises — will again lower them or their race, while the silent work of the ignored millions will continue to produce others, and to im- press upon them a distinctive character. Metaphysical psychology only scans the heights ; and internal observation does not continue long its re- cital of what takes place within the body ; thus, from the outset, the study of the general sensibility has been mainly the work of physiologists. Henle (1840) defines the general sensibility or ' * ccenaesthesis " as ''the tone of the sensory nerves, or the perception of the state of mean activity in which those nerves are constantly found, even in moments Vv^hen they are not excited by external impressions. " And elsewhere : "General sensibility is the sum total, the not yet unravelled chaos of the sensations inces- santly transmitted from every point of the body to the 20 THE DISEASES OE PERSONALITY. sensorium.'"'' Still more precise is E. H. Weber's definition of the term : an internal sensibility, an in- terior touch that furnishes to the sensorium informa- tion concerning the mechanical and chemico-organic state of the skin, the mucous and serous membranes, the viscera, the muscles, and the articulations. In France, Louis Peisse, a philosopher-physician, was the first to combat the doctrine of Jouffroy, who held that we know our body only objectively, as an extended, solid mass, similar to other bodies of the universe, placed outside the ego, and foreign to the perceiving subject, exactly as we know our table or our mantelpiece. Peisse showed, although in some- what cautious terms, that our knowledge of our body is pre-eminently subjective. His description of this organic consciousness is, in my judgment, too exact, not to be quoted entire. ''Is it certain," he says, '' that we have absolutely no consciousness of the activity of the organic func- tions? If the question be of a clear, distinct, and lo- cally determinable consciousness, like that of external impressions, it is plain that we lack it ; but we may possess a dull, obscure, and, as it were, latent con- sciousness of it, the analogue, for example, of that of the sensations which provoke and accompany the re- spiratory movements — sensations, which, though in- cessantly repeated, are scarcely noticed. In fact, might we not regard as a distant, faint, and confused echo of the universal vital activity that remarkable feeling which ceaselessly and without intermission tells us of the presence and actual existence of our own body? Almost always, and wrongly, this feeling is confounded * Pathologische Untersuchungen, 1848, p. 114. Allgetneine Anatofnie, 1841, p. 72& ORGANIC DISORDERS, 21 with the accidental and local impressions that in wak- ing hours arouse, stimulate, and maintain the play of the sensibilit}^ These sensations, though incessant, make only fugitive and transient appearances on the stage of consciousness, while the feeling we speak of lasts and persists amid all this mobile display. Con- dillac appropriately termed it the fundamental feeling of existence ; Maine de Biran called it the feeling of sensuous existence. By this feeling the body inces- santly appears to the ego as its own, and by it the spir- itual subject feels itself and perceives itself to exist locally, within the bounded extent of the organism. A constant, unfailing monitor, it renders the state of the body incessantly present to consciousness, and thus shows forth, to its depths, the indissoluble bond of the psychic and the physiological life. In the ordinary state of equilibrium which constitutes perfect health, this feeling, we may say, is continuous, uniform, and equable, which prevents its reaching the ego and at- taining the state of distinct, special, and local sensa- tion. To be distinctly noticed, it must acquire a cer- tain intensity; it is then expressed by a vague sense of general well-being or illness ; the former signifying a simple exaltation of the vital physiological activity, the latter its pathologic perversion. But in such cases it does not fail to localise itself in the form of specific sensations, connected with this or that region of the body. It sometimes reveals itself in a more indirect, but far more evident, manner, when it happens to be wanting in some part of the organism ; for example, in a limb struck by paralysis. Such a limb still naturally belongs to the living aggregate, but it is no longer com- prised within the sphere of the organic ego — if we may use that expression. It ceases to be perceived by the 22 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY, ego as its own, and the fact of this separation, though negative, is expressed by a particular, positive sensa- tion, known to all who have experienced a complete numbness of any member by cold or a compression of the nerves. The sensation referred to is nothing more than the expression of the break or loss which the universal feeling of the bodily life suffers ; it proves that the vital state of the limb in question really ex- isted, though obscurely felt, and that it constituted one of the partial elements of the general feeling of life of the organic whole. Similarly, any continuous, mo- notonous noise — as that of a coach in which we ride — ceases to be perceived, although always heard ; for if it suddenly stops, its cessation is instantly remarked. This analogy may help us to understand the nature and mode of existence of the fundamental feeling of organic life, which by this hypothesis would be simply a resul- tant in co7ifuso of the impressions produced on all the living points by the internal movement of the functions, carried to the brain, directly by the cerebro-spinal nerves, or indirectly by the nerves of the ganglionic system." * Since the epoch in which this passage was written (1844) psychologists and physiologists have been stead- ily at work studying the elements of this general sense of the body. They have determined what share each vital function contributes ; they have shown how com- plex this confused feeling of life is, which by incessant repetition has become ourselves ; that searching after it would be equivalent to seeking ourselves. Conse- quently, we know it only by the variations that lift it above, or force it below the normal tone. The reader * Note to his edition of the Rapports du physique et du moral of Cabanis, pp. 108, 109. ORGANIC DISORDERS. 23 will find in special works* the detailed study of these vital functions and their psychical dowers. It is be- side our purpose here to enter into a special investiga- tion of these topics, so a brief resume will suffice. In the first place, we have the organic sensations connected with respiration : the feeling of comfort pro- duced by pure air, of suffocation from close air ; the sensations arising from the alimentary canal ; others, still more general, connected with the state of nutri- tion. Hunger, for example, and thirst, despite ap- pearances, have no precise localisation ; they result simply from a discomfort of the whole organism. They are the loud pleadings of a too impoverished blood. As to thirst especially, the experiments of CI. Bernard have shown that it arises from lack of water in the or- ganism, and not from dryness of the pharynx. Of all the functions, general and local circulation exerts, per- haps, the greatest psychological influence, and its variations import the most from individual to individ- ual, and in different moments within the same indi- vidual. Let us recall further the organic sensations that arise from the state of the muscles : the feeling of fatigue, exhaustion, or its reverse ; finally the group of muscular sensations which, associated with the exter- nal sensations of sight and touch, play such a promi- nent part in the creation of our knowledge. Even re- duced to itself alone, in its purely subjective form, muscular sensibility will reveal the degree of contrac- tion or relaxation of the muscles, the position of our limbs, etc. I omit purposely the organic sensations of the genital organs ; we shall revert to this subject when studying the affective bases of personality. *See especially Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, part i, chap, ii, and Maudsley, Pathology of Mind, pp. 31 et seq. 24 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. If the reader will picture to himself a moment the multitude and diversity of the vital actions just classi- fied, by running over them in a general way, he will be able to form some idea of what is to be understood by the expression, ''physical bases of personality." Con- stantly active, they make up by their continuity for their weakness as psychic elements. Hence, as soon as the higher forms of mental life disappear, they as- sume the first rank. A clear example of this is found in dreams (pleasant or painful) aroused by organic sensations ; as night-mares, erotic dreams, etc. It is even possible to assign with some precision to each organ the place that belongs to it in these dreams : the sensation of weight seems mainly connected with the digestive and respiratory organs ; the feeling of struggle and combat with the affections of the heart. In rarer instances pathological sensations, unperceived during waking hours, re-echo in sleep like premoni- tory symptoms. Armand de Villeneuve dreams that he is bitten in the leg by a dog ; a few days later that same leg is attacked by a cancerous ulcer. Gessner, in his sleep, fancies he is bitten in the left side by a serpent ; a little later at the same spot an anthrax de- veloped of which he died. INIacario dreams he has a very sore throat ; he rises in normal health ; a few hours later is attacked by a severe amygdalitis. A man sees in a dream an epileptic ; a short time after- wards he becomes one himself. A woman dreams that she speaks to a man who cannot reply to her, because he is dumb ; on waking she herself has lost the power of speech. In all these cases we seize as facts those obscure incitations which, from the depths of the or- ganism, reach the nervous centres, and which our con- ORGANIC DISORDERS. 25 scious life, with all its turmoil and perpetual mobility, conceals instead of revealing. It is clear that the exclusive faith so long accorded by psychology to the sole data of consciousness, must have completely overshadowed the organic elements of personality; by profession, however, the physicians al- ways clung to them. The doctrine of the temperaments, old as medical science itself, ever criticised and ever remodelled,* is the vague and uncertain expression of the principal types of the physical personality, as furnished by observation, with the principal psych- ical traits that spring from them. Thus, the few psy- chologists who have studied the different types of char- acter, have sought their point of support in this doc- trine. Kant did so more than a century ago. If the determination of the temperaments could be rendered scientific, the question of personality would be greatly simplified. Until this takes place, the most important task will be, to rid ourselves of the purely preconceived notion that personality is a mysterious attribute, dropped from the skies, without antecedents in nature. If we simply cast our glance at the animals about us, we shall readily admit, that the difference between horses and mules, between geese and ducks, their ''principle of individuation," can only be derived from a difference of organisation and of adaptation to envi- ronment, with the psychical consequences that thence result ; and that in the same species the differences of * Henle has recently attempted {Anthropologische Vortrage, 1877, p. 103- 130J, to connect the temperaments with different degrees of activity, or tone, of the sensory and motor nerves. When this degree is at its lowest, we obtain the phlegmatic temperament. At a high degree, with a rapid exhaustion of nerves, we have the sanguine temperament. The choleric also supposes a high tonus, but with persistence in the nervous action. The melancholic tempera- ment cannot be defined by the simple quantity of the nervous action; it supposes a high tonus, with the tendency to emotions rather than to voluntary activity. 26 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. one individual from another cannot originally be owing to any other cause. In the natural order of things there is no reason for making an exception of man ; the diffi- culty is that here the excessive development of the in- tellectual and emotional faculties creates illusion, and masks the origins. We may now ask whether ''physical personality" exists in nature ; understanding by that term the mere feeling of the state of the organism ; a mode of being where, by hypothesis, all consciousness, clear or ob- scure, actual or reproduced, of external facts is ab- sent? Evidently not among the higher animals; phys- ical personality, in the sense postulated, can be re- garded only as a very artificial abstraction. It is prob- able that that form of psychic individuality which con- sists simply of the consciousness which the animal has of its own body, exists in very low species, but not in the lowest. In the latter, — for example, in multicellular indi- viduals composed of cells absolutely alike, — the con- stitution of the organism is so homogeneous that each element lives for itself, and each cell has its own spe- cial action and reaction. But, taken together, they no more represent an individual than six horses, drawing a carriage in the same direction, constitute a single horse. There is neither co-ordination nor consensus, but simply juxtaposition in space. If, as some authors do, we assign to each cell the analogue of conscious- ness (which would be only the ps3xhic expression of their irritability), we shall obtain consciousness in a state of complete diffusion. An impenetrability of one element towards the other would exist, that would leave the entire mass in the state of living matter, without even external unity. ORGANIC DISORDERS. 27 But higher up, for example in Hydra, observation shows a certain consensus in the actions and reactions, and a certain division of work. Yet the individuality is very precarious. With his scissors Trembly cut fifty individuals from one. Conversely, out of two hydras we can form one ; simply by turning the smaller in- side out, before introducing it into the larger, so that the two endoderms touch and blend. So far as one can venture an opinion on this obscure matter, the adaptation of the movements seems to denote a tem- porary, unstable unit}^, at the mercy of circumstances, yet probably not wholly destitute of some obscure con- sciousness on the part of the organism. If we find we are still too low, we may ascend the scale (for every determination of this kind is arbitrary), to fix the point at which the animal has only the con- sciousness of its organism, of what it suffers and cre- ates — only an organic consciousness. Perhaps, this form of consciousness, in the pure state, does not ex- ist ; for, as soon as the rudiments of the special senses appear, the animal rises above the level of general sensibility. Besides, it must be asked. Is general sensi- bility sufficient of itself to constitute a consciousness? It is known that the human foetus makes efforts to ex- tricate itself from inconvenient positions, to avoid im- pressions of cold or painful irritations. Are these un- conscious reflexes? But I hasten away from such conjectures. One thing, at least, is incontestable ; it is, that the organic consciousness (the consciousness which the animal has of its body and only of its body) possesses, in the greater part of animal existence, an enormous prepon- derance ; that it stands in an inverse ratio to the higher, psychic development; that, everywhere and 28 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. alwa3^s, this consciousness of the organism is the basis upon which individuality rests. By it all is ; with- out it nothing is. Indeed, the contrary is inconceiv- able ; for do not the external impressions — the first matter of all mental life — enter by the organism, and — what is still more important — are not the instincts, feelings, aptitudes proper to each species, to each in- dividual, stamped and fixed by heredity in the organ- ism — we know not how, but facts prove it — with im- pregnable solidity? II. If, then, we admit that the organic sensations com- ing from all the tissues, organs, and movements — in a word, from all the states of the body — are in some degree and form represented in the seiisoriujn ; and if the physical personality is simply their sum total, it follows that the physical personality must vary as they vary, and that these variations admit of all possible gradations, from simple ill-health to a total metamor- phosis of the individual. The examples of ''double personality" that have recently been made so much of (we shall speak of them later on) are only extreme cases. With patience and careful research one could find in mental pathology sufficient observations to es- tablish a progression, or rather a continuous regres- sion, from the most transient change to the most com- plete alteration of the ego. That the ego exists only on the condition of continually changing, is an incon- testable fact. As to its identity, that is simply a ques- tion of quantity. Its identity persists so long as the sum of the states that remain relatively fixed is greater than the sum of the states that are added to or de- tached from this' stable group. ORGANIC DISORDERS. 29 For the present, we have only to study the dis- orders of personality immediately connected with or- ganic sensations. As by itself the general sensibility has only a very feeble psychic value, it produces only partial disorders, except where the alteration is total or sudden. To begin, we shall notice a state, hardly morbid, yet probably well-known to all, which consists in a feeling of exuberance or depression, without apparent cause. The usual tone of life changes, rises, or falls. In the normal state we have a positive *' euphoria"; neither comfort or discomfort spring from the body. But sometimes the vital functions become exalted ; activity superabounds and seeks to expend itself; everything appears easy and favorable for us. This state of well-being, at first entirely physical, is propa- gated throughout the whole nervous organisation, and awakens a multitude of pleasant feelings, to the exclu- sion of others. Everything looks bright. At other times the contrary occurs : disease, despondency, list- lessness, impotence, and — as consequences of melan- choly — fear, painful or depressing feelings. At such times everything looks black. In either case, moreover, there is no intelligence, no event, nothing external to us, to justify this sudden joy or sadness. Surely it cannot be said that the personality is transformed, in an absolute sense. Relatively it has been so. For himself, and more so for others who know him, the individual is changed, is not the same. This, translated into the language of analytic psychol- ogy, means, that his personality is made up of ele- ments some of which are relatively fixed, others vari- able ; that the variable parts having far exceeded their 30 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. average power, the stable portion has been impaired, but has not disappeared. Now, if we suppose (a supposition daily realised) that instead of disappearing to return after a short in- terval to the normal state, this change persists, in other words, if the physical causes that induce the change are permanent, and not transitory, then a new physical and mental habitude will be formed, and the centre of gravity of the individual will tend to be displaced. This first change may give rise to others, so that the transformation constantly increases. For the pres- ent I shall not discuss this subject. I simply wished to show that from a com.mon state by imperceptible degrees we can descend to complete metamorphosis ; it is simply a question of degree. In studying the disorders of personality, it is im- possible to determine rigorously those that have their inunediate cause in the perturbations of the general sensibility, as the latter by secondary actions excite psychic states of a higher order (hallucinations, emo- tions, and morbid ideas). I shall limit myself to cases where they appear to preponderate. We shall find in the ^'Annales medico-psycholo- giques"* five observations which the author has grouped under this title : ''An Aberration of the Phys- ical Personality." Without cavilling at the title, which says perhaps more than it ought, we see here, without external cause, an unknown organic state, an altera- tion of the ccenaesthesis, produce a feeling of corporeal annihilation. ''In the fulness of health, and while possessed of exuberant vitality and strength, the pa- tient experiences an ever-increasing sensation of weak- ness, such, that he is in momentary fear of fainting * September, 1878. se serie, vol. xs, pp. 191-223. ORGANIC DISORDERS. 31 and of death." However, the sensibility remains in- tact ; the patient eats with appetite, and if his will is opposed he reacts with great energy; but he keeps re- peating that he feels his life is slowly ebbing away; that only a few hours are left for him to live. Natu- rally, on this purely physical trunk are also grafted delirious conceptions : one subject believes he is poi- soned, another maintains that a demon has entered his system and is ^* sucking his life away," etc. But let us keep to the immediate consequences of the physical state. We find here that state of despon- dency, already described and known to everybody, in a much graver and more stable form. The mental disorder grows apace and systematises itself. The individual tends no longer to be the same. It is a new step in the dissolution of the ego, although as yet far from being attained. This commencement of transformation, due to wholly physical causes, is also met with in persons who maintain that they are wrapped in a veil or a cloud, cut off from the external world, insensible. Others (and such phenomena are naturally explained by troub- les of the muscular sensibility) rejoice at the lightness of their bodies ; feel as if suspended in mid-air ; be- lieve they are able to fly ; or have a feeling of heavi- ness, in the whole body, in certain limbs, or in a single limb, which seems stout and heavy. ''At times a young epileptic felt his body so extraordinarily heavy, that he could scarcely support it. At other times he felt so light that he fancied he did not touch the ground. Sometimes it seemed to him that his body had be- come so great that it would be impossible to pass through a door."* In this last illusion, which refers ♦Griesinger, Traiti des maladies nientales, French trans. (Doumic), p. 92. 32 THE DISEASES OE PERSONALITY. to the dimensions of the body, the patient feels him- self much smaller or much larger than he really is. The local perversions of the general sensibility — although by nature limited — are of no less psycholog- ical importance. Some subjects assert that they no longer have teeth, mouth, stomach, intestines, brain : which can only be explained by a suppression or altera- tion of the internal sensations that exist in the normal state and contribute to constitute the notion of the physical ego. To the same cause, at times aggravated by cutaneous anaesthesia, we must refer the cases where the patient believes that one of his limbs or even his whole body, is of wood, glass, stone, butter, etc. A while afterwards, he will say, that he has no body at all, that he is dead. Instances of the kind are fre- quently encountered. Esquirol speaks of a woman who believed that the Devil had carried off her body ; the surface of her skin was completely insensible. The physician Baudelocque, during the last period of his life, lost all consciousness of the existence of his body: he maintained he no longer possessed head, arms, etc. Finally, there is Foville's widely known case. **A soldier believed himself dead since the battle of Aus- terlitz, at which he had been seriously wounded.* When asked about his condition, he would reply: * You want to know how old Lambert is ? He is dead ; he was carried off by a cannon-ball. What you see here is not he, but a poor machine that they have made, in imitation of him ; 3^ou ought to ask them to make another.' In speaking of himself, he never said *I,'but *that thing.' His skin was insensible, and often he would fall into a state of complete insensibil- ity and immobility, lasting several days." ♦Michea, Annales medico-psychologiques, 1856, p. 249 et seqq. ORGANIC DISORDERS. 33 We enter here the realm of grave disorders ; meet- ing for the first time a double personality, or more strictly speaking, a discontinuity, a lack of fusion be- tween two periods of psychic life. The case might be thus interpreted. Before his accident, this soldier, like every one else, had his organic consciousness, the sense, the feeling of his own body, of his physical per- sonality. After the accident a profound change was produced in his nervous organisation. Concerning the nature of this change we can unfortunately only form hypotheses, the effects alone being known. Whatever it may have been, it resulted in the formation of an- other organic consciousness — that of a /'poor ma- chine." Between this and the old consciousness, the memory of which still tenaciously remains, no amalga- mation is effected. The feeling of identity is lacking ; because in the organic states as well as in the others, this feeling can only result from a slow, progressive, and continuous assimilation of the new states. Here, the new states did not enter the old ego as an integral part. Hence, that odd situation in which the old per- sonality appears to itself as having been, and as being no more, and in which the present state appears as an external, foreign thing, and as non-existent. Be it re- marked, finally, that in a state where the surface of the body no longer yields sensations, and where those that do arrive from the organs are equivalent almost to none at all ; where both superficial and profound sensibility is extinguished — in such a state the organ- ism no longer excites the feelings, images, and ideas that connect it with the higher psychical life : it is re- duced to the automatic acts that constitute the habitude or routine of life; properly speaking, it is '*a ma- chine." 34 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. In a very strict sense we might maintain, that the only personality in this example is the personality which recollects ; but we must acknowledge that it is of a very extraordinary nature, existing only in the past ; and that, instead of calling it a person, it would be more exact to call it a memory. What distinguishes this case from those which we shall speak of elsewhere, is, that here the aberration is altogether physical, springs solely from the body and refers solely to the body. This old soldier did not imagine himself another (Napoleon, for example, al- though he was at Austerlitz). The case thus is as free as possible from intellectual elements. The illusion of patients or convalescents who be- lieve themselves double, must also be referred to per- turbations of the general sensibility. At times the il- lusion is pure and simple, without doubling : the mor- bid state is projected outwards ; the individual alienates a part of his physical personality. Such are the pa- tients of whom Bouillaud speaks, who having lost the sensibility of half of their body, imagine they have be- side them in bed another person, or even a corpse. But when the group of morbid organic sensations, in- stead of thus being alienated, cleaves to the normal, organic ego, and coexists with it for a time, without fusion, then and during that time the patient believes that he has two bodies. *'A man convalescing from a fever believed he consisted of two individuals, of which one was in bed, while the other walked about. Al- though without appetite, he ate a great deal, having, as he said, two bodies to feed."* '* Pariset, in his early youth having been attacked by an epidemic typhus, remained several days in an ♦Leuret, Fragments psychologiques sur la folic, p. 95. ORGANIC DISORDERS. 35 extremely low state, verging on death. One morning a more distinct feeling of himself was suddenly awak- ened. He began to think ; the impression was that of a genuine resurrection ; but, strange to say, at the same instant he had, or believed he had, two bodies ; and these bodies seemed to him to lie in two different beds. In so far as his soul was present in one of these bodies, he felt healed, and enjoyed a delightful repose. In the other body his soul suffered, and he argued with himself : Why am I so well in this bed, and so ill and oppressed in the other? This thought occupied him for a long while. Pariset himself — a man exceedingly subtle in psychological analysis — has often related to me the detailed history of the impressions which he experienced at that time."* In the above we possess two examples of double physical personality. Although we are still not far ad- vanced in our study, the reader may see that, closely examined, the two cases referred to are really unlike. The current term